'Beyond the Riots' – Policing in Partnership to Prevent and Contain Urban Unrest

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Abstract

For four days in August 2011 there were widespread public disturbances in 66 locations across the country. Known as the ‘2011 English Riots’, they were estimated to have involved 15,000 participants, cost half a billion pounds and were associated with five deaths (Bridges 2012). The Prime Minister described them as ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Cameron 2011). Consequently, there was no major official inquiry. An academic literature emerged, but this was theoretically driven and London-centric.

The lack of an empirical evidence-base provided the rationale for this study. The aims were to understand why the riots occurred in some places outside London, but not others; to explore the role of police and partners in preventing and containing unrest; and, recognising that policing rarely takes place in a vacuum, to identify other contextual factors undermining and promoting social order at local levels.

The case study method was selected for its ability to capture context. Cases included a riot affected city and an ‘at risk’ city, which were characteristically similar, to support a compare and contrast approach. Neighbourhood ‘sub-cases’ were used as a methodological tool to access community-level variables. The study drew on quantitative and qualitative data, but was primarily based on 45 interviews with police and partners involved in the public order response or working with affected communities.

The study found that inequality, exclusion and poor treatment of communities provided motivation for rioting. However, the activities of police and partners were able to prevent and contain unrest. The involvement of neighbourhood police officers and practitioners in the main public order response offered greater chance of success, due to their local knowledge and rapport, but was dependent on pre-existing partnerships and the mind-set of police commanders. Informal social controls, underpinned by community attachment, played an important role in inhibiting violence, especially where supported by formal controls.
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Abbreviations

ACPO  Association of Chief Police Officers
BME  Black and Minority Ethnic
CDA  Crime and Disorder Act 1998
CIA  Community Impact Assessment
CIC  Commission on Integration and Cohesion
CDRP  Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CSP  Community Safety Partnership
EDL  English Defence League
GSB  Gold Silver Bronze - is a command structure created by the Metropolitan Police Service following the Brixton riot of 1985 and is now used by all emergency services and some partner agencies as a means of delivering a strategic, tactical and operational response to large scale operations and critical incidents.
NDM  National Decision-making Model - is a decision-making tool used by the police to help determine a suitable course of action across a range of situations.
NPCC  National Police Chiefs' Council - succeeding ACPO on 1 April 2015, it brings together 43 operationally independent and locally accountable chief constables and their chief officer teams to coordinate national operational policing.
NPO  Neighbourhood Police Officer
NPT  Neighbourhood Policing Team
PACE  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
PACT  Police and Community Together
PCSO  Police Community Support Officer
PLO  Police Liaison Officer
PLT  Police Liaison Team
PPE  Personal Protective Equipment
PSU  Police Support Unit - a specialist unit of police officers who have undergone tactical training in public order and riot control. A basic PSU consists of three officers, including one inspector, three sergeants and 18 constables.

SNO  Safer Neighbourhood Officer

SNT  Safer Neighbourhood Team

SYP  South Yorkshire Police

TARA  Tenants and Residents’ Association

VCS  Voluntary and Community Sector
Introduction

Background

On Saturday, 6 August 2011 in Tottenham, North London, a community protest over the police killing of a young Black man, Mark Duggan, escalated into violent disturbances. This marked the beginning of what became known as ‘the 2011 English Riots’, which occurred over four days and across 66 locations in England and Wales. Some commentators reported them as the most widespread disturbances in recent history (Bridges 2012; Clarke 2012; Lea & Hallsworth 2012). They involved an estimated 15,000 people, cost approximately half a billion pounds and were associated with five deaths (Bridges 2012).

The immediate political and media response focused on ‘mindless thugs’. Prime Minister David Cameron claimed: ‘this was not political protest or a riot about protest, about politics. It was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting. And we don't need an inquiry to tell us that’ (Hansard HC Deb. 2001, col.1051). Thus, despite the scale of unrest, there was no major public investigation equivalent to the Scarman inquiry (1981) into the Brixton riots. Reports by the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) and the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011a) were light-touch by comparison.

An academic literature emerged to provide a critical contrast to the mainstream media construction of events, but this was theoretically driven and less grounded in an empirical evidence base. A dominant explanation drew on theories of consumerism to argue that a culture of individualism, envy and intense social competition, produced by late-capitalism and neoliberalism, had undermined any possibility of protest (Treadwell et al. 2012; Bauman 2012; Moxon 2011; Žižek 2011). This overlapped with Cameron’s view, albeit for different reasons, that rioters’ motives were primarily criminal. Beyond the micro-politics in Tottenham, people participated because they felt unable to let an historic opportunity to grab something for free pass them by. However, consumerism could not explain why riots did not occur everywhere.

Outside London, events were widely described as ‘copycat riots’, fuelled by media reporting and social networking, people were drawn into rioting by either ‘emotional contagion’ (Baker, 2012) or calculated opportunism as participants were seen ‘getting away with it’ (Morrell, Scott, McNeish, & Webster, 2011, p. 36). This closely aligns with ‘mob psychology’, whereby individuals lose their sense of self and personal responsibility and unquestioningly follow the predominant ideas.
and emotions of the crowd (Le Bon 1895); and by implication, context – local, national, or global – was irrelevant.

The main empirical work that was produced in the aftermath of the disturbances was the *Reading the Riots* study, conducted by the London School of Economics and *the Guardian* newspaper. However, this was London-centric and focused largely on rioters’ self-reported motivations, which may have been blind to the wider events and structural forces affecting individuals’ choices. There was some reflection on events in specific localities (Jeffery & Jackson 2012; Clifton 2012a; Clifton 2012b; Spalek et al. 2012), but without the depth of detail to understand how risk and protective factors interacted; and with little consideration of how policing partners can plan for unrest should there be a similar threat again.

**Aims and Objectives**

The lack of an evidence-based understanding about why the 2011 Riots occurred in some towns and cities outside London, but not others, provided the rationale for this study. The fieldwork was conducted in 2014-15, providing time since the riots for reflection. Based on the documented role of the police in previous riots, a key objective was to look at this again. However, in this study the scope was widened to explore the role of other agencies in preventing and containing unrest, given their remit in policing and protecting communities since the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. It was also important because after pointing the finger of blame firmly at rioters, the government began criticise the police for the extent of the disorders, claiming they did not act quickly enough and were initially too timid.

Recognising that policing rarely takes place in a vacuum, the study additionally sought to explore the relevance of key contextual factors, including those previously associated with urban unrest. The literature on contemporary riots in England, France and the United States made reference to deprivation, social exclusion, crime, previous unrest, dysfunctional community, police-community relations and austerity. However, the primary research was not restricted to these. The methodology involved both deductive and inductive inquiry to ensure any distinct local factors in the case studies were not overlooked. Context is critical and what works in one locality may not work in another.

Thus, the over-arching aim of the study was to understand the aetiology of the 2011 English Riots outside London. The objectives were:

1. to understand why riots occurred in some locales, but not others, highlighting the role of both risk and protective factors;
2. to explore the role of police and partners in preventing and containing unrest, as the actors primarily responsible for community safety and public order maintenance; and

3. to identify key contextual factors undermining and promoting order at local levels, which might limit the capability of policing partners to prevent and contain imminent unrest.

**Methods**

A case study approach was selected for its ability to investigate phenomena and context together. Two case studies were selected including a riot-affected city, Nottingham, and an ‘at risk’ city, Sheffield. These two cities were selected because they were characteristically similar and this supported a compare and contrast model. Nottingham and Sheffield were also selected because they were far away from London and non-contiguous with other riot-affected areas. Neighbourhood 'sub-cases' were used as a methodological tool to access data on community-level variables. These were identified in a similar way to the main case studies, to include riot-affected neighbourhoods in Nottingham and at risk neighbourhoods in Sheffield. It was a mixed methods study, involving analysis of social statistics, documentary material and 45 qualitative interviews across the two case studies. The semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers and managers and practitioners in partner agencies, including community-based providers, who were either involved in the public order response or worked with local people in the study neighbourhoods.

**Why understanding unrest is important**

Urban unrest is costly both financially and socially. In some cases, urban unrest also incurs human costs, when lives are lost, as they were in 2011. Although riots have occurred with alarming regularity in England (Solomos 2011), the level of social disruption leads to serious questions being asked about the state of the nation and our system of law and order (Newburn 2012a). The police come in for particular scrutiny. Scarman’s inquiry was critical of community policing. This time, public order policing was probed (Home Affairs Committee 2011a). The police also suffer financially, in terms of mounting a public order response and footing the bill for reparations because under the Riot Damages Act (1886) the police are liable for the cost of loss or damage to people’s homes and businesses.
Urban unrest can also have longer-term implications for the police. Hohl et al. (2013) found that a quarter of Londoners had substantially lower confidence in police competence and capability after the 2011 Riots, especially in parts of the city hardest hit, which tended to be multi-ethnic deprived neighbourhoods where confidence in the police has been historically low. Low confidence erodes public support for the police and can undermine citizen cooperation with the police and even nurture hate, which might be what was being expressed in 2011 (Waddington 2012b; Bradford & Jackson 2011). And, if riots further undermine confidence, this may lead to a vicious cycle that is difficult to break and which may explain why urban unrest tends to recur in the same places.

Additional financial costs, not factored into the figure above, include those linked to the sentencing of individuals convicted of riot-related offences. The 2011 English Riots may be remembered for their 'success' in punishing participants. The police use of CCTV increased the number identified and the judiciary uplifted the sentences of those appearing in court, even abandoning the sentencing guidelines that should have acted as a restraint on the judiciary's punitive impulses (Ashworth 2012; Roberts 2012). The severity of sentencing attracted some concern, however, there was an additional 'uplift' at every step of the criminal justice process (Lightowlers & Quirk 2014), which has barely been acknowledged, despite the implications for any society considering itself to be fair and just.

The importance of this study resides in its potential to understand how urban unrest can be prevented and contained to limit these costs, both to the public purse and to individuals and communities directly affected, linked to stigmatising narratives about riots. The literature makes important reference to riots as a form of collective action against perceived injustices (Grover 2011; Benyon & Solomos 1987; Tilly 1978). The rationale for this study was not to incapacitate protest, but to understand whether non-riot affected areas had found less harmful ways to make themselves heard.

**Structure of the thesis**

The first chapter reviews the literature on the 2011 English Riots, summarising what was known about these events before the study. The first section considers explanations for them by a range of commentators, including politicians, the mainstream press and academics. This exercise helped to identify gaps in understanding and informed the development the study aims and approach. The second part of the chapter reflects on previous unrest in contemporary England, France and the United States, to see how unique the 2011 Riots were. It concludes
they were continuous in being sparked by the death of a BME individual at the hands of the police and occurring in areas of high deprivation, typically affected by unrest before. They were remarkably widespread for English riots, but not compared to the 2005 French Riots (see Body-Gendrot 2016). Looting was unusually prominent or, at least, unusually seized upon by the media. Moreover, the media and political commentators revealed an exceptional level of condemnation, using the conceptual and perceptual framework of the underclass through which social inequalities are conceived as consequences of 'bad individual choices', an absence of moral judgement, poor parenting, hereditary deficiencies and/or welfare dependency (Tyler 2013; Young 2016).

The second chapter reviews relevant literature on policing, as a central focus of the research. The chapter sketches out key developments and issues relating to community policing, which has been implicated in previous unrest - and by the Reading the Riots study this time - whereby officers have caused community grievance due either to over-policing or under-policing. The chapter looks at how police powers have been expanded and constrained by legislation and how changing governance structures have affected police accountability because both have the ability to limit repressive policing. Organisational changes are also discussed, especially in the context of how the extended policing family, including the introduction of Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) role, provides the potential to improve police-community relations through increased visibility and positive contacts. Public order policing is considered in a later section of this chapter, as a distinct police activity. However, links are made with community policing in terms of procedural justice theory. The chapter concludes that the public perception of fair and just treatment is important in all interactions with the police and provides the capacity to prevent a tense situation escalating into violent disorder.

Theories and empirical evidence reviewed in the first two chapters informed the methodological framework, which is described in the third chapter. It outlines the logic of the research design and decisions taken about the methods and tools used for data collection and analysis. It provides a critical introduction to the case study approach and how the cases and subcases were selected, based on their socio-demographic profiles, to support a compare and contrast model of analysis. The chapter reflects on the contentious nature of ‘riots’ as a subject-matter for empirical research, which, combined with a focus on small geographical areas, presented particular challenges for the research design, the research experience and potentially the impact of the findings. Methodological challenges included the unwillingness of people to participate in the research; pressures for them to re-
write history in particular ways; and risks to the anonymity of individuals and
neighbourhoods involved in the research, with the potential for reputational and
wider social harms.

The fourth chapter constitutes the first of four empirical chapters. It is divided into
two main sections, which detail the nature of people and place in the case studies
and the disorder events occurring there in August 2011. This is not merely scene-
setting for the more substantive findings chapters; the physical, social and
situational context is explored as an essential part of the study design, being
hypothesised as part of the explanation for different disorder outcomes in
different places. By combining data from documentary sources and the qualitative
interviews, the chapter describes how the disorder in Nottingham began on
Monday 8 August and lasted for two nights. It seems that although Nottingham
gained less media attention than some other riot affected locales, the number of
incidents and scale of the attacks on police property were more significant. Police
struggled to keep up with a threat that was described as highly 'mobile' and 'fluid'.
Unsurprisingly, there is less material on Sheffield in this chapter because large-
scale disorder did not occur, but the perceived threat from disorder and the
manifestation of 'pre-disorder' is detailed as background to the local response.

Chapter Five describes the public order responses in the two cases studies. The
public order response is not merely the activities of the police, but rather the
collective actions all agencies and individuals purposely engaged in trying to avert
or contain urban unrest. This chapter draws on interview and documentary data to
establish the sequence and nature of activities taking place in each city.

Acknowledging competing and half-remembered accounts, this chapter makes a
best attempt to describe what happened and how some events may have been
causally linked. The chapter is thematically structured according to key elements of
the public order responses that seemed to promote differential outcomes in the
two cities, including timeliness of the response, partnership working, how
information was shared within and between agencies and with the public, the style
of policing and choice of tactics.

Chapter Six takes a step back from the public order response to examine the
nature of policing partnerships in the years and decades preceding the riots. The
chapter begins by looking at relationships between policing agencies and
communities in the two case studies. It considers how police operations and
particular tactics such as stop and search had antagonised communities,
constituting the tinder for unrest, but how mechanisms of accountability were able
to mitigate risk in Sheffield. Poverty and ethnicity are shown to correlate with
unrest due to the way that the police and wider society perceive and interact with people who are poor and Black. Research suggests that Black men are more likely than Whites to be labelled as gang-involved and this tends to result in more repressive policing (Williams 2015). The second part of the chapter looks at inter-agency relationships in the two case studies and identifies factors that promoted positive relations and joint-working in the two case studies. Co-location, partnership structures and facilitation roles were found to be beneficial, while funding allocation processes had the potential both to support and undermine partnerships. Pre-established relationships positively determined the capability and willingness of agencies to work together when unrest seemed imminent.

Chapter Seven focuses on community context. Dysfunctional community has previously been associated with urban unrest, either linked to community tensions within neighbourhoods, in the case of disturbances in the North East of England in the early 1990s (Campbell 1993); or between neighbourhoods, in the case of the 2001 disturbances in the mill towns of Bradford, Oldham and Burnley (Cantle 2001). This chapter describes the different social groups residing in the case studies and the extent to which they got on together at the neighbourhood and city level. The chapter refers to sociological concepts such as social capital and social cohesion to understand these relationships. The chapter then considers whether inter-group tensions, at any level, increased the risk of disorder in the two cities. The chapter examines the hypothesis that a collective sense of belonging can promote shared norms and values, which are the basis of informal social control. Thus, social cohesiveness at the neighbourhood level is likely to be protective by promoting collective efficacy across the whole locality. However, the findings suggest that informal controls may not be able to prevent young men, who are marginalised from education and employment, from collective violence beyond the boundary of the neighbourhood. This chapter underlines the importance of social equality and strong communities, which must be supported, rather than oppressed, by formal policing.

Chapter Eight, as the conclusion, draws together the various themes emerging out of the study and how they inter-relate. It considers the extent to which the study findings support and build upon existing theory and makes tentative recommendations for preventing and containing unrest in the future. Given the timing of the research, a view is taken about how recent austerity measures may affect the risk of riots and the capacity to respond in the two case studies. Findings suggest that some of what worked in 2011 may not work again as a consequence of changes to youth provision and community policing. The thesis concludes that the combined activities of police, partners and communities when
unrest seems imminent can inhibit unrest. The involvement of local police and practitioners in the main public order response is critical, but this seems dependent on relationships established over time. Structural and community factors are possibly the most difficult to address, but the most important. They can prevent the risk of unrest by providing individuals and groups, especially young men, with a sense of belonging and of having 'something to lose' by rioting. Attachment to community provides the basis of informal social controls, which offer the best chance of preventing and containing urban unrest, especially where these are supported by formal controls.
Chapter 1 – The 2011 English Riots and Other Contemporary Disturbances

1.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on what have come to be known as the '2011 English Riots' to help understand the nature of these events and why they occurred. It reflects on the main political and popular narrative and how this compares with other explanations to establish the level of consensus and disagreement between different commentators. The purpose of this exercise was to establish any gaps in understanding to help inform the development of the study aims and objectives. In particular, the exercise sought to understand why the riots spread from their original starting point in Tottenham, where the triggers were better understood, to towns and cities far beyond and non-contiguous with London. The chapter looks at accounts of previous riots in contemporary Britain, France and the U.S. to understand how the 2011 English Riots were continuous or unique by comparison and to inform the theoretical framework for this study.

The Chapter begins by outlining key events associated with the 2011 English Riots, followed by a descriptive section on previous British riots across three decades, including the 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s. Explanations for riots across this time period are considered under thematic headings as a way of summarising dominant theories, including that riots are primarily the consequence of criminal motives; political motives; material and social inequalities; styles of policing that either antagonise communities or leave them feeling unprotected; and community issues, for example, linked to inter-ethnic or gender relations. Overseas riots are considered in a separate section to consider similarities and differences between British disorders and U.S. and French disorders, respectively. The conclusion draws together key factors across time and space, spotlighting anger at the police as the thread running through all contemporary riots. Inter-ethnic conflict also emerges as a key factor, but is more prevalent in the U.S. than either Britain or France. Relative poverty, promoting a sense of social injustice, is identified as an important contextual factor at both societal and local levels. Finally, the chapter reflects on these findings in the context of the current study to highlight where there are any gaps in understanding and to focus the field of inquiry.

1.2 The 2011 English Riots

For four days in August 2011 there were widespread public disturbances in 66 locations across England and Wales. Generally referred to as '2011 English Riots',
they involved an estimated 15,000 people, cost approximately half a billion pounds and were associated with five deaths (Bridges 2012). In exploring the nature of these events it seems important to establish definitional terms. The legal definition of a riot in the UK is:

*Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety (Public Order Act 1986, Ch. 64)*

Although events in August 2011 were collectively identified as riots, commentators in some riot-affected locales were reluctant to accept this definition. For example, Assistant Chief Constable Broadbent for Nottinghamshire Police told the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011c) that Nottingham did not have riots. Instead he described local events, less seriously, as ‘violent disorders’, on the basis that ‘at no point could we substantiate that there were 12 or more people together for a common purpose with intent to commit the act of rioting’ (Ev.70). However, it is worth noting potential motives for avoiding the 'riot' classification, including the desire to limit reputational harm. Police forces are noted to have well-resourced communications offices to ensure that ‘brand’ image and message are accurately and/or positively represented (Greer & McLaughlin 2010). Police forces also have a financial incentive, because under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886 they are liable for the cost of loss or damage to people’s homes and businesses; but not if violent disorders have occurred.

Another term used to describe events in 2011 (e.g. One Nottingham 2011) and in previous decades is 'disturbances', for example, in referring to the '2001 disturbances' and this term can sometimes be used interchangeably with riot. However, Power and Tunstall (1997, p.viii) have distinguished the two by referring to a disturbance as being ‘an interruption of the peace, an uproar of an outbreak of public agitation’ compared to a riot, which is a term commonly used to describe ‘a gathering of several people which is so disorderly that police intervention is necessary to restore order’. Some commentators additionally refer to the political dimension of the term 'riot'. They suggest it is not merely descriptive or legalistic, but rather the term riot suggests criminal motives. On these grounds, Tester (2012) prefers to use the more neutral word ‘events’. This chapter and the thesis beyond use the terms assigned to events in the general discourse, noting where any specific distinction has been made.

Many authors (Bridges 2012; Clarke 2012; Lea & Hallsworth 2012) report the 2011 English Riots as the most widespread public disturbances in British history,
reaching areas previously untouched by such events before. Others think that commentators simply lost a sense of perspective. Durodié (2012) suggests that while the August 2011 disturbances may have been the most costly (depending on how such episodes are accounted for), others have matched them in terms of levels of participation and violence, including the inner-city riots of the early eighties (in particular 1981 and 1985); pitched battles between the British police and striking miners in the mid-80s; and protests against the Poll tax at the beginning of the nineties. Lea and Hallsworth (2012) claim the August 2011 riots were 'more serious than any that have gone before' because unlike previous riots, which have had a specific target or grievance, these were characterised by a more 'diffuse and generalised rage' (p.31).

The 2011 Riots began on 6 August, two days after a 29-year old man, Mark Duggan, was shot dead by police near Tottenham Hale station in North London. Duggan had been under surveillance linked to Operation Trident, an anti-gun crime operation being run by the MPS. The shooting occurred on 4 August as officers stopped a mini cab in which Duggan was travelling, and attempted to arrest him. The day after the shooting the press reported that a spokesperson for the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) had said that Duggan had been killed in a shoot-out with the police; and during this shoot-out a police officer was hit by a bullet that lodged in his radio and Duggan had been killed by return fire (Moore-Bridger et al. 2011). A conflicting story was reported a day later, claiming that an eye witness had seen Duggan being pulled from the mini-cab and held down by police before being shot (London Evening Standard 2011). Duggan was variously reported as a drug dealer and/or a ‘well-known gangster’, which were claims that his family and local community denied on the basis that he had no criminal record. What exactly happened is still not entirely clear, despite an IPCC investigation (2015). However, it is evident that a catalogue of errors by both the Metropolitan Police and the IPCC contributed to the disorder in Tottenham, which proliferated across a further 21 London boroughs and eventually reached other towns and cities across England, including Birmingham, Bristol, Liverpool, Nottingham, Manchester, Salford and Wolverhampton. Some minor incidents were also reported in Wales (Cardiff).

Without any direct communication from the MPS or the IPCC confirming or denying the ‘exchange of fire’ or ‘assassination’ stories, Duggan’s family and the wider community began to suspect police mishandling. The MPS review notes that ‘...The issue of inaccuracy in the media story concerning an exchange of fire between officers and Mark Duggan should have been positively rebutted immediately’ (Metropolitan Police Service 2012). It followed that on 6 August, a
peaceful protest march beginning at Broadwater Farm and finishing at Tottenham police station was held by friends and relatives, demanding 'justice' for Mark's family. They stayed outside the police station waiting for a senior police officer to speak to them, but none came. Much later, 'a younger and more aggressive crowd' congregated outside the station, and this is when the violence is thought to have broken out (Bridges 2012). Anger and frustration intensified when a young woman was pushed to ground and repeatedly hit by a police officer. Many agree that this event, rather than the death of Mark Duggan, was what 'sparked' the disturbances (Reicher & Stott 2011). At this stage a police car was set on fire, prompting some of the crowd to leave, but attracted others, curious to see what was happening (Morrell et al. 2011). There was an escalation in arson and destruction. Shop windows were smashed to provide access to missiles to throw at the police, rather than to loot, which increasingly became a feature of later disturbances in both in Tottenham and elsewhere (ibid).

1.3 Previous Riots in England and Wales

England has been described as the most riotous country in Europe based on the startling frequency of urban unrest throughout the post-war period (Campbell 1993). This section looks at major outbreaks throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. It provides a temporal and selective overview of key events, including triggers, how they developed and how they ended. Social disorder linked primarily to football violence, industrial or political disputes - such as the miners' strike in the mid-1980s, the Poll Tax riots in the 1990s - have been excluded from the analysis. Marx (1970) refers to these as 'instrumental riots', in which a generalized belief is present and which tend to involve a dissident group against the government or other authority or have a focused institutional context such as a factory or school. The chapter focuses on two other types of riots, including 'communal riots' (Janowitz 1969), in which a generalised belief may be present but this not instrumental in resolving a group’s problems. Communal riots are likely to have a more diffuse character, often involving violence between groups divided by religion, ethnicity, ideology, race, or region. The third type are referred to as 'issueless' or unprincipled riots, in which a generalised protest belief is absent or unclear. Marx (1970) sees these as developing out of two kinds of circumstances: (1) in the face of a pronounced weakening of the agents of social control, or (2) as expressive out-bursts, occasionally alongside victory celebrations or ritualized festivals. Marx notes that just because a generalised belief is not present, does not mean that issueless riots are mainly for fun or profit. Instead, it means that they need to be studied in more detail to gain an understanding of what motivated
rioters and what their consequences might be. The 2011 English Riots seem to fit best with the third type.

1.3.1 The 1980s

Benyon and Solomos (1988) remark on the relative tranquillity of the post-war years up until the major outbreaks of disorder in the 1980s. They claim that Margaret Thatcher’s administration failed in one of its principal functions, to maintain public order. Major riots commanded the headlines in 1980, 1981 and 1985, starting with events in the St. Paul’s district of Bristol in April 1980. This was widely reported as Black violence against the police following a raid on an illegal Black drinking club. However, the Café was frequented by both Blacks and Whites and when anger tipped over following a drugs raid, which found no drugs, they attacked the police together (Campbell 1993). Political commentators regarded the disorder as a one-off aberration in social behaviour and the Home Secretary resisted calls for a public enquiry (Benyon & Solomos 1988). A year later, however, this diagnosis was challenged when serious disorder took place in Brixton, London, over the weekend of 10-12 April 1981, resulting in many injuries and widespread damage. It was triggered by a series of incidents beginning on Friday 10 April, when a police officer apprehended a Black youth, Michael Bailey, who was on his way to hospital with a stab wound. This led to violent skirmishes between some 40 officers and 100 Black youths; as well as looting and destruction in the commercial centre (Waddington 1992).

Further unrest erupted in July of the same year, affecting many parts of the country, including Southall (London), Toxteth (Liverpool), Moss Side (Manchester), Handsworth (Birmingham), Chapeltown (Leeds), Sheffield, Nottingham, Hull, Slough, Bradford, Leicester, Derby, High Wycombe, and Cirencester. These were downplayed as ‘copycat’ riots (Scarman 1981), but many had their own specific triggers. For example, the Toxteth riot was traceable to the chase and arrest of a young Black motorcyclist by a routine traffic patrol. Arrest data shows that rioters came from a wide cross-section of the community, including a high proportion of Whites, women and older people (Cooper 1985). The night’s disturbances were terminated by police use of tear gas – the first such occurrence in mainland Britain. The Moss Side riot is thought to have started after a group of Black men were taunted by a group of White men for not having the courage to ‘rise up’ like the people in Brixton and Toxteth (D. Thompson 2011). This triggered two days of disorder, including the damage and looting of many shops and businesses and an attack, by hundreds of rioters, on Moss Side police station. Rioters were mainly Black, but there was also a large minority of Whites.
The riots in Handsworth and Southall were associated with local concerns about neo-fascists. The flashpoint in Handsworth was an attack on a locally known police superintendent who was trying to dispel rumours of an impending National Front march amongst a tense crowd of concerned residents (Southgate 1982). Within an hour, the police and fire stations were attacked, and looting and widespread damage to property ensued. Fearful shopkeepers from the South Asian community had already begun boarding up their premises. Half the rioters were White, a third Black and a fifth of South Asian ethnic origin. Violence erupted in Southall when hundreds of neo-fascist skinheads travelled into the area for a concert at a local pub (Unsworth 1982). They were reported to have racially insulted the wife of a South Asian grocer, smashed shop windows, and wrote National Front slogans around the area (Robb 2006). Around 400 South Asians congregated to wait for the skinheads outside the tavern (Miner Kingman Daily 1981), but their violence turned against the police, who they perceived to be protecting the skinheads. Of all the 1981 disorders, this is the only one described as a 'race riot', due to the inter-racial conflict (Benyon & Solomos 1988).

Police chiefs suggested that what the press had described as ‘riots’ in the early 1980s were for them ‘routine disturbances’ (Frith 1981). They represented ‘a temporary cluster of upsurges punctuating a chronic reality of tension and aggression in the inner city’ (Unsworth 1982). Further instances of unrest, usually involving police-community conflict, in places like Liverpool and London, continued on a reduced scale between 1982 and 1984 (Benyon & Solomos 1987). The Metropolitan Police Commissioner reported that during 1984 'there were many mini-riots which had the potential to escalate to Brixton 1981 proportions' but for some reason didn’t, adding that 'London nowadays is a very volatile city (cited in Benyon & Solomos 1988, p.404). Hence, unrest during this period was under-reported by the media.

In 1985 large scale unrest erupted again, linked to the shooting of a Black woman, Dorothy ‘Cherry’ Groce, when armed police entered her home looking for her son. A plastic bullet damaged her spine, causing permanent paralysis. The police station was later attacked and Black and White people took part in burning and looting causing costly damage and the death of a freelance photographer. Two days later, another riot occurred in Toxteth, precipitated when four Black men were refused bail at Liverpool Magistrates’ Court (Benyon & Solomos 1987). This provoked a demonstration outside the police station, which was subsequently attacked, along with police cars, and officers themselves. Rioting also occurred in Peckham, London, the same night, although the reasons are not clear (ibid).
The disturbance in the Handsworth Lozells Road area of Birmingham was sparked on the 9 September 1985 when a Black youth became involved in an altercation with a police officer over a parking ticket. Three hours later some 45 buildings were set alight and two South Asian men died as a result. Earlier disturbances had gone unreported by the media, but provided the immediate context of deteriorating relations with the police. Disturbances occurred in other parts of the West Midlands, regarded as 'copycat' (Benyon & Solomos 1987). A disturbance also occurred in the St. Paul's district of Bristol. The most serious disturbance in 1985 occurred on the Broadwater Farm Estate in Tottenham, following the death of Cynthia Jarrett during a police raid at her home. The violence against the police was ferocious, and resulted in the death of PC Blakelock (Loney 1986). The rioting tailed off as news of his death spread.

However, tensions and lower level disorder continued on the Broadwater Estate into 1986, when there were also other disturbances in Notting Hill, the St. Paul’s district of Bristol and Plymouth. In St. Paul’s, attacks on police led to more than 100 arrests. These were seen as a reaction to police operations in the area, in which a large number of houses had been raided in connection with drugs and drinking offences. In Plymouth, participants were White youths, who set up burning barricades and caused damage to local properties (Benyon & Solomos 1987). The 1986 disturbances were under-reported by the media, perhaps demonstrating an 'undercurrent of boredom and resignation' to urban unrest by this point (Benyon & Solomos 1987, p.10).

1.3.2 The 1990s

Between 1991 and 1995, 28 violent disturbances were recorded (Power & Tunstall 1997). These received much less attention from sociologists, perhaps because with one exception they were in largely ‘White’ areas and, consequently, lacked the social drama of the ethnic riots in the 1980s (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). Disturbances in the early 1990s were widely distributed across 13 locations in England and Wales, in places such as Cardiff, Oxford, Coventry and Newcastle (Power & Tunstall 1997). They were all outside London and 12 of the 13 were on run down council estates, which were heavily stigmatised. The disturbances were described as ‘street battles’ between young people and police (Waddington, Jobard, et al. 2009), whose actions in all cases were the immediate trigger (Power & Tunstall 1997); for example, in responding to car crimes such as ‘hotting’ (stunt driving on the streets) or ‘joyriding’ (Campbell 1993; Power & Tunstall 1997). Most of the damage was done to the community. The Meadowell riot, in Northumbria, saw hundreds of young men, burning buildings and raiding and razing shops, which
left local people with no access to essential provisions for some time (Campbell 1993).

Riots in 1994 and 1995 were characterised by racist policing. A disturbance in May 1994 in Darnall, Sheffield, followed an argument between White and South Asian residents over the use a local park. Violence was triggered when police arrived in defence of the White residents and were openly racist towards the South Asians (Wiles 1995). Arrests were entirely South Asian. The riot in Manningham, similarly followed an altercation with the police when four South Asian youths were arrested while playing football in the street. The youths were accused by the officers of swearing at them. A key point of antagonism was that the police made no differentiation between curious onlookers, people trying to calm things down and trouble makers (D. Waddington 2007). A rumour then spread that the police 'attack' on a baby had resulted in hospitalisation or even death, leading to community protests outside the police station. This led to more arrests, which were reported as the 'clinching factor in uniting young and old in openly expressing anger against the police' (Bradford Commission Report, cited in Waddington 2007).

1.3.3 The 2000s

Disturbances took place during the summer of 2001 in several towns and cities in the north of England, including Bradford, Burnley, Oldham, Leeds and Stoke-on-Trent. Most of these were characterised by inter-ethnic conflict and a perceived lack of police protection. The Oldham events in June 2001 followed an attack on two South Asian brothers by a White youth. South Asian homes and businesses were subsequently attacked. Police arrived on the scene, arresting many of the White offenders, but, in the meantime, an angry South Asian crowd had formed in response to rumours that the police were unwilling or unable to prevent the White attacks and this is when serious disorder erupted. A month later, there was a similar disturbance in Burnley, preceded by confrontations between Whites and South Asians over drugs. The police report acknowledges that an injured South Asian taxi driver was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time and it was not a racially motivated attack (D. Waddington 2007). However, rumours that the man had died and the men responsible had been released without charge, promoted tensions. The police helped avoid violent clashes between Whites and South Asians, who instead turned their attention to property damage in each other's' areas of residence.

There were two disturbances in Bradford in 2001. The first was smaller and less serious than the one taking place over the weekend of 7-8 July. This was described
as the worst civil disturbance on mainland Britain for twenty years (Bagguley & Hussain 2008) and was classified as a riot (McGhee 2003). It started after an anti-racist demonstration against a proposed National Front rally, which had already been banned by the Home Office. The context to this was the cancellation by the police of the closing day festivities of the month-long Bradford festival, an annual event designed to promote unity and understanding among the city’s diverse ethnic community (Waddington 2010). It is not entirely clear from the accounts, but some suggest the riots were triggered by racially abusive comments and an attack on a young South Asian man by neo-fascists (Bagguley & Hussain 2008), while others suggest that it may have been the stabbing of a White youth by South Asians, causing South Asian youths to ‘stream’ back to the city centre and ‘mayhem’ to ensue (Bujra & Pearce 2009).

The riots in the Lozells area of Birmingham in 2005 were different by involving conflict between two BME communities. African-Caribbean and South Asian residents were in conflict with each other linked to rumours of a young Black girl being gang-raped by a group of South Asian men in a local beauty parlour (King 2009). Police reported that disorder erupted during a public meeting arranged in a local church and attended by 300-400 people, mainly from the Black community, but some key members of the South Asian community were also present. One account suggests that Asian youths gathered outside the building shouting abuse, while another claims that Black youths armed and wearing masks emerged from the church and side streets and headed towards the local mosque. Two days of rioting followed, involving petrol bombs, machetes and firearms.

1.4 Explanations for Riots

The previous two sections were descriptive in style, outlining key events associated with the 2011 English Riots and other major outbreaks of urban unrest in the three preceding decades - in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s. The current section now turns to the various explanations for these riots. The purpose is to understand what may have changed or remained the same over time, in relation to the manifestation and aetiology of urban unrest and how this has been captured in popular and academic discourses. The various explanations are organised thematically below, followed by some over-arching conclusions about British riots at the end of the section.

1.4.1 Contagion and the mediated crowd

In 2011, events beyond Tottenham were described in the press and by politicians as 'copycat' riots. Politically, this was perhaps intended to disassociate the unrest
with any other kind of explanation that might signal widespread social problems. The 'copy-cat' assertion harks back to nineteenth century views of the 'criminal crowd'. Le Bon ([1895] 2002) describes how the criminal crowd amasses as individuals in spatial proximity experience heightened emotions and are transformed into a type of collective mind. Individuals lose their conscious personality and rational faculties - linked to the perception that the crowd confers anonymity, unaccountability, and cumulative sense of invincibility - and are predisposed to act criminally. Twentieth century crowd theory later rejected the notion of the 'criminal crowd', instead focusing on the social conditions that cause individuals to engage in 'collective behaviour' (McCarthy 1991). Crowds were still thought to amass in spatial proximity, but not pathologically, instead through shared feelings of frustration about social conditions such as inequality, discrimination and deprivation (Miller & Dollard 1941).

Not all locations affected by the 2011 Riots were contiguous and participants did not all share the same geographical space. Baker (2012), however, argues that crowd theory can still be used to help understand what happened through the notion of the 'mediated crowd', whereby emotional contagion is facilitated through social networking, which not only accentuates the speed and scope of crowd membership, but creates 'novel temporal and spatial contexts for mediated crowd membership that operate simultaneous to shared interactions in geographic public space' (Baker 2012, p.46). This theory receives some support from empirical findings, which show that social media was used by Tottenham residents in the immediate aftermath of Duggan's death. Their messages were concerned with the circumstances surrounding the death and evidenced mistrust in the Police and the IPCC (Ball & Brown 2011). Arguably, had the perception of police mishandling developed though other forms of communication, over a longer period and when emotions were less intense, perhaps the protest outside the police station, and ultimately the riots, would not have taken place.

Although Facebook and Twitter were used, it was the Blackberry Messenger (BBM) network that played the more substantive role in the 2011 Riots (Ball & Brown 2011). BBM became the rioters' communication method of choice because Blackberry handsets are owned by many young people, due to them being an affordable smartphone and because they provide a free instant messaging service between Blackberry users. The security of the BBM network was a key advantage. Unlike Facebook and Twitter, messages sent by BBM are private to recipients and encrypted during transmission, a fact which many rioters were aware. This level of security was designed into the phone to meet the needs of its original target group, which was business users, rather than teenagers. It is unlikely that action
could ever be taken to monitor BBM messages, owing to legal protections that all BBM users are entitled to.

Press and television coverage of the disturbances were also reported to have played a role in the contagion. 'It was the visibility of the chaos in Tottenham that led to its spread to Birmingham and elsewhere' (Spalek et al. 2012, p.14). Interviews with young people revealed that the experience of watching events unfold on real time television, showing 'people getting away with it' and the police 'responding in a low key fashion', was a 'nudge' factor for involvement (Morrell et al. 2011, p.36). There is evidence as well for the protective role of mainstream and social media. Young people described the deterrent effect of watching 'scary' television coverage, and some social media messages provided information on locations to keep away from to avoid involvement (ibid). Social media was proactively used by some communities as a tool to discourage rioting in their area. In Sheffield, for example, police, other local organisations and young people used social media to call for calm and dispel myths and rumours. An information sharing campaign between these same partners also meant that provocative posts appearing in the social media could quickly be removed (ibid).

Lord Scarman's inquiry (1981) into the Brixton disorders of 1981 similarly gave credence to the role of ‘media contagion’, blaming coverage of the Brixton disorder in April 1981 for generating riots elsewhere as the summer wore on. Mary Whitehouse led a campaign against the media for its coverage of the riots, managing to secure statements from editors of both the BBC and ITN news, admitting their broadcasts had probably had some copycat effect (Murdock 1984). However, this contrasts with the views of police and rioters, who suggested that rioting was not encouraged by the ‘advertising’ effect of television coverage (Tumbler 1982). This was evidenced by the speed in which some of the incidents flared up, which suggested that young people were not sitting indoors, but were already out on the streets, bored and resentful and waiting to for trouble (p.46).

1.4.2 Criminality

Each government presiding over major social unrest has looked to explanations of law and order. One of the first politicians to publicly respond to the 2011 Riots was local MP David Lammy. Standing before cameras on Tottenham High Road the day after the disturbances began, he described participants as ‘mindless, mindless people’ (cited in Bridges 2012 p.4). This gave the lead to other political leaders, who put the events down to ‘criminality, pure and simple’ (Prime Minister David Cameron), ‘needless and opportunist theft and violence’ (Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg) and the product of ‘a feral underclass’ (Justice Secretary Kenneth Clark)
Tester (2012) argues that the criminalisation of participants was 'commonsensically valid' because the media had immediately referred to the disturbances as 'riots' rather than using more neutral terminology. Clarke's reference to a 'feral underclass' suggests that participants were subhuman and beyond society (Waterton & Sesay 2012). The implication was that they needed no understanding, but simply to be controlled and dealt with (Newburn 2012b). Politicians also used the 'sick' analogy. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, responded to the disturbances by saying 'there are pockets of our society that are not just broken but frankly sick' (cited in Durkin 2012 p.50). This set the unhealthy 'them' against the healthy 'us' (Durkin 2012).

In its initial response, the Government promoted the idea of criminal motives by pointing to gangs as key contributors. Cameron described gangs as 'territorial, hierarchical and incredibly violent, they are mostly composed of young boys, mainly from dysfunctional homes' (cited in Newburn, Taylor and Ferguson 2011). A less emotive and broader definition set out in an influential report by the Centre for Social Justice (2009) suggests that youth gangs have a number of characteristics, including durability, being identifiable to others, associated with a particular territory, being engaged in crime and violence, and often in conflict with other gangs. It is unclear to what extent this definition informed estimates of gang involvement in the 2011 Riots. The Metropolitan Police Service mysteriously claimed that it had defined gang membership through 'some intelligence analysis' about suspects (Newburn, Taylor, et al. 2011). Data on those brought before the courts for riot-related offences classified 13 per cent as gang members (cited in Newburn, Topping, et al., 2011). While some regard this as an overestimation (Newburn, Topping, et al. 2011), others (Harding 2012) suggest it might be an underestimation because gang members are more experienced in avoiding detection. Moreover, it is suggested that that the orchestrated activity of gang members should raise concern because it is likely to have 'brought new entrants into the gravitational pull of the gang' and the gang truce may have generated new opportunities for partnership working across rival gangs. Consequently, the 2011 Riots may mark an 'evolutionary step' in the development of UK street gangs (p.23).

Many other commentators, however, dispute the role of gangs. One expert points out the practical fact that riots detract from the main activity of most gangs, which is selling drugs (cited in Wain, 2012). Moreover, gangs are famously protective of their territory or ‘hoods’ (Durodíé 2012), which does not sit well with accounts of rioters 'trashing' their own neighbourhoods. This is evidenced by reports of gang members protecting an area in East London, known as Poplar, when it was
perceived that the disturbances might spread that way (Morrell et al. 2011). The majority of those who took part in the 2011 Riots, from London to Liverpool and Manchester to Birmingham, denied that gangs had caused or exacerbated the unrest (Newburn, Topping, et al. 2011). Although it is accepted that gang members were involved, and in some cases may have played an important role, there is little indication that they orchestrated what happened. Rather, it seems that individuals stepped out of their gang roles and for the duration of the disturbances and worked together in shared endeavour, fighting side by side against the police (Briggs, 2012).

Previous riots in the 1980s and 2001 were similarly explained as criminality. David Blunkett referred to the 2001 disturbances in England’s northern mill towns as ‘sheer mindless violence – people behaving in a totally anti-social and thuggish fashion’ (cited in Allen 2003, p.23). Norman Tebbit ascribed riots in the 1980s to ‘wickedness’. This caused a correspondent to The Guardian to point out that if this were so, the stock of human wickedness must have risen alarmingly since the election of Mr Tebbit’s Conservative Party to government (Benyon & Solomos 1987). Speaking specifically about the Toxteth riots in 1981, political commentators claimed they were ‘hooliganism on a grand scale’ (Liverpool Liberal Leader, Sir Trevor Jones cited in Cooper 1985, p.61). Yet, the demographic data on those arrested for involvement in these riots evidenced participation from a wide cross-section of people, including a large proportion who did not normally have contact with the police (Cooper 1985). This supported an alternative view that the Toxteth riots were ‘powered by forces enough to promote law-abiding citizens into breaking the law’ (Unsworth 1982, p.65). Reports of mindless violence also ignored events that demonstrated considerable control and selectivity by rioters. For example, during the St Paul’s Riot in Bristol in 1980, rioters were observed directing traffic (Reicher 1984) and defending shops where children slept (Gilroy 1987).

Instead of gangs, explanations of these earlier riots referred to the role of 'agitators', who had set out to cause social disorder on a grand scale. A number of senior police officers claimed the riots in 1981 were planned either by drug dealers or political extremists (Benyon & Solomos 1987; Murdock 1984) and these agitators helped explain the spread of the disturbances across cities as far apart as Sheffield and Southampton. Fingers were pointed at groups on the far left and the far right. In particular, a socialist group called the Militant Tendency was implicated. This provided a reason to debate the potential threat of ‘entryism’ to Parliament (Crick 1986). Entryism was a strategy used by the Militant Tendency to gain political influence by its members joining (i.e. ‘entering’) the Labour Party.
Despite there being little evidence for the 'outside agitator' theory, and the fact that other accounts stressed the local residence of most riot participants (Waddington 1992; Gilroy 1987; Reicher 1984), the Labour Party National Executive Committee decided to expel many leading Militant supporters, prohibit sales of the Militant newspaper at party meetings and prevent the Militant tendency from using all party facilities (Crick 1986). By 1986, forty expulsions had taken place.

Identifying criminality as the main cause of riots can be a way of avoiding explanations. It puts the blame firmly on individuals and takes the actions of the government, the police and other authorities firmly out of the equation. When David Cameron claimed 'this was not political protest or a riot about protest, about politics. It was common or garden thieving, robbing and looting. And we don't need an inquiry to tell us that' (Hansard HC Deb. 2001, col.1051), he dismissed the need for a major public investigation equivalent to the Scarman inquiry into the 1981 Brixton riots. Reports by the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) and the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011a) have been narrowly focused and their findings fairly low key (Newburn, Lewis & Metcalf 2011). The main response to the 2011 Riots was the tracking down, arrest and conviction of offenders, which continued much longer than in previous riots and resulted in far more arrests. Furthermore, those brought before the the Magistrates' and Crown Courts, faced harsh sentencing (Heap & Smithson 2012), which attracted criticism for being disproportionate (Howard League for Penal Reform 2011). Some believe this was to prepare for a decade of worsening social deprivation and concomitantly increasing disorder, sending a clear message that this would not be tolerated (Lea & Hallsworth 2012, p.31).

However, in addition to the public response to riots there is often a 'quiet response', under the public radar so as not to signal that a problem is being addressed. After the 'Tesco riots' in Bristol in April 2011, additional effort was put into improving the area and addressing local concerns, such as those about crime and anti-social behaviour and this was reported to have played a role in preventing rioting later in the year. Multi-agency partnerships involving residents had provided opportunities for people to voice their frustrations and improvements to the area meant that people could see things were getting done (Clifton 2012b). In the aftermath of the 2011 Riots, the Government announced funding totalling £8 million to be spend in riot-affected cities (May 2011). Although this was communicated as a way of tackling a 'gang, guns and knives problem', agencies receiving funding were likely to have some flexibility in interpreting this aim locally. A more punitive response, also to address gangs, has been the national
roll-out of gang injunctions, or 'gangbos'. Heap and Smithson (2012) observe that this policy marks a shift back towards conduct regulation associated with the previous government, and runs counter to the Home Secretary's earlier statements about a commitment to localism and reducing 'top down' Whitehall driven national initiatives.

1.4.3 The Role of Looting

There was a heavy focus on looting in the media reporting of the 2011 Riots (e.g. BBC 2011b; Williams 2011; Greenslade 2011), leading to the label the 'consumer riots'. Around 2,500 shops and businesses were looted, which was estimated by insurance claims to have cost the London economy alone in the region of three hundred million pounds (Topping & Bawdon 2011). A single looter reported stealing goods worth £7,000 (Treadwell et al. 2012). Looting during riots is not unusual, 'but crowds moving from shopping centre to shopping centre? Actively trying to avoid a confrontation with police, trying to get in and out of JD Sports before the 'feds' arrive? That bit is new' (Williams 2011). Some observers reported that people were trying things on amidst the looting, suggesting an atmosphere of shopping (Williams 2011), rather than reckless 'snatch and grab'. Primarily, people were targeting luxury goods, including designer clothing, plasma televisions, phones and jewellery, but there were also some reports of people looting essential items such as rice, pasta and babies nappies (Topping & Bawdon 2011).

As discussed above, looting was viewed by some as evidence that rioters were common criminals. Overlapping, but providing some contrast with this view, another dominant approach drew on theories of consumerism to argue that the manifestation of looting in the 2011 was a product of overwhelming consumerism. Beyond the 'initial micro-political protest' against police misconduct in Tottenham, people participated because they saw it as an unprecedented opportunity to grab something for free (Treadwell et al. 2012, p.1). Tester (2012) argues that '[t]he events were not an uprising on the part of the urban dispossessed deliberately and consciously breaking into the spheres of neoliberal success in order to destroy it'. Police were only attacked because they got in the way of the shopping experience, or more analytically, because they are the 'symbolic gatekeepers keeping urban youth out of the glittering world of electronic goods, fashion and chemical oblivion into which they seek to roam' (ibid p.5). The ubiquity of the consumerist motivation was revealed by the fact, after selling the looted goods, rioters returned with the proceeds to the very stores they had targeted to buy legitimate goods (Treadwell et al. 2012). Thus, 'rather than signalling any breakdown of society of pathology on the part of the rioters, the events of 2011 represented
conformity to the underlying values of consumer culture, and showed how far the
diktats of that culture have been internalised by the participants' (Moxon 2011,
p.1).

Despite the obvious economic marginalisation of the rioters, their behaviour
showed how well they were incorporated into the competitive individualist culture
that had evolved under neoliberalism (Treadwell et al. 2012). An ethnographic
study in Birmingham (Treadwell et al. 2012) was able to capture the views of
rioters directly. At the outset of interviews, some claimed their involvement was
about exacting revenge upon the police for the death of Mark Duggan, but when
challenged on this in the context of how much they had looted, the importance of
this motive receded. Some were not even sure what had happened in London;
whether Duggan had been shot or stabbed. Additionally, they did not begrudge
the super-rich their success and nor were they outraged by recent economic
failures. These aspects of life 'simply confirm what they already know: the world is
a lonely place in which only the self can be relied upon, and the only way to relieve
forms of subjective torture and lack is to join the exploiter class and enrich the self
as quickly as possible' (p.11). However, other observations of rioting in
Birmingham told a different story (Davies 2012, p.16), suggesting that rioters' 'only
aim was to goad the police, challenging them vocally, attempting to provoke the
police to charge', at which point they would run through side streets to escape,
before returning to repeat the exercise till late into the night. Either this was an
attempt to draw police away from shops for the purpose of looting or there were
other factors at play, at least for some groups.

Those who claimed the 2011 Riots were devoid of politics and protest, blamed a
'weak and ineffectual left', which had failed to reinvent and reinvigorate itself in
the face of a deep economic crisis (Younge 2011). In previous eras, the
marginalised would have found collective support 'in the broad left's various, yet
closely allied and symbolically efficient' political groups, but in the 'post-political
present' there was nothing at hand to provide a means of grasping the reality of
common stresses and dissatisfactions (Treadwell et al. 2012, pp.2–3). Unable to
either succeed as individuals, linked to relative poverty and social injustice, or
articulate and address their situation as a collective, due to a weakened left,
destined only to fail while the mass media incessantly promotes 'the magical
success of consumer capitalism's winners', 'these young people had nowhere to
take their anger and resentment but the shops' (ibid p.2). These were the acts of
'defective and disqualified consumers' (Bridges 2012; Clarke 2012; Lea &
Hallsworth 2012). Others concede that the disturbances were political on some
level. Rioters were saying 'you call on use to consume while simultaneously
depriving us of the means to do it properly - so here we are doing it the only way we can!' (Žižek 2011, p.3). Lea and Hallsworth (2012) regard this generalised rage, without a vision of an alternative, as a reason the 2011 Riots should be viewed more seriously than any before. Thus, if nothing else is to come of the riots, Bridges (2012, p.11) hopes they serve as ‘a wake-up call for those on the Left to once again address the grievances and concerns of the disenfranchised and the disinherited’.

The consumerist thesis is built around the scale and nature of reported looting, but with little critique of this information. Based on The Guardian (2011b) database of riot incidents (collated from a range of media sources including news reports, blogs and twitter) it has been possible to categorisation of them – according to whether reported incidents were primarily about looting, criminal damage, conflict (with the police), or general disorder. This is a crude analysis, but, nonetheless provides some indication that looting may not have been as prevalent as some accounts suggest. The data indicates that two-thirds of riot incidents had little or nothing to do with looting (Figure 1.1), and, in some local authority areas, looting accounted for less than a tenth of what occurred (Figure 1.2). These findings undermine the explanatory power of personal greed and perhaps offer some support for claims that many rioters were more intent on ‘sticking it to the police’. There is also the fact that, in Nottingham, five police stations were attacked (Clifton 2011), which does not fit easily with the consumerist thesis.

**Figure 1.1: 2011 Riot events by type**

![Diagram showing 2011 Riot events by type](image)

Data source: The Guardian (2011b)
Consideration might be given to what else looting might represent, if not merely criminal acquisition. Ginty (2004) suggests ‘looting’ is a negative label used by the powerful, but conflates a wide range of activities that differ greatly in terms of organisation, scale and the object of looting. To counter the indiscriminate use of the term, Ginty proposes a four-fold typology, which establishes that in addition to economic motives, looting can be symbolic, strategic, or selective. Symbolic looting includes the taking of goods as trophies, fitting with some accounts that looting in 2011 was used as a means to acquire street reputation, especially by gang members, and this took primacy over material value (Harding 2012). Looting can also send a message about changing power relations, demonstrating a lack of consent for existing authority. This aligns with Angel’s (2012) view that riots are inherently political events because they both provoke and are a product of what Habermas (1975) describes as a ‘legitimation crisis’ the state, linked to the state’s attempts to maintain profitability in a capitalist-based economy. This is supported by survey data which show that perceived ‘looting’ of state resources by those at the top draws a significant minority of people toward a moral stance that makes them potentially available for participation in acts of mass illegality (Birch & Allen 2012). Thus, 'what some have unhelpfully labelled a 'feral underclass' is simply the mirror image of the now 'feral elite' (Neal Lawson, cited in Bauman 2012 p.12). People interviewed for the Reading the Riots study also referred to anger at the financial sector as a motivation for their participation (Newburn, Lewis, Addley, et al. 2011).
Collins (2008) has previously referred to the strategic role of looting, which can act as a 'mass recruiter and momentum sustainer', without which the riot would come to an end once the police chose to withdraw. From a Durkeimian perspective, looting is a 'symbolic expression of membership' (McDonald, 2012). Solidarity and integration was suggested by the way in which the 2011 rioters worked together (Tester 2012). Participants stood in the way of cameras, presumably to avoid fellow looters being identified (McDonald 2012). Looters taking goods from other looters was reported, but this was rare, and violence was generally targeted at non-participants. Selective looting, often a feature of communal rioting, is where properties or whole areas are looted in a manner suggesting target discrimination. For example, in the 1992 Los Angeles riot, property damage for Koreans was high (Min, 1996 p.90) because it was targeted by African Americans due to inter-ethnic tensions. Similarly, rioters' targeting of designer clothing and electrical stores in 2011 may not have been economically motivated. An alternative explanation, voiced by looters themselves, is that these stores were targeted because they were perceived to be the most exploitative and responsible for putting local shops out of business (Briggs 2012b).

Ginty (2004) has identified four variables that must come together for looting to occur:

1. availability of potential looters
2. availability of lootable goods
3. absence of restraint
4. permissible socio-cultural environment

These factors focus on the circumstances in which looting takes place, over the characteristics or motivations of offenders, which is how the ‘routine activity approach’ seeks to explain crime (see Cohen and Felson, 1979). The second variable spotlights the importance of place, suggesting that looting is more likely to occur where lootable goods are more easily available, such as commercial areas; and may explain the greater prevalence of looting in some places compared to others. Quantitative research in the U.S. has shown that where there has been no pre-arrangement or planned event, people tend to gather at symbolic locations, such as a well-known public building or major road intersection (Haddock and Polsby, 1994). Arguably, a shopping centre is a ‘symbolic location’ for young people living in contemporary urban Britain. Shopping centres are where young people meet to ‘hang out’ with their friends. Hence, it is understandable that young people living in Birmingham should head to the Bull Ring, where disorder
occurred in 2011. The manifestation of looting here is perhaps unsurprising given the proximity of loitable goods, but it does not confirm that participants gathered with prior intention to loot.

A number of commentators (Bauman 2012; P A J Waddington 2012a; Morrell et al. 2011; Stenson 2012) have also referred to the fun factor of looting and rioting more generally. Some of the scenes from the 2011 Riots have been described as carnivalesque (P A J Waddington 2012a). Of the participants who have since been interviewed, a proportion offered no motivation for their involvement other than 'the buzz of doing things they couldn't or wouldn't normally do such as smashing things and being chased by the police' (Morrell et al. 2011, p.27). The inconvenient truth is that disorder and rioting are fun (Rock 1981). The motivation of having 'something exciting to do' is likely linked to the everyday boredom experienced by some groups of young people with little else to do, due to high youth unemployment and a lack of quality youth provision. In other instances, the same motive was reported by young people otherwise engaged in work or education, with events being described in terms of a wild party, or as one young person put it 'like a rave' (Morrell et al. 2011). However, the fun factor has also been linked by some commentators to consumerism. They argue that, as capitalism advances and capitalists realise the limits to what can physically be accumulated, they turn to the provision of ephemeral services in consumption, including entertainment experiences, such as visits to the museum, theatre, cinema, gyms, and even shopping itself (Harvey 1989). Consequently, we have now become a society of 'sensation gatherers' (Bauman 1997). Moxon (2011) suggests that 'the nihilistic moment begins to bear some resemblance to the acquisitive moment' and this can help explain some of the thrill experienced by the 2011 rioters. Those involved in looting were able to acquire consumer goods, conferring identity and status (as demanded by consumer culture), with the added excitement linked to the illicit nature of this acquisition; 'this was a theme park with no entrance fee' (ibid).

As well as the sheer fun associated with the experience of rioting, was the euphoric feeling of seizing power (Stenson 2012; Briggs 2012b). This may not have been a motivation for getting involved in the first instance, but perhaps for sustaining involvement. Young people reported how good it felt to have deprived the police of their usual power. One young woman interviewed for the Reading the Riots study said 'people was just passing fags from the counters... You know what? For once it felt like you had so much power' (cited in Lewis 2011). Others spoke triumphantly about having the police 'under manners for once' (ibid). The social disorder had empowered some people to take on other forms of authority besides the police, even beyond the period of the riots. A dimension that has been
relatively neglected in accounts of the riots is the issue of how far urban unrest is liked to exclusion from political institutions (Solomos 2011). Research in the U.S. has highlighted a strong relationship between collective violence and exclusion from politics and positions of power. This was implicit in the views of people in riot-affected communities. For example, they claimed that local young people had participated in the riots because 'they just want to be heard...This is the only way some people have to communicate' (cited in Addley 2011). This highlights the need to consider the most recent outbreaks in the context of political power relations because little has been documented about the political cultures and local leadership in towns and cities where the riots took place (Solomos 2011).

1.4.4 Deprivation and social exclusion

Almost all academics writing about the 2011 Riots refer to socio-economic factors as critical context. Occurring not long after the global financial crisis of 2008-09, considered to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, commentators refer to the role of unemployment and austerity measures, which had been a consequence. Milburn (2012) argues that the 'hysterical campaign' demonising participants, reinforced by the ‘endless looping footage of shops set alight’, was launched by political and media elites to avoid the unrest becoming linked to 'the context of crisis and austerity from which they emerged' (p.402). Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis, demonstrating that previous social unrest has been invariably linked to recession (Ponticelli & Voth 2009; Gurr 1970).

However, in the majority of cases the unrest was not a reaction to the felt effects of governmental austerity, but rather to the anticipation of them (Ponticelli & Voth 2009). This is fitting for the 2011 Riots, which occurred at a time when the full weight of proposed spending cuts had not yet hit. Ted Gurr’s seminal book Why Men Rebel (1970) suggests that social unrest is most likely to occur during an economic downturn following a sustained period of growth, because this produces a pronounced discrepancy between expectations and reality, when people have come to expect prosperity as a matter of routine. Thus, it is relative rather than absolute poverty that drives discontent.

Taylor-Gooby (2013) argues that 'it is not so much the fact of cut-backs in social spending as the groups affected and the detail of the restructuring of the welfare state' that affects social order (p.12). Many scholars have argued that state welfare contributes to legitimacy, which is the extent to which citizens accept the authority of the government, and is central to the orderly operation of democracies (Weber 1964). Marxism identifies 'two basic and often mutually contradictory functions' for state welfare in capitalist societies: accumulation and legitimation (O’Connor
1973, p.9). Welfare provision helps to expand capital by ensuring a healthy, skilled, adequately housed workforce; and indirectly supports capital by addressing workforce needs not met by the market and by helping to secure acceptance of the existing social order as fair. Based on a longitudinal quantitative study covering 26 countries, Taylor-Gooby (2013) concludes that welfare cuts that hit the poorest groups hardest, and welfare restructuring that promotes a greater role for the private sector and a smaller role for the public sector, are most likely to undermine legitimacy, and in doing so are the most likely to promote social unrest. The Liberal Democrat / Conservative coalition government set out to achieve cut-backs by doing both these things. Findings in relation to the increased work-centredness of welfare reforms are more equivocal, and the Coalition policies in this particular area may not undermine legitimacy and social order except where vulnerable groups are denied adequate benefits at a time of high unemployment.

In 2011, those most affected by the recession and government retrenchment were young people, perhaps explaining why the majority of convicted rioters were aged under 20. Youth employment had reached record levels and, linked to public spending cuts, youth provision had reduced, leaving young people in disturbance-affected areas with less to do than in previous years. The Government’s removal of a £110 million in grant to the City of Manchester had led to services such as the Manchester Youth Service being axed (Wain & Joyce 2012). Haringey had cut its children and young people’s services by 62 per cent (Higgs 2011). Eight of 13 youth clubs had closed down, closing with them the opportunity of positive activity away from the streets and away from gang culture (McVeigh 2011). When young people have nothing more to lose, it is unsurprising that the social norms restraining people – such as fear of a criminal record, community exclusion and time in jail - become less of a deterrent (Waterton & Sesay 2012). Rioters interviewed as part of the Reading the Riots study, invariably talked about a pervasive sense of injustice, with younger interviewees particularly likely to mention lack of opportunities, the cuts, and the ending of the Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) (Newburn, Lewis, Addlley, et al. 2011).

Lord Scarman (1981) reported that a significant cause of the disorder for the riots in the 1980s was unemployment and social disadvantage. Social statistics provided evidence of dramatically high unemployment in all riot-affected areas. In early 1981, unemployment in the Brixton area was 13 per cent, rising to 25 per cent for ethnic minorities, and 55 per cent for Black males under 19 years (ibid). A study in the Birmingham area asked people why the riots happened, and 43 per cent of the sample identified unemployment as a major cause; the next two most popular choices were ‘copying other areas’ (23%) and boredom (22%) (Benyon 1984).
Thatcher, however, never conceded the role of employment. She referred to the involvement of school-age children in the disturbances as evidence that 'it has nothing whatever to do with the dole queue' (cited in Unsworth 1982, p.78). Thatcher blamed parents for the criminal behaviour of their children and suggested that this be dealt with in the form of parental fines. Conversely, others argued that the involvement of children was more likely due to their awareness of the prospect of unemployment or and the experience of their parents worklessness (Unsworth 1982).

Accounts of disturbances in the 1990s and the 2000s similarly referred to poverty, relative deprivation, social isolation and high levels of youth unemployment. Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, areas affected by large-scale disorders in 2001, had been built on the textile industry, but capitalism’s preference for the cheapest labour had decimated their local economies as soon as it became possible to source labour more easily abroad (D. Waddington 2007). Thus, these once low-paid local economies were transformed into severely impoverished communities, which were among the 20 most deprived areas in the UK. Consequently, in these areas...

...events did not come out of nowhere. They were the result of tensions that have been brewing for years and whose sources are not mysterious. The first is poverty. As in every other recent British riot, the trouble erupted in a place of desperate economic hardship. Youth unemployment in Oldham is 40%. That does not justify the behaviour of those young men ... but it helps explain their anger, frustration and the sense they had nothing to lose. (The Guardian 2001)

Power and Tunstall (1997) suggest that the locations affected by the of 1991-92 disturbances were characterised by ‘a dangerous combination of large numbers of out-of-work young males with no status or stake in society, living in low-income, work-poor households, ... suffering from a high social stigma’ (p.ix). These socio-economic conditions had contributed to a crisis of masculinity, which was the backdrop to the disturbances (Campbell 1993). Unemployment on some of the housing estates where violence occurred was three times as high as the local authority average and more than twice as high as other areas comprising social housing (Power & Tunstall 1997). This had undermined the ability of men on these estates to constitute themselves as men via legal routes and they were forced to express their masculinity instead through crime. For example, joyriding, which played a role in a number of the disturbances of the early 1990s, can be viewed as
‘hyper-masculinity’, which was detrimental not only to men’s relationship with law and order, but also women and their communities (Campbell 1993).

By the spring of 1990, joyriding performances in Blackbird Leys had become ritualised, but for more than a year, the police did not respond. According to one driver, known as ‘The Don’, the police ‘let it mature nicely... they were taking no notice’ (cited p.256-7). Eventually the drivers’ taunts and public pressure produced a police presence, which intensified excitement and by 1991 the displays were being designed not only for the drivers’ fans, but for the police as well. Joyriders used radio scanners to keep one step ahead of the police and because their behaviour was about being in control, they were keen to demonstrate their ability both to draw the police and not get caught. After the riots, senior police officers acknowledged the problem had been ‘a macho status-seeking thing’, but ‘gender palpably was not addressed as a problem' (p.267). Instead, officers at the time had argued that parents needed to take ownership of the problem. This contradicted Home Office research (Webb & Laycock 1992), which showed that it was peer culture and economics that kept offenders in car crime. Few joyriders would have been affected by parental influence.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s ‘problem families’ and poor parenting were being blamed for a range for societal ills. Charles Murray’s ruminations on the British underclass, published in the Sunday Times in 1989, referred to the ‘failure to work’ to explain high unemployment. Murray also focused on the undermining effect of illegitimacy. He claimed that ‘communities need families. Communities need fathers’ (cited in Campbell 1993, p.309). Murray’s prejudice was such that he never referred to the strength of mothers coping without men, who presumably were being evicted or allowed to abscond (by women) (Campbell 1993). Contrasting with this view, ‘neither manners nor mothers’ were to blame for the disturbances in the early 1990s, but rather the different ways in which men and women on 'Britain’s forgotten estates' dealt with the challenges of poverty and unemployment. While women had babies, made and organised and created community politics, men, deprived of work and wages – their one guarantee of power and privilege – spun into an identity crisis. This was not because they were starved of male role models, as suggested by Murray, but because they were saturated with them. The political system ‘did not know how to support the women and it did not know how to challenge the men’, and it is this ‘crisis of empathy’ that made the politicians ultimately culpable for the disorder and violence that took place (p.253).
In summary, the context of deprivation makes urban unrest more likely, especially when it falls unevenly. The worst-affected groups may feel abandoned by those who have the power to do something about it. However, deprivation is not the whole story. Some communities may have the strength to resist the damaging effects of poverty and unemployment. Other communities, though, may require support from the state and other local agencies and it is perhaps their second abandonment that is most dangerous.

1.4.5 Over-Policing

A number of accounts of the 2011 Riots refer to the role of the police. In some cases, poor experiences of community policing was seen as the longer-term context to disorder. Those interviewed for the Reading the Riots study claimed their participation in the disturbances was to seek retribution for police abuse of power in their communities (Prasad 2011). The Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) also highlighted frustration with the police as a causal factor. There was a prevalent view among rioters that ‘the police is the biggest gang out there’ and the shooting of Mark Duggan confirmed this (Prasad 2011). Rioters raised particular concerns about stop and search. Of those brought before the courts for riot-related offences, 78 per cent of males and 43 per of females had been stopped and searched in the previous 12 months (Topping et al. 2011). It was not just the quantity of stop and searches that was an issue, but the manner in which they were carried out. Being treated unfairly and without respect had generated grievance and anger (Reicher & Stott 2011). In Salford, antagonistic community policing was also a predisposing factor. This was associated with local strategies to 'cleanse' areas that had been gentrified under the guise of 'regeneration' (Jeffery & Jackson 2012, p.20).

Anger at the police linked to repressive tactics and styles of policing were similarly identified as in relation to previous riots. In the months preceding the unrest, the 'Swamp 81' operation accounted for more than 1,000 stop and searches and 100 arrests through the heavy use of the 'sus law' (Bunyan 1985), which allowed police to arrest members of the public for merely acting suspiciously. The operation aimed to ‘flood’ the Lambeth area with police to detect and arrest burglars and robbers, but only apprehended a small number of people on minor offences (Lea & Young 1982). 'The 'Swamp 81' operation served as 'a tailor-made example of how to antagonise the greatest possible number of people while at the same time achieving the minimum efficiency' (ibid, p.11). Those commenting on the Moss Side (Hytner 1981) and Toxteth Riots (Cooper 1985) also referred to a ‘deep seated hostility’ against the police. This was felt primarily by young people, who were
personally affected by stop and search, but police relations with the wider adult community were affected because in many cases they were the friends and relatives of young people. Loney (1986) has described the Broadwater Farm riot in 1985 as entirely a response to the police, which explains why officers were the ‘virtual exclusive target for the rioters’ and there was little looting or damage to property (p.82). Bernie Grant, the Leader of the Labour-controlled Haringey Council, remarked in the aftermath of the Broadwater Farm riot that ‘the youths around here believe the police were to blame for what happened on Sunday and what they got was a bloody good hiding’ (cited in BBC 2000).

Mervyn Jones and Winkler (1982) comment on the irony of reactive and coercive styles of policing in the 1980s, given the emphasis and open commitment by senior officers to 'bobbies on the beat' as the backbone of the police service. They explained as a discrepancy between police policy and practice, associated with how community policing was resourced and perceived by officers. These authors concluded that beat policing was both undermanned and undervalued. In particular, perverse incentives were undermining community relations. The informal route to promotion was gained through an impressive record of summons reports and arrest, which distracted attention away peace-keeping, community relations and other key elements of balanced beat policing. Thus, street patrol was often used as a punishment and officers who displayed dedication to the beat patrolling were viewed with deep suspicion within the organisation.

1.4.6 Under-Policing

Poor police-community relations were seen to have a role in the disturbances of the 1990s and the 2000s, but largely due to under-policing rather than coercive policing. In the years preceding the widespread disturbances in 1991-2, police had retreated from disadvantaged housing estates on the periphery of urban districts because crime was rife and they were considered too difficult to deal with (Campbell 1993). In the year before the riot, Meadowell in Northumbria had the highest crime rate in the country and ‘it was not unusual to have a ram-raiding night’ (Chief Inspector Waddington, cited in Campbell 1993, p.52). When the police suddenly began to increase their efforts, fortuitously averting a ram-raiding operation, the criminal fraternity, which had been given space to develop militaristic networks and systems, fought back. Individual officers were targeted. They were followed home, and their houses and cars were attacked. The death of the two young drivers in a police pursuit was but the final ‘call to arms’. The riot was but ‘an explosion at the climax of an ongoing process of loss of control over
certain individuals and groups by established authority’ (Power & Tunstall 1997, p.16).

The disturbances of the early 1990s have been described as an example par excellence of ‘too little policing followed by too much policing’ (Campbell 1993, p.45). The withdrawal of policing from these housing estates not only conceded ground to criminal fraternities, but left other residents, unsupported and unprotected, and less willing to share information with the police, when they later needed it. Campbell (1993) has described how groups of diligent women in these besieged estates across the country were working hard to ‘create community’, organising informal networks to sustain social integrity and make life liveable (p.50). But, rather than supporting them, the police and the local authority, abandoned these women to deal with men’s dangerousness on their own. The women's Meadowell Action Group tried to intervene against ‘neighbourhood terrorism’ by offering young people the use of their building, but the boys and young men refused to share space. Consequently, they began to regularly attack the building, stealing everything stored there, and to regularly harass the women. The police, nor any other agency stopped them and ‘that was why, despite the scale and stamina of community politics in Meadowell, it could not become hegemonic. That was why there was nothing to stop the riot’ (p.245). A lack of resistance to the young men’s misbehaviour, or punishment, ‘gave them permission to riot, and then represent the riot as the community’s dissent’ (p.244).

The situation was similar on the Scotswood estate, in Newcastle, where the criminal fraternity felt so unthreatened by the police that they positioned a sign outside their regular pub, announcing their intention to riot and their targets, which were local women activists, regarded as ‘grassers’ for reporting burglaries and their efforts in the community. Paradoxically, these women were scapegoated for the loss of respectability on their estates, despite doing exactly what Prime Minister, John Major, later asked them to do when he called for ‘the public to have a crusade against crime’ (cited in Campbell 1993, p.113). During this period, racist attacks had become a matter of public record, but attacks on women were largely ignored by the police and other public agencies. When the neighbouring Elswick estate was threatened with disorder, not long before, the Racial Equality Council mobilised the police to protect the symbolic sites of its South Asian residents. This proactive strategy was successful in preventing disorder. However, the lesson was not transferred to Scotswood. When the disorder erupted, the police stayed away long enough for the rioters to attack and destroy the post office, a symbolic place for local women. It was where they collected their benefits to support their
families; where they sent letters and bought birthday cards; and was also the community’s main ‘conduit to the big wide world’ (p.86).

Under-policing can also account for the aggression of ethnic minorities towards the police in a number of disturbances across the three earlier decades. The disturbances in Southall in 1981, Sheffield in 1994 and the disturbances of the northern mill towns in 2001 all began with some form of inter-ethnic conflict between South Asians and Whites. Conflict developed as a defensive response by South Asian men to racist threats against their communities. The police were not providing adequate protection, and, in some cases even ignoring requests for protection, so the South Asian community, traditionally seen as ‘passive’ became ‘aggressive’ actors against racism (Goodey 2001). South Asian violence has tended to shift towards the police when they are perceived to be siding with or protecting White racists. Referring to the disturbances of the 1980s, Unsworth (1982) suggests that South Asian and Black communities had different grounds for allegations of police racism. The principal complaint of the Black community was police harassment and abuse on the streets through the use of local powers of stop and search and the ‘sus’ offence. For South Asians, police racism manifested in their resistance to accept or investigate racial motivation behind violence against them.

Events in the run up to the Oldham disturbances in 2001 demonstrate how under-policing can contribute to unrest. The 2001 football season coincided with rising racial tensions in Oldham, which some football hooligans were looking to exploit. These tensions were linked to recent media coverage of an attack by South Asian youths on a White war veteran; the announcement by the leader of the BNP that he was going to stand for the Oldham West constituency in the forthcoming general election; and the announcement of a National Front March through the town (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). Expecting trouble after the football match between Stoke City and Oldham Athletic, the South Asian community asked the police to re-direct fans from their area. Police ignored this request for help (ibid). Consequently, South Asian men gathered to defend their own community, and this led to a large-scale confrontation with racist fans. The police managed to drive back the Whites and then attempted to disperse the South Asians, but it appeared that the police were taking the hooligans’ side. Eventually, the South Asian men had to be dispersed using truncheons and dogs. The main disturbances, taking place a few weeks later, characterised by extensive South Asian violence against the police, were undoubtedly affected by these events.
1.4.7 Public Order Policing

In addition to the context of poor-police relations, police public order tactics are also viewed as problematic in relation to the 2011 Riots (Wain & Joyce 2012). A perception that the police could not contain the scale of the rioting is thought to have been a key trigger for the spread of disorder; because people felt they 'would be able to loot and damage without being challenged by the police' (Riots Communities and Victims Panel 2011). Durodié (2012) additionally spotlights organisational issues. He argues that the 2011 Riots were only able to take place on the scale they did because the police were a weak and disorganised institution following a period of transformation. This meant the police were currently more concerned with risk management and health and safety issues than robust policing. Consequently, this encouraged 'mindless teenagers, who numbered never more than a few hundred in any one instance, to come and have a go' (p.5). The Reading the Riots research provided some evidence for this theory, suggesting that young people participating in the disorders felt powerful over the police and this spurred them on. One reason put forward for why the disturbances came to end was fear due to the swell in officer numbers on the street, giving the impression that the police had decided to take firm action (Taylor et al. 2011).

The increase in police numbers, however, was only possible through the use of mutual aid, which involved the loan of officers from one force to another. Otherwise, the Metropolitan Police Service felt unprepared for the scale of the unrest (Newburn & Prasad 2012). Officers dealing with the violence first-hand across localities reported being untrained, overwhelmed and afraid (ibid). Nevertheless, many officers believed they averted unrest on a larger scale, which meant it only lasted four days instead of several months. Yet, there are commentators who believe the MPS might have dealt with things better. Angel (2012) suggests that a crisis of leadership and consequent confusion at senior levels of the MPS contributed to two critical errors, which were instrumental in transforming a peaceful community protest outside Tottenham police station into a riot. These errors include an inability to locate a senior police officer to answer the protester's questions; and the decision, if any decision was made, to 'back off' when social disorder first erupted. At the time of the riots, police morale was at a low ebb due to job insecurity and recent controversies, such as the phone hacking scandal and the Tomlinson case, in which heavy-handed police tactic during the G20 protests had led to the death of Ian Tomlinson (e.g. HMIC 2009a). These things may be responsible for undermining the resolve of officers on duty in Tottenham and, consequently, the impression soon spread that the police were
either unwilling or unable to intervene, and this may have contributed to the spread of the unrest (Angel 2012).

A report by the HMIC (2011) has since proposed that a new framework for resolving public disorder should include the rules of engagement for weaponry such as water cannons, CS gas, and plastic bullets. This echoes the response of Thatcher's government, following the riots in the eighties. The Home Affairs Committee, however, concluded that these would have been an inappropriate as well as a dangerous response to events in 2011 (Home Affairs Committee 2011b). It is argued that however well-equipped the police force, society would be impossible to regulate without its consent (Jackson et al., 2012; Klein, 2012). People are more likely to obey the law and cooperate with the police where there is moral alignment between the people, the law and enforcement agencies (Jackson et al., 2012; Tyler & Fagan, 2006). In the words of one chief constable following the 1981 disturbances, the way forward for policing disaffected communities is 'to talk hearts and minds, not CS gas and plastic bullets' (Alderson 1981, cited in Wain and Joyce 2012 p.133).

'Provocative' policing during the Bradford disturbances using tactics of 'contain and disperse' (also known as 'kettling') were reported to have escalated disorder (Burja & Pearce 2011). Conversely, during 2011 some areas were reported to have avoided disorder specifically because the police avoided heavy-handed approaches. In Bristol, the police had gained experience during the 'Tesco riots' earlier the same year, and were 'very firm but very even-handed'. Police called on people to 'calm down' and this was reported to have a relaxing effect on an otherwise tense crowd (Clifton 2012b). In Chapeltown, an area of Leeds that had previously experienced riots, major unrest was averted by the decision of West Yorkshire police to allow community workers to conduct urgent outreach work to dissuade potential rioters (Clifton 2012a). The founder of the Chapeltown young people's club, much respected by young people in the area, recalls:

*They were going to input the full force of West Yorkshire police on Chapeltown that night. ... But me and Lutel asked them whether we could have one hour to go down and quell the situation. An officer made a very brave decision to hold back the police: on our wishes, she gave us the chance to go into Chapeltown and speak to these young people.* (cited in Clifton, 2012b)

Consequently, although there were some isolated outbreaks of violence in Chapeltown, due to the commitment of community workers and the willingness of
the police to listen and defer to local knowledge and expertise, the situation was contained.

Durodié (2012) claims that what was exposed by the 2011 Riots was a crisis of authority across society, and authorities needed to work out how to inspire their citizens to be part of and engage with their own society. Empirical evidence from the Reading the Riots research supports this, reporting that a major brake on the disturbances was the ‘call for peace’ from the father of one of the men killed in Birmingham, as opposed to heavy-handed police tactics. Several rioters commented how the father’s public speech made them feel sad and remorseful, and this directly informed their decision to exit from the disturbances (Taylor et al. 2011). Parental pressure and concerns about bringing shame on their families were also found to be key factors inhibiting young people’s involvement in the 2011 riots (Morrell et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011). Thus, demonstrating that even the most challenged communities have the ability to self-regulate; and perhaps suggesting a role for policing partners as ‘facilitators... rather than creators' of social order (Innes & Roberts 2008).

1.4.8 Race and Ethnicity

The typical participant in the 2011 English Riots was young, male, Black and unemployed, based on individuals appearing in court charged with riot offences (Ministry of Justice 2012). Over half belonged to a Black or Minority Ethnic (BME) group (59%), although Whites represented the largest single ethnic group (41%), followed closely by Blacks (39%). This clearly shows an over-representation of BME citizens and especially Black citizens and confirmed for some commentators that these were 'race riots'. However, academics (Lea & Hallsworth, 2012; Murji & Neal, 2011; Muir & Adegoke, 2012) later downplayed the role of race. Murji and Neal (2011) suggest they were less straightforwardly about race because of the high involvement of young White men and because they occurred in unracialised or only selectively racialised geographies (such as Gloucester, Enfield, Ealing). Although there was the fact that Far Right groups turned up to complicate the situation in Liverpool, Eltham and Enfield, declaring intentions to protect their areas from 'Blacks'. There were also some skirmishes between Black and South Asian residents in Birmingham, but otherwise inter-ethnic conflict was rare (Muir & Adegoke, 2012). It is argued that the over-representation of BME groups was less to do with race itself, but rather due to a range of other factors, such as deprivation, class, and geography, which tend to correlate with ethnicity in Britain (ibid). It is these other factors that underpinned people's sense of exclusion and made them more likely to riot (Wain & Joyce 2012; Lagrange 2012).
Race is 'an overriding theme that runs like a thread through most of the riots in post-war Britain' (Newburn, Lewis & Metcalf 2011). In the 1950s, social disorders in Nottingham and Notting Hill were described as 'race riots' linked to a history of conflict between Whites and recently arrived Blacks. In more recent times, the closest parallel to these were the 2001 disturbances, where there was significant conflict between White and local Asian youths. By contrast, the major disturbances of the early 1980s - in London, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool - coalesced around conflict with the police, but some commentators argued that race was still at the heart of the grievances (ibid). It was widely reported that rioters in the 1980s were mainly Blacks, but others (Keith 1993) have pointed out that of those arrested for riot-related offences in London in 1981, the largest single group (a third) was White; and in Toxteth, as many as 60 per cent were White (based on *The Guardian* estimates, cited in Unsworth 1982, p.69). Blacks and Whites fought side by side against the police because their experiences were increasingly shared (Bunyan 1981). The involvement of Whites was explained by the dislocation of traditional working-class communities in the course of industrial decline and the powerlessness and relative material and cultural impoverishment they have since endured (Unsworth 1982). Black youth had experienced years of police harassment and now the young (and not so young) poor White were suffering from the same aggressive policing; thus, adding a class dimension (Bunyan 1981). A youth worker reflected this in his comments:

*I can understand, as a black man who grew up with racism, how a lot of White working-class people feel today...These Politicians have no interest in the White man in Salford or the black man in Brixton.* (cited in Newburn, Lewis & Metcalf 2011)

There was a 'conspicuous absence' of South Asians in the 2011 disturbances. Lagrange (2012) suggests this was because the propensity to riot is linked to the prospects of an entire group. Apart from a few exceptional cases, young men of South Asian origin were more frequently targets than perpetrators of violence in 2011, typically as they defended their shops. Lagrange claims that South Asian shops were not looted by random. Rather they were targeted due to a politics of envy, which was directed at a group that had managed to acquire property and build businesses within a wider community that had nothing. Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants also had slightly better school achievement and employment rates compared to African-Caribbean and native British young people. In this respect, South Asians had better prospects in 2011 and, consequently, less of a reason to create disorder. This predicament demonstrates
how inter-ethnic conflict can manifest, which is both detrimental to community cohesion and, by consequence, social order.

Accepting the importance of socio-economic explanations, it cannot be overlooked that some Black participants, interviewed for the Reading the Riots research, felt unfairly treated because of the colour of their skin (Muir & Adegoke 2011). There is also the remarkable similarity between the shooting of Duggan and the role this played in providing a spark for the riots and the events leading to the Broadwater Farm riots in 1985, which took place in protest at the death of Cynthia Jarratt. In trying to understand why the riots happened, it is natural to look for commonalities, 'but it would be wrong to leave to one side the role that ... race and ethnicity played in some localities' (Solomos 2011, p.2). The initial unrest in Tottenham highlighted how the actions of the police, and rumours about their actions, can provide the spark for collective violence. It also spotlighted again the role of policing in racially and ethnically diverse communities. Although Scarman's inquiry (1981) denied institutional racism following the 1980s riots, it did recommend a more racially diverse and racially sensitive police force (Newburn 2011). Official accounts of the 2001 disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, similarly noted issues raised by policing in communities divided along lines of class, faith and culture in the context of deprivation, segregation and social exclusion (Cantle 2001; Burnley Task Force 2001; Oldham Independent Review 2001). These reports, too, identified a need for more minority ethnic police officers and a need to improve police-community relations.

1.4.9 Dysfunctional Community

Dysfunctional community has often been invoked as a response to urban unrest. Like law and order explanations, it puts the problem with the rioters and ignores structural reasons that might, at least, be important context. Dysfunctional community buys into the notion that there is a majority culture that is functional. In response to the 2011 English Riots, commentators referred to the erosion of community life across Britain, which had divided people within their own neighbourhoods. Hence, where Cantle (2001) indicated 'too much community' in relation to the 2001 disturbances, the response to the 2011 disturbances was 'not enough community' (Murji & Neal 2011). Young people seen trashing their own neighbourhoods (Briggs 2012a), looting and destroying local businesses and terrifying older residents were castigated for disrupting the norms and expectations of community. This can be contrasted with the relief expressed at the prevailing communitarianism of the ‘saviours of community’ who defended local space and cleared up the mess (Wallace 2012). Such a response reveals 'the moral
(as well as penal and economic) power which is brought to bear on the urban poor. 'Communities' have been repositioned within the context of urban regeneration 'as sites of order, participation and renewal', in which 'disorder is locally managed and welfare is locally produced'. It was this notion of community that informed the 'official' response to the disturbances, and is perhaps what the rioters succeeded in momentarily challenging (ibid).

Durodié (2012) notes that the government had spent considerable resources over recent years wanting to be seen to be ‘building resilience’ among ordinary people, particularly in the aftermath of recent acts of terrorism. Yet, when a community truly comes together, spontaneously, and at its own initiative to confront a shared problem – as the disturbances might be interpreted – the authorities are immediately concerned. In fact, what they really want ‘is not resilience, but compliance’. Durodié blames the erosion of community life on ‘an expansive and overarching state that does not allow its citizens to develop and maintain informal relations at their own initiative, but would rather constantly formalise these through constant codes and procedures' (p.7). In Birmingham, people did not riot on their own doorsteps. Some wonder whether this indicates any kind of respect for local residential spaces (Bhattacharyya et al. 2012) or merely the pull towards the usually inaccessible space of consumerism (discussed further below). Violence directed at local shopkeepers might reflect inter-communal tensions. However, this kind of violence was rare and did not generate a dynamic or resonance (McDonald 2012).

Tester (2012) asserts that the events of 2011 must be seen within the context of ‘interregnum’, which in the Gramscian sense means that 'the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously. ... The... old is dying and the new cannot be born; in their interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear' (Gramsci 1971, p.276). The current interregnum is due to the breakdown of the 'social imaginary', a term reflecting how people imagine their social existence, including expectations about how they and others should interact with each other and the values that underpin these expectations (Taylor 2007). Bauman (2012) similarly comments that 'the world as we knew it, or thought we knew it, is going out of joint. ... The old certainties have disappeared' (p.14). From this perspective, the 2011 English Riots were characterised by looting because consumer goods ‘are tangible - they appear to offer something certain in the circumstances of interregnum when everything else has been invalidated' (Tester 2012, p.9).
Official accounts have always blamed certain groups, who simply do not know how to behave. In 2011, as in the early 1990s, the group was poor young people, who had not been parented well enough. Consequently, the government presiding over the 2011 Riots decided that parents would now to be punished alongside their children using the 'riot clause' enacted through the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. This new piece of legislation extended the powers of possession to social housing landlords, suggesting courts may order possession where ‘the tenants or an adult residing in the dwelling-house has been convicted of an indictable offence which took place during, and at the scene of, a riot in the UK’. This has not yet been used, but, nonetheless, remains a symbol of state violence (Moxon 2011) and punishment on a class basis (Young 2016). Other times, certain ethnic groups have been identified as the cause of community dysfunction. In the 1980s, Black people were the ‘enemy within’, substituted by South Asian men in the official response to the 2001 disturbances (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). Diagnosing racial residential segregation leading to dysfunctional community as a major cause of the 2001 disturbances paved the way for the government’s ‘community cohesion’ agenda, which shifted away from multiculturalism and towards assimilation (ibid). Alternatively, Young (2007) argues that the disturbances in 2001, as in the 1980s, were due ‘not to discontent because of lack of assimilation but rather discontent because of the degree of assimilation’. In both cases these riots involved second generation immigrants, who had incorporated notions of citizenship and, thus, were acutely aware of their political and economic exclusion from wider society, and that bad policing was an additional violation of their citizenship.

An emphasis on cultural dysfunction ‘lays the blame clearly at the feet of the rioters and the community pathologies that have generated them’ (Alexander 2004, p.529), ignoring issues of racial disadvantage and White extremism, which some suggest were important for understanding the 2001 disturbances. The history of the northern mill towns have been interwoven with colonialism and racist housing policies, which provided the conditions of poverty and segregation, giving rise to inter-ethnic animosity (Kundnani et al. 2001; Amin 2003). Migrant labour was brought over from Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 1960s and 1970s to work the undesirable night shifts in the northern cotton mills. Initially, ‘the textile industry was the common thread binding the White and South Asian working class into a single social fabric. But with its collapse, each community was forced to turn inwards on to itself’ (Kundnani et al. 2001, p.106). Competition for scarce local opportunities fuelled resentment between the two communities, especially as stories grew of Whites getting better jobs and houses and of South Asians
receiving preferential welfare support (Amin 2003). Segregation in housing led to segregation in education, and meant that a generation of Whites and South Asians was now growing up with little contact or understanding of each other, except that provided by the media (Kundnani et al. 2001).

Additional context for the 2001 disturbances was the shift in perceptions of British South Asians. The ‘Honeyford Affair’ caused cultural issues to be debated and defended by a variety of groups when a head teacher in Bradford wrote an article for a national audience problematizing Muslim pupils’ inclusion in education (Bolognani 2012). The focus shifted more firmly from culture to religion, when a group of Bradford Muslims burned copies of *The Satanic Verses* and forced retailers to take the book off their shelves (Herbert 2003). It has been argued that the ‘Rushdie Affair’ marked the emergence of a Muslim identity separate from the South Asian cultural heritage (Bolognani 2009), and the beginnings of Islamophobia in the media and popular discourse (Runnymede Trust 1997). In 1995, there were then the protests against prostitution on Lumb Lane, which demonstrated the ability of Bradford Muslims to fend for themselves without the support of other groups previously associated with the Honeyford Affair (Macey 1999). Soon after, the 1995 Bradford riot occurred, considered another key turning point for the demonization of British South Asians, who by now represented the public face of Islam in Britain (Goodey 2001). Bradford had made the transition from ‘a touch of exoticism in the grim North’ to the home of Muslim aggressors (Goodey 2001, p.626)

These historical events cannot be divorced from the neo-fascist mobilisations and the mundane, persistent racism affecting the lives of many South Asian people living in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). The popular image of the 2001 rioters is one of ‘delinquent Asian-Muslim youths’, but it has been argued that at least some of them were motivated by resistance to racist mobilisations by neo-fascist groups and the failure of the police to provide protection from this threat (Kundnani et al. 2001, p.105). Some of the riot-affected areas had previously been popularised as no-go areas through the media coverage of racist attacks, especially on White people, and alarming references to South Asian gangs (Vasagar et al. 2001). There had been much less coverage of the plight of the South Asians living in these areas. The rally organised by the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF) in Oldham on the 26 May, seen as contributing to the 2001 disturbance, was in fact the third such demonstration involving White racists that year (Kalra & Rhodes 2009). As the Labour party neglected its core White working class base, the BNP and the NF saw the opportunity to mobilise this group under the theme of ‘rights for Whites’ (Bagguley
& Hussain 2008). The disturbances in Oldham, as in the other northern mill towns, must be seen within a context of repeated incursions instigation by neo-fascists (Vasagar et al. 2001).

Recognising the role of White extremism in precipitating the 2001 disturbances, Bagguley and Hussain (2008) were drawn into re-evaluating accounts of earlier riots. With the benefit of hindsight, they see that often the riots of 1981 and 1985 were a response to neo-fascist mobilisations, and can be seen as part of the same 'wave' of action starting in the late 1970s. They suggest that the St. Pauls’ and Brixton riots were indeed responses to police action, but others were not. They argue that, as with the 2001 disturbances, some of the riots in the eighties represented, more than anything, class disunity and inter-ethnic conflict, albeit 'mediated' through the police. The one disturbance in the 1990s that has always been associated with inter-ethnic conflict, the Southall disturbance in 1981, was never really investigated by the authorities. Instead, the skinheads were scapegoated by politicians, stereotyping them all as fascists and setting them out as the new folk devil (Unsworth 1982). This focus on the ‘skinhead invasion’ enabled the Southall incident to be slotted into the history of moral panics about youth and immorality, deflecting attention from underlying conditions that may have bred the racial violence.

Although the disturbances of the early 1990s took place in predominantly White areas, inter-ethnic conflict did play out in some of the events. In Meadowell, Northumbria, first-hand accounts of the disturbances show that rioters made collective decisions to target South Asian shops. The attacks on South Asian stores were also the most malicious, risking the lives of South Asian families living above them (Campbell 1993). The riot started as a crusade against the police, but ‘when the police refused to make themselves available for an attack, then low-flying endemic racism made the South Asians – who lived there – available to drive a mission that was drifting’ (p.88). Regarding the disturbances in Ely, Cardiff, the police and the people involved denied any ‘racist undertones’, but he incidents preceding them suggest otherwise. The trouble started with a dispute over a trade covenant between two shopkeepers: a Pakistani grocer, Abdul Waheed, whose business was doing well, and the newsagents, Mr and Mrs Agius, whose business was not. The policing of the unrest transformed it into a ‘gladiatorial contest’ between the men and the police, but the starting point was the racist response to a successful Pakistani business man in a predominantly White community.
1.5 **Urban unrest elsewhere in the world**

This section looks at urban unrest in the USA and France across the same three decades explored for Britain. These countries have been chosen because they are most similar to Britain. The main disturbances are identified and key events are briefly described and explained based on the available literature. The aim is to explore whether the frequency and nature of unrest in Britain is mirrored elsewhere and to what extent it is caused by the same factors. The USA and France are covered in separate sub-sections below. Reflections on how these compare with British disorders is then returned to in the concluding sections.

1.5.1 **U.S. Riots**

It is argued that the historical pattern of rioting in both Britain and the USA can be explained by the migratory movements of ethnic minorities, leading to two distinct phases of urban unrest the two countries (Waddington 1992). In their respective histories there has been an earlier period of what Janowitz (1969) has called 'communal riots', involving inter-racial clashes between Whites and ethnic minorities and a subsequent period of 'commodity riots', involving confrontations between ethnic minorities and the agents of social control, such as the police. A more recent period of rioting from the 1980s to the present sees rioting of both types, including some hybrid riots. Horowitz (1983) suggests that this re-emergence of inter-ethnic conflict may signify a new pattern of tensions linked to the large-scale immigration experienced by the USA since 1965. He also warns us, based on comparative evidence, that an accumulation of grievances against more than one competitor ethnic group may produce especially strong hostility.

The U.S. 'ghetto riots' of the 1960s have been likened to the British riots of the 1980s because in both cases they were typically precipitated by police actions and involved Black people (Waddington 1992; Benyon & Solomos 1987; Field & Southgate 1982; Horowitz 1983). It is argued that they occurred not in locales where discrimination and deprivation were at their worst, but where hope for amelioration was at its highest. They reflected aspirations of the marginalised Black population to be included in society and politics. There was another period of commodity riots between 1980 and 1989 in and around Miami. During this period, each major outbreak of violence was triggered by the fatal shooting of a Black person either by a White or Hispanic police officer. Similarly, the Cincinnati Riots, occurring over four days in 2001, were triggered when a Black American was shot dead by a White officer during a police chase. As described in relation to the Salford disturbances (Jeffery & Jackson 2012), the 2011 English Riots, the context to the Cincinnati Riots was poor police-community relations linked to gentrification.
Following these riots a ‘collaborative arrangement’ was developed. This comprised a community group to help reform police operations and policies and an independent citizen-complaint panel. The measures were thought to be instrumental in avoiding unrest in 2003, following the death of another Black man, who was beaten by White police officers (ibid).

Communal riots in the U.S. have tended to be more violent than commodity riots (Horowitz 1983). Although the Miami Riot of 1980 was sparked by the acquittal of four White police officers accused of killing a Black motorist, the response manifested as inter-ethnic violence, resulting in the brutal killings of both Cubans and Whites (ibid). The violence was preceded by an extraordinary growth in the Cuban population and surveys conducted before the riots suggested high levels of anti-Cuban resentment on the part of Blacks, linked to perceptions of economic competition and ‘opportunities usurped by newcomers’ (Horowitz 1983). There were other communal riots in the Crown Heights area of Brooklyn, New York, in 1991. The confrontation this time was between Blacks and Hasidic Jews and the perception of unequal treatment by the police. The incident was foregrounded by a long history of tension between Hasidic and Black communities, primarily over the allocation of housing and over-stretched emergency services. Resentment among Blacks had also been stoked by the head of the African American department at New York's City College, accusing Jews and the Mafia of devising ‘a system of destruction of Black people’ (cited in Waddington 1992, p.72).

The 1992 Los Angeles riots, also known as the Rodney King riots, have been described as the worst riot in modern American history (Gale 1996). They have also been described as something of a hybrid, containing elements of both communal and commodity rioting. Violence erupted when four police officers were acquitted of beating a Black man, Rodney King, by an overwhelming White jury. The rioting spread from Los Angeles up the Pacific coast in Seattle and to other parts of the country, including Newark, Detroit, New York, Washington, Chicago, and Philadelphia. Incidentally these were all places affected by rioting in the 1960s. In 1992, Blacks and Hispanics were united because Hispanics had their own grievances against the Los Angeles Police Department and felt the same racial and economic conditions that Blacks felt (Alvarez 2012). The riot brought a greater sense of understanding between the two groups and signalled ‘the start of a new coming together in community’ (ibid). Approximately half all the damage was to Korean American property (Min 1996, p.90). Tensions between Koreans and African Americans had been simmering for some time. These were largely due to cultural differences and the socio-economic success of Korean Americans relative to Blacks (Kim 2011). The media had stoked further resentment by presenting
provocative images of gun-wielding Korean merchants, fending off mostly Black and Hispanic inner-city residents plundering their stores (ibid).

1.5.2 French Riots

This section draws on accounts of the 2005 French Riots, which have been compared with the 2011 English Riots (Body-Gendrot 2012 e.g. Newburn 2016; Waddington & King 2009). Before the 2005 riots there was no academic tradition in France devoted to theoretically explaining periods of urban unrest (Jobard 2009a). hence, this section draws on sparse and retrospective accounts to identify the key characteristics of these earlier French riots and to examine why they occurred and, finally to compare and contrast them with British riots, specifically the 2011 English Riots. The discussion below is structured temporally, looking at major French riots in each decade from the 1980s to the 2000s.

The 'Minguettes Hot Summer' disturbances of 1981 were seen as the beginning of the Banlieues crisis in France (Jobard 2009a). They involved residents in the Minguettes housing estate, in the Banlieue-town of Vénissieux on the outskirts of Lyon. Banlieue is a French term from the middle ages literally meaning ‘banned location’, but is now widely used to designate an urbanised area on the outskirts of a large town (Waddington, Jobard, et al. 2009). The Minguettes were erected in the mid-1960s to house immigrant workers recruited from the former French colonies in northern-Saharan Africa. The disturbances occurred during the school summer holidays and mainly consisted of car crime and related disorder on the Minguettes estate itself. Young people stole high performance cars from Lyon and brought them back to the estate for car chases, sometimes with the police, and to set them on fire. By the end of the summer, around 250 cars had been destroyed. There are obvious similarities between these disturbances and the English disturbances on predominantly White working class estates in the early 1990s (ibid).

The 1990s came to be known as the 'riots decade' due to the frequency of disorder (Jobard 2009a). In the first half of the decade, disturbances occurred at a rate of 10-15 each year (Lagrange 2006). Although immigration was on the decline, the immigrant population was changing due to the arrival of a darker-skinned group from sub-Saharan Africa and racial attacks and police brutality rose concordantly, which in turn sparked riots (Schneider 2008). A long list of disturbances has been directly attributed to the deaths of young immigrants at the hands of the police, who never faced charges (ibid). However, Lagrange (2006) identifies two distinct periods between 1990s to 2004. Whereas, those in the earlier period (1992-96) were linked to policing and can be defined as ‘commodity
riots’ (Janowitz 1976). Those between 1997 and 2004, were more akin to communal riots. This shift this was due to worsening employment and living conditions that resulted in the radicalisation of inter-neighbourhood confrontations and a rise of neighbourhood-related identities. Neighbourhoods were demarcated with names like ‘La cité des 4000’ (City of 4,000) to represent the number of apartments in the local tower blocks (Bonelli 2005). Segregating poor migrants in the Banlieues had produced identities that emanated ‘from turf rather than ethnicity’ (Body-Gendrot 2007, p.423) and it was economic segregation, more than unemployment, that played the greater role in producing this unrest (Lagrange 2012, p.32).

A large episode of social unrest took place in autumn 2005, and a smaller one in 2007. Lagrange (2009) regards the rioting in 2005 as exceptional even for France 'where protests are a living tradition' (p.107). Other contemporary riots had lasted two or three days (Jobard 2009b). By contrast, the events of 2005 spanned 20 days and affected 300 localities (Body-Gendrot 2012). The damage to property was spectacular, including no fewer than 10,000 torched cars and 250 public buildings destroyed (Jobard 2009b) and costing between 200 and 250 million euros (Body-Gendrot 2012). Where the riots of the 1980s and the 1990s occurred in towns mainly populated by northern-Saharan immigrants (of Algerian and Moroccan heritage), the 2005 riot locations aligned with settlements of newer sub-Saharan migrants (Jobard 2009b). This meant that they could not be accounted for by a culture of protest, passed down from previous generations (Jobard 2009b; Lagrange 2009), meaning other explanations had to be found.

It was observed that the majority of the 2005 riot locations (85%) were in sensitive urban zones (ZUS), which had been identified as focal points for urban renewal since the 1990s (Lagrange 2006). A study by the National Council of Cities emphasised how the most violent events were actually in areas where investment had been the greatest (cited in Epstein 2009). This was due to the destabilising effect of these programmes (Lagrange 2006). Families living in damaged buildings scheduled for demolition or temporarily re-housed in hotels found it difficult to prevent their children going out in the evenings during the riots. Epstein (2009) points out that rioting also occurred in areas where demolition operations had not yet begun. Thus, it was not so much the roll out of the programme that contributed to unrest, but the way the renewal programme was perceived. Inadequate information regarding the nature and implementation of the programme, against the backdrop of a right-wing discourse in local and national politics (see Murray 2006), fed suspicions that ‘the urban renewal programme was
aimed less at improving the living environment of the residents than at ensuring their expulsion from the area’ (Epstein 2009, p.132).

The actions of the police in sparking the 2005 French riots are well documented (Schneider 2008; Waddington, King, et al. 2009). They followed an incident involving three migrant boys, who were approached by police officers wanting to check their identity papers on the way home from playing football. The boys fled and took refuge in an electricity substation, where one sustained major burns and the other two were electrocuted. It is believed that ‘a simple call to the electric power company would have saved the children’s lives, but instead the police abandoned them to almost certain death’ (Schneider 2008, p.135). Within two hours, rumours of the incident had provoked a violent response, involving around 100 local youths and the burning of 23 vehicles (Brown 2007). At the outset the rioting remained focused in towns close to where the incident occurred, but began to spread across large parts of the country after a tear gas grenade was thrown by police into a mosque and the Interior Minister, Nicholas Sarkozy, refused to admit the police had committed any wrong (Jobard 2008).

Although migrant youths in the Banlieues were frustrated by poverty and high unemployment, ‘neither underclass culture nor despair led young people to burn cars and public buildings for three weeks on end’ (Schneider 2008, p.138). Rather it was police brutality, ‘which is more likely in highly unequal societies and in those where particular racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities are excluded from full participation’ (ibid). The events of 2005 were foregrounded by deteriorating relations between immigrant communities and the state following the 2002 election, which put Sarkozy in charge of the police. Sarkozy was seen to have played a role in the riots by calling for aggressive enforcement against quality of life crimes, which disproportionately affected resident in the Banlieues; by extending police powers to check identity papers; and by disbanding community police. Complaints of police abuse rose dramatically as a result (Schneider 2008). Murray (2006) suggests that just as police stop and search practices had outraged Britain's Black communities in the 1980s, repetitive identity checks had alienating and antagonised France's ethnic minority youths.

Jobard (2009b) suggests that police management of the disturbances was responsible for the extent and spread of the violence once it had erupted. By focusing on containment instead of a more arrest-oriented mode of policing, rioters were left ‘free’ to continue their activities and there was no inducement for them to stop. This strategy can be linked to Sarkozy’s concern to avoid political fall-out of the type that contributed to the defeat of Chirac’s government, when
the police in 1986 beat a young man to death during a student demonstration. The 2005 riots gradually subsided only when Sarkozy developed the confidence to sanction a more confrontational role for the police. Jobard suggests the strategy of containment also explains the extent of the destruction in rioters’ own neighbourhoods. This was extensively cited by the authorities as nihilism and vandalism, but empirical evidence suggests that targets were collectively discussed and selected by rioters on the basis of local politics. For example, a car depot was burnt because its owner was rumoured to be racist and a school because its principal had recently expelled a student, perceived to be unjust by local people (Kokoreff 2006).

In comparing contemporary urban unrest in France and Britain, it seems there are many similarities. Both countries primarily experienced commodity riots in the 1980s and communal riots in the mid-late 1990s and early 2000s. The 1981 riots in France and the British disturbances in the early 1990s had striking parallels, linked to the thrill-seeking behaviour of unemployed young men on peripheral housing estates, who used joy riding as a way to relieve their boredom and antagonise the police. Both countries experienced a higher frequency of disorder in the 1990s compared to other decades. However, in France these were associated with aggressive policing of migrant communities rather than under-policing of poor White communities. The spread of the 2011 English Riots attracted a great deal of domestic commentary, but these were not on the same scale as the 2005 French Riots, which reached 300 localities compared to 66. Moreover, in England, the riots lasted 4 days compared to 20 in France; although it was reported that no single locality experienced disorder for more than four nights (Centre d’analyse stratégique 2006). In almost all cases in both countries, the rioting occurred in areas of high deprivation. A key difference with the 2011 English Riots was the level of looting, which might be explained by their occurrence in city centres compared with mainly residential localities in France (Newburn 2016).

1.6 Conclusion

Some issues cut across time and space in relation to urban unrest. Material and social deprivation are always key contextual factors. Unfair treatment by the police is usually the trigger and the longer-term context, either due to over-policing or under-policing of communities. In all three countries, aggressive policing tends to be the complaint of BME communities, invariably linked to racism within the police expressed through the use of aggressive operations and street-based practices; such as stop and search in Britain and identity checks in France. The death of
ethnic minorities at the hands of the police has been responsible for some of the most violent disturbances. Britain is unusual due to the relatively high level of rioting by White people. Their participation, often under-reported, adds a class dimension, which was more pronounced in the 2011 English Riots than ever before. Spatial patterning in the U.S. and France means BME groups are more segregated than in England and this may help explain why White and Black people are less likely to riot together in these countries.

Inter-ethnic conflict has been linked to migratory patterns in combination with poverty, unemployment and social injustice and appears more prevalent in the USA than either Britain or France. Even when U.S. riots have been triggered by the police, they have often resulted in inter-ethnic conflict, typically between Blacks and a newer migrant group. This is linked to the perceptions of Black people of economic competition and ‘opportunities usurped by newcomers’ (Horowitz 1983). In Britain, inter-ethnic conflict was most obvious in the 2001 riots, which were a response of South Asian communities to neo-fascist mobilisations in the north of England. White resentment of ethnic minorities in traditionally White working class areas had grown in response to increasing poverty and unemployment and campaigning of neo-fascist groups under the banner of ‘rights for Whites’. However, the popular narrative in the aftermath of the 2001 disturbances identified the ‘self-segregation’ of South Asians as the main problem, prompting the ‘community cohesion’ agenda aimed at helping migrant groups to integrate themselves, rather than a societal response aimed at addressing material and social deprivation.

Reflecting on the 2011 English Riots, despite some localised incidents, there was little evidence that these were communal riots. Policing was the immediate trigger and backdrop to events in London. Some commentators also suggest it was a key contextual factor in other localities, where people may have viewed the treatment of Mark Duggan and his community as symbolic of their own experience. Conversely, there was some indication that police were able to prevent unrest, especially where they worked in partnership with other agencies. However, much of the literature on the 2011 English Riots is not empirically grounded and where it is, this is mainly focused on the London experience. This provides a rationale for further research outside London, both in riot affected locales to examine predisposing factors and non-riot affected locales to better understand protective factors.

As with previous British riots, dysfunctional communities, poor parenting and criminal youth have featured heavily in media and political explanations of the
2011 English Riots; but perhaps more than ever before. Conversely, brief reference has been made to the role of parents in inhibiting young people’s involvement (Morrell et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2011) and perhaps the protective role of community needs to be explored further. The role of youth workers in averting violence in Leeds was also suggested (Clifton 2012a), as well as the deleterious consequences of cuts to youth provision. Given that rioters are most often young people, youth services were also worth exploring further, as a local contextual factor. This analysis of the literature has helped to identify a range of factors that might help explain ‘why’ and ‘where’ riots occurred in 2011. Given the prominent role of policing in almost every riot, the next chapter will look at the literature on issues affecting policing and police-community relations. The Chapter after this will show how the research design for the empirical part of the study was informed by the literature findings.
Chapter 2 – Policing literature

2.1 Introduction

Policing has been spotlighted as playing a prominent role in most contemporary riots in Britain, France and the USA. Often there has been a specific event involving an officer that has ‘sparked’ unrest. Typically, as with the 2011 English Riots, this has event has resulted in the death of a BME individual. However, the tinder for the unrest has sometimes been inter-ethnic tensions, but more usually and often in combination, the longer-term context has been poor police-community relations too. Conversely, there was some evidence that non-riot affected locales in 2011 were protected by the actions, or inactions, of police and partners. There were also reports that unrest was avoided in Cincinnati in the early 2000s because certain measures were put in place to promote joint problem-solving between the police and local people and to deal with complaints against the police independently, thus making the police more accountable to the public. Hence, the themes of community policing and public accountability will be explored here with the wider context of police and legislative reform. The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework to inform the empirical part of the study, which intends to look at the role of police and partners in preventing and containing unrest, and perhaps promoting it, during the 2011 English Riots.

The chapter begins by introducing key policing terms and definitions to clarify how they are used and understood within the thesis, leading onto a brief overview of how the police were introduced and developed in England and Wales. From here there is some attempt to chart key developments for the police and policing. The chapter is structured thematically, with consideration given to the temporal sequencing of events where this is possible. Key themes include how police powers have been expanded and constrained by legislation and governance structures; police accountability, particularly when officers are accused of misusing their powers; and how the role of the police has changed to accommodate new forms of policing, new policing partners and new personnel. Cross-cutting all these themes is how police work, particularly discretionary practice in situations of low visibility, can be checked to ensure it does not discriminate. This is because styles of policing characterised by procedural fairness are most likely to gain support for the police and compliance with the law. Public order policing is considered separately at the end, partly because this is seen as a distinct activity by the police. However, discussion will illustrate that police discretion and fair treatment are as important for crowd management as they are to community policing.
2.2 Police and the task of policing

The distinction between police, police-work and policing is an important one for facilitating understanding about the police role as it has evolved and currently exists in England and Wales. It is also important for understanding the relationship of the police to other public authorities, both generally and in the context of urban unrest. In Anglo-American societies, the term ‘police’ refers to ‘a specialised body of people given primary formal responsibility for legitimate force to safeguard security’ (Reiner 2010, pp.4–8). ‘Policing’, narrowly defined, refers only to the activities performed by the police, but there is also a broader definition, which is used to signify social regulation, recognising the term’s etymological link with politics and governance (Rowe 2013). To avoid policing becoming a catch-all for every institution and activity contributing to social regulation, which might include schools and schooling, Reiner (2010) practically suggests narrowing it down to ‘the creation of systems of surveillance coupled with the threat of sanctions for discovered deviance’ (p5). Thus, what the police do is policing, but other institutions, groups and roles also contribute to this activity.

The history of the police in England and Wales began with the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 by the Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel (Rowe 2013, p.24). This ‘new police’ replaced constables, watchmen and amateur justices and constituted part of a move to a more centralised social order (Reiner 2010, p.53). The police’s primary instruction was the ‘prevention of crime’ (Emsley 1991). In the face of massive resistance, the first officers were dressed in a non-military style, carried minimal weaponry, and were instructed to be civil and obliging to people of every position and respectful to private property at all times (McLaughlin 2007, p.3). Yet, public animosity and even conflict endured and it wasn’t until the 1950s that the police started to gain widespread acceptance, and to even be regarded as a symbol of national pride (Loader & Mulcahy 2003). This acceptance was achieved in three ways (McLaughlin 2007): Firstly, political patronage and judicial protection meant that allegations of police malpractice went uninvestigated or were explained away; secondly, the police learnt to negotiate ‘unspoken’ contracts with certain social groups to avoid conflict and get them on side; and, thirdly, representations of the police in popular culture normalised its presence and fictional characters such as PC George Dixon nurtured the image of the ‘beloved British bobby’.

Of these three explanations, the second alludes most strongly to the crux of policing, which is the ability of officers to use discretion to deal with incidents in a variety of other ‘peacekeeping’ ways even if an offence may have been committed.
Discretion is both a practical response to the limited capacity of the criminal justice system (Reiner 2010, p.19) and a logical outcome of legal rules that require interpretation in unpredictable situations (Newburn & Reiner 2012). For example, most offences require mens rea (a ‘guilty mind’), which can be difficult to assess and therefore leaves officers with ample scope for discretion. However, while it may be the consensually wise way to deal with some issues, discretion also raises the prospect of discrimination and malpractice (Reiner 2010, p.19). The Scarman inquiry (1981) into the 1981 Brixton riots acknowledged this dual nature of police discretion. The report influentially argued that maintaining order should take priority over law enforcement and in this way discretion was the better part of police valour (Newburn & Reiner 2012). On the other hand, the report identified disproportionate and indiscriminate use of stop-and-search, and by implication the use of police discretion, as the main cause of the riots by provoking community anger and hostility.

2.3 Procedural justice

Stop and search is a tactic used by the police to gain access to evidence on the person about a crime they have committed or are about to commit. It is a tactic that relies heavily on police discretion. In the run up the Brixton riots stop and search was heavily used as part of ‘Operation Swamp 81’ in an attempt to tackle high levels of street crime. Scarman (1981) found that of the 943 individuals stopped, over half were Black and most were aged under 21. Only 118 were arrested, and of the 75 charges just 21 were for the target offences theft, robbery and burglary. Most charges were for threatening behaviour, assault and obstruction, of which many, Scarman concluded, were likely to have resulted from police over-zealousness. Operations such as Swamp 81 were the product of a wider set of developments affecting styles of policing from the 1960s including the introduction of the Unit Beat System, which was a new reactive ‘fire brigade’ approach, intended simultaneously to improve efficiency and police-community relations (Holdaway 1983; Kinsey et al. 1986). Instead, by removing officers from the streets and transferring them into panda cars, it did the opposite. While the technology of fast cars and sirens gave officers the ability to speed from one incident to the next, it reduced opportunity for face-to-face contact beyond conflictual arrest situations, leaving a relationship which had little space for consent (Crawford 1997, p.46).

Scarman’s observation that many of the charges resulting from Operation Swamp were probably linked to how people were treated the police raises interesting
questions about the circumstances under which people will abide by the law. Research has found that perceptions of fair treatment, also referred to as procedural justice, are a key determinant of people’s lawful behaviour (Tyler 1990; Jackson & Bradford 2010). This is because fair treatment communicates to people that the police are ‘on the same side’ and this moral connection makes people more likely to trust the police. Trust is a future-oriented concept, defined as a ‘positive feeling of expectation regarding another’s future actions’ (Barbalet 2009, p.375) and is a powerful predictor of compliance and legitimacy. People comply not because they fear punishment (instrumental compliance), but because the police are seen as a legitimate authority. Because a trusting public are more cooperative, this can also make police work easier (Tyler 1990). Procedural justice is just one driver of legitimacy. Others include the perceived lawfulness of police behaviours and the absence of corruption (Beetham 1991); distributive fairness, or how fairly police resources are distributed; and the quality of outcomes or perceived competence of the police (Bottoms & Tankebe 2012). Researchers vary in the emphasis they place on these drivers (Hough 2013), but ultimately acceptance of police authority is linked to perceptions that the police are fair and act in the interests of the public.

The first serious riot in Brixton was triggered by two young policemen whose conduct, though not unlawful, lacked ‘discretion and judgement’ and failed ‘to strike the balance between enforcing the law and keeping the peace’ (sec.3.79). Scarman’s (1981) conclusion on this point provoked criticism from both the left and right of politics. Endorsing the use of discretion in the interests of peacekeeping was perceived by critics on the right, and reported in the Daily Mail, as ‘telling the police to turn a blind eye to black crime’ and as a ‘call for positive discrimination’ (Kettle & Hodges 1982). For critics on the left, Scarman’s recommendations failed to ‘grasp the nettle’ in relation to key areas of policing impacting on the use of discretion, including the application of police powers, the investigation of complaints against the police, and police accountability (see Howe 1988; Bridges 1982; Cain & Sadigh 1982). Scarman’s nod to police accountability was ‘statutory liaison committees’ as a means ‘of enabling the community to be heard not only in the development of policing but in the planning of many, although not all, operation against crime’ (sec.5.56). However, others felt that continued frustration and anger were inevitable unless more drastic measures were taken to bring the police under democratic control (Bowling & Phillips 2002).

To prevent racial discrimination, Scarman recommended recruiting more ethnic minorities, changes to officer training, and making the display of racially prejudiced behaviour a dismissible offence. However, these did not fully take account of
mechanisms structuring police discretionary bias. Research on ‘cop culture’ (Loftus 2009; Skolnick 1966) suggests that police suspiciousness alongside a commitment to ‘real’ police work, in the form of catching criminals, makes officers prone to operate with prejudiced stereotypes of potential ‘villains’ and ‘troublemakers’; and these stereotypes are influenced by dominant views within the police organisation, including elements of sexism, racism (Loftus 2009) and dominant views within society, especially about groups who threaten the tranquillity of public space, including the young, male, disproportionately Black, economically marginal, street population (Newburn & Reiner 2012, p.813). The finding that dominant views within society can serve to promote discriminatory policing is an important one, which will be returned to later in the chapter with reference to democratic and community-led policing.

2.4 PACE and rationalising police powers

Since Scarman’s report there have been various attempts to rationalise police powers and discretionary practices, with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) being the most significant of these. Ahead of the Brixton riots, Prime Minister James Callaghan had already announced the creation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (R CCP). This was in response to other police scandals, including miscarriages of justice such as the Confait case (e.g. Fisher 1977), which were recognised to be undermining legitimacy (Smith 2007, p.279). According to its terms of reference the RCCP was to have regard ‘both to the interests of the community in bringing offenders to justice and to the rights and liberties of persons suspected or accused of crime’ (cited in Reiner 2010, p.212). The RCCP went on to inform the PACE, which eventually came into force in January 1986. PACE offered a comprehensive set of measures aimed at bringing pre-trial criminal processes within the control of the law (Smith 2007, p.281), and has been regarded as ‘the single most significant landmark in the modern development of police powers’ (Reiner 2010, p.212). Although some provisions were amended by the 2012 Protection of Freedoms Act, PACE continues to provide the framework of accountability from which police powers are derived today (Rowe 2013; Hough 2007b).

The PACE Act and its accompanying Codes of Practice set out detailed procedures for regulating police practice, including stop-and-search, search and seizure, detention and questioning of suspects, identification parades, and recording of interviews. Failure to comply with these procedures was a disciplinary offence. The legislation attempted to address a key problem for police accountability, posed by
the low visibility of most routine police work, by requiring the use of recording equipment and detailed written records of interactions with suspects. To enhance police accountability more generally, PACE imposed obligations on police authorities to consult with local communities, and established the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). How well PACE achieved its aspiration of balancing power and safeguards, however, has been much debated. Some critics argue that it merely rationalised and codified powers the police already possessed (in statute and common law) (Reiner 2010, p.213). Others suggest that PACE gave the police a whole range of new powers. A mid-ground was that the constraints on police powers set out in PACE were largely cosmetic and that police rule-avoidance quickly resurfaced (McConville et al. 1991).

Responding to specific concerns about stop-and-search, PACE required that ‘reasonable suspicion’ become a legal justification and that written records be produced for all searches carried out. These constraints assume that legal rules act as ‘direct and explicit instructions’ to the police (Smith 1986, p.87). However, while legal rules are important in setting out broad parameters, police decisions to stop and search can spring from sources, such as organisational imperatives to get a ‘result’ (p.92). Recording the use of stop and search has also been problematic, due to partial recording and because written accounts can be (re-)constructed after the event. Research has found that officers stop a suspect ‘instinctively and then think about how... [to] satisfy a disinterested third party’ after the event (McConville et al. 1991 extract from field notes); but even then reasons are often vague (Bland et al. 2000). Since 1996 there has been an additional requirement to record the ethnicity of people stopped and additional pressure to record all PACE stop-and-searches following the Macpherson Report (on the murder of Stephen Lawrence). Yet, despite these pressures, levels of recording remain low. This leaves one positive outcome of recording requirements, which is that they make officers ‘think twice’ before acting and remind them of the limits of their powers (Bland et al. 2000; Foster et al. 2005).

Critiques of PACE raise important concerns about the extent to which police practice can be regulated by legislation, particularly when so many aspects of police-work routinely occur in situations of low-visibility. There is also the possibility that provisions intended to constrain police powers served to expand them. For example, it can be argued that a power to stop-and-question without ‘reasonable suspicion’ was implicit in PACE’s conferral of stop and search powers, interpreted from the wording of PACE part 1, which suggests that while a stop for the purpose of a search must be justified by reasonable suspicion, an officer ‘need not conduct a search if it appears to him subsequently – (i) that no search is
required; or (ii) that a search is impracticable’ because suspicion was dispelled by questioning’. It might be inferred from this that a person can be stopped to assess grounds for suspicion. After the Macpherson enquiry the relevant Code of Practice was amended, formally introducing this power to stop and account to ensure these were recorded. However, recording requirements were later dropped on the recommendation of Sir Flannagan, the former chief constable of the RUC, to cut ‘unnecessary bureaucracy’ (see Reiner 2010, p.220). In sum, attempts to regulate a discretionary police practice culminated in de facto recognition of a power never actually granted by legislation or case law; and, therefore, has never clearly been debated (ibid).

2.5 Expanding police powers

In addition to PACE, other pieces of legislation have affected police powers. These are mentioned here due their role in widening the scope for police discretion. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) permitted adverse inferences to be drawn from the silence of the accused (against recommendation of the RCCP) (ibid) and introduced an exceptional new stop and search power frequently used in the context of public order policing. Section 60 of the CJPOA provides the power to stop and search any person in a specific locality without reasonable suspicion if an inspector or higher ranking officer reasonably believes the locality to be at risk of serious violence (or persons carrying offensive weapons). Section 60 was intended to prevent violent offences at sporting and other large-scale events, specifically football matches, but has been used in response to a far wider range of situations ‘including lower level incidents that could not be dealt with by other means’ (Quinton et al. 2000, p.50). Official data shows that the number of section 60 stop-and-searches has been increasing steadily (Hand & Dodd 2009), despite relatively low effectiveness in producing arrests (Miller et al. 2000).

The Crime and disorder Act 1998 provided new powers to chief officers to apply for Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) and child curfew orders for a range of new (and spurious) offences. The Act was part of New Labour’s re-civilisational discourse, informed by New York’s ‘zero tolerance’ approaches (McLaughlin 2007). The Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 introduced spot penalties, Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs), for certain listed offences; and the scope of these gradually widened from minor drink-related disorder to thefts under £200 and vandalism under £500 (Reiner 2010, p.221). PNDs, increasingly accounting for clear-ups (Young 2008), were viewed as a welcome tool by the police for meeting ever demanding performance targets (Reiner 2010). Legislation affecting the treatment
of suspects includes the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which increased detention for up to 36 hours for arrestable offences, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCA), which provided power of arrest for all offences (not just arrestable offence or those satisfying the PACE criteria). Some House of Lord judgements have also been instrumental in increasing police powers without specific safeguards. Austin and another vs. Commissioner of the Metropolis (2009) found that police surrounding and holding large crowds (‘kettling’) did not infringe the human right to liberty where there was a threat of violence of damage to property (cited in HMIC 2009a), freeing the way for the police to utilise mass containment as a formal aspect of their tactical planning for public order events.

2.6 Complaints systems

One major development in terms of a check on police powers and police accountability to public was the creation of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which became operational from April 1985. The Police Act 1964 had codified the legal right of citizens to make complaints against the police, but until the introduction of the PCA this was primarily an in-house ‘police investigating police’ model (McLaughlin 2007, p.175). The PCA was introduced by PACE but can be linked back to Scarman’s (1981) recommendation that a degree of external involvement in the handling of police complaints was necessary to ensure police accountability at the organisational and officer level. The PCA was to be an important tool for improving police-community relations. In practice, however, public confidence and complainant satisfaction remained low long after its introduction (Maguire & Corbett 1991). One explanation for this is that the system was premised on the principle that the police themselves would determine whether a complaint warranted investigation and even then only the most serious cases would be supervised by outsiders. But while the public were concerned about the PCA’s lack of power and independence, police officers denounced it for being too powerful.

Calls for a fully autonomous complaints body were finally answered by the Police Reform Act 2002, which introduced the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). However, the IPCC was never set up to deal with all complaints against the police. Most complaints continued to be dealt with by the police using a ‘local resolution’ process, with the IPCC being given a ‘call in’ power to investigate or to supervise an investigation by the police only when necessary (McLaughlin 2007, p.178). Consequently, the benefits of a completely independent complaints system have not been as dramatic as many hoped. Increasing numbers
of complaints may indicate greater public confidence in the IPCC, or alternatively be explained by better recording of complaints and an expansion in types of police staff that can be complained against (Reiner 2010, p.226). Clear-up rates of complaints remain low, most likely due to the perennial problem for police accountability, which is the ‘low visibility’ of operational situations that give rise to many complaints. Hence, irrespective of who conducts the investigation, there is often little independent evidence to prove or disprove a complaint, which is likely to leave complainants with a sense of grievance.

An example of how a lack of evidence can undermine confidence in a complaints system is provided by the IPCC’s investigation into the police shooting of Mark Duggan. The 500-page report, released three-and-a-half years after the event, appeared to be a rehash of the police’s initial version of events, concluding that there was not enough evidence to challenge the testimony of the investigated officer (Stafford 2015). Unsurprisingly, the IPCC’s account was dismissed by Duggan’s family as a ‘whitewash’ and they were not the only ones to feel that the investigation lacked rigour. Justice Keith Cutler, who presided over the inquest, expressed his own concerns, claiming that he had been ‘left with an impression of some uncertainty about precisely what was being investigated, on whose behalf, for what purpose, and by what means’ (cited in Stafford 2015). The IPCC (2015) conceded that a lack of video/audio material made it difficult to know with absolute certainty what had happened, recommending that national policing bodies develop proposals for recording communications during covert operations, and fitting audio/visual recording devices in covert armed response vehicles, to improve police accountability for the future.

2.7 Governance structures

In addition to legislation and complaints procedures, police governance offers a structural mechanism for managing the police and making them more accountable to the public. This includes internal governance, which relates to how the institution manages the conduct of its own officers, and external governance, relating to how the police are managed by independent institutions, groups, and individuals. Despite significant reforms from the mid-1990s onwards, the Police Act 1964 remains the formal basis of current police governance (Jones 2008). The Police Act was an attempt to rationalise and consolidate national and local influences, which hitherto differed between rural and urban areas. For the 41 provincial police forces outside London the Act established the ‘tripartite structure’ of governance, which divided responsibility for policing policy between
the Home Office, chief constables, and local police authorities. The Metropolitan Police remained accountable to the Home Secretary alone, and the City of London to the Common Council of the City of London and the Home Secretary.

Critiques of the tripartite structure have focused on the balance between central and local control. Critics on the left have called for greater local control via a stronger role for police authorities. They argue that the Act provided the Home Secretary with an array of powers that established in statute the increasing dominance of central government within the framework of police governance (Jones 2008). Police forces were placed under the ‘direction and control’ of their chief constables, with the mode of accountability to external bodies being ‘explanatory and co-operative’ (Marshall 1978). Chief constables were not legally obliged to take account of any criticism from the police authority (Reiner 1995). In theory police authorities could dismiss their chief constable, but subject to Home Office veto (Reiner 2010). The imbalance of power was especially apparent in the 1984-5 miner’s strike when Labour-dominated authorities, unhappy with the repressive policing of pickets, tried to intervene. With a level of control over police finances at least (via the precept on Council Tax), South Yorkshire Police Authority attempted to restrict its chief constable’s spending on mounted police and the dogs section. This was immediately thwarted by the Home Secretary, who warned that the authority might be acting in contravention of the Police Act 1964 (Reiner 2010). Some believe that the role of the police in suppressing the miner’s industrial action not only damaged the moral status of the police (Waddington 1991), but made it easy to conclude that the police were a partisan vanguard of an authoritarian government (P. Waddington 2007).

Developments after the miners’ strike continued the trajectory of centralisation. Police authorities were reshaped by the Police and Magistrates’ Counts Act 1994, significantly reducing their size and requiring them to include more ‘independent’ members with business experience (Smith 2007, p.288). Police authorities were downgraded to mere ‘purchasers’ of police services, albeit with additional powers to decide how police budgets were spent (ibid). Yet, a court case involving the Northumbria Police Authority found that even in spending matters local police authorities had no real power to challenge a chief constable who had secured Home Office support (Reiner 1991). For example, if chief constables were prevented by their authority from purchasing CS gas or plastic bullets, they could obtain them instead from a central store if Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) felt it necessary. The HMIC is just one of a number of organisations, including the Audit Commission, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and the National Improvement Agency (NPIA), used by central
government to gain better control of policing (Reiner 2010, pp.235–7) through a series of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) reforms, returned to later.

2.8 Democratic policing

Proposals for strengthening the role of police authorities have stemmed from a belief in the value and importance of local democracy (Jones et al. 1996). Yet, there were others who doubted that bringing the police under closer control by elected representatives would guarantee ‘democratic policing’. The reason being that the tripartite system incorporated and disguised a more fundamental power imbalance because it failed to ensure representation of the weak, unorganised, or minority groups (Scraton 1982; Jefferson & Grimshaw 1984). Thus, closer control by elected representatives might simply result in more repressive policing of minority groups in the interests of the ‘respectable’ majority. This gets to the heart of debates about democratic policing, both as a concept and practice. The Greek translation of democracy is ‘rule of (or by) the people’. Yet the appropriate role of ‘the people’ in a democratic system has long been debated, for example, whether citizens should participate in developing ideas or simply choose between the ideas of ‘expert and accountable’ elites (Schumpeter 1961; Sartori 1962); participate not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself (Mill 1910); or be prevented from participating, because the ‘masses’ are inherently incompetent and a threat to political stability (Le Bon 1895). Similar debates are implicated in discussions about the role of the police in a democracy and the democratic governance of the police.

Drawing on the notion of democracy in political theory, Jones and colleagues (1996) advance seven criteria that can be applied to policing. In order of priority the seven criteria, which can be used to judge the quality of police governance in a democracy, include: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution of power, information, redress, and participation. The authors are pessimistic about the possibility of achieving equity in a vastly unequal society (p.191), but suggest service ought to be provided to citizens in general on the basis of needs. They argue that the ‘principle of effective service flows from the principle of equity’ and information plays a crucial in measuring and monitoring performance. Manning (2010, p.10) suggests that these ‘managerial criteria’ ignore the needs and demands of the public. Yet, the authors’ qualification of responsiveness demonstrates some understanding of how these might be dealt with. They argue that attempts to widen participation can be difficult because political activity has for some time been confined to a small elite and often only the most salient issues stimulate public concern. This predicament requires systems that are flexible
enough to allow effective participation when police legitimacy is called into question and requires a range of participatory and consultation techniques to ensure the police are responsive to a ‘representative’ body; even if, ultimately, the views of the public are weighed against the general principle of equity.

It is argued that non-democratic policing presents a risk not only to the victims of repressive unchecked policing, but to society as a whole. This relates to the symbolic role of the police in a democracy (see Loader 2006; Loader & Walker 2007; Loader & Mulcahy 2003). The police are the most visible and dramatic facet of policing and, because policing operates as a mediator of collective identity, how officers interact with the public has the ability to make people feel either attached or unattached to the political community. In line with procedural justice theory, repressive or procedurally unjust policing sends authoritative signals about societal conflicts, cleavages and hierarchies, fostering insecurity among members of disadvantaged groups. These feelings of insecurity are not necessarily derived from material threat, but from a lack of tacit trust in the institutional arrangements that are put in place for their security. This is because the feeling of security inheres not in relative immunity from threat, i.e. ‘am I safe?’, but rather in the capacity to feel at ease with threats posed by the everyday environment. This *axiomatic* security helps individuals to ‘go on’ in those settings without routine concern for how safe they are. Consequently, the police role is best seen as ‘backstop’ to other forms of social control; producing and maintaining security and getting and keeping democracy by being constrained, rights-regarding agencies of minimal interference and last resort (Kinsey et al. 1986, chap.9; Loader 2006).

### 2.9 New Public Management

In the 1990s New Public Management (NPM) became the principal way that central government governed the police. These originated from the Conservatives ‘value for money’ agenda in 1979, later continued and extended by New Labour (Senior et al. 2007). A major step in the development of NPM was the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994, which gave the Home Secretary new powers to set national policing objectives supported by measurable targets (Hough 2007b). Police authorities continued to have a duty to draw up local policing strategies, but these had to ‘have regard’ to the Home Secretary’s National Policing Plan (Reiner 2010, p.236). This new regime of performance management, preventing any local variation in policing, was consolidated by the establishment of the Police Standards Unit (PSU) (in 2002) to monitor police forces against their targets; the development of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF); and the
creation of the National Policing Improvement Agency (by the Police and Justice Act 2006) (see Neyroud 2007; Reiner 2010). NPM reforms additionally involved budgetary cuts, increasing the choice of service provision and the more general application of private sector management methods to public services.

It is difficult to disagree with the basic principle that organisations should identify priorities and focus their energies on these. However, it is possible that systematic focused action against these types of priorities may be worse that unfocused or badly implemented action against well-specified priorities (Hough 2007a). So, while NPM techniques are not inherently bad, they have been criticised for a narrow focus on crime fighting to the detriment of police-community relations and community disorder. This narrow focus on crime fighting contributed to a decline in public ratings of the police and an emerging ‘reassurance gap’, which is the divergence between public perceptions of crime compared crime as measured by statistics (ibid). From 1995 police recorded crime and the British Crime Survey (BCS) showed a reversal in the historic trend of rising crime, while at the same time the public were becoming more anxious about risk of victimisation (Dodd et al. 2004). Informed by the Signal Crimes Perspective (SCP) (Innes et al. 2002), senior officers, argued that reductions in crime had been achieved at the expense of a retreat from less serious more visible forms of disorder, termed ‘signal disorders’, which actually had a greater impact on public perceptions than ‘volume crimes’ such as burglary or car thefts being prioritised by government. Although declines in public satisfaction were likely linked to other factors as well, it is noted that the steepest decline occurred over a five-year period from the mid-1990s – at precisely the time when NPM reforms were most acute (Hough 2007a, p.73).

The conclusion to be drawn from this critique of the government’s NPM regime is that performance management has potential to influence police practice, which in turn has the potential to affect how the public sees the police and feels about crime and security. Thus, as a valuable mechanism for leverage and change within the police, some commentators have mainly been concerned about the emphasis of the NPM modernisation agenda on efficiency, effectiveness and consumer satisfaction, without due regard for how institutions such as the police require the support of the public to build legitimacy (see Horton & Smith 1988; Kelling 1999; Neyroud & Beckley 2001). Conceptualised differently performance management might be used to foster police practice that consolidates and supports their authority. While policing needs to be outcome focused, the complexity of the policing environment also needs to be recognised. So instead of narrow targets that see the police as directly responsible for levels of crime, a better approach would be to monitor policing practice against professional and ethical standards.
This would focus the efforts of managers on ensuring that officers maintain these professional standards. The relationship between establishing professional and ethical standards and the legitimation of police authority is self-evident (Hough 2007a).

2.10 Ambient Policing

Instead of calling for a switch from crime fighting targets to professional policing standards as a solution to the reassurance gap, ACPO’s solution was ‘Reassurance Policing’, which gained government support for a pilot in 2002. Reassurance Policing had much in common with community policing, advocated by Chief Constable John Alderson, as a way of reversing the alienation of communities from the process of policing, which had occurred as a result of the ‘fire brigade’ model of policing (Crawford 1997; Kinsey et al. 1986); and was later recommended by Lord Scarman (1981) as a way of repairing police-community relations in Brixton after the riots. There were attempts at community policing in the 1980s and 1990s, but these were regarded largely as failures (O’Neill 2015). Following a positive evaluation of the Reassurance Policing pilot by the Home Office (Tuffin et al. 2006), the programme was reshaped into the Neighbourhood Policing Programme and launched nationally in April 2005. Neighbourhood Policing was premised on the ideal that democratic policing is delivered most effectively through responsive policing teams operating and accountable at the local level (Jones 2008). As such, the approach represented a ‘bifurcation’ of the police reform agenda, characterised by the disempowerment of the police in some areas, as authority over decision making was increasingly centralised, but empowerment in others, as officers in the community were afforded greater discretion and authority (Savage 2007).

The Neighbourhood Policing Programme placed an emphasis on establishing a visible police presence, responsiveness to public concerns, co-produced solutions, and styles of policing that engender public trust and confidence. This approach was thought better suited to today’s higher and more demanding customer expectations (Innes 2004). Yet, a key challenge was the low rate of public participation, attributed to poor public awareness or understanding of the programme; frustration with time consuming and tedious processes; cynicism that input would have any impact on police decision-making; and inadequate methods of community engagement compounded by individual and community level characteristics (Myhill et al. 2003; Bullock & Sindall 2014). For example, being ‘time-poor’, low educational attainment, weak English language skills, and
disabilities or health problems all make participation difficult (Audit Commission 1999). Being fearful of crime can also affect participation by undermining trust in the community and preventing engagement with the police due to fears that this would lead to reprisals (Lloyd & Foster 2009). These barriers to participation demonstrate how neighbourhood policing can add to, rather than alleviate, social inequality. Poorer and Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups are especially under-represented, highlighting the importance of the police doing what is equitable rather than what is demanded by the vocal majority.

In addition to the non-democratic implications of policing based on partial or prejudiced views, there are other more pragmatic consequences of demand-led policing. Pressures from the middle classes risk distributing policing resources in inverse relation to crime risks (Hope et al. 2001). Setting the expectation of demand-led policing also raises the possibility of dissatisfaction when demands are not met and may result in the creation of a vicious, self-propelling cycle whereby popular demands, and the supply of police numbers in a bid to meet them, are both endlessly ratcheted up, with financial implications (Loader 2006). This presents a non-street-based situation whereby the use of police discretion has the potential to antagonise communities; whether to respond, when to respond and how to respond (Crawford 2007b). Yet, policing is often described as a ‘public good’, suggesting that equity in distribution, provision and service should be a policing ideal (Loader & Walker 2005). For these reasons, uncritically seeking to satisfy public demands seems both undesirable and unrealistic. Public demands might better be brought within institutional arrangements that subject them, and their supporting narratives and resource claims, to the scrutiny of democratic dialogue (Crawford 2007b).

In light of the earlier discussion on democratic policing, a broader criticism of Neighbourhood Policing and other forms of ‘ambient policing’ is that they fundamentally misconstrue the contribution that policing makes to citizen security (Loader 2006). The contribution of democratic policing to citizen security is said to be ‘deep but narrow’: ‘narrow’ insofar that it does not require police actors to be supplied in ever-greater numbers, nor in a highly visible way; and ‘deep’ insofar as ‘it can and does provide individuals with a powerful token of their membership of a political community’, making them feel both safe and secure (Loader 2006, p.214). Conversely, ambient policing, is criticised for being ‘shallow but wide’: ‘shallow’ because it focuses on material security, claiming to be able to protect persons, property, and neighbourhoods from the threat of crime and disorder; and ‘wide’ because, conceived as such, the police contribution relies upon a strategy of greater numbers and visibility, and making officers pivotal to community building
and cohesion. In this way, security becomes the prevailing discourse for understanding social problems, which in fact makes people feel less secure; and paradoxically a policing strategy intended to reassure the public does quite the opposite.

### 2.11 Multi-agency policing

One explanation for why Neighbourhood Policing has not succeeded in reassuring the public and is because the programme was really a manipulation of appearances used to foster organisational legitimacy, secure scarce public resources, and help the police compete within a widening market (Crawford 2007b). Neighbourhood Policing gave centre stage to the police at a time when the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) had made it a legal requirement for the police to form multi-agency Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) (now known as Community Safety Partnerships) with local authorities, which in practice could involve a range of local public agencies, as well as private and voluntary sector organisations (Crawford 1998). The message from government underpinning the CDA was that tackling crime and its causes should no longer be the sole responsibility of the police (Morgan 1991). This resulted in a patchwork of agencies becoming involved in the provision of security, euphemistically referred to as the ‘extended policing family’ (Newburn 2007). Neighbourhood Policing, on the other hand, offered the illusion that the police – alone – can make a difference (Crawford 2007b).

This said, Neighbourhood Policing became the primary setting for multi-agency working. The programme’s focus placed on problem-solving in communities has commonly found the police working with a range of agencies, including housing agencies, schools, children’s service departments and youth services, in order to reduce issues of crime and anti-social behaviour, and especially the underlying causes of these problems (McCarthy & O’Neill 2014). However, literature on the early years of multi-agency working reported how the police struggled to relinquish their authority and control, leading to hostility and inter-agency conflicts (Pearson et al. 1992; Sampson et al. 1988). The police were especially hostile towards welfare agencies, such as social workers, suspected of wanting to undermine their crime-control efforts. This is in keeping with understandings of police culture with regard to the police being distrustful of ‘outsiders’ and ‘challengers’ (Reiner 2010; Holdaway 1983). Police tried to retain control by hijacking partnerships for their own ends (i.e. crime control rather than ‘safety’) and dominating meetings, quickly losing patience with other agencies whose
internal processes were not immediately responsive (Edwards 2002). Where conflict was ‘defined away, avoided, or circumvented’, this was equally damaging because it led to decisions being made outside of formal meetings in ways that were exclusive and divisive and resulting in the interests of some agencies being ignored (Crawford & Jones 1995).

Since the early years there have been a number of changes relating to the increased complexity of policing that have improved the attitude of the police towards partnership working (McCarthy & O’Neill 2014). Given the core value base of pragmatism as a key part of police culture (Reiner 2010), it is perhaps unsurprising that increased support within the police for partnership working has relied heavily on fellow officers celebrating their experience in ways that emphasise the practical benefits (McCarthy & O’Neill 2014). These benefits are primarily outcome-based as officers have realised the limits of their own expertise to deal with certain social problems and the cost-savings accrued through shared endeavours. However, multi-agency policing does not necessarily mean better outcomes for the policed. It is argued that the increased number of agencies engaged in crime prevention has resulted in ‘net-widening’, whereby the social control apparatus of the state is extended so that increased numbers of people, especially police property, become ensnared in the criminal justice system (Clarke 1996). Even if this was no state-led objective, ‘the inter-connectedness of a multi-agency approach to crime prevention and control’ presents a threat to ‘due process’ and the rights of the putative offender (Crawford 1997, p.497). Moreover, ‘corporatist’ multi-agency arrangements pose a threat to justice and democracy via their focus on pragmatism and efficiency at the expense of ‘normative regulation’ (p.511).

Yet, there are reasons to be ‘cautiously optimistic’ (Henry 2007). The CDA’s role in promoting ‘plural policing’ (Newburn 2002) acknowledged that other agencies may have a different ‘purchase on a given crime problem’ (Young 1991). It also provided for the fact that other agencies may be better placed for community engagement. Moreover, the ‘vague and open-texture’ of community safety (Crawford 1994) offers the opportunity for creative ideological appropriation by local progressive alliances and networks, which may be able to challenge regressive local and centralist tendencies of law and order (Hughes 1998). On the other hand, it is argued that the proliferation of private security, as a consequence of plurality, represents a radical rupture in which one system of policing is being replaced by another (Bayley & Shearing 1996). The widening ‘choice’ of security hardware (e.g. CCTV) and personnel also emphasises the role of citizens as self-calculating, risk-monitoring consumers (Loader 2000). In this sense,
‘accountability’ denotes the responsibility of citizens to take care of their own crime and/or the responsiveness of private security providers to their paying customers. This commodification of security is also likely to compound extant inequalities by reallocating policing services in favour of those who can more readily afford them (ibid).

2.12 Organisational change

The emphasis within the Neighbourhood Policing Programme on establishing a visible police came with an important twist (Blair 2002). A significant number of street-based responsibilities were passed to Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), an auxiliary tier without full constabulary powers. Far from embracing this new addition to the team, however, there was a great deal of confusion within the organisation about what PCSOs were actually meant to do (O’Neill 2015). Training for PCSOs was brief and patchy and there was no central message to supervisors about how PCSOs should fit into existing arrangements. This may have been responsible for some of the initial hostility towards PCSOs (Cooper et al. 2006), along with concerns that PCSOs constituted ‘policing on the cheap’ (Newburn 2007). Over the longer term, however, officers who went onto to work with PCSOs developed strong support for their ability to gather information; to develop relationships with local people, by virtue of having ‘time to talk’; and to free up officers’ time to work on other things (O’Neill 2015). There are currently concerns about the impact of austerity on Neighbourhood Policing, which is being eroded by a widening of responsibilities for neighbourhood officers due to the loss of police personnel in other areas (e.g. response) (HMIC 2014). Under these conditions it is suggested that PCSOs can provide a continued link between the police and communities (O’Neill 2015); although this assumes that the role of PCSOs will not be widened too.

Leaving aside the pros and cons of high visibility policing, critiques of PCSOs relate to how well the role is utilised within the police. For example, although PCSOs can generate valuable community intelligence and local information, this is often poorly used; in part because information must be integrated into systems of intelligence and data analysis, which are invariably not in place (Crawford 2007b). Information generated by PCSOs also competes with other forms of intelligence. Crime hotspots, which are painstakingly mapped by the police to determine where resources should be targeted, are not the same as fear hotspots, which may offer a better indicator of where PCSOs should be deployed (ibid). Most importantly PCSOs provide an opportunity to reconfigure police-community relations via face-
to-face interactions which help rebuild police legitimacy. Yet, along with other uniformed officers, PCSOs have been increasingly used to deal with low level incivilities. Hence, if PCSOs remain the primary vehicle for delivering Neighbourhood Policing, there is a need to address unresolved concerns about their own legitimacy, as well as their capacity to generate trust and confidence in the police.

2.13 Public order policing

Although most policing is in some way related to the maintenance of public order, public order policing is regarded as a distinct activity requiring specialist training. All officers are trained to level 3, which is basic public order training. Levels 2 and 1 (Territorial Support Group Level) require ongoing training and officers are provided with protective clothing and equipment. In part, this specialist approach is due to the assumption that crowds are prone to a particular set of behaviours that pose a threat to social order (Reicher et al. 2007). Historically, and still largely today, public order policing is based on the notion that crowds are inherently irrational and uniformly dangerous. This is based on Le Bon’s (1895) ‘mob psychology’, which suggests that individuals within a crowd lose their sense of individual self and personal responsibility and unquestioningly follow the predominant ideas and emotions, which are limited by the moral and cognitive abilities of the least capable members.

Public order policing is especially important to public perceptions of the police due the high profile of public order events, which include large-scale sports events, public celebrations and planned protests, as well as spontaneous disorder and riots. These types of events usually attract attention from the media, which means that public order policing gets widely reported. More recently, the development of affordable handheld recording devices, such as smartphones, has also increased reporting of public order events by individual citizens, for example via social media. In this sense, media can play a positive role in holding the police accountable for their actions by providing evidence that might be used to support complaints. For example, media reporting, including video footage, was used to support complaints about excessive use of force against protesters and non-protesters during the anti-capitalist demonstration at the G20 summit in 2009 (Campbell 2009; Rosie & Gorringe 2009).

The handling of G20 protest by the Metropolitan Police was initially deemed a success because there were no major riots and only minor damage (HMIC 2009a). However, a few days later this changed and the force became the focus of
negative media headlines, nationally and internationally, not least because of the death of Ian Tomlinson, a newspaper vendor, who died after being struck by an officer. The Guardian (Lewis & Fernando 2009) published video which showed Tomlinson walking away from officers with his hands in his pockets. An officer strikes him behind the knees with his baton, and then violently shoves Tomlinson in the back sending him sprawling. None of the surrounding officers assist him to his feet or reprimand their colleague. Outside of the police complaints system, the courts offer an alternative means of redress. However, a paradox of the justice system provided two contradictory verdicts. An inquest jury determined unlawful killing by a police officer, while a criminal trial found the officer ‘not guilty’ of manslaughter.

Media headlines about the G20 protest also focused on the kettling of protesters, a tactic used to surround and control crowds. The Times carried a highly critical account by one of its own journalists, who had endured ‘7 hours of detention without food or water’ within the kettle (Whipple 2009). The Guardian reported that parents with children and passers-by were told they could not leave and given no further information and, once set up, police cordons were squeezed to move the kettles and protesters who refused to move were battered by officers (Laville & Campbell 2009). It was also reported how the containment, achieved with the use of mounted police and dogs, ramped up tensions and fuelled bloody confrontations (Campbell 2009). This approach was likely to have been influenced by media predictions of riots in the run up to the protest, not least because, as Gorringe and Rosie (2008).remind us ‘cops read papers too’. Research has found that when police anticipate violence they focus on ‘controlling’ the crowd using tactics of arrest, dispersal and containment (Earl & Soule 2006).

The controversy over the G20 protest led to a formal inquiry by the Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2009a), which focused on the policing strategy, the behaviour of individual officers, and a more general review of public order policing tactics. This led to the Adapting to Protest report, which praised the collective achievement of the Metropolitan Police, but was critical of various aspects of the G20 operation. In particular, it reinforced the requirement of officers to wear identity numbers; the need for advance communication with protesters and those caught up in ‘kettles’; and stressed the need to facilitate ‘peaceful protest through the planning process and execution of the operation’ (p.47). Critiques drew attention to the fact that many of the report’s recommendations had been made before and ignored; and that the terminology of ‘peaceful protesters’ gave officers the discretion to determine who was ‘peaceful’; and if the police have preconceived ideas that protesters do not have peaceful
intentions, the report simply paves the way for ‘business-as-usual’ (Rosie & Gorringe 2009).

The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) (e.g. Drury & Reicher 2000) explains how police perceptions of a crowd as being inherently and uniformly violent can itself lead to violence. Homogenous treatment of the crowd creates a common experience, promoting group identification and group behaviour. Once unified, an action against one member of the group is perceived as an action against the whole group; and collective conflict becomes a likely outcome where the police-civilian encounter gives rise to a shared sense of police illegitimacy. This played out in practice at a student demonstration against student loans in the late 1980s, referred to as the ‘Battle of Westminster’ (e.g. Reicher 1996). Most students started with a sense of themselves as respectable subjects exercising the democratic right to protest, and hence distanced themselves from radicals calling for confrontational action. The police, however, saw the student body as a dangerous threat and acted in order to impede its progress towards the Houses of Parliament. This action was seen as illegitimate by the students as a whole and united them in opposition to the police. This unity also empowered them to actively confront the police cordon, leading to conflict.

2.13.1 Negotiated management

Reflecting the growing understanding of ESIM principles, the policing of public order events in Western Europe (and Northern America) has moved away from overt force and towards a ‘negotiated management’ approach (Gorringe & Rosie 2008). This so-called ‘soft-hat’ approach emphasises cooperation and communication between police and protesters to de-escalate sensitive situations and reduce the likelihood of violence. A key intervening variable is ‘police knowledge’ (Della Porta & Fillieule 2004), which helps to carefully stage-manage events. It is expected that some disruption to public life will be tolerated. Negotiated management has developed through a capacity referred to as ‘liaison based public order policing’ (Gorringe et al. 2011; 2012). This was initially developed in Stockholm where a unit of ‘dialogue police’ was created as part of a wider set of public order police reforms, following the major riots in Gothenburg in 2001 (Holgersson & Knutsson 2001). Similar units of Police (or Protest) Liaison Officers (PLOs) have more recently been introduced to the UK. PLOs were referred to in the Adapting to Protest report, but without clarification of how to use them. The detail of the role was ‘pinned down’ by consultants working for South Yorkshire Police, who first used them to police protesters gathered at the Liberal
Democrat party conference in Sheffield in 2011 (Gorringe et al. 2012). This model has since been used as a template for other forces.

The theory is that PLOs add a low-level problem-solving capability to a public order policing operation (e.g. Stott et al. 2013). Situated within the crowd they are able to mediate emergent tension. They achieve this by wearing a uniform distinct (light blue tabard with ‘Liaison Officer’ written on it), to distinguish their role from other officers. They adopt a ‘non-repressive’ approach before, during and after crowd events to establish relationships of trust with protesters. In turn, these relationships, and the contextualised knowledge that flows from them, helps to improve police decision-making, often correcting inaccurate assumptions about emerging risks, and mitigating police tendency to use force to arrest disperse or contain entire crowds. In the context of perceived police legitimacy, fans begin to ‘self-police’. Despite police scepticism, self-policing was evidenced at the Liberal Democrat conference. A delegate, Patrick Streeter, made his way into the crowd provoking an angry response, and prompted a Police Liaison Team (PLT) to make its way through to protesters. Against the natural inclination of the public order commander to pull Streeter from the crowd, the assessment of the PLT was ‘not to do anything’. Subsequently volatile elements of the crowd were calmed by more moderate protesters. This outcome was interpreted by the police to be a direct outcome of the PLTs relationship with the crowd and its understanding of how police actions might impact a situation (Gorringe et al. 2012).

An evaluation of liaison based approaches (Stott et al. 2013) found evidence for the success of PLTs. Some protest groups now communicate with the police on a regular basis, demonstrating an improvement in relationships; there has been a dramatic decline in disorder, damage, and arrests at protest events; and a rapid decrease in the use of Police Support Units (PSUs), providing a significant financial saving, as a PSU constitutes 27 police officers (1 inspector, 3 sergeants, 18 constables, 3 drivers, and 2 operational medics), issued with full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and public order trained at least twice per year. Based on its perceived success, the liaison tactic has been adopted by around 75 per cent of all UK forces, including the Metropolitan Police. Some forces now consider it a primary tactic for their operational response to protest, and a proportion are testing an extension of the approach into the policing of football. However, PLTs and the negotiated management approach more generally have been criticised, on the basis that they represent a subtle and disingenuous way of containing or repressing political dissent, while at the same time ensuring public sympathy and legitimacy (Gillham et al. 2012; Gilham & Noakes 2007). Peter Waddington’s two-year participant observation study of public order policing in the Metropolitan
Police (cited in Gorringe et al. 2011) supports this view. It is reported how senior police were able to secure their objectives of having protesters march peacefully along the police’s preferred route thus minimising disruption and inconvenience to ongoing city life through the guileful deployment of spurious friendship, advice, guidance and extension of favours in pre-event negotiation with organisers.

Some protest organisations and civil liberties groups have been specifically concerned about the PLT tactic. Sussex Police were heavily criticised over the way they used PLTs ahead of a demonstration held in Brighton by UK Uncut, the campaign against tax avoidance (e.g. Parkinson & Evans 2012). Senior officers claimed PLTs had attempted to build bridges by engaging with protesters in ‘honest, two-way dialogue’. By contrast, protesters complained of harassment by officers who had visited their homes primarily to gather intelligence. Netpol (2012), the network for police monitoring, highlight that both Sussex and Metropolitan Police forces had recruited PLOs with a background in intelligence or counter-terrorism. Hence, while intelligence can be used to inform a peaceful policing operation, the suspicion was that the police’s real aim was to collect personal data relating to protesters, whether or not they had ever been arrested or convicted of a criminal offence; and this is a human rights issue. Arguably some of the concern about PLTs is a hangover from another police intelligence role previously discredited by protest groups, the Forward Intelligence Officer (FIO) (Stott et al. 2013). Forward Intelligence Officers were developed for use in protests, following the perceived success of Football Intelligence Officers (or ‘spotters’), who identified fans likely to become involved in criminality. The Forward Intelligence Officer role had been heavily criticised by protest groups for violating rights of privacy and for criminalising peaceful protesters. So, while the theoretical value of the PLT tactic is strong, its success depends on how it is implemented and the ability of the police to create transparent operational and structural divisions between PLTs and criminal intelligence resources (ibid).

The College of Policing, now the professional body for policing, has become the official source of guidance for police practice, referred to as Authorised Professional Practice (APP). Since the launch of the College of Policing website in October 2013, all earlier guidance has been decommissioned, including ACPO guidance on public order policing, such as the Manual of Guidance on Keeping the Peace (ACPO 2010b) and Guidance on Policing Football (ACPO 2010a). These earlier documents and the current Public APP seem to be underpinned by principles of ESIM, with their emphasis on a ‘presumption in favour of peaceful assembly’, proportionality, and the use of ‘engagement and dialogue whenever possible’. However, another important factor influencing police practice is the
training given to officers. A study of public order training (Hoggett & Stott 2010) found that although guidance may advocate negotiated management, taught tactics still tend to revolve around arrest, containment and dispersal. This meant that officers were ill-equipped to deal with approaches emphasising dialogue and facilitation. How officers are trained is often less transparent than practice guidance. For example, the ACPO manual of public order training (ACPO 2004) has been a ‘restricted’ document, only made available to members of the public via a Freedom of Information request.

2.13.2 Paramilitary policing

Running alongside and perhaps counter to these developments towards negotiated management as a way of responding to public order situations there has been a growing use of riot control hardware. The preparedness of the police to respond began to be expanded and refined during the 1970s, in part due to panic by the establishment following a miners' dispute in 1972, which resulted in the Saltley coke depot being closed after a six-day struggle (Reiner 2010, p.85). The Metropolitan Police had already developed a paramilitary role to help deal with public order and terrorism in the 1960s, but it was only after 1974 that all forces formed Police Support Units (PSUs). These special units were referred to as 'third forces', albeit located within the organisation rather than a separate force along the lines of the French Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (SRS). Shields were first used at Lewisham and Nottingham Hill in 1977, replacing the traditional protection of dustbin lids (ibid); and what has been termed the 'militarisation of policing' continued apace following the urban disorders of the early-1980s. It was during these riots that CS gas was first used on mainland Britain in a riot context. High speed driving of police vehicles to disperse the crowds was also used. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in unprecedented numbers of both police and civilians injured in the 1980s riots. This did not deter Thatcher's government from agreeing tougher tactics, equipment and legal powers for police to deal with rioters; specifically, the use of water cannon, CS gas, and plastic bullets if Chief Constables wanted them. These developments displaced Dixon of Dock Green for Darth Vader at least in public order policing (ibid, p.87).

Following the 2011 English Riots, there were immediate calls for harsh and exceptional remedies, including equipping police with water cannon and rubber bullets and even bringing armed forces onto the streets (Tyler 2013). The government also announced a huge expansion in riot training for police and proposed an expansion of police powers to impose a curfew in a riot situation with the possibility of extending that curfew in order to ‘keep the public off the streets
in a given location, for a given period of time’ (Fekete 2013). Liberty (2012, p.9) condemned this idea, claiming that it aligned the UK with the military dictatorships we ‘have been rightly quick to condemn during the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa’. Boris Johnson, as Mayor of London, bought three water cannon for the Metropolitan Police force, at a cost of more than £200,000 plus an additional £5,000 per month for storing them (Snowdon 2016). The purchase went ahead despite Peter Fahy, as the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, telling the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011b) that using water cannon and baton rounds would have been ‘very, very difficult’ in the sort of ‘fluid...fast moving situation’ that his officers faced during the 2011 disturbances. Theresa May, as Home Secretary announced in July 2015 that she would not be giving permission for police to use the cannon for riot control, citing safety fears as a major factor.

Ideas about police weaponry sit alongside more general debates about ‘paramilitary policing’, which some commentators argue entails an inevitable amplification of disorder (Jefferson 1990). This is because preparing for the 'worse case' scenario contains the germ of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conversely, paramilitary policing is thought to promote a peaceful resolution because militarised organisation keeps officers under close command (Waddington 1993). This 'command and control' approach is meant to suppress the discretion of individual officers and mitigate police subcultural values that glorify 'action and excitement' (Holdaway 1983) in the context of public order events, which have the potential for large scale disturbances and violence, leading to deaths, as was the case in 2011. It is argued that riot equipment is merely defensive and protects police employees working in a hazardous environment, which goes unquestioned in other areas of employment, such as the fire service (Waddington 1993). A BBC news article (Kelly & Fraser 2011) on the 9 August 2011 discussed the merits of using weaponry to stop the riots. It contained a warning from Shirlow, a public order expert, that although water cannon can be a useful way of containing rioters by directing them into a specific area, because it has never been used in Great Britain before, the authorities risk ‘sending out a message that we have lost control’ and inflaming tensions ‘in a country that has never been comfortable with the idea of militarisation’. This highlights how the social context can affect how styles of policing and tactics are perceived by the public and, hence, the reaction they are met with.
2.14 Conclusion

The literature points to the importance of styles and techniques of policing that treat people fairly. Procedural fairness is more important than outcomes for building police legitimacy and compliance with the law. Repressive and discriminatory policing has historically been associated with poor police-community relations, which at times as resulted in outright conflict.

Advocates of ambient policing may have understood the importance of police-community relations, but not necessarily how to improve them. An emphasis on a visible police presence can serve to undermine police ratings in two ways: by the unfair actions of street-based officers; and by positioning security as the dominant discourse for understanding social problems, which can make people feel less secure.

Whilst legislation is essential for setting out the legal boundaries for police conduct, concerns have been expressed about its ability to regulate discretionary practice. Performance management seems to have been slightly more successful in influencing police practice, albeit towards crime-related targets. Yet, performance management is credited with the potential to promote professional and ethical standards as a better approach to legitimate the police and make people feel secure.

Rebalancing control of the police has been a long-running debate, with proponents of democratic policing against both centralising tendencies and approaches that may confer advantage to the vocal majority at the expense of quieter groups in a bid for community empowerment. Their preference is for full representation in the consultation process, with a final weighing of public views against the general principle of equity.

Of particular importance moving forward into the empirical research is the role of police discretion in promoting order and legitimacy, on the one hand, and fostering unrest on the other, dependent upon perceptions of fair treatment. This applies both in the context of community policing and public order policing. In a crowd situation, fair treatment can avoid provocation and prevent discrepant elements uniting against the police. Thus, fair treatment, legitimacy, and the perception of police accountability, will be explored as potential explanations for where disorder occurred in 2011.
Chapter 3 - Methodology chapter

3.1 Introduction

This chapter documents how the literature and the theoretical framework, covered in the preceding chapters, have influenced the design of the empirical investigation. The aims and research questions are restated before going on to demonstrate the logic linking the research questions and their relevant theoretical propositions to the empirical research strategy. The case study method chosen for this study is justified according to the aims of the research and the epistemological framework. A researcher’s view of how the social world can be 'known' will have an overarching influence on the study. Thus, this is made explicit, explaining how critical realism is operationalised using Layder’s adaptive approach to discover findings both inductively and deductively through the processes of transcription and qualitative and quantitative data analysis. The chapter details how the study was conceived and revised over time to take account of problems and opportunities encountered along the way. The initial design is compared to what was achieved in practice, reflecting on the implications for the quality and rigour of the study. Ethical issues are considered, particularly in terms of the costs and benefits for the people involved in the study. Finally, attempts are made to locate the researcher within the study, to demonstrate how the social and personal characteristics of the researcher affect the co-production of the data with participants, as this may have a bearing on the possible replication of the study.

3.2 Aims and research questions

The study was prompted by the 2011 English Riots, which lasted four days, beginning in Tottenham and eventually spreading to 66 locations across the country. The literature emerging shortly after these riots offered a broad consensus on why the rioting erupted in Tottenham. This was due to the police killing of a young Black resident and the police mishandling of a community protest about this. There was less agreement about why disorder occurred in other parts of the country, especially outside London. As detailed in Chapter 1, commentators referred to various contextual factors including criminality, poor police-community relations, relative deprivation, social exclusion, and weak community bonds. Yet, there was little empirical evidence showing how these factors ‘caused’ unrest, or how they were mitigated in non-riot affected localities. The present study hopes to makes a distinct contribution to criminological knowledge by addressing this gap in understanding.
Linked to findings spotlighting the role of the police in previous disturbances, and recognising that social order maintenance is an explicit function of police in the UK, the research focused on the activity of the police and policing partners in the 2011 English riots. Recognising that policing activity does not take place in isolation, the study additionally sought to explore the role of other contextual factors. Context is assumed to be critical, because ‘what works’ in one place may not work in another, due to nature of the locality, including the physical and social environment. Thus, the over-arching aim of the study was to understand the aetiology of the 2011 English Riots outside London and the objectives were:

1. to understand why riots occurred in some locales, but not others, highlighting the role of both risk and protective factors;
2. to explore the role of police and partners in preventing and containing unrest, as the actors primarily responsible for community safety and public order maintenance; and
3. to identify key contextual factors undermining and promoting order at local levels, which might limit the capability of policing partners to prevent and contain imminent unrest.

This study was intended to be of academic interest, adding to the knowledge base about what urban disorder is, why it happens, and how it might be avoided in the future. The study also intended to have impact beyond academia by providing information and guidance to policymakers and practitioners, who play a more immediate and practical role in preventing and containing disorder. As a result of the research, persons and organisations involved in the maintenance of public order, particularly the police and local government, might be provided with a better understanding of what happened in August 2011 to help prevent and contain violent disorder in the future, tailored to the local context. Interventions which seek to address symptoms rarely lead to long-term outcomes, and so the intention of this study was to provide an understanding of causal processes.

Recognising the possibility that the 2011 English riots may represent a series of multiple riots rather than a single phenomenon (Gorringe & Rosie 2011), a full investigation might involve 66 in-depth case studies - one for each of the localities affected, and even more to understand why other locations were not affected. Clearly this does not fit the realities of time and resources, or even inclination for many researchers. Another approach, taken by this study, is to take stock of existing accounts of the 2011 English Riots, as well as accounts of previous
disorder in the UK and elsewhere; to identify relevant propositions about why the August disturbances occurred ‘when’ and ‘where’ and ‘how’; and then to select a small number of locations as case studies to explore in-depth how these propositions fit with the events. The findings can help confirm or dispute existing theory and to suggest further lines of enquiry for future research.

The primary aim of a literature review is to develop sharper and more insightful questions, rather than to determine the answers about what is known on a topic, as is often thought (Yin 2003, p.9). The research questions developed from the literature and which inform the empirical investigation within the two case studies, include:

1. What was the nature of the threat / occurrence of disorder? - What happened, where, and who was involved?
2. What was the nature of the police and partner response? - Who was involved and how? What was intended and what happened in practice? How timely and informed was the response?
3. What was the nature of people, place and community in the affected / at risk locales?
4. How did the police and partner response influence social order outcomes?
5. How did local contextual factors play a role in promoting/undermining social order?
6. How prepared are police and partners to respond to future threats of urban unrest? – What lessons have been learnt and how have these been put into practice? How has capability been affected by recent organisational changes?

These six questions interrelate and combine to meet the aims of the study and break the study down into manageable themes. Three are ‘what’ questions, and therefore exploratory in nature, including ‘what was the nature of the disorder?’; ‘what was known about the police and partner response?’; and ‘what was the nature of the communities affected?’ It is important to establish the ‘what’ before progressing to any ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions, which are explanatory types of inquiry. For example, ‘how did the response influence social order outcomes?’
(question 4), required information regarding the nature of the disorder and the nature of the policing response (questions 1 and 2 respectively). Similarly, answering 'how did local contextual factors play a role in promoting/undermining social order' (question 5) required information about the nature of the case study locales (question 3). Considering 'how prepared are police and partners to respond to future threats of urban unrest' (question 6), required information on lessons learnt in preventing and containing unrest (question 4) and key contextual factors (question 5), alongside additional information about police and partner resources, skills, policies and practice, that may affect how this learning can be operationalised.

3.3 Epistemological framework

The study is approached from a critical realist perspective. Critical realism was pioneered by Roy Bhasker (1978; 1979; 1989). It assumes that social structures (patterns of social relationships and social institutions that together compose society) have some form of independent existence, but that these structures are created by people, especially powerful groups pursuing their interests at the expense of less powerful groups. Social structures are assumed to be ‘real’ only in their effects; and ‘causal relations’ exist but they are highly specific in time and space. The research explored how individuals and groups were pressurised and constrained by social structures in the context of urban unrest. Accepting that public order policing is an emotive subject (D. Waddington 1998), the aim was to provide a thorough and fair-minded view of the facts. People were expected to have different perspectives on events in August 2011 linked to their whereabouts and specific role at the time; as well as the ‘positioning’ of events by powerful forces since they occurred. Critical realists can accept the ‘reality’ of competing accounts, but maintain the possibility and importance of critically evaluating why they compete and, based on the general weight of the evidence, aim to make reasonable conclusions about what actually happened.

Critical realism has roots in Marxism, which maintains that social structures are not only unobservable, they are often disguised by ideology, which is the dominant set of social norms and values promulgated by ruling groups to justify and protect their position in society (see Farganis 2004). The Marxist notion of ideology sets up the possibility of a distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ in the realm of ideas. This provides a rationale for the study of unobservable social structures and requires that concepts and theories are judged more in terms of their logical coherence and explanatory power, than their conformity with empirical evidence.
Taken to the extreme this ‘rationalism’ can abandon the world of experience, activity and observation and can justify ‘abandoning the subject’ (Layder 2006). Critical realism offers a more satisfactory resolution by recommending the study of underlying (and to some extent unobservable) social phenomena together with the subjective experience. The unobservable can by studied because ‘real’ generative mechanisms, which exist independently of but are capable of producing patterns of events and behaviour, can be ‘out of phase with the actual patterns of events’, making it both necessary to carry out research and possible to assess the validity of research results (Bhasker 1978). Similarly, experiences can be ‘out of phase’ with ‘actual’ events, and this is why a rigorous scientific method and trained researchers are so important.

Critical realism bridges the binary divide between positivism and social constructionism. Positivism emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the aim of studying human behaviour in the same way as the natural sciences. Positivist researchers assumed that ‘sense data’ provided ‘real facts’ about the social world, which could be reported dispassionately by the scientific observer. They preferred experimental approaches, using quantitative rather than qualitative data. Their social scientific method was seen to be the initial collection of facts, followed by the formulation of a theoretical hypothesis, by logical processes, and then the rigorous testing of that hypothesis, to verify or falsify it. Any necessary modification of the hypothesis was re-tested, and so on. This process became known as the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ method. Under the influence of Karl Popper, it came to be seen as the paradigmatic procedure for generating valid knowledge in the twentieth century (Bottoms 2008). Post-positivists have since ‘jettisoned’ the unsustainable notion that facts are theory-neutral (Bottoms 2008), but still continue to focus on the concepts of cause and explanation, to prefer quantitative data, and to use the ‘hypothetico-deductive’ method. A key strength of the hypothetico-deductive method is its emphasis on systematic and rigorous testing of theoretical ideas and hypotheses.

Compared with positivism (and post-positivism), social constructionists put more emphasis on the meaning of social actions to actors, as a way of uncovering the deep cultural meanings and normative bonds that are assumed to be important in everyday social life. Ethnography is a method used by social constructionists as a means of accessing this type of meaning via in-depth qualitative data produced from the researcher’s documented experiences, observations and interviews with the people in a real-world context. This typically requires the emersion of the researcher in the real-world context alongside the subjects being studied, and often their participation as well. Constructionists are usually suspicious of
theoretical generalisations, and insofar as they do generalise, they have a strong preference for the inductive rather than the deductive approach to theory construction. However, the inductive, or ‘grounded theory’ approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967), implies the existence of theory-neutral facts and its prioritisation of qualitative data seems as unjustified as the positivists’ prioritisation of quantitative data.

This study seeks to bring together the strengths of grounded theory and the hypothetico-deductive method by using the ‘adaptive theory’ approach developed by Derek Layder (1998). This approach regards induction and deduction ‘as equally important and mutually influential approaches to knowledge, according to different empirical and theoretical circumstances. The latter will reflect the ongoing nature of particular research projects.’ (p36). The adaptive approach recommends that researchers be aware of the ‘theory-ladenness’ of data. This requires researchers to construct an explicit ‘theoretical scaffold’ from the outset of the research process. These ‘theories (including frameworks and perspectives) should never be imposed on the research data as total systems of explanation. Rather they should be suggestive, sensitising and informative regards possible lines of enquiry and explanation’ (Layder 2006). Moreover, these pre-developed theories can be modified at any stage in the research (through the processes of induction or formal testing of hypotheses); and modifications may be relatively slight or fundamental. Adaptive theory also advocates ‘pragmatism’ in encouraging researchers to utilise both quantitative and qualitative data, as appropriate to the phenomena and theoretical underpinnings of the study.

3.4 Case study method

The research design is summarised in the diagram below (Figure 3.1). The research design is a ‘blueprint’ of the study (Yin 2003). Its purpose is to avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address the research questions. Thus, it deals with logical problems, rather than logistical ones. The diagram shows how the empirical strategy was built upwards from the research questions, which were already informed by the overall aims of the study. It shows how the type of inquiry, together with the proposition(s), determined the nature of the evidence required for each question. It followed that the case study was the most appropriate research method. This is because the case study method can be used for different types of research question and can deal with a variety of evidence. Perhaps the most important justification for choosing the case study method, however, was its ability to study phenomena in its real-life context, especially where the boundaries
between the phenomenon and the context are not clear. Question 5 refers explicitly to context, although the importance of the real-life context is assumed across the study.

According to Thomas (2011), ‘a case study provides a form of inquiry that elevates a view of life in its complexity’. Experiments, for example, deliberately divorce phenomenon from context to focus attention on only a few variables. Surveys can try to deal with phenomena and context but their ability to investigate context is extremely limited (Yin 2003). The case study recognises that the phenomenon and context are not always distinguishable, and so investigates both. Yin’s definition of the case study captures this:

A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (p.13)

The case study method is also preferred for the investigation of contemporary events where behavioural manipulation is neither possible nor desirable. While the 2011 riots occurred in the past, they can be investigated as a ‘contemporary event’ because relevant persons were still alive to report what happened, albeit retrospectively.

Some social scientists believe that the case study has implications for the kind of data that are collected, and how these are analysed (Hammersely & Gomm 2000). In particular, the case study implies the collection of unstructured data, and qualitative analysis of those data. Others argue that the case study strategy should not be confused with qualitative research (Yin 2003). Ethnography is a qualitative strategy which similarly aims to provide close-up detailed observation of the natural world, but does not necessarily produce case studies (ibid). Conversely, case studies do not have to include observations as a source of evidence. They might include, and even be limited to, quantitative evidence. Ethnography was not considered a suitable approach for this study for several reasons. Firstly, because the events of August 2011 were historical and so could not be observed directly. Secondly, capturing the lived experience of communities was not a primary aim of the study. In accordance with a critical realist perspective, it was assumed that local accounts of the events may not be the ‘real’ or the whole explanation, particularly with regard to the explanatory power of structural factors. Thirdly, this study intended to explore existing theories of causation, unlike ethnography which largely claims to enter the field with no prior commitment to a theoretical model (Van Maanen et al. 1982).
Figure 3.1: Summary of the research design

1. "What was the nature of the threat / occurrence of disorder?"
   - Research Question: Exploratory / confirmatory
   - Proposition(s): Mainly attacks on police, with little looting, by young people of black/mixed heritage from a few deprived inner city neighbourhoods
   - Data Sources: Written documents, TV, radio and online material, incident data, interviews

2. "What was the nature of the police and partner response?"
   - Research Question: Exploratory / confirmatory
   - Proposition(s): Little known - assume some differences between riot and non-riot-affected cases
   - Data Sources: Written documents, TV, radio and online material, social statistics, interviews

3. "What was the nature of people, place and community in the affected / 'at risk' locales?"
   - Research Question: Exploratory / confirmatory
   - Proposition(s): Little known - assume some differences between riot and non-riot-affected cases
   - Data Sources: Written documents, TV, radio and online material, social statistics, interviews

4. "How did the police and partner response influence social order outcomes?"
   - Research Question: Explanatory
   - Proposition(s): Social order promoted by a pro-active, inter-agency approach using local officers & practitioners, focused on liaison with at risk groups and timely arrest of offenders
   - Data Sources: Written documents, TV, radio and online material, interviews

5. "How did local contextual factors play a role in promoting / undermining social order?"
   - Research Question: Explanatory
   - Proposition(s): Social order undermined by relative deprivation, social exclusion, weak community cohesion, and poor police / agency-community relations & local accountability
   - Data Sources: Written documents, TV, radio and online material, interviews

6. "How prepared are police and partners to respond to future threats of urban unrest?"
   - Research Question: Exploratory / Explanatory
   - Proposition(s): Capability undermined by recent austerity measures
   - Data Sources: Written documents, TV and radio reports, interviews
3.4.1 Theory and generalisation in case study research

The role of theory development prior to data collection, is a key point of difference between case studies and related methods such as ethnography and grounded theory, which typically avoid specifying any theoretical propositions at the outset of the inquiry (Yin 2003). The case study design requires ‘a [hypothetical] story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur’ (Sutton & Staw 1995, p.378). Schuller (1988) uses the metaphor of a piece of string to illustrate the importance of theory in making the case study both purposeful and manageable. The researcher must ask not only how long is the piece of string, but also how thick it is, and how close or loose its weave. Length is fundamental and relates to when the study starts and finishes. The thickness of the string relates to the different strands or elements of the study, making the string thinner or thicker. The weave refers to the degree of detail incorporated in the study; the more detail that is omitted, the looser the weave. However, a denser weave is not necessarily better, if the detail does not support the research questions. Sometimes a looser weave is more effective (p61). A pre-developed theory can ensure the researcher does not get lost in the case, by defining what is relevant and can realistically be achieved within the resources available for the study.

It is argued that notions of intrinsic worth relax the requirements on researchers to proceed in principled ways (Gomm et al. 2000), which may be responsible for another prevalent criticism of the case study method, concerning its lack of rigor (Yin 2003). Consequently, Gomm et al. (2000) take the view that most case study research must be directed towards drawing general conclusions, either by the process of 'theoretical inference' or 'empirical' or 'statistical generalisation'. Theoretical inference is what happens with a given degree of probability in a certain type of theoretically defined situation. Empirical generalisation draws inferences about features of a larger but finite population of cases from the study of a sample drawn from that population. For example, if half of a study population had been a victim of violent crime, an empirical generalisation would infer from this that half of the whole population had been a victim of violent crime. The authors acknowledge that the greater the heterogeneity of the population, the more problematic are empirical generalisations based on a single case, or handful of cases. However, Gomm et al. suggest it is possible to take account of population heterogeneity in two complementary ways: (1) by using theoretical ideas and information about the case and the population in their analyses; and (2) by selecting cases for study on the basis of such ideas and information. This would be similar to quota or stratified sampling in survey research, whereby respondents are selected into a sample on the basis of pre-specified characteristics so that the
total sample has the same distribution of characteristics assumed to exist in the population being studied.

Some authors suggest that social science can only ever achieve theoretical generalisation. Yin (2003, p.10) argues that both case studies and experiments are only generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations of the universe: ‘in doing a case study your goal will be to expand and generalise theories and not to enumerate frequencies’. Even statistical generalisation, which requires numbers of cases, is merely about the concomitant variation of two characteristics, and analysts must always go beyond the sample and resort to theoretical thinking to link those characteristics together (Mitchell 1983). Thus, case studies are just as good a basis for such inference as other sorts of studies. The propositions underpinning the case study design are the main vehicle for generalising the results. The question is not whether case studies can legitimately be used in reaching generalisations, but from what one can reasonably generalise to what (Platt 1988). Cronbach (1975, p.125) reminds us that ‘when we give proper weight to local conditions, any generalisation is a working hypothesis, not a conclusion’ and another community may still require its own evaluation.

It is often suggested that a key weakness in the use of a single case study or just a small number of cases, is that it is too easy to devise an interpretation to fit them; and so the interpretation offered cannot even be treated as valid for the particular case(s). However, the strength of the case study approach lies in the nature of the data (Platt 1988). If there is a rich and detailed account of many features of the case(s), it may be a considerable achievement to devise an interpretation which can deal with all of them, and this may be harder to do than the fitting of superficial generalisations to larger numbers. On the ability of the case study method to provide generalizable findings, one can conclude that:

There seems no reason to except case studies from the normal assumption that one can reasonably make generalisations from what one knows already until information inconsistent with this becomes available; whatever is true in one instance should also be true of other instances of the same sort. (p.18)

The difficulty lies in establishing which instances are of the same sort in relevant aspects. This again supports the need for an appropriate base of information, or ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973). The issue of what constitutes thick description, however, has not been completely resolved, in part because relevant descriptors for facilitating transferability depends on assumptions about the ways in which other cases are likely to be similar or different (Lincoln & Guba 2000).
3.4.2 The case study design

The case study design for this research involved two cities as the primary cases and two neighbourhood subcases in each of these cities. The subcases were a methodological tool for accessing data on community level variables. The two cities were Nottingham, which experienced two nights of disturbances in August 2011, and Sheffield, which experienced no major disorder, but was considered to be at risk of rioting by local agencies. The rationale for a single case study may be to investigate a critical case in testing a well-formulated theory; to describe or explore an extreme or unique case; to capture the circumstances and conditions of a commonplace situation; a revelatory case, previously inaccessible to scientific investigation; or to explore change over time, revisiting the same case at two time-points (Yin 2003). However, a major drawback of the single case design is that the case may turn out not to represent what it was thought to be at the outset. Moreover, it is argued that empirical results are more potent if two or more cases support the same theory (Yin 2003; Platt 1988).

Another reason for multiple cases is that they offer the potential to hold some factors constant while others are examined, with differences imputed to the remaining factors. This is like the ‘replication’ logic used in experimental research, whereby a significant finding from a single experiment would be re-tested by duplicating the exact conditions or altering some of the conditions to see whether the finding can be duplicated (Yin 2003, p.47). In case study research, replication logic can be applied in two ways, either as a ‘literal replication’, selecting cases that predict the same results; or a ‘theoretical replication’, selecting cases that predict contrasting results, but for predictable reasons (ibid). The design of this study was underpinned by the logic of theoretical replication. The two cities were selected on the basis that they had contrasting social order outcomes for predictable reasons. The predictable reasons were assumed to be the theoretical propositions outlined in research questions 3 and 4.

The study was designed according to the working hypothesis that in August 2011 major disorder occurred in Nottingham and not in Sheffield due to the different nature of the police and partner response, police/agency-community relations, and intra-community relations in the two cities. More specifically, the empirical design sought to test the hypothesis that Nottingham experienced major disorder because the police and partner response was less cohesive, proactive, and less focused on liaison with at risk groups; and the affected communities were more marginalised, less cohesive, and had poorer relationships with the police and other public agencies compared to ‘at risk’ communities in Sheffield.
Nottingham and Sheffield were selected due to a combination of theoretical and practical reasons. Both belonged to the ‘core cities group’, a partnership of eight of England’s largest cities outside London. Of the cities in the affected and unaffected groups, Nottingham and Sheffield were well matched in terms of size and social characteristics, including those associated with disorder in the literature. As Table 3.1 shows, in 2011, the cities were broadly comparable in terms of deprivation, ethnic diversity and levels of crime. Compared to Sheffield, Nottingham had a marginally smaller population (305.5K compared to 552.5K), but greater ethnic diversity (29% non-White compared to 16%) and deprivation (ranked 20th most deprived local authority compared to 56th). Nottingham also had a higher incidence of crime (71 notifiable offences per 1K population compared to 52), including proportionally more violence offences. These were key contextual variables in the explanatory model of disorder for this study (see Figure 3.2). ‘Controlling’ for these put other explanatory variables – such as the nature of the policing response, police/agency-community relations, and the nature of community – in the spotlight, as per the quasi-experimental method. From a practical perspective, Nottingham and Sheffield were also geographically close to each other, and not too far away from the researcher’s location, making fieldwork manageable.

| Table 3.1: Social characteristics of the case studies, reflecting broad comparability |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Population                               | Nottingham      | Sheffield       |
| No. of usual residents ¹                  | 305,680          | 552,698         |
| Ethnicity                                | % BME (non-White groups) ¹ | 28.5           | 16.3           |
| Deprivation                              | Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) rank (of 326 districts) ² | 20             | 56             |
| Crime                                    | No. of total notifiable offences per 1K population³ | 71             | 52             |
| Violence                                 | No. of violence with injury offences per 1K population³ | 10             | 5              |

¹ Census 2011, published by ONS
² Indices of Deprivation 2010: Local Authority Summaries, supplied by DCLG, published by ONS. Rank of 1 indicates the district is the most deprived according to the measure and a rank of 326 indicates the district is the least deprived
³ Notifiable Offences Recorded by the Police, 2011/2012, supplied by Home Office, published by ONS
Experiments are done when a researcher can manipulate behaviour directly and systematically. Quasi-experiments are used when no direct manipulation is possible, but some control can still be achieved by selecting cases that are matched according to certain characteristics under investigation (Spilerman 1971). The ability of researchers to delimit the range of situations, for example by ‘matching’ comparator groups, is influenced by natural variation in the population of cases and the measures available to gauge this variation. Researchers often rely on social statistics collated by government and public agencies to match people and places, although these come with caveats regarding completeness and accuracy. Much has been written about the ‘dark figure’ of crime, which is omitted from official statistics due to under-reporting and under-recording of offences (see
Coleman & Moynihan 1996). Cronbach (1975) raises a more fundamental concern about fixing aspects of the conditions under which the subject is observed. He suggests this may conceal the interactions of any fixed aspect, which may be pulled into the main effect or into the interactions of other variables, and may even wipe out a real main effect of the variable that chiefly concerns the researcher. Arguably, however, this risk is mitigated in case study research by the focus on contextual factors and not merely the main phenomenon.

A ‘nested’ case study design was used to facilitate access to relevant data on contextual variables, which included the nature of community and police/agency-community relations. ‘Community’ is a complex and contested concept, which can refer to a community of place (contained within specific boundaries and rooted in a particular social, physical, cultural and economic context); a community of identity (composed of people with a common culture often related to shared ethnic or religious characteristics); or a community of interest (comprising people who share in an activity or interest, for example work, leisure, politics, religion) (Platts-Fowler & Robinson 2013). For this research, community of place was deemed most relevant, and the neighbourhood is a good proxy for this. This focus on neighbourhoods is not to deny that people are likely to be members of multiple communities that transcend geographical boundaries. However, neighbourhoods are the setting for much of daily life and their form and nature has real consequences for the people who live in them (Martin 2003). Most importantly for this research, the neighbourhood represents a tangible material setting and discernible target for service interventions by police and other public agencies.

The original plan was to focus on just one neighbourhood in each city. In Nottingham, this was to be a neighbourhood acutely affected by disorder and, in Sheffield, a neighbourhood deemed ‘at risk’ of disorder. Riot-affected and at risk neighbourhoods in the two cities were identified through analysis of documentary material and early interviews with local stakeholders. In Sheffield, several neighbourhoods were identified as being at risk in August 2011 by local respondents. The risk was gauged by local stakeholders on the basis of neighbourhood levels of deprivation, crime, ethnic diversity, and proportion of young people with little to do and little to lose, demonstrating some shared understanding with the researcher about factors promoting and undermining urban unrest. However, none of the respondents identified police/agency-community relations as a risk factor; so either this was not recognised as a risk factor for urban unrest generally, or not in the Sheffield context.
The revised decision to focus on two neighbourhoods per city was made a short way into the fieldwork as a combination of pragmatic and theoretically ‘interesting’ opportunities presented themselves. The decision was partially determined by who agreed to participate in the research. Interviews in the original target neighbourhood in Nottingham proved difficult to arrange at first, and opportunities arose to speak to target groups in another neighbourhood similarly affected by disturbances in 2011. A potential downside of increasing the number of study sites is that the researcher’s time and resource is spread more thinly, potentially limiting the depth of the research. However, doubling the number of study neighbourhoods did not double the total number of interviews because a proportion of the target participants worked at the city level, or at least across a wider area of the city than just one neighbourhood. Consequently, interviews with these participants merely needed to cover issues relating to both study neighbourhoods; although perhaps making these interviews longer to conduct, transcribe and analyse.

The first study neighbourhood in Sheffield was chosen because it shared several characteristics with the two riot affected neighbourhoods in Nottingham. Specifically, it had a relatively high African-Caribbean population; it was known for gang-related activity; it was located near the city centre; and local people had experienced antagonistic policing recently preceding the 2011 riots linked to a covert policing operation that had led to the arrest of a large cohort of younger residents. The second study neighbourhood in Sheffield was chosen because it had a record of previous disorder, which occurred annually around Bonfire Night, when local youths set fire to bins and vehicles, and targeted police with fireworks and other missiles. This seemed pertinent given the nature of the 2011 disturbances in Nottingham, which also involved attacks on police officers and property. The second site had a relatively high non-White population like the other three sites, but this was largely South Asian, as opposed to African-Caribbean, providing an opportunity to explore variation within the context of ethnicity.

3.5 Data Collection

The relevant data sources for answering the research questions and therefore meeting the overall aims of the study were decided according to the particular inquiry type and propositions associated with each question, as described above. These data sources included documentation, such as paper documents and online written material; multi-media sources, such as radio, television and video recordings; archival data, such as organisational records and statistics; and face-to-
face interviews. This section will explain specifically why these data sources were appropriate for the study compared to potential alternatives; how the data were collected; and how useful they were in practice, reflecting on the ‘authenticity’ of the data.

The study draws on data that are both qualitative and quantitative in nature, which warrant the study being classed as ‘mixed methods’ research. This may raise issues for researchers who distinguish between qualitative and quantitative methods not on the basis of the type of evidence, but on the basis of wholly different philosophical beliefs. In recognition of this, mixed methods research is referred to as the ‘third path’ (Gorard & Taylor 2004), the ‘third paradigm’ (Denscombe 2008) or the ‘third methodological movement’ (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2003). The first movement is qualitatively oriented, working primarily within the constructivist paradigm and principally interested in narrative data and analyses. The second movement is quantitatively oriented, working primarily within the (post) positivist paradigm and principally interested in numerical data and analyses (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009). The third movement includes mixed methodologists working primarily within the ‘pragmatist’ paradigm and interested in both narrative and numeric data and analyses. This does not mean that ‘anything goes’ (Denscombe 2008), but rather the use of whatever methodological tools are required to answer the research questions under study (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009).

A particular advantage for a study using mixed data sources is the development of converging lines of inquiry, or ‘triangulation’. In the social sciences, triangulation can be traced back to Campbell and Fiske (1959), who argued that more than one method should be used to ensure the variance reflected that of the trait and not of the method. This is termed by Denzin (1978) as the ‘between (or across) methods’ type of triangulation; as opposed to the ‘within-method’ type, which uses multiple techniques within a given method to collect and interpret data, such as having multiple questions within a survey to measure the same phenomena. It is suggested that some studies combine qualitative with quantitative research, not as a third methodology, but to meet a post-positivist research agenda with the aim of achieving more ‘accurate’ results (Meyer 2005; Giddings 2006). They use triangulation only as a means of validation. However, this overlooks the strength of true mixed research methods, which combines qualitative and quantitative research to explore complexities and contradictions in their own right (Denscombe 2008) to capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the phenomena under study (Jick 1979). That is, beyond the analysis of overlapping variances, the use of multiple methods may uncover some unique variance which
may have been missed otherwise. The value of triangulation rests on the premise that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another; although there needs to be some checks that liabilities are not compounded (ibid).

3.5.1 Documentary data

Documentary data were gathered from the outset, to get an overview of what had happened and why in August 2011 in the case study cities and neighbourhoods. National and local newspapers were searched online by day for August, and then again, with no time criteria, but using relevant search terms, such as ‘riots’ ‘disturbances’, ‘disorders’. The searches were refined using search terms specific to events occurring in the two case study cities. For example, there was an incident in Nottingham where rioters climbed onto the roof of a girls’ high school and threw missiles at the police. Hence, the name of this school became a search term. The aim was to collate information on disorder and pre-disorder events. Data on incidents were recorded in a database, with the location, date and time, and details of what and who was involved. This was 'cleaned' of duplicates. In the case of Nottingham, this information was useful context when speaking to police and other stakeholders about events. Appearing to know ‘facts and figures’ helped to build rapport, especially with some police officers, who seemed initially peevved to be speaking to a PhD student. The details from media reports were also used as prompts to seek respondents’ reflection on which accounts were more ‘truthful’.

In addition to media documentation, local reports were identified, such as those written by local organisations in response to the events. In Nottingham this uncovered a report by the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) (One Nottingham 2011). This did not cover the events in any detail, but focused on explanations for their occurrence in Nottingham and the characteristics of the places and people involved. The data on who was involved was based solely on the 117 people arrested for offences associated with the disturbances. This data included where arrestees lived; their biographical characteristics such as sex, age, ethnicity; and whether they were previously known to the police. Of course, this data provided only a partial picture, which may have been changed - slightly or drastically - by the addition of data on those who were not arrested. One police respondent was asked about persons responsible for the damage of forty vehicles parked on a residential street in one of the study neighbourhoods. The response was that ‘no one was caught for that’.

Documentation must not be regarded as a literal recording of events (Yin 2003). Written accounts are as likely as verbal accounts to contain inaccuracies and
biases, because they are both constructed by people, who are fallible and often partisan. It is likely that reports are written with a particular audience in mind. The CDRP is the strategic partnership for the city, comprising a range of organisations from the public, private and voluntary sector. It can be assumed that most of these partners, especially Nottingham City Council, would be mindful of presenting themselves and the city in good light. Thus, we can assume some bias along these lines in the One Nottingham report. This was perhaps reflected in the comment of one respondent, who was frustrated with the city’s focus on public image in the aftermath of the 2011 disturbances because this jeopardised potential learning opportunities:

...we know that we've got to put a public face on things. We've got to give a presentation of it. So, you know, 'the disturbances were superbly managed, great partnership working'; but I was very keen in the aftermath to say 'let’s not get taken in by our own hype'. [Nottingham Manager 6]

The internet has made 'unofficial' accounts of events more accessible. Anyone can post written or visual data on the web. Undoubtedly, there are concerns about the authenticity of online information because it can be posted by anyone (Mack et al. 2008; Litvin et al. 2008; Magnini 2001), but there is also evidence that online information is considered more credible than other traditional sources, dependent upon the author(s) and the message itself (Ismail & Latif 2013). The present study accessed information about events in Nottingham and Sheffield via social media sites, such as YouTube and the 'Sheffield Forum', which is a discussion website used by Sheffield residents and businesses. One YouTube clip showed the attack on Canning Circus Police Station in Nottingham (OfficialLondonRiots 2011). This was recorded using a mobile phone and included a running commentary by the person filming. It was a useful piece of visual data that the study was able to consider alongside the verbal account provided by Assistant Chief Constable Broadbent at the Home Affairs Committee (Home Affairs Committee 2011c). The YouTube clip contradicted Mr Broadbent’s claim that the disturbances were not riots because at no point were there 12 or more people together for a common purpose with intent to commit the act of rioting. The film commentary claimed ‘there’s quite a lot of them’ and the image showed at least 12 people involved.

The original plan was to obtain data of public order incidents recorded by the police during the August 2011 disturbances. These were to be analysed alongside the incident database constructed using documentary sources. Relevant police officers were asked during interview about the possibility of acquiring incident data, as well any reports referring to key events. Police respondents were relaxed
talking about the details of incidents during interview, but nervous at the prospect of sharing any official archival material. The response given by several people was that someone else would need to be contacted, or that they would have to check with someone else first. Follow up emails and telephone calls about obtaining the police data were ignored, and the incident data was never obtained. Assurances had been given about the researcher’s experience of working with police data and of data-sharing and storage protocols, so this was unlikely to have been the barrier. Eventually it was decided that the study should proceed without the police incident data. Documentary sources had produced some aggregate figures on the number of police recorded incidents and officers deployed during the riots, as well as the nature of some key events. This was considered sufficient for the study aims. Moreover, there was some concern that further chasing of the incident data might sour ongoing relations with Nottinghamshire Police.

3.5.2 Interviews

Interviews were the study's main source of data collection. Interviewing involves the researcher asking questions of one or more people. Interviewing can be used for a variety of purposes, but in the context of research, it is technique used for the purpose of improving knowledge (Wengraf 2001). An interview is a special type of conversational interaction, which must be planned and prepared for in advance, like other forms of research activity. This study used semi-structured interviews. These tend to have some pre-planned questions or topics, but also have a degree of openness, which allows the respondent to raise additional issues which may not have been conceived in advance. Thus, semi-structured interviewing fits with Layder's adaptive approach, by seeking knowledge both deductively and inductively.

All interviews need to be fully planned to ensure that the data produced is tailored to the aims of the study. Semi-structured interviews do not mean half the preparation of fully structured interviews, and in fact the degree of openness in the semi-structured interview can mean they are more challenging to undertake (Wengraf 2001). This is because during a semi-structured interview most of the respondent's responses cannot be predicted. Thus, the interviewer has to improvise, which ‘requires more training and more mental preparation than simply delivering lines prepared and rote-learned in advance’ (p5). Under the right conditions semi-structured interviews can offer more than fully structured ones, but under the wrong conditions they may offer nothing at all (ibid). For example, failure to follow up on an answer or a badly phrased question may result in the 'loss' of relevant data. Considering how the interview has been conducted is
especially important for semi-structured interviews, to consider how the interviewer might have proceeded better by making different decisions. This can be one reason for transcribing and starting to analyse interviews within the fieldwork phase, to improve later interviews, as was done for this study.

As an alternative to interviews, it is argued that observation offers access to ‘naturally occurring’ data, situated interaction in which local meanings are created and sustained (Emerson et al. 1995). Data derived through observation is ‘naturally occurring’ because it ‘appears to arise without an investigator intervening directly or providing some ‘stimulus’ to a group or respondents’ (Silverman 2007, p.50). Silverman (2007, p.60) argues that naturally occurring data is superior to the data ‘manufactured’ by interviews, which take place in 'artificial' research settings imbued with the researcher's own categories, embedded in questions, probes, stimuli, vignettes etc.. Faith is placed in depth interviews because it is assumed that people have a deep interior that can only be accessed through interrogation of what information is held in their brain (p.43-4), rather than observing how ‘experiences’ and ‘motives’ are made available in innumerable everyday contexts (p.46).

Arguably, however, even observed data is 'manufactured' in the sense that 'reality' never speaks for itself but has to be apprehended by the simple logistics of research. There are also specific events that cannot be observed as they naturally occur. Historical events, such as riots, are one example. The importance with interview data is to understand that it is an account which positions itself in a particular context; for example, as somebody responding to an interviewer’s question and as a person claiming a particular identity (e.g. a ‘family member’, a ‘police officer’ etc.), who often has a particular interest in presenting a particular version of events. A respondent’s account will depend on recall, but there is also the possibility that asking someone about past events invites a retrospective ‘re-writing of history’, with an unknown bearing on the causal problem (Garfinkel 1967). Sacks (1992) suggests that telling someone about our experiences involves telling a story, and often story-tellers prefer to display some kind of ‘first hand’ involvement in events. If these contextual factors are taken into account, there is no reason that interviews cannot inform (cautious) conclusions. The researcher must view what people say as ‘an activity awaiting analysis and not as a picture awaiting a commentary’ (Silverman 2007, p.56).

3.5.3 Sampling

This study was not interested in the general population, but in specific ‘types’ of people involved in the events of August 2011 in specific areas of Sheffield and
Nottingham. Interviewees were therefore ‘purposively sampled’. This is where people are selected based on the purpose of the study and knowledge of the relevant population(s). This compares to ‘random sampling’, which aims for an unbiased selection of individuals, so that if many samples were drawn, the average sample would accurately represent the population, and findings could be generalised to the population. The following types of people were considered important to the study and represented the sampling framework for each of the case study cities:

1. **Public order police** - including strategic, tactical and frontline officers, as well as communications and planning officers involved in the response.
2. **Neighbourhood Policing Teams** - including police officers and police community support officers (PCSOs) in position at the time of the disorders.
3. **Partner agencies** – managerial/strategic level positions in public agencies in the statutory, voluntary or private sectors involved in the public order response or working with residents in the study neighbourhoods.
4. **Community** - community-based practitioners and representatives including youth workers, community development officers, local faith-based organisations, ward councillors, and community activists.

These groups were not mutually exclusive. Police officers working in neighbourhood policing teams might also be public order officers. There was also some difficulty deciding on the two non-police categories. Initially they were defined as statutory stakeholders and voluntary-community sector stakeholders. However, as fieldwork began there was a realisation that strategic and managerial roles in the statutory sector and voluntary-community sector had more in common with each other than they did with practitioners in their own sector. Moreover, variations in public provision, particularly with regards to outsourcing, meant that the same role could reside in different sectors in the two case study cities. For the purposes of the study then, community-based practitioners and representatives regardless of their sector were defined as ‘community stakeholders’, and all operational and strategic managers were termed ‘policing partners’. Allocation to a stakeholder group was done pre-interview as part of the sampling, but sometimes re-allocation was necessary post-interview.

A target of 60 interviews was set, to be equally divided between the two case studies. This was deemed the maximum achievable with the timeframe and resources of the study. Ideally the number of interviews would be determined by
the ‘saturation point’, which is the point at which the researcher stops hearing anything new in relation to the research questions. Although, one can never really know if another interview might offer something novel. Table 3.2 shows the number of interviews targeted and achieved by type and city. It shows that in the end only 45 interviews were achieved, mainly due to problems accessing community-based participants, who were reluctant to engage with the research. The reasons for this are discussed in more detail below.

The refusal rate was 35 per cent across the two cases studies, meaning that just over a third of people contacted never responded or directly refused to participate in the research. However, this figure does not represent the effort dedicated to accessing people considered to be key actors. These were individuals who been recommended multiple times due to their important role in events taking place in August 2011 or their significance within the study neighbourhoods. One community practitioner in Nottingham was contacted several times by phone, by email and a personal introduction took place, arranged by an existing participant, and yet an interview never materialised. However, with other individuals, efforts did pay off. In any case, these efforts were critical to the success of the study. A larger sample of ‘easier’ participants could have been achieved, but the aim was for ‘quality over quantity’. For the rigor of the case study comparison it can be regarded as an achievement that the final samples were broadly similar in size and type across the two cities.

Table 3.2: Number of interviews targeted and achieved, by group and case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nottingham</th>
<th>Sheffield</th>
<th>Both Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Ach’d</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPTs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Agencies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>-6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Refusal rates: Nottingham 38% (12), Sheffield 32% (12), Total 35% (24)

3.5.4 Access

To access police officers as participants for the study, the first step was a formal letter to the Chief Constables in Nottinghamshire and South Yorkshire Police Forces. It was anticipated from the outset that a key obstacle for the study would be gaining the consent of Nottinghamshire Police, which was likely to be concerned with the presentation of their policing approach, specifically because
riots did occur. With no rioting in Sheffield, South Yorkshire Police had less to fear. With some surprise, both police forces offered their support for the research relatively easily and quickly. The only concession made to South Yorkshire Police was that the force logo would appear on research documents used with officers participating in the study, such as information sheets and consent forms. This had the potential to undermine the independence of the study and so organisational independence and the researcher's commitment to anonymity and confidentiality were emphasised in conversation with participants. It was expected that the logo might make some officers more willing to participate, by demonstrating the approval of their organisation. Access to statutory stakeholders was sought in a similar way. Formal letters were sent to the Chief Executives of Nottingham City Council and Sheffield City Council and both offered their support to the research relatively quickly.

Nottinghamshire Police appointed a named contact to provide practical assistance to the study. This person was helpful in identifying officers who had been involved in policing the disorders and those in Neighbourhood Policing Teams at that time. These officers would have been difficult to identify otherwise. The two senior officers in charge of the operation in Nottingham were named in various media reports, but had since left the force. Thus, the named contact was a valuable 'gatekeeper', typically defined as an individual, group or organisation that acts as an intermediary between researchers and participants (De Laine 2000). However, the use of gatekeepers can be problematic. They have the power to grant and withhold access to the people and situations of interest and may influence the research by limiting or providing selective access. In addition to the interviews organised by the appointed gatekeeper, other officers at Nottinghamshire Police were identified via documentary sources and by existing participants in the study. One neighbourhood officer was personally introduced by a community practitioner during a field visit. Recruiting officers via a range of methods ensured a sample that had not been entirely determined by a gatekeeper, whose bias and influence were difficult to gauge.

That said, no gatekeeper can be completely sure, nor control, what officers say in an interview situation, especially when anonymity and confidentiality have been promised by the researcher. In the company of a trusted researcher, Reiner and Newburn (2008) suggest that many police officers are only too glad to talk about their own views and experiences. The formal access granted by police managers is only the first of two 'gates' through which researchers much gain passage (Fox & Lundman 1974). The second gate is the access that must be sought separately from the officers identified for participation in the study. This might also be
defined as the difference between ‘physical access’ and ‘social access’ (Cassell 1988). Physical access does not ensure social access, which depends upon the researcher’s ability to build trust, rapport, and convince the participant of their credibility (Sixsmith et al. 2003). It is at the level of social access where the researcher can overcome some of the bias introduced by gatekeepers.

Beyond Nottinghamshire Police, most interviewees were identified though a version of ‘snowball sampling’, a recruitment method whereby current participants are asked to recommend new people for the study. For this study, it meant asking participants to identify others who had been involved in the 2011 events or had worked in relevant positions, organisations or neighbourhoods. One disadvantage associated with snowball sampling, is the likelihood that participants identify people with similar views to themselves, introducing bias to the study. Police and statutory sector participants were specifically asked to identify community organisations and activists in the study neighbourhoods. This was because, as an outsider, it can be difficult to establish which organisations work in which neighbourhoods, and even more difficult to know which are most valued by that community. This was a key reason for staging interviews with community stakeholders last. Another reason was to provide ample opportunity to pick up on any local sensitivities that might be relevant to fieldwork.

It was assumed that community stakeholders would be the most willing to participate because the research would provide a rare opportunity to present their version of events. This was not the case, particularly in Nottingham. Community stakeholders were reluctant to participate due to concerns about the stigma associated with rioting. One community stakeholder, who finally agreed to participate, angrily reported: ‘for people in this area, it’s still there; the fallout from it is still there; still upset about being associated with it as being a riot. So, no, they’re not happy’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. So, after the relative ease of completing two-thirds of the research interviews, the final third with community stakeholders was more problematic. Emails were often ignored in both Nottingham and Sheffield, possibly because this medium of communication was less routine in their jobs. Telephone numbers were not easy to find, but were marginally more effective. It became apparent that practitioners most valued for their work in the community were the busiest and least likely to prioritise the needs of a researcher over the needs of local people.

3.5.5 Fieldwork tools

Consent forms (see Appendix C) were used with all participants. This was to protect both the participant and the researcher. The researcher would be
protected from any later claims that the interview had been conducted under pretence. No vulnerable groups were knowingly contacted. The interviews were mainly with professionals. The consent form listed details that participants needed to make an informed decision. It made clear that participation was on voluntary basis. This was particularly important where the individual’s organisation had agreed to support the project. Individuals needed to know that organisational support did not make their participation compulsory. Participants were required to sign the form to show they had understood the purposes of the research and had consented to their involvement, as defined in a separate participant information sheet (see Appendix B). These together formed the basis of the research ‘contract’. The participant information sheet additionally set out the commitment to confidentiality and anonymity and the secure storage of any data collected from them. There was an option to leave some sections of the consent form unsigned. For example, one participant did not agree for their interview data to be used in any relevant future research.

The interview topic guides (see Appendix D) were devised to reflect the research questions. Additionally, the four stakeholder groups were asked specific questions acknowledging their 'position' in relation to events. For example, public order officers were expected to know more about the public order approach and tactics used and how these were communicated from strategic command to frontline officers. Neighbourhood Police Officers were thought to be better placed to reflect on the nature of place and community in the study neighbourhoods; police-community relations; local partnership working; and, of course, their own involvement (or lack of) in public order events. Policing partners were asked to reflect on partnership working within and across their organisations both prior to and during the events. Community stakeholders were expected to know about the nature of community; community relations with police and other public agencies; how local people felt about events and the policing response in 2011; and possibly ‘why’ local people were involved. It was also necessary to tailor the wording of some interview questions according to the city and particular study neighbourhood.

As the interviews progressed, the base schedules were adapted to build in specific questions that picked up on specific events and issues mentioned by previous respondents. For example, if a pre-disorder event had previously been reported, this was used as a probe to seek more information about the event. This technique was also a form of ‘within-method’ validation. The lead question for the interviews was variously changed across the first few interviews to see which would work best. The lead question can play an important role in setting the tone of the
interview and can serve to put respondents at ease or make them uncomfortable, suspicious, and worse, uncooperative. An early version of the topic guide led with a question asking respondents to reflect on why the disorders occurred in Nottingham or why they didn’t occur in Sheffield. Another version led with a question asking respondents about their role. The latter worked better in terms of putting respondents at ease; no doubt, because people feel more comfortable talking about their job than about their opinions, which may involve thinking about what is the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ opinion to have.

Another important fieldwork tool was a digital voice recorder to record the interviews and make possible verbatim transcription for analysis. All participants were asked whether they were comfortable with the voice recorder and informed that the recording would be stored securely and used only for the purposes of the research. Everyone agreed to be recorded. Many police officers quipped that they were used to being recorded anyway. However, one officer did email the day after the interview to confirm again that the recording would only be used for research purposes. This triggered interest in what they may have said in the interview that was particularly sensitive or controversial. Another participant adopted a whispering technique to avoid certain things being recorded, and possibly heard by others. The voice recorder was, however, sensitive enough to capture this whispering, making it possible to include this data in the analysis. Unfortunately two interviews went unrecorded, including one because the battery died at the start of the interview (after a full day of interviewing on a partial battery) and the other because the record button was never pressed. Notes for these interviews were made contemporaneously and after the interview from memory.

### 3.6 Reflection and reflexivity

Harding (1987) maintains that the researcher must appear ‘not as an invisible, anonymous voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests’. This is important for the study as a whole, but specifically in relation to interview data. Studies have shown that these attempts to create rapport are mediated by the personal characteristics of researchers, such as sex, age, education, race and previous experience can affect rapport. The sex of the researcher is particularly pertinent in researching the police, because police occupational culture promotes masculinity and ‘the denigration of women is a central part of this culture’ (Horn 1997). Although there is some inconsistency in the literature about how rapport affects the interview, it is generally seen to be valuable in motivating the respondent and in generating free and frank answers.
(Goudy & Potter 1975). However, studies have shown that researchers’ perceptions of rapport do not always correlate with data validity (Hill & Hall 1963). An interviewer who thinks they had a good interview because rapport was good may find that the interview was poor in terms of the amount and clarity of data produced. Nevertheless, many researchers retain confidence in rapport as a meaningful component of the interview situation and try to put respondents at ease, often trying to demonstrate that they are of ‘likeable character, worthy of another’s friendship and respect’ (Van Maanen 1981).

It was difficult to know whether some of the male officers interviewed for this study were responding to me based on my femaleness or my position as a student. One officer asserted his position in the interview situation by challenging my right to be there at all. It felt at the time as though the interview depended on my response to determine whether the interview proceeded at all. Before the interview was underway, the officer casually poured himself a hot drink and sat on the other side of the table between us, reclined in his seat with legs crossed casually and assertively, and said ‘so tell me about yourself then’. I felt the need to reach into my employment history to show that I was an experienced and competent researcher, not ‘just’ a PhD student. I felt the need to share that I had held several posts previously that involved close contact with the police, ‘dropping’ the names of senior officers that he would probably recognise to demonstrate that I was in some way qualified to interview him. This technique, although driven by my own insecurity, did seem effective. The officer proceeded on more respectful terms throughout the remainder of the interview. With other officers, I utilised the role of the ‘naive student’, presumed to have little experience of the world outside education, to venture into contentious topics; for example, to access their personal views about local gangs, disorder events and policing practice. From a more ‘expert’ researcher, similar questioning may have closed down dialogue.

I was most surprised, and perhaps upset, by the reaction of some of the community stakeholders to the study and me as a researcher. As mentioned above, some were angered that this research on riots focused on 'their' neighbourhoods in case it caused reputational harm. Linked to this concern was their perception that I was a middle-class educated White woman, who could have little understanding of the lived experience of local people. This perception was communicated to me through respondents' various statements about what it was 'really' like for people living in socially deprived places. One respondent was so sure I did not understand, she insisted on taking me on a tour of the neighbourhood. She pointed out the poor condition of housing, public buildings and the dilapidated youth centre. The respondent seemed almost gleeful showing
me these things because she assumed this provided me fresh and shocking insight. I was torn by the success I had achieved in appearing like I had not grown up in such a place. The long and purposeful process of self-improvement through education and imitation of middle-class appearance, speech and behaviours had fooled them. Others have noted the significance of self-presentation and appearance in providing clues about who the researcher is (Coffey 1999; De Laine 2000). However, to claim I was anything other than I seemed to these respondents would have sounded fraudulent. My deeper concern was that I no longer could make this claim.

The interviews with the community stakeholders felt the most challenging. Their perception of me as an outsider, insensitive to their issues, naturally made them defensive. Listening back to some of the interviews this possibly made me defensive too. On reflection, I might have gained more data on particular topics via additional questions and probes, had I not been so concerned to justify why I had raised a topic at all. Where I had made use of the naïve student persona with the police, with community stakeholders I was keen to prove that I was not naïve because, rightly or wrongly, I perceived that demonstrating my understanding of local issues would improve our rapport. I also wanted to show that I cared about local issues. In trying to achieve both these things, I sometimes revealed my hypothesis, which was that negative experiences of policing and social conditions had undermined social order at local levels. This potentially undermined the rigor of the study by promoting a particular point of view. However, listening to audio recordings of these interviews within the period of the fieldwork meant that I was able to learn and adapt my practice with subsequent respondents. Moreover, the detail and emotion revealed by respondents make it hard to believe they had created an account of local events purely to confirm my views. A fieldwork diary was kept to note and reflect on these types of issues as they occurred.

3.7 Ethics and anonymity

Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Leeds. It was agreed that participants would be informed about the research in a way that highlighted the benefits for them. For example, information provided to the police emphasised lesson learning to prevent and maintain unrest. It omitted the additional focus on identifying police practice that might promote unrest. The consequences of this approach were made apparent later in the research during an uncomfortable situation when one police officer disclosed he had read the researcher's journal article, which mooted the idea that
the disturbances in Nottingham were, at least in part, a reaction to antagonistic policing. This exposed a side to the research that Nottinghamshire Police were sure to be unhappy about. I consoled myself that the police would have guessed this aim anyway. That said, the revelation of the article coincided with the withdrawal of research support by the named contact at Nottinghamshire Police. She stopped responding to emails and no reason was given. The contact might have changed position, or left the police altogether or, alternatively, the force may have become nervous about the direction of research.

A key principle of research ethics is avoiding harm to participants (ESRC 2010). Concerns about reputational harm kept resurfacing throughout the study. There was from the start of the study a concern that the police might refuse to participate due to concerns about reputational harm, in case the findings suggested they were ‘responsible’ for the unrest. One option considered as a way to secure their involvement was an offer to anonymise the cities, thus, protecting their identity. This is not an uncommon approach in empirical studies, but was to be a last resort given the difficulties in anonymising places while at the same time exploring links with local contextual factors. Once access was granted by the police and the local authority, the idea to anonymise the case studies was firmly discounted. There was, however, a continued concern about the reputation of the study neighbourhoods because reporting on problems in particular locales has the potential to perpetuate stigmatising discourses (Clark 2006). Again, anonymisation was considered as a way to prevent this. However, pseudonyms offered a thin veil alongside details of local characteristics and events, which might be used by anyone via a quick google search to discover the real neighbourhood names. And, given the importance of local context in the pre-study hypothesis of where riots occurred in 2011, omitting too many details would compromise the findings. Hence, the actual place names were used in the end, not merely as a compromise, but because this offered the potential for social justice by drawing public attention to ways in which the study neighbourhoods had not been adequately supported or protected. Using real names can also encourage researchers to be more careful in their authorship which should always be a key technique for protecting participants (Guenther 2009).

Anonymity was assured for all individual participants. Anonymity is the process of not disclosing the identity of a research participant, or the author of a particular view or opinion (ibid). A senior figure in one of the case studies claimed not to mind if they were identified in the research, on the basis that there was a lot to be learnt about what had been achieved in their city. However, this waiver was not accepted due to the researcher’s responsibility to protect participants even if they
would not protect themselves. What this participant reported as 'good practice' may not have been good practice according to the findings of the study; and this may have publicly undermined him. The research involved conversations with a good many senior positions in both cities. As unique public figures, this required careful authorship to protect their identities. A commitment was made that drafts of the thesis would be shared with participants to ensure that any disclosive details could be identified and removed before the final version. Additionally, a promise was made to Chief Constables of both police forces that they would ‘be provided with an opportunity to comment on any reports or papers ahead of publication’ (see Appendix A). This was not an offer of editorial control, but a goodwill gesture recognising the role of the police in making the research possible.

It was not just the reporting of findings, but also the study’s approach to sampling that potentially compromised participant anonymity. Snowball sampling, as described above, involves existing participants recommending other participants for inclusion in the study, making it possible for those making recommendations to identify these participants in the findings. Risk is heightened when the study, like this one, is relatively small and concentrated in small areas where only a small number of people (sometimes only one person) occupy certain positions. Further risk was introduced for some youth workers participating in Sheffield. After organisational support for the study had been obtained, relevant youth workers were contacted directly by the researcher. However, one sought reassurance from their line manager, who then contacted other managers to check if it was appropriate (a) for him to be contacted in this way, and (b) for him to participate in the research. The manager’s motivation may have been to protect her staff, but ultimately her actions did the opposite because a protocol was hitherto agreed that the researcher would contact senior personnel as a route to accessing all further participants. Thus, revealing the identity of participants to people with influence over their jobs. Consequently, findings do not specify the role of interview respondents in any more detail than the stakeholder type and city. Thus, youth workers are identified generally as ‘practitioners’ for all quotations and sometimes within the discursive analysis.

3.8 Data analysis

Before the analysis could properly begin it was necessary to transcribe the recorded interviews. This was done verbatim. The resulting transcripts became the main source of qualitative data. Tilley (2003) cautions that a transcript is only a text that 're'-presents an interview; it is not the event itself. She argues that the
text is influenced by the transcriber’s interpretive/theoretical lens, which informs decisions about how much to include in the text, such as pauses, laughs, affirmative noises etc.; and how to record it, with regard to punctuation, emphasis of particular words and phrases according to how they were spoken, and the dynamics between the researcher and the respondent, such as cutting in and speaking over each other. Thus, the process of transcription must be viewed as a part of the analysis, which cannot be divorced from the aims of the project. Reading Tilley’s article altered the approach initially taken to transcription, with more of the researcher-respondent dynamics and unspoken data recorded in subsequent transcripts.

As outlined above, this study draws on Layder’s (2006) ‘adaptive’ approach, which recognises the equal importance of inductive and deductive approaches to analysing qualitative data. The approach addresses the weaknesses of perspectives that favour either induction or deduction as distinct and incompatible approaches. For example, grounded theory tends to overlook macro-level structures, by focusing on situated and interpersonal aspects of events and behaviours. Alternatively, structural perspectives overlook micro-level phenomena. The result is that both fail to advance knowledge about the relationship between structure and agency. Giddens’ (1976) structuration theory attempts to overcome agency-structure and macro-micro dualisms. However, it conflates the two dimensions, creating a ‘duality’ that overlooks the ontological and explanatory power of structure (Layder 2006). Adaptive theory instead offers a multi-dimensional approach, comprising four social domains (contextual resources, social setting, situated activities, and psychobiography). Figure 3.3 illustrates the vertical organisation of these domains, which indicates ‘ontological depth’ (ibid). The lower layers represent more immediate, personalised aspects of social reality, while the higher ones are relatively more remote and impersonal. The diagram demonstrates that the domains also have a horizontal dimension, existing in both time and space, and are interconnected through social relations of power.

Analysis of the interview data was not structured by these domains, but merely guided by them. For example, the domain of psychobiography was explored at the intersection of the biographical experience and social involvements of the four stakeholder groups. The situated activity domain was particularly important for this study, given its focus on interactions within and between policing partners and communities. Social settings form the immediate environment of situated activity, ‘distinguishable from other domains in that they are local aggregations of ‘reproduced’ social relations, positions and practices’ (Layder 2006, p.280). For the purposes of this study, social settings were explored in terms of the cultures and
practices of the groups and organisations involved in the events. Contextual resources, as a more encompassing feature of the social environment, has two constituent elements, including: (1) the distributional aspect, in which material resources may be unevenly allocated and aligned across groupings, such as those based on class, ethnicity, age and gender etc.; and (2) the historical accumulation of cultural resources, such as knowledge, artefacts, media representations, and (sub-)cultural styles. These socio-structural factors were also considered in the study as context to the events.

**Figure 3.3: The layering of social domains and power in time and space in the ‘adaptive social theory’ approach**

(reproduced from Layder 2006, p.273)

It is worth noting that Layder’s theory of domains aligns closely with the ‘flashpoints model of public disorder’ developed by Waddington et al. (1987), which outlines six interdependent levels of analysis for understanding the aetiology of riots. The authors argue that the six levels provide an explanatory framework, which is ‘flexible enough to encompass a variety of types of disorder while at the same time allowing for the uniqueness of each situation’ (p.159):

1. **Structural** – macro-sociological factors such as material and social inequalities, political impotence, which may lie at the root of collective grievances.
2. **Political/ideological** – actions or role of political and ideological institutions, as perceived by dissenting groups.
3. **Cultural** – shared conditions and experiences, which may inform members’ definition of themselves and others, and may influence the potential for conflict.
4. **Contextual** – socio-historical incidents and relationships, and the dynamic processes leading up to events, such as media or political statements or pre-event liaison.
5. **Situational** – spatial or social determinants of (dis-)order, such as the symbolic significance of locations, physical configurations of space that support or undermine (dis-)order and the policing of it, the organisational and tactical dispositions of police and citizens.

6. **Interactional** – face-to-face interactions between individuals and groups, which may provoke specific emotions, situations, or outcomes, including the ‘spark’ for disorder.

The categories in the two frameworks do not overlay exactly. Layder’s psychobiography domain is absent altogether from the flashpoints model. Otherwise the analytical features are broadly similar. Layder’s contextual domain approximates to Waddington et al.’s structural and cultural levels; the social settings domain approximates to the situational and contextual levels; and the situated domain is broadly similar to the interactional level. Waddington et al.’s ‘political/ideological’ level is less easy to place because it covers both the role and the actions of political and ideological institutions. The actions of political organisations would approximate to Layder’s situated activity domain, but *roles* sit better with the social setting domain. The inconsistent mapping of elements in the two models may be explained by Layder (2006, p.282) himself when he suggests that his four domains ‘do not operate separately or autonomously’.

The intention was to use Waddington’s flashpoints model to frame the thematic analysis. Themes capture patterned responses to help answer or at least say something meaningful about the data in relation to the research question(s) (Braun & Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis is compatible with both inductive and deductive inquiry making it is possible to identify patterns based on pre-existing theory or independently of this. Thematic analysis was operationalised using Nvivo, which is a computer software tool that makes the task easier to perform, but does not interfere with the decision-making process. The thematic analysis was focused around known risk and protective factors summarised in Figure 3.2 above, while at the same time examining line by line whether respondents referred to others. The analysis was an ongoing process of identifying and refining themes and subthemes across all 45 interviews, sometimes going back to transcripts considered nearer to the start. When it came to fitting the final themes into the flashpoints model, it became clear that this was merely an academic exercise that was helpful for capturing the relatedness of themes. Hence, like Layder’s adaptive model, the flashpoints model was merely instructive. It underpinned theoretical understanding about the aetiology of urban unrest, but not used to present the findings.
3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how the extant literature on the 2011 English Riots and other contemporary riots in Britain, France and the USA, detailed in the previous chapter, was used to develop a working hypothesis about what might have promoted and inhibited unrest in the two case studies (see Figure 3.2). Within this hypothesis, key contextual factors included intra- and inter-agency relations, police and agency relations with local people, the nature of community and structural factors affecting communities, such as poverty and crime, as well as socio-historical events, likely to include previous urban unrest. The working hypothesis identified the nature of the public order response as having a more immediate influence on social order outcomes. Key components of the response included timeliness, partnership working, intelligence gathering and communication within and between partners and communities.

The notion that local context was an important part of the explanation informed the use of the case study method. Similarly, the presumed importance of community level variables informed the selection of neighbourhood ‘sub cases’. Neighbourhoods refer to communities of place, which are the setting for much of daily life and, importantly for this research, represent a tangible target for interventions by police and other public agencies. The study drew on a ‘mix’ of data, including social statistics and documentary data, but primarily qualitative interviews with 45 people with public order officers, neighbourhood policing teams and managers and practitioners who work with the police or with the target communities.

Taking place several years after the 2011 English Riots, this was a historical study benefited from events being recent enough that people were still alive for interview, but raised the challenge that participants might be motivated to reconstruct these events according to political and personal motives. Had events been less contentious or further in the past participants may have been more likely to provide a detached appraisal. In any case, triangulation was used to help weigh the evidence for competing accounts, underpinned by a critical realist perspective, which assumes that all accounts are equally meaningful, but they may not be equally true. The findings, presented over the next four chapters, are a best attempt at recounting and understanding what actually happened in August 2011 and why, according to a range of people who were involved.
Chapter 4 - Places and Events

This chapter provides important detail about the case studies and the events associated with the 2011 Riots in each of the case studies. The case studies include Nottingham, as the riot-affected city and Sheffield, as the non-riot affected city. As a methodological tool to access community level variables, two neighbourhood subcases were selected in each city. These were selected according to the rationale detailed in Chapter 3. A combination of administrative statistics, documentary material and interview data are examined within this to help understand the nature of the physical and social space at city and neighbourhood levels. Contextual detail has been confined here to socio-demographic characteristics that demonstrate key similarities and differences between the study locations and between other parts of the country. This detail is not merely for scene-setting purposes. Context is a key focus of this study. Context was intentionally captured within the research design in accordance with the hypothesis that it forms part of the explanation for why disorder occurred in some parts of the country and not others.

The second part of the chapter provides an overview of the main disorder and pre-disorder events occurring in these locations during the period of the 2011 riots. 'Pre-disorder' events are defined within the study as the antecedents to more serious disorder, according to extant theory and previous empirical research. Pre-disorder events may include gatherings (McPhail & Wohlstein 1983), aggressive group behaviour, and the throwing of objects to cause harm or damage (Rosenfeld 1997). Pre-disorder events might never escalate to the point of becoming disorder and, consequently, they are distinct but related to actual disorder. This also presents a challenge when categorising events because one person’s pre-disorder may be another person’s disorder. This will be explored in more detail, with examples, in Chapter 5. The second section is dominated by events in Nottingham,
as the riot affected city, but it does refer to some notable events in Sheffield, which demonstrate that there was a level of risk.

4.1 The Two Case Study Cities

The two case study cities - Nottingham and Sheffield - are located over a hundred miles away from London where the rioting initially erupted on Saturday 6 August 2011. Nottingham is located in the East Midlands region and Sheffield, slightly farther North, is in the Yorkshire and Humberside region. Despite being in different regions, the two cities are also geographically close, as can be seen in the map (Figure 4.1). This helped with the logistics of fieldwork. However, the main reason for selecting these two cities was that they were broadly comparable in several ways.

Nottingham and Sheffield, both located in the North of the country, are two of England’s largest cities, each with their own industrial legacy dating back to the Victorian era. For Nottingham, the main industries, historically, were textiles and coal mining. The city was famous for lace-making and hosiery. For Sheffield, the main industries were steelwork and coal-mining. With the decline of industry and manufacturing across the UK, both Nottingham and Sheffield had experienced economic decline, impacting negatively on levels of employment and poverty. These effects had not been distributed evenly and there was huge variation in wealth and other correlated outcomes such as health, education and crime for different populations within each city. The study neighbourhoods, detailed below, represent some of the most disadvantaged of these populations.

Table 4.1 illustrates how Nottingham and Sheffield compared with each other and the rest of the country around the time of the 2011 English Riots. Compared to Sheffield, Nottingham has a marginally smaller population (305.5K compared to 552.5K), but greater ethnic diversity (29% non-White compared to 16%) and deprivation (ranked 20th most deprived local authority compared to 56th). Nottingham also had a higher incidence of crime (71 notifiable offences per 1K population compared to 52), including proportionally more violent offences. Compared to the city average for England, both Nottingham and Sheffield have higher levels of ethnic diversity, unemployment and overall crime. Sheffield only compares favourably with the England average for violence, with a marginally lower number of offences per resident population.
Table 4.1: Social Characteristics of the Case Study Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nott</th>
<th>Sheff</th>
<th>England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>Usual residents (no.)</td>
<td>305,680</td>
<td>552,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic diversity</td>
<td>% BME (non-White groups)</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td>IMD rank* (of 326 local authorities; 1 being the most deprived)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>% Jobseekers Allowance Claims (of working age residents)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Total notifiable offences per 1K pop (no.)</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>Violence with Injury offences per 1K pop (no.)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Study Neighbourhoods

The two Nottingham study neighbourhoods were St Ann’s and Radford. These are not officially ‘neighbourhoods’. In the absence of official neighbourhood level data in Nottingham, ward level data have been used to indicate the general nature of people and place. Wards are used to elect local government councillors and are the building blocks of UK administrative geography. Ward population counts can vary substantially, but the national average is about 5,500. While it is unlikely that all (if any) of the study participants had the same understanding of ward

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4 Census 2011, published by ONS

5 Indices of Deprivation 2010: Local Authority Summaries, supplied by DCLG, published by ONS. Rank of 1 indicates the district is the most deprived according to the measure and a rank of 326 indicates the district is the least deprived

6 Claimant Count data, August 2011, published by ONS

7 Notifiable Offences Recorded by the Police, 2011/2012, supplied by Home Office, published by ONS

Figure 4.2: Nottingham ward boundaries and the two study neighbourhoods
boundaries when being asked about St Ann’s and Radford, the data provide useful context. More about local understandings of place will be discussed later in this chapter. It should be noted that the ward is officially called ‘Radford and Park’, but the abbreviated name is used consistently from this point onwards.

The two Sheffield study neighbourhoods were Broomhall and Darnall. They are two of 100 neighbourhoods in Sheffield, which were defined by Sheffield City Council using a combination of natural boundaries and census output areas. Since 2003, the Council and other agencies in Sheffield have calculated statistics for these neighbourhoods (using published Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) data). In 2011, Sheffield had 28 wards, therefore, on average there were three neighbourhoods per ward. However, neighbourhoods did not fit neatly within wards and some overlapped ward boundaries. To avoid confusion, it is worth noting that there is both a ward and a neighbourhood called Darnall. The Darnall neighbourhood sits entirely within the boundary of the Darnall ward. Unless otherwise stated, figures are provided for the Darnall neighbourhood.

![Figure 4.3: Sheffield neighbourhood boundaries and the two study neighbourhoods](image)

A key reason for using neighbourhood level data to understand the socio-demographic nature of the Sheffield study areas is that Broomhall sits mostly
within the central ward, which also comprises the city centre. Thus, using ward level data would over-estimate Broomhall's experience of things like crime and anti-social behaviour, which tend to be higher in the city centre compared to residential areas due to retail activity and the night-time economy. To ensure comparability between the study areas, social statistics have been calculated as 'rates' based on the population count to make spatial scales less of an issue. Datasets were sourced for time periods closest to 2011 to reflect the nature of the study cities and neighbourhoods around the time of the riots. The statistical data is supplemented with information from documentary sources, with some impressionistic accounts from study participants about the nature of people and place.

4.2.1 Nottingham Study Neighbourhood 1 - St Ann's

The St Ann's ward is located North East of the city centre, taking in parts of the city centre itself including the Victoria Shopping Centre and the Corner House Sector, which is an entertainment complex. In 2011, the population density for St Ann's was greater than the city average. It had a higher percentage of working age adults (16-64); a relatively low percentage of student households; a high proportion of single person households; and a slightly lower proportion of households with dependent children (23% compared to 27% for the City) with over half of these being lone parent households (13% compared to an average of 10% across the City).

Of the 20 Nottingham wards, St Ann's had the third highest proportion of BME residents, accounting for half of the population. The largest ethnic category was Asian/Asian British (16%), followed by Black/Black British (14%)\(^9\). There was also a relatively large proportion of residents in the Mixed category (10%). In St Ann's this broad census category mainly comprised people within the subcategory 'Mixed White and Black Caribbean'. This was due to a long history of immigration dating back to the 1950s when the first West Indian workers, primarily young men from Jamaica, came to settle in the ward. Initially the Jamaican community and the White residents struggled to get along, due to competition for jobs, housing and

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8 Unless specifically referenced, social statistics for Nottingham are sourced from publications and tables published and made available by Nottingham City Council: [www.nottinghaminsight.org.uk](http://www.nottinghaminsight.org.uk)

9 Office for National Statistics, 2011 Census: Key Statistics. Categories are based on respondents own perceived ethnic group and cultural background. Sourced from [https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/](https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/)
the attention of the local girls (McKenzie 2015, p.33). Later, however, following a major civil disturbance between Blacks and Whites in 1958, enormous efforts were made by local people to successfully carve out a St Ann's community. It was said that currently 'St Ann's is as much about being Jamaican as it is about the white working class' (p.32-33) and local women talk of the pride of being 'more than just white' and of their 'beautiful mixed-race children' (p.126).

In 2011, St Ann's ranked second highest in the city for levels of multiple deprivation and the proportion of residents living in households reliant on means tested benefits was a third higher than for the city as a whole. Total crime is also well above the city average. In 2011, St Ann's ward had the second highest rate, 187 recorded crime incidents per 1,000 residents compared to 110 for Nottingham as a whole. Violent crime was also high. In 2011, St Ann's ranked fourth, with 13 violent crimes recorded per 1,000 residents compared to 10 per 1,000 at the city level.

GCSE achievement for pupils residing in St Ann's was significantly worse than nationally (Nottingham City Council 2011c) and below the city average, with only 40 per cent of pupils aged 16 achieving the equivalent of 5 GCSEs at grade A*-C including GCSEs in Maths and English in 2011 compared to 44 per cent across the city (Nottingham City Council 2012). A range of indicators suggested St Ann's residents had relatively poor health. Life expectancy for both males and females was worse than the national and city average; a significantly higher proportion of residents smoked; and a significantly lower proportion were a healthy weight. A number of medical practices in the ward reported a higher prevalence of severe mental illness than the national and city average (Nottingham City Council 2011c).

4.2.2 Nottingham Study Neighbourhood 2 - Radford

Radford is also located around the centre of Nottingham City and contains part of the city centre boundary. Due to its location, in 2011, Radford had a high student population, which contributed to a relatively high proportion of working age adults (16-64), 86 per cent compared to 70 per cent in the city. Like St Ann's, Radford had a relatively high proportion of BME residents, 49 per cent compared to 35 per cent for the city as a whole. This included a relatively high proportion of Black-Caribbean and Mixed Black-Caribbean residents, as well as Pakistani residents,

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10 Ward IMD figures produced by the London Health Observatory and North East Public using methods consistent with those used by DCLG, i.e. averages of LSOA-level scores population-weighted using adjusted 2008 mid-year estimates.
tending to be located towards the Northern tip of the ward (Nottingham City Primary Care Trust 2006). As with the other study areas, described above, the main period of migration from the Caribbean occurred in the 1950s and from Pakistan in the 1960s.

In 2011, the overall deprivation score for Radford was half that of St Ann's and somewhat lower than for Nottingham as a whole. However, while Radford may have ranked better than 65 per cent of wards in England, it did contain subareas (super output areas (SOAs)) that were in the worst 10 per cent (Nottingham City Council 2011a). The rate of crime in Radford was also lower than the Nottingham average (91 compared to 110 recorded crimes per 1,000 residents); albeit in part, due to some especially high ward rates at the top end of the scale. Radford's overall crime rate was still more than twice as high as the lowest ranking ward and Radford ranked third highest for violent crime, with 18 recorded violent crimes per 1,000 residents, compared to 10 per 1,000 residents for the city as a whole.

In 2011, the proportion of pupils aged 16 achieving the equivalent of 5 GCSEs at grade A*-C including GCSEs in Maths and English was just above the level for all pupils resident in the city, but still well below the attainment in the highest achieving ward, for example, compared to 87 per cent in Dunkirk and Lenton (Nottingham City Council 2012). A range of indicators pointed to relatively poor health in Radford; for example, Life expectancy for both males and females was worse than the national and city average and the prevalence of severe mental illness is significantly higher than the national average (according to records collated by local medical practices). On the other hand, Radford had a significantly lower percentage of overweight/obese resident and significantly higher percentage at a healthy weight (Nottingham City Council 2011b) and a lower proportion of residents who smoked and binge-drunk, although not 'significantly' lower than the city average.

4.2.3 Nottingham overview

In general, the socio-demographic data suggests that both the Nottingham study neighbourhoods were ethnically diverse, with a relatively high proportion of people of Black-Caribbean heritage. Both neighbourhoods were challenged across a range of indicators including deprivation; educational attainment; pupil engagement; crime, especially violent crime; substance misuse; poor diet; and physical and mental health. At the ward level, Radford presented as being slightly less challenged than St Ann's except for rates of violent crime. The interview data was rich with references to these and other challenges, often related to poverty, facing the two study areas.
Respondents were highly likely to refer to the criminal reputation of St Ann’s and Radford, especially with regard to violent and gang-related crime. A number of local high profile criminal incidents had contributed to this reputation. In particular, the reported gang-related shooting of 14-year-old Daniella Beccan in St Ann’s in 2004. A local carnival is held annually to commemorate her death. Incidents of this type, but not necessarily in St Ann’s or Radford, had impacted on the city’s reputation nationally and internationally and contributed to the nickname 'Shottingham' the gun crime capital of the UK (Nottingham Post 2015). There was also a report published a few years later by a think-tank, which used statistical analysis to conclude that Nottingham was the UK's 'most dangerous city' (Gibbs & Haldenby 2006) and this was splashed across the national headlines.

Gangs were almost always mentioned by police respondents. Many were keen to describe the names and particular features of the gangs that were apparently based in the two study areas. Three gangs had been 'mapped' as part of Nottingham’s Ending Gang and Youth Violence work. It was reported that at least one of these gangs was 'very present on the street' and members were involved in anti-social behaviour, drug-dealing and could 'get very uptight when other people go into their areas', thus demonstrating territoriality [Nottingham Manager 5]. Some community practitioners, however, disputed the existence of gangs in Nottingham. Gangs emerged as an important theme within the research and will be revisited in more detail in Chapter 6.

In addition to gangs and guns, respondents referred to prostitution, drug dealing and crack houses as local problems, as acknowledged elsewhere (McKenzie 2015, p.99). However, despite crime being prominent in discussions about the Nottingham study neighbourhoods, it was also reported that community safety had improved over the last decade. For example, one participant said that:

[St Ann’s was] completely different to what [it] used to be 10 years ago... Lots of members of the community would say how different it feels because there’s just not the levels of crime. We used to have firearms discharges probably every other day and through lots and lots of work from the police, from the City Council and all the partnerships within the City Council, it’s nowhere near what it used to be. [Nottingham NPO 1]

Moreover, when asked whether disorderly behaviour was a common occurrence in the study area(s), to explore whether 'normal' behaviour had simply been re-defined as 'riotous' in the context of national unrest, the response was 'certainly no'. Although the study neighbourhoods regularly experienced 'low level anti-social behaviour... and teenagers roaming the streets', the situation wasn’t such
that there were 'fights in the street every other night and it all kicking off at the weekend' [Nottingham NPO 2].

Concurring with the statistical profiles, both study neighbourhoods were characterised as being economically poor. Levels of unemployment were said to be high and home and car ownership, low. Ethnic diversity was raised as a positive and a negative aspect of community life. While it was acknowledged that both study areas were mainly African-Caribbean, they were otherwise massively diverse, hosting residents of Polish, Kurdish and South-Asian descent. On the one hand, different ethnic groups generally got on well together, but on the other hand, many groups that had more recently arrived were unable to speak English and this presented a problem, especially for service providers rarely able to afford interpreters.

It has already been mentioned that the study neighbourhoods are geographically close to Nottingham city centre. St Ann’s was purpose-built near to the city centre in the 1800s to house the working poor, who supplied labour to the City’s Lace Market, and was originally known as New Town (McKenzie 2013, p.23). Study participants reported that drug-dealing was a latter-day implication of local geography, which offered easy 'thoroughfare in and out of the city' [Nottingham NPO 2]. Yet, despite their proximity to the city centre, St Ann’s and Radford were reported each to have their own distinct centres comprising shops and public amenities. Much has been written about the importance of this type of arrangement, which offers informal public gathering places, or third places, that can be the heart of a community’s social vitality and the foundation of a functioning community of place (Oldenburg 2000). They serve to render places discernible, create habits of public association, and provide a setting for local activism and politics; and can offer psychological support to individuals through the promotion of shared experiences and values (Mean & Tims 2005).

While it seems that administrative data can help to paint a picture of the challenges facing localities, statistics may offer less insight into more positive aspects of living in the study areas. A term that was repeatedly used to describe both St Ann’s and Radford was ‘tight knit’ and respondents spoke positively about a ‘huge sense of community’ [Nottingham NPO 1], meaning that ‘everybody looks out for everybody’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. These accounts add to findings from previous research (McKenzie 2015) which has found that people in St Ann’s greatly benefit from the support of each other. Previous research has also found that despite problems in St Ann’s, many residents actually wanted to live there (p149); although a key reason for this was to keep themselves safe from stigma.
and the possibility of ‘being looked down on’. The topic of identity and belonging will be picked up again in Chapter 7.

4.2.4 Sheffield Study Neighbourhood 1 - Broomhall

Broomhall is located close to Sheffield city centre and was frequently described by respondents as a ‘diverse’ neighbourhood. Ethnicity data was not available at the neighbourhood level, but school data suggested, in 2011, 85 per cent of children (5-16 years) were from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups, compared to 31 per cent for Sheffield as a whole. The largest ethnic group was Black/Black British, which accounted for almost half (45%) of the school age population. The Black/Black British population in Broomhall was mainly people of Somali heritage and a smaller proportion of Caribbean heritage. Broomhall was also a popular area for students to live due to its proximity to both of the city’s universities. This helped explain the neighbourhood’s relatively high proportion of 15-24 year olds (39% compared to a 17% in Sheffield overall).11

There was no official figure on the number of Somali people in Sheffield. Estimates vary considerably from around 3,000 to 10,000 people, which represented around 1-2 per cent of the population (Harris 2004; Sheffield City Council 2014a). Sheffield's Somali population was thought to date back at least to the 1930s, when Somali seamen, who originally settled in port locations, were drawn to industrial centres such as Sheffield by employment opportunities. The Somali population grew dramatically from the 1980s with the arrival of asylum seekers into the city following the outbreak of civil war in Somalia.

Deprivation levels in Broomhall were higher than the Sheffield average and crime were also significantly higher. In 2010/11, 54 crime incidents were recorded per 1,000 residents compared to 39 for the city as a whole. Both primary and secondary school attendance rates were significantly low. Despite this, educational attainment at the end of primary school and at GCSE level was statistically similar to the Sheffield average. In 2011, Broomhall residents had poorer health than the Sheffield average. They had significantly high mortality rates (for both men and women); high rates of mental health referrals; high rates of accident and emergency attendance (for all age groups); high levels of hospital admissions for alcohol related conditions; and significantly high prevalence of smoking

(modelled). On the other hand, data indicated a more positive pattern in terms of diet, with Broomhall residents having a significantly high level of five-a-day fruit and veg consumption and adults exercising 5 times per week; and related to this low adult obesity (modelled).

4.2.5 Sheffield Study Neighbourhood 2 - Darnall

Darnall neighbourhood is located to the west of Sheffield, further out from the city centre than Broomhall. In 2011, it had a larger than average proportion of children compared to Sheffield as a whole; with 27 per cent of the population in Broomhall aged under 15 years compared to 16.5 per cent for the city. It was one of the neighbourhoods with the highest proportion of school children from a BME group, 89 per cent (compared to 85% in Broomhall and 31% across Sheffield). The largest BME group was Asian/Asian British, accounting for 61 per cent of the school age population, mainly comprises people of Pakistani heritage and a smaller proportion of Bangladeshi heritage.

In 2011, the Pakistani population in Sheffield was estimated to be about 22,000 people, or 4 per cent of residents, and nearly a quarter lived in the Darnall ward. The Bangladeshi population was estimated to be about 3,500, or 0.6 per cent of the Sheffield population, and over half lived in the Darnall ward. Pakistani and Bangladeshi settlement in the UK dates back to the 17th century when Lashkar seamen arrived and settled in port towns and cities. The biggest wave of immigration began in the 1950s when young men were encouraged to come to the UK to fill post-war labour shortages. In Sheffield, this was mainly in the steel and coalmining industries. As manufacturing industries that employed these early migrants have declined, this ethnic population has moved towards small businesses, especially in the restaurant and catering industries (Sheffield City Council 2014c; Sheffield City Council 2014b).

In 2011, deprivation levels in Darnall were higher than the city average. In fact, the IMD overall score was fourth highest of Sheffield’s 100 neighbourhoods. Crime was significantly high. In 2010/11, 65 crime incidents were recorded per 1,000 residents compared to 39 for the city as a whole. Both primary and secondary school attendance rates were significantly low; as was educational attainment at Y6 (age 10-11) and in terms of pupils gaining 5+ GCSEs grades A* to C including English and Maths. Health indicators were similarly poor. Mortality rates were significantly higher than the city average for both men and women and A&E attendance was significantly high. Darnall had high levels of alcohol related hospital admissions, prevalence of smoking (modelled) and mental health
referrals. Diet was poor and child obesity rates were high (in children aged 4-5 and aged 10-11).

4.2.6 Sheffield overview

In summary, both the Sheffield study neighbourhoods were challenged across a range of variables. They had relatively high levels of deprivation and reported crime; poor school attendance and educational attainment; high levels of substance misuse; and poor physical and mental health. The only indicator bucking an otherwise negative trend was a relatively healthy diet in Broomhall. Both neighbourhoods were ethnically diverse, with the largest ethnic group in Broomhall being of Somali heritage compared to a large Pakistani-Bangladeshi population in Darnall. These statistical patterns were confirmed by research respondents. Interview data reported a great deal of community-related activities in the study neighbourhoods, including festivals to celebrate local identity and also provision to support various groups and local issues. Strong ethnic identities in each neighbourhood informed the cultural life of residents, focused strongly around prayer and religious events and holidays.

4.3 The Disorder Events

This section looks at disorderly and pre-disorder events that occurred in the two case study cities over the course of the 2011 English Riots. As several respondents acknowledged, places outside London had a 'heads up' on disorder and a range of activities were triggered as a consequence of this forewarning. These activities, which I will refer to as the 'public order response', are covered in the next chapter. The present section is limited to the types of disorder that occurred. Factors helping to 'explain' these incidents, which may include the public order response itself, will be discussed across the remaining findings chapters. The aim of this section is to set the scene in terms of what happened, where and when. The section is unsurprisingly dominated by Nottingham by virtue of it being the riot-affected city. However, in Sheffield, there were some minor incidents and threats of disorder that are worth mentioning here.
4.3.1 Nottingham Events

4.3.1.1 Monday, 8 August 2011

Study participants and a range of other sources suggested that disorder began in Nottingham on Monday evening in the St Ann’s area, where a group of about 30 people were ‘roaming the streets’ and ‘throwing bricks at police cars’. It has been difficult to ascertain the exact order of events, whether the marauding groups came before or after the attack on St Ann's Police station or whether it was all happening at around the same time. Either way, the Station was attacked at around 11:30pm. Members of a large group threw bricks and masonry at the police station and threw two petrol bombs into the large car park at the back of the police station.

It was generally felt that the disorder in St Ann's was targeted at the police and police property. Unsurprisingly, however, it caused concern for local residents and a degree of real harm as well. It was reported that 'hundreds and hundreds of calls' were made to the police [Nottingham NPO 2]. These calls 'were of windows going through' and cars being damaged [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. The national media (BBC 2011c) reported the distress caused to one particular household when a brick was thrown through the bedroom window of a three-year-old boy. Although it caused no actual harm, because the boy was not in his room at the time, the father was unable to go back to sleep ‘for four or five hours … thinking that they were going to come back’.

Most of the damage to community property was on Pym Street, in St Ann’s. This included damage to approximately 40 cars, including ten that were set on fire, and a number of homes, which mainly constituted broken windows. Cars on other nearby streets (Luther Close and Kelham Green) were also affected. One respondent also referred to disorder at St Ann’s Community Farm, also located in
St Ann’s, which was associated with wider disorder occurring in the area rather than a targeted attack. Occurring around the same time as this a container of 200 tyres was set on fire in Gawthorne Street, New Basford. This was originally reported as part of the disturbances, but was later confirmed as accidental (BBC 2011c).

A group broke into the Victoria Shopping Centre (Clifton 2011), where they attempted to break into a number of stores, including JD Sports, House of Frazer, and an independent Jewellery shop. On this first night, however, looters were unsuccessful in making away with any goods. Police thought the groups in the city centre were the same people who had previously caused disorder in St Ann’s, but this was never confirmed.

### 4.3.1.2 Tuesday, 9 August 2011

Following the previous night of rioting, it was reported that by about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, most shops in the city centre had been boarded up, private security guarded some sports shops and phone shops and ‘police were everywhere’ (McKenzie 2015, p.184).

General disorder began again in St Ann’s early on Tuesday evening. It was reported in the local press that a group of 15 to 20 males threw bricks at police officers in Peas Hill Road before running off. Police then used a helicopter to follow the group, which eventually ended up on the roof of Nottingham Girls’ High School, just outside St Ann's in the neighbouring ward of Arboretum.

Press coverage was reported (Clifton 2011) suggested that the boys had been part of a much larger group, which had congregated in nearby Arboretum Park earlier.
that evening. This gathering, of around 100 teenagers, began to form in the park after arrangements to do so had been disseminated via Blackberry Messenger. Riot police arrived on the Arboretum about 7pm and scattered the crowds, and it was at this point that the breakaway group occupied the roof of the adjacent Nottingham High School and began throwing missiles at the police. Thirteen people were later arrested and charged with violent disorder.

Clarendon College, which was part of New College Nottingham in Sherwood Rise, was fire bombed at about 10pm. A glass door was smashed and considerable damage was caused before firefigters put out the blaze. However, in an attempt to maintain 'business as usual', the campus opened the next day.

Probably the most serious event of Tuesday night was the petrol bombing of Canning Circus Police Station, which also happened at approximately 10pm. According to respondents, no less than 35 people were involved [Nottingham Manager 1]. The incident was captured on video using a mobile phone from the vantage point of a nearby multi-storey residence. This video was later uploaded to the internet and is available on YouTube (OfficialLondonRiots 2011). The footage shows a large group walking towards a disused public house 'Severn Public House', which ran parallel to the main row of shops on Alfreton Road.

In addition to Canning Circus Police Station, four other police stations were attacked on Tuesday night, including St Ann's (for the second time), The Meadows, Bulwell and Oxclose. A study
participant reported how a police car was ‘burnt out’ in front of The Meadows Police Station just before the building was attacked by a group of about 15-20 youths [Nottingham NPO 1]. The window was smashed with a hammer and petrol poured through. There was a police officer inside, but he wasn’t harmed.

Late on Tuesday night, at around 11.30pm, the independent jewellery store that was attacked in the city on Monday evening was broken into again. This time thieves got away with stock estimated at £1,600 (Nottingham Post 2011a). According to the store owner, the haul included watches and gold teeth.

### 4.3.1.3 Overview

The disorder in Nottingham erupted on Monday 8 August, but most incidents happened on Tuesday night. Officers reported dealing with 600 more incidents than usual on Tuesday evening (Nottingham Post 2012) Respondents noted that there were no street stand-offs between rioters and the police, instead the disorder in Nottingham was ‘very mobile’ and ‘fluid’ [Nottingham NPO 1]. Even some of the larger events only involved about 40 people.

It was perhaps possible for the public to believe that Nottingham was less affected than other cities because most of the disorder events occurred in residential areas, primarily in St Ann’s, where the police station was attacked twice. Four other police stations were also attacked. While cities like Manchester and Birmingham were associated with large-scale looting in the city centre, Nottingham had very little. The main incident was a burglary at an independent jewellery store on the outskirts of the city centre.

### 4.3.2 Sheffield Events

There was a level of fear among some groups about disorder erupting in Sheffield, particularly as people became aware of unrest spreading through the country and reaching large cities in northern regions of the country, not dissimilar to Sheffield. As one local police officer said:

> We were observers really and thinking ‘oh that’s pretty bad down there’, and then it went to Liverpool or Birmingham next I think, and then Manchester, and our collective realisation was ‘hang on a minute, this could be coming our way’. And a phrase that we used at the time was ‘this is spreading virally’ and obviously with the benefit of hindsight it came to the stage where we were probably one of the few cities of our size in the area that didn’t [riot]. [Sheffield NPO 3]
Not everyone was worried about unrest coming to Sheffield and no store owners/managers were so concerned that they closed early. Types of shops that had been attacked elsewhere were most worried, including Footlocker.

There were rumours about disorder events occurring in various parts of Sheffield thought to be most at risk of rioting by the authorities. These rumours were spread via text messages and social media, including an online discussion site called Sheffield Forum. On Tuesday 9 August, a post on Sheffield Forum claimed ‘I did read on someone's Facebook who’s [sic] sister is a police officer that there is trouble on London Road and Pitsmoor’. It was difficult for respondents to recall the sequence of events as far back as 2011, but it is most likely these rumours began circulating on Monday night (8 August).

On Tuesday morning (9 August), a major local radio station, Hallam FM, disseminated its own rumours about disorder taking place in parts of the city [Sheffield PO Officer 6]. The radio station was contacted by the police and reminded of its responsibility to report facts. Subsequently, the radio station made no further reports of this type. Other rumours circulating about riots occurring locally included that the City Hall had been set on fire, which was without foundation.

In addition to rumours about disorder occurring on London Road, respondents reported that some incidents did actually take place there. These incidents fell outside the riot category, but can be categorised as pre-disorder incidents. They included youths congregating and ‘the odd bottle thrown at a passing police vehicle’. ‘The million dollar question’ [Sheffield PO Officer 3] was whether these were related to the rioting or whether they were usual incidents seen through a different lens. Some respondents argued the latter. London Road is a busy street with a range of bars and restaurants and is located between two areas of the city that have some reputation for low level disorder, including one of the study areas.

Low level disorder events in other parts of the city included a group of 15 youths throwing stones in a deprived suburb (Hackenthorpe). It was later confirmed that this had ‘nothing to do with riots’ [Sheffield Manager 6]. There were also gatherings of young people reported in both of the study neighbourhoods. Gatherings are not synonymous with collective behaviour, but provide the circumstances in which it may occur (McPhail and Wohlstein 1983 p.580) and, of course, collective behaviour (of 12 people or more) is central to the definition of a riot.

Accounts relating to gatherings in the two study neighbourhoods were not entirely consistent. There were several accounts of gatherings in Darnall. According to one,
the gatherings were not particularly threatening and were monitored and appropriately dealt with, in some cases dispersed, by community leaders and local practitioners. Some accounts suggested the gatherings involved non-resident youths, who had travelled from other parts of the city looking for trouble. Another version suggested there were no ‘big gatherings at all of any nature’ in Darnall [Sheffield Practitioner 2]. It is difficult to conclude whether these competing accounts can be explained by partial perspectives or due to the re-writing of history to suit political interests.

There were similarly competing accounts of gatherings in the City Centre. One statutory partner involved in the public order response said ‘to the best of my knowledge, there was no groups that were identified as either looking to cause trouble, or mobbing up to stop trouble’ [Sheffield Manager 5]. Conversely, a police officer also involved in the response recollected officers reporting ‘some people that are walking around town looking for a group to join’ and also that ‘there was some activity around places like Primark’ [Sheffield PO Officer 5]. This latter version of events was confirmed by another a respondent, who claimed they ‘vaguely’ recalled a ‘potential risk of Primark and McDonald's’ [Sheffield Manager 4].

Several interviewees referred to the arrangements communicated by potential rioters via social media, particularly Facebook, to meet outside a large discount department store, TJ Hughes. This was conveniently placed for transport connections into the centre of town. The plan was to meet just before midday. People working as Young Advisors to the local youth service passed on this information and, consequently, a plan was put in place, involving police helicopter surveillance, to monitor the situation, which never materialised.

The most significant event was a firearms discharge in a relatively central, but residential part of the city. It occurred in an area known as Park Hill. The incident occurred on Friday 5 August, the evening ahead of the riots erupting in London. It was recounted by one respondent as being drugs-related and that it resulted in a man being shot in the leg. It was publicly reported as an isolated incident, which presented no risk to the wider community, although some practitioners were concerned that potential rumour and speculation presented a risk during the context of unrest elsewhere in the country.

4.3.2.1 Overview

It was difficult to distinguish between routine disorder and pre-disorder events that might be associated with the riots taking place elsewhere in the country. There were lots of rumours about disorder taking place, but few were
substantiated. The events that were of greatest concern were those in and around the study neighbourhoods, including some missiles thrown at passing vehicles and gatherings, which caused police and youth workers to mobilise.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the case study characteristics as important context to the events taking place in August 2011 and explanations for these events. It has shown that in 2011 the cities were characteristically similar. Although Nottingham was marginally more challenged across a range of social variables previously associated with urban unrest, including deprivation, crime and unemployment. Nottingham also had a higher proportion of BME residents.

At the neighbourhood level, factors previously associated with urban unrest were more acute than at the city level. The Nottingham neighbourhoods had a reputation for crime and disorder, especially violent offending, associated with gangs. By comparison, violent crime was not such an issue in the Sheffield study neighbourhoods, but social disorder, verging on riotous behaviour, was a concern in one of the neighbourhoods, occurring on an annual basis around Bonfire Night.

The Nottingham neighbourhoods were predominated by Black and Mixed race people, whereas the Sheffield neighbourhoods were predominantly South Asian and Somali respectively. Communities in both case studies were referred to as having a strong sense of identity and being 'tight knit', meaning that members routinely provided social support to each other.

In Nottingham, disorder events were characterised by attacks on the police and police property, involving criminal damage to five police stations. There was damage to residential property, but this was almost entirely on a single street. There were minor attempts to loot in the city centre, but only a jewellery store was successfully burgled. In Sheffield, there were some gatherings, possibly intent on unrest, but little disorder was evident; only a few bottles were thrown at cars.
Chapter 5 – Public Order Response

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the combined activities of police, partner agencies and communities in responding to the threat of unrest. This is how the ‘public order response’ is conceptualised within this study. It is not merely the activities of public order police, which is how Nottinghamshire Police possibly interpreted it. Consequently, they failed to enlist the support of other agencies that might have mitigated the police tendency to ‘control’ groups presumed likely to disrupt public order (Earl & Soule 2006). The section on policing tactics suggests that officers in Nottingham were not violent, but they harassed and unfairly arrested people based on pre-conceived notions of who was intent on rioting. The chapter shows how the public order response in Sheffield demonstrated a stronger commitment to partnership working, which was instrumental in promoting a less antagonistic approach. The first section examines the timeliness of the activities in the two case studies, on the basis that a proactive approach offers greater opportunity to prevent unrest. The second section looks at the willingness and capability of partners to work together and the implications of this for social order outcomes. The subsequent sections look at the style of policing, tactics used and how these were perceived by local people. Finally, the chapter looks at information sharing between policing partners and with communities, as a means of achieving an integrated public order response and of disseminating positive and protective messages to groups at risk of rioting.

5.2 Timeliness of interventions

The disorder in London erupted in Tottenham on Saturday 6 August, spreading to other parts of London the next day, but only reaching other parts of the country on Monday 8 August. Hence, this afforded towns and cities outside of London at least a couple of days to consider the implications for their own populations and to start to develop contingency plans. A great many issues affecting London rarely impact on the rest of the country, but there were precedents. As detailed in Chapter 1, the Brixton riots in 1981 were followed by disturbances in a small number of cities a few months later, including Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds and Nottingham. The Brixton riots in 1985 were also followed by riots in other cities just a few days later. The riots in the early 1990s and the early 2000s, similarly, were characterised by riots in multiple localities within a relatively short space of time. The most recent riots in France, in 2005, also spread to as many as 300
localities. On this basis, it might have been expected that the scale of the events in London would be on the radar of police and partners elsewhere in the country, promoting their consideration of how to respond locally. Although urban unrest is characterised by its unpredictability, research has previously found that a proactive well-planned approach can be successful in preventing and containing disorder (see Campbell 1993). On this basis, the study set out to explore the timeliness of interventions in the two case studies and whether this affected social order outcomes.

5.2.1 Nottingham

In Nottingham, respondents reported watching events unfold in the media and during Monday daytime, police officers were starting to discuss the likelihood of anything happening locally. These discussions were facilitated by routine meetings, which had relatively recently been put in place, to inform strategic planning for recent and upcoming issues. Consequently, some officers were put on alert and assigned to the public order command team should anything occur, but otherwise no specific plans were put in place. The command structure being considered at this point by the police was the Gold, Silver, Bronze (GSB) structure. This command structure was created by the Metropolitan Police Service following the Brixton riot of 1985. It is now used by all emergency services and some partner agencies as a means of delivering a strategic, tactical and operational response to large scale operations and critical incidents (see College of Policing 2013). The GSB command structure is meant to ensure clarity of roles and that information and decisions are communicated effectively. In Nottingham, it was reported that apart from putting officers on standby, the police did not begin any preventative activities because no intelligence had been received implying real risk and because policing should not be ‘knee jerk’ or based on ‘gut feeling’, particularly where this might incur financial costs to the organisation [Nottingham PO Officer 2].

Respondents from other agencies in Nottingham reported how the events in London did cause concern. Those with direct experience of the 1981 riots, which had affected Hyson Green in Nottingham, suspected that disorder might reach the city. The problem was they were not expecting it to arrive so soon and, consequently, they were not fully prepared. For example, one agency respondent said:

*I did rather naïvely say at the time ‘this will come our way but it’s probably not going to hit us until probably Wednesday or Thursday of this week … we have got a little bit of time to actually prepare for things, but we need to start to get our act together today’. And you know, the surprise for*
everybody is that it wasn’t Thursday, it was that night. [Nottingham Manager 3]

The fact that Nottingham City Council had an emergency planning structure, like the police GSB structure, was reported positively, even if not all Council personnel were confident in using it. However, the structure was not brought into action until disorder had already erupted. As one respondent put it ‘Tuesday morning was when the button was pressed’ [Nottingham Manager 3]. It seems that both the police and other statutory agencies had arrangements for dealing with critical incidents, but did not consider using them in a preventative way.

Respondents talked about meetings at various levels between the police, other agencies and communities; but, again, these were primarily in response to events that had already taken place. The primary aim of community meetings was to reassure rather than to develop local solutions to the problem of disorder. There was one meeting of particular significance, instigated by a senior police officer with the purpose of establishing dialogue with a number of community practitioners who work in the neighbourhoods most affected by the disorders on the Monday night, including the two Nottingham study neighbourhoods – St Ann’s and Radford. Pre-existing politics between these practitioners most likely prevented this meeting occurring any earlier and strained inter-agency relations limited what could be achieved by it. Nevertheless, the meeting secured valuable funding at an early stage to enable outreach activity that may have not have been possible otherwise. Inter-agency relationships and their role in the Nottingham disorders will be returned to later in this chapter and again in Chapter 6 as the longer-term context to social order outcomes.

Local officers spoke about how members of the public were being proactive in reporting groups of youths wandering the streets. Although many of these groups were routinely on the streets, others were ‘not the local guys, [not] the ones you normally get issues with’ [Nottingham NPO 3]. A community respondent also reported unusual large groups of young people roaming the streets, although quickly added that ‘they didn’t do a thing’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was likely that many young people, aware of events around the country, were simply out on the streets just to watch for riots (McKenzie 2015). It is difficult to know whether these reports of groups on the streets represented genuine concerns for safety and public order; over-zealous helpfulness; or merely an opportunity to report youths more regularly considered a nuisance. It is also difficult to know how these reports affected the police response; whether they were incorporated into the city’s disorder incident figures,
boosting the level of perceived risk, dealt with by local officers, or simply ignored as more urgent matters were attended to.

5.2.2 Sheffield

There is potential difficulty in assessing how proactive the Sheffield response was by the mere fact that large scale disorder never erupted; and so, in theory, the whole response was proactive. An alternative way to make an assessment is by looking at when activities began in relation to events elsewhere. In Nottingham, disorder erupted on Monday night and so it seems appropriate to explore how well Sheffield would have been prepared by this point. Three years on, some respondents struggled to recount which day certain things happened, but these have been placed by other key events. For example, one senior officer recounted becoming concerned ‘when the fire happened in Croydon’ [Sheffield PO Officer 6], presumably referring to the burning down of Reeves furniture store on Monday 9 August, which was widely reported. Consequently, the officer initiated a meeting the next day, which would have been Tuesday 9 August, and, therefore, not very proactive if events had unfolded by Nottingham’s timeframe. As a result of this meeting, however, it was reported that that the police ‘started to staff up in the evenings’, and a public order command team moved into the force’s call centre, to ensure readiness for events occurring from that point [Sheffield PO Officer 6].

As mentioned previously in the thesis, Sheffield stakeholders were consistent on which neighbourhoods were most at risk of engaging in disorder, according to which were most often affected by crime and disorder issues within the city, and this informed where activities comprising the public order response were largely targeted. A number of stakeholders working in these at risk neighbourhoods, including the two study neighbourhoods, reported becoming concerned over the weekend watching the news of riots spreading across London and arrived at work on the Monday morning with a view to putting special provisions in place. A community practitioner reported: ‘I called a meeting initially on the Monday, straight away, with my manager and we started to formulate a plan’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. This meeting secured additional staff to engage with young people locally and these were in place by Monday evening. Community practitioners reported attending ‘a bigger meeting later on in the week’, but in the first instance were focused on their own neighbourhood as a priority.

So it seems there was important work taking place in parts of Sheffield as early as Monday morning, particularly talking to residents, tension monitoring and direct engagement with at risk groups. Local structures were in place to coordinate some of these activities. One of these was the Community Assembly structure, which
replaced local area panels in May 2009. The capacity and focus of Community Assemblies was drastically affected by local austerity measures in 2014, but in 2011 there were still seven, each covering four wards and having budgets, which were allocated according to levels of deprivation, to spend on local services, such as parks, libraries and street cleaning. The purpose of Community Assemblies was to inform local people about what was happening locally and to involve them in decision-making via regular meetings throughout the year. Respondents viewed Community Assemblies positively as a focal point for partnership working, being supported by representatives from the police, health services, voluntary groups and businesses. Respondents suggested that local devolvement of some decision-making also enabled them to be responsive and proactive:

At that time, Assemblies were quite a powerful thing in the communities, so we wouldn’t actually be instructed to do anything. … they had the respect to understand their areas, so there was no guidance from above. There was probably at the time ‘just be aware of anything happening’, but most of my guidance was through the police. I was working alongside the Inspector helping him. He was helping me. We were working together. [Sheffield Manager 7]

There were a number of centrally organised city-wide meetings for practitioners, but these did not happen until the Wednesday morning, which some respondents thought was too late:

‘Without being too critical, it was just a bit like ‘It’s a bit late. Maybe you should have got us in on Monday morning’. So it was a bit slow to react’ [Sheffield Manager 6]

Local practitioners who had in their view already done a lot of work to prevent unrest felt these meetings on Wednesday failed to acknowledge what had already been done. However, some managers reported that these midweek meetings were not the beginning of the strategic level response. They were a continuation of earlier telephone and email communications between key partners, including the Council, the Police, and the youth service, which was outsourced to a voluntary sector organisation called Sheffield Futures. As one senior level agency respondent recalled:

We quickly mobilised into having an e-mail exchange between different professional groups and myself, as a senior manager at the time, was part of that email exchange and in effect on call throughout that whole week. Just via emails really and making a bit of a chain of command in terms of information sharing. [Sheffield Manager 3]
Email communications were facilitated by existing email networks for partnership working, meaning there was no time wasted establishing points of contact. In particular, there were routine emails as part of the city’s tension monitoring process, sent to community members, councillors, youth workers, housing officers and schools etc., which facilitated communication at various levels.

5.2.3 Overview

People in both case studies reported a level of concern when events were occurring in London over the weekend of 6-7 August. However, these concerns stimulated little activity in Nottingham at this stage. Community practitioners reported engaging with local people to assess the level of risk, but the police merely put public order officers on standby and seemingly hoped for the best. Officers justified their approach by claiming there was no intelligence that anything was going to happen. However, this merely shows how poorly the police were connected into communities, who were thought, by some practitioners, to be likely to riot. Sheffield was more proactive, especially at the local level. Meetings to agree the centralised response did not happen until Tuesday / Wednesday. However, local partnership structures supported inter-agency activities with communities at the neighbourhood level on the Monday morning, which seems critical, as Monday night is when most unrest outside London began.

5.3 Partnership Activities

The extant literature says very little, if anything, about the role of other agencies beyond the police in policing the 2011 English Riots. A focus on the police is unsurprising, given that a primary responsibility of the police is ‘to keep the Queen’s Peace’ (Home Affairs Committee 2008, para.9). No other institution has this as a primary responsibility. It is also unsurprising that commentators might look primarily to the police in trying to explain the disorder, given their documented role in previous riots, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, with the emphasis on policing through partnership following the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 even the policing of riots is likely to involve other agencies. This section looks at who was involved in activities to prevent and contain unrest in the two case studies over the period when disorderly events were occurring elsewhere in the country and how well different agencies worked together.

5.3.1 Nottingham

Respondents’ accounts of the public order response in Nottingham suggest that ‘it was a pure police response in terms of the tactical element of it’ [Nottingham
Manager 5]. Other agencies were not integrated into the street-based response. When directly asked whether community practitioners were involved, one public order officer said:

_Not that I’m aware of. I didn’t see it. I worked the night shifts around public order so from the evening, I think it was from seven in the evening till seven in the morning so I was not briefed on any community workers out there. So if they had been, then yeah there was a communication breakdown but I never came across anybody._ [Nottingham PO Officer 1]

Nottinghamshire police commanded their response through the GSB structure and operationalised it mainly using Police Support Units (PSU). These are specialist units of police officers who have undergone tactical training in public order and riot control. A basic PSU (a beat duty unit) consists of three officers, including one inspector, three sergeants and 18 constables. More highly trained PSUs comprise an additional three officers as drivers of protected personnel carriers (see College of Policing 2016b). Although there are no specific equipment requirements for a basic PSU, respondents suggested that most officers wore personal protective equipment (PPE), which is their riot uniform. Police dogs and mounted horses were also deployed.

Officers participating in this study noted how the staffing requirements for the PSU deployment had implications for policing generally across the city. According to information provided to the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011b), an additional 150 officers were specifically allocated for disorder on the Monday night and 250 on the Tuesday night. One public order officer reported that, in the first instance, it was difficult to find enough officers for the PSUs and that taking these officers away from their usual duties left the force short for routine policing:

_One of the issues about mobilising a PSU from within staff that are on duty is that we pretty much run at minimum critical staff levels anyway during the night, so trying to find trying to find 20 cops out of maybe the 60 on duty actually leaves other areas vulnerable then; so it exposes you to a bit more risk. So essentially on the first night … we didn’t really have enough staff._ [Nottingham PO Officer 4]

Helping to alleviate the problem of there not being enough staff on duty, it was reported how officers meant to be off-duty were turning up for work on the basis that they wanted to help. The ‘goodwill’ of officers was described by many as a success factor of the police response in Nottingham. One officer described how ‘there was a real buzz in the officers around ‘this is our opportunity to keep the streets safe”. This perhaps links to the action-focused disposition of the police,
depicted as one of the more positive aspects of police culture; albeit a trait of machismo, accompanied by other traits, such as a propensity for risky and dangerous behaviours, which can be less desirable in certain circumstances (Reiner 2000).

Community respondents in both study neighbourhoods complained that the officers who remained to police their localities during the disturbances were not the usual faces, and consequently were blind to the local context. These ‘outside police’, as they were referred to, used styles of policing and tactics that antagonised local people. One community respondent described how ‘youths were just sitting on the park, messing about, and they were chased off’. A local police officer responding to this study explained how it was necessary to tailor community policing. Based on their experience in one of the study neighbourhoods, they said:

*It’s not a bad area, but it’s a hard area, as people don’t really want to engage with the police. It’s about adjusting the way you police. You have to be a bit more casual, or the people feel as if you are talking down to them.*

[Nottingham NPO 3]

The same officer also referred to the importance of local knowledge within a public order context. NPTs reported that many of the youth gatherings, proactively reported to the police by members of the public, were quite normal for the time and place. On this basis, officers responded to them in their usual way, saying ‘hello ... to kill them with kindness’ [Nottingham NPO 3]. After the first night of disturbances, the groups were reported to be friendlier than normal, even saying ‘hello’ back to officers. It seems the crisis situation had interrupted the usual rules of engagement. Perhaps the youths perceived they were on the same side as local officers in wanting to avoid riots and this brief interaction was intended to signal their support. It is difficult to know. The key point is that officers unfamiliar with the neighbourhood might have perceived these groups as a threat to social order, causing them to respond differently, which might have provoked an altogether different reaction from the youths. The elaborated social identity model, discussed in Chapter 2, theorises that treatment of a crowd perceived as unfair can undermine police legitimacy and lead to conflict.

Most of the disorder in Nottingham occurred in the evening and this was one explanation suggested by respondents for why neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) were largely excluded from the main public order response. Where neighbourhood officers (NPOs) were involved operationally, this was within the PSU structure, rather than within the neighbourhood policing structure. It was
reported that their local knowledge was highly valuable, for example, informing public order commanders about the local geography. This information was critical in preventing the PSUs becoming easy targets:

*What these groups were trying to do, from what the officers were telling me, they were trying to pull them into areas so they could set about the Police vehicles. So pulling them into cul-de-sacs, where if you stop them coming out, you are going to be targets.* [Nottingham NPO 2]

Some NPOs reported feeling frustrated at being left out of the main response. One respondent said they ‘felt like lost children’. Their disconnection from the police response was illustrated by the fact that as Canning Circus police station was being petrol-bombed on the Tuesday night, officers inside were on the telephone to senior managers to ask whether they should remain on duty, as they were aware officers elsewhere in the city had been asked to.

Although NPTs were outside the main response, there were involved in the wider policing activities surrounding the response, primarily by doing more of what they usually do. For Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) this meant providing more reassurance. One respondent recalled being told to ‘get your biggest brightest coat and go out and chat to local shops; talk to anyone ... tell them they don’t have to shut’. Another way NPTs were involved was in writing community impact assessments (CIAs). The purpose of community impact assessments is to record the effect any recent events have had on the community and identify issues that may affect community confidence in the police (College of Policing 2016a). Where confidence has been damaged, community impact assessments are meant to inform plans for how the police might rebuild community it and learn lessons for the future. According to one respondent, NPTs were also serving as a point of contact for other local stakeholders wanting to provide or seek information about the disorders, especially for local Councillors. NPTs were also involved through the investigative process to identify and arrest local people involved in the disorders, which was likely to have been an issue for the community impact assessments, linked to the fact that some local people felt the policing had been too aggressive and had resulted in unnecessary arrests.

Although the public order response was dominated by the police, other agencies were involved in a number of ways both at a strategic level and in terms of frontline activities. The local authority would usually be expected to play an important role in responding to major incidents and was especially likely to be involved in August 2011 because the political leader of the Council, Cllr Jon Collins, was also the ward counsellor for St Ann’s, the first residential area to be affected.
by disorder on the Monday night. Consequently the leader was involved in coordinating activities both at a city and neighbourhood level in St Ann's. It was reported how his was the phone call to inform some senior managers that unrest had erupted on Monday night. It was also reported how he instigated the community meetings in response to this, with the help of a community manager, who had the contacts and relationships to make these happen. Ward councillors in other neighbourhoods were also involved in setting up meetings as a first response following the events of Monday night.

These meetings, instigated by Councillors, can be considered part of the community-based response rather than the statutory response, because in this role Councillors were acting on behalf of their constituents. It was described how the main aim of the meetings was to provide reassurance to local people. They were attended by NPOs, who set out to achieve this aim by explaining that the police were doing everything possible to protect them:

*I've never been to a community meeting like it, it must have been about two or three hours long, it was very much around what the police were doing so you know it was a case of literally nobody is having any leave, nobody is having any time off, the entire Force is working 12 hours on 12 hours off, everybody had their rest days cancelled, it will be constant until we get this under control. Again reassurance.* [Nottingham NPO 1]

It was reported how local residents were especially interested to know what had happened the previous night, especially in relation to young people and the police running around the estate. Some residents also used the meeting as an opportunity to voice wider issues affecting the community. They identified problems with aspects of the physical environment that they felt affected community safety, including street-lighting, (lack of) CCTV, barriers and the locking of particular gates. On this basis, one NPO concluded that the meeting had been a valuable opportunity for community engagement:

*So there’s a lot of things that came out of that, that people raised, which wouldn’t have got raised normally [and] that we managed to address.* [Nottingham NPO 2]

This response, however, highlights potential concern about why these community safety issues were not being raised and dealt with prior to the disorders through the usual channels; for example, through processes referred to as Police and Community Together (PACT). PACT processes are meant to involve NPTs and their partners engaging and consulting with the community to ascertain local concerns, set priorities and develop tailored solutions through mechanisms such as
meetings, surgeries, postcards and environmental visual audits (EVAs) (College of Policing 2014). Research, however, has found that PACT meetings are often poorly attended and conducted; and generally lack definition as to what role they are performing within the wider neighbourhood management process (Innes et al. 2009). With this as context, it can be reasoned that some residents were either not fully engaged or frustrated with existing processes; evidenced by questions about why concerns previously raised (e.g. about CCTV) had not been addressed.

Structures were in place in Nottingham to facilitate partnership working in crisis events. Council directorates involved in the public order response included Community Protection, Children and Families and Environmental Services. Community Protection, referred to by some as the 'enforcement arm' of the local authority, was well-established in partnership working arrangements with the police and had staff co-located at the central police station. This meant they were well-placed to hear about the disorder as it erupted on Monday evening and were able to communicate information quickly to other colleagues within the Council. It was also reported how Community Protection staff played a role in communicating information to NPTs. Community protection staff did not, however, coordinate the Council’s strategic response. Instead, council officers within Nottingham’s Crime and Drugs Partnership (CDP) took on this role, which began with a series of meetings and briefings for the executive management team, wherein some senior managers voiced their uncertainty over the Council’s involvement in a situation that was not strictly life-threatening, nor a major disaster, for which the emergency planning structure had been conceived. Nevertheless, a critical incident response was endorsed, and members of the CDP continued as the Gold tier for the Council’s GSB structure.

Council input to the public order response was important but not central to the policing of the disturbances, being focused primarily on environmental issues rather than people. The Council’s contribution involved Environmental Services in preventative action and clean-up efforts after disorder had taken place. The clean-up was arranged quickly to reassure the community; and also, in accordance with ‘broken windows’ theory (see Kelling & Wilson 1982), to vanquish as soon as possible any tangible signs of disorder in case these should promote further disorder. Preventative action was described in terms of gathering up loose items across the city that could be used as missiles by rioters, such as loose gates and fence posts, as well as 'big structural things, where windows were boarded up and leisure centres and schools were secured' to reduce opportunities for arson. Large housing associations, such as Nottingham City Homes, which had a lot of
properties in the St Ann's area, were also involved in this type of activity via 'a command and control type approach' [Nottingham Manager 4].

However, this description of a command and control approach does not sit easily with the notion of partnership working. Command and control emphasizes top-down decision-making and unity of command that is meant to eliminate discretion and ambiguity in the chain of authority. This approach is associated with police culture and has been evaluated as a natural and beneficial response to some aspects of police work (e.g. Kelling et al. 1988). However, command and control can be contrasted with the main strength of multi-agency partnership working, which acknowledges that other agencies may have a different purchase on a given crime problem (Crawford 1997) by virtue of their particular expertise or position, including their relationships with a range of different social groups. It is also worth noting the distinction between ‘multi-agency’ relations, which merely involves the coming together of a number of agencies around a particular problem, and ‘inter-agency’ relations, ‘which entail some degree of fusion and melding of relations between agencies’ (Crawford & Jones 1996, pp.30–1). In Nottingham’s public order response, there was some melding of relations between the police and the local authority, but this was probably not in the way that Crawford and Jones anticipated. Rather, it was because a proportion of the people contributing to the Council response were ex-police officers:

> A number of ex-police officers working within the City Council [were pulled] out of their roles and [asked to] remember how to be a cop for a little while; and ‘now use your skills in this environment... and sort of apply the skills from the policing world into the local authority world and use those skills to understand what information was [sic] coming in, understand where people are, understand what your response is and get people to respond quickly rather than sitting on things’. [Nottingham Manager 3]

The melding of police-local authority relations was also helped by some of these ex-police officers having retained their personal links with serving officers. Although this facilitated communication, the lack of boundaries between the two agencies most likely meant that the Council’s particular expertise was lost from the public order response. However, the Council is a diverse organisation, with a number of different services and types of expertise and based on conversations with a range of respondents, it would be inaccurate to refer to ‘a’ Council response. There were lots of things happening within the Council, in addition to those coordinated by the CDRP. For example, some council managers sought the help of community practitioners to do outreach with at risk groups. As already
mentioned above, this was done by inviting a number of agencies to a meeting. This was instigated by a senior police officer, but in partnership with the Council’s Community Protection and children and families’ services.

Accounts of this meeting demonstrate the lack of trust between agencies in Nottingham, especially between the statutory and the voluntary sector. It was reported that these types of multi-agency meetings were unusual and so, firstly, there was the problem of knowing how to contact some of the practitioners identified as being influential within riot-affected neighbourhoods; and, secondly, there was the problem that some did not want to attend. One community practitioner explained:

I said ‘I’m not coming, because we just go around talking the same shit and then we leave and nothing else changes’ ...I said ‘I haven’t got time. I’ve got kids that I need to see’. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]

Reluctance to attend this meeting was linked to poor relationships within the voluntary sector as a consequence of rivalries and tensions between agencies, frequently pitted against each other when applying for funding from an ever-decreasing pot of money. Tensions were also linked to a sense that not all providers were equally effective, linked to their lack of interest in helping local people. It was reported that some agencies were almost entirely motivated by the money: 'I would say eight out of ten are there to fill their pocket. Two out of ten are there to do something about it. ... There's no relationship. ... They hate each other.' [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. In highly deprived neighbourhoods, this was unpalatable and agencies perceived to be in this category were referred to as ‘poverty pimps’ because they were living off people’s misery. The Council’s inability to filter out this type of agency within its funding process had affected how it was perceived by more committed agencies and local practitioners. The view articulated by several respondents was that the Council had ‘no backbone’ to deal with poor performance and this had undermined the willingness of agencies to work together, even in the face of a crisis.

While community-based organisations and practitioners played a critical role in preventing and containing unrest, in Nottingham they were not cohesive as a group. Their usual combative relationship and silo mentality prevailed even after additional funding was made available to them within the context of unrest. This undermined local coordination and made it difficult for other agencies to engage with them strategically at a city level, which is captured in the following comments:
They all had their own little neighbourhoods to go and work in, so one group went over here, and one group went over here, and one group went over here, and one group went over here. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]

When asked about the nature of the outreach activities, it was clear that community practitioners, including youth workers, were involved in a range of efforts to help prevent and contain unrest in their localities. Concerned about the consequences of urban unrest for the whole community, some practitioners tried to establish the level of risk. Going into the community and speaking to local people was an approach used by some to seek information about what might be planned and who might be involved. This included speaking to women, who were thought to be a good source of information:

For me it was about talking to people who you wouldn’t normally talk to. ...so I spoke to ... young women 'cos they’ll know which guys are going to go out and do what, and who are they going out with. And they were all saying ‘no, no-one’s interested. Looting and robbing. No, it’s not going to happen’. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

In addition to the women, shop keepers were also reported to be a good source of information in the study neighbourhoods, where small local shops were used frequently by residents. The reasoning was that 'shop keepers see the people we don't see. Your local gangster goes to the shop to get his fags ... [and] five years coming and buying something, [they] talk about what they're going to do next'[Nottingham Practitioner 2]. This emphasises the importance of not merely relying on the 'usual suspects' and traditional mechanisms of community engagement, such as tenants and residents associations (TARAs) and community meetings, as was explicitly understood by a number of community practitioners: 'Local residents, I went to speak to them. I’m not talking about residents’ associations; knocking on people’s doors' [Nottingham Practitioner 2].

Additional provision for diverting young people might have been beneficial in some localities, but it was reported that pre-existing activities were more likely to be trusted; and some felt that these played a critical role in containing unrest in Nottingham. It was reported how some young people were accessing regular youth club sessions because 'it was their regular place to be' or they knew it to be a place they might learn the 'gossip' on what was happening. Other young people 'on the periphery, were [attending] because they weren’t sure where they were supposed to be' [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Respondents emphasised the importance of these being regular youth club sessions, which meant that young people knew in advance when and where they could find them, providing a safe
and familiar space to be during the unrest. These sessions also provided a
distraction for some young people, who might otherwise have become involved in
events by mere fortune of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Youth
workers reported that the youth club sessions also provided an opportunity for
them to hear what young people knew about events in Nottingham. Access to this
information was facilitated through their pre-existing relationships with regular
attenders at the club; again impressing the importance of this provision being in
place before the unrest.

That said, funding was made available for additional youth provision, with the aim
of diverting young people, who might otherwise be tempted to get involved in the
disorder. In some cases, youth workers took them out of their usual
neighbourhoods altogether:

*So actually on the Tuesday evening there were all sorts of things going on
among youth workers. So they were taking them off to the Showcase Cinema on Derby Road, so out of their own areas, where they'd be milling around on the streets. Obviously it was a very short-term approach, and actually quite limited, because we couldn't occupy them at midnight, but at least they were kind of... there was a lot going on over those two or three nights. [Nottingham Manager 6]*

However, there were mixed reports about the additional youth provision. Some
felt ‘it made things worse … because you’re putting a plaster on, [but providing] nothing to sew it up; then when you have gone, there’s blood pouring out’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. This comment was indicative of wider concerns about the quantity and quality of community support provision and especially youth provision, which will be covered in more detail in Chapter 7. Of direct relevance, however, to the public order response, was the political wrangling about whether the additional diversionary activity could be justified, even in the context of imminent unrest, if this impacted on wider provision. For example, it was reported how some politicians were concerned that they would fall out of favour with constituents if children’s daytime activities over the summer were closed to allow youth workers to do outreach during the evenings. Evening youth provision was reported to have been significantly reduced, linked to austerity measures, as had youth work generally, and so ‘it felt very flaky at the time’, meaning that resources and goodwill were in short supply in Nottingham at the time of the 2011 Riots.

### 5.3.2 Sheffield

Although some respondents claimed that South Yorkshire Police took a lead role, there was a consistent view that Sheffield’s public order response was
characterised by genuine partnership working: ‘each organisation played an important part [but] …South Yorkshire Police were at the forefront’. The police taking the lead was not viewed problematically by any of the respondents, because the officers involved, at the neighbourhood and city level, listened and involved other agencies. In fact, there were many examples of the police being led by other agencies on particular aspects of the operation.

South Yorkshire Police reported a better experience of partnership working during the period of the riots due to usually slow bureaucratic processes being speeded up in the context of a crisis, as reported by one NPO:

*Partnership working is sometimes frustrating because their method of working is different to ours, but during that period there was much more of a proactive approach and greater degree of traction behind the work that they were offering.* [Sheffield NPO 1]

These frustrations of partnership working have been reported elsewhere before (Pearson et al. 1992). Previous findings have also pointed to the police tendency to dominate partnership working. There were reports from community practitioners explicitly on this point, suggesting this was not the case and that other agencies were able to act according to their particular knowledge and expertise:

*Everybody was working together. Everybody knew the importance of it, of collective responsibility. Although what the police had to do, they had to do their way, what the youth services they had to do their way, but collectively they agreed, ‘this is what we will take on, this is what they will take on, how to move it forward’* [Sheffield Practitioner 2]

Although, South Yorkshire Police were typically viewed as the lead agency, many respondents felt that ‘youth workers were key’ to the response [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. This was recognised by public order commanders from the start, in part, based on their experience of working with the youth service during the Sheffield’s Dark Nights operation. This was a multi-agency operation aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour, typically fire-work related, that occurred in some parts of the city around Halloween and Bonfire Night. Some respondents were keen to minimise the seriousness of the incidents occurring around this time, but others recounted how police had previously been attacked and burning debris had caused roads to be closed, confirmed by local newspaper reports and posts on the Sheffield Forum. Dark Nights involved a number of partners, including South Yorkshire Police, South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue, Sheffield City Council, Sheffield Homes, Trading Standards, Youth Offending Service, Sheffield Futures and Activity Sheffield. Partners took part in a lengthy planning process each year, generally
beginning around July for events taking place at the end of October and early November.

Officers acknowledged the importance of involving youth workers in the city’s public order response in August 2011. This was due to the ‘influence’ that some youth workers had with young people in at risk areas. As reported by one officer, ‘even the police need influence’ and especially ‘at the front end’ [Sheffield PO Officer 3]. In one of the study neighbourhoods, PCSOs and youth workers worked very closely together, attending the same venues and even pairing up to patrol the streets during the evening to engage with young people. These joint patrols had been tried before in Sheffield and there was an appetite from the police to use them more. However, some partners were resistant to this because it had the potential to undermine rapport between youth workers and young people. In the second neighbourhood, NPOs and youth workers still worked in partnership, but this was more backstage. This was because young people in the second neighbourhood were particularly difficult to engage. One NPO reported that ‘a lot of them had probably gone past the engagement side’ [Sheffield NPO 2]. A community practitioner agreed with this, explaining that ‘in every corner, every city, every area, they’ll be youngsters that will always be difficult to reach out to’ [Sheffield Practitioner 2]. They put this down to the exclusionary consequences of structural factors, particularly the lack of employment opportunities.

To engage this harder to reach group, it was deemed necessary to deploy youth workers separately and to involve youth workers who had worked in the area for a long time because they offered the best chance of ‘influence’. So, while NPOs were out on foot walking ‘figures of eight’ for reassurance and as ‘eyes and ears’, youth workers were ‘in the shadows’. They were less visible to the general public because they were positioned in the parks and other places where young people hung out: they were even ‘in stairwells, just doing good detached youth work’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. Youth workers remained in contact with the NPT via what as referred to as ‘the bat phone’. This constituted an arrangement whereby youth workers had a dedicated phone line to the local police station and if it rang, the phone would be answered immediately ‘no matter what’. This ensured that the police could respond urgently to an incident if youth practitioners felt they were unable to deal with it, safeguarding youth workers and preventing an escalation of disorder should this start to occur. The arrangement also ensured that youth workers were not seen to be working with the police. If a situation was challenging but not urgent, youth workers asked the police to delay their response long enough for them to get out of the way so the ‘kids didn’t think [they] were telling tales’. As was the case in Leeds, youth workers spoke positively about the
police withdrawing and letting them deal with the situation (Clifton 2012a), acknowledging that young people were challenging boundaries, which might have been made worse if the police had ‘come in too heavy handed, dispersing groups’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1].

Youth workers and other community practitioners were not only engaging with young people on the streets. It was reported how youth clubs were opening though the night to offer a safe place for young people to be. This was a special measure that was reported to be particularly helpful at the time because it was Ramadan. It has previously been suggested that Muslims were less likely to becomes involved in the riots because it was Ramadan (Morrell et al. 2011). However, practitioners in Sheffield reported that they were more likely because they gathered on the streets longer and later than usual waiting to break their daytime fast and afterwards many returned onto the streets enticed by the warmer weather:

A lot of them, because it was really warm as well weren’t it during that period, so a lot of them, they weren’t sleeping in between breaking their fasting and starting their fasting again, so of course, it was ‘well we’ll just go and hang about on the street, and have a chat and what have you’. [Sheffield NPO 2]

It was reported that the community practitioners keeping the youth clubs open and providing additional diversionary activities in one of the study neighbourhoods at least were not being paid for this. The goodwill and initiative of key people was consistently reported to have made all the difference in preventing and containing unrest.

Partnership working was strong between the Police and other community practitioners, which is a term used within the study to represent a range of community-based roles, including service providers, community leaders or representatives, faith leaders and elected councillors. It was described how community practitioners initiated key aspects of the public order response and partnership working in both study areas. It was reported how in one of the Sheffield study neighbourhoods, community practitioners initiated a series of meetings between community leaders, imams of the mosques, statutory agencies and the police. Their actions were underpinned by fear of a Bradford-style riot reaching Sheffield. The Bradford disturbances in 2001 served as a reminder to the predominantly South Asian community of what might happen if riots did erupt. It was agreed that messages would be disseminated to the whole community, but especially to parents, to ensure they knew where their children were and were
doing everything possible to prevent them from getting involved. The police were asked to keep by community practitioners to keep them informed of events, to help them correct any myths and rumours in real time. It was detailed how the pre-existing relationships between community practitioners and the police, especially with senior officers, were critical in facilitating these activities. Relationships will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.

For policing the city centre, pre-existing relationships between the local community and the police were also critical in promoting partnership working. In this area of the city, the local community was largely the business community. Most likely linked to the reporting of widespread looting in London, businesses were early to get in touch with the central Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT) with concerns about being attacked and for advice on whether to close. Safer Neighbourhood Team s have more recently (in 2015) been replaced by local policing teams (LPTs), but in 2011 they constituted a geographically focused partnership of police and statutory roles. A key role within Safer Neighbourhood Team s was the Safer Neighbourhoods Officer (SNO), employed via the local authority to provide operational support for the community safety partnership. Safer Neighbourhoods Officers were line-managed by Community Assembly managers, but were typically co-located with the police. Safer Neighbourhoods Officers were identified by a range of respondents as an important role in August 2011, facilitating partnership working and communication across agencies. In the city centre, the Safer Neighbourhoods Officer tended to be the first point of contact for businesses, due to their involvement with a range of local partnerships, including the Neighbourhood Action Group (NAG), which, like PACTs (Police and Community Together), typically bring together residents, the police, local authorities, businesses and schools. Due to their pre-established relationships with communities and the police, supported by co-location, the central SNO was invited to join the Silver tier of the police-led public order response; whereupon, they began to immediately utilise existing networks to disseminate messages to provide reassurance and quell rumours and also relay information between partners.

5.3.3 Overview

Multi-agency working was evident in both cities, which meant that a number of different agencies were involved in trying to prevent unrest and, in Nottingham’s case, contain it. Inter-agency working, by comparison, is when the activities of different agencies are integrated. In Sheffield, an inter-agency approach was made possible by the nature of pre-existing relations between police and partners, which had promoted trust, but also practical arrangements relating to communication
and decision-making that were also beneficial to the public order response. Conversely, rivalries and mistrust between agencies in Nottingham undermined willingness and capability to work together and this was largely responsible for the pure police response, which was not best suited for preventing unrest in communities that, historically, had poor relations with police response teams.

5.4 Style of Policing

This section seeks to describe the general approach taken by policing partners in their attempts to prevent and contain unrest. It reflects on why a particular approach was taken in each of the case studies and how this affected events in terms of who was involved, what happened and where.

5.4.1 Nottingham

There was absolute consistency in the way respondents described the approach of the police in Nottingham as ‘very fast, very hard’ or ‘assertive to put it politely’. Elaborating on what this meant in practice, respondents described how officers, dressed in full personal protective equipment (PPE), were deployed in large numbers and were focused on controlling the situation through the dispersal and arrest of individuals intent on causing trouble. This approach was taken because ‘the police wanted to prove a point that they’d make sure that it didn’t get out of hand’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Respondents were also consistent in describing how this approach came as a ‘shock’ to the community. Divergence appeared only in the way respondents theorised the implications of this approach. According to some, it meant that the disorder was limited both in scale and duration, which corresponded with the official view expressed in the local post disorder report (One Nottingham 2011, p.4):

A heavy police presence combined with a coordinated response from Nottingham City Council and its partners in the city resulted in a stabilisation of events on Wednesday 10th August.

The opposing view was that this approach contributed to the disorder by antagonising people, who were not originally intent on violence, but provoked by the indiscriminate use of repressive tactics.

Key context to the approach taken in Nottingham includes the events taking place elsewhere in the country and how these were being reported in the media, not least because ‘cops read papers too’ (Gorringe & Rosie 2008, p.193). Newspaper headlines on Monday morning, before the disturbances erupted that evening included ‘Police attacked as London burns’ (The Guardian 2011a) and ‘Police and
the riot blunders’; followed on Tuesday morning by headlines such as ‘The Anarchy Spreads’ (Daily Mail 2011), ‘Mobs rule as police surrender streets’ (The Times 2011) and ‘Riots: the madness spreads’ (Metro 2011). These headlines tell a story of police failures, allowing chaos to ensue. It is a discourse closely aligned to Gustave Le Bon’s (1895) outdated but still influential theory on ‘mob psychology’. Media reporting is relevant to public order policing because research has found that when police expect to be confronted by a mad mob – for example, at a football or sporting event - they focus on trying to control it using tactics of containment, arrest or dispersal (Gorringe & Rosie 2008).

The influence of the media was not merely inferred. One respondent recounted the backdrop to the command suite on Tuesday morning: ‘there was News 24 playing all over the room and you could see all these like really proper destruction and you would call it rioting and violence and disorder taking place in London’ [Nottingham PO Officer 4]; and from this coverage, the officer concluded that ‘it was escalating everywhere else so why would it not escalate in our area’. Officers on call, in particular, reported keeping their eye on the news; and there is some implication that this coverage influenced how the first ‘disorder’ events in Nottingham were interpreted and responded to:

so on the Monday night I was actually on call and I was specifically watching Sky News, watching Greggs go up in Tottenham or wherever it was, ... and started to monitor some stuff coming into St Ann’s, in the inner city, and clearly it started. There was bits of disorder, bits of windows going through that you wouldn't normally see. So as a result of that ... I said we need to mobilise here. We need to get some staff together, we need to actually set up a civil command and we need to do this because the numbers of jobs coming in now is over and above what was normality. [Nottingham PO Officer 6]

Without the police data it is difficult to gauge how unusual events in St Ann’s were at this point in time. As discussed in Chapter 4, crime and anti-social behaviour is generally high in St Ann’s compared to other parts of Nottingham; and members of the public, as noted earlier in this chapter, were proactively reporting incidents that they might typically ignore. With this as context, it is worth considering that both the police and public were overly sensitive and reactive to local events, based on what they had seen and heard in the media about events elsewhere.

The media coverage contributes to what Della Porta and Fillieule (2004) term ‘police knowledge’, which frames their understanding of who they are confronting, through the generation of stereotypes and short-hands. Police reliance on
stereotypes has been explained according to their usefulness in enabling officers to make quick decisions in life-threatening situations, but these stereotypes can also lead to discriminatory behaviour (Skolnick 1966), which may have been the case in Nottingham. With pre-formed conceptions of what they were dealing with, public order officers participating in this study reported how it was easy in August 2011 to ‘differentiate between the baddies and goodies’ [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. Officers talked about a typical public order event, like a football match or an organised protest as comprising ‘red blobs and white blobs’ and based on the theoretical principles of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (see Chapter 2) about the importance of keeping the white blobs on side to promote police legitimacy and prevent grievance against the police and to only ‘hammer the red blobs’ [Nottingham PO Officer 6], who are intent on violence. Officers' understanding of crowd behaviour was informed by guidance and training for public order policing, which was explicitly underpinned by the theoretical principles of the Elaborated Social Identity Model (HMIC 2009a; HMIC 2009b; ACPO 2010a).

On the basis of this public order guidance, Nottinghamshire Police did take a differentiated approach, but by geography, rather than within a crowd. They adopted reassurance policing in the city centre to ensure 'business as usual' and to avoid scaring away or antagonising the 'white blobs', who were there to consume. By contrast, the police took a paramilitary approach in poor Black neighbourhoods associated with gangs, including St Ann’s and Radford. In these neighbourhoods, anyone out on the street at night was viewed as having intent to riot and hence seen as the 'red blobs' form their public order training. This justified a single approach, focused on tactics of control, as this respondent reported:

> A lot of it was just getting to an area, dumping officers, getting control. ... I think what they had to get their mind set over was it was a different policing arena to a football match. The majority of people that would be out on that night were there for criminal intent, so you would not get a normal crowd dynamic of 99 per cent of people will not want to be involved and you will get the one per cent that want to cause trouble. [Nottingham PO Officer 1]

The comments above denote the 'command and control' response taken in Nottingham. Officers described how in usual day-to-day policing officers were able to use their own discretion in dealing with incidents. Police discretion can be affected by personal prejudice and stereotypes, but it can also allow officers to tailor their decisions to the situation, informed by understandings of contextual
factors and weighing up the implications of certain actions in light of these factors. However, in public order situations, due to the increased threat of danger, military-style policing is often adopted (see Waddington 1991). This was the case in Nottingham, where officers were clearly briefed on the importance of complying with orders:

> What we train our Officers to do day-to-day is sometimes, if you are told to do something, they will question it and go well ‘is that the right way boss, do we do it this way?’; whereas in public order you want ‘I told you to take that ground, take it, don’t come back and we will have a discussion’. So they very quickly got into it and, again, I think that was from the briefings from the top-down it was very clear what we were about. [Nottingham PO Officer 1]

This top-down approach meant that officers were following orders and not necessarily operating according to their own frames of reference. Who constituted the ‘red blobs’ and the ‘white blobs’ was largely decided by senior commanders.

In the city centre, the emphasis was on highly visible, but ‘normal policing’ to reassure, which meant officers in standard uniform and PCSOs in their distinctive yellow jackets. It was reported how PCSOs ‘were drafted in from across the County, to come into the city, to bolster those numbers’ [Nottingham PO Officer 1]. As well as protection of the public, another reason suggested for why the city centre was prioritised was due to its ‘iconic’ status. This rationale was underpinned by ‘learning from … the Bradford stuff’, meaning the Bradford riots in 2001, when the police made a conscious decision to protect the commercial centre. This approach, as noted in Chapter 1, was critiqued by Bagguley and Hussain (2008) for deliberately forcing rioters into residential areas, where, consequently, most of the damage occurred (Bagguley & Hussain 2008). The respondent recognised the tension between ‘looking after commercial people and not residential areas’, but justified this approach on the basis that residential areas ‘are very vast’, meaning that to provide the same level of resource as the city centre was not possible in all residential areas.

However, the resource put into some residential areas was substantial. The main issues relate to why only some residential areas, and not others, and why the resource was deployed so differently compared to the city centre. The response provided by one public order officer was:

> We deployed our staff into those estates around the outskirts [of the city centre] in public order gear because of the fact that tactically it wasn’t
difficult to work out who was actually out on the streets causing problems
[Nottingham PO Officer 6]

There is evidence to suggest that police targeted particular estates on the outskirts of the city, including St Ann’s and Radford, due to pre-conceived notions about mad mob rioters, which aligned with police stereotypes about gangs and other lawless types thought to reside there. How these stereotypes had formed will be returned to in the next chapter in the context of community policing and police-community relations.

Officers involved in the public order response variously referred to how individuals intent on disorder could be identified according to what they were wearing, specifically ‘masks’. For example, one officer said ‘it is not difficult here to differentiate between the people we need to get at and the people we don’t because they were frankly in masks’ [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. This contrasts with the response from another officer, who claimed that the force ‘maintained local operational officers at the front so that they could identify would-be rioters’ [Nottingham PO Officer 3]. The latter response, supports a version of events where the ‘usual suspects’, meaning those previously known to the police, were the main targets during the unrest. Probing for details of what the masks looked like, established that these were ‘just a kerchief’, or a bandana. One officer, described how these bandanas were coloured according to an individual’s gang affiliation, but also claimed that the bandanas were ‘a daily item of wear’, which would perhaps making it difficult for officers to separate those intent on rioting from those merely affiliated to a gang. Rather, it seems these two groups were viewed as one and the same thing. Some respondents challenged the existence of gangs in the study neighbourhoods, which is an issue that will also be explored in the next chapter.

5.4.2 Sheffield

Recognising that Sheffield’s approach was undoubtedly different to Nottingham’s precisely because large-scale unrest did not occur, it still cannot be discounted that Sheffield’s approach was instrumental in preventing unrest. It was reported how emerging out of the early communications between partners, at the city and neighbourhood level, ‘was a general message of restraint and everybody agreed and more or less signed up to that’ [Sheffield NPO 1]. Respondents consistently referred to a ‘relaxed’ approach, which meant ‘not upping the ante’, by flooding areas with resources, and avoiding trigger points. As well as limiting the visibility of the police resource, the visibility of youth work resource was also limited. Youth work managers and practitioners both described how an unusually high youth
work presence in response to anti-social behaviour had previously been found to raise tensions. So whilst there was a specific focus on engaging young people, this was balanced against perceived risks.

A number of respondents referred to the importance of keeping ‘riot cops’ out of sight, on the basis that this gives young people ‘something to kick against’ [Sheffield PO Officer 5]. Community practitioners involved in the response reported discussing this explicitly with their policing contacts:

*We were quite clear with the police as well about their community policing. ‘Don’t just drop your big boys in with truncheons and undo 25 years of work. Your PCSOs, who are out in the community every single day, who the kids know. You need to cut them some slack.’* [Sheffield Practitioner 1]

Respondents described how public order trained officers were out on the streets or in vans, but ‘they were dressed in normal uniform’ [Sheffield PO Officer 5]. The main response was through existing neighbourhood policing structures already located within at risk areas.

*In the first instance it would be local police. I think that’s probably one of the other things by and large Sheffield gets right; they don’t go in mob-handed at first. When all we had was rumour and speculation, it was very much left to the safer neighbourhood teams across, not just the city centre, but like Broomhall and Sharrow, and I guess the East end of the town as well. The PCSOs and the local police were ‘get out on foot, but we’re not going to flood the city centre with TSG officers in riot gear or anything like that’, and then really it was a case of a lot of people driving around, checking out things.* [Sheffield Manager 5]

As in Nottingham, the GSB structure was deployed to manage the public order response. This was described as being multi-agency at each of the three tiers. The Gold tier was much less active in Sheffield than in Nottingham, probably because major disorder never erupted, and activities were largely taken forward by the Silver and Bronze tiers. At the time, some questioned whether the GSB structure was appropriate given its typical emphasis on command and control, which was at odds with a whole community approach. However, others opined that the right mind-set, particularly of those in commanding positions, ensured an integrated approach. Being police led, it was the mind-set of commanding police officers that was particularly important, as well as their pre-existing relationships with partners. In this case, respondents suggested that key officers involved in the operation were not ‘Tackleberries’, meaning unlike the character Eugene Tackleberry in the
Police Academy films, they were not inclined to over-react and go in all guns blazing, likely turning a relatively minor incident into something more serious.

In Sheffield, NPTs were more fully integrated in the main operation than in Nottingham. It was reported how officers in Silver Command positions reached out to local police and practitioners for information, especially when there were reports of pre-disorder, for example:

> So where we had had reports, a mob assembling on London Road, the police went up. In the first instance it would be local police. I think that’s probably one of the other things, by and large Sheffield gets right, they don’t go in mob-handed at first. When all we had was rumour and speculation, it was very much left to the safer neighbourhood teams. [Sheffield PO Officer 3]

A view was expressed by one of the public order officers that the use of PSUs tends to lead to a different dynamic, which is down to the PSU tactic itself rather than the individual officers. Nevertheless, the same respondent felt that traditional public order tactics, including the use of water cannons, were required in some cases, especially where violent disorder was already in full swing. This highlighted the importance of preventing it occurring in the first place and this where other methods could be more useful.

It was suggested that the approach taken in Sheffield was influenced by a number of recent events. One of these was the Liberal Democrat party conference held in Sheffield city centre earlier the same year, in March 2011. The event was expected to draw angry protesters following the party’s formation of a Coalition Government with the Conservatives and especially after Nick Clegg’s backtracking on funding for higher education. However, the event passed with virtually no violence due to a dialogue policing approach using Police Liaison Officers (PLOs), wearing distinctive light blue tabards, PLOs aim to cultivate relationships with the public and to provide context-specific, real time information to commanding officers (Waddington 2013). Negotiated management, as discussed in Chapter 2, has been increasingly used to manage public order events, but the PLO role was newly specified (HMIC 2009b) and not operationalised in the UK before its use by South Yorkshire Police (Gorringe et al. 2012). Commanding officers can be reluctant to use negotiated management due to lack of evidence that it works (Stott et al. 2013). However, in August 2011, with the same officers still in post, South Yorkshire Police had direct experience of its success. Undoubtedly, this gave commanding officers the confidence to re-use the approach, albeit re-modelled, in the context of the 2011 English Riots.
A partnership approach, rather than agencies seeing it as entirely a police matter, was the city’s experience of dealing with disorder on an annual basis for the Dark Nights Operation (see sec. 5.3.2). It was reported how this had provided a clear structure for managing the public order response in August 2011. For example, one agency respondent said:

_We have got this type of structure in how we do things. It is not that dissimilar to how we do things around dark nights. So partnership planning with clear leads, it’s in each organisation, and that lead is then responsible for disseminating the relevant information, communicating with staff, being able to deploy staff to different places if you need to. So it was a scaled up approach to some extent._ [Sheffield Manager 3]

Another recent event that was reported to have influenced the partnership response to the threat of unrest, was a recent covert drugs operation, which had significantly affected one of the study neighbourhoods because it resulted in the arrest of a large number of local males including juveniles as young as 13 years (see The Star 2011a). In the study neighbourhood predominated by South Asian people another historical event was reported to be important context to the public order response. This was the 2001 Bradford riots, which mainly involving South Asians. This served as reminder of the consequences of disorder, in terms of reputational damage for whole communities and criminal convictions for individuals. These events were reported to have given the parental generation greater impetus to police their young people, proactively and in partnership, to maximise the chances of preventing unrest. Community issues will be returned to in Chapter 7.

### 5.4.3 Overview

The terms used to describe the style of policing in each of the cities were vastly different. In Nottingham, the consistent view was that the style of policing was aggressive and antagonistic, which was explicitly linked by respondents to the violent reactions of young men, who felt they were being unfairly treated. By comparison, the style of policing in Sheffield was relaxed and restrained to ensure young people had nothing ‘to kick against’. The integration of non-police partners from the earliest stage in deciding the policing approach was important. Other factors promoting a less antagonist approach in Sheffield was the mind-set of the public order commander and partners’ recent shared experience of trying to maintain order in parts of the city that are prone to volatility around Bonfire Night each year.
5.5 Policing Tactics

The general policing approach includes the strategic plan and style of policing, as discussed in the previous section, and tactics are the specific ways in which these strategic objectives are operationalised. Tactics used by police and partners in the two case studies and the consequences of these tactics are now discussed below.

5.5.1 Nottingham

The use of the PSU tactic in Nottingham has been considered above. Other key tactics used in the city include guarded perimeters, engage to disperse, stop and search, large-scale arrest, police dogs and mounted horses. It was reported that the use of dogs can be effective in public order situations, because they are highly mobile and are good at clearing crowds, but the comments of one particular officer illustrate how they are not always easy to control and can escalate tensions:

*I mean dogs are tremendous. When you have got a snarling dog they are difficult to control, they often bite cops because they get that excited but the effect they have is worth probably six officers, the ability for a dog to move crowds back. It’s almost like the dog is better than a horse because they know a horse is not going to bite you.* [Nottingham PO Officer 1]

Guarded perimeters were used a number of times in Nottingham. One account suggests that officers were put in place around Canning Circus police station to provide security after it was attacked. Another instance was when police officers were positioned in numbers around the central rail station during the Nottingham Forest Vs Notts County football match on Tuesday, 9th August. This was made to look like a football management operation, but was primarily to control who was coming in and out of the city, based on fears that people might travel to Nottingham to riot. The main guarded perimeter was around the city centre aimed at protecting shops and businesses. It was reported how the physical layout of the city enabled it to be protected in this way because it did not have many routes in and this made it ‘sealable’ [Nottingham Manager 4].

There were mixed reports on the efficacy of this ‘ring of steel’, as it was sometimes referred to. Many opined that the lack of looting in Nottingham, compared to other cities, was directly attributable to the perimeter, by deterring opportunists.
A senior officer suggested that it was because the perimeter had thwarted attacks on the city centre that rioters had ‘[taken] their frustration out on the peripheral police stations’ [Nottingham Manager 3]. Other respondents claimed that the perimeter was only successful because ‘there was no intention for anyone to go’, evidenced by the fact that ‘no-one came to challenge it ... [except] a few silly kids’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. They suggested that had ‘someone with a brain’ really wanted to attack the city centre, this would have caused problems for the police regardless. Only one respondent claimed they had actually seen people approach the perimeter, but their account seemed heavily influenced by their view of what this group was intent on, rather than actual behaviours:

So you could see from the control centre in the evening groups, a St Ann’s group on the CCTV, trying to come into the city centre and there was clearly the desire to have this great sort of festival of burglary that other cities had had [Nottingham Manager 4]

Speaking to the Home Affairs Select Committee (2011b) after the riots, Assistant Chief Constable Broadbent identified another key tactic as ‘engage to disperse’. He claimed the tactic worked well because it meant that the police ‘were able to keep those people who were intent on disturbances primarily on the back foot’ (Ev 71). As discussed above, police interpreted ‘intent’ if individuals were present on the streets at night in particular parts of the city, especially if they had been in trouble with the police before. The engage to disperse tactic was used because, unlike other riot-affected cities, the police were not faced with large groups of people overtly intent on conflict, but instead ‘small numbers of people – generally around about 10 or a few more – on street corners who we felt were prepared to commit violent acts if we didn’t go and engage with them in the first place’ (ibid).

The dispersal tactic was referred to alternatively as ‘cat and mouse’, which on the first night was reported primarily to be a way of keeping people out of the city centre. Officers involved, reported the result to be ‘fairly chaotic’, but successful:

I almost felt like yeah we are playing a bit of cat and mouse with them, but if all we are doing is chasing people around and they are not actually burning things down and smashing things up, to an extent we are kind of, they are going to get tired after a bit and they will go home and you know to an extent by about four o’clock in the morning it was almost like it is bedtime now we are going to go home. It didn’t kind of like, it wasn’t kind of like they weren’t so you know incensed to sort of keep it going and create more and more disorder. [Nottingham PO Officer 4]
A NPO provided a similar account, but wherein the young people ‘weren’t looking to
get into the city; they were just playing games with the police really. There were
lots of places that they could go, like little cut-throughs and they were just using
that’ [Nottingham NPO 2]. This latter version suggests the dispersal tactic actually
contributed to a sense of disorder in the city.

A third and more negative account of the ‘engage to disperse’ tactic suggests that
it raised tensions and directly promoted conflict and violence. McKenzie, a
resident academic in St Ann’s, claimed that the dispersal tactic, targeting young
people gathered in a local park actually provoked violence on the Tuesday
night (cited in Clifton 2011). A gathering, of around a 100 teenagers had formed in
Arboretum Park after arrangements had been disseminated via Blackberry
Messenger. Riot police arrived at about 7pm to begin dispersing the crowd, and it
was at this point that a breakaway group of eight young males occupied the roof of
the adjacent Nottingham Girls’ High School. Immediately surrounded by police, the
group began to throw missiles, including roof tiles, at officers. With no opportunity
to escape, the group were down within an hour and arrested. One young female
bystander recounted:

\[\text{The police chased them for no reason, for what they looked like and the way they was. ...and if they hadn't chased them, they were not going to loot, and they were not going to climb on a building and shout abuse, or whatever they were suspected of doing. (cited in Clifton 2011)}\]

A newspaper article (BBC 2012) claimed that the group on the roof were
associated with an older group of males that had been tracked to the park by a
police helicopter after throwing missiles and causing damage in St Ann’s.
However, officers involved in the incident did not recall this association when
interviewed for the study. Instead, they reported that their main concern at the
time was to prevent this group of boys, deemed to be of a type likely to riot,
causing them more serious problems further down the line:

\[\text{So we had them kind of surrounded. Well my view was we were in a position where we could keep back people that weren't involved so I set up a kind of outer cordon I suppose really. They were on the roof. I got staff on the roof. I made it clear to people I did not want people going on there and fighting on the roof because there was obviously risk. They weren't going anywhere. It very quickly materialised that they were some of the key potential protagonists in the St Ann's area that were going to cause us a lot of problems. They were all known to us and they were all kind of key players in terms of, or the intelligence suggested they were key players around} \]
other matters that might have been happening in St Ann’s. [Nottingham PO Officer 4]

Five of the eight boys, one as young as 13 years old, later appeared in court charged with violent disorder. There were mixed views about this outcome, even amongst police officers. One officer claimed these males were affiliated to a known urban street gang, which explained their behaviour and justified the outcome. Another officer claimed they were just kids caught up in the moment and the outcome was especially unfortunate given the harsh sentences handed out by the judiciary for offences linked to the 2011 Riots (see Piper 2011).

Accounts of the Pym Street disturbances suggest the police chasing of young people directly contributed to the damage to residential properties and vehicles. During this incident, it was reported that the police aim was more to corral and arrest, than disperse, but it was the chase that was primarily responsible for the criminal damage. It was reported how the police were in St Ann’s after reports of disorder, whereupon officers began chasing a group of youths down Pym Street. The youths were intentionally channelled down Pym Street because it had limited exit points. It was as they progressed down the street to the single pedestrian exit at the bottom that the damage was caused. Respondents described how the youths jumped on cars and knocked off wing mirrors, most likely as a show of strength or frustration. Consequently, the damage on Pym Street was referred to as 'collateral damage' by officers [Nottingham PO Officer 3], because it was neither pre-planned nor maliciously targeted at the affected residents. Rather, ‘they had been chased by the police and they took the opportunity’ [Nottingham NPO 2].

Nottinghamshire Police also put a section 60 in place, at least by the Tuesday evening. Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA) is an exceptional power of stop and search to tackle imminent threat of violence, allowing officers to search anyone in a certain area, without reasonable suspicion. Once in place, a section 60AA enables a similar authorisation to be given permitting constables to require the removal of face coverings if the constable reasonably believes these are worn wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing identity. The power to stop and search provided by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 has attracted a great deal of criticism (Bowling & Phillips 2007; Delsol & Shiner 2015). It is typically perceived to be unfair by individuals affected and statistics suggest it used discriminately with BME populations, especially Black people. Section 60 has attracted similar criticisms and additionally on the basis that its use is poorly monitored and, consequently, poorly regulated (Runnymede Trust n.d.). It is increasingly used to respond to low level disorder and linked to this
a Home Affairs Select Committee report (2011a) suggests that although section 60 powers are designed to prevent imminent acts of violence, their use in the months leading up to the riots may have had the opposite effect.

The intelligence used to inform the decision of Nottinghamshire Police to put a section 60 in place was not accessed by this study, but accounts of how it was used and its consequences were revealed during interviews. Respondents suggested that the tactic used in the immediate context of the riots may have caused at least some of the violence in Nottingham. For example, an account by one officer implied that the use of section 60 provoked conflict with the police, due to anger on the part of people who felt they had been treated unfairly:

There were people throwing bottles and bricks at police cars, and yeah you may have been searched and you may have thought there wasn't any grounds for it, but we put a section 60 in place. That for me would be the negative side. [Nottingham NPO 2]

The section 60AA additionally supported the tactic of large-scale arrests by making a person refusing to remove his or her face covering when requested liable to imprisonment for up to a month or a fine. In practice this meant that 'they would just get arrested, not questioned at all' [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. As discussed in Chapter 2, research has previously found that arrests deemed unreasonable by people in a public order situation can escalate tensions.

Large-scale arrest was a defining tactic of the police response in Nottingham. One officer involved in the public order response referred to the human rights implications of arrest, which deprives people of their right to liberty, set out in article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and enshrined in British law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The right to liberty is a limited right, meaning that it can only be interfered with in specific circumstances, for example in the case of lawful arrest or detention for criminal offences after conviction by a competent court; for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; or to bring a person before the competent legal authority after committing an offence or on 'reasonable suspicion' of having committed an offence or being about to commit an offence. In relation to the Nottingham arrests, most were made for latter reason, i.e. due to reasonable suspicion of an offence about to be committed. The respondent made reference to how officers have to weigh the human rights of the individual against the rights of the wider public (e.g. the right to life):

If you are taking somebody's liberty then that's quite an infringement on people's human rights isn't it? But then you need to look at the necessity
factors that might mean that you might want to arrest somebody. So seeing this individual I clearly think if I let them go from here, there is a real risk of a further breach of the peace taking place, even if they haven't actually caused that petrol bomb to be ignited down the road. [Nottingham PO Officer 4]

This response illustrates the conundrum for officers working in stressful and potentially life-threatening situations. What is deemed 'reasonable' in such situations may seem less so in the cold light of day. Officers referred to arrests made proactively in this way - with the sole aim of removing people from the streets - as 'positive arrests'; despite these potentially contravening article 5.

Positive arrests were not, however, merely a product of frontline conditions. Officers were strongly and clearly directed 'down to the last officer on the van' to use arrest as a way to prevent and contain disorder; and this was commanded from the highest level:

Mr Broadbent, part of his strategy and his briefing was that he wanted us to have a proactive approach towards arrests. So he did not want us to give people lots of chances to go on their way and then go and cause some damage around the corner. So he did not want us to give people lots of chances to go on their way. [Nottingham PO Officer 4]

It was reported how officers would usually be more considered about making arrests, not least because of the paperwork involved. In public order situations specifically, officers were usually instructed 'to take prisoners as a last option' and instead to negotiate wherever possible. In this respect, the order given in August 2011 directly conflicted with usual protocol. Temporary arrangements were put in place to facilitate mass arrests. Officers were told 'there will be a prisoner handling team ... so you won't have to deal with it yourself. All you will be required to do is make the arrest and put a witness statement in' [Nottingham PO Officer 4]. Officers were additionally told that 'if necessary we will double people up in the cells ... You deal with what you need'. The aim was to create the circumstances whereby officers would 'take action'.

This tactic resulted in more than 117 arrests. From these arrests, 75 people were charged (Nottingham Post 2012), meaning that at least 42 people were arrested without sufficient evidence to tie the suspect to the crime. Nearly a third of the arrests were youths (aged 10-17 years) and more than three-quarters (78%) were younger than 25 years (One Nottingham 2011), fitting with the younger age profile of rioters generally across the country. More than half were Black or Mixed ethnicity and the overwhelming majority (91%) were previously known to the
police. This latter statistic may be explained by officers targeting the 'usual suspects', as discussed above, due to preconceived notions of who was likely to riot.

5.5.2 Sheffield

Respondents spoke about the importance of preventing gatherings, likely to lead to disorder by using a dispersal tactic. This was identified as an appropriate response to a plan, uncovered by a group of the city’s Young Advisors, for people to meet in the city centre outside a large department store, TJ Hughes. It was described how police deployed a helicopter to detect and groups travelling to this spot so that officers on the ground could be informed and sent to disperse them before they arrived. It was not clear how many groups were detected or dispersed, but ultimately there was no gathering outside TJ Hughes. The other tactic used to prevent the gathering in the town centre was mounted horses, which were apparently positioned close to the department store, but there were no police cars or vans, which some respondents felt might have been antagonistic. It was noted, however, that the police were not dispersing groups in residential parts of the city. As discussed above, NPTs and community practitioners were taking the lead in their local areas, primarily focused on engagement. Where groups were identified as needing to be dispersed, practitioners reported being the ones to deal with this in the first instance. As one respondent said, the police ‘didn’t come in too heavy handed, dispersing groups. They kind of let us deal with that’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. The police played only a supporting role when contacted by youth workers for help in specific situations.

The main policing tactic deployed in Sheffield was liaison, which is a key aspect of the PLO role, deployed by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) for the Liberal Democrat party conference in March 2011. This communications-oriented approach was consistent with recommendations contained in recently published HMIC reports (2009b; 2009a). It was also due to the force’s mission statement, formally committing all ranks to re-establishing the public trust and confidence that had been lost as a result of the its controversial roles in the 1984–1985 miners’ strike and the Hillsborough football stadium disaster of 1989 in which almost a hundred spectators died amidst allegations of police mismanagement (Waddington 2013; D. Waddington 2007). The force’s mission statement is likely to have promoted SYP’s permissive approach again in August. The recent development and use of PLTs subsequently provided a tangible framework for operationalising this permissive approach. A case study of the Liberal Democrat party policing operation (Waddington 2013), named Operation Obelisk, reports how PLTs mingled with
protesters to cultivate a relationship of mutual trust and rapport and how this reduced the ‘chance of inducing the type of hostility and opposition that would have greeted their more conventionally deployed police colleagues’ (p.63). The study also reports clear lines of communication between PLTs and Silver Command to accurately inform decision-making, thereby avoiding the perception of indiscriminate and unjust police interventions.

The success of Operation Obelisk thus informed Operation Mimosa, SYP’s name for their public order response in August 2011. PCSOs, alongside other influential community practitioners, mingled not with protesters, but with local people, to similarly cultivate a relationship of mutual trust and rapport and to reduce the chance of inducing hostility and conflict. The lines of communication were similarly clear between the PCSOs and Silver Command. In this respect, PCSOs were transmuted to what might be termed ‘Community Liaison Officers’, rather Police Liaison Officers, in the context of unrest. For Operation Obelisk, many of the PLOs were trained negotiators. No doubt this training provided invaluable skills for a range of scenarios, including protests, but in the study neighbourhoods these skills may have not been enough. It was reported how it took a long time to build trust in these neighbourhoods and local people were highly suspicious of new people who tried to befriend them. For example, one community practitioner reported how they were suspected of being a covert police officer when taking up their position in one of the study neighbourhoods:

*When I first came into [the study neighbourhood], if I had a pound for every time a young person said to me ‘are you five-o’? I had to say ‘no I’m not’. I’ve gone out with very experienced youth workers, who’ve 20 years’ experience of working that community, and I’ve had to say to kids ‘ask [another practitioner], I’m not the old bill’. [Sheffield Practitioner 1]*

Hence, PLOs could have made matters worse. Local knowledge of who was who in local communities also meant that PCSOs could identify outsiders. Unfamiliar groups coming into the area was reported as a tension indicator. Community Practitioners in one of the study areas were worried about groups coming to stir their young people into violent action.

It has already been detailed how, in Sheffield, PSUs were not visibly deployed, especially in residential areas, in case they escalated tensions and gave young people something to kick against. However, it was reported how PSUs were available in the background in case they were needed. As for the Liberal Democrat party conference, PSUs were placed in back streets out of sight, but close to the city centre to enable a fast response. Respondents reported how this arrangement
increased their confidence to carry out their roles during the unrest and, consequently, they reporting feeling worried when PSUs from Sheffield were being transported to other cities to provide mutual aid. Other tactics, such as engaging parents to help deal with their children, were seen as a more effective. This confirms what others have previously reported about the importance of non-formal authority figures in preventing rioting (Morrell et al. 2011). For example, one NPO reported:

*I think sometimes the lads, particularly when they’ve got the riot vans there, they play up to it, because they always say to me, ‘oh [respondent’s name], you don’t chase me, why don’t you chase me because those others will’. ‘Well I know where you live, I know your mother. If I’ve got a problem I’ll go and knock on your door and speak to your mum and dad about it, and we’ll sort it out’. [Sheffield NPO 2]*

The concept and role of informal social controls will be returned to in Chapter 7. This Chapter builds on some of the findings briefly indicated here about how communities were involved in many activities to protect themselves.

### 5.5.3 Overview

Many of the tactics used by Nottinghamshire Police were provocative and it was reported that they escalated tensions and caused conflict with people who perceived they had been treated unfairly. These tactics included chasing young people around their local areas, searching them without reasonable suspicion and large-scale arrest based on ‘intent’ rather than actual behaviours. South Yorkshire Police, by contrast, used dialogue policing to engage with at risk groups in more positive ways. For groups with less favourable relations with the police, the involvement of youth workers to ‘negotiate’ the situation was a success factor.

### 5.6 Information and Intelligence

The flow of information has been covered to some extent in discussing who was involved in the public order operations in each of the case studies. This is because communication is central to how partners work together and can be a barrier to partnership working. However, a distinct section is warranted here to explore the role and effectiveness of different channels of communication, such as social media, which is of increasing interest in the context of critical incident management (Procter, Crump, et al. 2013). The section will also reflect on the distinction between information and intelligence, which emerged as an important theme due to its relevance in decision-making.
5.6.1 Nottingham

Communications within Nottinghamshire Police Force were supported by the GSB structure, as well as regular briefings, which ensured that officers across the three tiers, on day and night shifts, were well-informed about what was happening and the approach to take. The picture was less clear on the effectiveness of communications between the GSB structure and NPTs. As discussed above, some NPTs reported feeling isolated from the response, suggesting that information was not being systematically disseminated to them. However, it was still possible that information was being fed upwards from NPTs to the public order operation. One NPO reported receiving information about possible trouble in one of the study neighbourhoods and ‘feeding it into the uniform inspectors that were patrolling the areas’. A respondent involved in the strategic response also reported that decisions were being made on current intelligence about ‘activity [and] what was known about the individuals who were planning to commit disorder’ and that intelligence was ‘the brain of it all’. Responses such as these support a version of events where local information was being utilised. Alternatively, another police respondent reflected on the failure to use local intelligence in the early stages, which might have prevented unrest:

*Part of the problem with police intelligence is it relies on what’s happening in their locality, and their intelligence is the big square thing in the corner [i.e. a television]. That was the intelligence for us all. I think we failed to properly respond to it.* [Nottingham Manager 1]

Communication issues arose within the police force in relation to the police control and radio system. While there is no evidence that these necessarily impacted on local disorder, they are worth considering for future events on this scale. It was reported that there were ‘blockages’ in the control room due to the amount of calls received. The role of the control room is critical during a large operation, due to its coordinating role when hundreds of officers are on the same radio frequency. It was reported that officers are typically instructed not to use their radios to allow information from the control room to be heard. However, during the public order operation, commanders found it difficult receiving instructions from their tactical advisers at the same time as the control room. There was also the problem that personnel in the control room were not well placed to make decisions about where to deploy officers due to the fast changing nature of events, and in some cases commanders had to overrule them. Officers did not always wait for instructions from the control room, but sometimes self-deployed. As officers became aware of the petrol bombing at Canning Circus Police
Station, they immediately responded. This makes sense from the perspective that officers’ lives were in danger, but nonetheless undermines the command and control arrangement, intended to limit the use of discretion within public order situations (Waddington 1993).

Documentary and interview data together suggest that agencies in Nottingham worked well together to communicate with the general public via the use of social media. Nottinghamshire Police and the City Council received a joint award for their use of Twitter, associated with the huge number followers amassed during the disturbances, rising from about 3,000 to 16,500 over a two week period (Nottingham Post 2011b). However, this research confirms the findings from previous studies (Procter, Crump, et al. 2013; Procter, Vis, et al. 2013) that Twitter can present both a challenge and an opportunity. In Nottingham, social media provided an opportunity to reassure the public in real time, to quell rumours, correct misinformation and disseminate positive messages about how well the police were managing the situation. As one respondent put it: 'within a minute of us reading some nonsense we were able to put something out saying 'no, that is just not true'’ [Nottingham PO Officer 6]. It was reported how Twitter was used to promote 'business as usual', a key aim of the policing response, by ensuring that people had accurate information about Tuesday night’s football game. People were informed that the game was still on, dispelling existing rumours that it was cancelled, and that buses and trams were running as usual to help them get there.

The challenge emerged in relation to how well social media can be a source of information for the police. Although social media was reported to have been used to identify individuals trying to incite violence and to identify where disorder was occurring, many of these tweets ‘weren’t true' (Jo Hall, new media communications officer for Nottinghamshire Police Force, cited in the Nottingham Post 2011b). Respondents reported that it was impossible to rely on information received from the public, via social media or otherwise, because (a) the amount was overwhelming, and (b) because it was impossible to gauge its accuracy. As one respondent explained 'intelligence is only really information that's been graded' [Sheffield PO Officer 3], but it was almost impossible to grade all of the incoming information. Consequently, a lot was disregarded. There is the additional problem for the police that inaccurate tweets have the potential to raise anxiety and fear to an extent that outweighs their own reassurance efforts. Research found that rumours on Twitter were largely ‘self-correcting’ during the 2011 English riots, but nevertheless there remains a public safety case for providing information and advice via sources that the public can better trust in a timely way (Procter, Vis, et al. 2013).
Police officers referred specifically to the use of the National Decision-making Model (NDM) in managing the public order response. The NDM is a decision-making tool used by the police to help determine a suitable course of action across a range of situations (College of Policing 2013b). It has five key elements - information, assessment, powers and policy, options and action and review - which are bound together by the code of ethics as a sixth element. Some officers in Nottingham referred to the NDM without contention, but others expressed concerns about its usefulness, on the basis that it was only ever as good as the information being fed into it; and, because decision-making was ultimately subjective. Consequently, risk might be assessed differently by different commanders using the same model:

*I mean we have looked at the multi-dimensional risk assessment, so we look at the subject, location and see what the threat is, whether it is low; but it's difficult because it is subjective quite of a lot of the time, you know it might be your opinion that it's going to be high ... So I feel it's not a real great model in assessing threat, risk and harm really. You could have six different commanders and we will all probably have different viewpoints on the threat. [Nottingham PO Officer 2]*

The flow of information from community practitioners was not been fed directly into the public order response. However, it was reported that where relationships were good, practitioners did share information with NPTs, meaning they did have the potential to inform decisions where NPTs were integrated in the public order response. It was reported how some community practitioners were never going to hand over their information to the police. These tended to the practitioners closest to young people in the Nottingham study neighbourhoods. Reasons for not sharing information with the police included (a) because there was a lack of trust between these practitioners and local officers; and (b) because their relationships with young people were built on trust and confidentiality, which might have been undermined by any disclosure to the police. There were, however, certain officers in the police force and within the Council’s Community Protection team who were trusted by practitioners with information. But, there remained some concern, given the fast pace of events, whether this information reached decision-makers in time, due to the convoluted chain of communications:

*Some of our communication channels weren’t as well joined up as they might have be, but informal channels were working, and they were working up and down and across grades. So you had … a voluntary sector partner, talking to a youth service manager, who was then talking to somebody who*
wasn’t actually in [their] own line management chain; then I was talking to a [senior manager] in a different directorate, and he then used his links in to the police ... to highlight the risk. Now it’s clear that even then it nearly went wrong, because there was some, early evening, there were some disturbances ... [and] the police turned up in large numbers’ [Nottingham Manager 6]

5.6.2 Sheffield

Respondents in Sheffield also referred to the National Decision Model. Officers involved in the public order response reported how the model supported the process of decision-making, but did not resolve anything in itself. Its strength was that it promoted ‘logical thinking’ over ‘emotional thinking’. Ultimately, however, the model relied on the quality of the information being fed into it. It was reported how the police tended to rely simply on the use of the model without considering this. In 2011, officers reported that emphasis was duly placed on intelligence. In this case intelligence was referred to as the contextualised information provided by local police and practitioners on the frontline. Their intelligence was prioritised in decision-making over that received even from police analysts on the understanding that however well trained police analysts were likely to be blind to the important nuances of the situation. For example, it was reported how:

Young men from deprived areas, if you don’t know what you’re looking at, look aggressive because it’s culturally what they’re trying to do. They’re trying to be young men. So if you don’t know what you’re dealing with, it’s having the confidence to say ‘I’m going with the PCSO. They work it regularly. They know’ [Sheffield PO Officer 3]

Information not only flowed between local policing teams and central command, but in multifarious directions. As discussed above, a number of structures supported the flow of information, including partnership structures, such as Community Assemblies, Safer Neighbourhood Teams; regular meetings, such as Neighbourhood Action Group meetings; and shared processes and projects, such as the school tension monitoring system and the Dark Nights operation. Additionally, community structures facilitated communication with certain communities. For example, the Sheffield Federation of Mosques, facilitated communication with Muslim people across the city. Police were texting key contacts in the Federation of Mosques to provide reassurance and to correct rumours and these texts were being disseminating widely through the Federation’s own networks, especially through Friday prayers. Hence, it was a conduit for
information that also ensured a unified message to prevent confusion that might become a source of tension. Respondents from the Muslim community also reported the importance of the local radio station for communicating positive messages via one of the Asian programmes broadcast: ‘The local radio played a positive role, where you were able to go on radio and say ‘no, no no, this is what we need to be doing’. I think it was giving that positive message’ [Sheffield Practitioner 2].

South Yorkshire Police had a small number of staff responsible for the social media aspect of Operation Mimosa as well as a greater number of officers using social media in their own way. It was reported how the aims of the social media strategy were not only to quell rumours but to enhance the reputation of the force, ‘to engender some public feeling’, and ‘improve morale in the County’. The centralised social media activity was predominantly via Twitter, a micro-blogging site set up in 2006, allowing users to post messages, known as ‘tweets’, of up to 140 characters. Unlike some other social media, such as Facebook, Twitter’s model is directed and non-reciprocal, meaning that users can follow without having to be followed back. Another distinctive feature of Twitter, which was particularly useful in the context of the 2011 riots, is ‘hashtags’, which offer a way for users to label a tweet with a topic, distinguished by the prefix ‘#’. This facilitates information discovery and sharing, as anyone searching for the hashtag can see what everyone else is saying about this topic. The social media team were located in the next room to the Silver Command and so they had a direct line of communication, ensuring that messages were accurate and timely. It was reported how a decision was taken not to respond directly to individuals, as some other forces did, but send out a report based on a number of messages.

Another social media campaign was orchestrated by a team of the city’s Young Advisors, who are trained as consultants to guide the Council and its partners on the needs and experiences of young people. Young Advisors were reported to be drawn from diverse backgrounds and were not ‘your typical A-star students’. Under the guidance of the youth service, this team came up with a strategy to spread positive messages to and about young people during those early weeks of August 2011. One member of the team came up with the strapline ‘Steel City, Not Steal City’, with reference to the looting that was taking place elsewhere and to draw on the pride of Sheffield residents associated with its reputation for stainless steel manufacturing. It was reported that the Young Advisors used Twitter and Facebook to quickly and effectively get messages out. They were also challenging negative messages. An example was given whereby they asked a user to delete their link to video footage of looting in Birmingham with a question along the lines
‘are we going to do this in Sheffield?’. It was the Young Advisor’s monitoring of social media that first identified the plan for young people to gather in the town centre. They were also correcting rumours about police plans to use repressive tactics. The real success of the Young Advisors’ involvement in the public order response was that the police listened to them. The police took their role and information seriously and allowed the Young Advisors to report things anonymously. Hence, it ‘felt safe’ for them [Sheffield Manager 8].

5.6.3 Overview

Nottingham’s use of social media during the riots was celebrated, specifically because the police increased their number of twitter followers more than five-fold. However, the content of tweets mirrored their approach to street-based policing. They largely used social media to provide messages of reassurance to the general public and not to engage with at risk groups, as was the case in Sheffield. Young people in Sheffield were involved in identifying threats to social order on Facebook and other social media sites. They also disseminated messages to instil a sense of pride in the city to mitigate motivations to riot. Inter-agency communication in both case studies was promoted by pre-existing partnership structures; and communication with local people in Sheffield was facilitated by community structures that increased the reach of protective messages.

5.7 Conclusion

Reflecting across the public order responses in both case studies it can be concluded, unsurprisingly, that being proactive offers a better chance of avoiding unrest. However, this is only the case if the approach taken by policing partners is generally relaxed and does not visibly flood localities with resources, which can raise tensions. The general approach was not decided in a vacuum, but influenced by local contextual factors, including agencies’ perceptions of ‘would-be’ rioters; recent events that may have influenced these and/or provided understanding of how to manage a community crisis; and pre-existing relationships and channels of communication between policing partners, including community-based practitioners.

Socio-structural factors may be responsible for the marginalisation of some groups, making them more likely to riot. This requires the involvement of people who can best reach them, which may not be the police, but youth workers who have been able to build some level of rapport through sustained local engagement. This puts an emphasis on long-term youth provision and policing partnerships involving youth providers, but at a level that does not compromise
youth workers’ relationships with young people. Social media is a good way of communicating with the public to reassure and quash rumours as soon as they emerge and before they can incite violence. There is evidence that social media can also be used to engage those at risk of rioting, which, again, is most likely to be effective when the messages derive from people with influence, most likely people within the community.

NPTs have a role to play in managing the threat of urban disorder. While they may not have relationships with the most marginalised youth, they may have an understanding of who they are, who has influence with them, and what their normal behaviour looks like. On this basis, NPTs, and especially PCSOs, are well placed to feed intelligence to inform the decision-making of public order commanders. PCSOs can be deployed in similar a role to PLOs, used in other public order situations, such as football events and political demonstrations, by virtue of their pre-established rapport with local people, knowledge of the local area and community engagement skills, which together prepare them well for dialogue policing.

The style of policing informs the choice of tactics by police and partners. Dispersing people before they get chance to gather as a crowd was used to some extent in both case study areas with variable success. It seems critical who is involved in the dispersal and how it is done, in terms of perceptions of procedural fairness. Dispersing usual street-based groups is likely to antagonise, underlining the importance of involving people who know what is ‘normal’ for the time and place. Arrests may be required to protect people and property, but using large-scale arrest as a strategy from the outset to prevent disorder by taking ‘would-be’ rioters off the streets is likely to have the opposite effect.
Chapter 6 – Local Policing and Partnerships

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the immediate context to urban unrest in 2011, specifically how the activities of police and partners over a brief but critical period influenced outcomes. The current and following chapters take a wider perspective, exploring local contextual factors over the longer term, in the years and decades preceding the unrest. This chapter will specifically look at the pre-existing relationships between local agencies and communities. It is argued that the nature of these relationships determined the capability and willingness of various stakeholders to work together. The chapter begins by looking at police-community relations. As with previous disturbances, evidence suggests that simmering tensions due to repressive policing were most probably the tinder for riots in Nottingham. The spark was an antagonistic public order response, as described in the previous chapter. It is legitimate to consider that the crime-fighting activities of the police are likely to affect some relationships within communities; however, the Sheffield case study demonstrates that neighbourhood level tensions can be diffused by certain remedial actions, which themselves can provide a framework for responding to future crises. Remedial actions need to be perceived by communities as both genuine and effective. Ineffective resolution processes are likely to undermine police legitimacy further.

The chapter moves on to look at relationships between the police and other local agencies, exploring the realities of policing by partnership in the two case studies. A key finding is that pre-existing partnership relationships provide tried and trusted ways of working together, including channels of communication and decision-making processes, which are essential for managing a crisis. Trying to establish relations in the moment is thwart with difficulty. A key challenge in the Nottingham case study was the lack of mutual trust between agencies, which tends to be promoted by positive experiences and shared successes and, hence, can only be built over time. Tense relations, linked in part to local funding arrangements, meant that partnership working was only partial. Despite routine but low level incongruities between agencies in Sheffield, goodwill and routine partnership processes kicked in to promote a more joined-up response. A range of factors has historically supported partnership working in the city, including co-location of agencies and dedicated partnership structures and roles. Given the timing of this study, respondents were able to reflect on the impact of austerity measures. Unanimously, recent and planned changes were thought to be
detrimental to partnership working, undermining future capability to respond to unrest and other critical incidents.

6.2 Police-Community Relations

The nature of police-community relations have been spotlighted in explanations of previous riots. In particular, riots in the early 1980s were linked to Black people’s anger at the police due to failures in community policing and the use of repressive practices, particularly stop and search (see Chapter 1). Some explanations of the 2011 Riots resonate with this. The report of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (2012) described how in riot-affected areas young people’s trust in the police was ‘close to zero’ due to stop and search, which was ‘not necessarily intelligence-led’ and was carried out in a demeaning manner (p.106). This section examines the nature of police-community relations in case studies to help consider whether social order outcomes were somehow related. It describes how disproportionate targeting of young Black and Mixed race men in parts of Nottingham in the months and years preceding the unrest had produced anger, which was the ‘tinder’ for the riots locally. Although Nottingham’s local inquiry (One Nottingham 2011) into the disturbances made no reference to police-community relations, many respondents, including police officers, suggested that the actions of rioters were primarily ‘against the police and against establishments’ [Nottingham PO Officer 3]. The police investigation found that a number of the individuals involved in the bombing of Canning Circus Police Station had visited police hatred websites [Nottingham PO Officer 7]. This section suggests that police-community relations were better in Sheffield. Similar to Nottingham, repressive practices were largely used by specialist response teams, but local grievances had been mitigated by the efforts of both senior officers and Neighbourhood Policing Teams, who had directly engaged with communities to make amends.

6.2.1 Repressive and unfair practices

It was described how the ‘relationship between the police and the Black community in Nottingham [was] exceptionally poor, and particularly in St Ann’s where quite a lot of the individuals came from that were involved’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. Some police respondents suggested that police-community relations could be worse, on the basis that the force was not ‘having officers assaulted routinely [or]... cars attacked’ and there were no ‘no-go areas’ where officers felt unsafe, although in some neighbourhoods ‘you can absolutely feel that it ain’t your territory [Nottingham Manager 1]. The dominant explanation for the poor
relationships was repressive policing. Officers and other senior stakeholders in the city referred specifically to anti-drugs operations that had antagonised the residents in the study neighbourhoods over several years leading up to the disturbances. As discussed in Chapter 5, Nottingham had historically received negative attention for being the UK’s most dangerous city (Gibbs & Haldenby 2006) and dubbed ‘Shottingham’, the gun crime capital (Nottingham Post 2015). This had given impetus to a range of policing strategies and operations to deal with violence in the city. It was reported how policing activities had focused on the illegal drugs market as a ‘route into organised crime gangs’ [Nottingham Manager 3]. This ‘campaign’ was associated with some successes, including £40 million of heroin seized, but was recognised as having a detrimental impact on community relations, particularly with the city’s Black community.

It was reported that these anti-drugs operations in Nottingham, involving covert surveillance and house raids, took place between 2008 and 2010 and most of the convictions were in 2010 and 2011. Approximately 80 per cent of those arrested were given custodial sentences, estimated to be about 175 individuals. Some study participants emphasised the necessity of these operations because criminal elements must be dealt with and because the community had asked the authorities to deal with drug dealing on their streets. Few might challenge this basic proposition, but the way the issue of drug dealing was dealt with was contentious. Community practitioners reported that house raids, in particular, had angered people because they were repeatedly targeted at innocent households:

> Another thing that people were complaining about was, there’s a lot of houses where they were breaking into their houses and then, you know, nothing. So they kick someone’s door off, ‘ooh, wrong address’ or the information they thought they were going to get isn’t there. But if you do it to a set, certain amount of people all the time, it then looks like a game doesn’t it? And then if you saying you’re using intelligence, then why haven’t you found what you’re looking for? So that adds to the grievance. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

Officers themselves recognised the terrifying impact of house raids on whole communities:

> That normally means police officers with all the helmet and riot gear into a house. Well, a lot of these people they still live with their families, their parents so the consequence of going after one person usually when you go to a house you might have half a dozen people there; and it is an environment that is usually highly charged, you know for all sorts of
reasons, people don't want the police flooding in through their door having used an enforcer to take the door off its hinges. So that did have a knock on into the local community. [Nottingham PO Officer 3]

Despite their acknowledgement that these types of interventions were responsible for poor police-community relations, some officers tried to defend house raids as not being entirely negative on the basis that they provided opportunities to make homes more secure and to engage with local people about police work:

Our policy for quite a while was we would always replace a door with a more secure door to give the families a sense of security and we would always remain in that area so people could speak to us, so that we told them what we were doing, so there was an engagement aspect to it as well. [Nottingham PO Officer 3]

These comments may be purely defensive or may demonstrate a genuine lack of understanding about what constitutes good community engagement.

The disproportionate impact of Nottingham's anti-drugs operations on Black communities was explained as being ‘nothing to do with race issues. It was about who has got the biggest bag of drugs and who is dealing the most’ [Nottingham Manager 3]. A similar explanation is frequently cited by the police for disproportionate rates of stop and search (Bowling & Phillips 2007). Specifically, it is argued that BME people are disproportionately affected because they commit more crime (see EHRC 2010). Self-report surveys, however, suggest that offending behaviour and drug use is similar among Black and White people, and significantly lower among Asian people (Graham & Bowling 1995; Sharp & Budd 2005; Armstrong et al. 2005).

As illustrated in Figure 6.1, official figures show that for the five years between 2009/10 and 2013-12, South Yorkshire Police made greater use of stop and search than Nottinghamshire Police12. In 2010/11, the period preceding the 2011 Riots, South Yorkshire Police recorded 23,900 stop and searches compared to Nottinghamshire’s 4,763 in, meaning that South Yorkshire Police used the tactic 5 times as often. It is important to note that the South Yorkshire Police Force Area includes three other local authority districts as well as Sheffield and distribution across these geographies is not reported. Figure 6.2 illustrates the proportion of

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12 Number of persons and vehicles searched under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, by police force and self-defined ethnicity, excluding vehicle only searches. Sourced from Home Office 'Police Powers and Procedures England and Wales' annual statistical bulletins.
arrests resulting from these stop and searches. It indicates that arrests rates were lower for South Yorkshire Police across the five years compared to Nottinghamshire Police and England and Wales as a whole, suggesting they use the tactic less effectively. Nottinghamshire Police compares less favourably with South Yorkshire Police in terms of the stop and search ratio for BME compared to White groups (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Self-reported ethnicity of PACE s.1 stop and searches by Police Force Area

Figure 6.2: Resultant arrests for PACE S.1 stop and searches by Police Force Area
Both Nottinghamshire Police and South Yorkshire Police have been identified as having some of the worst disproportionately rates in the country. In 2007/8, Nottinghamshire had the second highest disproportionality ratio for Black people (Black people being 5.5 times as likely to be stopped as Whites) and South Yorkshire had the third highest disproportionality ratio for Asians (Asian people being twice as likely to be stopped as Whites) (EHRC 2010, Tables A13-14). A respondent in Sheffield claimed this historical data had inaccurately reflected the BME experience of stop and search locally because the population estimates used to calculate the ratios were out of date. They claimed the reality was that South Yorkshire Police was ‘very middle of the road’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. This claim was given some support by the 2014/15 disproportionality ratios, which were calculated using population estimates from the 2011 Census estimates and showed that although BME people were still nearly twice as likely as Whites to be stopped in the South Yorkshire Police Force Area, this ratio was now slightly lower than the national average (HMIC 2016a; 2016b).

Another explanation for disproportionate stop and search rates relates to the ‘available’ population (FitzGerald & Sibbet 1997; Waddington et al. 2004). This explanation recognises that some groups, stratified by ethnicity, are more likely to spend their time in private space, such as work or the home, compared to other groups that spend more time on the streets, thus making them more ‘available’. Empirical research supports this theory. One study (Waddington et al. 2004) found that when the characteristics of the available population is taken into account, racial minorities are proportionately no more likely, and often less likely, to be stopped by the police. A police officer in Sheffield gave a similar explanation for disproportionate stop and search rates of Asians in one of the Sheffield study neighbourhoods:

> South Yorkshire Police have been under the spotlight for disproportionate use of stop and search against BME backgrounds to the point that we had about 18 months ago, the MPI came out and they rode round [the study neighbourhood] with a couple of my officers to see why, to see for themselves why we were stopping a disproportionate number of Asian people, and the quote was after driving around [the study neighbourhood] for half an hour ‘do you know, all we’ve seen is Asian people. Where’s all the White folk?’ Because the White folk are either at home, in the club or in the pub, the Asian folk are on the streets [Sheffield NPO 3].

While the systematic differences in the street population may add a caveat to the per capita figure, some argue that ‘they do not diminish their value in assessing the
experience of being subjected to stop and search with the population as a whole' (Bowling & Phillips 2007).

Disproportionate use of stop and search was a particular issue in Nottingham around the time of the 2011 riots. Participants claimed that stop and search was not a feature of the anti-drugs operations, discussed above. Rather, it was a ‘normal policing tactic’ that many felt was used disproportionately against young people in deprived neighbourhoods. Although stop and search was never mentioned in the Nottingham inquiry (One Nottingham 2011), respondents indicated that it was locally understood to be a contributing factor to the disturbances. One senior stakeholder said:

Now stop and search did go on as a normal policing tactic; and I know that the data is again a matter of public issue there and people are very unhappy about the disproportionality of stop search. So that probably is the background to why you end up with twenty-odd individuals being influential in attacking police stations. I think that was an opportunity to respond to what the police had been doing over a long period of time. [Nottingham Manager 3]

This demonstrates how an official narrative can deviate from what people actually know and think. Most likely, the official narrative was constructed to minimise reputational harm. Greer and McLaughin (2010) remind us that police forces have well-resourced communications offices to ensure that ‘brand’ image and message are accurately and/or positively represented.

The experience of stop and search in Nottingham was reported to be extremely negative, not only in terms of unfair targeting, but because stop and search was carried out in ways perceived to be procedurally unjust, as this respondent recounted:

A lot of the lads that we work with will say ‘yeah, yeah, I kind of get it, that’s their job and that’s what they have to do, but do they have to be so bloody rude about it’? [Nottingham Manager 5]

A community practitioner reported that young people felt that searches were too intimate, leading to a sense of having been ‘sexually abused’:

Kids used to tell me they felt like [they were] being sexually abused, that’s their actual words, the way how they used to search them, you know, go up to them, whatever, put their hands down their baggies, you know looking for drugs. [Nottingham Practitioner 3]
This comment raises the possibility of human rights violations with respect to article 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment. The sense of being violated was similarly reported by a local survey of BME young people (Wright et al. 2013). The survey was conducted as part of a wider study commissioned by the Nottinghamshire Police and Crime Commissioner in the aftermath of the 2011 Riots to explore BME perceptions of the police. Survey responses indicated concerns about the lawfulness of stop and search encounters, for example, because individuals were not always given a reason for the stop or were denied information identifying the officer(s) involved. The vast majority of respondents affected by these types of issues (95%) said they had never formally complained because either they were worried about the consequences of 'police harassment' or because they lacked confidence in the complaints process (p.42).

Despite higher numbers of stop and search in the South Yorkshire Police Force Area, the tactic was rarely mentioned spontaneously by respondents in Sheffield and it was not reported to be a major issue, as it was in Nottingham. Respondents suggested that unfair targeting of stop and search had been a concern in the past, but less so now. However, it was suggested that officers in Sheffield, like everywhere in the country, used stop and search indiscriminately when trying to identify a suspect and this did impact negatively on trust and confidence in the police:

> I remember my mum used to have respect for the police, the British system and all of this, she went through the transition of being re-educated ... the police don't always serve the best purpose of young people and communities ... because when they came to [the study neighbourhood], if you could not find the culprit even if you are Somali whatever it is, you grab the very next person that's just there. So you have got this element of Police just coming in, just grabbing everybody stop and search and then you are going through this bitter experience of 'why am I being stopped? It is my God given right to pass through and get to where I need to go to'; but 'oh you look like somebody, you fit a description' and it's always the same story whether you are in Sheffield or London. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

Otherwise, little was said about the manner in which South Yorkshire Police carried out stop and search. In fact, it was reported that the policing in Sheffield was generally less aggressive than in some other cities, such as London and Liverpool, and local officers were generally more open to dialogue:
When you come across the Mets or the Tridents you just look back, you say 'Yes Sir, how high Sir, no problem Sir', whether you are a young person, whether you are Black, whatever you may be; you have got to really do it for the well-being of yourself. Sheffield Police you can argue with them, 'What are you doing?' [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

In addition to stop and search, respondents in Nottingham raised concerns about stop and account. As detailed in Chapter 2, stop and account refers to encounters where police officers stop (and in many cases, effectively detain) members of the public to ask them to account for their actions, behaviour or presence in an area, but do not go on to search them. In April 2005, changes were made to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Codes of Practice to require the police to record and monitor stop and account in the same way they did stop and search. This required police officers to provide anyone stopped, regardless of whether they were searched, with a receipt documenting key information about the encounter, including the reason for the stop, the outcome and the person’s self-defined ethnicity. But, in March 2011, new revisions gave discretion to police forces whether to record stop and account. Consequently, only ten forces continued to do so (Bridges et al. 2011). These legislative changes, made with no public consultation (ibid; Reiner 2010), were meant to ‘minimise the bureaucracy’ (Code of Practice A, para.22A). In reality, however, the personal data of those stopped was still frequently recorded (Bridges et al. 2011); only now this information cannot be accessed by them, nor monitored in the public interests.

Although Nottinghamshire was one of the forces that claimed to still record stop and account (ibid), some respondents said that individuals were not typically given a receipt following an encounter. The lack of a receipt was a major issue for young people because it meant they had nothing to prove to suspicious onlookers what their interaction with the police was about. Specifically, they were concerned that others might suspect them of snitching; suggesting that sharing information with the police was not generally approved of locally:

These are the grievances: ‘I get stopped, I get asked for somebody’s name, I don’t get the piece of paper that I’m supposed to get to say who they are, why they stopped me, what they’ve done. How do I address that?’ … Police are saying from their point of view it’s a friendly way of talking to people, but then from a cultural point of view, let’s say for those particular youths if you’re a bad youth in an area, Black, White or whatever, who’s the last person you want to be seen talking to. Then for someone looking on, what are you now? A grass! What problems does that bring into your life that
you don’t need? So you don’t want that interaction. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

Thus, stop and search was preferable to stop and account, because at least these encounters were more transparent: ‘from the onlooker’s point of view, that’s a strange interaction; and then from the point of view of accountability, it’s a strange interaction because where’s it noted?’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. Because there was a legal obligation to record stop and search, there was greater potential for holding the police to account: Removing the requirement to record stop and account removes ‘statistical evidence of both good and bad policing’ (Bridges et al. 2011, p.45), making it impossible to evidence discriminatory and disproportionate use or any improvements; and, ultimately, this undermines police legitimacy.

6.2.2 Forms of accountability

Unsurprisingly, how concerns about policing are dealt with by the police emerged as being important to police-community relations. As in Nottingham, Sheffield respondents reported concerns about repressive anti-drugs operations, particularly one known as 'Operation Mach'. This had been a city-wide operation, but had acutely affected one of the study neighbourhoods. Operation Mach was one of South Yorkshire Police’s largest drugs operations (The Star 2011a), which began in August 2009 and lasted for 18 months, culminating in more than 200 officers taking part in house raids and resulting in 83 people being sentenced for a total of 150 years. Like the Nottingham anti-drugs operations, it was reported by the police to be a response to community concerns about rising levels of violent and gang-related crime (BBC 2011a). The language of gangs and guns was explicitly used by the Superintendent leading the operation. The complaint of residents in the study neighbourhood was that the operation failed to apprehend any high-level drug dealers, so instead turned its focus to low-level dealers and children as easier targets. The community accused the police of ‘entrapping’ young people by giving them money or promising them designer goods to bring officers drugs. This fits with some of the facts publicly shared about the operation, notably that officers posed as salesmen offering designer clothes in exchange for drugs (The Star 2011c).

Given the timing of Operation Mach and the court judgements related to the case in early 2011, some respondents felt there was a risk that tensions might still be running high at the time of the August riots, which might have provided an opportunity to ‘take out vengeance’ on the police [Sheffield Practitioner 3]. Conversely, this research found that Operation Mach was a protective factor due
to police and partner efforts to help address community grievances in the period leading up to the riots. These efforts were instigated by a small number of influential residents, including a ward councillor, following agitated scenes outside the courts where families gathered to express their anger. Local people, especially mothers of the accused, were encouraged to meet together to discuss their grievances within the community. A member of the NPT reported these meetings to be challenging at first. The community used the meetings to vent its anger, but this was perhaps a necessary first step in re-building relations, which the NPT began to do by clarifying that they had not been involved in, or even aware of, the Operation:

The first meeting that I went to, because it was trying to get the message over, particularly to the parents again, and the wider community that I didn’t even know that was happening. There were about 200 people at the first meeting that we had after it, all shouting that it was entrapment, and we’d set these children up, and that they were good boys, they’d never done anything wrong and we’d set them up for it. So it was a real challenge. [Sheffield NPO 2]

Over time, local police-community relations began to thrive, even beyond their level before Operation Mach. A women’s group continued to meet regularly for about 18 months, providing a conduit for dialogue between the community, the NPT and other public agencies. A PCSO regularly attended these meetings to offer information and even formal courses about the criminal justice system to facilitate local understanding about what had happened during Operation Mach, as well as rights and risks more generally. The NPT claimed to benefit from these reformed relationships through the sharing of community intelligence to help tackle crime, as per theories of community engagement (Myhill 2006; Rogers & Robinson 2004):

There’s real reluctance in the area, even now to a certain extent, even though we’ve done all the work with the parents and the community, that they feel that they shouldn’t be telling us that things are happening. They’ll sort of hint to us. I’ve had the ladies group tell me that they’re really worried because there’s someone drug dealing on the flats, but they’ll not tell me directly. So I’m like ‘right I’m just going to the loo. If there happens to be a piece of paper on my desk when I come back from the loo’. And they’re happy to jot it down for me, but they’ll not tell me face to face. [Sheffield NPO 2]

In addition to the efforts of local police officers, it was described how the response of senior officers was critical for addressing tensions produced by Operation Mach.
Influential members of the community orchestrated a meeting between local people and senior officers. This meeting was supported and facilitated by the City Council, which provided language interpreters to maximise participation. Respondents were positive about the commitment of officers in coming to these meetings and in trying to identify solutions:

*It was really good that they were committed to come, attend these meetings after meeting, bringing officers, officers, officers and taking notes of what went wrong when they went to the houses; which part of that was why I did the training for them because somebody said to them ‘what are you going to do’ and they said ‘well we are going to have to get training or something’. I put my hand up and I said ‘well I’m a consultant and I train people in Somali so I can train you here. I can help you’. So that’s the thing. They were willing.* [Sheffield Practitioner 3]

These activities taking place in the aftermath of Operation Mach provided some confidence that police and other agencies might be willing to work with the community again to resolve difficult issues; including, for example, if groups in Sheffield had rioted in 2011:

*If the riot did happen then it would have been nice, it would probably be the same thing, people would meet the same way, kind of understand where it went wrong and the police you know dealing with this.* [Sheffield Practitioner 3]

As discussed in Chapter 2, trust in the police is a positive feeling about their future actions (Barbalet 2009) and a powerful predictor of compliance and legitimacy (Tyler 1990). Despite community perceptions of unfair treatment in relation to Operation Mach, South Yorkshire Police appeared to have been able to regain legitimacy through the resolution process and by committing to ongoing changes.

Conversely, respondents referred to processes in Nottingham to address concerns about stop and search as ‘tick box’ exercises, which produced little significant change. A key concern was that officers were not 'seen' to be listening. Rather they turned up at meetings and talked at the public using pre-written scripts:

*We had a new, whatever, Chief Superintendent who came in a couple of years back, and we had a few of them meetings. Again for me – and I’m not a pessimistic, I’m just a realist as I see things – was it a waste of time? Yes. Did it seem like a tick box? Yes. As the guy was speaking it was like he was doing a lecture. It’s like you’re not even, you know when you like already pre-presented it and you are just getting the point across and*
you’re just talking all about theory. ... I haven’t seen anything done differently throughout the 20 years. [Nottingham Practitioner 3]

Another respondent talked about the defensive approach of officers in public meetings, which prevented issues being progressed:

*I think it wasn’t an open approach been taken at that meeting by the police officer, inspector, at the time, who attended. It was more defensive. So then at the end of the meeting, you didn’t get the resolution that you might have needed.* [Nottingham Practitioner 2].

It was reported how these processes left community representatives feeling ‘powerless’ and ‘humiliated’ when returning from meetings with the news that nothing had been resolved. This stands in contrast to accounts of the resolution processes in Sheffield after Operation Mach. Although, it is important to recognise that Operation Mach was time-specific, unlike stop and search, which is an ongoing activity in Nottingham, as in other parts of the country, despite calls for ‘a fresh approach’ (Bowling & Phillips 2007).

There have been some attempts by the police to address concerns about stop and search since the 2011 riots. Nottinghamshire Police invested in the development of a Blackberry Data Application to record stop and search data to enable the force to easily and accurately map the location of encounters. It is not clear to what extent this was a response to the riots or to other pressures, such as reports by the HMIC (2013), which identified Nottingham as one of several forces nationally where concern over the use of stop and search had occurred. Wright et al.’s (2013) local study was unable to assess the effectiveness of the Blackberry application, as its development was ongoing at the time of fieldwork. Officers involved in this study, however, reported it to be an important for tool for ensuring transparency and accountability at both the organisational and officer level:

*Now we can actually identify officers who do the most searchers. We can identify officers who do the least number. We can identify officers who only target certain areas and it allows us to intervene with the officer and say ‘right why is it that you are doing this, why is it that every person that you stop is for drugs?’* [Nottingham PO Officer 3]

In addition to this technological response to disproportionate stop and search, officers reported being given more guidance and training, which was a recommendation of the National Police Improvement Agency’s (NPIA) ‘Next Steps’ review (Nottinghamshire Police and Crime Commissioner 2012). The review was commissioned by Nottinghamshire Police to help ‘understand the Force’s position
on stop and search and draw upon best practice nationally’ (p.8). The NPIA also recommended that the force immediately cease to record stop and account, directly contradicting StopWatch’s (Bridges et al. 2011) recommendation to reinstate the national recording requirement and to amend PACE accordingly (p.45).

6.2.3 Perception and treatment of gangs

What the plethora of official reports fails to consider when looking at stop and search is the mediating factor of gangs, or at least the police perception of gangs, as at least a partial explanation for the disproportionate targeting of BME young men. Respondents in Nottingham claimed that young men were frequently stopped by the police on suspicion of gang-involvement, based on little more than where they lived. Most respondents referred to gangs in some way, but particularly police officers, who provided detailed information about gang names, territories and identifiable ‘colours’. The main gangs in Nottingham were said to include the Brewster’s Crew in St Ann’s; the Certified Marmion Gang (or CMG) on the Marmion estate in St Ann’s; and Radford MPR (an acronym for ‘Money Power Respect’) in Radford. Respondents mentioned another, the Waterfront Gang, associated with The Meadows area; although everyone agreed this was historical and no longer existed. Some respondents maintained that all the Nottingham gangs were historical; claiming that they existed merely as a convenient explanation for the police whenever things went wrong:

Most people I know who’ve said they were MPR were in that ten years ago when they were kids - 19, 20, 17, 16. They’re adults now. They’re not interested in that. Got kids growing up. So whoever’s using the label it isn’t them, and the question they ask me now is ‘how do we get rid of this label? Because it’s like a kiddie thing, we’ve grown out of it, but then we’re still getting hammered with it because it keeps getting raised every time something goes wrong.’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

Other respondents described a more nuanced picture, whereby the main gangs were ‘broken down even more’ within neighbourhoods. This perhaps reflects the complexity and fluidity of ‘gang’ identity. Previous research describes how young people are ‘constantly changing the names of their groups’, but continue to refer to gang names from decades ago ‘in order for outsiders to understand who they are talking about’ (Adekunle 2011, p.25). Additionally, gang identity has been found to play a number of non-violent and non-criminal roles, which vary at different stages of young people’s social development (Fraser & Atkinson 2014). Friendship and loyalty were central roles, as well as claims for distinction at both
individual and community levels within the context of the ‘street’. This resonates with comments made by community respondents in this study. They described how groups were frequently misinterpreted as gangs, and therefore harassed by the police, despite their primary purpose being to socialise. It was also said that young people socialised in groups for safety on the streets, including protection from certain police practices: ‘they walk out in numbers for safety, and sometimes the safety is not about other people, it’s about stop and account’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2].

The fixation on gangs is not merely a police issue. A considerable amount of media time and research literature has been given over to the topic of gangs, leading to a general moral panic and the rise of a ‘gang industry’ (Hallsworth 2011). The gang industry ‘experts’ ‘consisting of largely liberal oriented policy makers and academics’ have similarly failed to reach consensus on whether gangs even exist in the UK context (Joseph & Gunter 2011), making it exceptionally difficult for agencies instructed to deal with the gang issue. The first piece of legislation to specifically mention gangs is the Policing and Crime Act (PCA) 2009, which came into effect on 31 January 2011. It defines a gang as a group that:

a) consists of at least three people;  
b) uses a name, emblem or colour or has any other characteristic that enables its members to be identified by others as a group; and  
c) is associated with a particular area.

This definition was evident in the descriptions of gangs by Nottinghamshire Police officers, particularly in the way they referred to colours as a defining characteristic.

You can see that inter-gang rivalry that results in firearms, so generally they don’t stray onto one another’s turf because they do know one another. And then the gang colours come into play. Whether they want to be copycat Americans. You’ve got Radford have red bandanas, sorry it is St Ann’s that will have red bandanas, The Meadows which will identify as blue bandanas, and Radford that will identify as black bandanas with a paisley pattern.
[Nottingham PO Officer 7]

Community respondents who refuted the existence of gangs in their neighbourhood also contested the reality of these colours. In their view, police perceptions of gangs locally were skewed by media representations of gangs in the US:

What colours? [sounding exasperated] But do you see what I’m trying to say to you? I couldn’t tell you what these colours are, what people are
supposed to be wearing to say we’re part of this gang. It’s just, I don’t know, to me it’s like you’ve watched too much American tv and tried to translate it to Britain. You need to understand America’s history has come from a different place to Britain’s. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

Officers themselves spoke of American gang culture, as evidenced by the quotation above, but on the basis that young people were actively copying this. Despite the view of some officers that the disturbances were nothing at all to do with gangs, Nottinghamshire Police used colours to try and demonstrate association between individuals charged with riot offences in 2011; in particular to demonstrate that Radford MPR was responsible for the petrol bombing of Canning Circus Police Station. Yet, respondents reported discrepancies in the evidence. An officer described how 'all bar about one, carried a black and white bandana' [Nottingham PO Officer 7], which was not strictly the black and paisley, apparently associated with Radford MPR. In addition, a blue bandana had been recovered at the scene, which police explained away as 'just a strange quirk' despite blue being the colours associated with the former Waterfront Gang.

The fact that Nottinghamshire Police were trying to prove association between defendants indicates use of the common-law doctrine joint enterprise. This was introduced in 1536 as a means of prosecuting duellers and their associates (Pitts 2014), but since 1985 has mainly been used to prosecute young men thought to be involved in gangs (Green & McGourlay 2015). Joint enterprise has emerged as a prosecution tool for collective punishment, whereby by all members of a group are liable for the criminal acts committed by the principal offender (Home Affairs Committee 2012) where it can be proved there were ‘in it together’ (Williams & Clarke 2016). There are two competing explanations for its use with gangs: Firstly, that joint enterprise provides a powerful deterrent message to would-be affiliates (Pitts 2014); and, secondly, that joint enterprise incapacitates as many affiliates as possible (Green & McGourlay 2015). Underpinning both is the perceived dangerousness of gangs, linked to a 'moral panic that has been raging thorough Europe in recent years about 'street violence' and 'delinquent youth'' (Wacquant 2009, p.243). The revival of joint enterprise is contentious because it introduces a lower burden of proof, which is concerning given that most cases involve serious crimes, typically murder (Green & McGourlay 2015). Campaigns against joint enterprise, by organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust and Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association (JENGbA), have prompted a series of inquiries (Justice Committee 2012a; 2012b; 2014). These have revealed a distinct lack of quantifiable data on joint enterprise, with neither the CPS nor the Home Office
actively logging its use. Consequently, research on joint enterprise has had to rely on Freedom of Information requests (see McLenaghan et al. 2014).

Due to gangs being racialized (Williams & Clarke 2016), joint enterprise has disproportionately impacted on Black and Mixed race young men (Justice Committee 2014; Crew et al. 2014). A group of young Black men in Birmingham were prosecuted using joint enterprise during the 2011 Riots. The group included Jermaine Lewis, even though CCTV footage could not put him at the scene. His prosecution was based on evidence of gang affiliation, which largely revolved around online rap videos and pictures downloaded to defendants' phones, which were used to demonstrate his attitudes to guns and the police (Williams & Clarke 2016). Lewis received a sentence of 23 years in prison. Just as Nottinghamshire Police referred to colours to substantiate gang identity, officers in Birmingham referred to a hallmark hand gesture known as 'throwing sixes', observed in rap videos made by some of the defendants. This demonstrates the tenuousness of evidence required for joint enterprise cases and of police intelligence about gangs. It also provides support for the idea of 'policing by association' (McAra & McVie 2005; Medina Ariza 2013; Ralphs et al. 2009), meaning that police attention is more strongly associated with who individuals hang out with than what they do. This has implications for people living in gang-affected neighbourhoods, who are labelled even if they do not self-define as a gang member, hold anti-gang views and are not criminally active (Ralphs et al. 2009). This is because police are not aware of the lived reality of these places, where gang-involved and non-gang-involved people live side by side and lead overlapping lives (Pitts 2014).

Respondents in Nottingham described how the gang label was being indiscriminately applied to people living in the study neighbourhoods, particularly young people who socialised on the streets, or were 'on road' (Gunter 2010). Consequently, they received undue attention from the police in the form of stop and search and stop and account, as detailed above. The gang label also meant the conflation of minor crime and anti-social behaviour with more serious violent crimes, as found in other studies (Smithson et al. 2012). Community practitioners felt the police view that all crimes in the neighbourhood were gang-related was nonsensical and antagonistic, as indicated by this comment:

As long as you live in these areas and you get any attention from the police, you’re in that gang, even if you’re not in a gang. So that winds them up even more. Because you’re getting stopped on the assumption that you must be in this gang, but how can every individual in the area, just because
you’ve nicked someone’s toilet roll, but now I’m in MPR. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

Being labelled a gang member also intensified young people’s social exclusion. Respondents in Nottingham spoke about the number of young people in special educational provision after being excluded from school and those barred from certain youth facilities. Ralph et al’s ethnographic research (2009) describes in more detail how this exclusion occurs for suspected gang member. Another risk of the gang label is that young people take on the criminal identity assigned to it (Becker 1963; Matza 1969).

Some commentators have highlighted that the quantity of information collected on those under the ‘police gaze’ is of serious concern (O’Neill & Loftus 2013). It can amount to whole dossiers on individuals and their associates. Seemingly mundane recordings of people’s movements, appearance and socialisation habits contribute to a growing, searchable database of personal information. This information is more easily and readily shared as a consequence of multi-agency working, representing new invasions into the private lives of the already vulnerable, multiplying state control and amplifying existing social inequalities (ibid). Gang-involvement is identified predominantly by street-based police officers, but increasingly by civilian office-based analysts as well (Fraser & Atkinson 2014). The discretion of these intelligence analysts offers the potential for a new 'edge' in law enforcement, but may also represent a point of failure in the intelligence cycle (ibid). Civilian analysts tend to supplement more traditional intelligence on ‘gang’ members with evidence found on social networking sites, as detailed above, ‘despite the evident extension of processes of self-presentation and imagined selfhood onto their online lives’ (p.165). It is also reported how street officers’ resistance to ‘top-down’ knowledge has meant persistent targeting of the ‘usual suspects’ (Brodur & Dupont 2008), which are invariably the types of young people regarded as ‘police property’ (Reiner 1992, p.48).

Gang databases were developed in the U.S. to assist police in conviction rates for gang members (Katz et al. 2000). There has been a take up of this approach in the UK, but research on some of these ‘gang’ databases suggests they are merely facilitate policing of the ‘usual suspects’. Williams (2015) reports that three-quarters of those listed on gang databases are not even regarded as ‘active’ members by the police; and the notion of ‘active’ was subject to interpretation, with some officers noting this meant ‘being predominantly seen on the street … [even if] he might not have done anything wrong’ (p.29). The same research also confirms that BME individuals are more likely to be listed, despite being less
involved in serious youth violence than Whites (Williams 2015; Williams & Clarke 2016). Williams (2014) maintains that it would be untenable not to consider the racial composition of 'gangs' as a feature of racist policing, which must be understood within a wider social and historical context. The ‘Othering’ of Black men dates back to colonial times (Williams 2015), becoming spotlighted in British policing in the 1970s when Policing the Crisis (Hall et al. 1978) documented how street robbery had been racialized as ‘mugging’ and represented in the media as an epidemic requiring swift and punitive intervention against young Black men. It seems this earlier concern about mugging has been transferred to gangs, which is frequently identified as a racial problem with references to ‘Black culture’ being responsible for violence and ‘nihilistic gangsters' and criminal 'hotspots' in areas known to be predominated by BME communities (Williams 2015).

In Sheffield, respondents rarely referred to gangs and when they did, it was usually to refute their existence. In the words of one respondent: ‘I would say in 20 years of being a youth worker, I’ve never come across an organised gang of young people’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. The same person, however, did express some concerns about a potentially changing picture and another respondent claimed that a shooting in 2009 had been gang-related [Sheffield Manager 5]. Otherwise, respondents were more likely to speak about ‘groups’ to describe affiliations that had endured over time, even if they were sometimes involved in criminality:

*Interviewer:* You’ve talked about people that have previously been involved in criminality; are those groups, is it a tight group or is it just a mix of individuals?

*Respondent:* No, they’ve probably known each other all their life. They’ve always knocked about with each other. Some will have probably gone to school together, and they still hang about on the streets now, together. [Sheffield NPO 4]

The rare mention of gangs in Sheffield at the time of the research was surprising given that the city had recently received funding to address the problem via the Ending Gangs and Youth Violence (EGYV) programme. The EGYV programme was a national response to the 2011 Riots that spotlighted the role of gangs on the basis that ‘one in five of those arrested in connection with the riots were known gang members’ (Home Office 2011, p.3). The EGYV programme re-stated the link between gangs and violence and set out the need for multi-agency working to be targeted in ‘gang-impacted communities’ (p.4); thus, providing the remit for racial targeting by geography, as suggested by Williams (2015). Although some voluntary, community and faith sector organisations (hereafter referred to as the
voluntary sector), reported concerns about the way the EGYV money was allocated in Sheffield – in uselessly tiny sums – they expressed some relief that the overarching strategy was largely preventative and welfare-based.

Respondents in Nottingham were similarly vexed that EGYV funding had been allocated piecemeal to the voluntary sector; and some voiced particular concern that the statutory sector had retained the lion’s share of it:

[the] statutory [sector], how I see it, got like a million out of it, ... some of the people must command big wages because I know half a million got to go in a justice gang issue, half of that went on wages and then a measly £500 or a grand here would go out to community projects to try and address the gang issue, like ‘yeah right, 1500 quid, you are absolutely crazy’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]

It was suggested that the EGYV funding had mainly been used to support and extend interventions in place before the riots, which meant a continuing focus on enforcement. Although ‘Stealth’ has elsewhere been (Williams 2015; Williams & Clarke 2016) identified as the specialist (gun and) gang unit in Nottingham, this was never mentioned by respondents. Instead, respondents referred to Vanguard, which was said to comprise two components: (1) Operation Vanguard, a police enforcement team set up in 2008; and (2) Vanguard Plus, a multi-agency team led by Nottingham City Council, focused more on preventative strategies. Vanguard Plus was established ahead of the disturbances but was not properly in place to feed into the public order response. Operation Vanguard was responsible for the types of anti-drugs operations detailed above, which had negatively affected police-community relations. On this basis, it was difficult for Vanguard Plus, with virtually the same name, to make inroads with communities. As one respondent conceded, ‘my name was mud over there for the better part of nine months’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. Despite reports that Vanguard Plus was taking a different approach to engage and support young people suspected of gang involvement, some respondents were still reluctant to partner an organisation that had such obvious links with the police.

An early activity of Vanguard Plus was mapping the city’s gang members. This exercise supports the claim that Nottinghamshire Police had an unrealistic view of gangs. At the start of the exercise, there were meant to be 800 members according to police intelligence. This number was eventually reduced down to 360
with closer adherence to ACPO’s\textsuperscript{13} definition of a gang (Home Office 2011). This has slightly more detailed criteria than the Policing and Crime Act 2009 definition, but is not substantively different. Some argue that the debate over gang definitions is not especially helpful in gaining a truer picture of gangs because it is ‘essentially an argument over the correct description of a ghost’ (Katz & Jackson-Jacobson 2004, p.106); meaning it is an invisible symbol onto which fear and prejudice is loaded (Fraser & Atkinson 2014). The study certainly revealed signs of prejudice in the way officers described individuals and events in the study neighbourhoods. They spoke about local criminals as if they were all part of the same group, dismissing the possibility that criminals could ever be victims too, which raises concerns about fair treatment under the law:

\textit{St Ann’s was an absolute failure, in terms of the attack on that police station because the petrol bombing didn’t make contact with the building and ironically did nothing more than seize a car that had been seized from a drug dealer in St Ann’s and kept in the back of the nick. So their effectively destroyed one of their own vehicles.}\textbf{[Nottingham PO Officer 7]}

Officers also expressed deprecating views about ‘gang’ members that had less to do with behaviours and more to do with where they lived and the social disadvantage characterising those areas; for example:

\textit{I will say, from a personal point of view, they’re not the brightest individuals in the world…. when you look at where they come from, none of them are academics, none of them got an A-level onto university}\textbf{[Nottingham PO Officer 7]}

Interestingly negative views were more likely to come from officers in senior and strategic roles than from NPOs, who had more day-to-day contact with communities. Non-police respondents spoke more favourably about ‘gang’ members. Contrasting with the officer’s comments about intellectual ability, a community practitioner said ‘these gang members, or whatever, ... are more clued up than what people think they are’ \textbf{[Nottingham Practitioner 3]}. Another respondent supported this view with claims that many of the young people suspected of gang involvement had relatively high educational attainment:

\textsuperscript{13} The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) was considered the definitive collective of chief officers and, as such, the Government legislated on a number of occasions to provide a duty to consult with ACPO before making certain directions, regulations, or before issuing certain codes of practice. ACPO was replaced by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) on 1 April 2015.
The Brewster lads are very bright lads, to be fair. We did a provision bit of research, pre-pre-everything. You’d got, I think, between about 15 and 20 per cent of the lads that we looked at across that group were ‘gifted and talented’ in school. Two or three of them left. One lad who’s moved out of the area now left school with something like five A*’s for his GCSEs and 4 Bs. He could have done anything. [Nottingham Manager 5]

Community practitioners in the study neighbourhoods acknowledged the disparity between their view and the general police view of groups and individuals living in the study neighbourhoods, even reporting that they had tried to do something about it:

I used to go to meetings and we used to talk about these different kids and they’d say ‘what are they like in your centre?’ and I’d be like ‘I’ don’t know what you’re talking about. The kid that I’ve got and the kid that you’re talking about, they don’t meet’. So it’s like ‘are you sure?’ ‘Come and see it, come and see it for yourself’. I used to have police officers in my sessions and all sorts to try and break the barrier and create an understanding on both sides. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]

In recognition that poor police-community relations were a motivating factor for the disturbances in Nottingham, a range of events were organised afterwards to address this, including a local radio debate on Kemet FM between Nottinghamshire Police and young people. An issue to emerge from this event was that young people across Nottingham felt poorly treated by the police, evidenced by the question posed by a female university student when she asked ‘why do nightclub bouncers treat me with more respect than your officers?’.

6.2.4 Heterogeneous relations with the police

However, police-community relations were not all bad in Nottingham. A finding to emerge across the case studies was that communities did not perceive the police to be a homogenous entity; meaning that communities were able to discriminate between different parts of the organisation, allowing them to have both positive and negative relationships with different groups of officers. As with the community affected by Operation Mach in Sheffield (detailed above), respondents in Nottingham reported that despite repressive treatment by police operational units, communities were still able to have good relationships with NPTs where they were perceived to be independent of operational units. This might explain why the local police station in one of the Nottingham study neighbourhoods escaped attack in 2011 despite five others having been targeted. Community practitioners suggested this police station was left alone because local people
generally had positive relationships with the NPT located there because ‘they’re out all the time [and] people know them’. The station was in the heart of the community, on the High Street, and therefore an easy target. Another police station on the outskirts of the neighbourhood and closer to the city centre was attacked. Some explained that this was because the officers based here policed differently:

“We’ve got different inspectors. How one inspector runs their thing is one thing. I’m assuming that each inspector runs their teams how they feel fit with their kind of ethos. So what I’m saying, what we had here was good.” [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

In the second Nottingham study neighbourhood, where the local police station was attacked, accounts suggest a drugs operations team was co-located with the NPT. This drugs team accompanied and supported centrally co-ordinated raids on local homes. So, while there was some evidence of good community relations with the NPT, the police station likely symbolised something oppressive in terms of some of its functions and perhaps also in terms of its physical design:

“It looks like a prison... It is a very formal building at the front and then it is literally 20 foot high fences all the way round it. So you know from like an engagement ‘come in and talk to us’, it does not have that.” [Nottingham NPO 1]

Community practitioners in Sheffield recounted incidents of repressive policing involving young people ‘literally being picked and put against the wall at school’ [Sheffield Practitioner 3] and the use of police dogs to perform arrests in residential areas. One respondent recounted how his position as a community practitioner made little difference to how he was treated when the police visited his neighbourhood. The police treated him as any other Black resident, suggesting the officers had entered the neighbourhood with a ‘them and us’ mentality that was difficult to penetrate:

“I clearly had my badge on, me and my manager saw it could go a bad way... we knew if it continued it would become physical. ... the police dog went for me, just jumped at me and honestly, as it got to there, the copper pulled it back and I said ‘what are you doing mate’ and he goes ‘I am not your mate, don’t call me mate’. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

These negative experiences, of course, had implications for police legitimacy, but because they were generally associated with special operational teams, they did not completely undermine community relations with NPTs. This highlights the
importance of NPT involvement in community crises. Where police legitimacy is low, based on negative experiences of special operational teams, sending in another operational team to maintain order is illogical. NPTs with pre-existing relations are better placed to calm tensions. There is no doubt that particular crises require specialist knowledge and expertise, which is often managed through the Gold-Silver-Bronze structure, but, given that NPTs have specialist knowledge and expertise in the context of community, there is a rationale to accommodate them too within the structure when seeking to prevent and contain community unrest.

It was reported how police-community relations were largely developed in the case studies through PCSOs. This is unsurprising given their role within the NPT structure. Despite an initial lack of clarity when PCSOs were introduced under the Police Reform Act 2002 (Home Office 2008), community engagement has become one of their main functions (ACPO 2007). Previous research has found that taking on this role with the NPT, over time, earned PCSOs the support of their warranted colleagues, who have been freed up to focus on other matters (O’Neill 2015). The current study supports this finding:

> When PCSOs first came in... I don’t think we were particularly bothered about having them if I’m honest. It was a little before my time, but to paraphrase, it was a little like ‘right, well, err, get out there for a wander then’ and there’s a little resistance from the cops because like ‘they might be taking my job here’. The fact that he or she is going to walk the streets and you don’t want to do it anyway and you weren’t going to be made redundant anyway seems a bit lost on people. And progressively over the years, we have got far more clued up as to their capacity and what they’re able to do for us. [Sheffield NPO 3]

PCSOs were referred to as 'professional natterers', with an emphasis on the value of this for police-community relations and intelligence gathering.

A Sheffield respondent claimed there had been a recent drop in PCSO numbers, amounting to about 15-20 per cent across the force. Numbers were often down due to natural wastage because, as documented elsewhere, a proportion of PCSOs were said to be in the role merely as a career step to becoming a police officer (Cooper et al. 2006; Johnston 2007), leaving gaps when they moved on. Other PCSOs proudly declared that they were in it for the long haul. The recent drop in PCSOs, however, was primarily linked to austerity measures; and financial pressures across the force meant that remaining PCSOs were increasingly used for crime fighting activities at the expense of community engagement. An alternative
or additional explanation for this shift in focus relates to the hunkering down of South Yorkshire Police following recent spotlight on their role in the Hillsborough disaster (see Scraton 1999) and the sexual exploitation scandal in Rotherham (see Jay 2014). This had compelled senior leaders to pursue good news stories, thereby, putting an emphasis on activities that were more readily quantified than community rapport:

*I just feel they’re in a phase at the moment where they’re fire-fighting, and they haven’t got time to necessarily think about some of those other things. There [have] been a lot of changes. I think it’s a struggle to maintain; as I say, it’s those lower level engagement things that are so difficult to justify, when instead you could send PCSOs out to do vulnerable vehicle notices and car crime, and you’ve got stats there where you can say ‘look we’ve done x number of this and that’. You just can’t quantify some of the other work that PCSOs used to do.* [Sheffield Manager 5]

It was reported how a shift away from community engagement was evident across the wider policing family in Sheffield, with statutory policing roles also being squeezed out due to cost-cutting. This meant that 'innovative work in terms of engagement and addressing issues' was suffering and 'a lot of positivity [had] been drained out of people' [Sheffield Manager 5]. Consequently, respondents across stakeholder groups felt that Sheffield would be in a much weaker position in the future to respond to critical incidents affecting communities.

In the previous chapter, it was described how the involvement of officers at Inspector level was critical to averting to the public order response in one of the Sheffield neighbourhoods, which was predominated by Asian people. Their involvement in the public order response was built on pre-existing rapport, which was sought by influential members of the Asian community because they 'are very rank conscious' [Sheffield NPO 3]. It was thought that part of the reason for being rank conscious was that rapport with senior officers helped reinforce their reputation and position of influence in the community. Although the issue of gender was not directly discussed, it is difficult to overlook that the 'influential' members of the community in this context were primarily men. This is not to overlook that some female residents may have sway within the Asian community, but they were less conspicuous. It was men that held key positions in the study neighbourhood's formal community structures, for example, as imams, ward councillors or chairpersons of community or faith-based organisations. Although the police force is largely male, senior police officers in particular tend to be men. The proportion of female police officers has risen slightly, but they still only
represent 21 per cent of senior ranks and 30 per cent at constable rank (Home Office 2015). PCSOs were more evenly split, with 55 per cent female. This may be another reason that rank was deemed important in this particular case.

Gender did present as an issue within neighbourhood policing. It was reported that one of the PCSOs in the Sheffield study neighbourhood regularly had abuse shouted at her by young Asian males, relating to her sex and racial characteristics:

*One of [the] PCSOs in [the study neighbourhood] happens to be a White blond female. Some of the abuse she gets from young Asian lads is horrendous. You know 'I’m gonna fucking rape you, you White slag', 'I’m gonna rape your mother, you White bitch', all this sort of stuff; horrible, horrible. [Sheffield Manager 5]*

However, this was juxtaposed by polite and even protective behaviour from other Asian men. Nonetheless, this type of abuse could make street-based policing more difficult for female officers in this neighbourhood, as this NPO conceded:

*It’s definitely more difficult being a female working [in the study neighbourhood], than it is male, just because of their attitude towards, I think towards females in general, but also females in uniform is even more, you know they just don’t like it. [Sheffield NPO 4]*

In contrast, it was described how female officers could sometimes have it easier than male officers in the Nottingham study neighbourhoods predominated by Black and Mixed race young men. A NPO reported that she had worked with male officers, who had constantly been threatened by groups of young men hanging on the street. Although the same groups were often 'lippy' towards her, they were never threatening. She speculated this was because being seen to threaten a woman might be damaging to their reputation, by undermining their 'macho image' [Nottingham NPO 3]. It is difficult to know how to interpret these findings. Research on gender differences in policing have tended to focus on women's 'soft policing' skills (McCarthy 2013) and their reduced likelihood of using force (Porter & Prenzler 2015; Lonsway et al. 2002). There is less published on gendered experiences of policing different communities beyond this.

Diversity training for police officers was identified by respondents as one solution to the problem of poor police-community relations, as it was by Scarman (1981) following the Brixton Riots. More and improved race and diversity training has also been a consequence of the Lawrence Inquiry (McGhee 2005; Bennetto 2009), which identified 'institutional racism' as the collective failure of the police in providing 'an appropriate and professional service to people because of their
colour, culture, or ethnic origin' (Macpherson 1999, para.6.34). Although racism was implicit in some complaints about the police, respondents never used this term. The suggestion of diversity training was linked to the police needing to be more culturally sensitive. For example, by understanding 'the sacred things', such as not entering an Islamic home when the women are not wearing their hijab [Sheffield Practitioner 3]; and being sensitive to different types of victimisation for some ethnic groups, such as female genital mutilation. Community practitioners in both cities felt that officers needed to be generally more 'clued up' about the neighbourhoods they were working in. Their comments were often about styles of community policing or the 'softly stuff', which meant knowing how to deal with 'little Johnny, whose dad is an alcoholic, or he's done a double digit sentence, his mum's a heroin addict' [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. They suggested that sometimes a 'quiet word' with an individual who is 'getting a little bit lary', or with their parents, can be more effective than hauling them down to the police station.

6.3 Police and Partner Relations

The previous section looked at relationships between the police and communities. The current section turns to relationships between the police and other agencies, particularly those involved in policing. The term ‘policing’ is used to mean activities performed under the broad banner of 'community safety', which has been defined as 'community-based action to inhibit and remedy the causes and consequences of criminal, intimidatory and other related anti-social behaviour' (LGMB 1996). The Morgan Report (1991), which was instrumental in defining and promoting community safety, distinguishes it from the narrower concept of crime prevention. The report also advanced the notion of multi-agency partnerships as a means to achieve it (Berry et al. 2011), even pointing to the irrationality of local authorities not previously sharing responsibility for community safety or crime prevention with the police (Squires 1999). This changed with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which placed a statutory requirement on local authorities and health authorities to work with the police to tackle crime-related issues. Yet, off the back of the Morgan Report, local authorities had already begun appointing community safety officers and developing partnerships with a range of statutory and voluntary sector bodies, resulting in a complex and variable picture nationally (Gilling 1999). The nature of partnerships in the two case studies is explored here as important context to events in August 2011. The previous chapter argued that a partnership response, compared to a pure police response, was better able to prevent and contain unrest, by virtue of the specialist expertise, local knowledge and community rapport that other agencies were able to contribute. Although
partnerships may be strengthened by a crisis event, the interview data suggests that a certain level of inter-agency working needs to be in place beforehand, which this section aims to explore.

There has been a massive proliferation in posts and teams linked to the community safety agenda (Hughes & Rowe 2007). Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) offered a formal structure for co-ordinating partnership working at the strategic level, although much of their activity has been carried out through other local partnerships that tend not to have the same statutory backing (Berry et al. 2011). In Sheffield, a key partnership structure at the sub-district level was Community Assemblies, as mentioned in the previous chapter. There were seven Community Assemblies, each comprising four wards and run by 12 local Councillors with support from City Council officers. The aim of Community Assemblies was to join-up the activities of the various Council services, the private sector, voluntary and community sector and other agencies, including the Police.

In the words of one respondent, another aim was 'to make the Council more accessible, move away from this idea that it was some kind of monolithic Town Hall centred organisation' [Sheffield Manager 9]. Each Community Assembly had a dedicated budget to boost spending on local services and locally defined issues, agreed through public consultation and set out in an annual Community Plan.

There were some concerns over how well Community Assemblies had been able to engage with local people, as public meetings were often poorly attended; but, otherwise, respondents were positive about their role in supporting partnership working. Formally putting agencies under the public spotlight together can itself be the impetus for partnership working because agencies want to be seen to be 'doing something' to address any perceived lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the local community (Crawford & Jones 1995).

Police officers in Sheffield did refer to aspects of partnership working that were frustrating:

*Partnership work is a little bit sometimes frustrating because, their method of working is different to ours. ... I suppose because it’s just as police officers, our nature is very, fairly quickly look at a problem, have a solution, implement it within an 8-hour shift period [laughs a little]. You want to solve the world’s problems. Whereas partners, it is perhaps their structures, it’s their decision-making process and possibly lack of resources; and all those things that may prevent them from operating in the same way we do.*

This 'clash of cultures' has been reported elsewhere (Hughes 2007; Pearson et al. 1992; Hughes & Rowe 2007), however, in the main, officers celebrated what
partnership working had achieved for them. NPOs, in particular, recognised that other agencies were able to contribute specialist expertise and resources to help tackle certain community safety issues, such as anti-social behaviour. Due to the subjective nature of its base and the extreme flexibility of each category, ASB has the potential to generate an almost endless number of infringements, including begging, public drunkenness, urinating in public, letting off fireworks, neighbourhood noise, hoax calls and a range of youth behaviours etc. (Mooney & Young 2006). The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) defines ASB as behaviour ‘that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as [the perpetrator]’. ASB, therefore, frequently encompasses non-criminal behaviour that can be dealt with by non-police agencies (Jacobson et al. 2005). For example, housing associations have specialist knowledge and organisational powers that can better equip them to deal with tenants.

Officers in Sheffield sang the praises of specific roles that supported partnership activity. One such role included Safer Neighbourhood Officers (SNOs). SNOs were managed by Community Assembly managers, but physically located within Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs), a sub-district partnership comprising the Neighbourhood Policing Team and community safety posts employed by the local authority. It was expected that the title of Safer Neighbourhood Teams would produce better chances of 'buy-in' from non-police partners; as would 'Neighbourhood Management' over 'Neighbourhood Policing' (Hughes & Rowe 2007). Police officers in Sheffield voiced strong support for SNOs, for their practical role in identifying and bringing agencies together:

_They pull everything together; so anything that needs feeding back between organisations. [The SNO], she’s worth her weight in gold. Well she has been for me because I deal with all the anti-social behaviour from our team, and sometimes you’re dealing with private landlords, council tenants, you need schools there, some have got social services involved, others have got high support, there’s building successful families, Shelter. I mean sometimes trying to get everybody to sit around the table and have a meeting is really difficult, but if I ever need any help [the SNO] will either come to the meetings or she’ll pull them together. ... The people that she knows are invaluable that are higher up the chain. So sometimes, when you feel like you’re just banging your head against a brick wall, you tell her what’s happening. [Sheffield NPO 4]_
These comments illustrate the complexity of some community safety issues and the requirement for multiple agencies to work together to address them. They also illustrate the difficulty in coordinating partnership working. Officers reported that SNOs were the 'glue between [the police] and the Council and the Councillors' and expressed concern about the number of posts recently cut from nine to six, with the chance of the role being lost altogether as part of local austerity measures [Sheffield NPO 3]. Officers’ comments in Sheffield challenge the early literature on multi-agency working, which focuses on police scepticism to partnerships (Liddle & Gelsthorpe 1994; Pearson et al. 1992). They contribute to a growing evidence base that, at least some parts of the force, the police have ‘(re)-negotiated police culture’ and are embracing inter-agency working (O’Neill & McCarthy 2012).

This study was also able to look at how other agencies had experienced working with the police. In Sheffield, it was reported that rather than dominating partnerships (Skinns 2011), the police were generally cooperative and responsive to agencies and communities:

> Although everyone moans about South Yorkshire Police, I think, in general, within Sheffield they have been really great partners; and I think maybe that's increasingly difficult because they are under pressure and having staff cut and whatever, but through Community Assemblies we work very closely with the police and they were generally really great, responsive and kind of community-oriented partners. [Sheffield Manager 9]

Being cooperative and responsive did not mean that partners were always in agreement. In fact, they sometimes faced difficult conversations due to competing views and ways of doing things. However, as this respondent suggests, healthy partnerships can accommodate conflict:

> We have those open conversations with the police and other partners and sometimes they are not that easy to have the conversations, but we get there in the end because we’ve got that sort of mutual respect at the moment with the people we are talking to. [Sheffield Manager 3]

Although co-location was generally viewed as a success factor in promoting good inter-agency relations, some were concerned about the blurring of organisational boundaries. Non-police members of the SNT had at times been reminded by their managers – in only a half-joking manner – to 'just remember who you work for' and warned not 'go native' working in a police station [Sheffield Manager 5]. These concerns played out in the aftermath of events in August 2011. Partnership working between police and non-police members of SNTs began immediately and organically in response to disturbances elsewhere in the country. As described in
the previous chapter, NPTs and SNOs began tension monitoring and engaging with local partners and residents ahead of any strategic level direction; and one SNO, based on their SNT relationships, joined the police-led silver command team. While some respondents reported these partnership activities to be part of Sheffield’s success in averting unrest, others identified them as a topic for discussion at the formal debrief. Questions were asked about why staff in SNTs had played a greater role in the response than other local authority roles, such as the community cohesion team. Rather than this ‘debrief’ representing a genuine desire to learn lessons, some respondents felt it was really to allow those who ‘felt slightly disgruntled’ to let off steam [Sheffield Manager 5]. Certainly, the findings of the debrief were never written up or disseminated. To some extent this situation represents intra-agency, rather than inter-agency, failures; whereby frontline community safety roles employed by the local authority were simply getting on with their usual jobs, unaware of any protocols to link up with centralised teams for critical incident management.

6.3.1 Relationships with the youth sector

There were concerns about the blurring of organisational boundaries linked to partnership arrangements between the police and youth provision. In the previous chapter, joint working between officers and youth workers was described as a success factor in helping to prevent and contain unrest in Sheffield. In one of the Sheffield study neighbourhoods, youth workers and PCSOs paired up to patrol the streets to show the community they were united, with the youth workers providing additional reach in terms of engagement. It was reported how this pairing-up of officers and PCSOs was not a nightly occurrence, but it was not entirely new. It was described as one of the various ways in which the NPT sought to build relationships with local practitioners and young people:

*Usually at night we’re paired up. I do sometimes go and meet up with some of the youth workers, and we’ll have a walk round and have a chat to people. I also try and get into the youth clubs and do work in the youth clubs. ... I’ll just sit on the sofas in there and having a chat with the lads and what have you. So it’s just getting into places where they are, and trying to engage with them. [Sheffield NPO 2]*

In the second Sheffield study neighbourhood, police and youth workers were in regular contact as part of the public order response in 2011, but agency patrolled independently on the streets (see Chapter 5). This was to protect youth workers’ rapport with young people, who might become suspicious of youth workers working too closely with the police. Youth workers in both cities spoke about the
importance of being seen to be independent of the police, restricting their level of visible contact with police officers and involvement in community safety initiatives. For example, youth agencies reported turning down requests from the police to provide ‘pre- and post-support’ for covert criminal investigations, like Operation Mach, to protect the standing of ‘youth workers, who spend months, if not years, building up community relationships’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. They had also argued against the involvement of youth workers in patrolling the night-time economy because this took them away from young people in communities. This was despite some obvious benefits to this role in keeping young people safe and ‘brokering’ young people’s relationship with the police:

*The detached youth workers, we used to, as I say we used to do that on Friday nights, and really it was about identifying young people who were either vulnerable in terms of being victims of crime or exploitation and also trying to prevent young people getting involved in anti-social behaviour and crime. So, the youth worker there was really like an engagement tool, I suppose in some ways brokering that relationship with the PCSO. [Sheffield Manager 5]*

Respondents emphasised that this was ‘not a youth work role... because youth work is all about engagement and it’s not a sort of emergency service... [or] a babysitting service’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. It was reported that youth agencies had since redrawn their boundaries and were no longer providing this universal street-based support for young people who may simply be drunk or rowdy; and, if any young person had been a victim of crime, they argued that ‘this need[ed] to be dealt with as a policing matter’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. Again, the nature of the partnerships in Sheffield meant that youth agencies were able to have their case heard by the police and respected:

*As agencies we understand each other’s boundaries ... we are able to say ‘actually no we are not going to do that. This is our role and this is how we can support it and how we can work together; but actually it is not appropriate for us to be doing that because of X, Y and Z.’ [Sheffield Manager 4]*

Senior managers negotiated the general role of partners in multi-agency initiatives, but frontline practitioners had to negotiate the day-to-day realities of working together. For community practitioners, including youth workers, this meant balancing their relationships between the community and the police in the context of information sharing. Previous research on partnerships has reported how inter-agency communication is often conducted through informal channels, such as
corridor conversations or text messages, which has implications for data protection and human rights (O’Neill & Loftus 2013). For youth workers, it also has implications for their rapport with young people, who suspect a confidence has been broken. On this basis, youth workers limited not only their visible contact with officers, but also what they shared with them; thus provoking a degree of animosity. NPOs conceded that youth workers ‘have a duty of care’ to young people; but suspected they sometimes withheld information that should really be shared. The respondent quickly followed this accusation with the comment ‘that’s they job isn’t it really?’, but at least a minor tension was revealed. That said, some practitioners worked hard to get the balance right. The quotation below reveals how a practitioner in Nottingham sometimes shared information with the police through a trusted third person:

"They won’t talk to neighbourhood police. They will to some degree; they won’t share things with them in the same way they will with us. [The community practitioner] quite often will ring me and say ‘I’m ringing you because I need to tell you this. I don’t want to tell [the police] because I want to tell you and I want you to tell me what you think I need to do before I go and see a police officer’; which can sometimes make it really difficult for me because I’m like ‘ok let’s think this through from a whole range of different issues’; and then I might have to go and share that with somebody before I can go back to him with a response, before I can kind of go to the next stage; and partly that’s about keeping them safe as well. [Nottingham Manager 5]"

Police secondments were identified as offering both benefits and challenges for partnership relations. The Police Advisory Board for England and Wales (2013) defines a secondment as ‘the agreed detachment of a person from their regular organisation for a temporary, time limited, assignment elsewhere which does not affect the employment status of the secondee’ and the Board sees them as a valuable tool for employee and organisational development (p.4). In Sheffield, respondents referred to the nine police officers seconded to community youth teams. These were described as being like the old school police officer, dealing with school-based incidents, but with additional links to SNTs and youth workers. They supported restorative justice interventions and dealt with out-of-court disposals for the Youth Justice Service. Respondents in the youth service reported feeling ‘lucky’ to have them as a dedicated resource, but also reflected that the police had different ways of doing things, which the organisation ‘hit up against on a daily basis’ [Sheffield Manager 3]. The culture clash was most noticeable when police secondees first arrived and so the transience of police officers was an issue.
There was a 50:50 split between officers coming into the role ahead of retirement and officers working towards their sergeant’s exam. The latter group were ‘very keen and willing but then moved very quickly’, either when they passed the sergeant’s exam or failed it, which made the youth agency question how committed these individuals really were to the role. The constant rotation of officers also drew complaints from communities. Transience in the police due to career progression has been typically covered in the literature as a problem for PCSOs, but respondents in Sheffield claimed that PCSOs tended to stay in role longer than warranted officers and this undermined partnership relations.

In Nottingham, Vanguard Plus, the preventative arm of the EGYV work had police secondees. Again, respondents reported pros and cons to this arrangement. Vanguard Plus had a difficult time already setting itself apart from the enforcement work of Operation Vanguard by virtue of its name. With a team comprising six police officers and six PCSOs, this was even more difficult. Although the officers seconded to Vanguard Plus were usually dressed in plain clothes, people knew they were officers and this presented a challenge for working with agencies that needed to maintain the appearance of independence from the police to protect their rapport with communities, especially young people:

> I have to be really careful when I go. I don’t just turn up ever. I’d always say to [the community practitioner] ‘Is it alright if I come down? When can I come down and see you?’ And we’re really careful with that, as well with the police officers. They know they’re cops even though they’re plain clothes; but, again, we’d never just turn up because it damages the relationship and it’s a fine line all the time trying to win the confidence, trying to win them over. [Nottingham Manager 5]

Again, a culture clash between police secondees and civilian staff was reported, at least when they first arrived at Vanguard Plus. Respondents said they were able to mitigate the risk of secondees completely unsuited to the role by interviewing applicants in advance. Successful applicants had to demonstrate a grasp of the various personal and societal factors explaining why some people became involved in crime. They also had to demonstrate some awareness of how to engage with offenders. On a very basic level, officers had to demonstrate they could do more than simply arrest their way out of a situation. According to one respondent, this vetting process had helped to produce ‘a team of police officers who I wouldn’t have any doubts about’ [Nottingham Manager 5].

It seemed important what the specific role was of each secondee in terms of challenges and successes. In Sheffield, there was a police secondee specifically
recruited to promote and manage partnership working. The position was jointly funded by the police and the City Council. While some respondents suggested there were challenges for the role in remaining connected to all the police structures while based at the Council, the role was regarded as a success in terms of joining-up agencies, especially at the strategic level. As with most things, the achievements of the role were not fully realised until after it had gone. Cuts to public sector funding meant the role was axed a few years after the riots (in March 2013). Like SNOs, this role was described as the 'glue' between partners:

[the partnership role] was extremely well linked between the two organisations at a time that, prior to [the partnership role], I wasn’t aware of a connection as close as we had then; and since his departure, with the retraction of funding, whatever, we’ve got nothing like it now. I would think we probably had a couple of years, two-three years in around that time with [the partnership role] being that glue between the two organisations. [Sheffield NPO 3]

Meetings and networks put in place and/or maintained by the role were described as being instrumental to a coordinated public order response in August 2011. These were surviving to some extent, but respondents were concerned for how long without further investment. It was reported that this police secondment and the wider commitment to partnership working by the police in Sheffield was associated with the outlook of senior officers at the time. As documented elsewhere, police leaders are seen by officers as both figureheads and role models for conduct and so the values and standards they set are important variables in organisational behaviour (Porter et al. 2015). Both a risk and benefit of this is that the culture and organisational practice of a police force can be transformed by new leadership.

Schools are another policing partner, involved in promoting community safety by making referrals to youth provision for interventions. Tension monitoring was carried out by Sheffield schools and respondents referred more generally to the role of schools in determining the life chances of young people. There was some suggestion that schools, especially in the Nottingham, were quick to exclude young people; even ignoring the appeals and assistance of community practitioners keen to keep individuals engaged. Previous research suggests the practice of excluding young people is part of an emerging trend of a heightened sense of risk that schools and other agencies are alert to (Ralphs et al. 2009). It is difficult for young people to find a replacement school once they are deemed as posing a ‘high risk’, thus triggering a spiral of increasing marginalisation. Schools were not involved in
the public order responses in either city because in August schools were closed for the summer break. Youth workers, however, reported that schools can play an important role in preventing disorder because students are likely to be involved or have knowledge of events, as illustrated by the comments of this practitioner:

*I think schools are key, absolutely key. That’s the grapevine. There’s 1300 kids in a secondary school and you know what Chinese whispers are: it starts with a little Y7, ‘it’s gonna kick off on London road tonight’, by the time it gets to Y11 and the kids who are running school, it’s on and it’s arranged.* [Sheffield Practitioner 1]

The rationale behind Sheffield’s tension monitoring system in schools is that information circulating among students might also provide insight into tensions in the wider community. In practice, however, the tension monitoring system was underused by schools because they were worried about the impact of reported tensions on the school’s reputation. Due to the same concerns, it was reported that some schools were not keen to work with youth agencies, making it difficult for youth workers to access individuals and groups for interventions. Reluctant schools tended to be the ones higher up the attainment tables, perhaps because they had more to lose from negative press.

### 6.3.2 Relationships with the voluntary sector

Pre-existing relationships between the statutory and voluntary sectors were especially important in defining the public order responses in the two case studies. As detailed in the previous chapter, weaker relationships in Nottingham meant agencies in the two sectors were less willing or able to work together than they were in Sheffield. Local commissioning arrangements and funding decisions emerged as an explanatory factor for this. In Nottingham, it was reported that the City Council’s commissioning processes for community and youth provision did not always favour the best providers. It was widely acknowledged that only a few organisations and individuals had the expertise to work with acutely marginalised groups in Nottingham. Yet, these agencies were under-resourced and under-supported by the Council, as this respondent suggests:

*We’re still very dependent on a relatively small number of providers who are particularly good at engaging with certain parts of the community. ... There’s probably half a dozen individuals who, you would have to say, if they weren’t there, would we necessarily we manage without them? And the corollary to that is, and how well do we support them? Most of those people are still on a kind of slightly hand to mouth existence in terms of the stability of their projects.* [Nottingham Manager 6]
Some voluntary sector agencies were reported to be only ‘in it for the money’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1] and local residents were aware of this, referring to them as ‘poverty pimps’ to imply they were merely ‘riding on the back of [their] misfortune’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. Consequently, during the 2011 disturbances, these organisations were not well placed to engage with communities; and some did not even try:

*Some of the organisations we gave money to, there was one in particular, which despite the fact that they receive £60,000 a year, and operate in that area, closed at 3 o’clock on the Tuesday afternoon and actually abandoned sessions. [Nottingham Manager 6]*

There were a number of reasons put forward for why the better-regarded agencies struggled to secure funding. One reason was that although they were ‘brilliant at engaging communities’, they were not necessarily good business managers. Alternatively, it was argued that the bureaucratic burden put on them by funders was unrealistic: ‘the amount of stuff, the hoops that you have to do is unrealistic at certain points, you know, to actually do the work, if that make sense. Just the amount of paperwork’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. This paperwork might be important to funders if it was used manage performance, but respondents suggested it was a meaningless form-filling exercise because the data was never interrogated:

*I can get a form to fill in, put anything I want on it, and I know nobody ain’t checking it; or people are checking and just putting the input. They’re not checking the input is correct. It’s a very touchy subject. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]*

Hence, the paperwork did little to make procurement transparent or the hold contractors accountable. Community practitioners claimed the Nottingham study neighbourhoods received large pots of funding to tackle deprivation and other social problems, but either it was unclear where the funding had gone and what it had achieved; or, more seriously, they suspected corrupt relationships had channelled the funding to a select group of agencies, including some that consistently underperformed, but the Council had no ‘backbone’ to deal with the problem ‘because they don’t want to deal with the drama’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. These grievances helped to explain why there was little goodwill from voluntary sector agencies, who were community minded, to work in partnership with the statutory sector when asked for help in August 2011.

Concerns about commissioning had understandably undermined relationships between statutory and voluntary sector organisations, but they had also
undermined relationships within the voluntary sector. The lack of transparency, in particular, seems to have increased the sense of competition between agencies. In an unfair game, players were less concerned about playing nicely. Consequently, respondents claimed that ‘it’s very territorial in Nottingham. People will tear your eyes out for ten grand, [which] is not even big bucks’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Referring specifically to the situation in one of the study neighbourhoods, a community practitioner reported ‘it’s horrible for politics’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. In summary, some voluntary sector agencies ‘hate[d] each other’ [Nottingham Practitioner 1]. Despite this backdrop of inter-agency tensions, however, some voluntary sector organisations in Nottingham were trying to work together, against the challenges of austerity, to make a difference:

_Coming up to 2011, when the funding started to cut there was a group especially in [the study neighbourhood] that none of us was accessing. We put on a lot of voluntary stuff because we knew that there’s a load of crazy kids coming up and they are not getting the activities. Very bright and intelligent but there is no services and there was a lot of worry._ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]

Promisingly, in the aftermath of the disturbances, there was reported to be some funding that had been set aside for ‘capacity building … where [agencies] were talking to each other’ [Nottingham Manager 1] to facilitate consortia that might help smaller organisations to pool their strengths and presumably have a better chance of producing successful bids in the future.

In Sheffield, relationships between statutory and voluntary sector agencies were reported to been facilitated by commissioning arrangements. Respondents spoke about voluntary sector provider networks in each Community Assembly area that were used to communicate funding opportunities to voluntary sector agencies. These networks were set up and managed by the statutory sector. It sometimes felt like ‘an uphill struggle’ [Sheffield Manager 3] because ‘the emphasis on trying to work together can sometimes be a bit difficult’ [Sheffield Manager 4], but generally the networks kept lines of communication open. As referred to above, voluntary sector organisations had been antagonised by the allocation of EGYV funding; because they felt small grants undermined what could be achieved. The Council responded by setting up at a network of all the agencies working on the EGYV agenda to help them coordinate their activities. An individual from the voluntary sector was recruited to manage the network to maximise buy-in. It was likely that these networks played a role in promoting positive relationships between voluntary sector agencies. Generally, respondents reported that the
voluntary sector in Sheffield was strong. However, recent austerity measures had reduced the commissioning role of local authorities and with it the rationale for these networks. Network meetings survived for a brief time with a few ‘stalwarts’, but even their attendance eventually dropped off [Sheffield Manager 3].

There had been renewed efforts to keep in contact with voluntary sector agencies via newsletters, email circulars and themed workshops, but due to reduced capacity in the voluntary sector – linked to reduced funding – these had had been relatively ineffective. On this basis, statutory sector respondents felt it might be difficult to integrate the voluntary sector into any future critical incident response, as in 2011, because they might not know whom to contact. However, there were still some voluntary sector networks, which may not have been conceived by the statutory sector but, nonetheless, offered routes in for dialogue and collaboration. For example, in one of the study neighbourhoods, there was a network called the Group of Groups, or the GOG. As its name suggests, this was essentially a structure that aimed to bring together the multifarious voluntary sector agencies working within the neighbourhood, including a number of different faith-based groups. The GOG was set up and continued to be managed by these agencies with an appointed chair. Its rationale was to help resolve tensions between groups so they might see themselves as partners rather than competitors, especially in relation to funding bids. Statutory agencies, including NPOs, were already accessing the GOG and found it useful for getting information to and from the groups represented.

There were other voluntary sector networks, organised around communities of identity, as opposed to communities of place. For example, the Federation of Mosques, representing Muslim faith-based groups, which played a role in the public order response in Sheffield by facilitating communication between the police and the Asian community residing in one of the study neighbourhoods. Other community-based structures will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, which moves the focus from institutional to community relationships and considers how these might also constitute important context for urban unrest at local levels.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has considered pre-existing relationships as the longer-term context to local events in August 2011. As in previous riots, this study highlights poor police-community relations as part of the explanation for disturbances in Nottingham. Based on interviews with a range of agencies, including the police, it emerged that repressive policing targeted at drugs and gang-related crime had
agonised whole communities through, for example, the use of house-raids, stop and search, and stop and account, which is a relatively unchecked police power to detain, easily used to harass the 'usual suspects'. Anger at the police following a covert drugs operation was a risk factor in one of the Sheffield study neighbourhoods, but this was mitigated by what were perceived by local people to be genuine efforts from the police to make amends. Furthermore, structures leftover from these remedial efforts were able to be used by police and partners to engage communities in a proactive and integrated public order response in August 2011. Accounts cross-cutting both case studies demonstrated the role of NPTs and particularly PCSOs in promoting good police-community relations, and police legitimacy, which was instrumental in preventing disorder at the neighbourhood level. This provides a rationale for involving NPTs, at the earliest stage, in operations to prevent and contain community disorders. Specialist response teams with little local knowledge are, on their own, likely to make matters worse.

The pros and cons of partnership working have been researched before, but not in the context of urban unrest. This chapter has detailed how pre-established partnerships are the foundations of a successful public order response. Relationships can be slow to build and trying to throw agencies together in the moment is unlikely to work. Police-agency relations can be promoted through multi-agency teams and co-location; and positions with a particular remit for facilitating partnerships were highly regarded by agencies in Sheffield. The police found them especially useful in co-ordinating the input of non-police agencies often required to deal with complex community safety issues, such as ASB. Unfortunately, these roles have been some of the first to go in various rounds of public sector cuts and respondents had already noticed a detrimental impact on inter-agency working. In Sheffield, this raised concerns about future capability to respond to critical incidents, as a repeat of previous activities would not be possible. The role of fair and transparent commissioning processes were spotlighted as important for good relationships between statutory and voluntary sector agencies and within the voluntary sector. There was a mixed picture across the case studies, and nationally, about which services were commissioned or which were provided by the local authority, nevertheless, voluntary sector agencies remained valuable partners in preventing and containing unrest because they frequently employed the few individuals able to engage with the most marginalised groups in communities. In Nottingham, a number of agencies were able and willing to respond to the threat of unrest, but not necessarily together and this undermined the possibility of a partnership response. Sheffield had much stronger track record of partnership working, and agencies were able to put any
outstanding grievances on hold, in the knowledge that pre-existing mechanisms could be used to resolve them once the crisis was over.
Chapter 7 – Community Context

7.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the nature of community in the case studies as potential variable affecting order outcomes in August 2011. Thus far, the term community has been used to mean the people living in the study neighbourhoods, which, as noted earlier, are place-based communities that may contain and be overlapped by other types of communities, such as communities of identity and of interest. Beneath this seemingly simple typology, however, lies a long-standing controversy about the term ‘community’, leading some to question whether it means anything at all (Stacey 1969; Cohen 1985). At the extreme, Young (2007) claims it is a dangerously exclusive concept, which, to boot, is sociologically outmoded for these liquid times of ‘lightly engaged strangers’. Arguably, however, there is a need to conceptualise how people live and interact together in groups that are not completely transient. Leighton (1988) offers the solution of the ‘social network’ approach, which he claims is implicit in a large body of criminology theory and research. The social network approach facilitates an understanding of community as a form of social organisation based on social interaction and common social bonds, which may be local or non-local or constituted by both. Some commentators have added a ‘sense of belonging’ as another key element of community (e.g. Wardak 2000). A sense of belonging has been referred to as a fundamental human need that places behind only physiological and safety needs (Maslow 1943). At the community level, it correlates with the ability of members to function competently (Glynn 1981) through the process of empowerment (McMillan & Chavis 1986) and collective problem solving (Bachrach & Zautra 1985; Wandersman & Giamartino 1980).

Chapter 4 provided socio-demographic profiles of the cities and neighbourhoods being studied, drawing largely on official statistics and reports. The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of social life in the case studies with greater reference to the interview data. Community was a focus of this study because explanations of previous riots had spotlighted dysfunctional community as a contributing factor. South Asian communities in England’s northern mill towns were accused of segregating themselves, which undermined inter-group relations and promoted conflict (Cantle 2001). While there is little evidence in the extant literature that the 2011 events represented ‘race riots’, the over-representation of BME participants suggested that issues of ethnicity and diversity were worth exploring. Alternatively, Campbell (1993) identified the different ways in which
men and women navigated the challenges of poverty and unemployment as part of the explanation for disturbances in the early nineties. These community explanations make implicit reference to social disorganisation theory, defined as ‘the inability of a community structure to realise the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls’ (Sampson & Wilson 1995, p.45).

The chapter begins by looking at social disorganisation theory, charting key conceptual developments that can inform explanations of urban unrest at local levels. It details how the systemic model has articulated a link between social order and social capital on the basis that depleted social networks undermine a community’s ability to realise common values or to enforce them. Hence, the chapter goes on to examines the evidence for social capital in the study neighbourhoods, with reference to the three different types of social capital identified by Putnam (2000; 2002): bonding, bridging and linking. The first type requires an understanding of which distinct groups reside within the study neighbourhoods and how well individuals feel attached to their group. The second type requires an understanding of how well the various groups get on together at neighbourhood and city levels. The bonds between social groups are referred to as bridging social capital, which has also been conceptualised within the police discourse as community cohesion. Finally, the chapter explores how community practitioners were an important source of linking social capital in the study neighbourhoods, helping local people to secure critical resources and to address local grievances, mitigating the tendency of marginalised young men to participate in riots.

7.2 Social Control Theory

This section explores how the nature of community in the case studies can provide the capability to prevent urban unrest via informal social control. In its broadest sense, informal social control is ‘the ability of social groups or institutions to make norms or rules more effective’ (Reiss 1951, p.196). For a community this means regulating the behaviour of its members in accordance with desired and established norms and this protects the general well-being of the whole community. Social controls consist of the rewards and penalties, real or imagined, that accumulate from adhering to or deviating from these group norms (Kornhouser 1978). There are two dimensions to these controls (ibid): the internal-external dimension, relating to whether the control comes from within the individual or is triggered by others; and the direct-indirect dimension, relating to whether actions are aimed at limiting deviance or whether actions are a by-
product of relationships established for other reasons. For example, *internal direct* controls result from an individual’s own acceptance of community values and norms, regulated by feelings of guilt or shame. *Internal indirect* controls relate to conformity on the basis of satisfying relationships with others in the community. *External direct* controls include supervision and surveillance by others. *External indirect* controls relate to the obligations placed on individuals due to their relationships with others.

Across time and space, explanations of urban unrest have focused on dysfunctional communities, linked to criminality, subcultures of poverty and ethnicity (see Chapter 1). These explanations resonate with social disorganisation theory, which emanates from the Chicago-school research of Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969), who argued that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility disrupted the social organisation of communities; and, in turn, these accounted for variations in crime and delinquency. Population churn was seen has been particularly detrimental to social controls because incoming social groups are likely to have their own values, increasing the challenge of consensus values at the neighbourhood level. It is the tendency of disadvantaged areas to experience high levels of population change due to a range of factors that prompt household relocation, due to the emigration of people dissatisfied with the area and the immigration of people attracted to cheaper accommodation (see Pearson & Lawless 2012). The existence of 'buy to let' housing is associated with population change in the UK, because it can be attractive to transitory households. For example, agencies rely on this type of housing to accommodate asylum seekers (Aden et al. 2007) and the homeless (Travers et al. 2007). A Neighbourhood Police Officer in the Nottingham described a situation in which population change can also be promoted by social housing policies, in this case where ‘trouble’ families were relocated as a sanction [Nottingham PO Officer 3]. The respondent opined that this policy had undermined local relationships, with consequences for crime and other social problems.

Social disorganisation theory has developed over time, increasing understanding of how social dynamics within neighbourhoods affect crime and disorder. For example, systemic theory (Berry & Kasarda 1977; Bursik & Grasmick 1993) has focused on 'the degree to which a neighborhood can employ the interactional networks that tie together community residents to effectively regulate the nature of the activities within its boundaries' (Bursik 2000, p.92). Further development of systemic theory provided a more specific definition of social ties in the form of 'collective efficacy' which is defined as 'social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good' (Sampson et al.
1997, p.918). Social cohesion results when there are high levels of trust among neighbours, which develops from shared expectations of how to behave, as the source of social controls. Where individuals are confident they know community standards for behaviour and that neighbours will support them, they are more likely to intervene. Collective efficacy, like systemic and social disorganization theories, holds that residential stability is critical for the formation of social networks that underpin effective social control by residents. However, social networks can also impede the development of social control if criminal types are embedded within them (Browning et al. 2004; Sampson 2006; Pattillo 1998). This puts emphasis on what the norms and values are within communities and not merely how well individuals are tied together.

7.3 Groups Identities

This section looks at the different social groups residing in the study neighbourhoods and the commitment of individuals to group norms and values. It draws on Putnam's (2000) notion of 'bonding' social capital, which refers to relationships amongst members of a network who are similar to each other and have shared interests. This can be distinguished from 'bridging' social capital, which represents the relationships between networks of people who are different to each other. Bridging social capital represents weaker ties, but the 'strength of weak ties' is the access they provide to information, including jobs, outside an individual's own social circle, increasing their opportunities for social mobility (Granovetter 1973). On the other hand, people are more likely to get social support from bonding social capital, although in the absence of bridging social capital it can produce deleterious consequences. 'Too much bonding’ can promote exclusionary practices based on distrust, intolerance and outright hate of outsiders (Fukuyama 2001), manifesting as territoriality (Webster 2003; Kintrea & Suzuki 2008) and ethnic conflict (Putnam 2000).

7.3.1 Familial networks

The origins of social capital can be found in the writings of Bourdieu (1980; 1986; 1993), Loury (1977) and Coleman (1988; 1990), who saw family as being the main source of social capital, which inheres in the structure of intergenerational relationships, especially between parent and child. Parents invest in their children, who are expected to support them in later life. Children will benefit from the development of an intense relationship with their parents, comprising attention, support and the transmission of norms and values, and this increases their human
capital, particularly in the form of educational achievement, which can provide economic rewards. Parental networks outside the home can widen the norm-enforcing environment, increasing social capital at a community level and further increasing the child’s human capital. Coleman (1988) refers to this phenomenon as ‘intergenerational closure’. Research has found mixed results for Coleman’s hypothesis, pointing to the additional effects of the child’s own social networks and the ethos of the school on academic attainment (Morgan & Sorensen 1999; Carbonaro 1998); therefore, demonstrating the complexity of social capital.

Family as a source of social capital is acknowledged in more recent theoretical developments by Putnam (1996; 2000; 2002) and Fukuyama (1995; 1997; 2001), but their primary focus is on the generation of social capital through large aggregates, such as communities, regions and nations (Edwards et al. 2003). Social capital is seen as a public good, embodied in civic engagement, which has consequences for democracy and economic prosperity. Putnam implicates changing family life as a causal feature of social capital decline, notably linked to the role of women as household earners, which has reduced their capacity to participate in school and neighbourhood associations (Leigh & Putnam 2002). Arguably, this is a rosy account of female domesticity, which overlooks the relationship between structural inequality and interpersonal dynamics (Oakley 1974). However, it does place the issue of working hours at the heart of understandings about social capital, which relies on people being able to engage in relevant spheres of social life. The downplaying of structural factors is a general criticism of social capital theory.

Fukuyama more deliberately decentres the family by referring to the ‘private-regarding’ nature of the social capital they generate (Edwards et al. 2003). He claims there is ‘something of an inverse relationship between the bonds of trust and reciprocity inside and outside the family; when one is very strong, the other tends to be weak’ (Fukuyama 1999, pp.17–18). Consequently, he argues that the ‘breakdown of the family’, while constituting a loss of social capital, may actually lead to some members of the family increasing their social ties elsewhere. Thus, Fukuyama (2001) moves the blame for the recent decline in social capital from the family to modern democracy’s promotion of excessive individualism. These debates about social capital have informed this chapter’s focus on both family and community ties as sources of norms and values, which can be used as levers of social control (Portes 1998), thus helping to prevent and contain urban unrest where this is deemed valuable by the community.
7.3.2 Ethnic identity

The importance of familial networks overlapped with ethnic identity in the study neighbourhoods. As detailed in Chapter 4, all four study neighbourhoods had relatively high BME populations. However, this did not mean a high degree of heterogeneity. In fact, each study neighbourhood had a dominant ethnic group that influenced the identity and wider cultural life of the community. In the two Sheffield study neighbourhoods, the dominant ethnic groups were reported to be Somali and South Asian respectively. The term ‘Asian’ was more generally used by respondents to refer to the South Asian group, which was mainly people of Pakistani heritage and smaller population of Bangladeshis. Similarly to Wardak’s finding (2000) about Edinburgh’s Pakistani community, the Asian community in the Sheffield study neighbourhood had a high degree of social interaction, which was facilitated by regular participation in particular kinship/friendship networks, known as Biraderi, and also the Mosque. Biraderi provided a sense of belonging to members, promoted by endogamy. But, more importantly than this, Biraderi provided reciprocal relationships that were an important source of social capital. In Wardak’s study, it was reported that Biraderi were actually stronger in Britain than in Pakistan, as a response to the immigrant community’s sense of social and psychological insecurity, linked to experiences of discrimination and racism (p.81). Consequently, Asian people were more likely to seek support from someone within their ethnic community. This was evident in the current study. For example, it was reported that, despite the other ward Councillors being ‘extremely active and extremely good’ [Sheffield NPO 3], members of the Asian community tended to approach the Asian Councillor on the basis that he understood ‘the politics [the] community very well’ [Sheffield NPO 3].

Respondents referred to the benefits of Asian kinship networks in terms of facilitating the engagement of local agencies with the community. Specifically, kinship networks were reported to have a ‘multiplier effect’, maximising the impact of information disseminated:

*It’s understanding the group, the family dynamics. If you have one individual kin, that kin maybe related to a number of different families, so by engaging with that individual you are then impacting on possible five-ten families. It’s like a force multiplier [Sheffield Practitioner 1]*

The same was said of the mosques, which together with family ties meant it was possible to reach most sections of the Asian community, including women and young people, who tended not to attend the mosque as regularly as men:
Same with the mosque. You know, Friday prayers, you do get the young people and so within that, and you get the elderly so you might have 300-400 people, but then you multiply that, the message that gets back, you know to a number. [Sheffield Practitioner 1]

In the sense that Coleman spoke about family ties providing human capital to children, this was explicitly recognised by respondents as a strength of the Somali community in the other Sheffield study area. Despite experiencing high levels of deprivation, as measured by official statistics, there was reported to be a rich family environment that was protective of local children, by providing material and social care within the home and encouraging and supporting children's engagement with school:

Somali community, nine times out of 10 the children their children will go to University, even the drug dealers you will find they have got degrees....They have got both parents there and even if they have got one parent, there it is warm, the house is clean, they have always got food, they are always being bought new clothes, they go on holiday so come on, you know, let's be honest with ourselves. ... without family, there is no community [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

Family was not explicitly identified as a protective factor in Nottingham, where the dominant ethnicity in both neighbourhoods was African-Caribbean. Official statistics failed to represent this due to the high level of mixed parentage and the limitations of how ‘ethnicity’ is measured. A history of immigration from Jamaica meant that a proportion of residents fell into the Mixed Census category. However, many Mixed race and White people living in the study area, culturally identified as being ‘Black’ due to the value placed upon Caribbean food and music within families and the wider community (McKenzie 2015). Despite the term dual heritage becoming more common in ‘polite’ discourse, this thesis makes a point of using Mixed race, after it was recounted by one respondent that local people were disdainful of the recent name change, which had happened without their consultation. Banks (1999) argues that outsiders to mixed parentage cannot impose terminology on those who are insiders. Just as the term Black was reclaimed in the 1960-70s, he suggests that in the future people of mixed parentage may be able to advocate their own term. Another critique of the dual (or mixed) heritage term notes its emphasis on cultural inheritance, despite culture being complex, intermixed and not genetically produced and transmitted in the way that racial characteristics are (Phoenix & Tizard 2002). There is another term, ‘ethnic group’, which refers to people who share more than just physical
traits, including a common history, language and culture as well. Thus, official categories are not really ‘ethnic’ but ‘racial’ categories because they fail to capture these additional components of identity.

As with other communities in Britain, group identity in the Nottingham study neighbourhoods was reinforced by how members were treated by outsiders (e.g. Wardak 2000; Webster 2003). These predominantly Black communities experienced repressive policing on a regular basis due to perceptions of gangs (see Chapter 6). The reputation for violent crime and gangs in the study neighbourhoods was linked to a number of high profile murders, but arguably, there was also a racial dimension to the policing. Racism against Black people has changed over time, but still exists and is currently being expressed though derogative discourses about Black culture, more punitive responses in the criminal justice system and over-policing of Black people via targeted crime hotspots, which tend to match the geographical areas where Black people live (e.g. Williams 2015).

It was reported that local people in the study areas were aware of how they were thought of by outsiders and this had both emotional and practical implications for them. As one community practitioner put it: ‘a lot of people have an impression of the area that isn’t correct as it is. For the people who live here, and love it, it’s heart-breaking for them’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. A police officer reported how the stigma of living in the study neighbourhood probably also impacted on how residents were treated and their life opportunities:

_I could imagine that they probably do find a number of things difficult. Like particularly young people, particularly young Black men in [the study neighbourhood]. You put down where you live, I have got no evidence of this, but it seems you know human nature would suggest that you know when you apply for a job and you put that address down, I’m sure lots of people form the opinion straightaway, ‘oh, you know, the gun capital of Nottingham’. [Nottingham NPO 1]_

The positive implication of neighbourhood stigma was that it had increased residents’ social cohesion within the neighbourhood. As detailed in Chapter 4, respondents described the Nottingham study neighbourhoods as having a ‘sense of community’, which meant that ‘everybody looks out for everybody’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]; and despite problems of poverty and crime, it was reported elsewhere that many resident choose to remain living there (McKenzie 2015). This possibly represents Wacquant’s (2008) ‘shield’ against prejudice, which is commonly used by urban outcasts. The shield protects people from ‘being looked down on’, but it also prevents them from engaging in life beyond the
screen and from bridging with other social groups, which has the potential to improve their life opportunities.

In a similar way to the 'multiplier effect' of familial networks in Sheffield's, which meant information was more easily disseminated, familial networks in Nottingham were reported to multiply the impact of negative treatment by public agencies. As previously detailed, the poor treatment of one family member by the police was reported to affect the feelings of the wider family. This raises a concern about whether members of the community were inclined to intervene to prevent disorderly behaviour and violence towards the police in 2011. Respondents across a range of stakeholder groups referred to young people from ‘bad homes’ in the Nottingham study areas, but this was necessarily related to poor parenting. Some community practitioners were keen to promote understanding of social structures impacting negatively on family life, which was necessary to make a difference, as captured in the comments of this respondent:

[The police] had a prejudiced perception of these kids, whether they were White or whether they were Black, it didn’t make no difference, they’re all shit and they’re all crap, and they were never gonna get anywhere. They knew that they came from these bad homes, some of ‘em did, some of ‘em didn’t, but there was no understanding of why their life was the way that it was; why they were known to the police in the first place. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]

The attachment to family and community is particularly relevant if there is validity in the explanation that some people participated in the 2011 Riots because they had ‘nothing to lose’ (Morrell et al. 2011). Social ties bind people into a situation where they have something to lose, namely the ongoing support of their family, friends and neighbours for contravening accepted rules and norms and ignoring any obligations associated with these.

7.3.3 Too marginalised to riot

In previous English riots in the 1980s, the protagonists were mainly Black, which has been explained by their marginalised status in mainstream society compounded by repressive policing. Some commentators (Newburn, Lewis & Metcalf 2011) have hypothesised that the increased role of White people in the 2011 Riots points to a White underclass that now feels comparably excluded. Respondents in this study expressed a similar view. Respondents in Sheffield identified some White communities on the periphery of the city that were more marginalised from mainstream society than either of the two study neighbourhoods. A community practitioner, who worked in a predominantly White...
area of the city, suggested this was because they did not have a sense of identity in that way that most BME communities did. Previous studies of White working class neighbourhoods found a ‘strong affiliation to the virtues of hard work, self-reliance, responsibility and independence’, but more recently this had been undermined by a popular discourse that defined them as ‘broken’ due to high unemployment and poverty, which set them apart from ‘the rest of us’ (Cole et al. 2011). Some respondents felt that White groups were let down because there was little focus on cultivating a sense of belonging, which at the national level can be done by a focus on shared history, experiences, customs and culture (Hedetoft 2004). Concerned about the implications of this, one practitioner talked about an occasion when they sought funding to take a group of White youths to London to help them connect with their heritage:

*So you know the youth club was these young people said to me, I have never been to London. I was shocked when they said we have never been to London. I was appalled. So I said we've got to do something about this. And they were very negative from the get go, we will never get anything and we won't get it and I was like no, it took me about three or four months to turn them around and then we made the application, on the basis of ‘We have never been to London. We are always asked to learn about others, but we don't know our own heritage and our own culture’; and that really touched me because I am very grounded in my culture and my heritage and I celebrate that, whilst embracing others; and I just felt these young people had such a loss for me that I had to do something about it. So we applied for it. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]*

The respondent described how despite being pessimistic at the outset, the young people eventually threw themselves into the bid, even presenting it to the funding panel themselves. The bid was unsuccessful, as many inevitably are because funding is finite and needs to be rationed. However, it is difficult not to wonder if the lack of success in this case was because promoting a sense of belonging among White children is rarely thought of, never mind prioritized. From someone who was themselves a member of a BME community residing in an inner-city neighbourhood of Sheffield, the comments of this practitioner were especially poignant in acknowledging that funding rarely goes to the White peripheral estates:

*The young people presented themselves ... and you know that was such a big thing, you know if you were to believe in something and give it, you would have given it to those young people because they would have visited*
London, they would have seen the Houses of Parliament, they would see Buckingham Palace, and the history; and whilst within that they would have had a little bit of fun, eat out and celebrate that, they would have told that story for how many years to come and they would probably have had a connection with their country and their history and their heritage. But we didn't get that funding. Where did the funding go do you think? It went to inner-city areas. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

Rather than seeing the marginality of these White working class neighbourhoods as being more likely to engage in urban disorder, the general view was that they were ‘too marginalised’ to riot.

7.3.4 The role of socio-historical events

Academics have begun to consider mechanisms for strengthening communities, including local festivals, which can provide opportunities for shared, collective action and experiences (Finkel 2010; Quinn & Wilks 2013; Wilks 2011). Local festivals have been found to promote a sense of identity and pride, which local authorities rarely take into account when deciding where the weight of spending cuts should fall (Platts-Fowler & Robinson 2016). It was reported that one of the study Nottingham study neighbourhoods was even excluded from these types of events. Other neighbourhoods were described as having big community events, but the study neighbourhood, by comparison, had no ‘real focal thing’ [Nottingham Manager 1]. A reason for this was said to be the geographical character of the area. Other neighbourhoods had more appropriate venues for fun days and carnivals because, for example, they were either by a riverside or by a forested area. The only annual event that the Nottingham study neighbourhood hosted was a memorial for the teenager, Danielle Beckham, who was killed accidentally in a gang-associated shooting. Nevertheless, this event offered potential for generating bonding social capital among residents because, as Groff (2015) claims, even negative events play a role in strengthening group cohesiveness if they remind members that they share a common fate.

Just as community events can have a bonding effect, so can external threats to the neighbourhood. As discussed above, the Nottingham study neighbourhoods experienced external threat through the stigma of poverty and crime, which had promoted an in-group versus out-group bonding. The Asian and Somali communities in Sheffield were also affected by poverty and crime, but did not experience the same level of stigma. However, they were affected by other external threats, including neo-fascist demonstrations. The Asian community had been most acutely affected by these, as captured in the comments of this NPO:
Locally our Asian communities have a certain fear of the EDL or fear of the scenario, and I can explain it better: it’s almost like there’s going to be a Viking raiding party. [Sheffield NPO 3]

The threat of the English Defence League (EDL) was not merely about the threat of violence from racist outsiders, but also from inside the community, associated with the potential defensive actions of its own men. The older generations were fearful of Asian young men bringing their community into disrepute by fighting the racists, which might lead to imprisonment and have negative implications for their own lives. Bagguley and Hussain (2008) explained the 2001 disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham partly by the defensive actions of Asian young when police failed to prevent neo-fascist incursions into their areas of residence. Members of the Asian community in Sheffield were particularly mindful of these events because they involved other Asian people. Other BME groups, including the Somali community in the other Sheffield study neighbourhood, were reported to be less fearful. Ahead of a recent EDL march, agencies reported being concerned about the Roma migrants, but found they were not affected in the same way. In fact, they were not even aware of them because Slovakian television, their main media source, made no reference to these UK events.

Another threat collectively felt by the Asian and Somali communities, linked to their shared religion, but also a wider world politics, was the radicalisation of their young people; both girls and boys. Interestingly the term ‘radicalisation’ was never used by community practitioners. Instead they referred to the risk of Muslim young people being ‘groomed’ by extremist groups, as evident in the quote of this practitioner:

One of the elements we are addressing at this very moment of time is how people are, you know, managing to be groomed and to be sent to Syria or go to Syria. Who groomed them, how? And this is something which is something worrying for the Muslim community and for everybody. Who is doing it and why we don’t know about it, why it is not visible there, it's not physically there. [Sheffield Practitioner 5]

The concern that their child could be next had created a sense of fear in the Somali community, which they responded to by ‘watching’ their children ever more closely. Implicit in respondents’ comments was the notion that parents were not merely watching their own children, but that everybody was watching everybody’s children. Just as the fear was collective, so was the response:

You know what, I think the Somali community got scared and kind of watched their kids more, not worried about the Police watching them or
anything but worried about the fact your child can go at any time, ‘you know so and so’s child has gone. Oh mine could be next because so and so was so good’. … The 13-year-old girl who disappeared from Bristol is the shocker for everybody. [Sheffield Practitioner 3]

The efforts of agencies and particular professionals in addressing the problem of radicalisation were acknowledged, including those by members of the city’s Prevent team. Prevent was the strand of the Labour government’s ‘CONTEST’ counterterrorism strategy, launched in 2003. Its aim was to ‘prevent’ individuals turning to (or sympathizing with) violent extremism. Although conceived as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach, it was widely regarded as ‘failed and friendless’ (Thomas 2010). Prevent was criticised as a vehicle of increased state surveillance in Muslim communities, which was especially problematic when merged with the government’s community cohesion agenda, of which more will be said later in this chapter. It was argued that this merger dissipated the goals and rational of Prevent while at the same time securitising and undermining community cohesion (Husband & Alam 2011). On coming to power in 2010, the coalition government announced a review of Prevent, which detached it from community cohesion, but arguably left local actors with little guidance on integration or community engagement; although this may have the advantage of promoting ‘unintentional localism’, which ‘may sustain more participatory modes of engagement with Muslims’ (O’Toole et al. 2012, p.387). The comments made by participants in this study, suggest that even before the revised strategy, Prevent was not simply being ‘done to’ the Muslim community. It was reported that influential people in both the Somali and Asian neighbourhoods had been proactive in engaging with the external agencies to ensure they got the support they specifically needed. One respondent, who emphasised the importance of being proactive, reported having just met with a police officer about Prevent before their interview for this study:

I’ve just been having a meeting with the police, just now, he’s just walked away, I don’t know if you met him downstairs. And that is looking at what do we need to do now at this moment in time, with the ISIS and the child grooming; … how do we really get these positive messages out; how do we make our children aware, of tell-tale signs to kids? It was a very positive meeting. I think it’s being proactive. If you see something coming, or you sense ‘oh no, it will never happen here’. That doesn’t work. [Sheffield Practitioner 2]

In the Somali community, being proactive meant getting the right information about the prevention of radicalisation to mothers, who were the most fearful and
due to their role in the family possibly in the best position to act on the information:

*I approached them and I said ‘do you want to do work around these sessions, around these issues to kind of deliver to the women in how to be safe, how to make sure your child is safe?’* [Sheffield Practitioner 3]

It was described how the Somali community’s willingness to work with external agencies in relation to the risks of radicalisation demonstrated the extent of their concern because generally ‘people don’t really want to involve these agencies’ [Sheffield Practitioner 3]. It was explained that part of the reason for this was, despite being resident in the UK for some time, the Somali community was not fully aware of the legal responsibilities of various institutions, including the police, in keeping their children safe. Somali people were used to performing this role on their own as families and communities. Not wanting to undermine the protective and supportive role of state and other welfare provision, it worth noting its potentially deleterious consequences on the parental role. According to Coleman (1988), the existence of state welfare services creates an ‘antibiotic resistance’ that negates the economic and social rationality of parental investment in their children, as well as investment in other family members and community members, by incurring trust-based obligations to help one another; and depreciating social capital (cited in Edwards et al. 2003). Coleman suggests this is one reason that ‘strong families and strong communities … are much less often present now than in the past, and promise to be even less present in the future’ (p.S118). According to participants in this study, the solution lies not in eroding state welfare, but in considering what is delivered and how to promote rather than inhibit social capital. The topic of community and youth provision will be discussed later in this chapter.

Another shared concern of the Somali and Asian communities, but especially the Somali community, was the ‘westernisation’ of their children. This was a recurring topic across interviews with a range of stakeholders. But, some wondered whether what was being framed as a clash of cultures was largely an expression of intergenerational tensions, which had been experienced by White communities over many generations:

*I don’t know in a way that is the kind of the microcosm of what happens in every society and particularly I don’t know probably what happened in white British society in the 1960s, kids were going out dancing to The Beatles and parents were going this is disgusting, you know but yeah, I think that would just be an ongoing issue but in a way, it’s kind of
interesting as the generation of Somali young people who have been born and brought up and educated in this country then sort of have their families, it's going to be interesting to see you know whether that gets easier or more difficult really because it is about sort of reconciling your sort of indigenous culture and Western culture and deciding how best you sort of balance all of that stuff. [Sheffield Manager 9]

However, a particular reason was articulated by the Somali community for wanting to retain young people’s attachment to their culture, because they felt a distinctive identity protected them from being affected by the problems of other communities. One of the messages being disseminated to young people to prevent them getting involved in urban unrest in 2011 was that this had ‘nothing to do with the Somalis’ [Sheffield Practitioner 3].

7.3.5 Overview

There was a dominant social group in each of the study neighbourhoods, based around ethnicity. In the two Sheffield neighbourhoods, ethnicity overlapped with familial and religious networks, which served to reinforce social networks and group identity. In Nottingham familial and religious ties were reported to be less important. Instead the identity of local people, who largely identified as 'Black', was more strongly focused around geography. It was perceived that residents in Nottingham's poor Black neighbourhoods were unfairly treated by police and other public agencies because of where they lived. The shared experience of this prejudice had strengthened local bonds; albeit their collective identity was imbued with negative associations.

7.4 Social Cohesion

The previous section considered the identity of the dominant social groups within each study neighbourhoods. The current section now looks how well these groups got on with others, at the neighbourhood and city level. There is a correlation between ethnic diversity and disorder, but 'bridging' can have a mediating effect, by providing a sense of attachment that fosters a greater sense of responsibility to maintain order at the neighbourhood level (Silver & Miller 2004). This resonates with the community cohesion agenda, which emerged in the aftermath of the 2001 disturbances (see Chapter 1). Community cohesion is defined as a common vision and sense of belonging for all communities; diversity being positively valued; those from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities; and strong and positive relationships between people of different backgrounds in the workplace, schools and neighbourhoods (LGA et al. 2002). This definition, which derives from
the work of the Community Cohesion Independent Review Team (Cantle 2001), is based on Kearns and Forrest’s (2000) model of social cohesion. However, while Kearns and Forrest emphasised the interconnectedness of social cohesion across different spatial scales – national/interurban, city/city-region and neighbourhood – the Review Team focused almost entirely on the neighbourhood as the context for the production and maintenance of community cohesion. In doing so, it failed to acknowledge that high cohesion at one scale can undermine cohesion at another (Robinson 2005). For example, a city may consist of socially cohesive but increasingly divided neighbourhoods, which, paradoxically, was the situation in the northern mill towns in 2011. Equally, a society in which citizens have a strong sense of loyalty to their respective cities might be in conflict with any sense of common national purpose (Forrest & Kearns 2001).

This study largely focused on cohesion at the neighbourhood level, as per the official definition of community cohesion, because the neighbourhood represents the small-scale domesticity of most people’s lives – a narrow *gemeinschaft* world of neighbourhood and kin (Pahl & Wallace 1988). By comparison, normative relations with the wider public can be ‘extremely tenuous’ (Mann 1970, p.435). ‘Social cohesion is about getting by and getting on at the mundane level of everyday life’ (Forrest & Kearns 2001, p.2127). Localised daily routines and interactions at the neighbourhood level can also constitute ‘repair work’ and ‘normalisation’ (Forrest & Kearns 2001), which protects individuals and social groups from macro processes of disorder, dislocation and social and economic social change (Turner 1991). This was one reason for considering the nature of community as a local protective factor against the spread of urban unrest in 2011. The study additionally sought to explore relationships between the study neighbourhoods’ and other groups in each of the case studies, accepting the interconnectedness of spatial scales, as posited by Kearns and Forest, and also that a ‘common vision and sense of belonging’, one of the four components of community cohesion, may be affected by inter-group dynamics (Oakes 2001; Tajfel & Turner 2001). The extent to which groups form normative barriers is said to vary greatly, being influenced by such factors as cross-group contacts and how far membership of multiple groups enables contact with a wide range of individuals and bridges between different identity groups (Brown 2008; Dryzek & Braithwaite 2000).

The study also considered variables that have previously correlated with social cohesion, such as deprivation (Lawrence & Heath 2008), ethnic diversity (Morales 2013; Meer & Tolsma 2014) and population transience (Wells 2006). Addressing disparities in wealth was emphasised in Kearn and Forrest’s model of social
cohesion, but replaced in the ‘official’ definition with reference to the provision of equality in life-opportunities (Robinson 2005). However, equality of opportunity only specifies a fair way of distributing unequal outcomes and has been linked to an even firmer dismissal of equal outcomes (Phillips 2004), which can adversely affect individual (Tajfel & Turner 2001), group (Oakes 2001; Newton 2006) and national identity (Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). Of specific relevance to this study, commentators (Tester 2012; Jeffery & Jackson 2012; Angel 2012; Stenson 2012; Lagrange 2012; Clement 2012) referred to the close proximity of wealth inequalities as a contributing factor to the 2011 English Riots (see Chapter 1). A community practitioner in Nottingham specifically referred to the lack of status frustration at the neighbourhood level as a protective factor, which explained why rioters did not attack their own neighbourhoods or loot local shops in the way that rioters did elsewhere in the country.

### 7.4.1 Neighbourhood Level Cohesion

This section looks at social cohesion within the study neighbourhoods, examining relationships between different social groups. The ability to pull together depends on a sense of shared identity, common interests and experiences. Neighbourhood attachment is theorised as being beneficial for social order via its capacity to foster collective efficacy. However, in the case of urban unrest, a distinct form of disorder, the role of community cohesion may be less straightforward. Contrary to theory, respondents felt that neighbourhood ‘in-fighting’ was protective because it prevented people from organising themselves, which was thought to be precursor to unrest. Referring to a Sheffield neighbourhood, which was not included in the study, a community practitioner claimed that recent population change had resulted in such a mix of different ethnic groups that young people there were not well placed to riot:

*If you’re gonna have a go at the biggest gang in the world, the police, you need to be organised, because they are. ... In [the non-study neighbourhood]... the change in ethnicity, 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 10 years ago, 5 years ago, from predominantly Black Afro-Caribbean, you’ve got Somali guys and Eastern Europeans in there now. There’s a lot of tensions, and I don’t think they’d come together to fight the old bill, to fight the enemy as they see ‘em. [Sheffield Practitioner 1]*

These comments imply that cohesion at the neighbourhood level is associated with the increased likelihood of urban unrest, because urban unrest, seen as a challenge against authority, relies on a degree of organisation. Of course, this presumes neighbourhood residents have a grievance in the first place. Moreover,
the comments only refer to relationships between young men and, drawing on social capital theory, if the neighbourhood is cohesive across other age groups, there remains the possibility that social order will controlled by the parental generation, either via direct or indirect controls.

In the Sheffield neighbourhood predominated by Somali people, respondents reported tensions between Somali and African-Caribbean young men, which sometimes manifested as territorial behaviour. Some young Somalis felt that parts of the neighbourhood were ‘occupied’ by African-Caribbean young people and meaning they were ‘no-go’ areas for them [Sheffield NPO 2]. It was reported that these inter-group tensions had made it difficult in the past for community practitioners belonging to one of these ethnic groups to work in the neighbourhood. There had been a situation where a practitioner perceived to be defending the interests of the other ethnic group rather than his own was regarded as a ‘traitor’ and even physically threatened. Consequently, the practitioner saw no other option but to request redeployment to another part of the city [Sheffield Practitioner 4]. The tensions between Somalis and African-Caribbeans were not, however, uniformly experienced across age groups. It was reported that it was mainly the cohort of men currently in their thirties, who ‘did not necessarily mix so well together’. Younger age groups, such as the 14-15 year olds got along much better, evidenced by their social interaction at the local youth club, as this NPO reported:

*The biggest group that I see at the youth club and what have you, there’s a couple of White British lads in there, there’s Afro-Caribbean, there’s some Yemeni lads that are in that group. There’s a really mixture, which is really good that they’ll come together.* [Sheffield NPO 2]

It was explained that the tensions among thirty-somethings stemmed back to the 1990s when the ethnic composition of the study neighbourhood transformed rapidly from being predominately African-Caribbean to being predominately Somali residents. As a relatively poor and less desirable part of the city, the study neighbourhood offered cheap housing options, which were used to accommodate asylum seekers arriving after the civil war in Somalia. Other Somalis were attracted to the neighbourhood because it had become a place they felt they ‘fitted in’ and had over time developed specialist facilities and social and cultural networks, perceived to be crucial to their well-being, sense of belonging and security (Aden et al. 2007).

The parental generation in the neighbourhood were aware of the inter-group tensions and were reported to be involved in efforts to reduce them.
Representatives from each ethnic community would come together regularly under the auspices of a local umbrella group, called the Group of Groups, which was referred to in the previous chapter. It seems the Group of Groups was not only valuable in resolving tensions between third sector organisations over issues like funding, but also in resolving inter-community tensions, as this respondent suggested:

*Under the umbrella in [the study neighbourhood] you had what you call the Group of Groups and within that you had [agency name], which was the African Caribbean community representation coming together. So you had a number of different Somali community groups, but the elders working together, so I think that facilitated some of the, removing some of that misunderstanding, friction between the young people. [Sheffield NPO 2]*

The Group of Groups was an important community structure for facilitating inter-community relationships, by providing a safe space to share and debate views. It was implied, however, that it was a pre-existing commitment of group members to harmonious relations that made conciliatory outcomes possible.

The second Sheffield study neighbourhood was similarly reported to experience inter-ethnic tensions, but, again, these were not insurmountable. Tensions between the dominant Asian and minority Somali populations primarily surfaced between young men, but sometimes involved other members of the family too. Moreover, these tensions were affected by relationships with other neighbourhoods. It was reported how ‘turf wars’ [Sheffield Manager 7] between local Asians and Somali young men living elsewhere in the city affected relationships within the neighbourhood. For example, tensions were inflamed following the murder of a young Somali male. The Somali teenager was killed by local Asian men after he travelled to the neighbourhood with friends ‘armed with sticks and metal bars’ to find a local an Asian youth, who had previously fought a member of their group (The Star 2011b). Somali and Asian teenagers clashed in the study neighbourhood, however, the Somali boy was killed by older Asians, who arrived at the fracas in their car and drove into them. He died when a road sign fell on his head. Somalis living in the study neighbourhood were not immediately involved, but became ‘very angry and very scared’ as a result of the incident [Sheffield Manager 7]. In this case, it seems their ethnic identity was stronger than their neighbourhood identity. Local agencies reported having to actively manage relationships in the neighbourhood for some time afterwards. One respondent wondered whether this community engagement work might have been a
protective factor for the neighbourhood when disorder began elsewhere in the country a few months later:

*A lot of prevention work and a lot of engagement work went into – making sure all sections of the community were talking. I wonder how much that did have to play in it, because we’d done all that during that period. [Sheffield Manager 7]*

However, the tensions between the Asian and Somali communities in the study neighbourhood did not run so deep that they were unable to pull together and provide mutual support in times of perceived crisis. For example, following an alleged sexual assault on a Somali boy by a teaching assistant at a local school, both the Somali and Asian communities reacted. It was reported that the reaction of the Asian community extended beyond the neighbourhood. Asians travelled from elsewhere in the city and other parts of the country, notably from Bradford, to add their support to local protests. A demonstration staged outside the school was so large that the head teacher decided to close due to the disruption (The Star 2011d). The perception of a shared threat to local children might be enough to explain why neighbours pulled together across ethnic lines, but it was perhaps the religious and cultural bonds of Asian people on a national scale that can explain the involvement of people from Bradford. Ethnographic research (Wardak 2000) has found that Pakistanis see themselves as members of the broader ‘Pakistani Community of Britain’, whichever town or city they live in. Moreover, this sense of belonging can sometimes go beyond ethnic boundaries to involve all Muslims in Britain, which seems relevant in this case. The homosexual nature of the alleged assault was reported to have been a particular concern, which might be explained by the general, although not homogenous, views of the Muslim community on homosexuality (see ICM 2016).

Ethnic diversity in the second Sheffield study neighbourhood had been recently affected by the in-migration of Roma people, following the accession of new countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007. The term ‘Roma’ is a generic name used to describe a group of people with similar cultural characteristics, who originated from India and migrated to Europe around thousand years ago (Roma Source 2012). They constitute Europe’s largest and poorest minority ethnic group (Gill 2009). The Roma generally migrate to Sheffield as whole families, contrasting with other migrants from central Europe who tend to be young, single men (Gill 2009). In 2012, it was estimated that 1,500 Roma people had settled in and around the study neighbourhood (Sheffield City Council 2015). Respondents spoke of tensions and even ‘hatred’ of this new group by the longer-established
Despite inter-racial tensions, already described, between Asian and Somali and White young men, there was evidence that all three of these groups were united in their dislike of the new arrivals. This had been demonstrated in local responses to a number of criminal incidents, which the Roma were wrongly accused of. For example, respondents described how a meeting was arranged by residents, who ‘summoned’ police and other agencies to attend, to discuss the rape of a White British woman by a Roma man. The meeting was well-attended with ‘200 and odd people baying for blood’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. It turned out that the allegation of rape was false and the man was not even Roma. Agencies recounted their frustration at the poorly attended follow-up meeting when this information was disseminated. They argued that residents did not ‘want to hear that bit because it doesn’t feed their thought processes’ [Sheffield NPO 3]. Thus, demonstrating the real aim of this ‘community activism’, which was to have ‘all the Roma rounded up and deported somewhere or sent somewhere, but either way not standing on the streets of [the study neighbourhood]’ [Sheffield NPO 3].

As detailed in Chapter 5, the disturbances in Nottingham largely constituted attacks on the police, with the main damage to community property being associated with ‘collateral damage’ resulting from cat and mouse games with officers. However, given the theories about population change it seems significant that the bulk of the collateral damage occurred on Pym Street, where the homes were newly built. Although not a single respondent felt these residents had been ‘targeted’, there remains the possibility that informal social controls were less effective here because rioters did not consider them to be part of the community. This is not to say, that they would not be over the longer term. Therein lies the catch with transience. It both undermines cohesion and undermines opportunities for agencies to develop socially cohesive relations between residents (Wells 2006).

One community practitioner in Sheffield referred to the challenge of just keeping up with who's who since the recent arrival of Roma people to the neighbourhood. Some examples of how agencies can positively impact on cohesion have already been discussed; the role of community provision more generally will be addressed in a later section.

7.4.2 City Level Cohesion

This section considers the extent and nature of cohesion at the city level, which means looking at relationships between neighbourhoods. Poor relationships between neighbourhoods may be a factor promoting social unrest. In fact, a police officer in this study suggested the attack on a police station in one part of the city occurred because they were 'competing' with a rival gang in another part of the...
city. As detailed in Chapter 6, Nottinghamshire Police were enthusiastic in their accounts of local gangs, despite other local agencies refuting their existence, at least in the form associated with U.S. style gangs. Nevertheless, territoriality is relevant to debates around local identity and conflict, being previously described as a cohesive behaviour in the context of deprivation (Kintrea & Suzuki 2008; Atkinson & Kintrea 2004). Territoriality offered a way of securing some of the few things that young people living in deprived areas could call their own – place and friendships. Thus, territoriality can be an expression of bonding social capital for young people. Additionally, for South Asian communities living in the UK, it has been viewed as a form of self-defence in the case of racial violence (Webster 1996). The two Nottingham study neighbourhoods were associated both with territoriality and high levels of deprivation.

Some respondents in Nottingham suggested that territoriality in the study neighbourhoods was not as problematic as many assumed or suggested. They suggested some families had members in both neighbourhoods and, in fact, what was often viewed by outsiders as gang-related conflict was more ‘to do with familial tensions than anything else’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. Moreover, these familial relations could be a source of positive interaction between the two neighbourhoods. It was recounted how groups of young men from each of the study neighbourhoods were taken together on a visit to London as part of an Ending Gangs and Youth Violence initiative shortly after the 2011 Riots. A police officer, who accompanied the young men, had been shocked over the way individuals from the two groups greeted each other as they boarded the bus. Far from being a tense encounter, they were ‘high fiving each other’. This is when it began to dawn on some statutory agencies tasked with working with gang members that many of the young men thought to be in rival gangs were related to each, even if this was ‘several steps removed’, and were acknowledged as ‘part of each other’s families’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. This situation started to put previous conflicts into perspective. Like community practitioners, people in more strategic roles were starting to realise possibly not every crime in the study neighbourhoods was gang-related nor every fight, which may not even be related to group rivalries. A conflict between the two neighbourhoods may simply be ‘one individual who’s gone off and done something on his own batt’ [Nottingham Manager 5].

The predominant Asian community in one of the Sheffield study neighbourhoods sometimes had strained relations with Somalis in another neighbourhood, as detailed above, but tensions were ‘predominantly between young Asian men and young White men’, who lived in adjacent areas [Sheffield Practitioner 1]. Youths
from both ethnic communities attended the same schools, demonstrating the importance of schools working in partnership to identify and resolve tensions. The local schools in this instance were reported to work closely with youth workers for this reason. Racism was not a term ever used by respondents in describing the tensions between Whites and Asians in this study. However, there was a history of racism, which had been responsible for local disturbances in the mid-1990s (Goodey 2001; Wiles 1995). Theories of racism (Balibar & Wallerstein 1991; Cohen 1988; Jackson & Penrose 1993; Goldberg 1993) suggest that all xenophobia is underpinned by a hostility to strangers, who are invariably seen as the enemy. This has previously helped to explain racism in and around the study neighbourhood at times when discrimination and violence were directed against Asians by the longer established White community (Goodey 2001). More recently, however, the manifestation of a two-way victimisation may be explained by Asian young men developing strategies of resistance over time, which include the creation of defensible space. Webster (2003), has described how this occurred elsewhere in the North of England, with Whites attributing ‘victim status’ to themselves after encroaching into Asian territories (p.15).

Alternatively, Webster warns about the simplistic understanding of violence between Asians and Whites as being racially motivated. Another of his study’s (1994) found that Asian and White young people routinely differentiated their violence as either racial targeting or proving oneself through fighting; and these two explanations sometimes co-existed in the same situation. Thus, he concluded that racial harassment may be part of a continuum of anti-social aggression with ‘race’ merely providing a vocabulary of motive for fighting between adolescents. He also found that White young people who targeted and attacked Asians also tended to be involved in fighting and victimising White young people too. Thus, the issue is one of how to separate ‘racially motivated behaviours’ from ‘just fighting’ or incidental abuse. One factor associated with a decline in Asian victimisation by Whites in Webster’s study (2003) was their participation in local youth clubs exclusively used by their own ethnic group. Not only did this take Asians off the streets, thus reducing their availability as victims, but provided a situation in which they could bond, creating and sense of ethnic solidarity, which has been key to their strength in containing and ultimately resisting White racism. The youth clubs in the study neighbourhood may have been fulfilling the same need. Respondents spoke of a local youth club that ‘was 101 per cent a Pakistani boys club. No girls went to it. No White kids from across the divide’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1]; essentially it was ‘their own youth centre’ [Sheffield NPO 4].
To further evidence that territoriality was not the sole preserve of gangs, respondents claimed referred to whole communities that did not like outsiders. One respondent reported concerns about starting work in one of the study neighbourhoods on this basis, although their actual experience was quite different from their expectation:

*I was told early on how people in [the study neighbourhood] don’t like newcomers but actually I was really welcomed and I found, you know, it was a very kind of, very warm and great community to work in although obviously there were kind of issues and pressures and all that kind of thing. But it was a very kind of satisfying community to work in. [Sheffield Manager 9]*

Some predominantly White neighbourhoods were reported to be ‘far more insular’ and consequently far less tolerant of new people. One respondent claimed that their territoriality was sometimes perceived as racism if new arrivals were from a BME community, but their hostility much more to do with them being outsiders:

*The White neighbourhood] is quite an insular community. The community cohesions issues in [the neighbourhood] are not race-based, they’re based on if you are from [the neighbourhood] you are alright, if you’re not from [neighbourhood], you’re not alright. You can have, you could have a Black person living on [neighbourhood] for ages and everyone thinks its fine, but then you’d get a Black or Asian family move into [the neighbourhood], who aren’t from [the neighbourhood], and they would be targeted, not because of their colour, but actually because they’re not from [the neighbourhood]. [Sheffield Manager 6]*

The Review Team diagnosed the bonding of ethnic communities as a ‘problem’ for community cohesion, but did not consider the range of factors that help explain why distinct groups cluster together. For example, Webster (2003) documented how racism against Keighley’s Asian population gradually created the boundaries of a ‘closed’ community in which they were able to find inclusion, acceptance and safety. Other commentators have pointed to the discriminatory policies and practices of housing agencies (Robinson 2002) or the mere affordability and accessibility of accommodation in certain areas (Johnston et al. 2002). However, as this and other studies have shown, communities living ‘parallel lives’ need not be ethnically homogenous. Poverty can be the shared experience that bonds people across ethnic lines and simultaneously excludes them from mainstream society.
7.4.3 Overview

Neighbourhood attachment was evident in both cases studies. There were some inter-ethnic tensions within the Sheffield study neighbourhoods, but these were not insurmountable. Territoriality between neighbourhoods was reported, which more likely an expression of neighbourhood attachment within the context of poverty than criminality. Concomitantly, this territoriality demonstrated lack of cohesion at the city-level. However, the conflict associated with this territoriality was not seen to be a cause of the unrest in Nottingham nor a significant risk factor in Sheffield.

7.5 Informal Social Controls

Despite evidence suggesting that the study neighbourhoods were cohesive at the neighbourhood level, all were identified as having higher than average offending rates (see Chapter 4), which may indicate relatively ineffective informal social controls, raising the possibility that collective efficacy was being undermined not by low levels of social capital, but instead by residents’ strong ties with criminal types. However, Foster (1995) claims that there is a degree of complexity in high crime areas that many theories of informal social control fail to take into account. Her ethnographic research in a high crime location, not dissimilar to the study neighbourhoods, found that crime did not necessarily result from residents’ inability to implement informal social controls. Crime existed alongside a number of social and economic problems, often beyond the scope of residents to resolve, and so they learned to tolerate it. She found that residents did not expect to live in a crime-free environment, but the type and level needed to be such that it did not intrude too significantly on their everyday lives and residents had to feel able to confront it. This section goes onto describe the ways in which residents in the current study were reported to manage criminality and maintain order in their neighbourhoods using informal social controls. The risks of self-policing will also be considered.

7.5.1 Family controls

Unsurprisingly, given their role in the transmission of norms and values, families were reported to play a significant role in policing the behaviour of young people; and larger and stronger family networks, such as the Asian Biraderi, seemed to widen the scope of these controls. It was reported how Asian elders would play a role in patrolling the streets to discourage young people from engaging in criminal and anti-social behaviour at times of concern, such as Bonfire Night; and they would make specific reference to the family links as leverage:
A couple of times, what we did do was try to get the community people to walk, leaders or so, to walk with them on the street and say ‘oi, come on what you doing here? Come on inside, you’re too young. I’ll tell your dad’ [Sheffield Practitioner 2]

It was not only community practitioners who were aware of these informal controls, police and other agencies also spoke of them, as this agency manager did:

The community tends to sort issues out themselves. Police will sometimes get called, sometimes they just sort it out themselves. So sort of, a family fall-out, family feuds, you hear about it on the street. It’s dealt with, end of. [Sheffield Manager 7]

In western societies this scenario harks back to 1950s and 1960s when it was more the norm for adults to take responsibility for looking after other people’s children; for disputes and disturbances to be resolved by informal means; and harmful behaviours limited and dealt with outside the formal criminal justice system (Bazemore 2001). In more recent decades, these functions have been increasingly performed by state institutions. This development has ‘widened the net’ by bringing more young people into what is perceived to be a harmful system from which it is difficult to exit (Polk 1984); and one they perhaps never should have entered because youth crime is ‘episodic’ and most young people ‘grow out of crime’ as they transition to adulthood (Maruna 1999; Graham & Bowling 1995).

However, some respondents reported concern that the strength of family and parochial networks within the Asian community, both as a source of social support and social control, were being undermined by the increasing size of the local population. The sheer number of people made it less likely that older members of the community would know all the young people they saw on the streets, thus, diminishing their regulatory controls:

But generations have changed now. I for one, as much as I think I might know everyone, I won’t know children who they are. So it will be just a youngster from somebody, so I might have to do a lot of homework to see who it is, out of 20 I might be able to recognise four or five of them, but the rest of the 15 I won’t know, I won’t know who’s their father, their parents is. They might be respecting and say ‘hi uncle’, you know, you might get that, but I won’t really know because there’s a lot more people here, the families have grown. [Sheffield Practitioner 2]
As already detailed above, the local population had also changed in this study neighbourhood with the recent arrival of Roma migrants. It was reported that elders did not feel able to engage with this new cohort of young people in the same way as Asians because they did not share the same family and friendship networks.

The Somali community in Sheffield were reported to be active in monitoring and regulating the behaviour of its members, especially young people, which was referred to by some as ‘inner policing’. Social controls were said to involve all members of the community, but especially ‘informal community leaders that young people and community groups that live in that community, respect and hold highly’ [Sheffield Practitioner 4]. As detailed in Chapter 4, the Somali community lived alongside students in the study neighbourhood, due to its proximity to the city’s universities. Victimisation of students, typically viewed as easy crime targets (Deakin et al. 2007), was not tolerated by the Somali community even though it was felt that students did little to cultivate social interaction with local people. Direct social controls were used by the community to deal with any Somali found offending against them. For example:

> If a young person has wronged a student and it gets picked up by us as neighbours we would literally take the young person to the student’s door to apologise because that is the right of that individual who is living amongst our community. So even though they just sleep there and go to their classes and come back – they are not really inclusive within the wider things that happen in the community – we still put an onus on ourselves to make sure that people are not wronged and justice is served; not in an extreme element, but it is done in a harmonious way and a learning way because also there is a need to educate young people. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

This type of intervention fits with the principles of restorative justice, which increasingly inform schemes aimed at preventing youth reoffending in the UK and elsewhere (Robinson & Shapland 2007). These schemes involve young offenders meeting with their victims to discuss the effect their crimes or other harmful behaviours have had on others and, in some cases, how they can make amends. These processes expose offenders to ‘shaming’ by others, but also provide opportunities for offenders to express or discharge feelings of shame/guilt/remorse, which may support their responsivity to other sources of rehabilitative and generate human capital (Robinson & Shapland 2007). Some commentators suggest that restorative practices also provide the potential for
‘community building’ where they focus on relationship building by engaging parents of troubled youth and other local people, who constitute their ‘natural communities of care’ (Bazemore 2001, p.221). Arguably, some of the study neighbourhoods were already benefiting from this approach.

State agencies recounted times when they explicitly called on the support of Somali elders to challenge anti-social youths rather than invoking formal interventions. For example, one year, a group of Somali young people from the study neighbourhood were captured on CCTV behaving badly at a town centre Halloween event called ‘Fright Night’. An agency manager reported showing the footage to community members to demonstrate what ‘elements’ of their community had ‘been up to’, which ‘shocked’ them and, thus, invoked a local intervention [Sheffield Manager 5]. Similarly, a Neighbourhood Police Officer reported driving Somali parents to ‘a stand-off’ between local Somali and African-Caribbean youths. Whereupon, seeing the parents arrive, the young people ‘starburst’, meaning they quickly dispersed, which apparently ‘eased all the tension’ [Sheffield NPO 1], or at least temporarily. It was suggested that the informal social controls of the small African-Caribbean community residing in the same neighbourhood were not quite as strong. Respondents opined that this was due to two inter-related factors: the length of time the two migrant groups had resided in the country and family structure. They suggested that the traditional structure of the African-Caribbean family had changed over time and many now constituted single parent households, which concomitantly reduced parental influence. Nonetheless, African-Caribbean parents, especially mothers, did still play a role in managing their children’s behaviour, which was evident in August 2011, alongside other influential members of the African-Caribbean community, which in this case was a youth worker:

> We have an African Caribbean youth worker … they were instrumental in engaging. And family members, despite my previous comment, they still had a degree, because the particular families were single parents, but the mother, the matriarch of the house was still you know calling the shots and to a degree she might not have a hundred percent, compared vis-à-vis her Somali counterpart, she may not have that same leverage, but she still had a degree of leverage and traction over the young people. [Sheffield NPO 1]

### 7.5.2 The role of community practitioners

Familial networks were also a source of informal social controls in the Nottingham study area, although not to the same degree as in the Asian and Somali
communities in Sheffield. A NPO reported how they regularly dropped into one of the local bars, where an older group of men from the Black community would typically strike up a conversation and ask about the behaviour of their grandchildren, offering to ‘sort them out’ if they were being problematic in any way [Nottingham NPO 3]. Otherwise, greater emphasis was placed on key members of the Black community who carried influence, especially with young people. Some of these people fitted into the category of ‘community practitioners’, at least for the purposes of this study, but they may have been musicians, who had fallen into community work because of their ability to engage and support young people, who might otherwise be led into criminal activity. These community practitioners were a valuable source of external control in the Nottingham study areas. Chapter 5 documented their role in calling for calm in August 2011.

Practitioners reported appealing to residents’ sense of community to prevent them from rioting in 2011. For example, these comments show how one practitioner sought to remind residents of their social ties to each other by explaining that damage to local property and shops was actually damage to their own community, which would have implications for everyone and themselves personally:

Because that work was done, saying to people ‘you’ve not got much already, so why do you want to damage the little that you’ve got? Because at the end of the fall-out from it, well what you gonna lose? Your shops gonna be closed for six months, your local shop. You don’t walk to town ‘cos you can’t afford to buy things in town. This is your local shop. This is your local area, and when you’ve damaged it, what are you gonna be left with?’ So they’d already got the message. [Nottingham Practitioner 2]

These comments make explicit how social bonding provides the foundations of social control. They also provide an example of Kornhouser’s external indirect social controls, which are only effective if individuals have a sense of being connected and, therefore, obligated to a social group. Although the practitioner’s actions were aimed specifically at preventing deviance, this was done by referring to the relationships between residents at the neighbourhood level. It was helpful that the local shops were not faceless organisations, but part of the community, being owned and run by local people. Because they were known and knew people in their community, it was reported that shopkeepers were not in the slightest bit worried about looting. When approached at the time about any concerns they
might have about looting, one shopkeeper responded with by saying ‘what you asking me these silly questions for?’ [Nottingham Practitioner 2].

The actions of the police and the local authority in August 2011 explicitly acknowledged the existence of informal social controls when they threatened the Black community with the cancellation of their ‘much loved’ Caribbean Carnival if the disorder did not quickly end. It was described how the Caribbean Carnival was ‘a real highlight of the city’, but meant most to the Black community, which included residents in both study neighbourhoods. As already referred to above, festivals can be important events for cohesion, and they also offer an opportunity to showcase and celebrate the positive aspects of a community’s heritage and identity, which can be especially important for groups that feel marginalised (Finkel 2010). It was described how ‘the good people’ had ‘put months and months of work’ into the preparations for the carnival and consequently there was a real impetus to ensuring it went ahead, which meant directly engaging with rioters and potential rioters to stop the disorder:

So part of this psyche was to say ‘we want our carnival, we want our carnival to happen’. So those people have a vested interest in making sure that the kids that normally would be away brought in to toe and told behave yourselves stay in this night, don’t go out, I don’t want you involved in the trouble. So families got involved in influencing others. And we ended up being able to celebrate it. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]

These comments suggest that informal social controls did have a role to play in containing the unrest in Nottingham, families, but mainly other influential members of the community successfully managing the behaviour of people, who, despite their ‘bad behaviour’, were not completely beyond reach of their community. The with contrast Sheffield was the extent to which youth workers, as opposed to familial networks, were a source of control.

7.5.3 Controlling marginalised young yen

Respondents in Sheffield referred to the social controls of criminal types in some communities, which were effective with some groups of young people who could not be reached by family and community practitioners. It was described how criminal types who did not want the ‘heat’ of the police in their neighbourhood might prevent young people from engaging in deviance that might attract the attention. Mindful of this, community practitioners said they might sometimes reluctantly remind young people of this to encourage better behaviour:
We’re saying to them ‘you need to be careful. You’re bringing a lot of heat into the area. There’s going to be people who don’t like that, people who are making lot and lots of money.’ And they know what you’re talking about. They know who you’re talking about: the drug pushers, who they might aspire to be. ‘you’ll end up with a little clip. Thrown in the back of a range rover, and took to the other side of Sheffield and warned. Don’t bring this heat to your community!’ And we’re having to say that to young people, and you’re kind of thinking some of those undesirable community leaders, people who are pulling all the strings, there needs to be informal conversations with them, as sad as that sounds. They can stop things like that [clicks fingers]. [Sheffield Practitioner 1]

Foster’s research (1995) highlights the importance of building upon existing mechanisms of informal social control in high crime areas because it seems likely that a combination of informal and formal mechanisms, together with wider social and economic programmes, hold the key to long-term crime prevention (p581). This recommendation seems particularly appropriate to all the neighbourhoods in this study, which seemed to have functioning informal social controls that were both protective of their communities and prevented problems that might otherwise incur the resources of police and partners. On the other hand, it was reported that at times these communities required external support and sometimes formal sanctions to keep certain groups in check.

Both the Asian and Somali communities were concerned about some groups of young men that were becoming increasingly harder to reach. They attributed their loss of influence down to processes of westernisation, which they viewed as being responsible for the disengagement of these young men from the mosque and increasingly their families. A Neighbourhood Police Officer in one of the study neighbourhoods recounted being approached by a mother, who felt she had lost control of her son and needed external support:

I had a phone call this morning - a mother who is frustrated as to why the police keep coming to the door. ‘We are coming to the door because your son’s a criminal. He’s going to court and we’re looking for him’. ‘What do I do? He’s nothing to do with me anymore. I don’t see him. How do I control him?’ [Sheffield NPO 3]

This respondent concluded that the loss of control over some young people, which had historically been so strong, had left the Asian community feel somewhat ‘disorientated’ and nostalgic for a perceived time when Asian children did as they were told by their parents.
Paradoxically, respondents referred to the ‘disillusionment’ [Sheffield Practitioner 1] of these same young men with key aspects of western life. Those who did not attend mosque typically did not attend school either. Respondents reported that this group were ‘NEETs’, meaning there were not in education, employment or training [Sheffield NPO 4]. The term NEET is officially reserved for young people aged 16-24 who have left compulsory education (Chandler & Barrett 2013). This group started to attract attention soon after New Labour came to power in 1997 and established the Social Exclusion Unit. This Unit drew attention to a growing body of evidence about the experiences and barriers that some groups of young people faced and concluded that ‘the best defence against social exclusion is having a job, and the best way to get a job is to have a good education, with the right training and experience’ (Social Exclusion Unit 1999, p.6). Subsequent NEET agendas have been criticised for stigmatising and marginalising young people, who are perceived as feckless and lacking both aspiration and employment-related skills compared to their more successful peers (Lawy et al. 2009) and for distracting attention from substantial and entrenched inequalities in both education and employment (R. Thompson 2011). On the positive side, the NEET category has maintained vulnerable young people in the policy foreground and some initiatives, such as the Educational Maintenance Allowance14, have been redistributive (Maguire & Rennison 2005).

There were also specific events that made communities worry about how effective their informal controls might be, even with their ‘decent young men’. As already detailed above, the Asian community were particularly worried about their younger members clashing with EDL demonstrators, who had come to the city on a number of occasions. So far there had been no serious incidents. Officers were supportive of the community, but due to the rights of protesters reported being unable to ban the demonstrations. Instead police focused on ensuring procession routes did not take EDL members close to any residential areas and they encouraged the community to disseminate preventative messages:

*With the EDL scenario, the first time they were coming, we had all the debate of – ‘we should ban them. They’re racist’. ‘We can’t ban them, this that and the other’. ... ‘We don’t want our young men arrested’. ‘Right, go*

14 Education Maintenance Allowance was introduced by the Labour Government and paid to young people between the ages of 16 and 19 from lower-income families. It was replaced with a bursary scheme by the Liberal Democrat / Conservative coalition government. Payments go to the educational establishment rather than the student and money provided is less overall than was paid by the Education Maintenance Allowance.
and tell, order your young men to stay at home. At Friday prayers tell them. Send out messages, text messages. You will tell people that they are not to go there. The only way to deal with the EDL is to ignore them’. ‘Our young men are not going there. We’re not having our decent young men getting embroiled by these racists because some of them will get involved and some of them will get hurt and some of them will end up getting arrested, and we’re not having it’. [Sheffield NPO 3]

The disorder that occurred on an annual basis in the Asian neighbourhood each Bonfire Night perhaps called into question the functioning of informal social controls. As a minimum, young people set on fire to black wheelie bins and rolled them onto the main road [Sheffield Manager 7]. The disorder had become predictable and the community and local agencies 'expected' and even planned for it. It had practically become part of the local Bonfire Night festivities and there was 'almost something of a reluctant acceptance' [Sheffield NPO 3] about it. But, this did not mean the community stopped trying to prevent it. The Asian ward Councillor was reported to walk around the streets telling young people to 'get in' and reminding them that he knew their fathers; thus appealing to family ties, values and obligations. Some respondents described how for young people it was just 'a good laugh' or an opportunity 'to get back at the police' for previously stopping them [Sheffield Practitioner 2]. As others have highlighted, delinquency is 'complicated, contradictory or ambiguous' and usually requires more than one explanation (Cohen 1987, p.ix), including that it may be pleasurable (Matza 1964) and a way for young men to contest ownership of the streets (Parker 1974; Campbell 1993). It is worth noting that the disorder involved a relatively small group of men, who were viewed as some of the most marginalised in the study neighbourhood. Nonetheless, even they did not repeat this behaviour at other times of the year, perhaps demonstrating that informal social controls were still functioning outside this 'liminal space'.

7.5.4 Overview

This section has drawn on the interview data to demonstrate the functioning of informal social controls across the case studies. It provides examples of how families proactively prevented conflict and promoted positive behaviour in the Sheffield study neighbourhoods. Police and partners were reported to tap into informal controls, recognising them to be frequently more effective than formal controls in managing young people. Informal social controls were also acknowledged by police and partners in Nottingham when they threatened that the annual Caribbean carnival would be cancelled in the rioting did not stop in
August 2011. Community practitioners were seen to play a greater role than familial relations in regulating the behaviour of young men. However, communities in both case studies were concerned about an increasing group of young men who had nothing to do and nothing to lose and in the context of austerity presented a risk for future disorder.

### 7.6 Community Provision

So far it has been described how the study neighbourhoods in both Nottingham and Sheffield were cohesive and had functioning informal social controls that were able to prevent and contain criminality and disorder in most cases. However, there was a group of young people, especially males, who were felt marginalised from society and concomitantly undermined their attachment to family and community. This highlights the importance of socio-structural factors and external support to build human and social capital within neighbourhoods. Respondents across the case studies lamented cuts to community and youth provision, which they felt was responsible for pushing many people to the margins of society. On the magnitude of these cuts, respondents said that ‘people are not as active as they were because there’s no funding’ and that youth provision had been ‘stripped back to the bare bone’ [Nottingham Manager 5] or ‘diminished to the point it’s zero’. Some specifically lamented the loss of resources that had played an important role in diverting young people away from crime and anti-social behaviour:

> So there are gaps but still I’m saying that, I mean like the drugs problem, it is there, despite the fact that we are doing quite a lot, the reason is and I will say it again and again and again that we do not have a strong youth work system. We lost that youth work system where whenever young people used to be free there used to go and meet in the youth club, they used to. [Sheffield Practitioner 5]

It was not only community practitioners who identified the loss of youth provision as an issue. In Sheffield, police officers also reported concern about the loss of initiatives that targeted youth crime:

> Equally with the cuts, from our partners, it’s a difficulty, but I’m not seeing the same level of resources from partners prior to the cuts taking place, in terms of youth work, detached youth work … we had a tackling knife programme. [Sheffield NPO 3]

Respondents recognised that the local picture was not unique and that austerity measures had undermined youth services nationally:
It's gone. It's gone. We have no youth work in [the study neighbourhood]. Not that I know of. There is no funding and it's not just unique to us, it is a national problem. [Sheffield Practitioner 4].

There were comments made about the type of provision that remained after the cuts and how this was did not meet the particular needs of people in the study neighbourhoods. On the one hand, respondents were disparaging about the focus on big youth clubs because this was mainly about containing young people: – ‘stack ‘em in high, keep as many kids occupied s you possibly can to reduce the anti-social behaviour’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. They felt youth clubs offered little in terms of promoting better life outcomes and were not even attractive to the most marginalised groups, for example, ‘cos those lads are just not interested’ [Nottingham Manager 5]. It was suggested that some young people needed courses and apprenticeships that might lead to a job, which, locally, they had shown interest in:

I wouldn’t say we’ve quite reached the tipping point or anything but we’ve got a lot of lads going down to [the community practitioner’s] and saying well I want a piece of that, I want to get an apprenticeship, I want to get a job. I don’t want to be doing this for the rest of my life. I want to do something different. I don’t want to have to look over my shoulder all the time. [Nottingham Manager 5]

However, the argument for this type of provision had older age groups in mind and specifically those considered NEET, as discussed above. With greater reference to younger people, other respondents, in Nottingham and Sheffield, were highly critical about the loss of universal youth provision, including youth clubs. The cuts had prioritised targeted, or detached, youth for individuals with high needs. While no-one argued against the importance of the targeted work, they felt the loss of open access provision simply meant more people than ever were reaching the threshold for targeted work:

I’m not saying that a kid in social care doesn’t need help or support but what I am saying is, I know now that I need to make more referrals to social care than I did five years ago ‘cos some of the work I would have done myself. You get what I’m saying? Yeah, a lot earlier on. And even when it got bigger, I would still do it. [Nottingham Practitioner 1]

On the importance of preventative work, it was argued that by the time young people get referred for targeted interventions it’s usually ‘too late’ to help them [Nottingham Practitioner 2]. Another argument was that universal provision ensured ‘good’ kids benefited too [Sheffield Practitioner 2], which they felt was
especially important in disadvantaged areas in sending the right message about the kind of behaviour that gets rewarded.

Respondents in Nottingham were especially vociferous about how the cuts had favoured short-term ad hoc youth initiatives over long term provision, which was essential for addressing the kind of ‘entrenched’ problems that existed in the study neighbourhoods. This sentiment can be read in the exasperated comment of this respondent: ‘how are you supposed to stop a gaping wound with a little plaster? It’s like come on its just unrealistic’ [Nottingham Practitioner 3]. Ultimately, it seems not to be an argument about whether youth provision should constitute universal or detached youth work. Both were sorely needed in the study areas and, in any case, all provision in the study areas can probably be classed as ‘targeted’ given the socio-demographic characteristics of people living there.

7.6.1 Provision for BME Communities

Despite being under-resourced, it was suggested that existing services were sometimes underused in the study neighbourhoods because they were ‘insensitive’ to local people. For example, family services that generally appealed to affluent educated middle class mothers, such as ‘wiggly toes’ baby classes, didn’t ‘cut it’ with young mums in the Nottingham neighbourhoods; with their mixed race children and fathers who were likely to be involved or on the fringed of criminal activities [Nottingham Manager 5]. In fact there was reported to be a lack of understanding across statutory services in Nottingham about the needs of BME communities:

So we always knew that the gap in service provision was really about something that was attractive, met the needs of the lads and some of the girls that we would say are out most at risk, and meets their needs in a different way. I think that because most of our case load are predominantly from BME community, and what you haven’t got is a good understanding I think, from a statutory perspective, in terms of how you work with the BME community, and how you make services attractive; and that’s been a really big issue.[Nottingham Manager 5]

On the basis of needing tailored provision, members of the Somali community were reported to have lobbied local government hard for their own services and community buildings. One reason was that they felt they had specialist needs, even compared to other ethnic groups in the city:

What works for the Somali community doesn't work for the Yemenis and Pakistanis. Every community have their own way. So they need a lot of
young Somalis to actually work with the community. That is the key. [Sheffield Practitioner 3]

However, some of the Somali community’s greatest concerns – about the potential radicalisation or westernisation of their children – evidently were shared with other BME communities, including the Asian community. On the other hand, a shared concern does not necessarily mean a shared solution, for example, if causal factors were found to differ between ethnic groups. The language needs of older Somalis, who did not speak fluent English, was another reason the community claimed to need distinct provision. Alternatively, some respondents suggested that the real concern was youth provision provided by English-speakers. There had been a particular anxiety about a youth club called the ‘Midnight Club’, which actually ran from 6-9pm, but sounded like ‘young people were out at doing stuff that they shouldn’t be at midnight’ [Sheffield Manager 9]. Additionally it played English music, which the elders felt was ‘culturally appropriate’. Thus, the ‘desire’ of some community members for single group provision was a way of protecting young people from westernisation.

Some members of the Somali community were mindful that single group provision could be a barrier to bridging social capital and to boot leave people from other communities unsupported. One practitioner recounted a time when someone from another BME community visited the Somali Community Centre. This encounter made them conscious of the inequitable consequences of it not being more transparently available to the whole neighbourhood, despite the building being funded by the City Council:

I remember a Turkish lady coming in saying ‘oh I’ve got a problem’ and she just asked me a question and I said ‘I can help you with what do you need’, and she said ‘oh I’m sorry I did not know I could come in here’. So I was shocked. I said ‘why would you think that?’ and she said well I just see Somali people coming here, so I just assumed it is their place’. You think about it, that is a Council building, it is a community structure, it is part of the community make up, but yet somebody felt that. ... Those community buildings that we do have, whilst also serving a particular need, need to serve the wider need as well [or] how do you create natural cohesion? [Sheffield Practitioner 4]

These comments resonate with the views of the Community Cohesion Independent Review Team, which concluded that one factor generating community tensions was a perception that some social groups had secured scarce funding resources in preference to others. On this basis, they recommended that
‘funding bodies should presume against separate funding for distinct communities, and require collaborative working, save for those circumstances where the need for funding is genuinely only evident in one section of the community and can only be provided separately’ (Cantle 2001, p.50). In short, the Review Team advised against single group funding, which means funding that is awarded on the basis of a particular identity, such as ethnic, religious or cultural. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), however, provided a more reasoned case for single group funding (Wells 2006). It supported single group funding where there was a clear need for capacity building within a particular group, such as a new migrant group. What was important, to prevent ‘damaging myths [being] perpetuated around preferential treatment’, was for all funding decisions to be transparent and open to scrutiny and communicated clearly to all communities (CIC 2007, p.162). The Commission’s rationale drew explicitly on the social capital literature, acknowledging that cohesion is primarily generated through bridging social capital, but that groups with bonding social capital are more likely to bridge, meaning that ‘the balance of emphasis on bonging or bridging activities will vary between local areas depending on the needs and make-up of the local communities’ (ibid).

There was evidence that although the Somali Community Centre may not have been directly generating bridging social capital, it may have been doing so indirectly by promoting bonding social capital. As a community that did not feel wholly included, due to their migrant and BME status, the centre provided a space where Somali people could re-group and gather strength, encapsulated in the views of this community practitioner:

*Well you ask the question, what is your stake in the City, where do you belong you know. [The Somali Community Centre], you belong there yes because there’s people that look like you and you have got a breather for a minute to speak your own language, be amongst your own culture, to let your hair down, but as soon as you walk out, you are having to, you know, think ‘Well where am I? Who am I? Where do I belong?’ – Constantly. [Sheffield Practitioner 4]*

The opening of the centre was also reported to have promoted intergenerational relationships between older and younger Somalis and increased the participation of women in formal community structures, which supports the generation of bonding social capital.
7.6.2 Role Models and Advocates

In all four study neighbourhoods there were reported to be community practitioners, who were invaluable as positive role models for young people and who worked tirelessly to engage and support people locally. The respect young people had for these practitioners gave them influence, which was a valuable source of social control at the neighbourhood level. They were not directly involved in promoting community safety and cannot be considered part of the ‘extended policing family’ (Crawford & Lister 2004), but these practitioners offered the capacity for informal policing, generally and specifically in August 2011. These community practitioners were an important source of social capital, promoting bonding by reinforcing norms and values and bridging, as per the example above when practitioners brought young people together to from the two Nottingham neighbourhoods for a visit to London. There were also reported to be advocates for local people and, therefore, an important source of ‘linking social capital’, which Putnam has described as people’s ties to individuals and institutions with relative power over them. Linking social capital is the result of the weakest relationship but offers the most valuable outcome. Studies have found that linking social capital offers pathways for the long term survival and revitalisation of communities and neighbourhoods (Hawkins & Maurer 2009; Jochum et al. 2005). However, bonding, bridging and linking are not compartmentalised experiences. They rely on, build upon and interact with each other and it is this interaction that offers the greatest opportunities for communities (ibid).

The importance of some community practitioners as role models and guides for young people was emphasised even in communities where family and religious networks were especially strong, such as in the two Sheffield study neighbourhoods. As this respondent indicated, faith leaders and adults in the community were able to offer guidance to Asian young men, but generally they did not have the same influence over young people:

_The youth workers actually are role models as well as guides for young people to tell them not to do this, do this, but if people from the community, adults, imams and others, if they say to the youth they have no means, no training and they don’t link up psychologically, to provide that assurance._

_[Sheffield Practitioner 2]_

However, it was suggested that some younger imams with ‘the means and the ability’ to work with young people were more recently ‘coming forward and working with youths’, with the added advantage that they were ‘born and bred’ in the study neighbourhood [Sheffield Practitioner 5]. The most influential
practitioners tended to be part of the community. This contributed to their status as role models for young people, both in the eyes of young people themselves and other members; partly explained by the study neighbourhoods’ suspicion of outsiders and also by the fact that people within the community were more likely to understand the needs of local people. It was also suggested that outsiders were often ‘scared of the kids’ locally [Nottingham Manager 5]. In Nottingham, they were scared because the reputation of the study areas, as being crime ridden and violent, preceded them.

As discussed in the previous chapter, community practitioners who felt themselves to be part of the community were also the strongest advocates because they empathised more easily with local problems and grievances. It was recounted how a young Somali man in the Sheffield study neighbourhood predominated by Asian people had regularly attended public meetings ‘vocal and angry’ about how the needs of Somali young men were overlooked by local provision [Sheffield Manager 7]. This individual’s value as a 'spokesperson' was recognised by statutory agencies, who eventually decided to ‘work with him, rather than ignore him’ and he was encouraged to take up a position in a local community-based organisation where he could continue to perform this role within a more formal structure and with support. Essentially he was 'connected to a stronger voice', generating linking social capital for local Somali people and being described has having an ‘inclusive’ approach, meant his efforts were likely to be advantageous for the neighbourhood more widely [Sheffield Manager 7]. Both Nottingham study areas were also reported to have key practitioners, who advocated for the community and young people in particular. The comments of this Neighbourhood Police Officer highlight that these practitioners ‘knew’ who to speak to about particular issues, thus, making explicit their ‘links’ to people in power:

*I mean I don’t live there but when I was going to public meetings I would be amazed as to how many, you know, people felt so strongly about things and there are always if you like a community advocate but they always knew young people for example, they knew who to come and talk to, to tell them the Police were giving them a lot of crap about X, Y and Z. [Nottingham NPO 1]*

It was repeated across the case studies that another key characteristic of these few prized practitioners was their passion for supporting the local community, which meant they would work ‘above and beyond’ even when the funding had run out, as this respondent from Nottingham recounted:
A lot of goodwill and a lot of communities spirit and you know that was off the back of, you know me, a lot of us, I know me at the time we set up voluntary projects luckily running at the time because there’d been no funding so I set things up off my own back at the time when St Ann’s was getting a bad reputation with a lot of young people who we never had contact with because of cuts. [Nottingham Practitioner 3].

Respondents in both case reported how many of the community activities that were critical in preventing and containing unrest in August 2011 ‘ran on goodwill’ and possibly would again should there be another critical event:

If it kicks off on Sharrow, people like [practitioner name], people like [practitioner name], who’ve worked in them communities for 20 years will work a forty hour week for nowt. It’s their community. They’re passionate about it. So a lot of it will be run on good will. [Sheffield Practitioner 1]

However, some respondents also claimed that goodwill was running out in some places due to the perceived poor treatment of community-based provision by state agencies, particularly in relation to funding, and this meant that key partners in protecting and supporting communities may not be there when needed in the future.

7.6.3 Overview

Young men are the most likely to riot and, consequently, provision targeted at their needs is likely to be effective in preventing riots. This spotlights the role of education and employment as institutions with the potential to re-engage individuals, but only where these offer the potential for enjoyment and status. Community provision can rarely affect structural issues, but if resourced adequately can help mitigate their worst effects. Across the case studies, local youth workers with the experience and expertise to engage with marginalised young men were valuable as guides and role models, and thereby a source of informal social control.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter finds support for the importance of social ties in promoting social cohesion, which is a mechanism for informal social controls. These social ties have been previously typologised as bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding social capital represents the stronger social ties with similar people. Whilst acknowledging the benefits of this in terms of social support, the community cohesion agenda, which was a response to the 2001 disturbances in north England, was cautious about ‘too
much bonding’ because of its potentially damaging effect on inter-ethnic relations. Single group funding was viewed as undermining inter-group relations, except where there was an immediate and urgent need for capacity building within a group. Hence, there was some acknowledgement of the role of bonding in promoting bridging, but barely any support for it. This study found that bonding and bridging were not inversely related, but mutually reinforcing, especially where bonding promoted group level structures that facilitated the process of bridging for a greater number of people.

As suggested within systemic theory, bridging did seem to be beneficial in promoting neighbourhood attachment within the Sheffield communities that were characterised by some low level inter-group conflict. Neighbourhood attachment was demonstrated by inter-group activities for leisure and to address local problems. Neighbourhood attachment also ensured community controls had greater reach. There was no evidence for ‘too much bonding’. Even the territoriality observed in both case studies, but especially in Nottingham, cannot be viewed in this way. Rather it represents a lack of opportunities for some communities to develop meaningful relationships with others elsewhere in the city. In Nottingham, the main barrier to wider social networks was the stigma conferred up people due to where they live, associated with issues of poverty and race. This seemed to be factor explaining why disorder in 2011 was largely prevented within neighbourhoods, but not against people and places that represented social injustice, especially the police.

In both cases studies there were groups of young men that were increasingly marginalised, due to changing social structures that perceptually and tangibly reduced their opportunities in the labour market; and this had impacted detrimentally on their engagement with education and training. Familial and religious networks were strong in the Sheffield study neighbourhoods and routinely played a role in regulating young people’s behaviour, but parents were concerned that their relations, and consequently their controls, were being increasingly challenged by young people’s sense of having nothing to do and nothing to lose. Familial networks were less extensive in Nottingham, prioritising trusted community practitioners and youth workers as a source of social control. Recognising this, practitioners in both case studies were pessimistic about the impact of austerity measures on youth provision, which were already visible by the increasing number of young people requiring acute interventions. Previously, these young people would have been dealt with upstream through universal provision. In the current context of worsening social conditions, at least for poor communities, and de-investment in youth and community provision, respondents
felt that capability to prevent and contain urban unrest would be severely compromised in the future.
Chapter 8 – Conclusion

Urban unrest happens infrequently, but has serious financial and social consequences, linked to reputational damage through stigmatising discourses about riots. The rationale for this study was to understand why urban unrest affects some communities and not others. In particular, the research sought to challenge superficial narratives, claiming the 2011 English Riots were 'criminality, pure and simple', which detracted from the political and socio-historical context, both nationally and locally. These explanations have tended to problematise affected communities, suggesting rioters were senselessly 'trashing their own neighbourhoods' (Briggs 2012a). However, this study argues that rather than communities being to blame for the unrest, they were let down in a number of ways: by social structures, which had forced some social groups to the margins of society, making them less responsive to formal and informal social controls; and by agencies that did not understand them or treated them unfairly. In particular, Nottinghamshire police, under pressure to deal with violent crime, had used repressive tactics against entire neighbourhoods. Moreover, agencies in Nottingham were not a cohesive 'extended policing family' and, consequently, were unable to provide a partnership response, which offered the best chance of preventing and containing unrest in 2011. They failed to apply a key principle of community policing, to engage local people in finding solutions to local problems. Communities in both case studies played an important role in inhibiting disorder. These informal controls might have been more effective in Nottingham if they had been integrated into the main public order response and supported by formal controls. The sections below expand on this summary, beginning with an overview of what the study set out to achieve, challenges and limitations; followed by a discussion of key findings; and, finally, the theoretical and policy implications.

8.1 The Study

The main aim of the study was to understand 'where' disturbances occurred during the 2011 English Riots, with a focus on the role of the police and other partners in preventing and containing unrest. Explanations emerging shortly after the riots were mainly theoretical and empirical research focused on rioters' self-reported motivations and was London-centric to a degree. The spread of the violence across 66 locations towns and cities was primarily explained as 'copycat' behaviour, linked either to emotional contagion or opportunistic criminality. However, this failed to explain why disorder did not occur everywhere. Ahead of this study, only two brief articles by Clifton (2012a; 2012b) considered factors inhibiting disorder,
including the specific efforts of community workers in Leeds and lessons learned in Bristol about taking a fair but firm policing approach following other recent disorders (Clifton 2012b). Arguments for why some locales had been particularly susceptible included the severity of cuts to youth provision (Higgs 2011; Wain & Joyce 2012) and poor police-community relations (Jeffery & Jackson 2012). Thus, key objectives for this study involved exploring the role of police and partners in preventing and containing unrest; and, recognising that policing does not take place in a vacuum, identifying other contextual factors undermining and promoting social order at local levels.

The importance placed on context informed the selection of the case study method, which offered the potential to utilise a range of data types and analytical tools to explore phenomena and context together. The two cases included Nottingham, as a riot-affected city, and Sheffield as a non-riot affected city deemed to have been 'at risk' of rioting. The two cities were characteristically similar in terms of socio-demographics to facilitate a compare and contrast approach. Neighbourhood subcases were also used as a methodological tool for accessing data on community-level variables. In Nottingham, these included two neighbourhoods affected by disorder in 2011; and, in Sheffield, two neighbourhoods considered to be 'at risk' by local stakeholders. The disturbances in Nottingham involved little looting. Violence was targeted mainly at the police and police property. There were attacks on five police stations, including one that was attacked twice and two that were petrol-bombed. An incident incurring damage to 40 cars and some properties on a single residential street was described by respondents as 'collateral damage' linked to policing tactics that involved chasing and corralling young people into a restrictive space. Sheffield did not experience large-scale disturbances, but there were some 'pre-disorder' events, including planned and actual gatherings of young people and some missiles thrown at police vehicles.

The study provides in-depth understanding of events in the two cases studies, but the research also has wider relevance for the understanding of urban unrest and how it can be prevented and contained in other locales. This was made possible by the depth of detail on key variables and contextual factors, which helps to illustrate 'how' and 'why' particular findings might apply elsewhere. However, as some commentators have suggested, the 2011 English Riots may constitute a series of riots with different causes (Gorringe & Rosie 2011) requiring each to have their own inquiry. Research in other cities might also help confirm some of the more tentative findings from the current study. For example, there was a distinct lack of looting in Nottingham, which some respondents attributed to the police
perimeter around the city centre. Thus, it might be useful to examine the police tactics used in other locations where looting was more prevalent. Another reflective point relates to the authenticity of the data, which was mainly derived from interviews. Accounts rarely but sometimes conflicted, likely due to political motivations or the sheer passage of time, making accurate recall an issue for respondents. Any variance has been acknowledged and methods of triangulation used to help identify the most probable scenario. However, there remains the possibility that some will contest these findings or, at least, the importance of particular conclusions.

The passage of time presented some challenges, but was also of value to the study. The timing of the research, several years after the Riots, provided the distance that some individuals and organisations needed to reflect. In the immediate aftermath, agencies involved in the events were likely to be focused on limiting reputational damage, especially in Nottingham where disorder did occur. For example, a local report (One Nottingham 2011) written shortly after these disturbances was reported to be less about lesson-learning than deflecting blame from policing partners and, as one respondent noted, there was a concern local actors would begin to believe their own hype. The time-lapse meant respondents were less likely to be thinking about any repercussions of what they said because the public scrutiny had died down and this might have given them the confidence to challenge any official version of events. Some were perhaps also less self-conscious about their own role in events as a consequence of reflective distance. Respondents made comments directly to this effect, even suggesting that the opportunity to remember was helpful for their own understanding of what occurred: 'I've not really spoke about it since. With this job you just get on. You just do it and there’s always the next thing, so the reflection time … but thinking about it now, it was that...' [Nottingham Practitioner 1].

It was the intention that local understandings about ‘what worked’, supplemented by the findings of this study, might inform local decisions about public sectors cuts being made as part of the national programme of austerity, ensuring the protection of roles and services key to inhibiting unrest. However, cuts had fallen fast and hard since the 2011 Riots, leaving minimal scope to influence them. Nevertheless, the research has been able to gain information about the specific outcomes of cost saving measures in the two case studies, as well as perceptions about how they might affect the likelihood of future unrest and the capability of local agencies to respond. In Sheffield, respondents were pessimistic about the impacts on local partnerships. They felt the loss of inter-agency structures and dedicated partnerships roles had undermined relations, already impeding local
ability to repeat the type of public order response successfully used before. The virtual loss of neighbourhood policing was a particular issue for Sheffield, for which South Yorkshire Police has received recent criticism via a peer-review (College of Policing 2016a). By contrast, Nottingham stakeholders reported a positive trajectory since 2011 in terms of partnership approaches for dealing with young people suspected of gang involvement. Consequently, Sheffield and Nottingham may now be in a similar situation in terms of local capability to prevent and contain future threats of urban unrest, but without greater investment in local policing and partnerships, neither city is likely to be entirely successful.

8.2 Key Findings

This thesis highlights the importance of analysing riots from an extended temporal perspective because, as Corfield (2007, p.251) notes, ‘the long term is always detectable in the immediate moment’. Why the 2011 English Riots occurred in some places and not in others can largely be explained by the nature of the local response when unrest seemed imminent, but the nature of this response was informed by socio-historical events and pre-existing relationships. Young men living in deprived areas and marginalised from mainstream education and employment were most at risk of rioting and so the involvement of local people and practitioners able to influence this group provided the best chance of preventing and containing unrest. However, willingness and capability to involve them in the public order response was determined by inter-agency relations in the preceding years and decades, which had deleterious consequences for the social order outcome in Nottingham.

The national context to events was the media and political commentary, which stirred concern about mindless criminality on the one hand and organised predatory gangs on the other. The latter, in particular, played to the anxieties of Nottingham's policing partners in Nottingham, including some who had witnessed local riots in their own professional lifetime. Other high profile incidents, such as the shooting of teenage girl in 2004, had put pressure on the city to be seen to deal with violence. Research has found that when police expect ‘mad mobs’ they tend to focus on tactics of control, such as containment, arrest or dispersal (Gorringe & Rosie 2008). However, South Yorkshire Police were less susceptible to the media reporting due to their recent success using dialogue policing at the Liberal Democrat party conference. Dialogue is a communication-based approach to managing crowds. Relationship building and mediation are used to deter violence, tied to philosophies of democratic policing (see Stott et al. 2013).
Directives contained in the HMIC's Adapting to Protest reports (2009a; 2009b) and the Keeping the Peace manual (ACPO 2004) meant that dialogue policing was routinely used by Nottinghamshire police to manage large events, such as football matches, but officers responding to this study did not see its relevance to community disorders.

Both cities had several days to consider the spread of rioting from its original source in Tottenham, London, providing offering the potential for a proactive response. However, stakeholders in both case studies reported that critical incident protocols were not designed for urban unrest, meaning they had to act quickly and on the hoof. This possibly put Sheffield at an advantage, due to recent experience of policing the Liberal Democrat party conference and also due to annual partnership planning for disorder occurring in certain parts of the city around Bonfire Night. The earliest actions in both case studies were taken by communities and practitioners at the neighbourhood level. Their continued involvement in Sheffield’s main response ensured a less antagonistic approach. Conversely, Nottingham’s was described as a ‘pure police response’ mainly involving officers in full riot gear instructed to engage to disperse those deemed intent on disorder and to make arrests on a limitless scale. These tactics were targeted in poor Black neighbourhoods, where ‘intent’ was pre-determined by police perceptions of resident ‘gangs’. It is highly likely that this response promoted unrest.

Residents in both the Nottingham and Sheffield study neighbourhoods possessed a strong sense of identity and belonging, which meant that 'at risk' groups were responsive to informal social controls. This helps explain why rioters in Nottingham did not 'trash' their own communities (e.g. Briggs 2012a). Instead, violence was mainly targeted at the police, due to repressive community policing that left young people feeling harassed and unfairly treated, often for little more than being present on the street. Arguably, there was a racial dimension to the police preoccupation with ‘gangs’ in these predominantly Black neighbourhoods. Consequently, the police killing of a Black man in London was reported to resonate with local people, who were monitoring the Mark Duggan case closely. It was also suggested that Mark had family ties in Nottingham. Poor police-community relations were most likely the tinder for the disturbances in Nottingham and the public order approach was the spark. There was little looting, or evidence of the intention of to loot, contradicting commentators who argued that the riots outside Tottenham were an expression of materialist greed and overwhelming consumerism (Moxon 2011; Treadwell et al. 2012). This may have been the
context explaining particular manifestations of disorder in other towns and cities, but it was not a significant variable in Nottingham.

8.3 Conceptual Implications

8.3.1 Theorising Riots

There are various theoretical models to aid our understanding of riots. The most influential is Waddington et al.’s ‘flashpoints’ model (e.g. Waddington et al. 1987; 1989; King & Waddington 2005), which has been used to facilitate understanding of various disorders since it was developed (e.g. Waddington 1992; Waddington 2010). The model offers six levels of analysis, including: structural, as the material circumstances of different social groups, their relationship with the state and how such factors relate to conflict; political/ideological, as the relationship between dissenting groups to political and ideological institutions and how dissenting groups are treated by those institutions; cultural, as the ways in which different social groups understand the social world and their place in it); contextual, as the long-term and more immediate backdrop to relationships—for example between particular groups and the police—within which disorder occurs; situational, as the spatial and social determinants of disorder, for example, that might influence the organisational and tactical dispositions of the police and civilians; and interactional, as the face-to-face interactions between police and civilians.

Some commentators have criticised this model for its focus on events that trigger disorder because in some cases ‘tense stand-offs’ may not be the result of a ‘flashpoint’ so much as a police tactic’ (Gorringe & Rosie 2008, p.201). Consequently, it is claimed the model lacks sufficient nuance for explaining all types of disorder. For example, global protest events involve numerous police encounters, which might become flashpoints, but many rarely do. Moreover, viewing ‘levels of structuration’ as concentric circles within which an event takes shape (Waddington et al. 1989, p.22) privileges the point of interaction (Gorringe & Rosie 2008). However, interactions may be determined primarily by political and historical factors. Findings from the current study support this argument. For example, street-level interactions between officers and civilians in Nottingham were dictated by command level policing strategies developed in response to media warnings of ‘mad mobs’ (e.g. Metro 2011; The Telegraph 2011) and historical concerns about local ‘gangs’ and levels of violence, which had been damaging for the city's reputation and for historical relations between Black communities and the police.
Towards the end of this study, two papers were published by Newburn (2015; 2016) that seemed to overlap with this research, and, therefore, warrant some brief discussion here. The first (Newburn (2015; 2016) uses the flashpoints model to explicate how rioting was avoided in two English cities. Drawing on Clifton’s work (2012a; 2012b), Newburn argues there were elements at the contextual, political and situational levels that mitigated risk, but it was primarily matters at the interactional level that explained the absence of riots in both Bristol and Leeds. The elaborated social identity model (Reicher 1984) was additionally used to explain how police-citizen interactions are less likely to trigger violence when perceived as proportionate and fair by the policed. However, it is disputable that residents in Leeds perceived the actions of police to be 'fair' because after tense interactions with officers early on, community representatives requested police leave the area while they calmed the situation. Consequently, Newburn refers to police 'willingness' to trust community representatives to be mediators and peacemakers as a success factor locally. However, he falls short of acknowledging the importance of including other agencies in policing the threat of urban unrest.

Newburn’s (2016) subsequent article introduces his ‘life-cycle’ model, which purports to move beyond antecedents and aetiology to focus on how riots unfold and what follows in their wake to facilitate historical and comparative analysis. The framework has four sets of features, including the context, within which disorder occurs. This captures the structural, political/ideological and cultural levels featured in the flashpoints model, as well as the relationships and attitudes that facilitate or inhibit collective violence. The second set of features relate to the dynamics of disorder to understand how disorder begins, matures and how long it lasts. The third set covers the nature of participation and motivation, how police and other agencies respond and the form of the disorder. Finally, there is the response when violence has ceased, which includes popular opinions, informed by the media and political response, the penal response and the public policy response, nationally and locally. The added value of the life-cycle model is meant to be its consideration of events in the aftermath of riots. However, this type of analysis has not necessarily been overlooked before. For example, Campbell (1993) reflected on the various responses to widespread disturbances in the early 1990s.

The life-cycle model is also meant to offer greater potential for historical and comparative analysis, although it is not immediately clear how the flashpoints model is less amenable to this. The life-cycle model is perhaps more
comprehensive, but what it gains in scope, it seems likely to lose in depth. Newburn admits that it was not ‘possible in a short article to do more than sketch out some of the similarity and difference between the riots in France, England and Sweden’ (p.550) and so he incorporates a summary table. However, in doing so, he perhaps overlooks the differences within countries. This is a typical criticism of comparative national research, but, as this study shows, local differences are key to understanding riots and preventing them. The over-arching issues may be similar, but the nuance of how they play out locally is critical. So, for example, partnerships relations may inform willingness and capability to work together in a crisis, but how partnerships are supported and undermined may differ from place to place.

In the present study, the flashpoints model was considered as a possible tool for interpreting events in the two case studies, but as the key findings emerged it became clear that the task of separating them out into the six levels was merely an academic exercise, which may be of little use to local stakeholders and actually detrimental to understanding by separately categorising factors that were critically related. For example, the ‘context’ of socio-historical incidents and relationships were central to community bonding and bridging processes as observed in Chapter 7, but these would have been separated into the ‘cultural’ level of the model. Moreover, the category headings are not immediately accessible to public agencies wanting to make use of the findings. The police might naturally pick up 'Interactional' findings, but other institutions may less readily see their role in addressing findings captured by and of the levels because they do not mirror the day to day priorities or practices of public service. Similarly, it is not clear within the life-cycle which agencies might respond to ‘nature’, which covers a vast range of issues including motivations and the policing of the unrest; and ‘context’ includes everything from poverty, to community belonging, to national political systems.

This study does not dispute the usefulness of the flashpoints and life-cycle models for particular types of academic analysis, but prefers to summarise the findings under four different themes, which emerged inductively from the research and seem more accessible to public agencies wanting to inhibit unrest at local levels. The four themes include structural factors, as appear in other two models, including material and social inequalities, diversity and population change. Community factors include intra- and inter-community relations, socio-historical events that define and influence communities and, uniquely, compared to the other two models, informal social controls. This study finds that urban unrest is not only ‘caused’ by communities, but can be prevented and contained by them
too. Despite community being a contested term, this is used above ‘cultural’ factors, which can have negative connotations associated with ‘sub-cultures’ of crime and disorder. Local policing and partnerships constitute police-community relations and intra- and inter-agency relationships, which may be supported by particular structures, practices and roles. The public order response is the collective activities of all local stakeholders, including communities, when unrest seems imminent, focusing on timeliness, joint-working, communication and decision-making and the style and tactics of community engagement/policing. There is a temporal dimension to these four themes, with the first three representing the longer to medium context and the public order response representing the immediate context to urban unrest.

Drawing together the above, the diagram below (Figure 8.1) illustrates the direction and strength of relationships between the four themes and social order outcomes. Even though these were not explicitly examined in this thesis, the model acknowledges the relevance of global and national context, for example, global events promoting migratory movement and austerity and national media and political commentary when rioting erupted in London, which affected policing in Nottingham and possibly other riot-affected locales too. Primarily, however, the model focuses on local factors. It shows how structural factors influence the nature of community, which has a dynamic relationship with local policing and partnerships. This is because local policing is responsive to the socio-demographic characteristics of communities, particularly linked to prejudice, which in turn can affect community identity and grievance and the functioning of informal social controls. Poor police-community relations can provide the tinder for riots and limit the willingness and capability of communities to control at risk groups. Willingness and capability of public agencies to work together to prevent unrest are similarly affected by pre-existing relationships. Thus, the nature of the public order response most strongly determines social order outcomes, but is also dependent upon other factors, most importantly local policing and partnerships.

8.3.2 Policing Partnerships

Previous explanations have spotlighted the role of the police in precipitating riots, linked to poor police-community relations and actions that have 'sparked' a violent response. The novelty of this research is its wider emphasis on the role of other policing agencies, which include the local authority and other statutory and voluntary sector organisations since the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This Act gave additional impetus to inter-agency working, which provides the potential for different perspectives on a given crime problem (Young 1991). Some of these
other agencies may also be better placed to engage with communities due to their relationships with particular social groups that the police, even Neighbourhood Policing Teams, struggle to engage with. Community-based organisations in the two case studies were especially well placed to understand the needs of local people, with respondents in both case studies referring to the value of practitioners, who were also members of the community. They were perceived to be more empathetic and, therefore, better advocates in helping to resolve local grievances.

**Figure 8.1: Aetiology of Riots at Local Levels**

However, a consequence of policing partnerships is that it is no longer just the police that offer the potential to antagonise communities. There was evidence in Nottingham that people were angry about 'poverty pimps', meaning organisations gaining funding for community safety initiatives and other community provision, but which were perceived to have little genuine concern for the community. Arguably, this supports a rationale for debates about democratic policing (e.g. Dryzek & Braithwaite 2000; Stone & Ward 2000) to be extended beyond the police to the full range of agencies comprising the extended police family. It perhaps also shows how the recent introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners intended to make the police more accountable to the public (Reiner 2013) may be less impactful as a consequence of policing partnerships. Local authorities may be democratically governed, but the views of the electorate do not necessarily trickle down to the local level. Policing partners may also reside within the voluntary
sector, which has variable governance structures. This study underpins the need for local people to have greater involvement in selecting and informing local provision, whether it is policing or other social provision.

Grievance between partners, however, was a more important factor influencing disorder outcomes in the two case studies. Responding to critical incidents can be the springboard for better partnership relationships, but the immediate response fares better where these are already in place. This is because such relationships are built on trust, which requires long-term investment. It is important to note the distinction between ‘multi-agency’ relations, which merely involves the coming together of a number of agencies around a particular problem, and ‘inter-agency’ relations, ‘which entail some degree of fusion and melding of relations between agencies’ (Crawford & Jones 1995, pp.30–1). There was evidence of multi-agency working in both case studies, but inter-agency was better evidenced in the approach to public order in Sheffield, where day-to-day partnership working facilitated communication, decision-making and joint interventions at both strategic and operational levels. Blockages in Sheffield were more likely to emerge within a single organisation, associated with the ambiguity of roles and the pace of events, but these were not insurmountable. This study supports existing literature, which suggests there has been widespread acceptance of partnership working across police forces in England and Wales, but also some cultural and practical barriers (O’Neill & McCarthy 2012; Loftus et al. 2014). A key barrier to partnership relations in Nottingham was the way funding was allocated for community provision, which did not always prioritise the specific needs of local people. Competing understandings about the meaning of crime and its solutions had also hindered local relations between policing partners and with communities. It was primarily the police view of who was likely to riot and why that prevented their cooperation with agencies, which were well-placed to engage with local people to avert and contain unrest.

8.3.3 Public Order Policing

The research also makes a novel contribution to understandings of public order policing by showing how dialogue policing can be revised for use in the context of urban unrest. A key development in the trend towards negotiated management of crowd events, now used to prevent and contain disorder at public demonstrations and football matches, has been the introduction of Police liaison Teams (PLTs). These comprise Police Liaison Officers (PLOs), which are meant to add a low-level problem-solving capability to a public order policing operation by mixing with the crowd and mediating situations of emergent tensions (see Gorringe et al. 2012).
They do this on the back of pre-established rapport, which they continue to build and maintain during and after crowd events. In turn, these relationships and the contextualised knowledge that flows from them helps to improve police decision-making by correcting inaccurate assumptions about risks and this mitigates police tendency to use force. Additionally, in the context of perceived police legitimacy, fans begin to police themselves. Although the PLO role has been associated with intrusive surveillance by some police forces (Netpol 2012; Parkinson & Evans 2012), there is empirical support for their ability to promote peaceful outcomes (Gorringe et al. 2012; Waddington 2013).

It is a finding of this research that the same liaison principles can be usefully applied to inhibit disorder in communities. Unlike football matches or demonstrations, however, this type of disorder is relatively spontaneous and PLTs would not have time to pre-establish rapport. Hence, in the place of PLTs it is sensible to deploy people already in positions of trust. This was the approach used within Sheffield, whereby commanders explicitly used Neighbourhood Policing Teams, especially PCSOs, who worked closely with other trusted individuals, such as local youth workers and community practitioners. In some cases, PCSOs and local practitioners patrolled the streets together, engaging with groups of young people about events in London and the consequences of becoming involved in similar activities. They were also able to gauge risk more accurately via their knowledge of what is normal for the neighbourhood and being able to read the behaviour of groups that may appear threatening to others. Conversely, parachuting ‘experts’ into socially marginalised neighbourhoods that tend to be suspicious of outsiders can transform a tense situation into a violent one. It was even reported that introducing additional youth workers into the study neighbourhoods could have been detrimental to social order outcomes.

The mind-set of partners at senior levels, but especially the police, was critical in shaping the approach and tactics of the main public order response in both study areas. The mind-set of commanders in Sheffield was informed by the recent success of their force in using dialogue at the Liberal Democrat Party conference (referred to earlier in this chapter), especially as some commanders were involved in both operations. Public order commanders are noted to distrust the tactic, particularly when the results of dialogue are not immediately apparent (Wahlström 2007). However, in the case of Sheffield, positive results had been demonstrated, which provided the confidence to work with the tactic again. Previous experience also meant that commanders understood the principles of the tactic well enough to revise it in the context of a community threat. However, it was the pre-existing rapport of partners and communities in at risk
neighbourhoods that made the tactic possible. Thus, demonstrating the fortuitous coming together of multiple protective factors in 2011 and how the ‘interactions’ were key to preventing unrest, but these were heavily dependent on socio-historical context.

8.3.4 Community Policing

Although the study did not set out to look at the motivations of rioters, the various accounts from Nottingham converged on a view that the disturbances were essentially an outburst of anger by young Blacks against the police, resonating with the Scarman (1981) and Hytner (1981) reports that sought to explain riots in the early 1980s. Stakeholders in Nottingham spoke of repressive policing of young Black men suspected of being in gangs, some for merely being present on the streets in particular neighbourhoods. This confirms the findings of other studies, which argue that ‘gang’ intelligence is based on societal prejudice against Black people and this has seeped into policing (Williams 2014). A recent mapping exercise, more closely adhering to the official definitions (Home Office 2011), provided some evidence that the Nottinghamshire Police had unrealistic perceptions of gangs, by more than halving their original estimate of gang members. Interviews with officers also revealed a level of prejudice, which was not distinctly racist, but did reveal negative attitudes towards places predominated by Black people.

As in the 1980s, stop and search was an issue, which the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) had clearly not resolved. It was reported that individuals were repeatedly targeted and searches involved degrading treatment. Moreover, changes to the PACE in 2005 meant that stop and accounts no longer had to be recorded, which was a particular issue in Nottingham because individuals felt they had little opportunity for redress. These findings confirm the importance of police accountability and procedurally fair interactions with the public. Procedural justice theory is associated with the work of Tom Tyler (e.g. 1990; 2002; 2003; 2007), who argues that where the police adequately demonstrate ‘fair’ procedures has the consequence of increased police legitimacy, which is associated with increased cooperation and compliance from the public and general commitment to the rule of law. In fact, Tyler’s findings suggest that people regard the process of policing as more important than the objective outcome.

Neighbourhood Policing Teams were able to mitigate some of the damage done by police operational teams, reported to be the most repressive in both case studies. This remedial work was largely carried out by Police Community Support Officers...
(PCSOs). It has been argued (Crawford 2007b; Innes 2004) that the introduction of PCSOs under the Police Reform Act 2002 provided an opportunity to ‘open out’ the police mandate beyond crime-fighting to deliver a visible and accessible community-focused policing style that could encourage familiarity with the public and respond to local priorities. This study found that the value of PCSOs as 'professional natterers' was recognised by officers and communities alike. Their regular interactions with local people were able to generate community rapport and insight. These were important resources for public order commanders in Sheffield. In Nottingham, these were available, but not drawn upon to the same extent as Sheffield; although good community relations with the Neighbourhood Policing Team in one of the Nottingham study areas most likely protected the local police station from attack. This supports Harkin's (2015, p.604) findings that legitimacy is not granted in blanket terms to the police, but is granted variably to individuals and groups within the police and that community policing officers generally carry more legitimacy than response officers.

8.3.5 Community Controls

This study makes a novel contribution to previous understandings of urban unrest by considering the role of informal social controls. Campbell (1993) made implicit links to community controls in her explanations of the widespread disturbances in peripheral urban neighbourhoods in the early 1990s, but stopped short of linking these with theory. More generally across explanations of urban unrest, the nature of community has been identified as a risk factor linked to criminality, poverty and ethnicity (see Chapter 1). These explanations resonate with social disorganisation theory, which emanates from the Chicago-school research of Shaw and McKay (1942; 1969), who argued that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility disrupted the social organisation of communities; and, in turn, these accounted for variations in crime and delinquency. This theory has, more recently, been developed by the systemic model of community attachment. This includes Bursik's (1999) work which articulated a connection between social disorganisation and social capital, claiming that neighbourhoods bereft of social capital, indicated by depleted social networks, are less able to realise common values and maintain social control. However, social networks only serve as a source of control if members can expect sanctions for behaviours that contravene community norms and values; and the norms and values of one community may differ to those of another.

Although the riot-affected neighbourhoods in Nottingham did present as high crime areas, this study challenges the popular discourse that the 2011 Riots were
about 'criminality, pure and simple'. High crime was not the main risk factor for urban unrest, but rather the marginalised status of young men in deprived areas, which is a challenge for informal social controls. Crime is partly the consequence of structural factors beyond the control of communities and so they learn to tolerate a certain level, as long as it does not intrude too significantly on their everyday lives (Foster 1995). It is suggested that community-based initiatives tend to hold unrealistic expectations of what communities can do to reduce crime (Crawford 2007a). However, communities need to feel able to confront crime and often do using informal social controls to prevent particular types, such as violent crime (Foster 1995). In keeping with other research (ibid), this study found that informal controls work best when supported by formal controls. Police in Sheffield seemed to recognise the value of informal controls more than in Nottingham. For example, Neighbourhood Policing Officers routinely involved parents in responding to youth disorder and conflict and did so again in 2011. So although communities in both case studies were actively involved in preventing and containing unrest in 2011, they were not fully integrated into the public order response in Nottingham, undermining the effectiveness of informal social controls. Additionally, young men in Nottingham harboured stronger grievances against the police, due to repressive policing over the longer term, which increased their motivation to riot and posed a greater challenge for community controls.

Informal social controls are strongest where communities are socially connected through social ties to family and friends, referred to as 'bonding' social capital (Putnam 2002). These ties increase the ability of residents to monitor and socialise young people and to work together to solve local problems (Sampson & Groves 1989). Social ties were especially strong in Sheffield due to the familial and religious networks of the Somali and South Asian communities predominating in each of the study neighbourhoods, respectively. However, these neighbourhoods were also characterised by a degree of ethnic heterogeneity, which is associated with poor relational networks due to the mutual mistrust that often exists between distinct groups (Merry 1981). On this basis, the systemic model predicts that regulatory capacity is adversely affected in heterogeneous areas, leading to higher levels of crime. However, this study found that social 'bridging' between different ethnic groups can mediate the correlation between diversity and disorder, by providing a sense of neighbourhood attachment that fosters a greater sense of responsibility to maintain local order (Silver & Miller 2004). Despite some ethnic conflict in the Sheffield neighbourhoods, mainly between young men, the various groups were able to overcome perceived differences to be a place-based community. Neighbourhood attachment was evidenced by a range of inter-group
activities, including community meetings, festivals and actions to address local grievances; and parental interventions to prevent youth conflict evidenced collective efficacy.

The protective role of bridging provides some support for the community cohesion agenda which emerged in the aftermath of the 2001 disturbances in northern England. The Cohesion Review Team (Cantle 2001) identified bridging as a mechanism to prevent inter-group conflict, which was as a key feature of these disturbances. On this basis, it advised against single group funding, which it was likely to be divisive. However, in doing so it overlooked the role of bonding in promoting bridging. This study found that bonding and bridging were not inversely related, but can be mutually reinforcing because bonding can promote group level structures that can facilitate the process of bridging. For example, in Sheffield, single group provision was reported to provide solace for BME individuals, who did not feel wholly accepted by mainstream society. Single group provision constituted 'safe space', which conferred emotional strength and this supported the development of intra-group ties, which conferred community strength. Social groups with high levels of social bonding are typically in a better position to make their voice heard and secure resources. They are also in a stronger position to forge links with other social groups (ibid). Hence, this study supports the view of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007), which advocates single group funding where there is a demonstrable need for capacity building.

The study also questions the Cohesion Review Team's (Cantle 2001) focus on self-segregation as the main barrier to social bridging. As others have spotlighted, this ignores the role of structural factors (Robinson 2002). The insularity of the two Nottingham study areas, which were predominated by Black people, was much less a consequence of self-segregation than socio-economic exclusion. A key barrier to mixing was how residents felt they were perceived and treated by people living in other parts of the city and by public agencies, due to the stigma of poverty and related issues. Territorial behaviour sometimes manifested in the study neighbourhoods, which signified to the police gang-related criminality and attracted repressive policing. Yet, this territoriality can be better understood as a form of neighbourhood attachment, developed in the context of deprivation and social exclusion (Kintrea & Suzuki 2008), which actually increases local capability to regulate behaviour. Although disorder did occur in Nottingham, this was restricted to violence against the police and did not involve people trashing their neighbourhoods, which was reported to be a feature of the Hyson Riots in Nottingham in the early 1980s. Community practitioners reported specifically appealing to neighbourhood attachment in their communications with at risk
groups, reminding them of inter-connectedness with other local people, including shop owners, as an 'external direct' form of control (Kornhouser 1978) (see Chapter 7).

A further reflection on the role of ethnic diversity within the context of urban disorder is that it might be a protective factor because of its association with poor relational networks. As one respondent commented 'if you’re gonna have a go at the biggest gang in the world, the police, you need to be organised' [Sheffield Practitioner 1]; and being organised requires a degree of cohesiveness. Neighbourhoods containing a greater ethnic mix, and particularly a high proportion of new migrants, were considered less likely to riot than other neighbourhoods, regardless of crime levels. It has been argued that social networks can impede the development of social control if criminal types are embedded within them (Browning et al. 2004; Sampson 2006; Pattillo 1998). However, the applicability of this argument to urban unrest depends whether it is viewed primarily as 'criminal'. Rioting is a lawful offence, but there is usually a political context, being typically foregrounded by social inequality and injustice (see Chapter 1). A sense of grievance was a self-reported motivation for some rioters (Prasad 2011; Lewis 2011). There was also the ‘generalised’ anger of marginalised groups, who knew not what to blame (Lea & Hallsworth 2012). A lack of understanding amongst those involved in riotous behaviour about the structural and processual causes of their suffering did not make their response any less 'political' if they were rioting because something was definitely not right. Thus, social disorganisation theory may be less relevant for understanding urban unrest, which may be inversely related to neighbourhood attachment.

This leads onto the role of linking social capital in preventing unrest. Linking social capital is described as people's ties to individuals and institutions with relative power over them and offers pathways for the long term survival and revitalisation of communities and neighbourhoods (Hawkins & Maurer 2009; Jochum et al. 2005). This study, similarly found that links between community-based practitioners and formal agencies, such as the police and the local authority, can help secure resources and resolutions to address community issues. Faith in local resolution processes was a protective factor for Sheffield in 2011. A recent policing operation had antagonised one of the study neighbourhoods, but community practitioners had helped mediate with the police, triggering police efforts to seek a remedy and rebuild relationships. In Nottingham, where familial and religious networks were less strong, community practitioners were particularly important in generating bonding, bridging and linking social capital. However, despite their links, practitioners reported frustration at the police, who had not been responsive
to calls to change stop and search practices despite many meetings. Additionally, police did not seek to involve them in the main public order response in 2011, as they did in Sheffield. Had police stepped back to let community workers calm tensions, as they did in Leeds, another characteristically similar area that avoided riots, this may have inhibited violence at the city level in Nottingham. If urban unrest is political, linking social capital offers the potential for a more peaceful politics via the relationships community practitioners have with local people combined with their expertise and willingness to advocate on their behalf.

8.4 Policy Implications

8.4.1 Policing Partnerships

The study concludes that urban unrest is more likely to be prevented by police and partners working together. This gives public order commanders and other key decision-makers access to the full range of knowledge and expertise. Involving local practitioners is particularly important where they have pre-established rapport with communities and especially with at risk groups. However, partnerships cannot be established in the moment. Relationships between policing partners and communities require long-term investment, which is overlooked by recent austerity measures. A recommendation of this research is for cities to consider how partnership relations, at managerial and practitioner levels, can be prioritised. Formal structures, dedicated partnership roles and co-location have been supported these before, and might be considered for re-investment in the future. Relationships with the voluntary sector can be adversely or positively affected by funding allocation processes and, as important partners in understanding and addressing the needs of communities, these processes must be perceived as transparent and fair.

8.4.2 Public Order Policing

Functioning partnerships ensure there is capability to respond to the threat of urban unrest, but partners may still lack the necessary expertise. Sheffield had prior experience of responding to similar threats, providing a template for action in 2011. More generic critical incident protocols and public order policing manuals were less helpful, suggesting the need for partners in every city to have a clear plan of how to respond to community tensions to prevent them escalating. National policing guidance might be revised to highlight the relevance of dialogue policing and how neighbourhood officers might perform the current role of Police Liaison Teams, due to their local knowledge and rapport. Where riots are a risk, local plans might recommend additional roles that have the ability to engage with
marginalised groups and protocols for communication and decision-making within and between agencies.

8.4.3 Community Policing

Repressive policing of communities has been associated with previous riots and was identified as a predisposing factor again in 2011. In the two case studies, poor police-community relations were primarily linked to interactions with special operations and response teams. Residents had much better relations with Neighbourhood Policing Teams, particularly via the engagement of PCSOs, who worked with other local partners to address complex issues, such as anti-social behaviour. These local relationships were key to the success of Sheffield’s public order response. However, as a consequence of cost-cutting, PCSOs were reporting to be doing increasingly less community engagement and a dramatic re-structure near the end of the project virtually abandoned community policing. This study supports the view that community engagement is a valuable tool for the police, offering greater potential for crime reduction and order maintenance at local levels through officers’ relationships with communities. Hence, it supports the recent recommendation that South Yorkshire Police re-develop neighbourhood policing structures in ways that better support community engagement than they do at present (College of Policing 2016a). In the interests of sustainability and recognising the national focus on cost-cutting, there is perhaps the possibility for geographical variation within future structures, determined by the level and nature of support required by different communities in accordance with existing informal social controls. Communities have the ability to self-regulate, but there is still a role for the police as ‘facilitators... rather than creators' of social order (Innes & Roberts 2008, p.257).

The policing of communities in Nottingham was heavily influenced by the police perception of a ‘gang’ problem. Interventions succeeding the riots have engaged other partners in gang and youth violence initiatives, which, consequently, are more informed by understandings of structural and other causal factors. This is positive development. Other developments might focus on educating police officers, including response teams, about the challenges and needs of the communities they work in. Respondents felt that generic diversity training was inadequate. Response officers might additionally need to liaise with Neighbourhood Policing Teams to ensure sensitivity to local context, to help understand what is ‘normal’ in certain areas and the difference between a gang and a group.
8.4.4 Structural factors

Both case studies referred to the challenges of increasing diversity in neighbourhoods, which had implications for social cohesion and the delivery of services where some groups did not speak English fluently. During the riots, local ethnic shops helped disseminate protective messages, but this may not be a sustainable solution. Social disorganisation theory, and the more recent systemic theory, sees diversity as a challenge for social order. Hence, there may be a need for localities to monitor the effects of diversity and provide additional support for bridging, which can help promote neighbourhood attachment. New migrants can be a particular concern if longer-term residents perceive them to be in direct competition for resources, which spotlights the role of other structural factors that can predispose particular groups to participation in riots. Young men who were not in education, employment or training (NEET) were perceived to be at greatest risk across the case studies. However, it seems not simply to be a case of forcing them into any. Respondents acknowledged that young people need to see that education, employment and training opportunities would provide longer term reward, both financially and in terms of feelings of personal worth. Hence, a recommendation of the study would be that all of these structural factors, though difficult to address, should not ignored.

8.4.5 Community Provision

Supporting communities own informal social controls seems a way of getting 'more for less', but in the context of social inequality and population change, communities still require external support, in terms of formal policing, as discussed above, and social provision. Social ties within and between communities at the neighbourhood level confer practical support for individuals and facilitate attachment to place, which promotes informal controls. Hence, community provision that supports bridging and bonding can help with maintaining social order at local levels. School-based initiatives were reported to be beneficial in Sheffield. Younger children were found to be less affected by inter-ethnic conflict and, thus, could be a conduit for addressing tensions between parents. Relationships with local media channels, newspapers and radio stations, might promote more responsible reporting. Negative headlines about neighbourhoods not only influence how outsiders perceive the area and the people who live there, but also how local residents perceive the area and their fellow residents, with a potentially damaging impact on the sense of community within the area. (Platts-Fowler & Robinson 2013, p.24). Conversely, positive stories have the potential to reverse these effects.
Cuts to youth provision were a strong theme in the research. Unlike adult social care and looked after children, there is no statutory requirement to fund youth provision and given the scale of the savings recently being sought by local authorities, it is unsurprising that young people have lost out. However, young people, men in deprived circumstances in particular, are the greatest threat to social order. The rapport that youth workers and other community-based practitioners have with marginalised young men is key to preventing and containing unrest, demonstrated by this study and the empirical research in Leeds (Clifton 2012a; Newburn 2015). Yet, practitioners reported how the loss of funding had already compromised their rapport. They were generally passionate about supporting young people and a number reported working without pay. However, as one respondent noted 'riots cannot be stopped on goodwill alone'. Cuts to youth provision may be storing up problems for the future, at a time when there will also be few people left with an ability to do anything about it. Government agencies, at the national and local level, must decide whether the short-term savings are worth it.
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Appendix A – Letters to Chief Constables

Dear Chief Constable Eyre

RE: POLICING SOCIAL DISORDER AND PREVENTING URBAN UNREST

I am writing to ask for your support in carrying out a much-needed independent study of events that occurred during the 2011 English riots. Specifically, I am seeking your support to access a small number of officers in the Nottinghamshire Police Force, who can provide information relating to the Nottingham disturbances, their policing and the manner in which conflict was contained and prevented.

The research is being conducted as part of doctoral thesis funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through the White Rose Doctoral Training Centre made up of a partnership between the Universities of Leeds, York and Sheffield. The research is under the supervision of Professor Adam Crawford (University of Leeds) and Dr Layla Skinns (University of Sheffield).

The research will explore how disorder during the 2011 English riots was prevented and contained in a small number of cities. Nottingham has been selected because its disturbances were reported to be on a smaller scale than other cities. The aim is to identify approaches and practices that worked well, with a view to developing good practice guidelines for future use in public order situations.

This study is unique. There have been other studies on the 2011 riots, but these have tended to focus on rioters’ motivations for their involvement. There has been much less
research on factors inhibiting and containing disorder in urban areas, which is a topic of paramount importance if lessons are to be learned for the future.

Upon completion of the study, an oral presentation will be given to those involved in the research and others who would find it useful, reflecting on lessons learned in Nottingham. A short written report on the main findings from the research will also be provided. Preliminary findings can be fed back at interim stages, if this would be useful.

In each city, the research will involve 30 interviews with key stakeholder groups, including the police, local government, statutory agencies, the voluntary-community sector, and residents. For Nottinghamshire Police, this will mean around 10 individual or group interviews with officers involved in policing the Nottingham disturbances and the communities most affected these.

All officers who participate in the research are assured of individual confidentiality and anonymity. Though some of what individuals say in interviews may be used in reports and publications stemming from the research, it will not be possible to identify who they are. Nottinghamshire Police will be provided with an opportunity to comment on any reports or papers ahead of publication.

I do hope you are willing to support this research. I attach an information sheet providing more detail about the study. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I very much look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Deborah Platts-Fowler

[Signature]

Professor Adam Crawford (supervisor)

cc. T/Ch Supt Steve Cooper, Temporary Divisional Commander of the City Division
Chief Constable David Crompton  
South Yorkshire Police HQ  
Carbrook House  
5 Carbrook Hall Road  
Sheffield S9 2EH

Dear Chief Constable Crompton

RE: POLICING SOCIAL DISORDER AND PREVENTING URBAN UNREST

I am writing to ask for your support in carrying out a much-needed independent study of events that occurred during the 2011 English riots. Specifically, I am seeking your support to access a small number of officers in the South Yorkshire Police Force, who can provide information relating to how civil disorder was prevented in the city of Sheffield.

The research is being conducted as part of doctoral thesis funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through the White Rose Doctoral Training Centre made up of a partnership between the Universities of Leeds, York and Sheffield. The research is under the supervision of Professor Adam Crawford (University of Leeds) and Dr Layla Skinns (University of Sheffield).

The research will explore how disorder during the 2011 English riots was prevented and contained in a small number of cities. Sheffield has been selected because it is a large city that avoided major unrest, but which is characteristically similar to other cities that did have riots. The aim is to identify approaches and practices that worked well, with a view to developing good practice guidelines for future use in public order situations.

This study is unique. There have been other studies on the 2011 riots, but these have tended to focus on rioters’ motivations for involvement. There has been much less research on factors inhibiting and containing disorder in urban areas, which is a topic of paramount importance if lessons are to be learned for the future.
Upon completion of the study, an oral presentation will be given to those involved in the research and others who would find it useful, reflecting on lessons learned in Sheffield. A short written report on the main findings from the research will also be provided. Preliminary findings can be fed back at interim stages, if this would be useful.

In each city, the research will involve 30 interviews with key stakeholder groups, including the police, local government, statutory agencies, the voluntary-community sector, and residents. For South Yorkshire Police, this will mean around 10 individual or group interviews with officers involved in policing the threat of disorder in Sheffield or the communities deemed to be most at risk.

All officers who participate in the research are assured of individual confidentiality and anonymity. Though some of what individuals say in interviews may be used in reports and publications stemming from the research, it will not be possible to identify who they are. Ethical approval for this study has been secured from the Research Ethics Committee at the University of Leeds (Ref: AREA 13-025).

I do hope you are willing to support this research. I attach an information sheet providing more detail about the study. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I very much look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Deborah Platts-Fowler

Professor Adam Crawford (supervisor)

cc. Chief Superintendent David Hartley, Sheffield District Commander
Appendix B – Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet

Study: Beyond the Riots - Policing Social Disorder and Urban Unrest

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

What is the purpose of the research?

Research has previously found that riots are linked to poverty, inequality, injustice, and austerity. This study will consider how the police, other local agencies and communities can work together to help prevent and limit social disorder even where these conditions exist. To identify useful approaches and practices, which take local factors into account, the research will explore how disorder developed and was prevented in two cities – Nottingham and Sheffield – during the 2011 English riots.

Why have I been chosen?

Approximately 60 individual or group interviews are planned across the cities of Nottingham and Sheffield. People and organisations are being approached to participate if they:

- have an understanding of the places or communities worst affected, or threatened by, the 2011 riots;
- observed or were involved in actions to prevent and manage disorder at the time of the 2011 riots;
- have been involved in understanding and/or responding to the events of 2011.

Do I have to take part?

It is your decision whether or not to take part. No-one else, not even your employer, can make this decision for you. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you
can still withdraw at any time without any consequences, and you do not have to give a reason.

**What will I have to do?**
The research will last for approximately 1-2 years. Participants will usually be asked to just one interview. In a few cases it may be necessary to contact participants a second time, to seek clarification on something they or another participant may have said. Interviews will be relatively informal. The interviewer may want to talk about some specific topics, but participants will be able to respond to questions in their own way.

**Confidentiality and anonymity**
Anything that you say during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Any notes and audio-recordings of conversations will kept safe by the research team, and will not be shared with anyone else. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications. Any quotations and descriptions of roles and situations will be anonymised.

This commitment to confidentiality will only be broken where a participant reveals plans to cause physical harm to themselves or another person. In this case, the interviewer will stop the interview, check they have understood correctly, and tell the participant which information they intend to report, and to which agency (such as the police).

**Who is organising/ funding the research?**
This study is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and supported by a group of Universities, including Leeds, York and Sheffield, which together are known as the White Rose Doctoral Training Centre.

**Contact for further information**
Deborah Platts-Fowler (PGR)
University of Sheffield
School of Law
Bartolome House
Winter Street
Sheffield S3 7ND
Tel: 07904 526934
E-mail: lwdpf@leeds.ac.uk / lw4dp@sheffield.ac.uk

**Finally ...**
Participants will be given a copy of this information sheet and a signed consent form to keep. The researcher will contact you via your preferred method of contact to arrange an interview.

Thank you for taking the time to read through this information.
Appendix C – Consent Form

Consent to take part in research project
Policing Social Disorder and Preventing Urban Unrest

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<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
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<tr>
<td>I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining the above research project, and I have had the opportunity to ask questions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree for the data collected from me to be used in relevant future research.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the lead researcher should my contact details change.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

To withdraw from the research or provide new contact details, contact the lead researcher, Deborah Platts-Fowler, on tel: 07904 526934 or e-mail: hwdfo@leeds.ac.uk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of participant</th>
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<tr>
<td>Participant’s signature</td>
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*To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant.

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/ pre-written script/ information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project’s main documents which must be kept in a secure location.
Appendix D – Interview Topic Guides

Nottinghamshire Police – Senior/ Public Order Officer

1. What was your role during the August 2011 disorders?

2. How do you think the disturbances in Nottingham were different to those elsewhere in the country?
   - nature of the disturbances?
   - how did they begin?

3. Where did the disturbances mainly take place, and why here?
   - nature of the place / residents?
   - historical events?
   - nature of the relationships between residents and statutory agencies?

4. Any particular groups over-represented, and why

5. Any forewarning of the violence?

6. Can you tell me about the police response?
   - any specific strategies or processes put in place?
   - proactive or reactive?

7. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way?
   - Different approaches for dealing with commercial areas and residential areas?

8. How was the response staffed?
   - enough capacity / trained in public order?
   - specialist roles involved? – liaison officers?
   - how were neighbourhood policing teams involved?

9. To what extent were statutory and voluntary sector partners involved?
   - which partners, and at what level?
   - how were the relationships between partners?

10. To what extent were members of the public involved?

11. What information / intelligence was used to inform the response?
• from where/who?
• what information was / would have been most useful?

12. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work?
• within the force? (with neighbourhood officers)
• with partner agencies and communities
• what media channels were used?

13. What do you think were the main successes of Nottingham's overall response?

14. What could have worked better, and why?

15. How have police relationships with the public been affected by the events in 2011?
• generally / in areas worst affected?

16. How has August 2011 informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public order?
Nottinghamshire Police – Neighbourhood Policing Team

1. Can you tell me about your role in the neighbourhood team
   • number of officers, and roles, in the team

2. How is the area to police?
   • Nature of community
   • what are the main crime and disorder issues
   • do people cooperate with the police - attend meetings, provide information

3. Why do you think the disturbances occurred in this neighbourhood?
   • how did they begin – spontaneous violence or gradual build-up of conflict?
   • any particular groups over-represented in the violence, why?

4. Any forewarning of the violence?
   • past public order incidents in these areas / with these groups (12 months previous)?

5. What was your role in responding to the disorders?

6. What can you tell me about the wider response to the disturbances?
   • proactive / reactive
   • national models / local approaches
   • who involved - police roles, and other agencies, local groups and members of the public

7. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way?
   • Different approaches for dealing with commercial areas and residential areas?

8. How well was the local policing team integrated into this response?

9. How were key decisions made?
   • Locally or centrally
   • which roles / partners involved?
   • what information/intelligence informed decisions?

10. Was there a communication strategy, and how well did this work?
    • locally, city-wide?
    • what media channels were used?

11. What do you think were the main successes of Nottingham’s response?
    • what specifically helped to contain the disturbances?
• policing vs. other stakeholders

12. What could have worked better, and why?
  • locally and centrally

13. How have police-community relationships been affected by the agency response in 2011?
  • any subsequent changes to local policing?

14. Do you think there is an ongoing threat to social order in this neighbourhood?

15. How has August 2011 informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public order?

16. How well placed to response now, given cuts and re-organisation of police and other services?
Nottingham Agency – Manager / Strategic

1. Can you tell me a bit about your role now and during the August 2011 disorders?

2. How do you think the disturbances in Nottingham were different to those elsewhere in the country?

3. Where did the disturbances mainly take place, and why here?
   - anything about the physical environment?
   - history of public disorder?
   - nature of the relationships between residents, other communities, and agencies?
   - any local grievances?

4. Any forewarning of the violence?

5. Can you tell me about the council response?
   - were any specific strategies or processes put in place?
   - when put in place?
   - proactive or reactive?

6. Did the location of the disturbances affect the response in any way?

7. What do you know about the staffing?
   - no. of officers and specialist roles involved?
   - trained in dealing with public order issues?

8. To what extent were other stakeholders involved?
   - which agencies, and at what level?
   - how were the relationships between partners?
   - To what extent were members of the public involved?

9. What information / intelligence was used to inform the response?
   - from where/who?
   - what information was / would have been most useful?

10. How were key decisions made?
    - how was level of risk assessed? (ask about ‘National Decision Model’)
    - which roles / partners involved?

11. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work?
    - Internally
    - with partner agencies and communities
12. What do you think were the main successes of Nottingham's overall response?
   • what specifically helped to contain the disturbances?

13. What could have worked better, and why?

14. How have been the outcomes of the events 2011?
   • Affected relationships with community/agencies
   • Funding
   • informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public order?

15. How well placed to respond to future threats?
   • Re. cuts and re-organisation of police and other services?
South Yorkshire Police – Senior/ Public Order Officer

1. What was your role during the August 2011 disorders?

2. How real was the threat?
   - where was the threat thought to be greatest, and why?
   - which groups thought to present the greatest threat, and why?
   - Did any significant incidents occur anywhere?

3. Can you tell me about the police response?
   - when was this put in place (following 1st outbreak of violence in London on Sat 6 Aug)?
   - specialist roles / public order police involved?
   - level of involvement by neighbourhood police officers - trained in public order policing?

4. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way?
   - Different approaches for dealing with commercial areas and residential areas?

5. How was the response staffed?
   - enough capacity / trained in public order?
   - specialist roles involved? – liaison officers?
   - how were neighbourhood policing teams involved?

6. To what extent were statutory and voluntary sector partners involved?
   - which partners, and at what level?
   - how were the relationships between partners?

7. To what extent were members of the public involved?
   - community leaders / established groups / or wider involvement of the public?

8. What information and intelligence was used to inform the response?
   - from where/who? (local?)
   - what information was / would have been most useful?

9. How were key decisions made?
   - which roles / partners involved?
   - how was level of risk assessed? (ask about ‘National Decision Model’)
   - who made the final call?

10. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work?
    - within the force? (with neighbourhood officers)
    - with partner agencies and communities
    - what media channels were used?
11. What do you think were the main successes of Sheffield's response?
   • specific policing factors

12. What could have worked better, and why?

13. How have relationships with the public been affected by the agency response in 2011?
   generally / in areas worst affected?

14. How has August 2011 informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public order?
Sheffield Agency – Manager / Strategic

1. Can you tell me a bit about your role during the August 2011 disorders?

2. Why do you think Sheffield avoided large scale disorder?

3. How real was the threat? - any significant incidents occur anywhere?

4. Where was the threat thought to be greatest, and why?
   - nature of the place / people?
   - historical events / grievances?
   - nature of the relationships between residents and statutory agencies?

5. Can you tell me about the council response?
   - were any specific strategies or processes put in place?
   - when put in place?
   - proactive or reactive?

6. Did the location of the threat affect the response in any way?

7. What do you know about the staffing?
   - no. of officers and specialist roles involved?
   - trained in dealing with public order issues?

8. To what extent were other stakeholders involved?
   - which agencies, and at what level?
     a. how were the relationships between partners?
     b. To what extent were members of the public involved?

9. What information / intelligence was used to inform the response?
   - from where/who?
   - what information was / would have been most useful?

10. How were key decisions made?
    - how was level of risk assessed? (ask about ‘National Decision Model’)
    - which roles / partners involved?

11. Was there a specific communication strategy, and how well did this work?
    - Internally
    - with partner agencies and communities
    - what media channels were used?

12. What do you think were the main successes of Sheffield's response?

13. What could have worked better, and why?
14. How have been the outcomes of the events 2011?
   - Affected relationships with community /agencies
   - Funding
   - informed approaches for dealing with any future threats to public order?

15. How well placed to respond to future threats?
   - Re. cuts and re-organisation of police and other services?
Sheffield Agency – Community Practitioner

1. Can you tell me about your role in the community

2. Can you tell me about how you felt when you became aware of the riots in London?

3. Did you think there was a real threat that your community would experience similar disorder, and why?

4. Where was the threat thought to be greatest, and why?

5. Which groups were thought to present the greatest threat, and why?

6. Did any significant incidents occur in the local area?

7. What did you do when you became aware of the riots in London and elsewhere?

8. Were you aware of what others were doing in the area during that time?
   - Police
   - Youth services
   - Council officers and ward councillors
   - Community organisations
   - Residents?

9. Were these various organisations/groups working together?
   - Police and youth workers
   - Agencies and residents

10. Was there a communication strategy, to let you and others know what was happening and what was being done by police and partners?
   - locally, city-wide?
   - what media channels were used?

11. What do you think were the main successes of Sheffield’s response?
   - what specifically helped to contain the disturbances?
   - policing vs. other stakeholders

12. What could have worked better, and why?
   - locally and centrally

13. How have community relationships with the police and other agencies been affected by the response in 2011?
   - how were relations then and now?
• any subsequent changes to policing practice?

14. How well do you think police and other organisations would be able to **cope with a future threat**?

• **Lessons learnt** from responding to the threat in 2011?
• **Organisational changes** that might affect future response (i.e. cuts)?
Abbreviated Topic Guide – Community Practitioner

1. Your role - what do you do?
2. What started to happen in your community/organisation when disorders occurring in London and elsewhere?
3. How were local people feeling/ what doing?
4. Aware of what other agencies (police / council) were doing (before/during)?
5. Joined-up response with other agencies?
6. What occurred locally? (any significant incidents / could have been prevented)
7. What did police and agencies do well?
8. What could police and agencies have done better?
9. How agency response affected relationships with local people (inc. police)?
   a. How were relations with before?
   b. Relations influenced local events?