The Collective Experience of Crime and Solidarity: A Cross-National Study of Europe

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

Stipulated by a growing interest in the social repercussions of crime control and imprisonment (e.g. Allen et al. 2014; Garland 2001; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014), this thesis presents a detailed empirical overview of the relationship between solidarity and the collective experience of crime in contemporary European societies, making three original contributions to knowledge. With \((a)\) a theoretical framework that combines Durkheim’s classic theory about the solidarity-enhancing effects of punishment with the contemporary framing theory of solidarity by Lindenberg (1998, 2006), the thesis \((b)\) operationalises Garland’s (2001, 2000) concept of the ‘collective experience of crime’ and \((c)\) assesses its potential to impact institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state and citizens’ solidarity attitudes in a comparative study of 26 European countries between 1995 and 2010. The theoretical framework argues that the collective experience of crime – consisting of the prevalence of crime, efforts to prevent crime, reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, and the salience of crime in society – is related to social solidarity has the ability to increase and to decrease solidarity, depending on which aspects of solidarity and the collective experience of crime are investigated. These propositions are tested on secondary data from social surveys, reports, sourcebooks, and country-level databases. Descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses indicate that in accordance to classic Durkheimian theory solidarity among citizens can be stimulated by public discourse about crime and is mainly produced at the expense of offenders. In contrast, welfare state solidarity is higher where penal regimes care for prisoners’ wellbeing and pursue reintegrative approaches to criminal justice. Furthermore, visible crime control efforts can highlight the presence of crime in society and decrease trust among citizens. Accordingly, crime control measures should not be seen in isolation from the social, economic, and political life around them, and policy-makers should take into account potential social consequences of crime control.
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1 Introduction

The prevalence of crime and routines of crime control have changed in Western democracies during past decades. On the one hand, a so-called ‘crime drop’ throughout industrialised societies has been occurring since the early 1990s (Berg et al. 2016; Eisner 2003; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009). On the other hand, the 1990s witnessed an intensification of wide-ranging crime control and an increased use of imprisonment. Paired with a turning away from rehabilitative ideals towards the retributive aspects of punishment, these developments in crime control have been described as a ‘punitive turn’ (Muncie 2008; Pratt et al. 2005).

Many explanations have been put forward as to why crime rates have been falling. These include upturns in the economy and rising consumer confidence (Rosenfeld and Messner 2009), a rise in private security measures and a resulting decline in opportunities for crime (Farrell et al. 2011; Tseloni et al. 2012), as well as lifestyle changes in the late 20th and early 21st century (Aebi and Linde 2014). The reasons for changes in crime control routines as well as causes for the development of different penal regimes have also been the subject of intense study. Here neoliberalism has been identified as a facilitator for increasing penal harshness and crime control measures (Lacey 2013; O’Malley 2016; Wacquant 2009). Declines in welfare state activity, promotion of the view that individuals rather than social or economic structures are responsible for their life chances, and economic deregulation have given rise to policies which focus on deterrence rather than therapy. In particular the co-occurrence of restrictive welfare states and high rates of imprisonment has been repeatedly demonstrated (Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a; Downes and Hansen 2006). Generous welfare states in contrast seem to avoid the punitive turn, concerning both imprisonment as well as crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system (Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Hinds 2005). In addition, the re-emergence of conservative new-rightist political culture across western democracies, as well as the development of crime control as a political issue with popular appeal, have been suggested as having spurred tough-on-crime policies and penal severity (de Koster et al. 2008; Jacobs and Jackson 2010).

Less attention has been paid to the ways in which different crime control and penal regimes might retroact on the social and political context which has shaped them. One notable exception is the seminal work of David Garland (1991a, 2001, 1991b) on the topic. In conceptualising crime control and punishment as social insti-
tutions he argues that the symbolic meaning they carry reaches an audience beyond offenders or professionals in the criminal justice sector. Through their contribution to the construction of cultural order they convey information about accountability, blame, authority, and morality to the general public. Garland (2001) further argues that new experiences of criminal justice and cultures of control with which the middle classes were confronted during the 1980s and 1990s have led to a decline in interpersonal trust and a rise in the fear of crime, and have helped to create stereotypes of (potential) offenders who deserve only ‘just deserts’ and not outreach, assistance, or reintegration to society. Punishment and crime control can thus affect how people perceive each other and can therefore leave traces in wider society.

More than ten years after the publication of Garland’s (2001) *The Culture of Control*, interest in the wider social implications of crime control in general and imprisonment in particular has re-emerged. In 2014 the *British Academy* released a report entitled *A Presumption Against Imprisonment: Social Order and Social Values* which argues that frequent use of imprisonment is disruptive to social integration by demonstrating institutional examples of exclusion:

‘A society that continues to expand the institution of imprisonment diminishes to that extent the power of moral individualism to unify and integrate society. Even more fundamentally, it does so not merely as regards prisoners, physically and symbolically excluded from the reach of this unifying value system, but also as regards citizens at large, who learn to ignore whole sections of the population as outside society’s networks of solidarity. The precedent, which the institution of imprisonment currently provides in Britain, of large-scale exclusion of whole sections of the national population (incarcerated offenders), facilitates other attitudes that favour exclusion or marginalisation of sections of society – of those who are not citizens, of those seen as ‘deviants’ in any of a number of ways, who appear as strangers in cultural terms. The excessive use of prison fosters, and indeed institutionalises, social fragmentation, notably along the lines of age, race, disability and gender – in vivid contrast to our public aspirations to human rights and civic equality.’ (Allen et al. 2014: 72)

Almost simultaneously the *National Research Council of the National Academies* in the USA has entrusted a committee to research the causes and consequences of mass incarceration in the United States. Similar to the British report, the committee not only highlighted the negative effects of mass imprisonment on offenders and their immediate families and communities, but also argued that by predominantly burdening the disadvantaged, imprisonment can exacerbate social inequalities in
Furthermore, the report discusses the potential of imprisonment to influence the general public’s attitudes towards the law, contribute to political disenfranchisement, and facilitate the treatment of certain parts of the population which are overrepresented in prisons as second-class citizens (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014: 291-319).

Hence, there is growing interest in the social repercussions of crime control. The empirical work on this topic is, however, largely constrained to the United Kingdom and the USA. Garland’s work is based on intensive study of processes within these two countries. Likewise the reports of the British Academy and the National Research Council of the National Academies of the USA are focused on their domestic situations. In addition, both reports outline ways in which the use of imprisonment can shape social inequalities and stereotypes. Assessments of crime control measures at the front end of the criminal justice system, as well as situational crime prevention measures, which stem from the private security industry or private households are still largely based on whether they fulfil their instrumental goal of reducing crime. Their wider social implications are a neglected research area (Karstedt and Hope 2003).

This PhD study responds to this research gap in regards to the social repercussions of the ways societies control, punish, and process crime, by assessing potential impacts of crime control on solidarity in contemporary European societies. The thesis gauges links between solidarity, crime, and crime control in a systematic and empirical way in order to provide a differentiated and evidence-based picture of how the prevalence of crime, crime prevention, reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, and the salience of crime-related issues in society can impact upon solidarity in society.

These four aspect of crime in society – prevalence, prevention, criminal justice reactions, and salience – make up what Garland (2001: 147) describes as the ‘collective experience of crime.’ This collective experience does not denote direct encounters with crime. Rather it refers to ‘the complex of practices, knowledges, norms, and subjectivities that make up a culture’ (Garland 2001: 147). The collective experience of crime hence describes a general frame of reference through which people can learn about the existence of and approaches to crime in their society.

Solidarity is a key feature of societies, often referred to as the ‘glue’ that holds individuals together to make a society in the first place (Bowman 1998: 331; Brodie 2002: 379; Walter 2001: 495). Feelings of common responsibility for each other’s welfare, i.e. solidarity, can contribute to phenomena as diverse as collective action, social order, integration, employee-employer loyalty, intergenerational exchange of resources, welfare policies, and inter-state assistance. The concept of solidarity can
be applied to analyse why people pool resources at all and engage in collective action, and why some cooperate more than others (Chai and Hechter 1998; Egonsson 1999; Karagiannis 2007; Komter 2005). Different levels of solidarity help to shed light on social integration and social regulation and how they are intertwined, as well as the dynamics of social exclusion (Adair 2008; Brodie 2002; Brunkhorst 2005; Veitch 2011; Delanty 2008; Silver 1994; Locke 2003). Due to its pivotal role in society, repercussions on solidarity are of particular interest when assessing the social impacts of the way societies deal with and process crime.

In this thesis, two theories build the theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between aspects of the collective experience of crime and solidarity. First is the classic work of Durkheim (1893, 1992) about the connection between punishment and solidarity in society. Second is the more contemporary framing theory of solidarity put forward by Lindenberg (1998, 2006). The work of Durkheim (1893, 1992) creates an understanding of how penal reactions to crime can impact upon solidarity in society, which he understands as the bond between an individual and society. This bond is based upon a shared agreement on norms and values between individuals who form a society. Punishment, which according to Durkheim reinforces the validity of shared moral beliefs, thus creates and strengthens solidarity between members of a society.

Durkheim’s theory will be supplemented by framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006), which helps to understand how certain methods of punishment can drive people apart rather than unite them. Framing theory will also be used to explain how aspects of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment can impact upon solidarity in society. Lindenberg argues that in order for people to uphold the value of solidarity themselves, they need to believe that solidarity guides the actions of their fellow citizens. Hence, individuals’ solidarity attitudes become strengthened through a social and institutional environment which suggests that people tend to hold the value of solidarity in high regard. Solidarity can be further strengthened by group unity as well as signals of outreach towards one another, which signal mutual reassurance about the appreciation of solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 81-90). In contrast, solidarity is threatened by experiences of loss and exploitation of common goods.

Based on Lindenberg’s conceptualisation of preconditions of and threats to solidarity there are three main ways in which the different aspects of the collective experience of crime might impact upon solidarity in society. First, politically salient discourse about crime as well as visible crime control efforts can highlight the problem of crime in society and therefore signal the occurrences of loss and exploitation. Second, even though punishment and crime control impose negative sanctions, they
can nevertheless provide institutional examples of outreach towards offenders by for example committing to a rehabilitative ideal which suggests that offenders, too, are members of society deserving of assistance and reintegration. Third, and on the other hand, crime control and punishment regimes as well as political discourse about crime and can give members of a society a tool to gain group unity as ‘righteous citizens’ in opposition to the dangerous and criminal classes (Kennedy 2000; Garland 2001). From the vantage point of framing theory the collective experience of crime thus has the potential to weaken as well as strengthen solidarity in society.

The thesis is consequently built on the assumption that there are links between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society which can be theoretically established and empirically identified. This assumption is assessed by answering four strategically set research questions:

1. What are current trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime and solidarity in Europe?

2. What are differences and commonalities in Europe in regards to the collective experience of crime and solidarity?

3. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to institutionalised solidarity in society?

4. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to solidarity attitudes of individuals?

The empirical assessment of links between the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society is based on quantitative, cross-national comparisons of 26 Council of Europe member countries between 1995 and 2010. This quantitative comparative approach allows for a variety of institutional, ideological, and country-specific factors to be controlled for in order to bring out the dimensions of the collective experience of crime that foster solidarity in society and those that drive people apart. The thesis combines secondary data from social surveys, criminal justice statistics, data about the content of political parties’ election manifestos, and information on welfare state activity to operationalise solidarity and the four dimensions of the collective experience of crime. These are the prevalence of crime in society, crime prevention efforts, reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, and the salience of crime in society. Cluster, diffusion, and time-series-cross section analysis, as well as multilevel models are used to identify patterns of the collective experience of crime and of solidarity and show how these relate to each other in contemporary European societies.
The thesis is divided into seven substantive chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of solidarity and outlines theories about its origins, foundations, and maintenance in society. Chapter 3 explains how solidarity can be influenced by the way societies deal with crime. This chapter establishes the working hypothesis that there should be an empirically identifiable connection between solidarity and different aspects of the collective experience of crime. Chapter 4 outlines the research strategy and the data sources consulted for the upcoming empirical analyses.

The four research questions outlined above structure the empirical part of the thesis. Accordingly, chapter 5 outlines trends and trajectories of indicators of the collective experience of crime as well as indicators of solidarity in the sample countries between 1990 and 2010. Chapter 6 analyses patterns of the collective experience of crime and solidarity within Europe and examines factors which contribute to convergence of indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime between countries. Chapter 7 runs time-series-cross-section analyses to identify correspondences between different aspects of the collective experience of crime and welfare state activity. Chapter 8 presents the results of a multilevel analysis of the salience of crime in society and characteristics of penal regimes on citizens’ individual solidarity attitudes. The relevance of findings, their contribution to existing literature, as well as avenues for further research are discussed in the conclusion.
2 The Concept of Solidarity

2.1 Introduction

Solidarity is omnipresent in public discourse, but if prompted most people find it hard to define what it means. The term solidarity is usually connected to a sense of shared sacrifice, concern for each other, and reciprocal duties within a group of people (Mau 2008: 9; Chai and Hechter 1998: 36). These groups can be demarcated by kinship, friendship, national or regional borders, similar socio-economic or ethnic backgrounds, shared activities, as well as common beliefs and ideals (van Oorschot and Komter 1998; Stjerno 2009). Social science has long agreed on the importance of solidarity for social integration, social cohesion, and its role in social movements (Brunkhorst 2005; de Beer and Koster 2009; Dean 2008; Hechter 1987b). Yet, different explanations for the emergence and persistence of solidarity compete with each other. Do people contribute to each other’s welfare due to emotional attachment, the belief that it is the right thing to do, or because of interdependence?

This chapter shows that the concept of solidarity contains affective, calculating, and normative aspects. Different definitions and theories of solidarity emphasise some aspects more than others, depending on the scientific background they come from. A generic definition describes solidarity as ‘positive bond between the fates of different people’ (de Beer and Koster 2009: 15). Concern for the welfare of others, prosocial behaviour which involves some form of sacrifice for the benefit of others without immediate compensation, the pooling of resources, as well as a general willingness to contribute to the welfare of others are all expressions of this bond (Lindenberg 1998, 2006; Paskov and Dewilde 2012).

Of all the theories that exist in relation to solidarity two are central for this thesis. On the one hand there is the classic social theory of Emile Durkheim (Durkheim 1893, 1915) focussing on society, and on the other is Sigward Lindenberg’s (1998, 2006) framing approach to solidarity which focusses on individuals and their decisions to perform acts of solidarity. Both theories are important for the thesis because they allow for a connection between solidarity, crime, and operations of the criminal justice system. For Durkheim, solidarity describes the bond that individuals feel to the society they live in. It is a crucial aspect for achieving social unity and social order, and is rooted in common beliefs about right and wrong behaviour. Crime and subsequent punishment can serve to reinforce solidarity in society, as
they highlight the common norms and rules of behaviour that have been violated and reinstate their validity through punishment (Durkheim 1992; Lukes and Prabhat 2012; Trevino 2008).

Lindenberg equates prosocial behaviour with solidarity (Lindenberg 2006: 23), arguing that individuals display prosocial behaviour because of their attachment to the norm of solidarity. As a result of this attachment to solidarity people feel a moral duty to others, which they seek to fulfil with prosocial behaviour. Acts of solidarity hence depend on the importance of solidarity values to the individual. The relevance of the value of solidarity for individuals can be influenced both by other people’s behaviour and the norms promoted by the institutional environment. Prosocial behaviour contributes to the creation of a culture of solidarity that holds the norm of solidarity in high regard. As a consequence of this appreciation, solidarity is more salient in the minds of individuals. Institutions can create opportunities for prosocial behaviour and also put the value of solidarity into practice: the welfare state for example is an institutionalised way of pooling resources in a nation state to ensure possibilities of social participation for those who are (temporarily) unable to support themselves as well as to create common goods like the public education system, public health care, and infrastructure.

This chapter introduces the current state of knowledge on the definition, emergence, and persistence of solidarity, including Durkheim’s and Lindenberg’s theories. Drawing on this foundation chapter 3 will explain how crime and the processing of crime in society might affect social solidarity in society. Section 2.2 first introduces the conceptual history and general understanding of the term solidarity. It then goes on to explain that solidarity can be assessed with a variety of foci but that the most important distinction is whether solidarity is analysed on the level of social aggregates – so to say as a feature of groups like the nation state, communities, or families – or whether solidarity is analysed on the individual level in terms of attitudes and individual decision making (Tranow 2012: 35). Section 2.3 gives an overview of theoretical accounts of solidarity on an aggregate level, while section 2.4 focuses on individuals, explaining reasons for their feelings of solidarity and their motivations for prosocial behaviour. The chapter concludes with an outline of the interplay between solidarity on the system (i.e. aggregate) level and solidarity on an individual level and a summary of the main points that guide this thesis’ research.

2.2 Solidarity – Necessary clarifications

Mutual assistance, concern, and responsibilities have existed throughout the history of humankind. However, it was not until the late 18th century that the term solidarity emerged in Europe (Thijssen 2012: 455; Brunkhorst 2005). Industrialisation
and revolutions led prior forms of social integration like the family and estates of the realm to break up. New ideas to integrate people beyond kinship and social status and to situate the individual in relation to society were required. Before industrialisation mutual help and senses of belonging were undisputedly based on kinship. However, guilds started to establish systems of mutual assistance like security funds or obligations to serve each other, and described these prosocial behaviours as ‘fraternity’ and ‘brotherhood’. Likewise, knights and the Christian community were also referred to as brotherhoods. Hence, terms to describe benevolent feelings and close cohesion between family members were extended to other voluntary associations based on ‘sameness’ over the course of history (Stjerno 2009: 26).

Yet, the term solidarity in its inclusive and political meaning was only established in the aftermath of the French Revolution: the idea of fraternity and brotherhood was further extended and elevated to the national level, being described as ‘solidarity’ (Leydet 2006: 800; Fiegle 2003: 91). Solidarity has its linguistic roots in Latin and is a combination of solidum, meaning entirety and collectivity, and solidus, which encompasses obligations, joint liability, and common debt (Brunkhorst 2005: 2). In its post-revolutionary meaning solidarity borrowed the ideal of brotherly equality, attributed it with civic freedom and duties, and applied to the new unity of people they called society. Society in turn was defined by the feature that its members were all equally subject to the same law (Brunkhorst 2005: 61-72). The concept of solidarity attempted to ‘combine the idea of individual rights and liberties with the idea of social cohesion and community’ (Stjerno 2009: 26). Solidarity acquired further political meaning in Marxist theory and as an important pillar of the workers movement during the late 19th and early 20th century.

In their theories about the origins, definitions, and especially the functions of solidarity, scholars have responded to the respective challenges of their times. Theorists like Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim, who lived in the aftermath of the French revolution and during industrialisation, addressed solidarity mainly as a means to achieve social harmony and order in society (Beckert et al. 2004: 9; Fiegle 2003: 95; Mayhew 1984: 1275; Stjerno 2009: 32). With the declining importance of kinship and status bonds, new forms of social integration were needed (Renaud 1855: 34, 106-107; Stjerno 2009: 28). Solidarity was a new description to situate individuals in regards to the social groups they belonged to. Explanations about the origins of solidarity in classic social science were mainly structural, as section 2.3 demonstrates.

Contemporary social scientists are confronted with social circumstances different to those of their academic forerunners. In contemporary western societies the situation of the individual in relation to society is well established and attributed
with great importance. Individualism has given rise to micro explanations of social behaviour with individual decision making processes at the centre of attention (de Beer and Koster 2009: 10). The concern for the functioning unity of groups and society is subordinated to individualism as a new structural condition (Vasta 2010; Breton 2010).

Welfare state-retrenchment and neoliberal ideas of responsibilisation are seen as the most serious challenges to solidarity in contemporary western societies, as welfare-state institutions enforce solidarity contributions to collective ends and therefore embody the institutionalized sharing of risk and personal fate (Andersen 1999; Beckert et al. 2004: 11; Clarke 2000: 89; Schokkaert and Sweeney 1999). Increasing geographical mobility, declining community involvement, ethnic fractionalisation, and cultural pluralism present further challenges to classic notions of solidarity (Bauman 1997: 21-23; Brunkhorst 2008; Crow 2002: 43-46; Room 1999: 171-173; Tetlock 1986: 97-98). In addition, globalisation has forced contemporary scholars to address possibilities for social integration in a global community in which society is not bound by national borders (Heintz, Münch, and Tyrell 2005; Luhmann 1975). Meanwhile, new communication technologies also present new possibilities for solidarity, giving rise to the question of whether solidarity in postmodernity is really threatened or whether it is just subject to change (Daatland and Herlofson 2003; Kurasawa 2004; Trofin and Tomescu 2011; Sanders and van Emmerik 2004).

Before discussing different theories about the origins and persistence of solidarity an important analytical distinction is necessary. On the one hand solidarity can be analysed as a macro-phenomenon on the system level, in the sense of the amount of practiced, institutionalized, or enforced solidarity within a social unit (Tranow 2012: 35). On the other hand, solidarity can be examined on the individual level as a special type of action or attitude, like, for instance prosocial behaviour or concern for other people (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 207). Hence, solidarity can be an attribute of individuals as well as an attribute of social aggregates, and its definitions vary with the level of analysis.

On the individual level, solidarity has two aspects. The first aspect is the importance of the norm of solidarity for an individual, in other words individual solidarity attitudes. These describe a sense of shared sacrifice and responsibility as well as the willingness to contribute to the welfare of other people without expectations of immediate return (de Beer and Koster 2009; Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 415). The second aspect of solidarity on the individual level is behaviour. Acts of solidarity describe actions which put solidarity attitudes into practice (Tranow 2012; Lindenberg 1998, 2001, 2006). Behaviour qualifies as showing solidarity if it contributes to somebody else’s welfare, involves some sort of sacrifice, and is performed without
the expectation of immediate returns or compensation (Lindenberg 2006; de Beer and Koster 2009).

On the system level, solidarity is the sum of behaviour considered as exemplifying solidarity in a social aggregate. Based on Tranow (2012: 42), the term ‘social system’ employed here and in the following can refer to any social unity, ranging from a simple dyad, family, friends, work, or neighbourhood network, to the nation state, or even global society. Solidarity can be a feature of those units in as far as its norms (mutual support, help, cooperation, caring about the other’s fate) exist and are repeatedly enacted in a socially recognized manner (Tranow 2012: 35, 40). Thus, solidarity on the system level is made up of the aggregation of individual solidarity behaviour. Solidarity on the system level varies in scope, that is the extent of the circle of people to whom solidarity is shown. These circles can encompass friends and family, neighbourhoods, specific people in need, or society as a whole (de Beer and Koster 2009: 19-21).

System level solidarity can be observed but it allows no conclusion about the motives of the contributing individuals. Whether the behaviour of individuals, which in its sum makes up solidarity on the system level, such as volunteering, support of social movements, or any other contribution to the welfare of others, occurs due to a fear of sanction, personal fulfillment, obligation, or importance of the norm of solidarity to a particular individual, can only be assessed by analyses of individual decision making. Even though both levels of solidarity must be distinguished analytically, they are intertwined and can influence each other, as section 2.5 highlights.

Segregating individual and system levels helps to distinguish solidarity from associated concepts like social capital, charity, and social cohesion. Although closely related to solidarity these concepts differ from the latter in important aspects. Social capital refers to all social relationships that people accumulate over the course of their lives and which allow them to improve their status (de Beer and Koster 2009: 17). In this regard, social capital is an individual attribute, although it is neither a type of action nor attitude. The closeness to solidarity appears in the process of building social capital: entering and investing in social relationships from which we can benefit can lead to solidarity. The difference between solidarity and building social capital, however, is that the focal goal of building social capital is not to contribute to the welfare of the other person, but for the ‘investor’ to get returns, like for instance access to jobs, a promotion, or a good reference letter, from this contribution later on. Not knowing and caring when or if prosocial behaviour will pay back is a critical characteristic of solidarity (de Beer and Koster 2009: 17). Of course social capital can result from solidarity but if supportive and prosocial behaviour is only aimed at building a stock of social capital, it cannot be classified
as solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 88).

Charity is directed solely towards others, whereas solidarity always entails a connection of the other’s benefit to oneself. The ‘feeling of common ground’ (Rippe 1998: 358) is totally absent in behaviour classified as charity, but pivotal to many conceptualizations of solidarity, as the following sections will demonstrate.

Lastly, social cohesion sometimes appears as synonym for solidarity on the system level. Yet, the concepts are not entirely congruent. Social cohesion refers to the unity and coherence of a social entity, which may, but must not, be caused by solidarity. Unity can take place completely devoid of sacrifice or consideration for others, or even be externally imposed by rules (de Beer and Koster 2009: 16). However, the existence of solidarity within a social unit often results in social cohesion.

These clarifications about the defining characteristics of solidarity and its levels of analysis set the stage for the following sections to outline different theories about its origins and preservation. Section 2.3 introduces structural explanations and solidarity on the system level. Section 2.4 explains theories for building and maintaining solidarity on the individual level. Section 2.5 delves deeper into how solidarities on system and on the individual level can influence each other.

2.3 Solidarity on the system level: Structural explanations

2.3.1 Theories of solidarity in classic social science

Early social scientists argued that the form of relationship people have with each other would determine their unification through solidarity. Hence, a variety of social relations were assessed for their potential to breed solidarity. The first theoretician of society, Auguste Comte, stipulated that solidarity arises from people’s interdependence (Cingolani 1992: 46). Interdependence binds people together in the present, for example through the specialisation and division of labour, but also integrates people across generations through dependence on knowledge accumulated by ancestors (Cingolani 1992: 46; Fiegle 2003: 93). This interdependence for Comte is the essence of cohesion and unity which turns an agglomeration of people into society. Comte used the term solidarity simply to describe cohesion and unity and thereby neglected the emotional component present in many other understandings of solidarity (Tranow 2012: 16, footnote).

This emotional component is precisely what distinguishes different types of solidarity for Max Weber. Solidarity, he argued, can emerge from two relational settings. Drawing on the work of the German theorist Ferdinand Tönnies (Mommsen 1989: 193), Weber considered relations of association [Gesellschaft] to be significantly different from communal relations [Gemeinschaft] (Müller 1992: 49-50). Each has its
own mechanism of producing solidarity: *communal solidarity* originates from people’s subjective feelings of belonging together as rooted in emotions or a traditional bond with family, friends, colleagues and other groups with an internal code of conduct (Henderson, Parsons, and Weber 1947: 136-138). *Associative solidarity* stems from relationships which are characterized by an adjustment of interests through rational reasoning in regards to values or expediency. Weber defined both forms of solidarity as the experience of being part of a ‘we’ (Stjerno 2009: 38). Nevertheless, their character differs as one form is based on affective feelings to a community, while the other is based on the matching of interest.

In responding to the social challenges of industrialisation and post-revolutionary France Emile Durkheim (1893, 1915) assessed solidarity in response to questions of how to integrate and unite society. Living and working in the late 19th and early 20th century, he observed several pathologies in society, which he ascribed to a lack of bonds people experienced towards larger social entities in addition to their interpersonal attachment to family, friends, and neighbours. Where people had limited bonds to society as a whole, they experienced anomie and anxiety (Hammond 2003: 359, 369). In picking up the emotional component of solidarity Durkheim defined it as the bond individuals feel to the society they live in (Hammond 2003: 359). This bond could only develop by virtue of a set of shared beliefs, norms, and values, which Durkheim called *conscience collective*, or ‘collective consciousness’ (Gangas 2011: 354; Stjerno 2009: 33, 34; Thijssen 2012: 455).

Like Weber, Durkheim distinguishes two types of solidarity. In pre-industrial societies people were linked together by their sameness in living conditions, life-styles, common culture, and shared beliefs. The resulting *mechanic solidarity* was characterized by the absorption of the individual into community based on likeness and a strong collective consciousness. This form of solidarity was reinforced and maintained by common (religious) beliefs and corresponding rituals (Hammond 2003: 370; Stjerno 2009: 33; Gangas 2011: 358). As societies developed and industrial revolution brought about more division of labour, occupational specialisation, and social differentiation, members of a society were no longer tied together by their sameness. Rather, compatible differences appeared to hold society together as these differences instigated social interaction and collaboration and eventually led to the formation of so-called *organic solidarity*. But what was the moral foundation for this new form of solidarity, if the common consciousness was cracked open by people’s different living conditions, cultures and ideologies? For Durkheim the emerging individualism, i.e. the belief that the needs of each person are more important than the needs of the whole society, was both cause of and solution to the problem of solidarity in differentiated modern societies. On the one hand, Durkheim saw a threat
to social unity in individualism. On the other hand, individualism also embodied the only common ground for shared values in industrial societies: the new morality revolved around a cult of the individual – a fortified belief that the dignity of the individual is sacred (Marske 1987; Müller 1992: 52). This cult of the individual paired with the smooth cooperation of different units of society is the foundation of organic solidarity for Durkheim.

Talcott Parsons further developed Durkheim’s notion of the importance of norms and values for solidarity (Parsons 1975a). The American scholar argued that all human conduct is based on and expresses a normative background, which is highly sensitive to cultural and contextual variation (Mayhew 1984: 1277, 1291, 1294). Norms and values – conceptions of what is right, wrong, normal, or rational – differ amongst societies and social sub-systems as well as amongst social strata (Mayhew 1984: 1290). Human beings become full members of society through a process of ‘socialization’, which familiarises them with the rights and duties of their roles on the basis of a given value system (Parsons 1975b: 34-35; Mayhew 1984: 1290-1291). As part of their socialisation individuals are rewarded for behaviour which contributes to the social order of a particular society and are subject to sanctions for behaviour which transgresses norms (Mayhew 1984: 1289; Parsons 1975b: 21-24). Institutions are a vital part in reproducing social norms and values as they both embody the values of larger society and are actors in the socialisation process. Through participation in established (social) institutions, individuals build sustained commitments to the normative order of society (Parsons 1940: 846; Mayhew 1984: 1291).

Parsons understands solidarity as a process of mutual assistance by which individuals become unified and treated as equals, regardless of their external characteristics, possessions or achievements (Parsons 1940: 850). Solidarity as such is consequently a value that can be embodied in institutions and learned by individuals during their socialisation. Even though the primary social unity producing solidarity is the household, solidarity attitudes can transgress kinship boundaries (Parsons 1975b: 25). Social solidarity emerges from processes in the political and social sphere whenever the audience ratifies proclaimed solidarities and indulges assertions of a common ‘we’ (Mayhew 1984: 1293). In societies whose institutions attach great importance to the value of solidarity it is also acquired by the members of this society in the course of their socialisation.

There are several key takeaway points of structural explanations of solidarity in classic social science to explain their relevance for more contemporary assessments of the term. Different as their conceptualisations may be the outlined scholars were united in the conviction that modernity and the new social structures it brought
along gave way to new forms of social integration circumscribed by the term solidari-
ity (Mayhew 1984: 1277). Solidarity is a value which can be conveyed by institutions,
strengthened in rituals, arise from the pooling of resources, or rest in a common be-
belief system. Solidarity creates a bond between the individual and the society or
group they belong to by offering the experience of a ‘we.’ It instigates the readiness
to contribute to each others welfare without the expectations of immediate return.
The scholars outlined above highlight that both sameness and differences matter
for solidarity: Durkheim’s *mechanic solidarity*, or Weber’s *communal solidarity* rest
upon similarity between people. Comte’s understanding of solidarity as well as the
conceptions of *organic* (Durkheim) or *associative* solidarity arise from differences
and the resulting interdependence between people. Lastly, Parsons highlights that
societies can actively build structures (institutions) in which their members learn
the value of solidarity. These main points are still present in contemporary con-
ceptualisations of solidarity on the system level which is introduced in subsection
2.3.2.

2.3.2 Theories of solidarity in contemporary social science

In contemporary social science there are two rival theoretical approaches to solidar-
ity, both of which are able to explain solidarity on group as well as societal level.

First, rational choice approaches to solidarity are based on interdependence be-
tween people. In his analysis of ‘group solidarity’, Hechter (1987b,a) argues that
individuals form groups whenever they are unable to achieve their aims for pri-

cate goods individually. Examples of such group-formation are sports groups, car
pools, membership in religious communities, or social movements (Hechter 1987a: 416).
Solidarity within these groups exists as a function of obligations which group
membership entails for the purpose of achieving the joint good and individual com-
pliance to these obligations (Hechter 1987a: 417; Hechter 1987b; Chai and Hechter
1998). Hence, the sheer existence of solidarity norms does not imply that there is
solidarity within a group: only if these norms are enacted does solidarity within a
group exist. Solidarity is threatened if control mechanisms are insufficient to ensure
compliance, as well as by low dependence of the individual on the group. Both
factors decrease incentives for individuals to comply to the obligations associated
with group membership and thus decrease solidarity (Hechter 1987b: 52). This con-
ception of the origins of solidarity is more closely related to associative and organic
solidarity. Common values are not necessary for this type of solidarity, although
they may emerge as a result of group solidarity.

Second, so-called ‘communitarian approaches’ argue that solidarity arises only in
groups which can be described as communities. Even though groups and communi-
ties alike refer to an aggregate of people, the term community has specific assumptions about the relationship between the individuals who form a group. Members of a community share values, norms, meaning, and feel affection towards each other (Etzioni 1997: 127). Communitarian scholars hence see the foundations of solidarity in sameness. Shared values and norms, shared interests, or a common identity within a group of people can all act as foundations of solidarity (Etzioni 1997: 127; Willmott 1986). Sameness in any of these aspects creates bonds between community members, which can in turn translate into solidarity. Communities are not locally bound, especially with new means of communication (Beck 1986; Etzioni 1997: 6; Crow 2002: 38-39). Still, communitarian scholars understand individualism, increased mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity in modernity as threats to solidarity (Bauman 1997: 18-23; (Delanty 2008)).

Communitarian approaches to solidarity clash with Hechter’s idea of group solidarity as communitarians strongly disagree with the idea that self-interest might be a breeding ground for commitments to help each other (Crow 2002: 42). Critics of communitarian approaches to solidarity in turn argue that it is solidarity which turns a group of people into a community, making it a contingent good rather than a result of communities (Rippe 1998: 361; Crow 2002: 46-47). Both theories, however, can help understand solidarity in ethnic groups as well as within the welfare state.

The welfare state exemplifies solidarity because fellow citizens benefit from each other’s contributions which are mediated by institutions. Benefit payments and reallocation of income within the welfare state qualify as solidarity since contribution and receipt are unbalanced: some people give more while receiving less, while others give little but are highly dependent on the contributions of others (de Beer and Koster 2009: 43). Social insurance is the aggregate example of pooling resources against risks. Taxation exemplifies the pooling of resources for shared benefit. Thus, the welfare state is often referred to as ‘state system of institutionalized solidarity’ (Gelissen 2000: 286) because its institutions ensure a collective hedge against aging, illness, and unemployment (Beckert et al. 2004: 10; Karagiannis 2007: 12).

Communitarian and rational choice explanations for institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state differ. The communitarian perspective understands the nation state as a community with collective history, memory, and morality (Vasta 2010: 504). These commonalities lead to institutionalised mechanisms of support against illness, unemployment, or any other inability to provide for members of society. From this perspective welfare state generosity is threatened by greater ethnic and cultural diversity (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007: 280; Vasta 2010: 504). In contrast, scholars who focus on the interdependence of citizens see the welfare state as a solution to a collective action problem (DeSwaan 1988): relief for the poor and
other social provisions serve the interests of both the ruling elites as well as the poor. The poor receive support in times of illness and unemployment and as a result the ruling classes are protected against the side effects of extensive poverty including the spread of infectious diseases, begging, crime, and riots. Hence, both groups need each other for the realisation of their respective collective interest: to ensure a base standard of living from the perspective of the poor and to maintain an agreeable life from the perspective of the elite (DeSwaan 1988; see also Roosma, van Oorschot, and Gelissen 2014).

2.3.3 Observing solidarity on the system level

Solidarity on the system level describes the existence of a norm of solidarity as well as the performance of associated duties in any aggregate of people. Structural explanations of solidarity state that the norm of solidarity can arise both from an affective bond between people as well as their interdependence. Either way, the norm and especially the enactment of solidarity contributes to the integration of a particular aggregate. Solidarity exists when members of a group or society repeatedly contribute to each other’s welfare without the expectation of anything in immediate return.

How can solidarity on the system level be observed? In families solidarity shows for instance in parents providing for and supporting their children, money transfers without expected reciprocity within the family, adult children assisting their elderly parents, and grandparents’ support in providing childcare (de Beer and Koster 2009: 25; Atkinson, Kivett, and Campbell 1986: 409-412). Furthermore, solidarity on the system level shows in the proportion of voluntary work or other behaviour for the benefit of others in a group of people. Solidarity on this level can furthermore show in the form of support for social movements and strikes that raise the status of a particular social group.

Lastly, in the welfare state solidarity is evident through the generosity of public protection, gross and net public social expenditure, tax revenue spent on subsidies for social housing and income replacement, as well as in the protection of private fates through unemployment and labour market programs (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; de Beer and Koster 2009: 32; Swank 2005; Veitch 2011). The contingency of benefit entitlements on previous contributions, their connection with efforts and achievements, or their administration under the idea of equity or equality are further ways to detect the broadness of solidarity in welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990). Solidarity on the system level also implies the absence of free-riding. Statistics on tax-evasion as well as benefit fraud present examples of such free-riding and can be used to gauge violations of the norm of solidarity.
2.4 Solidarity on the individual level

Solidarity on individual the level refers to the importance of the solidarity-norm for the individual person and the acts of solidarity that result. Solidarity on the individual level hence refers to attitudes and behaviour. Solidarity as attitude shows, for example, in the endorsement of institutionalised forms of solidarity like the welfare state, in expressions of concern for the welfare of others, or in the recognition of acts of solidarity by others. Solidarity as behaviour shows in voluntary work in an organization, participation in strikes, spontaneous unconventional political participation in favour of a non-privileged group, or donations (de Beer and Koster 2009: 20-22). Solidarity on the individual level manifests itself in each of the following situations: contributions to a common good, sharing joint costs and benefits, helping others in need, and resisting temptations to free-ride (Lindenberg 1998: 68-69).

Explanations of the occurrence and absence of individual solidarity (either as attitude or as action) in specific contexts require an assessment of the processes which lead an individual to either perform an act of solidarity or to hold the value of solidarity in high regard (Tranow 2012: 36). Fewer theories address the individual decision-making process of solidarity than structural explanations for its emergence. Nevertheless, from the above theories some assumptions about individual motives for prosocial behaviour and attachment to the norm of solidarity can be drawn. Explanations which focus on the affective aspect of solidarity locate the motivation for individual solidarity behaviour in people’s feelings towards one another. Feelings such as empathy and the willingness to support each other arise from the special bond between people – regardless whether it is kinship that ties people, or a shared identity caused by some direct (neighbourhood, sports teams, friendship networks) or abstract subjective (milieus, ethnic groups, religious communities) form of group membership (Adair 2008; Bellah et al. 1985; Etzioni 1997; Goodger 1986 van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 9-10; Thijssen 2012: 464). Likewise, Parsons highlighted the role of socialisation and institutions for the formations of individuals’ normative beliefs.

Explanations which have focussed on the role of interdependence for the emergence of solidarity have highlighted the potential role of self-interest for solidarity on the individual level. Hechter (1987a) for example argues that individuals join groups when group membership helps them to reach a goal. Likewise, theories about the emergence of the welfare state stress the possibility of joint benefits. The distinction between solidarity connected with shared utility and solidarity which originates from affective social ties or a common identity and morality traces back to the beginning of scientific attention towards solidarity. Communitarian scholars in particular have gone as far as to denounce solidarity as impure and false, if it involves any kind of
self-interest (Hechter 1987: 415; Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 417-418; Rippe 1998: 355-356). The scholars whose theories will be outlined in the following subsection acknowledge the presence of self-interest in the decision to perform an act of solidarity. An important clarification is however necessary: even though self-interest may play a role in actions that benefit others (Andreoni 1990; Batson 1993; Halfpenny 1999), such actions only qualify as solidarity in the presence of uncertainty as to how or if at all this prosocial act will pay back in the future (de Beer and Koster 2009: 19-20). If behaviour that benefits others is strictly gain-related it must be classified as acquiring social capital.

2.4.1 Theories and conceptualisation

Two theories explicitly address solidarity on the individual level, one of which sees solidarity as a by-product of exchange, while the other understands solidarity as stemming from people's volition to do what they believe is right.

19th century utilitarianism put forward the first classic account of solidarity, which focussed on the individual rather than structural explanations. The first and only scholar of this tradition to address solidarity was Herbert Spencer, who argued social cohesion would unfold spontaneously from individuals' egoistic pursuit of interest (Prosser 2006: 380, 383; Crow 2002: 15). Integration, harmony, and coherence of a differentiated society would happen by itself, he argued, because people with shared interests would tend to mingle in order to maximize their resources. Thus, economic exchange exemplified by contract was what held individuals together (Lukes and Prabhat 2012: 370; Perrin 1995: 795; Prosser 2006: 380). Cohesion – which was Spencer's synonym for solidarity – would automatically emerge out of the need for cooperation (Crow 2002: 14-15). He argued that society was founded upon individual reason, that individuals form a social order because it is beneficial for them to do so. This makes society a solidarity group bound by common and individual interest (Mayhew 1984: 1280, 1283).

In the 19th century this train of thought stood in stark contrast to the French tradition of structuralism, whose scholars denounced Spencer's conception of society as nothing more than a weak unit of interest and were opposed to the idea that solidarity would emerge as a by-product of rational individuals (Perrin 1995: 795). This disagreement mirrors the contemporary rival rational choice and communitarian explanations for solidarity. However, Spencer made a strict distinction between solidarity in society and social bonds creating cohesion between family, friends, and loved ones (Lizardo 2009; Perrin 1995).

The potential of economic exchange to foster solidarity is still the subject of ongoing debate (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Batson 1993). Exchange of
goods, services, and favours between people can occur unilaterally and bilaterally. In a bilateral exchange setting, a good, favour, or service which a donor has contributed is directly paid back by the recipient (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 212). This form of exchange is closest to the idea of economic exchange. In unilateral exchange people contribute goods, services, or favours but it is not clearly negotiated how, when, or by whom these contributions are compensated. This form of exchange is more closely related to the idea of solidarity, where contributions cannot be linked to a direct reward either.

Consequently, individual solidarity attitudes and behaviour are most likely to develop in settings of generalised unilateral exchange, i.e. in exchange situations where the recipient does not directly ‘pay back’ the donor on negotiated terms (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 206-207). Generalised unilateral exchange fosters solidarity because it drags exchange out of an economic, contractual setting and introduces an element of uncertainty. In unilateral exchange situations people deliberately enter the risk of non-reciprocity and by doing so depend on the actions of others. People express and signal trust towards the group, relying on others for compensation of their contribution as they have not negotiated the terms and conditions of this compensation in advance (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 211-213). In contrast, bilateral exchange extinguishes the risk of non-reciprocity as the terms and conditions can be negotiated (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 212). Hence, unilateral general exchange forms the bridge between exchange and communal relationships (Batson 1993). This expressive nature of exchange can translate into solidarity by creating commitment, signaling the existence of trust in others, and providing an environment for socialization into prosocial behaviour (Kuwabara and Sheldon 2012: 255-256).

The second theory about the origins of solidarity on the individual level is the framing theory of solidarity by Siegwart Lindenberg (1998, 2006). Framing theory reconciles different theoretical approaches to solidarity by arguing that a combination of norms, self-interest, learning, and the social and institutional environment instigate solidarity on the individual level. Framing theory stipulates that all human behaviour is directed by goals. Action is hence closely linked to self-interest: attaining goals is what people wish for. People may have a variety of goals, some of which may contradict each other. As a result, in every situation people can usually only pursue one goal at a time (Lindenberg 2001: 639-641). The importance that different goals attain in each particular situation is influenced by the social context, people’s attitudes, as well as the information they possess (Lindenberg 1998: 73). How do individuals make a decision as to which goal to follow in a given situation?

This decision is facilitated by so-called ‘frames’. Frames are people’s ways of
defining a situation and denote ‘the way in which people process information and act upon it.’ (Lindenberg and Steg 2007: 118). They make some aspects of the situation more relevant, some information more accessible, and certain types of action more attractive (Lindenberg 2006: 30). Hence, frames can set goals and dictate the appropriate course of action to follow them in any given situation.

The variety of goals which direct human behaviour can be summarised under three ‘master-frames’ (Lindenberg 2006: 33-36; Lindenberg 2001: 665; Lindenberg and Steg 2007: 119-121). Which of these frames becomes relevant and dictates behaviour in a given situation depends on (a) the information provided by the situation and (b) the salience of the frame. The hedonic frame is associated with the goal to improve one’s feeling, seek pleasure, and minimise distress in the present. The gain frame consists of the goal to improve scarce resources and secure long-term advantages such as time, money, and human capital. The normative frame sets the goal to act appropriately, that is to follow a norm from conviction. These three frames differ in their a priori strength, or salience. That is they differ in regards to how easily they become dominant and dictate action in a given situation (Lindenberg 2006: 36). As a general rule, the hedonic frame is strongest because it results in immediate gratification and is directly tied to self-interest and emotions. The gain-frame is less powerful because gratification usually has to be postponed. The normative frame is least salient and consequently relies on stabilization and additional incentives (Lindenberg 2001: 663). Once a frame is stimulated the situation will either be handled in order to maximise gain (gain frame), or pleasure (hedonic frame), or to do ‘the right thing’ (normative frame).

What is the place of solidarity in framing theory? Behaviour that contributes to the welfare of others may derive from any of the three master frames, but it can only qualify as solidarity if it is instigated by the normative frame. Solidarity hence consists of the goal to follow the norm of solidarity combined with operational knowledge as to what qualifies as an act of solidarity in a specific situation (Trawnow 2012: 197). The goal to follow the norm of solidarity in turn arises from the belief that fulfilling the norm of solidarity in a specific situation is right and that dismissing it would be wrong. Framing theory hence postulates a close relationship between attitude and action. Contributions to the welfare of others which originate from the gain frame are calculative. Hence, they qualify as an accumulation of social capital rather than solidarity (Lindenberg 2006: 40). Behaviour that benefits others and which is caused by the hedonic frame in turn is closely tied to emotions. When loved ones are distressed, people are often motivated to help them (Lindenberg 2006: 40). In making these distinctions framing theory is able to spell out the difference in associative and affective solidarity (Weber), mechanic and organic
solidarity (Durkheim), as well as communitarian and rational choice approaches to solidarity.

Of the three master frames the normative frame – and as such solidarity – is the least salient. Seduction through the immediate gratification of e.g. free-riding on common goods or free time gained from not helping someone in need generally seems to be more attractive to people than following norms they deem important (Lindenberg 1998: 77). In addition, the normative frame faces the following threats to its stability: first, it becomes weaker with negative experiences of acts of solidarity. Feelings of exploitation of one’s own contribution through the observed free-riding of others is an example of such a negative experience. Second, and in the same vein, absence of encouraging approval and gratitude for prosocial behaviour contributes to the decay of solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 80). Third, social environments which implicitly or explicitly highlight losses associated with acts of solidarity like cultures of efficiency (highlights lost time) or of distrust (highlights free-riding and exploitation) threaten the salience of solidarity and bring the gain or hedonic frame to the fore (Lindenberg 2006: 37).

These conditions make the normative frame and the goal to perform an act of solidarity with its associated course of action less readily available and contributes to the normative frame’s decay. Solidarity hence depends on past experiences and immediate situational cues, as well as the socio-cultural environment. This makes the salience of people’s solidarity frames contingent on the belief that the solidarity frames of others are intact and that society appreciates the norm of solidarity. Hence, people signalling the intactness of their solidarity frame between people and the possibility to give these signals are pivotal for the maintenance of solidarity:

‘When relationships become confused and norms vague, normative frames are in danger of being displaced, changing the conditions for the occurrence of prosocial behavior considerably. [...] Whatever lowers the working of relational signaling lowers the likelihood of prosocial behaviour generated by a normative frame.’ (Lindenberg 2006: 37)

Cues about the intactness of others’ solidarity frames can be gained through everyday interactions (Lindenberg 1998: 86). Examples in which people signal the intactness of their solidarity frame and hence signal that they are not primarily interested in their own gain are sharing, resisting the possibility to free-ride on a common good, or contributing something to a group without knowing whether or demanding that this contribution will be compensated. Likewise, disregard for the norm of solidarity can be conveyed through inflicting harm on others, or through purposefully acquiring gains through somebody else’s losses. Solidarity on the individual level hence depends on a society that allows for open, uncontrolled spaces
in which people have a chance to demonstrate trust in each other and to have the possibility of signalling credible commitments to each other (Lindenberg 1998: 102). Information on whether general society appreciates solidarity can be acquired through institutions as they embody and represent values in society. Strong and generous welfare institutions, which facilitate the social participation of those who are unable to support themselves, for example signal an institutionalised culture of outreach to marginalised parts of the population.

2.4.2 The importance of trust

Both framing theory as well as theories that argue solidarity can arise from exchange highlight the importance of trust for the development and maintenance of solidarity on the individual level. In order to maintain the stability of the solidarity frame people who perform acts of solidarity depend upon the belief that these acts will not be exploited by others every single time. Hence, trust in others – the expectation of solidarity from others – is an important precondition for the motivation to perform acts of solidarity. Lindenberg has described this as the necessity to assume (and receive signals) that other people’s solidarity frames are intact. Acts that imply trust also have symbolic function, which is beneficial for the emergence of solidarity. Environments which require a certain level of trust have shown to be most likely to turn simple economic exchange into solidarity (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007). Even regulated and institutionalised solidarity within the welfare state is deeply trust-related. ‘Mutual trust facilitates solutions to collective action problems that are inherent in social welfare programs, where citizens must trust each other to both take part as contributors and must not take advantage as beneficiaries.’ (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007: 280; see also Veitch 2011). Hence, a certain trust towards fellow citizens is an important precondition for solidarity. When trust within society falls short, people tend to restrict acts of solidarity to their immediate next of kin and primary ties (Lindenberg 1998; Parsons 1940).

This restriction of solidarity to social sub-groups can impede the realisation of wider society’s collective interests, such as social welfare or effective systems of public safety and security. Solidarity is a concept of dual nature: the subjective belonging to a ‘we’ always implies the exclusion of those who are considered ‘them’ or ‘others.’ Strong solidarity groups care a lot for their members, but at the same this strong within-group solidarity excludes non-members from its benefits, such as commonly produced goods, affection, or recognition arising from solidarity (van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 20-21). This exclusion can turn into intolerance towards whatever is connected with the non-solidarity group, for instance certain norms or behaviour (Komter 2001: 387). At the same time strong solidarity groups limit the scope of
action for their own members, holding them under rigid norms, control, and isolating them from the surroundings outside the group’s own realm (Parsons 1940: 852-853; Wacquant and Wilson 1989; Hechter 1987a).

Hence, strong in-group solidarity may be (partly) beneficial from an in-group point of view, but it can have negative consequences for wider society (Komter 2001: 388). Realisation of wider society’s collective interests for the equal benefit of all members of society is far less likely to occur if sub-groups are strongly bound internally, as this leaves little support for actions and attitudes that contribute to the welfare of other sub-groups (van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 21). Lindenberg also warns against the formation of strong solidarity groups within society and calls on states to provide environments in which strong solidarity groups created by discrepancies in income, political rights, or other form of discriminations are unlikely to arise (Lindenberg 1998: 102). In order to keep a normative solidarity frame intact, an atmosphere that stresses the gains from cooperativeness is needed.

2.5 The relationship between solidarity on the system and on the individual level

Solidarity on a micro-level is closely related to solidarity on the system level. Not only does an aggregate of micro-level solidarity lead to macro-level solidarity, but solidarity on a system level might feed back on the micro-level. As Parson’s socialisation theory predicts and Lindenberg’s framing theory suggests, if people find themselves in high solidarity environments, they will tend to value the norm of solidarity more highly.

Lindenberg and Parsons create an understanding of how solidarity on a system level, that is repeated routines of solidarity behaviour, can influence individual decisions to perform acts of solidarity. Parsons argues that individuals learn about the importance of solidarity in society through their active participation in institutions, while Lindenberg outlines how performing acts of solidarity becomes a more viable option when the social and institutional context suggests that prosocial behaviour is rewarded and not exploited. Goals and the salience of frames are shaped by the social context, which consists of institutional and cultural elements.

Which institutional and social contexts can foster solidarity? First, institutional settings set the stage for social interaction. Legal instruments and institutions can provide opportunities to gain social praise and reputation for following the norm of solidarity, as well as for people to enter credible commitments (Lindenberg 1998: 95). Individual action always takes place within institutional settings, and therefore is in large part influenced by them (Granovetter 1992). People who circulate in solidarity
environments (either institutional or social) are likely to learn that solidarity is tied to their role obligations and is ensued by recognition.

Second, institutions of the state act as representatives of society as a whole. Thereby they are – at least in democratic societies – institutionalised examples of values that are prevalent in society. Positive relational signalling to all citizens alike through generosity, equal treatment, and trust can act as a paragon by blurring lines between societal subgroups, and serve as an institutionalised example of the salience of a normative frame (Lindenberg 1992: 132-133). Welfare state institutions, for example, have the potential to impact upon people’s attitudes and behavioural norms towards contributing and receiving (Meier Jaeger 2006; Veitch 2011; Gelissen and Arts 2001; Gelissen 2000). Trust among members of a society, for example, can evolve through effective work of economic institutions (Bidner and Francois 2010; Lindenberg 1992). Hence, solidarity on individual level can be shaped by institutional settings.

Third, institutions serve as a possibility to learn about others’ behaviour. Thereby they may convey information about the salience of other people’s solidarity frames. However, it is not only the state that serves as source of information about others with whom we are not in direct in contact: news-coverage of fraud and other crimes, surveillance, hermetically sealed compound areas, warning signs about other people’s illicitness all convey information about other people’s behaviour and their (ostensible) frames and goals as well. This information about the solidarity behaviour or free-riding of others might get stored in people’s memory and so influence the salience of their normative frames.

2.6 Conclusion: A crime-solidarity nexus?

This chapter explained the meaning of solidarity and introduced different theories about its origins and maintenance in society. In so doing the chapter provides a basis upon which the next chapter can explain how solidarity, crime control efforts, and punishment are intertwined and how the latter might influence the former.

What are the key aspects important for linking the maintenance and shape of solidarity to the way a society experiences crime and criminal justice? First, for the development and maintenance of solidarity within individuals it matters what other people do and what attitudes they have. Individual solidarity depends on the behaviour of others inasmuch as this behaviour gives clues on whether solidarity as such is a value which is held in high regard in society. Moreover, free-riding, taking advantage, and exploitation also reduce incentives for the individual to display solidarity. Criminal behaviour should hence matter for solidarity. Acts which are defined as crime can, on an abstract level, be classified as the opposite of solidarity:
they inflict harm and loss on others (e.g. assault), take advantage of trust (e.g. fraud), and exploit common goods (e.g. tax evasion).

Second, solidarity can be shaped by the values and norms represented by institutions in society. Institutions of the criminal justice system are responsible for norm enforcement as criminal law spells out the boundaries for permissible behaviour. Crime, law, and criminal justice are thus closely linked to solidarity, as shared norms and values are generally understood as essential foundations for solidarity in society or other aggregates of people. Furthermore, criminal justice institutions can embody values of solidarity themselves (Garland 1991a). On the one hand, harsh punishment can be understood as solidarity with the victims who have suffered losses from the criminal acts (Garland 2012: 25; Garland 2012: 11-12). On the other hand, criminal justice and punishment conveys information about the status of the offender in relation to society. Are offenders separated and depicted as a special category of ‘others’ or do sentencing and punishing routines aim to reintegrate offenders into society and thus entitle them to solidarity (Braithwaite 1989; Currie 2013)?

Third, trust in others is an important part of solidarity. Levels of trust in society, however, might be lower when there is a salient crime problem, or when media, politics, and comprehensive crime control efforts suggest the existence of a crime problem (Garland 2000). Crime control through policing and surveillance in turn is closely linked to possibilities to demonstrate and create interpersonal trust and credible commitments. The next chapter will explain the relationship between solidarity and the way societies experience crime in more detail.
3 Solidarity and the Problem of Crime and Punishment

3.1 Introducing the collective experience of crime

This chapter builds on the theories of solidarity introduced in the previous chapter in order to understand how solidarity relates to the way societies experience and process crime. This requires a concept that makes crime, crime control, and criminal justice tangible for wider society, i.e. a concept which connects crime, crime control, and criminal justice with the general public beyond the circle of crime victims, perpetrators, their immediate family, and those who work within institutions of the criminal justice system.

A connection between the general public and crime (control) in society can be established by employing David Garland’s notion of the ‘collective experience of crime’ (Garland and Sparks 2000; Garland 2001: 139). The term collective experience does not denote that all citizens have the same experience, but rather means a common frame of reference for crime and crime control in society (Garland 1991a: 192-193; Garland and Sparks 2000: 193; see also Bushe 2009). Therefore, the collective experience of crime describes the totality of ways through which people can learn about the relevance of and approaches to crime in their society. The term expresses in short how societies deal with and process crime.

The cited authors refer to the collective experience of crime as an amalgamation of criminal justice policies, their enforcement, and discourses around crime and its causes (Garland and Sparks 2000: 199). Hence, I conceptualise the collective experience of crime to consist of four dimensions: (a) the prevalence of crime (b) crime prevention efforts, (c) reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, and (d) the salience of crime as an issue. The following section discusses how these four dimensions constitute an experience.

The prevalence of crime in society contributes to the collective experience of crime, even though most members of society do not offend or become a victim of crime during their lifecourse. Crime which happens in society nevertheless is accessible through statistics, newspapers, police reports, public discourse, and hearsay. The prevalence of crime is part of the collective experience of crime because it provides the subject of action and expression of the other three dimensions.

Efforts to prevent crime and to provide public order and safety may on the one
hand come from the front side of the criminal justice system, for example through policing strategies. On the other hand, the private sector and private households can also play a part in the prevention of crime (Loader and White 2015). Crime prevention in public spaces can, in addition to policing, occur through the use of private security guards and surveillance. Citizens’ use of special locks and alarms serves to secure their residence and property. These prevention efforts by the front side of the criminal justice system, the private security sector, and private households contribute to the collective experience because they are visible in the everyday lives of people. Shop detectives, bouncers, and security guards can be found in almost all urban settings. Likewise, patrolling police officers are visible signs of attempts to control and prevent crime. As such they have the potential to flag up the existence of crime and deviance in society to citizens. Furthermore, private households’ efforts to prevent crime might be based on personal experience of victimisation, but also express the presence of crime in the minds of people: prevention measures by private households indicate perceptions of risk of falling victim to theft, burglary, and other forms of crime.

Reactions to crime in the criminal justice system encompass the recording of crime by the police, convictions in courts, as well as imposed sanctions and the corresponding treatment of offenders. Crimes recorded by the police illustrate public sensitivities to crime as well as their willingness to report incidents to the police. On the other hand, recording an offence represents a first form of action by the criminal justice system in response to crime. The recording of crime by the police presents an intersection between the public and the criminal justice system. The number of recorded crimes illustrates the frequency but also normality of involvement of official authorities in incidents of law-breaking. The number of convictions represents the amount of people in formal contact with the criminal justice system and thus also indicates the workload with which the criminal justice system is confronted. Lastly, the use of imprisonment, gives cues as to how many people are separated from society as a result of having committed a crime. Apart from this separation, the treatment of offenders within penal institutions signals whether those individuals are still seen as worthy members of society. Conviction and sanction practices can reach the public beyond offenders who are under the supervision of the criminal justice system, or people who work within the criminal justice sector. The criminal justice system represents institutionalised ways of dealing with crime and disorder that are shaped by a country’s political and cultural histories (Barker 2006). At the same time, the criminal justice system as an institution has the ability to influence the culture and society it originates from by sending signals about authority, the treatment of others, especially those who have done harm, and values like retribution.
Lastly, the salience of crime as an issue in society is palpable through citizen’s sensibilities towards crime which may be seen in high levels of fear of crime. This salience is also evident in the importance of crime as an issue in election manifestos of political parties as well as the level of government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system. The status of crime as well as the provision of public order and safety as topics on the electoral and political agenda of a country implies that they are acknowledged as salient topics within this society. Likewise, fear of crime implies the presence of crime in the minds of people, and hence is an important pillar of a collective experience. The presence of crime as a topic in political discourse contributes to awareness for the crime problem as well as the promoted approaches to curb it. The public’s collective experience of crime in society is shaped by the type of justice principles, retributive or reintegrative, that are communicated to and within it.

These four dimensions – prevalence, prevention, punishment, and salience – in their totality shape and reproduce how members of a society perceive crime in their country and what information they are given about appropriate responses to it. The collective experience of crime in society provides a pool of meaning in regards to normality, authority, and social relations, as well as sentiments about good and evil (Garland 1991a: 194-196). Of course reception of the different dimensions may vary across social subgroups, but the information given through the collective experience of crime is, in principle, accessible for all members of society.

How do these dimensions of the collective experience of crime relate to solidarity in society? Section 3.2 explores the role of crime and criminal justice regimes as social institutions to give a first hint to their connection with solidarity. Section 3.3 critically discusses Durkheim’s theory about the relationship between punishment and solidarity. Section 3.4 uses framing theory to explain the connection between solidarity and dimensions of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment. The chapter concludes with a working hypothesis and four research questions, which guide the empirical analysis.

### 3.2 Criminal justice institutions as social institutions

Crime and criminal justice receive their relevance for solidarity in society mainly through their role as (social) institutions. As such they embody and recreate norms and values within society, provide information, and have the potential to shape opinions as well as attitudes.

Social institutions are by definition ‘systems of rules or regulatory norms’ (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008: 166). They stem from overarching value systems,
which provide the (context-specific) norms that the institutions embody, enforce, and reproduce (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008: 164-166; Karstedt 2010). Rules and constraints for individual behaviour that emerge from institutions may be both formal, expressed in laws and constitutions, as well as informal, like taboos, traditions, codes of conduct and the according social disapprobation of their violation (North 1991: 97). The norms and values which are represented and reproduced in institutions are assumed to be agreed upon by a vast majority of society and a large body of empirical research substantiates this claim (p.e. European Commission 2005; Hofstede 2001; Landwehr and Klinnert 2014; Waeraas 2010).

Hence, institutions connect individuals with society, as the previous chapter showed. As a macro-level phenomenon social institutions set the stage in which individual behaviour takes place. They constrain individuals, as they enforce a set of rules upon their behaviour, while simultaneously educating them about the norms and values underlying their society. Conformist action is rewarded, whereas behaviour outside the norm provokes negative sanctions (North 1991: 97). Furthermore, institutions provide orientation and motivation for individual decision making (North 1991: 97). They set goals for individual behaviour and provide the adequate means to arrive at the latter (Merton 1968). They offer cues as to what other people in this situation would do, set incentives for behaviour, and supply people with context-specific instructions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 15; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Karstedt 2012: 419; Swidler 1986). Institutions allow conclusions about which actions and beliefs are adequate and which actions are in congruent with the values of society at large. The institutional structure hence sets and represents fundamental social norms in society (Messner 2013: 50; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Karstedt 2012: 406; North 1991: 98). The connection with solidarity is obvious, as the latter is a value whose existence depends on its reproduction through institutions and individual behaviour.

The criminal justice system is part of this institutional context of society but is endowed with a particular responsibility. It is specifically designed to enforce norms in society. Institutions of the criminal justice system step in as a last resort when the other institutions’ rules are too weak to control breaches of norms and regulations. Hence, being an institution with the purpose of providing public order and safety, as well as exerting punishment, the criminal justice system is closely tied to values in society (Karstedt 2002, 2011b). Penal institutions and criminal law thus represent certain existing values in society, while at the same time impacting on people’s beliefs, attitudes, and sentiments (Garland 1991b: 125). As such crime control regimes can leave traces in society beyond their instrumental function of dealing with crime (Garland 1991b: 117-118). They can strengthen existing bonds,
foster alienations, and influence individual commitments to wider society (Garland 1991b: 154). Based on its role as a social institution we can draw a theoretical connection between the criminal justice system and solidarity. How specifically can crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system, by private households, and by the private sector, as well as punishment at the back end of the criminal justice system and the processing of crime in public discourse affect solidarity?

3.3 Durkheim – Crime, punishment, and solidarity

The first theoretical account of the relationship between the collective experience of crime in society focuses on punishment and was put forward by Emile Durkheim (1992, 1983). Durkheim conceptualised punishment as being in a circular relationship with society. On the one hand normative conventions, traditions, economic and political circumstances, but most importantly by the social differentiation of society shape penal regimes (Durkheim 1992). On the other hand punishment itself impacts society through its influence on solidarity. How does this influence work?

3.3.1 Original theory

According to Durkheim the main function of penal law and punishment is not instrumental as in trying to deter offenders and prevent future crimes, but social. Both penal law and punishment serve as expressions of the common moral code of society (Durkheim 1992; Lukes and Prabhat 2012; Trevino 2008: 254). This common moral code in turn is critical for solidarity, as, according to Durkheim, the roots of solidarity lie in shared moral values between members of society. Thus, solidarity, penal law, and punishment are closely connected, as they are all founded upon moral agreement (Trevino 2008: 239).

Durkheim defines crime as behaviour that provokes moral outrage and is hence covered by penal law (Trevino 2008: 239-240; Garland 2012: 15). As classifications of crime are deeply rooted in social norms, definitions of crime vary across time and space (Garland 2012: 24-25). Actions which are classified as crimes, however, always entail moral outrage in the eyes of Durkheim. As a consequence, responses to crime do not originate from rational or instrumental deliberations, but are founded upon the moral outrage felt by society. Hence, punishment is an institutionalised way to bundle individual reactions to crime which, according to Durkheim’s conception, are highly emotional, passionate, and expressions of moral sentiments. This moral outrage in response to crime is channelled into collective rituals of punishing the offender (Trevino 2008: 240-241).

Punishment as collective ritual reaffirms the normative order of society by re-
minding people of existing (and violated) moral values (Garland 2012: 25). The condemnation of offenders as well as their actions calls to people’s minds the norms they share as a collective. As solidarity originates from a common morale, punishment stimulates an increase of solidarity. Durkheim argues that in the wake of crime and punishment people often come together, talk about the crime, concertedly condemn it in everyday conversations, agree upon ‘the right behaviour’ and refresh their bonds between each other (Durkheim 2009). Expressions of sympathy with the victims and the moral outrage in reaction to their loss are signs of pre-existing solidarity within a society (Garland 2012: 25). In a society devoid of solidarity, crime would not evoke such sentiments in those who are not directly affected by the criminal act.

Harshness and forms of punishment correspond to the two solidarity types identified by Durkheim (Durkheim 1992: 34-36; Trevino 2008: 239; Garland 2012: 28). Mechanic solidarity, with its strict rule of the group over individuals and a strong collective consciousness, corresponds to draconian punishment of offenders and repressive criminal law. In modern societies, which are characterized by organic solidarity, interdependencies, appreciation of differences, and a collective understanding of the moral value of the individual, sentences become more lenient (Durkheim 1992: 34-36). The loss inflicted on the offenders for retaliation purposes decreases due to the respect of the rights of the offender as individual and member of society. Nevertheless, even though punishment becomes more merciful with the shift from mechanic to organic solidarity, reactions to crime will always be emotionally driven and resemble a moral outrage. Durkheim predicts that on account of the core social function it performs, punishment will never vanish completely either (Trevino 2008: 244). This corresponds to his notion that notwithstanding its evocation of extreme reactions, crime is a normal and not a pathological attribute of societies (Durkheim 2009).

3.3.2 Durkheim and contemporary criminology

Durkheim’s ideas are still prevalent in contemporary analyses of criminal justice (Smith 2008). Executions of death penalties in the USA are in a Durkheimian sense still conceived as ‘sacred ceremonies’ (Phillips 2013: 59) expressing society’s indignation about the threat to the moral order. Furthermore, the notion that punishment itself is an act of solidarity with victims is used to justify state-compensation for victims (Buck 2005: 154). Moreover, lenient punishment is often rated as disrespectful towards victims’ harm and losses (Garland 2001: 143-146). Finally, Kennedy (2000) argues that members of societies characterised by moral fractionalization and value pluralism – in Durkheimian terminology a ‘weak collective consciousness’
find unity in stereotypical images of ‘monstrous offenders.’ Kennedy discusses that grossly exaggerated stereotypes of violent youths, child molesters, and drug dealers are designed to create a moral outrage in order to re-establish a common ground. This common ground does not originate from an emphasis on desirable behaviour, but through consensus on wrong and despicable conduct. The media often helps to create pictures of those who endanger social unity and security (Soffer 2013: 53).

There are only a handful of empirical studies based on the Durkheimian crime-solidarity nexus (Garland 2012). Some of these support the notion that solidarity increases with the occurrence of crime. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the USA, Collins (2004) has identified an increased display of signs of solidarity, symbolic involvement in solidarity behaviour, and a large degree of public appraisal of the latter. These findings were supported in analyses of smaller social groups, such as school and student populations affected by mass shootings (Hawdon and Ryan 2011). Lending support to Durkheim’s theory, people engaged more frequently in event-specific as well as general community activities and conversations after such tragedies, creating interpersonal bonds and sustaining solidarity. In addition to the actual occurrence of crime, fear of crimes which are targeted against a community can exert positive influence on solidarity within the targeted population (Hawdon et al. 2013).

However, there are also studies which call attention to possible divisive effects of crimes within communities (Vuori et al. 2013: 8-10). The repeated occurrence of crimes like school shootings can lead to doubts about the community’s moral order and its ability to control members, especially if the perpetrators themselves are community members. Likewise, less drastic crimes, especially when indicated as being local, may signal deterioration and erosion of authority within neighbourhoods. Furthermore, findings suggest that fear of routine street crime leads to a decrease in trust and solidarity, in contrast to crime targeted to hurt a specific group or society which increased solidarity in those targeted communities (Hawdon et al. 2013). Fear of crime can prompt people to cut back on their social interaction, leading to division (Liska and Warner 1991: 1444, 1460-1461). When people reduce their daily routines to spaces they deem secure and only visit those at safe times, the opportunities of solidarity to surpass the boundaries of people’s immediate narrow circle of friends become limited. ‘That is, in contemporary urban societies, where crime rates are generally high, the reaction to crime, instead of bringing people together, keeps them apart’ (Liska and Warner 1991: 1461). Crime hence has the potential to decrease interpersonal trust and therefore to negatively affect an important precondition for solidarity.

These empirical studies corroborate that punishment conveys symbolic meaning
and that the occurrence and anticipation of crime leaves traces in interpersonal relationships and attitudes. However, some results question the anticipation of merely positive outcomes of crime control regimes.

### 3.3.3 Can penal regimes reduce solidarity in society?

In focusing only on positive effects for solidarity, Durkheim’s theory neglects possible negative outcomes of punishment (Garland 2012). These negative outcomes can entail a lack of solidarity with the offender as well as negative impacts on solidarity between social subgroups.

First, in Durkheim’s theory, solidarity is produced at the expense of the offender. In a Durkheimian sense, the aim of punishment is not reconciliation but retaliation. Even though Durkheim argued that in modern societies a sense for the sacredness of the individual leads to less draconian punishment out of respect for the rights of the offender, the theory does not foresee rituals to reintegrate the offender into society (Trevino 2008: 240; Garland 2012: 32). Solidarity with the offender is thus absent.

In contemporary societies punishment still implies expulsion of the offender from the community: ‘In the institutional practices of modern state punishment, the rituals of excommunication, stigmatization, and expulsion of the offender are elaborate and well-established’ (Garland 2012: 32; see also Garfinkel 1956). Prisoners are often deprived of political rights such as the right to vote, but also social rights such as access to public benefits or higher education (Owens and Smith 2012; Manza and Uggen 2006; Page 2004). Community re-entry after completion of the sentence is often difficult because of prejudice against ex-offenders, which makes entering new social relationships hard (Hirschfield and Piquero 2010). The damage to future life chances after any reported contact with the criminal justice system is such that even disorderly conduct arrests which never resulted in formal charges significantly decrease the likelihood of being admitted to a job interview (Uggen et al. 2014). Incarceration along racial, socio-economic, and gender lines can deprive whole communities as social structures become disrupted, negative effects of offenders’ incarceration on their relatives concentrate in these areas, and economic hardships continue or worsen (Clear 2007; Hagan and Foster 2012; Murray 2007).

Furthermore, Durkheim assumes that penal law and the resulting punishment routines correspond to the wishes of all citizens equally by representing universally held values. Hence, besides the lack of solidarity with the offender, according to Durkheim, punishment should have an equally solidarity-increasing effect on all citizens. However, society is composed of different social subgroups, which can be demarcated, for instance, by ethnic background, socio-economic status, level of attained education, or religious affiliation. The normative frameworks of each of
these different subgroups in turn can differ. As a consequence penal regimes and practices may have divergent effects on solidarity within as well as between those subgroups. And some of those effects may well be negative (Garland 2012: 31; Karstedt 2006: 241-243).

Powerful interest groups play a significant role in the formation of norms and rules (Smith 2008: 339). Consequently, the law tends to represent their wishes and values more instead of representing the wishes of all social subgroups equally (Garland 1991b: 125; Garland 1991a: 192). Hence, criminal law has the potential to advocate concerns of one group while overlooking the interest of others. Criminalisation of behaviour which is specific to some subcultures serves as a vivid example here (Ferrell 1995). In the USA, for instance, possession of crack cocaine, which is predominantly consumed in black communities, has a 100-to-1 sentencing ratio compared to powder-cocaine offenses, which are predominantly committed in white communities, even though both forms of cocaine have almost identical physiological and psychoactive effects (Hatsukami and Fischman 1996). Due to the negative effects of contact with the criminal justice system on future life chances, penal law and punishment can lead to a reproduction of social inequalities and thus decrease the potential for solidarity between subgroups (Sykes 1974; Siegel 2000; Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009).

This effect becomes especially relevant if the prosecution of norm deviance is unequal and specific groups, predominantly those whose moral beliefs and norms are poorly represented in penal legislation, are targeted. Poverty stricken populations find themselves under widespread control by criminal justice institutions, as are people of ethnic minorities or with a migrant background (Schram, Fording, and Soss 2008; Soss 2005; Wacquant 2009: 6, 297). As such criminal justice and other disciplinary interventions are not random, but closely associated to certain people and neighbourhoods (Weaver and Lerman 2010: 817; Clear 2007: 60-65). Population-specific control mechanisms are often justified by explanations which blame social problems on the malign moral values held by the poor and other groups of society (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009: 135-137). In Europe for example immigrants and citizens with migration background are often displayed as ‘dangerous classes’ on account of their overrepresentation in criminal and police statistics (De Giorgi 2010: 149; see also Longazel 2013). The creation of stereotypes is ‘often framed in a racialized language that postulates self-evident links between some nationalities or ethnicities and specific types of criminal activity (e.g. Eastern Europeans and violent crimes, Northern Africans and drug-trafficking, sub-Saharan women and prostitution, Roma people and property crimes) [...]’ (De Giorgi 2010: 154).

Thus, punishment may lead to deprivation and a perceived sense of injustice by those whose norms and wishes are not represented in the penal law and who find
themselves targeted by criminal justice institutions. Penal regimes can also represent and reinforce prejudice held by those whose interests correspond with penal law. These processes may increase solidarity within those subgroups. Solidarity across subgroups, however, is reduced in contexts where the intensity of crime control and punishment is contingent on ethnicity and socio-economic status. Yet, solidarity in society depends on solidarity which surpasses group boundaries (Garland 2012: 33-34; Karstedt 2013b; Lindenberg 1998: 100-103). The processes outlined in the previous paragraphs thus suggest that the Durkheimian notion that punishment increases solidarity in wider society does not always hold.

3.4 Framing theory and the collective experience of crime

Durkheim’s theory is restricted to the punishment-solidarity nexus. Thus, it can only explain how one aspect of the collective experience of crime relates to solidarity in society. However, the collective experience of crime also entails the prevalence of crime in society, prevention efforts, and the salience of crime as an issue in society. The framing theory of solidarity by Lindenberg (1998, 2006) emphasises the dependence of people’s feeling and actions of solidarity on the general social and institutional backgrounds they live in. It thus has a broader view than Durkheim’s theory. Framing theory consequently is a valuable supplement to Durkheim’s focus on punishment as it allows for connections between all four dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society. Which links between the dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society can be established through framing theory?

3.4.1 Prevalence of crime

Acts of crime can be understood as the opposite of solidarity: acts of crime cause harm to others and put financial burdens on states and communities. Many definitions of particular offenses like tax evasion, fraud, or human trafficking, focus on the concepts of free-riding, exploitation, and taking advantage of others. Crime in general and violent crime in particular are not intended to contribute to the welfare of others, which is a defining characteristic of solidarity, but rather to cause loss and harm to others. Of course there are examples in which acts of solidarity become criminalised or result in crime, such as the miners’ strikes in England for example. The common understanding of crime, however, is one of negative intentions and negative social externalities.

Crime’s impact on the solidarity frames of individuals should consequently be negative. High levels of crime signal that a high proportion of people have solidarity
frames that are not intact. The stability of individuals’ normative frames in general and the solidarity frames in particular, however, depends on the intactness of the solidarity frames of others, as chapter 2 showed. In order to develop a stable solidarity frame and be motivated to perform acts of solidarity, individuals need the assurance that solidarity is a value that is held in high regard, present in the behaviour of others, and that others can be trusted. Hence, high levels of crime have the potential to decrease solidarity through highlighting anti-social attitudes and behaviour of others.

The remaining three dimensions of the collective experience of crime exert their influence on individuals’ solidarity attitudes and behaviour by highlighting the crime problem in society on the one hand. In doing so they convey information about the trustworthiness of fellow citizens and assumptions about their motivations (i.e. master frames). On the other hand crime prevention, punishment routines, and political discourse of the crime problem can also act as institutionalised examples of values closely linked to solidarity, such as outreach and exclusion, and thereby reinforce as well as damage the salience of individuals’ solidarity frames.

3.4.2 Attempts to prevent crime

While the establishment of public order and safety is a common good which can breed solidarity by making trustful and uninhibited social interaction between strangers possible, certain attempts to prevent crime may unintentionally drive people apart.

On the one hand, visible crime prevention efforts can highlight the problem of crime in society and thereby highlight the general untrustworthiness of others. As crime represents violations of the norm of solidarity, signals of its prevalence can undermine people’s solidarity frames, as these depend on the belief that solidarity is a value which is held in high regard in society. Crime prevention measures in public spaces thus convey assumptions about the motivations of fellow citizens. Measures known under the term ‘situational crime prevention’ such as barriers, grids, defensible spaces, CCTV surveillance, shop detectives, visible alarm systems, or warning signs, rest on the premise that there is an abundance of people willing to commit a crime if faced with a suitable opportunity (Liska and Warner 1991: 1440; Felson and Clarke 1998; Clarke 1980). These measures make palpable within society the supposition that if it were not for these control structures, interpersonal contact with strangers in public spaces would be risky, as people exploit others, cannot be trusted, and commit crime upon the first suitable opportunity. Visible crime prevention efforts thus remind people of the necessity of constant control and surveillance to avoid antisocial behaviour. Williams and Ahmed (2009) have in fact been able to show in experiments that the presence of CCTV cameras can contribute
to building stereotypes and alter the perception of places from being safe to being problematic.

On the other hand, some prevention strategies specifically target certain social groups. As a consequence they convey information about the supposed instability of the solidarity frames of a specific subgroup of society, rather than of the general public. In so doing they contribute to the perception of those subgroups in society. Stereotypes, stigmatising effects, and resentment may follow, since targeting specific areas with increased police presence may mark these places and dwellers as problematic (Crawford 2009: 9; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012: 30-45). At the same time, members of social subgroups who find themselves under increased control and surveillance may well be aware of this unequal treatment and the corresponding stigmatising effects. This awareness can then transform into hostile feelings towards those people who are perceived as being responsible for the disparate treatment and those who do not suffer its consequences. Thus, certain crime prevention strategies have the potential to drive social subgroups apart.

Efforts to prevent crime can also have positive effects on solidarity, albeit on solidarity within social subgroups or communities, rather than solidarity across these groups. Community-based crime prevention initiatives (e.g. neighbourhood watch schemes) can lead members of a community to interact with each other and perceive themselves as risk-sharing groups (Crawford 2009: 9). Especially the latter has been shown to increase and maintain solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 97-99). However, residential areas are often segregated along socio-economic, socio-cultural, or ethnic backgrounds. Furthermore, they widely differ in their potential to provide for common goods such as public order and safety (Rippe 1998). Hence, community-based crime prevention activity may firstly ‘undermine bridging social capital between different social subgroups’ (Crawford 2009: 9), and as a consequence obstruct potential solidarity relationships.1 Secondly, the benefits of community-based crime prevention efforts are only accessible for immediate residents (Hope 1995: 75-77; Currie 1988). Often communities with the highest victimisation rates and therefore the highest demand for prevention efforts, have the fewest means to invest in community-safety (Hale 2009). Neighbourhood watch schemes or gated communities in turn find themselves in affluent areas with low crime rates. Thirdly, community-based prevention measures could even portray non-residents as the exact cause for the existence of neighbourhood watch schemes and gated communities, and thereby further avert inter-group contact and solidarity.

Crime prevention efforts which do not originate from the criminal justice system, such as community-based prevention activity, prevention efforts from private

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1Social capital and solidarity are not the same thing. The process of acquiring social capital however can lead to solidarity relationships across communities (See section 2.2).
households through alarm systems, and crime control through private security industry, carry additional meaning: these efforts are representations of a delegation of responsibilities to control and prevent crime to actors outside of the criminal justice system (Crawford 2009: 28-29). In the words of (Garland 2001: 170-171), crime control becomes ‘everybody’s business and therefore is in everybody’s minds’. This process of delegation promotes control rather than trust (Garland 2001: 195) because it encourages people to take precautions against the criminal behaviour of others. Various forms of crime prevention are hence closely related to people’s perception of each other.

### 3.4.3 Reactions to crime

The potential negative effects of imprisonment on solidarity were already partly discussed in subsection 3.3.3. The unequal use of imprisonment along ethnic and socio-economic lines can lead to stereotypisation and possibly infringe on solidarity between social subgroups. Penal attitudes for instance are harsher and oppose rehabilitation measures for crimes associated with certain ethnic groups in the USA (Pickett and Chiricos 2012: 679). Likewise, the harm of imprisonment on offenders’ future life chances as well as for the lives of their their families and communities further divide rather than unite people (Garland 1991b: 126).

Yet, penal regimes also communicate values inherent in the treatment of others to the general public. The execution of punishment can occur in very different fashions, but the two general principles of social interaction which guide sentencing are exclusion and inclusion (Braithwaite 1989). Punishment therefore conveys ‘relational signals’ (Lindenberg 1998: 102) or lack thereof towards offenders. Therefore, the social institution of punishment sets an example as to how to treat people who have violated the norms of social coexistence. Harsh and stigmatising punishment, indifference towards the negative consequences of punishment after completion of the sentence, scarce access to rehabilitation, therapy, or education, or even the revocation of civil rights such as the right to vote, all renounce solidarity with offenders and declare them unworthy of integration and belonging. In contrast, the treatment of offenders in accordance to international standards, attempts to mitigate collateral consequences of criminal sentencing, as well as access to therapy, education, and work, send signals of forgiveness, support, and solidarity. Therefore they represent and set examples of values which guide social cooperation, as well as suggest the capacity of solidarity to include even those who have violated the laws.
3.4.4 Salience of crime in society

The salience of crime in society has two aspects. First, there is the overall level of public and private attention given to crime as a topic. This attention can be found in people’s fear of crime, but also in the inclusion of crime and crime control as topics in political debate. The relationship between the salience of crime in society and solidarity follows the relationship patterns outlined above. If crime is too salient an issue, distrust within society may rise and citizens’ solidarity frames towards strangers may erode, as trust is an important precondition for solidarity to emerge (see chapter 2). The same is true for high levels of fear of crime among citizens. Fear of crime is likely to push solidarity frames into the background.

The second aspect is the content of this issue attention given to crime. Crime may be a salient issue but, depending on how it is framed, effects on solidarity may well differ. If a discourse around crime spreads negative stereotypical images of certain traits and characteristics as being strongly related to criminal behaviour, or if political discourse about the crime problem promotes the harsh enforcement of law and order without concern for the fate of offenders or their families, generalised solidarity in society, i.e. solidarity which surpasses group boundaries, is unlikely to be the result (Zimring and Johnson 2006). The portrayal of immigrant youths as ‘youths ready to use violence’ and subsequent ‘action plans’ in response in German politics in the mid-2000s (Pfeiffer and Wetzels 2006), or David Cameron’s attempts to blame the 2011 England riots on subcultures of bad parenting, deteriorating moral values, and lack of discipline in certain populations\(^2\) are illustrative of divisive stereotyping through political discourse. In contrast, if discussions of crime and crime control are factual, de-escalating, and convey a positive view of people in general, people’s solidarity frames are less in danger in spite of the existence of crime in society (Peeters 2013). Positive relational signals towards all members of society, including offenders, can be present in public discourse as well as in institutions and therefore help to strengthen citizens’ solidarity frames.

3.5 Working hypotheses and research questions

The impact of the criminal justice system on societal parameters beyond the offender, such as social solidarity, is rarely studied (Garland 2012: 33-34). Although there is a small body of literature that has tried to test Durkheim’s assumption about the solidarity-enhancing effects of crimes on small communities like student and school populations discussed above (Hawdon and Ryan 2011; Hawdon et al.\(^2\)http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8695318/UK-riots-David-Cameron-promises-to-restore-sense-of-morality-as-police-get-new-powers.html (accessed 11 Dec 2015).
2013; Vuori et al. 2013; see also Collins 2004), the established links are restricted to (a) direct experiences of victimisation and to (b) confined populations. It is unknown whether similar mechanisms exist in wider society.

Recently, however, the unprecedented scale of mass imprisonment in the USA has increased interest in the wider social implications of such widespread use of carceral sentences (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). Research suggests that mass imprisonment is a significant contributor to rising economic inequality, poverty, and unemployment in the United States due to the disruptive consequences of incarceration on the life chances of convicts and their immediate social environment (DeFina and Hannon 2009; Western and Muller 2013; Western 2007). Similar assessments of the consequences of incarceration outside the USA is scarce. Even though the USA has witnessed an increase in imprisonment rates of exceptional character, changes in crime control and penal regimes have occurred throughout advanced western democracies and raise questions about repercussions in wider society (Smit, Eijk, and Decae 2011).

Research in Europe, however, has previously for the most part employed social circumstances such as inequality, trust between citizens, and institutionalised solidarity as explanations for different levels of punitiveness. These studies suggest that decreases in income equality, trust, and (institutionalised) solidarity, usually in the form of welfare state activity, go hand in hand with increases in harsh punishment and punitive sentiments.

Criminologists have often connected increased punitiveness, increased exploitation of crime as a political subject, as well as cut-backs in institutionalised solidarity (i.e. welfare state activity) to a political economy governed by neoliberalism (Beckett and Western 2001; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a; Downes and Hansen 2006). Neoliberalism subordinates the political and public spheres to free market rationalities (Brown 2006). Neoliberalism consequently stands for a small state, low taxation, endorsement of individual freedom, disassembly of the social welfare, privatization of public services, and the valuation of citizens by their capacity to self-sustain (Brown 2006: 692-695). Neoliberalism furthermore offers private solutions to socially produced problems (Brown 2006: 704). Especially this last characteristic facilitates the emergence of a growing market of private security in response to the social problem of crime, as well as the increased use of prisons as a consequence of their privatization: if correctional facilities are privatized, they become companies in which offenses and prisoners are profitable goods (Burkhardt and Connor 2016; Fulcher 2010). These two processes are exemplary in describing the connection between the increased awareness for and harsher reactions to crime in countries governed by a neoliberal political economy.
Neoconservatism is a political ideology that offers a concurrent explanation for the correlation between low levels of welfare state activity and harsh interventions in regards to crime. Yet, it has received less attention from criminologists. In contrast to neoliberalism, which aims at introducing economic liberalisation to all aspects of the political and public sphere, neoconservatism explicitly supports a strong and powerful state in matters of moral regulation (Brown 2006: 697-698). Neoconservatism as an ideology encourages family values and praises traditional forms of western life rooted in a common normative social fabric. Neoconservatism is fuelled “by angst about the declining or crumbling status of morality within the West, and by a concomitant moralization of a certain imagery of the West and its values” (Brown 2006: 697). In order to enforce this morality, neoconservatists advocate for a strong state to deal with and regulate those parts of society that are considered a threat to the moral order (Brown 2006; Hancock 2016; DeKeseredy 2009). This circumstance associates neoconservatism closely with harsh penal policies.

Neoconservatism and neoliberalism are often conflated on account of their mutual disdain for state-led behaviourism in form of liberal democratic egalitarian projects that aim to reduce poverty and alleviate inequalities (Brown 2006: 697). Likewise, neoconservatism and neoliberalism can both offer explanations as to why limited institutionalised solidarity and punitiveness correlate.

Besides those two political ideologies, ‘cultures of inequality’ (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009) as well as low levels of trust in institutions and fellow citizens in Western democracies appear to occur together with harsher criminal justice practices (Lappi-Seppälä 2011). In addition, social instability has been identified to contribute to citizens’ punitive sentiments (Garin 2012). Pratt (2007) specifically argues that a decline of former high levels of solidarity, security, and homogeneity in Scandinavian countries are forerunners of potential increases in punitiveness and imprisonment rates, and the deterioration of prison conditions among Scandinavian countries.

However, even though these studies address a link between crime control and solidarity, they do so from a theoretical standpoint which employs solidarity as an explanatory variable rather than as an outcome. Questions about repercussions of altered punishing routines and punitive sentiments in the wider social context thus remain unanswered. A notable exception exists in form of a report of the British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences published in 2014 also warns about the potential negative consequences of imprisonment on solidarity in society (Allen et al. 2014: 72). By excluding parts of the population through prison walls from society, the authors argue, citizens learn to see whole sections of society as undeserving of support and hence the solidarity-project is weakened. However, these arguments are theoretical in nature.
Hence, a systematic empirical assessment of repercussions of the ways societies experience and deal with crime on solidarity in wider society is currently lacking. This PhD thesis is a first attempt to fill this gap. To do so it expands the focus of existing empirical literature in two ways.

First, in using the term of a ‘collective experience of crime’, this research addresses not only penal regimes, but also the prevalence, salience, and prevention of crime in society and their relationships with solidarity. This goes beyond the assessments of punitiveness and incarceration rates of previous research. Second, the thesis relates these different dimensions of the collective experience of crime to indicators of solidarity in a sample of 26 European countries and thereby supplements existing knowledge on social repercussions of crime control in the USA.

This chapter has built a theoretical foundation for understanding how the different ways in which citizens can learn about the existence of and approaches to crime in their society may leave traces in solidarity. The working hypothesis for the remainder of this thesis is that the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society are not independent of each other and stipulates that:

(a) A relationship between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society can be empirically identified.

However, this relationship is not unidirectional. Solidarity that surpasses socio-economic and ethnic group boundaries is unlikely to exist in contexts of collective experiences of crime which fuel distrust, the creation of criminal stereotypes, and which are devoid of outreach towards offenders. In contrast, solidarity widens with institutional examples of outreach, inclusion, and trust. In the first scenario the scope of solidarity narrows, in the second scenario it is inclusive of wider society (Garland 2012). Hence, dimensions of the collective experience of crime have the potential to divide as well as to unite society at large. The second working hypothesis which guides the empirical analysis thus argues that:

(b) Depending on the shape of the dimension under investigation this relationship can adopt a positive, solidarity-enhancing direction, but also a negative one.

On the basis of these two working hypotheses the thesis addresses the following four strategically set research questions:

1. What are current trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime and solidarity in Europe?

2. What are differences and commonalities in Europe in regards to the collective experience of crime and solidarity?
3. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to institutionalised solidarity in society?

4. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to solidarity attitudes of individuals?
4 Research Design and Data Sources

4.1 Strategic choices

This research presents a quantitative assessment of the collective experience of crime in contemporary European societies between 1995 and 2010. It aims to provide a statistical portrayal of the relationship between the collective experience of crime in society and solidarity in contemporary western democracies. In order to do so it analyses if and how indicators of crime, attempts to provide public order and safety, reactions to crime at the back end of the criminal justice system, and the salience of crime in society correspond to indicators of social solidarity. This chapter defines this thesis’ analytical strategy, describes the operationalisation of its two main concepts, and presents the data sources used for the empirical analysis. This section outlines reasons for employing an extensive comparative research design to address the research questions raised in section 3.5. Section 4.2 discusses the selection of cases. An explanation of the conceptualisation of solidarity and the collective experience of crime follows in section 4.3. Section 4.4 introduces the data sources consulted for this PhD project.

4.1.1 Comparative research – strategies and principles

This research employs a cross-national as well as cross-temporal perspective and thus belongs to the increasingly relevant discipline of comparative criminology (Karstedt 2001, 2012). There are compelling reasons why comparative research has gained importance in criminology and why the present study pursues a comparative approach. Contrary to expectations, globalisation has not (yet) led to a convergence of penal- and other policies to curb crime (Karstedt 2014; Lacey 2008; Tubex 2013). Sentencing strategies and attitudes about crime and punishment seem to be deeply influenced by the socio-cultural history of countries (Kury and Ferdinand 1999; Neapolitan 2001; Whitman 2003, 2005). Comparative research contributes to identifying and understanding differences, singularities, and regional patterns. In addition, it can lend empirical support to claims about global trends, such as those suggesting solidarity is declining or that there has been a punitive turn in Western democracies, and reveal how these global trends have been implemented in national policies or mitigated by a nation’s institutional environment. Even within seemingly homogenous groups of countries (like European democracies) and even within coun-
tries themselves, comparisons add knowledge to current criminological and other social scientific research as they provide a frame of reference for research findings (Kury and Ferdinand 1999; Neapolitan 2001: 706; Whitman 2005: 23).

As such, the study of social repercussions of crime, along with private and formal endeavours to deal with it, can only bear meaningful results if these are not seen in isolation but contrasted against points of reference (Nelken 2010: 12-18). Are patterns of particular approaches to curb crime like those identified by Cavadino and Dignan (2006a) apparent when using a different set of measures? And do these patterns covary with specific forms of solidarity? Without comparison either across time or across countries the significance of findings in selected countries is hard to determine (Tubex 2013: 59). The question of whether research findings display regional or country-specific anomalies or whether they reflect wider trends will remain unanswered if the focus remains on one or a few particular cases. Comparisons can add to the significance of singular in-depth case studies as they allow the latter to be placed within a framework of references.

Comparative research includes several strategic approaches, which are tailored to different research interests. These strategies differ depending on the kind of concept under investigation, the number of cases this concept is investigated, and the rationale the cases are selected with (van der Heijden 2014; Karstedt 2001, 2012).

The first consideration one has to make in comparative research is whether one wants to intensively research all characteristics of only a single or very few cases, or whether one wants to extensively research only some specific characteristics of a large number of cases (Karstedt 2001: 289-299). Comparative research interested in the study of certain characteristics common to more than a few cases typically embeds the chosen characteristics in a theoretical framework which aims to find variation by looking at associations, context effects, or moderating/mediating effects between the dimensions of a phenomenon and an outcome of interest (Tilly 1984: 82). The research methods most suitable for this task are extensive: collecting quantifiable information with parallel methods in a large sample of countries (Swanborn 2010: 12-14). That is, comparing the same variables collected with the same methods in many countries or instances. The ultimate aim of extensive research is to discover and explain a range of differences and/ or similarities in the phenomena under investigation, and to potentially link them to other variables. Whenever single cultural traits or isolated dimensions of a broader phenomenon are assessed, the research strategy differs. In this case the trait or dimension under investigation is assumed to be an idiosyncratic feature of a specific country, region, or milieu. Scientifically assessing such idiosyncrasies aims to provide an understanding of their meaning for cultural, institutional, and social processes in the context or region.
where they are found. The corresponding research strategy is intensive in nature. It
uses qualitative and ethnographic methods in small samples aiming to present case
studies and contrasting different phenomena or cultures. Methods do not need to
be parallel, but they still require a certain degree of equivalence.

In a second step the researcher must decide whether the comparison should take
place in a single, or in a multiplicity of forms (Karstedt 2012: 378; Tilly 1984: 81).
That is, whether the object of inquiry comes in one form or shape only, or whether
it is conceptualised as a multidimensional phenomenon, consisting of a synergy of
many different aspects. The concept of punitiveness can serve as a good example
here: a single form research design conceptualizes punitiveness as a unidimensional
concept, which can be measured with one variable, for example imprisonment rates.
A multiplicity of forms assumes that punitiveness is a concept which can appear in
different shapes and is comprised of several dimensions: punitiveness can express
itself in rising imprisonment rates, but also in conceding less parole to prisoners,
giving longer minimum sentences, and having higher conviction rates. Hence, for a
multidimensional measurement of punitiveness, variables measuring all these afore-
mentioned aspects need to appear in the analysis.

Lastly, there are different sampling strategies, of which the most prominent in
comparative research are the most-similar and the most-different-system designs
(van der Heijden 2014). The most-similar-system design refers to a selection of
cases which are as similar as possible in regards to potentially confounding variables,
meaning that differences in the outcome of interest can be ascribed to differences in
the explanatory variables. This method suffers from some shortcomings when the
units of analysis are countries as it is almost impossible to find two or more countries
that do not significantly differ from each other in some respect. The most-different-
system design does the exact opposite. It compares cases which are as different as
possible. This strategy is most suitable when the robustness of an effect or influence
in different settings is supposed to be be demonstrated.

4.1.2 Choice of research strategy

This PhD project investigates associations between two multidimensional concepts:
social solidarity and the collective experience of crime. Both phenomena come in
more than one shape and consist of multiple factors: as chapter 2 showed, there
are at least two levels of analysis for social solidarity. Furthermore, the scope of
people’s willingness to help each other ranges from immediate family members, to
people from the same region, ethnicity or social class, to fellow citizens of all kinds.
Reaching out to people in any of these groups can be subsumed under the term
solidarity. The collective experience of crime is the symbiosis of various aspects: the
level of crime that is actually happening, the sensibilities in society towards various offences, the formal reaction to crime through proceedings of the criminal justice system, private as well as official endeavours to provide public order and safety, and the salience of crime in politics and people’s minds. Many more elements can contribute to the collective experience of crime, illustrating that this concept consists of multiple dimensions.

As a consequence, the PhD thesis pursues an extensive research strategy concerned with a multiplicity of forms, as this is the most appropriate research design to assess associations between two multidimensional concepts. The goal is to present condensed information over a broad range of countries and years rather than to look intensively into two or three particular jurisdictions. Using a broad range of European countries allows the research findings to be generalised for ‘contemporary European societies’ rather than generating very well informed but very specific information about e.g. ‘England, Spain, and Poland’. Identifying trends and regional patterns is difficult when only a few cases are under investigation. A broad range of cases helps to prevent conclusions from being built on idiosyncrasies.

To this end, the thesis will employ a set of parallel quantitative methods. Condensed and quantified information across countries and time allows for an analysis of covariation and the identification of trends and patterns (Bryman 2008; Bachman and Schutt 2007: 18-19). Generating statistical portrayals and overviews of the collective experience of crime and solidarity within many countries across time allows regional convergences, possible outliers, and changes over time to be identified.

Arguments about ‘decreases’ in solidarity or ‘increases’ in punitiveness and prison populations imply a temporal aspect. Thus, collecting information across time is important. It is impossible to portray trends or developments with measurements at only one single point in time. If changes in penal policies affect solidarity this can only be observed across time with at least two data points. Therefore, the research needs information at more than one point in time in order to see whether any changes in solidarity correspond to trajectories in indicators of the collective experience of crime. Annual data is desirable, but many of the social survey data used in the following empirical chapters are not conducted on an annual basis (see section 4.4 below). Likewise, some data on crime and crime control on the country level are only available in four or five year intervals. Data on political parties’ emphasis on the importance of law and order policies was taken from party manifestos published prior to national elections (see section 4.4.3). As a consequence, politicians’ statements about crime, law, and order between elections remain unknown. The majority of aggregate data has however been available annually since around 1990.

A statistical portrayal of both solidarity in society and the collective experience
of crime cannot account for the everyday realities of people living in the sample countries or reflect “objective reality” (Bryman 2008: 22). Quantitative indicators can only approximate the particularities of a country’s approaches to controlling crime and how people feel towards each other. They help give a general idea of what is going on in a society, especially compared against a frame of reference. Furthermore, indicators can stimulate (qualitative) in-depth analyses of particularly interesting cases such as outliers, or countries that fit particularly well into a regional pattern. This thesis uses an inductive approach to discern patterns, trends, and differences, while a deductive framework will be used to test hypotheses about the relationship between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in different countries.

4.2 Case selection and sample

Since ‘the use of parallel procedures and variables works best when cultures are not too different [...]’ (Karstedt 2001: 291), the sample consists of contemporary European democracies which are currently members of the Council of Europe (CoE). Membership in this supranational organisation ensures a certain level of political and economic homogeneity between the sample countries: the CoE aims to promote common legal standards, human rights, democratic development, social welfare, and cultural co-operation.3

Still, there are individual cultural, penal, economic, and welfare differences between the countries in the sample. Even though, in comparison to the USA, Europe seems to be ‘resisting punitiveness’ (Snacken and Dumortier 2012), several studies show that there is considerable variation in approaches to control and punish crime in contemporary Europe (Brownlee 1998; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a; Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009; Downes and Hansen 2006; Dünkel et al. 2010; Karstedt 2013b; Klaus, Rzeplinska, and Wozniakowska-Fajst 2011; Kury and Shea 2011; Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Muncie 2008; Pratt 2007; Sack 2010). Likewise, European welfare states have a much higher level of redistribution of income than the USA where the state is kept as small as possible in regards to domestic regulation (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001). Nevertheless, there are also differences in approaches to institutionalised solidarity within Europe in terms of welfare provisions and practices (Esping-Andersen 1999). Hence, the sample was selected from a group of similar western democracies which nevertheless vary in regards to the variables of interest.

Not all CoE member countries were included in the sample. Countries involved

in the Yugoslav Wars (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro) or otherwise afflicted by upheaval and conflict in recent years (Cyprus, Ukraine) were excluded from the sample. Small countries with fewer than 600,000 inhabitants like Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco are also absent from the sample as well. Due to their special geographic location and distance to mainland Europe, Malta and Iceland are not included in the sample either. Lastly, Turkey, Moldova, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were deemed to be culturally and geographically closer to Asia and hence prone to other cultural, religious, and political influences than those that countries in mainland Europe are subjected to and hence were excluded from the sample as well. Belarus is not in the sample because the Lukashenko regime has run the country in an authoritarian fashion since 1994.

This leaves a total of 26 European democracies for which data on solidarity and the collective experience of crime was gathered: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Figure 1 shows the sample countries on a map of Europe.

**Figure 1:** Sample countries

![Sample countries on a map of Europe](image)

*Notes:* Sample countries shaded in dark grey. Map created with [www.stepmap.com](http://www.stepmap.com).

Not every indicator was available for every country within the sample, so the subsequent chapters will be comprised of analyses of different sub-samples of these countries depending on the availability of information (‘convenience samples’ as
described by Lynch (2006: 237)). Likewise, early waves of social surveys within Europe contain information for fewer countries, which means that some indicators are available for longer periods of time in certain countries than in others.

4.3 Measurement I: Conceptualisation and operationalisation

4.3.1 Solidarity

Chapter 2 clarified that there are at least two levels of analysis on which solidarity can be assessed. System level solidarity constitutes the existence and enactment of the solidarity norm. Individual level solidarity entails people’s solidarity attitudes as well as their pro-social behaviour.

Welfare state indicators are a suitable indicator for conceptualising the system level of solidarity, as welfare state activity can be seen as institutionalised solidarity (de Beer and Koster 2009). The re-allocation of resources is designed to enable the less affluent to fully take part in society and to support those who cannot provide for themselves. Welfare state activity can be assessed in terms of monetary expenditure for the purpose of social causes, but also in terms of the generosity of existing welfare programmes. It is important to ask whether such programmes are available to all members of society equally or if they are tied to prior contributions.

On an individual level solidarity has affective and calculative components which both result in people’s willingness to promote each other’s welfare without expecting immediate returns (see also Paskov and Dewilde 2012).

The calculative aspect of solidarity encompasses awareness for the interdependence of people. It is evident in people’s common belief that the fate of the individual does not lie in the individual’s responsibility alone but rather that people have a shared responsibility for either a common goal or a common wellbeing within a group of people. People’s support for welfare state activity, as well as their general ideas about whether individuals should be assisted if they cannot support themselves, are suitable measures for this aspect of solidarity on an individual level. Closely related to support for the pooling or re-allocation of resources is the notion that this mutual support should not be exploited. Free-riding is one of the main dangers to solidarity (Hechter 1987a). Thus, people’s condemnation of others falsely claiming benefits they are not entitled to or of tax evasion are further expressions for this calculative aspect of solidarity due to the awareness of interdependence. Solidarity is also closely related to trust in others: a belief that solidarity contributions do not suffer from constant exploitation and free-riding, but rather are met with solidarity, too, are important preconditions for the emergence as well as maintenance of solidarity in society (see also section 2.4.2).
The affective aspect of solidarity refers to people’s feelings of sympathy and moral duty (Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 417). This aspect of solidarity finds expression in people’s concern for the living conditions of other people for instance. Both affective and calculative aspects of solidarity on the individual level can prompt people to perform acts of solidarity such as voluntary engagement, or active support of social movements. The aggregation of individual behaviour which benefits others in turn also constitutes solidarity on a system level: the aggregation of individual acts of solidarity is an expression of a culture of solidarity and allows inferences on the pool of behaviour that benefits others in society.

4.3.2 The collective experience of crime

I conceptualise the collective experience of crime as a function of (a) the prevalence of crime (b) crime prevention efforts, (c) reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, and (d) the salience of crime as an issue.

Criminologists have produced seminal comparative examinations of different jurisdictions, accompanied by recommendations for detailed multidimensional measures of crime control and punitiveness consisting of up to 44 different indicators (Hamilton 2014; Kutateladze 2009; Tonry 2007).

While measures such as the ones proposed by the aforementioned researchers are desirable and certainly have the potential to give a very detailed insight into jurisdictions, their successful application depends on the availability of all required indicators. Given the time and effort it takes to collect criminal justice data, especially as not all of them are readily available, these proposed measures seem more suitable for intensive country portrayals than extensive comparisons between many jurisdictions. Hamilton’s (2014) multidimensional measure for New Zealand, Scotland and Ireland for example takes its data only partly from official statistics. To a greater extent the scores of the indices rely on information gathered from interviews with ‘key criminal justice stakeholders in each jurisdiction, including civil servants, academics, lawyers, politicians, crime editors and at least one current or former Minister for Justice’ (Hamilton 2014: 328), qualitative document analyses of criminological literature, official, NGO, and expert reports as well as newspaper articles, parliamentary debates, and analysis of legislation (Hamilton 2014: 329-330).

Furthermore, the measures proposed by prior research have a focus on criminal justice in general and the back end of the criminal justice system (i.e. reactions to crime) in particular. My research transcends this focus and employs a broader concept which, in addition to reactions to crime at the back end of the criminal justice system, also includes crime control efforts by the front end of the criminal justice system, the private sector, and private households, as well as the relevance
of crime as an issue in politics, and its prevalence in society. The entirety of these factors makes crime tangible for the general public, which is neither employed by nor otherwise in contact with institutions of the criminal justice system. They add up to a collective experience, which might impinge on the way people see each other and hence affect social solidarities. This broad concept of the collective experience of crime is based on publicly available secondary data. It is multidimensional, economical, and suitable for an extensive research design. The following paragraphs briefly outline its four dimensions. Specific details about variables and measurements will be explained in the relevant empirical chapters.

**Prevalence of crime**  Assessing the collective experience of crime warrants the measurement of the amount of crime in the first place. Petty and street crimes are the type of crimes most likely to affect a lot of people in society. They are also the subject of everyday concerns about crime. Yet, finding reliable statistics in this regard is complicated: many thefts, street-violence, or burglaries remain unreported and unrecorded. Therefore, the prevalence of crime in society in this thesis is measured by homicide rates. Even though considerably fewer people fall victims to homicide, of all crime types homicide rates are the ones which are most accurately reported by crime statistics (van Dijk 2008). In addition, the homicide rates are strongly related to the prevalence of other violent crimes and thus can reliably indicate levels of serious violent crime in society (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002: 8).

**Attempts to prevent crime**  The collective experience of crime implies action taken to prevent crime from happening in the first place. These prevention measures can originate from three sources: the criminal justice system, the private security sector, and private households. The number of police officers per 100,000 people in a country demonstrates the effort put into what Hinds (2005: 49) calls ‘crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system.’ Public order and safety however is also produced through the private security sector. The number of private security guards relative to the population is an additional crime prevention measure. Private households’ prevention efforts to secure their property and belongings is the last indicator of this dimension. These efforts can be measured by the percentage of people whose homes are equipped with special door locks and burglar alarms. These control and prevention strategies are indicators of action on behalf of the public and the police. On the one hand they contribute to the collective experience of crime by making crime tangible in people’s everyday lives through the visibility of police and private security for the general public. On the other hand they are built on and express individual experiences with crime: people will only undertake measures to
secure their property when they conceive burglary and theft as potential risks.

**Reactions to crime in the criminal justice system**  Not only does crime and attempts to pre-empt it, constitute experiences with crime and justice in society, so too do the criminal justice system’s formal responses to it. The criminal justice system’s reaction to crime comprises of several stages and its measurement hence warrants several indicators. The upcoming chapters will measure reactions to crime through *(a)* police recorded crimes, *(b)* the conviction rate, *(c)* the frequency and conditions of imprisonment.

Police recorded crimes are unsuitable for measuring the existence of crime in society because they are heavily influenced by sensibilities towards certain types of crime, reporting behaviour of the public, and action taken by the police (van Dijk 2008: 34-40). Sensibilities towards certain crimes may vary by country as well as over time as for instance it is the case for domestic abuse. Likewise, action taken by the police through special task forces to tackle certain types of crime such as drug-related offences may result in a sudden increase in crime figures. However, the exact mechanisms that render police statistics useless for assessing the level of crime in a country make police recorded crimes useful for indicating public sensibilities for crime, the absence of inhibitions to report crimes to the police, and the willingness of the police to take action, assuming that recording a crime is a first form of action. Thereby they contain people’s direct experiences with crime on the one hand and the approachability and activity of police forces in dealing with reported offenses on the other hand. In short, crimes recorded by the police represent whether formally reporting and recording offenses is an institutionalised, recognised and standard response to crime incidents.

Second, the number of persons convicted per 100,000 population represents the amount of people in formal contact with the criminal justice system. Conviction rates allow inferences on the workload and effectiveness of courts to be made, but also indicate activity in response to crime taken by the courts.

Third, reactions to crime include the imposition of sanctions. Specifically, analyses will incorporate information about the frequency and conditions of imprisonment. This information is firstly comprised of the imprisonment rate. Secondly, the analyses also include data on the conditions prisoners are confronted with. These enable us to evaluate whether prison conditions meet or violate the standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners (United Nations 1957). Conditions symbolise whether people, despite their status as convicts, are still granted respectful treatment, or whether on entering the prison they forfeit not only their freedom but also basic rights such as safety from bodily harm or access to sanitary facilities.

To conclude, reactions to crime are part of the prevalence and relevance of crime
control in society. They contribute to the collective experience of crime because they convey information about the activity and approachability of the police and law courts, and reveal the way offenders are dealt with.

**Salience of crime as an issue** Salience of crime in society consists of two aspects: (a) the salience of crime as an issue in politics and (b) the salience of crime in people’s minds. Both aspects contribute to a society’s collective experience of crime through shaping perceptions of crime as an issue in public and private discourse.

The issue salience of crime in politics is assessed with two indicators. First, by the relative frequency of sentences devoted to law and order policies in the manifestos of political parties published prior to elections. This indicator measures how much is said about crime and its control in relation to other politically relevant topics. Thereby issue salience of crime in politics indicates the prevalence of crime in public discourse and therefore constitutes a further pillar of the experience of crime. Second, the relative importance of crime as well as public order and safety is measured by the amount of government expenditure devoted to public order and safety institutions like police services, prisons and law courts, as well as to research on the subject. This indicator shows both how politicians recognise crime and how its control is an institutionalised pillar of national finances. In addition, the allocation of money to the different types of law and order institutions allows conclusions to be drawn about the official approach taken to curb crime: a strategy characterised by punitiveness may be evident through high expenditures for incarceration. When a significant amount of money is allotted to research surrounding crime, a government’s approach to crime, law, and social order is likely to be informed.

This information about the salience of crime in politics is supplemented by information about public opinion on crime. Is crime present in the minds of people through high levels of fear of crime? Does the population ask for harsh(er) punishment? Fear of crime and public opinion about it contribute to the collective experience insofar as they shape perceptions of crime and indicate what the public perceives as adequate response to crime. It thereby conveys vicarious experiences with victims, since harsh punishment is often understood as an expression of solidarity with victims of crime (Garland 2001: 351).

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4If however the prison population is low and expenditures for prison is high, better quality incarceration with a focus on rehabilitative measures, comprehensive counselling, and hence less punitiveness is likely (Sung 2006).
4.4 Measurement II: Data sources

4.4.1 Three types of sources

Secondary data from official statistics, social surveys, and sourcebooks are used to measure social solidarity and the collective experience of crime. Most of these data are available at multiple points in time between 1990 and 2010. The following paragraphs will introduce the three main types of data sources and discuss general limitations of the data. More specific problems related to particular indicators, data sources, or methods of analysis will be addressed in the according empirical chapters of the thesis.

Crime- and criminal justice statistics

Even though there is growing interest in the measurement and comparison of crime, security and criminal justice proceedings, the availability of data allowing it is still suboptimal (van Dijk 2008: 5). Attempts to provide such data have been made by the United Nations (United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation of Criminal Justice Systems (UN CTS)) and the International Police Organisation (Interpol), however the quality and comparability of these data has been the target of frequent criticism (Stamatel 2006; van Dijk 2008). Data provided by Interpol lacks quality control measures in regards to the data collection process and is barely comparable across nations, which resulted in the withdrawal of these data from public access in 2000. The UN CTS data undergo some quality control upon collection, but they represent ‘national official statements by national governments about the extent of crime and the operations of criminal justice systems in their countries’ (Stamatel 2006: 17), which leaves discretion to the providers of the information.

The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics\(^5\), Eurostat, and the World Health Organisation publish more reliable (since more rigorously controlled) crime related data (van Dijk 2008: 7), but disputes related to the general comparability across nations persist. Even a seemingly straightforward measure like the rate of people incarcerated at a certain point in time meets challenges in terms of its cross-national comparability: the imprisonment rate is influenced by what is counted as an annual account (the fiscal or the calendar year), whether mentally ill offenders are kept in prison or in specialized institutions, whether or not offenders in detention pending deportation are counted as regular prisoners, and the age from which offenders are counted as adults (Dünkel et al. 2010: 5). All these influences may vary between jurisdictions. Crime statistics in turn are influenced by sensibil-

\(^5\)For ease hereafter the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics will be referred to as the European Sourcebook.
ities and reporting behaviours within the population as well as by police recording mechanisms. Certain types of offences are systematically underreported (Justus and ScorzaFave 2014; Allen 2007). Official crime statistics should hence always be contrasted with victimisation surveys, from which the number of undetected cases can be estimated (van Dijk 2008). Furthermore, the definitions of offense types vary across time and between jurisdictions. For quantitative comparisons of the prevalence as well as the reaction to particular offenses the harmonisation of offense categories is critical.

The need for comparative criminal justice and crime statistics is clear and has been responded to by research projects like the European Prison Observatory,\(^6\) the Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics,\(^7\) the International Crime Victims Survey,\(^8\) and the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics\(^9\) which put efforts into providing comparable data across countries. Yet, the further comparative studies attempt to look back in time, the fewer data are available.

**Social surveys**

The availability of comparable social survey data is better than that for criminal justice statistics. Social surveys, in which a standard questionnaire is presented to a sample deemed representative of the population one wants to research, are one of the most widely known social research tools. Internationally recognised social survey projects such as the Eurobarometer, the European Values Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), or the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) are generally assumed to give a representative portrayal of opinions and attitudes of the population in the countries covered by the surveys. Yet, some research suggests that minority populations and immigrants are systematically underrepresented in social surveys (Deding, Fridberg, and Jakobsen 2008; Laganà et al. 2013; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).

Especially in countries like Germany, whose current annual number of permanent immigrants is second only to the USA,\(^{10}\) or France, which is home to Europe’s the largest immigrant population from the Middle East and Northern Africa Region, such systematic bias is problematic. It is difficult to make claims about solidarity between social subgroups if social surveys predominantly represent the majority population.

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Survey results can be distorted in two further ways: social desirability bias on the one hand and a divergent understanding of questions across cultures and nations on the other. Social desirability bias describes respondents’ tendency to overreport behaviour and attitudes which are deemed to be highly valued in society while simultaneously holding back information considered controversial (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Questions about solidarity are prone to this social desirability bias as it generally seems to be socially rewarded to express pro-social attitudes or pursue pro-social behaviour (Lindenberg 2001). The reverse mechanism can play a role too: the answers to victimisation surveys may be affected by victims who are ashamed of the offence that has happened to them, and hence, choose not to disclose it. Alternatively, offenses might not be recognised as such, for example this might be the case for domestic violence if the participant was brought up in a violent environment. Either way, underreporting in victimisation surveys may occur.

The different understanding of social constructs and concepts such as solidarity or tolerance can occur if surveys are translated into different languages without close attention to idiomatic meanings. Torpe and Lolle (2010) show that a seemingly simple concept like generalized trust, enquired about via the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ is understood differently between countries.11

Furthermore, answering patterns may systematically vary between countries and hence bias cross-national comparisons based on social surveys (Janmaat and Braun 2009). There are statistical methods which can mitigate the nested structure of international survey data (Gelissen and Arts 2001: 292). Yet, in order to be statistically accounted for these issues need to be recognised and kept in mind.

Welfare and other government statistics

Welfare and other government statistics are the third type of data used in this thesis. They provide information on an aggregate level and are either managed by supranational organisations like the Council of Europe or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or are provided by researchers interested in a specific topic. Welfare and other social statistics are important for sociologists, economists, and politicians as well as political scientists, but also carry relevance for criminology as they help to embed the results of criminological research in a wider social context (Felson 1993).

A government’s welfare activity can be assessed on several aspects and it is important to try to do so, as focussing on social expenditure alone can fail to capture other important goods and services contributing to social protection (Caminada,

11For a more general contribution see Adam (2008).
Public and private social expenditure show the amount of money allocated to general social protection. The allocation to different purposes (e.g. family, child care, veterans, old age) further gives hints as to what kinds of welfare programmes are valued and which are considered less important. Lastly, the percentage to which prior earnings are replaced by benefit programmes (replacement rates) allows for inferences to be made on how much of the expenditure actually reaches citizens.

General criticism of social indicators refers to their ranking of countries. There is little empirical support for the idea that distinctions between one rank and its neighbours are sufficient to set countries apart from each other (Høyland, Moene, and Willumsen 2012). Indices and ranks can be used much more fruitfully if they are understood as general directions, with statistical tests trying to find statistically different groups of countries. Furthermore, rankings based on human rights, development, or welfare indices have been criticised for being instruments to exert political pressure in international politics rather than being used for the purpose of research (Engle Merry 2014; Kelley and Simmons 2015).

I screened the following data sources for measures of solidarity and the collective experience of crime and compiled them. The empirical chapters describe the variables and indicators used in more detail. Despite the issues outlined in the previous sections, which make direct comparisons of individual nations difficult, the data are of sufficient quality for the broad analytical purposes of this thesis (Neapolitan 2001).

4.4.2 Data sources solidarity

Solidarity will be assessed with information on welfare state activity as well as with data from social surveys. Welfare state activity serves to measure solidarity on a system level. Survey data provides information about solidarity attitudes and citizens’ behaviour, therefore describing solidarity on an individual level. However, information about solidarity on a system level can be provided by social surveys’ aggregated information, such as the proportion (%) of the population engaged in voluntary activity or the percentage of the population who feel concern for other people.

OECD Social Expenditure Database  The OECD as an international organisation promotes economic progress, democracy and a market economy. It provides a forum for the governments of its 43 member states to share experiences, offers policy recommendations, and conducts analyses on various topics. To this end, the OECD has its own statistical office, running several databases containing more
than 400 data series, including information on economic performance and infrastructure, social expenditure, agriculture, government activity, and education. The OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) ‘includes reliable and internationally comparable statistics’\textsuperscript{12} from 1980 onwards on public and private social expenditure for various purposes. The amount of social expenditure is calculated as the percentage of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and is available for old age, pensions, health, unemployment, family, survivors, and active labour market programmes. SOCX data hence offer welfare information on macro and programme levels. SOCX data have been employed in many cross-country comparative analyses in political science and sociology (Caminada, Goudswaard, and Van Vliet 2010).

**Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset**  The Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED) provides data on institutional features of social insurance programmes in 33 countries from the 1950s onwards (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2014).\textsuperscript{13} It is run by a team of researchers from the University of Connecticut (USA) and the University of Greifswald (Germany). The social protection programmes covered are unemployment, sickness, and retirement. Available data range from income replacement rates over standard minimum pensions to various eligibility criteria for receiving benefits. In addition, welfare generosity scores for each year and country in the sample are available, which measure the degree to which an individual can maintain a livelihood independent of the market based on benefit provisions of the state. The data provide a valuable complement to data on welfare spending published by the OECD. In comparison to other social welfare data the CWED data is particularly useful as it provides detailed calculations of generosity scores, has a broad coverage of countries and years, as well as giving the scholarly community unrestricted access (Scruggs 2007: 139-143).

**European Values Study**  The European Values Study (EVS) is a longitudinal, cross-national survey research project interested in documenting European citizens’ values and attitudes.\textsuperscript{14} The EVS is the European part of the World Values Study (WVS) and data are currently managed by the Gesis Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences in Mannheim (Germany). The main topics in the EVS are life, family, work, religion, politics and society. Questions about society are most important for the research purpose of this thesis, as they assess social networks, confidence in others, solidarity, and tolerance of Europeans towards fellow citizens. Questions ask, for example, whether respondents are concerned about the fate of various social

\textsuperscript{13}http://cwed2.org/about.php (accessed 17 May 2015).
circles, like their family, people in their region, immigrants, unemployed people, or the sick and disabled, and hence measures one important dimension of solidarity. EVS data are available in a longitudinal data file comprising four waves of data collection conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. The number of countries included in the survey varies from year to year. The first survey, from 1981, includes 16 countries, whereas the second wave in 1990 comprises 27 states. The sample of participants within each country ranges between 1,000 and 1,500 respondents – a number which is comparably small for an attitudinal survey (Jo 2011: 9). The general points of criticism in regards to survey research outlined above apply to the EVS, too. However, latent-class analysis has shown that EVS questions concerned with solidarity have a high level of measurement equivalence between countries and thus allow for valid comparisons of solidarity attitudes between countries in Europe (Kankaras and Moors 2009). The EVS data are well established in the social sciences and have been used in over 1,300 publications.\(^{15}\)

**European Social Survey** The European Social Survey (ESS) presents the most recent survey project within Europe.\(^{16}\) The project was established by the Centre for Comparative Social Surveys of the City University London in 2001 and is governed by a General Assembly with national representatives from all participating countries. Surveys have been conducted biannually since 2001. Like the other social surveys, the ESS is interested in gauging social structure, attitudes and conditions in more than 30 European countries. In addition, on its website the ESS states that they particularly strive for advances in the methodological standards of cross-national quantitative research. The ESS provides a longitudinal data file as well as data specifically prepared for the purpose of multilevel modelling in which it provides combined data on country and individual level. This makes the ESS data especially suitable for researching context effects on individual attitudes, albeit only over a very short period of time. Population samples aim to be representative of all persons aged 15 and above as opposed to 18 and older in the other European surveys. Samples are drawn randomly at every stage. Household members are interviewed regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language. There is a special team responsible for an accurate translation of questionnaires. Metadata on the translation process, sampling strategy, pre-tests and pilot study is openly accessible, which endows the ESS data with a high level of transparency.


4.4.3 Data sources collective experience of crime

**WHO Mortality Database**  The World Health Organisation (WHO) runs an information system on health statistics, covering topics like access to medical treatment, prevalence of diseases, and mortality. The WHO Mortality Database compiles data on the causes of death by age and gender. Data are reported from member states based on their civil registration systems.\(^{17}\) Therefore, the WHO Mortality Database also provides data on death resulting from assault and intentional homicide per 100,000 population. This measure was used to operationalise the first dimension of the collective experience of crime, namely the amount of serious violent crime in society.

**European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics** The European Sourcebook is published by the European Sourcebook Group, an international association of academic and non-academic experts of crime and criminal justice statistics. In 1993, the Sourcebook Project was initiated by the Council of Europe in an attempt to respond to the growing need for internationally comparable data. The Sourcebook provides data from 1990 onwards. The data are collected in multi-year waves and provide information on five categories: police statistics, prosecution statistics, conviction statistics, prison statistics and in the most recent edition probation statistics as well. Data are acquired through a network of national correspondents who are typically employees of their Ministry of Justice and academics, as well as regional coordinators in more than 35 countries. National correspondents fill out standard questionnaires developed by researchers within the Sourcebook project. The group of researchers and experts have developed standard definitions of the offense types to allow comparisons between countries. These offense categories are updated with close attention to the comparability of data between editions whenever necessary. Metadata on different jurisdictions as well as their legal and statistical definitions supplement crime and conviction data. Furthermore, data collected by the national correspondents are supplemented by information from the WHO and the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), as well as data of the Council of Europe. The European Sourcebook data are published in printed editions (currently 5), but are also available in excel format for each edition. While data about offenses, offenders, and convictions are provided annually, data on the criminal justice system like caseloads, staffing, and dispositions are only available in five year intervals. Quality control of the data within the project gains the European Sourcebook an edge over similar providers of information provided such as the UN CTS (Stamatel 2006). Yet, some limitations persist: reporting sensibilities of the population still

manifest themselves within the data (Aebi 2004: 176), and whenever an offense category requires updating, peaks in the time series data are likely. The Sourcebook was mainly used for data on police density, conviction rates, and data on prison populations and hence was used to model parts of the second and third dimension of the collective experience of crime.

**Eurostat**  Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union. Like the OECD, Eurostat aims to provide its member states as well as other major non-European countries with comparable statistical information spanning a wide array of topics such as the environment, economy, and social statistics. Data are submitted by each member state’s statistical authority and not collected by Eurostat. However, Eurostat looks after harmonising the submitted data to allow for cross-national comparison. Hence, quality control takes place, and metadata about, for instance, changes in legal definitions are available. Nevertheless, accusations of irregularities in published data exist. The information used from Eurostat is about crimes registered by the police, in their total number as well as broken down into different offense categories such as burglary and robbery. As outlined earlier, police recorded crime constitutes a part of the formal and official reaction to crime and therefore can be used to measure the third dimension of the collective experience of crime. Eurostat data were also used to measure government expenditure for public order and safety.

**Confederation of European Security Systems**  The Confederation of European Security Systems (CoESS) is an organisation uniting 34 national private security employers’ associations in Europe. CoESS publishes reports containing country narratives on private security industries in Europe. These reports are unfortunately issued irregularly and only available from 2001 onwards, but they are suitable for painting a broad picture of the relevance of the private security industry in each country and hence supply information about endeavours to provide public order and safety outside the criminal justice system. The CoESS reports provide country-level information about the ratio of private security personnel per population. The CoESS reports are to date the only sources of comparative information about the private security sector in Europe (van Steden and Sarre 2007).

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US Department of State Human Rights Reports  The Human Rights Reports issued annually by the US Department of State\(^{21}\) were used to gauge prison conditions in the sample countries. These reports include a section describing life in prison for each country covered by the reports. Narratives about prison conditions include information about overcrowding, access to drinking water, health care, violence between inmates, violence between inmates and staff, visitors, access to and conditions of sanitary facilities, and the existence of independent monitoring. The basis of these assessments of prison conditions are the *United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners* (United Nations 1957). The information given in these country narratives was coded into an index which comprises five categories as described in Karstedt (2011a: 367-370). A score of 1 denotes that prison conditions in a given year and country fully comply with the minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. A score of 2 describes conditions which do meet the minimum standards with the conditions having some deficiencies, mainly caused by light overcrowding, problems with permissions for independent monitoring, or problems regarding sanitation and hygiene. Prison conditions were coded as substandard, receiving a score of 3, whenever the reports stated that they did not meet international minimum standards but were neither harsh nor life-threatening. A score of 4 was assigned for harsh conditions with endemic violence, malnourishment, severe overcrowding, deficient medical care, and the spread of contagious diseases. A score of 5 denotes prison conditions which the reports describe as ‘posing serious threats to prisoners’ lives and health.’

Manifesto Project Database  Data from the Manifesto Project Database is used to assess whether or not crime is high on the electoral agenda. The Manifesto Research Group is based at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (Germany) and is funded by a long-term grant from the German Science Foundation (DFG). The project provides ‘quantitative content analyses of parties’ election programmes from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since 1945.’\(^{22}\) The Manifesto Project codes these election programmes across 56 issue categories, for example market regulation, environmental protection, and social justice. The relative importance of each of these issues is calculated as the relative frequency of sentences devoted to each issue compared to the overall length of the party’s manifesto (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014). The category relevant for this thesis is ‘law and order’, which represents statements about support for the enforcement of all laws, action against crime, support and resources for the police, tougher attitudes in courts, and the importance of internal


security (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014). The Manifesto Project Data Base is the leading source for measuring the amount of attention political parties give to certain issues. However, the data still suffer from minor flaws: firstly, around 30 per cent of party manifestos in Denmark were considered ‘uncodable’, which results in missing data for this country (Hansen 2008). Secondly, manual coding comes with some degree of uncertainty. Consequently, the manifesto project’s data are an approximation of issue attention, rather than an exact quantification of the amount of time, effort, and resources devoted to a topic (Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009).

International Crime Victims Survey The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) is another project that originated from the demand for internationally comparable crime data. The ICVS was developed by an international working group of researchers from the Netherlands, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom and received funding from the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands and the British Home Office. The surveys collect self-reported information on victimisation on 10 street-level and household crimes, as well as feelings of unsafety, crime prevention activity, safety precautions, and reporting behaviour (van Dijk 2008: 47). The offenses comprise various types of theft, burglary, robbery, threat, assault and sexual offences. Due to the standardised nature of the questionnaires and interview procedures, IVCS data are comparable across countries. Using colloquial rather than legal terms to describe offenses means that respondents require no legal expertise to give valid answers (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013: 50). Victimisation rates are available for 78 countries worldwide, albeit with some restrictions in terms of how far back in time data is available for. The project was started in 1987 and has been carried out in six waves since, once about every three to four years, with the last wave having been conducted in 2010. The ICVS is widely recognised as the leading instrument for estimating experiences with crime across the globe (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013).

The ICVS’s limited budget has led to some shortcomings in the survey. National victimisation surveys are generally said to produce higher quality data, not least because they are based on larger sample sizes and use more sophisticated techniques (Lynch 2006: 232). Furthermore, the likely systematic underrepresentation of specific parts of the population which might have the highest victimisation risks, such as people without a permanent home, can bias survey results (Lynch 2006: 245). Lastly, even though the ICVS employs a standard questionnaire, the methods of data collection can differ between countries and waves. In some waves and countries interviews were conducted face to face, in others via telephone, and in some via computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The differences that result from
these shortcomings are, however, assumed to be minor. The data from the ICVS are suitable for comparisons within Europe (van Dijk 2008).

ICVS data will be used to assess private prevention efforts based on the percentage of people using special door locks and burglar alarms in their homes. In addition, ICVS data will be used to indicate people’s feelings of unsafety in regards to crime in their area. Furthermore, the ICVS provides information on people’s punitive sentiments, as respondents are asked to select a sentence they deem appropriate for theft of a colour TV by a young recidivist burglar, ranging from payment of a fine, imprisonment, community service, or suspension of the sentence. Lastly, the ICVS was called upon to measure people’s victimisation and subsequent reporting behaviour, in order to supplement information on police recorded crimes.

4.4.4 Data sets for analysis

The screening of all the above data sources resulted in two data sets containing information about the various aspects of social solidarity in on aggregate and individual levels in contemporary European societies, as well as data to measure the different dimensions of the collective experience of crime. One data set is structured in a time-series-cross-section manner, where each row constitutes one country-year observation. The second data uses individuals (survey respondents) as the unit of analysis and supplements these data on individual level with country-level information used to measure the collective experience of crime. Both data sets contain information across time with most data being consistently available after 1990 for all 26 countries in the sample. Almost all country-level data could be obtained annually, while survey data and information from election manifestos were only supplied every three to five years.

23 The ESS also offers information on fear of crime which will be used in chapter 8.
5 European Trends in the Collective Experience of Crime and Solidarity

5.1 Introduction

Solidarity and the collective experience of crime are both multidimensional phenomena. The collective experience of crime combines features of penal regimes and crime control as well as the salience of crime in politics and the minds of individuals. Solidarity in turn finds expression in individual acts of kindness and support, the condemnation of free riding and the exploitation of common goods, as well as in the pooling of resources in smaller groups as well as broader society. Hence, both concepts combine a variety of aspects at the individual as well as aggregate level. It is worth asking whether or not developments and patterns on those two levels occur in accordance with each other. This question is especially important in light of the discussions about global trends in crime, punitiveness, and the rise of neoliberalism accompanied by a reduction of welfare state activity and receding concern for the fate of fellow citizens.

This chapter presents the data upon which the empirical part of this thesis is built. It thereby assesses whether the sample countries are equally subject to the developments which dominate current discussions about crime, punishment, cultures of control, and solidarity in contemporary societies, or whether there are distinct trajectories in regards to indicators of the collective experience of crime and indicators of solidarity within Europe. What do recent developments of the different dimensions of the collective experience of crime and of the various aspects of solidarity look like?

Multiple indicators on both country and individual level are used to gauge the multidimensional character of both concepts. In doing so the chapter aims to analyse whether developments on an aggregate level reflect individual attitudes and vice versa: do objective and subjective trajectories in regards to solidarity, crime, and criminal justice diverge or correspond to each other? Is fear of crime, for instance, higher in countries that are afflicted by high crime rates? Is the content of political parties’ programmes in accordance with citizens’ attitudes about the urgency of action on crime, criminal justice, and public order and safety?

Country-level data are gained from official statistics, and represent developments in crime, criminal justice, and political activity regarding public order and safety as
well as social welfare. These indicators are (official) aggregates of procedures within a particular country or jurisdiction and as such construct a certain kind of reality. While they offer a description of underlying processes, they cannot represent all citizens’ subjective realities. People’s subjective impressions and attitudes are revealed through individual-level data obtained through answering patterns to survey questions about punitiveness, worries about safety, support for institutionalised solidarity, and a sense of concern for the fate of others. These individual-level indicators will be contrasted with country-level information throughout this chapter.

The following section presents a brief overview of empirical literature on developments of dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in the sample countries. Section 5.3 outlines developments of the collective experience of crime. Section 5.4 presents indicators of solidarity. Section 5.5 discusses the main findings of this chapter.

5.2 Previous research on developments of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in Europe

5.2.1 Collective experience of crime

There is consensus among criminologists that the USA has experienced a general crime drop since the mid 1990s (Berg et al. 2016; Pinker 2011). In Europe the situation appears less definite. First of all, crime trends seem to be varying by offence category: in a pooled analysis of victimisation surveys as well as police recorded crimes in 14 European states between 1988 and 2007, Aebi and Linde (2010) found that prevalence and incident rates of theft and homicide have been falling since about 1995. At the same time drug-related offences, assaults and robberies have been on the rise according to the authors.24 Trends not only differ across crime type, but also across countries. In Europe there appear to be as many countries with stable or increasing rates of assault and robbery as countries with decreasing rates (Killias 2010).

Research specifically concerned with differences between countries presents contradictory results (Tseloni et al. 2010): in a sample of 26 countries, the majority of which are situated in Europe, no country-specific differences between trends in residential burglary, various types of theft, and assault were found as all crime types unanimously declined in the authors’ sample countries.25 This result finds support

24Aebi and Linde’s (2010) findings in relation to drug related offences should be treated with caution, as the authors do not validate these police figures with findings of victimisation surveys (due to lack of questions about drug use in the ICVS).

25The paper by Tseloni et al. (2010) is also the only one which applies statistical trend analysis, i.e. tests as to whether a rise or fall in figures represents a statistically significant trend or ‘just’
through consistently decreasing residential burglary rates identified by Rosenfeld and Messner (2009).

Since some of these studies use police recorded incidents to measure crime, these trends possibly just reflect changes in reporting as well as recording mechanisms and public sensibilities. This potential bias in the data, however, illustrates additional aspects of the processing of crime in societies: reporting behaviour by the public and responsiveness of authorities. Hence, the aforementioned studies might also imply that official engagement with certain crimes has gone up, while having declined regards to violent and property crimes. There are no cross-national comparisons of reporting behaviour over time, but trends within individual countries suggest that victims of crime nowadays are more willing to report crimes to the police than they were at the beginning of the 1990s (Tarling and Morris 2010). Reporting is highest in mature and affluent democracies (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013: 59).

Have attempts to pre-empt crime altered in accordance with an increased willingness to report it? To be sure, Europe has witnessed an unprecedented growth of publicly installed CCTV cameras and an increase in the market for public and private security equipment (Loader and Walker 2007). Have private households jumped on the bandwagon in regards to installing security measures? Again, the prevalence of special door locks and burglar alarms varies strongly by country, with both measures being more frequently used in affluent nations (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013). Overall, however, ‘the percentage of households with burglar alarms, special door locks and other security measures has constantly increased from 1988 to 2007’ (Aebi and Linde 2010: 267). Amongst other things the increased prevalence of special door locks and burglar alarms serves as an explanation for falling burglary rates across Europe (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013: 57-58).

Alongside private securitization, official efforts to curb crime have also been expanded. The number of police officers in Europe has increased by six percent between 2001 and 2010 when measured as a European aggregate (Lindstrom 2013: 321; see also Hinds 2005: 57). Simultaneously, the private security industry has increased in terms of financial turnover as well as staff employed throughout Europe (Loader and Walker 2007; de Waard 1999; for a case study of England, see c.f. Jones and Newburn 1998). Despite its increasing importance, reliable data for robust international comparisons are lacking and there is a scarcity of comparative studies on developments in the private security industry (de Waard 1999: 145). The empirical work that is available, however, suggests that there has been an overall increase in the number of people employed, as well as in wages, within the private security

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a variation in the data.
sector, albeit with considerable variation by country (van Steden and Sarre 2007). In fact, Hinds (2005: 58-60) attributes the moderate increase in custodial sanctions in Europe compared to the United States to Europe’s and the USA’s different placements on a ‘crime control continuum’. While the USA focus on crime control at the back end of the criminal justice system, European countries seem more devoted to social control through police and private securities than custodial control in penal institutions.

Is this assumption supported by existing research on punitiveness in Europe? Several studies point to the very important fact that any claim made about increasing or declining punitiveness heavily depends on how it is measured (Frost 2008; Hamilton 2014; Kutateladze 2009; Tonry 2007). In this vein, by mainly criticising the lack of a clear conceptualisation of the concept of punitiveness, Matthews (2005) argues that contrary to popular scientific belief, there was no rise in punitiveness in the USA or Europe during the 1990s. However, analyses suggest that incarceration rates in Europe have risen over the past two decades (Lappi-Seppälä 2011: 304; Muncie 2008; Neapolitan 2001: 692). European countries have also witnessed policy changes related to juvenile offenders, for which the term punitiveness seems appropriate: reduction of the age of penal responsibility from 12 to 10 with a simultaneous three-fold increase of youth detention places since 1990 in the Netherlands, curfew alongside zero tolerance policing and referral of juveniles to adult courts in Belgium, so-called ‘warning shot arrests’ in Germany, and the treatment of juvenile recidivists as adult offenders in France (for a more comprehensive list see Muncie 2008). These indications of punitiveness are not limited to juvenile offenders. The average time served in jail for various crime types also shows an upward trend in adult courts (Blumstein, Tonry, and Ness 2005: 374). So there are developments to suggest that criminal justice responses to offenders have become more severe in Europe. When compared with the USA however, Europe is still ‘resisting punitiveness’ (Snacken 2010). Moreover, the Netherlands and Denmark have even experienced significant declines in their imprisonment rates between 1990 and 2005 (de Koster et al. 2008: 727; van Kesteren 2009: 26). Furthermore, van Kesteren (2009) finds that public opinion in Europe actually favours the use of noncustodial sentencing to punish recidivist burglars.

Increasing imprisonment rates as an indicator of punitiveness have often been attributed to neoliberal policies (Wacquant 1999 and Cavadino and Dignan (2006a)). Yet, the link does not appear to survive empirical scrutiny: in analysing the content of government parties’ manifestos, de Koster et al. (2008) find that increases in incarceration rates are unrelated to neoliberal manifesto content. Rather, increased discourse about strict enforcement of law and order policies and a political culture
around the new right which condemns left-libertarian politics best explain the increased numbers of inmates (de Koster et al. 2008: 723). This increased attention devoted to law and order in manifestos of European government parties is also documented by Wenzelburger (2015). Governments’ stronger focus on problems of crime and public order and safety however is not reflected in their expenditure on law and order as in OECD countries financial allocations to public order and safety seem to have experienced little variation over time (Norris 2007). European trends in the fear of crime in society are not available, but comparative studies indicate that fear of crime is associated with higher levels of crime as well as perceptions of disorder (Brunton-Smith 2011; Visser, Scholte, and Scheepers 2013). Consequently, fear of crime should have decreased alongside crime rates in Europe.

5.2.2 Solidarity

‘European welfare states in their various and differing ways have developed a range of policies designed to meet the social risks encountered in the normal life-course (loss of income due to unemployment, sickness, retirement, ill-health, education for children and so on), with some expenditure on benefits to reduce poverty’ (Taylor-Gooby 2010: 40). Yet, allegedly there is a rhetorical shift in Western countries’ perception of poverty, which is increasingly seen as the fault of the lower classes for lack of self-discipline, effort, and an accumulation of poor life choices (Andersen 1999). This rhetoric indeed seems to be accompanied by a more liberal approach to redistribution. This implies a passing on of responsibility from state to individuals, and an increasing contingency of access to benefits on proactivity of recipients and their prior contributions on the labour market (Taylor-Gooby 2010: 40). These developments are perceived as threatening the traditional solidarity promoted by a strong welfare state (Peeters 2013; Room 1999). Thus, there appears to be a qualitative transition in almost all welfare states in Europe: encouragement of active labour market participation, introduction of elements of competition, and spending constraints (Taylor-Gooby 2010: 456).

How do these changes materialise in different indicators of welfare solidarity? As expressed in the Lisbon and Maastricht Treaties, the European Union aims to harmonise the welfare models of its member states, and it would appear that indeed social expenditures have been converging since the 1980s (Caminada, Goudswaard, and Van Vliet 2010: 530). This dynamic of assimilation consequently implies restrictions of welfare state activity in some countries and expansion of benefit provisions in others. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 21st century aggregated social expenditure and the percentage of workers’ income paid out by pensions and benefits were consistently higher in Europe than in 1980 (Caminada, Goudswaard, and Van Vliet
This can mostly be attributed to increased spending for old age and pensions caused by demographic changes in the European population.

Incapacity and health related expenditure however have gone down, while other benefits for family support or active labour market programmes have reported no changes. Despite increasing social expenditure for old age and pensions, the benefit generosity (i.e. the degree to which an individual can maintain a livelihood independent of the market (Vis 2010: 48)) for pensions tightened in two thirds of Europe between 1985 and 2000 (Scruggs and Allan 2006: 892). The same is true for sickness benefit generosity, while unemployment programmes seem to have become more generous in almost all of Europe. Yet, scholars warn that ‘rollbacks of the welfare state have been more widespread than aggregate spending patterns reveal’ (Swank 2005: 184). Individual support for the welfare state as well as compassion for recipients who suffer from benefit cutbacks appears to counterbalance welfare state retrenchment. When there are low levels of institutionalised solidarity through the welfare state as well as economic downturns, citizens’ endorsement of institutionalised solidarity of the welfare state is higher (Clery 2012). These different developments in regards to social welfare have meant that, as of 2005, no systematic convergence between the welfare models of European states were observable (Swank 2005: 184).

In contrast to divergent paths of institutionalised solidarity exerted by the welfare state, the situation in terms of voluntary solidarity of individuals seems to be more homogenous. de Beer and Koster (2009: 36) report that, on the whole, individual performance of solidarity such as volunteering show a positive trend between the 1980s and the mid-2000s.

### 5.3 Trajectories in the collective experience of crime in European countries

In the following section data for the sample countries is presented. What are the developments of the collective experience of crime and solidarity across Europe? Do they reflect trends identified by previous research? And do trajectories of objective indicators reflect individual attitudes on crime and punishment? The presentation of results is structured according to the four dimensions of the collective experience of crime, which are the prevalence of crime, efforts to prevent crime, reactions to crime, and salience of crime as an issue in society.
5.3.1 Objective and subjective indicators of the prevalence of crime in society

The number of deaths resulting from homicides per 100,000 population serve as a proxy for the level of serious crime in each country due to the manifold methodological problems inherent in cross-national comparisons of other types of crime. Homicides in Europe oscillate on such low levels that it is the exception rather than the rule to come across a person who knows a homicide victim or is acquainted to surviving dependants. Nevertheless, media coverage of homicide is broad, especially in the course of assaults and batteries, meaning that information about homicide reaches individuals indirectly. Furthermore, homicide rates are highly correlated with the incidence of other violent crimes (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002: 8) and thus can indicate levels of serious violent crime. Hence, they contribute an important part of the collective experience of crime in society.

Figure 2 displays the average number of deaths resulting from intentional injuries per 100,000 population within the sample. The figure plots homicide rates for Baltic states as a separate graph as these are considerably higher than in the remaining sample and hence would have notably skewed the European average.

Figure 2: Homicide rates 1989-2010 in 26 European countries

Notes: Baltic countries: EST, LTU, LVA; all other countries: AUT, BEL, BGR, CZE, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, HUN, IRE, ITA, NDL, NOR, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: WHO Mortality Database.

In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia homicide rates peaked in the early 1990s with rates of up to 30 homicides per 100,000 population. The extraordinary affliction in the Baltic states with violent crime during the 1990s is well documented (Saar 2010:
The most common explanation for this anomaly is the cultural and geographical proximity of the region to Russia. Russia ranked as one of the countries with the highest recorded homicide rates worldwide during the 1990s (Chervyakov et al. 2002). Yet, as political ties and affiliations between the Baltic region and Europe were strengthened, homicide rates in the Baltic countries have been in steady decline and seem to be heading towards the other European countries in the sample. One possible explanation for the steady decline of homicide rates in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is the implementation of a better medical infrastructure in post-Soviet countries (Ceccato 2008; UNOCD 2013: 27-28). A greater density of hospitals, more hospital beds and increased medical staff, trauma centres as well as faster transportation to emergency care facilitate treatment of severe injuries inflicted by violence and therefore decrease the likelihood of these severe injuries resulting in death.  

Homicide rates in the other sample countries show almost no variation over time. Almost all countries display homicide rates below five casualties per 100,000 people younger than 65. Between 1990 and 2000 the European differences regarding the number of deaths from homicide and intentional injury were more pronounced than towards the end of the observation period: minimum and maximum values cover a wider range during the 1990s than after 2000. Hence, Europe seems to be converging in regards to its affliction with violent crime in two ways. On the one hand homicide rates of previous extreme outliers are declining towards the European average. On the other hand the homicide rates in the remaining sample countries, which already constituted a rather homogenous group at the beginning of the observation period, have been becoming even more similar over time.  

Figure 3 juxtaposes these findings with citizens’ fear of crime. The figure shows the percentage of ICVS respondents who feel very unsafe when walking alone in their area after dark. The sample for the non-Baltic countries does not completely overlap with the countries in figure 2.  

People’s fear of crime is higher in the Baltic states than in the other sample countries. In addition, fear of crime in the Baltic states did not decline with decreasing homicide rates. Rather, people felt slightly more unsafe after dark towards the end of the observation period, in which homicide rates in the Baltic states had already considerably declined. Thus, to some extent, feelings of unsafety correspond with crime figures when it comes to the overall level of insecurity. In cross-sectional...
comparison fear of crime is higher in contexts of high homicide rates. Across time, feelings of unsafety, however, do not seem to correspond with developments of violent crime as fear of crime remains high despite declining homicide rates.

**Figure 3:** Proportion of people who feel very unsafe after dark in their area in 19 European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Baltic countries</th>
<th>All other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992–1998</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2006</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Baltic countries: EST, LTU, LVA; all other countries: AUT, BEL, BGR, CZE, FIN, FRA, HUN, ITA, NDL, POL, ROM, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark? Do you feel safe, fairly safe, a bit unsafe, very unsafe? (1) very safe (2) fairly safe (3) a bit unsafe (4) very unsafe’.

### 5.3.2 Attempts to prevent crime

The police play a central role in providing public order and safety. The sample countries show profound differences regarding the manpower of national police forces, as shown in figure 4. The figure displays developments of the average number of police officers per 100,000 population for (a) the 25 percent of countries with the highest police density, for (b) the 25 percent of countries with the lowest police density, and for (c) all other countries whose police densities lie in-between.

While police density in the countries with medium and low numbers of police officers per 100,000 population stays fairly stable over time, those countries that already exceed the rest of Europe in regards to the manpower of their police forces increased the number of officers even further between 1995 and 2000. With the exception of Czech Republic and Latvia, this group is composed of the southern European countries Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. On average police forces seem
Figure 4: Police density 1995-2010 in 26 European countries

Notes: 25% countries with lowest police density: DNK, FIN, NDL, NOR, ROM, SWE, CHE; 25% countries with highest police density: CZE, GRE, ITA, LVA, PRT, ESP; all other countries: AUT, BEL, EST, FRA, GER, HUN, IRE, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN, GBR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: European Sourcebook.

...to be smallest in the European north, while countries in Central and Western Europe display a police density between those two extremes. In contrast to converging trends in violent crime, regional differences concerning the strength of police forces within the sample countries persist.

When looking at citizens’ confidence in the police it appears that exposure decreases confidence in the police: figure 5 shows that confidence in the police is lowest in countries which employ the most police officers. In countries with the smallest police density, confidence in the police is highest.

Considering the historical experiences of countries characterised by the highest numbers of police officers, the low levels of confidence in police in these states are not surprising. The political histories of the sample countries differ to a great extent. On the one hand, most countries which are situated in the north or west of Europe have had time to form, get used to, and consolidate democratic rule since the end of World War II. On the other hand, countries which were part of the Warsaw Pact (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) or were under Soviet administration (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) suffered from autocratic rule until the breakdown of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In addition, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were ruled by dictatorships until the 1970s. Both forms of regimes are usually characterised by high levels of state violence, repression, and little transparency surrounding their operations (Gershenson and Grossman 2001; Escriba-Folch 2013).
In all of these post-Soviet states and recent Mediterranean dictatorships, democracy has had considerably less time to be consolidated. Hence, people have had less time to regain confidence in state institutions that not too long ago were government instruments of oppression.

As a legacy of this former repressive rule, confidence in state institutions like the police, which are entitled to use force and violence in these countries, remains at low levels even nowadays. However, confidence in the police in countries which suffered from autocratic rule until the mid 1970s and until the breakdown of the Iron curtain respectively appears to be catching up to confidence levels in the remaining sample: along democratic consolidation, confidence in the police in countries with recent repressive rule continuously increased during the observation period. Increasing confidence in the police also can also be found in countries where citizens already displayed high levels of confidence in the police at the beginning of the observation period. Confidence in the police in countries with moderate levels of police density showed no variation over time.

Private security industry and private households also play a role in the prevention of crime. The rise of public-private partnerships for crime prevention and community safety especially shows the new relevance of private security in the prevention and
deterrence of crime. Figure 6 shows the number of private security personnel per 100,000 population for the 25 percent countries with the lowest police density, the 25 percent countries with the highest police density, and for countries whose number of police officers lies between these two extremes in 2004 and 2010.

It appears as though the private security sector reflects rather than counterbalances the police strength: those countries who employ the fewest police officers per 100,000 population in the sample (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden) also have the smallest private security sector, which also has not grown over time. The density of the private security sector in sample countries with moderate levels of police density is considerably higher than that of Scandinavian countries, but also remained stable between 2004 and 2010.

**Figure 6:** Private security personnel at different levels of police density in 22 European countries

Notes: 25% countries with lowest police density: DNK, FIN, NDL, SWE; 25% countries with highest police density: CZE, GRE, ITA, LVA, PRT, ESP; all other countries: AUT, BEL, EST, FRA, GER, HUN, IRE, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN, GBR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: Confederation of European Security Systems.

In contrast, countries with the highest police density doubled the manning level of their private security industry during those six years so that in 2010 the former Mediterranean dictatorships as well as Latvia and the Czech Republic exceeded the other sample countries not only in terms of their police density, but also in terms of the strength of their private security sector.

While police and private security density showed little variation over time in the sample – with the exception of the sharp increase of private security personnel in the Mediterranean countries, Latvia, and the Czech Republic – private efforts to prevent crime increased throughout the sample. Figure 7 shows the proportion of
respondents in the ICVS who stated that they used burglar alarms and special door locks for each ICVS wave separately.

**Figure 7:** Use of special door locks and burglar alarms in 24 European countries

![Graph showing the percentage of respondents using burglar alarms and special door locks over time from 1992 to 2005.]

*Notes:* countries: AUT, BEL, BGR, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, HUN, IRE, ITA, LTU, NDL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVA, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1); Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘In order to help us understand why some homes are more at risk of crime than others, could I ask you a few questions about the security of your house? Is your house protected by the following: a burglar alarm (answers yes/ no), special door locks (answers yes/ no).

In 1992 only about 6 percent of respondents reported using burglar alarms. In 2005 this figure had almost trebled, with 18 percent of respondents securing their homes with alarm systems. The increase is less pronounced for special door locks, but in 2005 almost half of all private homes in Europe were secured with special door locks in contrast to only a little more than a third in 1992. The data hence indicate that official levels of crime control have remained fairly stable, whereas private household and private security efforts to prevent crime have increased considerably during the past two decades.

### 5.3.3 Reactions in response to crime

Figures of recorded crimes reflect the first response to crime and therefore represent interactions between the public and the criminal justice system. On the one hand they indicate the public’s readiness to report harm to the police, on the other hand the police’s recording of the reported incident marks a first form of reaction to crime on the part of the criminal justice system.
Figure 8 shows the average number of total recorded crimes across time for (a) countries that experience an increase of over 30 percent of total recorded crime, (b) countries that experience more than a 15 percent decrease in total recorded crime, and (c) countries in which the number of recorded crimes remained between those two extremes during the observation period.

**Figure 8:** Total crimes recorded by the police 1990-2010 in 26 European countries

Notes: upward trend (more than 30% increase in total recorded crimes): EST, LVA, LTU, POL, ROM, SVN, CHE; downward trend (more than 15% decrease in total recorded crimes): BGR, CZE, DNK, FRA, SVK, GBR; trend fluctuating between 15% de- and 30% increase in total recorded crimes: AUT, BEL, FIN, GER, GRE, HUN, IRE, ITA, NDL, NOR, PRT, ESP, SWE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: Eurostat.

The graph depicts convergence and divergence at the same time. Countries with high levels of recorded crime display two different trends. The number of recorded crimes in one group of countries remained fairly stable with a slight increase. This group contains almost half of the sample countries and these are all situated in west, north, or south Europe. The other group composed of South-Eastern European countries, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and France, which displayed the highest numbers of crimes recorded by the police before 1995 saw a decrease by more than 15 percent during the observation period. This group of declining number of recorded crimes appears to converge towards the group composed of countries whose total recorded crimes have increased by more than 30 percent during the observation period and vice versa. With the exception of Switzerland, this group with low but strongly increasing numbers of recorded crimes is composed of post-communist countries. However, despite a strong increase in the number of recorded crimes, countries in this group still record about a third fewer crimes than the remaining
countries in the sample. In conclusion, towards the end of the observation period two groups of countries emerge in regards to the total number of crimes recorded by the police: one large group of countries with stable and high recording figures, and a second group of countries with increasing and decreasing recording figures which level their number of recorded crimes at about half of that of the first group.

The above figures have shown that confidence in the police in these post-Soviet countries is on average lower than in the rest of Europe, but confidence levels have recovered during the observation period. This increasing confidence in the police in post-Soviet countries seems to be accompanied by increasing interaction between the public and the police as indicated by increasing numbers of crimes recorded by the police. Notably, the late Mediterranean dictatorships are not among countries with low but rising numbers of recorded crimes, even though confidence in the police in these countries also increased from low to moderate levels as shown above. Hence, in regards to the number of crimes recorded by the police, the Mediterranean countries appear to resemble Northern and Western Europe rather than post-Soviet states. This finding indicates that the relationship between police density and confidence in institutions is complex and increasing numbers of recorded crimes may reflect other trends.

Figure 9 shows the average number of intentional homicides, robberies, and burglaries of residential premises recorded by the police at two time points for countries with decreasing, increasing, and stable numbers of total recorded crimes. First, compared with other types of crime, recorded homicides are so seldom that they are barely visible in the graph, even in the group containing the Baltic countries (group experiencing upward trend in total recorded crimes), where at times homicide rates exceeded those of the other sample countries by a factor of 10. Second, the number of recorded robberies appears to be stable in countries with decreasing or stable numbers of total recorded crimes, and to decrease a little in countries with rising total numbers of recorded crimes. Third, the number of recorded burglaries appears to reflect trends in the total number of recorded crimes in countries with decreasing or stable numbers of total recorded crimes. In countries which experienced an increase of more than 30 percent in their total numbers of recorded crimes, the number of recorded burglaries surprisingly declined by about a third. Hence, the increase of total recorded crimes in those countries appears to have occurred due to increased recording of non-violent offences like property crimes and fraud, or other violent offences such as sexual assault, which are not captured by the three categories shown in figure 9. In general European countries seem to be rather homogenous in terms of recorded robberies and burglaries as recording figures in regards to those two offenses do not differ as profoundly as the overall number of crimes recorded by the
Figure 9: Homicides, robberies, and burglaries recorded by the police in 26 European countries

Notes: upward trend (more than 30% increase in total recorded crimes): EST, LVA, LTU, POL, ROM, SVN, CHE; downward trend (more than 15% decrease in total recorded crimes): BGR, CZE, DNK, FRA, SVK, GBR; trend fluctuating between 15% de- and 30% increase in total recorded crimes: AUT, BEL, FIN, GER, GRE, HUN, IRE, ITA, NDL, NOR, PRT, ESP, SWE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: Eurostat.

Victimisation surveys provide an additional perspective on crime in society in general and reporting behaviour of the public in particular. Figures 10 and 11 show the proportion of respondents to the International Crime Victims Survey who had been victims of burglary (figure 10) and robbery (figure 11) during the five years preceding the survey, and juxtaposes these figures with the percentage of respondents who reported their incident to the police.

According to the ICVS data, victimisation of burglary (figure 10) has slightly increased in all three groups of countries, irrespective of whether they were experiencing rising, declining, or stable total recorded crime rates. Self reported victimisation is highest among those countries which had reported the smallest albeit increasing numbers of total recorded crimes. This divergence between personal experience and official statistics reflects the division between citizens and criminal justice institutions in former communist regimes which constitute this group of countries. Furthermore, the increasing confidence in the police in former communist regimes is not mirrored in reporting behaviour: the share of victims who report

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28 The samples do not completely overlap with the above figures as the countries for which information was only available at one point in time had to be omitted. These were Czech Republic and Denmark in the group of countries experiencing a downward trend and Portugal, Ireland and Germany in the group of countries experiencing stable total crime rates.
Figure 10: Victimisation and reporting behaviour for burglary at different levels of recorded crimes (n=20)

Notes: upward trend (more than 30% increase in total recorded crimes): EST, LVA, LTU, POL, ROM, SVN, CHE; downward trend (more than 15% decrease in total recorded crimes): BGR, FRA, SVK, GBR; trend fluctuating between 15% de- and 30% increase in total recorded crimes: AUT, BEL, FIN, GRE, HUN, ITA, NDL, NOR, ESP, SWE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘Over the past five years did anyone actually get into your house or flat without permission and steal or try to steal something? I am not including here thefts from garages, sheds, or lock ups. (answers yes/ no)’ Follow up question: ‘The last time, did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?’ (answers yes/ no).

crime to the police remained constant over time in these countries. Victimisation rates are lowest in countries where total recorded crimes remained stable at high levels. About three quarters of victims reported their incident to the police, which corresponds to high levels of recorded crime in these countries. This share is smaller in countries which experienced upward or downward trajectories in regards to the total number of recorded crimes.

The divergence between victimisation and reporting behaviour is even more pronounced for robbery (see figure 11). Only about half or even less than half (countries with declining recorded crimes) of robbery victims reported their incidents to the police.

Again, self reported victimisation stands in stark contrast to official recorded crime figures. Figure 9 showed a fairly stable amount of recorded robberies in all three groups of countries. While this stability is mirrored in victimisation reports
**Figure 11**: Victimisation and reporting behaviour for robbery at different levels of recorded crimes (n=20)

![Bar chart](image-url)

Notes: upward trend (more than 30% increase in total recorded crimes): EST, LVA, LTU, POL, ROM, SVN, CHE; downward trend (more than 15% decrease in total recorded crimes): BGR, FRA, SVK, GBR; trend fluctuating between 15% de- and 30% increase in total recorded crimes: AUT, BEL, FIN, GRE, HUN, ITA, NDL, NOR, ESP, SWE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘Over the past five years has anyone taken something from you, by using force, or threatening you? (answers yes/ no).’ Follow up question: ‘The last time, did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?’ (answers yes/ no).’

In countries with stable and increasing total recorded crime rates, the proportion of self-reported victimisation of robbery visibly increased over time in countries with declining official crime rates. The divergence between information given by official police statistics and figures provided by victimisation surveys highlights the difficulties involved in gathering valid information about the extent of crime and its perception in society. What all figures in this subsection do, however, show is that even though confidence in the police might increase over time, this increased confidence does not translate to a higher propensity to report burglaries or robberies.

In conclusion, three different trajectories of the total number of recorded crimes were discerned. However, the sample countries experienced a concordant decline in recorded burglaries and robberies. This finding suggests that increases in total recorded crimes are linked to increases in recordings of non-violent crimes and (sexual) assault. Furthermore, contrasting official recording figures with self-reported
data on victimisation and reporting behaviour revealed that the development of victimisation of robberies and burglaries again varied strongly between countries. Despite these differences about the same proportion of self-reported victimisation is reported to the police.

Do these differences of recorded crime leave traces in conviction rates? Figure 12 shows the average number of total convictions per 100,000 population and year for three groups of countries: the 25 percent countries with the highest number of convictions, the 25 percent countries with the lowest convictions and the remaining 50 percent of countries in between.

**Figure 12**: Total convictions 1990-2010 in 25 European countries

![Total convictions 1990-2010 in 25 European countries](image)

*Notes: 25% countries with lowest conviction rate: BGR, ITA, LAT, PRT, SVN, ESP; 25% countries with highest conviction rate: BEL, FIN, GER, NOR, SVK, SWE, GBR; all other countries: AUT, CZE, DK, EST, FRA, GRE, HUN, LTU, NLD, POL, ROM, CZE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: European Sourcebook.*

No discernable trend was found for countries with the highest conviction rates. This group comprises Belgium, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and Scandinavia (short of Denmark). Notably, as shown before, neither police density nor recorded crimes are higher in these countries than in the rest of Europe. In addition, Scandinavian countries are often cited as being thoroughly non-punitive in criminological literature (Pratt 2007). However, it appears as though they do exceed the rest of Europe in terms of the number of people who enter formal contact with the criminal justice system and are convicted.

The former Mediterranean dictatorships, which were characterised by high numbers of police officers per 100,000 population, comprise the countries with the 25 percent fewest convictions per 100,000 population. Apparently, high levels of formal
crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system (i.e. police) do not directly translate into more people being in contact with the back end of the criminal justice system. Quite the opposite seems to be the case, as the countries with the fewest police officers per 100,000 population are the countries with most convictions in Europe.

Central and Eastern European countries comprise the third group of countries whose average number of total conviction is much closer to the 25 percent of countries with the lowest conviction rates than to than to 25 percent of countries with the highest conviction rates in the sample. Between 2005 and 2010 the number of convictions in these countries even fell below the average of the countries with the fewest convictions. Thus, most of the sample countries seem to be converging in regards to their conviction rates, while the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom form a distinct group with significantly more convictions per 100,000 population than their European peers.

Figure 13 shows the amount of confidence respondents to the EVS expressed having in the justice system they live in. Interestingly, and in contrast to confidence in the police, confidence in the justice system among citizens of former dictatorships and in the Baltic countries did not increase but rather deteriorated over time (see also Karstedt 2015a). While in the second wave of the EVS almost 10 percent of respondents reported having a great deal of confidence in the justice system, in the fourth wave only about six percent shared this opinion.

Confidence in the justice system also seemed to be declining in countries where the number of total convictions per year lies in the middle range, but less noticeably. Finally, even Scandinavian citizens and the remaining high-conviction countries expressed declining confidence in the justice system as time went by.

Even though the direction of confidence in justice seems to be similar in all three groups of countries the paths of getting there differ. The 25 percent of countries with the fewest convictions experienced a linear decline in confidence in the justice system, whereas the trajectory of confidence in justice in the other two groups of countries is shaped like a u-curve. Even though fewer people had a great deal of confidence in the justice system after 2005 than during the 1990s, confidence levels were at even lower levels at the turn of the century. Hence, confidence in the justice system in countries with medium and high levels of convictions seems to be recovering.

In conclusion, not only do the amount of police officers employed and the number of convictions seem unrelated, but increasing confidence in the police does not automatically imply confidence in the justice system in general. Confidence in justice again seems to be negatively impacted by a country’s political history, especially if

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29This includes the whole justice system, not just criminal justice.
Incarceration rates represent the amount of people who are separated from the rest of society by prison walls. Generally, the use of imprisonment in Europe is not as common as in the USA, but the current debate about punitiveness suggests that the number of inmates has risen in recent decades not only in the USA but also in Europe.

When measured as a yearly average of all countries in the sample except the Baltic states, this notion finds statistical support in figure 14 (red line): the average imprisonment rate in 2010 within the sample is higher than in 1995. However, there are more countries below (14) than above (9) the average, suggesting that the majority of European states have less than 100 people in prison per 100,000 inhabitants.

The group which incarcerates an above-average number of people is composed of Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania) as well as Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. While the political history of Eastern as well as Southern Europe might be able to explain why certain states discipline their citizens with rather harsh measures and exclusion, there is no such historical explanation for the United Kingdom’s relatively high

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**Notes:** 25% countries with lowest conviction rate: BGR, ITA, LAT, PRT, SVN, ESP; 25% countries with highest conviction rate: BEL, FIN, GER, NOR, SVK, SWE, GBR; all other countries: AUT, CZE, DNK, EST, FRA, GRE, HUN, LTU, NLD, POL, ROM, CZE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: EVS. Question text: ‘Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? – The justice system; (1) a great deal; (2) quite a lot; (3) not very much; (4) none at all.’
use of imprisonment. Punitiveness in the United Kingdom has been accounted for by perceived cultural and political proximity to the USA, neoliberal policies, and increasing economic threats to the middle class (Garland 2001).

**Figure 14:** Imprisonment rates 1995-2010 in 26 European countries

![Graph showing imprisonment rates 1995-2010 in 26 European countries.](image)

**Notes:** Baltic countries: EST, LVA, LTU; countries above average: BGR, CZE, HUN, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK, ESP, GBR; countries below average: AUT, BEL, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, NDL, NOR, SVN, SWE, CHE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: European Sourcebook.

The Baltic countries again stand out from the rest of Europe. The high number of homicides that these countries are afflicted with seems to lead to imprisonment rates which exceed those of the rest of Europe. Furthermore, the trajectory of imprisonment rates in the Baltic region seems to resemble the trend of homicides: imprisonment rates peaked in the mid 1990s and have been on a decline ever since. However, convergence to the European average has not yet been achieved.

Prison conditions present a more qualitative assessment of the exclusion of offenders from society. They allow for conclusions to be made about whether inclusionary or exclusionary approaches are employed to deal with offenders. Furthermore, prison conditions are closely linked to solidarity: they are indicative of whether or not offenders are still regarded as worthy members of society whose treatment must occur in accordance with international human rights guidelines while serving their sentence (United Nations 1957).

**Figure 15** shows the average prison conditions in the sample countries during the observation period. On a first and positive note, the graph shows that the majority of European prisons fluctuate between meeting the minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and minor deficiencies caused by slight overcrowding.
On a similarly positive note, none of the sample countries run prisons with life-threatening conditions. Bulgaria is the only country in which prison conditions were consistently harsh, featuring endemic violence between inmates as well as between inmates and staff.

Figure 15 also indicates that the Baltic states are much more similar to the rest of Europe in terms of their prison conditions than with regards to their homicide and especially their imprisonment rates. Hence, while the Baltic states may incarcerate many more people than other European countries, it is not necessarily in worse conditions. However, they are situated on the lower spectrum of conditions, alongside Greece, Portugal, and Romania.

**Figure 15**: Prison conditions in 26 European countries


Prison conditions in Europe appear to follow regional and historical patterns. Countries whose prison conditions fall well below international standards are almost all situated in South or South-East of Europe, or are post-communist countries. In all these states there seems to be little care for the wellbeing of offenders implied by prison standards which meet international guidelines, suggesting that the idea of criminal justice follows a retributive rather than a re-integrative approach. In the North-West of Europe however, prison conditions usually meet international standards.

What do punitive attitudes look like in the sample? Figure 16 shows individual preferences for the use of imprisonment to sentence a recidivist burglar who stole a
colour TV. Here, subjective attitudes seem to correspond to objective developments: the frequent use of imprisonment at the institutional level seems to translate into people’s subjective attitudes about the appropriateness of this type of sentence. Even though a bigger share of respondents prefers non-custodial sentence types over imprisonment in all three groups of countries, the difference in the proportion of respondents in favour of a prison sentence in response of repeated burglaries mirrors differences in the overall imprisonment rates between countries.

**Figure 16:** Individual sentencing preferences for recidivist burglary at different levels of imprisonment (n=26)

![Graph showing sentencing preferences](image)

**Notes:** Baltic countries: EST, LVA, LTU; countries above average: BGR, CZE, HUN, POL, PRT, ROM, SVK, ESP, GBR; countries below average: AUT, BEL, DNK, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, IRE, ITA, NDL, NOR, SVN, SWE, CHE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1).

Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘People have different ideas about the sentences which should be given to offenders. Take for instance the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time he has stolen a colour TV. Which one of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case? (1) fine (2) prison (3) community service (4) suspended sentence (5) any other sentence (6) don’t know.’

Sample countries where prison sentences are imposed most frequently also have the highest percentage of respondents in support of a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar. In contrast, more citizens in countries in which the prison population is below the sample average find a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar inappropriate. However, despite outstandingly high imprisonment rates, the proportion of citizens who are in favour of imposing a prison sentence in Baltic countries does not differ to a great extent from citizens’ preferences for sentencing in countries where the
imprisonment rate is above the sample mean. Attitudes of citizens in the Baltic region are hence much closer to attitudes of European peers than the Baltic regions’ country-level developments in regards to crime and imprisonment suggest.

5.3.4 Salience of crime and its control in politics and public opinion

Verbal attention given to crime and criminal justice as a political subject and issue on the electoral agenda is the first aspect of the importance of crime in politics. Public discourse about crime as well as sentiments about punishment communicated within society can contribute to punitive sentiments, fear of crime, stereotypes of certain groups of the population being more threatening than others, as well as citizens’ preference for different approaches to criminal justice (e.g. retribution vs. penal welfarism). Surprisingly, crime as a political subject has, to date, received little attention from criminology (Wenzelburger 2015).

The space law and order policies take up in party manifestos published prior to elections allows conclusions to be drawn about the importance of crime relative to other politically relevant topics. Yet, data provided by the Manifesto Project Database employed here do not only measure issue attention but also provide information about the content of sentences devoted to law and order policies in party manifestos (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014). As such all manifesto content which falls into the category of law and order policies encompasses sentences in support of the strict enforcement of law and order policies, the enforcement of all laws, tougher attitudes in courts, all action against crime, support and resources for the police, and the importance of internal security (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014: 16). Higher values of these variables indicate more attention devoted towards the fight against crime as a topic as well as political support for repressive action against crime.

Figure 17 shows the distribution of crime and law and order on the electoral agenda in the form of support for the strict enforcement of public order and safety policies in the election manifestos of political parties across time. The graph clearly shows that support for repressive action on crime has gained importance as an issue on the electoral agenda over time. While before 2000 there were countries in which crime as an issue did not take up any space in party manifestos, this no longer is the case after 2000. With the turn of the century crime control as an issue generally took up at least some space in political parties’ electoral manifestos for the countries in the sample. However, the range of values in the sample per year has increased and differences are becoming more pronounced. Hence, as action on crime develops as an issue worth talking about in the run-up of elections, the extent to which political parties address it is becoming more diverse across Europe.
Figure 17: Crime and safety on the electoral agenda 1993-2010 in 26 European countries

Notes: Data: Manifesto Project Database (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, and Werner 2014).

Lithuania in the 1990s and more recently Italy stand out from the rest of Europe through particularly high issue salience surrounding crime and public order. In Italy these figures mirror the fight against the Mafia which has become a highly debated issue (Pinotti 2015). In Lithuania high levels of political support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies reflects the country’s crime problem as issue attention was most prevalent among electoral manifestos when Lithuania’s affliction with violent crime peaked in the mid-1990s (see figure 2).

Has expenditure for public order and safety risen alongside the increase in verbal attention to crime control expressed by political parties? Expenditure figures indicate whether governments that feel crime is one of the most important issues facing their country spend more on its control than others. Importantly though, expenditure for the control of crime can feed repressive as well as integrative policies. A prison system which aims to provide comprehensive counselling, medical care, education opportunities, and other measures which facilitate the prisoners’ reintegration into society upon completion of their sentence, while simultaneously incarcerating only a small fraction of offenders, might consume as much or even more money than a prison full of inmates that only employs the bare minimum of staff and provisions (Sung 2006).

Figure 18 provides an overview of the average government expenditure for public order and safety over time for (a) countries whose expenditure for public order
and safety underwent an increase of more than 10 percent during the observation period, (b) countries whose expenditure for public order and safety underwent a decrease of more than 10 percent during the observation period, and (c) countries in which expenditure for public order and safety fluctuated between 10 percent in- and decreases.

**Figure 18:** Government expenditure for public order and safety 1995-2010 in 26 European countries

![Government expenditure for public order and safety 1995-2010 in 26 European countries](image)

*Notes:* countries with more than 10% increase: BEL, BGR, DNK, FRA, GRE, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVN, ESP, GBR; countries with more than 10% decrease: CZE, EST, LVA, SVK; countries with stable expenditure: AUT, FIN, GER, HUN, IRE, ITA, LTU, NOR, SWE, CHE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: Eurostat.

The average expenditure for public order and safety within the sample (red line) slightly increased, similar to the increase in attention to crime and public order and safety in election manifestos. When broken down into different groups of countries, however, a different picture emerges. Only four out of 26 countries have decreasing government investments in criminal justice institutions (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia). It appears that those countries were rather outliers on the European public order and safety expenditure landscape and are now slowly but steadily meeting the expenditure figures of the remaining sample. This also applies to the group of countries whose expenditure for public order and safety increased during the observation period. Those countries start well below the European average but seem to settle at investing about 2 percent of their annual gross domestic product in public order and safety, joining the remaining countries within the sample. This group of countries is composed of countries from all European regions. The expenditure figures of countries with stable investments in their criminal justice systems
(mainly countries in the north and west of Europe) lie about 0.25 to 0.5 percent below the European average. Financial attention devoted to crime and criminal justice does not seem to change and also does not seem to be at high levels in those countries.

Expenditure figures exemplify a pattern that has also emerged for other indicators discussed in this chapter. The European landscape of government expenditure for criminal justice institutions was more diverse at the beginning of the observation period than towards the end of it. As European integration progresses, the Council of Europe member countries seem to be converging in terms of their expenditure for public order and safety as well as in terms of homicide rates and imprisonment rates, and partly in terms of recording and conviction figures.

Figure 19 gives a more detailed account of the criminal justice institutions receiving financial investments from the government. Expenditure figures are shown for different public order and safety institutions – the police, law courts, and prisons – and thus show which policy areas received special financial attention at the beginning and end of the observation period.

Figure 19: Government expenditure for different criminal justice institutions in 26 European countries

Notes: upward trend: BEL, BGR, DNK, FRA, GRE, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVN, ESP, GBR; downward trend: CZE, EST, LVA, SVK; stable trend: AUT, FIN, GER, HUN, IRE, ITA, LTU, NOR, SWE, CHE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: Eurostat.

Countries that increased their overall spending also increased investments in those three policy areas. The same is true for countries with decreasing or stable expenditure figures. Countries with stable expenditure rates slightly redistributed their financial investments from the police to investments in law courts. Generally,
however, the increase in expenditure does not favour one policy area over another, and a decrease in expenditure does not occur at the overwhelming expense of a specific policy area either. Nevertheless, countries with decreasing expenditure figures seem to mainly cut back on investments in the prison system.

Public opinion stating that public order and safety is one of the main issues that deserves political (financial) attention is not in accordance with political awareness of the topic. Figure 20 shows the percentage of respondents to the EVS who named public order and safety as the most important issue warranting political action. Bars are plotted separately for (a) countries whose expenditure for public order and safety underwent an increase of more than 10 percent during the observation period, (b) countries whose expenditure for public order and safety underwent a decrease of more than 10 percent during the observation period, and (c) countries in which expenditure for public order and safety fluctuated between 10 percent in- and decreases.

**Figure 20:** Public order named most important issue in different contexts of government expenditure for public order and safety (n=26)

![Figure 20: Public order named most important issue in different contexts of government expenditure for public order and safety (n=26)](image)

*Notes:* upward trend: BEL, BGR, DNK, FRA, GRE, NLD, POL, PRT, ROM, SVN, ESP, GBR; downward trend: CZE, EST, LVA, SVK; stable trend: AUT, FIN, GER, HUN, IRE, ITA, LTU, NOR, SWE, CHE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: EVS. Question text: ‘If you had to choose, which of the things on this card would you say is the most important? maintaining order in the nation; (1) very important; (2) important; (3) not very important; (4) not at all important’.

Citizens of countries with decreasing expenditure for public order and safety do in fact think that public order and safety is one of the most important current issues warranting political attention. This public attention to public order and safety however decreases alongside expenditure over time (see for example 1990 vs
2008). Since this group of countries includes two of the Baltic countries this concern for public order and safety could very well reflect the high homicide rates in these countries. As homicide rates go down so does public concern for public order and safety.

In the other two groups of countries (countries with stable and rising expenditure figures) public concern for public order and safety was highest around 2000, right at the time when the strict enforcement of law and order policies emerged as a political issue in party manifestos (see figure 17). The trajectory of public opinion in these two groups hence follows an inverted u-curve. Notably between 2000 and 2008 citizens’ interest in public order and safety seemed to undergo a sharp decline in all three groups of countries, which is depicted in figure 20. Financial instability in the run-up to the 2008 economic crisis might have diverted people’s interest from public order and safety.

Two main findings emerge from the analysis of trends in issue salience of law and order and public safety in politics as well as in public opinion. Public interest in the fight against crime or public order and safety as issues that should be most important on the political agenda is lower towards the end than towards the beginning of the observation period. Political parties in turn picked up on crime, and especially the strict enforcement of law and order policies, as an issue to include in their election manifestos. Furthermore, the sample countries seem to converge in regards to government action in funding criminal justice agencies. This convergence seems to be reflected in public opinion. In 2008 the difference between the proportion of people who named public order the most important issue was less pronounced between the different groups of countries than at the beginning of the observation period.

5.4 Solidarity in Europe: Welfare state activity, and individual attitudes

Trajectories of welfare state solidarity are presented in correspondence with the welfare-regime typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). This typology describes three different approaches to social welfare exemplified in conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare models and these should be reflected in expenditure figures, the overall generosity of the benefit system, as well as in the solidarity attitudes of individuals in the sample countries. In the ideal type of a conservative welfare state, entitlements to benefit payments for sickness, unemployment and pensions are based upon prior contributions to the respective programme and vary with the recipient’s previous income. Liberal welfare states are characterised by attempts to make the
receipt of benefits as unattractive as possible, so that people rely on work or other financial resources rather than the state to provide for themselves.\textsuperscript{30} In contrast, the social democratic welfare model’s core characteristics are high levels of benefits and services provided by the state, especially in regards to childcare, families and disadvantaged population strata.\textsuperscript{31} With the fall of the Iron Curtain the previously socialist Central and Eastern European countries have emerged as a fourth typology of welfare regimes. Owing to the limited time these countries have had to develop advanced welfare states, benefit provisions and support in those countries are usually considered to be scarce (Ebbinghaus 2012: 9).

5.4.1 Expenditure for social welfare and citizens’ condemnation of free-riding

Figure 21 shows the development of average total public social expenditures for these four types of welfare states within the sample.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure21.png}
\caption{Total public social expenditure 1990-2010 by welfare state type (n=25)}
\end{figure}

\textit{Notes:} conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, PRT, GRE; liberal: CHE, GBR, IRE; social democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR, SWE; central/ eastern Europe: CZE, POL, EST, LTU, LVA, HUN, SVK, SVN, BGR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: OECD Social Expenditure Database.

Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and the Mediterranean countries make up the group of conservative welfare regimes. The Scandinavian countries represent the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{30}‘[...]limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. Entitlement rules are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest.’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 26).
\end{footnotesize}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{31}Chapter 6 discusses Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology in more detail.
\end{footnotesize}
social democratic welfare model. Switzerland, Great Britain, and Ireland are the only liberal welfare states in the sample. Lastly the former socialist Central and Eastern European welfare type in the sample is made up of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and the Baltic countries.

It is not liberal welfare regimes, but rather Central and Eastern European states invest the least monetary resources into social welfare. While expenditure figures of both liberal welfare regimes and Eastern European countries are almost identical and well below the social welfare investments of social democratic and conservative welfare regimes at the beginning of the observation period, they started to differ around 2000. While Central and Eastern European states have kept their social expenditure figures low, liberal welfare regimes have steadily increased social welfare expenditure contrary to neoliberal rhetoric. Liberal welfare regimes’ public social expenditure appears to be converging towards conservative and social democratic welfare regimes, almost matching the expenditure figures of these regimes in 2010.

Conservative and social democratic welfare regimes’ public social expenditure also appears to be converging. While during the 1990s Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology was very well reflected by the social democratic regimes in the sample investing the highest level of monetary resources in social welfare, these regimes appear to have steadily cut back public social expenditure until they reached the level of conservative welfare states in 2000. As a result of increasing public expenditure by liberal and conservative welfare regimes and cutbacks in social expenditure by social democratic welfare states the expenditure figures of these three ideal types converge. As of 2010 patterns of social welfare expenditure did not seem to reflect welfare regime types, but a geographical divide between the East and West Europe.

Do individual attitudes about solidarity reflect welfare regime typologies and if so have the differences become less pronounced over time? Recognition of the importance of individual contributions to a common good as well as condemnation of free riding on collective means, such as government redistribution of wealth, constitute important aspects of solidarity. Figure 22 displays the proportion of respondents to the EVS who think that cheating on taxes is never justifiable for the four different welfare state types across time. First, there are no real differences in terms of people’s condemnation of free riding between welfare state types. Second, intolerance against free riding appears to be a stable social sentiment as there are only very slight variations over time. In all four groups of countries and all four years in which the EVS was conducted, about half of the respondents stated that they found cheating on taxes never justifiable.

Nevertheless, some shifts in public opinion are observable. In liberal welfare states public resentment towards free riding became stronger alongside increasing
social expenditure. The share of people who find cheating on taxes unacceptable also slightly increased in social democratic and conservative welfare regimes despite different trajectories of public social expenditure. In countries with a socialist background condemnation of tax fraud exceeded that of the other sample countries but has levelled off since the transition from communist rule. Altogether, however, the recognition of tax contributions as an important pillar of social integration, as well as intolerance against free riding seems to be a consistent sentiment across the whole of Europe.

Figure 22: Intolerance towards cheating on taxes by welfare state type (n=25)

Notes: conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, PRT, GRE; liberal: CHE, GBR, IRE; social democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR, SWE; central/ eastern Europe: CZE, POL, EST, LTU, LVA, HUN, SVK, SVN, BGR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: EVS. Question text: ‘Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card; Cheating on taxes if you have a chance.’ Answers: 1: never justifiable, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10: always justifiable.

Chapter 2 argued that solidarity within the welfare state is closely related to trust in society (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007; Veitch 2011). To effectively master the collective action problem associated with common goods in general, and social welfare in particular, societies depend on both citizens’ conviction that free riding on common goods is unacceptable as well as their trust in each other to not exploit provisions (and fellow citizens). Are different levels of interpersonal trust thus accompanied by different approaches to social welfare? Figure 23 shows the proportion of EVS respondents who believe that, in general, most people can be trusted in different welfare regimes.

The figure clearly shows that the social democratic welfare regimes in Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden stand out for the high levels of trust among citizens, which surpasses trust levels in the other three welfare regimes by factors of up to three. In addition, generalised trust in these countries appears to have grown with time. This is in opposition to the trajectory of interpersonal trust in liberal welfare regimes. Those are the second highest in the sample, but trust levels decreased noticeably between 1990 and 2010. It is interesting that this decrease of interpersonal trust over time coincided with an increase in intolerance towards free riding on services provided by the welfare state, as shown in figure 22. This could be interpreted as a sign of bad experiences with exploitation of social welfare, but could also be a sign of exposure to political and media rhetoric that gives the impression that both benefit fraud and tax evasion are on the rise. Levels of trust in conservative welfare regimes as well as in central and Eastern European countries appear to have maintained a constantly low level of trust over time, with the Central and Eastern European countries displaying the lowest levels of generalised trust among citizens.

**Figure 23:** Trust in other people by welfare state type (n=23)

Notes: conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, PRT; liberal: GBR, IRE; social democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, SWE; central/eastern Europe: CZE, POL, EST, LTU, LVA, HUN, ROM, SVK, SVN, BGR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: EVS. Question text: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ Answers: (1) Most people can be trusted; (2) Can’t be too careful.

Thus, trust in society appears to be somewhat related to investments in social welfare. The social democratic welfare regimes that make the biggest investments in social welfare in the sample also show the highest levels of interpersonal trust, while trust among citizens is lowest in countries with the least developed welfare states.
(Central and Eastern Europe). However, in contrast to social expenditure, levels of
generalised trust within the sample countries do not appear to be converging.

5.4.2 Benefit generosity and responsibilities to provide

Public social expenditure figures are sensitive to demand: expenditure for certain
programmes might increase when the numbers of entitled recipients rise. Hence,
increased expenditure figures do not automatically indicate increased solidarity. The
more qualitative indicator for the overall generosity of the benefit system of Scruggs
(2014) thus provides an additional perspective on institutionalised solidarity within
the welfare state. The index of Scruggs (2014) is based on characteristics of each
country’s three major insurance programmes (pension, sickness, and unemployment)
in order to arrive at a measure for the overall generosity of the benefit system. The
measure indicates the extent of public commitment to welfare and the restrictiveness
of access to welfare state provisions. Higher values on this index indicate a more
generous overall benefit system which is characterised by broad benefit coverage
with few restrictions on eligibility.

The benefit generosity indicators provided by Scruggs (2014) are only available
for 16 of the 26 sample countries and do not cover any of the eastern European
countries. Hence, figure 24 only shows the average combined benefit generosity
index across time for conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare states. In
line with public social expenditure figures, the overall generosity of benefit systems
within the sample also appears to be converging. The difference in the overall
generosity of benefit systems was much more pronounced during the 1990s than
towards the end of the observation period, especially between social democratic and
liberal welfare states. Social democratic states suffered a loss in benefit generosity,
whereas liberal states seemed to expand theirs, leading the sample countries to
converge.

In summary, tightening belts in regards to public social expenditure and benefit
generosity, a phenomenon typically associated with neoliberalism, seems to predom-
inantly pertain to social democratic welfare regimes. Liberal states in turn appear
to have expanded their public social expenditure and benefit coverage over time.
The average combined benefit generosity for conservative states shows little vari-
tion during the observation period, posing a further challenge to the claims around
welfare state retrenchment and declining solidarity.
Figure 25 implies that generous benefit provisions, at least to some extent, reflect public sentiments about states’ responsibility to provide for their citizens. The EVS asks participants to state who they deem responsible for providing for a living – the state or the individual.

Respondents living in the 25 percent countries with the most generous benefit system were the least likely to demand that the state takes even more responsibility to provide for its citizens. In contrast, respondents from the 25 percent countries with the least generous benefit systems would actually prefer the state to take more action. Respondents from countries whose generosity of welfare provision was between those two extremes form the middle group: they demand more action from the state than respondents in the most generous countries but do not express as much discontent with the current amount of responsibility taken by the state as respondents from the least generous benefit systems. This implies that the public does not have unrealistic or unsatisfiable demands for social welfare. Once the state steps up and takes responsibility for providing for its citizens in a generous way, people do acknowledge this solidarity and refrain from demanding more. It appears that once basic necessities are provided for people tend to look towards other sources of responsibility rather than blindly relying on policy solutions to keep the risks of life at bay. Finally, as benefit generosity within Europe is converging over time, so too are public sentiments about welfare provisions: the differences between the
Figure 25: Individual views on responsibility for providing for oneself by welfare state type (n=15)

Notes: 25% least generous countries: GRE, IRE, ITA, GBR; 25% most generous countries: BEL, FRA, NOR, SWE; all other countries: AUT, DNK, FIN, GER, NDL, ESP, CHE. Data: EVS. Question text: ‘On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?’ Answers: 1: individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10: the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.

percentage of respondents demanding the state to do more for its citizens were less pronounced in the late 2000s than at the beginning of the 1990s.

5.4.3 Targeted solidarity: Programme-specific welfare generosity and public concern for citizens in need

Institutionalised and individual level solidarity which targets specific groups of the population completes the picture of solidarities in the sample. Figure 26 plots generosity indicators for the three main benefit programmes in each welfare state type across time.

The figure shows that the different welfare state types pursue distinct strategies of support. Conservative welfare regimes are characterised by conceding a much higher degree of generosity to retirement pensions than to unemployment or sickness benefits. Pension benefits are a form of solidarity that focus on the middle classes of society rather than marginalised groups like recipients of sickness or unemployment benefits. The risk of becoming unemployed (especially on a long-term basis) is distributed unequally in society and is higher for people who suffer from other kinds of inequality like deteriorating health, low educational attainment, or being a single
parent (Heidenreich 2015). Similar arguments are made for the unequal distribution of health risks in society (Peacock, Bissell, and Owen 2014).

Liberal welfare states make less pronounced distinctions between the provision of support for different social subgroups in need. Although the levels of generosity of the three insurance programmes are slightly lower than in conservative and social democratic welfare regimes, the middle of society as well as marginalised populations are supported by the state in roughly equal measure. Hence, although being more restrictive in the administration of benefits, on average, liberal welfare states do not seem to prefer one social subgroup over another.

**Figure 26:** Benefit generosity by programme type in three welfare regimes 1990-2010 (n=16)

*Notes:* conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, GRE; liberal: CHE, GBR, IRE; social democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR, SWE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: CWED.

Lastly, social democratic welfare states seem to show the highest level of institutionalised solidarity concerning the sick and disabled, while pension and unemployment benefit generosity lie fairly close together. What is apparent, however, is that the decline in overall expenditure in social democratic welfare states after 2000 seems to have occurred at the expense of support for marginalised groups: both sickness and unemployment benefit generosity declined, while the generosity of pension benefits remained at a stable level and even increased towards the end of the observation period. Besides these difference in the institutionalised solidarity towards
social subgroups, there are some commonalities between the welfare regimes. European countries in the sample unanimously conceded the least state institutionalised welfare solidarity to the unemployed.

Do these distinct patterns of welfare state support correspond with different levels of citizens’ targeted solidarity attitudes? Figure 27 shows the percentage of respondents to the EVS who expressed concern about each of the following social groups: the unemployed, elderly, and the sick and disabled. Responses were split into the four different welfare regimes in Europe. The graph shows averages for the EVS waves 3 and 4 (1999-2001 and 2008-2010).

**Figure 27:** Concern for different social subgroups by welfare state type (n=25)

Notes: conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, PRT, GRE; liberal: CHE, GBR, IRE; social democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR, SWE; central/eastern Europe: CZE, POL, EST, LTU, LVA, HUN, SVK, SVN, BGR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: EVS. Question text: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of:’ (a) ‘elderly people in [COUNTRY]’, (b) ‘unemployed people in [COUNTRY]’, and (c) ‘sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’ Answers: (1) very much (2) much (3) to a certain extent (4) not so much (5) not at all. Concern in graph = categories (1) and (2) combined.

Consistent with institutionalised solidarity throughout Europe, public concern for the unemployed’s living conditions is consistently lowest in all four welfare regimes. Concern for elderly people in turn is consistently the highest. Concern for the living conditions of others seems to be lowest in former communist regimes and, surprisingly, highest in liberal welfare states. The overall lower levels of institutionalised solidarity in liberal welfare states seem to open up windows of opportunity or even spur individual concern for potentially marginalised others. In contrast, a
history of equality and economic scarcity (in former socialist regimes) seems to have caused people not to be concerned about each other’s welfare, but to care more for themselves.

5.5 Conclusion: Convergence but remaining differences

This chapter demonstrated that patterns and processes of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in selected European countries converged during the 1990s and 2000s, but that they nevertheless remain different. First, countries under former communist rule and to some extent the former Mediterranean dictatorships of Portugal, Greece, and Spain have shown to be unlike the rest of the sample countries in many indicator categories. The political histories of these countries differ from the majority of the other sample countries and these different historical trajectories seem to have left traces in public safety (higher homicide rates and victimisation rates), approaches to criminal justice (more police officers, less convictions, harsher sentencing, worse prison conditions), citizens’ attitudes towards state institutions (less trust and limited contact), as well as social expenditure (less government expenditure for social insurance programmes).

Second, the former dictatorships and post-communist countries converged with the rest of Europe in many aspects of the collective experience of crime, with confidence in the police as well as recording and conviction figures increasing, and homicide rates significantly declining. However, post-communist countries seem to have remained different in regards to solidarity as expenditure figures do not seem to have tilted towards Western and Southern Europe. Unfortunately there is no information in regards to benefit generosity, so the question as to whether post-Soviet states converge towards the remaining sample in this regard remains unanswered.

Third, the sample countries not only converge in the sense that the countries that displayed distinct high or low values on the indicators assimilated to the remaining sample, but also that differences in the rest of Europe seem to have vanished in a lot of aspects. This overall convergence is especially apparent for welfare state activity: social expenditure and the overall generosity of the sample countries’ benefit systems are well distinguishable by Esping-Andersen’s welfare state classification from the early 1990s, but increasingly overlap towards the end of the observation period. Convergence is equally evident for many indicators of the collective experience of crime, most notably concerning homicide rates, government expenditure for public order and safety, and confidence in the police and justice system.

Fourth, the sample countries show a number of similar trajectories. Confidence in the police seems to have increased among all countries in Europe. At the same time, however, confidence in the justice system has declined. Imprisonment rates
uniformly rose in the majority of sample countries, and were accompanied by the emergence of crime control as a political issue after 2000. Yet, these trends evolve slowly. Countries which underwent major changes were commonly those which stood out from the sample through either especially high or low figures.

Fifth, official objective indicators do not always reflect subjective attitudes and behaviour. The presence of many police officers does not automatically increase confidence in the police. Such confidence seems to be higher in countries that employ the fewest officers per 100,000 population within the sample. When it comes to the number of convictions this relationship is however reversed: criminal justice systems which convict the most people per 100,000 population also have the highest level of confidence among the wider public.

Sixth, objective indicators and subjective attitudes are also in accordance in many instances, most notably in regards to indicators of solidarity: throughout all welfare state types unemployment benefit programmes were the least generous compared to sick and pension benefit programmes. This commonality is shared by individual attitudes of citizens of the sample countries as they were least concerned about the living conditions of the unemployed in comparison to the sick and disabled or elderly. Furthermore, citizens do not seem to put unrealistic demands on the welfare state’s responsibilities to provide. Where the latter provides for a broad coverage of life risks, people generally see it as the individual’s responsibility to satisfy any additional needs. The welfare state hence has the ability to meet public demands.

Lastly, the chapter contributes to the discussion about declining solidarity in Europe. When measured on an aggregate level by means of welfare state statistics, solidarity generally does not seem to have shrunk as drastically as it is often conveyed in public discourse. Neither public social expenditure, nor benefit generosity indicators suggest significant declines in institutionalised solidarity. When plotted according to the typology of welfare state regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990), only the social democratic states suffer slight cutbacks in public social expenditure and benefit generosity. Liberal states in turn do not seem to be affected by a decline in solidarity. On the contrary, these states have expanded expenditure for, and accessibility to, welfare programmes. The politics of austerity, hence are not evident in data prior to 2010.
6 European Differences and Convergence

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that several aspects of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in Europe have changed over time. Many of these developments have taken the shape of convergence. Indicators about which European countries appear to be converging include people’s individual attitudes, public policy in relation to social welfare and criminal justice, as well as the prevalence of violent crime. At the same time there also appeared to be regional patterns of values towards both criminal justice and solidarity. In particular the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean countries often differed from the other sample countries. However, the differences between these countries and the remaining sample decreased during the observation period. Are these observations indicative of a process of Europeanisation? Has a harmonisation of political, economic, and social dynamics of European countries occurred during the past decades?

This chapter addresses this general question with respect to indicators of the collective experience of crime and solidarity. Countries in contemporary Europe as well as their citizens find themselves in a dialectic of supranational and local influences (Karstedt 2014). On the one hand countries strive to preserve their national identities and interests. On the other hand, however, membership in the European Union or the Council of Europe is dependent on concurrence on matters like rule of law, democracy, and respect for human rights, based on international agreements like the Treaty of Lisbon or the European Social Charter. Respect for human rights in particular is closely related to the idea of solidarity (respect towards all members of society), welfare state activity (granting social access for everybody), and criminal justice (dignified treatment of offenders).

Building on the findings from chapter 5, the present chapter analyses in more detail how countries in Europe are situated towards each other with regards to solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society. Four questions guide this part of the research:

1. Can indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society delineate different clusters of countries?
2. Do clusters of solidarity overlap with clusters of the collective experience of crime in society?

3. Is the structure of clusters stable over time?

4. Do countries converge within clusters, across clusters, or both?

The last question addresses whether countries which find themselves in the same cluster become even more alike over time, or whether convergence predominantly takes place across clusters, turning Europe into a more homogenous region in terms of solidarity, crime, and criminal justice.

To answer these four questions the chapter will proceed in two steps. First, two separate cluster analyses for patterns of solidarity and the collective experience of crime are calculated for the period 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 in order to answer questions 1-3. Subsequently, to address question 4, diffusion analysis is performed on indicators of solidarity and indicators of the collective experience of crime that significantly differ between clusters. The chapter begins with a brief literature review looking at European differences and similarities in regards to crime, criminal justice, and solidarity. The subsequent sections introduce the basics of cluster and diffusion analysis and present results from both analyses. Section 6.6 discusses the results in the wider context of this thesis.

6.2 Previous research on European differences and similarities

6.2.1 European differences: Typologies and classifications

The effort to classify countries in Europe and other advanced industrialised democracies along the lines of culture, institutional configurations, and policy outcomes is a recurring endeavour. Two accounts of country grouping have provoked academic debate and were applied in various fields of comparative research. These are the ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and the concept of ‘Families of Nations’ by Castles (1993).

Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) aimed to understand why distinct welfare logics and outcomes existed in industrialized countries. Drawing on historical accounts of different types of (working-)class mobilisation, social policy developments, and regime-institutionalisation, Esping-Andersen (1990) arrived at a typology of welfare regimes by applying dimensions of decommodification and social stratification (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 141) in 18 member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation (OECD). Decommodification circumscribes the degree to which social services are attainable independent of the recipients’ participation in and prior contributions to the market. Social stratification refers to the effect of the welfare
state on social structure: is the welfare state preserving existing status-hierarchies between different socioeconomic stratas, or does the welfare state contribute to a more egalitarian society?

Esping-Andersen (1990) arrived at the following, well-known classification of three welfare state types: on the one extreme there are liberal welfare states in which access to welfare benefits is closely tied to the market. Benefits only provide the bare minimum needed to survive in order to encourage labour-market participation by its citizens. The paradigm governing social policy is individualism: individuals are primarily responsible for their own fate and redistribution of wealth is kept to a relative minimum. Typically English-speaking countries and Switzerland fall into this category. In contrast, social democratic welfare regimes feature a high degree of decommodification of pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits. Correspondingly, welfare entitlement is not contingent on prior contributions or any other market-based status. Lastly, conservative welfare regimes find themselves between these two extremes. The state here acts under the premise of subsidiarity and only steps in when families are unable to support their members themselves. Values underlying social policy in conservative welfare states are influenced by a catholic religious background as well as corporatism. Countries in this group are situated in mainland and Southern Europe and comprise Spain, Austria, Germany, France, Belgium, and Italy.

Esping-Andersen’s threefold classification of welfare regimes has provoked praise and critique, as well as follow-up studies with new and refined country classifications (for an overview see tables in Arts and Gelissen 2002: 143-144). The most frequent criticisms refer to the miss-allocation of the Antipodean countries to the liberal welfare regime cluster alongside the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the USA, as well as the neglect of a distinct Mediterranean country cluster (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Cross-validations with other studies which used alternative heuristics to cluster countries according to their social policy, however, arrive at the conclusion that in the majority of cases their groups correspond with Esping-Andersen’s three ideal types of liberal, conservative, and social-democratic welfare states (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Ebbinghaus 2012). However, these cross-validations also highlight that some countries are hybrid cases, switching between clusters depending on the sample and policy indicators under investigation. Esping-Andersen’s original analysis was performed before the fall of the Iron Curtain which is why the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries are not considered in his classification.

While ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ assesses countries on the basis of one policy area only, namely social policy, the volume of Castles (1993) develops the notion of distinct ‘Families of Nations’ through an analysis of 13 public policy
areas. Castles, too, aimed to explain policy coherence and dissonance among OECD member countries and to understand the idiosyncratic trajectory each group (family) of countries had taken in the decades following World Wars I and II. Castles saw commonalities in public policy outcomes as well as policy antecedents as rooted in an affinity owing to similar language, comparable culture and shared geographical location, as well as common historical experiences within groups of countries (Castles 1993: xiii; see also Obinger and Wagschal 2001; Castles and Obinger 2008.) While Castles’ work bears close resemblance to Esping-Adersen’s (1990, 1999) classification of countries, he arrives at four rather than three families of nations. These are the following: the (a) ‘English Speaking Family’ is comprised of the United Kingdom, its fellow Commonwealth members of New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the USA, as well as Ireland. The (b) ‘Continental Family’ consists of countries located in Central-Western Europe but also includes Italy. The (c) ‘Scandinavian Family’ comprises Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Finally, Greece, Portugal, and Spain make up the (d) ‘Southern Family’ whose members suffered from autocratic rule well into the 1970s. Within these four families public policy outcomes (i.e. taxation, family policy, health care, etc.), policy antecedents, and legal origins are similar, while they significantly differ between families. A re-assessment of the families of nations concept after the Eastward expansion of the European Union in 2005 revealed the emergence of a new and post-communist family of nations and a convergence of the Southern Family towards the Continental Family (Castles and Obinger 2008).

Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) research as well as Castles (1993) and many follow-up studies have concluded that ‘many potential sources of resemblance between countries’ overlap to a greater or lesser degree’ (Castles and Obinger 2008: 324) and that current advanced democracies comprise three to four relatively homogenous groups. These country classifications have helped inform the grouping of countries in regards to crime and justice, but also in regards to solidarity and social justice.

One widely recognized study which has embedded criminal policy clusters in a wider framework of political economy is the work of Cavadino and Dignan (2006a). The authors consider whether penal policy, namely levels of imprisonment, are congruent with the classification of welfare states by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), and thus whether certain types of welfare regimes impact penal policies. Although the analysis shows that in 12 capitalist countries imprisonment rates vary roughly with the different welfare regimes, the categories are by no means discriminative. While the liberal welfare states display, on average, the highest imprisonment rates, and social-democratic countries the lowest, there are only marginal differences and some-

Policy antecedents are the institutional and legal structure of a country.
times even overlaps between the rates of the different welfare types (Cavadino and Dignan 2006a: 447). For example the Netherlands, which is among the conservative corporatist countries, has a higher imprisonment rate than Australia, which is considered to be a liberal state. Likewise, the range of values of the imprisonment rate within each welfare cluster all exceed the differences in imprisonment rates between clusters. Yet, they lend support to the notion that the underlying values of inclusion versus exclusion, for the most part, manifest themselves not only in welfare, but also in penal policies.

The rationale of in- and exclusion as dimensions for classifying countries was taken up by Hirtenlehner et al. (2012). The authors suggest that countries deal with social marginality either through exclusion, i.e. the use of imprisonment and other forms of penal control, or through inclusion through a strong and generous welfare state. A cluster analysis of European countries with a variety of indicators including welfare state characteristics, income inequality, individual punitive attitudes, fear of crime, social distrust, crime statistics, and penal regimes arrives at three groups of countries. Within these groups two extremes emerge. On the one hand there are highly decommodified countries in which fear of crime, individual punitive attitudes, and imprisonment rates are all on low levels. On the other hand there is a cluster of countries which are highly reliant upon penal regimes and only grant their citizens limited access to welfare benefits. The biggest group however consists of hybrid regimes (12 countries vs 5 and 6 countries respectively). Hirtenlehner et al’s (2012) cluster analysis only partly overlaps with the three ‘worlds of welfare.’ Similarly blurred lines among welfare clusters and clusters built from criminal justice indicators were found in other studies (cf Smit, Haen, and van Giammeren 2008). Scandinavia, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and Western Europe do not appear to be inherently different when more criminal justice indicators than just the imprisonment rate are taken into account. Welfare regime studies, however, find these three regions to be distinct in their administration of social welfare.

Independent assessments of cultures of control as well as penal regimes have revealed that even though they each form four distinct clusters among European countries both appear to be independent dimensions of a wider concept of punitiveness (Karstedt 2015a: 288). This cluster analysis did not take Esping-Andersen’s welfare types as the starting point but a heuristic close to the idea of families of nations. Countries which are spatially or culturally near are more likely to influence each others’ penal and control policies and therefore will show similar outcomes: ‘cultural peers’ are the main drivers of the emergence of policy and attitude patterns among Europe. The study again finds a spatial distribution of cultures of control, which corresponds to the European regions of Scandinavia, Western Europe, Central- and
South Eastern transitional countries, as well as post-Soviet countries on the eastern rim of Europe. Penal cultures, however, appear to only loosely overlap with European regions.

Interestingly, clusters of countries do not only form in relation to policy in matters of criminal justice but also in regards to individual perceptions and attitudes concerning crime, punishment, and the work of the police as well as citizens’ victimisation experiences (Norris 2009). The identified patterns almost perfectly overlap with the English and Nordic families of nations. Yet, the Continental and Southern families of nations cannot be unambiguously reproduced by means of individual perceptions of crime and victimisation.

Are similar patterns and groups also found for solidarity? It appears that there are indeed distinct ‘cultures of solidarity’ within Europe, which are guided by different underlying principles of inclusion, outreach, and concern for others (Karstedt 2014). Again these seem to follow geographical lines: in Central and Western Europe an individualistic but universal concept of solidarity governs individual attitudes and behaviour. Eastern Europe, in contrast, is dominated by collectivistic yet exclusionary forms of solidarity. This dividing line between East and West is also reflected in a respective divide in penal and control policies (Karstedt 2014: 106).

Dominant solidarity cultures are not only evident in individual attitudes, but also in welfare policies. Several studies have asked whether individual attitudes about solidarity, inclusion, and redistribution of wealth systematically vary with the welfare regime contexts individuals live in (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Gelissen 2000; Gelissen and Arts 2001; Meier Jaeger 2006; Roosma, van Oorschot, and Gelissen 2014). These find that in a majority of cases individual attitudes are shaped by the institutional structure of welfare regimes. Notions of solidarity and support for the welfare state vary between countries and are contingent on values of solidarity and inclusion represented by the welfare state regime (Gelissen 2000; Gelissen and Arts 2001; Roosma, van Oorschot, and Gelissen 2014; Meier Jaeger 2006).

6.2.2 European similarities: Convergence

Besides the extensive research on group differences there are voices claiming that an overall convergence of crime, criminal justice, and patterns of solidarity is taking place alongside the progress of globalisation. To assess whether convergence between countries takes place and whether it is facilitated by certain factors and characteris-

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33Country samples vary from 13 to 22 states and welfare state classifications range from the three classic worlds of welfare capitalism identified by Esping-Andersen to a classification comprised of six different welfare types.

34For more information about the institutional impact on individual attitudes see Jaggers and Gurr (1995) and Karstedt (2015b).
tics is best assessed through diffusion analysis (Gilardi and Füglistier 2008; Plümper and Schneider 2009).

The terms diffusion and convergence describe different things. Diffusion refers to the directed or undirected spread of policies, culture, and behavioural patterns across space (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 779). Diffusion hence describes a process of spatial exchange between for example countries, constituencies, cities, or regions. Convergence in turn is one possible result of diffusion (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 777). Convergence occurs when two spatial units (i.e. countries) become more similar in terms of policy, culture, behavioural patterns, or whichever other indicator under investigation. Convergence hence describes any increase in similarity between one or more characteristics of policy, culture, or behavioural patterns between spatial units. Diffusion can also result in divergence, i.e. leading to increased differences between countries, regions, or cities.

While diffusion analysis of policy convergence is a well-established research area in political science, it has only recently aroused the interest of criminologists. The few existing empirical studies concerned with diffusion, however, focus on convergence of penal practices and crime among US American states (Bergin 2011; Boushey 2016). Overall, Europe has remained a neglected area. Since the analysis of policy diffusion in Europe is still in its infancy, most research is concerned with whether convergence exists at all rather than with investigating which factors and processes do and do not contribute to an assimilation of solidarity, crime, and criminal justice policies between countries.

Although not directly concerned with questions of convergence, research on the punitive turn provides one of the first explorations of policy harmonisation outside the USA. Literature on the punitive turn argues that during the past decades criminal justice policies in Western countries have all started to display signs of increasing harshness and therefore bear signs of convergence (Newburn 2010; Pratt 2011). Even though the literature argues that the punitive turn is visible at all stages of the criminal justice process, from policing and sentencing to punishment, empirical assessments have been, with a few exceptions, constrained to comparisons of imprisonment rates (over time and across countries) (Farrall, Burke, and Hay 2016; Tonry 2007). Therefore, the question of whether a universal punitive turn has happened is still far from being answered (Matthews 2005; Pratt 2011).

A second strand of literature describes a universal drop in crime figures during the past century in western countries (Aebi and Linde 2010; Eisner 2003; Farrell et al. 2011; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009). Again this literature is predominantly concerned with identifying whether or not there was a ubiquitous decline in crime figures. Only one study assesses whether this decline has actually led to a harmonisation
of crime rates among Western countries (LaFree 2005). If the rates of all countries follow the same trend it may well be that differences between those countries persist. Indeed LaFree (2005) finds evidence that convergence of homicide rates mainly takes place among industrialised rich countries, therefore setting them further apart from transitional and developing countries.

Besides a partial convergence of homicide rates, convergence among Europe has been identified in a number of criminal justice policy areas such as youth justice, illegal substance policies, policing, and crime prevention (Aden 2001; Junger et al. 2007; Muncie 2005; Standring 2012). Muncie (2005: 36) observes that while youth justice in almost all of Europe has undergone shifts ‘from welfare to just deserts to restoration and responsibility’, the homogenization of juvenile criminal justice policies still bears strong national and regional differences. The relevance of regional and national differences is also pointed out in regards to illegal drug policies among Europe. Even though countries converge in several aspects of illicit drug legislation and responses such as following the guiding principle of harm reduction, evidence-based drug policy, targeting drug traffickers over users, and prioritising responses towards drugs that do the most harm, regional and country-specific differences persist (Standring 2012: 15-17). In terms of policing, convergence is mainly limited to a harmonisation of elite units of policing while everyday street policing is still very much driven by the nation-specific historical function of the police. Lastly, an assessment of similarities in crime prevention of seven Western industrialised countries finds signs of convergence surrounding the tendency to base decision making about the prevention of violent crime on research evidence. These attempts however are thwarted by the need of policy-makers to appease the public (Aden 2001).

Literature concerned with the convergence of various aspects of solidarity in Europe is equally scarce. There are no comparative studies about convergence of individual solidarity attitudes in Europe. And like research focussing on the diffusion of crime and criminal justice practices, studies interested in social expenditure and welfare generosity are first and foremost concerned with the question of whether convergence has occurred in the first place. Studies of welfare state activity the notion of a universal retrenchment of the welfare state, especially in terms of public social expenditure, does not hold up to empirical scrutiny as only a minority of countries have actually experienced a decline in expenditure figures (Castles 2008): ‘the consensus of the comparative literature has been that the case for wide-spread public expenditure retrenchment has been much exaggerated and that, therefore, the arguments for a globalisation-fuelled “race-to-the-bottom” in public spending must be rejected’ (Castles 2008: 3). This suggests that welfare state activity in Europe

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35 Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
appears to be converging. Income inequality however seems to remain unchanged and at best to be converging regionally (Boldrin and Canova 2001).

6.2.3 Implications for this chapter

Previous research offers some guidance for this chapter. First, the above studies indicate that cultural as well as geographical proximity coincides with similarities in regards to policy and attitudes. I therefore expect that the clusters in regards to the collective experience of crime and in regards to solidarity identified in this chapter resemble Esping-Andersen’s (1990) worlds of welfare or Castle’s (1993) families of nations.

Second, a re-assessment of the families of nations concept has shown the emergence of a new post-communist family as well as a convergence of southern European countries towards Central and Northern Europe. Likewise, chapter 5 has shown that many variables change their values over time. Hence, I assume the cluster structure identified between 1995 and 2000 will change for the period 2005-2010. Castles and Obinger (2008: 327) caution that ‘it should be noted, however, that policy convergence, even where it does occur, does not automatically produce a diminution in the distinctiveness of country groupings.’

Third, due to the lack of studies concerned with identifying factors that contribute to and hinder convergence between countries, little prior knowledge exists on factors which might contribute to convergence of dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity. Since similar cultural, political, and economic characteristics appear to produce similar outcomes I expect convergence of indicators of crime, criminal justice, and solidarity between two countries to be more likely if two countries experience similar developments in terms of their economic situation and political governance.

6.3 Analytic strategy

This chapter proceeds in two steps in order to address the four research questions outlined in section 6.1. To identify groups of countries regarding the collective experience of crime as well as solidarity in society and to assess their stability over time, cluster analyses at two points in time are performed. These cluster analyses are followed by a diffusion analysis which tries to answer which factors facilitate convergence between countries based on indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society. In this vein it will be assessed whether convergence is more likely to happen within the clusters identified in this chapter, across these clusters, or in line with another classification of countries such as families of nations.
or worlds of welfare capitalism.

Due to the limited availability of some variables used to measure patterns of solidarity and dimensions of the collective experience of crime across time, analyses were performed on only 21 out of the 26 sample countries. These are Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected based on the availability of data on the collective experience of crime and solidarity during the whole observation period.

Cluster analyses cover two five-year periods, 1995-2000 and 2005-2010. Diffusion analysis in turn was calculated for the complete period between 1996 and 2010.

6.4 European differences: Cluster analysis

6.4.1 Cluster analysis: Methods and variables

Cluster analysis is a method tailored to identifying patterns in an existing data structure. It ‘seeks to discern homogenous groups within a given set of observations’ (Obinger and Wagschal 2001: 101). Cases (here countries) are compared on a number of specified variables and grouped according to their similarity. The aim of cluster analysis is to identify two or more clusters which are internally homogenous and simultaneously significantly different from each other. Similarity between cases in this chapter will be determined using the squared Euclidean distance. The squared Euclidean distance determines the difference between two cases through the sum of their squared differences on all variables included in the cluster analysis (Spencer 2014: 93-95). The smaller the difference, the more similar the cases, and vice versa.

Clusters for this chapter were formed using Ward’s minimum variance method (Hale and Dougherty 1988). Ward’s method is an agglomerative clustering procedure which starts with every observation (i.e. every country) being its own cluster. The algorithm then sequentially joins countries with the aim of minimising the increase of the total variance (all variables considered) within the cluster created. Every agglomeration step joins those countries or groups, the combination of which leads to the smallest increase of the total dissimilarity of the cluster. The analysis ends with all countries being combined as one cluster. Cluster analysis does not stop at an optimal number of clusters. The researcher must identify the number of clusters from all solutions presented that best fits the data. This decision should be guided by an aim to keep the internal variance of clusters as small as possible while simultaneously condensing information.

Separate cluster analyses were performed to identify patterns of the collective
experience of crime and patterns of solidarity within the sample. The following variables were used to identify groups of countries.

Data on the collective experience of crime are structured according to the four dimensions of the concept. Homicide rates represent (a) the prevalence of (violent) crime in society. The provision of public order and safety and therefore (b) efforts to prevent crime was measured with the number of police officers per 100,000 population (police density). (c) Reactions to crime are represented by the total number of recorded crimes per 100,000 population, conviction and imprisonment rates, and a five-point index indicating the degree to which prison conditions meet or violate international standards for the treatment of prisoners. The (d) salience of crime in society is indicated by the salience of crime and public order and safety on the political agenda. The variables to represent this dimension are first the relative frequency of sentences devoted to the strict enforcement of law and order policies in the election manifestos of all political parties competing in national elections, and second total government expenditure for criminal justice system (CJS) institutions.

It would have been desirable to also include measures about citizens’ fear of crime, the strength of the private security industry, and efforts of private households to secure their property through alarms and special door locks. However, data on these measures are not available for a sufficient range of countries during the whole time period analysed in this chapter. Therefore, analyses do not include information on private efforts to prevent crime or about the salience of crime in people’s minds (fear of crime).

Solidarity in society was measured with five indicators containing information about actions and attitudes of individuals, and four indicators for institutionalised solidarity provided by the welfare state. Information about individual attitudes and behaviour was take from the European Values Study (EVS) waves 3 and 4 from the years 1999 and 2008 respectively, while data about institutionalised solidarity provided by the welfare state was taken from the OECD SOCX database.

First, analyses include the percentage of people who think that most other people can be trusted, because trust is an important precondition for solidarity. Second, the percentage of people who find that cheating on taxes is never justifiable, and the percentage of people who feel that it is mainly the individual’s rather than the state’s responsibility to provide for their livelihood, are used to measure how far citizens have internalised norms of solidarity such as the condemnation of exploiting common goods and feelings of mutual responsibility.

Third, people’s concern for and contributions to each other’s welfare was mea-

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36For an overview of a more detailed description of the variables used in this chapter and their sources see appendix A.2.
37For the original EVS question texts please see appendix A.2.
sured using the percentage of people who engage in any form of voluntary work, as well as with an additive index measuring people’s expressed concern for disadvantaged members of society. This index combines three separate EVS questions in which respondents can rate their level of concern on a five point scale (1=not at all; 5=very much) for the living conditions of each of the following three groups: the elderly, unemployed, and sick and disabled. Responses were added to an index measuring the combined concern for disadvantaged members of the population which can vary between a maximum of 15, which equals very much concern for all three groups, and a minimum of three, which represents no concern at all for any of the three groups.

Lastly, institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state is represented by (a) each country’s total public and mandatory private social expenditure, (b) public expenditure for old age and pension, (c) public expenditure for unemployment, and (d) public expenditure for health. Information about benefit generosity is only available for 16 sample countries and thus not included in the analyses for this chapter.

Cluster analyses were performed separately with indicators of the collective experience of crime and indicators for social solidarities. For both sets of variables one cluster analysis at the beginning of the observation period and one cluster analysis at the end of the observation period was performed. This was done by calculating means of the variables for the periods 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 in order to have a more consistent measurement of the indicators.\textsuperscript{38} Cluster analysis requires the variables to be on the same scale so as not to bias the total variance measure through variables which are measured on a much larger scale than others. Therefore all variables were z-transformed before performing cluster analyses. The summary statistics and characteristics of clusters, however, show actual values.

6.4.2 Clusters of the collective experience of crime and clusters of solidarity

Collective experience of crime

Figure 28 shows the process of clustering for the analysis performed with data between 1995 and 2000. Three groups of countries appear to best describe the data, as upon further agglomeration the dissimilarity within clusters, as indicated by the squared Euclidean distance, increases abruptly. The overall dissimilarity of the sample is greater than 100, while dissimilarity within the three identified clusters is well below 50.

The first and largest cluster is composed of twelve predominantly Southern, Central, and Eastern European countries with Ireland being the geographical exception. The second cluster spreads over the European north, covering Scandinavia, EVS data is only available for the single years of 1999 and 2008 respectively.
The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany. The Baltic countries are very clearly set apart as a third cluster, which only joins the rest of the sample in the last agglomeration step as shown in figure 28. This mirrors results from chapter 5, which showed the Baltic region differs from the other sample countries in regards to many aspects of the collective experience of crime. This three-cluster solution suggests that similar geographic location coincides with similar patterns of the collective experience of crime. A north-south divide is apparent in regards to clusters 1 and 2, while cluster 3 represents the Baltic region.

Which features characterise these clusters? Table 1 provides the mean values of the variables per cluster as well as the mean values of the total sample. It shows that cluster 1 is characterised by criminal and penal moderation. The averages of almost all variables in cluster 1 lie between the low values of the second and the high values of the third cluster. Corresponding to the moderate approaches to crime and the low homicide rates, crime as an issue has the least salience on the political agenda in this criminal and penal moderation cluster.

Homicide rates, police density, and the salience of crime in politics are all on low levels in cluster 2. However, cluster 2 stands out for its higher levels of recorded crimes and convictions, which exceed the values of the other two clusters by a factor of three. The high levels of convictions and recorded crimes in cluster 2 are mainly driven by Finland, which convicts a much higher number of citizens than the rest of Europe (von Hofer 2000). Nevertheless, high recording and conviction figures are also common in other Nordic countries, which led to the formation of
cluster 2. Despite the high number of people who enter formal contact with the criminal justice system in these countries, countries in cluster 2 have the lowest imprisonment rates, while granting their inmates the best prison conditions in the sample. Many people are thus diverted from a prison sentence and in cases where imprisonment is imposed, conditions are in line with the standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. Cluster 2 is hence characterised by high convictions and gentle interventions.

The Baltic countries, which make up cluster 3, are characterised by violent crime and harsh interventions. There, homicide rates towards the end of the 1990s are at unusually high levels,\(^{39}\) police density and imprisonment rates are high, and prison conditions vary between being substandard and harsh. In accordance with these high homicide and imprisonment rates, as well as the high levels of government expenditure for public order and safety, crime is a very salient issue in political parties’ manifestos. Crimes recorded by the police and conviction rates, however, are at the lowest level in the sample. Cluster 3 hence appears to be an inversion of cluster 2.

Table 1: Cluster characteristics (means): Collective experience of crime 1995-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
<th>total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>homicide rate ***</td>
<td>1.620</td>
<td>1.392</td>
<td>14.479</td>
<td>3.392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(52.747)</td>
<td>(54.830)</td>
<td>(30.591)</td>
<td>(144.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police density</td>
<td>380.375</td>
<td>235.778</td>
<td>394.444</td>
<td>341.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22.054)</td>
<td>(31.077)</td>
<td>(23.735)</td>
<td>(30.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recorded crimes</td>
<td>3748.888</td>
<td>9495.175</td>
<td>2318.602</td>
<td>5186.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41.527)</td>
<td>(34.404)</td>
<td>(34.094)</td>
<td>(62.509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conviction rate</td>
<td>541.4691</td>
<td>1584.533</td>
<td>537.3256</td>
<td>838.8955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51.227)</td>
<td>(12.650)</td>
<td>(82.862)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprisonment rate **</td>
<td>114.625</td>
<td>77.08333</td>
<td>359.2222</td>
<td>138.8413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47.150)</td>
<td>(13.733)</td>
<td>(74.609)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prison conditions</td>
<td>2.097</td>
<td>1.167</td>
<td>3.111</td>
<td>1.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(48.335)</td>
<td>(28.571)</td>
<td>(3.092)</td>
<td>(50.411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government expenditure CJS</td>
<td>1.772</td>
<td>1.505</td>
<td>2.505</td>
<td>1.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(30.145)</td>
<td>(12.142)</td>
<td>(30.358)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law &amp; order manifestos *</td>
<td>3.125</td>
<td>4.374</td>
<td>5.494</td>
<td>3.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(54.048)</td>
<td>(29.877)</td>
<td>(48.780)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 12 6 3 21

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses.
Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher than heterogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: CZE, SVK, FRA, GRE, PRT, ROM, SVN, ESP, ITA, HUN, IRE, AUT; Cluster 2: SWE, NDL, GER, GBR, FIN, DNK; Cluster 3: EST, LIT, LVA.

The three clusters (or geographic regions) identified between 1995 and 2000 are characterised by systematically different collective experiences of crime. However,

\(^{39}\)See also section 5.3.
the clusters only differ in a statistically significant fashion for three of the eight variables: the homicide rate, the imprisonment rate, and the salience of crime in party manifestos. While the other indicators systematically vary across clusters, too, the differences between clusters are not pronounced enough to be of statistical significance. Furthermore, the coefficient of variation, which measures the internal heterogeneity of the clusters, indicates that in regards to some indicators clusters 1 and 2 are more heterogeneous than the total sample. Table 1 highlights the coefficients of variation of clusters which surpass the heterogeneity of the total sample in bold font. Countries in cluster 1 disperse in regards to government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system as well as in regards to the salience of law and order policies in election manifestos. Countries in cluster 2 have a broad range of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants.

In conclusion, violent crime, the use of imprisonment, and political discourse significantly distinguish different collective experiences of crime between 1995 and 2000. The cluster structure thus confirms the different dimensions of the concept, as the variables which significantly differ between clusters each represent a different dimension of the collective experience of crime.

Figure 29 shows the process of clustering for the analysis using data between 2005 and 2010. The structure of clusters has changed over time. Instead of three, four clusters best describe the structure of the data. Simultaneously the overall dissimilarity of the sample has decreased compared to the data between 1995 and 2000, as the squared Euclidean distance is now smaller than 100. Dissimilarity within clusters ranges around a squared Euclidean distance of 20. Which countries are joined together to form clusters between 2005 and 2010?

The Baltic countries still form a distinct and unchanged cluster (cluster 4) in the 2005-2010 data. In contrast the first two clusters from the 1995-2000 data have split up into three groups. The first cluster contains a reduced number of the countries that composed the first cluster in the 1995-2000 data. Cluster 1 also includes Germany in the 2005-2010 period. Cluster 2 consists of countries that split from clusters 1 and 2 identified in the 1995-2000 period and now includes Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. There seems to be no geographical commonality between the countries that now compose Cluster 2. In contrast, cluster 3 is a clear Scandinavian cluster with Ireland being the only geographical exception. Hence, between 2005 and 2010 the clusters are less clearly defined in regards to geographic regions. While there are distinct Baltic and and Scandinavian clusters (clusters 4 and 3 respectively), the first two clusters spread across Southern and Western Europe without following demarcated geographical regions.
Table 2 provides a statistical summary of the characteristics and heterogeneity of the four clusters identified in the 2005-2010 period. Since cluster 1 is composed of nearly the same countries as between 1995 and 2000, it can still be described as a criminal and penal moderation cluster with no extreme values on any of the indicators. It seems, however, that prison conditions deteriorated as they are now closer to being substandard than to bearing only minor deficiencies. This can be explained by the greater weight that Portugal, Greece, and Romania with their harsh prison conditions have in this smaller group of countries.

The new additional cluster 2 can be described with the concept of ‘high-crime-societies’ by Garland and Sparks (2000). High crime societies are not necessarily characterised by high crime rates, but rather by the high relevance that crime and its prevention are given as issues in society. Accordingly, in cluster 2, crime is an extremely salient issue on the political agenda, the police force is strong, and many crimes are recorded, whereas violent crime is at the lowest level in the sample.

Cluster 3, the member countries of which were reduced to the Scandinavian countries and Ireland, is still characterised as above. Scandinavia and Ireland experience crime in the context of high convictions and gentle interventions. The number of total recorded crimes and convictions surpasses those of the other clusters, but people are sanctioned to less disruptive forms of punishment than imprisonment, as indicated by the low imprisonment rate. Prison conditions are still in full compliance with the international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners.
Table 2: Cluster characteristics (means): Collective experience of crime 2005-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
<th>Cluster 4</th>
<th>total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>**homicide rate *****</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>.862</td>
<td>1.260</td>
<td>7.065</td>
<td>1.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50.171)</td>
<td>(34.939)</td>
<td>(46.311)</td>
<td>(9.408)</td>
<td>(117.725)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>police density +</strong></td>
<td>377.222</td>
<td>386.267</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>337.222</td>
<td>342.571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>recorded crimes</strong></td>
<td>4773.572</td>
<td>5294.561</td>
<td>8357.319</td>
<td>2861.788</td>
<td>5307.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(39.539)</td>
<td>(54.496)</td>
<td>(58.395)</td>
<td>(27.43)</td>
<td>(58.412)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>conviction rate</strong></td>
<td>776.925</td>
<td>838.805</td>
<td>3217.583</td>
<td>593.722</td>
<td>1230.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38.409)</td>
<td>(74.436)</td>
<td>(58.039)</td>
<td>(35.389)</td>
<td>(103.530)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**imprisonment rate ***</td>
<td>113.185</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>72.208</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>133.857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>prison conditions</strong></td>
<td>2.648148</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.583</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.34127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42.388)</td>
<td>(24.411)</td>
<td>(31.580)</td>
<td>(14.285)</td>
<td>(44.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>government expenditure CJS</strong></td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>2.161</td>
<td>1.863</td>
<td>1.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>law &amp; order manifestos</strong></td>
<td>3.107</td>
<td>8.053</td>
<td>3.529</td>
<td>5.903</td>
<td>4.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40.506)</td>
<td>(11.718)</td>
<td>(37.203)</td>
<td>(6.414)</td>
<td>(49.331)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 9 5 4 3 21

Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses; Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher than heterogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: HUN, ROM, AUS, GER, ESP, GRE, SVN, PRT, FRA; Cluster 2: GBR, SKV, NDL, CZE, ITA; Cluster 3: IRE, SWE, DNK, FIN; Cluster 4: EST, LIT, LVA.

Accordingly, countries in cluster 3 also invest the most resources into their criminal justice systems.

Cluster 4 remains unchanged. The Baltic countries still stand out with high homicide and imprisonment rates and bad prison conditions as described above. Likewise, recording and conviction rates are well below those of the other clusters. Therefore this cluster can still be described as experiencing crime in the context of violent crime and harsh interventions.

Clusters formed between 2005 and 2010 are again set apart through particular experiences of crime. Yet, differences between clusters are only statistically significant for three indicators. Like in the 1995-2000 period these three indicators again represent three dimensions of the collective experience of crime: the prevalence of violent crime (homicide rates), reactions to crime (imprisonment rates), and efforts to prevent crime (police density). The salience of crime in politics can no longer significantly distinguish clusters. Instead, the clusters now significantly differ in regards to the prevention of crime, exemplified through different levels of police density.

In terms of within-cluster variance, with a few exceptions, the clusters appear to be much more homogenous than the total sample on all indicators, especially clusters 1 and 4. However, the countries composing clusters 2 and 3 disperse in regards to their police density as well as the number of recorded crimes (cluster 3.
only). In those clusters the coefficients of variation for police density and recorded crimes are higher than the variation of the total sample of these two variables.

In summary the sample countries show systematic variations in the collective experience of crime between clusters. Hence the concept of the collective experience of crime in society is a useful conceptual tool to work out similarities and differences among European countries. Moreover, significant differences between clusters occur along the four dimensions of the concept. The most significant driver of these differences is the prevalence of violent crime. However, also the use of imprisonment, the strength of police forces, as well as political communication about law and order significantly differ between clusters. The cluster structure at both observation periods mirrors geographic regions within Europe, with a north-south divide between 1995 and 2000, and an almost clearly demarcated Scandinavian cluster between 2005 and 2010. The Baltic region has its own distinct experience during both time periods. Also within clusters geographical, historical, and cultural proximity coincides with similarity in regards to the collective experience of crime. For example, between 1995 and 2000 Austria, Hungary and Slovenia constituted a homogenous group within cluster 1, as did Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (see figure 28). France, Austria, Germany, and Slovenia also constituted a homogenous sub-group of cluster 1 between 2005 and 2010 (see figure 29).

Solidarity

Figure 30 displays the cluster process for the data on solidarity during the period 1995-2000. Four clusters seem to best describe patterns in the data. The squared Euclidean distance of the total sample is around 130 while the dissimilarity within all four clusters is well below 50.

Clusters 1 and 2 contain countries which are close to each other both in terms of geography and cultural history. Cluster 1 contains Austria, France, and Germany, while cluster 2 clearly covers Scandinavia with Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Both clusters are clearly demarcated from each other as well as the rest of the sample until the last two merging steps. The western central region and Scandinavia appear to be characterised by distinct solidarity cultures. Cluster 3 is predominantly constituted of Mediterranean, South-Eastern European and Baltic countries, but also includes the United Kingdom and Ireland. This cluster comprises almost half of the sample countries, which suggests that the majority of European countries experience similar patterns of solidarity. Lastly, cluster 4 comprises Hungary, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, and Latvia. While a geographical placing of clusters 1 and 2 is possible, the countries in clusters 3 and 4 are dispersed across Europe.
Table 3 gives an overview of the characteristics of solidarity within the four clusters discerned between 1995 and 2000. Solidarity in cluster 1 can be described as *institutionalisation and responsibility*. The countries in cluster 1 all have high levels of institutionalised solidarity through strong welfare states, indicated by the particularly high social expenditure figures for health care and old age. The public however appears to expect the welfare state to act under the principle of subsidiarity, as citizens in the countries which constitute cluster 1 predominantly see individuals as being responsible for providing for themselves. In case individuals or their families fail to do so, a strong welfare state steps in.

In contrast, in cluster 2 solidarity seems to mainly emerge from individuals. Scandinavian citizens form a strong civil society characterised by high levels of concern for disadvantaged members of society, engagement in voluntary work, and mutual trust. Still, the welfare state is strong and especially inclusive of the unemployed. Cluster 2 therefore can be defined as a *civil society cluster*.

The contrary seems to be the case in the countries which compose cluster 3. These are characterised by low levels of solidarity on both the individual and policy level. The cluster does, however, feature the second highest percentage of people engaged in voluntary work. Nevertheless, this group of countries is best described as a *low solidarity cluster*. Lastly, citizens of countries in cluster 4 stand out due to their high levels intolerance of others exploiting the common good (cheating on taxes), while citizens simultaneously see the lowest level of responsibility of the individual to provide a living for themselves.
Table 3: Cluster characteristics (means): Solidarity 1995-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cluster 1</th>
<th>Cluster 2</th>
<th>Cluster 3</th>
<th>Cluster 4</th>
<th>total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>generalised trust</td>
<td>29.134</td>
<td>60.914</td>
<td>21.303</td>
<td>25.567</td>
<td>30.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cheating on taxes never justified</td>
<td>54.650</td>
<td>52.879</td>
<td>49.732</td>
<td>57.933</td>
<td>52.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.952)</td>
<td>(15.813)</td>
<td>(20.119)</td>
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<td>4.614</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>5.119</td>
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N 3 4 9 5 21

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses; Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher than heterogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: FRA, GER, AUT; Cluster 2: DNK, SWE, NDL, FIN; Cluster 3: ROM, LIT, EST, SVK, PRT, CZE, IRE, GBR, GRE; Cluster 4: ESP, SVN, ITA, LVA, HUN.
These attitudinal patterns might be a legacy of communism. Solidarity from the welfare state, however, is at low levels, which might be a reason that individuals wish the welfare state to be more proactive. Trust among citizens in these countries is low. Cluster 4, hence, is a cluster of unfulfilled state-focused expectations.

Similar to patterns of the collective experience of crime, only some indicators significantly distinguish between clusters. These are all welfare state characteristics. The four clusters significantly differ in terms of their total social expenditure as well as expenditure for unemployment and health. Individual attitudes do not seem to significantly differ between clusters.

The four clusters are internally more homogenous than the total sample on most indicators. However, the coefficients of variation regarding intolerance towards cheating on taxes in cluster 3 exceeds that of the total sample. The nine countries in cluster 3 also show considerable variation in terms of the engagement of citizens in voluntary work. This is not surprising as cluster 3 contains almost half of the sample. The rationale for clustering these countries together appears to originate from them not fitting into other homogenous clusters, rather than because they belong together per se. Cluster 4, which does not cover a clearly demarcated geographic region either, shows high levels of heterogeneity in regards to public social expenditure for health, while France, Germany, and Austria (cluster 1) disperse regarding citizens’ concern for disadvantaged members of society.

While four clusters best described the landscape of solidarity in Europe during the 1990s, towards 2010 this task can be done with a configuration of three groups, as figure 31 shows. In addition, the squared Euclidean distance shrunk by almost a third from around 130 between 1995 and 2000 (see figure 30) to just over 80. This decrease indicates that the sample countries are a more homogenous group in terms of solidarity between 2005 and 2010 than they were between 1995 and 2000.

Which countries show similar patterns of social solidarities between 2005 and 2010? Clusters 1 and 4 from the above analysis seem to have merged together over time. In the 2005-2010 period cluster 1 contains all countries that formerly were assigned two separate clusters apart from Latvia. Furthermore, Portugal and Greece found their way into cluster 1. Clusters 2 and 3 remain, for the most part, unchanged. Cluster 2 is still a clearly demarcated Scandinavian group of countries, while cluster 3 contains a reduced number of the same countries as in 1995-2000. Geographic location appears to play a part in the formation of clusters. Cluster 1 almost completely covers Southern and Western Europe and cluster 2 is spread across Scandinavia. The countries which compose cluster 3 are located in the east of Europe, but also include the United Kingdom and Ireland. Hence, on the one hand, the cluster structure is re-configured towards more homogeneity. On the other hand,
however, the clusters form more regionally than during the 1990s, clearly separating Scandinavia, South-Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (with the exception of England and Ireland).

Table 4 suggests that even though cluster 1 has trebled its size through the addition of Southern European countries its, characteristics remained stable overall. Solidarity in cluster 1 is still characterised through institutionalisation and responsibility with countries in cluster 1 still providing institutionalised solidarity through a strong welfare state. Here especially expenditure for old age exceed other forms of social expenditure, both within this cluster as well as in the remaining two groups. Individual attitudes seem to have changed slightly. Intolerance towards free-riding on a common good is now strongest in this cluster, with, on average, 60 percent of people finding it unacceptable to cheat on taxes in any way. At the same time the expectation that first and foremost individuals are responsible for the provision of their livelihood, shrunk and is now lowest in cluster 1. These changes in attitudes can be explained by the countries which formed cluster 4 in the 1995-2000 data. In this cluster solidarity was characterised by unfulfilled state-focused expectations. These countries, with the exception of Latvia, all joined cluster 1 in the 2005-2010 data.

The composition and characteristics of cluster 2 have not changed. Cluster 2 remains the civil society cluster. In the period 2005-2010 Scandinavia is still a high solidarity area with high levels of trust and concern among citizens, strong civil engagement, and high rates of social expenditure. Decommodification is particularly
Table 4: Cluster characteristics (means): Solidarity 2005-2010

|                                | Cluster 1           | Cluster 2           | Cluster 3           | total sample |
|                                | 27.101              | 65.102              | 29.541              | 35.555       |
|                                | (26.207)            | (10.312)            | (26.703)            | (49.597)     |
| cheating on taxes never justified + | 59.546              | 58.939              | 50.490              | 56.255       |
| mainly individual is responsible | 32.383              | 35.464              | 38.712              | 35.214       |
|                                | (29.426)            | (16.188)            | (29.258)            | (26.587)     |
| concern for disadv. members of society | 10.884              | 10.95703            | 10.31203            | 10.69819     |
|                                | (7.299)             | (6.441)             | (7.884)             | (7.469)      |
| engagement in voluntary work   | 20.409              | 38.426              | 21.108              | 24.257       |
|                                | (35.701)            | (17.654)            | (23.941)            | (40.239)     |
| total social expenditure ***    | 25.226              | 26.208              | 17.15               | 22.595       |
|                                | (11.748)            | (9.906)             | (18.094)            | (22.439)     |
| expenditure for old age***      | 10.013              | 7.971               | 6.145               | 8.251        |
| expenditure for unemployment    | 1.115               | 1.529               | 0.7                 | 1.053        |
|                                | (57.053)            | (39.921)            | (62.873)            | (60.510)     |
| expenditure for health**        | 6.643               | 6.367               | 5.024               | 6.021        |

N 9 4 7 20

Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses; Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher than heterogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: PRT, SVN, FRA, HUN, ESP, GER, GRE, ITA, AUT; Cluster 2: NDL, SWE, DNK, FIN; Cluster 3: EST, LVA, GBR, LIT, ROM, CZE, IRE.

visible in the high social expenditure for unemployment benefits, making the lives of people independent of success on the labour market. Nevertheless, individualism is strong in Scandinavia.

Cluster 3 is apart from the loss of Portugal and Greece and the addition of Latvia, still composed of the same countries as between 1995 and 2000. Likewise, its characteristics remained largely unchanged, so that it is still appropriate to call cluster 3 a low solidarity cluster. People feel that individuals are mainly responsible for providing for themselves and in correspondence to this opinion all welfare state expenditure figures are lowest in the sample. Only half of the EVS respondents living in those countries feel that it is unacceptable to cheat on taxes and only 30 percent of respondents trust their fellow citizens.

Again, mainly the structural variables, i.e. indicators about welfare state activity, significantly distinguish clusters. However, citizens’ intolerance towards cheating on taxes also significantly differs between the three clusters, albeit only at the 10 percent significance level. Other attitudinal variables as well as engagement in volunteering activity vary between the clusters as described above, but not in a statistically significant fashion. Variation of most variables is reduced through clustering. Nevertheless, in particular cluster 3 is internally more heterogeneous than the to-
tal sample on several indicators. Cluster 3, which contains countries from Eastern Europe as well as the United Kingdom and Ireland, shows a high diversity of social expenditure for unemployment and health benefits, of intolerance of tax fraud, of concern for disadvantaged members of society, and of the belief that the individual rather than the state should provide people a living. Countries in cluster 1 disperse in regards to the belief that individuals are primarily responsible for providing for their livelihoods. The smallest and clearly demarcated Scandinavian cluster (cluster 2) is internally homogenous on all variables.

6.4.3 Summary: Landscapes of experiences of crime and solidarity

The cluster analyses provide answers to the first three questions raised in the introduction of this chapter. First, both the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society are concepts which can discern groups among the sample countries. Two caveats are, however, necessary. On the one hand, the differences between these groups are significant only for a minority of indicators. On the other hand, in a few instances, heterogeneity on some indicators is higher in clusters than in the total sample.

Second, clusters of the collective experience of crime partly overlap with clusters of solidarity. Figure 32 shows the results of both cluster analyses between 1995 and 2000. Solidarity with an emphasis on civil society appears to largely overlap with an experience of crime characterised by high convictions and gentle interventions. Solidarity expectations which are unfulfilled and state-focused mostly exist in contexts of criminal and penal moderation. Low solidarity and solidarity characterised by institutionalisation and responsibility do not clearly fit into a specific collective experience of crime.

Figure 32 furthermore shows that neither solidarity clusters, nor patterns of the collective experience of crime, perfectly fit Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) worlds of welfare classification or the families of nations concept of Castles (1993). In terms of the collective experience of crime, geographical regions appear to best describe the cluster structure as Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and the Baltic region. However, the cluster of criminal and penal moderation includes almost all countries whose welfare regimes Esping-Andersen describes as conservative and corporatist. The cluster analysis for solidarity reproduces the social democratic welfare typology with the Scandinavian countries, but also discerns the continental family of nations (Austria, France, Germany). The other two solidarity clusters seem to disperse across Europe following no clear geographical logic or country typology.
Figure 32: Landscapes of the collective experience of crime and solidarity 1995-2000

Figure 33 shows the clusters discerned between 2005 and 2010. The congruence between experiences of crime in the context of *high convictions and gentle interventions* and strong *civil societies* persists, notwithstanding the Netherlands now being a high crime society. Those *high crime societies* in which the existence of a crime problem is suggested by prevention and politics, as well as countries with high rates of *violent crime (and harsh interventions)* appear to foster low solidarity. *Criminal and penal moderation* largely coincides with solidarities of *institutionalisation and responsibility*.

Apart from a clearly demarcated Scandinavian family of nations, or a social democratic welfare regime respectively, clusters of the collective experience of crime do not coincide with prior classifications of countries. In contrast, clusters of solidarity represent Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology very well. Solidarities of institutionalisation and responsibility exist in countries which, according to the worlds of welfare classification, are conservative corporatist welfare regimes. The civil society cluster coincides with the social democratic welfare regime. Lastly, low levels of solidarity exist in liberal welfare regimes with a slim welfare state, as well as the post-Soviet central and eastern countries, which could only start to establish social welfare after 1990.

Third, the cluster structures of both the collective experience of crime and of
solidarity change over time, but they do so in different ways. In regards to the collective experience of crime the three cluster structure from the beginning of the observation period morphs into four clusters in 2005-2010. In contrast, the sample appears to converge across clusters in terms of social solidarities. At the end of the observation period only three clusters are necessary to describe patterns in the data. These findings imply that convergence of indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime takes place across rather than within clusters. The following sections further scrutinise questions of within- and across- cluster convergence.

### 6.5 European similarities: Convergence

Diffusion analysis will help to further investigate whether convergence of aspects of the collective experience of crime and solidarity takes place within clusters, across clusters, or whether convergence is affected by Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology or the families of nations concept. Diffusion analysis is performed separately for the convergence of indicators of the collective experience of crime and for the convergence of indicators of institutionalised solidarity. In contrast to the cluster analyses presented above diffusion analysis was performed for the whole period between 1996 and 2010.
6.5.1 Diffusion analysis: Methods and variables

I followed a dyadic approach (Gilardi and Füglister 2008; Neumayer and Plümper 2010) to find out factors which facilitate convergence between the sample countries. Dyadic analysis uses pairs of countries as the unit of analysis. A dyadic dataset hence consists of observations in which two individual countries (henceforth referred to as country A and country B) in a given year form a pair (dyad). Each row in the dataset lists a dyad-year (Neumayer and Plümper 2010: 150).

The outcome of interest is whether country A converges towards country B over time. In technical terms the outcome of interest is a reduction in the difference between two countries forming a dyad in regards to a measure they are compared by at two points in time (Gilardi and Füglister 2008: 422):

\[ |\text{measure}_{A_{t}} - \text{measure}_{B_{t-1}}| < |\text{measure}_{A_{t-1}} - \text{measure}_{B_{t-1}}| \]

An example helps to illustrate the idea: country A converges towards country B if the difference between the imprisonment rate (= measure) of country A in a given year and the imprisonment rate of country B in the previous year is smaller than the difference between the imprisonment rates of both countries in the previous year. Let country A be Austria and country B be the Czech Republic. In 1996 the imprisonment rate of Austria is 88 and the imprisonment rate of the Czech Republic is 202. In the following year, 1997, the imprisonment rate of Austria is 91. The imprisonment rate of Austria hence converged towards that of the Czech Republic, as the difference between the rates of Austria in 1997 and Czech Republic in 1996 (111) was smaller than the difference between the two countries in 1996 (114).

Convergence can take place in two directions. Country A can move closer to country B, but country B can also move closer to country A. Therefore the analysis is based on a directed dyadic data set in which each combination of countries appears twice (e.g. Austria-Hungary and Hungary-Austria). Consequently each country takes the role of A in one dyad and the role of B in the other. All possible pairs between the 21 sample countries were considered, with the dataset for the upcoming analyses comprising 420 dyads, each of which is observed over a period of 15 years (1996-2010). This results in 6720 dyad-year observations.

The dependent variables, i.e. the variables for identifying convergence, are coded 1 if convergence of an indicator within a dyad takes place in a given year, i.e. if the above equation is true. The variables are coded 0 in cases where country A increases its difference on an indicator compared to country B in the previous year, or in cases where the difference between the two countries forming a dyad remains unchanged.
The variables whose convergence among the sample countries was assessed were selected according to their capacity to discriminate between clusters. In regards to the collective experience of crime the following sections only investigate convergence of homicide and imprisonment rates because both indicators significantly and consistently differed between clusters in the 1995-2000 as well as in the 2005-2010 data.

Only convergence of total social expenditure and expenditure for unemployment benefits are analysed for solidarity. Even though expenditure for unemployment benefits did not significantly differ between the clusters identified above, the factors which contribute to the convergence of this particular aspect of institutionalised solidarity are still of interest. Unemployment benefits represent one of the most outreaching forms of institutionalised solidarity as they do not target the middle classes, but are directed at vulnerable groups of the population. The risk of having to claim unemployment benefits is not distributed equally and is highest for people in the working class with low-income jobs and/or who suffer from chronic diseases (Heidenreich 2015; Karren and Sherman 2012). Furthermore, benefit cuts are often discussed with a special focus on the unemployed, arguing that cuts are necessary so that people are encouraged to work rather than ‘taking the easy way of claiming benefits’ (Marx and Schumacher 2016). Furthermore, figure 27 in section 5.4 showed that public concern for the wellbeing of unemployed fellow citizens is lowest compared to concern for the wellbeing of the elderly and the sick and disabled.

To identify convergence across time, for each of these four indicators a dichotomous variable was created, which is coded 1 if convergence took place in a given year, and 0 if the difference between two countries forming a dyad remained the same or increased. The dependent variables of the research are thus four dichotomous variables.

Since the dependent variables are all dichotomous, irrespective of which indicator is compared over time, logistic regressions were calculated to determine factors which facilitate or hinder convergence. Separate logistic regressions were calculated for convergence of homicide and imprisonment rates, and for convergence of total social expenditure and expenditure for unemployment benefits.

Three independent variables shed light on whether convergence is more likely to happen within or across clusters, within or across families of nations, or within or across worlds of welfare. These three variables are dichotomous. The first variable indicates whether the two countries forming a dyad are within the same solidarity or collective experience of crime cluster during 1995-2000 respectively. The second variable indicates whether the two countries that form a dyad are within the same family of nations. The third variable indicates whether the two countries forming a
dyad are within the same world of welfare classification.

Convergence of policy outputs between countries, as well as convergence of social indicators like homicide, can result from those countries facing similar challenges and situations. In addition, policy convergence can also result from the spread of what is considered ‘best practice’ (Gilardi and Füglistier 2008). The primary aim of this chapter is not to explain the exact mechanisms which underlie diffusion processes and which can thereby instigate convergence, but rather to identify the likelihood of convergence of policy outputs and social indicators within or across groupings of countries. Nevertheless, it is important to control for the existence of political and social factors which might instigate a diffusion process and thereby facilitate or hinder convergence.

Thus, the models include a number of control variables. On dyadic level the analyses control for a number of similarities between two countries forming a dyad that potentially influence convergence. The following variables assess the similarities between two countries forming a dyad for each year in the data.

First, analyses assess whether the two countries forming a dyad are both characterised by high levels of inequality. This variable is coded 1 if in a given year both countries that form a dyad are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest Gini coefficient (i.e. highest level of inequality) in the sample, and 0 otherwise. Second, models control for whether the two countries that form a dyad experience the same economic development in a given year. This variable is coded 1 if both countries forming a dyad experienced GDP growth, or if both countries experienced a decline in GDP. If the GDP of country A grew while the GDP of country B declined, or vice versa, this variable is coded 0. Third, analyses assess whether the largest government parties of both countries that form a dyad have the same ideological orientation. Government’s ideological orientation can significantly influence policy output and therefore contribute to convergence (Hibbs 1977). This variable is coded 1 if both governments are either dominated by a left, both are dominated by a centre, or both are dominated by a right-wing party in a given year. The variable is 0 if two governments have different ideological orientations, i.e. one left while the other one is centre and so on. Fourth, analyses of convergence of imprisonment rates also control for whether crime is a salient issue on the political agendas of both countries in a given year. This variable is coded 1 if political parties’ manifestos in both countries are among the top 25 percent that give the greatest issue attention to support for law and order, and 0 if otherwise. Fifth, analyses of convergence of total social and unemployment expenditure control for whether both countries are troubled with high unemployment rates. This variable is coded 1 if both countries are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest unemployment rate within
the sample, and 0 if otherwise.

Analyses also include control variables at the country level. Even though these variables do not describe the pair of countries, it is still important to control for certain country characteristics which can influence the measure by which the countries are compared. Therefore analyses control for income inequality (Gini coefficient), economic development (GDP growth) and the ideological orientation of the largest government party in country A, as previous research has shown these measures to be significantly associated with crime, imprisonment rates and social policy outputs by previous research (Adema, Fron, and Ladaïque 2012; Downes and Hansen 2006; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Jennings, Farrall, and Bevan 2012; Sutton 2004). Analyses concerned with convergence of imprisonment rates also control for the issue attention given to law and order in manifestos of political parties in country A, while analyses concerned with institutionalised solidarity control for country A’s unemployment rate.

Standard errors were clustered around dyads to account for the non-independence of observations over time within dyads. Time-fixed effects were included to account for temporal effects.

6.5.2 Convergence of violent crime, imprisonment, and welfare state activity

Homicide and imprisonment rates

Which factors contribute to the convergence of one country’s homicide and imprisonment rates to the rates of its dyadic partner? Table 5 shows the results of a logit analysis of the probability that one of two countries forming a dyad (i.e. country A) converges towards the other (i.e. country B) in terms of its homicide (Models 1-3) and imprisonment rates (Models 4-6). Variables with the subscript A describe characteristics of country A, while the variables without subscripts are characteristics of the dyad and describe similarities between the two countries forming it. Models for homicide only include information about inequality and economic development on country and dyad level, as direct effects of the government party’s ideological orientation, or of the content of party manifestos on homicide rates, are unlikely. Altogether the models can only explain a small fraction of the variance of the independent variables as indicated by small values of Nagelkerke $R^2$. The likelihood ratio test statistics, however, imply that in every model the independent variables do contribute to explaining what instigates and hinders convergence between countries.

In terms of explaining convergence of homicide rates between the countries within the sample it appears that characteristics of country A (i.e. the ‘approaching’ country) are more relevant than the similarities of two countries sharing a dyad. Conver-
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<td>Nagelkerke R&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.0504</td>
<td>0.0490</td>
<td>0.0502</td>
<td>0.0545</td>
<td>0.0547</td>
<td>0.0545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>219.0</td>
<td>212.4</td>
<td>217.8</td>
<td>220.9</td>
<td>221.7</td>
<td>220.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; LR</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by dyad); time fixed effects included but not shown to save space. Reference category for largest government orientation is ‘right.’; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
gence of homicide rates between two countries is significantly driven by high degrees of income inequality in country A. This finding corroborates previous research about the positive association between violent crime and income inequality (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Jennings, Farrall, and Bevan 2012; Pridemore 2011). This finding means that the extent of income inequality is significantly associated with changes in the homicide rate of country A, which then influences convergence of this country’s homicide rate to the rate of the country sharing the dyad. GDP growth in country A is a further significant contributor to convergence of homicide rates. Again, this positive significant effect implies a change in homicide rates in country A, which can take the shape of an increase or a decline in homicide rates. This change then positively contributes to convergence of country A’s homicide rate towards the homicide rates of other countries. Similar levels of inequality and similar economic development of two countries sharing a dyad, however, are not significantly associated with convergence of homicide rates. This implies that countries which face the same social and economic challenges might still experience persistently different levels of homicide.

What about convergence within theoretically (worlds of welfare, families of nations) and empirically (cluster analysis) informed groups of countries? Each of the first three models in table 5 test for the influence of joint membership of the two countries sharing a dyad in one of those classifications while all other variables in the models stay the same. The clusters identified in the 1995-2000 data (Model 1) as well as in Esping-Andersen’s concept of the three worlds of welfare (Model 3) significantly impact the likelihood of convergence between the homicide rates of two countries, but in a negative way. If the two countries which form a dyad are both in the same cluster or are both in the same ‘world of welfare’, their homicide rates are significantly less likely to converge. Hence, convergence of homicide rates takes place across those classifications and is less likely to happen within them. This result implies that the differences of homicide rates between clusters as well as between the three worlds of welfare become less noticeable over time. In contrast, membership in the same family of nations does not significantly influence the likelihood of convergence of the homicide rates between two countries (see Model 2).

Models 4-6 shed light on the factors which influence convergence of imprisonment rates. They indicate that similarities between two countries that share a dyad appear to be the critical factors for convergence of imprisonment rates.

First, similarly high levels of income inequality in two countries significantly increase the likelihood of the imprisonment rates of these countries converging. Experiencing the social challenge of inequality in society thus appears to foster an assimilation of penal regimes between two countries. Second, convergence of im-
prisonment rates is more likely to occur if the two countries that form a dyad are characterised by high levels of issue attention towards the strict enforcement of law and order policies expressed in party manifestos. This finding implies a close relation between political discourse and penal policies: if the strict enforcement of law and order policies is a salient issue on the political agenda in two countries then this attention appears to find expression in converging penal regimes.

However, similarities between two countries forming a dyad can also negatively influence the likelihood of convergence of imprisonment rates. Convergence of imprisonment rates is significantly less likely to occur if both countries in a dyad experience similar economic development patterns, that is if the GDPs of the two countries in a dyad either both shrink or grow. This is interesting in so far as it implies that similar economic developments do not automatically lead to an assimilation of responses to crime. GDP development however exerts influence at the country level. If the GDP of country A experiences growth it is accompanied by a change in imprisonment rates, which in turn appears to contribute to convergence. Economic development thus plays a role in the convergence of imprisonment rates, but similar economic developments in two countries do not bring about converging penal regimes.

Lastly, none of the country classifications is significantly associated with an increase or decrease in the likelihood of convergence of the imprisonment rates in the two countries. Hence, the assimilation of imprisonment rates is neither fostered nor impinged on by joint membership in the same cluster, the same family of nations, or the same world of welfare capitalism. Countries converge towards each other within but also across groups. Neither form of convergence, however, is significantly more likely than the other. This finding is important as it shows that convergence of imprisonment rates is not contingent on the type of welfare regime. These different regime types may each have different levels of incarceration as identified by previous research (cf Cavadino and Dignan 2006a). However, the development of imprisonment rates over time does not increase homogeneity within welfare state regime types.

**Social expenditure**

Which factors are conducive to convergence of institutionalised solidarity between countries? Table 6 displays the results of a logit analysis of the probability that country A will converge towards country B in terms of total social expenditure (Models 1-3) as well as total public and mandatory private expenditure for unemployment (Models 4-6).
### Table 6: Logit analysis of the probability that country A converges towards country B: Total social expenditure and expenditure for unemployment benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Model 1)</th>
<th>(Model 2)</th>
<th>(Model 3)</th>
<th>(Model 4)</th>
<th>(Model 5)</th>
<th>(Model 6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tot social exp.</td>
<td>tot social exp.</td>
<td>tot social exp.</td>
<td>unemp. exp.</td>
<td>unemp. exp.</td>
<td>unemp. exp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.00460</td>
<td>0.00224</td>
<td>0.00234</td>
<td>-0.0714***</td>
<td>-0.0733***</td>
<td>-0.0723***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.110***</td>
<td>-0.112***</td>
<td>-0.112***</td>
<td>-0.0252</td>
<td>-0.0256</td>
<td>-0.0269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>largest gvmt. party center&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.470***</td>
<td>0.458***</td>
<td>0.459***</td>
<td>-0.182*</td>
<td>-0.187*</td>
<td>-0.199*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>largest gvmt. party left&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.353***</td>
<td>0.336***</td>
<td>0.336***</td>
<td>0.0341</td>
<td>0.0266</td>
<td>0.0230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment rate&lt;sub&gt;A&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>-0.0376**</td>
<td>-0.0359**</td>
<td>-0.0361**</td>
<td>0.0359**</td>
<td>0.0369**</td>
<td>0.0379**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both high unemp. rate</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>-0.0528</td>
<td>-0.0539</td>
<td>-0.0543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both high inequality</td>
<td>-0.0558</td>
<td>-0.137</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>0.352**</td>
<td>0.322*</td>
<td>0.313*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same GDP development</td>
<td>-0.0505</td>
<td>-0.0434</td>
<td>-0.0444</td>
<td>-0.166</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same gvmt. orientation</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>0.151*</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>-0.0493</td>
<td>-0.0462</td>
<td>-0.0434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same cluster</td>
<td>-0.269**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same family</td>
<td>-0.0174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0958</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>same world of welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0144</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_constant</td>
<td>0.588*</td>
<td>0.590*</td>
<td>0.584*</td>
<td>1.754***</td>
<td>1.779***</td>
<td>1.774***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4856</td>
<td>4856</td>
<td>4856</td>
<td>4912</td>
<td>4912</td>
<td>4912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>0.0848</td>
<td>0.0813</td>
<td>0.0813</td>
<td>0.0803</td>
<td>0.0795</td>
<td>0.0801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>318.8</td>
<td>305.1</td>
<td>305.1</td>
<td>303.9</td>
<td>301.0</td>
<td>303.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; LR</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by dyad); time fixed effects included but not shown to save space.
Reference category for largest government orientation is 'right.'; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
The likelihood ratio statistics of the models in table 6 suggest that the coefficients of the independent variables are unequal to zero and thus exert effects on the outcome. The small values of Nagelkerke R² indicate low levels of explained variance. Thus, the dynamics of convergence between countries are only insufficiently explained by the present models. Nevertheless, the models identify significant influences of the variables on convergence of total social expenditure as well as on expenditure for unemployment.

Convergence of total social expenditure is predominantly influenced by the characteristics of country A rather than by similarities of the two countries sharing a dyad. Thus, convergence seems to be driven by government characteristics and hindered by economic developments as well as social challenges like unemployment. First, convergence is significantly more likely if country A is ruled by a predominantly central or predominantly left government as opposed to governments which are on the right of the spectrum of political ideology. Total social expenditure seems to undergo changes when central or left-wing parties have the majority in government, and these changes facilitate convergence of the social expenditure figures of that country towards those of its dyadic partner.

Second, convergence of total social expenditure is significantly less likely if country A experiences GDP growth. Both total public social expenditure as well as public expenditure for unemployment are measured as percentages of a country’s GDP, which makes the GDP’s significant effect unsurprising. However, the insignificance of the effect of GDP growth in Models 4-6 implies that its influence on total public expenditure is not entirely artificial. Thus, economic growth leads to changes in total social expenditure, but these changes result in divergence rather than convergence of the expenditure figures between country A and its dyadic partner. Third, high unemployment rates in country A make convergence of total social expenditure significantly less likely. The countries in the sample thus appear to pursue idiosyncratic approaches to the problem of unemployment with regards to total social expenditure, which results in these expenditure figures diverging rather than converging when a country is faced with high unemployment rates. This assumption is corroborated by the insignificant effect of similar unemployment rates between two countries sharing a dyad.

With regards to similarities between two countries sharing a dyad, only congruent orientations of the largest government parties in both countries matter. Governance under a similar ideological framework thus results in convergence of total social expenditure and therefore implies similar approaches to social welfare. Countries under the same ideological government might view each other as peers and thus adjust their welfare policies towards each other.
Is convergence of total social expenditure more or less likely within different groups of countries? Interestingly, joint membership in the same family of nations (Model 2) or the same world of welfare (Model 3) does not increase the likelihood of convergence of social expenditure figures between countries. Both classifications are partly based on countries’ similarities in public social expenditure. This might imply that countries that share a classification are already alike to a degree which would render further convergence unlikely. In contrast, Model 1 shows that convergence is significantly less likely to take place within the clusters identified in the 1995-2000 data. Rather, convergence of total social expenditure happens across cluster boundaries, rendering the total sample more homogenous rather than increasing group differences. Thus, this result mirrors the shift from a four-cluster to a three-cluster structure of the solidarity landscape in Europe.

What is the situation like concerning assimilation between public expenditure figures for unemployment in the sample countries (Models 4-6)? Governance and individual countries’ challenges appear to be more important for convergence than similarities between two countries that form a dyad.

First, high degrees of income inequality in country A decrease the likelihood that country A’s unemployment expenditure figures will converge towards those of the dyadic partner. Interestingly, if both countries that share a dyad experience high levels of income inequality their expenditure figures for unemployment are more likely to converge. Similar challenges thus appear to leave traces in the form of converging approaches to welfare for the unemployed. When observed as a feature of country A, however, income inequality decreases the likelihood of convergence. Second, convergence of unemployment expenditure is further hindered by government parties positioned at the ideological centre in country A. This leads unemployment expenditure figures to diverge from those of the other countries. Third, changes in a country’s unemployment rate result in changes to public expenditure for unemployment, increasing the likelihood of convergence. The problem of unemployment hence appears to have similar effects on public expenditure for unemployment benefits, but not on total social expenditure.

In regards to unemployment expenditure none of the classification variables (clusters, families of nations, worlds of welfare) are associated with a significant increase or decrease in the likelihood of convergence.

6.5.3 Summary: Convergence across clusters and typologies

What is the answer to question 4 raised in section 6.1? Diffusion analysis revealed that convergence of homicide rates is significantly more likely to happen across than within clusters. Convergence of homicide rates is less likely to happen if both coun-
tries in a dyad are in the same cluster identified by the 1995-2000 cluster analysis of the collective experience of crime. The cluster structure, however, appears irrelevant for convergence of imprisonment rates. Likewise, convergence of social expenditure figures is significantly less likely to happen within the same clusters than between countries that were assigned to different clusters in the 1995-2000 cluster analysis for solidarity in society. This result was expected as there are fewer clusters at the end of the observation period, indicating that Europe is becoming more homogenized in its patterns of solidarity. Again, convergence of public expenditure for unemployment is not affected by the cluster structure. Hence, there is no evidence that convergence is taking place significantly more often within than across clusters.

Interestingly, none of the other classifications were able to significantly affect (positively or negatively) convergence of imprisonment rates, of total social expenditure, or of expenditure for unemployment. Only in regards to convergence of homicide rates the world of welfare classification appears to exert (negative) influence, suggesting that homicide rates converge across rather than within worlds of welfare. In sum, however, it appears that even though both the worlds of welfare typology as well as the families of nations concept are useful heuristics for describing groups of countries, they are of limited empirical value for describing dynamics between countries.

Further influences of convergence between countries emerge from both country as well as dyad level. Convergence of homicide rates appears to be driven by processes within countries rather than similarities between them. In contrast, convergence of imprisonment rates between countries seems to result from similar economic developments and challenges, as well as from a political discourse that is framed in the same way. Convergence of total social as well as unemployment expenditure is especially driven by the government’s characteristics, but also by social and economic challenges within individual countries.

6.6 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of European landscapes of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society between 1995 and 2010. The key findings in relation to the questions raised in the introduction of this chapter are: first, among the sample countries, there are distinct clusters, each of which has a particular experience of crime in society. Likewise, there are varying patterns of solidarity in Europe. For both concepts however, differences between groups are only significant for about half the indicators.

Second, the cluster structures of both the collective experience of crime and solidarity are not stable over time. While patterns of solidarity among the sample
countries merge from four to three distinct groups during the observation period, the collective experience of crime in society appears to have become more diverse. While in the 1995-2000 data three clusters were sufficient for describing the data structure, in the 2005-2010 data four clusters emerge. The overall heterogeneity within the sample, however, is lower at the end of the observation period both in regards to the collective experience of crime and in regards to solidarity. The overall dissimilarity of the whole sample (indicated by the squared Euclidean distance in figures 28 to 31) between 1995 and 2005 is reduced by a third in regards to indicators of solidarity, and by around 20 percentage points in regards to the collective experience of crime. The cluster structures of both concepts bear regional similarities, as well as slight overlaps with the families of nations concept and the three worlds of welfare.

Third, clusters of solidarity overlap with clusters of the collective experience of crime, but they do so in a more consistent way towards the end of the observation period. During 2005-2010 a clear Scandinavian cluster emerged in regards to solidarity as well as the collective experience of crime. Similarly, for the most part, countries in Western and Southern Continental Europe appear to form a distinct group in both concepts. The Baltic region and some other post-Soviet countries form a third group in regards to solidarity that corresponds with countries which are in the third and fourth cluster of the collective experience of crime.

Fourth, convergence of indicators of crime, criminal justice, and solidarity between countries is less likely to occur if countries are within the same cluster identified in the 1995-2000 data. Convergence of social welfare, crime, and criminal justice between countries hence takes place significantly more often across than within clusters. This is further support for the suggestion that, despite the persistence of regional differences, Europe became a more homogenous global region in regards to both patterns of solidarity and the collective experience of crime during the observation period. However, convergence between two countries is generally more likely if the two countries share similarities in terms of economic and political factors. In conclusion, the chapter offers empirical support for the more general question as to whether a process of Europeanisation is taking place. At least for the sample countries the answer must be yes, but with a clear emphasis on the caveats about the perseverance of regional differences. The assimilation of countries on indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime is facilitated by prior similarity in terms of economic and political indicators, but is more likely across than within clusters.

This chapter replicates some of the findings of previous research. The special role of Scandinavia as a distinct region in terms of both solidarity and criminal justice is well documented (Christiansen and Petersen 2001; Delhey and Newton
Likewise the difference between post-communist countries and the rest of Europe has been stated before (Karstedt 2014; Saar 2010; Castles and Obinger 2008). Studies also indicate that groups of countries identified through similarities in public policy are also distinct from each other in terms of their citizens’ views and attitudes regarding solidarity, criminal justice, and victimisation (Norris 2009; Gelissen and Arts 2001). In terms of convergence, the chapter corroborates the suggestions of previous research that to some extent convergence is taking place among European countries.

This chapter enhances our knowledge on solidarity and the collective experience of crime within Europe in several ways. First, with the exception of Castles and Obinger (2008), previous cluster analyses only focused on one point in time. Thus, questions as to whether a specific cluster structure identified in the data persisted over time remained unanswered. Second, the analysis shows that not only do individual attitudes follow patterns identified by means of public policy, but similar groupings also emerge when individual and institutional data form the basis of cluster analyses together. Both cluster analyses presented in this chapter bear some resemblance to either the families of nations concept, or the three worlds of welfare. Third, in regards to the cluster analysis concerning the collective experience of crime in society this chapter has contributed to previous research which focused on either punitiveness or control structures, by simultaneously incorporating policy outputs from all stages of the criminal justice process. Fourth, the chapter provides the first empirical assessment of factors that facilitate convergence of solidarity, crime, and criminal justice among European countries. The chapter thereby lays groundwork for future and more refined research in this area.

The present chapter also provides a basis for the remainder of this thesis. The cluster analysis provides first empirical support for the notion that there is in fact a correspondence between solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society, as clusters from both concepts partly overlap. The upcoming chapters are concerned with bringing together indicators of solidarity with indicators of the collective experience of crime in society. They will analyse in more detail if and how institutionalised solidarity as well as citizens’ solidarity attitudes are associated with indicators of the collective experience of crime in society. The subsequent analyses take the theoretical view that solidarity is the outcome which corresponds with various aspects of the collective experience of crime in society. The aim of the following chapters is to lay the ground for empirically founded arguments about which dimensions of the collective experience of crime in society correspond with which forms of solidarity in order to stimulate further research on the causal directions of the relationship between solidarity and the collective experience of crime.
7 Connecting Institutions: Criminal Justice and Welfare State Solidarity

7.1 Introduction

Although Durkheim’s original ideas can be traced back to the late 19th century, the question of whether punishment and other approaches surrounding crime control have implications for wider society are still debated in current scholarship (Smith 2008; Garland 2012). One recent example of such interest is the Committee On Causes And Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration, whose members assessed the social implications of penal severity for wider society in the USA (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). The committee corroborated earlier research pointing out negative effects of imprisonment on the life chances of offenders and their communities which ultimately contributes to widening gaps between different subgroups of a population (Clear 2007; Manza and Uggen 2006; Murray 2007; Owens and Smith 2012). These findings challenge Durkheim’s assumptions about the benefits of punishment for society (Durkheim 1992, 2009).

Another strand of literature has focused on the relationship between penal severity and social welfare (Beckett and Western 2001; Cavadino and Dignan 2006b,a; Downes and Hansen 2006; Lacey 2008; Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Hinds 2005; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). The primary interest of those studies however was not to assess how penal regimes and crime control affect society, but to use welfare state types to explain different levels of punitiveness and different shapes of penal regimes respectively. The cited authors all found that high imprisonment rates and other signs of punitiveness were more common in contexts of limited welfare state activity, weak welfare policies, and hence in contexts of low levels of institutionalised solidarity (Cavadino and Dignan 2006b,a; Lappi-Seppälä 2011). In contrast, government investments in socially inclusive practices like welfare benefits coincide with smaller prison populations and less severe sentencing (Lacey 2008; Beckett and Western 2001). At the same time not only penal reactions at the back end of the criminal justice system, but also punitiveness in crime control institutions at the front end of the criminal justice system seem to be less likely in countries which emphasise social welfare (Hinds 2005; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). Again, these findings appear to stand in contrast to Durkheim’s theory, which argues that punishment reinforces solidarity within society.
The cited literature offers two concurrent explanations for these association between social welfare and punishment. On the one hand the co-occurrence of limited welfare state activity and high rates of incarceration have been explained by the underlying social values of inclusion and exclusion, which shape both the criminal justice system and the welfare system in those societies. The value of inclusion finds expression in reintegrative approaches to dealing with ‘failing’ individuals, which includes offenders but also those who are in need of support by the welfare state (Cavadino and Dignan 2006a, see also Hinds 2005; Karstedt 2013a; Lacey 2008). On the other hand some argue that welfare state solidarity and penal regimes are two alternative strategies to govern social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001; Downes and Hansen 2006; Greenberg 2001; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). Here, welfare solidarity and control or penal regimes are not seen as two distinct systems but two extremes on a continuum for dealing with social marginality. In this vein, penal regimes exclude people, whereas welfare state solidarity attempts to include marginalised populations into society. Governing social marginality through welfare takes away from the importance of penal control and vice versa. Societies hence deal with social marginality either through penal regimes, or through social welfare.

This chapter aims to shed more light on the established connections between welfare state activity and criminal justice. To this end the chapter analyses how institutions that control and process crime are linked to welfare state solidarity on the macro-level of nation states. In so doing it assesses institutions at the front end of the criminal justice, e.g. the police, the back end of the criminal justice system, e.g. prisons and courts, as well as government activity and political discourse related to criminal justice.

Conceptually, the chapter sets out to translate and test classic Durkheimian theory in a framework of contemporary state institutions. The core question is whether institutions that control and process crime can shape solidarity which is institutionalised by the welfare state and if so, which elements increase and decrease (institutional) solidarity? In addition, the analysis addresses how penal regimes and welfare relate to each other: are they two distinct systems or are they two extremes of a continuum in ways to govern social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg 2001; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012)?

This complements current scholarship in two ways. First, previous research has often focused on one aspect of crime control at a time, while this study considers crime control at the front and back end of the criminal justice system as well as government activity and political discourse related to crime control. Second, previous research on the relationship between crime, punishment and solidarity on an institutional level has preferred to analyse solidarity’s impact on punitiveness and
cultures of control as opposed to employing Durkheim’s analytical framework which proposes the inverse of this causal direction. There are accounts of the relationship in the direction from criminal justice policy to solidarity in wider society, but they take the shape of case studies (Garland 2001; Kennedy 2000; Allen et al. 2014; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). This chapter adds to those case studies by performing a cross-national quantitative comparison using Durkheim’s framework in the context of contemporary state institutions.

Questions about how crime and punishment relate to solidarity on an institutional level are not purely theoretical in nature. In political systems built upon redistribution of wealth among citizens, it is important to analyse and understand mechanisms that may influence policies of redistribution. The results may shed light on the susceptibility of institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state to processes in other institutions, such as the criminal justice system. If there is a relationship between criminal justice and welfare state activity this implies that criminal justice has the ability to impact the lives of people who are not subject to criminal justice interventions and thus can have indirect repercussions on the lives of the general public.

7.2 A Durkheimian framework of analysis for institutions

7.2.1 Translating Durkheim’s original theory

Durkheim understood solidarity as the bond of individuals to the society they live in (Durkheim 1893, 1915). As a result of this attachment to society people feel a common responsibility and contribute to each other’s welfare. This in turn strengthens their sense of being a part of society. The roots of solidarity for Durkheim lie in shared norms and values. According to Durkheim, crime and punishment are critical sources for maintaining and reinforcing solidarity within societies because they strengthen these shared norms and values (Durkheim 2009, 1992). The breaking of norms and rules (crime) leads people to become aware of the values they share, while the condemnation of rule-breaking through punishment reinforces the validity of these norms and values. In addition, crime can bring people together to talk about what happened, and thus create fertile ground for solidarity to evolve.

The chapter seeks to transfer Durkheim’s analytical framework to institutions of contemporary European societies. Institutions often reflect the values held within a society and also have the capacity to influence them (Karstedt 2010; Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Karstedt 2012; North 1991). Likewise, the ways institutions deal with crime and justice as well as their contributions to solidarity shape the lives and values of people. Welfare state activity
is the most common way to assess institutionalised solidarity in society (de Beer and Koster 2009). Social welfare enables weak members of society to participate in social life, while income is redistributed through taxes and social spending. The welfare state is the institutionalised way of pooling and redistributing each individual’s contribution to the society they live in.

Seen from a Durkheimian perspective, institutions that control and process crime have the ability to affect solidarity, which is institutionalised by the welfare state. If inclusiveness is the common norm represented by operations of the criminal justice system, it will lead to a reinforcement of solidarity. If, however, the criminal justice system promotes an excluding penal regime, solidarity on an institutional level will be limited.

7.2.2 Five hypotheses

The following section develops five conceptual hypotheses about the relationship between institutions which control and process crime and welfare state solidarity. The relationship is not assumed to be unidirectional: a conceptual differentiation between different aspects of crime control and the processing of crime in politics allows for assumptions about distinctive solidarity outcomes. Different institutions of the criminal justice system as well as different aspects of the processing of crime in politics, may stand in different relations to solidarity as institutionalised by the welfare state.

Consequently, the following hypotheses state that the interventions at the front end of the criminal justice system, as well as financial investment in criminal justice represent inclusive or less disruptive approaches to crime and will thus show a positive association with welfare state solidarity. Dimensions corresponding to punitive penal regimes at the back end of the criminal justice system, as well as tough approaches to crime on the political agenda, however, will correspond with low levels of welfare state solidarity.

In allowing for divergent solidarity outcomes the chapter addresses a central criticism of Durkheim’s theoretical framework about the relationship between crime and solidarity, namely the neglect of possible negative outcomes of crime control regimes (Garland 2012: 32; Garland 1991b: 124 Trevino 2008: 240).

Crime control efforts at the front end of the criminal justice system are less disruptive than efforts to curb crime through deterrence, harsh sentencing, and frequent imprisonment (Hinds 2005; Sung 2006). When the aim of crime control is to maintain public order and safety through the increased presences of police officers or private security guards, conflicts can be de-escalated or resolved on the spot. Interventions may be possible without punishment, and crime may generally be
prevented (Sung 2006: 327). These less intrusive and disruptive approaches to crime represent the enactment of a norm of inclusiveness in regards to crime and justice. On an institutional level, increasing efforts to control deviance at the front end of the criminal justice system are seen as a more supportive alternative to extending the penal repression of crime. Efforts to control crime through policing have been described as ‘mundane, non-enforcement general assistance to the public through a larger police force’ (Sung 2006: 327). As such, increasing the police forces is an expression of an inclusionary institutional processing of crime. This inclusionary approach to dealing with crime and disorder rests upon policy decisions that might also increase welfare state solidarity.

H1: Crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system corresponds to higher levels of welfare state solidarity.

This assumption must be put in perspective. It goes without saying that the work of the police can have negative implications for the lives of individuals and for solidarity in society (Rinehart Kochel, Wilson, and Mastrofski 2011; Lewis 2010; Wacquant 2009; Schram, Fording, and Soss 2008). Racial profiling or stop- and search policing are just two examples of how police work can be disruptive for individual lives and contribute to the creation of stereotypes and exclusion. This experienced disruption and exclusion can result in increased solidarity within marginalised social subgroups, but decreased solidarity across social- and racial borders (Garland 2012).

Welfare state solidarity is closely related to active, trustworthy and efficient state institutions. When states care and provide for their citizens they tend to undertake efforts to run effective and transparent institutions, both in regards to redistributing wealth in society, as well as in regards to the institutions which are directly responsible for maintaining law and order. At the same time citizens’ trust in these institutions will likely increase and they will be more likely to engage with the latter when encountering problems that could be solved by a state institution (see c.f. Kääriäinen 2008). A transparent and effective policing system, for example, may show in high recording figures, irrespective of whether the actual numbers of crime increase (van Dijk 2008). This statement rests on the assumption that high recording figures are mainly driven by citizens’ reporting behaviour, which is higher in trustworthy and inclusive (meaning strong welfare) states. Likewise, in such an environments, courts tend to process and convict a relatively high number of cases.

The regulation of disorder in an official and transparent manner via the full use of criminal justice institutions at the front end of the criminal justice system reflects a certain level of reliance on the state to handle crime problems. Citizens’
participation and use of state institution in turn may translate into institutionalised welfare state solidarity for the benefits of society at large, because solidarity as a concept depends on the active involvement and concern of its constituting parts in both systems. Thus, solidarity exemplified in the welfare system would benefit from inclusive crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system.

**H2: Use of police and courts facilitates welfare state solidarity.**

The back end of the criminal justice system, namely institutions that carry out punishment, represent a norm of exclusion rather than inclusion (Allen et al. 2014). Imprisonment can be one of the most disruptive forms of punishment not only to offenders, but also their families and communities (Clear 2007). Incarceration is a means of separating offenders from the rest of society and its networks of solidarity (Allen et al. 2014: 72-73). Unless best efforts to follow a rehabilitative ideal are implemented, offenders’ reintegration in society upon completion of their prison terms is mostly not the remit of, or achieved by, this particular type of sentence. Countries in which the processing of crime relies on punitive institutions at the back end of the criminal justice systems hence pursue a more disruptive and excluding approach to crime.

There is currently no country in Europe that renounces prisons as part of its penal regime. As a consequence, it is not only the proportion of people incarcerated but also conditions within prisons that indicate the extent of exclusion in penal regimes. If prison conditions do not meet the minimum requirements for the treatment of prisoners it is unlikely that they are seen as members of society who are deserving of solidarity. Societies characterised by frequent use of penal exclusion in criminal justice institutions will also undertake less efforts to allow other marginalised populations like the unemployed, poor, or sick, full social participation through a strong and generous welfare regime. Both systems entail values of in- and exclusion.

**H3: Penal exclusion corresponds to low levels of welfare state solidarity.**

In order to pursue inclusionary approaches to crime, institutions of the criminal justice system depend on staff and ultimately on financial resources: increasing police personnel increases governments’ wage costs. Courts, which provide due process, need enough staff to manage the work load, and prisons devoted to rehabilitation philosophies must implement costly services such as rehabilitative activities, therapy, job training, and generally must try to avoid understaffing (Sung 2006). In order to be approachable, inclusive, devoted to due process, and able to pursue a rehabilitative philosophy in punishing offenders, criminal justice systems essentially
require funds. Governments’ financial contributions to institutions of the criminal justice system hence facilitate the inclusive institutional processing of crime. The value of inclusion should also be present in the welfare system, which leads to the assumption that welfare solidarity will be higher, when the state contributes to the inclusive treatment of its citizens in matters of criminal justice.

**H4:** *Government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system is positively related to welfare state solidarity.*

Lastly, the relevance of crime in politics may be indicative of the generosity of a country’s welfare provisions. This point follows on from the third hypothesis: if tough approaches to crime are high on the electoral agenda, it is likely that the preferred institutional way of dealing with crime is ex- rather than inclusion. If political parties in a country communicate support for a strong penal regime and the strict enforcement of law and order policies, it is unlikely that these parties will support or initiate inclusive institutional approaches to crime. In contrast, inclusionary ways of dealing with marginality would warrant little support for tough crime policies.

**H5:** *Political discourse which favours tough approaches to crime corresponds with lower levels of solidarity exerted by the welfare state.*

Political parties hold a special office in the institutional structure around the processing of crime and social welfare. On the one hand they represent public claims, preferences, and sentiments. On the other, they are mediators between the different institutions: political parties (or their representatives in government and parliament) decide on policies for the criminal justice system as well as social welfare. They thus shape both systems and their policy programmes are indicative of their prospective actions and policies.

### 7.3 Analytic strategy

These five hypotheses will be evaluated by means of multivariate regression analyses with data from 16 established European welfare states for a period of 16 years (1995-2010). This period saw changes in criminal justice and welfare provisions, as chapters 5 and 6 have shown. The 16 countries assessed in this chapter represent the three core

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40 Efficiency defined as the capacity to economically apply limited resources to accomplish statutory goals to maximize the number of arrest and convictions does not necessarily make a criminal justice system effective or just. Rather, an excessive concern for efficiency in case processing will inevitably undermine the justice system’s institutional integrity and its most basic mission: doing justice.’ (Sung 2006: 327).
welfare regime types of Esping-Andersen (1999). These sample countries analysed in the following are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

For its analysis the chapter relies on country-level data about social welfare, criminal justice, and the processing of crime in politics. These indicators are available on an annual basis, which facilitates the analysis of dynamic interactions between dimensions of the institutional processing of crime and solidarity exerted by the welfare state.

7.3.1 Variables

Dependent variables Two kinds of welfare state solidarity are assessed, varying in scope and specificity. First, solidarity in the overall welfare system, which is directed towards all citizens of a specific nation, is analysed. This encompasses the total of all benefit programmes available in a country. Second, welfare provisions for the unemployed are assessed. This type of institutionalised solidarity has a narrowly defined group of recipients. It can be understood as solidarity with a socially and economically marginalised group of the population, as the risk of becoming unemployed, especially on a long-term basis, is distributed unequally and is higher for single parents, disabled people, immigrants, people who have a low socio-economic status, and people who work in low-skilled jobs (Heidenreich 2015).

Each welfare solidarity type is assessed via two separate indicators: (a) the amount of public social expenditure (both total and unemployment-specific), and (b) the generosity of the benefit system and specific welfare programme. Hence, analyses for four dependent variables are performed.

Expenditure data are provided as a percentage of each country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Welfare states which devote a larger share of their GDP to collective social needs are in the following assumed to display more institutionalised solidarity towards their citizens.

Welfare generosity is measured with the benefit generosity index of Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto (2014). This index is available for the total welfare system, as well as for the three major social insurance programmes (public pensions, sick pay, and unemployment). The generosity indices are composed measures which include information on how much of a person’s previous income is replaced by benefits, qualifying conditions to be eligible to receive benefits, waiting time until first payment, and broadness of coverage and duration of the respective benefit programmes (Scruggs

\footnote{For a more detailed description of the variables and their sources used in this chapter please see appendix A.2.}
Generosity in this way is thus understood as a relationship between someone’s prior contributions and the amount of benefit coverage that can be claimed through social welfare. Welfare states and benefit programmes are considered more generous if they offer broad benefit coverage and require little prior contributions in order to be eligible to receive benefits. Higher scores on the benefit generosity indice indicates greater welfare and programme generosity.

**Independent variables** The main independent variables of interest are country-level indicators approximating different aspects of how institutions deal with and process crime, namely:

(a) public efforts to control crime and process it at the front end of the criminal justice system,
(b) the penal reaction to crime exerted by institutions at the back end of the criminal justice system,
(c) financial resources devoted to institutions of the criminal justice system by the government, and
(d) political support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies.

Efforts to control crime at the front end of the criminal justice system are operationalised by the number of police officers per 100,000 population. The number of total crimes reported to the police per 100,000 population as well as the number of convictions per 100,000 inhabitants allow conclusions to be drawn on the frequency of use of courts and the density of police required to test $H2$.

Penal reaction to crime at the back end of the criminal justice system is assessed, on the one hand using the number of prisoners per 100,000 population in order to approximate the frequency of use of imprisonment. On the other hand, it is assessed using a five-point index indicating the degree to which prison conditions violate the standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. Higher values on this index imply a greater violation of these minimum standards and thus indicate excluding prison conditions.

Financial support for institutions of the criminal justice system is measured as the percentage of GDP that governments expend on them.

Lastly, political discourse which favours tough approaches to crime was measured as the communicated support for a repressive approach to crime by political parties in their election manifestos. This encompasses statements about the strict enforcement of all laws, action against crime, support and resources for the police, tougher attitudes in courts, and the importance of internal security (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, and Werner 2014). Larger values of this variable indicate more support.

**Control variables** A number of controls were added to the analysis. First of all, since social expenditure is measured as a percentage of each country’s GDP, the regression models control for economic growth. Secondly, previous research has
shown that welfare spending partly depends on the ideological orientation of the government (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991; Hibbs 1986; Schmidt and Ostheim 2007). Hence, a dummy variable measuring whether the largest government party’s ideology is left as opposed to center or right is included. Further controls for welfare state solidarity include the degree of income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, as well as the unemployment rate. The number of homicides per 100,000 population was included to control for a country’s affliction with violent crime. Lastly, all models control for ethnic fractionalisation to (a) see whether the willingness to provide a generous welfare system changes with increasing ethnic heterogeneity in society and (b) control whether the effect of crime control at the front side of the criminal justice system through the police is sensitive to ethnic heterogeneity, as proposed by the qualifying assumption relating to H1. Ethnic heterogeneity was measured with the fractionalisation index of Alesina et al. (2003) which represents the probability that two random people in a country are of different ethnicities. Higher values on this index indicate greater ethnic heterogeneity.

### 7.3.2 Statistical model

The data set comprises 240 country-year observations (15 years times 16 countries). As data meet the minimum requirement of 10 repeated observations per country (Beck 2001: 274; Beck and Katz 2011: 332), pooled time-series-cross-section (tscs) regressions were performed to evaluate the above hypotheses. Two separate sets of regression models were run for each type of welfare state solidarity.

While being able to model temporal and spatial dimensions of the process under investigation, tscs regressions are associated with a number of methodological challenges (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2011; Jahn 2009; Kittel 1999; Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005). Heteroskedasticity, serial correlation (error terms are correlated across time), and unit heterogeneity (error terms are correlated across countries) may bias results when they are not statistically accounted for.

Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that heteroscedasticity is not present in the four models, which do not suffer from multicollinearity either. All four dependent variables feature first order autocorrelation. Hence, the dependent variables were lagged one year and were included as explanatory variables to account for this autocorrelation (Beck and Katz 2011; De Boef and Keele 2008; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). The lagged dependent variable can account for path dependency of welfare

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42 Available from Dahlberg et al. (2015).
43 Sample sizes slightly vary among analyses due to missing values in independent and control variables.
44 Variance Inflation Factors vary between values of 2 and 4.
45 Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data significant for all four independent variables.
46 Dickey-Fuller tests reveal that total social expenditure data contain unit roots. Due to the
state activity and thus including it as an explanatory variable also adds theoretical value to the analysis. Benefit generosity and social expenditure in one year are highly likely to influence benefit generosity and social expenditure in the year to come. Consequently controlling for previous years’ expenditure and generosity enhances the validity of results. Furthermore, all models include country fixed effects in order to account for the fact that each country might have its own set of standard errors.

In order to control for the robustness of results for each dependent variable one model per hypothesis including control variables, one model including all independent variables at the same time, and one model with additional time-fixed effects was calculated. Since the measure for ethnic fractionalisation is time-invariant, it was omitted from models that include time-fixed effects due to multicollinearity.

7.4 Results: Linking criminal justice and solidarity

7.4.1 General welfare solidarity

Table 7 summarises the relationship between public social expenditure and institutions which process and control crime in the sample countries between 1995 and 2010. Models 1 through 5 sequentially include the variables required to test the above hypotheses, while Models 6 includes all variables simultaneously. Model 7 contains country- and time-fixed effects. Model 8 contains an interaction term between police density and ethnic fractionalisation in society in order to control for the possible negative effects of policing in heterogeneous societies. Explained variance is above 95 percent, which is common to models including a lagged dependent variable (here highly significant in all models) as the latter absorbs most of the variation of the outcome.

For the most part public social expenditure does not appear to be significantly associated with crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system. Although the explanatory variables of models 1 and 2 are all in line with the hypotheses only the number of recorded crimes reaches statistical significance.

unit roots, the first order autoregressive process cannot be modelled for the analyses using total social expenditure as a dependent variable (De Boef and Keele 2008). Including the one-year lag of expenditure on the explanatory side of the regression equation solves this problem, as this approach yields the same benefits as a first-difference model without the statistical sacrifices (Beck and Katz 2011; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). It is possible to model the first order autoregressive process for regressions on the remaining independent variables. However, this would essentially mean that different models were being used for the four independent variables, which would render the results incomparable. Hence, autocorrelation is accounted for by a lagged dependent variable in all four sets of regression analyses.
Table 7: Effects of the processing of crime on total public expenditure (in % of GDP); regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>social expenditure(_{t-1})</td>
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<td>government expenditure CJS</td>
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<td>adj. (R^2)</td>
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<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.889</td>
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</table>

Table reports regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; * \(p < 0.05\), ** \(p < 0.01\), *** \(p < 0.001\); Models 1-6 and 8 contain country fixed effects which are omitted from the table; Model 7 is a country- and time fixed regression model.
Thus, welfare state solidarity in the form of total social expenditure is higher when citizens actively engage with the police and criminal justice. The positive effects of police density and the conviction rate are insignificant.

The effects of penal control at the back end of the criminal justice system again match above assumptions. The more offenders that are excluded from the rest of society through imprisonment, the lower welfare state solidarity is (with the exception of a positive effect of the imprisonment rate in model 3). Likewise, welfare state solidarity is lower when inmates are confronted with prison conditions that violate international standards. However, both these effects fail to reach statistical significance.

Models 4 and 5 show the effect of political involvement in criminal justice. Total social expenditure is positively related to government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system and this positive correspondence is significant across all models. This is a first sign that the criminal justice system and social welfare are not competing systems in dealing with social marginality. On the contrary, high levels of expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice systems coincide with high levels of expenditure for social welfare. Financial contributions to one system do not imply a loss of funds for the other. Although the present expenditure figures for institutions of the criminal justice system do not show what the money is spent on, it is assumed that these expenditures reflect inclusive investments in the police and prison systems for the provision of rehabilitative activities, therapy, job training, and to avoid understaffing (Sung 2006). This finding hence lends support to $H_4$.

Lastly, the positive sign of the coefficient of political parties’ support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies throughout all models challenges $H_6$, which stated that tough approaches to crime are indicative of exclusionary approaches to dealing with social problems which should also be visible in lower levels of welfare state solidarity. However, the data suggest that an overall communicated climate of tough attitudes on crime coincides with higher levels of welfare state solidarity, at least when measured as total social expenditure.

Concerning the control variables, the models show a consistent, negative and significant effect of GDP growth on total social expenditure. This is unsurprising as GDP growth shrinks the share of the GDP devoted to welfare policies.

Furthermore, low levels of homicide correspond with increasing social expenditure. This could be a sign that low levels of interpersonal violence generally coincide with inclusive support for the population. The largest government party’s ideological orientation, as well as the unemployment rate, seem irrelevant in influencing a countries’ public social expenditure. Finally, public social expenditure is significantly lower when a society is particularly ethnically heterogeneous. This finding
implies that institutionalised solidarity indeed seems to be lower when people of different ethnic backgrounds pool resources. The identified positive association between welfare and policing, however, does not change with the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society, as the interaction term in Model 8 is insignificant.

Table 8 shows the correspondence between the generosity of the overall benefit system and institutions which process and control crime. The models are structured in the same manner as table 7. The lagged dependent variable is again highly significant throughout all models and is largely responsible for the high proportion of explained variance. Do the above results change when welfare state solidarity is measured with a focus on access to and comprehensiveness of benefit provisions, rather than on financial resources devoted to social welfare?

First, there appear to be more statistically significant links between benefit generosity and institutional responses to crime than between the latter and social expenditure. Second, some links have also changed substantively.

In contrast to social expenditure, total benefit generosity shrinks when the state employs more police officers. Nevertheless, the effect of the number of police officers remains insignificant and does not change with the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society (as indicated by Model 8). The coefficients of the number of recorded crimes and the conviction rate are similar to table 7 and support $H2$, which assumes that the use of police and courts facilitates welfare state solidarity. However, the effect of the conviction rate has lost its significance.

As for penal exclusion at the back end of the criminal justice system, the negative effect of imprisonment on welfare solidarity as shown in models 6-8 of table 7 is corroborated in regards to benefit generosity. Benefit programmes are tight and restrictive in contexts of high imprisonment rates. This effect becomes significant in models that include all explanatory variables. The absence of the will to inclusion in regards to dealing with crime, as indicated by high levels of penal exclusion through incarceration, appears to coincide with a lack of inclusionary mechanisms in regards to social welfare. The effect of prison conditions does not, however, support this notion, as benefit generosity seems to be greater when less care is given to providing inmates with prison conditions that meet international standards.

Benefit generosity of the overall welfare system is positively linked to both aspects of political involvement in criminal justice matters. Firstly, corroborating the results of table 7, it appears as though countries which invest in the institutions of the criminal justice system show greater solidarity in their welfare institutions. Statistical support for $H4$ hence gains consistency. The finding carries additional importance as it indicates that government investments in the criminal justice system do not crowd out investments in, or generosity of, benefit systems. This result
Table 8: Effects of the processing of crime on benefit generosity; regression results

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>0.0872**</td>
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<td>19.68***</td>
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<tr>
<td>adj. $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>0.981</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table reports regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; Models 1-6 and 8 contain country fixed effects which are omitted from the table; Model 7 is a country- and time fixed regression model.
challenges arguments about social welfare and the criminal justice system being mutually exclusive alternatives for governing social marginality. Rather, inclusionary approaches in one system appear to foster inclusionary approaches in the other.

Lastly, $H5$ is again refuted. Political parties’ support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies does not lead to cut backs in benefit generosity. What does this finding imply? This focus of political parties on the strict enforcement of law and order policies might be indicative of the aim to provide public order and safety to citizens and hence protect them from the risks of crime. This focus on protection against the risks of crime then corresponds with higher levels of protection against other risks of live through social welfare.

A different set of control variables is significantly associated with benefit generosity as opposed to public and mandatory private social expenditure. Firstly, the government party’s position on the left side of an ideological spectrum positively impacts benefit generosity. Left and social democratic governments provide more generous benefit systems than governments ranging from the center to the right spectrum of party ideology. Secondly, generosity of benefit programmes seems to increase rather than shrink with demand: higher unemployment rates are associated with greater benefit generosity. Ethnic fractionalisation once more seems to inhibit solidarity exerted by the welfare state, even when the latter is measured with the more qualitative indicator of generosity. The coefficients of the remaining control variables are insignificant predictors of benefit generosity.

7.4.2 Solidarity with a marginalised group: The unemployed

Welfare solidarity, as measured in the above analyses, includes expenses incurred by, and generosity of, benefit programmes for a variety of purposes: unemployment benefits, sickness payments, as well as the pension system. The last two benefit programmes in particular are usually aimed at the middle of society. Hence, general welfare solidarity is a very broad kind of solidarity directed towards the general public. All citizens age and will eventually retire, making them eligible for pensions. Likewise, most people will have to see a doctor at some point in their life, which is a circumstance envisaged by sickness benefits. However, only a small fraction of the population is at a high risk of becoming unemployed and an even smaller proportion enters a stage of permanent unemployment. Receiving unemployment benefits, especially on a long-term basis, is furthermore associated with stigma and negative stereotypes in many modern societies (Karren and Sherman 2012). Likewise, the risks of becoming unemployed and needing to claim unemployment benefits is distributed unevenly in society (Heidenreich 2015). Low-income households and people with deteriorating health face a greater likelihood of entering prolonged periods of
unemployment. Hence, expenditure on, and generosity of, unemployment benefits reflect solidarity towards a marginalised group of the population. In contrast to a society’s general welfare system, unemployment benefits do not redistribute wealth among the general public. Rather, they enable a specific subgroup of the population to participate in social life during periods in which they do not actively participate in the labour market. As a consequence this kind of solidarity with a socially and economically marginalised group might be more easily affected by the norms of in- and exclusiveness promoted through institutions of the criminal justice system which also deal with marginalised groups.

The analyses proceeded in the same manner as the investigation of general welfare solidarity. Multiple regressions were calculated for (a) public expenditure for unemployment benefits as well as for (b) generosity of the unemployment benefit system. Each set of regressions first introduces the variables necessary to test the above hypotheses separately. Additionally, one full model including all variables, one model including additional time fixed effects, and one model including an interaction effect between ethnic heterogeneity and police density is presented.

Table 9 shows the effects of the institutional processing of crime on total public and mandatory private expenditure for unemployment benefit programmes. Throughout all models, most of the variance of the outcome is explained by the one year lag of the dependent variable. Interestingly, a different set of variables shows significant coefficients in comparison to total social expenditure. Some effects also seem to have reversed their influence.

In line with earlier results, crime control through the police again appears irrelevant for welfare state solidarity. The switched signs of the coefficients of police density further implies ambiguous effects. The significant and positive effect of the number of recorded crimes per 100,000 inhabitants reflects the above assumption that the inclusiveness of the benefit system will be greater when institutions at the front end of the criminal justice system are frequently used. Yet, this applies only to citizens’ contact with the police as the effect of the conviction rate, despite being positive, is insignificant throughout all models in table 9.

Public expenditure for unemployment is significantly associated with both indicators used to measure penal exclusion at the back end of the criminal justice system. While the effect of the imprisonment rate is significant in model 3 only, the effect of prison conditions is consistently significant in all models. Contrary to expectations, the frequent use of imprisonment seems not to negatively impact welfare solidarity, at least not when measured in terms of financial contributions to unemployment benefits.
Table 9: Effects of the processing of crime on public expenditure for unemployment (in % of GDP); regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>unemployment expenditure (_t-1)</td>
<td>0.811***</td>
<td>0.804***</td>
<td>0.819***</td>
<td>0.824***</td>
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<td>0.787***</td>
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<td>0.0000533* *</td>
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<td>0.0253*</td>
<td>0.0207*</td>
<td>0.0230*</td>
<td>0.0400*</td>
<td>0.0400*</td>
<td>0.0398*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.000360</td>
<td>-0.00366</td>
<td>-0.00190</td>
<td>-0.00403</td>
<td>-0.00298</td>
<td>0.00554</td>
<td>0.00554</td>
<td>0.00549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homicide rate</td>
<td>-0.00523</td>
<td>0.00698</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
<td>0.0111</td>
<td>0.0134</td>
<td>0.00118</td>
<td>0.00118</td>
<td>0.00167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>-12.15*</td>
<td>-22.44*</td>
<td>-12.18*</td>
<td>-9.644</td>
<td>-10.61</td>
<td>-34.14**</td>
<td>-34.21**</td>
<td>-34.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_constant</td>
<td>1.332*</td>
<td>2.192**</td>
<td>1.323*</td>
<td>1.228*</td>
<td>1.302*</td>
<td>3.116**</td>
<td>-0.594</td>
<td>3.140**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.510)</td>
<td>(0.609)</td>
<td>(0.513)</td>
<td>(0.611)</td>
<td>(0.524)</td>
<td>(0.700)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.732)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adj. ( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table reports regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; \* \( p < 0.05 \), \*\* \( p < 0.01 \), \*\*\* \( p < 0.001 \); Models 1-6 and 8 contain country fixed effects which are omitted from the table; Model 7 is a country- and time fixed regression model.
The positive (and partly significant) effect of imprisonment rates implies that actually welfare states which feature high levels of financial support for unemployment benefits are more likely when offenders are excluded from society through imprisonment. However, when penal exclusion is measured as the care for the wellbeing of prisoners as indicated by the prison conditions they are confronted with, a different picture emerges. Deteriorating prison conditions correspond with less effort to include the unemployed in society by means of public spending for unemployment benefits. It seems to be the quality rather than the quantity of incarceration that is significantly related to solidarity.

The positive and consistent effect of government investment in the criminal justice system is reproduced with regards to (financial) welfare state solidarity with the unemployed. However, the association has lost its statistical significance. Nevertheless data suggest that investment in criminal justice do not crowd out investments in social welfare. Rather than being alternatives to each other, values of inclusion and exclusion can be found in both systems simultaneously.

Lastly, once again, the data show that political support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies seems to positively rather than negatively relate to solidarity, including solidarity targeted at the unemployed. This result too points out that the political relevance of public order and safety, as indicated by the communicated support for harsh approaches to dealing with crime, does not lead to a loss in (financial) attention given to social welfare as proposed by scholars who argue countries enter a trade-off between punishment and welfare when governing social marginality.

Regarding the control variables, GDP growth logically shrinks the fraction of the GDP governments devote to unemployment benefits. Demand in turn seems to increase expenditure for unemployment, as expenditure for unemployment benefits rises with a country’s unemployment rate. High degrees of ethnic fractionalisation again seem to infringe on solidarity with the marginalised group of the unemployed. Coefficients of all other control variables are insignificant.

The last set of regression analyses tests the above hypotheses for the generosity of unemployment benefits, as shown in table 10. Results almost identically replicate findings of the relationship between the processing of crime in institutions and the generosity of the total benefit system. The data hence suggests that institutionalised solidarity with marginalised groups does not stand in a different relation to the control and processing of crime in institutions than the overall amount of institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state, when solidarity is measured as access to and comprehensiveness of welfare programmes.

High degrees of police density are significantly associated with lower levels of wel-
fare programme generosity for the unemployed. Solidarity with marginalised groups thus seems to decrease with increasing efforts to control crime through policing. This finding also highlights the additional qualifying assumption made in relation to H1. While H1 argued that more police staff represent a more inclusive approach to dealing with crime, the qualifying assumption pointed out possible negative effects of policing. In light of these findings this qualifying assumption seems to partly find support in regards to solidarity with a socially and economically marginalised group. Nevertheless, the interaction between police officers and ethnic fractionalisation is not significant, implying that the negative effect of policing on solidarity with a socially marginalised group does not change with the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society. The coefficients of variables that measure the workload of police and courts are both insignificant.

In regards to the penal reaction to crime it is again prison conditions that stand out with a significant negative relationship to solidarity with the unemployed. If care for the wellbeing of the socially marginalised group of offenders is low (indicated by deteriorating prison conditions), care for the wellbeing of other socially and economically marginalised groups is also low (indicated by low levels of unemployment benefit generosity).

Table 10 provides further support for this conclusion, showing consistently positive effects of government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system. These results replicate findings from the previous analyses in this chapter and imply that a norm of inclusiveness positively relates to solidarity with marginalised groups (benefit recipients and offenders) in both systems, which is evident through benefit generosity in regards to welfare and the existence of funds to provide care and avoid understaffing in regards to criminal justice.

A similar conclusion appears appropriate in regards to the consistently significant and positive effect of political support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies. Although this does not imply concern for the fate of offenders it appears to show concern for the general public. Support for protection of the general public against the risks of crime goes hand in hand with the protection of marginalised groups against the risk of unemployment. H5, which suggests that a lack of concern for the fate of offenders indicated by support for tough approaches to crime also relates to a lack of concern for the socially and economically marginalised group of offenders, is refuted in light of these results.

Of the control variables, only left-wing and social democratic governments tend to promote benefit generosity for unemployment benefits, while ethnic fractionalisation once more appears to restrict high levels of solidarity institutionalised by the welfare state. The coefficients of the remaining control variables do not reach
conventional significance levels.
Table 10: Effects of the processing of crime on generosity of unemployment benefits; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 25</th>
<th>Model 26</th>
<th>Model 27</th>
<th>Model 28</th>
<th>Model 29</th>
<th>Model 30</th>
<th>Model 31</th>
<th>Model 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unemployment benefit generosity&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>0.757*** (0.037)</td>
<td>0.768*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.762*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.729*** (0.037)</td>
<td>0.739*** (0.037)</td>
<td>0.708*** (0.040)</td>
<td>0.708*** (0.040)</td>
<td>0.688*** (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police density</td>
<td>-0.00158 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00284* (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00284* (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.00694** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00694** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00694** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00694** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00694** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recorded crimes</td>
<td>0.0000638 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000468 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000468 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000342 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000342 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000342 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000342 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.0000342 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conviction rate</td>
<td>0.00469 (0.046)</td>
<td>-0.124* (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.124* (0.053)</td>
<td>-0.131* (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.131* (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.131* (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.131* (0.052)</td>
<td>-0.131* (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprisonment rate</td>
<td>-0.00507 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.00244 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00244 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00379 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00379 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00379 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00379 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.00379 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prison conditions</td>
<td>0.00000297 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000571 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000571 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000149 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000149 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000149 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000149 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.00000149 (0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government expenditure CJS</td>
<td>0.478** (0.149)</td>
<td>0.584*** (0.166)</td>
<td>0.584*** (0.166)</td>
<td>0.614*** (0.165)</td>
<td>0.614*** (0.165)</td>
<td>0.614*** (0.165)</td>
<td>0.614*** (0.165)</td>
<td>0.614*** (0.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law &amp; order manifestos</td>
<td>0.0287* (0.013)</td>
<td>0.0352* (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0352* (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0388* (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0388* (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0388* (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0388* (0.016)</td>
<td>0.0388* (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.0107 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.00656 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.0114 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.0228* (0.009)</td>
<td>0.0138 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.0181 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.0181 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.0192 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government left</td>
<td>0.150** (0.051)</td>
<td>0.140** (0.052)</td>
<td>0.136** (0.051)</td>
<td>0.169** (0.050)</td>
<td>0.143** (0.050)</td>
<td>0.200** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.200** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.201*** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.0136 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.0101 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.00491 (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.00444 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.00581 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.00715 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.00715 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.00267 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>-0.000480 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.00776 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.00574 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.00688 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.00551 (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.00281 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.00281 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.000446 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homicide rate</td>
<td>-0.0127 (0.086)</td>
<td>-0.0422 (0.101)</td>
<td>-0.0112 (0.089)</td>
<td>-0.0349 (0.085)</td>
<td>0.00149 (0.085)</td>
<td>-0.0561 (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.0561 (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.0391 (0.102)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>-33.63*** (11.912)</td>
<td>-43.09*** (14.839)</td>
<td>-31.10*** (12.448)</td>
<td>-61.86*** (14.690)</td>
<td>-40.15*** (12.107)</td>
<td>-83.80*** (18.678)</td>
<td>-88.78*** (18.755)</td>
<td>0.0283 (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>6.497*** (1.320)</td>
<td>6.675*** (1.494)</td>
<td>5.879*** (1.341)</td>
<td>8.727*** (1.530)</td>
<td>6.889*** (1.350)</td>
<td>11.78*** (1.916)</td>
<td>2.751*** (0.870)</td>
<td>13.15*** (2.046)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table reports regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Models 1-6 and 8 contain country fixed effects which are omitted from the table; Model 7 is a country- and time fixed regression model.
7.5 Discussion and conclusion

To conclude the presentation of results I juxtapose the latter with the initial hypotheses. Table 11 systematises the results. Do these results suggest that criminal justice and social welfare are two opposite extremes on a continuum of the governance of social marginality, or are they distinct systems which both are influenced by norms of inclusion and exclusion for ‘failing’ individuals?

Table 11: Synthesis of results (significant effects printed in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General Welfare</th>
<th>Unemployment Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expenditure</td>
<td>generosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front End</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police use cjs</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>contradiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back End</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support (impr. rate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expend. cjs</td>
<td>support</td>
<td>support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manifestos</td>
<td>contradiction</td>
<td>contradiction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dealing with crime at the front end of the criminal justice system was for the most part neither significantly related to welfare expenditure nor benefit generosity. Furthermore, the direction of the association between the number of police officers and institutionalised solidarity is contingent on how solidarity is measured rather than on whether solidarity targets the general public or a specified marginalised group. While higher police density seems to constitute environments in which high levels of expenditure are directed towards social welfare for both the general public and the unemployed, high levels of police density seem to reduce the generosity of benefit systems. Hence, the assumption that increased police density reflects an inclusive approach to crime and thus strengthens the norm of inclusion in the welfare system is supported (insignificantly) by the present data when institutionalised solidarity is measured with a focus on its quantitative aspect via social expenditure only. $H1$ is refuted when solidarity is measured as a function of access to, and comprehensiveness of, social welfare. While being insignificant for general benefit generosity, it appears as though the number of police officers significantly relates to solidarity with the unemployed: solidarity with this marginalised part of the population shrinks when the density of police rises.

$H2$, which stipulated that the frequent use of institutions at the front end of the criminal justice system (recording crime and convictions) positively impacts solidarity only found support in regards to the number of all crimes recorded by the police per 100,000 inhabitants. The significant and positive effects of this variable
in tables 7 and 8 suggest that when frequent interaction between police and citizens takes place, social welfare expenditure (both in general and for unemployment programmes) is higher. This effect was only significant when institutionalised solidarity was measured as government expenditure for social welfare. Support for \( H2 \) should thus be read cautiously. Solidarity institutionalised in the welfare state seems to have no significant links with the conviction rate.

Penal exclusion at the back end of the criminal justice system seems to matter much more for both quantitative and qualitative indicators of institutionalised solidarity. The significant correlations between prison conditions and indicators of institutionalised solidarity suggest that prison conditions, which conform to international standards and reflect attempts to include prisoners as full members of society, go hand in hand with other institutional efforts designed to include marginalised parts of the population such as social welfare. Notably, the relationship between social welfare and the imprisonment rate is not as definite as suggested by previous research. Imprisonment rates do not have the expected consistent negative association with welfare state activity when other factors of the control and processing of crime in institutions are taken into account (see table 9 and Model 3 in table 7).

The most consistent and significant associations with criminal justice and welfare state solidarity appear for the processing of crime in political institutions. Governments and political parties represent the institutional link between the criminal justice system and the welfare state. Ultimately, decisions about policies concerning social welfare and criminal justice are made by government and parliament. Therefore, whether norms of inclusion and exclusion are present in politics matters most for correspondence between features of crime control and institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state.

\( H4 \), which expected that institutions of the criminal justice system endowed with enough financial resources can work towards rehabilitation, employ experts, and hence promote a norm of inclusion which also shows in higher levels of welfare state solidarity, finds consistent support throughout all models and measures. This finding is important as it shows that government investments in the criminal justice system and in the welfare system do not compete with each other. Investments in public order and safety do not crowd out investments in social welfare as predicted by scholar who argue that governments choose to either employ penal control or use welfare policies to deal with social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001; Downes and Hansen 2006; Greenberg 2001; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). It thus seems more appropriate to analyse welfare policies and the institutional processing of crime as two distinct systems. Furthermore, these systems do not compete with each other but rather appear to be shaped by similar ideas about dealing with marginalised
populations.

Equally clearly, \( H5 \) was refuted by most statistical models. General solidarity as well as solidarity with outgroups (here the unemployed) is not negatively affected when political parties communicate support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies and advocate tougher attitudes in courts. Rather, institutionalised solidarity increases when political discourse focuses on protecting the general public from crime. However, this result suggests that solidarity is created at the expense of offenders, as support for tough approaches to crime are devoid of concern for their fates. Offenders are portrayed as a population against which protection is required and who deserve limited solidarity only. This resonates with Durkheim’s original theory, which gave no concern to the reintegration of offenders into society after punishment, and furthermore argued that discourse about crime enhances solidarity (Durkheim 2009, 1992). These classic assumptions find expression in institutions of contemporary European societies, as the analyses suggest that societies in which political parties are in favour of protecting the general public against crime appear to offer their citizens also high levels of protection against other life risks through strong welfare states.

The above findings tell an interesting story. First, arguments stating that states govern social marginality either through social welfare or by penal regimes find little support within the present data. Investments in the criminal justice system do not crowd out investments in social welfare. The situation appears to be more complex than a trade-off in political and financial attention between either social welfare or control and punishment. Hence, it seems more appropriate to analyse welfare state activity and the criminal justice system as (a) two distinct systems which (b) do not compete. Rather, crime control and social welfare seem to be driven by similar underlying ideas of in- and exclusion.

Second, both systems appear to be mediated by politics. Variables that measured the involvement of political parties and governments in matters of criminal justice show the most consistent and significant effects in the above analyses. In understanding the link between crime control and social welfare a closer assessment of those mediating political actors is thus indispensable. Nevertheless, the negative impact of police density on solidarity with a marginalised population like the unemployed highlights the importance of considering negative effects of policing.

Third, findings scarcely differ between solidarity directed at the marginalised group of the unemployed and the solidarity of the general welfare system. What seems to matter is that, ultimately, social welfare is targeted at individuals who are unable to support themselves. Links between institutions that process and control crime and social welfare seem insensitive to whether this support is directed at a
specific subgroup of marginalised people, or at all people in need.

The above results are based on an assessment of 16 advanced welfare states in Europe. Results may differ in a global sample, or in a sample including the less mature welfare regimes of post-Soviet Europe. These countries might face challenges in regards to crime and welfare state activity, which differ from those the current sample countries are confronted with. The current interpretation of research findings hence only applies to the part of Europe investigated in this chapter.

Future research should delve deeper into this topic. The findings of this chapter might be complemented by in-depth policy analysis of parliamentary voting behaviour about policies related to crime and social welfare in order to reveal motives behind opting for different approaches. Additionally, analyses of public and political discourses on crime, punishment and welfare might offer hints as to how the two policy fields are perceived as relating to each other. Crime control as well as social welfare have implications for the lives of many people. It is therefore critical to understand, and make transparent the mechanisms behind, those two policy fields and how they relate to each other.

What other meaning do the results carry for the attempt to translate Durkheimian theory to modern state institutions? First, it appears as if institutions at the front end of the criminal justice system relate to welfare state solidarity in a different manner than penal institutions at the back end of the criminal justice system. However the link is not as clear-cut as assumed. When the norm of inclusion is applied to dealing with crime, greater welfare state solidarity appears to exist. The results indicate that Durkheim’s original ideas about the relationship between crime, punishment, and solidarity are still valid for contemporary state institutions.

In the Two Laws of Penal Evolution Durkheim (1992) argued that punishment changes according to the type of solidarity binding society together. Punishment would be harsh in contexts of mechanic solidarity, while organic solidarity, which is based on increasing awareness for the value of the individual, would lead to more lenient punishment and more concern about the wellbeing of offenders. The results suggest that preferences for a certain type of justice indicate different levels of institutionalised solidarity. Retributive justice, in which offenders are excluded and possibly expelled from society (exemplified through high incarceration rates, little expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system, and bad prison conditions), takes place in countries with low levels of institutionalised solidarity. Countries with high levels of institutionalised solidarity, however, seem to take a more reintegrative approach to punishing crime. Even though political parties advocate the strict enforcement of law and order policies, the execution of the latter takes place in a less excluding manner. High levels of expenditure for criminal justice and
good prison conditions are indicative of approaches to crime that do not completely exclude the offender from the solidarity community. Penal welfarism is a central concept here. Trying to concede rights and reasons for positive motivations and providing an infrastructure that allows individual solutions for offenders to be found applies the norm of inclusion, exemplified in strong welfare states, to the criminal justice system. Even though Durkheim’s theoretical arguments are evident in the present data, some insignificant and unsubstantial results suggest that Durkheim’s classic theory cannot be offhandedly translated in a setting of contemporary state institutions.
8 Collective Experiences, Individual Attitudes: How People Experience Crime and Think Solidarity

8.1 Introduction

The last chapter showed that criminal justice and social welfare are two distinct systems that do not compete and are both driven by underlying values of society. If solidarity is present in one system, it is also apparent in the other. How does this play out on an individual level? How do features of the collective experience of crime relate to citizens’ solidarity attitudes? Is the norm of solidarity present in the minds of members of a society? Are members of a society concerned with one another’s welfare, and is such concern affected by the collective experience of crime?

This chapter analyses if and how the way a society deals with crime leaves traces in citizens’ individual solidarity attitudes. The collective experience of crime represents the way in which members of a society learn about the relevance of and approaches to crime and disorder in their country. In the words of David Garland (2000: 355): ‘to talk about an “experience of crime” in this way is to talk about the meaning that crime takes on for a particular culture at a particular time.’

Drawing on the solidarity theories of Durkheim (1893, 1983) and Lindenberg (1998) the chapter establishes an argument as to why the collective experience of crime matters for people’s individual solidarity attitudes. On this theoretical basis the chapter analyses which features of the collective experience of crime can foster social solidarity, and which features drive members of a society apart.

Shedding light on these issues can help indicate whether the criminal justice system has implications that go beyond the direct effects on offenders and their immediate families. Furthermore, knowledge about the institutional susceptibility of individual solidarity attitudes will be enhanced in this chapter. This is especially important in welfare states, which redistribute wealth and pool resources among citizens. In order to legitimise this institutionalisation of solidarity in society, governments and institutions need the support of the public and thus feelings of solidarity among citizens.

Survey data on the individual level from the European Values Study (EVS) was used to measure individual solidarity attitudes, and combined with context infor-
mation about the collective experience of crime. These data were analysed at two points in time for 15 European countries to see how the collective experiences of crime and individual solidarity attitudes are linked, and whether these links change over time. The chapter again relies on observational data, and as such the chapter is unable to provide a detailed account of the individual processes which transform certain information about a society’s collective experience of crime into individual solidarity. In order to determine whether learning processes, emotional effervescence, or rational calculation have potential impacts on individual solidarity values, experiments or in-depth qualitative psychological assessments are needed. Analyses with the present survey and country-level data are therefore restricted to detecting empirical and statistically significant relationships between individual solidarity attitudes and the collective experience of crime. Durkheim’s and Lindenberg’s theories provide a theoretical framework to understand this link.

Section 8.2 combines these theories, while section 8.3 develops three hypotheses about the potential impact of different aspects of the collective experience of crime on individual solidarity attitudes. Following a discussion of the methodology employed in this chapter the results of the analyses are presented in section 8.5. Section 8.6 embeds these results in the broader context of the thesis and discusses their strengths and weaknesses.

8.2 A combination of two theories of solidarity

Durkheim (1893, 1983, 1992) argued that members of society recall and strengthen their common moral values, which are the foundation of solidarity, by means of punishment. Punishment finds itself in a circular relationship with society: on the one hand, punishment strengthens solidarity. On the other hand, the type of solidarity which binds a society together as a whole influences the way the society punishes crime. In the Two Laws of Penal Evolution Durkheim (1992) explains how solidarity and punishment develop alongside each other with social differentiation.

As societies become more complex solidarity changes from being mechanic, i.e. being rooted in moral and value consensus in all aspects of life called collective consciousness, to being organic. Organic solidarity still needs moral consensus, but the common ground of the values uniting society is much smaller. Individuals are united as society because the division of labour results in interdependence between citizens. In a moral sense organic solidarity is based on the one common belief that the individual is sacred rather than on a whole set of unanimously shared moral values as in the collective consciousness which produced mechanic solidarity.

Alongside this shift from mechanic to organic solidarity, punishment routines undergo a transformation from being intense, harsh, and corporal, towards being
mainly based on the deprivation of liberty. Hence, ‘[i]n modern societies, the relationships between organic solidarity and moral individualism ought to be associated with a decline in the volume and severity of punishment [...]’ (McNeill and Dawson 2014: 899).

The still heavy reliance on strong penal regimes in some contemporary European countries (Lappi-Seppälä 2011), and mass imprisonment in the USA as a highly individualised country seem to prove Durkheim wrong (Whitman 2003). What consequences might this have for individual solidarity attitudes of citizens in these countries? Does frequent and excluding punishment still reinforce individual solidarity attitudes as assumed by Durkheim? Or might the effects of harsh punishment in modern societies take a different shape and potentially even decrease the pool of solidarity in society? Durkheim provides no answers to these questions other than calling the incongruence between punishment and solidarity ‘social pathology.’ (McNeill and Dawson 2014: 900).

The framing approach to solidarity of Lindenberg (1998, 2006) can provide explanations as to what harsh and excluding punishment might mean for individual solidarity attitudes and behaviour in contemporary societies. Framing theory is a theory about the motivations and foundations of individual behaviour (Lindenberg and Steg 2013: 49). Although the theory focuses on the individual level it stresses that personal ‘frames’, which govern individual behaviour, depend on the social, institutional, and political environment in which they are configured.

Frames are people’s perception and interpretation of reality and therefore define their thoughts, beliefs, and actions (Lindenberg 1998: 83). Lindenberg defines three master-frames which govern individual behaviour. These are (a) the hedonic frame, which results in pleasure seeking, the (b) gain frame, which results in personal gain maximising behaviour, and (c) the normative frame, which leads people to behave according to what is normatively the ‘right thing to do’. Solidarity and the resulting pro-social behaviour fall under this last frame.

Frames compete with each other and which frame dominates the other two depends on the signals people get from their social as well as institutional environments. In order for the solidarity frame to remain salient and dominant it requires constant stabilisation. The most important factor for this stabilisation is the belief that the solidarity frames are also dominant in governing the behaviour of others (Lindenberg 1998: 85, 89). This can result from situational, symbolic, and routine cues that might allow for conclusions on others’ conduct and their attitudes to be made. Information can be gained through day-to-day interactions with others, but also through the institutional environment, as shown in section 2.5. Furthermore, the solidarity frame requires contexts that signal citizens’ willingness to communi-
cate and engage with each other instead of resorting to formal control mechanisms (Lindenberg 1998: 90, 92). Lastly, the dominance of people’s solidarity frame is enhanced by group unity. Group unity can be achieved whenever a social group can distinguish and distance itself from other subgroups of society (Lindenberg 1998: 83).

Hence, solidarity frames depend on the belief that others’ solidarity frames are intact, the existence of relational interest between members of society, and the feeling of being part of particular groups in contrast to others. Institutions play a central role in educating citizens about the values inherent in their society, but also contain information about the actions and cues of others. Therefore they can significantly contribute to the salience of the solidarity frame in individuals’ minds. As such the existence of solidarity frames have ‘microfoundations and macrodependence’ (Lindenberg 1998).

Framing theory helps to understand the effects of harsh penal regimes in contemporary European societies on individual solidarity in several ways. First, the separation of offenders from society through incarceration represents institutional settings in which the public is not willing to actively engage with fellow citizens who have broken the law. Rather, they are controlled and separated from society. The frequent use of incarceration does not present institutional examples of outreach and engagement with others. Second, if the risk of incarceration is disproportionately higher for some social subgroups, such as ethnic minorities and people of lower socio-economic status, solidarity with these marginalised populations might decrease. Third, the presentation of some groups as especially prone to criminality decreases solidarity across subgroups. On the one hand the experienced strain through stereotyping might create group unity and therefore increase solidarity within those groups. On the other hand the rest of society can gain group unity by demarcating themselves as ‘righteous citizens’. Solidarity between these groups, however, will be reduced.

Framing theory also provides an explanation as to how, besides punishment, other dimensions of the collective experience of crime might influence individual solidarity attitudes and behaviour in society. From the perspective of framing theory, the collective experience of crime has the potential to positively as well as negatively shape solidarity on an individual level. The occurrence of crime can be seen as a violation of norms of solidarity within a society or group: crime is a way of taking advantage of others and inflicting pain or loss on them. Therefore, high crime rates, or environmental cues which make people believe that crime is a very salient problem in society like political debates, media coverage, and comprehensive crime control mechanisms, might contribute to a weakening of individual solidarity frames.
Contemporary crime control and prevention efforts also send solidarity signals. They highlight divisions in society, thereby creating unity within social subgroups, but diminishing solidarity between them. In addition, ubiquitous crime control and prevention efforts may constantly remind people of others’ crimes and thus diminish relational interest. As a consequence, solidarity frames might become subject to decay.

To conclude, from the perspective of framing theory, not only punishment but also the general way a society processes crime might be able to influence (positively and negatively) social solidarity in different segments of society, whereby solidarity within groups is likely to become strengthened and solidarity across groups likely to be impaired.

Framing theory complements Durkheim’s theory. The introduction of frames provides a theoretical account for the blind spot in Durkheimian theory, namely the mechanisms on the individual level that turn punishing routines into individual solidarity. Further, Durkheim’s theory neglects possible negative outcomes of punishment (Garland 1991b, 2012; Smith 2008). Framing theory predicts that under certain circumstances punishment can negatively impact social solidarity. In addition, while Durkheim’s explanation of the interdependency between punishment and social solidarity failed to recognise the existence of different social subgroups with potentially conflicting moral values within society, framing theory acknowledges this (Terpstra 2011: 7) and provides an analytical tool with which intra- and inter-group solidarities and their sensitivity to crime control and punishing routines can be understood. Lastly, framing theory can expand Durkheim’s narrow focus on punishment to the wider system of crime control and criminal justice. Which aspects of the collective experience of crime increase and which diminish the pool of solidarity in society and why?

8.3 Three hypotheses

Two sets of hypotheses are developed. The first hypothesis is concerned with the effects of the presence of crime in society on people’s individual solidarity. The other two hypotheses address how the criminal justice system’s penal reaction to crime might influence citizens’ solidarity attitudes.

Solidarity implies taking responsibility for each other, vouching for each other, and contributing to the welfare of each other (Stjerno 2009: 25-27). Crime itself can be viewed as a violation of the fundamentals of solidarity. It is constituted by acts that cause pain for others and exploit fellow citizens. The hypotheses deal with the effects of two aspects of society’s dealing with this breach of solidarity. Hypothesis 1 makes assumptions about signals for the presence of crime in society
and their meaning for individual solidarity. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are concerned with the reaction to this breach of solidarity. What does society do to heal itself after the occurrence of crime and how might this affect citizen’s concern for each other (i.e. solidarity)? All three hypotheses address aspects of the perception of crime control and operations of the criminal justice system, and how these can leave traces in individuals’ solidarity attitudes.

All hypotheses address the effects of the collective experience of crime on solidarity attitudes of individuals. Therefore, some of the influences of the collective experience of crime on these individual solidarity attitudes differ from the effects that were assumed in regards to welfare state solidarity on the institutional level in chapter 7.

The first hypothesis deals with information that people can get about the presence of crime in their society. The main argument is that the more signals people receive that crime, or a breach of solidarity, is constantly occurring and a great threat, the more likely their own solidarity frames are to fall apart.

This mechanism should mainly occur in what Garland (2000) describes as ‘high crime societies.’ This term does not denote societies afflicted by particularly high levels of crime rates, but rather where people’s everyday routines are dominated by concerns about crime and efforts to control it. Defining aspects of high crime societies include the acceptance of high crime rates as a normal social fact, the politicization and emotional representation of crime, the domination of concerns about victims and public safety in public policy discourse, widespread individual defense routines accompanied by a large market in private security, and the increased political exploitation of crime as an issue (Garland 2000: 367; see also Estrada 2004: 420). Garland argues that these processes lead to an ‘[...]enforced engagement with crime and crime prevention [...]’ (Garland 2000: 368): people are confronted with the existence of crime in society.

This heightened attention given to crime and its control efforts can signal other people’s breaches of solidarity and that fellow citizens cannot be trusted as they will exploit and take advantage of others. Indeed, experiments have shown that the presence of CCTV cameras can contribute to building stereotypes and the perception of places as more problematic than they really are (Williams and Ahmed 2009). In order to cultivate solidarity attitudes people need reassurance that others’ solidarity frames are stable (Lindenberg 1998: 83, 85). Crime suggests the opposite. High crime societies, which are defined through signs suggesting that society has a crime problem, thus reduce the possibility for individuals to feel and exert solidarity towards others.

\[ H1 \] (High Crime Society Hypothesis): In countries which display characteristics
of high crime societies, social solidarity is lower.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 are concerned with a society’s reaction to crime. Is the breach of solidarity punished by harsh exclusion or by outreach and signals of relational interest even to those who have violated fundamental laws of social life? The hypotheses are therefore concerned with the core theme of Durkheim’s theory: the nexus between punishment and social solidarity.

Durkheim developed his argument about the stabilising effect of punishment on social solidarity under the assumption that the criminal law would represent the moral beliefs of all groups in society equally. This assumption, however, is challenged by the fact that laws are developed by political elites rather than representatives of all parts of the population (Terpstra 2011: 7). Therefore, the effects of punishment on social solidarity are likely to depend on the degree of heterogeneity in society.

In homogenous societies the likelihood that a moral consensus is represented in (criminal) law is higher. As a consequence in such homogenous societies Durkheim’s original theory, which posits that punishment enhances solidarity, is more likely to apply. Harsh and excluding punishment might be an expression of consensual moral outrage about the violation of society’s moral code as represented in criminal law. Thus, in more homogenous societies I expect harsh punishment, as represented by the frequent use of imprisonment and bad prison conditions, and people’s individual solidarity attitudes to be positively associated with each other.

H2a (Harsh Justice Hypothesis): In homogenous societies harsh punishment corresponds with high levels of social solidarity.

The situation should be different in highly fragmented societies, i.e. societies composed of many social subgroups which are distinguished by social stratification along the lines of, for example, income, ethnic backgrounds, or political ideologies. In those fragmented societies it is far less likely that criminal law represents values that are equally important to all members, or subgroups, of society. The fact that ethnic minorities and people of lower socio-economic status are disproportionately represented in prisons as well as often targeted by crime control strategies lends support to this interpretation.

The exertion of harsh justice in such heterogeneous societies is hence less likely to be indicative of a common moral outrage in response to crime, but rather a reflection of the common moral framework of one particular (usually powerful) social subgroup. The harsher the punishment, the more likely it is that this subgroup wants to impose its moral framework on others. While harsh punishment might increase the solidarity of that particular subgroup whose norms and values are represented in the criminal law, solidarity between subgroups is likely to suffer. Consequently, the
pool of solidarity in heterogeneous societies decreases with the frequency of harsh and excluding punishment.

\( H_{2b}(\text{Harsh Justice Hypothesis}) \): In heterogeneous societies harsh punishment corresponds with low levels of social solidarity.

The last hypothesis delves deeper into the subject of punishment and the role of signals of solidarity towards the offender. The use of inclusive approaches to crime signals to citizens a relational interest towards offenders. In contrast, punishment with little emphasis on a deviant’s reintegration signals that society does not extend solidarity to deviant groups. These people are separated from the rest of society and stereotyped as a dangerous subgroup (Allen et al. 2014). Institutional examples of in- and exclusion of deviant groups can leave traces in people’s individual solidarity attitudes. Norms of solidarity embodied in institutional practices are central to maintaining a culture of solidarity. According to framing theory such a culture of solidarity is necessary for individuals to cultivate their own solidarity attitudes. Harsh approaches to punishing offenders are institutional examples of exclusion, devoid of solidarity with offenders. Therefore, levels of individual solidarity should be lower in contexts where little emphasis is put on the reintegration of offenders into society upon completion of their sentence.

In order to offenders who are separated from society through imprisonment support for reintegration, such as counselling, education, and vocational training, prisons require sufficient funds. High levels of expenditure per prison inmate are indicative of institutional inclusion of offenders. This reflects a culture of solidarity, which should also be evident in citizens’ solidarity attitudes.

\( H_{3}(\text{Expenditure Hypothesis}) \): High levels of expenditure for prison inmates corresponds with higher levels of social solidarity.

8.4 Analytical strategy

Analyses are based on multilevel data which combine information about individual solidarity attitudes provided by the European Values Study (EVS) with contextual country-level variables about crime control, the fear of crime, and political discourse about crime. Chapters 5 and 6 show that indicators of solidarity, as well as indicators of the collective experience of crime, have undergone changes. Thus, data were analysed at two points in time, 1999 and 2008, to see whether the identified relationships between the collective experience of crime and individual solidarity attitudes are robust across time or whether they too have changed.

Complete individual and country level data for 1999 and 2008 were available for a total of 15 sample countries. These are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The countries are predominantly situated in Western Europe but with Slovakia and Poland the sample also includes two post-communist countries.

### 8.4.1 Variables

**Dependent variables** Solidarity attitudes of individuals will be the dependent variables of the analysis.\(^47\) Two separate indicators were used to operationalise solidarity: (a) people’s trust in others and (b) their concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. These two variables measure two core aspects of Lindenberg’s (1998, 2006) theory of solidarity: trust indicates whether people assume that others’ solidarity frames are intact, while concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society indicates people’s own attachment to the norm of solidarity.

Trust in others is operationalised as generalised trust as available from the EVS. The EVS questionnaires in wave three (1999) and four (2008) ask respondents: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ Participants must decide between two answer categories: ‘(1) Most people can be trusted’ and ‘(2) One cannot be too careful.’ This variable was coded as a binary variable to indicate whether a respondent is of the opinion that others can generally be trusted.

People’s own solidarity frames is operationalised by the concern they express for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. This concern can instigate willingness to contribute to the welfare of these people, or support of institutions that do and hence is in line with definitions of solidarity as the ‘willingness to promote the welfare of other people.’(Paskov and Dewilde 2012). Concern for the living conditions of others represents people’s attachment to the norm of solidarity. EVS participants were asked: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of:’ (a) ‘elderly people in [COUNTRY]’, (b) ‘unemployed people in [COUNTRY]’, and (c) ‘sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’. For each group respondents could rate their concern on a five-point-scale ranging from 5 meaning ‘very much’ to 1 meaning ‘not at all’. From these answers an additive index measuring the combined concern for disadvantaged members of society, represented by the unemployed, sick and disabled, and elderly, was constructed. This additive index can vary between a minimum of 3, which represents no concern at all for any of the three groups, and a maximum of 15, which equals very much concern for all three

\(^47\)For a more detailed description of the variables and their sources used in this chapter please see appendix A.2.
Independent variables  Solidarity derives from individuals’ normative frame. If the normative frame is weak, people’s attitudes and actions are unlikely to be shaped by solidarity. Therefore, analyses include a measure for the weakness of people’s normative frame on the individual level. This was indicated as people's intolerance of having a neighbour with a criminal record. If the normative frame was strong people would extend their solidarity and trust to people who had violated norms and accept them as neighbours. I assume the normative frames of respondents to be intact if they do not mind living next to people with a criminal record and to be weak if they refuse to live next to neighbours with a criminal history. Intolerance towards living next to a neighbour with a criminal record was measured with an EVS variable, for which respondents had to pick among a list of several social groups the ones that they would not want to live next to, one of which was ‘people with a criminal record.’ People who stated they do not want to live next to people with a criminal record are assumed to have a weak normative frame.

EVS data of individuals were supplemented by context data about the collective experience of crime. These are either country level data, or individual data aggregated to the country level. Context data were again collected for the two years for which the EVS provides data (1999 and 2008). The fact that the EVS interview dates vary between 2007 and 2008 as well as between 1999 and 2000 between countries was taken into account and context data for the respective countries were taken from the year in which the interview took place. The main independent variables were categorised into three groups required to test the above hypotheses.

The first group of variables model ‘high crime societies.’ These are described as societies with increased public awareness and concern for crime and crime rates, in which crime as an issue is increasingly exploited as a political issue, and where concerns are mainly framed around victims and public safety (Estrada 2004: 420; Garland 2000: 367). Correspondingly, a large market in private security exists and efforts to control crime prevail in the public sphere (Garland 2000: 369). While it is difficult to capture all aspects that constitute high crime societies the analysis uses a range of indicators which represent several central characteristics of them. Homicide rates indicate the prevalence of violent crime in society, while the number of total recorded crimes (per 100,000 inhabitants) represent public sensibilities towards crime. The latter is supplemented by an indicator of fear of crime in society. This indicator is the percentage of respondents per country who feel unsafe or very unsafe when walking alone in their area after dark, aggregated from information

48For fear of crime and security density the temporally closest available data points were used.
provided by the European Social Survey waves 1 and 4. Permeating efforts to control crime are measured with two indicators for the number of people working as police officers on the one hand and private security guards on the other. Both measures are provided per 100,000 population. Lastly, the issue salience of crime control on the political agenda is indicated by the relative frequency of sentences in political parties’ election manifestos devoted to supporting strict enforcement of law and order policies per year and country based on data provided by the Manifesto Project Database (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014).

The second group of variables refers to the harsh justice hypothesis and encompass firstly the imprisonment rate (number of prisoners per 100,000 population, European Sourcebook), secondly a five-point-scale indicating the degree to which prison conditions violate the international standards for the treatment of prisoners, and thirdly an interaction term between the imprisonment rate and ethnic heterogeneity in society. Because the 15 sample countries only vary between scores 1 to 4 of the five-point-scale for prison conditions, the first four categories of the index were used as separate binary variables in the analyses. The score of 1 indicating that prison conditions are in full compliance with international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners is used as a reference category throughout all models. The three other binary variables indicate whether a country’s prisons have minor deficiencies, whether the conditions are substandard based on international standards, or whether the conditions are harsh with prevailing violence among inmates and between inmates and staff. Ethnic heterogeneity in society is indicated by the ethnic fractionalisation index provided by Alesina et al. (2003). Higher values on this index indicate higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The measure of Alesina et al. (2003) was chosen over the percentage of EVS respondents whose parents were born in a foreign country because the latter measure misappropriates third and older generation ethnic heterogeneity.

Lastly, the expenditure hypothesis requires a measure which relativises government expenditure for the prison system to the number of inmates. This was achieved by dividing the percentage of general government expenditure devoted to the prison system by the imprisonment rate. This quotient was multiplied by 1000 to eliminate zeros after the decimal point. Higher values of this measure indicate that a greater fraction of government expenditure for the prison system is available per prisoner.

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49 Original question text: ‘How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in your local area or neighbourhood after dark?’ Answer categories: ‘very safe’, ‘safe’, ‘unsafe’, ‘very unsafe.’
Control variables  A number of control variables were added to the analyses. On an individual level the models control for the gender of respondents,\textsuperscript{50} age in years, and highest educational level attained\textsuperscript{51} of the EVS respondents. Even though literature indicates that income is a significant predictor for people’s generalised trust, I did not include an income variable in the regressions. First of all, the information is partly already included in the educational attainment of respondents, as income and education highly correlate. Furthermore, the EVS does not provide a consistent measure of income across waves. The only consistent measure across waves is a categorical variable with income divided in three levels: ‘low’, ‘middle’, and ‘high’.\textsuperscript{52}

On a country level the analyses control for income inequality and GDP growth compared to the previous year. GDP growth was chosen over GDP per capita as the latter is a static indicator of wealth in society. GDP growth, or decline, is better able to capture the economic climate in society, which is more likely to influence outreach to citizens. Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient.

8.4.2 Statistical model

Multilevel analysis is best suited to testing the influence of contextual data on individual attitudes (Janmaat and Braun 2009; Leeuw and Meijer 2008). Multilevel models can distinguish between the variance of the outcome (here individual solidarity attitudes), which is explained by context (information on country-level), and which is explained by individual information (characteristics of the respondents). The robustness of multi-level modelling estimates depends on a large enough sample-size regarding the context level. Recommendations for sufficient sample-sizes on context vary from 10 to 50 units (Braun et al. 2010: 21f). The data meet these requirements by providing context information for 15 countries.

Separate analyses were run for the two dependent variables for data in 1999 and 2008. Analyses were repeated separately for the three different income groups provided by the EVS (see above). Garland (2000) conceptualises high crime societies to be mainly a phenomenon that has implications for the attitudes of the middle class. Analyses by income groups investigate whether the effects discovered in the main analyses differ between low, middle, and high-income groups.

Logistic multilevel models were calculated for all analyses that have trust in others as dependent variable because this variable is binary. The second dependent

\textsuperscript{50}Gender of respondents is indicated by a dummy variable which is 1 if the respondent is female.

\textsuperscript{51}Highest educational level attained is measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Inadequately completed elementary education) to 8 (University with degree/higher education).

variable, which measures concern for disadvantaged members of society, ranges from 3 to 15. This allows for linear multilevel models to be calculated in all analyses that use concern for disadvantaged members of society as a dependent variable.

All analyses were calculated with random intercepts at country level but with fixed slopes. This means that the slopes of the estimated regression lines (i.e. the coefficients of the variables) are the same for every country, but the regression lines of each country can have their own individual starting points. Random intercepts thus allow for heterogeneity between countries in the overall levels of trust and concern between citizens (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004: 167-168). To mitigate potential problems of multicollinearity, the variables that were interacted with each other (imprisonment rate and ethnic fractionalisation) were mean-centred before being included in the analyses.53

Analyses for the year 1999 were run on data of 17,853 individuals in all models where trust is the dependent variable, and on data of 18,320 individuals in all models where solidarity is measured as concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. Analyses for the year 2008 were run on data for 20,110 individuals in all models which used generalised trust as dependent variable, and data of 20,555 individuals in all models which used concern for disadvantaged members of society as dependent variable. In every analysis context data was supplied for the 15 countries in which the EVS respondents live. Sample sizes vary between dependent variables due to missing values, but are constant across model specification.

8.5 Results

The following sections present results for both aspects of social solidarity. First, the hypotheses are tested for their effect on people’s generalised trust in others. The subsequent analyses present models in which the dependent variable was people’s concern for disadvantaged members of society.

8.5.1 Assumptions about others: Generalised trust

Influence of high crime societies

Do features of high crime societies reduce trust among citizens? Table 12 shows the effects of variables, which were used to measure characteristics of high crime societies, on people’s trust in others in 1999. Model 1 introduces the measure for the weakness of people’s individual normative frame, namely intolerance towards living next to a neighbour with a criminal record. Models 2 and 3 introduce variables for criminal justice proceedings and the salience of crime in society separately, while

model 4 shows the effects of all variables used to assess high crime societies simultaneously. Akaike’s and the Bayesian information criterion (AIC and BIC) suggest that the model fits do not differ notably between models. Estimated variance between the intercepts of countries varies between .26 and .1 across models. Between 7 and 3 percent of variance in trust in others can be accounted for by country-specific differences (intraclass correlation).

Table 12: Effects of high crime societies on generalised trust (binary) in 1999; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>-0.454***</td>
<td>-0.451***</td>
<td>-0.454***</td>
<td>-0.451***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
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<td>homicide rate</td>
<td>-0.0350</td>
<td>-0.0189</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
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<td>0.0000528</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0000642)</td>
<td>(0.0000669)</td>
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<td>police density</td>
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<td>-0.00226</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00245)</td>
<td>(0.00243)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>security density</td>
<td>-0.00322*</td>
<td>-0.00361*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00126)</td>
<td>(0.00148)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>fear of crime</td>
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<td>-0.000119</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0326)</td>
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<td>law &amp; order manifestos</td>
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<td>GDP growth</td>
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<td>Gini coefficient</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(1.038)</td>
<td>(1.500)</td>
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<td>intraclass correlation</td>
<td>0.07273</td>
<td>0.02925</td>
<td>0.07137</td>
<td>0.02850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>-10185.6</td>
<td>-10178.7</td>
<td>-10185.5</td>
<td>-10178.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>20389.3</td>
<td>20383.4</td>
<td>20393.0</td>
<td>20387.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>20459.4</td>
<td>20484.6</td>
<td>20478.7</td>
<td>20503.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17853</td>
<td>17853</td>
<td>17853</td>
<td>17853</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Conforming to assumptions respondents, who feel uncomfortable having a person with a criminal record in the neighbourhood are also significantly less trusting towards their fellow citizens throughout all models. In regards to features of high
crime societies, only the number of private security officers employed per 100,000 population seems to be significantly associated with people’s generalised trust. The higher the private security and hence the level of visible efforts for crime control and monitoring, the less people trust each other. The correlation also allows for an alternative interpretation: the less members of a society trust each other the more they try to establish control and surveillance by means of private security. With the exception of the number of recorded crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, the other effects also lend support to H1 and suggest that visible efforts to control crime and high levels of public and political salience of crime reduce trust between citizens. These findings however fail to reach statistical significance. The data thus suggest that high crime societies erode trust between citizens, but statistical significance is limited to one indicator only. Effects remain stable throughout different model specifications.

Control variables on the individual level show significant and consistent effects of age and educational attainment. Older respondents and respondents with a higher degree of formal education are significantly more likely to choose trust over distrust in dealing with other people. On the context level, the amount of inequality in society seems to negatively and significantly reduce people’s likelihood to trust others. This effect however forfeits its significance with the inclusion of other context variables (models 2-4). GDP growth is positively associated with generalised trust, but the effect is not consistently significant across models. Ethnic heterogeneity in society does not seem to matter for people’s generalised trust.

Table 13 shows the effects of features of high crime societies on people’s trust in others in the year 2008. Variables are added in the manner described for table 12. In 2008 the models do not seem to fit the data as well as in 1999, as indicated by the slightly higher values of AIC and BIC. Variation in the intercepts between countries is within the same range as shown above. Country-level differences still account for between 2.7 and 7 percent of variance in regards to trust in others. The data in 2008 confirm the significant negative effects of intolerance towards neighbours with a criminal record as well as high levels of private security density on people’s trust in others. Furthermore, significant effects of police density (models 2 and 4), and the support for the tough enforcement of law and order policies expressed in manifestos, (model 4) are evident. In contexts of high levels of police density, people are significantly less likely to trust each other. This lends statistically significant support to the assumption that visible efforts to control crime through police and private security actually reduce trust between citizens.

The significant positive effect of space in party manifestos devoted to the strict enforcement of law and order policies increases rather than reduces trust in others.
Table 13: Effects of high crime societies on generalised trust (binary) in 2008; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>-0.344**</td>
<td>-0.342**</td>
<td>-0.344**</td>
<td>-0.343**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
<td>(0.0335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homicide rate</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recorded crimes</td>
<td>0.0000581</td>
<td>0.0000542</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000501)</td>
<td>(0.0000426)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>police density</td>
<td>-0.00410**</td>
<td>-0.00584***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00153)</td>
<td>(0.00142)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security density</td>
<td>-0.00106</td>
<td>-0.00192*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000749)</td>
<td>(0.000749)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear of crime</td>
<td>-0.0111</td>
<td>0.0161</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0230)</td>
<td>(0.0150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law &amp; order manifestos</td>
<td>-0.0103</td>
<td>0.0900**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0475)</td>
<td>(0.0314)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender of respondent</td>
<td>0.0523</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.0523</td>
<td>0.0525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0318)</td>
<td>(0.0318)</td>
<td>(0.0318)</td>
<td>(0.0318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.00407***</td>
<td>0.00403***</td>
<td>0.00407***</td>
<td>0.00400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000948)</td>
<td>(0.000948)</td>
<td>(0.000948)</td>
<td>(0.000948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.209***</td>
<td>0.208***</td>
<td>0.209***</td>
<td>0.208***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00880)</td>
<td>(0.00880)</td>
<td>(0.00880)</td>
<td>(0.00880)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.0671</td>
<td>-0.0398</td>
<td>-0.0648</td>
<td>-0.0168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0437)</td>
<td>(0.0451)</td>
<td>(0.0302)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>-0.110**</td>
<td>0.00279</td>
<td>-0.0933</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0389)</td>
<td>(0.0537)</td>
<td>(0.0352)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalisation</td>
<td>-1.563</td>
<td>1.232</td>
<td>-1.445</td>
<td>1.905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mc</td>
<td>(1.581)</td>
<td>(1.249)</td>
<td>(1.582)</td>
<td>(1.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_constant</td>
<td>1.609</td>
<td>-0.0579</td>
<td>1.424</td>
<td>-0.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.150)</td>
<td>(1.123)</td>
<td>(1.315)</td>
<td>(1.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>random intercept variance</td>
<td>.2562775</td>
<td>.0988632</td>
<td>.2518435</td>
<td>.0907818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0954603)</td>
<td>(.0379237)</td>
<td>(.0939099)</td>
<td>(.0350206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intraclass correlation</td>
<td>0.07227</td>
<td>0.02917</td>
<td>0.07111</td>
<td>0.02685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>-11824.6</td>
<td>-11818.3</td>
<td>-11824.5</td>
<td>-11814.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>23667.2</td>
<td>23662.5</td>
<td>23671.0</td>
<td>23659.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>23738.4</td>
<td>23765.4</td>
<td>23757.9</td>
<td>23778.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>20110</td>
<td>20110</td>
<td>20110</td>
<td>20110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

This result contradicts the high crime society hypothesis, which assumed that the presence of discourse around crime would make people suspicious of each other. The effect however resonates with Durkheim’s original theory, which assumed that the discussion of crime between people would bring people together. Even though this variable reflects political discourse it suggests that communication about the relevance of existing rules and norms, of which support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies is indicative, unites people by increasing their trust in each other.

The homicide rate, the number of recorded crimes, and fear of crime remain
insignificant for people’s trust in others. The effects of control variables remained unchanged and as discussed above.

These first results show that, in line with assumptions, the visibility of crime control coincides with a higher likelihood of distrust of fellow citizens. Likewise, a weak normative frame is associated with less trust in others. In contrast the political discourse of crime increases individual solidarity frames. This result reflects Durkheim’s theory which assumes that making crime an issue increases solidarity. The positive results on trust appear to resonate with this assumption.

Influence of penal regimes

What is the role of inclusion and exclusion demonstrated by the penal regime for individuals’ generalised trust? Table 14 presents the effects of the variables needed to test hypotheses 2 and 3 on generalised trust in 1999. Model 1 shows only the effect of the control variables and people’s intolerance towards having a neighbour with a criminal record. This model is identical to model 1 in tables 12 and 13. Model 2 introduces the variables required to test hypothesis 2, while model 3 also includes an interaction term between the imprisonment rate and ethnic fractionalisation to see if the effect of imprisonment changes with different degrees of ethnic heterogeneity in society. Lastly, model 4 tests for the effect of expenditure on inmates, which is assumed to reflect inclusive approaches and outreach to offenders. These models also control for prison conditions and the imprisonment rate, as these variables are likely to be related to expenditure on inmates. The effects of the control variables remain the same as in the tables testing for the effects of high crime societies, and thus are not discussed again here. The random intercept variance of all models is similar to the models presented above. AIC and BIC suggest there is almost no difference between the fit of the four models. The intraclass correlation suggests that variance explained by country-specific differences ranges from 3.2 to 7.2 percent.

Models 2-4 in table 14 indicate that EVS respondents who live in countries with deficient prison conditions of various severity compared to countries which meet all the minimum requirements for the treatment of prisoners are less likely to trust other people. These results resonate with H2 which assumed that outreach towards offenders brings the general public closer together. However, the effects are only significant in model 3.

Model 3 also shows a significant negative effect for the imprisonment rate, further strengthening support for H2: respondents who live in countries with a greater imprisonment rate tend to trust their fellow citizens less. Nevertheless, this negative effect of imprisonment rates is not robust across different model specifications.

The interaction effect introduced in model 3 indicates that people’s propensity
Table 14: Effects of penal regimes on generalised trust (binary) in 1999; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>-0.454***</td>
<td>-0.453***</td>
<td>-0.452***</td>
<td>-0.453***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
<td>(0.0366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprisonment rate_{mc}</td>
<td>0.000606</td>
<td>-0.0126*</td>
<td>0.000443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00517)</td>
<td>(0.00523)</td>
<td>(0.00451)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions minor deficiency</td>
<td>-0.673</td>
<td>-1.451***</td>
<td>-0.483</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions substandard</td>
<td>-0.642</td>
<td>-1.158*</td>
<td>-0.550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td>(0.454)</td>
<td>(0.520)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions harsh</td>
<td>-0.552</td>
<td>-2.034**</td>
<td>-0.487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.655)</td>
<td>(0.627)</td>
<td>(0.572)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprison. rate*ethnic frac.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.174***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0480)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditure on inmates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.449*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender of respondent</td>
<td>-0.0395</td>
<td>-0.0397</td>
<td>-0.0396</td>
<td>-0.0396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0342)</td>
<td>(0.0342)</td>
<td>(0.0342)</td>
<td>(0.0342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.00511***</td>
<td>0.00511***</td>
<td>0.00511***</td>
<td>0.00510***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00107)</td>
<td>(0.00107)</td>
<td>(0.00107)</td>
<td>(0.00107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
<td>0.212***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00877)</td>
<td>(0.00878)</td>
<td>(0.00878)</td>
<td>(0.00878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.0859</td>
<td>-0.0184</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0653)</td>
<td>(0.0760)</td>
<td>(0.0621)</td>
<td>(0.0721)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>-0.131***</td>
<td>-0.0827</td>
<td>0.0847</td>
<td>-0.0536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0297)</td>
<td>(0.0456)</td>
<td>(0.0568)</td>
<td>(0.0420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalisation_{mc}</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>-1.282</td>
<td>-1.218</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(1.932)</td>
<td>(1.405)</td>
<td>(1.922)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_constant</td>
<td>1.672</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>-3.848*</td>
<td>-0.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.853)</td>
<td>(1.133)</td>
<td>(1.513)</td>
<td>(1.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>random intercept variance</td>
<td>0.2580397</td>
<td>0.211754</td>
<td>0.109257</td>
<td>0.1595966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096084)</td>
<td>(0.079186)</td>
<td>(0.042313)</td>
<td>(0.060404)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intraclass correlation</td>
<td>0.07273</td>
<td>0.06032</td>
<td>0.03214</td>
<td>0.04627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.8953)</td>
<td>(1.133)</td>
<td>(1.513)</td>
<td>(1.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>-10185.6</td>
<td>-10184.2</td>
<td>-10179.5</td>
<td>-10182.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.96084)</td>
<td>(0.79186)</td>
<td>(0.423133)</td>
<td>(0.060444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>20389.3</td>
<td>20394.4</td>
<td>20387.0</td>
<td>20392.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20459.4</td>
<td>20495.6</td>
<td>20496.0</td>
<td>20501.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>17853</td>
<td>17853</td>
<td>17853</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; prison conditions: 0=conditions meet international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

to trust each other is lowest in countries characterised by a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity and high numbers of prison inmates. The interaction effect is positive and significant, implying that the effects of ethnic heterogeneity and the number of people in prison mutually reinforce each other. Both principal effects are negative in Model 3. Since the direction of the effect of ethnic heterogeneity however is unsteady across models, as is the effect of the imprisonment rate, this interaction effect should be read with caution.

Lastly, model 5 tests the expenditure hypothesis by adding information on gov-
ernment expenditure on inmates. The effect of this variable is positive and significant, indicating that people are more likely to assume that others can generally be trusted, and thus that others’ solidarity frames are intact, in environments which signal relational interest (indicated by expenditure) towards prison inmates.

Are these results robust across time? Table 15 outlines the models calculated with data for 2008.

| Table 15: Effects of penal regimes on generalised trust (binary) in 2008; regression results |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| no neighbour w/ record | -0.344*** | -0.344*** | -0.345*** | -0.347*** |
| (0.0335) | (0.0335) | (0.0335) | (0.0335) |
| imprisonment rate\textsubscript{mc} | 0.00222 | -0.00833 | -0.00240 | |
| (0.00646) | (0.00578) | (0.00491) | |
| conditions minor deficiency | 0.502 | 0.478 | -0.211 | |
| (0.640) | (0.483) | (0.511) | |
| conditions substandard | 0.353 | 2.302* | 0.671 | |
| (1.082) | (0.999) | (0.799) | |
| conditions harsh | 0.230 | 0.00922 | -0.254 | |
| (1.075) | (0.814) | (0.801) | |
| imprison. rate*ethnic frac. | | | 0.142*** | |
| | | | (0.0420) | |
| expenditure on inmates | 0.443*** | | | |
| | | | (0.124) | |
| gender of respondent | 0.0523 | 0.0523 | 0.0521 | 0.0518 |
| (0.0318) | (0.0318) | (0.0318) | (0.0318) |
| age | 0.00407*** | 0.00407*** | 0.00410*** | 0.00407*** |
| (0.000948) | (0.000948) | (0.000948) | (0.000948) |
| education | 0.209*** | 0.209*** | 0.209*** | 0.209*** |
| (0.00880) | (0.00880) | (0.00880) | (0.00880) |
| GDP growth | -0.0671 | -0.0858 | -0.0587 | -0.0604 |
| (0.0437) | (0.0623) | (0.0477) | (0.0463) |
| Gini coefficient | -0.110** | -0.121 | -0.0612 | -0.0603 |
| (0.0389) | (0.0719) | (0.0570) | (0.0555) |
| ethnic fractionalisation\textsubscript{mc} | -1.563 | -1.549 | -2.072 | 1.447 |
| (1.581) | (2.219) | (1.680) | (1.831) |
| _constant | 1.609 | 1.549 | -0.711 | -0.603 |
| (1.150) | (1.733) | (1.469) | (1.410) |
| random intercept variance | 2562775 | 2105374 | 1.101606 | 1.593495 |
| (0.0954603) | (0.789637) | (0.426559) | (0.603253) |
| intraclass correlation | 0.07227 | 0.06015 | 0.03240 | 0.04620 |
| log likelihood | -11824.6 | -11823.9 | -11819.7 | -11819.3 |
| AIC | 23667.2 | 23673.8 | 23667.3 | 23666.6 |
| BIC | 23738.4 | 23776.6 | 23778.1 | 23777.3 |
| N | 20110 | 20110 | 20110 | 20110 |

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; prison conditions 0= conditions meet international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Only the positive significant effect of expenditure on inmates, as well as the positive and significant interaction between imprisonment rates and ethnic hetero-
geneity in society could be replicated with the data in 2008. Results regarding prison conditions and rates in contrast are inconclusive and, with one exception, insignificant.

In conclusion, the effect of penal regimes on generalised trust among citizens thus is such that outreach towards prison inmates, indicated by high levels of government expenditure directed towards prisoners, appears to be the most consistent and significant link between trust among citizens and the reactions to crime in the criminal justice system. Outreach towards prisoners hence seems to stimulate trust in wider society. Likewise, a culture of mutual trust between citizens can facilitate outreach to those who have committed crimes. The finding that deteriorating prison conditions, which signal little care for the wellbeing of prisoners, are associated with significantly less trust among citizens, at least in the 1999 data, further supports this interpretation. The effect of the imprisonment rate on people’s interpersonal trust appears to be moderated by the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society. The principal effects of both variables are insignificant (with the exception of one significant effect of imprisonment rates in 1999) but their interaction is consistently significant and positive, suggesting that the effects of both variables reinforce each other. What does this reinforcement imply?

To help interpret this interaction, figure 34 offers a visual presentation of the relationship between the imprisonment rate and ethnic heterogeneity and their combined effect on generalised trust in 1999 and 2008. Figures 34 shows the marginal effects of the imprisonment rate on generalised trust at different levels of ethnic heterogeneity, including 95 percent confidence intervals. The interaction effect of both variables is not significant whenever a confidence interval includes the red zero line.

The graphs show almost identical situations in 1999 and 2008. The effect of imprisonment on generalised trust is negative for the lowest degree of heterogeneity within the sample, meaning that in rather homogenous societies too the more people who are incarcerated, the higher the probability is that people will be distrustful of each other.

The effect however switches its direction and becomes positive in the upper spectrum of ethnic fractionalisation. Interestingly, the interaction between the imprisonment rate and ethnic heterogeneity is only significant when ethnic heterogeneity in society is particularly high or low. In societies characterised by moderate levels of ethnic heterogeneity there does not seem to be a significant interaction between ethnic diversity and the effect of the imprisonment rate on people’s propensity to trust each other. In homogenous societies judicial exclusion of offenders appears to correspond with low levels of trust. In contrast, in the most ethnically diverse societies in the sample, the effect of the imprisonment rate on generalised trust is
Figure 34: Marginal effects of imprisonment rates on generalised trust at different levels of ethnic heterogeneity in 1999 and 2008

Notes: Based on Model 3 reported in table 14 and table 15 respectively. EVS wave 3 = 1999, EVS wave 4 = 2008.

positive. What do these findings imply?

In societies constituted of many different ethnicities people tend to assume that others can generally be trusted when a high number of offenders are incarcerated. Hence, in regards to generalised trust the data for both years seem to refute H2b. The negative effect of high imprisonment rates on people’s trust in others is not reinforced but mitigated by high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity in society. In highly fragmented societies in the sample high imprisonment rates are associated with a greater probability of EVS respondents trusting their fellow citizens. One possible interpretation here is that high rates of incarceration give ethnically heterogeneous societies the possibility to gain group unity as ‘righteous citizens’, thus increasing their trust in each other.

Lastly, the exclusion of offenders by the criminal justice system only appears to be relevant for people’s assumptions about the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens in either very ethnically homogenous or very ethnically heterogeneous societies. In societies with moderate amounts of ethnic fractionalisation, people’s propensity to trust each other does not seem to correlate with incarceration rates in a meaningful
Effects on trust: Differences across income groups

Previous research suggests that experiences of crime and crime control, as well as experiences of solidarity, differ across income groups (Garland 2001; Paskov and Dewilde 2012). Garland (2001) suggests that cultures of control mainly benefit the middle classes and liberal elites, while they have negative consequences for members of the working class. What is more, the changed experiences of crime of these middle classes during the 1980s have contributed to them supporting harsher penal measures in response to crime (Garland 2001). Feelings of solidarity among citizens have furthermore been shown to vary depending on the affluence of individuals (Paskov and Dewilde 2012).

To check whether the above results are stable across different income groups the above analyses were repeated separately for low, middle, and high-income groups. The EVS data offer an income classification variable which was used to form the three different income groups. Again data for the years 1999 and 2008 were analysed.

Figure 35 compares the results for each of the three hypotheses across the three income groups in 1999. Figure 35 plots the coefficients of the standardised variables, with markers representing coefficients and spikes representing 95 percent confidence intervals. Where the confidence interval crosses the red zero line, effects are not statistically significant. The further away from the zero line the estimated coefficients are, the more important their influence is. Coefficients on the right hand side of the zero line signify positive effects of the variables and generalised trust, coefficients on the left hand side of the zero line represent negative effects of the variables and generalised trust. Each subfigure shows the model specification required to test the respective hypothesis.

Results of the above analyses are robust for different income levels in regards to harsh justice and expenditure on inmates. Here, differences between income groups mainly concern the strength of effects, but not their direction or significance. Intolerance of having a neighbour with a criminal record corresponds unanimously and significantly with lower levels of generalised trust in all three income groups.

Characteristics of high crime societies, however, seem to exert different effects in different income groups. There are differences in effect size and direction concerning the variables that capture the ‘communicative’ dimension of the salience of crime in society, namely coverage of law and order in political parties’ manifestos, and fear of crime, as well as the homicide rate a nation is afflicted with.

Even though insignificant in all three income groups, the association between the homicide and respondents’ tendency to trust fellow citizens is mostly negative.
Figure 35: Model comparison across income groups (1999, DV: generalised trust)

Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n=5085; middle-income n=5443; high-income n=4100.

(and thereby conforms to assumptions) in the highest income group. The lower the income group, the less negative this association becomes until in the lowest income group, where the effect of the number of homicides on people’s generalised trust switches to being positive. A similar pattern appears for fear of crime. Again the effect for the lowest income group differs from the direction of the effect of fear of crime in the mid and high income group. The assumption that fear of crime lowers people’s generalised trust seems to only apply to middle and high income groups. In the lowest income group this association is positive. Once more the lowest income group stands out in regards to the role of the extent of support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies expressed in political parties’ election manifestos. While more support for law and order in manifests increased citizens’ propensity to trust each other in the middle and high income groups, trust among respondents of the lowest income group decreases when political parties devote large

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shares of their election manifestos to tough approaches to crime.

**Figure 36:** Model comparison across income groups (2008, DV: generalised trust)

Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n=5210; middle-income n=5580; high-income n=4579.

The difference of effects were less pronounced in 2008 as figure 36 shows. Nevertheless, differences persists in regards to high crime societies. In the most affluent income group the effect of fear of crime on generalised trust is negligible (effect size almost zero), while feeling unsafe in the dark seems to matter for the middle and low-income groups. A similar picture emerges in regards to the effect of recorded crimes. The former is almost zero for low-income groups, while more prominent for people with mid and high income. Effects of harsh justice and outreach to prison inmates are unanimous across income groups.

In conclusion, the effects of variables used to measure penal exclusion and outreach to inmates seem to apply equally in all three income groups. In contrast, high crime societies seem to be a phenomenon to which middle- and higher income classes respond in different ways than lower income classes. These differences were particularly pronounced in 1999. These findings resonate with the arguments of Garland...
(2001, 2000), who argued that high crime societies and cultures of control mainly revolve around experiences and feelings of the middle classes and liberal elites. The data analysed for this chapter reflect this argument.

8.5.2 Norm attachment: Concern for the disadvantaged

The three hypotheses are also tested for the second aspect of solidarity, namely people’s concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged fellow citizens. Concern for the fate of others, especially those who might experience difficulties and therefore depend on pooled resources within a society to support them, is an integral part of solidarity. Levels of concern for the living conditions of old, disabled, and sick people in society thus express people’s attachment to the norm of solidarity.

Influence of high crime societies

Table 16 displays the results of multilevel regression analyses with data from the year 1999 and indicators used to measure high crime societies. The 12 point scale indicating concern for disadvantaged members of society is the dependent variable of all models. The model fit statistics AIC and BIC hardly vary across different model specifications. The random intercept variance is smallest in model 4 indicating that the difference of the intercepts of effects between countries are smallest in this model. The proportion of the total variance of concern for disadvantaged members of society which can be accounted for by clustering data into countries varies between 2.3 and 0.6 percent (see intraclass correlation in table 16).

People’s unwillingness to live next to neighbours with a criminal record corresponds with lower levels of concern expressed for disadvantaged members of society, but the coefficient is insignificant. People’s normative frame thus only seems to be relevant for trust in others, but not for concern for fellow citizens.

While characteristics of high crime societies were associated with generalised trust according to the theoretical assumptions, their effects seem to be reversed in regards to solidarity with disadvantaged members of society. With the exception of political support for tough approaches to crime, all effects are positive, indicating that high crime societies foster solidarity between citizens. Four of these effects are significant at conventional levels. What are these relevant aspects of high crime societies for people’s concern with disadvantaged members of their society?

First, two new significant effects emerge in comparison to the models calculated for trust on others: fear of crime and the prevalence of violent crime have significant coefficients in table 16. Both variables are positively associated with people’s concern for fellow citizens. These findings contradict the assumptions about a negative effect of awareness for crime established with framing theory. Rather they support
Table 16: Effects of high crime societies on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12 point index) in 1999; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>-0.0477</td>
<td>-0.0484</td>
<td>-0.0473</td>
<td>-0.0488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homicide rate</td>
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<td>0.281*</td>
<td>0.281*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recorded crimes</td>
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<td>0.0000504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000552)</td>
<td>(0.0000422)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.00562***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00210)</td>
<td>(0.00153)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security density</td>
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<td>0.00148</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00108)</td>
<td>(0.000933)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fear of crime</td>
<td>0.0421*</td>
<td>0.0444**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0197)</td>
<td>(0.0140)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law &amp; order manifestos</td>
<td>-0.152*</td>
<td>-0.150***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.373***</td>
<td>0.373***</td>
<td>0.373***</td>
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<td>(0.0339)</td>
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<td>age</td>
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<td>0.0234***</td>
<td>0.0234***</td>
<td>0.0234***</td>
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<td>(0.00105)</td>
<td>(0.00105)</td>
<td>(0.00105)</td>
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<td>0.0215*</td>
<td>0.0206*</td>
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<td>(0.00863)</td>
<td>(0.00862)</td>
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<td>0.0993*</td>
<td>0.185***</td>
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<td>(0.0462)</td>
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<td>(0.0439)</td>
<td>(0.0450)</td>
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<td>0.0124</td>
<td>-0.0745*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0401)</td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
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<td>-2.815**</td>
<td>-2.143*</td>
<td>-3.704***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.890)</td>
<td>(0.908)</td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
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<td>5.260***</td>
<td>8.416***</td>
<td>7.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(1.178)</td>
<td>(0.882)</td>
<td>(1.049)</td>
</tr>
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<td>random intercept variance</td>
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<td>.0718306</td>
<td>.0898796</td>
<td>.0353542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.0479734)</td>
<td>(.0280078)</td>
<td>(.0343879)</td>
<td>(.0147535)</td>
</tr>
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<td>intraclass correlation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>82300.7</td>
<td>82296.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
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<td>82394.5</td>
<td>82421.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>18320</td>
<td>18320</td>
<td>18320</td>
<td>18320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Durkheim’s original theory: concern for one another, i.e. solidarity, is stimulated by actual as well as perceived threats of crime.

Second, the effect of police density is still significant, but has reversed its direction: concern for the unemployed, elderly, and the sick and disabled is higher in contexts of high levels of police density. Again, Durkheim’s theory can help to understand this positive effect: the police act as representatives of the law, which contains the legal principles that people agree on. Even considering that (criminal) law by no means reflects the interests of all members of society equally, criminal law for
the most part speaks to the ‘sacredness of the individual’, which binds fragmented societies together. It regulates the enforcement of the norm that other individuals shall not be harmed. The police as representatives of the law remind people of this shared principles and thus have the ability to increase solidarity in society.

Only the significant and negative effect of support for tough approaches to crime communicated in political parties’ election manifestos corresponds with the assumptions about the effects of high crime societies on individual solidarity attitudes. People indicate less concern for disadvantaged members of society in contexts of high law and order issue salience in election manifestos. Salient political discourse not directed towards the reintegration of offenders decreases more generalised solidarity in society.

This result stands in contrast to the positive relationship between politically salient discourses on law and order and generalised trust in society. However, the results do not contradict each other. While generalised trust measures solidarity expectations within the general public, concern for disadvantaged citizens is directed towards specific groups of people who are more or less marginalised. Thus, while the general public seem to be brought together by political discourse of law and order approaches to crime, ‘out-groups’ such as the unemployed, elderly, and sick and disabled seem to be left aside. Institutionalised endorsement of repressive approaches towards the ‘out-group’ of offenders also appears to decrease solidarity with other out-groups, while it enhances trust in the general public of ‘righteous citizens’.

Control variables correlate with people’s concern for disadvantaged members of society in generally the same fashion as with interpersonal trust. Female, highly educated, and older respondents expressed significantly higher levels of concern for the living conditions of old, unemployed, and sick and disabled fellow citizens. On the context level concern for disadvantaged members of society is higher in times of economic prosperity and lower in contexts of high income inequality. Lastly, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on concern for weak members of society becomes consistent and significant, implying that concern for others is lower when societies are more ethnically diverse.

Are these results robust across time? Table 17 gives an overview of the relationship between features of high crime societies and concern for disadvantaged members of society in 2008. Model 1 introduces individual and country level controls, which remain as described for 1999. The data for 2008 support the notion that intolerance towards having a neighbour with a criminal record does not significantly matter for people’s concern for fellow citizens.

Models 2-4 report the effects of variables used to operationalise high crime societies. Even though the direction of effects hardly differs from the findings in the
1999 data, there are almost no significant associations between characteristics of high crime societies and concern expressed for disadvantaged members of society.

Table 17: Effects of high crime societies on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12 point index) in 2008; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>0.0349</td>
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<td>0.0335</td>
<td>0.0388</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
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<td>homicide rate</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.0488</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>recorded crimes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.0000581)</td>
<td>(0.0000344)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.00114)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.000603)</td>
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<td>(0.0336)</td>
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<td>(0.00100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>education</td>
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<td>0.0206*</td>
<td>0.0202*</td>
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</tr>
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<td>(0.00925)</td>
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<td>(0.00924)</td>
<td>(0.00924)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
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<td>-0.0155</td>
<td>-0.0815**</td>
<td>-0.0629**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.0395)</td>
<td>(0.0406)</td>
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<td>(0.0244)</td>
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<td>Gini coefficient</td>
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<td>(0.0432)</td>
<td>(0.0369)</td>
<td>(0.0283)</td>
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<td>-1.111</td>
<td>-0.371</td>
<td>-2.145**</td>
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<td>(1.426)</td>
<td>(1.450)</td>
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<td>8.462***</td>
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<td>(1.038)</td>
<td>(1.300)</td>
<td>(0.908)</td>
<td>(0.880)</td>
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<td>1313639</td>
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<td>(.0868423)</td>
<td>(.0615079)</td>
<td>(.0496222)</td>
<td>(.0185844)</td>
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<td>94300.8</td>
<td>94303.6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>20555</td>
<td>20555</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Model 4 reproduces the significant and positive association between police density and solidarity in society, which was already identified in the 1999 data. As such, the solidarity-enhancing effect of visible norm enforcement through the police appears to persist across time.

Furthermore, table 17 confirms the significant relationship between citizens’ individual solidarity attitudes and political discourse on crime control. Nevertheless,
the data only reflect the theoretical assumptions in regards to feelings of solidarity with disadvantaged members of society. Solidarity is lower in countries where a large proportion of political discourse is focussed on repressive approaches to crime. On the one hand a politically salient discourse on law and order signals that people have weak solidarity frames by suggesting the existence of an imminent crime-problem in society. Consequently, people’s attachment to the norm of solidarity weakens. On the other hand political support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies is an institutional example of little solidarity towards the marginalised group of offenders, which seems to spread to other groups and the solidarity that the public shows to them. As in previous models we find lower levels of solidarity towards disadvantaged members of society when such discourse is prominent.

Influence of penal regimes

Tables 18 and 19 evaluate the association between people’s concern for disadvantaged fellow citizens and characteristics of society’s penal regime. Again, control variables and the effect of intolerance towards neighbours with a criminal record will not be discussed as model 1 in both tables is identical to model 1 presented in tables 16 and 17. Table 18 shows results regarding penal regimes in 1999. Country-specific differences account for between 2.3 and 1 percent of variance of concern for disadvantaged members of society as shown by the intraclass correlation.

First, models 2-4 show a consistent negative effect of imprisonment rates, indicating that concern for disadvantaged members of society is lower when many offenders are separated from society through prison walls and vice versa. Yet, this relationship is only significant in model 3. Significant associations between penal regimes and solidarity appear more consistently in regards to prison conditions. However, the findings contradict $H2a$, which assumed that institutionalised examples of a lack of care for the fate of offenders would be associated with lower levels of solidarity in society. Data suggest the opposite: people are significantly more concerned for disadvantaged members of society when prison conditions violate the international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. Thus, little care for the well-being of prisoners does not imply little care for the living conditions of fellow citizens. Rather, harsh punishment seems to bring society together outside prison walls, as predicted by Durkheim’s original theory. This positive correlation also covers a second aspect of Durkheim’s theory. He argued that punishment – besides its ability to stimulate solidarity in society – is also an expression of the level of solidarity that already exists in society. Therefore, the data might also indicate that societies characterised by high levels of solidarity demand harsher punishment. Either way, high levels of solidarity do not seem to include the offender: solidarity is created at
the expense of offenders while breaking the law in a high-solidarity society is ensued by exclusion from that solidarity community. Since effects are more consistently significant in regards to prison conditions than imprisonment rates, it appears that for individual solidarity attitudes, the quality (prison conditions) rather than the quantity (imprisonment rates) of punishment seems to matter.

Table 18: Effects of penal regimes on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12 point index) in 1999; regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>-0.0477</td>
<td>-0.0512</td>
<td>-0.0508</td>
<td>-0.0509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprisonment rate_{mc}</td>
<td>-0.00492</td>
<td>-0.00888*</td>
<td>-0.00487</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00288)</td>
<td>(0.00375)</td>
<td>(0.00266)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions minor deficiency</td>
<td>0.631*</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.548*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions substandard</td>
<td>1.196***</td>
<td>1.039**</td>
<td>1.160***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.326)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions harsh</td>
<td>0.949**</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.922**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.367)</td>
<td>(0.450)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprison. rate* ethnic frac.</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0344)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditure on inmate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.374***</td>
<td>0.374***</td>
<td>0.373***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0339)</td>
<td>(0.0339)</td>
<td>(0.0339)</td>
<td>(0.0339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
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<td>0.0235***</td>
<td>0.0235***</td>
<td>0.0235***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00105)</td>
<td>(0.00105)</td>
<td>(0.00105)</td>
<td>(0.00105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.0220*</td>
<td>0.0217*</td>
<td>0.0215*</td>
<td>0.0221*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00863)</td>
<td>(0.00864)</td>
<td>(0.00864)</td>
<td>(0.00864)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.0588</td>
<td>0.0346</td>
<td>0.0367</td>
<td>0.0615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0462)</td>
<td>(0.0425)</td>
<td>(0.0446)</td>
<td>(0.0426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.0959***</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td>0.0718</td>
<td>0.00863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0210)</td>
<td>(0.0255)</td>
<td>(0.0407)</td>
<td>(0.0249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalisation_{mc}</td>
<td>-1.340</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td>1.169</td>
<td>0.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.984)</td>
<td>(1.081)</td>
<td>(1.088)</td>
<td>(1.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_constant</td>
<td>6.679***</td>
<td>8.308***</td>
<td>6.930***</td>
<td>8.968***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(0.637)</td>
<td>(1.087)</td>
<td>(0.716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>random intercept variance</td>
<td>.1266534</td>
<td>.0632188</td>
<td>.0544295</td>
<td>.053048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0479734)</td>
<td>(.0248822)</td>
<td>(.0215658)</td>
<td>(.0212151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intraclass correlation</td>
<td>0.02373</td>
<td>0.01199</td>
<td>0.01034</td>
<td>0.01008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
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<td>-41135.9</td>
<td>-41134.8</td>
<td>-41134.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>82301.7</td>
<td>82299.8</td>
<td>82299.7</td>
<td>82299.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>18320</td>
<td>18320</td>
<td>18320</td>
<td>18320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; prison conditions: 0=conditions meet international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Model 4 shows a positive interaction effect between imprisonment rates and ethnic heterogeneity. This interaction effect, however, is not significant, implying that the effect of imprisonment rates on people's concern for disadvantaged members
of society’s living conditions is not notably altered by the degree of society’s ethnic heterogeneity. Ethnic diversity alone is not significantly related to solidarity with disadvantaged members of society either, as the insignificant coefficient of ethnic fractionalisation shows.

Model 5 indicates that a more caring attitude towards offenders, as represented by financial resources devoted to prisoners, is not significantly linked to people’s concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society.

Table 19: Effects of penal regimes on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12 point index) in 2008: regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no neighbour w/ record</td>
<td>0.0349</td>
<td>0.0339</td>
<td>0.0337</td>
<td>0.0346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
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<tr>
<td>imprisonment rate_{mc}</td>
<td>-0.00454</td>
<td>-0.00596</td>
<td>-0.00155</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00466)</td>
<td>(0.00549)</td>
<td>(0.00380)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions minor deficiency</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.992*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td>(0.458)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conditions substandard</td>
<td>0.898</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.779)</td>
<td>(0.947)</td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>conditions harsh</td>
<td>1.431</td>
<td>1.402</td>
<td>1.746**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.775)</td>
<td>(0.771)</td>
<td>(0.620)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprison. rate*ethnic frac.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.0190</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditure on inmates</td>
<td>-0.290**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0958)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>gender of respondent</td>
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<td>0.338***</td>
<td>0.338***</td>
<td>0.338***</td>
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<td>(0.0336)</td>
<td>(0.0336)</td>
<td>(0.0336)</td>
<td>(0.0336)</td>
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<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.0277***</td>
<td>0.0277***</td>
<td>0.0277***</td>
<td>0.0277***</td>
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<td>(0.00100)</td>
<td>(0.00100)</td>
<td>(0.00100)</td>
<td>(0.00100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td>0.0207*</td>
<td>0.0211*</td>
<td>0.0211*</td>
<td>0.0209*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.00925)</td>
<td>(0.00925)</td>
<td>(0.00925)</td>
<td>(0.00924)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.0606</td>
<td>-0.0848</td>
<td>-0.0812</td>
<td>-0.101**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0395)</td>
<td>(0.0449)</td>
<td>(0.0452)</td>
<td>(0.0358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
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<td>0.00446</td>
<td>0.0125</td>
<td>-0.0349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.0351)</td>
<td>(0.0518)</td>
<td>(0.0541)</td>
<td>(0.0429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic fractionalisation_{mc}</td>
<td>-0.717</td>
<td>1.716</td>
<td>1.646</td>
<td>-0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.426)</td>
<td>(1.598)</td>
<td>(1.593)</td>
<td>(1.415)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_constant</td>
<td>7.605***</td>
<td>8.433***</td>
<td>8.129***</td>
<td>9.836***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(1.038)</td>
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<td>(1.394)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>random intercept variance</td>
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<td>.1337687</td>
<td>.1316303</td>
<td>.0813251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0868423)</td>
<td>(.0504506)</td>
<td>(.0496912)</td>
<td>(.0312568)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intraclass correlation</td>
<td>0.03915</td>
<td>0.02281</td>
<td>0.02245</td>
<td>0.01399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>-47140.4</td>
<td>-47136.3</td>
<td>-47136.2</td>
<td>-47132.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>94300.8</td>
<td>94300.7</td>
<td>94302.4</td>
<td>94295.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>94380.1</td>
<td>94411.7</td>
<td>94421.4</td>
<td>94414.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>20555</td>
<td>20555</td>
<td>20555</td>
<td>20555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male; prison conditions: 0=conditions meet international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Models calculated with the 2008 data shown in table 19 support results from the
1999 data, although some of the indicators loose or gain significance. Imprisonment rates remain negatively related to concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society throughout all models, but effects do not reach statistical significance anymore. Model 4 replicates the positive and insignificant interaction effect between the number of prisoners and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. As the principal effects are positive (ethnic heterogeneity) and negative (imprisonment rate) the positive interaction implies that the negative effect of imprisonment rates is moderated by ethnic heterogeneity in society. Like in 1999, the principal effect of society’s degree of ethnic fractionalisation remains insignificant throughout all model specifications.

The significant association between relational interest towards the excluded population of incarcerated offenders, which is indicated by the provision of prison conditions that do not violate international standards, is limited to model 4 in 2008, which also includes financial resources made available for inmates. Again data suggest that solidarity in society is enhanced through the harsh treatment of offenders: concern for disadvantaged members of society is higher when prison conditions violate the minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and when fewer funds are available to offer rehabilitative measures in prisons. Outreach and a more caring attitude towards offenders thus does not seem to be reflected in citizens’ solidarity attitudes towards other marginalised groups. In contrast, trust in fellow citizens was generally higher when larger funds were available to offer rehabilitative measures in prisons (see models 4 in tables 15 and 14). Reflecting Durkheim’s theory, solidarity with disadvantaged members of society thus seems to be created at the expense of offenders, whereas general trust in solidarity behaviour by fellow citizens increases along with institutionalised outreach towards those who have failed society by committing crimes.

Figure 37 sheds more light on the interaction between imprisonment rates and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society by visualising their combined effect on people’s concern for disadvantaged members of society in 1999 and 2008. The graphs show the effect of imprisonment rates on people’s concern for weak members of society at different levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The interaction effect is not significant when the confidence intervals, represented by spikes, include the red zero line.

The combined effect of imprisonment and ethnic heterogeneity on concern for disadvantaged members of society resembles the effect of their interaction on generalised trust, as shown in figure 34. In both years under study the effect of imprisonment is negative in homogenous societies and loses strength, i.e. approaches zero, with increasing ethnic heterogeneity. This finding further challenges hypotheses 2a
and 2b, which argued that in heterogeneous societies the use of imprisonment diminishes solidarity. The data suggest that the opposite is the case: high rates of imprisonment are associated with lower degrees of solidarity in homogenous societies and are not (significantly) related to solidarity in heterogeneous societies. Hence, in ethnically diverse societies factors other than the use of incarceration influence social solidarities. However, the interaction between the use of imprisonment and ethnic heterogeneity is only significant in the 1999 data (EVS wave 3). In 2008 the interaction is insignificant and shows a flat slope, indicating that the effect of imprisonment does not notably change along the different degrees of ethnic fractionalisation.

What conclusions can be drawn from the negative relationship between imprisonment and solidarity in homogenous societies? In ethnically homogenous societies high rates of incarceration cannot be blamed on criminal activity by ethnic minorities. Rather, high rates of incarceration in homogenous societies indicate that the crime problem originates from the ethnic majority. This includes the general public as well as more or less marginalised groups. In homogenous societies high incarceration rates indicate deteriorating solidarity frames within the majority population.

**Note**: Based on model 3 reported in table 18 and table 19 respectively. EVS wave 3 = 1999, EVS wave 4 = 2008.
According to framing theory this perceived lack of others’ solidarity diminishes people’s own attachment to the norm of solidarity. As a consequence, citizens’ expectations about the general public’s solidarity (i.e., generalised trust) and solidarity with disadvantaged members of society are lower in ethnically homogenous societies with high incarceration rates. Since, however, the significance of both the effect of imprisonment and its interaction with ethnic heterogeneity is not robust across time but only exists in the 1999 data, this interpretation should be read with caution, as there appear to be other drivers of solidarity in society than the use of imprisonment.

**Concern for the disadvantaged: Differences across income groups**

Is the income of respondents critical for the effects of high crime societies and penal regimes on respondents’ concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society? Figure 38 shows the results of the above analyses replicated in low, middle, and high-income groups for 1999.

For the most part, differences between income groups are limited to effect sizes and significances. Thus, in contrast to their effect on generalised trust, characteristics of high crime societies seem to affect middle classes, liberal elites, and lower income groups in similar ways. However, the positive association between police density and violent crime in society on concern for old, sick, and unemployed fellow citizens is particularly pronounced in the lowest income group. High prevalence of violent crime and visible efforts to control it appear to mainly enhance people with low income’s attachment to the norm of solidarity.

Characteristics of penal regimes show the strongest effects in the lowest income group, too. Prison conditions that are substantially worse than the minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners are most notably associated with concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society expressed by respondents in the low-income group. Income-specific differences of the effects of imprisonment rates and of government expenditure on inmates ($H3$) are minor. Intolerance of neighbours with a criminal record matters most for concern for fellow citizens expressed by respondents of the lowest and highest income groups.

Figure 39 confirms the result that differences between the effects in different income groups are largely restricted to variations in effect size and significance with data from 2008.

However, the divergent effect of homicide rates in lower income groups persists. Concern for disadvantaged members of society increases with the prevalence of homicide in the lowest income group, while it decreases in high and middle-income groups. Nevertheless, the effects fail to reach significance in all three income groups. Coefficients for fear of crime and security density are almost zero for the lowest income
**Figure 38:** Model comparison across income groups (1999, DV: concern for disadvantaged members of society)

**H1: High Crime Society Hypothesis**
- no neighbour w/ record
- homicide rate
- police density
- security density
- fear of crime
- recorded crimes
- support law & order
- gender of respondent
- age
- education
- GDP growth
- GINI coefficient
- ethnic fractionalisation

**H2: Harsh Justice Hypothesis**
- no neighbour w/ record
- imprisonment rate
- conditions minor deficiency
- conditions substandard
- conditions harsh
- imp.rate & ethnic frac
- gender of respondent
- age
- education
- GDP growth
- GINI coefficient
- ethnic fractionalisation

**H3: Expenditure Hypothesis**
- no neighbour w/ record
- imprisonment rate
- conditions minor deficiency
- conditions substandard
- conditions harsh
- expenditure per inmate
- gender of respondent
- age
- education
- GDP growth
- GINI coefficient
- ethnic fractionalisation

---

**Notes:** Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n = 5171; middle-income n = 5572; high-income n = 4229.

Group, suggesting that these characteristics of high crime societies predominantly affect higher income classes only. Visible crime control efforts through private security most notably erode solidarity expressed by respondents in the high-income group, while enhancing solidarity among lower income groups. This finding further supports Garland’s notion that experiences and effects of high crime societies differ between well-off classes and lower income groups, whose members might be more often affected by crime controls (e.g. in stop and search). The positive effects of harsh justice and the negative effects of expenditure on prison inmates in contrast are consistent across the three income groups.
Figure 39: Model comparison across income groups (2008, DV: concern for disadvantaged members of society)

H1: High Crime Society Hypothesis
- no neighbour w/ record
- homicide rate
- police density
- security density
- fear of crime
- recorded crimes
- support law & order
- gender of respondent
- age
- education
- GDP growth
- GINI coefficient
- ethnic fractionalisation

H2: Harsh Justice Hypothesis
- no neighbour w/ record
- imprisonment rate
- conditions minor deficiency
- conditions substandard
- conditions harsh
- gender of respondent
- age
- education
- imp.rate # ethnic frac
- GDP growth
- GINI coefficient
- ethnic fractionalisation

H3: Expenditure Hypothesis
- no neighbour w/ record
- imprisonment rate
- conditions minor deficiency
- conditions substandard
- conditions harsh
- expenditure per inmate
- gender of respondent
- age
- education
- GDP growth
- GINI coefficient
- ethnic fractionalisation

Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n = 5323; middle-income n = 5690; high-income n = 4682.

8.6 Discussion and conclusion

This chapter provides empirical support for the assumption that dimensions of the collective experience of crime matter for people’s individual attitudes regarding trust in and concern for their fellow citizens. The way societies deal with crime can leave traces in society. The data analysed in this chapter shows significant associations between the way citizens see each other and (a) crime control efforts in society, (b) the discussion of crime and criminal justice by political actors, and (c) the treatment of prisoners.

The view that most people can be trusted and concern for disadvantaged members of societies relate differently to these three dimensions. Whether the high crime society hypothesis, the harsh justice hypothesis, and the expenditure hypothesis find support in the data depends on which aspect of solidarity is investigated. Generalised trust measures respondents’ expectations about solidarity in the general
public. Concern for disadvantaged members of society in turn expresses people’s own solidarity directed towards specific more or less marginalised groups.

The high crime society hypothesis found support in as far as visible crime control efforts by the police and private security go hand in hand with lower levels of trust in society. This finding resonates with the assumptions extracted from framing theory stating that encompassing official crime control strategies, like the securitization of public spaces, inform citizens about their fellow citizens’ lack of solidarity (decayed solidarity frames). Therefore, distrust among citizens is likely to grow in contexts of visible crime control efforts. However, this assumption does not apply to individual solidarity attitudes when they are measured as concern for disadvantaged members of society: visible norm-enforcement through the police is associated with more concern for the fate of others. In accordance with Durkheim’s original theory, but in contrast to the high crime society hypothesis, visible norm enforcement seems to strengthen solidarity in society in the 1999 as well as the 2008 data. The significance of the positive relationship between solidarity with disadvantaged members of society and the prevalence of violent crime in society was not robust across time, but its direction remained the same (positive). The same applies to the impact of fear of crime.

In addition, political endorsement of the strict enforcement of law and order policies is consistently and significantly associated with citizens’ trust in each other and concern for disadvantaged members of society across all years and all model specifications. Yet, the direction of these associations again differs between the two measures. While generalised trust is higher in contexts of salient political discourse about law and order policies, concern for disadvantaged members of society deteriorates when political parties endorse tough approaches to crime. Generalised trust and concern for disadvantaged members of society target different populations. The EVS question about trust asks respondents about trust in the general public, defined as ‘most people’, while the questions regarding concern target particular populations: unemployed, sick and disabled, and elderly. These different target groups might account for the divergent effects of crime control between these two measures.

The content of manifestos is indicative of the topics discussed by politicians during their election campaigns, in interviews and parliamentary debates, and which are reported by the media (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Helbling and Tresch 2011). Hence, if crime or the strict enforcement of law and order politics is a salient issue in party manifestos, it will most likely be a part of public discourse. The high crime society hypothesis argued that heightened communicated awareness of crime would drive society apart by highlighting broken solidarity frames of others, by the creation
of stereotypes, and by limited communicated care for the fate of offenders. This negative effect on solidarity in wider society only seems to be true for expressed concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. Minimal communicated concern for the fate of the out-group of offenders appears to be met by little concern for other marginalised groups, like the sick, old, and disabled.

In regards to generalised trust, the data appear to support the Durkheimian notion that even in contemporary Europe discourse about crime and punishment can bring citizens together. Confidence that the unspecified group of ‘other people’ can generally be trusted appears to be enhanced by political discourse about crime and punishment. Framing theory can offer a similar interpretation of this result. The theory suggests that one important pillar for the emergence of solidarity is group unity, which can be gained by means of demarcation from other groups. Public discourse about law and order policies can assist in the formation of group unity, as it has the potential to demarcate members of the general public as righteous citizens from those who pose threats to or exploit society (see also Kennedy 2000). However, this discourse generally singles out marginalised groups and consequently solidarity with these groups is negatively affected.

Indicators used to test the harsh justice hypothesis revealed that characteristics of penal regimes are more closely (i.e. significantly) associated with solidarity as concern for disadvantaged members of society than with people’s trust in the solidarity of others. It is solidarity with specific groups but not the generalised expectations of solidarity measured by trust that is significantly related to punishment. This finding again reflects Durkheim’s theory, as it shows that punishment has the potential to enhance solidarity also in contemporary societies. However, the conditions under which prisoners live, rather than the number of people who are kept behind prison walls, appear to be relevant for individual attitudes.

Contrary to the assumptions of the harsh justice hypothesis, but in line with Durkheim’s theory, findings suggest that solidarity is produced at the expense of offenders. In both 1999 and 2008, and across all model specifications, citizens’ concern for the fate of disadvantaged members of society was significantly higher in contexts of deficient, substandard, or harsh prison conditions. Prison conditions that are indicative of little concern and care for prisoners do not spread to and affect solidarity with other marginalised groups, rather the opposite occurs.

However, imprisonment rates suggest otherwise, which demonstrates that prison conditions and levels of imprisonment are two different dimensions determining solidarity in society. Even though only significant in 1999, data suggest that trust as well as concern for disadvantaged members of society is lower in contexts of high imprisonment rates. This finding resonates with the concerns expressed in both
the reports of the *British Academy* (Allen et al. 2014: 72) and the USA’s *National Academy of Sciences* (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014) that high rates of incarceration can erode general solidarity in society. The association between indicators of solidarity and exclusion of offenders through criminal justice varies contingent on the level of ethnic heterogeneity in society. Here, the data once more challenge the harsh justice hypothesis which assumed that harsh justice would decrease solidarity predominantly in heterogeneous societies, as the combination of high imprisonment rates and low levels of solidarity is particularly dominant in homogenous societies.

The expenditure hypothesis predicted that institutional concern and care for offenders, as measured by expenditure on them, would instigate trust in and concern for fellow citizens. Relational interest towards offenders is not only evident in prison conditions that meet international minimum standards, but also financial resources directed towards offenders in prison. Imprisonment which aims to rehabilitate offenders for a life in society is costly, as is compliance with the minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. Job training possibilities, sports facilities, therapists, health care, employment of sufficient guards, and the prevention of overcrowding all require appropriate funding. Providing the prison system with sufficient financial resources thus indicates a more rehabilitative and inclusionary rather than retributive approach, where only the bare minimum is conceded to those incarcerated. Greater investments in prisons relative to the number of inmates hence reflect an approach to justice that does not give up on those who are temporarily excluded from society through incarceration, but aims towards their re-integration into society as citizens who are deserving of solidarity.

Results once more differed between trust in the general public and concern for disadvantaged members of society. While the expenditure hypothesis found support in regards to trust in the general public, concern expressed for disadvantaged members of society is actually higher in contexts with little concern and care, i.e. relational interest, towards offenders. Hence, solidarity with disadvantaged members of society indeed seems to be created at the expense of offenders, as suggested by Durkheim’s original theory. Nevertheless, poor conditions in prison might also raise concerns for disadvantaged members of society as marginalised parts of the population are more likely to suffer them.

Effects of high crime societies differ in their intensity across income groups. This is in line with Garland (2001, 2000), who argued that cultures of control and high crime societies can be traced back to changing experiences of crime of the middle-classes. Effects of characteristics of high crime societies between low income classes and the middle and high income groups however mainly differ in regards to their intensity. There were no pronounced income-specific differences in regards to the
harsh justice and expenditure hypotheses. Relational signalling towards offenders thus appears to leave traces in all income levels equally.

Overall, the above results confirm that Durkheim’s original theory still deserves a place in contemporary criminology. The three core hypotheses for this chapter were derived from a combination of Durkheim’s original theory with a more contemporary theory of solidarity, namely framing theory. The empirical findings, however, especially in regards to the relationship between concern for disadvantaged members of society, in many instances mirror Durkheim’s original assumptions rather than the hypotheses of this chapter. Levels of concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society is a measurement which more closely captures the theoretical concept of solidarity than generalised trust. The latter measure represents perceptions about others, rather than solidarity towards them. Durkheim’s theory exclusively deals with solidarity and its relation to punishment, which might account for the fact that associations between concern for disadvantaged members of society and penal regimes can be understood with Durkheim’s original theory. In contrast, an integral part of framing theory rests upon people’s assumptions about others. Associations between trust in the general public and the way societies deal with crime in many instances support the hypotheses formulated on the basis of framing theory. In addition, framing theory helped to establish a theoretical connection between high crime societies and their impact on citizen’s perceptions of each other.

Furthermore, results of this chapter once more highlighted the effect of political action in regards to criminal justice. The investments governments make in the criminal justice system and the way political parties discuss approaches to crime are not only related to welfare state solidarity, but also have also proven to be the most consistent and significant predictors for how citizens feel about solidarity with each other and for specific groups. This chapter suggests that the actions of governments and political parties provide examples on how to treat others, as well as tools with which society can gain group unity. Both mechanisms can influence trust and solidarity in society.

In conclusion, this chapter further strengthens empirical support for the overarching theoretical assumption of the thesis that there is a relationship between social solidarities and the way a society deals with crime and offenders. Social institutions, in this case the ones attached to the criminal justice system, seem to be closely related to the way citizens feel about each other. Thus, the collective experience of crime and operations of the criminal justice system have the potential to leave traces in society that go beyond the offender. At the same time, and as postulated by Durkheimian theory, punishment and (solidarity in) society find themselves in
a circular relationship. While punishment can reinforce solidarity in society, the kind and level of solidarity that exists in society also determines the way societies punish offenders. Therefore, social parameters like interpersonal trust and concern for weaker members of society also have the ability to shape collective experiences of crime.
9 Conclusion

This thesis set out to investigate the relationship between the collective experience of crime and solidarity in contemporary European societies. This investigation was motivated by growing interest in the social repercussions of crime control in general (Garland 2001) and imprisonment in particular (Allen et al. 2014; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). It is set against the backdrop of previous analyses of the relationship between social welfare and penal regimes (e.g. Beckett and Western 2001; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a), as well as qualitative assessments of the impact of changing crime control routines on people’s everyday lives (Garland 2001). It expands on the focus of this existing research in several innovative ways.

First, previous work on the punishment/solidarity nexus focuses on social welfare. In contrast, this thesis does not only look at institutionalised forms of solidarity on a system level such as welfare state activity, but also citizens’ individual solidarity attitudes. In addition to being observable at two analytical levels, the system level and the individual level, solidarity is not a one-dimensional concept. Solidarity in society can vary in extent, can be directed at particular social subgroups, and can be evident in a variety of actions and attitudes. Consequently, in terms of both institutionalised solidarity and individual attitudes, different aspects of solidarity and their relationship to the collective experience of crime were taken into account throughout the empirical part of the thesis. On the individual level, chapter 8 looked into the relationship between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and (a) people’s expectation of the general public’s solidarity (i.e. generalised trust) as well as (b) people’s solidarity towards a defined group of more or less marginalised parts of the population. Institutionalised solidarity, whose relation to crime control and punishment was assessed in chapter 7, was also differentiated into institutionalised solidarity directed towards general society (i.e. the general welfare system) and institutionalised solidarity towards the defined group of the unemployed. Furthermore, chapters 5 and 6 assessed landscapes and trajectories of solidarity consisting of dimensions as diverse as concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society, engagement in voluntary work, condemnation of free-riding, support for group-based assistance to individuals, trust in the general public, and welfare state activity.

Second, the use of imprisonment was at the centre of most previous studies concerned with links between crime control and wider society (Cavadino and Dignan
Both crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system, as well as the processing of crime in politics, have received less attention. In this research, ways in which societies deal with and process crime beyond penal regimes were considered in order to discern links between crime control and solidarity. To this end the thesis presents the first attempt to operationalise the concept of the ‘collective experience of crime’ as introduced by Garland (2001, 2000). The notion of a collective experience describes a frame of reference for crime composed of the different ways in which citizens can learn about the existence of and approaches to crime in their society. As such the notion of a collective experience of crime links individuals who are neither offenders nor crime victims with matters of crime and criminal justice. This collective experience of crime in society was operationalised as consisting of four dimensions: the prevalence of crime, crime prevention, reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, as well as the salience of crime in citizens’ minds and political discourse. Thus, in addition to penal regimes the thesis considers three additional dimensions of the ways in which a society deals with crime to establish links with solidarity.

Third, Durkheim’s (1893, 1992) classic theory about the solidarity-enhancing mechanisms of punishment was complemented by a contemporary theory of solidarity, namely framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006). Durkheimian theory only posits positive effects of punishment on social solidarity (Garland 2012: 30). Empirical research which highlights the overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in criminal justice institutions, the detrimental effects of contact with criminal justice on life chances of offenders, and the seemingly close links between harsh punishment and limited welfare state activity as well as social inequality, however challenges Durkheim’s assumption about the exclusively solidarity-enhancing effects of punishment (Clear 2007; Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009; Downes and Hansen 2006; Uggen et al. 2014; Western and Muller 2013; Western 2007). Since Durkheim developed his theory based on the assumption that divisions in society only exist between the individual and society as a whole and not between different social subgroups, a theory that takes into account how punishment influences the way in which these social subgroups relate to each other was required, as well as a theory that accounts for the divisive effects of punishment rather than unifying effects on society. Furthermore, Durkheim’s theory is restricted to explaining the relationship between solidarity and punishment. Consequently, it is incapable of uncovering the potential of other routines of crime control, which make up the collective experience of crime, to impact on solidarity in society. Framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006) is capable of outlining negative implications of punishment as well as explaining how aspects
of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment may influence solidarity in society. It thus presents a valuable and contemporary addition to Durkheim’s classic perspective.

Starting from these three innovations, the first two chapters built the theoretical foundation of this thesis. Chapter 2 introduced the concept of solidarity as a multidimensional phenomenon, which can be an attribute of individuals in the form of solidarity behaviour and attitudes (e.g. helping others in need, supporting institutions that exert norms of solidarity), as well as an attribute of social groups, i.e. the existence and enactment of the norm of solidarity in an aggregate of people. The chapter carved out the defining characteristic of solidarity as concern for or contribution to the welfare of others which may involve self interest but must not be linked to direct returns. The chapter aligned classic as well as contemporary theories about the origins and maintenance of solidarity from different scientific traditions such as utilitarianism, structuralism, and rational choice theory to provide the foundation upon which links between solidarity and the collective experience of crime in contemporary societies could be established.

Chapter 3 introduced Garland’s (2001, 2000) concept of the collective experience of crime and outlined its potential to impact solidarity by means of Durkheim’s (1915, 1893) classic and Lindenberg’s (1998, 2006) framing theory. In combining the perspective of Durkheim with framing theory this chapter established the hypothesis that there should be an empirically identifiable association between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity, and potential solidarity-enhancing, as well as diminishing, relationships and mechanisms.

This hypothesis was assessed via four strategic research questions in the context of a comparative analysis of 26 contemporary European democracies. These sample countries are currently all members of the Council of Europe, which keeps confounding influences in regards to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law at a minimum. This allows light to be shed on the different ways in which solidarity and the collective experience of crime are linked in contemporary Europe, notwithstanding a certain amount of divergent political, economic, and historical backgrounds of each of these countries.

Each empirical chapter addressed one of the following four key research questions:

1. What are current trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime and solidarity in Europe?

2. What are differences and commonalities in Europe in regards to the collective experience of crime and solidarity?

3. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to institutionalised
solidarity in society?

4. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to solidarity attitudes of individuals?

In responding to the first research question, chapter 5 outlined trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime and of solidarity in Europe. Between the 1990s and 2010 countries in Europe converged in many respects of the collective experience of crime, as well as in aspects of solidarity. The sample countries assimilated in terms of their welfare activity, prevalence of violent crime, expenditure for public order and safety, as well as recorded crimes, convictions, and the use of imprisonment. Nevertheless, regional differences persisted. Here, the countries’ political histories appear to be crucial: post-communist countries as well as countries in the Mediterranean which where under autocratic rule until the 1970s differ from the other sample countries, especially in regards to their penal regimes, crime control through police, and citizens’ trust in institutions like the police or the justice system as a whole. In many instances these differences became less pronounced over the researched period. Furthermore, increased private efforts to secure property, increasing density of private security guards, and the emergence of crime control as a salient topic on the electoral agenda in many of the sample countries suggest that crime control is not constrained to the criminal justice system, but increasingly processed in the private sector, private households, and the political system. Experiences of crime as well as expressions of solidarity in Europe changed during the researched period.

Chapter 6 addressed the second research question and identified landscapes of solidarity and of the collective experience of crime in the sample countries. This chapter also investigated which factors contribute to the convergence of violent crime, penal policies, and welfare state activity. Cluster analysis revealed that there are several groups of countries, each of which is characterised by a distinct collective experience of crime. Likewise, Europe presents itself as a region with diverse expressions of solidarity. Landscapes of solidarity and landscapes of the collective experience of crime are not stable. During 1995 and 2010 groupings derived from both concepts partly reconfigured. Nevertheless, experiences of crime and landscapes of solidarity tend to cluster regionally: Scandinavia, the Baltic region, and to some extent Eastern and Western Europe emerged as geographic regions characterised by particular ways of processing crime in society and by particular shapes of solidarity. Cluster analysis also offered some initial hints about the correspondence between solidarity and the collective experience of crime: solidarity clusters partly overlap with clusters of the collective experience of crime. Over time the total variation of the sample countries in regards to solidarity and the collective experience of crime decreased.
Accordingly, diffusion analysis showed that convergence of violent crime, penal policies, and welfare state activity occurred across those identified groups rather than within them. Despite the persistence of regional differences, Europe appears to be becoming a more homogenous region in regards to both patterns of solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society during the years observed in this thesis.

In response to the third question chapter 7 looked more closely into the relationship between the processing of crime in institutions of the criminal justice system and politics, and institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state. Results of time-series-cross section analyses indicate that there are links between aspects of the collective experience of crime and welfare state solidarity, but that these are by and large constrained to penal regimes and the processing of crime in the political system. Criminal justice and social welfare are not alternative strategies for dealing with social marginality. Rather, if values of inclusion and outreach are present in one system, they are likely to be found in the other, too. Contexts where punishment is characterised by outreach to offenders, indicated by prison conditions and investments in criminal justice that allow for rehabilitative efforts rather than warehousing prisoners, also show higher levels of solidarity as institutionalised in the welfare state. Exclusion of offenders in turn goes hand in hand with low levels of solidarity outreach in the welfare system. Thus, criminal justice and social welfare appear to be two distinct systems, which are both shaped by values of inclusion and exclusion. This finding resonates with the notion of penal welfarism of Garland (2001: 27-49), who argues that the basic structure and functioning of a penal regime which prioritises the rehabilitation of offenders, their wellbeing, tailor-made solutions, and criminological expertise rather than retribution is a product of the values and ideologies which shape the general institutional environment of a society. This thesis shows that the close connection that Garland established in relation to penal welfare and general welfare on the basis of a qualitative assessment of the USA and the United Kingdom can also be found in a larger sample of contemporary European democracies. This finding actually salvages Garland’s results from the criticism that they may not be widely applicable as they were based on two similar countries only (Braithwaite 2003). Moreover, in chapter 7 governments and political parties were identified as the institutional links between criminal justice and social welfare. Accordingly, the processing of crime in the political system has shown the most consistent and significant association to welfare state solidarity. Government investment in public order and safety and political parties’ support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies consistently and significantly correspond with higher levels of welfare state solidarity. Hence, governments and political parties that promote protection of the general public against crime also seem to shield
citizens against other life risks through social welfare.

Lastly, chapter 8 assessed question 4 in search of associations between the collective experience of crime and individual solidarity attitudes. Here, too, significant relationships between the collective experience of crime and how people see each other were identified. However, people’s solidarity expectations of the general public (i.e. generalised trust) and their solidarity with a particular group of more or less marginalised members of society expressed by concern for the living conditions of the elderly, unemployed, and sick and disabled are linked to the collective experience of crime in different ways. These divergent relationships can be explained by means of the two solidarity theories employed in this thesis, Durkheim’s classic theory and framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006). The relationship between generalised trust in society and dimensions of the collective experience of crime resonates with framing theory: visible crime control efforts can act as constant reminders of the existence of crime in society and have thus been shown to correspond with lower levels of trust among citizens. Institutional examples of outreach, such as care for the wellbeing of prison inmates, can stimulate outreach in the general public like, for instance, trust in each other. In contrast, links between solidarity with disadvantaged members of society and indicators of the collective experience of crime often mirror Durkheim’s original theory: crime as well as the fear thereof can bring society together. At the same time solidarity in society appears to be created at the expense of offenders as concern for disadvantaged members of society is high when institutional outreach towards prison inmates is low. These findings lend support to Durkheim’s original theory. Nevertheless, Durkheim’s theory was also challenged by the findings of chapter 8: public discourse about crime, here represented by political parties’ attention to the strict enforcement of law and order policies expressed in manifestos, can take its toll on solidarity with marginalised groups of society. Concern for the fate of disadvantaged members of society is lower in the context of a politically salient discussion of tough approaches to crime, possibly due to the creation of stereotypes of potentially dangerous parts of the population. This chapter shows the importance of using different dimensions of both solidarity and penal regimes.

These empirical chapters all lend support to the main working hypothesis established in chapter 3: the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society are two phenomena that are related to each other. The way societies deal with and process crime can thus have repercussions on society and can leave traces in the way people see each other and take responsibility for each other’s wellbeing. This is evident on the one hand in the partial overlap between clusters of solidarity and clusters of the collective experience of crime shown in section 6.4.3, as well as in
the significant effects of the different indicators of the collective experience of crime on various forms of solidarity identified in chapter 7 and chapter 8. The empirical analyses also substantiate the second qualifying hypothesis, which argued that the collective experience of crime has the ability to increase as well as diminish solidarity in society, depending on which dimension of the collective experience and which kind of solidarity is under investigation.

Many of the identified relationships support Durkheim’s original theory formulated at the end of the 19th century: citizen’s concern for disadvantaged members of society – solidarity – was shown to be higher in contexts of actual as well as perceived threats of crime. Furthermore, data suggest that solidarity among citizens is created at the expense of offenders. Societies that offer little care for the wellbeing of prisoners have higher levels of solidarity with disadvantaged members of society. Likewise, some of the positive relationships between institutionalised solidarity and the processing of crime in criminal justice and political institutions confirm that Durkheim’s work still deserves a place in contemporary criminology. Political discourse about crime and its control that advocates the strict enforcement of criminal justice policies goes hand in hand with higher levels of institutionalised solidarity, exemplified by more generous welfare provisions and higher levels of public social expenditure. Hence, discourse about the violation of rules and their enforcement appears to enhance solidarity, not only among individuals, but also in welfare institutions of contemporary European societies.

The results of this thesis also speak to modern theorists, who elaborate on the relationship between penal regimes, political economy, and institutionalised solidarity. First, as chapter 6 shows, different experiences of crime partly vary along the lines of the welfare regime types identified by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1990). This result addresses the research of Cavadino and Dignan (2006b), who found that imprisonment rates systematically vary with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes. Yet, the results of chapter 6 indicate that if more aspects of the way societies deal with and process crime than imprisonment rates are taken into consideration, the link between crime control and welfare regimes becomes less definite. The holistic view of the collective experience of crime and its relationship with (institutionalised) solidarity consequently does not lend itself to an interpretation which claims that characteristics of neoliberalism such as low levels of institutionalised solidarity or a taste for individual responsibility in providing for a living automatically coincide with harsh and repressive crime control. The overlaps between landscapes of solidarity and landscapes of the collective experience of crime during the two time periods assessed in chapter 6 are multi-layered and suggest a more complex relationship between crime control and solidarity (or the lack thereof). Hence, the relationship
between social welfare and crime control identified in this thesis appears less definite than outlined by Cavadino and Dignan (2006b).

The results of this thesis also give reasons to believe that crime control and social welfare are not alternatives in dealing with social marginality. Beckett and Western (2001) as well as Downes and Hansen (2006) established the argument that states govern social marginality either through social welfare or through penal control by analysing the connection between welfare spending and imprisonment rates. However, the results of chapter 7 challenge this view as they show that instead of driving each other out, high levels of welfare spending coincide with high levels of government expenditure for the criminal justice system. High levels of expenditure for the criminal justice system in turn are indicative of a reintegrative instead of a repressive approach to crime, as measures that aim towards the inclusion of offenders into society like therapy, education programmes and good prison conditions are expensive. Hence, rather than being alternatives, social welfare and crime control as institutions either both represent values aiming at inclusion, or they are both governed by values aiming at exclusion.

This result is closely related to David Garland’s (2001) notion of penal welfarism. Garland argues that penal welfarism, i.e. the aim to design penal measures as rehabilitative interventions rather than repressive and retributive sanctions, has its roots in the wider value context of society. This wider value context is according to Garland not only represented in the criminal justice system, but also evident in other institutions such as the welfare system or educational institutions. It is for that reason, why harsh and excluding punishment is so often found to correspond with limited welfare state activity. The results of this thesis reflect to Garland’s argument regarding penal welfarism and its roots. Furthermore, the thesis shows that the political system and its inherent values play a crucial role regarding the relationship between social welfare and criminal justice. Actors in the political system, like the political parties represented in government and parliament, have the capacity to shape and change the welfare system as well as the criminal justice system.

What the thesis cannot answer however is where values of inclusion and exclusion originate from and whether high imprisonment rates and the corresponding limited welfare activity are brought about by neoliberalism. In order to determine whether this correspondence is stimulated by neoliberal political economies or other underlying political, economic, or cultural processes, a careful examination of the effects of characteristics of neoliberalism such as economic liberalisation, fiscal austerity, deregulation, free trade, and privatisation is necessary, as for example undertaken by de Koster et al. (2008). Likewise, policies driven by neoliberalism can unfold
their impact on the criminal justice system with a temporal delay (Farrall and Hay 2010), which warrants assessments that sequentially periodize neoliberal and criminal justice policies rather than correlate criminal justice indicators with indicators of neoliberalism from the same time period.

Besides reflecting the relationship between high levels of imprisonment and low levels of social welfare that is often credited to neoliberalism (Cavadino and Dignan 2006b; Downes and Hansen 2006; Lacey 2013; O’Malley 2016; Wacquant 2009), results of this thesis also suggest that neoconservatism might play a role in determining the relationship between certain aspects of the collective experience of crime and solidarity. Especially the correlation between issue-attention to questions of law and order in manifestos of political parties and high levels of welfare state activity can be read as indication that rather neoconservatism than neoliberalism can explain under what rationale the political and criminal justice system interact. Neoconservatism is in support of a strong state, which provides for its citizens but simultaneously takes responsibility for upholding the moral order (Tanner 2007: 38). Correspondingly, this strong state uses its force repressively against people, cultures, and behaviour that pose a threat to this moral order. Consequently, neoconservatives support the harsh enforcement of law and order policies against crime, which they see as an expression of the moral decay of society.

The thesis presents framing theory as a valuable theoretical addition to the Durkheimian perspective, especially in understanding findings that suggest some aspects of the collective experience of crime can have negative effects on individual solidarity attitudes. Framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006) is capable of explaining why the relationship between punishment and solidarity is not exclusively positive, as predicted by Durkheimian theory, and of explaining how dimensions of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment relate to solidarity. Framing theory, for example, explains that visible crime control efforts by police and private security lead people to think they can trust their fellow citizens less because these crime control efforts signal the deterioration of others’ solidarity frames. Likewise, if criminal justice institutions in general, and penal regimes in particular, suggest that solidarity-related values of outreach and inclusion are not held in high regard, citizens’ expectations of solidarity from the general public are also lower. In contrast, signs of outreach towards all members of society, including offenders, are important in order to maintain a culture of solidarity visible in individuals’ solidarity attitudes. Hence, from the perspective of framing theory, crime control and punishment are institutions that provide information about the motivations and trustworthiness of fellow citizens, as well as the solidarity values which inform society.

Dimensions of the collective experience of crime are not only found to have
positive and negative relationships with the dimensions of solidarity assessed in the thesis. Different aspects of the collective experience of crime appear to be relevant for different aspects of solidarity as well.

Crime control at the front end, for example, appears to matter more for individual solidarity attitudes than for solidarity institutionalised in the welfare state. Associations between police density and welfare state activity were generally insignificant, while police and private security density has shown significant relationships with citizens’ generalised trust in each other and their concern for the fate of disadvantaged members of society. There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, citizens are directly exposed to crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system, which operates in public areas. It is thus more likely that they have the capacity to influence the way people see each other. Second, crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system, as operationalised in this thesis through, for example, rates of police density, contain little information about the values of in- and exclusion which seem to connect the criminal justice system and the welfare system. Consequently, scarcely any significant relationship between those measures and welfare state activity was identified.

Likewise, crime control at the back end of the criminal justice system, i.e. characteristics of penal regimes, appears to be, for the most part, irrelevant for people’s generalised trust in others, while showing significant associations with citizens’ concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society as well as with institutionalised solidarity in the form of available social welfare. Whether people expect their fellow citizens’ solidarity attitudes to be intact and expect to be able to trust them does not seem to be related to the use of imprisonment or the treatment of offenders. In contrast, individual solidarity with others as well as institutional characteristics that exemplify solidarity in wider society (i.e. the welfare state) show significant links with characteristics of penal regimes. However, solidarity on individual and solidarity on institutional level relate to penal regimes differently. Findings suggest that on an individual level solidarity is, in agreement with Durkheim’s classic theory, created at the expense of offenders. The opposite is the case in regards to solidarity on an institutional level. Welfare state solidarity is higher in contexts which suggest more solidarity with offenders. Individual and institutionalised solidarities are generated by different mechanisms and through different layers in society.

This leads on to the role of the political system and its actors such as governments and political parties. As the analyses show, they provide a decisive link between the collective experience of crime and solidarity in contemporary societies. Across all different levels of analysis and dimensions of solidarity, what political actors do
and say in regards to crime control significantly matters for the aspects of solidarity considered in this thesis, which are: general and particular institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state, as well as individuals’ solidarity with a defined group of more or less marginalised citizens, and citizens’ solidarity expectations of the general public. On the institutional level governments and political parties constitute the institutional link between the welfare and criminal justice system. They appear to mediate values of either inclusion or exclusion, which can be found in both systems. In analyses of solidarity attitudes on individual level financial allocations of governments, which facilitate rehabilitative approaches to offenders, and the content of election manifestos of political parties in regards to crime control, represent public discourse about crime, criminal justice, and the treatment of offenders. This public discourse can represent solidarity with offenders and thus instigate expectations of solidarity among the general public. However, public discourse can also divide citizens by providing a tool to gain group unity as ‘righteous citizens’ against those who present possible threats to society (see also Garland 2012: 30). Hence, in order to understand and gauge the wider social implications of crime control policies it is critical to engage with the political system and its protagonists.

Lastly, conviction rates, as well as police recorded crimes, do not seem to be characteristics of the collective experience of crime which are decisive for its relationship with solidarity on either the institutional or individual level. Both indicators failed to show significant or consistent associations with any of the indicators of solidarity in society on the individual and institutional level. Even though, from a theoretical perspective, the frequency of recording crimes by the police as well as the workload of courts might matter for solidarity and values of inclusiveness, and despite the profound differences among the sample countries in terms of their conviction rate and the rate of crimes recorded by the police, recordings and convictions are processes that take place behind closed doors. Police stations and the court system might be too secluded from the general public and the welfare system to be connected in an empirically accessible fashion to either of the two.

Besides providing a first systematic and evidence-based assessment of potential social implications of the processing of crime in society, some caveats are necessary in regards to the findings of this thesis. First, analyses are based on a sample of established welfare states in Europe. Therefore the mechanisms identified in the empirical chapters are limited in their generalisability. They might be absent or might not manifest themselves in as pronounced a way in a sample of countries which are confronted with different political and economic challenges than the countries used in this study.

Second, the theoretical section of the thesis establishes causal arguments for im-
pacts of the collective experience of crime on solidarity in society. The empirical part of the thesis, however, is correlational in nature, rather than demonstrating a strict causal inference. Regression analyses are a standard methodological approach for discerning relationships between variables, and temporal effects were taken into consideration in all analyses performed in this thesis. Nevertheless, since regression analysis is based on correlation, this method is ultimately unable to give answers about which variable is the cause and which variable the effect, or whether the correlation is caused by a third confounding factor. The effects identified in the analyses thus allow for two interpretations. First, they can be signs that the ways societies deal with crime leave traces in society. Second, different levels of trust, solidarity, and welfare state activity may also shape the way societies control, prevent, and process crime. As Durkheim stated in his analysis: punishment finds itself in a circular relationship with solidarity. This statement might also apply to other dimensions of the collective experience of crime. Nevertheless, overall the results support the hypothesis of this study that the collective experience of crime and solidarity are related in contemporary societies. The identified associations are a first step in researching the relationship between the collective experience of crime and solidarity, and should be understood as a stimulus for future research concerned with the exact mechanisms that underpin these associations.

Third, and closely related, the study is based on observational data, i.e. surveys and country-level indicators. These data are appropriate instruments to show that a relationship between outcomes of solidarity such as concern for others and trust in fellow countrymen and indicators of the collective experience of crime exists, as done in this PhD project. However, with survey questions it is difficult to accurately measure people’s exact intentions behind solidarity such as self-interest, moral duty, or emotional affection (Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 418). In order to get to the core of what motivates people to perform acts of solidarity and how these are related to the different aspects of how society controls and processes crime, experimental designs are needed. These might present a valuable methodological complement to this study.

Thus, this thesis presents a starting point for several avenues of further research. First, the ‘collective experience of crime’ put forward by Garland (2001, 2000) is a meaningful and useful concept, not only on narrative accounts, but also in its quantitative operationalisation. Patterns of the collective experience of crime identified in the sample countries significantly differ along the dimensions used to operationalise the concept. Thus, future research should not shy away from trying to operationalise such broad and qualitative concepts, as even though quantitative data might not be able to fully gauge their whole qualitative meaning, their measurement opens up the
possibility to not only employ them in narrative, historical, qualitative studies, but also in quantitative studies. The collective experience of crime is a useful heuristic to structure both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the relationship between society and crime control.

Consequently, future research should continue to work with this concept and try to replicate the results of this study in different sample of countries. Developing countries or countries which are transitioning from autocratic to democratic rule present interesting contexts in which to study links between solidarity and crime control, because these countries have less established welfare states, are on the verge of building them, are confronted with higher levels of crime in society, and also might pursue different ways of controlling crime. In short their collective experiences of crime, as well as the forms and levels of solidarity in society, might differ from those of the countries assessed in this study. These differences present alternative opportunities to study links between the two phenomena.

Likewise, the robustness of context effects identified in this thesis lend themselves to being tested on lower-level aggregates. In this study the collective experience of crime was measured on a country-level. One step down to administrative areas within nation states like, for example, constituencies, counties in the USA, county-councils in the United Kingdom, or even different urban areas, present alternative aggregates in which to study context effects of the collective experience of crime on both individual solidarity attitudes and the administration of social welfare.

Second, future research might look into how the collective experience of crime shapes the views of different social subgroups, defined by age, income, ethnic background, or socio-economic status. Garland’s work is mainly built on how the middle-class and liberal elites perceive and experience crime. Yet, Garland (2001: 147-148) himself notes that exposure to crime control measures might differ profoundly across social subgroups. The meaning that crime control has for those different subgroups might, thus, shape their solidarity attitudes differently. Consequently, more efforts should be put into discerning different collective experiences of crime within societies.

Third, the role of political discourse on crime for people’s perception of each other, as well as its potential mediating function between social welfare and crime control policy, should be investigated in more detail. This thesis has employed the issue attention of political parties towards matters of crime, and law and order as a proxy for the climate and amount of political, as well as public, discourse in this regard. The content of manifestos has shown to be representative of what is discussed in politics, election campaigns, and the media (Helbling and Tresch 2011). However, election manifestos are only published prior to elections. As a consequence
the content of manifestos of political parties is unable to portray dynamics in the political discourse during the four to six years between elections. Nevertheless, even this proxy-measure of manifesto content has shown significant associations to social welfare, trust, and people’s concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. Thus, measures which are also able to portray dynamics of political and public discourse about crime between national elections deserve further study. Possible measures for the political salience of crime on the political agenda in particular, and in public debate in general, include politicians’ verbal statements about crime and criminal justice, or the frequency that topics related to crime and criminal justice appear in national newspapers. These could allow for additional insights into citizens’ exposure to crime related issues and how this exposure links to feelings of solidarity. Likewise, the role of political discourse in lower level aggregates such as city councils, constituencies, and counties should be assessed, as local and regional politics can diverge from the political discourse at national level as it is shaped by local developments. Thus this dimension of the collective experience of crime can vary regionally and those variations and their potential impact on the way people feel about each other deserve further scientific attention.

Finally, the results of this thesis also have implications for crime control policy. The thesis presents strong support for the demand of Karstedt and Hope (2003) to bring ‘the social’ back into assessments of crime prevention but also into assessments of other crime control measures. Even though the most obvious function of crime control measures is instrumental – to control crime – they should not be seen in isolation from the social, economic, and political life which goes on around them. That is not only because they are, to some extent, a product of society’s political, social, and economic circumstances, but because they themselves also have the potential to influence the social environment as the results of this thesis have shown. Visible crime control measures might reduce incentives for crime, but they also appear to remind people of the existence of crime and make them less trustful towards each other. These are considerations which should be taken into account and weighed against the gains derived from controlling crime.

Moreover, crime control measures might be perceived differently between social subgroups. Chapter 8 shows that the effects of indicators of the collective experience of crime and individual solidarity attitudes vary among income groups. Even though these variations are, by and large, constrained to variations in effect size in some instances, as for example in regards to the rate of private security guards, effects diverge between income groups. Similar or even more pronounced differences might exist in regards to age and ethnic background. Policymakers should be aware that crime control measures can affect different social subgroups differently. One group’s
gain might be the other group’s loss and these trade-offs in regards to the benefits of crime control for different parts of the population should be taken into consideration.

To conclude, there is still a lot of ground to cover in assessing the repercussions of crime, punishment, crime prevention, and the salience of crime in politics in society. This PhD thesis presents a first step by offering a differentiated, cross-national, empirical assessment of questions that have occupied criminology since Durkheim’s seminal work from the late 19th century.
A Appendix

A.1 Appendix Chapters 5 and 6: Country abbreviations

AUT – Austria
BEL – Belgium
BGR – Bulgaria
CHE – Switzerland
CZE – Czech Republic
DNK – Denmark
EST – Estonia
FIN – Finland
FRA – France
GBR – United Kingdom
GER – Germany
GRE – Greece
HUN – Hungary
IRE – Ireland
ITA – Italy
LVA – Latvia
LTU – Lithuania
NDL – Netherlands
NOR – Norway
POL – Poland
PRT – Portugal
ROM – Romania
SVK – Slovakia
SVN – Slovenia
ESP – Spain
SWE – Sweden
A.2 Appendix chapters 6 – 8: Variable descriptions and sources (in order of appearance)

homicide rate

*Description:* Deaths resulting from homicide per 100,000 population.

*Source:* WHO Mortality Database.

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

police density

*Description:* Number of police officers excluding civilians per 100,000 population.

*Source:* European Sourcebooks for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics.

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

recorded crimes

*Description:* Total number of crimes recorded by the police per 100,000 population.

*Source:* Eurostat.

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

conviction rate

*Description:* Total number of convictions per 100,000 population.

*Source:* European Sourcebooks for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics.

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

imprisonment rate

*Description:* Prison population per 100,000 population (total stock).

*Source:* European Sourcebooks for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics.

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Mean centered in chapter 8.

prison conditions

*Description:* 5 point ordinal variable measuring the conditions of prison for each year and country. 1: prison conditions meet international standards; 2: prison conditions meet international standards with minor deficiencies; 3: prison conditions are substandard; 4: prison conditions are harsh; 5: prison conditions are life-threatening.

*Source:* Data first used in Karstedt (2011b,a) supplemented by own coding where the index was not yet available. Coding based on US Department of State annual Human Rights Reports.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Categories used as separate dichotomous variables in chapter 8.

government expenditure CJS

Description: General government expenditure for public order and safety as % of GDP. Includes expenditure for fire protection services, prisons, police services, law courts, research and development on public order and safety, and expenditure for public order and safety areas not otherwise classified.

Source: Eurostat.

Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

dlaw & order manifestos

Description: Relative frequency of sentences in support of the strict enforcement of law and order policies take up in manifestos of all political parties competing in national elections per year and country. Higher values indicate more issue attention given to law and order.

Source: Own calculations based on data of Manifesto Project Database (variable: per605).

Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

generalised trust

Description: Opinion that most people can be trusted.

Source: European Values Study.

Question text: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ Answers: (1) Most people can be trusted; (2) Can’t be too careful.

Notes: Used as aggregate of answer 1 in chapter 6, i.e. as percentage of people per country who are of the opinion that most people can be trusted. Used on individual level in chapter 8, i.e. dichotomous variable with a value of 1 if the respondent stated that most people can be trusted and 0 otherwise.

cheating on taxes never justified

Description: Percentage of people per country who think that cheating on taxes is never justifiable

Source: European Values Study, aggregation of answer 1.
Question text: ‘Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card; Cheating on taxes if you have a chance.’ Answers: 1: never justifiable, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10: always justifiable.

Notes: Used in chapter 6.

mainly individual is responsible

Description: Percentage of people per country who think that individuals should take more responsibility.

Source: European Values Study, aggregation of respondents which picked answers smaller than 4.

Question text: ‘On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?’ Answers: 1: individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10: the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.

Notes: Used in chapter 6.

concern for disadvantaged members of society

Description: Additive index which measures combined concern for old, unemployed, sick and disabled people in respondents’ country. Calculated in two steps: first, the variables were recoded so that higher values indicate more concern. Second an additive index per respondent was calculated with a minimum of 3 indicating no concern for either of the three groups to a maximum of 15 which indicates very much concern for all three groups.

Source: European Values Study.

Question text: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of:’ (a) ‘elderly people in [COUNTRY]’, (b) ‘unemployed people in [COUNTRY]’, and (c) ‘sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’ Answers: (1) very much (2) much (3) to a certain extent (4) not so much (5) not at all.

Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 8. Used on country-level in chapter 6, i.e. the average sum score of concern of all respondents per country, and on individual level as described above in chapter 8.

engagement in voluntary work

Description: Percentage of respondents who are engaged in any kind of voluntary work.
Source: European Values Study. Aggregation of people who had stated that they are currently doing unpaid voluntary work for any of the below voluntary organisations.

Question text: ‘Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?’ Answers: social welfare service, religious or church organisation, education or cultural activities, labour unions, political parties, environment conservation ecology, animal rights, professional associations, youth work, sports or recreation, women’s group, peace movement, organisation concerned with health, work consumer groups, other groups.

Notes: Used in chapter 6.

total social expenditure

Description: Total public social expenditure as percentage of GDP.

Source: OECD SOCX Database.

Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 7.

expenditure for old age

Description: Total public social expenditure on old age as percentage of GDP.

Source: OECD SOCX Database.

Notes: Used in chapter 6.

expenditure for unemployment

Description: Total public social expenditure on unemployment benefits as percentage of GDP.

Source: OECD SOCX Database.

Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 7.

expenditure for health

Description: Total public social expenditure on health as percentage of GDP.

Source: OECD SOCX Database.

Notes: Used in chapter 6.

convergence homicide rates
**Description:** Dichotomous variable, 1 if the homicide rate of a country has converged to the homicide rates of its dyadic partner compared to the previous year.

**Source:** Own coding.

**Notes:** Used in chapter 6.

**convergence imprisonment rates**

**Description:** Dichotomous variable, 1 if the imprisonment rate of a country has converged to the imprisonment rate of its dyadic partner compared to the previous year.

**Source:** Own coding.

**Notes:** Used in chapter 6.

**convergence total social expenditure**

**Description:** Dichotomous variable, 1 if the total public social expenditure of a country has converged to the total public social expenditure of its dyadic partner compared to the previous year.

**Source:** Own coding.

**Notes:** Used in chapter 6.

**convergence expenditure for unemployment**

**Description:** Dichotomous variable, 1 if public expenditure for unemployment benefits of a country has converged to the public expenditure for unemployment benefits of its dyadic partner compared to the previous year.

**Source:** Own coding.

**Notes:** Used in chapter 6.

**Gini coefficient**

**Description:** Gini measure for the distribution of income; higher values indicate greater income inequality.

**Source:** Eurostat. In cases where Eurostat did not report information the data was supplemented by information from the World Bank World Development Indicators\(^{54}\) and the supplementary material of Wenzelburger (2015).

**Notes:** Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

GDP growth

*Description:* Growth of real GDP, percent change from previous year.

*Source:* Comparative Political Data Set by Armingeon et al. (2015).

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.

largest government party center

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if the largest government party of a country is ‘center’ in its ideological orientation.

*Source:* Own coding based on variable dpi_gprlc1 of The Quality of Government Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al. (2015).

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6.

largest government party left

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if the largest government party of a country is ‘left’ in its ideological orientation.

*Source:* Own coding based on variable dpi_gprlc1 of The Quality of Government Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al. (2015).

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6 and 7.

both high inequality

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries sharing a dyad are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest level of income inequality in the sample (as measured by the Gini coefficient).

*Source:* Own coding.

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6.

same GDP development

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries sharing a dyad experience GDP decline in a given year, or both countries sharing a dyad experience GDP growth compared to the previous year.

*Source:* Own coding.

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6.

both salient law & order manifestos

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries sharing a dyad are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest level of attention devoted to law and order policies in manifestos of political parties in the sample.
same gvmnt orientation

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if the largest government parties of both countries sharing a dyad have the same ideological orientation (right, centre, or left).

*Source:* Own coding.

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6.

same cluster

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries in a dyad were in the same cluster in the cluster analysis using data between 1995 and 2000.

*Source:* Own coding.

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6. Analyses concerned with convergence of homicide and imprisonment use clusters of the collective experience of crime as reference, analyses concerned with convergence of public expenditure figures use clusters of solidarity as reference.

same family

*Description:* Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries in a dyad are in the same family of nation as defined by Castles (1993).

*Source:* Own coding.

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6.

same world of welfare

*Description:* Dichotomous welfare, 1 if both countries in a dyad share the same welfare typology as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999).

*Source:* Own coding.

*Notes:* Used in chapter 6.

unemployment rate

*Description:* Percentage of labour force that is currently unemployed.

*Source:* The Quality of Government Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al. (2015), original International Monetary Fund.

*Notes:* Used in chapters 6 and 7.

both high unemployment rate
**Description:** Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries in a dyad are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest unemployment rates in the sample.

**Source:** Own coding.

**Notes:** Used in chapter 6.

**ethnic fractionalisation**

**Description:** Continuous measure for the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society. Probability of two random people being of different ethnicities where 0 represents a perfectly homogenous society and 1 a highly fragmented society.

**Source:** The Quality of Government Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al. (2015), original Alesina et al. (2003)

**Notes:** Used in chapters 7 and 8. Mean-centered in chapter 8.

**ethnic frac.*police density**

**Description:** Interaction term between the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society and the number of police officers per 100,000 population.

**Source:** Own calculation, sources of the two individual variables outlined above.

**Notes:** Used in chapter 7.

**combined benefit generosity**

**Description:** Continuous measure for the overall generosity of a benefit system, i.e. the ease of access and broadness of coverage of a country’s welfare system. Composed of the generosity indices for the three main social insurance programmes unemployment benefits, health benefits, and pension benefits.

**Source:** Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset by Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto (2014); Scruggs (2014).

**Notes:** Used in chapter 7.

**unemployment benefit generosity**

**Description:** Continuous measure for the generosity of unemployment benefits of a country, i.e. the ease of access and broadness of coverage of a country’s unemployment benefit programme.

**Source:** Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2014).
no neighbour w/ record

Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if respondents state they would not like to have people with a criminal record as neighbours.

Source: European Values Study.

Question text: ‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?’ Answers: Q.120A People with a criminal record.

Notes: Used in chapter 7.

fear of crime

Description: Percentage of people who state that they feel unsafe or very unsafe at night when walking alone in their local area after dark.

Source: European Social Survey waves 1 and 4.

Question text: ‘How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in your local area or neighbourhood after dark?’ Answer categories: ‘very safe’, ‘safe’, ‘unsafe’, ‘very unsafe.’


gender of respondent

Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if respondent is female, 0 if respondent is male.

Source: European Values Study.

Notes: Used in chapter 8.

age

Description: Age of respondent in years.

Source: European Values Study.

Notes: Used in chapter 8.

education

Description: Ordinal variable to measure the highest educational level attained by a respondent.

Source: European Values Study.

Question text: ‘What is the highest level you have reached in your education?’ Answer categories: 1 inadequately completed elementary education; 2 completed (compulsory) elementary education; 3 (compulsory)
elementary education and basic vocational qualification; 4 secondary, intermediate vocational qualification; 5 secondary, intermediate general qualification; 6 full secondary, maturity level certificate; 7 higher education - lower-level tertiary certificate; 8 higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate.

Notes: Used in chapter 8.

imprison. rate*ethnic frac.

Description: Interaction term between the imprisonment rate and ethnic heterogeneity in society.

Source: Own calculation, sources of the two individual variables outlined above.

Notes: Used in chapter 8. Variables were mean-centered before creating the interaction term.

expenditure on inmates

Description: Continuous measure which relativises government expenditure for the prison system to the number of inmates. The percentage of the general government expenditure devoted to the prison system divided by the imprisonment rate. This quotient was multiplied by 1000 to eliminate zeros after the decimal point.

Source: Own calculation, sources of the two individual variables outlined above.

Notes: Used in chapter 8.
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