Bringing back ‘Japan’: Prime minister Abe’s political rhetoric in critical perspective.

By:

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Abstract

The thesis provides a detailed analysis of prime minister of Japan, Shinzō Abe’s, political rhetoric. Adopting a critical realist approach to the analysis of political discourse, the thesis aims to identify how Abe sought to legitimate the substantial changes to the state, its international conduct, and relationship with its citizens, including the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution, Japan’s so-called ‘Peace Clause’.

Abe returned to office in December 2012 promising to ‘bring back’ Japan, but under this aegis, the Abe administration has enacted wholesale changes to Japan's social security, national economy and security agenda. While many of these changes are examined throughout, the thesis adopts depoliticization theory as an analytical tool and explanatory factor to discuss the changes in Japanese politics by parsing depoliticization into governmental, societal, and discursive forms. The analysis demonstrates how Abe relied on discursive depoliticization to legitimate changes by implementing a mixed-methods approach to discourse analysis using text-mining software to identify salient areas of speech, frame analysis to further characterize them, and critical discourse analysis for the micro-analysis of text. The thesis argues that Abe effectively depoliticized politically divisive issues by relying on the neoliberal account of globalization to justify substantial changes to Japan’s security agenda, economy and social infrastructure.

In order to reveal the process of depoliticization, the discursive analysis is supplemented with an analysis of two major foreign policy initiatives of the Abe administration, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and ‘Positive Pacifism’. These case studies enable us to conclude that, although Abe’s rhetoric is largely consistent with neoliberal doctrines, his administration's actions reflect a neonationalist ideology and political realism aimed at expanding military and economic power to encircle China and increase Japan's regional and international influence, while relying on depoliticizing tactics to legitimate the process of change underway.
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with so much in these last three years, she makes a Ph.D. look easy.
Abbreviations

3.11 The Great Tōhoku Earthquake and Fukushima Nuclear Disaster (which occurred on 3 March 2011)

Advisory Panel Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security
AllB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
B7 Business Seven, comprising business associates from each G7 member state
BFA Boao Forum for Asia
BOJ Bank of Japan
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CDS Critical Discourse Studies
CI Causal Interpretation
CL Critical Linguistics
CLM Complete Link Measure
COA Co-Occurrence Analysis
CR Critical Realism
CS Cosine Similarity
CSD Collective Self-Defence
DPJ The Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea ('North Korea')
ED Euclidean Distance
EEU Eurasian Economic Union
EEZs Exclusive Economic Zones
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
EU European Union
FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific
G20 Group of Twenty
G7 Group of Seven
GAD Group Average Distance
GOJ Government of Japan
GNP Gross National Product
HCA Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
HST Hegemonic Stability Theory
IMF International Monetary Fund
IAIs Independent Administration Initiatives
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
IRAPA Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association
IRE International Relations and Economics (frame)
IS International Security (frame)
ISIL Islamic State and the Levant
JCP Japan Communist Party
JDA Japan Defense Agency
JSF Jaccard Similarity Function
JSP Japan Socialist Party
KWIC Key Word in Context

1 It has since merged with the other parties to become the ‘Democratic Party’ (minshintō).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Moral Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>US-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance (Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>National Economy (frame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly Industrialized Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKP</td>
<td>New Kōmei Party²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>National Security (frame)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFI</td>
<td>Private Finance Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Problem Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Positive pacifism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Peace, prosperity, stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China ('China')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRF</td>
<td>Police Reserve Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCEP</td>
<td>Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China ('Taiwan')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Small-to-medium-sized enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENB</td>
<td>Transnational threats, or &quot;threats exceeding national borders&quot; (kokkyō-o koeta kyōi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TINA</td>
<td>There is no alternative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Trans-national Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>Treatment Recommendation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIP</td>
<td>Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNASUR</td>
<td>Union of the South American Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Peace Keeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Ward's Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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² Presently called 'Komeito' (komeitō).
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All texts are translated by the author unless stated otherwise. Japanese names are given personal name first and family name second, though in Japanese the family name would be given first. Additionally, in-text references to difference chapters or sections within the thesis use the symbol '§', where Chapter Two would be §2, section 2.3 in Chapter Two would be §2.3 and so forth.
1. Introduction

1.0 Introducing the topic and aims

On 13 August 2016, the prime minister of Japan, Shinzō Abe, upon visiting the grave of his father, the former Foreign Minister of Japan (1982-1986), Shintarō Abe, in Nagato City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, vowed to “exert all efforts” towards the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the National Diet that year (Asahi Shimbun 13 August 2016). On the following day, Abe visited the grave of his grandfather (Asahi Shimbun 13 August 2016), the former prime minister (1957-1960), Nobusuke Kishi, in Tabuse town, Yamaguchi, a man described by former prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987), as Japan’s greatest political leader (Samuels 2001). This view is not uncommon. Kishi was memorable for accomplishing the amendment of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 which, though subject to widespread opposition, it has greatly defined Japan’s commitment to the US and international affairs for over half a century.

A day later, the seventy-first anniversary of the end of World War Two (WWII), a seventy strong Diet members’ group visited Yasukuni Shrine, denoted as the “central custodian of national memory and mourning commemorating Japan’s war dead”, including fourteen Class A war criminals (Harootunian 1999: 144; Futamura 2008: 137; Mainichi Shimbun 15 August 2016). While Abe did not attend, owing possibly to the controversies surrounding his official and unofficial visits in the past, an aide to Abe presented an offering (tamagushiryō) to the Shintō gods at Yasukuni from the prime minister (Mainichi Shimbun 12 August 2016; 15 August 2016). Days before, 230 Chinese fishing vessels entered the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku Islands, Japanese-held territory

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3 The National Diet is Japan’s bicameral legislature, and is referred to as ‘the Diet’. The TPP was ratified in December 2016.

4 Yasukuni Shrine is a shrine of the Japanese religion Shinto (shintō). Shintoism was integrated by the Meiji government (1868-1912) with Confucianism to create the kokutai ideology which would become a ruling institution in prewar Japan. This attributed authority to the Emperor—and effectively the connected political elite—as Shintoism asserts that Japan is a divine nation created by an ascendant of the Emperor, a god who also created the imperial household to rule it (Sasaki 2012: 38-40). For Yasukuni Shrine, since its construction in 1869, it has been linked to national memory by honouring the spirits of those who had died in the struggle for national protection where it made “no distinction between service to the nation and to the emperor” (Harootunian 1999: 150; see also Breen 2008).
disputed between Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), while just weeks before, the political elites of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) ordered the firing of a ballistic missile which landed in Japanese territorial waters (Borah 11 August 2016). Further, around this time, Japan’s Ministry of Defense released a white paper explicating the administration’s intention to further integrate with regional partners—among others, Australia, India, the Philippines, and, of course, the United States (US)—in terms of military defense (Borah 11 August 2016; Ministry of Defense, Japan 2016). It was published amidst ongoing confrontations with Japan and its allies by actors that wish to “change the status-quo by force”, often referring to China and North Korea (Ministry of Defense, Japan 2016).

Abe had come a long way since inauguration in 2012, having served before from 2006 to 2007, where following a sea-change in Japanese politics (see §3), he would promote political stability to “bring back Japan” following the crises of the Great Recession and the Tōhoku Earthquake and Fukushima Nuclear Disaster on 11 March 2011 (henceforth ‘3.11’). The change to Japanese politics was itself sizeable, with many commentators criticizing the previous administrations of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which was seen to have jeopardized Japan-US relations nurtured under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), an alliance of profound influence in the state’s postwar history (McCormack 2007). Abe’s LDP returned, prioritizing the economy while its election platform frequently advocated, alongside the primacy of the economy, wholesale reforms (see below and §3).

Abe’s LDP won the 2012 general election and formed a coalition with the New Komei Party (NKP), now the ‘Komeito’, taking office from the DPJ which lasted just three years following the 2009 general election. Amidst the tumult of the previous administrations, the LDP campaigned on a return to the known, or more specifically a return to what the entire electorate had known for most, if not all, their lives – an LDP government. As the DPJ made painful concessions among a big tent party, the electorate, which had voted for an alternative to the LDP, had witnessed the party’s unceremonious decline, beleaguered by internal disputes amidst a string of impossible crises. With the largest ever nuclear meltdown in world history, more significant perhaps for Japan owing to the experiences of the two atomic bombings in August 1945, and an economy in recession having already brought up a ‘lost generation’, what better to return, then, than knowhow and experience? Who better to return than the grandson of the man who many consider the prime minister to have fully restored Japanese sovereignty, and whose grand-uncle, Eisaku Satō, had frequented the prime minister’s office in an era of rapid economic growth? Having won the 2012 general election, Abe’s LDP-Komeito coalition government won in the subsequent 2013 and 2016 Upper House elections and the 2014 general election. It appeared that political stability had at last returned, but while the administration
postulated over bringing back the traditionalistic intangibles, it enacted legislations that have greatly redefined the state’s relationship with its citizens and its role in international affairs. Such changes pose huge questions for researchers across many disciplines and have enormous consequences for the Japanese populace and the trajectories of the state’s relationship with the US and international society.

While page limitations mean not everything can be covered in this thesis, it attempts to offer an explanation over how Abe sought to explain, justify and legitimize many of the policies carried out during his administrations. For many researchers, not least to Japanese researchers, Japan has been a research subject of enormous intrigue whose changes whether pioneering or standardizations with other ‘developed nations’ in terms of political structure, are portentous of state responses to globalization and to the forces of neoliberal doctrines in the international political economy (IPE). Studies in and about Japan are not separable from a wider social scientific inquiry into how the world is changing, but at the same time offer interesting and often unique insights into the processes and mechanisms of these changes. While the Abe administration has significantly influenced the relationship of the state with its citizens and other states, such changes are part of a long series of developments in Japanese politics. Nonetheless, they are accomplishments, in the technical-sense at least, of perhaps unprecedented significance.

In 2010, the political science and international relations (IR) scholar, Walter F. Hatch, claimed that “today, in this new millennium, different elite groups inside Japan are engaged in a vigorous contest over Japanese identity” where “[t]he outcome is uncertain” (Hatch 2010: 381). Several administrations since then, this comment, if anything, is more accurate though the nature of the contest has changed drastically. Today, if there is one elite group of individuals which has had and will continue to have the most control in this contest, it is those closely connected to the prime minister and Abe himself. Here, this thesis will argue that the role of language is key and that its analysis allows researchers, informed by social theories, to adopt transdisciplinary methods with the aim of exciting further research into a diversity of disciplines that up to now have been generally overlooked or altogether not discussed. The aims of this thesis are thus:

1. To put forward a tentative research methodology to analyze politicians’ speeches combining methodologies employed in corpus linguistics, critical discourse studies (CDS) and communication studies. By doing this, it also aims to contribute to core knowledge shared across these research disciplines by promoting interchange with a hybrid methodology. The aim is not to prescribe it as the only method to analyze
politicians’ speeches, nor to suggest it cannot be changed, developed, supplemented and so on. Rather, it is to further the promotion and stimulation of dialogue across these disciplines (e.g. Iwagami 2005a/b; Kirvalidze and Samnidze 2016) as technologies develop and the areas of research grow affording researchers more opportunities to explore new means of analyzing texts. This is not limited to the developments of corpus methods alone. For example, discourse analyses may adopt models and theories from other research disciplines such as new cognitive and neural models of language processing to relate it to meaning-making and interpretation (Nabeshima 2005a/b; Lakoff 2009a/b; Hart 2010; van Dijk 2009; Morimoto 2013; Cap 2014).

2. To apply theories of post-democracy, most particularly depolarization (Wood and Flinders 2014), to the analysis as an explanatory factor into how prime minister Abe sought to legitimate his administration’s policies and actions. This theoretical approach derives from Fairclough’s (2009) analysis of the UK’s New Labour discourse and observations over the depolarization of politics in Europe and external Anglophone countries (Rancière et al. 2001; Hay 2007; Bates et al. 2014; Kuzemko 2014), with the view of tying these sociopolitical phenomena more concretely to localities thus far somewhat peripheral to this research paradigm to bolster the view that such changes are indicative of conditions in the IPE. In doing so, this social theory may provide another interface by which semiotic observations can be connected to IPE or IR theory (e.g. Onuf 1989; Widmaier et al. 2007; Whitham 2015) and hence the relationship between language and power in politics and over public opinion not only as a national framework but transnational also.

3. To employ an open definition of security with the adoption of securitization theory from social constructivism in IR theory (Buzan et al. 1998), applied to Japanese political discourse before (Williamson 2014a) and linked to depolarization (Wood and Flinders 2014: 164; Salter 2011; Kuzemko 2014). The aim is to demonstrate the importance of a holistic analysis of Abe’s speeches to understand how policies come to be legitimated and packaged to the electorate. Of course, the specificities of a policy are well worth rigorous analysis, but a holistic argument relating to a political worldview is potentially a far more important factor in legitimating one’s position or actions to the electorate (e.g. Lakoff 2009a; Underhill 2013). To aid its analysis, this thesis adopts analytical tools from social constructivism and eclectic traditions such
as the English School of International Relations, to political discourse. In doing so, it further emboldens the claim that language, like socially-embedded or internationally-embedded norms, which themselves must be communicated, often through the medium of language, plays a seminal role in the maintenance and contestation of ideology. Further, it raises the importance of how language relates to social constructivist and eclectic explanations of IR and the international system, creating space for further research such as transnational explorations of polities and political discourse.

With the aims above, it is by no means unreasonable to ask, firstly, why the focus of this thesis is Japan, and secondly, why Abe? This chapter, therefore, will provide an explanation and an introduction to prime minister Abe in §1.1, before detailing the structure of the rest of the thesis in §1.2.

1.1 Introducing Abe

The previous section sought to introduce the topic and aims of the thesis. This section seeks to introduce Abe in order to demarcate the political actions carried out by the Abe administration with that of the Japanese state as an atomic unit of analysis and domestic society. As argued in §3, because communicative efficacy is related to 'shared knowledge' surrounding both the context of an issue and the speaker, this section provides political background to Shinzō Abe. This is done by first explaining the considerable political profile of the prime minister and the career and influences of Abe himself in amongst changes to Japan’s political system. The former is carried out in §1.1.2, while the latter is provided in §1.1.3. Firstly, however, §1.1.1 seeks to explain briefly why Abe was selected as the subject of analysis in this thesis by discussing how this thesis aims to contribute to East Asian studies and Japanese studies and how it is that the Abe administration have catalyzed many significant changes in the system of governance in Japan, making it a focal topic of research.

1.1.1 The Abe administration in context

As stated, this thesis seeks to contribute to Japanese studies and East Asian studies. Its contribution to ‘area studies’ is its attempt to operate as a beneficial mediator between social and political theory in a given locality and testing its applications to another and hence whether or not such theories are
compatible with international, multinational or transnational domains of research. Also, it applies the other way around. Theories applied internationally may and to an extent have been applied to Japan but a transdisciplinary framework on a geographical locality may allow that theory to gain traction in other research disciplines of a given area such as Japan to excite interchange and contribute to core knowledge surrounding social theory.

This thesis adopts key arguments from post-democracy, which point to the obsolescence of adversarial politics in soi-disant liberal democratic states in favour of a post-democratic model of governance based on an inclusive consensus among a radical centre supportive of the free market, to discuss how depoliticization is manifest in Japan (Fairclough 2009: 172-174; Rancière et al. 2001; Mouffe 2002). This requires not viewing a given locality as an object as it were, but rather working in tandem with researchers and research conducted within Japanese institutions that is tied to traditional academic disciplines as well as multidisciplinary research on Japan itself to build bridges between disciplines and localities in a way that stimulates academic discussion. Indeed, studies on Japanese social transformation, economic change, politics, and IR offer considerable insights into the related disciplines themselves, while social and political theory from a separate locality can be applied to Japan that may cause the emergence of a research topic across disciplines that contributes to knowledge. Changes in Japanese politics, and its society and national economy more generally, have been significant, and, it may be (and is here) argued that many changes have been catalyzed by the Abe administration. This thesis assumes an “ontological bond between the structural and agential realm where one cannot exist independently” and where it is possible to identify actors who “instigate change as well as the structural factors that constrain or facilitate action” (Bates 2006: 157-158; see also Luke and Bates 2014). While the significance of the Abe administration is explained throughout this thesis, a number of examples of topical issues are discussed below in order to highlight the issues at stake.

In mid-2013, a 31-year-old woman residing in Osaka died from starvation and was found months later, having allegedly been denied financial support from the state despite having the right under Article 25 of the Japanese constitution to maintain the minimum standard of living under social welfare and security (Huffington Post 15 January 2014). This is not to say Abe is the sole and direct cause. Rather, cases of starvation, dying alone, and so on take place all over the ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ world. However, for a nation once described as homogenous in terms of a one-class ‘middle-mass’ society (Ishida and Slater 2009), the increase in poverty in Japan\(^5\) and the rise of non-

\(^5\) The rate of those living in ‘relative poverty’, defined as less than half the national median income, was at 16 per cent of the populace in 2014 having increased at an average rate of 1.3 per cent a year since the mid-1980s
permanent forms of work which have continued unabated through the Abe administration, signify huge socioeconomic changes to Japan's traditional developmental economic model (e.g. Hook and Takeda 2007). Additionally, the Abe administration has implemented a sweeping economic growth strategy based on quantitative easing and neoliberal reform which has dovetailed with record-breaking profits among Japan's large businesses and transnational corporations (TNCs) (Huffington Post 29 October 2014). That is, despite assertions of 'bringing back Japan', it has been suggested that the administration's growth strategy has largely benefited large corporations and not small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which employ the majority of the nation leading to, presuming the 'positive cycle' theory central to the growth strategy does not trickle down the benefits of profit, a far more unequal society even further departed from the so-called middle-mass society (Chūnichi Shimbun 12 June 2016).

Additionally, on 29 June 2014, a Japanese man protested through a megaphone for approximately one hour on a pedestrian bridge near JR Shinjuku Station, central Tokyo, against the administration’s efforts towards constitutional reinterpretation to permit the state to exercise the right to Collective Self-Defense (CSD). Immediately after, the man doused himself in gasoline from a plastic bottle and attempted suicide by self-immolation (Independent Web Journal 30 June 2014). While the Abe administration accomplished constitutional reinterpretation a few days later (Nikkei Shimbun 1 July 2014), its greater involvement with regional and international actors over international security affairs, carried out ostensibly to protect Japanese nationals (§6), have to some extent imperiled them. The murder of two citizens, Haruna Yukawa confirmed on 24 January 2015 and Kenji Gotō confirmed on 1 February 2015, both decapitated by the terrorist group Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) who subsequently posted snapshots of videos of both murders online (Huffington Post 25 January 2015; 1 February 2015), was, they claimed, in response to Abe’s pledge for an increase in non-military financial support for states fighting ISIL during Abe’s six-day tour of the Middle East (Abe 17 January 2015). Again, this is not to suggest Abe is the sole and direct cause. Cases like this have occurred before. For example, during the Koizumi administration (2001-2006), a militant group linked to al-Qaeda issued the demand that the Self-Defense Force (SDF), the unified military force of Japan, withdraw from Iraq within 48 hours or a 24-year old Japanese hostage would be murdered (Asahi Shimbun 27 October 2004). This followed the administration’s decision to support the US-led 'war on terror' with a newly enacted legislation authorizing the dispatch of SDF troops to Afghanistan and Iraq for non-combative and logistical operations. The hostage, Shōsei Kōda, |
was beheaded several days later and his body located in Baghdad wrapped in a US flag (*Asahi Shimbun* 31 October 2004).

During the negotiations over the fates of both Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Gotô, Abe spent half of the tour in Egypt and Jordan, and the final three days in Israel and Palestinian territories where the prime minister would meet Israel prime minister Netanyahu, president Rivlin, Palestine president Abbas, and a group of seven US senators\(^6\) led by senator John McCain (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2015a; 2015b; Keinon 18 January 2015; Ronel 23 January 2015). Whatever security, economic, humanitarian incentives may exist for establishing and broadening ties with these states/authorities, the Abe administration’s changes to Japan’s security agenda have sparked considerable controversy and represent the acceleration of the long decline of ‘One Country Pacifism’ (*ikkoku heiwa shugi*), particularly post-Cold War (see §3); a pacifist doctrine somewhat arbitrarily intertwined in Japan’s traditional minimalist security agenda with the Japan-US alliance (see §3 and §8).

These events have taken place amidst remarks by LDP politicians, among others, that elude to Hatch’s (2010) comment on the contestation over national identity, which appear to solicit public support for constitutional amendment. For instance, the Abe administration currently asserts that the constitution was forced upon the nation as a result of defeat in WWII and the subsequent US-led Occupation of Japan (1945-1952) (Ikeda 2016). However, this runs counter to a number of points. Firstly, the US never ordered Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) of Occupied Japan, to force a constitution onto Japan or not to allow Japan to maintain armed forces as in Article 9 of the Japanese constitution (Berkofsky 2014; Law 2013). Further, the US state has long since pressured Japan to remilitarize in contravention of the constitution and many among the public who supported and continue to support it. Finally, the preferences of the political elite did not always match those of much of the Japanese public in terms of democratic and social freedoms (Berkofsky 2014; Hook et al. 2012; Law 2013).

More specifically, Japan’s state identity has consistently been described as a ‘Peace State’ or on a ‘Peace State Journey’ (*heiwa kokka-to shite-no ayumi*) which conventionally depicts the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty as its starting point (but see Sakamoto 2005; §8). In the immediate aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War, SCAP promoted democratization and demilitarization within Occupied Japan, though, as stated, this was soon reversed with pressure on Japan to remilitarize with the onset of the Cold War (see §3). However, within Japan, a range of Japanese

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\(^6\) John Barrosso, Bob Corker, Joseph Donnelly, Lindsey Graham, Tim Kaine, Angus King, and John McCain (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21 January 2015a).
actors put forward “a flurry of alternative identities and strategies to influence the international relations of a new Japan” (Hook et al. 2012: 85), giving rise to the norm of antimilitarism which restrained the state’s ability to remilitarize following the post-war settlement and is given concrete form in Article 9 of the constitution which renounces war as a sovereign right (see §3 and §8). The so-called ‘Peace State Journey’ reflects notions of national identity and informs Japan’s security agenda. Here, antimilitarism formed a syncretism with the norms of bilateralism with the US, embedded in domestic society and given concrete form with the US-Japan Security Treaty, and, particularly post-Cold War, internationalism which promotes becoming a ‘normal’ state making “full use of its material capabilities” whether military or economic (Hook et al. 2012: 66). This is not to suggest that a ‘Peace State’ under antimilitarism is incompatible with internationalism. Some proponents of the formation of an antimilitarist ‘peace state’ advocated unarmed neutrality by relying on and contributing to the United Nations (UN) over security matters (Sakamoto 1959 in Hook et al. 2012: 131).

As discussed in §6, the ‘Peace State Journey’ metaphor may refer to unarmed neutrality or, rather, as used by Abe himself, to ‘protecting peace’ in the world by militarily as well as diplomatically engaging in international affairs. The ability to make changes to Japan’s security agenda seem concordant with the ‘journey’ of a ‘peace state’ contributes to making the changes appear natural and hence legitimate, underscoring the critical role of language in this dynamic. Despite this, lawyers and constitution scholars within Japan continue to criticize laws enacted following the Abe administration’s constitutional reinterpretation in 2014 (Ikeda 2016). Since its reinterpretation, the Abe government has enacted legislations that directly contradict the basic tenets of Article 9 in the name of self-defense (see §3), meaning that Japan is now a country that can go to war (Ikeda 2016).

One comment by Abe himself demonstrates the extent of this change. Answering questions in the Diet in March 2015, the PM referred to the SDF as ‘our army’ (wagagun), a comment of considerable controversy owing to the dubiousness surrounding the constitutionality of the SDF (see §3) which were created on the pretext of self-defense also, given that Article 9 renounces the right of the state to maintain land, sea, or air forces “as well as other war potential” (Constitution of Japan 1946; Huffington Post 25 March 2015). Hence, the comment was seen as an indictment of the constitution, particularly Article 9, despite the fact that the view that the SDF is de facto the army of Japan is not uncommon (see §8).

This and denying citizens public support to the point of death by starvation despite Article 25, represents ideological changes to the state, where language use plays a prominent role (e.g. see Hook and Takeda 2007). An example of this can be seen in the Abe administrations’ promotion of
‘positive pacifism’ or ‘proactive pacifism’ (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi) as a counter to ‘One Country Pacifism’. Positive pacifism (PP) is a slogan used to denote the Abe administration's foreign policy which aims to overcome restraints on the state’s capabilities ostensibly to contribute to international society (see §6). It accompanies the strong, decisive, and action-oriented language used by the Abe administration to contest and change the tenets of pacifism held within Japanese society, as if to ask ‘rather than negativity and restraining the state [i.e. in the constitution], what actions should the state be permitted to proactively undertake for the sake of peace?’

However, a number of policies recently enacted in its name have caused huge controversy with demonstrations outside the Diet, which have been compared to the Hitler administration’s dismantlement of the constitution of the Weimar Republic (Ikeda 2016). Additionally, in March 2016 Abe asserted that his administration would aim for constitutional amendment by 2018 (Mainichi Shimbun 2 March 2016). This would be a denouement of historic proportions by an administration that has already greatly altered the roles and responsibilities of the state. One example of this is the “Act of the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets” (tokutei himitsu-no hogo-ni kan suru hōritsu), henceforth State Secrecy Act, promulgated on 13 December 2013, which was argued by Abe as a necessary means to protect citizens’ lives and assets (Abe 9 December 2013). This law has been widely criticized as an unambiguous affront on Japanese citizens’ constitutional rights, and minimizing the influence of the Judiciary and Legislature, alongside academia, civil society, journalists and whistleblowers in general, in favour of the Executive (Repeta 2014; Utsunomiya et al. 2014; see §3). It was enacted without “legislative facts” (rippō jijitsu), i.e. concrete facts that exist within society which necessitate the law, with Japan already having numerous laws for whistleblowing (Hori 2014: 13-14), but on the pretext of safeguarding citizens and providing the suitable infrastructure to do so, underscoring again the important role of language in politics.

In sum, while Japan’s economy has changed considerably since its period of rapid economic growth and Japan’s security agenda has long permitted gradual state remilitarization, policies enacted by the Abe administration have catalyzed these processes. The main question this thesis aims to answer, then, is how did Abe attempt to legitimate these changes? And more generally, how can Abe’s language use be used to explain the nature and mechanisms of these changes? However, it first necessitates an introduction to Shinzō Abe, as this thesis’ analytical subject. That is, as argued in §2, contextual knowledge surrounding the prime minister is a factor in the impact of Abe’s rhetoric. Therefore, an overview of Abe in terms of his political profile and influences is necessary before analyzing methods of legitimation. This is provided in the following subsections.
1.1.2 Who is Abe? – Historical heritage of the prime minister

Abe is the matrilineal grandson to the former PM (1957-1960), Nobusuke Kishi, grandnephew to former PM (1964-1972), Eisaku Satō, patrilineal grandson to Kan Abe (1894-1946) who served in the Lower House from 1937-1946, and son to Shintarō Abe who is Japan’s longest serving postwar Minister of Foreign Affairs. His younger brother, Nobuo Kishi, is also an LDP politician and member of the Lower House.

Their grandfather and granduncle, Nobusuke Kishi and Eisaku Satō respectively, were two brother of three. Their elder brother, Ichirō Satō (1889-1958), who served in the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1908 to 1940, emphasized as early as 1927 the importance of securing the sea lines of communications in the region to guarantee the importation of raw materials and manufactured goods (Satō 1927 in Graham 2006: 83). He would also represent the Imperial Navy at the 1929 Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions of the League of Nations, make Vice-Admiral, and become Commanding Officer at the Ryojun Guard District in the Kwantung Leased Territory of Manchuria, now northeast China, from 1938 to 1939. The brothers came from a prominent family within the Chōshū military-bureaucratic clique which had a range of political and military connections. For instance, the Satō family had connections to the first ever Japanese prime

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7 Eisaku Satō is the father to Shinji Satō who is a former LDP politician and is grandnephew to Yōsuke Matsuoka (1880-1946) a pre-war and wartime politician and diplomat, and similarly is related to a number of other politicians.
8 Though at the time of writing, he may be overtaken by the current Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida.
9 The Ryojun Guard District is otherwise referred to as ‘Port Arthur’ or ‘Lushunkou’ in English. It is located in Dalian of Liaoning Province and the Liaodong Peninsula in China. The port’s position was of strategic significance in controlling the passage of cargo to and from the Bohai Sea and Korea Sea that leads into the Yellow Sea. The Qing Empire of China had ceded the peninsula to Japan following the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Shortly after, the Japanese Empire retroceded the territory to China complying with demands from France, Germany and Russia, only for Western Powers to scramble for territory within China with Russia gaining control over Liaodong Province. The Japanese Imperial Army then retook Port Arthur from the Russian Empire in 1904 which lead to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) with Russia allied with France and Japan allied with Britain. Japan would win the war and be granted control over the Liaodong Peninsula in the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), to be used as a springboard for further expansion into China (Arrighi et al. 1997; Elleman et al. 2015).
10 Chōshū was a feudal domain in the Edo period (1603-1867) in (pre-)Yamaguchi Prefecture of west Japan and contributed a number of important leaders of the Meiji Restoration (1868) (Deal 2006: 81). The Edo period was one of feudal rule in Japan with approximately 250-280 domains (han) all with one leader each (daimyō). These leaders had semi-autonomy over their fiefdoms and could employ samurai as upper-class retainers to them, all under the condition of loyalty to the shogun (head of the military government) based in Edo (now Tokyo) (Beasley 1998; Perez 1998; Deal 2006).
11 Abe’s great-grandfather, Hidesuke Kishi was adopted into the Satō family to marry a daughter (Welfield 2012: 116). His son, Nobusuke Kishi was given the name Satō until he was married to his cousin Yoshiko Kishi, whereupon he presumably retook Kishi as his surname (Bouissou 2002: 93).
minister and member of the Meiji oligarchy\(^{12}\), Hirofumi Itō (1885-1888; 1892-1898; 1900-1901), among other oligarchs of the Chōshū domain (Bouissou 2002: 93; Welfield 2012: 116).

The familial link between Kishi and Abe is regularly made within the Japanese media, far more than with Kan Abe, Eisaku Satō and even Shintarō Abe, owing possibly to the fact that Kishi’s tenure as PM is particularly memorable, with Abe’s chief goal of constitutional reinterpretation/revision analogous to Kishi’s premiership. Kishi’s career began in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce where he would eventually make minister (1941-1943) after serving as the second highest civilian official in the Japanese puppet government of Manchukuo, colonial Manchuria, from 1936 to 1939. He also served as State Minister (1943-1944), and vice-Minister of Munitions, a position directly under the PM, in the Imperial Japanese Government (Lentz 2013: 458; Packard 2015: 48-49). During wartime, Kishi was a close deputy to General Hideki Tōjō of the Imperial Japanese Army, Minister of Munitions and Japanese prime minister\(^{13}\) (1941-1944). He resigned after the fall of Saipan in 1944 with the rest of the Tōjō Cabinet in a bid to force the General’s resignation (Samuels 2001; Lentz 2013: 458; Packard 2015: 48). Following the war, he was arrested as a suspected Class A war criminal and held without trial until 1948 in Sugamo Prison (Lentz 2013: 458; Hara 2015: 36-37), but was released owing to the so-called ‘reverse course’ where, under the command of the US-led Occupation of Japan (1945-1952), US policymakers sought to change the direction it had determined Japan would chart postwar. The direction changed from demilitarization and democratization of the former imperial power towards making it a bulwark against communism to assist in the strategy of communist containment in East Asia (Hook et al. 2012).

Kishi joined the Liberal Party (\textit{jiyūto}) in 1953, and following an unsuccessful attempt to depose its leader, Shigeru Yoshida, Kishi and his faction joined the Democratic Party (\textit{nippon minshutō}), led by Ichirō Hatoyama. Both parties would later merge in 1955 to form the LDP. Kishi and his faction were connected with a number of ultranationalist groups, underworld organizations, and US policymakers, and it is alleged that they likely received partial funding from these sources (Samuels 2001; Welfield 2013: 116). Whether true or not, the strength of his faction had had an impact in the formation of the LDP and within two years of its foundation, Kishi became prime minister.

\(^{12}\) The Meiji oligarchy resulted from the Meiji Restoration (1868) where the clans from ‘outsider’ (\textit{tozama}) domains of Chōshū and Satsuma formed an alliance to orchestrate an armed coup d’état against the Tokugawa Shogunate and effectively restored the Emperor of Japan as ruler of the country but with an empowered oligarchy, many from \textit{tozama} domains (Beasley 2001; Walker 2015: 159-179).

\(^{13}\) Abe’s other grandfather, Kan Abe, had in fact opposed the war. Along with similar minded politicians, he demanded the resignation of the Tōjō Cabinet (Wada 2006), which presumably would have included Kishi up to a point – the man who became the father-in-law to his son in 1951, five years after Kan Abe’s death.
Renowned for his hawkish and nationalist stance on security issues, Kishi had sought unsuccessfully to revise the Japanese constitution, specifically Article 9, which constrained state remilitarization (Samuels 2001; §3). However, within the space of three years, he would achieve the normalization of trade with anti-communist US allies in the region, renewal of laws to national defence, education reform towards a ‘moral’ education while assessing teachers, cessation of trade with communist China and controversially the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The latter was carried out amidst mass demonstrations amounting to hundreds of thousands of protesters outside the Diet in 1960 and led to Kishi’s resignation (Samuels 2001; Hook et al. 2012).

Though the connection between Abe and his granduncle is less prominent in the Japanese media, Eisaku Satō, is Japan’s longest serving post-war PM (1964-1972). He joined the Ministry of Railways (later ‘Transportations’) in 1924 where he would hold many ministerial positions. For instance, he worked as Director of the Osaka Railways Bureau from 1944 to 1946 and vice-minister for Transportation from 1947 to 1949. In 1948 he became Chief Cabinet Secretariat to the Shigeru Yoshida administration and, having served as Finance Minister in the Kishi administration from 1958, Satō was then appointed Minister of International Trade and Industry and then State Minister in the subsequent Hayato Ikeda administration (Lentz 2013; Nobelprize.org 2016a). During this time, the government steered away from the divisive issues such as security and constitutional revision that had defined his brother’s administration. Instead, it prioritized economic development as a form of national consolidation amidst growing ideological conflict (Kingston 2012; McCargo 2013: 42-43). Along with a number of legislations in social security, the Ikeda administration promoted the Income Doubling Plan where over the Ikeda and Satō administrations, Japan’s Gross National Product (GNP) doubled within seven years amidst unprecedented economic growth (McCargo 2013: 42-44). The Satō government did, however, face numerous security issues. For instance, from 1965 the US escalated the war in Vietnam, necessitating the support of the Japanese government. Satō was able to point to antimilitarism within domestic society, owing to the traumas of the WWII, as a means to provide only indirect support such as the provision of US military bases while also maintaining favourable relations with the US to the boon of the economy14 (Hook et al. 2012: 132-133).

Despite the duration of Satō’s premiership, the approach to security issues was to change following a hiatus of Cold War hostilities in the mid-1970s. By the time Abe’s father, formerly secretary to PM Kishi (Lee 1995: 213), began serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1982-1986), new pressures on the state provided the space to dismantle a number of the constraints towards remilitarization; constraints that Kishi, too, had sought to dismantle and had since drifted further.

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14 He was also able to negotiation the 1972 return of Okinawa to Japan by the US (Hook et al. 2012: 132).
back on the political agenda while the state reprioritized national consolidation. Shintarō Abe had served as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry during the Miki administration (1974-1976), Chief Cabinet Secretariat under the Takeo Fukuda administration (1976-1978), and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry during the Zenkō Suzuki administration (1981-1982), and was known as a 'kingmaker' within Japanese politics (Hook et al. 2012). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the USSR embarked on a military build-up in the region, which, the Miki administration aside, gave incentive for the other administrations Shintarō Abe served in to advocate a more prominent international military role for Japan (Hook et al. 2012: 134-135). By 1981, the Japanese military was emerging as an ally to the US. However, Japan-US relations began to deteriorate with the appointment of Sunao Sonoda as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Suzuki administration, after the ignominious resignation of Masayoshi Itō having declared the alliance a “military alliance” (gunji dōmei), much to the opprobrium of large portions of domestic society (Hook et al. 2012: 135).

The subsequent prime minister (1982-1987), Yasuhiro Nakasone, who belonged to the conservative anti-mainstream associated with Kishi, was inaugurated into office seeking to restore the alliance. It is under this administration that Shintarō Abe became Japan’s longest serving postwar Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shintarō Abe served in an administration that promoted a more active military role for Japan with closer military operations with the US and the dismantling of constraints to militarization. Such changes engendered concerns in domestic society that Japan was moving irrevocably away from its postwar ‘peace state’ identity and towards a so-called ‘international state’ which advocated an active role for the state in global military-strategic affairs (Hook et al. 2012: 94-95, 136-37; Singh 2016: 595-96; see §3). This course of action, i.e., promoting a more active military role for the state internationally while overcoming domestic constraints against it, has been a recurrent theme in the political process of state remilitarization in Japan. It was a theme observable in the Kishi administration, the Nakasone administration, and for the Abe administration that was to follow it twenty-five years later.

That is, state remilitarization is frequently heralded as part of a larger project towards making Japan a 'normal' or 'international' state, particularly among conservatives within Japanese politics. In this regard, the domestic constraints placed on militarization are just one component of a multifaceted issue purportedly restraining the state from responding to changing international demands. During the Nakasone administration, Japan’s contribution to international society was not considered to be commensurate with its economic size, which was the world’s second largest national economy. Nakasone, with Shintarō Abe serving as foreign minister, sought to redress this by promoting a more assertive diplomacy, epitomized by the formation of the triumvirate with US
President Reagan and UK prime minister Thatcher, as well as overcoming impediments to remilitarization such as the 1 per cent ceiling of GNP on defence spending (Hook et al. 2012: 103-105/155). As stated, the Abe administration, too, promoted 'positive pacifism' as an assertive foreign policy while also overcoming constraints such as constitutional reinterpretation to allow for the exercise of CSD (§3).

Parallels between the Abe administration to the Nakasone administration might also be drawn for economic policy. While the former promoted Abenomics, with structural reform and deregulation purportedly at the core of the economic growth strategy, the latter was also known for its administrative reforms to the economy. For instance, under Nakasone, Japan National Railways and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were completely privatized causing large-scale redundancies, unheard of in Japan's developmentalist economic model (Krauss 2000: 183-184).

Though conceptually separate, overcoming structural regulations to the economy and state constraints to militarization are both carried out ostensibly to internationalize or normalize, reflecting the emphasis of the relationship between Japan and international society and/or the 'world'.

1.1.3 Abe and influences: Koizumi and new politics

Abe gained his seat in Yamaguchi Prefecture in 1994 where he has held it since\textsuperscript{15}. He served as Deputy Cabinet Secretariat (2001-2004) and then Cabinet Secretariat (2004-2005) during Koizumi’s premiership, who like Abe, was a proponent of state remilitarization and neoliberal structural reform. Following Koizumi’s resignation, Abe won the Upper House election in 2007 to become PM and resigned approximately one year later. He had gained a reputation during the Koizumi administration for his hardline stance towards North Korea over negotiations for the return of Japanese nationals kidnapped by DPRK agents from 1977 to 1983 (Uchiyama 2010: 108-109). Koizumi was Abe’s political mentor (Lam 2013: 6), and Abe is said to have been influenced by Koizumi’s style of leadership while acting as deputy (Azuma 2007; Uchiyama 2010: 161-162).

\textsuperscript{15} Abe was elected from Yamaguchi Prefecture District 4 (District 1 in the old system). His father, Shintarō Abe was elected in the 1950s while serving as company president to the soy sauce business established by his father Kan Abe. Kan Abe had also been elected in this district (Dickie 16 December 2012; Yoshiimi and Yozeki 1981: 274). Kishi and Satō regularly contested for District 2 of Yamaguchi Prefecture, where in the old electoral system, both regularly were elected from that district. Satō’s son, Shinji Satō, was elected in this district when his father passed away and Kishi retired and, since 2012, Abe’s brother, Nobuo Kishi, has been routinely elected in this district.
Koizumi, himself, had captured the imagination of the Japanese public gaining at one time a postwar record-breaking 80 per cent public approval rating (Azuma 2007) and was heralded endearingly as an "oddball" (henjin) (Uchiyama 2010: 160) who would revolutionize a politics perceived to be superannuated, ineffective and intractable in changing times. Koizumi was elected in 2001 and would remain PM for half a decade. He campaigned on a platform of change which made use of "bold, skillful rhetoric to win voters" (Inoguchi 2011: 17-18; see also Azuma 2007; Suzuki 2008). Such change would impact on the nature of Japanese politics, reorienting it away from intra-party emphasis on policymaking, to centralize power to the Cabinet (§2.2.3), having established the reputation of a "lone wolf", despite being appointed to several Cabinet positions before becoming PM (Oros and Tatsumi 2010: 144-145).

Many changes also came in the form of neoliberal economic reform as the state attempted to respond to the pressures of globalization and regionalization (Hook et al. 2012; Watanabe 2015b), made possible by Koizumi’s high approval ratings. Similar to the Abe administration, his administration also overcame a number of significant constraints on state remilitarization such as the dispatch of the SDF abroad in support for the US-led ‘war on terror’ (§3). A number of reforms were not without controversy. For instance, in 2005, having passed through the Lower House but been rejected in the Upper House, Koizumi dissolved the Lower House to call for a general election in order to establish the Postal Privatization Law (yūsei minei hōan). Were two thirds or more members of the Lower House to vote in favour of a bill, then it could be established as law without passing through the Upper House. The general election that ensued was highly focused on the issue of postal reform, and lent itself to the perception of a new, audacious politician attempting to bring about reform against the faction-oriented and quarrelsome politicians, in a pattern that was to influence political communication following Koizumi (§1.1.3). The LDP manifesto employed “courageous rhetoric over a detailed outline of specific policies” (Inoguchi 2011: 24), and was entitled “it is privatization of the postal system that is the crux to all reforms” (LDP 2005: 1). On the other hand, the DPJ attempted to “present themselves as the real representatives of the people” (Inoguchi 2011: 24), by promising “not to give up” on Japan and to establish a new politics for the people (DPJ 2005: 2). The result of the election was an emphatic victory for the LDP which broke the record for voter turnout post-electoral reform (§3) and allowed the privatization of Japan’s postal system, despite Upper House opposition.

The man pioneering this ostensible ‘revolution’ towards a new politics was also a third-generation politician, whose relatives exhibited ideological similarities with Abe’s. His father, Junya Koizumi, born Junya Samejima, became a mainstream member and “originator” (hokkinin) of the
“Board of the Willing MPs” (yūshi daigi shikai) following the election of General Tōjō in 1942. He was entrusted with the task of centralizing political power; bringing reform to the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association (IRAPA) (yokusan seijikai); establishing a wartime political system; increasing Japan’s war potential and wartime productivity16 (Yoshimi and Yozeki 1981: 317-336). Following the US purge, Koizumi returned to politics where he would serve as chairman to the LDP Foreign Affairs Committee during the 1960 Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty by the Kishi administration (Tanaka 2001: 58). Several years later, he served as the head of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) throughout the third Ikeda administration and the first Satō administration (1964-1967) (Tanaka 2001: 58; Iwamoto 2010: 33).

Matajirō Koizumi, allegedly a former member of the Yakuza, Japanese mafia (Maruko 2003), was a prominent prewar politician. He served as Minister of Communications (teishin daijin) in the Hamaguchi administration (1929-1931) which advocated austerity measures and where Koizumi would unsuccessfully pursue a partial privatization of telecommunication provisions into a parastatal framework (Iwamoto 2010: 32-33; NEC Corporation 1972: 146-147; Nagayama 2001: 199; Tanaka 2001: 55). Under the wartime Tōjō Government, he served as IRAPA Diet Member Chairman (yokusan seijikai daigisha) and was among over one hundred ‘trustees’ (hyōgiin) to the IRAPA (Yoshimi and Yozeki 1981: 302-303; Kusunoki 2005: 69-79). He had also served as advisor to the Koiso Cabinet during wartime in 1944 (National Diet Library 2013), the cabinet that succeeded the Tōjō Government where Kishi had acted as a close deputy to the PM.

In amongst the long, intertwining history of each family in Japanese conservative politics, Abe was elected as leader of the ruling LDP following the Koizumi administration in which he had come to play a prominent role. Following electoral victory, Abe successively won the majority in both houses. Though he would announce his resignation approximately one year later, allegedly due to health issues, Abe had been elected in 2006 having published a bestseller named “towards a beautiful country” (Abe 2006), and then continued to use the slogan in his campaign drive for office under the banner of “feeling [the effects] of growth” (seichō-o jikkan-ni). The language use again was

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16 The 1942 general election gained a startling 83.1 per cent voter turnout despite the Asia-Pacific War. Following the election, Matajirō Koizumi in Kanagawa Prefecture District 2, Junya Koizumi in Kagoshima Prefecture District 1, and Kishi in Yamaguchi Prefecture District 2 were among the candidates by the Tōjō government who were elected (Yoshimi and Yokozeki 1981: 254/274/281). Kan Abe in Yamaguchi Prefecture District 1 was among the non-endorsed elected (Yoshimi and Yokozeki 1981: 274; Dong-A Ilbo 28 October 2013; Ishii 3 June 2015). Due to the election of unendorsed candidates, the government established the IRAPA under which Japan was to become a totalitarian one-party state (ikkoku ittō), but it soon split into factions (Tsuzuki 2000: 302-303).
comparable to Koizumi’s manifestoes in that it employed strong, assertive rhetoric over specific policy issues, implicative of the candidate’s leadership qualities.

According to the LDP 2007 Upper House election manifesto, a ‘beautiful country’ is “a country that is opened to the world, which values the spirit of self-reliance, is filled with vitality and kindness, where the children’s generation can have self-belief and pride, and which the people of the world yearn for and respect” (LDP 2007). Further, in line with the rhetoric that preceded him, the Abe-led LDP heralded numerous priority issues for citizens to “feel the effects of growth” and hence make a “beautiful country”. Among others, these included ‘reconstructing’ the pension system, labour unions and abolishing the Social Insurance Agency; reform to civil service; education reform to ‘regenerate’ education with children as the cornerstone to economic growth; an assertive diplomacy and the resolution of the North Korean abduction issue with all abductees returned to Japan; efforts towards a new constitution and a reborn, new Japan in which “growth potential pervades” (LDP 2007: 3).

Though parallels between the policy ambitions of the Abe administration and his grandfather’s administration are not difficult to draw, whether causal or coincidental, a prioritization of economic matters is also observable between the Abe administration and the Satō administration. One significant difference is while the ‘economy first’ approach adopted by the Ikeda and Satō administrations was ostensibly to evade the divisive issues of security, Abe’s prioritization of the economy appears to legitimate it; that is, for people to feel the effects of [economic] growth and live in a beautiful country, changes to Japan’s diplomacy and constitution must be made.

While such reform to education and the constitution is touted as a means of economic growth, questions remain in the literature about Abe’s ideological ambitions (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014; Hughes 2015b) owing to his connections to numerous ultranationalist and historical revisionist groups. For example, Abe was vice secretary to the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Committee) which, among other things, opposes Japan’s “masochistic view of history” (jigyaku shikan) – a term which is often used to criticize the education of Japan’s war history in school textbooks (Junkerman 2006; Narusawa 2013). The group are alleged to advocate the position that “Japan should be applauded for liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers” and that the 1937 “Nanjing massacre” was fabricated or exaggerated (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014: 6). Further, they promote a Japan with a “beautiful, traditional national character” where citizens “respect and adore” (keiai suru) the Imperial Household, a new constitution for a new time, and the creation of “education that cultivates a Japanese sense” (nihon-no kansei-o hagukumu kyōiku) (Kato 12 September 2014; Nippon Kaigi 2015). PM Abe is also associated with other ideological groups. For instance, he is alleged to be:
o Advisor to the “Diet Member Group for Considering Japan’s Future and History Textbooks” (Nippon-no zento-to rekishi kyōkasho-o kangaeru giin-no kai) which seeks to eradicate the ‘masochistic view of history’ and install patriotic values through school history textbooks;

o Head of General Affairs to the “Shintō Political Alliance Diet Member’s Roundtable” (shintō seiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai) which aims to restore “Japanese-ness” (Nippon-rashisa) by promoting Shintō values. Among other things, they allegedly oppose female imperial succession despite historical antecedents, gender-free education and the construction of a non-religious site of war commemoration.

o Chair to the “Diet Member Alliance for Promoting ‘Parenting Studies’” (oyagaku suishin giin renmei) which, of a seemingly extreme behavourist position, purportedly believe that many parents need to be re-educated to become suitable parents as they are now unfit teachers of children, with the Japan Teacher’s Union often associated as among one of the causes.

o Advisor to the “Diet Member Alliance for Enacting a New Constitution” (shinkenpō seitei giin dōmei), which traces back to the 1955 “Diet Member Alliance for Promoting Our Own Constitution” (jishu kenpō kisei giin dōmei) where, allegedly, Kishi had served as Chair (atarashii kenpō-o tsukuru kokumin kaigi 2015).

(Penney 2013: 2-10)

A ‘beautiful country’ and the slightly more securitized slogan from his 2012 election campaign, “bringing back Japan” (nihon-o torimodosu), may be understood as a form of economic essentialism, where economic growth is the sine qua non to citizen well-being and national sustainability. However, these associations of the PM had led others to speculate whether it is less to do with concerns for the citizenry and more to do with the ideological ambition of ending Japan’s postwar regime of which a ‘peace-state identity’ is a central component (e.g. Chanlett-Avery et al. 2014; Hughes 2015b).

Whether such an undertaking is the central ambition of the PM or a bid to attract (neo-)nationalist voters in a competitive electoral system as parties attempt to incorporate the leanings of a diverse set of voters (§2 and §3), such changes to Japan’s peace-state identity is discussed in detail in §3. Further, the inclusion of economic arguments towards changes to security policy by Abe informs the definition of security in the theoretical approach in §3, and particularly how to approach the issue of security in the analysis of Abe’s speeches. Therefore, before discussing these issues in more detail, the following section lays out the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Structure of the thesis

As stated this section explains the structure of this thesis following on from the introduction provided above. Firstly, Chapter 2 comprises the Literature Review which provides an overview of research into the relationship between language and politics including CDS, political communication studies, and figurative language in political discourse, and changes in politics and political communication in Japan. Chapter 3 constitutes the Theoretical Approach. It introduces Critical Theory and the dialectical-relational approach to CDS applied to the qualitative analysis of speeches. Further, it explains the changes to Japan’s security agenda in the context of CSD carried out by the Abe administration and how it relates to the constitution, using analytical tools from social constructivism in IR theory. Finally, it discusses definitions of security, and introduces securitization theory and depoliticization as a semiotic point of entry to the analysis of speeches by discussing evidence for it in contemporary Japanese politics and society, as well as discusses why speeches are analyzed in this thesis ahead of other potential resources of political communication.

Following this, Chapter 4 offers a concise explanation of the methodology employed for the three-tier analysis in the subsequent chapters, while Chapter 5 constitutes the quantitative analysis of text carried out with the use of the text-mining software KH Coder (Higuchi 2004), and a qualitative analysis of frames throughout Abe’s speeches. Chapter 6 provides a qualitative-numerical keyword analysis based on the analyses in Chapter 5 in order to identify Abe’s major arguments. Next, Chapter 7 comprises the qualitative analysis using the dialectical-relational approach to CDS (Fairclough 2009) examining cases of depoliticization and securitizing moves as methods of legitimation for randomly selected frames identified in Chapter 5 and supplemented by the findings in Chapter 6.

With the textual analyses complete, Chapter 8 then discusses the results as a whole. To do so, it rigorously evaluates a number of key conjectures made by Abe which were used to legitimate policy change. More specifically, it addresses the conditions on globalization, the threat it poses to the Japanese state, using literature from IPE and IR theory to contextualize the arguments Abe makes with regard to state responses to global or international change. Further, it assesses two central initiatives concretely, the promotion of the TPP and the foreign policy, ‘positive pacifism’ (PP), to assess whether, despite the arguments made, there are existing theories and explanations in IPE and IR literature that might explain them, and hence the rhetoric used. Finally, Chapter 9 offers a conclusion to this thesis by summarizing its analytical findings and discussing the thesis’ broader contributions to Discourse Studies, Communication Studies, Japanese Studies and IR theory, and offers suggestions for future research and improvements.
With this, the thesis turns now to the Literature Review, which aims to explain the research disciplines and political context upon which the Theoretical Approach in Chapter 3 is constructed.
2. Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge in the fields of political communication and Japanese studies, a discourse analysis is carried out using mixed-methods. Therefore, this chapter will provide an overview of the literature in CDS, political communication and media studies, as well as the expansive field of figurative language use in political discourse. Secondly, its aim is to provide an explanation into the communication of (in)security and legitimation of changes in security policy in Japan. However, the definition of ‘security’ itself is highly contested and subject to reflexive modification based on the successful communication of risk within domestic society (§3), or discussed elsewhere more generally as the “manipulation of insecurity” in times of uncertainty (Bauman 2011: 42). Without narrowing down the conceptual parameters of the focal topic of this thesis, then, the agents subject to analysis were confined to only one, prime minister and Commander-in-chief to the SDF, Shinzō Abe. While Abe was introduced in §1, he is clearly not the sole communicative actor in Japanese politics. Therefore, this chapter will also examine political communication in Japan, its power structures and changes, to demonstrate why examining the speeches of the prime minister of Japan is an important task.

This wide span of topics is covered in this chapter along with the literature review. It leads into the theoretical approach provided in §3. Here, a review of discursive and political communication studies is carried out in §2.1, while a review into the changes in Japanese political communication is provided in §2.2. Finally, a summary of the main points of this chapter is conducted in §2.3.

2.1 Language and politics

This section offers an overview of the broad fields of discourse analysis and political communication studies. While the task of providing a comprehensive overview of these interrelated fields is beyond the spatial capacity of this thesis, this section covers the issues surrounding the methodologies employed in subsequent chapters and explains their significance. This section is structured as follows:
§2.1.1 introduces CDS and its relationship to the study of politics and power; §2.1.2 comprises an introduction to and review of political communication and media studies, specifically frame analysis, and §2.1.3 discusses figurative language use in politics, particularly in the context of the legitimation of policy change.

2.1.1 CDS: Language and power

This section will introduce CDS by first discussing its theoretical tenets, its connection to conceptions of power, and its multiplicity of approaches. Following this, it will discuss in more detail cognitive aspects of CDS, most specifically 'knowledge management', its relationship with theories of power, and two illustrative studies which aimed to explicate the discursive impact on the formation and maintenance of objects of knowledge.

Discourse is a multidimensional social phenomenon, difficult to define similar to how other fundamental components of communication are, such as language, cognition, memory and so on (van Dijk 2009). It is used to refer to a wide-range of communicative outputs (van Dijk 2009: 67), and is considered a form of semiosis, i.e. the intersubjective production of meaning, and a form of social practice (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Jessop 2004: 161; Fairclough et al. 2011). CDS “sets out to make visible through analysis, and to criticize, connections between properties of texts and social processes and relations (ideologies, power relations) […]” where the context of language use is crucial (Fairclough 1995: 97 in Takagi 2005: 1; Wodak and Meyer 2009b: 5). Language use is considered to be a form of social practice, which implies a dialectical relationship between a discursive event and the components which frame it (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Moreover, discourse is both socially situated and constitutive where for the former at all levels of social constructions, discourse is shaped, constrained and influenced by social constructs. For the latter, discourse reproduces social constructs of the ‘status quo’ and gives rise to new ones (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Takagi 2005: 1). That is, constructs shape a discursive event and are shaped by them (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Fairclough et al., 2011: 357). Therefore, it constitutes objects of knowledge and social identities of and relationships between groups of people (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258).

Given this dialectical relationship, CDS examines the power relations that exist in contemporary society and hence also ideology which denotes “particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation” (Fairclough et al. 2011: 369-371). CDS stem from Critical Linguistics (CL), an approach to linguistics which recognizes power as a central theoretical issue (Flowerdew 2008: 195) and
traces back to Critical Theory which advocates socially-directed research aimed at "critiquing and changing society" (Wodak and Meyer 2009b: 6). While its theoretical underpinnings are discussed in §3, CDS examines language as a social action under the assumption that its analysis will provide insights into social issues given that they are, at least partially, constituted in language use (Bhatia et al. 2008: 11).

As a result, CDS necessitates a theory of power. Power, itself, is another concept that is contested and remains difficult to define. Traditional conceptions generally describe it as being able to make someone do something they do not want to do (e.g. Dahl 1957). However, different definitions demonstrate that power can be subtler in its manifestations and more complex in its mechanisms of control. For instance, power has overt manifestations, but is also covert, with certain actors able to suffocate potential for social change by creating barriers "to the public airing of policy conflicts" and hence manage people's knowledge (Bachrach and Baratz 1970 in Lukes 2005: 20-23).

In terms of practice, power is observable through conflict where, whether overt or covert, practices may denote coercion, influence, authority, force, manipulation and so on (Lukes 2005: 21-27). In this sense, however, certain practices, for example manipulation, may be viewed in terms of, rather than forcing someone to do something against their wishes, influencing/Managing their "very wants" (Lukes 2005: 27). Further, these manifestations of power are not necessarily separate when taken as a social structure. For example, Boulding (1989) separates power into three forms:

a) Coercive or destructive power where threats are a common form of practice;
b) Economic or productive power such as exchange and trade, which is based on a model of supplying or denying people materials whether they are desired or needed;
c) Integrative power such as building and maintaining relationships and social bonds based on love, amity, trust, and so on.

(Boulding 1989)

Crucially, power within social structures is considered to comprise a mixture of all three forms, but has no durability without legitimation which is heavily dependent on integrative power (Boulding 1989; Cox 2013: 352).

Related theories similarly attest the importance of legitimacy where its contestation and hence control inherently involves semiosis. For instance, Strange (1994), attempting to identify sources of power to explain its asymmetries in the IPE, separates structural power from relational power, where the latter denotes getting an actor to do something against their wishes. Conversely,
the former is the power to determine the structure of the IPE, not only in terms of setting the agenda, but also influencing how other states including their economic, political, and social institutions operate – in short, defining the rules of the game (Strange 1994). These structures are separated into four interrelated categories: control over people’s security, the modes of production, finance and credit, and knowledge, beliefs and ideas. Additionally, secondary sources of structural power include control over transport, trade, energy, and welfare (Strange 1994). Again, when attempting to explain how these structural pillars stand firm against the asymmetries of power, legitimacy plays a crucial role as demonstrated through the structural pillar that is control over knowledge, ideas and beliefs – or, the mind.

Finally, power also can be parsed into hard and soft power where the former coerces and the latter co-opts. Crucially, soft power rests on the ability of a state (or non-state actor) to influence the behaviour of others and relies on three resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye 2011: 84, my emphasis). Given that theories of power recognize the importance of legitimacy and hence semiosis because it creates objects of knowledge: the analysis of the maintenance of asymmetrical power is an analysis of ideology.

CDS, then, aims to expose the naturalization of ideology, considering it to be powerful because it is naturalized and hence, not contested or scrutinized critically (Fairclough 1989; Goatly 2007). CDS does not have a specific methodology per se but rather is interdisciplinary research aimed at elucidating power structures that exist within society (Wodak and Meyer 2001 in Imura 2005: 25). Owing to this, CDS has numerous approaches to discourse analysis, which may be cursorily separated into, but not limited to, the following general domains. These are summarized below:

a) The dialectical-relational approach (e.g. Fairclough 2009): A transdisciplinary approach which focuses on “the discursive aspect of contemporary processes of social transformation” (Fairclough et al. 2011: 362; §3).

b) The discourse-historical approach (e.g. Wodak and Meyer 2009b): An inductive approach which attempts to integrate background information associated with a particular discourse to explicate discourses of prejudice (Fairclough 2011: 364; see also Wodak and Meyer 2001; 2009b; Imura 2005; O’Regan and Betzel forthcoming).

c) The socio-cognitive approach (e.g. van Dijk 2009): An approach focusing on the relations between knowledge and discourse through the cognitive sciences and social psychology,
and how social interactions and contexts condition the production, comprehension, and memorization of discourses (Fairclough et al. 2011: 363-364; see also Chilton 2004; Nabeshima 2005a/b; Watabe 2005; van Dijk 2009).

d) The corpus-based approach (e.g. Mautner 2009): An approach which employs computer-based methods of analysis such as text-mining from corpus linguistics affording both quantitative and qualitative perspectives from textual analysis (Fairclough et al. 2011: 365-366; see also Mautner 2009; Mulderrig 2011).17

Approaches to CDS span a broad spectrum between cognitive-based and sociological analyses because of its focus on ideology, which itself is both a cognitive and social phenomenon inasmuch as ideology is a form of knowledge of the world (Watabe 2005: 13). Knowledge may be defined as a “belief that has been ‘certified’ by the (epistemic) criteria of an (epistemic) community – criteria that may vary culturally, historically and socially” and is relative and contextual, though in an epistemic community it is not relative but assumed as a ‘true’ belief (van Dijk 2011b: 384-385). Therefore, what is knowledge for one community may be belief, superstition or apparent ideology for others (van Dijk 2011b: 385).

Here, “[t]he exercise of power involves the influence of knowledge, beliefs, values, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values” (Catalano 2012: 162), which may be seen within every individual as an interface between discourse and society (see Koller 2005; Wodak 2006; Catalino 2012). What is shared as knowledge between individuals constitutes collective identities of an epistemic community where the “content of social identities may take the form of four non-mutually-exclusive types” (Abdelal et al. 2006: 695). These include constitutive norms; social purposes; relational comparisons with other social categories; and worldviews and understandings of political and material conditions and interests, denoted as ‘cognitive models’ (Abdelal et al. 2006: 695). However, if ‘shared knowledge’ is defined in terms of that which is shared between members of an epistemic community, then those groups or institutions which have preferential access to public discourse or other forms of power and authority, such as politicians, are in a position to influence people’s formation of knowledge and identity (van Dijk 2005: 88). This is concordant with the aforementioned theories of power and related to the propaganda models in the political economy that aim to manufacture consent for a system-supportive agenda (Hermann and Chomsky 1988) or

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17 Another two approaches are the Dispositive Analysis approach (see Jäger and Maier 2009) and the Social Actors Approach (see van Leeuwen 2009).
sentimental nihilism in the mass media and the deterioration of media ethics in pursuit of power through market share as interrelated to other established attitudes and ideologies (West 2005).

In essence, then, those who enjoy a high symbolic rank within an epistemic community are better placed to influence the knowledge management process among listeners. One account of this is provided by Chilton (1996) who critically examines metaphors as cognitive mappings from a source domain to a target domain, where domains refer to a form of organized knowledge which may be (partly) innate and elaborated by culture-relative experience (Chilton 2006; Kövecses 2005; §2.1.3). Source domains tend to be “based in physical, especially spatial, experience and stored in the mind as what are often referred to as ‘image schemas’”, considered to be abstract knowledge structures based on patterns of experience (Chilton 2006; Velasco 2001). Many types of schemata exist, as illustrated by the CONTAINER schema, which imposes boundaries to collections of objects and individuals that need not have determinate boundaries in reality (Chilton 2006: 65).

The relevance of image-schema in conceptualizing complex political realities can exert a major impact in theorizing policies such as the US global strategy in the aftermath of WWII. For example, Chilton (1996) critically analyzes metaphors to elucidate image-schemata used to conjure up the US global strategy in the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States to the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ and ‘X-article’. Chilton (1996) demonstrates evidence of the PATH, FORCE, CONTAINER and the PERSON schemata as central to the conceptualization of the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War. It is argued that these schemata are interrelated where the PERSON schema differentiated ‘Russia’ from the ‘US’ in terms of character (collective identity) and in line with notions of the regional economic and military powers while the CONTAINER schema was able to consolidate this dichotomy.

Both articles represent a “crucial example of metaphorical structuring in a realist text that had a direct effect on policy formation”, owing to the initial audience of the X-Article (Chilton 1996: 8). These schemata influence the construction of objects of knowledge with, for example, the PERSON schema entailing descriptions of “relations among persons, moral attributes, quality of mind and intellect, bodily characteristics, and emotional characteristics” (Chilton 1996: 144). Further, the CONTAINER schema operates as a principle of division between East and West, and hence notions of Occidentalist Self vs. the Orientalist Other (see also §6). Chilton (1996) argues that a combination of these schemata contributed to notions that the USSR was irrational, morally defective, confused about ‘reality’, with metaphorical notions of Soviet “darkness, mystery, secretiveness, conspiracy and concealment” compared to the outside (the US/West) which entailed “openness, light and enlightenment” (Chilton 1996: 147).
In the aftermath of WWII, there was a pressing need to conceptualize the political uncertainties of the day. Due to how Kennan conceptualized the USSR in relation to the US and the world, his arguments greatly influenced the notion of ‘security’ over ‘defence’ and the need to ‘contain’ Soviet expansion as one would contain an infection or a cancer (Chilton 1996; Hook 1996a). This contributed to the idea of ‘national security’ as opposed to ‘national defence’ which metaphorically implies that (individual) defence is only necessary when attacked, while security and insecurity is strongly embedded in conditions of psychology (§3). Additionally, spatialized notions of ‘containing’ Russian expansion were buttressed by ‘national security’ which, unlike ‘national defence’, does not imply a specific geographical locus such as national borders. In short, the argumentation strengthened perceptions of epistemic communities which were not limited by national boundaries but conceptually related to differing ideologies (Chilton 1996).

While it may be debatable whether these reports by a member of the coterie of US policymakers could influence US policy to such an extent, it is not a view incompatible with existing theories in IR. For example, Haas (1992) refers to an epistemic group as a professional coterie from a variety of disciplines who share a set of norms and values, causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a set of common practices. Specifically, in this sense, epistemic groups are defined in narrower terms than ‘epistemic communities’ above, denoting specialized groups who “become strong actors at the national and transnational level as decision makers solicit their information and delegate responsibility to them” (Haas 1992: 5). Despite the fact that a number of scholars suggest practices and beliefs emanating from an influential authority has the capacity to disseminate globally and transmogrify social structures (e.g. Strang and Meyer 1993), such groups’ claims to knowledge are flawed inasmuch as the rationale behind a policy is limited to the beliefs, sometimes deriving from competing norms and values, and not necessarily a sacrosanct or altruistic assessment of options (Haas 1992).

Another example of the role of knowledge management is provided by Flowerdew and Leong (2010) who analyze a dataset of 250 articles from a Hong-Kong newspaper which is notorious for its ‘pro-China’ stance on social issues. Their central aim was to reveal how the newspaper presumes certain kinds of knowledge relating to sociopolitical and cultural identity to influence opinions concerning Hong-Kong patriotism and identity. Here, ‘othering’, non-naming, and metaphors were used throughout the articles to frame the debate about who may identify themselves as a Hong Kong patriot (Flowerdew and Leong 2010: 2251). These are also interrelated. For instance, othering\(^{18}\) may

\[^{18}\text{This denotes labelling someone or some group as belonging to a subordinate social category. For example, as part of the Other or as belonging to 'them' as opposed to 'us'.}\]
be seen as a general strategy (Flowerdew and Leong 2010), while non-naming and metaphors are tropes which can be realized through othering, which effectively demonstrates that language use by symbolic elites can have considerable influence on the creation and naturalization of objects of knowledge, thus harbouring the potential to influence policy formation on a large scale. However, it is not limited to the national-level as CDS may simultaneously explore the role of international mass media outlets and potential impacts on knowledge surrounding international affairs and conceptions of ‘international society’ also (e.g. Nakanishi 2005).

Overall, CDS casts a wide net in terms of its applications (O'Regan and Betzel forthcoming), but, as a discipline committed to exploring the relationship between language and power, it is well suited to the analysis of political discourse. Theories of power addressed above indicate, whether explicitly or implicitly, the role of legitimation in the maintenance of power as a social structure. Further, (de-)legitimation often relies on communication, and thus ascribes a linguistic dimension to the pursuit of power. However, CDS is not the only field suitable to the study of political discourse. Therefore, the following section aims to discuss frame analysis as another approach to this field of research.

2.1.2 Political Communication: Media and politics

Defining ‘communication’ and ‘media’ precisely is not straightforward, and hence providing a short introduction to political communication and media studies still touch only on the most essential points of relevance to this thesis. To do so, however, this section discusses the applicability of media studies and political communication to other traditions within the social sciences to then introduce and discuss agenda-setting, priming and framing as three phenomena that political communication and media studies is able to use to explore the power of the political communication of issues and its impacts on policy formation, public opinion, and social change.

As stated, this thesis aims to employ a hybrid methodology that incorporates ‘frame studies’ which derives from these fields to analyze Abe’s speeches. There is indeed extensive literature on how public opinion is mediated and shaped by setting the terms of discourse and the framing of issues for the mass media (Schmidt 2008: 311). In Japan (and elsewhere), the political framing of issues can prove a powerful tool in disseminating social norms and practices, and hence socially transformative responses to perceived risks and uncertainties (see Hook et al. forthcoming), making
the analysis of communication both within the mass media and among politicians a necessary and informative undertaking within political science, sociology, and other disciplines\textsuperscript{19}.

Simultaneously, scholars suggest we are (and have been) witnessing the emergence of an international or transnational culture as a result of the global diffusion of various forms of media and art (e.g. Crane 2002; Mattelart 2009). Whether or not one takes this to be a form of cultural imperialism\textsuperscript{20} or ‘the end of history’ with cultures converging on US or ‘Western’ values, it follows that discourses supportive of a new, shared culture would be effectively disseminated, whether top-down by monolithic media conglomerates or bottom-up as a form of cosmopolitanism, spearheaded by civil society (Cox 2013: 344-354), or a bit of both to varying extents. The emergence of an international or transnational culture is related to new conditions within the IPE and IR as it, theoretically at least, influences and is influenced by practices of international business and politics (e.g. Iwabuchi 2002; see also Strang and Meyer 1993) and relates to theories of power such as soft-power and structural power, described in §2.1.1. Thus, the analysis of political communication has implications for traditions within IR theory also, such as the social constructivism (Onuf 1989; Hook 1996a).

Though current developments in mass media communication suggest that its overall influence over the long-term could be on the wane (e.g. Bennett and Iyengar 2008), it is generally acknowledged that the mass media can significantly influence the framing of public issues and concerns, the attribution of responsibility regarding these issues, and hence the pursuit of justice as a response to them (Sen 2009: 219 in Lester forthcoming). The assessment of justice, also, is “inescapably discursive” (Sen 2009: 337 in Lester forthcoming), and therefore social scientific inquiry into the relationships between politics and the media, the media and public opinion, and into the formation of public policy necessitates analyses of political and media communication. Such studies have provided us with a number of important insights into this dynamic. For instance, though different scholars may lay emphasis on which is the most influential stakeholder in the political communication of issues (see §2.2 for discussion on Japan), the fact that the mass media has such an advantageous position in this regard underscores the significant role of agenda-setting in shaping public opinion and hence voting behaviours (Iyengar 2005: 230). Effectively, this makes the media of seminal importance for political power.

\textsuperscript{19} Due to this, research into subaltern discourses surrounding political issues can also prove insightful in explaining power-relations between different groups.

\textsuperscript{20} Cultural imperialism is a phenomenon where powerful stakeholders within powerful countries are able to indoctrinate others of a set of norms and values, practices and codes of conduct (Crane 2002), in principally the same way as described above on national-level manipulation of public opinion.
Here, agenda-setting is defined in similar terms to covert manifestations of power that seek to suffocate social change by controlling the public airing of certain issues, discussed in §2.1.1. Specifically, it denotes the “transmission of issue salience from the media’s agenda to the public’s agenda”, where the former is defined as “the pattern of news coverage for the major issues of the day” (McCombs and Guo 2014: 251-252). The agenda-setting process is considered to be an ongoing contestation between the media professionals, the public and policy elites where the interrelation between stakeholders influences the topics of discussion over politics (Dearing and Rogers 1996), and hence is a form of knowledge management. For instance, advocating ‘engineering of consent’ in the US, Bernays (1928: 9) writes:

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.

(Bernays 1928: 9)

While scholars may draw attention to inter-elite conflicts in the agenda-setting process which impacts the self-sustainability of some hegemonic discourses, the non-elite are nonetheless excluded from this dynamic, often to their detriment (Davis 2007: 172). Hence, in a similar way to ideology discussed in §2.1.1, the analysis of agenda-setting as a form of knowledge management may focus on its sociological and/or cognitive dimensions. Research into the sociological epiphenomena surrounding political communication, for instance, notes that despite the seminal influence of the news media on public opinion and possibly more so on politicians in relatively democratic societies, the ability of journalists to carry out investigative reporting is declining in such states, abetting agenda-setting and incapacitating democracy (Weaver 2015: 12-14; see §2.2 and §3 for discussion on Japan). However, analyses of political communication in particular tend to focus more on its cognitive aspects and is theoretically rooted in social and political psychology (Scheufele 2000).

Two cognitive phenomena that arise from this are priming and framing, which apply to a wide-range of disciplines. Priming denotes “changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” as attention is limited and hence selective making people reliant on heuristics based accessibility of information (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 63-64). This involves influencing cognitive accessibility of an issue based on a memory-based model of information processing, where,

21 The more popularized term, ‘manufacture of consent’ was used by Lippmann (1922) and subsequently in Hermann and Chomsky’s (1988) critical examination of the US media.
for example, the most salient or accessible political issues within memory influences perceptions of political actors or events (Scheufele 2000: 300). Priming is a necessary condition of framing because it raises the salience of certain issues, ideas, interpretations (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Entman 2007: 164), and may explain why certain rhetorical tropes have more resonance than others (Oppermann and Spencer 2013). That is, priming, like agenda-setting, relates to issue salience (see §2.1.3 for discussion on salience).

The notion of framing is used conventionally to denote how one argues a point regarding an issue usually by emphasizing some points and often overlooking others. Its application in political communication and media studies, however, cannot be separated from research into framing in the cognitive sciences where it came to include characterizations of knowledge structures (Cienki 2007: 171). Though conceptually it has come with numerous similar proposals across a range of cognitive disciplines, frames may be considered a coherent region of conceptual space in accordance with human knowledge (Croft and Cruse 2004: 14), and hence influencing the enactment of frames for certain issues is an act of persuasion or manipulation. For instance, in political election campaigns, candidates help to “set an agenda by telling us what issues are important in the campaign” and “can come to have a prevailing image that becomes the frame through which their actions are viewed” (Harris 2004: 238-39), influencing voter behaviour. As discussed in §1, for example, slogans such as “bring back Japan” can influence voter perception on a party’s role and character while Abe’s defining of the 2014 General Election as his administration’s seeking of a mandate over Abenomics is an unambiguous example of agenda-setting.

More generally, framing can dictate one’s decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Druckman 2001). Due to this, studies in public opinion research focus on the possibility of ‘framing effects’ such as when “(often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 104). Also, its direct application to political communication is clear. For instance, 20 per cent of US citizens are considered to believe (in the late 1980s) that too little was being spent on “welfare” while 65 per cent believed there was too little being spent on “assistance to the poor” (Rasinski 1989: 391 in Chong and Druckman 2007: 104), demonstrating the importance of communication over policy. Accordingly, framing can mean both “internal structures of the mind” and “devices embedded in political discourse” (Kinder and Sanders 1990: 74 in Pan and Kosicki 1993: 57), and hence as a strategy of constructing and processing political and news discourse. The point of departure for frame analysts, then, is to view media and political discourse as “a system of organized elements that both indicate the advocacy of
certain ideas and provide devices to encourage certain kinds of audience processing of the texts” (Pan and Kosicki 1993: 55-56).

Here, there are two approaches to conduct a content analysis of frames in the news and, by extension, political communication, which informs the approach adopted in subsequent chapters: inductive and deductive. The inductive approach involves adopting a loose definition of a ‘frame’ to induce extant frames in a text through rigorous analyses of small samples, while the deductive approach involves predefining certain frames as a variable in the content analysis to deduce frames in larger datasets (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000: 94). There are advantages and drawbacks to both approaches. For instance, induction means that researchers induce from the analysis what makes a frame and how it is composed, making the analysis rich and informative of theorized framing processes such as ‘framing effects’ but it is sometimes difficult to replicate because not everything identified by an analyst is applicable to all identified frames in different contexts. Alternatively, researchers can deduce frames in large datasets by adopting a predetermined definition, making it more reliable in terms of replicability but not as informative, not least given that the exact definition of a ‘frame’ or a ‘framing effect’ is still contested in the cognitive sciences as well as discourse and communication analyses (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000: 94). The inductive approach allows researchers to further examine and better pin down the definition of a frame and framing processes, while the deductive approach adds cohesion to frame analysis and hence authority to its analytical findings by adopting a predetermined a definition that can be observed in a variety of contexts. One commonly used definition is provided by Entman (1993) who proposed a taxonomy of frames for this very purpose:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman 1993: 53, italics deleted from original article)

Hence, a frame includes four components, a problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or a treatment recommendation (Entman 1993; see also §4), which has been used by other researchers to identify frames across extensive datasets (e.g. Kohrings and Matthes 2002; Matthes and Kohring 2008). Other definitions of frames have been identified by researchers and used in deductive methodologies in further research, also. For example, lyengar (1990; 1991) explores the impact of two different frame types in television news broadcasts, ‘episodic’ frames, and ‘thematic’
frames on viewers’ attribution of responsibility over political issues. Episodic frames focus “on specific events or particular cases” placing emphasis on “collective outcomes, public policy debates, or historical trends”, while the thematic frame “places political issues and events in some general context” which is “directed at general outcomes or conditions” (Iyengar 1991: 2/14/18). Television news is considered to rely on episodic frames as it depicts individualistic attributions of responsibility for national problems, weakening the accountability of politicians (Iyengar 1990; 1991). The distinction between episodic vs. thematic frames has been applied elsewhere (e.g. Hart 2010), such as to televised news in Japan where it is demonstrated that it relied on episodic frames for its coverage of the 2009 general election (Matsuba and Ueda 2011).

While research has focused on identifying frames and their effects, other research has aimed to identify how frames vary and how they are operationalized within the media and at the elite-level (Entman 2007; 2008; 2010; Snow et al. 2007). There is, for example, an open question over how some frames gain traction over others. In general, cognitively entrenched ‘frames’ are either seen to have out-competed others in a process similar to notions of natural selection22, or to be the result of unfair competition through hegemonic discourses (Koller 2005: 27). Of course, were the latter true it would undermine the former because the issue would not be about suitability—whether in terms of truth or to cognitive conditions for memorization and recall—but to do with access to discourse and social structures of power.

Both CDS and frame analysis emphasize the powerful influence of language use and communication in general on the formation of policy, public opinion and hence also power structures. Research in IR theory, for example, emphasize the illocutionary force of a speaker which denotes “the part of speech constituting an action of social consequence” (Onuf 1989: 81). Frames themselves contribute to the illocutionary force of a speaker because, as stated, it relates to the salience of an issue and how that issue is perceived, where if effective enough, the framing of an issue can have social consequences. While CDS and frame analysis aims to examine illocutionary force, the thesis also discusses the expansive body of research on the particularly forceful—that is persuasive and, at times, manipulative—role of figurative language in political communication. This is discussed in §2.1.3, below.

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22 This is similar to the notion of memes (Dawkins 1976).
2.1.3 Significance of figurative language in politics

Figurative language is a central component of political discourse and can exert significant rhetorical impact. As stated, discourse is dialectically related to society, while the use of language is dialectically related to cognition. That is, if we are to assume that language use has the potential to frame thought, thought also recursively influences our language use and communicative behaviours.

The relation between language and mind has long been a contentious issue, which this thesis does not attempt to resolve. In broad terms, there has been a surge of research into many aspects of language in the post-war period, which has culminated in a wide-range of theories of language (Chomsky 2013). From the late fifties, linguistics was influenced by theories from computability theory, formal mathematics and logic, such as Emil Post’s mechanism for formal languages (Scholz and Pullum 2007; Chomsky 2011). Linguistics shifted from the mathematically informed approach of structuralism, which analyzed surface structures of language (Harris 1951), to address its more deep-seated, theorized cognitive aspects (Chomsky 1957). This opened up the “possibility of [the] development of a very general theory of syntax for formal systems” (Kneebone 2001: 281), epitomized by generativism which proposes that all languages contain a set of rules, denoted as a grammar, and have the capacity to generate recursively an infinite number of compositional sentences of a language (Chomsky 1957; Jackendoff 2007: 28). Generativism has long been established as a core linguistic tradition. However, other theories of language have taken research from areas of linguistics located on the periphery of this formalist paradigm to develop alternative, and often broader, theories of language (Langacker 1991; Croft and Cruse 2004; Evans and Green 2006; Feldman 2006).

Put simply, this research area addresses ‘what language is’. However, its conceptual and analytical tools have informed other linguistic research which employs different theories of language in attempts to address different research questions. For example, Functional Linguistics contends that language is a communicative device, making it necessary to understand how it operates, or, in other words, to address ‘what language does’. It is within this context that the use of figurative language is often contended to be intimately connected to our thought processes (Reddy 1979; Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and hence, a significant rhetorical tool in political communication (Chilton 1996; Pikalo 2008; Lakoff 2009b).

The qualitative analysis of this thesis includes metaphors as a linguistic unit of analysis (see §7). Due to this, the following subsections aim to provide an account of the significance of metaphors in political discourse analysis with explanations and definitions of the relevant concepts and terminology. As stated above, the use of figurative language is particularly salient in political
discourse as it has a large impact on how concepts are framed (Pan and Kosicki 1993), or in other words, our knowledge of a given issue and hence the appropriateness of political responses to it. The analysis of figurative language in political discourse typically focusses on the use of metaphor, which allows us to “go through a process of seeing X, or a certain aspect of X, as belonging to Y; or, again, we are influenced in our view of X by Y” (Hook 1996a: 141). To provide an example from political discourse during the Cold War, speaking of an alternative politico-economic ideology such as communism in terms of a disease to be excised is not likely to “evoke the brutal image of a rightist knife slashing a communist throat” but rather, to evoke “the civilized image of a surgeon’s scalpel cutting out abnormality from an unhealthy body” (Hook 1996a: 141). The political use of figurative language contributes to a political expediency in the ‘management of knowledge’ (see van Dijk 2005) surrounding certain often esoteric or complex issues by influencing the “knowledge stored as social information about ideas, values and practices” (Chilton 2004: 51). Here, a given complex issue is described figuratively in more relatable and hence memorable and emotive terms, often based on more emotive concepts derived from embodied experience and/or day-to-day life (Kövecses 2005; 2010; Lakoff 2009b), which affords the foregrounding or backgrounding of associated aspects or information concerning the issue (Musolff 2004; Charteris-Black 2005; De Landtsheer 2007; Goatly 2007; Hart 2008; Flowerdew and Leong 2010).

Cognitive accounts of metaphor theory provide an explanation of how information concerning an issue may be foregrounded or backgrounded on the basis of metaphor use. Here, metaphors are considered to be enacted in a source domain and a target domain within the mind where the associative content of the target domain is compared with the content of the source domain. For example, to talk of communism as a disease is to mentally equate conceptions of ‘communism’ in the target domain to conceptions of ‘disease’ in the source. Metaphors may not be a direct linguistic comparison such as ‘we must overcome the communist disease’ but can be expressed in subtler terms. Such cases are examined in more detail using Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which claims that, conceptually concrete sources are used to relate to abstract targets which fall into patterns of usage making such comparisons highly conventional to the point of naturalization. Such comparisons are denoted as conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Turner 1989; Goatly 2007) and are identifiable across a range of languages, including Japanese (Matsuki 1995; Kövecses 2005). For example, one conceptual metaphor in English is to speak of an angry person as though he/she is a pressurized container, with phrases such as ‘you make my blood boil’, ‘let him stew’, and so forth (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987:195/198). Equivalent expressions exist in Japanese with phrases such as
‘to get angry with blue streaks [i.e., veins] bulging’, ‘hold it in the stomach’ meaning ‘to suppress one’s anger’, among others (Matsuki 1995: 139/144-145).

It is argued that such conceptual metaphors are indicative of a cognitive schema or conceptual model as long-term knowledge concerning a given concept wherein the cross-domain conceptual mappings orchestrated by metaphorical comparison comprise a fixed-set of ontological correspondences, or, in other words, implicit associations, which afford the foregrounding and backgrounding of information (Chilton 2004: 51; Lai et al. 2009: 145). This is supported by a number of psycholinguistic experiments which assert that metaphorical mappings underlie figurative meanings of many metaphors and preserve the cognitive topology of source domains (Gibbs and Colston 2012: 146). Based on such schemata, figurative language also includes metonymy which is where one denotes X by using a term that is related to it within its conceptual model to refer to it, denoted here as $x_i$. An example is the expression ‘she caught his ear’, where, in most scenarios, such a phrase is likely to be metonymical, where ‘ear’ is surrogated for ‘attention’ – something conventionally required if someone talking was to be understood.

The use of both metaphor and metonymy is observed in political discourse (e.g. Chilton 1987). However, there is ambiguity and conceptual overlap in figurative language use where it is unclear as to whether a synecdoche—a rhetorical trope where a term for part of something refers to the whole or vice versa—is metonymical or metaphoric. For example, the sentence ‘Japan seeks a peaceful resolution to North Korean aggression’ may either be a metaphorical personification of a country or a metonymical reference of a state as a country (Croft and Cruse 2004: 220; Leith and Soule 2011: 66). Nonetheless, despite the ambiguity, it is because of the fuzzy boundaries of the subject category that, whether metaphorical or metonymical, the synecdoche affords a political expediency to inform how the schematic boundaries of an epistemic community based on shared knowledge and presumptions among the public is demarcated; put simply, informing who belongs to ‘us’ and who belongs to ‘them’.

Research into this area typically asserts that metaphor influences perceptions of the social/political constructions that constitute reality (Charteris-Black 2004; 2005; Goatly 2007; Hülsse 2008; Lakoff 1996; 2009a; Underhill 2013). In this light, the literature varies in approach in terms of how far they delve into explicating theorized, deep-seated cognitive structures and how far they examine the utility of a metaphor in characterizing or reinforcing sociopolitical structures. For the former, CMT is a theory of cognitive semantic processing, and is placed within Cognitive Linguistics and Psycholinguistics which examines the relationship between the cognitive processing of figurative and literal language use. In more general terms, incorporating cognitive theories into
one’s approach to discourse analysis can be fruitful because it attempts to provide an account of salience – that is, what resonates (and what does not resonate) in the mind(s) of the listener(s), a topic at the core of all research on political communication. Due to this, before returning to the review of literature on figurative language, a brief discussion on the issue of salience serves to highlight the complex and as yet intangible issue of salience in communicative analyses, which informs the discussion here as well as the methodology, explained in §4.

For figurative language, for instance, there are a number of models of salience whose brief explanation here serves to highlight the issue of salience in discourse analysis as a whole (but see also §4). Firstly, Indirect Access Models state that literal meanings always take precedence over metaphorical ones while Direct Access Models propose that neither take precedence as an immutable rule (Lai et al. 2009: 146; see also Searle 1979; Gibbs 2001; Gentner and Wolff 1997; Coulsen and Matlock 2001). Other models attempt to theorize the semantic processing of salience such as the Gradient Salience Model which suggests that salience of a linguistic expression determines how quickly it is understood (Giora 1997; 2003) – and so, potentially, how effectively it is communicated. Here, salience is a construction determined by novelty, context, conventionality, and frequency (Giora 2003; Schmidt et al. 2010: 3).

While it is derived from the Cognitive Sciences, these indicators of salience are observable in the literature on discourse analysis. For example, Oppermann and Spencer (2013) argue that context influences the salience of a metaphor. Here, the salience of an issue relates to priming, and so is the priority of issues to be addressed concerning a given topic (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Additionally, metaphors operate to frame these issues, and so issue salience is a factor that can explain “why certain metaphors resonate stronger in the public sphere than others” (Oppermann and Spencer 2013: 46/50; see also Brewer et al. 2003). Further, context is significant as the frequency and power of metaphors all increase in political speeches in times of crisis (De Landtsheer 1994; De Landtsheer and De Vrij 2004) and the use of image-based rhetoric – e.g. through figurative language – contributes to the perceived charisma and greatness of a politician (Emrich et al. 2001), and hence his/her communicative impact.

While context and frequency may be interrelated, frequency relates also to conventionality and novelty. For instance, conventional metaphors (metaphors frequently used) are considered by some to have a particularly powerful ideological impact as their inherent logic is naturalized and hence unscrutinized, thus contributing to hegemonic discourses (Goatly 2007; see also Fairclough 1989: 92-107). If salience is determined by how quickly something is understood, then conventional metaphors have a considerable impact on the salience of a linguistic expression. However, if the
The importance of figurative language, particularly metaphor, here is important because it appeals to *ethos* and is crucial to politicians who aim to establish ‘affective bonds’, related to integrative power, with their followers and appeals to *logos* by translating complicated issues into more familiar terms to the public, often at the expense of accuracy (Feldman 2005: 111; Vertessen and De Landtsheer 2008: 274). However, while it is agreed that the framing of issues relates to salience, salience as a concept is determined by a range of intangible factors whose interrelations in language use are impossible to succinctly define, despite a range of models from the cognitive sciences that aim to do so. Nonetheless, the rhetorical effect of metaphor is rooted in the shared knowledge surrounding an issue, or, in other terms, its collectively-recognized *context* (van Dijk 2010). ‘Shared knowledge’ is central to the rhetorical impact of figurative language because it allows speakers to “insert unstated and questionable assumptions into the argument as implicit premises” (Neagu 2013: 38). In the case above, the metaphor works to imply that a return to militarism or imperialism does not necessarily follow from self-defence, which works to minimize the rhetorical power of the contemporaneous Social Democratic Party and many within domestic society, who frequently claimed otherwise (Hook et al. 2012) or claim that self-defence is only a pretext to separate agendas. Therefore, for cases concerning issues of security, or rather, highly securitized issues (see §3), the selection of metaphor (and metonymy) as a qualitative linguistic unit of analysis may provide an enriched insight into framing effects of political speeches. This is because metaphors are used more frequently in times of perceived crises, they are used to communicate complex matters, accurately or not, in simple and more emotive terms, and they afford political expediency with regards the organization of epistemic communities and the conceptual organization of an issue based
on ‘shared knowledge’. While other methods can be used to examine the important issue of salience (see §4), metaphor as a unit of analysis offers additional information of how a salient issue is framed. However, it is not enough for this thesis to simply describe theories and approaches to political communication and discourse. Rather, it is also necessary to discuss political communication within Japan before moving on to the theoretical approach. This is carried out in §2.2, below.

2.2 Contemporary Japanese political communication

While the previous section outlined approaches to political discourse analysis, this section provides an overview of the recent changes in Japanese politics and the impact these changes have had on political communication, as a background to the theoretical approach in §3. Since the end of the Cold War, Japanese politics is widely considered to have undergone significant changes which has placed greater emphasis on political communication. This section examines research that attempts to identify the major agency of power within the policymaking process and concludes that recent changes in Japan’s political system suggest that there is more power over policymaking decisions among senior members of the Cabinet, particularly on the prime minister, than ever before in Japan’s postwar history, making effective political communication from the Cabinet key.

Exactly who holds power in the Japanese policymaking process has long been a contentious issue. Traditionally, the tripartite model has been used to outline the most powerful agents. The model “stresses the elitist nature and high degree of interdependence between its principal actors, identified as the central bureaucracy, big business (zaikai) and the governing party” (Hook et al. 2012: 39). While the National Diet is Japan’s bicameral legislature and constitutionally “the highest organ of state power” (Pempel 1974: 648) in which both houses comprise elected representatives, much research focusses on discerning the relation between the three constituents, particularly bureaucracy and politicians, within the tripartite model and who among them can be said to hold the most power in deciding policy.

Traditional perspectives in the literature have tended to employ an inductive approach (Campbell and Scheiner 2008: 89). For example, Pempel (1974) examines the Diet’s legislative role, the control exercised over advisory committees, and the links between the LDP and the bureaucracy to assess its role in policymaking. Here, Pempel (1974) claims that the most successful legislation is drafted by the bureaucracy owing to its substantial control over nonlegislative devices such as ordinance powers and advisory panels. Further, the combined legislative power of the bureaucracy and the LDP, and the close institutional ties between them, as illustrated for example by the LDP’s
personnel controls over promotions within the bureaucracy, points to the 'bureaucratization' of policymaking in general (Pempel 1974).

Conversely, deductively-based rational choice frameworks suggest otherwise (Campbell and Scheiner 2008: 89-90). For instance, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) analyze institutional rules in Japanese politics, how political parties adapt to these rules and how organizations manipulate the institutional environment. Here, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) use the 'political marketplace' metaphor to describe their theory based on a principal-agent model where voters act as 'principals' and legislators as 'agents', who then choose bureaucrats and judges to address the voter's problems. The principle-agent model is more readily associated with stockholders and managers in firms within economics research and game theoretical modelling. However, using this framework, the authors contend that “the institutional framework of government [...] decisively shapes the character of political competition in Japan”, “the players in this competitive political market try to build organizations adapted to that framework”, and “also try to manipulate the framework to their private advantage” (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993: 3). Crucially, the principal-agent model suggests that the bureaucracy has minimal power in policymaking compared to political leaders who, as maximizers of self-interest, are limited in power as they are reliant on winning in the political marketplace and so their actions are dictated by currying favour among voters (see §3 for rational-choice frameworks). Thus, through two different approaches, we see two entirely different assessments on the nature of power in Japanese politics.

The rational-choice theory approach has been criticized as oversimplifying political motivations based on gain and loss to explain such a complex social phenomenon as the Japanese political process. Further, this streamlining of the basic tenets of behaviourism onto institutions in favour of examining their cultural and social meaning has ideological implications in line with American economic individualism despite the profound cultural differences between each polity (Johnson and Keehn 1994: 15). However, despite this, both studies may be seen as operating under assumptions of a false dichotomy between politicians and bureaucrats where in reality, political-bureaucratic alliances have often worked against other political-bureaucratic alliances in the policymaking process (Campbell and Scheiner 2008: 109). What is important to note is that, while power has centralized in the Japanese political process, both the bureaucracy and politicians are linked together in important ways (Campbell and Scheiner 2008). The nexus between the bureaucracy, the LDP, as well as to business elites within the tripartite model, is conventionally considered a by-product of the Japanese domestic practice of nemawashi ('wrapping around the roots'). This is the cultural practice in political or business affairs of carrying out preliminary negotiations to establish
consensus among all parties concerned before some proposed change or project is carried out, and, whether predominantly ‘collusive’ or ‘cooperative’, has led some claim that the Japanese political body is ‘acephalous’, without a leader (van Wolferen 1989). For instance, traditionally, “any legislative proposal to reach the level of Cabinet endorsement and thence to the Diet floor had to be approved by all relevant LDP committees”, and “the Cabinet would only discuss legislative proposals that were unanimously approved” by the LDP’s General Affairs Committee “even though there was nothing in the law—even in the party’s written rules—requiring the Cabinet” to do so (Estévez-Abe 2006: 636-7). Such a practice is not enabled by legislation but is a normative production and extends into the realm of IR, with Japan's traditional approach international affairs through 'quiet diplomacy' a case-in-point (Hook et al. 2012: 71-73).

This framework reflects the mechanisms of Japanese ‘quiet diplomacy’ on prioritizing long-term agenda and consensus-building both within the domestic political process and international affairs, and also has led to some colourful metaphorical descriptions to describe it such as 'kingmakers' (kingumēkā), 'shadow shoguns' (yami shōgun), or 'shadow warriors' (kagemusha), to depict powerful players and leaders who wield great influence but remain in the shadow, out of view from the demos (Feldman 2005; Hook et al. 2012: 73). However, a number of changes has led to a shift of power into the Cabinet's hands while also making party dominance less secure (at least temporarily) and hence has placed greater incentive for politicians to use their intangible resources such as communicative efficacy to curry support, whether tacit or not, among the electorate to make frequently substantial changes to the state and its relationship to its citizens.

While this latter point is discussed in more detail in §3, the key changes among these are discussed below. These are electoral reform (§2.2.1); a change in media culture on politics (§2.2.2); reforms to the Cabinet (§2.2.3), and a summary of points (§2.2.4).

### 2.2.1 Electoral reform

While the ramifications of recent election results are discussed in more detail in §3, this subsection aims to provide a concise overview to the electoral reform of 1994, as a point of departure to the very significant changes in the Japanese political process, post-Cold War.

Electoral reform came in 1994 following the LDP gaining a vote of no confidence the year before after several dozen Lower House representatives left to form new parties and formed a

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23 Though of course significant events took place before this time in order to lead up to it (e.g., see Horiuchi 2009; Krauss and Pekkanen 2010).
coalition of ‘anti-LDP’ parties, which subsequently attained public office (Reed et al. 2012: 356). The resultant electoral reform changed the election system from the traditional single non-transferable vote system of Japan’s Lower House to a new system where out of 480 seats, 300 are contested through a winner-take-all single-seat district, while the final 180 seats are gained through closed-list proportional representation (Reed et al. 2012: 356).

The LDP’s dominance before electoral reform was, to a large extent, reliant on its formidable rural base where politicians nurtured strong, clientelistic bonds with various organized groups, remaining in power from its formation in 1955 to 1993 (Reed et al. 2012: 354; Pempel 2010). However, the electoral reform significantly weakened intraparty competition and reduced such reliance on clientelism, particularism, and personalism (Reed et al. 2012: 354). Pork-barrel politics gave way to electoral strategies more inclined to promises towards the collective provision of benefits to larger portions of the electorate, reducing pro-rural malapportionment among larger parties or coalitions, while other parties such as the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) increasingly began to rely on ‘product’ strategies aimed at establishing niche ‘markets’ of voters, which presumably increases bargaining power in the formation of coalitions (Hirano 2006; Asano and Wakefield 2010; Reed et al. 2012: 356-357; Hirabayashi 2012: 394; Catalinac 2015). Put simply, the reform has caused a shift in electoral strategies where major political parties especially appeal to the median voter, which is argued to have a significant impact on their ideological bearings (see §3). That is, there is significant contestation on defining what constitutes the ‘centre’ in terms of public opinion over certain issues. Further, there is less overt representation from bureaucratic agencies, businesses, and other organized groups as individual party leaders increasingly take centre-stage with the role of the prime minister in policymaking strengthened (§2.2.3) to the point that, since the turn of the millennium, the assessment of the party leader has had a significant impact on electoral performance (Jou and Endo 2015). This new, more competitive electoral system also indirectly places heightened importance on party image and the image of its leader as ministerial appointment strategies, as an indicator of change in a party’s priorities, have shifted emphasis away from office-seeking through factional balancing and a seniority system, towards policy-seeking and vote-seeking, encouraging a packaged party label as a brand to appeal to voters (Pekkanen et al. 2013). This, in turn, has impacted political communication to the electorate, which goes hand-in-hand with recent changes within the mass media and journalism, and is discussed in the following subsection.
2.2.2 Change in media culture and politics

The commercialization of media representation of politics is observable on a worldwide scale (Sakamoto 2008) as well as Japan (Tanifuji 2003). However, since the dominance of the LDP in 1955 to the 1994 election reform, the relationship between the media and politics was characterized by the dominance of print media; the primacy of the ‘big fives’ daily newspapers (the Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nikkei Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun) and the NHK, Japan’s national public broadcasting organization; a collusive system between politicians and business elites with selected journalists in press clubs or ‘kisha clubs’; difficulty in breaking controversial news stories because of this co-opting system; and preoccupation with factional politics over the ‘bigger picture’ (McCargo 2003: 74-75).

In the early nineties, new trends in media coverage of politics emerged with the rise of commercial broadcasters, such as TV Asahi, and an increased tendency for certain programmes to make politics more ‘accessible’ (McCargo 2003: 75). Additionally, LDP politicians were engaged more critically in interviews, such as Soichirō Tahara’s critical interview of PM Kiichi Miyazawa (1991-1993) which served as another fatal blow to Miyazawa’s premiership, alongside satirical depictions of political issues, such as Hiroshi Kume’s nightly feature on the corruption scandal centered on Shin Kanemaru, an LDP kingmaker at the time (McCargo 2003: 56-61). Telegenic politicians with better communication skills also came to the fore as soft-news programmes and ‘infotainment’ shows increasingly began to report on political issues, with, for instance, former PM, Junichirō Koizumi (2001-2005), known for his ability to utilize such outlets in both television and print news (McCargo 2003: 75; Kabashima and Steel 2010: 61).

In general, political coverage of issues became more condensed, while Japanese political leaders, acting in this new environment, became more ‘extroverted’, using more emotive and personal language, in pursuit of favourable media exposure through soft-interviews and sound bites as well as becoming more assertive and vocal on security issues (Estévez-Abe 2006; Mishima 2007; Uchiyama 2010; Inoguchi and Jain 2011; Kabashima and Steel 2012; Catalinac 2015). This is not only limited to favourable coverage by the press in the national newspapers or television, but also extends to campaigns and discussions online, particularly since the ban on election campaigning online was lifted in 2013 (Hirabayashi 2014: 375). Thus, political parties, particularly since the Koizumi administration, have also adopted strategies of media management with the help of think-tanks as the government increasingly relies on managing information to the press to manage its public relations.
Finally, as opposed to the pre-1994 system, the prime minister has become increasingly portrayed as “leader of his party” and, metonymically, “of Japan” (Pekkanen and Nyblade 2005: 368). While the change in the media culture in Japan and the electoral reform has accommodated this transition, the notion that the prime minister as ‘leader of the party’ is not entirely unfounded as a result of increased executive power in the policymaking process, discussed below.

2.2.3 Change in Cabinet structure and policy

As stated, the role of the prime minister in policymaking has strengthened (Estévez-Abe 2006; Mishima 2007; Uchiyama 2010). Though a number of prime ministers in the 1990s sought to centralize power to the Cabinet, major reform took place during the Koizumi administration where politics changed from intra-party factions to a Westminster system where power is more centralized into the hands of the PM (Estévez-Abe 2006: 633; Azuma 2007; Kabashima and Steel 2010: 106-108). After regaining public office following the 2005 general election, Koizumi carried out the following measures to enact this change (in Estévez-Abe 2006: 639):

1. “Punishment of rebels”
   - Rebels “who ran against the LDP’s official candidates were asked to leave the party” or face expulsion;
   - LDP members “who voted against Koizumi’s Postal Reform Bills” and “[l]ocal politicians who campaigned [...] for rebel candidates [...] were asked to resign”.

2. “Preparation of a reform bill for Campaign Finance Law”
   - Centralization of the LDP’s “control over individual MP’s fund raising activities in the name of the party”.

3. “Treatment of new Diet members”
   - Instructing new MPs not to join intra-party factions and promote “a new effort to create a mechanism to train and assist new MPs”.

4. “Preparation for a new Human Resources Management System”
   - Establish a “personnel file within the part on each of the Diet member on their policy expertise”.

5. Anti-intra-party factions based Cabinet reshuffling
   - Never solicit recommendations from intra-party faction leaders “for filling the Cabinet positions”;
   - Ensuring that the Prime Minister decides all Cabinet-level appointments.
6. New term limit on chairmanship of Policy Affairs Research Committees
   
   - “[T]wo-year limit on the chairmanship of the same intra-party committees to prevent persistence of fiefdoms”.

   (Estévez-Abe 2006: 639)

As a result, new rules in Japanese intra-party politics “transformed the formal prerogatives of the LDP president and prime minister into real sources of power” (Estévez-Abe 2006: 650-651).

This power refocused emphasis on the person to be elected, where personality as well as policy became increasingly salient factors in garnering support among the electorate. In terms of political communication, the LDP now typically employs “courageous rhetoric over a detailed outline of specific policies” in order to win the confidence of those who are worried about the future, while their opponents typically focus on “presenting themselves as the real representatives of the people” (Inoguchi 2011: 18; §1.1.3). Here, we see two different kinds of appeals to Zeitgemaessheit, i.e. what “occurs when political leaders are in harmony with the political environment of the time” (Inoguchi 2011: 24). That is, although the LDP prime ministers after Koizumi are not particularly remembered for their charisma (Inoguchi 2011: 24), while the opposition typically attempt to portray themselves as the true representatives of the electorate, the true centre, the LDP have placed onus on conveying a strength of character in leaders who ‘make tough decisions’ and ‘do what one must’ in terms of policies. Both effectively impute personality traits onto a political party, whether, in terms of international affairs, as characteristic representatives of the nation, its people, or both.

2.2.4 Political communication in Japan today

Overall, the literature suggests that political communication in Japan has changed. Though there are debates about where exactly power lies within the tripartite model, it is generally agreed that following electoral reform, and particularly following the Cabinet reforms enacted by PM Koizumi, the executive authority of the Cabinet has strengthened. With this, the electoral reform has heightened inter-party competition ahead of overt competition among intra-party factions and has therefore encouraged parties to take a unified stance on issues as they increasingly appeal to the median voter in a balancing act between gaining more supporters and not losing old ones deemed to be on the periphery of the centre.

Similarly, change in the media culture has placed more emphasis on the personality of political leaders while also providing a more competitive environment for politicians which has led to their reliance on bold, assertive rhetoric and shrewd political communication in order to garner
support. These changes highlight the importance of political discourse analysis of Japanese politicians, which discussed further in the context of depoliticization in §3.

2.3 Summary

This chapter has provided the literature review for the thesis. The literature review covered the expansive fields of political discourse research and political communication studies while also emphasizing the significance of figurative language in political rhetoric. The main point argued here is that CDS casts a wide-net in terms of its applications but focusses primarily on explaining the relationship between power and language in socially-situated contexts. A supplementary but nonetheless crucial point is that the above theories of power incorporate within their definitions of power a communicative dimension due to the role legitimacy, persuasion, and manipulation play in maintaining or contesting systems of power. Further, the literature review examined ‘framing’ research within political communication studies, contending that political framing is a powerful tool in disseminating social norms and practices, and is compatible with IR theory, thereby giving it utility in explaining certain political actions involving a state’s IR.

Additionally, political communication in Japan was examined. It was argued that significant changes within the Japanese political process and the media have placed greater importance on effective communication by political leaders. Further, electoral reform and a change in the way mass media outlets provide political coverage has placed greater importance on effective political communication and on the personality of political leaders within a more competitive electoral and political environment. This, in turn, has led politicians to rely on assertive rhetoric to win votes. At the same time, structural changes to the Cabinet have granted more influence in the policymaking process to political leaders, reinforcing the link between the personality of a political leader and the image of the party.

While the literature review has unavoidably covered a wide-range of issues connected to the topic of this thesis, the following chapter aims to build on the issues discussed in this chapter to construct a suitable theoretical approach for the analysis.
3 Theoretical Approach

3.0 Introduction

This chapter aims to build on the discussion in §2 to explicate the thesis’ theoretical approach, and is separated into four sections. §3.1 introduces Critical Realism and the specific approach to CDS adopted in this thesis, the dialectical-relational approach. As a result, the following sections, §3.2 and §3.3, aim to locate a ‘semiotic point of entry’ to the discursive analysis. §3.2 examines the changes to Japan’s security agenda positing that constitutive norms comprise an important set of analytical tools to effectively explain this transition. Also, it contends that ‘securitization theory’ is a useful ‘point-of-entry’ for the qualitative analysis. Secondly, §3.3 links the changes in Japanese politics, particularly since the onset of the second Abe administration, with ‘post-politics’ more readily associated with analyses of European and external Anglophone countries. It is argued that depoliticization, as a discursive practice is also a semiotic point of entry to the textual analysis. Further, it discusses the processes and motivations behind speech-writing in Japan, with a focus on the Abe administration and why speeches are suitable for the analysis that follows in this thesis. Finally, the chapter concludes with §3.4, which summarizes findings to transition into the explication of the research methodology, carried out in §4.

3.1 The Dialectical-relational approach

The approach to the qualitative analysis is provided here as it informs the composition of the theoretical approach. This thesis employs CDS, specifically Fairclough’s (2009) dialectical-relational approach. While CDS was discussed in §2.1.1, the dialectical-relational approach is selected on the basis of its transdisciplinarity, conglomerating disciplines and theories to promote dialogue suitable for theoretical and methodological development (Fairclough 2009: 163). This thesis aims to contribute to knowledge in its analysis of Abe’s speeches during, and in the run up to, significant policy changes (§1). To this end, the rest of the theoretical approach attempts to identify social theories and analytical tools from IR theory, research regarding the sociopolitical recalibration of
risk in Japanese society, and research on depoliticization to develop an appropriate approach for the subsequent analyses.

It is first necessary, however, to explain the dialectical-relational approach, and so a brief overview of the key components of critical realism and how it relates to CDS, specifically the dialectical-relational approach, is provided in this section. Moreover, this approach provides the framework by which these issues are discussed separately within this chapter, and so the relationship between CDS and critical realism is first discussed in §3.1.1, and the key tenets of the approach this thesis adopts is explicated in §3.1.2.

3.1.1 Critical Realism

Critical realism (CR) is a philosophy of science which asserts that ontology is not irreducible to epistemology, rather there are unobserved structures in reality which cause observable events (Bhaskar 2010). It claims there is a stratified ontology where knowledge of the world may be distinguished between two sets. These are intransitive or ontological objects of knowledge and transitive or epistemological objects of knowledge. Transitive knowledge is “embodied in theories, practices, discourse and texts” which is “socially and historically located and engendered”, while intransitive knowledge points to a world outside the human mind where, regardless of whether it is known or not, it comprises reality (Joseph and Roberts 2004: 2). For instance, the ancient Greek theory of atomism is an example of ‘transitive knowledge’ while the fact that atoms exist is an intransitive object of knowledge, entirely invariant of human knowledge of it (Joseph and Roberts 2004).

CR asserts that discourse comprises a potentially important part of reality but it is essential to examine how it interacts with non-discursive social structures and causal mechanisms (Joseph and Roberts 2004). The dialectical-relational approach is an approach to the analysis of semiosis, which is considered to affect social practice (Fairclough et al. 2004: 24; §2). That is, semiosis “can generate variation, have selective effects, and contribute to the differential retention and/or institutionalization of social phenomena” (Jessop 2004: 164). Owing to the CR’s ontological emphasis, semiosis is considered both meaningful and causally efficacious despite many within the hermeneutic tradition viewing causal explication (erklären) as uncharacteristic of communication or redundant, and so favouring interpretative understanding (verstehen) for its analysis (Fairclough et al. 2004: 24-25; (Joseph and Roberts 2004: 2; Kurki 2007; Suganami 2013).

CR’s social ontology distinguishes the ‘real’ from the ‘actual’ and ‘empirical’, where:
The real refers to objects, their structures or natures and their causal powers and liabilities. The ‘actual’ refers to what happens when those powers and liabilities are activated and produce change. The ‘empirical’ is the subset of the real and the actual that is experienced by actors. (Fairclough et al. 2004: 25)

Objects are “structured and as having particular causal powers and liabilities”, and hence able to “act in certain ways and/or suffer changes” (Fairclough et al. 2004: 25-26). Here, CR contends that causation should centre on what it is that produces change, and that reasons can be responsible for this and hence operate as causes (Fairclough et al. 2004: 25-26). While this applies to political speeches and legitimating policy change, it must be noted that although a speech might be construed differently among its recipients, it does not mean that it cannot influence voting and hence is not meaningful (Bhaskar 1979; Collier 1994; both in Fairclough et al. 2004: 26). Due to this, the combination of erklären and verstehen are seen to provide a more coherent, holistic and impactful explanation of events (Fairclough et al. 2004: 26).

The assertion that causal powers are integral to our conception of causation, to scientific knowledge, and also to our thinking and practice in day-to-day life, is not incompatible with other views such as causal idealism which rejects the regularity view of causation (Suganami 2013). Viewing causation thus is to view events in open systems such as IR as the product of a combination of causal factors to particular cases (Cornell and Parker 2010: 32; Suganami 2013), facilitating the investigation of its semiotic effects (Fairclough 2009). The dialectical-relational approach allows us to examine semiotic effects, and, therefore, is discussed below.

3.1.2 The dialectical-relational approach

Semiosis is an element of the social process that is seen as the interplay between social structures, practices and events, comprising social reality (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2009: 164). Elements internalize other elements but are not reducible to them, meaning the social process is dialectically related to others (Harvey 1996; Fairclough 2009: 163). The analysis of discourse also amounts to an analysis of its potential impact, which intersects social structures, practices and events. Here, a step-by-step guide of the dialectical-relational approach is provided below:

1. Focus on a particular social issue and use transdisciplinary methods to construct relevant objects of research;
2. Identify obstacles to address the issue;
3. Consider the necessity of this social issue in the current social order;
4. Identify potential means to overcome it.

(Fairclough 2009: 174-82)

Here, the social issue addressed is depoliticization as a strategy in order to facilitate the implementation of policy. Depoliticization denotes “the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making” (Burnham 2001: 128 in Burnham 2014: 195). While this is addressed in more detail in §3.3, most concretely, it also involves governing with minimal interference from political divisions, pushing such differences into the public sphere, and otherwise suppression of differences in favour of a national consensus. Politicization and depoliticization are not considered opposites. For instance, this thesis argues that Abe depoliticizes chiefly by prioritizing international commitments. This also relates to the processes of globalisation such as deterritorialization of the nation-state which undermines its popular democratic sovereignty (§8; Dobson 2015: 466; Giddens 1991). With this has emerged theories of a ‘post-democratic’ regime in advanced states where deterritorialization and deindustrialization have endowed capital to the point that it undermines the fundamental tenets of democracy (Crouch 2004), or a kind of provincialized democracy due to the rise of the ‘national security state’ which seeks a protective sovereignty at the expense of the state’s own democratic and liberal infrastructure (Mendieta 2015).

While this is commonly considered to denote the “rolling back” of the state owing to the pressures of neoliberal globalization, broader definitions suggest a more accurate depiction is an “evolution of government”, and hence its relationship with its citizens and the state’s IR (Foster et al. 2014: 232). Despite this, it is too simple to denounce depoliticization or politicization as a social bad (Flinders and Wood 2014; Hay 2014). Additionally, orienting the theoretical approach of this thesis such that depoliticization is taken to be a social issue implies a “crypto-normativity that treats one form of politics as genuine and others as inauthentic” (Jessop 2014: 207), and may make the false assumptions of a “golden age” of politics in the past (Foster et al. 2014: 228).

Therefore, this thesis argues that many changes in Japanese politics can be explained by depoliticization, particularly under the Abe administration, where depoliticizing arguments have been used to legitimate policy changes which have further changed the state’s relationship with its citizens and potentially other states. Here, depoliticization and politicization are seen to operate as “parallel and simultaneous sociopolitical trends”, where politicizing content may be identifiable in contextual depoliticizing shifts in governance and vice versa (Bates et al. 2014: 246/257). Hence, depoliticization is used here as a heuristic to examine shifts in power and authority under the Abe
administration. That is, depoliticization is considered a key political strategy of the Abe administration in order to enact new legislations some of which undermine fundamentally the constitution. This is facilitated by discourses of risk in domestic society which minimize or suppress democratic deliberation in favour of top-down decisions from the national government or epistemic groups whether as urgent responses to threats to sovereignty (Mason 2013; 2014) or a technocratic response to an esoteric risk (Hirakawa and Shirabe 2015). Again, this is concordant with the literature on depoliticization, which suggests that the process of depoliticization facilitates the conditions for “technocratic decision making and/or the self-responsibilisation” of individuals, groups and organizations (Jessop 2014: 215).

Before discussing depoliticization under the Abe administration, however, it is first necessary to explicate the issue of constitutional reinterpretation in Japan as an example of Abe’s prioritization of international commitments over domestic democratic processes. To do so, §3.2 explicates the security changes carried out by the Abe administration, particularly pertaining to Collective Self-Defense (CSD) and the constitution. Following this, §3.3 builds on the discussion in §1.1 and §2.2 by examining the political communication, media relations and election platforms of the Abe administration, to discuss how processes of depoliticization have intensified during Abe’s post-2012 premiership.

3.2 Democracy, state and security

This section explains the security changes enacted by the Abe administration and its implications for the state’s IR and relations with its citizens. A major policy issue concerns CSD and the general expansion of the Japanese state’s military activities abroad, which is part of a much larger issue rooted in the history of the nation, and the complex dynamics between social structures, agency and norms, both domestic and international. It is argued here that the analytical tools used to explicate this change are also applicable to discursive analysis as they provide a context by which to understand the normative transposition of the state, which is often rationalized semiotically, for example, through figurative language (§2.1.3; Hook 1996a)

This section is divided into three subsections. Firstly, §3.2.1 provides an overview of the policy change permitting the state to exercise CSD wherein it is argued that it is inextricable to the legislative and normative constraints on the state and hence the state’s relation with its citizens. §3.2.2 discusses such change in its broader context, in §3.2.2.1, §3.2.2.2, and §3.2.2.3. The former elucidates changes to Japan’s security policy post-Cold War, contending that the use of norms as an
analytical tool provides a holistic account of such change. The following attempts to define ‘security’ itself, arguing post-Cold War conceptions of security have been transposed from a state-centric emphasis onto the individual which broadens it into domains otherwise external to its national-militaristic sense. Finally, the latter discusses securitization theory as a ‘semiotic point of entry’ to assess what Abe defines as security matters in his speeches, thus preventing the arbitrary reduction of the term in the analysis to a ‘case-by-case’ examination of policy. This is because the legitimation of changes relates to a much broader picture and is often carried out in the universe of this more intangible, higher level of abstraction.

3.2.1 Collective Self-Defense: The domestic and the international

As a result of security legislation enacted during the third Abe administration, the Japanese state for the first time post-war, may exercise the right to CSD. Though the state, as a member of the UN, has long had this right, it was restricted by the Japanese constitution. However, the debate stems from a much larger issue regarding the role of the state in the international arena. This section seeks to explain it.

Japan’s postwar security agenda is oft-described as an incremental process of state remilitarization following state demilitarization during US-led Occupation (1945-1952) (Hook and Son 2013; Singh 2013). At this time, antimilitarism was spread as a means to deracinate the seeds of militarism in domestic society and has endured despite the ‘reverse course’ from 1948 (§1). Emblematic of antimilitarism within domestic society is the so-called ‘pacifist clause’, Article 9, which since the enactment of the constitution in 1947 has, alongside citizens, remained a major constraint on state remilitarization. It states that:

*Article 9*

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

(Constitution of Japan 1946)
Since the onset of the Cold War, domestic and international elements pressured the Japanese nation to accept remilitarization which resulted in the political act of balancing internal and external pressures leading ultimately to the state’s gradual remilitarization to a standard now comparable to the other ‘developed’ states (Hook et al. 2012; Hughes 2004b). For instance, during the Nakasone administration (and others), domestic policymaking agents utilized pressure from the US (beiatsu) to legitimate security policies to expand the SDF’s international role (Hook et al. 2012: 129). The state was criticized due to the SDF’s limited international role by international actors (especially policy actors in the US) with the state characteristically attempting to compromise over its domestic constrains by prioritizing financial support and non-combative assistance to international affairs, such as for the UN-approved, US-led Gulf War (1990-1991) on Ba’athist Iraq24 (Hook et al. 2012). A combination of multipolarization and globalization has increased diplomatic and domestic pressures on the state to commit more to international affairs, particularly security affairs, to an extent commensurate with the economic size of the country so as not to be seen as a mercantilist ‘free-rider’ (Hook et al. 2012).

Of course, the constitution acts as a constraint to these pressures because it is difficult to overturn. As stipulated in Article 96, for constitutional amendment, the Diet must obtain a “concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House” for it then to be ratified by referendum or election requiring “the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes” (Constitution of Japan 1946). Any bills the Supreme Court judges unconstitutional cannot be enacted, as Articles 81 and 98 stipulate:

**Article 81**
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.
(Constitution of Japan 1946)

**Article 98**
This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed (Constitution of Japan 1946)

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24 That is, the Iraqi Republic under the Ba’ath Party led by Saddam Hussein.
In July 2014, the Abe administration circumvented amendment by officially reinterpreting the constitution, specifically Article 9, through Cabinet fiat and conducting official meetings with the “Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security” (anzenhoshō-no hōtekikiban-no saikōchiku-ni kansuru kondankai), henceforth the ‘Advisory Panel’. This epistemic group is a private panel to the Abe Cabinet which was formed by the first Abe administration in 2007 and re-adopted by the Abe administrations from 2012 to recommend how the constitution should be reinterpreted through decree.

Even preceding the constitution’s official enactment, the feasibility of Article 9 was hotly contested. For instance, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never ruled over the constitutionality of the SDF (Law Library of Congress 2006: 14-15), it has been tacitly accepted as constitutional by many within Japan owing to the 1946 ‘Ashida Amendment’ of the draft legislation to the constitution. The amendment provided enough ambiguity to afford constrained state remilitarization by inserting the phrase “in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” in Article 9 (see above). Due to this, its traditional, official interpretation was that it explicitly forbids the harbouring of war potential (senryoku) but permits the maintenance of the capacity for self-defence, such as the Self-Defense Force. Moreover, Article 9 was officially interpreted as allowing Japan to exercise the right to individual self-defence (kobetsu-teki jieken) under the UN charter and hence establish and maintain the SDF following demilitarization during the postwar Occupation of Japan (Berkofsky 2014; Hughes 2006: 728; Sasaki 2012; Ueda 2008).

This interpretation has continued until 2014, but has not been without contention. For instance, despite the DPJ’s general tendency to agree with the LDP’s interpretation of constitution, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the long-term opposition party during the 1955 dominant-party system, considered the SDF unconstitutional, as do the present-day JCP. Moreover, contention was and is not limited to political parties, with, for instance, the US consistently pressurizing the state to remilitarize. For example, PM Yoshida established the Police Reserve Force (PRF), which would later

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25 The Supreme Court has seldom rejected new legislations on constitutional grounds, having done so only six times since 1947, compared to the US’ Supreme Court which has done so for over nine hundred laws in a similar timeframe (Law 2013: 239).
26 Though it may have been the official interpretation, this is not to say it was not contested. For instance, both PM Kishi (Hook et al. 2012: 129) and PM Abe, at the time as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Koizumi administration (Katsuno 3 June 2002), have been quoted as regarding nuclear weapons as constitutional, with Kishi opining that they are a means of self-defence and Abe referencing Kishi’s comments.
27 Excluding the Navy mine-sweeping group (Law Library of Congress 2006: 8).
28 This was a stance which Hitoshi Ashida (of the Ashida Amendment) took himself as PM (1948) with the government pressured to rearm Japan due to fears of communism (Sasaki 2012: 136; Ueda 2008).
become the SDF, in 1952 under orders from the US and to strengthen its defence capacities under the soon-to-be-enacted Japan-US Mutual Defence Assistance (MSA) Agreement (Law Library of Congress 2006: 14; Chanlett-Avery 2011: 2; Sasaki 2012: 136). Further, where the Supreme Court has ruled over SDF issues, it has refrained from giving a definitive ruling over its constitutionality (Law Library of Congress 2006: 17). For instance, in 1973, the Sapporo District Court officially determined the SDF as unconstitutional, but the verdict was shortly reversed by the Sapporo High Court on technical grounds and with support from the Supreme Court (Law Library of Congress 2006: 17). The High Court, using state governance theory, stated in dictum that the SDF’s constitutionality was out of the scope of judicial review owing to the fact that national defence requires both “specialized technical judgment” and a “high level of political judgment” (Law Library of Congress 2006: 17).

It is within this contradiction between a) self-defence and b) antimilitarism that we find its relation to the debate over the constitutionality of CSD. From the outset of Japan’s postwar independence that proceeded the horrors of the Asia-Pacific war and a period of multipolar colonialist expansionism, there was concern that Japanese troops would be despatched overseas on military campaigns under the auspices of CSD. During the Lower House plenary session of the bill to establish the SDF, Diet member Junzō Imamura stated that the ambiguity of the relations between Article 9, the SDF, and the MSA agreement, meant that Japan could be obliged to despatch the SDF overseas under CSD which could unfetter state militarization. To combat this, upon its passage through the Upper House, the bill came with the Resolution on Ban of Dispatch of SDF Abroad (Law Library Congress 2006: 14).

Further, this contradiction would resurface most prominently during Kishi’s 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The treaty was originally signed in 1951 (Law Library of Congress 2006: 12-13), and “has been so pivotal in determining the postwar course charted by Japan that it, not the constitution, can be said to be at the heart of the Japanese security role in the world” (Hook et al. 2012: 127). With the treaty’s ten-year term coming to a close in 1960, Kishi sought to renegotiate a more equal treaty, while for much of the opposition, it was an opportunity to establish Japan as a ‘peace state’ in line with antimilitarism (Hook et al. 2012: 130). Despite large-scale demonstrations, legislation was passed by means of authoritarian tactics against the popular opposition outside the Diet and the political opposition within it stoking concerns over its implications on Japanese democracy and constitutionalism29 (Hook et al. 2012: 130). It was extended from 1960 to 1970.

29 During this time, the Kishi administration came close to using their own armed forces on Japanese citizens, having requested to use the SDF to silence demonstrators (Hara 1988: 425-428; Igarashi 1999: 166 both in Hook et al. 2012: 130).
Thereafter, unless either side gives one year’s notice, the treaty continues, which it has done up to the present day (Hook et al. 2012: 128).

The issue over CSD was debated during the 1960 revision of the Security Treaty, with Kishi opining that it is constitutional (Sase 2014: 18-19) and with longstanding pressure on the state to commit to a larger international security role as part of collective security under the UN Charter. For example, even before the restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1952, PM Yoshida was informed by the US that “Japan should be willing to make at least a token contribution and a commitment to a general cause of collective security” (Law Library of Congress 2006: 13). Despite international pressures, as well as domestic actors utilizing pressures to fulfil their own agenda, the sole legislative constraint to CSD is Article 9. The Japanese state unambiguously possess the right, as stated in Chapter 5 Clause C of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty (Taiwan Documents Project 2005; Law Library of Congress 2006: 13) and in the US-Japan Security Treaty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014a). Hence, the current debate centres on whether domestic law takes precedence over international law, where many constitutional law scholars assert that it does.

In terms of international law, CSD is a mechanism to ensure collective security in international society. However, these are not synonymous. Collective security denotes the procedure whereby UN member states act in unison against belligerent member state X who invades Y, with sanctions decided by the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Sase 2014: 24-26). As Article 48 Clause 1 of the Charter stipulates:

*Chapter 7, Article 48, Clause 1:*
The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

(United Nations 2015; Sase 2014: 26)

The right to CSD is stipulated in only Article 51 of the Charter, which contains one hundred and eleven articles, and is not defined in any detail (Sase 2014: 30-34). Article 51 stipulates that:

*Chapter 7, Article 51:*
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(United Nations 2015; Sase 2014: 30)

Put simply, although the definition is contested, the initial act of ‘collective security’ is a UNSC organized response where UN members in unison or representatives thereof take a stance against the belligerent state(s) under UNSC command. Conversely, CSD entails that allied states can respond to a belligerent state alongside the victim state while reporting back to the UNSC but, crucially, the UNSC is not essential (Sase 2014: 24-34; Lee 2015). Once the UNSC has decided on the measures to take for international peace and security, then individual states are no longer entitled to respond on the basis of individual or collective self-defense (Lee 2015: 382).

While Japan possesses the right to CSD, Diet members in the mid-1980s submitted a letter designed to ask questions to the Cabinet (shitsumon shuisho) requiring the Nakasone administration to directly explicate the constitutionality of CSD (Sase 2014: 140/12-113). The written reply (tōbensho) was produced predominantly by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau under the name of the prime minister and was as follows:

In accordance with international law, the state possesses the right to collective self-defense, i.e. to prevent by force, even though our country is not being attacked directly, military attacks on foreign nations which harbour close relations with our country. The fact that our country, in accordance with international law, possesses the right to this kind of collective self-defence is natural given that [our country is] a sovereign state, but we interpret that the exercise of the right to self-defence which is permitted under Article 9 of the constitution should be limited to the minimum extent necessary to defend our country, and consider the exercise of the right to collective self-defence to exceed this extent and to be not permitted by the constitution.

(Sase 2014: 46-48/112-113)

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30 The US-led war in Vietnam (1955-1975), invasion of Nicaragua (1982), the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979) were all conducted under CSD auspices (Sase 2014: 35)

31 This is not definitive. For example, elsewhere it is defined as “the right to defend another country that has been attacked by an aggressor” (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015: 21), that is, without mention of UN membership, a definition the Cabinet Legislation Bureau adopted from the Nakasone administration also (see below). Despite this, Lee (2015: 376) argues that even when the Security Council “fails to discharge its duty to maintain international peace and security”, it “does not necessarily mean that the role can be delegated to or assumed by a group of willing States operating outside the UN regime in the name of collective self-defense”.

58
In 2014, the Abe administration aimed to give the state the ability to exercise this right by arguing that it is the minimum level of self-defence necessary in accordance with Article 9. This was attempted before. In 1994, the Hata administration sought to make a case for the reinterpretation of the constitutionality of CSD on the grounds that the security environment is changing post-Cold War which requires a new response to a new environment (Sase 2001). In amidst the debate, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau responded that either the government reinterpret or amend the constitution as it is unconstitutional (Law Library of Congress 2006: 15-16).

Twenty years later, the Abe administration successfully reinterpreted the constitution; however, initially with only partial success as it permits CSD but under certain conditions, and domestic legislation was still necessary to do so (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015). Abe steamrollered such legislations through the Diet in July and September the following year amidst public demonstrations outside the Diet and elsewhere in Japan (Sieg 16 July 2015) reminiscent of the 1960 revision of the Security Treaty, and with similar questions over its implications on democracy and constitutionalism raised (Asahi Shimbun 21 July 2015). Among other concerns is whether or not the constitutional reinterpretation was arbitrary and hence weakening of the Supreme Law of the nation against political expediency. For example, while the Abe administration reinterpreted the constitution of Japan to allow the state to exercise CSD, much discussion, including the arguments made in the report by the Advisory Panel, involved issues beyond the traditional concept as defined in the UN Charter where some aspects of the issues are amenable to collective security and not CSD (Lee 2015). Similarly, the revised Defense Guidelines between Japan and the US, implemented from 2015, used the term ‘collective self-defense’ even though some instances were far removed from collective self-defense jurisprudence. The disconnect between legal theory and objectives pursued by the Abe administration suggests that the overall debate underscores a political objective of overall expansion of military activities which may be said to be calling into question the technical grounds for the reinterpretation of the constitution (Lee 2015: 383/390).

Following constitutional reinterpretation, Article 9 essentially has been made redundant as the new bills make it possible for a de facto military to be despatched to use force to settle international disputes. What follows, then, is not a question over security in the strict military sense but a question over law and values; and the relations between citizen and state. That is, if Article 9 was supplanted without amendment, what implications might this have on the legal process in general, and its impact on citizens? Further, political communication plays a crucial role in its legitimization. The LDP-Komeito coalition won the 2014 general election on the back of reinterpretation, but attained the lowest voter turnout in Japan's postwar history where the Abe
administration set the agenda by campaigning on Abenomics, not CSD (Hook 2014b; §2.1.2; §3.2.3). Here, the issue of Japan’s security agenda cannot be limited to CSD alone or even to just elements of hard power as broader considerations underpin their legitimacy. Rather, the issue over Japan’s security agenda per se branches out into much broader considerations such as Japan’s role in the world, collective memory, state identity, real and imagined threats facing the nation, its people, and so forth. Such considerations relate to understandings of present international conditions, and how to respond to news risks and uncertainties brought about by its transience, if such uncertainties are perceived by the electorate to pose or have potential to pose an existential threat. Further, despite the extant legal frameworks, there are nonetheless areas of Japan’s military security capabilities where its constitutionality is unclear, such as the SDF and the harbouring of US military bases in Japan. Such issues are situated betwixt legislative frameworks and normative underpinnings of the state and its citizens, and are subject to contestation, implying that the negotiation over changes to Japan’s security agenda, and by extension its postwar state identity of a ‘peace state’, bears a communicative and semiotic dimension.

Owing to the diversity of factors influencing this debate, the following section discusses the issue of security in Japan in broader terms, introducing the complex configurations and interactions between international and domestic political structures, agencies and norms, as analytical tools.

3.2.2 Defining ‘security’

§2 stated the power of a framing device or rhetorical trope often depends on the knowledge that underpins it. It is due to this that §3.2.1 summarized the CSD debate. However, it was concluded that the issue of Japan’s security agenda cannot be reduced down to a single case study of policy, at least not in order to investigate how such framing effects in discourse inform the greater debate and vice versa.

This view is concordant with social constructivism in IR theory, which “problematises[s] the interests and identities of actors” and highlights the roles of domestically embedded norms and institutions in the construction of collective identities and the calibration of interests, which in turn influences how a state can act under a given set of circumstances (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1998). Here, political actors are considered to be socialized into patterns of behaviour based on a specific set of expectations, norms and identities, which diametrically opposes the realist notion of ‘an immutable national interest’ that fully explains how all states act (Hook et al. 2012: 37). Rather, social constructivists contend that Japan’s security policy is shaped by material and ideational factors where the latter constitutes historical-cultural norms largely influenced by the
memories of the Pacific War, the events in the build-up to this, and the nature of postwar reconstruction (Singh 2013: 18; Hook 1996a; 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Fujiwara 2006; Oros 2008; §7). Norms are not fixed variables, but are negotiated and contested as institutionalized components of the state apparatus, influencing the policymaking process (Singh 2013: 18; Hook 1996a; Katzenstein 1996; Hatch 2010; Mason 2013).

The application of norms is not completely incompatible with liberalist and realist traditions of IR theory, either (Hook et al. 2012; Hughes 2015b). However, the view that the contestation and negotiation of norms can act as a catalyst or impediment to policy change, opens up space for the examination of political discourse in this process (Hook 1984; 1993; 1996a; 2015; Hook and Takeda 2007; Hook et al. 2015). To this end, it relates to the discussion carried out in §2 as knowledge is central to our perception of events and this perception in turn determines how we respond to them, which may influence the behaviour of others, and so on. How a concept is framed influences how it is remembered and how an issue is conceptualized in general (§2). An example of this is teaching children history. To take Japan as an example, so-called ‘memory wars’ in Japan (Fujiwara 2006) and the controversy of the revision of textbooks, particularly over the issue of war memory (Rose 2005), indicate a measure of sensitivity regarding the past, but also a recognition of its importance in rationalizing the choices a polity makes in the present and the future. Though there is criticism of ‘collective amnesia’ in Japan with regards to WWII, it is incorrect given that Japanese politicians have issued official apologies for crimes committed numerous times and civilian recognition of the war is far more complex and multifaceted than a blank canvas (Fujiwara 2006; Szczepanska 2014; see also §3.3.3). However, such acts are often seen to be offset by statements made by Diet members that challenge official apologies as well as official and unofficial visits by Japanese prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, of which Abe is one. This has led others to claim that the Japanese government has never fully accepted responsibility for colonialism and its acts of aggression (Fujiwara 2006).

Such sentiment ultimately relates to notions of national identity: seeing Japan as predominantly the aggressor or as predominantly a misrepresented victim. For example, Fujiwara (2006: 152) opines that those who support visits to Yasukuni Shrine by the prime minister are not necessarily about to start a war, but “assert that the Americans, Chinese, and Koreans have deprived the Japanese of their national pride” and that by reconnecting the present to the past—by honouring the war dead, for example—a more statist nationalism has emerged which serves to defend the nation’s integrity. Therefore, statist nationalism is borne out of perceptions that the Japanese nation was treated unfairly by other nations to the detriment of Japanese nationals and that restoring pride
of the past will contribute to redressing this imbalance. To what extent this enables future acts of aggression or a political expediency for the accomplishment of personal goals notwithstanding, this suggests that those with views such as this are not necessarily ‘warmongers’ and that ‘statist nationalism’ essentially engenders patriotism and taking pride in Japan.

Like collective depictions of the past, a national identity does not refer to one monolithic entity, but instead “distinct multiple facets of identity that are activated in different contexts and issue areas” (Legro 2009: 40). Identity can change over time, which impacts policy ideas. It is in this context that constitutive norms—“a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations” (March and Olsen 1998: 948)—are important in addressing Japan’s nonviolent conception of national security (Katzenstein 1996). Moreover, it is contended that Japan’s security policy has been and will to continue to be shaped by institutionalized norms, which in turn it modifies (Katzenstein 1996: 209). Owing to this, the link between security changes in Japan, discourse analysis and norms as components of actor identities, are explored in the two subsections below. This is carried out by first examining the role of norms in the transposition of Japan’s state identity in §3.2.2.1, then by exploring the conception of ‘security’ itself and how it has changed post-Cold War in §3.2.2.2, and finally, by exploring the role of discourse within this change in §3.2.2.3.

3.2.2.1 State identity and security change
Following the Cold-War, Japan’s security agenda has undergone a major change because of a transposition in state identity (Hook and Son 2013; Singh 2013). The taboo of overseas despatch of the SDF was broken in the Gulf War when the SDF undertook minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Also, the SDF has participated in humanitarian-based United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) in Cambodia (1992-93), Mozambique (1993-95), Rwanda (1994), the Golan Heights (1996-to-present), East Timor (2002-4), Haiti (2010 to present), Nepal (2007 to present) and Sudan (2008 to present). Under the Koizumi administration, the state proactively supported the US in the wake of the 9.11 attacks, with the Diet passing the ‘Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law’. The law enabled the despatch of SDF units to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to the US and allies, sending military personnel and equipment to Afghanistan between 2001 to 2010. The Diet also passed the ‘Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance’ permitting the SDF to carry out logistical support for US troops and members of the ‘coalition of the

32 The argument is that many Japanese in fact hold a more complex view of their country’s engagement in WWII. For example, opinion polls suggest that many supported PM Koizumi’s official visit to Yasukuni Shrine but also removing class A war criminals from it (Fujiwara 2006).
willing’ in Iraq from 2003 to 2008, despite UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, confirming the illegality of the invasion (British Broadcasting Company 16 September 2004; Hook et al. 2012: 12-14; Kaneko 2013). Additionally, the conceptual and geographical scope of Japan’s security commitments and defence budget has increased while the technological sophistication of the state’s military forces is no longer dwarfed in comparison to the nation’s economic size (Hughes 2004; Hook et al, 2012: 12). Crucially, however, the state has yet to despatch SDF forces into combat, though they may protect themselves and those accompanying them by engaging in hostilities, if attacked. This constraint against full military engagement owes at least partly to antimilitarism and domestic pressures against Japanese soldiers killing people.

Nonetheless, following the Cold War, particularly post-9.11, the shift from Japan’s minimalist security policy to increased military engagement, albeit non-combative, relates to transpositions in state identity (Hook and Son 2013; Singh 2013). Here, states are considered to incorporate certain norms as part of their identities, becoming convinced of their appropriateness at key historical junctures (Cass 2006: 6 in Hook and Son 2013: 37). For Japan, this perceived role in regional and international security affairs of the state’s security obligations are from what is described as a ‘peace state’ to an ‘international state’ (Singh 2013) or ‘humanitarian state’ as a precursor to a ‘normal state’ (Hook and Son 2013). Post-Cold War, there has been “an increased recognition within the Japanese security policymaking elite that the country’s national security was tied to the larger stability of the regional and international security environment, and hence the defence of Japan's national security would involve defending the larger regional and international security environment” (Singh 2013: 4). With this, the state incorporated internationalist norms as part of its state identity in contradistinction to antimilitarism that had defined it more prominently during Cold War bipolar world order (Hook and Son 2013). Simultaneously, particularly under the LDP, the transposition of state identities rebalanced the security agenda from antimilitarism, enshrined in Article 9 of the constitution, in favour of bilateralism with the US, symbolized in the Security Treaty. As with the unilateral support for the US in the 2003 invasion of Iraq despite its contravention under the UN Charter that is meant to uphold ‘international society’, the ‘internationalist’ state identity also strengthened bilateralism with the US.

Also, the perceived increase of threat from North Korea; the increase in Chinese military power alongside the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, particularly in the politics and security dimensions; and a growing awareness of local opposition to US military bases on Japanese soil, most prominently among residents of Okinawa, has posed new challenges to Japanese security (Hook 2010; McCormack 2014). This has played into a prevailing narrative of risk within Japanese domestic
society further extenuating a sense of existential threat to the nation, its citizens and the state’s IR (O’Shea 2013; Mason 2014; Hook et al. 2015). While this is explored further in §3.2.2.3, the following section argues that the security changes discussed above were facilitated by a conceptual change in the remit of ‘security’, particularly in terms of international society, post-Cold War.

3.2.2.2 Perceptions of ‘security’

Conventionally, ‘security’ refers to a psychological state. Compared to ‘defence’, ‘security’ is more intangible and, on the level of the nation-state, figurative. Security and insecurity may refer to a wide range of subjects in a wide range of contexts owing to a wide range of causes or perceived risks. While perceptions of Japan’s national identity serve to impact policy, the concept of ‘security’ also must be taken into account because differing conceptions thereof, particularly following changes to the world order, facilitated the transposition of Japan’s state identity.

As stated, Japan’s state identity traditionally competed with two contradictory forces, namely antimilitarism and being a ‘peace state’ and also bilateralism and existing under the US nuclear umbrella. The emphasis in the state’s security policy on making a contribution to international peace emerged during the Ōhira administration (1978-1980). However, it began to take root post-Cold War, following criticism of Japan for not committing ‘boots on the ground’ during the Gulf War, though Japan financed approximately 20 per cent of its entire cost (Calder 1992; Shinoda 2007; Hook and Son 2013: 41).

The end of the bipolar world order saw the emergence of a unipolar system in which the US remained a sole superpower (Sakamoto 2005; Herolf 2011: 5), which subsequently gave way to multipolarity, where, though its extent is contested, it is particularly observable following the global economic recession triggered in 2009, owing to the relative decline of the US and other western states and the rapid development of others (Pieterse 2010; Herolf 2011; Chan 2013).

US decline afforded ‘emerging powers’ increased influence over the formation of international policy through an array of multilateral institutions and regional/quasi-regional multilateral fora (Hook et al. 2012: 18, 32). While some suggest that a number of these institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), predominantly enact international policies aligned with the globalist project pursued by the US33 (Serraand and Stiglitz 2008; Stiglitz 2008; Petras and Veltmeyer 2010; Hook et al. 2012: 32; §8), multipolarization has led to greater influence in

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33 There is also emerging support and adoption for alternative agendas to the neoliberal model of capitalism epitomized by the US globalist project (§8). For example, there is widespread rejection of export-centred economic models to ‘inward-oriented models of sustainable development’ among Latin American and Caribbean countries (Harris 2008; Lebaron and Ayers 2013).
international affairs among other states and non-state actors (Pieterse 2010; Herolf 2011; Öniş and Güven 2011; Chan 2013). Whether predominantly due to increased influence among states or conformity to the US globalist project, this, in turn, has heralded a shift in the expectations of states regarding international security issues.

The end of the Cold War and the resultant restructuring of the international order enabled the UNSC to function for the first time as was originally intended under the UN Charter (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004). Since this time, notions of security for international peace have expanded in scope which “can be seen in the proliferation of new concepts of security: environmental security, human security, and democratic security” (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004: 28). Here, internationalism has played a prominent role in legitimating the transposition of Japanese state identity. Internationalism denotes “the expression of cooperation with and support for the ideals of international society constructed by the early-starters of the West” (Hook et al. 2012: 66) and may be seen as a “particularly demanding form of international cooperation” which “requires a strong sense of collective identity in addition to shared interests” (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 575-576).

These new security conceptions partially reoriented the locus of security from the nation to the individual. For example, ‘environmental security’ is achieved when “the aggregate impact of human consumption does not exceed the capacity of the earth’s systems to provide resources and absorb wastes now and for future generations, while ensuring that everyone enjoys a minimum standard of well-being which can be maintained despite periods of perturbation and change in environmental and social systems” (Barnett 2010: 125). Human security denotes “a comprehensive concept, encompassing freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity as a human being” with the purpose of ensuring “the life, livelihood and dignity of all individuals, particularly the vulnerable people, irrespective of the place where they live” (Takasu 2012: 2). Finally, democratic security refers to promoting and ensuring the maintenance of democracy as the system of national governance for the sake of human welfare.

This has also broadened the remit of international security agendas as “there has been a move to see security in a broader perspective, prompting the [UNSC] to adopt resolutions on thematic issues rather than specific conflicts” (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004: 29). The concept of security has transitioned from its initial conception in the postwar era, as outlined in Kennan’s Article-X to the coterie of US policymakers (Chilton 1996) to an increased recognition that potential security threats may be resolved through socialization. Here, “networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organizations [...] act as agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international
standards” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 902). This approach is related to neoliberal doctrines in
the IPE (§8) where states that are perceived to be potentially antagonistic to the ‘international
standard’ of behaviour are pressurized to act in a manner that is indicative of the underlying norms
of international society (Joseph 2012).

It is in this sense that the Japanese government has been able to legislate the despatch of the
SDF forces to engage in international affairs. As noted above, for example, Japan has become engaged
in numerous UNPKOs globally, under the banner of humanitarian assistance and as a precursor to
remilitarizing up to, at least, a degree comparable to other developed states (Hook and Son 2013).
Here, human security was considered a major component of Japan’s long-term foreign policy,
particularly by PM Murayama (1994-1996) and PM Obuchi (1998-2000), who both endorsed it
through national governments and international organizations following its launch by the UN
Development Programme in 1994 (Edström 2011: 9).

As stated, under this new state identity, the state has steadily become more proactive in
international security affairs, as signified by PM Koizumi’s ability to sanction the despatch of the SDF
to support the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq (Hughes and Krauss 2007: 158). Significantly,
the US-led ‘war-on-terror’ saw the emergence of the US’ unipolar moment globally, reinforcing the
“growing US preference for unilateralism” in a contradistinction to multilateralism as it affirmed a
pre-emptive strategy of offensively-minded approaches to potential threats (Sakamoto 2005; Hyde-
Price 2007: 72/85). Due to Japan’s alliance with the US, it has also “facilitated the legitimation and
perpetuation of US military preponderance in East Asia” and has “helped to nurture the widely-held
belief that East Asian stability rests fundamentally on US commitment to the region” (Goh 2011: 900).

In this way, this broader concept of security has provided an avenue through which the Japanese
state has been able to elicit a tacit consensus for state remilitarization as the “alternative security
agenda related to humanitarian concerns” affords the state “an increased military role” (Hook et al.
2012: 13). Also, the increased onus on internationalism among norm entrepreneurs (Ozawa 1994;
Ishiba 2014), supplemented by bilateralism with the US, indicates how the increased dimensions of
security has enabled Japanese policymakers to overcome the constraints of the constitution and
antimilitarism, by influencing the transposition of state identity to first a ‘humanitarian’ or
‘international’ state and then to a ‘normal’ state, however defined.

Additionally, the transposition process itself is at least partially influenced by semiotic
practices. It is to this that we turn in the following subsection.
3.2.3 Securitization theory

As stated, the transposition of state identity is influenced by the intersubjective processes of semiosis. Identity is “based on those aspects of the self in which an individual has special pride or from which an individual gains self-esteem” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 903). State identity may be considered a self-schema, providing the state with a sense of the collective self and the means to relate this construct with other states within the international community (Chafetz et al. 1998-9: ix in Hook and Son 2013: 37). Further, policymakers may exploit this ideational social construct to advocate state responses to perceived risks. An example of the relationship herein is seen in the figurative language use of Shigeru Ishiba, a Cabinet minister under the Abe administration and Defence Minister under the Koizumi and Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008) administrations. Ishiba frequently uses metaphor to convey the importance of CSD where he implies it is ethically comparable to sticking up for one's school friends against the playground bully, effectively equating one's school friends to member states of international society to promote internationalist norms as schoolyard ethics34 (Ishiba 2014).

In terms of discursive practices, this is an example of framing (§2), where the use of figurative language such as metaphor is a particularly useful rhetorical tool to appropriate “one taken-for-granted field of knowledge and applying it to another” (Chilton and Schäffner 1997: 222; §2.1.3). In political communication, it relates to Muntigl's (2002: 48) conception of 'politicking'. 'Politicking' is the negotiation of contingency regarding a certain issue which involves “creating some opportunities for alternative ways of acting and for constructing social reality while, at the same time, limiting or effacing certain other alternative ways of constructing social reality” (Muntigl 2002: 49). While this is a broadly defined concept, one mechanism by which to legitimate change this is through 'securitizing moves' based on securitization theory, and hence is a 'semiotic point of entry' to the qualitative analysis.

Securitization theory comes from the Copenhagen School of International Relations, and contends that by identifying an issue as an existential threat and having that view accepted by enough people, specific actors are able to take extraordinary—often undemocratic—measures in response (Buzan et al. 1998). Buzan et al (1998: 29) consider this in one sense a politicizing act because it heightens public attention surrounding an issue and, in another sense, a depoliticizing act because it

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34 Ishiba often used the US as an example, which serves to further emphasize the norm of bilateralism. Further, Abe himself appeared on Fuji Television in 2015 to equate metaphorically, with the use of visual props, CSD to extinguishing a house-fire. Were a 'fire' to occur to the US, as a house on the street, if the Japanese ‘firefighters’ are not able to ‘extinguish’ it, it may spread to ‘Japan’s house’ (Sankei Shimbun 21 July 2015). The figurative language use here contributes the same effect as above.
places its response outside the rules of normal politics (Foster et al. 2014: 164). However, given that heightening public attention thus functions as a tool to "impose a definitive position that closes down political debate", it is, in this thesis, considered primarily to be a depoliticizing act (see also §3.3). Here, security is considered an illocutionary act (Waever 1989; Buzan et al. 1998), and although there is interplay between politicization and depoliticization, it results in a depoliticization of governance because it places "at one remove the [commonplace] political character of decision-making" (Burnham 2001: 128 in Burnham 2014: 195) over a securitized issue.

Following this theory, something is a security issue when labelled as such with reference to a particular referent object under existential threat (Floyd 2007: 329). A securitizing move, i.e. attempt at securitization, depends on framing an issue in terms of survival or, in other words, a do-or-die scenario "because if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure" (Buzan et al. 1998: 25-26). In terms of analyzing attempts at securitization, one must identify "who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results and [...] under what conditions" (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). This approach provides a useful semiotic point of entry to analyze issues of security, without confining the analysis to policies selected a priori.

As stated, there is an increase in the prominence of narratives of risk in Japanese domestic society. The rise of such narratives suggests the practice of securitizing moves regarding certain issues, as risk is politically recalibrated to change the relationship between the state, citizens and responses concerning perceived threats (Hook and Takeda 2007; Nagashima et al. 2015). Though securitization in political discourse is not new (Williamson 2014a), one crucial change within Japanese society has been in the conceptualization of risk leading to a new system of governance. Here, key actors are able to underpin the identification, re-evaluation and framing of security risks via mainstream discourse intersecting civil society, the mass media and policymakers (Mason 2013; 2014; Hook 2014a; Hook et al. 2015). For example, the portrayal of risk among the Japanese mainstream media posed by North Korea shifted dramatically following the 1998 Taepodong 1 incident due to the framing of North Korea and the risk it poses across "the entirety of its media and civil society" (Mason 2013: 177). This recalibration of risk in response led to a general convergence among leading political figures up to 2007 which was facilitated by the weakening of antimilitarism and closer adherence to the norm of bilateralism with the US. For example, the Koizumi administration "primed the following mediation of reactions" through "their emphasis on the potentiality of risks" from North Korea, which would be vindicated through the DPRK’s ‘sabre-rattling’ through the launch of technologically enhanced missiles eastward across the Japan Sea.
(Mason 2013: 180). The public response of fear and anger “charged by the media’s constant coverage of all issues connected to North Korea” allowed political leaders to identify “concrete external sources of harm” and justify “military re-strengthening as a counter-measure” through the recalibration of risk (Mason 2013: 180/183).

As stated, securitization theory contends that security, as an illocutionary act, is a social construct (Buzan et al. 1998). Although it is admittedly state centric (Floyd 2007), the approach is useful to assess in what ways PM Abe defines security to the nation-state and what solutions are proposed in response. While securitization theory derives from post-structuralism, this thesis adopts a critical realist social ontology. Therefore, though it does not disregard the power of discourse in affecting change in security policy, it does not reduce security down to illocution alone, even when the agency is the nation-state. Rather, the analysis aims to examine the ways in which such illocutionary acts from Abe are indicative of depoliticization in Japan as an actual phenomenon impacting social structures such as the state’s relationship with its citizens. This necessitates examining this issue, which is conducted below.

3.3 Depoliticization during the Abe administration

This section argues that depoliticization is a significant characteristic of the Abe administration and that the analysis of Abe’s speeches is a suitable approach to evaluating this claim owing to the processes and strategic motivations behind political speech-writing in, but certainly not exclusive to, the Abe administration. Here, alongside constitutional reinterpretation and the passage of bills for CSD, the Abe administration has established the National Security Council and the State Secrecy Act despite opposition inside and outside the Diet (Hook 2014a: 5; RT 22 November 2013). These acts at least partly stem from the decision to view security issues, such as the Senkaku disputes35, as a military issue rather than a diplomatic issue which has engendered a steady increase in perceived threat within society due to a prevailing securitized narrative of risk percolating through both the state and the media to ordinary citizens and their everyday (Mason 2013; 2014; Hook 2014a; Hook et al. 2015). Further, the tit-for-tat ‘action-reaction’ cycle of political response to territorial disputes

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35 This dispute concerns the sovereignty of what is referred to as the Senkaku Islands (senkaku-shotō) in Japanese, the Diaoyu Islands and affiliated islands (diaoyudao ji qi fushu daoyu) in mainland China and Diaoyutai Islands (diaoyutai lie yu) in Taiwan. The Japanese government maintains administrative control over these tiny, uninhabited islands which are located northeast of Taiwan in the East China Sea, though both the governments of mainland China and Taiwan dispute Japanese sovereignty over the islands, claiming it for themselves (Hook 2014a: 1).
particularly with China, South Korea, and Taiwan, incrementally increased issue salience of
diplomatic disputes as an existential risk to citizens (O’Shea 2013; Hook 2012; 2014a). Effectively,
“the recalibration of risk as an instrument of governance is being exploited to support the emergence
of a new system of governance in Japan” under the Abe administration which involves strengthening
and expanding the Japan-US alliance, and the SDF “including collective self-defence through the
reinterpretation [...] of the constitution” (Hook 2014a: 5/19).

Added to this, this section argues that depoliticization plays an important role in the policy-
making process, which is indicative of the significant changes to Japanese democracy in recent years.
Further, depoliticization operates within such risk narratives that supports this new system of
governance fronted by the Abe administration. Therefore, this section explains why depoliticization
is an essential semiotic point of entry to the textual analysis and further, why the analysis of Abe’s
speeches is a suitable approach to examine this claim. This is carried out by first introducing
depoliticization research in §3.3.1, then examining the ways in which Japanese politics corresponds
with this phenomenon in §3.3.2, before discussing the processes and motivations behind speech-
writing in Japan in §3.3.3.

3.3.1 What is depoliticization?

Depoliticization is related to theories of post-democracy of establishing a post-ideological consensus
based on the free market and liberal state wherein issues are depoliticized and political values are
substituted for moral ones (Fairclough 2009: 172-174; Rancière et al. 2001; Mouffe 2002; Standing
2014: 28-32). It is indicative of changes in systems of governance brought about by changes in the
IPE, but theories of post-democracy extend also to the way governments attempt to provide security
to their citizens (Mendieta 2015). The argument follows that the weakening of the democratic
political public sphere has led to growing disillusionment towards liberal democratic institutions
(Mouffe 2002: 1-2). Further, a democratic deficit has been noted concerning the international
coordination of nation-states to confront international security contingencies (e.g. Chomsky and
Achcar 2007: 90-95). While much of the literature focusses on economic policy, it is argued that the
growing disillusionment runs the risk of contributing to the legitimation of extreme, populist
movements given that groups outside the established consensus are unable to effectuate meaningful
democratic change (Rancière 1995; Mouffe 2002; 2005; Žižek 2006; Streeck 2011). Depoliticization
is conventionally viewed as a governing strategy in which “the appearance of removing responsibility
(often in the direction of arm’s length bodies) results in low levels of deliberation and agency but also
high levels of government control” (Bates et al. 2014: 256). For this reason, depoliticization most

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specifically denotes “the appearance of having transferred responsibility for policy” (Burnham 2014: 195), making it, by definition, a political act. However, while much of the literature focusses on the governmental, depoliticization is a misleading phenomenon given that policymaking is political, regardless of the agency responsible for it (Beveridge and Nauman 2014: 277; Wood and Flinders 2014). Rather, depoliticization is viewed as a dynamic and fluid process which may be used as an analytical tool to examine patterns in the contemporary transformations of democratic governance (Flinders and Wood 2014), and hence connected to wider public and private spheres of society. To examine this, Wood and Flinders (2014) parse depoliticization into three interrelated categories, governmental, societal, and discursive depoliticization.

Governmental depoliticization examines depoliticization as statecraft allowing politicians to transfer the locus of responsibility to external domains, whether the market or the individual, as well as a way of analyzing emergent technocratic and managerialist forms of governance (Wood and Flinders 2014: 156). Societal depoliticization refers to the “changing nature of sociopolitical relationships, and specifically on the role and power of intermediary institutions that sit between the governors and the governed” and focusses on elucidating the “decreasing salience of ‘political’ issues among the public, and the emergence of a disinterested democratic culture” (Wood and Flinders 2014: 159). Analytical focus is not only on the state but on additional social actors and institutions such as the media, social movements and business associations which “fuel political apathy or deny the existence of choice in relation to certain issues” (Wood and Flinders 2014: 159). Finally, discursive depoliticization adopts a Gramscian perspective to focus on ideas and language as opposed to institutions, arenas or actors, and recognizes that any speech act that attempts to form “necessities, permanence, immobility, closure, and fatalism” or conceal, negate or otherwise remove contingency, is a powerful tool of depoliticization (Jenkins 2011: 160 in Wood and Flinders 2014: 161). Such analyses are concerned with the way in which issues are discussed and framed to foreclose certain options and make opposition appear irrational (Wood and Flinders 2014: 162).

While constructivist theories in IR have pointed to the depoliticizing power of discourse around global governance and securitization theory (Wood and Flinders 2014: 163; Widmaier et al. 2007; Joseph 2012), much research into depoliticization in general focusses on European or external Anglophone democracies. For example, it is claimed that the marketization of electoral competition abets depoliticization, as parties increasingly aim to attract the median voter, while smaller parties

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36 This also relates to securitization theory inasmuch securitization can be tantamount to “essentially the depoliticizing or ‘technologizing’ of a field as a way of securing it from the potentially disturbing if not devastating effects of critical questioning” (Tan 2001: 16).
target the establishment of niche ‘markets’ of voters (Hay 2007). This process is predicated on an economic analogy, subscribing itself to the central tenets of public choice theory as democratic parties are equated to ‘entrepreneurs’ as rational, self-interested utility-maximizers in a profit-seeking marketplace (Downs 1957: 295; Lees-Marshment 2001; Hay 2007: 118). Within this basic assumption, voters (as consumers) are seen to maximize their well-being while parties (as enterprises) seek to maximize their ‘market-share’ of votes to win the election (Hay 2007: 118-119). This causes convergence over issues between major parties as these ‘businesses’ seek to maximize their ‘capital’ by appealing to the median voter, however defined, while seeking to maintain their traditional supporters who become increasingly disillusioned with the given party's ideological shift (Hay 1999: 85-104; 2007: 119). This, along with changes in the IPE, facilitates the depoliticization of policy-substantive issues and hence surrogates public adjudication of policy choices for ephemeral issues such as leader personality, credibility, electability and so forth by politicizing those instead (Hay 2007: 119-12; Streeck 2012). Alongside this, voter turnout has substantially decreased across many democracies with voters increasingly disengaging from an electoral competition with little emphasis on substantive policy differences (Hay 2007: 121-122).

The trend is traced back to the rise of neoliberalism in the IPE, leading to the portrayal of neoliberal reforms to domestic economies in many national democracies as the only realistic option as ‘there is no alternative’, thus causing interparty convergence over issues. Though not completely due to the forces of neoliberal globalization alone (Hay 2007), the effects of globalization and financialization are considerable in having separated power from politics, where some traditional functions of the state are relinquished from political supervision (Bauman 2011: 33; Streeck 2011), while neoliberal globalization also strongly undergirds the nature of contemporary global governance and multilateralism. The section below argues that such a phenomenon is observable also in Japan particularly since the Noda administration (2011-2012) but took root in the 1990s. Further, it is argued that depoliticization has contributed to the rhetorical efficacy of the Abe administration in implementing significant policy changes that contribute to a new form of governance.

### 3.3.2 Depoliticization in Japan

This subsection argues that though there have been highly politicized events in Japan during the second and third Abe administrations, components of post-ideological consensus and depoliticization are observable in Japan’s democracy, too.
Firstly, the security changes adopted by the Abe administration reflect a highly significant juncture in the state's IR, with realist and neorealist camps claiming them to be a significant departure from Japan's post-Cold War security policy (Hughes 2015a; 2015b). Similarly, though social constructivist scholars explain this as part of an incremental departure from the postwar system (Singh 2013), that the Japanese state is able to exercise CSD without constitutional amendment completely undermines Article 9 of the constitution. This is explainable through a recalibration of social norms to counterweigh antimilitarism (§3.2).

It is unsurprising, then, that these changes have been highly politicized in places, with, as stated, demonstrations taking place during the steamrollering of legislations by the Abe administration through the Diet. Further, opposition parties such as the JCP called the new security measures, the “war legislation” (sensō hōan) (JCP nd), prompting Abe himself to complain about this counter narrative and, in effect, recognize it as a politicized argument. However, despite the punctuational bursts of politicized events, there has been a dearth of in-depth discussion from Abe and other Cabinet members regarding security reform (Sase 2014). Rather, discourse surrounding the legislation has been highly depoliticized, with Abe, for instance, frequently relying on reiterating his claims regarding a certain talking point rather than engaging opposition in agonistic debate, even during the Diet's question time (tōshutōron) (Tanifuji 2015b: 16-17).

For economic policy also, the Abe administration enacted sizeable changes. For instance, Abenomics has incorporated plans for deregulation and reforms to social security and welfare, healthcare, agricultural cooperatives, among other sectors (Tanifuji 2015a; but see Katz 2014). In the 1955 dominant party system, the LDP relied on a Keynesian-derived economic model which centered on manufacturing where politicians made use of clientelistic networks of citizens through pork-barrel projects to secure votes (Catalinac 2015; §2.2.1). With the rise of neoliberalism as the mainstream ideology for global economic development and newly emergent manufacturing powers, Japan is ostensibly faced with the conventional wisdom and Hobson's choice that in a globalized economy either the nation must face painful reform or continue to struggle economically (Dobson 2015: 453-454; Hay 2007). Particularly since the early 1990s, there have been many reforms to the Japanese economy (Hasegawa 2006; Dobson 2015) alongside the rise of New Public Management (NPM) as a method of public administration, reflecting both governmental and societal depoliticization. NPM involves privatizing, deregulating or otherwise externalizing public services through public-private partnerships (PPPs) or private finance initiatives (PFIs) (Andrews and v.d

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Walle 2012; Kudo 2004: 155-156; Yamamoto 2003; Hook et al. forthcoming), and the rise of so-called semi-autonomous organizations, named Independent Administrative Institutions (IAIs) (dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin), which outsource the function of policy implementation from the government (Yamamoto 2003: 17-18). In sum, government management restructures, decentralizes and disaggregates large bureaucratic organizations and management authority, alongside the adoption of (quasi-)market mechanisms to public services (Hood 1991; Yamamoto, 2003: 1).

While the state is characterized as having responded pragmatically to globalization by using new laws and circumstances to continue policies of promotion and protection of industries (Schaede and Grimes 2003: 8 in Dobson 2015: 458; Watanabe 2015a), and hence votes, the rise of NPM was significantly abetted by economic recessions Japan suffered since the late 1980s. Beleaguered by a stagnating economy since then, which involved the bailing out of financial institutions and enactment of a zero-interest rate policy, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) enacted negative rates in 2016 in attempts to overcome the chronic deflation that has beset the nation for longer than a generation (Asahi Shimbun 6 February 2016; Ueda 2012; Watanabe 2014: 1-25; 2015). This, alongside the emergent realities of a hyper-aged society (Coulmas 2007; Matanle 2014), meant that efforts were made to “streamline” public administration which provided space for greater private sector influence (Yamamoto 2003: 17-18). This change in public administration led to a recalibrated role of governance which impacted the relationship between the government and the private sector and civil society (Kudo 2004: 155-156; Andrews and v.d Walle 2012), where aspects of public administration were taken out of the domain of politics. Further, this has been managed with the emergence of competing norms in domestic society such as “self-responsibility”, placing greater emphasis on self-management and dependency away from the state over a host of issues (Hook and Takeda 2007; Hook et al. 2015; Hook et al. forthcoming).

Additionally, responding to the global financial crisis triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2008, the US implemented quantitative easing measures which led to the rapid appreciation of the yen impacting the traditionally export-intensive Japanese economy (Lam 2015). Dealing with the effects of the crisis, Japan also suffered an enormous humanitarian crisis following 3.11 which led to another recession. While the DPJ were in power throughout the vast majority of these events, Abe’s LDP sought to regain office by proffering solutions to these sizeable impacts on the domestic economy and hence citizens. As a result, they have been faced with the task of rejuvenating the economy with a government debt load of over 220 per cent of GDP (DeWit 2015b) without jeopardizing traditional bases of support to the point that it undermines their political power. To
address these issues, the Abe administration launched Abenomics, comprising “three arrows” (sanbon-no ya) to hit their growth targets. This may be argued to be a form of governmental depoliticization. For example, it attempts to legitimate “a domestic reorganization of the administrative system of governing tying policy to statute or clearly identifiable (and therefore constraining) targets” (Burnham 2014: 197), with the first two arrows comprising the so-called ‘audacious monetary policy’ of quantitative easing aimed at maintaining a 2 per cent inflation rate and to boost external credibility, and the so-called ‘flexible fiscal policy’ to boost demand to stimulate growth (Lam 2015) which have involved cuts to public services. The final arrow denotes economic restructuring to attract investment into Japan and to seeking foreign markets for Japanese products; that is, an increased reliance on market forces to improve economic conditions. This involves promising neoliberal reform so as to raise stock prices in order to raise approval ratings so that reform can be implemented without fatally compromising traditional support from protectionist sectors (Kaneko 2015).

Despite this, Abe dissolved the Lower House to trigger an early election in December 2014 owing to the economy’s slump into a recession after the rise in consumption tax38 (Hook 2014b). The manifesto of Abe’s LDP, similar to Koizumi’s 2005 manifesto (§1.1), oriented the focus of the election squarely on economic reform. However, it was highly depoliticized, symbolized by the campaign slogan of “for economic recovery, there is no alternative” (keiki kaifuku, ko-no michi-shika nai), that is, to quantitative easing and neoliberal restructuring (LDP 2014). The election came when approval ratings of politicians across the board were low. According to one opinion poll, the Japanese public consider politicians to be characteristically untrustworthy. That is, when asked who they relied on to understand the effects of climate change, politicians ranked bottom by a considerable margin losing out even to television celebrities (Mizuho 2015).

The low voter turnout is partly attributable to societal depoliticization. That is, on top of economic restructuring, the marketization of electoral strategies has expanded to Japan (Hirabayashi 2014; §2.2). As a result, a greater variety of methods are employed to appeal to the median voter, particularly political communication and media management, as an increasingly decisive factor in securing public approval (§2.2). Political parties began to rely more heavily on marketized electoral strategies from the 2003 and 2005 general elections, with the DPJ and the LDP-Komeito coalition greatly increasing their use of marketized techniques from 2009 (Asano and Wakefield 2010; Hirabayashi 2014: 394-395).

38 The approval ratings were to plummet again the following year also as a result of changes to Japan’s security policy.
Despite this, since the 1994 electoral reform, average voter turnout has declined from 71.42 per cent (1955-1993) to 61.25 per cent (1996-2014) (International IDEA 2015). Further, this average might be skewed somewhat by two historic elections post-1994. The 2005 general election won by Koizumi’s LDP broke the record for highest voter turnout post-electoral reform with 67.46 per cent of the electorate voting (International IDEA 2015). The election surrounding the issue of privatization of the postal services (§1.1) in a highly-politicized manner where the LDP gained the largest share of seats since its establishment and formed a coalition with Komeito. In just four years, the record would be broken again with 69.27 per cent voter turnout, again with historic results (International IDEA 2015). This time the LDP lost out to the DPJ in another highly-politicized election, with its leader, Yukio Hatoyama, becoming the first opposition party leader to attain office by public mandate for over sixty years.\footnote{Hatoyama beat Tarō Asō’s LDP, the vice-prime minister under the Abe administration. This epochal change bore similarities to the LDP dominance seemingly ended. That is Hatoyama, the first PM from the DPJ, is the grandson of Ichirō Hatoyama, the first PM from the LDP, having been leader of the Democratic Party when it merged with the Liberal Party, fronted by Shigeru Yoshida, the grandfather to Asō, both of whom would lose out on the chance to remain PM to a Hatoyama at an epoch turning time in Japanese politics. However, Ichirō Hatoyama had the edge due to the relative strength of his party, having been significantly bolstered when a powerful faction would leave the Liberal Party and join it. This faction was led by Kishi, Abe’s grandfather, who became PM soon after.}

Though the voter turnout for these two elections did not reach the average turnout in the 1955-dominant party system, they proved to be peaks in a system of overall decline. For instance, while the 2005 and 2009 general elections successively broke the record for highest voter turnout post-1994, the subsequent general elections in 2012 and 2014, both won by Abe’s LDP, successively broke the record for lowest voter turnout in the post-WWII era, with 59.32 per cent voter turnout in 2012, to be followed up by a staggering drop to 52.66 per cent in 2014, indicative of depoliticization. To get some understanding of its magnitude, the LDP acquired 27.3 million votes and lost in a landslide in the 2009 general election while in the 2012 and 2014 general elections, the LDP secured less (25.64 million votes and 25.46 million votes respectively) but won in a landslide (Tanifuji 2015a: 33). Further, in the 2014 general election, the LDP gained 48.1 per cent of the vote from single-member constituencies and 33.1 per cent from proportionally represented constituencies meaning that over 70 per cent of the electorate did not explicitly express support for the LDP who achieved a 76 per cent occupancy rate of parliamentary seats by securing 25.3 per cent of votes among the entire electorate and 17.4 per cent from proportionally represented constituencies.\footnote{The Upper House elections in 2016, where the LDP gained a majority, also heralded a historically low voter turnout at 54.7 per cent of the electorate, the fourth lowest turnout in postwar history despite having lowered the voter age by two years to 18 years old and thus giving the option of an additional approximately 2.4 million voters to vote for the first time (Asahi Shimbun 11 July 2016).} (Tanifuji 2015a: 33).
Amidst this, Abe’s LDP returned to office on an election platform centered on “bringing back Japan” (LDP 2012) from economic stagnation, and then when efforts resulted in a recession and despite, according to opinion polls, more Japanese citizens regarding Abenomics as a failure than a success (Tanifuji 2015a: 33), the LDP won under the slogan “there is no alternative” (LDP 2014), a logic central to the depoliticization of economy policy and governance (Hay 2007; Flinders and Wood 2014). Indeed, it appears that Abe returned to power due to a perceived lack of alternatives. After the election of the DPJ in 2009 in the aftermath of the global economic recession, the party would be subject to a series of scandals unfavourably impacting its image, poorly managed diplomatic incidents with regional neighbours, 3.11 (Hook et al. 2012) and hostile media coverage, changing leaders three times within three years, and in the end providing voters with a lack of a feasible alternative to the LDP under the electoral system. Further, another explanatory factor may be seen in the ideological convergence of the DPJ to the LDP from the Noda administration (2011-2012). The DPJ were formed from the merging of several parties across a broad political spectrum. With this, by the time PM Yoshihiko Noda sought to retain office in the 2012 general election following the resignations of both Hatoyama (2009-2010) and his successor Naoto Kan (2010-2011), approval ratings had plummeted amidst reports of disintegration within the DPJ and, hence, an inability to manage suitably the tasks ahead. There was widely reported intraparty quarrelling over controversial decisions as the party began to converge (chūdōka) with the LDP over key issues such as restarting nuclear reactors post-3.11 following a blanket shutdown of all reactors, negotiations in the TPP and raising consumption tax (Asahi Shimbun 6 June 2012).

Similar to Abe’s 2006 manifesto (§1.1.3), the 2012 manifesto adopted an economy-first approach which heavily prioritized economic recovery in the prospective government’s aims. However, as with realizing a “beautiful country” (§1.1.3), “bringing back Japan” was not limited to the economy alone, but also to bringing back education, diplomacy, a sense of security (anshin) (LDP 2012), and, incidentally, LDP rule. Both slogans represent a call for a return to old values or the “philosophies of tradition” (Hall 1988: 39), realizing something true to Japan, to the nation, to its families, something lost or forgotten, to overcome the problems besetting the present. This followed Abe’s publishing of an article after the 3.11 disaster which, contributing to the image of a decisive leader as opposed to the DPJ, was entitled “Earthquake disaster reconstruction – If me, I’d do this” (watashi-nara kō-yaru) (Abe 2011).

Despite the seemingly politicized title of the article, the economic emphasis during the election emboldened notions of a decisive and talented leader, with the economic growth strategy a neologism of ‘Abe’ and ‘economics’, playing up the technical credibility of the prospective PM to bring
back the 'Japan' that had been lost, simultaneously promoting a freer market and stronger state\textsuperscript{41}. During the 2014 general election, the DPJ and LDP converged over economic issues, with, for instance, both parties and Komeito agreeing to raise consumption tax further, only disagreeing exactly how it should be carried out, despite the LDP having raised it earlier that year with deleterious effects (\textit{Asahi Shimbun} 30 November 2014). It is possible that the LDP’s framing of the 2014 general election as its seeking a mandate over its economy policy (\textit{Asahi Shimbun} 2 December 2014; Hook 2014b) was to consolidate voters against more politicized and divisive issues, such as constitutional reinterpretation that was carried out several months prior to the election, but where the government would nonetheless be required to enact legislations for the state to be able to exercise the right to CSD, legislations surely to be enacted after the election. Such an approach has historical precedents as previous administrations had heavily prioritized economic issues before under an economy-first approach (§1.1.2). Either way, both elections took place amidst ideological convergence, while, during the Abe administration also, Abe has relied on assertive rhetoric to convey a sense of technical authority and leadership while depoliticizing issues.

Upon election, Abe would increase his authority over the media also, extenuating the influences of societal depoliticization. For example, he decided to select which media outlets to make appearances on, as opposed to the traditional custom where the PM rotated in order through every major private network while making appearances on the NHK for every appearance on a private network. This effectively places additional emphasis on television networks to maintain favourable relations with the Cabinet to compete with rival stations in a market competition for viewership (Gotō 2014: 9-10). Further, there are reports of resignations among senior news reporters with claims of pressure from Cabinet members due to their portrayal of the government (McCurry 17 February 2016; \textit{Economist} 16 May 2015), reflecting a system where the government is able to militate against what they consider to be negative portrayal and hence unfavourably politicized reporting.

The relationship between media and government changed also as a result of the enactment of the “Specially Designated Secrets Protection Law” (\textit{tokutei himitsu-no hogo-ni kansuru hōritsu}) in 2013, which effectively bolstered state power and limited press freedom. This was presaged by two famous case studies of charges against reporters for exposing state secrets, both of which provided evidence that the government had lied to its electorate (Repeta 2014). The State Secrecy Act has, in the name of national security, greatly increased sentences for whistleblowing over subject matter including and beyond the conventional scope of national security and espionage, as well as sentences for “soliciting” (\textit{kyōsa}) or “instigating” (\textit{sendō}) information. Further, there is no requirement that the

\textsuperscript{41} Though this is by no means a policy line exclusive to the Abe administration (Hall 1988).
government demonstrate that the release of information caused injury to the government which effectively perpetuates self-censorship of state officials, journalists and so on, and also demonstrates increased state authority over its own conduct, in contrast to its checks and balances (Repeta 2014; Utsunomiya et al. 2014; §1).

Overall, depoliticization has become observable in Japanese politics, particularly following the election of the second Abe administration in 2012, though this is not to suggest that depoliticizing processes were not present during the dominant party system of LDP-rule. However, for the first time, the LDP did not have what might be regarded as a major opposition party that was ideologically opposed to the LDP due to the ideological convergence of the DPJ over major decisions. Further, depoliticization, as a multifaceted phenomenon, is observable not just in political debates and opposition, but also statecraft and public administration with the outsourcing of responsibility for issues to non-political realms such as the private sector or its citizens (Hay 2007; 2014), a major component of contemporary trends. While no doubt a factor, depoliticization, here, is not only to outsource executive function over the management of an issue. Rather, while globalization and the rise of neoliberalism as the doctrine for the IPE has weakened state power which has led to the emergence of normative frameworks promoting individualism (Hook and Takeda 2007), perhaps in response, depoliticization, here, also seeks to place determination over executive function over the management of certain issues squarely within the remit of the political authority while, in its urgency and/or exactitude, foreclosing the necessity for public deliberation or agonistic political debate (Burnham 2014). One example is that though Abe employed the Advisory Panel to investigate constitutional reinterpretation (§3.2.1), he did not relinquish his authority over the issue. Rather, the panel’s recommendations served to contribute to the authoritative weight behind the Abe administration’s drive to change the state’s official interpretation of the constitution and, as an epistemic group with specialized knowledge, delegitimate dissenting voices by depoliticizing the argument. Given that depoliticization is characteristic of the Abe administration, and is widely viewed as giving rise to new systems of governance, it is essential to the theoretical approach of this thesis, which aims to examine how it is Abe sought to legitimate the sizeable changes to the Japanese state, its international conduct, and relationship with its citizens. Following on from this section is a discussion over the seminally important role of speech-writing in the Abe administration to create the most amenable environment for it to carry out its agenda and hence, also, over why the analysis of political speeches is a suitable approach to this thesis. This is provided in §3.3.3, below.
3.3.3 Why Abe’s speeches?

This section asks, in the context of the theoretical approach established above, why are PM Abe’s speeches the analytical focus of this thesis. For instance, there is a wide range of political texts from government issued white-papers, interpolations in the Diet to newspaper articles, editorials, television news broadcasts and even blog sites and popular topics or politicians on Social Networking Services, that might be analyzed. Firstly, it has been stated above that the Abe administration have seen out a highly significant juncture in the state’s IR, which at the time of writing (2017) might yet become more significant. Yet despite this, this thesis argues, discourse from the Abe administration, particularly from Abe himself has been highly depoliticized. Here, this section asserts that Abe’s speeches are suitable objects of analysis for this thesis as they constitute painstakingly and impeccably crafted bodies of texts created by political communication specialists who are employed specifically to make the job of the administration as easy as possible through effective communication. Thus, if we are to make the argument that Abe relies on depoliticization to legitimate the substantial changes to the Japanese state, then it follows that this strategy would be observable in his speeches. Therefore, this section introduces and discusses the influence of PM Abe’s speech-writer, Tomohiko Taniguchi, before discussing their ideological similarities and, consequently, the goals and motivations behind writing speeches for PM Abe. Following this, this chapter is concluded in §3.4.

Abe appointed Tomohiko Taniguchi as special advisor where he takes on the role of speech writer for the prime minister. The use of speech-writers in Japanese politics is considered to be a relatively recent phenomenon and underscores the added importance attached to effective political communication (see §1; §2.2), but might be seen as an offshoot of a growing public relations industry across private and public sectors in Japan (e.g. Wada 10 January 2015). This, of course, is not to suggest that prime ministers before had always written their own speeches. Rather, the soliciting of expertise from communicative specialists to influence the illocutionary force (§2.1) or communicative felicity of a politician is becoming a much more firmly embedded practice in mainstream Japanese politics, and is not unique to the Abe administration42. However, while political speeches had undergone a collaborative process where staff from the Cabinet Secretariat or the private secretary office of a politician consulted with every bureaucratic office over the contents of a

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42 For example, Yukio Hatoyama famously appointed the then Deputy Cabinet Secretary, Kōji Matsui, and playwright, Oriza Hirata, as speech writers, during his time as PM (2009-2010), while the two other DPJ prime ministers, Naoto Kan (2010 to 2011) and Yoshihiko Noda (2011-2012), relied on the expertise of former journalist, Ken’ichi Shimomura (Mineo 19 January 2015; Wada 10 January 2015; Nyūsu Posutosebun 3 February 2017).
speech, the process of speech-writing changed where what is included in the speech is decided to a much greater extent by the prime minister. Similar to a business where important speeches are written up by personal secretaries and the public relations office and then sent to each department for feedback and fine-tuning, speeches are written up by speech-writers selected by politicians and then sent to the relevant bureaucratic and government agencies in case of any need of adjustments (Wada 10 January 2015). Due to this, the changing dynamics of political speech-writing in Japan has led to greater input from the prime minister at the expense of government agencies. Though it is difficult to assess, there are claims, for example, that Taniguchi’s role in the Abe administration is so prominent that he is able to minimize the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abe’s speeches, granting the prime minister the freedom to voice his own, radical views, at the risk of opprobrium from international society (Takano 2 April 2015).

Whether or not this is true, Taniguchi is widely considered to be influential within the Abe administration (Aera 16 September 2013), particularly in terms of Abe’s political communication. Taniguchi served as the Foreign Affairs Vice-Spokesperson in the first Abe administration (2006-2007), and following Abe’s return to office, became a counselor of the Cabinet Secretariat for public relations as well as special advisor to the Cabinet and PM Abe (Huffington Post 23 October 2013; Takano 2 April 2015). As stated, he is commonly recognized to be Abe’s speech-writer (e.g. Sankei Shimbun 20 March 2015) and is alleged to have greatly influenced Abe’s rhetoric in terms of a number of reports emphasizing his role in improving international perceptions of the prime minister, due to his much-touted international and communicative expertise in English and Japanese (e.g. Toshikawa 3 September 2013; Takano 2 April 2015; Suzuki 22 February 2016). Despite this, there are reports that suggest that appointing Taniguchi was to influence domestic perceptions of the Abe administration also43 (Huffington Post 23 Oct 2013), and as a speech-writer, this would seem a matter of course.

While this may be difficult to evaluate concretely, it is certainly the case that Taniguchi has much experience in communicating political and economic issues to the public given that he was on the Chief Editorial Board for Nikkei Business Publications Inc., commonly referred to as Nikkei BP44.

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43 Taniguchi himself cogently discusses the role of public relations on internal and external audiences during his role as Foreign Affairs Deputy Spokesperson (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan September 2006), which is discussed briefly below.

44 Nikkei is generally associated with a focus on economic issues with the direct and literal translation of Nihon Keizai Shimbun, for instance, as “Japanese Economy Newspaper”, and with Nikkei being an amalgamation between the first syllables of ‘Japan’ and ‘Economy’ respectively, but does cover a wide-range of social, political as well as economic issues and is generally considered to be ‘right-of-centre’ in terms of political perspective.
This is a subsidiary of *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, frequently shortened to ‘Nikkei’ (President Online 18 March 2013). One renowned speech Taniguchi is responsible for is the so-called ‘Abe Statement’ he created with Nobukatsu Kanehara, Deputy Director of the National Security Agency. The ‘Abe Statement’ (abe danwa) was delivered on the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War (Nakata 24 August 2015). This politically divisive issue—that is the issue of memory of the Asia-Pacific War alongside the growing security concerns from neighbouring states regarding Japan’s militarization—was played down through the ‘Abe Statement’. Though there are claims that it was primarily for foreign consumption, given that Abe’s previous statements had effectively “hollowed out the apology he appeared to be making” (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017: 152), for such a politically divisive issue, the statement was received relatively well domestically with the Abe administration’s approval rating increasing afterwards, having nose-dived beforehand (Nakata 24 August 2015).

While the statement is rigorously analyzed elsewhere (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017), it adopted a future-oriented stance while aligning with previous statements from Japanese politicians and took the longer form of a speech as opposed to a statement in the traditional sense of the term (Nakata 20 August 2015). Further, it stopped short of offering an apology (o-wabi or shazai). Rather, it stated such apologies have been offered before and that Japan must not let the next generation be predestined to apologize for acts they did not commit. Instead, it somewhat ambiguously proposed that Japan ‘inherit the past’ and ‘pass it on to the future’ and endeavour to realize peace and prosperity in the world for the future (see Abe 14 August 2015).

This particular issue highlights the significance of Taniguchi’s role in the Cabinet owing to the complex and divisive issue of war apologies in Japan. For context, while there have been a number of substantial apologies by senior politicians in the past, this often has run counter to state-managed contrary discourses and actions by politicians perceived to dilute any sense of sincerity regarding remorse. For example, despite the ‘Abe Statement’, the so-called “apology industry” was denigrated by PM Abe, himself, who as prime minister visited Yasukuni Shrine in an official, and hence symbolic,

45 This followed the famous and controversial ‘Murayama Statement’ by former prime minister (1994-1996), Tomiichi Murayama, which included a war apology. Murayama was leader of the main opposition party, the Socialist Party, and then the Social Democratic Party of Japan (from 1996), which formed a coalition led by Murayama with the LDP and a small fringe party. The Socialist Party were well-renowned for supporting greater recompense for the damage suffered in former colonies of the Japanese Empire and of ‘righting the wrongs’ of the past, as opposed to the LDP, who are the party of constitutional revision, despite the ambivalence of a number of its leaders on this matter (Hook et al. 2012: 56-57; see Stockwin and Ampiah 2017).

46 Abe had also set up a commission, which included academics, to advise him on what he should say for the statement (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017: 172).

47 This is not to suggest it was accepted by every person outside of Japan. However, the statement was highly evaluated among ‘Western’ mainstream media outlets and supported by the Obama administration.
capacity (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017: 160). Indeed, on the day of the statement itself, the chairwoman of the LDP Policy Research Council who would later become Defense Minister, Tomomi Inada, stated her intent to establish an intra-party organization to examine the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (Nakata 24 August 2015; Sankei Shimbun 15 August 2015). Despite this, days before, former PM (2009-2010) Hatoyama visited Seodaemun Prison History Hall in Seoul, presenting flowers to a monument commemorating independence activists against Japanese colonial aggression, and prostrated himself in the form of a Korean-style bow (described in the Japanese media as a ‘dogeza’) before it (Nakata 24 August 2015; Sankei Shimbun 17 April 2017). Moreover, Hatoyama, in contradistinction to Abe, also offered an apology for Japan’s wartime treatment of activists who had been imprisoned and subjected to torture there under Japanese colonial rule. Further, he commented on the upcoming ‘Abe Statement’, asserting that PM Abe must recognize Japan’s colonial rule over South Korea and the “invasion” (shinryaku) of China and regional neighbours as facts, and apologize (shazai/o-wabi) (Huffington Post 12 August 2015). While the act in itself was symbolic, Yasuhiko Nakata suggests it was additionally so due to its resemblance of the infamous response of German Chancellor Willy Brandt who fell to his knees when he joined a Holocaust memorial demonstration in Warsaw in 1970\footnote{48}, though few other news outlets or commentators mentioned it\footnote{49}. Similarly, this parallel is contextually grounded in the well-documented contrast between official reactions and comments from German and Japanese politicians over wartime conduct (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017: 172; Bittner 16 April 2014; Taylor 13 August 2015), making Hatoyama’s act on the eve of the Abe Statement, a powerfully politicized one.

However, despite the hugely politically divisive nature of this issue, the ‘Abe Statement’ must be considered a relative success by the logic of public relations as explained by Taniguchi himself. While this point is addressed further below, to explain it first requires a brief discussion over the ideological similarities between Abe and Taniguchi, both of whom are considered to be on the far-right of the political spectrum (Takano 2 April 2015; Nakata 24 August 2015; Stockwin and Ampiah 2017), to understand the motivations behind making sure the Statement is a success. For instance, Taniguchi has published relatively extensively on the geopolitical issue of a ‘rising China’, particularly

\footnote{48} However, a direct comparison is fraught with implications and interpretations which are out of the scope of this thesis and are therefore not addressed. The comparison made here is only to underline the symbolism of the act.

\footnote{49} This parallel was also drawn when Hatoyama visited China in 2013 and acknowledged the territorial dispute between Japan and China, deviating from the Japanese government’s conventional line of not acknowledging it (Yuan 18 January 2013). Here, Hatoyama bowed before the Nanjing Memorial which commemorates those murdered by Japanese forces in the 1937 massacre, before apologizing (o-wabi) for the Imperial Japanese Army’s treatment of Chinese nationals, and was subsequently called a traitor by the then Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera (Nikkei Shimbun 17 January 2013; Yuan 18 January 2013).
on its modernization and geopolitically strategic trade of its military equipment to neighbours such as Pakistan (Taniguchi 7 September 2012), but also on the economic ramifications of a changing IPE to which China is contributing (e.g. Taniguchi 19 December 2012). Much of this adheres to the ‘China threat’ narrative, to which the Abe administration has also contributed\(^{50}\) (e.g. Hook 2014a; Hook et al. 2015; see §9.1.2).

More specifically, shortly before the onset of the second Abe administration (2012-), Taniguchi suggested that owing to a changing IPE, time is of the essence if the Japanese state plans to constrain ambitions of territorial expansion from China. Moreover, in terms of political communication, Taniguchi suggests that the “strengthening [of] deterrence against China” may serve as a “forward-looking narrative”, allowing the state to constrain China’s growing political influence (Taniguchi 19 December 2012). Additionally, Taniguchi goes on to state that because of a growing imbalance in Japan-US relations owing to changing economic conditions, finding a means to strengthen and broaden relations at no additional cost is important while the US steps up its investments in the Asia-Pacific as Japan’s finances become increasingly constrained. Thus, issues such as the constitutional recognition of the state’s right to CSD (see §3.2.1) become a matter of urgency (Taniguchi 19 December 2012). Further, strengthening the alliance with the US and its allies is of primary importance because, Taniguchi asserts, China may attempt to purchase oil in the Chinese Yuan, circumventing the system of purchasing Middle Eastern oil in the US dollar, much to the boon and hegemonic influence of the US, and hence vastly strengthen China’s political influence on the international system (Taniguchi 19 December 2012).

To address this, Taniguchi recommends, strengthening ties with “English-speaking countries” and “maritime democratic countries”, such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, India, and others, which is exactly what the Abe administration sought to accomplish. Taniguchi’s reasoning is that the former shares Japan’s values and ‘interests’ (read: securing the sea lanes of trade against a ‘rising China’), and the latter because most information flow is in English and information is essential in an era of so much uncertainty of the future (Taniguchi 19 December 2012; see also Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States July 2009: 15-16). A week after the publication of this article, PM Abe authored an article that discussed a strategic alliance between Japan and India where it was suggested that “the South China Sea seems set to become “Lake Beijing” allowing “the People’s Liberation Army’s navy to base their nuclear-powered attack submarines, capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads”, in the sea (Abe 27 December 2012). The prevention of “Lake Beijing” is the rationale behind his administration’s stance towards the Senkaku Islands and the efforts to

\(^{50}\) Though it was and is by no means exclusive to the Abe administration.
form a partnership with India to “shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian oceans” and is part of a strategy whereby “Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the India Ocean to the western Pacific” (Abe 27 December 2012). The article also echoed the sentiments of forming a greater partnership with regional and English-speaking allies with Great Britain and alongside Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand mentioned, as well as the “most important” ally for Japan, the US (Abe 27 December 2012).

While it is claimed in an article in the magazine ‘President’ allegedly based on a source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that this speech was written by Taniguchi (President 10 March 2013), whether true or false, Taniguchi is considered to be among the most influential actors in “Japan’s strategic tilt to India” and co-authored a speech given by PM Abe in 2007 which similarly proposed a strategic partnership with India on similar grounds (Eyal 7 November 2016; see also Suzuki 6 January 2016). Further, he has also discussed the implications of a “Lake Beijing” forming out of the East and South China Seas before the onset of the second Abe administration (Taniguchi 20 September 2012), while an presentation in 2011 from the U.S.-Japan Research Institute credited to Taniguchi discusses an “Alliance ‘Diamond’ and TPP ‘Pentagon’”, both of which are, to varying extents, mapped across similar geographical loci (U.S.-Japan Research Institute 7 February 2011; see also U.S.-Japan Research Institute nd). Thus, we see a common ideology shared between Abe and Taniguchi towards constraining China’s growing political and economic influence by utilizing increased multilateralism with the US and its regional and ‘English-speaking’ allies.

Within this framework, one of the core goals of the Abe Statement, then, is to appeal to these countries to legitimate Japan’s increasing security role in the region and international society. This task has been a huge force in what has been described as a “PR war” between China and Japan over each state’s public image regarding their territorial dispute (Reuters 14 February 2014). To this end, Taniguchi himself commented that the Chinese state’s “Goebbels-esque PR strategy where ‘repeating even a lie a hundred times, and it becomes true’ is proof that Leninism is alive even in the twenty-first century” (Reuters 14 February 2014).

This hugely politicized statement gives an indication of the enormous importance attached on securing a favourable public image of one’s nation that resonates across ‘international society’, and it is in this perspective that the ‘Abe Statement’ may be considered to have been a relative success as a political speech. For instance, Taniguchi in an interview during his time as Foreign Affairs Vice-

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51 Of course, the Abe administration has not only targeted Anglophone countries but other allies to the US (see § 6; § 8).
Spokesperson in the first Abe administration claims that diplomacy has three weapons: military power, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and language or “words” (kotoba) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan September 2006). For language, Taniguchi states that the world is entering into an era of momentous competition where Japan must effectively communicate and explain “what kind of country” it is rather than seeking to communicate based essentially on its actions alone and not words (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan September 2006). In a more global setting, Taniguchi views diplomacy as a business in that the Ministry should appeal to “customers”, i.e. those who support Japanese diplomacy. Here, he states that a company in order to sell products has two options. They can issue a press release and appeal to the media or they can write advertisements and appeal to the general public, while the two options of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is by either appealing to the media through the Press Secretary or by “marketing” through the Public Diplomacy Department to identify “mid-to-long-term customers” and “maintain the loyalty of existing customers” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan September 2006), or, in other words, increase soft power (§2.1.1). Political communication, then, might largely be considered to be a battle of public image, where an important role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and speech-writers to a prime minister) is to control, manage, and modulate the public image of the state (or administration) so that its own foreign policy and diplomacy are easier to carry out. This, Taniguchi states, is an issue of “branding” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan September 2006). For instance, Taniguchi claims that:

On the other hand, what is called ‘negative branding’ towards Japan such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine also wield enormous influence. For example, take “the rape of Nanjing”. After that image is created, you cannot keep up with it even if the photographs or descriptions are incorrect. This is what is frightening about negative branding. “Perception” becomes the “reality”. That is what a brand is and, in my view, is a problem which touches the essence of diplomacy. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan September 2006)

It is thus hardly controversial to state that Taniguchi’s role as speech-writer is to protect and manage the Abe administration’s public image among ‘customers’ so that it operates in the best possible environment to accomplish its own agenda. Hence, one fruitful approach to the analysis of political speeches is focus on what ‘public image’ is being constructed and to rigorously compare and contrast it to what is actually being done in its name, a general approach which is adopted in this thesis (§6; §7; §8). For instance, the aforementioned ‘future-oriented’ approach of the ‘Abe Statement’ is not a coincidence but may be seen as a communicative strategy observable in the Abe administration’s
approach to dealing with the sensitive issues of the past (e.g. *Sankei Shimbun* 20 March 2015; see also *Sankei Shimbun* 30 April 2015). In the case of the Abe statement, it has been suggested elsewhere that it may be interpreted as a way to circumvent apologizing while simultaneously precluding the need to apologize to regional neighbours in the future by acknowledging the Japanese state’s wartime conduct as accepted by the US and other ‘Western states’ (see Nakata 24 August 2015). While this remains only one interpretation and is not further addressed here, the point is that there is little doubt over the precise and carefully considered wording of the statement (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017).

For this reason, Abe’s speeches are considered to be a suitable resource for the textual analysis in this thesis. That is, these speeches are carefully crafted and reliant upon the political and communicative expertise of specialists with long experience in political communication such as Tomohiko Taniguchi, to carry out the ideological ambitions of the administration. As stated, this thesis will argue that one way to do this has been to depoliticize issues. However, if there is a place where discursive depoliticization by the Abe administration is observable, it is no great leap of judgment to suggest that it will be in the meticulously and strategically crafted speeches of the prime minister, and therefore, the point of departure for such an inquiry, is a rigorous analysis of these speeches.

## 3.4 Summary

This chapter has explained CR, and the dialectical-relational approach to CDS, to be adopted in the qualitative analysis of text in §7. The approach is problem-oriented and so the remainder of the chapter was comprised of explaining the issue of security in Japan, why in political communication it is helpful to retain a broad definition of security, and how socially-embedded norms constitute useful analytical tools in explaining political rhetoric aimed at redefining Japan’s role in the world. Finally, it discussed securitization theory and depoliticization.

For the former, securitization theory allows the researcher to analyze text without *a priori* setting the parameters of textual analysis over a given policy issue, but rather amidst the rise of ‘narratives of risk’ and its political exploitation, it means that ‘security’ is defined by Abe which means analyzing broader, and, this thesis argues, more rhetorically powerful aspects of political communication such as worldviews. For the latter, this chapter argued that the observations made of European and Anglophone countries of *post-politics* are applicable to Japan. Of course, phenomena regarding social systems are seldom cut-and-dry, but, as discussed in §3.3, the lower voter turnout,
the marketization of electoral strategies and its impacts on party-politics, economic restructuring and ideological convergence between the two main parties, changes in media management and political communication detail a situation comparable to the countries of post-politics in the literature. Further, Abe’s manifestoes are notable for its depoliticized language use, which has continued since his inauguration into office, and as PM, Abe has sought to empower the Cabinet at the expense of a range of actors, most notably, here, the media.

The approach contends that securitization is a helpful access point to the textual analysis and ultimately related to Abe’s attempt to depoliticize social issues which involves either delegating responsibility over certain public services to external sectors such as the individualization of responsibility, or empowering the state over others to carry out suitable actions without the need for agonistic political debate. The thesis contends that as Japan responds to globalization, Abe has exploited narratives of risk by securitizing issues as well as authoritatively depoliticizing others as his administration has endeavoured to create a new system of governance in Japan to respond to its many challenges.

With this, §4 elaborates the research methodology of this thesis, before transitioning to the analysis of Abe’s speeches.
4 Methodology

4.0 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology for the analysis. This comprises three stages: Stage one constitutes a quantitative analysis of textual data from most of Abe’s speeches from his second administration, from inauguration in 2012 to dissolving the Diet in 2014. The second stage comprises a numerical analysis of arguments and a frame analysis, in order to locate areas in his speeches of high repetition, which is taken to reflect a degree of salience or at least emphasis (§2). Finally, stage three provides the qualitative analysis of texts.

This thesis aims to examine a number of interrelated areas to effectively identify how Abe frames certain policy initiatives. To do this requires a holistic analysis of Abe’s speeches to provide a basis by which the analysis can ‘step down’ in stages to the micro-level of textual analysis, without the researcher arbitrarily selecting texts. The methodological approach to the analysis can be summarized as below.

Fig 4.0i Methodological approach to quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Source: Author.

Here, the diagram is modelled on a prism refracting light based on wavelength within the electromagnetic spectrum. That is, by constructing the methodology as explained below, we take the entire dataset to reflect a discursive spectrum where the stages above allow the researcher to, by degrees, shift analytical focus from the overall patterns of speech across the dataset to more micro-level areas of text while maintaining an integrative and holistic analytical approach. Without overdoing the analogy, an explanation of each stage is provided chronologically and separated into three subsections, §4.1, §4.2, and §4.3, with a conclusion leading on to the analysis carried out in §4.4.
4.1 Stage One

The thesis employs text mining software to assess Abe’s speeches. The software used is KH Coder, an open-source software which allows users to carry out quantitative content analyses and text-mining of text (Higuchi 2004). The analysis aims to assess what issues occur most frequently in Abe’s speeches as a basis for locating topics Abe most frequently discusses and to note any existing themes therein. Repetition of key terms is taken to be a measure of salience or emphasis (§3), and subject to further analysis. Themes are defined as clusters of terms within a community (see below). The analysis aims to assess salient areas within Abe’s speeches and examine the concepts and issues these surround.

This stage is split into the following steps:

1) Collect speeches and press conferences from PM Abe from December 2012 to December 2014 (pre-election) and compile the speeches into a dataset.\(^{52}\)

2) Conduct a co-occurrence analysis of centrality and community, and a hierarchical cluster analysis on the dataset to identify themes.

3) Follow this up with an examination of collocations of identified keywords to select keywords for §6.

For the first stage, all texts were retrieved from archived speeches and press conferences provided at “www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/statement/index.html” and general policy speeches (shoshin hyōmei enzetsu) conventionally held at the start of an extraordinary session of the Diet and other policy speeches (shisei hōshin enzetsu) from “www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/statement2/index.html” both included in the Cabinet Office website for the second administration. Speeches excluded were:

- A speech provided online but never given (Abe 18 January 2013);
- A speech delivered in English and translated into Japanese (Abe 7 September 2013);
- A joint press-conference provided in video format only (Abe 24 April 2014).

Further, official comments are omitted with one exception: a statement by Abe on his visit to Yasukuni Shrine (Abe 26 December 2013) owing to the publicity that surrounded it. The list of the

\(^{52}\) The entire database is stored on the free software, ‘Notepad++’ (Ho 2016).
texts selected is provided in the Appendices. For press conferences, where the PM spoke, the data were collected and for all other speakers, the data were not.

KH Coder allows the user to input conjugated words into the software so that for the analyses explained below that word is counted individually as separate from its constitutive parts. Here, the term 'security' (anzenhoshō) was inputted, which comprises the term 'safety' (anzen) and 'guarantee' (hoshō), and 'the right to CSD' or 'collective self-defence right' (shūdantekijieiken) which comprises the terms 'collective' (shūdan), 'self-defence' (jiei), 'right' (ken) and a conjugation for certain types of adjectives (teki). These were included because the term 'security' as opposed to 'economics' or 'politics' would not be picked up were it not manually inputted, while CSD was a controversial issue during the second administration so the thesis aims to test whether it was a prominent talking point in Abe’s speeches. The overall number of tokens in the dataset was 276,211 tokens. However, Japanese is an agglutinative language, and so to focus on the words used themselves, KH Coder removes particles, and verbal conjugations. When this is taken into account, the overall number of tokens “in use”, as it were, is 105,539 tokens (see Higuchi 2014: 25).

Two initial measures are carried out in step two to examine terms used by Abe throughout his speeches and how they may be seen to link together so as to delineate any recurrent themes in Abe’s speeches. These are a co-occurrence network and a hierarchical cluster analysis. Following this, an examination of collocations within identified themes is carried out. All three are explicated separately with the co-occurrence analysis discussed in §4.1.1, the hierarchical cluster analysis in §4.1.2, and the collocation analysis in §4.1.3.

### 4.1.1 Co-Occurrence analysis

In Linguistics, a co-occurrence analysis (COA) measures the “range of individual co-occurrence of a morpheme (or word) i [that] is defined [...] as the environment of morphemes (or words) which occur in the same sentence with i (in some body of linguistic material)” (Harris 1957: 284). KH Coder does not set the parameter at the sentence, but instead measures individual co-occurrences for a given word with a parameter of ten words preceding and proceeding a given instantiation (Higuchi 2014). Words which are measured as such are selected based on frequency in the dataset where the most frequent words are then subject to a COA (Higuchi 2014).

COA measures ‘centrality’ or ‘communities’ and are visualized as co-occurrence networks in KH Coder (Higuchi 2014). Networks consist of a set of ‘nodes’ (or vertices) which represent system units and are usually depicted as circles, which are concatenated by lines, denoted as ‘edges’ which represent the links between them (Clauset et al., 2004: 1; Lai et al. 2010: 1). In this thesis, nodes
represent frequently used terms and edges represent the co-occurrence of two nodes at a higher frequency relative to other terms in the network. Network analyses are applicable to a wide variety of research areas and hence, as a general rule-of-thumb, theory should inform what measurements of 'centrality' and 'communities' to take and not the other way around. Such analyses attempt to measure the flow of information within a given network, such as in a social network for reasons ranging from market purposes to security concerns such as drone warfare (see Chamayou 2015). They may also be applied to financial markets or to understand the rate and route of infestation, et cetera (Clauset et al. 2004; Newman 2005). However, there is little consensus over what centrality or community are that might satisfactorily be applied to all network analyses. Indeed, for centrality, there is "no unanimity on exactly what centrality is [...] and [...] very little agreement on the proper procedure for its measurement" (Freeman 1979: 215-17). Put simply it essentially is an indicator for the most important nodes (vertices) based on network flow in a given network where 'importance' is measured and quantified in different ways (Brandes 2001).

This thesis adopts the 'eigenvector' approach to centrality rather than 'betweenness' or the 'degree' approach for the following reasons. Firstly, 'betweenness' is based on the view that those within "the shortest communication path connecting pairs of others" have communicative power (Bavelas 1948; 1950; Freeman 1977) and so counts geodesic paths only (Borgatti 2005: 56). Thus, betweenness centrality may be seen to measure an actor's (whether individual or collective) control over the transmission of information. This is based on the view that communication only occurs along "the shortest possible path" (Stephenson and Zelen 1989: 3). However, this measurement assumes that signals (information) travel through a network where all nodes (in this case, communicative actors) send signals at the same constant rate (Newman and Girvan 2003: 3); an assumption which is not substantiated empirically (Newman 2005: 2). For example, it may be intentionally channeled through intermediaries to shield information such that it does not always transmit to the shortest possible path between actors (Stephenson and Zelen 1989: 3). Further, it is not an assumption that needs to be made in the analysis in the subsequent chapters.

Secondly, degree centrality measures centrality based on the number of edges (co-occurrence relations to other nodes) that a given node has (Borgatti 2005: 62), making it useful for measuring immediate influence, such as infestation, or an implicit process with no indirect links such as situated knowledge construction (Lave and Wenger 1991 in Borgatti 2005: 62; Borgatti 2005: 62). However, even though the total number of connections between a given word may be considered to measure the centrality of a word in a corpus, eigenvector centrality is adopted instead for the following reason. That is, eigenvector centrality assumes that "trajectories can not only be circuitous, but also revisit
nodes and lines multiple times along the way” (Borgatti 2005: 56; Bonacich 1987; 1991; 2007), meaning that it attempts to identify an important node (or vertex) by assessing the importance of the nodes to which it is connected (Borgatti 2005; Jackson 2008: 40). Given that our COA is conducted to identify themes where centrality is measured to highlight any prominent themes or salient areas to address in the following stages of analysis, then, though it remains imperfect, it is considered the best method here because it attempts to qualify the connections a node has with others based on their connections and how they are distributed in a network. For instance, suppose node \textit{i} is the term ‘Supreme Court’ and is connected to many technical ‘legalese’ terms that recur but are isolated, while at the same time node \textit{j} is the word ‘Liberty’ and is connected to the same quantity of nodes except these nodes are themselves connected to a range of others such as ‘Prosperity’, ‘Profit’, ‘US’ which connects to ‘Rights’, ‘Protection’, ‘Citizens’, and so on. Here, it is assumed that the concept of ‘liberty’ carries more rhetorical impact and potentially salience because it is part of a coherent structure of logic and a known context which links to existing discussions, whose examination can be then supplemented by qualitative analyses. Though this may not always be the case, the assumption is that, for instance, term \textit{i} which is frequently uttered and is connected to many other terms which themselves are connected to many others, has more centrality than term \textit{j} which is uttered more frequently and has more connections than \textit{i}, but whose connections are not connected to many other terms. This is considered preferable for the aims of this study given that centrality, here, aims to identify the most important—that is rhetorically impactful—terms used in PM Abe’s speeches in the view of highlighting in further stages of the analysis salient issues and arguments discussed over the two years’ timeframe PM Abe gave the speeches. The question is not ‘what is the most commonly used term’, but rather ‘what group of terms are frequently used in proximity to each other’, in order to assess an area of rhetorical impact or emphasis.

In addition, communities are considered to be “the division of network nodes into groups within which the network connections are dense, but between which they are sparser” (Newman and Girvan 2004: 1). Communities, therefore, reflect topological relationships between elements in the network and may represent a wide variety of entities dependent on what the network represents. For instance, communities may be used to identify and profile groups of individuals in a social network whether for economic, security, or political reasons, sets of Web pages on a given topic, information over purchases for an online retailer or pathways in metabolic networks, \textit{et cetera} (Lancichinetti et al. 2009: 2). KH Coder provides three community measurements: ‘betweenness’, ‘modularity’ or ‘random walks’. ‘Betweenness’ is selected for the following reasons.
Firstly, modularity measures "the difference between the actual fraction of edges within the community and such fraction expected in a randomized graph with the same number of nodes and the same degree sequence" (Chen et al. 2014: 46). It can be useful for community detection in the sense that it measures when a division is a good one based on there being many edges within communities and few between them, but it is limited in that it often overlooks smaller communities (Chen et al. 2014: 46; Clauset et al. 2004: 1-2). Further, ‘random walks’ does not follow the assumption that signals travel along the shortest paths but, might be regarded as closer to its polar opposite, in that it assumes that they perform "a random walk about the network until they reach their destination" (Newman and Girvan 2004: 3). Thus a ‘walker’ randomly chooses its hop to one of its direct neighbours at every step “following certain probabilistic preference for each neighbour” (Zhong and Shen 2006: 49), where random walks tend “to get “trapped” into densely connected parts corresponding to communities” (Pons and Latapy 2006: 192).

While both approaches are widely used, ‘betweenness’ is selected here because it is a divisive approach while the others are agglomerative. Agglomerative methods calculate similarities between node pairs and then add edges “to an initially empty [node] pair (n [nodes] with no edges) starting with the [node] pairs with highest similarities” (Newman and Girvan 2004: 2/13). Divisive methods iteratively remove edges from a network to effectively establish communities (Newman and Girvan 2004: 2/13). Put simply, the former focusses on adding edges bottom-up while the latter starts with the network and remove edges top-down. One drawback to agglomerative approaches is that they tend to detect only the core of communities and leave out the periphery. On the other hand, divisive methods start with the network and attempt to find the least “similar connected pairs of [nodes] and then remove edges between them”, which repeatedly divides “the network into smaller and smaller components” (Newman and Girvan 2004: 2).

Crucially, however, the ‘betweenness’ approach is divisive but rather than removing edges based on the lowest similarity between nodes, it finds edges with the highest ‘betweenness’, based on a set of betweenness measures such as that described above for centrality measurements (Newman and Girvan 2004). Standard divisive methods which remove edges based on ‘betweenness’ would calculated all edges in a network then remove edges in decreasing order of betweenness. However, after removing one edge, betweenness values “for the remaining edges will no longer reflect the network as it now is” (Newman and Girvan 2004: 3). Therefore, the ‘betweenness’ approach recalculates betweenness after the removal of every edge, which greatly improves the efficacy and utility of this measurement (Newman and Girvan 2004). Though it comes at the cost of considerable demands on computational processing compared to the other approaches, it is
considered here a price worth paying given that compared to agglomerative approaches above there is less of a tendency to leave out peripheral nodes of a community (Newman and Girvan 2004). Further, agglomerative methods are generally better applied to far larger datasets which optimize modularity where peripheral vertices may not be as valuable in the analysis (e.g. Clauset et al. 2004; Pons & Latapy 2006). For this approach, however, the dataset is relatively small and the COA is just one step in identifying areas for further analysis, and so it is considered important to assess how data are linked within and across communities (Newman and Girvan 2004), which might otherwise go unnoticed using agglomerative methods.

The COA was carried out under the following parameters:

- Minimum Term Frequency: 135 (Default)
- Unit: Sentences (Default)
- Filter words by POS: Default
- Types of edges: Word-words (Default)
- Filter edges: Top 60 (Default)

Following this a hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) was carried out, which is explained below.

### 4.1.2 Hierarchical cluster analysis

A HCA produces “a nested data set in which pairs of items or clusters are successively linked” (Rasmussen 1992), where “[i]n order to cluster the items in a data set, some means of quantifying the degree of association between them is required”, denoted as distance (Rasmussen 1992). ‘Ward’s Distance’ (WD) was selected as the distance measure ahead of ‘Complete Link Measure’ (CLM) and ‘Group Average Distance’ (GAD) because it differs from the others in that in the agglomeration process “the union of every possible pair of groups is considered and two groups whose fusion results in the minimum increase in loss of information are merged” where ‘loss of information’ refers to the total within-group error sum of squares (Gan et al. 2007: 132-3; Holliday 2013: 202). Further, though there is no definitive answer when it comes to selecting measurements, Jain and Dubes (1988: 81) point out many reviews of methods frequently point to WD as outperforming other hierarchical clustering methods (but see Lorr 1983). Given that this study is primarily concerned with relations at lower levels in the hierarchical structure for descriptive purposes, HCA is carried out using WD.

For approaches to the measurement of (dis)similarity between items, Euclidean Distance (ED) was selected over Jaccard Similarity Function (JSF) and Cosine Similarity (CS). Here, JSF is “defined
as a degree of commonality between two sets” and is “measured as a ratio of the number of common attributes of X AND Y to the number of elements possessed by X OR Y” (Kumar et al. 2005: 539). On the other hand, CS “is utilized to measure the similarity between two vectors of n dimensions by finding the cosine of the angle between them” while ED works in a similar way to CS but the similarity measure is judged from “the direct Euclidean distance between vector inputs” and not the cosine (Durao et al. 2012: 199). While different similarity measurements are useful depending on approach, data set and aims of the researcher (see Patidar et al. 2012), ED is generally recommended for WD as the only applicable coefficient (Rasmussen 1992; Holliday, 2013: 202) and hence is chosen in this study.

The HCA was carried out under the following parameters:

- Minimum Term Frequency: 135 (Default)
- Unit: Sentences (Default)
- Filter words by POS: Default
- Number of cluster: Auto (Default)

Following this a collocation analysis was carried out on words in identified themes, explained below.

### 4.1.3 Collocation analysis

The collocation analysis aims to provide further descriptive data of the findings to identify areas in Abe’s speech that will be the focus of the second stage of analysis.

To do this, a KWIC (Key Word in Context) Concordance function is carried out on the keywords identified in the COA and HCA. This function lists every instantiation of a keyword in the dataset, and also provides a list of the most frequent collocations for the keyword based on a parameter of five words preceding and proceeding every instantiation (Higuchi 2014). This can be calculated based on the ‘f-score’ or total number of co-occurrences. The f-score factors in the within-parameter-proximity of the co-occurring word to the keyword (the node word). Although the parameter set is small, f-score provides a conservative evaluation of the terms directly linked to keywords. For the total number of co-occurrence measure, t-scores and z-scores are used to calculate the significance of collocations within the same parameter. Both scores are calculated to show collocations of terms that cropped up in steps one and two and how they may relate. Thus, for every list of collocations of a given node word, how they relate to other ‘node words’ within the delineative groups identified previously provide further descriptive detail.
t-scores are calculated using the following formula,

\[ t = \frac{O - E}{\sqrt{O}} \]

where \( O \) is the 'observed' number of times a collocate is located within the set parameter from the
given node word, and \( E \) is the 'expected' number of times it would be located within the set parameter
from the given node word if by chance\(^{53}\). Secondly, z-scores are calculated as below:

\[ z = \frac{O - E}{\sigma} \]

where \( O \) and \( E \) denote the same as above and \( \sigma \) denotes the standard deviation which is calculated
for the node word in combination with the collocate (Barnbrook 1996: 97). More detailed formulae
are provided in the Appendices (also Gómez 2002). Finally, a “useful (though not very precise)”
measure of significance here, is provided for z-scores with a threshold of three and above, and t-
scores at two and above (Barnbrook 1996: 96; Stubbs 1995; Durrant and Schmitt 2009: 168). As
suggested above, a measure of significance could mean a number of things, such as idioms, but may
also point towards recurrent themes. It is for this reason that these cut-off measures are used to
further highlight potentially salient collocates, and why these three measures are used in tandem.

As stated, the top thirty most frequently co-occurring terms are analyzed using t-scores and
z-scores. Further, those terms which share the same value as the thirtieth but are given as thirty-first,
thirty-second etc., are also included. Associations are considered to be unreliable for low-frequency
collocations (Durrant and Schmitt 2009: 168) and so collocations with a frequency lower than five
are then omitted. For these reasons, some node word collocation lists may exceed the mark of 30 and
some may not meet it. The tests are also one-tailed and so any negative values are discarded.

\(^{53}\) This of course assumes that there are no other underlying factors that dictate how words collocate with
others, which for language clearly is false. Despite this, the use of t-scores and z-scores can be considered a
useful means by which to identify interconnected terms, leaving the researcher to cogitate over the significance
of a close interconnection.
4.2 Stage Two

This section explicates the research methodology for Stage Two of the analysis. This comprises two parts. The first involves a frame analysis to be conducted in §5 and the second is an analysis of keywords that is the focus of §6. These are explained in separate subsections, with the keywords analysis in §4.2.2, and the frame analysis explained first in §4.2.1, below.

4.2.1 Frame analysis

For the frame analysis, the scope of inquiry is ten lines preceding and succeeding a keyword instantiation and uses the framework set out by Matthes and Kohring (2002; 2008) who tailor a taxonomy of frames provided by Entman (1993) on political and media discourse. Here, a HCA is carried out to isolate clusters within text to discern salient attributes of framing effects. In doing so a number of assumptions are made. A chief one among these is that frames may be analyzed by separating information into variables which function as a selection of sub-frame components and that can be seen to systemize, revealing particular framing patterns (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 264). Sub-frame components are defined as below:

- **Problem Definition (PD)**
  - Entman (1993: 52): Determines "what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values".
  - Matthes and Kohring (2008: 266): "The frame element problem definition includes both the central issue under investigation and the most important actor".

- **Causal Interpretation (CI)**
  - Entman (1993: 52): Identifies "the forces creating the problem".
  - Matthes and Kohring (2008: 266): Measuring "who was deemed responsible for the risks and benefits" of the problem definition.

- **Moral Evaluation/Judgment (ME)**
  - Entman (1993: 52): "[...] evaluate[s] causal agents and their effects".
  - Matthes and Kohring (2008: 268) "[...] the most frequent risk and benefit evaluations [...] as these promote a direct (moral) evaluation".
- Treatment Recommendation/Remedy (TR)
  - Entman (1993: 52): “[…] offer[s] and justify[ies] treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects”.
  - Matthes and Kohring (2008: 268): “[T]he variables Negative Judgment […] and Positive Judgment […] [were treated] as proxies for the treatment recommendation” as due to the nature of the study made it was impossible to directly operationalize treatment recommendation.

The analysis aims to:

a) Test for evidence of framing effects;

b) Test if frames correspond to the themes derived from Stage One;

c) Identify a pathway by which to qualitatively analyze frames in §7.

As stated, the research methodology starts with an overview of the entire dataset and ‘zooms-in’ to areas of particular interest on the micro-level based on the identification and characterization of salient areas of speech. Therefore, this section aims to answer the following research questions:

1) Is it possible to identify distinct frames in PM Abe’s speeches?

2) If so, what are the main components of each distinct frame?

3) Is there any correspondence with frames with the themes identified in Stage One?

For reference, themes are the identified in the previous stage of analysis based on the interconnection and co-occurrence of frequently used terms in Abe’s speeches. While no delineation could possibly be clear or definitive between words used and points made (necessarily so for communication’s sake), the themes are identified based on word use, while the frames are established and identified based on the points and arguments made by Abe. They need not correlate, as the same tropes may be used throughout irrespective of topic and theme. For instance, we may find one theme where terms relating to international society frequently occur and another theme with terms frequently related to the US government, but find that frame types, such as a ‘Peace Frame’ are used consistently between both. Seeing, then, if there is a correlation between frames and themes is tantamount to identifying whether Abe uses certain arguments for certain
topics or themes, which is informative. For example, let’s suppose that the latter theme in fact contains terms frequently concerning the firing of Ballistic missiles by the DPRK into the Sea of Japan, and find also that a different frame altogether (for example, a ‘Security’ frame) is used here. Then testing for a correlation between themes and frames would allow us to identify and hence assert what are the most frequently used frames for these two themes, and whether they differ, which informs the qualitative analysis that follows.

While the analysis carried out by Matthes and Kohring (2002; 2008) examined reliability through trained coders, the author of this thesis did not have the resources sufficient to employ a team of trained coders to verify the robustness of identified frames in the frame analysis (§9). As a result, statistical measurements in accordance with the framework set out by Matthes and Kohring (2008) are explained in full here and the results are provided in Appendix 5. However, part of this thesis’ aims is to demonstrate the compatibility of these research methodologies from separate research disciplines to promote transdisciplinarity (e.g. Ishigami 2005a; 2005b). Therefore, while the frame analysis carried out in §6 remains a qualitative assessment of framing effects, for clarity, the full methodology is explained below.

Overall this section aims to examine the test-hypothesis, as follows:

\[ H_1: \text{There is a significant relationship between identified clusters and the previously identified three themes.} \]
\[ H_0: \text{There is no significant relationship between identified clusters and the previously identified three themes.} \]

Similarly, the ‘identified clusters’ refers to the clusters of sub-frame components identified in the frame analysis. It is necessary first to see how these ‘clusters’ of subframe components have systemized into identifiable and descriptive frames, and then to see how these frames relate to the themes identified in the previous stage of the analysis. Therefore, to test the above hypothesis, a HCA is carried out to answer research questions 1) and 2), and a Chi-square to answer 3). Seventy-five randomly selected instantiations of each keyword are examined within a parameter of ten lines per instantiation preceding and proceeding the word unless the speech ends whereupon that was taken as the limit. Where there are multiple instantiations of a keyword in the one parameter, all instantiations are included and the parameter is extended to the ten-lines succeeding the final instantiation. Frames were topic-oriented in that there could only be one topic per frame but multiple other components. This means that within one parameter numerous frames may emerge where topic shifts are obvious.
While this study attempts to replicate an existing methodology, modifications are necessary to shift the focus of analysis from media to political speeches. To elaborate, the model methodology was designed to identify media frames on biotechnology (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 266) and included actors as a category of the variable PD. The traditional framework for journalistic reporting is widely held to be disclosing the 4 ‘W’s and 1 ‘H’; i.e. ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘why’, and ‘how’, and so the decision to include the ‘who’ in the ‘what’, as it were, appears reasonable. However, for political speeches much discussion centers on a PD and how the government or the state/nation responds. Therefore, the main actor likely comprises multifarious terms for state and/or nation (‘Our Country’; ‘Japan’; ‘Abe administration’), so the category actor is excised from the analysis.

Further, while the variable ME includes categories denoting risks and benefits to various sectors, and more general distinctions of ‘positive’, ‘neutral’, ‘negative’, again both distinctions are unnecessary to the analysis. That is, political speeches are goal-oriented; there is very frequently a goal—whether a policy, a stance or another action—that is being justified and legitimated. This is not uncommon in political discourse in general. For example, Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer (2001: 37) analyze a preface by former UK PM Tony Blair to a White Paper on Competition produced by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1998, noting that the text is organized on a problem-solution model where the problem is defined as a process without social agents and the solution is defined in terms of what national agencies must do.

Hence, whether or not an aspect of, for example, the international economy is a risk or a benefit to a selected group such as Japanese citizens or whether it is portrayed as ‘positive’, ‘neutral’, or ‘negative’, it is considered to be more beneficial to group together such data under one category to show instead what groups are impacted in this relationship between a given PD and its espoused TR. Finally, in the model methodology (Matthes and Kohring 2008), TR was substituted for ‘negative judgements’ and ‘positive judgements’ as proxies for future action on this issue given that a news stories normative assessment of the issue implies potential TRs. Here, TRs are operationalized because the Japanese PM offers a wide-range of policies to a wide-range of issues.

As in the model methodology, binary ‘dummy’ variables are computed for every variable. Binary variables with frequencies higher than 5 per cent of frame instances were included in the HCA analysis using Ward’s Method. The non-frame variable is ‘Theme’. Here, because frames are identified based on a keyword instantiation or group of instantiations of a keyword identified in Stage One of the analysis, this variable simply denotes the theme these keyword instantiations belong to for every frame. This is a way to identify any patterns in the diversity of frames across different themes identified in Stage One, and hence to answer research question 3). Here, a crosstabs analysis using
Chi-Square is calculated to test for a significant difference in the distribution of frames for each theme. Then, a Phi and Cramer's V test is conducted as a post-hoc analysis of results. The software package used to conduct the HCA, the Chi-Squared analysis, and post-hoc tests is IBM™ SPSS® Statistics, version 21-23. The results of these tests are provided in Appendix 5, with the list of qualitatively identified frames provided in §6.

4.2.2 Keywords analysis

The keyword analysis is an analysis of the major arguments for each keyword to characterize each theme to support the analyses in Stage Three, which comprises the qualitative analysis of text using CDS. Stage Two aims to provide more descriptive detail of the salient areas of speech, having carried out the text-mining analysis in Stage One. The focus on keywords in the frame analysis is based on the supposition that keywords identified using quantitative techniques is indicative of salient areas of Abe’s speeches, and hence set a wide parameter to conduct an explorative, broad-ranging frame analysis around such areas. The keyword analysis, however, narrows down this parameter to analyze explicitly what arguments are made through the keywords themselves, so as to be able to better characterize themes to supplement the qualitative analyses in §7. Therefore, the keyword analysis aims to numerically analyze keywords in more detail by doubling the number of keywords to 150 instances each, unless the total number of instantiations for a keyword in the dataset is below this threshold. Though the number may seem arbitrary, it was considered that doubling the amount to 150 or all instances of a keyword would be representative of the main arguments for the keyword. However, it narrows the scope from ten lines to five sentences preceding and proceeding the keyword instantiation, unless it reaches the end of the speech. In doing so, it will provide an account of what kind of arguments are made concerning the identified keywords in Stage One, which will also inform the analyses in Stage Three, in accordance with the research methodology visualized in Fig 4.0i.

Once a given keyword is identified, we then qualitatively analyze the arguments made within the parameter based on a number of questions, loosely coalescing around the so-called 4 ‘W’s and 1 ‘H’. For example, should one keyword be ‘Liberty/Freedom’ (じゆう) then an example of the research questions would be:

a) Whose liberty?

b) Who provides it?

c) Freedom from/to do what?
d) How is it attained?

The keyword analysis is a qualitative-numerical analysis. Therefore, the answers for each question are categorized and then tabulated to provide an overall assessment of how each keyword is used. The analysis assesses the largest patterns of usage for each keyword and so categories that amount to less than five for each keyword are dissolved and incorporated into an ‘Other’ category, owing to the voluminous amount of data. Additionally, how answers to these questions interrelate is also provided in tables. Here, subject categories that amount to thirty or above are selected for further analysis to see how they interrelate with answers from the other research questions (see §6). This is considered to be a suitable enough threshold to label a given subject category as prominent among 150 instantiations of a keyword.

The analysis is carried out for every keyword identified in Stage One of the research methodology, and a qualitative and descriptive analysis is provided for the numerical outputs for each keyword in order to characterize each theme. The findings from both the frame analysis and keyword analysis are then used to supplement the qualitative CDS analysis in Stage Three (§7).

4.3 Stage Three

This section describes the third stage of the analysis, namely the micro-analysis of text using the dialectical-relational approach to CDS. While the approach is explained in §3, this section seeks to explain a) how it links together with the other stages of analysis and b) the specific analytical tools employed in the textual analysis.

Firstly, the qualitative analysis is supplemented by the findings in Stages One and Two. The themes identified through the quantitative analyses are then subject to a keyword analysis to qualitatively assess the main patterns of usage for each keyword in a theme. Additionally, the parameter for each keyword is doubled for the frame analysis which seeks to identify the use of frames over specific issues by the PM. In Stage Three, the analytical scope ‘zooms-in’ to the analysis of text specifically, to critically analyze Abe’s speeches for depoliticizing moves as a strategy of legitimation. The ‘zooming-in’ process is carried out by randomly selecting five frames for each frame type identified, schematically reconstructing the arguments for each frame and then analyzing the text while integrating it into the overall observations made regarding keyword usage in §6. Further, the CDS analysis in §6 provides the basis for answering the final two research questions of the dialectical-relational approach in §7, namely:
Considering the necessity of this social issue in the current social order;
Identifying potential means to overcome it.

(Fairclough 2009: 181-82)

As stated in §2 and §3, this analysis will focus on the ways in which politically salient metaphors/metonymies as well as norms are utilized to promote policy change as the latter is often used to legitimate ideas and to internalize them into domestic society (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) while the former is a useful means to appeal to the latter (Chilton 1996: 266). The norms selected for analysis and their definitions are as follows:

- **Antimilitarism**
  - As stated, this norm denotes the opposition to war and to the militarization of the state as a result of Japanese people's experiences of WWII, its immediate aftermath, and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

- **Asianism**
  - A norm which encourages Japan to “to develop its East Asian identity” potentially in contradistinction to bilateralism with the US, but more traditionally in conformity, as a bridge-builder (*kakehashi* or *watashiyaku*) between the US and the ‘East’ (Hook et al. 2012: 65).

- **Bilateralism with the US**
  - A norm which is embedded in the US-Japan Security Treaty which “builds up powerful consensual constituency in Japan for behaving in a bilateral fashion”, implying that Japan “should behave within the remit of the bilateral alliance” within the international system (Hook et al. 2012: 65).

- **Developmentalism/Economism**
  - Developmentalism denotes the goal to “catch up both in terms of the crude measures of economic success, as in per capita GNP, as well as in terms of international political influence, as with the ambition to gain a seat on the UNSC” with the ‘West’ (Hook et al. 2012: 67). It combines creatively with antimilitarism to buttress economism as a social norm which “prioritizes economic activity and

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54 Trialteiralism is excluded as it is no longer as prevalent as the other identified norms in the present day (Hook et al. 2012: 66-67).
imputes it with positive value”, as opposed to militarism and undergirds developmentalist norms “through an ‘economics-first’ policy that developmentalism has been given substance” (Hook et al. 2012: 67).

- **Internationalism**

  A norm which “is the expression of cooperation with and support for the ideals of international society constructed by the early starters of the West” (Hook et al. 2012: 66). The norm is embedded in the preamble of the constitution, which states that Japan, its people, “desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace [...]” (see Appendix 4).

- **(Neo-)Nationalism**

  While the above norms are used to explain Japan’s IR (Hook et al. 2012), (neo-)nationalism is also employed as an analytical tool because of Abe’s reputation for strong nationalist views (Chanlett-Avery 2014; 2015; §1). While nationalism is difficult to define, the definition adopted here is associated with neo-nationalism of the far right which stresses the need for a strong state with robust military force (Penny and Wakefield 2008). Alternative definitions based on relational approaches between politics and society lay greater emphasis on it as a response to globalization among working-class groups (Kalb 2009). However, this thesis analyses one individual, and so nationalism is taken to refer to the mobilization of the nation-state towards a strong state, military and social authoritarianism. This is assessed by identifying the three interrelated claims characteristic of nationalistic rhetoric: identity claims, spatial claims, and temporal claims concerning the nation (Özkirimli 2010).

Additionally, Stage Three sets out to analyze the political power of metaphors/metonymies as part of a framing device (Hook 1984; Pan and Kosicki 1993) and so does not rely on methods for quantitative metaphor analysis. That is, the aim is not to investigate metaphor use alone whether to demonstrate the power or prevalence of metaphor in hegemonic discourses or to collate and document the most frequently used metaphors to contribute to knowledge regarding its application. This is not to say such a study is not worthwhile. For instance, quantitative analyses of metaphors such as the ‘metaphor identification procedure’ (Pragglejaz Group 2007), among others (Steen 2002; Koller et al. 2008; Steen et al. 2010) has proven useful in mixed-methods approaches to assess the use of conventional metaphors by political leaders (Koller and Semino 2009; Semino and Koller...
Further, other methods such as Critical Metaphor Analysis (Chateris-Black 2004; 2005) are powerful methods for highlighting the role of metaphors in speeches and discourse on a generic-level. However, the aim of this thesis is not to study metaphor per se, but rather assess its impact in combination with other rhetorical devices. Therefore, metaphors/metonymies that supplement the points made in the textual analysis are selected by the researcher to expand on the framing effects in Abe’s speeches.

With the methodology set, the thesis now turns to the summary of this chapter, then to the analysis.

4.4 Summary

As discussed, the research methodology comprises three stages: Stage One denotes quantitative methods on an entire corpus using text-mining software (Higuchi 2004); Stage Two attempts to delve deeper in the analysis to provide a descriptive account of the themes identified in Stage One as well as a frame analysis; Stage Three seeks to supplement the findings from Stage Two by critically analyzing frames on the micro-level. The aim is to demonstrate a method by which researchers may combine holistic, quantitative analyses of datasets to the qualitative, micro-level textual analyses (see §9). In doing so, the claims made in the qualitative analysis have more impact because they relate to observations made across the entire dataset, while the quantitative analyses in Stage One is afforded greater detail in contextualizing and explaining the patterns of language use identified.

To note, this thesis does not seek to speculate or draw inferences on intentionality as such an exercise would be both unnecessary and impossible. Rather, it aims to offer a descriptive explanation of how salient political issues in Japan are packaged and framed, to address the research questions outlined in §3. In doing so, it is hoped that an enriched, holistic analysis of language use by PM Abe which seeks to explain how the prime minister sought to legitimate the substantial change made during his premiership will also stimulate further research in related disciplines.

With this in mind, the thesis now turns to Stage One of the analysis.
5 Quantitative Analysis; Frame Analysis

5.0 Introduction

This chapter constitutes Stage One of the research methodology and the frame analysis of Stage Two, and is separated into three subsections: §5.1 comprises the results of the COA, §5.2 provides the results of the HCA, and §5.3 constitutes the collocation analysis, while a summary of Stage One of the analyses is provided in §5.4. Following this, the frame analysis of Stage Two is then carried out in §5.5, while §5.6 offers a conclusion to this chapter.

5.1 Co-Occurrence analysis

This section provides the results of the COA. First, the results are visualized as a co-occurrence network in Fig5.1i and Fig5.1ii, to show the eigenvector centrality and betweenness community measure respectively. Following this, the translation for every node is provided in tables separated generally by communities and explained. Finally, a summary of the observations is provided.

Firstly, the co-occurrence network displaying eigenvector centrality is provided in Fig 5.1i, below.
Fig 5.1i: Eigenvector centrality of terms within co-occurrence network for Abe’s speeches. 
Source: Author.

Here, each circle comprises a node (vertex) with a word in it and the lines connecting nodes are referred to as edges. The bigger the node the higher the frequency of the term in it, the thicker the edge (the line connecting different nodes) the stronger the co-occurrence between nodes. For example, in the dataset node Aa which comprises the term ‘Japan’ (nihon; nippon) represents 2173 instantiations within the dataset, while node Ab—the term ‘world’ (sekai)—792 instantiations, and Ac, ‘contribute/contribution’ (kōken) represents 172 instantiations. Centrality is visualized through
a blue-to-white-to-pink spectrum with blue the weakest and pink the strongest. Betweenness communities are provided in Fig5.1ii, below.

**Fig 5.1ii: Modularity community of terms within co-occurrence network for Abe's speeches.**
*Source: Author.*

The different colours represent different communities, the thicker the edge the stronger the co-occurrence, while dotted lines signify inter-community links. In Fig 5.1i and Fig 5.1ii, every node is given an individual label. These were added by the author to translate each term into English, which are tabulated and provided below. The letter in Upper case indicates the community while the letter in lower case simply marks the word. All major communities are examined and summarized, with
the more obvious connections within and across communities discussed in terms of what theme can be drawn out from the results.

Table 5.1i: Terms in nodes clustered within Community A and E.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Author</th>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>日本</td>
<td>Nihon/nippon</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>世界</td>
<td>Sekai</td>
<td>World/Society/Universe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C</td>
<td>貢献</td>
<td>Köken</td>
<td>Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>國際</td>
<td>Kokusai</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>我が国</td>
<td>Wagakuni</td>
<td>Our Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>安定</td>
<td>Antei</td>
<td>Stability/Steadiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G</td>
<td>積極</td>
<td>Sekkyoku</td>
<td>Positive/Progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>主義</td>
<td>Shugi</td>
<td>Doctrine/-ism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>自由</td>
<td>Jiyū</td>
<td>Liberty/Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J</td>
<td>平和</td>
<td>Heiwa</td>
<td>Peace/Harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
<td>地域</td>
<td>Chiiki</td>
<td>Area/Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L</td>
<td>アジア</td>
<td>Ajia</td>
<td>Asia/Asian/Asiatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community E links to Community A through the node term ‘society’ which links to ‘stability’ and ‘international’. The other term in Community E is ‘woman/women’ and likely reflects the “society where every woman shines” (subete-no josei-ga kagayaku shakai) initiative promoted by the Abe administration. Conversely, ‘international society’ links Community A and Community E. Due to this, Community A may be summarized as centered on the theme of ‘Peace and Stability’.

Table 5.1ii: Terms in nodes clustered within Community B and C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>社会</td>
<td>Shakai</td>
<td>Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>女性</td>
<td>Josei</td>
<td>Woman/Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community A centers on ‘peace’ and ‘stability’, whether on the global or regional level. ‘Peace’ itself has the highest eigenvector centrality. Community E links to Community A through the node term ‘society’ which links to ‘stability’ and ‘international’. The other term in Community E is ‘woman/women’ and likely reflects the “society where every woman shines” (subete-no josei-ga kagayaku shakai) initiative promoted by the Abe administration. Conversely, ‘international society’ links Community A and Community E. Due to this, Community A may be summarized as centered on the theme of ‘Peace and Stability’.

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55 The Abe administration sought to encourage women into the labour market as part of Abenomics. As of 2015 the female employment rate stood at 63.6 per cent, higher than the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average (2014: 58 per cent) (OECD 2015) and has been increasing since at least the turn of the millennium. However, non-regular employment has increased for both males and females with 38 per cent of all Japanese employees either in low-paid temporary employment or part-time work (Katz 2014), while regular employment has decreased under Abenomics by 3.1 per cent. This is heavily slanted towards the precariat and has reinforced the marginalization of women (Osawa and Kingston 2015: 60).
Community B and C show more than one cross-community connection with Ca ‘Growth’ (seichō) linked with Ba ‘Economics’ (keizai) and Bb ‘Policy’ (seisaku), while Cd ‘Security’ (anzenhoshō) is also linked to Bb ‘Policy’. Community B can be linked to economic policy with ‘economics’, ‘public finances’, ‘policy’, ‘reform’ and ‘regeneration’, while Community C depicts issues concerning state security with ‘security’, ‘state’, alongside ‘diplomacy’ and ‘strategy’. However, owing to the connections cross-community—particularly, for example, ‘growth’ in Community C and ‘economics’ in Community B, both communities are taken together to represent ‘State and Policy’.

Table 5.1iii: Terms in nodes clustered within Community D.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>守る</td>
<td>Mamoru</td>
<td>To Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>責任</td>
<td>Sekinin</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>国民</td>
<td>Kokumin</td>
<td>The nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>皆様</td>
<td>Minasama</td>
<td>Everyone/Everybody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>申し上げる</td>
<td>Moshiageru</td>
<td>To humbly say</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community D centers on the theme of ‘National Protection’ or protection of national citizens. Here ‘protect’ links with ‘the nation’ as well as to ‘responsibility’, potentially reflecting the so-called
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) rhetoric associated with political discourse concerning international security, and a contestable legal norm in international society (Stahn 2007; Cooper and Kohler 2009; Bellamy 2010; Bellamy and Williams 2011; Hehir 2011; Cunliffe 2011; Chomsky 2016a). Here, ‘the nation’ (kokumin) does not directly translate into English but might be translated as ‘citizens’, ‘Japanese nationals’, ‘nation’, but not always nationals or citizens in the technical sense (see Hook and McCormack 2001: 5). Specifically, it refers to the people of the Japanese polity. Henceforth, it is simply translated as ‘nation’.

Table 5.1iv: Terms in nodes clustered within Community G.

Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>医療</td>
<td>Iryō</td>
<td>Medical Care/Medical Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>分野</td>
<td>Bunya</td>
<td>Field/Sphere/Realm/Division/Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>協力</td>
<td>Kyōryoku</td>
<td>Cooperation/Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>関係</td>
<td>Kankei</td>
<td>Relations/Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>日</td>
<td>Nichi</td>
<td>Japan-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>米</td>
<td>Bei</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>頭脳</td>
<td>Shunō</td>
<td>Head/Brains/Leader(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>行う</td>
<td>Okonau</td>
<td>To perform/do/carry out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>支援</td>
<td>Shien</td>
<td>Support/Backing aid/Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community G appears to reflect IR notions with ‘nichi-bei’ referring to ‘US-Japan’ (relations) alongside, ‘cooperation’, ‘relations’, ‘leader(s)’, and ‘support’. Further, the inclusion of ‘healthcare’ and ‘field/sphere/realm’ appears consonant with notions of international cooperation as it is not difficult to envisage how healthcare may relate to the Abe administration’s drive for increased international cooperation. For example, ODA plays an important role in the Japanese state’s approach to global health, which itself may be considered conducive to domestic economic benefits (Sugiyama et al. 2013). However, this may be regarded as too tenuous a connection as despite the international premise, there is only mention of the Japan-US relationship and so it is concluded here that Community G cannot be summarized as easily as the communities discussed above.

Table 5.1iv: Terms in nodes clustered within Community F, H, I, J & K, respectively.

Source: Author.

56 The terms Ge and Gf has a number of meanings. However, given the strong link between the terms and their connection to Gd ‘relationship’, it is assumed that the terms refer to ‘nichibei’ meaning ‘Japan-US’, and are often joined with ‘relations’ to make ‘Japan-US relations’ (nichibei kankei).
The peripheral communities are not summarized owing to their small size and relative isolation. However, overall, the co-occurrence networks show which words are most prevalent and to what words they most prevalently link. These links are established between nodes while communities are groups of nodes which share a higher density of edges (connections) between each other (Clauset et al. 2004: 1). A higher density of links suggests that there are strong connections between many words within a group, which is why it is investigated further in separate analyses.

An examination of which words share correlations is necessary to be able to identify any running themes. Therefore, a number of observations necessitate further investigation. Firstly, as shown in Fig 5.1i, Aj (‘peace’) correlates with a number of also relatively central terms, all of which exhibit relatively high centrality. The thematic element of ‘peace’ appears to be a central concept connecting to discussion in Abe’s speeches. Added to this is the Abe administration’s foreign policy, dubbed ‘Positive pacifism’ (‘Ag’ + ‘Aj’ + ‘Ah’), which is clearly linked together in the co-occurrence network. Another within-community observation is that there are varying localities with ‘Japan’ (Aa), ‘the world’ (Ab), ‘region/area’ (Ak), ‘Asia’ (Al) and ‘international’ (Ad) all present in Community A.
‘To protect’ (Da) is linked curiously to ‘Peace’ (Aj) and is also linked separately to ‘responsibility’ (Db), and Dc, ‘the nation’ (see above). That is, while ‘peace’ itself is connected to a number of different localities, ‘protection’ appears connected to the level national. This potential discrepancy is further investigated and analyzed also as ‘National Protection’.

Finally, ‘Security’ (Cd) connects to Bb, Ce and Cc, ‘policy’, ‘diplomacy’ and ‘state’, respectively. Community C exhibits relatively close connections to Community B which appears to centre more on the theme of economics as opposed to ‘security’. To better characterize these individual themes, the results of the HCA is provided below.

5.2 Hierarchical Cluster analysis

This section provides the results of the HCA. As in §5.1, translations are provided in individual tables and explained below with a summary of overall observations. Firstly, Fig5.2i provides the results of the HCA, below.
Colours of different clusters represent distinct groups that are assigned automatically to clusters which share more similarities than others. Brief translations are given next to every term while the
Cluster A comprises the terms ‘peace’, ‘positive/proactive’, ‘doctrine/-ism’. While ‘peace’ may link with ‘doctrine/-ism’ to make ‘pacifism’, both ‘positive/proactive’ and ‘doctrine/-ism’ are linked equally to ‘peace’, suggesting that the terms are predominantly used together, to make ‘positive pacifism’, denoting the Abe administration’s foreign policy. ‘Peace’ is also linked to ‘stability’, while ‘world’ is seen to link to ‘contribution’, suggesting ‘contributing’ to the ‘world’ for ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ comprises a central theme reflected in Cluster A from the HCA and Community A (and E) from the COA.
Table 5.2ii: Terms within clusters B to E.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cluster B</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日</td>
<td>Nichi</td>
<td>Japan-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>米</td>
<td>Bei</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cluster C</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大臣</td>
<td>Daijin</td>
<td>Minister (of the Cabinet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総理</td>
<td>Sōri</td>
<td>Prime Minister/Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cluster D</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国民</td>
<td>Kokumin</td>
<td>The nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>自衛隊</td>
<td>Jieitai</td>
<td>Self-Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>方々</td>
<td>Katagata</td>
<td>They (people)/You(pl.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>多く</td>
<td>Ōku</td>
<td>Many/Much/Largely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>今</td>
<td>Ima</td>
<td>Now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>申し上げる</td>
<td>Moshiageru</td>
<td>To humbly say</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>皆様</td>
<td>Minasama</td>
<td>Everybody/Everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>思う</td>
<td>Omou</td>
<td>To think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cluster E</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>訪問</td>
<td>Hōmon</td>
<td>To make an official visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>今回</td>
<td>Konkai</td>
<td>This time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>支援</td>
<td>Shien</td>
<td>Support/To support/aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>首脳</td>
<td>Shunō</td>
<td>Head/Brains/Leader(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>行う</td>
<td>Okonau</td>
<td>To carry out</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cluster B points to ‘Japan-US’ relations while Cluster C demonstrates the link between ‘prime minister’ and ‘minister (of the Diet)’ as when conjugated it refers to the prime minister. Cluster D displays numerous terms located in Community D above. Several of these terms reflect the parlance of PM Abe with references to the audience and the use of the humble form of the verb ‘to say’ to refer to something when Abe or a group associated with him, such as his Cabinet, are the actor. However, two notable terms emerge in ‘the nation’, located in Community D, and the SDF with the HCA exhibiting a close relationship between these two terms somewhat separated from the terms in the rest of the cluster. Finally, Cluster E reflects Community G in the co-occurrence network with ‘to make an official visit’ connected with ‘this time’ and also connected to ‘head/brains/leader(s)’, ‘support/to support’ and ‘to carry out’.
### Table 5.2iii: Terms within clusters F.

Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster F</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>技術</td>
<td>Gijutsu</td>
<td>Technology/Skill/Art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>高い</td>
<td>Takai</td>
<td>Tall/High/Expensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>可能</td>
<td>Kanō</td>
<td>Potential/Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>持つ</td>
<td>Motsu</td>
<td>To hold/possess/take/carry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>改革</td>
<td>Kaikaku</td>
<td>Reform/Reformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>進める</td>
<td>Susumeru</td>
<td>To advance/promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>協力</td>
<td>Kyōryoku</td>
<td>Collaboration/Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>分野</td>
<td>Bunya</td>
<td>Field/Sphere/Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>医療</td>
<td>Iryō</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>社会</td>
<td>Shakai</td>
<td>Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国際</td>
<td>Kokusai</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>皆さん</td>
<td>Minna-san</td>
<td>All/Everyone/Everybody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>企業</td>
<td>Kigyō</td>
<td>Enterprise/Corporation/Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>強い</td>
<td>Tsuyoi</td>
<td>Strong/Robust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>外交</td>
<td>Gaikō</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>アフリカ</td>
<td>Afurika</td>
<td>Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>課題</td>
<td>Kadai</td>
<td>Issue/Subject/Theme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>重要</td>
<td>Jūyō</td>
<td>Important/Serious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>関係</td>
<td>Kankei</td>
<td>Relation/Relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国</td>
<td>Kuni</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>自由</td>
<td>Jiyū</td>
<td>Liberty/Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>地域</td>
<td>Chiiki</td>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>アジア</td>
<td>Ajiai</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>責任</td>
<td>Sekinin</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>守る</td>
<td>Mamoru</td>
<td>To protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>考える</td>
<td>Kangaeru</td>
<td>To consider/to think</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>政府</td>
<td>Seifu</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>今後</td>
<td>Kongo</td>
<td>From now on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>問題</td>
<td>Mondai</td>
<td>Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>向ける</td>
<td>Mukeru</td>
<td>To face (towards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>取り組む</td>
<td>Torikumu</td>
<td>To tackle/grapple with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>復興</td>
<td>Fukkō</td>
<td>Reconstruction/Revival</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the size of this cluster it is not suitable to classify a particular theme deriving from it. However, as noted in the co-occurrence network, ‘protect’ is linked closely with ‘responsibility’. Further, both ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’ are linked to ‘consider’, which is linked also to ‘from now on’ and ‘government’, possibly reflecting R2P rhetoric.

Additionally, ‘international’ is linked to ‘society’ as discussed above for Community A and E. Also, ‘liberty/freedom’ is linked to ‘region’ and ‘Asia’, all of which belong to Community A above.

Table 5.2iv: Terms within clusters G to I.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Basic Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cluster G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>経済</td>
<td>Keizai</td>
<td>Economics/Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>再生</td>
<td>Saisei</td>
<td>Regeneration/Resuscitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>政策</td>
<td>Seisaku</td>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>財政</td>
<td>Zaisei</td>
<td>Public finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>戦略</td>
<td>Senryaku</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>成長</td>
<td>Seichō</td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>我が国</td>
<td>Wagakuni</td>
<td>Our country (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国家</td>
<td>Kokka</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安全保障</td>
<td>Anzenhoshō</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, Cluster G shows a similar relation exhibited between Community B and C in the co-occurrence network. Here, ‘economics’ and ‘regeneration’ is connected to ‘policy’ and ‘public finances’. Despite the fact that ‘growth’ and ‘strategy’ are closely linked together in Cluster H, Cluster H itself links with Cluster I, and then to Cluster G. Cluster G, on the other hand, is not themed on economic growth but on security of the state with ‘state’ and ‘security’ closely linked and connected to ‘our country’. As in the co-occurrence network, there appears to be themes across different clusters which might be summarized collectively as concerning ‘State and Policy’.

Overall, then, the co-occurrence network and HCA, both using different approaches, point to a number of themes. Here, there is a discrepancy between a) discussion of peace within given supranational domains and b) discussion of protection at the national level, while c) at the same time the term ‘security’ links to ‘state’ and ‘policy’. Further, the HCA buttressed a number of observations while also providing more information. For instance, the terms ‘positive’ (sekkyoku), ‘peace’ (heiwa), and ‘doctrine/-ism’ (shugi) appeared to be more closely related than otherwise represented from the co-occurrence network. Moreover, Community B and C is reflected by Cluster G to I, which are all more closely related to each other than other clusters.

Interestingly, we also see a discrepancy between this so-called ‘Japan in the World’ as outlined in Community A and Cluster A, to another, albeit less prominent, theme which appears to focus more on ‘National Protection’ and R2P, with Community D exhibiting this relationship while Cluster D indicated a close link between ‘the nation’ and the SDF, and Cluster F showed that ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’ are closely connected and linked to ‘government’. Additionally, Japan’s ‘security’ policy is linked to ‘state’ and ‘our country’ in Cluster F and ‘policy’, ‘state’, and ‘diplomacy’ in Community B and C. Further, ‘security’ links to notions of economic ‘growth’ through ‘strategy’ and ‘policy’ reflecting a broader theme of ‘State and Policy’. Overall, the HCA has yielded a number of mixed results. While, there is overlap most particularly with Community A, Community B, C and D, further analysis is necessary to identify key themes. Here, it is suggested that regional and international stability, as well as ‘positive pacifism’, appear to be two closely connected characteristics of Abe’s speeches. These themes, however, are by no means certain and so §5.3 provides the collocation analysis to examine them further.

5.3 Collocation analysis

This section investigates the findings from §5.1 and §5.2. To begin, the keywords selected for further examination are provided in Table 5.3i, below.
Table 5.3i: Themes derived from Steps One and Two and the terms that comprise them.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme A: 'National Protection'</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>守る Mamoru</td>
<td>To protect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国民 Kokumin</td>
<td>The nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>自衛隊 Jieitai</td>
<td>Self-Defense Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>責任 Sekinin</td>
<td>Responsibility/Duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme B: ‘Japan in the World’</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>平和 Heiwa</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>貢献 Köken</td>
<td>To Contribute/Contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安定 Antei</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>主義 Shugi</td>
<td>Doctrine/ism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>世界 Sekai</td>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>地域 Chiiki</td>
<td>Region/Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>積極 Sekkyoku</td>
<td>Positive/Proactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>社会 Shakai</td>
<td>Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国際 Kokusai</td>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>自由 Jiyū</td>
<td>Freedom.Liberty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme C: ‘State and Policy’</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>政策 Seisaku</td>
<td>(Political) Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>成長 Seichō</td>
<td>To grow/Growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国家 Kokka</td>
<td>State (Nation)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>安全保障 Anzenhoshō</td>
<td>Security guarantee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>外交 Gaikō</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>戦略 Sennyaku</td>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>財政 Zaisei</td>
<td>Public finances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>経済 Keizai</td>
<td>Economics/Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keywords were selected based on the results of the COA and HCA. However, a number of additions and minor alterations were made also. Firstly, in Theme A (‘National Protection’), while ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’ appeared with ‘the nation’ in the same community in the co-occurrence network, ‘the nation’ is linked with the SDF in the HCA. Due to this, all four terms are grouped into Theme A, as above. For ‘Japan in the World’, terms in Community A of the co-occurrence network and the related Cluster A in the HCA were incorporated, while a number of terms shared between Cluster F and Community A are also included. Finally, for Theme C (‘State and Policy’) the terms which emerged in Community B and C as well as Cluster G, H, and I were incorporated. The names of the themes are not
an objective statement of content but rather made based on keywords, and used to distinguish each theme before the analysis of collocations.

The top 30 collocations for the keywords (node words) provided in Table 5.3i and the ‘total score’ between each node word and every collocate were extracted using KH Coder, where collocates with a total score of below five were excised from the analysis. Following this, t-scores and z-scores were measured for each collocation. Collocations which did not meet the threshold set were excised (§4). Then, relatedness between node words was measured in terms of how many collocates they shared, where collocations where the node word and the collocate were the same, were not counted. These were then placed into a matrix where the number of collocations each node word shares with another was measured by dividing it by the sum of collocations for each given node word. This was carried out by dividing the number of collocations shared by the sum of all collocations of one node word, and then dividing the number of collocations shared by the sum of all collocations of the other node word, and then dividing the sum of these two figures by two. Further, intra-theme relatedness and inter-theme relatedness were measured by adding together the relevant values of relatedness calculated as above between keywords and dividing them by the number of interconnections between the relevant keywords.

Here, Table 5.3ii shows the inter-theme relatedness between themes A to C, where 0 indicates zero relatedness and 1 indicates absolute uniformity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Between-theme relatedness</th>
<th>.0314</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Between-Themes (A-B, B-C, A-C)</td>
<td>.0147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes A-C</td>
<td>.0531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes B-C</td>
<td>.0264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following this, the relatedness of node terms was measured within themes. Intra-theme relatedness is provided in Table 5.3iii, below.
Here, the data show that the average degree of relatedness shared across all themes is .0314, with the highest degree of relatedness across themes between Theme A and Theme B, at .0531. Relatedness within individual themes is much higher. In particular, Community D of Theme A (‘responsibility’, ‘protect’, ‘the nation’), Cluster A of Theme B (‘peace’, ‘contribution/to contribute’, ‘stability’, ‘world’, ‘positive/proactive’, ‘-ism/doctrine’), and Community C of Theme C (‘growth’, ‘security’, ‘diplomacy’, and ‘strategy’), which came to .2037, .2589, and .1935, respectively.

Based on findings from the between group comparison, the collocations of node terms within groups were compared on a case-by-case basis and ranked in terms of highest relatedness. The study sought to select the most related terms to identify keywords subject for further analysis in Stage Two. Therefore, given that the average across theme relatedness was approximately 3 per cent, increasing to 5 per cent between themes A and B, those keywords that demonstrate a 15 per cent and above relatedness was selected to portray any salient within-theme relatedness between keywords. The most related keywords within Theme A is provided in Table 5.3iv, while those for Theme B are given in Table 5.3v, and Theme C in Table 5.3vi, below.

| Table 5.3ii: Relatedness within-themes in terms of collocations shared. Source: Author. |
| Relatedness of collocations within groups |
| Theme A ‘National Protection’ | .1019 |
| Keywords from Community D only | .2037 |
| Theme B ‘Japan in the World’ | .2019 |
| Keywords from Cluster A only | .2589 |
| Keywords from Community A only | .1797 |
| Theme C ‘State and Policy’ | .1457 |
| Keywords from Cluster G only | .1850 |
| Keywords from Community B only | .1850 |
| Keywords from Community C only | .1935 |

In Theme A, ‘protect’, ‘the nation’, and ‘responsibility display a relatively high level of relatedness, while SDF does not share collocations with the other keywords within Theme A to the same extent. The number of significant collocations for each keyword is limited particularly for Theme A (The

| Table 5.3iv: Highest degree of relatedness between keywords in Theme A. Source: Author. |
| Theme A: National Protection – rank of within group term relatedness |
| 1 守る–国民 Mamoru- kokumin Protect-The nation  .2708 |
| 2 守る–責任 Mamoru-sekinin Protect-Responsibility  .1875 |
| 3 国民–責任 Kokumin-sekinin The nation-Responsibility  .1528 |

In Theme A, ‘protect’, ‘the nation’, and ‘responsibility display a relatively high level of relatedness, while SDF does not share collocations with the other keywords within Theme A to the same extent. The number of significant collocations for each keyword is limited particularly for Theme A (The
nation: 18; Protect: 7; Responsibility: 4; SDF: 8) somewhat obscuring the degree of relatedness as calculated above. However, the observations bulwark the findings from the previous analyses, linking all three terms together in the COA and ‘protect’ and ‘the nation’ together in the HCA.

Table 5.3v: Highest degree of relatedness between keywords in Theme B.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Keyword 1</th>
<th>Keyword 2</th>
<th>Degree of Relatedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>平和―貢献</td>
<td>Heiwa-kōken</td>
<td>.4167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>貢献―安定</td>
<td>Kōken-antei</td>
<td>.3889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>貢献―地域</td>
<td>Kōken-chiiki</td>
<td>.3889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>貢献―世界</td>
<td>Kōken-sekai</td>
<td>.3761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>安定―社会</td>
<td>Antei-shakai</td>
<td>.3750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>平和―安定</td>
<td>Heiwa-antei</td>
<td>.3472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>平和―積極</td>
<td>Heiwa-sekkyoku</td>
<td>.3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>主義―積極</td>
<td>Shugi-sekkyoku</td>
<td>.3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>主義―自由</td>
<td>Shugi-jiyū</td>
<td>.3111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>安定―世界</td>
<td>Antei-sekai</td>
<td>.3077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>社会―国際</td>
<td>Shakai-kokusai</td>
<td>.2667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>平和―世界</td>
<td>Heiwa-sekai</td>
<td>.2650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>安定―地域</td>
<td>Antei-chiiki</td>
<td>.2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>世界―社会</td>
<td>Sekai-shakai</td>
<td>.2436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>世界―地域</td>
<td>Sekai-chiiki</td>
<td>.2404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>平和―主義</td>
<td>Heiwa-shugi</td>
<td>.2222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>貢献―積極</td>
<td>Kōken-sekkyoku</td>
<td>.2222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>積極―国際</td>
<td>Sekkyoku-kokusai</td>
<td>.2111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>平和―積極</td>
<td>Heiwa-sekkyoku</td>
<td>.2083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>安定―積極</td>
<td>Antei-sekkyoku</td>
<td>.1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>世界―積極</td>
<td>Sekai-sekkyoku</td>
<td>.1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>安定―国際</td>
<td>Antei-kokusai</td>
<td>.1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>貢献―主義</td>
<td>Kōken-shugi</td>
<td>.1667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of significant collocations for keywords in Theme B was higher than Theme A (Contribution: 9; Doctrine/-ism: 18; International: 13; Liberty/Freedom: 15; Peace: 18; Positive/Proactive: 9; Region/Area: 12; Society: 13; Stability: 12; World: 14). Table 5.3v shows that the highest degree of relatedness in terms of collocations shared is between ‘Peace’ and ‘Contribution’, with ‘Contribution’ and ‘Stability’ as well as ‘Contribution’ and ‘Region’ the joint second most. ‘Peace’ is also strongly related to ‘stability’ relative to the other keywords indicating that ‘peace’, ‘contribution’ and ‘stability’ comprise three highly central keywords in Theme B. This is reflected in the COA where all three are among five keywords with the highest centrality, together with ‘positive/proactive’ and ‘doctrine/-ism’ which combine with ‘peace’ to make ‘positive pacifism’. Further, all these terms, alongside ‘world’ comprise Cluster A in the HCA.
The number of collocations that met the threshold set for keywords in Theme B was as follows: Diplomacy: 10; Economy: 18; Growth: 18; Policy: 24; Public Finances: 15; Security: 22; State: 15; Strategy: 14. As shown in Table 5.3vi, ‘security’ and ‘diplomacy’ exhibited the highest degree of relatedness, followed by ‘policy’ and ‘diplomacy’ and ‘state’ and ‘security’. ‘Security’ and ‘diplomacy’ are both within Community C from the COA while ‘policy’, linking with ‘diplomacy’, is from Community B. Out of the top six most interrelated keywords in Table 5.3vi, two are between keywords from Community B and C (‘policy’ and ‘diplomacy’; ‘policy’ and ‘security’) while four are from Community C (‘security’ and diplomacy; ‘state’ and ‘security’; ‘state’ and ‘strategy’; ‘growth’ and ‘strategy’), showing a relatively high degree of interrelated terms in Community C when compared to Community B. The HCA provided more information on this theme with ‘strategy’ and ‘growth’ closely linked in Cluster H, while economy-themed terms comprised Cluster G (‘economics’, ‘regeneration’, ‘policy’, ‘public finance’) when compared to Cluster I which appeared more related to national security (‘our country’, ‘state’, ‘security’).

The observations above were calculated through the use of t-scores and z-scores. Calculations are made based on the number of times a given word (collocate) is within a ten-word span of the node word with respect to the frequency of use of the collocate and the node word within a corpus and the corpus size, but regardless of within-parameter proximity of the collocate to the node word. Additional calculations were made to examine how closely keywords link directly, that is, taking into account the within-parameter proximity of the collocate. The measure used was the $f$-score, which was applied to all collocations that met the threshold set for t-scores and z-scores. The top 15
The strongest collocations are provided for Theme A in Table 5.3vii, Theme B in Table 5.3viii and Theme C in Table 5.3ix, below.

Table 5.3vii: Top 15 $f$-score of collocations of keywords in Theme A.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme A</th>
<th>Collocation</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>国民×皆様</td>
<td>Kokumin-minasama</td>
<td>The nation – Everybody</td>
<td>35.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>国民×生活</td>
<td>Kokumin-seikatsu</td>
<td>The nation – Lifestyle</td>
<td>22.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>国民×命</td>
<td>Kokumin-inochi</td>
<td>The nation – Life</td>
<td>19.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>守る×命</td>
<td>Mamoru-inochi</td>
<td>Protect – Life</td>
<td>15.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>国民×国家</td>
<td>Kokumin-kokka</td>
<td>The nation – State</td>
<td>13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>守る×暮らし</td>
<td>Mamoru-kurashi</td>
<td>Protect – Life/Livelihood</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>国民×生命</td>
<td>Kokumin-seimei</td>
<td>The nation – Life/Existence</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>国民×皆さん</td>
<td>Kokumin-minnasen</td>
<td>The nation – Everyone</td>
<td>11.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>守る×平和</td>
<td>Mamoru-heiwa</td>
<td>Protect – Peace</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>責任×果たす</td>
<td>Sekinin-hatasu</td>
<td>Responsibility – To carry out/fulfill</td>
<td>9.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>国民×守る</td>
<td>Kokumin-mamoru</td>
<td>The nation – Protect</td>
<td>9.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>責任×持つ</td>
<td>Sekinin-motsu</td>
<td>Responsibility – To possess/hold</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>責任×守る</td>
<td>Sekinin-mamoru</td>
<td>Responsibility – Protect</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>自衛隊×諸君</td>
<td>Jieitai-shokun</td>
<td>SDF – You (pl.)</td>
<td>7.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>自衛隊×活動</td>
<td>Jieitai-katsudō</td>
<td>SDF – Action/activity</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As demonstrated in Table 5.3vii, ‘the nation’ and ‘protect’ frequently link to words expressing one’s livelihood or life in general, potentially suggesting that what is protected is people’s lives and lifestyles. Further, ‘protect’ also links with ‘peace’ and ‘responsibility’. Though at this stage it remains uncertain, one summary of Theme A is that it centers on national protections of citizens where ‘the nation’, ‘protect’, and ‘responsibility’ comprise the three keywords.
Table 5.3viii: Top 15 $f$-score of collocations of keywords in Theme B.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme B: Japan in the World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>f-Score</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 社会-国際</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 平和-主義</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 主義-民主</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 社会-保障</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 平和-世界</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 平和-安定</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 地域-太平洋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 平和-積極</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 社会-輝く</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 主義-積極</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 平和-繁栄</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 地域-地域</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 平和-国家</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 地域-アジア</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 自由-民主</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest score within Theme B is between ‘society’ and ‘international’ which conjoin to make ‘international society’. Second to this is ‘peace’ and ‘doctrine/-ism’ which combines to make ‘pacifism’; third is ‘doctrine/-ism’ and ‘democracy’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ which makes ‘democracy’ when taken together, and fourth is ‘society’ and ‘security’ which combines to make ‘social security’. Aside from these compound words, the strongest collocation is between ‘peace’ and ‘world’, closely followed by ‘peace’ and ‘stability’, suggesting the topic of Theme B is generally on peace and stability on the international level, with contribution and ‘positive pacifism’ also comprising key terms.

57 It is likely that this term is strongly related in terms of the $f$-score because when conjugated it comprises the ‘Liberal Democratic’ to the ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ (jiyūminshu-tō).
Table 5.3ix: Top 15 $f$-score of collocations of keywords in Theme C.  
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme 1</th>
<th>Theme 2</th>
<th>$f$-Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>成長・戦略</td>
<td>Seichō-senryaku</td>
<td>142.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>経済・再生</td>
<td>Keizai-saisei</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>経済・政策</td>
<td>Keizai-seisaku</td>
<td>57.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>経済・成長</td>
<td>Keizai-seichō</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>国家・安全保障</td>
<td>Kokka-anzenhoshō</td>
<td>38.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>経済・強い</td>
<td>Keizai-tsuyoi</td>
<td>34.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>国家・戦略</td>
<td>Kokka-senryaku</td>
<td>33.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>政策・安全保障</td>
<td>Seisaku-anzenhoshō</td>
<td>31.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>政策・金融</td>
<td>Seisaku-kyōyū</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>財政・再建</td>
<td>Zaisei-saiken</td>
<td>29.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>財政・保全</td>
<td>Zaisei-hozan</td>
<td>28.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>戦略・特区</td>
<td>Senryaku-tokku</td>
<td>28.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>経済・対策</td>
<td>Keizai-taisaku</td>
<td>26.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>政策・財政</td>
<td>Seisaku-zaisei</td>
<td>24.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>成長・センター</td>
<td>Seichō-sentā</td>
<td>21.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The four strongest collocations are essentially related to means of attaining favourable economic conditions with ‘growth’ and ‘strategy’, ‘economics’ and ‘regeneration’, ‘economics’ and ‘policy’, and ‘economics’ and ‘growth’ comprising the gamut. A number of collocations also relate to security with ‘state’ and ‘security’ and ‘policy’ and ‘security’ comprising two of the top ten. Despite the fact that a number of economy-related collocations emerge with ‘economics’, ‘regeneration’, ‘policy’, ‘public finance’ from Clusters G and H, when within-parameter-proximity is not taken as a measurement of collocation strength, collocations more closely related to security are more prominent with ‘state’, ‘security’ and ‘diplomacy’ interconnected. While, $f$-score results offer a means to analyze further elements within identified themes, t-scores and z-scores are taken to be the more suitable measurements in characterizing themes as it effectively examines the likelihood that a number of collocations between two terms would arise with respect to the frequency of both terms and the size of the corpus (see Appendix 4). That is, one might say that for speeches, it is a useful means to explore areas of emphasis and repetition across an entire dataset as opposed to strength as collocation frequency weighted by proximity.

The overall findings are summarized in §5.4, below.
5.4 Stage One: Keywords

The analysis thus far has identified three themes, these are summarized here while two keywords from Theme A and Theme C, and three keywords from Theme B are taken for further analysis. Three keywords are taken from Theme B because it is the largest theme and has the highest centrality. This section seeks to provide an overview of Stage One and select the keywords for Stage Two, including the frame analysis in §5.5.

Theme A, contained the terms ‘the nation’, ‘protect’, ‘responsibility’ and the SDF. Though ‘the nation’ linked most prominently with ‘protect’ in the collocation analysis, the exact order of relatedness in terms of collocations shared is inconsequential owing to the limited number for ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’. Rather, the collocation analysis provided a means to further characterize Theme A where terms such as ‘life’, ‘living’ and ‘livelihood’ emerged from measuring the f-score of keywords, suggesting that citizens’ lives are the object of protection. With this, ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’ emerged as closely linked across all analytical steps and potentially reflect the R2P rhetoric associated with discussion on participations/interventions over international affairs. Due to this, ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’ were selected as the keywords for Theme A.

Throughout all three steps of analysis, ‘peace’ was strongly related to ‘doctrine/-ism’ and ‘positive/proactive’, as well as ‘stability’ and ‘contribution’. These comprised the five terms with the highest eigenvector centrality as shown in Fig 5.1i, while, alongside ‘world’, constituted all of Cluster A in the HCA, shown in Fig 5.2i. Further, ‘peace’ and ‘contribute’ were the two most interrelated terms within Theme B, followed by ‘contribute’ and ‘stability’ and ‘contribute’ and ‘region’, in terms of collocations shared. Due to this, ‘contribute’ and ‘stability’ were selected as two of the three keywords for Theme B, while owing to the close interconnection between ‘positive/proactive’, ‘peace’, and ‘doctrine/-ism’, which amalgamate to denote the Abe administration’s foreign policy, ‘positive pacifism’ was selected as the third keyword for Theme B.

Finally, Theme C comprised Communities B and C, and Clusters G, H, and I of the COA and HCA. Communities B and C were taken together owing to the number of interconnections between them, with the collocation analysis in §5.3 also indicating a number of relations between communities which were not indicated in the co-occurrence network in Fig 5.1i. The HCA provided further information as to how these terms interrelate with Cluster G comprising an economy-themed group with the keywords ‘economics’, ‘regeneration’, ‘policy’ and ‘public finances’, while Cluster H supplemented this with ‘strategy’ and ‘growth’, and Cluster I indicated issues of security with ‘our country’, ‘security’, and ‘state’ constituting the keywords. Despite this, the theme overall was
summarized as 'State and Policy' owing to the observation that whether 'economics' or 'security', both key terms linked to 'policy'. The collocations analysis was fruitful in providing additional information as to how to delineate the ostensible theme where the relatedness measured on the basis of the number of significant collocations shared, showed 'security' and 'diplomacy', 'policy' and 'diplomacy', and 'state' and 'security' to be the most highly related terms, on the basis of t-scores and z-scores which are taken to be more appropriate measures of collocation strength in this research. Therefore, the keywords selected for Theme C are 'diplomacy' and 'security', also closely related in the co-occurrence network in Fig 5.1i. These are not to be taken as themes in the qualitative sense of the term, but rather areas for further analysis in subsequent stages of research. Hence, these keywords provide the basis for Stage Two of the analysis, including the frame analysis, which is provided below.

5.5 Stage Two: Frame analysis

This section presents the results of the frame analysis. To begin, frames were analyzed in a ten-line parameter of 75 keyword instantiations for each of the seven keywords identified above, except for 'positive pacifism' where 30 instantiations were analyzed due to its relatively small frequency in the dataset. The parameter was truncated to the start/end of the paragraph it was identified in if it extended beyond the paragraph. If another of the same keyword was identified within the parameter, the parameter was extending an additional ten lines from the final keyword or to the end of the paragraph or speech. Next, binary 'dummy' variables were computed for every variable (sub-frame component) and those with a frequency of 5 per cent or higher were included in the HCA. The list of variables included and a description of them are provided in Table 5.5i, below.
Table 5.5i Variables and Descriptions for Cluster Analysis (D = Domestic; I = International; G = N/A).

**Source:** Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame Element</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem Definition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Economy/Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerning domestic political issues relating to the economy and energy in Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: National Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerning domestic political issues relating to national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: General</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerning general, ambiguous and miscellaneous issues relating to global affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerning global/regional/multilateral/bilateral political issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Economy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerning global/regional/multilateral/bilateral economic issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerning with global/regional/multilateral/bilateral security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>58</strong> This section does draw a line between issues of security based on securitization theory (§3) and more conventionally recognized notions of security. For the frame analysis, a 'security issue' denotes physical violence enacted by an agent onto another, whether individual or collective. Conceptions of 'violence' are discussed in more detail in §8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Causal Attribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Abe Administration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Benefit attribution: Government representative(s) of Japan are responsible for benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: World/Region/Foreign State(s)/Institution(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Benefit attribution: The world, stipulated region(s) and/or stipulated foreign state(s) are responsible for benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Vulnerable Group(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Benefit attribution: Vulnerable group (e.g. women/children/elderly/disabled/NGO workers) internal and/or external to Japan are responsible for benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Opposition and Obstructions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk attribution: Domestic democratic/civil opposition, previous Cabinets/governments, legislation and/or regulation are responsible for risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Unfavourable economic conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk attribution: Deleterious domestic economic factors such as deflation/high value of the yen etc. are responsible for the risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Extreme Climate Events/Climate Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk attribution: Extreme climate events and/or global warming are responsible for the risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Threats from foreign states</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk attribution: Foreign state(s) are responsible for the risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: World changing/Borderless Threats</td>
<td></td>
<td>Risk attribution: Changing/internationalizing world and/or threats exceeding national borders are responsible for the risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral Evaluation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts Japan as a nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Japanese Citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts Japanese citizens specifically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Economy (Japan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts Japanese domestic economy specifically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Vulnerable Groups (Japan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts vulnerable groups in Japan (women, the elderly, the young, the disabled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: World/Region/Foreign State</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts the world, specific region(s), foreign state(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Economy (World/Region/Foreign State)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impacts global, (internationally) regional, foreign states' economy specifically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Moral Incentive</td>
<td></td>
<td>External expectations on Japan, 'there is no alternative'/last chance, post-war state identity (state identity), and/or impacts 'peace' (general), responsibility to do so.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment Recommendation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Reform to Social Security/Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy reform/changes to social security/welfare/labour sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Reform/Changes to National Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform/changes to national security policy; Amendments/changes to constitution concerning national security capabilities; Inquiry into such policy changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Reform to State Governance/Cabinet</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reform/changes to state governance/parliamentary procedures/appointment of new ministers etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**58** This section does draw a line between issues of security based on securitization theory (§3) and more conventionally recognized notions of security. For the frame analysis, a 'security issue' denotes physical violence enacted by an agent onto another, whether individual or collective. Conceptions of 'violence' are discussed in more detail in §8.
A HCA using Ward’s method and Squared Euclidean distance was performed to determine how these sub-frame components ‘systemize’ to answer the research questions, below:

1. Is it possible to identify distinct frames in PM Abe’s speeches?
2. What are the main components of each distinct frame?

The number of clusters was determined through the ‘elbow criterion’, where, similar to a scree test, “a clear ‘elbow’ in the plot of the heterogeneity measures signifies that fusing these two clusters would result in a cluster that is too heterogeneous” (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 269). Four clusters were identified, whereupon descriptive statistics for each cluster relative to the binary variables were collated including the mean value and standard deviation.

As Matthes and Kohring (2008: 269) note, “the mean values of binary variables are problematic in statistical terms” but they alleviate “a quick interpretation of cluster solution[s]”. Here, there are three things to note when studying the results: “the highest means within one cluster indicate the most important variable”, “rather low means within a cluster can also be of significance when it is a high value compared to all other clusters”, and “it is also important to note which variables have low values” (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 269). The mean values and standard deviations of these clusters for every binary variable is provided in Table 5.5ii, below.
Table 5.5ii Mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) for four identified frames (D = Domestic; I = International; G = N/A).

Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>National Security Frame (N = 82)</th>
<th>National Economy Frame (N = 64)</th>
<th>International Security Frame (N = 142)</th>
<th>International Relations &amp; Economics Frame (N = 96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic/D: Economy/Energy</td>
<td>0.01 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.69 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic/D: National Security</td>
<td>0.67 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic/I: General</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic/I: Politics</td>
<td>0.01 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.64 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic/I: Economics</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.19)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic/I: Security</td>
<td>0.09 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.65 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit Attribution/D: Government of Japan/Abe/Japan</td>
<td>0.89 (0.32)</td>
<td>0.88 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.70 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.98 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit Attribution/D: Self-Defence Force</td>
<td>0.21 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.27 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit Attribution/I: World/Region/Foreign State etc.</td>
<td>0.15 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.53 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit Attribution/G: Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td>0.01 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.31)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Attribution/D: Oppositions and Obstructions</td>
<td>0.26 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Attribution/D: Unfavourable Economic Conditions</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.34 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Attribution/I: Changing World/Borderless Threats</td>
<td>0.33 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Attribution/I: Threats from Foreign States</td>
<td>0.28 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Attribution/G: Global Warming/Natural Disasters</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.35)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/D: Japan (General/Nation)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.42)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/D: Japanese Citizens</td>
<td>0.80 (0.40)</td>
<td>0.50 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/D: Economy (Japan)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.43 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/D: Vulnerable Groups (Japan)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.28)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/I: World/Region/Foreign State</td>
<td>0.24 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.82 (0.39)</td>
<td>0.51 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/I: Economy (World/Region)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.13)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.61 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement/G: Moral Incentive</td>
<td>0.35 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.35)</td>
<td>0.74 (0.44)</td>
<td>0.38 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/D: Reform to Social Security/Labour Sectors</td>
<td>0.02 (0.16)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/D: Reform/Changes to National Security</td>
<td>0.67 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.24 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/D: Implement Economic Growth Strategy</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.73 (0.45)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/D: Reform to State Governance/Cabinet</td>
<td>0.10 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/I: Improve/ Strengthen Relations/Dialogue</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/I: Positive pacifism</td>
<td>0.06 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.48 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/I: Rule of Law</td>
<td>0.02 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/I: Aid</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.37)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution/G: Vague Statements on Actions/Visions</td>
<td>0.47 (0.50)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.46)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.42)</td>
<td>0.56 (0.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, there are four identifiable frames, providing a clear answer to the first research question. These frames are named: ‘National Security’, ‘National Economy’, ‘International Security’, ‘International Relations and Economy’, respectively. For the second research question, two frames are more focused on national issues while others more so on international issues. In order to better characterize each frame, all variables with a mean value over .2 were taken to be characteristic components of each frame and were included in Table 5.5iii, below.
Table 5.5iii: The composition of four identified frames with mean values (D = Domestic; I = International; G = N/A). Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Definition</th>
<th>Causal Attribution</th>
<th>Moral Evaluation</th>
<th>Treatment Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Security Frame (N = 82)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: National Security</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>D/Benefit: Abe administration, etc.</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/Risk: Changing world, etc.</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>D: Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/Risk: Foreign State, etc.</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>G: Moral Incentive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D/Risk: Opposition, Obstructions, etc.</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>D: Vulnerable Groups (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D/Benefit: SDF</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>I: World/Region/Foreign State(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Economy Frame (N = 64)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: National Economy</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>D/Benefit: Abe administration, etc.</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D/Risk: Unfavourable economic conditions</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>D: Economy (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D/Risk: Oppositions, Obstructions, etc.</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>D: Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Security Frame (N = 142)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Security</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>D/Benefit: Abe administration, etc.</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/Risk: Changing world, etc.</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>G: Moral Incentive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/Benefit: World/Region/Foreign State</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>D: Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D/Benefit: SDF</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>G: Vague statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/Risk: Threats from foreign states</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Relations &amp; Economics Frame (N = 96)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Economics</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>D/Benefit: Abe administration, etc.</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: Politics</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>I/Benefit: World/Region/Foreign State</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.5iii shows that for all frames, the main causal attribution is beneficially to the Abe administration or Japan as a whole. For the 'National Security' (NS) and 'National Economy' (NE) frames, the main party impacted by issues are Japanese citizens and Japan as a nation, while for the 'International Security' (IS) frame and the 'International Relations and Economics' (IRE) frame, it is to the 'world', a given geopolitical region or a foreign state, and their economies respectively. For the NS frame, the most frequent TR is to reform national security; for the NE frame it is to implement the
Abe administration’s economic growth strategy; and for the IS and IRE frames, it is to improve relations or commit to dialogue.

Further, the NS and IS frames frequently include the SDF as responsible for the benefits of issues that impact Japan and its citizens, while the risk associated with such issues is commonly statements regarding a changing world or terrorism (§6), a foreign state, or domestic elements in Japan obstructing a suitable response, whether legislations or people. However, the IS frame also includes the international actor of ‘World/Region/Foreign State(s) where international security issues more frequently impact areas external to Japan, i.e. the ‘world’, a given region, or foreign state(s), while there is also a larger emphasis on the moral incentive for Japan/the Government to act on such issues. Moreover, while the NS frame does not include improving international relations as a solution, the IS frame does include domestic changes to state legislation as a solution to international issues.

Additionally, the NE attributes risk to unfavourable economic conditions such as the devaluation of the yen and long-term deflation, as well as to domestic (legislative or normative) obstructions to its response. Its impacts are domestic to either the Japanese people, Japan in general or to its economy, while responding to it entails carrying out the Abe administration’s growth strategy or reforms to social security, alongside vague statements. In comparison, the IRE frame attributes the cause of the benefits to international actors and the Abe administration, while linking together impacts on the Japanese economy to the international economy or the ‘world’, a given region, or foreign state in more general terms. As with the IS frame, its TR promotes international relations. However, as with the NS frame, it advocates changes to or the implementation of domestic policy to respond to international issues, most specifically for this frame, implementing the Abe administration’s growth strategy.

While there are parallels between national and international frames, one discernible discrepancy is the difference in frequency. Both the IS and IRE frames are over 150 per cent more frequent than their national frame counterparts, suggesting a particular emphasis on international issues in Abe’s speeches. Such a ‘national-international’ discrepancy was observable in Stage One, above, where the ‘Japan in the World’ theme appeared to incorporate overseas agencies and locations. Due to this, in order to answer the third research question of whether there is correspondence between themes and frames, a crosstabs analysis using Chi-square was carried out on each case for their theme and frame type. The results of the Chi-square analysis are provided in Appendix 5, while the difference between the observed value and expected value of each frame for every theme is provided in Fig 5.5i, below.
While international frames are more prevalent, the ‘Japan in the World’ theme is the only theme over the expected number of international frames, while the ‘National Protection’ theme is more prone to national frames, and the ‘State and Policy’ frame shows no discernible discrepancy either way. Therefore, though the analysis is remains only a qualitative assessment, the results suggest that Abe’s overriding discussions centre on the relationship between Japan and the world. The findings overall are summarized in §5.6, below.

5.6 Summary

Overall, the results from Stage One revealed three main themes, namely: ‘National Protection’, ‘Japan in the World’, and ‘State and Policy’. Here, seven keywords were selected for further analysis in both the frame analysis, and the keyword analysis in §6. The keywords are ‘protect’ and ‘responsibility’ for the ‘National Protection’ theme, ‘contribute’, ‘stability’ and ‘positive pacifism’ for the ‘Japan in the World’ theme, and ‘diplomacy’ and ‘security’ for the ‘State and Policy’ theme. Based on the frame analysis of these keywords, four distinct frames were identified, namely: the NS frame, the NE frame, the IS frame, and the IRE frame.

Here, there is an observable preference in Abe’s speeches for international frames, which when compared to the national frame counterparts were both more than 150 per cent more frequent. At the same time, international frames also include domestic responses as treatment
recommendations, while international actors are portrayed alongside the Abe administration or Japan more generally as agents responsible for benefits whether to Japan or external localities. However, while the centrality of ‘Japan in the World’ and the high frequency of international frames is clear, evidence gathered of other frames and themes suggest that other areas are not without rhetorical significance.

Due to this, the following section aims to numerically analyze the chief assertions relating to the keywords identified above to elicit more descriptive and detailed information concerning each theme, leading into the qualitative analysis in §7 which incorporates findings from both Stage One and Stage Two of the analyses.
6 Characterizing themes

6.0 Introduction

The previous chapter identified three themes subject to further analysis in this chapter. This chapter seeks to examine more closely how the keywords within each theme are used to qualitatively characterize identified themes to supplement the micro-level analysis to be carried out in §7.

In this chapter, the major arguments for each keyword are analyzed. The focus on keywords in the frame analysis in §5 is based on the supposition that keywords identified on the basis of quantitative analysis is indicative of salient areas of Abe’s speeches, and hence set a wide parameter to conduct an explorative analysis around these key areas. The analysis in this chapter, however, supplements this by truncating the parameters to analyze explicitly what arguments are made through the keywords themselves. This is done by doubling the number of keywords to 150 instances each but reducing the scope from ten lines to five sentences preceeding and proceeding the keyword, unless it reaches the end of the paragraph. For all but two of the keywords, 150 instantiations are analyzed. For ‘positive pacifism’, all 65 instantiations in the dataset were analyzed, while for diplomacy all but one of the 142 instantiations were analyzed. Instantiations that were not compatible with the research questions (below) were excised.

The analysis is separated by theme with ‘National Protection’ analyzed in §6.1, ‘Japan in the World’ in §6.2, and ‘State and Policy’ in §6.3, with an overall summary provided in §6.4.

6.1 ‘National protection’

This section discerns the prominent patterns of Abe’s speeches within the theme, ‘National Protection’. This section is divided into two sub-sections. §6.1.1 investigates the use of the keyword ‘Protect’ (mamoru), and §6.1.2 examines ‘Responsibility’ (sekinin).

6.1.1 ‘Protect’

Here, 150 instances of ‘Protect’ were analyzed in the dataset. The software used to count and identify every instance of the keyword ‘Protect’, however, did not recognize a related term ‘mamori-nuku’
which can be translated as 'to protect to the end', where the '−nuku' in the term is a suffix on the verb to 'protect' (mamoru) which conveys the meaning of seeing an act out to its conclusion. It was often used interchangeably by Abe with the keyword 'Protect'. Therefore, the analysis was carried out on 150 instantiations of 'Protect' without the suffix '−nuku', but where 'mamori-nuku' appeared within the parameter of the keyword 'Protect' (without the suffix), a keyword analysis of both words was carried out, owing to how interchangeably both terms were used. Only seventeen instantiations of 'mamori-nuku' were analyzed and, as stated, 150 instantiations of 'Protect' (without '−nuku') were analyzed. This is labeled in Table 6.1.1i, below.

In order to evaluate how 'Protect' was used throughout the dataset, the following questions were used as a heuristic to derive patterns of usage:

1) Who/What protects?
2) Who/What is protected?
3) Who/What is the threat?

The results were categorized accordingly and tabulated in Table 6.1.1i, below. Owing to the large volume of data, subject categories with a frequency over thirty—that is, comprising approximately a fifth of keyword usage—were selected for further analysis, while anything below five, was categorized as 'Other'. Groups that are italicized and contain asterisks denote subset groups of the non-italicized group immediately above. The font used to designate these groups are also emboldened.

59 Occasionally the term involved more than one subject.
### Table 6.1.1i: Categories with frequencies per instantiation for the keyword: Protect.

**Source:** Author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories for keyword: ‘Protect’ (N=150) + ‘Protect to the end’ (N=17)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Who protects?</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/Abe/Government</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We/Our Country/Japan</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF/Japan Maritime Defense Agency/Japan Coast Guard</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law/Policy/Bill/Measure</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A State/States (General)/Officials/Institutions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three most frequent protecting agencies are Abe or the Government of Japan (GOJ) at approximately 43 per cent, ‘Japan’—whether as nation, state or the proverbial ‘we’—at approximately one quarter, and the SDF and related agencies comprising roughly 11 per cent of all instances. The object of protection centers on the national domain with Japanese citizens’ lives, Japan and its territories, as well as international assets and rule of law, at approximately 45 per cent, 20 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. The threat or risk involved is unclear, at approximately 53 per cent of all instances, followed by “threats exceeding national borders” ( kokkyō-o koeta kyōi) (TENB) at roughly 13 per cent.

The protector is almost always an agent of the state or the state itself. The protected is most commonly “the nation” ( kokumin) and related terms—often as a possessive noun accompanied by terms such as ‘peaceful lifestyle’, or ‘life and assets’ and so on—and Japan and its territories. This explicitly conveys an existential threat to citizens. Less frequent are international concerns with little to no reference of any personal referent but instead ‘international assets’—namely international trade routes—and intangible concepts such as peace, stability and life.

Most notably, there is a dearth of concrete disclosures of the threatening agents’ identities from whom the state is protecting citizens and the country. This is not to say that it is not implied or that contextual knowledge does not fill in the gaps. However, whatever knowledge there is, it is not explicitly confirmed. Rather, it is either left completely unclear or the nature of the threat is disclosed,
i.e. TENB. Here, ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ are discussed in similar contexts, where though a ‘threat’ can refer to an entity which implies hostility from an Other, ‘risk’ is a fuzzier concept and need only refer to a consequence of an act or inaction, making it more reflexive in its usage (Williamson 2014a: 183). Despite the lack of specific disclosures, then, Abe conveys a sense of risk and an emphasis on decision-making and policy in response (§7).

Out of 167 instances, the DPRK and PRC are mentioned eleven times altogether and there is no mention of designated terrorist organizations. Excluding ‘cyber-terrorism’, Abe discusses the protection of certain sectors of Japan’s economy from ‘disadvantageous’ trade agreements in the TPP, almost as many times as he mentions the TENB threats. This is despite the fact that Abe positions his administration as the main agency protecting Japanese citizens/Japan from a threatening entity the majority of times. The lack of specifics also makes intangible from where the threat(s) emanate and indeed why they pose an existential threat to Japan. Instead there is the argument that there are elements in the world that threaten Japanese citizens and Japan.

To further illustrate this point, the distribution of results is provided in separate tables for the two main actor categories: ‘I/Abe/the Government’ in Table 6.1.1ii and ‘We/Our Country/Japan’ in Table 6.1.1iii, below. Here, as above, owing to the large amount of data, categories below five instances are placed into ‘Other’, to show the main correlations.

| Table 6.1.1ii: The recipient and the causal agent of ‘Protect’ when the actor is ‘Abe/The Government’. Source: Author. |
| Keyword: ‘Protect’ (N=150) + ‘Protect to the end’ (N=17) |
| Actor Category: I/Abe/Government of Japan (N=86) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To protect what/who?</th>
<th>From what/whom?</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/National (DN): N=76</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>45 (DN: 40; IR: 4; NA: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Citizens (Assets/Life/Livelihood)*: N=49</td>
<td>Threats exceeding national borders (TENB)</td>
<td>12 (DN: 10; IR: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan/Territory*: N=10</td>
<td>Guerrillas/Pirates/Terrorists etc.*</td>
<td>7 (DN: 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Villages &amp; Tradition*: N=9</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile/WMDs*</td>
<td>2 (DN: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*: N=8</td>
<td>TENB (General)*</td>
<td>2 (IR: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/Regional (IR): N=11</td>
<td>Cyberattacks/Cyberterrorism*</td>
<td>1 (DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable/Unclear (NA): N=11</td>
<td>TPP implementation without review</td>
<td>11 (DN: 8; NA: 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea (DPRK)</td>
<td>5 (DN: 3; IR: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18 (DN: 12; IR: 1; NA: 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1.1ii shows that when Abe or his administration is the actor(s), the vast majority of times the issue concerns specifically Japan. Though the object of protection may be more than one for every

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60 This is not to say that such groups are not mentioned at all. ISIL is mentioned by Abe in his speeches though not within the parameter set for ‘protect’. The point is that for the most part, when discussing ‘protection’, the identity of the threat is scarcely mentioned and discussed of in broader and more general terms.
keyword instantiation, Japan constitutes approximately 88 per cent. Within this, Japanese citizens are among the object(s) for roughly 64 per cent of every instance in the DN category, and where it is not, it is often things pertaining to Japan such as territory.

Further, of the times this actor category is portrayed to be protecting national elements, the threat is unclear in approximately 53 per cent of instances, and where the threat is explained it is usually what kinds of threats rather than who is the perpetrator. Specifically, Abe emphasizes TENB, which he regularly cites as examples, acts of cyberterrorism, terrorism as perpetrated by guerrillas, pirates and other “violent groups” (bōryoku dantai), and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles61. Out of 76 instances, the data point to an overwhelming tendency towards Abe/GOJ protecting the nation from undesignated threats. That is, though Abe is drawing on the long tradition of obscuring agents of threat or risk, the observation challenges the view that Abe prioritizes China and/or North Korea as the threatening agency. While it will be argued that this is the case to an extent, Abe most frequently does not specifically disclose the agents of the threat.

In addition, Table 6.1.1iii shows the distribution of results for the actor categories ‘We/Our Country/Japan’, below.

Table 6.1.1iii: The recipient and the causal agent of ‘Protect’ when the actor is ‘We/Our Country’.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword: ‘Protect’ (N=150) + ‘Protect to the end’ (N=17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor Category: We/Our Country/Japan (n=37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To protect what/who?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/National (DN): N=29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Citizens (Assets/Life/Livelihood)*: N=13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Peace &amp; Stability*: N=8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*: N=8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/Regional (IR): N=17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Assets/Rule of Law*: N=9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*: N=8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable/Unclear (NA): N=6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From what/whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 (DN: 19; IR: 12; NA: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats exceeding national borders (TENB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerillas/Pirates/Terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (DN: 2; IR: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyberattacks/Cyberterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (DN:2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (NA: 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This agent group comprised typically of terms such as “we” (wareware, watakushitachi), “our country” (wagakuni) and “Japan” (nihon, nippon) and was the second largest actor category. Though the frequency is considerably smaller, the results are similar to the above. Components of ‘Japan’ amount to approximately 78 per cent, where citizens or Japanese ‘peace and stability’ are the things protected,

61 The final category of this group may be seen to relate to anxieties surrounding the DPRK also. Where Abe mentioned the DPRK’s weapons development and practices, however, this was categorized as DPRK and not TENB.
amounting to 72 per cent together. Moreover, both citizens, ‘peace and stability’, and other elements of Japan are threatened mostly by an unidentified entity, at 66 per cent.

In sum, the results allow us to answer the following question as follows:

1) Who/What protects? Predominantly the Abe administration or ‘Japan’.
3) Who/What is the threat? The threat is largely undesignated, intangible and/or unclear.

6.1.2 ‘Responsibility’

An analysis of the keyword ‘Responsibility’ (sekinin) is carried out in this section. The key questions here are:

1) Who has the responsibility?
2) Responsibility to do what?
3) Responsibility to/for whom?

The results are categorized into groups based on commonality and tabulated in Table 6.1.2i, below. The tables are formatted as above. However, there is one subcategory that has sub-subcategories which are given an additional asterisk and aligned to the right of the column, as below.
Table 6.1.2i: The Categories with frequencies per instantiation for the keyword: Responsibility.
Source: Author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I/Abe/Government</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Domestic/National</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Japanese Citizens</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We/Our Country/Japan</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Protect/Support Japanese citizens</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Life/Assets/Livelihood)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A State/States (General)/Officials/Institutions</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Deal with Energy/Environment/Related crises*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>International Society/the 'World'</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC)/President Xi Jinping*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Restructure/Revitalize economy*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States (General)*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bolster security/Maintain peace*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral nation-based institutions*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Conduct politics/Govern suitably*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashar al-Assad Administration of Syria*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Improve/Maintain Social Structures (e.g.,</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>education, healthcare)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>General/Vague (e.g., make Japan a beautiful</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>country/bring back Japan)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli &amp; Palestinian Authorities*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Government*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>International/Regional</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified/Hypothetical related party</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>General*</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>To ensure peace/prosperity/stability**</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General/vague action (e.g., answer international expectations/Contribute/Deal with issues)**</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Politics (e.g., promote dialogue/good relations/effective diplomacy)*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security (e.g., nuclear disarmament/respond to heightened security(^{62}))*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economics + Security (Rule of Law/Ensuring trade routes)*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Abe administration or Japan are the possessors of responsibility for approximately three quarters of all instantiations. The responsibilities are divided mostly into national and international issues, with more emphasis on the national where the largest subgroup is protecting/supporting life, reflecting R2P rhetoric. The largest subgroup within ‘International/Regional’ are general references to international peace, prosperity and/or stability (PPS), frequently used interchangeably, and general references of responsibility to meet expectations, proactively contribute to international affairs, and so forth.

\(^{62}\) With the view that nuclear disarmament may only be achieved by effective diplomacy (ElBaradei 2011), nuclear disarmament may fall within the subcategories of ‘politics’ and ‘security’ in Table 6.1.2i. Therefore, where Abe recommended diplomacy, it was included in the former subcategory and where he recommended nuclear disarmament or at least a reduction in nuclear weapons, it was included in the former. Where he mentioned both, it was included in both subcategories.
PPS as measurements of qualities of life frequently emerged in tandem with one another. This is a standard trope observable in political rhetoric where security and economics coalesce under the common denominator of requisites for one's life and livelihood, or 'national security'\(^{63}\). For instance, though Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida at a Group of Seven (G7) summit called for PPS on the South China Sea amidst disputes between China and other states, the Chinese ambassador to New Zealand advocated the "joint sharing" (gōngtōng wèihu) of the sea between China and the Association of South East Asian Nations\(^{64}\) (ASEAN), asserting that China is the most committed to PPS because it is ASEAN's largest trading partner (Reuters 11 April 2016; South China Morning Post 11 April 2016; Tian 19 June 2016).

Whatever one's views regarding these issues, the point here is that 'peace', 'stability', and 'prosperity' are ill-defined terms and hence easily proposed. Abe does qualify his own logic over PPS when asked by a reporter how the state can militarize without eliciting anxieties among states in the region. Here, before talking explicitly about the constitution, Abe states:

Firstly, the basis of my thinking is that regional peace and stability is a major premise of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, not only Japan, and at the same time, economic prosperity is something that brings about regional peace and stability.

(Abe 27 July 2013)

In a critical sense, PPS functions as a set of buzzwords which, like other buzzwords, convey the sense of a better future with "much of what is actually done in its name unquestioned" (Cornwall 2010: 2, emphasis in original) and help securitize the present (§8).

Nonetheless, the circuitous logic behind it is traceable in Japanese governance at least as far back as the Meiji era (1868-1912) with national goals of modernization embodied in the slogan 'rich country; strong army' (fukoku kyōhei) (Beasley 1987: 27-40; Hook et al. 2012: 8) and beyond (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Hook et al. 2012). For instance, one subcategory, 'Economics + Security', was created to refer specifically to ensuring the rule of law on routes of trade\(^{65}\) as Abe often provides security answers—i.e. for peace and/or stability—to economic problems whose resolution,

\(^{63}\) Though some scholars suggest that actions taken by a state under the aegis of safeguarding 'national security' does not always translate to protecting citizens’ lives but rather maintaining, at all costs, state power (Chomsky 2016b).

\(^{64}\) No G7 nation is a full member of ASEAN.

\(^{65}\) The TPP, however, was categorized as an economic policy on the national front as Abe regularly contends that joining negotiations is the best method of revitalizing the Japanese domestic economy. Also, it is an initiative which will necessitate national-level economic restructuring.
one assumes, leads to prosperity, convalescing economics and security interests. This relates to the
norm of economism within Japanese domestic society which imputes economic growth with positive
value and pacifism (Hook et al. 2012: 67). However, given the duality between peace/stability with
prosperity, Abe is able to invert the terms of this logic stating that, rather than economic activity
begets peace and stability per se, “[we] cannot enjoy prosperity without regional peace and stability,
security of the skies and seas” (Abe 19 September 2014). That is, (military) security in international
affairs is a means to ensure economic vibrance.

Additionally, Japanese civilians comprise the majority of the category ‘to/for whom’, which
predominantly constitutes ‘the nation’66. Further, there are more frequently cases where it is unclear
as to exactly who benefits or to/for whom the actor is responsible. To garner a more precise
understanding of how this term is applied throughout the dataset, the distribution of results is
provided for groups denoting the possessor of responsibility, with both tables below formatted as
above. Firstly, Table 6.1.2ii offers the results for the category ‘I/Abe/Government’, below.

Table 6.1.2ii: The recipient and the causal agent of ‘Responsibility/Duty’ when the actor is ‘I/Abe/GOJ.
Source: Author.

Keyword: ‘Responsibility’ (N=150)
Actor Category: I/Abe/Abe Administration/GOJ (N=57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To do what?</th>
<th>For/to whom?</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/National (DN): N=66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect/Support Japanese citizens*: N=20</td>
<td>Japanese Citizens in general</td>
<td>37 (DN: 37; IR: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal with Energy/Environment/Related crises*: N=14</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>14 (DN: 13; IR: 0; NA: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructure/Revitalize economy*: N=11</td>
<td>Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td>8 (DN: 8; IR: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct politics/Govern suitably*: N=8</td>
<td>International Society/Region</td>
<td>5 (DN: 2; IR: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve/Maintain social structures*: N=7</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5 (DN: 4; IR: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*: N=6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/Regional (IR): N=1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*: N=1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1.2ii indicates a clear focus on domestic issues when the bearer of the responsibility is the
Abe administration where it is often to an unclear element or Japanese citizens generally to whom
he/they are responsible. Japanese citizens amount to 55 per cent of Abe’s responsibilities, and
comprise 64 per cent of all instances, demonstrating that responsibility to citizens frequently came
with other responsibilities simultaneously.

What responsibilities? As stated, the Abe administration’s tasks are mostly nationally-
oriented. However, there is no standalone act with ‘protect/support [the lives of] Japanese citizens’

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66 This might be argued to exclude foreigners. For example, Koseki (1989) contends that the use of the phrase
“all the nation” (subete-no kokumin) for the English phrase “all people” facilitated the denial of constitutional
rights to non-Japanese citizens, including Korean and Chinese descendants living in Japan as a result of the
Japanese Empire (Hook and McCormack 2001: 5).
amounting to approximately 30 per cent of all responsibilities, ‘deal with energy/environment/related crises [e.g. 3.11]’ at roughly 21 per cent, and ‘restructure/revitalize [the Japanese] economy’ at nearly 16 per cent. The majority domestic actions are for elements domestic to Japan, and of that, mostly to citizens. This is in stark contrast to the responsibilities when the possessor is not the Abe administration, but extended to include the Japan as a whole, whether as the proverbial ‘we’, ‘our country’, or the term ‘Japan’. The results are provided in exactly the same format as above, in Table 6.1.2iii, below.

Table 6.1.2iii: The recipient and the causal agent of ‘Responsibility/Duty’ when the actor is ‘We/Our Country/Japan’.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keyword: ‘Responsibility’ (N=150)</th>
<th>For/to whom?</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor Category: We/Our Country/Japan (N=55)</td>
<td>International Society/Region</td>
<td>26 (DN: 3; IR: 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>15 (DN: 4; IR: 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerable Groups</td>
<td>8 (DN: 8; IR: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese Citizens in general</td>
<td>7 (DN: 2; IR: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 (DN: 2; IR: 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1.2iii shows that when Japan is the bearer of responsibility the emphasis is on international responsibilities where most of the time it is either unclear or to international society, the ‘world’, or a given geopolitical region. Responsibilities are more internationally-oriented reflecting notions of a collective responsibility that Japan shares towards international affairs. Responsibility for/to international society or a given geopolitical region amounts to approximately 44 per cent of responsibilities, constituting the largest category, followed by ‘unclear’ which amounts to roughly 25 per cent. Further, approximately 73 per cent of responsibilities are internationally-oriented, where the largest category consists of responsibility towards international/regional PPS or vague statements such as ‘more proactive contributions’. However, the categories ‘politics’, ‘security’, or ‘Economics+Security’ (e.g. maintaining trade routes for growth) are relatively even, comprising respectively 21 per cent, 19 per cent, and 12 per cent of international responsibilities.

The overall results point to a number of findings. To start with, there is the responsibility of the government to protect its citizens and Japan for its citizens, and the responsibility of the nation to ensure PPS abroad for the world or a geopolitical region. Additionally, the government is portrayed as the protector of Japan and its citizens from a largely undesignated threat. Despite the fact that
securitization theory necessitates identifying the threatening agency, this displays a securitized narrative of risk, as opposed to a clear threat, making it a depoliticizing act. Further, the altruistic responsibility conveyed by Abe of the nation and hence its people, with Abe as the representative, to ensure PPS in the world is another means by which to legitimate an increased military role abroad for Japan. For instance, it conflates issues of conflict and recession where Japan as a collective ensures economic growth and security internationally. The analysis suggests a more complex view of politics that fits well with the wider understanding of security by postwar—and to an extent, prewar—Japanese political leaders and public opinion (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993). That is, economics and security are closely related, and pose a risk to the state and its citizens, making issues in the global economy an issue of state security.

In sum, the results allow us to answer the following question as follows:

1) Who has responsibility? Predominantly the Abe administration or ‘Japan’ as a collective.
2) To do what? GOJ mostly are responsible for national issues, particularly protecting citizens’ lives; ‘Japan’ is responsible for international affairs, particularly general contributions and PPS.
3) To/for whom? GOJ is mostly responsible to the citizens of Japan; ‘Japan’ is mostly responsible to the ‘world’ or a given geopolitical region.

With this, the analysis continues below by focusing on the ‘Japan in the World’ theme to further dissect the role Japan is portrayed by Abe to have in the world.

6.2 ‘Japan in the World’

This section comprises a keyword analysis of ‘contribution’ (kōken), ‘stability’ (antei), and Abe’s foreign policy, ‘positive pacifism’ (sekkyoku-teki heiwa shugi) (PP). The cut-off point is 150 instances of a given keyword, with 150 instance of ‘contribution’ and ‘stability’, as well as all 65 instances of ‘positive pacifism’ in the dataset.

This section is divided into three subsections: §6.2.1 covers ‘contribution’; §6.2.2 ‘stability’; and §6.2.3 PP and overviews the findings for Theme B.
6.2.1 ‘Contribution’

This section examines the keyword ‘contribution’ (kōken). In order to analyze the usage of the keyword, the following questions were used to derive patterns in usage.

1) Who/What contributes?
2) Who/What receives the contribution?
3) Why this contribution?

Table 6.2.1i, below, provides the results of the analysis. The table is formatted in the same way as the analyses above.

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**Table 6.2.1i: Categories with frequencies per instantiation for the keyword: Contribution.**

*Source: Author*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories for Keyword: Contribute/Contribution (N=150)</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Contribution to</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>World/Region/Foreign State</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We/Our Country/Japan*</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>World/Prosperity/Stability*</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese industries/innovations/exports*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Economy*</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/Abe/Government*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Economy growth/Development**</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Technological improvements/Nuclear safety**</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign governments/states/groups of statesRegions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Human welfare/Healthcare*</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN/Full member states*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Resolution of security issues (e.g. UNPKO/Nuclear disarmament)*</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/Obama administration*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Environment (Combat climate change)*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies/Various nations/leaders*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Unclear/General*</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/South America/Brazil*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

67 The ‘peace state walk’ or ‘journey as a peace-state’ (heiwa kokka-no ayumi) is a metaphor, described in §6.2.3 and relates to Japan being perceived to be a ‘peace-state’. This is merged into the category of Japanese responsibility because of the importance of this undertaking having renounced war, stipulated in the constitution, as a sovereign right, following the traumas of the Asia-Pacific war and its aftermath.
Table 6.2.1i shows that the actor category 'We/Our Country/Japan' is the majority of all actor subcategories, comprising approximately 67 per cent of all categories, and when amalgamated with other subcategories to make the category 'Japan', it constitutes approximately 87 per cent of all categories. The largest 'action' category is 'world/region/foreign state' at 94 per cent of all 'action' categories. Of this, PPS is the largest subcategory and 'economy' the second largest amounting to approximately 43 per cent and 18 per cent of the category, respectively. Finally, the largest category denoting the reason behind the acts is 'interdependence', comprising 40 per cent of all categories, which denotes claims over the importance of relations to Japan and partners and global interdependence. The category 'interdependence' comprises three subcategories which include 'support/expectation' from an existing partner or 'world', an emphasis over the 'significance of relations' with a given partner, often with claims of mutual risks and benefits between them, and notions of 'world change'. This denotes accounts of globalization or internationalization (§7; §8), typically with assertions that the world is becoming borderless or TENB changes how states respond to threats (and risks), that the security environment is becoming more treacherous, or generally that there is increased state interdependence. All these notions support the claim by Abe that protecting one’s country's ‘peace’ cannot be achieved alone, meaning that Japan must rely on international alliances, most typically with the US, but also other nations and the UN through CSD. The claim lends itself to notions of international contribution which, itself, generally is accepted as a positive thing in Japan (Hattori 2007; Hook et al. 2012) and elsewhere. It is essentially to delegitimize arguments for an independent ‘one country’ pacifist policy. That is, using the depoliticizing trope that the world has changed (§7), so too must Japan with it.

Overall, Table 6.2.1i indicates that the main pattern of usage for the keyword ‘contribution’ is ‘Japan’ contributing to the world, a region, or a foreign state, due to global interdependence. To examine this further, the results for the patterns of use of the keyword when the actor is ‘We/Our Country/Japan’ is provided in Table 6.2.1ii, below.
Table 6.2.1ii: The act and reason of ‘Contribute/Contribution’ when the actor is ‘We/Our Country/Japan’. Source: Author.

**Keyword: ‘Contribute/Contribution’ (N=150)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Category: We/Our Country/Japan (N=110)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>To do what?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World/Region/Foreign State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace/Prosperity/Stability*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy growth/Development**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological improvements/Nuclear safety**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human welfare/Healthcare*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution of security issues (e.g. UNPKO/Nuclear disarmament)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear/General*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment (Combat climate change)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 118 Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Importance/Closeness of/Dependence on relations/Mutual benefit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Support from/ Expectations/Approval of partners*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 World change (TENB, borderless world, increased interdependence)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Appropriateness of contributor’s experience/technology/resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Unclear/Unstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Threats to life (e.g. extreme weather events/ outbreak of Ebola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Japan's responsibility/duty / post-war journey as a ‘peace state’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 For a better world/future/for people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As above, the clear pattern of usage is that Japan contributes something to somewhere exterior to Japan. The reasons behind this, however, are somewhat more variable. For over half of all keyword instantiations, Japan is portrayed as the contributor and it is either because of interdependence or not made clear. For the latter, this may be due to the fact that perceived contributions to PPS on an international scale are often unlikely to require justification (§8).

Though not provided in Table 6.2.1ii due to a large quantity of data, for the category ‘interdependence’, approximately 66 per cent of all instantiations relate to the act of contributing to PPS. This reflects the overall pattern of usage for the keyword, that because of the significance of IR, owing to either world change, support from allies and so forth, Japan is contributing to PPS. Another large category is ‘appropriateness of contributor’s experience/technology/resources’, the majority related to either the economy (c. 59 per cent) or combatting climate change (c. 24 per cent), indicating the Abe administration’s economic policy of penetrating foreign markets with Japanese products marketed for their technological sophistication.

Overall, contributions to PPS suggest a conflation of economic and security issues, converging on the premise of life quality measurements. Further, regional/international contribution is hinged on the supposition that international growth is conducive to Japanese growth and *vice versa*. This is buttressed with the presence also of ‘world change’ and general assertions of state interdependence making contributions indispensable. The well-being of the world links to the well-being of Japan, which delegitimizes notions of one-country pacifism due to not necessarily accurate (§8) notions of isolationism, non-interventionism, and potentially delegitimizes economic principles of
protectionism in favour of an internationalism which involves stabilizing world elements to ensure a stable national condition. Of course, none of this is cast in stone, but reflects Abe’s espousal of internationalism to legitimate policy change.

In sum, the results allow us to answer the following questions:

3) Why this contribution? – Predominantly owing to increased interdependence in the world.

6.2.2 ‘Stability’

In this section, the keyword ‘stability’ (antei) is examined. However, first it must be noted that ‘stability’ is ill-defined throughout Abe’s speeches and often used interchangeably with peace and prosperity. Further, contributions to PPS do not always require justification as such an act is imbued with positive value within Japan, and most likely everywhere else in the world, affording it an inherent legitimacy. However, ‘stability’ itself is often linked to the balance of power in international politics, with for example critical accounts focused on major powers suggesting that in the ‘technical-sense’ of the term it denotes conformity to US demands or imperialism as opposed to conditions of ensuring human welfare, which do not always coalesce (wa Thiong’o 1993: 110; Chomsky 2016b: 50). Moreover, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), which asserts that stability is attainable only when there exists a unipole in the international system to enforce order, has influenced US foreign policy as the state closest to being what might be considered the world’s unipole post-Cold War68 (§8). In such a worldview, the interests of the hegemon (that is, its chief architects and stakeholders in the policy-making process) theoretically merge, or at least overlap, with the ideational ambitions of freedom and peace because without the dominance of an unrivalled superpower, states vying for power would lead to humanitarian disaster. Whether or not one subscribes to this theory, stability, therefore, is, in a sense, a political construct.

Additionally, in East-Asian IR, ‘stability’ functions as a buzzword and is often synonymous with US presence in the region serving as a deterrent against changes to the status quo (Wirth 2015). Though this might come with calls for protecting democracy, open markets and so forth, in Northeast Asia, it ultimately denotes an abstract conception of the balance of power among governments that often heavily prioritize economic growth through mercantilist means (Wirth 2010; 2012; 2015).

68 Other schools have noted that versions of pan-nationalist imperialism also depended on the same assumption that a hegemon is a net-gain to a politico-economic bloc (Hotta 2007: 113).
Again, were HST applied to the IR of a region, this need not be hypocritical, in theory at least. Rather, what exactly is stability and how to attain it are crucial questions at a time when Northeast Asian governments are securitizing the maritime sphere while the largest military and industrial state power in world history is waning. Also, answers to these questions are important at a time when there is a paucity of global export markets which greatly increases competition among traditionally trade-surplus national economies such as that of China and Japan, and a resurgence in forms of protectionism including but not limited to China69 such as trade tariffs and currency manipulation70 (Rachman 2011; Varoufakis et al. 2011) while sovereign and jurisdictional claims related to trade are expanding (Wirth 2012). Thus, answering the questions ‘whose stability’ and ‘how to attain it’ might prove a useful heuristic in discerning government priorities amidst talks of seemingly altruistic commitments to PPS.

Therefore, the questions used to understand the patterns of usage of the keyword, unlike ‘contribute/contribution’ do not delve into why it is being carried out, but rather how, as provided below:

1) Who is the actor?
2) Whose stability?
3) How to attain it?

As above, categories under the value of 5 are subsumed into an ‘Other’ category, while subject (actor) categories over the value of 30 are selected for further analysis. Table 6.2.2i below shows the overall patterns of usage for the keyword separated by the three questions above.

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69 Though emergent powers often claim that previous and present major powers that today espouse deregulation relied on protectionist policies for rapid economic growth (Chang 2010), there has been a rise in protectionism even among these nations post-2008 global recession (Evenett and Fritz 2015).

70 Allegations of the PRC resisting calls for the revaluation of the Chinese Yuan to the US Dollar is related in no small measure to the widely-held belief among Chinese policymakers that the 1985 Plaza Accord, where the US dollar was manipulated against the German deutschmark and the Japanese yen, effectively ended the so-called ‘Japanese miracle’ of rapid economic growth postwar (Rachman 2011: 256). Also, it might be argued that policymakers have responded to the lessons of the 1998 East Asian Financial Crisis and the demands imposed by the IMF for loans (Varoufakis 2011: 219; Hook: 2005; Hook et al. 2012: 222-225).
### Categories for Keyword: Stability (N=150)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>World/Region/Foreign state</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>Contributions to international affairs</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We/Our Country/Japan*</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Region/Regional state institution*</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>General (Carry out duties/contribute/positive pacifism)*</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/Abe/Government*</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>ASEAN/Asia (East/Southeast)/ Asia-Pacific**</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Strengthen ties with state allies/(Promote) dialogue**</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Middle East/the Gulf**</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>United States**</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Africa**</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>ASEAN**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign state/ Multilateral State Institution**</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>World/International state institution*</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>China (PRC)**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC)*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Foreign State*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Middle Eastern/Gulf states**</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 states/International society/ Various states (General)*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>International society/G7 states/ General (e.g. 'Countries that share our values')**</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN/Asia-Pacific (States)*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Japan (General)/Citizens*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Russian Federation**</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Social Security/Pensions/Finance*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Politics/Cabinet*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>UNPKO/SDF involvement*</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Energy supply*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Financial assistance/ODA*</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes to/Implementation of domestic policy

|                                           |     |
| Security legislation*                    | 24  |
| Economic legislation*                   | 22  |
| Energy legislation*                     | 18  |
| Social welfare legislation*             | 6   |
| Other*                                  | 1   |
| Unclear/Unstated                        | 8   |
| Other                                   | 4   |

Here, ‘Japan’ is the largest actor amounting to approximately 78 per cent of all categories, while ‘we/our country/Japan’ is its largest subcategory, comprising roughly 54 per cent of all actor subcategories. Stability external to Japan is most predominantly discussed, with the category ‘world/region/foreign state’ constituting approximately 82 per cent of all categories, while within it, the subcategories denoting a ‘region/regional state institution’ and ‘world/international state institution’ greatly outnumber ‘foreign state’. Finally, the largest means to ensure stability is ‘contributions to international affairs’, at roughly 68 per cent of all categories, while within it both the subcategories ‘general (carry out duties/contribute/positive pacifism)’ and ‘strengthen ties with state allies/(promote) dialogue’ substantially outnumber all others, comprising the large majority.

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71 The sum of subcategories in this section does not add up to the number of instantiations for the whole category because Abe occasionally listed states and institutions in one instantiation.

72 The sum of subcategories exceeds the number of instantiations for the whole category because Abe occasionally listed states and institutions.
PP was included in the subcategory ‘general’ because Abe often recommended contributions to international affairs as a reflection of PP, making the two analogous as he sought to legitimize his administration's foreign policy, which of course comes with a number of (some since carried out) implications to Japan's domestic security legislation and constitution. Moreover, general ‘proactivity’ in international affairs is equated to a new kind of ‘proactive pacifism’ where the pacifism that existed before was not ‘proactive/positive’. Here, the implication is that ‘proactive’ contributions to international affairs epitomize PP as they safeguard/bolster world peace and stability, while the difference between the pacifism advocated by the Abe administration to traditional manifestations boil down to notions of attitude and manner (§6.2.3; §7 and §8 for discussions on this).

Overall, Japan collectively or an individual element within Japan contributes to international affairs for the sake of stability in the world, region or foreign state. To further understand the patterns of usage, the actor (sub)categories over the value of 30 are selected for further analysis. These are, in chronological order, ‘We/Our country/Japan’, ‘Foreign state/Multilateral state institution’ and ‘I/Abe/Government’.

First, Table 6.2.2ii shows the patterns of usage when the actor category is ‘We/Our country/Japan’, below.
Table 6.2.2ii: The categories ‘whose stability?’ and ‘how to attain it?’ for ‘stability’ when the actor is ‘We/Our Country/Japan. 
Source: Author.

Keyword: ‘Stability’ (N=150)  
Actor Category: We/Our Country/Japan (N=108)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whose stability?</th>
<th>World/Region/Foreign state (IR)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World/International state institution*</td>
<td>156 (IR: 229; DN: 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Region/Regional state institution*</td>
<td>68 (IR: 88; DN: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASEAN/Asia (East/Southeast/Asia-Pacific)**</td>
<td>60 (IR: 95; DN: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East/the Gulf**</td>
<td>Middle Eastern/Gulf states**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa**</td>
<td>ASEAN**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign state*</td>
<td>United States**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (DN)</td>
<td>Japan (General)/Citizens*</td>
<td>China (PRC)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Security/Pensions/Finances*</td>
<td>International society/G7 states/General (e.g. ‘Countries that share our values’)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politics/Cabinet*</td>
<td>Russian Federation**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>Other**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes to/Implementation of domestic policy</td>
<td>UNPKO/SDF involvement*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security legislation*</td>
<td>Financial assistance/ODA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic legislation*</td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy legislation*</td>
<td>Changes to/Implementation of domestic policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>Security legislation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Economic legislation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Energy legislation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results show that when the subject is Japan as a collective, overwhelmingly the issue of stability is concerned with a geopolitical region or the ‘world’/international society. Foreign states, regions and international state institutions/the ‘world’ were counted separately, but used in combination with one another by Abe throughout his speeches, explaining why the numbers in parentheses outnumber the number of instantiations per keyword. As before, ‘contributions to international affairs’ comprise the majority of means by which stability is attained/ensured with the subcategories ‘general (carry out duties/contribute/positive pacifism)’ and ‘strengthen ties with state allies/(promote) dialogue’, collectively amounting to roughly 65 per cent of all (sub)categories.

Typically, the logic asserted is that stability in a given region or foreign state is stability for the world (and, implicitly, Japan). This might be seen in the fact that among all regions and states to whom the Abe administration is officially seeking to strengthen ties, Middle Eastern states are mentioned the most, when taken together. Of course though not limited to Japan alone, the Middle East is viewed by Japanese policymakers as a region of extreme strategic importance (Miyagi 2008; Hook et al. 2012). Japan, like many other countries, is overwhelmingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers as its “energy lifeline” while those producers, as states, are not dependent in any significant measure on Japanese exports, making bilateral relations between the oil producers and
Japan unfavourable to Japan (Miyagi 2008: 176-177). Due to this, Abe visited a number of Middle Eastern states and sought to expand trade relations or its “partnership” (e.g. Abe 23 May 2013) with states such as Bahrain (e.g. Abe 28 August 2013b), Qatar (e.g. Abe 28 August 2013a) Saudi Arabia (e.g. Abe 23 May 2013) and the United Arab Emirates (e.g. Abe 1 May 2013), into other domains and hence establish a Middle East trade dependency on Japan by creating new markets for Japanese exports.

Strengthening relationships or “friendship” (e.g. Abe 27 July 2013; 17 November 2013; 14 December 2013) with ASEAN “friends” (e.g. Abe 17 November 2013; 15 May 2014) is emphasized by the Abe administration also. Notions of ‘friendship’ by Abe, as well as, incidentally, ‘fraternity’ by the Hatoyama administration (2009-2010), tie in with the norm of Asianism and is readily extended to the Asia-Pacific region (see §7 and §8 for discussion on ‘Asia-Pacific’). The ideological underpinnings of Asianism, like Pan-Asianism associated with expansionism by imperial Japan and the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (daitōakyōeiken), is ill-defined and incorrect to assume that there is or was a complete standard agreement on it (Hotta 2007: 3). For example, generic views regarding Pan-Asianism stretched across time and agencies from “a civic rights-based liberal internationalist idea” to the shared responsibilities of an “Asiatic Monroe Doctrine” to Japanese supremacist imperialism epitomized through expansionist political slogans such as ‘all the world under one roof’ (hakkō ichiu) (Hotta 2007; McCormack 2007: 115). Rather, as embedded norms, they can be manipulated for political ends. For instance, one difference between Abe and previous administrations is the relationship between Japan and the US amidst the Japanese government’s attempt to portray itself as a regional leader. In short, Abe is keen throughout to promote more integrative relations with ASEAN states with, crucially, the US as base, reflecting his administration’s comparative conformity with the traditional intermediary role of the Japanese state to ASEAN and the US compared to the Hatoyama administration, and hence also conformity to bilateralism with the US. This is despite the similar language between both administrations used to construct more favourable relations in the region by appealing to notions of solidarity, cultural affinity and/or a sense of kindred links that binds

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73 Notions of ‘partnership’ also are seen to reflect a set of norms and ideals, with, for instance, African policymakers in disagreement with the Japanese state’s conceptualization of ‘partnership’ and its operationalization through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) (Ampiah 2008: 302-303).

74 This approach, however, is nothing new to Japanese oil diplomacy towards the Middle East (see Nester and Ampiah 1989).

75 Though it must be note that such language is not exclusive to Abe alone nor did ‘friendship’ or ‘fraternity’ always apply only to Asians (e.g. Hook et al. 2012: 340-41), but when used in the Asia-Pacific context can be seen to evoke normative conceptions of Asianism.

76 A move that requires some sensitivity and mired difficulties due to memories of Japan’s regional endeavours before and during WWII (Hook et al. 2012: 251).
neighbours together associated with pan-national as well as internationalist movements (Hotta: 2007: 21). Further, in doing so it may allay concerns from regional actors (and citizens) that Japanese imperialism might recrudesce, in favour of the status quo by only engaging in ‘proactive contributions’ under US auspices, and hence offer a degree of maneuverability towards further legitimating military engagements in the region.

Again, it is Abe’s listing of states, most typically US and ASEAN, that explains why the sum of each state subcategory within the category ‘strengthen ties with state allies/(promote) dialogue’, is larger than the total for the category\textsuperscript{77}. Also, it corresponds with the Obama administration’s so-called “rebalance” (of power) in the Asia-Pacific towards the US as opposed to challengers to the perceived status quo such as China (Emmers 2015; Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2016), bolstering notions of Japan between both the US and ASEAN as a mediator as opposed to challenger. The notion of ‘balancing’ here appears to be an accurate description of affairs. That is, though not obvious from Table 6.2.2ii, while strengthening ties with Middle Eastern/Gulf states and ASEAN frequently is ostensibly to create new markets within those regions or to ensure the use of sea-lanes of trade in a ‘win-win’ dynamic, strengthening ties with the US is not related to affairs in the US \textit{per se} but to localities external to both Japan and the US. Again, this likely reflects the Obama administration’s attempts at “rebalancing” US influence in the Asia-Pacific, and the Abe administration’s attempts to ‘balance’ concerns over engagement and disengagement in international affairs by fleshing out an intermediary role to realize its long-term goal of remilitarization.

Finally, while international contributions greatly outweigh alternative ways of attaining ‘stability’, the category ‘changes to/implementation of domestic policy’ indicates that changes to Japan’s domestic legislation is a necessary condition for stability abroad. In terms of security legislation, this typically involves setting up the National Security Council (\textit{kokka anzenhoshō kaigi}), inquiring into CSD, moving the US military base in Futenma, Okinawa to Henoko, Okinawa, reducing the burden of US bases in Okinawa (see Hook and Siddle 2003; McCormack and Oka Norimatsu 2012; Hook et al. 2015: 159-227), and boosting deterrence. Abe often appeals to notions of state interdependence coalescing, for instance, stability abroad with stability at home. Such an argument hence collapses any dichotomy that might exist between national action and international impact and

\textsuperscript{77} Another state frequently discussed is Russia. Discussion here mostly relates to the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and warfare in Donbass. However, this itself is not without significance given the fact that there is no post-WWII peace treaty between Japan and Russia and there are territorial disputes between both states for the ‘Northern Territories’ or ‘Kuril Islands’ (\textit{hoppō ryōdo}), all currently part of Russia’s Sakhalin Oblast (Kuhrt 2007; Ferguson 2008; Kimura 2008; Bukh 2010). Dialogue between leaders took place before and after annexation (Abe 30 April 2013a; 2013b; 11 November 2014), reflecting the importance of Japanese-Russian relations to the Abe administration.
vice versa. Changes to domestic legislation are legitimated by presenting them as a Hobson’s choice, which is depoliticizing inasmuch as this questions where it is exactly that popular democratic sovereignty lies in such an interdependent and fragile international condition. Thus, issues such as constitutional reform can, and have often been, argued particularly among conservatives by appealing to internationalist norms as well as national defense, while opponents often point to the damage state empowerment may have on national conditions such as human rights as well as conduct abroad over the long-term (Stockwin 2008: 202-223; §8).

In order to assess how ‘stability’ is used among the other main actor categories, Table 6.2.2iii provides both actor categories ‘I/Abe/Government’ and ‘Foreign State/Multilateral State Institution’, below.

Table 6.2.2iii: The categories ‘whose stability?’ and ‘how to attain it?’ for ‘stability’ when the actor is ‘Abe/Government’ and ‘Foreign state/Multilateral state institution’ respectively.
Source: Author.

Keyword: ‘Stability’ (N=150)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Category: Foreign state/Multilateral state institution (N=42)</th>
<th>How to attain it?</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whose stability?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World/Region/Foreign state (W)</td>
<td>Contributions to international affairs</td>
<td>53 (IR: 86; DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Regional state institution*</td>
<td>Strengthen ties with state allies/(Promote) dialogue*</td>
<td>33 (IR: 56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN/Asia (East/Southeast/Asia-Pacific)**</td>
<td>ASEAN**</td>
<td>11 (IR: 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/the Gulf**</td>
<td>China (PRC)**</td>
<td>11 (IR: 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa**</td>
<td>Russian Federation**</td>
<td>5 (IR: 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World/International state institution*</td>
<td>United States**</td>
<td>5 (IR: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign state*</td>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>12 (IR: 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (J)</td>
<td>General (Carry out duties/contribute/positive pacifism)*</td>
<td>13 (IR: 22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (General)/Citizens*</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>7 (IR: 8; DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security/Pensions/Finances*</td>
<td>Changes to/Implementation of domestic policy</td>
<td>1 (IR: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics/Cabinet*</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>1 (IR: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>2 (IR: 2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor Category: I/Abe/Government (N=38)</th>
<th>How to attain it?</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whose stability?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World/Region/Foreign state (IR)</td>
<td>Contributions to international affairs</td>
<td>19 (IR: 26; DN 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Regional state institution*</td>
<td>General (Carry out duties/contribute/positive pacifism)*</td>
<td>10 (IR: 10; DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN/Asia (East/Southeast/Asia-Pacific)**</td>
<td>Strengthen ties with state allies/(Promote) dialogue*</td>
<td>9 (IR: 16; DN: 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/the Gulf**</td>
<td>United States**</td>
<td>5 (IR: 5; DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa**</td>
<td>Other**</td>
<td>9 (IR: 11; DN: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World/International state institution*</td>
<td>Changes to/Implementation of domestic policy</td>
<td>33 (IR: 5; DN: 35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign state*</td>
<td>Economic legislation*</td>
<td>10 (DN: 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (DN)</td>
<td>Energy legislation*</td>
<td>7 (DN: 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (General)/Citizens*</td>
<td>Security legislation*</td>
<td>5 (IR: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security/Pensions/Finances*</td>
<td>Social welfare legislation*</td>
<td>5 (DN: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics/Cabinet*</td>
<td>Unclear/Unstated</td>
<td>5 (DN: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>4 (DN: 6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, ‘whose stability’ is divided between the international-regional-bilateral domains and Japan. For the actor category ‘foreign state/multilateral state institution’ it must be noted that methods to attain
stability mostly refer explicitly to strengthening relations with Japan, not to the countries listed, which for the most part are actors. This is the result of Abe’s inclusive language use which frequently adopts a loose format of praising the significance of a relation and advocating that both nations strengthen their connections with each other, hence granting an agency to other states and institutions, most commonly with ASEAN and China. One example for ASEAN and the US is praising the significance of the alliance between Japan and then to discuss agreements between nations to strengthen ties, while another example is, with Japan as the subject of the clause, to state that Japan will contribute to stability with allies, technically making other states actors in the clause, as demonstrated in the two examples provided below:

*We [prime minister Abe and US vice president Joe Biden] agreed* that for regional prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, the growth centre of the world, stability of security is more important than ever, and the *Japan-US alliance has an increasingly big role*, and furthermore *must be strengthened*. In this context, *we agreed* on the view that the TPP has significance for the whole of the Asia-Pacific, and *both Japan and the United States should carry out a big role [towards] successful negotiations*.78

(Abe 27 July 2013, my emphasis)

*B*ased on forty years of friendship and cooperation, there are *deep ties between Japan and ASEAN. ASEAN, which is now the driving force of the world economy, is an indispensable friend* for the regeneration of the Japanese economy. At the same time, it is *an important partner* in order to make the seas of Asia stable, open and free. *Japan and ASEAN are maturing relations* to contribute *hand-in-hand* to regional and world peace and prosperity, not stopping *simply* at cooperation for mutual benefit.

(Abe 17 November 2013, my emphasis)

As a result, when the actor is ‘foreign state/multilateral state institution’, it is not always clear as to whom the actor aims to strengthen ties in Table 6.2.2iii. Despite this, ‘contributions to international affairs’ comprises the majority of means to attain stability when the actor is a state entity or institution external to Japan amounting to roughly 95 per cent of all methods to attain stability, while ‘strengthening ties’ is the majority method of contributions constituting 62 per cent of the category. Further, as for ‘whose stability’ it is that is being sought, the vast majority of cases pertain explicitly to localities external to Japan.

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78 To note, this quote also included the actor category ‘I/Abe/Government’.
Conversely, when the actor category is 'I/Abe/Government', the majority of means to attain stability pertains to 'changes to/implementation of domestic policy' amounting to over 54 per cent of all categories. Further, there is a divide between the national and the international, where methods to attain stability by contributions to international affairs concern stability external to Japan in all but three instantiations, while when discussing how the Abe administration will carry out/ carried out ‘changes to/implementation of domestic policy’, Japanese stability comprises 88 per cent of all references. This mirrors the observations made in §6.2.1 suggesting that state actions in international affairs are a reflection of the whole nation including its citizens. However, it must be noted that for ‘security legislation’, though the sample is small, all cases refer explicitly to stability foreign to Japan. This again demonstrates the interrelationship conveyed by Abe between favourable international conditions as premised on change at the national level.

Overall the analysis of the two keywords underpins Abe’s foreign policy initiative. Namely further internationalization, often with the Japan-US relationship at the centre, whether in the field of economics or military security, with significant conceptual overlap. The links between Japan and foreign conditions are made frequently in Abe’s speeches which reflect PP, the administration’s foreign policy and the final keyword within the theme, ‘Japan in the World’. The figurative use of language over this term concerns two interrelated dimensions, namely: positivity in terms of how ‘Japan’ as a collective is seen by the ‘world’ often as a kind of single, atomized unit, and positivity as an attitude of its citizens, often discussed in more detail in topics such as the ‘cultivation’ of ‘the new Japanese’ (atarashii nihonjin).

With this, we may answer the research questions as follows:

1) Who is the actor? Mostly Japan as a collective.
2) Whose stability? Mostly the ‘world’ or a geopolitical region.
3) How to attain it? Mostly by contributing to international affairs whether denoted as ‘general’ contributions or by integrating further with regional partners.

Following this, §6.2.3, below, provides an analysis over the use of the keyword ‘Positive Pacifism’.

6.2.3 Positive Pacifism

As stated, PP is the Abe administration’s slogan for their foreign policy initiative. This is connected principally with the third arrow of Abenomics, and also the policy towards the administration’s diplomatic strategy, termed “diplomacy that overlooks the globe” (chikyūgi-o fukansuru gaikō). To
gain a better understanding of how PP is discussed by Abe, the following questions were applied to the analysis of the term.

1) What is the purpose/goal?
2) What is the problem? What is it a response to?
3) How is it instrumentalized?

Given the fact that this keyword denotes the Abe administration’s foreign policy, the demarcation between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ in the analysis in previous keywords is not drawn as clearly here. Further, an actor category is not sought because it obviously refers to GOJ or Japan as a whole. Also, the entire number of instances for the keyword amounted to 65 in the dataset. However, owing to the relatively low frequency of the term, the following analysis only includes identifying the major categories of usage. Every single instance was analyzed in accordance with the questions set above and the results are provided in Table 6.2.3i, below.
Table 6.2.3i: Categories with frequencies per instantiation for the keyword: Positive pacifism. Source: Author.

### Categories for Keyword: Positive pacifism (N = 65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal/Ambition</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Problem/Response to</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Way of instrumentalization</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World/Regional PPS</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Expectation/Support from partners/the ‘world’</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Contribute to international affairs/ Cooperate with international society/the ‘world’ (General)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World change/ Interdependencies</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Changes to/implementation of domestic legislation*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional development/growth/Improve the world quality of life (e.g. healthcare)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>State-based security threats*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Security legislation/Inquiry into constitution*</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuance of peace-state journey/uphold/protect Japanese pacifism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iran/Nuclear development*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Economic legislation/revitalize economy*</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese safety/peace/territory/ constraint (e.g. US bases)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Syria/Conflicts/Use of chemical weapons*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Strengthen ties/Integrate with partners*</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a society ‘where women shine’</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>General/Countries ‘that share our values’*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear/Unstated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Japan’s/Japanese politicians’ responsibility</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>European Union (EU) /EU states incl. United Kingdom (+NATO)* #81</td>
<td>7(+3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realizing CSD/Interpretation of the constitution</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>United State (+NATO)*</td>
<td>7(+3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Introversion (among Japanese/pacifism etc.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>ASEAN*</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENB-based security threats</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental problems/Natural disasters/Climate change</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aid/Financial support/ODA/Export for development</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undear/Unstated</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Explain intent over positive pacifism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>SDF activity (in PKO/patrolling seas)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vague (e.g. ‘concrete action’/ ‘stabilization’/’support efforts’)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in human security initiatives/arms reduction #82</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79 The number of instances of a category is outnumbered by the number of individual references among subcategories because PM Abe would list more than one subcategory element of a given category within a given parameter.

80 “Shared values” are regularly defined by Abe as one, some or all of the following: Rule of law (hō-no shihai), fundamental human rights (kihon-teki jinken), liberty (jiyū), and democracy (minshushugi).

81 The referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) over whether to remain or leave the EU took place after the timeframe of speeches by Abe collated and analyzed here. Therefore, the UK is considered an EU state, which it was at the time.

82 Abe appears to use a loose definition of ‘human security’ taken to mean a broad range of activities (e.g. Abe 24 January 2014; 6 May 2014). For clarity, this section includes references to “human security” (ningen-no anzenhoshō) and arms reduction. For a definition of human security see Takasu (2012: 2).
The largest ‘goal’ is for ‘world/regional PPS’, accounting for approximately 40 per cent of all ‘goals’ and 77 per cent of all instances, where one category can apply to an instance only once. Again, this is concordant with the observations made regarding PPS and demonstrates a close and purposeful link between PP and PPS, and the promotion of the norm of internationalism. Additionally, Abe places emphasis on upholding or safeguarding the rule of law, maritime trade routes and so forth, while also promoting regional development, where both are considered as related to, and premised upon, PPS.

Abe also links PP with the continuance of the “journey as a peace state” which relates to One Country Pacifism as they both propound peace following the horrors of the Asia-Pacific War. In terms of what issues are they that PP is attempting to address, ‘expectations/support from partners/the ‘world” comprise the largest group amounting to approximately 19 per cent of all categories, and closely followed by ‘world change/interdependencies’ which amounts to 18 per cent. ‘World change’ refers to claims that the “security environment is becoming more treacherous”, claims of increased interdependence with state partners such as “we cannot protect peace alone”, “world interdependence is increasing”, among others. Both categories convey a commitment of Japan as a collective towards engagement in international affairs. In terms of specified threats, the most commonly discussed were the Syrian crisis and the use of chemical weapons, and Iran’s nuclear program; not the North Korean weapon’s program or Chinese activity on the East China Sea and South China Sea (though both were mentioned, but not over the threshold of five times).

Rather, PP reaffirms the inclusion of Japanese ‘proactive’ diplomacy in response to global hostilities and security threats strongly condemned by the leaders of nations of the G7 and ‘Western powers’, led by the US and including Japan (ElBaradei 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2016). Notably, the ‘West’ or ‘Western powers’, as a subject category, is somewhat problematic with scholars stating that it is both a subjective construction and by, but not limited to, its own logic, oppressive (Coronil 1996; Dabashi 2001). However, it need no concrete definition here. Rather, it might be understood as states comprising predominantly of the US and other allied members of the G7, formerly the G8 with Russia currently suspended, which “essentially preserves the right of the powerful [...] to take decisions on behalf of and without consulting the rest of the world” (Dobson 2007: 30).

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83 The ‘West’ can include Japan depending on what it is that it describes. For instance, it may depict ‘imperialist nations’ that support the status quo in the IPE (wa Thiong’o 1993: 110). However, how power-relations internal and external to this subject category are internalized in domestic society can at the same time reflect complex depictions of subalternity (Miyake 2012).
Further, it links in with claims that being ‘introverted’ or ‘inward-looking’ (uchimuki) either among Japanese people or of Japanese (one country) pacifism, vitiating Japanese efforts to realize PPS. For example, Abe states that:

To sum up, Japan is a country which, in the regional and global security framework where the US plays a leading role, must not be the weak link that determines the strength of the chain. Japan is one of the world’s most matured democracies and so must be a net contributor to world welfare and security. And Japan will become such a country. Japan will become a country that contributes to regional and world peace and stability more proactively than before. Ladies and gentleman, I am determined to make the country I love a positive pacifist country. I am now aware that my historical mission is to first revitalize Japan and to encourage Japanese people to become more positive and thereby prompting them to be proud bearers of the flag for ‘positive pacifism.’

(Abe 25 September 2013)

Both comments appear to reduce Japanese traditional antimilitarist pacifism as a stance or manner that is now outdated in the world, both stressing that Japan and/or citizens have become too inward-looking or ‘introverted’, to which the suitable response to ‘modern’ times is to become more forward-looking, extroverted or ‘positive’ (maemuki). Further, while comment on Japan’s peace-state journey points out that changes to the nation’s long-term pacifism are necessary, the nature of the change is compatible with Japan’s postwar identity as a peace-state and how it is upheld in the constitution. Put simply, rather than changing what Japan is—or rather, how Japan is viewed—the issue of Japan’s security agenda is depoliticized with PP simply a natural response or a necessary step in a changing world for a peace-state to take. By extension, then, being ‘introverted’ is a dated attitude that ‘action’, or rather, engagement in international affairs, and not passive introversion, can remedy.

As alluded to above, pacifism can relate here to economic issues owing to the link between prosperity and economic well-being in general, and the link between prosperity to peace and stability, in Abe’s speeches. Here, also, discourse surrounding ‘introversion’ or being ‘inward-looking’ does not relate solely to discussions on ‘One Country Pacifism’ explicitly. For example, Abe discusses PP in terms of economics and education, as one of the same thing, below:

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84 Abe uses the term ‘maemuki’ which can be translated as ‘positive’, ‘proactive’ or ‘forward-looking’ which may be seen to offer an interesting contrast between encouraging citizens to be ‘forward-facing’ as a ‘historical mission’, while also linking to PP.
If we say that deflation has made Japan downcast and prone to be inward-looking, then now as we once again lift our heads up and set off towards growth, we entrust our mettle which shoulders [our] security, and supports world prosperity and stability, to the banner of “positive pacifism”. Working together with nations who share our interests and values, we will protect and cultivate the international public goods ranging from space and cyberspace to the skies and the seas, which are all indispensable to make the world a happy and prosperous place. In order to do so, I would like for us to exhibit all possible wisdom and capabilities. The “positive pacifism” that I am talking about has within it such a meaning. Nothing would please me more than for Abenomics to cultivate the young to gladly bear this [ethic]. Like the sparkly-eyed young people I saw in Mozambique, a new generation of Japanese people who gladly strive for world peace, prosperity, and security in a bright, polite and steadfast manner. It is cultivating this new generation of young people that is our politicians of Japan’s responsibility. This is exactly why Abenomics must succeed.

(Abe 17 April 2014)

This ‘pacifism’, then, incorporates the principal of anti-war as a reason to ensure or enforce ‘stability’ in or proximate to a region of particular importance to Japan and allies, chief among them the US, such maritime trade routes. This distinction is legitimated chiefly due to ‘changing times’ and ‘support/expectations’ from the interdependent allies of the Japanese state, which as discussed in §7, depoliticizes the argument.

That is, despite the supposition of ‘world change’, the idea of the continuance of Japanese state-identity or its ‘peace-state journey’ is not in stark contrast to discussions of a ‘new (generation of) Japanese’ or ‘new flag’ for the state and its citizens. Rather, because times have changed, the change in pacifism is a natural one which means that a new approach—or a new culture signified by discussions over a ‘new Japanese’ or flag and so forth—are a necessary response to ensure the survival of old principles. While notions of ‘introversion’ are also used to back economic reform (§7), as Abe himself explains, such a view is ostensibly based on a philosophical distinction between optimism and passivism:

Finally, I would like to wrap up this address by introducing the words of French philosopher, Alain85. The words: “Pessimism comes from the temperament, optimism from the will”86. I am determined,

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85 Emile-Auguste Chartier. Alain was his pseudonym.
86 “Le pessimisme est d’humeur, l’optimisme est de volonté” from Alain’s “Propos sur le bonheur” (1928: 195), on the art of being happy. In the subsequent Abe administration, Abe would use this quote again as chair of the G7 to argue in favour of discussion among member states and its respective business associates ostensibly towards a Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the TPP and “making Japan’s abenomics, world abenomics”
with all you [SDF] members leading the vanguard, to resolutely protect citizens’ lives and assets and our country’s land, seas and skies. With both of us together, I am confident that we can always hold fast. To give this conviction foundation, through the power of the will, I assuredly will implement the rebuilding of our country’s security policy.

(Abe 12 September 2013)

The assertion, then, is that Japanese pacifism and hence its security policy is too ‘introverted’, referring to One Country Pacifism or its effects on the state’s current security policy. However, changing the situation amounts to actions of the will, while a lack of activity, for example opposition to reform, is “of the temperament” (French: *d’humeur*; Japanese: *kibun-ni yoru*) – or rather, due to the wrong attitude. The depoliticizing rhetoric here of course obscures and hence delegitimizes any agency that disagrees with such a conviction by substituting political arguments with arguments on character and disposition. Also, the assertion that the introverted pacifism of antimilitarism must change is backed up by phrases such as “no country can any longer protect its peace and safety alone” (Abe 6 May 2014)87. This can be seen to contribute to the use of internationalism since cooperation with allies is considered necessary for the ‘world’ and Japanese safety, while implicitly bolstering bilateralism with the US which is perceived to be the leader in the pursuit of world PPS. Also, this effectually delegitimizes claims that increased international engagement through the use of the SDF is not pacifist by undermining the fundamental tenets of antimilitarism with the labelling of such views as essentially outdated and hence unrealistic, another standard trope in political rhetoric (Sanders 2015:250-251). Further, it implies that attempts to resist a movement that the ‘world’ is in agreement with, that many countries are expecting and dependent upon, and where a response is required in times of heightened security risk, is dangerously introverted, or for a nation-state isolationist88.

Finally, in terms of how to instrumentalize PP, the three largest categories denote general contributions to international affairs, action regarding state legislation and strengthening ties with allies, at roughly 23 per cent, 20 per cent, and 19 per cent of all categories, respectively. These were often used in combination with one another, with ‘contribute to international affairs’, ‘changes to

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87 Such phraseology has persisted in the following Abe administration (Abe 14 May 2015).
88 This is very much in tandem with the assessment of the media use of the metaphor ‘nuclear allergy’ where discourse was changed to reflect the idea that the attitudes of Japanese citizens are abnormal from the rest of the ‘world’ concerning the issue of nuclear technologies (Hook 1984).
domestic legislation’ and ‘strengthen ties with partners’ comprising approximately 57 per cent, 51 per cent, and 47 per cent of all instantiations, respectively. Again, this is concordant with the findings from the analysis above; that is, general contributions to international society are emphasized to a large degree as well as strengthening ties with partners. Simultaneously, changes to or implementation of domestic policy is emphasized, particularly concerning security legislation or the constitution and relates to ‘CSD/interpretation of the constitution’ in the problem category. Ostensibly, while PP requires international engagement, it also requires action to be taken concerning domestic legislations for it to have full effect.

However, it might be argued that in the name of pacifism, the allies with whom the Abe administration is ostensibly seeking to strengthen ties the most do not appear to be the states which pose the greatest threat to the Japanese state. Rather, the largest subcategories include the EU, individual EU states (including the UK) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as ASEAN and the US. This trend likely reflects Abe’s emphasis on a regional community in the Asia-Pacific with the Japan-US alliance at the centre and hence with emphasis on building stronger ties with US allies within the EU (McCormack 2012). In contrast to the Hatoyama administration that sought to build a regional community on a Japan-China axis, such a notion includes building alliances with India and Australia, among other states, so as to partially encircle China, and exclude it from the regional community (McCormack 2012; §3.3.3). For instance, in 2016, Japan, the US and India participated in a trilateral joint maritime military exercise in southwest India following on from the Japan-India leaders’ summit in December the previous year and September 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014b; 2015c; Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 7 June 2016). Further, in a joint statement both leaders heralded the “Japan-India Strategic Global Partnership” and later the “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014b; 2015c), supporting PPS and upholding the “rule of law”89 in the Indo-Pacific region.

Six days later from the leaders’ summit in December 2015, Abe held a joint summit with Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull following on from his visit to Australia to give a speech to the Australian Parliament on 8 July 2014, where both prime ministers “welcomed” more cooperation between each other, the US and India concerning issues on the South China Sea, East China Sea, and North Korea, and strengthening economic ties through a Japan-Australia EPA and the TPP (Abe 8 July 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2015c). Since then, Japan and Australia

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89 Though not stated directly, the ‘rule of law’ in Abe’s political rhetoric is used to challenge, among other things, China, specifically regarding its activities concerning its territorial disputes with other states, including Japan by ‘othering’ (§2). Debates typically concern the legal validity of territorial and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) claims under the United Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
carried out a joint military exercise off the coast of Sydney (Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 9 March 2016).

Overall, the running theme within Theme B can be summarized as follows: there is expectation and support on Japan among members of the ‘international society’ to respond to the effects of world change. As is argued in §7 and §8, Abe’s use of ‘world change’ is to depoliticize issues. Here, not facing up to the task is the wrong attitude. The right attitude, established from a political praxis based on depictions of probity to the ‘world’, is proactivity and action; most particularly, it involves increasing ties with other states and institutions that share the state’s values and which are conducive to the mutual benefits of PPS in the world and Japan.

This has been a major conservative argument from the end of the Cold War but with a significant difference to the one described here. That is, this argument was linked to Japan being an honorable member of international society, highlighting how the preamble to the constitution, rather than Article 9, should be emphasized in the ‘changing’, or multipolarizing (§8), world. Through international society, Japan would become a ‘normal nation’ by playing a more proactive role as a peace-state through the UN in accordance with the preamble of the constitution. Within such a view there was no need to revise the constitution, just reinterpret it by focusing on the preamble rather than Article 9. However, PM Abe frequently prioritizes relations with the US rather than the UN by emphasizing the importance of the US-Japan treaty system (nichibei anpo jōyaku taisei), the lead role the US plays for world PPS, and strengthening ties with US allies, with the US as the foundation. In doing so, discourse surrounding PP relies heavily on bilateralism with the US by portraying the US as an altruistic ‘contributor’ to the values that underpin internationalist norms, so as to put forward a foreign policy that aims to empower the Japanese state’s military and economic capabilities through the Japan-US alliance and access to the material benefits that it brings, such as input in the formation of regional-cum-global politico-economic frameworks (§8). Here, the nature of pacifism is transposed from its initial emphasis on no combat to avoid Japan re-experiencing the traumas of war, towards the idea of ensuring stability in the world whether through the UN or through key allies, i.e. allies of the US, with the US as base, for everyone’s sake, including Japan’s.

In sum, we may answer the research questions as follows:

1) What is the purpose/goal? Mostly, world or regional PPS or to safeguard trade routes.

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90 This is of course in not to suggest that Abe does not mention the UN or international society. Rather, the US is often mentioned within the same context, demonstrating the importance he attaches to the US for maintaining the regional/global order.
2) What is it a response to? Mostly either world change or expectations/support from (interdependent) international partners.

3) How is it instrumentalized? Mostly, by general international contributions or strengthening ties. However, it may be conducted by changing national legislations, mostly to national security.

6.3 ‘State and Policy’

This section examines the usage of keywords from the final theme identified in §5. The keywords are ‘diplomacy’ (gaikō) and ‘security’ (anzenhoshō). The former is analyzed in §6.3.1 and the latter in §6.3.2, where a conclusion to the overall results of analysis for this theme is also carried out.

6.3.1 ‘Diplomacy’

This section provides the analysis for all 142 instantiations of the keyword ‘diplomacy’. To analyze effectively the keyword, the following questions were formulated:

1) Whose diplomacy?
2) What is the issue surrounding it?
3) What is the response/solution?

The results of the analysis are tabulated and given below. The tables are formulated as above. First, Table 6.3.1i demonstrates the most frequent patterns of usage of the keyword in the dataset, below.
Table 6.3.1i: Categories with frequencies per instantiation for the keyword: Diplomacy.  
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories for Keyword: Diplomacy (N=142)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We/Our Country/Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I/Abe/Government of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign State</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most cases, diplomacy is that of Japan’s, while most issues are referred to as ‘various problems’. This is because on occasion, Abe would state that the nation is facing a panoply of crises and proceed to list them. The number in parentheses for the category denotes the number of occasions Abe alluded to the view that Japan faces various problems, while the number for each subcategory denotes the number of times altogether—that is either separately or as part of Abe’s listing of problems—that they were mentioned. These typically included threats to citizens’ lives and national territory, damage to the Japanese economy and social security system, ineffective IR, decline in standards of education, slow recovery following 3.11, and weakening of governance owing to previous administrations. Of these, conflicts that ostensibly pose an existential threat to Japanese civilian lives, poor economy and ineffective diplomacy were the most common, comprising 47 per
cent, 37 per cent and 34 per cent of all keyword instantiations, respectively. However, ‘general’ issues were also fairly frequent with endeavours for PPS and securing national interests constituting 31 per cent and 19 per cent of all keyword instantiations.

Further, the response to these issues typically favoured further integration with international partners, which amounted to approximately 72 per cent of all keyword instantiations and where among partners, the US comprised the largest subcategory at 38 per cent of all references, and over half if taken together with ‘countries that share our values’, of which the US is implicit. This strikes a stark comparison to the UN, which comprises only 6 per cent of references, less than the G7 or G8, hinting at a larger emphasis for bilateralism with the US, as opposed to internationalism through the UN. Additionally, changes to domestic policy are also frequently heralded as solutions. Of these, changes to security legislation or the constitution amount to approximately 23 per cent of all instantiations, while changes to economic legislation amount to roughly 10 per cent of all instantiations, 15 per cent when taken together with calls for the TPP. Finally, calls for a new kind or specialist diplomacy such as “diplomacy that overlooks the globe” (chikyū-gi-o fukansuru gaikō), “economic diplomacy” (keizai gaikō) or PP comprise 41 per cent of all keyword instantiations, indicating the emphasis Abe places on establishing an assertive, effective foreign policy (as, presumably, opposed to previous administrations).

With this, Table 6.3.1ii presents the most prominent responses for the top five issues/problems when diplomacy refers explicitly to that of Japan, below.

Table 6.3.1ii: The response for the top five issues/problems for ‘Diplomacy’ when the possessor is ‘We/Our Country/Japan’.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most prominent response for top 5 issues/problems</th>
<th>Possessor: We/Our Country/Japan; Keyword: Diplomacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Top 5 issues/problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen ties: N=78</td>
<td>Various: ‘Conflicts’: N=56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States*: N=27</td>
<td>Various: ‘Economy’ : N=46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East*: N=16</td>
<td>Various: ‘Diplomacy’: N=40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General (e.g. “countries that share our values”)*: N=14</td>
<td>General: ‘(need for) PPS’: N=27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic policy: N=58 (+9)</td>
<td>General: “national interests”: N=25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security legislation/constitution*: N=30 (+4)</td>
<td>36 (+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic legislation/Budget (+TPP)*: N=13 (+5)</td>
<td>21 (+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political legislation/Ministerial appointments*: N=8</td>
<td>24 (+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of diplomacy/PP: N=45</td>
<td>12 (+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vague action/Unclear: N=20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: N=7</td>
<td>10 2 20 23 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

172
Here, the subcategory ‘conflicts’ is the most frequent issue surrounding Japanese diplomacy, followed by ‘economy’ and then ineffective ‘diplomacy’. A number of insights are derived from this table. For instance, for issues concerning ‘conflicts’ or ‘diplomacy’, when the response is to strengthen ties, the US is the predominant partner of the Abe administration, while for issues concerning the ‘economy’, it is not the US per se but also the Middle East. That is, despite that the locality of many ostensible threats to international society is perceived to be within the Middle Eastern region, the solution is not to integrate with states there per se but more frequently to integrate with the US.

Further, while less concrete issues such as the need to attain/secure ‘PPS’ or ‘national interests’ are more prominently ascribed an international solution, issues concerning (international) conflicts and diplomacy, as well as Japan’s national economy, comprise a relatively even mix, suggesting changes to national legislations to respond to international issues. Moreover, the category ‘various’ problems hints at evidence of securitizing moves in Abe’s discourse by, for instance, listing issues that are seen to face the country and that without suitable response would leave the nation in crisis. An example of this is provided below:

As PM, I would like to demonstrate my determination to protect citizens’ lives, land and the beautiful seas. Now, even in this very instance, off the coast of the Senkaku Islands, the Japan Coast Guard and Self-Defense Force are protecting Japan’s skies and seas. Japan’s security is not someone else’s problem, it, right now, is in crisis. I have newly established the ‘Chief Minister for Strengthening National Security’. With the establishment of the National Security Council as control tower, all the Cabinet will work towards strengthening the diplomacy and security system [of Japan].

At present, children’s lives and futures are in a state of crisis. Regenerating education which is bordering on crisis owing to many problems such as bullying and the reduction in academic achievement, is the responsibility of politics. In the previous Abe administration, we amended the Fundamental Law of Education. We will proceed with more concrete reform such as creating a framework where the country as the party ultimately responsible for public education can fulfill its responsibility under the Fundamental Law of Education. We will cultivate in the children a world leading academic level and normative consciousness, and an attitude that respects history and culture.

(Abe 26 December 2012, my emphasis)

Though Abe does not specifically refer to ‘various problems’ in the citation above, the transition from what are described as existential threats to national sovereignty to the “crisis” of education,
demonstrates the securitizing rhetoric of Abe’s speeches, with in the first paragraph ostensible threats to citizens’ lives and in the second, threats to the lives of the children. As explained in §3, this is considered a form of depoliticization.

In terms of diplomacy itself, Abe frequently recommends the development of diplomacy, often packaged as technically specialist renditions with “economic diplomacy” or “assertive diplomacy” (shuchō-suru gaikō)91 or PP, the administration’s ‘proactive’ foreign policy, as means to overcome a range of issues, not limited to issues of ‘conflict’ alone. For instance, 96 per cent of times Abe refers to ‘national interests’ as an issue, the development of diplomacy is a solution, demonstrating the link Abe makes between national conditions and IR. Further, though the values are small, 63 per cent of times Abe discusses securing ‘PPS’ as an issue, the development of diplomacy or PP is a solution, while for issues of the national economy, it is 43 per cent. The point is, then, whether stated as a matter-of-fact or not, Abe constructs a narrative in his speeches that point to a weakened diplomacy, which is connected to politico-economic issues in Japan such as continued deflation, its effect of public finance and related social services, as well as to national security threats and so forth. By way of solution, developing diplomacy or further integrating with international partners, when taken together, is the most frequent proposal. The implicit suggestion is that returning diplomatic power is related to economic power and the power to overcome national security threats. The applicability of diplomacy here whether for economic growth or national or international security feeds into the overriding message of Abe’s speeches; that is, whether for economics or for security reasons, Japan must ‘internationalize’, and an effective, specialist diplomacy is a means to achieve this.

Overall, then, we may answer the research questions as follows:

2) What is the issue surrounding it? – Mostly ‘various problems’ and of these, mostly pertaining to ‘conflicts’ or the economy.
3) What is the response? – Mostly, to further integrate with international partners or, more generally, to develop diplomacy, as well as change national legislations.

Accordingly, the following section analyses the final keyword of the theme ‘State and Policy’.

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91 As opposed to Japan’s more traditional “quiet diplomacy” (Hook et al. 2012).
6.3.2 ‘Security’

This final subsection examines the keyword 'Security' (anzenhoshō). The following questions were derived from ‘securitization theory’ by asking:

1) Who is at risk/under threat?
2) What is the risk/threat?
3) What is the response?

‘Risk’ is incorporated alongside ‘threat’ despite its comparatively fuzzier conception and more reflexive usage (Williamson 2014a: 183) to provide more insight into the use of the keyword. This is not to suggest that examples of ‘securitizing moves’ are limited only to the use of the term ‘security’ (§7), which is, of course, not the case. However, to address the keyword, it is assumed that ‘security’ exists or is recommended because there is a need for it and hence dangers, risks and threats as well as agency whose safety they would imperil.

As above, the results of these questions are tabulated. Firstly, the overall categories for the keyword are provided below in Table 6.3.2i, followed by Table 6.3.2ii, which provides a more in-depth analysis of the main possessor categories and responses.
Table 6.3.2i: Categories with frequencies per instantiation for the keyword: Security.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories for Keyword: Security (N=150)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese lives/people*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (General)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese territory/sovereignty*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World/Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World (General)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable Groups (Women/Children/NGO Workers)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific/East Asia**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstated/Unclear**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstated/Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficiencies in the Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence/Conflict/War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe Administration/Ministerial Appointments/Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Trade Routes/International Commons (Rule of Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundament Law of Education/Education Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, Japan is the largest entity at risk or under threat, while within this category, Japanese lives/people and general references to the Japanese nation or state comprise the largest subcategories. Further, the ‘world’ or a given geopolitical region are also portrayed as at risk or under threat. The danger itself is most frequently ‘world change’ which comprises general references to ‘world change’ denoting increased interdependency of states and a more treacherous security climate, as well as references to TENB, as discussed above. Further, ‘insufficiencies in the law’ refer to discussions over the so-called “grey zones” (gurēzōn) in the law that purportedly jeopardize Japanese national security, such as the constitution or other state legislations. ‘Various national problems’ comprises another relatively frequent category which, as above, denotes national issues which Abe often lists as part of his speech and where the number in the parentheses denotes the number of occasions Abe listed them as such.
For the response, Abe routinely discussed diplomacy and security in conjunction with one another, including sometimes PP, and so these were collated into the category ‘Diplomacy/Security’ which is the most frequent and where changes to ‘security laws’ comprises the largest subcategory therein. Additionally, and in correspondence with numerous other keywords, Abe frequently recommends strengthening or broadening ties with international partners, with the US the most frequent subcategory amounting to 23 per cent of all instantiations and 29 per cent of all instantiations when taken together with NATO. This greatly outnumbers references to the UN, demonstrating the emphasis Abe places on bilateralism with the US, albeit often in the name of internationalism and proactive diplomacy (§7). Further, ‘international contribution’, which denotes general references to international commitments (often to PPS) and financial support such as ODA, and the SDF comprise two other relatively frequent categories, amounting to 27 per cent and 23 per cent of all instantiations respectively.

To further examine these patterns of usage, Table 6.3.2ii provides the five most common responses alongside the most commonly related risks/threats when the possessor category is either ‘Japan’ (J) or ‘World/Region’ (WR), below.

92 ‘Development of diplomacy’ and PP were places into separate subcategories as PP often related to both diplomacy and security changes. It is the Abe administration’s foreign policy; however, Abe would make security changes and discuss them as representative of PP. When taken together ‘development of diplomacy’ and PP was amounted to 40 per cent of instantiations.
Table 6.3.2ii frequency of the top 5 responses for the most common threats/risks per instantiation of the keyword 'Security'.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most prominent threat/risks for top 5 responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possessor: J='Japan' (N=113), WR='World/Region' (N=90); Keyword: Security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What threat/risk?</th>
<th>Top 5 Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dip-Sec:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'Security Laws' (J:90; 54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Change (J:63; WR:50)</td>
<td>[J:54; WR:39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Change (general)* (J:55; WR:38)</td>
<td>[J:46; WR:27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENB* (J:29; WR:30)</td>
<td>[J:28; WR:12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign State (J:38; WR:29)</td>
<td>[J:33; WR:21]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC* (J:15; WR:5)</td>
<td>[J:15; WR:5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other* (J:11; WR:5)</td>
<td>[J:11; WR:5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various National Problems (J:28(+5); WR:13)</td>
<td>[J:14(+3); WR:2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Economy* (J:24; WR:9)</td>
<td>[J:12; WR:0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy/Security* (J:9; WR:4)</td>
<td>[J:3; WR:2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstated/Undear (J:12; WR:18)</td>
<td>[J:10; WR:10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (J:9; WR:6)</td>
<td>[J:5; WR:4]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World change, the most common risk/threat, is a danger to both Japan, its people and the world, where the two most frequent solutions are changing or implementing Japanese ‘security laws’ as well as the ‘SDF’, demonstrating how Abe attempts to legitimate the operationalization of the SDF to respond to international affairs. Namely, as with the Hata administration twenty years before unsuccessfully seeking constitutional reinterpretation to allow for CSD on the grounds of ‘world change’ post-Cold War (§3), Abe repeatedly signifies ‘world change’ as a reason to draft new legislations connected to altering Japan’s security agenda including the constitution, whether the risk is to Japan, the world or a region, or both categories. This is compounded by the category ‘insufficiencies in the law’, which constitutes another risk/threat, though this time more prominently to Japan as opposed to the ‘world’. Here, “grey zones” in Japan’s laws must be addressed through the enactment of security laws. As Abe states below:

That is today’s grey zones; for example, is it truly alright that were the SDF attacked within collective security or while carrying out peace keeping operations, they would be helped by the troops of other countries working with them, but were roles reversed, the SDF would not help others? Alternatively, is it okay that were people working for an NGO to come into danger, the SDF could not protect them? Additionally, I was informed by a number of US officials that the US military or the US would carry out its duty towards Japan in accordance with Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, to defend
Japan. However, I was told that they would like me to earnestly consider whether, were US vessels on patrol to protect Japan attacked and Japan’s SDF vessels nearby who could protect it did not rescue the vessel or did not take any measures to protect it, would US citizens’ trust in Japan or [their] volition to work together to protect Japan continue?

(Abe 1 July 2014)

Here, “grey zones” relate to conditions of fairness, where Japan’s current security legislation are clearly slanted towards the Japanese state and not its allies in the international community. Further, the cost of this unfair situation is that it jeopardizes the longevity of Japan’s relationship with the US, with the implicit sequitur being that it poses a risk to Japanese security also. Not only do “grey zones” in the law imperil Japanese lives and NGO workers abroad whether Japanese or otherwise, but also potentially the Japan-US alliance, considered to be the cornerstone to Japan’s postwar security agenda (Hook et al. 2012). While this is a demonstration of the influence of the norm of bilateralism with the US embedded within Japanese domestic society, it also points to the contradictions in Japan’s security agenda discussed in §3. That is, is it possible to follow the traditional interpretation of the constitution and maintain the US-Japan Security Treaty? The view provided by Abe is that it is not. Why? Because the world has changed. Though not provided in the tables above, Abe, in amongst this, routinely describes action as tantamount to ‘facing reality’. For example, Abe comments:

During the Koizumi administration, the Diet enacted the so-called ‘Emergency Legislation’93 and the ‘Civil Protection Law’94; at the time, I was Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary. At that time, we faced the reality that there are inadequacies in the law which aim to protect Japan’s independence and Japanese lives, amidst even the passing of the sixtieth year postwar.

(Abe 1 July 2014)

Additionally, Abe provides a number of definitions of what this ‘reality’ is, three of which are provided below:

[The SDF], on location, even in this very instance, are facing “reality”. We also must not avert our eyes from this “reality” because the security environment is becoming increasingly severe. I will proceed with the reshaping of [our] foreign and security policies that squarely faces “reality.”

93 “yūji hōsei”
94 “kokumin hogo hō”
Here, the ‘reality’ is that the security environment is changing which imperils national security and hence averting one’s eyes from this fact endangers the nation. The nature of this change is described in more detail in the following quotations below:

Of course, it is not just the threat of large-scale disasters. The development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by North Korea. Provocations against our country’s sovereignty. The security environment surrounding Japan is increasing in severity. This is “reality”.

Even within this “reality”, we will resolutely protect to the end citizen’s lives and assets, our country’s land, seas, and skies. Also, we will contribute to world peace and stability.

The changing security environment is understood, here, in terms of severity as opposed to nature. That is, the development of sophisticated weaponry by the DPRK and “[p]rovocations against our country’s sovereignty”, implicitly referring to the PRC’s activities on the East China Sea and South China Sea. Both threats pose a threat to Japan whether in terms of sovereignty or to the lives and assets of its citizens. However, ‘reality’ also takes on a far more intangible definition, as demonstrated below.

The world is drastically changing. In such a period, there is no guarantee that what was common sense up to yesterday will be correct tomorrow also. We cannot avert our eyes from “reality”. Whether economy or diplomacy and security, we can only break through walls with our own strength and proceed onwards.

Reality, here, is simply that the world is changing and that common sense, and implicitly traditional approaches to economics, diplomacy and security, simply do not apply any longer, and with the metaphorical comparison of this as a ‘wall’, are portrayed as barriers obstructing the Abe administration or Japan’s path towards responding in time. However defined, rhetoric on what is now ‘reality’ is a component of a narrative of risk surrounding Japan’s security agenda, asserting that there are increasing risks and threats to Japanese national security which require a response. Not responding is to avert one’s eyes to this reality and hence, by extension, Japan’s contemporaneous
security agenda is unrealistic because of changes in the world. While, again, this points to discursive depoliticization.

Although 'world change' is the most frequent category for both Japan and 'World/Region', the conduct of foreign states also constitutes a large category, with the DPRK and PRC the two largest cases. That is, the DPRK and PRC, where specified, are principally responsible to threats to Japanese sovereignty and Japanese lives where for both states, the most common response is through changes to/implementation of security laws, as opposed to (though not completely excluding) the development of diplomacy. That is, the development of diplomacy when the issue is the DPRK is not an uncommon response, though nonetheless outnumbered by the ‘security laws’ category. However, particularly concerning the PRC, this reflects the assessment that the Abe administration is contributing to the emergence of a new system of governance in Japan which involves strengthening the SDF and Japan's alliance with the US through a risk-management approach to governance which increasingly views, for example, the China territorial problem “through the lens of a military rather than a diplomatic response to the China risk” (Hook 2014a: 18). Concrete examples of this may be seen in the establishment of the National Security Council, the State Secrecy Act, and the reinterpretation of the constitution which ostensibly aim to mitigate risk by empowering the state and the military (Hook 2014a: 17-18).

Overall, we may answer the above questions as follows:

1) Who is at risk/under threat? Mostly Japan, but also the ‘world’ or a given geopolitical region.
2) What is the risk/threat? Risks and threats are predominantly the result of world change or the conduct of a foreign state, mostly the DPRK and the PRC.
3) What is the response? The response predominantly is to enact changes to Japan’s security legislations, to strengthen relations with international partners, most prominently the US, or otherwise to make international contributions to mitigate against risks and threats.

With this, the thesis now turns to the conclusion of the chapter, provided in §6.4, below.

95 When collated together, ‘development of diplomacy’ and ‘PP’ amount to 15 for both the ‘Japan’ and ‘World/Region’ categories when the issue is the DPRK, and stay at 5 when the issue is the PRC.
6.4 Conclusion

The standout message is that Japan must ‘internationalize’. To do so, Japan must overcome its own exceptionalism which is outdated. More specifically, to ‘internationalize’ is to develop economic and security ties with international allies to overcome the ostensible deterioration of the economy and national security. For ‘security’ in the traditional sense, this chiefly denotes operationalizing the SDF with a ‘proactive’ foreign policy to expand Japan’s role in international society, if not through the UN, then the G7 and most prominently, with the US. For economics, it means attracting investment into Japan and seeking investment opportunities through EPAs. In amongst this, however, what is an economic issue and what is a security issue is not always clear, which potentially points towards legitimating an increased security role as an answer to economic questions, such as the SDF securing strategically important trade routes. Further, it implies economy answers over security issues such as TPP negotiations to better influence regional rules of trade amidst ongoing territorial disputes amongst trading partners. To note, this position was only further cemented following the Obama administration’s attempts to fast track the agreement shortly after the PRC’s announcement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Olorunnipa and Dornign 5 October 2015). As a means of legitimation, Abe frequently states that the world is or has changed such that Japan’s approach must change also. As is argued in §7 and §8, this is also an example of discursive depoliticization.

For Theme A, a key distinction is that Abe frequently casts his administration as protectors of Japanese lives, while keeping the enemy obscure. The topic is invariably what to do about these threats rather than why they exist in the first place. Abe identifies the role his administration has as protecting citizens from external dangers and improving their domestic conditions. Conversely, Japan itself is portrayed as responsible for regional commitments, rather than the Abe administration, per se. This is an implicit transferal of responsibility to the electorate, delegitimating potential claims against certain acts that are presented as conducive to PPS in the ‘world’, as it would renge on this international responsibility. This contrast between an intransigent ‘Japan’ against a ‘community’ of ‘respectable nations’ all in full concert towards the realization of implicitly held universal norms in PPS on many occasions implies that disagreement with the Abe administration is disagreement with the ‘world’ or otherwise could fatally damage alliances with normatively agreeable—and strategically significant—international allies such as the US.

In Theme B, one distinction is that Abe consistently draws links with international contributions to national benefit. The argument put forward is that Japanese commitment to international affairs is an ‘everybody wins’ scenario through which world/regional PPS implicitly
produces benefits for Japanese people also. Conversely, not contributing to security affairs or not achieving economic growth by linking with international partners or enacting neoliberal reforms to the national economy is a danger to the world owing to Japan’s economic size, implying a responsibility for Japanese citizens to the world to follow the Abe administration’s proposals. It is within this framework that the Abe administration’s foreign policy initiative, PP, is often discussed. In his assessment of PP, Abe most frequently conveys a sense of responsibility towards commitment to international affairs whether by suggesting the ‘world’ or international partners are supportive or in anticipation of PP, or more generally that it will create a better world. While this points to the norm of internationalism, throughout Abe frequently cites the US as central to Japanese state strategy—whether economic or security—often more than with concrete multilateral state institutions such as the UN, demonstrating the key importance within the Abe administration to bilateralism with the US. Further, such change is necessary because the world is changing and there is international expectation and support for Japan to commit to a response in keeping with international initiatives and attitudes. Opposition is not a political issue but due to the wrong attitude, while increasing ties and international commitments is conducive to PPS for the ‘world’ and Japan in a win-win dynamic. This repeated appeal to external legitimacy to make such changes is likely due to the deficit of internal legitimacy in Japan. That is, while in Japan some may view changes to Japan’s security agenda, such as reinterpreting the constitution to permit the state to exercise CSD, as a politicized issue, making a firm link to its external legitimacy—whether it is firmly established or otherwise—is a means to depoliticize the issue by calling Japan the exception and compounding the electorate to allow the state to act like a responsible member of international society for PPS, or, in other words, everyone. Thus, for instance, constitutional reinterpretation to allow the state to exercise CSD has been criticized in the Diet for increasing the risk that Japanese citizens will become embroiled in a foreign war (e.g. National Diet 02 October 2014), while the TPP has been criticized in the Diet for its secrecy and because it will lead to further market deregulation increasing social inequality (e.g. National Diet 25 November 2013; 6 February 2014). For both these issues, rather than damaging quality of life, the Abe administration’s proactive response to internationalized times is in fact the only means by which Japan can effectively respond, to the boon of Japanese and world PPS.

96 Of course, there are views that run counter to this. For example, there is the view that increasing integration between Japan and the US militarily may reduce Japan’s ability to prioritize its own security if it differs from the US.

97 The comments cited were, in the order provided above, from Yoshiki Yamashita, Kenshō Sasaki, and Kōtarō Tatsumi, all from the JCP.
For Theme C, a frequent message is the connection of diplomacy to the state’s ‘economic power’ and economic conditions in Japan such as long-term deflation and social services, and also to the ability to maintain national security, where the means to overcome this is in keeping with calls elsewhere to internationalize. Further, changes in the world are placing Japan in jeopardy alongside provocations by foreign states, chiefly the DPRK and, to a lesser extent, the PRC, the insufficiencies in the law abet these risks. The response is to overcome the “grey zones” in security laws, to operationalize the SDF and to integrate with international partners, most prominently the US, and make international contributions. Here, an ineffective diplomacy is considered to exacerbate unfavourable conditions within Japan such as long-term deflation or perceptions of a degradation in national security and hence an effective diplomacy, whether an “economic diplomacy”, “diplomacy that overlooks the globe”, “assertive diplomacy” or PP, meaning increased influence over international affairs is key to overcoming problems and anxieties at the national level. Additionally, the emphasis Abe places on world change enabled him to portray the hypocrisies in the syncretism between bilateralism with the US and antimilitarism that underpin the state’s security agenda, as inherently unrealistic. Here, change to Japan’s security legislations is a consistently frequent response to problems besetting the nation and the ‘world’, while integrating with international partners is another. Strengthening ties with the US routinely outnumbers calls for linking with the UN, demonstrating the emphasis the Abe administration places on bilateralism with the US, similar to previous LDP administrations (McCormack 2007), though often under the internationalist aegis of contributing to world PPS.

With the overall message that Japan must internationalize, the use of ‘Japan’ or references thereto as a subject category and intangible agents such as the ‘world’ or a given region is key to articulate the frame of international expectation or support versus domestic intransigence and absurd exceptionalism. Thus, the underlining assumption is that agreements made on the international level are indicative of an ‘international community’ of friendly actors in agreement with a consistent moral assessment, and hence depoliticizes issues. Exactly where and how far this ‘international community’ is connected to notions of the ‘world’ as used by Abe is uncertain. More concretely, what specifically they denote is unclear. That is, while the ‘world’ may be portrayed as largely in agreement with many of Abe’s proposals, elsewhere critical literature has problematized it as a subject category. For instance, in Anglo-American discourse, the ‘world’ has been criticized as being seen to reflect “the political class in Washington and London (and whoever happens to agree on specific matters)”, while the ‘international community’ refers to “the United States and whoever happens to agree with it” (Chomsky 2016b: 22-23/51). In terms of rhetoric, implying that the eyes of
the ‘world’ are on Japan is a means by which to isolate and delegitimize the position of those who object to certain changes. However, with Abe’s frequent emphasis on strengthening ties with the US, it is perhaps more accurate that the largest expectations are among chief policymakers of the G7 states, who preserve the right of the powerful to make decisions concerning (the rest of) the world (Dobson 2007: 30). A strategy to further integrate with G7 states (and their B7 conglomerates), particularly the US, then, is indicative of power ambitions of the Abe administration rather than, though at least according to HST not exclusive of, idealistic notions of securing PPS for the (entire) world. Through this lens, notions of proactive diplomacy and the enactment of the TPP may speak less of the heralded idealisms of PPS and universal norms symbolized by the UN and more to structural power as defined in §2 (see §8). That is, rather than ‘ensuring the rule of law’ for PPS and other norms, it is to ensure ‘a system that rules by law’.

While the implications of this are addressed in §8, the following chapter comprises the qualitative analysis of text using CDS to examine in more detail key areas of Abe’s speeches.

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98 It is noted elsewhere for example that the Eurocentric cartography of “the West” may be used as “the universal reference of the world” (Miyake 2010 in Miyake 2013).

99 This turn of phrase is taken from Sakwa’s (2009: 1) analysis of Vladimir Putin’s leadership as head of the Russian state.
7 CDS analysis

7.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the qualitative examination of text. One of the major patterns of usage derived from the keyword analysis was that Abe recommended that Japan ‘internationalize’ in security and economic domains. This was frequently argued to benefit the ‘world’ or a given geopolitical region and Japan. However, internationalization poses a dilemma for the Japanese state, and every other state in the world, which seeks to accrue and maintain power as forces of globalization weaken it (§8). In order to effectuate the necessary changes and remedies to the problems besetting the nation, it was often suggested that it is necessary to overcome outdated legislations, regulations, or outmoded thought and attitudes unrealistic in modern times.

Thus far, there has been no detailed micro-analysis of text that addresses the methods of depoliticization in Abe’s speeches discussed in §3. This chapter aims to provide this analysis. As discussed in §3, this thesis views semiosis as an element of the social process that is seen as the interplay between social structures, practices and events, comprising social reality (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2009: 164). While the previous analyses have sought to highlight key arguments within salient areas of speech and to facilitate the transition to the micro-analysis of text here, this section analyzes text from Abe’s speeches to discuss strategies of legitimation and delegitimation to complement the information provided in the previous analyses. To this end, the approach (see §3 and §4) is recapitulated briefly in §7.1, while the analysis itself is carried out in §7.2, and the chapter is summarized in §7.3.

7.1 Issue and approach

As stated in §3, depoliticization was selected as semiotic points of entry to the textual analysis. Further, as per the arguments provided in §3, depoliticization, including securitization theory, is considered to be a compatible tool for the textual analysis. Additionally, this analysis focusses on the use of certain metaphors as well as norms identified in Hook et al. (2012: 12); namely, bilateralism, multilateralism, Asianism, economism, and antimilitarism, as well as (neo-)nationalism (Özkirimli...
2010) (§4). These are utilized to support the analysis as the latter is often used to legitimate ideas and to internalize them into domestic society (Finnermore and Sikkink 1998) while the former is a useful means to appeal to the latter (e.g. Chilton 1996; Hook 1996a: 266; §2).

Five examples of each type of frame identified in §5 were randomly selected using a random number generator. The frames were used because they were largely separated through a formal taxonomy of sub-frame components, with one in particular denoting the topic of discussion. The keyword analysis in §6, though carried out in detail based on the text-mining analyses in §5, does not provide a clear delineation of areas based on subject matter. Thus, the employment of frame types allows the textual analysis here to potentially cover a range of issues as frames are demarcated on the basis of subject matter and to see any consistencies and inconsistencies regarding strategies of legitimation by Abe over a range of issues. However, given that the frames were labelled by SPSS using quantitative means on the basis of the ten-by-ten-line parameter set, there were occasions where frames within this parameter were present but alongside obvious topic shifts following them. Where this occurred, frames examples were shortened. Further, there were occasions where, despite the frame example ending, the speech itself ends or only changes topic obviously after several lines following the end of the parameter. Where a frame is truncated as such, the ending is added in the Appendices to provide a more detailed account and the cut-off point in the frame analysis is labelled. What is more, owing to the fact that the IS frame was the most prevalent, one frame example is analyzed in detail to further elucidate discursive patterns. This ‘key example’ was selected from the randomly identified frame examples based on size and detail in order to provide a detailed and holistic analysis.

The following section provides the analysis of text separated into four subsections for each frame-type identified in §5.

### 7.2 CDS analysis

This section contains the CDS analysis as described above. Five frames for each frame-type were randomly selected and the arguments from each frame examples are first schematically reconstructed (Fairclough 2009: 177). Due to limitations of space, these are provided in the Appendices where the excerpts of all frame examples analyzed here are also provided in Japanese.

This section is separated into four subsections, based on the frame-types identified in §5. These are §7.2.1 which focusses on the ‘International Security’ frame; §7.2.2 on the ‘National Security’ frame; §7.2.3 on the ‘International Relations and Economy’ frame; and §7.2.4 on the
7.2.1 International Security frame

All International Security (IS) frames are provided in Appendix 7. The frame examples are named IS.FE1, IS.FE2, IS.FE3, IS.FE4 and IS.FE5, respectively.

A major pattern is that Abe is portrayed as working diligently for the benefit of the Japanese populace and/or the ‘world’ or a region. Further, issues are not limited to the possibility of military conflict, but often issues such as the despatch of the SDF entail the protection of normative values as well as economic well-being. For example, the connection is frequently made that events in the world can have a deleterious effect on Japan and the livelihood of Japanese citizens. Also, Abe frequently points to international expectation or the need for Japan to contribute more to international affairs. Such conditions are constructed upon the assumption that ‘the world has changed’. Into this space, then, emerges PP as a solution. PP, a normative construction, is described metaphorically as a new “self-portrait” or a new “flag” for Japan in IS.FE2 and IS.FE4 or in IS.FE5 for “new Japanese”. Such metaphors serve to suggest and legitimate that, given the world has changed, traditional pacifism is no longer sustainable. Further, by acting proactively as a new marker on national identity, i.e. PP, Japan is able to safeguard its interests, whether in terms of human or economic safety, of the ‘world’, a region and Japan itself by safeguarding the normative qualities of PPS, however defined (§8).

Further attempts at legitimating the SDF operating abroad may be seen in the way that Abe describes them performing such tasks. Put simply, it is in glowing terms. The SDF are portrayed as “his pride” and “highly thought of in the world”, often braving inhospitable climates with the ‘world’ and Japan dependent upon them. This usually is proximate to the claim that ‘Japan’ must contribute more internationally, which works to conflate the two constructs of nation, as opposed to state, and the SDF. In other words, the SDF are seen to be emblematic of Japan’s commitment as a national collective, and so high praise for them is indirectly an external legitimacy for the nation, and by extension, an approval of its people. SDF endeavour is shown to reflect well on Japan in the ‘world’. Moreover, in IS.FE4, Abe refers to the SDF as “our SDF” (wagajieitai), further strengthening the connection between the SDF and citizens, despite of course that its existence in the framework of Japanese law is not sacrosanct.

Abe is the agent attempting to produce change while no domestic political opposition is construed. Where such opposition is realized, it is not given social agency, as in doubts over whether Abenomics can work in IS.FE3. Here, the verb ‘to say’ is passivized, obscuring any social agency, to
confirm that “it is said ‘the contents [of Abe’s growth strategy] is good but can it actually be realized?’” (Abe 19 September 2014). This hardly entails criticism alone, but resembles questions more along the lines of ‘is it not too ambitious to be feasible?’, ‘is it too good to be true?’ The task for Abe, then, is to confirm that it is possible. This is done by first suggesting that owing to globalization, economics and security are not separate issues and rhetorically asking whether we could really talk of an “evolved” “global economy” without security of the skies and sea lines of trade, and then promoting PP and proactive contributions to world peace.

Though seemingly a banal feature of such discourse, Abe’s use of metaphor in discussing economics depoliticizes issues by obscuring responsible social agencies and hence facilitating the naturalization of certain economic conditions. For example, the metaphorical use of the verb “evolved” relating to the “global economy” likely implies a sense of progress as well as evades any construal of a responsible social agency as actors operate in a system which develops naturally. To this end, Abe asserts that for Asia-Pacific PPS, he aims for Japan to contribute more to world peace under “the flag of positive pacifism” (Abe 19 September 2014). Thus, the evolution of the global economy is predicated on maintaining conditions conducive to globalization through the securing of trade routes. Essentially, then, Abe proposes a security answer to a question over economics. Further, it avoids the potential claim that current conditions of trade favour some states over others, which were that to be the case, would essentially undermine any system which fairly selects for traits based on ‘fitness’. But rather, by ensuring a “global economy”—implicitly an economy which benefits all—which has “evolved up to now”, Abe can be seen as proposing PP to maintain the conditions of fairness against elements—or stability—who might wish to jeopardize through belligerence the capability of the global economy to evolve or self-organize to realize PPS.

Additionally, Abe’s actions and position are consonant with the ostensible normative values of international society, however defined. The issues are social, economic and normative. In IS.FE2, for example, Abe puts forward PP for world peace and prosperity suggesting that a more proactive contribution in international affairs is conducive to Japan’s journey as a peace state. In other words,

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100 Evolution may be defined briefly as stochastic change in a population over a series of generations. It does not necessarily follow that such change is progress as it depends entirely on how one defines and measures ‘progress’ as a human value. Rather, through the mechanism of natural selection in a competitive system where fitness is measured by one’s ability to produce offspring, traits—whether genetically determined or culturally learned—which assist in the task of reproduction such as attracting a partner for anisogamous species and survivability are spread over a continual process of stochastic change in a population where the less-fit elements are unable to pass on their traits at the same rate and hence face extirpation over generations. In this sense the analogy evades the necessity for responsible social agency as the system is natural and hence not open to critical scrutiny, while actors are tasked only with maximizing their fitness which, again, is entirely natural.
Japan as a ‘peace state’ and member of international society, is obligated to ensure peace. This is not just for Japan but also the ‘world’. These two groups coalesce as the world has changed making people and states more interdependent. Thus, Japan too must change not by reneging on its principles, but by adapting them as that is the only way for such principles—namely pacifism and prosperity—to survive in this new climate. What follows then, is Abe’s solutions, which are displayed as inalienable and natural solutions to the problems besetting members within this ‘international community’. It is a narrative where the ‘world’ is in agreement with Abe’s solutions, meaning essentially that to oppose them is to stand against the ‘world’ and potentially run a huge risk to national and international safety, and prestige or respect.

Such discourse works effectively at depoliticizing the issues at hand by obscuring and delegitimizing political opposition. For instance, there are no comments on the risks that ‘proactive’ or ‘positive’ actions/interventions might bring to Japan. Moreover, there is the fallacy of division i.e. “when a general category has properties which are mistakenly attributed to each of its parts” (Fairclough 2009: 178). For instance, there is no mention as to who may benefit more from Japanese state remilitarization or more proactive international engagements; it is simply that Japan and elsewhere will benefit. There is little concrete discussion as to why, if the world is agreed, there are indeed any disagreements at all in the world. Similar to Fairclough’s (2009: 179) discussion on neo-liberal discourse, barring a few examples, the call for universal change is predicated upon an agentless phenomenon—i.e., ‘world change’—which calls on Japan, whether the state or the people, to change with it. Further, the actor category of international society or the ‘world’ is also problematic (§6). While Abe frequently asserts that Japan must strengthen relations with states and regions which share Japan’s values, it is not always digressed clearly who these actors are and whether they indeed do share values such as human rights, liberty and democracy. Without such critical engagement, Japan’s allies are portrayed as consecrated pioneers of such values and hence one may equate opposing aspects of internationalization with standing against such values, though often it is concerns for democracy and human safety that undergird opposition also (§3 and §8). Moreover, complex geopolitical security issues are boiled down to a normative decision between doing the communal thing for the common good or disappointing those who are reliant on you or those to whom you are connected either in obligation or normatively. In other words, it is depoliticized.

Despite Abe’s endorsement of PP as a solution to international security issues, Abe may be seen to emphasize the norm of internationalism and bilateralism with the US with Abe highlighting Japan’s contributions to the UN on the one hand but also suggesting that partnership with NATO is natural as its connects Europe and the US, on the other, in IS.FE2. Additionally, Abe elevates
developmentalism and economism to dissociate pacifism with its more traditional antimilitarist normative underpinnings. This is to say, true pacifism is proactive engagement, including that of the SDF, to ensure safety and economic prosperity. In this sense, pacifism is normatively recalibrated in attempts to delegitimate traditional antimilitarist norms by asserting effectively that they are outdated, and that for the new world, there must be a new pacifism. This claim is addressed in more detail below in the analysis of IS.FE5.

7.2.1.1 IS.FE5 – Fostering “new Japanese”
Abe attempts to transpose elements of national identity by influencing attitudes towards pacifism. Here, Abe defines the topic of discussion as to do with “the banner of positive pacifism” or “flag of positive pacifism” (Abe 30 May 2014). Conditions are then problematized as following positive examples of SDF efforts with regional state militaries, NGOs workers and UN staff who he describes as “friends”, Abe states that were these “friends” attacked, “our SDF” would not help them owing to the views of GOJ up to now. That is, in the technical sense, the SDF would not defend them specifically by fighting back, unless they themselves were attacked and then they would. Abe states that “our SDF could not go to help the civilians under attack” (30 May 2014), implying perhaps that they would do nothing at all or that the civilians would be completely reliant on the SDF and not other troops. The use of the possessive pronoun “our” to the SDF, following the linking together of UN and Japan under concomitant “flags”, conveys a commonality between agencies and a responsibility on the part of Japan as a collective, to back changes to its military capabilities that will not permit such an abrogation of responsibility towards its “friends” who are working for peace.

Here, the securitizing actor is Abe, the issue is that “friends” and peace are under threat from something due to a changing world and an—up to now—unchanging Japan. The solution is more commitment and CSD (and hence legislative/constitutional change). Abe also asserts his desire for Japan to “exert all efforts” “more” towards world peace as a nation that “bears a lot” for peace and stability in international society. However, this is construed rather than as a digression on Japan’s peace-state identity, as a natural continuance of it. Here, Abe states that Japan has “devotedly walked for many generations the single road to peace, without straying once. Many generations from hereon will walk it, unchanged” (Abe 30 May 2014) How? A new flag and a “new Japanese” identity.

This new identity is reinforced when, in line with internationalism, Abe lists a number of examples of Japanese women working abroad to improve the quality of life for people in the world, indicating compatibility with the ideals of the UN and that of the new approach from Japan, metaphorically represented as flags. After stating that Abenomics has been erroneously classified by
others as an economic policy, Abe claims it is in fact a “mission” to cultivate “new Japanese, who will bear the future” (Abe 30 May 2014), listing examples, and suggesting finally that PP is the “new banner” by which “new Japanese” may work together with regional neighbours for PPS out of their own volition and as their own responsibility. With this implicit self-responsibilization, a standard depoliticizing act (Jessop 2014), the new Japanese person possess a responsibility to the “stability of order” and Asia-Pacific peace. Further, Abe states that “our responsibility” to the next generation—who will also walk the road of peace—is to realize the economic growth potential of the Asia-Pacific, equating economic growth with peace, with the metaphor in the sentence prior stating “[i]n our future, the road to peace and prosperity stretches out wide [in front of us]” (Abe 30 May 2014).

Japan is described as being on a timeless journey down the “path to peace”. This new identity is necessitated by world change, and rather than diverging from this path, as a result of becoming “new Japanese”—i.e. harbouring a responsibility to engagement in the region—the “path to peace” widens to include those elements not formerly included in Japan’s previous approach to peace. Asianism, bilateralism and internationalism all emerge as Abe uses examples to evidence the historical and close relations Japan is described as having with Asian states, while also fixing the US as the foundation to this drive for PPS and, by extension, legitimating PP. The category ‘we’ and possessive pronoun ‘our’ in “our responsibility”, then, is problematic as new Japanese relates to Japan and Asia-Pacific with the US and the ‘world’. However, the interchangeability of ‘prosperity’ and ‘peace’, and more generally PPS, emphasizes the collective norm of economism and developmentalism while also downplaying antimilitarism. The speech ends emphasizing Japan and Asia’s need and commitment to the rule of law and that the rule of law is for ‘our benefit’ [lit. “us”], and states that peace and prosperity in Asia could be eternal.

For what, then, is apparently a nationwide social engineering project, there is no explicit construal of contemporaneous political opposition. Further, the semiotic construal of “new Japanese” conceptualizes an identity wherein commitment to humanitarian concerns in the Asia-Pacific region/the ‘world’, appears to determine whether one is a “new” Japanese or otherwise. However, this is an attempt at depoliticization because it “dedifferentiate[s] potentially antagonistic identities” (Fairclough 2009: 178). The question is how an ostensibly economic package creates “new Japanese” in the first place. Also, who determines whether someone is identified as such? The fact that it is an attempt to transpose national identity under the slogan of “new Japanese” and packaged under the

101 Of course, traditional ‘pacifism’ is not necessarily internalized to the Japanese state alone, while the view that the Japanese state cannot remilitarize but contributes personnel to a UN force is considered to benefit Japanese as well as non-Japanese (§8).
“banner” of Abe’s ‘proactive’ foreign policy in PP, suggests that membership is determined by whether these “new” people stand under the “new” banner that represents them or not, and hence the actions and policies that come with it, such as CSD. Thus, being a “new Japanese” depends on individual alignment to the current administration, and hence, while depoliticized, is an entirely political construction.

To further assess the strategies of legitimation, the analysis below moves on to the NS frame.

7.2.2 National Security frame

As before, all NS frames are provided in Appendix 7. These are NS.FE1, NS.FE2, NS.FE3, NS.FE4, and NS.FE5.

The NS frame places much more emphasis comparatively on the existential threat to citizen’s lives, and denotes securitizing moves. One prominent example is the claim that either the interlocutor or their children/grandchildren hypothetically face peril because the SDF cannot to come to the military aid of a US vessel transporting Japanese escapees of conflict, were it attacked outside of SDF jurisdiction, leaving them presumably to die. This is a go-to example which Abe uses to describe current “grey zones” in Japan’s present day security legislation (and constitution). This supplements Abe’s frequent portrayal of the SDF and their families as making prodigious contributions and sacrifices for the safety of Japanese citizens. Further, though mentioned less, where the discussion broaches international perception of security changes in Japan, it is construed as extremely positive. That is, the citizen and their loved ones face peril, our ally in the US is providing support, SDF wish to help the citizens and the US, and the ‘world’ wishes to see Japan make these changes – and also, not making these dangers imperils Japan and its alliance with the US.

Moreover, insufficiencies in the security policies cannot be ignored. One reason provided in NS.FE2 is relates to notions of fairness and morality. Abe asks rhetorically whether it is alright that the SDF cannot protect NGO workers and cannot legally protect foreign troops working with Japan were they attacked, even though foreign troops would protect the SDF\footnote{Of course, were the SDF attacked alongside another country’s troops, the SDF could legally protect all those accompanying them.} (Abe 1 July 2014). Further, Abe states that US officials asked him to consider how far US resolve to protect Japan would go if the SDF did not come to the aid of a US vessel under attack while protecting Japan. The statement clearly suggests that the Japan-US alliance is in jeopardy, despite its longevity since the enactment of the MSA in the early 1950s and before. However, while Abe stresses that greyzones in the law threaten
Japanese national security (Abe 1 July 2014), a common reason for the heightened security risk is that the world has ever deepening interdependence making it impossible to "protect peace" alone, as stated in NS.FE4. In amongst this, Abe is construed as acting out of a responsibility to protect Japanese citizens in NS.FE2. Further, in NS.FE5, insofar that politicians have a responsibility to protect people’s right to "live in the pursuit of happiness", enshrined in Article 13 of the constitution as “the supreme consideration of legislation” (Constitution of Japan 1946), simply ‘inquiring’ into what should be done with regards to the constitution and security, is perfectly constitutional. This represents a politicized argument. That is, not exerting all efforts as prime minister to protect lives is irresponsible, and hence Abe must inquire into possible solutions, even if constitutional amendment. However, in doing so Abe defers judgment to the Advisory Panel, as the epistemic authority on which to base potential policy changes, which is a depoliticizing act. Moreover, in NS.FE1 and NS.FE4, Abe asserts that his administration is rebuilding a national security policy that “directly faces reality”, implying also that not to do so is imperils the SDF and that the national security policies that existed before are dangerously unrealistic (Abe 12 September 2013; 15 October 2013).

In terms of norms, the case of pacifist antimilitarism is challenged by Abe’s imputation of neonationalism to security issues. As described by Özkirimli (2010), this can be assessed by identifying identity claims, spatial claims, and temporal claims, prevalent in nationalist discourses. For identity and spatial claims, Abe points to the DPRK whose missile range covers a large portion of Japan in NS.FE5. However, most threats are in the context of ‘world change’, i.e. an ahistorical, naturalized present which possesses no concrete responsible agency. Thus, while ‘world change’ is construed as a natural phenomenon to be adapted to, there is the identification of the ‘us’ category group, typically with the US as in NS.FE2, 4, and 5, and the ‘them’ group in state antagonism and incursions, implicitly the DPRK and the PRC, with mentions of the SDF action off the Senkaku Islands in NS.FE3. Such threats facing Japanese territory are confronted by the SDF who are described as diligently endeavouring to guarantee national security and as Abe’s “pride” in NS.FE4. Additionally, the construction of nationalist category groups buttresses the case that this security issue requires a national—as opposed to international—response. For instance, in NS.FE5 Abe states that “[..] we cannot save mothers, children, the many Japanese riding this vessel in whatever circumstances” and in NS.FE4, “in a world of deepening interdependence, we cannot protect our country’s peace without proactively carrying out our responsibility towards world peace and stability. This is our problem” (Abe 15 October 2013, 15 May 2014, my emphasis). This constructs a national (as opposed

\[^{103}\text{In the sentence translated, this ‘we’ is not translated directly from the Japanese. Rather it is added by the author based on context as the sentence in Japanese does not have a subject, and so is not italicized.}\]
to international) subject category to security problems by drawing attention to (hypothetical) relationships of the potential victims, and conflating the agency of government and national citizen in the latter. The latter also implies that having received an authoritative knowledge with the report from the epistemic authority, the Advisory Panel, government and citizen now decide what to do wherein the citizen has concrete input over decisions without going to a plebiscite over reinterpretation, for example. While much of the rhetoric may be seen as politicization since it identifies an issue to be dealt with by the Abe administration, it operates under the same principles of securitization theory in that it depoliticizes the decision over the response by construing it as one which the nation makes collectively but in practice it is one that the Abe administration make for the sake of the nation's values, for instance, “the right to exist in the pursuit of happiness”, “life and peaceful living”, or indeed its land (Abe 15 May 2014). In short, the debate is politicized in as much as it grants the Abe administration legitimacy to respond, but depoliticized in that the Abe administration as representing the state is construed as having the legitimacy to act and opposing such actions is to stand against this collective consideration (and those children on the US vessel and their parents).

In terms of temporal claims, as in the IS frame, NS.FE4 references Japan’s “journey as a peace-state”, emphasizing the need to act now to protect peace with PP an appropriate “signboard” of Japan for the 21st Century. Without reiterating the points made previously, such a discourse may be considered nationalistic in the sense that it demonstrates “the linear time of the nation”, and “reflects present concerns” and is “deployed to legitimize the decisions [leaders take] regarding the eventual shape of their nations” (Özkirimli 2010: 209), and neo-nationalistic as this ‘reshaping’ is towards a strong state and military. However, Özkirimli (2010: 209) states that “national projects invest considerable resources in establishing meaningful links to a past that is often problematic”. An example of this can be seen in Abe’s allegorical characterization of his push for a change in security laws and criticisms of this as essentially the same as the time his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi104, railroaded the revision of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty as prime minister, in NS.FE5.

Here, Abe states that the claim that Japan will be embroiled in war was the centre of criticism directed at PM Kishi’s policies, even though Japan never went to war in any combative capacity. Further, Abe opines that the US-Japan Security Treaty contributed to peace because US presence in

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104 Without wishing to overemphasize their familial link, it is assumed that most people will likely make the link when Abe compares his policies and the environment surrounding them with former PM Kishi’s changes to security laws.
the Asia-Pacific was a deterrence to war. Similarly, then, changes to Japan’s security legislations will buttress deterrence and hence promote peace, and not have Japan embroiled in a foreign war, contrary to such criticism. To fully address this claim would require a more detailed analysis than this section can provide. However, a counter claim might be that the actual wars that occurred in Asia-Pacific and their casualties with US military presence in the region still happened without Japanese combative involvement in the region. Hence, the deterrence, if any, was that Japanese soldiers would not perish, as opposed to the many others, not all soldiers. Whether or not the US presence served as a deterrence, Abe’s security changes necessitated the reinterpretation of the constitution, while, though the criticism surrounding the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty is historic, the revision itself is not. Further, one may make the claim that these two instances are not comparable because they are part of the same process, i.e. the incremental transition that as its conclusion will see Japan participate in the combat of war despite no attack on Japanese territory, and not just humanitarian and logistical support in which Japan already participates.

In short, all suppositions of this allegory and implicit metaphorical representation of Abe’s policy changes in line with Kishi’s changes are not established and incontestable truths. However, the composition of Abe’s arguments does reinforce notions that this view is fact and hence imply that because the same criticism was wrong then, it is wrong now, delegitimizing criticism and concern. Firstly, Abe states that the claim that Japan would be embroiled in a war was the centre of criticism at the time of the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Whatever the case, it was not the only criticism, with concern for democracy which is obfuscated by such emphasis. Also, there is a transition from ‘is’ or ‘was’ to ‘ought’ (Fairclough, 2009: 179), which contributes to notions of attitude as a factor in such criticism. In making this allegory, Abe asks two rhetorical questions. The first asks whether despite criticism, have not over 50 years passed since the revision of the treaty, and the second asks whether it is not common knowledge among Japanese people that the US presence in the Asia-Pacific contributed to peace. Following this, several modal verbs are used with statements such as “we must have an inquiry from the view that Japan must do what it should do to protect Japanese lives” (Abe 15 May 2014, my emphasis). Abe then relates this compunction for action by stating “I think there is a responsibility to carry an active view that asks what we should do, in order to protect peace, and not passive views concerning being engulfed [in war]” (Abe 15 May 2014, my emphasis). The NS frame demonstrates an interplay between politicization and depoliticization (see Bates et al.)

105 There were, of course, wars in Asia-Pacific post-WWII. Rather, the argument is that these wars did not oblige Japanese involvement to the point of active combat, though at the very least Japan was tacitly involved in major conflicts in the region (Hook et al. 2012).
For example, while there is politicization in that Abe specifically addresses opposition to the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, there is depoliticization owing also to much of the securitized narrative and the obfuscation of potentially antagonistic identities or equation of alternative views as passive in the NS frame. This interplay is predominant in this frame, and is likely to demonstrate the unavoidably contentious issue of security reform in Japan. However, much of the rhetoric concerns an inquiry into how to respond to national security threats. Much of this denotes an inquiry conducted by the Advisory Panel, which was established by the Abe administration (Huffington Post 1 May 2014), and so represents the placing at “one remove” the political character of decision-making (Burnham 2014), making it an act of depoliticization.

### 7.2.3 International Relations and Economics frame

As before, all IRE frames are provided in Appendix 7. These are IRE.FE1, IRE.FE2, IRE.FE3, IRE.FE4, and IRE.FE5.

The IRE frame relates to issues concerning diplomacy, whether relations with other states are for economic or political concerns. Similar to the IS frame, Abe routinely makes links between benefits to Japan to a region or the ‘world’, whether this is, for example, creating a new politico-economic bloc in IRE.FE1 and IRE.FE5, resolving diplomatic issues with the PRC in IRE.FE2 and IRE.FE4, or promoting world economic growth and ‘Abenomics’ on a more general level in IRE.FE3. Abe’s proffered changes are generally construed as beneficial to Japan/Japan’s economy and the ‘world’/region and/or its economy. The ‘world’, therefore, is frequently construed as interested in such policies, keen for Japan to overcome an existing problem and hopeful for Japan to ‘contribute’ more. Further, prosperity is linked implicitly with peace such that prosperity may be seen as a necessary condition of peace, and peace a necessary condition of prosperity, and due to this, economic, political, and security issues are seen to coalesce (§5; §6). This is consistent with the IS frame where Abe’s policies/position towards issues are construed as the subject of focus and anticipation from the ‘world’ and have the capacity to benefit all people. As stated, this is an example of the fallacy of division given that it does not follow that changes will impact everyone in the same way. This serves to legitimate Abe’s policies as it implies consensus between Abe and the ‘world’, delegitimizing opposition to it as to disagree is to disagree with the sentiments of the ‘world’.

In IRE.FE2 and IRE.FE4, Abe explains his approach to managing Sino-Japanese relations. While in IRE.FE2 Abe broaches the issue of the “continuing territorial incursions by Chinese vessels”, claiming that “to us, this is very regrettable” and that “Japan will not compromise over territorial rights”, the issue is not subject to a securitizing move. Rather, Abe seeks to promote dialogue with
President Xi Jinping and the PRC in general given that “Sino-Japanese relations is one of the most important bilateral relationships and is unbreakable in various areas”, with both the PRC and Japan having a responsibility to PPS “in the world and Asia-Pacific region” (Abe 27 September 2013). The overall message is that Abe will not compromise over the issue of territorial rights, specifically the Senkaku Islands regarding which are “our country’s land by history and international law” (Abe 27 September 2013), but that dialogue between the countries should be sought, with specifically the “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” (hereafter ‘mutually benefit relationship’) as a principle on which to develop relations. Put simply, there is no concrete solution to the territorial issues which addresses the claims made by either party in this relationship, but rather it encourages that where there are issues, solutions should be sought by peaceful and cooperative means.

Despite this, the issue is depoliticized by implications of responsibility and accountability which is influenced using personal deixis. Abe constructs a deictic centre in ‘Japan’, in which Abe positions himself. The deictic counterpart to this—the ‘they’ group to the ‘we’ group—is of course the PRC and President Xi Jinping. Japan’s actions are portrayed as in adherence to its responsibility to regional/world PPS. That is, Japan is construed as doing all it can to find a solution to the issue through dialogue while also maintaining that its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands is founded in history and international law. Further, this contrast through deixis may be seen through Abe’s metaphoric use of the word ‘door’ to describe openness towards peaceful resolution between both groups.

Firstly, Abe advocates a return to the ‘mutually beneficial relationship’ between the PRC and Japan, implying that with continual water incursions that this has broken down. With this, Abe

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106 According to a joint statement issued from PRC President Hu Jintao and Japan PM Yasuo Fukuda on 7 May 2008, the issues of territorial disputes only emerge in point 6(3) wherein both states claim they should cooperate towards making the East China Sea a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014c). However, both leaders confirmed they would continue to adhere to the principles espoused in the 1972 ‘Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China’, the 1978 ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China’ and the ‘Japan-China [1998] Joint Declaration’, as the foundation of Sino-Japanese Relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014c). In all three documents, the issue of the Senkaku Islands is not directly addressed. Rather, any disputes are to be resolved by peaceful means such as dialogue based on mutual respect (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014d; 2014e; 2014f). Hook et al. (2012: 169) claim that the PRC “declined to discuss the issue of sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, deferring it to later generations to decide”. In 1992, the PRC issued its ‘Law of Territorial Waters’ in which a decision appeared to have been made, and again in 2013 when the PRC established its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), both of which covered territory claimed by Japan including the Senkaku Islands (Hook et al. 2012: 241; Page 27 November 2013). Thus, dialogue only is promoted in the ‘mutually beneficial relationship’.

107 It must be noted that most, but not all, incursions occur in the claimed EEZ as opposed to territorial waters (Hook 2014a).
states that one should not “close the door of dialogue” when there are problems but that precisely because there are issues, there should be dialogue between the countries (Abe 27 September 2013, my emphasis). Further Abe states that “my door of dialogue is always open” and that “I hope to see the approach from the side of China also” in both IRE.FE2 and IRE.FE4 (Abe 27 September 2013; 14 December 2013, my emphasis). The implication is that if it was not the deictic centre that has closed the door, then presumably it is its counterpart, the PRC, which suggests a degree of intransigence or irresponsibility towards international welfare on one side but not the other. If Japan’s door is open, then China’s must be shut. With this metaphoric reduction, deictic groups are condensed into binary categories which are schematically organized such that ‘IF Group A = X, THEN Group B ≠ X’ and vice versa. It may be seen to also imply that ‘if Japan is acting responsibly, then China is not’, or that ‘if Japan’s actions are legitimate, then China’s are not’ and so forth. Despite this, the PRC’s ‘doors’ are at least slightly ajar as it were, given that, as Abe himself notes in IRE.FE2, he “directly conveyed” to President Xi during a G20 summit that he wishes to develop relations (Appendix 7). This, by definition, must have been dialogue, though not official. Further, this zero-sum logic does not paint the whole picture of events as conduct at the state-level is influenced by the actions of non-state actors. That is, civilians from the PRC, ROC, Japan and Hong Kong have impacted on the dynamics of the conflict also, while President Xi has also advocated the ‘mutually beneficial relationship’, seeking to portray China as a ‘peace-loving’ nation (Schneider 2014: 698). In a similar vein, Abe, in this zero-sum logic, portrays Japan as the responsible nation. Here, Abe’s use of personal deixis construes ‘Japan’ as acting responsibly to solve the issue against the PRC/Xi Jinping which or who, as an atomic unit, is acting irresponsibly. This effectively depoliticizes the issue as it suggests consensus within the deictic centre of Japan with the ‘world’. Further, without deconstructing this group, there is no consideration of any explanatory factor as to why establishing effective dialogue has been difficult other than Chinese irresponsibility, for instance, Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and so forth 108.

With regards to frame examples concentrated on international economics also, opposition is seldom recognized or given social agency, as in shared agreements over the necessity of the TPP in IRE.FE1, or is not construed as political, as in citizen concerns as natural regarding what might happen once the TPP is implemented in IRE.FE5. Depoliticization by obscuring social agency is also observable in IRE.FE5. Abe, using the honorific form of the verb ‘to be’, states “on the other hand, it is natural that there are people [in Japan] who have various concerns regarding the TPP” (Abe 15 March 2013). This is not opposition per se, and certainly not political, but rather a statement which

108 Insight may be drawn, however, from studies into discourse on Sino-Japanese relations and how it is governed, shaped, exploited in China (e.g. Schneider 2016) as well as Japan (e.g. Hook et al. 2015).
openly accepts concerns and which implies that Abe is aware of what they are. Following this, Abe attempts to convey that he and his party can be trusted over negotiations of terms of the TPP given the fact that they keep their promises, for instance claiming they would oppose a TPP of “tariff elimination without sanctuary [i.e. protected sectors]”, and that following a conference with US President Obama, establishing that the TPP would not entail complete tariff elimination. The follow-on implication, then, is that the Abe administration are partly responsible for the fact that the TPP will not carry this out (Asahi Shimbun 5 March 2013). Owing to this, and the subsequent concluding statements such as “we, as our nation, will protect what should be protected” (Abe 15 March 2013), it is implied that Abe can be trusted and hence should participate in negotiations further.

Abe conflates the national and international with claims of interest and expectations gathering towards Japan as it “starts boldly walking the road to economic recovery, based on the three arrows” (Abe 10 October 2013). Moreover, Abe is keen to highlight the importance he attaches to maintaining good relations with ASEAN states while members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are agreed on the importance of realizing a new form of economic integration in the region. Of course, ASEAN does not comprise all of the Asia-Pacific, and not all APEC members, which includes states from Central Asia to North and South America, are agreed on the TPP with, for example, the PRC and Russia engaged in other economic regional frameworks. Additionally, the TPP discourse is the product of securitizing moves. The securitizing actor is Abe, while the referent object and threat respectively are that Japanese citizens might miss out on a now-or-never opportunity to make the most out of economic changes by vacillating over what actions to take or whether or not to take them. For instance, in IRE.FE5, Abe makes the argument that the establishment of the TPP is a great opportunity for Japan, Asia-Pacific, the US, and the ‘world’. The reasons for this are that countries which share universal values of liberty, democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law will join the economic bloc. This suggests the economic bloc, along with bringing prosperity to people worldwide, will comprise of states which keep to such values. This claim is certainly contestable as, for example, there are states within the framework from the very beginning which are not democracies such as Brunei, which is an absolute monarchy. Other reasons for the TPP are that economic interdependence contributes to regional stability in terms of security and that Japan has the opportunity to create trade rules that connect to future free-trade economic blocs in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which in IRE.FE1 Abe states are “also no longer mere works of fiction” (Abe 10 October 2013), impacting the creation of world rules. Abe contributes further to the notion of history-in-the-making by claiming “historians will look back” on now as the time when “the TPP lifted the curtains
for the Asia-Pacific Century”, with the TPP also construed as a “state plan for 100 years”, while in IRE.FE1 Abe claims the TPP is “the way to realize a suitable market for the growth centre of the twenty-first century”, of course only thirteen years in at the time (Abe 15 March 2013; 10 October 2013, my emphasis). Both help convey the sense of necessity towards establishing a new politico-economic bloc, where, as Fairclough (2009: 180) notes with New Labour discourses on the global economy, the TPP is semiotically located within “the realm of necessity”, and therefore outside the “realm of contingency and deliberation” (Hay 2007 in Fairclough 2009: 180). It is going to be the Asia-Pacific Century. And as Abe states two sentences prior to this in IRE.FE5, right now is “the last chance”.

Following this, the issue is problematized because, as Abe asserts, Japan is two years late to the negotiation table, meaning that it is a hard fact that changing rules where consensus has already been established is difficult. Further, “there really is not long left”, and therefore Abe contests that Japan must “participate in negotiations as soon as possible” given that Japan, as the third largest economy of the world, can go on to “lead the creation of new trade rules” (Abe 15 March 2013). Here, there are few qualifiers of doubt or qualifiers of probability pertaining to anything less than certainty. These claims are construed as absolute truths and constructed as though Japanese citizens were faced with a choice in a risk-benefit ratio wherein perceived risk of joining the negotiations is outweighed by the projected risk of not joining, which increases every second they do not take part in negotiations. In other words, the ‘realm of deliberation’ is at the negotiation table, where the Abe administration ostensibly comprises the only representatives for the Japanese nation and, among them, are only those who share Japan’s values. This is opposed to within Japanese politics where deliberations over what to do amount only to making one’s chances for prosperity harder and harder to attain.

In terms of norms espoused, internationalism plays a prominent role in legitimating economic policies owing to the link between benefits for Japan and the ‘world’. However, in harmony with internationalism, the norm of economism also plays a more prominent role in the IRE frame than ‘security’ frames. Abe routinely emphasizes the importance of economic integration with states who share the same values as Japan in either economic blocs or the so-called ‘global economy’, both of which are construed as a priority, and a means of PPS. Further, Asianism is relied on to promote regional integration and for Japan to commit more to international affairs. For example, in IRE.FE4 Abe emphasizes the special role that ASEAN always has in the Abe administration’s diplomatic strategy, with Abe himself, interpreting his reward as the “face of Asia” as proof that ASEAN states highly regard Japan’s contribution and welcome Japan’s impending economic recovery. Similar
notions of expectation and interest regarding Japan’s purported economic recovery are conveyed also in IRE.FE1. Further, Abe states also that he “felt the large expectations from all ten ASEAN member states without exception for Japan to contribute to regional and world peace and prosperity” (Abe 14 December 2013). The promotion of Asianism may be seen also in IRE.FE5 where Abe stresses that the “TPP will open [lit. lift the curtains of] the Asia-Pacific Century”, where Japan “must be the centre of this” as joining the TPP constitutes a “100-year state plan” (Abe 15 March 2013). Here, Abe’s policies are portrayed as widely accepted in the Asia-Pacific, which is a region where Japan has a long-term term future towards PPS.

This construal of consensus depoliticizes the issue as the equation of the TPP to the conceptually vague region of Asia-Pacific helps to dedifferentiate antagonistic identities (such as with East Asia) within this region by also constructing an association of the TPP with the accepted wisdom of Asia-Pacific as a region of growth. However, as touched on above, it is an open question as to who belongs to this region. For instance, if we define ‘Asia-Pacific’ as the ASEAN ten states, then the TPP contains as many Asia-Pacific states as states from the Americas. Further, if we define it as members of the APEC, then the TPP excludes two BRICS 109 states in the PRC and Russia and Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in Indonesia that are characterized by large growth and regional influence. Asia-Pacific may also be taken to include India, another BRIC state, which also is not a member of the TPP. Further why these states have seemingly opted not to participate in what is construed as a golden opportunity remains undisclosed.

Due to this, to assert as categorical fact that historians—and hence ‘we’—will look back on the TPP as the curtain-opener to an Asia-Pacific century seems problematic as negotiating TPP trade rules does not necessarily entail being at the “centre of the Asia-Pacific Century” (Abe 15 March 2013). For instance, the TPP may not fully represent integrated economic blocs in Asia-Pacific, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes states within this geographical location such as the PRC and Russia as members and India as an acceding “observer state” (guanchayuan-guo), promoting ideals of long-term economic, political and military integration (Shanghai Hezuo Zuzhi 2016). This is despite the implication in IRE.FE1 that the TPP relates to creating bigger free-trade blocs in the future free-trade agreements such as the China-led RCEP and the US-led FTAAP, which in their embryonic stages presently include most of these states110. That is, in line with the tenets of structural power (§2), who manages to influence most the formation of rules in a new regional bloc is key. However, the equation of the TPP to Asia-Pacific economic growth helps to condense the issue

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109 Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
110 The FTAAP does not presently include India.
down to a false dilemma: either join the TPP and be part of the Asia-Pacific century, or do not and, somewhat paradoxically, risk being excluded from economic prosperity for the region and ‘world’, which is not a self-evident fact. In effect, Abe’s imputation of the TPP with the ‘future of Asia-Pacific’ as a region depoliticizes what amounts to a seemingly highly complex and potentially perilous geopolitical situation. How this may relate to debates over the national economy is discussed below.

7.2.4 National Economy frame

As before, all NE frames are provided in Appendix 7. These are NE.FE1, NE.FE2, NE.FE3, NE.FE4, and NE.FE5.

The NE frame typically advocates structural reform to Japan’s economy and, though less often, reform to social security and governance. The frame examples indicate that Abe frequently promotes sizeable changes by attempting to securitize the issue of Japan’s economy. The securitizing actor is Abe, the threat is to the Japanese people owing to the claims that a poor economy will impact society, people’s lives, social services, Japan’s place in the ‘world’, and the ‘world’. To this end, the world is also under threat, and prevention is in Japan’s hands. To respond, Abe proposes his eponymous economic growth strategy of the three arrows of Abenomics. Processes of depoliticization function to effectively delegitimate opposition owing to the connection between Abenomics to the people of Japan and the ‘world’.

Firstly, Abenomics is portrayed as a clinically technical and epoch-breaking short-fire quick-fix solution, while the issue of economic recovery is problematized with the claim, explicit or implicit, that immediate action towards economic recovery is imperative. For instance, in NE.FE4, Abe asserts that Japan is in a “do-or-die situation” (shōnenba) in terms of realizing a “virtuous cycle” of economic recovery when discussing budgetary plans. Further, in NE.FE3, Abe claims that “the largest as well as the most urgent task for our country is the revitalization of the economy” (Abe 28 January 2013; 9 December 2013). Additionally, in NE.FE1, Abe claims that “the mission assigned to this administration, more than anything else, is to bring back a strong economy [...]” (Abe 4 January 2013, my emphasis). The term ‘bring back’ (torimodosu) a strong economy is used also in NE.FE1, NE.FE3 twice, and NE.FE5. Further, in NE.FE5 Abe uses the same verb stating the necessity of “bringing back Japanese politics” and “bringing back Japan”, the latter of which was also Abe’s 2012 election campaign slogan (Appendix 7; §1.1). Clearly, to ‘take/bring back something’ necessitates that it has gone/been taken. This is to infer, then, that “Japan’s politics” has gone, “Japan’s strong economy” has gone, and also, perhaps in line with the ‘philosophies of tradition’ noted in §3, that peoples’ ‘Japan’ has gone.
With this, the urgency of such economic policy, then, is not limited to economic concerns alone. In NE.FE5, Abe metaphorically portrays ‘bringing back Japan’ as Japan’s “fight”, which is “still halfway through” (Abe 17 May 2013). It is an open question as to what of Japan has gone. However, in NE.FE3 Abe stresses that economic conditions are “shaking from the roots the foundation of trust in a society that ‘rewards those who work hard’”, and also states that “it does not matter how many times the government [re-]distributes incomes, without the creation of wealth through sustainable economic growth, the pie of the whole economy shrinks” (Abe 28 January 2013, my emphasis). The metaphor of pie reflects a standard trope for neoliberal economic reform, much like the metaphor of ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’. Abe reinforces this by continuing to state “without this, it does not matter how hard individuals work, income that remains in their hands will only decrease”, and adding paratactically that “the foundations of social security which support our own [sense of] security, will probably also be shaken [lit. shake]” (Abe 28 January 2013, author’s translation). If we take this to mean Japan, i.e. a Japan where growth underpins social security which supports “our [sense of] security”, then what Abe is implicitly proposing in effect to bring back is a ‘sense of security’ through growth. As stated, this view is portrayed by securitizing the issue of economic revival which, as a theory, relies explicitly on making sure people are insecure about the issue enough to legitimate extraordinary, often depoliticized measures to address it.

Further, the use of the metaphor ‘fight’ supplements this sense of urgency and the notion that there may be hardships along the way. The use of the possessive pronoun ‘our’ deictically positions Abe as fighting alongside the Japanese population for Japan, depoliticizing the issue of economic reform. Abe claims that “a politics that cannot make decisions, will jeopardize the future of Japan” (Abe 17 May 2013). Specifically, Abe here refers to the twisted Diet (nejire kokkai) which is a metaphoric description of constitutional procedures for when the ruling party has majority seats in the Lower House but not in the Upper House. Here, Article 59 of the constitution states that if the Upper House vetoes a bill (which will have already passed through the Lower House), the bill can still become law on condition that it passes through the Lower House a second time with a two-thirds or more majority of the members present (Constitution of Japan 1946). Of course, this does not apply to only bills to do with the economy, but applies to a wide-range of bills111. In a ‘twisted Diet’, then, such a scenario is likely to occur more than if one party had majority in both houses112. Due to this,

111 However, there are exceptions. For instance, Article 60 stipulates that the decision of the Lower House over the national budget can be made the decision of the Diet on certain conditions, while Article 61 stipulates that the same applies for the conclusion of treaties.

112 Between 2007 to the 2013 Upper House election, there have been three twisted Diets, where the only majority in both houses were under the Hatoyama administration of the DPJ for approximately one year of the six between the end of the first Abe administration to the Upper House elections in the second.
the task of eliminating the ‘twisted Diet’ is construed as part of the ‘fight’ to bring back Japan. Additionally, as Abe states in NE.FE5, ‘a strong economy’ relates to a nation’s diplomacy, security, and social security, and due to this, Abe aims to “place focus on economic policy” and operate by means of “policy management” (Abe 17 May 2013). This is because the “voice of the nation [ kokumin] is ‘please bring back a strong economy’”. With such consensus, Abe is able to legitimize economic policy by appealing to expert knowledge implied in policy management. Abe contends that politics must be ‘stabilized’ to get results, which necessitates the elimination of the ‘twisted Diet’. To this end, Abe rhetorically asks “as for the twisted Diet, is it not that the voice of most people is ‘that’s enough already’?”, and asserts that “the [upcoming] Upper House election is also the fight to bring back Japanese politics” (Abe 17 May 2013). While the managerialist and technical credentials of Abenomics are emphasized, Abe recommends overcoming a democratic and constitutional constraint on the ruling coalition parties to effectuate economic growth and bring back ‘Japan’, however defined.

Despite the metaphoric depiction of a democratic election as a fight suggests a degree of politicization with the implicit suggestion that bills cannot be passed due to opposition intransigence, the issue of economic reform is depoliticized as Abe’s suggestions is effectively the legitimate restriction of the powers of the Upper House, which comprise of democratically elected representatives. ‘Stabilization’ is denoted as though it were a technical procedure for the sake of nuanced policy management towards ‘bringing back a strong economy’ which is the voice of the people and winning the fight to ‘bring back Japan’. With this, Abe constructs an argument which holds that he must ‘bring back politics’ to be able to ‘bring back the strong economy’ which, because it underpins ‘diplomacy, security, and social security’, the latter of which supports ‘our [sense of] security’, will ‘bring back Japan’ or at least the part of Japan that has been lost/taken. Thus, the issue of economic reform is securitized and its resolution consists of depoliticized technical fixes to reorient the state towards economic strength and hence a future for Japan, is what is required to overcome this crisis.

The causes of this economic crisis are construed as long-term deflation and high value of the yen in NE.FE3, which to overcome require an “audacious package” of an “audacious monetary policy”, a “flexible fiscal policy” and a “growth strategy that stimulates private investment” as the ‘three arrows’ of Abenomics (Abe 28 January 2013). The use of the neologism ‘Abenomics’ conveys the sense that Abe’s economic growth package is of a unique and special composition. Further, in NE.FE3 and NE.FE5, Abe refers to such policies as “of another dimension” serving to construe them as unparalleled and unrivalled. This is a major factor in the NE frame; namely, depoliticization by an
appeal to expert knowledge. For instance, Abe describes his three-pronged strategy as “three arrows” which further conveys a sense of clinical and technical precision to economic policy, even though the three areas of economic policy are in themselves not particularly specific.

Additionally, in contrast to other frame types, Abe frequently relies on metaphoric associations with ‘fighting’, ‘battling’ and so on to discuss the implementation of policy as though it were an aggressive strategy of obliterating an enemy over a series of calculated steps. The ‘three arrows’ might be said to serve this function. In NE.FE5 growth strategies come in “rounds” as Abe claims he “explained the first round of the growth strategy, with the “activity of women” at its nucleus, last month”, while this time Abe asserts that “the investment expansion policy through regulation reform etc., and an aggressive agricultural policy [lit. agricultural policy of attack] as the second round, with the key-phrase of “winning in the world”” (Abe 17 May 2013, my emphasis). Further, in NE.FE3 Abe refers to the newly established “Japan Economic Revival Headquarters” as the “control tower” of economic revival113. Additionally, alongside the headquarters, Abe refers to the restart of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy as his “line-up/battle formation” (fujin) (Abe 28 January 2013, my emphasis).

This construal of economic growth as a battle to be won is interspersed with metaphoric portrayals of economic revival as a technical and mechanical process reliant on momentum/propulsion. For example, in NE.FE1 Abe aims for a “rocket start towards economic revival”, and states in NE.FE3 that “innovation and system reform will, owing to the fact that it leads to the solution of societal issues, bring new values of living and be the driving force of economic revival” (Abe 4 January 2013; 28 January 2013, my emphasis). Additionally, in NE.FE4, Abe emphasizes the necessity of realizing a “virtuous cycle of this economy” to “be able to spread the feeling of growth to all you Japanese nationals, across the whole nation […]” (Abe 9 December 2013, my emphasis). The latter case especially works to assert that the economy is recovering and that people need only consent to changes until they are able to feel its effects. Such a construal of the economy delegitimates claims counter to the metaphor of the ‘pie of the whole economy’, i.e. that some people/sectors appear to benefit more from the changes than others, because people still unaffected by the changes need only consent to reform and wait until the momentum of growth is ratcheted toward them.

Further, the issue of economic reform and the commercialization of technological innovations is often linked to realizing a new vision of society. In NE.FE2, for example, Abe discusses his

113 The term is also used to refer to a playmaker in sports.
abolishment of regulatory impediments to the commercialization of Fuel Cell Vehicles\textsuperscript{114} as an example of his administration’s drive to realize a “hydrogen society” (Abe 23 September 2014), which denotes a society which prioritizes low carbon in energy production, consumption, and storage, chiefly through, but not limited to, the use of hydrogen. This is despite concerns that it may be partially reliant on low grade carbon from Australia because Japan does not have a source of hydrogen gas (Hanley 18 September 2015 in DeWit 2015a; see also Hook et al. forthcoming). Additionally, in NE.FE2, Abe describes a “society where women shine” as a “pillar” to his growth strategy (Abe 23 September 2014), which in reality means more women in the labour force mostly in non-regular forms of work (§5). NE.FE3 suggests that seeking “the image of how society should be” which involves a society where “both the young and the elderly are given a chance for anything, where every person feels they have meaning in life, regardless of age or disabilities”, or a society where “men and women can easily balance work and child-rearing together, with women constructing their own careers”, is linked to bringing back a strong economy, and hence Abenomics (Abe 28 January 2013). Further, Abe states that the discovery of iPS (induced pluripotent stem cells)\textsuperscript{115} is, if put into practical use, something that “not only will contribute to the realization of the “society where people live long and healthily””, but will also create new wealth and employment\textsuperscript{116}. Here, ‘bringing back’ or ‘restoring’ the economy is linked to society and the future, while typically regulations stymy the innovations necessary to attain economic growth. Here, economism is utilized in that economic change entails a change to Japan to that of a country that through openness to the ‘world’—that is, deregulation—innovation and reform to economic sectors, can bring benefit to everyone.

The construal of Abenomics as a technical, ground-breaking and unrivalled policy as well as its relation to the ‘world’ is epitomized in his metaphorical equation of Japan with Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, in NE.FE5. As Abe explains, the Allegory of the Cave tells the story of people “who have been chained to the wall in the depths of a cave from childhood, [and] think the shadows reflected on the wall comprise reality [lit. substance]” (Abe 17 May 2013). Further, were these people to escape the cave and see light for the first time they would “understand that the world they were in is only one part [of it]”. Abe continues by stating that, in the same way, “the policies “of a different dimension” that I uphold, are probably a surprise to people who have until now only seen the wall in the cave.

\textsuperscript{114} An electric car which uses a fuel cell to generate power, typically involving hydrogen.

\textsuperscript{115} This refers to Professor Shinya Yamanaka’s discovery that “mature cells can be reprogrammed to become pluripotent” for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (Nobelprize.org 2016b).

\textsuperscript{116} This vision involves people modifying their lifestyles to stay healthy for longer, and, presumably, stay in employment for longer (see Hook et al. forthcoming).
However, after seeing the outside world, they would likely find that [such changes] are natural” (Abe 17 May 2013). To this end, Abe proposes “a Japan that grows robustly in the world where the sun shines”, and states “we must not hesitate to rush out of cave” and that “without action, there is no growth” (Abe 17 May 2013). In effect, this delegitimates opposition towards Abenomics as it is construed as a natural phenomenon of people who have no understanding of the world owing to being closed away in a cave, presumably a result of Japan’s traditional protectionist-developmentalist economic model having ‘shut out’ the world (presumably, excluding exportation to international markets). The solution to this is to dash out of the cave, which one assumes to mean deregulation and deepening economic integration with international state and non-state partners, where we can see the ‘real world’. The solution is reduced to a committed attitude as opposed to an understanding of the tenets of economic change. That is, though it may be surprising and difficult to understand by some, this is natural because they have never seen the world. However, there must be prompt action. This effectively depoliticizes economic reform in its construal of Abenomics and its helmsmen as paradigm-breaking who know the world while others do not.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter provided the qualitative analysis of text, employing the dialectical-relational approach to CDS. Depoliticization was also used as a point-of-entry to assess strategies of legitimation. It is argued that though frames have differences, legitimation is realized predominantly by depoliticizing issues, though in the NS frame, issues were on occasion politicized resulting in governmental depoliticization. Further, in concordance with the analyses in §5 and §6, Abe routinely establishes links between the international and the national whether in terms of national response to international change or national change bringing about international change, as well as makes links between economics and security by stating that the sustainability of one is essentially predicated on the other being robust. Here, the national and international, and ‘security’ and ‘economics’ are construed as interrelated by nature and hence what is a security issue or not cannot be defined by issues over military combat, for instance, but depend essentially on how they impact the referent objects of Japan, Japanese citizens, the ‘world’, and so on.

With this, the issues concerning constitutional amendment/reinterpretation with respect to Article 9 and CSD may be seen in a more holistic semiotically realized context than simply analyzing instances of ‘collective self-defense’ in the dataset. Rather by analyzing the separate topic areas identified in the frame analysis, it was found that the interrelation between the national and
international, and security and economy hugely inform the context in which the need for constitutional change is construed. Specifically, it is such that the ‘world has changed’ giving rise to new security issues while economic conditions necessitate Japan economically integrate internationally. Such integration necessitates increased security contributions such as patrolling sea lanes, which also benefits the ‘world’ and/or a given region in terms of universal values as well as PPS which are construed such that one often follows the others.

Delegitimation is carried out with the linking of Abe’s position with the rest of the ‘world’ who are usually portrayed as agreeing with Abe’s actions, while political opposition is obfuscated, and where opposition is discussed—whether over economic or security matters—it is usually as in ignorance of how the world really is often in terms of being outdated, irrelevant, or unfeasible – again a common political trope. To this end, Abenomics is proffered as simultaneously a package that will rescue the Japanese economy from itself while also integrating younger generations particularly into more international economic frameworks. This relates to PP which though predominantly discussed in the context of international security, is construed as a new “signboard”, “portrait”, “flag”, “banner” of the Japanese nation wherein traditional pacifism is recalibrated towards increased engagement in international security commitments. These portrayals bolster notions of identity and reflect the notion that such acts are emblematic of Japan as a collective among the society of international actors and their people, possibly conveying the sense that failure to do so among this dependency or peer pressure would impact on Japan’s appearance of decency (sekentei) or ‘keeping up of appearances’ in the world, and potentially put others in danger. As stated throughout, peaceful acts of charity in international affairs such as humanitarian support are viewed positively by many in Japan, and so implications that Japanese ‘exceptionalism’ with regard to their ‘outdated’ pacifism would disappoint, trouble, upset, endanger and so on, people of the world is likely to wield considerable rhetorical significance in legitimating further integration into international society whether through constitutional amendment or otherwise.

In the following chapter, and in line with the methodology, the social issue of depoliticization in the current social order is discussed with respect to the negotiation between increased international security and economic integration with constitutional ‘obstructions’ that beset the Abe administration. Following this, a discussion over potential ways past this obstacle is carried out.
8 Results and discussion

8.0 Overview of results

This thesis is, to the author's knowledge, the first holistic analysis of Abe's speeches as prime minister following the return to power of the LDP in 2012. As stated in §1, Abe's premiership has brought a number of enormous legislative changes that have greatly impacted the state's IR and relationship with its citizens. This thesis has sought to explain how the prime minister legitimated such substantial changes by analyzing his political rhetoric. Here, it was argued that Abe frequently relies on depoliticizing issues (with securitization another means by which to depoliticize issues) communicatively as a macro-strategy of legitimization. To investigate this further, this chapter aims to contextualize Abe's rhetoric with regard to two key initiatives of his administration—the TPP and PP—in IR and IPE theory. It is suggested that despite claims of Abe's neonationalism and historical revisionism, documented in §1, his rhetoric overall is aligned with the fundamental tenets of neoliberalism. This is not to say, however, that the Abe administration is comprised of orthodox neoliberals, as the key policies discussed below could well be argued as undergirded by neonationalist ideology and political realism. That is, the administration exploits neoliberal doctrines in the global political system to further empower the state on the premise of international contribution, despite the questionable pretext by which a number of pieces of legislations were implemented with, for example, questions over CSD (Lee 2015) and the State Secrecy Act (Repeta 2014; Utsunomiya et al 2014). This has impacted on the state's IR, making it a political issue, and its relationship with its citizens, making it, among other things, a social issue, too. Hence, the point is that despite comments criticizing Abe's neonationalism and historical revisionism, the prime minister is able to legitimize such change on the bases of constructing neoliberal arguments, undergirded by internationalist norms, that are heavily reliant on the depoliticization of core issues to state and national identity.

There are security answers to economic questions as 'prosperity' is predicated on another index of life-quality, 'stability', which similarly is predicated on or used interchangeably with 'peace'. There is a tendency for prioritizing international law and partnerships over domestic legal and political structures. This tendency is frequently backed with the observation from Abe that the 'world has changed' and so citizens must accept policy initiatives so the state can contribute to 'international
society’ and overcome domestic problems, to the benefit of the nation and the region and/or ‘world’. Also, subject categories are frequently ambiguous. What benefits the citizens on many occasions benefits the state and vice versa, while how the state’s or the SDF’s actions are received by international society or the ‘world’ is also implicitly a reflection on the people who are believed to belong to the nation. The subject categories ‘the world’ and ‘international society’ are also problematic and, it is suggested, conventionally used to talk about allies and those close to the Japanese state and the US, its most important ally under the Abe administration.

With this, this chapter aims to explain these observations in more detail by carrying out the latter two stages of the dialectical-relational approach, provided in §3, and given below:

- Consider the necessity of this social issue in the current social order;
- Identify potential means to overcome it.

(Fairclough 2009: 181-82)

Therefore, this chapter seeks to examine the issues of depoliticization with respect to the common correlational factor behind major policy initiatives, according to Abe’s speeches; namely, the ‘changing world’. This is carried out in several stages. Firstly, §8.1 discusses conditions of the ‘changing world’, relating key points made by Abe to IR theory. Here, it is claimed that Abe’s ‘world change’ and response predominantly accords with neoliberal accounts of globalization. Two case-studies are then examined in §8.2, where §8.2.1 examines Abe’s assertion of regional economic frameworks as a gateway to a new century and §8.2.2 assesses the supposition of PP as a recalibration of the minimalist One Country Pacifism. This is related to the controversy surrounding constitutional reinterpretation and bills which allow for the exercise of CSD. Finally, §8.3 comprises the conclusion where it is surmised that the contested nature of liberalism amidst a rapidly changing international environment allows leaders to use such discourses to bulwark policy initiatives, even when their liberal premises are contestable. By way of potential means to overcome it, it is suggested that values of liberalism—whether universal or not—require a more rigorous and concrete definition which is reflexively evaluated and assessed.
8.1 Policy in a changing world: Making an international state?

Changing international conditions is a prominent factor of legitimization in Abe’s speeches, whether changes are regional or global. It therefore warrants further investigation to assess what it is about this change that may explain depoliticizing elements of Abe’s rhetoric. This may provide a tentative answer to the final section of the methodology by affording us a more detailed understanding of the issues that Abe raises in the context of ‘world change’ and its challenges.

As stated, a key pattern in Abe’s speeches is to prioritize internationalized frameworks of governance over domestic equivalents. Due to this, while two concrete case-studies are examined in detail in §8.2, a general overview of literature into the changing international conditions is necessary first to lead into a more concrete examination of the justification of policy initiatives by the PM. This is carried out by providing an account of what Abe means when he talks of world change in §8.1.1, before discussing the nature of this change in IR and IPE in §8.1.2. Finally, §8.1.3 attempts to bridge the two subsections by considering where Abe’s general suppositions might be placed in the literature on a changing global structure. It is concluded that Abe’s discourse on this change is generally in accordance with the neoliberal account of globalization.

8.1.1 Defining a ‘changing world’

‘World change’ as defined in Abe’s speeches typically denotes change to a world as follows:

a) increasing state interdependence;
b) heightened insecurity and;
c) consequently, a borderless world meaning peace cannot be protected alone.

Further, the policy response has been summarized previously as ‘internationalizing’ in the sense that Japan must seek to broaden relations with other states in terms of economic and security integration. The term ‘internationalize’ was selected over, for instance, ‘globalize’ as the latter implies “simultaneous extension and expansion in all directions” while the former, more accurate to Abe’s proffered solutions, implies “a relationship between two or more nations” where “a minimum of two nations can engage in “international relations”” (Befu 2001: 3 in Dobson 2015: 455).
These of course share similarities. For example, Dobson (2015) provides a cursory overview of the meaning of 'internationalization' as a synonym of globalization:

[It denotes] having emerged from the Cold War and now living in an increasingly crossborder, transnational, interconnected and interdependent world that will eventually undermine the building block of the previous international order, the nation-state. Under this definition, globalization could be seen as little more than a historical period.
(Dobson 2015: 454)

This definition coincides with Abe’s emphasis on international interdependencies (§6) and, though perhaps not the nation-state per se, the rejection of state-centricity/introversion with regards to maintaining national security and economic health. Further, the perceived historicity of the term lends itself to Abe’s frequent emphasis on the ‘out-with-the-old-in-with-the-new’ rhetoric for national and international security with the ‘new flag’, ‘new banner’ of PP. Similar themes exist for economic policy also with Abenomics as a mission to influence Japanese culture and identity and as comprising an economic package of a ‘different dimension’ wherein change through reform to old structures and deregulation are key.

This might suggest that the dual direction of internationalization constitutes both opportunity and challenges to the state. Potential challenges might be viewed as the state being influenced by external actors while opportunities may comprise the state’s increasing its capacity to influence the international order and affairs. For instance, Hook and Weiner (1992) provide another definition of ‘internationalization’:

Analytically, internationalization can be understood to involve a multi-dimensional process – of one nation penetrating another; of a nation being penetrated; of policy adjustment on the national level in response to international pressures; and of subnational actors influencing the international system (Hook and Weiner 1992: 1 in Dobson 2015: 455)

Both opportunity and challenges are reflected in a key-phrase of Abe’s growth strategy, namely winning in the world (sekai-de katsu). That is, while Japanese growth is often portrayed as beneficial to the ‘world’, there are paradoxically potential winners and losers—at the very least, Japan—dependent on its response to changing conditions.

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To understand the potential opportunities and challenges, it is necessary to first understand the nature of change brought about by internationalization. Of course, owing to the broad-scope of this phenomenon, the amount of literature on this topic is, to understate it, extensive, and cannot be fully covered here (but see Strange 1995; Stiglitz 2002; Rupert and Solomon 2006; Herod 2009; Baylis et al. 2013; Chirico 2014; Ravenhill 2014; Scholte 2015). However, the following section discusses the nature of such change and how it influences state behaviour over international affairs. This, too, influences political behaviour in domestic politics because globalization involves and necessitates national level response to international pressures (Hook and Weiner 1992).

8.1.2 How is it changing?

While terms denoting globalization are contested, it is generally accepted that ‘world change’ took place following the Cold War era, with the world undergoing or having undergone significant structural change. IR theory on Japan generally regards this change to have impacted Japanese security and economic policy (Hasegawa and Hook 2001; Hook et al. 2012; Singh 2013; Dobson 2015; Hughes 2015b).

Bipolarity gave way to a unipolar world order following the collapse of the USSR. The rise of other major single-state actors such as the PRC and the EU as a regional actor are suggested by some to challenge this unipolar global structure, with the US having demonstrated limitations to its economic and even military power. However, unilateralist action by the US such as shelving the Kyoto protocol on climate change and the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and prosecuting a war in Iraq in violation of the UN Charter, supports the notion that the post-Cold War structure is better described as unipolar with a limited dominant global power in the US and emerging powers (Sakamoto 2004; Karatani 2009: 118-130; Hook et al. 2012: 31-33).

These emerging powers are considered by some to be a source of antagonism further destabilizing the security environment as a force contributing to the multipolarization of the world order. However, as Sakamoto (2004) notes, two components to the post-Cold War structure constitute an inherent contradiction and hence pose challenges to it. These include a global hierarchy of power “which constitutes a pyramid of hegemony and disparity” and a concurrent “dynamic of universalizing the principle of equal rights of human beings”, with the US playing a lead role in both. In the present-day existing structure, top-of-the-line arms are monopolized by and in the US where simultaneously there is the possibility of dissemination of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to states at the lower layers of the pyramid and terrorist groups and that “militant forces at the lower layer of the pyramid, keenly conscious of their being ruled and oppressed, resort to terrorism as
asymmetrical warfare” (Sakamoto 2004). Concurrently, what is behind much political conflict is the “universalization of the demand for equal rights” wherein many people are increasingly aware of inequality and oppression between the various national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups (Sakamoto 2004).

More asymmetrical methods of warfare towards the US, such as the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi and the 9.11 attacks, have buttressed the view that the world is a source of threat to US homeland security while the US is “perceived by public opinion in many countries as the “biggest threat to peace”’ (Sakamoto 2004). This view stems from counter-terrorist responses resulting in indiscriminate killings of innocent citizens; torture of people, some held without trial, in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and UN Convention against Torture; and criticism surrounding ‘democratization-from-above’ as being centered on making the world safe for US interests, or replacing authoritarianism with—at least temporarily—occupation (Sakamoto 2004). Conversely, there are claims that dictatorships are unsustainable forms of governance which gives the US and other members of the UN the imperative to democratize-from-above so that new markets are opened up, affording further economic integration which ostensibly benefits everyone, enfranchising oppressed populations, and where a democratic system can safeguard against belligerence (Dunne 2011; Forsythe 2014; Jönsson 2014).

Amidst this, the post-Cold War structure is still transforming with the US undergoing a kind of “military and economic over-stretch” forcing it to offset some pressures on its own economy and military, catalyzing globalization and regionalization (Hook et al. 2012: 34-35). For instance, the US has increased pressure on states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand to join the US’ self-proclaimed ‘war on terror’ against designated terrorist groups and the proliferation of WMDs (Hook et al., 2012: 34-35). The Japanese state has also been pressurized by key actors within the US to enact changes necessary to be able to exercise CSD and the TPP (Hughes 2015b). The contraction of its nonetheless unparalleled military and economic power has forced the US “to seek closer working ties with multilateral institutions and regional groupings in the future” (Hook et al. 2012: 34-35). The empowerment of such formations will likely comprise the most sizeable influence on how the Japanese state determines its IR (Hook et al. 2012; see also Mendl 1995; Hook 2000; Katada 2002; Solís 2003; Pekkanen 2005; Miyajima and Kim 2006; Yoshimatsu 2007; Hughes 2009; Jain and Lam 2013; Zhang 2014).

The result of internationalization might be seen as the intersection between globalizing and regionalizing forces. Firstly, globalization “signals the fact that one state can no longer be isolated from others, and heralds the interlinking of human relationships across space and time” (Malcolm...
Regionalization is considered as conceptually separate as it denotes “a dynamic process leading to the formation of units of social interactions with at least some degree of geographical proximity and interdependence in the economic, political or security dimensions” (Hook et al. 2012: 31). However, it has been implied regarding numerous regional institutions that such projects may be stepping stones to integration-on-integration, potentially as a form of interregionalization. Examples may include proposals of Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) integration to the EU, TPP as a stepping stone to FTAAP, or the US-led New Silk Road Initiative (US Department of State 2011; 2015) to connect and integrate Afghanistan in Central Asia and to further integrate Asia and Europe. In theory at least, then, a state’s (and none-state actors’) capacity towards attaining an advantageous position within regional frameworks has the potential to greatly influence their position in the world as regional frameworks may expand to interregional or even global levels. The question at the heart of theoretical discussions surrounding the formation of new blocs, accompanied by national deregulations and transnational regulations such as investor-rights agreements, who has most input and who benefits the most? These frameworks have the potential to significantly empower and enervate state and non-state actors.

On the one hand, a number of regional institutions such as APEC and North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are considered to embody a US “globalist project” towards “spreading the norms of neo-liberal, free-market economics and liberal democracy” (Hook et al. 2012: 32-33). On the other, regional initiatives exclusive of the US such as the AIIB, Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), EEU, SCO, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), among others, may be considered to add a further restraint on US unilateralism as states operate in institutions without US input, potentially disseminating and buttressing different norms and rules of trade and investment. How this array of seemingly competitive groupings integrate within an increasingly multipolar global structure and its implications for peace and sustainability is an open question.

Similarly, globalization has seen the emergence of non-state actors who construct institutions “to govern rules in their daily lives in the face of exposure to global economic and political forces” while transnational representatives “accre [global knowledge to overcome state impediments” (Hook et al. 2012: 33). This deterritorialization of the state as a fundamental building block to the international system has caused states to become obsolescent and restricted in their ability to exercise sovereignty, leading some to claim that states may wither away or transmogrify (Giddens 1991; Strange 1995; Dabashi 2001; Dobson 2015: 456). Further, the accelerating rate of

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117 The PRC, too, is leading a regional economic initiative with states in the region known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (*yidai yilu*), among other initiatives.
technological development has led to increased capital costs and a shortening of a product’s market life causing firms to internationalize impacting deterritorialization and interstate competition to attract capital and win market shares in profitable products and services with high value-added output\(^{118}\) (Strange 1995).

This increased bargaining power of capital poses a threat to a nation’s democracy, as the victories gained by labour over capital are abjured by states seeking to maintain ‘competitiveness’ amidst rapid technological change (Hook 2000; Supiot 2013). For instance, pressures on states to attract capital results in a socioeconomic process akin to the race-to-the-bottom phenomenon. While NICs may be able to provide more lucrative offers, state support among developed nations for firms such as those in the defense industries can increase market share in world markets, constituting a source of affluence among such states. Owing to this competition, it is argued that many democracies are transitioning towards a ‘post-democratic’ state where much decision-making is delegated to a politico-economic elite, without restriction to lobbying from businesses within a polity centered on non-interference in market forces – related to what some dub ‘new medievalism’ denoting more generally decentralization of state authority (Crouch 2004; see also Strange 1995; Marquand 2004).

Paradoxically, then, within this paradigm, though not necessarily incompatible, there are claims that internationalization has resulted in increased security threats compelling the US and allies to forcefully democratize nation-states due to it being considered a peaceful system of governance vis-à-vis other democracies and also a consistent system for enduring economic growth (Fukuyama and McFaul 2010). However, there is also the view that it endows capital to the point that it poses an existential threat to democracy, which, then, is inherently dangerous internationally within the logic of liberal interventionism as it risks giving rise to extreme domestic (at first) forms of social movements and forms of government.

Overall, then, the challenges and opportunities that globalization and regionalization present to the state are related to sovereignty where penetration into other nation-states or regions potentially affords it and its associated stakeholders sizeable benefits. In contrast, a weakening of state sovereignty and determination based on foreign state or regional penetration of the nation-state poses an enormous challenge to state legitimacy. It is, however, within this broad scope that various IR traditions conceptualize these two internationalizing processes. To this end, with ‘world change’ a prominent theme in Abe’s speeches and causative factor behind treatment

\(^{118}\) Strange (1995) argues this has become more fundamental for wealth-creation than the amount of land in cultivation or even resources causing state authority to wither as it is forced to share it with non-state entities.
recommendations, then, it is necessary to examine exactly how Abe conceptualizes this change based on the divergent theories from IR theory. This is carried out in the following subsection, below.

8.1.3 Abe and globalization: Placing Abe in the IR literature

Though §7 discussed neonationalism in Abe’s depiction of national security issues, Abe’s overall framing of issues is mostly attributable to the neoliberal account of globalization. That is, while controversial statements that appear neonationalist may be commented over more prominently, Abe’s overall rhetoric reflects most predominantly neoliberal ideology. Crucially, within this framework, security and economic issues are seen to coalesce where, as a result of increased economic interdependence and hence vulnerability to international changes, Japan’s ostensibly introverted security policy is considered to be jeopardizing Japan and the global economy’s economic potential and security, while also being inadequate to respond to internationalizing security threats such as asymmetrical warfare. This section, then, provides a brief overview of liberalism and neoliberalism with respect to globalization (denoting internationalization in general), relating it to Abe’s central arguments concerning policy change.

A general proposition of liberalism is that all citizens are all equal before law and all possess fundamental human rights. The upholding of human rights, rule of law and other elements of liberalism are routinely used by Abe as a rationale for the state’s international engagement or its delegates, such as the SDF, whether agreements are multilateral, regional or bilateral (§6; §7). Also, despite obvious abuses in soi-disant liberal states, the authority of the legislative assembly of any liberal polity should only be what people invest into it, whose rights are to be upheld (Dunne 2011). To this end, Abe frequently includes democracy and human rights as a value that Japan upholds (§6 §7), often to demarcate the state’s ostensible allies with other states such as the PRC. Further, liberalism encourages a largely market-driven system of economic exchange, contending that it is more effective than one subordinate to regulation and control (Dunne 2011). Again, Abe frequently points to the value of free-markets or free-trade, and the rule of law and security of trade routes to safeguard it (§6; §7).

While realists consider military might as the ultimate arbiter of international affairs, liberalists consider it to be multilateral institutions, meaning that the solution to issues where antagonistic behaviour arises is to reform the system and encourage purportedly peaceful activities such as business to increase interdependencies and cooperation (Dunne 2011: 102; Hook et al. 2012: 36-37; Jönsson 2014: 106-107). Again, Abe frequently draws the link between increased interdependencies between states and the need for Japan to integrate with international partners,
though most prominently the US and not multilateral institutions. Further, he employs notions related to theories of mutually assured destruction concerning security matters with frequent claims that security changes, particularly those that benefit the Japan-US relationship, serves as a deterrence (yokushiryoku) to war\textsuperscript{119} (Jönsson 2014; Forsythe 2014; Sakai 2014: 55-62; Urata and Kim 2012). For economic matters, also, Abe frequently employs a TINA rhetoric, where the electorate are faced with the Hobson’s choice of acquiescing in economic reform or watching conditions drastically deteriorate.

While it emphasizes international governing institutions, liberalism might best be described as pulling in two basic directions. On the one hand, there is the commitment to freedom of social and economic spheres which generally supports a minimalist role for governing institutions as a form of ‘negative’ freedom, denoting freedom from external interference. On the other, there is the view that the democratic political culture on which such freedom is predicated must be safeguarded as an analogous extension of ‘positive’ freedom which denotes individuals having the power and resources enough for self-actualization (Dunne 2011: 103). For instance, liberal internationalists assert that free-trade leads to international prosperity, peace and cooperation with an innovative private sector considered the engine of progress while freedom provided by democratic and republican governments support the maintenance of this system. Crucially, this strand of liberalism typically ascribes a minimalist role for governing institutions (Jönsson 2014: 108-109). Conversely, neoliberal institutionalism states that, though such economic conditions are conducive to prosperity and peace, independent states must proactively “pool together their resources and even surrender some sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth” and liberty (Lamy 2011: 121). Here, Abe may be described as leaning towards positive liberalism and neoliberalism as he frequently imputes business activity and economic growth with positive value. What is more, this is not just positive in itself, but a stabilizing and peaceful force in the world. That is, peace and stability is premised on prosperity (i.e. through free-trade and the rule of law), while such prosperity is premised upon proactive contributions for international peace and stability. Hence, the state is treated like an individual in the international community where it must self-actualize to fulfill its own responsibilities suitable to its economic size and contribute to a stable international order. Further, in economic policy also, Abe frequently points to the free-market as the engine for growth, given that on many occasions, Abe’s discourse reflects the observed tendency of the state to become a

\textsuperscript{119} Realists, on the other hand, remain largely unconvinced of the promise of international institutions to a resounding and lasting peace (Mearsheimer 1994).
'competition state'\textsuperscript{120} in its adjustment to neoliberal globalization in which he places emphasis on the deregulation of markets and 'opening up' Japan to international competition.

The emphasis on the bilateral relations with the US, however, may indicate a separate political ideology behind the rhetoric. That is, realists and neorealists claim that globalization is a means for states to maximize their power relative to others (Dunne and Schmidt 2011). For instance, one view is that the unipole predominantly decides the terms of agreement, with claims that many of the multilateral institutions that embody economic and security integration associated with globalization are ultimately US-founded, allowing the US to reward cooperation and punish defectors on its own terms (Charrette and Sterling-Folker 2014; Sakamoto 2008). Further, the core values of globalization—liberalism, capitalism and consumerism—are exactly those advocated by actors and many key stakeholders of the US state, which at the same time, is the foremost proponent of globalization and the dominant power. Thus, through rule-making it acquires a disproportionate share of the benefits relative to others (Dunne and Schmidt 2011: 97; Mastanduno 2009). This view is shared among critical theorists and Marxist scholars also who generally consider the acceptance as a norm of neoliberal policies a telling example of US hegemony. For instance, many claim neoliberal emphasis on free-trade, while generally accepted in some states to benefit everyone, in fact only benefits the hegemon and advanced state allies as efficient producers in the global economy making their products cheaper than even locally produced goods of the same kind worldwide. Further, this causes Third World countries to become reliant on the export of raw materials while privatizing industries in developing countries allows investors from advanced states to purchase infrastructure and resource industries at bargain prices, while bankrupt states undergo neoliberal structural reform to receive loans from the IMF (Hobden and Wyn Jones 2011: 139), or other more distant methods of modulating state behaviour (Joseph 2012).

Moreover, realist and critical/Marxist research frequently emphasizes the conflictual nature of the changing international system, with interconnectedness giving rise to mutual vulnerability. For the Japanese state, many realists argue that the transforming international system is pushing Japan “to revisit some of its prewar assumptions about how to secure its national interests” (Hughes 2015a: 443-444). Additionally, critical theorists/Marxists emphasize the state's drive for material domination over other societies alongside mercantilist interests such as state remilitarization driven

\textsuperscript{120} The ‘competition state’ is also sometimes called the ‘Schumpeterian workfare state’ (Jessop 2002). Put simply, in a ‘knowledge-based economy’ (Powell and Snellman 2002), the state prioritizes ‘liberalization’ and deregulation of markets, notions of ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘innovation’ in workfare, and a ‘flexible labour market’. The state reflects Polanyi’s (1944) ‘market society’ where all things are commodified. To this end, Abe in fact references Schumpeter directly in a speech stating his desire to ‘open’ Japan, and to make it an innovative country based on knowledge through reform and deregulation (Abe 6 October 2013).
based on a military-industrial commercial interest, especially during premierships of Koizumi and Abe (Halliday and McCormack 1971; McCormack 2007; Hughes 2015a: 443-444). Within both traditions, the Japan-US alliance is crucial. For example, McCormack (2007) notes that the Japanese state is dependent on the US but also harbours a neonationalist drive to become a global power. Also, defensive realist scholars contend that the Japanese state plays a balancing act with the US between being drawn into conflict and being abandoned if not seen by the US as a reliable ally. Simultaneously, offensive realists argue that with the PRC as a possible new hegemon and the weakening of the US-dominant system, the Japanese state will seek to strengthen ties with the US and become a strong military power independent of allies also (Hughes 2015a: 443). However, there are doubts as to whether increasing dependence on the US will not prove counterproductive to ambitions of becoming an autonomous global power (Hughes 2015b: 94).

Despite this, a standard conservative argument in Japan is for Japan to become a ‘normal state’ by focusing on the preamble of the constitution as opposed to Article 9. Here, the preamble promotes attaining “an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace” (Appendix 8), which on the surface at least would mean a prioritization of the UN as the face of international society as well as internationalism. Of course, this is in no way to suggest that Abe does not frequently promote Japan carrying out a more proactive role in the UN; rather it is to suggest that the fact that Abe most frequently promotes further integration with the US is indicative of political realism and not neoliberalism, per se. That is, while the US is frequently portrayed as a nation that “shares our [Japan’s] values” or an active contributor to international PPS, internationalist norms are exploited to simultaneously promote bilateralism with the US. Despite calls for PPS throughout the world, the US is the foundation of much of the Abe administration’s foreign policy initiatives, even though, as stated in §6, most initiatives involve Japan and the US carrying out a proactive role in localities external to both states. In the realist literature, further integration with the US remains an issue of power, a pursuit that undergirds the global political system. Thus, while advocating international contribution on the basis of PPS for all, Abe legitimizes actions that reflect underneath a political realist ideology whether by emphasizing the alliance with the US or, based on Hegelian notions and HST, to further integrate with other G7 states with the US at the centre.

Additionally, neoliberal orthodoxy contends that a system of global governance is key to manage the processes of globalization (Lamy 2011: 121), while other liberalist schools alongside realist and critical theoretical/Marxist claims, assert that economic liberalization advocated by
Western financial institutions frequently conflict with human liberty121 (Dunne 2011: 108-110). Needless to say, to the author’s knowledge, this point is not addressed by Abe. Rather, what is emphasized is the “rule of law” as a necessary part of ensuring a peaceful world. This is despite the lack of consensus even among liberal theorists regarding the role of international law and the extent to which international organizations should place political or legal restrictions on state sovereignty (Jönsson 2011: 114). Here, there is the view that a system of world peace must be proactively sought through legal frameworks and institutions while competing regionalist, multilateral frameworks pose a threat to this order. Conversely, there is a skepticism towards the corrigibility of these frameworks, exactly how inclusive they are to all people and states, and whether they are more conducive to the values of liberty or whether they adhere more to the power interests of a privileged minority of actors and stakeholders, effectively undermining the legitimacy of liberalist endeavours to avoid the violent repetitions of history.

Here, apart from Abe’s advocation for Japan to become a permanent member of the UNSC (e.g. Abe 26 September 2013), challenges are, of course, seldom made towards the frameworks of which Japan is a member. However, though not in the dataset, Abe was asked to reflect on why the Abe administration had chosen not to join the AIIB in a television interview, where he stressed, among other things, concerns over disorganized frameworks of investment and their impacts, shared among member-states of the G7 including the US 122 (Reuters 20 April 2015). These sentiments were repeated eight days later during a joint press conference with US President Obama (Abe 28 April 2015). That is, while Japan and the US proactively seek a system for world peace, competing frameworks potentially pose a threat to this, even though a number of other G7 states, who ostensibly share Japan’s values, elected to join the AIIB. Again, this hints at political realism underneath the neoliberal rhetoric. Further, this is conducive to suggestions in critical theory that liberalist sentiment is used by state actors and non-state actors alike to maximize their own interests at the expense of others, effectively undermining the legitimacy and conviction of the liberalist enterprise (Cunliffe 2011).

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121 An example of this would be the poorest children in parts of Africa having to pay for primary school education, despite its inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Booth and Dunne 1999: 310 in Dunne 2011: 110), or the privatization of healthcare in Zambia promoted by the World Bank (Galeano 2002 in Leal 2007: 541). Others may include the democratic deficit in global governance where, for instance, up to 200 states might believe in international military action over a security issue but with one veto, any action would contravene the UN Charter (Dunne 2011: 110).

122 Similar sentiments are found elsewhere regarding frameworks for Chinese international investment. For example, there are claims made by senior Japanese cabinet members that Chinese investment through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation lacks transparency (Ampiah 2008: 307).
Overall, Abe’s arguments are mostly reflected in neoliberal accounts of globalization. For instance, the emphasis on stability as a condition of peace and prosperity; merging together economic and security concerns; the emphasis on the mutual benefits of integration; the need to ‘secure’ peace in an increasingly hostile and transforming world; and the emphasis on ‘proactivity’ as a foreign policy to carry this out alongside domestic reform in Japan to achieve growth to the collective benefit of all. However, it is nonetheless unclear as to whether the policy initiatives are ultimately neoliberal responses to globalization, despite the fact that core tenets of neoliberalism denote Abe’s depiction of world change; a key depoliticizing theme used to justify policies and initiatives. To this end, two case-studies are examined in detail in the following section to evaluate whether these can be concluded to be (neo-)liberally motivated or whether such policy initiatives may be motivated by other factors.

8.2 Abe’s justification of key initiatives

The two examples that have been of central importance to the Abe administration and examples of state response to the changing international structure (Hughes 2015b); namely, discussion over integration into the TPP and the transposition of pacifism. These two issues specifically are addressed as they relate to the observed tendency in the holistic analysis for the PM to support international frameworks over domestic ones in response to internationalization.

As stated, the onus placed by neoliberals on international mechanisms of governance is shared by Abe, who frequently points to international conditions, expectations or frameworks to depoliticize debate concerning the enactment of policy through the national, democratic framework of legislation. The following subsections, then, aim to analyze two key policy initiatives of the Abe administration, negotiations in the TPP and PP as a new state-pacifism and foreign policy, to consider the possible motivations behind them. It is argued that for both case-studies it is by no means certain as to whether these policies derive from liberalist and neoliberal motivations. The following two subsections provide the case-studies to the conclusion in §8.3, which suggest ways in which we might seek more clarity in defining such values.

8.2.1 Regional frameworks as a gateway to the new century

Most discussions concerning the formulation of regional economic frameworks refer specifically to the TPP in Abe’s speeches. The decision to enter negotiations was controversial among LDP
supporters with the prospective Abe administration promising to oppose the TPP if premised upon an “elimination of tariffs without sanctuary” in the 2012 General Election manifesto (LDP 2012: 12/21/25). Nonetheless, it comprises a major component of the administration’s policy portfolio (Hughes 2015b) and so warrants further examination123.

The TPP was discussed in both the IRE and IS frame. Both frames place the Abe administration as the purveyors of benefit alongside world actors, while the IS frame denotes a ‘changing world’ as a reason for risk. In terms of evaluation, both appeal to localities external to Japan and morality, while the IS frame includes Japan and the IRE frame includes the Japanese economy and the economy of the world/region/foreign state. Finally, these frames differ in terms of treatment recommendations with IRE recommending the implementation of the domestic economic growth strategy, while the IS frame recommends PP and reforming national security. However, both frames recommend improving IR with other states or multilateral fora and the category ‘vague statements’.

The qualitative analysis regarding the TPP demonstrated that it was subject to securitizing moves through a last chance saloon rhetoric, that is, join now or lose your chance to negotiate terms within the borders of this new economic deal. While Abe frequently likens it to a curtain-opener to an Asia-Pacific century, the deal itself currently includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US, Vietnam and Japan, but does not include any states more strongly associated with the more recent rapid economic growth within the Asia-Pacific such as China, India, and Indonesia (§7). The deal comprises measures to reduce the number of tariffs of trade to expand the scope of products and services to be exported and imported (Tanaka and Uchiyama 2012); establish an investor-state dispute mechanism permitting private companies to sue states under certain conditions in international courts of arbitration (Nakamoto 2012); and a “living agreement” to cover new trade topics that may develop and to allow new members to join the framework at a later date (Li and Whalley 2014). Further, it is contended that it allows states to address the noodle bowl phenomenon of a disorganized growth of bilateral preferential trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific which could lead to the “distortion of investment and trade” (Capling and Ravenhill 2011). Additionally, the TPP might be used as a building block to FTAAP which, theoretically, includes most APEC states (Hook et al. 2012: 124).

123 On 23 January 2017, US President Trump issued an executive order formally ending US involvement in the TPP (Tōyō Keizai Shimpō 24 January 2017), even though the Abe administration pushed TPP legislation through both houses of the Diet the month before. However, it remains to be seen how well the Trump administration’s economic plan is received internationally, and how the administration will take a hard-line stance against the PRC, as it often claims, without engaging in some form of multilateral framework in the region.
As noted in §7, Abe claims that the reasons for his administration’s decision to join negotiations is that having an input in the rule-making process is in Japan’s national interest and contributes to the creation of new world rules, making it also beneficial for the world. Though the jury is ostensibly out on the AIIB, the TPP is considered to ensure that relationships between states deepen which will be a boon to the economy. Further, it will bolster Japanese security as a new economic bloc, and together with the US, will be established among nations which purportedly share the values of liberty, democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. Moreover, Abe cites international expectations on Japan to participate in negotiations, which he states elsewhere that Japan can lead. Due to this, his arguments surrounding the negotiations correspond to neoliberal accounts of globalization. That is, the free-market economic model is the most conducive to growth. To achieve this end, however, independent states must seek to “pool together their resources and even surrender some of their sovereignty” in the interests of the universal values that member states share (Lamy 2011: 121). Moreover, security interests are tied with economic interests as mutual interdependence is within the interests of Japan’s security agenda, to the collective benefit of all, while the way to enable such amicable conditions is through proactive engagement in establishing a framework of business that binds states to the established terms of agreement.

Aside from this neoliberal account, there are other theories that may explain the PM’s decision to engage in TPP negotiations. For example, realist and critical theoretical/Marxist accounts both point to the Japan-US alliance as a major factor. Firstly, realist literature, for example, suggests that the TPP “ostensibly contributes to the ‘third arrow’ of ‘Abenomics’ in that its wide-ranging ‘twenty-first century’ liberalization measures covering all areas of cross-border trade in goods and services, and investment and regulation should oblige domestic economic restructuring” (Hughes 2015b: 69). Further, this contributing factor to the third arrow of Abenomics has political and security implications owing to the US viewing the TPP “as a crucial component of its strategic rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific” (Hughes 2015b: 69). This is to say, “Abe’s intent has thus become to demonstrate US-Japan solidarity across all military, political and economic dimensions of the bilateral alliance, and to present a view of Asia-Pacific regional cooperation essentially under US and Japan leadership characterized by liberal political economy [...]” (Hughes 2015b: 69).

As stated, the Japan-US relationship is a significant factor in Japan’s IR because the US-Japan Security Treaty establishes a framework by which both states should integrate in the dimensions of security (Articles 3, 5, 6) as well as economics (Article 2)\(^{124}\). Following the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government has overcome domestic legal constraints to state remilitarization (§1; §3)

\(^{124}\) See Appendix 8.
while the scale of the Japan-US alliance has also undergone conceptual amendments. For instance, the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty identified ‘the Far East’ as the point of departure for the alliance though this was amended to the ‘Asia-Pacific’ in the 1996 ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century’ (Kaneko 2013; Hughes 2015b). As discussed in §7, ‘Asia-Pacific’ is a conceptually problematic geopolitical space (Hook 1996b). For instance, the UN Regional Groups contain within the Asia-Pacific Group states as far west as Cyprus but do not include any state on the eastern side of the Pacific Ocean nor in Australasia (United Nation Department for General Assembly Conference Management 2015). Moreover, though the UN includes fifty-three states in this regional group, less than half of the TPP member-states are also members of it (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam).

Regardless, the scope expanded to cover all areas of the globe in the 2006 ‘Joint Statement: The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century’ (Kaneko 2013; Hughes 2015b). Here, the economic relation to the security alliance is clear: Both states affirm that they have stood against mutual threats and for the “advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, market economy, and rule of law” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014g). Also, both acknowledge their mutual interest in “winning the war on terrorism; maintaining regional stability and prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights; securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing global energy security” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2014g). Finally, in the same year as this joint statement, US President G.W. Bush announced the Riga Global Partnership Initiative, allowing NATO to carry out joint training and exercises and “common defense planning with nations like Japan and Australia, countries that share NATO’s values [...]” (US Department of State 2006; Kaneko 2013: 400-401), while plans for FTAAP were devised by the Bush administration in the same year (Lee 2014: 53). As a core value of the Riga Global Partnership Initiative, the free-market is described as a universal, and hence inviolable, value for a better world, and thus within the cooperative remit of these ‘global’ security partnerships.

This expanded scope means that the state’s ability to exercise CSD enacted by the Abe administration could lead to the SDF supporting the US in combat operations across the globe in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz to support the US in the case of a security contingency to defend sea lines and energy supplies (Hughes 2015b: 48/67). The defense of the sea-lanes of trade is of course a vital aspect of the TPP, where economic and security issues are more interconnected because of globalization (Lee 2014). With this, it is contended that the TPP “stands in contrast to the more state developmental-oriented model for Chinese engagement in the region” (Hughes 2015b: 69). To this
end, it may exacerbate concerns from the PRC about containment which has the potential to divide
the region (Capling and Ravenhill 2011; Beeson 2014: 221). As stated, realist claims support the view
that such frameworks constitute a contestation for power. This may be affirmed with, for instance,
US President Obama suggesting that US involvement in the TPP is important because “if we do not
help to shape the rules so that our businesses and our workers can compete in those markets [of the
Asia-Pacific], then China will set up rules that advantage Chinese workers and Chinese businesses”
(Japan Times 18 April 2015).

Despite the fact that the DPJ administrations before Abe’s return to office, particularly the
Hatoyama administration, had sought to address what was considered an overreliance on the US by
engaging with China, among other states, the Abe administration can be characterized as seeking to
restore and indeed strengthen Japan’s reliance on the US both for economic and security interests, to
address the concerns of China’s growing regional influence among US and Japanese policymakers
(Lee 2014). Here, the TPP plays a crucial role. Abe joined negotiations over the TPP by promising to
protect strategic products and industries from deregulation125. The administrations prior to Abe had
shown greater interest in the China-led RCEP than the TPP, while the Abe administration’s decision
to join the TPP over RCEP hints at motivations beyond short-term economic growth, as RCEP is
expected to push economic growth by 1.1 per cent, as opposed to the TPP which is estimated at 0.66
per cent (Lee 2014: 52). While the decision to join the TPP may be in part due to fears of
marginalization following the announcement of negotiations over the US-EU FTA, the Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership126 (TTIP) (Solís and Katada 2015), it is also the result of the well-
documented diplomatic tensions with China over political dominance in the Asia-Pacific (Capling and
Ravenhill 2011; Hughes 2015b), a region which in Abe’s own words is the “growth center of the world”
(Abe 10 Oct 2013)127.

The notion of regionalization as a source of potential conflict is shared within Marxist/critical
theoretical research, which typically challenges the view that internationalization is essentially
predicated on realizing liberalist values as opposed to maximizing the self-interest of key
stakeholders of the status quo. Much research contends that owing to inequality it might produce the
profound social dislocations associated with the violent social and political movements of the past

125 The TPP, however, has high-liberalisation targets that are expected to be around 98 per cent of tariff lines
(Solís and Katada 2015: 170).
126 However, following the onset of the Trump administration, the TTIP looks to be in doubt, having also, like
the TPP, been the subject of public demonstrations by people across a broad political spectrum (Dearden 14
November 2016).
127 Of course, this is not limited to the Asia-Pacific per se. For instance, Chinese investment in Africa, is widely
considered to displace US, European or Japanese influence (Ampiah 2008; Zhang et al. 2016).
(Hobden and Wyn Jones 2014; Karatani 2014). Such violent movements are a reflection of cyclical changes in politico-economic systems. For example, Karatani (2009) suggests patterns in the world economy and IR are observable by examining the relation between state and capital during shifts in world commodities in cycles of approximately 120 years through “modes of exchange” (kōkan yōshiki). Here, in periods of 120 years comprising 60-70 year cycles in models of capitalism and world commodities in line with Kondratiev waves, world systems have oscillated between more multipolar imperial systems and hegemonic liberal systems (Karatani 2009; 2014; 2015a; 2015b). Further, assuming ‘imperialism’ and ‘empires’ may be differentiated by examining the modes of exchange, ‘empires’ are formed in a world system wherein commodity exchange is subordinate to a mode of exchange characterized by state control which is based on rulers controlling and protecting the masses (Karatani 2014: 24/82-87; 2015a). In contrast, ‘imperialism’ denotes expansion whereby control is maintained through commodity exchange and, for instance, the removal of tariff rights of other states.128 Moreover, the most recent transition is from a capitalist system of durable goods with the US as hegemon and emphasis on the welfare-state to the post-Cold War neoliberal system, characterized by the expansion of IT industries and regionalism (Karatani 2009: 114; see also Hay 2007: 141). Crucially, following Wallerstein’s (1974) claim that world powers are established firstly on superiority in the manufacturing sector and then financial and commercial sectors, Karatani (2009: 115-116) suggests that the post-Cold War system is characterized by dominance from the previous capitalist centre, the US. That is, the US is seeking to prolong its influence in financial and commercial sectors as superior manufacturing powers such as China begin wielding greater influence over international affairs.

In this light, the Abe administration’s decision to join TPP negotiations may be seen as predominantly an enterprise for regional influence and structural power. Given also that the transition into imperialism comes at the cost of civil liberties129 (Karatani 2009; 2014; 2015a), there are doubts about how conducive it is to the liberal values Abe suggests it embodies. Rather, Abe’s counselling of the TPP as a safeguard to the values that underpin liberalism serves to alienate China despite the fact that not all of the signees to the TPP can objectively claim to be the embodiment of

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128 This phase might be, if inelegantly, dubbed ‘globalization’ as the removal of protectionist trade barriers coincides with greater international exchange. The so-called “first globalization” is considered to have taken place from 1870 to 1914 where Britain and France were leading industrial and financial powers following on from the Industrial Revolution (Piketty 2014: 28).

129 Other forms of economic regionalization such as those driven by informal economic interaction as opposed to intergovernmental collaboration might suggest that regionalist and subregionalist projects are reactions by strong and weak state-actors alike to buttress security against globalist forces and manage the increased ‘organic’ changes in the mode of exchange within the global political economy (Breslin and Hook 2002).
liberal values, and that Abe has pursued further integration with other states commonly perceived as having abused liberal values such as a number of Middle East states and Russia. Behind the rhetoric, the decision to join the TPP was based on the Abe administration’s volition to restore dependency on the US to address the asymmetrical relations that existed with China, which outstripped the US to become Japan’s largest trading partner in 2006, following the re-emergence of diplomatic tensions in Sino-Japanese relations thereafter (Lee 2014: 27).

Thus, while Abe depoliticizes the issue and securitizes the negotiations, the decision to enter negotiations as quickly as possible and the partial transferal of arbitration of some economic decisions as a means of binding states to their commitments serve at least to underscore questions over regional influence as they relate to state power relative to other actors. To this end, it is possible that while ‘Asia-Pacific’ is vague as a concept and potentially misleading, Abe’s use of the term permits the inclusion of the US, as opposed to the ‘Far East’, which could conceivably include China, as an emerging power, as one of the key driving forces in the region, allows for the inclusion of the US and southward and eastward state allies, as members of APEC. With this, Abe stresses the role that the US, and potentially Japan, will play as leaders within this new deal. This, of course, coincides with the Abe administration’s drive for a more ‘proactive’ foreign policy and a larger international role for the state whether principally for peace, bilateralism with the US, or using increased multipolarity to strengthen the state’s capacity to pursue goals towards more independence, whether neonationalist or otherwise. This is discussed in more detail below, with respect to the Abe administration’s foreign policy.

8.2.2 Proactivity and pacifism

Discussion over PP is prominent in the IS frame. Revision of Japan’s national security policy is the main treatment recommendation of the NS frame, the policy initiatives of which are said to reflect the revisionist outlook of the Abe administration (Hughes 2015b). As demonstrated in §6 and §7, the Abe administration and the SDF were portrayed as beneficial causal agents while a ‘changing world’, foreign state(s) and domestic (primarily apolitical and intangible) opposition and (legal) obstructions were portrayed as the purveyors of risk. The solution was largely to reform national security and improve IR to the overwhelming benefit of Japan, and to a lesser extent, the ‘world/region/foreign state(s)’ alongside its own moral incentive. There was particular emphasis on

130 In doing so, China would be faced with considerable trade diversion effects such as an expected income loss of $15 billion dollars, far more than any other state (Solís and Katada 2015: 170-71).
the existential threat to citizen’s lives with, for example, claims that citizen’s children and grandchildren face hypothetical peril due to the inability of the SDF to come to the aid of a US vessel were it attacked in international waters transporting Japanese refugees back to Japan as a result of conflict abroad.

Also, with focus on temporal, spatial and identity claims (§7), it is argued that Abe invokes neonationalist norms to justify changes, particularly the policy change to permit the exercise of CSD. Such an argument is predicated on delegitimating the antimilitarism and related noninterventionist sentiment, which Abe effectively does by portraying his solutions as in line with international expectations of Japan and against the absurd exceptionalism of an antiquated and unrealistic pacifism (§6; §7). Abe also frequently points to the missile range of the DPRK or incursions on the East China Sea and South China Sea by, mostly implicitly131, the PRC132.

For the IS frame, the purveyor of benefit is the Abe administration, the ‘world/region/foreign state’ and the SDF, while the cause of risk is attributed to the ‘changing world’ and ‘threats from foreign states’. Treatment recommendations are generally to improve relations, PP, and reform national security, alongside vague statements. These acts would predominantly be a boon to the external localities, a moral incentive, and, to a lesser extent, Japan. As noted in §7, Abe frequently points to international expectations on Japan to contribute more to the international community and the high regard and dependency of it on the SDF as representatives of the nation. Further, Abe regularly emphasizes internationalist norms, alongside bilateralism with the US, at the centre of his foreign policy, to push forward the notion of Japan overcoming its constraining passivity regarding international affairs. Such an act would be to the benefit, both humanitarian and economic, of the world, a given region, or a foreign state, and to Japan.

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131 This activity is not limited to the Chinese state military, but also includes actions from the Chinese public such as fishermen or activists (Hook et al. 2012; O’Shea 2013; Choong 2014; O’Rourke 2015).
132 Acts of belligerence by a foreign state within Japan’s undisputed territory would fall within the remit of individual self-defence and response would not be a constitutional quandary. However, there are unresolved territorial disputes where such quandaries may lie. For example, one territorial dispute directly involving Japan and China is over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Wada 2010; McCormack 2013; Drifte, 2014) where disputes potentially allow states to assert ADIZs and EEZs (McCormack 2012; O’Rourke 2015). Owing to competing territorial claims, both the ADIZs and EEZs of China and Japan overlap, along with a number of other states (McCormack 2013; Choong 2014; Drifte 2014). Though certainly not limited to this, many incursions from both states are within these zones and not territories outright (Hook 2014a). However, neither state can claim territorial sovereignty over an ADIZ or EEZ and must allow other states the right of navigation in these zones (Abeyratne 2011; Drifte 2014; O’Rourke 2015), though crucially states have sovereign rights over resources within their EEZs where nationals of other states must comply with the law and regulations established by the coastal state (see Part V, Article 56 & 58 in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2016). Similarly, though there is no concrete basis in international law for ADIZs in general (Abeyratne 2011; Drifte 2014), ADIZs are national security measures and may require any aircraft to follow a set of instructions to pass through (Choong 2014), where the lack of compliance runs a security risk and could rapidly escalate hostilities.
Abe’s central claim regarding PP is that it is consistent with Japan’s peace state identity. Rather, owing to the world internationalizing, a more proactive pacifism will ensure PPS and hence this tradition (§6; §7). This recalibration is reinforced with Abe imputing of notions of passivity, introversion, antiquation and unfeasibility to the state’s traditional minimalist approach to pacifism (§6; §7). Abstaining from an act such as SDF deployment abroad amounts to passivity as opposed to pacifism, while in a globalizing world of heightened security risk (including economic), being a “link in the chain of international society” (§7) against threats amounts to a proactive attitude towards pacifism where the state goes-out-there-and-gets-it, rather than renouncing its ability to do so, by the same means as other internationalist states and economic powers.

The argument, then, effectively is depoliticized by isolating and delegitimating opposition by portraying the changes to Japan’s domestic security agenda as in keeping with the norms of this international society while resistance to it is due to an antiquated, passive and unrealistic attitude towards pacifism that cannot exist in an internationalizing world. This is also securitized as an issue for the state with the claims that “no country can protect peace alone anymore” (§6), effectively stating that there is an existential threat to peace and implying that minimalist pacifism is too introverted and does not acknowledge the realities of more interdependent times. The antiquated minimalist pacifism then requires a new approach. To this end, Abe frequently denotes PP as a “new flag”, a “signboard for Japan in the twenty-first century”, and a new “face” of Japan, and in one specific occasion, a “new flag” for a “new Japanese people” (§6; §7). The “new Japanese people” are more oriented towards walking down a more inclusive “road to peace” by becoming responsible actors in the ‘world’, representing a state as a responsible member of ‘international society’.

The crux of this argument, then, is that the world has changed such that the pacifism espoused by the constitution can no longer protect peace. As a result, pacifism is recalibrated to protect peace where the agency of the state transforms from an entity that threatens peace (and hence PPS) to an entity that causes it. This philosophical transition from a ‘passive pacifism’ to a ‘positive pacifism’ is seemingly consonant to liberalist disagreements over what role governing institutions and actors therein should take or refrain from to realize liberal values, itself related to notions of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberalism, outlined above. While the topic is admittedly broad, the previous chapters argued that two effective means to legitimate state intervention in international affairs and remilitarization is by securitizing the issues of pacifism with claims that traditional pacifism is unable to protect PPS in the world. The second means is by depoliticizing the argument by portraying the positive approach as both beneficial to and highly anticipated by the ‘world’.
Despite this, the view of history is a large basis from which traditional antimilitarism, which acted as a major constraint to these changes, is derived; a view that inherently distrusts the capacity of the ruling class to put the interests and welfare of its citizens first as a result of myth propagation calling for loyalty and sacrifice alongside the horrors of war and the abandonment of many state subjects during and immediately after the Asia-Pacific War, in return (Sakamoto 2005). Despite this, the minimalist approach to security by the state has led to criticisms of “buck-passing” or “free-riders”, while the increased commitment to international security affairs, whether UN-sanctioned or not, by the state, may be interpreted as a ‘proactive’ engagement (Hook et al. 2012: 69-70). As noted, passivity is often equated with introversion and abnormality vis-à-vis international society, while the remedy to this problem is a ‘proactive’ foreign policy where Japan has effective enough leadership to have input in international affairs and whose international behaviour is not subjected to further metaphorical criticisms of state/national identity.

From this, several questions emerge. Does this ‘proactive engagement’ denoted by PP as a foreign policy equate to other definitions of ‘positive pacifism’? What is passive or introverted about minimalist pacifism? To answer the first necessitates a definition of ‘positive pacifism’ as espoused by Abe. As shown in §6, PP predominantly entails contributions to the ‘world’ for PPS and strengthening ties with allies. Further, the central implicit, depoliticizing claim is that Japan cannot resist a movement on which the ‘world’ agrees. Rather, it should not act introverted and passively in a time of heightened security risk, and instead answer to international expectations by further integrating in terms of economics and security with multilateral institutions and states which would positively impact the world and Japan.

This has been the argument of many Japanese conservatives in the post-Cold War era, i.e. that Japan, as a peace-state, should become an honorable member of international society where the state carries out a more proactive role through the UN (Ozawa 1994). For example, Daisuke Akimoto (2012) argues that the process by which the state was able for the first time to despatch SDF troops abroad on a UNPKO, as a form of PP, over ‘negative pacifism’ based on Article 9 (Akimoto 2012). Moreover, it is claimed that this transition is linked to the distinction of ‘positive peace’ and ‘negative peace’ as defined by Galtung (1969; 1996) (Akimoto 2012). Here, ‘positive peace’ is taken to be the basis of a general ‘positive pacifism’. Therefore, it is necessary to understand what ‘positive peace’ means.

Galtung’s (1969) definition of ‘positive peace’ and ‘negative peace’ stem from his definition of violence. Here, it denotes “that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance”, where, for example, a child dying from
tuberculosis (the actual: she dies) in an era where she can be cured (the potential: she is cured), is a form of violence. Moreover, though violence may be personal i.e., denoting a direct act with concrete actors, it may also be structural; that is, in a system which allows children to die of tuberculosis despite having the medical resources to cure them, violence is exercised despite no concrete actors directly attacking the victims (Galtung 1969: 171). Peace refers to the absence of violence, where “negative peace” refers specifically to the absence of personal violence, and “positive peace” denotes the absence of structural violence (Galtung 1969: 183-184). Using the example above, the reintroduction of school-fees in poor countries such as Tanzania due to the IMF structural adjustment program is structural violence leading to greater inequalities against the poor (Brock-Utne 1995). In other words, violence built into the structure that causes inequality in terms of power and life chances is considered structural violence (Degenaar 1980).

The basis for labelling this kind of peace as ‘positive’ is because the absence of structural violence entails social justice (the egalitarian distribution of power and resources). Here, peace is not limited to the reduction of the overt use of violence in conflict theory alone but also incorporates development theory by seeking ways to change the system that gives rise to violence (Galtung 1969; 1996; Barnett 2008). It is in this sense, then, that the emphasis from renouncing "war as a sovereign right of the nation", "the threat or use of force", and "land, sea, air forces, as well as other war potential" to settle international disputes in Article 9 (Constitution of Japan 1946), to rather becoming an honoured member of “an international society that strives for the preservation of peace” in the preamble (Appendix 8), is considered a transition from negative to positive pacifism. In short, social justice is achievable by contributing to the eradication of structural violence in the world, as a member of international society.

However, peace is realized with the absence of all violence, structural and personal – including the agency of the state whether a deterrent or not. Further, ‘positive peace’ does not assume there is peace already to be preserved, nor does it simply entail a proactive—as opposed to reactive or ‘quiet’—foreign policy. Very specifically, it entails overcoming structural injustices that increase or impede the decrease of the distance between what violence there is in the world and what the world could be without such violence. In this sense, the instrumentalization of PP becomes key. Though a full examination of this will likely benefit from post-hoc analyses of the Abe administration, there are a number of insights early on into the third Abe administration. For example, Hughes (2015b: 29-30) contends that the National Security Strategy established by Abe posits that “an analysis of a general global power shift towards the Asia-Pacific, marked by the rise of China and its challenge to the ‘status quo by coercion’”. By extension, it also posits the need for the US ‘rebalance’
to the region where threats that exceed national borders (§6) and access to the global commons and global economic stability are considered emergent and associated threats (Hughes 2015b: 29-30). This has come with an increase in funding for Japan's defense budget, an expansion of Japan's military capabilities with emphasis on increased “readiness, mobility and jointness” for the SDF to respond to national security threats, upgrading the Japan-US alliance in terms of interoperability (e.g. of intelligence, surveillance) and aiming to develop security partnerships with ASEAN states, Australia, India, NATO, South Korea, and the UK (Hughes 2015b: 30-45; see also §3.3.3). The Abe administration has also overturned the arms export ban moving from a system of total ban of exports (with some exceptions) to “a new potential to export all forms of weaponry overseen by the [National Security Council] with some key restrictions” and, as part of its ‘proactive contribution to peace’, has linked for the time its ODA to military forces of other countries, making it easier for the state to utilize ODA for the training of foreign militaries (Hughes 2015b: 37-38). As stated, how conducive this is to the realization of the universal values it is ostensibly safeguarding remains an open question. However, the result of PP is an increased agency for the state where, “the only effective constraint” of it becoming involved in foreign wars is the word of the PM and “the prevailing political sentiment” (Hughes 2015b: 57).

Consequently, it remains dubious as to exactly how related PP as a foreign policy is to the ‘positive pacifism’ based on Galtung’s (1969) positive peace. To this end, Galtung himself has criticized the Abe administration, asserting that PP is in fact the polar opposite of his definition of positive peace (Ryūkyū Shimpō 23 August 2015), and claimed the state should establish harmony through cooperative relations with neighbouring states, rather than expand its military (Ryūkyū Shimpō 21 August 2015). Moreover, he further asserted that the administration’s efforts to permit the state the ability to exercise CSD goes against world trends of establishing a new peace order without military bases, and, in contrast to the notion of a new security agenda for a new era as routinely conveyed by Abe, suggested it is outdated (Ryūkyū Shimpō 23 August 2015).

Additionally, the choice presented by Abe frequently is somewhat of a false-dilemma; either the traditional passive pacifism which entails refraining from engagement in international society or the Abe administration’s PP. Here, the dichotomy between ‘proactive’ and ‘passive’ pacifism is a depoliticizing act as it implicitly places the locus of dissent in the attitude, as opposed to alternative political views of opponents, where there are apparent, non-military alternatives. Thus, it is dubious as to whether the relations between ‘positive peace’ and Abe’s ‘proactive’ foreign policy extends too far beyond its linguistic similarities. However, the claim that antimilitarist pacifism is at least partially passive is by no means a judgment exclusive to the Abe administration and its supporters, but a claim
that is shared by many, across a broad range of political spectra. For example, Sakamoto (2005) claims that opposition to constitutional revision for state remilitarization has amounted to only “passive” resistance as there is little discussion of concrete programs on how to overcome the double-standards posed with a security strategy that was established on compromises between Article 9 of the constitution and the US-Japan Security Treaty (§3). This “double standard” in Japan’s minimalist security agenda relates to one of its core principals regarding the course Japan would chart post-war: the Yoshida Doctrine (Singh 2013). This emphasized economic growth above all other concerns as non-military development and, to palliate questions over remilitarization of the state, reliance on the security alliance with the US and their nuclear umbrella as a deterrent from threat. As stated in §2, the use of an ‘economy first’ approach to policy has proved an effective means to promote national consolidation in Japan. Its effectiveness likely stems from the Yoshida Doctrine which facilitated the diffusion of three socially embedded norms: developmentalism as a national project to catch-up with economically advanced states, economism and bilateralism with the US (§3; Sakamoto 2005; Hook et al. 2012). It has been suggested that Abe’s efforts to re-establish Japan-US relations are tantamount to a restoration of the Yoshida Doctrine following the DPJ administrations, particularly concerning the TPP (Lee 2014). However, it is not quite a return to the Yoshida Doctrine of old because Abe frequently portrays PP as a means to stabilize the world economy by proactively promoting peace to grant the Japanese military a larger role internationally.

As for the traditional minimalist security agenda, the immediate post-war pacifism lost its effectiveness following periods of high growth and began to function as essentially a “passive-break” against, or a “passive non-support” for, constitutional revision (Sakamoto 2005). This gave way over time to the support for “constitutional revision through reinterpretation”. Here, there emerged a double standard regarding Article 9 and Japan’s security agenda, where although Article 9 originally intended non-armament of the state, over time a tacit consent emerged in support for the constitution on the one hand and the SDF and the stationing of US troops on Japanese territory on the other, which is disproportionately concentrated in Okinawa (Sakamoto 2005; §3). Moreover, the state’s military expenditure rivals that of other major powers despite Article 9 of the constitution (Sakamoto 2005; §3), while the government has traditionally advocated nuclear disarmament, implementing economic sanctions, for example, when India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, despite being strategically situated under the US nuclear umbrella.

The cause behind these contradictions is considered to be due to a “suspension of thought” where “the double standards of ‘Constitution and Self-Defence Forces’, ‘Constitution and the US-Japan Security Treaty’, and ‘anti-nuclearism and nuclear umbrella’ have permeated the consciousness of
much of the population” where owing to the fact that there are “more than a few people for whom both standards represent real intention” there is a “tendency to avoid thinking about it” (Sakamoto 2005, emphasis in original). The notion of ‘thought suspension’ regarding political issues is not uncommon in the literature as, for instance, Fujita (1986 [2010]) also describes a similar concept which he terms “totalitarianism for peace [of mind] and comfort” (anraku-e no zentaishugi)\(^{133}\) which concerns a disposition towards wanting to do away with psychological discomforts by not thinking about the inconvenient truths, particularly that come with developmental change\(^{134}\). Crucially, Fujita (1986 [2010]) also asserts that the safeguarding of peace and comfort is used by the state in attempts to legitimate militarization, given that it requires both economic development and security. At the same time, an economy-first emphasis has in the past abated deep divisions regarding the state’s security agenda (§1; §3).

In this sense, such resistance to militarization might be seen as passive because it centers on defending the constitution without “any positive, concrete program on how to change the current situation in order to overcome this double standard and to fill the gap” (Sakamoto 2005). In contrast, the Abe administration’s PP theoretically affords the state agency to realize conditions of peace, where, in the words of former US President Woodrow Wilson, and a quote that Abe himself uses and references, the emphasis is on “making the world safe for democracy” (Abe 19 December 2013), by spreading and safeguarding the ‘universal values’ of liberalism (Hoffmann 1995).

As a caveat, however, PP in effect ennobles the state with the capacity to safeguard its interests. How these states might be domestically and internationally structured and organized to realize a world without war is the central premise of liberalism. For instance, liberalism may be based on the Kantian premise that there must be the formation of republican states as the first step towards a perpetual peace (Dunne 2011: 104; Jönsson 2014: 108). This theory was criticized as being unrealistic, with, for instance, the Hegelian view that the only way for a multilateral framework of nations to work is for a hegemon state therein to be able to punish those that do not abide by its rules (Karatani 2015b), consonant with HST and the logic of international governance among some realists and neorealists (Charrette and Sterling-Folker 2014: 98-99). Further, a common criticism of Kant’s

\(^{133}\) Fujita (1986 [2010]: 389) suggests this is predominantly a totalitarianism in one’s way of life as opposed to in the manner of warfare or political domination. However, he equates this with Japan’s wartime militarist totalitarianism in terms of the ideational premises that undergird both systems, stating what this totalitarianism has in common with war-time militarism is the “disposition to fear the fact that one faces an unpleasant society or situation” while also fearing and avoiding direct confrontation with these fears (1986 [2010]: 389).

\(^{134}\) Of course, this is no way to suggest it is unique to Japan.
idealism is that it is naïve compared to Hobbesian and realist views of the international system undergirded by an endless struggle for power.

Despite this, the Kantian view is based on notions that a federation of republican states would be established as a result of this fundamental nature and not through reason or morality, but through war (Karatani 2015b: 33). Further, on the back of the League of Nations established following World War I (WWI), for a more robust UN to be established post-WWII suggests that these international frameworks of governance, unprecedented in history, were established as a result of the traumas of war (Karatani 2014; 2015: 33). Moreover, the same can be said also for Article 9 of the constitution and particularly the supporting antimilitarist norms held by many of the sufferers of such traumas. Here, there is an indirect link between Kantian ideals on the one hand with the formation of the UN and the adherence to the elements of the postwar starting point enshrined in the constitution, on the other. Owing to this link, legitimate questions might be raised towards the liberalist ambitions of state actors that seek ways to circumvent the multilateral procedures for decision-making—whether on the international level through the UN or the state level through democratic frameworks—particularly concerning, but not exclusive to, issues of military-security. For instance, the decision by the US Bush administration (and UK Blair administration) to invade Iraq in contravention of the UN Charter was premised around the Hegelian notion and HST that the US state has to unilaterally assert its leadership in the world for peace and, simultaneously, for US interests.

A similar comparison might be drawn between the Abe administration and opposition to constitutional reform. That is, Abe frequently equates or coalesces benefits to Japan and its people with benefits to the world and international society. That is, what is good for Japan is simultaneously good for the world, and Abe’s attempts to further remilitarize the state is a means to ensure a system of mutual benefits. On the domestic level, however, the drive to reinterpret the constitution—in other words, become able to enact policy that would otherwise be deemed unconstitutional without adhering to the democratic and republican frameworks in place to amend it by consent—is to depoliticize the procedures of decision-making of the state and leave its republican framework not reliant on the liberal values it was founded on, i.e. democracy and public representation, but on the power of the state to change or not. Whether or not the changes were necessary, the crux of the argument, then, is based on whether the reinterpretation was arbitrary or not (§3), with an entrenched sense that it is the notion of the state acting in the citizens’ interests and in the interests of peace at all times, as Abe frequently opines when advocating PP, that is, based on history, inherently unrealistic—a skepticism which has informed the seventy-years of antimilitarist norms against state militarization.
Further, while PP is often discussed by Abe in the context of contributing more to the ‘world’ or international society despite its conceptual disparities with the Kantian notions that undergird the UN, a more accurate description of PP is that it is a means for the Abe administration to remilitarize the state chiefly by further aligning with the US and its allies over international affairs, whether over economic or security matters. As noted in §6, the connection between PP and PPS in the world is frequently drawn in Abe’s speeches, while the threats that Abe mentions where PP may act as a suitable response frequently concern separate geopolitical regions to Japan’s, such as the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria and the nuclear enrichment program in Iran. Here, PP represents a means by which Japan can carry out its duties in international society, appropriate for a G7 state among Western Powers, where the Abe administration sought to make full use of the strategic multilateralism of the Obama administration to remilitarize Japan, regardless of how much it conforms to CSD jurisprudence (Lee 2015). Indeed, this is reflected in the states Abe most often recommends Japan should increase ties with under the aegis of PP, with ‘General/Countries that share our values’, ‘EU (including the UK)’ and the ‘US’ the most frequent (§6). In this sense, while Abe frequently suggests that there is widespread international support for PP, a more accurate reading would be that PP is dependent on eliciting international support for Japan to remilitarize as a requisite for its international commitments on the one hand, and to build and strengthen alliances to encircle China and exclude it from the regional community (McCormack 2012), on the other. What is more, these goals are not mutually exclusive as, for instance, part of increasing the state’s ‘proactive’ contribution to international society will most likely include the protection of sea routes of trade, which is a necessary condition of the TPP, which is another framework that will likely exclude or otherwise greatly disadvantage the Chinese state’s efforts for regional influence.

Overall, then, Abe’s arguments regarding the promotion of international frameworks over domestic equivalents is achieved in accordance with the neoliberal account of globalization. However, at the heart of the changes to Japan’s security agenda under PP is evidently a disagreement as to what role a state should play towards realizing peace where internationalist norms might lend themselves to the view that the state should set out a ‘proactive’ foreign policy, while antimilitarist norms specifically support the minimization of such a role, particularly if it is to involve hard-security such as combat. This debate also is at the heart of liberalist enquiries into how to direct the world into one which has less violence, warfare, exploitation and suffering than that which exists today. In contrast, realist and critical theoretical/Marxist research draw attention to the revisionist nature of the Abe administration or states in the international system as potentially more concerned with their own power ambitions by obtaining a larger role in international affairs to the benefit of their own
interests in a changing international environment. It is within the disagreements over the role of the state that Abe is able to make his case for the recalibration of state pacifism to one where the state has the agency to ensure peace internationally, in line with the norms of international society as a means to depoliticize voices opposed to the direction the state and, by extension, the nation and its citizens, are taking.

8.3 Conclusion: Solutions

This chapter has aimed to carry out the following tasks of the research methodology where the ‘social issue’ is depoliticization (§3):

- Consider the necessity of this social issue in the current social order;
- Identify potential means to overcome it.

(Fairclough 2009: 181-82)

While §8.0 provided an overall summary of findings up to this point, it was posited in §8.1 that internationalization is a prominent theme in Abe’s speeches as a reason for his policy initiatives and the necessity to act. Moreover, this contributes to the depoliticization of issues. Due to this, what this ‘world change’ might denote was addressed to assess the first bullet-point. Overall, though processes of internationalization are hard to define, the idea of world change as a causal factor in necessitating state response has credibility.

However, owing to its potentially vast scope, what response is necessary and the manner in which it is carried out is an entirely open question. As a result, §8.1 also aimed to further provide a theoretical background to accounts of globalization and relate it to the observations made from Abe’s speeches, suggesting his arguments over how Japan should respond are mostly in keeping with the neoliberal view of globalization. In §8.2, the analysis was related back to the justification of two key initiatives in Abe’s speeches, i.e., negotiations in the TPP and PP as a new foreign policy. Both discussions suggest that though the emphasis of international governing systems over domestic legal frameworks is a prominent occurrence in Abe’s speeches—an act in its self which is depoliticizing (Hay 2007; Burnham 2014)—it is not apparent that such provisions are in the values on which liberalism is based and not to state power ambitions.

Therefore, this section concludes that it is because of the uncertainties within the liberalist project alongside the rapid changes to the IPE that state leaders are able—and possibly compelled—
to depoliticize events to push for change. One of the key factors in Abe’s speeches is the obscurity of his subject categories. For instance, claims that international society/the ‘world’ is expecting Japan to ‘respond’ (i.e., sanction the changes Abe proposes) allows Abe to depoliticize issues. Moreover, generic claims such as a policy initiative benefiting Japan, a given regional and/or the ‘world’ is another effective means of depoliticizing arguments. Critical responses to such a view might question the agential proportionment of benefits and costs to such changes, whether considering society on the national or international level.

Further, the securitizing moves associated with Abe’s speeches may be best explained by the increased uncertainties that have been brought about by globalization. The global financial crisis; increased multipolarization and political uncertainties in the region; the rise of new threats such as cyber-terrorism and cyber-espionage; the rise to prominence of international terrorist groups, have contributed to an environment of uncertainty in which the Abe administration has sought to convey a sense of precariousness to situations. The use of these discursive strategies, then, provides an effective means to garner a tacit consensus enough to implement changes in response, whether or not they are entirely contributed to the values on which the liberalist project is constructed.

Providing solutions to such a process is obviously complex. On the one hand, the transfer of decision-making to more depoliticized domains, whether from public to private, national to international, do not always entail good or effective governance (Asayama and Ishii 2012; Kuzemko 2014; Hay 2014). On the other, it is too simplistic to normatively presume a moral dichotomy between depoliticization as bad and politicization as, therefore, good (Hay 2014). What is necessary, then, is a clear framework by which the values that the (neo-)liberalist project is ostensibly striving for can be defined and hence sought after and evaluated with more scrutiny—minimizing the impacts of depoliticizing rhetoric. To this end, such approaches have already been taken, with Galtung’s (1969; 1996) more clinical definition of peace providing a framework by which it can be strived for. Further, more clinical definitions of these values might afford a better understanding of how they interrelate, and provide a global framework by which such issues can be addressed on a global, multilateral and popularly-representative basis. Though seemingly farfetched, such a framework also may lend itself to the cultivation of a cosmopolitan, international or transnational identity under the UN (Sakamoto 1979 [2015]), and contribute to a popular emphasis on transnational democracy (Hook 2000: 37-38), and hence the importance of politics and public deliberation and scrutiny as a countervailing force to antidemocratic elements capacitated by depoliticization whether inalienable values of liberalism or not.
To this end, Sakamoto (1979 [2015]) proposes five common goals to better define the values are the heart of the world order: balance of the ecosystem, economic welfare, development of communication, holistic development and peaceful change\textsuperscript{135}. While much research has been carried out in this field, with a more concrete and rigorous criterion for development and ‘progress’ at the heart of globalist projects under the auspices of the UN, assertions that a certain policy initiative will lead to ‘peace’, ‘growth’, ‘prosperity’, ‘freedom’ and so forth might be subject to more rigorous scrutiny as there would be a concrete, inclusive and global criteria to compare it against. Such a criterion may also contribute to improving the governing efficacy and hence authority of the UN and delegitimate notions of the necessity of a unilateral state-actor to punish defectors. The impact of semiosis in this process is also crucial, with ‘peace’ itself a frequently used term to justify even fundamentally violent policy initiatives. That is, as Galtung notes “[f]ew words are so often used and abused – perhaps, it seems, because ‘peace’ serves as a means of obtaining verbal consensus – it is hard to be all-out against peace” (1969: 167). And so too with PPS.

\textsuperscript{135} See Sakamoto (1979 [2015]) for a more detailed discussion and definition of these goals.
9 Conclusion

9.0 Overview

This chapter offers a conclusion to the thesis. Firstly, it examines its contributions to the existing literature in §9.1. §9.1 is divided into two subsections where §9.1.1 assesses the broader implications of this research in the fields of discourse analysis and communication studies, and §9.1.2 aims to examine the contributions of this thesis into IR theory, particularly of Japan. Following this, §9.2 provides an account of limitations of the thesis and areas for further investigation. To begin, this section aims to summarize the main findings to discuss its contributions across a range of academic research.

The thesis contributes, to the author's knowledge, the first holistic analysis of Abe’s speeches as prime minister following his return to power in 2012, pioneering an administration that has carried out a number of significant legislative changes. Moreover, it sought to explain how the prime minister legitimated such changes by analyzing his political rhetoric. To do so, it has contributed a hybrid methodology, demonstrating how frame analysis can be combined with other quantitative methods for a more holistic approach to CDS which makes the step from text-mining the entire dataset to the micro-analysis of text. Further, the combination of research methods from media and communication studies to CDS supplements research that seeks to draw together research paradigms and methods from the two disciplines (e.g. Ishigami 2005a; 2005b).

Additionally, the thesis argued that the literature on depoliticization applies to Japan, particularly under the Abe administration, whether governmental, societal, or discursive depoliticization, which supplements research pointing to the emergence of a new system of governance in Japan (Hook and Takeda 2007; Hook 2012; 2014a; Nagashima et al. 2015; Hook et al. forthcoming). However, the application of theories derived from one sociopolitical area to another runs the risk of substituting research accuracy for theoretical conformity (e.g. see Johnson and Keehn 1994), and hence before explicating the depoliticizing rhetoric of PM Abe, the thesis demonstrated how changes within Japanese politics and media have resulted in a situation similar to that observed in European and external Anglophone countries on which most of the literature is focused.

Further, the thesis argued that despite the fact that Abe’s political rhetoric is largely consistent with the neoliberal account of globalization, the policies and actions carried out in its name
more accurately reflect a political realist ideology where neonationalism, state power and regional and international influence are the key driving forces undergirding policy changes, not liberalist values. Therefore, this thesis supports the social constructivist account of Japan’s IR which states that alongside material factors, it is shaped by historical-cultural norms defined by the memories of the Pacific War, the constitution, and the postwar reconstruction and period of rapid economic growth (Singh 2013: 18; see also Hook et al. 2012). Here, the thesis supplements the research by stating that Abe exploited extant norms both within domestic society such as pacifism associated with antimilitarism and Japan’s peace-state identity, as well as economism on the one hand, with internationalist norms in international society, on the other, to enact policies in the name of international contribution. Moreover, constructivists suggest that political actors “are socialized into a specific set of expectations, norms and identities, which serve to constrain and provide opportunities for them to define how they will behave internationally” (Hook et al. 2012: 37). While this explains why Abe relies on internationalist norms that are consistent with the US-led globalist project, this thesis argues that the Abe administration has effectively used the strategic multilateralism of the Obama administration’s foreign policy to further empower the state. This is consistent with the view that even under the Abe administration, the Japanese state has transitioned from a so-called “peace-state” to an “international-state” (Singh 2013; 2016) where a minimalist security agenda is surrogated by an internationalist agenda where Japan is seen to be carrying out its responsibility to the international community commensurate with its economic size. Herein, the thesis’ contribution is to show how Abe operated within this set of parameters to carry out the significant changes to the Japanese security agenda, economy, constitution and governance. Here, Abe successfully depoliticized issues relating to state and national identity, where Japan’s state identity as a peace-state is continued by transposing it away from a purportedly inward-looking pacifism to a ‘proactive pacifism’ that the ‘world’, however defined, supports.

The thesis began with the quotation by Walter F. Hatch (2010) over the contestation of national identity (§1), and stated that one of the most influential groups informing that identity since the return of the LDP to power, is Abe and his administration. By using depoliticization theory, the thesis has sought to demonstrate how Abe has garnered increasing influence in transposing state identity to one that better conforms to the administration’s ideological ambitions. It is, of course, too simplistic to make predictions on future manifestations of state identity, not least because the Abe administration is limited by the cultures and practices of governance in the international system, and hence drastic changes therein could effectuate equally significant changes domestically. However, depoliticization in Japan as discussed in §3 means that Abe’s LDP have minimized external
competition while voter turnout has dwindled to record-breaking levels. At no time, even during the LDP-dominant party system in Japan, were voter turnouts as low as today. In amongst this, to address what was considered an imbalance in Japan’s security capabilities compared to other advanced states and Japan’s economic size, Abe has sought to depoliticize issues through rhetoric on economic growth through internationalization and further reliance on market forces or by claiming the collective responsibility of the nation and state to act in accordance with international state allies on issues of global governance. Further, this has facilitated legislations related to the so-called rise of the ‘national security state’, where democratic rights and liberties are curtailed in the name of national security (Mendieta 2015) with, for example, the State Secrecy Act. However new developments in the international system or domestically impact governance in Japan, this thesis argues that depoliticization is an essential analytical tool to investigate its changes in systems of governance.

While the findings are summarized above, the following section explains further the contributions to the literature this thesis makes.

9.1 Broader implications and contributions

This section is divided into two parts. Firstly, in §9.1.1 this thesis’ contribution to the fields of political discourse studies and political/media communication studies is assessed. §9.1.2 discusses its contributions to IR research, particularly focusing on Japan. Additionally, both sections examine how the implications of certain empirical observations fit into the larger field of research that probes into structural and normative changes in the role of the state due to globalizing and regionalizing forces. Following this, §9.2 discusses the limitations of this thesis and areas for further research.

9.1.1 Discourse and Communication Studies

The approach to political communication/discourse analysis makes use of text-mining software, methods of frame analysis in media/political communication studies, and CDS. Discourse analysis has benefitted from tremendous developments in approaches and methodologies to address and understand its role in the ubiquity of human communication (see van Dijk 2011a). In CDS, too, a wide variety of methodologies have emerged to systematically explore the relationship between language and social institutions, the exercise of power, and the transmission and constitution of knowledge (Wodak and Meyer 2009a; §2). Among these, corpus linguistics has allowed researchers to analyze
discourse from voluminous datasets and broaden their empirical base while adding quantitative methods to research designs that can help to reduce researcher bias (Mautner 2009). Additionally, this particular approach can make use of text-mining software designed towards statistically deriving useful information from expansive datasets as technological developments continuously afford increased data storage and demands to do insightful things with it.

However, to ‘step down’ from the quantitative analysis surveying all texts to the localized qualitative analysis of selected texts can require making presumptions about the discourse before qualitatively assessing it, which, though limited to a small number of texts, can often be much richer in content and hence informative. One step may be to ‘step-up’ to the macro-quantitative from the micro-qualitative analyses to examine, for instance, how discourses of knowledge are recontextualized to other social fields or institutions (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). There too, however, the risk remains of overlooking something significant as the researcher has set the conceptual parameters of study without first acquiring the empirical, quantitative data as a basis to do so. For this thesis, the breadth of the topic necessitates using text-mining software another way. Rather, it was necessary to outline the content structure of the texts. To do so, the thesis offered a hybrid methodology which relied on the identification of keywords given that there are theoretical grounds for claiming highly repetitive areas in speech are likely more salient than others (§2). In doing so, it provided a novel means by which frame analysis can supplement approaches to CDS and how the quantitative analysis of text can transition to micro-level analysis to provide a holistic analysis of political speeches.

Therefore, the frame analysis contributes to political/media communications research, and particularly, to the growing body of frame analysis research carried out on Japanese politics and the media (Ishigami 2004; 2005a; 2005b; Matsuba and Ueda 2011; Asayama and Ishii 2012; 2014; Katô 2012; Mitani 2012; Yoshimoto 2012; Hamano 2013; Nagai 2014a; 2014b; Wakuta 2015), while the thesis contributes also to the growing body of work that seeks how to combine quantitative methods with micro-level analysis (e.g. van der Does-Ishikawa 2015). Further, the research methodology is adapted from that provided by Matthes and Kohrings (2008) to politicians’ speeches as opposed to media analysis, which contributes to the expansion of domains of analysis from media representation to political speeches. This, it is hoped, will provide room for further exploration into the relationship between media coverage and political speeches; a research paradigm of acute significance as the relationship between politics and the media has undergone notable change in many countries, including Japan (§2; §3).
Additionally, the thesis contributes to the literature on assessing state responses to the pressures of globalization while attempting to integrate observations to existing research in a variety of fields within the social sciences. This is carried out with the application of depoliticization to the textual analysis, where the thesis claimed that discursive depoliticization is not only identifiable in national responses to globalization in the realm of economics (including social welfare) but also to issues of global governance (see also Joseph 2012), including state responses to international security contingencies. Here, one empirical finding is that Abe successfully equates issues seemingly of national security with issues concerning economic growth by attempting to securitize both issues under a vision of a global economy wherein costs/benefits for Japan impact the world in the same way. Moreover, the analysis links depoliticization with research on global governance, with most research on depoliticization centered on economic policy, and supplements research that seeks to incorporate securitization theory into research on depoliticization (Kuzemko 2014; Wood and Flinders 2014).

The analysis also indicates how Abe rationalizes the challenges exerted on the state by the forces of internationalization as a reason also to expand the state’s military role. As indicated in §6, this is carried out by attempts to securitize such issues by, for example, relating the protection of sea trade-routes and so forth to the quality of life of Japanese citizens. This opens the avenue for the further development of the theoretical contribution of this thesis, discussed in §9.2. Before this, however, owing to the transdisciplinary nature of CDS, this thesis also provides a case for explaining aspects of Japan’s international relations with regards to the subtle use of norms. This is the topic of the following section.

9.1.2 Japan in IR Theory

While theories from realist and liberalist camps of IR have been used in the preceding chapters, the contribution this thesis seeks to make is towards buttressing the social constructivist approach and eclectic approaches such as the English School.

Here, key political actors are considered to operate within the parameters of a dominant discourse and negotiate socially-embedded ideational constructs to recalibrate the roles and responsibilities of the state and its citizens in line with new methods of governance and/or state interest (Hook 2012). This intersects frameworks of governance towards the domestic population and foreign policy within the architecture of international society and a transforming IPE. Political behaviour and the behaviour of states is constrained by a range of material and ideational factors mediated across the gamut of stakeholders in the policymaking process. Due to this, the analysis of
discourse can provide useful insights into how these constraints are negotiated or rationalized in attempts to legitimate and naturalize behaviours. The analysis of media communications, for instance, highlights its importance in this process, while others, of course, point to the role of politicians and the relationship between the two (§2; §3).

The thesis claims that Abe’s rhetoric is concordant with neoliberal accounts of globalization, but that behind the rhetoric, the policies and initiatives pursued by the Abe administration reflect a political realist ideology which undergirds the administration’s aims of expanding the state’s influence in regional and international affairs and structural power within multilateral economic frameworks (§8). This is premised upon the so-called ‘China threat’ where the Abe administration is seeking to encircle China to minimize the state’s growing influence in regional and international affairs, and hence power (§3.3.3; §6.2.3; §8.2.2). In this process, the Abe administration has sought to form strategic partnerships amidst the US’s foreign policy of strategic multilateralism with a host of states including India, Australia, and ASEAN to effectively contain China. However, the Abe administration has also sought to ‘restore’ the Japan-US relationship as a priority for the state, in contradistinction to the DPJ administrations which sought to form a strategic partnership with China to overcome what was considered an overreliance on the US (§8.2.1). Amidst this, Abe’s rhetoric effectively aligned Japan with the perceived normative underpinnings of the US globalist project, which entails neoliberal globalization, to effectively externalize China and North Korea as states that do not share Japan’s values, as opposed to the US and its allies (§7; §8). Thus, Abe is operating with the specific set of expectations and norms that come with integrating with the US and allies, promoting liberalist values and PPS, while underneath endeavouring to expand the state’s military activities abroad.

This thesis also makes a number of contributions in terms of assessing how norms are politically utilized by Abe, and makes a number of contributions which supplement the social constructivist claim that alongside material factors, Japanese IR is influenced by historical-cultural norms. It is the (re-)negotiation of these norms which adds to the rhetorical impact of Abe’s speeches. For example, Abe frequently makes use of international as well as domestically-embedded norms to make his case for security reform. This undermines the norm of antimilitarism which has acted as a major constraint on the militarization of the state (Hook 1996a; Katzenstein 1996; Hook et al. 2012; Singh 2013). In general, this might be observed in the way Abe routinely points to values shared among international society, typically fundamental human rights, liberty, democracy, and sometimes also the rule of law and the free-market. Abe regularly uses these values to promote the actions and
positions the state (plans to) take within the geopolitics of international security and economic issues as a normative obligation to act how a ‘normal’ state acts, often implicitly in contrast to the PRC.

Internationalism, here, serves to imply, following the widespread criticisms of the Japanese state’s contribution to the 1990-1991 Gulf-War, that Japan is an abnormal actor within international society whether under the UN or under the US, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Moreover, in the promotion of the normative construction PP as a conceptual framework for international diplomacy, Abe made use of the internationalist, Asianist and bilateralist norms with the US. Here, Abe positioned the state as a leading contributor to the development of the Asia-Pacific alongside the US, whether as an arbiter under a supplementalist foreign policy or a partner with more autonomy than before. The negotiation between these existing norms is of interest to understand Japanese foreign policy in the future. This is because there are areas of conflict which emerge within the actuality of international politics. For instance, we earlier witnessed a tremendous flexibility in the application of internationalist norms (§7; §8). That is, they might be evoked towards the resolution of international conflicts whether under the aegis of the UNSC or not. This is despite the fact that other norm entrepreneurs evoke internationalism to promote the ‘normalization’ of state behavior under the multilateral global institutions and away from bilateralism and the ‘abnormal’ dependency on the US (Ozawa 1994). Further, as the Japanese state attempts to respond to the changing global order, what is the standard, ‘normal’ behavior of a state is something that may be subject to further disagreement and negotiation in the future. To this end, §8 suggested a more rigorous and representative definition and reflexive evaluations of the values underpinning international society. These are of particular importance in making more concrete and distinguishable the notion of an international identity and the norms that ostensibly inform it (Sakamoto 1979 [2015]).

Additionally, this thesis has problematized the subject category ‘Asia-Pacific’ as a contested region (Cook et al. 1996). That is, the concept of Asia-Pacific as a region is ambiguous with, for instance, some definitions explicitly or implicitly including the US and others not. The notion of East Asia or Asia as a region, on the other hand, is unambiguous in this regard: the US is exterior to the region, even though the US is a member of the ‘East Asia’ summit (Hook et al. 2012). Hence, Asianist norms have been used by political actors within Japan as a motivating force towards the rebalance of the state’s relationship with the US by becoming a normative leader in the region. For instance, PM Hatoyama promoted the idea of building an East Asian community based on the notion of fraternity (yūai) (Hook et al. 2012: 66), including the PRC and ROK. At the same time, the Hatoyama administration faced widely reported controversy concerning the promised offshore relocation of the Futenma US military base located in the urbanized centre of Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture.
Presently, the intent is to move the base to Henoko, Okinawa Prefecture, which constituted a major component of the more general campaign to establish a more equal relationship with the US (Hook et al. 2012). At present, locals are unable to democratically influence the location of US military bases in Japan, despite the US and Japan purportedly sharing the value of democracy. On the other hand, the promotion of Asianist norms within the context of Asia-Pacific is more ambiguous in this regard. That is, any notion of externalizing the US or at least challenging the relationship are far more obscure owing to the role of the US as the main driving force in the region in its aim for a strategic rebalance, weighted in more favour of the interests of the US state and its primary stakeholders. This ‘rebalance’ aims to address the ‘China threat’, a prevailing narrative in Japan over East Asian diplomacy (Hook et al. 2015; see also §3.3.3), in contrast to the emphasis of ‘fraternity’ during the Hatoyama administration. In this sense, Asianist norms are used by Abe to legitimate Japanese state influence in the region, while, owing to the ambiguous definition of the Asia-Pacific, also implicitly buttressing bilateralist norms with the US.

Additionally, Abe’s employment of economism contributes to the changing focus on the basic tenets of state pacifism. As stated, economism derives from the Yoshida Doctrine, and imputes economic growth with positive and pacifist value based on the ‘economics-first’ policy central to post-war developmentalism by the state. This doctrine was particularly salient during the premierships of Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Satō as a means for national consolidation following the divisive policies enacted during the administration of Nobusuke Kishi, prior (§1). Under Abe, economism coalesces with internationalism as opposed to traditional antimilitarism epitomized by the state’s former minimalist security policy. This is because alongside internationalist norms, Abe routinely equates conditions of ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ with conditions of ‘prosperity’ to justify the expanding scope of state involvement in international and regional affairs. Actively creating conditions of prosperity and safeguarding the citizens’ everyday lives is, then, tantamount to peace and hence a pacifist act, and hence inverts the traditional tenets of economism.

Overall, then, this thesis, while supporting the social constructivist and English School accounts of Japanese IR, emphasizes the significance of analyzing the political use of norms in attempts to understand how political actors communicate and attempt to legitimate state responses to a changing global order. This allows us to further examine the ways in which states are driven and...

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136 Notions of ‘fraternity’ were not solely towards ‘Asians’ under the Hatoyama administration (2009-2010). For example, PM Hatoyama promoted internationalist norms based on a ‘diplomacy of fraternity’ to legitimate the despatch of the SDF for relief efforts following the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (Hook et al. 2012: 313). ‘Fraternity’ was also a major theme in the political career of his grandfather, Ichirō Hatoyama, including during his premiership from 1954-1956 (Lee 2015).
constrained by ideational as well as material factors. However, the analysis is not limited to focusing only on ideational factors. Rather, the thesis also makes a modest contribution to research in IR and sociology on the changing role of the state, which, of course, has material impacts on its citizens. Frequently such analyses employ risk as a heuristic to understand the changing relationship between state and citizen. For instance, Hook and Takeda (2007: 94-96) contend that the state set the parameters of the normative framework for citizens to respond to risk, whereby it seeks to depoliticize issues by off-loading state risks to the market and citizens, in response to “structural changes in both international and domestic politics”. Here, the primary agency of risk prioritization is assigned to the state where it interprets and mediates risks identified within the international arena (Hook et al. 2015: 228). The process of this changing dynamic between the state and its citizens is applicable to a wide variety of areas where the construction, framing and recalibration of risk contributes to a narrative framework within which stakeholders in the policymaking process can operate to legitimate policy change in response. Such risk-based approaches have been applied to the Japanese state response to climate change, environmental issues and natural disasters (Williamson 2014b; Nagashima et al. 2015; Hook et al. forthcoming), the provision and change to social welfare (Takeda 2005; Hook and Takeda 2007), and into a range of domestic and international security issues (Hook and Takeda 2007; Hook 2010; Mason 2013; 2014; Hook et al. 2015; Nagashima et al. 2015).

While this thesis has not focused on risk as a heuristic device, by employing depoliticization as an analytical tool, it has highlighted how Abe frequently promotes international frameworks of governance over the domestic and obfuscates conceptual boundaries between state and citizen in attempts to legitimate policies which contribute to the recalibration of the roles of the state. Further, securitizing moves have contributed to this inasmuch as state transformation is deemed necessary for PM Abe to ‘bring back’ Japan from the brink, while other forms of depoliticization also convey the general sense that the Abe administration is the sole epistemic authority that can do so, obfuscating alternative views and buttressing the notion that in an internationalizing world, ‘there is no alternative’. More concretely, in §7 and §8, it was demonstrated that Abe attempts to ‘rebrand’ state pacifism as ‘positive pacifism’ for the 21st Century. This is to say, what is ‘positive’ or ‘proactive’ (sekkyoku-teki) about ‘positive pacifism’ is not necessarily that it is in keeping with ‘positive peace’ as defined by Galtung (1969; Ryūkyū Shimpō 21 August 2015; 23 August 2015), but that the role of the state is recalibrated where its agency transforms from an entity that threatens peace, as premised within antimilitarist norms, to one that causes and ensures it.
This is observable in the way Abe promotes a narrative more in line with the Preamble of the Japanese constitution and away from Article 9, which poses an inherent contradiction (§8; Sakamoto, 2005). That is, arguments towards an increased role for the state frequently centre on state obligation and notions of a rapidly changing world where state-centricity or introversion is no longer viable to ensure peace (§6; §7). This serves to renegotiate the role of the state towards a more ‘proactive’ role in international society, whether centralized under UN auspices or not. As stated, this constitutes not only a change in legislation, but is reinforced by a redefinition of the parameters of the normative framework that informs and supports it. For instance, the narrative is of ensuring global PPS to ensure Japanese PPS, linking with global partners as an obligation to international society, as a responsibility of the government to protect citizens. What is seldom—if at all—mentioned is the increased risk such an act places on the citizens of Japan. Stated in §1 is that such risk is epitomized by the hostage crisis and brutal murders of Haruna Yukawa and Kenji Gotō perpetrated by the terrorist militant group ISIL during the Abe administration (Al Jazeera 1 February 2015; Sim 24 January 2015). Further, there were 54 suicides among the 6000 SDF personnel sent to assist in the US invasion of Iraq for non-combatative reconstruction and logistical operations (Hook et al. 2012: 146; Kaneko 2013; Karatani 2015b: 41). Despite this, as stated in §6, there is a fixed emphasis on the responsibility of the government to protect citizens alongside an emphasis on the responsibility of the Japanese state to contribute to ‘international society’. The renegotiated role of the state intersects these two asserted responsibilities, where the Abe administration has successfully reinterpreted the Supreme Law of the nation to assign primary agency to state and political administration of risk prioritization towards contributing to resolving and, by extension, participating in, international conflicts. This is largely carried out by framing the debate in terms of overcoming the normative and legislative obstacles conducive to the exceptionalism, passivity and abnormality that characterize the traditional stance on state pacifism and security policy in an internationalizing 21st Century, in line with internationalist norms (§6; §7; §8). Herein, Abe promotes ‘Abenomics’ as a project to cultivate ‘new Japanese’ where these ‘new Japanese (people)’ are considered to work towards regional PPS in the Asia-Pacific as their own ‘responsibility’ under the ‘new flag’ of PP (§6). Such an argument suggests a risk-based analysis on the underpinnings of PP may provide an insightful analysis into the considerations of risk and responsibility of the state in the promotion of a less constrained foreign policy and international security policy.
9.2 Suggestions for future research

This thesis has carried out an extensive analysis reliant on an open definition of security in order to provide an account of the legitimation of policy by PM Abe. While the contributions to the literature this thesis has sought to make are outlined above, the expansive scope of the research necessitated the reduction of potentially fruitful avenues of research in other areas. Chief among these is in terms of agency. The prime minister was selected because, as the leader of the administration, he is assigned responsibility with the directing of governance of the state. However, the importance of other actors in the field in terms of legitimating policy and the official views that underpin them should not be overlooked. This is not restricted to the party in office but also an analysis of how such views are challenged (or not) by opposition parties is a potentially insightful avenue of research. Further, an analysis of media communication is important to gain a more comprehensive account of political communication over broad issues such as ‘security’, as in surveying and assessing, for example, the creation and buttressing of narratives as well as agenda setting in the mass media.

While both areas of research are by no means uncommon in and concerning Japan and elsewhere, an integrated account of the political communication of ideas and policies mediated throughout the various agencies of this process is an exciting research paradigm that offers the opportunity to further understand the, as yet, intangible processes of depoliticization as well as other observed rhetorical trends, in the process of communicating, legitimating, and naturalizing state action. One such model, compatible with social constructivist research in IR theory, focusses on the identification and apportionment of risk as a mechanism of state governance, as discussed. Such an approach provides a fruitful means by which observations made in this thesis might be investigated and extrapolated into a richer account of the processes of political and media communication in Japan and how policy changes relate to the broader observations of the changing relationship between state and citizen. Similarly, incorporating both research on the emergence of a new system of governance based on the apportionment of risk dovetails with research on depoliticization and the rise of technocratic and managerialist forms of governance. A clearer conceptual focus on concrete aspects of both risk identification and apportionment as well as processes of depoliticization would benefit communication studies that aim to demonstrate empirically changes in governance and governmentality through discourse in Japan, and elsewhere.

In this regard also, the thesis ‘traded-off’ the opportunity for a more localized study on specific (military-)security policies or topics and the ways in which they were promoted and challenged by various political agencies across time to search for any discrepancies and similarities
between political administrations or major international or national events. Such diachronic analyses of political communication potentially offer insightful contributions to research on the dissemination of ideologies, myth propagation and insights into the operationalization of norms and values to create conditions for mobilization and their cognitive impacts on individuals (e.g. van der Does-Ishikawa 2013; 2015). However, as stated in §3, a more holistic methodology as provided in this research which does not set limits on the conceptual parameters but rather on time and agency to inform and provide a means by which further research in this area might be contextualized and evaluated, is also a beneficial approach to understand the impacts of political communication. Here, the interlinking of economic and security concerns as discussed throughout this thesis might provide a useful source for a diachronic analysis on how the relationship between the two has (or has not) changed within the history of Japanese political communication.

Further, this thesis has made use of quantitative analysis from KH Coder (Higuchi 2004), frame analysis adapted from the methodology provided by Kohring and Matthes (2008) and a qualitative analysis using the dialectical-relational approach to CDS provided by Fairclough (2009). The wide scope of methods employed, then, has allowed the transition from the all-encompassing analysis of the corpus to the identification of significant areas of speech, and an informative analysis of highly localized areas of PM Abe’s speeches. However, owing to the limitations of time, space and resource, all three methods used could not be explored further. For example, coding methods were not employed in the quantitative analysis which might have enriched the analysis, while the author did not have the aforementioned resources sufficient to employ a team of trained coders to verify the robustness of identified frames in the frame analysis (Kohrings and Matthes 2008), and the qualitative analysis was carried out on twenty frames – plus potential add-ons (§7) – which were of considerable size but the analysis would have been enriched were a larger number of text analyzed.

However, this thesis has offered to the literature a methodological framework by which the analysis of large datasets might make the transition into highly localized areas of speech, not based solely on word associations but the structural framing of concepts by carrying out a frame analysis using the adapted taxonomy provided by Entman (1993). These ‘access point’ for the qualitative analysis that follow provided an avenue through which we could assess and evaluate the ways in which PM Abe sought to put his case for various policies falling under the broad remit of security. To this end, the methodological framework may contribute to future research in this field that seeks combine the rigorous quantitative methods of analysis to the highly enriching and informative methods of qualitative analysis. Further, this may contribute to an improved knowledge and explanation of political communication as a mechanism of state governance, intersecting the ever-
fuzzier peripheries of the domestic and international domains. Finally, such an understanding would also inform sociological and IR research that seeks to evaluate how the changing dynamics of domestic and international governance in an ‘internationalizing’ world impacts or will impact the day-to-day lives of the various people of the world whether for the better or for the worse.
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Appendices

Appendix (Speeches)

All texts were collected from the Cabinet Public Relations Office website, <http://www.kantei.go.jp>.

Table App.4i: List of speeches/interviews subject to analysis.
Source: Author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Speech Title</th>
<th>Translation into English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.12</td>
<td>岸田内閣総理大臣就任記者会見</td>
<td>Inauguration press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.01</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣 平成 25 年 年頭所感</td>
<td>2013 New year's impressions by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.01</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣年頭記者会見</td>
<td>New year’s press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.01</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>ゴラン高原 PKO(UNDOF) 隊旗返還式 安倍内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>Golan Height PKO (UNDOF) Flag returning ceremony, address by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.01</td>
<td>第百八十三回国会における安倍内閣総理大臣所信表明演説</td>
<td>General policy speech by prime minister Abe to the 183rd Session of the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.02</td>
<td>日本は戻ってきました</td>
<td>Japan is back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.02</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.02</td>
<td>第百八十三回国会における安倍内閣総理大臣施政方針演説</td>
<td>Policy speech by prime minister Abe to the 183rd Session of the Diet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>東日本大震災二周年追悼式 内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>Address by prime minister Abe at the second memorial ceremony for the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>内閣総理大臣東日本大震災二周年記者会</td>
<td>Second press conference by prime minister on the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.03</td>
<td>平成 24 年度 防衛大学校卒業式 内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>2012 National Defense Academy of Japan graduation ceremony, address by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.04</td>
<td>第 47 回 国家公務員合同初任研修開講式 安倍内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>47th Opening ceremony for joint training of national civil servants, address by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.04</td>
<td>安倍総理「成長戦略スピーチ」</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe ‘Growth strategy speech’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.04</td>
<td>主権回復・国際社会復帰を記念する式典 内閣総理大臣式辞</td>
<td>Ceremony to commemorate the restoration of sovereignty/return of international society, ceremonial address by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.04</td>
<td>日露関係の強化に向けての経済協力について （日露フォーラム）</td>
<td>On economic cooperation towards strengthening Japan-Russia relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.04</td>
<td>日本食材プロモーション・レセプションにおけるスピーチ</td>
<td>Speech at the Japan food promotion reception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.05</td>
<td>共生・共栄・協働がつくる新時代の日本・中東関係</td>
<td>Japan-Middle East relations in a new era that creates co-existence, mutual prosperity and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.05</td>
<td>日 UAE ビジネス・フォーラムにおける安倍総理スピーチ</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe speech at the Japan-UAE business forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.05</td>
<td>日トルコ経済合同委員会における安倍総理あいさつ</td>
<td>Greetings from prime minister Abe at the Japan-Turkey joint economic committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.05</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.05</td>
<td>安倍総理「成長戦略第2弾スピーチ」（日本アカデミア）</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe 'Second speech on growth strategy' (Japan Akademia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>第19回国際交流会議「アジアの未来」安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>19th International Exchange Conference: 'The future of Asia', speech by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.05</td>
<td>ESRI国際コンファレンス歓迎レセプション安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>Speech by prime minister Abe at ESRI international conference welcome reception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.06</td>
<td>TICAD V開会式安倍内閣総理大臣オープニングスピーチ</td>
<td>Opening speech by prime minister Abe at TICAD V opening ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.06</td>
<td>TICAD V「共同記者会見」</td>
<td>TICAD V 'Joint press conference'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.06</td>
<td>安倍総理「成長戦略第3弾スピーチ」（内外情勢調査会）</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe 'Third speech on growth strategy' (Research Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.06</td>
<td>二・仏共同記者会見</td>
<td>Japan-France joint press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.06</td>
<td>世界経済フォーラムJAPAN Meetingオープニングセッション</td>
<td>JAPAN Meeting opening session for world economic forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.06</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.06</td>
<td>安倍総理大臣・経済政策に関する講演</td>
<td>Lecture on economic policy/Prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.06</td>
<td>沖縄戦没者追悼式総理あいさつ</td>
<td>Memorial ceremony for all the Okinawa war dead –Greetings by the prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.06</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.06</td>
<td>「日本とASEAN・Always in tandem――「3本の矢」で一層のWin-Win関係へ」に関する講演</td>
<td>Lecture on 'Japan and ASEAN/Always in tandem - towards a more 'win-win' relation with 'three arrows''</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.08</td>
<td>広島市原爆死没者慰霊式並びに平和祈念式あいさつ</td>
<td>Address at the Hiroshima atomic bombs victims and peace memorial ceremony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.08</td>
<td>長崎原爆犠牲者慰霊平和祈念式典あいさつ</td>
<td>Address at memorial ceremony for the Nagasaki atomic bomb victims and peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>全国戦没者追悼式辞</td>
<td>Ceremonial address at the national memorial service for the war dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.08</td>
<td>日本・カタール・ビジネスフォーラムにおける総理あいさつ</td>
<td>Greetings from the prime minister at the Japan-Qatar business forum</td>
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<td>28.08</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>07.09</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<td>12.09</td>
<td>第四十八回自衛隊高級幹部会同 安倍内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>48th SDF high rank executive’s assembly, address by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
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<td>25.09</td>
<td>2013年ハーマン・カーン賞受賞に際しての安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>2013 Herman Kahn Award acceptance speech by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.09</td>
<td>ニューヨーク証券取引所 安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>New York Stock Exchange, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日付</td>
<td>トピック</td>
<td>詳細</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.09</td>
<td>第68回国連総会における安倍内閣総理大臣一般討論演説</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe general debate speech at 68th UN General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.09</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.09</td>
<td>安倍晋三日本国総理大臣基調講演</td>
<td>Keynote speech by Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.10</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
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<td>03.10</td>
<td>日・スペイン共同記者会見</td>
<td>Japan-Spain joint press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.10</td>
<td>STSフォーラム2013年年次総会における安倍総理挨拶</td>
<td>Greetings from prime minister Abe at 2013 annual meeting for STS forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.10</td>
<td>2013インドネシアAPEC・CEOサミット安倍内閣総理大臣基調講演</td>
<td>Keynote speech by prime minister Abe for 2013 Indonesia APEC/CEO Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>第百八十五回国会における安倍内閣総理大臣所信表明演説</td>
<td>General policy speech by prime minister Abe to the 185th Session of the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>平成25年度自衛隊記念日観閲式 安倍内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>2013 SDF memorial day parade – address by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.10</td>
<td>マルマイ・プロジェクト開通式典における安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>Speech by prime minister Abe at the Marmaray project opening ceremony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.12</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.12</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.12</td>
<td>日本アカデミア 安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>Japan Akademeia, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.12</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣の談話～恒久平和への誓い～</td>
<td>Discourse of prime minister Abe: Vow for permanent peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>01.01</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣 平成26年年頭所感</td>
<td>2014 New year’s impressions by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.01</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣年頭記者会見</td>
<td>New year’s press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.01</td>
<td>日本・モザンビク投資フォーラム 安倍内閣総理大臣スピーチ</td>
<td>Japan-Mozambique investment forum, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣アフリカ政策スピーチ～「一人、ひとり」を強くする日本のアフリカ外交～</td>
<td>Africa policy speech by prime minister Abe ～ Japan’s Africa diplomacy, making ‘one by one’ strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.01</td>
<td>世界経済フォーラム年次会議冒頭演説～新しい日本から、新しいビジョン～</td>
<td>World economic forum annual meeting beginning speech ~a new vision from Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.01</td>
<td>第百八十六回国会における安倍内閣総理大臣施政方針演説</td>
<td>Policy speech by prime minister Abe to the 186th session of the Diet</td>
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<tr>
<td>08.02</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.03</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>東日本大震災三周年追悼式 内閣総理大臣式辞</td>
<td>Address by prime minister Abe at the third memorial ceremony for the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.03</td>
<td>安倍内閣総理大臣記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.03</td>
<td>平成25年度防衛大学校卒業式 内閣総理大臣訓示</td>
<td>2013 National Defense Academy of Japan graduation ceremony, address by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.03</td>
<td>内外記者会見</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>02.04</td>
<td>48th Opening ceremony for joint training of national civil servants, address by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>17.04</td>
<td>2014 Japan Summit, keynote speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>01.05</td>
<td>City hosted welcome dinner, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>06.05</td>
<td>OECD Ministerial Council, keynote speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>06.05</td>
<td>Speech by prime minister Abe at the North Atlantic Council ~ Japan and NATO: Natural partners~</td>
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<td>07.05</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<td>15.05</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.05</td>
<td>20th International Conference, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>30.05</td>
<td>13th Asia Security Council (Shangri-La Dialogue), keynote speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>02.06</td>
<td>World economic forum, 2014 Japan meeting, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>05.06</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.06</td>
<td>2014 memorial ceremony for all the Okinawa war dead ~ Greetings by the prime minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.06</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>01.07</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>08.07</td>
<td>Australian Houses of Parliament General Assembly, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>02.08</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>02.08</td>
<td>South-and-central America business seminar, policy speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>06.08</td>
<td>Address at the Hiroshima atomic bombs victims and peace memorial ceremony.</td>
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<tr>
<td>09.08</td>
<td>Address at memorial ceremony for the Nagasaki atomic bomb victims and peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>Ceremonial address at the national memorial service for the war dead</td>
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<tr>
<td>03.09</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>06.09</td>
<td>Speech by prime minister Abe at Japan-Bangladesh business forum</td>
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<td>07.09</td>
<td>Speech by prime minister Abe at Japan-Sri Lanka business forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.09</td>
<td>WAW! Tokyo 2014 public form, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>13.09</td>
<td>WAW! Tokyo 2014, high-level/round table, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.09</td>
<td>Research council lecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>Visit to Colombia University, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>Speech by PM Abe at round-table and luncheon meeting with Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>Japan investment seminar, greetings by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>23.09</td>
<td>UN Climate Summit, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<td>24.09</td>
<td>Second Japan-Africa Regional Economic Communities, speech by PM Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.09</td>
<td>UN high-level meeting responding to prevalence of Ebola hemorrhagic fever</td>
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<td>25.09</td>
<td>Prime minister Abe general debate speech at 69th UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>25.09</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>29.09</td>
<td>General policy speech by prime minister Abe to the 187th Session of the Diet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>05.10</td>
<td>Greetings from prime minister Abe at 2014 annual meeting for STS forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>Speech by prime minister Abe at the AEBF closing session</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>International Bar Association (IBA) Tokyo Conference annual meeting, speech by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.10</td>
<td>MoD/SDF 60th annual air review – address by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>Press conference</td>
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<td>18.11</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.11</td>
<td>Press conference by prime minister Abe</td>
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</table>

**Appendix (Chapter 4)**

**Preamble to the constitution of Japan**

"Promulgated on November 3, 1946
Come into effect on May 3, 1947

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith."
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.”

(Constitution of Japan 1946)

Calculation of t-scores and z-scores

**t-scores:**
As stated, t-scores are calculated using the following formula,

\[ t = \frac{O - E}{\sqrt{O}} \]

O = Number of observed collocations.
E = Expected frequency of collocations within the set parameter in the dataset.

To calculate E:

\[ E = (N \times P)(C/T) \]

Where:
C = The overall frequency of the collocate in the dataset.
T = The overall frequency of tokens in the dataset.\(^{137}\)
N = The overall frequency of the node words in the dataset.
P = The concordance lines, i.e. the parameter set for each node word.\(^{138}\)

The formula assumes there is no overlap of co-occurrence in the concordance lines of each node word, making it a relatively conservative equation.

---

\(^{137}\) Here, the number of tokens (in use) was 105,359.

\(^{138}\) 5 preceeding and 5 proceeding the node term, so P = 10.
**z-scores:**
As stated, z-scores are calculated as below:

\[ z = \frac{O - E}{\sigma} \]

Here, O and E are calculated as above.

To calculate \( \sigma \):

\[ \sigma = \sqrt{(N \times P)((C/T)(1 - (C/T)))} \]

Where:

C = The overall frequency of the collocate in the dataset.
T = The overall frequency of tokens in the dataset.
N = The overall frequency of the node words in the dataset.
P = The concordance lines, i.e. the parameter set for each node word.

**Appendix (Chapter 5)**

The frame analysis was carried out with slight adaptations to the research methodology constructed by Matthes and Kohring (2002; 2008) who operationalized Entman’s (1993) taxonomy of frames as sub-frame elements, which itself was proposed in order to bring more coherence in frame analysis in communications studies. In their methodology, Matthes and Kohrings (2008) were able to rely on a source established by trained coders. Unfortunately, the author of this thesis did not have the resources to employ a team of trained coders for the analysis (§9) and so the frame analysis remains a qualitative assessment. Despite this, the aim of constructing the methodology in this thesis was to demonstrate the compatibility with text-mining methods and qualitative analysis through approaches to CDS, so as to propose an eclectic model towards the analysis of politicians’ speeches in order to support research transdisciplinarity and stimulate further research across various fields. The findings, for example, from the use of KH Coder in §5, the keyword analysis in §6, and the CDS analysis in §7 are not undermined whatsoever by this. Rather, the frame analysis may be used to identified areas of potential salience, supplementing the observations made in the text-mining analysis. Due to this, the results of the Chi-Square and post-hoc analyses are provided here.

The test-hypothesis formulated in §4 was as below:

\( H_1 \): There is a significant relationship between identified clusters and the previously identified three themes.
\( H_0 \): There is no significant relationship between identified clusters and the previously identified three themes.

The Chi-square test and Phi and Cramer’s V post-hoc tests reveal that the distribution of frames by themes significantly differed from expected results \( (X^2(6, N = 384) = 45.120, p < 0.01) \), which would allow us to reject the null hypothesis.
Appendix (Chapter 7)

IS Frame: Schematic reconstructions

**IS.FE1**
Premises:
- Peace and stability in the Middle East is critical to Japanese lifestyles.
- Japan must act upon its responsibility to proactive engagement in the region.
- The world is dependent on the SDF/Japan.
- SDF are laudably fulfilling their responsibilities for us and helping the world.
- Abe is proud of the SDF who are braving inhospitable climates.
- Based on meeting foreign leaders, Abe feels that the SDF are internationally highly praised.
- But also that international society has expectations of Japan.
- Chemical weapons been used in Syria.
- This cannot be tolerated.
- The Assad regime is responsible for the worsening of conditions in Syria.

Implicit premises:
- SDF deserve credit/SDF are an international emblem of Japan.
- SDF are abroad for peace and stability.
- Without the SDF abroad, pirates could seize the Gulf of Aden.
- Without the SDF abroad, Japanese economy would be hit.
- Assad is responsible for chemical weapon use.
- Assad is unmoved by humanitarian sufferings.
- International Society is against Assad.
- Japan is standing in rank with the rest of the world.

Solution:
- Must contribute more to peace and stability in the region.
- Must expand security dialogue with allies.
- Link with international society/provide aid so that the situation improves.

**IS.FE2**
Premises:
- “Japan is ready to do what it must for international society.”
- This is the address, Abe made as prime minister at the North Atlantic Council in 2007.
- Now, once again prime minister, Abe has returned to the North Atlantic Council.
- It gives Abe great pleasure to say that Japan, having hoisted the flag of ‘positive pacifism’ which based on the principle of international cooperation, is now fulfilling the promise Abe made seven years ago.
- Japan has walked the path of a ‘peace state’ for seventy years, and exerted all efforts to realize the fundamental values such liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, that are heralded in the UN Charter.
- Japan will continue to do so.
- Japan has steadfastly contributed to world peace and stability across many individual fields international peace cooperation, disarmament, non-
proliferation, international counter-terrorism, promoting "human security" to disaster management cooperation.
- As many as 50,000 members of the SDF have committed themselves for peace all over the world such as Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Haiti, South Sudan, and fighting terrorism in the Indian Ocean and providing reconstruction assistance in Iraq.
- Japan shoulders 11 per cent of the budget for UNPKO, following only the US. Japan has provided more than US$300 billion dollars altogether to over 190 countries and regions up to now.
- This year is the 60th year of Japanese ODA. And looking back, it is clear that Japan has extended a helping hand to the world, starting with its friends in Asia, since Japan was impoverished after the war.
- The cornerstone to Japan's unwavering peace state journey, is to make larger commitments for world peace and prosperity.
- Abe believes that Japan must play a more proactive role to protect the "global commons" such as freedom of the skies and seas (overflight and navigation).
- This is the “positive pacifism” that Abe is advocating.
- This determination was made clear with Abe’s creation of the country's first “National Security Strategy”.
- Abe has prepared a new system also to realize this strategy, where all important decisions are now flexibly carried out by the “National Security Council” under Abe’s direct supervision.
- Japan is a “natural partner” of NATO.
- This is what Secretary General Rasmussen said, and Abe agrees.
- Under the “diplomacy that overlooks the globe” which Abe has been advancing, European states together with Japan’s ally in the US, is a partner that shares our fundamental values.
- Therefore, NATO is an ally which connects the US and Europe, overcoming the Atlantic, espousing an “alliance based on values”.

Implicit premises:
- During the administrations before Abe’s return to office, Japan did not do all it could for international society.
- International cooperation is the crux of positive pacifism.
- More proactive contributions through the UN is part of a peace state journey.
- Proactive contributions to international society is part of a peace state journey.
- Japan’s has demonstrated it is a supportive country.
- Japan has and does contribute to peace and prosperity.
- More proactive contributions to protect the freedom of overflight and navigation is part of a peace state journey.
- The changes in domestic security legislation is part of positive pacifism, and hence a peace state journey.
- Alliance with NATO, who are allied with the US, is conducive to Japan’s “diplomacy that overlooks the globe”.

Solutions:
- Positive pacifism based on the principle of international cooperation and a more proactive role for world peace and prosperity.
- Changes to security legislation that facilitate positive pacifism.

IS.FE3
Premises:
- There have been doubts about whether the contents of the Abe administration’s growth strategy are good enough, whether they can be achieved.
- There is the claim that the Abe administration really seeks to deal with security, not the economy.
- Security and economics are not entirely separate discussion.
- There is an intricate relationship between security and economics.
- For example, security of the seas is a major premise of free-trade.
- Without security of the seas, skies, and regional peace and stability, there cannot be prosperity.

Implicit premises:
- Those question Abe’s growth strategy or indicate that his Cabinet focusses more on security, do not really understand Abe’s growth strategy/economics.
- Due to globalization, security and economic are not entirely separate phenomena.
- Without positive pacifism there cannot be economic growth.
- More commitment to the contribution to world peace, is to step towards prosperity.

Solution:
- Positive pacifism
- Contribute to world peace.

IS.FE4
Premises:
- Japan and UK are aiming for ‘new’ security relations.
- PM Abe and PM Cameron agree on joint military equipment development
- This used to be just between Japan and the US.
- SDF took part in joint defence exercises.
- Abe seeks further integration on the security front.
- The US is Japan’s No1 partner but linking with the UK is good for world peace as both nations have a responsibility to it.
- As public spaces become more ‘borderless’, nations which share the same values must seek to integrate further.
- To this end, Japan cannot be the weak link in the chain that is international society.
- Japan has a responsibility to the security of the seas as a large commercial state.

Implicit premises:
- Progress in relations development.
- “Our SDF” are emblematic of this progress.
- SDF are emblematic of “us”.
- We are not secure enough.
- World is integrating.
- Failing to regulate the sea trade routes would lead to economic woes in Japan.
- Elements/structures preventing a full commitment to world/positive pacifism.

Solutions:
- “New portrait” of Japan with the representative ‘flag’ of positive pacifism.
- Investigating what to do to fully implement positive pacifism.

IS.FE5 (Italicized text denotes the text outside the parameter set, as stated in §7)
Premise:
- Abe will talk about the new flag that Japan heralds.
- This is no longer a time when any country can protect peace by itself and this is commonly recognized across the world.
- Abe thinks it is necessary to reconstruct law fundamentals concerning international cooperation, including UNPKO and CSD and will proceed ahead domestically to inquire into such legislative changes.
- The SDF are endeavouring to establish peace in South Sudan, alongside troops from Cambodia, Mongolia, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, South Korea, China, NGO workers from many countries and UN civilian staff; these are all Japan’s friends.
- But let’s say that these civilian or NGO workers, who cannot protect themselves, are suddenly attacked by armed insurgents.
- Up to now the thinking of the Government of Japan is that our Self-Defence Force cannot go to the rescue of these civilians under attack. Is it alright for this to go on?
- The Abe administration is proceeding with national inquiries and deliberations on the matter.
- Japan should contribute to peace and stability through positive pacifism.
- Japan will continue to walk the path of peace, and not war, upholding and respecting the rule of law and order, human rights and liberty, and pass this on to the next generation.
- Abenomics is a mission that exceeds economics and is aimed at making ‘New Japanese’.
- Japanese will keep old values to continue cooperation for economic growth in other countries, particularly Asia. There is no difference than before in terms of selflessness.
- What is different is that there are more Japanese women contributing and doing splendid work.
- New Japanese spare no effort to improve the abilities of people such as women who are placed in unfair and disadvantaged positions given that at the end of day the engine of growth are people.
- New Japanese are delighted with Asia-Pacific prosperity as if it were their own.
- New Japanese find values and raison d’etre in making Japan a place of hope for young people who have ambitions for the region.
- New Japanese have a broad-minded self-identity that is not limited to Japan’s national borders.
- There are dozens of Chinese high school students come each year to all areas of Japan and live and learn alongside Japanese students for a year.
- The Chinese high school students go back to China calling Japan their ‘second home’, and without exception are moved to tears by the friendships they made.
- Abe wants the new Japanese to place even more importance on the spirit of welcoming non-Japanese.
- New Japanese take on responsibility for regional peace, stability and order and strive for it, working with regional partners who share their values of liberty.
- ‘Positive pacifism’ is an expression, as the new banner for ‘new Japanese’, of Japan’s determination to endeavour even more for Asia-Pacific prosperity, peace, and security.
- Japan will spare no effort to assure regional PPS, respecting its links with ASEAN, and with the alliance with the US as the foundation.
- Our future sees “the road of peace and prosperity” widening.
- Our responsibility to the next generation is to attain regional economic growth.
- Japan is for the rule of law, as is Asia, and the rule of law is for all of us.
Implicit premises:
- The world has changed meaning Japan cannot only rely on others nor only on itself to protect peace.
- The exercise of CSD is a means to address this problem.
- If civilians or NGO workers came under attack, they would be reliant on the SDF but the Government of Japan’s position on this would see them perish.
- A contribution to Asia-Pacific peace and stability is to contribute to the world.
- New banner for more world contribution means a new Japanese [identity].
- Economic growth is conducive to pacifism/peace and prosperity.
- Japanese are responsible for the future.
- New Japanese are part of the engine of economic growth in the region.
- PPS in Asia-Pacific requires the US.
- Realizing growth potential is means peace as well as prosperity.
- The ‘rule of law’ benefits all nations.

Solution:
- Domestic inquiry and deliberation over changes to Japan’s security legislation.
- Enforce the rule of law.
- Abenomics and positive pacifism.
- Link with the US as a foundation.
- Link with ASEAN for regional PPS.

NS Frame: Schematic reconstructions

NS.FE1
Premises:
- It is imperative to have a realistic discussion so that it does not negatively impact SDF personnel on the ground.
- The first thing to do is to establish the National Security Council early on.
- Ensuring Japan’s safety is one of our country’s long-term national interest.

Implicit premises:
- Some proposals surrounding security laws have not been serious enough.
- The Abe administration has realistic proposals.

Solutions:
- Rebuilding of Japan’s security policies that face ‘reality’.
- Creating of the National Security Council and strengthening of diplomacy and security policies.
- The National Security Strategy and increase the response capabilities of the SDF

NS.FE2
Premises:
- Abe was deputy Cabinet Secretary at the time the Koizumi administration enacted the ‘Emergency Situation Law’ and the ‘Civil Protection Act’. This was an act that recognized the reality that Japan even in its 60th year postwar, has inadequacies in laws that are supposed to protect Japanese independence and citizens’ lives.

139 Yūji hôsei.
140 Kokumin hogo-hō.
- There are still grey zones in the law that must be addressed.
- It is not right that the SDF and Japan cannot help other countries’ troops were they attacked but they would help the SDF.
- It is not right that the SDF cannot help NGO workers.
- Abe was asked by US officials to consider how durable the US trust in Japan and US desire to work with Japan for Japan’s national security would be were a US vessel attacked and the SDF, despite being able to help them and despite the US carrying out its obligations under the US-Japan Security Treaty for Japan, does not.
- The security environment in the region is becoming more severe and increasing deterrence is the way to make the region more peaceful and stable.
- Abe has a responsibility as prime minister to protect citizens’ lives and their peaceful living.

Implicit premises:
- Abe is partly responsible for the Emergency Situation Law and the Civil Protection Act.
- Abe is partly responsible for bolstering Japanese national security during the Koizumi administration.
- Japan and their citizens are not safe because the law does not fully protect them.
- Japan cannot help their allies were they attacked.
- Japan cannot help NGO workers.
- The US is protecting Japan under the US-Japan Security Treaty, it is only right that Japan protect the US when the US is working with Japan for Japan’s national security.
- The alliance with the US is potentially under threat because of the inadequacies in Japan’s law.

Solutions:
- Cabinet Decision on the basic policies for developing new security laws.

NS.FE3

Premises:
- Abe would like to indicate his determination to resolutely protect citizens’ lives, Japanese land, the beautiful seas.
- The SDF and Japan Coast Guard are protecting Japanese seas and skies right now off the Senkaku Islands.
- Japanese security is not someone else’s problem, it is a present crisis.

Implicit premises:
- There are threats to Japanese lives and sovereignty.
- Incursions near the Senkaku islands are a threat to Japanese lives and sovereignty.
- Japanese national security is under threat from the PRC.

Solutions:
- Establish a minister in charge of strengthening national security.
- The whole Cabinet work together to strengthen Japan’s diplomacy and security system.

NS.FE4
Premises:
- This is a world of deepening interdependence.
- Our problem is that we cannot protect our country's peace without acknowledging Japanese responsibility to proactive contributions to world peace and stability.
- We should be proud of our journey as a peace state.
- But now to protect peace we must act.
- We must be a country that proactively contributes to world peace and stability, not just tout 'international cooperation'.
- Positive pacifism is the signboard of the 21st Century that our country should carry.
- SDF/JMDA protecting Japan dutifully. They are Abe’s pride.
- Thanks to the families of SDF/JMDA operatives.
- SDF/JMDA are facing reality.
- We too cannot turn a blind eye to the reality that the security environment is worsening.
- Abe’s solutions are based on the fact he is facing reality.

Implicit premises:
- Peace is in peril.
- Japan has not contributed to peace and stability internationally before.
- Constitution is not a contribution to world peace anymore.
- To question over security reform is to turn one’s back on SDF/JMDA operatives and their families.

Solutions:
- Reform security policies.
- Implement a ‘national security strategy’ to guarantee our country’s safety.
- Strengthen links with countries which share our values of liberty, democracy, fundamental human rights, rule of law, with the Japan-US alliance as the cornerstone (i.e. China and North Korea do not share these values).
- Lessen the burden of US bases in Japan in regions such as Okinawa but maintain that deterrence (i.e. from US military presence).
- Exert all efforts towards a complete solution of the abduction problem (by the DPRK).

NS.FE5
Premises:
- We cannot save or protect the children, mothers, the many Japanese on the [US] vessel, even though we have the ability.
- Abe is asking the question ‘is this truly alright?’
- Politics will be carried out in accordance with constitutionalism.
- Abe would like ‘everybody’ to give thought to whether it is alright for ‘us politicians’ to turn a blind eye from the current reality.
- Politicians have the responsibility to protect people’s right to life and pursuit of happiness141.
- Abe cannot consider that the constitution demands the abrogation of that responsibility.

141 This is stated in Article 13 of the constitution: “All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs” (Constitution of Japan 1946).
- This is a real problem that relates to every individual citizen.
- North Korean missile range covers most of Japan and Japan has been tackling the issue of an increasingly precarious security environment.
- It is our responsibility to protect citizens’ lives and so from this view, Abe will push forward research.
- Abe does not consider that ‘self-defence’, e.g. collective self-defence, permits all actions. It is not the aim of the SDF to participate in other countries’ wars, and the pacifism that the constitution ‘hoists’ will continue to be protected.
- There have been criticisms that Japan will become engulfed in another country’s war.
- This was repeated over and over also during the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960.
- However, rather, the revision served to increase constraint and is it not now common sense among Japanese that due to US presence in Asia-Pacific has made peace more secure?
- What Abe is advancing is something that will increase this constraint and must be investigated from the viewpoint of doing what must be done to protect Japanese lives.
- Abe thinks Japan has a responsibility to possess active ideas on what it is that can be done to protect citizens’ lives and not hold passive ideas such as becoming embroiled [in war].
- Abe thinks Japan will not become engulfed in war because of an increase in constraint.

Implicit premises:
- Were the US vessel attacked, the victims of the attack would be left alone to die.
- To not do something about this is to abrogate the responsibility politicians have towards citizens’ rights, and it is not really unconstitutional to act on this responsibility.
- The current security laws do not provide enough deterrence against DPRK missiles.
- The changes Abe is making are like the changes his grandfather, PM Kishi, made.
- Criticism in 1960 was entirely wrong then, and criticism today entirely wrong now.
- Concerns of being engulfed in war is passive and Abe has a responsibility to be (pro-)active to solve the problem.
- Abe’s changes will solve the problem.
- Without the US in Asia-Pacific during the Cold War there would be no peace.
- Without more military presence in the region today, there can be no peace.

Solutions:
- Understanding and consent for Abe’s inquiry into changing laws for the sake of security.

IRE Frame: Schematic reconstructions

IRE.FE1
Premises:
- This time 49 years ago Japan was the growth centre of [East] Asia.
- Asia-Pacific now demands a new model as the growth centre of the world.
- Abe thinks nations are taking big steps to speeding up growth in the region.
- Expectations on Japan, which has recovered economically by the three arrows (of Abenomics), from region.
- TPP is the first step to a free economic bloc which will bring prosperity and abundance to people.
- RCEP and FTAAP also no longer mere works of fiction.
- The TPP is the first step to this larger free-trade bloc, and will create common rules across a broad range of fields, not only in the trade of goods, but also services, investment, intellectual property, and the environment.
- This is the appropriate market (model) for the 21st Century.
- Economic integration across the Asia-Pacific will be realize through political resolve.
- Abe thinks that all leaders are in agreement on this and have created the momentum to reach an agreement this year.
- Abe's diplomacy started with visiting ASEAN states.
- ASEAN and Japan have a 40-year relation of hand-in-hand development.
- Going to push relations to elevated heights.
- This will benefit the young and future generations.
- Japan will contribute to lifestyles of people in all ASEAN nations with experience and technology.
- Spoke of the need for the rule of laws starting with the seas, and to respond in unison over the North Korea problem.
- APEC leaders agree.
- Some leaders are expecting an increased role from Japan in line with positive pacifism.
- Invited leaders to Tokyo in December.
- Going to express [my] vision of further developments of Japan-ASEAN relations.
- Abe has been able to meet foreign leader ‘friends’ at multilateral fora recently.
- Of them, Abe managed to have four rounds of talks with Russian president Vladimir Putin in the last five months, which Abe feels has deepened personal trust between them.
- Japan is facing a mountain of issues as the extraordinary session of the Diet starts next week.
- Abe will work hard to demonstrate a determined government that can get results.

Implicit premises:
- Japan can help ASEAN as a former growth centre/driving force of Asian growth.
- Japan has a duty to help having recovered economically.
- RCEP, FTAAP, TPP are markets for today and the future (current markets not suitable).
- Markets can only be actualized through political decision-making.
- Abe doing all he can to elevate Japan-ASEAN relations/bring these changes.
- North Korea and insecurity of trade routes are a threat to prosperity.
- Positive pacifism is conducive to ensuring economic growth.
- Russian president Vladimir Putin is a friend and there was not an ideal level of personal trust between leaders before.

Solutions
- APEC meeting to take place in Tokyo.
- Positive pacifism
- TPP and changes to international markets structures.
IRE.FE2
Premises:
- Sino-Japanese relations are one of the most important bilateral relationships and is unbreakable in various areas.
- China and Japan both have a responsibility to peace, stability, and prosperity in the world/Asia-Pacific.
- The Senkaku Islands is absolutely ‘our country’s territory in terms of history and international law.
- Continual territorial invasions by Chinese vessels is very regrettable to ‘us’, Japan cannot compromise its territorial rights.
- Japan will respond calmly and firmly without escalating the situation.
- Abe made the point to Xi Jinping at G20 that he would like to develop Sino-Japanese relations, returning to ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’, so as not to influence our entire relation even if there is an individual problem.
- Whatever the issue, because it is an issue, the countries should talk including among leaders, without closing the door for dialogue.
- Abe’s door of dialogue is always open, I hope/expect the same from China.
Implicit premises:
- PRC’s claims to Senkaku Islands are illegitimate.
- Japan’s claims to Senkaku Islands are legitimate.
- Actions from Chinese vessels are irresponsible towards the region and the world.
- Poor relations between China and Japan are deleterious to peace, stability and prosperity in the world and region.
- Japan is acting for the benefit of regional/world peace, stability and prosperity.
- Relations can be solved by PRC acceptance of ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’.
- Xi Jinping has not accepted Abe’s proposals.
- Abe/Japan is open to talk; Xi Jinping/PRC is not.
Solutions:
- Dialogue between Japan and China.
- Return to the ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’.

IRE.FE3
Premises:
- Even though the world economy has finally begun recover from the Lehmann Shocks, the current international situation could become a major risk factor.
- There is also the issue of sluggishness in the economies of emerging nations.
- Abe will cooperate with the G7 to realize the large growth potential and to support structural reform of emerging nations.
- In the summit last year, the world concentrated their interests on Japan’s new economic policy, Abenomics.
- This year focus has been on the results of this.
- With the ‘three arrows’, the ratio of job offers to job seekers has increased for 17 months.
- Wages of many businesses have set off upwards this spring.
- Japan is also the engine of world economic recovery.
Abe expressed his determination to push forward reform without faltering. It was a summit where Abe felt “Japan has once again become [lit. returned] to the centre of the world”.

Implicit premises:
- Sluggishness in emerging nations is due to structural issues.
- Sluggishness in emerging nations imperils world economy.
- The G7 summit is an event which the world observes.
- The world is excited by Abe’s economic growth strategy.
- Abenomics is a success.
- Reform in Japan’s economy will benefit the world.
- A strong economy means Japan has a large role to play in the world.
- The world is in agreement with Abe’s economic package.

Solutions:
- Structural reforms to emerging nations.
- Abenomics.
- Linking with G7.

IRE.FE4
 Premises:
- Gratitude from Abe for receiving the honorable award, ‘This Year’s Face of Asia’.
- Abe believes our country’s contribution has been highly evaluated at that ‘Japan is back’, Japan’s revival, return of Japan’s economy have been welcomed.
- Since coming into office, Abe has developed his strategic diplomacy ‘which overlooks the globe’, where ASEAN has always been in the centre as a ‘special banner’.
- As proof of this Abe has been to ASEAN many times and interacted with ASEAN peoples.
- Abe felt the large expectation for Japan to contribute to world/regional peace and prosperity from all countries without exception.
- Every leader at this summit expressed their expectation towards the role that Japan should carry out and to contribute to world and regional prosperity with ASEAN.
- Regarding Sino-Japanese relations, Abe’s ‘door of dialogue’ is always open.
- Abe thinks they should return to the ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’ so as to control the situation without impacting the whole relationship even if there is a problem.
- Abe asks rhetorically whether it is not that leaders should carry out talks precisely because there are issues.
- Abe would like China to adopt the same position.

Implicit premises:
- Japan has economically recovered.
- Japan was gone and now it is back.
- All leaders are in agreement with Abe over policies.
- The PRC is are not prepared for dialogue.
- Abe is not responsible for current poor political relations because he is open to dialogue.

Solution
- China/Xi Jinping to engage Abe in dialogue.
- Return to the ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’.
Premises:

- Regarding the economic effect of tariff elimination, the Abe Cabinet has carried out a trial as one of the foundations of tackling the issue as a ‘one body government’ without scattered/disconnected ministries.
- Even on the assumption that all tariffs are put to zero, as a whole, a plus effect is expected in our country’s economy.
- While in this trial it is anticipated that the products from agriculture, forestry and the fisheries will decrease, this is based on the trial’s hypothesis which is extremely simplified as tariffs are all immediately eliminated and it does not take into account national countermeasures.
- In fact, it is natural that based on all efforts such as special consideration over our country’s sensitive commodities through negotiations, the worst impacts will be minimized.
- It is also assumed that there will be a plus effect which was not included in this trial. It is necessary to inquire further into the effects of the stimulation of investment due to linking with an economic bloc that comprises one third of the world’s economy.
- Minister Amari who is in charge of the TPP issue will explain the details after this.
- The significance of the TPP is not limited to our country’s economy alone. Japan, together with our US ally, will create a new economic bloc, and countries who share the universal values of liberty, democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, will join.
- Abe is certain that the fact that we will make new rules together with these countries for the Asia-Pacific region is in the national interests of Japan and will definitely bring prosperity to the world.
- Further, it is certain that, under a new economic order, the fact that mutual economic relations is going to deepen with these countries will, even in terms of our country’s security agenda, greatly contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
- A new economic order where the two big economic powers of Japan and the US have participated in its construction will likely not stop with rules for the TPP alone.
- It will likely be a springboard for rule creation in RCEP from before, and the bigger construction of FTAAP.
- Right now is our last chance. If we miss it, Japan will not be able to contribute to the creation of world rules.
- “The TPP lifted the curtains for the Asia-Pacific Century”: this is how later historians will evaluate it – Asia-Pacific’s Century.
- Japan must exist in the centre of this.
- Abe believes that participation in TPP negotiations is certainly a state plan for 100 years.
- Unfortunately, TPP negotiations have been ongoing for two years and Japan, as a late comer, is faced with the hard fact that it is difficult to overturn rules where there has been consensus.
- Abe believes that it is precisely because of this that Japan must participate in negotiations right away.
- Japan is the world’s third largest economy.
Abe is certain that were Japan to enter negotiations, as a major player, Japan could lead the creation of new rules.

On the other hand, it is natural that there are people who have their reservations about the TPP.

It is precisely because of this that at the previous Lower House Elections, our LDP clarified that "[the LDP] oppose participation in TPP negotiations only if [the TPP] preconditions tariff elimination ‘without sanctuary’ [i.e. protected sectors]".

Also the LDP promote five decision preparations to protect medical insurance for the whole nation.

We absolutely ‘protect’ [i.e., stick to] our promises with the citizens of Japan.

Due to this, it was confirmed that the TPP will not precondition tariff elimination without sanctuary, following a direct conference with President Obama.

Abe is also determined to resolutely protect the five decision preparations in the negotiations.

Making full use of our bargaining power [lit. negotiation power], our country will protect what should be protected and will attacked was must be attacked. We will pursue the best path towards the realization of our national interests.

Implicit premises:
- The effects of the TPP can be best mitigated by a ‘one body government’, i.e. centralization.
- Abe/the LDP know which sectors need protecting and which sectors do not.
- Owing to the size of the economic bloc, joining would stimulate investment which will benefit everyone.
- Japan is dithering over a massive opportunity that is almost gone.
- If the US and Japan are central to rule creation for the TPP, then the US and Japan will be central for rule creation for RCEP and FTAAP projects that follow.
- There are only state actors in the rule creation process.
- All members of the TPP will share our values.
- Economic interdependence naturally boosts security through stability.
- Not taking part in the rule making process/negotiations/TPP itself will consign to Japan one hundred years of economic obscurity.
- The US and Japan possess large economies so the US and Japan will have a large say in rule creation.
- Deleterious impacts are because Japan is late to the negotiations process.
- The TPP will be settled and implemented shortly.
- That the TPP is not preconditioned on tariff elimination without sanctuary is Abe’s/the LDP’s achievement.

Solutions:
- Join the TPP
- Trust Abe/LDP to protect sectors/do what is best.

NE Frame: Schematic reconstructions

NE.FE1
Premises:
- It is year of the snake, the year of thriving business.
- Abe determined to see ‘rocket start’ for economic recovery.
- The mission assigned to this administration is above anything else to ‘take back’ a strong economy.
- Would like to push forward growth strategy with three arrows [of abenomics]: audacious monetary policy linking with Bank of Japan, flexible fiscal policy combining the large-scale supplementary budget and the budget for the new fiscal year, and stimulate private investment.
- Bank of Japan monetary policy is vitally important regarding the exchange rate and the 2% inflation target, and the Bank of Japan have a responsibility to implement it.
- There is a three-party consensus to increase consumption tax.

Implicit premises:
- The current economic condition is the most urgent issue responsibility of the administration.
- Sweeping changes are necessary for economic recovery.
- Success of Japanese economic recovery is dependent on the Bank of Japan implementing the Abe Cabinet’s ‘audacious’ monetary policy.
- The Bank of Japan do not appear to recognize that they are responsible for this.

Solutions:
- The Bank of Japan recognize that they must take responsibility and act.
- Abe make judgement considering economic conditions including the April-June economic indicators.
- Aim to revitalize the economy before moving towards increasing consumption tax.

**NE.FE2** (italicized text denotes the text outside the parameter set)

Premises:
- *Abe is grateful for the opportunity to influence global markets and intends to work hard [to make the most of it].*
- *Abe’s main priority is to continue to restore the Japanese economy.*
- *The fundamental principles behind Abe’s growth strategy is “challenge—open—innovation”, where through these three principles, Abe is successively effectuating reforms that were thought to be unfeasible.*
- *The TPP will create an economic bloc in the Asia-Pacific, which is the world’s growth centre, and is an attempt to build free, fair, new, and thorough rules in a wide-range of fields, not just in tariffs, but in state-owned enterprises, investment, and intellectual property.*
- *The Japan-US relationship will drive these developments, which is why Abe has elected to join the negotiations.*
- *A way to reach the key milestone has been identified between US President Obama and Prime Minister Abe in April of that year, and now the negotiations are in their final stages.*
- *The Abe administration is also proceeding with domestic agricultural reform also.*
- *Abe will abolish the so-called “reduction of rice” that has continued for forty years.*
- *Abe will carry out drastic reform even against powerful agricultural cooperatives.*
- *Domestic structural reform will increase Japan’s agricultural competitiveness and economic partnerships such as the TPP will create an expansive economic bloc.*

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142 *kome-no gentan*; this refers to the specific policy for limiting the acreage given to rice farmers in Japan.
Domestic and international reform is essential to the future of Japanese agriculture.
- It is difficult to suppress the resistance of people who protect their vested interests.
- However, these people also have no future if they are not exposed to competition.
- So it is for them that Abe will continue with reform.
- Energy is also a key component of Abe’s growth strategy.
- Reflecting and taking lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster (3.11), Abe will proceed with restarting the nuclear reactors that are recognized as being in conformity with new regulation standards established by the independent Nuclear Regulation Authority.
- Abe aims for a ‘front runner’ reform to energy.
- Abe aims for a world-leading hydrogen society.
- Last year, Abe reformed a regulation that obstructed the commercialization of Fuel Cell Vehicles, advancing the development of fuel cells as a State Project from thirty years ago.
- As a result the world’s first Fuel Cell Vehicles and hydrogen stations have arrived and Fuel Cell Vehicles can be seen for the first time in the show windows of car dealers.
- Even for electricity businesses, Abe will create a free and dynamic energy market where innovations blossoms, and end the regional monopolies of electricity [businesses] that has continued for sixty years.
- Companies must change to make an investment-friendly environment in Japanese enterprises.
- Strengthening corporate governance is in the ‘top agenda’ of Abe’s list of reforms.
- Abe amended the ‘Company Act’ and introduced the “comply or explain” rule for installing directors from outside one’s company. This has caused the number of firms that appointed company directors from outside the company to increase.
- Abe is pursuing corporate tax reform, which was cut by 2.4 per cent this year and is aiming to reduce it further next year.

143 Following a blanket shut-down of all reactors in Japan following 3.11.
144 Though there are claims that it was more of a reorganization than a reform given that 460 members of staff were transferred from the old Nuclear Safety Commission and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, to the new Nuclear Regulation Authority (Kingston 2013).
145 It is likely referring to the ‘top runner’ method of energy reform in Japan which has been implemented before and takes the highest standard of the most efficient service or product and makes it the standard to be met across an entire sector over a period of time (Shreurs 2015: 140; Hook et al. forthcoming).
146 Kaisha-hō.
147 ‘Comply or explain’ denotes a provision in the amended ‘Company Act’ where listed companies must either employ a company director from outside the given company (comply) or provide an explanation of why they employed someone from within the company to that position (Shibata 2015). This concept, ‘comply or explain’ is used is used in European countries also such as the UK where rather than a fixed law or regulation per se, listed companies are expected to comply with a code, and if they do not, then to explain why (Financial Reporting Council 2012).
Abe takes GPIF\textsuperscript{148} reform seriously, and wants to review its portfolio as soon as possible. In the recent Cabinet reshuffle, Abe appointed Mr. [Yasuhisa] Shiozaki, the standard bearer for reform, to Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, who has jurisdiction over the GPIF. He also has jurisdiction over healthcare, pension, and the labour system. Abe believes he has conveyed is genuine intent on reform to the audience. The heavy and gloomy air that covered Japan has completely changed because of the three arrows of Abenomics. The ratio of effective job offers to application ration has increased for the first time in twenty-two years. Wage increase is at its highest rate in fifteen years. The ROE\textsuperscript{149} of listed companies has improved by fifty per cent since the start of the Abe administration and is at its highest level in six years. Achieving a ‘society where women shine’ is the pillar to Abe’s economic growth strategy. This has resulted in the number of employed women increasing by 820,000 people. Since inauguration Abe has already visited close to fifty countries in one year and nine months. Japanese companies are now looking overseas with interest. With proactive economic diplomacy, the Abe administration last year triple to nine trillion yen the orders received for infrastructure abroad. The inward-looking Japanese mind before Abenomics no longer exists. Abe would like frank discussion over how to improve Japan’s investment and business environment.

Implicit Premises:
- The TPP is good for the Japanese economy.
- Abe’s style underpinned by ‘challenge—open—innovation’ means real reform is possible.
- The Japan-US relationship is good for the TPP and for the Japanese economy.
- Vested interests are hindering economic reform, and hence growth.
- The easier it is to invest in Japan, the better for the economy.
- The new standards set means that it is now safe to restart the nuclear reactors.
- New standards and the new regulatory authority mean that the 3.11 disaster will not happen again.
- Regulation stymies innovation.
- Regulation stymies investment.
- Regulation stymies economic growth.
- On the whole, appointing company directors from outside one’s company is better than employing someone from within.
- The appointment of Minister Shiozaki shows that Abe is serious about reform.
- Abe wishes to reform healthcare and the labour system as well as pensions.
- A ‘society where women shine’ and economic growth is achievable with more women are employed.

\textsuperscript{148} GPIF is the abbreviation of the ‘Government Pension Investment Fund’ (nenkin tsumitate-kin kanri un’yō dokuritsu gyōsei hōjin), an IAI.

\textsuperscript{149} The author presumes this to mean ‘Return on equity’.
- Abenomics is working.
- Abenomics is about proactivity, and proactivity is good for the Japanese economy.

Solutions:
- Join the TPP.
- Domestic reforms to the national economy/Deregulation.
- The three arrows of Abenomics.

**NE.FE3** (italicized text denotes the text outside the parameter set)

**Premises:**
- Economic revitalization is the most urgent task of ‘our country’.
- This is because deflation and high value of the yen are shaking the foundations of faith in a society “that rewards hard work”.
- No matter how the government divides incomes, without sustainable growth, the pie of the whole economy shrinks.
- If this happens, no matter how hard one tries, in-hand income only decreases.
- This also is capable of shaking the foundations of social security which supports ‘our’ [sense of] security.
- Up to now Japan has not been able to escape deflation and the high value of the yen.
- Abe suggests an audacious package of a different dimension.
- Abe asks shall we go with firm resolve and get back a strong economy?
- Abe already set up organizations for revitalization and, with the line-up in full operation, will push through an ‘audacious monetary policy’, ‘flexible fiscal policy’ and growth strategy that stimulates private investment.
- Audacious monetary policy is between the Government of Japan and the Bank of Japan.
- The Bank of Japan and the Government of Japan have a responsibility to implement soon contents such as 2% target of inflation.
- Government of Japan and Bank of Japan to link together more closely.
- Also Abe will increase growth power by an ‘emergency economic package’.
- The supplementary budget supports this.
- Abe to take measures on an audacious supplementary budget which ‘disaster response and recovery’, ‘wealth creation from growth’ and ‘regional activity/security of living’.
- Abe asks for all parties/factions for ‘understanding’ and ‘cooperation’ so as to implement policy promptly.
- On the other hand, fiscal packages cannot go on forever.
- Abe will establish and implement policies for growth strategy that expands consumption and private investment sustainably.
- E.g., iPS (induced pluripotent stem cells) is a great achievement. If it can be industrialized it will contribute to a ‘health longevity society’ and create new wealth and employment.
- Innovation and system reform is fundamental to economic revitalization, solving societal problems and bringing new values to living.
- The most important thing is the spirit to make a bold challenge in unknown territory.
- Abe asks ‘everyone right now shall we aim to be world no1?’
- A society where everyone regardless of age or disability feels meaning in life and has a chance for anything; which draws in investment and human resources from all over the world; where working women can construct their own career and men and women can easily balance work and child-rearing; where its regions are overflowing with charm; and where the resources of the rural districts are the food of growth – Abe will return a ‘strong economy’ and this ‘image of how society should be’ with his administration’s growth strategy.

- At the same time, Abe aims to bring Japan’s primary balance into the black.

- It is now the second winter in the area impacted by the Great Tōhoku Earthquake (3.11).

- Abe’s first visit upon election last year was to Fukushima and then Miyagi (Prefecture) and intends to visit the areas affected again.

- When Abe thinks about the area there is a story of a little girl and her family that he cannot forget.

- This girl at the time was a third year in primary school¹⁵⁰ lost her grandmother and mother.

- Abe received letter from this family two months after the disaster, which was a ‘letter addressed to the future’ which the girl’s mother had written to her daughter two years before after the girl was enrolled into primary school.

- After talking about the difficulties at first when entering school, it said that the girl’s mother was relieved that she’s made it to school and she is looking forward to her daughter reading this to everyone, and she will try her best as a mother too.

- *Abe met the girl who look at him fixedly and said that she wants her school rebuilt.*

- *Abe was impressed that the girl communicated her hopes of the future and not looking back on the past.*

- *Reconstruction of these areas is about returning hope to all those affected, and returning smiles to the face of the people struggling to get by right now.*

- *It is also the way to repay the spirits of those who perished who are watching over us.*

**Implicit premises:**

- Japan is in a state of emergency over its economy.

- People are insecure and social security is in jeopardy due to previous policies of wealth division.

- The real problem is high value of the yen and deflation which has taken away a strong economy and now requires audacious structural reform to the economy.

- If people are determined to see the reforms out they can bring back a strong economy.

- Inter and intra party bickering among politicians delays Abe’s ‘emergency economic countermeasures’ and hence the ability for everyone to bring back a strong economy.

- Budgetary/emergency economic issues supersede political division.

- The discovery of induced pluripotent stem cells is an opportunity for private investments and consumption.

- The current system/economic structures are hindering innovation.

- Economic reforms amount to creating a new society.

¹⁵⁰ That is, in a *shōgakkō*. The girl would most likely have been either eight or nine years old.
Solutions:
- Abe prioritizes the people impacted by the Great Tōhoku Earthquake.
- Promotion of society which attracts investment and human resources from the world, where everyone including old, young, disabled, feel life purpose, everyone has a chance, where women can develop their own careers, men and women can balance work and child-rearing, where regions are full of charm and small/medium business owners are active.
- Return a ‘strong economy’ by connecting to the growth strategy this ‘vision of how society should be’.
- Bring the primary balance out of deficit towards medium to long-term fiscal health.
- *Supplementary budget to address reconstruction in the areas affected by the Great Tōhoku Earthquake, and transforming the system of governance to deal with reconstruction.*

**NE.FE4**

**Premises:**
- Last week Abe decided on an economic countermeasure amounting to 5.5trillion yen (c. USD44billion).
- Economic recovery is linked to a rise in income and a boost in consumption.
- This links to more economic recovery.
- Now it is do-or-die in terms of realizing this kind of economic virtuous cycle.

**Implicit premises:**
- Economic recovery is systematic. Economic recovery will lead to more economic recovery.
- If changes are not made soon, the chance for economic recovery will be missed.
- New economic countermeasures will be felt by all members of the country.

**Solutions:**
- Abe to strive even more to spread the feeling of growth to all, to every nook and cranny of the land.
- There is hardly anything left in this year’s budget too, but Abe will give all efforts to the compiling an annual budget for next year.

**NE.FE5** *(italicized text denotes the text outside the parameter set)*

**Premises:**
- Abe previously explained the first round of the growth strategy with “women activity” at its centre. Today Abe explained the second round concerning ‘winning in the world’ with the policy of expanding investment by regulation reform etc. and an offensive agricultural policy.
- It is not over yet. We must go forward while continuing our will for reform.
- Abe would like to close with the Allegory of the Cave from Plato, creator of “Academia”.
- People tied to a wall in the depth of the cave from childhood, believe the shadows reflected on the wall are reality [lit. substance].
- On leaving the cave, they see the light of the sun for the first time and understand that their world was but a fraction of it.
- Abe’s economic policy ‘of a different dimension’ is likely a surprise to people who have only seen the wall of the cave up to now.
- However, after seeing the outside world, they would likely notice [such changes] are natural.
- [Abe wants] a Japan which grows rigorously in a world where the sun shines.
- We must jump out of cave without hesitation.
- Without action, there is no growth.
- Abe wants to push forward the growth strategy together with the understanding from everyone of 'Japan Academia' as well [the primary audience], who have already escaped Plato's Cave.
- Next month is the Tokyo Metropolitan Election and in July there is the Upper House Election.
- The atmosphere in the world has changed bit by bit, and our fight to 'bring back Japan' is still halfway done.
- "I want you to bring back a strong economy"; this is the voice of the Japanese people.
- [Abe wants] a diplomacy, security, social security, which has a strong economy.
- Going to place focus on economic policy and from now continue with policy management.
- In order to get results, Abe must stabilize politics.
- A politics that can’t make decisions imperils Japan's future.
- The voice of many Japanese citizens is that they've had enough of 'Nejire Parliament'.
- This Upper House Election is also a fight to bring back Japanese politics.
- I want overcome this hot summer together with everyone [you all].

Implicit premises:
- Lack of growth is due to Japan not being active in the world.
- Large-scale reforms are necessary for Japanese growth.
- Lack of growth imperils Japan's security, diplomacy and social securities.
- The world has changed and Japan until now has not understood this world enough to attain growth.
- Ignorance of this new world makes Abe's growth policies appear irregular.
- Those opposed to such policies do not understand the world and hence how to attain growth.
- There is too much 'inaction'.
- Growth necessitates the right attitude. There must be a will for reform.
- Those opposed to such policies do not have the right attitude/volition.
- Growth requires policy management which 'Nejire Parliament' imperils due to causing political 'instability'.
- A strong economy, politics, and Japan have been taken.
- Bringing them back necessitates a fight.
- People are sick of political instability, people are sick of a lack of growth.
- To win the fight, there needs to be consensus.

Solutions
- The second round of economic growth strategy.
- LDP victory in the Upper House Elections.

IS Frame: Texts

IS.FE1 (Abe 28 August 2013b):
そして、中東地域の平和と安定も、我が国の国民生活にとって死活問題であることは、言うまでもありません。この地域の諸国との間で安全保障についての対話を拡大し、この地域で積極的な役割を、責任を果たしていかねばならない。そのことを忘れてはなりません。

世界のコンテナの約2割が通過するアデン湾において、日本の自衛隊の活動を、日本の船舶だけでなく、世界が頼りにしています。ジブチでは、自衛官と海上保安官の諸君が、海賊対処行動にあたっています。砂煙が舞い、気温が50度にも及ぶ過酷な環境のもとでも、高い士気で任務にあたっている彼らの姿は、私の大きな誇りです。

「日本の自衛隊は、地域の安定にとって、素晴らしい貢献をしている。」

ジブチのゲレ大統領からも、バーレーンで会った多国籍連合海上部隊のミラー司令官からも、自衛隊は高い評価を受けました。日本への国際社会の大きな期待を、改めて実感することができました。

地域の平和と安定に、さらに貢献していかなければなりません。今回の中東・ジブチ訪問は、その決意を新たにする旅となりました。

最後に、現下のシリア情勢について一言申し上げます。日本政府としては、シリアにおいて化学兵器が使用された可能性が極めて高いと考えています。化学兵器の使用はいかなる場合でも許されるものではない。シリア情勢の悪化の責任は、人道状況の悪化を顧みないアサド政権にあることは明らかであります。日本政府は、事態の改善のため国際社会と緊密に連携していきます。"

IS.FE2 (Abe 6 May 2014):

“ラスムセン事務総長、温かい歓迎の言葉をありがとうございます。

各大使閣下、ご列席の皆様、

「日本は、国際社会のために為すべきことを、実行する用意がある。」

2007年、日本の総理として初めてNACで演説するという栄誉を頂いたとき、私は、こう申し上げました。

あれから7年。再び日本の総理となって、この場所に戻って参りました。そして今、国際協調主義に基づく「積極的平和主義」の旗を掲げ、7年前の約束を果たしつつある。そのことをお伝えできることを、私は、とても嬉しく思います。

日本は、第2次世界大戦後70年近くにわたり、平和国家としての道を歩み、一貫して、国連憲章に掲げられた、自由、民主主義、人権、法の支配など、基本的価値の実現に尽力してきました。今後とも、この方針を貫いていくことに一点の迷いま増えません。

日本は、同時に、国際平和協力から、軍縮・不拡散や国際テロ対策、「人間の安全保障」の推進、そして防災協力に至るまで、個別の分野を通じて、世界の平和と安定に、着実に貢献してまいりました。
カンボジア、ゴラン高原、ハイチ、そして南スーダン。さらには、インド洋でのテロとの闘い、イラクにおける復興支援。世界中で、冷戦終結後、5万人もの自衛隊員が、平和のために身を尽くしてきました。

国連PKOには、米国に次ぐ11%の財政負担を行っています。190の国と地域に、総額3000億ドル以上のODAを実施してきました。日本のODAは、今年で60周年。振り返れば、戦後貧しい頃から、アジアの友人をはじめ、世界に支援の手を差し伸べてきました。

そのような、揺るぎない平和国家としての歩みを礎に、日本は、これまで以上に、世界の平和と繁栄に強くコミットしてまいります。空の自由、海の自由といった「国際公共財」を守り抜くため、より積極的な役割を果たさなければならない、と考えています。

これが、私が掲げる「積極的平和主義」です。その決意を、我が国初の「国家安全保障戦略」をつくり、明確にしました。その戦略を確実に実現していくため、新たな体制も整えました。今や、重要な意思決定は、すべて、私直属の「国家安全保障会議」が、機動的に行っていいます。

日本は、NATOの『必然のパートナー』である。ラスムセン事務総長は、このようなおっしゃいました。私も、心から賛同します。

なぜ、日本とNATOなのでしょうか。

私が進める「地球儀を俯瞰する外交」において、同盟国である米国と共に、欧州諸国は、基本的価値を共有するパートナーです。そして、NATOは、「価値に基づく同盟」を掲げて、また、大西洋を越えて、米国と欧州を結ぶ同盟です。"

IS.FE3 (Abe 19 September 2014):
"他方、今年の成長戦略は、「中身はいいが、本当に実現できるのか？」と言われています。

一つは、「安倍内閣は、本当は、経済ではなく、安全保障がやりたいのだ」という指摘です。

安全保障と経済とは、別次元の話ではありません。むしろ現実には、極めて密接な関係があります。海の安全保障は、自由貿易の大前提です。ここまで深化したグローバル経済が、海や空の安全保障政策抜きに、はたして、語れるでしょうか。

地域の平和と安定、海や空の安全保障なくして、繁栄を享受することはできません。だからこそ、私は、「積極的平和主義」の旗を掲げて、これまで以上に世界の平和に貢献していく姿勢を明確にしてきました。"

IS.FE4 (Abe 30 September 2013):
"そんな両国は、安保の協力関係で、大きな前進を遂げつつあります。

折も折、ヨーク公がおいでになった。第一海軍卿も来日される。本シンポジウムの副題があります「21世紀の新たな関係に向けて」、本年は後代、歴史家によって、画期をなす年だったと評価されるかもしれません。"
装備品の共同開発は、我が国の場合、年・米国とだけ実施してきたものです。このほど、初めて、英国ともできるようにしました。キャメロン首相と私の間で、合意に至るべく、仕上げを急ぎました。

ソマリア沖・アデン湾では、この12月以降、我が自衛隊は第151連合任務部隊（CTF151）に参加し、「ゾーンディフェンス」による海賊対処行動を実施する予定です。英海軍との連携は、これまで以上に充実するでしょう。

私も日本の側では、私が再び政権に就いてこの方、海がつなぐ国々との間、あるいは、宇宙、サイバースペースを大切に想う国々との間で、安全保障のスカイスケープ、シースケープ、ならびにランドスケープを、広く、互いに共有するよう努めてきました。

もちろん米国は、常に変わらず、第一の協力相手です。英国にとっては、そうに違いありません。そのうえで、申し上げようとしているのは、英と、知見を交換し合い、経験を分かち合って、世界の平和、安定に責任を分有する仲間として、ともに歩んでいきたいという、私どもの意欲です。

いまや、人類にとっての公共空間がすべてボーダーレスになり、そこににある一切合財が、ネットワークによって結ばれるとき、法の支配を重んじる、価値観をもとにする国々は、ますます力を合わせ、叡智を分かち合わなくてはなりません。

そんなとき、私は、私の愛する祖国に、進んで、世界の平和と、安定を支える鎖の弱い環であってはならないと思います。

長らく自由で平和な国際環境、穏やかな海洋秩序から裨益してきた一大通商国家なので、日本には、果たすべき相応の責任があります。

そんなつもりで、私は先週、国連総会などニューヨークにおける一連の機会をとらえ、新しい日本の自画像を打ち出すことにしました。「積極的平和主義」という、これからの日本を代表し、導いて行くひとつの旗印です。

いま私の政権では、国家安全保障会議の設置、国家安全保障戦略の策定、集団的自衛権や、集団安全保障措置と憲法との関係など、「積極的平和主義」の旗を掲げるにふさわしい基礎的枠組を、いかにすれば充実できるか、衆知をあつめて検討しているところです。

どうしていま、こんな検討が必要なのか、先週私はニューヨークで、具体例を挙げて説明しています。お手元に、その際の講演原稿をお配りしました。どうぞご参照ください。

核戦略の基礎理論から、いまや金融界では不可欠の「モンテカルロ分析」の手法まで、「考えられないことを考える」天才だった、ハーマン・カーンの名を冠した賞をいただいた時の公演です。"
もはや、どの国も、一国だけで平和を守れる時代ではありません。これは、世界の共通認識でしょう。さすればこそ、集団的自衛権や、国連 PKO を含む国際協力にかかわる法的基盤、再構築を図る必要があるのではないか。そう思い私はいま、国内で検討を進めています。

いま、日本の自衛隊は、国連ミッションの下、独立間もない南スーダンにいて、平和づくりに汗を流しています。

いま、日本の自衛隊は、国連ミッションの下、独立間もない南スーダンにいて、平和づくりに汗を流しています。

そこには、カンボジア、モンゴル、バングラデシュ、インド、ネパール、韓国、中国といった国々の、部隊が参加しています。国連の文民スタッフや、各国 NGO の方々も、大勢います。南スーダンの国造りを助けるという点で、彼らは皆、仲間です。

ここでもし、自らを守るすべのない文民や、NGO の方々に、武装勢力が突然襲い掛かったとしましょう。いままでの、日本政府の考え方では、襲撃を受けているこれら文民の方々を、我が国自衛隊は、助けに行くことはできません。今後とも、それでいいのか。われわれは現在、日本政府としての検討を進めるとともに、連立与党同士の協議を続けています。

国際社会の平和、安定に、多くを負う国ならばこそ、日本は、もっと積極的に世界の平和に力を尽くしたい、「積極的平和主義」のバナーを掲げたいと、そう思うからです。

自由と人権を愛し、法と秩序を重んじて、戦争を憎み、ひたぶるに、ただひたぶるに平和を追求する一本の道を、日本は一度としてふれることなく、何世代にもわたって歩んできました。これからの、幾世代、変わらず歩んでいます。

この点、本日はお集まりのすべての皆さまに、一点、曇りもなくご理解をいただきたい。そう思います。

私はこの 1 年と半年ちかく、日本経済を、いまいちど、イノベーションがさきわい、力強く成長する経済に立て直そうと、粉骨砕身、努めてまいりました。

アベノミクスと、ひとはこれを呼び、経済政策として分類します。私はこの 1 年と半年ちかく、日本経済を、いまいちど、イノベーションがさきわい、力強く成長する経済に立て直そうと、粉骨砕身、努めてまいりました。

アベノミクスと、ひとはこれを呼び、経済政策として分類します。

新しい日本人は、こうした、無私・無欲の貢献を、おのがじし、喜びとする点で、父、祖父たちと、なんら変わらないとは言えません。
変わるとすれば、日本が実施する支援や協力は、その対象、担い手とも、ますます女性になることでしょうか。

カンボジアで、民法をつくり、民事訴訟法をつくるお手伝いをした日本人が、3人の、いずれも若い女性裁判官、女性検事だったことを、ご記憶ください。

2011年8月のことでした。フィリピンの、ベニグノ・アキノ3世大統領と、ムラド・エブラヒム MILF議長とのトップ会談が、日本の、成田で実現し、本年3月には、とうとう、両者間に、包括和解の合意がなりました。

2年後には、いよいよ、バンサモロ自治政府が産声をあげます。そのため私たち日本の援助チームは、何に、いちばん力を入れているでしょうか。

女性たちに、生活の糧を稼ぐ実力をつけてもらうことが、そのひとつです。ミンダナオに、我が国は女性職業訓練所を建てました。銃声と怒号が消えたミンダナオに響くのは、彼女たちが動かすミシンの、軽快な機械音です。

新しい日本人とは、いままでと同じように、成長のエンジンが、結局のところ人間であり、ともすると不当に不利な立場に置かれてきた、女性たちであることを踏まえ、その、実力を向上に、力を惜しまない人間です。

新しい日本人は、アジア・太平洋の繁栄を、自分のこととして喜び、日本を、地域の意欲ある若者にとって、希望の場所とすることに、価値と、生き甲斐を見出す日本人です。日本という国境にとらわれない、包容力ある自我をもつ、日本人です。

中国からは、毎年、何十人かの高校生がやってきて、北から南まで、日本列島に散らばって、まる1年、日本人の高校生と、生活や、学習を共にします。

彼ら、彼女らは、例外なく、日本人の友達と結んだ友情に感動し、ホストファミリーが注ぐ愛情に涙して、母国に帰ります。日本を、第二の故郷だと言って帰ります。

新しい日本人には、そんな、外国の人たちを慈愛深く迎える心を、いっそう大切にしてほしい。そう思います。

新しい日本人とは、最後に、この地域の平和と、秩序の安定を、自らの責任として、担う気構えがある日本人です。

人権や、自由の価値を共有する地域のパートナーたちと、一緒になって、アジア・太平洋の平和、秩序を担おうとする意欲の持ち主です。

そんな新しい日本人のための、新しいパナー、「積極的平和主義」とは、日本が、いままでより以上に、地域の同輩たち、志と、価値を共にするパートナーたちと、アジア・太平洋の平和と、安全、繁栄のため、努力と、労を惜しまないという、心意気の表現にほかなりません。

米国との同盟を基盤とし、ASEANとの連携を重んじながら、地域の安定、平和、繁栄を確固たるものとしていくため、日本は、骨身を惜しまません。
私たちの行く手には、平和と、繁栄の大道が、ひろびろと、広がっています。次の世代に対するわれわれの責任とは、この地域がもつ成長のポテンシャルを、存分に、花開かせることです。

日本は、法の支配のために。アジアは、法の支配のために。そして法の支配は、われわれすべてのために。アジアの平和と繁栄よ、とこしえなれ。"

NS Frame: Texts

NS.FE1 (Abe 12 September 2013):
“「現実」とかけ離れた建前論に終始し、そのしわ寄せを「現場」の自衛隊員に押し付けるようなことは、あってはなりません。

私は、「現実」を直視した、我が国の安全保障政策の立て直しを進めています。

その第一が、すでに国会に法案を提出している、「国家安全保障会議」の創設です。早期の成立を図り、官邸における外交・安全保障政策の司令塔機能を強化します。

これと併せ、我が国の国益を長期的視点から見定めた上で、我が国の安全を確保していくため、「国家安全保障戦略」を策定します。

防衛大綱も見直し、南西地域の防衛態勢の強化を含め、自衛隊の対応能力の向上に取り組みます。”

NS.FE2 (Abe 1 July 2014):
“小泉政権時代に、いわゆる有事法制あるいは国民保護法の制定を行ったわけでありますが、当時、私は官房副長官でありました。あの時、改めて戦後60年経つ中において、そうした日本の独立、そして国民の命を守るための法制には不備があるという現実と向き合うことになりました。

その中において残された宿題がまだあった。それは今回グレーゾーンであり、例えば集団安全保障の中において、PKO活動をする中において、一緒に活動する他の国部隊に対して、自衛隊もし襲撃をされたときには助けてもらうことになるけれども、逆はないということで果たしていいのか。あるいはNGOの人たちが実際に危険な目に遭っている中において、自衛隊が彼らを守ることができないっていうのか。そしてまた、米国の米国の高官から、米軍あるいは米国は日本に対して日本を防衛する義務を安保条約5条において果たしていく考えである。しかし、例えば日本を守るために警戒に当たっている米国の艦船がもし襲われた中において、近くにいて守ることができる日本の自衛艦がそれを救出しなくて、あるいはまた、その艦を守るために何の措置もとらなくて、アメリカ国民の日本に対する信頼感あるいは日本に対して共に日本を守っていくという意志が続いていくかどうか。そのことを真剣に考えてもらいたいと言われたこともあります。
段々安全保障環境が厳しくなる中において、正にそうした切れ目のないしっかりとした態勢を作ることによって、抑止力を強化し、そして全く隙のない態勢を作ることによって、日本や地域はより平和で安定した地域になっている、そう考えたわけでありました。今次、その意味において閣議決定ができたのです。

私は総理大臣として国民の命を守り、平和な暮らしを守るために、様々な課題に対して目を背けずに正面から取り組んでいく責任があります。その責任において、今回、閣議決定を行いました。"

NS.FE3 (Abe 26 December 2012):
“総理として、国民の生命、領土、美しい海を守り抜いていくという決意を示していきたいと思います。今、この瞬間にも、尖閣諸島沖では、海上保安庁や自衛隊の諸君が日本の海や空を守っています。日本の安全保障は人ごとではなく、今、そこにある危機であります。新たに国家安全保障強化担当大臣を設けました。司令塔となる国家安全保障会議の設置など、内閣を挙げて、外交・安全保障体制の強化に取り組んでまいります。”

NS.FE4 (Abe 15 October 2013):
“相互依存を深める世界において、世界の平和と安定に積極的な責任を果たすことなくして、もはや我が国の平和を守ることはできません。

これは、私たち自身の問題です。

戦後六十八年にわたる平和国家としての歩みに、私たちは胸を張るべきです。しかし、その平和を将来も守り抜いていくために、私たちは、今、行動を起こさなければならない。

単に国際協調という「言葉」を唱えるだけでなく、国際協調主義に基づき、積極的に世界の平和と安定に貢献する国にならねばなりません。「積極的平和主義」こそが、我が国が背負うべき二十一世紀の看板であると信じます。

石垣島で漁船を守る海上保安官。宮古島で南西の空をにらみ、ジブチで灼熱(しゃくねつ)のもと海賊対処行動に当たる自衛官。極限の環境でも高い士気を保つ姿を目の当たりにしました。彼らは、私の誇りです。御家族にも感謝の気持ちで一杯です。

彼らは、現場で、今この瞬間も、「現実」と向き合っています。私たちも、安全保障環境がますます厳しさを増す「現実」から、決して目を背けてはならない。

私は、「現実」を直視した、外交・安全保障政策の立て直しを進めてまいります。

国家安全保障会議を創設し、官邸における外交・安全保障政策の司令塔機能を強化します。これと併せ、我が国の国益を長期的視点から見定めた上で、我が国の安全を確保していくため、「国家安全保障戦略」を策定してまいります。

さらに、日米同盟を基軸とし、自由、民主主義、基本的人権、法の支配といった価値観を共有する国々と連携を強めてまいります。
在日米軍再編については、抑止力を維持しつつ、沖縄を始めとする地元の負担軽減を図るため、現行の日米合意に従って着実に進めます。

拉致問題については、私の内閣で、全面解決に向けて、全力を尽くしてまいります。”

NS.FE5 (Abe 15 May 2014):
“今、私が説明をしたように、この事態でも私たちはこの船に乗っている、もしかしたら子供たちを、お母さんや多くの日本人を助けることはできないのです。守ることもできない。その能力があるのに、それで本当にいいのかということを私は問うているわけであります。

立憲主義にのっとって政治を行っていく、当然のことである。その上において、私たち政治家は、こうしたことができないという現状から目を背けていていいのかということを皆さんにも考えていただきたいと私は思います。

人々の幸せを願って、まさに生存していく権利があるわけなのです。そして、その権利を私たち政府は守っていく責任があるのです。その責任を放棄しようと憲法が要請しているとは、私には考えられません。

会見を御覧になっている皆さんや、皆さんのお子さんやお孫さんが、こうした立場になるかもしれないという、そのことを考えていただきたいと思います。

この議論は、国民の皆様一人一人にかかわる現実的な問題であります。北朝鮮のミサイルは、日本の大部分を射程に入っています。このような日本を取り巻く安全保障環境の大きな変化を踏まえて、年がかりでこの問題に取り組んできました。いかなる事態にあっても国民の命と暮らしが守っていく責任が私たちにはあるはずです。こうした観点から研究を進めてまいります。

他方、私は、日本国憲法が集団的自衛権を含め、自衛のためなら全ての活動を許しているとは考えていません。自衛隊が武力行使を目的として他国での戦闘に参加するようなことは、これからも決してありません。それは、今、申し上げたとおりであります。憲法が掲げる平和主義は、これからも守り抜いていきます。

今回の検討によって、他国の戦争に巻き込まれるといった批判があります。こうした批判は、1960年の安保改正の際、盛んに言われました。この安保条約の改正によって、むしろ反対論の中心はここにありました。この日米安保の改正によって日本は戦争に巻き込まれる、さんがん、そう主張されました。しかし、50年たってどうだったでしょうか。この改正によって、むしろ日本の抑止力が高まり、アジア太平洋地域においてアメリカのプレゼンスによって、今、平和がより確固たるものになるというのは、日本人の常識になっているではありませんか。まさに、私たちが進めていこうとすることは、その抑止力を高めていく、そして、日本人の命を守るためにやるべきことはやらなければならないという観点から検討していかなければならないということであります。巻き込まれるという受け身の発想ではなくて、国民の命を守るために、何をすべきかという能動的な発想を持つ責任があると、私は思います。
繰り返しになりますが、抑止力が高まることによって、より戦争に巻き込まれることなくなると、私はこのように考えております。"

IRE Frame: Texts

IRE.FE1 (Abe 10 October 2013):

"今日は10月10日。49年前の10月10日。抜けるような青空のもとで開会したオリンピックを機に、日本はいち早く成長センターとなり、アジアの成長の牽引車となった。

ＡＰＥＣ、そしてＴＰＰ首脳会議が開催されたバリ島の澄み渡った空は、あの日の興奮を呼び起こしてくれた。アジア・太平洋地域は、「世界の成長センター」として、新たな飛躍のモセリを求めつつある。今回のＡＰＥＣ首脳会合では、地域全体の成長の加速化に向けて、大きく動きつつある。そう実感した。三本の矢によって、経済再生への道を力強く歩み始めた日本には、さらに大きな関心と期待が集まっている。

アジア・太平洋全体に、ダイナミックで、人々に繁栄と豊かさをもたらす、大きな自由経済圏をつくっていく。ＲＣＥＰも、その先のＦＴＡＡＰも、もはや絵物語ではない。ＴＰＰは、その大きな自由経済圏への第一歩。モノの取引だけではなく、サービス、投資、知的財産、そして環境など、幅広い分野で共通のルールをつくっていくこと。これこそが、21世紀の成長センターにふさわしい市場を実現する道である。

政治的な決断によって歩みを進め、アジア・太平洋にまたがる、新しい経済統合を実現する。その認識を首脳たちが共有し、年内妥結に向けて大きな流れをつくることができたと考えている。

その中心に、ＡＳＥＡＮ諸国がいる。私の外交は、ＡＳＥＡＮ訪問からスタートした。ここブルネイで8か国目となる。日本とＡＳＥＡＮは、40年にわたって共に手を携えて、発展してきた。その協力関係を、もう一段の高みへと押し上げていく。今回の日・ＡＳＥＡＮ首脳会議では、ＡＳＥＡＮ側からも強い意欲が示された。次世代を担う若者たちの交流をさらに強化する。医療、都市開発、災害対策など様々な分野で、日本の経験と技術を活かし、ＡＳＥＡＮ各国の人々の生活を豊かにすることに貢献していく。

東アジア首脳会議でも、地域の安全と繁栄のために、海洋分野をはじめとした法の支配的重要性、北朝鮮問題への一致した対応の必要性を強調し、多くの首脳から賛意を得たところである。「積極的平和主義」を掲げる我が国の安全保障政策についても、私から丁寧に説明をし、一層の役割を期待する声もいただいた。

12月には、首脳の皆さんを東京にお招きし、日・ＡＳＥＡＮ特別首脳会議を開く。今回の結果を弾みに、日・ＡＳＥＡＮ関係のさらなる発展の将来ビジョンを示したいと考えている。
今回の訪問中は、前回の国連総会に引き続き、多くの友人である首脳と再会することもでき
た。特に、プーチン大統領とは、ここ5か月で4度目の会談を持つことができ、個人的な信頼
関係を深めることができたと考えている。

来週からは、いよいよ臨時国会がスタートする。問題は山積しているが、この国会を通じ
て、決めめる政治、そして結果を出す政治に全力で取り組んでいく考えである。"

IRE.FE2 (Abe 27 September 2013):
"申し上げたいことは、日中関係は最も重要な二国間関係の一つ。日中両国は、さまざまな分野
において切っても切れない関係といってもよい。
アジア・太平洋地域、世界の平和と安定、繁栄に共に責任を持っている。

尖閣諸島については、歴史的にも国際法的にも、我が国固有の領土であり、現に我が国はこ
れを有効に支配している。
中国公船による領海侵入が続いており、我々にとっては大変遺憾なことであるが、領有権につ
いて日本が妥協することはない。
同時に、当方から事態をエスカレートさせることなく、毅然かつ冷静に対処してきている
し、これからもそうしていく。

私としては、個別の問題があっても関係全体に影響を及ぼさないように、互いにコントロー
ルしていくとの「戦略的互恵関係」の原点に立ち戻って、
日中関係を発展させていきたいと考えている。この点、G 2 0 の場で私から習近平国家主席
に、直接伝えた。

何か問題があるからといって、対話のドアを全て閉じてしまうのではなく、課題があるから
こそ、両国の間で、首脳レベルも含めて、話し合うべき。
私の対話のドアは常にオープンであり、中国側においても同様の姿勢を期待している。"

IRE.FE3 (Abe 5 June 2014):
“現在の国際情勢は、リーマン・ショックからようやく立ち直り始めた世界経済にとっても、
大きなリスク要因となりかねません。伸び悩みを見せる新興国経済も大きな課題です。新興国
の構造改革を支援し、成長の大きな可能性を開花させるため、G 7 が連携して努力をしてまい
ります。
一年前のサミットでは、日本の新たな経済政策、アベノミクスに、世界の関心が集中しまし
た。そして、今年は、その成果に注目が集まりました。「三本の矢」によって、日本は、有効
求人倍率が、17か月連続で上昇し、1倍を超えています。
今年の春から、多くの企業が給料アップに踏み切りました。今や、日本は、世界経済復活のエ
ンジンでもあります。経済セッションでは、今後も、たじろぐことなく改革を進めていく決意
を表明しました。"
「日本が、再び世界の中心に戻ってきた。」そのことを、改めて実感したサミットでもありました。

IRE.FE4 (Abe 14 December 2013):
「今年のアジアの顔」という栄誉ある賞をいただき、感激をいたしております。ASEANに対する私の思いと、我が国の貢献が評価されたものとこのように思いますが、日本が復活すること、日本の経済が強い経済に戻ってくること、ジャパン・イズ・バックが歓迎されたのだとこのように思います。

就任以来、私は地球儀を俯瞰する戦略的な外交を展開してまいりました。その中でASEANは常に特別なパートナーとして、その中心になりました。その証しに、就任以来、私は5回、ASEANへの歴訪を実現させました1月のベトナム訪問から始まり、先月のラオスでASEAN10カ国を全て訪問し、ASEANの人々と交流をしました。全ての国で例外なく日本が地域や世界の平和と繁栄に貢献していくことへの大きな期待を感じました。

今回の首脳会議でも各国首脳より、日本の果たすべき役割への大きな期待が表明され、ASEANとともに地域や世界の繁栄に貢献していきたいとの思いを強くしたところであります。

日中関係については、私の対話のドアは常にオープンであります。問題があっても、関係全体に影響を及ぼさないようにコントロールしていくという戦略的互恵関係の原点に戻るべきであると思います。課題があるからこそ、首脳同士が胸襟を開いて話し合うべきではないでしょうか。ぜひ中国側にも同じ姿勢を取っていただきたいと思います。”

IRE.FE5 (Abe 15 March 2013):
“関税撤廃した場合の経済効果については、今後、省庁ばらばらではなく、政府一体で取り組んでいくための一つの土台として試算を行いました。全ての関税をゼロとした前提を置いた場合でも、我が国経済には、全体としてプラスの効果が見込まれています。

この試算では、農林水産物の生産は減少することを見込んでいます。しかしこれは、関税は全て即時撤廃し、国内対策は前提としないという極めて単純化された仮定での計算によるものです。実際には、今後の交渉によって我が国のセンシティブ品目の特別な配慮など、あらゆる努力により、悪影響を最小限にとどめることは當然のことです。

今回の試算に含まれなかったプラスの効果も想定されます。世界経済の3分の1を占める経済圏と連結することによる投資の活性化などの効果も、更に吟味をしていく必要があります。詳細については、TPPに関する総合調整を担当させることにした甘利大臣から後ほど説明させます。

TPPの意義は、我が国への経済効果だけにとどまりません。日本が同盟国である米国とともに、新しい経済圏をつくります。そして、自由、民主主義、基本的人権、法の支配といった普遍的価値を共有する国々が加わります。こうした国々と共に、アジア太平洋地域における新たな
なルールをつくり上げていくことは、日本の国益となるだけではなくて、必ずや世界に繁栄をもたらすものと確信しております。
さらに、共通の経済秩序の下に、こうした国々と経済的な相互依存関係を深めていくことは、我が国の安全保障にとっても、また、アジア・太平洋地域の安定にも大きく寄与することは間違いありません。
日本と米国という二つの経済大国が参画してつくられる新たな経済秩序は、単にTPPの中だけのルールにはとどまらないでしょう。その先にある東アジア地域包括的経済連携/RCEPや、もっと大きな構想であるアジア太平洋自由貿易圏/FTAAPにおいて、ルールづくりのたたき台となるはずです。
今がラストチャンスです。この機会を逃すということは、すなわち、日本が世界のルールづくりから取り残されることにほかなりません。「TPPがアジア太平洋の世紀の幕開けとなった」。後世の歴史家はそう評価するに違いありません。アジア太平洋の世紀。その中心に日本は存在しなければなりません。TPPへの交渉参加はまさに国家百年の計であると私は信じます。
残念ながら、TPP交渉は既に開始から2年が経過しています。既に合意されたルールがあれば、遅れて参加した日本がそれをひっくり返すことが難しいのは、厳然たる事実です。残されている時間は決して長くありません。だからこそ、1日も早く交渉に参加しなければならないと私は考えました。
日本は世界第3位の経済大国です。一旦交渉に参加すれば必ず重要なプレイヤーとして、新たなルールづくりをリードしていくことができると私は確信しております。
一方で、TPPに様々な懸念を抱く方々がいらっしゃるのは当然です。だからこそ先の衆議院選挙で、私たち自由民主党は、「聖域なき関税撤廃を前提とする限り、TPP交渉参加に反対する」と明確にしました。そのほかにも国民皆保険制度を守るなど五つの判断基準を掲げています。私たちは国民との約束は必ず守ります。そのため、先般オバマ大統領と直接会談し、TPPは聖域なき関税撤廃を前提としないことを確認いたしました。そのほかの五つの判断基準についても交渉の中でしっかり守っていく決意です。
交渉力を駆使し、我が国として守るべきものは守り、攻めるものは攻めていきます。国益にかなう最善の道を追求してまいります。"

NE Frame: Texts

NE.FE1 (Abe 4 January 2013):
“先ほど冒頭でも申し上げましたが、今年は巳年、商売繁盛の年でもありますから、経済再生に向けて、ロケットスタートを切りたいと、こう決意しております。この政権に課された使命は、何よりも強い経済を取り戻していくことでありまして、日本銀行との緊密な連携による大
胆な金融政策、いわゆる15カ月予算の考え方の下、大型補正予算と新年度予算を合わせて実施していく機動的な財政政策、民間投資を喚起する成長戦略、この三本の矢で進めていきたいと思います。

特に2%の物価目標、為替については、日銀の金融政策が決定的に重要であります。日本銀行に責任を持って対応してもらわなければならない。今、申し上げましたように、物価目標と、そして為替については、日本銀行の金融政策が決定的にバイタルに重要でありますから、日本銀行に責任を持ってそれを実行して行ってもらわなければならない、このように思います。その認識を日本銀行に持っていたくことが極めて重要であると考えております。

また、消費税の引き上げの実施については、4～6月の経済指標を含め、経済状況を総合的に勘案して判断をしていくことになります。3党合意では、来年春に消費税を引き上げるということが決まっておりますが、その方向に向かうように、経済を再生させていきたいと考えております。

NE.FE2 (italicized text denotes text added outside the parameter set) (Abe 23 September 2014):
"本日は、世界のマーケットを動かす方々と意見交換できる機会をいただき感謝申し上げます。2日前に60歳を迎えましたが、40代のように頑張っていきたいと思います。

政権も第二章に入り、内閣も新たな閣僚でスタートしました。私の最優先政策は、引き続き経済再生です。

私の成長戦略の基本理念は、チャレンジ・オープン・イノベーション。この3つの理念で、「できるはずがない」と思われていた改革を次々と実現しています。

世界の成長センターであるアジア太平洋地域に一つの経済圏を作るTPP。この地域に、関税だけではなく、国有企業改革、投資、知的財産といった、広汎な分野で、徹底した自由でファーーン新たなルールを構築する試みです。

これを日米で牽引していこう、という強い思いで、私は交渉参加を決断しました。日本も思い切って合意へ向けて貢献していく覚悟です。

今年4月、オバマ大統領とキー・マイルストーンを画す道筋を特定しました。交渉は最終段階です。

一方で、国内でも攻めの農業改革を進めています。40年続いていた、いわゆる「コメの減反」の廃止を断行します。徹底した流通構造改革を進め、これまで手を付けることすらタブー視されていた農協についても、60年ぶりの抜本改革を実行します。

国内の構造改革を進め、日本の農業の競争力を高める。同時にTPPなどの経済連携によって、広い経済圏に打って出る。内外の改革を一体で進めていくことが、日本の農業の将来のために欠かすことができないと考えています。

既得権益に守られてきた人の抵抗を押さえるのは正直かなり大変です。しかし、彼らもまた競争に晒されなければ未来はありません。彼らのためにこそ、私のあくなき改革は続きます。
エネルギーも成長戦略の鍵です。福島原発事故の反省と教訓にたって、独立した原子力規制委員会が策定した新規制基準に適合すると認めた原発は、再稼働を進めています。

一方で、エネルギー革命のフロントランナーを目指します。私は、世界に先駆けて日本で水素社会を実現したいと思います。燃料電池の開発を30年前から国家プロジェクトとして進め、昨年私は、燃料電池自動車の実用化を阻む規制を一気に改革しました。そしてついに、世界で初めて、水素ステーションと燃料電池自動車の実用化を実現しました。来年初めには、自動車ディーラーのショーウィンドーに燃料電池自動車が並びます。

電力事業でも、戦後60年続いた電力の地域独占を終わらせ、イノベーションが花開く、自由でダイナミックなエネルギー市場を創り上げていきます。

会社も変わらなければならない。皆様が日本企業に投資しやすい環境を築きます。

コーポレートガバナンスの強化は私の改革リストのトップアジェンダです。この夏、会社法を改正し、社外取締役の設置について、"Comply or Explain"ルールを導入しました。上場企業では、ここ1年間に社外取締役を選任した企業が12％増えて74％になりました。

法人税改革にも取り組んでいます。今年度から法人税実効税率を2.4％引き下げました。来年度から数年間で20％台まで引き下げることを目指します。

私はGPIFの改革を極めて重視しています。できる限り早く、ポートフォリオの見直しを行うたいと考えています。今回の内閣決定では、GPIFを所管する厚生労働大臣に改革の旗手の塩崎さんを任命しました。医療や年金、労働制度も所管します。私の改革に対する本気度をおわかりいただけると思います。

アベノミクスの「三本の矢」によって、日本を覆っていた暗い重い空気は一変しました。効効求人倍率は22年ぶりの高水準。賃上げ率は過去15年間で最高です。上場企業のROEは政権発足時から約5割改善し、6年ぶりの高水準になりました。

女性の輝く社会の実現も、私の成長戦略の柱です。安倍政権誕生以来1年半で、女性の就業者数は82万人増加していることは、自信を持って言える成果です。

私は、就任から1年9か月で、すでに50か国近くを訪問しました。日本企業も、今や、海外に熱いまなざしを向けるようになってくれています。積極的な経済外交によって、海外でのインフラ受注は、昨年、これまでの3倍の9兆円へと拡大しました。

もはや、アベノミクス以前の内向きな日本のマインドは、ここにはありません。

今日は、皆様から、日本の投資・ビジネス環境改善のために忌憚ない意見を賜りたいと思います。"

NE.FE3 (italicized text denotes text added outside the parameter set) (28 January 2013):
"我が国にとって最大かつ喫緊の課題は、経済の再生です。"
私が何故、数ある課題のうち経済の再生に最もこだわるのか。それは、長引くデフレや円高が、「頑張る人は報われる」という社会の信頼の基盤を根底から揺るがしていると考えるからです。

政府がどれだけ所得の分配を繰り返しても、持続的な経済成長を通じて富を生み出すことができなければ、経済全体のパイは縮んでいってしまいます。そうなると、一人ひとりがどんなに頑張ってみても、個人の手元に残る所得は減っていくばかりです。私たちの安心を支える社会保障の基盤も揺らぎかねません。

これまでの延長線上にある対応では、デフレや円高から抜け出すことはできません。だからこそ、私は、これまでとは次元の違う大胆な政策パッケージを提示します。断固たる決意をもって、「強い経済」を取り戻していこうではありませんか。

既に、経済再生の司令塔として「日本経済再生本部」を設置し、「経済財政諮問会議」も再起動しました。この布陣をフル回転させ、大胆な金融政策、機動的な財政政策、そして民間投資を喚起する成長戦略という「三本の矢」で、経済再生を推し進めます。

金融政策については、従来の政策枠組みを大胆に見直す共同声明を、日本銀行との間で取りまとめました。日本銀行において二％の物価安定目標をできるだけ早期に実現することを含め、政府と日本銀行がそれぞれの責任において、共同声明の内容をきちんと実行していくことが重要であり、政府と日本銀行の一層の緊密な連携を図ってまいります。

加えて、先にまとめた「緊急経済対策」で、景気を下支えし、成長力を強化します。これから提出する補正予算は、その裏付けとなるものです。「復興・防災対策」「成長による富の創出」「暮らしの安心・地域活性化」という三つを重点分野として、大胆な予算措置を講じます。速やかに成立させ、実行に移せるよう、各党各会派の格別の御理解と御協力をお願い申し上げます。

他方、財政出動をいつまでも続けるわけにはいきません。民間の投資と消費が持続的に拡大する成長戦略を策定し、実行してまいります。

iPS細胞という世紀の大発明は、新しい薬や治療法を開発するための臨床試験の段階が見えています。実用化されれば、「健康で長生きできる社会」の実現に貢献するのみならず、新たな富と雇用も生み出します。

イノベーションと制度改革は、社会的課題の解決に結び付くことによって、暮らしに新しい価値をもたらし、経済再生の原動力となります。

最も大切なのは、未知の領域に果敢に挑戦をしていく精神です。皆さん。今こそ、世界一を目指していこうではありませんか。

世界中から投資や人材を惹きつけ、若者もお年寄りも、年齢や障害の有無にかかわらず、全ての人々が生きがいを感じ、何度でもチャンスを与えられる社会。働く女性が自らのキャリアを築き、男女が共に仕事と子育てを容易に両立できる社会。中小企業・小規模事業者が躍動し、農山漁村の豊かな資源が成長の糧となる、地域の魅力があふれる社会。そうした「あ
るべき社会像」を、確かな成長戦略に結び付けることによって、必ずや「強い経済」を取り戻してまいります。

同時に、中長期の財政健全化に向けてプライマリーバランスの黒字化を目指します。

東日本大震災の被災地は、二度目の厳しい冬を迎えています。私は、昨年末に総理に就任した直後に、最初の訪問地として迷うことなく福島を選びました。そして、先日は宮城を訪れ、これからも、可能な限り現地に足を運ぶつもりです。

被災地のことを想う時、私は、ある少女とその家族の物語を思い出さずにはいられません。東日本大震災で、小学校三年生だった彼女は、ひいおばあさんとお母さんを亡くしました。悲しみに暮れる家族のもとに、被災から二か月後のある日、一通の手紙が届きます。それには、二年前、少女が小学校に入学した後に、お母さんが少女に内緒で書いた「未来へ宛てた手紙」でした。

手紙には、入学当初の苦労話をの後に、こう書かれています。
「げんきに学校にいってくれるだけで、とてもあんしんしていました。この手紙をみつけて、お母さんはがんばっていきます」

この手紙を受け取ったのは、私がかって被災地で出会った、先般、再会を果たした少女です。その時、彼女は、私の目をじっと見つめ、「小学校を作って欲しい」と言いました。過去を振り返るのではなく、将来への希望を伝えてくれたことに、私は強く心を打たれました。

故郷(ふるさと)の復興は、被災地の皆さんに生きる希望を取り戻す作業です。今を懸命に生きる人々の笑顔を取り戻す。それは、その笑顔をただ願いながら天国で私たちを見守っている犠牲者の御霊(みたま)に報いる途(みち)でもあるはずです。

復興という言葉を唱えるだけでは、何も変わりません。まずは、政府の体制を大転換します。これまでの行政の縦割りを排し、復興庁がワンストップで要望を吸い上げ、現場主義を貫きます。今般の補正予算においても思い切った予算措置を講じ、被災地の復興と福島の再生を必ずや加速してまいります。"
“先月、「女性の活躍」を中核に、成長戦略の第一弾をご説明しました。そして、今日、第二弾として、「世界で勝つ」をキーワードに、規制改革などによる投資拡大策や、攻めの農業政策について、お話しました。

これで終わりではありません。改革の意志を継続しながら、力強く前に進んでいきます。

最後に、「アカデメイア」の生みの親、プラトンの「洞窟」の比喩で締めくくりたいと思います。

洞窟の奥深くで、子どもの頃からずっと、壁に向かって絞られている人は、壁に映る「影」を「実体」と思い込む。

振り向くことが許されて、初めて、自分たちで見てきたのは「影」に過ぎなかったことに気づく。さらに、導かれた洞窟の外で、太陽の光を初めて見て、自分がいた世界は、ほんの一部でしかなかったことを悟る。

こんなお話だったと思います。

私が掲げる「次元の違う」政策は、これまで洞窟の壁しか見てこなかった人たちにとっては、驚きのものであったでしょう。

しかし、外の世界を見た後で考えれば、当たり前のことが気付くのではないだろうか。

太陽が光り輝く世界で、力強く成長する日本。私たちは、洞窟の外に、ためらうことなく飛び出していかなければなりません。

「行動」なくして、「成長」なし。

すでにプラトンの洞窟から脱出した「日本アカデメイア」の皆様にも御協力いただきながら、成長戦略を共に前に進めてまいりたいと思います。

いよいよ、来月には東京都議選があり、7月には参議院選挙であります。

世の中の空気は、少しずつ変わってきたとは言え、私たちの「日本を取り戻す」戦いは、まだ半ばであります。

強い経済を取り戻してほしい。これは、国民の声です。

強い経済で、外交であり、安全保障であり、社会保障であります。経済政策に足を置いて、これからも政策運営にあたっていきます。

忘れてはならないのが、東日本大震災からの復興です。

日曜日にも宮城県に伺いましたが、総理就任以来、毎月被災地に足を運んでいます。

一日でも早く復興を加速させて、その思いで、現地に足を運び、現場の皆さんの声に耳を傾け、一つひとつ地道に結果を出してきました。

これからも、毎月被災地に伺って、復興への歩みを着実に進めていきたいと考えています。

そして、こうした政策をしっかりと前に進め、結果を出していくためにも、政治を安定させなければなりません。

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決められない政治は、日本の未来を危うくします。ねじれ国会は、「もう、たくさんだ」というのが、多くの国民の声ではないでしょうか。今回の参議院選挙は、日本の政治を取り戻す戦いでもあります。
皆様と共に、この暑い夏を力強く乗り越えていきたい、と思っております。
ご清聴ありがとうございました。

Appendix (Chapter 8)

Selected articles from the US-Japan Security Treaty

Article 2:
“The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.”

Article 3:
“The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.”

Article 5:
“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Article 6:
“For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.”