Culture Heritage Management Policy by the European Union: Reconciling Diversity and Inclusivity?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to critically assess the culture heritage policy discourse as executed by the EU and its main institutional bodies of culture. This in-depth descriptive analysis of the concrete character of the EU's supra-national culture identity project as expressed through culture heritage starts with chapter 1 establishing the wider socio-cultural and socio-political context in which the cultural past has become of crucial importance for (EU)ropean supra-nationalism in terms of making this comparatively new imagined community become real in people's lives by generating the notion of common cultural values. Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical and methodological foundations on which to base the analysis of all following, interrelating case studies. Examining the planning stage of EU culture heritage generation, asking questions about how knowledge of the past is being generated in the Eurocratic context, chapter 3 employs the case study of the Council of Europe's European Cultural Routes Project and, more specifically, its The Celts Cultural Route. Chapter 4 then focuses on the concrete implementation of the EU's message of culture heritage on the ground, in the form of the Council of Europe's Santiago de Compostela Pilgrimage Routes project. The final case study then critically illuminates the EU's creation of supra-national heritage on the symbolic level, taking the shape of the most omnipresent (EU)ropean symbols of all, the Euro banknotes iconography (chapter 5). Finally, chapter 6 summarises the preceding studies, and, on the basis of a final discussion of its findings in terms of the role played by culture heritage in the Eurocratic context at the planning and implementation level in relation to general Eurocratic rhetorics, serves to combine the above individual discourse analytical threads into a catalogue of practical recommendations, outlining how EU culture heritage management could be reconciled with Eurocratic notions of openness, diversity, and inclusivity.

This thesis represents the first systematic in-depth attempt to critically assess the supra-national culture heritage paradigm underneath the level of general public-orientated Eurocratic rhetorics. Because it is a first attempt, and deals with a notoriously large-scale and complex discursive setting (i.e. the EU), this thesis' findings must be considered provisional, but establish new study areas for the future.
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This work is dedicated to my mother and friend Karin Schroeder, who never lost her faith in me. To my father for his continuous support.
DECLARATION

This thesis is based on original research by the author. No part of this research has been previously published, with the exception of an article summarising the Euro Banknote Design Competition iconography discourse as part of the development of the final Euro design (Grabow 2007).
1.1 THE IDEA OF EUROPE

'[T]he history of a European identity is the history of a concept and a discourse. A European identity is an abstraction and a fiction without essential proportions.'

(Stråth 2002, 388)

To the surprise of many, geographical and geological Europe is not a continent at all – that is a landmass separate from other such masses and entirely surrounded by water. In the true meaning of the word it is thus only possible to distinguish five continental units: America, Australia, Greenland, Antarctica, and a large block consisting of Europe, Asia, and Africa. As pointed out by Champion (1990, 79), widening this definition to include any land mass mostly separated from others by water, in an attempt to defend and justify Europe as being of continental status, would turn America into two continents. This definition would subsequently turn Africa, connected with Eurasia by the narrow Suez land bridge, into a continent of its own. Yet, still this widened definition of a continent provides no grounds on which to set apart Europe from Asia. Even at its narrowest point 2000 kilometres separate the Black Sea

1 'One reads more and more about Europe – I am beginning to get the impression that it must lie somewhere nearby!' (my translation)
from the White Sea. To complicate the issue even further, Armenia and Cyprus are commonly considered part of Europe while geographically and geologically lying on the African continent (Wikipedia.org 2005b). In fact, one corner of Staten Island, New York, is geologically speaking Europe, so is part of Newfoundland (Bryson 2003, 161). However relaxed a geographical/geological definition for a continent we might apply, Europe is rather a peninsula forming the westernmost part of Eurasia (Figure 1.2). One can thus say that 'Europe is a geographical expression with political significance and immense symbolic weight, but without agreed boundaries' (Wallace 1990, 7; cf. Dunford 1998). The forces defining and binding Europe as an imaginary unit are not to be discovered between the contour lines of geographical or geological maps.

Instead, Europe's recognition and status as a continental unit must be considered as predominantly social in character. More to the point, it is cultural and historical links, the stories that people relate, that provide the grounds on which Europe becomes Europe. For example, Turkey is often regarded as not part of Europe due to most of its territory not being located on the European
landmass. Yet, as pointed out by Dobson (2004, 5), no part of Britain or Eire is part of this landmass either. So what and where is Europe (see figure 1.1)?

The Greek word *Europé* has two meanings. On the one hand, it names the mythological figure of the daughter of the king of Tyros and beloved of Zeus, and later wife of Asterius, the king of Crete. On the other hand, it names a certain place, a physical relationship with two aspects to it. It seems to have first designated the ‘continent’ (see below) in relation to the Peloponnese and the Greek islands. Also, it placed a part of the world in opposition to Asia Minor and Libya (Thomas-Penette 2000c, 3-4). Since antiquity, the idea of Europe and European-ness has undergone numerous re-evaluations and redefinitions (see Delanty 1995). The use of the adjective ‘European’ is first documented for Pope Pius II (1405-1464 AD). Representing an ideologically ill-defined concept (Graham 1998a, 3; see also Mikkeli 1997), it did not come into wider use before the Renaissance (Dodd 2002, 189), reappearing with renewed vigour at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries as ‘part and parcel of an early secularisation that sought to replace Judaeo-Christianity as the continent’s common cultural focus’ (Graham 1998b, 3; see also Wilson and van den Dussen 1993, chapter 3). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the idea of Europe and European changed with increased speed. Throughout this time, the contrasting faiths, cultural traditions, attitudes, and historical experiences ensured a vast array of distinct identifications and feelings of us and them to be found all across Europe (Nugent 1989, 5-6; Zeff and Pirro 2001, 1). In particular the continent’s wars and armed conflicts – leading Werbner (1997, 261) to refer to the European ‘continent’ (see below) as ‘a mass of land delimited by cultural and historical enmities and exclusions, frequently of the most barbaric kind’, such as the Napoleonic wars, WWI, and WWII – provided the impetus for the redrawing of numerous geographical and socio-cultural frontiers (see Elliot 1992; Broers 1996).

With the idea of Europe being dependent on the historical and cultural environment within which it is pronounced, it is not surprising to find not one overarching definition of the ‘continent’ of Europe through time, not only one story that people relate to, but a multitude of changing paradigms (see Stráth 2002 for an in-depth discussion of the historical concept of ‘Europe’). To quote Morin (cited in Bellier and Wilson 2000, 13, original emphasis),
Chapter 1: The Challenges of EU Culture Heritage Management

Modern Europe is the fruit of a perpetual metamorphosis: from Europe of the states to Europe of the nation-states, from Europe of the balance of power to Europe of deregulation and outburst, from merchant Europe to industrial Europe, from Europe of the Apogee to Europe of the Abyss, from Europe master of the world to Europe region under control. So its identity is not defined despite metamorphosis but within metamorphosis.

Since the coining of the term 'Europe' there have been numerous large-scale redefinitions of its meaning in terms of territorial extent and cultural characteristics, such as during the transformation from Cold War Europe, during which it was divided into two parts, each belonging to the opposing sides in a global conflict, to post-Soviet Europe. Europe as a paradigm has become its own 'totem/fetish' (Swedberg 1994, 383), 'highlighted whenever it appears, traced back from the origin of history, juxtaposing ancient myths and modern institutions, geographical areas, and utopian movements' (Sassatelli 2002, 446). These redefinitions represent an important focus for scholarly research, ranging from politics and economy to cultural studies. To quote Paasi (2001, 8),

For almost 3,000 years ideas of Europe have been characterized by difference, whether geographical and/or mythological. One challenge for research is to deconstruct the processes in which the ideas of difference have been created, and to analyse what has been included and excluded at different times in different spatial contexts.

At the chronological end of this list of large-scale re-conceptions of Europe so far, and representing 'the first institutional self-identification of Europe' (Kenny 2007, 171), is the European Union (henceforth EU) and its idea of a united supra-national Europe. It is this latest large-scale 'reinvention' of Europe, depending, as did its predecessors, on particular discursive interpretations, that shall be the focus of this thesis.

1.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION

Representing the 'largest expanse of peace and widely shard prosperity in the world' (Elliott 2007, 25), the EU, founded in 1951 as the European Community for Coal and Steel (henceforth EEC), is regarded to represent the world's most successful example of institutionalised supra-national policy coordination.
Since the end of WWII and during over four decades of the Cold War (1947-1989), 'encouraged by self-interest and an expanded sense of a European identity' (Heffernan 2001, 29), Western Europe changed from an assemblage of independent nation-states to a politically and economically at least partially amalgamated co-operative structure of governance (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991, 4; see Davies 1997). At the present-day the EU has 27 member states, including three former Soviet republics. Emerging in particular in opposition to unitary conceptions of state authority prevalent in the ancient régime2, the EU - or 'United States of Europe' (Bakunin 1980, 104; Lipgens 1985, 471-472; see also Wistricht 1994) as it has been called - represents an "in between" phenomenon' (Wallace 2000, 100), a structure of governance spanning the domestic (national) level on the one side, and the intergovernmental (international) on the other (Mikkeli 1997; Wallace 1999; Lord 2001). This ongoing process places Europe in the middle of a period of rapid change and transformation unmatched by most other Western regions (Solomos and Wrench 1993, 3).

Over the last fifty years, a series of legislative and institutional instruments worked towards the establishment of a supra-national jurisdiction (Pryce 1974, chapter 1; Ashworth 1997, 69; see George 1991, chapter 1 for a summary of the EU’s historical development). It is in this context that the year 1993, seeing the disappearance of the EU’s internal borders with the intent to allow free movement of capital, goods, services, and (certain categories of) people, has come to signify a new phase in the relations between the EU member states (Brah 1993, 9). While the individual member states remain important actors in the EU’s overall construction process, they also have to share power and authority with the Eurocratic institutions that make up the EU’s political system. In doing so, the delegation and distribution of powers, as well as the increasing competence of EU-wide institutions, has gone so far as to create a form of governance operating on the local, regional, national, and supra-national level (Peterson 1999, 255). Instead of the national capitals, European policy is made in Brussels, the capital of the European Community. Characterised by a democratic division of tasks and responsibilities, the EU’s most important institutions are the European Commission, the Council of

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2 Meaning 'Old Rule' or 'Old order' in French, in English, the term denotes primarily the aristocratic socio-political system established in France under the Valois (1328-1589 AD) and Bourbon dynasties (1589-1792 AD). In its more general use, the term refers to any regime sharing the former's defining characteristics: a feudal system controlled by an absolute monarch justified to rule by Divine Right and the explicit consent of the, usually Christian, Church. In the European context, this system can be traced back as far as the thirteenth century (Wikipedia.org 2006e).
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Ministers, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament (henceforth EP) (Grant 1998, 148-149; see Moravcsik 1993 for a detailed account on the EU’s governmental structure). Its institutional structure represents a highly complex network, comprising linkages and connections between governments, organisations, institutions, groups, and individuals at the local, regional, national, and supra-national level (Grant 1998, 151; see Cooper 2003). Within its institutional framework, a (EU)ropean policy style of decision-making has emerged. This is characterised by ‘a cumulative process of accommodation whereby the participants refrain from unconditional vetoing proposals, and seek, instead, to attain consensual agreement through compromise in the process complying with institutional regulations’ (Grant 1998, 151; see Mazey and Richardson 1995). On this basis, policy actors usually prefer interaction with one another rather than with bodies from outside the EU’s institutional system, leading to a distinct policy culture characterised largely by a complex sub-system of working groups, committees, and expert panels working under the overall guidance and control of the Brussels-based Eurocratic elite (Pedler and Schaefer 1996; Grant 1998, 152; Kabakchieva 2002, 2). The interaction between the different institutional network actors leads to the creation of a EU-specific policy-making culture, history, and frame of reference for its maintenance (Grant 1998, 151). This policy culture finds expression ‘in texts of European law, court cases, and other official sources of news and reports’ (Delgado-Moreira 1997, 1).

The EU’s ‘multi-level governance’ (Bromley 2001b, 289) approach roots in the understanding that this way it will be possible to transform the European nation-states from the top down, while multiculturalism – a word initially plucked out of educational debates about school curricula in a globalising world – is hoped to transform them from the bottom up (Werbner 1997, 262). As such, the EU adopts a view on modern-day nations as representing entities multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-faith in character (Ben-Tovim 1997, 217; see Goldberg 1994; Werbner and Modood 1997; Willett 1998 for critical debates of the multicultural paradigm). Multiculturalism comes to be regarded as a solution for the perceived decay of present-day society (Radtke 1994, 37). Here

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It must be mentioned that this represents the (EU)ropean ideal only. Hardly surprising, this ideal, as most, comes with an ever-growing number of exceptions. France, for example, vetoed the UK’s application for EU membership for years, while the UK threatened to undermine all EU business if France did not moderate its demands in the Council of Ministers and permitting the EU Commissioner to have more flexibility in particular in terms of trade negotiations (Grant 1998, 155, 161-162).
it is important to emphasise the main aim of this governance of intergovernmental co-operation and supra-national management as being to secure economic and political benefits - in this order - for its member states (Heffernan 2001, 30). This reason for this goes back to the beginning of the EU during the decades following WWII, when it was thought that an emphasis on economy and capitalist modernity would avoid undermining national interests (Kenny 2007, 171; see also Patocka 1983). Social issues are not part of these primary aims and objectives. Yet, they are of major importance in that only changes within the social sphere hold the power to generate support for changes initiated and enforced within the other two spheres. The EU’s internal structural stability - that is the legitimation of the political objectives of those in power in order to obtain, maintain, or further their position (Bradburne 2000, 387) - depends on the establishment of a (EU)ropean public sphere in which individuals identify as fully-fledged (i.e. qualified) citizens (Balibar 1990b, 75; Schnapper 1997; Bellier and Wilson 2000, 3; Neveu 2000, 121; Rodrik 2000, 299; Donnan and Wilson 2003, 10). In short, a unified (EU)rope can only exist if the majority of its citizens feel as united (EU)ropeans. As such, the Eurocratic meritocracy, holding the power to initiate and implement economic and political changes in support of a ‘New Europe’ (i.e. the new institutional Europe) (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 13), realised that, in order to avoid ‘fragmentation, chaos, and conflict’ (Santer 19954), and to ‘achieve cohesion, solidarity, subsidiarity, concertation and cooperation’ (Delgado-Moreira 1997, 7), it was necessary to project and protect a vision of a new comprehensive order providing stable and lasting social foundations (Eder and Giesen 2000; van Ham 2001; Petersson 2001; Cronin 2002; see Bauman 1997, 47-50). This tactical necessity acquires even more importance in that (EU)rope as a socio-political entity appears trapped between ‘einer größtenteils fiktiv gewordenen ‚nationalen Souveränität‘ und einer volksfern agierenden ‚kontinentalen Führungsrolle‘’5 (Balibar 2003, 13; see also Wallace 1999). In order to tackle and overcome this, ‘identity’ came to be the label given to the escape sought from the human uncertainty of where one belongs (Bauman 1996, 19). The EU has to develop a common (EU)ropean identity:

4 Throughout this thesis, direct quotes lacking page numbers as part of the reference are referring to documents, such as speech transcripts or articles, provided on web-pages that are not available in, for example, PDF-format.

5 ‘a mainly fictitious ‘national sovereignty’ on the one hand and that of a ‘continental leader’ distant from the people on the other’ (my translation)
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The dream of the Community's founding fathers was, ultimately, to see the emergence of a European identity. That does not mean that European identity should replace national identities, but that it should become strong enough, and be perceived as 'inclusive' enough by European citizens, for Europe to develop a genuine political entity.

(Duchesne and Frognier 1995, 193)

To quote José Maria Ballester (1999, 3), Head of the Cultural Heritage Department of the Council of Europe (henceforth CoE), the EU's main body of education, culture, and heritage,

[the real challenge of the process of European construction is not just to establish a unified legal or administrative area, adopt a single currency, or set up a common market. What matters is debate about the social models we are going to offer.

Based on the assumption that supra-national consciousness is based on the co-existence of politics and culture, as is the case for community, national, pan-national, and world histories (Balibar 1990b, 59; Ben-Yehuda 1995; Duara 1996, 152; Rowlands 1998, 34), this identity must be rooted in a social justification myth, an interpretation that presents the present state of affairs as the natural and legitimate outcome of what went before (in this context, see Žižek 1999, 179; 2001a, 149; 2005, 122, 200-201, 257). Phrased differently, in order to offer a re-description of the European world by presenting a set of political and economic beliefs as the more appropriate, the EU has to anchor itself in a social justification myth, and to provide a European identity model for its subject citizens to identify with (see Rorty 1989, 3-22; Torfing 1999, 68). The EU will only maintain its structural stability if the differences between its member state citizens 'are relativised and subordinated to the new community. In other words, these differences appear as secondary and superficial because of the common "we"' (Jacobs and Maier 1998, 17). In Badiou's (cited in Hallward 2003, 223) words, 'politics can only think as the thought of all'. Only this way it would be possible for very different members of society (socially, economically, politically, etc.) to establish a generally stable system of (EU)ropean society. In the words of the former president of France, François Mitterand, (EU)rope is a 'continent' that 'is returning in its history and geography like one who is returning home' (cited in Derrida 1992, 8). The crucial question for the EU is thus where to identify and how to promote this 'home'? 
1.3 (EU)ROPEAN CHALLENGES OF CULTURE IDENTITY

'Is there such a thing as "One Europe", or are there rather several Europes? New Europe, old Europe, wider Europe, narrower Europe, a Europe of the fifteen, the twenty five, or forty five, Europe à la carte and Europe plat du jour?'

(Schieder 2003)

In its need for a common identity model, the EU is facing four major entativity challenges, challenges based on the organic-ness and multiplicity of Europe's social, political, historical, and geographical borders. Firstly, there is the challenge of identity diversity. Distributed over almost fifty states, around 800 million people live in present-day Europe, incorporating as many as forty recognised ethnic groups (Dunne 1997, 16). They speak more than fifty languages and/or hundreds of local and regional dialects, and exhibit a plethora of religious and ethnic self-understandings and allegiances working at the local, regional, and national level (Tolz 1998, 1016; Williams 1998, 189-192; see also Rief 1993; Bort 1998). As Walter Schwimmer (2004), Secretary General of the CoE, the EU's primary tool for the development of society in Europe, acknowledges, '[a]t the heart of the problem we find the simple fact that the continental unity is marked by structural diversity'. This diversity roots lies in Europe's history:

Europe has experienced successive invasions of culturally distinctive peoples over more time but less space than most other world regions. Its intricate topographical detail and interpenetration of land and sea have exacerbated the resulting overlays and intermixtures of cultural elements... The longevity of recorded history has further sensitised local identities, not to speak of grievances over territories lost and other affronts between neighbours.

Tunbridge (1998, 237)

Perhaps more than any other continent, Europe is characterised by a multitude of distinctive local, regional, and national identities firmly rooted in centuries or even millennia of history. Cultural conflicts observable between minorities

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6 The socio-psychological concept of 'entitativity' refers to the process of an imagined community becoming real in people's lives by increasingly sharing what is perceived as joint cultural values, a common fate, and a feeling of boundedness and belonging (Risse 2003, 3).

7 Due to the fluid and plural nature of the definition of Europe, it is not possible to give precise numbers for European countries and its total population.
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in some of the oldest and allegedly most stable states of Western Europe highlight particularly well the deep-going cultural diversity, and often ruptures, observable in modern-day Europe. For example, the UK is facing enduring ‘Celtic fringe’ problems as the Scots, Northern Irish, Manx, and Welsh continue their longstanding drive for autonomy or independence, France is facing a Breton and increasingly violent Corsican problem, northern Scandinavia has its Saami minority, while homogenous Spanish national identity is contested by Basque and Catalan regionalism (Olsen 1986; Moreno and Arriba 1996; Tunbridge 1998, 239). Other countries have begun to challenge the cultural and/or religious diversity of their former empires, such as in the case of Turks in Germany, North African Muslims in France, and Hindus and Sikhs in Britain (Tunbridge 1998, 241). In summary, Europe is characterised by a high level of identity diversity, including, among others, paradigms of personal, local, and regional identity. Immigration, in particular of Muslims from Northern Africa, paired with the lack of successful national integration policies, have led to an intensification of this trend from the outside. As Farouky (2007, 18) notes, ‘Europe is getting more diverse by the day’. Closely related, and thus included in the challenge of identity diversity, is the EU’s democratic challenge. In order to tackle the first, it is necessary for the EU to develop a democratic approach, to give a balanced voice, to a plethora of identities.

Secondly, the EU is facing the challenge of the national. The EU’s supra-national culture identity project must be considered highly problematic in that it is ‘counter-historical’ and ‘designed to run against more basic world procedures between and with nations’ (Galtung 1973, 12; see also Bromley 2001a). While the EU aims to develop a supra-national hegemonic structure, the dominant, if not only, political unit type to be found across the world today is that of the nation-state. As numerous scholarly works have demonstrated, Europe’s more recent history has been characterised by a heightened development and stabilisation of its nation-states (Eisenstadt and Rokkan 1973; Flora 1983; Elwert 1989; Hahn 1993; Castiglione et al. 2004). It has even been argued that the West must be considered moving, on the basis of ‘traditional’ animosities and ruptures between nation-states, towards a civil war to defend primordial

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8 The concept of hegemony, employed in particular by Gramsci (Forgacs 1988), refers to ‘forms of power which depend upon consent rather than coercion’ (Fairclough 2001, 232), and ‘depends upon winning the consent (or at least acquiescence) of the majority to existing social arrangements’ (Fairclough 2001, 232). As such, hegemonic struggle penetrates all domains of social reality (cultural, economical, political, etc.).
attachments, such as identities, heritages, cultures, and languages (Wieviorka 1994, 23; Riotta 2000). This overall trend towards the reinforcement of the national is sadly exemplified by more and more European members of the political meritocracy advocating the need for the redevelopment of an inward looking nationalism or regionalism. For example, the French Front Nationale and 'its demagogue Jean-Marie Le Pen liked to claim that France's four Million Muslims should be repatriated to the countries of their immigrant grandparents, since they could never become 'French', never manage to 'sing the Marseillaise' (Kabbani 2001, xvi; see also Crumley 2007). For every European leader preaching tolerance and common sense, such as former Czech President Vaclav Havel and former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, there is one politician in the mould of Austria's Jörg Haider (former chairman of the Far-Right Freedom Party) and Italy's Umberto Bossi (former chairman of the Lombard League Party) (Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Diamanti 1996; Riotta 2000; Wodak 2000). Going hand-in-hand with this process, there has been the growing problem of racially, ethnically, and religiously motivated violence spreading across Europe:

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\text{Racist violence has reached alarming levels all over Europe. By the 1990's, many groups of people have had to face racist violence and harassment as a threatening part of life: This is the situation in a Europe characterised by rapid economic, social, demographical, political, and ideological changes, and by increasing instability.}
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(Björgo and Witte 1993, 1)

A Eurobarometer\footnote{The Eurobarometer surveys are public opinion polls conducted biannually by the CEC among EU citizens from 1974 onwards.} survey conducted by the Commission of the European Communities (henceforth CEC) in 1997 testifies for 'a worrying level of racism and xenophobia in member States, with nearly 33 percent of those interviewed openly describing themselves as "quite racist" or "very racist"' (CEC 1997a, 1; see also van Donselaas 1993; Fuchs et al. 1995; de Cillia et al. 1999, 150; Marsh and Sahin-Dikmen 2003; Delhey 2004). All this taken together led Balibar (2003, 28; see also Kabbani 2001) to speak of the development of a new 'European Apartheid'. In this context it is interesting to note that 'while states were defining boundaries, governance and sovereignty, they also developed a shared resistance to Europe being united under the hegemony of a single state or political master' (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 13; see, for example, Broers 1996).
This traditional rejection of a unified Europe under a single power can be observed, for example, in the case of the Napoleonic Wars and WWII. Only when facing the threat of Europe falling under the control of a sole political power, did European nation-states manage to form lose and often uncomfortable supra-national allegiances. Historically speaking it can thus be said that European unification only happens in rejection of the same or similar motives.

Thirdly, there is the challenge of ‘fuzzy’ borders (see Christiansen et al. 2000). Europe, often referred to as the ‘Old Continent’, is, in fact, the youngest of all as far as its political boundaries are concerned. Sixty percent of its present-day borders were drawn during the twentieth century (Foucher 1998; Paasi 2001, 22). Moreover, with the downfall of the world’s second to last superpower, the USSR, in 1989, Europe has lost one of its cornerstones of identity construction (Tolz 1998, 993). With the Soviet Union gone, leading to the formation of a variety of new independent states to the east, the political, economical, as well as cultural map of Europe has been thoroughly redrawn, resulting in deep-going changes, not to say ruptures, in the ‘continent’s’ social fabric (Husbands 1991; Balibar 1996; Morley and Robins 1996; Roche and Van Berkel 1997; Toggenburg 2004; see also contributions to Mannin 1999)\(^{10}\). As numerous scholarly works, in particular in the context of immigration, demonstrate, it is through this process of rearrangement that old identities are being challenged; some are breaking down, and new ones are emerging (e.g. Bovenkerk et al. 1990; Campani 1993; Carter et al. 1993; Miles 1993a; 1993b; Leman 1998; see also contributions to Wrench and Solomos 1993; Farnen 1994; Guibernau and Rex 1997). Europe’s traditional border regions are on the move, and with them the attached concepts of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, in-groups and out-groups are being rearranged (Kofman and Sales 1992). Human identity construction always depends on the exclusion of certain social elements. Put differently, in order to include certain people within a socio-political unit, other people must be excluded:

\[\text{The function of identity lies in providing the basis for making choices and facilitating relationships with others while positively reinforcing these choices... In emphasising sameness, group membership provides the}\]

\(^{10}\) In fact, it has been held that EU enlargement and the diversity input going hand-in-hand with it might easily result in a dilution of the idea of a common (EU)ropean identity. Cynical commentators regard this to be the reason for the UK’s long-standing sympathies for Eastern enlargement, as well as for the force with which the US backs Turkey’s accession to the EU (Toggenburg 2004, 1; cf. Salesse 1997).
basis for supportive social interaction, coherence and consensus. As identity is expressed and experienced through communal membership, awareness will develop of the Other.

(Douglas 1997, 151)

Identifying always means ‘separating the pure from the impure’ (Young 1993, 7) through ‘inferiorisation and differentiation’ (Wieviorka 1994, 23). So where the USSR provided an ideological theme (i.e. the ‘Red Threat’) against which to define and unite Western, capitalist Europe as a whole (see Neumann 1999), the EU now faces numerous former Soviet Union member states eager to join the ranks of capitalist nation-states. With the EU expanding continuously towards the east since the breakdown of the USSR, at present stretching as far east as Latvia and Estonia in the north and Romania and Bulgaria in the south\(^1\), the EU’s external borders have been prone to constant change, making them unstable and fluctuating (Héritier 1999, 7; Brabant 2001; O’Dowd 2002; Delhey 2004, 6; Massey 2004; Eder and Spohn 2005; see also contributions to Héritier 1993; Mannin 1999). As has been pointed out by Risse (2003, 3) in relation to EU enlargement, boundedness represents a crucial – yet obviously not the only – ingredient for the perceived ‘realness’ of any, in particular national, community. As such, the ‘fuzziness’ (e.g. Fuchs et al. 1995, 167; Jacobs and Maier 1998, 13) of the EU borders poses difficulties for (EU)rope’s social unification in terms of the development of a common identity (Hellström 2003b, 32; Risse 2003, 3-4; see also CEC 2003). This finds its most poignant expression in the fact that although EU membership is restricted to ‘European states’ by article I-1,2 of the Treaty Establishing a European Constitution (EU 2004b, 11; see also European Parliament 2003, 17), the term itself is nowhere defined. The EU is dealing with a ‘moving target’ (Bromley 2001b, 287). As the CEC (1990, 1), the EU’s executive body and one of its three main institutions of governance, acknowledges in a report entitled Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union, acknowledges:

Since the political changes in Poland and Hungary, and especially since the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, people throughout Europe have been spectators at an exhilarating series of debates which have made them think carefully about their own identity as Europeans.

\(^1\) The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia joined the EU on 01 May 2004, Bulgaria and Romania on 01 January 2007. The list of candidate countries at the time of writing includes the Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey.
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These difficulties are intensified by the fact that the European historical experience of being part of a political entity has traditionally been based on the idea of being part of a system relating to a geographically limited territory, a territory closed off from that of its neighbours (Fuchs et al. 1995, 166). Europe's countless wars over territory testify to this tradition.

Fourthly, there is the challenge of novelty causing problems for the EU's political architects. With the EU being the world's first supra-national hegemonic structure, it lacks any established reference points for instilling feelings of supra-national identity in its subject citizens. As poignantly phrased by Elliott (2007, 25), '[t]he EU has spawned admirers - how could it not? - but no imitators. No other multinational grouping - not Mercosur in Latin America, or ASEAN in Southeast Asia - has anything like the powerful institutions of the union' (Elliott 2007, 25). As such, the EU, as well as its individual member states, is moving in uncharted territory. It is against this background that the question of being for or against the EU severely divides and separates countries, social groups, and individuals (CEC 1979, 40). This phenomenon cannot only be observed for different European nation-state citizens, but also for the political meritocracy itself. As Risse (2003, 7) observes, while for the German political élite European Unification represents a means of overcoming the country's national, and, in particular, military past of the two World Wars, the French political élite tends to construct the coming into being of a Unionised Europe as an externalisation of distinct French values (e.g. enlightenment) and expression of its mission civilisatrice (civilising mission) (see Amin 2004, 5). Contrary to Germany and France, the British (mainly English) élite constructs Europe in opposition to their own understanding of the nation. In short, many citizens and members of national political élites actively resist the idea of a supra-national Europe.

It is against these challenges that EU officials are facing the major problem of having to find a way to recast or commodify the ambiguous idea of Europe in order to promote unification (Tunbridge 1998, 239; see Schlesinger 1997, 374). As McCormick (2002, 29; see also Morin 1991, 20) sums up poignantly,

_We know where Europe sits on a map, but we have a difficulty in defining its physical and cultural boundaries, and in being certain about what makes it distinctive. Europeans have much that unites them, but much more that divides them. They lack a common history, they speak_
many different languages, they have different social values, their views of their place in the world often differ, they have gone to war with each other with tragic regularity, they have often redefined their allegiances and their identities, and they have frequently redrawn their common frontiers in response to changes in political affiliation.

Ballester (1999, 3; see also Holmes 2000, 94), Head of the Cultural Heritage Department of the CoE, describes the (EU)ropean situation as one of ‘contradictions [...] causing very serious distortions [resulting] in an increasingly unequal society, with even greater differences between countries, regions, communities, and individuals, a society where cohesion is breaking down’. Aiming to develop a supra-national identity, the EU’s ‘New European order’ (Prodi 2000) is in more than one way in the middle of a problematic frontier experience (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 9).

The EU is in need of a supra-national identity model fashioned in the act of political and social self-definition. Having identified the major challenges faced by the EU in its need for a common European identity, what is the primary Eurocratic means by which to develop, maintain, and further feelings of communal belonging among EU citizens?

1.4 THE EU AND THE CULTURAL PAST

1.4.1 (EU)ropean beginnings

According to Jean Monnet, first President of the EC and one of the so-called ‘Founding Fathers’ of the EU, the idea of a united Europe goes much deeper than geographical rearrangements after World War II: ‘We are not forming collations between states, but union between people’ (Monnet cited in Fontaine 1988, 6). However, during the following decades, such 1950s idealistic motivations for European unification lost much of their ideological innocence and idealism. In fact, for most of the EU’s existence, issues of social identity have been only marginal aspects of Eurocratic interest. As Hart (1998, 164) summarises, ‘[t]he original objectives to prevent another war in Europe and create a bloc against the Communist East, while countering the economic power of the United States, has been overshadowed by an emphasis on economic integration’. This, ultimately unsuccessful, course taken by the EU was decided on for historical reasons. During the 1950s, a decision was made to keep the economic and cultural spheres formally separated (Pantel 1999, 48). By focusing
solely on the economic unification of Europe, the need for the development of a comprehensive cultural policy or articulation of European culture identity was largely ignored by the European Coal and Steel Community12 (Pantel 1999, 48). It is in this context that the Treaty of Rome (EEC 1957), establishing the EU, while evoking the existence of a 'solidarity, which binds Europe' (CEC 1987a, 217), not even mentions the word 'culture' (Dunne 1997, 5). The reason for this lies in the initial belief in the natural emergence of a common (EU)ropean identity 'from below' (Heintz 2001, 8). According to this line of reasoning, also termed the 'Monnet method' (Abélès 2000, 34), a common European identity represents a 'popular psychological community' (Taylor 1983, 3) emerging as an overflow product of what has been termed a 'pull model' (Wessels 1995, 137) or 'cultivated spill-over effect' (Taylor 1979, 69; Holmes 2000, 93; see also Haas 1958; George 1991). According to the 'spill-over' theory, rationalisation and harmonisation within the economic and political sphere is regarded to generate surplus pressure 'colonising', and thus, integrating and harmonising, the socio-cultural sphere (Haas 1958; Hoffmann 1966; Feld and Wildgen 1976; Taylor 1983; George 1985; Bekemans 1990; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Wessels 1995; Wessels et al. 2003, 9-11). Ideologically, the EU's technocratic belief in the 'spill-over' effect roots in, and is fed by, the underlying assumption that European unification as such is inevitable (Holmes 2000, 93). The EU's architects failed to see, or simply ignored, the need to question and rethink their nation-state-based ideas about the dynamics of political action and public mobilisation (Solomos and Wrench 1993, 3). As numerous scholars observed, 'European institutions [were] operating as if they were establishing something on whose form everyone agrees' (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 11; see also Judt 1996, 23-24; Shore 1996, 98-99; Holmes 2000, 93).

As observed by numerous scholars (Castells 2000; Lucas 2001; van Ham 2001; Petersson and Hellström 2003; Spohn and Eder 2005; Hellström 2006), the EU's institutional structure and physical enlargements alone were unable to sustain the EU as a viable political entity above and beyond its constituent member states. Simply assuming the generation of a (EU)ropean identity at the

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12 In 1950, in a speech inspired by Jean Monnet, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman put forward the proposal to integrate Western Europe's coal and steel industries. As a result, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded, incorporating Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, with Jean Monnet as its first President. Due to the big success of the ECSC, its member states decided to integrate other economic sectors, leading to the development of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 (Treaty of Rome), and the EU in 1992 (Treaty of Maastricht) (EU 2006).
Eurocratic administrative centre to go hand-in-hand with its spread to the peripheries and finally over the social sphere as a whole (Barnard 1983, 240; Bellier and Wilson 2000, 3), the question of identity remained ill-defined throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The EU was seriously suffering from what Dunne (1997, 16) termed an ‘identity gap’, a continuously intensifying deficit of the social. The EU was in need of active measures towards a common identity (see Zielonka 1998, 224; see also Harmsen and Wilson 2000).

1.4.2 In search of a shared identity

As late as 1973, European Community leaders at their Copenhagen summit decided on a policy calling for the review of Europe’s common heritage (CEC 1973, 119). With no practical implementations following this decision, it remained a call only. Instead, it was through a number of legal and formal decisions that the 1970s saw the launch of the Common Identity Option (henceforth CIO) (Wiener and della Sala 1997; Neveu 2000, 123). Fuelled by the will to create a European identity shared by its member states’ citizens, the CIO endowed EU members with what the Eurocratic élite considered identity-forming symbols ‘par excellence of membership of that community’ (CEC 1987c, 4). This present-based ‘Eurosymbolism’ (Jacobs and Maier 1998, 23; see also Shore 1993) took the shape of the introduction of traditionally national symbols of identity, such as the EU flag, passport, anthem, and ritual calendar (Shore 1995, 227; Dunne 1997, 16; Sassatelli 2002, 436; Kenny 2007, 171), hand-in-hand with special rights, such as the free movement of citizens between the member states (CEC 1988a; 1988b). Once again, a European common identity was simply assumed to be already in existence – all that had to be done was to label traditional (i.e. national) symbols of state identity as expression of the new supra-national Europe, and to decide on when to celebrate it. As exemplified particularly well by the introduction of the EU passport (a passport being per se a symbol of identification), the (EU)ropean question of identity became a question of merely printing and distributing ‘badges’ of belonging. Unsurprisingly, the centralisation of the European bureaucratic apparatus and the introduction of traditional symbols of national identity did not lead to the cultural Gleichschaltung of EU citizens as hoped for by the political meritocracy. As pointed out by Smith (1991, 73-74), ‘[t]here is no analogue to

\[13\] I am using this German term in the widest sense of its meaning, referring to any kind of social consolidation or synchronisation by political means, and not in the context of the Nazi party’s desire for total societal control.
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Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of kings and saints’. Nevertheless, these symbols have remained among the most omnipresent aspects of top-down EU symbolism, firmly written into the draft for a European Constitution in 2003 (European Convention 2003, article IV-1). Yet, the CIO was bound to remain a project of desire of the EU administration only. It based on the notion of an external identity only, tied to the EU’s role as a developing solidary entity in international, mainly political and economic, relations (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 3). Yet, what was needed in order to generate a feeling of belonging among EU member state citizens was an internal identity. In this context it is surprising to find scholars recently calling for the use of even more nation-state symbols as an effective means of developing a supra-national EU identity (see, for example, Risse 2003, 8).

Parallel to the CIO, Eurocratic attempts to develop a common identity were based on two models. The first, termed a ‘European Model for Society’ by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission14, rooted in the idea of ‘a typology of European features’ (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 3). Placing more emphasis on the social sector, this model’s main aim was to develop and employ ‘similar family structures, the democratic distribution of political power, as well as the freedom of the individual vis à vis the state’ (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 3). (EU)ropean-ness became a matter of civic rights. Such rights, however, are by no means exclusive to the EU, but reflect the concept of human rights and freedoms characteristic of Western society in general. As a result, the EU’s present-based notion of civic identity remained too ill-defined to allow identification. The second model converged around the notion of a shared common destiny and interest (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 3; Pombeni 2003, 6, 10). Yet, as the first model, it failed to produce the results aimed for by the political architects of the New Europe. The reason for this has to be seen in the notion of a shared (EU)ropean destiny being projected onto the future, making it ‘rather a promise or delusion’ (Paasi 2001, 11; see Barker 1990; Mazower 1998) rather than a justification of the present state of affairs. The flaw integral to this approach is that identity, at whatever level, is about being in the here and now, not about becoming in the there and then. Of particular importance in the context of this thesis, both models lacked any concrete EU identity-forming

14 A small unit attached to the President of the European Commission conducting studies on issues such as equal opportunity rights, governance, social models, and culture (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 22-23).
projects. The existence of a shared identity was recognised as crucial for the success of the (EU)ropean project. Yet, at the same time, the actual character of this identity remained un(der)-defined.

Analysis of national trends demonstrates feelings of (EU)ropean belonging not to have increased among EU citizens with the passage of time, but to be unstable and often counteractive of efforts by Eurocratic agencies (Everts and Sinnott 1995, 442; Immerfall and Sobisch 1997, 32; Nissen 2004). For example, in a 1982 Eurobarometer survey (CEC 1982, 42), 43 percent of all respondents stated never to think of themselves as Europeans instead of belonging to a particular nation. In 1990, this number had risen to 51 percent (CEC 1990, 2). Exhibiting similarly low support for the EU, a 1988 Eurobarometer survey (CEC 1988a, 5) showed only 39 percent of respondents to be interested in EU matters. To this point, Brussels's meritocracy had failed to rid the (EU)ropean project from tangibility problems. Its Eurocratic élite had to ask itself 'what elements will link people(s) with a variety of histories, references and aspirations, whether between European societies or within them? What does it take for Europeans to feel European?' (Neveu 2000, 128).

1.4.3 The EU's discovery of culture

'It if one adheres, as many do, to the concept that 'Modern man [sic] is not loyal to a monarch or land or faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture', then the attempt to promote the idea of a distinctive European culture, tradition, or set of values is of high political significance.'

(Dunne 1997, 1)

Not until the late 1980s, under the EC presidency of Jacques Delors, did culture come to be seen as an integral and crucial sector of Eurocratic public policy. The political élite slowly began to realise culture to represent an active resource to be managed in order to make the transformation of the plethora of administrative, judicial, and bureaucratic agreements, procedures, and regulations representative and meaningful to EU citizens (Dunne 1997, 5; Pantel 1999, 48; Johler 2002). As phrased poignantly by Jacques Delors, then president of the EC, in an address to the College of Europe in Bruges, 'I find myself

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15 For a EU-friendly interpretation of Eurobarometer survey data see van der Veen (2002). See also Martiniello (1994, 40) and Heintz (2001, 8) for a critical discussion of Eurobarometer reports not so much as an opinion-monitoring device, but as a Eurocratic tool to give birth to a certain opinion.
dreaming of Europe [...] which tends its immense cultural heritage so that it bears fruit' (Delors cited in Nielsen and Stubb 1998, 68). It was in the wake of this dawning that an internal policy document labelled *Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community* (CEC 14.12.1987, 1; see also Economic and Social Committee of the European Union 1990) acknowledged and affirmed that

> [t]he sense of being part of European culture is one of the prerequisites for the solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market, and the considerable change it will bring about in living conditions within the Community, is to secure the support it needs.

In its *Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament* on the subject (CEC 1987b, 5), 'designed to trigger thought and action among decision-makers and action-takers throughout the Community' (CEC 1987b, 5), the CEC further emphasised 'that increased Community activity in the cultural sector is a political and economic necessity (CEC 1987b, 6). To go into more detail, culture

> is the basis of European Union, which has goals other than mere economic and social integration, however important these may be. The sense of being part of European culture is one of the prerequisites for that solidarity which is vital if the advent of the large market, and the considerable changes it will bring about in living conditions within the Community, is to secure the popular support it needs.

(CEC 1987b, 6)

Eurobarometer surveys conducted in the years following the *Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community* further supported the potential importance of culture as an identity-forming tool providing a catalyst to transform political and economic unification into a social one. When asked what respondents considered as specifically European, and to which they are personally attached, 'peace' ranked first (47.0 percent), followed by 'democracy' (38 percent) and 'culture' (33 percent) (CEC 1990, 3). Yet, in terms of their usefulness for concrete identity-forming projects, the first two concepts remain too insubstantial in character, as well as too general and unspecific. After all, democracy and, in particular, peace can hardly be considered to represent

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16 Recalling the general trend of Eurobarometer surveys, the round table meetings in Vienna in 1994 defined European values as tolerance, democracy, and human rights (Muller 1995, 4). It should, however, be pointed out that in contrast to Europe's contemporary adherence to principles of liberty, peace, and freedom, it has also been 'the birthplace for devastating experiments of tyranny' (Dunne 1997, 7).
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exclusively European values, and even less European achievements. In contrast to this, culture, being third in the list, provided two major advantages over the first two. Firstly, it represents a ‘notoriously elastic concept’ (Graham 1998b, 19) through which to communicate, reproduce, experience, and explore the envisaged new social order (Williams 1982, 13). This paradigmatic elasticity would lend itself readily to a supra-national project lacking clear-cut political, geographical, or ideological boundaries, as well as bring past, present, and future in line with (EU)ropean ideology (see chapter 1.1-1.3). Secondly, culture represents a much more concrete concept than democracy or peace in that it is actively and passively lived and experienced by every citizen on a daily basis. Recent survey data re-emphasised the potential importance of culture in furthering a common (EU)ropean identity. In a 2001 Eurobarometer survey, measuring citizens’ general interest in different aspects of society, culture rated first (56.9 percent) (CEC 2001a; see also CEC 2001b). In fact, Jean Monnet, the first architect of a United Europe, himself retrospectively acknowledged this importance when, late in his career, he stated, ‘[i]f I had to start all over again I would start with culture’ (cited in Dunne 1997, 2; see also Smith 1992, 57; Bellier and Wilson 2000, 6). Recalling Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of cultural capital, EU officials realised that any policy-making ruling political meritocracy, in order to legitimate and justify its authority, must capture the ‘accumulated cultural productivity of society and also the taste for the selection and valuation of such products’ (Ashworth 1994, 20; see also Friedman 1992b, 336; Graham 1998b, 19; 2002, 1004; Graham et al. 2000). To quote the European Task Force on Culture and Development (henceforth ETFCD) (1997, 21), a working group attached to the CoE, imbued by a renewed Eurocratic spirit, culture found its way into the official EU policy discourse as a ‘powerful promoter of identity’. In particular after the blow delivered ‘on the political insiders, government leaders, [and] academics by the initial Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union’ (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 1; see also Deflem and Pampel 1996) in 1992, culture came to be regarded as the weapon of choice in the EU’s search for a social justification myth that would allow the Eurocratic meritocracy to present the present state of (EU)ropean affairs as the

17 Nevertheless, the 2003 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Convention 2003, 3, 5, 47) states democracy, freedom, equality, human rights, and respect for reason to represent (EU)ropean values deeply embedded in the ‘continent’s’ history.

18 In France, the same referendum, while still passing, gathered 49 percent of voters being against the (EU)ropean project, with the general rate of participation being extremely low (Heintz 2001, 8; see Kubicek 2003). Support for the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Convention 2003) demonstrates an equally low support rate among many EU citizens. In fact, two of the EU’s founding members, the Netherlands and France, rejected the draft European constitution in 2005 (Elliott 2007, 25).
natural and legitimate outcome of what went before (Shore 2000; Tzanidaki 2000; Barnett 2001; see CoE 09.1993 for a detailed Eurocratic account on the development of the EU’s cultural institutions and policies). As poignantly remarked by Mercer (1990, 43), ‘identity only becomes an issue when in some way it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty’. To quote a CoE report on the challenges of citizenship and sustainable development, ‘[t]he key role of cultural practices [is] as cement for the current building of solidarity and that of cultural references to maintain a coherence between the past, present, and future’ (CoE 02.12.1996, 6, original emphasis).

With the EU’s newfound ambition to generate and mediate the notion of a common identity through culture, culture came to be ‘governmentalised’ (Barnett 2001). Yet, (EU)ropean cultural consciousness still had to be considered underdeveloped at best (CEC 1988a, 7). Even though culture provided an ‘elastic’ mould for the development of a shared (EU)ropean identity, it was still necessary to give this identity a more concrete shape. It was at this point, in order to create an ‘emotional identity’ (Mandel 1990, 154), and after the present and the future had failed to do so, that the Eurocratic eye turned back towards the past. To quote from the First European Community Framework Programme in Support of Culture,

[i]f people are to give their full support to, and participate fully, in European integration, greater emphasis must be placed on their common cultural values and roots as a key element of their identity and their membership of a society founded on freedom, democracy, tolerance, and solidarity.

(CEC 06.05.1998, 5; see also CoE 1998a, 61-64; CEC 09.02.2000, 3)

This way, it would hopefully be possible to give (EU)ropean cultural action a more concrete meaning. In more direct terms, Eurocratic rhetorics argued for the existence of ‘long-term factors’ (Pantel 1999, 49) woven into the fabric of Europe’s collective cultural past (see Balibar 1990c, 115). These were regarded to legitimise ‘their own political positions, to influence present social practices and values, and to naturalise the past so that it appears to lead logically to the present’ (Skeates 2000, 90; see also CEC 25.07.2001, 27).
1.4.4 The EU's discovery of the cultural past

The Eurocratic tide, in particular in terms of policy culture, did not firmly turn towards the cultural past before the mid- to late-1990s. Special influence in this process has to be attributed to the CoE, stating as early as 1995, in an internal policy document entitled *A Land Dreamed, Invented and Built*, a case study on how to identify (EU)ropean culture heritage in the regions of its member states,

> [t]he vestiges of the past, inscribed on the landscape, in the imagination, local values, language, and customs, are not mere icons to be admired as museum pieces. They constitute a rich reserve from which the actions that we take today should derive their inspiration and their force in order to embellish it.

(CoE 07.04.1995, 8)

For the EU's cultural institutions, realising the supra-national state not only to be a political construct but also a system of cultural representation (see Hall 1994, 200), the cultural past, formerly only of marginal value for the EU's architects, took on an active character. The ETFCD re-emphasised this in its final report, entitled *In from the Margins: A Contribution to the Debate on Culture and Development in Europe*, when concluding the establishment of a stable EU to be dependant on the creation of 'a cultural area common to all Europeans [...] in order to develop intercultural dialogue, knowledge about history and culture, the transnational dissemination of culture, cultural diversity [and] the promotion of heritage' (ETFCD 1997, 37). Similarly highlighting this shift of perceived importance, the CoE (2003a), in the *Introductory Note to the Draft European Framework Convention on the Integration of the Cultural Heritage into Development*, states culture heritage to be no longer perceived as 'a marginal sector, but, instead, 'is now at the heart of societal development'. In particular, the Eurocratic élite realised the necessity of allowing the notion of a common identity 'to crystallise' (van den Broek 1994) in a concrete and tangible way. Unlike notions of 'peace' or 'democracy', the cultural past came readily equipped with such a 'crystallisation surface'. This surface took the shape of the past's material legacy. To quote from a CoE resolution on culture heritage adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 1998, 'to identify [...] common values, it is necessary to promote an understanding of Europe's history on the basis of its physical [...] heritage, so as to bring out the links which unite its various cultures and regions' (CoE 1998b). Once again, Eurobarometer data further
supported the cultural past's potential impact on citizens' notions of identity. Amongst the six most frequently practiced cultural activities, respondents ranked 'visiting a historical monument' second, while 'visiting a museum or gallery' ranked fourth (Spadaro 2002, 9-10). Backed up by survey data, the cultural past came to be regarded to hold the power to legitimate the current EU-political discourse as decided in Brussels (Hellström 2003b, 124; 2004, 4), as well as to counteract the intensifying xenophobic tendencies coexisting with the strong belief in a democratic system and fundamental human rights throughout the member states (CEC 1997a, 1; 1997b; see also Johler 2003, 7). As a result of this awareness, governmental bodies began to cultivate, harvest, and winnow knowledges of the past in support of the (EU)ropean project. For Brussels, culture heritage took on a whole new dimension. It is in this context that the EU embarked on the creation of a (EU)rope of knowledge of the past (McDaniel 1991; Mesikämmen 2003, 2; Balibar 2003, 28) in reference to which any EU citizen could constitute him/herself in relation to what is presented as fact-based historical conditions (Thomas 1990b, 65; see, for example, contributions to Martín 2000). As a result, in particular over the last fifteen years, the Eurocratic realisation of 'the social functions of the heritage of the past', to quote the European Institute of Cultural Routes (henceforth EICR) (2004f, original emphasis; see also CoE 2003; Thomas-Penette 2000b), one of the CoE's primary projects rooted in the notion of a common European culture history, led to the development of a (EU)ropean discourse on the cultural past (Hill 2000, 431). This discourse is systematically sponsored by the EU administration and communicated to the wider public through educational culture heritage projects. As such, the cultural past came to be cemented into the operational frameworks of EU bodies, its operational context setting the background for any scholarly analysis of the external and internal culture heritage discourse at EU level.

1.5 EUROCRATIC USES OF THE CULTURAL PAST

The EU's use of the cultural past in terms of legitimising the process of European Unification is dichotomistic in character. On the one hand, it is presented as an essentially ahistorical endeavour (the absence of a past also

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19 'Visiting a library' ranked first among people's responses (Spadaro 2002, 10).
20 I am referring to the administration of the EU in its broadest sense, including the activities of the European Commission, Commission of European Communities, European Parliament of the European Union, Council for Cultural Co-operation, Council of Europe, Intergovernmental Conferences, and Reflection Groups.
representing a use of the past), existing independent of European history before the end of WWII. On the other hand, the European past is envisaged as a natural predecessor of European Unification. Instead of building a New Europe, the 'continent' is argued to have always been united. All the EU has to do is to uncover this 'forgotten' past of previous united Europes, and to present it to its subject citizens in order for them to remember their common roots. As such, the supra-national discourse offers two models of the (EU)ropean family: a family that just planted its sapling to grow strong from the ashes of a recently war-torn 'continent', or one with its genealogy extending back to times immemorial.

In order to draw a closer picture of the discursive construction of both approaches, expanding on Hellström's (2004) exploratory study of the general EU culture discourse, I will focus mainly on speeches by leading figures of the EU meritocracy, such as Günther Verheugen, Commissioner of EU Enlargement, and Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission (1999-2004).

1.5.1 The EU as a dehistorised phenomenon

One of two ways in which the Eurocratic élite aims to construct and justify (EU)ropean unification through the use of the cultural past is by presenting it as a dehistorised endeavour, an ahistorical societal process disconnected from anything but the most recent past. The EU becomes a 'continental' state of affairs exclusively resting in the arms of the here and now. As such, the (EU)ropean project is rhetorically engineered as a truly New Europe. As José Manuel Barroso (2004, 3), current President of the CEC stated at the Berlin Conference for European Culture Politics, European Unification represents 'a process unique in history at large'. More precisely, the European past is envisaged as something that has been left behind through the process of European Unification: 'The lesson we all had to learn from the past is the same: integration is the only instrument we have to overcome the past' (Verheugen 2001, 2). As Verheugen (2001, 4) further states in a speech entitled Changing the History, Shaping the Future, '[h]istorically, the EU is quite unusual. There has never before been anything quite like it, and there is still nothing quite like it anywhere else'. The idea of a shared culture heritage (yet not identity) is straightforwardly rejected. To quote the CoE (2004) webpage, 'the history of Europe reaches far into the past, but the history of European integration is much more recent - and so cannot be encapsulated into a monolithic identity, forged by centuries of unity'. The EU is declared as having no historical predecessor or contemporary equal.
Chapter 1: The Challenges of EU Culture Heritage Management

The catalyst separating the EU from anything the 'continent' had experienced in previous centuries and millennia takes the shape of the historical period of, and between, WWI and WWII (1914-1945): 'The experience of this tragedy [...] fuelled the conviction of the founding fathers of European integration that a fresh start to European history was both necessary and possible' (Verheugen 2002, 4). All of Europe's past negative aspects, its 'dissonant heritage' (Ashworth 1997, 81), its long history of war and persecution between nations, classes, ethnic groups, 'races', and faiths (see Canning et al. 2004), become a phenomenon exclusive to the past — a past not to be remembered but to be undone and forgotten (see Dodd 2002, 191-192). To quote Verheugen (2002, 4; see also Thomas-Penette 1999, 7; Verheugen 2001; Schwimmer 2004) from the speech entitled Learn From History and Shape the Future:

Europe's history books show that over the centuries the small states became the football of the big states, and, at the end of the day, the big states became a danger for all, not least of all for themselves... War, hatred passed down from generation to generation, nations going it alone, all that belongs to the past.

The image conjured by Eurocratic rhetorics is that of a European past having neither connection to, nor relevance for, the present or future state of (EU)ropean affairs. This discursive act of letting Europe's past pass into irrelevance for the present state of affairs becomes of particular importance in the light of EU enlargement. To quote Verheugen (2002, 13) from a speech on Poland's then future role as EU member state,

Poland will [soon] have found its place in Europe, thus opening a completely new chapter in its history, a history stretching back several hundred years, a history full of threats, dangers, and disasters, including the loss of its very existence as a state. All that will be consigned once and for all to the past.

The act of becoming a member state of the EU disconnects and frees states from their historical baggage. Yet, in doing so, the Eurocratic élite projects nation-state culture identity procedures onto the EU's supra-national project. As Kabbani (2001, 1; see also Mazower 1998) points out, it is the Western nation-states that are characterised by

the tendency [...] to overlook the past as a direct influence on how we think and feel. Although there is an oppressive preoccupation with the
imperial past, children tend to be taught history as something separate from their own existence, as if to suggest they are products only of individual circumstances and immediate environment. Only the here and now counts. For many Americans and West Europeans, the present is so successful and all-engrossing that it seems to rule out any psychological need to connect with the past.

The notion of a community of identity as developed by the ahistorical use of Europe's past results in a 'dehistorised Europe (which extends in a time without memory) and a deterritorialised Community (which is located in a space with no territory)' (Abélès 2000, 35), a (EU)rope having experienced the death of its own past, reappearing cleansed through its nationalist trial of fire. The supra-national phoenix is reborn from the ashes of its fiercely nationalistic past. Yet, in doing so, the tangible remains of Europe's past lose all of their culture identity-forming potential. (EU)rope's culture identity becomes 'badly explained' (Abélès 2000, 47) at best, and 'un objet [...] non identifié' at worst, with Eurocrats once more being one step behind the needs of their own culture identity project.

As Peter Schieder (2003), President of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly, points out in a speech entitled Building One Europe given at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, '[i]t would be quite wrong [...] to blame ignorance alone for Europe's poor popularity rating. Lack of clarity, for example, is a charge that cannot be easily dismissed'. It is in the light of this failure that the second Eurocratic use of the past (i.e. its active embracement) must be read as an attempt to turn (EU)ropean culture into a well-explained project.

1.5.2 Remembering the New Europe

In order to develop the explanatory substance and density needed, the EU turns precisely towards what at first it wanted to leave behind: Europe's cultural past. According to this paradigm, the New (united) Europe takes the shape of being simply the latest development in a long, linear, and natural sequence of old (united) Europe's. European Unification becomes a cultural family reunion, with the bureaucratic meritocracy not having to create a new unity, but simply having to pronounce an edict informing EU citizens about their already unified

21 'an unidentified object' (my translation)
ancestors. To quote Erhard Busek, former Vice-Chancellor of Austria and chairman of the Institut für den Donauraum und Mitteleuropa (Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe),

"Europa hat es eigentlich zwischen 1945 und 1989 nicht gegeben... Seit 1989 ist uns die Chance zurückgegeben, Europe wieder als einen Kontinent zu begreifen und seine Vielfalt zu nutzen. Damit verändert sich die Qualität der europäischen Einigung... Europa hat noch einmal die Chance, Europa zu sein. Das verschiebt alderdings den Akzent von der Ökonomie zur Kultur, zur eigentlichen Befindlichkeit des Kontinents."

(cited in Egretaud 2004; see also Leniaud 1994, 6)

Along the same lines, the CoE (10.03.1992, 6), in an internal report by D. Ronconi on the importance of cultural tourism in the context of European Unification, states that

"Pre-European Europe, by which I mean the eventful periods of inter-relations during the history of the peoples who lived on the continent, gave rise, well before our era, to a feeling of belonging, if not to a great common nation, at least to an arena of continuing and fruitful relations.

This paradigm also found its way into EU educational publications aimed at its citizens. For example, in A Portrait of Europe, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, the CEC states that 'peoples of Europe have always been linked together by shared culture' (CEC 1993, 5; see also McCormick 2002, 29). Moreover, the Eurocratic meritocracy wrote, and continues to write, itself firmly into this Euro-vision, stating that 'before the advent of nationalism, 'European careers' were quite normal' (CEC 1993, 5). In doing so, the Eurocratic elite projects itself as eternal (EU)ropeans back into the past. It is in this Eurocratic understanding that it becomes the cultural duty of every EU citizen to rally behind Europe's renewed battle-cry for unification, called to them by all the united Europeans that had preceded them 'since prehistory' (CoE 10.03.1992, 6). Put more poignantly by Verheugen (2002, 5), a non-united Europe 'is quite unimaginable' in that there exists a 'clear historical [...] foundation that no democrat can call into question'. The main characteristic

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22 'Europe, in fact, did not exist between 1945 and 1989... Since 1989 we were given back the chance to understand Europe as one continent again and to make use of its diversity. This way the quality of European Unification changes... Europe has once again the chance to be Europe. However, this redirects the emphasis from the economy to culture that is the actual essence of the continent.' (my translation)
of this past becomes that it is 'purified' of those darker aspects and periods of the 'continent's' history that cannot easily be made to fit present-day rhetorics of unity. In particular, this supra-national (selective) amnesia of the past includes the many continental wars, such as the World Wars, the Napoleonic Wars, or the Hundred Years War, to name but a few of Europe's endless list of armed conflict. It is in this context that Prodi (2003, 5; see also Beetham and Lord 1998, 36), in a speech entitled Cultural Diversity and Shared Values, declared the World Wars to actually represent 'civil wars' stemming from the self-centred protection of 'misjudged interests' (CEC 1973, 119), such as the defence of primordial attachments (e.g. identities, heritages, cultures, and languages) (see Wieviorka 1994, 23; Riotta 2000), instead of true differences, rivalries, and animosities between the European nation-states (see Pantel 1999, 49). Instead, Europe's cultural past is imagined along the lines of Braudel's concept of la longue durée (Braudel 1972; see also Butlin 1993; Dunford 1998), 'in slow motion, revealing permanent values that can be set against a relatively unchanging physical environment' (Graham 1998b, 29; see, for example, Le Goff 2003). (EU)rope's past becomes a continuous state of affairs observable throughout the 'continent's past'. As such, (EU)ropean culture identity construction becomes an issue of uncovering historical roots that have always existed and that have simply been forgotten. To quote Verheugen (2001, 5-6; see also CoE 10.03.1992, 7) once more, 'Europe has always been about diverse peoples with varied cultures, religions, and languages learning to live together because they share a common destiny. In discovering and respecting each other's diversity, we also uncover shared values'. This brings us to the question of the rhetoric character, the ideological thrust, of this culture heritage paradigm of the remembered (EU)rope.

1.5.3 'In varietate concordia': The EU's understanding of culture

In order to bridge the paradigmatic gap between the notion of identity as organic and fluid entities on the one hand and traditional inward-looking models of national identity on the other, the EU put forward the rhetorical device of Unity-in-diversity (Latin: In varietate concordia) (see McDonald 1996; Pantel 1999; Hellström 2004; Toggenburg 2004). Selected from 2.000 proposals for a slogan submitted by 80.000 school children in the EU member states, Nicole Fontaine, President of the European Parliament, officially selected the motto on 4 May 2000 (Toggenburg 2004, 1; see Morin 1991 for an early account on the EU's dialogic nature). In 2004, the EU's supra-national culture motto
found its way into the latest treaty for the establishment of a EU constitution (EC 2003, 4; EU 2004b, 5). 23

Firstly, it is important to note that by no means does the EU represent the first governmental body to employ this motto. Various nation-states, such as South Africa and Indonesia, in their search for a national culture identity, have preceded the EU in doing so. 24 As such, it can be observed that Unity-in-diversity by no means represents a new supra-national phenomenon of culture heritage appreciation. Nevertheless, Eurocratic rhetorics claim this device to create and communicate a coherent entity rooted in notions of shared culture heritage and values, while at the same time recognising its internal differences. To quote Prodi (2003, 2; see also CoE 16.06.1994, 3-4) from his speech Cultural Diversity and Shared Values, ‘[t]his is a key concept for us, because diversity is a fact of life in Europe and goes to the heart of the European Union—a Union “united in diversity” as our motto puts it’. As mentioned above, further highlighting the EU’s (at least rhetoric) commitment to values of openness, multiplicity, and diversity, Eurocratic beliefs proved strong enough to declare in the Treaty of Maastricht the EU’s cultural role to be to contribute ‘to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and, at the same time, bringing the common heritage to the fore’ (CEC 1992, article 128:125). In the best Saidian sense, Europe’s past is perceived as holding the power to see Others ‘not as ontologically given but as historically constituted’ (Said 1989, 225). It is in this context of diversity that Prodi (2003, 2) further observes the (EU)rope’s ‘quasi-constitutional obligation to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’ (Prodi 2003, 2), and, as he firmly accentuated in a speech entitled Monotheistic Religions and the Futures of Peoples given at the Interfaith Meeting in Brussels in 2001, to be ‘open to all traditions and religions’ (Prodi 2001). To better explain this rhetorical device, the Eurocratic élite employs in particular the notion of a European cultural family: ‘[W]e all know that the smaller the differences, the more heated the dialogue may become. Every family knows that!’ (Prodi 2003, 2; see also CoE

23 In Article IV-1 of the draft for a European constitution from 18 July 2003, the rhetoric device of Unity-in-diversity was changed into United-in-diversity (European Convention 2003, 222).

24 The preamble of the South African constitution, adopted in 27 April 2000, contains the motto Unity-in-Diversity (Ike: /xarra //ke) in /Xam, an extinct Khoisan language, while the Indonesian coat of arms includes this old Javanese motto (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) since 1945 and is also part of the country’s constitution. Even more interesting to note is that the Unity-in-Diversity is also similar to e pluribus unum (Latin for ‘culture out of many, one’), one of the official mottos of the United States of America (Toggenburg 2004, 5; Wikipedia.org 2005a).

25 In the revision of the treaty in 1997 this clause became article 151.
16.06.1994, 3). Doing so, EU governmental bodies regard it to be possible to generate 'sentiments of solidarity similar to those felt by members of a family who remain united not out of material necessity but out of choice, out of a desire to remain a family' (Barnard 1983, 242, original emphasis).

Amongst academic circles, the EU's need to negotiate difference and otherness in the face of diversity is generally claimed to offer the possibility for the deconstruction of essentialist notions of ethnic and racial purity (Hall 1992, 306; Asad 1993, chapter 7; Turner 1993; Habermas 1994, 21; Brah 1996, 178-179; Pantel 1999; D. J. Bell 2001; Olsen 2001, 54; Toggenburg 2004). In particular, it has been seen as a development leaving behind a state of modernity characterised by 'barbaric nationalism' (Giddens 2000, 160-161; see also Habermas 2001, 203). Particularly archaeologist and heritage managers have become interested in the search for, and presentation of, Europe's united past (e.g. Leniaud 1994; Ashworth 1997; Werbner 1997; Jacobs and Maier 1998; Werbart 2001; Carman 2003). As such, scholars began to edit European history, a European history with a new emphasis on the past's New Europes. To employ a concrete example, O'Brian (1994; see also Longworth 1994; Reinhold 1997), in an article published in the journal European Heritage and entitled The Bronze Age – the first Golden Age of Europe, states that 'all the vital elements of modern [European] material culture are immediately rooted in the Bronze Age' (O'Brian 1994, 6). He further states, '[t]he story of the Bronze Age is one of great regional diversity in the face of rapid social change and technological progress' (O'Brian 1994, 7). Such statements about Europe's past mirror Eurocratic rhetorics on the EU's socio-political present: '[T]he great, centralised structures which typify European states are rapidly changing' (Muller 1995, 6; see also CoE 07.04.1995, 7). Two societies, separated by a yawning gulf of 4000 years, are constructed, if not being the same, as representing the logical and inevitable basis, as well as result, of each other (see also Díaz-Andreu 1996). As much as the Bronze Age is presented as one of the major predecessors of a united (EU)rope, it is the Eurocratic ethos of a united Europe that becomes the ideological basis for archaeological interpretations of the Bronze Age. Past and present become intermingled, turning both into a cultural hybrid Same. In a similar fashion, Brague (1993) and Sloterdijk (1994) identified the (EU)ropean spirit in the Roman period. Other scholars even considered Europe's material past to represent a source par excellence for the study of Otherness as such (Trotzig 1994, 3; Beetham and Lord 1998, 39-40). This trend also led to the
formation of supra-national archaeological institutions, such as the European Association of Archaeologists (henceforth EAA) (in this context, see Kristiansen 1992). In its declaration of intend, the EAA states its paramount aim to be ‘to promote the management and interpretation of the European archaeological heritage’ (EAA 2004). In other cases, this (EU)ropeanisation of the profession led to the establishment of professional fora devoted to Europe’s unified past, such as the European Journal of Archaeology (henceforth EJA)\textsuperscript{26}, stating its role to be

\textit{to promote open debate amongst archaeologists committed to the new idea of Europe in which there is more communication across national frontiers and more interest in interpretation. The journal [...] encourages debate about the role archaeology plays in society, how it should be organized in a changing Europe, and the ethics of archaeological practice.}

(EJA 2004)

To return to the rhetoric device of Unity-in-diversity, as highlighted by Pantel (1999, 46-47) and Toggenburg (2004; see also Johler 2003, 7, 8; Dobson 2004, 7-8), it appears to represent an eminently suitable tool to achieve greater homogeneity among the actors involved in the process of supra-national identity construction. To quote Hellström (2004, 3), it successfully aims at ‘the potential clash between the endeavours to establish a coherent political/cultural/social entity (unity), and also permits differing internal identity constellations (diversity)’. Yet, as rightfully pointed out by Hellström (2003a, 196; 2004, 11), the conceptual heart lying at the troublesome centre of the rhetoric device of Unity-in-diversity is that it ‘does not help us to answer the crucial question of what is meant by [European] ‘culture’’. To answer this question it is necessary to turn towards concrete EU identity-forming projects based on the cultural past. Europeanisation represents the Eurocratic reordering and reinvention of ‘territoriality and peoplehood’ (Borneman and Fowler 1997, 487). Yet, what concrete character does, as stated by the EU (2005, 1) in its newsletter, the ‘Europeanisation of Europe’ take via the medium of the past?

\textsuperscript{26} From 1993 to 1997 it was published as the Journal of European Archaeology (volumes 1-5).
1.6 SCOPE AND AIM OF THE PRESENT STUDY

This thesis roots in an understanding of the material evidence of the past as having no intrinsic value itself, but as being the constantly changing product of current circumstances. It acquires value through social, political, and economic processes, disciplinary practices, as well as through the construction, maintenance, and reproduction of (supra)national identities (see Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Martin (1995, 13; see also Gillis 1994) offers a concise summary of this relationship:

To put it in a nutshell, the identity narrative channels political emotions so that they can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power; it transforms the perceptions of the past and of the present; it changes the organization of human groups and creates new ones; it alters cultures by emphasizing certain traits and skewing their meaning and logic. The identity narrative brings forth a new interpretation of the world in order to modify it.

As such, the access to, generation, and mediation of culture capital is by no means evenly distributed throughout society, but rests in the hands of cultural 'taste leaders' (Ashworth and Howard 1999, 62). These are themselves determined in character by the academic capital (archaeological/historical data, information, and knowledge) within the field of archaeological/historical production and reproduction, which forms the raw material for the operation of heritage and culture industries (Hamilakis 1999, 67; 69-70; in this context, see Zerubavel 1995; Zapatero 1996). As Sahlins (1985, 155; also Thomas 1990a, 18; cf. Hindess and Hirst 1975, 312) poignantly summarises, 'culture is precisely the organisation of the current situation in terms of the past'. Accordingly, the cultural past is selectively and continually remembered, appropriated, fortified, invented, contested, marginalised, or forgotten (Jones and Graves-Brown 1996, 6; see, for example, contributions to Brown and Hamilakis 2003a). As such, what this thesis does not attempt to do is to ask questions such as 'do we have a common archaeological heritage in Europe?' (Werbart 2001, 57). Nor does it attempt to give an answer to this question. Instead, it puts into contrast the EU's rhetoric dedication to cultural diversity with the character of concrete EU culture heritage projects. Doing so, the Eurocratic notion of what Halbwachs (1987) terms 'collective memory' – 'the selective recollection of past events which are thought to be important for the members of a specific community' (de Cillia et al. 1999, 154) – allows the identification of connections between
theoretical discourses on supra-national identity and the symbols and myths of day-to-day life (see de Cillia et al. 1999, 154-155).

Notions of culture identity, representing an important aspect of EU governance, continue to represent an under-researched field of scholarly enquiry (Gaffney 1999, 208; van der Veen 2002, 2). To quote Bellier (1997, 74),

[le]ss spécialistes des cultures d'ici et d'ailleurs se sont mis à interroger le sens de la construction communautaire, à analyser les relations entre institutions européennes, les cultures, langues et identités nationales, à observer les effets des politiques [...] sur la perception des frontiers.27

While the growing amount of energy channelled by EU bodies into identity-forming projects attracted a growing degree of scholarly attention, mainly taking the shape of largely theoretical social science and political studies (e.g. Giordano 1987; Martin 1993; Hedetoft 1994; Preuß 1995; 1998; Landau and Whitman 1997; Warleigh 1998; Koslowski 1999), it was Tarrow (1994), Borneman and Fowler (1997), and Parman (1998) in particular, who realised the need for an intensification of practical involvement for anthropology and other humanities. This has become the more necessary in that much scholarly work conducted on the EU’s supra-national model of culture is suffering from ‘the touch of ‘official line’ of discourse’ (Heintz 2001, 42). In this context, however, it becomes important to highlight the few, albeit limited in scope, studies conducted on the subject by archaeologists and heritage managers to this point (e.g. Slapšak 1993; Holmes 2000; Wolfram 2001; see also Friedman 1993; Johler 2002). In particular, it is necessary to abandon the growing number of analysis of metaphors in the EU official discourse (e.g. Shore 1996; 1997; McDonald 1996; Hansen and Williams 1999; Hellström 2003a; 2004), and, instead, embark on an analysis of the actual ‘substance’ of the cultural past as generated and mediated by the Eurocratic élite (in this context, see Howard 2003). The lack of such studies is the more surprising in that, in representing the dominant caretaker of Western society’s past, archaeologists should be particularly interested in critically approaching a subject that will undoubtedly shape, if not determine, the future of their profession in Europe. Further, as pointed out by Holmes (2000, 111), any inquiry into the Eurocratic notion of cultural belonging

27 'The cultural specialists here and elsewhere have failed to question the sense of community construction, to analyse the relations between European institutions, cultures, languages and national identities, and to observe the effects of politics [...] on the perception of frontiers.' (my translation)
intersects with virtually every theoretical problem pursued by anthropologists working across the EU, ranging from the political and economic to the social.

Here it is necessary to insert an important theoretical note on identity. Shotter (1993, 188) wrote that ‘identity has become the watchword of the times’. And indeed, without specifying what is meant by the term, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to handle it in the context of this thesis. To paraphrase Jacobs and Maier (1998, 16-17), in any proper sense the paradigm of identity can only be identified within the individual. Ultimately there exists only individual identity. Individuals, however, do not live in isolation, they organise themselves in groups and communities at various different levels, and these associations consequently have impact on individual identities. As such, identity is influenced and co-determined by other, non-individual, forms of association. As Balibar and Wallerstein (1991, 94) clarifies,

\[\text{[i]t is not a question of setting a collective identity against individual identities. All identity is individual, but there is no individual identity that is not historically or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behaviour, and collective symbols.}\]

Put differently, the individual social actor holds the power to redefine him/herself. Yet, this individual identification will always take place within extra-individual categorisations imposed by various other social actors on numerous levels (Jacobs and Maier 1998, 17). It is against this understanding of social identity that it becomes irrelevant whether we adopt universalistic conceptions of identity (e.g. Habermas 1976; 1994), sociological theories of identity (e.g. Giddens 1984; 1991), or socio-psychological paradigms (e.g. Tajfel 1981), for they all share some common traits (Jacobs and Maier 1998, 16-17). All of them regard identity to be dynamic and prone to constant change. Also, identity is envisaged ‘as a more or less integrated symbolic structure with time dimensions (past, present, future), and which provides important competencies to individuals such as assuring continuity and consistency’ (Jacob and Maier 1998, 15). It is in this context that, from the nineteenth century onwards, European nation-states presented themselves as entities characterised by a culture identity of their own, one substantially different from those of their neighbouring countries (Jacob and Maier 1998, 16). As such, the nation-state generated, and continues to do so, a new type of community based on the notion of collective identity. The term ‘imagined communities’ coined by
Anderson (1983) highlights especially well this characteristic of the nation-state. The same mechanism must be assumed to apply for 'all other communities that are larger than face-to-face groups' (de Cillia et al. 1999, 154), including supra-national state forms of governance such as the EU. To quote de Cillia et al. (1999, 153), the idea of any political community, may it be national or supra-national, 'becomes reality in the realm of convictions and beliefs through reifying figurative discourses continually launched by politicians, intellectuals and media people, and disseminated through the systems of education, schooling, mass communication'. As Billig (1995; see also Paasi 1999; Moser 2001, 280; Lister and Wells 2001; Tusa 2004) demonstrates in his book Banal Nationalism, the characteristics of such feelings of belonging take place to a large degree within the symbolic sphere, sustained by non-academic modes of representation, the mundane world and everyday practices. It is these common sense assumptions of everyday life that, through ideology, sustain hegemonic structures (see Fairclough 2001, 232). To explain, scholarly research into issues of identity-generation has been suffering from a 'fundamentalisation' of the very concept. Traditionally, the notion of nationalism has primarily been used for the more 'exotic, rare, and often violent' (Billig 1995, 43) manifestations of identity, such as Celtic fringe (see chapter 1.3), Basque, Arab, Catalanian, or Quebecquois nationalisms (Trevor-Roper 1983; Breton 1988; Keating 1996; see also contributions to Meskell 1998; Coakley 1992). For example, in The Nation State and Violence, Giddens (1985, 215) himself states that nationalist emotions 'are not so much a part of regular day-to-day life [but, instead,] tend to be fairly remote from most of the activities of day-to-day social life'. Lived national - or, by implication, supra-national - identity becomes imagined as being bound in its existence to a kind of psychological crisis situation, fuelled by 'hot' nationalist passion (Billig 1995, 44). It is in opposition to this understanding that Billig's notion of banal nationalism refocused the analytical gaze towards the day-to-day, naturalised practices of identity (de)construction and maintenance. Such banal modes of representation, however, should not be confused with being benign or irrelevant in that they seem 'to possess a reassuring normality' (Billig 1995, 7). In fact, it is precisely their perceived normality that turns them into powerful measures of influencing notions of identity. Lastly, this thesis also roots in the basic assumption that the discursive construction of identity - in this case that of supra-national identity - is bound to go hand-in-hand with the construction of difference and

*since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat; one is a Gush Emmunim settler in the West Bank to the extent that one is not a secular Zionist.*

Doing so, this thesis rejects 'the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness' (Benhabib 1996, 4). It is against this understanding that supra-national identities are also regarded to be dynamic and often incoherent, instead assuming that there exist certain relations between the projections of identity offered by political élites and day-to-day discourses about supra-national identities (see de Cillia et al. 1999, 154).

The aim of this thesis as a critical study, then, in going beyond simplifying analysis of rhetoric metaphors in the EU official discourse, is the in-depth descriptive analysis of the character of the EU’s supra-national culture identity project as expressed through culture heritage. It will present theoretical considerations, followed by an explanation of the methodology employed for the study (chapter 2). Chapter 3 will then explore the planning stage of EU culture heritage generation employing the case study of the CoE’s European Cultural Routes Project (henceforth ECRP) and, more specifically, its ‘The Celts’ Cultural Route28 (henceforth TCCR). Chapter 4 then, focusing on the implementation of the EU’s message of culture heritage on the ground, turns towards the CoE’s ‘Santiago de Compostela Pilgrimage Routes’ (henceforth SCPR) project for a case study. This will be followed by a case study illuminating the EU’s creation of supra-national heritage on the symbolic level, taking the shape of the Euro banknotes iconography (chapter 5). Reflecting on the case studies, chapter 6 will then critically characterise the EU’s culture heritage project at the planning and implementation level in relation to general Eurocratic rhetorics, as well as show, by formulating a set of concrete guidelines, how a common standard in culture heritage management (henceforth CHM) can be reconciled with notions of equality, diversity, and inclusivity. Doing so, this thesis addresses the issue of the negotiation of

28 These are also known as the European Celtic Cultural Routes.
identity (i.e. difference), that is 'the political problem facing democracies on a global scale' (Benhabib 1996, 4).
CHAPTER TWO
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 POST-PROCESSUALISM AND THE SOCIO-POLITICS OF THE PAST

Chapter 1 already told us of the paradigm of 'Europe' as being dependent in its meaning on the social, political, and economic environment at the time of its formulation, thus resulting in numerous definitions of what is Europe. How would one approach an assessment of such a construction of Europe in the context of the EU and its use of the cultural past in pursuit of a common culture identity shared by its member state citizens? Having highlighted in the previous chapter how this thesis roots in an understanding of the material evidence of the past as having no intrinsic value itself, but as being the constantly changing product of current social, political, and even economical circumstances, this chapter demonstrates how archaeologists and heritage managers have become more conscious of the socio-political entanglements of the past and, thus, their analysis. This awareness takes the shape of post-processual archaeology¹. Going on from this, by employing critical realism, this chapter develops an ontological (questions about what exists) and epistemological (questions about what can be known) position making it possible to assess the socio-political character and consequences of knowledge of the past. Further, it provides an analytical methodology, taking the shape of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA), allowing the Eurocratic use of the cultural past in the context of European identity generation to become subject of critical analysis.

2.1.1 Intra- and extra-disciplinary context

Also referred to in the discipline as 'critical' or 'interpretive archaeology', post-processualism arose out of an Anglo-American rejection of processualism's understanding of the archaeologist as an impartial, objective, fact-driven, and value-free observer and scientist (Shanks and Tilley 1989a, 2; Johnson 2001, 98). As such, post-processualism set out to challenge 'the authority of a scientific and professional knowledge of the past' (Shanks and Hodder 1995a, 5). It was in particular the Zeitgeist of the late 1970s to early 1990s that lead to more and

¹ It should be pointed out that the singular term post-processual archaeology is misleading in that it suggests a closely defined post-processual body of theory and practice. Even though I am employing the term throughout this thesis for reasons of simplicity, I am fully aware that the term post-processual archaeologies might represent a more appropriate term in that it indicates the post-processual emphasis on multiplicity and diversity (Johnson 2001, 101-102).
more self-reflexive/self-critical voices to be heard among archaeologists. This period, in particular in England, was characterised by social transmutations, the forging of new social and political alliances, and the dissolution of old ones, such as in the case of university reforms (Patterson 1989, 559-560). Far from taking root in socio-political neutral soil, post-processualism must be understood as a reaction to a number of political issues regarded to dominate processual positivism (see Baker et al. 1990, 1 for a characterisation of post-processualism as a Salon des Refusés). Regarding themselves to be politically progressive by struggling against their 'establishment' colleagues (Trigger 1995, 263-264), post-processualism represents an essentially left-wing movement aimed at challenging predominant social and political norms and structures (Young 1990; Smith 1994, 303; Carman 1995, 99; Berglund 2000, 11; see Smith 1996, 73 for a critique of this position). In particular, archaeologists were concerned that the growing heritage industry in the UK was offering a 'rose-tinted version of the past' (Champion 1991, 141), serving purely politically conservative objectives via CHM (Leone et al. 1987, 284). This political role was regarded to lie especially in supporting Thatcherite conservative and reactionary uses of the past - a nostalgic wish for a never-existent past providing confidence for a Britain in economic and political decline (Wright 1985; Hewison 1987; Smith 1994, 305). Thus, concerns about the 'abuse' of the past firmly wrote the profession's interrelationship with politics onto the post-processual agenda (Leone 1981a; Gero et al. 1983; Leone et al. 1987; Rowlett 1987; Champion 1991; Wylie 1993; Brown and Hamilakis 2003b; see Vinsrygg 1988 for a discussion on the importance of the 'human factor' for archaeology).

2.1.2 Post-processual ontology

Contra objectivists who insist that the subtraction of our subjectivity from our observations leaves us with an ultimate reality cleansed of subjective experience, and drawing upon established debates within the wider human sciences (e.g. Foucault 1972; Hempel 1974; Jones 1976; Cohn 1980; 1981; Bailey 1985; Clark 1985; Nora 1985; Clifford 1986; Bennett 1987; Medick 1987; Davis 1989; Outhwaite 1991; Smith and Godlewska 1994), post-processual theory takes as its ontological starting point the rejection of the 'myth of objectivity' (Wylie 1989, 93; Shanks and Hodder 1995a; see also Johnson 2001, 98-99 for the notion
of 'the problem of equifinality'). To go into more detail, Johnson (2001, 102-108) identifies eight key tenets of the post-processual 'manifesto': the rejection of a positivist view of science, the emphasis of interpretation as hermeneutical, the rejection of the dichotomy between material and ideal, the importance of thoughts and values in the past, the accentuation of the individual as an active agent, the context-dependency of material culture, and, of particular importance in the context of this thesis, the understanding of interpreting the past as a socio-political act in the present, as well as the treatment of material culture as text. To quote Trigger (1989a, 106; see Murphy 1932, 205 for an early account on the context-dependency of scientists in general),

people, and not inanimate machines, write and create the past. Archaeology is a process, a system of social relationships in the present within which the production of meanings takes place. An essential part of the process of investigating the past is that the data are constantly re-articulated in relation to each other. The selfsame materials are repeatedly placed in different analytical contexts and associations and put to different uses; new meanings are discovered as the relationships between them are reshuffled.

Against this conviction, the past lost its status as something irrevocable, 'eine in Stein gemeißelte Schrift' (Wallerstein 1990, 97), turning - at the very best - into 'eine in Lehm gezeichnete Inschrift' (Wallerstein 1990, 97) that is the result of provisional negotiations and solicitations (Friedman 1992a; Baucom 1999, 5; Olivier 2001, 187). Clifford’s introduction to Writing Culture (1986) must be considered a key text here. Interpreting the past is always a political act, '[i]t is always a question of saying more than there actually is' (Hodder 1984, 25). Knowledge claims of the cultural past came to be regarded as formulated and accepted not because they are based on facts (i.e. truth), but because they serve the social, political, and economic interests of stakeholders and interest groups responsible for their generation and mediation (Wobst and Keene 1983; Wylie 1983). To quote Johnson (2001, 107), '[t]he meanings we produce are always in the political present, and always have political resonance'. It is here that the links between post-processual archaeology and the archaeology of gender, both closely related to each other and to feminist

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2 In fact, the origins of this paradigm can be traced back to German Romantic idealism (Rowlands 1998, 37; Thomas 2004, 27-34).
3 'a text carved in stone' (my translation)
4 'a text pressed into clay' (my translation)
thought in the human sciences, must be mentioned. Developing in the early 1980s, gender archaeology aims at illuminating the constructions of gender in the past, critiquing existing structures of practice in archaeology, correcting male bias in archaeology, tackling what is seen as the male-biased nature of scholarly knowledge, and reassessing the history of archaeology (see, for example, Gero 1988; 1991; Spector 1993; Johnson 2001, 116-131). This includes feminist archaeology and its questioning of ‘existing archaeological practice at a very basic level’ (Johnson 2001, 129).

To illustrate this contextual understanding of knowledge of the past, let’s have a closer look at the Battle of Hastings fought in 1066 AD, one of the most commonly known ‘facts’ about the English past. Historical sources tell us when and where it was fought, as well as by whom. Yet, are facts not simply less complicated statements of opinion (Dymond 1974, 68)? In fact, the statement of ‘Battle of Hastings (1066 AD)’ contains at least two misstatements of fact and one expression of religious prejudice already (Dymond 1974, 68-69). Firstly, unlike the name of the famous battle suggests, it seems to have been fought not at Hastings but at Senlac, about seven miles away. Secondly, it seems more likely these days that Christ was not born in the 31st year of the reign of Augustus. And, thus, thirdly, we can observe the imposition of religious prejudice in the imposition of a Christian chronology on a largely non-Christian world. Closely related to this, any present understanding of the past is prone to ‘primal baptism’ (Žižek 1989, 90). To employ a somewhat simplified example in order to explain this concept, the Early Medieval period in England is often referred to as the ‘Dark Ages’ (e.g. Carver 1987, chapter 3; Hodges 1982; S. Evans 1997; see Žižek 1989, 90-91 for a discussion of the term ‘gold’ in this context). The term is linked to a period that is itself linked to a cluster of descriptive features through primal baptism. This link holds even if the original identifying description proves false. To clarify, archaeological research over the last decades has cast considerable doubt on portraying the Early Middle Ages as ‘dark’ (i.e. missing the ‘light of civilisationary development’). Instead of the term ‘Dark Ages’, scholars nowadays prefer the term ‘early historic’ or ‘early medieval’ in that it is perceived as less misleading (Carver 1999, 13; Lowe 1999, 7; Hamerow 2002, 2-3):

*It is not easy to find a convenient name for the period AD 550-850. In the past it has commonly been regarded as the central centuries of a period known as the ‘Dark Ages’. This is unsatisfactory, however,*
because it is normally misunderstood. It was originally coined with regard to the loss of the 'Eternal Light of Rome', in the sense both of the Roman Empire and the Christian Religion, as a result of the barbarian invasions. It has, however, come to be understood as meaning that the period is obscure to us, because it is not illuminated by copious written evidence. This is, however, a gross misconception.

(Alcock 2003, 5)

Yet, independent of this paradigmatic change, the term 'Dark Ages' continues to refer to the same chronological period as before - i.e. most archaeologists now say that the so-called Dark Ages do not possess the properties hitherto ascribed to them, not that the period that they have until now taken for a distinct period is not really a distinct period at all. The same applies to the counterfactual situation: there might have been a period in the history of humanity that has all the identification features commonly attributed to the Dark Ages. We would say that even though this period has all the appearances initially used to identify the Dark Ages, it still is not the Dark Ages (see Kripke cited in Žižek 1989, 91). The reason for this lies in the period in question not being bound to the term 'Dark Ages' through a causal chain reaching back to the act of 'primal baptism' that established the reference parameters of 'Dark Ages'.

With material culture being considered inevitably - and in any socio-political context - charged with power relations, acting as a medium of reference, restriction, and communication for and of socio-political practice, thus making it an important part of the social construction of reality, post-processualism did for archaeology's understanding of the cultural past what Einstein's (1992; see Fine 1986; Kaku 2005) Theory of Relativity - by re-imagining the concept of gravity not as a substantial force which 'bends' space, but as the name for the curvature of space itself - did for our understanding of gravity. It was 'desubstantialized' (Žižek 2005, 209). Also, it adopted the issue of incompleteness, a problem highlighted by Heisenberg's (1929; see Griffiths 2004) Principle of Tolerance⁵ (Tilley 1991, 338; see also Lee 1992, 35), dealing with the problem that knowledge of some things precludes certainty of other things. To employ an archaeological example, knowledge of the processes and

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⁵ Heisenberg's theory is better known as the Principle of Uncertainty. With 'uncertainty' being a positivist expression, which is the opposite of the theoretical stance adopted by Heisenberg in his principle, Principle of Tolerance represents the more appropriate term.
mechanics of destruction or decay in the archaeological record precludes certainty about what has been destroyed/decayed (see Kristiansen 1985; Patrik 1985; Schiffer 1987; Binford 1981). In short, with 'facts' about the cultural past being situated, contingent, complex and partial by nature, and dependent upon the producer's cultural environment, the accurate reconstruction of the past as it was became impossible (Adams and Brooke 1995, 94; cf. Guba and Lincoln 1989). Placing emphasis on the development of narratives of the past instead of authoritative models, post-processualism desubstantialised and 'emotionalised' the act of archaeology (Hodder 1992, 155-156; see Shanks and Tilley 1987a, 19; Tilley 1989b; 1990a; 1991; Thomas 1990b).

On the basis of the above paradigm, post-processualism offers the ontological tools to allow the archaeological discipline itself, as well as any other knowledge-producer and knowledge-mediator of the cultural past (including the EU), to become the focus of critical analysis (e.g. Leone 1981a; Leone et al. 1987; Hodder 1986; Shanks and Tilley 1987a; 1989a; Wylie 1989; 1992; Shanks 1992; Shanks and Hodder 1995a; 1995b). Providing archaeology and CHM with an important part to play in the politics of culture identity (Smith 1994, 304; in this context see, for example, Silberman 1982; 1997; Abu El-Haj 1998; 2001; Hamilakis 1999), it is this framework that determines post-processualism's aims and objectives.

2.1.3 Post-processual aims and objectives

Grounded in the above ontological framework, post-processual archaeology's main objective became the exploration of meta-theory. Widely paraphrasing Patterson (1990, 555-556; see also Champion 1991; Hodder 1991a; 1992; Preucel 1991; Trigger 1991a; 1991b), meta-theory, at least in Anglo-American debates, can be divided into three dominant strands. Even though conceptually distinct, they are closely related to each other, showing areas of overlap rooted in an ongoing dialogue over contested theoretical terrain. The works of Leone (1982; 1986; Leone and Potter 1992; Leone and Preucel 1992; Leone et al. 1995) and Wylie (1985; 1987) represent a first strand. This is characterised by the use of critical theorists, such as Althusser (1971) and Habermas (1970), as well as the 'strong school' of sociologists of science (Bloor 1976; Barnes 1977; 1981; Barnes and Bloor 1982; Hanen and Kelley 1983). Employing Habermas' (1980; 1984; 1989) concept of Ideal Speech Situation, archaeology - or, indeed, any knowledge of the past - is perceived as ideology in the present, revealing the historical
specificity of knowledge claims and rationality (Smith 1996, 68). ‘Truth’ becomes a title of respectability attached to the dominant disciplinary belief system put and kept in place through the political power of those who back it (Blakey 1983; Wobst and Keene 1983; Wylie 1983, 125-126). Ontology is reduced directly to social realities. Of particular interest becomes the relation between theory and archaeological practice (Shanks and Tilley 1987a, chapter 1; 1989a). The second, closely related strand revolves around the radical post-structuralist works of Shanks and Tilley and their colleagues. Grounded, in particular, in the writings of Michael Foucault as well as Karl Marx, they focus on ‘politicising’ archaeology, arguing for archaeologists’ professional need and responsibility for political awareness and action (e.g. Miller 1980; Kohl 1981, Miller and Tilley 1984; Rowlands 1986; Shanks and Tilley 1987a, chapter 7; 1987b; 1987c; 1989a; 1989b; Tilley 1989a; 1991; Bapty and Yates 1990a; 1990b; Shanks 1992; see Mulk and Bayliss-Smith 1999 for a recent critique) and the development of a progressive archaeology. Thirdly, there is Hodder’s emphasis on the social context of theory as being rooted in the post-modern metaphor of ‘text’ (Hodder 1986; 1988; 1989a; 1989b; 1989c; 1991b; 1992; see also Johnson and Olsen 1992; see below). Doing so, post-processualism puts an end to theory perceived as something separate from the actual practice of archaeology, instead making its main aim to ‘develop a theory of and in practice’ (Shanks and Tilley 1989a, 2).

Common to all three strands is an emphasis on hermeneutics (the process of interpretation itself). This emphasis makes it possible to become the critical observer of a particular interpretive field, critically assessing, challenging, and, when necessary, undermining interpretative practices that appear inadequate or unhelpful. It is in this context that professional interest in marginalised voices came to be regarded as representing a particularly good starting point in developing a critical assessment of the discipline’s subjectivity (Miller 1980; Baker 1990; see Bender 1989; Nordbladh 1990 for a critique of this position). For example, in the USA it was, in particular, the attempt to negotiate conflicts over the interpretation of Colonial Williamsburg and eighteenth/nineteenth century Annapolis that aimed to challenge normative perceptions and assumptions through exploring multiple voices in the archaeological record (Leone 1984; Wylie 1985; Potter 1994; Handler and Gable 1997; see also Leone et al. 1995; Orser and Fagan 1995, 240-241). It is within the same paradigm, often focusing on the reclaiming and reburial of Indigenous human remains (in particular in the US and Australia), that the question of control of the cultural past by
community groups was firmly written on the agenda (Smith 2007, 5). Diversity and multiplicity became pillars of the post-processual agenda, allowing, as Geuss (1981, 2; see also Leone et al. 1987, 284) comments on critical theory in general, 'emancipation from coercion, including coercion that is self-imposed'. In particular, post-processualism provided approaches to notions of culture identity as organic and multiple entities whether or not these are acknowledged by official state ideologies themselves (e.g. Jones 1997a, 8; 1997b; Ruppel et al. 2003, 324; see also Østergård 1992; Osborne 2002, 311). Also, post-processual writers explicitly acknowledge our understanding of identity as being further complicated by the nascence of supra-national entities, such as in the case of the EU (e.g. Brands 1987; Shore 1993; 1996; Janik and Zawadzka 1996; Jones 1997a, 8; Veit 2002, 409).

It is in the above context of challenging a particular interpretive field that post-processualism acquires its value for the critical exploration of EU practices of culture heritage generation and mediation. However, does it also provide the epistemological tools needed?

2.1.4 Post-processual epistemology

Characterised by an anarchistic philosophy of science rejecting all appeals to factualness, rationale, scientific proof, and reason to be observed within Western academic circles, post-processual theory incorporates much of the post-modern debate on knowledge and truth (see Weber 1949; 1972a; Feyerabend 1975; 1978; 1987; Derrida 1978; Norris 1982; 1992; 1995; Lyotard 1979; Lawson 1985, 116; Harré and Krausz 1996). With every decoding of a message (including archaeological data) representing simply another step of encoding, archaeological/scientific objectivity becomes a utopian dream filled with nothing but subjective 'sense-data' (Russell 2001, 4; see also Auel 1991). Whether derived from Saussure (1959), Bernstein (1976), Foucault (1982; 1994), Rorty (1979; 1982), or Lyotard (1979), post-processual 'truth' of the socio-political (not truth in general) takes on a linguistic character, 'a kind of universalized aestheticization whereby 'truth' itself is finally reduced to one of the style effects of the discursive articulation' (Žižek 1989, 153; see Habermas 1987). It is in this context that, for example, science and academia become

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6 Notions of linguistic relativity can be traced to Kant's divide between analytical and synthetic truth, Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and Aristotle's notion of things having essence but only linguistic forms having meaning (Quine 1980, 20, 22).
merely labels attached to one currently prestigious, state-supported ‘language-game, phrase regime’ (Norris 1992, 50; see also Norris 1992, 16; 1995, 118; Fairclough 1995a; Hodder 1998, 124). However, it must be highlighted here that not all archaeological approaches situated within the post-processual tradition share this focus on text. For example, some scholars turned instead to phenomenology, the study of conscious human experience in day-to-day life as developed by philosophers like Heidegger and Husserl (Johnson 2001, 114). Instead of understanding material culture as text, scholars such as Thomas (1996) and Tilley (1994) focus on the physical experience of the past through the body. While not providing a helpful concept in the context of this thesis, their contribution to post-processual archaeology has to be acknowledged.

With post-processual endeavour into the socio-political being rooted, to varying degrees, in an understanding of interpretations of the past as discourse and text (Smith 1996, 66; see Shanks and Tilley 1987b; 1989a; Hodder 1988; 1989a; 1989b; 1992; Tilley 1989a; 1989b; 1991; 1993a; 1993b; Norris 1992; 1995; Shanks 1992; Thomas 1993; Carman 1995; Meskell 1996), interpreting past material culture becomes an act of encoding a particular form of language through which meanings are communicated in the present (Hodder 1988; 1989c; see Olsen 1989; Pols 1992 for an objectivist critique). This leads to the power of language and the use of word and text becoming one of the main media of post-processual studies of the socio-political (e.g. Johnson et al. 1982; Hodder 1989b; Thomas 1990a; see also Shiach 1991 for a wider discussion of the relationship between writing and politics). The multitude of interpretations of the past is given theoretical corporeality through the importation of semiotics (Smith 1996, 72; see Owoc 1989; Olsen 1990; Silverman 1990; Yates 1990; Tilley 1991).

With the material culture record envisaged as a text read and interpreted by different stakeholders of the past, archaeologists and heritage managers take on the role of specialised readers, interpreters, and critics who give meaning to this text (Patterson 1989, 561-562). At the same time, archaeologists interfere with the interpretive process itself, holding the power to move it in different directions by refocusing analytical lenses and redefining spheres of interpretive gravity inside as well as outside the profession. The methodological tool allowing the disentanglement of the socio-politics of the past takes the shape of thick description (see Geertz 1973; 3-30 for an in-depth discussion), a method, as the term suggests, based on ‘describing thickly the processes through which
archaeology has become engaged in a practical struggle' (Hodder 1998, 124). In doing so, post-processualism emphasises the importance of individual perceptions, and privileges the cryptographic skills and professional enunciation of the archaeologist/heritage manager as informed interpreter (Hodder 1985; 1986; 1987a; 1987b). In doing so, post-processualists reach a decisive theoretical point of departure away from mechanistic/scientific procedures and towards assessing the interplay/dialectic between subject and object within a determinate socio-political field of interpretative practices (Patterson 1986a; 1986b; Shanks and Tilley 1987b, chapter 3). Yet, while this achievement deserves recognition, it is at the same time that post-processualism of the socio-political suffers from a major shortcoming.

As pointed out by Smith (1994, 302; 1996, 66; also Vinsrygg 1988), the post-processual focus on language and text, instead of bringing the 'enlightenment' (Geuss 1981, 2) it heralds, obscures or denies a number of issues raised by post-modern 'strong' sociologists of knowledge in particular (Norris 1995, 105). In many cases, this shortcoming roots in the post-processualists' over-reliance on Habermas (1980; 1984; 1987; 1989) and his notion of Ideal Speech Situation (Smith 1994, 301). Advocating a true participatory democracy by allowing every person the same opportunity to participate in any given discourse, he proposes three main rules (Habermas 1980, 86): (1) every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; (2a) everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever; (2b) everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse; (3) no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his/her rights as laid down in (1) and (2). The social world, however, is not characterised by Ideal Speech Situations, but composed of complex and organic networks of power. As such, post-processualism employs a rather utopian idea of social reality, directing only limited attention to post-modern ideas of the nature of science, knowledge, and power (see, for example, Foucault 1972; 1981; Bhaskar 1978; Hesse 1980; Bernstein 1983; Edmonds 1990; Norris 1995). It should, however, be pointed out that there exists a limited corpus of post-processual work explicitly aimed at addressing issues of knowledge and power (e.g. Hodder 1989a; Tilley 1990b). Yet, in borrowing heavily from Quine's influential work Word and Object (1960), these attempts are limited to stressing narrative, interpretation, and linguistics as the key feature of investigating the socio-politics of the cultural past (Smith 1996, chapters 2 & 3). In particular, post-processualists turned towards
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hermeneutics in order to identify and understand the conditions that make the understanding of otherness possible (e.g. Hodder 1991b; 1991c; 1992; see also Owoc 1989; Sinclair 1989; Moore 1990; Johnson and Olsen 1992). It is in this context that archaeological enquiry - including its data source, interpretation, and communication - becomes a text consisting of signs and symbols that must be deciphered and interpreted. As a result, focusing on words and sentences rather than on non-linguistic subjects and objects (even when not directly concerned with linguistics), this emphasis on language, text, and dialogue turns the post-processual critical approach into an endless spiral of rhetorics and 'language games' (see Harré 1989; Knapp 1990; Norris 1992, 19; 1995, 111; Bintliff 1993, 97; Purvis and Hunt 1993, 476; Eagleton 2003, 198). As Geertz (1988, 2) poignantly states, post-processual archaeology becomes nothing but 'a mere game of words, as poems and novels are supposed to be', while Smith (1994, 300) refers to post-processualism's 'introspective loop'. Texts become more important than practice, and linguistics more important than practical consequences. As Eggert (2002, 124; see also R. J. Evans 1997) points out, it is one thing to admit to the organic and multifaceted nature of knowledge of the past. But it is quite another to deny the past 'an integrity of its own' (Evans 1997, 116), as well as having very real consequences within the socio-political sphere in the present. It is in this respect that, to employ a term coined by Žižek (1997, 97) in a discussion of 'the violence of interpretation', post-processualism of the socio-political confines itself to the 'prison-house of language'. This shortcoming can also be observed for many studies on EU supra-national identity generation (Pieterse 1991; Shore and Black 1994; Shore 1995; McDonald 1996; Werbner 1997; Zeff and Pirro 2001; Mittag and Wessels 2003). In placing too much emphasis on general, skin-deep Eurocratic rhetorics, and in advertising them as social reality and linguistic analysis as social analysis, the actual systems, dynamics, and relationships in terms of power structures and frameworks are being neglected.

Closely related to the above, the post-processual exploration of the socio-political functions of the cultural past in the present, in particular in terms of its concrete practical effects, is limited by many of its proponents' recourse to Feyerabend's (1975; 1978; 1985a; 1985b; 2002; see also Preston 1997; Lakatos et al. 2001) concept of democratic relativism in the sciences in general. For many post-processualists of the socio-political, as for Feyerabend, it is pluralism and 'theoretical anarchism' (Feyerabend 1975, 15) instead of law and order creating
progress within the academy: '[K]nowledge is not a gradual approach to truth. It is rather an ever-increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation' (Feyerabend 1975, 32). Arguing the notion of 'anything goes' to represent the only epistemological principle that can be defended under all circumstances - a principle ferociously attacked and caricatured by processualist writers as leading to 'interpretationism' (Harding 1990, 2), 'quietism' (Keenan 1997, 32), nihilism, and fascism (Flannery 1982; Renfrew 1984; 1989; Binford 1987; Schiffer 1988; Bender 1989; Rosenau 1992; Stark 1993; Berglund 2000; in this context, see also Lampeter Archaeology Workshop 1997; 1998) - post-processualism creates an intellectual environment in which the "real" world is visualised as a web of competing ideologies, all of which are equally true and all of which are equally false' (Anthony 1995, 85), including, for example, nationalist or racist agendas. Due to its focus on text, writing, rhetorics, and the unchallenged and unrestricted interpretation of the past, post-processual archaeology of the socio-political serves every politics in principle. Yet, in doing so, it either serves none in practice, or has its practicality determined by semantic availability and ability (Rutherford 1990, 22). Moving archaeology and CHM from 'science to séance' (Schloen 2001, 30), 'the socio-political role for archaeology as advocated by post-modernists [...] is proven unrealistic the moment it is faced with real issues, [risking] either outright instrumentalisation by (integration into) political élites or complete social insignificance' (Slapšak 1993, 194-195).

In summary, post-processualism, while making considerable ontological advances towards an investigation of the extra-academic context of power of knowledge of the past, offers very little insight into the practical uses and consequences of archaeological knowledge and heritage locations outside of dense rhetorics and professional jargon. Instead, it becomes an expressive forum for 'archaeologists writing about archaeologists...with little engagement with concrete, practical problems posed within CHM' (Smith 1994, 301; see also Smith 1996, 104). Due to this cavernous gap between theory and practice (Brooke 1995), the concrete crystallisations of archaeological discourse, in particular its actual social relations, structures, and institutions that typify them (Smith 1994, 302), remain substantially underdeveloped. Leading Carver (2002, 467; see also Kohl 1993) to refer to it as just another 'cartel of professional theory-making', post-processualist epistemology remains trapped,
not taking into account that holding on to a system of evaluation principles on which to choose certain readings of the past as more or less appropriate 'is not a matter of closing down the past, but simply recognising that its openness cannot be infinite if the truths produced there are to prove actionable' (Bennett 1991, 181). It remains as 'intimidating and sermonising' (Bahn 1999, 14) as its predecessors, offering hardly any insight into, nor explanation of, the practical consequences of archaeology and CHM, in fact of the cultural past in general, within the wider socio-political sphere, such as the interaction of archaeological knowledge and supra-national governmental concerns and ideals.

As pointed out previously, knowledge of the human past in the use of the present (culture heritage) simultaneously represents a kind of knowledge, a cultural product, as well as a political resource (Graham 2002, 1007). Due to this tripartite character, the specific social, political, and intellectual environment that they rest within always determines the nature of knowledge. Accordingly, these landscapes lead to a heterogeneous distribution of control and power within the knowledge/heritage industry (Graham 2002; see also Livingstone 1992; Sibley 1995, 115). Certain ideas are given more credibility and subsequently count for more than others. Thus, the key questions when discussing the practical role played by knowledges of the past are as follows. Which interpretation of the past, based on what kind of underlying assumptions (see Tainter and Bagley 2005, 70), is given supremacy over others? Why is this particular interpretation of culture heritage promoted at the expense of others? Whose interests are advanced, how, and in what kind of milieu are they mediated? Post-processualism, tending to shy away from decision-making, and, instead, waiting for more and different views on the matter, fails to provide the experience of ‘being in touch’ with the ‘real’ world necessary for both action and a deeper understanding of the cultural past’s socio-political entanglements. As Parzinger (2002, 49) recently remarked, ‘was die angloamerikanische Archäologie betrifft, so können die Postprozessualisten wohl kaum das letzte Wort sein. Einer “europäischen Archäologie”, wenn sie sich wirklich als solche vorstellen will und ihren Auftrag ernst nimmt, stehen wichtigere Aufgaben bevor’. What is needed in order to prevent the ‘hollowing-out’ of any attempt to analyse the consequences of knowledge-claims (Norris 1992; 1995) is an

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7 'In the case of Anglo-American archaeology, it appears to be more than unlikely that post-processualists represent the final word of wisdom. A 'European archaeology', if it wants to perceive itself as such, and aims to fulfil its duties, will have to deal with more important issues' (my translation)
epistemological approach allowing the ‘unpacking [of] practical problems to which there are equally practical solutions’ (Waterton 2005, 320).

As such, while resting within post-processualism’s ontological paradigm, and in order to outline a methodology providing the epistemological underpinnings to allow an assessment of the concrete character and effects of the socio-political uses of the past in the context of the EU, this thesis turns outside archaeology. This takes the shape of critical realism.

2.2 CRITICAL REALISM AND DISCOURSE

Reducing the meaning – and thus importance – of the cultural past to exist only within text and discourse, means to deny the concrete consequences that the proficiency to interpret and mediate (in short control) the cultural past holds. As demonstrated by Smith (1996, 95; see also Smith 2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2005; 2006; Smith and Campbell 1998) in the Aboriginal context, it is by anchoring notions of text and discourse (as focused on by post-processual theory of the socio-political) within critical realism, that a sense of the concrete effects and consequences of archaeological discourse and knowledge within CHM is achieved.

2.2.1 Critical realism

The sociological works of Bhaskar (1978; 1986; 1989a; 1989b), Woodiwiss (1990), Outhwaite (1991), and Collier (1994) provide a non-reductionist approach avoiding discursive relativism (see also Gibbon 1989). Even though the term ‘critical’ is to be found attached to a variety of nouns, making it difficult to identify a closed critical paradigm, a commonality among ‘criticalists’ can be identified (Kincheloe and McLaren 1994, 139-140; Locke 2004, 25-26; see also Lopez and Potter 2001): (a) all thought is regarded as fundamentally mediated by socially situated power relations; (b) understandings and explanations of reality can never be isolated from ideological inscription; (c) language is central to the formation of subjectivity; (d) certain individuals and groups within a society are privileged over others, a phenomenon most forcefully reproduced when this privilege is assumed to be natural, necessary, or inevitable; (e) un-‘critical’ research frameworks and practices are generally – although in most cases unknowingly – implicated in the reproduction of systems of oppression (e.g. gender, race, class, faith).
Striking an epistemological compromise between objectivism and subjectivism, critical realists provide an approach to reality that 'allows for the importance of language and discourse, but stresses the concrete social relations and generative and causal structures that underlie discourse' (Smith 1996, 98). Realism in this context of 'explanatory critique' (Bhaskar 1986; see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, chapter 2) translates into taking seriously 'the existence of things, structures and mechanisms revealed by the sciences at different levels of reality' (Outhwaite 1991, 19). While accepting that intra- and extra-academic knowledge claims can, ultimately, never be verified or falsified (subjectivist), critical realists consider extra-discursive knowledge to be possible (objectivist) (Bhaskar 1978, 250; Woodiwiss 1990, 6). To quote Smith (1996, 99; also Woodiwiss 1990, 25; Sayer 1992, 5-6; Locke 2004, 25), critical realism

acknowledges that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it, but that knowledge is fallible and theory-laden, that the production of knowledge is social practice, and that phenomena such as institutions and texts are concept dependent, and that knowledge must be accompanied by scepticism and critique.

It is against this understanding of life (natural and social) as 'an 'open system' in which any event is governed by simultaneously operative 'mechanisms' (or 'generative powers')' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 19) that critical realism’s proponents have argued it not to represent a social theory of its own, but to act as an 'underlabourer and occasional midwife' to the sciences and social sciences' (Bhaskar 1989b, 24; also Woodiwiss 1990, 25; Sayer 1992, 5-6; Smith 1996, 98-98).

Arguing for the existence of things independent of our knowledge of them (Outhwaite 1991, 19; Norris 1995, 123), critical realism, contrary to the post-processual focus on social practices as entirely context-dependent, explicitly understands social structures and relations to 'always have a material dimension' (Bhaskar 1989a, 4; see also Dant 1999). To quote Smith (1996, 99-100),

society is conceived as an ensemble of social practices in which social agents, while not creating social practices, presuppose them and thus

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8 It should be noted that Bhaskar’s term 'mechanism' is misleading. Mechanistic and deterministic notions are not part of critical realist epistemology. Instead of closed, life is conceived as an ‘open system’ determined by mechanisms and structures, and characterised by complexity (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 19).
both reproduce and transform them. The social sciences, in seeking to identify and describe these social practices, must be dependent on the understanding and perceptions which agents have about these practices... In short, the discourses we develop about 'things', 'events' and practices, while not having a reality in a positivistic sense, are nonetheless 'real' in that they have a material consequence.

Thus, instead of putting forward an epistemological position of relativist 'anything goes', critical realism aims at examining how discourses in science and society at large are conducted, legitimated, mediated, or ignored (Bhaskar 1978; 1989a; Outhwaite 1991, 34; Smith 1996, 100). To employ Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992, 11; see also Bourdieu 1990; Morrow and Brown 1994) terminology, critical realism puts forward a constructivist structuralism/structuralist constructivism. Instead of disengaging from the socio-political consequences of knowledge-construction, critical realism allows the understanding of the consequences of discourse and knowledge as being interlinked in their materiality with social practices, institutions, frameworks, and relations. As Gee (1996, vii) highlights, '[:dliscourses, then, are ways of behaving, interacting, valuing, thinking, believing, speaking, and often reading and writing... Discourses are 'ways of being in the world', they are 'forms of life'' (Gee 1996, vii). As such, critical realism lifts discourse out of the epistemologically unsatisfying realm of language games and, instead, 'provides discourse with a materiality, a substance, or an 'identity' for the subjects of discourse' (Smith 1996, 100). In summary, '[:c]ritical realism thus anchors discourse in the realm of the real' (Smith 1996, 100; see also Hamilakis 1999, 74), allowing an examination of the material consequences of the socio-political use of knowledge of the cultural past in the present. Social reality is explained in relation to its discursive context. As Pilbeam (cited in Orser and Fagan 1995, 238) states, '[w]e do not see things as they are, we see things as we are'. This requires a brief discussion of the notion of discourse as employed in this thesis.

2.2.2 Discourse

The notion of discourse as employed here, shared by numerous proponents of social theory (e.g. Foucault 1970; 1977; 1981; 1982; Bourdieu 1977; Giddens 1993; Castoriades 1987; Bhaskar 1986; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999), rests on a

9 Critical realism is structuralist in character in that it aims at relational systems that constitute relative permanences within social practices. At the same time it is constructivist in that it is orientated to illuminate how those systems are produced and transformed in social action' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 32).
number of basic assumptions. Firstly, social life is envisaged as consisting of practices, meaning 'habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 21). Any practice of 'production' becomes the application of 'technologies' (i.e. any apparatus applied to materials within a practice of production to achieve particular social effects (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 23)) to 'materials' within particular social relations of production. It is in this context that '[t]he relative permanence of practices can be theorised in terms of specific institutions or institution complexes' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 22), such as, for example, the EU. This understanding is directly reflected in this work's case studies, progressing from an examination of the EU's culture heritage paradigm at the planning stage of knowledge-construction (chapter 3), via a critical assessment of the Eurocratic use of the past's material resource (chapter 4), to an investigation of the EU's symbolic resource (chapters 5 & 6). Secondly, a particular practice brings together various operative 'mechanisms' and 'agents', linked in particular ways to particular materials (knowledges, experiences, semiotic resources), thus locating each practice 'within a network of relationships to other practices, and these 'external' relationships determine its 'internal' constitution' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 22). These 'moments of discursive practice', or, to employ Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) term, 'articulations', become the source from which to produce 'specific accounts of the form which their dialectic relationship takes in particular practices' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 21). Thirdly, the term 'practice' provides an ambiguous flexibility in that it can be understood both as an active social action as well as in the sense of a habitual (passive) way of acting (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 21-22). Reflecting critical realist epistemology, this dialectic view of practice avoids both, a determinism grounded in stabilised structures (see Barrett (1991) and Larrain (1994) for a critique of Althusser) and a voluntarism focusing exclusively on concrete activity (see Mouzelis (1990) and Best and Kellner (1991) for a critique of Laclau and Mouffe) (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 21-22): 'The advantage of focusing upon practices in this way is that they constitute a point of connection between abstract structures and their mechanisms, and concrete events - between 'society' and people living their lives' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 21).
Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

The term 'discourse', a concept Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 4) understand as being thoroughly welded onto late modernity, is used to refer to the different ways of structuring knowledge and, thus, social practice (Fairclough 1993, 3; Smith 1996, 101). Discourses, or 'coherent ways of making sense of the world (or some aspect of it) as reflected in human sign systems' (Locke 2004, 5), become reproduced by the means of discursive action (Macdonell 1986). Put differently, 'discourse is a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated' (Torfing 1999, 85), including language (written and spoken), nonverbal communication (e.g. gestures), electronic communication (e.g. e-mail), visual images (e.g. photographs), and televisual (i.e. combinations of speech, image, and sound) and multisemiotic (i.e. combinations of written language and visual images, with written language itself becoming a visual surface) 'texts'10 (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 38, 46; also Fairclough 2001, 231). As such, the term discourse (i.e. the 'semiotic elements of social practices' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 38)) can be translated into frameworks of knowledge collected into different discursive disciplines generating and disseminating knowledge (claims) (Smith 1996, 101), and contributing to the establishment, maintenance, and change of social relations of power and domination (Fairclough 2003, 9; see contributions to Lacorne and Judt 2004). Fairclough (2001, 227) refers to this process of 'meaning-making through language, body language, visual images, or any other way of signifying' as semiosis. Phrased differently, discourse represents an ideological structure that guides (i.e. limits) people's thought processes and actions through a naturalisation process of its normative foundations, making it appear inevitable (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105; Eagleton 1991; Purvis and Hunt 1993; Fairclough 1995b, 27; cf. Flax 1990). Patriarchal ideology, for example, makes it appear inevitable that men rule and women serve, while European racist ideology of the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries turned the idea of Western superiority and the resulting control over those deemed barbaric and uncivilised into common sense (Billig 1995, 15). In this sense, discourse can best be defined as a hegemonic socio-political organisation system laying down by the means of ideology social rules (i.e. social reality) for the actors and structures that exist within its framework, such as the EU defining and justifying social reality for its subject citizens through its use of the cultural past (see Torfing 1999, 13). Discursive practices can be found in the domain of

10 In this context, the term 'text', often referred to in the discourse literature, is not ideal as a descriptive term for this diverse set of discursive forms, because it still suggests an emphasis on the written word. In absence of any better alternative, it is, however, still in wide use (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 46).
economy, politics, science, culture, as well as everyday life (Mouzelis 1990; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 21; see also Billig 1995). It is against this teleological paradigm that the totality of social practices in which agents produce, maintain, transform, and reproduce these practices represent the building blocks of socio-political reality as such (Bhaskar 1989b, 4).

It is in the above context that social texts - discourse about something being said or told by somebody to somebody else - become the active components of discursive practice (Ricoeur 1979; Bourdieu 1999; Taylor 2001a, 9). The reality of texts, however, is by no means 'exhausted by our knowledge about texts' (Fairclough 2003, 9). Undeniably, texts act as an important aspect of ideological representation (Laclau 1982), and, thus, play an irreducible part of social life (Fairclough 2003, 2; Scollon and Scollon 2003). Yet, also taking on physical form, they are not restricted to the realm of mere language games. As highlighted by Smith (1990) in relation to feminism, and Mason (2004) for museums in contemporary Britain, texts become active, and, thus, physical, in that they organise the social relations that they mediate. As emphasised by Taylor (2001a, 7, original emphasis), in order 'to understand what is being done with language, it is necessary to consider its situated use within the process of ongoing interaction'. Further, as Fairclough (1992, 3) emphasises, discourses should not be limited to being understood simply as social significations, structures, or relations. Instead they should be understood as simultaneously constituting them. While representing different ways of structuring/organising knowledge, discourse also interacts and influences the character of knowledge in order to compose, strengthen, and transform it (Cousins and Hussain 1984, 29; see also Smith 1996, 101). This relationship holds true throughout all levels of discourse, including the individual actor. Thus, an actor’s discursive statements can be employed to map out his/her institutional position, while at the same time reinforcing the actor’s institutional position (Macdonell 1986; Fairclough 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). This definition of discourse, in avoiding a ‘discourse idealism’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 28) in which texts are treated as exiting within a value-free and extra-social space, provides a useful conceptual tool for any enquiry into the conditions that make certain discourses possible, as well as into the character of discourse itself (Foucault 1970; 1972; see also Smith 1996, 102; cf. Widdowson 1995; 1996; 1998 arguing CDA to blur the distinction between concepts, methodologies, and disciplines).
As has been suggested by Purvis and Hunt (1993; see also Smith 1996, 101), the notion of ideology provides an important concept for any examination of discourses and their material effects. Criticising Foucault’s work for reducing ideology simply to a matter of interest, they emphasise the ideological effect of discourse, and re-establish a sense of discursive consequences (Purvis and Hunt 1993, 491). Discourses become ideology when they are established within, or related to, systems of domination. The consequences of discourse become ideological in that they exhibit a material relation to systems of domination, and, as such, become incorporated into lived experience within the wider social sphere (Smith 1996, 104-105; see Purvis and Hunt 1993, 486 for the notion of ‘popular discourse’). Here it becomes necessary to theorise the interplay of power and knowledge systems as discourse.

2.2.3 Knowledge systems as discourse

It is within discourse that power and knowledge come to crystallise and to articulate themselves. To quote Žižek (2005, 139; see also Thompson 1982, 41; Hallward 2003, 210-213), ‘[w]hen knowledge itself assumes the moment of ‘authority’ (i.e. becomes imperative), a short-circuit between the ‘neutral’ field of knowledge and the ‘performative’ dimension is produced’. In particular, these crystallisations/articulations take the shape of hegemonic discourses generating and/or maintaining authority and leadership, such as in the case of the EU culture heritage paradigm (see chapter 1.4).

Since the 1970s, social science research on discourse has turned its gaze away from researching the use of words by different social classes towards what was hitherto considered a neutral area — the discourses of knowledge claims themselves (Macdonell 1986, 2; see, for example, Habermas 1970; Barnes 1977; Knorr 1977; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Barnes and Bloor 1982; Nencel and Pels 1991; Russell 1993; Fricker 1994; Norris 1995; Fink et al. 1996; Lawrence and Döbler 1996). This new perspective refocused on knowledge itself as a form of socio-political power and authority. For some scholars power is regarded as being grounded in authority and defined as the legitimate right to act, while for others it is the authorisation of power itself that represents the actual act of power and imposition (Torfing 1999, 155). Whichever conceptualisation one prefers, characteristic of both is that power and knowledge are considered fused: ‘To know is to exercise the power of [...] domination; hence power-knowledge’ (Gillan and Lemert 1982, x, original emphasis; see Balibar 1990a;
Keenan 1997, 146-154 for a discussion of the intellectual power-knowledge concept). The reason for this relationship lies in any social or political force depending on the creation of an image of itself as the coming into reality of a wider, fulfilling order expanding into the general population. Phrased differently, ‘for a class or group to become hegemonic, it must be able to present its particularity as the incarnation of the empty signifier which refers to the absent communitarian fullness’ (Torfing 1999, 177). The Eurocratic notion of and drive towards a united Europe represents a particularly vivid example of this relational necessity (see chapter 1.2).

It is in the above context that any discussion of knowledge as power must place major emphasis on élites in terms of power-granting and power-justifying bodies (see, for example, Russell 1993; Mason 2004). In Western society, this knowledge-élite often takes the shape of scholars, academics, and other intellectuals (LaCapra 1983; Martin 1987; Mohan 1987; Robbins 1990; 1993; Grimshaw and Hart 1994; Wilcken 1995; Jenning and Kemp-Welch 1997; Becker-Schmidt 2003; see Hodder et al. 1995 for a discussion in archaeology). It is in this understanding that Bauman (1987) defines the roles played by such élites as that of the legislator (institution-based authoritative experts) and interpreter (experts translating discourses created in one knowledge system into another). However, knowledge-élites also include, for example, politicians and economists, depending on the field of expertise in question. Knowledge-élites, in particular in their role as articulations (i.e. practices establishing social, political, or economic relations between social bodies in order to modify their identity) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105; Bocock 1986, 36; Torfing 1999, 101), function as key-protagonists in any larger scale socio-political process (van Dijk 1993a, 179; Conversi 2002, 11; see also Gellner 1983). As ideology is produced, regulated, and contested through knowledge-élites in government-funded positions, intellectual practice becomes an important part of the justificatory cement of any governmental edifice (Smith 1996, 109; see Larrain 1984). This includes the process of European Unification. As Weiss and Wodak (2000, 75-76) point out, it is crucial for present-day research to focus on the ‘epistemic communities’ or ‘transnational knowledge and expertise communities’, which process, progress and provide common definitions of problems, assumption of causes and policy recommendations’.

73
2.2.4 The EU as discourse

As highlighted in chapter 1.1, the image of Europe as a unit does not exist as a natural, but as a discursive phenomenon. From the very first medieval notions of Europe as a distinct cultural entity, via the spread of the concept from purely scholarly circles to the wider public during the fifteenth century, and down to the present-day, every single new vision of Europe depended on particular discursive interpretations of the community in question. As de Cillia et al. (1999, 149) establish for the nation-state, CDA allows us to ask 'which topics, which discursive strategies and which linguistic devices are employed to construct national sameness and uniqueness, and differences to other national collectives on the other hand'. With the notion of cultural discourses constructing and maintaining ideology and identity being widely accepted within the social sciences (de Cillia et al. 1999; Glazier 2007, 45), this relationship must be assumed to be not only limited to the Europe of nation-states, but also to be applicable to the context of the latest project of common European identity construction, namely the EU. Borrowing from Hall's (1994, 201; see also Ram 1994) discussion of national identity, supra-national culture, through constructing identities by creating meanings of 'the supra-nation' for its subject citizens to identify with, 'is a discourse, a way to construct meanings which influence and organise both our actions and our perceptions of ourselves'.

Notions of identity always become discursively produced, reproduced, transformed, and deconstructed. In the words of de Cillia et al. (1999, 153), '[t]he idea of a specific [...] community becomes reality in the realm of convictions and beliefs through reifying, figurative discourses continually launched by politicians, intellectuals, and media people, and disseminated through the systems of education, schooling, mass communication'. It is in this understanding that the EU, as well as any other politico-territorial unit, can thus be interpreted as a purpose-built system of identity representations. As such, identity becomes a major player in the discursive legitimisation of the EU, for, as pointed out by Martin (1995, 13), it

*can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power; it transforms the perceptions of the past and the present; it changes the organization of human groups and creates new ones... The identity narrative brings forth a new interpretation of the world in order to modify it.*
Discursive legitimation aims to make culture and state become identical (Hall 1994, 200; de Cillia et al. 1999, 153), a process relying heavily on the construction of notions of distinctiveness, difference, uniqueness, and inevitability (Cillia et al. 1999, 153; see also Hall 1994; 1996a; 1996b; Martin 1995). These notions are, however, not limited to the establishment of cultural boundaries only, but become the means by which to inaugurate a multitude of mechanisms and expressions of dominance, resistance, inclusion, and exclusion (Reisenleitner 2001, 8; see also Ålund 1994, 59; Tunbridge 1998). The EU is no exception to this (Delgado-Moreira 1997, 2; Reisenleitner 2001, 10), its identity discourse not being limited to ephemeral ‘language games’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 33; Hellström 2004, 7) only. Instead, rooted in the material dimension of discourse, it crystallises in the shape of concrete institutionalised projects having culture identity as their main course, providing the opportunity to illustrate the interplay of socio-political movements and knowledges of the past (Hellström 2003a, 187; Wodak 2003, 11). What makes the EU a particularly rewarding object of analysis is the fact that it was ‘cast into being’ by a political and bureaucratic meritocracy, giving it a definitive starting date, as well as traceable measures and projects.

It is in this context that it becomes important to ask of each Eurocratic cultural past-employing discourse which flag it waves, and what its characteristics are. Yet, it is equally important, if not more so, to ask deeper questions about the underlying knowledge assumptions, routine policies and rules, as well as any other procedures supporting and characterising, securing, and mediating a particular discourse (Ben-Tovim 1997, 219; see Foucault 1970; 1977; 1980; 1981; 1982; see Mathers et al. 2005, 6-7 for an archaeological voice). What are the practical effects of these assumptions, and whose particular interests do they serve (either actively or passively)? In short, it is the forms and strategies of constructing the everyday (EU)ropean world - the naturalisation of what are merely options of social understanding and organisation - as something inevitable, which become subject of the following investigation. Here, to point this out clearly, it must be highlighted that in focusing on the EU’s official culture identity discourse, this thesis does by no means assume or advocate an understanding of EU citizens as passive and not engaged in the production of their own culture heritage/identity. Numerous scholars (e.g. Sarup 1996; Holstein et al. 1999; Elliot 2001; Bauman 2004; see also contributions to Devine and Logue 2002; cf. Hough 1992; Jensen and Richardson 2003) have
demonstrated every person’s process of identity construction to be multi-level (e.g. national, regional, local, and family identity), plural, continuous, organic, and porous by nature. This thesis, however, aims to illuminate the generative powers governing the complex event of EU culture identity construction. As such, while mechanisms of identity construction within the subject citizen are of interest, it is Eurocratic discursive practices of culture heritage being the subject of analytical endeavour, for it is not the citizens’ interpretation of the EU’s culture heritage paradigm that determine its character and discursive thrust.

Élite-driven acts of constructing and maintaining notions of culture identity, as in the case of the EU, must be supported by ideological systems and mechanisms. In order to legitimise the dominance inherent in any such system requires the prevalence of certain sets of attitudes (socio-cognitive frameworks). As Pearce (1998, 3) poignantly states, ‘[t]he use of the past in the construction of community identity revolves around political authority of those who hold the right to tell its story’ (Pearce 1998, 3). It is in this context that discourse becomes the principle means for the construction and reproduction of such attitudes (van Dijk 1993a, 192; Fairclough et al. 2004, 2; see also Fairclough 1992; Chilton and Schäffner 1997; Gee 1999). Transcending the strict traditional opposition between interpretivist and structuralist conceptualisations of social reality against an epistemological background of critical realism in order to analyse discourse in the context of the Eurocratic discourse on the cultural past, this thesis turns towards CDA.

2.3 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

2.3.1 Aims and objectives

Critical discourse studies (henceforth CDS) did not develop within one specific field of scholarly enquiry. Instead of a homogenous body, it represents a conglomerate of developments happening in linguistics, literary studies, gender studies, semiotics, political science, sociology, anthropology, and history over the last quarter of a century (Macdonell 1986, 1; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 1; McKenna 2004, 10; see Blommaert 2005, 22-24 for a detailed account on the origins and development of CDS). It borrows, in particular, from Marxist theory, Bakhtinian language theory, Foucaultian discourse theories, and Bhaskarian critical realism theory, leading to the vector of CDS being formed by
the intersection of discourse, language, speech, and social structure (Fairclough 1995a, 73; McKenna 2004, 10-11; Blommaert 2005, 25; see also Gee 1999). In particular, CDA focuses on the various linkages among practices — a focus Scollon (2001, 16) terms the 'nexus of practices'. To quote de Cillia et al. (1999, 157; see also Fairclough 2001, 229), CDA

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{assume a dialectical relationship between particular discursive events} \\
\text{and the situations, institutions, and social structures in which they are} \\
\text{embedded: on the one hand, the situational, institutional, and social} \\
\text{context shape and affect discourses; on the other hand, discourses} \\
\text{influence social and practical reality. In other words, discourse} \\
\text{constitutes social practice and is at the same time constituted by it.}
\end{align*}
\]

It is in this understanding that CDA represents neither a closed ontological nor epistemological paradigm. Instead, its meanings and applications range from that of pure methodology, via an entirely linguistic paradigm influenced by wider social theory, to a specific field of research (Billig 2002; Wodak 2003, 9; see, for example, Titscher et al. 2000). Independent of the individual approach taken, CDA, instead of claiming to represent a particular theory or practice, welds together theory and practice (Hammersley 1997, 238).

CDA has discourse as its main analytical focus, discourse being understood as 'the differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated' (Torfing 1999, 85). It aims to understand the relationship of discourse, language, speech, and social structure in terms of concrete social structures and relations underlying the discourses of 'power, dominance, [and] social inequality' (van Dijk 1993b, 249; see Bhaskar 1986; 1989a; 1989b). As Becker-Schmidt (2003, 10-11) points out, the analytical 'objects' of CDA result from

sozialer Praxis und umfasst Ideengebäude, Bereiche ideeller und materieller Produktion, Gegenstands- und Lebenswelten, sowie übergreifende gesellschaftliche Zusammenhänge... Da keine menschliche Praxis aus der Geschichte herausspringen kann, stößt sie immer auch auf Ablagerungen von Vergangenem im Gegenwärtigen, und damit auf Rahmenbedingungen für Zukünftiges Handeln.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} 'social praxis, embracing bodies of ideas, areas of ideological and material production, object- and lifeworlds, as well as interconnected societal structures... Because no human praxis can develop within a
As such, CDA does not limit discourse to material objects and immaterial ideas and interpretations, but also emphasises the notions of knowledge that constitute, reinforce, and alter social practice (Cousins and Hussain 1984, 29). Whatever statement is made in any form of text always rests upon notions of legitimising knowledge. This knowledge itself rests and depends on underlying, 'unsaid assumptions' (Fairclough 2003, 11) that result in its naturalisation. Incorporating this extended understanding of social reality as discourse, CDA places special attention on identifying in any 'text' what is assumed and, thus, remains unchallenged (see McNay 1993 for a critique). Unlike mere textual analysis, CDA rejects texts as primary data for analysis, and, instead, aims at the meanings behind the text, for it is the meanings within their discursive framework that have social effects rather than texts themselves (Fairclough 2003, 11; McKenna 2004, 11). It is in this understanding that CDA aims

to systematically explore the often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power.

(Fairclough 1995b, 132)

In doing so, paraphrasing Locke (2004, 1-2), CDA views (a) reality as textually and intertextually mediated via verbal and non-verbal language systems, (b) any prevailing social order as socially constructed and, thus, historically situated; (c) human subjectivity as at least in part constructed or inscribed by discourse; (d) a prevailing order and social processes as constituted and maintained more by the pervasiveness of particular constructions of reality than by the will of individual social actors; (e) discourse as characterised by and productive of ideology; (f) power and dominance in society to represent an inevitable effect of ways in which particular discursive configurations and arrangements privilege the status and position of some people over others rather than being imposed on the individual; and (g) the systematic analysis and interpretation of texts as revelatory of ways in which discourses consolidate power and colonise human subjects through often covert position calls. How does CDA achieve its aim in terms of analytical methods?
2.3.2 Analytical method

It is against the background of Bhaskar’s (1978; 1986; 1989a; 1989; see also Collier 1994; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 32-33) notion of critical realism that this thesis has a ‘transitive’ as well as an ‘intransitive’ analytical object. Its intransitive object is the concrete Eurocratic practices of culture identity construction it is analysing. Its transitive object is the mechanisms – or ‘proto-theories’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 32) – that are produced as part of those practices. In particular, this thesis employs CDA, against a background of critical theory, in order to demonstrate the ideological workings of proto-theories (i.e. their practices of sustaining relations of domination). It aims at subverting the practices it analyses ‘by showing proto-theories to be miscognitions, and producing scientific theories which may be taken up within (and enters struggles within) the practices in question’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 33). In order to achieve this aim, the case studies following this chapter are subjected to ‘explanatory critique’ (Bhaskar 1986; see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 33).

To go into more detail, employing Foucault’s (1994; see Locke 2004, 29-30) ‘archaeological method’, this thesis aims to identify the set of discursive rules (i.e. forms and limits) employed by the Eurocratic meritocracy in the context of EU culture heritage construction. Firstly, by conducting CDA, it maps the forms and limits of what is sayable in this particular domain of discourse. Secondly, it explores the forms and limits in which signifying sequences emerge, are maintained, circulate, and disappear. Thirdly, it asks how a particular relationship is institutionalised between the discourse, the speakers, and its audience. Fourthly, it maps the forms and limits of reactivated discourses. The ‘archaeological’ analysis of the EU’s culture heritage discourse as conducted in the following chapters adheres to the dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis as laid out by Fairclough’s (1995b, 98; see also Fairclough 1992, 232-234) three boxes (Figure 2.1), relating three interrelated dimensions of discourse to three interrelated processes of analysis. What is useful in Fairclough’s schematisation is that it highlights the socially and discursively embedded nature of any text (in the widest sense of the term). It also permits differing foci of analysis. Employing this conceptualisation, the CDA as conducted in the following chapters takes place on all three of Fairclough’s levels of discourse. Interweaving all of these in an organic fashion, the
following CDA illuminates the socio-cultural practice of EU culture heritage construction.

This means focusing our analytical lens on the immediate situation and circumstances that have given rise to the production of a specific discourse, as well as on the various socio-cultural practices and discursive conditions providing the wider contextual reference (Foucault’s discourse analytical dimension 1) (Locke 2004, 42). Going hand-in-hand with this is the analysis of discourse practice, centring on the way in which a certain text has been produced, including institutional frameworks, its relationship with similar texts, and its mode of distribution and consumption (Foucault’s discourse analytical dimension 2) (Locke 2004, 42-43). Further, the following case studies analyse text in terms of the ways it ascertains particular ways of social reality (Foucault’s discourse analytical dimension 3) (Locke 2004, 43-44). This includes asking questions of if and in what way a ‘text’ (or a body of ‘texts’) – may it be written, verbal, non-verbal, visual, or combinations of those (see chapter 2.2.2) – underpins or counteracts a particular discursive hegemony or social practice: ‘Does it serve to reproduce particular social and discursive practices, or are there transformative impulses in the text?’ (Locke 2004, 43).

Based on Fairclough’s three dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis and Bhaskar’s (1986) notion of ‘explanatory critique’, the subsequent CDA follows the ‘operational’ analytical framework laid out by Chouliaraki and Fairclough.

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Figure 2.1: Dimensions of discourse and discourse analysis (after Fairclough 1995b, 98)
Applying this framework to the study of the Eurocratic discourse of a common European culture heritage, it starts out with a social problem (Fairclough's (2001, 236-237) analytical stage 1). This problem takes the shape of the challenges of culture identity faced by the Eurocratic meritocracy, as expressed, for example, by the low support of EU citizens for the (EU)ropean project, as well as the alarming rise of xenophobia and racism observable in many EU member states (see chapters 1.3 & 1.4). The question becomes how these problems might be more successfully tackled in terms of a revision of the character of the EU culture heritage discourse. In order to give an answer to this question, an analysis of conjunctures will be conducted.

Culture heritage/identity represents 'eine Erzählung, eine Geschichte die Menschen über sich selbst erzählen um ihrer sozialen Welt Sinn zu geben' (Ram 1994, 153). This suggests a passive character for such narratives. Yet, such an understanding must be rejected in that interpretations of the past and notions of culture identity neither materialise out of nowhere, nor do they function within a social vacuum (de Cillia et al. 1999, 155). Bellier and Wilson (2000, 15) term this inevitable, yet underemphasised, relationship the 'surface incongruity between 'institutions' and 'identity‘'. As such, narratives should be understood as becoming socially real within conjunctures. The term conjuncture in this context denotes 'relatively durable assemblies of people, materials, technologies and therefore practices (in their aspect as relative permanencies) around specific social projects' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 22). Such configurations of practice associated with specific settings become reality when produced, reproduced, maintained, and spread by active and/or passive actors within concrete institutionalised contexts (de Cillia et al. 1999, 155). It is in this understanding that institutional 'texts' become one of the main bearers of norms, values, ideologies, and identities, potentially having concomitant effects on influencing the way of thinking of the people being part of the particular political and social system in question. Even more, institutional texts construct practices from a particular perspective in order to ‘iron out’ - or at least try to - the contradictions, dilemmas, and antagonisms of practices in ways which accord with the interests and projects of domination’ (Chouliaraki and

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12 It must be noted that CDA as a method of analysis should be seen as continuously changing and evolving as its application to new areas of social life is extended, its theorisation of discourse developing correspondingly (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 59).

13 ‘a narrative, a story that people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world’ (translation by de Cillia et al. 1999, 155)
Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

Fairclough 1999, 26; see Larrain 1979; Thompson 1984, 130-131). The advantage of analysing discourse within conjunctures is that it allows the effects of conjunctually linked series of discursive events in sustaining and transforming practices to be traced (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 22). The (EU)ropean project and its institutions are no exception to this. In fact, it represents an example *par excellence*. As Bellier (2000, 53) points out, ‘European institutions are the main agents in this change, and for the anthropologist they represent a real political field in which to analyze the effects induced by institutional discourses and agents on the formation of collective identities’. A growing, albeit small, number of scholars has begun to realise this, focusing specifically on EU institutions and their projects (e.g. Shore and Black 1992; Shore 1993; Weiss and Wodak 2000; Wodak 2000), thus avoiding a preoccupation with texts as rhetorics at the expense of the material elements and effects of discourse. Analysing EU culture heritage conjunctures for case studies (the discursive importance of which will be established at the beginning of each individual case study chapter), the next analytical step asks what the ideological function of a certain discursive paradigm is in sustaining existing social arrangements (chapters 3-5) (Fairclough’s (2001, 237-238) analytical stage 2). It identifies the ideological message mediated by the Eurocratic approach to European culture heritage, and enquires whether those benefiting most from a certain way of organising social life might have an interest in the problem not being solved (Fairclough’s (2001, 238) analytical stage 3). This analysis then culminates in a catalogue suggesting discursive actions towards overcoming the problem of EU culture identity initially identified, allowing the EU to live up in culture heritage practice to its rhetorical dedication to openness, multiplicity, and diversity (chapter 6) (Fairclough’s (2001, 238-239) analytical stage 4). This last step also includes a critical reflection on the analysis itself (Fairclough’s (2001, 239) analytical stage 5).

As pointed out in the earlier discussion of discourse, it is in the context of CDA that data takes the shape of ‘text’ in its widest meaning (verbal, textual, and visual). As such, the following analyses employ as its data conjunctually related policy documents, open-ended interviews, images, as well as the material remains of the past, and, by placing them into their discursive context, and by explaining their relationship to other such texts, develop an account of the
processes of production and interpretation at the level of discursive practice. Going hand-in-hand with the analysis of individual texts in terms of description, this is put in relation to wider socio-cultural practices. As every conjuncture controls its decision-making process through the production of reports, directives, and other bureaucratic mechanisms, it is those control mechanisms and its ‘texts’ that become the analytical resource. As Clifford (1986, 13) summarises, CDA asks ‘[w]ho speaks? Who writes? When, where, and about what? With or to whom? Under what institutional and historical constraints?’ However, due to CDA as a method of analysis continuously changing depending on the context of its application (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 59), it is not possible to present a closed framework of analysis prior to the analysis itself. Instead, the analytical process develops organically as texts are analysed in the context of conjunctures, dependant on the character, complexity, and availability of different forms of discourse data. As Wooffitt (2001, 58; also Taylor 2001b, 312) states, ‘analysis is data driven, not theory led’.

Before progressing, two data-analytical issues must be highlighted. Firstly, it must be pointed out that the third of Fairclough’s analytical foci, i.e. textual analysis, rests to a large degree within the realm of critical linguistic analysis. This thesis, however, is not a piece of critical linguist work, but is conducted within the field of archaeology and CHM. The question, as identified by Locke (2004, 44), must thus be how much linguistic knowledge is needed in order to conduct CDA. In short, the linguistic knowledge possessed by the researcher must be sufficient to allow an identification of the often, but not always, underlying assumptions of a ‘text’ presented to its ‘readers’ (Locke 2004, 44). Fairclough (1992, 74) himself observes that ‘discourse analysis is in fact a multidisciplinary activity, and one can no more assume a detailed linguistic background from its practitioners than one can assume detailed backgrounds in sociology, psychology, or politics’. Secondly, analysing a discourse on the level of text, discursive frameworks and relationships, and wider discursive conditions, there is the question of the ‘effect’ that all three discursive dimensions have in their interplay on the individual ‘reader’, i.e. in the context of this thesis the EU’s citizens. As pointed out by Locke (2004, 73), it is in many cases that critical discourse analysts do not know. Obviously an assessment of

14 The conjunctual relevance of each case study in the context of an examination of the EU culture heritage discourse will be established at the beginning of each of the case study chapters.
the reactions of EU citizens to the Eurocratic culture heritage/identity discourse represents a useful addition to the CDA as conducted in this thesis. Yet, for two reasons, such analysis was not included. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, even though people’s reactions to discourses represent an interesting field of research, the character of a particular discourse as such is not determined by outside perceptions of it (Locke 2004, 73). Secondly, such analysis is prohibited by the sheer size of such an endeavour. A sufficiently large sample size would be required from each, or at least a large number, of the EU member-states (this already means excluding citizens’ reactions from ‘European’ non-member states, as well as extra-(EU)ropean/’European’ responses), resulting in a prohibitively large corpus. Further, the logistics of, for example, translating questionnaires into the twenty main languages spoken in the EU (or conducting interviews in those languages), distributing them all over Europe, and translating the responses back into English, are beyond the organisational possibilities, thematic focus, and word limit of this thesis.

2.3.3 Visual images as knowledge, power, and discourse

As highlighted in chapter 2.2.2, the critical discourse notion of ‘text’ is by no means limited to words and texts, but includes a wide variety of media. Representing a crucial aspect of the following CDA, it is in particular visual imagery as discourse that requires further theorisation.

Policies may inform the Eurocratic culture identity discourse on the institutional level, but they only achieve their full character and meaning when put into relation to practical projects built on this restrictive frame. Such projects are, however, not constructed and mediated through words alone, as the Western preoccupation with the written word may suggest. Instead, based on naturalised conventions, such visual/pictorial discursive ‘evidence’, including the material remains of the past itself, is loaded with symbolic content. It is in reference to the Eurocratic project of common culture identity construction that Graham (1998b, 43) refers to this ‘evidence’ as ‘iconographies of identity’, for there can be no signification without ideology. To quote Fairclough et al. (2004, 2), ‘[p]eople not only act and organize in particular ways, they also represent their ways of acting and organizing, and produce imagery projections [...] in particular discourses’. This holds especially true in

15 The term corpus, originally employed in the context of extensive data collections stored on computers, is used in the CDA literature to describe any body of discourse data (Taylor 2001b, 313).
that the present-day world, representing a thoroughly mediated environment, seems to have become obsessed with the visual (Gombrich 1960, 7; Ball and Smith 1992, 1-2; see also Fairclough et al. 2004, 2). Iconographies are not official EU doctrines or policies, yet they reflect the EU's wider underlying social premises, imparting an organisational, historical, and moral framework (Holmes 2000, 93-95; see also Hopkins 1994, 58; G. Rose 1996, 283). Representing an irreducible part of the organisation and naturalisation of social reality, while, at the same time, being legitimised and sustained by them, they become an important means of mediating power relations (Rogoff 1998, 15). To quote Torfing (1999, 183),

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\text{[r]epresentations can be viewed as the process through which unachieved particular identities are inscribed within a universal context... The link between the unachieved particular identities and the hegemonic agent, which, at the same time, provides the particular filler and undertakes the filling function, is established in and through representation.}
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Phrased differently, imagery conceptualises the ideological forms of discourse in order to generate and display society as fully developed and sutured identities (in this context, see also Žižek 1989, 33; 1997, 32-33; 2002, 181-182; 2005, 277-282 for the notion of ideological fantasy). They play a paramount role in the construction, maintenance, and expansion of any hegemonic project.

Based on this understanding, it becomes meaningless in the context of CDA to ask questions of how accurately a certain image copies the real world. Instead, the main concern becomes to understand how a certain image functions to produce a particular representation, as well as an understanding of the world in relation to representations: 'Instead of worrying about bias, it [is necessary] to elucidate the ways in which particular social power relations structure the meaning of an image' (G. Rose 1996, 283). It is in this context that the EU provides a promising opportunity, for, as pointed out in chapter 1.4.2, much of its imaging is consciously aimed at banal symbols (Wilson 2000, 155; see chapter 1.6 for the notion of banal symbolism). As has been highlighted by Sassatelli (2002, 436; see also Lister and Wells 2001, 61), it is in fact the detailed illumination of the specificity of EU cultural symbols and their use that, to this point, has received only marginal attention among scholars, making this study one of the first of its kind.
Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

Representations of the past are not simply by-products of positivist academic research. This insight developed as a strand of the culture-historic investigation of how science and culture interact. It was in the 1980s that questions concerning archaeological representations started to be reviewed in the context of the socio-political dimension of archaeological practice. North American archaeologists (e.g. Leone 1981b; Gero 1985; Patterson 1986a) were among the first to highlight how socio-political value frameworks determine the shape of representations of the past in both the academic and popular realm (Moser 2001, 265). During the following decade, post-processualists such as Shanks (1992), Moser (1992; 1995a; 1995b), Tilley (1993c), Carman (1995), and Stone (1997), aiming to link archaeological knowledge with the wider socio-political sphere, further emphasised the need to critically reflect on the medium of archaeological representations itself. In particular, they highlighted how the means by which a particular representation of the past gets 'written' plays a paramount role in determining its meaning(s) (Moser 2001, 263). It was then that the subject of archaeological poetics, aiming to identify the means, forms, and shapes through which archaeological knowledge designs, produces, and mediates its pasts, came to be firmly written into the profession's socio-political research agenda (Moser 2001, 263). Research on the different genres of communicating the past took the concrete shape of, for example, the role of museum displays, site representations, and archaeological reconstructions/illustrations (Walsh 1992; Stone and Molyneaux 1994; McManus 1996; Arnold et al. 1998; Collings 2007). Other studies focused on different media, such as film (Serceau 1982; Piccini 1996; Wyke 1997), popular magazines (Gero and Root 1990), popular literature (Evans 1983; Girdwood 1984; Landau 1984; Fagan 1987; Hackett and Dennell 2003; see also Auel 1991), children's books (Burtt 1987), graphic novels (Bjørkklid and Langfeld 1994), re-enactment (Sansom 1996), and souvenirs (Beard 1992). Most recently, computer-based/generated and multimedia representations of the past have come to the analytical fore (Forte and Siliotti 1996; Higgins et al. 1996; Dingwall et al. 1999). All of these media, or types of 'text', carry meaning because they operate as symbols standing for or representing the meanings their producers want them to communicate, whether that be conscious or not. Moser (1995b; 2001) and Mitman (1993; see also Mitchell 1998), in particular, flagged up how knowledge about the past becomes constructed and mediated to the wider public through

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16 By this term, I am referring to the arguments surrounding the interaction of science and culture being indicative of a temporally specific intellectual milieu, rather than to the designated archaeological paradigm.
processes of 'symbolic shaping' (Paasi 2001, 17; see also Panofsky 1970; Kress and van Leeuwen 1996; Paasi 1998). As we have seen through the example of the EU in chapter 1.4.2, it is in particular élites turning towards cultural symbols in order to support their interests (see Brass 1985 for other examples). In one of her latest contributions, Moser (2001) identifies two interconnected groups of representations. Firstly, there are academic modes of knowledge representation, such as in the shape of scholarly publications. Secondly, communicating to a much wider audience, there are non-academic modes, such as heritage sites, museums, and their associated displays. In most cases these two types of modes cannot be clearly separated from each other. Most notable here is Moser's (2001, 262) conclusion that there exists a lack of academic studies on non-academic modes of representation based on a dominant assumption of academic modes as being more important in shaping knowledge about the cultural past. This thesis aims to address this lack.

In order to analyse visual representations as cultural 'texts', this thesis employs Visual Content Analysis (henceforth VCA), a visual analysis tool, for its research methodology. VCA is a systematic, observational procedure allowing the quantification of visual representation by using explicitly defined categories. This methodological approach, representing one of the most widely cited kinds of evidence in Media Studies for many decades, allows generalisations about visual modes of representation in terms of observational evidence. Resting in a visual-anthropological understanding of optical records as being constructed (i.e. ideological), as well as being a concrete reflection of what is visible, its particular methodological usefulness lies in it representing 'the most basic way of finding out something about the [visual] media's meaning and allows for apparently general statements to be made about aspects of representation which non-specialists, journalists and experts alike can understand' (P. Bell 2001, 13).

To quote Collier (2001, 35), when we 'make a visual record we make choices influenced by our identities and intentions, choices that are also affected by our relationship with the subject'. Barthes (1977, 23) in his work on visual semiotics termed these choices 'photogenia'. As such, in its understanding of visual representation as ideological discourse, VCA lends itself for incorporation into wider CDA. To briefly go into more methodological detail, visual content analysis rests on the comparative quantification of explicitly defined categories

17 However, content analysis is not exclusive to visual data, but can be conducted on any kind of meaningful visual/verbal information (P. Bell 2001, 14-15).
Chapter 2: Theory and Methodology

(see P. Bell 2001 for a detailed discussion). Instead of analysing individual visual 'texts', 'it allows the description of fields of visual representation by describing the constituents of one or more defined areas of representation, periods or types of images' (P. Bell 2001, 14). Employing Collier's (2001, 39-45, 58-59) basic four-stage model for VCA, the first step consists of the observation of the data as a whole, and involves, in particular, the identification of connecting and contrasting patterns (contextual relationships). This is followed by the construction of an inventory of all images forming the database, followed by the definition of relevant variables and their values. As a third stage, VCA then classifies all 'texts' in question on specified, independent dimensions or 'variables' in order to characterise its totality (e.g. colour, position, perspective). Each variable consists of 'values', i.e. dissimilar elements of the same logical/conceptual kind. Statistical information (e.g. graphs, statistical analysis) is then employed in order to produce detailed description of the database's visual content. In a fourth and final stage, the search for meaning returns to the complete visual record, allowing details from the structured analysis to be placed in their wider - articulation-dependent - context. Defining their wider discursive significance, this allows us 'to make full use of the power of the visual record to define and convey meaningful statements' (Collier 2001, 45; see Bell 2001; Collier 2001 for an in-depth discussion of VCA).

2.3.4 Data evaluation in CDA

Having discussed discourse, in particular in terms of conjunctures, against the background of the EU's common culture identity project, a last methodological step becomes necessary. This takes the shape of a theorisation of the evaluation of data in CDA in general.

Discourses, which by their very nature are constantly contested in terms of power and knowledge, shape the way people experience and make sense of the social world around them. Thus, CDA represents a method of identifying such discourses, a way of 'seeing and researching social life as both constrained by social structures as well as an active process of production which transforms social structures' (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 1). It becomes a prime tool for perceiving and analysing inter- and intra-structural social reality. Yet, how does it evaluate its findings? To employ Torfing's (1999, 12; see also Dreyfus and Rabinov 1982, 184) general understanding, CDA represents 'a context-
dependant, historical, and non-objective framework for analysing discursive formations, [...] shedding light where formerly there was darkness'. Identifying patterns within the data, it is against this understanding that, in CDA, the role of the analyst becomes that of an interpreter, translating discourses created in one knowledge system into another (Taylor 2001b, 312-313; see chapter 2.2.3), and disciplining his/her discourse analysis 'by the analysis of practice' (Flyvberg 2001, 134). Against this understanding, this thesis avoids judging different understandings of social reality (discourses) as true or false, for ultimately it is impossible to determine where the scholarly expert ends and the politician begins. Numerous scholars of social research have referred to this phenomenon as a 'crisis' of evaluation (Taylor 2001b, 319; see, for example, Denzin and Lincoln 1998). It is, however, necessary to have some means of agreeing on the value of discourse analytical work. Yet, as highlighted by Taylor (2001b, 319), 'unfortunately no specific alternative criteria for the evaluation have gained widespread acceptance, although many have been proposed. Some have become better known than others but all are, inevitably, open to criticism'. Thus, it becomes a prerequisite for any scholar conducting CDA research to present an argument for the evaluative validity of the analysis.

Before going into any detail, as Taylor (2001b, 318) points out, CDA 'is a process of exploration and interpretation, and simultaneously, one of evaluation'. Yet, this process of evaluation/validation 'cannot be reduced to neat rules or technical procedures' (Taylor 2001b, 321; also Riessman 1993). Nevertheless, a number of criteria have been developed by leading discourse analysts. This thesis employs, as far as applicable, the general as well as specific criteria for evaluation as discussed by Taylor (2001b, 320-324). To begin with his general criteria, this thesis acquires its evaluative credibility by locating its research in relation to previously published work, challenging the claims of academics and other knowledge-elites (see chapters 2.1). Secondly, it is coherent. '[D]epending for its persuasiveness on argument rather than, say, emotional impact' (Taylor 2001b, 320), the following analysis is characterised by systematic investigation, or rigour. As suggested by Seale (1999), the following analysis incorporates qualitative as well as quantitative analytical techniques as a form of rigour and good practice. This includes detailed data description. Even though many discourse analytical projects employ solely qualitative techniques, it has been suggested that policy makers are more likely to be convinced by quantitative research (Taylor 2001b, 324). Aiming to have
impact on EU policy, this must thus be considered a prerequisite. Thirdly, and perhaps of most importance in the context of this thesis, there is the evaluation criteria of triangulation, referring to the use of more than one form of data in order to investigate the same phenomenon. In the field of content analysis (see above), this evaluative criterion has also been termed 'intra-coder reliability' (P. Bell 2001, 21). It is against this understanding that the case studies employed here, besides employing various types of data (e.g. text, images, interviews, material heritage), progress from the planning stage of EU heritage generation (chapter 3), via the implementation of the EU's message of a common European culture heritage on the ground (chapter 4), to the creation of heritage on the symbolic level (chapter 5). Further, they do so by employing multiple discursive articulations (see chapter 2.2.2). Fourthly, employing a fallibilistic approach, it seeks out, where possible, deviant cases in the data (see Seale 1999; Fairclough 2001). Fifthly, there is the validity criterion of good practice. Employing Potter and Wetherell's (1987, 169-172) understanding of this notion (a notion which they term fruitfulness), the coherence of the findings of the following CDA, as well as its ability to provide a basis for future work by other researchers (see chapter 1.6), provide it with analytical validity. In a similar way, Riessman (1993, 65-68) advocates the pragmatic use of any CDA to be characterised by its usefulness by others in the research community. With hardly any other scholarly work having provided so far an in-depth assessment of the EU's concrete culture heritage paradigm in relation to its discursive framework, this thesis provides an analytical point of departure for future work in this field. Yet, as highlighted by Taylor (2001b, 322), it is important not to blur this evaluation justification with a tacit claim of truth. This brings us to the notion of controversy, representing perhaps the most fundamental evaluative characteristic of CDA. As pointed out by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 38), social structure is not only dependent on its continuous instantiation in social interaction, 'but social interaction is also the nursery for new social forms and themes of all sorts out of which the materials are forged for new social relations, new social identities and new social structures'. It is in relation to this understanding that CDA aims to 'expose the scrutiny claims of inevitability, claims that the way things are is the way they have to be' (Fairclough et al. 2004, 1; see also Wodak 1996; Bach 1999, 95; Weiss and Wodak 2000, 79; McKenna 2004; Badiou 2005, 99), raising awareness, legitimising what used to be denied or negatively valued, and 'offering a voice to those who were previously unheard' (Taylor 2001b, 327). In short, the value of CDA is to a large
extent determined by its ability to challenge existing discursive structures and mechanisms in terms of oppression, and encourage change (in this context, see also Žižek 2001b, 225 for the notion of the 'split from within'). This aspect links very closely to van Dijk’s (1993b, 249; see also van Dijk 1993a) understanding of the purpose of CDA to be to expose how dominance is established discursively. In particular, any enquiry to spell out the character of a hegemonic discourse must look for ‘shock absorbers’ (Kay 2003, 138), i.e. groups onto which to off-load the discourse’s own inherent imbalance. In the context of the EU culture heritage paradigm, this means asking questions about the discursive means through which the Eurocratic meritocracy aims to turn the EU from an impersonal society into a community (in this context, see Žižek 1993, 209-214). As raised by Stone and Mackenzi (1989, 117) for the socio-political use of the past in the present in general, what themes and periods are employed, and, more importantly, what particular elements of the past are excluded in order to allow the promulgation of the officially accepted values and understandings of the dominant hegemonic group? It is in this understanding that this thesis, in representing a space for alternative constructions of social reality that are not usually heard in the context of EU culture heritage, aims to ‘violently’ disrupt the status quo, to puncture the prevailing ideology, and to contribute to socio-political change (see Taylor 2001b, 326; also Willig 1999, 16). Lastly, even though it does not in itself represent an adequate argument for the validity of analysis, there is the issue of relevance or topicality. There exists a timely connection between this thesis’ subject of research and a widely published socio-political event, the character and relevance of which has been highlighted in chapter 1.2 and 1.3. As Taylor (2001b, 323) remarks, the claim to relevance is ‘often made in introductions and conclusions to academic publications of analyses and, as such, is a feature of an accepted and persuasive style’. This must also hold true for this thesis. Ultimately, to paraphrase an argument made by P. Bell (2001, 26; see also Collier 2001, 36) in reference to content analysis, the findings of CDA (as well as social science studies in general) must be considered conditional in that they are bound by their theoretical and methodological context in which they are positioned, but they must also be considered ‘true’ until and unless they are contradicted by further evidence. Lastly, even though it might not be possible to assess the discourse analytical – and, thus, interpretive – findings of this thesis against an empirical positivist scale, it is, nevertheless, possible to evaluate them by putting the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm as implemented in practice (as revealed through
CDA) in relation to the Eurocrats' own claims and understandings of what is being implemented and achieved. This is an interpretive thesis supported by qualitative and quantitative data.

To add a purely technical note, references employed as data in the context of the case studies and subjected to CDA have their publication date shown in italics and appear in a separate bibliographic list at the end of the thesis (see CDA Database Bibliography). Doing so, contributes to the methodological accountability of the analysis. However, in order to avoid repetitive references unnecessarily obstructing the main body of text, the full title of each reference will only be provided at the first instance of its use in any given paragraph. Also, from this point onwards, all emphases in direct quotes belong to the original author.

2.4 SUMMARY OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

While we have no independent means of assessing what the reality of European culture heritage is, critical realism and CDA nevertheless allow us to assess social reality in terms of the concrete consequences that the proficiency to interpret and mediate (i.e. control) notions of Europe's the cultural past holds. As such, this chapter provided a conceptual framework allowing the Eurocratic use of the past, its objects, texts, and ideas in relation to its institutions, its notions of naturalised knowledge, and its underlying assumptions, to become subject to critical analysis. However, before turning towards the case studies, some final issues have to be raised.

As highlighted by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 22, 23, 25), although any discursive practice can be characterised in terms of its form of production, its location within a network of relationships, and its 'reflexive dimension' (people automatically generating representations of what they do as part of what they do), practices vary substantially in terms of their individual nature, extent, and complexity. They operate through complex and sophisticated technologies of mediation. As such, this thesis employs a variety of different sources to construct its CDA database. Due to the EU representing an extremely complex discursive practice, within which is located its culture heritage generation, its web of practice is hard to sketch and unravel. This begins with the many different institutions and stakeholders involved in the generation and execution of EU policy. It was thus necessary to limit the following case studies to some
of the most prominent or omnipresent — and thus most telling — practices within the EU’s culture heritage discourse. Also, due to the complexity of the EU as a discursive practice and the limits of this thesis, I am not conducting in-depth linguistic analysis of individual texts, such as grammar, composition, etc., providing, instead, a characterisation of the discursive thrust in a more general way. Not doing so would mean to lose out of sight the aim that is the characterisation of the EU’s culture heritage discourse as observable across a number of contextually relevant institutional articulations. Further, it must be pointed out that this thesis does not employ the responses of EU citizens to Eurocratic culture heritage measures in order to evaluate and give meaning to these measures. Even though representing an interesting field of academic enquiry, the discursive character of the EU’s culture heritage paradigm does not acquire its meaning through its citizens’ responses. To employ a brief explanatory metaphor, to argue EU notions of cultural identity to acquire their meaning in terms of the reaction of its subject citizens would mean to argue a, for example, racist statement to acquire its racist character not in the mouth of the person uttering it, but in the ears of those hearing it. This, however, would also mean that as long as the listener in question does not perceive a statement as racist, it couldn’t rightfully be called racist, and the statement could thus not be challenged. As such, the responses of EU citizens, within the temporal and logistical restrictions of this thesis, are not part of this body of work. CDA as employed in this thesis does not attempt to demonstrate how people understand or react to the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm. What it does is to determine what is given cultural priority or salience and what is not, asking questions about what discursive agendas and connections are given publicity and how (see P. Bell 2001, 26). Also, obviously the data employed depends on what is available, i.e. what can be tracked down and put into discursive context. In terms of policy documents employed for the case studies, this means that every attempt has been made to use sources written in English. This way the discursive material does not have to be translated, which would mean to add an additional layer of linguistic interpretation. In some cases, however, documents written in a different language have been employed due to issues of availability. After all, one should not forget that the EU also employs French, and to a smaller degree German and Spanish, as its official languages. As a final remark, whenever an English version of a document was not available, a German version was employed. Due to the author of this thesis being bilingual
(German and English), this ensures the translation and interpretation of text to take place with as much linguistic precision as possible.
CHAPTER THREE
THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE:
THE PLANNING STAGE

Chapter 1 has already told us of the problems faced by the Eurocratic meritocracy in its strive towards a united Europe rooted in the notion of a common cultural past. How would one approach these problems? Chapter 2 tried to explain that archaeology, CHM, as well as the social sciences in general have become more aware of the socio-political role played by the past in the present, and have made theoretical as well as methodological advances towards the analysis of this relationship. How can we therefore formulate guidelines for a (EU)ropean policy that overcomes these problems, allowing the EU to live up to its claims of cultural openness, diversity, and multi-vocality (see chapter 1.5.3). In order to propose an answer to this question, and to understand the EU’s concept of culture heritage, what it could be, and what it should be, I am going to examine the discursive character and likely effects of the present culture heritage policy using a number of case studies. In a first step, the following chapter will focus on the planning stage of EU culture heritage creation. This takes the concrete discursive articulation of the CoE, the EU’s main body of education, culture, and heritage, in general, as well as of the ECRP in particular.

3.1 THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The overriding relevance of the CoE for this thesis, and as a proxy for the EU, is determined by its institutional history, context, and objectives. Founded in 1949, the CoE represents Europe’s oldest supra-national political institution. It currently incorporates 45 countries with its headquarters in Strasbourg, France (Schwimmer 2003; see Huber 1999 for an in-depth history of the CoE). The framework for the CoE’s work on education, culture, and heritage is the European Cultural Convention (CoE 1954). Signed by all member states, this document encourages the study of ‘European history and civilisation’ (CoE 1954, 2). The CoE, however, is not equivalent with the EU. Instead, the two organisations are both distinct and complementary. All present 25 EU member states are also members of the CoE. In fact, while not being a prerequisite, no country has ever joined the EU without first having belonged to the CoE (CoE 2004). It is in this context that the CoE, in a policy document discussing the complementary and interactivity of culture and tourism, claims that through its very coming into being, European state governments ‘acknowledged that they
shared a heritage of values rooted in their culture’ (CoE 16.06.1994, 5). As such, as argued by Walter Schwimmer (2003), Secretary General of the CoE, in an address to the CoE entitled The Council of Europe at the Dawn of the 21st Century, the CoE is regarded to have played, and to still play, a crucial role in preparing – perhaps one should say grooming – countries for their membership of the EU.

3.1.1 Institutional aims and objectives

To go into more detail, with regards to this thesis, the importance of the CoE and its attached projects, as highlighted in the Vienna Declaration of the Summit of the State and Government of the Council of Europe (CoE 1993; also CoE 06.04.1994, 10; see also Dunne 1997, 5; Herbert 1997, 15), lies in it representing the Eurocratic ‘prime instrument’ for the safeguarding and strengthening of cultural heritage. Further, the CoE’s webpage postulates it to ‘promote awareness of a European identity based on shared values and cutting across different cultures’ (CoE 2004a; see also CoE 30.04.1990, 8; 2004b; in this context, see Smith 2000, 71; Wallace 1996, 17 for the notion of mythomoteurs). To quote Annegret Karstens, member of the CoE, in a policy report to the Council for Cultural Co-Operation (henceforth CDCC) on the institution’s aims and objectives,

[e]s gilt zu zeigen, daß Europa kein künstliches Gebilde, kein Abstraktum, keine politische und wirtschaftliche Neugründung auf der Grundlage zufälliger Nachbarschaft, sonder gelebte und lebendige Realität, die unter anderem – und dies bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit der einzelnen Regionen und Nationen – in mannigfaltigen Verbindungen, kulturellen Verwandtschaften in der Geschichte und Gegenwart, zum Ausdruck kommt.1

(CoE 11.10.1990, 1)

Clearly the child of its Eurocratic superstructure, the CoE’s idea of achieving this aim rests in the arms of the rhetoric device of Unity-in-diversity (see chapter 1.5.3). As the CoE (10.03.1992, 7, "Happy is he who, like Ulysses...": Cultural Routes, or How to Travel Differently) states in a policy report in the context of the ECRP, for the CoE this means

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1 'The aim is to show that Europe is no artificial construct, no abstract concept, no new political and economic entity on the basis of random neighbourhood, but a lived and alive reality, that, among other things – while taking into account all the diversity of the different regions and nations – finds expression in history and the present in terms of a multitude of connections and cultural-familial ties'. (translation by L. A. Dobson and S. Grabow)
embracing many quite specific and clearly differentiated identities, while at the same time linking them for the sake of both, the common parameters derived from the past and the desire to co-operate on the basis of the present situation.

Further reflecting general Eurocratic rhetorics of openness, multiplicity, and diversity, the CoE (11.01.1993, 2; see also EICR 2003c; 2004f), in its Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee report, states to have ‘analysed the current situation, which called for a generous and imaginative response from the Council of Europe on the basis of its fundamental values - a response which it intended to provide’. This response takes the shape of aiming ‘to use cultural co-operation to promote grassroots experiments in interculturality, foster the concept of cultural identity as the simultaneous sharing of several identities, and encourage education for democracy, tolerance and solidarity’ (CoE 11.01.1993, 2). As such, in societal terms, and to quote its Secretary general, the CoE’s foremost purpose is to ‘combat social exclusion and cultural isolation’ (Schwimmer 2003; see Huber 1999 for a detailed account on the CoE’s philosophy of inclusion). To emphasise this even more, the CoE, as stated on its webpage, perceives its work with culture and heritage as preventing European culture from being ‘misused to justify inter-cultural and inter-religious conflict’ (CoE 2004b; see also CoE 1996). It is against this background that amongst the Eurocratic meritocracy the CoE is widely acknowledged to represent the ‘Organisation of the One Europe’ (Schwimmer 2003), and the one to ‘help member states to develop a comprehensive approach to policies for cultural diversity’ (CoE 2004b). In short, by ‘teaching history’ (CoE 1996, Cultural Routes: History of the Project), ‘[t]he Council of Europe [...] quite naturally has as its task that of “creating” Europeans’ (CoE 10.03.1992, 7, "Happy is he who, like Ulysses...": Cultural Routes, or How to Travel Differently). The source used to achieve this aim, as stated by the CoE in its European Convention for the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage2, takes the shape of ‘all remains and objects and other traces of mankind from past epochs’ (CoE 1992; see Willems 1998; Olivier 2001, 176 for a critical discussion of this document). So, what shape does this process of creating Europeans by the means of the past take?

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2 This document is also known as the Malta Convention.
3.1.2 The CoE and cultural tourism

'[W]e will master the challenges ahead only if we do some "soul-searching".'

(Barroso 2004, 2)

As MacCannell (1992, 1; also Herbert 1997, 14) points out, 'tourism is not just an aggregate of merely commercial activities; it is also an ideological framing of history, nature, and tradition; a framing that has the power to shape culture and nature to its own end'. It is against such an understanding of the socio-cultural role of cultural tourism that for the CoE, the means to overcome the EU’s entativity problems (see chapter 1.3), and, thus, to create Europeans, first and foremost takes the shape of cultural tourism. As the CoE (16.06.1994, 8; in this context, see also Amin 2004) highlights in a landmark policy document bearing the title Culture and Tourism: Making Culture and Tourism Complementary and Interactive, the idea of culture experienced in dialogue between identities and of travel as enriching experience-life is the context in which the Council of Europe views the concept of cultural tourism... It means an encounter with persons and places (heritage sites, sites of significance to the collective memory, and places of inspiration), and the corollary discovery of oneself.

It can thus be observed that the CoE’s concept of cultural tourism is characterised by the same rhetoric dedication to organic-ness, diversity, and interactivity observed above for its general aims and objectives. This can be identified as one of the major themes to be found across the CoE’s policy landscape. To provide a second vivid example, from a policy report by D. Ranconi, member of the CoE, entitled "Happy is he who, like Ulysses...": Cultural Routes, or How to Travel Differently, and discussing the importance of cultural tourism for the CoE,

a European journey is par excellence a voyage of discovery to the many, varied, and original experiences of our common roots, our European memory, the spirit bequeathed to us by this area, this history, this geographical and historical proximity and promiscuity, these exchanges which have, in the religious, social, and cultural spheres, shaped our continent since prehistory. And which a political, cultural, and moral
desire for association and mutual assistance seems not to be lifting above our problems, our difficulties, and even our tragedies.

CoE (10.03.1992, 6-7)

It is in the same document that the CoE openly acknowledges its active use of cultural tourism as an identity-forming tool. By travelling Europe and experiencing its culture heritage, EU citizens are encouraged ‘to find contemporary meanings for ancient symbols’ (CoE 10.03.1992, 14). As the CoE (08.09.1997a, 2) elaborates in the concluding policy document to a seminar on the challenge of citizenship and sustainable development in the EU, the cultural route travelled ‘is not just a physical journey embarked upon as a sort of holiday tour; instead in social terms, it is always an internal journey that we make’. A similar understanding of the role to be played by cultural tourism can be found all across the CoE’s policy landscape. To quote from a CoE (16.06.1994, 8; see also CoE 07.04.1995, 1) policy document prepared in the context of the ECRP –which I shall discuss in more detail shortly – and entitled Culture and Tourism: Making Culture and Tourism Complementary and Interactive,

[c]ultural tourism, as it is understood by the Council of Europe, necessitates preparation, confrontation with the various realities, and, afterwards, a period devoted to appraisal, memories, and [...] dreams. This dimension makes travel more than a mere artistic pilgrimage: it opens the traveller’s mind and eyes to the entirety of the reality encountered.

Once again, in reference to the ‘confrontation with various realities’ and the opening-up to ‘the entirety of reality encountered’, the CoE highlights its rhetoric dedication to diversity and openness. This dedication cannot be emphasised enough, for it is against these rhetoric claims that the CoE’s projects on the ground have to be assessed. Sticking closely to the Eurocratic notion of the ‘eternal Europe’ (see chapter 1.5.2 Remembering the New Europe), the CoE’s idea(l) of culture heritage tourism takes the shape of a (EU)ropean ‘Road to Damascus’, an ideological ‘pilgrimage’ at the end of which stands the (self)discovery of the culturally qualified (EU)ropean. As the CoE states in the aforementioned document, ‘it is important to “make Europeans” even before “making Europe” if we are to transcend the identity as a source of conflict’ (CoE 16.06.1994, 6). However, such an aim, in particular in the context of the EU’s very concrete entativity problems (see chapter 1.3), calls for direct, concrete, and practical measures. Of particular importance in this context is the
ECRP, presented in a CoE (09.1993, 15) information leaflet as the CoE's 'most prestigious and emblematic' project of culture heritage. This 'flagship programme' (CoE 17.03.1994, 3, Practical Guide to Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe) will be discussed in the following.

3.2 THE EUROPEAN CULTURAL ROUTES PROJECT

Considering itself to represent an umbrella organisation for the development of society in Europe through cultural means, as expressed by Michel Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003), current Director of the ECRP, in an interview with the author, the CoE perceived itself as rather unsuited to deal in a concrete way with the 'very strange concept of culture heritage'. In particular, as stated on the CoE's (2003b, European Cultural Routes) webpage, the subject's 'pedagogy had largely been led on the theoretical level by the Council of Europe'. As further clarified by the CoE (24.03.1994, 2) in its Third Meeting of the Advisory Committee Meeting Report, it was in response to this perceived shortcoming/inability, and in order to conduct 'the 'practical work' of the construction of Europe', that the CoE 'invented, as a kind of support, the Cultural Routes Project and the European Institute of Cultural Routes' (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003). As a result, the ECRP was inaugurated by the CDCC in 1987, offering, to quote the CoE's (17.03.1994, 2) policy document Practical Guide to Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe, 'a prime living example of the virtues of transnational co-operation, in which all the main strands of the Council of Europe's work were forged together to form a coherent whole'. Developing culture heritage networks - also called itineraries - by interconnecting cultural sites (e.g. culture heritage sites), structural sites (e.g. museums and exhibition centres), service sites (e.g. hotels), and associated sites (e.g. tourist information offices), and working under the supervision of the CoE (CoE 2004c), its sole institutional purpose, as emphasised from the project's draft rules onwards, was to employ 'the richness of the material, immaterial, and natural heritage of Europe. It goes beyond the museological signposting of the European space: it explains the influences, exchanges, and evolutions, which have forged the European identity in its unity and diversity' (CoE 27.04.1997, 1).
3.2.1 Project history and structure

The history of the ECRP began in 1960, three years after the Treaty of Rome (EEC 1957) established the EEC (CoE 11.10.1990, 2). It was then that a CoE working group named 'Europe Continues' presented a draft report entitled *Collective Awareness of European Cultural Highlights and Their Incorporation into Leisure Culture* (CoE 01.10.1996, 6). Its conclusions moved towards the idea of rediscovering Europe's common heritage through travel (EICR 2003a, 1; 2003f). It was then, as stated on the CoE's (1996) webpage, that it was decided to 'place greater emphasis on cultural tourism, which is one of the best ways of using leisure time. Such tourism should above all serve as a social experience and provide the opportunity to develop individual sensitivity' among Europeans towards the (EU)ropean project. European citizens were to discover their European-ness through travelling to the important sites of the 'continent's' cultural past. Then, in 1965, the Merger Treaty established a single Council and a single Commission for the European Communities. Yet, it was not until 1985, with the results of the *Second Conference of the European Ministers for the Architectural Heritage* (CoE 1985), that the CoE decided to employ travel, in particular in the shape of culture heritage tourism, 'to make people aware of their heritage' (CoE 30.03.1987, 2), as expressed in a Secretary General's memorandum. One year later, during a discussion of the objective entitled *European Citizenship and Cultural Identity: Raising European Consciousness* in the Third Medium Plan (1987-1991), the CoE's Committee of Ministers made the CDCC responsible for activities enhancing awareness of Europe's cultural heritage, particularly in connection with the establishment of cultural routes (CoE 30.03.1987, 2). This led to Recommendation 987 of the Parliamentary Assembly and the mandate of the corresponding Ministers Committee that invited all members, as stated on the EICR (2003f) webpage, 'to encourage the launching of European cultural routes likely to highlight concretely the European cultural community'. One year later, in 1987, expressing active interest in the launching of cultural routes, the CDCC decided, on an experimental basis at first, to initiate a number of actions which might lead to the development of official European Cultural Routes (CoE 30.03.1987, 2; 25.05.1988, 4). The same year, following the Parliamentary Assembly's proposal to revive the medieval pilgrimage routes to Santiago de Compostela (*henceforth SdC*) in northwestern Spain, the CDCC launched the ECRP (see CoE 25.04.1996, 4-5 for a detailed account on the project's political impulse).
Established by the Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam in 1992, the presence of the EU further strengthened the administrative basis for the project, resulting in the foundation of the EICR as, to quote from a policy document entitled *Cultural Routes: History of the Project* (1987-1996), ‘breeding grounds for new proposals’ (CoE 25.04.1996, 12; see also CoE 1996; EICR 2003f). As highlighted by the current Director of the EICR in the aforementioned interview with the author, in practical terms, the purpose of this new, 'largely experimental' (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003) culture heritage institution was the implementation of the CoE’s Cultural Routes Programme by processing new ECR proposals, coordinating and providing technical assistance for the existing ECR networks, as well as mediating and publishing (CoE 1996; EICR 2003f). To quote the EICR from one of its information documents, it represents

> an institution intended to put together all the programme’s files and documents, to guide the promoters of already elected cultural routes, to help the carriers of new projects in the implementation of their actions, and to disseminate complete information about the programme.

(EICR 2003a, 4)

At a less technical level, to quote *in extenso* a CoE (25.05.1988, 5) General Secretary’s memorandum on Cultural Routes, the EICR

is intended to fulfil three aims: 1) making Europe’s common cultural identity more apparent and better appreciated and bringing the European public face to face with its shared cultural identity; 2) safeguarding and enhancing the European cultural heritage as a means of improving daily life and as a source of social, economic, and cultural development; 3) providing the public with new scope for fulfilment in their leisure hours by according a special place to cultural tourism and related practices.

Overall responsibility for the ECRP is unequally divided between three partners (Figure 3.1). The CoE is responsible for the approval of new proposals – which can be proposed by national authorities, regional or local authorities, associations, cultural institutions, or even individuals (CoE 06.02.1992, 2, *Management and Consolidation of the European Cultural Routes Set Up by the Council of Europe*) – as well as for the evaluation and continuity of the project. The EICR is liable for the coordination and technical assistance for the existing European Cultural Routes (henceforth ECR), the preparation of new proposals
with a view to their approval, the construction and maintenance of a database for the project, as well as the dissemination of this data through an information and communication policy.

Figure 3.1: ECRP organisational structure

Thirdly, the ECR networks carry out activities within the different elements of each individual project. Ultimately, however, it is the EICR only that holds the authority to 'analyse proposals submitted, bear responsibility for implementing activities, and for granting the "European Seal"' (CoE 25.05.1988, 6). The decision of granting a proposed route official ECR status must be based on careful consideration, for it commits the CoE and EICR to support and promote the project's spirit, aims, and content (CoE 09.10.1992a, 2). To quote from a CoE internal policy paper entitled Conditions for the Award of a "European Cultural Route" Seal of Approval, what is required is 'great caution in awarding the seal, and reliable guarantees as regards not only the content of the project and the methods adopted, but also the future of the route submitted for approval' (CoE 09.10.1992a, 2).

3.2.2 The project's material

Centring on themes dealing with 'typical' aspects of the 'continent's' past, 'Momente europäischer Zivilisation, die mehrere oder gar alle betreffenden Länder in einer bestimmten Epoche teilten' (CoE 30.03.1987, 3), the discursive material from which to generate ECRs takes the shape of culture heritage,

3'moments of European civilisation shared by some or all countries during a certain period' (my translation)
mainly in the shape of monuments, objects, and historical figures. This material is arranged as cultural routes, based on the triad of heritage, cultural identity, and tourism (CoE 25.04.1996, 12; see also CoE 10.11.1989; 30.04.1990; CEC 17.04.1996). In short, the ECRP’s purpose evolves around the creation, implementation, and development of operational culture heritage tourism networks across Europe’s regions. It is in this context that – as laid down by the CoE (30.03.1987, 2) in its first memorandum on ECRs, and remaining unaltered to the present day (see CoE 25.04.1996, 5; see also CoE 25.05.1988, 7; CoE 1996; EICR 2003a, 3) – a ECR is defined as ‘[a]n itinerary crossing one or more countries or regions, organised around cultural themes whose historic, artistic, or social interest is apparently European’. Culture heritage elements eligible for inclusion in an ECR, as one of the projects main foundational policy documents states (European Cultural Routes (Secretary General's memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport)), are considered to be those ‘whose cultural, historical, artistic, and social interest goes beyond the boundaries of region or [...] states’ (CoE 30.03.1987, 3; see also CoE 09.10.1992a, 2; 1998a).

Phrased differently by Annegret Karstens, member of the CoE, in her report to the CDCC, ECRs are ‘imaginäre Straßen die die Spuren und Zeugnisse solcher Kristalisationsmomente europäischen Denkens und Handelns in verschiedenen Regionen miteinander in Verbindung setzen’4 (CoE 11.10.1990, 1). These, however, must qualify as ‘European’ in character. To go into more detail,

> the application of the term ‘European’ to a route must imply a significance and cultural dimension that is greater than merely local. The route must be based on a number of highlights, with places particularly rich in historical associations, which are also representative of European culture as a whole.

(CoE 30.03.1987, 3)

It is those places particularly rich in historical associations – according to Eurocratic policy rhetorics – that will become the focus of CDA in chapter 4. For now, having highlighted the discursive material employed in the generation of ECRs, it is necessary to ask questions concerning the discursive character of the ECRP’s aims and objectives. For it is only in contrast to Eurocratic claims of institutional purpose that it will later be possible to assess the project’s discursive character as revealed through CDA.

4 ‘imaginary routes connecting with each other the traces and evidence of such crystallisation-moments of European thinking and doing in different regions’ (my translation)
3.2.3 The project's aims and objectives

Resting firmly within the EU's rhetoric paradigm of 'remembering the New Europe' (see chapter 1.5.2), the ECRP, as summarised by the CoE (25.04.1996, 11) in a policy paper on the history of the project, aims to 'bring back to life the networks on which European civilisation was built', a 'revitalisation (CoE 15.04.1994; also Egretaud 2004a, 1; 2004b, 1) making 'possible the reconstruction of Europe' (EICR 2003b). In the words of Michel Thomas-Penette (2000b, 3), Director of the EICR, its purpose is to overcome 'the amnesia of a common European history, an amnesia which evolved over a period of more than seventy years to respond to the geographical and political structure of two opposing camps [a capitalist West and a communist East]'. So, what character does this act of remembrance take?

Stating its economic interest not to extend beyond financial self-sufficiency, the ECRP, as emphasised in the EICR's (2003f) most important policy framework document for the project (The Cultural Routes Programme of the Council of Europe: A Framework for Cultural Co-operation), 'remains exclusively cultural', its interests lying, above all, as emphasised in a CoE (26.02.1996, 2) policy document entitled Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe - Culture and Tourism, in tourism as 'a social phenomenon that influences our perceptions of ourselves in relation to space and time, our cultural behaviour, and our way of relating to others'. It is in this understanding of cultural tourism as a social phenomenon (and thus social tool) that, as laid out in the draft rules for the project established during the fifth Advisory Committee meeting of the CoE, in developing itineraries, the ECRP claims to 'permit dispersed knowledge to be assembled together' (CoE 27.04.1997, 7). The aim of this knowledge as expressed in and through ECRs, as stated by the CoE (02.12.1996, 12) in a report on the challenges of citizenship in the context of the ECRP, is to offer 'an idea of Europe where concepts of nation, region, minority, and cultural community can be inserted in an all-embracing interpretation, coherent with the objective interdependence and the de facto multicultural European society'. European multicultural society is declared an unquestionable fact. This claim can be identified throughout the ECRP's discursive landscape. For example, the CoE (27.04.1997, 1; also CoE 16.06.1994, 13; 04.07.1997, 5; Capp 2004), in its draft rules, resulting from the fifth Advisory Committee Meeting, and laying down the project's institutional character, states it to represent 'an instrument for the readability of European values which stem from the complexity of cultures and
societies which have constituted Europe'. Also, the CoE (29.05.1990, 12; see also EICR 2003d), in an internal policy document entitled *Cultural Routes: From Ingurgitation to Dialogue* and discussing cultural tourism's possible effects on notions of identity, states the project as a whole to represent 'not a closed representation, a hard-and-fast whole to which the society providing the framework is reduced. Above all, it is an entrance based on a theme, an incentive, a suggestion for possible lingerings and wanderings'. It is 'not a visit of places and objects belonging to a given culture, but a journey through a significant whole' (CoE 29.05.1990, 9). In conclusion, it was from the first meeting of the 'European Itineraries' Group onwards, its results summed up in a policy document entitled *European Cultural Routes: Thoughts on Council of Europe Action in this Field*, that ECRs were regarded as one of the prime Eurocratic tools, a 'flagship programme' (CoE 17.03.1994, 3), for 'enhancing cultural pluralism' (CoE 20.01.1992, 2, *European Cultural Routes: First Meeting of the "European Cultural Itineraries" Group – Thoughts on Council of Europe Action in this Field*; also Thomas-Penette 1999, 7).

Of particular importance for the CoE/EICR in the context of cultural pluralism becomes the notion of the Other, or, more to the point its exploration and acceptance. To quote the EICR's (2003e) webpage, and highlighting the project's importance for our understanding of the EU's culture heritage paradigm, the ECRP forms part of 'a perpetual offensive of a continent, directed towards others. The case is unique'. Or, to quote the CoE (16.06.1994, 10) from a policy document on how to make culture and tourism complementary through the use of ECRs,

*the Council of Europe's cultural routes are a practical, open response to the need to bring together tourism and culture because they give practical expression to culture in a fundamental experience where the pure act of travelling is transformed into encounter and, in the end, understanding of oneself, of others and of the world.*

This rhetorical dedication also finds expression in the fundamental values to which the ECRP claims to adhere. To quote Thomas-Penette (1999, 7), Director of the ECRP, from an article entitled *Cultural Routes: Key factors in the discovery of a common heritage*, the project is rooted in 'respect for different religious or cultural identities, heritage protection, and transmission of the heritage in a manner sensitive to the outlooks of others'. It is in particular the claim to
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respect all faiths that is highlighted throughout the project’s policy landscape, such as in the case of the CoE (2003b) stating on its webpage the ECRP to offer

_a tangible and visible illustration of both the overall unity and the inherent diversity of European culture, corresponding perfectly to the aims and ideals of strengthening European identity while respecting to the full the cultural heritage and the beliefs of others._

It is in the same sentiment that the EICR’s (2005d; see also Prodi 2002) information leaflet on the ECRP states as one of its major aims ‘to promote intercultural and interreligious dialogue through a better understanding of European history’. In the succinct and poignant words of the EICR’s (2003e) webpage, ‘the project’s variations, research, education, heritage, creation, and cultural tourism, are among the aims, but respect of the other and exchange remain paramount’. It is against this Eurocratic understanding of the ECRP that it is claimed to highlight ‘the boundaries where Otherness begins’ (CoE 29.05.1990, 5), and, as further emphasised on the EICR’s (2003e) webpage, to translate this otherness into ‘attractive otherness’. This way, as stressed in a CoE (16.06.1994, 5; see also CoE 1996; 01.09.1997b, 2) policy document entitled _Culture and Tourism: Making Culture and Tourism Complementary and Interactive_, the project is stated to successfully ‘overcome a number of challenges: xenophobia, racism, nationalism, nervous withdrawal into closed identities, or, indeed, fundamentalism’. Taking all of the above together, the ECRP’s aims and objectives are characterised - as already observed for the EU (see chapter 1.5.3) and the CoE, the project’s institutional umbrella structure, in general (see chapter 3.1.1) - by claims of openness, multi-vocality, multiculturalism, and multi-faith. In particular the claim to respect equally all faiths will become of major importance in the following case study chapters.

The means by which to achieve this exploration of the _Other_, to quote the EICR’s (2004f) webpage, the crux lying at its paradigmatic core, takes the shape of making Europe’s past ‘subject to multiple discourses’ through the employment of a ‘mutivocal paradigm’ (CoE 11.01.1993, 2, _Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee Meeting Report_). As such, the EICR claims to practice a system of knowledge acquisition standing in antithesis to that of the nation-state, in which ‘intellectual practice is located within the state as ideology is produced, contested, and regulated through the creation of intellectuals in state funded institutions and state mediated processes of accreditation and
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authorization' (Smith 2004, 67). This claim to knowledge-diversity makes it necessary, in a next discourse analytical step, to turn our critical attention towards the project's institutional mechanisms of knowledge-generation, and to ask if and in how far such claims become practical reality for the ECRP's planning stage of heritage production. What type of knowledge deserves to be employed and propagated through cultural routes that bear the European Seal of Approval? How is it being generated, and does its character qualify for the claim of multi-vocality?

3.3 THE ECRP'S CHARACTER OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF EXPERTS

The role of expertise within the context of European Unification has become the object of increasing academic interest and debate. Studies range from those shedding light on how knowledge determines public policy due to the presence of experts and other epistemic communities to those analysing the policy entrepreneurship of various Eurocratic bodies (see, for example, Andersen and Eliassen 1993; Cram 1993; Pedler and Schaefer 1996; Richardson 1996; Radaelli 1999). Among many scholars of the socio-political, conclusive, generalising explanations of EU politics and policies have remained fashionable for decades (George 1985; Mazey and Richardson 1995; Schmitter 1996; Wallace 1996; Héritier 1999; Cram 2001). Yet, so far, the cultural policies of the EU administration have largely received attention too limited, general, and shallow to penetrate Eurocratic rhetorics (see, however, Rijksbaron et al. 1987; van der Staay 1987; Shore 1993; Schlesinger and Doyle 1995; Pantel 1999; Sassatelli 2002).

The EU represents a vast and complex élite-driven institutional network based on authority (Risse 2003, 3; see also Bromley 2001b; Bellier and Wilson 2000). This élitist authority roots in, and is at the same time characterised by, the possession and use of knowledge (see Smith 2004, 67). This should include the ECRP and its institutional bodies. Yet, as already highlighted above, both the EICR and CoE claim to have achieved exactly the opposite for the ECRP, the development of a multi-vocal and multi-discursive framework of knowledge evaluation and dissemination.
3.3.1 The ECRP's external notion of qualified knowledge

On its webpage, the EICR (2004c) defines the ECRP’s raw material as ‘the objects of heritage’. These objects, however, are regarded to have become increasingly complex and composite in that they

*are cut through by very different levels of reading. They become carriers of a subtle range of perceptions that play with history and memory, refusal and nostalgia, recovery and interpretation, concern for scientific and technical analysis, or appropriation without foundation.*

(EICR 2004c; see also CoE 09.10.1992a, 2)

As such, with all interpretations of the past being subjective, with no internal hierarchy based on the nature and character of explanation, the EICR acknowledges that the cultural past can and should be interpreted and presented in a plethora of different ways. In fact, the CoE (16.06.1994, 4), in the policy document *Council of Europe Cultural Routes – Culture and Tourism: Making Culture and Tourism Complementary and Interactive*, claims the ECRP to have developed ‘an ability to read at several levels and setting out the essential, with a view to appropriating the various manifestations of the cultural heritage’. In a similar fashion, the EICR (2004f) on its webpage, in a section entitled *European Mediations: Interpreting the European Heritage*, states the ECRP to highlight ‘the multicultural dimension of heritage and the plural dimension of its visiting’.

The practical means by which to achieve this multicultural and plural reading of the cultural past, as established by the CEC (04.12.2001) in its *Science and Society Action Plan* for EU institutions in general and by the CoE (11.10.1990) in a summary report specifically for the ECRP, takes the shape of an opening-up process ‘providing opportunities for the voicing of alternative views (‘a competition of ideas’)’ (CEC 04.12.2001, 22) from the ECR planning stage onwards. As Michel Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003), current Director of the ECRP, highlighted in an interview with the author, ‘[i]n terms of the European Cultural Routes project, perhaps the most important step was for the Council of Europe heritage sector when they decided to stop with the idea of basing all heritage on the idea of consensus, acknowledging that we also have to face the values of conflict and disagreement’. The institutional mechanism to achieve this aim takes the shape of the internal composition of the team of interpreters.
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(as opposed to legislators)\(^5\) put together by the EICR in order to develop a proposed cultural route into an ECR culture heritage network qualifying for the CoE's European Cultural Route Seal of Approval. To quote a CoE (11.10.1990, 3) report on the ECRP, ‘[h]ier sind nicht nur Fachleute, Wissenschafter aus allen Ländern gefragt’\(^6\). Instead, as emphasised by Marc-Henri Piault in a CoE (07.04.1995, 8, A Land Invented, Dreamed, and Built) report, a team's members should come from a variety of different backgrounds, including 'historians, ethnologists, curators of museums, social and economic players, small farmers and intellectuals originating from the area or linked to it by ties and affection'.

The CoE (29.05.1990, 10), in a policy document entitled Cultural Routes: From Ingurgitation to Dialogue, regards this necessity to evolve over the danger of experts exploiting the past for their own means: 'There is always a possibility that cultural and environmental raw materials will be purely and simply exploited by experts'. He continues, 'culture would then represent only an amorphous deposit to be mined by any entrepreneur, a kind of "vacant property" of which the first occupant could take possession'. In rejection of this, to quote another policy report, the ECRP is stated to represent 'a practical approach to the tricky problem of combining the good intentions of intellectuals' (CoE 10.11.1989, 4, Cultural Tourism in Europe - Prospects for the Production of Cultural Routes; see also CoE 27.04.1997, 7, 5th Advisory Committee Meeting: Draft Rules) with that of other stakeholders in the cultural past. Moreover, in doing so, the CoE (1998a; see also CoE 25.10.1993, 7), in its Resolution (98) 4 on the Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe, claims the ECRP to 'rise to activities which break down the barriers between professionals and non-professionals', and to adhere to the CEC's (04.12.2001, 19, Science and Society Action Plan; see also EP 06.11.2001) general requirement for EU funded knowledge-generation to be based on an open dialogue between 'the scientific community, religions, cultural groups, philosophical schools, and other interest groups'.

In summary, rooted in the rejection of any monotheistic interpretation of Europe's cultural past, in particular in terms of faith, the CoE and EICR present the ECRP as a new type of culture heritage project, a project incorporating

\(^5\) Bauman (1987) defines two roles fulfilled by knowledge disseminators, interpreters who translate discourses from one knowledge system into another and legislators who speak as authoritative institutional experts.

\(^6\) '[w]hat is needed here is more than only experts and scientists from many different countries' (my translation)
democratic values in its institutional structure, aims and objectives, and notion of qualified knowledge. Yet, what happens to this democratic ideal of culture heritage generation in institutional practice?

3.3.2 The ECRP's internal notion of qualified knowledge

As demonstrated above, in terms of notions of qualified knowledge and knowledge-generating mechanisms, the ECRP is presented as being based on democratic and open dialogue, resulting in a fresh way of appropriating the cultural past. This democratic approach, however, changed drastically in 1991, just before the establishment of the EICR. It was then, due to the enlargement of the CDCC framework following the entry of Central and East European countries (see Berglund et al. 1995 for an in-depth discussion), as well as in expectation of the EICR the next year, that the CoE saw the need to clarify the ECRP's aims and to redefine its working methods. Two years later, this 'process of reflection' (CoE 1996), as it is termed in the policy report Cultural Routes: History of the Project (1987-1996), was further influenced by the Vienna Declaration (CoE 1993; see also CoE 01.10.1996, 7). It is against this background that the CDCC and CoE, as stated in numerous policy documents and reports, decided to devote 1992 to 'a thorough stock-taking, to in-depth discussion of the aims, objectives, working methods, and partnerships of the cultural routes' (CoE 1996; see also CoE 20.01.1992, 2; 01.07.1994; 01.02.1997). With the ECRP - the flagship of the CoE's cultural activities - having 'taken on symbolic value in terms of the Council of Europe's work' (CoE 20.01.1992, 2, European Cultural Routes: First Meeting of the "European Cultural Itineraries" Group - Thoughts on Council of Europe Action in this Field), highlighting once more the importance of the ECRP for any scholarly enquiry into the EU's culture heritage discourse, this was considered of particular importance. As such, it became more and more important to keep control over the symbol's symbolism. According to the CoE (25.03.1994, 3), to quote from an internal policy document laying down new rules for the ECRP entitled Project Redefinition and Methodology, the reason for the redefinition of the ECRP's working methods was the 'uncontrollable mushrooming of initiatives'. Providing more detail on the issue, the CoE's webpage on the history of the ECRP states the project to have been suffering from the 'proliferation of numerous local cultural routes of mainly minor interest to European heritage' (CoE 1996), as well as from 'a multiplication of proposals made to the secretariat from private sources concerning new themes' (CoE 1996). As a result, the coherent processing and assessment of new
proposals is stated to have been 'hindered by a lack of precise criteria' (CoE 1996), leading to the 'dilution of the original idea' (CoE 1996), and preventing citizens from arriving 'at a clear understanding of what really constitutes Europeans' (CoE 16.06.1994, 4).

In order to take action against these factors perceived to damage the ECRP's institutional purpose, and to achieve 'a greater degree of coherence from the multitude of possible themes' (CoE 1996), the CoE decided, as a first step, to establish priority criteria. The first of these was labelled Peoples, incorporating 'specific contributions that peoples have made to the foundations of European civilisation and the significant influences they have had' (CoE 1998b, Explanatory Memorandum Concerning the Rules). The second priority criteria was entitled Migrations, focusing on 'the movements of population, whether voluntarily or forced, even those which took place on a small scale' (CoE 1998b). The third and last was termed Civilisation's Major Developments, coalescing culture heritage elements highlighting 'the spread of the major European currents of civilisation in the fields of philosophy, religion, the arts, science and technology, and trade' (CoE 1998b). In doing so, instead of incorporating 'all types of knowledge which characterise society' (CEC 17.04.1996, 3), as called for by the CEC in its Green Paper - The Role of the Union in the Field of Tourism, the CoE put forward an internal policy framework contributing to exactly the opposite, limiting the Eurocratically approved cultural past to a narrowed-down, predefined selection of culture heritage themes. In terms of the establishment of functioning culture heritage networks, this also meant to appoint acceptable official partners, taking the shape of ministries, local authorities, and universities (CoE 10.02.1992, 2, First Meeting of the "European Cultural Routes Group - Co-Operation with New Partners). Acceptable private partners came to be deemed national and specialised associations, in particular the mass media and national associations of private owners of historic monuments (CoE 10.02.1992, 3). What this means is that partners deemed qualified were restricted to a small group, with private stakeholders in the past, as far as the networks are concerned, only being deemed qualified partners in so far as they hold the authority to grant access to privately held culture heritage sites. Instead of providing a framework characterised by openness, multiplicity, and inclusively, a claim that has been highlighted above and that can be identified across the ECRP's discourse landscape (e.g. CoE 29.05.1990, 9; 16.06.1994, 4; 2004b; EICR 2003e; 2004f), it is
the rules for the selection of themes and partners that violate the project’s institutional credo. As Raymond Weber, then Director of Education, Culture, and Sport of the Council of Europe, puts it in a speech on the purpose of the ECRP, ‘[t]he Cultural Route is not there to impose values’ (CoE 01.09.1997b, 3). Yet, as demonstrated above, they - perhaps inevitably - do in a way determined and controlled by the Eurocratic bodies involved responsible for the project.

In summary, the process of reflection on working methods, in order to end the ‘uncontrollable mushrooming of initiatives’ (CoE 25.03.1994, 3), channelled, and thus limited, the ECRP’s notion of qualified knowledge. Abandoning notions of openness and multi-vocality, the ECRP was transformed, based on a revised internal policy framework, into what was hoped to be a more controllable initiative. In doing so, the ECRP must be considered part of a wider Eurocratic policy shift from the 1990s onwards aiming, as stated by the CEC (25.07.2001, 27) in its White Paper on European governance, for ‘the Union to speak more with a single voice’. The practical means by which to achieve this single voice took the shape of experts. Their role shall be the subject of the following investigation.

3.3.3 The role of experts

The means by which to ensure a singular voice for the ECRP, while allegedly still allowing for the past to be interpreted in a multitude of different ways, took - and still takes - the form of scientific experts from complementary disciplines. It became their duty, to quote an internal report on the ECRP (CoE 10.03.1992, 9, Happy is he who, like Ulysses...‘: Cultural Routes, or How to Travel Differently), to ‘define the subject, explain its European meaning and place it in its European context’. The role of the ECRP’s groups of experts became to research, assemble, and present the European themes on which to build ECR networks. Instead of assembling mutivocal teams of interpreters, as propagated towards the public (see chapter 3.3.1), their role was that of legislators, speaking as authoritative institutional experts (see Bauman 1987). While continuing to present the project as a democratic endeavour characterised by multiple and diverse readings of the cultural past towards the outside, the CoE produced three policy documents determining the role to be fulfilled by the experts. The first was entitled Some Thoughts on the Procedures to be Applied When Creating a New Council of Europe Cultural Route or When Adding to an Already Existing Council of Europe Cultural Route (CoE 09.10.1992b), the second
New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of Experts: Draft Agenda and Introductory Report (CoE 04.11.1993; see also CoE 25.10.1993), and the third New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of Experts: Meeting Report (CoE 06.04.1994). Based on these internal policy documents, in order to be considered for the award of the European Seal of Approval, a scientific qualification was made of paramount necessity for any ECR proposal. To quote the CoE’s (09.10.1992b, 1) major conditions for application,

[t]he proposal to create a new route or to join an existing route would be presented to the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. The proposal would be accompanied by: (1) a (scientific) definition of the theme; (2) a justification of the choice of theme. The applicant would also supply: (3) an inventory of the places to visit; (4) other scientific texts.

In terms of themes and culture heritage elements to be included, ‘to define the subject, explain its European meaning and place it in its European context’ (CoE 10.03.1992, 9, Happy is he who, like Ulysses...': Cultural Routes, or How to Travel Differently), and in order to prevent the allegedly uncontrolled mushrooming of readings of the cultural past as perceived by the CoE, scientific experts became the sole evaluators of potential ECRs. In short, ‘setting up groups of experts, and defining content, marks the first stage in the implementation of the routes’ (CoE 11.01.1993, 3, Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee: Meeting Report Prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport). To quote another internal policy document, produced by the Advisory Committee for the Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe and entitled Practical Guide to Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe (17.03.1994, 4), informing the role of knowledge-élites in the context of the ECRP, ‘Cultural Routes provide ready-made itineraries and thus help to promote cultural tourism. But they are also developed at a more abstract and theoretical level by enabling specialists to exchange knowledge, research and opinion’. Hand-in-hand with this, the role of the CoE in the development of new ECRs was redefined as to ‘control the scientific quality of the route’ (CoE 09.10.1992a, 2, Conditions for the Award of a "European Cultural Route" Seal of Approval). It can thus be observed that, while continuing to propagate to adhere to values of multi-vocality and diversity, the changes made to the ECRP’s internal policy framework in the years following 1991 turned the project into one in which the Eurocratic élite employs another élite, in this case a knowledge élite, at the expense of anyone not belonging to either of the two groups. This makes it necessary to ask what, according to the CoE/EICR,
characterises (i.e. qualifies) an expert. As emphasised by Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003; also CoE 01.07.1994, 3), Director of the EICR, in an interview with the author, even though many different partners are involved in the ECR networks, viable experts for the assessment of the overall theme and culture heritage content are considered only scholars who have done work on a special field, and who, thus, have a certain expertise. But, of course, it can also be a politician who has expertise in the field of tourism or in building up links between countries. But mainly it is scholars of different kinds.

As the meeting report on New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of Experts (CoE 04.11.1993, 10) further specifies, qualified scholars are considered those who 'have almost always worked on a single theme and within groups which are themselves monothematic, and even monodisciplinary', and who are 'recognised by their peers for their very comprehensive knowledge of a theme' (CoE 25.10.1993, 8, First Meeting of Leaders of Networks: Draft Agenda and Introductory Report; also CoE 04.11.1993, 11). As such, as Thomas-Penette (2000a, 2), in a speech at a CoE seminar entitled Europe Continues: Cultural Values and European Citizenship, states for the ECRP knowledge base in general, it 'relies on the support of intellectuals, scientific experts, pedagogues, museum managers... By and large, it is these participants who will constitute, all along the policy process, the expert Scientific Committee which will endorse the proposed lines of action'. This way, in limiting the function of interpreter to a single type of qualified knowledge-producer dependant on the recognition of the other members of the in-group, the Eurocratic élite ensures a minimal, and thus easily controllable, scope of 'knowledge intake variety' (henceforth KIV). It is in this context that the CoE's (04.11.1993, 11, New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of the Experts: Draft Agenda and Introductory Report) call for 'interdisciplinary analysis' should not be confused with inclusivity in terms of multi-vocal knowledge appropriation and generation. Though the CoE emphasises the necessity of experts involved in the ECRP to show 'their willingness to break down the barriers between disciplines' (CoE 06.04.1994, 4, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe - New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of Experts: Meeting Report), we are dealing with analysis and evaluation conducted by, and between, mutually recognised members of the academic disciplines only.
To conclude on the planning stage of the ECRP’s culture heritage paradigm in general, since 1991, as has been emphasised by Ritva Mitchell, Programme Advisor at the Council of Europe, in a speech given at the opening session to the CoE seminar entitled Challenges of Citizenship and Sustainable Development, the major part of its knowledge has been, and continues to be multidisciplinary, peer-recognised academic research carried out by experts in a particular field (CoE 01.09.1997a, 3; also CoE 1998a, Resolution (98) 4 on the Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe). It is at the same time that contributions from outside the academy are excluded. The ECRP thus fails to qualify for its own claims to multi-discursivity. This phenomenon has previously been described in the literature by Fischer (1994, 7). Seeking specifically academic specialisation, whilst presenting rhetorics of multi-vocality externally, it is mono-vocality that is internally enforced though the ECRP’s policy framework of knowledge generation and qualification. Taking this into account, how can the CoE claim the teams establishing the discursive character and content of individual Cultural Routes ‘to represent the people for whom the routes are being designed and made available’ (CoE 10.03.1992, 9, ‘Happy is he who, like Ulysses...’: Cultural Routes, or How to Travel Differently)? Such a discursive distance between the values the ECRP projects towards the outside and those it enforces towards the inside, this gap between the project’s internal policy discourse of knowledge qualification/generation and its institutional self-perception in terms of open discourse and encouraged multi-vocality, calls for critical reflection within Eurocratic circles of culture heritage. The CoE’s and EICR’s focus on peer-recognised scholars can best be explained as part of a wider Eurocratic reliance on the scientific expert as legislator and interpreter, thus showing its institutional origin. As has been observed by Pedler and Schaefer (1996) and Joerges et al. (1997), the EU as a whole relies on a plethora of working groups, standardised bodies, and committees of experts. This roots in a perceived, and believed in, link between expertise, simple and clear communication, and an expected rise in public confidence in EU institutions. This conviction finds one of its most poignant expression in the CEC’s White Paper on European Governance (CEC 25.07.2000, 33; see also CEC 04.12.2001, 21): ‘Scientific and other experts play an increasingly significant role in preparing and monitoring decision... [T]he institutions rely on specialist expertise to anticipate and identify the nature of the problems and uncertainties that the Union faces’. In short, as poignantly expressed in the CEC’s (04.12.2001, 6; see also CEC 04.12.2001, 22) Science and Society Action Plan: Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, the main Eurocratic policy guideline on the role to be played by scholarly knowledge in the EU, experts are employed in order to provide 'easy answers to easy questions'. It is in this understanding that the EU's comprehension of qualified knowledge employs the traditional European nation-state framework for governmental knowledge-generation and -dissemination, in which making sense of the past is 'reserved to objective, dispassionate, infallible academics' (Lowenthal 1996, 116). To illustrate this discursive dedication to traditional elitist notions of qualified knowledge further, I would like to employ two brief, seemingly fatuous examples, one of a book and one of a building.

Starting with the book, I will have a closer look at the ECRP's most successful publication to date, the SCPR guidebook (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, Guide Européen des Chemins de Compostelle), the sole source of information regarding the detailed layout of the routes' network and the culture heritage sites included. Only by using this book is it possible to travel and experience the SCPR as created by the CoE/EICR. In short, the guidebook is the SCPR's database. I will compare its physical characteristics with Trigger's (1989b) A History of Archaeological Thought. I am doing so because both books are soft-backed with about the same dimensions, the importance of which will become apparent. While being of similar format, the guidebook, with 1.23 kilograms, weighs 1.7 times more than A History of Archaeological Thought. With its 568 high-quality glossy pages, the guidebook even encompasses 68 pages more than Trigger's book. Put more directly, the guidebook is extremely heavy for a soft-back publication. Thus, it is on the basis of its physical characteristics that it becomes a 'tome' of knowledge and wisdom. To intensify this discursive effect, the more than 800 photographs of culture heritage sites included in the guidebook provide physical 'proof' for the Eurocratic understanding of the relevant themes and elements of Europe's cultural past. As such, the SCPR guidebook reflects the wider CoE publication policy, in which the presentational quality, in particular through the use of photographs, is of paramount importance: 'Everyone knows the American "National Geographic" magazine, with its accurate reports and its superb photos, it is truer to life than nature itself' (CoE 10.03.1992, 14, 'Happy is he who, like Ulysses...': Cultural

7 Those perceiving a factor of 1.7 as no considerable weight difference between books of the same cover type and dimensions should try it with some of the books available at home. Even when testing books at the local library, it is very hard to find two books with a higher differential factor between them.
Chapter 3: The Planning Stage

Routes, or How to Travel Differently). The Eurocratic understanding of Europe’s typical culture heritage becomes itself something bigger than life. To quote a CoE (29.05.1990, 6) policy report by M. H. Piault entitled Cultural Routes: From Inauguration to Dialogue discussing in detail the CoE’s publication policy in the context of the ECRP, brochures and publications produced with an emphasis on high-quality photos ‘offer the man-in-the-street [sic] conditioned destinations, risk-free, calculated in time, and in relative expenditure, and pick out the most common expressions, they would look not unlike a poetical inventory of the obvious’. Having first limited the character of qualified knowledge to be employed in the ECRP to that produced by groups of scientific experts, the CoE’s publication policy on the project, as characterised here by two brief examples, aims to present this discourse as natural, objective, and thus unquestionable. It thus further discourages multi-vocality and diversity. This élitist paradigm of control over the cultural past can also be identified for a second example, namely the EICR’s geographical location. For the last decade, the institute has been situated in the Tour Jacob, overlooking the city of Luxembourg (EICR 2004g) – a city nicknamed the ‘Gibraltar of the North’ due to the number, size, and extent of fortifications built from the 10th century onwards. It is here that meetings, workshops, and conferences are held. It also houses the project’s public access resource database. Built in 1428 AD and restored in 1994, the Tour Jacob is part of the city’s 15th century fortifications, having once served as one of its main entrances. This tower, with its thick walls, small windows, and massive dimensions, rises high above and dominates its surroundings through its sheer physical presence (Figure 3.2). This way, the EICR, as well as the ECRP that it represents, visually presents itself as the guardian and protector of qualified knowledge of Europe’s cultural past (see chapter 2.3.3 for a discussion on the ideological role of the visual in the construction and maintenance of power relationships). In particular when taking into account that the plateau on which the tower is built is redolent with the military-architectural marks of domination (walls, towers, turrets, barracks, etc.) left by the numerous regimes who have occupied the city in the past (e.g. Burgundians, Belgians, Habsburgs, Prussians, Spanish, French, and Austrians) (National Historic Monuments Commission of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 1995, 13-14), it can be argued that the EICR moving into the Tour Jacob for its headquarters represents only the latest in a long line of ‘conquerors’. The Tour Jacob becomes physical embodiment of the often-conjured cultural ‘fortress Europe’ (Dunne 1997, 22; Morley 1998; Heintz 2001, 38).
This symbolic power, and the EICR's awareness of it, could also explain why for many years the EICR has heavily, and to this day successfully, resisted a move on the part of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to relocate the institute in new, specially constructed premises (pers. comm. Sorina Capp, EICR Chief Administrator, October 2003).

As the analysis of the planning stage of the CoE's and EICR's internal policy framework of knowledge generation in the context of the ECRP has demonstrated, explicit claims to values of multi-vocality and diversity must be considered largely rhetoric. These rhetorics disguise the thoroughly élite character of a project in which scientific experts become the main source of truth for European society. What this institutional élitism allows at the expense of a practical multi-vocality is to make Eurocratic measures of common identity construction more controllable, thus potentially intensifying its ideological thrust. The discursive 'energy' of the ideological paradigm in question, in an attempt to maximise its discursive thrust, is minimised in terms of discursive 'spread'. Yet, what happens when the panel of experts put together to arrive at an agreed definition of a particular ECR, in their role as interpreters, fails to do so? What if they 'fail' to provide 'easy answers to easy questions' (CEC 04.12.2001, 6; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Science and Society Action Plan)? What if the experts' interpretation

Figure 3.2: Tour Jacob, Luxembourg (photograph by S. Grabow)
stands in paradigmatic opposition to the Eurocratic idea(l) of a unified Europe of the past? In order to shed light on these questions, the following case study conducts CDA on one of the ECRP's projects, namely the TCCR. This underdeveloped and unsuccessful case of an ECR (pers. com. Sorina Kapp, EICR Chief Administrator, October 2003; Thomas-Penette, Director of the EICR, 17 October 2003) allows us to illuminate who ultimately determines the character of knowledge of the past as expressed through the ECRP. Even though the TCCR represents only one of the project's ECRs, it represents a discursive articulation transparent enough (as the ability to conduct CDA is always context-dependent) to allow us observations concerning the final act of decision-making.

3.4 'THE CELTS' CULTURAL ROUTE

Before turning our analytical gaze towards the TCCR, it is necessary to theorise the paradigm of the Celts in terms of its recent revival in European popular culture. In particular, the following section will highlight the Celtic paradigm as encouraged, supported, and mediated by EU bodies of culture heritage. This will allow the positioning of the TCCR within its wider discursive framework.

3.4.1 Europe's recent 'Celticisation'

As pointed out by Dietler (1994, 585), the term 'Celtic' has been applied to everything from a Boston basketball team to a Scottish football team, from holiday resorts to health insurance companies, from music style, literary genre and style, to religion and spirituality (see Aldhouse-Green 1999; Falaky Nagy 1999; Ford 1999; Ó Briain 1999; Price 1999; Bowman 2000; Thornton 2000). In many cases it is used to denote a perceived link with what is understood as the Celtic ethnic and cultural heartland, usually regarded to be Ireland, Scotland, and Wales (Dietler 1994, 585; see Payton 2000). Over the last decades, the Celtic paradigm has proved itself to be a socio-cultural success story. It is in this context that an ever-growing number of EU-, mainly CoE-, sponsored publications and exhibitions focused on the Celts as embodying an early form of united Europeans, similar in many ways to EU citizens of today. This discursive paradigm has been identified and described in detail in chapter 1.5.2 (Remembering the New Europe). This includes exhibitions as early as the 1970
exhibition *Krieger und Salzherren*\(^8\) at Mainz, Germany (Angeli and Barth 1970), focusing on the spectacular finds from the Iron Age salt-mining centre at the Dürnberg, Germany, as part of a continent-wide trade network. Another example is the 1980 exhibition *Die Kelten in Mitteleuropa*\(^9\) at Hallein, Germany (Pauli 1980). Spelling out the use of the Celtic paradigm in support of modern-day European Unification most poignantly, the 1980 EU-sponsored Austrian exhibition *Die Hallstattkultur* (trans. The Hallstatt Culture) was already subtitled *Frühform Europäischer Einheit*\(^10\) (Straub 1980).\(^11\) A continuous intensification of this trend led to the development of what Megaw and Megaw (1992, 254) termed EU-funded ‘Celtic block-buster exhibitions’, such as the 1992 Palazzo Grassi exhibition *The Celts: The First Europe* at Venice (Moscati 1991) announcing the Celts as (EU)ropean citizens’ direct ancestors, a development well-documented in the academic literature (Biehl and Gramsch 2002, 367; see also Dietler 1994; 1998). To quote from the exhibition catalogue foreword (Leclant and Moscati 1991, 4), the exhibition

> was conceived with a mind to the great impending process of the unification of Western Europe, a process that pointed eloquently to the truly unique aspect of the Celtic civilisation, namely it being the first historically documented civilisation on a European scale... We felt, and still feel, that linking the past to this present was in no way forced, but, indeed, essential, and could effectively call us back on our common roots.

Within the same paradigm of ‘remembering the New Europe’, the introduction to the 1990 exhibition *Les Celtes en France du Nord et en Belgique VIe-ler siècle avant J.-C.*\(^12\) (Kruta 1990, 8), also EU-funded, explicitly states that

> [t]he history of Europe begins with the Celts. The Celtic peoples were able to develop an original culture of great richness, the reflection of a singular spirit, which will remain henceforward an essential component of the intellectual evolution of our countries. The multiform heritage of this ‘First Europe’ remains no less today one of the principal factors of our cohesion.

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\(^{8}\) ‘Warriors and Salt-Lords’ (my translation)

\(^{9}\) ‘The Celts in Central Europe’ (my translation)

\(^{10}\) ‘An early form of (EU)ropean Unity’ (translation by Megaw and Megaw 1992, 258)

\(^{11}\) Under the rules of the German language, the use of the term *Europäische Einheit*, in particular in reference to its earlier form, is always, but implicitly, employed in reference to the EU. As such, Megaw and Megaw’s (1992, 258) translation of it into ‘(EU)ropean Unity’ must be considered well-informed.

\(^{12}\) ‘The Celts of Northern France and Belgium 6th-1st Century BC’ (my translation)
The overwhelming success of these exhibitions led numerous scholars to speak of a European 'Celtomania' closely linked to the EU's self-justificatory search for examples of united Europes in the past (Sims-Williams 1998, 1; Biehl and Gramsch 2002, 367; see also Haywood 2004). Latest exhibitions on the Celts – such as The Mystery of the Celts of Glauberg: Faith-Myth-Reality, which attracted 102,841 visitors between 24 May and 01 September 2002 (Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt 2002), or Das Fürstengrab von Hochdorf (Keltenmuseum Hochdorf 2004) – emphasise the continuation of this trend. This 'Celtomania' can also be observed in other areas of present-day culture, such as the success of so-called 'coffee table' publications on the Celts (e.g. Cain and Rieckhoff 2002; Haywood 2003; Konstam 2003) and the formation and popularity of Celtic festivals (see Hale and Thornton 2000) and Celtic re-enactment groups (e.g. Celtic Brotherhood 2001; Ambiani 2004; Pax Celtica 2004). It is at the same time that we can observe an intensification of archaeological research on Iron Age sites all over Europe, as exemplified by the work conducted on the Iron Age landscape of Wessex (Megaw and Megaw 1992; see contributions to Collis 2001) and the partly EU-funded archaeological work at the Iron Age oppidum of Bibracte (Mount Beuvray), France (Bibracte 2004; see contributions to Revue Archéologique de l'Est et du Centre-Est 14).

In summary, over the last three decades, the paradigm of the Celts has experienced a period of intense revival (see Maier 2003 for an extensive analysis of this phenomenon). It should, however, be mentioned that by no means does this represent an entirely new phenomenon. It was in particular during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that numerous European nation-states justified their existence as a geo-political unit, and the existence of its populace as a culturally distinct and homogenous group, by having discursive recourse to Celtic cultures that had been identified to have occupied the nation's territory in the past (Dietler 1994; 1998). In opposition to this, the latest large-scale crystallisation of the Celtic paradigm, as mediated poignantly – yet not exclusively – by EU-funded museum exhibitions, takes the shape of a

13 'The Chieftain's Burial of Hochdorf' (my translation)
14 Eighty years after the first excavations were planned under Napoleon III, it was in 1984 that French President François Mitterand and Minister for Culture Jack Lang declared the excavation a national project of paramount necessity. Since then, with the participation of excavation teams from all over the EU, and the development of the Centre Archéologique Européen, Bibracte has developed into a project of European scale (Megaw and Megaw 1999, 23).
15 The definition of a culture in terms of belonging and non-belonging was of course itself dependent on the Zeitgeist of the research conducted by antiquarians, historians, and archaeologists at the time (in this context, see chapters 1.1.1 & 2.1.4).
united Celtic Europe representing a direct predecessor of a present-day united Europe (Ford 1999, 471). With EU-funded museum exhibitions on the Celts attracting large numbers of visitors all over Europe for decades, the theme was considered promising enough to be transformed into an official ECR.

3.4.2 The TCCR as Unity-in-diversity

As highlighted in the first meeting report of the panel of experts assembled by the CoE in order to develop an ECR based on the theme of the Celts, it was in 1990, due to the 'popularity and timeliness' (CoE 29.10.1991, 3) of the Celts as a phenomenon of the past, that the CDCC decided on the development of a Celtic ECR. Arguing, in an introductory seminar on the TCCR (CoE 14.12.1990, 2), the Celtic civilisation 'to be found in France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Great Britain, and Ireland', the Celts were regarded to lend themselves readily to the demonstration of the existence of a united Europe prior to the EU. As stated in the same document, '[t]he Route of the Celts is a very important theme for Europe, for it constitutes a true affirmation of an identity through the conscious use of its civilisational and cultural elements' (CoE 14.12.1990, 4). The Celts were regarded to provide the perfect crystallisation surface for Eurocratic notions of 'remembering the New Europe' (see chapter 1.5.2). Unsurprisingly against the background of the powerful Eurocratic notion of Unity-in-diversity (see chapter 1.5.3), the CoE highlights that, even though the Celts should be presented as a phenomenon that has united Europe in the past, they only represent a lose overarching theme that must be approached wearily by placing major emphasis on the internal differences existing between the cultures that have come to be labelled Celtic.

To quote the CoE (14.12.1990, 5, European Cultural Routes, Routes of The Celts: Lorient Inter-Celtic Festival Introductory Seminar) in reference to the TCCR, '[t]he idea is to create a collective - but not homogenous - identity in Europe. The Route of the Celts is one means of achieving this'. This understanding also found expression in the internal CoE (16.12.1994, 2, Celtic Routes – Theoretical Bases and Proposals) policy document prepared by Christian Goudineau, CoE member and professor at the Collège de France, formulating the knowledge-theoretical framework for the project:

Finally we must beware of equating a (relative) degree of cultural homogeneity (at certain periods) with any kind of political unity.
notion of a "Celtic Europe" is absurd: there never was a Celtic Empire (like the Persian Empire), but, instead, a mosaic of separate entities which were only capable of joining together from time to time to mount an expedition or form a "league".

In doing so, the project's policy discourse on qualified knowledge on the Celts, from the very outset, set the scene for the development of a paradigm of the Celts mirroring the general organisational structure of the EU - not an empire, but a league of separate entities united in a higher cause (see chapter 1.2). Similarly, on its TCCR webpage the EICR (2004d) states that

[The Celts are Indo-Europeans whose precise origin is mysterious... During the first millennium before Christ they migrate in small groups, which dominate without eliminating the conquered populations, and are constituted in a kind of "royal tribe of the heads", contributing to the creation of mixed peoples.

This rhetoric paradigm can be found all over the policy landscape. To employ one more example, as J.-P. Richard, member of the CoE, pointed out clearly in a policy report in 1990 in reference to the TCCR, '[r]evitalisation of Celtic culture requires, first and foremost, a complementarity between past and present: The task is to combine historical elements and elements of a common civilisation, which will result in the creation of cultural routes' (CoE 14.12.1990, 4, European Cultural Routes, Routes of The Celts: Lorient Inter-Celtic Festival Introductory Seminar).

3.4.3 The TCCR and the role of scientific experts

As demanded by the ECRP's internal policies on qualified knowledge of the past (see chapter 3.3.3), in order to provide 'easy answers to easy questions' (CEC 04.12.2001, 6, Science and Society Action Plan), the task of explaining the Celts in the context of the TCCR fell to scientific experts. To quote from the first meeting report of the group of specialists assembled for the development of the TCCR (CoE 29.10.1991, 4), the panel's first decision was 'to set itself up as a kind of scientific council in charge of devising, implementing, and monitoring the Celtic cultural route, vouchsafing its quality and its image'. Rejecting diversity and multiplicity, they emphasise that the 'obscurity of the Celts has to be dispelled in the light of scientific knowledge' (CoE 29.10.1991, 3). As such, interpretations of the Celts 'deserved to be made known' (CoE
29.10.1991, 3) became those ‘recognised by the group of specialists as worthy of
interest’ (CoE 29.10.1991, 5). Considering only ‘archaeological reality’ (CoE 29.10.1991, 3) to represent acceptable knowledge on the cultural past, and in
order to ensure a ‘sound scientific basis’ (CoE 29.10.1991, 4), qualified
knowledge-producers for the TCCR were considered to be ‘archaeologists, historians, linguists, and writers’ (CoE 29.10.1991, 4), but mainly archaeologists
(Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003). Instead of making Europe’s past ‘subject to multiple discourses’ (CoE 11.01.1993, 2, Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee Meeting Report) by employing a ‘multivocal paradigm’ (CoE 11.01.1993, 2), as claimed by the CoE, the CoE’s over-reliance on scientific experts, who themselves consider only scientific knowledge to represent qualified knowledge, ensures the qualification of only a single type of knowledge-generator in practice. In the context of the TCCR, the case of the Inter-Celtic Festival of Lorient shows this mechanism at work.

In 1990, after a recommendation by J.-P. Pichard (CoE 14.12.1990, 6, European Cultural Routes, Routes of the Celts, Lorient Inter-Celtic Festival, Introductory Seminar), the CoE decided, in order to provide ‘the opportunity to consolidate the idea of a community of cultures’ (CoE 14.12.1990, 6), to incorporate Celtic festivals as an important aspect of the TCCR. As a result, the CoE accepted a proposal coming from one of the biggest Celtic Festivals in Europe (see Festival Interceltique de Lorient 2004), and, to quote Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003), Director of the EICR, from an interview with the author, ‘put together experts coming from universities with a man who was organising the Inter-Celtic Festival in France for more than twenty years’, namely Jean-Pierre Pichard, Director of the Inter-Celtic Festival of Lorient. The Inter-Celtic Festival of Lorient, however, is not about the communication of a singular scientific paradigm of the Celts. Instead, it is about Celtic experiences and the individual participant (Pichard 1990, Itineraires Culturels Européens: Les Routes des Celtes). The problem with this, as highlighted from the EICR’s perspective by its Director (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003), is that such ‘individual experiences stand in opposition to the notion of a cultural identity shared by all EU citizens’. The result of putting together the TCCR scientific panel with a Celtic festival organiser was that ‘any form of dialogue between those groups was simply impossible. For the archaeologists the project was a question of research, while for this man it was a question of animation’ (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003). To make things worse, ‘[o]n top of this, the CoE decided to give
the chairman position to the man who organises the Inter-Celtic festivals. That made the archaeologists very angry (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003). The scientific panel screamed foul, demanding the chairman position to be given to 'a credible researcher' (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003) instead. The CoE, adhering to its internal notion of qualified knowledge of the past (see chapter 3.3.2), and in contradiction to its external/rhetoric notion of qualified knowledge of the past (see chapter 3.3.1), put the whole project at a halt, excluded Celtic Festivals from any future participation in the TCCR, and, instead, re-launched the theme three years later in 1993/1994 with a major conference at which academic experts could meet and develop a 'qualified' approach to the Celts to be adopted for the TCCR. The project's chairman became one of the scientific experts.

The example of the Inter-Celtic Festival of Lorient in the context of the TCCR demonstrates in practice how the CoE/EICR, while employing democratic rhetorics of diversity and multiplicity towards the outside, ensures the prevalence of a single accepted mechanism of making sense of the past on the inside. As this case highlights, it is the scientific expert, and in particular the archaeologist, as interpreter who screens interpretations of the cultural past, leaving the CoE and EICR to deal only with scientifically approved knowledge of the past. They satisfy the need of 'the Union to speak more with a single voice' (CEC 25.07.2001, 27, European Governance: A White Paper) in order to overcome its entativity problems (see chapter 3.2.3). As such, the TCCR violates one of the ECRP's main credos, that the past should be interpreted in a plethora of different ways (see chapter 3.3.1). Yet, what happens if the scientific experts fail to speak with a single voice to be put in the service of the EU? The next section illuminates this question.

3.4.4 Expecting unity, encountering diversity: Scholarly paradigms of the Celts

After establishing the TCCR's group of specialists, made up solely of recognised scholars in the field of Celtic/Iron Age studies, problems for the CoE/EICR arose from an unexpected side. These problems took the shape of the panel's inability, to quote the EICR's (2004d) webpage on the TCCR, 'to overcome the feuds among members of differing scientific schools of interpreting the past'. As the aforementioned Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003) recalls, to the surprise of the Eurocrats involved, ' [t]he group of experts was
unable to put forward a singular Celtic paradigm lending itself for interpretation as an early form of European unity’. There was no unified voice.

Looking back at the great success of EU-funded exhibitions on the Celts as an early pan-European phenomenon of unity (see chapter 3.4.1), from *Krieger und Salzherren* (Angeli and Barth 1970) to *The Celts: The First Europe* (Moscati 1991), the Eurocratic meritocracy was not aware of a new epicentre of heated debate that had developed in the academic field of Celtic studies since the 1980s and, in particular, during the 1990s. This debate evolved around the rather simple sounding question of what is actually meant by the term Celtic (Megaw and Megaw 1999, 47; Hale and Payton 2000, 1, 5). The terms Celt and Celtic had turned into a fierce academic war zone (Sims-Williams 1998, 1), resulting in the development of two dichotomistically entrenched schools of archaeological thought.

The first paradigmatic camp is formed of those scholars who believe the Celts to represent a culturally distinct and largely homogenous group to be found all over Iron Age Europe (e.g. Arnold 1995; Cunliffe 1999; Evans 1999). In particular the Hallstatt and La Tène cultures of continental Europe are equated with the Celts (Megaw and Megaw 1992, 254; Brun 1995, 13; Sims-Williams 1998, 29; see also Merriman 1987). To quote Benvenuti (1991, 11), ‘it is commonly agreed that all European cultures can trace their roots to Celtic origins’. This Celtic origin takes the shape of ‘late Hallstatt high status élite society [...]’, which cuts horizontally across kin groups and territorial boundaries, binding communities together in new ways’ (Arnold 1995, 49). The value of this paradigm in terms of its usefulness for present-day notions of a culturally connected Europe was recognised by numerous scholars. Cunliffe (1999, 19; see also Megaw and Megaw 1992; 1999), for example, argues this reading of the Celts to provide ‘a vision of a European past to comfort us at a time when ethnic divisions are becoming painful and disturbing reality’. The Celtic past and the European present are written, if not as *Same*, as similar (see Hill 2000, 433). It was this idea of a united Celtic Europe that found great resonance within the wider public sphere, resulting in the publication of numerous ‘bigger and bigger coffee table books in many European languages’

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16 Publications illustrating the discursive character of the two archaeological camps were not included in the CDA database bibliography, and thus not displayed in italics. Even though they have influence on the Eurocratic discourse on the past in the context of the process of TCCR knowledge production, they, nevertheless, do not represent a direct part of the Eurocratic discourse.
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(Sims-Williams 1998, 1; see, for example, Moscati et al. 1991; Green 1995; Birkhan 1999; Kruta 2005; see chapter 3.4.1). Knowing of the potential of the Celts (as a paradigm that has shown to be highly successful in reaching Europe's wider public and making it aware of what is presented to be an early relative of a united Europe under the leadership of the EU), this archaeological theorisation of the term Celt/Celtic represented an ideal point of departure for the development of the TCCR. The problem for the CoE and EICR, in their search for a single voice onto which to attach the Eurocratic ideology of identity, was that there coexisted a second, opposing school of archaeological thought.

This second camp is characterised by a rejection of the Celts as representing a culturally distinct and homogenous peoples (e.g. Chapman 1992; Collis 1994; 1996a; 1996b; 1997; Champion 1996; Sims-Williams 1998; James 1999; Jones 2001). Abandoning the notion of the spread of Celtic languages as being congruent with the spread of distinct Celtic populations (Chapman 1992, 22), British archaeologists in particular employ a heterological discourse on difference, arguing that 'the Celts never actually existed as a recognisable group with unique traits' (Hale and Payton 2000, 6; see also Chapman 1992, 251; Hill 2000, 433). To quote Sims-Williams (1996, 97-98) highlighting what he believes to be 'uncomfortable problems relating to 'Celticity'" (Sims-Williams 1996, 97),

*ancient and medieval writers never used the term Celtic to describe the peoples and languages of Britain and Ireland; the medieval Irish and Welsh did not believe that they sprang from a common stock and showed no fraternal feelings for each other; the vernacular literatures of Wales and Ireland seem to have been less open to mutual influence than to influences from Latin, French, and English; the Irish and Welsh seem hardly to have perceived the special affinities between their languages before Edward Lhuyd (1707); and the idea of 'Celtic literature' hardly existed before Ernst Renan (1854).*

This lack of linguistic, historical, and archaeological evidence led Champion (1995, 411; see also Sims-Williams 1998; Collis 1995; 1997; 2003) to conclude that 'it is not currently possible to prove that any of the Iron Age peoples who lived in central and western Europe in the first millennium BC definitely spoke a Celtic language or defined themselves as Celts'. Instead, 'Celtic, like any
other ethnonym, is an imprecise term which covers a range of phenomena far exceeding language or material culture' (Hale and Payton 2000, 9). As such, the concept of Celticity, regarded to represent the heir to the traditional genetic framework of Indo-European studies (Sims-Williams 1998, 9), is rejected as merely representing

\[ a \text{ mishmash of information from different times and different places, which is often of little value for understanding the societies being described. Descriptions, or rather caricatures, of societies cannot be transposed in time and space under an invented concept of the 'Celts'; indeed, the whole use of the terms Celt and Celtic is something which should be avoided as it distorts our understanding of the archaeological record.} \]

(Collis 1995, 76-77)

As such, this archaeological paradigm understands the Celts as an entirely modern phenomenon starting in the nineteenth century (Dietler 1994, 585). Emphasising the heated debate between the two camps, Rowlands (1986; 1987) and Hill (2000), in particular, emphasised the dangers inherent in the 'continued uncritical discussion of the Celts' (Hill 2000, 432), resulting in 'modern fantasies in prehistory' (Hill 2000, 432). Understanding the Celts as a modern invention rather than a homogenous culture traceable in the archaeological and historical record of Europe's Iron Age peoples, this second camp 'seeks to de-legitimise the present by criticising attempts to impose our 'presentist' common sense, categories, and premises' (Hill 2000, 434). Obviously, such aims and objectives do not sit comfortably with the Eurocratic notion of generating and strengthening a common cultural identity among its subject citizens by presenting the EU of the present as only the latest development in a long line of united Europe's of the past.

In summary, the academic world of Celtic/Iron Age studies is, generally speaking, divided between "new directions' and an 'old core"' (Ford 1999, 471). Each camp accuses the other of following misconceptions by knowingly ignoring the actual, obvious scientific evidence. Hale and Payton (2000, 7) even go as far as claiming this situation to question the integrity of Celtic/Iron Age Studies as a field of academic enquiry as such. This situation, in the spirit of the CoE's (16.12.1994, 2) internal policy document Celtic Routes - Theoretical Bases and Proposals highlighting the TCCR's need to 'call upon multidisciplinary
research and confront the most recent scientific concepts', should thus have presented a valuable opportunity for multi-vocality (if only within the sphere of different archaeological interpretations of the past).

3.4.5 The TCCR’s response to expert discourse diversity

Due to the two dichotomistic conceptualisations of the Celts, there was major controversy amongst the TCCR’s panel of experts over the nature of the Celts as an archaeological paradigm. The academic controversy over the question ‘Is there such a thing as Celtic?’ destroyed all Eurocratic hopes to have experts providing them with a controlled, singular reading of the past - a reading easily adaptable to the Eurocratic concept of remembering the New Europe (see chapter 1.5.2). As one of the CoE’s (14.12.1990, 4, European Cultural Routes, Routes of The Celts: Lorient Inter-Celtic Festival Introductory Seminar) main policy documents on the TCCR states, ‘[r]evitalisation of Celtic culture requires, first and foremost, a complementarity between past and present’. As it further asserts,

the task is to create a cultural research base bringing together the countries of Europe in a community wishing to belong to a group with common characteristics... Consequently, the Council of Europe must ensure that all countries of the community work together to consolidate the image of a united Europe that exploits its cultures to the full.

(CoE 14.12.1990, 4)

For the CoE (16.12.1994, 3, Celtic Routes – Theoretical Bases and Proposals: Working Document), this complementarity was prevented from taking shape in that ‘the experts in this field do not co-operate’. For the Eurocratic bodies involved, this must have been the more surprising in that the idea of the Celts as an early pan-European community had proved highly popular within the public sphere in the past. Yet, instead of living up to its rhetoric dedication to multi-vocality and diversity, to quote Michel Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003; see also CoE 25.04.1996, 12), Director of the EICR, reflecting on the case, the group of experts was, as he believes deservedly, criticised for failing ‘to put forward a singular Celtic paradigm lending itself for interpretation as an early form of European unity’. As he further states, ‘the TCCR expert panel was not behaving as the CoE and EICR had envisaged they would’ (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003). Put differently, the experts were ‘misbehaving’.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the experts screamed foul, arguing the CoE/EICR to attempt to impose a particular politicised interpretation of the Celts, one in line with Eurocratic rhetorics of the past as *Same*, while ignoring the diversity and complexity to be found in this field of study. This is how Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003) recalls the experts' reaction:

> You in the Council of Europe, you are trying to impose on us the idea of a united Europe. But, in fact, things are much more complicated than that... Not all researchers have to agree on all aspects of their field.

The CoE's reaction to the TCCR panel of experts 'misbehaving' was to dismiss it from the project altogether (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003). The means to do so when considered necessary were written into the CoE internal policy document entitled *New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of the Experts: Draft Agenda and Introductory Report* (CoE 04.11.1993, 10), stating that, even though experts are needed in order to keep the project's character of knowledge under control (see chapter 3.3.2), it is 'difficult for them, despite the presence of the secretariat at the majority of meetings, to follow the development of the programme, or to understand exactly how their personal action fits into the programme'. Furthermore, the panel of experts is accused of being ill-informed, narrow-minded, and ignoring the Celts as an important phenomenon of the past. To quote the CoE (16.12.1994, 3, *Celtic Routes - Theoretical Bases and Proposals: Working Document*),

"[i]raditional" textbooks tend to focus on the brutality of these "Barbarians"; archaeological research gives priority to Greek and Roman sites and monuments... In short, all that is Celtic, Gallic, or Galatian has been met with near silence or cursory (and far from complimentary) consideration.

As the document continues, it is due to this shortcoming, that (EU)ropeans are 'presented with vague and mistaken notions which are extremely difficult to challenge later' (CoE 16.12.1994, 3). Furthermore, dismissing the TCCR's panel of experts for not being able to provide a single interpretation of the Celts, one in line with Eurocratic rhetorics of a EU representing only the latest development in a long line of previous united Europes, this decision is justified by arguing for the experts' inability to prevent their own socio-political convictions from interfering with their interpretation of the past. As Thomas-
Penette (17 October 2003) pointed out to the author in an attempt to justify the CoE's and EICR's reaction,

_I don't know what the situation in the UK is like, but in the case of French archaeologists, the political party to which they belong, to which they attach themselves, has a huge impact on their interpretation of the past. The fights were not only about different scientific schools, but also represented a war between communist and socialist archaeologists. And of course the right wing plays a part in this war as well._

The interpretations of the cultural past put forward by the scientific experts involved in the TCCR are politicised, while, at the same time, those of the CoE/EICR itself are depoliticised. Declaring the archaeologists' different interpretations of the Celts to be inspired by political allegiance instead of archaeological evidence, their expertise is devaluated. In order to further justify the exclusion of the panel of experts, in what could be called a lecture on professional morals, Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003) links their behaviour to the role played by certain archaeologists during Germany's Nazi regime:

_It would be important that archaeologists become more aware of the influence and use of the knowledge that they generate within the social or political sphere. I mean we only have to look at the use of archaeology, or the past in general, by the German government during the Third Reich._

The Eurocratic response to multi-vocality, even if encountered only in the shape of multiple knowledge discourses among scientific experts, becomes its very denunciation as narrow-minded and potentially dangerous. While archaeological knowledge of the past is politicised, in particular in the context of Nazi archaeology, the Eurocratic past, by implication, claims moral high ground. It is de-politicised and naturalised, and presented as non-sensitive to its own socio-political context, of which it has plenty (see chapter 1). Ultimately it is the Eurocratic elite that holds the power to decide on what is considered qualified knowledge of the past and what is not, even if this means to silence the scientific experts employed in order to safeguard the quality of the ECR in the first place, i.e. employed to exclude alternative knowledges of the past and to make the project more easily controllable. It can thus be observed that the ECRP's policy framework informing the planning stage of culture heritage production and dissemination fails to live up to public-orientated rhetorics,
such as the latest EICR information leaflet on the TCCR claiming the project to include most of all 'les conclusions de la recherché archéologique actuelle et en prenant aussi en compte les données d'autres disciplines scientifiques'\textsuperscript{17} (EICR 2005g). The Eurocratic reliance on experts lasts only as long as they provide knowledge in support of the EU ideology of a united Europe. Doing so is by no means a singular occurrence among Eurocrats and their institutions. In fact, it was in the CEC's (04.12.2001) Science and Society Action Plan, a policy document defining a mode of conduct for the interplay between Eurocratic bodies of knowledge generation and scientific expertise, in particular when facing a multitude of scholarly approaches instead of a singular scientific voice, which cemented this discursive approach. To quote the document in question,

\begin{quote}
science is often perceived as dealing with certainty and hard facts, whereas in reality this is rarely the case, particularly at the frontier of research. Scientists are naturally cautious, and the advice they provide is often wrapped in caveats. There may also be more than one school of thought, or there may be maverick voices arguing against the mainstream. There can then be a sense of frustration and despair when experts fail to provide simple answers to apparently simple questions. The conclusion: 'Even the experts don't know what they're talking about!'
\end{quote}

(CEC 04.12.2001, 22)

What this translates into is that any scholarly expertise – or, in fact, any kind of knowledge – that does not suit Eurocratic interests can simply be ignored in favour of a discursive paradigm deemed more appropriate.

So what became of the TCCR in practical terms? Having succeeded in silencing the panel of experts' multiple voices, in particular those standing in paradigmatic opposition to the Eurocratic notion of the Celts as representing an early form of European unity, the CoE/EICR still faced the question of how to develop the TCCR as a functioning ECR network. In short, even though still being on the list of official ECRs, the TCCR has ever since remained underdeveloped in concept, structure, and extent, as well as lacking a functioning network structure (pers. com. Sorina Kapp, EICR Chief Administrator, October 2003). Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003) even calls the

\textsuperscript{17} 'the conclusions of present-day archaeological research and also take into account the contributions of other scientific disciplines' (my translation)
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TCCR a complete failure. Nevertheless, the CoE and EICR implemented a number of actions in order to learn from the problems encountered over the project. In order to ensure complementarity between knowledges of the past as produced by scientific experts and the Eurocratic notion of 'remembering the New Europe' (see chapter 1.5.2), as the Director of the EICR recalls (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003), the CoE reminded the institutional bodies involved in the TCCR of the main internal policy document defining the role of the expert in the context of the ECRP. In particular, it re-emphasised the necessity to ensure more rigorously that experts interested in getting involved in the TCCR had demonstrated in advance their 'desire for European cultural co-operation in the context of a "Greater Europe"' (CoE 06.04.1994, 4, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe – New Policies of Cultural Routes and Role of Experts: Meeting Report). From now on, experts had to prove their propagandistic value. Further, the CoE decided to shift the project's emphasis back to 'activities which are both simple and educational' (CoE 16.12.1994, 4, Celtic Routes – Theoretical Bases and Proposals: Working Document). In concrete terms, this meant a reorientation towards prompting 'the media and publishers of Europe into action by issuing an invitation to tender various products on the theme "The Celts in Europe" (above all avoiding the term "Celtic Europe"l)' (CoE 14.12.1990, 3, European Cultural Routes, Routes of The Celts: Lorient Inter-Celtic Festival Introductory Seminar) 'while staying clear of the pitfalls of multiple, in particular contradicting, schools of expertise' (Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003; see Schlesinger 1993; 1997; Schlesinger and Doyle 1995 for an in depth discussion of EU media politics). This, in turn, led to numerous publications on Europe's 'comparative history' (Thomas-Penette 2000c, 2), such as the publication series Faire l'Europe (trans. Making Europe) (e.g. Moore 2001; Le Goff 2003; see also Ahrweiler and Aymard 2000; Benevolo 2003), published simultaneously by European publishing houses in France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom (Thomas-Penette 2000c, 2). Aiming at the wider public, these are regarded to represent 'good literature praising this community' (Thomas-Penette 2000c, 3, History, philosophy, Europe's heritage', paper presented at the CoE seminar Europe Continues: Cultural Values and European Citizenship).

3.5 THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE: THE PLANNING STAGE

To summarise and conclude on the findings of this chapter's CDA focusing on the planning stage of Eurocratic culture heritage production in the articulation of Europe's oldest supra supra-national political institution and 'prime
Sven Grabow

instrument’ (CoE 1993) on culture heritage, namely the CoE and its ECRP, a number of revealing observations can be made. In terms of general rhetoric dedication, the CoE claims to encourage tolerance, solidarity, interculturality, and the sharing of multiple identities, with its foremost purpose being to ‘combat social exclusion and cultural isolation’ (Schwimmer 2003). The CoE perceives and presents itself as the ‘Organisation of the One Europe’ (Schwimmer 2003), an organisation deeply rooted in the notion of cultural diversity. It is within this institutional set-up, and against the wider Eurocratic notion of ‘remembering the New Europe’ (see chapter 1.5.2), that the ECRP represents the CoE’s most prestigious and emblematic project of culture heritage, its ‘flagship programme’ (CoE 17.03.1994, 3, Practical Guide to Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe), established in order to conduct ‘the ‘practical work’ of the construction of Europe’ (CoE 24.03.1994, 2, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe – Third Meeting of the Advisory Committee: Meeting Report).

Based on the triad of heritage, cultural tourism, and cultural identity arranged in cultural route networks around ‘cultural themes whose historic, artistic, and social interest is apparently European’ (CoE 30.03.1987, 2, European Cultural Routes (Secretary General's memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport)), the ECRP is stated to represent one of the main Eurocratic tools for ‘enhancing cultural pluralism’ (CoE 20.01.1992, 2, European Cultural Routes: First Meeting of the "European Cultural Itineraries" Group – Thoughts on Council of Europe Action in this Field). From the very beginning of the ECRP, the means by which to achieve this aim is argued by the Eurocrats in charge of the project to be the generation of a ‘mutivocal paradigm’ (CoE 11.01.1993, 2, Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee (Meeting Report prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport)) based on unrestricted dialogue and the democratic use of multiple discourses on experiencing and making sense of the past. Also, it was in this understanding that European governments, organisations, institutions, as well as individuals could propose themes for future ECRs. Emphasising the plural dimension of interacting with culture heritage, the ECRP is presented as bringing together Europeans from many different backgrounds and experiences - a multitude of stakeholders in the past - in order to develop Cultural Routes, and, in particular, as breaking down barriers between professionals and non-professionals. In doing so, the ECRP is argued to successfully translate otherness into ‘attractive otherness’ (EICR 2003e), an achievement in line with ‘the de facto multi-cultural European
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society' (CoE 02.12.1996, 12, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe. Seminar on Cultural Routes - Challenges of Citizenship and Sustainable Development: Introductive Report). In short, the CoE and EICR claim democratic and pluralistic values to determine the ECRP’s aims and objectives, as well as its notion of qualified knowledge.

However, after a 'process of reflection' (CoE 1996, Cultural Routes: History of the Project (1987-1996)) by the CoE during the early 1990s, the ECRP’s character of knowledge as mediated through ECRs changed dramatically. Going hand-in-hand with the establishment of priority themes and the definition of officially accepted partners, this 'process of reflection' reduced the project’s notion of qualified knowledge of the past. Mainly, with Eurocrats wanting ‘the Union to speak more with a single voice’ (CEC 25.07.2001, 27, European Governance: A White Paper), this took the shape of giving priority to scientific experts in defining the subject of ECRs, interpreting them in their European meaning, and placing them in their (EU)ropean context. Redefining the role of the expert in the context of the ECRP, a range of internal policy documents made a scientific definition a paramount necessity when proposing a new theme (see CoE 09.10.1992b; 04.11.1993; 06.04.1994). The qualified expert became the scientific expert, recognised by his/her peers for specialisation in a particular, monothematic scientific field of knowledge. In short, after its phase of reorientation, the ECRP had been transformed on the inside into a project in which the Eurocratic élite employs another élite (i.e. the scientific knowledge élite) in the hope to develop a clearer voice, at the expense of anyone not belong to either of the two groups. Doing so, Eurocratic claims to multi-vocality and diversity must be considered largely rhetorical in nature. Similar observations led Bellier (2000, 59) and Risse (2003, 3) to refer to (EU)rope as the 'Europe of the élite', a Europe failing 'to escape intellectually and linguistically from the dominant model of the nation state' (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 6). This brought up the question of what happens when the scientific experts, employed by the Eurocratic meritocracy in order to provide 'easy answers to easy questions' (CEC 04.12.2001, 6, Science and Society Action Plan: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions), fail to speak with a single voice? The case of the TCCR provided the discursive setting for the illumination of the final act of Eurocratic decision-making on the character of the cultural past.
With the Celts having proven their interest-generating and unity-evoking potential among EU citizens, as demonstrated by the continuous success of EU-funded, so-called 'Celtic block-buster exhibitions' (Megaw and Megaw 1992, 254), the CoE and EICR decided on the development of a Celtic ECR. It was on these grounds that both bodies expected the panel of scientific experts, established in order to develop the TCCR, to come up with an agreed, singular reading of the Celts, one characterised by complementarity between Europe’s past and present. However, when – after dismissing non-scientific contributions to the project – the experts failed to do so, and, instead, fought each other over two dichotomistic understandings of the concept of the Celt that had developed within the archaeological community, the Eurocrats involved accused the experts of misbehaving. With the scientific panel of experts being unable to decide on a single understanding of the Celts, one providing complementarity between Europe’s past and the present, the CoE decided to dismiss the panel from the project altogether. Justification to do so took the shape of accusing the experts of politicising their interpretations of the past, while, by implication, suggesting the Eurocrats involved in the project to be free of such entanglements. Even though this resulted in the TCCR remaining un(der)developed to the present day, it allowed the Eurocratic bodies involved to discount the experts, and enabled them to focus their attention on general publications on the Celts as representing an early form of European unity, thus suggesting the EU to represent a historically legitimised phenomenon.

In summary, the Eurocratic notion of qualified knowledge as projected towards the outside stands in harsh contrast to the notion of qualified knowledge enforced on the inside. While initially employing scientific expertise in order to keep control over the character and message of the project, ultimately it is the Eurocratic élite deciding on what does and what does not constitute qualified knowledge of the past. Thomas-Penette (2000c, 8), Director of the EICR, in a paper entitled History, philosophy, Europe’s heritage presented at the CoE seminar Europe Continues: Cultural Values and European Citizenship, declares in reference to the ECRP that ‘[t]he right to memory, the right to history devoid of manipulation, and the respect for human rights combine to form the “right to cultural heritage”’. In terms of the planning sage of Eurocratic culture heritage production, the ECRP, with manipulation, as demonstrated, happening all along the process of knowledge generation, must be considered a failure against its claims of openness and multi-vocality. Having highlighted how it is Eurocratic
bodies of culture holding complete control over the nature and character of knowledge of the past as employed in the ECRP, what message is implemented on the ground in terms of actual culture heritage elements? To give an answer to this question, the following chapter will focus on the culture heritage elements employed to make the SCPR, the first ECR implemented, and the one stated by the EICR (2005d, 1) to represent a 'source of inspiration' and a 'reference point' for all other ECRs.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE:
IMPLEMENTATION ON THE GROUND

As chapter 3 demonstrated for the planning stage of Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage generation in the context of the ECRP, even though scientific experts are employed in order to limit the function of qualified interpreter to a single type of qualified knowledge-producer, thus ensuring a minimal KIV, ultimately it is only the Eurocratic élite involved in the project who decides on the discursive character of (EU)rope's official cultural past as expressed through ECRs. The question thus becomes, what is the concrete character of this Eurocratically accepted reading of Europe's supra-national cultural past as implemented on the ground? In order to propose an answer to this question, the following chapter will conduct CDA on the ECRP's SCPR.

4.1 THE SCPR: A FLAGSHIP OF EUROCRATIC CULTURE HERITAGE

The SCPR's thematic focus lies on the historical movement of Christian pilgrims travelling from all over Europe to the city of SdC in north-western Spain. The pilgrim routes to SdC, which was elected European City of Culture in 2000, form a network of terrestrial and maritime connections crisscrossing the European 'continent' (Murray and Graham 1997, 514). The many subsidiary routes focus on four traditional French assembly points: Tours, Vézelay, Le Puy, and Arles. From these, the main routes lead across the Pyrenees, eventually converging near the Navarrese town of Puente le Reine to create one major route, the Camino Frances (Murray and Graham 1997, 514; see Rudolph 2004 for an in-depth description).

The SCPR's relevance in terms of this thesis' examination of the EU's culture heritage discourse stems from three sources. Firstly, it represents a project of the ECRP, which has been the centre of analytical focus in the previous chapter. Thus, being situated within the same discursive articulation, this allows us to gain a deeper understanding of interlinked discursive processes at work, namely the interplay between the planning stage of the Eurocratic creation of culture heritage and its execution on the ground. Secondly, representing the oldest of the ECRs, as well as the first ECR officially awarded certification as a Major Cultural Route of the Council of Europe (EICR 2005a; EICR 2005e), the CoE and EICR had decades during which to shape the SCPR's culture heritage character to their liking. As such it can be assumed that the SCPR, having for
longer than any other ECR been subject to paradigmatic moulding by the Eurocratic élite in charge of the project, represents the most telling crystallisation surface for the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm. Thirdly, Eurocratic bodies of culture claim the SCPR to represent a special case. To quote the CoE’s (2003d; see also CoE 12.09.1994) webpage on the SCPR, ‘[a]lthough they are included amongst the Council of Europe’s Cultural Routes, the Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Routes are unquestionably a special case’. Why is that? The EICR, on its SCPR webpage (The Pilgrim Pathways: A Founding Theme), states it to represent the ECRP’s ‘founding theme’ (EICR 2007). It is this special status that, according to Eurocratic rhetorics, turns the SCPR into a leitmotiv for all present and future ECRs, thus making it a case of paramount importance for analysis. To quote the EICR’s (2005d, 1; see also CoE 2003d; EICR 2005b) information leaflet on the SCPR, ‘[t]he Santiago Pilgrim Routes served initially as a source of inspiration, then became the reference point for the development of future activities’. This status as reference point the EICR, in its information leaflet on the ECRP in general, argues to be justified in it representing the ‘modèle de coopération culturelle pour la Grande Europe du futur’1 (EICR 2005b, 1; see also Thomas-Penette 2003). Similarly, the CoE meeting report on the revitalisation of the Santiago de Compostela Ways states the SCPR to represent the ECRP’s most successful ‘civilising mission’ (CoE 15.04.1994, 4). Further, the SCPR, as early as 1988, has been announced to represent the most ‘European’ of all ECRs (CoE 25.05.1988, 8, European Cultural Routes: Secretary General’s Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport; see also Thomas-Penette 2003, 187), as well as, according to Plötz (1989, 108), member of the SCPR’s panel of experts, the ‘most European of all pilgrimages’. In this role, the EICR argues the SCPR, in its information leaflet on the ECRP, to ‘crée de nouvelles dynamiques adaptées aux attentes de la société contemporaine, sur la base de la mémoire collective’2 (EICR 2005b, 2).

In short, employing the poignant words of the CoE (01.10.1996, 6, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe. Seminar on Cultural Routes – Challenges of Citizenship and Sustainable Development: Introductive Report, see also CoE 04.07.1996), the SCPR ‘symbolise first and foremost the process of European construction’. Also, once again reflecting general Eurocratic rhetorics of culture (see chapters 1.5.3 & 3.1), the SCPR, in a CoE (19.11.1993, 2, Revitalisation of the Santiago Pilgrim Ways: Ethics and Deontology of a Cultural Route) internal policy

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1 ‘co-operation model for a future Great Europe’ (my translation)
2 ‘create new dynamics adapted to the needs of contemporary society on the basis of collective memory’ (my translation)
document defining the Cultural Route's ethics, is stated to provide the opportunity to 'be interpreted in very different ways - whether on an imaginary or a territorial level'. In short, in line with general Eurocratic rhetorics on culture heritage, the SCPR is presented as a mould for a culture heritage paradigm firmly rooted in values of openness, diversity, and multiplicity. In particular, as emphasised by the CoE (16.06.1994, 4) in an internal policy document entitled Council of Europe Cultural Routes - Culture and Tourism: Making Culture and Tourism Complementary and Interactive, the SCPR, as well as ECRs in general, is stated 'to combat the ignorance of others, near or far'. Or, in the words of Ballester (2002, 11; Saint Jacques et L'Europe; see also CEC 1992), Head of the Cultural Heritage Department of the Council of Europe, from his introduction to the official SCPR guidebook, the SCPR counteracts the 'dangers qui planent sur le processus d'union et de construction actuellement en cours: Intolerance, racisme, xénophobie, violence, exclusion sociale'. Along similar lines, and this cannot be over-emphasised, the EICR (2005a, 1), in its SCPR information leaflet, specifies the SCPR to provide 'people of varied background, believers and non-believers, with an opportunity to gather together', while the EICR (2005d, 1, The Council of Europe Cultural Routes, information leaflet; also EICR 2003f; see also CoE 01.10.1996, 3) states the ECRP in general 'to promote intercultural and interreligious dialogue through a better understanding of European history'. In doing so, the SCPR rests within the wider EU policy of strongly propagating the separation of the religious and the social sphere, as well as supporting religious pluralism in general. None of its primary or secondary laws incorporates statements binding the EU to a concrete religion (Gerhards 2004, 16), and the Draft Treaty of the European Constitution includes no references to God or Christianity, but, instead, actively prohibits religious discrimination of any form (EU 2004, article II-21, part II) and emphasises its respect for Europe's creeds (EU 2004, article II-22, part II; see also CoE 2003a).

The above values are then discursively embedded within the paradigm of 'remembering the New Europe' (see chapter 1.5.2). As José Maria Ballester (2002, 11), Head of the Cultural Heritage Department of the Council of Europe, promulgates in his introduction, entitled Saint Jacques et l'Europe, to the official SCPR guidebook, '[a]près dix siècles de pratique ininterrompue, la mouvance

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*danger that threaten the process of union and construction on the way at the moment: intolerance, racism, xenophobia, violence, social exclusion* (my translation)
Chapter 4: Implementation on the Ground

Jacquaire sillonne toujours notre continent. Son élan renouvelé rappelle aux nouvelles générations les racines profondes d'une épopée aussi ancienne et aussi moderne que la construction européenne. It is in this context that Plötz's (1989) extensive and colourful discussion of the uninterrupted longevity of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC, put forward in his role as one of the members of the SCPR's panel of experts at the CoE's Bamberg Congress (The Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Routes), provides a particularly vivid crystallisation of this paradigm. As Ballester (2002, 11) continues to phrase even more significantly in terms of Eurocratic ambitions concerning the project, the SCPR 'préfigure, dans une certaine mesure, l'Europe que nous voulons construire maintenant à l'aube du troisième millénaire'. The question we have to ask is, what is the discursive character of the SCPR, and thus, by implication, that of the present-day EU as envisaged by the Eurocratic élite of culture?

Before conducting CDA on the SCPR, it is necessary to understand pilgrimage - the theme around which the SCPR revolves - not only in religious terms, but, first and foremost, as a socio-cultural phenomenon. Particularly over the last decade, a growing number of general publications have focused on the pilgrimage to SdC (e.g. Dunn and Davidson 1994; Coelho 1995; Frey 1998; Nooteboom 1998; 2000; Mullins 2000; Brierley 2003; Ohanoglu 2003; Starkie 2003). Most of these take the shape of practical or mystical manuals for the modern-day pilgrim, filled with inspirational, usually religious, quotations. It is within this wider interest that the pilgrimage to SdC, as well as Christian pilgrimage in general, has become the focus of scholarly attention (e.g. Mieck 1977; Turner and Turner 1978; Brown 1982; Eade and Sallnow 1991a; Graham and Murray 1997; Murray and Graham 1997; Sumption 2002; Rudolph 2004). Yet, in many cases, this interest remained on a rather superficial level only, often taking the shape of discussions of pilgrimage in terms of tourism only (see, for example, contributions to Fladmark 1998a). This makes it necessary, in particular in a critical discourse analytical context, to theorise the phenomenon of pilgrimage in its wider historical and, even more importantly, socio-cultural context.

4 '[a]fter ten centuries of uninterrupted practice, the Saint Jacques movement continues to crisscross our continent. Its renewed élan reminds the younger generations of the deep roots of an epic as ancient and also as modern as the construction of Europe' (translation by R. B. Rahn)

5 'préfigures, within a certain measure, the Europe that we want to construct now at the dawn of the third millennium' (my translation)
4.2 PILGRIMAGE AS A HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL PHENOMENON

The phenomenon of pilgrimage goes back to the old tradition of journeying to sacred places, a tradition possibly going back as far as the Upper Palaeolithic (Nolan and Nolan 1989, 3). Archaeological and documentary evidence suggests that, in historic times, pagan Mediterranean, Celtic, and Germanic peoples practiced various forms of theistic journeys (Nolan and Nolan 1989, 3). Christian pilgrimage probably began as early as the first century AD. It was certainly occurring by the second century AD as the veneration of saints' relics gathered momentum among Christian communities across the Roman Empire (Brown 1982; Eade and Sallnow 1991b; Sumption 2002). During this early period, Christian pilgrimage did not convey the idea of a concrete geographic goal, but simply meant wandering through unknown lands in the search for God (Herbers 1989, 9). Pilgrimage simply became a more physical and concrete way of seeking religiosity in general (peregrinatio pro Christo). The standardised idea of peregrination ad loca sancta, the journey to holy places, did not develop until the High Middle Ages (11th–15th century AD), a period during which the crusades added stimulus to the phenomenon (Green 1998, 121). Since then, and particularly during the last decades (Roof 1993), Christian pilgrimage has been a continuous phenomenon observable across many countries. For example, ever since the martyrdom of Thomas Becket in 1170 AD, people have been travelling to Canterbury Cathedral, the seat of English Christianity and the scene of Becket's murder (Chu 2004, 38). Most recently, and mainly in the USA, the phenomenon of pilgrimage has led to the development of pilgrimage theme parks, such as the Holy Land Experience in Orlando, Florida (Rowan 2004; see also Lyon 2000). Yet, pilgrimage must not be understood solely as a religious and/or touristic endeavour, but as a complex socio-cultural phenomenon holding wider social significance.

Employing Graham and Murray's (1997, 389; see Nolan and Nolan 1989, 36; Graham 1998b, 23) definition, Christian pilgrimage represents 'a religious phenomenon in which an individual or a group sets forth on a journey to a particular cult location to seek the intercession of God and the saints of that place'. The physical act of being a pilgrim, in particular the harsh strains caused by a long, exhausting, and often unsafe journey, becomes a metaphor for the spiritual hardships and sacrifices necessary to attain religious enlightenment (Lane 2001, 170). Yet, it is at the same time that - as is characteristic for all manifestations of knowledge - pilgrimage represents a
social construction and a form of cultural production (Graham and Murray 1997, 389; Murray and Graham 1997, 514; Graham 1998b, 23). Drawing inspiration from nostalgia, memory, and tradition, pilgrimage links cultural and spiritual consumption with a continuous reinvention of culture and place (Murray and Graham 1997, 514). It is linked to the specific social, political, economic, and historical contexts in which it occurs (see Graham and Murray 1997, 389). In short, pilgrimage represents 'an existential act of self-definition' (Lodge 1995, 304) and 'barometers of an age' (Chu 2004, 38). As such, the phenomenon of pilgrimage holds the power to influence the spiritual state of people, making it possible to affect notions of spiritual, cultural, and political identity. To quote Tilson and Chao (2002, 81), pilgrimage represents a form of 'devotional-promotional communication, a particular form of communication that inspires allegiance for an individual, political entity, or religion'. The revival of medieval pilgrimage in late nineteenth century France (see Emery and Morowitz 2003) and the more recent, hugely successful, world tour of St. Thérèse's relics (1995-2001) (see Tilson and Chao 2002) testify for this socio-political, not to say propagandistic, quality. In short, pilgrimage, as the devotional-promotional communication that it represents, holds the power to excoriate people of their social personae and, instead, restore or create another individuality (Eade and Sallnow 1991b, 3-4). It represents a powerful operator welding together otherwise diverse communities and strata into larger scale collectivities, might these be tribal or regional (see Fought 1969; Spiro 1970; Marx 1977; McKeivitt 1991), national (see Cohn and Marriott 1958; Wolf 1958; Obeyesekere 1966), or trans-national (see Sallnow 1981; 1987). The EU, in its search for a common (EU)ropean paradigm of culture identity, seized upon this inherent potential.

EU supra-national bodies, being in need of a rallying point of shared belief for its subject citizens (see chapter 1.3), have become aware of the potential usefulness of pilgrimage as a mass phenomenon. This usefulness rests in the similitude existing between the concept of pilgrimage and Eurocratic rhetorics of 'remembering the New Europe' (see chapter 1.5.2). To explain, both paradigms depend on the identification of diverse people with something bigger. To quote Chu (2004, 38) commenting on the phenomenon of pilgrimage, 'the joy of pilgrimage is a spirit of community that comes from identifying with something bigger than oneself'. As chapters 1.2 and 1.4 demonstrated for the EU in general, as well as chapters 3.1 and 3.2 for the CoE and ECRP in
particular, the same notion of identifying with something bigger can be found to dominate Eurocratic rhetorics of European Unification. What makes pilgrimage an even more promising theme to develop, in particular in the context of the ECRP, is its filial relationship with tourism (see chapters 3.1.2 & 3.2.2). Both phenomena centre on the idea of journeying in order to widen the traveller’s horizon, may that be in religious or touristic terms. It is in awareness of this relationship that Fladmark (1998b, xvii; see also Bauman 1996, 23) even claims that ‘pilgrimage was the start of modern tourism’. Taking into account Western Europe’s more than 6,000 pilgrimage sites generating an estimated 60 to 70 million religiously motivated visits annually (Nolan and Nolan 1989, 1-2), the identity-forming potential of this phenomenon can hardly be overestimated. Further, taking into account that the pilgrimage to SdC had ‘undergone a remarkable renewal of interest in Europe’ (Rudolph 2004, ix; see also Graham and Murray 1997, 519; Mustoe 1998, 11) in recent years, as well as recognising its potentially cross-national dimension, it offered a promising projection surface for Eurocratic ambitions of the development of a common European culture identity through cultural tourism. Further, against the wider Eurocratic disillusionment with science as holding the power to bind EU citizens together, the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC became a promising ‘génératrice du culture’ (Ohanoglu 2003, 235). To quote the CEC (2001, 35) policy document Science and Society – European Attitudes and Views in response to the EU’s entativity problems (see chapter 1.3), ‘we put too much trust into science and not enough in faith’ (in this context, see also chapter 3.4.5). As Feuerbach (1957, 13) argues, ‘[r]eligion is man’s [sic] earliest and also direct form of self-knowledge’. As such, with the CoE choosing a religious theme for the ECRP’s first ever established ECR, the SCPR provides the possibility to develop a deeper insight into the Eurocratic cultural self-understanding. However, before conducting CDA on the SCPR, i.e. the Eurocratic understanding of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC in the shape of an ECR, it is necessary to elaborate on the religious theme and setting on which it is based and around which it evolves.

4.3 ST. JAMES: LEGEND AND MEDIEVAL PROPAGANDA

The medieval world knew three major Christian pilgrimage sites: Jerusalem, Rome, and Santiago de Compostela (Herbers 1989, 9). After having been the

6‘generator of culture’ (my translation)
least important for hundreds of years, it was when Pope Calixtus II (1119-1124 AD) proclaimed that all pilgrims who went to SdC in a Holy Year (i.e. when the Saint’s Day falls on a Sunday) should be free of all their sins, and, in particular, after Pope Alexander III (1159-1181 AD) declared SdC a Holy Town (Nolan and Nolan 1989, 137-138), that, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, SdC became by far the most popular pilgrimage site of the Christian world. During this period, four customary routes were established for those travelling to the traditional burial site of the Apostle St. James the Greater. As briefly mentioned above, these major routes began at Tours, the Magdalenian shrine at Vézelay, Le Puy, and Arles in France, and converged just before the Pyrenees near the town of Ostabat (Hopper 2004, 73) (Figure 4.1). 

The period of greatest pilgrimage activity was due to the popularity of medieval veneration of holy relics. It was also the period of maximum Christian effort to wrest control of religious relics and sites from Muslims, be these Saracens fought by Crusaders on the roads to Jerusalem or Moors battled by Spain’s (and other) Christian knights along the unstable frontier just south of the pilgrimage route to SdC (Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiv). It was during the same period that Christian religious military orders were created, beginning in

7 The descriptive ‘the Greater’ is used to distinguish him from the other Apostle named James, son of Alphaeus.
8 It is, however, hard to determine which pilgrimage routes qualify as major routes, exactly where they started, or even their exact course, making it difficult to define the precise geographical character of the pilgrimage routes to SdC.
1118 AD with the establishment of the Order of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem (or simply the Order of Hospitalers) (Oldenburg 1998, 283), their main aim being 'to wage war against the infidels and to protect pilgrims journeying to the holy places' (Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiv).

In order to understand the ideological connotations going hand-in-hand with the pilgrimage to SdC, be it in the past or the present, it becomes necessary to introduce the legend of St. James. What kind of saint are we dealing with? What was the socio-political context in which this Apostle's legend came to popularity and flourished?

4.3.1 The legend of St. James

The history and legend of St. James (Lat. Jacobus, Span. Sant-Yago, Santiago, Jacobo, Diego, Jaime) has many variants. Its historical evidence ranges 'from the fantastic to the contradictory to the obscure' (Rudolph 2004, 3). In the following, I will present the most widely accepted version (see Fletcher 1984).

The legend of St. James begins two millennia ago, when, not long before his crucifixion, Jesus divided up the known world among his Apostles in order to spread the Christian faith (Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiii). The legend has it that James the Greater was assigned the Iberic peninsula, the area of modern Spain and Portugal. According to documents from the seventh and eighth centuries, James then spent a couple of years preaching in the country - allegedly managing to convert two souls - before returning to Jerusalem where he died around 44 AD as the first Apostle to be martyred (Herbers 1989, 9; Gibbs 1997, 26). The legend goes on that his companions laid his body in a ship built of stone, which eventually ended up at the Spanish northeast coast, near the town of Finisterre. Santiago's disciples, having awaited his arrival, took his body, and buried St. James on a hill nearby (Gibbs 1997, 26; Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiii; Olsson 2001). There his tomb lay forgotten for almost 760 years. During these centuries, caused by an ongoing pressure from Muslim kingdoms to the south, the military, political, and social situation in Spain experienced an 'unexpected burst' (Smith 1999, 305) of Islam into the Christian world. In 636 AD, Jerusalem fell to Islamic forces. Later, in 711 AD, a large army of Berbers crossing the Straits of Gibraltar invaded Spain, taking control of the southern part of the country (Graham and Murray 1997, 390; Coppee 2002; Akram 2004). From this time onwards, the power and influence of the
Islamic forces grew continuously. Making raids into France, Muslim armies crossed the Pyrenees, until finally halted in 732 AD by Charles Martel (688-741 AD), King of the Franks, at the battle of Tours, near Poitiers in north-western France (Smith 1999, 314-317; Freeman-Grenville and Munro-Hay 2002, 46-48, 76-80). Nevertheless his victory, of the Iberian Peninsula only the northernmost fringe, the Spanish regions of Asturias and Galicia, remained unconquered, yet under overwhelming military pressure (Graham and Murray 1997, 390). The psychological effect that the growing Muslim influence had on medieval Christians can hardly be underestimated. Teleologically, the medieval Christian world had turned upside down: 'The fact that within a century of the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 632 Islam had spread across much of the known world was for many Christians inexplicable, frightening, and theologically incomprehensible' (Smith 1999, 305). In this context, it was then in 814 AD during the reign of Alfonso II, king of Asturias from 791 to 842 AD, that, according to legend, the tomb of St. James was rediscovered (Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiv; Freeman-Grenville and Munro-Hay 2002, 112). According to myth, a rainfall of stars enlightened the spot of the tomb, hence the name Santiago de 'Compostela' (cAMPUS STELLAE meaning 'field of stars') (Olsson 2001), where it was discovered by a local priest. After the alleged discovery, the remains were declared genuine by bishop Teodmiro of Iria, and a shrine was built to hold them. It was then that the 'cult of Santiago' (Luard 1998, 79) began. Later, in 834 AD, after Spanish Christians defeated a Muslim force at Clavijo, King Alfonso II - who failed in most of his military endeavours against the Moorish kingdom of Cordova - built a church at the place of the shrine, which, in the following centuries, was transformed into one of the most elaborate cathedrals of medieval Europe, that of SdC (Green 1998, 121). It is, however, only in the context of the Islamic 'occupation' of Spain that the legend of St. James the Greater, its growing popularity and ideological connotations, can be understood as part of a wider paradigmatic whole. As pointed out by Robins (2004), '[w]ithout the Moorish invasion, Santiago would probably not exist'. Why is that?

4.3.2 A saint as medieval politico-military propaganda

With Spanish Christians fighting a desperate war with their backs against the 'wall' of the Atlantic Ocean, they were in need of an inspiring figure. At a time

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9 It is interesting to note that one of the first uses of the term 'European' (Europeenses) was in an eighth century description of the Battle of Tours (Macfie 2002, 17).
when the battle over territory and the battle over souls were usually one and the same, and with Spanish military forces dwindling in numbers, a religious fighting figure was needed capable of rallying and uniting Christians from all over Europe under a single banner against Iberia's Muslim rulers. It was then that the political eye fell on the mythical figure of the allegedly only Apostle buried on European soil. Arising from a need 'for the living presence of religious-national figures' (Gibbs 1997, 25), the legend of St. James was promoted by the political, military, and religious leaders in order to provide a unifying role-model for Christians from all over Europe, as well as an efficient tool for the wider power politics of the medieval Roman Church (see Graham and Murray 1997, 393). St. James became 'the ideal Christian warrior, invincible in battle and flawless in character' (Gibbs 1997, 27). As his myth grew stronger on the back of ecclesiastical and secular propaganda - for example, professional storytellers were employed in order to spread his legend (Humphreys 2004) -, St. James, the preacher of love and understanding, became Santiago de Matamoros (trans. St. James, the Moor killer) (Graham 1998b, 24; Olsson 2001), aiding, according to legend, the Spaniards and their Christian allies at least forty times in military operations against Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula (Gibbs 1997, 26-27). He became synonymous with the Christian Reconquista (reconquest) - and, going hand-in-hand with this process, the Christian repoblación (repopulation) - of Spain (13th-15th century AD), and crucial to the 'effective mobilization' (Graham 1998b, 24; Seward 2000, 103) of the Reconquista as a Holy War (see Seward 2000, chapter 8; Freeman-Grenville and Munro-Hay 2002, 112-114). In fact, it was as early as the second half of the eleventh century that Pope Calixtus II declared northern Spain a holy land and the wars against Muslim Spain crusades (Fletcher 1984, 297-298). As a result, Santiago became the Saint of the 'free' Europe, and a foreign policy tool seeking support from Central and Eastern Europe. He became the Reconquista, the fight against Islam. It is in this context that legend claims that at the aforementioned battle of Clavijo (844 AD), a battle between Muslim and Christian forces that many historians doubt ever occurred (Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiv), St. James miraculously came riding through the skies on his white charger, 'wielding a bloody, dripping sword, [and] surrounded by decapitated infidels' (Graham 1998b, 24). Under his

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10 It should be noted here that Santiago is also said to have appeared to help Catholics in the New World. When a Ute war party attacked a hispanic village in the San Luis Valley, the villagers knelt to pray. Suddenly the Indians turned and left. The reason for this was not known, until years later, when peace was made with the Ute, warriors stated that they did not attack that day because they saw an armoured knight on a white horse emerging from the dark clouds, namely St. James the Greater (Lucero 2005).
command, the Christian army allegedly defeated the Muslim force, killing as many as 70,000 Arabs. From this point onwards, ‘St. James, the gentlest of Christ’s disciples, [became] Santiago-Matamoros, the vengeful and triumphant blackamoor killer’ (Luard 1998, 81). As Rudolph (2004, 15) poignantly summarises, ‘the cultural atmosphere of medieval pilgrimage [...] was one of faith and the manipulation of this faith’. It was, in fact, not only during the Middle Ages that political players mined St. James for their own propagandistic purposes. For example, under Franco’s regime, the saint, once more, picked up his sword and donned armour to ride into battle on his white horse, bringing victory not to Christian knights, but, instead, to the nationalist army (Preston 1993; Graham and Murray 1997, 398). In fact, the image of St. James as the Christian-uniting, Muslim-smiting saviour of Europe has survived well into the present. To quote from Luard’s (1998, 81) discussion on the modern-day importance of St. James in the context of the pilgrim routes to SdC in terms of heritage tourism,

*St James had challenged the common enemy at the gates of Europe and hurled the enemy back. He was heroic. He wore the mantle of the new religion, Christianity, but he was rooted in the old, in the tales children heard whispered around the fire at night, when, in deep midwinter, branches of evergreen fir framed the hearth to encourage the return of spring. The carpenter’s son preached peace and died on a cross. Santiago wielded a sword, rode a magic horse, and lived. Europe flocked to the field of stars.*

This led Luard (1998, 81) to conclude St. James to represent, to the present-day, ‘the spirit, the *anima*, of [...] all Europe’. The important thing to keep in mind is that this spirit always evolved around something that could hardly be more profane: politics. After the final victory over Iberian Islam in 1492, the cult of Santiago entered a long phase of decline, transforming the saint into ‘an elderly statesman and national patrician’ (Graham and Murray 1997, 398) in which the image of St. James as a fighter for Christianity and Europe survived to the present day.

To sum up, the iconographic meaning of St. James the Greater, from the Middle Ages to the present-day, evolved around the military struggle of Christians against Muslims (Gibbs 1997, 28). It is within this discourse that Europe is defined as an exclusively Christian ‘continent’ to be defended against what is
presented as hordes of infidels washing up against its southern shores. According to Christian doctrine, saints are those believers who the church officially recognised as having 'practiced heroic virtue and lived in fidelity to God's grace' (Tilson and Chao 2002, 90). Arguing the SCPR to represent the ECRP's flagship project, a 'reference point for the development of future activities' (EICR 2005d, 1, ECRP information leaflet) and a 'modèle de coopération culturelle pour la Grande Europe du futur' (EICR 2005b, 1, SCPR information leaflet) symbolising 'first and foremost the process of European construction' (CoE 01.10.1996, 6, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe. Seminar on Cultural Routes - Challenges of Citizenship and Sustainable Development: Introductive Report), the CoE/EICR employs the symbol of medieval politico-religious propaganda in which the exclusion of and fight against Muslims becomes a European - and thus, by implication, (EU)ropean - duty. Yet, to this point, only St. James' icono-propagandistic legacy has been illuminated, a legacy not easily lending itself to Eurocratic notions of (EU)rope being 'open to all traditions and religions' (Prodi 2001, Monotheistic religions and the futures of peoples, speech given on the occasion of the Interfaith Meeting, Brussels 20 December 2001) and 'the de facto multicultural European society' (CoE 02.12.1996, 12, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe. Seminar on Cultural Routes - Challenges of Citizenship and Sustainable Development: Introductive Report) (see chapters 1.5.3 & 3.2.3). The question must thus become, what icono-discursive character does St. James take in the discursive articulation of the SCPR? The CoE (15.04.1994, 15), in an internal meeting report discussing the SCPR's aims and objectives, and entitled Revitalisation of the Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Ways, states the SCPR to

encourage people in this Europe under construction, and young people in particular, to rediscover the Santiago pilgrim ways, and bear witness to all that this movement towards Santiago de Compostela has brought to European cultural identity, and to, once more, travel along these routes, but with the future in mind.

What is the ideological character of the future as discursively created by the use of the heritage on the ground in terms of the SCPR?

11 'co-operation model for a future Great Europe' (my translation)
4.4 THE ‘SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA PILGRIM ROUTES’

The pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC experienced its first post-medieval revival in nineteenth and early twentieth century France (see Mollaret 2003). Yet, it was in modern Spain that the cult of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC experienced a major revival, as exemplified by the theme’s appearances on various stamps (Figure 4.2).

It was this popularity that, in 1987, awakened the ‘appétits politiques’\(^\text{12}\) (Mollaret 2003, 184) of the Eurocratic meritocracy. Ministers entrusted the task of organising the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC at intergovernmental level to the Steering Committee for Integrated Conservation of the Historic Heritage and to the Directorate of Environment and Local Authorities (DELA) (CoE 25.05.1988, 4, European Cultural Routes: Secretary General’s memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport). Following the Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 987 (28 January 1984) and a discussion held during the 2nd European Conference of the Ministers for Architectural Heritage (CoE 1985), the CoE adopted, at the initiative of France and Spain, the SCPR as the first official ECR. As a result, several French regions came together to set up the Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Ways Association for Inter-Regional Co-operation, signing co-operation agreements with other regions of Europe (CoE 01.07.1994, 4, Cultural Routes of the Council of Europe – Meeting of the Networks of the Cultural Routes: Preliminary Report), and supporting local authorities and scientific experts (CoE 25.04.1996, 13, Cultural Routes – History of the Project (1987-1996)). Since then, the SCPR, under the leadership of the CoE, have constantly expanded. To date, the SCPR incorporates routes of linearly connected heritage sites passing through Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, France, Spain, and Britain (Cornwall) (EICR 2004e; 2005f) (Figure 4.3).

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\(^{12}\) ‘political appetites’ (my translation)
The official routes, as well as the heritage sites incorporated, are, for some 850 km, marked with the SCPR’s symbol (Figure 4.4). 4000 of these markers are placed in the North of Spain alone (Murray and Graham 1997, 516).
The SCRP symbol represents a hybrid between the shape of a scallop shell\(^{13}\), symbol for the pilgrimage to SdC since the second half of the twelfth century\(^{14}\), and the deep-blue and gold colours of the EU flag (Figure 4.5; see also EU 2004a).

![Figure 4.5: Schematic illustration of SCPR symbol composition (scallop shell photograph by Jacques Villon)](image)

Contended to 'point towards the ideal of European integration, signifying an attitude of mind that encompasses an attentiveness towards others and a deeply felt dedication to the European experience' (Graham and Murray 1997, 399), the symbol is also widely used on CoE/EICR publications, posters, and other media. In 1993, a Holy Year for SdC, the Spanish government even minted coins (5 and 100 pesetas) bearing the symbol (CoE 15.04.1994, 18, Revitalisation of the Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Ways: Meeting Report). Also, stating the project to give 'exceptional witness to the power and influence of Christian faith among people of all classes and countries in Europe' (UNESCO 1999, 29), UNESCO awarded the SCPR World Heritage Site status for Spain in 1993 and for France in 1998 (UNESCO 1999, 28-29; see also Pouey 2003).

\[^{13}\text{There are, however, modern authors interpreting it as a cockle shell (e.g. Graham and Murray 1997, 399).}\]

\[^{14}\text{The legend goes that when St. James' followers dragged the boat holding the apostle's body onto the beach a horseman went by. When the horse bolted in fear from St. James' relics, it lunged into the sea, taking the rider with it. Miraculously re-emerging unscathed from the deep waters, the horse and rider were covered in scallop shells (Luard 1998, 79; see also CoE 15.04.1994, 5).}\]
In line with the ECRP's general rhetoric dedication to multi-vocality and multidiscursivity (see chapter 3.2.3), the SCPR claims to achieve these aims by developing and promoting a multitude of diverse readings of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC. To quote the CoE (15.04.1994, 19, Cultural Routes - History of the Project (1987-1996) (Council for Cultural Co-Operation, Culture Committee 12th meeting)) commenting on the wide KIV (see chapter 3.3.3) allegedly ensured for the SCPR, 'any number of readings of the Santiago routes and the movement towards Compostela may be proposed'. Further highlighting the SCPR's claim to the above values, Thomas-Penette (1999, 7), the EICR's current Director, in an article published in the journal European Heritage (entitled Cultural Routes: Key factors in the discovery of a common heritage), states them to successfully have become the embodiment of

*respect for different religious or cultural identities, heritage protection, and transmission of the heritage in a manner sensitive to the outlooks of others... What matters is to be aware of these different readings, and be able to articulate them when it comes to revitalising the Santiago de Compostela pilgrim ways.*

For the following analysis, these claims represent the bar against which to measure the SCPR's culture heritage discourse as executed on the ground. As argued by Smith (2000, 24; see also Macmillan 1998), identity always involves knowing and doing. Thus, the SCPR, as the identity-forming tool that it is, is bound to present a culture heritage discourse evolving around paradigms of knowing and doing. The question here must thus become if and how the SCPR generates this discourse for the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC. This shall be the subject of the following section. What discursive shape does it take when seen through the Eurocratic lens?

4.4.1 The pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela through a Eurocratic lens

*The Santiago route is a cultural good of considerable extent and diversity, no doubt one of the biggest in the world after the Great Wall of China.*

(Consejo Jacobeo cited in CoE 15.04.1994, 7)

At the general level of Eurocratic rhetorics, the SCPR is projected to develop a reading of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC characterised by notions of openness, democracy, peace, and multi-vocality. As stated by Thomas-Penette
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(1999, 8; see also Wild 1989, 6; Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 14, 166, 329; Thomas-Penette 17 October 2003), Director of the EICR, explaining the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC in the aforementioned journal article, the ‘millions of people who have travelled together, since the beginning of the Middle Ages, towards a place full of sacred meaning’ were ‘Europeans of all social backgrounds, ages, and cultures’. Employing similar rhetorics, Plötz (1989, 94), member of the SCPR group of experts, in his contribution to the aforementioned Bamberg Congress, states that

"In medieval times pilgrimages were a mass phenomenon, which aspire admiration and even astonishment in today’s observers, considering the low population figures of the time. Chroniclers reported a stream of many thousand of pilgrims in one day, often many times more than the total population of the largest places of pilgrimage themselves."

Further, in the tradition of the Eurocratic rhetoric device of Unity-in-diversity (see chapter 1.5.3), he argues the pilgrimage to SdC to have given ‘the pilgrims a feeling of belonging to a family of nations, each distinct from the others, but all sharing the same basic values linked by a common civilisation’. In the light of the discourse analytical results concerning the ECRP’s internal mechanisms of qualified knowledge-generation (see chapters 3.3 & 3.4), experts selected by the CoE/EICR for the SCPR’s panel of experts rather unsurprisingly support this interpretation. To quote Coco Arias and Fernández Garcia’s (1989, 114; see contributions to CoE 1989) contribution to the Bamberg Congress,

"With the pilgrims, and often as pilgrims themselves, there came to Spain French stonemasons, German artisans, Tuscan merchants, Flemish noblemen, English and Burundian crusaders, and with them Provençal lyric poetry, Carolingian philosophy, Slav legends, new building techniques etc. All these influences and ideas intermingled and returned to their lands of origin, spreading to the most remote points."

Further enforcing this reading of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC, the EICR’s (2005a) information leaflet on the SCPR states that medieval and later ‘[p]ilgrims really did gain an incomparable cultural experience. They could discover various new customs, languages, and ways of life, and return home enriched with a breadth of knowledge rare at the time’. It is in this reading of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC as an early form of Unity-in-diversity (see chapter 1.5.3) that the SCPR rest within the Eurocratic culture heritage
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paradigm of Remembering the New Europe (see chapter 1.5.2). The modern-day community of EU citizens and the medieval (and later) community of pilgrims on their way to SdC are written, if not as Same, at least as Similar. In this process, (EU)rope is discursively constructed as a largely unchanging, eternal cultural entity. To further illustrate this, Wild (1989, 6), another expert in the service of the SCPR, again at the occasion of the Bamberg Congress, states the medieval community of pilgrims to SdC to have been travelling ‘freely, with legal protection, and the blessing of the ecclesiastical and secular authorities’. The Eurocratically qualified understanding of medieval pilgrimage to SdC takes the shape of a mirror image of the present-day EU with its free trade and free citizen zone. As most poignantly summarised by Wild (1989, 6),

*[i]n thinking back to the spiritual and physical unity of medieval Europe, and, thus, reflecting upon our identity, the Council of Europe is endeavouring, with its project on pilgrim routes as cultural itineraries, to reawaken or rediscover an awareness of our traditions and history in order that the goal of European unification with a basis in history may be made clear.*

Such readings of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC are characterised by the exclusion of interpretations not in line with the Eurocratic idea of past and present merging into a paradigmatic Same. In the following, in order to highlight some of the SCPR’s unused multi-discursive potential, I will present some alternative readings of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC that should have easily lent themselves to Eurocratic notions of multiple discourses and diversity. In doing so, I am by no means arguing that these alternatives hold any more factuality than the Eurocratic interpretation. Yet, they represent equally valid alternatives and should, according to the Eurocratic doctrine (see chapter 3.2.3), be given expression in the SCPR.

4.4.2 The pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela through alternative lenses

In reference to the medieval pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC, numerous present-day scholars argue that ‘*[l]a réalité est beaucoup plus complexe*’15 (de Grozals cited in Favreau 2003, 49; see also Vincent 2003, 97). Contrary to the above Eurocratic idea(l) of pilgrimage to SdC, scholars (not members of the SCPR’s group of experts) have argued that it is, for example, very ‘hard to determine

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15 ‘the reality is much more complex’ (my translation)
reliable statistics as to the exact numbers of people that partook in pilgrimage throughout the medieval era' (Hopper 2004, 69). Accounts arguing millions of pilgrims at a time to have streamed towards SdC (see above) are generally considered as factually doubtful and highly exaggerated. Closely related to this, scholars have argued that the routes actually taken by the medieval pilgrims were usually of a rather undetermined character, with most pilgrims, in an attempt to avoid the many perils of the main roads (e.g. highwayman), following whatever road or track they could find (Herbers 1989, 10). Also, the further away from SdC the more vague notions of specific pilgrim routes and associated sites become, making it difficult in many, if not most, cases to identify traditional pilgrim routes outside Spain and France (Alsina 1989, 50; Herbers 1989, 10). This absence of evidence has been acknowledged by UNESCO, having, as mentioned above, only included the Spanish and French pilgrimage routes to SdC in its list of World Heritage Sites. Yet, as can be seen in Figure 4.3, the SCPR stretch as far as Århus (Denmark) and Gdansk (Poland) to the north-east, and Zagreb (Croatia) and Bari (Italy) to the south-west. In this context it is also interesting to note that most of the pilgrimage routes to SdC were not of religious or civil origin or character, but were built during the Middle Ages to serve primarily military functions. For example, Sancho III (1004-1035 AD) built the *Inter Sancti Iacobi* in Navarre, one of the main Spanish pilgrimage routes to SdC, not for the pilgrims, but for his military campaigns against Muslim Spain (Herbers 1989, 10; von Sauken 1989, 59-60; Favreau 2003, 51; c.f. Alsina 1989, 48). To quote von Sauken (1989, 60) in specific relation to Italian pilgrimage routes to SdC, their

*function was eminently strategic, with the result that the first settlements served to maintain and defend the road. Fortifications were built, and defence systems were set up around bridges and villages... [T]he defence of the road network became part of a specific policy of expansion and consolidation based on a system of royal abbeys in control of the traffic along it.*

Additionally, the erection of castles and other fortifications at strategic points along the roads towards SdC, particularly during the tenth and eleventh centuries, became an important means of contesting and consolidating the established territorial organisation among Christian rulers (Favreau 2003, 53). Yet, most importantly, this Eurocratic reading of the pilgrimage to SdC ignores the complex socio-religious character attributed to the medieval pilgrimage to
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SdC by researchers in the field. Davies (1997, 278; see also Sumption 2002; Hopper 2004), for example, opposing the image of pilgrims as representing a peaceful and open-minded community of destiny, argues that

[The pilgrims' motives were not simple. Some set out from a belief in the power of the famous saint to intercede for their souls. Some set out for a cure. Many went for the joy of fellowship, for a rollicking adventure, or for baser reasons of lust, gain, or escape.

Baser reasons included, for example, professional pilgrim brothers and sisters who undertook pilgrimage to save the souls of the dead or of the prosperous living for money (Rudolph 2004, 4-5). Numerous scholars have put forward similar arguments (e.g. Roff 1985; Fickelman and Piscatori 1990b, 15-18; see also contributions to Fickelman and Piscatori 1990a). Rudolph (2004, 6) even referred to the SdC pilgrims as a 'pretty tough bunch', representing quite the opposite to what Thomas-Penette, Director of the EICR, in an article on the ECRP in European Heritage, argues to have been an 'enlightened family' (Thomas-Penette 1999, 8). To quote Rudolph (2004, 6),

[There were so many stabbings of pilgrims by pilgrims in the cathedral of Santiago (probably brought on by heavy drinking during feast days) that normal church functions were regularly interrupted because of the constant need to reconsecrate the church each time blood was shed within it, something that caused one medieval pope to grant Santiago the special privilege of an unusually brief reconsecration blessing.

He further argues that such violent excesses occurred on such a regular basis that pilgrims were referred to as 'hordes [...] characterized by vast, unruly crowds, often completely out of control' (Rudolph 2004, 7-8). In reference to the medieval (and later) pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC, Eurocrats in charge of the SCPR, such as the aforementioned Thomas-Penette (1999, 8; also EICR 2004e; 2005b), argue that 'Europeans of all social backgrounds, ages, and cultures have thus met there and had the opportunity to share their discoveries and engage in dialogue'. Such interpretations, however, ignore the considerable number of medieval documentary sources suggesting alternative, and often contradictory, interpretations. For example, one source states that 'at the night-long vigil of a great feast day at Santiago, the Germans occupied one side of the high altar, the French another, and the Italians yet another, all singing independently and in their own languages' (Rudolph 2004, 7). In fact, during the Middle Ages even
the concept of pilgrimage as such developed into a point of heated contestation. A series of controversies over the nature of Jesus’ relationship with God had split Christians into a number of opposing camps (Smith 1999, 309). While some groups adhered to the idea of pilgrimage as a way closer to God, it was others — including church fathers such as St. Augustine — who argued pilgrimage to represent a pointless endavour since the holy could not be localised in any specific place (Rudolph 2004, 6). Moreover, as Dunne (1997, 7) observes in her discussion of European cultural identity in the context of the EU, ‘[c]laims upon the Christian tradition must be juxtaposed against centuries of religious strife; between Constantinople and Rome, Catholicism and Protestantism, the religious and the secular’. The medieval Christian world was far from united. Obviously, such accounts represent the antithesis to the Eurocratically accepted, or at least encouraged, reading of the phenomenon of pilgrimage to SdC, a reading poignantly summarised by Wild (1989, 6), member of the SCPR panel of experts, at the Bamberg Congress:

In thinking back to the spiritual and physical unity of medieval Europe, and thus reflecting upon our identity, the Council of Europe is endeavouring, with its project on pilgrim routes as cultural itineraries, to reawaken or rediscover an awareness of our traditions and history in order that the goal of European unification with a basis in history may be made clear.

Yet, are such diverse readings of the past not also part of the multiple-layer phenomenon and experience of pilgrimage, and should they thus not be promoted through the SCPR as claimed by the CoE and EICR (see chapters 3.1.1 & 3.2.3)? Confronted with this contradiction, the Eurocratic reply, as expressed by Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003), Director of the EICR, in an interview with the author was as follows: ‘We can give a simple interpretation saying that millions went along this route. This is not a contradiction at all. It only depends on the interpretation and enriches the discussion. It only depends on what sources you use’. The validity of this statement is unquestionable. However, it is only applicable if the CoE/EICR could demonstrate a willingness to include interpretations that stand in contradiction, or at least apart, to their own. That which does not fit — as already observed in chapter 3.3.2 for the ECRP’s planning stage of heritage creation in general and in chapter 3.4 for the TCCR specifically — is disregarded. To make this even clearer, I am not arguing alternative interpretations to be more valid than the Eurocratic reading. I am,
however, suggesting that, in particular against the Eurocratic claim of the ECRP adhering to values of multi-discursivity, multiculturalism, and multi-faith, such readings should be given an active voice as part of the SCPR.

Following on from the above characterisation of the SCPR's general discursive set-up, we have to ask what concrete elements of culture heritage are employed in order to form the SCPR's official culture heritage grammar. What aspects of the material past — in their role as discursive 'text' — are used to construct the SCPR on the ground?

4.4.3 The SCPR's culture heritage discourse

In the SCPR information leaflet the EICR (2005a, 1) confidently asserts that

> [b]y providing people of varied background, believers and non-believers, with an opportunity to gather together, the Santiago Routes serve both as symbol, reflecting over one thousand years of European history, and as a model of cultural co-operation for Europe as a whole.

The following section will illuminate if and how far this claim becomes reality in terms of the actual culture heritage grammar assembled by the Eurocratic bodies involved in the formation of the SCPR on the ground. To return to the claim made by the CoE (01.10.1996, 6) in the introductive report to a seminar on the role of the SCPR in the context of citizenship and sustainable development, if the SCPR 'symbolise first and foremost the process of European construction', what is the discursive character of this process?

In order to do so, the following analysis uses the CoE-constructed and CoE-published SCPR guidebook (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, Guide Européen des Chemins de Compostelle) for its database. It represents the sole source for the entirety of culture heritage elements (sites and objects) officially included in the SCPR, and is a necessity for anyone planning to travel the CoE's take on the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC. As such, the following analysis is not based on a simple guidebook, but has recourse to the entire SCPR culture heritage grammar as devised and mediated by the EU's prime institutional body of culture and its flagship project (see chapters 3.1 & 3.2). It may not be representative of the opinions and ideas of every individual Eurocrat. How could it? Yet, as a case study, it represents one of the most important implemented crystallisations of the Eurocratic culture heritage ideal, as well as
the end result of the Eurocratic process of knowledge-generation, and, as such, must be assessed in terms of general and context-specific Eurocratic claims to pluralism and multi-vocality, and, in particular, discursive openness. Further, the presentation of the culture heritage elements (see Kress and van Leeuwen 1996 for the notion of visual design grammar) in the guidebook itself, representing a ‘text’ to be analysed by CDA, provides a second, multisemiotic and interlinking, discursive field for analysis, including language and visual imagery. It is against this background of providing context, content, and character of mediation that the SCPR guidebook’s discursive relevance cannot be over-emphasised.

Before going into more detail, due to the SCPR consisting mainly of architectural culture heritage sites, a brief word on architecture as culture identity has to be inserted. Cultural representations shape the boundary between people’s Self and their Other (Sibley 1995, 10). One of cultural selfhood’s most tangible and enduring representations is architecture, often in its monumental form (see Carver 1998; 2001 for a discussion of monumentality and ideology). What makes architecture a particularly powerful carrier of notions of cultural Self is that, in its pure material presence, it appears objective (in the truest material sense of the word), and, thus, free of the need to be critically questioned and challenged. As Abel (1997, 154) observes,

\[w\]e do not have architecture, therefore, but rather, a part of us is architecture. Architecture is a way of being, just as sciences, art, and the other major culture-forms are ways of being. So when we come to define the true and deeper functions of architecture, we will not be simply describing the production of a certain type of artefact, but explaining one of the original ways in which we know ourselves.

It is in this understanding that architectural heritage as employed in the SCPR acquires its major significance in terms of ideology, and thus its relevance for this chapter’s examination of EU culture heritage policy as implemented on the ground.

To return from this little excursion, in order to critically assess the SCPR’s culture heritage discourse in terms of heritage sites on the ground, the following analysis is based on two of the project’s major routes to SdC, namely the interlinking Route de Pologne (trans. Polish Route) and the Route de
Danemark (trans. Danish Route). Starting in Gdansk (Poland), and after passing through Germany, Luxembourg, and France, it joins the Route de Danemark at the French town of Sauveterre-de-Béarn, from where it leads to SdC (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6: The Route de Pologne (pink)/Danemark (bright blue) in the context of the SCPR network (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, inside cover)

This route was chosen for quantitative analysis on the grounds that, unlike other routes, the Route de Pologne/Danemark\textsuperscript{16} represents a continuous linear path of heritage sites with no alternative sub-routes available\textsuperscript{17}. As such, the Route de Pologne/Danemark represents a closed body of culture heritage grammar reaching from one of the SCPR network’s easternmost points all the way to SdC at the Western end of the Eurasian continent. It thus provides the full width of supra-national culture heritage sites as would be encountered by a cultural tourist travelling the SCPR on a linear route from Gdansk via Germany, Luxembourg, and France, to SdC. In technical terms, the author entered each culture heritage site on this route officially part of the SCPR into a SPSS 12.0.1 database (n=673). Data was collected in terms of a number of variables, which will be discussed in detail in the following.

\textsuperscript{16} In the following, the term ‘Route de Pologne/Danemark’ refers to the combination of routes as discussed above.

\textsuperscript{17} Only between the French towns of Bénévent-l’Abbeye and Cahors, on a length of 268 km, there exist two alternative routes running parallel to each other (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 234-235). For the following analysis, the first of the two routes was chosen on the basis of a random selection.
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In the following sections, I will discuss types of SCPR culture heritage sites that contributed at least three percent of the total number included (see Figure 4.7). Some of the less prevalent types will, however, be revisited in a wider context later on in the discussion. Making up 41.4 percent (278 incidences) of all heritage sites employed, by far the most dominant type of culture heritage site - and thus the one primarily encountered by those travelling the Route de Pologne/Danemark as cultural tourists - is that of Christian churches (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7: Distribution of heritage sites on the Route de Pologne/Danemark by type

In addition to this, 3.9 percent of the sites included in the route are cathedrals, including St. Peter at Trier (Germany) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 194-195), St. Étienne at Châlons-en-Champagne (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 201), St. Étienne at Bourges (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 216), and, obviously, the cathedral of SdC (Spain) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 161-162). 10.1 percent of heritage sites are - or, in the case of ruins, used to be - abbeys, monasteries, or convents, such as the abbeys of Lehnin (Germany) and Vézelay (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 176, 209), followed by chapels (6.7 percent), amongst them St. Roch, Saligny (France) and St. Jacques, Villalcazar de Sirga (Spain) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 149, 211). Medieval village or town fortifications make up 6.3 percent of all cases, including the monumental Porte Chaussée, Verdun (France) and the town gate of Los Arcos (Spain), as well as
the city walls and defensive towers of Sasamon (Spain) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 139, 147, 197), followed by castles and fortresses (5.8 percent), such as the citadel of Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port (France) and the imposing castles of Les Cars (France) and Montbazon (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 104, 135, 242). Last of the heritage site types included in this discussion are the palaces and residences of the secular élite, making up 4.3 percent. These, to name but one, include the seat of the Dukes of Orleans at Blois (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 97).

In order to sketch the general discursive and ideological thrust of the culture heritage site grammar as employed in the Route de Pologne/Danemark, each element, where appropriate, was allocated to a broader category based on the overall function of a site (Figure 4.8).

![Figure 4.8: Route de Pologne/Danemark thematic heritage site distribution](image)

For example, all Christian religious sites, may they be churches, monasteries, or roadside crosses, were combined under the theme 'Religious (Christian)'. Categories accounting for less than three percent were collapsed into 'Other'.

### 4.4.3.1 Christian religious culture heritage sites

Allocating culture heritage sites included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark to a broader category based on the overall function of the site, we find heritage sites of a Christian religious nature to heavily dominate the SCPR’s thematic
character (65.4 percent). This might appear the result to be expected in the context of an ECR revolving around a Christian pilgrimage phenomenon. However, besides alternative choices always being possible, this position of dominance can only be justifiable if the Christian religious sites included can be demonstrated to have a connection to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC. After all, the SCPR claims to be based on the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC and not on the Christian religion as a whole. However, as the data analysis reveals, of all Christian religious heritage sites considered, it is only in 16.4 percent (n=439) of cases that the SCPR guidebook - providing information, whenever possible, on a site’s connection to St. James and the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC - can demonstrate a direct connection (Figure 4.9).

As Figure 4.10 demonstrates, when grouped according to the modern-day country in which a site can be found, the number of Christian religious sites related to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC drops dramatically the further away they are from SdC. Only in the case of Spain are at least more than half (56.2 percent) of the Christian religious sites included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark related to St. James. For France, this number already drops to about a third (37.0 percent), while for central-European Germany only 5.4 percent of the sites are thematically connected. In the case of Poland, the starting point of the route, a mere 1.4 percent of sites are thematically linked.
Figure 4.10: Route de Pologne/Danemark Christian religious heritage sites related to St. James by country

This distribution mirrors Alsina's (1989, 50) and Herbers' (1989, 10) argument that specific pilgrim routes to SdC and associated sites are extremely difficult to identify outside Spain and France (see chapter 4.4.2). In fact, going back to the culture heritage sites included in the SCPR in general, even in those cases where a connection is demonstrated, the thematic link is often as far-fetched as, for example, the single stained-glass window dedicated to St. James in the church of Baugy (France), a church exhibiting numerous other windows dedicated to a variety of Christian saints (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 214; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 71, 127, 202, 248, 295). As such it has no more connection to St. James than to many other saints. In other cases, the connection is merely the existence of a statue of St. James among those of other Apostles and saints inside a church not dedicated or otherwise directly related to the saint himself, such as in the case of the cathedral of Tulle (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 234; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 41, 68-69, 91, 180, 183, 291, 293), or a single sculptural detail, such as the small scallop shells ornament to be found on the façade of St. Jean-d'Estissac, Villamblart (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 245; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 107, 183, 215, 221, 245). Another particularly demonstrative case is the Jesuit church of Győr (Hungary), thematically connected to St. James only by a single scallop shell to be found among the
building's numerous other architectural ornaments (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 262) (Figure 4.11).

Nevertheless, this single, small architectural detail - which might, in fact, be completely unrelated to St. James after all in the light of the fact that decoration in imitation of shells (coquillage) were extremely fashionable in classical Greek and Roman architecture, as well as in its derivates Renaissance, Baroque, Rococo, and Neo-Classicist architecture - was all that was needed to qualify this church for incorporation in the SCPR. As such it can be observed that the SCPR's discursive character revolves more around Christianity as a whole than around St. James and the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC. The requirement of a direct link to the theme is sacrificed in favour of an expansion of the SCPR network to as many EU countries as possible, however removed from the recognised pilgrimage routes to SdC, such as Hungary. In areas where directly related culture heritage sites are largely missing, this evidential void is filled with Christian religious sites unrelated to St. James. This discursive gravitational centre of Christianity in general is further emphasised in the SCPR guidebook's thematic organisation. Information provided for each town included consists of two categories. The first category is entitled L'histoire (The
Generally speaking, while claiming the SCPR to represent a cultural tourism approach rooted in ‘the idea of culture experienced in dialogue between identities’ (CoE 16.06.1994, 8, Council of Europe Cultural Routes – Culture and Tourism: Making Culture and Tourism Complementary and Interactive) that can ‘be interpreted in very different ways’ (CoE 19.11.1993, 2, Revitalisation of the Santiago Pilgrim Ways: Ethics and Deontology of a Cultural Route) (see chapters 3.1.2 & 3.2.3), the information given on churches, the majority of which is unrelated to St. James or the pilgrimage to SdC, heavily outweighs that given on the city, town, or village, or, in fact, on any other type of culture heritage site.

The discursive emphasis on Christianity as a dominant whole – as opposed to a primary emphasis on St. James and the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC – is given additional symbolic weight through the visual discourse of the manifold photographs of Christian religious buildings included in the official SCPR guidebook (see Howells 2003, chapter 8 for a general discussion of photography as visual culture). Throughout our daily lives we are exposed to photographic representations, in particular in the shape of the mass media. As Kuhn (1985, 27; see also Lister and Wells 2001, 89-90) succinctly comments,

*photographs connote truth and authenticity when what is ‘seen’ by the camera eye appears to be an adequate stand-in for what is seen by the human eye. Photographs are coded, but usually so as to appear uncoded. The truth/authenticity potential of photography is tied in with the idea that seeing is believing. Photography draws on an ideology of the visible as evidence.*

In this context, it must be highlighted that, unlike many other guidebooks that employ a mix of visual representation ranging from photographs to drawings and paintings, the SCPR guidebook employs only a single case of a culture heritage site not displayed in photographic form, that of a black-and-white sketch of Knill Monument near St. Ives (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 176). It can thus be said that the SCPR guidebook draws exclusively on such an ideology of visible evidence. What makes the selection of photographs of culture heritage sites presented in the SCPR guidebook a particularly

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18 In general this only applies to bigger towns and cities incorporating a larger number of churches and/or a cathedral. In the case of small towns and villages the guidebook does not structure the information given.
important, in fact crucial, aspect of the project’s ideological discourse is that they represent the product of an active Eurocratic selection process (see chapter 2.3.3). Amongst the thousands of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR, it is those displayed in photograph (i.e. a visual unit of meaning) that are attributed primary status in terms of perceived importance simply by nature of the fact that they are given both textual and visual expression, and will thus influence and direct the selection of heritage sites visited by those travelling the SCPR (see Lister and Wells 2001 for a detailed discussion of photography as ideology). Photographs are always already an interpretation of the visible evidence. They are always discourse, and thus ideology. In order to illuminate the visual character of the photographs of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook, the following analysis employs VCA (see chapter 2.3.3 for a discussion in terms of methodology).

To return to the actual photographs of Christian religious heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook, in order to conduct VCA on their photogenic character, a SPSS 12.0.1 database including all photographs of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR was constructed by the author (n=427). To begin with the first variable recorded, determining the point of view of each photo as a combination of the elevation of the viewer in relation to the object, the distance between the viewer and the object, as well as the angle in which it was shot, an interesting observation can be made and interpreted in terms of ideology. As emphasised by Lister and Wells (2001, 83), the viewing position constructed via the camera is loaded with ideology. As Figure 4.12 shows, the majority (52.6 percent, n=329) of photographs of Christian religious heritage sites – with 77.2 percent (n=427) easily representing the majority of all photographs taken – are taken from a low point close to the monumental façade of the building itself, at an upward angle aiming towards the sky (categories accounting for less than two percent were collapsed into 'Other'). It must be pointed out that this mode of representation overshadows even the second most prevalent one (i.e. medium elevation, medium viewing distance, neutral angle) by factor four. As exemplified by the photographs of the cathedral St. Michel, Brussels (Netherlands) (Figure 4.13), Santa Maria la Redonda, Logroño, (Spain) (Figure 4.14), the Basilica of Goslar (Germany) (Figure 4.15), and the Église de l'Assomption, La Souterraine (France) (Figure 4.16), Christian religious buildings – imbued with symbolic, and thus ideological, monumentality – acquire a tower-like, powerful, imposing, and controlling visual character (see

Figure 4.12: Distribution of points of view for photos of Christian religious heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook

Figure 4.13 & 4.14: Saint-Michel, Brussels (Belgium) and Santa Maria la Redonda, Logroño (Spain) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 36, 141)
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Representing a visual phenomenon observed by Jewitt and Oyama (2001, 136) for photographs taken from a low, close, and acute angle in general, the churches and cathedrals visually acquire power over the viewer. Quite literally, the churches stand tall while we kneel. In 44.1 (n=329) percent of photographs of Christian religious culture heritage sites, this visual effect is further emphasised by the portrait format in which they were taken (Figures 4.13-4.16). The same photographic phenomenon can be observed for other Christian religious sites, such as the photographs of the collegiate institution of St. Waudru, Mons (Belgium) (Figure 4.17) and the abbey of Einsiedeln (Switzerland) (Figure 4.18) (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 40, 360; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 82, 87, 118, 160, 233, 416, 456, 515 for just a small selection of those included in the guidebook). In filling most of the picture frame, the photographs exclude any signifying context except that of the background of the sky, the heavens. Quite literally, the SCPR guidebook’s visual discourse, going hand-in-hand with the Route de Pologne/Danemark’s culture heritage site discourse, is filled out with the notion of a dominant and overshadowing Christian heritage observable throughout, and thus unifying, Europe. Further, in 84.5 percent of all cases (n=329), humans are completely excluded from the photographs.
As such, Christian religious buildings are lifted out of their day-to-day context as part of the urban and rural landscape - as buildings most of us encounter in passing on a daily basis - and acquire a character removed from the worldly sphere. Also, with human activity largely removed from the photographs, the viewer, in absence of any human context, is 'forced' to take the role of the photographer, thus making him/her kneel in front of the Christian religious buildings.

In addition to the 'forced discourse of veneration' identified above, the SCPR's culture heritage grammar can be argued to develop an evangelising character. In terms of ritual function, it is in particular the ornate medieval fonts to be found in some of the churches and cathedrals that the guidebook directs the cultural tourist's attention to. Among the hundreds of fonts included, examples appearing in the SCPR guidebook with photographs attached are the fonts of the Grande Église, Breda (Netherlands), the Vor Frue Domkirke, Haderslev (Denmark) (Figure 4.19), the Aegidiuskirche, Lübeck (Germany), Saint-Barthélémy, Liège (France) (Figure 4.20), the church of Viloria de la Rioja (Spain), and that of St. Stephanus, Halberstadt (Germany) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 30, 60, 64, 65, 77, 143, 180; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 37, 38, 57, 58, 61, 83, 85, 143, 152, 167, 183, 186, 301, 387, 469, 477 for just a small selection of fonts included in the SCPR). This category of heritage grammar also includes a number of Roman fonts (e.g. Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 143, 148, 191).
Further strengthening this discursive (i.e. ideological) emphasis, the SCPR guidebook highlights sculptures, paintings, and frescos showing scenes of baptism, as, for example, the sculpture on the façade of Notre-Dame-la-Grande, Poitiers (France) (Figure 4.21) and the fresco at Notre-Dame-Du-Mont-Carmel, Le Luc (France) (Figure 4.22) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 113, 492; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 47, 78, 93, 299, 476 for just a small selection of those highlighted photographically in the guidebook).

This discursive emphasis is further intensified by directing the cultural tourist’s attention particularly towards the baptisteries of churches and cathedrals, such as in the case of St. Étienne, Châlons-en-Champagne (France) and Saint-Cyr-Sainte-Juliette, Nièvre (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski
2002, 201, 224; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 30, 68, 72, 73, 78, 113, 225, 270, 301, 408, 411-412, 414, 435, 490 for just a small selection of those included in the SCPR). The SCPR guides the cultural tourist travelling along it, quite literally, from font to font, from baptism to baptism - an act that could hardly be any more ideological. Further strengthening this discursive character of 'conversion', the Route de Pologne/Danemark, as well as the SCPR in its entirety, places particular discursive emphasis on the figure of John the Baptist, whether this is in the shape of statues, reliquaries, or murals depicting his life and deeds (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 48, 78, 183, 205, 224, 291, 292, 293, 297, 391, 400, 469, 481, 486, 556 for just a small selection of those included in the SCPR). In this context it is also important to note that the very few pre-Christian culture heritage sites included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark (0.7 percent, n=673) the SCPR guidebook barely mentions the existence of. Otherwise they are met with near commentary silence (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 230, 232, 233, 242, 254). However, in the few cases when provided with a contextual commentary, pre-Christian culture heritage sites are presented as the material remains of crude and barbaric cultures having long disappeared due to the success of a superior Christian faith. For example, the SCPR guidebook states the dolmen at Saint-Priest-la-Feuille and Rebeyrole (France) to represent a ‘signe tres ancien de cultures primitifs’19 (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 232). In a similar vein, the Viking runestone at Jelling (Denmark) qualifies for inclusion in the SCPR only in so far as it is used to represent ‘le symbole du passage du peuple danois du paganisme au Christianisme, du culte des ancêtres a celui rendu au Christ’20 (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 59). As such it can be argued that pre-Christian heritage appears only to be incorporated in the SCPR in order to testify for the European development from the 'primitive' and 'dark' times of paganism to a 'civilised' and 'enlightened' Christian Europe. The 'misdoings' of the past are smiled upon indulgently from a position of spiritual maturity. This discursive thrust echoes, for example, in Plötz (1989, 92; Pilgrims and pilgrimages yesterday and today, around the example of Santiago de Compostela), member of the SCPR panel of experts, stating at the CoE's Bamberg Congress Christian and Viking culture to represent 'on the one hand an advanced civilisation and on the other a primitive culture'. Christianity is discursively constructed as Europe's civilising force.

19 'very ancient symbol of primitive cults' (my translation)
20 'the symbol of the passage of the Danish people from paganism to Christianity, from the cult of ancestors to that of Christ' (translation by P. B. Rahn and S. Grabow)
4.4.3.2 'Defensive' culture heritage sites

Returning to the thematic categories identified above for the corpus of culture heritage sites forming the Route de Pologne/Danemark (Figure 4.8), the second most prominent group (13.9 percent, n=673) consists of structures of a mainly defensive, largely military, character. These take the concrete shape of castles, fortresses, and, in the majority of cases, village and town fortifications (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 131, 147, 163, 172, 193, 206, 217, 222, 223, 229, 243, 253 for just a small selection of those included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark). In the case of town fortifications it is in particular the access-controlling, towering, commanding, and often visually intimidating gates that are given primary emphasis. Medieval examples, which constitute the vast majority of this category of culture heritage site, include the fourteenth century Porte Chaussée, Verdun (France) (Figure 4.23) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 197; see also Figures 4.26-4.29; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 75, 120, 122, 125, 255, 278, 336, 339, 393, 396, 404, 415, 417, 436, 520 for just a small selection of those included in the SCPR).

The few non-medieval village/town fortifications incorporate, for example, the Porta Nigra, the colossal main gate of Trier's (Germany) Roman town defences (Figure 4.24) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 193). Examples of castles, bastions, and fortresses, also mainly medieval in origin, include the remains of the fortress at Pierre-Perthuis (France) and the Count of Never's well-defended castle at Bazoches (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 221, 222; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 134, 147, 151, 217, 228, 234, 243, 249 for just a small selection of those included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark). The
defensive-military and protective character of this culture heritage theme is given further discursive weight, and directly linked with the theme of Christianity, by the many medieval commanderies – bases of operations for medieval Christian monastic orders of knights (e.g. Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, Teutonic Knights, Maltese Knights) – included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark (see, for example, Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 137, 172, 185, 234, 250; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 84, 86, 94, 204, 207, 214, 251, 318, 330, 338, 559 for a small selection of those included in the SCPR in general). It is at the same time that culture heritage site-related references to various Christian monastic orders (i.e. the Knights Templars, the Knights of Santiago, the Maltese Knights, and the Teutonic Knights) and their most prominent members feature heavily throughout the SCPR guidebook (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 138, 161, 187, 207, 216, 218 250, 255, 381-382, 425 for just a small selection of those included in the guidebook). European culture heritage as presented/embodied by the Route de Pologne/Danemark becomes something that has to be defended and protected from outside influences, if necessary by force. It is at the same time that, similar to the Christian religious sites discussed above, the vast majority (90.4 percent, n=94) of fortifications included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark is not demonstrated to have a direct connection to the theme of St. James or to the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC (Figure 4.25).

![Figure 4.25: Route de Pologne/Danemark ratio of 'Defensive' culture heritage sites related and non-related to St. James](image-url)

Figure 4.25: Route de Pologne/Danemark ratio of 'Defensive' culture heritage sites related and non-related to St. James
As such, the inclusion of culture heritage sites of a defensive/military character must be considered largely ideologically rather than thematically driven. Symbolically speaking, in this (EU)ropean context, the defensive culture heritage sites included protect from the outside an inside that is filled with exclusivist notions of Christianity.

Mirroring, although with less dominance, the visual character of the photographs of Christian religious culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook (making up 7.5 percent of the total number of photographs), fortifications are in the majority of cases (46.9 percent, n=32) displayed from the outside foot of the structure, sharply angled against the sky, and filling out most of the frame (Figure 4.26).

![Distribution of points of view for photos of 'Defensive' culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook](image)

Figure 4.26: Distribution of points of view for photos of 'Defensive' culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook

In the case of settlement fortifications, particularly poignant examples of this mode of presentation/mediation include the Porte d'Amsterdam, Haarlem (The Netherlands) (Figure 4.27), the Spalentor in Basel (Switzerland) (Figure 4.28), the thirteenth century barbican and town gate of Montagnana (Italy) (Figure 4.29), and the barbican and town gate of Krakow (Poland) (Figure 4.30) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 25, 298, 506, 549; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 61, 85, 114, 120, 147, 217, 290, 330, 336 for a selection of those included in the guidebook; see also Figure 4.23).
In adopting this visual-presentational mode, the town gates take on a particularly powerful character, imposing, exclusive, and protecting the inside from an alien and hostile outside. The same mode, even though slightly less prominent, can be observed for castles, such as highlighted by the photographic presentations of Monzaron Castle (France) (Figure 4.31) and Duras Castle (France) (Figure 4.32) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 104, 250; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 103, 262). Further strengthening the photogenic discourse of intimidation towards the outside and protection towards the inside, making it - even though not by much - the most prominent type of format, 48.5 percent (n=33) of the photographs of ‘Defensive’ structures
are displayed in portrait format – as opposed to 45.5 percent for landscape format and 6.0 percent for square format.

Figure 4.31 & 4.32: Monzaron Castle (France) and Duras Castle (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 104, 250)

In three-quarters (75.0 percent) of all photographic representations of ‘Defensive’ culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook, human activity of any form is excluded. With the photographs taken from the outside of the structures, in particular the gates appear impermeable, prohibiting – or at least controlling – movement from the outside to the inside. Instead of developing a visual discourse of openness, the representations of fortifications take on an inward-looking character. So, if the ‘Defensive’ culture heritage sites included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark, as well as in the SCPR in general, generate a discourse of access-control, the question must become who is being allowed, and who is being denied, access.

As the previous discussion highlighted already, it is the Christian religion in general that symbolically is not only allowed access to the qualified culture heritage paradigm as generated by the SCPR, but fills most of it out. However, the SCPR holds material and symbolic clues to the answer to the above question concerning who is being denied access. On numerous occasions, culture heritage sites qualify for inclusion in the SCPR not on the grounds of a thematic connection to St. James or the pilgrimage to SdC, but in their ability to present Muslim civilisation in a negative, destructive light. It is Muslim civilisation that discursively is denied access to (EU)rope. To support this claim, it is in this context that, for example, the small priory church of Espalion (France) qualifies as part of the SCPR only in that it ‘a été édifié à l’endroit où Hilarion
Sven Grabow

fut décapité par les Sarrasins sous le règne de Charlemagne’²¹ (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 321), while the later reconstructed abbey of Moissac (France) is highlighted to have been ‘[d]évastée par les Arabes en 734-736’²² (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 332). Similarly, the small Spanish town of Logroño is lamented to have suffered in fights against Arabs (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 140), the cathedral of Villafrance Montes de Oca (Spain) to ‘fut ruinée par les Arabes lorsqu’ils assiègèrent la ville’²³ (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 144), while Sisteron (France) is introduced to the traveller as a village that ‘fut pillée par les Sarrasins et ne retrouva sa prospérité qu’au XIe siècle’²⁴ (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 488). As such, in an act of cognitive and evaluative delimitation²⁶ (see Fuchs et al. 1995, 165), Muslims are continuously placed in the discursive context of barbarism, aggression, invasion, and destruction—a threat to Europe and European culture (in this context, see also Kabbani 2001, 1; Asad 2002, 227). Doing so, the SCPR guidebook forms part of a wider Western Orientalist discourse in which, in the words of Haddad (1999, 631; see also Said 1978, 12-13; Schaar 2000, 67-68; Graham 2002, 1008), Islam becomes discursively constructed as

\[\text{a religion that is devoid of integrity and progressive values, a religion that promotes violent passions in its adherents, a menace to civil society, and a threat to the peace-loving people of the world. Muslims are often cast as bloodthirsty, whose loyalty as citizens must be questioned because they are perceived to be obsessed with the destruction of the West.}\]

In a similar fashion to the references to Muslims, culture heritage sites thematically unrelated to St. James are included in the SCPR on the basis that

²¹ ‘was founded in memory of Hilarion, who was decapitated by the Saracens during the reign of Charlemagne’ (my translation)
²² ‘[d]evastated by the Arabs in 734-736’ (my translation)
²³ ‘to have been ruined by the Arabs when they besieged the town’ (my translation)
²⁴ ‘was pillaged by the Saracens and that did not recover its prosperity until the eleventh century’ (my translation)
²⁵ ‘the invasions of the Saracens, the assassination of the abbot and 50 monks, provoked the decline of the monastery’ (my translation)
²⁶ Cognitive delimitation refers to the process of constructing an out-group in terms of being dissimilar from the in-group, while evaluative delimitation generates the image of an out-group as being inferior to the in-group (Fuchs et al. 1995, 165).
they provide, however distant, references to Christian military victories over Muslims, such as in the case of the small church of Santa Maria del Camino o de la Victoria (Spain), included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark only in reference to the sculptural detail of bulls carved on its façade alluding to the local 'victoire remportée sur les Maures par un troupeau des taureux furieux'\(^\text{27}\) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 149). This discursive paradigm can not only be observed for medieval Muslim civilisation in Spain and France in the west (e.g. Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 122, 212, 329, 338, 495, 501), but also for Europe's east and south-East, such as in the case of the Arab influence on Sicily and Italy, or the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Turkish expansion into, among other areas, Hungary and Croatia (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 258, 262, 375, 380, 384, 451, 455). Further strengthening this discourse, it is Christian kings and military leaders known for their campaigning against Muslims that are given particular discursive emphasis in the SCPR guidebook. In many cases, these kings and military rulers – and, in particular, reliquaries dedicated them (see, for example, Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 122, 136) – provide the context qualifying culture heritage sites not directly related to St. James or the pilgrimage to SdC for inclusion in the SCPR. These figures include, for example, Charlemagne (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 69, 74, 75, 430), ‘organisateur et protecteur de l’Église’\(^\text{28}\) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 74), Roland of Ronceveaux (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 122, 125, 135-136), nephew of Charlemagne, commander of the rearguard of his forces, and qualifying for inclusion in the SCPR in the context of his last stand against a superior Arab force, the Duke of Acquitaine and Count of Toulouse (Boudarias and Wasielewski 2002, 508), also mentioned only in the context of his fight against the Saracens, and Charles Martel, who ‘défit les Arabes’\(^\text{29}\) at Poitiers (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 112), with the result that, ‘[a]près de multiples incursions, les musulmans seront repoussés en 721’\(^\text{30}\) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 439). Also mentioned must be the appearance of the Spanish noble Rodrigo Diaz de Bivar (the Cid Compeador), who is presented in the context of making possible the ‘Reconquête contre les Maures’\(^\text{31}\) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 145), hand-in-hand with a list of reconquest battles out of which the Christian side emerged victorious (see also Bourdarias and

\(^{27}\) ‘the victory won over the Moors by a herd of furious bulls’ (my translation)

\(^{28}\) ‘organiser and protector of the Church’ (my translation)

\(^{29}\) ‘defeated the Arabs’ (my translation)

\(^{30}\) ‘after numerous incursions, the Muslims were repelled in 721’ (my translation)

\(^{31}\) ‘Reconquista against the Moors’ (my translation)
Wasielewski 2002, 265). It is in the same discursive context that Ramiro I is included as the Christian noble who defeated the Muslim forces near the village of Clavijo (Spain) in May 844 AD, a battle that, as pointed out previously in chapter 4.3.2, many historians doubt to have ever occurred (Gitlitz and Davidson 2000, xiv). It is, however, this doubtful battle that qualifies Clavijo – a settlement possessing no direct link to the pilgrimage to SdC, and a link to St. James only in a military context – to be included in the SCPR. In the SCPR guidebook the battle becomes a historical fact: ‘C’est ici que s’est déroulée la bataille entre Ramiro Ier des Asturies et le chef arabe Abderraman II en mai 844’32 (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 141). To employ another example, for Croatia, Thomas Bakac-Erdody, ‘qui fut vainqueur des Turcs en 1593 à la bataille de Sisak’33 (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 375), is presented to the cultural tourist as one of the country’s most important, if not the most important, historical figures. Yet, he is also entirely unrelated to St. James or the pilgrimage to SdC. What all these historical figures have in common is that they are presented, as in the case of Charlemagne, as protector of the Church (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 74; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 74, 202, 325, 331, 332, 465) and, as in the case of the Roman Emperor Constantine, ‘vainqueur du paganisme’34 (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 115). Symbolically speaking, these historical figures can be argued to man the SCPR’s ‘Defensive’ culture heritage sites, repelling non-Christian faiths, and, in particular Islam, from Europe (and thus, by implication, (EU)rope). In fact, it is the Apostle St. James himself who, as his medieval propagandistic alter ego of Santiago de Matamoros, ‘the vengeful and triumphant blackamoor killer’ (Luard 1998, 81; see chapter 4.3.2), picks up arms in defence of Christianity in the context of the SCPR. Taking the concrete shape of sculpture, this includes the saint’s depiction as part of the ornamental figures on the central portal of Amiens’ Notre-Dame cathedral (France) (Figure 4.33), as well as his depiction as a mounted fighter for Christianity on the Puerta de Santiago35, a fortified town gate facing the cathedral of Lugo (Spain) (Figure 3.34) (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 91, 140, 274, 343, 410 for more examples).

32 ‘It is here that the battle between Ramiro I of Asturias and the Arab leader Abderraman II took place on May 844’ (my translation)
33 ‘who had conquered the Turks in 1593 at the Battle of Sisak’ (my translation)
34 ‘the vanquisher of paganism’ (my translation)
35 The sculpture used to show Santiago de Matamoros high on his horse and wielding a sword. Damaged at some point in the past, however, the blade has snapped off.
Chapter 4: Implementation on the Ground

Both examples are discursively emphasised by the inclusion of close-up photographs in the guidebook. Taking into account Eurocratic claims to encourage culture experienced in dialogue between different identities, a phenomenon - as previous chapters have demonstrated (see chapters 3.1.1-3.1.2, 3.2.3, 4.4) - observable across the project’s ‘articulatory’ width, the use of Santiago Matamoros as part of the SCPR’s symbolic grammar should have been carefully avoided. This is particularly the case in that hundreds of sculptural representations of the saint in his image as a peaceful preacher, representations to be found at numerous culture heritage sites included in the SCPR, lend themselves readily for photographic representation in the guidebook while avoiding the propagandistic figure of St. James the ‘Moor killer’.

4.4.3.3 ‘Charitable’ culture heritage sites

Returning to the thematic categories of the corpus of culture heritage sites incorporated in the Route de Pologne/Danemark (Figure 4.8), the third most prominent thematic group consists of culture heritage sites primarily ‘Charitable’ in character (10.0 percent, n=673). This category mainly includes medieval hospitals and hospices caring for the sick, such as the tenth century AD hospital of Irache (Spain) and the ruins of the pilgrim hospital of Bassaou (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 139, 253; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 133, 140, 151, 164, 182, 194, 213, 223, 233, 251 for just a small selection of those included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark). With 37.3 percent (n=67), more than twice the number of sites when compared to Christian religious sites and thrice the number when compared to ‘Defensive’.
sites can be linked - based on the contextual information given in the guidebook - to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC (Figure 4.35).

As such, of all heritage site categories analysed to this point, it is the hospitals and hospices that are comparatively most justified in their inclusion in the SCPR in terms of thematic connection. It is, however, at the same time that no particular attention is drawn to them in terms of photographs included in the SCPR guidebook. In fact, only two photographic representations of a 'charitable' culture heritage site are to be found amongst the more than 427 photographs of culture heritage sites included. One of them shows a close-up of an architectural detail in the shape of a scallop shell on the façade of the hospital Saint-Jacques at Auch (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 517), the other being a photograph of the entrance gate of the hospice at Pons (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 120). As such, due to the very limited number, and with one of the two photographs only showing an architectural ornament, quantitative analysis of their visual modes of presentation is not feasible. Nevertheless, it can be observed that the hospitals and hospices included in the SCPR, while in their thematic connection to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC being most justified for inclusion, are given only minimal visual-discursive weight.
4.4.3.4 ‘Residential’ culture heritage sites

A very different pattern to the above, while mirroring the first two thematic categories, can be observed for the last major category of heritage sites discussed here. As can be seen in Figure 4.8, heritage sites of a ‘Residential’ character make up 4.3 percent (n=673) of the culture heritage sites on the Route de Pologne/Danemark. This category consists of the mainly representational residences (i.e. palaces, residences, and stately homes) of Europe’s Christian, secular, élite. For the Route de Pologne/Danemark these include, for example, the seat of the Dukes of Pomerania at Darlowo (Poland) and the palace of the Dukes of Nevers at Metz-le-Comte (France) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 173, 208; see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 158, 210, 220, 223, 230, 244 for a selection of those included). However, even though the entirety of ‘Residential’ heritage sites included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark is demonstrated to have no direct connection to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC (n=29), it is the photographs of this type of culture heritage site displayed in the guidebook that generate a special discursive emphasis for those travelling the SCPR (for which, to emphasise this once more, the official guidebook is an essential prerequisite). This becomes particularly evident in contrast to the lack of visual emphasis observed before for ‘Charitable’ culture heritage sites. As previously highlighted for the thematic categories of ‘Religious (Christian)’ and ‘Defensive’ culture heritage sites, the majority of palaces and residences are photographed from a low, fairly close point, at an angle aiming towards the sky, thus strengthening their visual impact in terms of importance and monumentality. Even though these statistics must be approached with caution due to the limited total number of photographs belonging to this category (n=18), every second (50.0 percent) representation exhibits this mode of display (Figure 4.36). Examples include the photographs of the aforementioned Ducal palace at Nevers (France) (Figure 4.37), the Palace of the Doges, Venice (Italy) (Figure 4.38), and the palace of Clos-Lucé, Amboise (France) (Figure 4.39) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 100, 224, 388; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 228, 230, 404, 428, 480).

36 The only non-secular residence included in the SCPR is the thirteenth century papal palace at Viterbe (Italy) (see Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 462).
Figure 4.36: Distribution of points of view for photos of 'Residential' culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook

Figure 4.37 & 4.38: The Ducal palace at Nevers (France) and the Palace of the Doges, Venice (Italy) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 224, 388)

Figure 4.39 & 4.40: The palace of Clos-Lucé, Amboise (France) and the Hohenzollerns' seat at Hechingen (Germany) (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 100, 294)
 Alternatively, achieving a similar visual-discursive effect of importance, control, and power, residences, in particular those positioned on high ground, are presented from a low point at medium distance, symbolically lifting them above their surroundings. The photograph of the Hohenzollerns' seat at Hechingen (Germany) (Figure 4.40) provides a particularly vivid example of this mode of display (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 294; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 151, 222, 283). Unlike the categories discussed above, only 27.9 percent of all 'Residential' photographs use a portrait format. The reason for this might lie in the emphasis of residences within their wider setting, in particular when located on higher ground, for which a landscape format is more suited. This way the geographical context generates the notion of extensive power wielded by the residences' owners over the surrounding area. Here it could be argued that such residences were built to exert power over their surroundings through their elevated positioning in the landscape in the first place. However, even though this might have been the objective of the elite responsible for their construction, it does not follow that these sites have to be photographed and displayed in this particular fashion. The sites could, for example, have been displayed from a different distance, height, and/or angle. Their mode of visual representation is an active choice (i.e. ideology).

4.4.4 Summary and discussion

In order to draw together the SCPR's discursive character - as expressed through the use of culture heritage sites on the ground for the Route de Pologne/Danemark on the one hand, and the guidebook's site-specific photogenic discourse on the other - the following diagram of the project's 'ideoscape' (Figure 4.41) presents a summary of the preceding analysis and discussion. Each theme is represented by an internal circle, its diameter being proportionate to the theme's discursive force (i.e. frequency). The shaded areas indicate the proportion of sites in this category actually related to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC. The outer circle, where existent, represents the photogenic discourse's strength.
To start with the SCPR’s culture heritage discourse on the ground, as Figure 4.41 illustrates (Theme I), the large majority of culture heritage sites forming the Route de Pologne/Danemark are, seemingly hardly surprisingly, of Christian religious character. However, the CoE/EICR cannot demonstrate a direct relation to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC for the large majority of these sites. Outside of Spain and France only a minute fraction of culture heritage sites included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark could be linked to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC. Based on the culture heritage on the ground as included in the SCPR, the pilgrimage routes to SdC hardly qualify as an extensive cross-European phenomenon. As such, Christian religious sites in general become the discursive ‘filler’ included in order to flesh out the route due to the absence of a firm corpus of thematically related sites outside of Spain and France. This means that the SCPR, instead of revolving around the theme of St. James, turn firmly into a discursive articulation characterised by Christianity in general. Even though St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC represent Christian religious themes, it does not follow that all Christian religious sites are representative of the theme of St. James. It can thus be concluded that the SCPR can be argued to appear a ideological/propagandistic
tool in support of European Christianity as a whole. The impact of this discourse is further intensified by the photographs of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook. The large majority of photographs included (77.1 percent, n=427) display Christian religious sites (Figure 4.42), thus drawing visual attention to them.

As pointed out above, this type of heritage site represents the majority type included on the Route de Pologne/Danemark. Yet, it does not logically follow that the majority of photographs has to be of this type of heritage site. Instead, as with any case of discourse, it represents the result of active decision-making. An active additional emphasis is created. The visual-discursive character of the photographs of Christian religious heritage sites included in the guidebook, making the viewer kneel in front of the towering ‘evidence’ of this faith’s greatness and power, further presents Christianity as Europe’s legitimately dominant religion. A visual discourse of veneration is created for those travelling the SCPR (for which, to re-emphasise, the guidebook is a prerequisite). The emphasis on architecture and artefacts of baptism (fonts, baptisteries, and scenes of baptism in painting and sculpture) unrelated to St. James and/or the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC, as well as the contextual positioning of pre-Christian culture heritage sites in terms of primitive cults existing before the advent of Christianity, generates a strong complementary discourse of conversion.
Here it must also be pointed out that the official guidebook includes special info-boxes on historical figures deemed qualified for inclusion. In 89.2 percent of all cases, these boxes contain information on the lives and deaths of Christian saints (Figure 4.43, categories accounting for less than one percent were collapsed into ‘Other’).

![Figure 4.43: Thematic distribution of historical figures included in the SCPR guidebook's info boxes](image)

Including in this group Christian nobles who were granted sainthood, this number rises to 92.1 percent. In fact, on its 559 pages, the guidebook contains a total of 182 of info-boxes on Christian saints (187 when including the category of Christian noble/saint), an average of one per every 3.1 (3.0) pages. This number does not take into account the hundreds more saints mentioned or briefly discussed in the SCPR guidebook's accompanying text. Also providing the saint’s day for each saint included, the guidebook becomes a hagiolatric ‘timetable’, a calendar for the veneration of Christianity and its figures. In terms of the context in which Christian saints are recognised as qualifying for inclusion in the SCPR guidebook info boxes, the largest group of Christian saints (23.3 percent, n=172) acquires recognition in reference to their conversion of non-Christians (Figure 4.44), for example St. Hubert and St. Ludger (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 36, 70).
Closely related to this category, and further strengthening its discursive thrust, 16.9 percent of cases focus on Christian saints recognised by the Church for acts of martyrdom, in many cases in the context of conversion activity. These include, for example, St. Castor, St. Léger, and St. Pêlerin (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 191, 198, 208). Also, the most prominent category of historical figures not being a saint, and completely unrelated to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC, is that of Christian personalities recognised by the church for their missionary activities, such as Pauline Jeuris, a Franciscan missionary in China killed in 1900 during the Boxer Revolt (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 76), Jacques Marquette, a seventeenth century missionary bringing the Christian faith to many indigenous Canadians (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 83), as well Toribio (1538-1606 AD), archbishop of Lima, who, after serving as the head of the Inquisition in Granada, was sent out by Phillippe II of Spain to spread Christianity in Peru (Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 153). Making up the last major category, 17.4 percent of Christian saints are included in reference to the foundation of churches, monasteries, or other religious institutions (Figure 4.43). After the symbolic conversion of the population of non-Christian areas (i.e. unification in Christianity), these figures are the ones who established an ecclesiastic infrastructure. As such, the SCPR guidebook’s historical figures, presented in special, separately highlighted info boxes, further intensify the SCPR’s discourse of conversion as identified.
previously for the SCPR’s culture heritage site and photographic discourse. To emphasis this once more, here one might argue the inclusion of Christian saints in a guidebook about culture heritage sites linked through a Christian theme to represent a natural state of affairs. However, as highlighted above, and with particular reference to Billig’s (1995) notion of banal nationalism (see chapter 1.6), there exists no so-called ‘natural state of affairs’ when it comes to practices of identity construction. Even if an identity/ideology paradigm (i.e. a particular understanding of the world) appears ‘to possess a reassuring normality’ (Billig 1995, 7), this perceived normality is itself subject-dependent and does by no means translate into objective neutrality. In fact, it is precisely this reassuring normality that turns it into a powerful measure of influencing notions of identity. There always exist alternative understandings. This holds particularly true in that only 6.4 percent of the total number of historical figures included in the info boxes – however natural or obvious this selection may appear to some – is demonstrated to have an, even distant, connection to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC. To return to the SCPR’s culture heritage on the ground, sites of a defensive/military nature supplement the dominant theme of Christianity as the SCPR’s second most prominent discursive corpus (Figure 4.41, Theme II). Also, accounting for 7.7 percent of the total, photographs of this type represent the second most prominent type of culture heritage site included in the SCPR guidebook (see Figure 4.42). In combination with their photogenic discourse, these culture heritage sites, in particular the massive medieval town gates, develop a protective, exclusivist, access-controlling, impregnable, and often intimidating character. They symbolically defend and protect against the outside a Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm that, whilst largely unrelated to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC, is filled with the exclusive notion of Christianity on the inside. In the light of this second discursive emphasis it is difficult not to recall notions of ‘Fortress Europe’37 (Heintz 2001, 38). Perhaps nowhere else is this ideological paradigm as directly expressed in reference to the SCPR as by Plötz (1989, 108), expert to the SCPR, in the final conclusion to his presentation Pilgrims and pilgrimages yesterday and today, around the example of Santiago de Compostela at the Bamberg Congress:

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37 The notion of ‘fortress Europe’ refers to the exclusionist establishment of strengthened EU external border controls and access regulations following the replacement of border controls between EU states after the agreements of Trevi (1976) and Schengen (1986, 1990) (see Kofman and Sales 1992).
Chapter 4: Implementation on the Ground

The way of the stars of German mythology, the way of the stars which, legend has it, showed Charlemagne the way to the Apostle’s tomb, the European circle of stars which flies over the Council of Europe’s project, the medieval holy way which led from the Baltic to Cape Finisterre at the extremity of Europe could all help us to find and defend our identity, help us to understand our Western heritage and our European consciousness and also guard us from losing our culture in the face of an average, international-style culture.

Europe’s cultural identity is presented as a good to be defended by force. This identity, however, is largely understood (and communicated) as being characterised by Christianity in general, not by the pilgrimage to SdC as a multi-national phenomenon. It is in this context that the inclusion of palaces and residences of Europe’s Christian secular rulers in the SCPR’s culture heritage site grammar – with 4.2 percent of the photographs of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook making them the third most often displayed type (see Figure 4.42) – further strengthens this discursive character. Even though not a single example of this type of site included in the Route de Pologne/Danemark could be presented in the SCPR guidebook as having any direct connection to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC, it is the photogenic character of the representations of such sites included in the guidebook that they are given increased discursive weight in terms of control and power (Figure 4.41, Theme III). In comparison to the above three main elements of the SCPR’s ‘idescape’, it is ‘Charitable’ culture heritage sites that, due to them representing the category most often thematically directly related to St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC, should be expected to receive considerable discursive emphasis. However, not only do the hospices and hospitals not receive photographic emphasis as the first three categories do, they receive none whatsoever (Figure 4.41, Theme IV; see Figure 4.42). They become discursively deflated in importance.

In conclusion, the SCPR, having been portrayed by Eurocrats involved in the project to represent the most ‘European’ of all ECRs (e.g. CoE 25.05.1988, 8, European Cultural Routes: Secretary General’s Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Education, Culture and Sport; Thomas-Penette 2003, 187, Les itinéraires de pélerinages et le tourisme culturel; see chapter 4.1), has been demonstrated in its discursive character to be less characterised by the theme of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC, but to revolve around the wider theme of
the cultural defence of a Europe exclusively united in Christianity as a whole. The threat against which it has to be defended is discursively constructed as being Muslims and Islam. Argued by the CoE (01.10.1996, 6; see chapter 4.1) to ‘symbolise first and foremost the process of European construction’, this process of European identity construction (Self) takes the shape of a Europe united in Christianity in opposition to Muslim civilisation (Other). As its discursive thrust aims to unite EU citizens under the banner of Christianity through its discourse of conversion and veneration, so does the SCPR define Europe as exclusively Christian in its cultural character for non-EU tourists travelling along it.

As highlighted in chapter 2.3.4, criteria for data evaluation in CDA include the application of a fallibilistic approach (i.e. seeking out, where possible, deviant cases). Thus, as a final step in the critical discourse analytical assessment of one of the flagships of Eurocratic culture heritage measures, namely the ECRP, the following section will focus – briefly, but, nevertheless, revealing – on the Legacy of Al-Andalus Cultural Route (henceforth LAA), another of the ECRP’s itineraries. With the SCPR failing to generate an open and diverse reading of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC, instead generating a discourse revolving around the veneration of Christianity in general as Europe’s unifying cultural trait, the LAA, revolving around the theme of Iberia’s medieval Arab caliphate and, allegedly, its immense influence on Europe, holds the power to provide a discursive counterweight.

4.5 THE LEGACY OF AL-ANDALUS CULTURAL ROUTE

Following the proposal by the cultural branch of the Society for the Development of the Sierra Nevada Winter Games of a project entitled ‘Legado Andalusi’, and, after its presentation at an assessment seminar for new ECRs in 1997, the Culture Committee of the CoE elected the theme for an ECR in 1997 (EICR 2004b). Representing one of the CoE/EICR’s more recent projects, it centres upon the medieval period of Iberian Muslim civilisation and its influence on Europe culture as a whole.

4.5.1 Aims and objectives

In line with general Eurocratic rhetorics of cultural openness and diversity, the CoE (2003c; see also EICR 2004a; 2004b), on the webpage entitled The “Legacy of
Al-Andalus’ Route, states the LAA to develop a culture heritage paradigm of Iberian and wider Europe revolving around ‘the intermingling of different European and North African influences’. In ideological terms, the EICR (2004b; see also CoE 01.09.1997b, 2), on the website entitled The legacy of Al-Andalus: Arabs in Spain, states the LAA to employ ‘this common history and heritage to improve the perceptions of the “Other”’ by critically reflecting – as expressed by Raymond Weber, Director of Education, Culture, and Sport of the Council of Europe, in his opening speech at the Seminar on Cultural Routes: Challenge of Citizenship and Sustainable Development – ‘on our current ideas and knowledge, as well as on the ways in which we view others’ (CoE 01.09.1997b, 2). As the CoE (08.09.1997b, 2) states in more detail in the results from the fourth session of seminars on ECRs,

Of particular importance in the context of the project becomes its reconciliatory value for present-day (EU)rope. To quote Paey Lopez, Director of El Legado Andalusi, from his speech given at the Seminar on Cultural Routes. 4th Session: The Geopolitical Challenge. The Legacy of Al Andalousi, the project should not be founded solely on the recovery of the historical past, nor on the aesthetics of the period, but should be based rather on the present, as well as on the concepts such as critical analysis, and the active search for solutions to modern-day problems. We believe that this cultural recovery or “rediscovery” may serve to unite, to promote tolerance and solidarity, to establish links based on common cultural ties.

(CoE 01.09.1997c, 1)

38 ‘[w]ith the heritage route of Al-Andalous we are given an example which constitutes a bridge and a possibility for dialogue not only between administrative and political officials, but also between citizens who want to travel through Arabic culture. It is also a reflection on the influence that Arabic and Islamic culture had on European civilisation and identity’ (my translation)

39 El Legado Andalusi is the organisation with which the CoE jointly formed the LAA network.
It is in this understanding that the CoE presents the LAA as providing a tool able to deal with the 'ghosts of the past' (CoE 01.09.1997c, 1), and – quoting the EICR's webpage entitled The legacy of Al-Andalus: From Africa to Europe – to successfully 'seek solutions together, without traumas or tears' (EICR 2004a). In summary, at the general rhetoric level, the LAA is presented as an example par excellence for the ECRP's devotion to openness and diversity, as well as for the inclusion of the Other. However, before assessing the character of the LAA on the ground, it is necessary to illuminate, where observable, ideological (pre)conceptions inherent in its internal policy discourse and its outwardly directed public discourse.

4.5.2 The LAA in terms of its underlying ideology

Firstly, by highlighting the LAA and its culture heritage to represent a project aiming at the advancement of Europeans' understanding of the Other, the first discourse analytical observation to be made is that, by stating so, Muslim culture and Islam are indirectly presented as something inherently alien to Europe. Even though inclusion is advocated, Muslims and Islam are nevertheless perceived and presented as an alien Other. This discursive characteristic can be identified throughout the Eurocratic LAA discourse. To present some more examples, quoting Gala (cited in CoE 01.09.1997c, 6, Proceedings of the Seminar on Cultural Routes. 4th Session: The Geopolitical Challenge. The Legacy of Al Andalousi; see also CoE 08.09.1997b; CoE 01.09.1997c; EICR 2004b), the CoE states that the Iberian Muslim caliphate of Al-Andalus 'has the historical mission of creating bridges, that is to say, strictly speaking, as a pontifex: the bridge between Europe and Islam'. Firstly, it is the image of the necessity of a bridge to be built that, instead of highlighting both, to a certain degree, to be part of the other, enforces the idea of an essential difference existing between the two entities. Further constructing Europe and Islam as two dichotomistic cultural entities, the paradigm of Europe, be it in geographical or cultural terms, is not juxtaposed against, for example, Africa, Russia, or the Near East, nor is Islam presented in opposition to Christianity. Instead Europe finds its dichotomistic partner in Islam, which is a religion. Thus, it is by implication that Europe is understood as a Christian phenomenon. Similarly, the LAA official information leaflet as devised by the EICR further highlights the basic connotation of Muslims and Islam as representing an extra-European phenomenon. Right at the beginning it states the Iberian Peninsula to have been 'occupied by the Muslims from the early 8th to the late 15th centuries.
The occupiers consisted of families and groups of Arab nobles from the East and Berber tribes from North Africa' (EICR 2005c, 1). Employing 'the' as the prefix to 'Muslims' imposes a value judgement characterised by exclusivist undertones in terms of defining an out-group that is acknowledged but impossible to integrate (in this context, see Robins (1996) for a discussion of the notion of 'the Turk'). Further, even though Muslim presence in Spain lasted for more than eight centuries, it is regarded to represent a continuous act of occupancy, occupation referring to 'the control of a country by a foreign military power' (Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus 1997, 785). As such, the presence of Muslims in Spain — and, as highlighted above, Europe as a whole — is regarded such a grave cultural and spiritual violation that even eight centuries of largely positive and immensely productive Islamic presence fail to break down the notion of otherness. Applying this approach to, for example, the Norman invasion of England in 1066 AD would mean that at least until the mid-nineteenth century Norman culture would have had to be regarded as alien to English culture. A similar argument can be made for the Anglo-Saxon 'occupation' of the fifth and sixth centuries (HE I. 15; McClure and Collins 1999, 27; see also Higham 1992; Hamerow 1997; 2000 for discussions of Anglo-Saxon migration theories). However, there also exist a limited number of cases in which the Eurocratic voice appears to acknowledge the Muslim influence on Spain, as well as on Europe as a whole. For example, on the webpage entitled The "Legacy of Al-Andalus" Route, the CoE (2003c; also EICR 2004b; 2005c, 1) states that the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula 'did not represent a total rupture with the then dominant hispano-visigothic culture. Quite to the contrary, the two cultures were based on a singular and dazzling indigenous culture that enormously differentiated Western Islam from the Eastern one'. What makes the existence of a Muslim culture in Spain noteworthy is that the hispano-visigothic culture succeeded in 'westernising' it sufficiently to turn it into something substantially different from Eastern Islam. In doing so, the CoE/EICR paints the picture of a Christian Europe holding the civilisational power to influence and change Muslim culture, whilst, at the same time, largely denying Muslim culture to have had significant influence on Christian Europe itself. Christian Europe becomes the cultural force succeeding in developing a more 'civilised' (i.e. more Same) Western Islam. As such, Iberia's Islamic history is only internalised in so far as to allow the externalisation of Muslims in general. Perhaps the most poignant expression of this discursive paradigm (i.e. ideology) is to be found on the CoE (2003c) webpage The "Legacy of Al-Andalus"
Route, justifying the LAA's inclusion in the ECRP. It states that '[t]he theme has a dimension of tolerance which is especially important at a time when Islamic intolerance is scoring points' (CoE 2003c; also EICR 2004a). Once again, in representing a discourse characteristic observed previously for the SCPR in terms of the context of references to Muslims in the SCPR guidebook (see chapter 4.4.3.2), Muslims and Islam are continued to be presented as Europe's Other, in a negative light, characterised by aggression and barbarism. In summary, it can thus be argued that, while claiming to adhere to values of openness, inclusivity, and multi-faith, the LAA's internal policy discourse, as well as its public-orientated rhetorics, enforce a paradigm of European – and, by implication, (EU)ropean – culture in which Muslims and Islam cannot lose their Otherness (see Carassava 2006; Graff 2006a; 2006b; Pingree 2006 for some recent crystallisations of this paradigm within the wider Eurocratic sphere).

However, before examining the general character of the LAA on the ground, it is necessary to highlight, even though briefly, the intensity and extent of the influence of (pre-)medieval Muslim civilisation on Europe as understood by numerous scholars in the field. Doing so, it is possible to assess its potential for inclusion in a multi-discursive, multi-cultural, and multi-faith reading of Europe argued by the Eurocratic élite to represent its major objective in the field of culture heritage (see chapters 3.1.1 & 3.2.3).

4.5.3 Muslim influence on Europe

For centuries Muslims and Islam have made huge contributions to European culture. For example, the Muslim rule over the Iberian Peninsula, a largely peaceful 'occupation' that lasted for nearly 800 years (711-1492 AD), had an immense cultural influence not only on those areas under direct Muslim control, but also on the rest of medieval and later Europe (see, for example, Watt 1965; 1972; Chejne 1974; Harvey 1990). Beginning with the establishment of a stable administration, and refraining from plundering the conquered lands as medieval Christian forces did, the Spanish Islamic state reached its zenith of power and fame by the tenth century AD (Kennedy 1996; Zahoor 1997; Fierro and Samso 1998; Marin 1998). During this period, when the Umayyads of Spain assumed the title of caliphs (see Marín-Guzmán 2004, 61-67 for a detailed account on this process), many Iberian cities, including Cordova, Granada, Seville, and Valencia, entered a 'Golden' era. Acquiring magnificent public libraries, public baths, and hospitals (see contributions to Hoyland 2004),
particularly Cordova, as the capital of the Umayyad caliphate, developed into 'one of the wealthiest and most brilliant cities of the medieval world' (Ettinghausen and Grabar 1987, 127; see also Graham 1998b, 23), the 'most civilised city in Europe' (Trend 1931, 9), and 'the wonder and admiration of the world' (Trend 1931, 9). Muslims, Jews, and Christians lived side by side, with only porous 'barriers' between them (Brooke 1975, 39; Graham and Murray 1997, 394; Graham 1998b, 25). This was by no means an exclusively urban phenomenon. Muslims transformed most of the Iberian Peninsula into a productive and thriving community 'of great opulence and achievement' (Smith 1999, 318). It was under these conditions that the European 'creative genius' (Prodi 2000b) made huge leaps. Yet, it was mainly based on the Muslims' thirst for knowledge. Compared to the Christian societies of Europe, Muslims were far advanced in fields ranging from philosophy and literature to medicine, architecture, mathematics, chemistry, and astronomy (Trend and Nakosteen 1964, 68-69; Champion 1990, 90; Smith 1999, 318). In fact, the Islamic influence was so immense that Christian scholars, who used to write in Latin, began to compose their works in Arabic instead (Smith 1999, 319). At the same time, Christian nobles craved and adopted Arabic styles of music, poetry, and social demeanour (Smith 1999, 319) (Figure 4.45).

Figure 4.45: A Muslim teaching a Christian noble to play the lute, 13th century manuscript (Kamen 1998, 39 facing)
As poignantly phrased by Scott (1904, 271),

'Islamic rule' [became] the school of polite manners, the home of sciences and arts; to be regarded with awe by every Moslem, with affectionate veneration by every scholar, and with mingled feelings of wonder and appreciation by the turbulent barbarians of Western Europe.

Muslim liberalism, however, was by no means limited to the secular sector. Under Muslim rule, Iberian and southern French Christians and Jews were granted the freedom to practice their religion without any restrictions, and to appoint their own judges (Hillenbrand 1980; Bashear 1997; Smith 1999, 319; Harvey 2004; see also Constable 1997). In fact, the Muslim conquerors actively protected the religious rights of Christians and Jews, and sometimes even went to war to enforce this freedom. This led Insoll (2001, 124-125; see also Gellner 1981; Insoll 1999, 9-13) to refer to Islam as a religion based on the principle of 'unity and diversity', a theme lending itself readily to EU rhetorics of Unity-in-diversity (see chapter 1.5.3).

Muslim cultural influence, however, was by no means restricted to Spain and parts of southern France. One of the most significant and lasting contributions of the medieval Muslim world to Christendom, besides its own cultural achievements, was to provide access for Western scholars, via their translation into Arabic, and for the first time since the end of the Roman Empire, to the great classics of Greece and Rome, such as Plato, Pliny, Socrates, Aristotle, and Pythagoras (Sarton 1952, 27-28; Smith 1999, 332; see also Jaeger 2002; Freudenthal 2004; Kunitzsch 2004). Scholars from all over Europe flocked to Muslim Spain, 'the single most powerful cultural centre of Europe' (Ettinghausen and Grabar 1987, 127), where they rendered the Arabic works on Classic authors into European languages, spreading new knowledge all over Europe as they returned to their seats of learning and teaching. In summary, the Muslim rule succeeded in turning the Iberian Peninsula of the eighth to fifteenth centuries into 'a brilliant intellectual era, as Muslims, Jews, and Christians, sometimes separately, sometimes together, embarked on major philosophical, literary, and scientific adventures' (Ettinghausen and Grabar 1987, 128; see also Menocal 2003). Even the decline of Muslim politico-territorial influence over Spain did not end its immense influence on European culture. For example, the fall of Toledo to Christian forces in 1085 AD represented a major step in the Christian reconquest of Spain. Yet, due to the
large number of manuscripts kept in the city’s many Muslim-built libraries, by the twelfth century Toledo had developed into Christendom’s primary centre of learning, ‘as scholars from all over Europe came to work with native speakers of Arabic’ (Smith 1999, 333). In short, as a result, medieval Muslim society on the Iberian Peninsula sparked and drove forward a developmental boost in the fields of art, music, architecture, engineering, science, technology, and agriculture observable all over the European ‘continent’, an intense boost that it had never before experienced (see contributions to Jayyusi 2000). This cultural boost for Europe as a whole was, in fact, so substantial that it later sparked and drove forward the European Renaissance, a cultural phenomenon often understood in an exclusively Christian and Italian context (Hayes 1983; Haddad 1999, 602; Ghazanfar 2004; 2005; Taylor 2005). However, instead of representing the offspring of a number of highly gifted Italian geniuses (and their contribution should not be belittled), the European Renaissance was the result of artistic and scientific knowledge collected and expanded during previous centuries by Muslims, with influences from Byzantium, India, and even China, and introduced to Europe via Medieval Muslim societies in Spain, Portugal, parts of southern France, southern Italy and Sicily, Greece, as well as the Balkans (see Hobson 2004). As Jones (1981, 125) poetically comments,

\[\text{the term \textit{rennaissance} itself is suggestive. It is as if the scientific-technical phoenix flew from the Middle East to Greece and then to Rome and then died, only to arise from the same Italian ashes a thousand years later.}^{40}\text{ In reality the phoenix had gone back to Byzantium, travelled all over the Arab world, picked up some feathers from India and China and only then returned to Italy.}\]

In conclusion, (pre-)medieval Muslim culture, in particular on the Iberian Peninsula, was fundamental to the direction that European culture, and many of its greatest achievements, took. This influence survived right into the present, from ‘Turkish cuisine, Moroccan tiles, works of art by Muslim artists in the Victorian and Albert museum, to modern pop music’ (Lewis 2004, 2). Europe’s culture heritage has been, and still is, formed (i.e. passively and actively) in part by Islam, as exemplified, for example, by the use of Arab numerals (Strâth 2002, 396; Dobson 2004, 8; see also contributions to Høfert and Salvatore 2000).

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40 Numerous scholars have termed this paradigm the ‘Greece-Rome-Christianity-Renaissance-Western-democracy route’ (Barnett 2001, 407; Shore 1993, 792; see also Shore and Black 1994; Rose 1995).
4.5.4 The LAA’s implementation on the ground in contrast to the SCPR

To begin with a brief remark, the following assessment of the LAA in terms of its implementation on the ground is not as detailed as the analysis conducted for the SCPR in terms of its culture heritage sites. The reason for this lies in the CoE/EICR not having produced to this point its own LAA guidebook. Instead, the EICR (2004a; 2004b) webpages presenting the LAA refer those interested to a guidebook produced by an independent publisher not connected to the CoE/EICR. Not representing the result of a Eurocratic selection process, as is the case for the SCPR, an in-depth analysis of the composition of the LAA in terms of culture heritage sites and their presentation was thus not relevant. Nevertheless, a number of revealing general observations can be made concerning the LAA in terms of its implementation on the ground.

Although the caliphate of Al-Andalus at its height of power included nearly all of the Iberian Peninsula and some parts of modern-day France, the extent of the LAA is limited to the southernmost part of Spain. Its network of cultural routes, presented on the EICR (2004a) webpage under the heading *European importance of the theme*, covers the area between the Spanish towns of Seville, Cádiz, Algeciras, Málaga, Córdoba, Jaén, Almería, and Murcia (Figure 4.46).

Figure 4.46: The LAA cultural routes network (EICR 2004a)
As such, the LAA remains of regional importance only. However, as Figure 4.47 illustrates, even though this might appear a large area, the LAA only includes around eight percent of what was once the Umayyad caliphate on the Iberian Peninsula when it was at its zenith in the ninth and tenth centuries.

It can thus be argued that the importance of Al-Andalus for Europe – as suggested by the EICR map’s heading – is actively confined to the southernmost tip of the Iberian Peninsula, as close to Africa as possible. Doing so, the cultural importance and influence of Al-Andalus is belittled, reflecting, as observed by Menocal (1987, xiii; see also Watt 1972, 84), ‘Europeans’ great difficulty in considering the possibility that they are in some way seriously indebted to the Arab world, or that the Arabs were central to the making of medieval [and later] Europe’.  

Asked in an interview if any short- or long-term plans by the EICR or CoE exist to expand the LAA network, Michel Thomas-Penette (17 October 2003), current Director of the EICR, clarified that

as far as the European Institute of Cultural Routes is concerned, there won’t be any further development of this particular route. There does not seem to exist the necessity to do so. Effort is more likely to go into the expansion of other networks or into the development of new routes.

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41 This inability seems all the more surprising when taking into account that Europa, the eponymous princess after whom the ‘continent’ was named, was by no means native to it, but came from Phoenicia (i.e. modern-day Lebanon) (Macfie 2002, 15).
Also, justification for this marginalisation cannot be found in an unavailability of appropriate Muslim culture heritage sites in the rest of the Iberian Peninsula and south-western France. As Insoll (2001, 123) points out in his discussion of the archaeology of Islam, 'Islam is a religion which is in many ways easier to assess in terms of archaeological visibility than some of the other world religions [...], such as, for example, Christianity'. This testimony finds expression in the wealth of Islamic heritage sites and artefacts to be found over most of Spain and Portugal, as well as parts of southern France (for examples of Franco-Iberian Islamic archaeology see Lecam 1965; Bazzana 1990; Ruiz 1990; Sénac 1990; Brentchaloff and Sénac 1991; Palazón 1991; Amigues 1992; Bazzana et al. 1994; Clément 1994; Cuenca and Armenteros 1995; Joncheray and Sénac 1995; Boisellier 1996; Picard 1996). As such, from an archaeological and culture heritage point of view, there is no reason for the LAA being limited to Spain's far south only. In fact, it can be argued that the LAA - with its numerous heritage sites of Muslim origin to be found all over the Iberian Peninsula and southern France, not to mention the other territories that have at some point during Europe's past been under Muslim control, such as Sicily, Greece, the Balkans (see Figure 4.46) - lends itself much easier to the development of a transnational ECR than the SCPR. As has been pointed out by Alsina (1989, 50) and Herbers (1989, 10), with every step away from SdC the archaeological evidence for specific, firmly established historical pilgrimage routes becomes increasingly vague (see chapter 4.4.2). This phenomenon is reflected in the distribution by country of culture heritage sites related to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC included in the SCPR. As Figure 4.48 (see also Figure 4.10) demonstrates for the Route de Pologne/Danemark, even for Spain, the country in which SdC is situated and in which the legend of Santiago rose and spread as part of Medieval Christian politico-military propaganda (see chapter 4.3), only slightly more than half (58.2 percent, n=110) of the culture heritage sites included could be put in context with St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC in the official guidebook. For France this number already drops to around a third (36.7 percent), plummeting to only 4.5 percent for Germany and 0.91 percent for Poland. Nevertheless, undeterred by this lack of thematically related culture heritage sites, the SCPR are, as highlighted in chapter 4.4.1 (also chapter 4.1), presented as a hard and fast network of sites testifying for the pilgrimage to SdC as a trans-European phenomenon.
In a similar fashion, countries are presented as having been part of the medieval pilgrimage phenomenon, and thus are included in the SCPR, less on historical or archaeological evidence than on the desire for a crystallisation surface for Eurocratic notions of ‘remembering the New Europe’ (see chapter 1.5.2). For example, in order to justify the inclusion of Scandinavian countries in the SCPR, Krötzl (1989, 64), in his paper given at the CoE’s Bamberg Congress (The Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Routes) entitled Pilgrims to Santiago and their Routes in Scandinavia, argues that

\[ \text{the first pilgrims to Santiago definitely identifiable as Scandinavians were crusaders on their way to the Holy Land, who broke their journey in Galicia. In the year 1108, a crusade of 60 (Viking) ships under the leadership of the Norwegian king Sigurd wintered in Galicia, referred to in the descriptions of the journey as “the land of St James”. There is no proof that they visited Santiago de Compostela, but it seems likely that they did.} \]

Although, for example, all of Sweden only boasts ‘8 churches and chapels dedicated to St. James and some 30 preserved paintings and sculptures’ (Krötzl 1989, 64), in comparison to ‘the several hundred distributed over Germany’ (Krötzl 1989, 64), and the map of Scandinavia provided in the publication of the contributions to the Bamberg Congress in order to visualise its network of
historical pilgrimage routes to SdC only showing 'likely' routes and 'assumed' routes, his conclusion becomes that,

'[a]lthough it is only possible to sketch an approximate picture of the routes most used by Scandinavian pilgrims to Santiago, deep-lying traces of the cult and pilgrimage of St James are unmistakable. Though remote, Scandinavia therefore also took an active part in the Europe-wide phenomenon of the Santiago pilgrimage.

(Krötzl 1989, 68-69; see also Bourdarias and Wasielewski 2002, 52-54)

It can thus be observed that, while a discursive drive aiming to present the SCPR as a European-wide hard and fast network of traditional pilgrimage routes can be observed, the LAA exhibits a reverse trend. The LAA is discursively 'deflated', its importance played down.

4.5.5 Summary and discussion

In summary, even though the CoE and EICR argue the LAA to have been designed to revolve around the intermingling of different European and North African influences on the European Peninsula, no direct attempt has been made to this point by the bodies involved in the project to develop an ECR network that provides a Eurocratic interpretation of the caliphate of Al-Andalus in a wider European context. This finds its most poignant expression in the absence of a LAA guidebook allowing cultural tourists to travel this cultural route network. To this day, the only way to travel the LAA is to buy an unrelated guidebook about Muslim Spain referenced by the EICR on its webpage. Yet, this guidebook has nothing to do with an active Eurocratic measure to develop and mediate Muslims' contribution to European culture. Instead, in failing to do so, the presentation of Muslim sites and their interpretation in a wider European context is eschewed by the EICR/CoE. In doing so, the CoE/EICR misses an important chance to live up to its claims of openness, diversity, and multiplicity, and to deconstruct stereotype notions of the Other. In fact, based on the analysis of the LAA's internal policy discourse and its outwardly directed public discourse, it was possible to identify an underlying ideology of Muslims and Islam as being unable to discard their 'Otherness' in a European context. Rooted in such ideological preconceptions, it is perhaps unsurprising to find the impact that Muslim culture had on the direction that Europe's cultural development took from the Middle Ages onwards, as well as Muslim
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society's existence on European soil in general, to become discursively reduced to a peripheral role. This is best exemplified by the LAA's implementation on the ground. Instead of presenting the Caliphate of Al-Andalus as a politico-territorial entity including at the height of its power nearly the entire Iberian Peninsula, as well as parts of southern France, the extent of the LAA network as devised by the EICR/CoE geographically restricts this influence to the southern-most part of Spain only, the part closest to northern Africa. Quite literally, it is attributed a peripheral role. At present, no plans exist by the EICR or CoE to change this.

4.6 THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE: IMPLEMENTATION ON THE GROUND

Setting out to identify the concrete character of the Eurocratically approved reading of Europe's cultural heritage as implemented on the ground, this chapter focused on the ECRP's SCPR. Working within the same discursive articulation as the previous chapter (i.e. the ECRP), the SCPR represents a special case for analysis, based on Eurocratic bodies responsible for the project presenting it not only as the ECRP's founding theme, but also as a co-operation model for a future Great Europe symbolising first and foremost the process of (EU)ropean construction on the basis of the needs of contemporary society. To once again quote Ballester's (2002, 11) poignant summary, the SCPR 'préfigure, dans une certaine mesure, l'Europe que nous voulons construire maintenant à l'aube du troisième millénaire'42. It is against this background that the Eurocratic bodies of culture responsible for the development and implementation of the SCPR (i.e. the CoE and EICR) argue it to represent a project rooted in notions of openness, diversity, and multiplicity. By applying CDA to one of the most important Eurocratic projects of culture heritage, this chapter illuminated the discursive character of the SCPR. Phrased differently, with the SCPR argued to represent a 'modèle de coopération culturelle pour la Grande Europe du futur'43 (EICR 2005b, 1), what is the discursive character of this model of cultural cooperation?

As discussed, pilgrimage represents an act of self-definition, a form of social communication that seeks to inspire allegiance for an individual or a religion. It

42 'préfigures, within a certain measure, the Europe that we want to construct now at the dawn of the third millennium' (my translation)
43 'co-operation model for a future Great Europe' (my translation)
is in this understanding that the choice of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC for the ECRP’s project flagship must be considered ill advised. First of all, in the light of the EU, CoE, and EICR’s claims to multiculturalism and multi-faith (see chapters 1.2, 3.1, 3.2.3), the choice of a Christian religious theme for the ECRP’s flagship can be argued to represent a contradictory move. If the SCPR represents, as stated by the Eurocratic bodies involved, a model for the future cooperation of a Greater Europe, then this model is discursively constructed as based on the idea of a Europe united in Christianity. In choosing this exclusively religious topic to serve as a leitmotiv for the ECRP, the past – and, by implication, present – European ‘family of nations’ (Thomas-Penette 1999, 8) is discursively suggested as being traditionally Christian in character, a phenomenon previously observed for different Eurocratic discursive articulations by Dassetto and Bastenier (1988) and Bryant (1991, 199). This, however, does not represent the full extent to which the SCPR’s theme must be considered a contradiction to general Eurocratic rhetorics of openness and diversity. The figure of St. James, his legend as a whole, is inextricably linked to the medieval struggle of Christians against Muslims on the Iberian Peninsula (the Reconquista), a context in which Muslims and Islam are understood as an unchangeable alien cultural element that must be removed from European soil. As pointed out by Robins (2004), the pilgrimage to SdC has traditionally been expression of – and, by implication, a role model for – a worldview in which ‘Moors are part of the Arab and African world [and] Christians part of Europe’. This understanding, however, does not take into account the immense positive civilisational impact that Muslim culture in Iberia and parts of southern France had on Europe as a whole. Without the politico-military ambitions of Asturian and Gallician medieval nobles to expand their own territories by the means of wrestling back control over Spain and Portugal from the Muslims, St. James in his incarnation as Santiago Matamoros (St. James, the Moor killer) would not exist. The remains of St. James would probably never have been ‘rediscovered’, while the saint himself would possibly have remained in obscurity. In selecting St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC for a theme, the ECRP’s flagship revolves around a role-model for Christians whose unificatory power rests exclusively in discursively providing Europeans with a common enemy in the shape of Muslims and Islam. In short, the SCPR reawakens a propagandistic tool invented to make people ‘believe that relations between Christians and Muslims were necessarily and justly hostile, [...] and that the Muslims should be driven out of Spain’ (Fletcher 1991, 50) and Europe. It is against this background that
the selection of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC for a theme must be considered poorly judged at best when setting out to provide Europeans with a paradigm of culture heritage appreciation allegedly rooted in notions of multi-faith (see chapter 3.2.3). For example, how could the SCPR’s cultural discourse as devised by the CoE/EICR possibly ‘promote intercultural and interreligious dialogue through a better understanding of European history’ (EICR 2005d, 1), and, thus, provide ‘people of varied background, believers and non-believers, with an opportunity to gather together’ (EICR 2005a, 1)? How, for example, might European Christians react to a north-African cross-national cultural route network claiming to allow and further inter-cultural dialogue but, instead, being based on an exclusively Islamic theme revolving around a historical figure carrying the pseudonym ‘the Christian-slayer’?

In order to illustrate this intrinsic flaw, I would like to briefly present the case of a heritage conflict literally revolving around the figure of St. James and its wider discursive symbolism. In the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid, cathedral authorities of SdC decided to remove an eighteenth century statue depicting St. James on his white charger slicing the heads off Muslim ‘invaders’ (Figures 4.49 & 4.50), and replace it with a statue by the same artist, Jose Gambino, depicting the saint’s calmer pilgrim image (BBC NEWS 2004).

Figure 4.49 & 4.50: Statue of St. James in Santiago Cathedral; its setting an closer detail (Sacred Sites 2005)
Cathedral authorities wanted to do so in order to ‘avoid upsetting the “sensitivities of other ethnic groups”’ (BBC NEWS 2004), and, in particular, to ‘avoid causing offence to Muslims’ (BBC NEWS 2004; Wilkinson 2004). At the same time, however, they insisted that the timing of the decision had nothing to do with the Madrid bombings, a terrorist attack alleged to have been carried out by an Islamic group (BBC NEWS 2004). To quote Alejandro Barral, President of the Cultural Commission for the Cathedral Council, ‘[t]his is not an opportunistic decision. This is not through fear of fanatics of any kind and [has] nothing to do with 11 March or 11 September’ (cited in BBC NEWS 2004). Instead the Commission argued the decision to remove the statue to have been made some years ago, but that it had simply never been implemented. After the Commission’s decision was announced, an outcry burst forth from Western Christian fundamentalists. American groups, in particular, were outraged at ‘the level of ignorance in Europe’ (Rational Explications 2004). Santiago’s propagandistic character is most poignantly expressed in a letter sent to Julian Barrio, Archbishop of SdC, by a fundamentalist Christian in response to the announcement to exchange the statue:

Please forgive that I am writing to you in English. Regretfully, I do not speak the beautiful Spanish language. Under normal circumstances, I would not bother you, but recent events have troubled me greatly. You see, I am quite disturbed by your diocese’s decision to remove the statue of St. James from the cathedral of Santiago de Compostela. How can you even think of bowing to Moorish pressure at a time when the good Christian people of Spain need your guidance more than ever? Do you honestly think coddling the Muslims invading your country will make them any less hateful toward the Spanish people? Do you think that bowing to their every demand will make them less likely to oppress Christianity when they become a numerical majority? I must say that at a time when Moorish invaders attack your country’s capital, killing or wounding hundreds of people, a time when Moorish terrorists exhume and desecrate the body of a Spanish policeman, at a time when the Moors are poised for a second conquest of your country, you should not in any way bow to their demands. Spain is one of the last bastions of Catholicism. By acquiescing to Moorish pressure, you are hastening the demise of Christianity in Spain. Your excellency, please understand that by giving up Spain’s culture, history, and pride to the Moors, the blood of those Christians who are sure to suffer the evils of Islam is on your
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hands. Why do you not take a stand? Do you want history to remember you as a traitor to your country and – even worse – a traitor to your faith? I beseech you. Help to turn the tide of the Moorish invasion and conquest of Spain. Be not a traitor to your people, but rather a hero to them. I beg you in the name of God and all that is holy.

(Zagloba 2004)

For many Christian fundamentalists St. James still represents a symbol for the Christian fight against Muslims and Islam on the European ‘continent’. He is a symbol for allegedly justified cultural aggression. To quote a Christian fundamentalist webpage arguing for the statue to remain at its place in the cathedral of SdC, ‘[t]hose depicted having their heads cut off are infidel invaders, who are adherents to the world’s most aggressive and intolerant religion, seeking to devastate and enslave a Christian kingdom’ (Anon. 2004). Similarly, the webpage of the Christian fundamentalist organisation Stormfront states in reference to the statue’s iconography, ‘aggression is justified in defence of ‘White Western Culture’ (Stormfront.org 2004a). The image it serves is that of a war of faiths, a war between civilisation on the one side and barbarism on the other. Muslims, as expressed in a contribution to another Christian fundamentalist webpage entitled Spain surrenders, become ‘the enemies of civilisation’ (Rational Explications 2004). As another such organisation’s webpage states in response to the planned replacement of the statue of Santiago Matamoros in the cathedral of SdC, ‘[w]hy don’t the Spaniards just cut to the chase, order the women to wear burkhas, destroy the cathedrals, and replace them with mosques, and change the national language from Spanish to Arabic?’ (Free Republic 2004). Further, it is over the case of the statue of St. James that Christian fundamentalists actively call for aggression against Muslims. To quote another contributor to the Stormfront webpage,

[watch, just watch. Next thing we’ll see is France removing any statue or plaque of their own Saracen-slayer Charles Martel. Never bow to Muslims! Never bow to Muslims! I say we make Mel Gibson our new Pope and go on a crusade!

(Stormfront.org 2004b)

It is in the above context of St. James representing – to the present day – a symbol for the allegedly justified Western aggression towards Muslims that the SCPR fails to live up to Eurocratic rhetorics of cultural, and, in particular,
religious, diversity and sensitivity. As for the statue, after much public
discussion and outrage, it was removed from the cathedral of SdC. Whether the
Madrid terrorist attack was responsible for the officials' heightened wish to
remove the statue of the Muslim-slaying saint from the cathedral of SdC or not,
we seem to be witnessing an act of cultural sensitivity and a desire for religious
dialogue. But this is not the full story. It is true that the sword-wielding statue
of Santiago Matamoros, this 'symbol of the fight between Christianity and
Islam' (BBC NEWS 2004), was removed from its former resting place. However,
the statue is by no means hidden from the six million pilgrims and tourists who
visit the city and its cathedral per annum. Instead, it was placed inside the
Cathedral Museum (BBC NEWS 2004). As such it can be argued that, by doing
so, the saint's Muslim-slaying image, consisting of 'an inextricable mix of
historical facts and mythical legend' (Gibbs 1997, 30), was moved, physically
and symbolically, from the realm of faith and (make)belief (the cathedral of
SdC) into the realm of historical evidence and facts (the Cathedral Museum).
It is hard to believe that the statue will prove less offensive to (EU)ropean and
non-(EU)ropean Muslims when displayed in a public museum instead of inside
a Catholic church. Instead, it is arguably more likely that repositioning the
statue will deepen the impact of the saint's anti-Muslim message on the
'ideoscape' of pilgrims and tourists. To provide a second wider discursive
example of St. James' present-day symbolism, when Pope John Paul II declared
2004 a Holy Year for SdC, the celebrations at the end of the pilgrimage year
included the erection of a new façade representing a Muslim palace in front of
the cathedral of SdC (Lohmann 2004). At the high point of the festivities, this
façade was then burned in front of thousands of spectators. This symbolical act
represented the defeat, the very impossibility, of Islam on European soil
(Lohmann 2004). Spain - and, by implication, Europe - was symbolically
purified of Muslim influence by the 'cleansing fires of Christianity'. Archbishop
Michael Fitzgerald, the Vatican's President of the Pontifical Council for
Interreligious Dialogue, justified this celebratory highlight by stating that
'Muslims must accept history' (cited in Abend and Pingree 2004).

As demonstrated by the two cases above, the saint's ideological character still
revolves around the notion of Islam as a culture unable to lose its barbaric and

44 It is interesting to note that after scepticism arose from the sixteenth century onwards concerning the saint
taking personal part in the Reconquista, it was in the eighteenth century that Pope Benedict XIV, contra the
unbelievers and unfaithful, 'declared Santiago's participation and leadership as an essential and factual
element of Spain's Christian warfare against Muslims - case closed' (Gibbs 1997, 27).
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threatening character, a culture that is allegedly impossible to integrate into Europe. As pointed out by Robins (1996, 66) in the context of EU culture policy and Islam in general, 'cultural arrogance can turn into cultural hatred. When it is declared that the other is marked by an insurmountable particularity, and consequently can never be assimilated (converted) into our culture, then we have the basis for racism'. With at least sixteen million EU citizens being Muslims (see Hunter 2002), making Islam (EU)rope's second religion after Christianity, the SCPR’s theme must be considered a dangerous choice, a choice counterproductive from the outset to the EU’s ambition to create a supranational state on the basis of openness, multiplicity, and, in particular, multi-faith.

As this chapter has also demonstrated, the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC seen through the Eurocratic interpretive lens takes the overall discursive shape of the paradigm of Remembering the New Europe (see chapter 1.5.2). Pilgrims travelling to SdC from the early Middle Ages onwards become the predecessors to present-day EU citizens travelling unrestricted by national borders within the EU. Yet, it is at the same time that all alternative interpretations of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC are excluded from the Eurocratic discourse. Reminiscent of Hallward (2003, 259) stating that 'in order for a truth to [qualify] as the truth of its situation, the subject of that truth must stop short of investigating everything within the situation', instead of developing a multidiscursive approach to interpreting this phenomenon, the SCPR excludes any interpretations not in line with the Eurocratic paradigm of Remembering the New Europe. However, a culture heritage project that claims to be both multi-vocal and multi-interpretational - 'What matters is to be aware of these different readings, and be able to articulate them when it comes to revitalising the Santiago de Compostela pilgrim ways' (Thomas-Penette 1999, 7) - has to make a more active attempt to allow and mediate multi-vocality. Following on from this, if, as Eurocratic rhetorics have it, the SCPR ‘symbolise[s] first and foremost the process of European construction’ (CoE 01.10.1996, 6), then what is the concrete character of this process? Conducting CDA on the SCPR’s culture heritage discourse as implemented on the ground, this chapter arrives at a number of conclusions. The majority of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR’s Route de Pologne/Danemark the SCPR guidebook is not demonstrated to have any thematic connection to St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC. In fact, the percentage of thematically related sites drops exponentially the further
one gets from SdC and Spain. As the analysis further demonstrated, it is in the
context of the Eurocratic wish to mediate the pilgrimage routes to SdC as a
Europe-wide supra-national phenomenon along the lines of Remembering the
New Europe that the material culture ‘void’ created by this absence of culture
heritage sites with a direct thematic connection to St. James and/or the
pilgrimage to SdC is being filled with Christian religious sites, symbols, and
figures in general. The SCPR discourse becomes less about St. James than it
becomes about Christianity as a whole. The inclusion of detailed information on
hundreds of Christian saints in the SCPR guidebook, all of them unrelated to its
specific ‘St. Jamesian’ theme, further testifies to this discursive thrust.

Employing VCA as a complementary tool to CDA, analysis of the photographs
of culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook revealed Christian
religious sites to develop a visual discourse revolving around notions of the
veneration of and conversion to Christianity. This discursive thrust was
demonstrated to be further intensified by the historical figures included in
special info-boxes throughout the SCPR guidebook. In turning a project claimed
to be based on the theme of the pilgrimage to St. James and SdC into a project
revolving around Christianity as a whole, the Eurocratic élite responsible for
the development and implementation of the SCPR fails to live up to its claims
of the project embodying ‘respect for different religious or cultural identities’
(Thomas-Penette 1999, 7) through the ‘transmission of the heritage in a manner
sensitive to the outlooks of others’ (Thomas-Penette 1999, 7). Moreover, this
heritage of Christianity is mediated as being worthy of and in need of
protection, as embodied by sites of a primarily military/defensive character
constituting the second largest thematic group of culture heritage sites included
in the SCPR. As such, it can be suggested that the SCPR’s discursive character
is less characterised by the theme of St. James and/or the pilgrimage to SdC,
but also revolves around the defence of Christian Europe from extrinsic threats.
Throughout the SCPR guidebook, the destructive force from which European
Christianity – and, by implication, Europe in general – has to be symbolically
protected from takes the shape of Muslims and of Islam. No other religious or
cultural group is continuously presented in such a negative light (i.e. barbarism
and aggression). In conclusion, with the SCPR argued to ‘symbolise first and
foremost the process of European construction’ (CoE 01.10.1996, 6; see chapter
4.1), this process takes the shape of constructing a supra-national European Self
based on the notion of unity-in-Christianity, not diversity. Going hand in hand
with this, the non-European Other takes the shape of Islam and of Muslims. It is
in this context that it is not surprising to find the LAA being reduced to the southernmost part of Spain only. Had the LAA have been treated in a similar way to the SCPR, its thematic focus would be the general influence of Muslim/Islamic culture on Europe, incorporating at least Portugal, Spain, and France. While the SCPR is discursively 'inflated' by the inclusion of a majority of thematically unrelated Christian religious culture heritage sites in order to create a network stretching from Portugal to Poland and from Italy to Scandinavia, the LAA becomes discursively 'deflated'. As Modood (1997, 11) previously concluded after assessing the politics of multiculturalism in the New Europe, 'rich, complex histories become simplified and collapsed into a teleological progress or a unified ideological construct called [...] 'European' civilisation or the 'Muslim' way of life' (Modood 1997, 11). Also, the LAA has been demonstrated to exhibit an underlying ideology of otherness and 'alien-ness' in relation to Muslims and Islam, not only in its public-orientated rhetorics but also in its internal policy discourse. Based on this chapter's case studies, the Eurocratic implementation of culture heritage on the ground must be considered biased and by no means multi-discursive or multi-faith.

Raymond Weber, Director of Education, Culture and Sport of the Council of Europe, in his opening session speech to a CoE seminar on ECRs regarding the challenge of citizenship and sustainable development, states the SCPR, as well as ECRs in general, to 'offer a dynamic, forward-looking vision of Europe. Not an inward-looking Europe immersed in its own heritage, history, and memory, but one that is receptive to outside influences. A Europe which tries to be an open society' (CoE 01.09.1997b, 3). However, as this chapter has demonstrated through the use of CDA and VCA, the SCPR and LAA, instead of developing a dynamic culture identity model, turn into an exercise of labelling units of space with characteristic and quintessential attributes derived from a 'diagnostic time period' (Graham 1998b, 45) characterised by 'subtexts of [...] cultural chauvinism' (Stråth 2002, 388). This phenomenon has been described in the literature for other Eurocratic articulations of culture heritage by a number of researchers (e.g. Hay 1968; Graham 1998b; Heffernan 1998; Stråth 2002). It is in the light of the above analytical findings that it is possible to argue the ECRP, in terms of an Eurocratic idea(l) of supra-national cultural identity implemented on the ground, to fail to meet two of its major challenges of entativity as laid out in chapter 1.3. Firstly, unable to avoid the search for a supra-national culture identity becoming an excuse for the exclusion of others,
it fails the EU's challenge of identity diversity. Secondly, it has run aground its democratic challenge by not actively encouraging, and, in fact, preventing, the development and recognition of multiple readings of the past.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE: IMPLEMENTATION IN SYMBOLS

Employing the ECRP’s SCPR for a case study, the previous chapter conducted CDA (including VCA) on the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm as implemented on the ground. Continuing from this, this chapter turns its analytical gaze towards the Eurocratic creation of supra-national heritage in terms of its implementation in symbols. As emphasised in chapter 2.2.2 for discourse in general, the materials of discursive practice range from physical resources to symbolic resources. As highlighted in particular by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, 21), symbolic elements are just as real as physical elements in that they have concrete effects on and within practices. It is these symbolic practices that shall be the focus of this chapter.

The empirical evidence for this chapter is drawn from a detailed study of the Euro banknote iconography discourse, utilising, besides different Euro policy documents and design proposals, interviews with Central Bank officials and artists involved in the creation process of the final Euro design. There exist a number of banal symbolic ‘vessels’ through which a state can mediate meaning to its subject population as well as to those outside of it. Besides banknotes, these include, for example, stamps, coins, flags, and public buildings (see Billig 1995; Gounaris 2003). Yet, only the Euro banknotes lend themselves for analysis of the Eurocratic creation of supra-national heritage as implemented in symbols. Why should this be so? Stamps in the EU have remained fully national responsibility, and as such hold no analytical value for the supra-national context. Also, as highlighted by Hymans (2002, 5), unlike stamps, money must be instantly recognisable to all citizens, thus demanding more attention in terms of iconography. Unlike some recent analysis of EU currency iconography suggests (see Raento et al. 2004), Euro coins also must be considered entirely unhelpful for this kind of analysis, for they feature a national symbol chosen by the individual European Monetary Union (henceforth EMU) member state national bank on the one side, and a standardised map of Europe, together with the coins monetary value, on the other. They feature no supra-national element. The EU flag (see Figure 4.5) represents a too simplistic source of data to allow detailed VCA1. Public EU buildings were rejected for analysis on the basis that

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1 The EU flag goes back to 1955 (see EU 2004a). It was then that the CoE was looking for its own symbol. After much discussion, the present design was adopted, namely a circle of twelve gold stars on a dark blue
generally they lack a high public profile in the sense that they are neither frequently viewed nor recognisable to the EU population en masse, while many were also not purpose-built. In contrast to these sources, only the design process of the Euro banknotes remained fully under supra-national control, with only one design for each banknote denomination for all of Europe. The Euro banknotes, wherever they are printed, show exactly the same design, thus 'leaving no room for national symbols' (Kaelberer 2002, 8). Further highlighting their importance for analysis in terms of Eurocratic symbolism, the Euro banknotes, in particular in the absence of a common (EU)ropean language, education system, and media (Dyson 2000, 235), are much more widespread than, for example, the EU passport, driving licence, flag, or anthem (Raento et al. 2004, 932; see also Johler 2003, 7). In fact, recent Eurobarometer survey data (CEC 2004, 9) shows 50 percent of citizens polled in the original fifteen EU member states, and 45 percent of those polled in the New Member States, to regard the EU and the Euro as being synonymous. Lastly, unlike flags, anthems, or public buildings, due to inflation and the need to stay ahead of forgers, new banknotes are regularly issued. As Hymans (2004, 7) points out,

[the requirements of regular updating of banknotes means that their design at any one point in time reflects not inertia but rather a relatively contemporaneous, conscious choice. This probably unique combination of universality, selectivity and regular updating makes currency iconography an ideal avenue to assess the content of nation-state, and now, EU, identities.

However, despite the Euro's importance as an expression of supra-national ideology, and despite numerous scholarly attempts to understand the manipulation of images on banknotes, coins, and stamps in the pursuit of social, political, and/or cultural control, only very limited attention has to date been paid to the supra-national Euro. The few existing studies, such as Thrift and Leyshon (1994), Gilbert and Helleiner (1999a), Kaelberer (2002), Hymans (2003; 2004), and Raento et al. (2004), are characterised by selectivity in terms of the samples selected, and remain largely at the descriptive level (e.g., Unwin background. According to the EU, in various traditions twelve is a symbolic number representing perfection. Also, the twelve stars are stated to symbolise the number of months in a year and the number of hours shown on a clock face, while the circle is considered a symbol of unity. After having decided on a symbol, the CoE then encouraged other EU institutions to adopt the same flag. The European Parliament took up the call in 1983, the EU (then the EC) followed in 1985. All European institutions have been using it from 1986 onwards.

2 The Euro banknotes consist of seven denominations, 5€, 10€, 20€, 50€, 100€, 200€, 500€.
Other studies only mention the Euro in passing (e.g. Pointon 1998, 252; Paasi 2001, 17; Johler 2003, 7, 9; Pollard and Sidaway 2002, 8). As such, a detailed and critical descriptive analysis of the Euro banknotes is needed. It is against this background that this chapter conducts CDA (including VCA) on what is perhaps the most powerful, and surely most widespread, expression of the Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage/identity paradigm in symbols.

On a purely technical note, even though this chapter may appear substantial, much of its length is due to the inclusion of numerous reference-specific illustrations. Rather than including them in an appendix, it was decided that their in-text use would illustrate the argument in a clearer and more immediate way. Further, this chapter’s division into multiple chapters would have interrupted its analytical flow.

5.1 CURRENCY AS EXPRESSION OF THE STATE’S SELF-UNDERSTANDING

Before conducting analysis on the Euro banknote discourse, it is necessary to theorise the role of currency iconography in the context of the national, or, as for the Euro banknotes, supra-national, state. How can currency inform us about governmental notions of culture identity?

Since its development, currency has been a key instrument of the economy. Yet, at the same time, it has been, and continues to be, part of the issuing society’s very social structure (Weber 1972b; 1978; Giddens 1985; Kertzer 1988; Connerton 1989; Goodhart 1989; Dodd 1994; Zelizer 1994). Its symbolic role represents one of its essential features. As has been pointed out by numerous scholars, it was particular with the emergence of the Western nation-states that currency began to play an important part in the centralisation- and territorialisation-process of state authority, providing a symbol of internal as well as external coherence and stability as envisaged by the public authorities (i.e. national banks) charged with its development (Poggi 1978, 93; Dodd 1994, 30-36; Zelizer 1994, 205; Pointon 1998, 231; Gilbert 1999, 25; see also Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; Hobsbawm 1990). It is in this context that currency iconography in particular, as the ‘generalised medium of communication’ (Parsons 1967, 357) that it is, became a key expression of statehood sovereignty and the government’s understanding of its own and its society’s Self. Policy-makers, taking full advantage of advances in printing
technology during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, provided detailed imagery of their vision of the state on their currency (Gilbert and Helleiner 1999b, 8). Following Hobsbawm (1983) who demonstrated the invention of state traditions - may they be in a national or supra-national context - to rest on 'exercises in social engineering’ (Hobsbawm 1983, 13-14; see also Hobsbawm 1990, 81) as part of the governance-making process, this relationship has been observed by numerous scholars of currency iconography in a variety of contexts (Dyson 1994, 5; Helleiner 1998; Unwin and Hewitt 2001, 1009; see also contributions to Gilbert and Helleiner 1999a). The work of Gilbert (1998; 1999) on nineteenth century Canadian money, for example, demonstrates how, whilst not attracting direct attention, money provides a highly efficient way of influencing the culture identity of those exposed to it (i.e. Canadian citizens as well as non-citizen ‘visitors’ to the country). The revival of nationalism in south-eastern Europe during the early and mid-1990s re-emphasised this relationship between currency and a group's Self. For example, scholars such as Brown (1994), Brozović (1994), Danforth (1995, 142-184), Schwartz (1995), Hamilakis and Yalouri (1996), and Gounaris (2003, 69) paid critical, albeit at times ironical, attention to the controversy between Greece and the newly formed Republic of Macedonia over the alleged symbols of ancient Macedonian/Greek culture heritage. When in 1991 the newly formed Republic of Macedonia adopted the so-called Star/Sun of Vergina3 as the centrepiece of its national flag, Greece accused Macedonia of ‘stealing' Alexander’s symbol' (Gibbons 2004, 4), a symbol that also features on the Greek currency. The result, millions of Greek demonstrated in the streets regarding the Macedonian use of these symbols as ‘blatant acts of aggression’ (Gibbons 2004, 4), whilst the government toyed with the idea of getting rid of its northern and defenceless neighbour with the help of the Serbian dictator Slobadan Milosovic (Gibbons 2004). Facing aggression from two neighbouring states, Macedonia hastily withdrew the Star/Sun of Vergina from its national currency and flag. Luckily, Greece, under considerable international pressure, retreated from military action and, instead, decided for an economic blockade against its northern neighbour. Since then, Greece has spent many millions of Euros on campaigns for the ideological (re)conquest of Philip and Alexander (of Macedonia). As this example highlights, currency iconography represents iconography in terms of a state’s self-understanding and -presentation as executed by the institutional

3 The Sun/Star of Vergina ornaments the container of the remains of Philip I of Macedonia, father to Alexander the Great, discovered on the border of modern Macedonia and Greece.
bodies holding the power to produce a currency. The potential impact that currency iconography can have on a state’s population was reflected in the millions of Greek citizens demonstrating in the streets. In the words of Unwin and Hewitt (2001, 1026; see also Raento et al. 2004, 929), currency iconography is an active measure in providing

\[ a \text{ means through which identity is not only produced, but also daily reproduced as this money is exchanged from hand to hand. It is a means through which individuals constantly re-establish and reassert their alliance to a particular identity. Moreover, [...] new banknotes also provide a crucial insight for foreigners into the national identity of the countries that they visit. Paper money is, therefore, not only a way of reinforcing internal cohesion and identity, but is also a way of depicting that identity to the outside world.}\]

Currency represents a primary, literally ‘state-sponsored’, inscription surface for state-ideological texts generating and holding together – or, as in the case of Greece, threatening other – ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983). Borrowing Habermas’ (1989, 262) term, they represent a ‘codified steering medium’. As, for example, neatly highlighted by the imaginary banknote design produced by the Peace Tax Campaign during the second Iraq War (Figure 5.1), it is because of this relationship between currency iconography and notions of identity as prescribed by the government4 that, up to the present day, no currency iconography has employed contentious or complicating design iconographies.

Figure 5.1: Imaginary negative banknote iconography (Peace Tax Campaign 2005)

4 To the knowledge of the author, there has never been a national currency iconography that was not developed by the governmental/monetary elite, usually in the shape of the national bank.
Currency iconography represents such a powerful inscription surface for ideological texts in that it communicates these texts in the best tradition of Billig's (1995; see chapter 1.6) notion of banal nationalism, that is the promotion of national iconography and identity in the everyday landscape of citizens ('ideoscape') (Billig 1995, 93; Raento et al. 2004, 930; see also Kenny 2002; 2007 for the notion of 'visual repertoire' in this context). In other words, '[s]mall, rather than grand memorable arrangements offer constant, but barely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making 'our' national identity unforgettable' (Billig 1995, 93). What makes currency so successful at colonising what Habermas (1989, 327) terms the 'lifeworld' is precisely its banality, making it a seemingly 'natural', and hence unquestioned, part of the public's very day-to-day social understanding. Currency, in its very subtleness as a medium, holds the potential to spread easily across 'the arena of routine social life' (Zelizer 1999, 82). Other governmental instruments are certainly also associated with ideologies, but only currency holds the power to become synonymous with them. To quote Hymans (2004, 6; see also Hymans 2002, 3) in reference to Billig (1995), money represents

'a perfect site on which the state could construct a 'banal nationalism' that is all the more powerful for being part of the seemingly unremarkable fabric of everyday life... It has the potential to be an especially effective pedagogical tool because while many people simply have little taste for military parades or for education, everybody wants money.'

As a result of this relationship, nation-states, from their genesis onwards, sought to maintain a palpable, uniform, and exclusive currency within their state boundaries. Besides representing a supra-national unit, the EU has done the same, in particular with the Euro banknotes. They too are uniform and exclusive. After all, the introduction of a supra-national currency, besides all its stated novelty value, does not represent a revolution in the relationship between currency, the government, and its citizens. Instead, present-day initiatives to create supra-national forms of money, such as the Euro, 'find partial precedents in nineteenth-century monetary union initiatives and also in the vast common currency zones imposed by colonial powers across a number of political jurisdictions they governed' (Gilbert and Helleiner 1999b, 9; see also Dyson 1994, 5).
In summary, money iconography represents an expression of state ideology. In the words of Raento et al. (2004, 930), ‘as a product of the state, money creates a link between the state’s political identity project and its citizens. The imagery of money supports the production and maintenance of a national narrative, written by the élite’. It is in this context that currency design is always intended to reduce the need ‘to engage in interpretive efforts’ (Habermas 1989, 262; see also Misgeld 1985), and to make a country’s residents ‘not forget who they are supposed to be and where they are supposed to belong’ (Raento et al. 2004, 930). Having theorised the role played by currency iconography in terms of a state’s cultural self-understanding, the question becomes, what can the Euro banknote iconography tell us about the EU’s cultural self-understanding?

5.2 THE EURO AS DISCOURSE

To begin with a brief history of the Euro, in an awareness that different currencies tend to separate groups of people (Laffan et al. 2000, 155; Gupta 1992, 7), it was after the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte (1814 AD) that European politicians came to the conclusion that the economic integration of Europe’s nation-states could reduce or even eradicate ‘continental’ armed conflict (Heffernan 1998, 98). It was, however, only after the Second World War that politicians made steps towards a Europe operating as a single economic unit, thus, hopefully, making military aggression between individual nation-states for the sake of economic gain counterproductive, self-mutilating, if not self-defeating (Heffernan 1998, 98). As such, ‘European Monetary Union was originally conceived not to tackle an external but an internal European challenge’ (Solans 2003). Yet, no concrete steps towards a common European currency were taken. It was then the 1990s that provided an important watershed in Europe’s currency history. The programme to complete the (EU)ropean internal market, launched in 1982, ended in December 1992 with the abolishment of many of the remaining barriers to the unhindered movement of people, goods, and capital between EU member states (Hart 1998, 164; see also Dyson 1994; Pinder 1998). Around the same time, the Maastricht Treaties for Political, Economic, and Monetary Union, signed in December 1991, committed the EU to the introduction of a single (EU)ropean currency no later than 1999. However, it was not before 1 January 2002, after the formation of various Eurocratic bodies responsible for the development, introduction, and establishment of a common currency – taking mainly the institutional shape of the European Central Bank (henceforth ECB) – that 50 billion coins and 14.5
billion banknotes entered circulation in twelve of the EU member states\(^5\), four 'other European countries'\(^6\), two Balkan countries\(^7\), and a number of territories and islands around the world which are part of, or associated with, a Eurozone\(^8\) (also known as Euro Area or Euro Land) member state\(^9\) (ECB 2005a; 2005b; 2005c). Today, more than 315 million people are using the Euro.

As pointed out above, currency iconography is always constructed by planned measures of the responsible public authorities. These discursive articulations (see chapter 2.2.2) become 'sites through which shared meanings are constructed, identities formed, interests shaped, problems defined, and actions framed' (Dyson 2000, 126). In the case of the Euro, this ideological 'site' takes the shape of the ECB. As such, we are, as demonstrated by Mak's (2001) work on the CEC's internal discourse for public acceptance of the EMU, provided with an 'articulatory' context for CDA and, in particular, VCA. The following study provides a critical analysis of the Euro\(^{10}\) as expression of the Eurocratic 'illusive search for a single theory of European integration' (Dyson 1994, 315). It presents the institutional policy and design discourse leading to the establishment of the final Euro design. Carving out the iconographic discourse's underlying 'logic of social appropriateness' (Dyson 2000, 131), it will be possible to leave behind the selective and simplifying approaches that have dominated previous studies on the Euro iconography, and add a symbolic dimension to this thesis' examination of the EU's supra-national culture heritage paradigm. As stated by the ECB's Theme Selection Advisory Group (henceforth TSAG), the body endowed by the ECB with the selection of Euro themes on the basis of which banknote designers could then produce entries for the Euro Banknote Design Competition (henceforth EBDC) out of which the final Euro design would then be selected, the most important aspect of the Euro design is that '[r]egardless of its precise meaning as a graphic model, its real value is that it is accepted as a signal of "common identity"' (TSAG May 1995, 4, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European

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5 Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland
6 Monaco, Montenegro, Andorra, and Vatican City
7 Montenegro and Kosovo
8 By this term I am referring to all European states having adopted the Euro as their official currency.
9 Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, Saint Pierre, Miquelon, and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories
10 From this point on, when I use the term Euro, I am referring to the Euro banknotes only.
Banknote Series). The question to be asked thus becomes, what is the Eurocratic understanding of this common identity as expressed through the Euro?

Starting with the Eurocratic theme selection discourse for the Euro banknote iconography, the following analysis makes the 'careful process of Euro design' (ECB 2001b), as stated on one of the ECB's webpages providing information on the development of the Euro, together with the 'carefully co-ordinated series of activities to ensure that nothing is left to chance' (ECB 2001b, Euro Banknotes: From Cotton Field to Your Pocket), subject to critical scholarly enquiry. As such, if nothing was left to chance in terms of the Euro iconography, then it can be assumed that the Euro design discourse, and, in particular, its results, represent a culture heritage paradigm as envisaged by the institutional élite responsible for its development. In order to retrace the Eurocratic process of heritage creation as implemented in symbols, the following critical analysis employs numerous ECB policy documents. However, many internal ECB documents informing the institutional selection process leading to the final establishment of the Euro have been classified as confidential. The official reason for this Olivier Strube (15 October 2003), spokesperson of the ECB's Banknote Issue Division, states to be security issues. However, at the same time, a high-ranking ECB member (who prefers to remain anonymous) commented that 'diese Richtlinien jede Menge Interpretationsspielraum zulassen. Wenn man zum Beispiel von Sicherheitsbedenken spricht, so kann man dies für das Zurückhalten von fast allen Informationen nutzen'\(^\textit{11}\). Yet, with the relevant documents not displaying or discussing any aspects of the final Euro design, or even mentioning security features, the reason for this self-enforced discretion years after the launch of the Euro itself remains unclear. One explanation might be the ECB's very own plans to publish a book on the Euro's development process (Moss and Heinonen 08 December 2003; Olivier Strube 15 October 2003). Whatever the reason, after intense negotiations stretching over many months, including a final telephone conference with its four directors, the ECB finally agreed to provide access to a number of previously unreleased internal documents crucial to the analysis of the Euro iconography discourse, namely the TSAG report (TSAG May 1995, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series) and the Feature Selection

\(^{11}\) 'these guidelines leave lots of space for interpretation. If one speaks, for example, of security concerns, one can, in fact, use this as a justification to hold back nearly every type of information' (my translation)
Advisory Group (henceforth FSAG) report (FSAG 1995a, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote) together with its complementary catalogue (FSAG 1995b, Selection of Portraits and Architectural Features (Appendix 2 to the Report of the Features Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on the Selection of Design Features)). As such, the following analysis is based on discursive material never before released or processed as part of a scholarly enquiry into the Euro iconography process as expression of the Eurocratic creation of supra-national culture heritage as expressed in symbols.

5.3 THE EURO THEME SELECTION DISCOURSE

The decision over what general themes could or should be depicted on the Euro banknotes (i.e. limiting the KIV) represents the first key stage in the development of the Euro iconography. For national currencies, a committee consisting of Central Bank members, government officials, and scholars recognised by their expertise usually makes this decision (Unwin and Hewitt 2001, 1015). In the case of the Euro, the Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote12 (henceforth BNWG), mandated by the Council of the European Monetary Institute13, was established. The BNWG then, in order to lay down at an early stage general parameters for the Euro iconography, and, in doing so, reflecting the Eurocratic élite's overall reliance on committees and panels of experts as also identified for the ECRP (see chapters 3.3), set up the TSAG. The TSAG's sole role as a group of internal and external expert advisors under ECB supervision was to help the BNWG put forward themes around which individual design proposals for the European banknote series could be proposed by designers (TSAG May 1995, 3, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series). More precisely, as stated in the Theme Selection Advisory Group’s confidential report, it was the TSAG’s main task as an institutional steering mechanism to 'enumerate and evaluate the merits of themes which might appropriately provide a sense of

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12 The BNWG is made up of cash experts made up from the EU national central banks.
13 The European Monetary Institute is the institutional forerunner of the ECB. To avoid confusion, and with both institutions, besides minor changes to its internal structure, representing the same Eurocratic body, this chapter will employ the term ECB as a generic abbreviation for both bodies.
unity or "family" to the series of seven banknotes' (TSAG May 1995, 3; in this context, see also Prodi 2003, 2). Its experts were chosen from what the BNWG considered 'appropriate disciplines – historians, art experts, psychologists, and banknote and general graphic design professionals' (TSAG May 1995, 3). The precise composition of the TSAG in terms of its members would be of major interest here. Yet, disclosure of information on the names, professions, and background of individual members has, up to the present day, been rejected by the ECB on the grounds of data protection issues. However, in response to a letter sent to the ECB by the author asking for more information on the TSAG panel's composition and the experts' professions and fields of expertise, the directorate stated panel members to have been professors of universities (art, history, psychology, graphic departments), graphic designers, Central Bank management from the Banknote and Coin Departments and Printing Works, keepers of Central Bank collections, members of national design centres, representatives of ministries of culture, and ECB staff themselves (Moss and Heinonen 18 March 2004; see also FSAG 1995a, 6). Recalling the case of the TCCR (see chapter 3.4), it also becomes important to note that even though experts are employed in the search for appropriate iconographic themes, 'the BNWG is free to accept or modify any proposals of the Advisory Group' (TSAG May 1995, 3). Once more, ultimately it is the Eurocratic élite and not the experts holding the power of decision-making.

In its search for acceptable themes, the TSAG, in its Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series, formulated a number of general theme criteria. Firstly, 'the theme should symbolise Europe, carry a message of European unity and be capable of visual representation' (TSAG May 1995, 3). Similarly, the TSAG states that the 'European banknotes should be recognisable both within and beyond the European Union. Themes, including patterns and designs should project an easily identifiable message which unequivocally spells "Europe" at a glance' (TSAG May 1995, 5). As such it can be observed that the TSAG set itself up to find appropriate themes by the means of an 'essentialisation' process. Secondly,

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14 A list of the TSAG members, together with information on their professional background, was originally included in the Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series (TSAG May 1995). However, when disclosed, for the first time, to the author, the relevant pages containing this information were removed from the original document (TSAG May 1995, 11-12).
'there is a need to be aware of the sensitivities of the countries which may not be in a position to join the single currency, at least initially' (TSAG May 1995, 3). In addition to these criteria, the TSAG laid down a set of complementary criteria against which to assess proposed themes for the Euro. The Acceptability Criteria aims to ensure a harmonious supra-national character of the Euro iconography: 'the themes and the design elements should be acceptable to the EU public' (TSAG May 1995, 4). Secondly, the Legibility of the Message Criteria states that 'illustrations of the themes should be legible and understandable by everybody' (TSAG May 1995, 4). Also, 'the Advisory group considered that national/regional bias and gender imbalance in the theme proposals should be avoided, if possible' (TSAG May 1995, 4). It must be noted here that no mention is made regarding the avoidance of religious or cultural bias. As such, either the TSAG, based on its members' own cultural assumptions of what is 'normal', assumes no religious imbalance to be possible, or it attempts to avoid the sensitive subject of religion altogether. However, a detailed explanation of the actual meaning of these criteria statements is entirely avoided. In summary, the TSAG was responsible, under the control of the ECB's BNWG, for deciding on themes for the Euro iconography on the basis of which the designers could then set out to produce their entries.

5.3.1 The TSAG theme discourse

Based on the above general guidelines, the TSAG developed and ranked a total of eighteen themes in terms of their formulaic appropriateness for the EBDC (see TSAG May 1995, 5-6, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series), from which the final Euro design would be chosen (Figure 5.2). Thirteen of these eighteen themes employ elements of cultural memory, and, thus, are of further interest within the culture heritage context of this thesis. These thirteen themes are characterised by three major, non-exclusive, thematic strands.

15 Excluded were themes iii, vi, viii, xi, and xvi. Theme iii (Abstract Themes and Security) revolves around abstract designs (e.g. geometric shapes and non-figurative design elements) (TSAG May 1995, 9). Theme vi (Fauna and Flora and their Natural Environment) bases on the portrayal of 'different fauna and flora and natural environmental scenes from the Member States' (TSAG May 1995, 13). Theme viii (Aspects of Europe) revolves around 'one or more significant aspects of the near future of Europe (e.g. communications)' (TSAG May 1995, 14), while theme xi (Landscapes) utilises 'either European landscapes or European rivers or landscapes from a geological viewpoint' (TSAG May 1995, 14). Lastly, theme xvi (Maps of Europe Through the Ages) would be illustrated by maps of Europe through the ages (TSAG May 1995, 15).
The most prominent thematic strand revolves around, or at least relies heavily on, portraits\textsuperscript{16} of European personalities (Figure 5.2, theme i, ii, v, vii, x, xvii, xviii). Only in the case of theme i are we dealing with 'portraits of ordinary men and women' (TSAG May 1995, 13, 16). Theme ii (Heritage of Europe) revolves around '[t]he illustrations of famous men and women from the past on the one side of the note and a mix of related achievements in different disciplines on the other side of the note' (TSAG May 1995, 13, 18). Examples qualifying for this theme are considered to be 'Ludwig van Beethoven and music, Rembrandt and painting, Sir Isaac Newton and science, Otto Wagner and architecture, Charlotte Brontë and literature, Marie Curie and medicine' (TSAG May 1995, 18). Similarly, theme v (Collective Memory of Europe and Cultural Achievements of Europe) has recourse to 'great European achievers up to the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (renowned world-wide)' (TSAG May 1995, 29), 'together with pictorial symbols of their respective fields of achievement' (TSAG May 1995, 13). Also included in this thematic category, theme vii (Great European Figures Associated with a Single Discipline) employs 'portraits of historical figures associated with a single discipline' (TSAG May 1995, 14), such as 'Nobel prize winners' (TSAG May 1995, 29). Similar to this, theme xvii (Cosmology) suggests '[f]amous

\textsuperscript{16} The term 'portrait' in this context, throughout this chapter, is employed to refer to numerous media in which a human figure can be displayed, mainly painting, sculpture, and photograph.
astronomers and other scientists' (TSAG May 1995, 42) to be displayed on the Euro. This thematic emphasis on world-renowned personalities characterised by specialised cultural and scientific achievements finds its most poignant discursive expression, and is set into wider justificatory context, in the case of theme x (Several portraits on both sides of each banknote denomination). The TSAG (May 1995, 34) explains this theme to base on

*a wide gallery of characters prominent in the fields of science and culture, thereby paying tribute to learning, enterprise and the creative imagination of the mind. These qualities - learning, enterprise and the creative imagination of the mind - constitute the European Union's greatest asset and gave rise to the very strength of the entire Western civilisation.*

European culture is discursively constructed as the core essence of Western civilisation. It is in the same understanding, only in a strictly cultural context, that the portraits of ordinary men and women (theme i) qualifying for inclusion the TSAG states to be the works of famous painters, sculptors, and architects:

To almost everybody in the world, Europe is noted for fine arts, beautiful paintings, famous sculpture, and architectural styles. While American and Japanese tourists may be unable to name European leaders, they usually know the names of Europe's most famous museums.

(TSAG May 1995, 8)

Also included in the group of European personalities is theme xvii (The "Founding Fathers" of the European Union), revolving around the EU’s so-called 'Founding fathers', namely Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and Paul Henri Spaak (TSAG May 1995, 41). In summary, with human figures in the shape of scientists, artists, and politicians taking centre-stage, the most prominent TSAG group of Euro themes reflects traditional approaches to nation-state currency iconography between 1950 and 1979 (see Hymans 2004, 15).17

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17 There exists a heated debate over why portraits have so regularly been incorporated in banknote designs. Some argue portraits to function as a security feature. Based on the human facial recognition ability, it is possible to detect very slight variations in facial expression. Thus, including portraiture on banknotes can be understood as an attempt to harness the human ability of visual face recognition as a measure in deterring fraud, because of the skill required to produce a precise match of the original engraving of the face displayed on the banknote (Unwin and Hewitt 2001, 1013; see also Bruce et al. 1996; Bruce 1988). However, other authors disagree with this understanding, arguing instead that [as] we never see the subject on whom the portraits are based, nor even the original on which the banknote designer has based the engraved
The second most prominent thematic strand, including themes xii and xiii (see Figure 5.2), as well as sharing theme i and v with the first thematic group, takes the shape of architectural heritage sites and styles, in particular those considered typical for a specific historical period (e.g. Classic, Gothic, Renaissance) or development in European history (e.g. cultural, economic). Theme i features prominent architectural styles on one side of the banknote, together with the portraits of ordinary men and women (TSAG May 1995, 13). Theme xiii (Monuments) revolves around ‘famous European monuments’ (TSAG May 1995, 14), clarified by the TSAG to include Stonehenge (England), the Pantheon in Rome (Italy), the Eiffel Tower in Paris (France), and the Houses of Parliament in London (England). Similarly, theme v suggests the representation of what the TSAG considers architectural sites symbolising unequivocally representations of Europe, such as the Acropolis and the Parthenon in Athens (Greece) (TSAG May 1995, 26), together with, as mentioned above, the portraits of ‘great European Achievers’ (TSAG May 1995, 13). In the case of theme vii (Cities which played an important role in the cultural, economic and financial development of Europe), the theme of architectural heritage sites is expanded to include historical cities – and selected sites within them – ‘associated with the cultural development of Europe’ (TSAG May 1995, 36). Examples include Venice (Italy), Amsterdam (The Netherlands), and London (England), stated to symbolise Europe’s economic and financial development between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as Salamanca (Spain) and Heidelberg (Germany) symbolising the development of Universities (TSAG May 1995, 36). In summary, the second thematic strand discussed here, once again reflecting traditional nation-state banknote designs (see for example, Unwin and Hewitt 2001, 1019), focuses on depictions of buildings and urban architectural imagery rather than on rural landscape imagery.

The third most prominent thematic strand employs figures from legends and myths, predominantly from the Early Middle Ages and Middle Ages (see Figure 5.2, theme ix and xiv). Theme ix (Great European Poems and Narratives), according to the TSAG based on ‘the idea that there exists a wealth of collective memories and scenes from common stories [that] is unequivocally European’ (TSAG May 1995, 32), suggests, among others, Beowulf – the eponymous Geatish warrior who valiantly slayed the monster Grendel on behalf of the Anglo-Saxon portrait head, we are being invited here to recognise deviations from a standard representation rather than deviations from a unique original. There is little evidence that viewers are adept at this’ (Pointon 1998, 237). Nevertheless, both viewpoints acknowledge the ideological qualities of portraiture on banknotes.
Chapter 5: Implementation in Symbols

The figure of Hroðgar (Bradley 1995) – as a symbol for the European tradition of ‘heroic courage in defence of the values of the group against alien foes’ (TSAG May 1995, 32). As has already been observed in chapter 4.4.3.2 for the SCPR culture heritage discourse in terms of heritage sites of a defensive character, the theme revolves around the notion of defending an in-group (i.e. the Europeans) against outside foes. Similarly, the figure of Siegfried – crown prince of Xanten, hero, and central figure of the *Nibelungenlied* (de Boor 1979) – qualifies for inclusion in this theme as a symbol for the alleged European tradition of ‘the defence of honour, land, and rights’ (TSAG May 1995, 32). It is under the same theme of *Great European Poems and Narratives* that Roland of Roncevaux, one of the traditional symbols of the fight against Muslims already encountered earlier in the context of the SCPR (see chapter 4.4.3.2), re-emerges as an allegedly typical European figure (TSAG May 1995, 32). As the TSAG clarifies in the context of theme xiv, entitled *Myths and Legends* and based on characters and images from European myths and legends (e.g. Scandinavian, German, Celtic), such historical/mythical figures ‘convey timeless values and messages’ (TSAG May 1995, 38). In general it can thus be argued that, by the means of historical/mythical figures, the third thematic group develops a discourse of Europe as an eternal unit distinguishable from a non-European, alien, and hostile outside and its external Other. It promotes a defensive, inward-looking view of Europe, not the open and outward-looking paradigm that Eurocratic rhetorics claim the EU to be based on. Once again (see chapters 3.3.3 & 4.4.4), we are reminded of ‘Fortress Europe’, with Roland, Siegfried, and Beowulf manning its walls of culture. Here it can be argued that theme xvi (see Figure 5.2), *Maps of Europe Through the Ages*, based on maps of Europe from different centuries (e.g. Ptolemy’s maps, Mappaemundi, Portolan charts), in utilising, as Raento et al. (2004, 935) put it, the ‘persuasive power of cartography’ in terms of ‘our space’ (Raento et al. 2004, 935; see also Kosonen 1999, 91), further emphasises this paradigm of ‘defence’ and ‘closed-ness’. It is, however, at the same time that the TSAG emphasises this theme to be rather unsuited for the Euro iconography, firstly because maps have traditionally played only a secondary role in banknote design, and secondly because ‘maps and charts which incorporate border would not be in keeping with the objectives of the EU’ (TSAG May 1995, 40).

Ranking all eighteen themes by the use of a Paired Comparison System (see Figure 5.2), the TSAG elected the following top three as providing the most ‘a
sense of unity or "family" in European terms (TSAG May 1995, 3, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series). Stating that, more than any other theme proposed, they 'minimise both a national bias and a gender imbalance' (TSAG May 1995, 1), their choice fell on Ages and Styles of Europe (theme i) and Heritage of Europe (theme ii), as well as Abstract Themes and Security (theme iii), which, in employing - as stated in the ECB's catalogue to the EBDC exhibition - 'a contemporary or modern depiction of abstract and figurative elements' (ECB 2003, 9), was regarded as providing 'a high degree of design flexibility' (TSAG May 1995, 1). On the basis of the TSAG's advice, the BNWG then proposed those three themes to the ECB Council as representing the ones most suited to act as acceptable iconological themes for the EBDC. On 12 June 1995, the Council's final choice of themes for the EBDC fell on Ages and Styles of Europe (theme i) and Abstract/Modern (theme iii) (ECB 2003, 9). As such, it can be observed that, in their search for appropriate Euro iconography themes, the Eurocratic élite, besides providing an abstract/modern theme, turned towards cultural heritage. Themes based on natural heritage, such as theme vi (Fauna and Flora and their Natural Environment) and theme xi (Landscapes), were not selected for the final choice of themes. It can thus be argued that the TSAG theme discourse identifies Europe in terms of cultural, not natural, heritage. To continue, while the BNWG considered it unnecessary to further control the design choices for the Abstract/Modern theme, it considered it a necessity for the culture heritage theme of Ages and Styles of Europe. In other words, the Eurocratic élite in charge of the development of the Euro iconography deemed it imperative to further de-randomise Europe's culture heritage as would be expressed in the EBDC proposals, and thus in the final Euro design. The institutional control body created within the discursive articulation of the ECB in order to provide this service took the shape of the FSAG.

5.4 THE EURO FEATURE SELECTION DISCOURSE

In the FSAG's confidential report, entitled Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote, the advisory group's mandate is stated to be
to make proposals concerning a set of features for the future European banknotes based on the Theme "Ages and Styles of Europe", a description of which is attached [see below]. The features should be chosen to symbolise Europe and to contribute to the acceptability of the notes among the population.

(FSAG 1995a, 14)

This 'well-balanced series of features' (FSAG 1995a, 2), after approval by the ECB’s BNWG, would then be passed on, in the shape of the aforementioned confidential report (FSAG 1995a, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute’s Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote) and a complementary catalogue of approved features (FSAG 1995b, Selection of Portraits and Architectural Features (Appendix 2 to the Report of the Features Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute’s Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on the Selection of Design Features)), to all designers partaking in the EBDC. As such, the FSAG influenced, if not determined, the character of all proposed EBDC visualisations of culture heritage to be featured on the Euro, as any designer hoping his/her design to be chosen would shy away from proposing iconographic elements not included in, or actively opposing, those suggested by the Eurocratic élite’s panel of experts. In the words of the FSAG (1995a, 2),

the present proposals should not be viewed as fully prescriptive. The group considers that a designer who wishes to deviate from its recommendations in his/her submission for the design competition should be allowed to do so, provided he/she explains in detail how all requirements have been met.

The implication of this statement is that, even though some deviation from the guidelines might be considered, explicit justification would be required from any entrant proposing a set of iconographic elements that did not fit with the FSAG’s ‘definition’ of qualified European culture heritage. In doing so, the FSAG (and, thus, ECB) implicitly ensured that its own understanding of acceptable culture heritage was likely to feature on the final Euro design. As with the TSAG, detailed information on the internal build-up of the FSAG in terms of its members’ profession and background, as well as on the character of
the decision-making process itself, is, to the present day, classified as confidential.\textsuperscript{18}

The FSAG met four times between June and October 1995, choosing on the basis of 'a considerable amount of research' (FSAG 1995a, 2, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote) - a process remaining further unspecified - seven chronological periods as appropriate for the Ages and Styles of Europe theme (Figure 5.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>STYLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th century BC to 4th century AD</td>
<td>Classical (Greek and Roman)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th century to 12th century</td>
<td>Romanesque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th century to 14th century</td>
<td>Gothic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th and 16th centuries</td>
<td>Renaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600 to 1750</td>
<td>Baroque and Rococo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850 to 1914</td>
<td>Iron and glass architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the 1930s onwards</td>
<td>Modern architecture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.3: FSAG list of Ages and Styles of Europe (FSAG 1995a, 6)

Features considered representative of each period and style, depicting real portraits and (parts of) real buildings, were collected in the FSAG catalogue entitled Selection of Portraits and Architectural Features (Appendix 2 to the Report of the Features Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on the Selection of Design Features) (FSAG 1995b). This collection of cultural features the FSAG (1995a, 9; see also TSAG May 1995, 1, 7), in its final report, presents as representing an un-biased product: 'Given the anonymous nature of the

\textsuperscript{18} A list of the FSAG members, together with information on their professional background, was originally included in the Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote. However, when disclosed for the first time, the relevant pages containing this information were removed from the original document sent to the author (FSAG 1995a, 12-13).
proposed material, it may be neither necessary nor feasible to check "political correctness" in the case of the European notes'. As such, the FSAG considers its selection of cultural features to be free of bias. In particular, in its final report, it claims its catalogue of features to ‘minimise both national bias and gender imbalance’ (FSAG 1995a, 15; see also TSAG May 1995, 1, 6, 7). However, it is at the same time that any still identifiable, in particular national, bias is stated to simply have to be ignored in that ‘[t]he quality of the designs, which will circulate for years, is of greater importance’ (FSAG 1995a, 2).

The FSAG (1995a, 7, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote) states its selection of architectural features, deemed appropriate for the theme Ages and Styles of Europe, to ‘convey, without specific reference to any given building, a clear message on the architectural richness and unity of Europe’. In the same vein, the FSAG (1995a, 2) states the historical portraits, featuring together with the architectural elements and sites, to belong ‘to the European culture’ in general. The FSAG avoids any discussion of what is meant by the term ‘European culture’. In order to understand the culture heritage paradigm as proposed – and, thus, prescribed – by the FSAG, it thus becomes necessary to conduct analysis on the FSAG (1995b) catalogue of features. How is European culture heritage understood by the FSAG? What cultural paradigm is prescribed, under the control of the ECB’s BNWG, to the designers as acceptable for the Euro iconography?

The features collected in the FSAG (1995b) catalogue, 107 in total, can be divided into two categories: human figures and architectural sites. In order to analyse the culture heritage paradigm as expressed through the FSAG feature catalogue, the author entered each feature into a SPSS 12.0.1 database. Data was collected in terms of a number of variables, which will be discussed in detail as the analysis progresses. The following graphs represent the result of statistical analysis based on this database. Due to the FSAG catalogue consisting mainly of black-and-white photographs, colour was not recorded as part of the variables. The catalogue is a collection of features, not of designs (for which the choice of colour could be important). In all but one architectural case – that of a collection of individual column designs by Michelangelo (FSAG 1995b, 59) which was excluded from the analysis – features take the shape of references to tangible architectural heritage sites or historical portraits.
5.4.1 The FSAG historical portrait discourse

To start with the historical portraits included in the FSAG (1995b) catalogue, they make up 52.44 percent (n=107) of the total number of features included. As pointed out earlier, the FSAG (1995a, 14, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote), in its report on appropriate design features for the EBDC, highlights its catalogue selection to have been 'chosen to symbolise Europe'. Similarly, the TSAG (May 1995, 5, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series) claims to have developed its EBDC themes, including Ages and Styles of Europe, to generate 'an easily identifiable message which univocally spells "Europe" at a glance'. Furthermore, the TSAG states that the FSAG's selection of portraits made on the basis of the theme Ages and Styles of Europe 'should form an ideal European family' (TSAG May 1995, 7). As such it must be assumed that the portraits selected symbolise an archetypical European population as understood and envisaged by the Eurocratic and academic élite responsible for its selection (i.e. the FSAG), and as approved by the Eurocratic élite of the ECB's BNWG.

The most significant pattern observable for this symbolic European sample population, based on each individual figure (including those displayed in groups), is the utter absence of portraits displaying people of a non-White ethnic background (100.0 percent, n=64). The sample population chosen to symbolise Europe consists exclusively of people of White ethnic background. As such, the FSAG failed to put together a selection of portraits that 'represent the great variety of physical types which characterise European society', as demanded by the TSAG (May 1995, 7, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series) for the theme Ages and Styles of Europe. 67.3 percent of portraits display male figures, while less than half as many display female figures (32.7 percent). When related to the number of people displayed on the portraits (i.e. individuals or groups\textsuperscript{19}), an even more detailed picture can be drawn. Firstly, individual figures dominate the FSAG portrait discourse (92.85 percent, n=56). As Figure 5.4 further demonstrates, it

\textsuperscript{19} In this context, groups are defined as an assembly of at least two people.
is White male individuals dominating the Eurocratically approved ‘ideal European family’ (62.5 percent, n=56).

Groups of people, all displaying White ethnic features, make only 7.1 percent of the total. As such it can be argued that, instead of emphasising the EU as a family, or group, of people, most emphasis is placed on male individuals. Doing so, the FSAG figure selection exhibits traditional nationalist characteristics. As has been demonstrated by Unwin and Hewitt (2001) for nineteenth century Central and Eastern European banknote design, male individual figures tend to dominate the figural discourse. Stating to have minimised gender imbalance (see above), the FSAG would have been well advised not to simply assume and/or state the politically correct nature of its proposed material, but to actually check it. The only alternative interpretation of this discrepancy would be to understand the FSAG stating it to be unnecessary to check the features selected in terms of gender bias as an attempt to prevent people involved in the Euro iconography development process from actually doing so. The unbiased nature of the human representations selected is assumed, and the selection thus likely to have remained unquestioned. Yet, due to the still confidential nature of detailed data concerning the FSAG’s internal feature selection process, it will, at least for now, remain impossible to establish the Eurocratic reasoning behind this discrepancy. To continue with the portraits, in order to analyse the age distribution across the portraiture, the age of each individual displayed
was assigned one of four broad age categories: *infans* (infant), *juvenis* (juvenile), *adultus* (adult), or *senilis* (senior). Even though this does not represent a categorisation based on absolute physical-anthropological measurements, it, nevertheless, allows a number of revealing observations. 10.7 percent (n=56) of human representations were undeterminable in terms of age category. As Figure 5.5 shows, with 72 percent (n=50), the large majority of human figures depict adults.

This is followed by representations of juveniles (16.0 percent) and seniors (8.0 percent). The least prominent category, with only 4.0 percent, consists of depictions of children. In summary, the FSAG selection of historical portraits visual-discursively constructs its European sample population as being of exclusively White ethnographic background, dominated by the male adult individual.

To go into more analytical detail, even though the FSAG claims its selection of historical figures to be anonymous, theme-free, and, thus, non-biased, in 44.6 percent (n=52) of cases the FSAG provides, together with the photograph of the portrait in question, a context in terms of who is being portrayed, such as 'portrait of an unknown architect' (FSAG 1995b, 22) or 'farmer family' (FSAG 1995b, 99). When entered into a database, these contexts can be subdivided into seven thematic categories (Figure 5.6).
Chapter 5: Implementation in Symbols

By far the largest individual group of figures included in the FSAG catalogue is made up of Christian religious figures (33.3 percent, n=24). Recalling their extensive use in the SCPR guidebook (see chapter 4.4.4), more than half (55.6 percent, n=9) of these display Christian saints, such as St. Catalina (FSAG 1995b, 23), St. Florian (FSAG 1995b, 38), St. Theodor (FSAG 1995b, 39), and St. Peter (FSAG 1995b, 36), founder of the Christian Church (Figure 5.7).
Of the remaining Christian religious figures, 33.3 percent are of liturgical character, including the fifteenth century painting of the so-called ‘Reliquary Bearer’ by a Flemish anonymous painter, now kept in the Musée Condé, Chantilly (France) (FSAG 1995b, 37), and the twelfth century bronze statue of the so-called ‘Candle Bearer’ from Erfurt Cathedral (Germany) (FSAG 1995b, 20). The remaining 11.1 percent display biblical figures, such as the eleventh century limestone head of an Old Testament figure from Astorga Cathedral, now in the museum of Astorga Cathedral (FSAG 1995b, 18). However, while it allows the ranking of different types of figures, these percentage statistics, due to the relatively limited total number of Christian religious figures (n=24), should be approached with caution. To return to the main figural categories, the dominant Christian figures are followed by the depictions of artists (16.7 percent), such as musicians, sculptors, painters, and actors (see, for example, FSAG 1995b, 32, 98, 100). Next come representations of professionals (12.5 percent), such as academics, doctors, architects, and bank managers (e.g. FSAG 1995b, 95, 97), tying with farmers/workers (12.5 percent) (e.g. FSAG 1995b, 24, 80). These, together with representations of artisans (8.3 percent), can be argued to develop a, even though secondary, visual discourse revolving around notions of artistic creativity and professional and non-professional skill. This in turn is followed by representations of athletes and nobles (members of the secular élite), both groups accounting for only 8.3 percent each. As such, the theme of Christian religion utterly dominates the character of the FSAG portrait discourse.

To continue with the analysis, the FSAG (1995a, 15), in its report on appropriate design features, in adhering to the notion of political correctness (FSAG 1995a, 9), states its selection to avoid in particular national bias. As such it should be assumed that the historical portraits were selected from artists coming from a wide, preferably evenly distributed, variety of (EU)ropean countries, equalising the chances of each portrait to be selected by designers for the EBDC. In order to assess the FSAG’s claim, the country of origin of each portrait, as recorded in the feature catalogue for 78.6 percent (n=56) of all cases, was entered into a database (n=44). As Figure 5.8 demonstrates, the origin of artists whose portraits were selected, and thus the origin of their works, is far from evenly distributed.
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It is Italian artists whose portraits are chosen most often by the FSAG (25.0 percent). These are followed by the works of German artists (20.4 percent), followed by the works of French (13.6 percent) and Dutch (13.6 percent) artists. When compared to the list of EU member states at the time of the FSAG catalogue’s production, it can be observed that, while all artists whose portraits were selected come from EU member states, no works of Portuguese, Irish, Finnish, Swedish, Danish, and Belgian artists - countries that were also EU members at the time - were included. In particular we can observe a complete absence of works of Scandinavian artists. Assuming that throughout their history all of the countries that are now EU member states produced talented portrait artists, a clear national bias can be observed.

In summary, the ‘ideal European family’ (TSAG May 1995, 7; see above) as envisaged by the FSAG under the control of the ECB’s BNWG, ‘chosen to symbolise Europe’ (FSAG 1995a, 14; see above), exhibits a number of telling characteristics. Summarising the main characteristics of the FSAG historical portrait discourse, Figure 5.9 displays each discursive ‘orb’s’ size proportionate to its relative discursive frequency/strength.20

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20 This is not the case for the discursive ‘orb’ displaying ethnography. With the FSAG’s entire selection of portraits exhibiting a White ethnographic background, the orb represents the wider discursive character of the thematic categories.
Firstly, the FSAG historical figure discourse creates this 'ideal European family' as being exclusively White in terms of ethnographic background. As such it fails to develop, as demanded by the TSAG (May 1995, 7) in its Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series in reference to the theme Ages and Styles of Europe, a selection of portraits that 'represent the great variety of physical types which characterise European society'. Why then, for example, are there no portraits of Afro-Europeans or Asio-Europeans included? Both represent groups having contributed, and still contributing, considerably to Europe's/(EU)rope's population, and, thus, its de facto ethnic diversity. Secondly, the FSAG figure discourse is by no means characterised by political correctness in terms of gender bias. Instead it is mainly the portraits of individual males that are chosen to symbolise Europe/(EU)rope. Representations of groups are largely avoided. In terms of age, the large majority of this 'ideal European family' (TSAG May 1995, 7) displays adult features. In terms of wider thematic categories, references to the Christian religion dominate the FSAG figure discourse. As such, the Eurocratic understanding of an 'ideal European family' as expressed through the FSAG figure discourse takes the shape of a White community united in Christianity.
The second most prominent thematic category combines this theocentric discourse with the, even though much less prominent, notion of this 'family' being characterised by artistic creativity, as well as by professional and non-professional skill. Also, it is mostly historical portraits by Italian artists that were selected. By no means can the FSAG portrait discourse be considered unbiased.

5.4.2 The FSAG architectural heritage site discourse

As pointed out above, the theme *Ages and Styles of Europe* employs two main iconographic elements. Having discussed the historical portraits, this section turns towards the architectural heritage sites included in the FSAG catalogue. Having been entered into a SPSS 12.0.1 database, making up 47.66 percent (n=107) of the total of features included, each was allocated to a general category based on the overall function of the site (Figure 5.10). Due to many modern buildings representing multi-functional structures, a small number of architectural sites could be included in more than one category. In these cases the category selected was the one reflecting most the trait for which the site is mainly renowned. For example, Le Corbusier's Notre Dame du Haut at Ronchamps (France) (FSAG 1995b, 105), even though being a chapel (which would suggest it to be incorporated in the 'Christian Religious Building' category), was included in the 'Architecture as Art' category. Even though being used as a chapel, as well as a meeting place, it is the building's recognition in terms of Le Corbusier's artistic vision that qualifies it predominantly for the category 'Architecture as Art'. Categories accounting for less than three percent were collapsed into 'Other'. In the following, the four most prominent categories will be discussed.

As can be seen in Figure 5.10, recalling the pattern already observed for historical portraits, by far largest architectural site category (by overall function) (39.2 percent, n=51) collected for the FSAG catalogue, overshadowing all others, consists of Christian religious buildings. Of these, every second Christian religious sites takes the concrete shape of cathedrals (50.0 percent, n=20) (Figure 5.11), such as those of Lund (Sweden) and Speyer (Germany) (FSAG 1995b, 26, 30).
These are followed by Christian churches (25.0 percent), including San Pietro in Montorio (Italy) and St. Niklas in Prague (Czech Republic) (FSAG 1995b, 54, 74), abbeys (20.0 percent), such as Königslutter (Germany) and Mont-Saint-Michel (France) (FSAG 1995b, 27, 29), and a single Tempietto21, that of San Pietro in Rome (Italy) (FSAG 1995b, 54). Returning to the overall architectural site categories, the second largest, with 19.6 percent (n=51), is that of public venue.

21 A Tempietto is a small commemorative martyrium (final resting place for the remains of a martyr or saint).
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sites. Used for mass entertainment and covering a time span of more than two millennia, these range from the classical theatre of Epidaurus (Greece) (FSAG 1995b, 16) to the modern Palazzetto dello Sport in Rome (Italy) (FSAG 1995b, 108) (see also FSAG 1995b, 12, 15, 90, 104). With 15.7 percent this group is followed by architectural heritage sites categorised under the heading of 'Architecture as Art'. As mentioned above, this category includes sites recognised primarily in the context of works of art rather than as practical buildings. Exemplary for this category is Antoni Gaudí's Casa Mila in Barcelona (Spain) (FSAG 1995b, 92) and Le Corbusier’s Villa Savoye in Poissy (France) (FSAG 1995b, 103) and Notre Dame du Haut at Ronchamps (France) (FSAG 1995b, 105) (see also FSAG 1995b, 102, 107, 109). Arriving at the last category to be discussed here, 9.8 percent of architectural sites are recognised mainly in terms of feats of technological engineering. These include the mid-nineteenth century Kew Gardens Palm House in London (England) (FSAG 1995b, 93) and the Clifton suspension bridge over the Avon Gorge (England) engineered by Isambard Brunel (FSAG 1995b, 89) (see also FSAG 1995b, 86, 106).

As previously mentioned (see chapter 5.4), the FSAG claims its feature selection to adhere to the notion of political correctness, and, in particular, to avoid national bias. As such, one would expect the architectural sites included in the FSAG catalogue to be widely distributed across the EU member states, so that all EU citizens could find some familiar culture heritage element as part of the Euro iconography. The following section examines the validity of this claim. In 3.8 percent of cases (n=52) the architectural sites' country of origin was not determinable due to the vagueness and poor quality of the FSAG catalogue photographs and/or the absence of any but the most general, location-determinate information. However, in all other cases, each architectural site included in the FSAG catalogue was provided with name and location. As can be seen in Figure 5.12, as previously observed for the geographical origin of historical portraits, every fourth (24.5 percent, n=49) architectural heritage site included in the FSAG catalogue, making it by far the most prominent country of origin, is located in Italy. As such it can be argued that the FSAG feature discourse locates 'European culture' (FSAG 1995a, 2, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote) predominantly in Italy, and, thus, by implication, envisages it as crystallising primarily within the Italian cultural context.
Italian sites were chosen nearly twice as often as sites from the second most prominent country of origin, Germany (14.3 percent), and nearly three times as often as sites from England (10.2 percent) and France (10.2 percent). Spain, the Netherlands, and Ireland, each providing the country of origin in only 8.2 percent of all cases, also feature around three times less often than Italy. For Finland, Greece, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Sweden, the numbers drop even more dramatically (see Figure 5.12). When compared to the list of EU member states at the time of the FSAG catalogue’s production, it can be observed that no architectural heritage sites from Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Portugal were included. Surprisingly, the Czech Republic, at the time not a member of the EU or the EMU, features with one site. Due to this national bias the FSAG catalogue cannot be called a ‘well-balanced series of features’ (FSAG 1995a, 2). One way to ensure an unbiased series in terms of national origin would have been to include an equal number of sites from each EU country in the catalogue. This way the EBDC designers would have been unaffected by the FSAG catalogue’s national bias.

To summarise, Christian religious buildings have been demonstrated to dominate the FSAG selection of architectural heritage sites, thus developing a theocentric discourse. In fact, as graphically displayed in Figure 5.13, each discursive ‘orb’s’ size being displayed proportionate to its relative frequency,
no other faith's religious buildings to be found across Europe were included in the FSAG catalogue, such as Islamic, Jewish, or Orthodox.

Figure 5.13: FSAG architectural heritage site 'ideoscape'

The only culture heritage site that can be shown to have any connection to a non-Christian faith takes the shape of the Alhambra, the palace and fortress complex of the Moorish monarchs of Grenada (Spain) (FSAG 1995b, 58). However, besides not being a religious site, this building complex also includes the later Renaissance palace of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, making it more of a non-religious hybrid site. This, however, remains a singular case. As such, 'European culture' (FSAG 1995a, 2, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote), as argued by the FSAG to be represented by the features selected, is discursively constructed as dominantly characterised by religion, which is exclusively the Christian faith. Culture heritage sites of mass entertainment, which can be argued to generate the image of the EU as being a form of governance dedicated to or resulting in leisure and enjoyment, then supplement this Christian religious discourse. Also, it can be observed that while sites emphasising 'Architecture as Art' present Europe as being at the forefront of artistic development, it is architectural feats of engineering that generate the image of European brilliance in the field of
technological understanding and advancement. Further, the above analysis demonstrates the FSAG architectural heritage site discourse to stand in opposition to the FSAG's claims to minimise national bias (FSAG 1995a, 15; see above). Even though the theme Ages and Styles of Europe might lend itself to the minimisation of national bias in that it avoids thematic emphasis on any particular country or region, it is the FSAG's selection of architectural sites deemed appropriate for use by the EBDC designers that must be considered highly biased. The qualified architectural site in a (EU)ropean context is positioned predominantly in Italy.

5.4.3 The FSAG discourse: Summary and discussion

Summarising and concluding on the FSAG feature discourse, analysis of the historical portraits and architectural sites has shown both categories to be characterised predominantly by the use of Christian religious symbols. In the case of architectural sites, these symbols take the concrete shape of Christian religious buildings, such as churches, cathedrals, and abbeys. For the historical figures included in the FSAG catalogue these Christian religious symbols primarily take the shape of saints. For both categories it is exclusively Christianity that features in terms of religious references. All other religions are excluded. As such, both discourses, and thus the FSAG discourse as a whole, are dominated by symbolic references to the Christian religion. With the architectural sites conveying, as stated by the FSAG (1995a, 7, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote; see above) itself, 'a clear message on the architectural richness and unity of Europe', and the historical figures, as stated by the TSAG in reference to the FSAG's selection of Ages and Styles of Europe portraits, meant to represent 'an ideal European family' (TSAG May 1995, 7, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series; see above), Europe's unity is discursively constructed as rooted in the Christian faith, with the 'ideal European family' taking on a predominantly Christian, exclusively white, and preferably male character. Symbolic notions of Europe and Europeans as being characterised by artistic vision, professional and non-professional skills, and mass leisure supplement this discourse. As such it can be argued that European culture as understood and envisaged by the Eurocratic and academic élite responsible for its selection, expressed through the features collected in the
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FSAG catalogue, approved by the ECB's BNWG, and stated by the FSAG (1995a, 14; see above) to have been 'chosen to symbolise Europe', takes on a predominantly Christian religious discursive character. In comparison to this, all other observable symbolic discourses take on a minor role. Here it has to be pointed out that the FSAG does not explicitly state to aim for religious balance in its selection of features. Nevertheless, it claims its selection to represent such an unbiased product that a check for political correctness is 'neither necessary nor feasible' (FSAG 1995a, 9; see above). However, even though the FSAG does not specifically state to actively avoid religious bias, Eurocrats generally emphasise, as expressed by Romano Prodi (2003, 2), President of the European Commission (1999-2004), in his speech on (EU)ropean Cultural Diversity and Shared Values, the EU's 'quasi-constitutional obligation to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity', as well as to be 'open to all traditions and religions' (Prodi 2001, Monotheistic Religions and the Futures of Peoples, speech given at the Interfaith Meeting in Brussels) (see chapters 1.5.3, 3.1.1, 3.2.3). Also, as previously highlighted in chapter 4.1, the Draft Treaty of the European Constitution includes no single references to God or Christianity. Instead, it actively prohibits religious discrimination of any form (EC 2004, article II-21, part II) and emphasises its respect for Europe's creeds (EC 2004, article II-22, part II). Also, none of its primary or secondary laws incorporates statements binding the EU to a concrete religion (Gerhards 2004, 16). As such, the selection of exclusively Christian religious figures and culture heritage sites in the FSAG catalogue, a heritage site type that is also dominating the FSAG figural and architectural discourse in general, stands in harsh opposition to such claims. To continue, in search for acceptable architectural sites and portraits, the FSAG most often has recourse to Italian culture heritage. It can thus be argued that European culture as understood by the FSAG crystallises mostly in Italy, followed by Germany and France. As such, the FSAG catalogue is by no means free of national bias, as claimed by the FSAG as well as the TSAG in reference to the Ages and Styles of Europe (FSAG 1995a, 15; TSAG May 1995, 1, 6, 7; see above). Even though the theme Ages and Styles of Europe might lend itself to the minimisation of national bias in that it avoids thematic emphasis on any particular country or region, it is the FSAG's selection of features deemed appropriate for use by the EBDC designers that must be considered highly biased. One explanation of this emphasis on Italy, Germany, and France takes the shape of an 'accounting exercise' based on Eurozone population and Euro printing numbers. These countries represent three of the
four EU member states with the highest population numbers. As such, no other Eurozone states printed and distributed more Euros for its introduction on 1 January 2002 (ECB 2004). It can thus be argued that the FSAG selected features mostly from those countries in which the largest numbers of Euro banknotes would be printed and distributed, thus heightening its overall chances of public acceptance.

Taking all this together, statements such as Hymans (2004, 20; see also Hymans 2003; Johler 2003, 11; Kaelberer 2002) arguing that 'the Euro banknote design selection process was carefully structured to avoid offending various identity groupings' must be considered generalising and uninformed, if not straightforwardly inaccurate. Instead, the FSAG's paradigm of an 'ideal Europe' (see above), this crucial step in the implementation of the Eurocratic culture identity paradigm in symbols (i.e. the Euro iconography), is dominated by notions of a male-dominated, exclusively White ethnicity and an exclusively Christian faith. As argued earlier, this paradigm, in the physical shape of the FSAG catalogue, after Eurocratic approval by the BNWG, was then suggested to the EBDC designers in their search for acceptable features to be incorporated into their Euro design proposals. Based on the theme Ages and Styles of Europe (theme i) and/or Abstract/Modern (theme iii), the official EBDC was launched by the ECB in February 1996. The EBDC design proposals – from which the final Euro design would be chosen – and their iconographic discourse shall be the focus of the following analysis. What is the designs' discursive character? How much did the FSAG feature selection influence the EBDC discourse?

5.5 THE EURO BANKNOTE DESIGN COMPETITION

With firm suggestions of what the Eurocratic élite deemed acceptable in terms of iconographic themes and visual grammar handed out to them, 29 designers or teams of designers, nominated by the fourteen national banks participating, submitted a total of 44 entries for the selection of the final Euro design (ECB 2003). 61.4 percent of these were based on the theme Ages and Styles of Europe,
while 38.6 percent adopted the *Abstract/Modern* theme. In order to conduct VCA on the EBDC designs as part of the critical discursive analysis of the Euro iconography, each individual visual element displayed on the front and/or reverse side of each denomination of each design proposal was classified in terms of visual grammar elements and entered by the author into a SPSS 12.0.1 database. All designs were published by the ECB in the EBDC exhibition catalogue (ECB 2003, *Euro Banknote Design Competition*), as well as released on CD-ROM. Of the 927 individual denomination entries considered, 715 (77.1 percent) display aspects of culture heritage (as, for example, opposed to abstract patterns and shapes), forming the database for the following analysis.

In terms of identification and categorisation, in 85.5 percent of those cases (n=715), designers provided their individual denomination entries with contextual and explanatory information on the visual elements displayed. In other cases, designs not accompanied with information as to the nature of the elements displayed, copied features directly from the FSAG (1995b) catalogue, thus allowing detailed identification. Entirely abstract designs consisting only of patterns and made-up symbols were excluded from the database. 26 Colour schemes were not recorded as part of the database for two reasons. Firstly, the colours for each individual Euro denomination, together with the banknote dimensions, were imposed upon the designers by the ECB (2003, 9). As such, as can be seen in Figure 5.14, the colours chosen by the designers do not reflect free choice, but only mirror the colour discourse as decided on by the ECB.

Also, instead of representing a culture heritage element, colours used for the EBDC were prescribed mainly for technical reasons. Secondly, as previously observed by Unwin and Hewitt (2001, 1020-1021), advances in printing technology, combined with a desire to keep ahead of banknote forgers, has led to modern banknotes including a wide variety of multi-layered colour blends and shadings. This has made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which colour(s) dominate(s) a particular banknote design or sub-element of it. Besides the colour, it was also decided by the ECB that each Euro design denomination must include a) the name of the currency in Latin and Greek, b) the denomination at least twice on both sides of the banknotes, c) the initial of the European Central Bank in the five linguistic variants – BCE, ECB, EZB, EKT, and EKP, d) the signature of the ECB president, and e) the '12 stars' symbol of the EU at least on the front of the banknotes (ECB 2003, 9).

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26 This includes Luis Filipe de Abreu’s, Terry Thorn’s, Miguel Angel Plaza’s, Klaus Michel and Sanne Jünger’s, Brigitte Matoul, Benoît Grégoire, and Véronique Boland’s, Robert Kalina’s, Roger Pfund’s, and Enric Satué Llop *Abstract/Modern* design (ECB 2003, 34-35, 42-43, 48-49, 62-63, 74-75, 84-85, 90-91, 94-95).
Size and colour

The euro banknotes must be the following sizes and colours:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Note</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Colour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>€5</td>
<td>120mm × 62mm</td>
<td>grey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€10</td>
<td>127mm × 66mm</td>
<td>red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€20</td>
<td>133mm × 70mm</td>
<td>blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€50</td>
<td>140mm × 74mm</td>
<td>orange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€100</td>
<td>147mm × 78mm</td>
<td>green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€200</td>
<td>153mm × 78mm</td>
<td>yellow-brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>€500</td>
<td>160mm × 78mm</td>
<td>purple</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.14: Size and colour specifications as laid down by the ECB for the EBDC (ECB 2003, 9)

Due to their prescribed, mainly technical and legal character, none of these visual elements were included in the following analysis. It was against this background that data was collected in terms of a number of variables, which will be discussed as the analysis progresses. The following analysis is based on this database.

The 715 culture heritage elements identified in the EBDC’s visual discourse can be divided into three overall symbol categories: historical portraits, architectural sites, and artefacts (Figure 5.15). Historical portraits (48.4 percent, n=715) were chosen more often than architecture (36.2 percent) and artefacts (15.4 percent). This trend of the dominance of portraiture is by no means new, but has been observed by various researchers analysing national currency iconographies, leading Unwin and Hewitt (2001, 1018; see also Hewitt 1994; 1995) to speak of the ‘dominance of the human face’ in currency iconography. Some scholars have even gone as far as to suggest that ‘if nationalism and currency are a pair, so too are nationalism and portraiture’ (Pointon 1998, 233). As the above numbers show, the same holds true for the designs produced for the EBDC, arguably reflecting the designers working background as employees of national banks.
As Figure 5.16 shows, portraits, architectural sites, and artefacts show an equal distribution across the seven 'Ages of Europe'.

This ensures an overall balanced and representative study of each symbolic category. To add another general observation, 96.3 percent (n=27) of all banknote designs based on the theme *Ages and Styles of Europe* link the chronological development of the different artistic styles (i.e. the historical
paradigm) with ascending banknote value. In all but one case, Ingle Madlé’s Euro design proposal (ECB 2003, 58-59), the Classical period is employed for the five Euro denominations, while the Modern period is depicted on the 500 Euro denominations. As such, only her design stands in opposition to the specifications given by the FSAG (1995a, 3-5, Selection of Design Features: Report of the Feature Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote) and ECB (2003, 9, Euro Banknote Design Competition), in which a chronological ascent is developed, thus reading ‘history in conventional European ideological fashion as the story of progress’ (Kaelberer 2002, 9).

5.5.1 The EBDC historical portrait discourse

Starting with the most prominent visual element category (48.4 percent, n=715; see Figure 5.15), with the TSAG (May 1995, 3, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series; see chapter 5.3.1) stating the theme Ages and Styles of Europe, and in particular its historical portraits, to provide the most ‘a sense of unity or “family”’, what character does this European ‘family’ take in the context of the EBDC? A total of 361 human representations were identified for the EBDC entries. The large majority of these, 76.6 percent, are anonymous. Yet, in this context, anonymity does not equal the absence of bias. Reflecting the FSAG portraiture discourse (see chapter 5.4.1), all (n=354) human representations, where determinable, exhibit White ethnographic features. Not a single design proposal includes a depiction of, for example, an African European or Asian European, both representing ethnographic groups forming a not insubstantial part of present-day (EU)ropean, as well as past European society. 60.2 percent of portrayals depict males, while only 39.8 percent are female. As such, even though the TSAG claims the themes Ages and Styles of Europe and Abstract/Modern, more than any other theme proposed, to ‘minimise both a national bias and a gender imbalance’ (TSAG May 1995, 1; see chapter 5.3), no real gender balance can be observed for the EBDC entries. Instead, the EBDC gender discourse mirrors the FSAG catalogue portrait selection (see chapter 5.4.1). As such it can be argued that the Eurocratic pre-selection of portraits in the shape of the FSAG catalogue strongly influenced the EBDC designers’ portrait discourse. Also, in its emphasis on male portraits, the EBDC discourse reflects an approach typical of traditional, in particular nineteenth and early twentieth century nation-state
banknote designs (see Hewitt 1994; 1995; Unwin and Hewitt 2001). It is against these findings that Hymans' (2004, 21) claim that the development of the final Euro design, including the EBDC, represents a successful replacement of 'Great Men' with 'Great Women' must be considered unsubstantiated. In summary, with the TSAG (May 1995, 5) claiming the themes Ages and Styles of Europe and Abstract/Modern to generate 'an easily identifiable message which univocally spells "Europe" at a glance', the archetypal European takes the shape of an ethnographically White, male person. While women feature considerably less often than men, it is non-White ethnographic backgrounds that become completely excluded from the EBDC portrait discourse, thus, once again, mirroring the FSAG portrait discourse. After having established the most basic characteristics of the symbolic European population as expressed through the EBDC historical portrait discourse, what other characteristics can be identified?

In order to analyse the age distribution across the portraiture, as previously done for the FSAG portrait discourse (see chapter 5.4.1), the age of each individual displayed on the EBDC denominations was assigned to one of four broad age categories (infans, juvenis, adultus, senilis), based either on information provided by many designers for each of their banknote denominations, visual identification, or, where directly copied from the FSAG (1995b, Selection of Portraits and Architectural Features (Appendix 2 to the Report of the Features Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on the Selection of Design Features)), on their catalogue descriptions. Looking at the overall age distribution (Figure 5.17), the 'qualified European through the ages', in half of all cases, is displayed as an adult (49.2 percent, n=329). One-third of all representations display juveniles (34.3 percent). In opposition to these dominant age categories, senior individuals, featuring in only 8.8 percent of all cases, and children, making up only 7.6 percent, play a very much subordinate role. As such, even though juveniles feature comparatively more strongly, the EBDC portrait discourse exhibits the FSAG's overall discursive set-up, i.e. adults representing the strongest category, followed by juveniles, seniors, and infants (see Figure 5.5). This, it can be contended, highlights once more the discursive influence that the Eurocratically-approved and -prescribed selection of features collected in the FSAG (1995b) catalogue had on the EBDC designers in terms of iconography employed.
Further, by cross-correlating the above age categories with sex, a more detailed picture emerges. As Figure 5.18 shows, while both sexes are fairly equally distributed among adults (*adultus*), male senior (*senilis*) individuals (14.0 percent, n=324) feature ten times more often than female senior individuals (1.4 percent).
Also, male children (infans) (9.2 percent) predominate over female children (2.9 percent). Exhibiting a reverse trend, which is all the more surprising when taking into account the generally male character of the portraiture, nearly half (48.2 percent) of all depictions of females are juveniles (juvenis), with only a quarter (24.9 percent) of all male depictions being in the same category. In short, the European ‘family’ (see above) as generated by the EBDC portrait discourse takes the shape of adults of both sexes, ‘beautiful young women’ (Figures 5.19 & 5.20; see also ECB 2003, 26, 54, 60, 68, 88 for a selection of those included in the EBDC), and ‘wise old men’, such as exemplified by the depiction of a scribe in Figure 5.21 and of a Roman dignitary in Figure 5.22 (see also ECB 2003, 12, 14, 54, 59, 98 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

In doing so, the EBDC portrait discourse displays a traditional approach to banknote iconography as typical for the European nation-states between 1920 and 1949, the height of European nationalism (see Hymans 2004, 15).

Having established its age distribution, what social class structure can be observed for the European ‘family’ (see above) as expressed through the EBDC portrait discourse? To answer this question all portraiture were assigned, wherever possible, to one of three social classes (Lower, Middle, and Upper). This assignment was based on the explanatory information given by most designers in reference to individual denominations designed by them (e.g.
identifying a portrait as that of a 'lady' or 'princess'), on the basis of their
dress and ornaments in relation to the historical period that they are stated to
represent, or, when directly copied from the FSAG (1995b, Selection of Portraits
and Architectural Features (Appendix 2 to the Report of the Features Selection
Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing
and Issuing a European Banknote on the Selection of Design Features)), on their
catalogue descriptions. On this basis, 59.3 percent (n=194) of all portraits could
be identified as members of the upper classes. As Figure 5.23 shows, this is the
case particularly for portraits of women.

![Figure 5.23: EBDC portrait social class/sex distribution](image)

While no female portraits could be identified to display a member of the lower
social classes, three-quarters (74.7 percent, n=79) represent members of the
upper classes. Not only are women displayed as part of the EBDC portrait
discourse characterised by youth, they also belong to the upper, if not highest,
social classes. Only 38.1 percent (n=194) of all portraits display members of the
middle classes, for which men represent the more dominant sex, while only 2.6
percent of individuals could be attributed to the lower classes. It seems
superfluous to point out here that European society through the ages was, and
still is, far from this discursive image generated by the EBDC portrait discourse
(see Crumley 2006; Gumbel 2006).
To summarise so far, the 'ideal European family' (see above) as constructed by the EBDC portrait discourse exhibits the following characteristics. First of all, this 'family' consists exclusively of members of White ethnographic background. Further, generally speaking, it is primarily made up of adolescents and adults belonging to the upper classes. References to the lower classes are generally avoided, making them part of Europe’s socially excluded Other. Cross-correlating sex with social class, it has been demonstrated that discursive emphasis is placed particularly on representations of young female members of the upper classes on the one hand, and, although to a much lesser degree, on representations of adult or senior male members, largely of the middle classes, on the other. Taking all this together, reminiscent of Sibley (1995, 57) writing in reference to nineteenth century schemes to redefine and reshape the European city, it can thus be argued that we are witnessing 'a process of purification, designed to exclude groups variously identified as polluting - the poor in general, the residual working class, [and] racial minorities'.

In order to develop an even more detailed picture of the EBDC's 'ideal European family' (see above), in particular in terms of in-groups and out-groups, human representations were assessed in terms of 'profession'\(^{27}\), resulting in thirteen thematic categories (Figure 5.24).

\(^{27}\) I am employing the term 'profession' in the loosest sense possible.
This classification was conducted on the basis of explanatory information provided by designers for their banknote denomination designs in the EBDC exhibition catalogue, as well as on descriptions provided by the FSAG (1995b, Selection of Portraits and Architectural Features (Appendix 2 to the Report of the Features Selection Advisory Group to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on the Selection of Design Features)) catalogue, when directly copied. The following analysis will mainly, but not exclusively, focus on the top four categories. On this basis, 64.0 percent (n=361) of all human representations could be assigned to one of the categories, while the remaining 36.0 percent held no clue on the individual's 'profession'. Comprising 27.3 percent (n=231), the by far largest category consists of the representations of gentlemen and gentlewomen, members of society's social élite (Figures 5.19 & 5.20, 5.25-5.28; see also ECB 2003, 15, 25, 40, 46, 52 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

Figure 5.25 & 5.26: Examples of EBDC portraits of gentlemen (ECB 2003, 10, 33)

Figure 5.27 & 5.28: Examples of EBDC portraits of gentlewomen (ECB 2003, 32, 68)

In particular, these portraits are characterised by their elaborate costumes and hair-dresses, as well as jewellery. In addition to the representations of gentlemen/gentlewomen, 10.8 percent of portraiture displays members of the highest socio-political élite in the shape of nobility and royalty (Figures 5.27-5.30), such as the painting of a princess by Jean Hey (Figure 5.29) and the portrait of Luise Ulrike of Prussia, Queen of Sweden (1720-1782) (Figure 5.31).
As such, a total of 38.1 percent (n=231), more than one-third of all determinable portraits, shows members of a ‘profession’ that throughout Europe’s history made up only a minute fraction of its total population. Further, as in the case of its nineteenth and twentieth century nation-state predecessors, the EBDC portrait iconography mainly harks back to past epochs when their identities were forged by powerful rulers holding sway over significant territories (Unwin and Hewitt 2001, 1017). The display of elaborate jewellery and costuming emphasises the individual’s status particularly in terms of wealth, power, and artistic and cultural sophistication. It is here that the TSAG’s (1995, 7, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute’s Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series) recommendation that ‘[t]he portraits should be aesthetically beautiful and impressive’ seems to find its most concrete realisation. Facing the problem of national bias when depicting any non-anonymous members of European nobility, as well as lacking clear territorial in- and out-groups due to the EU’s ‘fuzzy’ borders (see chapter 1.3), the EBDC, as exemplified by the many portraits of, for example, ‘an unknown lady’ (e.g. ECB 2003, 14, 15, 24,
40), can be argued to develop a largely anonymous class of nobles. With the EBDC's 'ideal European family' (see above) consisting mainly of members of the uppermost social strata, Europeans, in a banal sense (see chapters 1.6 & 2.3.3), become the 'descendants of kings and queens', and, thus, members of Europe's 'noble' heritage. This discourse of social success and power is discursively further emphasised by the portraits of wealthy middle class citizens (Figures 5.33 & 5.34), with 17.3 percent of determinable portraits (n=231) making it the third strongest category (see ECB 2003, 24, 27, 53, 61, 65 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

Figure 5.33 & 5.34: Examples of EBDC portraits of wealthy middle class citizens (ECB 2003, 15, 31)

Taking together the portraits of gentlemen/gentlewomen, nobles/royalty, and wealthy middle class citizens, this populace of social élites accounts for more than half (55.4 percent, n=231) of the determinable EBDC portrait iconography. Yet, even though being the strongest, this does not represent the only major figurative discourse.

Representing the second largest individual portrait theme category (19.9 percent, n=231), second only to that of 'gentleman/gentlewoman', are representations of Christian religious figures. First of all, it must be pointed out that, mirroring the FSAG catalogue portrait discourse (see chapter 5.4.1), not a single religious figure of alternative faiths could be identified for the EBDC. As such, not only do Christian religious figures represent the strongest religious group for the EBDC portrait discourse, they represent the only one. Based on the information provided by the designer(s) for most banknote denomination designs, as well as in reference to the FSAG (1995b) catalogue, Christian religious figures fall into six sub-categories (Figure 5.35).

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28 The only non-anonymous portrait of a nobleman/noblewoman or noble/royalty is that of Luise Ulrike of Prussia, Queen of Sweden (ECB 2003, 50; also Figure 5.29).
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Figure 5.35: EBDC 'Christian religious figure' sub-categories

Of these, 28.3 percent (n=46) display clergymen/clergywomen, such as the early twentieth century photograph of an anonymous clergyman by August Sander (Figure 5.36) and the sculpture of the French medieval abbess Héloïse (Figure 5.37) (see also ECB 2003, 36, 45, 64 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

Figure 5.36 & 5.37: Examples of EBDC portraits of clergymen/clergywomen (ECB 2003, 15, 88)

Moving on from this category, 23.9 percent of portraits display Biblical figures, mainly in the shape of an unnamed Old Testament figure from Astorga Cathedral (Spain) (Figure 5.38 & 5.39), a figure also featuring in the FSAG catalogue (see ECB 2003, 18, 44, 68, 88 for a selection of those included in the EBDC). In turn, and in further reflecting the FSAG historical portrait discourse (see chapter 5.4.1), these figures then provide the hierarchical link between the 'earthly' figures of Christian iconography presented above and the more 'heavenly' figures that are to follow.
Making up 21.7 percent, this next step up the Christian theological hierarchy takes the shape of a plethora of representations of saints. This category includes, among others, St. Florian (Figure 5.40), St. George (Figure 5.41), St. Theresa (Figure 5.42), and St. Thomas (Figure 5.43).

With 17.4 percent, this hierarchical ascent is followed by representations of Christian angels, of which cherubs constitute only one category (Figures 5.44 & 5.45) (see also ECB 2003, 40, 56, 60, 92 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

\[\text{29 In Catholic theology, the Cherubim, along with the Seraphim, are one of the highest ranks in the hierarchy of angels. In the Book of Genesis (3:24) Cherubim are described as guarding with their flaming swords the way to the Tree of Life, east of the Garden of Eden (Wikipedia.org 2006a). The endearing winged infants that most people associate with the word Cherub are, in fact, an invention of the Rococo style.}\]
Drawn in a style reminiscent of medieval illuminations, displaying an angel holding in its hands a book with the EU flag for a cover (a EU passport or perhaps the EU's constitution itself), Figure 5.45 highlights particularly poignantly how exclusive references to the Christian religion develop an iconographic discourse marrying cultural (EU)rope to the notion of Christianity. Metaphorically, as well as literally in this case, the Christian religion becomes cultural (EU)rope's 'guardian spirit', the New Europe being envisaged as resting in the exclusive hands of Christianity. It is in this context that the ascension up the Christian iconographic hierarchy culminates, in 4.3 percent of all determinable cases each, in the representations of Madonna and Jesus Christ himself. In particular, these representations figure Jesus Christ in the context of the Last Supper (Figures 5.46 & 5.47), evoking, as can be argued, links between the community between Jesus and his Apostles and between Christianity and the (EU)ropean community.

In summary, the EBDC portrait discourse provides an exclusively Christian theological hierarchy from the bottom up, linking Europeans, via anonymous preachers, important historical clerics, biblical figures, and angels, with Jesus Christ himself.

Before concluding on the EBDC portrait discourse, cross-correlating the above thematic portrait categories with the displayed person's sex allows an even
more precise picture of the 'ideal European family' (see above) as envisaged by the EBDC designers to be painted (Figure 5.48).

Figure 5.48: EBDC portrait thematic categories/sex distribution

As the above bar chart shows, 50 percent (n=229) of all female portraitures display members of the upper classes (gentlemen/gentlewomen), as opposed to only 14.5 percent for male portraitures. A reverse trend can be observed for the representations of Christian religious figures. Here males (26.2 percent) feature almost three times as often as females (9.5 percent). This dominance of male Christian religious figures, however, might well mainly be based on women's continuing debarment from Catholic office. Further, even though representing categories of only minor importance in terms of their statistical frequency, depictions of professionals, athletes, and artisans are exclusively male, while portraits of artists display twice as often males (8.3 percent) than females (4.8 percent). It is against these observations that the 'ideal European family' (see above) as expressed through the EBDC portrait discourse, which in itself is heavily influenced by the Eurocratically controlled FSAG selection of representations of human figures (see chapter 5.4.1), consists of women exhibiting a predominantly representative character (i.e. beauty and cultivated manners), their social role largely limited to representational duties of the social élite alone, while men take on a much more active character in terms of practical skill, knowledge, and artistic vision. It is against these findings that it can be proposed that the EBDC portrait gender discourse generates, or at least reflects, a gender paradigm reminiscent of many seventeenth and eighteenth
century historians of civilisation, such as Voltaire, claiming ‘that women lack the fire of imagination and strength of perseverance required for inventive genius’ (cited in Schiebinger 1989, 102), a clearly erroneous viewpoint. As such, the EBDC portrait discourse becomes expression of centuries-old sexist notions of gender-specific attributes and abilities. For example, to quote from the seventeenth century The History of the Royal Society of London, For the Improving of Natural Knowledge (Sprat cited in Moore 1994, 50),

> [a]s the feminine arts of pleasure and gallantry have spread some of our neighbouring languages to such a vast extent: so the English tongue may also in time be more enlarg’d, by being the instrument of conveying to the world the masculine arts of knowledge.

As three and a half centuries ago, women and men become socially constructed as essentially dichotomistic types of persons. As pointed out by Moore (1994, 50) for discourses of sexuality in general, they become embodiments of different principles of agency.

To conclude on the EBDC portrait discourse, as graphically summarised in Figure 5.49, its ‘ideoscape’, this ‘ideal European family’ generating ‘an easily identifiable message which univocally spells “Europe” at a glance’ (see above), is dominated by the exclusive use of ‘family members’ exhibiting White ethnographic features. If, as stated by the TSAG (May 1995, 3) in its confidential report, the themes of Ages and Styles of Europe and Abstract/Modern are best suited to ‘provide a sense of unity or “family” to the series of seven banknotes’, then this unity is located in shared White ethnographic characteristics. Further, it is men in terms of sex, representations of adults and juveniles in terms of age, and members of the Upper Class in terms of social status that dominate this symbolic discourse. As such it reflects the historical portrait discourse developed by the FSAG feature selection (see chapter 5.4.1), highlighting the influence this Eurocratically-approved collection of features, handed out as a general guideline to each designer, had on the EBDC. Further, as can be seen in Figure 5.49 displaying each discursive ‘orb’ in a size proportionate to its relative frequency, the largest group of human representations displays members of the upper social strata. Diverging from the pattern observed for the FSAG portrait discourse, the EBDC mainly portraits gentlemen/gentlewomen, nobility, or even royalty. The message allegedly spelling ‘Europe’ at a glance
becomes that of European society being characterised by social and cultural sophistication and power, as well as wealth.

Figure 5.49: EBDC historical portrait ‘ideoscape’

In particular, this sophistication and wealth is identified in juvenile and young adult Upper Class women. Exhibiting an even distribution in terms of sex, this emphasis is further strengthened by the third strongest discursive element, namely that of representations of wealthy Middle Class citizens. This discourse, once again reflecting that of the FSAG, is followed by the exclusive use of Christian religious figures. In fact, a complete Christian theological hierarchy is created. Against the background of Europe’s present-day de facto multi-faith society, the exclusive pictorial representation of Christian religious persona, in particular those of ‘heavenly’ persona (see above), represents a violation of a number of non-Christian religious belief systems, such as those of Jews and Muslims, in that these religions do not permit the visual representation of such religious figures (e.g. angels, prophets, God). Even though individually representing minor aspects within the EBDC portrait discourse, it is the joint use of portraits of artists, athletes, and professionals, all of them exclusively male, which discursively attributes men with notions of active skill and knowledge. In contrast, the predominance of female members of the upper classes attributes them with passive, more representational, traits. In
conclusion, the EBDC historical portrait discourse generates an ‘ideal European family’ (see above) characterised by notions of social élitism, power, and wealth, and the exclusive notion of the Christian faith.

5.5.2 The EBDC architectural heritage site discourse

Continuing with the second most prominent EBDC visual element category (36.2 percent, n=717; see Figure 5.15), after entering each individual element into a SPSS 12.0.1 database, 63.8 percent (n=271) of EBDC architectural heritage sites could be identified as anonymous. Examining the country of origin of architectural sites for the remaining 36.2 percent, Italy (33.9 percent, n=109) can be observed to have been mined most often by the designers in search of appropriate architectural sites (Figure 5.50). 30

France (20.2 percent) and Germany (11.9 percent) follow in second and third. As such, the EBDC architectural heritage site discourse resonates that of the FSAG in terms of country of origin (see Figure 5.12). In both cases, ‘European culture’ (FSAG 1995a, 2) as expressed through architectural sites is predominantly located in Italy. Further, when compared to the FSAG discourse (see chapter 5.4.2), Germany and France remain in the top four countries of origin chosen by

30 These numbers are based not on non-anonymous sites, but include all sites for which a country of origin could be determined by the information provided by most designers for each banknote denomination (even though the actual site remains anonymous).
the EBDC designers. Greece (8.3 percent), only ranking at number nine in the FSAG (1995b) catalogue, makes the biggest leap forward as the fourth most prominent country of origin chosen, while England (5.5 percent) drops from third position to sixth. However, generally speaking, the FSAG feature selection appears to have determined, or at least to have strongly influenced, the character of EBDC visualisations of architectural culture heritage to be featured on the Euro in terms of country of origin. Having established the EBDC discourse to employ architectural heritage sites mainly to be found in Italy, what types of site are selected?

For the following categorisation, each architectural heritage site featuring on the EBDC designs was allocated to an overall thematic category. Employing the categories identified for the FSAG architectural feature discourse (see chapter 5.4.2; see also Figure 5.10), as well as, where appropriate, devising new categories, the architectural grammar employed by the EBDC designers falls into six general thematic categories (Figure 5.51). Categories with less than 4 percent were collapsed into 'Other'. In the following I will discuss the five most prominent categories.

![Figure 5.51: EBDC architectural thematic categories](image)

By far the most dominant architectural group of all purpose-determinable sites, with nearly forty percent (41.8 percent, n=232), consists of Christian religious buildings. Further reflecting the FSAG architectural feature discourse, not a
single religious building belonging to a non-Christian faith, such as a mosque, a synagogue, or an Orthodox church, was included in any of the EBDC designs. Of the Christian religious buildings, churches, such as the Dreifaltigkeitskirche in Munich, Germany (Figure 5.52), represent the most prominent building type (52.1 percent, n=96) (see Figures 5.52-5.55).

Figure 5.52 & 5.53: Examples of EBDC Christian churches (ECB 2003, 30, 40)

Figure 5.54 & 5.55: Examples of EBDC Christian churches (ECB 2003, 80, 98)

The second most prominent type of Christian religious building takes the shape of cathedrals (39.6 percent) (Figures 5.56-5.59), including, for example, Wells Cathedral, England (Figure 5.59).

Figure 5.56 & 5.57: Examples of EBDC cathedrals (ECB 2003, 30, 70)

The visual-discursive dominance of cathedrals over the EBDC’s visual grammar becomes particularly transparent when taking into account that the number of cathedrals within EU/EMU borders, these most monumental expressions of Christianity (see Rodwell and Bentley 1984; Pevsner and Metcalf 1985, 13), represent only a minute fraction of the number of Christian churches – or, in
fact, of the buildings of other religions (e.g. synagogues) - to be found within the same area.

As such, the discursive emphasis placed on the most monumental expressions of Christianity cannot be underemphasized. Recalling their use as an essential part of the SCPR guidebook’s culture heritage discourse (see chapter 4.4.3.1), the EBDC depictions of cathedrals particularly emphasise the heavenly ascendant, imposing façades and Gothic flying buttresses on the one hand (Figures 5.56 & 5.57; see also ECB 2003, 12, 24, 44, 52, 98 for a selection of those included in the EBDC; see also Figures 4.13-4.16 for this visual theme’s use in the context of the SCPR), and the gravity-defying naves with their slim, primarily gothic, rows of columns on the other (Figures 5.58 & 5.59; (see also ECB 2003, 24, 50, 52, 60, 88 for a selection of those included in the EBDC). In summary, the EBDC architectural heritage site discourse is heavily dominated by references to the Christian faith. As such it mirrors the FSAG catalogue’s discourse (see chapter 5.4.2, Figure 5.10), demonstrating its influence on the EBDC designers’ selection of features. Symbolically, the EBDC develops a paradigm of ‘European culture’ (FSAG 1995a, 2; see above) characterised by a strong discursive emphasis on the Christian religion, while at the same time excluding references to any other faith having, unarguably, contributed to Europe’s past and present. It can thus be concluded that the EBDC architectural discourse, held firmly in the ideological ‘grip’ of the FSAG catalogue, generates a culture paradigm in symbols presenting (EU)rope as an entity held equally firmly in that of Christianity.

The strongly dominant category of Christian religious buildings is followed by four architectural themes, each accounting for only around ten percent of all architectural heritage sites. The strongest of these (13.8 percent, n=232), even though only by a margin, revolves around representations of architectural heritage sites recognised, in may cases by the designer(s) him/herself in the
text accompanying the denomination design, mostly in terms of feats of technical engineering as opposed to, for example, their artistic value (see also ECB 2003, 11, 69, 83 for a selection of those included in the EBDC). These include the Clifton suspension bridge over the Avon Gorge designed by Isambard Kingdom Brunel (Figure 5.60) and the generic design of an early cast-iron bridge (Figure 5.61).

Figure 5.60 & 5.61: Examples of EBDC 'feats of engineering' (ECB 2003, 41, 58)

Also featuring in this category are large-scale public buildings constructed in iron and glass, making it possible to engineer buildings and roofed spaces bigger and more complex than before. In particular the technical aspect of these structures is emphasised. Exemplary of this type of architectural heritage site are the generic representations of large roofed halls built in iron and glass (Figure 5.62) and the technical section and roof plan of ironwork buildings (Figure 5.63) (see also ECB 2003, 15, 19, 31, 36, 55, 61, 69, 99 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

Figure 5.62 & 5.63: Examples of EBDC 'feats of engineering' (ECB 2003, 11, 25)

In particular the technical drawings and blueprints used in many cases (e.g. Figure 5.63) emphasise them as symbols of engineering excellence. However, architectural sites falling into this category are by no means limited to iron and glass architecture. Also featuring as part of this category are representations of Roman aqueducts, one of the most astonishing feats of Roman engineering.
Aqueducts displayed include stylised generic Roman aqueducts (Figure 5.64), as well as actual sites, such as the aqueduct of Segovia (France) (Figure 5.65) (see ECB 2003, 54, 64, 82 for a selection of those included in the EBDC). In summary, representations of these architectural sites develop, even though minimal in comparison to the overshadowing category of Christian religious buildings, a visual discourse characterised by notions of technical engineering excellence.

Third in the list of thematic categories, with only 9.9 percent (n=232), it is representations of residences and palaces featuring as part of the EBDC visual discourse. This category has already been observed for the FSAG (see chapter 4.5.2, Figure 5.10). In particular the Baroque and Rococo, characterised by some of the most ornamental approaches ever adopted in Europe’s architectural history, provide the source for architectural sites. This includes the stylised Baroque palace in Figure 5.66, as well as the representation of the late eighteenth century Schloss Pfünz (Germany) by Mauritio Pedetti (Figure 5.67).

Representations of non-Baroque/Rococo residences and palaces include the Villa Hadriana, Rome (Italy) (Figure 5.68), as well as stylised Renaissance palaces (Figure 5.69) (see also ECB 2003, 11, 24, 32, 60, 64 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).
In summary, the third most prominent architectural theme category - again, minimal in comparison to the overshadowing discursive weight of Christian religious buildings - employs Upper Class representational sites as symbol for Europe's common culture heritage. A discursive emphasis is placed on representational structures associated exclusively with the upper classes, structures built as expressions, and visible proof, of cultural sophistication, power, and grandeur (see de Nicolay-Mazery and Naudin (2001), McKean (2004), Gregory and Walter (2006), and Mackley (2006) for a detailed account of their historicity and social message). This discursive strand mirrors the one identified previously for the EBDC representations of historical portraits (see chapter 5.5.1), with its extensive use gentlemen and gentlewomen, nobles and royalty.

Departing from the FSAG catalogue's iconology by introducing an entirely new architectural theme, 9.5 percent (n=241) of architectural heritage sites display buildings or cityscapes emphasising notions of construction and progress. As Figures 5.70 to 5.71 demonstrate, these Über-modern\(^{31}\) metropolitan landscapes are characterised by a constructive and progressive spirit (see also ECB 2003, 19, 31, 33, 45, 51, 66, 71 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

As can be seen in Figures 5.70 and 5.71, the iconological theme of construction and progress finds particularly vivid expression in the use of cranes and

\(^{31}\) I am using this term in avoidance of the loaded term 'post-modern'.
scaffolding in the context of an urban environment characterised by skyscrapers, while Figure 5.72 and 5.73 highlight the often futuristic character of this thematic category.

Figure 5.72 & 5.73: Examples of EBDC architecture of 'construction/progress' (ECB 2003, 33, 61)

Also, it is not surprising, due to the majority of designers presenting the different Euro denominations as a chronological ascent (see chapter 5.5), and, thus, expressing European history as a story of progress, to find most visual grammar of 'construction/progress' on the 500 and, to an even a greater degree, on the 200 Euro notes (Figure 5.74).

Figure 5.74: EBDC use of architecture of 'construction/progress' by banknote denomination

They never appear on designs for the 50 and 100 Euro denomination, and only sporadically feature on the 5 and 10 Euro denominations. In summary, the second most prominent strand identified for the EBDC architectural discourse, a discourse not suggested by the FSAG catalogue, takes the shape of future-orientated progress located within the urban environment. This discourse, to employ the words of Enzensberger (1987, 115) commenting on what he
identifies as the EU’s self-understanding in general, in particular in the context of the Ages and Styles of Europe theme going back as far as the classical period, ‘mündet schließlich in der Illusion, als wäre ausgerechnet unsere Kultur dazu ausersehen, zwischen Altertümlichkeit und Science Fiction zu vermitteln’\textsuperscript{32}. Once again mirroring the discursive strands of the FSAG architectural feature catalogue (see chapter 5.4.2), the last architectural category (14.5 percent, n=241) to be included in this discussion incorporates sites characterised by a primarily artistic understanding of architecture, including buildings recognised primarily in the context of being a work of art more than a practical building. As exemplified by the representations of Le Corbusier’s Villa Savoye, Poissy (France) (Figure 5.75) and Mies van der Rohe’s German pavilion, built for the 1929 Barcelona World Exhibition (Figure 5.76), this ‘architecture as art’ consists of buildings of visionary artistic design, many of them at best of limited practical value (see also ECB 2003, 19, 31, 45, 51, 68, 82 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

Figure 5.75 & 5.76: Examples of EBDC ‘architecture as art’ (ECB 2003, 15, 25)

For example, in the case of the German pavilion, this limited practical value takes the concrete shape of the absence of a complete roof, as well as the dissolution of any defined internal partitioning or enclosing external walls. Other designs feature the Schröder House by Gerrit Rietveld, Utrecht (The Netherlands) (Figure 5.77), or display, for example, house architecture of the Dutch De Stijl school of art (Figure 5.78).

\textsuperscript{32} ‘finally culminates in the illusion that for some reason only our culture is being destined to mediate between ancient times and Science Fiction’ (my translation)
In summary, in their search for an architectural heritage paradigm 'which unequivocally spells “Europe” at a glance' (TSAG May 1995, 5, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute's Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series; see chapter 5.3), adhering closely to the suggestions made by the FSAG (see chapter 5.4.2), the EBDC designers identify, and thus display, Europe as characterised by heritage recognised for its artistic value.

To conclude on the overall EBDC architectural feature discourse, as graphically summarised in Figure 5.79 (the size of each discursive ‘orb’ being displayed proportionate to its relative frequency), its ‘ideoscape’ is dominated by representations of Christian religious buildings, and thus references to the Christian religion in general. As such, with 16.2 percent (n=271) of architectural heritage sites directly copying features included in the FSAG catalogue, it reflects the architectural heritage site discourse developed by the FSAG feature selection (see chapter 5.4.2), highlighting the influence this Eurocratically-approved collection of features, handed out as a general guideline to each designer, had on the EBDC. The EBDC’s discursive emphasis on Christian religious buildings remains uncontested by any of the other discursive strands identified above. It can thus be proposed that Europe’s cultural essence, even though passively through the EBDC designers’ heritage site discourse, is identified to crystallise primarily in the Christian religion. It is in the shadow of this overwhelming Christian religious discourse that four minor discursive themes, which can be conjoined into two loose groups, could be identified. On the one side, notions of engineering excellence and future-orientated progress and urban development can be argued to combine into a loosely connected discursive strand of technical and civilisational progressiveness. On the other side, notions of cultural sophistication and artistic vision and skill can be contended to combine into a discursive strand of refined cultural vision.
In doing so, it can be argued, the EBDC discourse recalls nineteenth century nation-state schemes to 'Europeanise' the continent's major cities, such as Paris and Berlin, by reshaping and 'purifying' their architectural organisation (see Corbin 1986; Sibley 1995). They aimed to turn European cities into places 'fit for the bourgeoisie by creating elegant spaces, which distanced them from the poor and enhanced property values' (Sibley 1995, 57). Instead of physically restructuring Europe's urban landscapes, as planned by the nineteenth century nation-states, the EBDC iconologically 'purifies' Europe's built culture heritage. It develops 'those places where the bourgeois have himself [sic] to the enjoyment of the senses - which implied the exclusion of the dirty, the unclean, the malodorous, and the non-city' (Corbin 1986, 268-269). In the case of the EBDC, this symbolic purification process leads, in particular, to the exclusion of any non-Christian religious buildings, such as mosques and synagogues. This shortcoming must be considered the more grave in that Europe's multi-faith architectural heritage, such as epitomised by the cathedral of Cordova, having been used as both Christian church and Muslim mosque, provides perfect examples in support of the Eurocratic notion of 'Unity-in-diversity' (see chapters 1.5.3 & 5.3). As Brooke (1975, 38-39) observes for the mosque of Cordova,
[i]n the mosque one may recall how much medieval Europe owed to Islam, in the influence of art, architecture, and literature. In its transmission of the philosophy and technology of the ancient world, the technical achievements, and the spices of the Far East, Cordova, in particular, was the symbol of Muslim splendour north of the Straits of Gibraltar, and the home of many great Muslims.

Yet, most likely mainly due to their initial exclusion by the FSAG, no such architectural heritage sites found their way into the EBDC designs. As such, the EBDC visual discourse fails to develop an iconographic grammar that is not based on traditional nation-state notions of the exclusion of a non-includable Other.

5.5.3 The EBDC artefact discourse

Turning towards the weakest iconographic category in terms of comparative numbers (see Figure 5.15), representations of artefacts make up 15.4 percent (n=715) of all iconographic elements considered. As such, they play a subordinate, yet important complementary, role. It must be pointed out that, unlike portraits and architectural sites, artefacts were not discussed by the FSAG or included in its feature catalogue. As a result, the EBDC artefacts as developed by the designers were not influenced by Eurocratic preconceptions and prescriptions. In order to analyse the artefactual discourse as generated by the EBDC, all representations of artefacts were entered into a SPSS 12.0.1 database. It is impossible to produce mutually exclusive categories when analysing any data set in terms of ideology and meaning. However, in order to be able to perform CDA, it is essential for such categories to be produced. Categorisation took mainly place on the basis of an artefact’s practical purpose and historical context, as well as, whenever possible, on explanatory information provided by the designers. Even though not all are mutually exclusive, categories were carefully selected in order to minimise interpretational confusion. With this in mind, the EBDC artefacts could be attributed to a total of seven overall categories (Figure 5.80). Categories accounting for less than 2 percent were collapsed into ‘Other’. The following section will discuss the three most prominent categories due to their relative discursive weight.

33 I am using the term in the widest sense possible, denoting any human-made object, as opposed to natural objects.
Less prominent categories are not discussed in detail. However, they will be taken into account and included in the discussion wherever appropriate.

As can be observed from Figure 5.80, the largest individual category, accounting for more than a quarter of all artefacts includes (28.7 percent, n=115), consists of artefacts recognised mainly in terms of scientific and technological qualities, advances, and achievements. These include, for example, representations of microscopes, in the case of Figure 5.81 from the Rococo period, and in the case of Figure 5.82 from the present-day.

Other examples fitting within this iconographic paradigm of scientific and technical progress include representations of the earliest electric streetlights (Figures 5.83 & 5.84), as well as the first steam trains (Figure 5.84; see also ECB 2003, 57, 89).
What all artefacts subsumed in this group have in common is the theme of scientific and technical invention, innovation, and progress (see ECB 2003, 38, 65, 66, 76, 88 for a selection of those included in the EBDC). Many, but by no means all, of these inventions have their origin in Europe. The electric streetlight for example was invented in Russia in 1875 (Wikipedia.org 2007a).

With 20.9 percent (n=115) representing the second most prominent thematic category, it is artefacts from the field of navigation and exploration that characterise the EBDC artefact discourse. In particular, these take the shape of historical astrolabes and compass roses (Figure 5.85), as well as armillary spheres (Figure 5.86), globes (Figure 5.87), and sextants (Figure 5.88) (see also ECB 2003, 55, 56, 62, 64, 69, 77, 78 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).
Taking into account that the FSAG feature catalogue includes no artefact selection (see chapter 5.4), resulting in the absence of a Eurocratic iconography guideline directing, or at least influencing, the EBDC designers, it is surprising to find the same five types of artefacts being chosen that often. The reason for this can only be speculated upon. Firstly it must be highlighted that none of these navigational instruments represents a European invention, making them not inherently European. For example, the astrolabe (the predecessor of the modern planisphere) — whether the Greek Hipparchus in the second century BC or the Persian Fazari initially invented it — was developed mainly within the Islamic World as a means to find the direction of Mecca during prayer (Wikipedia.org 2006b; see also Frye 2000, 163). Also, under no circumstances can the compass be said to be of European origin (Aczel 2002; Gurney 2005). It was invented by Chinese scientists, with the earliest recorded use of Lodestone as a direction finder going back to the fourth century AD Chinese Book of the Devil Valley Master. It only reached Europe many centuries — some say as many as 1200 years (Aczel 2002) — later, possibly via the Silk Road (Gurney 2005; Wikipedia.org 2006c). Similarly, the armillary sphere, allegedly invented by the Greek Eratostenes in 255 BC, was further developed by the Chinese from the West Han dynasty onwards, leading to the invention of the first water powered celestial globe in 52 BC and to the first water powered mechanical clock in 723 AD (Wikipedia.org 2006d). As such, with no historical evidence suggesting the above artefacts of ‘navigation/exploration’ to be linked to Europe in terms of origin, the reason for their iconographic ubiquity must be looked for elsewhere. One explanation could be their role in European Imperial/Colonial expansion. Even though not originating in Europe, it was the arrival of these navigational tools that allowed Europe, on the back of its continuously growing fleets of merchant and military ships, to discover, explore, and exploit other continents, sparking a race for global economic and cultural domination (see Scammell 1989; Mollat and Fagan 1993; Bradley 2000). It is in this historical context that the above artefacts of ‘navigation/exploration’ became symbols for Europe’s ‘right’ to take global control. For example, Renaissance public figures, in order to represent their ‘global’ claim to power, often had their portraits painted displaying them with one hand resting on an armillary sphere (Wikipedia.org 2006d). As the designer Robert Ballagh expresses in the EBDC catalogue in reference to his drawing of a globe (Figure 5.87), it represents an ‘early European globe, reminding us of the success of those early navigators’ (ECB 2003, 20). However, many of the celebrated discoveries by these European
explorers have been challenged by historical and archaeological evidence. Columbus, for example, was by no means the first European to reach the American continent, as there are accounts of European transatlantic contact prior to his first voyage in 1492 (see van Sertima 2003; Huyghe 2005; Sale 2006). What his voyage did achieve was to lead to a general European awareness of the hemisphere, resulting in its subsequent colonisation and exploitation, and to the acceleration of European imperialism on a global scale. The above connection between historical instruments of navigation, such as the compass and the armillary sphere, and Europe’s well documented post-medieval to early modern Colonial ambitions, is perhaps most poignantly expressed in the following EBDC design (Figure 5.89).

![Figure 5.89: Example of EBDC artefact of 'navigation/exploration' (ECB 2003, 60)](image)

Here a historic sceptre representing a globe with longitudes and latitudes is displayed. Symbolically, this artefact can be argued to link directly Europe’s nautical tradition with its global ambitions and claims. In summary, the second most prominent EBDC artefact discourse employs nautical instruments from Europe’s ‘Imperial Age’ (see Scammell 1989), evoking, although not exclusively, strong notions of legitimate European dominance on the global stage.

The last category to be discussed in detail, with 15.7 percent (n=115) of all EBDC artefacts making it the third most prominent artefact category, was labelled ‘The Written Word’. This theme revolves around representations of different types of writing (i.e. recording), from prehistoric cave paintings (Figure 5.90), via Roman stone letters (Figure 5.91), to modern font types
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(Figure 5.90) (see also ECB 2003, 38, 39, 62, 59 for a selection of those included in the EBDC).

Also featuring in this category, emphasising particularly the technical act of literary production, are representations of typesetting (Figure 5.92) and printing equipment, such as the platen press in Figure 5.93 and the modern moveable type sets in Figure 5.90.

Other crystallisations of this theme include the representation of a Romanesque copyist monk at work in Figure 5.94. In other cases again, this paradigm takes the shape of an extract from a mid-fifteenth century printing of the Gutenberg Bible (Figure 5.95), the first major book to be printed instead of copied, and the iconic artefact of the ‘Gutenberg Revolution’ initiating the ‘Age of the Printed Book’ (Wikipedia.org 2007b).
In summary, the third most prominent EBDC artefact category develops a discourse revolving around humanity's dominant medium of knowledge dissemination, preservation, and reification - the written word. It seems superfluous to mention that writing or printing was neither invented in Europe nor represents an exclusively European phenomenon. Still a highly controversial subject, Xuequin et al. (2003), for example, suggest China as at least one of the possible birthplaces of writing. Wherever its origins lie, there is no evidence that would suggest Europe. The reason for the considerable inclusion of artefacts of the ‘written word’ can only be hypothesised. As Champion (1990, 89) argues in the context of historical records in general,

the uniqueness of the European historical experience and the primacy of the written word as the means for appreciating it were integral [in conjuring the image of] the superiority both of Europe as a cultural entity and of history as its record.

It is in this understanding that EBDC artefacts of the ‘written word’ can be argued to generate a paradigmatic understanding of Europe’s past as based on the notion of history. Further, they can be contended to evoke notions of knowledge generation, accumulation, and dissemination. Lastly, it must be mentioned that of all purpose-determinable artefacts 7.8 percent (n=715) are of a religious nature. Even though representing an only minor artefactual group, the entirety of these religious artefacts (n=9) belongs to the Christian faith.

In conclusion, the EBDC artefact ideoscape, as graphically summarised in Figure 5.96 (the size of each discursive ‘orb’ being displayed proportionate to its relative frequency), has been shown to revolve around three major discursive strands, namely those of ‘science/technology’, ‘navigation/exploration’, and the ‘written word’, in order of discursive strength. Taken together, these three major categories of artefacts, based on their historicity, can be argued to conjure notions of Europe as characterised in its culture heritage by excellence and vision of the mind (be this in terms of scientific innovation, global navigation, or knowledge generation). In addition to this, this discourse can be contended to hark back to Europe’s period of exploration, which is inextricably linked to Europe’s ‘Golden Age’ of Colonialism and Imperialism. Global claims in multiple fields are being made. However, only a minority of artefacts used in the generation of this discourse are actually European inventions.
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Not completely without religious references, yet at a much-reduced level when compared to historical portraits (see Figure 5.49) and architectural heritage sites (see Figure 5.79), the EBDC artefacts include exclusive references to the Christian faith (7.8 percent, n=115). Most poignantly, this is expressed in the representations of the Holy Grail (ECB 2003, 56), one of the most important symbols of Christian belief.34

5.5.4 The EBDC discourse: Summary and discussion

In order to visualise the overall EBDC iconographic discourse, this most powerful, and surely most widespread, expression of the Eurocratic culture heritage/identity paradigm in symbols, the results of the historical portrait, architectural heritage site, and artefact analysis were put in relation to each other and displayed in graphical form in Figure 5.97. The discursive ‘orbs’ for each feature category are displayed in terms of size relative to their discursive prevalence.35

34 Due to the banknotes’ security features, the Holy Grail shows in the EBDC exhibition catalogue but not on the CD-ROM version. Scanning the images from the catalogue also proved unsuccessful.
35 Due to graphical limitations, it was not possible to display the category of ‘Christian Religious Buildings’ precisely in relation to its discursive prevalence. Doing so would have resulted in the ‘orb’ becoming too big.
As the preceding analysis revealed, the EBDC symbolic discourse revolves most strongly around the Christian faith. Not only does it dominate the architectural discourse, it features heavily for portraits, and could also be identified, even though at a reduced scale, for the artefact category. Together with that of 'Art' (being of only minor importance throughout), it represents the only theme appearing in each feature category. Further, no non-Christian religious features could be identified for either of the categories. As such it can be argued that exclusivist notions of Christianity dominate the EBDC feature discourse. Two about equally strong wider symbolic themes then follow this, namely those of high-status individuals and architecture, and scientific and engineering excellence. In the context of the direct and indirect Eurocratic claims of the EBDC features being the result of a 'careful process of Euro design' (ECB 2001b) and a 'carefully co-ordinated series of activities to ensure that nothing is left to chance' (ECB 2001b) (see chapter 5.2-5.4), the features 'chosen to symbolise Europe' (FSAG 1995a, 14) generate (EU)ropean culture as characterised mainly by social élites and excellence in knowledge and skill. However, the 'umbrella' discourse, to point this out once more, is characterised by exclusivist notions of

to be accommodated in the visual summary. The only other option would have been to shrink all other 'orbs', which would have made them too small in size for easy reading.
the Christian faith and, in the case of the portraits, of a European 'family' (TSAG May 1995, 3, see chapter 5.3) of exclusively White ethnographic background. Further, when comparing the three EBDC feature discourses in terms of themes, it can be observed that those of portraits and architecture match each other more closely than is the case for the artefacts. While the Christian faith represents one of the, if not the, major element for the portrait and architecture discourse, also sharing references to the social élite and to artistic vision, artefacts only rarely have recourse to Christian symbols. One explanation for this could be the absence of Eurocratically pre-selected artefacts in the FSAG feature catalogue, i.e. the absence of a prescribed cultural feature discourse (see chapter 5.4). This would highlight the discursive influence/control exerted indirectly by Eurocratic steering bodies, namely the FSAG. As such, it could be assumed to have had an equally important influence on the final Euro design selected from the EBDC entries.

5.6 THE FINAL EURO DESIGN

Having discussed the EBDC iconographic discourse, this chapter's last section focuses on the design finally selected for the Euro, investigating its images as indicators of the cultural values associated with collective identities. The final decision on the EBDC proposal to be offered for approval to the President of the ECB, meaning that the decision on the final Euro design remained fully in the hands of the top Eurocratic élite, was made by a fourteen members strong panel of experts selected by the ECB President himself. In terms of composition, '[t]he jury was made up of internationally renowned experts in marketing, design, and art history, chosen by the President of the ECB from a list of candidates submitted by the national central banks' (ECB 2003, 7, Euro Design Exhibition). Based on the list included in the EBDC exhibition catalogue (ECB 2003, 7), the jury members can be said to have come from three general fields of expertise. Half of the panel's fourteen members originate from the field of media studies, four from the wider field of design studies, and three from culture studies. As further stated in the EBDC catalogue, in order to avoid any national bias, 'jury members were completely independent of any national central bank or printing works involved in the competition' (ECB 2003, 7). Yet, while national bias is avoided, the same cannot be said for the panel in terms of gender. Only three of the fourteen members were female (21.4 percent). Sadly, details on the ECB President's decision-making process for selection of the final panel of experts are still considered confidential or have not been recorded. Requests for an
As a next step, which took place 7-13 October 1996 on behalf of the ECB, the ten short-listed designs were made subject to a qualitative public survey conducted by EOS Gallup Europe, involving more than 2000 people from all EU member states except Denmark. The results were summarised in a final report (EOS Gallup Europe 1996, Euro Banknote Test Results and Comments: Final Report), which, for the first time ever, was disclosed to the author. Two groups, professional cash handlers and members of the general public, examined all ten short-listed design series and responded to a questionnaire (ECB 2001b). As stated in the final report (EOS Gallup Europe 1996, 6), this questionnaire was designed to illuminate citizens' views on the designs in terms of general perceptions, emotional responses, and iconography acceptance. The results of the survey led EOS Gallup Europe (1996, 40) to conclude that 'Set G is ALWAYS among the top two in all the countries' surveyed, thus making it the most appropriate design to be adopted. 'Set G' (EOS code M194), exemplified by Figures 5.98 and 5.99, refers to the Abstract/Modern design proposal by Maryke Degryse (see ECB 2003, 76-77).

In this design, each denomination has its own theme. These include, for example, Green Europe (see Figure 5.98) and A People's Europe (see Figure 5.99) (for the full list of themes see ECB 2003, 76-77). In the context of the survey, this design represents the proposal most likely to find acceptance among EU citizens, and, thus, the one most statistically appropriate for the Euro as a banal expression of a supra-national (EU)rope. It was then that, on the basis of the

36 Denmark is the only EU member-state that is not part of the Euro-zone.
public survey results and the advice given by the jury, the ECB Council selected
the winning design series in December 1996. However, the final decision on the
design selected rested solely in the hands of then ECB President Baron
Alexandre Lamfalussy. Surprisingly in the light of the results of the EOS Gallup
Europe survey, the Set G design series was not selected for the final Euro
design. Instead, the Ages and Styles of Europe entry of Austrian banknote
designer Robert Kalina (Set B, EOS code T382), ranking second in the EOS
Gallup survey (1996, 40), was selected. In a congratulatory letter to the
designer, Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy (13 December 2003) justified the decision
on the grounds that ‘[b]ased on favourable reactions both from the jury and
from the public, the members of the Council felt that your design represented
best the idea of a common Europe’. As pointed out above, the EOS Gallup
Europe survey paints a slightly different picture. Even though Set B ranks
second after Set G, it is among the top two designs only in eight out of the 14
countries surveyed, as opposed to Set G being among the top two in all fourteen
countries surveyed. It can thus be argued that in its selection the final Euro
design does not so much reflect the preferences of EU citizens, but rather those
of the Eurocratic élite in control of the final decision-making process. As such it
can further be contended that the Euro design represents – if in symbol only –
(EU)rope as seen and identified with by the Eurocratic élite rather than by its
citizenry. Also, while informing Robert Kalina of having won the EBDC, it was
in the same congratulatory letter mentioned above that the ECB President
pointed out that the ‘design proposal will require certain adjustments in order
to arrive at the banknote designs which are finally printable’ (Lamfalussy 13
December 2003). These ‘adjustments’ will be discussed in detail as part of the
following analysis.

Willem F. Duisenberg (2001a; see also Duisenberg 2001b; Trichet 2004),
predecessor to Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy as Head of the ECB, who was
closely involved with the development of the Euro design throughout the
process, in a speech given at an awards ceremony and press conference held on
the eve of the introduction of the Euro banknotes and coins, claimed its final
iconography to represent ‘a true catalyst for integration, and is helping to
build a community enriched by our diversity of cultures’. The following
analysis conducts CDA and, in particular, VCA on the final Euro design, asking
if and in what way it manages to do so.
5.6.1 The final Euro design

Generally speaking, the banknote fronts of Kalina’s winning design display windows and gateways (Figure 5.100), while the reverse sides feature representations of bridges plus one aqueduct (Figure 5.101) (ECB 2003, 82).

![Figure 5.100 & 5.101: Examples of R. Kalina’s winning design series (ECB 2001a)](image)

According to the ECB (2005a, European Banknotes and Coins), these architectural features symbolise ‘the European spirit of openness and cooperation’, while the bridges betoken ‘the close cooperation and communication between Europe and the rest of the world’. In short, ‘they epitomise the dawn of a new Europe with its shared cultural heritage and the vision of a joint future in the next millennium’ (ECB 2003, 82, Euro Banknote Design Exhibition). The designer himself, in an interview with the author, stated the banknotes to display ‘auf der einen Seite die Brücke als ‘Kommunikation’ und ‘Verbindung’, und auf der anderen die Fenster und Tore für ‘Öffnung’, ‘Blick in die Zukunft” (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003). In addition, the reverse sides exhibit a map of Europe (see Figure 5.101), which will become subject of analysis later.

According to the ECB (2004) webpage Frequently Asked Questions: Who Chose the Designs and When?, the main advantage of Kalina’s design was that it displayed bridges and doorways as ideal-typical examples of styles from the seven chronological periods proposed by the TSAG, rather than specific structures. To further quote the ECB (2004), ‘if it were easy to recognise particular bridges, then certain banknotes would inevitably be associated with a specific country. Therefore, the bridges merely represent a period in European history by using a stylised representation’. As such, Kalina appears to have developed a new, supra-national currency iconography, one that avoids references to site-specific heritage features in search of symbolic meaning. This, however, is not the case.

1 ‘on the one side the bridge as a symbol of ‘communication’ and ‘connection’, and on the other side the windows and doorways for ‘openness’, ‘looking toward to the future’" (my translation)
According to a confidential source at the ECB's managerial level, the bridges and windows incorporated in Kalina's design represent very real architectural monuments, and, thus, have a very clear country of origin. Shortly after presenting the final Euro design to the public, a British architectural journal sued the ECB, arguing Kalina had copied the bridges, windows, and archways directly from the illustrations of real architectural sites in one of its issues. As the confidential source further explains, the reason for this Kalina told ECB officials to have been his lack of time to invest on the project, as well as his belief that his work would never make it into the list of official EBDC design proposals. Yet, instead of admitting to the design’s failure to develop site-, in particular nation-, unspecific supra-national banknote iconography, and, for example, selecting Maryke Degryse's most promising design in terms of public acceptance (see above), the ECB instead assembled another panel of experts, its purpose being to sufficiently alienate Robert Kalina’s existing design in order to rule out the possibility of a successful plagiarism law suit by the architectural journal in question. In doing so, the ECB’s hurriedly arranged ‘alienation process’ led to the development of composite architectural styles displaying a lack of architectural understanding, and resulting in what Phil Thomas (21 August 2005), architectural historian for the Diocese of York (England), calls a ‘chewing-gum approach to architectural styles’. As he further comments after close examination of the Euro's architectural features, the motives seem to have been put together ‘by someone who knows what a certain architectural style looks like, but who does not understand how it works; like somebody composing a sentence in a language he/she does not understand’ (Phil Thomas 21 August 2005). As such, the images are not, as claimed by the ECB (2001b) on the webpage entitled Euro Banknotes: From Cotton Field to Your Pocket, ‘modelled on the typical architectural style of each period’.

Hindering a more critical understanding of the Euro iconography, numerous scholars, such as Gilbert and Helleiner (1999a), Kaelberer (2002), and Hymans (2002; 2003), argued that in selecting Kalina’s design, the ECB succeeded in developing a ‘post-modern’ approach to banknote iconography, i.e. an iconography that is so ideologically undetermined that it can only be interpreted in organic and multiple ways at the individual level. To employ

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1 The only other example of a post-modern currency iconography Hymans (2002, 33; 2004, 21) identifies to be the Dutch banknote design from the late 1970's onwards. Instead of displaying national figures (e.g. Rembrandt, Erasmus of Rotterdam), it was then that natural motifs, such as sunflowers, water-snipe birds, and a lighthouse, entered the Gulden's visual discourse.
Hymans' (2004, 21; see also Hymans 2002, 32) definition, a 'post-modern' currency iconography does

abandon the past practice of transmitting any literal, unmistakable message. For the postmodern rejects cultural 'author/ity' in favour of a radical democratic vision of author and reader jointly producing the meaning of 'text'. A currency fully in tune with postmodern cultural norms would therefore offer something rather abstract and open to multiple interpretations, enticing the citizen-consumer to identify with and, indeed, to form his or her own vision of community.

In this case, as demonstrated by Figures 5.102 and 5.103, the numerous Abstract/Modern EBDC designs would have lent themselves much more readily for a 'post-modern' Euro design by providing a crystallisation surface for citizens' individual understanding of (EU)ropean identity.

After all, Kalina's design has recourse to actual - plagiarised (see above) - architectural sites. Further, as previously mentioned, the design suggested to the ECB by EOS Gallup Europe as representing the one most likely to be accepted by EU citizens was the modern/abstract design by Maryke Degryse (see Figures 5.98 & 5.99). Indeed, there was no shortage in high quality, aesthetically pleasing, and organic design proposals. Nevertheless, the ECB chose Kalina's design. In response to this discrepancy, Olivier Strube (15 October 2003), spokesperson of the ECB Banknote Issue Division, in an interview with the author, justified the non-selection of an abstract/modern design by arguing that they 'symbolisieren sehr viel weniger die europäischen Ideale oder auch die europäische Tradition. Und zum anderen könnten sie sehr viel eher verwechselt werden mit anderen gängigen Währungen'. Yet, if this is the case,

Figure 5.102 & 5.103: Examples of EBDC 'abstract/modern' designs (ECB 2003, 42, 90)

2 'symbolise much less the European ideals or European tradition. Further, they could much easier be mistaken for other existing currencies' (my translation)
then why did the ECB, together with the *Ages and Styles of Europe*, select it as one of the two EBDC *leitmotifs* in the first place?

There can be no doubt that the Euro design represents a certain iconographic departure from many national currency iconographies. To re-quote Pointon (1998, 233), ‘if nationalism and currency are a pair, so too are nationalism and portraiture’. Robert Kalina’s design is set apart from other EBDC entries by its absence of portraiture. As such it diverges from the ECB design brief, which, as remembered by Kalina in an interview with the author, stated that the use of portraits was not only ‘*ausdrücklich erlaubt und nicht verboten, sondern sogar erwünscht*’3 (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003). Further, he explains his decision to, nevertheless, exclude portraits from his design as follows:

> Ausgeschlossen war es für mich weil diese Portraits ja fiktive, erfundene Portraits hätten sein müssen die einfach nur zu den Epochen passen. Und Portraits haben für mich auf einer Banknote nur einen Sinn wenn es ein König ist, oder jemand der in direktem Bezug mit dem Geld steht, der eine Garantie abgibt, also zum Beispiel der Kaiser, der König, oder später irgendwelche Persönlichkeiten. Wenn das also anonyme Köpfe sind war es für mich sinnlos und wertlos. Und es erschien mir auch etwas leer, sinn-entleert sage ich mal so.4

(Robert Kalina 15 October 2003)

It is in this context that Hymans (2004, 22) argues the design, in displaying what appear to be uninhabited architectural landscapes, to allow each citizen to position him/herself within this landscape, making the individual the nucleus of cultural identity. As he states in short, the euro ‘has pushed the iconographic envelope with its embrace of the post-modern cultural *Zeitgeist*’ (Hymans 2002, 35). Assuming this to be the case, if Kalina’s designs ‘invite habitation by the holder of the notes’ (Hymans 2004, 22), then who is invited? Having recourse to actual architectural heritage, what ‘iconographic environments’ are the holders passively ‘forced’ to project themselves into in a banal fashion? Is it, as argued by, for example, Hymans (2002; 2004), everyone? The official ECB response to such questions of ideology takes the shape of rejection. To quote Olivier

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3 ‘explicitly allowed and not prohibited, but even desired’ (my translation)

4 ‘It was impossible for me because those portraits would have had to be fictional, made-up portraits that simply fit the epochs. And, in my opinion, portraits on banknotes only make sense if they show a king, or somebody else who stands in direct relation to the currency, somebody who gives a guarantee, as for example the emperor, the king, or later some personalities. So if they are anonymous heads, then for me they are senseless and worthless. It also seemed to me empty, emptied of sense so to speak.’ (my translation)
Strube’s (15 October 2003) official response from the aforementioned interview, ‘insbesondere höhere ideologische Ziele, darüber habe ich mir, und ich glaube auch meine Abteilung, keine Gedanken gemacht. Wahrscheinlich hat sich darüber die gesamte Bank [ECB] noch keine Gedanken gemacht’⁵. Yet, if this were the case, then why did the ECB assemble specific institution-internal control organs (i.e. TSAG, FSAG) restricting and channelling closely the KIV (see chapter 3.3.3) during the whole Euro iconography development process? The following detailed examination of the actual Euro iconography leaves behind the generalisations that have dominated this field of academic enquiry so far.

5.6.2 The Euro architectural feature discourse

In order to critically analyse the architectural features displayed on the different Euro denominations, they have to be analysed, where appropriate, in terms of their wider architectural context. This context was provided in this instance by Phil Thomas, architectural historian for the Diocese of York (England), and specialist in the study of architectural styles and historical renovation and conservation, following a series of cross-informative discussions with the author.

To begin with the representations of windows and doorways, after analysing the architectural features on each Euro denomination, it was possible to identify a single dominant discourse. This discourse takes the shape of a mono-religious paradigm in the shape of Christianity. Its most direct expression is the Christian ecclesiastical architecture on the twenty Euro note (Figure 5.104). It shows two early Gothic stained-glass windows, characterised by geometrical tracery in its purest shape (Phil Thomas 21 August 2005).

Figure 5.104 & 5.105: Christian iconography in the final Euro design (ECB 2001a)

⁵ ‘in particular higher ideological aims, this I, as well as my department I think, have never given any thought. Probably the whole bank [ECB] has never given this any thought’ (my translation)
On the basis of the iron armatures, the diamond-shaped stained-glass elements (usually displaying Biblical scenes), and the windows' overall ornamental complexity, they can be said to belong to a very large-scale monastic building, most likely a French or Western German cathedral. The cathedral - Christianity's most monumental symbol - succeeds, against all Eurocratic rhetorics claiming and emphasising neutrality of faith (see chapter 1.5.3), in appearing on the final Euro design. However, it does not remain the only reference to the Christian faith. The front of the ten Euro note (Figure 5.105) displays an early Romanesque archway. In its intricate 'ornamentality' the archway shows the Romanesque tradition in its most intense form, and is most likely to belong to a large-scale Christian church, possibly a cathedral (Phil Thomas 21 August 2005). In fact, Robert Kalina (01.06.2005) himself, in an e-mail response to the author, states portals such as the one depicted on the ten Euro note to have preferably been used for Christian church and cloister entrances. Adding to this discourse of Christianity, the idealised composite Baroque portal displayed on the one hundred Euro front (Figure 5.106) could easily belong to a Christian church of the period (Phil Thomas 21 August 2005), such as exemplified by Chiesa del Gesu in Palermo, Sicily (Figure 5.108).
Also, as further highlighted by Kalina (01.06.2005) himself, the Renaissance window (*aedikula*) on the fifty Euro note (Figure 5.107) could easily belong to a Portuguese church. Taking into account that 'Angaben über konkrete Gebäude, die mich zu den Motiven auf den Euro-Banknoten inspiriert haben, kann und darf ich leider nicht geben, obwohl ich schon oft danach gefragt wurde'⁶ (Kalina 01.06.2005), whether or not this is his way of saying that he meant it to be the entrance of a Portuguese church, but is explicitly refused permission to do so by the ECB, can not be determined.

In summary, at least two, and possibly four, of the seven Euro fronts can be argued to represent features of Christian religious buildings. No references to other faiths could be identified. With the ten and twenty Euro banknotes being the most ubiquitous⁷, this means that almost every second banknote in circulation (44.5 percent) depicts Christian ecclesiastic architecture. If one assumes the fifty and one hundred Euro fronts to represent parts of Christian churches too, this number rises to 75.5 percent. As such it can be argued that up to three out of four Euro banknotes in circulation display architectural references to the Christian religion. In a banal fashion, the Euro carries the ideological message of Christianity. It can further be contended that Europe’s ‘shared cultural heritage and the vision of a joint future in the next millennium’ (ECB 2003, 82) takes, by implication, the shape of the Christian faith. It has been argued that in employing representations of windows and doorways the Euro design successfully develops ‘post-modern’ notions of openness and communication (Gilbert and Helleiner 1999a; Hymans 2002; 2004; Kaelberer 2002), if not an altogether ideologically undetermined model of banknote iconography. Yet, how can this be the case if these allegedly ‘ideo-neutral’ features are presented in a cultural context that could not be more loaded with ideology, namely that of exclusive references to the Christian faith?

In comparison to the front sides’ windows and gateways, the bridges displayed on the Euro reverse sides come much closer to what Hymans (2002, 32; 2004, 21) calls a ‘post-modern’ banknote iconography, at least in that they do not incorporate direct religious references (Figures 5.109-5.112).

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⁶ ‘unfortunately, I cannot and may not provide any information concerning concrete buildings that inspired the motifs on the Euro banknotes, even though I have been asked about this very often’ (my translation).

⁷ This is based on banknote quantities produced by 1 January 2002 (ECB 2005c).
Besides being symbols of 'connection', of 'bridging gaps', they represent feats of civil engineering that, particularly in the case of the younger architectural styles (Figures 5.111 & 5.112), can, in variation, be found over most of the globe.

As Olivier Strube (15 October 2003), spokesperson for the ECB, stated in an interview with the author, the bridges represent 'die Verbindung zwischen den Völkern in Europa'. At the same time, however, it could be argued that bridges carry the inherent idea of a divide separating two essentially different units - a connection between units that are not meant to be one. Are bridges not also about controlled access? Whichever symbolic interpretation one prefers, these civil structures lend themselves much better to the development of an 'ideo-neutral', or at least 'ideo-abstract', discourse in symbols revolving around notions of 'openness and cooperation' (ECB 2005a, European Banknotes and Coins).

5.6.3 The Euro's map of Europe

The Euro iconography is by no means limited to architectural elements only. Each Euro denomination's reverse side also displays a map of Europe (see Figures 5.109-5.112). As poignantly demonstrated by Wood (1992) and Monmonier and de Blij (1996), maps (or cartograms) are taken for granted by

1 'the connection between the peoples of Europe' (my translation)
most people. Yet, with maps being produced by people for people, they are always bound to also be ideology. While certain aspects are emphasised in a map, others are marginalised or even excluded. Maps are a form of discourse. As such they are, depending on the body responsible for their production, influenced by cultural values. For example, Monmonier and de Blij (1996) demonstrated their subjective production and use in the service of the state in the case of Nazi Germany and the USSR. As such, the Euro map must be assumed to be determined by ideology too. This is particularly the case in that in selecting Robert Kalina’s design, the ECB acted in contravention of the advice of its own specialist groups, the TSAG (May 1995, 4, Interim Report to the European Monetary Institute’s Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote on The Selection of a Theme for the European Banknote Series; see also ECB 2003, 9), stating that, ‘[w]hile other symbols were discussed (e.g. the map of Europe without internal borders, the myth of the abduction of Europe, etc.), there was a general consensus that the European flag/stars should be a feature on the notes’.

Robert Kalina’s initial design featured a geographical map of the Western peninsula of the Eurasian continent, without internal (national) or external (supra-national) borders. It included Iceland to the north, northern Africa to the south, Portugal to the West, and Russia and the Ukraine to the East. The entire map was displayed in the same colour. It included countries that are currently not part of the Eurozone or the EU, including, for example, Turkey and northern Africa ‘um die Küstenlinie darzustellen, und damit auch die generelle europäische Geographie als solche’¹ (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003, interview with the author).² As such, this initial design could have served as an effective symbol in support of Eurocratic rhetorics of openness and cooperation (see above). With the EU representing an ongoing political, economic, and, thus, territorial process, instead of a political system of clear-cut and largely unchanging boundaries, it is subject to continuous organic expansion (see chapters 1.3). Thus, any map of Europe displayed on the Euro should either define its borders clearly on the basis of the current member states³, or show a borderless European ‘continent’. The Euro’s designer opted for the second option. Yet, shortly after Kalina’s design was officially declared winner of the

¹ ‘in order to represent the general coastline, and, thus, the European geography as such’ (my translation)
² Due to legal reasons Robert Kalina could not release a copy of the initial map design.
³ As series of banknotes are continuously reprinted – even the sturdiest banknote has a lifetime of only a limited number of years – after a currency’s introduction, it would be possible to continuously update the Euro map in terms of new member-states. Obviously, even small changes in any currency design put additional organisational and financial strain on the issuing bank.
EBDC, the ECB demanded a number of changes to be implemented on the map (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003). These changes demanded certain geographical areas to be displayed in a colour-blend different to the area to be highlighted as Europe (as understood by the Eurocratic élite in charge of these changes). As Robert Kalina (15 October 2003) remembers, the map

war also nicht verlangt, aber ich wollte sie drauf haben, als Symbol für Europa. Abgesehen von der EU Flagge und der Karte gibt es ja auch nicht so viele Symbole die für ganz Europa gelten. Die Karte hat ja auch eine sehr charakteristische Form die man auf einen Blick als Europa erkennt. Darum habe ich sie draufgegeben. Und da hat es etliche Schwierigkeiten gegeben, hauptsächlich was die Darstellung verschiedener Inseln und Länder betrifft.4

Firstly, as can be seen in the close-up of the map design as finally printed on the Euro (Figure 5.113), the ECB demanded Kalina to display the map's Eastern borders as geographically undetermined (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003; see also Hymans 2004, 19).

Figure 5.113: Close-up of the map of Europe (from the 50 Euro note) (ECB 2001a)

4 'was not demanded, but I wanted it on the banknote, as a symbol for Europe. Besides the EU flag and the map there are not many symbols that apply for all of Europe. The map has a very characteristic shape, recognisable at a glance as Europe. That is why I included it. And that resulted in numerous problems, mainly in terms of the representations of various islands and countries.' (my translation)
In the words of the designer, the revised map ‘ist nicht hart abgegrenzt nach Osten hin sondern verbleicht sozusagen nach Osten hin’\(^5\) (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003). By making it visually fade out towards the east, the map can be argued to communicate the general Eurocratic willingness to expand the EU towards the Eastern European nation-states (see Hedetoft 2005, 5 for the notion of ‘asymmetric membrane’). This Eurocratic openness has been demonstrated during the last decade by the EU’s continuous expansion towards the east, including Poland and Estonia\(^6\), and, most recently, Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria\(^7\). However, this was not the only change demanded by the ECB. In contrast to Europe’s East, the ECB wanted the northern African coast displayed on the map, including Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, to be displayed in a considerably different (i.e. paler) colour-blend (Figure 5.114; see also Figure 5.113). Also, the ECB insisted on Turkey undergoing the same changes, while the Greek islands off the Turkish coast had to be darkened to generate an even greater contrast (Figure 5.115; see also Figure 5.113).

![Figure 5.114 & 5.115: Close-up of Gibraltar and of the Greek islands off the Turkish coast (from the 20 Euro note) (ECB 2001a)](image)

To quote the designer (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003) from an interview with the author,

\begin{quote}
die Türkei musste heller gemacht werden, während einige der Griechischen Inseln dunkler gemacht werden mussten damit sie sich besser voneinander abheben, insbesondere im Falle der Türkei-nahen
\end{quote}

\(^5\) ‘is not firmly delimited towards the east but fades out towards the east’ (my translation)
\(^6\) Date of membership: 01 May 2004
\(^7\) Date of membership: 01 January 2007
In doing so, his geographical map of the western peninsula of the Eurasian continent, through the application of a different, contrasting colour-blend, demarcates and separates countries and geographical areas as not being part of Europe. The Euro’s Europe is defined by territorial boundaries. This, however, goes contrary to the EU’s ambitions/rhetorics of organic openness (see chapter 1.5.3 for the notion of ‘In varietate concordia’). The reason for their demarcation cannot be argued to lie in North African countries and Turkey not being part of the EU or the Eurozone at the time of the Euro release. If that would be the case, then countries such as Iceland, Switzerland, Norway, Ukraine, Belarus, and Albania should also be displayed in the bright demarcating colour-blend. If it were based on Eurozone countries, then the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria should also be visually excluded. If the demarcation were made on the basis of geology, then, for example, Cyprus and Armenia should have been excluded (see chapter 1.1). Taking all this together, an ideological reason for the Eurocratic demarcation of northern Africa and Turkey must be assumed, rather than a political or economic one. This is particularly the case in that Turkey’s territory to the south of the Bosporus is excluded, while its territory to the north is included. In fact, one is reminded of centuries old preconceptions of Europe, such as expressed in the sixteenth century map of Europe in Sebastian Münster’s Cosmographica (Figure 5.116). On this map, the European ‘continent’ appears as a united aggregate of semi-independent territories, standing in contrast to what is perceived as extra-European territories, namely those considered as belonging to Africa or Asia (Kleinschmidt 2000, 112), while Europe’s eastern borders are displayed as being part of it. Displaying Europe as a queen, one is also reminded of the dominance of figures of nobles and gentlemen/gentlewomen in the EBDC portraiture discourse (see chapter 5.5.1).

8 ‘Turkey had to be displayed in brighter colours, while a number of Greek islands had to be made darker. In particular, this was the case with the Greek islands close to the Turkish coast. It is in this context that it was also demanded to display Northern Africa in a much brighter colour.’ (my translation)

9 Münster’s Cosmographica was published 1628 in Basel. However, he borrowed the picture from Johannes Pucius who printed it first in 1537 (Kleinschmidt 2000, 112).
Taking all of the above together, it can thus be argued that the Euro map becomes banal expression of the EU’s and most of its member states’ immigration policies. Even though stating a commitment to values of democracy, personal freedom, and humanism, in particular France, Great Britain, Germany, and Spain have passed legislation to close their borders to immigrants (see Hedetoft 2005). Also, the EU recently set up an agency, named Frontex, in an effort to coordinate rapid reaction teams of border guards in order to defend in particular its Mediterranean borders (BBC NEWS 2006a; 2006b). It is in this context that the Euro map can be argued to hint at Turkey’s marginal chance to become, even in the long run, a member of the EU (in this context, see Barchard 1985; Termourian 1991; Kunbali-Camoglu 1996; Casey 2002; BBC NEWS 2006c). As demonstrated by Sebastian Münster’s map of Europe, these policies could further be argued to root in centuries-old perceptions of Europe within the world. Alternatively it can be contended that the inclusion/exclusion of countries on the Euro map is based on faith. As can be seen from Figure 5.117, the countries excluded from what is displayed as a kind of ‘core Europe’ on the Euro (exhibiting the same colour and no internal divisions) are those where the majority of the population adheres to the Muslim faith. As on the Euro map, this is the case for the North African states and Turkey. At the same time, all countries understood by the ECB as qualifying as part of Europe – and, by implication, (EU)rope – have a primarily Christian population.
As such it can be argued that the Eurocratic idea(l) of Europe in the context of the EU is, at least to a certain degree, based on faith. While Christianity can be argued to become the criterion for inclusion, in particular in the light of the Euro’s exclusive references to the Christian faith in terms of architectural features, Islam becomes that for exclusion. As such the Euro map can be contended to passively evoke the idea of civilisational clashes based largely on faith (in this context, see Barber 1995; Huntington 2002; Juergensmeyer 2001).

As a last step in the analysis of the Euro map, it becomes necessary to, if only briefly, discuss one of its elements that, to this point, has received no academic attention. Shortly after the release of the final Euro design, numerous EU member states vehemently objected to the non-inclusion of their ‘extra-European’ territories (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003). For example, for the French, the subject of the heated debate took the shape of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion, all of them acquired during the early era of European Colonial expansion (i.e. the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). All these territories are part of France’s Colonialist/Imperialist legacy. To go into more detail, Réunion, an island in the Indian Ocean east of Madagascar, was discovered by the Portuguese in 1513, and later became a French colony (CIA 2004). Similarly, the island of Martinique, located north of Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean Sea, became a French colony in 1635, as did the island of Guadeloupe, south of Puerto Rico. French Guiana, situated in northern South America, was first settled by the French in 1604, and became infamous for its notorious penal settlements maintained by the French government up until 1951.
The French exploited all these territories as part of their Eurocentric Colonialist/Imperialist ambitions. In a similar fashion to the French, the Portuguese government demanded the inclusion of Madeira and the Azores. The Azores were colonised by Portugal in the mid-fifteenth century, and, due to their strategic position in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, became crucial for - if not symbolic of - the European exploration, colonisation, and exploitation of the Americas (CIA 2004; Worldatlas.com 2005). Madeira became Portuguese territory as early as 1419. From the last decade of the fifteenth century onwards, based on the exploitation of countless Africans who were brought there as slave workers, it developed into a major centre of sugar production and exportation (CIA 2004). To return to the Euro design, after months of heated debate, the ECB capitulated. The representative of each Euro country’s national bank had to sign a document signifying their acceptance of a new map, this time including the French and Portuguese ‘extra-European’ territories, as well as Spain’s Canary Islands (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003, interview with the author) (Figure 5.118). In fact, Columbus studied navigation in Madeira before setting off to discover a new passage to India, leading to the (re)discovery of North America; a discovery that, in the following centuries, would bring genocide and incredible suffering to both Americas in the shape of Western Colonialism/Imperialism. This arrangement excludes any territory belonging to EU member states that is smaller than 400 km², the smallest printable area on the Euro map (Robert Kalina 15 October 2003).
Closer examination of the ‘extra-European’ territories on the Euro reveals them to be displayed in a colour-blend matching that of the European ‘core territories’ as defined by the Eurocratic élite on the Euro map (Figure 5.119).

As such it can be observed that European nation-state territorial acquisitions, in most cases made by force during Colonial/Imperialist times, and separated in the case of French Guiana by 5000 km from the European ‘continent’, qualify more for inclusion in what the ECB considers to be Europe, than, for example Turkey, a country sharing a border with Greece. A similar argument can be made for Morocco, a country positioned at the narrowest point a mere twelve kilometres from Spain. With the ‘extra-European’ territories not being part of the European ‘continent’ in geographical or geological terms, and, for example, French Guiana being unquestionably situated on the American continent, the qualification criteria must be argued to be of a cultural quality. Reminiscent of Romano Prodi (2000a, 45-46), President of the European Commission (1999-2004), stating, in his book Europe as I See It, Europe to continue to represent the ‘beacon of world civilisation’, that these territories are visually expressed as culturally belonging to their ‘mother’ state, and thus to Europe, as a result of their forced incorporation into European nation-state Colonial/Imperial ambitions. Again, one qualifier for inclusion can be argued to have been faith, for none of these Colonial/Imperial acquisitions are present-day territories with a Muslim majority, but are mainly Christian (see Figure 5.117).
5.6.4 The Euro discourse: Summary and discussion

In summary, the above investigation of the Euro iconography as indicator of the cultural values associated with collective identities has, first of all, demonstrated its development to have been under the complete control of the highest Eurocratic élite, from the selection of themes for the EBDC, via the selection of the winning design, to changes in terms of iconographic details. In particular, in selecting Robert Kalina’s design, the ECB acted in opposition to the advice given by EOS Gallup Europe on the basis of a detailed opinion survey, and, thus, in opposition to the preferences of the EU citizenry. With the decision of the final Euro design lying exclusively with the President of the ECB, it can be argued that the Euro design mainly reflects the ideology of the Eurocratic élite responsible for its production. This is particular the case in the light of the changes to the final Euro design demanded by the ECB from the designer immediately after its selection, making them a prerequisite for final acceptance. In short, the final Euro design mainly reflects an understanding of cultural Europe as understood by the Eurocratic élite. At the same time, the Euro does by no means, as has been claimed by numerous researchers, represent a ‘post-modern’ (i.e. ideologically undetermined and uncommitted) approach to currency iconography. Like traditional nation-state currencies it has recourse to nation-specific culture heritage elements in terms of culture heritage sites. Even after the ECB ordered, in avoidance of a plagiarism lawsuit, the design to undergo a Eurocratically controlled ‘alienation process’, it is by no means without ideological context. On the superficial level the Euro design’s windows and doorways have been interpreted as signifying openness and communication, the empty buildings symbolically inviting habitation by the owner of the banknote. Yet, the places offered for habitation are dominated by architectural references to the Christian faith. These represent the only references to religious buildings, generating an iconographic environment characterised by exclusive notions of Christianity. With up to three-quarters of Euro banknotes in circulation at any given time displaying features of Christian religious buildings, the Euro iconography can be argued to banally ‘force’ EU citizens to insert themselves into a Christian context, as well as anyone handling the money (citizens and non-citizens) to understand Europe, as well as, by implication, (EU)rope, in a primarily Christian context. Further, the map of Europe included on the Euro, starting as a geographical map and later altered on demand of the ECB, excludes, by the use of a contrasting colours/brightness, certain countries as not being part of Europe/(EU)rope. It
has been contended that this act of exclusion, based on the idea of rightful historical belonging, is also most likely based on faith. All countries displayed as not belonging to Europe have a mainly Muslim population. An ideological demarcation on the basis of faith can be argued to take place. Also, reminiscent of Early Modern Eurocentric conceptualisations of Europe, 'extra-European' territories, most of them thousands of kilometres away from Europe, are displayed in the same colour as 'core Europe'. The far distant Colonial acquisitions of European nation-states become more European than countries bordering present-day EU countries.

In conclusion, unlike suggested by numerous scholars, the Euro iconography does neither represent a 'true catalyst for integration' (Duisenberg 2001a, *A New Future for Europe – Welcoming the Euro Banknotes and Coins* (speech given at an awards ceremony and press conference held on the eve of the introduction of the *Euro banknotes and coins*)) nor a successful symbol for 'the European spirit of openness and cooperation' (ECB 2005a, *European Banknotes and Coins*). Instead it becomes expression of Eurocratic elitist notions of Europe/(EU)rope being characterised in terms of in-groups by Christian societies, and in opposition to out-groups taking the shape of Islamic societies. If indeed it represents, as claimed by the ECB (2003, 82, *Euro Banknote Exhibition*), a 'vision of a joint future', then this joint future is generated by banal means as taking place under the unifying influence of Christianity. Taking all this together, the final Euro design can be argued to exhibit traditional Western cultural and religious prejudices characterised by exclusivist notions of *Self* and *Other* (i.e. Islamophobia and Eurocentrism, as well as, to a lesser degree, Colonialism and Imperialism).

5.7 THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE: IMPLEMENTATION IN SYMBOLS

Setting out to identify the concrete character of the Eurocratically approved understanding of Europe's cultural heritage as implemented in symbols, this chapter focused on the Euro banknote iconography discourse and its result, the final Euro design - the most omnipresent and prestigious expression of the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm. Via the application of CDA and VCA, it was possible to demonstrate how each major stage in the development and implementation of the Euro iconography represents a discursive process under the complete control of the Eurocratic elite. This control ranges from the
selection of themes deemed appropriate by the TSAG, via the selection of
features deemed qualified by the FSAG, to the selection of the winning EBDC
design and its subsequent enforced iconographic changes. Further, this chapter
demonstrated the result of this intense Eurocratic control to be the generation
of a symbolic discourse rooted in the notion of Europe — and, by implication,
(EU)rope — being characterised in cultural terms by exclusive references to the
Christian faith. The analysis of the FSAG discourse (see chapter 5.4), its
architectural sites and historical portraits, generally speaking, showed it to be
governed primarily by Christian religious symbols (historical figures and
architectural heritage sites). In comparison, all other symbolic discourses play
reduced roles, while, besides a single case\(^{12}\), non-Christian religious references
are completely absent. Also, the European ‘family’ (TSAG May 1995, 3) as
symbolically defined by the FSAG historical portraits exhibits an exclusively
White ethnographic background. Further, on the basis of the FSAG’s
recommendations for symbols, the EBDC discourse was shown to mirror its
main characteristics (see chapter 5.5). As observed for the FSAG discourse
before, the EBDC’s architectural features, historical portraits, as well as, to a
lesser degree, its artefacts exhibit religious references exclusive to the Christian
faith. In particular the architectural discourse is dominated by such symbolic
references. Perhaps unsurprising in the light of the FSAG discourse, the EBDC’s
historical portraits also portray an exclusively White ethnographic populace in
symbol. In a last step, the Euro architecture iconography as implemented, when
analysed beyond the level of doorways and windows as symbols for openness,
has been demonstrated to be characterised by references to Christian religious
buildings, and, thus, by Christianity in general (see chapter 5.6). As with the
aforementioned FSAG and EBDC discourse, no non-Christian religious symbols
make an appearance. Similarly, it was possible to identify the map of Europe
displayed on the final Euro design, after having undergone final editing by the
Eurocratic élite, to develop an iconography of in-groups and out-groups.
Instead of the borderless geographical map initially designed by Robert Kalina,
the Eurocratic version, in its use of colour-blends, can be argued to become
expression of a cultural paradigm in which states with a Muslim majority are
displayed as alien out-groups. As such, the Euro iconography, with its alleged
assemblage of ‘token architecture’, by no means represents a ‘post-modern’ (see
above) approach to currency iconography, inviting as claimed by numerous

\(^{12}\) This single case is the inclusion of the Alhambra in the FSAG architectural feature catalogue (FSAG 1995b,
58). Also, it can be argued that the Alhambra does not represent a ‘pure’ non-Christian religious site, for it
also includes the later Renaissance palace of Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor.
scholars (Gilbert and Helleiner 1999a; Kaelberer 2002; Hymans 2002; 2003; 2004), those exposed to it to form their own vision of community. Of course identification always takes place by the individual, yet, unlike an abstract/modern design, the Euro’s banal message strongly narrows down the possibilities to do so. It influences and guides the identification process.

In conclusion, this chapter’s investigation of the Euro iconography discourse as indicator of the cultural values as understood and envisaged by the Eurocratic élite responsible for its selection has demonstrated this identity to be constructed as being exclusively characterised by notions of Christianity. Across all three major development steps towards the final Euro iconography, only a single non-Christian religious reference appears, while Christian religious references dominate the discourse in general. Exhibiting this religio-cultural bias, the Euro iconography discourse stands in opposition to the EU’s ‘quasi-constitutional obligation to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’ (Romano Prodi 2003, 2), as well as its claim to be ‘open to all traditions and religions’ (Prodi 2001) (see chapters 1.5.3, 3.1.1, 3.2.3). The fact that the Euro represents the most prestigious expression of the Eurocratic culture heritage idea(l) makes this disparity between Eurocratic rhetorics and actions even more telling. This has been further emphasised by finding the control and assessment bodies established by the ECB in order to safeguard the neutrality of the decision-making process to be ignored when standing in opposition to what must be assumed to represent the Eurocratic élite’s own paradigm of European culture (i.e. its consciously or subconsciously held cultural, including religious, assumptions and preconceptions). With the large majority of Eurocrats originating from a White ethnic background (of the 785 European Parliament’s MEPs just nine are not White (Matthews 2007)); this could also explain the fact that not a single FSAG or EBDC portrait could be confidently assigned to a non-White ethnic background. Also, the preceding analysis has cast considerable doubt on numerous academic work concluding the Euro design selection process, this ‘carefully co-ordinated series of activities to ensure that nothing is left to chance’ (ECB 2001b), to have been ‘carefully structured to avoid offending various identity groupings’ (Hymans 2004, 20; see also Hymans 2003; Johler 2003, 11; Kaelberer 2002). In short, the Eurocratic implementation of a supra-national culture heritage paradigm in

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13 With at least five percent of the EU’s population being of non-White ethnographic background, the number of non-White MEPs, in order to reflect this situation, should be at least 40, not 9 (Matthews 2007).
symbols fails to live up to its *challenge of identity diversity* (see chapter 1.3), becoming instead a tool for exclusion. Further, the development process leading to the final Euro design, in failing to encourage and safeguard the open and equal treatment of different understandings of the cultural past, has been demonstrated to run aground its *democratic challenge*. 
CHAPTER SIX
THE EUROCRATIC CREATION OF HERITAGE:
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After having conducted an in-depth analysis of the Eurocratic creation of heritage at the supra-national level, ranging from the planning stage (chapter 3), via its implementation on the ground (chapter 4), to its implementation in symbols (chapter 5), this final chapter serves to combine the findings of these individual threads into a catalogue of recommendations aiming to assist the Eurocratic élite in the development of a culture heritage paradigm grounded in notions of openness, inclusivity, and diversity. To go into more detail, firstly it will reiterate the aims and objectives of this thesis, followed by a summary of how it examined the discursive role played by supra-national culture heritage in the EU. This, in turn, leads to a final presentation and discussion of the analytical findings of this thesis, which will then culminate in a catalogue of practical recommendations for heritage policy at EU level as suggested by this study. Finally, this chapter provides a critical assessment of the thesis itself in the context of future fields of study. In brief, the following chapter outlines how EU culture heritage management could be reconciled with Eurocratic rhetorics of the same.

6.1 DISCUSSION OF THE STUDY

6.1.1 Aims and objectives

Rooted in a post-processual understanding of the material evidence of the past as having no intrinsic value itself, but as being the constantly changing product of current social, political, and even economical circumstances (chapter 1.6), this thesis set out to provide a critical, in-depth examination of the EU’s supra-national culture heritage - and, thus, culture identity - paradigm as planned and implemented by Eurocratic bodies of culture. In leaving behind the simplifying analysis of rhetoric metaphors in the EU official discourse, as has largely characterised this field of academic enquiry so far, this thesis aimed to expose the actual character of Eurocratic culture heritage/identity discourse practice. This included an examination of its ‘transitive’ (i.e. practices of sustaining relations of domination) as well as ‘intransitive’ (i.e. concrete practices of culture identity construction) aspects. In doing so, this thesis aimed to provide a fresh boost for EU culture policy in the light of its numerous challenges, i.e. its democratic challenge, challenge of identity diversity, challenge of
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the national, challenge of the 'fuzzy' borders, and challenge of novelty (chapter 1.3). The result of this would be a list of practical recommendations and general guidelines to be taken up (and entering struggle) within the practices in question, aiming to improve the chances of Eurocratic heritage measures to meet those challenges, and, thus, to successfully live up within the practical realm of culture heritage policy to the EU's overall rhetoric dedication to notions of openness, multiplicity, and diversity (chapter 1.5.3).

6.1.2 Analytical method

In order to allow an assessment of the concrete character and consequences of discourse and knowledge of the cultural past in the context of the EU's supranational culture heritage paradigm, this thesis rooted its analytical method within critical realism (chapter 2.2). Offering the epistemological underpinnings within which to anchor notions of text and discourse, critical realism provided the analytical foundation for this explanatory critique. In doing so, transcending the strict traditional opposition between interpretivist and structuralist conceptualisations of social reality, this thesis turned towards Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in search for an appropriate analytical theory and methodology (chapter 2.3). Working within Fairclough's three interrelated dimensions of discourse, it also re-emphasised CDA's usefulness as an analytical framework in the context of critical heritage studies. It is in this context that data took the shape of 'text' in its widest meaning, including verbal, textual, visual, and material evidence. In concrete terms this study employed for its data conjunctually related policy documents, reports, directives, and other bureaucratic mechanisms, as well as open-ended interviews, images, and the material remains of the past themselves, and, by placing them into discursive context with each other, developed an account of the processes of production and interpretation at the level of discursive practice.

In order to examine the concrete character of the Eurocratic culture heritage discourse, this thesis presented a string of three logically interrelated case studies. Starting with an examination of the planning stage of Eurocratic culture heritage generation, chapter 3 analysed two interrelated discursive articulations. These took the shape of the Council of Europe (CoE), the EU's main body of education, culture, and heritage, and the European Cultural Routes Project (ECRP), one of its allegedly most successful culture heritage
projects, and it’s The Celts Cultural Route (TCCR). Having examined the planning stage of heritage generation, chapter 4 then focused on the Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage paradigm as implemented on the ground. This took the concrete shape of conducting CDA on the ECRP’s flagship project, namely the Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Routes (SCPR), and its culture heritage site discourse. Further, in order to ensure a fallibilistic approach to analysis (i.e. seeking out, where possible, deviant cases in the data), this chapter also employed the case of the Legacy of Al-Andalus (LAA) cultural route, another of the ECRP’s cultural routes. Continuing from this, chapter 5 turned its analytical gaze towards the Eurocratic creation of supra-national heritage/identity in terms of its implementation in symbols (symbolic elements are just as real as physical elements in that they have concrete effects on and within practices). In order to make such symbolic practices subject to scholarly analysis, chapter 5 turned towards what must be considered the most omnipresent expression of the Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage paradigm in symbol, namely the Euro banknote iconography, including the development process leading towards its establishment.

6.1.3 Analytical results

Each of the case studies employed in this thesis revealed some of the Eurocratic élite’s ‘hidden’ attitude towards qualified knowledge of the cultural past in the context of a European supra-national culture heritage paradigm. Eurocratic rhetorics, from the EU in general (chapter 1.5.3), via its primary institution of culture, i.e. the CoE (chapter 3.1.1), down to individual projects of culture heritage (chapters 3.2.3, 3.3.1, 4.4, 4.5.1), such as the ECRP and its cultural routes networks, are characterised by a rhetoric dedication to notions of diversity, openness, inclusivity, and multi-vocality. The same has been demonstrated to be the case for the European Central Bank (ECB) in reference to the development of the Euro iconography (chapters 5.3, 5.4, 5.6.1). This overall approach is most poignantly summarised by the EU’s official motto of Unity-in-diversity (chapter 1.5.3). As, for example, the case of the ECRP demonstrated (chapter 3.3.1), the means by which to ensure this takes the alleged shape of a democratic and multi-vocal Eurocratic approach to knowledge generation and appropriation, resulting in a plethora of different levels of reading (i.e. making sense of) the cultural past. The past is claimed to be made subject to multiple discourses. In particular it has to be emphasised that the EU strongly propagates the separation of the religious and the social sphere. Stating to
support religious pluralism in general, Eurocratic bodies emphasise the supranation’s ‘quasi-constitutional obligation to respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’ (Prodi 2003, 2), to be ‘open to all traditions and religions’ (Prodi 2001), as well as ‘to promote intercultural and interreligious dialogue through a better understanding of European history’ (EICR 2005d). Accordingly, as highlighted in chapter 4.1, none of the EU’s primary or secondary laws incorporate statements binding it to a concrete religion, while the Draft Treaty of the European Constitution actively prohibits religious discrimination of any form and emphasises its respect for Europe’s creeds (EU 2004, article II-21, part II, article II-22, part II). It is against the backdrop of these and similar claims that this thesis examined concrete cases of EU culture heritage generation.

In practice, the critical analysis of the planning stage of Eurocratic culture heritage generation, as particularly poignantly demonstrated by the case study of the ECRP (chapter 3.3), found the Eurocratic process of culture heritage generation to be characterised by institutional élitism. Even though Eurocratic bodies of culture seem to have started their institutional activities with the best intentions of allowing and actively furthering a multi-vocal paradigm of appropriating the cultural past, the Eurocratic character of knowledge, fuelled in the case of the ECRP by a fear of losing control over the past, quickly underwent substantial changes on the inside. Wanting ‘the Union to speak more with a single voice’ (CEC 25.07.2001, 27), Eurocratic bodies of culture heritage reverted to a process of knowledge generation relying entirely on the establishment of expert panels, panels selected by the Eurocratic élite. Experts, it has been demonstrated, mainly take the shape of peer-recognised scientists and other academics working within a monothematic field of knowledge. Their role as perceived by the Eurocrats is to define appropriate subjects for culture heritage projects, interpret them in their European meaning, and place them in their wider (EU)ropean context. In doing so, the Eurocratic élite of culture heritage narrows down the ‘knowledge intake variety’ (KIV) in terms of notions of qualified knowledge of the past. For example, the establishment of the Theme Selection Advisory Group (TSAG) and Feature Selection Advisory Group (FSAG) in the context of the Euro iconography development demonstrated this clearly (chapters 5.3 & 5.4). According to the Eurocrats, the scientific élite is relied on in order to develop a clearer, single voice for the EU. Yet, in relying entirely on this élite, one demonstrated in the context of the TCCR (chapter 3.4.3) to reject any non-scientific approaches to the past as invalid, the
Eurocratic paradigm of knowledge generation effectively excludes anyone not belonging to either of the two groups. Yet, even though scientific experts become the discourse mechanism limiting the KIV for Eurocratic culture heritage projects, it is by no means them holding full control of their final character. As the case study of the TCCR further highlighted (chapter 3.4.4), when scientific experts, employed by the Eurocratic meritocracy in order to provide 'easy answers to easy questions' (CEC 04.12.2001, 6), fail to speak with a single voice, one providing complementarity between Europe's past and present and in line with official EU rhetorics of supra-national unity, the experts are being dismissed altogether. Justification to do so takes the shape of accusing the experts of politicising their interpretations of the past, while, by implication, suggesting Eurocratic bodies involved to be free of such entanglements. As such, ultimately it is the Eurocrats who, even in opposition to various bodies employed in order to inform its decision-making process, as well as in opposition to the opinion of its own citizenry, decide on the EU's official culture heritage paradigm. This pattern has, for example, been identified for the development of the Euro banknote iconography (chapter 5.6). As has also been demonstrated for the case of the SCPR (chapters 4.4.1 & 4.4.2), multiple ways of making sense of the cultural past, as well as the opinion of the EU's citizenry, are rejected in favour of a single way that is in line with Eurocratic ideology. As such, this work has demonstrated the planning stage of Eurocratic culture heritage generation, unlike official rhetorics suggest, to be mono-vocal and non-democratic in its decision-making process. It is on the basis of these findings that the case studies demonstrated the planning stage of culture heritage generation, underneath a skin-deep layer of pluralist and democratic rhetorics, to exhibit all characteristics of the 'Europe of the élite' as identified for EU identity politics in general by, for example, Bellier (2000, 59) and Risse (2003, 3). It is in this context that the EU fails 'to escape intellectually and linguistically from the dominant model of the nation state' (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 6), considerably limiting its chances for, if not outrightly preventing, the development of a democratic and multi-vocal supra-national culture heritage paradigm.

Having examined the character of Eurocratic knowledge generation in terms of the cultural past, and having demonstrated the Eurocratic élite to hold full control over the cultural past even in opposition to scientific experts and its own citizenry, this thesis went on to examine the concrete character of the
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culture heritage paradigm as implemented. How does the EU envisage Europe's supra-national culture heritage in practice? In order to propose an answer to this question in terms of its implementation on the ground, chapter 4 employed the case study of the SCPR as the ECRP's flagship project, inspiration and reference point for Eurocratic measures of culture heritage in general. Understood by the Eurocratic élite to represent a co-operation model for a future Great Europe, it is this ECR's Christian religious theme of the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela (SdC) that, arguably, by implication, creates this cooperation model as being based on the notion of Europe traditionally being united in the Christian faith, yet not in diversity. This is particularly the case in that the Christian religious culture heritage elements collected to form the SCPR are only in a minority of cases actually thematically connected to the figure of St. James or the pilgrimage to SdC. As such, in order to develop the SCPR as a heritage network of European/(EU)ropean proportions (i.e. stretching from Portugal to Poland and from Italy to Scandinavia), yet with the pilgrimage routes to SdC lacking any firm evidence on the ground outside of Spain and France, its thematic/discursive focus of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC is widened from a particular religious phenomenon to that of the Christian faith in general. The Visual Content Analysis (VCA) conducted on the photographs of culture heritage sites (in their role as discursive 'texts') included in the official SCPR guidebook, taking mainly the shape of Christian religious buildings with a particular emphasis on cathedrals, demonstrated how the notion of a powerful, imposing, controlling, and all-encompassing Christianity in a European context is discursively further emphasised. The numerous artefacts of baptism (e.g. medieval fonts) given particular emphasis in the context of the official SCPR guidebook further intensified this discursive thrust. It is at the same time that throughout the official guidebook references to Muslims or Islam were shown to generate a discourse revolving around notions of barbarism and violence. In short, while Christianity is presented as the 'cultural glue' uniting and holding together Europe (and, by implication, (EU)rope), Muslims and Islam are discursively generated as representing a threat to Europe as a whole, and, thus, as non-European (and, by implication, non-(EU)ropean). The fact that Eurocratic bodies of culture responsible for its creation consider the SCPR to represent a leitmotiv for the ECRP and for Eurocratic culture heritage measures in general, while at the same time failing to recognise any conflict in terms of their rhetoric dedication to notions of neutrality in terms of faith, may be expression of the Eurocratic élites own...
cultural assumptions and preconceptions. Further, the selection of the figure of St. James has been demonstrated to represent a particularly ill-advised selection for a theme. Not only does the SCPR revolve around an exclusively Christian theme (which is not surprising in the context of St. James, but also not helpful in terms of the EU’s search for neutrality of faith), but in selecting the figure of St. James the ECRP has recourse to a legend rooted in its historical context in the fight of medieval Christian rulers against Muslim Iberia. Arguably, it conjures images of a clash of civilisations and carries with it the message of justified aggression against Muslims (or, in fact, any non-Christian faith). The recent case of the statue of St. James (chapter 4.6) in the cathedral of SdC highlighted the timeliness (or timelessness) of this discursive paradigm in terms of its symbolism for Christian fundamentalists. In short, the SCPR revolve around a historical discourse in which Muslims do not belong to Europe. St. James’ unificatory power within the Eurocratic context rests in discursively providing Europeans with a common enemy in the shape of Muslims and Islam. The inclusion of numerous culture heritage sites of a ‘defensive’ and largely military character (e.g. barbicans, town walls, and castles) was argued to further fuel this discourse. As was the case for Christian religious buildings, the photogenic discourse of ‘defensive’ culture heritage sites included in the SCPR guidebook was demonstrated to further emphasise notions of defensiveness, power, and control of access. Taken together, in the light of the more than sixteen million EU citizens adhering to the Muslim faith, the selection of a theme revolving around St. James or Santiago Matamoros, a Christian saint carrying the ‘honorary’ title ‘the Moor killer’, must be considered inappropriate, counterproductive, if not dangerous to the EU’s identity project. This discourse of Europe’s cultural past being defined, in religious terms exclusively, by the notion of Christianity could also be identified at the symbolic level. As chapter 5 demonstrated, the Eurocratic over-reliance on Christianity in their search for a supra-national culture heritage/identity paradigm could also be identified for the development of the Euro banknote iconography. In particular the VCA conducted on the FSAG catalogue features (chapter 5.4), a Eurocratically tightly controlled process of knowledge appropriation representing the Eurocratic symbolic feature guideline for all following Euro design Competition (EDC) entries, presented the idea of a united Europe to be inextricably and exclusively linked to the idea of the Christian faith. While Christian religious buildings dominate the FSAG catalogue’s architectural heritage site discourse, this over-reliance on
Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations

Christianity is particularly emphasised by the utter absence of any other faith's religious buildings. This could be observed for all development stages towards the establishment of the final Euro design following the FSAG, culminating, via (and reflected in) the EDC discourse (chapter 5.5), in the exclusive references to the Christian faith to be found in the final Euro design. In short, throughout the Eurocratic development of the Euro iconography, religious references are exclusively made to the Christian faith. Also, not only could the Eurocratic notion of qualified European culture heritage be demonstrated to be deeply rooted in the notion of the Christian faith, it is also inextricably linked to an understanding of Europe in an exclusively White ethnographic context. As highlighted in particular by the Euro design development discourse (chapters 5.4.1 & 5.5.1), Europe's qualified (i.e. qualified for representation on the Euro, and, thus, considered qualified to represent (EU)rope) population through the ages as expressed in symbols includes not a single example of a non-White person. Other biases could be identified in terms of gender distribution (preferably male) and gender roles (male-active/female-passive), as well as for national bias (largely Italy), something the Eurocratic élite claims to have successfully avoided. Numerous political and academic commentators have heralded the Euro design as implemented as perhaps the world’s first 'post-modern' currency design, exhibiting an iconography that is so ideologically undetermined that it can only be interpreted in organic and multiple ways at the individual level. The critical assessment of the Euro iconography development as conducted as part of this study argued this not to be the case. As such, the Eurocratic discourse of culture heritage on the ground and in symbols was demonstrated to not only fail to remain neutral in terms of religious orientation, but, in fact, to actively generate a culture heritage discourse that could hardly be more over-reliant on exclusive references to a single faith, that of Christianity. Against the background of a fallibilistic approach to data analysis in CDA, examination of the LAA’s implementation on the ground (chapter 4.5.4), an ECR revolving around the cultural influence of the medieval Islamic caliphate of Al-Andalus on Europe as a whole, revealed it to be discursively 'deflated'. While the geographical coverage of the LAA reduces the cultural impact of Al-Andalus on Europe to the southernmost tip of Spain only, instead of including all of the Iberian peninsula and parts of modern-day France (representing the full extent of the medieval caliphate), it is, as highlighted above, the SCPR's geographical coverage that is discursively
‘inflated’. As such, the Eurocratic culture heritage discourse could be identified to apply different standards to culture heritage projects depending on faith.

6.2 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Eurocratic discourse on the supra-national cultural past fails to live up in practice to numerous of the challenges faced by the EU in terms of entativity (chapter 1.3). Firstly, on the basis of three major case studies, this thesis demonstrated the Eurocratic elite to have run aground its democratic challenge. Even though representing a prerequisite for successfully tackling any challenges of culture identity diversity, Eurocratic bodies of culture fail to allow a democratic approach at the planning stage of culture heritage implementation in terms of a wide KIV needed in order to give a balanced voice to a plethora of identities. While Eurocratic rhetorics claim an effective system of knowledge diversity to be in place, allegedly making Europe’s past subject to multiple discourses and, as a result, developing a multi-vocal paradigm, the various case studies employed as part of this study, and, in particular, the case of the TCCR (chapter 3.4), demonstrated scientific expert panels to be given priority in terms of qualified knowledge of the cultural past. As a result, non-scientific understandings and appropriations of the cultural past tend to be rejected, thus gravely limiting the Eurocratic KIV. It could be argued that the Eurocratic reliance on scientific experts allows Eurocrats to claim to actively encourage knowledge diversity, while employing scientific experts as an efficient ‘screening-tool’. Such an interpretation of the mechanisms at work at the Eurocratic planning stage of culture heritage generation was given further argumentative weight by the Eurocratic reaction to unexpected scientific expert diversity when interpreting the paradigm of the Celts (chapter 3.4). Scientific experts, when not providing interpretations of the past in line with the Eurocratic notion of ‘remembering the New Europe’ (i.e. interpreting Europe’s past and (EU)rope’s present as a paradigmatic Same) (chapter 1.5.2), are disregarded together with all other alternative interpretations of Europe’s cultural past. Instead it is only the Eurocratic élite’s reading of the cultural past that is accepted, making it a mono-vocal paradigm of knowledge appropriation. With the Eurocratic élite holding complete control over the cultural past, and executing this control according only to its own (culturally and ideologically determined) understanding of appropriate knowledge, it is bound, from the outset, to fail its democratic challenge.
Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations

In the light of the above failure it is arguably unsurprising to find the Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage paradigm as implemented in terms of concrete projects on the ground and in symbols to fall short of its challenge of identity diversity. While rhetorically devoted to the notion of Unity-in-diversity, Eurocratic bodies fail to develop a diverse and multi-vocal culture heritage paradigm, one in which Europe’s diverse ethnic and religious identity groups, existing – and having existed throughout the ‘continent’s’ past – at a multitude of different levels (e.g. local, regional, national), are not marginalised or silenced in favour of a mono-vocal, in particular mono-religious, culture heritage concept. A supra-national way of European culture heritage appreciation cannot be developed without multi-vocality and multi-discursivity. By largely reducing the culture heritage essence of being European, through banal measures, to the exclusive notion of an ethnographically exclusively White ‘Unity-in-Christianity’ worth defending, the Eurocratic élite seems to remain trapped in its own cultural assumptions and preconceptions. In excluding – or at least marginalising – from its implemented supra-national culture heritage paradigm every present-day (EU)ropean identifying him/herself as being a Muslim, Jew, or Orthodox Christian, as well as anyone not exhibiting a White ethnography, the EU is arguably bound to alienate numerous and diverse cultural identities to be found among the EU’s citizenry.

Closely related to the above is the EU’s failure in terms of its challenge of the national. In developing a mono-discursive paradigm of supra-national culture heritage, one having recourse to centuries old exclusivist religious, ethnographic, and gender stereotypes, as well as emphasising notions of a Same worth defending against an alien and aggressive Other, the EU can be argued to at least passively fuel the growing problem of racially, ethnically, and religiously motivated violence spreading across Europe. In fact, in the light of the growing numbers of European members of the political meritocracy advocating the need for the redevelopment of an inward looking nationalism, this failure, in the long run, might prove to become one of the main threats to the continuing existence and success of the European supra-national state.

This brings us to the EU’s challenge of novelty faced by the EU’s political architects. It cannot be claimed that the Eurocratic meritocracy is operating within an easy hegemonic environment. Representing the world’s first supra-
national hegemonic structure at this institutional level, the EU lacks any established reference points for instilling feelings of supra-national identity in its subject citizens. However, it is precisely because of this 'uncharted-ness' that a successful response to the EU's challenge of novelty is unlikely to be found in an adoption of culture heritage paradigms that were intended to unite the European 'continent' in the distant past, such as in the case of the legend of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC. The legend of St. James might for a short period of time have united European military forces against an alien foe. Yet, the 'enemy' then (if one understands the medieval Muslim occupation of the Iberian peninsula over a period of nearly eight centuries to represent a continuous aggressive act) is by no means the 'enemy' now. Muslims are, to a considerable degree, part of present-day Europe. As such, in order to have a chance of successfully tackling its challenge of novelty, the EU has to interpret the past in the light of the present, not in the light of the past.

In reflection of this thesis' findings in relation to the challenges faced by the Eurocratic architects of (EU)rope, what recommendations can be made? Representing the key output of this work, the following section will present a catalogue of practical recommendations as suggested by this study, outlining how EU supra-national culture heritage management at the planning and implementation stage could be reconciled with the Eurocratic rhetoric dedication to openness, inclusivity, diversity, and multi-discursivity.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Even though this thesis does not represent an empirical but argumentative assessment of the EU culture heritage discourse in relation to Eurocratic claims about it (the complexity of the EU as a subject for analysis precludes such possibility), it nevertheless allows the pinpointing of a number of crucial issues. As summarised in Figure 6.1, based on the analytical results of this study, five major recommendations concerning the planning stage of Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage generation can be proposed.
Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations

The Planning Stage of Eurocratic Heritage Generation

- More careful consideration in terms of the initial choice of a theme for EU culture heritage projects (particularly important for flagship projects, such as the ECRP)
- No exclusive reliance on scientific experts when deciding on acceptable knowledge of the cultural past (diversification in terms of KIV)
- More acceptance by Eurocratic institutional bodies of the findings, decisions, and recommendations of their own panels and groups, even if their views are not in line with EU ideology
- More acceptance by Eurocratic institutional bodies of the opinions and reactions of its own citizenry
- More active awareness among the Eurocratic elite of its own socio-political and cultural 'entangled-ness' in terms of its understanding, selection, and use of the cultural past

Figure 6.1: Recommendations for the planning stage of Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage generation as suggested by this study

Firstly, Eurocratic bodies of culture heritage should put more careful consideration into the selection of appropriate themes for projects to be used in the context of supra-national culture identity generation. As the case of the SCPR highlighted, Eurocratic institutions of culture - resting firmly within the wider EU policy discourse of strongly propagating the separation of the religious and the social sphere, supporting religious pluralism in general, as well as actively prohibiting religious discrimination of any form - should not select an exclusively Christian religious theme for a flagship projects after which to model others. The fact that in terms of their historicity the legend of St. James and the pilgrimage to SdC are also inextricably linked to the notion of Muslims and Islam as representing a non-European aggressive and barbaric Other that has to be removed from European soil, emphasises the necessity for reflection in this area even more poignantly. It is in this context that prehistory might provide a particularly fruitful area for Eurocratic heritage activities. In having recourse to a cultural past predating the emergence of any of today's main religions, such as the Neolithic or the Bronze Age, a culture heritage paradigm devoid of religious references could be developed. Secondly, in order to develop in practice an inclusive, diverse, and multi-vocal system of appropriating the cultural past at the supra-national level, Eurocratic bodies
cannot rely solely on scientific experts. As the case of the TCCR demonstrated, in considering only scientific, peer-recognised understandings of the past to represent the qualified standard, inclusivity and diversity are effectively being prevented from the outset. As such, panels employed by the Eurocratic élite in defining the character of acceptable knowledge for a particular culture heritage project must be diversified in terms of their background and KIV. At the same time however, and constituting a third recommendation, after establishing more diverse panels and groups allowing a wider KIV in terms of appropriating the cultural past, Eurocratic institutional bodies of culture heritage have to show more acceptance of their findings, decisions, and recommendations. This process of accepting the validity of multiple ways of making sense of the past must take place even if not all of these ways are in line with the eurocratic notion of 'remembering the New Europe'. This does not mean that the (EU)ropean message has to be diluted. In fact, this way it should be possible to re-centre the emphasis in Unity-in-diversity on the notion of diversity, instead of sacrificing this diversity in the search for unity. Closely related to this recommendation, as highlighted by the case of the selection of the final Euro design from the Euro Banknote Design Competition (EBDC) entries, Eurocratic institutional bodies in their search for supra-national identity should have their actions guided to a larger degree by the opinion of its citizenry. For example, instead of ignoring the findings of the EOS Gallup Europe opinion survey concerning the EBDC design most likely to be accepted by the EU’s citizenry (based on the results of a citizen opinion survey), the ECB should have been led in its final decision-making process by the people’s opinion instead of imposing an ultimately top-down approach. Lastly, and perhaps the most important recommendation in that it must be considered a prerequisite for the successful implementation of all others, the Eurocratic élite must develop a higher awareness of its own social, political, and cultural 'entangled-ness' in terms of its understanding and use of the cultural past. For example, when Thomas-Penette (2000c, 8; see chapter 3.5) declares the ECRP to embody everybody's 'right to history devoid of manipulation', the danger of Eurocrats perceiving themselves and their projects of culture heritage as objective and unaffected by ideology becomes apparent. When ideological neutrality is assumed/declared for the planning stage of culture heritage generation, this means that decisions are not critically questioned anymore and alternatives are not explored. As such, it stands in the way of a culture heritage paradigm characterised by openness, diversity, and inclusivity.
Concerning the question how the implementation stage of Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage production could be reconciled with notions of openness, diversity, and inclusivity, four major recommendations can be proposed on the basis of the results of this study (Figure 6.2).

**The Implementation Stage of Eurocratic Heritage Generation**

- More inclusion of interpretations of a particular phenomenon of the cultural past not lending themselves readily for, or standing in opposition to, its interpretation in a supra-national context in terms of the Eurocratic notion of *Remembering the New Europe*.
- Theme-independent distribution of culture heritage resources in the implementation of projects within a particular discursive articulation.
- Avoidance of projects becoming, in the Eurocratic search for a trans-European culture heritage phenomenon, geographically and discursively 'inflated' while others are being 'deflated'.
- More active awareness among the Eurocratic élite of its own socio-political and cultural 'entangled-ness' in terms of its understanding, selection, and use of the cultural past.

Figure 6.2: Recommendations for the implementation stage of Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage generation as suggested by this study

Firstly, interpretations of a particular phenomenon of the cultural past not lending themselves readily for, or even standing in opposition to, Eurocratic notions of *Remembering the New Europe* (see chapter 1.5.2) should find expression as part of a multi-vocal paradigm of appropriating the cultural past. As demonstrated by the case study of the SCPR, the presentation of the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC should also include those interpretations and heritage sites standing in paradigmatic opposition to the preferred Eurocratic reading. To do so does not have to translate into weakness for the Eurocratic culture heritage/identity paradigm. In fact, this diversity in practice might prove even more successful in highlighting the dangers, the possibilities, as well as the limitations of a present-day united Europe. Secondly, the application of culture heritage resources in terms of the practical implementation of projects within a particular discursive articulation should be theme-independent. As the case of the SCPR demonstrated in contrast to that of the LAA, different standards can be argued to be applied. While the SCPR
represents a — largely evidence-unsupported — network criss-crossing most of
the European ‘continent’, the LAA, in ignorance of the extremely widespread
Muslim culture heritage sites existing in a large number of European countries,
is limited to a comparatively marginal phenomenon restricted to the
southernmost part of Spain. Both ECR networks should, on the basis of the
culture heritage available on the ground, have been developed to vaguely
similar proportions — at least at the theoretical even though not yet practically
implemented level. For the Eurocratic élite of culture heritage measures, not
doing so means to put oneself in danger of being accused of the development of
token projects in order to maintain the image of actively seeking diversity and
inclusivity. Going hand-in-hand with this recommendation, in their search for
trans-European phenomena of the past in support of the idea of a culturally
united Europe by tradition, Eurocratic bodies of culture heritage have to be
careful to avoid geographically ‘inflating’ projects to supra-national
proportions by including discursive ‘fillers’, and, thus, changing the character
of the discourse altogether. The case of the SCPR demonstrated this discursive
mechanism at work. In an attempt to generate the notion of the evidence on the
ground proving the pilgrimage phenomenon to SdC to be of trans-European
proportions (a notion largely unsupported by direct evidence outside of Spain),
the SCPR heritage site network is widened to include a wide variety of other
countries, resulting in the majority of sites being unrelated to the theme of the
pilgrimage or St. James. Instead, the thematic link becomes that of the Christian
faith, baptism, and conversion in general. As such, in order to make this
‘inflation’ possible, the project’s theme discourse changes from that of St. James
and the pilgrimage to SdC to the Christian faith as a whole. This has to be
avoided. To proceed to the final point of recommendation, and repeating a
recommendation made for the planning stage, it is at the same time that
Eurocratic self-understandings and self-perceptions may become an excuse for
geographically and discursively ‘deflating’ other historical phenomena in terms
of qualified knowledge of the past. As census data demonstrates (chapter 5.7),
most Eurocrats come from a White ethnic background, with the Christian
tradition firmly embedded within the Eurocratic élite since its coming into
being (see, for example, Fransen 2001). Yet, these personal convictions and
ways of looking at and understanding the world must not stand in the way of a
democratic paradigm of Eurocratic culture heritage appreciation. It is in this
context that the LAA should not be geographically restricted to a marginal role.
It is this discrepancy between the SCPR’s discursive ‘inflation’ and the LAA’s
discursive 'deflation' that qualifies for a passive form of religious, as well as cultural, discrimination, something that the EU and its institutions claim to actively prohibit and avoid. As observed above for the planning stage of culture heritage implementation, a more active awareness among the Eurocratic élite of its own socio-political, as well as cultural, preconceptions and unchallenged assumptions is needed. This includes religious beliefs. The decision-making élite may perceive itself largely in a White Christian cultural context. The FSAG discourse, influencing the character of the Euro design discourse all the way to the final design adopted, and including only references to the Christian faith but no other, highlighted this area for potential improvement. This, however, does not mean that this cultural self-understanding is shared in the same way by the EU's citizenry. The Eurocratic meritocracy might be largely monocultural in its internal set-up, yet, as demographic data shows, its citizenry has, and continues to, become more and more multi-cultural. What is thus needed is a bottom-up approach to culture heritage instead of one prescribing culture heritage from the top down.

Advances in all the areas identified above for improvement would seriously heighten the chances for the development of a Eurocratic culture heritage management paradigm reconciled with (at the moment largely rhetoric) notions of openness, diversity, and inclusivity, as well as one that reflects more closely the cultural composition of the EU's present-day citizenry. It is, however, changes in the planning stage of Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage generation that must be considered the most important at this point. If the KIV is not widened in order to develop a more diverse system of Eurocratic knowledge assessment and qualification, the development of a supra-national culture heritage paradigm in practice (may this be on the ground or in symbols) must be considered at least very unlikely.

6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH

This thesis set out to determine in the Eurocratic supra-national context which aspects of the cultural past are given priority or salience, and which are not, by the meritocratic élite in charge of their production. As such, it asked questions about what discursive agendas and connections are given publicity and how, as observable across a number of contextually relevant institutional articulations. In doing so, it provided what represents perhaps the most detailed critical assessment of actual Eurocratic culture heritage measures to date. Here it must
be pointed out that this thesis employs as part of its analytical process subjective, not mutually exclusive categories. Doing so, this work ultimately represents a subjective assessment by the author. However, as such it must be considered as valid as any other academic interpretation, in particular in the context of CDA's aim to challenge existing discursive structures and mechanisms (in this context, see chapter 2.3.4). In order to facilitate further research along the lines of this thesis, as well as to open its CDA database to alternative interpretations, a CD-ROM with all the data collected and employed for this work has been included on the back inside cover. It contains the SPSS (v.12.01) databases for the SCPR Route de Pologne/Danemark heritage sites, the SCPR guidebook photographs, the SCPR guide-book figure info-boxes, the FSAG catalogue, the EBDC entries, visuals (JPEGs) of the FSAG catalogue items and EBDC design entries, as well as interview transcripts (incl. Kalina, Strube, Thomas-Penette).

As previously highlighted (see chapter 2.4), due to the complexity of the EU as a discursive practice and the limits of this thesis, a number of alternative routes of analysis could not be included, but, nevertheless, lend themselves as avenues for future research. With this piece of work having characterised the Eurocratic creation of supra-national culture heritage in terms of its discursive thrust in contrast to Eurocratic claims of the same, it lends itself as a starting position for CDA at the linguistic level. Such analysis would focus on the in-depth linguistic assessment of individual texts (e.g. policy documents), including aspects such as their composition and grammar, by employing discourse analytical methods such as key-words-in-context analysis (KWIC), lexical grammar analysis, and content analysis. Further, for reasons highlighted in chapter 2.4, the analytical spectrum of this thesis did not include a characterisation and assessment of the responses of EU citizens to Eurocratic culture heritage measures. As such, future work in this area of academic enquiry could demonstrate how people understand and/or react to the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm. By putting these findings in relation to the discursive character of the Eurocratic cultural past paradigm as, for example, presented by this study, and preferably with both being based on research having recourse to the same discursive articulation(s), a deeper understanding of the interplay between discursive object (the cultural past) and discursive subject (EU citizens) could be achieved. Reactions of non-EU citizens to the Eurocratic supra-national culture heritage paradigm would be of further
interest. Of particular use for such work would be Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Combining research along the lines laid out above, it should be possible to develop a more in-depth critical understanding of the Eurocratic culture heritage paradigm as an interactive discursive system, as well as to formulate concrete, articulation-specific programmes, not only recommendations. This way it should be possible, at least in the long run, to reconcile in practice culture heritage management by the EU with to date largely rhetorical notions of inclusivity, diversity, and multivocality.

Going full circle, the humorous, or rather sarcastic, illustration in chapter 1 (Figure 1.1) displayed a couple, one of which stating while reading a newspaper that 'One reads more and more about Europe - I am beginning to get the impression that it must lie somewhere nearby'. As public opinion polls as well as the Danish rejection and French near-rejection of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union have demonstrated, the EU lacks support from its own citizenry. (EU)ropeans have had problems feeling part of this supra-national project. They largely lack a feeling of joint cultural belonging. It is hoped that this thesis contributed towards the EU successfully tackling its entativity problems in terms of developing a culture heritage paradigm rooted in notions of openness, inclusivity, and diversity, bringing its practical actions in line with its rhetorics. Thus, might (EU)ropeans truly feel part of a modern-day Europe.
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>BNWG</td>
<td>Working Group on Printing and Issuing a European Banknote</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>CDCC</td>
<td>Council for Cultural Co-Operation</td>
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<td>CEC</td>
<td>Commission of the European Communities</td>
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<td>CHM</td>
<td>Culture Heritage Management</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Common Identity Option</td>
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<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>EAA</td>
<td>European Archaeological Association</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECR</td>
<td>European Cultural Route</td>
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<td>ECRP</td>
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<td>EBDC</td>
<td>Euro Banknote Design Competition</td>
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<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>European Institute of Cultural Routes</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ETFCD</td>
<td>European Task Force on Culture and Development</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FSAG</td>
<td>Features Selection Advisory Group</td>
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<td>KIV</td>
<td>Knowledge Intake Variety</td>
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<td>LAA</td>
<td>Legacy of Al-Andalus Cultural Route (as devised by the EICR)</td>
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<td>SdC</td>
<td>Santiago de Compostela</td>
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<td>SCPR</td>
<td>Santiago de Compostela Pilgrim Routes (as devised by the EICR)</td>
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<td>TCCR</td>
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<td>TSAG</td>
<td>Themes Selection Advisory Group</td>
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<td>VCA</td>
<td>Visual Content Analysis</td>
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Appendix

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