Governing tourism-led local economic development planning

An interactive tourism governance perspective on the Elmina 2015 Strategy in Ghana

Emmanuel Akwasi Adu-Ampong

A thesis submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, The University of Sheffield for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Sheffield
December, 2016
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that where references to the work of others has been made, appropriate credit has been given.

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© 2016 Emmanuel Akwasi Adu-Ampong and The University of Sheffield
To my dear wife Marre, for your love and sacrifice

To Zoë and Joshua, in whose childhood charms I found respite
Mural painting in School Boy Restaurant adjacent Victoria Park, Cape Coast
These are known as Adinkra symbols, and are visual representation of philosophy, concepts, thoughts and aphorisms of the Akan (Ashanti) people of Ghana. Each symbol has distinct meaning that encapsulate proverbial and/or evocative messages through which traditional wisdom on social life is conveyed. I have used some of these symbols at the end of the chapters of this thesis with their accompanying meanings.
Preface and Acknowledgements

Always giving thanks to God the Father for everything,
in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ
(Ephesians 5:20)

Looking back on it, that evening of 7th March, 2013 opened a great door for me. On that evening, after over two years of searching, applications, and interviews, I finally received an email stating that I have been offered a Faculty PhD Studentship Award. I could barely contain my excitement as I imagined the world of academic life awaiting me in Sheffield. As sleep eluded me, I got up around dawn to go running on the beach of Barcelona where I was living at that time, all the time thinking of how my dream of starting a PhD was becoming a reality. It was not long after accepting the offer from Sheffield that I was notified of another PhD Studentship award offer at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. Torn between a choice of continued sunshine ‘down under’ and a cold wet South Yorkshire, I chose the latter and can now look back on what has been an incredible three years and counting. The many opportunities that have come my way at the University of Sheffield have made this a great academic journey. The culmination of all the ups and downs of my research apprenticeship is partly found in this thesis. For all that I have learnt and experienced as a student, I am most grateful first and foremost to God through Jesus Christ, of whom and through whom I have been blessed with the opportunity, perseverance and determination to successfully complete this research project.

This thesis would not have been possible without the help, encouragement and support of a number of people and institutions. Firstly, I will like to thank the Department of Urban Studies and Planning (née the Department of Town and Regional Planning) for providing me with an intellectual home even when on many occasions I was unsure of my belonging. I am also grateful to the University of Sheffield for the award of a three year Faculty of Social Sciences PhD studentship. In this regard, I am indebted to Steve Connelly for nominating me for the award and making a case on my behalf. I will also like to offer profound thanks to my supervisors Glyn Williams and Tom Goodfellow for giving me room to learn, develop and make mistakes. Thanks for reading through all the drafts of my chapters along the way and offering constructive and detailed feedback. I am grateful to the following senior academics who at various stages provided me with feedback and encouragement on aspects of my work through face to
face meetings and over email – Bill Bramwell and the late Dorothea Meyer of Sheffield Hallam University, UK, Chris Rogerson of the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, David Harrison of Middlesex University, UK, and Regina Scheyvens of Massey University, New Zealand.

Over the course of my research, I have had the opportunity to undertake a number of fieldwork visits, attend conferences and engage in research mobility programmes. In March, 2014, I founded the Tourism Research Network (TouRNet) which brings together staff and students with research interest in tourism across the Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York, and other affiliate universities. I am grateful to the White Rose Doctoral Training Centre for providing the seed funding to kick-start the network through which some of the ideas in this thesis were developed. I am grateful for funding from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning that supported a number of conference attendance and presentations. The Sheffield Institute for International Development (SIID) provided funding for a second fieldtrip to Ghana through its Research Enhancement Fund. An award from the Santander Research Mobility Fund programme at the University of Sheffield funded a research visit to the Department of Geography and Resource Development at the University of Ghana. I also undertook a research visit to the School of Tourism and Hospitality Management at the University of Surrey through an award from the Sheffield Methods Institute Fund. An award from the World Universities Network Research Mobility Programme funded a 6 weeks research visit to the African Centre for Cities based at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. All these research visits provided me with time and opportunity to think, analyse and write this thesis as well as to discuss my work with (senior) colleagues at these institutions.

I will like to acknowledge and extend special thanks to all the people who made time to be interviewed during the two periods of fieldwork in Ghana. This research would not have been possible without your assistance. In particular, I am grateful to Dr. Annah Prah at the University of Cape Coast, Mr. Justice Amoah who is now a Coordinating Director at the Wa Municipal Assembly, and Mr. Ebenezer Ebo Dadzie, a proud citizen of Elmina, based at the desk of the National Commission on Civic Education in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly. I am also indebted to my dear friend George Nana Addo Ofori-Atta for hosting me during my stays in Accra and for our ongoing discussion and debates about governance, politics and national
development in Ghana. My thanks go out to my mates and friends in Dunkwa-On-Offin, Kumasi, Accra, Cape Coast and Elmina for making each fieldwork visit feel more like a homecoming. Special mention goes out to 'Organa Fadas' Ben and R. Nico for all the visits to the Fufu joint, to Kaku Ackah and 'Burga' Ankomah for the jokes and reminiscing each time I get to Kumasi and Dunkwa-On-Offin, and to Martin 'Alaska' in Elmina for the fun times. Enrique Wedgewood Young, a man of the world and whose last known location was in a stately home in Edinburgh deserves a mention for help with proofreading. To the many others who kept asking about the progress of the PhD, I say thanks!

Last but certainly not the least, I wish to acknowledge and thank my ever-supportive family. I am grateful to my parents, A.B. Gyedu and Cece Akua for all the investment in my education. I look forward to being able to tell my mum that I am no longer a student. My deepest gratitude and thanks go to Marre Adu-Ampong, my dear wife without whom this thesis could not have been produced. Thank you for your patience, sacrifice and strength in being a 'single mother' for Zoë and Joshua for long stretches of time while I got lost in this research project. I dedicated this thesis to you, Zoë, and Joshua. Maybe one day we can all read through the thesis as a family bedtime story!

Emmanuel Akwasi Adu-Ampong
Sheffield
1st December, 2016
Abstract

Tourism is expanding in many developing countries, in contexts where states struggle to effectively manage local economic development processes. This thesis aims to bridge a gap between the literature on the tourism-poverty nexus and scholarship pertaining to the politics and governance of local development planning, by examining how governing interactions shape the planning and use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. A key contribution of this thesis is the development of an interactive tourism governance framework built on the three key concepts of stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles. The research is framed as an embedded case study of the Elmina 2015 Strategy in Ghana. A mainly qualitative research approach was adopted involving interviews, observations and documentary analysis.

The Elmina 2015 Strategy sought to leverage tourism as a catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction through an integrated planning approach led by the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA). The thesis identified that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was insufficiently embedded within existing institutional structures. Through a process-tracing analysis, it was found that cycles of national elections and local government politics resulted in the loss of institutional memory and knowledge at the KEEA. This constrained the governing capacity of the KEEA in steering project implementation. This thesis shows that the state and the internal power dynamics between key players within it remain crucial in setting and implementing policy agendas. The thesis therefore seeks to make a contribution towards debates on the significance of the state in tourism governance and argues that the state ought to be brought back into any conceptualisation of tourism governance, especially as it relates to the governing of tourism-led local economic development. As local governments take a more active role in tourism development planning, the issue of their capacity needs to be addressed.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>ATAG</td>
<td>Aid to Artisans Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATB</td>
<td>Ashanti Traditional Buildings</td>
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<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDECOM</td>
<td>Central Region Development Commission</td>
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<td>CERIDEP</td>
<td>Central Region Development Programme</td>
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<td>CORDAID</td>
<td>Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Action Plan</td>
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<td>CHLDEP</td>
<td>Cultural Heritage and Local Development in Elmina Programme</td>
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<td>DACF</td>
<td>District Assembly Common Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCE</td>
<td>District Chief Executive</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DMTDP</td>
<td>District Medium Term Development Plan</td>
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<td>DPCU</td>
<td>District Planning Coordinating Unit</td>
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<td>EACM</td>
<td>Elmina Arts and Craft Market</td>
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<td>ECHMP</td>
<td>Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Union Development Fund</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>ETO</td>
<td>Elmina Tourism Office</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GATTA</td>
<td>Ghana Association of Travel and Tour Agents</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GHA</td>
<td>Ghana Hotels Association</td>
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<td>GHATOF</td>
<td>Ghana Tourism Federation</td>
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<td>GHCT</td>
<td>Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust</td>
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<td>GIMPA</td>
<td>Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>GLSS</td>
<td>Ghana Living Standards Survey</td>
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<td>GMMB</td>
<td>Ghana Museums and Monuments Board</td>
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<td>GNCC</td>
<td>Ghana National Commission on Culture</td>
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<td>GoG</td>
<td>Government of Ghana</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPRS I</td>
<td>Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>GPRS II</td>
<td>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>GSGDA</td>
<td>Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda</td>
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<td>GSS</td>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
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<td>GREET</td>
<td>Ghana Rural Ecotourism and Travel Office</td>
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<td>Ghana Tourist Board</td>
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<td>Ghana Tourist Corporation</td>
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<td>Ghana Tourist Control Board</td>
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<td>GTCA</td>
<td>Ghana Traditional Caterers Association</td>
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<td>GTDC</td>
<td>Ghana Tourism Development Corporation</td>
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<td>GNTDP</td>
<td>Ghana National Tourism Development Plan</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<td>HOTCATT</td>
<td>Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute</td>
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<td>IGF</td>
<td>Internal Generated Fund</td>
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<td>IHS</td>
<td>Institute for Housing and Urban Studies</td>
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<td>ILGS</td>
<td>Institute of Local Government Studies</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>KEEA</td>
<td>Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abream Municipal Assembly</td>
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<td>LED</td>
<td>Local Economic Development</td>
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<td>LGS</td>
<td>Local Government Service</td>
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<td>MCE</td>
<td>Municipal Chief Executive</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MDPO</td>
<td>Municipal Development Planning Officer</td>
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<td>MMDAs</td>
<td>Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies</td>
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<td>Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives</td>
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<td>MOT</td>
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<td>MOTCCA</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts</td>
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<td>MOTDR</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations</td>
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<td>MOTMCC</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism and the Modernisation of the Capital City</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Medium Term Development Plan</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NCRC</td>
<td>Nature Conservation Research Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<td>NDPC</td>
<td>National Development Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NICAS</td>
<td>Netherlands Institute for Conservation, Art and Science</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Council</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Patriotic Party</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Redemption Council</td>
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<td>NRCHP</td>
<td>Natural Resource Conservation and Historic Preservation Project</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Protected Area</td>
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<td>PANAFEST</td>
<td>Pan-African Festival Historical Theatre Project</td>
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<td>Political Business Cycle</td>
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<td>Doctor of Philosophy</td>
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<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defense Council</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
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<td>PPPF</td>
<td>Public Private Partnership Forum</td>
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<td>PPT</td>
<td>Pro Poor Tourism</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Coordinating Council</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programmes</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Save Elmina Association</td>
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<td>SHTC</td>
<td>State Hotels and Tourist Corporation</td>
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<td>SHC</td>
<td>State Hotels Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
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<td>SNV</td>
<td>Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>TDF</td>
<td>Tourism Development Fund</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>TORGAG</td>
<td>Tour Guides Association of Ghana</td>
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<td>TOUGHA</td>
<td>Tour Operators Union of Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSMTDP</td>
<td>Tourism Sector Medium Term Development Plan</td>
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<td>UNESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia Pacific</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education and Scientific Organisation</td>
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<td>UNWTO</td>
<td>United Nations World Tourism Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WD-FC</td>
<td>Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission</td>
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<td>WHL</td>
<td>World Heritage List</td>
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<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Heritage Site</td>
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<td>WTTC</td>
<td>World Travel and Tourism Council</td>
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Chapter 1

Defining the research agenda

The historic city of Elmina is the capital of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) Municipality in the Central Region of Ghana. With a 2012 population of just over 23,000 (GSS, 2014b), Elmina is the biggest settlement in, and the capital of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) Municipality of the Central Region of Ghana, headed by the Municipal Chief Executive. The KEEA Municipality is made up of six zonal councils, 54 electoral areas and 15 decentralised departments. There are four overlapping traditional areas/councils within the municipality – these being Komenda, Edina (Elmina), Eguafo and Abrem traditional areas. The population of these areas are largely Fanti in ethnicity. Thus, as well as being the seat of the Elmina Urban Council as per the decentralisation policies in place, Elmina also doubles up as the capital of the Edinaman Traditional Council which is headed by the Paramount Chief. This dual system of governance within Elmina requires cooperation and dialogue between the political system and the traditional system in many areas of socio-economic policy making. This is because both the political administrative structures and the traditional structures have responsibility for the overall development of the area under their jurisdiction. It is estimated that 60% of employment in Elmina is in the informal sector while the remaining 40% of formal sector employment is found in teaching, nursing and government jobs at the KEEA Municipal offices (KEEA, 2002). The informal sector includes activities such as fishing, ship building, fish processing, salt mining, artisanal self-employment, agriculture and petty trading.

Poverty incidence is widespread in Elmina and is manifested in a number of indicators. These include high rates of unemployment, high school dropout rates, high rates of child delinquency, low school enrolment rates, high rates of teenage pregnancy among others. For instance, the results of the 2010 Ghana Population and Housing Census shows that “at least three in every ten persons [in the KEEA municipality] are economically not active (32.4%)” and that “one key finding of important social and health implication is the poor nature of housing condition in the Municipality which confirms the relative poverty of the residents” (GSS, 2014:70). As the KEEA Municipal Coordinating Director concedes, “…yes we have poverty, the bulk of people are poor so to speak and if you go into the hinterland you see people depend on seasonal cropping and they are peasant farmers, from hand to mouth. This is how they've survived all the
The Municipal Assembly identifies the key development challenges in Elmina and its environs as found in education, agriculture, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), health and local economic development. Improvements in these areas are considered as essential for improving socio-economic development and poverty reduction. It is in this regard that beginning in the mid-1990s, tourism came to be seen as a potential ‘third sector’ growth pole in Elmina - after fishing and salt mining - which could serve as a catalyst for local economic development (Holden et al., 2011).

Elmina is endowed with a number of cultural heritage tourism resources and assets that is based on its long association with European explorers and settlers. In 1470, Portuguese explorers first made contact with the people of Elmina. The Portuguese King Alfonso renamed the city el Mina (“the Mine”) due to the city’s strategic access to the gold fields in the surrounding areas. Soon afterwards trade relations between the people of Elmina and the Portuguese (and other Europeans) became established and by 1482 the Portuguese had built St. George’s Castle – commonly known as the Elmina Castle. The castle was later captured and controlled by the Dutch in 1637 and then by the British in 1872. Prior to its conversion into a slave dungeon and auction site at the start of the infamous slave trade era in the early 16th century, St. George’s Castle was a centre for trading in goods (Bruner, 1996; Essah, 2001). As the oldest European building on the African continent, St. George’s Castle and the smaller Fort St. Jago in Elmina along with the many forts and castles along the coast of Ghana have been recognised as UNESCO World Heritage Sites since 1979 (Adu-Ampong, 2010). These sites and the existence of a number of European-style churches and cemeteries, old merchant houses and Dutch street names as well as the rich cultural heritage of the people of Elmina serve as significant tourist attractions. On average about 75,000 domestic and international tourist visits are recorded at St. George’s Castle alone on an annual basis, with the year ending 2014 recording just over 58,000 visitors. In the past attempts have been made to leverage this rich cultural heritage-based tourism to catalyse local economic development and poverty reduction in Elmina through

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1 Interview with Alhaji Musah, Municipal Coordinating Director, KEEA, Elmina 04.11.2014
2 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Planning Officer, KEEA, Elmina 23.07.2015: KEEA Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017
3 Calculations based on raw figures from the Ghana Museum and Monuments Board monthly record notebooks. The dip in visitors in 2014 compared to the yearly average is the result of the Ebola epidemic that scared visitors from coming to Ghana.
programmes and projects. The most recent of such attempts is what became known as the Elmina 2015 Strategy which began in the early 2000s.

On April 15th, 2002 Prince Willem Alexander (currently King Willem Alexander) and Princess Maxima of the Netherlands were present in Elmina for the official opening of the *Elmina Town Consultation* under the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme (ECHMP) which was an attempt to leverage the heritage tourism assets for local economic development and poverty reduction. The ECHMP was developed by the KEEA Municipal Assembly and sought to integrate efforts at stimulating local economic development in the city of Elmina “as a means to alleviate poverty an[d] improve the living standard of the Elmina people” (KEEA, 2002:11). It was through the ECHMP that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was developed which envisaged heritage tourism as a catalyst for stimulating local economic development. The Elmina 2015 Strategy was comprised of three key reports: 1) Sector Strategy and Vision; 2) Project Portfolios and; 3) Elmina Profile and Summary Profile. The Elmina Profile was a report on the socio-economic development and political situation of Elmina. This served as basis for developing the Sector Strategy and Vision as well as the Project Portfolios. The Elmina Profile also served as a baseline against which to evaluate its outcomes. Out of the three reports, it is the Sector Strategy and Vision report that offers an insight into how stakeholders arrived at an image of how tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction were related in Elmina. Thus the Elmina 2015 Strategy set out a tourism-led local economic development planning strategy that went beyond simple heritage conservation. In summary, the argument was this;

*The Elmina 2015 strategy goes beyond restoring monuments. It believes that with improved tourist infrastructure, the revitalisation of the existing monuments and the development of other important cultural sites, tourism can become a major economic activity in Elmina and serve to improve the general standard of living in the town. The strategy identifies tourism as an entry point in facilitating sustainable development through an integrated development approach. Thus mutual cultural heritage and monuments serve as a springboard in working towards improvement of living standards. At the same time, the improvements to the other sectors such as health, education and waste management will enhance the touristic potential of Elmina, thereby allowing for a synergistic development framework.*

KEEA (2002a:10)
In effect, the Elmina 2015 Strategy was positioned as the culmination of a tourism-led local economic development planning process that began in the year 2000 by the KEEA Municipal Assembly in collaboration with the Institute of Housing and Urban Studies of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. This process was also initiated in close collaboration with the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB), Ghana Institute of Local Government Studies (ILGS) and the Department of International Relations and International Organisations at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

A number of projects outlined in the Project Portfolio document under the Elmina 2015 strategy were implemented between 2003 and 2007 (see Chapter 5, section 5.2 for more details). These projects were part of a shared vision that was mapped out for the future socio-economic development of Elmina. This shared vision was arrived at through rounds of stakeholder and community consultations lead by the KEEA. These projects ranged from the rehabilitation of St. George's Castle, Fort St. Jago, the Dutch Cemetery, old merchant houses and the dredging of the fishing harbour, as well as training of artisans and the construction of the Elmina Craft Market. The funding sources for these projects included the Dutch Culture Fund, the EU's 9th European Development Fund and Government of Ghana funding through the KEEA Municipal Assembly. These projects were agreed upon through a number of stakeholder consultations and public workshops. The implementation of these and other projects aimed to ensure that by 2015 Elmina's socio-economic development fortunes would be flourishing through increased tourism. The ultimate expectation was that by the end of 2015, Elmina would become ‘the engine of equitable socio-economic development that impacts on the wealth creation, poverty reduction and improved local governance on a sustainable basis’ (Arthur and Mensah, 2006:310).

At the end of the year 2015 however, the outcomes on the ground show a remarkable difference from the objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as originally outlined. Epitomising this mismatch between objectives and outcome is the state of the Elmina Castle as shown in figures 1 and 2 below. Figure 1 represents the Elmina St. George’s Castle immediately after renovation in 2007 while figure 2 represents the neglect experienced by the Castle as at November, 2014. This neglect in maintaining the renovated Castle is a reflection of the implementation failures of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.
In Elmina today, the expected integration of tourism to foster local economic development has yet to be realised. Collaboration and coordination between various tourism-related and development-related agencies has broken down and many of the completed projects are beginning to fall apart again. The tourism products on offer have not been diversified and the Elmina St. George’s Castle continues to remain the centrepiece attraction without linkages being created to other existing and potential attractions in the locality. The rehabilitated St. George Castle, Dutch cemetery, old merchant houses and tourist signage are all in various stages of disrepair and neglect. Many of the business enterprises that were set up at the start of the ECHMP process to benefit from and attract increased number of tourists into the larger community have closed down because of the failure of institutional collaboration and coordination.

The Elmina Arts and Craft Market which was to offer revenue creation opportunities for local artisans is non-existent (see figure 3 below), and the grounds are currently used by sellers of foodstuff and children learning to ride bicycles. The Elmina Tourism Office set up to provide information to tourists and to collect funds for the Tourism Development Fund is no longer functional, with allegations that poor oversight and accountability monitoring led to the embezzlement of funds. Tourists continue to visit the Elmina Castle in buses parked right in front of the Castle, and usually as part of an intensive day’s itinerary. This means that tourists have little to no interaction with the larger Elmina community (Adu-Ampong, 2016). The KEEA Municipal Assembly as the highest political and administrative body with responsibility for overall development of
the locality no longer shows any interest in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Other institutions that were involved in the planning process appear to have recoiled back into a narrow focus on their own respective mandates. Governance and management of the Elmina 2015 Strategy appears to have fallen through the cracks.

Figure 3 The current state of the Elmina Arts and Crafts Market

The divergence of objectives and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 strategy while common to many development plans and projects raises a number of important questions about tourism-led local economic development planning processes more generally and the particular case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy specifically. The Elmina 2015 Strategy can be considered as a failure inasmuch as not all policy objectives were achieved. Part of the empirical question that needs to be answered is about what kind of failure it is. An important starting point is to question whether the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy is an example of a policy fiasco (Bovens and ’t Hart, 1998), the result of poor policy design (Howlett, 2011), an implementation failure (Hill and Hupe, 2002, 2008) or a case of state fragility and failure (Torres and Anderson, 2004). The literature on policy design and policy implementation offers a number of interesting perspectives within which to assess the Elmina 2015 Strategy and its outcomes. Nonetheless, as Hill and Hupe (2008:4) has rightly pointed out, questions of implementation presuppose a prior act of policy formulation of “what needs to be done and making a decision on it”. Therefore, it is important to firstly clarify the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a policy and the processes through which it was developed.
Thus in this research I locate the explanation of the gap between policy intention and policy outcome not necessarily in problems of implementation but rather in the overriding governance environment that shaped the policy planning process. In a recent paper, Peters (2015) demonstrates the need to consider policy failure in a broader context of the systemic conditions relating to the characteristics of governance arrangements and political variables that altogether shape the policy formulation process. A big majority of the causes of policy failures identified in the literature tend to be related to the characteristics of the policies themselves with little regard to the overarching socio-economic and political environment. It is this larger governance environment that Peters sees as a more encompassing approach to understanding why policies fail. This forms one departure point for this thesis vis-à-vis the literature on public policy, policy implementation and policy failure.

Given the wide range of stakeholders involved in the Elmina 2015 Strategy, an examination of the larger context of governance interactions and the institutional structures within which the Elmina 2015 Strategy took place becomes key. This is the focus of this thesis, which investigates the institutional and political arrangements, and stakeholder capacities within which tourism-led local economic development planning takes place. The research aims to closely examine the particular ways in which the dynamics of governance interactions shape the use of tourism for local economic development. In focusing on the dynamics of governance interactions, this thesis places a strong emphasis on the important role of politics. It does so in order to address the lacuna in the literature on the tourism-poverty nexus where there is insufficient attention given to the political and governance dimensions of tourism’s role in local economic development and poverty reduction. While this thesis deals with policy and in part questions of implementation, it is fundamentally a research about tourism governance vis-à-vis tourism’s role in local economic development and poverty reduction.

The Elmina 2015 Strategy was based on a technocratic understanding of governance and the institutional arrangements under which implementation was to take place. This technocratic understanding of governance interactions in the locality meant that the strategy proceeded on the assumption that once the consultations had been completed, plans agreed, and the project had begun, things would fall into place to ensure that tourism lead to local economic development. This did not happen due to a number of
reasons. The inadequate attention given to the political dimensions of governance in the design of the strategy appears to be key. The fact that the governance system is based on a political cycle that ushers in new political and governance agents through elections conducted every four years was clearly not factored into the design of the strategy and plans for its sustainable implementation. What is clear is that within the Elmina 2015 Strategy there has been a failure in the governance of tourism planning and hence of creating effective linkages between tourism and local economic development. It becomes clear that what is needed is a new understanding of the governance of tourism-led local economic development that is sensitive to and grounded in the political context in which it takes place. Such a politically informed understanding of governance can provide a basis for developing a more resilient governance framework for tourism-led local economic development planning.

The rest of this introductory chapter outlines the research objectives and questions, situates the research in its academic context, introduces the interactive governance framework and summarises the contribution and structure of the thesis and the conclusions drawn.
1.1 Research objectives and questions

The overall objective of this research is to understand, explain and analyse how governance interactions shape the planning and use of tourism for local economic development. Governance interactions in this thesis are conceptualised as comprising of stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles. These are detailed in Chapter 2. To this end the overriding research question is stated as:

- How do stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles shape tourism-led local economic development planning in a tourism destination?

The answer to this main question will be arrived at through an empirical examination of the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy process. As such, the specific research questions for this thesis are the following:

1. How did the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualise the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction?

2. To what extent did the level of governance capacity held by key stakeholders shape the planning process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy?

3. To what extent was the Elmina 2015 strategy embedded within the institutional arrangements for local economic development planning of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo Abrem Municipal Assembly?

4. How did local government politics and cycles of national elections shape the Elmina 2015 Strategy?

5. To what extent does an interactive tourism governance framework allow for a nuanced understanding of the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning?
1.2 The tourism-poverty nexus and the need for a governance perspective

Poverty remains one of the greatest challenges in modern times. Indeed one of the main goals of increasing economic development is to combat poverty whether in 'developed' or 'developing' countries. Within this challenge of poverty reduction, tourism is often promoted as having the potential to make a significant contribution to the development process (Ashley et al., 2000; Sofield et al., 2004; Scheyvens, 2011; Holden, 2013; Novelli, 2016). The continuous growth of the tourism sector globally has been the basis on which tourism has come to be regarded as a means to development. This is especially the case in many African countries, where there was a 6% increase in international tourism demand in 2013 (UNWTO, 2014). Many of these African countries possess a wide variety of natural, cultural, and man-made tourism assets like beaches, wildlife parks, cultural festivals and World Heritage Sites. Consequently, tourism has been seen as having the potential to improve livelihoods through foreign exchange earnings, job creation, income generation and biodiversity conservation (Ashley et al., 2000; Meyer, 2007; Adu-Ampong, 2014; Christie et al., 2014; Novelli, 2016). As such, throughout this thesis, I use the term tourism-poverty nexus to refer to tourism’s potential impact on local economic development and poverty reduction and to the projects, programmes, plans and policies that are based on and/or geared towards achieving this.

In recent decades, extensive research has been undertaken into the positive and negative impacts of tourism on development (Bryden, 1973; Turner, 1976; Britton, 1982; Lea, 1988; Sinclair and Tsegaye, 1990; Pleumaron, 1994; Ashley et al., 2000; Schilcher, 2007; Mowforth and Munt, 2009; Scheyvens, 2011; Holden, 2013). It has been noted by both de Kadt (1979) and Britton (1982) that from the late 1960s to the early 1980s much of the research on tourism’s role in economic development and the resulting discussions were divorced from the historical and political processes that shape development in any given country. The mid-1980s and the 1990s therefore saw critical reflections on the role of tourism in development which placed tourism within the political economy of international development. This period saw a number of studies that critiqued the overly positive tone of earlier research on tourism’s role in development. This new set of studies highlighted the negative impacts of tourism and
insisted on a cautious approach to using tourism as a tool for economic development (Britton, 1982; Pleumaron, 1994; Brohman, 1996; Mowforth and Munt, 1998).

On the cusp of the millennium, the debate moved from tourism’s role in economic development to a more direct focus on how tourism contributes to poverty reduction with the publications of Bennett et al. (1999) and Ashley et al. (2000). This precipitated the burgeoning of a number of ‘pro-poor tourism’ studies published in the ‘grey literature’ on how to leverage tourism’s potential for poverty reduction (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). Since the first two publications were made, there have been a number of critiques and counter-critiques about the contributions made by ‘pro-poor tourism’ studies to our understanding of tourism’s role in economic development and poverty reduction (Chok et al., 2007; Schilcher, 2007; Scheyvens, 2007; Harrison, 2008; Goodwin, 2008; Spenceley and Meyer, 2012). Thus throughout the 2000s the literature on tourism’s role in economic development and poverty reduction featured both optimistic and the cautious studies existing side by side without a clear consensus. It is within this context that Sharpley and Telfer (2002) note that a conceptual leap was being made between tourism and development. They argue that many studies of this period failed to situate tourism’s role in economic development within the socioeconomic processes of other sectors that altogether shape development outcomes in a given country. In a sense, this conceptual leap related to the insufficient attention within tourism studies to insights from the field of development studies.

Increasingly however, attention is now being focused on the dynamic relationship between tourism and the development process more generally (Telfer and Sharpley, 2008; Mowforth and Munt, 2009; Scheyvens, 2011; Spenceley and Meyer, 2012; Sharpley and Telfer, 2015). It has been noted by Spenceley and Meyer (2012:301) (see also Scheyvens, 2011) that the “new poverty” agenda that came to underlie research into tourism’s role in economic development and poverty reduction brought a new focus on the need to enhance state institutions and governance. They argue that this new focus moved the debate away from reductionist conclusions of seeing tourism simply as a force for good or for evil. Rather, the new focus calls for tourism to be seen as “a powerful social force that needs to be better understood in order to connect it more effectively to development agendas that go beyond purely economic considerations”. This is to an extent a manifestation of the ‘institutional turn’ and ‘good
governance’ agenda that came to engulf the development studies field since the 1990s. Thus to effectively connect tourism to development agendas that extend beyond economic considerations, it is imperative that the larger governance context in which tourism development takes place is better understood.

The overall purpose of this thesis is to address some of the issues associated within the larger governance context in tourist destinations by exploring the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. It is worth noting here that this thesis has its genesis in earlier research I carried out in 2012 (Adu-Ampong, 2012, 2014). One of the key findings from that research was that policy development and implementation in the tourism sector of Ghana’s Central Region was failing because of an absence of open communication between stakeholders. Although stakeholders in the sector held a similar vision of tourism’s potential for economic development, the necessary collaborative efforts to achieve such a vision were lacking. I concluded that a collaborative approach to tourism planning and development was needed if tourism was to make any significant contribution to local socio-economic development ambitions. A key issue that my earlier research identified but could not follow up on was the extent to which collaborative efforts in tourism planning are enhanced and/or constrained by existing governance and political structures.

An intuition from this earlier research was that the political relations that underpinned governance structures in Ghana and in the Central Region in particular, had a formative influence on the tourism sector. This realisation made clear the fact that politics matter in governance and that it was important to move beyond a technocratic understanding of governance to a more dynamic analytical framework of governance. Such an analytical governance framework would need to take into account the effects of party politics on tourism policy-making processes. For instance, while it is generally known that a change from one political party to another party leads to changes in government policy, what is less understood is how leadership changes within the same political party in government tend to lead to changes in the pace of implementation of policies and projects. This thesis therefore picks up where Adu-Ampong (2014) left off by examining ongoing governance interactions in the tourism sector of Ghana generally and in the particular case of the Elmina 2015 strategy.
The importance of governance in enhancing tourism’s contribution to poverty reduction has been readily highlighted in the literature (Brohman, 1996; Konadu-Agyemang, 2001; Scheyvens, 2007; Holden, 2013; Rogerson, 2014). For example, Holden (2013) maintains that the effective future use of tourism for poverty reduction will depend on good governance which is characterised by “increased citizen participation and improved accountability of public officials” (pg. 155) in contradistinction to ‘bad/poor governance’ in which “corruption and the abuse of public office for private gain…undermines the legitimacy of government and reduces the availability and quality of public services” (pg. 156). This is an echo of an earlier assertion by Scheyvens (2007:248) that “there is a need for effective governance structures if tourism is to maximise benefits for the poor”. While these theoretical insistence on understanding the governance context is a welcome development, there are still a number of salient and fundamental questions that can only be answered through empirical studies. The dearth of such empirical studies means that there has been an implicit acceptance of how governance might affect tourism’s contribution to development.

Following the advent of the pro-poor tourism agenda, the debate on the tourism-poverty nexus has been energised with talks about the crucial role of national government policies and interventions. Recently, Rogerson has also conceded that “…the prospects for strengthened tourism-poverty linkages will be enhanced if tourism planning can be embedded as part of wider strategic initiatives for place-based interventions and active local and regional economic development planning across the Global South” (2014: 607). This awareness is a positive step towards understanding how tourism can contribute to economic development and poverty reduction. This raises a number of key empirical questions including how the process of embedding tourism planning within local economic development planning is shaped by governance structures and the resulting effects on the tourism-poverty nexus. These empirical dimensions of how governance structures are shaping tourism-poverty nexus outcomes are currently under researched. Moreover there is as yet not much research into the process of embedding tourism planning as part of wider local economic development planning initiatives in Sub Saharan Africa. The exception has been in South Africa where a number of studies on tourism-led local economic development process have been undertaken (Rogerson, 2002, 2007, 2014; Binns and Nel, 2002).
There is a need for a deeper understanding of the tourism-poverty nexus in order to move the debates forward. I argue that this requires analyses of the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning processes that incorporate rigorous political analysis. Tourism is embedded in various place-based socio-economic interventions and hence the focus also needs to be on the governance mechanisms through which overall socio-economic development takes place at the destination level. Addressing the tourism-poverty nexus should go beyond simply looking at the figures of specific tourism-poverty nexus projects and the idea of ‘getting the policies right’. It is well known that governments’ choice of particular plans or policies does not only serve developmental goals but also political goals (Kelsall, 2011). Importantly the extent to which plans and policies get implemented – given changing governments and even changes within governments that comes through ministerial reshuffles – also becomes a deeply political process. Surprisingly there is a silence in the tourism literature when it comes to the specific issues of stakeholder capacity and the political aspects of governance that influence tourism’s role in local economic development and poverty reduction. Given this silence, I draw on analytic and theoretical concepts and ideas from political science, governance studies, planning and policy studies as well as from international development studies especially in relation to work on the political economy of public good provision in developing countries.

The premise of this thesis is that gaining a deeper understanding of the tourism-poverty nexus require a reconceptualisation of the tourism-poverty nexus within a governance framework. Existing governance frameworks in the tourism planning and policy literature tend to be generic and based on a technocratic theorising of governance. For instance, Holden’s (2013) assertion and treatment of governance and its role in the tourism-poverty nexus appears to assume that the mere presence of such variables as citizen participation and accountability of public officials will automatically lead to good governance for the tourism-poverty nexus. What is missing is an analytical understanding of the governance of the tourism-poverty nexus that highlights how different scales of governance have an impact at the destination level. A more analytical and systematic governance framework is required in order to undertake a holistic assessment of the tourism-poverty nexus, which is to be seen as a system of interrelated and interdependent components. Consequently I develop an interactive tourism governance framework building on the interactive governance perspective (Kooiman, 1999, 2000, 2003; Kooiman et al., 2005; Kooiman et al., 2008; Slocum and Backman, 2011; Bavinck et al., 2013), institutionalist perspectives in the local economic
development planning literature (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Raco, 1998; Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002; Helmsing, 2003; Pike et al., 2006) and work on development politics relating to political business cycles (Keefer and Khemani, 2005) and the political economy of public good provision and unfinished development projects (Kelsall, 2012; Williams, 2016).

1.3 The interactive tourism governance framework

Since the turn of the millennium, governance has been in vogue across much of the social sciences. Seen as signifying the changing nature of the state in governing society, governance is variously defined (see Chapter 2 for more details). This variation notwithstanding, Stoker (1998:17) identifies a consensus on how governance is seen as changing and explains this to be “the development of governing styles in which the boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred”. Thus in a broad sense governance is simply about the process in which government coordinates the activities of (non-) state actors in solving collective action problems. Within the tourism literature however and especially the literature on the tourism-poverty nexus, discussions of governance are yet to be fully established (Erkuş-Öztürk, 2011). Indeed the term governance is used much less frequently in tourism research relative to related terms such as policy and planning (Bramwell and Lane, 2011). This is a baffling situation because the tourism sector is characterised by high fragmentation and interdependencies across wide geographical spaces that call for greater interaction between the different actors and stakeholders in tourism planning (Waayers et al., 2012) making it ideal for understanding governance as interactions.

Governance offers a prism through which to view the interaction of actors and stakeholders in the highly fragmented tourism sector. Ruhanen et al., (2010) point out that tourism is a most interesting context within which to study governance because it sits at the intersection of public, private, civil society and community interests. Recently, it has been argued that “…much of the work related to governance in tourism has managed to define the state out of governance processes or at least minimise its role in comparison to emphasising markets (business), network (voluntary self-organisation) or community (local) approaches” (Amore and Hall, 2016:6). The
literature on governance in tourism research therefore remains skewed towards work on public-private partnerships (Bramwell and Sharman, 1999; Zapata and Hall, 2012); policy networks (Dredge, 2006; Scott et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2009); sustainable tourism development (Bramwell, 2011; Sofield and Li, 2011) and destination competitiveness (Ritchie and Crouch, 2003; d’Angella et al., 2010). In order to fully understand the governance of the tourism-poverty nexus as exemplified through the Elmina 2015 Strategy, a governance framework is needed that makes interaction between and within the public, private and civil society sectors central to its conceptualisation. Such a framework needs to (re)define the state back into the governance process.

There are as many definitions of governance as there are authors writing about it. The varied definitions of governance found in the literature include, “governance refers to governing with and through networks” (Rhodes, 2007: 1246); “the tools, strategies and relationship used by governments to help govern” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009:2) and governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group” (Keohane and Nye, 2000:12). The emphasis in the various definitions of governance (see Chapter 2 for more details) is the fact that governance involves a process in which a multitude of actors come together with the aim of achieving some collective goals. Recently, Grindle (2017:17) argues that governance when applied to the public sector “encompasses notions of how political and administrative decisions get made, how governmental systems work, and why both formal and informal institutions matter in how things get done and how states relate to societies”. Governance then is essentially about interactions between actors. This is where the interactive governance perspective (Kooiman, 1999, 2000, 2003; Kooiman et al., 2005; Kooiman et al., 2008; Bavinck et al., 2013) – formerly known as socio-political governance – provides a starting point for the interactive tourism governance framework developed for this thesis.

Interactive governance (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) according to this perspective refers to “the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities; including the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them” (Kooiman et al., 2005:17). This definition offers a most useful framework and starting point for exploring and explaining the governing of tourism-led local economic
development planning processes as exemplified in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. It has been noted that such a conceptual framework acts to “provide a language and frame of reference through which reality can be examined and lead theorists to ask questions that might not otherwise occur” (Judge et al., 1995: 3). The value of the interactive governance perspective is that it offers an organising framework for understanding changing processes of governing and helps to identify important questions (Stoker, 1998).

At a foundational level, the interactive governance perspective distinguishes between three subsystems: i) a system-to-be governed made up of a set of available resources; ii) a governing system consisting of actors responsible for governing the set of resources and iii) a governance interaction which refers to the interactions between the two. It is on the basis of Kooiman’s work that I develop the concept of stakeholder governance capacity as the first building block of the interactive tourism governance framework. This allows for disaggregating the capacity of various actors and their actions in order to clearly highlight and undertake a holistic assessment of how governance interactions shaped the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This helps to fill a key gap in the tourism governance and the tourism policy and planning literature by providing a systematic approach to understanding governance interactions.

Building on aspects of Kooiman’s governing system, I bring in insights from the concept of institutional thickness as the second conceptual building block of the interactive tourism governance framework. Institutions represent the main mechanisms through which stakeholder governance capacity is developed and deployed. Thus it is important to consider how institutions that support tourism-led local economic development get formed and multiply, how they are positioned vis-à-vis other institutions and the extent to which they are becoming integrated within each other based on a shared vision of working towards the same goal. A focus on these issues creates room for redefining the state and politics back into the discussion of tourism governance and development processes. To this end, I introduce the idea of political cycles as the third conceptual building block. Through this concept of political cycles I explore the effects of changes and transitions in political parties and governments on development projects. Moreover, I focus on how party politics influence local government staff transfers and the resultant loss of institutional memory and capacity at the local level. This will allow for a politically informed analysis of how tourism-led local economic development
Planning processes are governed in two key ways. First, it enables questions to be asked of how governance structures shape overall development planning processes in a given country. This can then lead to an analysis of how these governance structures specifically shape tourism-led local economic development planning (i.e. the embedding and implementation of tourism plans within local and regional economic development planning processes).

In many ways the interactive governance perspective adopted for this thesis offers a nuanced way of understanding the tourism-poverty nexus through its conceptualisation of governance with both theoretical and normative implications. The interactive governance perspective offers what Peters and Pierre (2016: vii) call a functionalist approach to governance that enables this research to “identify processes as well as actors involved in governance” of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Importantly, the functionalist approach of the interactive governance perspective makes it possible to “identify more readily the interaction among social actors and the state, emphasising the manner in which these potential sources of governance interact[ed]” in shaping the processes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Thus governance and governance structures as used here are seen as being political in nature and not just an apolitical techno-managerial set up. Problematising the tourism-poverty nexus as essentially a problem of governance frees the debate from the overemphasis on the narrower cost-benefit analysis of economic considerations to a more nuanced political analysis and understanding. Thus by bringing politics back into the discussion of the governance of the tourism-poverty nexus, this thesis provides a carefully traced historical perspective on the political economy of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.
1.4 Contribution of the thesis

This research makes a theoretical and conceptual contribution alongside the value of its empirical work. The theoretical and conceptual contribution of this thesis lies in the interdisciplinary approach that combines insights from tourism studies, international development studies, political science, governance studies, local government studies, public administration and regional and local economic development studies. These insights are then integrated to offer a new view of tourism governance processes and how they influence the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. This contribution to knowledge is achieved through a focus on an in-depth case study of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Significantly, my research identifies a conceptual gap with regards to the role of governance on the tourism-poverty nexus. Consequently, there is an explicit development and application of concepts such as stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles in this thesis that offers new insights into the debates on the tourism-poverty nexus. This thesis contributes to bridging the conceptual gaps identified. Empirically, the research offers fresh data and an in-depth examination of micro-processes of local economic development planning and tourism planning in Ghana using the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In particular, the richness of the data enables an understanding of the ways tourism-poverty nexus policies are understood by various actors and the contestations that surround implementation efforts at different levels of state hierarchy as well as between the state and other societal actors.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This introductory chapter has sketched out the research focus of this thesis by identifying the gaps in knowledge it addresses and explaining how this thesis contributes to filling those gaps. Following from this, this section outlines how the remaining seven chapters of this thesis are arranged.

Chapter 2 outlines and develops the interactive tourism governance framework as a conceptual and analytical tool for assessing tourism-led local economic development
planning. It first starts by highlighting relevant debates and existing gaps within the tourism-poverty nexus and tourism governance literatures. Drawing on perspectives from public administration and governance studies literature, institutionalist perspectives in the local economic development planning literature, research on international development politics relating to political business cycles and the political economy of public good provision and unfinished development projects, I reemphasise the role of the state and its institutions and the political aspects that underline tourism development governance processes. It is here that I develop the three conceptual building blocks of stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles. These conceptual building blocks allow me to raise a number of questions that are later on addressed in the empirical chapters.

Chapter 3 presents an account and justification for the research methodology and methods adopted for this research which is that of an embedded case study research design. Some of the philosophical assumptions underlining the choice of methods are discussed before a description of the processes of data collection and analysis. The goal of such a description is to show the consistency between research questions, conceptual framework and data analysis. In the final section of this chapter I offer a reflexive account of the ethical considerations made at different stages of the research process. I also reflect on my positionality as a UK-based Ghanaian researcher.

Chapter 4 is the first of four chapters rooted in the empirical field research. This chapter is devoted to questions of national level governance of tourism planning and local economic development planning in Ghana. Beginning with a brief account of the historical, political and economic development history of Ghana, it moves on to a detailed look at how local economic development planning is governed from the national level to the local level. This chapter identifies some of the contradictions and challenges involved in embedding tourism development as part of strategic district level planning. This chapter also considers how tourism has been conceptualised within national economic development policy and planning over the years and its impact on long term national tourism development plans. In the final section, the tourism sector in Ghana is explored in depth, focusing on resources, key institutional actors and their governing interactions.
Chapter 5 offers an analysis of the Elmina 2015 Strategy using the theoretical and analytical framework developed in Chapter Two. The chapter starts with an overview of the socio-economic conditions of Elmina before focusing on the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a policy and planning document that sought to transform the fortunes of the city. In particular this chapter explores the antecedents of the plan and the processes that led to its final development. The second part of this chapter empirically examines the concept of stakeholder governance capacity upon which the delivery and implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was anchored. Using the three key elements of images, instruments and action potential, I consider the many particular ways in which stakeholder governance capacity shaped the process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

Chapter 6 focuses on the empirical manifestations of the concept of institutional thickness within the Elmina 2015 Strategy development and implementation. This chapter explores the depth and extent of thickening experienced by the organisational and institutional structures within which the Elmina 2015 Strategy evolved. It starts by first analysing how the Elmina 2015 Strategy aligned with national economic development policy and national tourism development plans. This analysis aims to ascertain the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy aligned with national institutional and organisational structures for economic as well as tourism development. This chapter in particular discusses the planning process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy in relation to the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipality Assembly (KEEA) in order to identify the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy became embedded within KEEA's structures. This discussion is anchored on the two examples of the Elmina Tourism Office and the Elmina Arts and Craft Market that were set up as part of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

Chapter 7 considers some of the key political elements that shaped the governance of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a tourism-led local economic development initiative. The organising logic to this chapter is the idea of cycles or cyclical transitions and change that take place regarding international development donor policy and funding, national and local elections and transfer of local government staff. The analytic focus however, is on the politics and political contestations that underline these cycles. The chapter therefore starts by assessing the prevailing international development donor policy and funding environment that made the start of the Elmina 2015 Strategy possible. It
then follows up with a close examination of the national and local election cycles that spanned the duration of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and their political implications for the implementation and sustainability of the project. A final section in this chapter then considers how the transfer system of local government service staff was hijacked by political elements at the municipal level. Specifically, close attention is paid to the key role played by District/Municipal Development Planning Officers and how their administrative transfers shaped the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by reflecting back on the empirical evidence set out in the previous four empirical chapters. The first section highlights the key research findings by addressing and providing answers to the research questions that were set out in Chapter 1. This is followed by setting out the theoretical, conceptual and empirical findings of this thesis in the context of existing knowledge. The chapter provides a review of the key research findings and highlights their wider significance and implications for both the theory and practice of planning for tourism’s role as a catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction in destinations around the world. Finally, the chapter offers reflection on the research process before assessing the implications of the research and then outlining avenues for future research that can extend and consolidate the contributions of this thesis.
Chapter 2

An interactive tourism governance framework for tourism-led local economic development planning

Since the turn of the millennium, "governance", viewed as both an empirical phenomenon and the set of theories used to describe it, has been in vogue across most of the social sciences (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000; Bang, 2003; Kjaer, 2004; Torfing et al., 2012). A fundamental reason for the increased interest in governance has been the acknowledged growth of internal and external challenges to the legitimacy and institutional capacity of nation states to manage their own affairs. The authority of the nation state has been eroded due to international financial market deregulation, the growing assertiveness of subnational (regional, local and city level) governments and the emergence of cohesive policy networks among other factors (Pierre, 2000). In a recent treatise on governance, Peters and Pierre (2016) consider that in spite of the vogue in using governance, the concept is often misunderstood, used in different ways and can sometimes be contradictory in usage. A common sense definition of governance is that it is about “bringing together a multitude of actors of different types toward some collective goal” (Peters and Pierre, 2016: 3).

In tourism studies, despite increasing interest in governance (Ruhanen et al., 2010; Bramwell, 2011; Hall, 2011a, 2011b; Wan and Bramwell, 2015; Amore and Hall, 2016), the discussion of governance is yet to be fully integrated within the tourism literature (Erkuş-Öztürk, 2011). It has been estimated by Amore and Hall (2016) that as at late 2015, about 75% of research on tourism and governance was written from 2008 onwards. Given that tourism is considered to be an interesting context in which to study governance (Ruhanen et al, 2010), the inadequate attention accorded to theorising tourism and governance is particularly curious. This is the more so when it comes to discussions on the tourism-poverty nexus where the importance of governance in enhancing outcomes has been readily acknowledged (Brohman 1996; Scheyvens, 2007; Sharpley and Ussi, 2012; Holden, 2013; Rogerson, 2014). Nonetheless few systematic attempts have been made at developing a governance framework that captures the dynamics of the tourism-poverty nexus.
In this chapter I develop an interactive tourism governance framework as a conceptual and analytic tool for assessing tourism-led local economic development planning. There are three conceptual building blocks to the framework developed here – stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles. These are linked through processes of communication, collaboration and coordination. This interactive tourism governance framework owes much to, and draws heavily from the work of Kooiman (1993, 1999, 2000, and 2003) and his colleagues (Kooiman et al., 2005; Kooiman et al., 2008; Bavinck et al., 2013) on governing, governance and governability. Moreover, I draw on insights from the larger literature on governance (Peters and Pierre, 2016; Torfing et al., 2012; Boven’s et al., 2002; Rhodes, 1996, 2000). In other respects the framework has drawn lessons from institutionalist perspectives in the local economic development planning literature (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002; Helmsing, 2003; Pike et al., 2006), the communicative turn in planning theory (Healey, 2006), research on international development politics relating to political business cycles (Keefer and Khemani, 2005) and the political economy of public good provision and unfinished development projects (Kelsall, 2012; Williams, 2016). Drawing on these ideas, I bring back and make explicit the role of the state and its institutions and the political aspects that underline tourism development governance processes. An explicit focus on political contestations throws a spotlight on the dynamic relationship between structure and agency in the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning.

The following chapter, which is structured around four main sections, explores how the three building blocks are conceptualised through a review of the relevant literature. The first three sections deal with stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles. I also explore how these concepts are translated into empirical variables. In the final section I show how the processes of communication, collaboration and coordination serve as the mortar that holds these building blocks together.
2.1 Stakeholder capacity for governing the tourism-poverty nexus

In its most basic sense, stakeholder capacity concerns the extent to which a given stakeholder or set of stakeholders have at their disposal the tools and the ability to effect desired change. Given that the mandate of stakeholders tends to differ, it becomes crucial that they are able to aggregate and pool together their resources. In a fragmented sector such as tourism, this aggregation and pooling together of resources is key to effective stakeholder collaboration. In this section, I develop the concept of stakeholder governance capacity from Kooiman's work on interactive governance. This section begins with an exploration of the tourism-poverty nexus and the literature on tourism governance. This exploration allows me to clearly identify the gaps in the current literature which I aim to contribute to filling by borrowing insights from the political science and governance theory literature. This leads to the development of the stakeholder governance capacity concept in the second half of this section.

The tourism sector and the tourism-poverty nexus

The tourism sector – however defined – is commonly regarded as the largest industry in the world. This sector currently contributes more than 9% to global GDP (Christie et al, 2014). The year 2012 was historic as the billion mark was surpassed with 1.035 billion international tourist arrivals and US$ 1.075 billion tourist receipts worldwide (UNWTO, 2013). The continued growth in international tourism and associated revenue has witnessed two reactions among academics, policy makers and practitioners. On one hand, there are those who maintain that tourism has the potential to bring about more equitable, sustainable and net benefits to local people (Ashley et al., 2000; 2001; Goodwin, 2008; Mitchell and Ashley, 2010; Spenceley and Meyer, 2012). Many others are however cautious and note that increased tourist arrivals do not always translate into increased economic opportunities and participation for local people in the tourist destination. The tourism industry, they argue, tends to entail exploitation of the resources of developing countries which in the end can lead to the increased entrenchment of poverty and inequality (Pleumarom, 1994; Schilcher, 2007; Mowforth and Munt, 2009; Cole, 2012). These two views are not necessarily mutually
exclusive but should be considered as the ends of a continuum with regards to the tourism-poverty nexus.

The two views at the end of the tourism-poverty nexus continuum tend to analyse issues at either the very micro (community) level or the macro (global) level. However, both levels need to be seen as being in a dynamic constitutive relationship and analysed as such across a range of geographical scales. One of the myths surrounding the relationship between tourism and development has been the assumption that “initiatives, projects, and investments in this activity systematically result in strong and sustainable development effects for the countries and regions involved” (Fayos-Sola et al., 2014: ix emphasis mine). In fact, outcomes are anything but systematically guaranteed as tourism as a social force depends on the interactions of various stakeholders in the planning process. Sharpley and Telfer (2002) have noted that up to the early 2000s, there was a conceptual leap with research on the tourism-poverty nexus. This was because the research during this period focused on the tourism-poverty nexus in isolation from and without recourse to the core debates in the field of development studies, theory and thought. Building on the third way approach of Giddens (1998), it has been argued by Burns (2004) that a similar approach is needed in tourism planning. Such an approach to research on tourism planning is to take into account local political particularities. This approach is in contrast with a first way approach which overemphasises strong state-led planning, or a second way approach which overemphasises free market-led planning. A politically informed governance approach to the tourism-poverty nexus represents one way of addressing these political particularities and providing a dynamic analysis the effects of local and global forces. Previous studies in Kenya (Akama and Kieti, 2007) and the Gambia (Sharpley, 2009) have outlined some of these structural challenges in utilising tourism as a tool for local economic development and poverty reduction.

Tourism as a socio-economic and political activity is recognized as being a highly complex and dynamic system that comprises a multitude of actors and stakeholders (Britton, 1982; Ioannides and Debbage, 1998; Hall, 1998; Mosedale, 2011). How stakeholders interact is not always necessarily compatible and this raises key governance issues such as the application and allocation of resources, rules and decision-making power (Bramwell, 2011). This is especially so when it comes to how stakeholders interact in leveraging tourism for poverty reduction purposes (Slocum
The tourism-poverty nexus therefore has governing needs that stakeholders have to address through their interactions. It is through interactions that conflicting interests are negotiated, coalitions built and activities coordinated between stakeholders across multiple governance levels.

Within tourism studies, the term governance is used much less frequently compared to other related terms like policy and planning (Bramwell and Lane, 2011). In the majority of cases where tourism governance is studied, it is done from the perspective of sustainable tourism development (Bramwell, 2011; Sofield and Li, 2011), public-private partnerships (Bramwell and Sharman, 1999; Zapata and Hall, 2012), policy networks (Dredge, 2006; Scott et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2009) and destination competitiveness (Ritchie and Crouch, 2003; d'Angella et al., 2010). Currently there is a research gap in terms of how governance shapes tourism’s role in local economic development and poverty reduction. In particular, there has been a lack of detailed exploration into the specifics of governance such as institutional presence, politics and the internal power dynamics of the state apparatus at the local level, and how these interact with the planning and use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. It is this gap that this thesis contributes to filling, firstly through conceptualising the capacity of tourism stakeholders in the governance process.

Current discussions on tourism governance whilst rarely focused on the tourism-poverty nexus do provide a number of insights that can be built on. One strand of tourism governance focuses on destinations management from a corporate/business management perspective (Buhalis, 2000; Pechlaner and Tschurtschenthaler, 2003; Pechlaner et al., 2009). Increasingly, research in this area is focused away from organisations and institutions to the impact of individual elites like managers of destination management organisations (DMOs) and how their leadership styles affect destination management in terms of competitiveness (Pechlaner et al., 2014; Beritelli and Bieger, 2014; Valente et al., 2015). This focus on the creativity and innovation of individual leadership styles does not, however offer any sustained analysis of how existing power relations and structures constrain the success of DMO leadership (Bianchi, 2002). Research from this strand of tourism governance has nonetheless shown the importance of encouraging full stakeholder participation in destination management. However, the difficulties in establishing collaborative efforts (Jamal and Getz, 1995; Lovelock 2001) and the differences in performance outcomes of destination
management organisations (DMOs) (d'Angella and Go, 2009) have led to calls for this strand of tourism governance to critically engage with the concepts of stakeholders and their collaboration and coordination. This is because while it is important to get all stakeholders involved in destination management, consideration needs to be given to the capacity of each stakeholder. It is this call that I respond to in developing the concept of stakeholder governance capacity.

A second strand of research on governance in tourism which draws on political science theories (Goymen, 2000: Erkuş-Öztürk, 2011; Bramwell, 2011: Hall, 2011a, 2011b), informs my concept of stakeholder governance capacity. This strand of research is premised on the assumption that "tailored and effective governance is a key requirement for implementing sustainable tourism" (Bramwell and Lane, 2011:411). In this sense, governance is understood as opening up tourism planning and decision-making processes to the participation of various actors as well as the use of appropriate policy instruments to achieve sustainable tourism development outcomes. This research argues that one has to pay attention to issues of social relations of power in the tourism development process (Bianchi, 2002:226) and the significant influence of the state (Bramwell, 2011) in setting tourism development priorities. Further developments in this strand of research on governance in tourism from a political economy perspective (Dieke, 2000; Bianchi, 2002; Mosedale, 2011; Wang and Bramwell, 2012; Wan and Bramwell, 2015) have also highlighted the importance of focusing on how structural processes and contingent forces shape the actions of stakeholders and ultimately the governance of tourism. Crucially, there has been a call for a close examination of the relationship between formal institutional arrangements, informal cultural practices and major structural socio-economic changes like change in political party governments (Pastras and Bramwell, 2013). To contribute to this call, this thesis integrates ideas from the general governance literature and from public administration and management. Within these literatures the key role of governance variables in explaining development and poverty reduction outcomes, especially in developing countries, is well established.
Governing, governance and governability

Governance is considered as both a theory and a science, a structure and a process that describes public administration and management, public-private partnerships, and coordination of mechanisms geared towards collective interests (Pierre and Peters, 2000). There are two dual meanings commonly attached to governance: i) as the “empirical manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century” and; ii) as a “conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems and ... the role of the state in that process” (Pierre, 2000:3). Thus, however defined, governance calls into view the role of the state in balancing collective interests. The term governance has therefore come to be used in distinction to the term government which many perceive to be a narrow. For Gamble (2000), the popularity of the term governance in academic and policy circles is due to the decoupling of governing as a separate process from government. Where once government went hand-in-hand with governance, governance is no longer used as a synonym for government but rather to signify a change in the way society is governed (Rhodes, 1996) – what Rhodes (1994) famously referred to as the ‘hollowing out of the state’. However, others have argued that the changing nature of the state attests more to its adaptation to contemporary challenges rather that a decline of the state. For Kooiman (2000), there is a noticeable shifting of state roles rather than a shrinking of roles.

A wide variety of definitions of governance has been offered in the literature (see Kjaer, 2004 for an extensive overview) but the term remains slippery as there is neither a consensus on a comprehensive theory of governance nor of its definition. In its usage, governance as a concept covers the range of public, private and civil society sector institutions and relationships involved in the process of steering society and achieving collective goals (Pierre and Peters, 2000). While there are some basic core features common to various definitions of governance found in the literature, there are large differences as each definition may well refer to different debates. Kjaer (2004) argues that the many definitions of governance can be placed under three disciplinary subfields of political science namely; public administration and policy, international relations and comparative politics (see table 1 below for examples of ideal-typical definitions). Governance as used within public administration and policy refers to the changes in the tasks, organisation and management structure of the public sector. Within international relations governance is connotes the transnational nature of
governing activities due to globalisation. Finally, governance when used in comparative politics tends to focus on state-society interactions.

Table 1 Ideal-typical definition of governance per the three subfields of political science (based on Kjaer, 2004:3)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Administration and Policy</th>
<th>International Relations</th>
<th>Comparative Politics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 1997: 15).</td>
<td>Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity - from the family to the international organization - in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions (Rosenau, 1995: 13).</td>
<td>Governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of power and settling conflicts over such rules. (Hyden, 1999: 185)</td>
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These three subfields of political science are not entirely separate and hence there is frequent blurring of research. Consequently, the use of governance definitions becomes blurred and fluid in research. Such fluidity in subfields and definitions add to the slipperiness of governance as a term. The slipperiness notwithstanding, governance is considered as having a dual meaning attached to it. On one hand it is seen as the “empirical manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century” while on the other hand it is seen as a “conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems and ... the role of the state in that process” (Pierre, 2000:3). While earlier definitions of governance tended to conflate these two meanings, current work on governance, especially in political science and policy studies mainly focus on the latter. Governance as a conceptual representation of how society is coordinated and the state’s role in this process is further categorised into “traditional old governance” and “new governance” (Peters, 2000). Traditional old governance focuses on the question of state capacity to exercise control over the rest of government, the economy and society. New governance according to Peters, asks the question of how the state interacts with the economy and society in order to make policy decisions that are acceptable to all actors in the society. Interaction is therefore an important aspect of new understandings of governance.
A nuanced understanding of contemporary governance is about an understanding of the transformation of the state in the interaction processes through which policy decisions are made and sectors of the society and the economy are governed (Peters and Pierre, 2016; Torfing et al., 2012; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Bovens et al., 2001; Pierre and Peters, 2000). In contrast to other scholars who sees the state as becoming less powerful due to the increasing governing interaction in society, it is argued here that the state still maintains a central role in new forms of governance. As Pierre and Peters (2000; 2005) have shown, the state maintains control over key resources that put it at the centre of any form of governing interactions. Consequently, the interesting research questions to ask are about how the interplay between state and societal actors makes the steering of society possible given the increasing complexity and incoherence in public policy processes. To this end, Gamble’s (2000) differentiation of two levels of understanding of the governing of a social order is useful. Gamble identifies a first level of often non-formalised but implicit rules of the game that create a constitutional framework for governing and a second level that comprises the peculiar ways through which [state and societal] institutions and agencies govern – i.e. the techniques, tools, practices and ethos particular to each institution and agency. The central idea underlying the centrality of the state in new forms of governance and Gamble’s differentiation is that of interaction – of different actors at different scales in a complex environment. It is this emphasis on the centrality of the state that provides the basis for justifying the use of interactive governance approach as the overall analytic framework.

Interactive governance

Interactive governance as a mode of analysis is gaining traction within political science and its subfields as well as in more cognate fields given the acknowledge shift from government to governance. There is increasing appreciation of the mutual interdependence of a variety of stakeholders in the public policy making process. It is these processes of stakeholder involvement in policy making that have given rise to the idea of interactive governance – i.e. governance achieved through the interaction of a variety of stakeholders in the public, private and civil society sectors. A basic concern of interactive governance is how the state steers the economy and society in collaboration with other actors. While there has been a shift from governments to governance, the
state still remains at the centre of (interactive) governance. In many cases, especially in developing countries like Ghana, the locus of political power has not shifted away from the state. It is the state that leads the steering of governance activities by initiating and encouraging interactive forms of decision making and policy making.

In a 2012 book co-authored by Torfing, Peters, Pierre and Sorensen, attempts are made at advancing the paradigm of interactive governance as an analytic approach to research inquiry. They define interactive governance as “the complex process through which a plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote, and achieve common objectives by means of mobilizing, exchanging, and deploying a range of ideas, rules and resources” (Torfing et al, 2012:2). The interactive governance paradigm they argue, provides a balanced count of how governmental and nongovernmental actors engage in interactions. The emphasis is then placed on the horizontal interaction of public and private actors as well as on the interdependency and independence of the actors (see also Kooiman, 2003). As new forms of interactive governance processes emerge, it is important to consider the institutional implications of such process (Edelenboas, 2005) by developing a framework that can guide the research process. The work of Kooiman (1993, 2000, 2003, 2008) provides one such analytic framework. Insights from their work of Torfing et al (2012), Peters and Pierre (2016) among others will be used here to support that development of the concept of stakeholder capacity building on the work of Kooiman and his colleagues who have developed a nuanced view of governance stemming from a background in public administration and management.

Informed by systems theory, Kooiman’s socio-political governance theory, as it was initially called in 1993, is understood as the patterns of interactions amongst different societal and political stakeholders aimed at solving societal problems, creating societal opportunities, or the care of societal institutions within which these governing interactions occur. Socio-political governing was considered in terms of a continuous process in which there is interaction between a wide range of social actors, groups, organisations and institutions. This idea has been refined through both theoretical and empirical application into what is now referred to as interactive governance. Interactive governance is defined as “the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities; including the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for
institutions that enable them” (Kooiman et al., 2005:17). This definition offers a viable approach to systematically conceptualising the ongoing interactive processes aimed at solving societal problems and creating societal opportunities. Such systematic conceptualisation is needed to evaluate, analyse and explain the forms of governing interactions taking place and the key factors that shape governing outcomes.

As a mutually influencing relationship between two or more entities, interactions can also be seen as the specific form of actions undertaken in order to solve societal problems or create societal opportunities (Kooiman, 1999, 2008a; Kooiman et al., 2008). Thus the potential to use tourism as a poverty reduction tool through tourism-led LED can be considered as a societal opportunity. Since what constitutes a societal problem or societal opportunity is context specific, it is only through public and private sector interactions that tourism’s potential can be realised. The interactive governance approach includes theoretical and normative elements. On the theoretical level, the interactive governance approach suggests that there are a large number of governance actors who make up society and that the actions of these actors are constrained and/or enabled by structures (Edelenbos, 2005; Torfing et al., 2012). This is generally in line with the acknowledged nature of the tourism sector as having high fragmentation and interdependencies across geographical spaces with a need for coordination and collaboration between the different actors in tourism governance and planning in tourist destinations (Waayers et al., 2011).

Within this approach, an actor is basically any social unit with agency or power of action and can include individuals, associations, leaders, interest groups and international bodies. Structures on the other hand relate to the frameworks such as policies, politics, culture, norms, laws and material possibilities within which actors operate and which both limit and widen the reach of their action potentials. In terms of its normative aspects, the interactive governance approach argues that broad societal participation in governance is desirable. This is because any governance arrangement without such a normative basis will in the long run experience ineffectiveness and illegitimacy (Kooiman et al., 2008; Kooiman, 2003).
Governability

The interactive governance perspective is analytically and empirically operationalized through the concept of **governability**. Governability relates to the qualities of the object of governance (the tourism-led LED planning process), to the subjects of governance (public, private, community and civil sector actors) and to the relation (communication, collaboration and coordination) between the object and subjects of governance given multiple internal and external influences (Kooiman, 2000; 2003; Kooiman et al., 2005; Kooiman et al., 2008; Bavinck et al., 2013). Governability is also founded on systemic thinking which allows for a systematic operationalisation of the concept. Thus to talk of the governability of tourism-led LED initiatives raises the question of how the planning process evolves and the extent to which emergent institutions are compatible with existing structures. Answering this question reveals the factors that shape the process and outcomes of tourism-led LED.

By definition governability is “the overall capacity for governance of any societal entity or system” Kooiman (2008a:173). The interactive governance perspective and the related concept of governability distinguishes between a system-to-be-governed, a governing system and governance interactions (see figure 4 below). ‘Systems’ as used here is a heuristic conceptual tool and not a taxonomy, nor with functional or teleological connotations (Kooiman, 2008). The system-to-be-governed comprises of a natural sub-system (an ecosystem, its resources and other tangible cultural heritage resources) and a socio-economic sub-system (made up of users and stakeholders of the natural system who form institutions and political coalitions) (Jentoft, 2007; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009).
The boundaries within any given system-to-be-governed are socially determined based on the positions and perspectives of stakeholders. Nonetheless the perspective of a researcher is also critical in defining boundaries for the purpose of empirical research. A governing system on the other hand, is constituted by institutions and steering mechanisms – states, markets, civil society and hybrids – through which governing activities are carried out (Kooiman, 2008). Finally, governance interactions reflect the relationships between a governing system and a system-to-be-governed, and are concerned with the mechanisms of interaction between and within these two systems. The most common mechanisms of interaction are communication, collaboration and coordination on the positive side, while the negative side of interaction includes conflict, tension and disagreements. The interactive governance perspective postulates that any societal system such as tourism is constituted by a system-to-be-governed, a governing system and a system of governance interactions. To solve problems or create

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4These three set of interaction mechanisms (communication, collaboration and coordination) are used throughout the thesis in terms of their common (sense) definition without any attempt at theorising them. I am nonetheless aware that these are also often used in conceptual terms that in many academic work are theorised.
opportunities within the system – for example leveraging the benefits of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction – one depends on all three systems functioning in complementarity. Thus these three systems need to be thought of as an integrated whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

All three systems are recognised as being characterised by diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale (Kooiman, 2000). Diversity deals with the nature and degree to which stakeholders and their qualities differ from one another in terms of interests, values, visions and perspectives on the future (Jentoft, 2007; Kooiman et al., 2008). Complexity in terms of the system-to-be-governed highlights the issue of the systemic and institutional structures that condition the interrelations and interdependencies between stakeholders, actors and components. It is the presence of complexity that tends to result in conflicts. Complexity thus refers to “the number, intensity and spread of interrelations between its [a system's] components” (Kooiman, 2013:355). Dynamics refers to the tensions within and between systems which lead to fluctuations in outcomes. Thus dynamics also present the potential for change in stakeholder interactions (Kooiman, 2000; Jentoft, 2007). These tensions may be due to conflicting interests of stakeholders in the system. Scale is a dimension of spatiality and temporality and represents the level(s) at which the effects of diversity, complexity and dynamics within the system-to-be-governed can be observed and analysed (Kooiman, 2008). Scale therefore indicates an important structuring aspect of the relationship between stakeholders at the national, regional and district levels as well as across time.

The characteristic features of diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale serve as an operational basis on which to assess the governance interactions of a societal system such as tourism. In a tourism destination therefore, diversity relates to whether stakeholders and actors within a given system share the same interests and aspiration as to how the sector should operate. Complexity points to the institutions and structures in which tourism actors communicate, collaborate and coordinate their interests and visions. The institutions and structures that give rise to complexity in the tourism sector also provide the interface for the dynamics and potential for change. In the face of tensions between stakeholders and institutions, opportunities for cooperation and/or conflicts arise. These issues are further compounded by how actors interact over time and across differing governing scales of national, regional and

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5 See section 1.3 in Chapter 1
district tourism agencies and private sector trade associations. Within the planning process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy some key stakeholders did not share the same aspirations and had differing organisation structures and chains of command. For example, the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) had sole governing responsibility over the Elmina Castle and report directly to its head office in Accra. The Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA) with overall responsibility for the socio-economic development of the Elmina area did not have access to revenue accruing from visitor fees at the Elmina Castle. These features of the key stakeholders shaped the form and extent of communication, collaboration and coordination between them. In the earlier phase of the project, there was a high level of interaction between the GMMB and the KEEA due to the informal revenue arrangements that were put in place. Once this informal revenue sharing arrangement ceased, the level of interaction went down. Thus for the tourism sector, the success of meeting goals depends on how well the characteristic features of diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale are handled and addressed by stakeholders.

In its operationalization, the interactive governance perspective differentiates between governing, governance and governability. While governing is seen as a process of coordination, steering, balancing, regulating, integrating, and generating goal-oriented interventions, governance is considered as the overall effects that are the outcome of the governing process. Governability as the overall capacity of a societal system to govern itself, is defined in terms of the ability to meet governance needs given governance capacities (Kooiman, 1993; Jobbins, 2003). Governability as balancing needs with capacities is thus central to exploring the governance of the tourism-poverty nexus in general and the Elmina 2015 Strategy in particular. Needs are manifestations of problems and opportunities faced by individuals, groups and institutions while capacities are the abilities of actors and stakeholders to meet their governance needs. However, needs are not neutrally defined but are infused with political contestations. It is therefore important to make explicit the political contestations within which needs are defined and met (see discussion in section 2.2 and 2.3). For instance, the Elmina 2015 Strategy highlighted a number of needs – i.e. both problems and opportunities for using heritage tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction – that required adequate capacities of stakeholders to govern the process. Given that no single stakeholder will have the required capacity on their own, there is need for increased interdependence between stakeholders and the pooling of resources and capacities. As Kooiman has rightly noted,
“no single actor, public or private, has all the knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no single actor has sufficient overview to make to application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate uni-laterally…” (Kooiman, 1993:4). These ideas suggest new ways of understanding and assessing tourism governance and its effects on the tourism-poverty nexus by looking at the individual and collective capacity of stakeholders.

**Stakeholder governance capacity for the tourism-poverty nexus**

The concept of stakeholder governance capacity developed here as one of the building blocks of the interactive tourism governance framework draws further from two aspects of Kooiman’s work – the concepts of governance capacities and stakeholder interactions as shown in the table 2 below.\(^6\) Both concepts operate at an intentional/action level and a structural/conditional level. Stakeholder interactions are the actions emanating from the values, goals, visions and purposes of stakeholders at the intentional level. The intentional level simply refers to the choice or agency available to stakeholders to choose how they act or interact with others. At the structural level it refers to institutions, rules and patterns of communication which enable and/or constrain actions at the intentional level. I further develop this aspect of Kooiman’s work in the next section on thickening institutions for tourism-led local economic development planning. The key point of stakeholder interaction is that the less constraining the structures, the more flexibility and freedom available to stakeholders to choose their goals and interests (Kooiman, 2000; Caffyn and Jobbins, 2003). Governance capacities are the capabilities stakeholders and actors are able to derive from within the governance system. Governance capacities are constituted by three components operating at the intentional level but embedded within structures: images (as part of culture), instruments (as part of resources) and action potential (as

\(^6\)While there is a wider depth to Kooiman’s work (see Appendix A), it is the work on governance capacities and stakeholder interactions that enables this current research to progress towards developing a governance framework for tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives.
part of institutional power relations) (Kooiman, 1999, 2000; Caffyn and Jobbins, 2003; Slocum and Backman, 2011).

Table 2 Stakeholder governance capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Capacity</th>
<th>Intentional/Action level</th>
<th>Structural/Conditional level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Images</td>
<td>Culture, data collection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action potential</td>
<td>Institutions, power relations</td>
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</table>

*Images* at the intentional level represent the guiding lights for governing activities and are the mental portraits or constructs held by stakeholders concerning both current and future governance situations. At the structural level images typically consist of visions, judgements, ways of data collection and analysis, presuppositions and convictions that serve as filters or background to images held by stakeholders. Images not only speak to specific issues at hand but may involve fundamental assumptions about the role of the state vis-à-vis other actors and of the relationship between society and nature (Kooiman and Bavinck, 2005; Kooiman, 2008; Mahon, 2008). Given that everyone possesses an image, the key question is whether stakeholders make them explicit in their governing interactions at both intentional and structural levels.

*Instruments* are the tools that link images to action. The range of instruments available to stakeholders in translating their held images into tangible actions vary from 'soft' to 'hard' ones – licences, standards, taxes, educational forums, peer pressure and physical force among others. The choice of instruments available to and deployed by stakeholders is not neutrally given but depends on their power positions in society and within the governance system. Consequently the choice, design and use of instruments frequently involves competing interests and tensions (Kooiman, 2008). At the structural level, instruments are seen as resources – material, human, technical, social capital - that need to be developed and implemented. Thus given the range of possible resources and instruments, the critical question to ask is; how are new instruments chosen and developed, and do the deployed instruments achieve their stated goals?
The concept of action potential refers to the socio-political room for action within which stakeholders operate, and the extent to which they are able to put an instrument into effect in order to translate images into societal outcomes. At the structural level action potential is embedded in power relations. These can be political, as in the willingness of a government to encourage or constrain tourism revenue sharing between stakeholders. Thus an action potential which may include a simple task of implementing a set of policy guidelines often requires the mobilisation of support and adequate socio-political will among other stakeholders. Central to action potential are questions and issues of legitimacy and authority and the ability of stakeholders to achieve their goals through the enabling and constraining structural contexts of power relations with others (Kooiman, 2000). In terms of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, this raises the question of which stakeholders had the authority and legitimacy to sanction the sharing of revenue from the Elmina Castle. There is also a question of how the sharing of revenue contributed to widening the socio-political room for action of stakeholders. The action potential available to stakeholders is sometimes a matter of power and to an extent the strength or fragility of the state in meeting governing needs.

Within the international development literature, and especially in the literature on state failure and fragility, state strength and capacity tends to be conceived of in technical and ‘objective’ terms (Hameiri, 2007). The tendency is to conflate state strength and capacity in terms of state fragility and state failure. A common definition of state fragility is that offered by the OECD who state that “states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” (OCED, 2007). The converse of this is that strong states are those are able to meet poverty reduction needs. However, most states irrespective of their level of economic development are characterised by some level of enduring relative poverty among their populace. This definition therefore fails to recognise that the general conditions of underdevelopment in many poor countries relates to the structural difficulties in attaining poverty reduction goals at both international, regional and national levels. Such difficulties are therefore not always related to the fragility of the state. State fragility is now used as catch-all phrase for conflict, post-conflict, humanitarian crisis-prone or chronically poverty stricken states (Torres and Anderson, 2004; Putzel, 2010) which makes the concept debateable and at times of little analytic value (Ikpe, 2007; Call, 2008; Di John, 2010) in countries not experiencing conflicts and/or humanitarian crisis. Perhaps, a useful way to approach this is to examine the...
factors that shape a given state’s capacity to meet poverty reduction goals (see Chapter 5, section 5.5).

In the context of this research, the questions raised by the fragile state literature about the political will and capacity of the state in Ghana to provide functions needed for poverty reduction do not offer a strong basis to frame the research. The Ghanaian state cannot be considered a fragile state because there is state legitimacy, a political will and a capacity in providing basic development functions. Although there are limits to the capacity of the state to meet all needs, this is not due to the fragility of the state. There are a number of internal and external political conditions that shape the extent of the state’s ability to meet basic development needs. Framing the concept of governance capacity in terms of fragility therefore deflects the analysis from the key issue of examining the specific ways in which state capacity is deployed. Development outcomes are only partly explained by structural factors (Ikpe, 2007) and hence there is a need to consider human agency, role of external donor countries and the interactions between the state and other stakeholders in the development process. Putzel (2010:4) has succinctly noted that “at the core of the problematic definition of state fragility used by the international development community is a misguided belief that the institutional practices of advanced democracies and developed economies need to be transferred all at once to the poorest countries”. To overcome this misguided belief, this research focuses on the governing interactions through which images, instruments and actions potentials became (mis)aligned in the Elmina 2015 Strategy planning process.

As a result of the interconnectedness between images, instruments and action potential, and the interactive nature of the governance process, these elements are not always distinguishable, nor are they always linear in conceptualisation (Kooiman and Bavinck, 2005; Chuenpagdee et al., 2008). Recognition of the interconnection of these elements is therefore critical to governability since the structural aspect of these elements may have important implications (Kooiman, 2008). Consequently, I deploy the concept of stakeholder governance capacity as the capabilities available to stakeholders to interact with others, form images and select appropriate tools in order to express their values and goals while being embedded in the institutional structures that proscribe their socio-political room for action. Within this conceptualisation of governance capacity, the issue of power is acknowledged as being an important
element. The idea of the ‘two faces of power’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) for instances shows that the second face of power – the restrictive face of power – offers a foundation for understanding the dynamics of non-decision making in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In the context of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, it was Urban Solutions as consultants for example, who strongly shaped the image of tourism-poverty nexus held by stakeholders. The initial image of conserving the Elmina Castle came to be widened to the overall socio-economic development of the area without much assessment of the capacity of stakeholders. Due to its access to financial instruments, Urban Solutions held more power over other stakeholders. In the end, the restrictive face of this power became evident when Urban Solutions left the scene without adequate planning for the long term sustainability of the project.

Some of the insights on power are embedded within the conceptualisation of the stakeholder governance capacity put forward here. It is worth also acknowledging that this research does not seek to analyse power structures but to primarily outline the various stakeholders involved in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Nonetheless, where appropriate in the analysis of the case, the relation between power and capacity will be highlighted. Thus for tourism-led local economic development planning, the elements to consider include the images held by stakeholders with regards to the role of tourism in local economic development and poverty reduction, the instruments available to translate such visions into achievable objectives and the actions taken to meet these objectives. Moreover, questions concerning what are the sources of the images held by tourism stakeholders, and how do the images travel across governance scales and through which mechanisms do such images get filtered, are key. Finally, the resources out of which instruments are shaped, the politico-cultural context of action and the power relations that constrain and/or enable action are important considerations.
Institutions, what they are and their role in social, economic, and political life is a subject of widespread debate. This ranges from the old, new and varieties of institutionalisms in institutional economics (March and Olsen, 1983; Rutherford, 1996; Morgan et al., 2010) through to the use of institution in economic sociology (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992), politics (Rhodes et al., 2008) and, geography and planning (Wood and Valler, 2004). There is not enough space in this thesis to fully engage with this burgeoning literature on institutions and the related issue of how to differentiate institutions from organisations. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that the most commonly cited definition of institutions is as the “rules of the game” North (1990). Recent work on institutions however, shows that there are two common approaches to defining institutions. First, from a classical sociological perspective that sees institutions as a set of ideal types – the family, the community, religion, among others. The second approach define institutions in reference to rules, norms, practices, and shared strategies, both formal and informal, which structure individual actions in their social context (Giddens, 1984; Jessop, 2001; González and Healey, 2005).

In this thesis, the second approach to defining institutions is adopted to refer to rules, norms, practices, and shared strategies. As Hodgson (2006:18) puts it, “institutions are systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions”. Moreover, following Bouma (1998:243), I considered organisations as “deliberate arrangements of norms, values and roles to achieve a particular end”. In essence, the institutions of governing tourism-led local economic development include general norms and expectations about managing resources, participation, collective decision-making, and the outcomes of participating in organisations engaged in steering, leading and managing societal needs, and meeting those needs. These norms about institutions, to an extent, exist separately from such formal organisations such as the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly, national political parties, and the civil service authority among other organisations. Whilst institutions provide the normative context that shapes organisations, it is organisations that reproduce institutions (Bouma, 1998). Thus the two can be considered as mutually constituted. Consequently, the use of institutions in this thesis also denotes organisational forms. Where necessary, and to achieve analytic clarity, a distinction is made between the two.
Institutions, and organisations are the main mechanisms through which stakeholder governance capacity is deployed within the tourism sector. However, a number of these institutions are not necessarily focused on tourism even though their activities intersect with the central tourism institutions and agencies. This calls for high levels of communication, collaboration and coordination between stakeholders and institutions in order to move towards desired outcomes. Within tourism-led local economic development planning, policies are required to strengthen existing institutions and to give backing to newly emerging ones. In this section I draw on the local economic development and planning literature to build up the concept of institutional thickness as a building block for the interactive tourism governance framework. I start this exploration by building on insights from the tourism policy and planning literature.

Tourism policy and planning as a social and political process

It has been recognised that tourism policy and planning is a social and political process and not simply a technocratic one (Dredge and Jenkins, 2007, 2011; Stevenson et al., 2008). Tourism policy and planning is seen as “…being a position, strategy, action or product adopted by government and arising from contests between different ideas, values and interests” (Dredge and Jenkins, 2007:7). Given that it is a social and political process shaped by government actions and inactions, the importance of systematic planning cannot be overemphasized. This is especially the case when it comes to the explicit policy goal of ensuring that tourism contributes to local economic development and poverty reduction. Brohman (1996:59) for instance was of the view that the equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of tourism in a country is achievable only when tourism development processes are appropriately planned. Thus tourism public policy-making must go hand-in-hand with planning in order to reap the full benefits of tourism. As Inskeep already noted, “tourism requires systematic planning so that it is developed properly, responsive to market demands, and integrated into the total development pattern of an area” (1988:361). To integrate tourism development into the total development pattern of an area means that tourism public policy needs to be embedded into the local economic development planning processes of an area. This is an issue that extend to the wider issue of public policy as a whole.

The literature on public policy offers a number of insights into questions of why policies are enacted by governments, who participate in that process, how the policies
are agreed on and implemented and subsequently what the impacts of such policies are on society (Howlett, 2011; Hill and Hupe, 2008; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Bovens et al., 2002; Sabatier, 1991). The study of public policy is however a complex endeavour. Four of such key complexities have been identified by Peters and Pierre (2006). In a study of public policy that focuses on a single policy area like the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the first complexity has to do with overcoming the tendency to oversimplify the ways that multiple policies interact to shape outcomes in the policy domain under study. Secondly, the need to examine policy issues and questions from a range of theoretical perspectives present a complexity. A third complexity concern the overemphasis on the role of the public sector and official actors in analysing the policy making process at the expense of understanding how other private sector and civil society actors are involved. The fourth complexity of studying public policy relates to the question of what to study when studying public policy. This is a very important point since it determines whether one is focusing only on the processes leading up to the policy decisions made, examining the policy programmes developed by governments or focusing on the tools of implementation. This last point offers a number of interesting perspective with regards to the outcome of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

It is undeniable that there is a noticeable gap between the objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and the eventual outcomes. Given the number of stakeholders involved, one way to look at it will be to focus on how the implementation process was shaped by the interaction between the various stakeholders. Such questions have been the basis through which the sub-discipline of 'implementation studies’ flourished from the early 1970s onwards (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier, 1991; Bovens et al., 2002; Hill and Hupe, 2002, 2008). The small literature on policy implementation studies provide useful ways to fill some of the gaps identified in terms of the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives. For instance, the literature raises questions about the degree to which one can think of implementation as operating in a linear process from decision making and then progressing into translated outcomes The implementation literature highlights that it is important to approach public policy analysis in ways that take as starting point, the range of actors involved in the policy process and the interactions between them (Peters and Pierre, 2006; Howlett et al., 2015). “It is only when we start wondering what might have been that we fully realise that what in fact has happened need not have...the more one knows about the intricacies of the actions and events that shaped a particular policy’s fate, the more important small details seem to be in determining collective appreciation of it.”
(Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996: 6-7). Thus a key insight for example from the work on policy fiascos and policy failures (Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996; McConnell, 2015) is the use of counterfactuals – wondering about the ‘what ifs’ – as a way of overcoming oversimplified accounts about the gaps between policy objectives and outcomes.

Nonetheless, there are limitations to the usefulness of this literature to the current research. Although the attention given to interactions, ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ aspects of implementation remains relevant to this research, its general focus is on processes of bargaining in the formally-constituted state and private sector organisations that make up the implementation structures (Hill and Hupe, 2002, 2008; Howlett, 2011). In this regard, the implementation studies literature offers limited potential in analysing the highly complex mix of formal and informal institutional bargaining that goes into public policy making in a developing country like Ghana. Much of the literature is based on and limited to liberal-democratic political administrative systems (Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996) and thus can only offer partial insights in the current case study that does not tick all the boxes of a liberal-democratic political administrative system. The Ghanaian context challenges the assumptions within this literature regarding a clear cut separation between formal and informal institutions. In the Ghanaian context informal politics and formal processes tend to be inseparable creating complexities in the policy process. This is in addition to the role played by traditional authorities in governing local development.

Moreover, the attempt at creating a distinct field of study that separate implementation from the other aspects of the public policy process is now considered to have ‘largely failed’ especially in regards to a formal modelling of implementation (John 2012:23). It has been pointed out that implementation and policy failure cannot be studied in isolation from the larger governance context (Howlett, 2011:20), nor from the broader context of the systemic conditions characteristic of the governance arrangements and political variables (Peters, 2015; Howlett et al., 2015) that altogether shape policy formulation. Given this, the literature on policy implementation is considered less suitable to serve as a foundational anchor of analysing the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This notwithstanding, some of the insights from this literature will be integrated in the analytic questions raised about the empirical data. The analysis will also highlight the ways in which the empirical observations from the Elmina 2015 Strategy differ from those expected by the policy implementation failure literature.
Insights from the tourism development policy and planning literature highlight the fact that the ability of tourism to deliver pro-poor benefits is dependent most crucially on state policy directives that span a multitude of institutions across different governance levels (Scheyvens, 2007; Slocum and Backman, 2011; Spenceley and Meyer, 2012; Rogerson, 2014). Indeed Harrison (2008:863) has succinctly summarized the point that “as in development matters generally, the impact of any PPT [pro-poor tourism] projects, even if on a large scale, is likely to be limited unless a state’s entire tourism strategy is constructed around the aim of poverty alleviation. In effect, PPT requires a developmental state”. Thus poverty alleviation needs to be central to state strategy for each economic sector from industrial policy to tourism policy. The state needs to play a key role if tourism policy is to be integrated into local economic development planning processes in ways that systematically address poverty alleviation. Importantly, the tourism development policy and planning literature posit a need to reconsider the tourism-poverty nexus in light of local economic development planning and the institutions involved in this process. This provides a focused lens with which to explore the issues of institutional design, stakeholder governance capacity, participation, communication, collaboration and coordination in the policy and planning process. For instance a decentralised approach to tourism policy making might result in the establishment of regional and local destination management organisations that allow local people to assume direct responsibility for tourism development and the benefits accruing from it.

**Planning for local economic development**

The local level is key to understanding the tourism-poverty nexus and how to systematically address poverty alleviation through tourism. However, it must be analysed vis-a-vis what goes on at the regional, national and even global levels. This is because the local level is where tourism resources are located and where local resources are used or have the potential to be used to provide and maintain the infrastructures upon which tourism development thrives. At the local or destination level, the role of institutional structures, local agency and other factors that shape development outcomes can be analysed while paying due attention to the impacts of regional, national and global level factors. Such an integrated analysis recognises the interrelatedness of economic, social and political dimensions. In the end, development however defined has a concrete geographical dimension. Consequently, to better understand the governance of the tourism-poverty nexus, one needs to appreciate the
local and/or regional economic development planning context. This is especially important when tourism is identified as a lead sector to drive overall local economic development.

In many countries of the Global North, local economic development (LED) as a development strategy has been practised since about the 1960s. Indeed Western Europe is seen as “the cradle of LED approaches” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2009 quoted in Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010:466). Although certain elements of LED such as place-marketing and boosterism have long been practised in the North, it is perhaps in the last 30-40 years that the literature on and activities associated with LED have really blossomed (Nel, 2001). In contrast to the North, LED in the Global South is a relatively recent phenomenon, the emergence of which is the result of reasons not too dissimilar to those found in the North. In one sense, LED can be considered as a response to the impasse in development theory and practice around the 1970s and 1980s. This impasse stemmed from a sense of disillusionment with mainstream development theory and practice, especially as it relates to the failure of top-down economic development planning and policy to bring about desired outcomes. This led to the search for alternative approaches to development.

In addition, there are a number of other critical factors that have shaped the emergence of LED in the South. These include slow economic growth, the failure of trickle-down effect when growth did occur and the persistence of poverty in many countries of the South. These issues have been compounded by imposed structural adjustments, debt crises and ineffective state intervention at the local level (Nel, 2001:1004). Moreover, alongside increasing globalisation, the spread of decentralisation, and rapid urbanisation across the South has come the diffusion of LED ideas from the North (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010). It is within this context that many regions and localities are actively planning for and implementing a range of LED strategies across Latin America, Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). For much of SSA, LED has gained ground in intellectual circles over the last 15 years but with limited implementation as national authorities have been slow to adopt LED approaches. The exception is South Africa, where LED strategies were initiated in the early 1990s in the immediate post-Apartheid period as a way of overcoming structural development inequalities between regions and localities (Nel, 2001; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010).
In general terms, LED is differentiated from other development strategies in terms of territory and management (Rodriguez-Pose, 2002: Pike et al., 2006). The key issues of LED are that it is confined to a well-defined territory or locality, makes use of existing resources available in that locality and the process is controlled by local actors and stakeholders. Following Helmsing (2003:69), I define tourism-led LED as “a process in which partnerships between local governments, community and civic groups and the private sector are established to manage existing [tourism] resources to create jobs and stimulate the economy of a well-defined area”. The emphasis here is on local control and the utilisation of an area’s existing potential in terms of human, institutional and physical resources. As these resources tend to be controlled by different groups of governors, actors and stakeholders, LED initiatives rely on the mobilisation of actors, organisations and resources in order to develop local systems and new institutions. This is accomplished through a process of dialogue and strategic actions within the well-defined area. The focus on a local level ‘bottom-up’ approach to development is predicated on the recognition that national level macroeconomic policies are insufficient in themselves to bring about sustained growth that tackles poverty at the local level and that increasingly, localities and wider city-regions are becoming the drivers of national economic development and growth (Nel, 2001; Pike et al., 2006; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010). Thus LED initiatives focus on building networks of people, institutions and resources in order to bring about local development.

There are three categories of LED that provide an avenue to situate tourism-led LED. These are community economic development, enterprise development, and locality development (Helmsing, 2003; Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002). Community economic development is essentially about improving livelihoods and reducing the poverty and vulnerability of people in both rural and urban settings through encouraging household diversification of economic activities. Enterprise development focuses on policies that remove barriers towards specialisation in a locality. Enterprise development initiatives are directly focused on developing cluster(s) of enterprises with a core aim of expanding, restructuring or creating anew the economic base of an area. The economic base of an area refers to the “activities that involve exporting their products and services outside of the area. The local economic base may consist of one or several agricultural or manufacturing products or service activities (e.g. trading or tourism)” (Helmsing, 2003:72). Finally, locality development initiatives relate to the holistic management of the entire local territory with conscious efforts made to achieve integrated spatial planning. Locality development is therefore about the planning and
timely development of specific physical and socio-economic infrastructures that stimulate complementary private infrastructures which altogether improve the local economic base to remain competitive. Successful tourism-led LED planning must therefore pay attention to these three categories.

**Using tourism in local economic development planning**

It has only been since the late 1990s that tourism-led LED initiatives began to emerge in various African countries with the majority of these situated in South African cities (Binns and Nel, 2002; Rogerson, 2002). While the initial spread of interest in tourism-led LED coincided with the emergence of the concept of ‘pro-poor tourism’ the two ideas have operated side-by-side rather than in an integrated manner. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that the bulk of tourism-led LED studies being focused on developed countries whilst the bulk of research into ‘pro poor tourism’ is carried out in developing countries. An aim of this thesis is to build a bridge between these two approaches given that earlier works on the tourism-poverty nexus, notably Goodwin (1998), already acknowledged that developing strong linkages between tourism and the local economy is fundamental to maximising tourism benefits. Tourism-led LED is about ensuring an integrated development of tourism spaces in a locality as a means of enhancing the economic base of that area in a way that creates new employment and business opportunities for local people. For the long term sustainability of tourism-led LED initiatives, the creation of new employment and business opportunities must complement existing livelihood options.

In order to ensure project sustainability, tourism-led LED planning initiatives need to align with the idea of locality development, and should involve a number of components. These components include: (a) participatory LED planning through which overall development priorities are established and appropriate strategies are devised; (b) physical planning and development controls that are transparent in order to prevent rent-seeking; (c) urban planning and design that improves commercial centres in a bid to improve economic performance; (d) infrastructure provision in basic services like access roads, electricity and street lighting and water and sewage systems, and; (e) socio-economic overhead capital provision in the form of institutions in education and training among others (Helmsing, 2003:74). These components ensure that LED initiatives are embedded into the overall local planning and governance
systems. In terms of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, this raises questions as to how it engaged with some of these components of locality development and importantly, the question of the depth of institutional support. The Elmina 2015 Strategy shows evidence of having engaged with some of these components (see Chapter 5 and 6 for more details). However, the institutional depth surrounding its implementation run to problems.

Tourism policy and planning can have a greater impact on poverty alleviation if it is embedded within place-based strategic initiatives and as part of local and regional economic development (Rogerson, 2014:106). This emphasis on place-based interventions is critical since tourism resources and their potential to contribute to job creation and income generation have concrete geographical dimensions. To focus on tourism-led LED planning is to recognise the interrelatedness of economic, social and political dimensions of development. In order to leverage their tourism assets for LED, localities need to be first of all recognised as tourism spaces. In practice, places are recognised as tourism spaces in at least three different ways. The first process is when developers and entrepreneurs identify development opportunities in localities and begin to provide accommodation and other recreational facilities. The appeal of these developed tourist attractions also partly depend on the attractiveness of the locality (Rogerson, 2002). Secondly, localities may become tourism spaces when they become accessible due to improved mobility and the search of new experiences by tourists. Thus in this process some tourism spaces are created by default which can sometimes even be against the desires of residents in the locality and without their active participation. The imperative of finding new sources of economic activities is the final way in which localities may become tourism spaces. Thus out of economic necessity such tourism spaces emerge as a way of enhancing the local economic base of an area (Davidson and Maitland, 1997).

The emergence of tourism spaces in any locality does not in any way guarantee successful tourism-led LED initiatives. This is achieved through effective planning and management of tourism activities (Inskeep, 1988; Dredge and Jenkins, 2007; Hall, 2008). The planning and management of tourism activities in a locality is an important function that requires collaboration and partnership between the public sector, the private sector and civil society (Bramwell and Sharman, 1999; Tosun, 2000; Adu-Ampong, 2014). Given their responsibility for overall socio-economic development and
governance, public sector institutions may be best placed to play a steering role in the planning process. Such destination management activities require “the institutional thickness of a successful tourism system” in a destination (Geerts, 2000:120-124 quoted in Rogerson, 2002:100). Institutional thickness in turn depends on organisational structures that enable high levels of communication, collaboration and coordination.

**Conceptualising institutional thickness in tourism-led LED planning**

Institutions are key to understanding the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning. It is through institutions that stakeholder governance capacities are shaped and given meaning. Successful tourism-led LED planning initiatives require the establishment of new local institutions through the identification, recognition and participation of key stakeholders. Such new local institutions might include a chamber of commerce, an information office or a visitor reception office. This ultimately calls for new forms of local governance of local economic development processes in which the state and local government play a key role. In this context, the role of the state through local governments includes “facilitating, supporting, part-financing and devolving control” (Nel, 2001:1006) to the partnerships set up to drive the LED strategies. The provision of the right mix of local public goods and services by local government is also important in enabling other stakeholders to make their most productive contribution. This then becomes the platform on which institutional thickness can be built.

The concept of ‘institutional thickness’, coined by Amin and Thrift (1994), was introduced in an attempt to synthesise theoretical debates and empirical evidence on how regions and localities can grow and develop in the face of global competition. Institutional thickness was a way of explaining the local conditions that are favourable to local and regional economic growth and development. These local conditions were found to be centred on institutions and how their arrangements influence the capacity of a given locality to economically grow and develop (MacLeod, 1997; Raco, 1998; Coulson and Ferrario, 2007). In their conceptualisation, Amin and Thrift (1994) identify four elements or factors that contribute to institutional thickness in a locality. These are; 1) strong institutional presence; 2) high levels of mutual interaction; 3) structures of domination and/or patterns of coalition and; 4) mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise.
Strong institutional presence relates to the existence, within a locality, of a multiplicity and variety of institutions and organisations that perform a diverse range of social, political and economic functions. These include financial bodies, local and regional authorities, central government agencies, marketing boards and agencies, development agencies, educational establishments and voluntary organisations involved in providing both material services and collective representation (MacLeod, 1997). A strong presence of this plethora of institutions provides the infrastructure for local coalition-building and represents the building blocks of institutional thickness (Raco, 1998). Within the context of tourism-led local economic development planning, strong institutional presence can be examined by investigating the range and diversity of institutions directly and indirectly involved in tourism development and local economic development within a tourism space. In the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the presence of institutions can be measured by asking a series of practical questions: how many different institutions were involved in the planning and implementation of the project?; what was the mix of public sector, private sector and civil society organisations involved?; on which spatial scales (locally, regionally or nationally) were these institutions operating?; what were the lines of accountability of the institutions involved in the Elmina 2015 Strategy? For instance, the Elmina Tourism Office and the Elmina Arts and Craft Market as new institutions were placed under the oversight of the Komenda-Edina-Eguago-Abrem Municipal Assembly but the embedding process remained incomplete. This meant that the oversight responsibilities could not be effectively carried out. As has been noted in the literature, a strong institutional presence, while a necessary condition is not sufficient in itself for the development of institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995, emphasis mine).

The second element to conceptualising institutional thickness concerns the level of mutual interaction between local institutions and organisations. In this regard, an empirical analysis of institutional thickness revolves around questions of the nature of contacts between local institutions, the form and regularity of both formal and informal contacts at various institutional levels. The extent of mutual interaction provides a way of understanding the level of information flows and exchanges that facilitate reflexive networking and cooperation which over time could lead to a degree of ‘mutual isomorphism’ (MacLeod, 1997:300). Mutual isomorphism implies that institutions co-evolve and map on to each other in a stable and predictable manner that offers both benefits and risks. Moreover, forms of institutional interaction can lead to the creation of specific social norms and habits (Coulson and Ferrario, 2007:593) and “the
establishment of trust relations and mutual cooperation (Raco, 1998:978 emphasis in original). For this thesis, examining the level of mutual interaction in the context of the Elmina 2015 Strategy is about analysing the information flows and contacts between institutions and the extent to which these made it possible for the institutions in question to move beyond their individual remits of action towards collaborative action. The indicators of mutual interaction that will be examined include; the issues around which collaboration was developed, the number of formal partnerships between organisations and the intensity of other forms of collaboration and interactions.

The interactions between institutions within a given locality take places within structures of domination, control and power. It is these structures that represent the third element of institutional thickness. Since institutions draw on different resources and have different power bases, the structure of institutional relationships will reflect these differentials. While some institutions are locally accountable, others have upward accountability to the central government, and other institutions may have fixed short/long-term budgets and lifespans (Coulson and Ferrario, 2007). Moreover, and of great significance to this thesis, some institutions, depending on their local significance and organisational independence from external actors, are empowered or disempowered with changes in national and/or local level politics (Raco, 1998). Given all this, how institutional interactions take place will reflect structural differentials with more powerful institutions having a dominant influence. Such a dominating influence can contribute to coalition-building and collective representation in ways that minimize divisions and bring rogue behaviour under control (MacLeod, 1997). However, it can also lead to some institutions disengaging from interactions. The key questions that this raises for the study of the Elmina 2015 Strategy involve the institutional sources of power and how changes in national and local level politics result in the empowerment of some institutions and the disempowerment of others. These will be assessed through local actors’ perception of the relative power of different institutions and an examination of the formal competencies of institutions. Moreover, given the three cycles of national political elections that took place over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, an interesting issue to consider is the changes to the form of structures of domination after each electoral cycle (see section 2.3 for a more detailed conceptualisation of political cycles).
The final element of institutional thickness is the development of a mutual awareness of being involved in a common local enterprise – i.e. the coming into existence of a shared vision of growth and development by institutions. It is this common agenda that local institutions both develop and depend upon to ensure collaboration (MacLeod, 1997; Coulson and Ferrario, 2007). The existence of a common local vision or agenda is important in developing institutional thickness because it is a “widely held common project which serves to mobilise the region with speed and efficiency” (Amin and Thrift, 1994:15). The development of this common local vision or agenda is “influenced by the specific patterns of domination and relative power” (Coulson and Ferrario, 2007:593) of institutions and this in turn establishes “local legitimacy and relations of trust” (Raco, 1998:978) in the locality. In the context of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, this final element of institutional thickness points to the importance of exploring how stakeholders understood their roles vis-à-vis the ultimate goals of the project. There are also questions of whether there was a clear and shared local identity, clear and shared local priorities and a sense of a shared awareness and stewardship about the common enterprise regarding the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

The concept of institutional thickness as conceptualised provides a framework for identifying a set of taxonomies to interpret local governance (MacLeod, 1997:307). However, the concept of institutional thickness is sometimes seen as resting on a conflation of institution and organisation (Jessop, 2001). This is a common critique against a number of other institutional approaches. In such approaches, formal organisations tend to be defined as institutions. In the empirical analysis for this thesis, an awareness of the danger of conflation is addressed through a clear distinction between institutions and organisations where necessary. Due to its emphasis on the dynamics of globalisation’s effects at the local level, the concept of institutional thickness has the tendency, at the theoretical level, to downplay the significance of the governance practices of the nation-state. A further critique of the institutional thickness concept is that it appears not to ‘see’ how the process of arriving at a common agenda in the locality involves some forms of political and social exclusion (Raco, 1998; MacLeod, 1997). Notwithstanding these issues, the strength of the concept of institutional thickness lies in the framework it provides for an empirical and analytic study of the process of institutionalisation at the local level. It provides not only a means to classify institutions but importantly a way to consider their interactions. However, in applying the concept of institutional thickness, it is important to adopt a more broad view of the political economy of a given locality. This enables one to
identify the social, political and economic forces that shape the processes of institutionalisation (Raco, 1998) and therefore throws a light on the role of the state.

Traditionally, the role of the state in fostering economic development and poverty reduction from the national to the regional and local levels has tended to proceed from a top-down centralised approach. Although there is much to be said about the positive aspects of such approaches, centralised or top-down development interventions have generally being criticised for failing to reduce inter-local disparities and close the gap between prosperous and less prosperous areas in a country (Pike et al., 2006). Such failures are usually also tied to the inability of national planning and development authorities to achieve their mandates. Coupled with the opportunities and challenges of globalisation, there is now a clamouring for bottom-up approaches to local and regional development (Nel, 2001; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007). This is also the case when it comes to the utilisation of tourism for economic development and poverty reduction (Binns and Nel, 2002; Rogerson, 2002). For such bottom-up development interventions to work however, they “require strong institutions of local and regional governance and to be based on local and regional participation and dialogue” (Pike et al., 2006: 123). This raises questions as to the nature and role of the state as well as how best to develop those strong institutions required for successful tourism-led LED planning.

In contrast to traditional development approaches, LED initiatives are based on local and regional institutions and systems that are specifically geared towards local needs. For Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2007:525) “the success of LED strategies depends to a large degree on the existence of appropriate local and regional institutional systems and on the availability of the necessary frameworks and skill levels at all government tiers”. This means that the capacity and competence of local institutions need to be developed, if not already developed. The measure of institutional thickness and competence therefore becomes a key aspect of governing the tourism-led LED planning process. This is especially critical because of the highly fragmented nature of the tourism sector. Moreover, the tourism sector is a net policy-taker in the sense that a number of policies – visa issues, environmental standards, air traffic regulation and the like – that (in-) directly affect tourism are made in other sectors with little, if any, participation from tourism stakeholders (Jenkins, 2015). It therefore becomes
imperative that attention is paid to local institutional politics within the governance process.

The governance of tourism-led LED initiatives must start with the participation of various stakeholders including community members. It is through the participation and interaction of stakeholders that new local institutions are developed which will be responsible for the planning, design, implementation and monitoring of the LED strategies. This involves the communication, collaboration and coordination of stakeholders at both vertical and horizontal levels and across different scales of governments. As has been noted by Pike et al. (2006:123) LED is increasingly being subjected to complex governance systems that can empower communities, foster civil society mobilisation, and promote networks that provide a basis for communities to self-determine an appropriate form of LED. For the Elmina 2015 Strategy this raises questions about what happened to the trained group of Elmina Tour Guides and the Elmina Tourism Office which were established as new institutional and organisational structures to provide services and accrue revenue that was to be reinvested for community development. Within tourism-led LED planning initiatives, newly emerging forms of institution do not always replace existing ones but may operate alongside them, or be superimposed on and/or subsumed under existing institutional governance structures. The resulting configuration of institutional and organisation arrangements depends on local political dynamics. An analytical task, in terms of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, is to find out what oversight responsibility the Komenda-Edina-Eguago-Abrem Municipal Assembly had over the Elmina Tourism Office and the Elmina Tour Guides and whether such responsibilities were effectively carried out.

The concept of institutional thickness, as conceptualised for this thesis and the interactive tourism governance framework being developed here (see figure 5 below), are about exploring local institutional political economy within which old and newly emerging institutions for tourism-led LED planning are situated. Institutional thickness is about how the many institutions directly and indirectly involved in tourism and local economic development mesh together to create depth for embedding tourism-led LED initiatives. Institutional thickness raises questions about the set of new institutions that emerge, the extent of their embeddedness within existing institutional structures, their durability over time and the ways in which they shape tourism-led LED planning processes and ultimately outcomes. Specifically, institutional thickness raises questions
about leadership, collective representation, inter-organisational communication, collaboration and coordination and whether there exists a common goal that is being pursued by all stakeholders. Within the interactive tourism governance framework, an institutional political economy approach is seen as essential to understanding the governance of tourism-led LED planning. Using the metaphor of a dance to characterise local governance problems in Sub Saharan Africa, Helmsing (2005) argues that, there are relatively few dancers (stakeholders) on the dance floor of local governance and that the few present tend to dance according to their own scripts and rhythms. Successful local governance of tourism-led LED planning therefore requires more dancers on the dance floor who are swaying to the same rhythm of leveraging tourism assets for socio-economic development.

Figure 5 Interactive Tourism Governance Framework

Source: Authors own design
2.3 Changing cycles of politics, governance and development outcomes

In what is considered a seminal article in tourism studies, Britton’s work on the political economy of tourism in the South Pacific found that up to that point, “discussion of tourism [was] typically divorced from the historical and political processes that determine development” (1982:332). Over three decades later, this assertion still largely holds true despite the progress that has been made toward historically and politically informed discussions of tourism. There have been relatively few attempts in the tourism literature to situate discussions of tourism’s potential as a vehicle for economic development and poverty reduction within the larger context of the evolution of development theory and thought (Sharpley, 2000). There have of course been some very notable exceptions, such as the application of dependency theory concepts of core and periphery in the work of Britton (1982). Lea’s (1988) book on tourism and development in the Third World situated tourism’s role in development from a political economy perspective to show the distortions and imbalances in international tourism and the consequent effects on developing countries. The relationships between tourism development and the structural adjustment programmes introduced in African countries in the 1980s have also been analysed by Dieke (1995), Harrison (2001) and Konadu-Agyemang (2001). These works and others such as Milne and Ateljevic (2001), Sharpley (2003), Scheyvens (2007, 2011) and Holden (2013) have helped to develop the subfield of tourism and development more generally and have informed tourism-poverty nexus debates.

To assess tourism’s potential role as a vehicle for development and especially as a catalyst for local economic development, it has to be examined in the light of the broader developmental context in which it occurs, and by which it is in turn conditioned. Bearing this in mind, political cycles become important in terms of development outcomes generally and the outcomes of tourism-led LED initiatives specifically. In this section, I develop the concept of political cycles as the third leg of the interactive tourism governance framework. This conceptual exploration has benefitted greatly from the literature on the political economy and governance of public goods (service) provision in developing countries. The discussion here is structured around three subsections – international development policy and funding cycles, national and local political electoral and party cycles, and finally, local
government service cycles. To start each subsection, I first outline the relevant tourism literature in order to identify the gaps that are to be filled by my conceptual development.

**International development policy and funding cycles**

Tourism's perceived role in economic development (and later poverty reduction) has been shown to have evolved in tandem with the changes and evolution of international development thought, policy and funding (Telfer, 2015; Scheyvens, 2011). Tourism research has drawn on development ideas ranging from liberal, critical, alternative, neoliberal and post-development perspectives but mostly in an implicit rather than explicit fashion. In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of tourism researchers explicitly drew on the prevailing liberal perspectives in development studies, specifically the modernisation ideas of Rostow (1960), to argue that "tourism cannot be considered outside the context of the different stages of development countries have reached" (Van Doorn, 1979, cited in Pearce, 1989:12). More recently, Sharpley in his study of tourism development in Cyprus, provides evidence that shows that “tourism has proved to be an effective growth pole, underpinning both dramatic economic growth and also the fundamental *structural modernisation* of the economy” (2003:254, emphasis mine). Tourism was, and is still largely seen as being functional for the socio-economic development of countries.

It was generally believed that the benefits of tourism would result in a greater multiplier effect that would stimulate local economies. Boissevain (1977) has noted that up to the 1970s, the economic case for tourism was overstated and the socio-cultural costs almost completely neglected. However, as the anticipated trickle-down effect failed to materialise, tourism researchers began to draw on work from critical and alternative perspectives in development studies to direct attention to the questions of the value of tourism with its associated environmental issues (de Kadt, 1979; Britton, 1982; Brohman, 1996). In the 1980s and early 1990s, studies began to focus on how the implementation of the IMF and World Bank backed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) affected tourism development in developing countries. For instance, Dieke (1995) shows that the liberalisation of the economy through the SAPs made way for local private sector and foreign investment in the tourism sector. The impact of the SAPs was to consign the role of the state to that of an enabler rather than
an operator for the tourism sector. This situation therefore limited the extent to which tourism could be directly utilised for local economic development and poverty reduction.

Furthermore, Konadu-Agyemang (2000, 2001) contends that the implementation of SAPs in Ghana resulted in higher leakages of tourism revenues due to increased rates of foreign and private sector involvement. Moreover, SAPs brought about increased and entrenched socio-economic and spatial disparities some of which persist to date. This is because tourism development for instance focused on areas in the south of the country that had the potential for a quick return on investment at the expense of areas with sufficient tourist attraction but lacking needed infrastructure. Thus while the SAPs enabled tourism to be positioned as a development strategy, the lack of active state control resulted in uneven development and sharing of benefits. The existing literature on tourism’s role in economic development has been right in showing how changes in the international development context are reflected on tourism’s perceived role in development. There is awareness within the tourism-development literature about paying attention to the overarching development milieu within which tourism development and promotion initiatives take place.

The idea of ‘pro poor tourism’ (PPT) offers the clearest example of the intricately linked relationship between tourism’s perceived role in development and the wider evolution of international development policy. The mid to late 1990s saw a new poverty consensus emerge with the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of the World Bank in 1999 and the coming into being of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000. The focus on pro-poor policies was a direct response to the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the preceding period. The SAPs as major economic restructuring projects had encouraged developing countries to diversify their economies and to expand their exports offerings to include areas such as tourism. This move within the international development industry to make poverty a top priority broadly inspired the concept of PPT (Scheyvens, 2007). PPT came to be seen as “tourism that generates net benefits for the poor (benefits greater than costs)” (Bennett et al., 1999: iii, emphasis in original). With the advent of PPT, a number of alternative initiatives have emerged linking tourism with poverty alleviation and in some cases providing funding for projects and initiatives in developing countries. The idea of PPT has attracted critiques, not least for the insistence of proponents of PPT
that it is not a theory or a model nor is it tied to any particular underlying theory or model (Roe and Urquhart, 2004; Goodwin, 2008a). This position is however questionable because while PPT may not be a theory per se, the idea is founded upon certain initial assumptions about society, economic development and poverty reduction efforts which are not always made clear or explicit in research. A fundamental weakness with PPT therefore lies in its dislocation from a theory of poverty (Scheyvens, 2011:19) and also stems from the failure to account for how international development policy and funding cycles shape PPT initiatives.

As international development policy shifts from one perspective to another, funding for projects tends to follow suit. Thus, tourism's role in economic development is subject not only to changes in international development policy but also to fluctuations in funding for tourism initiatives. This issue has partly been addressed to some extent, within the current literature on the role of international development agencies in tourism-poverty nexus projects (Hawkins and Mann, 2007; Scheyvens, 2011; Hummels and van der Duim, 2012). The current focus within international development for instance appears to be on providing donor support to the private sector in developing countries (Rodrik, 2006). The poverty consensus and agenda is now seen as best addressed through private sector capacity building and entrepreneurism (Mair and Marti, 2009; Naude, 2010). Funding for international (tourism) development projects and initiatives is therefore increasingly being channelled through private sector institutions and NGOs (Lewis and Sobhan, 1999; Parks, 2008; Richey and Ponte, 2014).

The importance of international donor funding and foreign aid cannot be overstated when it comes to different socio-economic sectors of many developing countries (see Pronk, 2004; Lahiri, 2007 for a detailed discussion). This is certainly the case in the tourism sector and in the use of tourism as a tool for local economic development and poverty reduction (Hummel and van der Duim, 2012). However, the issue of aid effectiveness is often assessed from the view of a recipient country's performance in meeting project and programme objectives. There is less focus on the performance of donor countries who supply the aid and that of the international consultants and experts involved in project implementation. This is a biased approach to assessing aid effectiveness because it places the burden of effectiveness on recipient countries. Donor countries and the various other actors in the value chain of aid delivery are consequently absorbed of all responsibility (Martens et al., 2002). There is a need to
move beyond this bias because the effectiveness of development aid depends not only on the internal conditions of recipient countries but also the internal incentives of aid donors, aid agencies and related consultants and experts.

This research therefore pays attention to the incentive mechanisms in the aid delivery process that are available to donor countries and the experts and consultants involved in aid delivery (see Chapter 7, section 7.1). This helps to address the bias of only focusing on the performance of the recipient country institution. It has been noted by AbouAssi (2013) that the volatile nature of donor funding through NGOs can affect the full implementation of projects and programmes. This situation shapes the sustainability and long term impacts of initiatives that seek to use tourism to address development and poverty issues. If funding for such initiatives is now being channelled through the private sector, then what happens to government institutions that are responsible for overall local economic development and poverty reduction in terms of their capacity to ensure that objectives are achieved? These are key questions that are yet to be fully addressed in the literature, not least questions about the role of external NGOs, and the influence of funders, international experts and consultants as well as the effectiveness of international donor assistance.

Tourism research informed by post-development thinking offers a number of insights into exploring the effects of international donor policy and funding fluctuations on the tourism-poverty nexus. Tourism is seen neither as a panacea nor the source of all negative issues in a destination (Scheyvens, 2010:43) but rather as a social force shaped by a system of actors (public sector, private sector and civil society) across multiple and varying scales (Hall, 2008; Dredge and Jamal, 2015) that can be harnessed for multiple objectives. Post-development thinking in tourism research is interested in understanding how tourism systems and processes work and how these shape the interactions between people and places (Cornelissen, 2005). Questioning and examining actors – local and international – in the tourism process, their power differentials and how these shape interactions and outcomes becomes important. In a sense, a post-developmental view of the tourism-poverty nexus – which sees tourism as neither a panacea nor the source of all negative issues in a tourism destination – calls for a close examination of the governance interactions at the international, national, regional and local levels through which tourism policies and planning take place. This raises questions about the (dis)continuities of tourism planning and development
initiatives when there are changes in international development policy and funding cycles. An awareness of these contextual issues provides a means of thickening the account of tourism-poverty nexus research. If tourism is a social force, then the social interactions that govern its development have a formative role to play in whether it is used for poverty reduction or not.

The starting point of operationalisation is to inquire into how international development policy impacts on the trajectory, success and long term sustainability of tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives. The issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs highlight ways of operationalising the idea of international development policy and funding cycles as part of an interactive tourism governance framework. For the Elmina 2015 Strategy, key questions to ask are, what was the prevailing state of international development policy and practice at the start of the project in 2000, and how did this shape the financing and governance of the project? Arguably, the Elmina 2015 Strategy can be seen as situated within an international development policy milieu characterised by the MDGs, the Monterrey Consensus of 2002, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action on Aid Effectiveness in 2008. Given that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was largely funded by international development donors – the EU, and the Dutch, Belgian and Canadian governments – an understanding of the international political economy at the time provides insights into the particular ways the financing of the project shaped the governing interactions between stakeholders. This is because a given international political economy with regards to international development policy comes with prescriptions as to how projects are to be funded and how they are to be governed and the role of state and non-state actors in this process.

**The role and nature of national and local electoral cycles**

Tourism tends to be considered as a largely private sector business activity but research has shown that national government policies play a key role in shaping tourism development in a given destination (Adu-Ampong, 2015; Jeffries, 2001). In terms of the tourism-poverty nexus, Harrison (2008) argues that a state’s entire apparatus needs to be geared towards the goal of sustainable tourism development in order to maximise the benefits of tourism for economic development and poverty reduction. States however, are not static but are made up of governments that are
voted into power in line with a country’s national and local electoral cycles. National and local electoral cycles present both positive and negative incentives that shape the socio-economic and political behaviours of governments. For instance, it is commonly known that incumbent governments often engage in increased government spending and/or decreased taxation in the year leading up to national, regional and local elections. Such increased government spending close to elections puts the incumbent government in a position to be re-elected. The result is a cycle of high spending during elections and low spending in between. Within the political economy literature, this situation is known as the political business cycle (PBC).

Empirical research has established the existence of PBC in both developed and developing countries (Drazen and Eslava, 2010; Keefer and Khemani, 2005; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Khemani, 2004; Franzese, 2002; Drazen, 2001). Incumbent governments engage in such expansionary economic policy prior to elections in order to increase their chance of re-election. A key insight from this set of literature is that incumbents have a preference for “pork barrel” or targeted spending. In the run up to elections, incumbents are shown to reallocate the bulk of government expenditure to high visibility projects that make an immediate impression on voters (Rogoff, 1990). A conclusion to be drawn from the PBC literature is that politicians with an eye on re-election take deliberate steps in the allocation and timing of government resources, which is usually in favour of big development projects at key stages of the electoral cycle. The more visible the projects, such as extension of electricity, road upgrades and other building projects, the more likely electorates are predisposed to vote for the government. In many cases, these projects need only to be started and not be completed by election time. In such situations the question of project (dis)continuity becomes an important consideration.

Within the existing PBC literature, it appears that there is less focus on the issue of project (dis)continuity after elections (Drazen, 2001). The key focus in this literature is on establishing the existence of PBC in a given country. But what happens to the high visibility projects and programmes once the electoral cycle is over and the incumbent is re-elected? Do the incumbents see these projects through to full implementation or do they let such projects lie idle until the next electoral cycle is on the horizon? Importantly, what happens to the (dis)continuity of projects if and when an incumbent government is voted out of power and a new government is elected? In a highly
contested political landscape what happens to uncompleted projects when a new political party assumes power? Answers to these questions are important in helping to understand how a long term project like the Elmina 2015 Strategy unfolded within a context of changing party governments.

To fully comprehend what happens to projects after elections, a set of literature on the political economy of public good provision offers a number of insights. Research from this area has shown how national and local electoral cycles impact on project implementation and development outcomes (Williams, 2016; Hirvi and Whitfield, 2015; Batley et al., 2012; Turner, 2012; Kelsall, 2012; Whitfield, 2009; Lindberg, 2003). Thus while a given government might initiate tourism development policies and projects, the (dis)continuity and full implementation of such projects is dependent on underlying political economic conditions in a given destination – of which national and local electoral cycles are a prime example. Clearly then, tourism planning and the tourism-poverty nexus projects are bound to be affected with changes in government.

The different set of incentives available to politicians and policy makers in the lead-up to elections may shape their decision to start high visibility projects and to (dis)continue such projects once electoral victory has been sealed.

There is an overlap between national and local electoral cycles and the time it takes to see the benefits of tourism development projects. There is an inherent tension between the technical demands of project implementation and the structural political processes such as elections and electoral competition. The temporal dimension of project implementation interacts with governmental time consistency problems in order to shape eventual outcomes of policies and projects (Williams, 2016). This means that the time it takes to complete a project or fully implement a policy might extend beyond the electoral time limit of the initiating government. The underlying process of national and local electoral cycles and its attendant incentives play a key role as to whether a project will be seen through to full implementation if there is a change of government. The question then is whether successive governments are committed to continuing the projects they come to meet in office. This becomes an empirical question because such commitment is not a given, especially in a winner-takes-all political environment.

Furthermore, it has also been shown that in many instances politicians tend to devote resources to starting new projects rather than completing existing ones in order to
appease distributive pressures from constituents (Williams, 2016). This is especially the case in countries like Ghana where there is a highly intensive political competition which tends to constrain economic progress (Kelsall, 2012; Whitfield, 2011, 2009) due to a lack of policy and project continuity. Thus to understand tourism-led LED policy and implementation like the Elmina 2015 Strategy, one must consider the political and administrative processes – i.e. the national and electoral cycles – within which it is situated. Key questions to ask about this include: what was the number of electoral cycles over the span of the Elmina 2015 Strategy? In which ways did these electoral cycles lead to administrative changes in local governments? Answers to these questions will provide insight into how electoral cycles lead to administrative changes in local governments which may have shaped the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

The effects of local government service and transfer cycles

Local governments play an important role in tourism planning and development. As the third tier (after national and regional governments) of public sector in tourism, they bear the biggest responsibility for ensuring that the tourism product remains competitive (McKercher and Ritchie, 1997). It has also been shown that local governments are key to achieving sustainable tourism development (Dredge, 2001; Ruhanen, 2013). However, the assessment of local government capacity in tourism governance and development has been relatively less studied (Churugsa et al., 2007; Slocum and Backman, 2011). Decentralisation and other public sector reforms in many countries have resulted in a downward shift in a number of key socio-economic development responsibilities to local governments. It was envisaged that these reforms would strengthen the capacity of local governments, reduce central government control and increase the managerial autonomy of local government authorities and personnel (Manning, 2001; Crook, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Awortwi, 2010). Given that local governments can either facilitate or inhibit tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives, it is important to fully understand their capacity and the political processes of local government management and administration in a destination.

In many cases, decentralisation has only been partially implemented and so local government authorities lack complete autonomy in managing the governing process at the local level. In addition to waiting on the central government for funding, the capacity of local government authorities is hampered by their lack of control over staff
and human resourcing (Silver, 2003). In many developing countries where decentralisation has only been partially implemented, local government authorities do not directly employ their key management staff. The hiring, posting, reposting and firing of staff in local government institutions is often centrally managed at the national level (Ayee, 2008). Indeed, the heads of local government authorities tend to be nominated or appointed by the central government. This means that accountability is upwards towards the centre instead of downwards towards the community. In a study of decentralisation in Ghana and Uganda, Awortwi (2010) found that central governments in both countries are taking some of the powers of local governments in a process of recentralisation. This has an impact on policy and project development and implementation at the local level. For instance staff can be transferred from their post at one local government authority to another at any point in time, often at very short notice. For key staff such as planning officers, such sudden transfers have repercussions on policy development and implementation. It usually leads to a loss of institutional memory and project continuity. This raises questions with regards to the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning projects initiated by local government authorities who are subjected to the sudden loss of staff through transfers.

The literature on local government and administration has highlighted the important role of organisational memory in improving the performance of local governments, especially in terms of project implementation (El Sawy et al., 1986; Pollitt, 2000, 2009; Haque, 2001; Barrados and Mayne, 2003; Cain et al., 2004; Zakaria and Mamman, 2015). The retention of organisational learning is important in achieving policy objectives especially in local tiers of governments where the nitty-gritty of policy and project implementation takes place. Organisational learning and the memory that is derived from it reside in the members or staff of a given organisation (Pollitt, 2000). It is through this organisational memory that desired outcomes in decision making, productivity, innovation and organisational learning are achieved. Thus it is important that an organisation is able to influence the movement of its members in order to preserve institutional memory and improve organisational performance.

While organisational memory is partly constituted by documents and practices, it is the staff that keeps records of organisational practices. Thus, if an organisation does not have much influence over staff transfers and movements then it loses its memory and
consequently its ability to effectively achieve desired outcomes. The lack of autonomy of local government authorities in directly hiring staff can hinder their capacity when it comes to policy and project implementation. For an already highly fragmented sector like tourism, tourism-led LED planning initiatives require the building up of trust and open communication between stakeholders based on the stability of key personnel. This is because "stability preserves trust, while instability creates uncertainty...turnover in key roles is [therefore] postulated as a factor that can erode trust..." (Cain et al., 2004:559). If personnel of local government authorities are key stakeholders in the tourism planning process then the question that arises is how this cycle of personnel transfer and turnover affects the trust needed to ensure project completion.

In Ghana for example, research has shown that the unpredictability of local government staff transfer, in part the result of political interference, affects organisational memory and the operations of local government authorities (Zakaria and Mamman, 2015). The sudden departure of usually experienced staff in the middle of policy and project implementation significantly affects the operations of such projects and their successful implementation. In addition, it has been well established that the assumption of office of new political heads coincide with a surge in local government staff transfer cycles. This is due to the tensions in the relationship between politicians and civil servants in local government authorities (Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett, 2014).

Since chief executives of local government authorities and regional ministers are central government appointees and belong to the same ruling party, they can easily instigate the transfer of staff that they perceive to be loyal to a previous government and critical of the current government’s development priorities and spending. This means that inherited policy and projects from the old government might not be seen through to full implementation due to organisational memory loss that arises from the transfer of old staff. This situation indeed happened over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy following a national electoral cycle that ushered in a new party government. Thus the unpredictability of local government staff transfer cycles raises important questions with regards to the governance of tourism-led LED planning initiatives. These questions, such as what happens with project implementation when staff are transferred, are key because it is the local government authorities that are constitutionally mandated to see to overall local economic development. They
therefore play leading roles in tourism-led local economic development initiatives and hence their capacity or the lack of it in project implementation and governance has a direct bearing on project outcomes.

As an illustration, there were four national electoral cycles – 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 – over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The electoral cycle in 2000 ushered in a change of ruling party for the first time since (re)democratisation in 1990s. The same government was re-elected in 2004 before a second change of ruling party in 2008. These electoral cycles were accompanied by changes in the administrative governance of municipalities symbolised by the (re)appointments of Municipal Chief Executives at the KEEA. These cycles and changes had a profound impact on the trajectory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The loss of institutional memory that comes from political cycles and staff transfers resulted in low governance capacity and challenges by the KEEA for instance in effectively overseeing the Elmina 2015 Strategy process. Thus the interactive tourism governance framework pays attention to the role of national and local electoral cycles.
2.4 Tying up the interactive tourism governance framework: communication, collaboration and coordination

There are two meanings that are commonly attached to governance. Firstly, it is defined as the "empirical manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century" and secondly as a "conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems and ... the role of the state in that process" (Pierre, 2000:3). Current research on governance tends to focus on the later meaning of how society is coordinated and the role of the state in this process. This understanding of governance is further categorised by Peters (2000) into "traditional old governance" and "new governance". Traditional old governance focuses on the question of the capacity of the state to exercise control over the rest of government, the economy and society in a hierarchical fashion. New governance on the other hand is concerned with the question of how the state interacts with the economy and society in order to make policy decisions that are acceptable to all actors in the society. A key feature that underlines this understanding of new governance is interaction – interaction between state, the economy and society.

In recent times governance has been seen as political and social communication (Bang, 2003) through which decisions and actions are arrived at through negotiation and dialogue between representatives of different sectors of society in a collaborative fashion. This contrasts with the traditional view of governance, in which hierarchy rules, and in which policy decisions are made by the state in a top-down manner. In such cases, other societal stakeholders have little input into the policy making process but must still comply with policy implementation directives. The communicative turn in governance and in planning has highlighted the need for increased interaction between the state and other stakeholders in the policy making process (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Healey, 2006). Indeed just two decades ago, the idea of a network society was put forward by Castells (1996). When new networks emerge around governing process, they erode and/or shift the location of power away from previous institutional configurations. This opens up the governance arena making it possible for new stakeholders at the very local level as well as at the regional and national levels to have a say in processes and outcomes which tend not to be possible under a traditional hierarchical top-down governance system. This situation brings
about new dynamics in which the authority of the state is not necessarily ended but is rather redefined (Rhodes, 2000).

Underlying the interactive tourism governance framework developed in this chapter, lies the issues of interactions. If we are in an increasingly networked society then the importance of continuous interaction in the governing process cannot be overemphasised. Interactions within the governing process can have many forms. However, three key forms of interactions are considered pertinent to this research and the conceptual framework developed. These three - communication, collaboration and coordination – are the very basic building blocks of any governance interaction and represent a way of addressing the empirical issues of how policymakers communicate with other actors within the tourism-led LED planning process and the form and extent of coordination and collaboration between the various governance agencies.

ANANSE NTONTAN

“spider's web”

Symbol of wisdom, creativity and the complexities of life.
Chapter 3

Research design and methods

This thesis examines the governance interactions between stakeholders involved in tourism-led LED planning initiatives and the institutional structures within which these interactions take place which are underlined by politics. The selection and framing of this research has been guided by curiosity and fascination about the cause-and-effect relationship between development outcomes and specific forms of governance interactions. Although for most of the research enterprise emotions tend to be kept in the background, "one place it should remain is in the choosing of research topics...[since]...the emotional aspects of choosing research topics...[ensures that]...these emotions contribute to the intense commitment to finding out what really causes things to happen that leads to good research (Geddes, 2003:28-30). Thus it is through curiosity, fascination and intuitiveness over the past five years, including the years before I embarked on the PhD programme in 2013 that I arrived at the broad contours of this research. This process was further underpinned by systematic interaction of observations based on reading existing literature and conjectures of possible cause-and-effect relationships based on first-hand experience. This research is therefore framed as an embedded case study because it offers unique insights into the causal mechanism between governance interactions and outcomes of tourism-led LED planning initiatives.

In this chapter, I provide an account and justification for the particulars of the embedded case study research design adopted for this research. In the first section, I discuss the philosophical assumptions that underpin the approach to the research enquiry, methods of collecting data and the analysis. The specifics of the research methodology and methods adopted for this study are then addressed in the second section where I also provide a description of the processes of data collection, the kinds of data acquired and how the data is analysed and written up. The goal of such description is to show the consistency between research questions, conceptual framework and data analysis. The final section is a reflexive account of my positionality as a UK-based Ghanaian researcher undertaking fieldwork (research) in Ghana and the ethical considerations made.
3.1 Philosophical foundations

The overall objective of this research is to understand, explain and analyse how governance interactions shape the planning and use of tourism for local economic development. Meeting this objective involves understanding governance interactions between different structures of governance in the tourism sector of Ghana. Consequently, this research proceeds on the basis that society is made up of actors and their interactions. Actors are used here to refer to both individuals and collectivities such as organisations. These actors often represent and constitute enduring features of society. The world is therefore a socially constructed 'reality' in which actors both influence and are influenced by the very institutions and structures they operate through. Thus "economic [social] action is socially situated and cannot be explained by reference to individual motives alone. It is embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than being carried out by atomised actors" (Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992:9).

The philosophical starting point of this research is based on the assumption that the governance interactions that give rise to and shape tourism-led LED planning are socially constructed through the relations of actors. These actor-relations are influential in how institutional arrangements are produced and reproduced and how these in turn proscribe the processes of actor-relations. As actors become engaged in interactions through social relations they begin to shape institutional processes but are simultaneously constrained in their choice of actions and strategies by these very institutional processes (Giddens, 1984; Scott, 1995). Nonetheless, actors are considered as being innovative and capable of learning through their interactions and being able to then change the very structures that guide their interactions (Healey, 1999, 2003).

On the basis of the communicative turn in planning theory, Healey (1999) has argued that social interactions represent an important mechanism through which policy initiatives and ideas become solidified, instruments chosen and action taken. These processes are continuously changing as actors develop new ideas, new relations and mobilise critical resources in new ways. A study of the interaction between actors is therefore important in understanding how new governance ideas become institutionalised. Consequently, to understand how governance interactions in the tourism sector of Ghana gave rise to and shaped the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a process
of tourism-led LED planning initiative, this research considers how actors understand, perceive and aim to implement tourism-poverty nexus policy conceptualisations. This research will therefore seek to let actors self-reflect on how they perceive their roles, their relations with others and how such perception gets formed and shaped through interactions and institutional context. Importantly, the focus is on the ways actors are able to get their work done within a given institutional context and their interactions with others.

There are a number of important points regarding agency and structures that provide a basis for the approach adopted for this research. These points as highlighted by Marsh and Furlong (2010) are: i) social structures and institutional arrangements tend to shape actions. In this action-shaping process, actors’ experiences affect how they can come to understand the social structures that are influencing their actions; ii) social structures are not independent from actors’ views of their behaviour and how they interact with others and; iii) social structures change as a result of the action of actors in social interactions. These points are important in understanding and accounting for the variations in actors’ perceptions and behaviour across time and space. This is achieved by accessing the views of actors who have the lived experiences of social interactions and the construction of meanings attached to these interactions. Thus while actors may be considered to be conscious, self-reflexive and strategic in their actions (Marsh, 2010), it is also important to bear in mind that actors also rely on implicit, tacit and non-reflexive behaviours (Cook and Wagenaar, 2011).

Given that the main interest of this research is to understand how processes of governance interactions affect policy outcomes, a quantitative approach to the research is inadequate on both theoretical and practical consideration. Theoretically, since these governance interactions are not given constants but are continuously changing, quantitative methods are unlikely to produce a nuanced picture. On a practical level, there is a lack of availability of data on governance interactions that will aid a quantitative approach to the research. A qualitative approach is therefore considered adequate and appropriate for this research in order to understand, explain and analyse how governance interactions shape the planning and use of tourism for local economic development. A qualitative approach through interviews, documentary analysis and observations is the most viable approach for establishing and interpreting actors lived experiences and for understanding the ‘how’ of social constructions that shape choices.
3.2 Approach to research inquiry

Considering the aim and research questions, the approach to qualitative research adopted for this research is that of an *embedded single case study*. An embedded case study is one that involves more than one unit of analysis and is embedded within a larger case study (Yin, 2009). Thus the focus on the Elmina 2015 Strategy is embedded within the larger case of tourism-led local economic development planning in Ghana as a whole. Odell (2001) has highlighted how on the basis of basic epistemological disagreement, the terms “qualitative” and “case study” are used with diverse understanding by different scholars. This research proceeds on the basis that the case study is but one of the several different ways social science research is conducted. According to Yin, the case study approach is appropriate in research where: i) “how” or “why” questions are being asked, ii) the researcher has little control over the research events, and iii) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life setting is being researched (*Ibid*: 2). Why questions according to (Hempel, 1965 quoted in Morgan, 2012:676) can be distinguished into ‘explanation-seeking why questions’ and ‘reason-seeking or epistemic why-questions’. “The latter ask for grounds (epistemic reasons) for believing something is true; the former take something to be true and ask for the explanation (substantive reasons) why it is so”. Case study research deals head-on with both questions together. My research therefore deals with the question of; how can we know that governance interactions fundamentally shaped the process and outcomes of tourism-led LED planning? If it is true that governance interactions shape outcomes then what are the features of such governance interactions?

The underlying rationale for selecting an embedded single case study for this research is that a tourism-led LED planning initiatives as illustrated through the Elmina 2015 Strategy is a *critical case* (Flyvberg, 2006; Yin, 2009) through which the correctness of the propositions implicit in the interactive tourism governance framework can be determined. A critical case is one that has “strategic importance in relation to the general problem” (Flyvberg, 2006:229). The Elmina 2015 Strategy is considered as a critical case study of the general problem of how to leverage tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Consequently, an understanding of how the Elmina 2015 Strategy was governed will provide insights to a number of other similar initiatives. Furthermore, an embedded single case study allows a look at multiple units of analysis within the research. The multiple units of analysis include conceptual units
and scalar units. Conceptually, the units of analysis are; stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles (see Chapter 2). In terms of scale, the units of analysis are focused on the national level, the regional level and the district level. The use of multiple units of analysis provides analytic focus to this research inquiry and helps to make the research empirically grounded. The use of multiple units of analysis also provides opportunities for extensive analysis that enhances the insights from the research inquiry making it possible to generalise from a single case to a larger population.

A case study defined by Gerring (2004:342) "as the intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" focuses on ‘rare’ events that are instances of substantial and relative quick change. The case study method therefore “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2009:4). This thesis designed as an embedded single case involves the intensive study of the Elmina 2015 Strategy for the purpose of understanding the governance interactions that shape tourism-led LED planning initiatives (larger class of similar units) more generally. The intensive study of the Elmina 2015 Strategy can therefore provide insights into tourism-led LED in other destinations with similar characteristics. Thus my research serves a double function of meeting my wish to know what is particular about the governability of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and at the same time my wish to know what is general about the governability of tourism-led LED planning initiatives.

An embedded single case study is by definition a single case study design that involves more than one unit of analysis and where a unit of analysis can include persons, groups, situations and/or events that all together speak to the larger case under study (Yin, 2009). Thus in the context of this thesis, the case under consideration which is illustrated through the Elmina 2015 Strategy is how tourism-led LED planning initiatives are shaped by governance interactions. The use of an embedded case study is essential because the research is concerned with the ‘how’ of governance interactions as it occurs in its real-life setting over which I have little to no control. Moreover the specificities of governance interactions at the various scales of the tourism system in Ghana can be captured and understood in relation to how they shape interactions at the locality level.
While the case study method generally and an embedded single case study specifically have their strengths, there are potential pitfalls that need to be highlighted. The major potential pitfall which can occur is when there is an over-focus and overemphasis on the units of analysis leading to a failure to return to the larger unit of analysis. Thus throughout the research process I held in check the propensity to present an assessment of the governance implications of each unit of analysis – stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles – in such great detail that it would become removed from and would not analytically connect to the larger tourism governance conceptual framework that seeks to explore how these interactions shape tourism-led LED planning. This research therefore proceeded in an iterative fashion in which the units of analysis were constantly being reflected back to the context of the tourism sector and national development planning in Ghana. This accords with the defense of the case study method by Morgan (2012:672) who argues that a key strength of the case study method lies in the importance given to both description and conceptualization in the process of distinguishing a phenomenon from its context.

Notwithstanding the potential pitfalls, the lacuna in current literature that this research seeks to contribute to filling makes the use of the embedded single case study design approach not only appropriate but also indispensable. Much of current research on the tourism-poverty nexus and tourism-led LED planning point out the importance of governance variables. However, there has at yet not been a detailed study of the causal mechanisms through which governance shapes tourism-led LED planning outcomes. This is precisely where my research fits in and offers new insights. My thesis provides in-depth description, analysis and explanation of how governance interactions shape tourism-led LED planning through the illustrative case of the Elmina 2015 strategy. The research approach adopted for this research has allowed me to make a choice to ‘know more about less’ than to ‘know less about more’. Such a choice faced by all research designs is both a strength and a weakness, and the embedded single case study approach adopted for this research can be defended and criticized for knowing more about less (Gerring, 2004).

A comparative advantage of the embedded single case study approach used in this research over other research designs such as multiple case studies and /or quantitative designs is that it allows for the identification of causal mechanisms. My thesis therefore
sheds light on the causal mechanisms of governance interactions and the outcomes of tourism-led LED planning. The research allows me to look into the box of causality (governance interactions and its shaping effects on the Elmina 2015 strategy) and through process-tracing see the intermediate and proximate causal mechanisms. This is accomplished when the general academic knowledge of the world (that governance is essential in shaping outcomes) is put together with the empirical knowledge of how the Elmina 2015 strategy unfolded. As succinctly noted by Roberts (1996 cited in Gerring, 2004:348), process-tracing is “the minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to the point where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more certain”.

3.3 Research strategy

A key advantage of the use of a case study methodology is that it allows the collection, use and analysis of multiple sources of evidence or data (Mason, 2002; Yin, 2009; Blaikie, 2010). These multiple sources include documents, archival records, direct observation, participant-observation, physical artefacts and interviews (Yin, 2009). In view of the philosophical approach and assumptions underpinning this research and given the adoption of an embedded single case study as a methodological approach (see section 3.1 and 3.2), interviews and documents represented an essential and central means of data collection for this research. In addition I made use of both participant and non-participant observation with accompanying notes as well as photographic evidence. The choice of methods for data collection and analysis adopted for the study were also shaped by the research questions that were set out in Chapter 1. The guiding research questions of this thesis are:

1. How did the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualise the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction?

2. To what extent did the level of governance capacity held by key stakeholders shape the planning process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy?
3. To what extent was the Elmina 2015 strategy embedded within the institutional arrangements for local economic development planning of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo Abrem Municipal Assembly?

4. How did local government politics and cycles of national elections shape the Elmina 2015 Strategy?

5. To what extent does an interactive tourism governance framework allow for a nuanced understanding of the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning?

It is instructive to point out at this point, before a description of the various data collection techniques used, that qualitative research designs cannot be tightly prescribed in advance. It has been noted by Mason (2002) and Creswell (2007) that in many cases qualitative research designs are emergent and that elements of the design are amenable to changes as a result of the very ongoing and unfolding process of the research itself. In the table below, I present a mapping of the research question-data sources and methods-justification that guided the fieldwork.
Table 3 Research Questions – Data Sources – Justification Matrix

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<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Data Sources and Methods</th>
<th>Justification</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. How did the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualise the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction?</td>
<td>Documentary Analysis: The key documents that were consulted and analysed include: the Elmina 2015 Strategy Part I: Sector Strategy and Vision, Progress Reports of project implementation, the draft of the final project report, government archival materials, public news archives. Interviews: Interviews with former and current bureaucrats at the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly such as the Municipal Chief Executive, the Municipal Development Planning Officer, the Municipal Coordinating Director and the Member of Parliament for the municipality. In addition, interviews were conducted with key informants outside of the municipal assembly but who were centrally involved in the planning and implementation of the strategy.</td>
<td>How the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualised the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction is investigated through the analysis of the strategy documents and the various progress report on project implementation. The information held in the official documents provides the state’s position on how the tourism sector is understood and conceptualised. The analysis of such documents available through secondary sources reveals the ‘official’ position which is compared with the position found in the interviews. The conducted interviews were then analysed in order to understand the perspective of stakeholders regarding how the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualised the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. To what extent did the level of governance capacity held by key stakeholders shape the planning</td>
<td>Documentary Analysis: National Tourism Development Policies and Plans, Technical Reports, Elmina 2015 Strategy Part I: Sector Strategy and Vision, Progress Reports, Municipal Medium Term Development Plans.</td>
<td>The question of how governance capacity shapes outcome is best addressed through analysis of documents especially progress reports. It is however important in the first place to first ascertain the governance capacity of each stakeholder, which is</td>
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<td>Process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy?</td>
<td>Interviews: These were mainly conducted with bureaucrats and policy makers at the national, regional and district levels in order to assess their governance capacity and identify the main constraints on this. These interviews were conducted within public sector (state) institutions, private sector institutions and civil society institutions who are all involved in the governance of the tourism sector.</td>
<td>Established through interviews with bureaucrats. Moreover, the use of documentary sources provides a means to identify the official functions and capacity afforded to each stakeholder.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. How did local government politics and cycles of national elections shape the Elmina 2015 Strategy?</td>
<td>Documentary Analysis: Successive Medium Term Development Plans of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo Abrem Municipal Assembly, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II and the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I &amp; II. Key documents are the various progress reports on the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as well as the draft final report. Interviews: All the interviews conducted at the national, regional and local district levels within public sector (state) institutions, private sector institutions and civil society institutions explored the issue of local government politics and effects of political cycles.</td>
<td>An analysis of the progress report taking particular notice of the period of government transitions provides insights into whether and how the Elmina 2015 Strategy was shaped by local government politics. This helps to identify trends regarding progress of the Elmina 2015 Strategy vis-à-vis cycles of national and local government transitions. The documentary analysis is complemented with key informant interviews that provide a more in depth insight as to the particular ways in which changes in governments affect project continuity.</td>
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<td>4. To what extent was the Elmina 2015 strategy embedded into the institutional arrangements for local</td>
<td>Documentary Analysis: Successive Medium Term Development Plans of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II and</td>
<td>As this question relates to the process tracing of whether and how the Elmina 2015 Strategy got embedded in local economic development planning institutions, it is investigated through interviews with both current and former bureaucrats. Importantly, it was key that former</td>
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<td>Question</td>
<td>Economic Development Planning of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly?</td>
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<td>the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I &amp; II.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Interviews: These were conducted mainly with bureaucrats at the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly involved in local economic development planning and the development of the Medium Term Development Plans – especially the Municipal Development Planning Officer.</td>
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<td>Bureaucrats who were involved in developing successive Medium Term Development Planning were interviewed. This provided a perspective within which the documentary analysis was carried out on the subsequent Medium Term Development Plans. These plans and other documents provided insights on the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy got embedded in the institutional arrangement for local economic development planning.</td>
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<th>5.</th>
<th>To what extent does an interactive tourism governance framework allow for a nuanced understanding of the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning?</th>
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<td>The data sources and methods as discussed under the first four questions together form the basis to answering this question. This entailed a reflective and reflexive analyses of the answers to the first four questions in relation to the existing literature on tourism governance and tourism-led local economic development planning.</td>
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<td>While building on the empirical data collected, answering this question also required conceptual analysis based on existing literature. Assessing the interactive tourism governance framework developed here and its contribution to understanding the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning proceeds in a reflective and reflexive way taking into consideration both empirical data and also theoretical literature.</td>
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The interviewing process

Interviews represent an essential source of information for this research. The use of interviews allow for the views, understandings, interpretations and interactions of people to be explored in much detail through asking questions and gaining access to their articulations (Mason, 2002). However, the information from interviews does not necessarily represent ‘factual’ accounts of the lived experiences of people but (re)constructions of people's views that take place during the interviewing process. Since knowledge is situated, contextual and interactional, the use of interviews enabled the exploration of the policy process of the Elmina 2015 strategy in as great depth as possible. This means that questions asked during the interview were focused and specific enough to allow each interviewee to fully express their contextual knowledge about issues.

In view of the central concerns of the research, the use of a structured survey with ‘one-size-fits-all’ type of questions was neither appropriate nor adequate. The use of interviews on the other hand provided an avenue for understanding and interpreting the contextual knowledge (re)constructed with each interviewee. As Mason (2002:64) aptly notes, “the interview is just as much a social situation as is any other interaction”. The interviews conducted for this research therefore consisted of a fluid set of conversational questions that still focused on a consistent line of inquiry rather than rigid and structured queries (Yin, 2009).

Before, during and after interviews

Prior to the start of the fieldwork phase of this research, a case study protocol was drawn up to guide fieldwork activities including the interview process. The case study protocol contained a list of potential interviewees, a set of questions and issues to be discussed as well as a listing of fieldwork procedures and procedural reminders. I drew up a list of the contact details of all the institutions and agencies within which there were potential interviewees. Through the searching and compiling of the contact details, I got to know of the names of the people occupying the specific managerial/administrative positions that I needed to talk to. For some agencies and institutions it was not possible to get their complete contact details online.
For the majority of interviewees my first contact with them was by phone. At the beginning of each week, I called the potential interviewees in my planned interview schedule and arranged appointments with them for that week or the following week. The initial phone call comprised of me briefly introducing myself as a PhD student doing research on the tourism-poverty nexus in Ghana and asking if it was possible to get to speak with them. I also summarised the contents of the research information sheet that received ethical clearance from the University of Sheffield Ethics Committee. In general national level interviews were arranged by phone while most of the regional and district level interviews were arranged in person. After agreeing on a date, time and location for an interview by phone, I usually called interviewees again a day to the appointment to confirm that we were still having the interview.

Access to interviewees was not an issue (except for the multiple cancellations of my appointment with the Deputy and substantive Minister of the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts and the Central Regional Minister). Interviews were conducted in the offices of potential interviewees and in few instances in a mutually agreed upon neutral location that was comfortable and relaxed for interviewees. Interviewees were provided with an information sheet concerning the research which they had time to read and ask for clarification before signing the consent form. During the interviews, extensive notes were taken and wherever possible and consent given, a digital recorder was used as a backup to the notes taken. Interviews were usually scheduled to last no more than an hour. At the end of each interview I spent an extra 30 minutes to an hour to write up and flesh out in more details the handwritten notes as well as begin initial analysis of the information collected.

In total and over the course of two separate periods of fieldwork, 59 individual interviewees were conducted in addition to 9 community interviews, three of which ended up becoming a form of focus group with between two – five persons. These individuals included past and present KEEA officers, Directors at the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, community members and homeowners who benefitted from the building projects of the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme and private sector organisations that come under the Ghana Tourism Federation among others (a list of interviewees with dates of interview is provided in appendix A). Aside from these formal interviews I also had a number of informal conversations and
chats with people that provided background information for this research. Interviews were conducted in English which is the official language of Ghana, hence the dynamics of the interview process were not affected by language issues. Nonetheless in the few cases where interviewees were more comfortable speaking a local language like Twi or Fanti rather than English, the interview was conducted in that language. In order to maintain similar interview dynamics in both those conducted in English and those in local languages, the interview schedule was translated into the local languages in advance. This allowed me time to think through how to translate English concepts in ways that were understandable in the local language while maintaining the underlying essence. At other times the challenge was to translate Twi/Fanti expressions with dense layered meanings into English. In many instances there are no equivalent single words in English which meant that I transcribed a Twi/Fanti word as an expression in English. I transcribed all recorded interviews in full with no need for an interpreter, as I am fluent and competent in these local languages.

Given that one of the potential pitfalls of interviews is the possibility of deliberate collusion by interviewees from the same organisation, extra caution was exercised so that “when different interviewees appear to be echoing the same thoughts – corroborating each other but in a conspiratorial way” (Yin, 2009:107) further probing and the interviewing of other people was undertaken. In view of the embedded single case study design adopted for this research, the potential pitfalls of interviews were overcome by using additional sources of data collection. The interviews were used to confirm evidence from other sources but also led to and opened up new lines of inquiry that took me back to a (re)analysis of documents and other pieces of evidence. The iterative process of using documentary analysis and interviews to confirm, corroborate and highlight differences ensured a robust data collection process.

**Documentary Sources**

In answering the research questions and achieving the research objectives, documentary analysis served two crucial functions. Firstly, documents were analysed to understand how state policies and the Elmina 2015 strategy specifically conceptualise the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction. This helped in the process of arriving at the research questions and in the design of the interview guides. The second function of documentary analysis was
to provide information invaluable to corroborating, verifying and extending data collected from other sources such as interviews and observations (Yin, 2009) within the iterative process noted above. Documents were analysed on the acknowledged basis that there are some that may have been ‘constructed’ in a specific socio-political context by specific people with particular purposes. Documents used in this research are therefore considered to be constitutive of the social and institutional relations that give rise to them. Consequently, information contained in documents does not necessarily reveal ‘facts’ about these social and institutional relations since they are embedded in each other (Mason, 2002).

Prior to going for fieldwork I was already in possession of a large number of essential documents including the Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027, Ghana National Tourism Policy 2007 and the Elmina 2015 Strategy (Part 1: Sector Strategy & Vision). Whilst in the field I was able to get access to a wide range of policy documents particularly progress reports on the various implementation stages of the Elmina 2015 Strategy (see appendix B for a list of key policy documents reviewed). The only difficulty was getting access to the 1975-1990 Ghana National Tourism Development Plan and the Ghana National Tourism Strategic Action Plan 2003-2007. Nobody at the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts knew when copies of these plans were held.

**Observations and other sources of information**

Participation in meetings and events with key tourism stakeholders was another stream of data collection. During the fieldwork period in Ghana I had the opportunity to participate in, observe, make notes and make recordings of speeches during various tourism related events. These included the Central Regional branch of the Tour Guides Association meeting in Cape Coast, the Central Region Tourism Awards Night in Elmina organised by the Ghana Tourism Authority and the commissioning of the Eguafo-Dumpow Eco-heritage site attraction led by the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust. The participant observation I was able to engage in provided an avenue for gaining additional contextual knowledge within which to situate information gained from the interviews and documentary analysis.
In addition to the formal participant observation of meetings and events, I also undertook a number of observational walks around Elmina. In particular I went to the various projects and sites that were a key component of the Elmina 2015 strategy to assess their current state. These included the Elmina Castle, the Elmina Craft Market, the Nana Kobina Gyan Square and a number of renovated old merchant houses. I therefore took a number of photographs of the current state of these sites and projects which were then used to compare to earlier photographs. These photographs (some of which are used in this thesis) provide visual evidence and reminders of the outcomes of the Elmina 2015 strategy.

**Data analysis and write-up**

Data analysis was an iterative process that already started with the writing up of the initial research proposal and continued throughout the research process. The overall analytic strategy adopted relies on the research propositions which provide a theoretical orientation to guide the case study analysis (Yin, 2009). The research propositions shaped the case study design and research questions, and consequently highlighted priority areas to focus the analysis.

A purpose-made spread sheet database was designed to log information regarding gathered data so that none is inadvertently lost. Audio recordings of the interviews were stored digitally and securely with backups, along with transcriptions, labelled with identifiers for easy retrieval. In ensuring the security of data, all data files were password protected to protect the confidentiality of interviewees. Data was securely stored in multiple locations – on my personal computer, external hard drive and on flash drives with cloud storage as additional backup to prevent data loss and ensure that there was a constant back-up of data should my personal computer crash. Handwritten notes and signed consent forms were scanned and stored digitally in addition to the paper copies. A list of interviews indicating time, place and duration was kept. Notwithstanding the time consuming and strenuous nature of transcription, all recorded interviews were transcribed wholly and verbatim (excluding most of the ‘oohs’, ‘aahs’ and ‘hmms’). When transcribing, I spent an extra 10 minutes and more at the end of each audio recording to write up an initial analysis of the transcribed interview identifying the key themes and their relation to other transcribed interviews.
(a sample of a transcribed interview is provided in appendix D). This was a first stage in the data analysis that was built upon after all the interviews have been transcribed.

As part of the process of organising, managing and analysing the data, I uploaded the various transcripts and notes into NVivo. This allowed me to easily code the data into broad codes and themes. I also concurrently set up a manual approach to organising and managing the data which allowed me to write on print-outs of the interview transcripts. The framework approach for qualitative analysis as developed by Ritchie and Spencer (1994) was used to analyse both primary and secondary data. The five step process of the approach consisted of familiarization, identifying a thematic framework, indexing, charting, and mapping and interpretation. An iterative following of these steps enabled the data to be scrutinised for meaning, salience and connections between what actors perceive in their governing interactions and what actually pertains in their day-to-day activities. Significantly, this approach to analysis made it easier to identify salience and connections between governing activities or inactivity and outcomes of the tourism-led LED process. Data analysis focused on building up broad sub-themes of commonalities and differences between actors. These themes included, ‘political interfering’, ‘party politics’, ‘forced staff transfer’, ‘project champions’, ‘revenue sharing’, ‘tourism management’, ‘project monitoring’, ‘KEEA politics’, ‘New Patriotic Party role’, ‘National Democratic Congress Party role’ among others.

The familiarisation stage involved immersion in the data – listening to the recordings, rereading transcripts, and going over and over documents – in order to get an overview of the range and diversity of the data gathered. This immersion process was also the beginning of abstraction and conceptualisation that led to setting up a thematic framework to sift and sort out recurring themes, concepts and issues relating to governance interaction as they emerge. To use the example of the theme of ‘party politics’, the familiarisation stage involved immersion into the data to identify when and where the various issues to do with party politics show up. This included interviewees from public, private and civil society sectors mentioning that every development issue or project is politicised at the local level. Other instances that were picked up on were when interviewees began to explain what happened to the Elmina 2015 Strategy implementation once a new political party and/or a new Municipal Chief Executive comes into office. The next stage in data analysis was to devise an index of
descriptive key issues – ‘negative incentive for forcing staff transfer’, ‘positive incentive for forcing staff transfer’ – which was then applied to all data in an iterative process of refining the analytic themes. The charting phase involved rearranging data in accordance with appropriate thematic references. Building on the party politics example, at this stage more refined themes emerged under which data was rearranged. These refined themes included ‘era of New Patriotic Party’, ‘era of National Democratic Congress Party’, ‘role of Municipal Development Planning Officer I’, ‘role of Municipal Development Planning Officer II’ and so on.

The crux of data analysis took place in the mapping and interpretation stage. This process is neither neutral nor mechanical but represents the outcome of choices made with regards to which issues are considered salient. The central concern at this point was to provide a coherent analysis of all gathered data. In achieving this aim of analytic coherence, Yin’s (2009) analytic techniques of pattern matching and explanation building was used to complement the framework approach to data analysis utilised. Pattern matching consisted of example comparing the empirical patterns of governance interaction with the predicted patterns in order to accept or reject the working research propositions. This helped to strengthen the internal validity of the research. Explanation building on the other hand, allowed data to be analysed in a way that built up an explanation about the causal links and mechanisms [the ‘how’ and ‘why’] between the key issues stated in the research questions.

To conclude with the example of the ‘party politics’ theme, at this stage the issues coming under ‘era of New Patriotic Party’, ‘era of National Democratic Congress Party’, ‘role of Municipal Development Planning Officer I’, and ‘role of Municipal Development Planning Officer II’ were related back to issues of the progress of implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The explanation building process then showed for example how during the ‘era of the New Patriotic Party’ there was a strong political commitment to the project but this commitment began to recede once the ‘era of the National Democratic Congress Party’ had begun. Given this, a plausible conclusion of this line of ‘party politics’ thematic analysis was that there is a causal link between the cycles of political party change and the rate and extent of implementing the Elmina 2015 Strategy. After establishing such a plausible explanation, it became possible to then critically analyse through pattern matching how various factors such as power, access to resources and system of local governance influenced this causal link. The whole data
analysis process was driven not only by the proposed conceptual framework but crucially, by the themes that emerged from the empirical data collected. Data analysis remained an iterative processes through which constant reference were made to the original research questions and propositions.

3.4 Reflexivity and ethical considerations

As a Ghanaian based in a UK university carrying out research in Ghana I actively had to reflect on my positionality. There were a number of issues throughout the research process that provided spaces for me to reflect on my position as a researcher, a PhD student and a Ghanaian with a deep-seated interest in the socio-economic development of my country. I had to reflect on how the tensions inherent in these various positions and be aware of them throughout the research. In framing the research issue for this thesis I invariably set a boundary around the issues that I am interested in, and could research and write about. Thus how I have identified the research agenda and the language (of governance) I use to describe this constrains alternative understandings. As Mason (2002:5) indicates, reflexivity means “thinking critically about what you are doing and why, confronting and often challenging your own assumptions, and recognizing the extent to which your thoughts, actions and decisions shape how you research and what you see”. I therefore did not see myself as a ‘detached’ researcher out in the field to simply collect data. I perceived myself as being positioned within the socio-cultural relations within which data for this research was ‘constructed’.

In effect, this thesis is as much a social construction rather than a comprehensive statement of ‘truth’ about the governance of tourism-led LED planning processes. Notwithstanding how I have sought to be comprehensive in an integrated manner, this thesis offers a ‘partial’ view of the complexity of the research issue. Given this complexity, complete comprehensiveness is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Indeed a critical question to ask is whether achieving complete comprehensiveness is desirable. In this thesis, therefore, a middle ground in terms of comprehensiveness and details is achieved – i.e. I sketch out an overarching structure of the research problematique while at the same time paying close attention to the important details. For instance, through the use of the interactive tourism governance framework to
arrive at the research questions, particular focus was given to institutions and bureaucrats. This meant that the views and voice of community members became a bit marginalised in the overall analysis.

In terms of ethical considerations, the first step was to obtain research ethical approach from the University of Sheffield Ethics Board which was then duly followed throughout the research. Details of the information sheet and consent form were explained to my interviewees during the initial phone contact. At the agreed upon time and location for the interview, interviewees were then given the information sheet and consent form. Every effort was made to ensure that interviewees had the time to read through the information sheet and consent form before signing it and that I was able to provide further explanation to any queries they had.

Due to the varying level of literacy and education levels of community members interviewed in Elmina, the local dialect was used where appropriate. Due to an understandable distrust of signing papers that they could not fully read, verbal consent was sought from these interviewees before I asked them any questions. I translated and explained the information sheet and consent form to them and then asked for the consent before proceeding with the interview. Moreover, for those who expressively stated their preference for complete anonymity efforts have been made to meet such requests. In the analysis and final writing of this thesis, the views of all interviewees have been represented in a fair and accurate manner. It is not expected that any harm – physically, emotional or career wise – will behalf any interviewee as a result of participating in this research.

In summary, this chapter has explained in detail the research design and method used for this research. The philosophical foundation of this research stems from the idea that social and economic actions are socially constructed and hence can only be understood in context rather than only through individuals’ motives. From this philosophical starting point, a qualitative research designed at the centre of which was an embedded single case study was deployed as the approach to the research inquiry. I then discussed in detail the primary and secondary sources of data collected. Using the theme of ‘party politics’, I have discussed in great length the process of data analysis that was accomplished using the framework approach to qualitative data analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). I supplemented this approach with Yin’s (2009) pattern
matching and explanation building techniques to data analysis. The final section in this chapter provided an overview of how I reflected on my various research positionality as a researcher, a PhD student and a Ghanaian. I also provided an overview of the ethical considerations that underpinned the whole research project.

The next four Chapters present findings from this research starting with a chapter on the wider development planning and tourism planning context in Ghana. Chapters 5 – 7 present the findings of analysing the Elmina 2015 Strategy and its governance discontents. After these three chapters, I draw together key themes from the analysis in a concluding discussion in Chapter eight which is the final chapter of this thesis.

AYA

Symbol of endurance and resourcefulness.
Chapter 4

Local economic development and tourism planning in Ghana

A key argument in this thesis so far has been that we need to reconsider the tourism-poverty nexus in terms of wider place-based local economic development planning processes. The planning process at the local level is critical to enhancing the tourism-poverty nexus because it is at this level that tourism resources are located. Moreover the infrastructures on which tourism development thrives are provided through local resources. Consequently in localities with rich tourism resources, a tourism-led local economic development planning approach might represent a viable driver for development and poverty reduction. This is because of the potential linkages to be made between tourism and sectors like agriculture, construction and hospitality. These linkages contribute to job creation and income generation. As I outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis, tourism-led local economic development planning requires effective tourism governance, and this effectiveness can be usefully investigated by looking at stakeholder governance capacity, institutional arrangements and the effects of political cycles.

In this first empirical chapter I analyse and examine the governance of tourism planning and local economic development planning in Ghana. The first section looks at the governance of national economic development planning and highlights some of the contradictions and challenges involved in embedding tourism development as part of strategic district level planning. The second section takes the analysis to the national level by considering how tourism has been conceptualised within national economic development policy and planning over the years. This leads to an analysis of the national tourism planning experience in the third section with a specific focus on long term national tourism development plans. In the final section I dissect the tourism sector in Ghana in terms of resources, key institutional actors and their governing interactions.
4.1 Actors, structures and processes of governing local economic development planning

This section starts with an overview of the socio-economic development profile of Ghana. This will be followed by a subsection that analyses the decentralised governance structures in place. The aim of this section is to show how decentralisation and its governance both enable and constrain local economic development planning and the role MMDAs can (not) play in using tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction purposes.

A historical-political and geo-economic overview of spatial development

With a total surface area of 238,537 km², Ghana is slightly larger than the United Kingdom. It is the first Sub-Saharan African country to gain independence on 6th March, 1957 from British colonial role. It is bounded to the North by Burkina Faso, the East by Togo and West by Cote d’Ivoire. To the South of the country is the Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Guinea) which provides long stretches of pristine beaches in many areas. There are 10 regional administrative regions (see figure 6 below) and 216 sub-regional divisions in the form of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) (more detail on this in the next section). This division of the country into regions and districts has been informed by the need for efficient administration and crucially, the need to maintain homogenous units of large cultural groupings of people. This logic goes back to the colonial period (Dickson, 1969; Ofori, 2002).
Figure 6 Map of Ghana showing regions and their capitals
Ghana’s population according to 2010 Population and Housing Census is a little over 24.6 million with 50.9% living in urban areas and 49.1% living in rural areas (GSS, 2012). Spatially, the population distribution is skewed towards the Southern parts of the country. The economic structure of Ghana has remained relatively stable with no significant changes – even after the discovery of oil. Endowed with a number of natural resources including, timber, cocoa and gold among others, the domestic economy continues to revolve around primary exports and subsistence agriculture. The largest sector as a share of the GDP is the services sector (51.9%). However, agriculture including forestry and fishing represents the largest economic activity in the country constituting 16.8% of nominal GDP (GSS, 2015) and employing about 41.5% of the economically active population aged 15 years and older (GSS, 2012). At the end of 2014, national GDP was valued at $38.55 billion dollars compared to the $48.65 billion dollars recorded at the end of 2013 (GSS, 2015). This shrinking of the national economy is partly due to plummeting global commodity prices in gold, cocoa and oil – commodities on which the country’s economic development is built upon. The ups and downs of GDP growth has yet to translate into significant structural changes in the national economy (Osei et al., 2015). Over the years the country has been become reliant on international financial and technical assistance to make up for government revenue shortfalls and as part of budgetary planning and efforts at reducing poverty (see table 4 below).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Political-Economic Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Ghana gains independence from British rule becoming the first sub-Saharan country to become independent</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Prime Minister Dr. Kwame Nkrumah outlines a Five-Year Development Plan as part of the ‘Big Push’ policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>The construction of the Akosombo Hydroelectric Dam is completed with a by-product being the creation of the largest man-made lake in the world – the Volta Lake</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Dr. Kwame Nkrumah is overthrown in a bloodless military coup leading to the establishment of the National Liberation Council (NLC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Dr. Busua’s government initiate an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) by devaluing the national currency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A bloodless military coup disposes of Dr. Busua’s government which is then replaced with the National Redemption Council (NRC) government headed by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exiled first President Dr. Kwame Nkrumah dies while seeking medical treatment in Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) lead by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings takes over the country after a coup against the SMC II</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Hilla Limann ushers in the third republic as president of Ghana after his People's National Party (PNP) wins national elections initiated by the AFRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings leads another coup which dissolves the third republic. The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) seizes control with Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings as chairman</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>IMF and World Bank supported Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) officially start in Ghana through the devaluation of the national currency</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>PNDC government officially introduces Economic Recovery Programme II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>A decentralisation programme is initiated leading to the creation of a three-tier subnational governance structure – regional, district and sub-district units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ghana returns to Constitutional rule after a national referendum approves a new constitution and multiparty system First elections under the new constitution are held and won by the PNDC which had become the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>The New Patriotic Party (NPP) wins the third election of the fourth republic. The party leader, John Agyekum Kuffour is sworn in as president the following year. This is the first change of government through a ballot box rather than through the barrel of a gun since 1979.</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ghana joins the IMF/World Banks’ Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative which many saw as a new form of SAPs</td>
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<td>2003-2006</td>
<td>The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) I is formulated and implemented in accordance with the conditions outlined within the HIPC initiative</td>
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<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>GPRS II is formulated and implemented with a strategic focus on accelerated economic development and poverty reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Oil in commercial quantities is discovered off the coast of Ghana</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>The NDC led by Prof. John Evans Atta Mills returns back to power after winning national elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Months to the next general elections, the NDC’s Prof. Mills passes away and his vice – John Mahama is installed as president John Mahama wins the December national elections as leader of the NDC and is sworn into office as president the following year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>The opposition NPP appeals against the election of NDC’s John Mahama alleging rigged elections. The Supreme Court after months of public hearing rejects the appeal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>The IMF’s press release after its consultation with the Ghana government notes the emergence of large fiscal and external imbalances since 2012 In August, 2014 the government is ‘forced’ to request for financing support from the IMF following the fiscal debt crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A series of protests and demonstrations are held across the country to protest the failure of government to resolve an ongoing three-year long power crisis that has forced many business to lay off people and some others to close down.

There are also a number of demonstrations against generally high cost of living and the slowdown of economic development

In early 2016 government announced an increase in petroleum products even though prices on the world marketing were at all-time low.

Additionally, the Public Utilities Review Commission announced further increases in utility (water and electricity) tariffs that have already been increased on two different occasions in the previous year

Political campaigns for the general election heat up. Elections are scheduled for 7th December

The poverty profile in Ghana is most commonly expressed in terms of the rural-urban dichotomy as these areas show major disparities in any key socio-economic indicator. While these disparities continue to exist, the results of the sixth round of the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS6) in 2013 indicate that the first MDG target of halving poverty by 2015 has been met. The results show that the percentage of the national population living in poverty declined from 51.7% in 1990 to 24.2% in 2013 (GSS, 2014a). This reduction in poverty is however geographically and spatially uneven.

Figure 7 below provides a clear visual overview of the poverty trend per administrative regions as captured by the Ghana Living Stand Surveys in 1991/1992 (GLSS3), 1998/1999 (GLSS4) and 2005/2006(GLSS5).
The above figure shows a geo-spatial variation in the pattern of poverty with the three regions in the North (Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions) continuously have a higher incidence of poverty compared to the other regions in the South. The spatial inequalities in present Ghana originate from legacies of the colonial era. These issues have however been reinforced and exacerbated by post-colonial development policies that have focused on the resource-rich Southern parts (Songsore, 2003). The 2010 Ghana MDG Report (UNDP/GOG, 2012) for instance observed a decline in total poverty reduction expenditure as a percentage of total government spending from 34.6% in 2006 to 22.3% in 2008 and a further decline to 21.3% in 2010. In the 1998/1999 GLSS4 results, the Eastern and Central regions were considered to be the two poorest regions in the South of Ghana. Both regions experienced significant reductions in poverty incidence between 1998/1999 and 2005/2006. However, the Central Region is still generally considered, by some sections of policymakers, the media and the general populace, to be the 4th poorest region, a perception that is not in congruence with the GLSS results. This enduring perception is attributable perhaps to a hangover from earlier period as perceptions takes time to change and catch up with reality.
Given the Central region’s poverty incidence and its rich endowment of tourism resources, many have argued that tourism represents a viable route for economic development and poverty reduction in the region (Agyei-Mensah, 2006; Adu-Ampong, 2014). Thus the Central region provides an empirical setting in which to examine the proposition that tourism can play a key role in poverty reduction. Indeed the Central region is considered as the hub and the heartbeat of tourism in the country. In a number of workshops organised on identifying ways of boosting economic development, tourism is consistently held up as the key to development in the region. Many stakeholders consider the role of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to be crucial in this respect. This is because MMDAs are vested with the responsibility of overall local development planning. However the governance structures of this planning process present challenges to embedding tourism in local development plans and it is these issues that I will now address.

Decentralised governance of local economic development planning: diversity, complexity and dynamics

In order to fully understand and appreciate the role that governance plays in tourism-led local economic development planning in Ghana, it is instructive to note that there is a parallel governance system in Ghana made up of the traditional system (informal) and statist system (formal). Both systems are mutually reinforcing and shape the outcomes of development planning from the national to the local level. The traditional system of governance which is centred on chieftaincy is constituted by four administrative levels as shown in figure 8 below.

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7 Interview with Eric Ohene-Larbi, Deputy Director of Centre for National Culture, Cape Coast, 05.09.2014; Interview with Dr. Nana Ato Arthur, MP and former MCE for KEEA, 07.11.2014
8 Interview with Alex Boakye, Central Regional Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Cape Coast, 10.09.2014
9 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 31.10.2014; Interview with Dr. Nana Ato Arthur, MP and former MCE for KEEA, 07.11.2014; Interview with Alex Boakye, Central Regional Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Cape Coast, 10.09.2014
At the apex of the traditional governance structure is the paramountcy which is headed by the paramount chief. The administration of land is a primary concern of the traditional governance system as lands in Ghana are owned by traditional authorities primarily at the divisional or paramountcy level (Agyare, 2013). Thus the traditional governance system is deeply involved in political governance and hence in the shaping of development outcomes. Significantly for this thesis, the traditional and chieftaincy institutions in Ghana are the embodiment and guarantors of traditional cultural heritage and identity and they still command respect and allegiance. It is this traditional cultural heritage and identity that serves as a key tourism resource to be ‘exploited’ for socio-economic development. This raises questions as to the extent to which traditional authorities have a say in developing heritage assets for tourism and how revenue from cultural heritage tourism gets distributed. Thus a discussion of tourism-led local economic development planning must take cognisance of the role played by traditional governance systems. Moreover, the 1992 constitution guarantees the existence of and provides for the establishment of regional and national house of chiefs in an almost identical way to the parliamentary system. Thus formal governance mechanisms have always been deeply embedded in (neo-) traditional governance systems from the colonial era up to date.

In terms of the formal statist governance system, Ghana is an unitary republic operating a decentralised democratic governance as enshrined in the 1992 Constitution as “Decentralisation and Local Government”. State policy towards decentralisation however predates the adoption of the 1992 constitution and can be traced back to the

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10 For detailed discussion about how the chieftaincy institutions shape development outcomes in Ghana see, Boafo-Arthur (2003), Schramm (2004) and Knierzinger (2011).
colonial era when the British introduced Indirect Rule in 1878 (Ayee, 2003). From the post-independence era up to the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) period, local economic development planning was largely a top-down activity. The problem of poverty and socio-economic inequalities were defined by central government agencies and ‘experts’ without recourse to the views of the intended beneficiaries. Consequently national and sector development plans remained “beautiful on paper”11 but failed to materialise. This failure was due to among other things political and economic instabilities, mismatch of plans and national budgets and significantly a lack of opportunity for local communities to undertake their own development initiatives (Owusu, 2005). Within this context and the negative effects of SAPs, local agitation grew for increased participation in development planning. This was also in line with a growing global discourse on participation, empowerment and good governance (Grindle, 2004) as a condition for further international development aid assistance. These factors lead to the passing of legislation on decentralised administrative governance and local economic development planning.

The current form of decentralisation in Ghana stems from the radical reforms of 1988 ushered in by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government. These reforms were given legal backing in Chapter 20 of the 1992 Constitution which states that “Ghana shall have a system of local government and administration which shall, as far as practicable, be decentralized” (Article 240 [1]). The 1988 reforms established a three-tier system of sub-national governance – the regional, district and sub-district levels. This was modified through the Local Government Law (Act 462) of 1993 into a four-tier system for Metropolitan Assemblies, but maintaining the three-tier system for Municipal and District Assemblies. The decentralisation policy seeks to promote popular participation in local decision-making processes, to stimulate responsive local level governance and to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery by bringing responsible institutions closer and accountable to the people they are to serve (Ayee, 2008). Thus Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (commonly referred to as District Assemblies) represent the essential cog in the governance machinery for decentralised national and local economic development planning.

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11 Interview with Felix Nguah, Regional President of Tour Guides Association Ghana, Elmina, 09.09.2014
Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies: images, instruments and scale of planning

There are four levels of governance in Ghana. The first level is the national government including deconcentrated entities such as the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and line ministries such as the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts. The second level consists of the 10 administrative regions represented by the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) who have upward accountability and responsibility to the central government. The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) are the third and most important level in terms of local economic development planning and poverty reduction (see figure 9 below).
MMDAs are considered as a hybrid form of decentralised authority because of the combination of elected and appointed officials (Ayee, 2013). Assembly Members of various electoral areas represent 70% of MMDA members and are elected by universal adult suffrage. The remaining 30% are nominated by the national President and include Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) as well as traditional
authorities, community leaders and other expert representatives. MMDCEs are the administrative and political heads at the local level combining both political and executive powers. They are nominated by the President but are subject to approval by two-thirds of the MMDA members through voting. This situation is an institutional legacy of the past stemming from the implicit objective of the 1988 decentralisation reforms of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government. This politics of decentralisation was an attempt by the PNDC government to legitimise itself by using decentralisation as “an instrument of stabilizing a political system in crisis and securing some of the political objectives of the government” (Ayee, 1997:39) while holding power at the local level. Thus MMDCEs are appointed based on loyalty and accountability to the central government. In a sense they are Presidents of the local government structure and often enjoy unrivalled power at the district level with little downwards accountability.

Governance at the local level is supposed to be nominally non-partisan – i.e. those standing for local elections as Assembly Members cannot stand on political party lines even though they may be members of a political party. The reality however is different, especially given that the Member of Parliament (MP) in a given jurisdiction is also a non-voting member of the MMDAs. Thus party politics are very much a part of governance at the local level12. Given that MMDCEs are appointed based on their allegiance to the ruling national party there are bound to be tensions and frictions where the corresponding MP belongs to the opposition party (Ayee, 2003). It is commonly known that MMDCEs of one political party who aspire to become future MPs and win the parliamentary seat away from the opposition party tend to sabotage the sitting MP in order to make him or her appear incompetent and unpopular. Such tensions between opposing political parties and sometimes MMDCEs and MPs of the same party tend to result in the failure to continue with policies and projects that were started by a different party government. This is one of the structural factors that shaped the outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as will be further explained in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

12 Interview Frederick Nyame, Planning Officer, Central Regional Coordinating Council, Cape Coast, 08.09.2014; Interview with Dr. Nana Ato Arthur, MP and former MCE for KEEA, Cape Coast, 07.11.2014; Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Planning Officer, KEEA, Elmina, 23.07.2015
The fundamental function of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) is the responsibility of overall development of the localities through planned and coordinated projects and programmes. There are 86 specific responsibilities entrusted to the MMDAs ranging from the provision of basic services to the collection of revenue. Thus MMDAs are political and administrative authorities; development authorities; planning authorities; and revenue collection authorities among others. The financial instruments available for carrying out their responsibilities come through three main sources. The first two sources are Internally Generated Fund (IGF) from local rates and Ceded Revenue from taxes paid by local businesses such as chemical sellers, dressmakers and restaurants which are collected on behalf of the assemblies by the Ghana Revenue Authority. The third source of funding which is also the bulk of MMDA finance comes from central government transfers through the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) which is a constitutionally-guaranteed contribution of not less than 5% of central government revenue. However, MMDAs are often constrained in achieving their set objectives due to the irregular flow of the DACF. This is caused by both bureaucratic failures and centre-local political party politics. The scale of such challenges is aptly captured in this comment by the Municipal Coordinating Director of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abream Assembly:

*It is just that we have a lot of constraints when it comes to resources. We depend on foreign inflows that is central government inflows. We have the common fund, the district assembly common fund but as we talk now [November] 2014 up to now we are supposed to be getting the money in quarters 1st quarter, 2nd quarter, 3rd quarter and 4th quarter. As we sit, 1st quarter gone, 2nd quarter gone, 3rd quarter gone, 4th quarter is going and we haven’t received 1 single cedi from our share of the common fund and there is a budget there to carry out certain projects and programmes so how are you doing that?*

Notwithstanding the irregular flow of the DACF, MMDAs are expected to carry out their core functions of development planning by drawing up a four year District Medium Term Development Plan (DMTDP) which follow national political cycles of change in government.

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13 Interview Frederick Nyame, Planning Officer, Central Regional Coordinating Council, Cape Coast, 08.09.2014; Interview with Dr. Nana Ato Arthur, MP and former MCE for KEEA, Cape Coast, 07.11.2014; Interview with Alhaji Musah, Municipal Coordinating Director, KEEA, Elmina, 04.11.2014: see also Ayee (2013).
14 Interview with Alhaji Musah, Municipal Coordinating Director, KEEA, Elmina 04.11.2014
The nitty-gritty of local economic development planning processes

Planning for the District Medium Term Development Plan (DMTDP) takes place within a national decentralised planning system (see figure 10 below). The main actors in this system are the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and Sector Ministries (Finance and Economic Planning, Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Education, Health etc.) at the national level, the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) at the regional level, and then finally the MMDAs at the district levels.

The NDPC is the highest coordinating body tasked with the responsibility of national economic development planning. In consultation with relevant stakeholders the NDPC prepares and issues the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) along with other fiscal and financial guidelines which are used by the sector ministries, the RCCs and the MMDAs in drawing up their respective development plans. At the regional
level, RCCs coordinate and harmonise district level development plans and programmes which are then approved by the NDPC. The RCCs are also responsible for the monitoring, coordination and evaluation of the performances of MMDAs in their region.

As with governance, the nitty-gritty of decentralised development planning takes place at the level of the MMDAs where the District Planning Coordinating Unit (DPCU) are tasked with performing the planning functions of the MMDAs. The DPCU is made up of the District Planning Officers and a minimum of eleven officers drawn from the heads of the various decentralised Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in addition to the central MMDA administration. Of particular relevance to this thesis is the fact that tourism related MDAs like the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, the Ghana Tourism Authority and the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board have not been decentralised to the MMDAs as at yet. This means that District Medium Term Development Plans (DMTDP) tend to give only a passing mention to tourism because of a lack expert inputs. This situation is compounded by poor institutional collaboration between tourism-related agencies (Adu-Ampong, 2014).

The first stage in preparing the DMTDP involves identifying and defining the needs and aspirations of local communities into the Community Action Plans (CAPs). The CAPs of various areas are then harmonised by the DPCU secretariat and then sent back to the communities for validation. Once validated, further inputs are added from the five statutory sub-committees of the MMDAs - social services, finance and administration, development planning, works, and security and justice. In addition to these statutory sub-committees, MMDAs may constitute other sub-committees that they deem useful. Thus in the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA), there is a Tourism sub-committee because the area has a number of tourism resources and assets that they seek to utilise for socio-economic development. The District Planning Coordinating Unit (DPCU) synthesises the various inputs to the CAP into the District

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15 Interview with Irene Rafiatu HUDU Assistant Municipal Planning Officer, KEEA, Elmina, 23.07.2015
16 Discussions are however underway to add the tourism ministry and its agencies to the next MDA decentralisation bill for parliamentary consideration according to Interview with Nana Bright Oduro Kwarteng, Chief Director, MOTCCA, Accra, 23.10.2014: Interview with Olivia Opoku-Adoma, Director for Research, Statistics and Information, MOTCCA, Accra, 20.10.2014
17 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Planning Officer, KEEA, Elmina 23.07.2015
Medium Term Development Plan (DMTDP) which is given final approval by the General Assembly of the MMDA. In the implementation phase the local economic development planning process receives a rude jolt as interests, political ambitions and political cycles coincide to override the aspirations of communities captured in the DMTDP.

The politics of decentralisation has concentrated power at the local level in a few hands – especially the hands of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs). Since they are appointed on political party affiliation and loyalty, MMDCEs have upward accountability to the central government rather than to the local population. Political considerations of winning the next election tend to trump systematic implementation of DMTDP as explained by a Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA:

... people appointed to head the assemblies are politicians. They lack the necessary expertise when it comes to what the development plan is and why it should be prepared and how it should be done and how it should be followed. So even when you prepare the development plan it is not referred to for anything. They go out there and with the political thinking around their necks they decide what should be done where, not based on any plan, not based on any data. I hope you get that. The Chief Executive can go out and tell a people he feels his party has a lot of sympathisers in this community then tell them I’m giving you a school, 6-unit classroom block, just that town. Whether or not it was captured in your plan, whether or not it is an issue that it should be addressed in the community to ameliorate their development challenges, no he gets it done. Even a toilet to this community he gets it done. So when you talk about preparing a plan, engaging the people, he doesn’t really have interest because whether there is a plan or not he can always have his way, when in actual fact it should be the plan preparation stage that should see his attention so that he gets all his issues in there.18

This frank assessment of the situation by the Municipal Planning Officer raises questions about the level of discretionary power available to MMDCEs. By acting informally, MMDCEs often subvert decisions arrived at through the planning process. This breaks accountability mechanisms and linkages between plans and spending. This is an outcome of a failure in institutional design in which MMDCEs have upward accountability to the President rather than to constituents at the local level. Moreover, DMTPs are not accorded enough formal authority to guide spending which means that

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18 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Planning Officer, KEEA, Elmina 23.07.2015
project spending tends to be done on partisan lines. This situation is especially adverse when there is a change in political party governments at the end of political cycles. Thus many development projects and programmes are left uncompleted and unfinished due to the competitive nature of party politics. Parties in government are usually looking to start their own projects rather than complete an existing one in order to claim political points. Underlying this political economy of unfinished projects is a lack of political will and the constant search of political expediency at the expense of long term planning\textsuperscript{19}. These issues are an inherent part of the decentralised governance and planning system which shaped both the process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as will be discussed in detailed in Chapter 7.

The foregoing discussion has outlined the actors, structures and processes of governing local economic development planning. This has provided a context within which to situate the premise of this thesis as outlined in Chapter 1 on the need for a more analytic and systematic approach to examining governance issues in relation to the tourism-poverty nexus. I have shown the images held by policymakers with regards to the goal of decentralisation and the instruments and the action potential within which MMDAs operate. In providing an overview of decentralisation I have highlighted the fact that tourism planning is not fully decentralised. Unlike other ministries, departments and agencies, tourism related agencies are not able to make inputs into the DMTDP. This is especially relevant in gaining a better understanding of the governance issues around the Elmina 2015 Strategy and the extent to which it was embedded in the DMTDP of the municipality. In the next section of this chapter I consider these local issues with the context of national development policy and planning.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Justice Amoah, former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA and Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, Dunkwa-On-Offin, 13.11.2014 and 17.07.2015
4.2 From forex to growth to poverty reduction: tourism in the eyes of national development planning from 1957-2017

In this section I explore the extent to which tourism development has been prioritised within national development planning and policies. The section is divided into four subsections with the first looking at the image of tourism within national planning from independence up to 2002. The next two subsections looks at the New Patriotic Party’s Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers I & II and the National Democratic Congress’s Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I &II. The final subsection summarises the enduring image of tourism’s role in national economic development while noting the change and continuities over the years.

Tourism as a net foreign exchange earner in the early years

At independence, it was well known that the country was endowed with immense tourism potential. Tourism was seen as an opportunity to bring about economic development and reduce regional disparities as many tourism resources and assets were found in poor communities. The construction in 1956 of the Ambassador Hotel in Accra to accommodate guests to the 1957 independence celebration is seen as the first formal tourism development project by the government (Asiedu, 1997). Further efforts at tourism development were shaped by various short, medium and long term national development policies and plans. Within these plans there are considerable variations in the policy goals and priority given to the tourism sector. As summarised in table 5 below tourism enjoyed increased prominence in national development plans over time with a slight dip in 2003.
Table 5 Key national development plans in Ghana and the number of times the word ‘tourism’ appears in them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National development plan and coverage in years</th>
<th>Number of times the word ‘tourism’ appears</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>10-year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the Gold Coast, 1950 – 1960</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5-year Development Plan, 1951/52 – 1956/57</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Second 5-year Development Plan, 1959 – 1964</td>
<td>Unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7-year Development Plan for National Reconstruction and Development (including a National Physical Development Plan), 1963/64 – 1969/70</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) I, 2010-2013</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 7-year Development Plan for National Reconstruction and Development, considered to be one of the best plans ever developed in the country, there is one instance of the word ‘tourism’ and another of the word ‘tourist’ in the whole document. The plan states that “Tourism is in many countries a very important source of foreign exchange earnings and this should be encouraged as a means of improving our invisible trade with the rich countries of the world” (pg. 228). However, no mention is made of the tourism resources available and how these are to be developed to increase forex. Thus there was no attempt at embedding tourism within the wider place-based projects that were to be implemented over the course of the plan. On the contrary, the 5-year Development Plan of 1974/75-1979/80 gave increased prominence to tourism (13 occurrences of the word ‘tourism’) seeing tourism as a source of foreign exchange that can be utilised while taking care to “minimise ecological, social and other hazards which tourism seems to generate when not properly programmed and monitored” (pg. 22). There was an awareness of potential economic leakages and the need to embed tourism within national development planning projects. For instance the plan noted that the construction of the Kumasi-Kuntunase road was important for boosting
tourism in the areas surrounding the Lake Bosomtwi. The overall planning goal was to develop the tourism sector as a viable net foreign exchange earner.

The Ghana Vision 2020 (The First Step: 1996-2000) was developed as a long term development plan to guide the attainment of a middle income country status by 2020. The goal was to lay a foundation for accelerated growth and development of the country over the subsequent two decades and tourism was crucial in this. Tourism’s role was conceptualised in terms of: i) agriculture (forestry) linkages; ii) services sector in order to establish Ghana as a major venue for international tourism and; iii) culture, especially in relation to slavery and colonial heritage. This is the first plan that linked the use of cultural heritage (Pan-Africanism) to tourism promotion in order to attract Africans in the Diaspora. Significant attempts were to be made to diversify the tourism products and services on offer. There was a clear shift in marking out culture and heritage as the basis for future tourism development as signified in 1998 by the first ever Emancipation Day celebrations that attracted a number of Africans in the Diaspora and in the Caribbean. In this plan, the role of tourism in national development was taken more seriously and efforts were made to embed tourism within national development programmes and projects. This notwithstanding, the development of tourism was seen largely in terms of increased foreign exchange earnings.

Tourism as direct poverty strategy vs. growth targeted strategy in the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I & II

The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005 (GPRS I) made mention of ‘tourism’ only 9 times. The GPRS I focused on poverty-related spending and redistributive policies as a direct poverty reduction strategy. The tourism sector was identified as part of the strategies that can be developed to directly address poverty reduction goals. In addition to existing business and conference tourism, holiday, vacation and leisure tourism were to be expanded as areas with the potential “through multiplier effects to create employment opportunities in other sectors, for example the food industry” (pg. 72). Within the GPRS I, tourism’s role in national development was conceived of in the specific terms of tourism’s direct and indirect employment potentials – as well as for foreign exchange earnings. It was recognised that tourism can “employ and enhance the skills of people in geographical areas where the poor reside most” (pg. iii). Thus there is a clear linking of tourism promotion and development to the plan’s overarching poverty reduction goals.
In line with a shift in international donor emphasis from poverty-related spending and redistributive policies to a focus on growth, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006-2009 became the *Growth* and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II). This change in name reflected the change in policy intent. The GPRS II saw growth as the primary path to poverty reduction and the tourism sector was increasingly seen as essential for this growth to happen. The word 'tourism' appears 47 times in the plan compared to the 9 times found in the GPRS I and the overall policy thrust of the GPRS II was "to realise the potentials of the sector by making Ghana a competitive and quality tourism destination whilst preserving the country's cultural, historical and environmental heritage" (Pg. 38). In order to achieve it, the GPRS II outlined four main strategies and policy interventions to be pursued over the life span of the plan. These were: 1) promote tourism as a major source of domestic revenue; 2) promote domestic tourism to foster national cohesion as well as redistributive income; 3) promote sustainable and responsible tourism in such a way to preserve historical, cultural and natural heritage and; 4) promote crafts industry for tourist trade and export. Although the GPRS II makes clear the importance of tourism to the national economy, the emphasis here was on the growth potentials of the sector to become the main foreign exchange earner for the country.

Both the GPRS I and GPRS II were prepared by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government that came into power for the first time in 2001 and left office in 2009. The poverty focus of the GPRS I was instrumental in the design of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as the new government sought to bring about local economic development. The GPRS I is the first national development plan that conceptualised a direct relationship between tourism and poverty reduction in addition to the usual focus on foreign exchange earnings. In contrast, the GPRS II did not make a direct conceptualisation of tourism's role in poverty reduction. While the GPRS I was primarily directed towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals – specifically halving of poverty – the GPRS II was a strategic shift towards accelerated growth of the economy. Thus the general policy focus of the plan was on growth as a pathway to poverty reduction. In a sense the problematic idea of 'trickle-down' permeates this plan as the assumption was that a focus on growth would eventually lead to employment creation and then poverty reduction. Thus the unfolding of the Elmina 2015 Strategy can be understood within this shift from poverty to growth in the GPRS I and GPRS II. While the GPRS I talks about the need to "vigorously expand employment in the sectors such as tourism" (pg. iii), it is not very clear on the 'how' of fully exploiting the employment potentials. The
GPRS II on the other hand provided specific strategies but noted that major constraints such as inadequate infrastructure and low quality of service delivery and standards were hampering the effective utilisation of tourism.

**Sharing tourism’s growth in the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda I & II**

After 8 years in opposition, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party came back into office in 2009 and prepared the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I) for 2010-2013. The emphasis in this plan is on accelerated employment creation and income generation for poverty reduction. 'Tourism' is mentioned on 61 occasions in the plan and the sector is seen as one of seven growth pillars and priority areas to drive the long-term growth and economic development of the country (Adu-Ampong, 2015). The GSGDA I identifies and make provisions for overcoming some of the structural constraints facing the tourism sector including the legal and institutional framework, human resources and financing. For instance, in 2011 the Ghana Tourist Board (GTB) was upgraded to the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) through an Act of Parliament to provide the needed institutional framework for tourism development, the significance of which is discussed in Section 4.3 of this chapter. The establishment of the GTA also came with the establishment of the Tourism Development Fund (TDF) to be financed through government seed capital and a 1% levy on tourist accommodation. The TDF is to be used for tourism product development and other infrastructural development projects that can contribute to the competitiveness of the sector.

The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda 2014-2017 (GSGDA II) is the current national development plan and was prepared in the context of Ghana having attained the status of a lower middle-income country. The overall policy objective is economic transformation built on higher employment composition in industry and services. This is to be achieved through accelerated public investments and the promotion of tourism to facilitate job creation. Tourism (with 66 mentions) is once again given prominence and identified as one key strategic area to utilise. Specifically, the GSGDA II outlines that “Ghana’s historical, cultural and ecotourism assets will be leveraged with support services and infrastructure to make the country an important tourism destination and accelerate the growth of tourism earnings” (pg. 22). Clear strategic linkages between tourism and other sectors like creative arts are identified as
essential for tourism to create jobs and increase foreign exchange earnings. Unlike in the 1980s-1990s when the focus was mainly on foreign exchange earnings, the GSGDA II provides a nuanced conceptualisation of tourism's role in national development as one of job creation and income generation. However, the plan is unclear as to the kinds of (skilled) job to be created through tourism. The main focus appears to be on youth entrepreneurial employment opportunities to be created through improving tourist infrastructure and "underpinned by vigorous promotion of international conferences, cultural, leisure, health, and education tourism" (pg. 51). The prominence given to the tourism sector within the GSGDA II provides a framework for understanding current tourism development policy and planning efforts in the country.

**Enduring images of tourism over the years: from a source of forex to a catalyst for growth and poverty reduction**

In the early days of national development planning, the image of tourism was one of foreign exchange earnings. This image of tourism’s role was reinforced in the 1980s-1990s when after years of political and economic instability the country sought to rebuild its economic base. During this period the development of tourism was part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes that sought to diversify the national economy away from over dependence on primary produce exports. The tourism sector was seen as an opportunity to increase foreign exchange earnings and improve the country’s balance of payment deficit. The early 2000s ushered in a poverty focus in national development plans. Consequently, tourism’s role was reconceptualised as a source of direct and indirect employment opportunities that contributes to poverty reduction efforts. This image has received a retouch in contemporary times as the overall focus of national development has shifted away from direct poverty reduction strategies to one of growth and employment creation. Tourism is currently one of seven key economic sectors on which the long-term transformation of the economy is to be built.

Given the transformations in how tourism is perceived within national development plans, the instruments and action potentials available to stakeholders involved in plan implementation have also changed. Importantly the modes and levels of governance activities that shape tourism development have evolved over the years resulting in significant changes to tourism planning and the use of tourism for economic development and poverty reduction. For instance the changing portfolio of the Ministry of Tourism since its inception in 1993 (see detailed discussion of this in section 4.3 and
4.4 below) suggests that there is not a clear decision from successive national governments on how best to connect tourism with other parts of government. This situation has had a role in shaping the trajectory of tourism development. While many of these changes have taken place at the national level, there has been a neglect of tourism governance at the regional and district levels. This situation has had adverse consequences on tourism development at the regional and district levels due to unclear roles and overlapping responsibilities between tourism and non-tourism governance institutions and agencies.

The analysis in this section so far has sought to make clear the changing diversity, complexity and dynamics of tourism’s role as seen in successive development plans in Ghana. These changes also have political dimensions that have ripple effects at the local level. It is worth remembering that the GPRS I&II and the GSGDA I&II were formulated under the New Patriotic Party and the New Democratic Congress Party governments respectively. Ghana’s political space is a highly competitive one. Political parties are therefore keen on claiming maximum credit and votes and hence will rather start their own projects than complete existing ones. This is especially the case when it comes to physical infrastructure projects with high visibility like construction of roads, markets, schools among others. In such cases, the party that begins the project becomes associated with it in the minds of voters even if another party happens to continue it up to completion. This is an important context to bear in mind when understanding how political cycles and party politics greatly shaped the (dis)continuities in the Elmina 2015 Strategy implementation. It has been important to explore these issues because any research on the tourism-poverty nexus at the locality level needs to be situated within the larger framework of development policy and planning in a given country. It is the national development policy framework that tend to give shape to tourism development plans. Thus the interplay between national development policy and national tourism development plans, which I now turn to in the next section, provides the images, instruments and action potential of stakeholders at the local level who seek to utilise tourism for economic development and poverty reduction.
4.3 Tourism planning in Ghana: “tourism first” vs. “development first”

The tourism sector in Ghana continues its trajectory as the fastest growing economic sector of the economy since the turn of the new millennium (see figures 7 and 8 below). Starting from an insignificant entry into and contribution to national accounts, the tourism sector rose to become the third highest foreign exchange earner for the country in 2010 (Adu-Ampong, 2014). Having been overtaken by remittances, the sector is currently the fourth highest GDP earner. In this section I examine how successive governments have approached tourism development planning since independence.

I divide up this period into four phases building on the three identified by Akyeampong (2006). These are: 1) 1957 – 1966: era of active state involvement; 2) 1966 – 1985: era of passive state involvement (with a twist); 3) 1985 – 2006: era of deregulated state involvement and; 4) 2006 – 2016: era of reactivated state involvement. Each phase is analysed using the binary of “Tourism First” or “Development First” developed by Burns (1999). In summary, a “Tourism First” approach focuses on developing tourism as an industry with an emphasis on achieving high tourist arrival numbers and gross national receipts. The arguments for focusing on developing tourism first is hinged on tourism’s multiplier effects. A “Development First” approach on the other hand sees “tourism as a means of, or a tool for, achieving national social and economic goals” (Burns, 1999:332). A Development First approach focuses on a holistic approach to development through tourism that is set against the context of social, cultural and environmental costs. These categories are used heuristically, and should be seen as not mutually exclusive but rather as a continuum within any tourism planning process.

The analysis in this section is set out in four sub sections. In the first subsection I explore the tourism development planning in the first two phases between 1957 and 1985. The next two subsections will consider the tourism planning experience from 1985 to 2016 paying specific attention to the key long term tourism development plans that were developed within each phase. The final subsection identifies some of the enduring challenges to tourism plan implementation.
From active state tourism planning to passive state involvement with a twist: 1957-1985

The 1957-1966 period witnessed an active role of the state as an investor and entrepreneur in tourism development in Ghana. In 1956 the Ambassador Hotel was commissioned as the first international class hotel to be built in Ghana. This was to serve as accommodation for dignitaries attending the planned independence celebrations of Ghana in March, 1957. Indeed given that the political economy of Ghana at this time was based on a strong socialist inclinations – ‘African’ or ‘scientific’ socialism – the state's role in overall national development was near total. Although there was an active state investment in the nascent tourism sector, there was no specific tourism policy nor plan (see discussion in section 4.2 above). There was government ambivalence in prioritising tourism within national development planning because international tourism was seen as a form of neo-colonialism which was incompatible with the tenets of ‘African socialism’.

When the government of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah engaged in hosting Pan-African conferences and other international meetings, summits and conferences (Akyeampong, 2006) their need for building international hotels and conference facilities had to be met. The ideology of ‘African socialism’ meant that a mixed approach of strong state involvement and indigenous private sector involvement was encouraged in tourism development. Thus tourism planning within this period fell under a "Development First" approach. Tourism planning and development was to be used as tool for overall socio-economic development of the country based on socialist principles. Thus the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) and other agencies and the State Hotels and Tourist Corporation (SHTC) were set up in 1957 and 1962 respectively. The SHTC was split in 1965 into the Ghana Tourist Corporation (GTC) and the State Hotels Corporation (SHC) with the former tasked with developing, promoting and regulating the tourism sector. Consequently although the government was well aware of the foreign exchange to be gained from international tourism the development of the sector was not simply left to economic considerations. Importantly the development of tourism served the political goals of highlighting the socio-economic progress being made in the newly independent country.

In 1966, the Nkrumah government was overthrown in a military coup ushering in what has been considered as the lost decades for Ghana (see table 4 above). The 1966 – 1985
period was an era of passive state involvement in tourism planning but with a twist. The high frequency of successful and abortive coups d’état led to economic meltdown and political instabilities which had a negative impact on tourism development (Teye, 1988). The twist in the tale is that many tourism development and impact studies were undertaken during this period (see table 6 below). This period was therefore the beginning of a more systematic approach to tourism planning and development although many of the plans never saw the light of day. In addition there was also considerable institutional tinkering in the tourism sector. In 1973 the Ghana Tourist Corporation (GTC) was split up into the Ghana Tourist Control Board (GTCB) and the Ghana Tourist Development Company Limited (GTDC). In 1977 the GTCB was renamed as the Ghana Tourist Board (GTB) and remained so until 2013 when it became the Ghana Tourism Authority (discussed in more detail below).
The first major nationwide tourism master plan in Ghana was the 15-year Tourism Development Plan 1975-1990 (also known as the Tourism Master Plan). This was a comprehensive plan developed with financial and technical assistance provided by the Danish government. The plan assessed Ghana’s tourist assets, human resource
development needs and evaluated the potentials for developing the physical, cultural and historical resources of the country vis-à-vis the general and tourism-specific infrastructural needs. The country was delineated into three tourism development zones – the coastal zone starting from the beachline of the Togolese border on the East through to the Cape Coast/Elmina area in the Central Region; the Western zone and then the Northern zone from the Ashanti Region northwards. Initial development was to be concentrated in the coastal zone especially the Cape Coast/Elmina area which is still the case up to the current time. The Elmina 2015 Strategy was therefore a continuation and beneficiary of this trend.

The 1975-1990 Tourism Master Plan was a classic example of a "Tourism First" approach to tourism planning and development. A number of projections were made in terms of tourist arrivals and receipts which served as the basis for undertaking tourism development projects. A 12.5% average annual growth rate was envisaged for the 15 years of the plan with arrivals projected to increase from 64,000 in 1975 to 357,000 a year by 1990. Between 1975 and 1990 a projected total of 35,700 additional direct and indirect jobs were to be created while foreign exchange earnings were expected to reach $57 million a year by 1990 (Teye, 1999; Asiedu, 2008). State involvement in tourism development during this period was passive and did not go beyond commissioning of studies, passing of new legislation and restructuring of tourism institutions. In summary, over this time period a "Tourism First" approach was adopted towards tourism planning and development. However, the many coup d'états and constant regime changes created a political-economic situation that was not conducive for plan implementation or for encouraging international tourist arrivals.

Diversified and deregulated state involvement in tourism planning: 1985-2006

The 1985-2006 period is significant in terms of both tourism planning and development as well as overall national economic development planning. Amidst the economic turmoil of the last successful military coup in 1981, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime with help from the World Bank and IMF embarked upon the liberalisation of the national economy. The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which began in 1983 sought to deregulate the economy and free it from state controls and market distortions as well as promote a private-sector-led trade and investment economic environment (Konadu-Agyemang,
Within this context, the tourism sector was transformed as part of diversifying the national economy. From the passiveness of the 1966-1985 period, the tourism sector began to see high growth rates in both international arrivals and receipts. As foreign aid and international development assistance flowed in, so did the international tourist traffic. Massive foreign direct investments began to pour into the tourism sector leading to a tripling of registered hotels from 273 in 1989 to 766 in 1997 (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). These transformations were underpinned by strategic tourism planning and policies.

Under the remit of the SAPs, PNDC Law 116 of 1985 declared the tourism sector as a 'priority sector'. The Ghana Tourist Development Company (GTDC) in 1987 had its mission reoriented toward tourism promotion and the mobilisation of investment resources. A first substantive Ministry of Tourism was established in 1993 which played a key role in tourism promotion leading to a 5-year Tourism Development Action Programme in 1996. Emancipation Day celebrations were introduced into the Ghanaian tourism calendar in 1998 after the President’s visit to the Caribbean the previous year to witness their celebration. Through this and the PANAFEST (Pan African Historical Theatre Festival) a large number of Africans in the diaspora and other international tourists flocked to Ghana in the late 1990s as tourism enjoyed a boom. As part of a broader Ghana Vision 2020 (see discussion under section 4.2 above), a new 15-year National Tourism Development Plan 1996-2010 (GNTDP 1996-2010) was prepared with financial support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and technical assistance from the United Nations World Tourism Organisation (Teye, 1999).

The GNTDP 1996-2010 was a comprehensive master plan and a culmination of the initial policy attempts of developing tourism as a major tool for socio-economic development. Although there are elements of a “Development First” approach to it the GNTDP 1996-2010 can be considered to be largely underpinned by a “Tourism First” approach to tourism planning. Thus the major objectives for developing the tourism sector were to among other things, to “bring socio-economic benefits to the country including generating income, employment, foreign exchange earnings and government revenues, serving as a catalyst to expansion of other economic sectors, and strengthening both the urban and rural economies” (p.28). This was a reflection of the nascent state of the tourism sector that required a strong case to be made about its
economic viability in order to secure the commitment of both public and private sector investors. The plan did conceptualise the tourism planning process at three geographical and governance levels – the national, regional and district levels. However, this aspect of the plan was not fully followed through leading to the current lack of coherent tourism planning and governance at the local district level.

This era of deregulated state involvement in the tourism sector is “regarded as a watershed in the development of tourism in Ghana and the period 1985-2007 can be considered as the ‘golden age’ of Ghana’s tourism development” (Akyeampong, 2006:17). With its mix of Tourism First and Development First approaches, the important role of the sector in overall national economic development strategies was highlighted. The mandate of the tourism sector was regularly reoriented and realigned to meet strategic national interests. For instance the Ministry of Tourism’s mandate was expanded in 2003 to include the modernisation of the capital city to become the Ministry of Tourism and the Modernisation of the Capital City (MOTMCC). This new mandate was then realigned again in 2006 to address the issue of Diaspora Relations (Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations) in the year leading up to the 50th independence anniversary and start of the Joseph Project (discussed in detailed below). Thus although the economy was liberalised and deregulated the state still maintained a strong role in shaping the trajectory of tourism development.

**Reactivating state involvement in tourism planning: 2006-2016**

The past ten years have seen a number of significant developments in terms of tourism planning and development in Ghana. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) government that was in power between 2001 and 2009 created a “golden age for business”. This encouraged private sector investment in the tourism sector which was given priority in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2006-2009 (see section 4.2 above). Tourism planning within this period was strategically tied to overall national development ambitions. Coming up to the 50th Independence celebrations of Ghana in 2007, the newly realigned Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations (MOTDR) launched the Joseph Project to position Ghana not only as a tourist destination but as a Homeland destination for Africans in the Diaspora in search of their roots. This was a fairly successful project leading to increased patronage of the annual Emancipation Day and biennial PANAFEST celebrations.
In policy terms, the National Tourism Policy was developed to a 7th draft in August, 2006 with the support of the Netherlands International Development Organisation (SNV). While this still remains a draft policy document, it provided important direction for tourism planning. The tinkering and constant realignment of the mandates of the tourism ministry meant that towards the end, the GNTDP 1996 – 2010 had lost some relevance. When it elapsed in 2010, the re-christened Ministry of Tourism lacked the capacity to prepare a new long term tourism development plan and instead prepared a Tourism Sector Medium Term Development Plan (TSMTDP) for 2010-2013. The main goal of the TSMTDP 2010-2013 was to "develop Ghana as an internationally competitive and high quality destination where the tourism industry, besides producing macroeconomic benefits, explicitly contributes to poverty reduction and conservation of the country’s cultural, historical and environmental heritage" (pg. vii). Thus the TSMTDP 2010-2013 was finely poised between a Development First and a Tourism First approach to tourism planning. This plan has now been succeeded by the new 15-year Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027.

Unlike earlier long term plans the GNTDP 2013-2027 took a mere two months to complete. The GNTDP 2013-2027 is presented as an update on the GNTDP 1996-2010 and aims to provide a new direction for the development of the sector over the next 15 years by assessing how best tourism can contribute to national and local economic development. The new plan considers tourism’s role in employment creation, revenue generation, environmental conservation, national cohesion and overall economic growth. The GNTDP 2013-2027 appears indecisive with respect to positioning the tourism sector vis-à-vis overall national economic development as sections of the plan seem to counter each other. For example in the executive summary, the plan states that tourism is not seen as being significant in the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA 2010-2013). This is however inconsistent with the GSGDA 2010-2013 itself, which identifies the tourism sector as one of seven growth pillars (in addition to agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, services, extractive industry – oil, gas and minerals – and creative arts) on which the foundation of Ghana’s long-term growth and economic transformation is to be built through direct private and public sector investments (Adu-Ampong, 2015). A plausible explanation for this seeming

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20 Interview with Dr. Joel Sonne, Director of Projects, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 16.09.2014
21 Interview with Dr. Joel Sonne, Director of Projects, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 16.09.2014
contradiction lies in the fact that although tourism has been regarded as an engine of growth there has not been enough corresponding government investment in the sector.

Tourism’s role in development is conceptualised clearly within the GNTDP 2013-2027. Throughout the plan the emphasis is on identifying the opportunities that can enhance the sector as well as identifying the obstacles and constraints. The main goal guiding the GNTDP 2013-2027 is to “ensure that tourism in Ghana achieves its full potential in a sustainable and responsible manner and that it contributes to the country’s GDP, reduces poverty, ensures that its operation is not detrimental to the environment and the culture and traditions of the Ghanaians and attracts a wide range of markets” (p. 9 emphasis added). In contrast to the earlier plan the GNTDP 2013-2027 has a central focus on the tourism-poverty nexus and seeks to utilise tourism not only for general economic growth but also specifically for poverty reduction. In this sense, the GNTDP 2013-2027 adopts a clear Development First approach to tourism planning.

Following such a Development First approach, there is an acknowledgment in the plan that increased economic growth is important although not for its own sake. There is an awareness in the plan that the traditional ‘trickle down’ effect that was inherent in the 1996-2010 plan had failed to materialise and so deliberate steps need to be taken if tourism is to have an impact on poverty reduction. The argument is that for tourism to contribute to a broad based growth agenda there have to be increased linkages between tourism and other sectors of the economy. It is within this context that this thesis makes an important theoretical and empirical contribution by showing that the best way to increase linkages is to fully embed tourism within local economic development planning. This is yet to be done in Ghana and explains why the Elmina 2015 Strategy did not live up to expectations. For tourism to play a significant role in economic development and poverty reduction it needs to be anchored at the local level and not only planned from the national level.

The period of 2006-2016 has been an era in which the state has reactivated its steering role in tourism planning. Although direct investment in the sector has been minimal the state has used tourism policy and planning to reorient the tourism sector. For instance the Tourism Act 817 was passed in 2011 to re-christen the Ghana Tourism Board (GTB) as the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA). In the process a Tourism Development Fund has been established and additional powers has been granted to the GTA to engage in
direct tourism investment (see discussion below on the tourism governing system). The Ministry of Tourism was in 2013 further realigned into the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts (MOTCCA) reflecting the bundling of tourism, culture and the creative arts sectors. Discussions are currently underway to consider how best to fit all three sectors within a new coherent policy and plan.

Enduring challenges to tourism planning in Ghana – with specific reference to the implementation of the Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027

Over the years, tourism planning in Ghana has been faced with numerous challenges in terms of implementation. Five key challenges can be identified from the analysis above on the tourism planning experience. Firstly, the political and economic instabilities experienced in the late 1960s and late 1980s delayed the take-off of tourism development. Investors and tourists alike were discouraged from visiting an unstable political environment. This stalled attempts at implementing tourism plans. The second challenge has been poorly designed institutional arrangements. The high level of fragmentation in both public and private institutions involved in the tourism sector has hindered effective collaboration and coordination in tourism planning and development (Adu-Ampong, 2014). This is linked to the issue of an unstable political environment that meant that the mandate and functions of tourism institutions were constantly being realigned to meet short term political goals.

The third main challenge to tourism planning in Ghana has been the absence of legislation to provide political and legal backing to tourism plans. There is as yet no legally binding National Tourism Policy and hence the implementation of tourism plans lack regulatory enforcement. Subsequent governments are under no legal obligation to commit to plan implementation. The issue of financing is the fourth main challenge to tourism planning in Ghana. Budgetary allocation to the tourism ministry for plan implementation and projects remain inadequate. With limited government investment to open up new areas through infrastructural projects like building roads, extending water lines and electricity, private investment has been slow and tend to flow into already developed areas in the Coastal/Central zone as advocated in the first 15-year 1975 Tourism Master Plan. The final challenge facing tourism planning in Ghana has been deficiencies in the quality and quantity of available human resource in view of the required needs of the sector. This lack of capacity in both professional and vocational
roles in the tourism and hospitality sector constrains the effective development and implementation of tourism plans and strategies. There is, for instance, no national hotel training school at this moment and the Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute (HOTCATT) is unable to live out its mandate due to their financial and logistical challenges (see discussion below).

Given all five main issues outlined above, the implementation of the GNTDP 2013-2027 faces a number of challenges. The primary challenge is that the GNTDP 2013-2027 is yet to be adopted as a national legal document that is binding on all successive governments. Without a national legal status, the plan remains an aspiration more than anything else. Subsequently it is likely that no systematic implementation of the plan will take place. At best what will happen is a piecemeal implementation process. Related to this challenge is the fact that successive governments have different views of what the tourism sector should be about. With the constant changes to the portfolio of the tourism ministry, it is possible that successive governments might come with different agendas that are not in line with the plan. Indeed the latest realignment to the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts after the GNTDP 2013-2027 was developed means the culture and creative arts aspects will have to be reviewed and extended. However, with the Ghana National Tourism Policy of 2006 still a seventh draft, it will not be surprising should the GNTDP 2013-2027 remain unchanged and hence not fully implemented to reflect the new sector realignment.

The issue of funding also remains a critical challenge to the full implementation of the plan. For a majority of the projects and actions slated to be carried in the first 5 years of the plan, there is no clear indication of where the sources of funding are to come from. This is a serious challenge especially in instances where more than one institution is stated as being responsible for actualising the projects and/or actions. It is already well established that the Ministry of Tourism since its establishment has been underfunded and suffers from low budgetary allocations.\textsuperscript{22} Therefore the failure of the plan to indicate where the needed funds are going to come from represents a formidable challenge to the implementation of these projects. For the GNTDP 2013-2027 to be

\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Nana Oduro Kwarteng, Chief Director, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 23.10.2014; Interview with Dr. Joel Sonne, Director of Projects, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 16.09.2014; Interview with Mrs. Olivia Opoku-Adomah, Director of Research, Statistics and Information, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, 20.10.2014
implemented successfully and for it to contribute to economic development and poverty reduction there is an urgent need to address these challenges and overcome them. Much hope is now pinned on the new Tourism Development Fund in this regard.

4.4 The tourism sector in Ghana: resources, institutions and governance capacity

Governability can be conceived of as the balancing of governance needs of resources, individuals, groups and the capacity of governors to meet these needs. Thus the governability of the tourism sector is concerned with assessing how likely the tourism sector can be successfully governed to bring about desired outcomes given the set of tourism resources, the institutional arrangements and the capacity of governors within these institutions. I explore the governability of the tourism sector in Ghana in this section and set out the discussion under three subsections. The first subsection provides a portrait of the realities of tourism development in Ghana. In the second subsection, I offer a description of the various tourism resources – i.e. the system-to-be-governed component – followed by an analyses of the various institutions-as-governors which are in place. In the final subsection, I evaluate the governance process in the form of communication, collaboration and coordination within and between the various tourism related institutions.

The contemporary reality of tourism in Ghana: markets, visitors and earnings

The tourism sector in Ghana continues its trajectory as the fastest growing economic sector of the economy since the turn of the new millennium (see figures 11 and 12 below). Starting from an insignificant entry into and contribution to national accounts, the tourism sector rose to become the third highest foreign exchange earner for the country in 2010 (Adu-Ampong, 2014).
Having been overtaken by remittances, the sector is currently the fourth highest GDP earner. It is estimated that in the year ending 2013 the travel and tourism sector made a direct contribution of US$1.3 billion and a total contribution of US$ 3 billion to GDP which is about 3% of total GDP and 7.2% of total GDP respectively (WTTC, 2014). In his State of the Nation Address, the Ghanaian President in 2014 however noted that the tourism and creative sector contributed US $1.9 billion representing 4.7% of total GDP (Adu-Ampong, 2015). Although there are differences in total figures due to differences in methodology, what is clear is that the tourism sector in Ghana is currently a significant contributor to economic growth and development. Nonetheless, the question remains, to what extent do local communities benefit from the tourism sector and its contribution to the national GDP.
In order to fully understand the Elmina 2015 Strategy and its subsequent implementation challenges, it first needs to be situated within the realities of tourism in Ghana. This is in terms of the key source market of tourists to Ghana, their travel patterns and itineraries and the role of tour operators in shaping the distribution of tourists across the various tourism attractions in the country. In this section, I outline the main market segments of tourists that visit Ghana, the key generating regions, the patterns of tourists flow within the country and the role of local tour guides and operators. It should be noted that one of the key challenges facing the Ghanaian tourism sector is the issue of accurate and up-to-date statistics. The section therefore relies on the statistics and information provided through the Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027. These statistics are aggregation of figures from the Ghana Immigration Service, the Ghana Tourism Authority, the Ghana Statistical Service, the Ghana Revenue Authority and the Bank of Ghana.

International tourist arrivals, key source regions and patterns of flow in Ghana

The Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) estimates that the one million mark of international arrivals was passed in 2011. However, figures from the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) do not appear to concur with this. The estimate of the GTA is based on projections while that of the GIS is based on self-completed entry/exit card for international arrivals. In the year ending 2014, international tourist arrivals in
Ghana were recorded by the World Bank to be around 1,093,000. This figure is an aggregation of data from the World Tourism Organisation, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, Compendium of Tourism Statistics and other data files. The figure below from the GIS depicts the number of international arrivals in Ghana up to the year ending 2011.

![International Arrivals](image)

**Figure 13 International arrivals in Ghana, 2000-2011 (excludes people travelling with Ghanaian passports)**

Source: Ghana Immigration Service

The composition of international tourists arriving in Ghana is concentrated in a few key markets with the top 8 countries making up 60% of all foreign arrivals in 2011. Figures from both the GTA and the GIS shows that that has not been any major change in the international tourist market structure for Ghana since 2005. The key source markets in 2011 were Nigeria (19%), the USA (13%), UK (9%), Cote d'Ivoire (5%), India (3%), Germany (3%), South Africa (3%) and the Netherlands (3%). The motivations of international tourists to Ghana are varied. Nonetheless, a 2009 report of the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) shows that the main purposes of visits for 40% of arrivals are professionally related travel – businesses, conferences, study/training. Visiting friends and relatives (VFR) is the second most important travel motivation (25% of arrivals) with leisure holiday travel coming in as a third main purpose with 19% of arrivals. Thus in terms of leveraging tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction, it would appear that professional-related travel in the form of business, conferences and education tourism represents a viable route.
The most common itinerary of international tourists in Ghana tend to revolve around the triangle of Accra-Kumasi-Cape Coast with the length of stay varying between 2 nights and 6 weeks. These cities have varied tourism products and assets and therefore are at the core of tourism development and activities in Ghana (see discussion below on key tourism resources). It is this core triangle that shapes the tourist experience in Ghana as the flagship attractions on offer are located in these areas such as long stretches of pristine beaches, the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles, the Kakum National Park and Lake Bosomtwi among others. Due to the short average length of stay, most international tourist itineraries tend to be packed full and congested. This means that in many instances, tourists are moved from one attraction to the other with little time for meaningful contact and interaction with local communities. This is especially the case with the Accra-Cape Coast side of the tourism triangle. A number of tour operators design packages in such a way that tourists embark on a same-day return trip from Accra to the Cape Coast area. Many tourism businesses in and around Cape Coast for instance, complain about the fact that tourists are not staying long enough in the local economy to bring about the desired benefits of tourism. As the President of the Central Region Ghana Hotels Association explained,

"I will say that is part of business activities in the Central Region because looking at night life in Cape Coast it’s not like the one you have in Accra. Yah, so when you look at it, you go to the Castle, you go to the Kakum [National Park], you go to the Forts and all those slave areas, after you are done at the end of the day you would like to go and sit somewhere to be entertainment which we don’t have in Cape Coast. So obviously they would like to go to Accra whereby they have these posh restaurants, whereby there are live bands, discotheques and then yeah, we don’t have those things in Cape Coast. So that is one thing we are lacking in the Central Region"23

The close proximity between Accra and Cape Coast, and the fact that there are limited night time leisure and recreation activities in the Cape Coast municipality means that as much as possible, tour operators and tour guides maintain an itinerary that returns tourists back to Accra on the same day. The challenge has been to diversify tourism attractions in the Cape Coast metropolis and surrounding areas that can capture the interests of tourists for at least an overnight stay in the area.24 It is within such a

23 Interview with Mr. Ben Aidoo, Central Regional President, Ghana Hotels Association, 30.11.2014
24 Interview with Mr. Alex Boakye, Regional Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Central Region, 10.09.2014
context that the Elmina 2015 Strategy needs to be understood and assessed in terms of its ambition of utilising tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction.

**Tourism as a system-to-be-governed**

As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, a system-to-be-governed refers to the set of resources and network of users and stakeholders within a given system. The boundaries of any given sector as a system-to-be-governed – but especially for a highly fragmented sector as tourism – are fuzzy and is thus determined by the perspectives of given actors at specific times. The set of resources that make up the system-to-be-governed are not necessarily self-evident but they acquire relevance through the attribution of meanings and values given by actors. Thus it is only through stakeholder interactions that a set of resources get imbued with meanings and given value as tourism resources.

Consequently in outlining the boundaries of Ghana’s tourism sector as a system-to-be-governed, I rely on the perspectives of actors interviewed as well as the definitions offered within national planning and policy documents. To do this I categorise the set of tourism resources in Ghana under the three main headings – 1) Historical/Cultural and UNESCO World Heritage Sites; 2) Natural resources and protected areas and; 3) Akwaaba: the proverbial Ghanaian hospitality. These categories should not be seen in isolation because there are many overlaps between them (see appendix C). These tourism resources tend to be mutually constitutive when it comes to how Ghana is perceived as a tourism destination.

*Historical/Cultural and UNESCO World Heritage Sites:* In 1979 the forts and castles dotted along the coast of Ghana were granted World Heritage Site (WHS) status by the World Heritage Committee under selection criteria (IV) – ‘to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history’. These sites spread across the Volta, Greater Accra, Central and Western Regions of Ghana consist of 3 castles, 15 forts, 4 forts in partial ruins, 5 ruins with visible structures and 2 sites with traces of former fortifications. The most developed of these sites for tourism are the Cape Coast and
Elmina Castles in the Central Region in consonance with the 1975-1990 tourism plan as discussed previously. Indeed there is a common misperception among Ghanaians and tourists that it is only the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles that are UNESCO WHS. In addition to these castles and forts Ashanti Traditional Buildings (ATBs) in the Ashanti Region of Ghana were also inscribed onto the World Heritage List in 1980. However, ATBs have not been fully developed as tourism resources compared to the castles and forts. This is an example of a resource that require further government investment in order to be fully developed as an attraction.

The fact of being the first country south of the Sahara to gain independence in 1957 and the historical role played by the country in Pan-Africanism and African unity represent rich historical tourism capital for the country. This is underscored by the post-independence branding of the country as the Black Star of Africa. This status was given new meaning when the country became the first African country visited by the first US President with African heritage - Barack Obama and his family in 2009. The cultural capital of Ghana that attracts both domestic and international visitors every year include traditional Ghanaian institutions like chieftaincy, festivals and everyday way of life. Yearly festivals of different ethnic groups like Ogua Fetu Afahye in Cape Coast, Bakatue in Elmina and Hogbetsotso festival in Anlo attract large numbers of both domestic and international tourists. There is also the annual Emancipation Day and biennial PANAFEST celebrations that attract a high number of Africans in the Diaspora. Both events are centred on the slavery heritage of Cape Coast and Elmina Castles as well as incorporating traditional elements. Notwithstanding the overall diversity on offer in terms of tourist attractions, the core tourism resources in Ghana is represented by the UNESCO WHS and the historical legacy of the colonial era in addition to traditional culture and festivals. It has been argued that “European heritage, colonial legacies, and traditional institutions and festivities are the bricks and mortar of Ghana’s
tourism industry” (Addo, 2011: 421). The sense is that “without culture then there is not tourism...so tourism and culture are like bedfellows”28 in Ghana.

Natural resources and protected areas: There are two major ecological zones that make up the natural landscape of Ghana – the high forest zone in the South West and the savannah in the North East. The high forest zone represents about a third of the land area of Ghana and consists of 266 gazetted forest reserves (Derkyi, 2012). There are 16 Protected Areas (PAs) in Ghana that are under the jurisdiction of the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission. These PAs are made up of 7 National Parks, 6 Resource Reserves, 2 Wildlife Sanctuaries and 1 Strict Nature Reserve. The Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission is also responsible for the management of 5 coastal Ramsar Sites and 2 Zoos in Accra and Kumasi. It is these that form the bulk of the natural attraction base of tourism resources in Ghana. In addition to these are the long and wide sandy beaches along most of Ghana’s coast which in many places are in pristine condition. The Lake Volta as the largest man-made lake in the world, a number of spectacular waterfalls, crocodile pond in Paga and the Stilt Village in Nzulezu are other natural resource attractions for tourism.

There are currently no natural resource based attractions in Ghana that have been designated as UNESCO WHS. However three key attractions – the Kakum National Park, the Mole National Park and the Nzulezu Stilt Settlement have since 2000 being put on the UNESCO tentative list. These sites are considered to be suitable for inscription to the final list but the procedure is yet to begin in earnest.29 Notwithstanding the diversity of natural resources on offer, it is only a few sites that have well developed tourist and visitor facilities. Notable among these sites include the Mole National Park, the Kakum National Park with the canopy walkway, the Boabeng-Fiema Monkey Sanctuary and the Shai Hills Resource Reserve. These resources are surrounded by a complex web of users and stakeholders with a diversity of roles and responsibilities. These include the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission, the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, the Nature Conservation and Resource Centre and community groups and individuals whose livelihoods involve the use of these resource. Coordination and collaboration among these stakeholders tend to be a challenge which

28 Interview with Eric Ohene-Larbi, Central Regional Deputy Director (Administration), Centre for National Culture, Cape Coast, 05.09.2014
29 Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
have impeded the effective development of the identified triangle of tourism resources around the sites in Accra, Kumasi and Cape Coast/Elmina\textsuperscript{30} (See figure 14 for an overview of key tourism resources in Ghana).

\textit{Akwaaba: the proverbial Ghanaian hospitality:} If the bricks and mortar of Ghana’s tourism industry consist of the cultural capital and UNESCO WHS then the decorative painting is made from the proverbial Ghanaian hospitality afforded to visitors. Akwaaba – meaning a ‘warm welcome’ is the first word most tourists will encounter in Ghana. It is this warmth that ensures that there are many repeat visits to Ghana. There are also a number of visitors who choose Ghana through word-of-mouth testimony from those who have experienced this warmth. Currently the country is marketed with the brand tagline of “Ghana: Culture, Warmth and Much More”. The friendly nature of people and the safe and secure way in which tourists are able to move about (Dayour, 2013), represents an essential part of the tourism resources available in the country.

While this sense of warm hospitality is embodied within communities and ‘enforced’ through traditional authority, formal hospitality establishments do not always hold up to this ideal. This is mainly due to the amorphous development of the hospitality sector in Ghana and the lack of proper hotel training institution available in the country.\textsuperscript{31} Consequently the country has gained the unfortunate reputation as being an ‘expensive destination’ due to the high cost of hospitality services relative to quality. The perceived poor standards of service and professionalism in the hospitality sector lead to low rates of tourist satisfaction.

\textsuperscript{30} Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027; Interview with Enoch Ashie, Park Manager, Kakum National Park, Kakum, 11.09.2014; Interview with Michael Attipoe, Director (Finance and Administration), Ghana National Commission on Culture, Accra, 14.08.2014

\textsuperscript{31} Interview with Joseph Mensah, Hospitality Lecturer (Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration) and CEO of HospitalityPlus Ltd., Accra, 18.09.2014; Interview with Judith Abase, Acting Director, Hotel Catering and Tourism Training Institute, Accra, 17.09.2014
Tourism governing system: institutions and governors

In line with the complexities of the tourism system-to-be-governed, the tourism governing system in Ghana is a complex one. The tourism governing system is made up of the set of institutions and steering mechanisms through which the development of the tourism sector is managed. In this section I outline some of the key governing institutions in the tourism sector of Ghana and their steering mechanisms. A look at the
roles and responsibilities of public, private and third-sector institutions involved in tourism will make evident the stakeholder governance capacity in terms of the fit between images, instruments and action potential. Importantly the discussion in this subsection will help to identify how the goals and visions of the various governing institutions relate to each other – i.e. whether they differ, compete or co-operate. This will help in highlighting the extent to which tourism governance intersects with local economic development planning and governance. I begin with public institutions followed by the private sector institutions and finally civil society institutions.

*Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts*: Prior to the establishment of a substantive Ministry of Tourism in 1993, tourism management was an appendage to the Ministry of Culture and then to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the 1960s to 1980s. The mandate of the ministry has been to oversee the development, promotion and coordination of all tourism related activities in Ghana. As highlighted in the earlier sections of this chapter, the tourism ministry has undergone a number of realignment and changes to the focus of this fundamental mandate. An expanded Ministry of Tourism and the Modernisation of the Capital City (MOTMCC) came into existence between 2003 and 2006. In 2006 it became the Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations (MOTDR) in time for the launching of the Joseph Project and the 50th Independence anniversary of Ghana and the yearlong celebrations that sought to reunite Africans in the Diaspora, with Ghana as a tourism destination positioned as the gateway for this homecoming. Functions were streamlined and the ministry reverted back to being just Ministry of Tourism with a change of government in 2009. In 2013 the mandate of the ministry was realigned to become the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and the Creative Arts (MOTCCA) following the end of one political cycle that brought in a new government.

The vision and mandate of MOTCCA is to develop tourism with culture serving as the fulcrum and in partnership with key stakeholders. Specifically the ministry is to “develop sustainable tourism pivoted on Ghanaian culture and creative arts as a key

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32 Interview with Michael Attipoe, Director (Finance and Administration), Ghana National Commission on Culture, Accra, 14.08.2014; see also Tourism Sector Medium Term Development Plan 2010-2013

33 Interview with Nana Oduro Kwarteng, Chief Director, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 23.10.2014
driver to accelerated national development”. In line with this new image the governance instruments and action potential of MOTCCA has been expanded to 14 state and quasi-state agencies including the traditional implementation agencies of the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) and the Hotel Catering and Tourism Training Institute (HOTCATT). Although the instruments available to the MOTCCA to translate and link the vision into action have remained the same – namely legislation, regulation and the development of policies and programmes including direct investment – the expanded number of agencies brought under its remit potentially increases the actions that can be taken to put instruments into effect. This entails adequate mobilisation of support and socio-political will among key stakeholders which is unfortunately not always the case.

The main steering mechanism of the MOTCCA in governing the tourism sector is one of a top-down approach although there are sometimes elements of co-management involved. Currently heads of the 14 agencies under the ministry participate in senior management meetings. However there tend to be infrequent meetings of the inter-ministerial advisory committee headed by MOTCCA. This presents a number of challenges to effective communication, collaboration and coordination among stakeholders. Moreover, outcomes of these high level meetings are not effectively communicated to agencies at the regional and district levels. A related issue is that the MOTCCA suffers from high turnover rates of ministers, deputies and chief directors. This instability of leadership at the ministry affects policy continuity. Some stakeholders express misgivings about the appropriateness of some of the new agencies brought under the ministry. Some agencies like the National Commission on Culture and the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board enjoyed a semi-ministerial status prior to their incorporation under the MOTCCA. These agencies therefore see themselves as only advising the MOTCCA. Thus if “…the minister [of MOTCCA] wants the commission [Ghana National Commission on Culture] to do [something] she writes a

35 Interview with Nana Odoro Kwarteng, Chief Director, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 23.10.2014
36 Interview with Dr. Joel Sonne, Director of Projects, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, Accra, 16.09.2014; Interview with Charles Osei-Bonsu, Acting Chief Executive Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 17.09.2014; Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
37 Interview with Senior Officer at the Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 20.08.2014;
This is because unlike internal departments the minister cannot simply instruct agencies to carry out tasks without first putting it in writing for the agencies to consider.

**Ghana Tourism Authority:** The genesis of the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) is found in 1962 when the State Hotel and Tourist Corporation (SHTC) was set up to develop and manage hotels and other catering guest houses around the country (Asiedu, 1997). The SHTC was in 1968 split up into the Ghana Tourist Corporation (GTC) and the State Hotels Corporation (SHC). In 1973 the GTC became the Ghana Tourist Control Board (GTCB) and the Ghana Tourist Development Corporation (GTDC). In 1977 the GTCB was made the Ghana Tourist Board (GTB) and tasked with the overall development of the tourism industry including planning, regulation and promotion. Its commercial functions were placed under the GTDC because "the GTCB could not be a player and a referee at the same time, operating commercial ventures in the same industry in which it is the statutory regulator" (Akyeampong, 2006:14). With the setting up of a substantive tourism ministry the GTB became the main implementation agency. In 2011, the GTB became the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) with enlarged mandate through the Tourism Act of 2011 (Act 817).

The vision of the GTA is to make Ghana the preferred tourism destination capital of the West Africa sub region through developing a quality non-mass approach to cultural heritage tourism, ecotourism and conference tourism. To accomplish this, Act 817 established a Tourism Development Fund (TDF) to be funded through a 1% Tourism Levy on tourist services. The TDF is to provide the decried lack of financial resources to develop tourism facilities and infrastructures. While the mechanisms for collecting the levy was laid out from the start, the mechanisms for disbursing the funds had yet to be finalised as at the end of fieldwork in 2015. The question this raises is whether in the end the GTA will be given enough power and authority over the TDF to correspond with its new functions. The expanded functions of the GTA to include regulation of attraction sites and tourism product development is seen as a step in the right direction for the tourism sector in Ghana. The GTA carries out its mandate through 11 Regional

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38 Interview with Michael Attipoe, Director (Finance and Administration), Ghana National Commission on Culture, Accra, 14.08.2014
39 Interview with Spencer Doku, Manager for Planning and Business Development, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 14.08.2014; Interview with Nana Twum Barima II, Manager for Research, Statistics and Information, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 20.08.2014; Interview
Offices with the Act 817 requiring the establishment of District Offices as well. At the moment however, the GTA is “experimenting with 7 Districts and the idea of the District Offices is to be in close contact with the district assemblies [MMDAs] and then all the relevant agencies so that they can really form the bedrock of tourism development and promotion within the district”.40

As the main implementation agency of the MOTCCA, the GTA engages in more interactions with key stakeholders in the day-to-day regulation and management of the tourism sector. In its governing interactions, the GTA relies mainly on regulatory instruments such as registration, licensing and accreditation of tourism enterprises.41 The main form of interactions between the GTA and other stakeholders especially at the destination level is through communication but these are typically confined to the national and regional levels. Indeed due to the logistical constraints facing the institution,42 the existing forms of interactions among stakeholders is incomplete and not mutually supportive when it comes to developing and improving tourism facilities.43 Consequently there is little communicative interaction between the GTA and stakeholders in small towns and cities where potential tourism resources may be located. With the establishment of the Tourism Development Fund and the setting up of district offices, there are expectations that the GTA's interaction with other stakeholders will be improved.44

The Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute: In 1989 a training unit was set up to polish up the skills of hotel staff to serve the needs of officials and diplomats attending the 1991 Non-Aligned Movement conference in Ghana.45 This unit became formalised

with Sampson Donkor, Deputy Director (Finance and Administration), Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 18.08.2014
40 Interview, Charles Osei Bonsu, Acting Executive Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 17.09.2014
41 Interview with Alex Boakye, Central Regional Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Cape Coast, 10.09.2014; Tourism Act, 2011 (Act 817).
42 Interview with Sampson Donkor, Deputy Director (Finance and Administration), Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 18.08.2014; Tourism Sector Medium-Term Development Plan 2010-2013
43 Interview with Alex Boakye, Central Regional Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Cape Coast, 10.09.2014; Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
44 Interview with Sampson Donkor, Deputy Director (Finance and Administration), Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 18.08.2014; Interview, Charles Osei Bonsu, Acting Executive Director, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 17.09.2014; Interview with Spencer Doku, Manager for Planning and Business Development, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 14.08.2014
45 Interview with Judith Abase, Acting Director, Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute, Accra, 17.09.2014
as the Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute (HOTCATT) at the end of the conference and was later made an implementation agency of Ministry of Tourism. The objective of HOTCATT is to provide training programmes in order to develop and enhance the available human resource for the tourism and hospitality industry. HOTCATT provide training programmes for middle and basic supervisory roles including front office, housekeeping, kitchen work and tour guiding among others. These training programmes are delivered at their rented premises in Accra which was meant to be an interim location but has remained a permanent place up to this time. A building project started in 2007 (see figure 15) to provide a better place for the institute has been left uncompleted due the effects of political cycles that led to change of government and tourism ministers with differing policy focus.46

![Figure 15 The uncompleted and abandoned building for the Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute](image)

Source: Author’s fieldwork photo archives

In a 2005 review it was concluded that HOTCATT was underperforming due to a lack of resources, weak curriculum, poor leadership and management among others.47

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46 Off the record conversation with a number of tourism stakeholders.
47 Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
Consequently, the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) took over HOTCATT after signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Tourism in 2009. GIMPA was expected to give the image of HOTCATT an uplift while improving professional standards.\(^48\) However, in 2011 the Ministry of Tourism took back control of HOTCATT due to GIMPA misunderstanding the MOU and hence not been able to achieve the set objectives.\(^49\) This sudden abrogation of the MOU is seen as having been caused in part by some “underground forces” and the “initial perception [among other stakeholders] that GIMPA was expensive and therefore if they link it [HOTCATT] to GIMPA can the students pay [?]”\(^50\) Currently HOTCATT is in a transition stage and discussions are underway to decide on new proposals for a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement. Ultimately, the goal is to establish a National Hotel School in addition to regional HOTCATT centres.\(^51\)

The major form of governing interaction by the HOTCATT involves communication, collaboration and coordination with other stakeholders especially the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA), the Ghana Tourist Development Company (GTDC) and the Ghana Tourism Federation (GHATOF). The interaction with the GTA is fraught with inconsistencies due to overlapping roles and responsibilities where there should have been collaboration and coordination. This long quote from the Acting Director of HOTCATT summarises some of the tensions in stakeholder interactions;

\[
\text{Hmmm clash of interests with GTA, I will be honest with you they actually set up this school when they were GTB okay. I will, we were then to train for them, we were actually with them. They go and do the inspection and we were there as the specialised human resource for them to be able to, because most of these officers at the GTB they don’t have the hospitality background. You could have graduated in Sociology, that is it but that doesn’t make you an executive house keeper, ahhh so this was what HOTCATT brought on board, so it was like if you are going for inspection, take them, we would have gone as a team so am able to tell you that}
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\(^48\) Interview with Judith Abase, Acting Director, Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute, Accra, 17.09.2014; Interview with Joseph Mensah, Hospitality Lecturer (Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration) and CEO of HospitalityPlus Ltd., Accra, 18.09.2014
\(^49\) Interview with Judith Abase, Acting Director, Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute, Accra, 17.09.2014; Interview with Joseph Mensah, Hospitality Lecturer (Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration) and CEO of HospitalityPlus Ltd., Accra, 18.09.2014; Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
\(^50\) Interview with Joseph Mensah, Hospitality Lecturer (Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration) and CEO of HospitalityPlus Ltd., Accra, 18.09.2014
\(^51\) Interview with Judith Abase, Acting Director, Hotel, Tourism and Catering Training Institute, Accra, 17.09.2014; Interview with Joseph Mensah, Hospitality Lecturer (Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration) and CEO of HospitalityPlus Ltd., Accra, 18.09.2014
This is that, in the kitchen I will tell you the storage is wrong, this, look out for this, let us look out for this, this is how they go about to do it but that has never been the case. Yes, so they do their own thing and the, that, that, and even they do some kind of trainings, they, they also do some training that is where such there is conflict of interests because we are here...

This quote shows that a lack of collaboration and coordination between institutions like the GTA and HOTCATT has adverse effect on managing the sector. The creation and development of good synergy between institutions is important because no single institution or stakeholder has sufficient overview to deploy required governing instruments nor sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally.

The Ghana Tourist Development Company: The Ghana Tourist Development Corporation is a quasi-private, quasi-public entity established in 1973. It is currently a limited liability company called the Ghana Tourist Development Company (GTDC). The GTDC is an agency under the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts (MOTCCA) and is supposed to be an investment wing that sources for both local and international investment to develop tourist attractions in Ghana. The Ghana Tourism Authority holds 40% of the shares of GTDC with the remaining 60% made up of shares of the Bank of Ghana, the National Investment Bank and the State Insurance Company. The GTDC receives no subvention from the state and must generate its own operating and investment funds. According to the Deputy Executive Director the vision is to use “GTDC as a tool to develop the tourism industry” by promoting and mobilising investment and equity participation in joint investment ventures in tourism development. Currently the GTDC co-owns and co-manages the Duty Free Shop at the Kotoka International Airport in Accra, runs the Akuaba Travel Agency, and a car rental agency in addition to managing three tourist receptive facilities.

In terms of governance interactions the GTDC works in close collaboration with the MOTCCA and other agencies under the ministry. Although not a sub-vented

52 Interview with Gideon Areequaye, Deputy Executive Director, Ghana Tourist Development Company, Accra, 12.08.2014
53 Interview with Gideon Areequaye, Deputy Executive Director, Ghana Tourist Development Company, Accra, 12.08.2014; Interview with Spencer Doku, Manager for Planning and Business Development, Ghana Tourism Authority, Accra, 14.08.2014
54 Interview with Gideon Areequaye, Deputy Executive Director, Ghana Tourist Development Company, Accra, 12.08.2014
55 Interview with Gideon Areequaye, Deputy Executive Director, Ghana Tourist Development Company, Accra, 12.08.2014; Ghana Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
government agency, the Directors of the GTDC are appointed by the President who also nominates board members.\textsuperscript{56} The board of the GTDC has representation from the GTA as a shareholder and the other agencies that hold shares in the company. This means that although it is a quasi-private entity the activities of the GTDC is streamlined to serve national interest in the tourism sector. The existing form of interactions between the GTDC and other agencies are therefore mutually supportive and usually consistent with the vision and mission of the company. Since interactions are mostly at the national level as the GTDC has issues in adapting its form of interactions to reach the local level.

\textit{The Ghana Museum and Monuments Board:} The Ghana Museum and Monument Board (GMMB) was established along with the opening of the National Museum of Ghana on 5\textsuperscript{th} March, 1957 to be the legal custodian of Ghana’s material cultural heritage including both movable and immovable heritage. The mission and goal is to acquire, preserve, display and document the material cultural heritage in Ghana. The GMMB was “equipped to chart the progress of the new nation as it went forward and the collection of memorabilia to do with the past as an inspiration for the future”.\textsuperscript{57} Currently the vision and mission of GMMB is stated as “to be an effective, efficient and focused institution in the preservation of the material cultural heritage of Ghana and West Africa” and “...to acquire, protect, conserve and document the Nation’s movable and immovable material cultural heritage for posterity, for the purposes of research and education of the public” respectively.\textsuperscript{58} This mission of providing research and education to the public on Ghana’s heritage is where the work of GMMB intersects with tourism both as part of the system-to-be-governed and as part of the governing system. This is because the GMMB has the ultimate governing and management responsibilities over all museums and cultural monuments in Ghana including the UNESCO World Heritage Sites that are the crown of Ghana’s tourist attraction resources (see discussion above on tourism resources in Ghana).

The core activity of the GMMB is the management of the museums and monuments, made possible through its head office in Accra and regional presence in the Ashanti

\textsuperscript{56} Interview with Gideon Aryeequaye, Deputy Executive Director, Ghana Tourist Development Company, Accra, 12.08.2014
\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Dr. Zagba Oyortey, Executive Director, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Accra, 23.09.2014
\textsuperscript{58} GMMB official website \url{http://www.ghanamuseums.org/mission.php} (Accessed on 04.03.5016)
Region (Kumasi), the Volta Region (Ho), Upper East Region (Bolgatanga), Upper West Region (Wa) and combined Central and Western Regions (Cape Coast). The GMMB does not see itself as working necessarily in or for tourism and this tends to be a source of clashing interests between itself and other stakeholders like the MOTCCA and the GTA. The Education Unit Head of the GMMB Central Regional office explained that "...we don't have a vision of tourism development. We have a vision of maintain[ing] the facility [Cape Coast Castle], making sure that the facilities are in good condition...from the GMMB point of view we are providing education so our staff are not even called tour guides [but rather museum educators and school service officers] as we are not in tourism".59

The governance interactions of the GMMB with other stakeholders in the tourism sector tend to be tense. While channels of communication between stakeholders exist, these are often incomplete, inconsistent and plain contradictory interactions. The GMMB as a state agency has been moved around different ministries from education through culture and chieftaincy affairs to the tourism ministry.60 Given the national and internationally binding legislation underpinning their mandate it is not always easy to make their activities fit the agenda of other stakeholders in the tourism sector. This sometimes results in a clash of perspectives as to how best to utilise the cultural assets of museums and monuments as tourist attraction sites. The Executive Director of the GMMB succinctly summarises this stakeholder conflict of interest;

"... the conception of a ministry of tourism of what the forts and castles are is radically different from ours...maybe conflict of interest is too strong a word. What they’ve tried to do subsequently is to try and merge what our expectations are or our understanding of what we do with theirs, it’s not as seamlessly as it could be but it’s not irreparable, it can, it can be fixed because those are the present demands. You see, you can see a fort and a castle as a place to visit and a place where people will visit and spend money. You can also see the forts and the castle as the evidence of the past which should, we should conserve, conserve so as to use to educate people, so you see already it’s not the numbers that will matter to a conservationist as much as they want the thing to last for another 500 years.

59 Interview with Essel Blankson, Senior Museums and Monuments Officer (Head of Education), Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Central Region, Cape Coast, 08.09.2014
60 Interview with Raymond Agbo, Deputy Director (Museums), Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Accra, 20.08.2014; Interview with Dr. Zagba Oyortey, Executive Director, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Accra, 23.09.2014
So if a conservationist have their way they will even limit the number of people because, so as to better conserve it.”

The consequence of this differing perspective means that attempts at ‘modernising’ the forts and castles to include guest houses and restaurants is met with disagreement. These ideas are inconsistent with the international standards that have to be followed by sites on the UNESCO World Heritage Sites List and so have to be rejected by the GMMB. In the Elmina 2015 Strategy, for example, one of the initial plans was to convert Fort Jago into a tourist accommodation but the GMMB had to come out against such proposition because the structural integrity of the Castle as a UNESCO World Heritage site would have been affected.

The Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission: Up until 1999, the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission (WD-FC) was a unit of the Forestry Department at the Ministry of Agriculture with responsibility for wildlife issues. In 1965 it became a line agency under the then Ministry of Forestry called the Department of Game and Wildlife later becoming the Wildlife Department in 1997. Having moved from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Forestry through to the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources, the WD-FC is currently under the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. The WD-FC has direct responsibility for managing all wildlife in Ghana including those that are trans-boundary. Through a system of protected areas (PAs), the WD-FC manages 6.2% of Ghana’s total land area (13,489 square kilometres). Thus the natural resources and protected areas that form a large part of Ghana’s tourism resources are managed by the WD-FC.

The mandate of the WD-FC is to “conserve wildlife in Ghana in general and manage wildlife protected areas in particular within representative ecological zones of the country” while its mission is the ”conservation, sustainable management and development of Ghana’s wildlife resources for socio-economic benefit to all segments of society”. In order to achieve its primary objective of conservation and wildlife protection the division sees the development of eco-tourism and tourist activities in the

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61 Interview with Dr. Zagba Oyortey, Executive Director, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Accra, 23.09.2014
PAs as one key strategy to pursue. In pursuance of this strategy the WD-FC plays a key governing role in the tourism sector of Ghana. PAs are classified according to their tourism potentials and thus each PA management plan includes specific tourism developed plans.\(^63\) Class A PAs are the Mole National Park and the Kakum National Park which have the most developed tourist facilities. Although it develops linkages with other agencies, the WD-FC has sole responsibility for the management of all tourist activities within PAs. All revenue from tourist activities at PAs accrues to the accounts of the Forestry Commission. There is no revenue sharing arrangement between the WD-FC and adjoining communities due to restrictions of current legislation.\(^64\)

The governance interaction between the WD-FC and other stakeholders in the tourism sector tends to be constrained by existing legislative frameworks. There are no effective channels of communication and avenues for joint-decision making by all the agencies who control key resources that are the bedrock of tourism development. The WD-FC have absolute legal administrative and management oversight and there is a lack of collaboration and coordination when it comes to tourist activities within PAs. As the Park Manager at Kakum National Park puts it “…the Forestry Commission our main mandate is not for tourism, our main mandate is to regulate the use of the natural resources of which tourism is one and also conserve the resource and sustainably development and manage it, you get me?”\(^65\) Thus effective stakeholder interactions need to be improved from the inter-ministerial level through to the implementation agencies level. This will ensure that although agencies like the WD-FC might have differing core mandates, their activities with regards to tourism are mutually supportive and consistent with the vision of tourism held by the MOTCCA and the GTA.

The Ghana Tourism Federation: As an umbrella organisation, the Ghana Tourism Federation (GHATOF) is the apex body that represents the interests of all private sector associations involved in the tourism sector of Ghana. Prior to its establishment in 1994/1995 the private sector involvement in the tourism sector was disparate and not concerted. GHATOF was therefore established to serve as a link between the various private sector trade associations and public sector ministries, agencies and

\(^{63}\) Interview with Luri Kanton, Operations Manager, Wildlife Division of Forestry Commission, Accra, 19.08.2014
\(^{64}\) Interview with Luri Kanton, Operations Manager, Wildlife Division of Forestry Commission, Accra, 19.08.2014; Interview with Enoch Ashie, Park Manager, Kakum National Park, Kakum, 11.09.2014
\(^{65}\) Interview with Enoch Ashie, Park Manager, Kakum National Park, Kakum, 11.09.2014
departments engaged in the tourism sector. Since its formation GHATOF has engaged in the development and promotion of tourism through lobbying for legislations and organising training and capacity building for its members (Akyeampong, 2006). Current membership stands at 23 trade associations comprising associations registered and licensed by the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) status such as the Tour Operators Union of Ghana (TOUGHA), Ghana Hotels Association and the Ghana Traditional Caterers Association (GTCA).

The one vision that binds all members of GHATOF is the need to improve customer service because “in terms of customer service we [GHATOF members] need to work together as a team because if one fails all of us fail”. As part of its governing interactions GHATOF works closely with the Ghana Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (COTVET), GTA, HOTCATT and MOTCCA as well as other international development institutions like the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV). These interactions are usually carried out at the national level and involve training and capacity building programmes. An established Public Private Partnership Forum process is now dormant after the seed funding from JICA got finished. The involvement of the private sector in the governance interactions of the tourism sector has not been as effective due to among other things funding challenges and weak institutional capacity. GHATOF has only a national office and as at yet no regional or district level presence. Efforts are now however being made to get representation at the regional and district levels in order to get to know more of the issues at destinations outside of Accra.

Non-Government/Civil Society Organisations: In addition to the public and private sector institutions and organisations, there are also a number of third sector organisation that are involved in the governing activities of the tourism sector. These organisations are disparate and each operates in specific geographical areas and in relation to specific tourist attraction sites and/or tourism development projects. The governing

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66 Interview with Daniel Nana Anim, President of the Ghana Tourism Federation, Accra, 14.08.2014; Interview with Kwaku Passah, President of Tour Guides Association of Ghana, Accra, 21.08.2014
67 Interview with Daniel Nana Anim, President of the Ghana Tourism Federation, Accra, 14.08.2014
68 Interview with Kwaku Passah, President of Tour Guides Association of Ghana, Accra, 21.08.2014; Interview with Daniel Nana Anim, President of the Ghana Tourism Federation, Accra, 14.08.2014; Interview with Herbert Acquaye, National President, Ghana Hotels Association, Accra, 12.08.2014
interactions undertaken by these organisations are mostly related to the specific projects that they are involved in. These interactions are often at the destination level and do not always relate to overarching policy interactions that take place at the national level. Prominent among these are the Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC), the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust (GHCT), the Ghana Tourism Society and the Ghana Wildlife Society.

The NCRC was founded in 1996 as a local conservation organisation and has worked with communities around protected areas to start ecotourism initiatives across the country. Through the work of the NCRC, a Ghana Rural Ecotourism and Travel Office (GREET) was officially started in 2010. However due to financial challenges their first office closed down and the plan is to now have a GREET desk when the Accra Visitor Centre project is completed.69 The GHCT on the other hand was launched in 1996 and registered in 1997 under the Trustees Incorporation Act of 1962 (Act 106). The GHCT operates mainly in the Central Region manages the Canopy walkway and visitor reception centre at the Kakum National Park and supports the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles (the GHCT will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 as they played a key role in the Elmina 2015 Strategy).70

*International Development Agencies:* Over the years there have been a number of international development agencies and partners involved in the tourism sector in Ghana. Such involvement ranges from financial assistance to technical assistance through to direct development of tourism products and projects. The height of the international development agency involvement in the tourism sector of Ghana was between 2000 and 2010. This period witnessed an intensive involvement of various development agencies and international non-government organisations in the tourism sector of Ghana. These activities and projects have expanded the tourist attractions available across the country while improving the conditions of tourist receptive facilities. In particular international development agency involvement in tourism has been centred on encouraging community participation in the management of tourism resources. This was seen as a way of increasing the benefits of tourism accruing to local

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69 Interview with Douglas Nanka Bruce, Director, Ghana Rural Ecotourism and Travel Office, Accra, 22.10.2014
70 Interview with Francis Cobbinah, Executive Director, Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, Cape Coast, 29.09.2014; Interview with Nkunu Akyea, Former Executive Director, Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, Cape Coast, 08.09.2014
communities. The Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV) for instance have been involved in the setting up of a Savanaland Destination Management Organisation for communities around the Mole National Park and were involved in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In 2007 the SNV was recognised for its efforts in tourism development in non-traditional tourist areas with the Ghana Tourist Authority's prestigious ‘development partner’ of the year award (Akyeampong and Aseidu, 2008).

Since 2010 there has been a drastic reduction in the number of international development agencies and international non-government organisations involved in the tourism sector of Ghana. This has been due to both domestic and international political economy issues. For instance there has been an international management decision by the SNV in the Netherlands to discontinue their involvement in tourism. This is a worldwide policy decision that has refocused SNV away from tourism in all operating countries including Ghana. This withdrawal of the SNV from tourism had repercussions for the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as shall be further discussed in Chapters 7. The United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations World Tourism Organisation through the Sustainable Tourism Eliminating Poverty (ST-EP) programme however remain somewhat active in the governance of the tourism sector in Ghana through the provision of financial and technical assistance.

**Communication, collaboration and coordination of tourism governing interactions**

In this section so far I have explored the complexities of the tourism governing system in Ghana and have shown the diversity of institutions and steering mechanisms. Interactions within public sector institutions such as the MOTCCA are based on strong governing hierarchies with high differentiation of functions between each hierarchy. Governance interactions between public sector institutions are constrained by rigid legal regimes that leave little room for effective integration and coordination of governing activities. The structure of public sector bureaucracy has resulted in a compartmentalised rather than an integrated analysis of how individual agencies can contribute to tourism development and governance. A lack of information sharing and poor communication in developing tourism plans further contributes to this general
lack of integrated analysis. Indeed the inter-ministerial committee that is conveyed and chaired by the MOTCCA is far from active and for the whole of 2014 did not meet.\footnote{Interview with Olivia Opoku Adomah, Director for Research, Statistics and Information, MOTCCA, Accra, 21.10.2014}

Communication between various governing institutions at the national level ranges from low to medium. Across the national, regional and district levels there is low and infrequent interaction. Stakeholders interviewed at the regional and district level were of the view that all the action in terms of tourism policy and planning activities takes place in Accra and that very little is communicated downwards. In an interview with the Regional Director of the National Commission on Culture in Cape Coast it became evident that intra-organisation communication is also a problem. This long quote provides rich contextual information that reflects the extent of communication within the tourism sector;

\begin{quote}
For example you know I just phoned Accra because I was reading something from this paper [Daily Graphic Newspaper] and this paper they have declared, I think it’s starting from today, today to 4th October as a, is it a drama month or something like that, creative, is it creative arts something, something and there are a whole lot of activities going on in Accra. So I just phoned our headquarters, NCC [National Commission for Culture], the director, Mr Attipoe and I said Mr. Attipoe am reading this from the paper, so are you telling me that Accra is Ghana and Ghana is Accra, because we are here... am surprised because apart from the high school drama competition, the rest we are not aware and he say oh you see it’s money ... and I said it’s not a matter of invitation, it’s a matter of information.\footnote{Interview with Christiana C. Oparebea, Regional Director, Centre for National Culture, Central Region, Cape Coast, 05.09.2014}
\end{quote}

This quote shows that stakeholders take a different perspective on the essence of sharing information. This lack of information flow affects communication both within and across institutions operating at the national, regional and district geographical scales. Cross-institutional communication while rated as medium at the national level is rated as very low at the regional and district levels. Thus there is also very little governing communication for example between the regional offices of the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) and the National Commission on Culture in Cape Coast. If, as Bang (2003) has argued, governance is political and social communication then the
failure of tourism governing institutions to openly communicate accounts for their inability to effectively govern the tourism sector.

There is a related issue here about stakeholder governance capacity when it comes to the failings in communication, collaboration and coordination. As conceptualised in Chapter 2, section 2.1, stakeholder governance capacity can be thought of in terms of the alignment between images, instruments and action potentials. The evidence shows that within the tourism sector in Ghana, coordination is limited. There is a lack of alignment between the images held by stakeholders such as the MOTCCA, the GTA, the GMMB and the National Commission on Culture, the instruments available to them and the action potentials within which they work. Even within institutions, there is a misalignment in images, instruments and action potential. This is exemplified in the case of the Cape Coast office and the national head office of the National Commission on Culture (see previous paragraphs). The image of tourism’s potential for local economic development and poverty reduction is arrived at through communication. The low levels of communication and collaboration within the tourism sector in Ghana consequently result in a lack of alignment between images held by stakeholders, instruments and action potentials available to them. This ultimately affect stakeholder governance capacity, especially at the national level in utilising tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction.

The success of tourism-led local economic development planning depends on the collaboration between institutions and the coordination of governing activities. Given the diversity and complexity of institutions involved in the tourism sector the current hierarchical process of arriving at governing decisions is not optimal. The dynamics (Kooiman, 2000) within the tourism sector in the sense of tensions, misunderstandings and suspicion among stakeholders offer both potential for change in both positive and negative ways. Often, the dynamics within the tourism governing system in Ghana are driven by conflicting interests. However, through open communication and collaboration, there is the possibility of turning the tensions into positive changes in how the tourism sector is governed. A collaborative process of negotiation and dialogue between representatives of different sectors of society appears as the most optimal mechanism for arriving at decisions and actions. This ensures that decisions are binding on all stakeholders involved and that actions can be coordinated to achieve desired outcomes. This process of stakeholder negotiation and dialogue is currently
lacking in the tourism sector of Ghana especially at the local level where metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) barely feature in tourism governing arrangements. The question is whether the involvement of MMDAs might make a difference in improving tourism governance interactions. While it appears that MMDAs might have something to bring to the table in both positive and negative ways, this is an empirical question that the Elmina 2015 Strategy offers an opportunity to explore.

Conclusions

This chapter has explored the institutional structures for decentralised local economic development planning in Ghana and the way tourism has been conceptualised within national economic development policies and plans since independence. The chapter also explored in detail the actors, structures and processes of tourism development and the challenges facing the sector. This chapter argues that institutional structures, inconsistence of policy and weaknesses of inter-agency collaboration are problems of and for tourism development and attempts at embedding tourism within local economic development planning processes. It has also provided a context within which to situate the premise of this thesis as outlined in Chapter 1 on the need for a more analytic and systematic approach to examining governance issues in relation to the tourism-poverty nexus. Within Ghana’s current form of decentralisation, tourism planning is not fully decentralised and thus tourism related agencies are not able to directly make inputs into the making of District Medium Term Development Plans (DMTDPs). This issue is compounded by the position of tourism within successive national economic development plans.

Furthermore, the tourism sector itself has been shown to be characterised by a high level of complexity and diversity in terms of the institutional actors involved in the governing process. Given the complexity and diversity of stakeholders, interaction within the tourism sector is shaped by resulting dynamics due to conflicting interests. It is however aspects of these dynamics that offer the potential for change in the governability of tourism sector. Sometimes, this change is positive in leading to an alignment of stakeholder images, instruments and action potential. This chapter has however shown that in the tourism sector of Ghana, the dynamics within the sector
more often than not make governing a challenge. Systematic implementation of tourism development plans continues to be a challenge facing the sector due to financial limitations and the regular change to the portfolio of the tourism ministry. The issues explored in this chapter raise a number of issues for current understanding of the tourism-poverty nexus.

First, this chapter has shown that tourism is a socio-economic and political activity within a highly complex system made up of a variety of actors and stakeholders (Britton, 1982; Ioannides and Debbage, 1998; Waayers et al, 2012; Adu-Ampong, 2014). A key point highlighted here is that the tourism policy and planning process is not simply a technocratic process but rather a social and political process that is open to contestations. Such understanding raises significant questions for the conclusion of Rogerson (2014) that tourism policy and planning when embedded as part of local and regional economic development can have a greater impact on poverty reduction. As has been shown by the policy implementation literature, it is important to approach policy analysis by first looking at the range of actors involved and the interactions between them (Peters and Pierre, 2006; Howlett et al., 2015). Moreover, there are questions about the extent to which one can think of policy implementation as operating in a linear process (Hill and Hupe, 2008; Sabatier, 1991). National institutional structures and underpinning political contestations need to be understood and explained first before any attempts are made at embedding tourism policy and planning in local institutions. As Harrison (2008) has noted, enhancing the use of tourism for poverty reduction requires a developmental state that sets out its development and tourism strategy around such aims. This is where the governing issues of coordination, steering and goal-oriented interventions (Kooiman, 1993) becomes important to ensure an alignment of institutions. It is within such process of alignment that institutional thickness gets formed and capacity developed for localities to grow and develop (Coulson and Ferrario, 2007).

Second, in relation to the concept of institutional thickness as conceptualised in Chapter 2, section 2.2, his chapter indicated a low level of institutional thickness within the tourism sector of Ghana. While there is a broadly shared image of tourism's potential contribution to local economic development and poverty reduction, different institutions have differing perspectives on translating this image into reality given their set of instruments and action potential. While not directly contradictory, the
application of some of the instruments are not consistent with each other due to the fact that only a few institutions operate at the national, regional and district levels at the same time. Many of the key institutions like the GTA and GHATOF operate at either the national and regional level with little presence at the local destination level. Thus, the strong presence of a plethora of institutions needed to provide local coalition-building which is a key building block of institutional thickness (Raco, 1998) is missing at local level destinations. National level institutions, although they have bigger action potential for driving national policy direction have little action potential for actually affecting the nitty-gritty of everyday tourism management and governance interactions. It is the institutions at the destination level that are likely to have the needed leverage and presence to maximise the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. However, destination level institutions such as metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) are not always involved in mutual interactions and discussions on the tourism-poverty nexus due to the structure of institutional relationships.

A policy focus on tourism-led local economic development (LED) planning necessitates the development of a certain level of institutional thickness and new forms of governance arrangements (see Chapter 2, section 2.3). This is to ensure that stakeholders have adequate governance capacity to develop and implement plans in a collaborative way. As this chapter has shown clearly, both the institutional structures for local economic development and tourism development are in a constant flux due to policy inconsistency and weak inter-agency collaboration, especially at the national and regional level. Thus at the national level, there is a lack of stakeholder governance capacity – in the sense of an alignment and coordination between images, instruments and action potentials held by various stakeholders – in planning for the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Low levels of communication, collaboration and coordination not only affect governance capacity but also the extent of institutional thickness at the national level around the tourism-poverty nexus. The open question then is whether localising tourism-led local economic development planning processes offers a solution to these problems. Such a change of scale might not be immune to wider political and institutional conditions even though Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) have the constitutional mandate to plan, manage and govern overall local economic development in the areas under their jurisdiction.
In the next chapters I present the empirical case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The development of this strategy was led by the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA) in the Central Region of Ghana. The KEEA sought to utilise its cultural heritage tourism assets as a catalyst for LED and poverty reduction. The process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy faced challenges in terms of the fit of images, instruments and action potential of all stakeholders. Some stakeholders like the GMMB did not have the corresponding instruments to ensure that tourism in Elmina was being leveraged for local economic development and poverty reduction. The KEEA on the hand, while having some of the instruments needed, did not have access to a conducive action potential through which it could encourage collaboration and coordination. These factors shaped the level of institutional thickness developed for implementation of the Strategy. Stakeholders’ inability to provide an adequate fit between the images, instruments and action potential for the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was further compounded by changes brought in through national and local electoral and political cycles.
Chapter 5

The Elmina 2015 Strategy: plans, actors and stakeholder governance capacity

The previous chapter analysed and examined the governance of tourism planning and local economic development planning in Ghana as a whole and provides the context in which to situate the rest of the thesis. This chapter offers an analysis of the Elmina 2015 Strategy using the theoretical and analytical framework developed in Chapter Two. Particularly in this chapter, I examine the stakeholder governance capacity upon which the delivery and implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was anchored. The aim is to identify the particular ways in which different aspects of stakeholder governance capacity shaped the process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The analysis in this chapter is therefore based on the three key elements of stakeholder governance capacity – images, instruments and action potential.

There are four sections to this chapter the first of which provides an account of the socio-economic conditions of Elmina, the development of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and the stakeholders involved. The second section analyses the images held by stakeholders in terms of the facts, visions and presuppositions they attributed to what could be achieved from the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This section also provides an in-depth analysis of the sector strategy document in which the idea of the Elmina 2015 Strategy is given full expression. The third section identifies and examines how the various instruments available to stakeholders enabled and constrained the extent to which images were translated into action. Finally, the fourth section analyses the socio-political room for action - i.e. action potential – within which stakeholders were to implement the Elmina 2015 Strategy.
5.1 Reinventing Elmina: European African town of history, heritage and poverty

Given its well-documented extraordinary past, it is impossible to do justice to the complex history of Elmina in a few pages. This section therefore briefly highlights some of the historical trajectories that are relevant to this study. The pre-colonial and colonial periods in Elmina cannot be discussed in detail due to space constraints. However, particular attention will be given to how key historical trajectories have shaped the contemporary socio-economic dynamics of the city.

Imbued with over 700 years of history, the modern city of Elmina traces its roots to the adventures of Kwaa Amankwa. Local history has it that Kwaa Amankwa a native of the nearby Eguafo village on one of his hunting expeditions towards the coast came across a stream which he christened Anomansa - meaning an inexhaustible supply of water. He subsequently brought over people from Eguafo to come and settle in this place thereby founding the village of Amankwa Krom (Henige, 1974). The traditional name of Anomansa became superseded by the Portuguese name of 'La Mina' ('The Mine) in reference to the abundance of gold in the area. Over time the Portuguese name became localised as 'Edina' and later anglicised as Elmina. Thus at present Edina is the traditional name of the area while Elmina represents the English name. Traditionally inhabitants of Elmina trace their ancestry to the Ashanti Kingdom of interior Ghana. Consequently, Elmina was long considered as an independent city-state while the surrounding settlements formed part of the Fante Kingdom.

The year 1470 marked a change in the trajectory of Elmina's development when Portuguese explorers Juan de Santaran and Pedro d'Escobara landed at the coast. Subsequently, twelve ships with 600 men arrived in Elmina from Portugal on 19th January 1482 lead by Don Diego d'Azambuja. The chief of Elmina at the time, Nana Kobina Ansah I agreed and leased land for Don Diego d'Azambuja to build St. George's Castle (Essah, 2001). This made Elmina to be the "first place in the whole of Africa for a land title deed to be signed" between locals and European explorers. The building of the Castle rejuvenated Elmina's development and made it a centre of commerce with surrounding regions as well as a key node in an international trading network between

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73 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 16.07.2015
Africa, Europe and the Americas. In 1637, the Dutch took over control of the castle from the Portuguese and continued with the booming transatlantic slave trade. It was during this time that Elmina came to be known as the European African city owing to an increased settlement of Dutch merchants in the city. European-styled merchant houses were built and the city layout was reconfigured to Dutch standards. In 1871, the British took over and after the abolition of the slave trade, used the castle as the central administrative centre during colonial rule. In the aftermaths of Ghana’s independence in 1957, the castle was used for various purposes including: as an office for the Ghana Education service, as a District Assembly office and as a policy training academy before its inscription unto the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1979 under criteria (iv) – ‘to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history’. It was only after this time that the Elmina Castle which remains the oldest European building in Africa, became recognised as a tourist attraction site and efforts were made to preserve and present it as such (Bruner, 1996).

The geo-political and socio-economic state of Elmina

With a 2012 population of just over 23,000 (GSS, 2014b), Elmina is the biggest settlement in, and the capital of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) Municipality of the Central Region of Ghana, headed by the Municipal Chief Executive. The KEEA Municipality is made up of six zonal councils, 54 electoral areas and 15 decentralised departments. There are four overlapping traditional areas/councils within the municipality – these being Komenda, Edina (Elmina), Eguafo and Abrem traditional areas. The population of these areas are largely Fanti in ethnicity. Thus, as well as being the seat of the Elmina Urban Council as per the decentralisation policies in place, Elmina also doubles up as the capital of the Edinaman Traditional Council which is headed by the Paramount Chief. This dual system of governance within Elmina requires cooperation and dialogue between the political system and the traditional system in many areas of socio-economic policy making. This is because both the political administrative structures and the traditional structures have responsibility for the overall development of the area under their jurisdiction. Out of the four major traditional occupations in Elmina – gold prospecting, fishing, salt making and pottery – salt making and fishing with its associated processes remain the most dominant occupation in contemporary times (see figure 16 below), in addition to the ubiquitous petty trading and commerce. It is estimated that 60% of employment in Elmina is in
the informal sector while the remaining 40% of formal sector employment is found in teaching, nursing and government jobs at the KEEA Municipal offices (KEEA, 2002). The informal sector includes activities such as fishing, ship building, fish processing, salt mining, artisanal self-employment, agriculture and petty trading.

Figure 16 Fishing boats in the Benya Lagoon with the Elmina Castle in sight

Poverty incidence is widespread in Elmina and is manifested in a number of indicators. These include high rates of unemployment, high school dropout rates, high rates of child delinquency, low school enrolment rates, high rates of teenage pregnancy among others. For instance, the results of the 2010 Ghana Population and Housing Census shows that “at least three in every ten persons [in the KEEA municipality] are economically not active (32.4%)” and that “one key finding of important social and health implication is the poor nature of housing condition in the Municipality which confirms the relative poverty of the residents” (GSS, 2014:70) – see figure 17 below. As the KEEA Municipal Coordinating Director concedes, “...yes we have poverty, the bulk of people are poor so to speak and if you go into the hinterland you see people depend on seasonal cropping and they are peasant farmers, from hand to mouth. This is how they've survived all the way”74. The Municipal Assembly identifies the key development

74 Interview with Alhaji Musah, Municipal Coordinating Director, KEEA, Elmina 04.11.2014
challenges in Elmina and its environs as found in education, agriculture, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), health and local economic development. Improvements in these areas are considered as essential for improving socio-economic development and poverty reduction. It is in this regard that beginning in the mid-1990s, tourism came to be seen as a potential 'third sector' growth pole in Elmina - after fishing and salt mining - which could serve as a catalyst for local economic development (Holden et al., 2011).

Figure 17 A shot of the Elmina Township from the hill of Fort Java

Elmina is endowed with a number of cultural heritage tourism resources and assets. These include the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Elmina Castle and Fort St. Jago, 18th and 19th century built traditional Asafo Posts, Old Merchant houses, the Old Dutch Cemetery, the Bakatue and Edina Bronya traditional festivals and a number of historical landmarks in addition to a long stretch of beach and the Benya Lagoon. These assets have long been noted as having the potential to attract a large number of both domestic and international tourists to Elmina. The first serious attempt at developing tourism in Elmina as part of a strategy to stimulate regional and local economic development and tackle poverty came under the Central Regional Integrated Development Programme (CERIDEP). CERIDEP, which was funded by the UNDP and

75 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Planning Officer, KEEA, Elmina 23.07.2015: KEEA Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017
USAID, was implemented by the Central Regional Development Commission (CEDECOM) between 1993 and 1998. This project was aimed at developing an integrated tourism programme for the Central Region culminating in the restoration of the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles as well as the development of the Canopy Walkway at the Kakum National Park. Thus in 1995, the Elmina Castle and Fort St. Jago were partly renovated and given fresh painting. Unlike in the case of Cape Coast where a number of historic houses were also renovated through home-owner grants, the project in Elmina was isolated rather than integrated into overall economic development strategy. In its evaluation reports, the UNDP identified a lack of coordination between stakeholders and recommended the involvement of the Municipal Assemblies and Chiefs as stakeholders in future tourism related programmes and projects (cited in Sonne, 2010). These recommendations were later to be applied in the subsequent tourism development project that came to Elmina.

The Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme

Given its historical role in Ghanaian-European relations, the Elmina Township has seen a number of major development initiatives taking place in the late 1990s to the early 2000s. These included the CERIDEP project and the construction of market stalls, provision of waste containers and trucks through a World Bank loan scheme under the Urban II and III projects. Furthermore, a fish nursery and fish processing centre had been constructed with support from the French and Canadian governments as had the provision of waste bins and other equipment to the Waste Department of the KEEA Municipality by CORDAID and the German Embassy in Accra. The various development projects initiated in Elmina in particular and the KEEA Municipality in general, have been characterised by isolated impacts and a lack of an integrated approach to addressing the development challenges of the city and the municipality at large. It was in this regard that the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme (ECHMP) was initiated in the year 2000 under the leading auspices of the KEEA Municipal Assembly.

The ECHMP was an attempt to provide a coordinated effort towards existing and ongoing initiatives in order to define and develop an integrated approach to the development of Elmina. The ECHMP aimed at stimulating the development potentials in Elmina through the creation of new local employment opportunities in order to
alleviate poverty and improve living standards\textsuperscript{76}. With initial funding from the Dutch government, a fundamental aim of the ECHMP was urban heritage conservation and the revitalisation of identified mutual heritage between Ghana and the Netherlands. This mutual heritage which constituted the system-to-be-governed within the ECHMP process refers to the evolved heritage still evident in Elmina today. The system-to-be-governed was comprised of primarily the Elmina Castle, Fort St. Jago, Java Museum, Old Dutch Cemetery, Asafo Posts, St. Joseph’s Catholic Church building and museum, the Methodist Church Chapel building, numerous merchant houses and the very layout of the city of Elmina. It was these (potential) tourist assets that underpinned the overall objective of the ECHMP which was to develop a “clear-cut strategy and institutional framework for integrated urban cultural heritage conservation in Elmina town and to revitalise the identified mutual heritage”\textsuperscript{77}.

The governing system within which to develop and implement the ECHMP strategy was made up of the following key institutions and actors. The Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) Municipal was the primary stakeholder in the preparation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This was done in close collaboration with the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB), the Institute for Local Government Studies (ILGS) in Accra and with technical support from the Institute of Housing and Urban Development (IHS) at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and the University of Groningen (RUG) both in the Netherlands. In addition, the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust (GHCT), the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA), the Regional Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Regional Town and Country Planning Department, the Public Works Department and the Regional Attorney General’s Department were also involved in a supervisory role. Moreover, a large number of business leaders and community groups were involved in the preparation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

In order to create a sense of local ownership, the governing interactions for the ECHMP process were designed in such a way that allowed multiple public consultations and involvement of the community. There were thus four phases to the planning process of the ECHMP (see figure 18 below). In the first phase, a number of public consultations were held in order to identify key stakeholders who were to later form working groups. One of the first outputs from this phase was the development of the Elmina Profile

\textsuperscript{76} KEEA (2002a) The Elmina 2015 Strategy
\textsuperscript{77} KEEA (2002b:1) The Elmina Profile
based on the public consultation and desk research. The Elmina Profile served as a baseline document that highlighted various development issues in Elmina. The centrepiece of this first phase was the Elmina Town Consultation held between 15th and 18th April, 2002, the official opening of which was attended by Prince Willem Alexander (currently King Willem Alexander) and Princes Maxima of the Netherlands and the chiefs and people of the Elmina traditional area. The presence of the Dutch royalty underlined the high level of importance that was attached to the ECHMP and its objective of preserving the mutual heritage between the Dutch and Elmina (Ghana).

![Figure 18 The four phases of the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme](image)

Source: KEEA (2002)

In the phase II of the ECHMP process, five priority areas were arrived at through a series of community stakeholder consultations. These were: 1) drainage and waste management; 2) fishing and fishing harbour; 3) tourism and local economic development; 4) health and; 5) education. Following on from this, phase III involved the formation of working groups of about 20 members each for the identified priority areas. The working groups were tasked with developing specific strategic action plans and projects that can be implemented for each given priority area. This might be interpreted as perhaps a sign of the lack of joined-up governance of the process at the outset. However, the setting up of these working groups made up of a wide range of stakeholders was an attempt at collaborative planning. The various strategic action plans were then aggregated by the core Task Force group of the ECHMP into the Elmina
2015 Strategy. The Elmina 2015 Strategy mapped out a strategy for the future integrated development of Elmina accompanied by specific action and project plans for all the five priority areas. These project and action plans were to be implemented across phase III and phase IV. With its tagline of ‘Building on the Past to Create a Better Future’, the success of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was predicated on the effective implementation of priority three – tourism and local economic development.

5.2 Reimagining the Elmina Castle as a catalyst for local economic development

As developed in Chapter 2 section 2.1, the concept of stakeholder governance capacity denotes the capabilities available to stakeholders to interact with others by forming images and selecting appropriate instruments of implementation within a given socio-political room for action. In this section, I first identify the key stakeholders involved in the formulation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and analyse the images they held of tourism’s role in local economic development. Importantly, the analysis will highlight some of the underlying contradictory images stakeholders held regarding what the Elmina 2015 Strategy was ‘originally’ intended to represent.

The cast, roles and backstory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy

The seeds of the idea that turned out to be the Elmina 2015 Strategy can be traced to the Save Elmina Association (SEA). The SEA was founded in 1990 by a group of Dutch nationals and a handful of Elmina citizens (Holsey, 2008). Some of the Dutch nationals involved in the setting up of the SEA were either residents in Ghana or had conducted their research on the Dutch connections in Elmina78. A key Dutch member of the SEA at the start was Dr. Michel Doortmont who was then at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and would later be part of the University of Groningen team providing technical assistance to the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The SEA, which was registered as a

78 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA and founding member of SEA, 16.07.2015
non-profit non-governmental association of citizens and friends of Elmina published a number of ‘Save Elmina’ Magazines.

The first of these magazines was published in 1995 through the financial support of the Dutch Embassy in Ghana for a production run of 500 copies. The preface of this first edition was written by Thomas Austen Ankumah, the then District Chief Executive (DCE) of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) District Assembly. In this preface, the DCE applauds the work of the SEA in drawing attention to Elmina’s historical and architectural heritage. The DCE proposes the development of sister-city relations between Elmina and those cities in the Netherlands with strong connections to the trade house that were built in Elmina. The preface is signed off with the “…hope that it [the efforts of the SEA] soon will result in new private investment that will rekindle the rehabilitation of Elmina’s monumental town centre” (SEA, 1995:3). The SEA magazine made the case about the tourist potential of restoring the many historical houses found in Elmina. Using an example from Cote d’Ivoire, the writers of the magazine were of the view that the restoration of one or two houses could see the beginning of the rehabilitation of the whole town. The magazine contained a detailed architectural drawings showing how the rehabilitation of Bridge House could be adapted to serve as a restaurant with a roof top bar. Due to the inability to attract the needed funding, the work of the SEA slowed down towards the late 1990s.

Around the end of 1999 and early 2000, the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) wrote a project proposal for the rehabilitation of Elmina castle. They applied to the Dutch government for funding through a partnership with the Netherlands Institute for Conservation, Art and Science (NICAS)79. For the GMMB, the image they held was basically one of a simple conservation/restoration/rehabilitation project of the Elmina Castle to prevent the collapse of the Castle. The intention of the GMMB was to develop and make use of local capacity for consultancy and implementation of the project. The GMMB’s proposal was thus solely focused on the Elmina Castle with no bearing on the surrounding Elmina Township. Wind of this project proposal got to the people based at the Institute of Housing Studies and Urban Development (IHS) of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam and Michel Doortmont who had by then moved to the

79 Interview with Nicholas Ivor, Central and Western Regional Director of GMMB, 30.10.2014; Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
University of Groningen (RUG)\textsuperscript{80}. After the GMMB entered into discussions with the IHS and RUG, it was suggested that the best way to secure funding was to expand the scope of the project proposal beyond just restoring the castle. From the interviews, it appears that the Dutch counterparts had a much stronger and decisive role in expanding on the original idea of castle renovation. Building on the experiences of the IHS, it was decided that the proposal should link the rehabilitation of the castle to the revitalisation of the whole Elmina Township – bringing in the original idea earlier espoused by the SEA. This was based on the recognition that the community needed to see a direct benefit from any rehabilitation work on the castle. This is because,

\begin{quote}
\textit{"...people will come to the castle, within an hour or two they are finished. There is nothing to sustain their stay here for at least three days and the local community does not benefit from that type of tourism and it was very clear that the Castle did not bring any economic benefit to the people so they didn't care, they didn't care to litter around it, to put canoes around it, sometimes to use it as places of convenience."}\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

### The sector strategy and vision for tourism-led local economic development

The Elmina 2015 Strategy was comprised of three key reports: 1) Sector Strategy and Vision; 2) Project Portfolios and; 3) Elmina Profile and Summary Profile. The Elmina Profile was a report on the socio-economic development and political situation of Elmina. This served as basis for developing the Sector Strategy and Vision as well as the Project Portfolios. The Elmina Profile also served as a baseline against which to evaluate its outcomes. Out of the three reports, it is the Sector Strategy and Vision report that offers an insight into how stakeholders arrived at an image of how tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction were related in Elmina. In this section, I provide a detailed analysis of the Sector Strategy and Vision. I highlight how it conceptualised the relationship between tourism and poverty reduction and make the argument that the entire strategy was hinged on tourism.

In the foreword of the report, the then District Chief Executive of the KEEA starts of by explaining that it is the existing cultural heritage in Elmina that is being renovated and

\textsuperscript{80} Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015

\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
conserved in an integrated manner. He is quick to add that “...conservation of heritage is not considered in isolation but in a broader environment of poverty, social and economic development” (KEEA, 2002a:7). An underlying assumption and hope in the foreword was that the implementation of the strategy will not only preserve heritage but at the same time improve upon the living conditions of the people in the city. The introduction of the report takes the discussion further by noting that “[u]nfortunately, the surroundings of the fort and castle are a far cry from an attractive area for tourists to linger around and spend money” (KEEA, 2002a:9). While fishing was considered to be the major economic activity in Elmina, it was nonetheless “[w]ithout doubt, [that] the historic buildings are the main assets of the town” (KEEA, 2002a:9). From this starting point, it became simply a matter of connecting other sectors of the local economy to the potential offered by the estimated 100, 000 tourists who annually come to Elmina in order to expand tourism-related employment opportunities. The actual visitor numbers to the Elmina Castle between 2007 and 2015 are shown in the figure 19 below.

![Figure 19 Elmina Castle visitor numbers, 2007-2015](image)

**Figure 19 Elmina Castle visitor numbers, 2007-2015**

Source: Author’s calculation based on raw daily visitor records at the Elmina Castle.

Thus the Elmina 2015 Strategy set out a tourism-led local economic development planning strategy that went beyond simple heritage conservation. In summary, the argument was this;
The Elmina 2015 strategy goes beyond restoring monuments. It believes that with improved tourist infrastructure, the revitalisation of the existing monuments and the development of other important cultural sites, tourism can become a major economic activity in Elmina and serve to improve the general standard of living in the town. The strategy identifies tourism as an entry point in facilitating sustainable development through an integrated development approach. Thus mutual cultural heritage and monuments serve as a springboard in working towards improvement of living standards. At the same time, the improvements to the other sectors such as health, education and waste management will enhance the touristic potential of Elmina, thereby allowing for a synergistic development framework.

KEEA (2002a:10)

It is on this basis that this thesis focuses on the tourism and local economic development component of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. A key reason for this focus is that the success of the other areas was to a large extent predicated on the success of the tourism and local economic development priority area. Consequently, while the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, the outcomes of the tourism and local economic development component is representative of the larger plan of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. An understanding of the extent of success achieved under the tourism and local economic development component provides insights into the extent of success in the other components.

Under the tourism and local economic development component, the main problem identified was the fact that the average length of tourist stay in Elmina was 1 night and the resulting limited benefit accruing to the town from tourism. This was attributed to among other things the undeveloped tourist attractions, limited tourist information and promotion of sites, inadequate tourism facilities, poor sanitation, a lack of community awareness and limited institutional capacity. On the basis of these identified problems, a selected number of strategic actions were prioritised. The overall strategic objective for tourism was "...to make Elmina more attractive and interesting to tourists so that they will increase their length of stay [through] ...improvement of tourist infrastructure and marketing sites [and the]... development of un(der)-developed attractions like the Asafo Posts, the Catholic museum and the Dutch cemetery" (KEEA, 2002a:61). A key shortcoming within the Elmina 2015 Strategy process at this point was the failure to situate tourism in Elmina within the larger context of the reality of tourism development in Ghana as a whole (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.4). This would have allowed stakeholders to understand the tourism product in Ghana that includes
Elmina Castle, the profile of visitors, the key source markets and the role of local tour operators in shaping travel itineraries. Such an understanding might have allowed a different way of determining which projects were to be implemented and how to connect them to the reality of tourism development in Ghana. This was however not the case.

In addition to the rehabilitation of selected parts of the Elmina Castle and Fort St. Jago and a proposal for renovating some selected historic houses through a home-owner scheme programme, 15 specific project proposals were developed under the tourism and local economic development priority area of the Elmina 2015 Strategy (see table 7 below).

Table 7 Projects to be implemented under priority area 3: Tourism and Local Economic Development with indicative total cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Total Cost (in Euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project 41: Erection of signposts at strategic locations in town</td>
<td>€ 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 42: Establishment of an internet café in Elmina</td>
<td>€ 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 43: Upgrading of Kiosks</td>
<td>€ 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 44: Rehabilitation of the historic site adjacent to the Castle</td>
<td>€ 22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 45: Developing of community performing arts night theatre</td>
<td>€ 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 46: Providing street lighting in Elmina town and illumination of the Elmina and St. Jago Castles</td>
<td>€ 43,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 47: Diversify choice of eateries and hotels in Elmina Town and provide alternative services for visitors</td>
<td>€ 830,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 48: Redevelopment of Trafalgar Square</td>
<td>€ 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 49: Tree planting</td>
<td>€ 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 50: Skill development and capacity building</td>
<td>€ 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 51: Redevelop the former government garden into a children playground</td>
<td>€ 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project 52: Improve the salt industry</td>
<td>€ 2,900,000 (with € 20,000 for feasibility study)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It was expected that the implementation of these projects would lead to “…the attainment of longer stays by tourist [which] will contribute to local economic growth and generate employment and income in Elmina. It will thereby contribute to the town's longer-term development goals including its social, economic and heritage revitalisation” (KEEA, 2002a:61). In the conclusion section of the document, the centrality of the tourism and local economic development component to the whole Elmina 2015 Strategy is reiterated. The Elmina 2015 Strategy starts from the restoration and management of existing heritage assets for tourism. It is after this that tourism’s potential for local economic development and poverty reduction becomes mutually-reinforcing with the other components of health, sanitation and education. The Strategy document succinctly notes that;

But this strategy goes beyond restoring monuments. It recognises the importance of taking away the factors that presently prevent visitors from spending more time and money in Elmina Town. Only if the drains will be cleaned, illegal waste dumps are cleared, waste is collected routinely and visitors are not constantly harassed by children, visitors are tempted to further explore the town. Paving the streets of the New Town and upgrading of some strategic sites such as the former Government Garden and the historic site next to the Castle will further improve the town image of Elmina. An increase in tourist numbers can make this sector an important industry to complement the present sources of local employment. KEEA (2002a:84)

The last section of the Strategy document is titled “A Vision for the year 2015” and it is here that the ultimate vision for Elmina is set out and is worth quoting in part. The vision is that;

“In 2015 we envisage Elmina to be a thriving town in which fishing is still the main economic activity but has significant other sectors of employment in the salt mining, boat building but most importantly the tourist industry. The unique heritage assets and the picturesque harbour make the town Ghana’s prime tourist destination. The excellent road conditions allow tourists to reach Elmina by car within 2 hours from Accra, while the building of airstrip is underway. The town is to be visited by over 150,000 tourists annually that spend an average of two
This vision for what Elmina will look like in 2015 did not however materialise as originally envisaged. The hope that tourism will serve as a catalyst for local economic development and contribute to poverty reduction turned out to be less real than expected. There are a number of reasons that account for the disjuncture between objectives and eventual outcomes. Key among these is what appears to be a failure (or oversight) of Urban Solutions as the consultants to undertake a detailed market research of tourist behaviour in relation to visits to Elmina. For instance, the basis on which the projected annual visits of 150,000 tourist was made remains unclear. Records at the Elmina Castle shows that in the year ending 2014, there were just about 58,000 tourists which is paltry compared to the projected figure envisaged in the Strategy document. The design of the Strategy failed to take into account how Elmina as a destination is intrinsically a part of the regional tourism product. This means that the majority of tourists visit Elmina as part of a day's itinerary that tend to include the Cape Coast Castle and the Kakum National Park which are all lying within about 30kms of each other. From this perspective, the anticipated average spend of two nights was going to be a challenge since for most tourists, a visit to the Elmina Castle is part of a tight itinerary that leaves little time to engage with the rest of the town (Adu-Ampong, 2016). Perhaps, one conclusion to be drawn from how the vision was set up is that there was not a realistic assessment of what was possible in terms of tourism development and the potential of tourism within Elmina to contribute to local economic development and poverty reduction.

The planning process leading up to the formulation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy follows a classic stakeholder identification-stakeholder consultation-stakeholder agreed upon action plans process – which is commonly referred to as collaborative/communicative planning (Healey. 1997, 1999; see also Brand and Gaffikin, 2007 for a useful critique). While the planning process to arrive at the Elmina 2015 Strategy might pass as unproblematic, its implementation was anything but that. However, to account for the problematic nature of implementation, one must necessarily take a closer reading of the planning process. This allows for the identification of the writings that had always been on the wall, so to speak, but which were overlooked in the euphoria of achieving consensus and arriving at a shared strategy. In the next main section, I will outline and
assess the images held by key stakeholders that are (were) involved in the tourism and local economic development planning process.

The role and influence of external donors in consolidating the image of a rehabilitated Elmina Castle

The original image held by the GMMB, the IHS and the RUG after the start of the ECHMP shifted from a project of castle rehabilitation to one of an integrated tourism-led local economic development project. Having expanded this way, it became necessary to get the politico-administrative backing of the Ghanaian state. Consequently, the KEEA Assembly was brought on board since it is the local government body charged with the responsibility for overall planning and development of the district of which Elmina is the district capital. It therefore became clear that the KEEA had to act as the leading agency for the project proposal instead of the GMMB. Furthermore the Dutch Institute for Conservation, which was the preferred partner of the GMMB, was left out at this stage and the Ghana Institute for Local Government Studies (ILGS) was also brought on board. It is noteworthy that although the project was basically proposing a vision of heritage tourism-led local economic development planning process, neither the Ghana Tourism Authority (GTA) nor the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts was involved. With the proposal ready, funding was sought and secured from the Culture Fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science in the Netherlands. It is from this funding that the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme was born.

The essence of the image held by stakeholders at this point can be put like this – an integrated approach to cultural heritage asset restoration and management can lead to an improvement in the tourist, social and economic conditions of Elmina. The idea was that a diversification of tourist attractions and the maintenance of existing assets will lead to increased visits and duration of stay of tourists. This will then feed into the local economy through the multiplier effects of tourists’ spending. The image of tourism’s

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82 Interview with Nicholas Ivor, Central and Western Regional Director of GMMB, 30.10.2014
role in local economic development held by stakeholders at the conclusion of the ECHMP was given expression in the following documents:

- The Elmina Profile
- The Elmina 2015 Strategy
- 15 project proposals under priority area III – tourism and LED
- a number of project proposals for the other priority areas
- project proposal for the rehabilitation of Elmina Castle and Fort St. Jago
- project proposal for renovating selected historic buildings.

At the conclusion of the ECHMP and the production of the documents outlined above, the KEEA was given the responsibility of implementing the projects by first securing the necessary funding. When it became clear that additional funding could be secured from the Dutch government and the European Union’s Development Fund (EDF), the representatives of the IHS established a consultancy firm – Urban Solutions BV – as a spin-off from the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in 2003. Once the funding for implementing some of the Elmina 2015 Strategy projects had been secured, Urban Solutions BV bid for and won the contract for providing consultancy services for project implementation. This is how it happened in the words of interviewees who witnessed the process;

“…you know people are also fast. After the proposal and the, soliciting for funds to, Paul, I think they knew where they could get funding so they formed before the, they formed a consortium to manage the programme so that is how come the Urban Solutions came in because what happened was that they were not paying the officers for the job, they were always taking consultants so they felt that okay if I have done to this point and there is money coming and for somebody to be, if I have a group who can do the same thing why not? So that is the way I see it, I perceived it because he was the one who started from the root and then maybe…”

“...let me put it this way, the people of Urban Solutions were originally employees of IHS – Institute of Housing Studies in Rotterdam – and to make themselves functionally and also to maintain themselves in jobs that they wanted, they identified places which need help and together with the locals brought up strategic plans with action plans, with budgets and in collaboration with the

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83 Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015
locals, sought funds from institutions and it is from the funding that they also carve out their remuneration.”84

This situation however did not sit well with the original image held by the GMMB who wanted to use the project to make use of and develop local capacity in consultancy service provision. In fact the GMMB also formed a small business unit to bid for consultancy services and projects relating to the Elmina Castle but they were not successful. This was in part explained through the funding rules which stipulated that one cannot be a benefactor and a contractor of the same project85. Nonetheless this became a source of disenchantment for the GMMB towards the whole project leading to some degree of ambivalence towards the later stages of project implementation.

The analysis above provides a number of insights into the processes through which stakeholders of the Elmina 2015 Strategy developed their image of tourism and its role in local economic development. The Elmina 2015 Strategy document shows no evidence of a systematic review of tourist behaviour in Elmina. However, reference is made to information from the Ghana Tourism Authority concerning the average length of tourist stay in Elmina which happens to be one night. The facts about the number of visitors to the castle and their short stay and lack of interaction within the Elmina Township shaped stakeholders’ views. Stakeholders saw that given a diversified and wide range of attraction sites, visitors were more likely to spend more time and money within the community which would then catalyse a number of local economic development opportunities. Thus the linking of tourism to local economic development as expressed through the Elmina 2015 Strategy was underlined by a number of assumptions regarding tourist behaviour, tourism multiplier effect and the likelihood of increased tourism leading to a rejuvenation of other sectors of the local economy. These assumptions are aptly expressed also in the view of interviewees such as this;

“You see, I don’t know how to, I, I, am not find the words to really describe, because the moment you tackle tourism, you tackle all other sectors of the economy. We say that people produce let’s say agriculture, people are producing they are not processing so people lose their harvest and all their produce and all that, do you think that if we have another million or 2 million people visiting

84 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
85 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
Ghana and spend a day or two, our demand for foodstuff wouldn’t go up, that whatever is produced in the village will get bought”86

There was a broadly shared consensus among stakeholders about what they perceived to be the relationship between tourism and local economic development. Stakeholders held the image summarised in the aspiration of the Elmina 2015 Strategy which was to “restore and manage mutual heritage existing in Elmina; for it to become the forefront of an integrated programme to improve the tourist, social and economic condition of Elmina”87. Underneath this unified image, there was a bit of infighting with regards to the direction in which the original idea of the GMMB had become expanded. The sharing of information (communication) and the aggregation of it (coordination) to arrive at an image of tourism’s potential for local economic development and poverty reduction was characterised by the diversity of stakeholders, the complexity of their internal procedures and dynamics of conflicting interests. There are challenges in aligning the images, instruments and action potential of the stakeholders. Thus the process of transforming stakeholders’ images was constrained by structural elements of the judgements of some of the stakeholders like the GMMB who were not too pleased that their preferred partner in the Dutch Institute for Conservation was left out of the project. The failure to develop and make use of the capacity of local stakeholders for the consultancy services was also a source of filter that shaped stakeholders’ images. Indeed, this issue of a lack of local stakeholder capacity to continue with implementation and the failure to develop capacity is one that I will come back to later. The key point here is that the images held by stakeholders with regards to project design shaped their governance capacity when it comes to implementing project objectives.

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86 Interview with Francis Cobbinah, Executive Director of Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, 29.09.2014
87 KEEA (2002b: 86) The Elmina 2015 Strategy
5.3 Instruments to link tourism to local economic development

A key aspect of stakeholder governance capacity is the availability of instruments that can be selected to translate images into tangible actions and outcomes. Within the ECHMP process there were a number of instruments available to and used by different stakeholders. As Kooiman (2008) notes, the design and use of instruments involves competing interests and tensions. Thus stakeholders’ choice of instrument is not through neutral selection but is arrived at vis-à-vis their position in society and within the governance system. In this section, I provide a descriptive analysis of the key instruments that were at play in the implementation of ECMP and the Elmina 2015 Strategy projects – politico-legal and administrative, communicative instruments and financial instruments. The key point from this section is to highlight the fact that these instruments were dispersed among various stakeholders. This dispersal of instruments and underlying resources and accompanying lack of communication, collaboration and coordination served as structural constraints to the full achievement of project objectives. These structural constraints were not adequately considered and so there were no provisions made in the setup of the Elmina 2015 Strategy to overcome these.

Politico-legal and administrative instruments

As described in section 5.1 above, the seeds that finally yielded the Elmina 2015 Strategy are found in the early efforts of the Save Elmina Association (SEA). As a non-profit non-governmental organisation, the SEA did not have at their disposal the essential political, legal and administrative tools with which to take forward their ideas. This is why even for their magazine they relied on the District Chief Executive of the KEEA to give it a sort of political backing. When the GMMB resurrected the idea, albeit in a more circumscribed form, they were relying on the legal and administrative prerogative they had (see discussion in Chapter 4 about the roles and responsibilities of the GMMB). The GMMB is the legal custodian of the Elmina Castle and has management responsibilities for it. Thus if the project had ended up being solely about the Elmina Castle then the GMMB would not have needed the support of any other institution. This appears to have been the preferred position of the GMMB88. However,

88 Interviews with GMMB officials in Accra and Cape Coast
once the project had been expanded to cover overall local economic development of Elmina, there was the need to involve the KEEA Municipal Assembly.

The politico-legal backing of the KEEA to the ECHMP rested on the provisions in the Local Government Act 462 of 1993 and section 5 of the National Development Planning System Act 480 of 1994. Under these legislations the KEEA is a planning authority and the only institution legally mandated to prepare local and/or sub-district development plans either directly or through delegation to lower tiers of government like Town and Urban Councils. The proposals for the ECHMP therefore fell into the category of a sub district local economic development plan of Elmina and hence the KEEA had to be the leading institution for the project in order to provide the requisite politico-legal instruments. The KEEA had the technocratic mechanism and tools for the planning process as the preparation of District Medium Term Development Plans (MTDP) is one of its key responsibilities. The KEEA was therefore able to facilitate the Elmina 2015 Strategy which involved a much more detailed planning process than usually accorded to the making of the MTDP. One of the reasons for this was that the financial resources were provided by external parties. The Planning Officer at that time explains that “the Elmina 2015 Strategy, that was, for that one there was a thorough consultation, participation... [T]he resources were not provided by the assembly otherwise there was no [Elmina] 2015.”89 It must also be noted that at this point in time, a new political party had just come in into office for the first time and was eager to show that they were bringing the promised development projects to the community. This political reality was very instrumental in shaping the enthusiasm and support given to the project in the beginning (see detailed discussion in section 5.3 and Chapter 7).

Notwithstanding its legal mandate for overall development of the municipality, the remit of the KEEA did not extend to the management of the Elmina Castle or many of the other tourist assets of the municipality. These areas fell under the responsibility of the GMMB. Thus while the KEEA came to lead the preparation and implementation of the ECHMP and the Elmina 2015 Strategy plans, it was the GMMB that had the ultimate governing authority over the golden goose upon whose golden eggs all other components of the project hinged. In addition, given the dual governance structure (see section 4.1 in Chapter 4), it was imperative for the traditional council to deploy their

89 Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015
traditional authority instruments and give backing to the project. These traditional instruments consisted largely of the mobilisation of community support for and participation in the projects. Thus the politico-legal instruments that made the ECHMP process possible were dispersed across many stakeholders. During the interviews, an interesting counter perspective as to who should have ultimately been in charge for the project was given by the head of the tourism subcommittee at KEEA, who also serves on the traditional council and is often a spokesperson for the traditional council. He noted that had there been enough capacity within the traditional council, then they should have been the ones to lead the project. In his view, because of the fact that the land on which the Elmina Castle was built was first given to the Portuguese by the traditional authorities, they have the right to claim the castle as their own. In his own words,

“If the traditional council have the capacity to manage this project I would have been the first person to suggest that what, these help or whatever should have channelled through there. The reason is that any project for the people by the people for the people they handle it very well. But the traditional council weren’t in a position to handle such a big project and for that matter assembly came in as the facilitator.”

The dispersal of legislative instruments notwithstanding, stakeholders communicated, collaborated and coordinated their activities to ensure the smooth take off of the project. In the beginning, stakeholders backed the project through the politico-legal instruments available to them. However, the power to use these instruments were not transferred to a centralised body that would oversee the Elmina 2015 Strategy. There was no mechanism put in place to mitigate future misunderstandings in the course of project development and implementation. Could this have been a source of ambivalence towards the project from stakeholders like the GMMB who became inward looking once the Elmina Castle had been renovated? The fragmentation of stakeholders raises questions about whether there were institutional and organisation mechanisms put in place for continued communication, collaboration and coordination between stakeholders. This would have ensured that all stakeholders would have continued to pool their instruments together even when the initial project funding and enthusiasm had waned. It appears that once the physical projects were completed, like the rehabilitation of the Elmina Castle, the GMMB pulled back on the revenue sharing arrangements in place. This led to a reduction in the governance capacity of other stakeholders like the KEEA and the traditional council. The KEEA and the traditional
council therefore grew apathetic towards deploying the needed governing instruments like enforcing sanitation rules around the beaches and the Elmina Castle.

**Communicative Instruments**

In the initial stages of the Elmina 2015 Strategy preparation and project implementation, a number of communicative instruments were developed and used by the KEAA and other stakeholders. Throughout the 4 phases of the ECHMP, community and interest group consultations were heavily utilised for two main goals. Firstly, to accurately capture the development needs of the community and secondly, to generate a sense of ownership among the community members towards the project. Thus it was through a communicative process of dialogue and negotiation that the final 5 priority areas were agreed upon. However, there was some level of discontent among community members with regards to how the communicative instruments were deployed. Those community members who were involved in the working groups and taskforce were “Not too happy because they thought that meetings should be paid for by way of sitting allowances and all that...the locals sometimes thought that the money has been given to Urban Solutions and they were just sitting on it and ahu, so there, there was the discontentment.”90 Thus while the use of communicative instruments were useful for developing a sense of community ownership for the project, it also brought about some tensions.

In addition to community consultations, the initial phase of the Elmina 2015 Strategy also witnessed increased communication, collaboration and coordination between key stakeholders. This improvement provided the needed foundation support for the Elmina 2015 Strategy to take off. However, due to the constraints of institutional arrangements, once the initial fervour for the project had waned, the communication between stakeholders fell apart. This was especially so once the funding for the project had been expended. Currently, there is now a feeling of apathy towards communicative engagement. As summarised by the current municipal planning officer of KEAA,

“You see if you look at the key actors in that sector, you’re talking about the GTB, the GMMB, you’re talking about the others. There is no direct linkage between...”

90 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
their activities and that of the assembly. The assembly has a responsibility over the entire catchment area of the municipality yet every activity of these boards, these agencies as far as tourism is concerned is without the involvement of the assembly. So the assembly over the years have not made any effort to do any serious investment in tourism because they wouldn’t get any returns.”

What can be highlighted from the above is that there is a breakdown in communication between stakeholders. The failure to develop the channels of communication, collaboration and coordination has consequently resulted in the inability of stakeholders to fully achieve the set objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

**Financial Instruments**

At the structural level, financial resources have the propensity to enable and/or constrain the way in which images are translated into tangible actions. The availability of financial resources makes it possible to bring together the material, human, technical and social capital assets required to develop and implement projects. Within the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the source and conditions of the financial resources available served as both an avenue of constraint and enablement in shaping the final outcomes. Phase I of the ECHMP, which involved the preparation of the Elmina Profile and then the Elmina 2015 Strategy in addition to the numerous project-specific proposals, was funded through the Culture Fund of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and funds from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Project implementation funding came from the Culture Fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This funding was used to complete 5 main projects (see table 8 below). The remaining projects were completed with funding from the 9th European Union Development Fund under the so-called Cultural Heritage and Local Development in Elmina Programme (CHLDEP).
Table 8 The financial instruments and associated projects implemented under the Elmina 2015 Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Instruments</th>
<th>Projects Implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Dutch Culture Fund    | - Rehabilitation of Nana Etsiapa Hall  
|                       | - Renovation of Nana Kobina Gyan (formerly Victoria/Trafalgar) Square  
|                       | - Restoration of Van Dyke House  
|                       | - Restoration of the Dutch Cemetery and surrounding area (including Catholic Museum) |
| EU 9th European Development Fund under Elmina Cultural Heritage Local Economic Development Programme (CHLDEP) | - Rehabilitation of selected parts of St. George's (Elmina) Castle and Fort Jago  
|                       | - Rehabilitation of St. Jago Hill  
|                       | - Renovation of selected historic buildings through a home-owner scheme (20 in total)  
|                       | - Establishment of tourist information and tourist facilities  
|                       | - Training for local economic development (tourist guides, artisans, financial management etc) |
| Royal Netherlands Embassy in Ghana Funding | - Renovation of 4 Asafo Posts in Elmina |

These main sources of financial instruments were project-specific and hence once those projects were completed, there was no additional financial provision for continued maintenance of some of the projects. Some of the projects, like the renovation of historic buildings were to be partly used for income-generating ventures like guest rooms and commercial stores. However, not all these income-generating activities were successful since the image held by stakeholders regarding increased tourist numbers and length of stay in the community were not realised. An Elmina Development Fund (EDF) was also established, envisaged as a source for finance for ongoing maintenance and improvement in facilities. In addition, the EDF was to be used to train young people as tour guides as well as paving city streets in parts of Elmina.
The EDF was to be financed from donations and a daily levy of $1 on all tourists to Elmina – to be collected by owners of tourist facilities. In the 2003 document, the EDF was expected to initially generate $25,000 annually and to increase to considerably more as tourists visit Elmina and stay longer. As shown in table 9 below, there was a lot of hope placed on the expected flow of money into Elmina through Tourism.

Table 9 Expected flow of money into Elmina from Tourism
(Source: KEEA, 2002a)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visitors Annually (total)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying 1 night</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying 2 nights</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spent Locally</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,440,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,390,625</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,725,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spent on Accommodation</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2,082,500</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3,675,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel 'Levy' to EDF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>42,969</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>91,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,680,000</td>
<td>4,458,094</td>
<td>8,481,878</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDF = Elmina Development Fund

However, the EDF was poorly developed and deployed as a financial instrument. In addition to the fact that there was not much fund accrued due to poor marketing and collection, there was no clear institutional arrangement as to the management of the fund. Perhaps it is of no surprise that in the draft final report of the project compiled by Urban Solutions – the project consultants – and dated 23th October, 2006, there is no mention of the EDF. This absence of a pot of funding to carry on project implementation, especially the challenging aspect of linking increased tourist numbers to local economic development, meant that the ultimate objective of the Elmina 2015 Strategy remained unfulfilled. One way of looking at this inadequate financial planning is by examining the power imbalance and the commitment of the Urban Solutions as consultants in this project. The decision or perhaps, non-decision of Urban Solutions to talk of the long term financial sustainability of the Elmina 2015 Strategy in its final report can be seen as the ‘second face’ of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). As explored in Chapter 2, section 2.3, it appears that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was a practice run for Urban Solutions as this was their first project as a consultancy business. As a Dutch company being paid by the Dutch government and the European Union to implement a project in a developing country, the internal incentive available to Urban Solutions BV within the aid delivery process meant that they did not have to be overly concerned with failure. The development of the Elmina 2015 Strategy can
therefore been seen as a ‘trial and error’ process through which Urban Solutions could gain experience for future consultancy work. A key reason for this is situation which is also underlined by power differentials is the absence of a feedback loop through which aid recipients can hold aid donors to account.

The lack of financial sustainability being planned into the project from the start constrained the governance capacity of stakeholders. In the absence of additional financial instruments, stakeholders were unable to maintain and further improve upon completed projects in pursuit of the ultimate objective of using tourism to catalyse local economic development. The GMMB for instance should have been made to set aside a percentage of visitor fees for continued maintenance. As this was not planned for, all the visitor fees that accrue to the GMMB from Elmina Castle go straight into the national consolidated fund. The national office of the GMMB then have to make requests in order to access these funds. It is after this that the Elmina Castle Manager can make request for funds to undertake maintenance work. The bureaucracy involved in this process is a big constraint to effective everyday governing activities at the local level. This reality is succinctly explained in the quote below from the former Executive Director of the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust which provides ongoing financial support for the maintenance of the Elmina and Cape Coast Castles;

"...the government way of doing things, if you want a pin they need to write a memo to Accra or go to Accra and this and then that, by the time it come back you no longer need a pin but you need a nail. Then you start writing, oh sorry the nail didn't work, the nail didn't work, let's go for a nail and then it collapses."\(^{91}\)

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\(^{91}\) Interview with Nkunu Akyea, Former Executive Director of Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, 08.09.2014
5.4 The socio-political room for implementation

The socio-political room for action in which stakeholders operate is what is termed action potential. It is here that stakeholders' images of current and future situations are translated into tangible actions through the selection and application of appropriate tools. This is a process that usually takes place within the intentional level of action potential. At the structural level, action potential is embedded within institutional power relations that serve to enable and/or constrain the ability of stakeholders to meeting their governing needs. The Elmina 2015 Strategy came with certain governing needs that had to be met in order for it to be successful. This meant these needs had to be balanced by the capacity of stakeholders, which in turn was dependant on the socio-political room for action available to stakeholders. Thus the process of the ECHMP and resulting Elmina 2015 Strategy required the mobilisation of support and the generation of adequate socio-political will among all stakeholders. To a large extent, the action potential available is shaped by how stakeholders are able to answer questions about their source of legitimacy and authority.

The most notable observation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy is that the greatest action potential was aggregated in state institutions, and to an extent in the structures of political parties. The (incomplete) decentralised governance and planning system provided the source of legitimacy and authority to the KEEA Municipal Assembly when it came to the planning process. Since the project involved a lot of planning activities, the KEEA was able to bring to bear its technocratic planning apparatus in a way that was not possible for any other stakeholder. The KEEA was therefore able to derive considerable authority and legitimacy from its control of the technical planning knowledge production system. Nonetheless, the incomplete nature of the decentralised governance system also served as a structural source of constraint to the governing role of the KEEA vis-à-vis the GMMB. The GMMB is the only state institution with the administrative and legal mandate for the day to day management and governing activities of the Elmina Castle and Fort St. Jago. This was a source of action potential for them to translate their image of the castle into reality, which sometimes tended to differ from the image of other stakeholders (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.4). In essence the GMMB sees the forts and castle as heritage that has to be conserved for educational purposes. Thus if they had their way they might limit the number of
visitors in order to conserve it better.\textsuperscript{92} This situation was therefore an underlying structural constraint even as the ECHMP expanded to include overall local economic development. The failure to adequately deal with this meant that the action potential for using tourism as a catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction became fragmented across different state institutions.

The fragmented action potential did not paralyse the project in the beginning due to high levels of cross-sectoral coordination and mobilisation of support. This was further given strength by the strong political support of the newly elected government. The ECHMP began earnestly in the context of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government taking over power from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party. This context was key in shaping the trajectory and outcomes of the project (see Chapter 7 for more detailed discussion). The quick point to make here is that, on assumption of power, the NPP government which was also in charge of the KEEA Municipality were eager to show that they were bringing development to the area and so encouraged coalition between different sectoral institutions.

In the course of the town consultations for the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the issue of revenue sharing from the Elmina Castle was raised by the traditional authorities and community leaders. The argument was that the traditional authority deserve for royalties to be paid to them from the proceeds generated from the Castle since the Castle is on traditional land. Comparison was made to other traditional authorities in mineral areas like the Ashanti traditional authorities who receive royalties from gold mining companies. These concerns, in addition to that of the KEEA who also felt they deserved a cut in the revenue for ensuring clean surroundings to the Castle, were brought to the attention of J. H. Mensah who was a senior minister in the then NPP government and hails from Elmina. He mobilised the support of the then Minister for Tourism – the late Jake Obetsebi-Lampetey – and together they brought the issue to a Cabinet meeting\textsuperscript{93}. It was thus a Cabinet decision that established an ‘informal’ revenue sharing arrangement between the GMMB, the Elmina Traditional Authority and the KEEA. The traditional authority and the KEEA were therefore given about 5-10\% of the

\textsuperscript{92} Interview with Dr. Zagba Oyorthe, Executive Director, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Accra, 23.09.2014

total revenue from the Elmina Castle on a yearly basis\textsuperscript{94}. This arrangement greased the wheels of the socio-political room for action and strengthened the capacity of key stakeholders to meet the governing needs of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

However, after the NDC party returned to power in 2009, the new management of GMMB lobbied for this arrangement to be cancelled on the basis that there was no legislative instrument backing it. Moreover, officials of the GMMB argue that the revenue generated through the Elmina Castle is also used for the preservation and maintenance of the many forts and castles dotted along the Ghanaian coast that do not generate any revenue themselves but are part of the UNESCO World Heritage Status designation\textsuperscript{95}. The earlier Cabinet directive was therefore revoked on the basis that it was not the legal and formal way to approach the issue of revenue sharing. The legislative instrument that established the GMMB stipulate that all revenue accruing to heritage sites should come under the GMMB. There is no room made for revenue sharing arrangements or the payment of royalties. Consequently, the establishing legislative instrument needed to be amended first through parliament so that a formal revenue sharing arrangement could be instituted. This amendment process is however yet to begin. Thus after 2009 the new socio-political environment – in which there was no revenue sharing – constrained the action potential of stakeholders in meeting their governance needs. This contributed to the decline in the level of communication, collaboration and coordination among stakeholders and ultimately in a decrease in governance capacity for the realisation of the objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

In the initial phase of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, action potential was aggregated in state institutions who coordinated their activities to ensure that there was enough capacity to meet governing needs. This was helped in no small measure by the ‘informal’ revenue sharing arrangement between the GMMB, the KEEA and traditional council. When this revenue sharing arrangement was abrogated in 2009, the socio-political room for action changed leading to a fragmentation of action potential among various institutions. This fragmentation lead to a decline in communication,

\textsuperscript{94} Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015; Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 16.07.2015; Interview with Clifford Ashun, Elmina Castle Manager, 10.08.2015

\textsuperscript{95} Interview with Dr. Zagba Oyortey, Executive Director, Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Accra, 23.09.2014; Interview with Raymond Agbo, Deputy Director (Museums), GMMB, Accra, 13.08.2014
Collaboration and coordination ultimately affecting stakeholder governance capacity – especially that of the KEEA – in meeting the governance needs of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

Conclusions

The Elmina 2015 Strategy was the result of a comprehensive tourism-led local economic developing planning process. There were four main phases envisaged for the project – stakeholder identification, analysis and vision, strategy and action plans and implementation. An analysis of the strategy and action plans in particular highlights that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was largely centred on the assumption that developing and enhancing the heritage tourism assets of Elmina would catalyse local economic development and poverty reduction. The analysis further shows that it was the transition from the third stage to the final stage of implementation that the project encountered a number of challenges.

This chapter has provided an answer to the first and second research questions set out in Chapter 1. This is in relation to how the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualised the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction and the extent of stakeholder governance capacity in developing and implementing the Elmina 2015 Strategy and how this shaped outcomes. A simplified answer to the second research question is that there was some level of stakeholder governance capacity but that this was not high enough to guide the transition to the implementation stage. The analysis in this chapter provides a more nuanced response. In the initial stages of the project, stakeholders all shared an overriding image of how tourism could contribute to local economic development. This allowed them to pool together their individual capacities and ensure a strong stakeholder governance capacity. However, this pooling together of capacities through the use of complementary instruments appears to have taken place only because the resources out of which financial instruments were fashioned came from an external source. Once
the external funding was removed, the fractures in stakeholder relationships opened up and there was little attempt to repair these fractures and ride on the coordination momentum created by the external funding.

Stakeholder governance capacity is about the alignment of images, instruments and action potentials (see Chapter 2, section 2.2). Over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy process, there were many instances of misalignment of these three elements within and between stakeholders. A prime example of such misalignment can be seen in the relationship between the KEEA and the GMMB who were two key stakeholders in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The dynamics between these two institutions, which could have offered the potential for positive outcomes however resulted in a negative outcome due competing interests that were not reconciled or aligned. The KEEA was keen on getting access to part of the revenue accruing from visitor fees at the Elmina Castle. The GMMB on the other hand sought to keep these revenues away from other stakeholders. Part of the reason for this is due to the complexity and diversity in their internal procedures as well as the differing instruments that were available to them. The legislative instrument that guides how revenue from the Elmina Castle is to be disbursed stipulates that all funds should go to the GMMB and not to any other body. Thus while there was a shared image between the KEEA and the GMMB in their efforts to utilise tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction, the legislative as well as the financial instruments to make this happen were dominated by the GMMB. The GMMB was unwilling to match its image with available instruments leading to a lack of alignment. This misalignment affected the governability of the Elmina 2015 Strategy – where governability refers to the ability of governors to meet governance needs given their capacities (Kooiman, 1993, 2008; Jobbins, 2003). The Elmina 2015 Strategy brought about governances needs that required the pooling together of not only shared visions but critically also instruments, especially financial ones, in order to meet those needs. This pooling of instruments and coordination activities did not effectively take place.

The fragmentation of instruments among stakeholders contributed to undermining the vision of how to make the transition to the stage of full implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This was further compounded by the change in action potential when the semi-formally brokered revenue sharing arrangement was overturned. The end of revenue sharing between the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board and the KEEA
and Elmina traditional Authority shaped the socio-political action potential of stakeholders. This constrained their ability to meet the governance needs of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Overall therefore, there was a low level of governance capacity to ensure that the 'software' aspects of the Strategy were fully implemented so that tourism could indeed catalyse local economic development and poverty reduction in Elmina.

The low level of governance capacity that characterised the Elmina 2015 Strategy is starkly represented in the (in)actions of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA). The KEEA remains the key governing stakeholder when it comes to the management and administration of local economic development and poverty alleviation in Elmina and its immediate environs. There were a lot of expectations and responsibilities placed on the KEEA as the local government authority to foster communication, collaboration and coordination between other stakeholders to ensure that the goals of the Strategy are met. However, these responsibilities were not always accompanied by corresponding access to the resources from which to fashion governing instruments. While the KEEA understood the potential of tourism to catalyse local economic development and poverty reduction, the legal and importantly, financial instruments for managing the tourism assets in Elmina are held by the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB). With increasing attention on local governments to facilitate sustainable tourism development (Dredge, 2001; Churugsa, 2007; Ruhanen, 2013), the analysis in this chapter raises important questions about what can be expected from local governments. Given the multiplicity of other state and non-state institutions involved in tourism, what role is there for local government? How do local governments reconcile their day-to-day management of public service provision with the long term planning required of tourism-led local economic development initiatives?

The analysis in this chapter shows that the mere presence of local governments and other state institutions in tourism development, while a necessary condition, is not sufficient for effective development of stakeholder governance capacity. The finding of an inadequacy of stakeholder governance capacity offers an explanation as to the failure of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. However, this is only a partial explanation. It is not enough to know the proximate reasons for the inadequacy of stakeholder governance capacity. To arrive at a deeper level of understanding regarding the Elmina 2015 Strategy, one requires an analysis of institutional thickness, and to consider how
changes in wider national and regional socio-political landscape shape actions at the local level. A key question is whether the presence of a plethora of institutions at various levels of governance contributes to developing institutional thickness that can enhance the capacity for tourism-led local economic development (Amin and Thrift, 1995). It is to these issues around institutional thickness that I now turn to in the next chapter.

MATE MASIE

“What I hear, I keep”

Symbol of wisdom, knowledge and prudence.
Chapter 6

Institutional thickness for sustained tourism-led local economic development

The literature on local economic development (LED) planning has established that the success of new LED initiatives to a large extent depends on the development of appropriate organisational and institutional structures (Helmsing, 2003; Pike et al., 2006). Such organisational and institutional structures do not always start from scratch. More often than not, LED initiatives depend on building synergy between existing organisations. In relation to existing structures, newly emerging organisational and institutional structures might then have to replace them, be superimposed on them or be subsumed under them and/or made to operate side by side. There are a number of combinations available and the choice of which option to pursue rests on the local political context. The resulting mix of organisational and institutional arrangements and interactions – i.e. institutional thickness – then come to play a key role in shaping the sustainability and success of new LED initiatives. In this chapter, I make use of the concept of institutional thickness as outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.2 to explore the depth and extent of thickening experienced by the organisational and institutional structures within which the Elmina 2015 Strategy evolved.

There are four sections to this chapter, the first of which analyses how the Elmina 2015 Strategy aligned with national economic development policy and national tourism development plans. This analysis is to ascertain the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy linked up to national institutional and organisational structures for economic as well as tourism development. In the second section, I turn my attention to the specifics of the planning process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy in relation to the institutional and organisational structures of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipality Assembly (KEEA). The point here is firstly to answer the question of the KEEA municipality’s involvement in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The answer to that question appears to be positive since the whole process could not have gone ahead without the active involvement of the KEEA. However, the analytical and more interesting puzzle is to identify the extent to which it was embedded within KEEA’s structures and the resulting patterns of coalition and structures of domination. In the third section, I zoom in on the Elmina Tourism Office and the Elmina Arts and Craft
Market which were established to add to a strong institutional presence and create mutual interactions between various stakeholders. An overarching analytic conclusion is then provided in the last section of this chapter.

6.1 The fit of the Elmina 2015 Strategy with national development and tourism policy planning

This section looks at the extent to which the tenets of the Elmina 2015 Strategy reflected existing and contemporary national development plans as well as national tourism development plans. The assumption here is that an alignment between the aims and objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and those of national development plans and national tourism plans add to a strong institutional presence that can contribute to institutional thickness within which it is to be implemented. Similarly, once new national development plans and national tourism plans change focus so that there is no longer clear alignment with the Elmina 2015 Strategy, then there is less institutional support to ensure complete implementation.

Linking local development plans with national development policy

At the time of the Elmina 2015 Strategy's preparation, the national economic development strategy in place was the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2005 (GPRS I). The overall focus of the GPRS I was on redistributive policies and poverty-related spending (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.2). This meant that the economic and political climate in the country as at that time was very conducive to the ideas, aims and objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. It is also pertinent to reiterate the point that although a decentralised development planning process was supposed to be in place, municipal and local plans such as the Elmina 2015 Strategy have to fit within overall national development strategies of the ruling political party. Thus the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management (ECHMP) planning process that gave birth to the Elmina 2015 Strategy had to follow the planning guidelines set out for the preparation of District Medium Term Development Plans (MTDP). This enabled those involved in the process to tap into resources made available to support national development priorities and to make that reflect in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. There was thus a
shared awareness of a common enterprise between national and local institutions regarding the need for local economic development and poverty reduction. Actors at the KEEA during the interviews pointed out that they saw an opportunity to bring in and link up issues of education, health and sanitation to the original proposal for the rehabilitation of the Elmina Castle.96

The GPRS I also had specific implications for the development of the tourism sector. The tourism sector was identified as part of those strategies that could be developed to directly address poverty. As noted in Chapter 4, the GPRS I was the first national development strategic plan that conceptualised a direct relationship between tourism and poverty reduction. It was acknowledged that tourism can have a strong impact on the development objectives of the country at both the national and local levels. This in part explains the government’s support in the making of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The GPRS I shifted the traditional overemphasis on tourism’s contribution to foreign exchange earnings to a focus on how to utilise it at the very local level. Within such a framework, the Elmina 2015 Strategy provided a very specific instance of how tourism’s potential can be tied up with local economic development and poverty reduction. In this way, the Elmina 2015 Strategy fitted in and aligned itself with the national development strategy in place. This gave the project strong claims of legitimacy and governmental backing in the beginning phase. A practical outcome of this was how actors at the local level managed to get national actors to institute a revenue sharing arrangement of the proceeds of the Elmina Castle between the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB), the KEEA and the Elmina Traditional Authority (see section Chapter 5, section 5.4).

In the period of 2006 – 2009, national economic development was guided by the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II). Unlike the GPRS I, the focus of the GPRS II shifted from redistributive policies and poverty-related spending to that of growth. The tourism sector was considered crucial to this new focus on economic growth. However, this new focus on growth was more concerned with increased revenue to national coffers rather than a redistribution of revenue. On the balance of available evidence, it appears that during this period, the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy did not have the same level of support as it did under the GPRS I. A focus

on growth meant that the interest in tourism was more about how it can increase government’s foreign exchange revenues and thus help to plug balance of payment deficits. This was accompanied by less interest in how communities can directly tap into tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction which is what the Elmina 2015 Strategy was seeking to do. One of the practical outcomes of this shift appears to have led to a realignment of the portfolio of the Ministry of Tourism into the Ministry of Tourism and Modernisation of the Capital City and then into the Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations during the period of the GPRS II. These changes meant a divergence in policy aims between the Elmina 2015 Strategy and that of national development plans for the tourism sector.

At its expiry, the GPRS II was replaced by the two sets of the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Strategies – GSGDA I and GSGDA II. The GSGDA I and the GSGDA II were in place between 2010-2013 and 2014 – 2017 respectively. These national development strategies held a slightly different vision of tourism’s role in economic development. It is important to highlight here that the GSGDA I and GSGDA II were enacted under a new political party government - the National Democratic Congress party – while the GPRS I and GPRS II were formulated under the New Patriotic Party government. As will be fully discussed in Chapter 7, change of political party government tend to come with inherent issues in terms of project continuity. Within the GSGDA I, the tourism sector was seen as an area to encourage strong private sector participation. The private sector was to drive the tourism sector for job creation and revenue generation. Within this context, the Elmina 2015 Strategy’s focus on state driven tourism-led local economic development and poverty reduction became slightly misaligned with national development strategies. In practice however, the state was seen as playing a crucial role through infrastructure investments that will encourage private sector participation in the tourism sector. Although efforts were made during this period to address challenges of the tourism sector, these were all geared towards starting new initiatives rather than helping to complete existing projects like the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This period also saw the termination of the revenue sharing arrangement between the GMMB, KEEA and the Elmina Traditional Authority.

The GSGDA II also gave prominence to the tourism sector by identifying it as one of seven growth pillars on which the future long term development of the country was to be built. Once again the focus is on diversifying tourist attractions and initiating new
projects. Moreover, policies for the tourism sector are targeted at the macro level with the aim of improving tourism's contribution to national revenue. In the GSGDA II the overall strategy for the tourism sector is to make strategic linkages between tourism and other sectors in order to achieve the goal of using tourism to create jobs and increase foreign exchange earnings. This strategy is to be “underpinned by vigorous promotion of international conferences, cultural, leisure, health and education tourism” (pg. 51). The GSGDA II looks to the private sector through the mobilisation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to achieve the goals of addressing the deficits in infrastructure, human resource and tourism product diversification. It appears from available evidence that at the start of the GSGDA II, the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was already in a dire state and key stakeholders seem to have given up on it. The potential support from the GSGDA II in terms of encouraging PPPs could therefore not be utilised for the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This was due to the lack of good patterns of coalition between national institutions and local ones which affected the development of institutional thickness and the ability of local institutions to tap into the resources available at the national level.

In terms of the evolution of the Elmina 2015 Strategy vis-à-vis national economic development strategies, the institutional space to support full implementation began to shrink once the ‘G - Ghana’ in the GPRS I was replaced by ‘G – Growth’ in the GPRS II. This change of emphasis meant that the focus on tourism’s role in economic development became shifted from the micro to the macro level. Moreover, the subsequent focus of the GSGDA I and GSGDA II on private sector participation came at a time when the Elmina 2015 Strategy was in a dire state in terms of implementation. The changing patterns of mutual awareness of a shared enterprise between national and local institutions meant that on one hand, there were times when there was less institutional depth at the regional and national level to provide the necessary support for implementing the Elmina 2015 Strategy. On the other hand, the inadequacy of strong institutional depth at the local level during the latter period meant that the Elmina 2015 Strategy could not reach for the potential resources available at the national level.
National tourism plans and institutional support for local tourism development plans

The Elmina 2015 Strategy was developed at the time of the Ghana National Tourism Development Plan (GNTDP) 1996-2010. The GNTDP 1996-2010 was a 15 year plan for tourism development that focused on enhancing tourism’s contribution to economic growth. The plan made note of the role that tourism could play to improve upon the economic situation of communities living around key tourist sites. There was however not much consideration – aside talk of multiplier effects and trickle down effects – given to the specifics of how tourism could aid local economic development and poverty reduction. At the time of its development in 2003, the anticipated ‘trickle down’ effects advocated in the GNTDP 1996-2010 were failing to fully materialise. Communities living around key tourist attractions were not gaining much benefit from tourism activities. The Elmina 2015 Strategy was, on many levels, unique in its conceptualisation of tourism having a direct role in local economic development and poverty reduction. Its focus on directly addressing poverty issues through tourism was well received. This is because the Elmina 2015 Strategy provided an opportunity to put to test at the district level the assumptions held in the GNTDP 1996-2010 about tourism’s potential to contribute to economic development and poverty reduction. In all, there was a strong alignment between the GNTDP 1996-2010 and the Elmina 2015 Strategy and this thickened the institutional structures for implementation. This thickening of institutions is in the sense of a mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise among stakeholders at all levels, and clear and shared priorities concerning the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. In practice this came in the form of technical advice and knowledge transfer from national and regional stakeholders during the planning stage of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This institutional support did not however get carried over when the subsequent national tourism development plan was made.

The Ghana National Tourism Development Plan (GNTDP) 2013-2025 was “…prepared that one over a 2 month period, from October to November, 2012, covering a 2 month period. Precisely because of the challenges we had in terms of funding, in terms of funding and then also in terms of availability of personnel who had to work on it”97 This plan sought to review the previous 15 year tourism development plans and to assess

97 Interview with Dr. Joel Sonne, Director of Projects, Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts, 19.09.2014
the position of the tourism sector in terms of contribution to national and local economic development. This plan was prepared by a team led by Dr. Joel Sonne, the Director of Projects at the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts. Dr. Sonne completed his PhD thesis in 2010 on tourism’s role in poverty reduction in Elmina from the perspective of the community. His thesis touched on some aspects of the Elmina 2015 Strategy process and implementation challenges. However, when it came to the making of the GNTDP 2013-2027 in which he quotes a generous portion of his PhD thesis, there is no mention made of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. There is not a single reference to the Elmina 2015 Strategy in the whole of the 362-page document.

The neglect of the Elmina 2015 Strategy in the GNTP 2013-2027 is all the more surprising given that the goal was to reassess how tourism can be positioned to effectively contribute to national and local economic development. There were so many lessons from the Elmina 2015 Strategy that could have been incorporated into the tourism plan. The state of the Elmina 2015 Strategy at the time when the GNTDP 2013-2027 was made provided a clear example of what to do and what not to do when it comes to utilising tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Even under the section in the GNTDP 2013-2027 where there is a discussion about the use of tourism to tackle poverty at the destination level, no assessment is made of what happened to the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The lessons from the ups and downs of implementing the Elmina 2015 Strategy were simply not alluded to in the new tourism plan. That the Elmina 2015 Strategy did not feature at all in the GNTDP 2013-2027 is indeed odd. Perhaps part of the reason for this oversight lies in the fact that by the time the GNTDP 2013-2027 was being developed the Elmina 2015 Strategy has simply fallen off the radar of most stakeholders. The main impact of this situation is that there is no institutional learning from the outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy to inform future tourism-led local economic development initiatives.

What can be deduced from the above is that the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, especially post 2006, became highly constrained by the lack of strong institutional networks and a positive policy environment. Neither national economic development strategies nor national tourism development plans sought to integrate the Elmina 2015 Strategy as an example of using tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. On the basis of available evidence, it is fair to conclude that while the policy shifts at the national level might have had an impact on the support
and resources available for the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, it is the timing of the completion of the physical projects that most significantly impacted upon the success of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The completion and handing over of the physical projects to the various agencies and the failure to work on institutional change at this point constrained the development of the needed institutional thickness to support the continuity of the strategy. Ironically, on page 218 of the GNTDP 2013-2027 it is noted that "tourism's potential for poverty reduction cannot be realised until there is a development paradigm shift from macro-economic oriented goals to poverty-focused livelihood opportunities and decision-making process at the local levels". This is exactly what the Elmina 2015 Strategy sought to accomplish by integrating tourism development with local economic development and poverty reduction goals. Nonetheless, the GNTDP 2013-2027 failed to point out what lessons could be learned from the Elmina 2015 Strategy to inform future initiatives.

6.2 Embedding the Elmina 2015 Strategy in the district medium term development plans of KEEA

In this section I examine the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy was embedded within the development planning and governance structures of the KEEA Municipal Assembly. The conceptual assumption here is that a deep embedding within these structures will mean that the institutional structures for implementation will have been thickened to meet the governance needs of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. There are two ways in which I approach the issue of embeddedness and its link with institutional thickness. Firstly, I focus on examining whether the Elmina 2015 Strategy as an area level plan became a part of subsequent District Medium Term Development Plans (MTDP) of the KEEA Assembly. The second approach which is treated fully in section 6.3 looks at what happened to those institutional and organization structures that emerged as part of the Elmina 2015 Strategy planning process.

MTDPs and Elmina 2015 Strategy

The question of whether the Elmina 2015 Strategy was embedded in the KEEA is to be answered by looking at the subsequent Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP)
produced by the municipal assembly in the periods after the strategy was drawn up. MTDPs, as explained in detail in Chapter 4, section 4.1, are compiled every 3-4 years. A MTDP is an aggregation of the development needs and plan of action covering all communities falling under the responsibility of the KEEA. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) provides guidelines for the preparations of District MTDPs. These guidelines stipulate that assemblies are to engage in community participation in the planning process (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.1). This is to ensure that MTDPs are in fact an aggregation of the development needs of communities. Thus the preparation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as an area level development plan had to follow the guidelines set out by the NDPC. This should have entailed a full deployment of the technical planning capacity of the KEEA.

It is known that on many occasions resource and capacity constrains mean that most metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies, are not able to fully follow the planning guidelines. Consequently, new MTDPs tend to include a lot of repeated information and materials from previous MTDPs since there are not enough resources to fully follow through the planning guidelines. Moreover, the development challenges facing many communities remain unmet from one cycle of MTDP to another. In contrast, the external funding for the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme meant that the making of the Elmina 2015 Strategy – an area council plan – followed and even exceeded the planning guidelines of the NDPC. The preparation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy involved detailed stakeholder identification and iterative consultation between the KEEA and community groups (see section 5.1). It was through such a detailed planning process that the five development priority areas were arrived at and specific projects designed to meet identified development needs.

It has to be remembered that the detailed planning process for the Elmina 2015 Strategy was only possible because of external funding for the ECHMP, and that usually the KEEA would have lacked the resources to undertake such a detailed process. In this context, one would expect that once this process had been completed, the Elmina 2015 Strategy would be embedded in and form part of all subsequent MTDPs prepared by the KEEA, as the strategy proposed development that would extend across the lifecycle of a number of MTDPs. However, a review of subsequent MTDPs after the Elmina 2015 Strategy had been developed shows that this embedding process did not occur. The

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98 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Development Planning Officer, KEEA, 23.07.2015
reasons for this are varied. Some of the key reason however relates to the loss of institutional memory and institutional knowledge which was a direct result of the haphazard transfer of municipal staff, and changing political leadership. These reasons will be fully explored in Chapter 7. For now it is important to review what subsequent MTDPs had to say about tourism development within the KEEA in general and in Elmina in particular.

A review of the previous MTDP for 2010-2013 and the current 2014-2017 MTDP\(^99\) offers key insight into the lack of embeddedness of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In the 2010-2013 MTDP no mention is made of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In the sections where tourism is discussed, the plan notes that "tourism potential [in Elmina and the municipality] is yet to be fully tapped."\(^100\), and goes on to explain that while Elmina and Cape Coast remain the tourism hub in Ghana, "...yet few of the benefits of tourism actually reach the local population and the local administration"\(^101\). Despite its preparation being led by the KEEA, there is no mention in the MTDP as to whether the Elmina 2015 Strategy was successful, or how it is to be extended. In fact, between 2009 and 2011, there was no Municipal Development Planning Officer at post at the KEEA. This was due to a hostile environment created by the new Municipal Chief Executive from the National Democratic Party who did not want to work with personnel who had previously worked under the New Patriotic Party government\(^102\). This meant that there was no institutional knowledge that would have ensured that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was incorporated into the MTDP.

In the 2013-2017 MTDP, the Elmina 2015 Strategy was mentioned once and as a reference source for one of the picture depicting drainage and sanitation issues that featured in the original document. There is no discussion of some of the action plans initiated by or through the Elmina 2015 Strategy and their current status. This is how

\(^99\) It was impossible to get access to 2006-2009 MTDP or earlier ones. The current Planning Officer at the KEEA did not come to meet a copy of any earlier MTDP in the office. It is fair to assume that even these earlier MTDP did not embed the Elmina 2015 Strategy since the development issues facing Elmina remains the same.

\(^100\) KEEA (2010:3) Medium Term Development Plan under the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I: 2010-2013)

\(^101\) KEEA (2010:6) Medium Term Development Plan under the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I: 2010-2013)

\(^102\) Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Development Planning Officer, KEEA, 23.07.2015
the current Municipal Development Planning Officer explained why the Elmina 2015 Strategy was not embedded in 2014-2017 MTDP of the KEEA:

When you look at this document, Elmina 2015 Strategy. It was a beautiful document prepared to address the key issues in these areas, drainage and waste management, fishing and fishing harbour, tourism and local economic development, education and health. I came here, met this document, I went through, I realised it was a very useful document that was prepared and before they could start implementation the government under which they prepared this thing went out of office. So I made frantic efforts to get this document reviewed so that we could still follow through the objectives of the document. But it was like this was prepared by the NPP government and I [current NDC government] don’t want to have anything to do with it. So we had to put it back where I just brought it out from. So it is like the issue of continuity is, its partisan political consideration of issues is affecting a lot of things everywhere especially in the assemblies103

It is clear from the analysis above that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was not embedded within the development planning framework of the KEEA. The Elmina 2015 Strategy appears to have just been a parallel development plan for Elmina that elapsed once the international funding backing it had been expended. This is contrary to one of the key objectives that the Elmina 2015 Strategy sought to meet – that of defining a more integrated approach to long term development planning. A key institutional objective of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was to strengthen the systems of local government in Elmina and enable them to implement the strategy in an integrated and participatory manner. This was to entail the strengthening of key local processes, systems and human resources – like the making of MTDPS – to ensure effective and continued management of and financing of local development processes. Embedding the Elmina 2015 Strategy in subsequent MTDPs would have meant that the municipality had to allocate some funding for these projects. However, once the detailed plans, aims and objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy had fallen off the radar of the KEEA, there was no oversight responsibility for monitoring, evaluation and/or continuity of the projects.

103 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Development Planning Officer, KEEA, 23.07.2015
6.3 Building institutional density: the Elmina Tourism Office and the Elmina Arts and Crafts Market

The Elmina Tourism Office (ETO) was created as a direct outcome of the Elmina 2015 Strategy to serve as an organisational and institutional structure that could contribute to the successful implementation of project objectives. In a similar vein, the Elmina Arts and Craft Market (EACM) was set up and built as an integral part of using tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Artisans and craftsmen in the community were to have a place to produce, advertise and sell their wares to tourists. In this section, I present an analysis of how these two institutional structures operated and failed to live up to their expectations. In particular I focus on unpacking some of the underlying causes for the way things turned out.

The Elmina Tourism Office

The Elmina Tourism Office (ETO) was set up on the ground floor of one of the renovated merchant houses (see figure 20 below). The ETO was to serve as an institutional structure to ensure the sustainability and also continuity of using tourism as a tool for local economic development and poverty reduction. It was to be an information and visitor reception facility in the centre of the Elmina Township. The goal was that every tourist visiting Elmina will make the ETO their visit point of call. This was to ensure that tourists get to know more of the many other diversified tourist highlights on offer rather than the singular focus on the Elmina Castle. The reasoning behind the ETO is captured in this quote from the interviews;

"Let all visitors coming to the Elmina visit the place first whether going to Castle or whatever go there first. Yes, your mission, I want to visit the Elmina Castle, okay this that that, just put a token here, they take you to the Castle” 104

In addition to raising funds from tokens – i.e. gifts and donations – given by tourists, the ETO was stocked with postcards, t-shirts, specially packed salts from the salt mines in the community as well as other tourist souvenirs. This was to serve as a source of income for running the office as well as income for the producers of these local souvenirs. There was also a group of trained tour guides attached to the ETO who were

104 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 16.07.2015
to benefit from taking tourists on tours. Furthermore, the ETO was equipped with a Public Address system, a set of canopies and plastic chairs that was hired out as extra source of income. The renovated community square which was renamed Nana Kobina Gyna square (Trafalgar Square being the former name) was under the management of the ETO. The ETO was thus responsible for taking bookings and revenue from those renting the Nana Kobina Gyan square for funerals and other community events. The deal was that people would rent the square in addition to the PA system, canopies and chairs that are available from the ETO. The revenue from these activities were to be used to maintain and improve upon the touristic infrastructures in the community including the sign board and directional signage erected under the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

Figure 20 The Elmina Tourism Office building
The ETO was first managed by one Richard Ewusi – a citizen of Elmina – who was appointed after interviews organised by Urban Solutions – the Dutch consultancy company – and the KEEA. He was sent out on a training programme to Kenya to build his management capacity before taking over the management of the ETO. The first six months of his salary was guaranteed from the programme funds and it was expected that his subsequent remuneration would come from the revenue streams identified above. As manager of the ETO, Richard Ewusi was to be accountable to the KEEA Municipal Assembly who were given oversight governance responsibility for the running of the place. In fact the proceeds from the ETO accrued to the assembly as part of its Internally Generated Funds (IGF). After the first six months of operation, the active involvement of the KEEA in providing oversight governance for the ETO began to wane – among other things due to ongoing personnel changes within the KEEA Municipal Assembly as discussed in detail in Chapter 7, sections 7.2 and 7.3.

While accounting to the KEEA for the revenue accrued at the ETO, the manager’s salary was not being paid to him. Once the salary stop forthcoming, the manager of the ETO started to remunerate himself from the revenue coming to him. This lead to a mismanagement of the ETO and its associated revenue-generating assets. The KEEA also failed to put in place adequate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The result was that funds from the ETO were embezzled and there was no effort made to maintain the assets and tourist infrastructures under the ETO. Many interviewees pointed out that for mainly political reasons, the ETO manager was not held to full account for the mismanagement of the place. What happened is best quoted in the words of one of the interviewees.

*He was given free hands to operate there so there was some funds even in the account, he operated the account and took money for whatever he, eventually he could not run the place very well and the place, we even called him for him to render an account twice he came but he could not give a good account of his, so eventually he deserted the office and I don’t know at the moment where is he now whether he has gone to Europe or whatever.*

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105 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014
107 Interview with Michael Bentil-Arthur, Assemblyman/Head of Development Planning Subcommittee/Head of Elmina Zonal Council, KEEA, 01.10.2014
108 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 31.10.2014
The expectation that the ETO would contribute to institutional thickness failed to materialise. This greatly affected the extent to which the goal of using tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction could be reached. Moreover the long term sustainability and continuity expected of the Elmina 2015 Strategy became subverted. Currently, the offices of the ETO are being used as the office of the Elmina Zonal Council. The tourist signage and directional signboards have faded and/or fallen down without any maintenance (see figure 21 below). The ETO was to make visible the direct ways in which tourism was beneficial to the community. However, the mismanagement and embezzlement of funds meant that it was not able to play its expected role. The ETO required a high level of communication, collaboration and coordination between the various agencies with a strong steering role from the KEEA.

The tourism office was set up as an independent place which is answerable to DCE [District Chief Executive]. Veronica Nelson the DCE sat down for the boy to take all the money and equipment away, you never prosecuted and so the tourism office is there to take receipts for those who use Nana Kobina Gyan Square, how does it promote tourism, all the signages that we put you know for Elmina town tour, walking tour they are all faded, they are all torn...109

As the Elmina 2015 Strategy slipped from the top of the agenda of the assembly, there was less and less oversight management of what was going on at the ETO. In the end, the mismanagement of the ETO played a role in the failure to achieve the aim of using tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction.

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109 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
Figure 21 Faded and broken down Elmina 2015 Strategy sign boards
The Elmina Arts and Craft Market

A key component of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was to act as a catalyst for generating local economic development opportunities. In both direct and indirect ways, these income generating opportunities were to be linked to the expected increase in heritage tourists coming to Elmina. It was towards this end that the Elmina Arts and Craft Market (EACM) was established as a primary mechanism for tapping into the tourist market for local economic development and poverty reduction. The EACM was to be an avenue for local artisans and craftsmen to produce, display and sell their work to tourists visiting Elmina. The establishment of the EACM was also geared towards increasing the density of tourism-related attractions in the town – i.e. to thicken the institutional support structures within which the Elmina 2015 Strategy objectives were to be achieved. The expectation was that the tourists would be directed from the ETO and the Elmina Castle to the EACM where they would then buy artefacts, souvenirs and other memorabilia. This would then generate revenue for shop keepers and contribute to overall local economic development and poverty reduction. According to project documents these three sites were to “become a true tourism centre of the town” (Urban Solutions, 2006:11). The EACM was sited to the North-West of the renovated Nana Kobina Gyan Square with the Elmina Tourism Office located in building on the Southern corner of the Square (see figure 22 below).

Figure 22 Map of the centre of Elmina
Prior to the establishment of the EACM, it was noted by Urban Solutions – the consultants – that there were barely any artisans in Elmina. Although there were a few people active in arts and craft, their activities were not on a professional level nor fully geared towards meeting tourist demand. Thus a cohort of artisans and craft makers had to be developed from scratch. A number of people in the community were given training in various arts and craft design and production including wood work, metal and fabrics (see figure 23 below). The training programme was contracted to the Aid to Artisans Ghana (ATAG) for implementation over the course of over 15 months. A progress report of the period documents that over 80 people were trained in various craftsmanship in wood, metal, textiles and leather products among others (Urban Solutions, 2006).

In addition to this, OBAP Services – an accounting and bookkeeping services company – were contracted to provide business training for the craftsmen and craftswomen. There were 38 artisans from the ATAG training programme who received further training from OBAP Services. This second training programme focused on soft skills and covered topics such as ‘Skills in Costing’, ‘Principles of Management’ and ‘Financial Management’. Furthermore, there were also 379 business operators across Elmina who received business sensitisation and rudimentary training in such topics as ‘Fundamentals of Business Development’, ‘Principles of Management’, ‘Record Keeping’, ‘Financial Management’ and ’Taxation’. These hard and soft training programmes were to ensure that artisans and business operators understood the tourist market and were thus able to tap into it. These goals were already specified within the Elmina 2015 Strategy documents and part of the EU funding under the Elmina Cultural Heritage Local Economic Development Programme (CHLDEP) were specifically earmarked for training artisans.
In the first few months of the opening of the EACM, there was surge in patronage. A number of tourists were coming to the market through the ETO and the Elmina Castle leading to a boom. This initial surge of visitor numbers at the EACM was partly due to the heightened awareness from the Elmina 2015 Strategy projects as a whole. When the EACM started operating, there were ongoing projects like the renovation of the old merchant houses. This gave high visibility and attraction to the EACM. Moreover, there were newly erected sign boards and directional signs at vintage points throughout the community which directed tourists to the market. There was also a high level of communication, collaboration and coordination between the key stakeholders such as the ETO, the KEEA and the GMMB. A close reading of the various progress reports and interview transcripts seems to suggest that as the physical projects began to wind down and be handed over, the level of communication, collaboration and coordination began to fall. This affected patronage at the EACM because tourists were no longer directed from the Elmina Castle or from the ETO which itself was being mismanaged. Currently, the EACM is a disserted place and many of artisans and shop keepers have packed up and left (see figure 24 below).
In analysing this situation, there are two key explanatory variables that help in understanding how the EACM unravelled. Through these variables, it is possible to see why the EACM was unable to live up to the expectations of contributing to the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Importantly, the collapse of the EACM also meant the loss of institutional density for the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The first reason for the failure of the EACM has to do with its location vis-à-vis the physical plan and layout of the town centre. For a market that is geared towards tourists who come to the town chiefly for the Elmina Castle, the choice of the location is interesting. This is especially so because there were no changes made to the way most tourists access the Elmina Castle. The assumption was that more
tourists would take up the town tours being offered through the Elmina Tourism Office and hence would be taken to the EACM. This assumption however neglected the fact that most tourists visiting Elmina come in buses or private vehicles that pass through the town and are allowed to park right in front of the Castle. The planning that went into setting up the EACM failed to situate the tourism product in Elmina in the context of the national tourism system (see Chapter 4, section 4.4.). Elmina Castle is part of the Ghanaian tourism product and is often provided by tour operators as part of a wider Central Region tour package. Given the usually tight and hurried itinerary of tourists who get to Elmina, after visiting the Castle most jump right back into their vehicles and drive out of town. This is without so much as walking through the town, let alone visiting the EACM. The planning of the EACM failed to incorporate the views of tour operators and tour guides who usually bring most tourists to Elmina.

The location of the EACM is far out of sight from the main thoroughfare that leads up to the bridge over which tourist cross to get to the forecourt of Elmina Castle. Thus there is no chance that tourists in their buses might even see the EACM and decide to visit it (Adu-Ampong, 2016). Even if they had been informed of it at the Castle, the distance of the EACM does not present a strong incentive for them to go out of their way. Tourists know that they can also get these arts and crafts at other points of their travel itinerary. In one of the final project documents from 2008, the President of ATAG who implemented the training programme for artisans and helped in setting up the EACM is quoted as saying “[n]ow that the Arts and Craft market is finished, we are happy that its location outside the Castle is good, the emotional impact of a visit to the Castle does not have a positive effect on the purchasing behaviour of the tourists” (KEEA, undated: 30). This approach to planning the location of the EACM while having some merits ignored the fact there are shops within the walls of the Castle.

The second reason that might account for the collapse of the EACM is the existence of arts and craft shops within the Elmina Castle. These already existing shops within the castle are usually manned by sales persons and not necessarily artisans themselves. The establishment of the EACM therefore created direct competition with the shops in the Castle. This competition is perhaps the strongest causal reason why the EACM did not survive for long. This is because tourists visiting the Elmina Castle had immediate access to the shops in the Castle. In fact during a tour of the Castle, the shops are pointed out to tourists and they are encouraged to visit these shops. Given this
arrangement, tourists will have little to no inclination to then walk through the town to
get to the EACM. Furthermore, as the shop owners were paying rent to the GMMB, it
was in the interest of the GMM to ensure that tourists buy from the shops inside the
Castle rather than going over to the EACM whose management was tied up with the
KEEA. Thus the issue of the physical layout of the town, the location of the EACM, in
addition to the competition from the shops within Castle constrained the use of the
EACM as an institutional mechanism through which tourism was to contribute to local
economic development and poverty reduction (Adu-Ampong, 2016). This was
compounded by reduced stakeholder communication and collaboration. There was
little coordination between the KEEA, the GMMB, the ETO and artisans at the EACM.
Consequently, as tourist traffic to the EACM dwindled, its sustainability and the very
sustainability of the Elmina 2015 Strategy became undone. Surprisingly, this outcome
was not foreseen in the Elmina 2015 Strategy hence there was no coordinated effort to
prevent such an outcome.

The goal of setting up the ETO and the EACM was to provide new institutional
structures that were specifically geared towards becoming the catalyst for local
economic development and poverty reduction. These two key structures were to
bolster the density of tourism attractions and assets through which the larger
objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy could be achieved. Due to the reasons outlined
above, the structures became unsustainable and therefore were unable to contribute to
the objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. From the perspective of the literature on
policy implementation failure, there are a number of interesting counterfactual ‘what
if’ questions (Bovens and ’t Hart, 1996) that could be asked to further explore the
failure of the ETO and the EACM to contribute to institutional thickness. One of these, is
the question of what would have happened if the EACM for instance had been
developed on the foregrounds directly in front of Elmina Castle. It can be argued that
this would have increased the likelihood of tourists patronising products at the EACM
because they would have seen the market as they enter and exit the Castle.

It is evident that the stakeholders involved in the Elmina 2015 Strategy perceived the
policy making process in a linear fashion. Thus it was felt that one can move from
decision making and then seamlessly progress into translated outcomes. It has been
noted that this is rarely the case in policy making and that it is important to approach
this process by identifying the key actors involved and the ways in which their actions
and inactions might affect policy outcomes (Howlett et al., 2015; Peters and Pierre, 2006). In summary, this long quote from Member of Parliament for KEEA and the former Municipal Chief Executive under whose watch the projects began provides a flavour of the linear vision held for the EACM and the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

I think that it will only have impact if we look at the way we were actually developing this strategy. We added what we call local economic development. Close to the old market in Elmina if you pass there, nothing is going on there though but if you pass there, we were going to assemble all those who were developing beads and other things to stay there so that when and even within the strategy we had in mind that those who visit the castle, they wouldn’t even drive straight to the castle. Their cars will be parked at the Kobina Gyan Square. They will be walking, along the line when they are walking, they will drop to buy a bottle of water, they will drop to buy a bottle of blue skies, where would they do that? It will be along the route going to the castle. How people are going to benefit from this will be, somebody from Elmina selling his or her bottle of water. They will buy from them. It’s a way of making money. If beads and these that these people were actually developing, tourists buying from them, we will be promoting local economic development. If this our homestay, these houses that if they had been able to work, it’s a way of empowering the poor. This was what we had in mind that we said tourism and local economic development.

6.4 Form and depth of institutional thickness

Municipalities such as the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA) want to promote tourism because they see it as an opportunity to diversify their economies, create employment and aid overall local economic development. Interviewees from the KEEA spoke about the potential benefits that tourism can bring to the municipality. However, there is a challenge facing KEEA when it comes to tapping into the potential of tourism for local economic development. This challenge was partly overcome through the Elmina 2015 Strategy whose external funding source provided the needed institutional support for the KEEA. Normally, the KEEA is overwhelmed with the day-to-day issues of local basic service provision and resolving immediate priorities of fixing roads, repairing markets and/or fixing street lights. Within such an environment of pressing needs, tourism tends to drop down on their list of priorities. Thus while there is a shared image of tourism’s potential positive role in local economic

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110 Interview with Nana Ato Arthur, MP for KEEA/Former KEEA MCE/Former Regional Minister, 07.11.2014
development among municipal staff, the immediate demands on their time and inadequate resources keep them from developing and entrenching institutional structures that can tap into tourism to achieve local economic development and poverty reduction.

From the interview data two key observations can be made regarding the perceptions of the form and depth of embeddedness of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and how it shaped outcomes. On one hand are those who feel that the project did not succeed because it was too much embedded in the KEEA structures and hence suffered from the vagaries of inherent political issues. Others are however of the view that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was not embedded deep enough in the structures of KEEA nor of the community. In this view, this lack of depth of embeddedness explains why the outcomes were less than hoped for. For those in the first camp, their view is exemplified in this quote by the Executive Director of the Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust who stressed that, “…if you needed that project to succeed, even though it will need the protection and support of the state, it must be independent…So what am saying is that the 2015 strategy was good, really very good but then again structural-wise, who is supposed to implement that?”111 From this perspective, given the many responsibilities of the KEEA, the added task of governing the implementation process for the Elmina 2015 Strategy proved to be beyond their capacity. However, there is the prior question of who the policy writers of the Elmina 2015 Strategy envisaged as taking the project forward. In this regard, the KEEA was clearly seen as the best institution to carry out the full implementation of the vision since it has the constitutional mandate of ensuring overall local economic development and poverty reduction in the municipality.

It appears that if an independent and well-endowed institutional structure had been set up to lead the implementation process, then the chance of success would have been higher. This view therefore echoes the point made by Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2007:525) that “the success of LED strategies depends to a large degree on the existence of appropriate local and regional institutional systems and on the availability of the necessary frameworks and skill levels at all government tiers”. In this regard the KEEA was an appropriate local institution to lead the design of the strategy. Nonetheless, another layer of independent institutional body to oversee full

111 Interview with Francis Cobbinah, Executive Director, Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, 29.09.2014
implementation and monitoring and evaluation of projects might have given further depth to the institutional structures in the locality or lead to a duplication of institutions and a lack of accountability – see the example of the Elmina Tourism Office discussed above. It must be noted that even when new organisational and institutional structures have been put in place, it is important to have adequate oversight from existing bodies like the KEEA. It was the breakdown of this oversight governance responsibility of the KEEA that lead to the mismanagement of the Elmina Tourism Office revenue and assets. As one interviewer noted, “you know the governance system is not working. You know also because it is not working the, those at the helm of affairs are not on their toes, you get it, ahh they are not on their toes ahh, so we need to have a strong supervisory system to make governance work”\(^{112}\)

The second perspective from the interviews point out that there was a shallow depth of embeddedness of the Elmina 2015 Strategy within the KEEA and the community. From this perspective, the project failed because it was not strongly rooted into the community nor within the KEEA. The reason for this perceived shallow depth of embeddedness is explained in terms of the commitment of those individual actors who are involved in the planning and implementation process. Thus for some people, the best way would have been to have people who hail from Elmina at the helm of the governing process. This sentiment found expression in quotes such as these which are worth quoting in some detail;

“But the assembly coming in with its expertise, I don’t kick against it but most of them are not from Elmina so they weren’t interested in the project itself or the benefits that the community will derive...so you can see that when you put wrong officers into a project which does not concern them too much, it brings about the collapse of the whole thing or something like that. So that is what I, this is what I have to say about why the project has been in abyss now and up to now nobody seem to take the second phase on.”\(^{113}\)

“The technocratic or the expertise who were then in place helped channel the project, did that but I’m sorry it is only the coordinator who was Elminaian and he happens to be Prof. Annah Prah at that time. He had to request for sabbatical leave for 2 years to help this project to be carried on. But the assembly they also supposed to write a cheque, they are also supposed to do that monitoring, do that, awarding contracts to these people and all that. They did but how competent these people were? How committed are these technocratic were? How did they

\(^{112}\) Interview with Felix Nguah, Manager of Elmina Ecotours Ltd/Interim Chair of Tour Guides Association Central Region, 09.09.2014
\(^{113}\) Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 31.10.2014
value the sustainability of this project, aftermath of the first phase? I’ll say most of them did not put value on it and carelessly never thought of sustaining the programme after the first one.”

The assumption in these quotes is that developing the right depth of institutional thickness will require that actors are ‘true’ Elminians who will be more interested in attending to the long term sustainability of the project. To some extent this assumption is plausible since it has been argued by for example Pike et al., (2006:123) that communities need to be empowered to self-determine an appropriate form of local economic development initiatives. The fact that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was initiated by and funded by external agencies took away a bit of the self-determination of the community. The other side to this is that the manager of the Elmina Tourism Office when it was first opened was from Elmina. Thus one would expect that he would have been particularly keen to ensure the success of the activities under his authority. As already explained in the section above, this did not turn out to be so. Thus, it is not so much whether key actors hail from Elmina but rather the extent to which there are clear institutional and organisational lines of authority and accountability to ensure effective governance of the process.

Conclusions

The tourism planning process is recognised as being a social and political process as well as being a technocratic one involving a number of governmental and societal institutions (Dredge and Jenkins, 2007). It is through effective planning and implementation that tourism’s potential for local economic development and poverty reduction can be enhanced (Brohman, 1996; Harrison, 2008). Thus to understand tourism-led local economic development planning processes such as the Elmina 2015 Strategy, it is important to consider the institutional structures that enable and constrain the planning processes and the social and political processes that underline it all. This chapter explored the third research question of this thesis which looks at the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy was embedded into the institutional arrangement for local economic development planning at the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-

114 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 16.07.2015
Abrem Municipal Assembly (KEEA). In particular, the concept of institutional thickness allowed the analysis to identify the level of institutional presence, the level of mutual interaction between stakeholders, the structures of domination and pattern of coalitions as well as the awareness among stakeholders of being involved in a common enterprise. The development of institutional thickness enhances the propensity of tourism-led local economic development initiatives to be successful and sustainable.

In this chapter I examined the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a tourism-led local economic development initiative was rooted in a system of institutional support. To arrive at such an understanding it has been important to analyse whether national economic development planning systems and national tourism development planning systems provided enough institutional support for implementing the Elmina 2015 Strategy. A plethora of institutions at national, regional and in particular at the local level is a necessary condition for developing institutional thickness (Raco, 1998) that can ensure the sustainability of tourism-led local economic development initiatives. The start of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was characterised by a strong institutional presence derived from its alignment with national economic development policies and national tourism development plans. The provision of such institutional support was in the form of setting up new organisational structures such as the Elmina Tourism Office and the Elmina Arts and Crafts Market. The capacity of existing organisations was also enhanced through a revenue sharing arrangement that enabled them to take on additional governance responsibilities for the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This support network however, began to disintegrate midway through implementation due to among others the inability to build on the new institutional support and changes in national economic and tourism development policies and plans. The analysis in this chapter therefore goes to support the argument by Amin and Thrift (1995) that a strong institutional presence while being a necessary condition is not sufficient by itself to lead to the development of institutional thickness.

Furthermore, the analysis in this chapter shows that the expected ‘institutional isomorphism’ (MacLeod, 1997) that was to come with the setting up of new institutional and organisation structures failed to materialise. The Elmina Tourism Office (ETO) and the Elmina Arts and Crafts Market (EACM) were set up to add to a strong institutional presence and the KEEA was charged with oversight management responsibilities. However, key stakeholders conceived of the establishment of the ETO
and the EACM as a linear policy making process that will lead to goal attainment. There was inadequate attention paid to the ways in location of the ETO and the EACM could affect outcomes, and to how competing interests could undermine the success of policy objectives. Moreover, the analysis shows that the structures and lines of accountability were weak due to reduced stakeholder communication and collaboration. The KEEA was unable to hold the Manager of the ETO to account for the resources put at his disposal which were to be used to further enhance the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Moreover, the establishment of the EACM, rather than encouraging stakeholder interaction based on a mutual awareness of being involved in a common enterprise, appears to have led to sectionalism and disengagement from some institutions like the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB). This is partly because there were existing arts and craft shops within the Elmina Castle from which the GMMB collected rent charges. Thus there was an absence of shared norms and practices (Coulson and Ferrario, 2007) and an inadequate attempt at "the establishment of trust relations and mutual cooperation (Raco, 1998:978 emphasis in original) that would have contributed to the development of institutional thickness.

The analysis in this chapter also shows that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was not embedded within subsequent Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) of the KEEA. The planning and implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy appears to have become parallel to, rather than integrated into the long term development planning of the KEEA. Embedding the Elmina 2015 Strategy into subsequent MTDPs would have thickened the institutional support for implementation. If subsequent MTDPs had made reference to it and looked to build on it, the governance needs of the Elmina 2015 Strategy would have been kept alive on the agenda of the KEEA so that resources were allocated to meet its needs. Furthermore, this embedding process would have contributed to the development of a mutual awareness of being involved in a common local enterprise amongst old and new stakeholders at all levels. As it so happened, the depth of embeddedness was shallow and hence the Elmina 2015 Strategy fell off the planning and governance agenda of the KEEA. This conclusion raises questions about the emphasis on the local level within the concept of institutional thickness. Is the local level the optimal spatial scale to assess the ways institutional thickness shaped tourism-led local economic development planning outcomes? While the local level offers much insight into the planning process, a look at the regional and national level can also provide additional insights into the structures of domination and/or patterns of coalition that shape action at the local level. This makes visible the forms of political
and social exclusion that shapes the process of institutionalisation (Raco, 1998). In many ways the level of institutional thickness developed for the planning and implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was influenced by political contestations and it is these issues that I explore in depth in the next chapter.
Chapter 7

“Today it’s party A, tomorrow it’s party B”: political cycles and the shaping of development outcomes

Much like any development intervention, tourism-led local economic development initiatives are deeply political. The political underpinnings of tourism-led local economic development initiatives exist at the international, national, regional and local levels. A fundamental reason for the political nature of tourism-led local economic development initiatives is because at its heart, it involves a wide range of stakeholders and actors with differing vested interests. Differing vested interests represent a potential source of stakeholder conflicts that can impede joined-up communication, collaboration and coordination efforts. An awareness of the political nature of tourism-led local economic development initiatives is therefore critical in exploring the governance of such initiatives. While there is a sizeable literature on tourism governance in general, there is little research that provides an extensive focus on the political underpinnings of governance. Rarer still is research that looks at tourism governance in terms of the tourism-poverty nexus. In this last empirical chapter of the thesis, I consider some of the key political elements that shaped the governance of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a tourism-led local economic development initiative. The idea of ‘cycles’ offers the organising frame to this chapter. I use cycles to refer to the cyclical nature or patterns of change in ideas and politics from the international level to the local level. This allows me to open up the workings of the KEEA and international donor funding. These have so far in the thesis appeared as ‘black boxes’ but will now be opened up to show the political contestations that surrounded the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

There are three main sections in this chapter. In the first section, I assess the prevailing international development donor policy and funding under which the Elmina 2015 Strategy was born and how this shaped the trajectory of its growth and eventual downturn. I first consider the opportunities and constraints of the European and Dutch funding. In particular I look at how the Elmina 2015 Strategy got tied up in the internal evolution of private sector organisations and NGOs who were funded to implement certain aspects of the initiative. The first section also examines how cycles of
international donor funding to the KEEA shaped the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The second section is structured around how national and local election cycles resulted in changes in leadership at the KEEA and the political implications of each change of party government on the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The analysis in this section takes a closer look at the shaping role of District/Municipal Chief Executives on the outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Finally, I examine how the transfer system of local government service staff was hijacked by political elements at the municipal level. Specifically, I pay close attention to the key role played by District/Municipal Development Planning Officers and how the cycles of their transfers shaped the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

7.1 Changing rhythms of international donor policy and funding

A number of development aid agencies and donor governments have in recent times attempted to integrate political economy analyses and assessments in their policies and practices. However, these attempts have not always been successful or effective in bringing about desired outcomes. The reasons for this situation are varied. Key among these reasons is the fact that the very nature of these development aid agencies and donor policy means that development is by and large seen in primarily technical terms. Moreover, those development consultants and professionals are faced with incentives that tend to make them resistant to fully integrate political economy analyses and assessments. This is because development institutions are not expected to mingle in the politics of a given country or locality. Consequently development consultants and professionals tend to depoliticise issues and must rely on technical and technocratic definitions of development problems in order to justify their interventions – the anti-politics machine (Ferguson, 1994; Escobar, 1995). In this section, I consider some of these issues by exploring how the donor funding mechanisms underpinning the Elmina 2015 Strategy shaped outcomes. The section is structured around two subsections that look firstly at EU and Dutch funding. In the final subsection, I consider how a new cycle of donor funding to the KEEA after a change of national political party government displaced the Elmina 2015 Strategy.
Funding for mutual heritage preservation from the European Union and the Dutch government

Attempts to get funding to undertake a renovation of various historic and heritage buildings in Elmina goes back to the 1990s when the Save Elmina Association (SEA) was very active (see discussion in Chapter 5, section 5.2). In the very late 1990s and at the turn of the new millennium the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) also sought for funding to help in the renovation of the Elmina Castle. It was at this time that international donor funding cycles became aligned to the needs of Elmina. In view of the 300-year celebrations of Ghanaian-Dutch diplomatic relations of which the town of Elmina is a physical embodiment, funding began to pour in. This was the beginnings of the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme (ECHMP) which was then funded by the Dutch government and through which the Elmina 2015 Strategy was formulated.

The funding from the Dutch government made it possible for the KEEA to undertake a much more detailed planning process and public consultations for the Elmina 2015 Strategy than is normally possible when preparing the Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) of the assembly. The funding also meant that the pace and trajectory of the project was controlled to an extent by the Dutch government115. Many of the projects identified through the ECMP and the Elmina 2015 Strategy focused on the remnants of Dutch culture and heritage in Elmina, including the Dutch Cemetery and Old Dutch merchant houses. Once the Elmina 2015 Strategy had been formulated, additional funding was secured from the European Union through the 9th framework of the European Development Fund (EDF). This funding, to the tune of €1.6 million116, was for the implementation of 5 key strategic projects under the so called Elmina Cultural Heritage and Local Economic Development Programme (CHLDEP). The conditions that came attached to this fund meant that it was Urban Solutions BV that got contracted as the international consultants for the project. This situation did not go down well with the GMMB who had favoured a local consultant in order to develop and build

115 Interview with Michael Bentil-Arthur, Assemblyman/Head of Development Planning Subcommittee/Head of Elmina Zonal Council, KEEA, 01.10.2014
116 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
Indeed the GMMB did set up a consulting business unit to specifically bid for part of the project but they were unsuccessful. This was primarily due to EU funding rules that stipulated against an organisation being a benefactor and a contractor of the same project.

The Dutch international development organisation SNV was contracted by Urban Solutions BV to implement Lot 4a of CHLDEP. This lot was for tourism and local economic development. At that time the SNV was venturing into the tourism-poverty nexus project, there was a general trend across the international development field to consider tourism as a viable route to local economic development and poverty reduction (Scheyvens, 2007; Hummel and van der Duim, 2012, 2016). Much of international donor funding tend to go into employing their own country organisations and consultants for project implementation in third countries. This appears to be essentially what happened with SNV being contracted to carry out this component of the project. Among other things, the main objective for SNV was to integrate tourism as an economic activity into the daily lives of residents and to build capacity for utilising tourism in Elmina. There was only one document that I could source with regard to SNV’s role in tourism and local economic development. This is an Elmina Tourism Management Plan document that is an outcome of a steering committee meeting in June, 2005. In this document a number of plans and strategies were envisaged for development tourism. It included developing an Elmina Brand to cover all the individual tourist attractions and assets. This was to be the ‘software’ aspect to accompany the ‘hardware’ component of physical building renovations.

This software aspect however appears to have been unsuccessful as there is no mention of it in the subsequent progress report. Indeed, in the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy implementation SNV underwent a structural transformation from its headquarters in the Netherlands due to funding cuts. The result was a consolidated focus on WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) in terms of programming and a phasing out of tourism-related programmes (Hummel and van der Duim, 2012, 2016). This change in international development policy of SNV, on the balance of available evidence, appears to have affected the sustainability and continuity of the software components of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. While phasing out their tourism-related

117 Interview with Nicholas Ivor, Central and Western Regional Director of GMMB, 30.10.2014
118 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 22.07.2015
programmes did not mean an abrupt end to existing contracts, in the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, it meant that there was no follow-up monitoring and evaluation of the projects executed. Indeed, in the draft final report of the whole project prepared by Urban Solutions, there is no mention of the SNV’s work under the contracted Lot 4a. This is perhaps a sign of the unsuccessful aspect of the SNV’s involvement in integrating tourism as an economic activity into the daily lives of residents.

The EU and Dutch government funding mechanisms had profound effects on both the process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Firstly, there was an over focus on physical projects – i.e. the ‘hardware’ side. It appears that the process of local economic development and poverty reduction was considered in primarily technical terms. Thus much of the funding was for the renovation and rehabilitation of buildings and other physical infrastructure including the Elmina Castle, Fort St. Jago, Dutch Cemetery, Old Dutch merchant houses among others. While these were essential, there was not an accompanying strong emphasis on the ‘software’ side of the process. This software side included fully understanding the political economy of Elmina and Ghana at large and integrating this understanding in the design of the projects to ensure continuity and sustainability. In the draft final report of 23rd October, 2006 prepared by Urban Solutions BV, there is very little mention of the software side of the project. Instead there is a detailed listing and explanation of the hardware aspects of building renovation, rehabilitation and painting. Moreover, since the project was strongly led by Urban Solutions BV, once they pulled out of Elmina after having completed their contract, a capacity vacuum was created because the KEEA was not in a position to continue.119

The history of Urban Solutions BV and its role in the Elmina 2015 Strategy highlights the incentive structures in the aid value chain that affect aid effectiveness. As discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.3, assessment of aid effectiveness tend to be biased because it places the full burden of effectiveness on recipient countries with little regard to the role of donor countries and other actors in the value chain of the aid delivery process. In looking at the evolution of Urban Solutions BV and the other Dutch institutions that were involved in the Elmina 2015 Strategy it becomes clear that there were negative incentives within the aid delivery process. This contributed to the low rate of effectiveness in meeting some of the project objectives. Urban Solutions BV started as a

119 Interview with Nicholas Ivor, Central and Western Regional Director of GMMB, 30.10.2014
spin-off from the Institute of Housing Studies and Urban Development (HIS) based at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The IHS (see Chapter 5, section 5.2) was involved in the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme (ECHMP) out of which the Elmina 2015 Strategy was developed. After the Strategy was developed and funding secured, staff of the IHS who had been seconded to the ECHMP moved to establish Urban Solutions BV as a private consultancy business in November, 2003. Thus it appears that the academics at the IHS saw the Elmina 2015 Strategy as an opportunity to strike out into the world of full time consultancy business.

Given that funding was from the Dutch government and the EU, the newly formed Urban Solutions BV was selected to provide consultancy services to the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Thus although the Dutch government was providing aid to the Elmina 2015 Strategy, part of this aid was flowing back into the Netherlands through the use of Dutch consultants and Dutch NGOs (see previous paragraph). This use of technical assistance through which a not-so-insignificant percentage of aid budget is spent on consultancy, has been reported to be ineffective and overpriced (Easterly and Pfitze, 2008; Borda-Rodriguez and Johnson, 2013). Nonetheless this mechanism of aid delivery was used for the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This appears to have become a source of negative incentive within the value chain of the aid delivery process. From available evidence it appears that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was simply a practice-run for Urban Solutions BV in terms of their then budding consultancy business. There was no follow-up evaluation the effectiveness of the various projects undertaken and their outcomes after the implementation process. This is partly because of the peculiar situation of an absence of feedback loops between aid beneficiaries and aid agencies as well as their consultants. Urban Solutions BV could afford to lose interest in the project once the external funding was running out. The Elmina community could not hold Urban Solutions BV accountable nor could the citizens in the Netherlands who contribute to Dutch aid.

Urban Solutions BV is now based mostly in Asia working on urban housing and heritage projects across different countries. There is very little trace left of the Elmina 2015 Strategy on their current website although it is clear that it was the experience of the Elmina project that kick-started their consultancy business. It is under the ‘Publications’ section of the website that they say this about the Elmina 2015 Strategy;
Elmina – Building on the Past to Create a Better Future

Old Dutch slave fortresses in Elmina were restored and alongside the restoration some sustainable developments took place: the set up of a tourist office in Elmina in one of the buildings, plus an employment project in order to keep the buildings well maintained. This meant an increase in tourism, a revival of traditional culture and skills, an increasing demand for local products and thus improved living conditions.

The publication is highly illustrated with beautiful pictures by Nana Kofi Acqua. Published in co-operation with KIT Publishers with support by the European Commission.

Contact KIT Publishers to order a copy

This website content can be seen as simply a repetition of the original objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This is because the evidence on the ground in the Elmina portrays a contrary reality than the one stated on the website in terms of tourism development, revival of traditional culture and skills, increasing demand for local products and improved living conditions. These objectives were not achieved as expected.

The role of Urban Solutions BV and the other external funding agencies points to the issue of power differentials between aid donors and recipient countries. The relationship between the Urban Solutions BV and KEEA was to a large extent characterised by an imbalance of power and accountability. The findings suggest that in the preconditions attached to the funding for the Elmina 2015 Strategy, it was the Dutch government through Urban Solutions BV who had a stronger say in how the project was designed and implemented. Indeed an enduring perception among local stakeholders was that the KEEA had a weak influence on the pace and trajectory of the project compared to the donors and Urban Solutions BV. Given its low internally generated funds (IGF), the KEEA was dependent on the financial support of its donors in making the project successful. In a sense, the Elmina 2015 Strategy was done to the KEEA and not with them. This is partly because donor bodies saw tourism-led local economic development initiatives in purely technical terms. There is also a perception, especially within the GMMB that the project was hijacked by international donor interests. As one interviewee puts it,

120 http://www.urban-solutions.nl/toolkits-publications/
“You see, the project itself, I had a document here that showed that it was not fully in the hands of the assembly directly. It was a joint venture between Urban Solutions and KEEA and the EU so the influence of the assembly was not all that great but the major role was played by KEEA” \(^\text{121}\)

This meant that once the EU and Dutch funding for the project had been expended the KEEA had to look for new sources of funding to further its development projects. Urban Solutions BV as the consultancy part lost interest and hence the enthusiasm around the project died down.

**Swapping Dutch-funded projects for German-funded projects**

International development organisations are not commonly known for joined up efforts in project delivery. In many cases, this lack of joined-up efforts result in a duplication of development projects strewn across many communities that are left in various stages of completion because of funding challenges (Ferguson, 1994; Mosse, 2004; Hout, 2012). There are two main related reasons for this situation. First, there is the cyclical changes in the ‘pet’ projects supported by international donor funding agencies. This relates to the second cause being regular changes in international development policy directions. At the community level, this is compounded by changes in local politics and the composition of vested interests. As discussed in detail below in section 7.2, changes in the political governance of Ghana offer different sets of incentives for politicians in terms of whether to continue with existing projects or to begin new ones. It is the interplay of these two reasons that partly account for the how the Elmina 2015 Strategy played out.

When in 2009 a new political party – the National Democratic Congress – came into power at the KEEA, they showed an indifference towards continuing with the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy and instead sought for funding to begin a new local economic development project in the municipality. When a German-funded project was brought to the KEEA, paper traces of the Elmina 2015 Strategy appear to have been wiped out. The room within the assembly building that was first given out to the ECHMP was cleared out to make way for the new German funded project that focused on different aspects of development in Elmina. All the project documentation

\(^{121}\) Interview with Michael Bentil-Arthur, Assemblyman/Head of Development Planning Subcommittee/Head of Elmina Zonal Council, KEEA, 01.10.2014
relating to the Elmina 2015 Strategy was discarded. It took the intervention of the Head of the tourism sub-committee of the assembly and the former local implementation officer to salvage some of the documents that were being sent to the dump. As it happened, “…documents were just left at the mercy of the weather. It was Dr. Annah Prah who came for all these documents and it is in his custody”122. During the interview with Dr. Annah Prah at his residence, he showed me the pile of documents and explained how he came about them.

“So it is the government to follow, after all the office was in the KEEA not in the chief’s palace so why do you throw away the documents in the first place. If you walk with me here, they are in, some of them are in my daughter’s boy’s quarters. This was there when I was visiting the assembly, all the plans for the Castle, for the forts etc, they were thrown away, I collected them here, come and see…”123

This process of intentional institutional knowledge and memory cleaning – institutional amnesia (Pollitt, 2000) – breeds a cycle of dependency on international donor assistance. This means that traces of previous projects tend to be scraped clean in order to attract new donors. Municipal assemblies like the KEEA do not have to commit to devising strategies to raise additional funds to support project continuity. The responsibility for proper record keeping of projects to ensure continuity is a big challenge facing the KEEA. The issue of improper keeping of records means that knowledge of existing projects are not passed on to new staff when there are staff transfers.124 The Municipal Coordinating Director at the KEEA during the interview did confirm that “proper handing over has always been an issue and record keeping I have also noted is a problem…[due to]a lot of misfiling, a lot of just placing records in certain places that if care is not taken even to retrieve them becomes a problem.”125

The cycle of international donor funding changes interact with cycles of political party governments to create negative incentive towards project continuity. Each donor wants to focus on discrete projects even if a similar project is ongoing. This is what partly

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122 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 31.10.2014
123 Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
124 Interview with Michael Bentil-Arthur, Assemblyman/Head of Development Planning Subcommittee/Head of Elmina Zonal Council, KEEA, 01.10.2014; Interview with Alhaji Musah, Municipal Coordinating Director, KEEA, Elmina 04.11.2014
125 Interview with Alhaji Musah, Municipal Coordinating Director, KEEA, Elmina 04.11.2014
happened to the Elmina 2015 Strategy once a new funded project arrived at the KEEA. As a former municipal planning officer at the KEEA explained,

“But the assemblies do not want to commit themselves as far as monies are concerned. They think that if somebody brought the project they call, they always call for continuous support from donors, I mean that’s the way the Ghanaian, even Ghana government thinks. Every project if you go through the books there are, I keep on asking why would, when would the pilot land in Ghana? Any project that comes they say pilot project and the pilot never lands, the pilot is always in the sky waiting for green light to land. So all the projects are pilots. The moment donors’ monies end that’s it.”

This quotation paints the picture of how development projects such as the Elmina 2015 Strategy tend to be perceived. Indeed the existence of this cycle of waiting on donor funding for another ‘pilot’ project of the same nature was given further credence in my interview with the then Municipal Chief Executive under whose reign the Elmina 2015 Strategy took off. He explained that (as the current Member of Parliament for the KEEA Constituency) he has an appointment at the Dutch Embassy in relation to the Elmina 2015 Strategy because “...we want to sit down, look at, we need to you see, we are just around 2015, how far have we gone with this strategy, what next, what is the way forward. That is what I am talking about.” What is clear from the ongoing is that one cannot talk about the governance of tourism-led local economic development – or indeed of the governance of any development intervention – without a closer look at the (dis)incentives to project implementation presented by international donor funding cycles.

126 Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015
127 Interview with Nana Ato Arthur, MP and former Municipal Chief Executive of KEEA, 07.11.2014
7.2 The formative influence of national and local electoral cycles

In this section I provide an analysis of the evolution of the Elmina 2015 Strategy vis-à-vis national and local electoral cycles. In particular I look at the impacts of succeeding political party control of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo Municipal Assembly (KEEA) in the form of District/Municipal Chief Executives and the direction in which they took the project upon assumption of office. Research in the political economy of public goods provision have shown a relationship between the national electoral cycles and probability of development project being seen to full completion (Williams, 2016; Batley et al., 2012). There is an overlap between electoral cycles and the time it takes for many development projects like the Elmina 2015 Strategy to be fully implemented. Within this overlap are both positive and negative incentives for politicians coming into power to either continue or not to continue with project implementation. These are the key issues analysed in this section which is structured around the electoral cycles in Ghana and the political party in charge.


The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military government was in charge before the transition back to democratic elections in 1992. Prior to this, in the very late 1980s, Ato Austin who hailed from Elmina was appointed as the PNDC Regional Secretary (Regional Minister) for the Central Region. At this point the Central Region was in socio-economic decline - a process that started once the British colonial government moved the national capital from Cape Coast to Accra in 1877. Thus the Central Region was one of the poorest regions in the country until the late 1980s. This perception of poverty in the region still persists until now, even though the latest figures from the Ghana Statistical Service shows a remarkable decline in poverty incidence (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.1). In order to reverse the economic decline, Ato Austin saw tourism as a potential catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction.128 The key attractions on which this tourism-led local economic development strategy was to be based were the Cape Coast Castle and the Elmina Castle. Both of these Castles were in a deplorable state. The plan was therefore to

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128 Interview with Nkunu Akyea, Former Executive Director of Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, 08.09.2014
restore these Castles and to then market them to African Americans, Afro Caribbean and other Africans in the Diaspora who want to reconnect with their roots. It was thus from this period that a concerted planning and development effort turned the Central Region into the hub of tourism in Ghana. As one interviewee noted,

“...he [Ato Austin] was looking for a strategy that will stem the economic decline, reverse it and he choose tourism as a catalyst and the proposal, that proposal was to enhance these two Castles, Cape Coast and Elmina, bring them up because they were decaying very fast. So the proposal’s main aim was to restore so that they could be catalyst, important catalyst for African American heritage tourists...”

At the 1992 national elections, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party which mutated from the PNDC won the elections and retained control of all Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). At the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem District Assembly (KEEA), one Austin Ankumah was appointed as the District Chief Executive (DCE). He was also keen on seeing to the restoration of the Elmina Castle for tourism development. Around this time, the proposal from the Regional Minister - Ato Austin – known as the Tourism Development Scheme for the Central Region received funding support from UNDP and USAID. The proposal looked into how tourism could bring more development benefits to the region – this objective is similar to the Dutch funded Elmina 2015 Strategy that came a decade later and points to the nature of the cycle of international funding discussed under section 7.1 above.

The USAID funding for this programme was provided through a so called Natural Resource Conservation and Historic Preservation Project (NRCHP). The funding enabled the restoration of the Cape Coast Castle, the Elmina Castle as well as works to establish Fort St. Jago also in Elmina. In a bid to diversify the tourism products away from only heritage, a visitor reception centre and a canopy walkway was built in the nearby Kakum National Park. It was also realised that this bricks and mortar approach to tourism development in the regional was not enough to tap into tourism’s full potential for local economic development and poverty reduction. To this end, part of the funding was used to develop an integrated tourism-led town planning and development plan for the Cape Coast metropolis as well as providing homeowner grants for the renovation of old merchant and colonial buildings with historic value.

129 Interview with Nkunu Akyea, Former Executive Director of Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, 08.09.2014
These buildings were then to be used for commercial activities that would generate income for those involved. This initial effort at tourism-led local economic development and poverty reduction did not include Elmina.

Up to the next national electoral cycle in 1996 that was again won by the NDC party, the then DCE for Elmina – Thomas Austen Ankumah – was very keen to replicate in Elmina the integrated tourism-led local economic development plan that was developed for Cape Coast. The NDC government at this period showed strong political will and support to utilise tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Indeed, after their restoration, the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles became the centrepiece for Emancipation Day celebrations. The first Emancipation Day celebration in Ghana was introduced in 1998, a year after the NDC’s former President Rawlings had attended Jamaica’s national commemoration of the end of slavery. Emancipation Day is currently a yearly celebration in Ghana that attracts a large number of tourists – especially African Americans and Afro-Caribbean. It was this regular boom in tourist visitation to Elmina that the DCE sought to tap into as a catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction. The key issue at this point in the late 1990s was the issue of financing. The NDC government was at this time crippled with financial difficulties. Briggs (2012) notes that between 1998 -1999, the NDC government faced a sharp decline in international aid. This limited the government’s ability to allocate resources to places like Elmina.

Notwithstanding limited government resources, the DCE in Elmina encouraged and was supportive of private initiatives that sought to attract investments for renovating some of the historic building for tourism purposes. In fact the DCE wrote the preface of the first magazine of the Save Elmina Association which sought to increase awareness of the other heritage tourism assets in Elmina beyond the Elmina Castle (see discussion in Chapter 5, section 5.2 for more detail). The point to be made here is that up the year 2000, there was a lot of political support for tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives Elmina. When the NDC party lost the December, 2000 national polls to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) party, much of the ideas that were later to become the Elmina 2015 Strategy were already on the ground being discussed.

When the NPP government assumed office in 2001, one Nana Ato Arthur who hails from Elmina was appointed as the DCE for the KEEA. The government was keen to get as many high-visibility projects as possible running having campaigned on the promise of economic development and poverty reduction. It is within this context that the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme (ECHMP) took off. There was strong political support for and backing of the project through the allocation of resources. The ECHMP was very much in line with the NPP government’s economic development strategy – the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy – which focused on redistributive policies and poverty-related spending (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.2 and Chapter 6, section 6.1). There was also the positive political incentive for the NPP government to fully back this project since it could place its stamp on the project. Thus the continuity of the project was shaped by the fact that the NPP government could lay full claim to and gain political credit to having implemented the project even if the original ideas were already afloat during the era of the NDC government. As one of the interviewees explained,

“...this project was started by Nana, former MCE, he is now died and gone, Nana Ankumah [from the NDC government]. He initiated this 2015 strategy but they were passing through some challenges. It was Nana Ato Arthur’s time that we had the funds coming down...”

The fact that the benefits of the project were realised during the period of the NPP government had a positive impact on the standing of the NPP government in general and on the political career of the DCE – Nana Ato Arthur – in particular. The DCE was very committed to the project and endeared himself to both the national government and the people in KEEA. He explains his commitment and dedication to the project as this;

“How we sat day and night to develop this document. I will be here in the afternoon and then J.H. Mensah, the then senior minister will call me to his office in Accra that look, I have been able to get some Ambassadors together and I want you to come and speak with them. It’ll be 12midday here, he will tell me I need to be there at 4pm. I need to pick my car and even whether I have said goodbye to

130 Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 31.10.2014
my wife or family or not, I will go because I needed to do something for my people. That was the zeal then.”

At the next national elections in December 2004 the NPP government was re-elected in office. For his good work, Nana Ato Arthur from the KEEA was promoted to the role of Deputy Regional Minister and subsequently as the substantive Regional Minister for the Central Region. Figure 25 below is a timeline of some of the key political events that has taken place over the years at the KEEA.

131 Interview with Nana Ato Arthur, MP for KEEA/Former KEEA MCE/Former Regional Minister, 07.11.2014
132 Currently, Nana Ato Arthur is the Member of Parliament for KEEA even though the NDC government is back in power since 2009.
Figure 25 Timeline of key political cycles and events at the KEEA, 2000-2016
In 2005, the re-elected NPP government appointed one Frank Asmah as the DCE for the KEEA to replace the promoted Nana Ato Arthur. In fact the initial nomination of Frank Asmah was strongly contested by local party members of the NPP. As discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.1, DCEs are nominated by the President but need the approval of two-thirds of assembly members through voting. In the case of Frank Asmah, a number of the assembly members who were themselves government appointees planned to stage a demonstration and to vote against the newly nominated DCE. When word of this reached Nana Ato Arthur who was then the Deputy Central Regional Minister, he in consultation with the Regional Minister and the Minister for Local Government postponed the voting. The troublesome government appointees at the assembly were then suspended with immediate effect after the President through the Minister for Local Government sent a fax of their dismissal letters on Friday 3rd June, 2005. Thus 15 out of the 16 appointees were dismissed and replaced by new appointees the following Monday. When the voting was held again on the 7th of June, 2005, Frank Asmah polled 40 out of the 52 votes (77%) and was sworn into office together with the 15 new government appointees. The point of this backstory is to highlight the political nature of DCE appointments and the resulting upward accountability of DCEs to the President rather than to the local community.

At the time that Frank Asmah became the DCE, a lot of the physical projects were ongoing and near completion. Preparations were also being made to hand over the completed projects to the responsible bodies. Thus the second term of the NPP government coincided with the later part of Phase III and beginning of Phase IV of the Elmina 2015 Strategy – project implementation and institutionalisation phases respectively. However, it is also at this point that the zeal and political commitment shown during the first term of the NPP government began to wane. Within the political environment of Ghana, political credits are assigned to the politician or political party who initiates a project. Incoming politicians or party are therefore unable to claim much credits even if they are the ones to see the project through to full completion. Consequently, for the new DCE, there was little positive incentive to show the same zeal towards the project because the political credits had already being assigned to the

133 Lecture presented by Nana Ato Arthur, KEEA MP/Former KEEA MCE/Former Regional Minister at the School of Law, University of Cape Coast, titled 'The road to decentralisation: the present and the way forward', 07.11.2014
previous DCE. Available evidence from the interviews suggest that the new DCE began to privatise certain aspects of the Elmina 2015 Strategy projects and spin-offs like the waste management component. Thus interviewees noted that "It was Frank's time the whole project went off to a private entity. It was Ato Arthur’s time we started benefiting. It was Frank Asmah’s time this project went off."\textsuperscript{135}

The point here is that each political cycle of national elections presents different sets of incentives to politicians that shape the extent to which they continue existing projects. Thus after the NPP government had been re-elected, the political commitment and zeal that was associated with the Elmina 2015 Strategy began to wane. Certain aspects of the project did not get the needed attention while other aspects came into private hands. The new DCE did not share the same focus for the project as the predecessor.\textsuperscript{136} Thus the phase of institutionalising the projects and objectives of the Elmina 2015 Strategy within existing governance structures of the KEEA could not begin in earnest due to the low level of political commitment.

**Era of the National Democratic Congress: 2009 – 2016**

Electoral and party politics in Ghana are highly competitive and intense. This intensive political competition generates negative incentives for politics in ways that constrain economic progress (Kelsall, 2012; Whitfield, 2011, 2009). This is especially the case when it comes to project and programme continuity. When a new political party comes into power, they are faced with both positive and negative incentives and often tend not to continue with certain projects already began by the previous government from a different party\textsuperscript{137}. At the December 2008 national polls, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party was elected into power to replace the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government that had been in power from 2001. This was a keenly contested election that went to a run-off second voting and a third voting in one constituency before the NDC was able to secure the required minimum of $50\% + 1$ of total votes. Thus when the NDC came into office, the positive incentive for them was to initiate and start up their

\textsuperscript{135} Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA and founding member of SEA, 16.07.2015
\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015
\textsuperscript{137} Interview with Nana Ato Arthur, MP and former Municipal Chief Executive of KEEA, 07.11.2014; Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
own development projects and programmes even though there were uncompleted programmes and projects of the NPP government. This is simply because the political credits of completing existing projects will be claimed by the NPP party in opposition. While political credits are not fixed entities but open to claims, the party that initiates a project appears to be able to easily lay full claims even if a different party completed the project. Thus by beginning their own projects, the new government can claim all the political credits available which it is hoped will translate into electoral votes at the next elections. This is exactly what happened in terms of the continuation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy once the NDC party came into power.

The NDC government appointed one Rev. Veronica Essuman Nelson in 2009 to the position of the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE)\textsuperscript{138} for KEEA. This change had a strong shaping role on the trajectory of the final phase of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This was the institutionalisation phase where the municipality had to ensure, through effective communication, collaboration and coordination between stakeholders, that tourism was generating the momentum for local economic development and poverty reduction. It appears that there was not much political commitment to see to this phase of the project. The following quotes from some of the interviewees provide a sense of this situation;

“KEEA, and KEEA keeps on changing with the personnel. Today is party A, tomorrow is party B. Party A does not see anything right with the work started by party A or party B, that itself creates a problem.”\textsuperscript{39}

“...paradoxically when this thing started it started with an NDC government, the actual execution was done by an NPP government, an NPP government was succeeded by an NDC government who also wanted to make a niche and did not...now when one party leaves and another party comes, the way it looks at the project differs....”\textsuperscript{40}

“...every government, local etc. want to start something that they will be called an initiator and not a person who built upon what the previous person has done and so the Elmina 2015 strategy was unfortunately seen as an NPP achievement, you see and so the NDC had to start on its own”\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{138} The KEEA was declared as a municipality in 2007 by the NPP government
\textsuperscript{39} Interview with Francis Cobbinah, Executive Director, Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust, Cape Coast, 29.09.2014
\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
The implementation and institutionalisation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy from 2009 onwards began to take a downward turn even as a new political party came into office. As the quotes above make clear, there was not enough incentive for the new party to continue and make sure that the strategy was fully institutionalised within the governance structures of the KEEA. While the negative political incentives as discussed above played a role in this downward direction, part of the reason is also closely related to the loss of institutional memory and institutional capacity. For instance, the office room in which the documentations for the Elmina 2015 Strategy were kept at the KEEA were emptied to make room for a German funded project secured by the NDC government[^142] (see also discussion in section 7.1 above). The desire to start from scratch therefore meant that there was no incentive to retain institutional memory about the Elmina 2015 Strategy. Moreover, with change in party governments comes a high rate of municipal staff transfers based on the perception that existing staff may have become too loyal to the previous party government and might therefore be a hindrance to the agenda of the new government (this is discussed in more detail in the next section).

In this section I have analysed how the temporal dimension of implementing the Elmina 2015 Strategy interacted with and was shaped by the governmental time inconsistency problems that arise from change of political party governments. The political commitment of successive governments towards the institutionalisation phase of the project declined over the years. As the first DCE under whose watch the project began mentioned, “[h]owever as I alluded to earlier, when government changed, those who followed us, the zeal, the commitment, I don’t see it the way that we started”[^143] This lack of commitment is due to the negative incentives faced by politicians who decide to continue project implementation rather than starting one from scratch. Thus when the NDC government came into power, it was keen on starting its own new projects rather than continuing the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This is because the political credit for it had already been claimed by the opposition NPP government. The point of this section has been to show that an understanding of the implementation trajectory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy must take into account the effects of electoral cycles. Changes in government in a highly competitive political environment like Ghana present both

[^142]: Interview with Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah, Head of Implementation of Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, 03.11.2014.
[^143]: Interview with Nana Ato Arthur, MP for KEEA/Former KEEA MCE/Former Regional Minister, 07.11.2014; Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA and founding member of SEA, 31.10.2014 and 16.07.2015
positive and negative incentives for the level of commitment politicians can make towards existing development projects. An account of tourism-led local economic development initiatives and their implementation needs to be aware of and appreciate the shaping role of underlying electoral cycles and the incentives presented to politicians.

7.3 Changing personnel through local government service transfer cycles

As part of ongoing implementation of the decentralization policy in Ghana, the Local Government Service (LGS) is the national institution responsible for meeting the staff needs of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). This is done through staff postings and transfer from one MMDA to the other. This process is often fraught with complications and open to political influence and abuse. In some cases staff are posted to places where there is no need for their services while sometimes staff are transferred from one place to another at very short notice. Such situations lead to a lack of continuity in the projects and programmes of MMDAs. This is often because there is not enough institutional memory or capacity left when trained staff are transferred and replaced with new ones in the middle of project implementation.

In this section I analyse the impact of the process of LGS transfer of KEEA staff on the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In particular, I consider how the transfer process around Municipal Development Planning Officers (MDPOs) got manipulated through local government politics and political party interference – especially on that of Municipal Chief Executives. I assess the role played by MDPOs in the Elmina 2015 Strategy and how their subsequent transfer shaped the trajectory of the project. MDPOs are a critical piece of the jigsaw when it comes to the overall goal of MMDAs in bringing about local economic development and poverty reduction. This is because they are the ones who lead the planning process that culminate in the Medium Term Development Plans that are supposed to guide development at the local level. Consequently, the transfers and postings of MDPOs when not handled well can lead to a loss of institutional memory and a loss of institutional capacity required to guide and complete projects.
Municipal Development Planning Officer I – Justice Amoah

Municipal Development Planning Officers are key actors when it comes to the preparation of Medium Term Development Plans of MMDAs. In addition, they play a crucial role in making sure that project plans and action plans in MTDPs are seen through to full completion towards the goal of economic development and poverty reduction. In the specific case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, which is an area level MTDP, one Justice Amoah was the MDPO at the KEEA at the start. He played a significant role in shaping the initial trajectory of the project. As explained earlier, MMDAs are planning authorities tasked with the management and governance of overall local economic development of the communities within their boundaries. This mandate is exercised by MMDAs through their preparation of MTDP which is led by the MDPO (see discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.2). Prior to the formal start of the Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme, Justice Amoah as the MDPO of the KEEA was sent to the Netherlands for a training course. This was arranged by Urban Solutions through the Dutch NUFFIC grant. The goal was to build up the capacity of the MDPO to oversee the project. Upon return he was made the coordinator of the project in addition to fulfilling his other duties as a MDPO of the KEEA. He was subsequently sent to the Netherlands with a number of other stakeholders for further training once the Elmina 2015 Strategy had been developed and the implementation phase was about to begin.

As a coordinator for the Elmina 2015 Strategy, Justice Amoah had his knowledge and capacity fully developed in how to utilise tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. He was thus in a good position to guide the trajectory of project implementation and institutionalisation. He also had to put in a lot of personal commitment and zeal that went beyond the call of duty. In his own words he explained the form of such commitment:

“The way I suffered for this particular project, sleepless nights. There was one day I left the office 2am, sent a friend to Cape Coast, came back to Elmina to sleep, woke up 5am so I had 2 hours sleep because we were supposed, we were, that was the day we were launching the project and we had to stay in the office and make sure things were in order, early morning we had to go and do the set up for all the,

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144 Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 13.11.2014; Interview with Ebo Dadzie, Head of Tourism Sub-Committee, KEEA, 16.07.2015
there was when the Prince and Princess (of the Netherlands) came. We had to make sure that everything was in order.”

From the beginning of the project in 2001 up to the first national electoral cycle in December, 2004 there was a positive upward trajectory to project implementation. Shortly after the NPP government had been retained and a new DCE had been appointed to the KEEA in 2005, Justice Amoah was transferred. Even after he was transferred from the KEEA to the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly (CCMA), he was committed to come back and attend some of the project meetings. He explained in the interview that Urban Solutions as the international consultancy body retained him on the committee after his transfer in order to benefit from the training given to him. However, this was met with distrust from others at the KEEA “...so even though I was in Cape Coast, I was a member of the committee. At a point then I decided not to go again because anytime I go for meeting, it was as if I have been transferred and I don’t want to go that kind of thing so I decided not to participate in the meetings again.” Thus the capacity that was provided for Justice Amoah for project implementation was lost. It appears that Urban Solutions in the design of the project failed to anticipate the possibility of this situation happening. The subsequent efforts at getting the transfer request revoked were however unsuccessful.

It is plausible to argue here that the transfer of the MDPO is directly related to the influence of new DCE. As one interviewee explained, “[y]eah so in the middle of the project, they just sent him to, to create space and you know there are and I, if you talk to him you will see that he’s kicked away...so during the project in the middle of it they just transfer him, you know. There are, there were a lot of you know a lot of inside politics.”

As explained earlier in this Chapter local government staff are supposed to be (re)allocated on an arbitrary basis. However it is also well known that the process is open to interference by political actors. Thus new DCEs are known to seek for the transfer of the key staff such as MDPOs whom they feel may have become too loyal to their predecessors. There is the perception that staff may have developed personal loyalty, an alliance and/or even corrupt relationships with former political heads. In

146 Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015
147 Interview with Felix Nguah, Manager of Elmina Ecotours Ltd/Interim Chair of Tour Guides Association Central Region, 09.09.2014
the case of Justice Amoah for example, after his transfer from KEEA to the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly (CCMA) another electoral cycle ushered in his further transfer in the middle of another project. He explains that although he cannot tell who was behind his transfer from the KEEA, he does know how his subsequent transfer from the CCMA came about;

“But for the Cape Coast one [transfer] I know for sure and I was told even when I went to where the transfer came I was told that people orchestrated it but the Elmina one I don’t have what do you call it, evidence to show that somebody did it but the Cape Coast one somebody did it”\textsuperscript{148}

The failure to retain the trained MDPO at the KEEA greatly affected the trajectory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This is because the project was entering a critical stage at the time of his ‘forced’ transfer. This was the stage when the physical projects were being wound down and being handed over and the KEEA was supposed to come to the fore in institutionalizing the gains within its governance system. It was therefore a critical time to have the specifically trained personnel with the right capacity to be there to coordinate activities. With the MDPO being transferred, there was not enough capacity and institutional memory to keep these issues high on the agenda. Had Justice Amoah been retained, things might have turned out differently. Asked if he had wanted to remain at the KEEA, he answered that;

“That, that was my, my what do you call it, my wish, that to see the project through to at least so that at the end of it you can see that you have done A, B, C and it didn’t happen and I left. And those who were left behind and I think the MCE may not, might not have been the way as Ato Arthur did because Ato Arthur had more interest in the project than the one who came after”\textsuperscript{149}

\textbf{Municipal Development Planning Officer II – Abu Mohammed}

In the aftermath of the transfer of Justice Amoah from the KEEA to the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly (CCMA), one Abu Mohammed was allocated to the KEEA as the new Municipal Development Planning Officer in 2007. This was the period in which

\textsuperscript{148} Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015

\textsuperscript{149} Interview with Justice Amoah, Former Municipal Planning Officer of KEEA/Former National Project Coordinator of Elmina 2015 Strategy, 17.07.2015
many of the projects had been completed and handed over to the respective owners and managers. Urban Solutions as the international consultant for the Elmina 2015 Strategy was also formally ending their work and prepared their final report for the KEEA and other donor agencies in the last quarter of 2007. The project and associated final report documents were formally handed over to the KEEA in early 2008. The KEEA was to assume its place as the institution with responsibility for the governance and management of this tourism-led local economic development initiative. This was a process that was to be spearheaded by the recently arrived MDPO – Abu Mohammed.

It appears that at the time that Abu Mohammed assumed the role of MDPO at the KEEA much of the project documents were available. Thus he would have spent the initial period trying to get to grips with what the Elmina 2015 Strategy and how to continue with the implementation and institutionalisation phase. As the physical projects got completed and handed over, the level of communication, collaboration and coordination between stakeholders began to decline even as the new MDPO worked to keep abreast with the demands of his role. Since he had not been specifically trained for the project there were issues with regards to overseeing the implementation of the project. Moreover, he faced challenges in getting the MCE and other members of the KEEA to give full commitment to the Elmina 2015 Strategy. It is pertinent to note here that the year 2008 was also an election year and so for the DCE and his political party, the focus would have been on a “pork barrel” or targeted spending approach that would gain them electoral votes. The political incentive was to move resources away from implementing the ‘soft’ components of the Elmina 2015 Strategy which were difficult to gain political credit for. In an election year, MDPOs have to suspend a number of ongoing projects in order to focus on physical infrastructure projects with high visibility.

At the December, 2008 national elections, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) lost and was replaced by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party. This was despite the attempt at targeted spending by the NPP to win over voters. With the coming into power of the NDC government, a new MCE was appointed to the KEEA (see earlier

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150 A copy of their Draft Final Report is dated as 25th October, 2007
151 It was impossible to trace his whereabouts and interview him during the two fieldwork visits. However information from other interviewees and especially the current Municipal Development Planning Officer helped to fill in the information gap.
discussion under section 7.3 of this chapter). It was the commencement of this appointment in 2009 that the Elmina 2015 Strategy appears to have taken a turn for the worse in terms of implementing the final phase of it. This is also related to the treatment of the MDPO at that time. As explained earlier, the end and start of each electoral cycle presents incentives to politicians who win power. With the NDC party coming into power in 2009, civil servants and local government staff at many levels but especially at the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) level were seen as having become too loyal to the previous party which was in government. Consequently, this period is the time that most staff transfers took place. Staff who are not transferred tend to face antagonism from the new MCE’s if they are seen as not being agreeable to the agenda of the new political party government. This makes it difficult for MDPOs to be able to do their work effectively when it comes to making sure that existing development plans are being followed through. This is what happened to Abu Mohammed after the NDC came into power. In the end he left because he became frustrated with the system. The current MDPO explains that,

"The system beat him [Abu Mohammed, the former Municipal Development Planning Officer] harder until he left. There was no officer here for more than one year before I came because he had served in the assembly during the time of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) so when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) came, the first Chief Executive under the government said I wouldn’t work with you because you worked with the previous government. So he had to leave so he didn’t prepare any handing over notes, there was nothing”\textsuperscript{152}

This situation of Abu Mohammed leaving abruptly meant that there was no replacement MDPO for the KEEA. Thus there was no formal and proper writing of handing over notes for the next MDPO to be able to carry on the work. This affected the Elmina 2015 Strategy because it meant that the institutional memory was also almost totally wiped out. For over a year and half after Abu Mohammed left the KEEA as the MDPO there was no replacement because no one wanted to accept a posting to the KEEA. This was in part a protest against the mistreatment of their colleague and also a perception that the KEEA might be a difficult place to work. As a consequence the Elmina 2015 Strategy did not get institutionalised nor embedded with the subsequent

\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Development Planning Officer, KEEA, 23.07.2015
Medium Term Development Plans of the KEEA. The negative downward trajectory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy therefore continued.

**Municipal Development Planning Officer III – Labaran Fuseini**

In November, 2011 a new MCE – Isaac Kwaku Sam – was appointed to replace Rev. Veronica Esumah Nelson. It was after this new MCE had taken office that a new MDPO – Labaran Fuseini – accepted posting to the KEEA. For over a year and a half prior to this, there was no MDPO at the KEEA because of the way the previous MDPO had been treated. Thus "... for a very long time no officer was ready to come here because if our colleague was treated this way...and all that". When asked about the reception he received once he came as the MDPO, Labaran Fuseini responded that

"It was as bad as it is up to date. Because they [MCEs] actually don’t see why your office exist, he doesn’t know why it exist, he doesn’t care to know because (laughing)... seriously we have a lot of challenges so we also, it’s like the authorities pretend not to know our challenges, we also pretend to exist (laughter)".

This apparent hostility towards the office of MDPO is because in many cases, MCEs can decide by themselves and based on political interests which communities receive which development projects, regardless of what is in the MTDP. Thus the relationship between MDPOs and MCEs plays a key role in shaping the continuity or otherwise of development projects at the local level. MDPOs have very little leverage in reinig in the use and abuse of the personal power of MCEs. When asked what options are available to him if an MCE initiates a project that is outside the MTDP, the KEEA MDPO explained that; “I don’t have any option. I have to do it the way he [MCE] wants it done...[projects] will be started and when its time, when it comes to payment I will be required to go and see, verify what is done and prepare a report before it is paid”.

In terms of the continuity of projects at the assembly, the current MDPO explained that there were no handing over notes when he first came to the assembly. Thus all work with regards to the making of MTDP had to be started from scratch. With specific reference to the Elmina 2015 Strategy, what he found among a pile of old papers was a
single document that outlined the Elmina 2015 Strategy project in broad policy terms. That there was only a single document available is attributable to the poor culture of record keeping and the clearing out of the documents in order to make room for the new German project that was secured by the NDC government after the NPP government left power (see discussion in section 7.1 of this Chapter). Although the loss of physical evidence of the Elmina 2015 Strategy could have been compensated for by relying on the memory held by individuals, this was rather dispersed across multiple stakeholders. This made it difficult to access and be able to develop a coherent narrative of the project. Thus local government politics contributed to shaping the trajectory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy because there was little information available to the MDPO to build on. Moreover, the unfinished business of decentralisation in Ghana (Arthur, 2012) also played a part in the sense that MDPOs have to follow the line set by the MCE – even if this is not in the interest of integrated community development efforts. If MDPOs decide to stick to the rules rather than towing the line of the MCE they are then considered as undermining the authority of the MCE and the political party.

A related issue is that at the local level there is upward rather than downward accountability. Thus since MCEs are political appointees answerable first to the central government (National President), their actions are guided by the imperative of building up political support for their party. This is to ensure that the incumbent party gets votes at election time. If discontinuing projects in order to start new and even a similar one is deemed preferable, this is done. This negative incentive, which has also been explained above, kept the Elmina 2015 Strategy from the agenda of the KEEA. The efforts of the MDPO – Labaran Fuseini – to embed it within the municipality’s Medium Term Development Plan was met with resistance (see Chapter 6, section 6.2 for more discussion). His explanation of this, which has already been quoted once in this thesis, is worth repeating here;

"When you look at this document, Elmina 2015 Strategy. It was a beautiful document prepared to address the key issues in these areas, drainage and waste management, fishing and fishing harbour, tourism and local economic development, education and health. I came here met this document, I went through, I realised it was a very useful document that was prepared and before they could start implementation the government under which they prepared this thing went out of office. So I made frantic efforts to get this document reviewed so that we could still follow through the objectives of the document. But it was like this was prepared by the NPP government and I don’t want to have anything to do with it. So we had to put it back where I just brought it out from. So it is like the
The foregoing discussion points out the fact that what is on paper differs dramatically from the actions on the ground. Although the MDPO of KEEA was to play a key role in the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the ability to do that was constrained by the actions of MCEs and the existing politics of local governments. Thus the transfer of MDPO over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy negatively affected the trajectory and outcomes that were expected from the project. This was the result of the loss of institutional memory and institutional capacity to oversee the implementation and institutionalisation phase of the project. Moreover, since tourism related institutions are yet to be decentralised to the district levels, the issue of tourism-led local economic development remains outside of the agenda of MMDAs such as the KEEA.

### Conclusions

The organising logic in this chapter has been the idea of cycles while the analytic focus has been on the politics and political contestations that underline these cycles. International development policy and funding cycles, national and local electoral cycles and local government service staff transfer cycles have all been examined in relation to their shaping role in the implementation and sustainability of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The analysis opened up what had so far in the thesis appeared as ‘black boxes’ – Urban Solutions, international donor funding and the KEEA. The examination highlighted the internal cyclical dynamics of these 'black boxes' and the political contestations that surrounded the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The Elmina 2015 Strategy would not have been possible without the key role of Urban Solutions and the funding secured from the Dutch government and European Union. This arrangement had an implication on the pace and trajectory of the project as the funding came with requirements about outsourcing and contracting for services. A key outcome of this

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156 Interview with Labaran Fuseini, Municipal Development Planning Officer, KEEA, 23.07.2015
was that much of the funding was assigned to the ‘hardware’ aspects involving physical building projects. While these were important in enhancing the tourism assets in Elmina, it meant that there was an inadequate attention paid to the ‘software’ aspects of skills training and building up the capacity of local stakeholders to be able to continue with the objectives of the project. This situation was further worsened when a new German sponsored project came to the KEEA leading to the Elmina 2015 Strategy being put aside. Thus the changing cycles of international donor funding tend to affect not only stakeholder governance capacity but also the development of institutional thickness due to a lack of a shared vision of development among stakeholders.

The planning process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy appears to not have adequately considered how the tourism system operates (Cornelissen, 2005) nor an understanding of some of the socio-political challenges involved in tourism development. In a sense, the issue of how best to leverage tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction became rendered into primarily technical terms (Ferguson, 1994). This left the project exposed to changes in international donor policy and funding focus. Moreover, the internal incentive structures of international aid and donor funding delivery processes played a key role in shaping outcomes. The analysis of the role of Urban Solutions BV shows that the aid delivery process resulted in Dutch aid money flowing back to Dutch consultants. Not only was the Elmina 2015 Strategy rendered into primarily a technical project of fixing buildings and setting up offices, Urban Solutions BV appears to have used the project as their first practice run of their consultancy business after spinning off from the Institute of Housing Studies and Urban Development (IHS) of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The failure of Urban Solutions BV and the other international donor funding agencies to undertake a proper evaluation of the project after completion raises questions about the absence of feedback loops between aid donors and aid recipients (Martens et al., 2002).

The analysis shows that SNV – the Dutch international development organisation – which was contracted to carry out some of the ‘software’ aspects of integrating tourism as an economic activity into the daily lives of residents, underwent an organisational transformation in its operation over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. On the balance of available evidence, the change in SNV’s development policy to cease its involvement in tourism projects had an effect on the Elmina 2015 Strategy.
from the literature on implementation theory suggest that one needs to consider counterfactuals in assessing the gap between policy objectives and outcomes (Bovens and t'Hart, 1996). This helps to avoid oversimplification of the accounts of projects such as the Elmina 2015 Strategy. In this case, the counterfactual question to ask is whether the Elmina 2015 Strategy would have still met its objectives if SNV had continued its involvement in tourism projects. It appears that even if the SNV had not made the policy switch away from tourism projects, the odds of the Elmina 2015 Strategy fully meeting its objectives were limited due to other political cycles that were taking place in the internal conditions of Ghana and within the international development policy environment.

The analysis here supports an emerging literature on aidnography of international development organisation in relation to their involvement in tourism and development (Hummel and van der Duim, 2016, 2012). It also points to the issue of power imbalances in the relationship between donor countries, their experts and consultants, and the recipient countries. The power tends to lie with the donor countries as often aid is tied to certain preconditions such as the use of consultants and NGOs who originate from the donor countries in carrying out projects and programmes in recipient countries. Indeed, the (non-)decision of Urban Solutions BV to not carry out post-implementation evaluation can be understood as the ‘second face’ of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Thus the decisions and non-decisions of aid donors in project development, implementation and evaluation is based on the power they have in the process – over the beneficiaries in recipient countries. These cyclical changes in the policy, strategy and practices of international (tourism) development organisations therefore need to be understood as these affect how local development outcomes are defined and measured.

The analysis in this chapter shows how the process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was shaped by cycles of national and local electoral outcomes. The findings affirm the literature on the political economy of public good provision (Hirvi and Whitfield, 2015; Batley et al., 2012; Kelsall, 2012; Whitfield, 2009). While the idea for the Elmina 2015 Strategy started during the reign of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, it was under the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government that the project began in earnest. Tracing the Elmina 2015 Strategy vis-à-vis the four cycles of national elections shows increasing progress from when the NPP came into power and then a decline
immediately prior to and after the NDC came back into power in 2009. The reason for this is partly due to what Williams (2016) identifies as the interaction between the temporal dimension of project implementation and governmental time consistency problems. This means that the time duration for the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy extended beyond the electoral time limit of a single political party in power. This created both positive and negative incentives for political parties regarding whether to continue project implementation or to begin new ones. Given alternating political party governments amidst a highly competitive political environment, the analysis in this chapter raises questions about the credibility of policy commitments of political parties in public good provisions. Indeed, there is a related question of how efforts at developing institutional thickness are constrained by national and local electoral cycles. The analysis in this chapter therefore supports the view that an account of institutional thickness will need to consider the shaping role of underlying electoral cycles and the incentives presented to political actors (Raco, 1998).

Local governments are considered as playing a key role in tourism planning and development (McKercher and Ritchie, 1997; Ruhanen, 2013). The analysis in this chapter has opened up the 'black box' of local governments and their role in tourism planning and development. The Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) Municipal Assembly as the local government body was vested with the responsibility of leading the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The analysis has highlighted the process and politics of local government staff transfer cycles and its effects on the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The politically influenced transfer of the first Municipal Development Planning Officer (MDPO) under whom the Elmina 2015 Strategy began, lead to a loss of institutional memory and capacity within the KEEA. This finding is in line with the assertion of Pollitt (2000) that organisational learning and the memory needed to achieve desired outcomes reside in staff members. The sudden transfer of the MDPO who had been specifically trained to guide implementation meant a loss of organisation memory and consequently a negative effect on the progress of the project. The tensions between politicians and civil servants in local government (Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett, 2014) also meant that the subsequent MDPO assigned to the KEEA experienced interference in his work. Indeed, for a period of close to two years, there was no MDPO stationed at the KEEA to guide the implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. These findings shows that while local governments do indeed play a key role in tourism planning and development, it is important to go one step further and analyse their internal political dynamics. An understanding of their internal political dynamics can
provide insights into the specific ways local governments can enable and/or constrain the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. This is especially critical in destinations where tourism related institutions are yet to be decentralised to the district level and brought under the direct authority of local governments.

ADINKRAHENE

“chief of the adinkra symbols”

Symbol of greatness, charisma and leadership.
Chapter 8

Beyond the Elmina 2015 Strategy: governing tourism-led local economic development

This thesis set out to understand, explain and analyse how governance interactions shape the planning and use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction through the empirical case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy in Ghana. Addressing this aim of the thesis has involved first conceptualising interactive tourism governance in terms of stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickening and political cycles. The three immediate preceding chapters have examined the Elmina 2015 in detail, tracing its beginnings and how things unfolded within the shaping context of governance interactions. The purpose of this last chapter of the thesis is to review the key research findings and show their wider significance and implications for both the theory and practice of planning for tourism’s role as a catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction in destinations around the world.

This chapter is structured into three main sections. The first section highlights the key research findings by addressing and providing clear answers to the research questions that were set out in Chapter 1. In the second section, I set the theoretical, conceptual and empirical findings of this thesis in the context of existing knowledge. I also make claims about why the answers to my research questions resonate beyond the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The third section offers a reflection on the research process before outlining avenues for further research that can extend and consolidate the contributions of this thesis.
8.1 Addressing the research questions

In meeting the overall research objective, this section of the chapter summarises the key findings and arguments made within the empirical chapters, and shows how they provide plausible answers to the research questions set out in Chapter One. The questions that framed the design and execution of the research for this thesis were as follows:

1. How did the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualise the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction?

2. To what extent did the level of governance capacity held by key stakeholders shape the planning process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy?

3. To what extent was the Elmina 2015 strategy embedded within the institutional arrangements for local economic development planning of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo Abrem Municipal Assembly?

4. How did local government politics and cycles of national elections shape the Elmina 2015 Strategy?

5. To what extent does an interactive tourism governance framework allow for a nuanced understanding of the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning?

These questions will now be addressed in turn in order to provide a basis for drawing out a more general set of wider significance, implications and conclusions.

**How did the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualise the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction?**

In Chapter 1 of the thesis, I outlined that I use the term tourism-poverty nexus as shorthand to refer to the idea of tourism’s potential positive impact on local economic development and poverty reduction. The tourism-poverty nexus is also used in this thesis to refer to the projects, programmes, plans and policies that are based on and/or geared towards leveraging tourism’s potential for local economic development and poverty reduction. This research has shown that the Elmina 2015 Strategy is an epitome prime example of the tourism-poverty nexus. The conceptualisation of the tourism-poverty nexus within the Elmina 2015 Strategy, while centred on tourism also depended on simultaneous improvements in other sectors. In all the Elmina 2015 Strategy identified five priority areas – 1) drainage and waste management; 2) fishing
and fishing harbour; 3) tourism and local economic development; 4) health and; 5) education. Tourism and local economic development was to be an entry point for an integrated approach towards the sustainable development of the Elmina Township. In the Strategy document, the argument is that by restoring monuments, improving tourist infrastructure, revitalising existing monuments and developing other important cultural sites, tourism could become a major economic activity in Elmina that will help to improve the general standard of living in the town.

The essence of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was to improve cultural heritage assets in order to increase the number and length of stay of tourists coming into Elmina. The assumption was that this increase in tourists would serve as a catalyst for local economic development and poverty reduction. Within the policy and planning documents that guided the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction was conceptualised in an almost linear way: once the cultural heritage assets had been renovated and given a facelift, tourists would come and would then spend more time and money in Elmina on accommodation and food. In addition they would also buy souvenirs from the established Elmina Arts and Craft Market. It was envisaged that increased tourism would lead to increased income and revenue for businesses in the community, thereby catalysing local economic development and poverty reduction. Interviewees also articulated a similar conceptualisation of the tourism-poverty nexus found in the policy documents. Their view was that by renovating cultural heritage assets in the community, tourists would spend more time in Elmina thereby increasing the amount of money they spent and left behind in the local economy. On the basis of the tourism multiplier effect, it was considered that the increased tourist spending to come would have a ripple effect and then trickle down to various segments of the community. The conceptualisation of the tourism-poverty nexus was therefore founded upon a number of assumptions regarding tourist behaviour and the tourism multiplier effect.

The Elmina 2015 Strategy’s conceptualisation of the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction, while linear on the surface had a level of sophistication. Tourism was seen not in solitary terms but as an avenue through which an integrated approach to local economic development and poverty reduction could be developed in tandem. Tourism was to serve as the initial spark that would kick-start local economic development processes through a mutually reinforcing
relationship with other sectors of the economy such as waste management, health and education. This integrated approach notwithstanding, there appears to have been a conceptual leap in how the Strategy outlined the specific process through which tourism was to contribute to and bring about local economic development and poverty reduction. There was an inherent assumption within the Elmina 2015 Strategy that with properly renovated heritage assets, tourism in Elmina would provide a number of benefits that would feed into local economic development and poverty reduction efforts. Consequently a number of important issues such as continuity, sustainability and governance challenges appear to have been overlooked in the planning and implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

A number of key issues were overlooked including an understanding of the processes and the socio-economic and political conditions under which local economic development and poverty reduction is achieved and how these might shape the role of tourism. As the public policy analysis and policy implementation literature has shown, one cannot think of the policymaking process in a linear fashion. Moving from decision making into translated outcomes involved a number of circular interactions among stakeholders that shape the pace and eventual outcomes of policy objectives. The Elmina 2015 Strategy planning process failed to incorporate this non-linear understanding of the policy making process. Lastly, the conceptualisation of the tourism-poverty nexus in the Elmina 2015 Strategy failed to understand and appreciate how tourism in Elmina was a part of and fitted within a regional tourism product. Thus a large number of tourists visited Elmina as part of a day’s itinerary that also included visits to the Cape Coast Castle and the Kakum National Park all lying within about 30km of each other. In a sense, the vision of using tourism for economic development and poverty reduction in Elmina was not situated within the realities of the tourism sector in Ghana and the linkages between attractions and the tourism product offered to tourists.

In summary, this research found that the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualised the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction in a linear fashion underlined with unexamined assumptions about tourist behaviour and tourism multiplier effects. The conceptualisation also had a sophisticated focus on incorporating other sectors of the economy towards an integrated development approach of which tourism was to be an entry point.
To what extent did the level of governance capacity held by key stakeholders shape the planning process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy?

The concept of stakeholder governance capacity as explained in Chapter 2 refers to the alignment between the images held by stakeholders about current conditions and future change, the instruments available to them to translate this image into reality and the socio-political room for action within which images get aggregated and instruments chosen and deployed. Within the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the key stakeholders who had a strong shaping role in the process included the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem (KEEA) Municipal Assembly, the Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB), the Elmina Traditional Authority, Urban Solutions BV, the Dutch government, and the European Union. These key stakeholders held a broadly shared consensus and image about cultural heritage and tourism development in Elmina and its potential to contribute to local economic development and poverty reduction. Urban Solutions BV, the Dutch government, and the European Union had more power in the process through which the consensus was reached. This shared imaged was that by restoring and managing the heritage assets and monuments in Elmina, an avenue would be created for an integrated programme that would improve the tourism, social and economic conditions of Elmina. It is this broadly shared image that formed the basis upon which the relationship between tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction was conceptualised – as discussed in the previous subsection above.

The instruments that stakeholders made use of in the planning and implementation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy came in three forms – politico-legal and legislative instruments, communicative instruments and financial instruments. The research findings show that these instruments were unevenly spread across the key stakeholders. The bulk of the financing for the Elmina 2015 Strategy came through the Dutch government and the European Union’s Development Fund. These funds were overseen by Urban Solutions BV which is a Dutch consulting company that was set up for that purpose. This situation meant that ‘faces of power’ in the planning process were held by external actors. While Urban Solutions BV could hold local stakeholders to account, they themselves were not held to account for the eventual outcomes of the project. The financial contribution of the KEEA and the GMMB came in the form of staff time that was allocated to working on the project. The KEEA moreover provided the needed politico-legal and legislative instruments needed to embark on the project in the first place. As a planning authority, the KEEA has the constitutional and
administrative monopoly over development plan making and implementation at the
local level. Thus the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a tourism-led local economic development
planning process could only proceed under the auspices of the KEEA. Further
instrumental capacity was provided by the GMMB which held management
responsibility for and authority over the Elmina Castle. These instruments were then
complemented through communicative instruments of community and interest group
consultation and increased level of communication, collaboration and coordination
between state institutions. The politico-legal, communicative and financial instruments
were utilised strongly in the planning phase and initial phase of implementation of the
Elmina 2015 Strategy in comparison to the mid to later phases of implementation.

The research findings point out that there were two distinct periods of socio-political
room for action available to stakeholders. The initial planning stage took place in a
context that offered a strong socio-political room for action as stakeholders were
encouraged to communicate, collaborate and coordinate their activities. This period
was underlined by a strong state commitment to utilising tourism for economic
development and poverty reduction. This commitment was felt at the national, regional
and district level of the then New Patriotic Party (NPP) government which was in
power from 2001-2008. The commitment towards the Elmina 2015 Strategy resulted
in the setting up of a revenue sharing mechanism between the GMMB, the KEEA and the
Elmina Traditional Authority over the proceeds from the Elmina Castle. This was
through a directive from Cabinet after the President was lobbied on the issue through
the then senior minister – J. H. Mensah who hails from Elmina – the then Minister for
Tourism – the late Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey. These two were the figurehead of lobbying
efforts by the KEEA and the Traditional Authority. The sharing of revenue was an
incentive that boosted the capacity of stakeholders and oiled the wheels of
communication, collaboration and coordination between them in the preparation of the
Elmina 2015 Strategy.

The second period of action potential was not as positive and encouraging as the first.
This was during the time of the expected implementation and institutionalisation of the
projects outlined in the Elmina 2015 Strategy. There was a change of political party
government from the NPP to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party
government in 2009 at the national level. The revenue sharing arrangement that had
served stakeholders so well in their earlier efforts was abrogated by the new NDC.
government leading to a more restrictive socio-political room for action for stakeholders. The research findings suggest that this change in socio-political room for action negatively impacted upon stakeholder governance capacity in overseeing the implementation of the Strategy. This is because the KEEA and traditional authority, as key stakeholders, became less incentivised to continue with the same zeal and efforts in driving forward the Strategy.

In summary, the research found that the level of stakeholder governance capacity was conditioned by the images of the tourism-poverty nexus held, the form of instruments available and used by stakeholders and the socio-economic room for action within which they had to operate to translate images into reality. It was established through the research that high level of stakeholder governance capacity experienced in the beginning had a positive shaping effect on the planning phase of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. However, for much of the period there was an inadequate (and sometimes a total lack of) alignment between the images, instruments and action potential held and exercised by stakeholders. This meant low stakeholder governance capacity which in turn negatively affected the implementation and institutionalisation phase of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

**To what extent was the Elmina 2015 strategy embedded into the institutional arrangements for local economic development planning of the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo Abrem Municipal Assembly?**

This research has established that the planning process which produced the Elmina 2015 Strategy was embedded in the structures of the KEEA Municipal Assembly. The KEEA has legislative standing as a planning authority and is charged with the responsibility of overseeing to the overall development of the locality under its jurisdiction and boundaries. Thus it was impossible for the Elmina 2015 Strategy to have been developed without the central role played by the KEEA. The interesting analytic puzzle therefore was to find out the extent to which the Elmina 2015 Strategy after it was developed became embedded within the policy and planning structures of the KEEA. Following the development of the Strategy, did the KEEA whose mandate it is to ensure local economic development and poverty reduction incorporate the ideas and projects outlined in the Elmina 2015 Strategy in its efforts? A key development policy document which guides the development efforts of the KEEA is the District Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP) which is developed on a 3-4 year cycle. This
constitutes an aggregation of the development needs of communities and includes budgeted action plans to meet those needs. Much of the information and development needs found in MTDPs tend to remain the same from cycle to cycle. This is because many of the development needs faced by communities remain unmet. Thus the MTDPs of the KEEA were a primary source of answering the question of the extent of embeddedness.

The research findings suggest that the Elmina 2015 Strategy was not embedded in the MTDPs of the KEEA. The 2010-2013 MTDP for instance notes that Elmina has a good tourism potential that can be tapped for local economic development. However, the MTDP does not even once make a mention of the Elmina 2015 Strategy which was meant to do exactly that – leverage tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Moreover, the current MDTP for 2013-2017 had just a single mention of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This single instance turns out to be as that of the source for one of the pictures which was used to depict the outstanding issue of sanitation and waste management facing the community. By inference, the research found that once the Elmina 2015 Strategy was finalised in 2003, it was not embedded within the two MTDPs between 2003 and 2010. While the idea of tourism-led local economic development planning could have been embedded without subsequent MTDPs mentioning it, the total absence of the Elmina 2015 Strategy points to a lack of embeddedness. There were two main reasons for this lack of embeddedness of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

Firstly, although the KEEA was the lead institution for the planning process that culminated in the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the funding for this was external, coming from the Dutch government and the European Union. This meant that on some level, there was not a strong sense of local ownership. Consequently once the Strategy had been developed it became viewed as an aside instead of becoming a part of the KEEA’s overall development intervention efforts. At its core, the KEEA is faced with the pressure of meeting day-to-day basic service provision for communities. In the face of such pressures, the goal of institutionalising tourism’s role in local economic development and poverty reduction fell off the agenda. This was especially so after the revenue sharing arrangement had been cancelled and the assembly saw no financial incentive in deploying its limited resources to the goals of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.
The second reason for the lack of embeddedness had to do with the undue political interference in the work of the Municipal Development Planning Officers (MDPOs) within the KEEA. This is linked to the issues of political cycles discussed in the next section. MDPOs are responsible for coordinating the development of MTDPs at the assembly level. Between 2009 and 2011 there was no MDPO at the KEEA after a former MDPO was mistreated by a new political head of the assembly. Consequently the MDPOs who were posted to the KEEA refused to accept the postings. This meant that the institutional knowledge, capacity and memory about the Elmina 2015 Strategy was lost. Moreover, the current MDPO of the KEEA explained that in preparing the 2014-2017 MTDP, he was discouraged by the political head of the assembly from including things from the Elmina 2015 Strategy since the project was seen as belonging to the opposition NPP party.

To summarise, the Elmina 2015 Strategy was insufficiently embedded within the institutional structures of the KEEA for local economic development. While the planning phase was embedded in the planning structures of the KEEA through its technocratic resources, the implementation and institutionalisation of the Elmina 2015 Strategy was not embedded in the KEEA. This is evident in the lack of mention or building upon of the Strategy in the subsequent MTDPs developed by the KEEA.

**How did local government politics and cycles of national elections shape the Elmina 2015 Strategy?**

The Elmina 2015 Strategy, much like any development intervention, was underlined by a number of political contestations from the international level through to the national, regional and local levels. The planning and implementation process of the Elmina 2015 Strategy involved a number of stakeholders and actors who did not always share the same interests or commitment. It is within this context that the political nature of the Elmina 2015 Strategy is made evident. The research findings indicate that the undoing of the vision of the Elmina 2015 Strategy is largely down to the effects of local government politics and the cycles of national elections through which new political parties come into power.

The research findings seem to support the view the political cycles through which one political party replaces another in government have profound effect on the continuity and sustainability of project preparation and implementation. In the course of the
Elmina 2015 Strategy there were three instances of electoral cycles – in 2004, 2008 and 2012. The findings show that each electoral cycle brought about a downward trend in the implementation of the project, and also in the prospects for the project’s sustainability. This is due to among other things the fact that the National Democratic Congress (NDC) party government that came into power after the 2008 elections did not want to continue with the visible projects like the Elmina 2015 Strategy that was initiated by the departing New Patriotic Party (NPP) government. The perception was that whatever political credits that could be gained from project completion would accrue to the opposition NPP rather than to the incumbent NDC who would continue with implementation. At the local level, new Municipal Chief Executives at the KEAA were more predisposed to start their own projects rather than ensuring the full completion of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The findings indicate that there was both a passive attitude of letting things peter out and an active attitude of interfering with the work of Municipal Development Planning Officers who wanted to resurrect the project and continue with implementation (see discussion in the previous subsection).

In terms of local government politics, the research identified that the incomplete nature of the decentralisation process in Ghana complicates the relationship between civil servants and political heads of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. The system is also open to abuse and political interference when it comes to the transfer of technical staff such as the Municipal Development Planning Officers (MDPOs). MDPOs are key cogs in the machinery of national and local economic development planning system. They are tasked with the responsibility of leading the process for drawing up and implementing the MTDPs that guide development and poverty reduction efforts at the local level. The research findings identify three MDPOs who came through the KEAA over the course of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. The first MDPO, under whose tenure the whole project began, and the third and current MDPO were interviewed for this research. The findings point to the fact that the first MDPO was twice sent to the Netherlands to undertake training courses and gain knowledge that equipped him to play a crucial role in the preparation and implementation of the project. Shortly after implementation began and a new MCE was appointed to head the KEAA, the first MDPO was transferred away. The evidence suggests that this transfer was politically influenced by the new MCE who perceived the loyalty of the MDPO to be tied to the former MCE even though this new MCE was from the same political party. The findings also point out that the second MDPO faced hostility and mistreatment when the NDC party government was elected into office in 2008 to replace the NPP government. The
second MDPO therefore left his office without preparing handing over notes. Consequently, for over a year and a half no new MDPO accepted posting to the KEEA. The effect of this on the Elmina 2015 Strategy was that there was a loss of institutional knowledge, capacity and memory that was required to continue with the implementation of the project.

To summarise, the cycle of national elections and local government politics shaped the outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy through the failure of incoming political party governments to continue with projects started by opposition political parties. Moreover, the political power of new MCEs at the KEEA was used to interfere in local government service transfer to force MDPOs who had been specifically trained for the Elmina 2015 Strategy to be transferred. The cumulative effect of local government politics and cycles of national elections was the loss of institutional knowledge, capacity and memory needed to ensure full implementation, continuity and sustainability of the Elmina 2015 Strategy.

**To what extent does an interactive tourism governance framework allow for a nuanced understanding of the governing of tourism-led local economic development planning?**

In much of the current research on the tourism-poverty nexus, the importance of governance variables has been readily acknowledged. However, there have been few detailed studies to identify the essential governance variables and the causal mechanisms through which they shape outcomes. Research on governance in tourism studies in general has, on the other hand, redefined the state and hence politics out of the governing process with emphasis now being placed on markets, networks and communities. This research and the interactive tourism governance framework that was developed and applied to the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy straddles these two areas and fills a critical gap in the literature. The interactive tourism governance framework as applied to the Elmina 2015 Strategy offers a number of important insights about the governing process of tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives. This is achieved through an identification and disaggregation of the key governance variables of stakeholder governance capacity, institutional thickness and political cycles. The framework allowed for tracing the specific mechanisms through which each variable affected the planning, implementation and ultimately the outcomes of the tourism-led local economic development.
In the next section I discuss in detail the significance of the interactive tourism governance framework and the theoretical and empirical contribution of this research thesis to existing knowledge about the tourism-poverty nexus.

8.2 Theoretical significance and implications

This research was conceived through an interdisciplinary approach to conceptualizing the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives. As noted at the start of this chapter, the thesis set out to understand, explain and analyze how governance interactions shape the planning and use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction in the context of the Elmina 2015 Strategy. To this end, the interactive tourism governance framework was developed as an analytical framework with which to examine the Elmina 2015 Strategy. This framework was developed based on ideas from diverse fields such as tourism studies, international development studies, political science, governance studies, local government studies, public administration, and regional and local economic development studies. This allowed for an integrated approach to understanding tourism’s role in national, regional, and local economic development planning and how this role shapes and is shaped by state governance institutions and processes. In this section, I address the question of the significance of the research findings and what this thesis contributes to the existing knowledge about the tourism-poverty nexus.

This thesis makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to existing knowledge about the governance of tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives. Empirically, this thesis provides fresh data on local economic development and tourism planning in Ghana. In particular, the thesis provides primary information regarding the governance processes in the pre-planning, planning, implementation and post-implementation stages of key aspects of the Elmina 2015 Strategy as a tourism-led local economic development initiative. It provides empirical evidence on the governance, politics and administration of local economic development planning in Ghana. Specifically, I provide a detailed empirical analysis of the Elmina 2015 Strategy highlighting how the policies were understood by various actors and the contestations at different levels of state hierarchy and between state and societal actors.
The overall original contribution of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, I identify a conceptual gap in the tourism literature with regards to governance and the outcomes of the tourism-poverty nexus. Secondly, through the development of the interactive tourism governance framework and the empirical research of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, I contribute to academic efforts at bridging this conceptual gap. An integrated approach to understanding and analyzing tourism governance in the context of the tourism-poverty nexus tends to fall into the cracks between tourism studies, urban studies and international development. My thesis, which takes insight from each of these fields, therefore makes a significant contribution to knowledge by issuing a reminder that tourism governance ought to be placed squarely on the table. At the turn of the millennium, Sharpley and Telfer (2002) first noted a conceptual leap in the tourism and development literature in the sense that much of the work at that point discussed the benefits of tourism for economic development in isolation from the inherent process of other socioeconomic sectors that drive overall development in a given country.

Since then, attempts have been made to address this gap through research that situates tourism within the wider context of theories, thoughts and practices that shape overall national development (Schilcher, 2007; Scheyvens, 2007, 2011; Harrison, 2008; Mowforth and Munt, 2009). This new stream of research helped to problematise the relationship between tourism and development. They also identified some of the variables that shaped tourism's contribution to economic development and poverty reduction, one of which was governance structures. These developments in turn however require further research on how governance shapes outcomes of the tourism-poverty nexus. Thus much of current discussion on the tourism-poverty nexus reach conceptual conclusions about governance structures being important for the tourism-poverty nexus without specifying how and in which ways (for examples see Rogerson (2014), Spenceley and Meyer (2012) and Harrison (2008)). My thesis contributes to knowledge by taking a first step in bridging this gap.

In developing the interactive tourism governance framework as a conceptual framework and then applying it empirically, this thesis makes further contribution to knowledge. I combine, what on the surface appear, disparate concepts in new ways by integrating them into a coherent framework. This integrated framework (see figure 5 –
the interactive tourism governance framework – in Chapter 2) then allows me to
disaggregate key governance variables and then to analyse the specific ways in which
these shape the tourism-poverty nexus. In this regard I make a specific contribution to
knowledge by re-emphasising the role of the state and its importance within tourism
studies. This point is supported by the recent work by Amore and Hall (2016) who
assert that the state has been redefined out of current conceptualisations of governance
in tourism studies to be replaced by an emphasis on markets (business), network
(voluntary self-organisation) or community (local) approaches. Moreover, current
work on governance in public policy and public administration has noted the continual
centrality of the state in the variety of governing arrangements that are emerging
shows that the state and the internal power dynamics between key players within it
remains crucial in setting the policy agenda and thus must be brought back into how
we conceptualise tourism governance. This is especially so when it comes to the
tourism-poverty nexus (see also Adu-Ampong, 2015).

In emphasising the state’s centrality to tourism governance, a related contribution of
this thesis is to highlight how a focus on politics and political cycles provide a rich
context in which to trace how governance affects the tourism-poverty nexus. My thesis
therefore builds on earlier works such as Slocum and Backman (2011) and Sharpley
and Ussi (2012). In their study of the tourism-poverty nexus in Zanzibar, Sharpley and
Ussi for instance identify four broad areas of governance failures within tourism. What
is missing from their account and what my thesis therefore contributes is a central
focus on underlying political interactions – electoral and political party competition
and local government service politics – that helps to offer a greater depth of
explanation as to what is observed as a first-order governance failure in investment,
policy implementation, institutional confusion and patronage.

A further conceptual contribution of this thesis lies in highlighting new understandings
of the existing issues around the tourism-poverty nexus by placing this within the
wider context of the governing processes that shape local economic development
planning. In this regard, my research empirically assess the assertion of Rogerson
(2014:607) about the positive prospects for the tourism-poverty nexus when tourism
planning is embedded as part of wider strategic initiatives of local economic
development planning. The Elmina 2015 Strategy provided a perfect case study of
looking at the tourism-poverty nexus in the wider context of local economic development planning. The findings are however inconclusive but throw up a number of questions where further research is needed. In effect the evidence shows a paradox in terms of embedding tourism planning within local economic development planning. While in theory the prospects for poverty alleviation might be enhanced when tourism development is embedded in local economic development planning, in practice the embedding process at the same time exposes tourism planning to local government politics and planning challenges as detailed in Chapter 7.

To this end, a related contribution of my thesis has been extending the concept of institutional thickness into tourism studies from its traditional home in the regional and local economic development studies literature (Helmsing, 2003; Pike et al., 2006; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007). This allows me to specify the presence of institutions, their levels of mutual interaction and the domination structures in which such interactions take place as well as the existence of a shared vision within the Elmina 2015 Strategy. While the concept of institutional thickness tend to be critiqued for the danger of conflating institutions and organisations, it was useful in isolating the form and extent to which tourism planning was embedded in the institutional structures of local economic development planning and governance to ensure the continuity. Institutional thickness as a concept provides an avenue to explore how the many direct and indirect institutions in tourism planning and local economic development planning mesh together to create a durable institutional ecosystem to ensure continuity of tourism-led local economic development planning initiatives. In the case of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, the envisioned meshing together to form institutional thickness failed to materialise due to a number of issues as outlined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Nonetheless, insights from this concept can complement emerging lines of research in the literature on destination governance that focus on leadership such as Pechlaner et al. (2014), Valente et al. (2014) and Valente et al. (2015). This thesis’ contribution therefore lies in extending the analysis of destination governance beyond the qualities of a single individual leader by showing that the extent of institutional thickness matters for how well leadership functions.

Finally this thesis contributes to knowledge by providing nuanced insights about the concept of stakeholder governance capacity with a particular emphasis on the capacity of local governments. While it is acknowledged that local governments have a key role
to play in leveraging tourism benefits for local economic development and poverty reduction (Dredge, 2001; Ruhanen, 2013), there have been few studies on local government capacity to fulfil this expectation (Churugsa et al., 2007; Slocum and Backman, 2011). Given that the spread of decentralisation and other public sector reforms in many countries has led to a number of socioeconomic development responsibilities being relocated at the local level, it is important to fully understand the capacity of local governments and the political processes, public administration and management at the local level. Consequently, this thesis contributes by conceptualising governance capacity in terms of images, instruments and action potential. Through this, questions can be asked about how local governments view tourism’s role in economic development and poverty reduction, the instruments (legal, financial and legislative) available to them to leverage tourism, and the socio-political room for action within which they can act. The increasing calls for local governments to take a more active role in tourism development need to go hand in hand with attention paid to how local governments are being equipped to engage in tourism development.

8.3 Avenues for further research

The findings and implications of this thesis suggest a number of potential avenues for further research. The finding that embedding tourism planning within wider place-based local and regional economic development planning exposes tourism planning to the vagaries of local government politics throws up a challenge as to how best to utilise tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. This represent an avenue for further research which can focus on comparative study of destinations that are making efforts at planning tourism development with a specific focus on local economic development and poverty reduction. Perhaps, what is first needed is a questioning of the viability of tourism as a tool for local economic development and poverty reduction. Such studies could examine whether tourism’s potential tends to be overstated, and then identify the other factors that enable and/or constrain the use of tourism for local economic development and poverty reduction. Insights from future research will therefore complement the findings of this thesis in providing a broader view about embedding tourism planning within systems of local and regional economic development planning.
A second potential research avenue would be to further explore the nature of institutional thickness that exists in the Central Region of Ghana with respect to tourism planning. This thesis suggest that the Central Region is considered as the heartbeat of tourism in Ghana due to its many developed and varied tourist attractions. The region is also considered as one of the poorest regions in the country. Consequently, it will be useful to examine the existing local institutional conditions and how their arrangements influence the possibility to leverage tourism for regional development. Earlier research for instance has noted that a clearly defined policy framework on tourism development is missing in the Central Region (Adu-Ampong, 2014). An application of the concept of institutional thickness in studying the Central Region will therefore add much needed insights into identifying what else is missing and how best to develop these in order to maximise tourism’s potential for local economic development and poverty reduction.

Another potential avenue for future research can be found in a detailed examination of the role and capacity of local governments in the planning and governance of tourism development. The concept of stakeholder governance capacity as developed and applied in this thesis can be extended to focus specifically on local government authorities. This could potentially generate further insights into the challenges faced by local governments in governing a sector as highly complex and dynamic as tourism. As local governments are increasingly being asked to take up more responsibilities in shaping development, there is a need to also consider their governance capacity in meeting these responsibilities. It will therefore be useful to explore how local governments approach tourism development and how they build up their capacity to be able to effectively manage the process. The exploration of local government capacity in tourism planning and governance will be further enhanced by drawing on insights from the literature on decentralisation and public administration.

The newly emerging literature on the relationship between tourism and inclusive growth (Hampton and Jeyacheya, 2015; Lee et al., 2015; Adu-Ampong, 2015; Butler and Rogerson, 2016; Bakker and Messerli, 2016) offers a final avenue for future research drawing on some of the conclusions of this thesis. If tourism is to serve as a driver for inclusive growth then questions has to be asked with regards to policy formulation, the time frame of projects and the extent to which tourism-inclusive growth ideas become embedded within existing institutional structures in a given destinations. As one of the
key findings of this thesis shows, future research on tourism-inclusive growth nexus need to be sensitive to, and grounded in the political context in which tourism and economic development planning takes place.

8.4 Reflections and final words

“Oh, so you are a planner?”, ”Will you go and work as a planning officer when you complete?”, “Hurry up and come help plan our country!” These were some of the most common comments I received during fieldwork in Ghana after I introduce myself as a PhD student in Urban Studies and Planning. At an academic and disciplinary level, I have had to constantly (re)negotiate my academic identity in terms of where I position myself and the contribution of this thesis. The very large number of different academic disciplines I draw upon in this thesis is a reflection of my broad academic training. I completed my undergraduate BA (Hons) Sociology and Social Work with a minor in Geography and Rural Development in the Department of Sociology at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana. My first MSc Tourism, Environment and Development took me to Department of Geography at King’s College London, UK. I studied for an MA Development Studies (Governance and Democracy) at the International Institute of Social Studies, which is now part of the Erasmus University of Rotherham in the Netherlands, as part of the then two degree Erasmus Mundus Masters Programme in Public Policy. The other degree programme was an MA International Development Policy at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) in Barcelona, Spain. Ending up in a Department of Urban Studies and Planning for my PhD only served to confirm my affinity for interdisciplinary research. The interdisciplinary approach that I have taken inevitably raises questions about which disciplinary home I position the contributions of this thesis. The challenge, throughout my PhD candidature and the writing of this thesis, has been to position the thesis contribution as straddled between international development planning and tourism studies157. In essence, the contribution of this thesis is to a call for international

157 There are ongoing debates as to whether development studies, and tourism studies can be considered as fully fledged academic disciplines – compared to traditional disciplines such as Sociology, Economics, and Political Science among others.
development studies to “take tourism seriously” and for tourism studies to “take the political nature of tourism seriously”.

The research process that culminated in the writing of this thesis has offered many highs and lows for me. It was especially during the fieldwork period in Ghana and in the first phase of analysis that I experienced significant low periods. On paper and at first approach, the Elmina 2015 Strategy appeared to have the potential to offer so much in terms of leveraging tourism development for local economic development and poverty reduction. As the interviews unfolded, I was confronted with what was systemic and structural constraints facing planners and policymakers. There came certain moments of the research process that I felt were emotionally draining. As a Ghanaian with a keen interest in the development of my country, I sometimes found myself thinking of a ‘meta theory’ for change in Ghana. This was of course beyond the remit of my PhD research but it was in the beginning difficult not to get emotionally tangled up. At various points in time I was torn between just getting on with the PhD research and trying to conceptualise a way out of the deep systemic and structural constraints facing development aspirations in Ghana. What helped me at this point was to write a series of blog posts that were tangential to my PhD research but which allowed me to hang up my emotional entanglements. This enabled me to then focus squarely on meeting the requirements of a PhD thesis through a rigorous analysis of the data. I remember the advice given to me by a senior researcher to the effect that I should focus on getting the PhD done and then I can write up a page of policy proposals for each institutional stakeholder I analysed.

The outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy, as shown through this thesis have been below expectations. From the perspective of planning one of the key issues has been the failure in institutional building and integration to ensure the continuity and long term sustainability of the project. In policy terms, setting up appropriate governance structures and mechanisms have been shown to be crucial in achieving planning goals. Where this thesis might finally end then is with a challenge of some sort relating to how planning research could make way for reconciling emotional disappointments and academic excitement. How does one reconcile the recognition that the research data while being ‘very good’ for writing the thesis at the same time points to how the planning system is far from working as it ought to and there appears to be little progress at making it work. Is there room for more researchers to become ‘activist
researchers’ in order to help make systems work? Do we just study, understand, explain and make recommendations leaving the messy details of implementation to the political and bureaucratic machineries? Perhaps, the increasing interest in public engagement, co-production and research impact that goes beyond citations offers an opportunity for us as researcher to roll up our sleeves and join in "making better places"
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## Appendix A

### List of interviews with dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<th>Position/Role</th>
<th>Organisation/Institution</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dr. Zagba Oyortey</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Ghana Museums and Monuments Board</td>
<td>11.08.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mr. Gideon Aryeequaye</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Director</td>
<td>Ghana Tourism Development Company</td>
<td>12.08.2014</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Mr. Herbet Acquaye</td>
<td>National President</td>
<td>Ghana Hotels Association</td>
<td>12.08.2014</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Mr. Raymond Agbo</td>
<td>Deputy Director (Museums)</td>
<td>Ghana Museums and Monuments Board</td>
<td>13.08.2014</td>
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<td>5.</td>
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<td>Deputy Director (Monuments)</td>
<td>Ghana Museums and Monuments Board</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Mr. Spencer Doku</td>
<td>Manager for Planning and Business Development</td>
<td>Ghana Tourism Authority</td>
<td>14.08.2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Mr. Daniel Nana Anim</td>
<td>President</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Mr. Humphrey Kuma</td>
<td>Director of Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts</td>
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<td>Mr. Leni Kanton</td>
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<td>Mrs. Abigail Tagoe</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Mr. Kwaku Passah</td>
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<td>17.</td>
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<td>Mrs. Georgina Bentum</td>
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<td>Mr. Eric Ohene-Larbi</td>
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<td>21.</td>
<td>Mr. Essel Blankson</td>
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<td>24.</td>
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<td>25.</td>
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<td>Mr. David Gray</td>
<td>Vice National President, Ghana Association of Travel and Tour Agents</td>
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<td>17.09.2014</td>
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<td>Dr. Joseph Mensah-Ansah</td>
<td>Lecturer of Hospitality Policy Officer, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Ghana Tourism Federation</td>
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<td>Tourism and Commercial Officer, Wildlife Division, Forestry Commission</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Mr. Francis Cobbinah</td>
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<td>Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust</td>
<td>29.09.2014</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Mrs. Lucy Owusu-Ansah</td>
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<td>30.10.2014</td>
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<td>44.</td>
<td>Mr. Ebo Kow Amoasi Dadzie</td>
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<td>Komenda-Edina-Eguago-Abrem Municipal Assembly</td>
<td>31.10.2014</td>
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<td>Central Region Development Commission</td>
<td>03.11.2014</td>
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<td>Regional President</td>
<td>Ghana Hotels Association, Central Region</td>
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<td>47.</td>
<td>Dr. Anthony Annah-Prah</td>
<td>Local consultant/Implementation Officer, Elmina 2015 Strategy</td>
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<td>Mr. Isaac K. Sam</td>
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<td>Komenda-Edina-Eguago-Abrem Municipal Assembly</td>
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<td>50.</td>
<td>Dr. Stephen Nana Ato Arthur</td>
<td>Member of Parliament Former Municipal Chief Executive Former Deputy Central Regional Minister</td>
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<td>51.</td>
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<td>Komenda-Edina-Eguago-Abrem Municipal Assembly</td>
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<td>Ghana Heritage Conservation Trust</td>
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<td>Officer-in-Charge Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Elmina Castle</td>
<td>Ghana Museums and Monuments Board, Elmina Castle</td>
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Appendix B

List of key policy documents reviewed

- Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-2027
- Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 1996-2010
- Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda) 2010-2013
- Ghana Ministry of Tourism Pilot Programme Based Project Budget 2013-2015
- Ghana National Cultural Policy 2004
- Ghana National Tourism Policy (7th draft) 2006
- Ghana National Tourism Marketing Strategy 2009-2012
- Ghana Tourist Control Authority Act, 1973 (Act 224)
- Ghana Tourism Act, 2011 (Act 817)
- 2010 Ghana Millennium Development Goals Report
- 1992 Republic of Ghana Constitution
- Local Government Law (Act 462)
- 7-year Development Plan for National Reconstruction and Development (including a National Physical Development Plan), 1963/64 – 1969/70
- 5-year Development Plan, 1975/76 – 1979/80
- Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) I, 2003-2005
- Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) II, 2006-2009
- Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) I, 2010-2013
- Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) II, 2014-2017
- Ghana Population and Housing Census 2010 Report
- Ghana Living Standards Survey 6th Round Main Report
- Ghana Poverty Profile based on the Ghana Living Standards Survey 6th Round
- 2010 Population and Housing Census District Analytical Report for the Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipality
- Elmina Tourism Option Plan/Elmina Tourism Management Plan
- Draft Final Report of Elmina Cultural Heritage and Management Programme
- Save Elmina Magazine of June, 1995
- Elmina Profile Executive Summary, final draft of April, 2002
- Elmina Profile, main report
### Appendix C

#### Key Tourism Resources in Ghana

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<th>National Level</th>
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<td>National Parks and Reserves</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Mole National Park</td>
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<td>- Gbele Resource Reserve</td>
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<td>- Bui National Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Kakum National Park &amp; Assin Attandanso Resource Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Shai Hills Resource Reserve</td>
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<td>- Boabeng-Fiema Wildlife Sanctuary</td>
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<td>- Kogyae Strict Nature Reserve</td>
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<td>- Diagya National Park</td>
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<td>- Bomfobiri Wildlife Sanctuary</td>
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<td>- Owabi Wildlife Sanctuary</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Nini-Suhien National Park &amp; Ankasa Resource Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Agumatsa Wildlife Sanctuary</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Aburi Botanical Gardens</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Kyabobo National Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Bia National Park &amp; Resource Reserve</td>
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<td>- Kalakpa Resource Reserve</td>
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- Wetlands, Lakes, Rivers & Others
  - Keta lagoon
  - Songhor lagoon
  - Muni Pomadze lagoon
  - Densu delta
  - Lake Volta
  - Lake Bosomtwie
  - Wli Waterfalls
  - Boti Waterfalls
  - Kintampo Waterfalls
  - Paga Crocodile Pond
  - Beaches; Busua, Kokrobite, Brenu-Akyinim, Half Assini

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<th>Histo-Heritage</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Cape Coast Castle</td>
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<td>- Elimina (St. George's ) Castle</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Fort St. Jago</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Osu (Christianborg) Castle</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Manhyia Palace</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Kumasi Military Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Larabanga Mosque</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Kwame Nkrumah Mausoleum</td>
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<tr>
<td>- W.E.B. Dubios Centre</td>
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<td>- George Padmore Library</td>
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<td>- Dutch Cemetry, Elmina</td>
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<th>Festivals</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Pan-African Historical Theatre Festival (PANAFEST)</td>
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<td>- Homowo festival</td>
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- Odwira festival
- Hogbetsotso festival
- Adae Kese festival
- Aboakyre festival
- Damba festival
- Funeral celebrations

Crafts & Arts
- Arst Centre, Accra
- Kumasi Cultural Centre
- Bonwire Kente-weaving village
- Metal and woodwork villages

(In)Tangible cultural & economic practices
- Traditional music and dance forms
- Traditional cuisines
- Nzulezu Stilt village
- Kumasi Kejetia open-air market
- Shrines
- Languages
- National Football Passion
- Proverbial Ghanaian hospitality

Regional Level – Central Region
Natural & Histo-Heritage
- National Parks and Reserves
  - Kakum National Park & Assin Attandanso Resource Reserve
  - Nini-Suhien National Park & Ankasa Resource Reserve
- Histo-Heritage
  - Cape Coast Castle
  - Elimina (St. George’s ) Castle
  - Fort St. Jago
  - Dutch Cemetery, Elmina
  - Colonial & historic buildings
- Wetlands, Lakes, Rivers & Others
  - Beaches; Busua, Benu-Akyinim, Gomoa Fetteh

Socio-cultural & Economic
- Pan-African Historical Theatre Festival (PANAFEST)
- Odwira festival
- Aboakyre festival
- Edina Bronya
- Akwabo festival
- Edina Bakatue festival
- Fetu Afahye (carnival)
- Masquerading festival
- Elmina fishing village
- Winneba fishing and ceramic village
- Gomoa-Otsew-Jukwa pottery villages
- Mankessim Posuban shrine
- Local cuisine
- Traditional music and dance forms
- Heritage of being former colonial capital
- Funeral celebrations
- Proverbial Ghanaian hospitality

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<tr>
<th>District Level – Elimina (Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abrem Municipality)</th>
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<td><strong>Natural &amp; Histo-Heritage</strong></td>
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<td>- Elmina fishing village</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Traditional music and dance forms</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Heritage of being former colonial trading post</td>
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<td>- Funeral celebrations</td>
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<td>- Proverbial Ghanaian hospitality</td>
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Appendix D

Sample Interview Transcript

*Interview with current KEEA Member of Parliament who is also the former KEEA District Chief Executive and a former Deputy and later substantive Regional Minister of the Central Region*

[Thank you very much once again. I think you are the most ideal person to talk to with regards to this one – Elmina 2015. But before then, what is your general view of the economic development state of KEEA]*

It’s not in bare shape as, as I should say...We’ve had some improvements particularly when we started the 2015 strategy. But I must be quick to point out that we are almost at the tail end of the implementation of the strategy. But the last 5 years, it hasn’t gone the way that it has to go. Why am I saying this? The effort that we put in, in doing this thing, we were looking at in line with the MDGS – Millennium Development Goals. We started in 2001 so we said look, in the next 15 years where do we see KEEA. And so we brought actors together. Local actors I mean, together. What do you want to see in the next 15 years? That led to the 5 thematic areas that we have here. First of all the waste management and drainage. The second one had to do with local economic development and tourism. The third one had to do with fishing and the fishing harbour and then education and health. These are the 5 thematic areas. They are as important today as it was. We did quite well when it came to the fishing and the fishing harbour. As a result of this we had the Elmina lagoon dredged. It was a response to this. When it comes to education, we had the Edinaman Secondary School a new face lift. When it came to health, we had support from Gouda Municipality and then they worked on the infrastructure in Elmina. Apart from that linking that to sanitation and local economic development we had to solicit for waste bins at the time to be able to strategically point at very many areas so that if you pick waste you will be...and then as a very consequences of this, we had what we call the Elmina-Gouda waste – Cyclus – processing plant at Abraza. And now at the time, nobody will put a sachet bag in the street. People will be picking them because they know people will buy from them to take to the site [and there were bins available] and there were bins available to do that. And people will buy, so if someone will buy from you even after drinking the sachet water you can even put it in your pocket because when you go home, dump them, put them there, gather them, somebody will come to purchase from you. Even if for 1 cedi you can give that to your son or daughter to take to school in the morning. You see, so that is how it started.

However as I alluded to earlier, when government changed, those who followed us, the zeal, the commitment, I don’t see it the way that we started.
[Why is that, why did the commitment go down?]

No, because the way you’ve struggled to get to where you are, if you didn’t get to that through sweat you didn’t appreciate it. How we sat day and night to develop this document. I will be here in the afternoon and then J.H. Mensah, the then senior minister will call me to his office in Accra that look, I have been able to get some Ambassadors together and I want you to come and speak with them. It’ll be 12midday here, he will tell me, I need to be there at 4pm. I need to pick my car and even whether I have said goodbye to my wife or family or not, I will go because I needed to do something for my people, that was the zeal then. When Kuffour’s second term, I became the (Regional) Minister and then someone else took over as DCE, the coordinating director that I was working with at the time had been transferred to Tema, the planning officer that I was working with at the time had been transferred to Cape Coast. So the...

[Why, why did you allow or maybe you were not there but why were they allowed to be transferred, because they had…]

No, we don’t control transfer.

[But then the DCE/MCE can also have a say because you can also ask someone to be transferred so you could have some say in retaining the capacity]

Either the DCE will say, I do not want to work with this person but the DCE hasn’t even got much control. If Local Government Minister, today it is Local Government Services but that time Local Government Minister, notwithstanding, even one of them I was a (Regional) Minister, one of the guys when he was been transferred, I put in a letter that look, KEEA has trained this person in this and that, the capacities that that person has gained, please. They said no. the capacities that he has gained, he should also go and share with other places. So before we realised, new officers had come to KEEA and so the institutional memory was lost on us

[But then, well that is what the immediate past Chief Director at the Local Government ministry told me that you can’t stay at one place for 10 years but then that is why you have handing over notes. Were there enough information for the new guys to pick up from]

We had the like you just had a copy and most of the projects that I did; most of the projects we did, reports were available. As for reports, they were there

[When you left the reports were there?]

They were there, I mean DCE’s office and then when consultants also print and came with the report, there were also there. So as for reports, institutional memory by way of report, fine. But having at least one or two of the members trained, you know to actually continue with the mantle that wasn’t there.
Because as at now, there is no document at the Municipal assembly with regards to this. I have been there. It was not even in the handing over notes of the current coordinating director

Because the current coordinating director didn’t do anything about this so that is the reason why he might not find anything. But I tell you from my time to the new DCE who continued, you will find documentation on what we've done. But from there coming, I wouldn’t know.

Yeah, well that is what I mean. So it is like with every successive administration there is less and less information available

That one I agree with you because they themselves are not doing much in the implementation. Some DCE might not even know of the Elmina 2015 strategy.

Yeah that’s maybe because there is no information on it in the handing over notes that he came to me. Because that is what the current DCE is saying

I agree with you but I am telling you, current MCE while doing this project, he lived in KEEA. He knew about this. If I tomorrow find myself in a ministry, if there is no document even there but I have learnt that look when this man was a minister, I overheard him talk about this and that, I will fish for where I can find the information. Because I tell you, if ask the current MCE, he might not even remember one thematic area of this document. He might not even remember and that will be sad.

It is (sad), well that is the case, it is sad. At least if, I don’t come from Elmina but I have been studying about Elmina for quite some time now and I have become invested in it so...will this be achieved, will the strategy, the vision be achieved?

I actually, just last month I had a meeting the the Embassy of the Netherlands. I want to look for funding and then we all as stakeholders sit down and look at the 2015 strategy where we are. Because just recently I was invited to a programme in Bonne, Germany. We are looking at re-localisation of MDGS. Because 2015 is almost with us so now we are looking at 2030. So we this, where are we, where have we gotten to, what can we do, what is the next line. That is what I want to do and then I have another appointment to meet the Netherlands Embassy again. They are waiting for my proposal to see how...because I need local actors to sit down. How many people are even aware of this project and then where we are now, what we have been able to achieve and then where do we go from here. That is something I want to do.

Were you still the MCE or were you are the regional office when the consultants finished their work?

I had just moved to the regional coordination council as the deputy regional minister. So that time when the consultants finalised, I was at the regional office, I had left KEEA.
Well because it seems like at the point where the Urban Solutions moved out, that is when the project went like this... downwards]

That is true. It was when they moved out because they were the consultants, both the consultants and in a way part of the implementers. Yes, so Urban Solutions when they finished their job, their report written, I had the hard copy not this one. They’ve come with [the final report] yes, I have a copy of that report.

[And there was supposed to be Elmina Development Fund]

Exactly, there was supposed to be Elmina Development Fund. Even on this heritage houses, I don’t know whether you’ve gone there... when we were actually restructuring those buildings, there was this plan that they were to contribute, in fact part came from, 20% of the fund. It is still sitting in the account. If you ask me if somebody has even redrawn, I wouldn’t know but I don’t think anybody has redrawn. They have an account there which is supposed to be used to rehabilitate the house. But the houses, we didn’t actually achieve our aim because we were to use as home-stays [or to use as business so it generates money] Yes, business in the form of home-stay in the sense like this... when students for instance visit the castle, how many students will be able to afford Elmina Beach Resort? So when we say Elmina Beach Resort is taking 200-300 Ghana cedis a night, we can get a place there say 20-30 Ghana (cedis) a night as a bed. Students from the UK, US, you can stay there; you know about the heritage of the area and also use that to visit the castle. Even if one night, two nights, it’s far cheaper than. How can you afford 300-400 Ghana (cedis). The hotel I stayed in Accra last night, it is not any hotel but Parliament organised it. Before I realised that hotel is 700 Ghana (cedis) per night and then I said, what, how can I pay 700 Ghana (cedis) to stay here. You see so that was what was supposed to generate some funds to the housing scheme. But because we were unable to actually get people to stay there in the rooms, it has now become normal houses.

[So who is in charge of that money because I have also been told that not everyone paid the full 20%, some did like 10% part payment and after the renovation was done...]

They themselves had executives. They had the executives. I don’t think I will remember who was the chairman and others but they themselves had executives. You also had someone from Elmina here, in fact he just retired from UCC – [Dr Annah Prah] – Annah Prah. He is a Prof now, Prof Annah Prah. So he was actually in close links with them so I think he will know the executives and the... I don’t even know the account number, I have to admit but they had funds.

[So when it comes to accountability, who should be held accountable for such a project? Because I don’t know it just beats my mind that such an interesting project like this can just disappear. Currently in the assembly]
very few people, Mr Ebo Dadzie have an idea about what the project was about and no one else]

Ebo Dadzie was very key, an assembly man at the time and the fact that he also work with the NCCE, any function, he was the MC and so he will know much about this project. But if you talk about the accountability, I think that first of all the assembly must be able to be accountable to the people about the project. When I talk of the assembly, it is in the hands of the DCE/DCD. They should be, you know but that is, they cannot say because they were not there because I tell you when you inherit, in both assets and liabilities. So if they're committed to this project, they would’ve learnt about this project, read about it and even know about who and who have the, that executives who have the account and those things. It should be the assembly and the committee, they had a committee – the housing scheme ownership project, they had a committee.

[Which sector of the economy in KEEA do you think should be the driving force for economic development?]

Tourism must be our driving force. It is the tourism hub of Ghana. You talk about central region here, the most visited castle is St. George’s Castle until recently when we had a problem with our bridge and it is even now under construction. So if we are able to promote tourism, I think that should be our driving force for our economy.

[Then who should take the lead in that?]

It is the assembly. Assembly, you listen to my presentation is responsible for overall development of the area, you see so it is the assembly. The assembly is responsible for overall development.

[So, how best do we, how best can knowledge be managed in such a way that notwithstanding the administration that comes in, there is information available to carry on projects]

Knowledge can be managed in 1) documentation – where are they?, 2) are they properly filed, 3) are they accessible to whoever wants to lay hands on those documentation? For me this is how knowledge can be managed. If they are not properly filed, if somebody comes now, we even had a number of softcopies, CDs. We had the number, which the project when they finished gave us a number of CDs. If today, regional coordination council that I have left, today as I speak, some of my development projects, we made sure that we had today’s Member of Parliament Fritz Baffour, Member of Parliament for Ablekuma is it central or south. We consulted him and gave him a project and today when you go to the regional coordinating council we have CDs from my time. I also have copies. They gave us copies. They were all left, I left them with the CDs then, the one that came I do not know if they still treasured the CDs.
[They threw them way and Prof Annah Prah had to go and claim, because he showed me, I went to his house and he showed me. They just threw them out and people could just take them away. I don’t know when it comes to development, how do you ensure continuity?]

How do you ensure continuity is, how each and everybody sees development being a continuous action. If you all see it that way, I have left office, somebody has come, does he really sees this as a project that needs to continue. No, somebody comes even the time that we used in doing this, he doesn’t see it. He all that he knows is that I’ve been a DCE, why don’t I put up 3-classroom block here, why don’t I do that...there is no connectivity you understand. But development is a kind of a cycle; we need to appreciate it that way. If we don’t that fine but if we don’t do it that way and we think that oh how many schools should I build, how do you actually link health to education, how do you link local economic development to tourism, how do you link our infrastructure needs to our fishing and then agriculture. In fact I must admit that in this our strategy, agriculture is quite silent in this but because it was in Elmina, yes. But at a point in time, we thought that we were using the naming Elmina just because it was the capital but that is was truly meant for the municipality, KEEA. Actually much of the work that we did was in Elmina.

[So in the end, does tourism have any impact on poverty reduction you think? If you say that tourism should be the centre point for the economic development, will it have any impact on poverty reduction?]

I think that it will only have impact if we look at the way we were actually developing this strategy. We added what we call local economic development. Close to the old market in Elmina if you pass there, nothing is going on there now but if you pass there, we were going to assemble all those who were developing beads to stay there so that when and even within the strategy we had in mind that those who visit the castle, they would even drive straight to the castle, their park should be parked at Kobina Gyan Square. They will be walking, along the line when they are walking, they will drop to buy a bottle of water, they will drop to buy a bottle of blue skies, where would they do that? It will be along the route going to the castle. How people are going to benefit from this will be, somebody from Elmina selling his or her bottle of water. They will buy from them. It is a way of making money. If beads and these that these people were actually developing, tourists buy from them; we will be promoting local economic development. If this our homestay, these houses that if they had been able to work, it’s a way of empowering the poor. This was what we had in mind when we said tourism and local economic development. Yeah but then today if you ask me how tourism has really impacted positively on our people, I guess it still needs to be measured. I, a word I will find it very difficult, a word that we’ve done so well in that or it has only been negative.
[Maybe qualitative evaluation]

No, qualitative evaluation I think we've made some progress but I don't, I think we still need to do more.

[Is the fact that not more has been done, is it due to governance? Is it that failure of governance that is why not much has been done?]

If we talk about how these various assemblies, MCE have not been followed adequately the way we wanted to do it, governance issues will come in. I think that the, another aspect has do with that of the institutional capacity of those who are left behind. The lawyers just told me the wanton transfer of actors you know, I think has also culminated into the whole thing.

[Now you are talking about going for a new project with the Dutch Embassy and all]

All in connection with this one (Elmina 2015 Strategy) we want to sit down, look at, we need to you see, we are just around 2015, how far have we gone with this strategy, what next , what is the way forward. That is what I am talking about.

[Yeah, I know. Then it makes me want to ask, would we always have to go back for more funding because this was supposed to have been handed over to KEEA to implement. But then it is in the implementation, that is always the lacking point...it's a cycle]

I agree but it also had to do with funding. If were to go by this, the assembly has received some resources along the line. Were they committed to this as a way to fund this project? That for me is an issue. Are there other extra resources that we need, how do we do that. We don't sit in your office and think that the resources will come to your office. You go for it, you go with proposals, you prepare before you can get some of these resources. Those are the areas that I think we've lacked.

[And that is because there is not enough capacity in the assembly?]

Exactly, it's two things, capacity and know-how, capacity and commitment. You can have capacity but if the person is not committed to that thing, you will not get it. So capacity and commitment, they are all governance issues.

[Naa, it's sad, I find it really sad because at a point the whole Ghana it was only KEEA that has a strategy for economic development]

The whole Ghana, everything was Elmina strategy, Elmina 2015, the whole Ghana they talk about Elmina 2015 strategy that was what they were talking about. Hmm, maybe I went with it but I didn't go with it. I only went to become the regional minister but I left everything here.
[Maybe you should have stayed to finish it]
You are right, yeah but everybody also want to move forward. A dean wants to become a vice chancellor.

[But then you ought to have succession planning also]
But succession planning is what we said we have all these officers but local government service is also different, you see.

[Yeah, so we also have to reform the local government service also to make sure that at least some key personnel are employed]
Maintained or employed by the assembly.

[Or that the assembly will have a say in whether the person is transferred or maintained]
Oh, that one will be difficult. If local government service thinks you've been there for 4 years or you've been there for this number of years and then another assembly also needs your expertise, it will be difficult for KEEA to say that no we wouldn't allow that person to go.

[Because you've just trained the person for a specific project]
Are we still recording?

*some guy talking about his law lecture on local government systems. In addition there seem to be a lot of people waiting to see him*

[If that is okay]
Are we done?

[Yeah, I think I will end it here]
You've gotten, ok you've gotten what you want to get.

[Well, we could talk more but you have a lot of people waiting for you]
Anytime, you have my number. Anytime, even you have my card, let me give you my card. My email if it is something you want me to drop, even one or two lines I will find time to do that for you.

[Thank you. You can have my card. You have a very busy schedule so I will leave you to it. Thank you very much once again for your time]