Defining the Problem of Tomorrow’s Memory: The Time of Cultural Heritage in the Digital Age

Elizabeth Mary Charlotte Stainforth

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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Abstract

Theories of cultural and collective memory are now well-established in academic scholarship, and in contemporary cultural heritage debates. While the interconnectedness of cultural and technical memorial forms has often been highlighted, the vast literature on memory studies has seldom been channelled into an extended investigation of this relationship in the wake of digital technologies. The thesis seeks to develop insights from media memory studies for a discussion of digital cultural heritage projects, exploring how conceptions of memory are interwoven with conceptions of communication and technology in that context. The methodology for the thesis is informed by Michel Foucault’s writings on governmentality and approaches from the field of utopian studies. Utopia is important, both historically and structurally, shedding light on the construction of heritage discourses in the modern period and providing a means of locating the hopes and fears implicit in current debates. This critical method allows for an examination of memory from the standpoint of European heritage, world heritage and what is tentatively staged as ‘cultural information’ in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The memory practices through which heritage operates are analysed and then considered in relation to the kinds of discourses emerging out of developments in digital technology. The thesis also addresses broader philosophical concerns about collective memory and temporality, and reflects on the implications for cultural heritage.
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Introduction – The Problem of Tomorrow’s Memory

The topic of my thesis is framed as a problem, which is evoked by the idea of ‘tomorrow’s memory’. This is a phrase that is often used in articles and reports to register concerns about cultural heritage collections with regard to practices such as digitisation and digital preservation. There is widespread recognition that a growing portion of texts, records and artefacts are created or being converted into digital formats. On one level, then, the problem of tomorrow’s memory is a direct reference to these issues. However, the phrase is also significant aside from the particular details of such debates and can be read as an expression of the interconnectedness of the past and the future: memories are continually re-constructed based on present interests, shaping expectations of tomorrow. Likewise, possibilities for the future are themselves delimited by the shape and structure of memory.

Here, rather than treat tomorrow’s memory as an empty paradox, I intend to consider seriously the connotations of this temporal dynamic and its dialogue with cultural heritage and digital technology. In investigating its various manifestations through case studies, I will attempt to define the nature of the problem to which the title of the thesis alludes. It is a problem which is broadly related to the figuring of the past and the future in the present. Formulations such as memory and heritage represent examples of this figuring and re-configuring and are discussed and commented upon across a range of disciplines. The impetus to remember, memorialise and pass on a

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legacy, particularly in the sphere of culture, is underpinned by the fear that a failure to do so will perpetuate the already pervasive spectre of cultural amnesia. Studies pertaining to the scarcity-abundance of memory and heritage in contemporary life are well documented and have given rise to individual fields of research. Yet memory studies and heritage studies also have their own sets of interests, ones that seldom consider questions of cultural heritage, technology and memory together. While media memory is a large and flourishing research theme, it is less engaged with the institutional setting of memory producing organisations. On the other hand, in cultural heritage debates there is a tendency to focus on memory as an identity question, rather than as a media-technology question. Although these lines of thinking are connected, in much of the current scholarship they are dealt with separately, a matter that is examined in more detail below. In offering an extended exploration of the interplay between memory and technology in the context of cultural heritage projects, my study bridges the gap between these distinct but related fields. I concentrate on digital technology because of the explicit memory questions it has and continues to provoke.

To summarise, then, my intention in this thesis is to explore the contemporary significance of memory for cultural heritage in the wake of digital technologies. The originality of the study lies in its sustained treatment of heritage’s ‘memory problem’ and in its questioning of the framing of memory within the ambiguous temporal structures of digital heritage. Therefore, it considers but ultimately goes beyond the vexed issue of digital obsolescence and instead attempts to understand what kinds of futures a digital memory might promise or exclude. Such thoughts are particularly pertinent to recent heritage studies debates, which are increasingly preoccupied with how the logic of cultural heritage regulates the distance of the past relative to the present and the future.
In order to render visible these shifting temporal structures, my research focuses firstly on how digital memory practices operate in specific cultural heritage projects and secondly on the idea of tomorrow’s memory as it emerges in these projects. The case studies, the European-Commission funded project Europeana, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Memory of the World (MoW) programme and the European Union’s (EU) right to be forgotten, were chosen because of their conscious engagement with memory and forgetting at a policy level. The former two initiatives also involve the management of digital cultural heritage collections and the protection of digital heritage.

There are limitations to this approach insofar as the questions of heritage the case studies present primarily rest on assumptions about Western heritage traditions, deriving from a relatively recent period (the eighteenth century onwards). These traditions also inform the account of heritage time, elaborated below. Despite such limitations, part of my aim is to read into heritage practices a different set of temporalities and preoccupations than those normally expressed, and to bring out the dialogue between heritage and memory as it intersects with digital technology.

**Memory-Media-Heritage**

The emphasis on memory in my study is informed by the pervasiveness of the concept, both in academic studies of cultural heritage and in heritage organisations. Within the organisational context, a number of projects and mission statements use memory as a marker of value and significance; the Library of Congress hosts the American Memory

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UNESCO runs the Memory of the World Programme, Archives UK state of their archival holdings, ‘they are our collective memory’, and the Australian Government Records invoke ‘the memory of our nation’. The resurgence of memory in public discourse has been variously described and analysed as the ‘memory boom’, the ‘memory industry’ and the ‘memory wave’, among others. The unifying theme in many studies of this phenomenon has been the ongoing negotiation of relationships with the past, through sites, texts and artefacts of remembrance. Such conceptualisations of memory rely on an understanding of cultural forms as practices of memorisation, and can be traced to earlier metaphors that presuppose a connection between space and mental categories. Frances Yates’ work on the art of memory investigates these spatial metaphors in the classical mnemonic tradition, which were exercised in the mental arrangement of images and places as a means of situating knowledge so that it would not be forgotten; architectural tropes were especially popular as they were thought to provide the most familiar locations for memory. Notwithstanding the difference between individually constructed mental spaces and physical, collective spaces, the

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8 See Kerwin Lee Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse’, Representations, 69, Special Issue: Grounds for Remembering (Winter 2000), 127-150.
motif of the store-house has implications for both and the storage model of memory continues to occupy a central position in the contemporary field of memory studies.\textsuperscript{12}

Within this field, much of the major academic literature draws from Maurice Halbwachs’ work on the social determination of collective memory. He believed ‘general history starts only when tradition ends and the social memory is fading or breaking up. So long as a remembrance continues to exist, it is useless to set it down in writing or otherwise fix it in memory’.\textsuperscript{13} Writers such as Jan Assmann and Jeffrey K. Olick have built on Halbwachs’ thinking, developing the terms ‘communicative’ and ‘cultural’ remembrance to account for the transmission of memory through social and media forms.\textsuperscript{14} While communicative memory refers to living memory circulated via social structures and person-to-person communication, cultural memory incorporates the mediation of memory in external records and documentation. Ann Rigney describes this second model of memory as ‘a social-constructivist model that takes as its starting point the idea that memories of a shared past are collectively constructed and reconstructed in the present rather than resurrected from the past’.\textsuperscript{15}

Halbwachs’ insight about the interruption to memory that occurs in the process of writing history has been influential in debates that oppose the immediacy of memory to the constructed nature of history.\textsuperscript{16} Pierre Nora is a notable figure in these debates,

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\textsuperscript{12} This field emerged during the 1980s when memory became a popular means of challenging the perceived authoritarian strain in historical narratives and established itself as an alternative mode of inquiry. See, for example, Huysen, \textit{Twilight Memories}, p. 249, and Patrick H. Hutton, \textit{History as an Art of Memory}. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1993, p. 123. It is also worth noting that memory discourses emerged earlier in the 1960s in the wake of social movements and decolonisation, although what is generally referred to as the ‘memory boom’ occurred later.


\textsuperscript{16} Halbwachs, ‘The Collective Memory’, p. 140.
\end{flushleft}
who elaborates on the distinction between what he calls ‘traditional’ (living) and ‘modern’ (material) memory in his collaborative project, *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, or *Places of Memory*, written between the years 1984 and 1992. He proposes that the memory embodied in the customs and ritual practices of traditional societies has receded, to be replaced by external sites of commemoration that are detached from that experience. This shift in the location of memory is part of the broader issue that Nora distinguishes as the gradual disappearance of primitive or sacred memory in the wake of historical consciousness: ‘There are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory’.17 Instead, ‘modern memory is above all archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image’.18 However, Nora’s study was widely critiqued in the years following its publication19 on the basis that his argument hinges on the inviolability of ‘primitive memory’, which John Frow describes as a ‘nostalgic essentialism that affirms the reality of an origin by proclaiming its loss’.20 Here, the destruction of memory is attached to the same process of modernisation that reinstates it in a compensatory manner.

In fact, as Eric Gable and Richard Handler observe, both memory and history may be understood as constructed categories of analysis.21 Therefore, situating memory within a longer history of practices and technologies provides a useful corrective to the essentialist tendencies frequently found in the delineation of pre-modern memorial

17 Nora, ‘Between Memory and History’, p. 7.
forms. Paul Ricoeur’s observation that ‘what is peculiar to a history of memory is the history of the modes of its transmission’ highlights the extent to which they are interrelated.\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, in studies of heritage, the question of memory has more often been explored through questions of identity and belonging and less in terms of the circulation of media.\textsuperscript{23} That is not to say that the scholarship altogether overlooks the subject; there are a number of writers who investigate heritage and museums through the frame of media communications and technologies.\textsuperscript{24} The most insightful of these, including Tony Bennett, point to role of such institutions as socially differentiating cultural technologies.\textsuperscript{25} Equally, from the perspective of media theory, some scholars have undertaken inquiry into cultural heritage institutions, but show less direct interest in memory.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, those working in media history and memory studies have developed socio-technical readings of the growth of different memory cultures, but have tended to focus elsewhere than the institutional heritage context.\textsuperscript{27} Examples of this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Huyssen’s work is an exception in this respect, in that it focuses directly on museums, media and memory. See particularly \textit{Twilight Memories}.
\end{itemize}
approach can be found in the work of Geoffrey C. Bowker,28 Wendy Hui Kyong Chun,29 Anna Reading,30 and José van Dijck.31

It is my contention that these latter studies have much to bring to contemporary cultural heritage debates, especially insofar as they consider the question of shifting media forms. There is a link between such work and the interests of social memory studies as expressed in a writer like Nora. In his discussion of the archive, Jacques Derrida clarifies this connection, developing comparable, if less nostalgic, insights about the problems of locating memory in the external record. As he writes:

The archive, if this word or this figure can be stabilized so as to take on a signification, will never be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the contrary: the archive takes place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory.32

Derrida’s thinking draws attention to the destructive character of the archive, and the way in which it produces memory traces to be reassembled and reconstructed with the passing of time. To remember, is at once to forget, the negotiation of an ongoing process, quite different from the trope of the storehouse described above. As Chun recognises, the assumption of this trope persists in digital media:

The major characteristic of digital media is memory. Its ontology is defined by memory, from content to purpose, from hardware to software, from CD-ROMs to memory sticks, from RAM to ROM. Memory underlies the emergence of the computer as we now know it.33

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In demonstrating the pervasiveness of the memory as storage metaphor, Chun hints at a crucial aspect of the problem my thesis attempts to define. It presents a storage-recall mechanism that risks obscuring the absences that memory implies. Yet the emphasis on the media of memory is also productive because it allows for a questioning of the material basis of many memory practices. This is an issue to which I will return throughout the thesis.

The Time of Cultural Heritage

Debates about memory, and the relative neglect of media memory theory to discussions of cultural heritage are perhaps due to the way in which heritage is implicated in the management of time. Heritage stresses, to a greater extent than memory, materiality, continuity and long-term persistence. Critical studies of heritage have attempted to interrogate these assumptions by considering the historical conditions for the emergence of a set of practices by which the past was actively produced and managed. As Rodney Harrison writes:

Official approaches to heritage are related in fundamental ways to Western, post-Enlightenment understandings of the world and to the experience of modernity. In particular, heritage reflects a modern, linear notion of time that emphasizes progress in its separation of past from present. In turn, this sense of linear time and the speed of its passage produces an underlying sense of uncertainty and vulnerability in its insistent focus on the overthrowing of tradition to focus on the future. Modes of ordering, classifying and organising heritage simultaneously represent strategies for managing this sense of risk and uncertainty, whilst creating the ordered linear sense of time on which these ideas of progress rest. Heritage is thus both a product and producer of Western modernity.

Such insights are connected to the way in which the experience of modernity is characterised by a distinctive sense of its own time and have led to contemporary

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34 See Macdonald, Memorylands, p. 15.
definitions of heritage that stress its present-orientatedness as, for example, ‘a contemporary product shaped from history’. Here, I would propose a further qualification by highlighting the future dimension implicit in heritage; that is, the sense in which it testifies to future hopes and aspirations. The relationship between the past and the future has important implications for notions of heritage in the present. In her anthropological study *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today*, Sharon Macdonald touches on a similar issue; although she agrees with the need for critical inquiry into present uses of the past, she perceives that it risks a form of presentism, instead advocating for approaches that consider the ‘ways in which the past was multiply encoded, recorded and transmitted at different points in time, as well as at the various ways in which the past could inform the present, and the present use the past’. In her anthropological study *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today*, Sharon Macdonald touches on a similar issue; although she agrees with the need for critical inquiry into present uses of the past, she perceives that it risks a form of presentism, instead advocating for approaches that consider the ‘ways in which the past was multiply encoded, recorded and transmitted at different points in time, as well as at the various ways in which the past could inform the present, and the present use the past’.

In the heritage context, observations about the ordering of time have often lent themselves to investigation of the institutional space of museums, libraries and archives. Bennett notes that both the art museum and the museum of natural history are ‘in and of modernity, belonging to and helping to shape its organisation of the relations between past and present and, moreover, functioning within these to initiate and regulate a “progressive” movement between past and present’. In making this statement, Bennett argues, via Michel Foucault’s work on governmental technologies, that the museum can be understood as a progressive cultural technology through its exercise of specific forms of knowledge and expertise. Others have drawn from Foucault’s writing on heterotopias to develop studies of the museum as a space that encompasses ‘the perpetual and


indefinite accumulation of time’. However, some scholars read into these practices alternative tendencies. Andreas Huyssen regards the museum as a place for negotiating difference, ‘a site and testing ground for reflections on temporality and subjectivity, identity and alterity’. Likewise, François Hartog asserts:

The itinerary of the concept has undoubtedly shown that heritage has never thrived on continuity but on the contrary from ruptures and questioning the order of time, with the interplay of absence and presence, visibility and invisibility that has marked and guided the incessant and ever-changing ways of producing semaphores. Heritage is one way of experiencing ruptures, of recognizing them and reducing them, by locating, selecting, and producing semaphores.

While these are not necessarily conflicting views, they express distinct emphases. Both recognise the temporal rupture that motivates the desire for continuity and gradual progression, but Bennett positions the museum as a regulative entity, whereas Huyssen and Hartog claim they initiate change, ‘a questioning of the order of time’. The difference in view is also accounted for, in part, by the time periods to which they allude; Bennett’s remark is made in reference to museums in the nineteenth century, while Huyssen and Hartog reflect on the role of contemporary institutions and sites, directly engaging with the idea of heritage as ‘both a product and producer of Western modernity’. As Beth Lord writes, ‘the museum functions according to an ethos of permanent critique of its own history’, following Foucault’s identification of modern thinking in influencing current practices, ‘the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment’. Therefore, if contemporary manifestations of heritage are concerned

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40 Huyssen, Twilight Memories, p. 16.
with provoking reflection and critique of established temporal narratives, then this perhaps has wider relevance for the way in which rupture and discontinuity have become part of contemporary lives and experiences.\textsuperscript{44} What I am interested to explore further here is the effects that are produced in the encounter between the time of cultural heritage and digital technology, and how memory articulates between the two.\textsuperscript{45}

**Distinguishing the Digital**

The subject of digital technology and the digital medium more generally requires further clarification.\textsuperscript{46} As noted earlier, the study of memorial forms also entails the study of memorial technologies. In a similar vein, Geoffrey C. Bowker suggests that distinct memory epochs emerge from new media of record keeping. Following Jacques LeGoff, he identifies five memory epochs: oral transmission, written transmission with tables, file cards, mechanical writing and electronic sequencing.\textsuperscript{47} Digital media fall under the latest epoch, introducing significant changes to information infrastructures and modes of communication and storage. Some of the characteristics attributed to digital media include ephemerality,\textsuperscript{48} mobility, transmission\textsuperscript{49} and spreadability\textsuperscript{50}. The constitution of digital objects marks a departure from analogue formats insofar as they are rendered

\textsuperscript{44} As Chun writes, such experiences may account for why ‘networks have emerged as a universal concept, resonating across disciplinary and political divisions […] Networks answer the dilemma posed by postmodernism – How to navigate an increasingly confused and confusing globalised world?’ See *Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{45} These effects also refer to the kinds of systems and narratives produced by digital technologies.

\textsuperscript{46} I have, at times, used media and technology interchangeably throughout the thesis. However, broadly speaking medium refers to the channel of communication, technology refers to a tool or system such as a database.


\textsuperscript{48} See Hui Kyong Chun, ‘The Enduring Ephemeral’. Chun posits the *enduring* ephemerality of digital media, to attempt to account for its materiality.

\textsuperscript{49} See Wolfgang Ernst, ‘The Archive as Metaphor: From Archival Space to Archival Time’, *Open*, 7 (2004), 46-53. Ernst opposes the logic of transmission with the storage and preservation model of the archive.

from binary code. The logic of binary data presents a challenge to the assumption of memory as storage, discussed in relation to Chun’s work. As Abby Smith explains:

When all data are recorded as 0’s and 1’s, there is, essentially, no object that exists outside of the act of retrieval. The demand for access creates the “object”, that is, the act of retrieval precipitates the temporary reassembling of 0’s and 1’s into a meaningful sequence that can be decoded by software and hardware.51

However, as important as these changes are, important too is the recognition that digital media developed from pre-existing technologies. There has been a tendency, particularly in media theory, to emphasise the difference of the digital, and consequently to neglect those links to earlier technologies and industries.52 Jonathan Sterne reasons that ‘this is not to argue that “nothing new” has happened with digital media – only that to know exactly what is new, it would be imperative to know what is old’.53 Sterne’s view positions digital media as different but also a continuation of older technologies. Hence, new systems introduce change, as well as being a composite of already established systems. In her media history work, Lisa Gitelman has observed that the periods of transition between media, such as that from analogue to digital, allow for interesting insights into the social shaping of technologies. She writes:

Looking into the novelty years, transitional states, and identity crises of different media stands to tell us much, both about the course of media history and about the broad conditions by which media and communication are and have been shaped.54

This thesis, in dealing with the technology of cultural heritage and its dialogue with digital media is, in some respects, a transitional study and highlights a formative period

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in the uptake of digital memory practices in cultural heritage institutions. Moreover, it engages with digital media in several ways. Firstly, it refers to the practice of digitisation, whereby digital reproductions or surrogates are made from other text, image or audiovisual works. The description of digital collections in Chapter 2 and digital documents and digital heritage in Chapter 3 encompasses objects created from a digitisation process. Such digital collections, documents and heritage also comprise born-digital material.\(^\text{55}\) Secondly, in Chapter 2’s analysis of Europeana, it outlines the aggregation of digital object metadata; these are the descriptions that make digital objects identifiable. Finally, although in less detail, Chapter 4 addresses digital search and data collection practices.

**Methodology**

The research focus is oriented towards identifying the role of memory in the initiatives that are the subject of my case studies. This focus has two strands; the first, regarding the nature of digital memory practices in cultural heritage projects, requires a method of analysis directed towards locating these practices within a broader set of social-political relations. In concerning itself with the ‘history of the organization of knowledge with respect to both domination and the self’, Foucault’s work provides insights about how strategies of rendering memorable are also implicated in rendering societies governable.\(^\text{56}\) His theory of governmentality, ‘the conduct of conduct’, set out to isolate and describe the different techniques and knowledge practices through which government had been thought and deployed.\(^\text{57}\) While Foucault did not directly discuss culture as part of this project, a number of commentators have drawn from his writings.

\(^\text{55}\) Born digital refers to material created in a digital form and not converted from another format.


to highlight the instrumentalisation of culture in governmental policy. In particular, Bennett’s work has been influential in establishing governmentality approaches to cultural policy studies. Likewise, there is a precedent for Foucauldian institutional critique in the museum context. Identifying the various technologies and knowledges through which cultural heritage operates will aid the process of exploring digital memory practices as part of the specific discourses of European heritage and world heritage the case studies introduce.

Foucault’s historico-critical approach is useful, not only for analysing institutionally embedded knowledge practices, but also for producing a history of the present; that is, an understanding of history through the processes that have led to the present reality. He poses the question as follows:

What is present reality? What is the present field of our experiences? Here it is not a question of the analytic of truth but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of ourselves.

Here, Foucault clarifies the point that historical inquiry should entail critical assessment of the present itself. Recognition of the need for a history of the present speaks to my interest in the historical shaping of past and future temporalities and their current trajectories in concepts of heritage. As the conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck explains, it is a matter of asking ‘how, in a given present, are the temporal dimensions

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59 See, for example, Tony Bennett, Culture: A Reformer’s Science. London: SAGE, 1998.
of past and future related?"\textsuperscript{63} Both dimensions encompass the present through what Koselleck calls horizons of experience and expectation, the former being that part of the past preserved and made present, the latter being a sort of present-future informed by hopes and expectations.\textsuperscript{64}

The matter of what is made possible or foreclosed by these horizons of experience and expectation links to the second strand of my methodology, which adapts the approach of Ruth Levitas in \textit{Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society}.\textsuperscript{65} The method is characterised as utopian because it constitutes a mechanism for reflecting critically on the present from the standpoint of the future, what Levitas describes as utopia in its archaeological mode. It involves ‘piecing together images of the good society’, where these are partial or suppressed in policy claims and ‘addressing the silences and inconsistencies all such images must contain, as well as the political steps forward they imply’.\textsuperscript{66} My approach, then, seeks to reconcile methodological utopianism and governmentality theory, in the vein of Bennett’s work, outlined above. In Chapter 1, I present an argument for how this might be achieved and describe the methodology in more detail.

\textbf{Chapter Outline}

The thesis is divided into four chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. The present introductory chapter has sought to establish the rationale for the study, as well as sketching out the research background, clarifying the use of terms such as digital

\textsuperscript{64} See Koselleck, \textit{Futures Past}, p. 259.
media/technology and introducing concepts, including cultural memory and heritage time, that will re-appear in later chapters.

Chapter 1 elaborates on the discussion of heritage time and its relationship with modernity through the lens of utopia and history. Foucault’s essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ provides the basis for understanding the critical attitude of modernity, framed as the question of what difference today introduces with respect to yesterday,\(^{67}\) and the intertwining of this attitude with the politics and institutions that are the focus of critique.\(^{68}\) The emergence of modern, historical thinking in the eighteenth century is then explored with reference to the idea of progress, which Koselleck describes as a process of the world naturally, inevitably perfecting itself.\(^{69}\) These changes have implications for utopia insofar as its spatial orientation begins to shift so that it gradually becomes aligned with the hope of a better future. I suggest that just as progress informs a particular way of telling the future, it also has a bearing on narratives of the past as they begin to play out in modern cultural heritage institutions. I stress the need to put these developments into dialogue with the past and the future to allow for a more nuanced understanding of heritage time. The second part of the chapter offers a reading of heritage from both ends of time with reference to William Morris, a figure known for his utopian writing and his heritage work. The third part of the chapter gives a detailed explanation and justification of the methodology, which is applied to the case studies for Chapters 2 and 3. The chapter concludes by considering the relevance of utopian thought for heritage and the research question of tomorrow’s memory.


\(^{68}\) In this case, modern cultural heritage institutions.

Chapter 2 introduces the first case study, the EC-funded digital heritage project Europeana. After setting out the background and establishing the importance of the EC’s cultural policy for its political goal of European cohesion, I move on to a descriptive analysis of the initiative, its motivations and the uptake of memory in its policy documentation. European memory is identified as the suppressed utopian content in the project which, despite emphasising the achievements of the past, manifests itself as an uncertain destination in the future. Europeana’s grounding as a technical database is the starting point for my examination of its memory metaphors and the technical models that have shaped its move from a portal to a platform-based system.

Chapter 3 gives an account of the second case study, UNESCO’s MoW programme. My investigation begins with an overview of the world heritage enterprise that finds form in the organisation’s registers, lists and conventions. Both the loss of memory and material culture inform the ethos of UNESCO, and its principles of protecting and safeguarding heritage. This ethos also expresses itself as the desire for memory resistant to loss in its policy guidelines, which is discussed with particular reference to digital documents and digital heritage. Finally, I consider the ways in which the digital medium productively unsettles certain notions of heritage persistence.

Chapter 4 provides a counterpoint to the memory initiatives of Chapters 2 and 3 in its exploration of the EU’s right to be forgotten. It also introduces the commercial challenge to digital cultural heritage in the form of the Google Books project, and a response in the proposal for a UK digital public space, which would be protected from commercial imperatives. These developments are analysed through the frame of everyday culture online, paying attention to the various challenges to memory-forgetting and public-private presented by this environment.
The final chapter concludes the study. After summarising the concerns of the thesis, the chapter discusses its contributions, limitations and the direction of potential future research.
Chapter 1 – Mixing Memory and Desire

April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.¹

The famous opening lines of T.S. Eliot’s *The Waste Land* imply a creative, imaginative potential in the mixing of memory and desire. The present, always on the threshold of the future, is carried onward by the momentum of forward moving desire. But memory and recollection orient this movement. It is the dynamic of *mixing* that emerges as a theme throughout the works that are the subject of my investigation, whether implicitly or more overtly, to which the various articulations of ‘tomorrow’s memory’ attest. But, while the past may be embedded in any attempt to conceive the future, the relative weighting of these elements has political implications for conceptions of heritage in the present. The character of what could be described as this temporal manoeuvring is also relevant, so that when the relationship of the past to the future is expressed as that of memory to desire, it takes on different dimensions and possibilities.

Here, I establish the theoretical framework which serves as the analytical method for subsequent chapters, allowing for an examination of memory in discourses of European heritage and world heritage in the wake of digital technologies. Broadly speaking, this framework joins two approaches; a branch of methodological utopianism, adapted from the work of Ruth Levitas and Fredric Jameson, and the theories of governmentality discussed in Michel Foucault’s later writing. Following Tony

¹ T.S. Eliot, *The Waste Land: Authoritative Text, Contexts, Criticism*, ed. by Michael North. New York; London: W.W. Norton, 2001, p. 1. There is also a memory/heritage component to the first line of the poem, which is a reference back to the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*. Eliot overturns Chaucer’s portrayal of April as the sweetest month and the month in which people desire pilgrimage. Thanks to Catherine Karkov for pointing out this link to Chaucer.
Bennett’s application of Foucault in the context of culture, to critique the power relations embedded in institutional knowledge practices, attention is given to the processes that inform digital cultural heritage projects and the political rationalities constituted therein. The conceptual category of utopia is equally important, both historically and structurally, as a lens through which discourses of heritage have been formed and as a means of locating hopes, desires and the problems to be overcome with regard to contemporary debates. As Fredric Jameson contends in the conclusion of *A Singular Modernity*, ‘ontologies of the present demand archaeologies of the future, not forecasts of the past’, which encapsulates that central concern of my project, to explore the temporal structures underpinning notions of heritage, and to situate these within a locus of history and futurity that is critical, reflexive and provisional.

**Utopia and History**

My uptake of utopianism entails inquiry into how the concept might be historicised in Western societies. This is a fundamental question to the extent that it is connected to the emergence of modern historical thinking, and the parallel development of modern cultural heritage organisations. However, utopia is a contested and multivalent term, which has eluded clear definition. The designation and naming of it as such originates in Thomas More’s *Utopia*, first published in Latin in 1516. Simultaneously the good place (eutopia) and no place (outopia), the deliberate ambiguity of More’s title has plagued subsequent formulations of utopia. It has been noted that the problem arises

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3 Of course, the history of utopia understood as a symbolic expression of hope in human thought and communication goes back much further.
4 As Jameson (in his discussion of Bloch) observes, there are ‘two distinct lines of descendancy from More’s inaugural text: the one intent on the realization of the Utopian program, the other an obscure yet omnipresent Utopian impulse finding its way to the surface in a variety of covert expressions and practices’, in Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. London: Verso, 2005, p. 3.
from the tension between the necessary impossibility of no place, and the possibility of improvement implied in the good place.\textsuperscript{5}

Two of the most prevalent branches of utopian thinking highlight this tension. In the utopian socialist tradition efforts to classify utopia descriptively have been divided as to whether it is the presentation of a fictional alternative or the qualitative content of the good society that constitute its defining features; the programmes devised by writers such as Charles Fourier, Henri Saint-Simon and Robert Owen are notable cases of descriptive model societies. On the other hand, in the Marxist tradition the question of the utopian function is debated, as both a means of enabling social change and an obstacle preventing it, depending on the level of possibility/desirability in each case. Ernst Bloch’s three-volume work, \textit{The Principle of Hope}, is the most sustained Marxist study of utopianism, which attempts to revise the negative judgement of it as a form of idealism by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.\textsuperscript{6} In such studies utopia is often associated with a mode of reflecting on the future, although it has in fact undergone various transformations in rendering the proportions and dimensions of the good/no place. As Krishan Kumar observes, notions of the Golden Age, Eden or Arcadia are a utopian lamenting of the past.\textsuperscript{7} The representation of utopia can also be spatial before it is temporal, as in More’s \textit{Utopia}, which presents an island counter-world that is heavily influenced by the expanding geographical knowledge of sixteenth century Europe.\textsuperscript{8} Therefore, the equation of utopia with the future requires some qualification. The suggestion that the development of utopian narratives is linked to the development of historical thinking puts temporality at the heart of the matter, the growth of the specific and paradoxical temporality of modernity. Among the many theorists who have written

\textsuperscript{6} See Levitas, \textit{The Concept of Utopia}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{8} As evidenced by the work’s tribute to the Italian explorer, Amerigo Vespucci.
on modernity, it is Michel Foucault and Reinhart Koselleck who are best placed to give an account that speaks to my present concern of tracing this development.9

At first sight, the move to bring Foucault into dialogue with theories of utopia is counter-intuitive, since much of his career was spent dismantling such systems.10 Yet his historico-critical mode of investigation is well equipped to respond to the issue of its temporality. This mode became a feature of his writing during the 1970s, when he had started to propose that historical inquiry should involve a critical appraisal of the present itself, rather than a reconstruction of the past. In one of his last essays, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Foucault borrows the title of the 1784 essay by Immanuel Kant, to give an analysis of the philosopher’s position and to pose the question again two centuries later. In Kant’s essay he identifies the source of the critical ontology of the present, when the question of the contemporary moment first becomes apparent.11 The way in which Kant describes Enlightenment as a measure of ‘man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage’12 points to the conscious process of liberation from a state of immaturity, which is related to the conception of the autonomy of reason, a breaking with the past as a source of authority. For Foucault, ‘the basis of an entire form of philosophical reflection concerns only the mode of reflective relation to the present’, the critical mode which is concerned, at the most basic level, with what difference today introduces with respect to yesterday.13 What is distinctive about his approach is that he

10 See, for example, Michel Foucault, ‘Texts/Contexts: Of Other Spaces’, Diacritics, 16:1 (1989), 22-27.
11 Although he is also careful to stress the connection between this brief essay and Kant’s three Critiques, writing, ‘the critique is, in a sense, the handbook of reason that has grown up in Enlightenment; and, conversely, the Enlightenment is the age of critique’.
sets out a challenge to ‘the blackmail of the Enlightenment’, seeking to avoid the 
oppositional standpoint either for or against it. In Foucault’s view, the Enlightenment’s 
most influential legacy is what he calls its ‘philosophical ethos’, and he suggests, ‘we 
must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically 
determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment’. That is, through recognition of 
our constitution through modern institutions and power relations, although these are 
nevertheless the focus of critique. To elaborate on the character of this ethos, he refers 
to the attitude of modernity evoked by Charles Baudelaire in his poetry. Baudelaire’s 
interest in the ‘ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent’ is in-keeping with the sense of 
temporal rupture experienced as part of modernity, but Foucault locates the attitude of 
being modern in his response to that experience, the ‘difficult attitude (that) consists in 
recapturing something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but 
within it’. The purpose of such an endeavour is to juxtapose reality with the exercise 
of imaginative freedom; to extract from reality that element of history (the eternal), and 
to transform it through apprehension. He summarises the move as follows:

The attitude of modernity, the high value of the present is indissociable from a 
desperate eagerness to imagine it, to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to 
transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is. Baudelarian 
modernity is an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted 
with the practice of liberty that simultaneously respects reality and violates it.

14 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’’, pp. 32-50, URL =

15 Cited from Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’’, pp. 32-50, URL =

16 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’’, pp. 32-50, URL =
<http://foucault.info//documents/whatisenlightenment/foucault.whatisenlightenment.en.html> [Accessed 26 August 2016]. Foucault does not understand this as the transcendental eternal; rather it is a historicised 
universal, hence something eternal ‘within’ the present instant.

17 Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment?’’, pp. 32-50, URL =
Foucault’s acute observation, that the ethos of modernity and reflective relation to the present is defined by its simultaneous respect and defiance of reality, is complex, involving the difficult performance of imagination and realisation. It is also of key relevance in understanding the way in which utopian narratives became future-oriented and the basis upon which they were legitimated. Further discussion of the experience of modernity will clarify the reasons for this temporal shift.

1784 was the date of Kant’s essay, and the second half of the eighteenth century is also the period in which Koselleck notes a growing awareness of the difference of the past, when time itself gains a historical quality.¹⁸ His argument is that this disjuncture between the dimensions of past and future creates the conditions for the emergence of modern temporal structures. Under these conditions, the relationship of a given present to a given past and a given future is constituted, for Koselleck, by the horizons of experience and expectation.¹⁹ Hence, along with his description of historical time, which is marked by development and transition, he isolates progress as ‘a modern category whose content of experience and whose surplus of expectation was not available before the eighteenth century’.²⁰ The implication is that progress encapsulates something important about Enlightenment thinking; originally associated with a natural, spatial movement forward, it was temporalised and generalised during the eighteenth century and came to refer to the progress of history or the progress of humanity. The critical mode through which Kant was able to consider his own present and use autonomous reason is the same mechanism that facilitates the transformation of

¹⁸ Reinhart Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 165. It is interesting to note that this critical mode of reconstructing the past would, for Nietzsche, be among what he called the ‘excesses of history’, a difficulty in acknowledging that ‘since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors and indeed of their crimes’. See Untimely Meditations, edited by Daniel Breazeale and trans. by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 76.


progress into a task of infinite human striving, thematising social-technological
advances as part of the process.

It is also at the heart of Koselleck’s discussion of utopia, which directly
addresses the emergence of the future within it, what he terms ‘the temporalization of
utopia’.²¹ Through recourse to the novel, The Year 2440 by Louis-Sébastien Mercier, he
demonstrates how utopian narratives became aligned with progress in the
conceptualisation of a better future. Mercier’s utopia is interesting for several reasons;
the first edition of 1770 was published in the same year as the first Europeans reached
the east coast of Australia²² and represents, for Koselleck, the stage at which ‘utopian
spaces had been surpassed by experience’.²³ The failure to discover utopia within the
world was therefore the compelling motive for seeking out alternative ground, and the
new consciousness of the development of time, as progress, made the future an
available option.²⁴ The method by which Mercier establishes the legitimacy of his
vision for 2440 is also notable, though it would later become a conventional mark of the
utopian genre. The fact that Paris is the setting for the novel is revealing of the author’s
ambition to forge a link with the present reality, more aligned with the idea of a possible
good place than no place. The city of 2440 is still recognisably Paris but, predictably,
the streets are cleaner and the citizens more considerate. The effect of such a device, as
Koselleck explains, is that the credibility of the utopia relies on points of connection to
the empirically redeemable present.²⁵

Here, the ethos of modernity that Foucault describes becomes discernible; the
futuristic utopia displays close attention to features of the present, onto which the

²¹ Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, p. 84.
²² This was the expedition of 1768 to 1771, led by Captain James Cook.
²³ Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, p. 86.
²⁴ As Michelet famously wrote, history ‘is first of all geography’. See Peter Osborne, The Politics of
imagination is imposed to create a more desirable situation. The future is not beyond the present’s reach but perceived, rather, as a rational extension of current conditions.

Further, the surplus of expectation, identified by Koselleck in the concept of progress, transforms hopes and desires into the inevitable outcome of a process of improvement and it is this modern attitude that distinguishes *The Year 2440*. While the novel’s setting derives its futuristic element from progressive Enlightenment thinking, Koselleck notes that the theoretical foundation of progress is actually much older, originating in the classical doctrine of perfectio, which went from being understood as a goal or ideal state to a path of development, giving shape and momentum to the notion of a perfectible society. To emphasise the significance of the connection, Koselleck makes reference to the political theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his account of perfectibility, a neologism for the ability to perfect oneself, and the grounds upon which humans are set apart from animals. However, in Rousseau’s view, the human capacity to produce and organise, to build civilizations, is countered by the increased risk of decay, through violence, destruction and moral corruption. It is those technological gains that fuel the possibility of catastrophe and mass death, and the redefinition of progress as an infinite and unfinished task only makes the chances of decay more likely. Progress thus finds its dialectical corrective in the concept of decline, exposing the preclusion of that dynamic in Mercier’s utopia, which is a uni-directional extension of the present.

Koselleck explores the relationship between these concepts in more detail in a longer essay on the topic, describing how the transformation of progress in the modern period brought about a re-adjustment of its relationship with decline. Each setback was

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26 For example, in the early part of the eighteenth century, Leibniz would propose the thesis, ‘progressus est in infinitum perfectionis’. The best of all worlds is the best only if it permanently improves. See Koselleck, *Futures Past*, pp. 265-266.
to precede even more rapid progress, and ‘it was precisely progress that reproduced the phenomena of decay that are part and parcel of it’.  

However, he also recognises that, whereas progress shed its earlier, natural associations during the eighteenth century, decline was unable to do the same.  

A similar identification of the asymmetry between the concepts informs Walter Benjamin’s writing on cultural and narrative forms, the decay of which enables a new appreciation of what is vanishing. This observation introduces another subtlety into the Enlightenment interpretation of progress and decline. Not only is the latter anomalous to the linear march of progress, it also signals the perceived loss of a more authentic form of lived experience. As Peter Osborne argues, Benjamin’s work ‘points to the crucial role of modernity in the construction of the image of tradition to which it is opposed’. Such insights reveal the complexity of the break and subsequent tension between past and future, which is fundamental to an understanding of the modern experience, and gives the background for the emergence of heritage in that context.

A number of scholars in the field of heritage studies have examined the temporal dimensions of modernity and the implications for representations of the past, although more often these are peripheral to other themes. For example, Kevin Walsh explicitly notes a new experience of time and history, and the enchantment with the past that develops in the nineteenth century, partly as a result of the imposed rootlessness of

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30 Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, p. 221.  
31 See Walter Benjamin, ‘The Storyteller’, in Illuminations. London: Pimlico, 1999, in which he identifies lived experience as the source from which all storytellers have drawn. This tradition recedes in the wake of new forms of communication such as information, which ‘lays claim to prompt verifiability’, p. 88.  
33 See Koselleck, Futures Past, p. 31 and Osborne, The Politics of Time, p. 132.  
modern society. Like Benjamin’s historicism, heritage is positioned as both a reaction against and a producer of modernity in Walsh’s argument. But while he is interested in the concept of progress, he does not expand on its significance, beyond making associations with modernisation and the teleological ordering of time. Koselleck’s work scrutinises the thematisation of temporal modalities and their contingent relation to the present. Decline is the aporia of progress; despite the reproduction of its effects in the modern period, the natural connotations of decay, ruin or disaster, cannot be easily assimilated to progressive narratives.

It is my contention that such modalities, e.g. today-yesterday, progress-decline, desire-memory, have specific consequences for the figuring of heritage and that they imply various relationships and degrees of tension or mixing. Moreover, the gesture through which narratives of progress are replicated in interpretations of the past can equally be applied to models for the future, as in The Year 2440, suggesting that investigation of one has the potential to shed light on the representation of the other. To redress the balance of Mercier’s naïve utopia, wherein the future is extracted confidently from the present, involves a turn to memory and desire, which provides a way into thinking about other forms of utopian expression. Indeed, if ‘the dialectic of remembrance and future projection (is) at the core of modern utopian thought’, as Andreas Huyssen has written, then this relationship requires further analysis. The next

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36 See above and the discussion of the conceptual coupling of experience and expectation in the production of history in Koselleck, Futures Past.
37 Other work in this area includes that of Johannes Fabian, who observes how temporal modalities are used to reinforce and naturalise moral hierarchies (e.g. progress, civilisation). See Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.
38 As Phillip E. Wegner has written, ‘all of the great twentieth-century works that participate in the generic institution of the narrative utopia are involved in the project of remaking the form so that it will be adequate to a changing experience of modernity’. See Imaginary Communities: Utopia, the Nation, and the Spatial Histories of Modernity. Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2002, xxiii.
section will focus on the dynamic of memory and desire, alongside that of progress and decline, in order to give a different temporal perspective on the utopian currents implicit in modern notions of heritage.

**Desiring Differently: William Morris**

The extended discussion of utopia has shown the futurity of the concept to be historically contingent, coinciding with the transformation of progress as part of the emergence of historical thinking in the eighteenth century; in other words, the temporality of utopia is inseparable from modernity, though not, as I will contend, inseparable from narratives of progress. Perhaps, then, without denying the influence of such narratives, it is possible to argue the same of cultural heritage and to construct an alternative utopian account of its development. There is already some precedent for utopian thinking around art and cultural heritage, particularly in the institutional context. A number of writers have commented on the utopian ideal of museums, libraries and archives to house and preserve intact cultural memory. Likewise, in his study of national identity and the heritage industry, Patrick Wright argues that, ‘like the utopianism from which it draws, national heritage involves positive energies which certainly can’t be written off as ideology’. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the idea of a backward-looking Golden Age utopia, a nostalgic longing for the past, is frequently evoked in relation to heritage sites and monuments. However, there is another, distinct

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utopian strain in cultural heritage, which can be traced through examination of the formation of principles for cultural heritage management in the nineteenth century.

Although the birth of the public museum has been traced back to the eighteenth century, with the founding of the British Museum in 1753, the nineteenth century was arguably the period in which modern conceptions of heritage were consolidated. Scientific advances gave rise to an intellectual model of linear evolution, and the disciplines of biology, archaeology and architecture were established and joined to history, the dominant organising framework of modern societies. This was also the time when heritage became inseparable from the processes associated with its management. Among these processes, conservation emerged as a key concern, casting a long shadow in debates about the value and persistence of heritage. The development of conservation methods was influenced to a large extent by the writing of John Ruskin and by William Morris through his work for the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB). Although the literature originates in the English context, it was also to prove influential in determining European and North American principles of heritage conservation. These older approaches persist alongside newer techniques and continue to inform heritage practices today.

42 The significance of conservation for notions of heritage is demonstrated in Beverley Butler’s statement that heritage ‘takes on modernity’s languages and curative aspirations and subsequently embeds these in its own foundational values and transforms them into practice’. See Return to Alexandria: An Ethnography of Cultural Heritage Revivalism and Museum Memory. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2007, p. 50.


44 For a European example, see Alois Riegl’s essay ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Origin’, in Historical and Philosophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage, ed. by Nicholas Stanley Price, Mansfield Kirby Talley and Alessandra Melucco Vaccaro. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute, 1996, pp. 69-83, which Riegl wrote in 1903 after his appointment to the Austrian monuments commission. The influence of such principles can also be seen in the US context in the Antiquities Act (1906) and The Preservation of Historic Sites Act (1935).

45 As Rhiannon Mason notes, recent cultural policy continues to quote from figures like Ruskin and Morris, drawing upon assumptions about culture and its transformational power that were developed in the nineteenth century. See ‘Conflict and Complement: An Exploration of the Discourses Informing the Concept of the Socially Inclusive Museum in Contemporary Britain’, International Journal of Heritage Studies, 10:1 (2004), 49-73, p. 54.
Born in 1834 to a wealthy bill-broker, from an early age Morris had a keen interest in the architecture and art of the Middle Ages, which led, in his adult life, to a fascination with medieval communities. Sympathy for the medieval craftsman’s relationship to his society and his work was partly derived from romantic sensibilities and gave him a deep appreciation of the value of pleasure in labour, ‘the work […] and thought of the people, the result of a chain of tradition unbroken from the earliest ages’.\footnote{William Morris, ‘The Restoration of the Rouen Cathedral’, Letter to the Daily Chronicle, 14 October 1895. URL = <https://www.marxists.org/archive/morris/works/1895/rouen.htm> [Accessed 26 August 2016]\n} In contrast, he viewed the industrial capitalism of Victorian society as a system of degraded labour, advancing the production of goods primarily for profit.\footnote{However, Morris was also conscious of being a beneficiary of this system. In an 1883 letter to the Austrian socialist, Andreas Scheu, he wrote, ‘my father was a business man in the city, and well-to-do; and we lived in the ordinary bourgeois style of comfort’, cited from E.P. Thompson, \textit{William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary}. London: Merlin Press, 1977, p. 2.} He would later assert that, ‘apart from the desire to produce beautiful things, the leading passion of my life has been and is hatred of modern civilization’\footnote{William Morris, ‘How I Became a Socialist’ (1894), in \textit{Political Writings of William Morris}, ed. by A. L. Morton. New York: International Publishers, 1979, pp. 240-245. URL = <https://www.marxists.org/archive/morris/works/1894/hibs/hibs.htm> [Accessed 26 August 2016]} Morris’ contempt for civilization manifested itself not only in a loathing of industrial capitalism but also in what he believed to be a destruction of the past through restoration.

He co-founded the SPAB, dubbed ‘Anti-scrape’, in 1877 because he was concerned that restoration, the trend for fashionable alteration, was ruining the original features of ancient buildings. Informed by Ruskin’s thinking on the moral relationship between art and society, he devised ethical and political reasons for conserving buildings, placing more emphasis on these considerations than on purely aesthetic assessment. In the Manifesto, which the SPAB retains to this day, Morris wrote:

\begin{quote}
It is for all these buildings […], of all times and styles, that we plead, and call upon those who have to deal with them, to put Protection in the place of
\end{quote}
Restoration, to stave off decay by daily care […] and otherwise to resist all tampering with either the fabric or ornament of the building as it stands.49

After Morris became a socialist in the 1880s, his conviction in the relationship between the production of art and the relations of production was strengthened; in an 1884 lecture, he stated, ‘nothing should be made by man’s labour which is not worth making, or which must be made by labour degrading to the makers’.50 The conservation of buildings, therefore, provided the opportunity for comparing the artistic production in former times with that of Morris’ own time. He would often allude favourably to the guild system and the place of art in social life in the Middle Ages. However, that is not to say he was regressive in his thinking. Raymond Williams noted the practical difficulties Morris faced in finding such a place for art in Victorian society, and the compensatory interest invested in medieval guilds, but challenged the assumption that this was demonstrative of a desire to return to an earlier age. Of both Morris and Ruskin he observed that, ‘although their reference is to the past, their concern is with the present and the future’.51 The fullest expression of that orientation in Morris comes from his writings and lectures.52 His commitment to socialism was bound up with his confidence in the potential for social change, which prevented him from becoming ‘a mere railer against “progress”’.53 In the preface to a book on medieval lore, he explained:

52 Morris’ interest in what would now be understood as cultural heritage has almost opposing aims to the idea of culture understood ‘as a means of staunching the rising tide of anarchy and civil unrest that accompanied the rapid industrialisation […] of nineteenth century Britain’, Mason, ‘Conflict and Complement’, p. 53. Such arguments are often presented as a formative influence on the development of cultural heritage principles through figures such as Matthew Arnold.
At the present time those who take pleasure in studying the life of the Middle Ages are more commonly to be found in the ranks of those who are pledged to the forward movement of modern life; while those who are vainly striving to stem the progress of the world are as careless of the past as they are fearful of the future. In short, history, the new sense of modern times, the great compensation for the losses of the centuries, is now teaching us worthily, and making us feel that the past is not dead, but is living in us, and will be alive in the future which we are now helping to make.  

Here, Morris crystallises the complex negotiation of history and progress, of lived experience and transformed future, provoked by the modern consciousness. His awareness of having a stake in the future as otherwise, suggests an understanding of progress both aligned with and distinct from those definitions outlined previously, while the Enlightenment sense of critique facilitates the work of history, of assessment and comparison with past times, to compensate the loss of lived tradition. The mixture of forward and backward influences confirms Morris’ pivotal position and also offers a way into thinking about the temporal figurations of heritage in the tropes of progress and decline, desire and memory. To further distinguish between them, it is necessary to examine in more detail the principles of conservation developed by Morris, in relation to the practices of restoration, to which he was opposed.

It is significant that these principles were a direct response to what Morris perceived as the destructive tendencies of restoration; superficially, he was reacting against the altered appearance of ancient buildings, the obliteration of the material of the past. But because of his moral and political viewpoint, the rationale behind the intervention also made him uneasy:

In our day under the name of Restoration, while professing to bring back a building to the best time of its history […] the very nature of their task compels

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55 See again Williams, Culture & Society, p. 155.
them to destroy something and to supply the gap by imagining what the earlier builders should or might have done.\textsuperscript{56}

The question of ‘supplying the gap’ refers to the way in which work was carried out; for example, later additions to an early medieval church would be removed with the intention of ‘restoring’ to those structures a more appropriate medieval feature, based on modern (Victorian) understandings.\textsuperscript{57} Conversely, Morris claimed that such additions were a testament to historical change and the thought and labour of past societies.\textsuperscript{58} To remove them with the purpose of achieving ‘some ideal state of perfection’\textsuperscript{59} was to fundamentally misunderstand the relation of the past to the future.\textsuperscript{60} The idea of perfection surfaces again here, implying a link between the act of restoration and the narratives of progress identified in Koselleck’s account.\textsuperscript{61} Perhaps, too, there is an echo of Foucault’s attitude of modernity, the simultaneous respect for and violation of reality, which is another way of interpreting the aims of restoration. Less a destruction of buildings, as Morris would have it, and more an eagerness in grasping them in what they are, transforming them through a greater knowledge of history and the periodisation of styles. Of course, this kind of justification is also a product of the


\textsuperscript{57} It is interesting to note that this tendency extended beyond building practices and into other heritage objects; as in the fashionable trend for re-binding rare manuscripts in period styles. The Riviere company were particularly notable for this practice but inaccuracies were later discovered in their work, as knowledge of historic binding styles developed. For some examples of Riviere binding, see the Howard de Walden Collection, Leeds University Library, Brotherton Collection BC H de W.


\textsuperscript{59} Cited from Thompson, \textit{William Morris}, p. 226.

\textsuperscript{60} For example, in an Anti-scrape lecture, ‘The History of Pattern Designing’ (1879), Morris declared, ‘it is living art and living history that I love. If we have no hope for the future, I do not see how we can look back on the past with pleasure […] It is in the interest of living art and living history that I oppose so-called restoration […] Let us leave the dead alone, and, ourselves living, build for the living and those that shall live’, published in \textit{The Collected Works of William Morris, Vol. 22}, ed. by May Morris. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910-1915. URL = <https://www.marxists.org/archive/morris/works/1879/pattern.htm> [Accessed 26 August 2016]

\textsuperscript{61} Here, we might note Jameson’s observation about the ‘individual building as a space of Utopian investment, that monumental part which cannot be the whole and yet attempts to express it’, \textit{Archaeologies of the Future}, p. 4. Crucially, for Morris, this incompleteness was the source of its utopian potential.
thinking that conceptualised the linear movement of time, and that idea of progress as a temporal goal towards perfection. The notion of the world naturally, inevitably perfecting itself, which Koselleck locates in the doctrine of perfectio, can be read in the values of restoration as a return to a former completeness.62 This is one manifestation of the experience of modernity discussed earlier but it is by no means the only one. For instance, decline, which has been shown to unsettle the logic of progress, represents a different experiential form, as the natural decay following from growth. In the context of restoration, the physical markers of decay are the elements which restoration seeks to exclude or expunge. On the other hand, conservation practices acknowledge signs of age as part of the cycle of life and the passing of time. The new sense of history, described by Morris, was undoubtedly part of the reason for the development of both restoration and conservation principles.

Alois Riegl’s work at the turn of the century highlighted the divergence of conservation and restoration, and the intermingling of history in these processes. His 1903 essay ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origin’ was an attempt to systematically locate and categorise the values of monuments, in the wake of popular cultural heritage.63 Central to his investigation was an assertion of the modern perception of history: ‘Everything that has been and is no longer we call historical […] The crux of every modern historical perception is precisely the idea of development’.64 Closely linked to this observation was his discussion of age value, which vastly expanded the definition of monuments, to include many artefacts because of their

63 Riegl’s formulation of values-based preservation was incredibly important in influencing modern approaches to monuments, which ultimately gave rise to the problem of monumental heritage in relation to multiple and shifting values. It has been suggested that this dilemma in contemporary conservation theory and practice was also inherent in Riegl’s own project. See, for example, Michele Lamprakos, ‘Riegl’s “Modern Cult of Monuments” and The Problem of Value’, Change Over Time, 4:2 (Fall 2014), 418-435.
64 Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 70.
historical significance and their relative age. The logic of age value as ‘the purely natural cycle of growth and decay’\textsuperscript{65} resists any sort of human interference.

Nevertheless, as Riegl acknowledged, in practice some intervention is necessary to protect monuments from completely deteriorating, giving rise to different strategies of preservation. In his description of age value, which ‘addresses the emotions directly’\textsuperscript{66}, there are recognisable aspects of Morris’ conservation values. The tendency that lends itself to restoration is distinguished from it as a type of newness value, ‘the postulate of stylistic unity, which advocated not only the removal of additions added to the work at a later stylistic period but also the renovation of the monument to a form in-keeping with its original style’.\textsuperscript{67} Crucially though, both values were linked to the emergence of historical value, based on ‘the very specific yet individual stage the monument represents in the development of human creation’.\textsuperscript{68} Age value joined with historical value in advocating the best means of preserving monuments in their current state.\textsuperscript{69} However, Riegl considered age value the most modern and the most important value for the future cult of monuments because of its potential mass appeal: ‘It claims to address everyone, to be valid for everyone’.\textsuperscript{70}

These conclusions suggest several interesting insights with regard to Morris. Published just over twenty years after the founding of the SPAB, the influence of his conservation principles was already evident in the work of other European scholars. Yet already too, the nature of Morris’ intervention was becoming complicated by the pervasive narratives of progress and development. In Riegl’s essay, the decline of monuments is related to the constant renewal of life, the setback that precedes even

\textsuperscript{65} Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{66} Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{67} Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{68} Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{69} See Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{70} Riegl, ‘The Modern Cult of Monuments’, p. 74.
more rapid progress.\textsuperscript{71} Likewise, implicit in his commentary on age value and the prediction of its future ascendancy is a homogenised idea of the past, the cult of the old for its own sake. While a greater appreciation of the past across wider sections of society was certainly something Morris believed in, for him, it demanded the perspective and context of history in order to shape actions in the present. His interest in the formation of disciplines such as architecture and archaeology was connected to the role they played in cultivating a sense of history. In a paper read to the SPAB in 1884, he stated of architecture:

\begin{quote}
(It) bears witness to the development of man’s ideas, to the continuity of history, and, so doing, affords never ceasing instruction, nay education, to the passing generations, not only telling us what were the aspirations of men passed away, but also what he may hope for in the time to come.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

This extract is notable for its emphasis, not only on how people lived in the past, but also on what they hoped for in times to come, and hints at the utopian dimension in Morris’ thought. The seeming affirmation of the modern dynamic of progress and decline in the ‘development of man’s ideas’ is also subtly challenged in the statement of former aspirations, as a branch of history littered with lost expectations and alternatives. Development, then, is the experience of things that both did and did not come to pass, a challenge to the teleology of progress as an improved extension of current conditions.

As Koselleck observes, ‘the progress of modernity, despite its universal claim, reflects only a partial, self-consistent experience and, instead, masks or obscures other modes of experience’.\textsuperscript{73} It is just such other modes of experience to which the discussion will now

\textsuperscript{71} See again Koselleck, \textit{The Practice of Conceptual History}, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{73} Koselleck, \textit{The Practice of Conceptual History}, p. 235.
turn in Morris’ interest and uptake of the utopian form, which evokes a different temporality of cultural heritage in the coupling of memory and desire.

So far, in tracing the development of conservation and restoration principles, the tendencies that informed them have been shown to stem from similar but divergent concepts of historical time; the values Riegl analysed in monuments were also indicative of temporalities that hinged on the relationship between progress and decline, as both natural and historical categories. But Morris’ motivation for conserving buildings went beyond the cult of age value, and it is only through his desire for a future of non-degraded labour that it is possible to fully understand his essays and lectures for the SPAB, hence E.P. Thompson’s suggestion that his involvement with Anti-scrape at once arose from and contributed to his rebirth of hope. This idea once more draws attention to Morris’ consciousness of history, which is a marked characteristic of his utopian writings. However, he also recognised, ‘it is impossible to build up a scheme for the society of the future, for no man can really think himself out of his own days’, testifying to the incompleteness of his vision. Instead, by locating in former hopes one source of utopia, he established an experiential link with the past and re-opened the structural closure of classical utopias that followed a progressive teleology. The memory of these past hopes was a means of stimulating the desire for something otherwise, what Miguel Abensour calls ‘the education of desire’. Important too was the recognition that the process of change brought with it the potential to suffer defeat,

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74 See Thompson, William Morris, p. 240. Thompson’s biography of Morris was published in 1955, while he was still a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (he would leave a year later after the Soviet invasion of Hungary). His reading of Morris perhaps foreshadows and informs his later move away from orthodox Marxism, in which history is understood as a series of stages.
which accounts for the way Morris understood history, establishing a cyclical temporal rhythm that pointed to possibilities beyond the present by holding the past and the future in tension. These features were most striking in *News from Nowhere: An Epoch of Rest*, published in 1890.

While *News from Nowhere* is not Morris’ only utopian work, it is the one that marries most effectively his theories of art and politics. It also shares a peculiar parallel with his interest in conservation, conceived in direct response to restoration, because it was written as a rejoinder to another literary utopia, *Looking Backward* by Edward Bellamy. The story is set in a future England, into which the protagonist, William Guest, wakes from a dream. The narrative is structured around some of Morris’ personal experiences, beginning in his house in Hammersmith and ending at a house, very like Kelmscott Manor, after a journey by boat up the Thames. In the London of the twenty-second century, most of the buildings have been replaced by fields and countryside, there is no private property and people live together in large communal dwellings. It is a sustainable society, based on craft production, and the theme of work as pleasure is conveyed strongly in the descriptions of the ‘banded-workshops’ and the wonder of Guest at the workmanship of even small and trivial objects. Unlike *Looking Backward*, which depicts the gradual emergence of a centralised socialist society from capitalism, in *News from Nowhere* the figure of Old Hammond tells Guest of the violent destruction of the capitalist system, which is the implied necessary means of bringing about a

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77 With regard to this tension and the difficult negotiation of past and future in translating thought into action (a juxtaposition between the utopian and the tragic), see T.J. Clark’s essay ‘For a Left with No Future’, *New Left Review*, 74 (March/April 2012), 53-75.

78 Jameson suggests that this may also be peculiar to the utopian form, writing, ‘few other literary forms have so brazenly affirmed themselves as argument and counterargument […] who can read Morris without Bellamy? Or indeed Bellamy without Morris?’; *Archaeologies of the Future*, p. 2.
transformation of work and the realisation of a society based on participatory democracy.\textsuperscript{79}

Morris’ utopia sets up an encounter with past, present and future quite different from the dynamic of progress and decline. Part of the concept of the new society is derived from the past, but it is also a world in which the centrality of history has receded; as the boatman Dick comments: ‘It is mostly in periods of turmoil and strife and confusion that people care much about history […] we are not like that now’.\textsuperscript{80} The effects of such an outlook become apparent as Guest reflects on his surroundings in the evening of his first day:

For the first time in my life, I was having my fill of the pleasure of the eyes without any of that sense of incongruity, that dread of approaching ruin, which had always beset me hitherto when I had been amongst the beautiful works of art of the past, mingled with the lovely nature of the present; both of them, in fact, the result of the long centuries of tradition, which had compelled men to produce the art, and compelled nature to run into the mould of the ages.\textsuperscript{81}

It is less the working of the new society and more the experience of living in it that comes to the fore in this extract. Pleasure in art is no longer compensatory but fully integrated into social life, while appreciation of the past is no longer beset by the shadow of decline, evoking an atmosphere of timelessness. Yet the happy amnesia of many of Nowhere’s inhabitants is countered by the character Ellen’s more cautious view that ‘sometimes people are too careless of the history of the past […] Happy as we

\textsuperscript{79} The description of this revolution in the chapter ‘How the Change Came’ is thought to be heavily influenced by Morris’ own experiences of ‘Bloody Sunday’ in 1887.


\textsuperscript{81} Morris, \textit{News From Nowhere}, p. 146.
are, times may alter’. Together, these perspectives express the ambiguity of *News from Nowhere*, and reflect Morris’ own ambivalence about history. Abensour explains that:

A very subtle dialectic of forgetfulness and memory – the memory of nostalgia and not that of heritage – is apparent in the roles people act out at different moments in *News from Nowhere*, and it unfolds throughout the hidden and most profound structure of the novel […] If on the one hand the narrator has the role of reintroducing history to this nowhere land, on the other the inhabitants of *News from Nowhere* […] triumph over history by submitting it to the ordeal of nonhistory.

The dialectic of memory and forgetting emerges here as part of the utopian structure of the work, in which the tension between Dick’s complacence and Ellen’s concern remains unresolved. This structure provides insights into the possibility of a living relationship with the past, and a future where heritage (a form of false memory according to Abensour) is no longer necessary. There is a sense of these sentiments at other moments too, when Dick says of Windsor Castle, ‘a museum, it would have been called in the times you understand so well’ or when he mentions ‘a queer antiquarian society’ in a thinly veiled reference to the SPAB, and its conservation of old buildings, which have become a foil to the beautiful new ones. The implication is clear; for Morris, the practice of heritage conservation, undertaken as a driver for future hope, could, at the same time, create the conditions for the non-existence of heritage.

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85 This structure also expresses Morris’ desire for revolution and social transformation, the disruption of the present that utopia effects.
87 Morris, *News From Nowhere*, p. 34.
It is a superficially paradoxical conclusion, in light of my concern with recovering utopian tendencies within heritage practices, but I want to argue that it is exactly this paradox which has relevance for contemporary debates. Analysis of *News from Nowhere* has fleshed out the dimensions of Morris’ utopianism, its incompleteness and ambiguity setting up an emergent and necessarily provisional relationship with the world.88 His desire for society as otherwise also turned towards questions of memory and forgetting, and his work with the SPAB demonstrates that he was engaged with that dialectic on a practical level in advocating for the ‘capacity for a true conception of history, a power of making the past part of the present’.89 Morris’ framing of the relationship between the past, the present and, by implication, the future is echoed by many recent definitions of heritage as ‘a contemporary product shaped from history’ and ‘a creative engagement with the past in the present’. 90 However, as in the case of Nowhere, making the past part of the present could entail a complete transformation of society and its ideas of heritage. On the other hand, it could underpin and perpetuate societal inequalities, in keeping with the well-established critiques of heritage by scholars such as Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger and David Lowenthal. What this comparison shows, then, is that such definitions are not sufficient to an understanding of heritage. Therefore, with regard to conservation, it is possible to see how a process that works to save relics of the past could be translated into an interest that supports the

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88 There are similarities here with H.G. Wells’ conception of the modern utopia, which ‘must not be static but kinetic, must shape not as a permanent state but as a hopeful stage, leading to a long ascent of stages’, although Morris’ thinking diverges from the narrative of progress that ‘the long ascent of stages’ implies. See H.G. Wells, *A Modern Utopia* (1905), URL = <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hgwells/1905/modern-utopia/ch01.htm> [Accessed 26 August 2016].


maintenance of the status quo. A resounding message in Morris’ writings, though, is that the guiding principle for conservation should not be stasis but change, specifically social change. Just as ‘art for art’s sake’ was part of his critique of the Victorian middle classes, so conservation for conservation’s sake embodies a similar problematic. In fact, Morris believed that, if necessary, under changed and improved conditions of working life, old buildings may no longer have a social purpose. With these thoughts in mind, he begged for a truce, ‘lasting perhaps for a century, the preservation of the buildings intact until then, for the future to decide’, expressing a desire for revolutionary transformation that would invest the future society with knowledge and understanding lacking in the present.

This idea opens a way into thinking about more reflexive definitions of heritage, and is pertinent to current scholarship about the pervasiveness of heritage in contemporary life. The threat of being overwhelmed by the past has been widely commented on by cultural critics and recent work by Caitlin DeSilvey, Simon Naylor and Colin Sackett has challenged the logic of long-term, indefinite conservation in the wake of disappearing landscapes. It also speaks to the interests of those who study conservation practices; Siân Jones and Thomas Yarrow note the continuing influence of the tenets of minimal intervention but stress that ‘the ways in which these are practically

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92 As Andrew Culp writes, ‘From the perspective of utopia, the difference between right-wing and left-wing […] is clear: one seeks the restoration of lost authority, while the other pursues the revolutionary triumph of a classless society’. See parallax, 21:4, Philosophy without an Object (2015), p. 432.
93 It is interesting to contrast the social change that Morris linked to the process of conservation with the inheritance of a stable, yet malleable culture that David Lowenthal identifies with heritage. See The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 69. This conception is often implicit in definitions of heritage in terms of the ‘presence of the past’.
94 Cited from Thompson, William Morris, p. 240.
interpreted and applied are inflected by distinct perspectives arising from different forms of expert practice, suggesting it is not only the principles of conservation that need to be addressed but also their application. Lastly, it is relevant to issues around digitisation and the preservation of cultural heritage, which are particularly acute in relation to digital memory systems, where forgetting becomes incidental to a process of accumulating and retrieving information. In reaching both towards the past and the future, Morris’ work shows an active negotiation of heritage, shedding light on how contemporary practices and decision-making might hold open or foreclose possible futures.

Several objections could no doubt be raised to the way I have structured this account, which does not, in any way, claim to be a comprehensive history. Conservation is one among many practices associated with heritage, just as Morris was an individual whose influence on the formation of heritage principles is sometimes in danger of being overstated. Likewise, absent here are the contributions of thinkers like Raphael Samuel, who built on the work of Raymond Williams, and emphasised democratic aspects of heritage practices and their potential to promote social change, distinct from but related to my own argument. Samuel’s work has been recognised as a precursor to theories of heritage as a process in writers including Rodney Harrison, David C. Harvey and Laurajane Smith within the last twenty years. Such writers have done a great deal to raise the profile of heritage practices in a range of contexts, challenging

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99 To be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, in relation to the distinctly different materiality of digital heritage.
101 Of conservation, Samuel writes, ‘conservation is not an event but a process, the start of a cycle of development rather than (or as well as) an attempt to arrest the march of time’. See *Theatres of Memory, Vol.1. Past and Present in Contemporary Culture*. London: Verso, 1994, p. 303.
dominant heritage discourses and their privileging of material culture and essentialist values. However, the critical and analytical purchase of my argument is intended to foreground what is in the background of these debates, that is, the shifting temporalisation of heritage in the modern period. The mixing of temporal modalities as part of that process is relevant to the question of tomorrow’s memory as it is problematised in later chapters. Bringing utopianism into dialogue with the formation of heritage principles, through the forward and backward references of Morris, has also elucidated an alternative history of its development through the interplay of memory and desire. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that desire does not always lead in a utopian direction. This is perhaps an appropriate juncture for introducing methodological utopianism, in which the future is positioned as the critical space of the present.

**Approaching Tomorrow’s Memory**

Utopia, frequently used in its most pejorative, idealist sense, can offer much to the study of heritage when considered in relation to the past and the future as otherwise. The work of Ruth Levitas offers among the clearest and most sustained treatment of utopian methods, in particular her 2013 publication *Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society*. In it, she builds on her research on the concept of utopia, and the historical shifts that have influenced the form, function or content of the utopian imagination. Levitas’ recognition of the limitations that follow from defining utopia based on these categories leads to her proposal for an analytic definition, which would establish a common point of reference across various manifestations of utopianism. She

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103 For example, where Smith presents a critique of the authorised heritage discourse (AHD), which also works to legitimise itself as opposed to other competing discourses or performances of heritage, I have focused on the dialogue between narratives of progress and other (more marginal) temporal modalities in the conceptualisation of heritage in the modern period. See Smith, *Uses of Heritage*, p. 300.


105 See Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*. 
goes on to suggest that the desire for a better or different way of living fulfils that role, whereby the disruption of the present in anticipation of a future state of satisfaction becomes the focus, rather than what is desired or the prospect for the desire to be realised. This logic has the capacity to reconcile numerous disagreements within the field of utopian thought, and points towards a way of thinking about utopia as method. As Levitas explains:

A definition of utopia in terms of desire is analytic rather than descriptive. It generates a method which is primarily hermeneutic but which repeatedly returns us from existential and aesthetic concerns to the social and structural domain.106

In drawing a link between utopia and desire, Levitas is influenced by the work of Morris, and in particular Abensour’s notion of the education of desire, which he defines as the organising function in News From Nowhere.107 The work of Ernst Bloch is equally significant for her development of the hermeneutic of utopia and the idea of a utopian impulse that underpins the desire for social transformation. Bloch argued that the traces of this impulse can be found in a vast array of social and cultural forms, what he called ‘anticipatory consciousness’ of the future within the present.108 Against the view that such traces only constitute compensatory fantasies, he asserted that they may be understood as a set of real but not existing possibilities; therefore, the transcendental aspects of utopia are located within the immanent, material world. However, Bloch also distinguished between those futures that are real possibilities and those that are not in terms of abstract and concrete utopias. Whereas abstract utopia is comprised of wishful thinking and escapism, concrete utopia which, for Bloch, was to be found in Marxism, is where the potential for effective change lies.109 His central concept of the ‘not yet’

106 Levitas, Utopia as Method, xiii.
109 It is also important to note that, for Bloch, concrete utopia was embodied by the Soviet Union. See Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future (footnote), p. 3.
(simultaneously an expected, future presence and a current absence) refers to the really possible that has not yet come about.\textsuperscript{110}

It is this embedded quality in human practice and culture which is a source of influence for Levitas.\textsuperscript{111} Her thinking around the analytical definition of utopia, also described as the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society (IROS), develops a link between utopia and the speculative strand of sociology and focuses on the importance of society imagined differently.\textsuperscript{112} Levitas proposes a tripartite structure for IROS: the archaeological mode, as a piecing together of the images of the good society that are embedded in political programmes and social and economic policies; the ontological mode, as a questioning of what kinds of ways of being are shaped by particular societies; and the architectural mode, as the imagination of potential alternative scenarios for the future.\textsuperscript{113} It is possible to see parallels between IROS and other forms of critique,\textsuperscript{114} and Levitas is quick to dispel the idea that it constitutes the invention of a method.\textsuperscript{115} Further, she stresses that the different modes are part of the same method, subject to shifting emphases, although there are clearly separate implications for each. As indicated in the Introduction, most relevant for my purposes is IROS in its critical, archaeological mode. Levitas elaborates on the details of utopia as archaeology later in


\textsuperscript{112} Levitas, \textit{Utopia as Method}, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{113} Levitas, \textit{Utopia as Method}, p. xvii.

\textsuperscript{114} The fact that, conceptually, utopia is a relatively empty vessel makes this possible. In the archaeological mode, it is also fairly close to the operation of critique itself, see Judith Butler, ‘What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue’, in \textit{The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy}, ed. by David Ingram. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, pp. 212-226. However, the difference is that where critique questions social or political assumptions, utopian critique attempts to render whole the worlds implied in those assumptions.

\textsuperscript{115} Levitas, \textit{Utopia as Method}, xiv.
the book, explaining how this process initiates an implicit questioning of the ideological closure of policy discourse with regard to its partial or repressed elements:

Archaeology undertakes excavations and reconstructions of both artefacts or cultures, based on a mixture of evidence, deduction and imagination, representing as whole something of which only shards and fragments remain. Where images of the good society are buried and denied, they are rendered partial and fragmentary. Utopia as archaeology entails the imaginary reconstitution of the models of the good society underpinning policy, politics and culture, exposing them to scrutiny and critique.\(^{116}\)

In her uptake of archaeological tropes, Levitas shares some affinities with another prominent theorist of utopia, Fredric Jameson, whose 2005 anthology, *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*, investigates the development of the utopian form and its relationship with science fiction. Jameson’s study is written in the Marxist intellectual tradition and is concerned with the contemporary political relevance of utopia. Similarly informed by the distinction between the utopian programme and the utopian impulse, he too draws attention to the effectiveness of Bloch’s interpretive principle in revealing ‘the operation of the Utopian impulse in unsuspected places, where it is concealed or repressed’.\(^{117}\) However, in his literary critical account, Jameson concentrates on utopian texts, developing insights from his earlier writing about the ideological and utopian features of works of art.\(^{118}\) *Archaeologies* does not expand fully on the structural significance of the archaeological, although several commentators have noted Jameson’s interest in excavating the present from the perspective of the future.\(^{119}\) In a later essay, ‘Utopia as Method, or the Uses of

\(^{116}\) Levitas, *Utopia as Method*, p. 154.  
\(^{117}\) Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, p. 3.  
the Future’, he goes into more detail about these aspects of utopia, again gesturing towards archaeology and Foucault’s genealogies. He writes:

I consider the utopian method outlined here as neither a hermeneutic nor a political programme, but rather something like the structural inversion of what Foucault, following Nietzsche, called the genealogy […] The genealogy was, in effect, to be understood as neither chronological nor narrative but rather a logical operation […] The operation, however, consists in a prodigious effort to change the valences on phenomena that so far exist only in our own present and experimentally to declare positive things that are clearly negative in our own world, to affirm dystopia is in reality utopia if examined more closely, to isolate specific features in our empirical present so as to read them as components of a different system.

Jameson’s allusion to Foucault here signals a clear divergence between his thinking and that of Levitas, who explores utopia as a dimension of the sociological. Insofar as archaeological-genealogical inquiry distinguishes itself from sociology, it entails an interpretive principle that historicises the emergence of truths and essences in societies, regarding as fragments those elements that appear unified. The utopian version, described by Jameson, locates components of a different system in the future dimensions of current phenomena, in order to disrupt the systematic nature of history and the social totality. That is not to say that Jameson aligns himself with a Foucauldian approach; in advancing his Marxist hermeneutic, he has explicitly

The Dialectic of Utopia in the Work of Fredric Jameson’, Utopian Studies, 9:2 (1998), 58-77. See also the conclusion of A Singular Modernity, quoted earlier in this chapter.

Archaeology and genealogy are similar methods used by Foucault but where the former principally addresses the organisation of knowledge production and power relations, the latter is concerned with how (through this organisation) truth and falsehood come to be distinguished.


As Bennett writes, ‘we are now accustomed to the project of ‘sociology without society’ as the sociological concept of society has increasingly been replaced by variant formulations of the social as a historical effect of regulatory and governmental practices’, Making Culture, Changing Society. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2013, p. 12.

Foucault’s method has been described by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow as combining ‘a type of archaeological analysis which preserves the distancing effect of structuralism, and an interpretive dimension which develops the hermeneutic insight that the investigator is always situated and must understand the meaning of his cultural practices from within them’, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1983, xii.

See again Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, xii.
challenged Foucault and other poststructuralist thinkers.\textsuperscript{125} Rather, the reference to genealogy would suggest that he is interested in the structural conditions of possibility for ideological closure. This indicates a move away from some of the more problematic concepts in Bloch’s philosophy, which has attracted criticism for the anticipatory function it assigns to utopia. For example, Matthew Charles points out that the surplus of intentional expectation which grounds the idea of anticipatory consciousness has a tendency to reassert, rather than disrupt, historical continuity.\textsuperscript{126} Levitas shows awareness of such criticisms in her discussion of utopias and literary theory and is in turn critical of Jameson and the fact that his work highlights the limits of our ability to imagine the future; she argues, ‘overemphasis on openness, process and impossibility […] and sidestepping the substance of imagined alternatives can go too far’.\textsuperscript{127} Levitas’ concern with utopian impulses is primarily oriented towards drawing out images of the ‘good society’, which is connected to her aim of reinstating utopia within the discipline of sociology. Therefore, the social function of utopia is important, and her overall project is more unequivocally Blochian in the sense that she foregrounds the causal role of utopia: ‘The utopian method allows preferred futures – including the survival of humanity on earth – their proper causal role in the emergent future’.\textsuperscript{128}

The utopian method I adopt for this study draws from both Levitas and Jameson. While Levitas’ methodological study and her elaboration of utopia as a mode of analysis are useful, Jameson provides important insights in relation to the structural logic of the archaeological, the full implications of which are not explained in Levitas’

\textsuperscript{125} For example, in The Political Unconscious, Jameson acknowledges ‘a new hermeneutic, is already to announce a whole polemic program, which must necessarily come to terms with a critical and theoretical climate variously hostile to these slogans. It is, for instance, increasingly clear that hermeneutic or interpretive activity has become one of the basic polemic targets of contemporary post-structuralism in France’, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. London: Routledge, 2002, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{127} Levitas, Utopia as Method, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{128} Levitas, Utopia as Method, p. 218.
scheme. If, in its historical mode, such a method performs a critique of ideas or truths that appear naturalised, it can potentially do the same from the perspective of the future and make evident the partial utopian content of ideological propositions. In my investigation, this method is utilised in the second and third chapters to draw out the absent or implicit statements in strategy and policy documents pertaining to the case studies. These relate to the ways in which memorial concepts and practices have been taken up in digital cultural heritage projects, specifically the European Commission-funded Europeana and UNESCO’s Memory of the World Programme. The explicit articulation of memory in the policy framework is connected to its cultural currency, and the extent to which conceptions of technology have become interwoven with it. The emphasis, then, will be on the utopian content embedded in claims about memory, raising questions as to the kinds of futures they signal towards.

The uptake of utopia as a critical method is part of a broader attempt to register and make visible problems in the form of policy, which is produced with the purpose of shaping and acting upon the social. However, to expand the inquiry beyond the realm of policy discourse requires further exploration of the practices and processes informing the management of cultural heritage. For these reasons, the other aspect of my methodological approach draws from Foucault’s writings on governmental rationality, more often known by the neologism, governmentality. The earlier reference to Foucault in relation to archaeologies offers an important precedent to governmentality in that it addresses power relations and the organisation of knowledge, particularly in the realm of the sciences.129 The genealogical method that Foucault developed from archaeology went further and was attentive to how such knowledge practices were implicated in the

emergence and naturalisation of discursive formations regarding universal truths.

Following Nietzsche, Foucault proposed:

If interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations.  

There is a link here between Foucault’s characterisation of truths as a series of interpretations and the power relations through which such interpretations come to define societies. These concerns occupied much of Foucault’s later writing on governmentality, particularly in relation to domination and the self; in a 1982 lecture series, he commented, ‘the contact between technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality’. Colin Gordon elaborates on this description, explaining practices of government as follows:

Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty. Foucault was crucially interested in the interconnections between these different forms and meanings of government; but in his lectures specifically on governmental rationality he concerned himself principally with government in the political domain.

Foucault was interested in how such practices gave rise to historically distinctive governmental regimes that worked to control populations, not only through restrictive

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or disciplinary measures, but also through the uneven ordering of limited freedoms.\textsuperscript{133} The diversity of these operations calls attention to another important strategy of government, that it is seldom fully successful in its regulative aims and is therefore undergoing constant revision.

Perhaps because of its potentially wide application, Foucault’s analysis of power/knowledge formations has been influential across a number of disciplines and now comprises a field of inquiry in its own right, loosely labelled governmentality studies. In the realm of cultural studies, too, his approach has been taken up by scholars researching policy and administration. Foremost among these is the Australian writer Tony Bennett, whose work on the relations between knowledge practices and governmentality has made a significant contribution to cultural heritage debates, through his examination of the institution of the museum. Bennett shows how historical sciences such as anthropology informed museological techniques in the nineteenth century, as part of the development of modern modes of liberal government, and highlights the mis-match between the museum’s democratic rhetoric and the rationality of public instruction constituted in its functioning.\textsuperscript{134} In broader terms, his work is directed towards understanding the concept and logic of culture, through an engagement with its administrative processes. Along these lines, he also argues for a defined interpretation of culture based on Foucault’s methodological principles, something which Foucault himself did not undertake.\textsuperscript{135} In his 2013 publication, \textit{Making Culture, Changing Society}, Bennett identifies the emergence of culture as a ‘complex’: ‘that is,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{133} See Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Stanford University, 10 and 16 October, 1979. URL = <http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/foucault81.pdf> [Accessed 26 August 2016], in which Foucault identifies the mutually reinforcing relation of all and each, the individualising and totalising effects of which rely on the limited freedom of individuals to continue functioning.
\textsuperscript{135} See, for example, Tony Bennett, \textit{Culture: A Reformer’s Science}. London: SAGE, 1998.
\end{flushright}
an ensemble of institutionally embedded knowledge practices that are entangled within, and act on, economic and social relations in varied ways’. He writes in more detail about the components of the culture complex later in the study:

The culture complex [...] is, the public ordering of the relations between particular kinds of knowledges, texts, objects, techniques, technologies and humans arising from the deployment of the modern cultural disciplines (literature, aesthetics, art history, folk studies, drama, heritage studies, cultural and media studies) in a connected set of the apparatuses (museums, libraries, cinema, broadcasting, heritage sites, etc.) [...] This complex consists in its organisation of specific forms of action whose exercise and development has been connected to those ways of intervening in the conduct of conduct that Foucault calls governmental.137

Bennett’s approach is instructive; in applying governmentality to the analysis of culture, he provides a way to think through the idea that specific forms of knowledge and expertise give rise to mechanisms, techniques and technologies for the practice of government. This recognition is important for my study insofar as the discussion focuses on the practices underpinning the articulation of memory in each case study. The framework through which heritage, memory and digital technology can be understood to sit within the culture complex is also well suited to the multiple relational sites and contexts of the investigation and helps to draw out various elements of the heritage-memory problem. As suggested in the Introduction, I am interested in defining the general shape of that problem, both in terms of its technological dimensions and the multiplicity of its temporal manifestations, which the governmentality perspective addresses.

It is important to clarify, however, that my uptake of Bennett’s thinking reflects a concern with the organisation of culture as it relates to the research question of

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136 Bennett, Making Culture, Changing Society, p. 2. It should be noted that in this study governmentality theory is complemented by assemblage and actor network theory as a mode of analysis (see especially chapters 2 and 3).

tomorrow’s memory, rather than one that tends towards a pragmatics of culture and direct engagement with cultural policy makers. Bennett has, to a greater or lesser extent, emphasised the ‘policy horizon’ of culture throughout his career and has made a case for the constructive capacities of cultural technologies in much of his earlier work.\(^{138}\) This aspect of his thinking was widely critiqued, because of its perceived privileging of methods of technical evaluation.\(^{139}\) As Jonathan Sterne cautions, ‘while there is certainly nothing inherently wrong with combining the intellectual, the technical, and the ethical, my concern is that Bennett’s invocation of technique mimics the occupational ideology of state bureaucracy’.\(^{140}\) Sterne’s argument is that Bennett’s application of Foucault is part of what contributes to the uncertainty regarding his position, since the latter’s methods focus on the mechanisms of power rather than the outcomes.\(^{141}\) Technical language and indeed the languages of technology have frequently been deployed to occlude questions of differential social relations and Bennett is, at times, close to reproducing a bureaucratic ethos, and limiting the scope for substantial critical work.\(^{142}\) On these grounds, I argue for a methodology that aligns governmentality theory with the utopian method outlined above. Both approaches are required because it is my aim, not just to explore the organisation of memory cultures, but also to consider the degree to which organising and conceptualising memory is capable of holding open and foreclosing possibilities for social change.

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\(^{138}\) See Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer’s Science*.


\(^{141}\) Sterne, ‘Cultural Policy Studies and the Problem of Political Representation’, p. 72. He also makes the related point that ‘Foucauldian governmentality provides no mechanism for determining the difference between working with the government and working for the government’, p. 73.

\(^{142}\) Although it is important to note that much of Bennett’s later work distances itself from this position, for example, *Making Culture, Changing Society*. 56
As indicated earlier, Foucault’s qualified suspicion of utopia as society in its perfected form is potentially problematic for a theoretical framework that seeks to reconcile governmentality with methodological utopianism. However, Jameson’s formulation of the utopian method as a structural inversion of genealogy points towards how they might be made compatible. Where Foucault examines how systems of thought have defined the boundaries of knowledge and truth, Jameson uses the standpoint of the future to isolate emergent features of ‘a different system’ in the present. In both cases, there is no essential meaning to be interpreted; the move consists, rather, in performing a critique of the present from the perspective of the past and the future respectively, on the understanding that meaning is always already conditioned by historically contingent relations of power. Although Bennett is critical of Foucault’s susceptibility to the legacy of post-Kantian aesthetics and to being ‘caught within the “machinery of culture” rather than providing critical purchase on that machinery’, I would argue that is exactly the condition, between interpretive distance and situated criticality, that creates the productive tension of this approach and opens up a space for thinking otherwise.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have given a fuller account of heritage time and its relationship with modernity. Through the lens of utopia and with reference to specific literary utopias, several articulations of the past, the present and the future have been explored, in order to highlight their implications for my investigation of memory. In opposing memory and desire to the dominant narratives of progress and decline, Morris’ nineteenth

143 For Foucault, part of this critique consisted in producing counter-histories, reading alternative accounts into the dominant narratives of history.
144 For Jameson, utopia at once challenges the existing order and projects currently unrealisable futures into the present.
145 Bennett, Making Culture, Changing Society, p. 9.
146 This account follows from the discussion of heritage time in the Introduction.
century utopian writing revealed a world imagined otherwise and a view of heritage in
dialogue with the living conditions of society. My suggestion that Morris’ thinking also
provides a framework for approaching contemporary heritage issues refers to the way in
which he draws out the multiplicity of temporal perspectives invested in the relationship
between the past and the future. His insights speak to the concerns of the other chapters
insofar as these involve a conscious treatment of memory and the management of time.
In the case studies, much of the analysis is focused around memory’s temporal
manifestations in the context of digital media and cultural heritage, and the tensions that
arise from them.

Morris’ interest in the extent to which practices such as conservation held open
possibilities for the future is likewise relevant to my aim of studying digital memory
practices and how they negotiate the problem of tomorrow’s memory. In the second part
of the chapter, I introduced the methodology for the thesis, which is informed by
Foucault’s theory of governmentality and Levitas’ notion of methodological
utopianism. I argued that this approach complements my research interest in how
different practices and memory claims for heritage produce their own kinds of temporal
horizons. Utopia offers a critical lens for reading these claims; as Levitas writes, utopia
is ‘society imagined otherwise, rather than merely society imagined’. Utopianism,
then, always speaks to the idea of the world thought differently and, in doing so, sheds
light on the opportunities or limitations of the present. It is precisely this dialogue
between the real and the imagined that gives utopia its critical force and will be
significant for the following discussions.

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147 Levitas, Utopia as Method, p. 84.
Chapter 2 – Europeana

Without a collective memory, we are nothing, and can achieve nothing. It defines our identity and we use it continuously for education, work and leisure. The Internet is the most powerful new tool we have had for storing and sharing information since the Gutenberg press, so let’s use it to make the material in Europe’s libraries and archives accessible to all.

This statement was part of a 2005 speech made by Viviane Reding, European Commission (EC) Commissioner for the Information Society and Media (2004 – 2010). The occasion was the unveiling of the EC’s i2010 Strategy, a policy framework concerning growth and employment for the ‘European information society’. The i2010 Strategy announced digital libraries as one of its three flagship projects, an agenda that informed the early thinking around Europeana, the case study for this chapter. Europeana is a database and website that offers access to digitised items from over 2500 of Europe’s museums, libraries and archives. It also comprises a number of organisations, content-contributors and developers and is increasingly understood as a network organisation, which marks an important change from the original proposal for a ‘European digital library’. Reding’s comment, made in reference to the Internet’s capacity for storing and sharing information, is in-keeping with the figure of the storehouse model of memory discussed previously; in this scheme museums, libraries and archives are re-defined as memory institutions, reflecting the broader uptake of memory in the EC’s cultural policy. However, the term also highlights a tension between institutional and technical structures in its rendering of memory, as both collective cultural inheritance and as networked cultural content. The issues raised by

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4 See the discussion of memory in the Introduction.
these different but related models will be the focus of the chapter, through an examination of the Europeana project. My purpose is to trace the conceptual trajectory of memory within this context, and to address the implications of a European cultural memory structured by technology.

As discussed, memory and heritage are symptomatic of our contemporary relationship with time. Sometimes used synonymously, they also suggest distinct strategies for managing the past, present and future. In the first chapter, I investigated the mixing of these temporalities in order to shed light on the development of modern notions of heritage. Through the lens of utopia, I characterised memory-desire and progress- decline as different articulations of that experience, which both enabled and limited possibilities for the present of the nineteenth century. These insights led to a consideration of utopia as a method of critical discourse analysis, both to allow for an examination of policy statements in terms of their buried or suppressed content and to draw out the kinds of possibilities they suggest or foreclose. Such a method, I argued, is pertinent to my study of tomorrow’s memory, and to how digital memory practices shape and are shaped by the organisational dimensions of media in the cultural heritage sector.

The Europeana case study provides an opening for extended exploration of these practices insofar as memory is a key reference point for the initiative, which began as a technical database to bring together digital cultural heritage collections. Yet it is distinct from the memory of the past evoked in the first chapter, pertaining instead to the building of a European memory in the uncertain ‘no place’ of European identity. The creation of this memory guides the logic of Europeana, within the wider organisational setting of the EC, and constitutes its latent utopian content. As Andreas Huyssen proposes, ‘in an age of emerging supranational structures, the problem of national identity is increasingly discussed in terms of cultural or collective memory rather than
in terms of the assumed identity of the nation and state’.\(^5\) The suggestion here is that memory is more appropriate to conceptions of supranational entities such as the EC, perhaps because it is superficially inclusive and ubiquitous enough to accommodate their uncertain identity structures. It is potentially troubling for the same reasons, since its very ubiquity makes it vague as a category of analysis.\(^6\) However, one way of negotiating such difficulties is by analysing the knowledge practices through which memory operates, and the instrumentalisation of memory as part of the EC’s governmental rationality. Despite extolling the virtues of the immense heritage of Europe,\(^7\) these practices are revealing of present-oriented interests that tend towards the idea of European memory as a destination point and a marker for greater social and political cohesion. My specific interest here is to trace, in the uptake of digital technologies, how the utopia of cultural memory is imagined and applied in Europeana’s policy and strategy documents. I start, then, by explaining the context for the EC’s interest in memory and identity before moving on to a discussion of the technical metaphors that have informed the conceptualisation of the project.

To give a clearer sense of the context, each section is interspersed with extracts from interviews conducted with representatives from Europeana in 2014.\(^8\) These individuals were responsible for publicising and promoting the project and the inclusion of the extracts is intended to give a fuller perspective on the policy documents analysed in the following sections. Often, the ideas expressed in the interviews replicate the

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\(^7\) See, for example, ‘A Community of Cultures: The European Union and the Arts’, a publication released by the EC’s Directorate-General Communication, where it is stated, ‘the idea of European citizenship reflects the fundamental values that people throughout Europe share and on which European integration is based. Its strength lies in Europe’s immense cultural heritage’. See European Commission, Directorate-General for Press and Communication, Brussels (2002), URL = <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/a-community-of-cultures-phNA4001456/> [Accessed 26 August 2016].

\(^8\) Interviews were conducted with Europeana’s former Head of Communications, Jonathan Purday, and the former Chair of the Europeana Network (2010 – 2014), Nick Poole, in 2014.
dominant policy narrative, although there are moments when they convey a degree of
ambivalence about the capacity of Europeana to contribute to a coherent ‘European
memory’ culture. Europeana’s policy and strategic planning documents were selected as
the primary material for the case study because they had an explicit future orientation,
which allowed for critical reflection on their partial utopian elements.\(^9\)

**The European Commission’s Cultural Integration Agenda**

*I have come to regard Europeana chiefly as a process rather than a destination. The process is one both of asserting a European cultural identity […] and of identifying where it is located so that people can discover and experience it.*\(^10\)

Europeana is funded primarily through the EC, the Executive Body of the EU.\(^11\)

Therefore, before investigating the Europeana case study, it is necessary to give some
background to the EC’s increasing emphasis on cultural heritage and collective memory
and identity. With regard to Europe, much of the formative research conducted in this
area\(^12\) has studied the process of national identity building, made famous by Eric
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger through the concept of invented tradition:

‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact,
where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a
suitable historic past.\(^13\)

Hobsbawm goes on to explain how objects and practices inform the invention and
reproduction of tradition and implicates the founding of national archives and heritage

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\(^9\) This approach is consistent with methods such as discourse analysis, which are concerned with

\(^10\) Unpublished interview with Nick Poole, 2014.

\(^11\) The EU is a politico-economic union, which at the time of writing is made up of 28 member states.


in what he calls a process of ritualisation and formalisation.\textsuperscript{14} If the rise of national consciousness is demonstrated by attempts to maintain continuity with particular narratives of the past, it is also characterised by a tendency for nations to define themselves against others.\textsuperscript{15} In a wider European context, a similar tendency is apparent. As with national identity, there is a symbolic difference according to which Europe has historically distinguished itself. Stuart Hall has written that this identity was produced by ‘Europe’s contact and self-comparison with other, non-western, societies […]', very different in their histories, ecologies, patterns of development, and cultures from the European model'.\textsuperscript{16} However, the active invention of tradition as part of European collective identity building is a relatively recent phenomenon, relevant to the study of European institutions such as the EU and the EC. As many political commentators recognise,\textsuperscript{17} the EU represents a singular entity within international politics, especially in terms of the values upon which membership is conditional: democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{18} On that basis, Ian Manners characterises the EU as a normative power, writing ‘the discourse of the EU as a normative power constructs a particular self of the EU […], while it attempts to change others through the spread of particular norms’.\textsuperscript{19} The ‘self’ of the EU, it is implied, is grounded in those principles outlined above, while the spread of its norms is achieved through decision-making bodies like the EC, and policies that have the normative identity of the EU at

\textsuperscript{14} Hobsbawm and Ranger, \textit{The Invention of Tradition}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{18} These principles were first presented in the 1973 Copenhagen declaration on European identity.
their core. Cultural initiatives have been recognised as playing a key part in this process.\textsuperscript{20} Hence, in the same way that heritage was used in the formation of nation states, the EC’s cultural heritage projects are intimately linked to efforts to forge and popularise a cohesive European identity.\textsuperscript{21}

These efforts have been more pronounced since the expansion of the cultural sector in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{22} The focus on unity through shared values and culture began to gain momentum later through the creation of symbols of the kind that could be identified with invented tradition, including a European flag, the European passport and the creation of a new currency, the Euro, as well as initiatives like the Culture Programme and the European Capitals of Culture.\textsuperscript{23} As Cris Shore points out:

> The failure of a functionalist approach to political union (as a by-product of economic and technical measures) led to ‘a renewed interest in the cultural aspects of integration’. EU policy-makers therefore decided that more ‘concrete measures’ were needed to enhance the image and identity of the Community through information campaigns and a series of symbolic initiatives.\textsuperscript{24}

Such symbolic initiatives have been criticised because their representation of Europe is often based on a highly selective set of cultural influences and universal values.\textsuperscript{25} Yet they only constitute part of the strategy by which the EC has sought to further trans-national integration. Another longstanding cultural policy slogan is ‘unity in diversity’, a gesture towards cultural pluralism that also emphasises the overarching unity of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} See Macdonald, \textit{Memorylands}, p. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Shore, ‘European Union and the Politics of Culture’, p. 9.
\end{itemize}
Europe. A 1991 article by Maryon McDonald, “‘Unity in Diversity’. Some Tensions in the Construction of Europe”, suggests that the phrase had been in circulation for some time, and it continues to pervade the EC’s cultural policy in different forms, most recently in the European Agenda for Culture. In theory, it works by promoting European citizenship through cultural diversity in order to loosen national ties. One of the objectives of the Agenda for Culture is to encourage diversity and intercultural dialogue ‘as a sustainable process contributing to European identity, citizenship and social cohesion’. Here, the logic of unity in diversity ensures that the former takes precedence over the latter and diversity is only encouraged to the extent that it does not obstruct unity.

Although this contradiction makes it difficult to appreciate the substance of the proposition beyond political rhetoric, anthropological research into the organisational structure of the EC indicates that such contradictions shed light on important aspects of the European project. Marc Abélès discerns a dimension of uncertainty in the working culture of the EC that he relates to the EU’s initial principles of engrenage or ‘action trap’ for cooperation between member states; in agreeing on a specific course of action, member states would find themselves obliged to take another set of actions that pointed in a direction they had not necessarily intended to go. In line with the theory of engrenage, he suggests that the underlying paradigm of the European political process is less one of unification than of harmonisation and rationalisation. These terms refer

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to a process that demands continual compromise and negotiation. The result is that European policy begins to influence national politics without spelling out its political goals; it is an indefinite process, the conclusion of which is never quite achieved. He defines these features as part of a larger practice of Europe-building, but one whereby Europe comes into being as ‘a virtual object’.  

30 The concept of virtual Europe corresponds with how the EC’s policy, through slogans like unity in diversity, both feeds on and reproduces forms of identification and difference and reflects the indefinite geographical and governmental status of the European entity. Yet these same manoeuvres also constitute a mode of governing. In this scheme, cultural heritage is less about access to the past than entry to an indeterminate future. Abélès quotes one EC official as saying: ‘At the Commission everything goes faster than in an ordinary administration. Everything goes forward, there is no going back. It’s a little like if one drives without a rear-view mirror’.  

31 His description chimes with Nick Poole’s comment at the start of the section that Europeana is a process of discovering European identity and is in-keeping with the tone of the EC’s cultural policy more broadly. Such similarities, in the repeated occurrence of words like ‘invention’, ‘discovery’ and ‘building’, suggest a shared language and set of terms for the operations by which European integration might be achieved. As I will go on to argue, the language of building and discovery also permeates the policy documentation of the Europeana project. Here, memory acts as a hinge between heritage and information, past and future. Moreover, the EC’s emphasis on memory resonates with another virtual object in the form of the memory institution, a concept that will now be explored in more detail.

If the cultural policy of the EC exemplifies a form of cultural determinism in the sense that political cohesion is the objective of its symbolic initiatives, a similar rationale has been noted in its policy statements about media technologies. It could be argued that the notion of the memory institution constitutes a means of joining the two. For, while it is broadly understood as a metaphor for museums, libraries and archives, it also hints at a reimagining of these organisations in the online environment. Indeed, the first definitions of the memory institution came from the field of information science, where it was conceived as a collective term for libraries, archives, museums and clearinghouses and intended to encourage a coherent view of the information resources they provide. The question of coherent ‘information resources’ is significant because it implies a drive towards the standardisation of content, as opposed to changing institutional infrastructures. Within the last ten to twenty years, the term has also become widely used in the EC’s research programmes concerning technology and European heritage. For example, in Europeana’s 2011 – 2015 Strategic Plan the former Chair of the Europeana Foundation Board, Elisabeth Niggemann (2007 – 2011), wrote:

[Europeana] has facilitated innovative collaboration and knowledge transfer throughout the memory institutions of Europe. The result is a new spirit of collaborative enterprise that is creating a sustainable European information space (Europeana 2011: 4).

Niggemann highlights the benefits of collaboration and knowledge transfer with reference to ‘Europe’s memory institutions’, suggesting that the framework of

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Europeana facilitates new relationships across organisations and borders. Her assertion that ‘Europeana will become the trusted source of Europe’s collective memory’\(^{35}\) indicates a link between shared experiences of the past and the collective designation of places and resources. Jonathan Purday, Europeana’s Head of Communications, echoed this reasoning in a 2014 interview, remarking:

> I’m seeing that all the time – people talking about the memory organisations of Europe – so that there is a sense that every library, because it has got all of the thoughts […] of its people embedded within it somehow and so that is in a sense a kind of memory.\(^{36}\)

Purday’s and Niggemann’s statements both assume a degree of relevance for the EC’s interests, and a culture of European memory. As Marija Dalbello observes, ‘pronouncements on the past and future of the European digital heritage space mirror similar teleological and technocratic visions of universal access to European collective memory’.\(^{37}\) Hence, the memory institution at once speaks to the objective of cultural integration in Europe, while remaining consistent with the technically distributed elements of the Europeana project. The places it designates do have a concrete existence but it is constituted in the relations between sites, which corresponds more closely with the networked structure of the Internet. The architecture of the Internet lends itself to the integration of digitised material from across cultural heritage collections, and is significant insofar as it facilitates a collective view of past events that is mediated digitally. José van Dijck writes more on this phenomenon with specific reference to memory:

> The traditional idea of collective memory is generally grounded in the presumption that the individual and the collective are separate entities that are associated through technological mechanisms, such as media, and through social


\(^{36}\) Unpublished interview with Jonathan Purday. 2014.

institutions, such as archives. However, the formation of memory is increasingly structured by digital networks, and memory’s constituting agency is both technological and human.38

The memory institution is no doubt symptomatic of the parallel development and co-existence of analogue and digital technologies.39 As such, it is not immediately incongruous with either of the media-memory models outlined by van Dijck. In practice though, the distributive logic of the digital network is quite different from that of the physical repository. It has also been suggested that the latter is representative of a particularly Euro-centric tradition. Wolfgang Ernst observes, ‘there are different memory cultures. European cultural memory is traditionally archive-centred, with resident material values (libraries, museums, 2500-year-old-architecture), whereas trans-Atlantic media culture is transfer-based’.40 Ernst’s comment is made in the context of a more complex argument about the need to re-think the archive in the wake of digital technologies. While acknowledging the concurrence of resident and transfer-based cultures, he signals the need for an understanding of ‘the time-based archive as a topological place of permanent data transfer’, writing that ‘the archive transforms from storage space to storage time; it can deal with streaming data in electronic systems only in a transitory way. The archival data lose their spatial immobility the moment they are provided with a purely temporal index (‘data’, literally)’.41 The suggestion is that time-based media stage the divide between what Ernst refers to as European and trans-Atlantic media cultures. This assertion has implications Europeana and the way the

41 Ernst, ‘The Archive as Metaphor’, pp. 49-50. Ernst’s implied division between the spatial and the temporal is, however, artificial for a number of reasons, among them, those discussed in Chapter 1 regarding the spatial and temporal dimensions of utopia. In the given context, we might also collapse the distinction by thinking of the network’s capacity to spatialise temporal durations.
project is legitimised, since part of the value of cultural memory is seen to lie in the ‘resident values’ of those European memory institutions from which digital collections are drawn. On the other hand, the logic of transfer and connectivity is important for fostering trans-national identity. The memory institution concept is one attempt to negotiate these different memory cultures. A closer look at the EC’s earlier research programmes regarding the technology framework for museums, libraries and archives will give some background to its uptake of the term.

**Background to Europeana**

*I hope that in future the physical and digital experience of collective memory will be seamlessly integrated, so that they augment each other, but for the time being, putting collections online is a very blunt way of providing access to one part of that experience.*

The point at which the EC began to show an explicit interest in culture and technology, particularly digitisation, can be traced back to its Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (1998-2002). Within this framework, the Information Society Technologies (IST) theme received the largest share of funding, and digital heritage and cultural content was one of the five main areas of research and technological development under its ‘multimedia content’ action with a budget of €3,600 million. Simon Knell and Ross Parry have also highlighted the significance of the action plan eEurope 2002: An Information Society for All, endorsed at the Feira European Council in 2000, which identified the need to coordinate digital heritage projects at both a national and European level. To that end, the EC commissioned a 324-page report, entitled *Technological Landscapes for Tomorrow’s Cultural Economy*:

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42 Unpublished interview with Poole, 2014.
Unlocking the Value of Cultural Heritage (or the DigiCULT study), which aimed to provide a ‘roadmap’ for negotiating the political, organisational and technological challenges faced by European museums, libraries and archives in the period 2002 – 2006. Over six months, 180 international experts from the cultural heritage sector took part in twenty four interviews, six expert round tables and two online surveys, helping to shape and define the key issues of the report.45 The introduction sets the scene as follows:

Europe’s cultural and memory institutions are facing very rapid and dramatic transformations. These transformations are not only due to the use of increasingly sophisticated technologies, which become obsolete more and more rapidly, but also due to a re-examination of the role of modern public institutions in today’s society.46

It is more than ten years since the publication of the study and the period of transformation alluded to here is now in its next phase. Nevertheless, the report was influential regarding the management of digitisation activities and digital library development in the Sixth Framework Programme (2002 – 2006), which, in turn, led to the adoption of a resolution for a European digital library (later launched as Europeana) in the Seventh Framework Programme (2007 – 2013). It also represents one of the EC’s most sustained investigations of technology and cultural heritage to date and therefore provides a detailed snapshot of the organisational landscape at a time that has been described by Lorcan Dempsey as a foundational moment for digital content management. He notes that programmes funded during that period were more ‘visibly momentous than their many successor initiatives: they galvanised the discussion about

the electronic library, they created high expectations for change, and they corroborated with a flourish the growing recognition that living in the network world was going to be different’.\footnote{Lorcan Dempsey, ‘The (Digital) Library Environment: Ten Years After’, *Ariadne*, 46 (2006), URL = <http://www.ariadne.ac.uk/issue46/dempsey/> [Accessed 26 August 2016]} This factor is important in connection to the characterisation of memory in the report and indicates the scale of the EC’s thinking and ambition around digital technology during that period. The following section considers how such narratives of memory, both implicit and explicit, manifested themselves in relation to these ambitions.

The DigiCULT study formulated recommendations with both policy makers and cultural heritage sector employees in mind. As such, it covers topics governing future decision-making at an organisational level, a national level and a European policy level. While the report is arranged according to this tripartite structure, perhaps unsurprisingly the discussions frequently feed back into the idea of European cultural heritage. For example, the ‘National Policies and Initiatives’ section advises governments to encourage cultural diversity within the context of a more socially integrative cultural heritage policy, corresponding with the EC’s unity in diversity motif.\footnote{European Commission, ‘Technological Landscapes’, p. 36, URL = <http://www.digicult.info/pages/report.php> [Accessed 26 August 2016]} The guidance on low-barrier digital access to cultural heritage similarly attempts to strike a balance between these two poles, as in its recommendations for the Danish database project, KulturNet:

> The primary objective of a European KulturNet should be in communicating European culture, taking into consideration cultural diversity as well as similarities between the European countries.\footnote{European Commission, ‘Technological Landscapes’, p. 58, URL = <http://www.digicult.info/pages/report.php> [Accessed 26 August 2016]}
It is interesting to note how technological models also offer a means of navigating the oscillation between national and supranational concerns. The report states: ‘The conditions for success of the cultural and memory institutions in the Information Society is (sic) the “network logic”, a logic that is of course directly related to the necessity of being interoperable’. The recognition that the infrastructure of the Internet has implications for cultural heritage collections is immediately linked to the question of interoperability and systems compatibility, although it is also acknowledged that ‘interoperability in organisational terms is not foremost dependent on technologies’. While the report shows an awareness that ‘network logic’ will not naturally and inevitably effect structural changes in museums, libraries and archives, in its larger themes, it tends towards emphasising points of connection, both cross-site and cross national.

In relation to these observations, references to the memory institution, which appear over 100 times in the report, are striking. This is, in part, a preference of one of the authors, former head of the EC’s Preservation and Enhancement of Cultural Heritage Unit Bernard Smith, who published several other policy documents emphasising the term around the same period. However, in much the same way as the network, memory is indicative of a conceptual investment; both in how the cultural past is experienced collectively, and in a mode of organisation or storage. These different understandings feed into one another but there are also moments when they diverge in the report, especially regarding the social effects of technical matters such as digitisation. The view that the digital medium is ‘profoundly democratic’ informs the

focus on access to cultural heritage and its vision of digitisation services that allow people ‘to contribute their own story to the cultural memory’. By the same token, assumptions about the existing canon of memory are evident in statements endorsing the expertise of cultural heritage institutions in developing criteria for digitisation projects. In the first case memory is understood as being formed through a variety of experiences and perspectives, in the second, it is used as shorthand for the official cultural record.

Scholars investigating heritage and memory institutions have commented on the ambiguity of memory in a number of EU projects, sometimes attributing it to the types of resources they manage; what could be called informational memory dominates discussions of archives and libraries, while cultural memory is more closely aligned with museums. The DigiCULT report begins to gesture towards an increasingly standardised model for organising cultural heritage collections, which takes shape through the production of digitised content. Here, memory is at the border zone between heritage and information. The technical metaphors that accompany this shift have been traced in a number of ways by media theorists, perhaps most famously by Lev Manovich in the emergence of the database as a cultural form; he suggests that the database offers new ways of structuring experience through the various non-sequential operations it can perform. Geoffrey C. Bowker proposes a qualification to Manovich’s theory, indicating that the development of computerised databases is an outgrowth of a

57 See Manžuch ‘Archives, Libraries and Museums as Communicators of Memory’ and Knell, ‘The Shape of Things to Come’. 
longer movement towards standardisation and universal classification, beginning in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{59} He writes that contemporary memory practices are characterised by the ‘greatly increased centrality of the past for the operation of the state […] and greatly increased technical facilities for such reworking (of the past) with the development of database technology’.\textsuperscript{60} In the report, too, the emphasis is firstly on a centralisation of memory, even while networked databases are able to map diverse and distributed interactions. The development of Europeana, which runs on a distributed database model, presents an opportunity for further consideration of these issues.

The original impetus for the Europeana initiative was to safeguard Europe’s cultural heritage after the announcement of the Google Books Project in 2005,\textsuperscript{61} beginning with the mass digitisation of five of the world’s most extensive library collections (Universities of Michigan, Harvard, Stanford, Oxford and the New York Public Library). There were worries that Google would end up transferring a large volume of cultural resources into the private sector, and so the proposal was made for an equivalent European programme that was open access, with non-exclusive rights.\textsuperscript{62} A notable figure in the Google Books debate was Jean-Noel Jeanneney, Director of the National Library of France (2002 – 2007), who first called for a European campaign to counter the commercial focus of Google’s project in January 2005.\textsuperscript{63} This call was taken up by the then President of France, Jacques Chirac (1995 – 2007) in April of the same year. In a letter paying tribute to the richness and diversity of European heritage collections, Chirac, with support from the leaders of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland

\textsuperscript{60} Bowker, \textit{Memory Practices in the Sciences}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{62} Purday, ‘Think Culture’, p. 171.
and Spain, proposed the establishment of a digital European library. The President of the EC responded positively to the letter and subsequent backing from the i2010: Digital Libraries Initiative, the Ministers of Culture of the Member States and the European Council led to the successful vote, which gave the go-ahead for the commencement of the Europeana project in 2007.

The prototype database was launched in November 2008 as a proof of concept, providing access to content from across European cultural heritage collections via the website www.europeana.eu. In the initial stages of the project it was decided that Europeana would not store digital objects on a central server, partly because of cost implications and partly because some national libraries had already carried out large-scale digitisation activities. Instead, it would function as an aggregator of metadata about existing digital objects and point to the institutional sites where they were held. Here, the broad term digital object is understood to encompass a range of artefacts, including thumbnail images, digital photographs of artworks and other visual material and digital scans of text and print works. Metadata refers to the descriptions of those digital objects to facilitate their discovery online. A great deal of technical effort went towards the development of the European Data Model (EDM) for metadata, with the aim of creating interoperability between discrete digital collections. The metadata feeds Europeana’s distributed network database and distinguishes it from projects like Google Books, which stores digital files in a single database.

Around the time of its launch, Europeana was focused on building up a large volume of digital content, consistent with its strategic objective of reaching 30 million

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66 Aggregator refers to the software that harvests metadata about digital objects from local cultural heritage institutions. Europeana’s content is delivered based on a model of domain and cross-domain aggregators as well as individual organisations.
items in 2015.\textsuperscript{67} By 2025, the plan was to cover ‘all of Europe’s digitized cultural heritage’.\textsuperscript{68} There is a precedent for this impetus to amass content in some of the documentation discussed previously. For example, the DigiCULT report repeatedly draws attention to the quantity of European cultural heritage material, stating that, ‘today, the volume of material to be digitised is the most pressing digitisation issue, and related to that, the need to select’.\textsuperscript{69} The Digital Libraries Initiative, launched in 2005,\textsuperscript{70} conveyed a similar view, which was furthered through the coordination of a High Level Expert Group on Digital Libraries in 2009. In a final report commissioned by the EC, the Group concluded that:

Digitisation and online accessibility needs to be achieved in full respect of the current copyright rules, while for cultural institutions there is the need for copyright reform and further harmonisation at European level to create the appropriate conditions for large scale digitisation.\textsuperscript{71}

This excerpt registers one of the greatest barriers to large-scale digitisation, in the form of copyright restrictions. Such restrictions undoubtedly informed Europeana’s focus on digital object metadata rather than digitisation. Yet, it is notable that the problem of copyright is cast as one of harmonisation, the suggestion being that greater cooperation between member states would go some way towards its solution.\textsuperscript{72}

Europeana’s ambitions, to be a comprehensive and representative source of Europe’s cultural heritage, were closely tied to its prioritisation of volume and scale

\textsuperscript{70}This was originally announced under the i2010 Strategy in 2005, as discussed in the Introduction. The i2010 Strategy was superseded by the Digital Agenda for Europe, which launched in May 2010.
\textsuperscript{71}Cited from Marton, \textit{Forgotten as Data}, p. 68.
early on. However, success in that sphere has created a new set of difficulties: making the content serviceable in the face of such vast collections. This has necessitated a selective approach, and a stronger focus on the curation rather than the aggregation of material. In 2013, Europeana’s website was re-launched with more curated content and a bigger image slideshow. The new site is heavily oriented towards images in its presentation, including a featured partner section and an exhibitions page. Designed as a showcase for the collections, these exhibitions are comprised of images grouped under different headings with additional descriptive information.

Unified European cultural and historical themes are highlighted in the exhibitions, ranging from monuments, artistic movements and historical events, to topics that make their trans-national affiliations plain, e.g. ‘Being European’ and ‘The Euro’. All exhibitions are available in English, and the majority are available in French and German. This hierarchy loosely reflects the languages spoken in the EU at an organisational level but is less reflective of the European identity that Europeana claims to embody. Furthermore, countries such as France and Germany have significantly larger content contributions than other EU member states, meaning that their own national collections have better coverage. While these inconsistencies are to some extent unavoidable (in the case of France, there was sustained government support and funding through the culture.fr initiative), it makes it more difficult to justify the claim that Europeana is a comprehensive cultural resource.

Such issues are implicitly linked to the memory institutions from which the majority of digital material is sourced and the role of information management processes in constructing representations of cultural heritage. As noted, because it is an aggregator, Europeana holds the metadata about digital objects, but access to the objects...

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themselves are from the providers’ sites, which means that they retain the context relevant to the collections. Consequently, the designs of online exhibitions are influenced by the pre-existing collection structures of individual (national) organisations. Dalbello observes a similar precedent for the arrangement of physical collections to be reproduced in digital projects. Writing of the cultural record that heritage institutions are concerned with maintaining, she argues that ‘studying how digital libraries are involved in the production of knowledge is crucial to our understanding of how memory institutions are currently shaping this record in the digital environment’.  

Dalbello has also remarked on the way technological developments become intertwined with existing cultural imperatives in institutional settings. Signs of this tendency can be found in some of her more recent qualitative research into national libraries. Of the EC’s digital culture agenda, she quotes one interviewee as saying:

I think libraries can go along with this policy [of a unified Europe], because we can cooperate, we always did that. With the Internet we have a vehicle, an instrument that allows us to put all this together. And still we are all very different. Everybody does it a little bit differently. So I think that politics in Europe and what libraries would like to do is very near together.

Memory institutions, then, not only provide a model for organising content but a framework for institutional cooperation, in which their own sense of their role in building political cohesion in Europe becomes explicit. These are important concerns, especially in light of the changes Europeana introduces with respect to the conversion of cultural heritage artefacts into digital objects. As suggested, the effects of these changes go beyond the digitisation process itself, and also indicate a drive towards greater

standardisation. Viewed in this way, the duplication of terms like ‘harmonisation’
across the EC’s technical and cultural policy seems more than coincidental.

Harmonisation is a form of governmental rationality and refers to the strategy whereby
the EC creates the conditions for collaboration between institutions and governments, in
order that they become more closely aligned. The idea of harmonisation chimes with the
logic of standardisation, a rendering memorable, and thus governable, with the aim of
acting on the present.\textsuperscript{77} The technical instantiation of these modes of acting in
Europeana’s distributed database or its model for metadata also have implications for its
building of a European memory and the potential of digital collections in terms of use
and access to cultural heritage content. The rest of the chapter will examine the relation
between the EC’s governance and the changing conception of memory in Europeana
over the course of its development from ‘portal’ to ‘platform’. Recognition that digital
technologies make up the organisational environment of the project are important for an
understanding of the tropes of portal and platform respectively.

\textbf{Europeana as Portal}

\textit{Europeana itself is not a source, to me at least, but a collection of sources. It is
not in itself trusted, except to the extent that it signposts resources from trusted
cultural heritage institutions [...] (It is) a channel through which people can
arrive at cultural experiences.}\textsuperscript{78}

Like the concept of the memory institution, the umbrella term Europeana is indicative
of an ambition to go beyond associations with particular institutions. The term currently
encompasses a number of organisations, consisting of the Europeana Network and Tech
community, more than 2500 content-contributors, twenty five EU-funded projects, a
board of content holders, a Member State Expert Group and an Executive Office of fifty

\textsuperscript{77} See Bowker, \textit{Memory Practices in the Sciences}, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{78} Unpublished interview with Poole, 2014.
full-time employees.\textsuperscript{79} However, the project started out as a proposal for a European digital library.\textsuperscript{80} Europeana’s shift in focus from a library portal to a networked platform is one way in which it has measured its progress and relative success.\textsuperscript{81} Therefore, further consideration of its technical elements and decision-making are required to give an insight into the reasons for this shift.

As outlined in the introduction, the vision for a European digital library originated in the i2010 Strategy, which defined digital libraries as ‘organised collections of digital content made available to the public’.\textsuperscript{82} Consultation about how to move towards the development of a digital library system formulated recommendations based on the feedback that digitisation and online access were important to raise the visibility of the project. The proposal was made for ‘a common multilingual access point’ to European cultural heritage collections with the idea that ‘such an access point would increase its visibility and underline common features’.\textsuperscript{83} The need for collaboration with existing initiatives was also foregrounded. The digital library would continue and extend the achievements of projects such as The European Library to aggregate bibliographic records across European libraries by offering access to digitised content from their collections. Leadership for the prototype database was assigned to a team at the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, because of its experience with this initiative.\textsuperscript{84} The EC’s


\textsuperscript{80} It has been observed that such entities can be made up of numerous technologies, including Internet Protocol, digitisation, electronic storage, servers, metadata and search and retrieval systems. See Béquet, ‘Digital Library as a Controversy’, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{83} Cited from Marton, Forgotten as Data, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{84} Project leadership was assigned to Jill Cousins, the Director of The European Library, who went on to become the Executive Director of the Europeana Foundation.
Thematic Network for the project was called EDL-net, which organised working groups to address issues around fragmented digital collections coverage with the clear objective of community building and creating the consensus for the European Digital Library. Work on the prototype continued until its launch in 2008, by which point it had collected approximately 4.2 million digital objects from over 1000 museums, libraries and archives. At the launch, the popularity of the website caused it to crash and a spokesperson was quoted as saying: ‘Thousands of users were searching for the words “Mona Lisa” at the same time […] European culture is more popular than we had anticipated in our wildest dreams’.

The development of Europeana leading up to its launch, is revealing of the portal-centred vision for the project in its first years. Notions of consensus and community were fundamental to the creation of a database and website that would increase the visibility of European digital heritage collections. These associations were apparent in the immediate response to Europeana; in 2009 it received the Erasmus Award for Networking on the grounds of its contribution to ‘the development of a common European consciousness’. Furthermore, the crash of the website due to users all searching for the same famous artwork at the same time demonstrates the logic of the database model as a centralised destination through which European memory and culture can be ‘discovered’. Attila Marton has identified such functions as characteristic of Europeana’s portal model, writing:

EDL [European Digital Library] was closely linked to the notion of a portal offering discovery services for and accessibility to digitized cultural artefacts.

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86 Cited from Marton, Forgotten as Data, p. 157.
Just as one would expect from an online library catalogue, the scenarios of use were primarily defined as discovery and access.\textsuperscript{89}

The tropes of building and discovery also featured in Europeana’s first Strategic Plan (2011 – 2015). Although released a few years after the launch, the legacy of the digital library proposal is noticeable in it. The document announces that ‘Europeana is assembling the most comprehensive, trustworthy and authoritative collection of Europe’s cultural and scientific heritage ever compiled’.\textsuperscript{90} Linked to the goal of compiling this resource is the status of museums, libraries and archives as cultural gatekeepers. Memory institutions are highlighted in the foreword to the Strategy, in conjunction with the objective of becoming ‘established as the trusted and comprehensive resource for authoritative cultural heritage content from across Europe’.\textsuperscript{91}

The vision for Europeana, then, is rooted to an idea of museums, libraries and archives that is synonymous with those ‘resident values’, discussed earlier.\textsuperscript{92} Europeana has sought to replicate and maintain such values as part of its distinctiveness. Defining itself as the trusted source of Europe’s cultural heritage online, the website guarantees that ‘Europeana always connects you to the original source of the material so you can be sure of its authenticity’.\textsuperscript{93} Equally, the statement of ‘Europeanness’ inflected in its view of cultural heritage inevitably constrains the drive towards ‘pan-European, cross-domain content (that) creates new juxtapositions and opens up new interpretations’.\textsuperscript{94} The 2011

\textsuperscript{89} Marton, \textit{Forgotten as Data}, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{92} See again Ernst, ‘The Archive as Metaphor’, p. 52.
– 2015 Plan often articulates these types of contradictions; while recognising the need to move away from a dominant discourse,\textsuperscript{95} the significance of the flagship Europeana brand is nevertheless brought to the fore.\textsuperscript{96} Likewise, the view of European culture as an end in itself vies with the obligation to provide a means of engaging with culture, as in the following extract:

We are working with partners that specialise in User Generated Content […] on models that allow Europeana to bring in user content without compromising our authoritative positioning and with appropriate levels of mediation.\textsuperscript{97}

Hence, user-generated content is encouraged but not so far as to compromise the ‘authoritative positioning’ of Europeana’s collections, revealing a tension between user participation and what is deemed to be trustworthy content. Further evidence of this tension can be found in its strategic priority to optimise social media activities, to drive a larger percentage of user traffic to the Europeana website.\textsuperscript{98} The value of social media is measured by its potential to generate publicity, again reflecting the ‘culture portal’ side of the project. It is interesting to note the disjuncture between the instrumentalisation of social networks for the purposes of creating a centre of gravity around the website and the distributed network structure of the database itself, a decision that is partly explained by the importance attached to creating a brand for Europeana. The Strategy suggests:

We are building a strong brand that is associated with the destination site, Europeana.eu. We will continue to develop the portal in line with our users’


evolving needs and expectations, but in addition, we will develop initiatives to make the content as findable, understandable and reusable as possible.\textsuperscript{99}

The stated intention of making content findable and usable refers to the idea of an open services platform that provides access to digital collections via an application program interface (API).\textsuperscript{100} APIs can be used to access collections data and incorporated into new applications, e.g. other websites. Yet even within this type of structure, the Europeana brand is recognised as significant: ‘It is of unquestionable importance that origin and ownership need to be clearly visible, whenever the Europeana API is used’.\textsuperscript{101}

In the policy excerpts above, the idea of building and assembling recurs several times. While Europeana’s collections are largely comprised of historical works and manuscripts, such language gestures towards a destination in the future. There are several factors that explain the use of this terminology. On one level, the technical development of Europeana does resemble a practice of building. However, statements about the need to build a European heritage space online are also aligned with the project of social and political cohesion in Europe.\textsuperscript{102} As discussed, Europe-building is an urgent, forward looking process.\textsuperscript{103} If Europeana can be understood as one expression of that process, the initial idea of building an integrated portal corresponds

\textsuperscript{100} Europeana’s definition of an API is as follows: ‘The Europeana API (Application Programming Interface) is a web service which provides remote access to the Europeana collections, allowing you to build applications, websites and mash-ups that include a customised view of Europeana Metadata and Content’. See Europeana, ‘Glossary’ (2016), URL = <http://pro.europeana.eu/page/glossary> [Accessed 26 August 2016]
\textsuperscript{102} It could be argued that the language of building and discovery also reproduces the mentality of European colonialism, whereby progress towards a common goal was used as the justification for the ‘civilising’ missions of European explorers. See Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
with the EC’s objective of moving towards self-defining European entities and harmonising relations between national institutions. The potentially problematic aspect of this approach is that the starting point of national heritage collections assumes the end point of a shared European identity. Furthermore, the Strategy portrays European identity as a calculable project, wherein the volume of content digitised is the measurement of its success: ‘The scale and scope of the content represents a significant step towards a comprehensive account of Europe’s cultural and scientific achievements’. It is the work associated with building the portal that facilitates these manoeuvres and the sleight of hand from developing a technical resource to establishing a shared cultural inheritance.

The assumption that cultural heritage is a common good constitutes the underlying motivation for the project and this is where utopian elements manifest themselves in the policy. For example, the Strategy includes a quote from the former European Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes:

Europeana is the EU’s most visible expression of our digital heritage. In less than three years, Europeana has established itself as a reference point for European culture on the Internet. Kroes’ description of Europeana seeks to legitimise a representation of the project as a recognised cultural reference point, and hints at an imperative towards a final goal, which is marked by the achievement of the last three years (2008 – 2011). This goal is not stated; rather, the descriptive and the prescriptive are elided into the declaration of the common good of ‘European culture’. The utopia of European culture is presented as spontaneous and self-evident, the implication being that shared cultural heritage can

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resolve differences of national histories and imaginaries. The EC’s role as the guarantor of online access to this culture is ambiguous; it is not expressed as a political issue but rather in terms of a valuable public service – ‘to build the open trusted source for European cultural heritage’. It is precisely the political consequences of a common cultural heritage that emerge as utopian here. Abélès explains that part of the reason that the end point is implicit is that it is constantly deferred: ‘Everything happens as if ‘Europe will be inventing itself everyday, thereby reconfirming its permanence’.

The fact that European culture is neither self-evident nor uncontested is not acknowledged in Kroes’ statement, yet the allusion to being a visible expression of digital heritage registers the necessity of visibility for Europeana. There is another utopian aspect to this claim; a visible digital presence bolsters European cultural values in the online environment, thereby affirming the supranational power of the EU. At the macro policy level, the degree of visibility counts as a marker of validity but it also suggests an association between visibility and heritage itself. As Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka write, ‘through its cultural heritage a society becomes visible to itself and to others’. It is a community, rather than a society at question here, the notion of European community, through which citizens are made subject to a particular regime of European culture. The importance of visibility also speaks to that of ‘visuality’, a nineteenth century term, which refers to the authoritative visualisation of history. In his essay ‘The Right to Look’, Nicholas Mirzoeff explains that:

This process is not composed simply of visual perceptions in the physical sense but is formed by a set of relations combining information, imagination, and insight into a rendition of physical and psychic space […] (It is) a discursive

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practice for rendering and regulating the real that has material effects, like Michel Foucault’s panopticism.¹⁰⁹

The purpose of visualisation, he argues, is to present authority as self-evident by imposing the sensible evidence of its legitimacy. This process is characterised by a series of operations, namely classifying, separating and aesthetisising. The first two produce the third of these, which is understood as a naturalisation of such distinctions.¹¹⁰ Strategies for managing and producing cultural heritage replicate the operations ascribed to visuality. Tony Bennett, drawing from Foucault’s writing on the Panopticon, proposes that the development of the museum in the nineteenth century should be understood as part of a broader ‘exhibitionary complex’ and the emergence of practices that aided new forms of civic self-fashioning: it worked by seeking ‘to allow the people to know and thence regulate themselves to become, in seeing themselves from the side of power, both the subjects and objects of knowledge’.¹¹¹ Elaborating the process of visualising also recalls the comment that ‘politics in Europe and what libraries would like to do is very near together’.¹¹² Just as modes of classification and ordering have acted as a mirror for the production of a civilised social order in heritage institutions, the processes connected to the mass assembly of national digital heritage collections are intended to call forth a burgeoning European public.

This is the audience that represents Europeana’s assumed user base and informs its ambition to make Europe’s ‘common and diverse cultural heritage more widely accessible to all’.¹¹³ Here, it is implied that accessibility furthers the promotion of a

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common and diverse cultural heritage, or unity in diversity. Furthermore, the strategic priorities in the 2011 – 2015 Plan, to aggregate, facilitate, distribute and engage, are all framed around the central notion of access. The emphasis on access is perhaps related to the positioning of Europeana as the cross-cultural, multilingual venue for European cultural heritage collections. As such, it has required the collaboration of museums, libraries and archives from the outset and progressed with multiple user bases in mind, notably cultural institutions and individuals.\footnote{It later branched out to creative enterprises and professionals. See Europeana, ‘Europeana Strategy 2015-2020’, p. 11, URL = <http://pro.europeana.eu/files/Europeana_Professional/Publications/Europeana%20Strategy%202020.pdf> [Accessed 26 August 2016]}

These different groups have distinct needs. As Cesare Concordia et al explain, while the general public primarily perceive Europeana as ‘a portal exposing a great amount of cultural heritage information’, for cultural institutions, it is used ‘to access and manage a large collection of surrogate objects representing digital and digitized content’.\footnote{Concordia et al, ‘Not Just Another Portal’, p. 61.}

The differences highlighted are ones of prospective use, although the two main groups identified also present their own differences. For example, the promotion of Europeana’s content to enhance learning and teaching\footnote{Europeana, ‘Strategic Plan 2011-2015’, p. 16, URL = <http://www.pro.europeana.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=c4f19464-7504-44db-ac1e-3ddb78c922d7&groupId=10602> [Accessed 26 August 2016]} places students and teachers at the heart of its priority to demonstrate public value at an individual level and links back to its funding, which is partially reliant on Member States’ ministries of culture and education. However, cultural tourists are also included in its audience remit, and coordination with the European Capitals of Culture programme and the Council of Europe’s Directorate of Culture and Cultural and Natural Heritage is actively encouraged.\footnote{Europeana, ‘Strategic Plan 2011-2015’, p. 17, URL = <http://www.pro.europeana.eu/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=c4f19464-7504-44db-ac1e-3ddb78c922d7&groupId=10602> [Accessed 26 August 2016]}

Equally, with regard to cultural institutions, museums, libraries and archives have separate emphases and collections histories,
which lend themselves to distinct strategies for managing and accessing digital collections.

These observations throw into question the scenarios of use outlined by Concordia et al and suggest a user group based more on the functionality of Europeana than the different needs presented by the groups themselves. The conceptualisation of a portal or a gateway to content contributes to the problem and casts doubt on whether ‘exposing a great amount of cultural heritage information’ is beneficial to the individual users outlined in the Strategy. Likewise, while Europeana potentially streamlines access to cultural institutions’ digital collections, it also relies on the collections content to feed its own database and website. In constructing its projected audiences around its own structure, Europeana does not reflect the way people would actually use or contribute to a digital heritage portal. The focus on access to culture in the 2011 – 2015 Plan can be seen as symptomatic of this issue and resembles what Ben Roberts describes as ‘a kind of staged engagement with the outside’, one that reflects the objectives of the project itself. Consequently, the two user groups come to represent what was earlier identified as the tension between access to culture (as administered by memory institutions) and participation in culture (as part of a broader set of activities online). The attempt to hold two models of memory and two modes of organising information concurrently reveals that the portal model, premised on database logic, was inadequately adapted to the rapid, technologically driven cultural changes that were taking place at the time.

**Europeana as Platform**

*Memory, to me, is complex, layered, situated and incremental. It has to do with customs and experiences and personal reflections on these. The skill of the curator is to lead you through these experiences and to draw the connections and stories out of them so that they become accessible as a collective memory [...] Most of the next generation of digital cultural channels are focusing much less on aggregating large bodies of undifferentiated content and much more on creating highly targeted niche experiences structured around cultural themes.*

118 Unpublished interview with Poole, 2014.
More recently, Europeana started to reconsider its role as a single access point to European culture. In its latest strategy document, Europeana 2020, the section headed ‘From Portal to Platform’ acknowledges:

We need to reconsider our initial aim of building a single access digital museum, library and archive for Europe — a place where you’re invited to look back at the great achievements of the past. We still believe that this is a good idea, but technology allows us to do so much more and we have to work much harder to meet rising user expectations. People want to re-use and play with the material, to interact with others and participate in creating something new.\(^ {119}\)

A platform is broadly understood as a framework or content management system that is comprised of hardware, software or some combination of the two.\(^ {120}\) The platform has become a pervasive metaphor in the context of contemporary digital media debates, moving away from its original definition as a material structure to connote an organising logic for the development or use of digital applications. In the 2020 Strategic Plan, the conflict between the authoritative positioning of memory institutions and user engagement has shifted towards the latter in line with Europeana’s uptake of the platform model and the wider uptake of Internet technologies. Instead of promoting the portal as a destination website, the platform is defined as ‘a place not only to visit but also to build on, play in and create with’.\(^ {121}\) The idea is to make the content easier to re-use or export, as well as feeding into other sites that users habitually use, like Wikipedia.


and Flickr. In the quote, it is interesting to note Europeana’s self-consciousness about the limitations of the portal approach and its negotiation of past and future in articulating its new focus on re-use, play and interactivity. The invitation to ‘look back at the great achievements of the past’ almost reads as a statement of the initial conception of the project, and signals again the urgency with which the working culture of the EC operates. The stress is on moving forward, reinventing cultural content and ‘creating something new’.

Within this scheme, European identity is still important to Europeana’s vision, but it is the rhetoric of connectedness, rather than commonness, that comes to the fore in the new strategy. The affirmation of trans-nationalism is apparent in the statement that ‘a culturally connected Europe is a better Europe’. The emphasis on connectedness is mirrored at an organisational level in the re-branding of Europeana as a network, a structure that is an explicit assertion of its collaborative working practices. The Network consists of individuals who have professional connections with the core aims of Europeana’s digitisation activity, and task forces, comprised of Network members, to work on areas including user-generated content, metadata quality and content re-use.

The relational structure of the network re-frames the relationships between Europeana and some of those organisations that would originally have been considered audiences or users. The Strategy states:

We are expanding our network with thousands of cultural institutions, politicians, tech entrepreneurs, open data activists, developers and researchers all

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with one thing in common: a shared dream of a world where every citizen will have access to all cultural heritage. We transform the world with culture.\textsuperscript{125}

Hence, while references to memory institutions continue, it is more often within a narrative of partnership, through which Europeana undertakes to disseminate their collections to wider audiences: ‘memory institutions get the visibility, cost reductions and return they deserve from tapping into a shared infrastructure’.\textsuperscript{126} The language of innovation and transformation pervades the tone of 2020 Plan and, in some ways, continues the trope of building that was a feature of the first strategy. However, the new slogan, ‘we transform the world with culture’ is explicit in its instrumentalisation of cultural heritage. Transforming the world is tantamount to inventing the world and, by extension, re-confirming Europe’s place in it. The technical infrastructure of Europeana comes to the fore as part of the process, but it is positioned as a component of the digital information environment, rather than a gatekeeper to knowledge. In a similar vein, the concern for memory that was formerly visible at a conceptual level in the policy has receded, to be replaced with the ‘dreams’ of universal access to cultural heritage. Digital storage metaphors influence this change, what Jussi Parikka calls banal archive technologies:

The archive is indeed becoming banal – as it refers more generally to everyday storage needs, and the various devices, from portable flash memory drives and external hard drives to cloud computing, in which storage is a new business, for files and documents, family photos, and personal collections of other digital material, for example music files.\textsuperscript{127}


Memory, as a major characteristic of digital media, has been inscribed in hardware and software devices such as memory sticks and RAM. These devices are gradually being supplemented or replaced with cloud storage and computing technologies, seemingly ethereal networks of ubiquitous communication and interactivity. The tropes of clouds and dreams are also appealing at a policy level to the architects of Europeana. The overt future-oriented utopian drive of the 2020 Strategy maps more closely onto the aim of ‘building’ European memory that was identified in previous policy documentation.

However, part of the reason for Europeana’s move towards a network model in organisational terms is connected to its sustainability plan for 2015 onwards. Under the 2011 – 2015 Strategic Plan, Europeana received funding of around €30 million a year from the ICT-PSP Competitiveness and Innovation programme, but for the period 2015 – 2020 its funding was transferred to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), a programme that had its budget cut from €9 billion to under €1 billion in 2014. Under CEF, initiatives are required to move towards self-sustainability, which for Europeana meant becoming ‘a more entrepreneurial and service-centred operation […] embedded in and supported by the Europeana Network’. Financial imperatives, coupled with developments in technology, inform this move. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the new Strategic Plan often alludes to technical infrastructure when highlighting the

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129 As Mark Andrejevic writes of the cloud, ‘one of the term’s current uses is to obscure the very concrete shifts in control over information associated with the recentralization of information and communication resources envisioned by the architects of the internet “cloud”’. See ‘Surveillance in the Digital Enclosure’, *The Communication Review*, 10 (2007), p. 296.
benefits of the Network, as in recommendations for open source publishing, knowledge exchange services and the hosting of co-creation spaces.\textsuperscript{132}

Europeana 1914 – 1918, a project for the First World War Centenary, offers a practical example of this approach. Using the Europeana database, online content was aggregated from national collections, in conjunction with several European roadshows, where people brought their manuscripts and memorabilia from the war to be digitised. There was also an online collections form on the website, where personal stories and images could be uploaded. The idea was based on the Great War Archive’s Community Collection Model in Oxford, which set up a public Flickr group after its digitisation funding ended, to sustain the life of the project without professional moderation.\textsuperscript{133} The intention was that, through a mixture of stories from the public, national collections and film archives, the experiences of the First World War could be communicated from diverse perspectives, across Europe and the world.

The scope of Europeana 1914 – 1918 involves a shift in priorities, from aggregation to curation. Europeana’s original idea was that aggregating and making digital heritage content available would lead to higher engagement, and this was not the case. Nick Poole acknowledged that “‘access’ as a principle has failed almost entirely because it is passive – we have had to learn to move on from passive provision of access to proactive engagement with audiences’; he suggested that ‘the next challenge is not mass-digitisation or mass-preservation, but mass-curation of the sheer volume of cultural content’.\textsuperscript{134} Poole was the Chair of the Europeana Network (2010 – 2014) and the Chief Executive Officer of the Collections Trust up until 2015, the organisation that


\textsuperscript{134} Unpublished interview with Poole, 2014.
managed the UK aggregator for Europeana cultural heritage data. As such, he was involved in the writing of the 2020 Strategy, which presents a similar view that digital heritage needs to be made meaningful to people through curation and creative open use.\textsuperscript{135} Europeana 1914 – 1918 goes some way towards this because it invites individual and collective world-wide contributions and makes them available in the ‘curated space’ of the website. It looks at the broader context and impact of WWI beyond the institutional walls of museums, libraries and archives. In addition, all the material is available for re-use, which allows for adaption of the content. Here, it is possible to imagine how Europeana’s services might begin to enable more democratic memory making practices.

These services do not, however, resolve or displace the rationale of Europeana itself, and the project of making cultural heritage meaningful cannot be detached from the aim of promoting European identity. Therefore, the greater focus on individual stories and experiences represents a revision of its strategies, employed when previous governmental approaches failed to engage audiences in anticipated ways. Rosemary Coombe and Lindsay M. Weiss observe that it is in-keeping with such strategies to seek to foster regulated freedom in persons and locales: ‘The cultivation of personal autonomy is one means through which such technology does its social work’.\textsuperscript{136} Another way of framing the EC’s aims is through Anna Tsing’s notion of effective generalisation. She writes:

\begin{quote}
Generalization to the universal requires a large space of compatibility among disparate particular facts and observations. As long as facts are apples and oranges, one cannot generalise across them. One must first see them as ‘fruit’ to make general claims. Compatibility standardizes difference. It allows transcendence: the general can rise above the particular. For this, compatibility must pre-exist the particular facts being examined; and it must unify the field of
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{136} Coombe and Weiss, ‘Neoliberalism, Heritage Regimes, and Cultural Rights’, p. 45.
enquiry. The searcher for universal truths must establish an *axiom of unity* – whether on spiritual, aesthetic, mathematical, logical, or moral principles.\(^{137}\)

Therefore, while the centenary of the War has been an occasion for the articulation and exploration of different cultures of memory and forgetting,\(^{138}\) it also has a sufficiently large space of compatibility, as a pan-European catastrophe, to act as an effective generalisation.\(^{139}\) Generalisations standardise difference and fold particulars into universals in the online heritage space of Europeana. While this may be a productive process in some respects, the stakes are important: the memorial culture around the War has a minimum consensus – an axiom of unity in Tsing’s terms – yet the idea of a federal Europe does not.

Such effective generalisations again draw attention to the issue of standardisation and link back to those features of the database model mentioned earlier. Here, it is Europeana’s users that are implicated in the process; Europeana targets different ‘locals’, different potential actors, local institutions and populations, down to individual contributors, to support its trans-national vision. Yet questions remain about how far constructing the user as an active participant leads to greater participation.\(^{140}\)

The capacity of networks and platforms, on their own, to enable the social interaction implied by participation is also uncertain. These concerns resonate with van Dijck’s observation that the constituting agency of memory is increasingly technical and social. The potential influence and impact of such a relationship is obvious, even if there are


\(^{138}\) It has been observed, for example, that German cultural memorials tend towards a cautionary message regarding WWI, whereas in Britain events and re-enactments are intended to display a mark of respect for those that died. See Macdonald, *Memorylands*, p. 38.

\(^{139}\) Steffi de Jong has noted a similar move in the presentation of WW2 narratives, suggesting the war is remembered as a tragedy ‘in which all Europeans appear equally as victims’. See ‘Is this us? The Construction of the European Man/Woman in the Exhibition It’s our History!’, *Culture Unbound*, 11 (2011), p. 378.

not yet answers to many of the questions about the ethics and politics of digital technologies as mediators of cultural engagement. As van Dijck suggests, understanding how contemporary experiences and memories are constructed requires more nuanced research into the interplay between these technologies, the connective work of human contributors and institutional selection mechanisms.\(^{141}\)

Comments made by Poole are interesting in this regard. His ambivalence about aspects of the Europeana project is perceptible in his reflections on memory:

I think people want experiences that give them access to a sense of collective cultural memory. I think that they also want experiences that enable them to contribute to that collective cultural memory as an ongoing process. I think we are only at the earliest stages of understanding how to use technologies such as the Internet and mobile platforms to support that experience.\(^{142}\)

In this statement, there is an acknowledgement of the transitional phase in Europeana’s development. Poole shows an implicit recognition that the online platforms used to facilitate collaboration, access and re-use do not necessarily lead to experiences of connectedness or engagement. Such an admission hints at the problems of conflating the logic of networked memory with the process of collective remembrance.

In a more recent article about the role of technology in museums, Poole expanded on his argument, suggesting that, via digital media, cultural heritage institutions could be places for mediating change, rather than presenting the illusion of linear time: ‘There is a need for us to focus on what it would mean to provide a platform for contemporary audiences to reflect on the full chaos and complexity of our lived experience’.\(^{143}\) Poole registers in the time of cultural heritage, its double capacity to regulate and highlight temporal ruptures.\(^{144}\)

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\(^{141}\) van Dijck, ‘Flickr and the Culture of Connectivity’, p. 11.

\(^{142}\) Unpublished interview with Poole, 2014.


\(^{144}\) See the discussion of heritage time in the Introduction.
platforms, may seem capable of mediating discontinuities which heritage has historically sought to minimise, yet as the case of Europeana shows, networks can also render static those dynamic interactions they trace. Although the project has superficially moved on from the logic of gathering together that was a feature of the first strategic plan, its structure, both organisational and technical, nevertheless tends towards standardised models. As highlighted in the 1914 – 1918 initiative, perspectives and memories are thus folded into the larger aims of the EC, to build European cohesion and harmonise relations between member states, even while the European project is more uncertain than ever.

**Conclusions**

Sharon Macdonald’s anthropological research on memory calls attention to the importance of research into memory practices in specific locales, including European institutions, to address the continual re-imagining of histories, nations, and cultures.\(^\text{145}\)

She cautions:

> So much policy and practice hinge on assumptions about matters such as that ‘memory’ will be materialised in certain ways, that ‘communities’ will typically have a discrete and distinctive body of heritage that they will want to maintain and present, that certain events will be recalled, perhaps even in similar ways, across Europe and that ‘shared’ heritage will necessarily bind people together.\(^\text{146}\)

My argument here has attempted to interrogate these assumptions from the perspective of cultural heritage and its use within a policy framework relating to digital collections. Rather than focusing on the narratives and representations of the heritage space itself, I examined a wider discursive and material space, across which museums, libraries and archives come into contact with one another. Narratives and representations are still important, as they express themselves in this relational structure, particularly with regard to memory. The EC’s drive to establish a broader memorial culture across

\(^{145}\) Macdonald, *Memorylands*, p. 34.  
nations offers one such articulation, revealing the interests of a geo-political entity aspiring toward a supranational, trans-national identity. Digital memory is another, finding form in both virtual systems of networked communications and as a means of accumulating, storing and retrieving information. These modes of memory have quite different proclivities: where one is defined by unity and discrete cultural entities, the other has a distributive, future-oriented drive. Yet the discussion has also revealed ways in which they are aligned in the EC’s policy and projects.

The point again calls to mind the governmental rationality of the EC, understood as the pursuit of harmonisation and rationalisation. In Europeana, it has been possible to discern a similar process, channelled through decentralised technical and cultural operations, with the aim of fostering cohesion. This process has undergone various transformations; in its early years (2008 – 2011), Europeana was predominantly a digital library project, supported by experts in information systems, who concentrated on building its database and website. Later (2014 – present), because of its range of interests and partners, it was increasingly portrayed as a network of people and projects, using the platform metaphor as a way of expressing its interaction between distinct but interdependent groups. Indeed, technical language has influenced the conceptualisation of Europeana throughout its lifespan. Bowker suggests that this convergence is fundamental to information infrastructures, writing, ‘our way of organizing information inside a machine is typically mediation on and development of the way we organize the world’.

In Europeana, it is the organisation and standardisation of information that supports the EC’s assertion of European memory and a common cultural heritage. The

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149 Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences, p. 31.
elision of information with memory constitutes a technological solution to what is a political problem, namely, that of European federalism. This goal cannot be stated directly, but expresses itself through a continual re-imagining of the European project, as Abélès discerns. He observes that EC officials ‘prefer the delights of a future whose content they choose not to draw precisely. The care which is taken for erasing any sign of a political form yet to come (one can simply refer to the sad fate of those who have proffered a notion of a future ‘federal’ Europe), allows us to understand that New Europe, tomorrow’s Europe, looks more like an ethereal dream than a utopia which could stir people into action’. The view that the EC fails to offer a productively utopian vision for ‘tomorrow’s Europe’ speaks to my claim that the suppressed utopian content in Europeana’s policy is precisely that of tomorrow’s (European) memory. The ethereal dream, in Abélès’ terms, is the partially expressed manifestation of a utopia that is deliberately occluded. The utopian destination of European memory is simultaneously assumed and denied in the project, in part because of its ambiguous mode of governance, in part because it hinges on a future which is not drawn precisely. For Abélès, such a future ‘extends in a time without memory’, which signals again the unstable foundations upon which the idea of EU Europe rests. Despite or perhaps because of this instability, memory has been a preoccupation for the EC, as both a technology and a condition of European identity. The Europeana case study has provided an opening for exploring these issues, and shown how networked cultural resources and memory institutions operate within a broader agenda of trans-national integration.

150 Abélès, ‘Virtual Europe’, p. 34.
151 Abélès, ‘Virtual Europe, p. 35.
Chapter 3 – Memory of the World

All around us, there are [...] more and more ‘signs of the irreversible’, which are causing us to plunge headlong into a state of confusion [...] I am convinced that the human species is capable of extricating itself from this predicament but time is getting short. How can I communicate both my impatience and my determination? If action is not taken, the ‘Gordian knots’ will remain tied. Can they be loosened? Yes, if we move off the well-trodden track with imagination and daring, if the vision of the future wins over the vision of the past. It is never too late to think about tomorrow, no matter how distressing today may be.¹

In 1995 Federico Mayor, the former Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) (1987 – 1999), wrote Memory of the Future, in which he identified what in his view were the most pressing obstacles facing multilateral cooperation and UNESCO’s ongoing efforts to address them through cultural, educational and environmental initiatives. The excerpt above expresses the general character of these obstacles, the ‘signs of the irreversible’ prompting concerns about shoring up a legacy for the future. By way of explaining UNESCO’s response, Mayor goes on to mention the Memory of the World (MoW) Programme. Launched three years before, with the aim of facilitating ‘preservation, by the most appropriate techniques, of the world’s documentary heritage’,² digitisation came to feature prominently in MoW as a means of preservation and access to heritage materials. Here again, the problem of tomorrow’s memory surfaces, not only in the title of Mayor’s book but also, significantly, with regard to the type of future and legacy that digitisation promises. As I have suggested previously, this problem poses complex questions about the relationship between such methods and the perceived threat of loss to heritage; does digitisation alleviate that threat? Is it symptomatic of it? Or is it

constitutive of a sense of threat in the first place? To try and answer these questions, in Chapter 3 I will examine MoW and its associated policies, in order to elucidate the particular conditions that underpin UNESCO’s configuration of memory, heritage and digital technology.

Chapter 2 focused on the EC-funded digital cultural heritage project, Europeana. Following from the line of thinking that culture has become the instrument of a form of EU governmentality, unity in diversity was recognised as a key policy motif, aimed at reconciling the many cultures implicated in European identity. The tensions inherent in this motif were explored through the tropes of memory, as they occurred at different levels of the Europeana project, from the umbrella term memory institution, to the portal model on which the database was originally based. Harmonisation and rationalisation, identified by Marc Abélès as defining features of the European political process, also emerged as part of the language of Europe-building in Europeana’s strategic plans. After discussing the ways in which vocabularies of memory (both technical and cultural) are encoded in the trans-national values of the project, I argued that the utopian destination of European memory is simultaneously assumed and denied in Europeana. Likewise, the projection of a user base that mirrors the EC’s aims was shown to be problematic in the absence of a self-defining ‘European people’, and a heritage that could transcend national boundaries.

Here, I will explore the trope of memory as it is positioned in the broader international framework of UNESCO. As in Chapter 2, the argument is informed by analysis of a case set of texts pertaining to digital memory practices. While the focus is

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on digital documents and digital heritage, I also refer to various world heritage guidelines, in order to contextualise the use of terms such as heritage and memory in UNESCO’s documentation. In this chapter there is less emphasis on the role of policy makers in policy making. The decision taken to include a small portion of interview material, notably from an interview I conducted with the former Director of the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos (Chile), was intended to give some insight into the relationship between state managed memory initiatives and UNESCO. The interview took place in Spanish but the sections I have reproduced are translated into English. The full interview (in English and Spanish) is included in Appendix A.

**Formation of UNESCO**

Like the formation of the EU, UNESCO was created as part of a post-war effort to promote unity and reconciliation on a supranational scale, and to mitigate the threat of extreme nationalisms. This shared historical background led to the expression of comparable symbolic declarations of peace and democracy and the aftermath of the War was the foundation on which UNESCO marked its project of reconstruction: ‘Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed’. International educational development was the initial impetus for

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5 In addition to the interview conducted with Ricardo Brodsky, the former Director of the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos in Chile (2011 – 2016), I also reproduce a section from an interview with Michael Heaney, a former member of the International Advisory Committee (IAC) of MoW (2011 – 2015).

6 The EU developed out of earlier trade agreements, beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.

7 Although, it could be argued that, in practice, some of its cooperation policies have served as a platform for nation states to assert themselves. See, for example, The Nubian Campaign (outlined later on in this chapter).

8 Many of the EU’s core objectives, including the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights are in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. See Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:2 (2002), p. 241. Furthermore, The EU promotes the role of UNESCO in the field of education and the protection of world cultural heritage.

the organisation’s creation and the UNESCO Constitution, which came into force in 1946, arose from a series of United Nations (UN) meetings of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) between 1942 and 1946. 10 Its core principles of mutual understanding and international cooperation are consonant with the UN Constitution, but call attention to culture and the dissemination of knowledge in the service of peace. 11 As such, it has been described as a universalising imaginary, by which Eurocentric values of humanism, democracy and cosmopolitanism became globalised in the post-war era. 12 The legacy of Enlightenment thinking evident in these tropes has led some critics to identify in UNESCO the revival of an explicitly Kantian cosmpolitics. Jacques Derrida remarked in a 1991 lecture:

Kant’s writings can be described as announcing, that is to say predicting, prefiguring, and prescribing a certain number of international institutions that only came into existence (qui n’ont vu le jour) in this century, for the most part after the Second World War. These institutions […] are philosophical acts and archives, philosophical productions and products, not only because the concepts that legitimate them have an assignable philosophical history and therefore a philosophical history that is inscribed in UNESCO’s charter or constitution; but because, by the same token and for that very reason, such institutions imply the sharing of a culture and a philosophical language. 13

The alignment of UNESCO with philosophical acts and archives indicate that its foundational narrative, inscribed in documents such as the Constitution, is underwritten by a philosophy of universal peace 14 that, although older, was only realised in response to its opposite. After the War, the allied nations faced ‘a material problem of rebuilding and re-equipping destroyed schools and universities, museums and libraries (and) a

13 Derrida, Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy, p. 3.
human problem of rebuilding the shattered lives of thousands of children and young
people who have been almost totally deprived of normal schooling’.  

The Constitution’s twin aims, to maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge and collaborate in
the work of advancing popular education were addressing themselves to the task of re-
building in both senses, and had the practical objective of protecting and maintaining
cultural heritage. The link drawn here between the effects of modern warfare and the
preservation of heritage recalls the discussions of previous chapters, with reference to
modernity’s role in constructing the image of tradition to which it is opposed. Indeed,
as Beverley Butler notes, the fear of loss of knowledge and memory that is symptomatic
of modernity is also invested in a wider museological narrative. She writes,
‘museological and archival discourse is pressed into the service of modernity’s
metaphysics and memory-work and thus takes on modernity’s languages and curative
aspirations’. So, while UNESCO’s impetus to re-build in the wake of ruin can be
traced to a specific set of historical circumstances, it is also a product of its philosophy
and the broader temporal shifts associated with modernity. The process of change,
figured as loss, is central to the experience of that temporality; hence, it becomes
possible to speak of the recession of traditional memorial customs and the

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19 Butler, Return to Alexandria, p. 50. Restoration and preservation are among those practices characterised as part of such memory work. Similarly, in his account of the museum, Andreas Huyssen identifies continuity as a feature of modernisation, which is characterised by ‘its strong subject, its notion of linear continuous time, and its belief in the superiority of the modern over the premodern and the primitive’. See Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 28.
20 This impetus relates to what Derrida describes as the philosophical history of UNESCO: its broad agenda to create a culture of peace through science, education, culture and communication can be traced to Enlightenment philosophical traditions. See again Chapter 1.
compensatory investment in modern, external sites of commemoration. This paradox, whereby the modernising processes that contribute to the disappearance of memory also provide the basis for its reinstitution, is crucial to an understanding of UNESCO and reflects the way memory is positioned within the organisation. Its flagship memory programme, MoW, clearly draws from the frequent association between memory and the delineation of official and unofficial narratives of past events. Specifically designed to ensure the preservation of endangered documents, the emphasis on digital technologies in its mission statement hints at its alignment with the storage and recall model of memory that has been so pervasive and problematic in digital media debates.

It is the threat and the promise of memory resistant to loss that emerges as the utopian content in the programme, to be examined in more detail in MoW’s supporting documents. If memory is the threatened entity, then heritage functions as a protective mechanism via strategies of preservation. In UNESCO, such strategies are principally negotiated through the concept of world heritage and the idea of universal value. Originally, this concept encompassed sites of natural beauty and the built environment but, over time, a growing interest in other forms of heritage led to the expansion of its remit and the introduction of new heritage programmes, including MoW, based on its principles. Therefore, world heritage and the operations by which universal value is measured are inextricable from MoW and inform the dialogue between heritage and memory in that context.

In order to clarify the relationship between world heritage and MoW, I begin by reviewing the history of UNESCO, focusing on key issues such as the World Heritage Convention, the development of the world heritage concept and its instantiation in the various World Heritage Lists. I then investigate the influence of such mechanisms in the

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21 See again the discussion of Nora in the Introduction.
22 See the discussion of memory in the Introduction.
MoW programme as part of its remit to facilitate preservation of the world’s endangered documentary heritage. Important here is the *Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage*, linked to MoW through its digitisation projects, which is committed to the ‘continuity of the digital heritage’. The language of the *Charter* and its concern for continuity indicates a return to the issue of heritage in regulating understandings of historical change, even while the digital medium makes palpable a sense of transience and discontinuity in its material manifestations. Through highlighting such contradictions, my aim is to reflect critically on the notion of world heritage and memory, and to consider the problem and solution of digital memory practices in relation to potential threat or loss.

**World Heritage**

The concept of world heritage developed out of the introduction in 1972 of the World Heritage Convention, which came into effect after ratification from forty signatories in 1975. Several events have been recognised as significant in creating the momentum for the Convention, chief among them the Nubian Campaign of 1959, to safeguard the antiquities of Egypt and Sudan after the Egyptian government announced its construction of the Aswan High Dam. The project, designed to regulate the flooding of the River Nile, threatened ancient monuments located in the flood valley. Although UNESCO’s involvement with Egyptian heritage started a few years earlier, at the fifty fifth session of its Executive Board in November 1959, an appeal for cooperation to assist the Egyptian and Sudanese governments in relocating the monuments was adopted. The campaign was subsequently launched in 1960, for the relocation and

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24 As well as the Nubian campaign, the call to restore monuments in Venice and Florence after the flooding in 1966, along with the restoration of the temple of Borobudur in Indonesia between 1975 and 1982, were other important safeguarding campaigns that led to the 1972 World Heritage Convention.

reconstruction of the Abu Simmel and Philae temples, which raised more than $40 million from forty-seven countries.\(^{26}\) This large-scale salvage project, which extended to architectural and engineering collaboration, began to consolidate the idea that heritage was a universal inheritance and an international responsibility. Yet, as Lucia Allais suggests, there was also a substantial degree of political self-interest involved; expeditions instigated by donor states negotiated for half of the archaeological finds to be taken back to their own countries, including several temples, and these were described informally as incentives for nations to contribute.\(^{27}\) So, while the campaign began to give shape to the idea of heritage as an internationally important and collectively owned entity, it also had a clear colonial and nationalist bent, whereby UNESCO member states could assert their power on the world stage with regard to the level of support they offered.\(^{28}\)

Overall, UNESCO’s intervention in Egypt and Sudan would be inflected in several notable ways in the 1972 World Heritage Convention, Firstly, the heritage the Convention undertook to protect, principally monuments, buildings and sites, reflected the professional activities of architects and archaeologists, the chief beneficiaries of the expeditions to Egypt and Sudan. Secondly, its emphasis on ‘new dangers’ in the wake of ‘changing economic and social conditions’\(^ {29}\) hinted at the uncertainty occasioned by military and political upheaval in the region around the time of the Aswan Dam project. Thirdly, like the rationale for UNESCO intervention in the Nubian Campaign, the Convention reiterated the idea of heritage as an international responsibility, to protect

\(^{26}\) See Singh, ‘Cultural Networks and UNESCO’, p. 23.


'the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value', warning that the 'deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world'. At a functional level too, it set out a plan for the protection of world heritage through international support, grants from the World Heritage Fund and the inscription of properties on the World Heritage List. The nominations for world heritage sites grew rapidly in the years following 1975, resulting in a List of eighty two by 1980. At the time of writing the List stands at 1052.

However, perhaps partly because of the influence of the Nubian Campaign, the sentiments expressed in the Convention have made it subject to sustained criticisms over the years. It has been argued that the idea of a shared set of values for universal heritage does not correspond to the traditions associated with many sites and monuments, that it is a means by which Western values are imposed on non-Western settings and communities or local interest groups excluded from decision-making. Further, writers like Laurajane Smith contend that the discourse of universality promotes a totalising view of heritage, stressing material concerns and official narratives over cultural practices and inter-generational relationships.

Although such criticisms have been ongoing, demands for representative heritage from increasingly wide-ranging audiences became more prevalent in the late

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33 See Harrison, *Heritage: Critical Approaches*, p. 64.
35 See, for example, Denis Byrne, ‘Western Hegemony in Archaeological Heritage Management’, *History and Archaeology*, 5 (1991), 354-370.
1980s. These demands were shaped and perpetuated by a number of factors, relating to economic, political and social changes under globalisation and largely came about as a result of the expansion of the heritage industry and cultural tourism. Furthermore, there was a growing international awareness of the need to protect intangible cultural heritage, which led to UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore in 1989. Later, in 1994, UNESCO addressed the politics of representation directly in the call for a ‘representative World Heritage List’, and an expert committee recommended that ensuring the representative nature of the list would guarantee its credibility in the future. The conceptual flexibility of world heritage would be tested in the years following this proposal as claims for representation became aligned with universal values in UNESCO policy. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s work is instructive here insofar as her analysis of world heritage is revealing of its structural dynamics. She writes:

World heritage weakens the link between citizenship and nationality (by affirming the prepolitical cultural bonds of subnational groups) in order to strengthen the bond between emerging cosmopolitan citizens and an emerging global polity. In other words, this move, unlike civilizing missions predicated on the monocultural universalism of “civilization,” reverts to subnational as well as diasporic particularities in order first, to transcend the national articulations of culture, and second, to rearticulate them supranationally.

37 Globalisation is here understood as the development and intensification of cross-border contacts and operations.
This description shows how current understandings of world heritage are distinct from monocultural models of universalism and are, instead, predicated on diversity as a universal principle.\textsuperscript{41} It also calls to mind the image of cosmopolitanism inscribed in UNESCO’s Constitution and perhaps signals its re-appearance in a different form because of the attempt to make diversity consistent with universal values.\textsuperscript{42} As Rodney Harrison comments of UNESCO’s shift to the diversity model, although its universal standards have been seen as exclusionary, it is the same standards that mean it has been unable to ignore reformatory demands on the part of minority communities who represent a component of the humanity it seeks to uphold.\textsuperscript{43}

Nevertheless, these concepts sit in an uneasy relationship and UNESCO’s proposal for a representative world heritage list, which would later be inaugurated in the 2003 Intangible World Heritage Convention, is demonstrative of the tension between them. The advent of the 2003 Convention constitutes formal recognition of intangible heritage in international policy, which is intimately linked to the diversity model of heritage. The Convention text sets out the following definition:

The ‘intangible cultural heritage’ means the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, ‘World Heritage and Cultural Economics’, p. 185.
\textsuperscript{42} Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, ‘World Heritage and Cultural Economics’, p. 185. Diversity is the preferred term, since cultural relativity is logically incompatible with universal values.
\textsuperscript{43} Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches, p. 117. This is adapted from Tony Bennett’s argument about the political rationality of the museum.
The necessarily broad outline for intangible heritage incorporates an explicit affirmation of human diversity and the integral role of communities, along with an acknowledgment of the benefit and threat that ‘processes of globalization and social transformation’ pose to them. But there is little sense in the text that UNESCO is in fact a symptom of these processes and that a phenomenon like world heritage also plays a role in the transformation of communities. Moreover, the mechanism by which intangible cultural heritage is recorded is a list, a measure of value based on the same ideas of universal significance as (tangible) world heritage. Implicitly, then, diversity must be qualified, and some expressions of intangible heritage are placed above others, which is an inevitable by-product of the list form itself.

Listing is a widely noted aspect of state administration, but it had also become a cornerstone of the Euro-American tradition of heritage management by the end of the nineteenth century. Rosemary Coombe and Lindsay M. Weiss are among many commentators to detect in these operations the workings of governmental power. They write:

The design and use of inventories, cultural mappings, traditional knowledge registers, and 3-D renderings are but a few means by which cultural resources are rendered legible as forms of governmental power. To enjoin others ‘to write things down and count them’ is to exercise a form of government ‘without encroaching upon their “freedom” or “autonomy”’ and ‘often precisely by offering to maximize it’.

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46 Indeed the idea of community is, like memory, a symptom of modernity and associated with a similar characterisation of the temporal shifts from pre-modern to modern societies.


The fact that such processes reinforce rather than undermine autonomy can be linked to the diplomatic objectives of an organisation like UNESCO, and related back to Chapter 1’s discussion of governmentality, outlined with reference to Tony Bennett. He proposes that a distinctive field of government has been shaped into being through the apparatuses of the culture complex, including broadcasting, heritage sites and universities, among others.\(^{50}\) The employment of lists in UNESCO’s programmes begins to clarify its governmental rationality and the difficulties of reconciling such technologies with diversity; the list produces a structure by which diversity in all its complexity is codified in a narrow representational framework. In a similar vein, Geoffrey C. Bowker identifies the coin and the list as examples of the two dominant modalities of what he calls ‘universals’. The first, the coin, works by attempting to accord everything a single value, which is the modality of implosion; the second, the list, attempts to categorise every single thing, the modality of particularity.\(^{51}\) He explains, ‘with the modality of particularity, we find background stasis […] The result is a packaging of species that guarantees humans some kind of immunity from the flow of natural time’,\(^{52}\) leading to a hypostatization and freezing of the present. Both universals, he claims, developed as methods of dealing with scale through abstraction and classification and could be described as truth systems for understanding the world.\(^{53}\)

As he recognises though, these types of systems are inadequate to an understanding of diversity, which involves other, localised ways of knowing. Although Bowker’s study focuses on biodiversity, UNESCO’s model for cultural diversity follows a similar pattern; by breaking heritage down into countable units, the World Heritage Lists


\(^{51}\) Bowker, *Memory Practices in the Sciences*, p. 204.


\(^{53}\) Much like Michel Foucault’s characterisation of the sciences as very specific ‘truth games’ related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand themselves.
transform the sites and practices of diverse cultures into recognisably Western heritage products.\textsuperscript{54} Kirshenblatt-Gimblett outlines the effects of this transformation, suggesting that ‘heritage is a mode of metacultural production that produces something new, which, though it has recourse to the past, is fundamentally different from it’.\textsuperscript{55} In her terms, then, world heritage is a ‘metacultural outcome’ of efforts to safeguard and preserve endangered cultural practices that profoundly alters them. While her concepts are different, like Bowker, she also draws attention to the temporal logic of these metacultural productions:

Central to the metacultural nature of heritage is time. The asynchrony of historical, heritage, and habitus clocks and differential temporalities of things, persons, and events produce a tension between the contemporary and the contemporaneous, […] a confusion of evanescence with disappearance, and a paradox – namely, the possession of heritage as a mark of modernity – that is the condition of possibility for the world heritage enterprise.\textsuperscript{56}

Here, it is implied that the tension between the processual nature of culture and the metacultural freezing of time defines the world heritage project. It is the second tendency that mobilises heritage interventions in the global environment. Yet, that being the case, it also limits the kinds of stories that can be told about the past and by extension the present and the future. This key aspect of world heritage will be significant for the following discussion of the MoW programme and the idea of world memory, which places limits on articulations of the past in its assertion of international memory rights.

\textbf{Digital Documents, Digital Heritage}

The previous section gave an abridged account of the development of world heritage and UNESCO’s employment of world heritage lists. Bowker’s work highlighted that the

\textsuperscript{54} This move could also be described as an extension of the colonial project.
process of listing is bound up with the universalising memory practices of Western societies. In relation to the concept of diversity, the Intangible World Heritage List makes possible the transformation of cultural practices into world heritage, which was defined as a metacultural phenomenon. It is only as world heritage, intangible or otherwise, that such practices can be made intelligible within the framework of UNESCO, committed as it is to a universal discourse. However, it also seems clear that the Intangible Cultural Heritage List fails to capture the diversity embodied by the practices it records. This issue draws attention once again to the relationship of stasis to change in heritage debates; if UNESCO’s recognition of intangible heritage is an attempt to address the idea of heritage as process, it nevertheless relies on the stabilising operations of the Convention in order to establish a criteria of evaluation for new entries to the List.

In what follows I introduce MoW and examine its objective of safeguarding and facilitating access to documentary heritage, with particular reference to the *Charter for the Preservation of Digital Heritage*. MoW’s association with the *Charter* is bound up with its description of a document as that which ‘records’ something by deliberate intellectual intent, and is reproducible and migratable. The transference of analogue documents to digital formats and the increasing production of born digital material connects the *Charter*’s activities to MoW’s aims. I also analyse world memory, an attendant concept to world heritage, in two of its most pervasive forms; firstly, through the idea of an international right to memory; secondly, through thinking about how digital memory is implicated in UNESCO’s goal of ‘permanent’ and ‘universal’ access to heritage. While these expressions of world memory do not speak directly to one

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another, there are ways in which they are linked in MoW’s documentation. For
example, the *General Guidelines* state, under ‘Principles and Methods for Access’,

Permanent access is the goal of preservation: without this, preservation has no
purpose except as an end in itself […] While perfection may never be achieved,
it is right to aim in that direction. This is consistent with the United Nations’
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (1966). Everyone has the right to an identity, and therefore the
right of access to their documentary heritage.  

The alignment of preservation and access with identity as a basic human right reveals
the extent to which memory and identity are implicated in UNESCO’s definition of
documentary heritage. This definition and the major principles of MoW will now be
examined further.

UNESCO founded the MoW programme in 1992. Like the 1972 Convention, it
came in response to a particular event, the destruction of the National Library in
Sarajevo. Following its first meeting in 1993, UNESCO undertook to foster national
government partnerships, and prepared a list of endangered documentary heritage in
coordination with the IFLA (International Federation of Library Associations) and ICA
(International Council on Archives). Recognition of the threats posed to documents,
notably war and social upheaval, along with a systemic lack of funding, informed the
key objectives of MoW to facilitate preservation and promote universal access to these
resources. Thereafter, an International Advisory Committee (IAC) was established, with
international, regional and national subcommittees. These correspond with the three-tier
structure of the MoW registers, which all contain material of world significance. The

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programme is similar to the World Heritage Convention in its designation of universal significance: ‘Documentary heritage are (sic) part of the inheritance of the world, in the same way as are the sites of outstanding universal value listed in the UNESCO World Heritage List’.\textsuperscript{61} But, in defining world memory as an umbrella term for diverse knowledge and disciplines,\textsuperscript{62} it also shares affinities with other UNESCO programmes, particularly the 1989 \textit{Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore} and the 2003 \textit{Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage}, mentioned previously. The trope of memory is significant, then, both as it is materialised in the document and insofar as it points beyond the materiality implied in UNESCO’s definition of the document. This focus may also be related to the contemporary popularity of memory and its frequent association with the commemoration of former conflicts or the recuperation of past injustices from the mid to late twentieth century.\textsuperscript{63} The widespread references to memory in that context resonate with the circumstances out of which MoW was founded. Yet why and how certain memories have been perpetuated remains important because, as other studies have shown, these are capable of undergoing the same revisions and exclusions as historical discourse.\textsuperscript{64}

The notion of world memory would appear to have a similar role to world heritage in the sense of being a metacultural production or operating at a meta-level. These operations entail the creation of universal standards, drawn from what could be described as UNESCO’s philosophical ethos; hence, its rationale and promotion of


\textsuperscript{63} Harrison, \textit{Heritage: Critical Approaches}, p. 168.

world heritage is fundamentally linked to its commitment to certain rights based on democracy and peace. Further, the recognition of intangible heritage in UNESCO’s more recent programmes is indicative of a growing awareness of a wider range of cultural heritage practices, the protection of which can involve human rights issues.65 This increased attention in UNESCO’s policy has given rise to uncertainty about whether it is individual or collective rights that are at stake. As Harrison observes, historically, ‘whereas the search for human rights emphasised the individual’s right to difference, there was a sense in which the search for collective cultural rights was expressed less in terms of difference and more in terms of common humanity’.66 Anna Reading identifies a similar tension between human rights and memory rights:

The discursive formulation of a world cultural memory can run the risk of being over-extended to the point of meaninglessness. The question it raises is whether cultural memory can be shared at such a meta-level, even if we are saying that universally all human beings share cultural memories that are integral to their identities. This is not only a problem with conceptualizing a right to memory, but is an integral problem that besets the language and discourse of rights in creating a balance between the particular and the general.67

Central to Reading’s argument is the question of a right to memory at local, national and international levels. She discerns the difficulty of creating a balance between the particular and the general in these debates, which speaks to the previous discussion of the diversity model of heritage. As shown, there is the potential for contradictions in this scheme. In order to explore these issues further with regard to memory, I will give a brief account of how the demand for memory rights has played out in the Latin

66 Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches, p. 159.
American context, with specific reference to the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos in Chile.

The relationship between human rights and memory has been important in conflict resolution work and transitional justice. This field of research and activism comprises a number of memory practices such as truth commissions, direct commemoration and reparation for human rights violations. The UN and UNESCO use the right to memory to frame a number of their transitional justice initiatives, through the negotiation of victim and perpetrator identities. These ideas have proven particularly resonant in several post-dictatorship countries in Latin America, including Chile. Under Michelle Bachelet’s first government (2006 – 2010), Chile ratified various international human rights conventions and made an effort to achieve minimum justice for victims of Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973 – 1990). MoW has been an important reference point for Chile’s state-sanctioned memory politics and the principles behind world memory informed the project to build the Museo de la Memoria, which opened in Santiago in 2010. The Human Rights Archive of Chile, added to MoW’s Register in 2003, is the basis of the museum’s collection, along with testimonies given to the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNVR) and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (CNPPT). The former Director, Ricardo Brodsky (2011 – 2016), highlighted the importance of MoW in the formation of the project:

It seems to us that the Memory of the World concept of UNESCO is highly positive, in fact the declaration of several archives of organisations dedicated to the defence of human rights in Chile as ‘Memory of the World’ was important in

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68 See, for example, the UN Development Programme and UNESCO’s seminar on Human Rights and Memory in 2009.
69 This is comprised of the documentation from agencies gathered at the House of Memory: Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches (FASIC) Corporation for the Promotion and Defense People’s Rights (CODEPU), Foundation for Child Protection Damaged by States of Emergency (PIDEE) and Teleanálisis.
70 Also known as the Informe Rettig or the Rettig Report.
encouraging the formation of this museum, as it comes from a kind of moral obligation of the country to preserve and provide public access to the archives that have been deemed worthy of this title.\textsuperscript{71}

The museum itself is also a testament to universal human rights; the 30 articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights\textsuperscript{72} are mounted on the building’s outside wall and a permanent exhibition gives an account of truth and reconciliation commissions around the world. It then goes on to explore the human rights violations committed in Chile, beginning with General Pinochet’s coup in 1973 and progressing through the Junta’s military rule, punctuated by the stories of victims of the dictatorship. It has been suggested that this explicit declaration of the Chilean state’s commitment to the human rights of its citizens was productive for opening up public debate about Pinochet and post-dictatorship memory.\textsuperscript{73} While it is a state initiative, management of the museum has been entrusted to a private foundation with public financing to protect it from the political pressures and necessities affecting national governments.\textsuperscript{74}

However, these precautions have not protected the museum from a degree of controversy, and criticisms of its universal message. The narrative of the Museo de la Memoria hinges on a minimum consensus; that is, the level of agreement that exists (both nationally and internationally) about the extent of human rights violations during the dictatorship. The duty of memory here is to denounce the moral wrongdoing rather than focusing on the political situation or initiating a debate about the events in question. Critical interpretations of these events would allow for a dynamic relationship to memory. Instead, as Michael J. Lazzara notes, the museum is limited to complying

\textsuperscript{71} Unpublished interview with Ricardo Brodsky, 2014, translated from Spanish. See Appendix A. Brodsky resigned from his position at the Museum in March 2016 after being implicated in the SQM case in Chile, which involved tax fraud and violations of political campaign laws.
\textsuperscript{72} These were composed by the UN in 1948.
\textsuperscript{74} From unpublished interview with Brodsky, 2014, translated from Spanish. See Appendix A.
with the mandate of the Rettig Report, which mobilises the concepts of reparation and denunciation more than debate and explanation.\textsuperscript{75} The universal formulation of this mandate potentially obscures the complex circumstances of the Chilean case and effectively produces the requirement to forget certain details by constraining the locus of remembrance. Lazzara argues that the attendant emphasis on victimhood also has its limits; the social and political struggle of many prisoners of the regime pre-dates the period of military rule and is integral to an understanding of their lives beyond their status as victims.\textsuperscript{76} In its negotiation of victim-perpetrator memories, the museum promotes a right to memory and, by extension, identity but it does not go much further than that or attempt to accommodate fluid conceptions of identity in the wake of the dictatorship.

In the Museo de la Memoria, then, the balance between the general and the particular is re-cast as one of minimum consensus and the narrative of memory operates through the metacultural frame of universal human rights. Yet, if the metacultural production of memory produces a requirement to remember in the international context, it may stand in opposition to national strategies and grassroots commemorative efforts. The structure of the museum and its collections is in keeping with the tendency of state-endorsed projects to memorialise through monuments and buildings. However, when the framework for memory is too simple and static, it runs the risk of presenting a similarly static portrayal of events, so that the memories of those who lived and died during the dictatorship are placed at a remove from the realm of experience. Ann Rigney captures the performative imperative of memory in relation to physical memorials:

\textsuperscript{75} Michael J. Lazzara, ‘Dos Propuestas de Conmemoración Pública: Londres 38 y el Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos (Santiago de Chile)’, \textit{A Contracorriente}, 8:3 (Spring 2011), p. 68. Translated from Spanish.

\textsuperscript{76} Lazzara, ‘Dos Propuestas de Conmemoración Pública’, p. 85. Translated from Spanish.
As the performative aspect of the term ‘remembrance’ suggests, collective memory is constantly ‘in the works’ and, like a swimmer, has to keep moving even just to stay afloat. To bring remembrance to a conclusion is de facto already to forget. While putting down a monument may seem like a way of ensuring long-term memory, it may in fact turn out to mark the beginning of amnesia unless the monument in question is continuously invested with new meaning.  

This concern is not only to do with the space of the museum but the archival collections that constitute a record of the events. The inclusion of these collections in MoW’s register entails the collective designation ‘Human Rights Archive’ for the papers and documentation of numerous non-governmental organisations. Viewed through the lens of human rights, the programme stresses that these papers are something to be safeguarded, rather than engaged with. Even accepting MoW’s principles about protecting memory and identity rights, in the General Guidelines it is the threat to the document that is given precedence. The issue of documentation returns us to the question of its significance for world memory, and its collective instantiation in library and archive collections.

In his essay Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, Derrida reflects on the pervasiveness of what he calls ‘archive fever’, that passion for documenting origins. The materiality of the archive is important for Derrida. He maintains: ‘there is no archive without consignation in an external place which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression’. As he goes on to explain, in this context the word consignation has a double meaning; it relates not only

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78 Jacques Derrida, ‘Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression’, Diacritics, 25:2 (Summer 1995), p. 14. Through reading Freud, Derrida suggests that repetition is, at the same time, impossible to dissociate from the death drive and oblivion. This refers to the way in which actions such as writing history efface memory. See again the discussion of memory in the Introduction.
to the act of consigning or depositing but to a principle of gathering together. Yet the parameters of physical space are also important for distinguishing the material of the archive. As Paul Ricoeur writes of the construction of archives:

Archives are a set, an organised body of documents. Next, comes the relationship to an institution. Archives are said, in the one case to result from institutional activity; in the other, they are said to be produced by or received by the entity for which the documents in question are the archives.

Here, the link is made between archives and documentary evidence, which, Ricoeur suggests, partly accounts for the archive’s institutional character, and is implicitly bound up with authority. Derrida adds further nuance to Ricoeur’s point in his observation that:

The documents, which are not always discursive writings, are only kept and classified under the title of the archive by virtue of a privileged topology. They inhabit this unusual place, this place of election where law and singularity intersect in privilege.

The practice of instituting or authorising evidence that Derrida and Ricoeur both discern in the archive is concerned with place and the law as it dictates the government of knowledge and memory. Derrida writes in a footnote, ‘there is no political power without control of the archive, if not of memory’. These insights are relevant for the present discussion of MoW. While the programme is influenced by the alignment of memory and human rights (where memory is a figure for commemoration and transitional justice), its political stakes lie with the archive; protecting the document is tantamount to saving memory and transforming it into a universal artefact in the

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79 This recalls the previous discussion of the Europeana database, which similarly works via a logic of gathering together.
process. The contradiction is that this transformation occurs through a set of procedures intended to fix or preserve the document. But, as suggested in Chapter 1, if the notion of preservation carries with it intimations of permanence, the practice itself essentially addresses the inevitability of change, be it physical, environmental, technical or political. In *The Past is a Foreign Country* David Lowenthal writes:

> Preservation itself reveals that permanence is an illusion. The more we save, the more aware we become that such remains are continually altered and reinterpreted. We suspend their erosion only to transform them in other ways.\(^{83}\)

The recognition that we can only slow, rather than halt the passage of time is particularly interesting with regard to MoW’s qualification of documentary heritage, which is defined as a record of deliberate intellectual intent. Different formats are implicated in this process, a point Derrida also addresses, stating that the archive today is produced by the facts of the technology used to record it. The archive’s existence in the future will take shape in the same manner, different again to what it is in the present and what it was in the past:

> The technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into existence and its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it records the event.\(^{84}\)

The stake in the future is crucial to understanding the logic of the archive, and archive fever, initially interpreted as an obsession with origins also exposes a desire born of the promise of the future. Derrida makes it clear that the archive is ultimately answerable to the future, insisting, ‘it is a question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow’.\(^{85}\) The

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\(^{84}\) Derrida, ‘Archive Fever’, p. 17.

\(^{85}\) Derrida, ‘Archive Fever’, p. 27.
realisation or non-realisation of this responsibility is a defining feature of the problem of tomorrow’s memory. Moreover, the suggestion that ‘archivization’ produces as much as records the event goes to the heart of MoW’s definition of the document. The increasing production of documents in digital formats again raises the question of the kind of future that digitisation promises and the utopian investment in the medium as a way of articulating between the concerns of memory and the threat of loss.

Because MoW’s remit is documentary heritage, its activities have tended to encompass library and archive collections, which is reflected in its outline:

Memory of the World embraces the documentary heritage of humanity. A document is that which ‘documents’ or ‘records’ something by deliberate intellectual intent. While the concept of a document is universal, it is acknowledged that some cultures are more ‘document oriented’ than others. Therefore – for this and other reasons – not all cultures will be equally represented within the global documentary heritage, and hence within Memory of the World.86

However, the programme’s frequent references to memory introduce a degree of ambiguity into the understanding of the document and its substantive elements. The General Guidelines attempt to address this ambiguity by indicating the varied forms the document can take. Documentary heritage is defined as comprising items which are:

- moveable (but see below)
- made up of signs/codes, sounds and/or images
- preservable (the carriers are non-living)
- reproducible and migratable
- the product of a deliberate documenting process.87

The list takes account of both the documenting process and the potential reproducibility

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of the medium, elements that are isolated from one another later on: ‘A document is deemed to have two components: the information content and the carrier on which it resides. Both may be of great variety and both are equally important as parts of the memory’. Memory is re-introduced into the frame here, hinting at the way the document and memory are sometimes used interchangeably. The separation of the content from the carrier in MoW’s description is a superficial one and the assertion that both are equally important for memory has far-reaching implications, as Derrida’s work shows. The sense in which the document produces as much as records the event makes the technical composition of the document a relevant question. Yet, while MoW registers the potential for documents to be copied or migrated into different formats, the other features it attributes to documentary heritage of the world run counter to the dynamic definition required by reproducible media. The General Guidelines suggest the significance of some items ‘is deemed to transcend the boundaries of time and culture, and they should be preserved for present and future generations and made accessible to all peoples of the world in some form’. However, the emphasis on transcendence presents a problem for the time-based structure of digital media. Even accepting, in MoW’s terms, that the content, rather than the carrier, is accorded that status, it is an inconsistent proposition, assuming that both are equally important.

Other examples of the implicit privileging of the content over the carrier can be found in the kinds of items and collections appearing on MoW’s International Register. To date, no entries for digital documentary heritage have been added to the list. The Australian National Register has the PANDORA web archive, which was added in 2004. The archive was also submitted for inclusion on the International Register. The

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nomination stressed the interactivity of websites, making its case on structural grounds, but it was ultimately rejected because its content was not unique enough. Ross Harvey writes that a web archive such as PANDORA also presents a challenge to the concept of documentary heritage: ‘It seems that fluid entities, those that are constantly growing or changing, such as some archives and digital collections, pose a problem’. He argues that the reason for the problem is that documentary heritage is perceived as fixed, unlike intangible heritage, which is ‘constantly recreated’. Therefore, while claiming to allow for ‘diverse knowledge and disciplines’, MoW’s alignment with the Intangible Heritage Convention can only accommodate diversity within narrow formal parameters. Digital documents throw these issues into sharp relief, giving weight to Lowenthal’s point about the continual reconfiguration of heritage, so that preservation becomes less a matter of maintaining a fixed state of things and more a case of interpreting and transforming them.

Concerns about different document formats in MoW relate to the Charter’s focus on ensuring long-term access to digital materials. This more recent initiative was a response to institutional calls for greater awareness of the importance of digital preservation practices at a government level. With the creation of digital content comes the recognition that it, too, must be safeguarded. As Jussi Parikka writes:

> Digitalization represents a curious wave of practical interest in maintaining important materials for posterity, even if at the same time it leads into crucial foundational questions: how does the encoding of film material in M-PEG introduce a new kind of image conception […] and what about the fact that the digital is, despite hype in the 1980s and 1990s about immaterial virtuality, itself...

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91 As Jussi Parikka writes, ‘unlike earlier formations of the archive which can be said to focus on freezing time – to store and preserve – these new forms of archives in technical media can be described as archives in motion. See What is Media Archaeology? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012, p. 120.

a very material notion that includes hardware, software and other material contexts and is prone to deterioration?\textsuperscript{93}

Both MoW and the Charter address potential problems associated with the management of digital content; MoW recognises the threats to audiovisual and electronic materials from ‘man-made technical obsolescence […]’ driven by commercial imperatives\textsuperscript{94} and the Charter stresses that ‘continuity of the digital heritage is fundamental’.\textsuperscript{95} Continuity refers to a commitment to ensuring that heritage resources are widely accessible to users over time, and supported by keeping abreast of developments in technology. The 2003 Guidelines for the Preservation of Digital Heritage, which could be considered an adjunct to the Charter, go into detail about digital preservation strategies such as migration, emulation and preservation metadata. These are distinguished from digitisation: ‘Digital preservation […] does not refer to the use of digital imaging or capture techniques to make copies of non-digital items, even if that is done for preservation purposes’, rather ‘the purpose of preservation is to maintain the ability to present the essential elements of authentic digital materials’.\textsuperscript{96} Like the custodianship of artefacts or archival records, the emphasis is on the persistence of the materials. Unlike MoW, the Charter also introduces the idea of digital heritage in its own right, an entity that is necessarily wide-ranging. Article 1, ‘Scope’, states:

The digital heritage consists of unique resources of human knowledge and expression. It embraces cultural, scientific and administrative resources, as well as technical, legal, medical and other kinds of information created digitally or converted into digital form from existing analogue resources.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{93} Parikka, What is Media Archaeology?, pp. 118-119.
The definition of digital heritage presents several difficulties. If it is ‘heritage’ by the virtue of being unique, how are criteria for uniqueness to be established when the technology allows for the production of multiple copies? The picture becomes even more confused, considering this description encompasses both born digital objects and digital surrogates. For example, the creation of surrogates could be viewed as part of a broader practice of preservation, whereby access to digital collections decreases the need to consult or handle the originals.\textsuperscript{98} In such a scenario, it is difficult to determine whether the surrogates would qualify for preservation in their own right.

Another difficulty pertaining to the designation of uniqueness for digital resources relates to the framework for selection. Because digital documents require the maintenance of more elements to render them readable, the preservation of material ideally takes place at each stage of the digital life cycle, including creation. This necessitates decision-making about significance at a very early stage, perhaps without knowing whether UNESCO’s standards for world heritage have been met. Michael Heaney, former member of the International Advisory Committee (IAC) of MoW (2011–2015), proposed that the ubiquity of digital memory making practices contributes to the uncertainty of the situation:

\begin{quote}
We are entering a new age of ephemerality. We treasure the remains of the ancient and medieval worlds that have come down to us because they are fragments of a much greater corpus of material now lost to us […] The age of print and material recording (disc, film) inserted a barrier to production (it had to be worth the investment in printing presses or film studios) so what was produced had passed a quality test and was available in multiple copies (leaving aside the continuing production of MS material), making the issue of preservation less pressing – ‘all the documents’ was both justifiable and achievable. Now anybody can produce material and everybody can know about it, so the question arises of what is worth keeping, and the fear that we can’t
\end{quote}

always know – the experience of lost works of the past puts us on our guard against throwing it away (or letting it disappear) unthinkingly.\textsuperscript{99}

The suggestion here is twofold; while conceding that pre-determined criteria for heritage may be difficult to establish, Heaney also registers a reluctance to take decisions on behalf of future generations. He implies that it is a ‘new age of ephemerality’ that intensifies the issue. Yola de Lusenet goes as far as to argue, ‘the recognition that what is considered trivial today may be of serious interest to future generations thwarts any attempt to demarcate cultural heritage’.\textsuperscript{100} De Lusenet’s statement addresses the problem of selection from an ethical viewpoint.\textsuperscript{101} The dilemma of what to preserve is ongoing in cultural heritage debates, with commentators frequently critiquing the stewardship principles of heritage, whereby the past is figured as a legacy to be maintained unchanged into the future.\textsuperscript{102} François Hartog poses the question as follows:

\begin{quote}
Is it a matter of protecting the present or preserving the future? Both, of course. The question is, however, not necessarily pointless. Do we reason in going from the future towards the present or rather from the present towards the future?\textsuperscript{103}
\end{quote}

Hartog’s point makes the temporal stakes explicit; is it a question of tomorrow’s memory or today’s? Digital heritage provides an answer to the question, though in terms different to those set out by the \textit{Charter}. The digital is one in a series of media that involves the large-scale migration of works to new formats. Bowker recognises that contemporary interests are important in determining what is transferred over: ‘Every act of migration across media is a conscious act in the present: unless there is contemporary

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Unpublished interview with Michael Heaney, 2014.
\item de Lusenet, ‘Tending the Garden or Harvesting the Fields’, p. 169.
\item The previous discussion of universal values also locates a tension within the notion of world heritage itself; that is, in its claim to represent humanity equally, while being based on Western ideals.
\item Smith, \textit{Uses of Heritage}, p. 300.
\end{thebibliography}
constituency for a book, for example, it will not find its way on to the Web’. Hence, the process of digitisation and digital preservation already constitutes its own present-oriented selection mechanism, although the link between selection criteria based on heritage values and the selection necessitated in the transition from one medium to another is not made in UNESCO’s policy.

MoW’s concern about technical discontinuity and the rapid obsolescence of file formats foreshadows UNESCO’s agenda for protecting digital heritage in the *Charter*, a formulation of world heritage which differs from categories such as intangible and natural because it incorporates analogue materials converted into digital form. In MoW, the designation of digital heritage is less evident and digitisation is aligned with conservation in a list of activities that furthers its objective of protecting documents. The reverse condition of loss is addressed in the policy of both but is a central preoccupation of MoW, since part of the programme’s remit entails awareness-raising about the historic losses of documentary heritage:

> All Information Society Division Programmes, and other relevant UNESCO Programmes, should include a broad introduction to Memory of the World. This should include an appreciation of the significance of documentary heritage, the scientific and practical issues relating to its preservation and accessibility, and the context of its vulnerability and past losses.

The recognition of past losses also extends to guidelines for the Memory of the World Register:

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105 This point echoes Derrida’s proposition that the archive today is produced by the technology used to record it.
The Memory of the World Register will include a section devoted to the listing of lost and missing heritage which, had it survived, would have been eligible for inclusion in the main body of the register.\textsuperscript{109}

The decision to include not only endangered documents but destroyed or lost heritage gestures towards the notion of unity and the utopian return to a former completeness.\textsuperscript{110} It is the spectre of such completeness that underpins the logic of MoW and the reinstitution of lost memory, which is connected to the foundational principles of UNESCO itself. The digital medium is implicated in the process to the extent that the digital document is compatible with a model of memory composed of finite parts, i.e. virtual memory. When maintained properly, these parts can be consolidated and repeatedly produce and recall the same image or object without the gradual decay associated with analogue formats. As Paul De Marinis remarks:

\begin{quote}
Analogue media, to be preserved, must not be played: each replay is a partial erasure and a new recording – an overlay. Digital preservation relies instead on the frequent rereading, erasure and rewriting of the content.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

A contradiction inherent in this notion of digital heritage is that it seems to offer a system of memory that is resistant to loss, even while its formal structure undermines narratives of continuity and makes its discrete components less discreet. The threat of loss, combined with the appearance of persistence indicates MoW’s utopian investment in digital memory systems.

Discussion of MoW and the \textit{Charter for the Preservation of Digital Heritage} has shed light on the relationship of the document to world heritage as one of a number of technologies involved in its continued operation. As Chapter 2 showed explicitly, the


\textsuperscript{110} See again the discussion of Reinhart Koselleck and the notion of ‘perfectio’ in Chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{111} De Marinis, cited from Parikka, \textit{What is Media Archaeology?}, p. 223.
ways in which contemporary heritage is managed are shaped by changes in the technical structuring and communication of heritage collections. At the same time, such changes are implicated in the creation of their own international networks and forms of cultural exchange, which are produced through collection, documentation, preservation, presentation and interpretation. Like Europeana, UNESCO does not undertake these practices directly; instead it promotes awareness of the need to digitise and preserve endangered documents. Yet, whereas Europeana is a technical database initiative into which digital collections feed, for UNESCO, digital media support its key aims to preserve and provide access. In other words, the idea of the digital is more heavily entangled in heritage values. These tendencies form part of a broader culture complex in a connected set of technologies (e.g. listing, registers) and apparatuses (e.g. museums, libraries and archives), observed by Bennett.

However, as demonstrated, such associations create problems for an understanding of the digital document. Part of the problem is that, implicitly, the definition in MoW, does not accommodate items that go beyond the documentation or record of discrete entities (be they objects, texts or events). The notion that some documents ‘transcend time and culture’ contributes to this problem and, as Harvey registers, MoW struggles to represent digital documentary heritage, even as it advocates digitisation and the preservation of born digital material. As Fiona Cameron argues, the ‘ascription of heritage metaphors to cultural materials in a digital format means that digital media has become embedded in a cycle of heritage value and consumption’.

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112 Described as the third phase of heritage by Harrison, i.e. heritage in the context of postindustrial economies and new forms of late-modern capitalist societies. See Heritage: Critical Approaches, p. 43.
The overt processual nature of digital content would perhaps require a definition closer to that of intangible heritage, even while being thoroughly material. Here, we encounter a temporal modality that mixes persistence with loss, which might be read as another form of the progress-decline dynamic. However, this is distinct from that earlier concept of decline as a setback that precedes ever more rapid progress insofar as the impulse to ‘save everything’ is not motivated by a belief in the natural improvement of current conditions, but related to a fear of inevitable change and a deferral of decision-making.

**Memory Resistant to Loss**

Closer examination of the interplay between world memory and the document, particularly the digital document, revealed that, despite acknowledging issues of format obsolescence and long-term solutions for digital preservation, the utopian content in MoW is expressive of a model of memory that is resistant to loss. Reasons for this were suggested earlier; the perceived loss and attempted recovery of memory that forms a part of the experience of modernity is mirrored in the aims of UNESCO to protect world heritage from the threat of destruction or deterioration. The questions posed at the start of the chapter also refer to this threat, and hint at the entanglement of the digital medium with heritage in MoW; its memory function both promises to guard against loss but also makes the discontinuity of its formats more apparent, so that preservation becomes more a matter of ensuring long-term access to resources. These attributes are suggestive of something particular to the digital itself. As Matthew Kirschenbaum writes:

Kirschenbaum’s description draws attention to those discontinuous elements of the digital medium and clarifies the close proximity of preservation and accessibility in the rendering of digital documents. The General Guidelines are influenced by this factor in their statement that ‘permanent access is the goal of preservation’, suggesting that the document is becoming increasingly aligned with records in a digital form. However, the introduction of words like permanence and continuity into definitions of digital heritage indicates the undesirability of the reverse condition, i.e. transience and discontinuity.

The discussion of Wendy Hui Kyong Chun’s work in the Introduction, which brings out some of the conceptual and ideological links between memory and digital media is significant again here; Chun’s argument that the conflation of memory and storage underpins and undermines digital media’s archival promise leads her to contend that new-media scholars have been blinded to some aspects of its recursive nature. She uses the phrase enduring ephemerals to write about these aspects of digital media:

Digital media […] depends on a degeneration actively denied and repressed. […] If our machines’ memories are more permanent, if they enable a permanence that we seem to lack, it is because they are constantly refreshed so that their ephemerality endures, so that they may store the programs that seem to drive our machines.\(^{118}\)

This notion of enduring ephemerality incorporates the ideology of memory as storage (that which endures) and helps to explain the implicit utopian hope invested in digital media (as that which represses degeneration). Both Chun and Kirschenbaum also focus on digital media’s performative elements; these appear to be built into the process of digitisation because the objects it produces are systemic and require a combination of


hardware and software components to be decoded and viewed. Hence, the recall of a
document is tantamount to an act of creation, or re-creation. Additionally, its machine
readable format makes it vulnerable to manipulation and undetectable modifications.
Discontinuity, then, is essential to an understanding of the digital medium.

In ‘The Discrete Image’, Bernard Stiegler discusses this phenomenon in relation
to digital photography. The function by which the photograph is converted into a
manipulable, machine readable format, he calls ‘discretization’. The discrete of the title
is indicative of digital technology’s capacity to store images as binary code, a form that
is entirely quantified, and which could be seen to interfere in the process that renders the
photograph whole, or continuous.\(^\text{119}\) It is his view that ‘by discretizing the continuous,
digitization allows us to submit the ‘this was’ (of the photograph) to a decomposing
analysis’.\(^\text{120}\) However, this form of analysis is also what destabilises the experience of
continuous time. In the heritage context, a digital image/object disrupts continuity by
revealing its ‘wholeness’ as an illusion.

Another way of exploring the value system implied by the opposition of
continuity and discontinuity is suggested in the functionality Stiegler locates in digital
images. His description of a decomposing analysis is indicative of decay, more often
aligned with natural than technical processes. This issue recalls Koselleck’s discussion
of the ‘denaturalisation’ of spatial metaphors such as progress in Chapter 1 and the
inability of decay to shed these associations.\(^\text{121}\) The resuscitation of the tropes of ruin
and decay in Frankfurt School thinkers such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno

Stiegler*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, pp. 157-158. What Stiegler describes as the ‘this was’ is the
experience of looking at the analogue image/photograph, which invites comparison with Roland Barthes’
project in *Camera Lucida*.
\(^{121}\) Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Stanford:
was, on one level, a response to the temporal figuring of progress and constituted a method for re-conceiving history and tradition. An example of this thinking can be found in the estrangement of the artwork Adorno addresses in ‘Valéry Proust Museum’. The essay discusses the museum in terms of the life and death of artworks through the writings of Paul Valéry and Marcel Proust. For Proust, the neutral context of the museum is necessary for consciousness to mediate the experience of the works. Of this experience, Adorno writes:

In the artifact’s capacity for disintegration, Proust sees its similarity to natural beauty. He recognises the physiognomy of decomposing things as that of their second life. Because nothing has substance for him but what has already been mediated by memory, his love dwells on the second life, the one which is already over, rather than on the first.

The motif of decomposition bears further examination insofar as Stiegler’s use of the word highlights the discontinuity of cultural artefacts. The already fragmentary nature of cultural heritage collections is reinforced by the digital image and the circulation of digital objects. Memory’s mediating function in Proust’s contemplation of the artwork could also be applied to Stiegler’s identification of the analytic function in digital technology; decomposition occurs with the passing of time but the technology initiates, accelerates and is even capable of reversing the process. The systemic structure of digital technology, while vulnerable (see the earlier discussion of preservation), is also dynamic. Its capacity to break down and reconstitute digital objects does not square well with a conventional definition of decomposition that is indicative of irreversible decay, but the metaphor is nevertheless productive in allowing that idea of

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122 As Hannah Arendt wrote of Benjamin’s thought, ‘what guides this thinking is the conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in the depth of the sea […] some things “suffer a sea-change” and survive in new crystallized forms’. See ‘Walter Benjamin: 1892 – 1940’, in Illuminations. London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 55.
‘degeneration actively denied’ to be brought to the surface. What emerges in Stiegler’s writing is the productive capacity for decomposition as a mode of analysis; that is, the coupling of degeneration with regeneration in digital media. Rather than attempting to minimise these unstable elements, Stiegler engages with the specificity of the medium to posit new formations of knowledge, based on reconfiguration and reassembly. The longstanding association of decomposition with gradual decay is thus challenged by the reversibility of this condition in the media context (i.e. decomposing, re-composing) and demonstrates the potential of the digital to disrupt static definitions of heritage such as those outlined by UNESCO.124

A similar suggestion has been made with regard to the dominance of archival logic more generally. Rebecca Schneider’s essay, ‘Archives: Performance Remains’, is helpful in clarifying the argument. Schneider discusses the way performance acts as a destabilising force against a Western tradition that privileges the material remains of the past. Challenging the preservative impulse of the archive, she questions: ‘To what degree can performance interrogate archival thinking?’, for ‘Is it not precisely the logic of the archive that approaches performance as disappearance?’125 The reference to what is described as ‘the logic of the archive’ is a gesture towards the debate that divides performance from its subsequent documentation in the archive.126 Schneider seeks to reconcile these concepts, suggesting that the document is a site of performance, and that rather than disappearing, performance remains but remains differently. This relationship returns us to the familiar realm of memory and forgetting, and can be productively channelled into MoW’s characterisation of the documentary losses of the past. In her

124 In arguing that the trope of decomposition is productive to a discussion of the digital, my position differs to that of scholars such as Andrew Hoskins, who argues that digital media makes society more vulnerable to ‘instant decay: corruption, disconnection and deletion’. See ‘The End of Decay Time’, Memory Studies, 6:4 (2013), p. 388.
description of performative documents ‘producing the fleshy losses to which they testify’. Schneider calls to mind the guidelines for listing lost heritage and offers a corrective to the rationale for this policy, emphasising active practice rather than irretrievable loss. Furthermore, the staging of loss and remains as mutually constitutive demonstrates how performance disturbs the assumption of the archive as that which persists, and begins to signal a way into thinking about the performative aspects of documents. Like Stiegler’s notion of analytical decomposition, performance introduces a productive trope for thinking heritage because documents can be seen to perform the losses to which they testify in Schneider’s terms. Digital documents are also arguably more explicitly performative in that they rely on access and use for their material constitution.

These insights have significant implications for the figure of utopia identified in the MoW programme, that of memory resistant to loss. This preoccupation is consistent with earlier formulations of heritage and world heritage in UNESCO but finds a peculiar expression in digital documents and digital heritage, a medium that both offers and denies a sense of continuity. However, the dream of total or complete memory that digital media superficially promises is not equal to MoW’s concern with loss, which is more oriented around a certainty of inevitable decay. Decay does not disappear with the digital but the physical signs of decay change substantially, and in ways that do not necessarily mark the gradual passing of time. The discussion here reveals that the dialogue between heritage, memory and the digital is an uneasy and provocative one. Heritage management practices of storing, maintaining and preserving are severely challenged by a medium which relies on active degeneration and regeneration. These

are issues which call for sustained critical reflection of the values embedded in heritage work.

**Conclusions**

This chapter began by outlining UNESCO’s founding principles of universalism, before discussing its construction and later revisions to the concept world heritage. The inscription of different variations of world heritage in its national and international lists and registers has the effect, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s work showed, of changing people’s relationship to places and practices; while heritage transforms these into legible entities in the context of UNESCO, it emphasises universal, rather than local significance and experiences. Examination of the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos demonstrated how the same process is observable in the context of international memory rights and the MoW register. Formulations of world heritage and world memory codify things within a narrow frame of representation, what Bowker calls the modality of particularity. He writes, ‘because we package the past into these bundles, we can only distinguish stories that operate within these tightly coupled registers’. However, the utopia of memory resistant to loss that is implicit in MoW’s and the Charter’s documentation, taken to its logical conclusion, denies selection as part of the memory process; with the result that the inability to generalise and abstract thought vastly reduces the horizons for decision-making about the future.

The investigation of digital documents and digital heritage highlighted another dimension of the persistence loss-relationship, on the one hand seeming to offer a medium invulnerable to gradual decay, on the other troubling established notions of heritage with the technical discontinuity of its formats. I argued that these tensions between heritage and the digital may be productive for the figuring of both. Stiegler’s

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‘decomposing analysis’ addresses the suppression of degeneration in the rendering of
digital documents. Equally, the palpable performativity of the digital medium holds
open the potential for a different relation to memory than MoW would seem to allow
for. John Frow, following Derrida, proposes a similar performative dynamic based on
the logic of textuality, through which he opposes the trope of retrieval in storage
memory with the trope of reversibility:129

In such a model the past is a function of the system: rather than having a
meaning and its truth determined once and for all by its status as event, its
meaning and its truth are constituted retroactively and repeatedly. Data are not
stored in already constituted places but are arranged and rearranged at every
point in time. Forgetting is thus an integral principle of this model, since the
activity of compulsive interpretation that organizes it involves at once selection
and rejection […] Memory has the orderliness and the teleological drive of
narrative. Its relation to the past is not that of truth but of desire.130

Frow’s description rejects the realism of the past assumed in the metaphor of storage
and suggests that textuality’s continual reconfiguration of past, present and future puts
memory into dialogue with utopian desire. Here, we might note Miguel Abensour’s
identification of a similar relationship in the narrative structure of News from Nowhere
in Chapter 1.131 The explicit systemic structure of digital data likewise enables a view of
heritage as a continually decomposing and recomposing entity, what Chun calls the
‘resuscitability or the undead of information’.132 The challenges posed by this undead of
information will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4.

129 Here, Stiegler’s thinking is informed by Derrida’s notion of ‘arche-writing’. See Of Grammatology.
Stiegler also draws from this notion in his proposition of an original technicity: ‘Arche-writing is not
writing: it is the structure of elementary supplementarity’. See Bernard Stiegler, ‘Derrida and
Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith’, in Jacques Derrida and
130 John Frow, ‘Toute la Mémoire du Monde: Repetition and Forgetting’, in Theories of Memory: A
p. 154.
Max Blechman. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1999, p. 136. See also Chapter 1.
Chapter 4 – The Right to be Forgotten

I want to introduce the ‘right to be forgotten’. Social network sites are a great way to stay in touch with friends and share information. But if people no longer want to use a service, they should have no problem wiping out their profiles. The right to be forgotten is particularly relevant to personal data that is no longer needed for the purposes for which it was collected.¹

Under huge technological and economic pressure, we are in the process of turning ourselves inside out. Why keep something to yourself when you can share it? Why keep something to yourself unless you have something to hide? […] Our thoughts and preoccupations leave traces, which always threaten to take on the character of evidence.²

Viviane Reding’s introduction to the ‘right to be forgotten’ was delivered in her role as Vice-President of the European Commission (responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship) (2010 – 2014), which followed from her term as European Commissioner for Information Society and Media (2004 – 2010). It is interesting to consider this second speech, in comparison with Reding’s advocacy of collective memory in Chapter 2. While there is a clear distinction between cultural heritage and personal data, the proposal for the introduction of such rights indicates – in the five years between these speeches – growing wariness about online web cultures and a shift away from uncritical optimism about the Internet more generally. This concern is reflected in the second quote by Hari Kunzru, which questions the rhetoric of participation and sharing in the wake of increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies.

Internet culture presents a challenge to the narratives of safeguarding digital heritage and having trusted digital cultural resources that were explored in the Europeana project and the Memory of the World programme (MoW). The interest in re-using and re-mixing digital cultural content implies a breakdown of the authorising structures for heritage and practices such as curating, interpretation and labelling increasingly take place in non-traditional settings and online. As Aaron Straup Cope notes, ‘the Internet is the means that people are using to greater and greater effect to perform the roles that the cultural heritage sector has traditionally assumed’. In its examination of such practices, this chapter offers a comparison with the institutional and policy-laden framework of projects like Europeana, while, at the same time, exploring in more detail the proprietary structures underlying them and the policy response in the form of the right to be forgotten proposal.

The trope of forgetting, then, provides a counterpoint to the previous two chapters. As I have suggested, the dialectical relationship between remembering and forgetting is central to debates about material memory traces and has the capacity to take on different forms, whether through a re-orientation of existing memory cultures, or a preoccupation with saving memory. While the emphasis on memory in the case studies testifies to its historical privileging in modern societies, the attendant fear of being overwhelmed by the past is almost as prevalent. As shown in Chapter 3, the inability to forget limits the extent to which the future is thinkable. Anne Galloway brings the consequences of this predicament into sharp relief, warning that ‘without being able to decide what we can remember and forget, we are effectively left without

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hope of becoming different people or creating different worlds’. The potential for thinking differently about the world draws attention once again to the figure of utopia. The suppressed utopian content of memory as it emerges in the case studies is revealing of aspirations that tend towards current political interests. Tomorrow’s memory is a key problem for these initiatives, partly because they presuppose the storage of memory in a static form against the backdrop of large-scale supranational and global transformations. If the resolution to this problem comes at the cost of being able to imagine the future, or even attempt it, then forgetting is a much needed corrective to the duty of memory in the policy context. The proposal for a right to be forgotten is a tacit acknowledgement that active forgetting, especially in relation to systems designed to gather and retain information, has important ethical implications, and forms a part of the larger landscape of social memory.

Here, I consider this broader social interweaving of memory, digital technology and cultural heritage. It therefore constitutes a direct inquiry into an implicit aspect of the other chapters; that is, through its dialogue with forgetting, the dynamic of memory as a mode of acting. In the case studies, the conceptual investment in memory was the starting point for investigating the technical and organisational dimensions of cultural heritage, and analysing their embedded utopian content. Because the focus of this chapter is different, moving away from the institutional framing of memory, I will not work through the methodology directly, although I will have recourse to governmentality theory and the utopian alignment of forgetting with hope, mentioned above. Instead, the emphasis is on how routine digital memory practices hold

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implications for institutions traditionally associated with practices of remembering and how they restructure relationships between public and private at various levels. As Nancy Van House and Elizabeth F. Churchill write of contemporary archival technologies:

Archives sit at the boundary between public and private. Current archives extend well beyond a person, a space an institution, a nation state. They are socio-technical systems, neither entirely social nor technical.⁶

I will briefly define the context for the proposal for a right to be forgotten through recourse to theories of the everyday before moving on to an outline of the right itself. The issues raised by the EU’s proposal will be explored through the Google Books Project and the proposal for a digital public space in the UK, before returning to a discussion of the everyday in the online environment. While the former initiative highlights concerns relating to data collection and the monetisation of cultural information, the latter, more recent venture, resonates with the growing demand for web-based privacy rights in its call for a digital public space.

The Context for the Proposal

The everyday has had its most sustained analysis in the philosophy of Henri Lefebvre, who stressed the social reality of the concept as a residue of the circuit of capitalist production. By way of a definition, Lefebvre called it ‘what is left over’, after the isolation of distinct and specialised activities. He proposed that these activities

Leave a ‘technical vacuum’ between one another which is filled up by everyday life. Everyday life is profoundly related to all activities, and encompasses them with all their differences and their conflicts; it is their meeting place, their bond, their common ground.⁷

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Here, it is possible to locate one source of the dialecticism of the everyday; the development of specialised activities as part of the social division of labour gives shape and experience to familiar and repetitive daily practices. Within the realm of cultural heritage, there is a well-established convention for attempting to codify such practices, what Sharon Macdonald identifies as a specific dimension of the memory phenomenon: ‘The collection and display of objects and sites of banal, if vanished or disappearing, daily domestic and workplace existence’. However, at an institutional level, it is exactly the specialised processes of categorising, ordering and conserving that have been and are still, to some extent, inseparable from ideas of heritage; with the paradoxical result that representing the everyday entails isolating objects and artefacts from day-to-day usage. Hence, at various points, there have been efforts to reconstruct aspects of everyday life in museums and galleries, although they have often been selective, idealised portrayals.

These sorts of projects can be distinguished from more recent attempts in heritage studies, to engage directly with the everyday, which entails a re-conceptualisation of heritage as a cultural process. Writers including Rodney Harrison, David C. Harvey and Laurajane Smith have all argued, to varying degrees, that heritage should not only be understood through recourse to its material manifestations, but through ideas and politics that inform the culture of the present. Such approaches have the potential to locate the value of heritage within everyday practices, rather than remaining fixed in organising and differentiating principles. The precedent for this

9 For example, 1920s and 1930s Britain saw a museological ‘turn to the everyday’ in the wake of WW1 and economic depression. See Gaynor Kavanagh, History Curatorship. London: Leicester University Press, 1990.
thinking can be traced to the work of theorists including as Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams, to narrate and take seriously everyday experiences.\textsuperscript{11}

Another possible source of interest in the everyday can be found in the longstanding democratic and educative rhetoric around cultural heritage. The idea of heritage being for the people first gained traction in the mid-eighteenth century with the opening up of private collections, then later through the creation of public institutions. These were based around public rights principles, to create open and accessible places, while equally representing different sections of the populace. In their working practices, however, they tended towards reformative and regulative conventions, manifested in both their representation of the world and the public they addressed. Tony Bennett’s work usefully registers the disparity between the two in the museum context:

On the one hand, (there is) the democratic rhetoric governing the conception of public museums as vehicles for popular education and, on the other, their actual functioning as instruments for the reform of public manners. While the former requires that they should address an undifferentiated public made up of free and formal equals, the latter, in giving rise to the development of various technologies for regulating or screening out the forms of behaviour associated with popular assemblies, has meant that they have functioned as a powerful means for differentiating populations.\textsuperscript{12}

He goes on to argue that the contradictory political rationality of the museum produces an insatiable demand for reform and the regular rehearsal of strategies for more equitable access to museum services, comparable to the demand for representative heritage, outlined in Chapter 3. Over the last ten to twenty years, against the backdrop of the wider uptake of the Internet, digital platforms and social media have become a means of meeting this demand and fostering engagement between audiences and


heritage institutions. Web-based services are increasingly used to manage financial transactions, access and share information, participate in culture and politics and interact socially. David Beer’s characterisation of the mundane technologies of participatory web cultures speaks to the routine and habitual nature of such activities.\textsuperscript{13}

At the most basic level, this might include utilising social media to tag, share or comment on cultural content. As observed in Chapter 2, there is also an emphasis on re-using, re-mixing and distributing content, which signifies a change in the positioning of audiences from cultural consumers to cultural producers. Construed in positive terms as the democratisation of knowledge, the logic of participation and shared ownership belies much of the contemporary discourse around the digital commons as a space that engenders different levels of cultural experience, as well as engaging different levels of society. Yet it is those same routine aspects of everyday culture online that facilitates the collection and retention of personal data, which is often disclosed passively.

The accumulation of personal data by private companies is a matter of growing concern and the basis upon which the right to be forgotten emerged. As Alessia Ghezzi et al note, such rights would not have come into being if our digital lives were insignificant to questions of privacy.\textsuperscript{14} In 2012, the EC published the draft ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data’. Articles 17 and 18 of the Proposal outline the details of a person’s right to the deletion of their personal data, whether disclosed voluntarily or not, subsequent to it being made available on the Internet. Under Article 17 individuals have the right to:

\begin{itemize}
\item Obtain from the (data) controller the erasure of personal data relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data, especially in relation
\end{itemize}


to personal data which are made available by the data subject while he or she
was a child or where the data is no longer necessary for the purpose it was
collected for, the subject withdraws consent, the storage period has expired, the
data subject objects to the processing of personal data or the processing of data
does not comply with other regulation.  

The reference to personal data is based on the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive,
which pertains to ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person’. The term erasure refers to the mechanism by which individuals are granted
control over personal data. However, while these definitions may seem fairly
straightforward, they have faced criticisms from a number of legal commentators. For
example, Meg Leta Ambrose and Jef Ausloos argue that there are at least two ways the
right could be interpreted in the European Data Protection Regulation framework: the
droit à l’oubli (right to oblivion) and the right to erasure. They suggest:

The two have led to much confusion. Oblivion is founded upon protections
against harm to dignity, personality, reputation, and identity but has the potential
to collide with other fundamental rights. However, oblivion may be relatively
easy to exercise in practice, because a user can locate information she would like
the public to forget by utilizing similar search practices. The second [the right to
erasure] is a mechanical right, allowing a data subject to remove the personal
data she has released for automated processing.

The confusion stems from the proposal’s use of the word erasure to account for both the
deletion of data disclosed for automated processing and the removal of data potentially
harmful to an individual’s reputation. The latter, they argue, is closer to the right to
oblivion, historically applied in exceptional cases to individuals who no longer wish to

15 European Commission, ‘Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten” Ruling’ (2014), URL =
26 August 2016]
2016]
17 Meg Leta Ambrose and Jef Ausloos, ‘The Right to be Forgotten Across the Pond’, Journal of
be associated with their past deeds, e.g. crimes, involvement in political conflicts etc. Erasure, on the other hand, refers to mechanised data created passively and is not intended to apply to content created by others. Time is also a factor here; oblivion allows information to be less accessible with time, whereas erasure is not necessarily time-dependent. Because it involves the removal of publicly available data, the right to erasure is also legally distinct from privacy rights, which require that data is inaccessible in the public realm.

These issues give an alternative perspective on the debates about memory and digital technology in the case studies and the uncertain terrain of rights with regard to data collection practices. The assumed persistence of memory in one form or another, whether through cultural consensus building or protecting heritage, forms the basis upon which Europeana and MoW operate. However, the increasing mediation of cultural experiences digitally through editable, open source and file sharing platforms has given shape to a structuring of memory that is at once personal and social. The rationale for a right to be forgotten, and one that specifically addresses the mechanised retention of personal details, develops from the recognition that social-personal, public-private distinctions are less clear-cut in digital culture. The intervention of such a right has important implications, then, in terms of attempting to demarcate these shifting boundaries. As Michel Foucault’s writings show, rights function as practices of government that have simultaneously subjectifying and objectifying effects.

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19 Ambrose and Ausloos, ‘The Right to be Forgotten Across the Pond’, p. 15.
relations with others but at the same time establishes a particular relation to, and conception of, the rights holder’. 22

The idea of an individual rights holder with regard to memory opens up the previous discussions to a different set of concerns, namely the legitimacy of third party access to personal digital data. That technologies generally deny forgetting as part of a memory function raises ethical questions about the accumulation of such information, especially by data controllers with commercial interests. The temporality of data-based memory is also significant here, which returns us to Wolfgang Ernst’s distinction between resident, archive-centred and transfer-based cultures. 23 His argument is that the latter of these is characterised by ‘dynamic, temporal forms of storage in streaming media’, which constitute what he terms ‘the digital challenge to traditional archives’. 24 The digital challenge, for Ernst, relates to a shift from storing and preserving to transmitting, comparable to the coupling of preservation and access, noted in Chapter 3. As Jussi Parikka writes,

The archive is being rethought in its role as a public institution connected to other institutions of transmission of cultural heritage like the museum, but also renegotiated through everyday practices of network culture. 25

In line with these thoughts, I will now examine the Google Books project and explore how the dynamics of network culture have started to re-direct the flow and distribution of cultural heritage.

Google Books

The American technology company Google began in 1996 as the PhD research project of two students at Stanford University, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, and is currently one

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23 See discussion in Chapter 2.
25 Parikka, *What is Media Archaeology?*, p. 133.
of the most powerful and profitable businesses in the world.\textsuperscript{26} The core of the company’s business, which was also the core of the original research project, is a web-based search engine designed to find information online. Google makes most of its profits from the advertising service AdWords, an adjunct to the search engine, which features adverts related to the topic of the search in the list of results.\textsuperscript{27} Adwords works on a pay per click (PPC) basis – Google is paid when users click on the advertiser’s site – and is the most popular PPC service, which is in a large part due to the reliability of its search model and its access to a huge audience who are actively looking for products. Google’s model runs on an algorithm called PageRank. While the details of this algorithm are secret, it is comprised of several components designed to maximise the accuracy of search results, including relevant occurrences of search terms, geographical location and the number of page links a web page has.\textsuperscript{28} The search engine results list is a temporary rendering of PageRank’s algorithm and database functionalities, quite different from a list of results that might be yielded from an electronic library catalogue or the search function on Europeana’s website. These are based on pre-existing classification systems, whereas Google’s search does not have fixed paths for information discovery; instead, the search function produces a momentary index that is recalculated with each separate query.\textsuperscript{29} Here, Ernst’s claim about the digital challenge to archive culture becomes clearer. In this context, the archives, or search results, are a function of their software protocols, focused on transmitting information rather than holding content.

\textsuperscript{26} Auletta, Googled: the End of the World as We Know It. London: Virgin, 2010, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{27} Auletta, Googled, p. 63.
There are over 200 variables weighed up in each of Google’s search queries, produced from what has been described as the ‘network effect’ of the data generated by the search engine.\(^{30}\) The more people use it, the more Google’s service improves.

Lawrence Lessig explains that:

> Everything sits on top of that layer, starting with search. Every time you search, you give Google some value because you pick a certain result. And every time you pick a result, Google learns something from that. So each time you do a search, you’re adding value to Google’s data base. The data base becomes so rich that the advertising model that sits on top of it can out-compete other advertising models because it has better data […] The potential here is actually that the data layer is more dangerous from a policy perspective because it cuts across layers of human life. So privacy and competition and access to commerce, and access to content – everything is driven by this underlying layer.\(^{31}\)

In other words, Google’s search layer feeds on data and improvements to its PageRank algorithm are dependent on amassing more data about its users.\(^{32}\) This, in turn, is dependent on users having a degree of access to the information they search for, hence, Google’s corporate mission statement ‘to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful’.\(^{33}\) The Google Books project represents a now infamous attempt to achieve just that. The announcement at the end of 2004 of Google Print, later renamed Google Books, signalled the start of the project to digitise and index books from a number of major US and UK library collections, initially those held at the Universities of Michigan, Harvard, Stanford, Oxford and the New York Public Library.\(^{34}\) Inspired by the lost library of Alexandria, the plan was to digitise and make

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\(^{32}\) As of 2015, machine learning also plays a role in Google search. It now uses the deep learning system RankBrain, as opposed to only algorithmic rules coded by human engineers. That Google can now train machines to recognise search queries and respond to them testifies to the quantity of user data that the company has collected.


available approximately 15 million volumes within a decade. Google would provide full text searches of these digital books as well as differentiated access options, subject to the work’s copyright status. By showing only ‘snippets’ or limited pages from copyrighted works, Google claimed it was acting under the Fair Use clause of copyright law. Yet the project soon caused controversy, and claims from authors and publishers that digitising these collections was in fact an infringement of copyright.

In 2005 the Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers brought separate class-action lawsuits against Google, based on what was viewed as an exploitation of fair use principles. That is, Google didn’t seek the permission of copyright holders before scanning the books and instead put the onus on authors and publishers to request the removal of titles from its database. Eventually these lawsuits were consolidated and a settlement agreement was proposed in 2008, which would have granted Google almost exclusive rights to millions of orphaned works, where the copyright is unknown or indeterminable. The federal district court ultimately rejected this proposal in 2011, and the Association of American Publishers settled with Google soon after. The Authors Guild continued its case but in 2013 the lawsuit was formally dismissed, with the judge ruling that Google Books qualified as Fair Use under US copyright law.

The drawn out legal case between Google and the Authors Guild demonstrates some of the issues at play around the reproduction and use of cultural resources online.

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35 Auletta suggests that Larry Page, who came up with the Google Books project, was inspired by the idea of the library of Alexandria, see Googled, p. 95. However, a more cynical view of the venture can be taken by comparison with Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, who reportedly chose to set up an online book store because of the high volume of units offered by books. See George Packer, ‘Cheap Words’, in The New Yorker (17 February, 2014), URL = <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/cheap-words> [Accessed 26 August 2016]


37 Auletta, Googled, pp. 123-124.


39 The Authors Guild appealed this decision but their appeal was rejected.
These are related to the proprietary and custodial tendencies underlying the rhetoric of open culture that characterised the initial claims made for Google Books.\textsuperscript{40} It also sheds light on the EC’s vision for ensuring free, public access to cultural heritage, discussed in Chapter 2. A 2010 report\textsuperscript{41} estimated that there are about 3 million orphaned books in Europe, which could have been digitised and privatised under the proposed settlement agreement of 2008. Moreover, many commentators have drawn attention to the fact that a commercial company like Google is not committed to the long term preservation of cultural heritage in the way that museums, libraries and archives are.\textsuperscript{42} As Siva Vaidhyanathan argues:

\begin{quote}
It is important to remember that Google serves its own masters: its stockholders and its partners. It does not serve the people of the state of Michigan or the students and faculty of Harvard University. The real risk of privatization is simple: Companies fail. Libraries and universities last.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

Fears about the longevity of digital cultural resources surface in this statement and recall one of the threats to documentary heritage identified in the MoW programme as obsolescence driven by commercial imperatives.\textsuperscript{44} Such concerns partly explain why the Europeana initiative was launched in response to the 2005 announcement of Google Books.\textsuperscript{45} Yet, in its first phase, the EC-funded project failed to fully understand

\textsuperscript{40} See again Page’s comparison with the library of Alexandria. Sergey Brin also reportedly echoed these sentiments, stressing the project ‘would make millions of “out-of-print” books available to the public online’. See BBC, ‘Google Hits Back at Book Critics’ (9 October, 2009), URL = <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8298674.stm> [Accessed 26 August 2016]
\textsuperscript{42} See Darnton, ‘Six Reasons Google Books Failed’ and Abby Rumsey Smith, \textit{When We Are No More: How Digital Memory is Shaping our Future}. New York: Bloomsbury, 2016. Rumsey Smith writes, ‘unless there is a handoff made between private entities that have the power to create, disseminate and own content on the one hand and the long-lived non-profit institutions capable of providing stewardship on the other, it will be hard to avoid collective amnesia in the digital age’, p. 154.
Google’s agenda, and the centrality of the search layer of the business, described by Lessig. For example, Ken Auletta recounts a conversation between the company’s former Chief Executive Eric Schmidt and Larry Page in which Page is quoted as saying, ‘for search to be truly comprehensive, it must include every book ever published’. The priority of search is clear in Page’s statement. But Jean-Noel Jeanneney, the former Director of the National Library of France and pioneer of the EC’s digital library concept, was more troubled by the diminishment of culture implied in Google’s venture, declaring ‘many Europeans […] refuse to accept that a cultural work might be considered and treated as just another piece of merchandise’. These distinct views convey the shifting configuration of heritage, digitisation and Internet culture in the early part of the twenty-first century. A clear dividing line was being drawn between the notion of a public good and commercial interests. In order to highlight the divide more clearly, it is worth comparing the Google Books project with one of its other initiatives, Google Cultural Institute (GCI).

GCI is a not-for-profit initiative launched by Google in 2011. Based in Paris, the team is largely made up of designers and software engineers. Like Europeana, the trajectory of the project has been governed by socio-technical changes in the way people access cultural resources. For example, GCI ran the pilot Google Art Project 2011, an initiative to digitise artworks and create virtual tours of museums and galleries. In the early stages, there were seventeen art museums and galleries involved. The project explored different lighting options in these venues and used street view technology to emulate the experience of walking around them. The resulting virtual

<http://www.dlib.org/dlib/december06/bearman/12bearman.html> [Accessed 26 August 2016]. Jeanneney also was notably concerned about threats to European culture because of Google’s emphasis on Anglo-Saxon works in the project.

46 Auletta, Googled, p. 96.
galleries had very high quality digital reproductions of paintings, and a zoom function that showed the tiniest details of the colours and brush-strokes used. But the pilot threw up several questions, the foremost among them being, what can distinguish the digital object from the authentic object in a positive way? The realisation that virtual access to artworks was not something audiences or institutions were invested in, over and above in-person visitation, may have influenced GCI’s subsequent move in a different direction, away from prioritising very high quality images. With the widespread uptake of smartphone-based applications, in 2012 GCI launched an exhibition facility, designed with mobile devices in mind. The software allows for the display and exploration of partner institutions’ collections in online exhibitions. This platform comprises digital objects such as images, video, and associated metadata, together with content management tools to facilitate a broader narrative context. The GCI currently works with over 1000 museums and galleries from forty countries and encompasses both art and historical collections. As well as hosting the exhibitions of partner institutions, the project also has a user gallery feature that can be taken up by individual users. Within this scheme, the Art Project is a supplement to the broader platform.

GCI’s similarity to Europeana goes beyond a move from portal to platform-based services. The framework is also similar. GCI operates on a hosting model; the rights to works remain with the partners or users and it does not make curatorial decisions about the content. Likewise, a lot of the project’s investment has gone into metadata and linking projects on different platforms by making content available through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). GCI developed a system for

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tagging items with Freebase elements, and has also investigated image-based search solutions.

Although Google does not describe it in these terms, the former head of GCI, Steve Crossan, aligned the service with the work the company does as part of its Corporate Social Responsibility Programme. Nevertheless, the production of high quality non-English language content is good for the longevity of the web and thus, long-term, for Google.\(^5\) Crossan was emphatic though that GCI is very different from Google Books in its mission and purpose.\(^5\) The latter is much more closely tied to Google’s business interests, and its search service. Therefore, the EC's worries about the privatisation of cultural resources, though perhaps not entirely unfounded, are revealing of a misunderstanding about the precise nature of their value for Google.\(^5\)

The enhancement to search as a result of Google Books is also part of the reason it has proven controversial. The project not only improved the user experience by making full text searches of works available, it also greatly expanded the scope of its database with data gleaned from book searches and text mining. Text and data mining are practices that are accepted under the Fair Use clause of copyright law. The judgement in the Authors Guild case is exemplary here: it was exactly these elements that made Google Books lawful because they were considered transformative to the extent that they did not supplant the original work.\(^5\) Data collected during this process is channelled back into Google’s search layer, and the information gathered from user

\(^5\) According to Crossan, this is also why GCI is based in Paris, rather than an English-language speaking country. See ‘Google Cultural Institute’.
\(^5\) Crossan, ‘Google Cultural Institute’.
\(^5\) There was also a misunderstanding about the degree to which a system like Europeana could compete with Google in the initial stages of the project. As Ricky Erway commented in 2009, ‘Europeana expects users to search there first, rather than go to Google – and it is not up to competing with the big guys at the network level’. See ‘A View on Europeana from the US Perspective’, Liber Quarterly, 19:2 (2009), p. 104.
\(^5\) Significantly though, Google was prevented from advertising on Google Books or charging for the books.
behaviour is used to improve its functionality. By the same token, the information about
the user also improves the quality of its targeted advertising, putting a different slant on
Google’s slogan about organising the world’s information. As suggested earlier, in the
context of search, the world’s information is not a pre-existing clearly contained entity;
each search enlarges and adds value to its database. It is not just that Google seeks to
make private that which could have been freely available, it represents a completely
different, simultaneously data generating and data organising entity. The system
potentially circumvents and displaces text works digitised under the Google Books
Initiative, so that they resemble discrete datasets, rather than cultural artefacts. The
dislocation of these text works has far-reaching consequences for cultural heritage. If
the storage model of memory has been deployed to negotiate between the concerns of
information and heritage, as observed in the other case studies, then Google’s system
takes memory as storage to its logical conclusion by creating long-term data trails of
users. This practice involves more than the retention of a user’s preference for a
particular book, instead focusing on habitual actions such as keyword searches or URLs
clicked, and making correlations between actions to build up a more comprehensive
user profile. The contemporary obsession with memorial culture, sometimes described
as the musealisation of everyday life,54 takes on a new significance here. In everyday
culture online, habits project links based on frequent repetition and constitute part of the
data that Google collects, fleshing out the dimensions of the user as a function of its
search-retrieval mechanism.55

54 As Sharon Maconald notes, ‘the notion of “musealisation” is used most frequently in German
scholarship – Musealisierung – though it has seen increasing use in other European languages, including
English. In German, the first use of Musealisierung is usually said to be Joachim Ritter’s essay
“Musealisierung als Kompensation”, first published in 1963; which includes an extended discussion of
this phenomenon. See Memorylands, p. 138.
55 For an extended discussion of habit and new media, see Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Updating to Remain
In addition, the advent of mobile technologies also makes it possible to trace interactions with other mobile users, locations and length of stay in particular areas, a technique like data mining that is sometimes referred to as reality mining. Google representatives have consistently deflected the privacy implications of such practices, suggesting that more user data leads to better search results. On one occasion, when questioned, Schmidt deferred to Google’s quality of search principle, claiming as a by-product the commercial advertising side of the company. But the failure to reflect on the fine line between anticipating user needs and privacy violations has exposed Google to much criticism, and scepticism on the part of open web campaigners and EU policy makers.

It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that there was also a disparity of perspective between the EU and Google in the wake of the right to be forgotten proposal. There is a connection between the Google Books debate and the proposal insofar as the latter pertains directly to the data trials created by searching the former. Different cultural backgrounds and legal frameworks regarding privacy inform the reasons for this disparity. Whereas there is a long history of privacy regulations in Europe, the US has tended to address privacy issues indirectly with subject-specific rules, market-based approaches, and voluntary codes of conduct. Therefore, the EU’s proposal for a right to be forgotten in 2012 met with mixed responses, particularly from legal commentators in the US.

56 See Auletta, Googled, p. 188.
58 See Auletta, Googled, p. 192.
59 Ambrose and Ausloos, ‘The Right to be Forgotten Across the Pond’, pp. 6-8.
However, it was not until the 2014 case of Mario Costeja González in Spain that the proposal was brought into law. The case involved the disclosure online of information relating to the forced sale of Costeja González’s property due to social security debts. He requested the removal of this information from Google’s search index, claiming that it was outdated and no longer relevant, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in his favour. Google was also involved in a number of similar cases subsequently. It is perhaps not a coincidence that Google is one of the companies that has received such frequent data erasure requests. Under the EU’s legislation, these requests do not apply to media companies, because of the potential for conflict with matters of public interest. However, although it is the owner of Youtube, one of the largest media platforms on the Internet, Google chooses to operate as a data controller. It is therefore exposed to claims regarding the erasure of personal data, as in the Costeja González case. Although the company has complied with the new law, it was also quick to offer an interpretation of the legal framework. For example, in 2012, prior to the 2014 ruling, Google published its thoughts on the right to be forgotten. In the post, the need for search engines to help speed up the removal of unlawful sites from search results was acknowledged, but it was clear in its view that the responsibility for deleting personal data should lie with those creating it:

Ultimately, responsibility for deleting content published online should lie with the person or entity who published it. Host providers store this information on behalf of the content provider and so have no original right to delete the data.

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62 It has been noted that in this case a limited right to erasure was applied, which constitutes a more restricted version of the notion of erasure than was included in the original proposal.
Similarly, search engines index any publicly available information to make it searchable. They too have no direct relationship with the original content.\textsuperscript{64}

Google’s core service of search was what made it vulnerable in the Costeja case, but it was the same status that absolved it of the responsibility it attributed to host providers. However, the claim that it does not deal directly with content is difficult to verify, considering its purchase of several other media companies.\textsuperscript{65} Furthermore, as the company acknowledges, part of what makes its search useful is by feeding the data it collects about individual users back into its search algorithm. It is precisely Google’s commercial status and its privatisation of data that fuels these privacy concerns; as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun quips, ‘privatization is destroying the private’; that is, the private understood as a sphere shielded from public view.\textsuperscript{66} This is a point to which I will now turn in discussing the digital public space proposal.

**The Digital Public Space**

Although, as explained earlier, the right to be forgotten (the representation of facts already disclosed in the public domain) differs from the right to privacy legally (the protection of private information from being disclosed to the public), the rationale for the right is, at the same time, a response to a perceived threat to privacy. This was evident in the title of Reding’s speech, ‘Privacy matters – Why the EU needs new personal data protection rules’, and in its tacit recognition of the fact that passively disclosed data such as IP addresses and cookies can be regarded with a degree of privacy.

\textsuperscript{64} Google Europe blog, ‘Our thoughts on the right to be forgotten’ (16 February, 2012), URL = <https://europe.googleblog.com/2012/02/our-thoughts-on-right-to-be-forgotten.html> [Accessed 26 August 2016]

\textsuperscript{65} See the purchase of Anvato and Waze for other examples of media companies acquired by Google.

\textsuperscript{66} Hui Kyong Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same*, p. 12.
Understandings of privacy have historically been defined in relation to various manifestations of the public; the domestic space of the home was crucial in marking this divide and separating privacy and intimacy from the duties of public life.\textsuperscript{67} In a similar way, the establishment of publicly funded and maintained institutions has come to represent a defence against the widespread privatisation and marketisation of fundamental services.\textsuperscript{68} For example, in the Google Books case, I noted that one objection to the project had been that Google did not ensure the long-term interests and preservation of cultural heritage, unlike museums, libraries and archives. Such places are generally regarded as trustworthy, in part due to their public service remit. Here, Bennett’s work is instructive once more; in his recognition of the public rights demand informing the democratic rhetoric of the museum, he demonstrates how the idea of the public was at the heart of a developing definition of heritage in the nineteenth century. The provision of public space was influenced by the Enlightenment view of the public sphere, defined as ‘the sphere of private people come together as a public’ by Jürgen Habermas.\textsuperscript{69} Simon Susen clarifies this definition, suggesting:

The public sphere and the private sphere can be considered mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive, social realms. Indeed, the public and the private seem to represent two necessary conditions of the social: to the extent that every private person is represented by the foreground performativity of a public persona, every public persona is embedded in the background subjectivity of a private person.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{67} For a discussion of private space along these lines see, for example, Hannah Arendt, \textit{The Human Condition}. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998.

\textsuperscript{68} In the US and Europe, the provision of public services such as gas and water dates from the nineteenth century and was consolidated (particularly in Europe) in the wake of the World Wars, influenced by central planning principles. For a more wide-ranging account of the relative success and failure of centrally managed social plans, see James C. Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed}. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

\textsuperscript{69} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society}. Cambridge Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1989, p. 27.

He goes on to argue, following Habermas, that it is the blurring of lines between public and private that constitutes the breakdown of the public sphere in the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{71} Hence, alongside the mutual dependency of the public-private relationship, the existence of clearly demarcated, if permeable, boundaries is identified as important.\textsuperscript{72}

This relationship is also important in the context of public service broadcasting, which had its institutional origins in the early 1920s, but was influenced by older public rights principles.\textsuperscript{73} Williams traces a link between the development of sound broadcasting and older public services:

\begin{quote}
The period of decisive development in sound broadcasting was the 1920s [...] The earlier period of public technology, best exemplified by the railways and city lighting was being replaced by a kind of technology for which no satisfactory name has yet been found: that which served an at-once mobile and home-centred way of living: a form of mobile privatisation.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

In Williams’ description it is possible to discern again the locus of public and private through the lens of domestic life, as well as a conception of the public in relation to its inherent media and institutions. Among such institutions, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has what Georgina Born calls ‘a special place in the history and the imagining of public service broadcasting’.\textsuperscript{75} Initially known as the British Broadcasting Company, the BBC emerged out of a consortium of wireless receiver manufacturers in 1922 and made programmes based on terms set out by the Post Office and the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{71} This has been attributed to what is broadly defined as neoliberalisation. See Michel Foucault, \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79}, ed. by Michel Senellart and trans. by Graham Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
\textsuperscript{72} Indeed, Susen is careful to point out the ambiguity of the public and private spheres, and the intermingling of characteristics such as openness and closure, visibility and invisibility in both. See \textit{‘Critical Notes on Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere’}, p. 40.
\end{footnotesize}
Government. Williams observes that this bargain between state and market interests was due to several specific factors relating to Britain’s early industrialisation and a pre-existing national culture and press.76 Nevertheless, it would go on to become synonymous with public service, relying on the licence system of domestic receivers for income rather than commercial advertising. The principles of the first Director General, John Reith, to democratise access to politics and culture, also became closely tied to the BBC’s institutional identity.77 These features are now widely regarded as one of the enduring achievements of the corporation.

Tony Ageh, Controller of Archive Development at the BBC, drew from this legacy in presenting his vision for a digital public space.78 In an interview with the Guardian in 2010, he coined the name to describe a new layer of the Internet in which institutions could make publicly owned cultural content available, usable and free for non-commercial purposes.79 Ageh also spoke in starker terms about the need to designate and safeguard an allocation of bandwidth for public access (like the public broadcasting spectrum) in a more recent 2015 address. Without this, he warned, there are threats to access, personal data and privacy rights from the commercial sector. He explained:

The ‘Digital Public Space’ is intended as a secure and universally accessible public sphere through which every person, regardless of age or income, ability

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76 See Williams, Television, pp. 27-28.
77 See Hendy, Public Service Broadcasting, p. 22.
78 Ageh also quoted from Reith in another publication, writing, ‘the benefits of the broadcast medium were to be shared by every single citizen of the UK […] in founder Lords Reith’s own words, the BBC’s mission was “to bring the best of everything to the greatest number of homes”, free from direct political or commercial considerations’. See ‘Why the Digital Public Space Matters’, in Digital Public Spaces, ed. by Drew Hemment, Bill Thompson, José Luis de Vicente and Rachel Cooper. FutureEverything, 2013, pp. 6-7, URL = <http://futureeverything.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/DPS.pdf> [Accessed 26 August 2016]
or disability, can gain access to an ever growing library of permanently available media and data held on behalf of the public by our enduring institutions.80 Ageh’s direct reference to the public sphere is notable. Likewise, he hints that a digital public space encompasses a wider sphere of influence than the BBC in the allusion to ‘enduring institutions’. Such a space, it is implied, would enable the convergence of cultural heritage and broadcasting through digital media.

Firstly, however, it is important to clarify that the digital public space does not yet exist, although the idea has developed since 2010 through collaborations with partners, including Arts Council England, the British Film Institute, the British Library and the Open Knowledge Foundation. In November of 2014 a report commissioned by the Strategic Content Alliance (SCA) was released, detailing the opportunities and barriers to creating a digital public space in the UK.81 The SCA is a collaboration of public sector organisations, including the BBC, who are involved in the production and care of digital heritage content. The core mission of a digital public space, as defined by the report, reads very much like the original aims of Europeana: to make links between diverse collections, facilitate discovery and access and promote the digital content of its stakeholders.82

While recommendations were made for the initiative to be taken forward, the digital public space is still a contested concept; consultation revealed that there was not widespread support for the project, for several reasons, which are connected to the aims of the different partners. Indeed, one is that it is reinventing the wheel. Many large

cultural heritage organisations already have in-house digital content management systems through which they make their cultural collections accessible to audiences, and services such as the Digital Public Library of America (DPLA) and Europeana were mentioned as examples of working digital public spaces. The report found ‘there were some respondents who thought it at least possible that the SCA should do nothing in this space, and others who thought that while the DPS might be useful the case for investing time and effort into it was not sufficient’. Doubts about the need for the project were also expressed at the level of the name. The report distinguishes between the bottom up approach to a digital public space as ‘an emergent sphere of online activity’ and the more formal Digital Public Space, indicative of ‘a specific initiative, platform or service’.

Another problem is that there are serious obstacles presented by copyright and licensing laws. The organisations represented by the SCA are all involved in the negotiation of such rights for their collections and are often restricted by copyright with respect to facilitating discovery, access and re-use. This is a particular issue for organisations like the BBC who have licensing restrictions on screening their programmes outside the UK. Such concerns are not trivial and the problems raised by proprietary frameworks and rights management considerably undermine the potential scope for access to digital content. It also makes it more difficult to assure the public service principles demanded of the project. The report predicts, ‘it is highly likely the

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83 However, UK institutions’ participation in a project like Europeana may be called into question in the wake of the UK’s EU referendum result in 2016.

Part of the case for building a digital public space, then, would rest on securing openly licensed, accessible content and distinguishing it from existing initiatives. The report’s description of a ‘cultural creation’ suggests the way in which it does that: ‘Regardless of what form the digital public space may finally take, it will never be just a technical solution but will itself be a cultural creation, where the process of forming it brings together a wide range of organisations with different interests and perspectives.’\footnote{Strategic Content Alliance, ‘Towards a UK Digital Public Space’, p. 19, URL = <https://digitisation.jiscinvolve.org/wp/files/2014/12/141208-Towards-a-UK-Digital-Public-Space-A-Blueprint-Report-November-2014-WEB-VERSION.pdf> [Accessed 26 August 2016]} In line with this view, the report emphasises the need for features linked to cultural production, which has been echoed by partners and stakeholders at various stages. Early on, Tony Ageh stressed that the ability to chop up, re-use and reinvent cultural content online should be central to the operation of the digital public space, and others have cited the affordances of the open web (for example open source file sharing, text and media editing) as a means by which the initiative could become central to cultural public life; basically as a facilitator of cultural production.\footnote{See Jemima Kiss, ‘BBC makes Space for Cultural History’, in The Guardian (6 January, 2013), URL = <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jan/06/bbc-digital-public-space-archive> [Accessed 26 August 2016]} For example, a routine activity such as tagging structures and organises cultural content, making it searchable and retrievable. A platform-based digital public space would vastly expand the sets of relations and perspectives involved in this process, creating the prospect of more personal contributions that document, narrate and contextualise cultural collections.
In his essay, ‘The New Reithians’, Simon Popple describes the potential of such services to change the BBC’s relationship with the public. Initiatives like the digital public space, he suggests, would provide people with what they want, rather than what they need, the latter view representing Reith’s directorship of the BBC and its mission to educate that was consolidated in the first years of the corporation. This is presented as connoting a change from a patrician approach based on passive reception to interactive modes of participation and co-production. He quotes Ageh as saying:

Our primary relationships with licence fee payers have been essentially a one-way transmission of media to a passive recipient, with a relatively limited amount of ‘have your say’ commenting, which is strictly moderated and framed within often tight parameters and not really taken into account in subsequent commissioning decisions.

Popple and Ageh both make distinctions between audience models via references to the technology; where broadcasting is characterised by passive reception, web-based services are indicative of active engagement.

However, creating a source of reliable educational content is still important for the digital public space in the aims set out by the report. One of the benefits it lists is ‘the creation of a source of trusted content, which a general-purpose search engine cannot provide’, indicating that the rhetoric aligned with a figure like Reith has not receded. Rather, the initiative positions the BBC and other partners as authenticators of information instead of the first point of contact for information. As with the

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Europeana 1914-1918 project in Chapter 2, the issue of staged engagement emerges again here, although the digital public space draws from more deeply embedded notions of public rights than were found in virtual object of European identity. In the context of the BBC, these were established on the grounds of the licence fee. Yet there is perhaps a disparity between the assumption of such rights and privatised point-of-access services that use of the Internet requires.

Therefore, while on an individual level, the digital public space might entail increased opportunities for engagement and participation, on a wider level it signals something more complex and paradoxical. If the authority with which cultural heritage organisations have been associated is now more diffuse and distributed, that is not to say it is necessarily distributed more evenly or democratically. Scott Lash proposes that such conditions are symptomatic of power relations in contemporary societies, wherein governmental regimes become harder to pin down. He uses the term post-hegemonic to describe the effects of this change, writing, ‘if the hegemonic order works through a cultural logic of reproduction, the post-hegemonic power operates through a cultural logic of invention, hence not of reproduction but of chronic production’.94 Lash elaborates his argument through recourse to Foucault’s writings on power/knowledge:

For Foucault, there are two modes in which pouvoir (power) works. In the first it normalizes puissance from above. In the second it takes the shape of puissance: of life itself. It is power that does not work through normalization. At stake are two modes of power-knowledge. The first is the power-over that Foucault talks about in terms of surveillance and discipline. The second is when power starts – in more contemporary times – to work from below.95

Linked to the idea of power working ‘from below’ is Foucault’s identification of practices of government that function via the mutually reinforcing relation of all and

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each. The presupposition of relative autonomy informs governmental practice insofar as it is at once individualising and totalising. The move of all and each speaks to the concept of the digital public space, which is premised on the empowerment of the user. But the anticipated freedom that follows from increased interaction feeds into a logic of culture that is also more totalising, not only in terms of the convergence of content but in terms of web infrastructure. The accumulation and retention of personal data by Internet and mobile technologies maps and magnifies the uniqueness of individuals, and their movements across space and time. Under such circumstances, forms of engagement become increasingly specific and technical and the sense of surveillance and control is ‘intensified’ in Foucault’s terms.

This danger resonates with the more far-reaching potential of the digital public space, outlined by Ageh. In his 2015 speech, he made a case for it as a service that safeguards the public and offers features that are not currently available in the digital domain: anonymity, unmetered usage and access unmediated by commercial providers. He warned:

The internet – certainly when thinking about using it to access the public service broadcast networks – removes all of those things […] We are now in a situation where the commercial sector has complete control. And they are dividing up the spoils often making commercial return the only criteria for developing or maintaining our right to access our public services – including but not limited to the public service broadcasters themselves.

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96 See Michel Foucault, *Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason’*, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Stanford University, 10 and 16 October 1979, URL = <http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/foucault81.pdf> [Accessed 26 August 2016]


The priorities of the BBC in light of the digital switchover are clearly present in this framing of the initiative; the renegotiation of the license fee for 2016 stipulates that it is now a requirement for access to services such as BBC iPlayer, which raises questions around public value. Nevertheless, it brings into focus one of the fundamental issues of any publicly funded online initiative; how can the idea of participation and shared ownership be maintained when the infrastructure is privatised?

The different issues implicated in the digital public space concept begin to reveal themselves in this question; on the one hand, the power to choose and arrange objects for display (which is also the display of power), on the other, the authority to educate an undifferentiated public. The former has long been contested ground in cultural heritage debates and the basis of various campaigns for inclusion and representation. The latter, in physical heritage spaces, is connected to the former to the extent that it is built on a principle of general human universality, through which approaches to the public have developed and subsequently been found wanting. The digital public space intends to challenge problems of representational inadequacy by attempting to democratise the curation of cultural content, i.e. by making online collections more available and usable. Yet the ability to re-mix and re-use content is threatened by an emerging privatised politics of data and reality mining, which collects and exploits the data those actions generate.

In consideration of such issues, is the proposal for a digital public space, comparable to the idea of public radio, timely or untimely? While Ageh registers higher stakes for the public in relation to digital media, it is debatable whether the categories of public and private are adequate to an understanding of the online environment. There is a technical dimension to this problem as Chun recognises:

New media call into question the separation between publicity and privacy at various levels: from technical protocols to the Internet’s emergence as a
privately owned public medium, from Google.com’s privatization of surveillance to social networking’s redefinition of ‘friends’ [...] Internet users are curiously inside out – they are framed as private subjects exposed in public.100

With these examples, Chun demonstrates the Internet’s challenge to the clear, albeit permeable, boundaries between public and private that gave shape to the notion of the public sphere. From this perspective, Ageh’s call for a digital public space unmediated by new media seems flawed insofar as such media are connected to the user experience of the Internet, a space which is itself increasingly defined by tracking strategies such as IP addresses, logins and cookies. Furthermore, the anonymity and unmetered usage that Ageh lauds is, at the same time, the mode of passive reception (inherent to broadcast media) that he critiques in contrast to the digital public space proposal. Williams’ work shows that it was a very specific set of conditions that allowed for the establishment of the BBC and the idea of public service it would come to embody. Ageh’s comments are thus revealing of broadcast media’s embeddedness in the institutional identity of the corporation. That is not to say the idea of public service is completely redundant in the context of the Internet. However, a viable formulation would demand critical reflection on the types of publics shaping and shaped by this medium. The combination of ever smaller private concentrations of power and ever larger, insidious digital data retention means that it is all the more important to find ways of negotiating the figure of the private subject exposed in public.

The Everyday Online

The discussion of Google Books and the digital public space proposal raises an interesting and difficult set of questions, in relation to the everyday online and cultural heritage as it has been framed in this chapter. Clearly there are a set of online practices

100 Hui Kyong Chun, Updating to Remain the Same, p. 12.
that conform to the routine, habitual temporality of the everyday. Yet these are also specialised and differentiated practices, quite distinct from the way in which the everyday has previously been conceived.\(^{101}\) While the Internet may offer increased opportunities for cultural engagement and participation, activities such as labelling and archiving digital content begin to resemble a form of cultural work. Therefore, online at least, the familiar but undifferentiated experience of the everyday remains elusive. Furthermore, as examination of the digital public space revealed, the privatised services that underpin social web cultures give shape to a peculiarly vulnerable ‘inside out’ public, which calls to mind Kunzru’s quote at the beginning.\(^{102}\) Investigation of Google Books and the company’s search layer suggested that it is the very habituation of users online that generates this vulnerability, enabling a clearer picture of their preferences to be built up over time. Digital heritage collections form part of the searchable material that renders users findable.\(^{103}\) The EU’s right to be forgotten speaks to these concerns in that it attempts, in theory at least, to grant users rights over passively disclosed data.\(^{104}\)

However, in that sense that rights both contest and assume the definitional possibilities of the rights holder,\(^{105}\) the right to be forgotten is ambiguous regarding the public circulation of such data. For example, since the right came into law in 2014, it has largely been applied in cases where information that was deemed irrelevant or damaging was indexed via Google Search, not in cases pertaining to Google’s own store.

\(^{101}\) There are now a wide range of writers who are now concerned with these developments, notably Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, who write that ‘software is imbuing everyday objects with capacities that allow them to do additional and new types of work’, see ‘Software, Objects, and Home Space’, *Environment and Planning A*, 41 (2009), p. 1344.


\(^{103}\) See Hui Kyong Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same*, p. 39.

\(^{104}\) See again Article 17 of ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data’. The scenario where ‘data is no longer necessary for the purpose it was collected for, the subject withdraws consent, the storage period has expired’ encompasses passively disclosed data.

\(^{105}\) See Golder, *Foucault and the Politics of Rights*, p. 88.
of user data. The fact that the right has fallen short of its aims perhaps signals, not only the limits of its reach, but the failure to capture the range of memory that digital data is supposed to represent. The work of Geoffrey C. Bowker is helpful in shedding light on this issue. Bowker regards the memory associated with digital media to be one in a longer series of memory practices, the latest of which he calls the epoch of ‘potential memory’, writing:

This is an epoch in which narrative remembering is typically a post hoc reconstruction from an ordered, classified set of facts that have scattered over multiple physical data collections. The question is not what the state ‘knows’ about a particular individual, say, but what it can know should the need ever arise […] At the start of this epoch, the state would typically, where deemed necessary, gain information on its citizens through networks of spies and informers writing narrative reports; such information gathering continues but is swamped by the effort to pull people apart along multiple dimensions and reconfigure the information at will.

The description of memory as a ‘post hoc reconstruction’ recalls the notion of performative documents in Chapter 3 and John Frow’s account of a dynamic system, where data are arranged and rearranged at every point in time. If the right to be forgotten responds to a politics of memory as storage, the logic of potential memory exceeds the parameters that storing would seem to entail. A belief in the realism of memory as storage is what leads to this fundamental misconstruction. As Andrew Hoskins writes, the proposal attempts ‘to see and solve the complexities and scale of the digital through the backward-looking prism of an era of media containment that has long since removed the doors – and the walls – to its archives’. Frow’s emphasis on

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106 Indeed, in the context of the right to be forgotten, a similar manoeuvre can be observed in both public-private and memory-forgetting tropes. These map more closely onto one another because the demand to be forgotten is at least, in part, a privacy demand.


reversibility, as opposed to retrieval, clarifies the dynamics of potential memory, but here the term potential assumes a threatening guise. In the context of privatised web infrastructures, potential memory is potential exploitation, potential manipulation, potential abuse. It is telling that, when asked about privacy violations, Google’s former vice president of engineering Jeff Huber replied, ‘it’s a fear of the possibility rather than the reality’. The possibility-reality relationship is what characterises the current memory epoch: ‘Each data “object” carries its salient history with it, and pathways and relationships can be in principle reconfigured at will’.

Bowker’s identification of the term ‘potential memory’ feeds into his wider claim about the greatly increased centrality of memory practices, from the nineteenth century onwards. His aim is to highlight the contingency of such practices in order to advocate for a past ‘other than it seems to have turned out’. In recognising these historical conditions, he draws attention to what he calls the ‘texturing of memory’. That is to say, the repetitious, abstracting nature of memory practices are, at the same time, acts of oblivion, which tend towards the deliberate manipulation of the past to work in the present. In this respect, the work of D. Vance Smith is also relevant. His essay ‘Irregular Histories: Forgetting Ourselves’ develops the idea that acts of oblivion exemplify the practice of the everyday. He reasons:

Defined both by what it excludes as extraordinary and other, and by its necessary recursiveness – by what is enacted rhythmically and regularly – the everyday is, essentially, a practice of oblivion. That is, it occults and obscures whatever is not reiterated in representational practice, the practice of everyday life and the reproduction of immanent practices.

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110 Cited from Auletta, Googled, p. 192.
112 Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences, p. 29.
114 Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences, p. 29.
Instead of giving weight to the memorial function of such repetitive activities, Smith proposes that they occlude other irregular ways of being, hinting at the alignment of habit and routine with specialisation once more.\textsuperscript{116} Systems such as Google search rely on the regularity and repetitiveness that habit produces in order to return accurate results. Habits and the connections between habits inform a specialised process of data collection.\textsuperscript{117} As Chun remarks ‘repetition breeds expertise, even as it breeds boredom’.\textsuperscript{118} Her argument is that this paradoxical aspect of habit is central to an understanding of new media. Hence, the everyday online does not correspond to Lefebvre’s description of the everyday, as filling the ‘technical vacuum’ between specialised activities; rather, it constitutes the technical instrumentalisation of the everyday’s ‘necessary recursiveness’.

These observations also have important implications for the cultural heritage case studies of Chapters 2 and 3. The way habit positions change as persistence is comparable to the way in which continuity is central to notions of cultural heritage, and supports the rationale for practices such as conservation. The performance and repetition of these practices and their tendency to limit the kinds of stories that can be told about the past contributes to a view of the past ‘as it seems to have turned out’, in Bowker’s terms. The examination of memory cultures online shows parallels between the two, and brings out different perspectives on memory as a mode of acting. Where heritage stresses the repetition of the exceptional, potential memory hinges on the specialisation of the habitual.\textsuperscript{119} While it would be false to claim that only the latter

\textsuperscript{116} The way in which habit unsettles the boundaries between undifferentiated experience and specialisation, lending itself to these different emphases in Lefebvre and Vance, corresponds with Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of habitus as the ‘generative principle of regulated improvisations’. See *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{117} See Hui Kyong Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same*, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{118} Hui Kyong Chun, *Updating to Remain the Same*, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{119} With regard to this idea, Bennett notes that habit has always been at issue in the museum in one way or another. He writes that the modern art museum has ‘has been committed to a program of perpetual perceptual innovation, seeking to prevent vision from falling into “bad habits”’. See ‘Exhibition,
produces the demand to be forgotten, the particular conjuncture of memory and forgetting in the right to be forgotten seems to speak to concerns about the pervasiveness of memory in contemporary life and the inability to do or be otherwise in the shadow of practices that unfold as a set of calculable and programmable processes.

Conclusions

In this chapter, the question of digital cultural heritage collections that was a focal point of Chapters 2 and 3 was broached more obliquely in the context of wider changes in digital web culture, with particular reference to the Google Books project and the digital public space proposal. Likewise, through examination of the EU’s right to be forgotten, forgetting was staged as a counterpoint to the preoccupation with memory in the case studies. In the introduction to the chapter, forgetting’s alignment with utopia was noted in relation to ‘the hope of becoming different people or creating different worlds’. The hope of becoming different evokes the idea of desiring differently, which was explored in the writings of William Morris in Chapter 1. However, the politics of the everyday online is revealing of a privatised regime of memory which threatens that space of possibility. This regime develops out of those tendencies directed towards saving everything identified earlier and constitutes a foreclosure of decision-making about the future. Moreover, it restricts a mode of acting that is punctuated by alternatives.

At the same time as memory and forgetting have been at the heart of these discussions, such issues also raise questions about whether the terms are adequate to an understanding of the online environment. A call for the right to be forgotten, on closer

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inspection, turned out to be revealing of fears about privacy. The two are linked through the surveillance mechanisms of the Internet, a space that is both individualising and totalising, while collapsing the historical tenets of privacy as a realm protected from public view. On one level, the demand for privacy and forgetting is not intelligible in this space. Just as a gap was identified between total memory and memory resistant to loss in Chapter 3, so forgetting is inimical to the notion of potential memory as a set of pathways and relationships that can be reconfigured at will. Privacy online is difficult to demarcate because it involves operations that leave users exposed: its very routine-ness makes them trackable and traceable. On a practical level, the right to be forgotten offers a legal instrument for forgetting in response to the mechanised collection and re-collection of data. Yet it is unable to fully address the ethics of forgetting, as they are related to privacy and identity. What, then, happens to tomorrow’s memory when the threat of undead information becomes too unsettling?  

Perhaps it is a question of memory and forgetting but not in the terms set out by the right; just as forgetting is crucial to the ability to hope, memory is important for recognising how tomorrow could be otherwise. The difficult balance between remembering and forgetting is a task of recognising how each emerges and conditions the other. As Smith eloquently puts it, ‘we need to more fully understand the routes by which and in which things are forgotten, the rhythms of prohibition and pleasure that call us to ourselves in our distant past’.

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Conclusion – On Memory and Forgetting

This final chapter concludes the research study by reflecting on the findings of the previous chapters with specific reference to memory and futurity, the issue around which the original research question was framed. The problem of tomorrow’s memory, which also involves forgetting, has found various forms in the case studies. In Chapter 1, I considered the proposition that heritage is ‘both a product and producer of Western modernity’ in more detail, and the dynamics of progress-decline and memory-desire as different ways of figuring heritage. I also outlined the method for the thesis, and my approach to memory in the case studies. Chapter 2 gave an analysis of the EC-funded digital cultural heritage project, Europeana. Against the backdrop of the EC’s goal of trans-national integration, I explored the politics of Europeana through its technical and media memory metaphors. Examination of the memory institution and the idea of building European memory revealed the instrumentalisation of the term to cut across notions of information and heritage, signalling the move towards the increased standardisation of organisations and resources. I concluded that Europeana’s uncertain goal of European memory hinges on a continual re-imagining of the project and its infrastructure, which can be aligned with the workings of the EC. Chapter 3 focused on the Memory of the World (MoW) programme, and the digitisation strategies it promotes as part of the objective to safeguard the world’s endangered documentary heritage. After investigating the implications of MoW’s characterisation of the document for its understanding of memory, I critiqued the definition of digital heritage, as described in Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage, in terms of the values and assumptions.

underpinning the concept. Finally, Chapter 4, intended as a foil to Chapters 2 and 3, discussed Google Books, the digital public space proposal and the EU’s right to be forgotten. The tripartite structure of this chapter attempted to connect the particular concerns of digital cultural heritage projects with wider developments in Internet services. By putting these concerns into the context of debates about digital culture and privacy, I highlighted their entanglement with a range of issues relating to the everyday online. Ultimately, it was suggested that the proposal’s call to be forgotten fails to speak to the regime of potential memory that underpins this experience of the everyday.3 I ended by reflecting on the difficult balance of memory and forgetting, and stressing the importance of their conditions of emergence for being able to think otherwise.

The methodology employed in the thesis combined governmentality theory with a mode of utopian critique, in order to address the dual aims of the research. These were to examine the implications of digital memory practices for cultural heritage projects and to identify the different versions of tomorrow’s memory that such projects implicitly gesture towards. The utopian content in Europeana and the MoW programme was gleaned through analysis of their particular memory propositions, primarily at the level of policy. In both the elusive notion of European memory and the promise of memory resistant to loss, the assumptions informing these propositions were shown to correspond with different expressions of heritage time, as discussed in Chapter 1. For Europeana, it was the invention of tradition; the EC’s cultural-symbolic efforts to popularise European identity correspond with what has been defined as ‘the assertion of an emergent political reality’, the working of the past in the present.4 However, as Marc Abélès discerns, these traditions have been built on shifting foundations, giving rise to what he terms ‘virtual Europe’, a project which relies for its political effectiveness on

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4 Bowker, Memory Practices in the Sciences, p. 29.
the urgent movement towards an uncertain goal. This practice of government, described as a process of harmonisation between EU member states, was also shown to underpin the technical operations of Europeana, in its standardisation of discrete national collections and metadata. In the UNESCO case study, it was the concept of world heritage, with its various lists and registers, that surfaced as a governmental technology, changing the relationship of communities to their cultural sites and practices. The MoW programme employed similar operations but was also influenced by international human rights discourses in its formulation. In practice, the focus was endangered documentary heritage, wherein the suppressed idea of memory resistant to loss manifested itself. I argued that, while reproducing heritage tropes of permanence and continuity, these were unsettled by digital documents and the recognition of digital heritage in the 2003 Charter. Likewise, memory resistant to loss and memory minus the physical signs of decay were distinguished from one another; although the promise of the second feeds into the first, it also presents a threat to strategies of heritage designation and management. The conflation of memory and storage was a recurring theme across both case studies, which revealed itself to be a political gesture embedded in technical metaphors. While the constitution and utilisation of digital media take shape in ephemeral routine practices that hinge more on mobility and transferability than ‘saveability’, at this transitional media moment the demand for persistence persists and such technologies continue to be defined by their storage capacities. The fourth chapter did not work through the methodology directly, but reflections on utopia as a space of

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7 See, for example, cloud storage.
possibility came in response to the issues raised around potential memory and the foreclosure of the future in the everyday online.

In performing a critique of the present from the standpoint of the past and the future respectively, my purpose was to shed light on the contemporary significance of memory for cultural heritage in the context of digital technology. However, the extent to which this method has been successful was limited by several factors. The criteria for selection of the case studies was determined by the explicit treatment of memory in the EC’s and UNESCO’s initiatives, which was also the focus of my critique. There was a sense in which I was therefore obliged to take the stated memory claims on their own terms, even while attempting to draw out their embedded hopes and fears for memory. Likewise, while governmentality theory was important for situating digital memory practices within a larger field of knowledge practices, it restricted the work that could be done in terms of unsettling these practices and exploring more marginal past and future formations, in the vein of the approach in Chapter 1.

The justification must be that the method was primarily deployed as mode of critique, as the notion of utopia as archaeology implies. This critique produced a complex picture of memory in the case studies. While Europeana was more explicitly oriented towards the future, its perpetual re-imagining of European memory gave the impression of stasis. Likewise, MoW’s remit to protect memory was revealing of a teleological drive towards the present, wherein the future emerged as an implicit threat. These insights provide the basis for further study, which might attempt to render the partial utopian content expressed in Europeana and MoW to fuller effect. For example, the EC’s techniques of harmonisation and rationalisation could be investigated in more detail, paying attention to the potential for change that is created, as well as foreclosed, in its incomplete political vision. A related venture would be to problematise the terms
of institutional memory narratives, and to show how they obstruct routes towards tomorrow insofar as they hinge so thoroughly on the maintenance of a hypostatised present.

Another way of building on the research presented here would be to investigate the governmental rationalities of large-scale digital cultural heritage initiatives. The governmentality perspective has been useful in rendering visible the practices associated with the memory claims in the case studies, and points to several future avenues of study. For instance, a common factor in the projects considered here, notably Europeana and the digital public space proposal, was the uncertainty that surrounded their conception and actual or projected implementation. In the former at least, this uncertainty was shown to be rooted in the governmental strategies of the EC. More work could be done to survey the technical structures underlying such strategies. Furthermore, as distinct cultural artefacts of the early digital era, the various manifestations of digital library portals and platforms are currently an under-researched topic and could be studied as examples of transitional media forms.

The intention of my study has been to outline the contours of a problem, expressed by the paradox of tomorrow’s memory. The thesis has explored the different dimensions of this problem as they are perceived with regard to the existing institutional shaping of memory. The complicated dialectic between memory and forgetting is deeply embedded within cultural heritage as a process in which vested private and public interests have a stake. By addressing the challenges of the digital age in order to foreground this dialectic, in the present work I have attempted to offer new perspectives on ongoing debates.

The contribution my thesis makes to these debates is primarily in its aim to link up distinct fields of inquiry regarding notions of heritage, media and memory. My
approach to investigate the mixing of temporalities in different memory propositions and aspects of heritage emphasises the management of time in which they are invested. Likewise, my excavation of alternative utopian impulses from within the dominant narrative of Western modernity has opened up new perspectives on heritage, both as a framework for diagnosing the hopes of former generations and as a means of locating points of rupture and continuity in contemporary memorial practices.
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Appendix A

Interview with Ricardo Brodsky (Director, Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos, Chile) [Translated interview in English underneath]

1. ¿Cómo entiendes el papel de la memoria dentro de tu organización, y hasta qué punto podemos decir que el concepto de memoria tiene relevancia política para el Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos más allá del acceso a documentos y recursos archivados?

El concepto de memoria está en el centro del MMDH, ya que se trata de un proyecto de reparación moral a las víctimas de violaciones a los DDHH bajo la dictadura de Pinochet. Esto implica que se trabaja desde la subjetividad del mundo de las víctimas y se busca una empatía de los visitantes con su experiencia. Naturalmente esto se hace apoyado no sólo en los testimonios personales sino también en documentación y contraste de experiencias que validan lo expuesto. En otras palabras, el trabajo propiamente archivístico e histórico se relaciona con el testimonio en la exposición permanente.

Por otra parte, hay que decir que el concepto de memoria es muy dinámico y plural, que ésta está en permanente construcción, en diálogo y a veces confrontación con otras memorias. Con todo, en Chile la memoria del mundo de las víctimas se ha venido constituyendo con creciente fuerza en una memoria social, aceptada como válida por la sociedad chilena y sostenida por el esfuerzo público.

2. ¿Cuáles son tus opiniones sobre el programa ‘Memoria del Mundo’ de la UNESCO? ¿Dirías que la visión de memoria que tiene UNESCO es diferente al concepto codificado por el Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos?

Nos parece que el concepto Memoria del Mundo de UNESCO es muy positivo, de hecho fue importante la declaración de diversos archivos de organismos de defensa de los DDHH en Chile como "Memoria del Mundo" para alentar a la formación de este museo, ya que surge una suerte de obligación moral del país por preservar y hacer acceso público a esos archivos que han merecido ese título.

3. ¿Cómo entiende tu organización la relación entre sus funciones del estado y civiles? ¿Crees que, así como la memoria, un grado de olvido es importante para fomentar la cohesión social y política?

El MMDH es una iniciativa gubernamental y/o estatal pero tiene la particularidad que se entrega su gestión a una Fundación privada, con financiamiento público. Se buscó con ello proteger al museo de los vaivenes y presiones derivadas de las necesidades políticas de los gobiernos de turno. En tal sentido, el museo debe mantenerse fiel a su misión aunque ello implique una cierta incomodidad política para el gobierno. Ahora bien, el objetivo del museo es servirse de la experiencia traumática para aportar a la construcción de una convivencia en paz y respeto a los DDHH entre los chilenos, pero basada en la verdad. Siempre habrá un grado de olvido en un proyecto de memoria, ya que ésta se basa en la selección y jerarquización de hechos representativos o ejemplares. Lo opuesto a la memoria es la supresión, no el olvido, como dice Todorov.
4. ¿Crees que es importante movilizar a tecnologías, especialmente ellas posibilitadas por el internet, para hacer disponibles documentos online? ¿Constituye esto una manera de diseminar memoria cultural?

Es muy importante y de hecho lo hacemos con mucha fuerza. Nuestras audiencias son tanto presenciales como virtuales y dedicamos muchos esfuerzos a nuestras páginas web y a nuestra presencia en las redes sociales. Tenemos una biblioteca digital que permite el acceso a buena parte de las colecciones del museo, un centro de documentación con archivos en línea y un centro de documentación audiovisual que permite el acceso a los archivos audiovisuales del museo.

5. Aunque se llama un museo, el Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos también tiene un centro de documentación repleto con una biblioteca y archivos. En tu opinión, ¿existe una distinción entre museos, bibliotecas y archivos, y es esto significante en cuanto a tu organización siendo identificado como un museo?

Me parece que no puede plantearse una separación radical entre estos tipos de instituciones. Un museo es tal sólo si tiene una colección representativa de su temática y obviamente tiene que dar acceso público a sus colecciones. Esto se hace a través de las exposiciones y a través de la biblioteca física o virtual. Para nosotros, el museo es una entidad dedicada a la comunicación: usa diversos medios para cumplir su misión que es dar a conocer lo ocurrido en Chile bajo la dictadura.

6. Citando a Reinhart Koselleck, ha escrito Ann Rigney que ‘aunque un monumento tal vez parezca una manera de asegurar la memoria a largo plazo, en realidad es posible que acabara señalando el principio de la amnesia si dicho monumento no sea continuamente dotado de nuevos significados’. ¿Cómo responderías a esta preocupación en cuanto a tu organización?

Es posible que un monumento sirva sólo para una memoria ritualizada y que finalmente no aporte nada. Pienso que para un museo o un sitio de memoria las cosas son diferentes. Somos una entidad viva, que participa de los debates de la sociedad y que se constituye en un recurso educativo para el sistema escolar y para los funcionarios del estado. No conformes con ello, dedicamos un gran espacio a las actividades culturales (cine, teatro, danza, libros, etc) y a las exposiciones temporales de artistas chilenos y extranjeros. Con ello buscamos revisitar la memoria desde otros lenguajes, asumiendo que el arte tiene una independencia crítica que, como dice Nelly Richard, encuentra virtud allí donde el consenso político sólo ve defectos. En otras palabras, a través de nuestras actividades vamos renovando el sentido y mensaje de esta institución, contemporanizándolo, si se puede decir, y acercándonos a las nuevas generaciones, como de hecho ha ocurrido si se analiza las audiencias del museo.

1. How do you see the role of memory within your organisation, and how far does the idea of memory have political agency beyond providing access to archival documents and resources?

The concept of memory is at the heart of the MMDH, as it is a project of moral reparation for the victims of violations of human rights during the Pinochet dictatorship. This implies that it works from the point of view of the victims' world and intends for visitors to empathise with their experience. Naturally this is done with the support not only of personal testimony but also that of documentation and the comparison of experiences that validate that which is exhibited. In other words, the
properly archivistic and historical work is related to the testimony in the permanent exhibition.

On the other hand, one has to say that the concept of memory is highly dynamic and plural, that it is permanently being constructed, in dialogue and at times in confrontation with other memories. Nevertheless, in Chile the memory of the world of the victims has grown increasingly into a social memory, accepted as valid by Chilean society and sustained by the effort of the people.

2. What are your views on UNESCO’s Memory of the World programme? Is UNESCO’s understanding of memory is distinct from the concept of memory encoded by the Museum of Memory and Human Rights?

It is seems to us that the Memory of the World concept of UNESCO is highly positive, in fact the declaration of several archives of organisations dedicated to the defence of human rights in Chile as "Memory of the World" was important in encouraging the formation of this museum, as it comes from a kind of moral obligation of the country to preserve and provide public access to the archives that have been deemed worthy of this title.

3. How does your organisation negotiate the relationship between its civil and state functions? Do you believe that, concurrent with memory, a degree of forgetting is important in order to foster social and political cohesion?

The Museum of Human Rights is a governmental and/or state initiative but is peculiar in that its management has been entrusted to a private foundation with public financing. The intention of this was to protect the museum from the fluctuations and pressures that are derived from the political necessities that affect any given government. In that sense, the museum must remain faithful to its mission although this might imply political discomfort for the government. On the other hand, the objective of the museum is to use traumatic experience in such a way as to contribute to Chileans living together in peace and respect for human rights, but with a basis in the truth. There will always be a degree of forgetting in a project related to memory, as it is based on the selection and hierarchization of representative or exemplary events. As Todorov says, the opposite of memory is suppression, not forgetting.

4. How important do you think it is to mobilise technologies, particularly those enabled by the Internet, with a view to making documents available online? Do you think this constitutes a means of disseminating cultural memory?

It is very important and in fact we put a lot of effort into this area. Our audiences are both present and virtual and we dedicate a great deal of effort to our webpages and to our presence on social networks. We have a digital library that grants access to a good part of the museum's collections, a centre of documentation with on-line archives and an audiovisual centre of documentation that gives access to the audiovisual archives of the museum.

5. Although it is called a museum, the Museum of Memory and Human Rights also has a Centre of Documentation, with library and archive facilities. In your view, is there a distinction between museums, libraries and archives, and is this significant with regard to your organisation calling itself a museum?

It seems to me that we cannot make a radical separation between these types of institutions. A museum is a museum only if it has a collection representative of its theme
and obviously it must grant public access to its collections. This is done through its exhibitions and the virtual or physical library. For us, the museum is an entity dedicated to communication: it uses various methods to accomplish its mission, which is to bring to light what happened in Chile under the dictatorship.

6. Citing Reinhart Koselleck, Ann Rigney has written that, ‘while putting down a monument may seem like a way of ensuring long-term memory, it may in fact turn out to mark the beginning of amnesia unless the monument in question is continuously invested with new meaning’. How would you respond to this concern in relation to your organisation?

It is possible that a monument only serves to create a ritualised form of memory that in the end does not contribute anything. I think that things are different for a museum or a place of memory. We are a living entity, which participates in societal debates and which constitutes an educational resource for the school system and state employees. Not satisfied only with this, we dedicate a broad space to cultural activities (cinema, theatre, dance, books etc) and to the temporary exhibitions of Chilean and foreign artists. Through this we intend to revisit memory through other languages, assuming that art has a critical independence that, as Nelly Richard says, finds virtue where the political consensus sees only defects. In other words, through our activities we renovate the meaning and message of this institution, making it contemporary, if that is possible to say, and approaching new generations, as has in fact happened which we can see when attendance figures for the museum are analysed.