The Generational and Social Class Bases of Pro-Democratic Culture in Turkey: A Quantitative Analysis with WVS Data

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ABSTRACT

Political culture research focuses on the relationship between individual-level orientations and system-level institutions. Three approaches within this line of research suggest different sets of orientations that are understood to support democracy. Yet, very little is known about what underlines these pro-democratic orientations. Focusing on two potential bases, generation and social class, the present research asks: ‘What are the generational and class bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey?’ The research tests the theoretical predictions of both Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis to examine whether there are differences in pro-democratic culture across generational and class categories. The findings do not lend complete support to either theory. The analysis reveals that Turkish respondent’s pro-democratic attitudes do not follow generational lines. However, an indirect effect of generation is revealed when social class is included in the analysis. The findings show that for those generations which have come of age under authoritarian politico-juridical orders, social classes are homogenized with respect to their pro-democratic attitudes. On the other hand, for those generations socialized under non-authoritarian governments, the findings lend support to the modernization theory’s classification of the social classes challenging that of Lipset’s theory. Three types of regression techniques are applied to cross-sectional data from the 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) for Turkey. The overall thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the main arguments and hypotheses. The second chapter gives a brief overview of the recent history of Turkey to provide the necessary background for making sense of the
analysis. The third chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the research. The fourth chapter introduces the data and the methodology used for the analysis. The following three chapters present the empirical findings of the research. Finally, the eighth chapter provides a brief summary of the findings and discusses their wider implications.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The current thesis is primarily designed to investigate the generational bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey. This investigation is important for a number of reasons. It was widely understood in Turkey that the 1980 military coup was aimed at preventing a potential civil war and of securing the future of democracy by producing a generation that would not contest the political order. Arguably, it was believed by those who staged the coup that a suppressed, obedient and non-political young generation would not repeat the same ‘mistakes’ of their predecessors that had brought Turkey to the brink of civil war. The members of such a generation would only be faithful to the country, not external ‘demonic’ ideologies that would lead them to fight with each other. However, the analysis of the present thesis revealed that the generation which came of age after 1980 is not necessarily more pro-democratic than its successors. Yet, it would not be right to argue that the period of socialisation of a generation does not influence pro-democratic orientations at all. Instead, results presented in this thesis show that the generational influences on pro-democratic attitudes are largely indirect, operating through the social class structure. It is shown in the present thesis that while for the previous generation which was not exposed to system level authoritarianism, social classes exhibit significantly different levels of pro-democratic attitudes, for the post-1980 generation, social classes are not sharply differentiated, showing generally a lower level of pro-democratic orientations. It seems that while the military coup leaders’ aim of producing a generation of depoliticized, like-
minded individuals seems to have worked, but this has not necessarily been for the benefit of democracy.

These findings, beyond providing an answer to our particular research question, have also theoretical implications. The present thesis adopts Karl Mannheim’s ‘theory of generations’ and Seymour Martin Lipset’s ‘working class authoritarianism thesis’ as the two main theoretical guides while investigating the generational and class bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey. The analysis reveals that Mannheim’s theory of generations is not applicable in our particular case. On the other hand, Lipset’s working class authoritarianism seems to hold true when generational dividing lines are ignored. The analysis of the pooled data showed that the manual class, which corresponds to Lipset’s working class, is less pro-democratic than the non-manual class when generation is ignored. However, the picture changes comprehensively when generations are considered.

For the generation which was socialized under system level authoritarianism, social classes’ pro-democratic orientations are homogenized, thus challenging Lipset’s thesis. This finding poses a ‘generational challenge’ to the static working class authoritarianism thesis of Lipset. What is more, for the generation which was not socialized by system level authoritarianism and for which we expect to find Lipset’s thesis hold true, the social classes produce significantly different levels of pro-democratic attitudes, yet the findings are still different from how Lipset would predict. Unlike Lipset’s expectation, for this generation the manual class does not appear to be less pro-democratic than the non-manual class. Instead, the members of these two social classes together with those of the
service/self-employed class were found to be more pro-democratic than the members of the unemployed and farmer classes. In other words, those classes which take part in modern production, regardless of whether it is manual or non-manual, are more pro-democratic than those who remain out of it. This finding lends support to modernization theory that posits a positive relationship between the transformation of the traditional modes of production into modern ones and democracy.

The idea of discovering the bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey originates from the famous ‘how to make democracy work’ question, which has spawned an enormous amount of scholarly attention in the 20th century political science literature. A large and growing body of literature has investigated the factors that provide support for democracy. The political culture research is one of those approaches seeking an answer to this question. Three separate approaches operate within the political culture research: the legitimacy approach, the communitarian approach and the human capital approach. While the legitimacy approach prioritizes legitimization of democracy and delegitimization of its autocratic alternatives, the communitarian approach focuses on orientations reflecting strong community belonging and the human development approach gives precedence to values reflecting strengthening of the individual (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 245-71).

Although its known that all these three approaches emphasize different types of orientations as important for democracy, very little is known about their underlying dynamics. Many different factors could be at work. This research sketches a model where three different ways of measuring democratic attitudes lie at the dependent end of the
relationship as a function of two bases: generation and social class. Generation has long been a question of great interest in the political science and sociology literatures. Replacement of generations is viewed as a fundamental property of social change. According to Ryder (1965: p. 843), ‘The lives and deaths of individuals are, from the societal standpoint, a massive process of personal replacement, which may be called ‘demographic metabolism’. Labelled either as ‘demographic metabolism’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 843-4) or as ‘social rejuvenation’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 296), the process which is more widely known as ‘generational replacement’ corresponds to the renewal of society as well as its values and orientations. Therefore, although it is a biology-based concept, its further attitudinal and behavioural implications locate it at the heart of a social scientific study. Today, various strands of evidence in the literature lend support to the belief that generational location is responsible for a range of human attitudes and behaviours. The generational phenomenon was first treated systematically by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim’s theory of generations, as a well-entrenched system of thought, aimed to bring a scientific and comprehensive explanation to the generation problem. Mannheim laid down all the aspects of his theory in his seminal 1927 essay, The Problem of Generations. In this essay Mannheim raised arguments that are inspiring for those wanting to study generation phenomenon quantitatively. Although, Mannheim’s theory did not remain free of criticism and controversy in the following years, it is still an important point of reference for understanding the generation phenomenon. According to Mannheim, in addition to being contemporary, the members of a generation must have been exposed to the same formative events. Nevertheless, it is also implied by Mannheim that sharing the same birth year and
being exposed to the same formative events are still not enough in themselves for a generation to emerge. According to him, only if the same memories are collected during the early years in life, can we speak of a generation. Derived from the theories of the development of the human mind, Mannheim asserts that trends peculiar for a generation are moulded in the years before its members embark on adulthood. Mannheim specifies a period around the age of 17 in this regard, since this is the age which the individuals are the most impressionable. According to Mannheim; about this age, young individuals are old enough to engage with the life and the societal culture, but still too young and vulnerable to its formative effects. The core values, as suggested by Mannheim, acquired by young individuals about this age are so deep and strong that they remain impervious to change and shape later attitudes and behaviour (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 300; see also Ghitza & Gelman, 2014).

The work that is outlined in the above lines matters not only because it tests two prominent theories in the Turkish political context and because it is the first— to our knowledge— attempt to evaluate Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis from a generational perspective, but also because it accounts for some country specific issues which deserve a scrutiny. The lack of quantitative research on generations is an important deficiency in Turkish political science literature. Therefore, it is believed that advancing knowledge on Turkish generations through a sophisticated use of empirical data and quantitative methods will fill an important void in the literature. Moreover, the analysis of the thesis may also provide some information in regards to the ‘new rising Turkish generation’ question which was frequently asked after the 2013 Gezi Protests. However, a far-reaching answer to this
question should not be expected because we do not have the data to directly analyse this generation that is currently in its youth. We can only speculate based on the insights from the evidence for socialisation that we will have uncovered for the other generations. The first empirical chapter tackles with this question as a part of political participation issue in Turkey. On the other hand, the second and third empirical chapters employ democracy preference and out-group tolerance as dependent variables. Studying these two orientations is important not only because they are known to be significant predictors of system level democracy, but also because Turkey ranks very highly in the former and very lowly in the latter amongst the other countries of the world. Therefore, the findings of this work may be an answer to the underlying mechanisms of high overt support democracy and low tolerance in Turkey. Last but not the least, studying pro-democratic culture in Turkey can provide an answer to the noted ‘compatibility of Islam and democracy’ question. Although our findings regarding this inquiry must be treated with caution since our analysis does not delve directly into that matter, but, by extension only, this research may provide a general perspective on the underlying mechanisms of pro-democratic orientations in a country with a predominantly Muslim population.

Questions naturally arise regarding the selection of Turkey as the case study. Turkey constitutes an unprecedented case to carry out such an investigation due to several reasons. First, Turkish public’s high acclamation of democracy as well as low out-group tolerance and political participation make Turkey an interesting case for a study on pro-democratic attitudes. Although these three attitudes are well-distributed (for democracy preference in a positive and for political participation and out-group tolerance in a negative way) across all
segments of the society, this research is a proof that, with careful specifications and fine-tuned analysis, variability between class and generational categories can be captured. On the other hand, Turkey’s developing economy,¹ remarkably uneven distribution of the resources², fierce application of the market economy model together with it’s young and dynamic population as well as regime changes are expected to produce large attitudinal differences across class and generational categories which makes Turkey a potential appropriate case to study attitudinal gaps across class and generational categories. In addition to these, the traditional culture and low class awareness in Turkey, which may potentially counterbalance the first group of factors make Turkey an interesting test case. However, it should be noted that, despite it takes the form of a case-study of Turkey, the models sketched in the analysis are generalizable for all societies experiencing similar conditions. Countries with large attitudinal gaps across socioeconomic groups, high tempo of long-term socioeconomic development and intermittent political histories would be fruitful locations for replication studies testing generalizable conditions. It can also be applied cross-culturally within a comparative setting, nevertheless a comparative research was particularly avoided in this thesis since interpreting the results adequately requires profound knowledge about the political history of the country that is researched.

A quantitative approach was employed in this research. Quantitative based methods enable social scientists to study common forms, trends and patterns of behaviours in a more rigorous way. Multivariate logistic regression, ordinary least squares (linear least squares)

¹ The Turkish economy grew by 4.89% between 2001 and 2015.
² The inequality in income distribution in Turkey is one of the highest amongst the OECD countries.
and ordered logistic regression (ordered logit) models are adopted in the three respective empirical chapters. WVS data for Turkey were recruited in the analyses. The selection of the WVS is underlined by the fact that it is the only available data for Turkey involving the variables of interest. In the lack of panel data, five waves of cross-sectional WVS data for Turkey spanning over twenty years accomplished our aim to treat the notorious age/period/cohort (APC) identification problem.

Before introducing the remaining chapters, let us briefly touch upon some key concepts that will be further discussed in the course of the thesis. Throughout the thesis, ‘pro-democratic culture’ will refer interchangeably either to a latent concept providing support for democracy or to its three particular measures employed in each empirical chapter, namely democracy preference, political participation and out-group tolerance. The term ‘generation’ is used in the meaning of generation as a cohort. The term ‘social class’ refers to an objective class measurement and the term ‘modernization theory’ is used to refer to the classical modernization theory. The term ‘out-group’ refers to Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) usage and is used to denote those who fall outside of one’s physical and cultural ascribed circle. In this connection, the term ‘out-group tolerance’ corresponds to one’s readiness to welcome his/her out-group members.

The overall thesis takes the form of eight chapters. The remaining part of the thesis proceeds as follows. The second chapter is designed as a background chapter. It provides an overview of the 20th century Turkish politics in order to justify the delineation of three subsequent Turkish generations. This chapter divides the recent-era Turkish political
history into three periods, namely foundation, interim and post-1980 by referring to two landmark events, the 1960 and the 1980 military coups. The selection of the two events is due to their significant influence on economic, social and political life in Turkey. The third chapter presents an overview of the extant theory and serves a theoretical background for forthcoming empirical chapters. It pays particular attention to the three theoretical pillars of the thesis, namely the pro-democratic culture, the theory of generations and working class authoritarianism. The fourth chapter introduces the data and the methods that are employed in the analysis. The next three chapters provide the empirical investigations of the thesis. In the first empirical chapter, democracy preference, in the second, political participation and in the third, out-group tolerance are employed as the dependent variables to examine the three different facets of pro-democratic attitudes highlighted by theoretical accounts. Save for minor changes in the controls, roughly the same model is run for all the three empirical chapters. Finally, the last chapter develops on the wider implications for the literature of our results as well as indicating fruitful avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2. THREE PHASES OF THE 20th CENTURY TURKISH POLITICAL HISTORY

The aim of the present chapter is twofold. First, to present an overview of the 20th century Turkish political history in order to familiarize the reader with the recent era Turkish political agenda and second, to help the reader grasp the logic underlying the periodization of the Turkish political history, and the delineation of the three Turkish political generations accordingly. With these objectives in mind, this chapter divides the 20th century Turkish political history into three periods: the foundation, the interim and the post-1980. The chapter supports the view that while the foundation and the post-1980 periods can be labelled as authoritarian and the interim period can be labelled as non-authoritarian with respect to the character of their relevant incumbent governments and the legislation in power. This chapter also implies that system level authoritarianism reflected on the outlook of the governments and the legislation has left their unique mark on relevant generations. High political events including the two military coups and others, which are thought to be important, are discussed in the following sections. The chapter covers a period which starts from 1914, the formative year of the oldest respondent, and extends to 2009, the formative year of the youngest respondent in our sample. A chronological order was followed throughout the chapter.³

³ The documentary movies; ‘Demirkurat’, ’12 Mart İhtilalin Pençesinde Demokrasi’, ’12 Eylül’ and ‘Özallı Yıllar’ were heavily relied on in the structuring of this chapter.
The foundation period starts with the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic by the end of the First World War and extends through the years during which the country was governed by the single party governments and the DP. During this period, Turkish governments fought against economic challenges stemming from the First World War, the global economic crisis and the mobilization for the Second World War. Another challenge that the Turkish governments faced during this period was reactionary and separatist rebellions. Those groups which did not accept the reforms and the new political regime, armed and rebelled against the governments. All these challenges compelled the governments to take authoritarian measures while governing the country. It should also be noted that the rising authoritarianism in the world during the first years of the foundation period and lack of democratic tradition among the ruling elites and the members of the society also played a role in the authoritarianism of the Turkish governments. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the governments’ authoritarian methods during the single party period was challenged by the opposition party executives, the same authoritarian methods including closing the political parties, oppressing the opposition and the media, restricting social and economic rights were used by them to consolidate their power in the first years of the multi-party era.

The interim period started with the overthrow of an elected government by means of a military coup and continued until another coup in 1980. Although the interim period started with a military coup, the military government introduced a relatively liberal legal system in order to prevent the establishment of authoritarian governments. The new constitution recognized a series of economic, social and political rights, including, the right to assembly and demonstration, to strike and sign labour agreement, to establish trade
unions. With the new constitution, political parties gained legal status and the tenure of the judges were strengthened. On the system level, the new constitution envisaged the separation of powers and establishment of autonomous state organs, including the Constitutional Court, National Security Council, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (MGK) and the State Planning Organisation, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (DPT). The universities and the national television company gained autonomy with the new constitution. Yet, when compared with the previous period, the governments between 1960 and 1980 were weak to prevent the establishment of juntas within the army and the rise of violence in the streets.

The post-1980 period started with the military coup of 12 September 1980 and continued taking effect on the political, economic, social and intellectual environment in Turkey down to present. The military government introduced a highly authoritarian system. Many journalists, intellectuals, left and right wing party members were put in prison and face maltreatment and torture, and some even lost their lives in prison. Many economic, political and social rights given by the 1961 constitution were suspended by the new constitution. The new constitution had a clear aim of centralizing the power in the hands of the government. By means of the strictly hierarchical system the government gained the control over the universities, the media and the political parties. The military government controlled the universities by higher education law and a supreme education board established in accordance with the law. Many daily newspapers were either closed or censored. The new political parties law envisaged MGK’s approval for the establishment of political parties. An electoral system which favours big political parties was also introduced by the law. Even after decades following the civil governments came to power,
many authoritarian legal provisions introduced by the military government remained in force.

2.1. The Foundation Period

This section attempts to introduce to the reader a period which started with the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic following the Turkish War of Independence that took place immediately after the First World War. The section includes four sub-sections: (a) the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, (b) The independence war and the foundation of modern Turkish Republic, (c) The single-party period and (d) The beginning of the multi-party era. During this period, the Turkish governments faced serious economic difficulties as well as political and social turmoil. To tackle these, a series of authoritarian measures were taken, including suspending political, economic and social rights.

2.1.1. The Ottoman Empire in the First World War

The First World War, which was then called the Great War, began with the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by a nationalist Serb in Sarajevo on 28 July 1914. In general, the war was between the Central powers; Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers; the Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Italy and, following 1917, the United States (U.S.). In addition to these countries, many from European, Asian, American and Australian continents were involved in the war. In total, over 115 million of combatants and civilians died in the war. The Turkish army fought against the Allied powers in five main
campaigns: Caucasus, Sinai and Palestine, Mesopotamian, Persian and Gallipoli. Turkish forces were backed by Kurds, Chechens, Circassians and Turcomans (Keegan, 2014).

After the Tripolitanian War with Italy in 1912 and the Balkan Wars with the Balkan countries, Montenegro, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania in 1912 and 1913, the Ottoman army was war-weary. In order to have its army modernized, receive financial support and weaponry, the government sought to make an alliance with a European power. Following the out-break of the war, the government signed the secret Ottoman-German Alliance with German Empire in 1914. The government’s aim was to have its armed forces modernized by means of German aid and recapture three provinces; Kars, Artvin and Ardahan from the Russian occupation. On the other hand the German Empire wanted to ally with the Ottoman Empire to use the Anatolian territory to reach its African colonies, to conduct its operations in the Middle East and to prevent Russian access to the underground resources around the Middle East and the Caspian Sea (Karal, 1988).

The Ottoman entry into the war was triggered by two cruisers bombing Russian ports. In 1914, a dreadnought named Rio de Janeiro, which was initially built upon Brazil’s order in British navy yards, was not sent to Brazil due to problems with the payment. The Ottomans were already interested in buying two dreadnoughts and sent the payment to Great Britain in advance. Rio de Janeiro was renamed as Sultan Osman I and another dreadnought called Reşadiye was built. However, following the Ottoman Empire’s alliance with the German Empire, the British Empire seized the two dreadnoughts and did not send neither the ships nor the payment. About the same days, two cruisers of the German Empire, the battle-cruiser SMS Goben and the light cruiser SMS Breslau were pursued by British forces in
Mediterranean offshore waters. Escaping from the British forces, the two cruisers passed through the Dardanelles and anchored in the İstanbul Bosphorus. It was declared that the two cruisers are bought from the German Empire in substitution for Sultan Osman I and Reşadiye. The two cruisers, which were renamed as Yavuz and Midilli, sailed into the Black Sea and bombarded the Russian ports, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossisk and Fedosya on 29 October 1919. After this, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire’s declaration of war on Russia was followed by the British Empire’s and France’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire (Erdem, 1992).

During the war, about 400,000 Ottomans lost their lives and about a million of them were injured or taken captured. At the end of the war, the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia on 4 June 1918, the Treaty of Batum with the three trans-Caucasus countries, First Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and Democratic Republic of Georgia on 4 June 1918 and the Armistice of Mudros with Great Britain as the representative of all the Allied powers involved it the war with the Ottoman Empire on 30 October 1918 (Sonyel, 1994; Sofuoğlu, 2002). The Mudros Armistice called for the most severe terms. Under its terms, the demobilization of the Ottoman armed forces (article 5), the withdrawn of the Ottoman army from Tripoli, Benghazi, Persia, Hejaz, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Caucasus (articles 11, 16, 17, 18), the right given to the Allied powers to occupy six Armenian provinces in case of disorder (article 24) and strategic points in the Ottoman territory in the event of they perceive a threat (article 7) and confiscation of the Ottoman railways, war vessels, telegraph systems (articles 6, 12, 15) were regulated (Mudros Agreement, 1918). It was obvious that the Allied powers paved the way for full occupation of the Ottoman territory. As expected, first Italy occupied
Antalya on the plea of the violation of the article 7 and then in Paris Peace Conference, a decision was made for the occupation of İzmir by the Greek army.

2.1.2. The Independence War and the foundation of modern Turkish Republic

In the Turkish history, Mustafa Kemal’s (who was then honoured with the surname Atatürk, father of the Turks) arrival in the province of Samsun is referred to as the beginning of the Turkish war of independence. Rejecting the conditions imposed by the Allied powers, the Turkish nationalists were organized all over the country under a countrywide resistance organization called Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri and organized the fight against the occupation forces. During the Independence War, the fighting force of the nationalists, Kuva-yi Milliye, fought against Greek, Armenian, French, British forces as well as reactionary forces in the country. At the end of the war, the Treaty of Sèvres was abandoned. On 24 July 1923, the foundation of the modern Turkey was declared with the Lausanne Treaty, which was a peace treaty signed by Turkey, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Following the treaty, Turkey was declared as a republic on 29 October 1923.

Born out of the ashes of WWI-defeated Ottoman Empire, the modern Turkish Republic was founded as a sovereign state. Just after the foundation, Mustafa Kemal, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish Independence War, and high-level bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire who supported the Independence War were organized under People’s Party, Halk Fırkası (Partisi) which was then called Republican People’s Party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP). Atatürk was elected as the first President of the country and he assigned his comrade in arms, İsmet İnönü as the Prime Minister (PM). İnönü was a
venerated commander, who defeated the Greek army in the Independence War. The CHP governed the country from 1923 to 1950 under the leadership of İnönü, except for a short-term leadership of another CHP Deputy Ali Fethi Okyar from late 1924 to early 1925. This period is known in the literature as the single-party period (Tuncay, 1981; Öztoprak, 2002).

2.1.3. The single-party period

Although Atatürk led an Independence War against imperial countries of the West, his ultimate objective was to build a western-type, secular nation state and a modern society. With his objective in mind, Atatürk introduced a broad range of social, economic, political, and legal reforms which are known as ‘Atatürk’s Reforms’. The laws concerning the abolition of the sultanate (1922) and the caliphate (1924), the closure of the dervish lodges (1925), the Latinization of the alphabet (1928), clothing reforms (1934) the surname law (1934), and adoption of secularism in the constitution (1937) aimed uprooting monarchical and fanatical commitments and establishing a western-style socioeconomic and political system. The civil code, which was a slightly modified version of the Swiss civil code, was adopted in 1926. With the new civil code, polygamy was forbidden and women were given right to divorce. Long before many countries in the world, the suffrage was extended to women. Women were given the right to vote and stand for elections for municipal elections in 1930, for village council elections in 1933 and for parliamentary elections in 1934. In 1931, old systems of measurement were standardized which eased the commercial transactions with foreign countries (Eroğlu, 1982; Aybars, 1984).

Nevertheless, some ethnic and religious segments of the society, i.e. the pro-Sultanate and pro-Caliphate reactionary movements and pro-Kurdish forces, showed resistance to the
implementation of the reforms. In 1925, Sheikh Said and a group of the former Ottoman commanders who were uncomfortable with the abolition of the Caliphate agreed on a plan to fight against the newly established regime. Sheikh Said called all the Muslims in the country to fight against the government forces. He collected about 10,000 armed men and attacked four South-eastern provinces, Diyarbakır, Bingöl, Mardin and Elazığ. Although, the rebellion has started with an anti-secular notion, it gradually gained a pro-Kurdish character. Ali Fethi Okyar, the incumbent PM did not consider the riot as a serious rebellion and thought it can be suppressed by means of martial law. Thereupon, Atatürk demanded Ali Fethi Okyar’s resignation and asked İsmet İnönü to form the new government. Following the rebellions, the regime took a series of authoritarian measures to protect the newly established order. The parliament adopted a law, Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu, immediately and equipped the new government with extraordinary power. With this power in hand, the government forces suppressed the rebellion shortly. Sheikh Said and the leaders of the rebellion were executed by newly established Independence Courts, İstiklal Mahkemeleri in 1925. It is widely believed that the United Kingdom masterminded the rebellion with the purpose of founding a sovereign Kurdish state and protecting its interests in the Middle East, especially in the Mosul province (Toker, 1968; Mumcu, 1991; Olson, 2013).

From the foundation of the country, Atatürk had a multi-party system in mind and urged the establishment of two opposition parties during the single-party period. However, both attempts to establish a multi-party system failed. The first attempt came from Kazım Karabekir, a former General of the Independence War and a group of Atatürk’s civil and veteran friends. Progressive Republican Party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (TCF),
was established in 1924 and closed in 1925 after the Sheikh Said rebellion. The second attempt came from Ali Fethi Okyar. Urged by Atatürk, Okyar, the former ambassador of Turkey to Paris, founded the Liberal Republican Party, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (SCF), in 1930. It was declared in SCF’s party program that the party was going to be an advocate of liberal economy. However, the party was closed by Okyar in the same year, on the grounds that it became a focus of reactionary groups which refused to accept the secular characteristic of the new regime (Okyar, 1987; Yetkin, 1982; Koçak, 2006; Zucher & Çağalı-Güven, 2010). After Atatürk’s death on 10 November 1938, İsmet İnönü, the Chairman of the CHP was elected by the parliament as the second President of Turkey. During İnönü’s presidency the Second World War broke out. The economic situation in Turkey worsened during the war. The poor economic conditions and Atatürk’s death encouraged opposition groups. In particular, the government’s land reform invoked an intra-party opposition movement in the CHP. The movement consisted of those deputies who felt their interests were threatened by the reform program. Four deputies, Celal Bayar, Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, Refik Koraltan and Adnan Menderes gave a memorandum called the Memorandum of the Four, *Dörtlü Takrir* to their own party on 7 June 1945. With this manifesto, they challenged the authoritarian practices of the incumbent government and requested the adoption of a system giving people further democratic rights and freedoms. İsmet İnönü urged the four deputies to form a new political party and oppose the CHP government. The CHP administration first expelled Mehmet Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes and then Refik Koraltan from the party and Celal Bayar resigned from parliamentary membership. Four former CHP deputies established the Democratic Party, *Demokrat Parti* (DP), a moderate right-wing political party on 7 January 1946. The DP
attracted the attention of peripheral masses with its liberal party program and challenged the single party government’s authoritarian practices (Kongar, 1998; Akandere, 2003).

2.1.4. The beginning of the multi-party era

By the end of the war, İnönü realized that a multi-party system had to be established in the country in order to gain acceptance in the new international economic and political system. On the other hand, Stalin’s rejection to renew the 1925 Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality in 1945 also played a role in taking this decision (Gürün, 1991; Bilge, 1992). On 26 May 1946 local elections were held, but the DP boycotted the elections. However, upon the DP’s boycott the turnout rates remained low in the elections. This showed the DP’s potential power in the upcoming general elections (Akandere, 1998; Kayiş, 2008). On 21 July 1946, the first multi-party elections were held and the CHP preserved its ruling position, but it was widely speculated that the CHP owed the victory to open balloting and secret counting of the votes (Akşin, 1997). Thus, the turnout rate and the distribution of the votes remained uncertain. It was declared that the CHP received 85.4 and the DP received 13.1 percent of the votes. In terms of seats in the Parliament, the CHP gained 397 seats, the DP gained 61 and the independents gained 7 (TBMM, elections). Following the elections, İsmet İnönü was elected as the President for the fourth time on 5 August 1946. İnönü assigned Recep Peker as the PM and the new government was established on 7 August 1946 (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). The DP’s gerrymander claims and hard-liner Peker’s criticism of the opposition party and its leaders raised the tension gradually in the Parliament in 1946 and 1947. After rising tension between Peker’s CHP and Celal Bayar’s DP, İnönü declared his neutral position between the two parties in
the Parliament with a declaration on 12 July 1947 (Akın, 2005; Dünya Bülteni, 2009). The majors in the provinces, who were also provincial chairmen of the governing CHP, were asked to maintain a neutral position. After rising tension, İnönü requested Recep Peker to resign and gave the mandate to Hasan Saka to form the new government (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). In 1947, Turkey has become a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (Burçak, 1979; Haytoğlu, 2006).

Despite the non-combatant position was preserved thanks to the PM İnönü, the general mobilization for the Second World War disrupted the war-torn Turkish economy, which was also further pressed by the financial depths of the overthrown Ottoman Empire. The challenging economic situation sparked reactions in society. Towards 1950s, poor economic conditions, high inflation and taxes, shortage of critical goods and bureaucratic and inefficient practices of the government decreased people’s support for the government. General elections were held on 14 May 1950. In the elections, a single member plurality voting system was adopted and the votes were cast secretly and counted openly. The DP gained a landslide victory in the election, especially with the electoral support that came from rural habitants. The majority of the DP’s votes came from peasants from the countryside, agricultural labourers, merchants and petit bourgeois of the small towns. The DP symbolized change for those who were unhappy with 27 years of governance of the CHP. Owing to the majority voting electoral system with party lists and large constituencies, the DP gained 416 seats in the Parliament with 55.2 percent of the votes. On the other hand, the CHP gained only 69 seats with 39.6 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The CHP and especially the PM İsmet İnönü took all the necessary measures to
pass on the reigns of government to the DP peacefully. This was an unprecedented political movement when revolutionary cadres’ resistance for staying in power in other countries is considered (Timur, 1991; Akandere, 1998).

Two names were put forward for the prime ministry seat in the new government, Mehmet Fuad Köprülü and Adnan Menderes. Although Celal Bayar favoured Menderes over Köprülü for this position, Menderes became the PM of the 19th government of Turkey on 22 May 1950. Fuad Köprülü became the minister of foreign affairs and the same day, Celal Bayar was elected by the new parliament as the third President of Turkey (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents). Although the founders of the DP were former CHP deputies, the DP was quite different than the CHP with respect to its approach to the economy and acquisitions of the Republic. The CHP’s late attempts concerning the liberalisation of the economy were further implemented by the DP government. One of the first practices of the Menderes government was to appoint new people to the office of commander in chief and service commands. This decision was taken upon the rise of the rumours that the army was preparing to stage a coup to overthrow the newly formed government.

From 1950 to 1953 the DP had its golden period; this however did not prevent the budget give deficits from the first year of DP’s government. The economy grew at a faster rate than it had under the CHP government. During this period, as part of the Marshall Plan, Turkey and Greece received 400 million dollars of grants from the US. This grant was mostly used in mechanisation and supporting peasants. Low interest loans, high tariffs, removal of the quota restrictions and mechanisation gave quick results and agricultural

Relying on its electoral power and popularity, the DP government did not refrain from taking some controversial decisions in the domestic and international politics. In 1950, chanting of the call to prayer in its previous Arabic form which was banned in 1932, was allowed, religious classes started in the schools and construction of the mosques accelerated. These controversial steps were regarded as a counter-revolution by pro-CHP circles and the army. Sending troops to the Korean War was another controversial decision of the DP government. Following the North Korean forces’ crossing of the 38th parallel and invasion of the South Korean territory on 25 June 1950, the US and United Nations (UN) decided to send troops to assist the South Korea. In response to this, the North Korea was supported by China and the conflict between the two countries instantly raised global tension. The potential Soviet threat felt by the Turkish government after Stalin rejected to renew the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality underlined the government’s decision to take a stand in support of the Western bloc. By sending troops to the Korean War, the government wanted to show its solidarity with the Western coalition and become a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to face the potential Soviet threat. The government sent troops without the decision being discussed in the Parliament. A brigade consisting of about 5,000 soldiers and officers was dispatched. Following Turkish involvement in the war, Turkey was invited to join NATO and became the member on 18 February 1952 (Sarinay, 1988; Kongar, 1998; Uslu, 2003).
From 1953 onwards, the public’s high economic expectations with respect to the DP government yielded their place to disappointment. The balance of payments equilibrium and trading equilibrium were disrupted. Agricultural mechanization produced high numbers of landless peasants in the Eastern provinces which triggered the first wave of domestic migration in Turkey. Metropoles with large industrial investments, İstanbul in the first place, attracted large numbers of people owing to the better employment opportunities they provided. The government’s failure to reinvigorate the economy and establish social peace, however, increasingly gave rise to rising authoritarian sentiment. This is the point where the DP began to turn away from democratic reforms. Although the DP challenged the strict authoritarianism of the single-party government and claimed to be the protector of peripheral populations against central elites, it did not refrain from using the same authoritarian controls to suppress intra-party opposition movements, the rival political parties, left-wing organizations and the press. In 1953, the DP Chairman and the PM Adnan Menderes started attacking harshly the CHP and especially its leader İsmet İnönü, for all the troubles and poverty that the nation had faced. He started regarding all types of criticism to his government as equal to treason. The government increased its control over the opposition parties. The DP government passed a bill to hand over all the assets of the CHP to the state treasury, i.e., People’s Houses, Halkevleri, a state sponsored institution aiming social transformation of the people and the CHP’s official newspaper Ulus (Karpat, 1963). University administrations and senior bureaucrats were targeted on the grounds that they supported the CHP in the elections. The DP government continued its oppression of the opposition following the 1954 elections. Because of his high level of public support, the Republican Nation Party’s leader Osman Bolükbaşı’s electoral city Kırşehir’s province
status turned into district and Bolükbaşı was imprisoned for insulting the Parliament in 1956. Adnan Menderes explained the logic of this status change by saying that it was an answer to ‘abnormal’ voting practice in the city (Eroğlu, 1990). In the 1954 elections, the DP won the 57.61 percent of the votes and won 503 seats in the Parliament. The CHP, on the other hand, had 35.36 percent of the votes and 31 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). The DP government’s authoritarian policies started to disturb the DP’s party group in the Parliament. The tension peaked after a group of the DP deputies gave a proposal to the Parliament regarding ‘the right to prove’. According to the law which was then in force, when a journalist asserted a claim about a minister and the claim was brought to the court, the journalist was not given the right to prove his claim. The law was clearly providing an unjust immunity to the executives of the governing party. The proposal was not accepted, but protesting against the gradually rising authoritarianism of the government, nineteen deputies of the governing DP resigned and founded the Liberty Party, Hürriyet Partisi (HP) (Çakmak, 2008). This caused the resignation of the government. During his address to the DP group in the Parliament, Menderes made one of his most controversial statements which sparked reactions. While trying to express that he recognizes the power of the party group, Menderes said to DP deputies that they could bring back the caliphate if they desired so (Sirmen, 2013). This speech was then considered as one of the foremost events provoking the army’s reaction.

On 6/7 September 1955, the tension between the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus triggered conflicts in İstanbul. The September riots, 6/7 Eylül Olayları, a series of organized attacks against the Greek minority in İstanbul sparked after a rumour was spread that the house in which Atatürk was born in Saloniki was bombed. The pro-government newspaper, İstanbul
Express’s provocative news telling that Istanbulite Greeks were financially supporting Cypriot guerrilla forces to fight against the Cypriot Turks also played a role in the rising tension. The government responded to the events with martial law and arrested over five thousand people. Yet, in fear of the attacks, a large portion of the Greek population fled from İstanbul (Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, 1983; Kuyucu, 2005). In 1956, the DP increased its pressure on the press. A new press law was adopted. Based on the new law, criticizing the government was criminalized and journalists were imprisoned. The law on meetings and demonstrations was amended and political rights were limited. Even opposition party officials were detained upon exercising their political rights (Yıldız, 1997).

Rising authoritarianism, censorship, bans on the opposition and the worsening economic situation eroded the popularity of the DP in the eyes of the public. The Turkish lira was devaluated several times as a result of which the American dollar-Turkish Lira exchange rate tripled. The supporters of the DP saw that many of their expectations were not satisfied. The low-rank officers in the army were not also happy with the DP government. In 1957 a coup plot led by Lieutenant Colonel Faruk Güventürk was prevented. However, this attempt caused the government to realize the opposition developing within the army (Eroğlu, 1990). On 27 October elections the DP had 47.88 and the CHP had 41.09 percent of the votes. With these results, the DP received 424 and the CHP received 178 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). The governing DP did nothing to defuse the tension among the people, instead fuelled it by polarizing society. In 1958, a political campaign was launched by the DP, called Fatherland Front, Vatan Cephesi. This campaign was based on drawing bold lines between DP supporters and the supporters of the opposition implying.
that while DP supporters work to achieve the interests of the country, the others betray the country just because they do not support the DP government (Uyar, 2001).

In early 1960, the Committee of Inquest, *Tahkikat Komisyonu* was established by 15 DP deputies for a period of three months and soon turned into a mechanism to suppress the opposition and the press. The committee investigated CHP deputies and the press. It worked as a juridical body and even sentenced some defendants to imprisonment. İsmet İnönü criticized the establishment of the committee and its actions and warned the DP deputies in the Parliament that they were forcing the limits of democracy and paving the way for military coup (Bulut, 2009). After these authoritarian steps, university students mobilized large-scaled protests against the government in İstanbul and Ankara. On 5 May 1960, an anti-DP demonstration was organized in Kızılay square, Ankara, called 555K, symbolizing the date, time and the place of the demonstration. The students met the PM in the square and the PM remained between the demonstrators. The government wanted to recruit the army to oppress the protests, but the army refused to take an action against the students. PM Menderes accused the professors of provoking the students and tried to demonise them in the eyes of the public (Dündar & Çaplı, 2006).

As can be seen from above, during the foundation period, both the single party and the DP governments faced economic, political and social challenges. In order to tackle these challenges, the governments took strict measures, including economic, political and social restrictions to oppress the opposition parties, public opposition, the media and minorities. At times, the extent of these measures was exaggerated, which caused the interruption of the democratic progress of Turkey.
2.2. The Interim Period

The interim period starts with the overthrown of the DP government by a military coup on 27 May 1960. The main reason for the coup, as it was declared to the public, was the rising despotic practices of the DP government. In order to prevent the establishment of authoritarian governments in the future, the junta adopted a new constitution, which guaranteed economic, political and civil rights. The 1961 constitution recognized the right to assembly, the right to demonstrate, for workers the right to strike, sign labour agreement and establish trade unions. The constitution also strengthened the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. The constitution envisaged new autonomous government bodies as well as strengthened autonomy of the existing institutions, including the universities and the media. Taken together, the period, which starts with the 1960 military coup and extends through the 1960s and the 1970s, is hypothetically different than the preceding period with respect to the level of authoritarianism of the governments in power and the legal system in force.

From the Ottoman era to the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic, the Turkish military has always remained a strong presence in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, Atatürk’s and İsmet İnönü’s emphasis on the neutrality of the military in politics and the army’s reliance on their control over the country kept the army neutral in the day-to-day political struggles. However, Atatürk’s death in 1938, İnönü’s overthrow from the government in 1950, and in addition to these, a series of factors, including the DP government’s gradually rising authoritarianism and its relationship with reactionary segments of the society, the PM’s harsh statements targeting the army and the opposition parties, all sparked reactions
within the army. On 27 May 1960, the first military coup in modern Turkey's political history came. The military's coup interrupted democratic life. Thirty-seven middle and low-rank military officers, who called themselves the National Unity Committee, *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (MBK), acted outside the hierarchical chain of the military and overthrew the government on 27 May 1960. Alparslan Türkeş, one of the powerful images of the junta, who later founded the far-right Nationalist Action Party, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, (MHP) announced the coup to the public (Gerçek Tarih Sayfası, 2015). Following the Committee’s seizing of power, the commander of the Third Army Ragıp Gümüşpala, who was forced to retire from the army and became one of the cofounders and the first Chairman of the Justice Party, *Adalet Partisi* (AP), threatened that if the leader of the junta has a lower rank than himself, he will walk to Ankara with his army (Yürekli, 2012). After this threat, a well-respected retired General Cemal Gürsel replaced the leader of the junta, Cemal Madanoğlu and became the Chairman of the committee. The junta declared its aims in the 6th and 13th notifications as to save the country from those politicians accused of leading the country towards crisis and disaster, and to prevent a potential civil war. One of the first actions of the junta government was to abolish the constitution and the Parliament. A group of academics was requested by the committee to set up a commission in order to write a new constitution. The committee has assigned ministers to the Council of Ministers, *Bakanlar Konseyi*, and used the executive power by means of this institution. The committee used the legislative power directly and the judiciary power remained independent. The executives of the overthrown DP were sent to Yassıada, an island long used to send political prisoners into exile. During their imprisonment, the ex-executives of the DP faced maltreatment and violence. On 14 October 1960, the Yassıada trials were set
to judge the executives of the overthrown government. The hearings lasted about a year
and the judgement of the court was declared on 15 September 1961. A series of
accusations were directed to the ex-DP executives, relating to treason, corruption and
authoritarian practices of the government. The high court sentenced 15 defendants to death.
The National Unity Committee endorsed the execution of three of them, PM Adnan
Menderes, Foreign Secretary Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan
(Kayalı, 1994; Aydemir, 1984).

The 1961 constitution replaced the 1924 constitution and remained in force until 1980. In
fact, although the constitution was introduced by a junta government, it had a liberal
outlook to such an extent that it was likened to ‘a loose shirt’ tailored for weak Turkish
democracy (Aldıkaçtı, 1973; Öymen, 2007). Two draft constitutions were written, one by
İstanbul University, Faculty of Law and another by Ankara University, Faculty of Political
Sciences. They were called the İstanbul and Ankara drafts. The İstanbul draft envisaged a
weak executive and the Ankara draft prescribed strong executive power. On 6 January
1961, a constituent assembly was established and 20 members of the assembly formed a
constitutional committee. The constitutional committee used the İstanbul draft as the main
text and the Ankara draft as the subsidiary text, however the final text resembles more the
latter than it does to the former (Aldıkaçtı, 1973). A constitutional referendum was held on
9 July 1961 and the constitution was approved by 61.7 percent of the votes (TÜİK, 2008).

The constitution involved a series of reforms in the state structure and in fundamental
rights and liberties. In the legislative sphere, a two-chambered Parliament was established
and a constitutional court was founded to supervise the constitutionality of the laws (art.
The principles of state of law and social state were recognized in the constitution (art. 2). Tenure of the judges was strengthened (1961 Turkish Constitution, art. 137). Restrictions on political rights i.e. the right to assembly and hold demonstration without prior authorization lessened (art. 28); workers’ rights i.e. the right to strike and to sign labour agreement (art. 47) and the right to establish trade unions (art. 46) were approved. In the executive sphere, government bodies, i.e. the MGK (art. 111) and the DPT (art. 129) were established. The state authority was decentralized by giving more autonomy to institutions, i.e. the National Radio and Television Cooperation (TRT) and the universities (art. 120, 121). The political parties were given a legal status (art. 56).

As the ban on political parties lifted, new parties were established. Four parties entered the elections. The CHP was re-established under the leadership of İsmet İnönü. The political legacy of the closed DP was claimed by three political parties; Republican Villagers Nation Party, Cumhuriyetçi Kōylū Millet Partisi (CKMP), Justice Party, Adalet Partisi (AP) and New Turkey Party, Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP). CKMP was established as a fusion of two former parties; Turkey Villagers’ Party, Türkiye Köyülü Partisi (TKP), and Republican Nation Party, Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi (CMP). The Chairman of the AP was Ragıp Gümüşpala who was forced to retire by the committee members following an unsuccessful coup. On 15 October 1961 general elections were held. While the CHP received 36.74 percent of the votes, the AP, despite ex-President Celal Bayar’s explicit support, had 34.79 percent. The two minor parties, namely the YTP and the CMKP both had about 13 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The three successor parties of the DP had enough electoral support to form a coalition government. However, the army did not favour this option. A junta within the armed forces led by the Military Academy
Commander, Colonel Talat Aydemir was particularly concerned about it. The first clash sparked on the presidential elections. The three parties prepared to nominate Prof. Ali Fuat Başgil, who was a name which was not favoured by the army. The Generals and junta members had a long meeting in İstanbul and agreed on a new military coup and signed the 21 October Protocol. However, İsmet İnönü was informed about the plan and he stood up against the coup plot. İnönü had the Chief of the General Staff General Cevdet Sunay’s support. Sunay convinced the junta members on a plan involving İnönü’s prime ministry and a popular General Cemal Gürsel’s presidency. İnönü’s strong stance prevented the coup and once again saved Turkish democracy (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994).

On 25 October 1961 the Parliament was re-opened. Its first task was to elect the President. Cemal Gürsel, as agreed before, has become the fourth President of the Turkish Republic. The President Cemal Gürsel gave the authority to establish the government to İsmet İnönü. The first coalition government in the Turkish history was formed between the CHP and the AP (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). The CHP-AP coalition lasted for only seven months. During the CHP-AP government, İsmet İnönü played an important role in the suppression of another coup plot led by Colonel Talat Aydemir on 22 February 1962 (Demir, 2006). İnönü split in opinion with the AP on granting an amnesty for the imprisoned ex-DP deputies and resigned from the government. However, İnönü was given authority by the President to establish the government for the second time. The first round of talks did not end up with a coalition. Under pressure from the army, a coalition government was established between the CHP, the YTP, the CKMP and independent deputies (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994). On 21 May 1963, former Colonel Talat Aydemir attempted to stage another coup, but it was suppressed. Talay Aydemir and his friends put
on a trial and Aydemir and his fellow soldier major Fethi Gürcan were executed a year later (Demir, 2006). In the 1963 local elections, the CHP received 36.22 percent and the AP received 45.48 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The two minor partners of the coalition, namely the YTP and the CKMP linked their failure in the elections to their coalition partnership with the CHP and pulled out of the coalition government. İnönü established the first minority government of Turkey with independent deputies (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).

One of the first important incidents the new government faced was the rising tension between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus. The Turkish and Greek parties had meetings in London Conference but achieved no solution regarding the Cyprus problem at the meetings. This fuelled the antagonism between the parties. There was a strong community pressure on the Turkish government to send soldiers to the island. İnönü knew that the army did not have necessary technical equipment to succeed in such an operation. Yet, he had a meeting with the American ambassador and asked him to inform the American government about the government’s intervention plan. As soon as the American President Lyndon B. Johnson was informed, he sent a letter to İnönü. In the letter, Johnson stated that the US government does not agree on the use of the American weaponry in Turkey in this intervention. Johnson also warned the Turkish government that if Turkish intervention caused a Soviet intervention in Turkey, NATO allies might not be able to protect Turkey (Şahin, 2002).

The Chairman of the AP, Ragsp Gümüşpala died in 1964 and Süleyman Demirel was elected as the Chairman of the AP. On 13 February 1965, the CHP’s budget law was voted
in the Parliament and upon its refusal İnönü resigned from the government. The elections were held and the AP, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, won 52.87 and the CHP won 28.75 percent of the votes in the elections (TBMM, elections). Thanks to the national remainder electoral system, even the smallest parties got into the Parliament. The most surprising result was the success of Mehmet Ali Aybar’s socialist Workers Party of Turkey, Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP). TİP’s 2.97 percent vote gained the party 16 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). Demirel formed the government and won a vote of confidence (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).

The conflict-ridden environment of the Cold War increased the tension between the right and left wing parties in the Parliament in 1968. At times, the TİP and the AP deputies involved in fights in the general assembly. Fuelled by the tension in the Parliament the clashes intensified between right and left-wing student groups. Armed left and right-wing student groups were boycotting the classes and occupying university buildings. In order to protest against American involvement in the Cyprus problem and the Vietnam War, an anti-American protest was held on 17 July 1968. The police wanted to arrest the student leaders before the protests and one student died during the clashes with the police. On 18 July 1968, blaming them for their friend’s death, left-wing students attacked the mariners of the 6th Fleet that was anchored in the Bosphorus and threw them overboard. Another anti-American movement took place on 6 January 1969. During the American Ambassador Robert W. Komér’s visit to the President of the Middle East Technical University (ODTÜ), his car was fired by a group of left-wing students. Komér was targeted because of his previous anti-Viet Cong operations in the South Vietnam as a CIA member. The responsible left wing students were expelled from the school, which further radicalized
them. A group of them went to Palestine to receive guerrilla training and following their return, organized under a left-wing armed organisation called Dev-Genç (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994). On the other hand, right-wing students were recruited and trained to be para-military forces by Alparslan Türkeş’s MHP. A confrontation between the two militarized groups in Istanbul’s Taksim Square on 16 February 1969, which is known as Bloody Sunday, Kanli Pazar was particularly dramatic. The left wing student group organized an event to protest the existence of the 6th Fleet in the Turkish territorial waters. The right wing group’s arrival at the square and their attack to the leftist students turned the Taksim Square into a battleground. Both groups were trained and organized which increased the causalities. Two people were killed and over a hundred got injured in the confrontation. The Bloody Sunday was the most important milestone in the transformation of the ideological opposition into a narrow-scoped civil war (Kabacalı, 1992).

Before the 1969 elections, in order to prevent TİP deputies’ parliamentary membership, the electoral system was changed. The national remainder system was replaced with D’Hont method (Erdogan, 2007). The new electoral system supported parties with high votes rates over those with low vote rates, therefore, although the TİP largely preserved the number of its votes, it only had two seats in the Parliament. On the other hand, the AP had 46.55 and the CHP had 27.37 of the votes (TBMM, elections). The street fights further increased after the exclusion of the socialist TİP from the Parliament. On 4 March 1971 four aviation officers were kidnapped by People’s Liberation Army of Turkey, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO). The security forces clashed with the members of the group in ODTÜ and the four officers were released. However, the armed left-wing para-military group has
already drawn the attention of the generals and hold responsible for the rising tension in the country.

The disturbance concerning the rising violence was growing amongst the members of the armed forces. Many secret juntas were formed to overthrow the AP government, which was regarded as responsible for the rising violence. The widely accepted view among the army members was that the 1960 coup had not obtained its goals because the military government left the administration to the civilians too early. This view was also shared by some opposition deputies, some journalists and representatives of some non-governmental organisations. These groups were holding meetings and broadcasting their ideas concerning the policies that were going to be implemented following a potential coup. A junta led by the chief of the air staff General Muhsin Batur and the commander of the land forces General Faruk Gürler made all the preparations for a coup that was going to be staged on 9 March 1971. According to the plan, Gürler was going to be the President and Batur the PM. Although, the low rank Generals were willing to overthrow the elected government and take charge of the country, the Generals were against a total coup. The two commanders in chief of the armed forces and the chief of staff Memduh Tağmaç were agreed on a memorandum to be given to the government on 12 March 1971. In the memorandum text, the armed forces listed a series of actions to be taken by the government and expressed their determination to stage a coup unless they were implemented. The President Cevdet Sunay, who was informed about the memorandum, requested the PM Demirel to resign from the government. Demirel, decided to require a vote of confidence from the government and consolidate his power to stand against the
coup. However, he was not supported by the AP groups and resigned from the government (Arcayürek, 1985).

The President charged Nihat Erim, a CHP Deputy, to establish a new government. Erim formed his government with deputies from the AP and the CHP. He held the view that the 1960 constitution gave more than necessary rights to the individuals. Thus, one of the first actions of the new government was to declare martial law in some cities to struggle with the radical right and left wing groups. The right to strike and collective bargaining right for the workers were abolished. The powers of the autonomous state organs were decreased. Some left-wing newspapers and youth organisations were closed. On 17 May 1971, Elfraim Elron, the consul general of Israel, was kidnapped by the Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front, Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi (THKP/C). Those who kidnapped Elron asked the government to release their arrested friends in exchange to Elron’s life. The government rejected this and soon afterwards, Elron was found dead. After Elron’s death, the new government increased the pressure on the left wing groups. An operation, called Sledgehammer, Balyoz Harekatı was carried and thousands of left wing students, including 23 members of THKP/C, intellectuals, professors, journalists, authors, army members, politicians were arrested and put on trial. They were found guilty of violating the constitution art. 146/1 regulating the crime of ‘aiming to abolish the constitutional order by arm’. Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Huseyin İnan, the three members of the THKP/C, were executed on 6 May 1972. Following the executions it is widely speculated that these three young left wing student leaders were executed in retaliation for the executions of the three members of the right wing government in 1961 (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994).
After İnönü’s resignation in 1972, the General Secretary of the party, Zonguldak Deputy and ex-Minister of Labour of the previous three coalition governments, Bülent Ecevit was elected as the new Chairman of the CHP. In the 1973 elections, Bülent Ecevit’s CHP won 33.30 and Demirel’s AP 29.82 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). The election results confirmed that Ecevit’s novel ideological doctrine, Left-of-Centre, *Ortanjı Solu* was approved by the people. However, none of the parties were able to establish the government solely. Thereupon, Ecevit established the government with Necmettin Erbakan’s pro-Islamist National Salvation Party, *Millî Selamet Partisi* (MSP) which received 11.80 percent of the votes in the elections (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers TBMM, elections).

On 15 July 1974, Nikos Sampson, the leader of the EOKA-B movement staged a coup in Cyprus, overthrew Archbishop Makarios’ government and declared himself as the President of the Hellenic Republic of Cyprus. EOKA/B was a paramilitary organisation established by General George Grivas in order to unite Cyprus with Greece. Turkey, together with Greece and the United Kingdom, was one of the guarantor countries of the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, the agreements stipulating the foundation of Cyprus as an independent state. After the coup, the MGK issued a decision regarding a military intervention in Cyprus called Operation Attila. On 20 July 1974, Turkish naval and air forces were dispatched to the island. The operation was met with weak resistance from the Greek Cypriot forces. After political pressures coming from the US and the UK, Turkey stopped the operation. A ceasefire was declared between the parties and the island was divided, *de facto*, into two. However, the Turkish operations secured Turkish minority interests in Cyprus. Two conferences were held in Geneva, the first one between the
foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and the UK, and the second was between the leader of the new civil Cypriot government, Glafcos Clerides and the leader of the Turkish population, Rauf Denktas who then became the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. At the Geneva conferences, the Turkish-Cypriot party was first recognized politically by the Greek Cypriots. However, the parties did not come to an agreement. In order to protect the Turkish population in the island, the Turkish forces occupied the 35 percent of the island’s territory. A buffer zone was established by the UN between the two territories which is known today as the Green Line (Eroğlu, 1975; Kalelioğlu, 2009; Alasya, 1987).

The PM Ecevit greatly enjoyed the popularity of the intervention and consolidated his political power. However, the intervention was perceived badly in the West, especially the US. In addition to Ecevit’s left-wing background and his government’s permission for opium poppy plantation, Turkish military intervention to Cyprus further damaged Turkey’s bilateral relations with the US severely. The American senate imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. Oil supply had already been low due to the embargo of the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries and now the American embargo caused a further unease in the Turkish economy. As a result of these embargos, many of the goods went on the black market and inflation rose in Turkey (Erhan, 1996). Following the fall of the CHP-MSP coalition government on 17 November 1974, a new coalition government was established by Demirel’s AP and three minor right wing parties; the MSP, the MHP and the Republican Reliance Party, Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (CGP) (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). The coalition government was also known as the Nationalist Front, Milliyetçi Cephe (MC) which had a clear anti-leftist perception. The government’s
aim was to prevent another CHP-led government, which was thought to be responsible of the rising tension in the country.

The weakness of the public authority in the second half of the 1970s provided a fertile environment for terrorist organizations to carry out violent actions against Turkey. Two of those organizations which will stage the bloodiest attacks for decades emerged during these years. One of them is the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the other one is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). ASALA was founded to force the Turkish governments to recognize the clashes between the Turkish and Armenian parties during the First World War as genocide. After recognition of the alleged genocide, the plan was to claim reparations and then territory of Turkey. The problem dates back to the First World War. During the war, the Armenians made an alliance with the Allied Powers. They were organized under a series of military organizations, including the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as Dashnaktsutyun) and Social Democrat Hunchakian Party and fought with Russia and France against the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the war, the Paris Peace Conference started and the Armenians attended to the conference. Their main argument was that tens of thousands of Armenians fought with the Allied Powers and in exchange for their service they deserved reparations and an independent state. They demanded 19 billion francs for reparations. In addition to that, they claimed a territory, involving a great portion of the Eastern and Southern East Anatolia. Against the Armenian thesis, the Turkish thesis was that a small territory could be given to Armenians in Caucasus. They argued that for those cities that were claimed by the Armenians, the Armenians had never been the majority segment of the society and therefore, an independent Armenian state could not be established in those cities. The
Armenian issue was discussed in the London and San Remo Conferences. At the end of the discussions, the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920. The treaty appointed the American President Woodrow Wilson to determine the boundaries of an Armenian country which was agreed to be established broadly in Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Trabzon provinces. Since the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the Ottoman executives, the Turkish Independence War invalidated this agreement. As such, after about half a century, ASALA was founded to revive these claims. ASALA’s main target was carrying out terrorist activities against Turkish diplomats and politicians abroad. ASALA’s first attack targeted the Turkish ambassador to Vienna, Danış Tunalıgil on 22 October 1975. From 1975 to 1990s a total number of 46 people (many of them were senior diplomats) were killed and 299 were injured in the attacks staged by ASALA (Kurz & Merari, 1985; Dugan et. al. 2008).

The 1970s also witnessed the rise of the PKK. The political struggle of Abdullah Öcalan, the co-founder and current imprisoned chief of the PKK, dates back to the foundation of Ankara Democratic-Patriotic High Education Association, Ankara Demokratik Yurtsever Yüksek Ögrenim Birliği (ADYÖD) which was founded in 1975. In 1975, ADYÖD was co-founded by Öcalan and some of the other future leaders of the PKK as one of the first university-based associations after the 12 March memorandum. Öcalan occupied the Secretary-General of the association. Öcalan and his 16 friends from ADYÖD founded another organization called Apocus, Apocular, the followers of Apo, a nickname derived from Öcalan’s first name. The organization evolved into PKK in the following years. The PKK was officially founded on 27 November 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan and a group of his friends. In the beginning, PKK’s ideology was based on Marxism and Leninism. Its
ultimate aim was to promote a proletarian revolution, overthrow the capitalist economic system and replace it with a communist one. However, in the following years the PKK specified its ultimate aim as to establish an independent Kurdish state in the East and Southeast of Turkey. In the first years, the PKK fought against other pro-Kurdish movements and local feudal tribes collaborating with the central government in Ankara. From its foundation, the PKK used armed conflict as a means to achieve its ultimate aim.

The PKK’s first important assassination attempt targeted Mehmet Celal Bucak, a Şanlıurfa Deputy of the AP and a member of the Bucak tribe. During about forty years of fighting between the PKK and Turkey, about 35,000 people, including the members of the security forces and common citizens were killed (Crisis, 1995; Sayari, 1997).

Turkey entered the end of the 1970s with worsening economic conditions, high inflation, international embargos, ideological tension and terrorism. The tension between the right wing coalition government and the left wing main opposition party, the CHP was also high. One of the most important sources of the tension was the establishment of the State Security Courts, Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri (DGMs). The DGMs were special courts established to judge terror cases. The Revolutionary Confederation of Labour Unions, Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (DİSK), the most powerful workers union with a total number of 500,000 members, was supporting the CHP in this conflict. On Mayday in 1976, the DİSK organized a rally and thousands of its members walked to the Taksim Square to protest the DGMs. The demonstrations started peacefully; however, the fire which was suddenly commenced from the surrounding buildings of the square caused a panic among the protesters. That day 34 people were killed and hundreds of them were injured in Taksim Square (İkinci, 2003; Mavioğlu & Sanyer, 2007).
In the 5 July 1977 elections, Bülent Ecevit’s CHP received 41.38 and Süleyman Demirel’s AP received 36.89 percent of the votes, while none of the minor parties exceeded ten percent. With these election results, the CHP had 213 and the AP had 189 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). Ecevit was given the mandate to form the government. After Ecevit’s failure to win a vote of confidence from the Parliament, another right wing government was established by the AP, the MSP and the MHP, which was labelled as the second Nationalist Front government (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). In the following days after the foundation of the second Nationalist Front government, Ecevit promised ministry seats to 11 AP Deputies and established the new government. This political bargain was named as Güneş Motel Event, deriving its name from the place where the negotiations between Ecevit and the 11 AP Deputies were held (Altındağ & Mocan, 2015). Neither left wing nor right wing governments were able to stop the violence in the street. The whole country, including the police and the army, was divided ideologically. The division was so deep that the radicals from each camp took up arms and formed liberated areas that the members of the opposite camps were not allowed to enter. The right wing groups organized dramatic attacks on the left wingers in İstanbul University and Bahçelievler and Balgat districts in Ankara. On the other hand armed left-wingers were fighting against the right-wing groups and the other factions within the left-wing camp. In addition to these, pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist groups started taking up arms too. On 6 September 1980, a meeting was organized in Konya, a central Anatolian province, by MSP supporter Islamists to protest Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem and declaration of it as its capital. At the end of the demonstrations, the MSP supporters organized violent attacks to tourists hotels and workplaces that sell alcohol, protested the Turkish National Anthem and
shouted Islamist and reactionary slogans (Güzel, 2006). The conflict between the left and the right wing groups also gained an ethnic dimension. In Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, Malatya and Çorum provinces, hundreds of Alawites were slaughtered and their workplaces were vandalized by right wingers. Everyday tens of people were being killed and the country was being dragged into a civil war. The ex-PM Nihat Erim and ex-Minister of Customs, Monomopolies and Vice Chairman of MHP Gün Sazak, Journalist Abdi İpekçi were among those who were assassinated in these days (Birand, Dündar & Çaplı, 1994).

Beside crisis in the domestic politics, very important developments also took place in the international arena these days. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran made protecting the stability in Turkey, more of an issue for global peace. Turkey was indebted to the IMF creditor countries and was not able to pay its debt. New credit agreements between Turkey and the IMF were signed and loans were activated on a series of conditions, including the adoption of the free market economy, the devaluation of the Turkish Lira, the implementation of austerity measures, introduction of export incentives and adoption of the daily exchange rate system. To respond to these requests, a series of decisions concerning the general state of the economy were taken on 24 January 1980. They are known as January 24 Decisions, 24 Ocak Kararlari. These decisions constituted a paradigm shift in the Turkish economic administration. The state-led economy was transformed into a market-oriented one. The import-substitution industrialization were abandoned. The subventions were removed and foreign trade was liberalized. The decisions also involved the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and the selling of the state enterprises. The AP government assigned Turgut Özal as the general director of the Electric Power Resources Survey and Development Administration, who was then
going be the Chairman of the Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) between 1983 and 1989, and the President of Turkey from 1989 to 1993, to carry out the reforms (Başkaya, 1986; Sönmez, 1982).

The presidential election was an important date on the agenda ahead of Turkey in 1980. The President Fahri Korutürk’s term was ending on 6 April 1980 and the Parliament was to elect a new President. None of the parties had enough seats to elect the new President and they failed to come to an agreement to designate a joint candidate. Beginning from 22 March to 11 September, the Parliament held a total number of 114 rounds of meetings but failed to elect the new President (Güreli, 2007). During this six-month period Senate Chairman İhsan Sabri Çağlayan acted as a Deputy President (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents).

Considering the points mentioned in the above pages, it can be assumed that the political and the legal outlook of the interim period is relatively less authoritarian than that of the foundation period. Weak governments, liberal 1961 constitution, the conflict-ridden environment of the Cold War era can be discusses as potential reasons underlying this. The final section looks at the events that marked the Turkish political history between the 1980 military coup and late 2000s.

2.3. The Post-1980 Period

The post-1980 period starts with the 12 September 1980 military coup which left its mark on economic, political and social environment in Turkey in the 1980s, the 1990s and to a lesser extent even in the 2000s. Some of its influences can still be seen in the legal
procedures, including the political parties and anti-terror laws. The influence of the coup is such an extent that many macro and individual level economic and social indicators swing sharply after 1980. With the aim of establishing the lost public authority, the military government established a highly hierarchical order. The whole state system was centralized. The government and the President were given exceptional powers. The universities, media, political parties, workers’ unions and non-governmental organizations were controlled by the central authority. All those who were thought to be opposed to the military government were held responsible for the pre-1980 violence and were either sent to prison and faced maltreatment and torture and even sentenced to death or at least fired from their jobs or blacklisted. For all these reasons and many others that will be elaborated in the following pages, the post-1980 period is considered different with respect to the character of the governments in power and legal procedures in effect than its preceding period.

Weak governments and collapsed public authority failed to respond effectively to the violence in the streets as well as separatist and reactionary movements. All these brought Turkey at the end of another democratic period. On 12 September 1980, the Turkish democracy succumbed to another military coup. In fact, the coup was planned to be staged on 11 July 1980 but the Süleyman Demirel’s AP government won a vote of confidence which precluded its happening. The Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren declared to the public in the state television that the aim of the coup was to protect the integrity of the country and the nation, to re-establish democracy and the public authority (Uğur, 2007). Immediately after the coup, the government and the Parliament were dissolved and the leaders of the four major parties were detained and sent into exile. Unlike
in 1960, this time the military has staged the coup through the chain of order and command. Five army commanders, General Kenan Evren the Chief Commander of the General Staff, General Nurettin Ersin the commander of the land forces, General Nejat Tümer the commander of the naval forces, General Tahsin Şahinkaya the commander of the air forces and General Sedat Celasun the commander of the gendarmerie forces formed the governing body of the military rule, the MGK. Kenan Evren was attained as the head of the state and retired admiral Bülend Ulusu was appointed as the PM. Ulusu formed a government with retired army members and civilians, which was approved by the Committee. Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry and the State Planning Organization of the 43th government Turgut Özal, who was going to be the 8th President of the Turkish Republic, became the Deputy PM with responsibility for the economy. It was speculated that Özal’s assignment to this post reflects the military-led government’s commitment to the January 24 decisions.

In order to control the entire political, economic and social system, the military government replaced the mayors, the general directors of public economic enterprises, bureaucrats with military officers. Martial law was declared in 13 regions throughout the country. The military coup did not face a serious resistance from the armed groups, most of their members surrendered themselves. The others were detained and the detention period was increased from 15 days to 90 days. A total number of 210 thousand claims were filed in the courts and 230 thousands of people were put on trial. Dev-Sol, MHP, Barış Derneği were the most popular cases. Attorneys sought the death penalty for about 7 thousands of people. Among them, 517 people were sentenced to death, but 50 of them were executed. Especially the execution of Erdal Eren, who was only 17 years old at the
time of the crime, was widely condemned. Thousands of left and right wingers were sent to prison and faced maltreatment and even torture. More than 300 people died in prison, 171 of which died because of torture. In accordance with the law no: 1402, 30,000 people were fired from their jobs including 120 academics. While 14,000 Turkish citizens were expatriated, 30,000 people fled abroad and requested asylum from foreign countries. All types of political and associational activities were banned and important daily newspapers, Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Milliyet were closed for about a year. As it is seen, the military government maintained the domestic tranquillity at the expense of individual economic, social and political rights. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the coup and the military government’s repression were undemocratic, the coup was welcomed by the majority of the public, especially because it put an end to the violence in the streets (Birand, 1987; Mazıcı, 1989).

The military-led government took a series of controversial steps both in the international and domestic politics. Greece’s return to NATO had long been vetoed by Turkey. The Rogers plan was accepted, which was suggested by NATO’s supreme allied commander Bernard William Rogers as a plan to allow Greece to return to NATO. Another important step in the international arena was the military government’s ban on opium poppy plantation which was allowed by Ecevit’s government. More controversial steps were taken in domestic politics. The military government aimed to depoliticise the people of the country. The government declared both the right and left wing ideologies as the ‘demonic’ and started a campaign to produce a depoliticized generation with no ideological leaning. With this objective in mind, education was used as a tool. The government controlled the universities by means of the Higher Education Law, no: 2547. In accordance with the law,
a supreme body called the Council of Higher Education, Yüksekoğretim Kurulu (YÖK) was founded on 6 November. The council had twenty-one members two thirds of them were elected by the President and the council of ministers and one third of the members were elected by Inter-University Council which was composed of two academics from each university. Professor İhsan Doğramacı was attained as the first President of YÖK. Doğramacı was widely criticized in the following years, especially due to his collaboration with the military government to indoctrinate the young. YÖK was given the authority to determine the content of the university lectures, assign the university lecturers and make strategic planning of the university education. In universities, compulsory Turkish Language and Ataturk’s Principles and History of Turkish Revolution lectures and in high schools, national security and obligatory religion lessons were put in the syllabus (Higher Education Law, 1981).

The military government established a constitutional committee to write a new constitution. A draft constitution was written on 23 September 1982 and approved in the constitutional referendum on 7 November 1983 by 91.4 percent of the votes (Gözler, 2000; TÜİK, 2008). The first three articles of the constitution were designed as non-amendable ones. The fourth article forbade the amendment of the first three articles and also legislative proposals given to amend them. In the first three articles the type of the regime was defined as a Republic, the state was described as democratic, secular, social state of law, the integrity of the country and the nation was mentioned, the official language, the flag, the National Anthem and the capital of the Turkish Republic were mentioned. According to the related articles of the constitution, the legislative power was given to the Parliament of Turkey, the executive power to the President and the Council of Ministers
and the judiciary power to the independent courts. The first temporary article of the constitution regulated Kenan Evren’s presidency for seven years. The fourth temporary article banned all types of political activities of the pre-coup politicians (1982 Turkish Constitution, art. 1/2/3/4, temp. art. 1/4). The council of ministers was given authority to issue statutory decrees and to declare two types of state of emergency, mobilization and war (1982 Turkish Constitution, art. 121/122).

One of the military government’s most controversial regulations was the Political Parties Law. According to the law, the permission for the establishment of the political parties had to be provided by the MGK. Before the upcoming elections in 1983, the MGK gave permission for the establishment of only three parties. They were Turgut Sunalp’s Nationalist Democracy Party, *Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* (MDP), Necdet Calp’s Populist Party, *Halkçı Parti* (HP) (which claims the political legacy of the CHP) and Turgut Özal’s ANAP. While the MDP was under the auspices of the military regime, the HP was a social democrat and the ANAP was a centre-right party. On the other hand, a series of parties, i.e. Social Democracy Party, *Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi* (SODEP) of Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü, first Ali Fethi Esener’s Great Turkey Party, *Büyük Türkiye Partisi* (BTP) and then Ahmet Nusret Tuna’s True Path Party, *Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP) (which claims the political legacy of the closed AP), Welfare Party, *Refah Partisi* (RP) (which claims the political legacy of the closed MSP) of Ahmet Tekdal and Conservative Party, *Muhafazakar Parti* (MP) (which claims the political legacy of the closed MHP) of Mehmet Pamak were rejected by the MGK (Kabasakal, 2013).
On 10 June 1983 the new electoral law, no 2839 was approved. The law stipulated a modified version of the plain D’Hondt system by adding two (one for each constituency and one for the whole country) 10 percent thresholds. The elections were held on 6 November 1983. Three parties entered the elections: Retired General Turgut Sunalp’s MDP, former Deputy Minister in Charge of the Economy in the Bülend Ulusu government, Turgut Özal’s ANAP and former Undersecretary of the Prime Ministery in the Bülend Ulusu government, Necdet Calp’s HP which claimed the political legacy of the closed CHP. The military government supported the MDP explicitly. However, the Özal’s ANAP received 45.14, the HP received 30.46 and the MDP received 23.27 percent of the votes. With this election result, the most voted party, the ANAP had 211, the HP had 177 and the MDP had 71 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections).

Turgut Özal, the Chairman of the victorious ANAP, was the Deputy PM with responsibility for the economy and the coordination of the pre-coup January 24 decisions in the military led-Ulusu government. Özal resigned from the Ulusu government after the bankers’ crisis. However, the President Kenan Evren warned the public against the ANAP and his Chairman Turgut Özal on 4 November, just two days before the elections. Nevertheless, this did not prevent, instead, further encouraged the public to vote for ANAP. This was interpreted as a reaction against the military government. Özal was given the mandate by President Kenan Evren to form the government. Özal formed his government on 13 December 1983 and won a vote of confidence from the Parliament on 24 December 1983 (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).
Although the ANAP was established as a catchall party with the aim of reconciling four major political streams in the country, namely conservatives, liberals, nationalists and social democrats, it was a strong supporter of economic liberalism, entrepreneurship, privatization, the right of private property. Therefore, the ANAP received most of its electoral support from then-newly growing middle classes, i.e. petit bourgeois and the peasantry living in the central Anatolian towns and cities. Accordingly, during the first ANAP government, the January 24 decisions and IMF directions were strictly followed and economic reconstruction programmes were developed. The government aimed downsizing of the state and fought against bureaucratic barriers slowing down the implementation of the economic reforms. One of the first implications of the government to abolish the law regarding the protection of the value of Turkish currency, which was, in practice, used as a mechanism to prevent inflow of foreign currency to the country. According to the law, Turkish citizens were allowed to go abroad every other year and in each visit they could carry maximum 200 dollars with them. Hoarding foreign currency was regarded as a crime. With the abolition of the law, the free exchange rate system was introduced and individuals were allowed to buy and sell foreign currency and open a foreign currency account. Import and export regimes were liberalized and tariffs were reduced. An export-originated industrialization plan was promoted and export tax rebate was introduced in order to promote export. The PM Turgut Özal invited businessmen to accompany his official overseas visits. Industrial estates and free zones were established. Under Özal’s Prime Ministry, a series of changes were introduced in the daily lives of the average citizen. Electricity and telecommunications were made available throughout the country, including distant villages. Foreign products penetrated into the market freely and
credit card usage became widespread which dissolved the black market. In order to fund large-scaled investments, high taxes were imposed and state economic enterprises that were established during the first years of the republic were sold owing to their inefficient economic performance. Value added tax was introduced, public participation, housing development and defence industry support funds were launched and revenue sharing bonds were sold. With these economic sources, infrastructural investments were made to ease marine, airline and land transportation, energy and communication. New highways, airports, power plants were established.

Although the post-1980 governments did not apply strict control over the economy the authoritarian character of the state largely remained in place. The imprisonment of the journalists, authors and intellectuals, publication ban on literary works, torture were still widespread. No serious step was taken to enhance democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms apart from economic ones. Turgut Özal was widely criticized over his previous MSP candidacy and relationship with reactionary religious cults especially the Naqshbandi cult. Another criticism levelled against Özal was his hesitation in combatting the rising terrorist attacks. Starting from 1984, PKK escalated its attacks to Turkish security forces in the Southeast region. On 15 August 1984, PKK organized raids to police stations and public buildings in Eruh and Şemdinli districts. The PKK broadcasted propaganda from the mosques in these two districts for hours. These two raids marked the beginning of the PKK’s large-scaled terrorist actions and uprising plan (Birand & Yalçın, 2007; Ünal, 2012).
During the first ANAP government, the government forged close ties with the EU. An application to accede to the European Economic Community, which then became the European Union, was made by the government on 14 April 1987 (Erhan & Arat, 2001). The government decided to hold a referendum on 6 September 1987 to ask people, whether the political ban should be lifted. Although, the military-led government introduced a 10-year political ban on former politicians, the political leaders did not obey the ban and kept organizing rallies starting from the first years. Therefore, there was no point in not lifting such a ban which was tarnishing the image of the Turkish democracy. Throughout the campaign period, Turgut Özal tried to convince the public to vote against the ban. A few hours before the referendum results were made public, the PM Özal declared that the government was holding an early election on 29 November 1987. Özal wanted to catch the opposition leaders unprepared for the elections. The referendum results showed that 50.16 percent of the participants voted in favour of the abolition of the ban against 49.84 percent (Milliyet, 2016). In the 29 November elections, Turgut Özal’s ANAP received 36.31, Erdal İnönü’s SHP 24.74 and Süleyman Demirel’s DYP 19.14 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). With these elections results Özal formed the second ANAP government (TBMM, governments).

Özal was assassinated, but survived during his speech in the general assembly of the ANAP on 18 June 1988. The assassin, Kartal Demirağ, fired two gunshots and shot Özal. After the assassination attempt, Demirağ was arrested. He was first condemned to the death penalty, then it was commuted to 20 years of imprisonment and Özal pardoned him in 1992 during his presidential term. It was speculated that Demirağ had links with the Counter-Guerrilla but the Turkish branch of Operation Gladio and Özal, who knew this,
did not want to carry the investigation further. In the 1989 local election, the ANAP received only 21.80 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). Following the end of the presidential term of Kenan Evren, Özal run for the presidential elections. Özal received his party’s support in the Parliament and became the 8th President of Turkey on 9 November 1989 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents). Yıldırım Akbulut, ex-President of the Assembly, became the PM of the third ANAP government (TBMM, governments).

In the first months of Özal’s presidency, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Turkey played an important role in the US-led coalition forces established against the invasion. Özal’s willingness to play a leading role in a war against Saddam Hussein was underlined by his aim to have a voice in the post-war scenarios. Thus, Turkey could prevent the foundation of a Kurdish state in the northern Iraq and claim the two former Ottoman provinces, Kirkuk and Mosol. However, the members of the MGK, the Chief of the General Staff General Necip Torumtay and the PM Yıldırım Akbulut as well as many members of the Parliament were not willing to invade Northern Iraq. After the clash with the President, General Necip Torumtay submitted his resignation. Following the US-led coalition forces attack on Iraq, Saddam withdrew the Iraqi army from Kuwait. However, defeated Saddam Hussein launched attacks against Kurds living in the Northern Iraq. To escape from Saddam’s attacks about 300,000 Kurds fled to Turkey. A no-fly zone was declared to protect the Kurds, which, in the following years, facilitated the development of the Kurdish region in Iraq (Gözen, 2000; Kalkan, 1991; Cevizoğlu, 1991).

In the general assembly of the ANAP on 15-16 June 1991, Mesut Yılmaz, a Rize Deputy and Deputy PM, was elected as the new leader of the party and established the new
government (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers). General elections were held on 20 October 1991. Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP fell from the government and became the main opposition party. Six parties entered the 1991 general elections. Süleyman Demirel’s DYP received 27.03, Yılmaz’s ANAP 24.01, Erdal İnönü’s SHP 20.75, Necmettin Erbakan’s RP 16.87 and Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party, Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) 10.74 percent of the votes. While the DYP had 178, the ANAP had 115 and the SHP had 88 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). A coalition government was established by Süleyman Demirel’s DYP and Erdal İnönü’s SHP on 30 November 1991. Demirel became the PM and Erdal İnönü became the state minister and the Deputy PM (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991, a series of Turkic republics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were founded in central Asia. Turkey recognized these newly-founded republics immediately. President Özal organized an overseas trip to these countries. Right after this long and tiring trip, on 17 April 1993 President Turgut Özal died from a heart attack (Laçiner, 2009). Süleyman Demirel, the PM and the Chairman of the DYP, became the 9th President of Turkey on 16 May 1993 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents).

Following Demirel’s election as the President, the coalition partner SHP’s Chairman Erdal İnönü became the PM. In DYP’s general assembly on 13 June 1993, Tansu Çiller was elected as the new Chairman of DYP. Çiller, a brilliant professor of economics at Boğaziçi University, started her political career in DYP as the Vice Chairman with responsibility for the economy. In the 1991 general elections, Çiller was elected as a member of the Parliament and became minister of state with responsibility for the economy. Çiller was
given the mandate by the President Demirel to form the government. Tansu Çiller’s DYP and Erdal İnönü’s SHP formed the 50th government and Çiller became the first female PM of Turkey on 25 June 1993 (Prime Ministry, Prime Ministers).

A dramatic event called attention to the rise of radical Islamism in Turkey. To commemorate Pir Sultan Abdal, a classical Turkish Alawite folk poet who lived in the 15th and 16th centuries, Alawite groups organized a meeting in the Sivas province of Turkey in the summer of 1993. Prominent Alawite intellectuals, writers, singers, folk poets went to the event. Aziz Nesin, a prominent intellectual and humourist, who translated the Satanic Verses book of Salman Rushdie into Turkish, was the most renowned guest of the event. The tension started rising in the city several days before the event. Inhabitants of the city were provoked by the local media and some pro-Islamic circles against the event and its participants especially Aziz Nesin. Groups of angry people started gathering around the Madımak Hotel, where the guests were staying, and protesting against the participants of the event. The local security forces failed to take necessary measures of safety and the number of protesters increased to thousands rapidly. The protesters chanted pro-Islamist slogans and threw stones at the walls of the hotel. Soon after, the hotel was set alight. A total number of 59 people, including Aziz Nesin survived with injuries, but 35 people burned to death (Gölbaşı, 1997; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005).

Terror started to increase in Turkey from the beginning of 1990s. In addition to separatist PKK terrorism, Turkey now faced increased Islamic terrorism. Hezbollah (also known as Turkish or Kurdish Hezbollah, which is a different group from the Lebanese Shi’a Islamist Hezbollah) was established as a result of a conflict between two fractions of an Islamist
group called Union Movement, *Vahdet Hareketi* in 1987. Hezbollah targeted secular intellectuals, including prominent journalists Uğur Mumcu and Çetin Emec and a series of academics. It has been argued that the Hezbollah was supported by the security forces in the war against the PKK (Nugent, 2004; Harvey, 2011).

In 1994, Turkey was also hit by an economic crisis. Macroeconomic equilibrium was not maintained. The current deficit rose up to 6.4 billion dollars and the inflation rates reached its historic peak of 150 percent. The interest rates increased and the Turkish Lira was devaluated against the US dollar by as much as 100 percent. To overcome the economic crisis a series of decisions were taken which were known as April 5 Decisions, *5 Nisan Kararları*. The decisions aimed at developing strict austerity measures in order to control rising inflation, levying new taxes, selling public economic enterprises or shutting them down, protecting the value of the Turkish Lira and increasing growth rates (Celasun, 2002). It is likely that these strict economic measures eroded public support for the governing party in the elections. Necmettin Erbakan’s pro-Islamist RP increased its votes in the 1994 local elections. The elections were held on 27 March 1994. In the elections, Tansu Çiller’s DYP received 21.40, Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP received 21.08 and Necmettin Erbakan’s RP received 19.13 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). An increase in the RP’s vote rate was particularly remarkable. Economic crisis victims were attracted by the RP’s populist campaigns. ‘Just Order’ was the slogan used to engage the more deprived classes in Turkey by the RP which claimed to be their representative. The RP ran an unusual election campaign. Housewives organized and canvassed door to door especially in the disadvantaged regions of metropolises. However, the RP’s leader Necmettin Erbakan’s provocative statements disturbed the secular public. Erbakan wondered in his
address to the party group in the Parliament on 13 April 1994, ‘whether the transition to
the RP government and Just Order will be peacefully or by bloodshed’ (Ebubekir60, 2012).

Under the DYP-SHP government, Turkey accessed to the Custom’s Union in 1995. The
Ankara agreement which was signed between the Turkish Republic and the European
Economic Community on 12 September 1963 envisaged three phases before the full
succession; the preparatory phase, the transition phase and the completion phase. The
preparatory phase started from 1964 and lasted until 1970, the transition phase, started
from 1973 and lasted until 1995 and the final completion phase started from 1996 and
envisaged to last until the full economic integration of Turkey to the European market. By
2016, the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU stipulates the free trade
of industrial goods and processed agricultural goods, but leaves the traditional agricultural
goods outside its scope (European Commission, 2016).

The second DYP-SHP government under Çiller’s prime ministry followed a strict security
policy against the rising PKK. A series of measures were taken, i.e. the establishment of a
Special Forces Command as an unconventional warfare force in order to combat the PKK
and equipping the armed forces with new technology weapons. A village guard system was
established and recruited personnel from Kurdish tribes. The right wing mafia was
organized and urged to fight against Kurdish businessmen who provided economic support
to the PKK. However, these groups committed unidentified murders and violated human
rights in the region. Hundreds of local residents were killed in unsolved murders. On the
other hand, the pro-Kurdish political parties, first the People’s Labour Party, Halkın Emek
Partisi (HEP) and then Democracy Party, Demokrasi Partisi (DEP) were closed by the
constitutional court. The parliamentary immunity of the Kurdish politicians was lifted, they were tried and imprisoned as per Turkish Penalty Code article 168/2 regulating ‘membership of an illegal organization’ (Mynet, 2005).

Another problem that caused the Çiller’s government’s popularity to decrease was the Gazi Quarter Riots. On 12 March 1995 three cafés in Gazi Quarter that were frequently visited by Alawites were attacked by people with automatic guns. After provocations and police’s brutal response to the initial demonstrations, Alawite groups initiated a broad-scaled demonstration and clashed with the police. With the coup of the army and the declaration of curfew the riots were suppressed. During the riots 23 people died and hundreds were injured (Crisis, 1995; Birand, 2012).

On 30 November 1995 Tansu Çiller’s DYP and Deniz Baykal’s CHP formed a coalition government (TBMM, governments). However, Baykal’s insistence on the further investigation of the Gazi Quarter Riots brought the DYP-CHP government to an end. The President Süleyman Demirel called for an early election and the elections were held on 24 December 1995. In the elections, Necmettin Erbakan’s RP received 21.38, Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP received 19.65, Tansu Çiller’s DYP received 19.18 and Bülent Ecevit’s DSP received 14.64 percent of the votes. The CHP also took part in the elections under the leadership of Deniz Baykal and barely passed the threshold by 10.71 percent (TBMM, elections). Although Erbakan’s RP was the most voted party in the elections, President Süleyman Demirel gave the mandate to form the government to Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the ANAP, the second most voted party. Following the elections, a coalition government was established by the DYP and the ANAP which was called Ana-Yol on 6 March 1995.
The government won a vote of confidence from the Parliament. The two parties agreed on a rotating prime ministry and Mesut Yılmaz became the first PM of the government. However, the government did not last long. During their trials in the Supreme Court, the two leaders conflicted and this brought the Ana-Yol government to end (TBMM, governments).

At the beginning of 1996, an international crisis erupted in Turkey’s shores. Turkey had a dispute with Greece on two minor inhabited rocky islets in the Aegean Sea called Kardak (Imia in Greek). Essentially the dispute on these small islets was related to the long-lasting dispute on the territorial waters between the two countries. The Lausanne treaty determined the territorial waters of the both countries as 3 nautical miles. In 1936, the Greek side increased them to 6 miles through a cabinet decree. Following the United Nation’s 1982 convention on the law of the sea, the Greek side wanted to increase territorial waters further to 12 nautical miles. This was rejected by the Turkish side since this could have advantaged Greece due to the higher number of Greek islands in the Aegean sea (Hasan, 2012). Following an accident of a civilian Turkish ship near the islets, a dispute arose between the two countries’ authorities on its salvaging operation. A technical dispute soon turned into a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Greece and the two NATO countries came to the brink of war. On 28 January 1996, a major and a priest from Greece went to the island and planted a Greek flag. Two days later a few Turkish journalists went to the islets and replaced the Greek flag with the Turkish one. The Greek naval forces were sent to the islets to plant the Greek flag again. Meanwhile, the two PMs, Tansu Çiller and Kostas Simitis escalated the tension with their vehement statements since both PMs were wary of the public’s reaction and did not want to take the political risk of
withdraw their claims. After the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, İnal Batu’s wise plan, Turkey sent a team of commandos to the second islet. After this point, both countries withdrew its soldiers from the two islets under the United States’ mediation and a potential war was prevented (Şenkal, 2016; Ayman, 2011; Pratt & Schofield, 1996).

A new coalition government, which was called Refah-Yol, was established between the RP and the DYP on 28 June 1996 (TBMM, governments). However, a pro-Islamist RP was not welcomed by the secular people in the country. The resistance was based in the belief that such a government would overturn the secular regime in Turkey. Necmettin Erbakan and Tansu Çiller, the two leaders of the coalition government, agreed on a rotating prime ministry system in which each leader will serve as the PM for two years. The government won a vote of confidence and Erbakan became the PM of the government and Çiller became the ministry of foreign affairs and Deputy PM for the first two years. The PM Necmettin Erbakan made one of his first official overseas trip to Libya. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi entertained the PM in his Bedouin tent. During the meeting, Gaddafi severely criticized Turkey’s counterterrorism policies, NATO membership, relationships with the US in front of the cameras. Erbakan’s failure to respond these criticisms sparked reactions in the secular segments of the Turkish public. Erbakan’s fast-breaking meal for cult leaders in the PM’s Office, the RP-led large-scaled demonstrations against the headscarf ban, a Jerusalem commemorative ceremony in which the invited speakers targeted the secular regime explicitly were some of the other events that drew attention from the army and the secular public. In addition to these, Erbakan’s criticism of the EU and his endeavours for the establishment of an international organization called D8 with
the regional countries as an alternative to it drew further reactions (Kongar, 2008: p. 281; Aksoy, 2000: p. 180).

On 3 November 1996, a traffic accident near the Susurluk district of Balıkesir province caused one of the most prominent scandals in the Turkish modern history. In the accident, Hüseyin Kocadağ, Abdullah Çatlı and Gonca Us died and Sedat Edip Bucak survived with injuries. Hüseyin Kocadağ was the manager of Kemalettin Eröße Police School, Abdullah Çatlı was the leader of the right-wing Grey Wolves criminal organization who was sought with red notice by the Interpol, Gonca Us was Abdullah Çatlı’s lover and a former beauty queen and Sedat Bucak was a DYP Şanlıurfa Deputy and the leader of a Şanlıurfa based feudal Kurdish clan. The accident caused rumours to spread concerning a dark alliance between the bureaucracy, politicians and mafia. Following this accident, the Deputy PM Tansu Çiller during the parliament group meeting made one of her controversial speeches by saying ‘those who have fired bullets for this state and those who got hit by it are all equally honourable persons’ (Huriyetdailynews, 1997). With this speech, she explicitly supported the use of the mafia in state’s dark affairs. A parliamentary commission was launched to investigate the matter. The government demanded the interior minister Mehmet Ağa’s resignation, but apart from that no serious action was taken. After being tried, Ağa received 5 years of imprisonment. The Susurluk accident sparked a considerable reaction in Turkish society. Artists, journalists, authors encouraged an action of civil disobedience which was called ‘one minute darkening for incessant enlightening’. Every night people in the cities switched off their lights for a minute to protest the government. The reaction’s emphasise on darkness had anti-RP sentiment too. The Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders in Chief of the armed forces in the MGK pressed
on the members of the government to take necessary steps to ease the rising reaction in the public. However, the government did not take serious steps to investigate the matter fully (Milliyet, 2001).

The army launched a new strategy against the Refah-Yol government. In order to tarnish the government’s image in the eyes of the public, a psychological campaign was conducted. A new working group, Western Study Group, *Bati Çalışma Grubu* (BÇG) was launched within the body of the Office of Commander in Chief to manipulate the public opinion. The BÇG prepared video recordings of some government members targeting the secular Turkish Republic in the media. The commanders of the War Colleges organized seminars for prominent journalists, authors, judges, attorney generals to draw attention to the rising reaction. The army did not stop at this point and on 30 January 1997, military vehicles were seen in the streets of the Sincan district of Ankara. This was interpreted as an indicator of the upcoming military coup. This event was justified by the Deputy chief of the Turkish general staff General Çevik Bir by saying ‘We re-balanced democracy’ (Arsu, 2012). In this tense environment, a MGK meeting was held on 28 February 1997. The non-civilian members of the MGK criticized the government side severely in the meeting. The army accused the government members for not taking the necessary measures for blocking these reactionary movements. During the meeting, a final document was issued by the army members and conveyed to the government members. The document consisted of 18 requests of the army members from the government side. Some of them were to ban illegal Quran courses and the cults, to increase the compulsory education from five years to eight and to stop the rise of Islamist capital. The change concerning the compulsory education was important because it meant the closure of the first three years of the religious
vocational high schools, İmam Hatip Lisesi which the executives of the RP saw as their electoral backyard. At the end of the MGK meeting, the PM Erbakan rejected signing the final document, but the document was leaked to the press. Erbakan signed the document on 5 March 1997 but resisted in the implementation of the measures. However, the armed forces were decisive in the implementation of the matters written in the document. The historical MGK meeting became known to be ‘a post-modern coup’ in the following years (Birand, 2012; Akpınar, 2001; Alpat, 1999: p. 66-70).

The government was also targeted by the judiciary power. The Supreme Court opened a closure case for the governing party, RP, on the grounds that it became a focus of anti-secular activities. The prosecution process took eight months and the constitutional court decision was declared to the public on 16 January 1998. The party was closed and the executives of the party and its Chairman, Necmettin Erbakan, were banned from politics. However, a new party called Virtue Party, Fazilet Partisi, (FP) was established immediately by the ex-RP members. However, the newly established FP was also closed by the constitutional court on the grounds that it became a focus of anti-secular activities (Atacan, 2005: p. 188). Concerning for the future of democracy, a group of Deputies from the RP’s coalition partner DYP submitted their resignations and the coalition government fell. Although the coalition partners, the DYP and the RP, had the majority in the Parliament and the leaders of the two parties were ready to form the new government under the prime ministry of Tansu Çiller, the President Süleyman Demirel gave the mandate to form the new government to Mesut Yılmaz, the Chairman of ANAP. The Demirel’s decision was criticized from the RP and the DYP sides. The new coalition government, known as Anasol-D was established by Mesut Yılmaz’s ANAP, Bülent
Ecevit’s DSP and Hüsamettin Cindoruk’s Democrat Turkey Party, *Demokrat Türkiye Partisi*, (DTP) on 30 June 1997. The government also received support from Deniz Baykal’s CHP during the vote of confidence in the Parliament. Yılmaz became the PM and Ecevit became the Deputy PM of the new government (TBMM, governments).

In 1998, Turkey was on the brink of war with Syria where Abdullah Öcalan, the fugitive founding leader of the PKK was living in. Turkey was highly disturbed by Syrian’s protection of Öcalan. On 16 September, the commander of the land forces, Atilla Ateş, made a speech at the Turkish-Syrian border and criticized the Syrian government on this matter. The message of the commander’s speech was clear. It was implied that the Turkish army was ready for a war if the Syrian government kept protecting Öcalan in its country. The Turkish government and the President Süleyman Demirel released statements supporting the commander’s message. Öcalan was driven out of Syria and transferred to Greece on 9 October 1998. Fearing harming its bilateral relations with Turkey, the Greek authorities rejected his entrance to the country. Thereupon, Öcalan flew to Russia. After Turkish government’s pressure on Russian authorities, Öcalan was transferred under the protection of an Italian Communist Party Deputy Roman Mantovani to Rome. He was captured in Rome on 12 December 1998. Italy rejected giving him to Turkey on the grounds that the death penalty was then still in force in Turkey. Italy’s protection of Öcalan caused Turkish public’s boycotting Italian products. Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT) planned a bombed attack in the house where Öcalan was hiding in Rome. The US authorities were informed about the plan. Seeing Turkish authorities’ determination, the US increased pressure on the Italian government and Öcalan was forced by the Italian authorities to leave Italy. Öcalan flew from Italy to Russia again and then
from Russia to Greece. The Greek authorities issued him a new passport and send him to the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. In the following days Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authorities contacted to MİT authorities and proposed to help in Öcalan’s capture in Kenya. With a joint operation run by the US and the Turkish intelligence forces and Kenyan authorities, Öcalan was captured. He was put in a Turkish jet by MİT agents and flew to Turkey on 15 February 1999 (Turkish Weekly, 2009; Varouhakis, 2009; Manaz, 2015). The governing party DSP enjoyed the capturing of Öcalan in the elections. General elections were held on 18 April 1999. In the elections, the DSP received 22.19, the MHP received 17.89, the FP received 15.41 and the ANAP received 13.22 percent of the votes (TBMM, elections). A coalition government was established by the DSP, the MHP and the ANAP on 3 May 1999. DSP’s Chairman Bülent Ecevit became the PM, MHP’s Chairman Devlet Bahçeli became the Deputy PM and minister of state of the government (TBMM, governments).

On 17 August 1999, Turkey’s Marmara region was hit by a 7.5 MW earthquake. It was the most destructive earthquake in the recorded history of Turkey. About 17,000 people were died, 23,000 were injured; 500 people became permanently disabled and 300,000 houses and workplaces were damaged. It was predicted that the earthquake costed 6.2 billions of dollars to the Turkish economy (Salman, 2001). Thus, following the earthquake, an economic crisis hit the Turkish economy, which costed about 250 thousand billions of dollars to the country. The crisis was triggered by a dispute broke out between PM Bülent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in the National Security Council meeting on 19 February 2001. In the meeting President Sezer wanted to assign the State Supervisory Council, Devlet Denetleme Kurulu (DDK) to inspect the bankrupt banks, which were
seized by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund, *Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu* (TMSF). In fact, according to the government and the PM Ecevit, the fund was established to inspect the bankrupt banks and therefore another inspection, which was going to be run by the State Supervisory Council, was unnecessary. In the meeting, President Sezer criticized the government’s position on this matter. Sezer argued that according to the constitution, the President has an authority to inspect any state organ by using the DDK. Following this dispute, PM Bülent Ecevit and Deputy PM Mesut Yılmaz walked out of the National Security Council meeting. The PM Ecevit announced his argument with the President in a press release following the meeting. The immediate reaction of the markets was marked. The stock market dropped by 18 percent and the overnight interest rates rose up to 7500 percent in the repo market. The American dollar-Turkish Lira parity doubled and 7.5 billions of dollars were withdrawn from the Central Bank. In the long term, unemployment increased and growth displayed negative rates (Satışoğlu, 2001). To tackle the devastating economic crisis, Kemal Derviş, a Turkish economist and the Vice President of the World Bank for the Middle East and North Africa, was invited to Turkey. His main task was to implement IMF and World Bank’s recovery programme. Derviş became the minister of state in charge of the economy in the Ecevit’s government. The recovery programme envisaged a series of structural reforms, i.e. the Public Treasury and the Central Bank were made autonomous, the banking system was strengthened, a transparent and accountable economy administration was established and corruption was fought. Following the implication of the recovery plan, the IMF and Turkey singed stand-by agreements and then the World Bank and the IMF credits were activated for Turkey (Celasun, 2002: p. 1-16).
The 2001 economic crisis shook people’s faith in the incumbent political parties. This environment facilitated the birth of the Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the co-founder and the future leader of the AKP entered politics in Necmettin Erbakan’s MSP. He became head of the MSP’s Beyoğlu Youth Branch and İstanbul Youth Branch in 1976. Erdoğan was elected as the RP’s Beyoğlu District Head in 1984 and İstanbul Provincial Head in 1985. Erdoğan became a candidate in the 1986 parliamentary elections but was not elected as a member of the Parliament. He ran for local elections in the Beyoğlu district of İstanbul in 1989 but was not elected. Erdoğan won the 27 March 1994 local elections in İstanbul and became the mayor of İstanbul. Erdoğan’s Mayorship played an important role in the RP’s success in the 1995 general elections. 12 December 1997, Erdoğan read a poem in Siirt province and was tried in Diyarbakir’s DGM on the grounds that he violated article 312/2 of the Turkish Criminal Law which regulates hate speech. At the end of the trial, Erdoğan received a ten months of imprisonment. His political activities were banned and Mayorship was abolished. This imprisonment increased his popularity in the eyes of the public. After four months of imprisonment, Erdoğan was released from prison (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents).

A closure case was opened for the FP and the party was closed on the grounds that it became a focus of anti-secular activities on 22 June 2001 (Turhan, 2002). Following the closure of the party, the followers of the National Vision tradition established a new party called Felicity Party, Saadet Partisi (SP) under the leadership of Recai Kutan on 20 July 2001. In the first ordinary congress of the SP, the clash between the hardliners and the reformist wings became apparent. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç and
Abdullatif Şener were the prominent figures of the reformist wing. The reformist wing founded the Justice and Development Party, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, (AKP) on 14 August 2001. They challenged the National Vision tradition which was followed by the pro-Islamist MNP, MSP, RP, FP and lastly SP. Instead of strict pro-Islamism, the AKP adopted a moderate conservative vision. In the party program market economy, democracy and the EU membership of Turkey were supported. The members of the party were criticized on the grounds that they criticized the founding principles of the Turkish Republic especially its secular regime drastically in the past. In response to these criticisms, they repeatedly emphasized that they had changed their political views which was symbolized in Erdoğan’s phrase ‘we took the National Vision shirt off’ (Şafak, 2006).

In addition to the reformist former National Vision members, the party received support from individuals from diverse ideological backgrounds, i.e. nationalists, conservatives, social democrats and even liberals. On 22 October 2002, the chief public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, Sabih Kanadoğlu filed a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court as per article 104/2 of the constitution on the grounds that the party did not abide the Constitutional Court’s previous act of caution. Meanwhile, Erdoğan seceded from the party membership and the case dismissed (Hürriyet Haber, 2002).

General elections were held on 3 November 2002. In the elections, the AKP received 34.28 percent of the votes and gained 363 seats in the Parliament. Deniz Baykal’s CHP received 19.39 percent of the votes and gained 178 seats (TBMM, elections). None of the other parties exceeded the national 10 percent threshold. With these results, the AKP came to power alone. Yet, there was a problem about the Chairman of the victorious AKP, Erdoğan’s prime ministry. According to the 109th article of the 1982 constitution, the PM
is assigned among the members of the Parliament by the President. Traditionally, the leader of the party with the most votes is given the mandate to form the government by the President. However, Erdoğan was banned from political involvement. Therefore Abdullah Gül founded the government on 16 November 2002 (TBMM, governments). A legislative proposal was submitted to the Parliament, which envisaged lifting Erdoğan’s political ban. The proposal was approved by the Parliament, but it was vetoed by the President Sezer on the grounds that it was subjective. Sezer sent the proposal back to the Parliament. However, the Parliament approved the proposal without amendment and sent it to the President for the second time. This time the proposal was accepted by the President. A formula was found to make Erdoğan a member of the Parliament. The Supreme Committee of Elections had cancelled the elections in the Siirt Province owing to gerrymander claims. The statuses of the three elected Siirt Deputies were cancelled. A by-election was held in Siirt on 9 March 2003. The first raw candidate of the AKP, Mervan Gül withdrew from candidacy and Erdoğan replaced him. The AKP received 84.80 percent of the votes in the by-elections in Siirt and Erdoğan became a member of the Parliament. Abdullah Gül’s government resigned on 11 March 2003. Erdoğan was given the mandate by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to form the new government. On 14 March 2003 first Erdoğan’s government was formed (TBMM, governments).

The AKP government had one of the most important crises within its first year of governance. Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. launched a series of wars against terrorism. First Afghanistan was invaded. Following the Afghanistan war, the U.S. invaded Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussain’s government. The Bush administration had a plan to use Turkish military bases and ports in the war against Iraq. The plan
included the deployment of 60,000 U.S. troops, 255 aircrafts and 65 helicopters in the Turkish military bases. The AKP government promised to make Turkish bases available for the U.S. troops. However, according to the Turkish constitution, such a decision had to be approved by the Parliament. The U.S. had offered economic aid of 6 billions of dollars for the decision to pass. However, on 1 March 2003, the Turkish Parliament denied the plan. A total number of 553 deputies joined the parliamentary session. In the session, against 264 Yes votes, only three votes less than required for the plan to be approved, 250 No votes were cast and 19 members were abstained (CNN International, 2003). The 1 March crisis, affected the Turkish-American bilateral relationship adversely. An event that is known as Hood Event further raised the tension between Turkey and the U.S. On 4 July 2003, U.S. soldiers carried out a raid on a house in Süleymaniye Province of Northern Iraq. A team of Turkish Special Forces soldiers was based in the house. The Turkish soldiers were captured by the U.S. soldiers. The capture of the Turkish soldiers and hoods that were thrown over their heads sparked a reaction in the Turkish public. It was widely believed in Turkey that the Hood Event was the U.S.’s response to the Parliament’s decision on 1 March (T24, 2011).

On 15 and 20 November 2003, four terrorist attacks were staged with bomb-laden trucks in İstanbul. On 15 November, two trucks were exploded near Bet Israil and Neve Shalom synagogues in İstanbul. A total number of 27 were killed and about 300 were injured in the double attacks. On 20 November another double attack targeted the headquarters of HSBC Bank and the British Consulate in İstanbul. The attacks were organized during the U.S. President George Bush’s meeting with the UK PM Tony Blair. Thirty people were killed, including British Consul-general Roger Short and more than 400 people were injured in
the attacks. The responsible persons of the attacks were found to be associated with the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda (BBC, 2003).

The AKP consolidated its political success in the 2004 local elections. Although it was its first elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP received 41.67, Deniz Baykal’s CHP received 11.08, Devlet Bahçeli’s MHP received 17.07 and Mehmet Ağar’s DYP received 13.21 percent of the votes. With these results, the AKP won a total number of 1.750 province and district municipalities while the CHP and the MHP won 467 and 242 of them respectively. The municipalities of two most populated provinces, İstanbul and Ankara were won by the AKP (YSK, local elections).

The year 2007 was marked by the assassination of Hrant Dink, a Turkey-born Armenian Turkish citizen, journalist and the executive editor of the İstanbul-based weekly Agos newspaper. Dink had declared his ideas outspokenly about the alleged Armenian Genocide. He was under prosecution on the grounds that in his column in Agos he violated the Turkish Penal Code art. no: 301 which regulates the penalty for insulting the Turkish Nation. He was receiving threats from ultra-nationalist groups, but he never requested a special protection. On 19 January 2007, Dink was assassinated by Ögün Samast in front of the Agos office in İstanbul. The assassin was related to a Trabzon-based ultra-nationalist group which previously organized a bomb attack to a McDonald’s restaurant in 2004. Dink’s assassination caused a widespread reaction in Turkey. At Dink’s funeral, hundreds of thousands Turkish people protested his killing (Radikal[a], 2007).

From the foundation of the AKP government, the secular segments of the society regarded President Sezer as the last guard of the secular regime in Turkey. Nevertheless, President
Sezer’s term of office was coming to an end on 16 May 2007. The secular opposition feared Tayyip Erdoğan’s candidature for the presidency. This fear was originated from Erdoğan’s previous controversial public statements targeting the secular regime, democracy, head scarf ban and the criminalization of adultery. The CHP and other opposition parties in the Parliament opposed the election of the President by then-incumbent parliament, which was coming to the end of its term. However, the AKP did not decide to hold an election and supported the idea that the incumbent parliament was fully competent to elect the new President. The new President was going to be elected by the Parliament, which was dominated by the AKP deputies. Before the announcement of the AKP’s candidate, the Chief of the General Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt stated that the army wanted to see a President who is ‘loyal to the principles of the Republic, not just in words but in essence’ (Radikal[b], 2007). Fearing a pro-Islamist President, secular public opposition organized a series of rallies called the Republic Protests. Atatürkist Thought Association, Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (ADD), an organization that was established to espouse Atatürk’s ideas and the preservation of the secular regime in Turkey, led the organization of the rallies which were supported by some 300 secularist non-governmental organizations. Although the political parties also took part in the protests, care was paid to avoid turning the protests into party rallies. The first rally was held in Ankara Tandoğan Square on 14 May 2007 (Armutçu, Yalazan & Akın, 2007). It was speculated that Tayyip Erdoğan changed his mind about running for the presidential office after this rally. On 24 April 2007, Erdoğan announced Abdullah Gül as AKP’s candidate for the presidency (Hürriyet, 2007). However, the rallies carried on in İstanbul, İzmir, Manisa and Çanakkale
provinces. According to some sources, the number of the participants exceeded a million in some of these provinces (Reuters, 2007).

According to the constitution a Presidential Candidate had to receive 367 votes in the first two rounds to be elected as the President. If none of the candidates are able to do so, the two candidates with most votes run for the third round and the candidate who receives the most votes in the third round becomes the President (1982 Turkish Constitution, art. 102).

The first round of the presidential election was held on 27 April 2007. Abdullah Gül achieved 341 votes. On the same day, the Office of Commander in Chief released a statement on its website, which was described as an ‘e-memorandum’. In the statement, it was declared that the Armed Forces is a party in the debate over the election of the President and the defender of the secular system, when necessary they would not hesitate from taking actions (Ülsever, 2007). On 10 May 2007, the Parliament passed a series of amendments in the constitution. The amendments envisaged the presidential term will be five years and the President will be elected by direct vote, general elections will be held in every four years. In the second round on 24 August, Gül achieved 337 votes. In the third round on 28 August 2007, however, Gül achieved 339 votes and was elected as the 11th President of the Republic of Turkey (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Presidents).

A month before the election of Abdullah Gül, general elections were held on 22 July 2007. In the elections the AKP received 46.47, the CHP received 20.84, and the MHP received 14.26 percent of the votes. With these rates, the AKP gained 341, the CHP gained 112 and the MHP gained 71 seats in the Parliament (TBMM, elections). The government won a vote of confidence by receiving the support of 337 MPs in the 550-seat parliament. The
government, which is also known as the second Recep Tayyip Erdoğan government, was approved by the President Abduallah Gül on 29 August 2007 (TBMM, governments).

The Ergenekon trail and its related trials left their marks on the political agenda in Turkey between 2006 and 2009. Originally, Ergenekon is a legend which tells about the escape of ancient Turks from Ergenekon valley in the Central Asia where their army was defeated and the foundation of Turkish Khanate. Allegedly, a secret armed organization called Ergenekon nested in the state body, carried out psychological warfare, acts of violence and terrorist attacks against the individuals, non-governmental organizations and the elected governments. It was argued that, such a secret or shadow government-like organization was inherited from the Ottoman Empire and Ergenekon is the present-day body of this organization. The demystification of the Ergenekon organization started after Tuncay Güney, a former journalist, was taken into custody in 2001. In his office, documents showing the organizational structure of Ergenekon were found. Years later, on 12 June 2007, the Turkish police found 27 grenades, TNTs and fuses in a shanty house in Ümraniye, İstanbul related to the Ergenekon case. The grenades had numbers matching with others which were used in some previous attacks. Following the extension of the inquiry, more than 400 people, including active and retired police and army members from all kinds of ranks, former politicians, bureaucrats, lawmakers, academicians, unionists and the journalist were arrested. The accusations were several, i.e. coup plans against the AKP government, assassinations and assassination plots and armed attacks to the newspaper buildings. On 3 August 2009, the Ergenekon case was merged with another case investigating the Council of State shooting. On 17 May 2006, Alparslan Aslan staged a terrorist attack to the meeting of the second chamber of the Council of State killed the
member Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin and injured four other members of the council. It was claimed that the Ergenekon organization instigated Aslan to carry out this attack. On 29 March 2007, Nokta, a weekly political magazine in Turkey, published diaries, which allegedly belonged to the Commander of the Naval Forces, Admiral Özden Örnek. According to the magazine’s claim it was written in Örnek’s diary that the Commander of the Land Forces General Aytaç Yalman, the Commander of the Naval Forces, admiral Özden Örnek, the Commander of the Commander of the Air Forces General İbrahim Fırtına, the Commander of the Gendarmerie General Şener Eruygur and the Commander of the First Army General Hurşit Tolon planned four military coups in 2004, but they were prevented by the Chief of the General Staff General Hilmi Özkök. Özden Örnek and İbrahim Fırtına were also accused of a coup plot called Sledgehammer involving plans such as bombing Fatih and Bayezid mosques in Istanbul and accusing Greece of causing a Turkish plane crash. Allegedly, the aim of the Sledgehammer coup plot was to create a chaotic atmosphere and justify a military coup against the AKP government. A Turkish daily newspaper, Taraf, revealed the plan. Çetin Doğan, the Commander of the First Army, who was accused of preparing the coup plan, stated that Sledgehammer was scenario-based military exercise plan but not a coup plan. The Turkish Armed Forces also made a statement to the press in the same direction. At the end of the Sledgehammer trials 236 suspects were released. It was widely speculated that the Sledgehammer was a conspiracy against nationalist and secular members of the Turkish Armed Forces (Jenkings, 2011; Gürsoy, 2013).
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents an overview of the extant literature on modernization theory, Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis. The chapter is organized as follows. It starts with a brief introduction on democracy and political culture research. In the second section, modernization theory is introduced. The first sub-section gives a brief overview of the recent history of Western Modernization. The Industrial Revolution and French Revolutions are discussed in this part in order to help the reader to better understand the historical background of the modernization phenomenon. The second sub-section focuses on the question of what is modernization. In addition to this, some subsidiary questions, i.e.; what are the characteristics of the process of modernization, what changes the modernization process brings to individual attitudes, organizations and the overall society, what are the differences between traditional and modern societies are also addressed by referring to some prominent students of the modernization school.

The third section starts with introducing four types of understandings of generation: generation as a genealogical and non-genealogical phenomenon, generation as a life stage, generation as a historical period and generation as a cohort are presented respectively. It provides brief information on the generation concept and some substantial topics relevant to it, i.e. the formation of generations; age, period and cohort effects; socialization and generational replacement. Rival hypotheses such as the impressionable years, later life
experiences and symbolic attitudes hypotheses are also discussed by referring to the leading authors’ views.

In the fourth section, Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations is discussed in detail. This subsection aims to give a comprehensive analytical account of Mannheim’s theory as well his ‘actual generation’ and ‘generation unit’ arguments. In the final section, the working class authoritarianism thesis of Seymour Martin Lipset and the criticism levelled against Lipset’s thesis are presented.

3.1. Democracy and Political Culture

Today, democracy is widely seen as the ideal form of government in many countries of the world. It is suggested as important for tackling with many political, social and economic problems in domestic politics and for solving conflicts between nations. However, democracy is perhaps the most difficult political regime to develop fully. A large and growing body of literature, which has attempted to answer the popular question of ‘what makes democracy work, revealed that the establishment and continuation of a democratic system requires the satisfaction of a great deal of conditions. Perhaps one of the most striking answers to this question has come from the political culture research. The very basic argument raised by this line of research is that people’s value orientations determine institutions. In fact, some of the most reputed works in the political science literature has investigated the relationship between individual-level value orientations and system-level institutions. All of these works are grounded on the basic idea that people’s values are conducive to the characteristics of macro systems. Max Weber, in his seminal work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, argues that a particular form of religious
belief paves the way for the establishment of a particular macro-economic system. According to him Protestantism, especially Calvinism and to a lesser extent Pietism, Methodism and Baptism, is the basic factor underlying under the creation of the modern capitalist economic system (Weber, 1958 [1904]). Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s 1969 book, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, is the first systematic comparative research studying the relationship between people’s values and democracy. From a structural functionalist point of view, Almond and Verba argue that political culture serves as ‘the connecting link between micro and macro politics’ (Almond & Verba, 1969: p. 32). As a result of their analysis of the data derived from surveys held in the US, Germany, Mexico, Italy, and the UK, they distinguish between three types of political cultures; parochial, subject and participant. Parochial culture represents traditional and tribal societies. Individuals in parochial cultures do not have enough knowledge, about neither the political system nor their rights and powers to shape it. They also do not get involved in either its input or output processes for the political system. This form of culture is likely to emerge in small traditional societies. On the other hand, individuals in subject cultures are aware of the system more generally and its outputs, but are unaware of the input objects and their own power to shape the system. Lastly, individuals in participatory culture are both aware of the system, its inputs and the outputs and their power to shape it. Their argument, suggesting that only in the US and in the UK a participatory civic culture is prevalent, was criticized on the grounds that it is Anglo/American-centric with respect to its findings. As a result, Almond and Verba conclude that a participant civic culture upholds democratic political systems (Almond & Verba, 1969).
Robert Putnam and his collaborators’ 1993 work on twenty Italian regional governments, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, investigates the factors underpinning effective representative institutions. The analysis of data collected over two decades by means of quantitative and qualitative techniques revealed that, while in the northern Italy, individuals are more participatory and interested in community affairs, the regional governments work more efficiently, on the other hand, in southern Italy, individuals are not participatory and less interested in community affairs and regional governments are corrupt and their operations are inefficient. As a result, Putnam and his collaborators conclude that strong social capital fosters institutional performance (Putnam, 1993).

All the above-mentioned works which focus on the relationship between individual-level orientations and institutions can be considered within the political culture research. Looking from the democratization perspective, the political culture research links widespread individual orientations in the society and system-level democracy. According to the political culture approach, harmony between the people’s values and the democratic principles facilitates the establishment of a democratic political system and the maintaining of it. On the contrary, incompatibility between the two makes the establishment and continuation of democracy difficult (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 247-49). Inglehart and Welzel note in their book, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, although there is no encompassing theory within political culture research, thus three rival approaches compete with each other within this line of research. They are the legitimacy (system-support), the communitarian (social capital) and the human development (emancipative) approaches. These three approaches attribute
importance on three different sets of values and orientations which are thought to be pro-
democratic. The legitimacy approach highlights two orientations with high face validity; 
the importance of citizens’ favourable assessment of democracy and their confidence in the 
institutions of a democratic political system. On the other hand, the communitarian and 
human development approaches place importance on the values deeply instilled in the 
culture of the society. While the communitarian approach emphasizes the citizens’ 
participation in voluntary activities and their trust in fellow citizens, the human 
development approach prioritizes a diverse range of values, i.e. political participation, 
tolerance and self-expression. In addition to simply introducing each approach, Inglehart 
and Welzel test the orientations underscored by each of them with respect to their power to 
predict system level democracy. Their analysis of the combined data from the WVS and 
the democracy scores assigned by the Freedom House (FH), showed that countries’ 
aggregated scores of ‘democracy-autocracy preference’, ‘post-materialist liberty 
aspirations’, ‘tolerance of homosexuality’ (as proxy for ‘out-group tolerance’), ‘signing 
petitions’ (as proxy for ‘political participation’), ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘self-expression 
values syndrome’ strongly determine their formal and effective democracy scores 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 245-71). Based on this theoretical consideration and 
empirical finding, the present research operationalizes pro-democratic culture by means of 
three variables, namely ‘democracy preference’, ‘out-group tolerance’ and ‘political 
participation’. Thus, each variable stands as the dependent variable of the respective 
empirical chapters.
3.2. Modernization Theory

Perhaps, the best way to approach the investigation of a far reaching phenomenon like modernization is to go back to the historical conditions which gave birth to its emergence. The following pages will serve for this purpose. Modernization, also called as the First Modernization, is widely viewed as a Europe-originating phenomenon. According to the generally accepted view, centuries-old societal order in Europe lasted without a significant change until the 18th century. Yet, the Industrial Revolution in England between 1760-1840 and the Political Revolution in France between 1789-1799- dual revolutions as named by Eric Hobsbawm- resulted in the birth of the modern socioeconomic and political order in the European continent and then spread to the other regions of the world. The new order comprised novelties in numerous fields, i.e.; economy, politics, social structure and culture (Eisenstadt, 1966: p. 1; Huntington, 1971: p.36; Harrison & Huntington, 2000: p. 257; Hobsbawm, 2000: p. ix). Thus, in order to better understand the historical origins of the modernization phenomenon, perhaps one should start by looking at the Industrial and the French Revolutions.

3.2.1. The Industrial Revolution

Between the 9th and 15th centuries there was not an appreciable alteration in the daily lives of the common man. Throughout the middle ages, the majority of the population was involved in agricultural activity, worshipping in institutionalized monotheistic religions and conducting their lives under the protection of absolute monarchies. This economic and political order produced a definite social system involved local hierarchies which were based on land ownership in exchange for military service and agricultural production.
There were four hierarchically ranked social groups. A very large proportion of the population was serfs. If we liken the distribution of the population amongst social groups in the medieval Europe to a pyramid, serfs were in the lowermost category with the largest share within the system of hierarchy. The primary duty of serfs was to provide agricultural products and services for the knights. They were bought and sold with the land and did not even have the fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to liberty, the right of possession and the freedom of movement. Knights were located in the second from the below section of the pyramid. They were the belligerent power of the monarchy. They owned some lands which were given to them by the Lords in return for recruiting an army to protect the Lord and his family and being prepared for the battle to protect the Kingdom. Lords could fully exercise their authority on their land once they leased it from the King. The Lord’s position with respect to the King was understood according to the principle of *primus inter pares*, first among equals, although the King, as is known, was located at the top of the social and political hierarchy and owned the whole territory of the Kingdom (Tocqueville, 2001: p. 35-7; Brenner, 1976: p. 37-42; Bois, 1984: p. 135-261; Israel, 2001: p. 714).

The first indicators of change appeared with the beginning of the Age of Enlightenment. Development of the global trade, rise in the usage of underground resources, rise in slavery and colonialism ended up with a great deal of capital stock in the hands of European merchants who thus found enough time and money to fund the arts and sciences. The invention of the printing press and distribution of the translations of the Oriental classics and Classical Era pieces boosted the accumulation of knowledge in the continent. Press, literacy, mass communication and education played important roles in the spread of this
knowledge to the wider masses. The pioneer members of the modern European intelligentsia, i.e.: René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and John Locke were the men of this era. They, in their works, questioned the authority of the established political, economic and spiritual institutions and guided the Enlightenment Movement (Israel, 2001: p. 3-14).

The investment made in economic and intellectual domains brought quick results in the 18th century England. The technological leap was particularly remarkable. A great number of inventions were introduced and they were rapidly adopted into the production mechanisms. Novel industrial production methods were first used in textile production and then spread to other production areas. Innovation in the machinery and tools precipitated the overall transition of production methods. Among others, particularly the application of the steam engine in the manufacturing process as an equivalent of manpower changed the rules of the game. Throughout the 19th and the 20th century, agricultural production and labour intensive manufacturing gradually yielded their place to mechanical systems. The replacement of the agrarian feudalism with mercantilism and of mercantilism with the overall mechanization of production was called the Industrial Revolution. In turn, industrialization gave birth to the capitalist mode of production. In the capitalist economic system all means of production, whether it is land or a factory are owned by private persons and the state authority is limited to a supervisory power. Privately owned companies do not receive subventions from the state and their primary objective is to survive and extend their market share. This alteration in the modes of production took effect on the daily lives of millions of people as well as organizational structures and the society as a whole. In order to administrate large-scale industrial production, factories went
through rationalization and reorganization which entailed the establishment of complex, rationalized and hierarchical administrative bodies. Centralized and bureaucratized production mechanisms required a further division of labour and specialization in skills. As a result of that, the capital and the labour are strictly segregated and the labour is sectioned according to the specialization of skills. Strict working hours, well-defined tasks and abstract schemes are introduced to the workers. Due to social isolation in the workplace, class consciousness arose among the workers. The working class with characteristic attitudes and behaviours appeared as a distinctive social group in Europe (Marx, 1976, Volume III; Thompson, 2002: p. 1-12; Foster, 2003: p. 8-38).

3.2.2. The French Revolution

Having discussed the historical conditions that paved the way for the emergence of the Industrial Revolution and the modern economic system in Europe, we can move on to examining the conditions that allowed for the flourishing of the modern political system on the continent. The French revolution, with respect to its consequences is recognized widely as the milestone political event in the formation of the modern state system. This is since the social and political events that took place between 1789 and 1799 in the wake of King Louis XVI’s rule were particularly dramatic with respect to their consequences for 18th century French and modern global politics.

The French government under King Louis XVI’s rule gradually excluded the aristocracy and focussed all power in the monarchy as symbolized by Louis’s famous quote ‘L’etat c’est moi’. In response to ever increasing authoritarianism in government practices, poor living standards, unjust taxation, decadence within the court and so forth, the members of
the French lower classes, also known as *sansculottes* fought against the established order which consisted of the monarchy, the aristocracy and the church. They were led by intellectual and idealist revolutionary cadres. Their main ideal was to destroy privileges in the society and establish an egalitarian social order which protected every individual’s right. They won against monarchical powers and executed King Louis XVI and proclaimed the power of the people. The new rule abolished all federalist, aristocratic and religious privileges and declared the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and thus all the people considered as equal citizens with equal rights. However, the revolutionary cadres radicalized further in the course of the revolution and in the second phase of the revolution known as the Reign of Terror, executed thousands of opponents in guillotines. The reins of power moved between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries several times and at the end of a period of political uncertainty, Napoleon Bonaparte seized power in 1799 and fought a series of wars against other European monarchies. The Napoleonic wars ended the Holy Roman Empire’s order and stimulated nationalist sentiments throughout the Europe. Sovereign nations founded their own nation states. Different to multi-national emperorships, nation states based themselves on cultural, ethnic, political and economic commonalities (Tocqueville, 1856: p.i-xi; Bendix, 1967: p. 292; Israel, 2001: p. 714-20).

The developments in the international politics about one and a half centuries after the French revolution led to a renewed interest in modernization. Immediately after the second world war, came a period in which colonized nations emancipated from their colonial ties and established independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The need for a speedy economic and political reconstruction in these countries also revealed the need for an all-inclusive theory. This drew much academic attention in the literature. Some early
Discussions developed in American academic circles. In 1950s and 1960s, a group of sociologists, behavioural scientists, historians and economists, i.e.; D. Lerner, S. M. Lipset, M. Weiner, R. E. Ward, M.J. Levy and C.E. Black published pieces which laid the foundations of a system of thought called modernization theory.

D. Lerner, in his 1958 book *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, made very important contributions to the psychological aspect of modernization theory. His general argument was clear, Western development patterns should be followed by the underdeveloped nations if they wanted to successfully modernise. In his seminal piece, Lerner investigated radio listening habits of people from six countries in the Middle East region, namely Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran. The objective of the study was to find out the influence of exposure to mass media on the transformation of the public. Lerner argued that the American state funded radio channel Voice of America (VOA) played a positive role in the transformation of its audiences from traditional to modern individuals. Lerner's attempt was as significant, most importantly, as it laid the foundations of modernization theory and, to a lesser extent, as an early attempt of the application of empirical surveys and quantitative methods in the social sciences realm (Lerner, 1958).

Another important modernization author is Lipset. His ground-breaking work, *Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*, is acclaimed as one of the most cited and most influential social science articles of all times. The article reinforced our understandings pertaining to the relationship between the economy and the social and the quantitative model he employed, gained important insights into the realm of
comparative studies. In this piece, Lipset examined socioeconomic conditions of democracy and particularly drew attention to economic development in this regard. Basically, he credited the view which he also briefly summarized as: ‘the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the changes that it will sustain democracy’ (Lipset, 1959: p. 75).

Lipset’s other book *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, on the other hand, elaborated his views pertaining to the relationship between socioeconomic development and political democracy. In this book, Lipset argued that socioeconomic development promotes a series of social attributes, i.e., education, urbanization, communication and extended middle class. According to him, these social attributes concomitantly form a construct which is associated with democracy (Lipset, 1960: p. 41).

Another major development of the theory was published by Ward and Rustow in their book *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, which compared the westernization process of two non-western Asian nations. They examined institutional structures of two countries, which had made some progress in the process of modernization, from a historical perspective and aimed to find similarities and differences in their modernization journeys. In this way, they aimed to show the decisiveness of the institutional factors for the advancement of modernization (Ward & Rustow, 1964). Levy’s two volume study *Modernization and the Structure of Societies: Aspects of Social Structure in Modernized and Nonmodernized Societies* can also be considered as one of the influential works in the realm of comparative sociology. In this study, Levy strongly supported the duality of societies in the world and analysed the transition from ‘relatively modernized’ society to ‘relatively nonmodernized’ one. His writings involve one of the most systematic analysis of the modernization process of its time. He compared Japan and China with respect to
their openness to the Western cultural influence. Finally, it is worth mentioning the book, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*, of Black, a historian who compared 155 nations from throughout the world, and argued that modernization of societies incorporates a series of revolutions, i.e. political, economic, social, intellectual and psychological ones. These reformations are buttressed by technological advancement, communication and transportation and a centralized administrative bodies, savings and investment, change in family size, urbanization, social mobility, changing family roles. Black advanced four themes for analysis of modernization’s impact on a society. They are a) The challenge of modernity, b) The consolidation of modernizing leadership, c) Economic and social transformation, d) The integration of society (Black, 1966: p.13-55).

The literature shifted the focus from the western-centric understanding of modernization, yet it did not undermine the value of the western experience. Instead, the western experience came into a particular prominence since it was set out as a model. The modernization thinkers’ objective was to find a comprehensive model, which subsumed the experience of the western world and on the basis of this experience guided the way for the new nations of the non-western world in their economic and socio-political transformations. With this purpose in mind, they indicated the current stage of the European and the North American social, economic and political systems as an ideal. This was hardly surprising since the western modernization was understood as a successful model in the eyes of modernization theorists. A growing body of literature from the 1950’s to the present, presented the view that modernization has enormous impacts on millions of people’s lives throughout the globe. A great deal of scholarly attention on the subject of modernization made it a fundamental focus of study in numerous academic disciplines i.e.
political science, sociology, psychology, history, economics, linguistics and law. Beyond the academic field, popular understandings in the media and other social commentary also started to refer to the term frequently to describe personal attitudes, architectural structures, and institutions and so on. It is suggested that a broad range of individual attitudes, organizational decision-making mechanisms and societal values relate to modernization in some way or other. As a consequence, the term modernization has undergone a substantial semantic change to become located at the heart of our understanding of the individual and the societal transformation in the developing nations of the 20th century (Marx, 1859; Huntington 1971: p. 295; Inkeles, 1975; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 15-48).

3.2.3. What is modernization?

Having discussed the economic and political conditions that paved the way for the emergence of modernization in the European continent in the 18th century and the underlying historical conditions of the theoretical emergence of modernization theory in the 20th, the next subsection examines the question: ‘What is modernization?’ In the *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, modernization is defined as ‘view of historical progression as a series of stages, reflecting intellectual, technological, economic and political development’ (McLean & McMillan, 2009: p. 349). The adherents of the theory failed to make a full definition of the concept of modernization, but similar definitions are adopted for the concept which aided the development of a common and useful conceptual groundwork. Samuel Huntington maintained that most modernization thinkers agreed that modernization is a revolutionary, complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, homogenizing, irreversible and progressive process (Huntington, 1971: p. 288-90).
Eisenstadt, a prominent thinker of the modernization theory, in his work, *The Basic Characteristics of Modernization* defines modernization as follows:

Historically modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in the Western Europe and North America from the seventieth century to the nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth century to the South American, Asian and African continents (Eisenstadt, 1966: p. 1).

Similarly, Karl Deutsch defined ‘social mobilization’ which he used to explain social aspects of modernization as ‘… a name given to an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life’. Deutsch continued and argued that this change involves a great number of more idiosyncratic changes; i.e. ‘changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face associates, of institutions, roles and ways of acting, of experiences and expectations and finally of personal memories, habits and needs…’ (Deutsch, 1961: p. 493). In order to reveal the individual level differences that modernization brings, Inkeles developed one of the most comprehensive depictions of modern man. He developed eight to ten general dimensions by reducing many explanatory variables delineating various characteristics. These dimensions are; education, work experience, contact with mass media, consumer goods possessed, father’s education, urbanization, skill level, length of urban residence, the modernity of one’s factory and the modernity of one’s home and school backgrounds. According to this analysis, modern man embodies four basic traits in his character: (1) participation (2) self-efficacy (3) independence and autonomy (4) openness to change (Inkeles, 1974: p. 38-32).
Although theorizing such a far-reaching and multi-staged phenomenon like modernization is a thorny task, modernization theory has attempted to provide a comprehensive answer to the question ‘what is modernization?’ Despite over a half century having elapsed since it was first theorised; for many, it still remains as a well-developed system of thought explaining the social, economic and political change. However, this does not render modernization theory immune from harsh criticism. Starting from the very beginning of the second half of the century, more particularly from the 1960s down to the present, many methodological and substantive critiques have been raised against the theory. Alongside this, in recent years, with the current developments in data processing techniques and availability of large-N data, the arguments of the theory have been subjected to a large number of quantitative tests. By the help of robust and novel empirical examination techniques political scientists achieve mixed results involving both those which justified and those which falsified the arguments raised by the proponents of the theory. The following section presents the fundamental aspects of the theory by referring to the views of the adherents together with the critics. However, before that, we examine modernization theorists’ ideological origins since this useful to better understand the logic behind their theorizing. There are many common characteristics shared by modernization thinkers so a particular typology representing most of them can be outlined. It should be primarily emphasized that the modernization theorists’ worldview is heavily influenced by certain specific sources. Positivism, evolutionary theory, structural functionalism and Marxism are central to the development of this approach.

Positivism forms part of the background to modernization theorists’ methodology and ideology. Similarly to the natural sciences, modernization theorists aim to isolate variables
concepts, and quantify and rank them in categories. They propose testable hypotheses to guide observations and analysis. They hold the view that positivist methodology provides structured rules pertaining to operating mechanisms of the society by the help of which they can delineate global norms of societal change. Positivism, on the other hand, comprises an extensive area in modernization theorist’s ideology. They hold the view that modernization is an objective process which, independent of cultural factors that allow them to underscore the historical and cultural differences between societies. The modernization theorists assume that all societies are bound to be traditional at one time in their history and either they have already transformed into a modern society or they are currently on course for achieving this objective. The departure and destination points and the direction of the change are clear in their approach. The approach assumes that if economic and societal experiences of the West were repeated, similar political consequences could be achieved in other socio-political contexts. The influence can be observed in many classical works of the modernization theorists. Marx, in the preface of the first volume of the Capital, argued that ‘the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ (Marx, 1867: preface).

Daniel Lerner, in his book where he explores the change in the Middle East, *The Passing of the Traditional Society*, expressed his views strikingly ‘What America is… the modernizing Middle East seeks to become’ (Lerner, 1958: p. 79). In a similar vein, the words of Levy; a pioneering modernization thinker, predicted that in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, American and Japanese publics will resemble each other more than in the 1990s. Levy states that: ‘Underdeveloped nations would inevitably develop institutions that paralleled those of the more economically advanced nations,
which ultimately would lead to a global convergence of societies.’ (Levy, 1965: p. 30). We can also see this perspective in Walt W. Rustow’s growth theory. In his book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Rustow draws a growth model which is formed by the past experiences of the economically developed nations and can be applied as a development model to less developed ones. There are five stages identified in the process of development, they are; (1) the traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the take-off, (4) the drive to maturity and (5) the age of high mass consumption. According to Rustow, less developed economies can make a quicker progress by looking at the past experiences of the developed ones which ultimately may result in an increasing commonality between the two (Rustow, 1960).

Marxism, on the other hand, has had immense influence on positivist thinkers’ understanding of the functioning of society. Heavily informed by the Marxist tradition, the modernization theorist’s way of evaluating the relationship between the economy and the social spheres carries the ideological traces of Karl Marx, who stated in the preface of his well-known piece, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, ‘The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general’ (Marx, 1859: p. 45). Especially the more reductionist, orthodox readings of the theory (later, New Left Marxists rather saw this relationship as dialectical and fluid and mutually constitutive), frequently saw the social sphere as dependent on the economic mode of production as the independent variable and saw a causal relationship between the two. Among various indicators of socioeconomic development, classical modernization theory puts a particular emphasis on the diversified and complex industrial mode of production as the basis of the modern social system. Besides positivism and Marxism,
Structural Functionalism also constitutes an important source feeding into the modernization theorists’ approach. Informed by the work of social theorists such as Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim, modernization theorists view society as a working organism which progresses from a simple to a complex level. In the process of social evolution, social groups act as organs which take on supplementary roles in the proper functioning of the ‘body’ of society.

The contrast between the traditional and the modern is central to the modernization theorists’ understanding. To conceptualize a large-scale, multi-dimensional and complex process like modernization, modernization theorists frequently refer to dichotomies. The great dichotomy, which incorporates ‘the traditional’ on one side and ‘the modern’ on the other, has been central to the modernization theorists’ understanding of social change. Analogous to the two poles of an axis, these two concepts correspond to two end states of the modernization process. Within this dichotomous evaluation, they are designed as mutually exclusive and contrasting poles. This usage implies that traditional is equal to everything that is not modern and modern is equal to everything that is not traditional. This methodological selection is reflected in the views that tradition is an obstacle to be overcome to achieve economic and social development; therefore one can only be modern as long as one emancipates oneself from traditional commitments and ties restricting his social self. With reference to the great dichotomy, the modernization theorist also employs a vast number of descriptive binary axes, i.e.; economy, politics, society, personal life and culture. Rural against urban settlement, illiterate against literate person, religious against the secular lifestyle, self-sufficient against complex society are some examples of this dichotomous understanding of change. Levy who drew a bold line between ‘the relatively
non-modernized’ and ‘relatively modernized’ nations and argued that the greater the ratio of inanimate sources to animate sources the less traditional a given society is (Levy, 1972: p. 3). The limitation of the traditional man surrounding his existence has many consequences relating from his belief system to his role in the society. He is insufficiently technically equipped against the compelling forces of nature and this has implications for a broad range of areas. His abilities are largely limited by structural forces. The production mechanism is heavily based on his muscle force and apart from tamed animals that are used in physically demanding jobs, such as ploughing, haulage and transportation he only had that to rely on. He needs to wait for the rain to pour and the sun to shine in order to produce. What is more, geographical isolation makes him heavily rely on goods and services produced in his close vicinity. In response to being exposed to economically and physically insecure situation, the traditional man develops a fatalistic world view. Since he has a limited power to exercise control over his own life, he becomes more inclined to believe in a higher authority contemplating his life from birth to death and even after. Believing in such a supernatural power, reinforces his existential security and helps him reduce in his mind the unpredictability of the journey of life. His belief system provides him with the answers to the questions that have been asked throughout history, such as ‘where do we come from?’ ‘what are we?’. Contrary to traditional man, his modern counterpart leads a completely different life. By making use of innovative technology he enjoys a greater level of control over the nature. He is intellectually and technically equipped to change his surroundings according to his needs. He makes the use of machinery in the process of production. He is employed in complex, hierarchic and rationalized institutions which require developing an inherent discipline to comply with

Although the dichotomous approach provides a ‘cognitive map’ of the modernization process, it has attracted a considerable amount of criticism and has become one of the most debated points of modernization theory. Criticism gathered particularly around the mutually exclusive design of the traditional and the modern concepts (Huntington, 1971: p. 295-6; Bendix, 1967: p. 326; Gusfield, 1967: p. 356; Eisenstadt, 1974: p. 236), their homogeneity (Tipps, 1973: p. 231, 218-9; Gusfield, 1967: p. 352; Huntington, 1971: p. 293-5), and the static depiction of the traditional society (Gusfield, 1967, p. 356; Bendix, 1967: p. 293; Tipps, 1973: p. 213). Tipps, in this regard, claimed that the dichotomous approach is biased against traditional societies because it rules out the option of equality of opportunity and transmissivity between the two attributes (Tipps, 1973: p. 213-4, 207). Tipps also argued that an absolute rejection of tradition does not necessarily lead to a perfect state of modernization, but to disorder (Tipps, 1973: p. 206). Huntington (1971), in a similar vein, suggested that the zero-sum character of the contrast between the traditional and the modern does not necessarily reflect the reality. Instead, in some cases, traditional and modern may strengthen one another. The positive role of the family based entrepreneurialism on the development of modern capitalist economic mechanisms and the role of modern mass communication technologies in broadcasting traditional cultures are given as examples of such a positive relationship between the two. Regarding to the homogeneity of the concepts, Huntington argued that the unbalanced characterization of the traditional and modern categories defined the traditional concept as a residual category
implying that it simply covers everything which falls out of the modern category. Instead, traditional societies are diverse in many aspects, although to a lesser extent, this holds for the modern ones as well (Tipps, 1973: p. 231, 218-9; Huntington, 1971: p. 293-6; see also Gusfield, 1967: p. 352).

Another criticized point is the theory’s linear, deterministic, inexorable, irreversible depiction of the change. Opposing this picture, Huntington advances the view that modernization is an uneven process and political reversals can take place (Huntington, 1971: p. 298). Barrington Moore’s argument is more elaborate. He suggests that there are three different destinations of the modernization process. The modernization process may lead to a democracy or a fascist or communist government. What determines that is a couple of factors, i.e.; power distribution amongst the elites, the economic basis of the agrarian upper-class, the class constellation, the distribution of power between classes and the state’s economy against the dominant class (Moore, 1966). Inglehart and Baker in this regard suggest that modernization is not deterministic, but a probabilistic phenomenon in which many other factors apart from socioeconomic development can also play significant roles. Giving the former Soviet Union countries as an example, they maintain that although economic development is accounted for by a predictable cultural change, economical backing can reverse the process of modernization (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 49).

A broad range of criticism has been levelled against the convergence thesis that is supported by the modernization thinkers. One of the aspects of the criticism was related to the repeatability of the modernization process. Eisenstadt, a prominent revisionist thinker of modernization theory, admitted that the process of modernization is linked to several
factors, i.e.; the availability of essential resources in a society, the type of change societies were influenced, its international relations, pre-modern socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds and maybe the most crucially perceptions and decisions of ruling elites in pre-modern regimes (Eisenstadt, 1966: p. 1; 1974: p. 252). Relative to this point, it is also argued that modernization is a unique experience of Western European societies that has emerged as a consequence of unique historical events. Following the Weberian tradition, exponents of the culturalist approach argued that since it is impossible to reproduce the same historical conditions, European modernization cannot be repeated in other politico-historical contexts. Emphasizing the importance of the cultural legacy and its lasting influence conditioning the modernization effect, theorists in this school claimed that all societies bear their own internal dynamics which would lead them to a different expression of the process of modernization (Huntington, 1971: p. 298; Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 29; Bendix, 1967: p. 327-35). Samuel Huntington, one of the leading scholars in this camp, maintained that, let alone converging, instead, countries do diverge based on their cultural heritage in the process of modernization (Huntington, 1971: p. 298). Huntington’s claim marshalled empirical evidence in the following years. It has been shown that lasting cultural gaps prevail between both modern and non-modern camps contrary to what is suggested by modernization theory (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 36).

The convergence thesis was also opposed within the context of modernization-Americanization debate. Tipps argues that the classical modernization theory idealizes the western and particularly American cultures. It ranks western especially American values upon non-western ones to legitimize unbalanced power relationships between western and non-western societies, in particular the European colonialism (Tipps, 1973: p. 210-16).
Another criticism is raised by Edward Said, who in his long debated book *Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient* criticized Western perspective of the non-western world, particularly the Middle East. He argued that the Orientalist perspective laid by the modernization theorists serves for the justification of European and American cultural, military domination of the countries in the Middle East. Most of the Western investigation of the Middle Eastern culture aims to confirm the European and American superior position against the Middle East (Said, 1978). Mazrui linking modernization theory with Darwinism is another critic who harshly criticized this perspective on the grounds that it incorporates racist and ethnocentric implications (Mazrui, 1968: p. 82). Inglehart and Baker, relying on their findings, argued that modernization does not transform countries into the United States. Even if there was such a cultural convergence, not the United States, but Scandinavian countries would be the point where all countries will eventually resemble. Finding the convergence thesis unlikely, at least in the near future, they note that; ‘economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages’ (Inglehart & Baker, 2000: p. 49).

3.3. The Generation Phenomenon and Mannheim’s Theory of Generations

3.3.1. The concept of generation

In daily life, we often come across older generations lamenting that younger generations have become for selfish, disrespectful or unconcerned and young berating older citizens for being reactionary or inconsiderate of their lifestyles. Traditionally, we are accustomed to attribute this clash solely to age disparities. We tend to think that young or old people
behave in a particular way due to the very nature of being young or old. However, attributing age as the only cause of social disparities is to assume that every individual is born into and lives through the same life conditions. However, this assumption does not seem to be a reasonable one, especially in today’s world of rapid change and inequality. What other factors may come into play in the occurrence of age-related disparities? Generation is one of the answers given to this question.

Generation is not a new concept to our understanding. The appearance of the concept dates back a long time in both religious and non-religious scriptures. In religious books the term generation connotes age-stratified human groups. In non-religious context it is used in a similar meaning. Homer, in his ancient epic poem the Iliad, which narrates the battle between the King Agamemnon and Achilles, likens the succession of generations to the leaves of the trees which are ‘born and perish’. Herodotus mentions the term generation in his writings about the chronological sequence of Egyptian monarchs and priests. For him, one hundred years is equal to three generations. Beyond its general recognition in the religious and classical literary texts, the concept generation has first been studied scientifically in the modern times by August Comte, the father of positivist ideology. Comte, who basically attempted to find globally applicable laws of social change, argued in his book *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, that ‘the true filiation of every kind of progress should be traced from generation to generation’ (Comte, 1853: p. 542). John Stuart Mill, largely influenced by his contemporary Comte, argued that generation is one of the key concepts to understand history. According to him, each generation is the product of the preceding generations and as their time comes by they take the possession of the society (Mill, [1983] 1961: p. 598).
Despite these early attempts, the generation phenomenon has not been analysed comprehensively until the beginning of the 20th century. As is known, the 20th century witnessed the most devastating wars in human history. Several millions died or were injured in the battlefields and trenches of WWI. Families fell apart and the social order was undermined in the belligerent countries. In addition to this, people from all over the world suffered from the devastating consequences of migration, famine and epidemic diseases. At the end of the war, empires collapsed and national borders were changed which underpinned long term and continued conflicts among nations. On the other hand, economic difficulties implied poor conditions for large human populations. Originating from a stock market crisis in the US, the Great Depression spread to the rest of the globe. Global GDP dropped, international trade shrank and unemployment rose. These conditions left dramatic imprints on the lives of millions of people throughout the world and paved the way for the exacerbation of conflict that fed into the outbreak of WWII, which brought even more dramatic consequences. Intellectuals could not be indifferent to these major developments. Francois Mentré, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Wilhelm Pinder, Karl Mannheim, Alfred Lorenz are some of the writers who observed these events closely and pondered on their social consequences. Perhaps for that reason, generational responses given to these events constitute an important aspect of their works.

Karl Mannheim deserves particular attention among these writers. Mannheim, in his seminal 1923 essay ‘The Problem of Generations’ analysed the generation phenomenon within a fully developed theory and laid down the foundations of the theory of generations. Mannheim states that: ‘[Generation]… is one of the indispensable guides to an understanding of the structure of social and intellectual movements’ (Mannheim, 1952
Mannheim’s theory is outlined in the following pages, but now we turn to his brief explanation of the state of knowledge in his time, which will provide us with a sound theoretical ground to further develop our discussion of the generation phenomenon. In the first part of his essay, Mannheim highlighted the outstanding aspects of a rivalry between two ‘positivist’ and ‘romantic-historical’ approaches in the realm of generations. Because of French and German dominations in the respective approaches, Mannheim preferred calling them French positivism and German romanticism. Mannheim suggested that, these two rival approaches diverge mainly on their depictions of the formation of generations. Mannheim argued that, reflecting the general perspective of the positivist mind, the positivist understanding of the formation of generations seeks to find general rules explaining the historical development. The positivist approach, according to Mannheim, developed a quantitative understanding of the formation of generations by emphasizing mere biological forces, i.e. birth, limited life span and death. It is also assumed by the positivists that characteristic differences and time intervals between each pair of successive generations are identical, which implies a linear and predictable pattern of social progress. Contrary to the positivist approach, as Mannheim noted, the romantic-historical approach, which is dominated by German historicists, challenged the mere biological explanation of the succession of generations. The adherents of this approach favoured the separation of generations by time intervals based on subjective experiences of time. According to them despite the biological base the direction and the tempo of change are heavily influenced by the social forces which allow successive generations take on their unique place in the process of social change. In their qualitative periodization of the time, history is not depicted as a smooth chronological flow, but as a fluctuating process.
One might draw such a conclusion from Mannheim’s comparison. The positivist approach views generations as equally sliced age groups replacing each other in the flow of history. Not surprisingly, this relates to a particular depiction of history, which is linear in terms of its course of action and predictable in terms of its pace. Conversely, the romantic-historical approach views generation as a social location and supports the view that generational formation is based on qualitative periodization of time. History is pictured as a fluctuating process by this approach. Reflecting his German historicist origins, Mannheim takes a critical stance on the first group and took sides with the second one. He opposes the sole positivist explanation which, he argues, causes losing the social perspective. He claims that, the biological forces are important because they set the rules of the game; however, the sociological explanation of generations starts beyond this point (Mannheim 1952 [1923]: p. 290-91).

Mannheim’s theory which he elaborated in the second part of his essay is elaborated in the following pages, but now we turn to the question asked above: What is a generation? In its most basic meaning, the generation phenomenon establishes a unique link between man and the time. It locates individuals within particular time intervals in history and helps us to answer the question why a particular individual who lived in a particular time point in history acted in a particular way. The importance of the generation concept is recognized by leading philosophers of the 20th century. Ortega y Gasset, a pioneer Spanish liberal intellectual, defined the concept generation as ‘… a dynamic compromise between mass and individual and is the most important conception in history’ (Y Gasset, (1961 [1933]: p. 15). Jane Pilcher, an influential sociologist, described the generation phenomenon as ‘a way of understanding differences between age groups and as a means of locating
individuals and groups within historical time’ (Pilcher, 1994: p. 481). As can be seen, there exists a general consensus on the importance of the concept of generation. However, these definitions only address the most general meaning of the concept of generation. In order to come to a better understanding of the concept, we need to distinguish between the different meanings that exist in the literature.

David I. Kertzer, reviewed the diversified sociological usage of the generation concept in his essay. He argued that we can make a progress in the problematic field of generation only if a common definition is adopted. Therefore, the following pages aim to distinguish between different meanings of the concept in the guidance of Kertzer’s categorization. Based his categorization on Troll’s five different concepts of generation, Kertzer suggests that there are four different usages of the concept of generation in the sociological literature. They are: (a) generation as a principle of kinship descent, (b) generation as a cohort, (c) generation as life stage and (d) generation as a historical period (Kertzer, 1983: p. 126).

2.3.1.1. Generation as a principle of kinship descent

In Kertzer’s categorization, the first usage of the term generation implies a genealogical meaning. This type of usage corresponds to presence in a family linkage and is indigenous to the parent-offspring type of investigations. These investigations are particularly useful in studying intrafamilial value transmission from family to the children. In these investigations, the conditions of value transfer are mostly explored by comparing parent and offspring generations. Specific to the realm of politics; some common themes are party preferences, political participation and political attitudes. Hyman (1959); Levin (1961),

The family has long been suggested as the primary source of children’s political development. The main assumption in ‘the transmission model’ is that family’s political orientations and values are reflected in children attitudes and behaviours (Hyman, 1959; Levin, 1961; Beck & Jennings, 1991: p. 744). Herbert Hyman, in his 1959 review article on political socialization, suggested family as the primary transmitter of the political values in children (Hyman, 1959: p. 72). Although this view acclaimed widely in the literature and became the traditional view, it did not remain free from criticism. Hess and Torney (1965) opposed this view and brought the family’s preeminent role in children’s political socialization up to discussion. They argued that family is one of the agents of socialization, but it is no way comparable to the public school in terms of its power to socialize young individuals (Hess & Torney, 1965: p. 93-116). On the other hand, the idea that family is the primary source of political socialization is endorsed by numerous studies, yet it is supported by scant empirical evidence that many additional factors could be at work. An early parent–offspring type of empirical evidence is presented by Martin L. Levin. Levin analysed data yielded from Illinois high school students and their parents in 1957 and 1959. Levin reported 95 percent family-offspring party preference congruency in Republican, and 75 percent in Democrat families (Levin, 1961: p. 597). Levin also found that parent’s social status influence adolescent’s party preference, but this relationship is mediated by family’s party preference. Another finding is that girls are slightly more likely
to agree with their parents on party preferences than boys. On the other hand, boys are more likely to be influenced by the political environment in their high school than girls and girls are more likely to be influenced from the national political climate than boys (Levin, 1961: p. 603). Deriving from Hyman’s finding that boys are more interested in politics than girls, Levin speculates that boys are less likely to adhere their parent’s party preference and remain exposed to the national political climate, but on the other hand, more likely to be influenced by the political environment at school (Levin, 1961: p. 603). However, it should be noted that he did not support this with empirical findings.

In another parent-offspring study, Jennings and Niemi achieved variegated evidence regarding to parent-offspring correspondence in the American context (Jennings & Niemi, 1968). They employed data derived from surveys made with American secondary school seniors (12th graders) and their parents. They relied on intra-pair tau-beta correlation scores as indicators of parent-offspring congruence. Their analysis revealed a compatibility between children and their parents on party preference with a tau-beta correlation of .47 (Jennings and Niemi, 1968: p. 7). On the other hand, when specific issues such as federal role in integrating the schools, allowance of prayers in the schools, communists’ taking office positions and speaking against religion are explored, they found less compatibility between the two groups. While the parent-offspring congruence is relatively higher in the first two items, with correlations of .34 and .29 respectively, a clear incompatibility is revealed in the last two with correlations of .13 and .05 (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p.9). They also found that the level of parent-offspring congruence is lower on their feelings toward dissident groups. While the feelings toward Catholics topped the list with correlations of .36, feelings towards big business ranked the lowest with .12 (Jennings &
Niemi, 1968: p. 12). To look at cynicism against the government, they employed Guttman scaling and found that students are less cynical than their parents, which made the correspondence between the two groups appear low with tau-beta correlations of .12 (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 12-15). The last point they make is related to the salience of political matters. They found that neither the children’s nor the parent’s politicization influence parent-children congruence remarkably (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 22). From these results they concluded that party preference is the most agreed political orientation between children and their parents in the American context while other political values display a lower level of congruency. For comparative purposes, they tested parent-offspring agreement on religious beliefs and found that 74 percent of pairs agreed on a denominational preference which is a much higher rate than the rate of agreement on party preference (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 16-17). Their analysis also revealed some interesting findings. They found that parent-offspring congruence is largely independent of sex roles and close relations between children and the parents promotes the congruency (Jennings & Niemi, 1968: p. 19-20).

In their analysis of data derived from the Socialization Panel Study conducted in 1965, 1973 and 1982 with a sample of American high school seniors and their parents, Niemi and Jennings explored the patterns of the influence of parent’s partisanship on offspring partisanship over time. Their preliminary analysis supports the traditional conviction that parental influence is higher in the beginning of adulthood, but then levels off as one ages. While in 1965, parent partisanship data are correlated with 1965, 1973 and 1982 filial partisanship data by .61, .38 and .38 respectively (Niemi & Jennings, 1991: p. 972; Beck & Jennings, 1991: p. 749). To explore the underlying reasons of this decline in parental
influence they employed a series of variables corresponding to specific issues, i.e. ‘racial integration of the schools’, ‘use of prayers in school’, ‘correctness of entering the Vietnam war’ and ‘the government’s role in ensuring jobs and a good standard living’ (Niemi & Jennings, 1991: p. 173). When separate regressions are run, in which filial partisanship in 1965, 1973 and 1982 are the dependent variables; it is revealed that in 1965, parental partisanship is the strongest determinant of offspring partisanship and followed by school integration issue. However, in 1973, the family influence decreases, but still remains a more powerful determinant of filial partisanship than any of the specific issues mentioned above, despite their increased determinative power. In 1982, the family influence does not decrease remarkably but the influence of opinions on all other issues increases (Niemi & Jennings, 1991: p. 978). Replicating the same analysis for presidential elections revealed that parental influence follows the same trend. However, at each year the family influence is lower and issue influences are higher compared to the partisanship results (Niemi & Jennings, 1991: p. 985). As a result of this analysis, Niemi and Jennings come to the conclusion that family partisanship is a strong determinant of children’s partisanship especially at the time when children embark on their adulthood. Although, it’s power declines over the years, it remains being as one of the most powerful predictors of the matured children’s partisanship. Their findings confirmed Hyman’s previous findings. In addition to this, opinions on specific issues become more salient in terms of their power to determine filial generation’s partisanship over the years.

Similar results were achieved by Beck and Jennings (1991). Having the data derived from the three-wave panel study of American high school seniors and their parents; they investigated parent influences on interest in politics and partisanship. They found that the
congruence between parental and filial partisanship was at its highest in 1965 and then gradually eroded with the passage of time. On the other hand, a curvilinear effect occurred between the parental and filial politicization between 1965 and 1982 which reached its peak in 1973. Their analysis illustrates that partisanship and politicization differ in strength in terms of their influence on the children. While family-child correspondence is modest in partisanship, it follows a low pattern in politicization (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p.747-49). The similar trends are observed when partisanship is categorized into republican, neutral and democrat groups and politicization is divided into low, medium and high categories (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p.752). They found that while children from partisan families are more likely to adopt a partisan outlook, what is more, these children are those who are less likely to stand against anti-partisan movements between 1965 and 1973 (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p.755). Given these results, they conclude that ‘times’ influence people coming from different family backgrounds and different age groups (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p.756).

2.3.1.2. Generation as a non-genealogical phenomenon

In Kertzer’s categorization, the last three usages of the term generation bear non-genealogical meanings. They are: generation as life stage, generation as a historical period and generation as a cohort. Quite different than in the first usage, when generation holds a non-genealogical meaning the members of each successive generation are not necessarily linked with familial ties. Nevertheless, generation in a non-genealogical meaning plays an important role in addressing the issue of social change. Strong theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the sociology literature suggest that social change appears by three
means; namely biological maturation, historical evolution and replacement of generations (Riley, 1973; Converse, 1976; Glenn, 1981). More frankly, either the ageing of the individuals, or the influences contemporary events impinge on people or the replacement of older individuals with younger ones change the prevailing values in a society. In the sociology literature, these three means of change are also known as ‘age, period and cohort (APC) effects’. These three effects are discerned in numerous studies thus far and linked with a broad array of human attitudes and behaviour. However, it should be kept in mind that there exists a fundamental problem with these effects. Despite clear theoretical differences between them (Abramson, 1983; Riley, 1987), their overlapping influences make treating them statistically a thorny task (Glenn, 1976; Alwin & Krosnick, 1991: p. 171). On the other hand, not disentangling cohort age and period effects may lead to dramatic results. There are some scholarly works in the literature which did not distinguish between these effects and failed to show the real reasons of change (Kertzer, 1983: p. 131). On the other hand, there are several works in the literature which made successful attempts at disentangling their overlapping influences. In their 1976 work, Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz attempted to disentangle age and period effects from cohort effect in party identification, political efficacy and political trust. Their findings indicate that regardless of which one is controlled first, period effects prevail age effects in terms of their influence on cohorts. Similar results are achieved when political efficacy and political trust are considered (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 105-11). Norval D. Glenn in his 1976 work visited this problem and argued that it is a ‘futile quest’ to try to disentangle age, period and cohort effects. He noted that ‘Regardless of how cohort data are examined, two kinds of effects are confounded with one another; age and cohort effects are confounded in
cross-sectional data by age, age and period effects in intra-cohort trend data, and period and cohort effects in trend data for each age level’ (Glenn, 1976: p. 900). Leaving aside the empirical difficulties of ‘un-confounding’ these effects for now, these three effects are discussed below with regards to their conceptual meanings.

2.3.1.2.1. Generation as a life stage (Age effect)

Kertzer’s first non-genealogical usage of the term generation is ‘generation as a life stage’ which is also known as ‘age effect’ or ‘life cycle effect’ in the sociology literature. It is an irrefutable fact that aging brings about a broad range of changes to individuals. We all undergo a change as we accumulate knowledge, gain new skills or encounter other individuals and ideas while passing through different stages of life. Further to that, aging which is actually one’s biological progression in life, when considered from an aggregate perspective, becomes a fundamental property of social change. In other words, the prevailing values in that society are bound to change as the members of a given society age. This holds true for political values as well. Age-related changes in political attitudes and behaviour is a frequently observed phenomenon in daily life. Aging may exert its influence on political attitudes through a great many mechanisms. Some usual consequences of aging i.e. decline in mental inabilities, biases or mobility problems may be associated with a change in attitudes. Alwin and McCammon investigated the relationship between aging and cognitive abilities. Having all potential intervening factors, i.e. race, gender, parental education, father’s occupational prestige, maternal employment and rural upbringing controlled for, they found that aging causes a decline in vocabulary knowledge (Alwin & McCammon, 2001: p. 156; Merelman, 1972: p. 154). A considerable
amount of evidence shows that political participation follows a curvilinear pattern as individuals travel through different stages of life. It increases incrementally after the age of eighteen, peaks around the age of thirty as one seizes maximum power to participate and then slows its increasing pattern and finally it descends (Milbrath, 1965; Inglehart, 1971: p. 312; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980: p. 48; Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 31).

Lastly the spirit of the time should also be considered when the relationship between age and political attitudes is investigated. Empirical evidence introduced by Beck and Jennings, matched the panel data involving American high school students’ , their parents’ and teachers’ political activity patterns between 1965 and 1973 with Michigan presidential election series between 1956-1976. Although a considerable part of their data come from high school children and their parents, their use of the data does not bear a genealogical meaning because they did not match children with their parents but used each group as the representative of their generation. Their findings are important because the situation in a very volatile period in American politics is reflected in their findings. Their main finding is that period effects should be taken seriously while the diversion of the youth political values from that of their parents is investigated. They show that during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the younger generation took a more active position in six out of nine political activities than their parent’s generation, which appeared contrary to the traditional view about the age and participation. What is more, they are more politically active than their counterparts from other periods as well. In return for that, the parent generation also exhibits an uncommon political participation during this period (Beck & Jennings, 1979: p. 739-43). By looking at these results, they detected the period between the late 1960s and early 1970s as an exceptional one. They argued that political activity patterns during this
period does not comply with the general theories of participation in the US. As a solution to this problem, they suggested that the conventional relationship between age/ideology and political participation must be revised by adding a factor ‘the opportunities of involvement’ into this relationship (Beck & Jennings, 1979: p. 748-49).

2.3.1.2.2. Generation as a historical period (Period effect)

Kertzer’s third usage of the term generation, namely generation as a historical period which is also known as ‘the period effect’ in the literature, tells us a completely different story. The period effect basically corresponds to short term attitudinal and behavioural reactions developed against far-reaching macro-scale events. These events may exert shifting influence on large numbers of people within the society and cut across several age groups (Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 21). Beck and Jennings argue that period effect represents ‘… far-reaching socio-political forces and events that touch the lives of most contemporary individuals’ (Beck & Jennings, 1991: p. 743). Take for example, a repeated question asking whether the government should take more responsibility to provide people things they need, was directed to the same respondent just before and after a destructive and sudden economic depression. The assumption regarding to period effect is that, in the second interview the respondent will be more prone to the option that government should take more responsibility. Regardless of whether these ideas will change or persist in the future, the economic crisis is, with a high degree of probability, responsible for the respondent’s sudden alteration of his idea of government’s role in the economy. It is not surprising that some particular social and economic groups may remain more vulnerable to period effects. For instance, in above-mentioned case an unemployed
young individual’s answer is more likely to change between the two waves than that of an employed adult who feels more secure economically. Whether similar over-time disparities can be observed across age groups is an important question to ask at this point. Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz, in their 1976 work, searched for an answer to the question whether ageing or contemporary events play a more important role in determining individual political orientations. They tested the ‘the primacy principle’ on nine orientations relating to party identification, political efficacy and political trust. As a result, they found that in some particular cases all age groups react in a similar way and in similar magnitudes to the same political events. In seven out of nine political orientations, period effect dominated the age effect. However, it should be kept in mind that according to their findings period effects do not erode age effects. The spread between age groups remain the same, but all age groups contribute to the same overall shifting trend (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 101-11). In another investigation, Jennings and Markus reported on their longitudinal analysis that the period effect is conditional on the age effect when partisan orientations are taken into account. According to their findings, responses to fourteen political events are less likely to be influenced from partisan orientations as the members of both offspring and parent groups (with two exceptions) age (Jennings & Markus, 1984: p. 1007). Although these are very particular forms of interaction between the two effects, we need to keep in mind as a general rule that period effect should be considered carefully and must be separated from age effect due to their overlapping influences.
2.3.1.2.3. Generation as a cohort (Cohort effect)

Kertzer’s fourth category is ‘generation as a cohort’. Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz argue that ‘generations are age cohorts whose orientations are unusually durable, having developed in response to major events and crises which have reshaped a population’s outlooks.’ (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 98-99). According to Glenn a cohort consists of ‘… those people within a geographical or otherwise delineated population who experienced the same significant event within a given period of time’ (Glenn, 1977: p. 8). In a similar vein, Ryder identified the concept cohort as ‘… the aggregate of individuals (within some population definition) who experienced the same event within the same time interval’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 845). Ryder opposes the synonymous usage of the term cohort instead of generation and suggests that the term generation should only be used to connote ‘the temporal unit of kinship structure’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 853). It is seen from the above definitions that both concepts bear parallel meanings, yet it should be noted that there exist at least two important differences between them. The first one relates to their conceptual frameworks. The concept cohort is a broader concept than the concept generation. As an umbrella term, it involves several sub-terms, i.e. birth cohort, marriage cohort, workforce cohort and graduation cohort. Each form of cohort refers to a different type of stratification of human groups. A marriage cohort, for instance, consists of those who got married in approximate years. Members of a marriage cohort do not necessarily share a birth year because obviously not everyone gets married at the same age. Similarly, a workforce cohort includes those who entered the workforce at about the same year. Again the members of a workforce cohort are not necessarily coevals because workforce entering age is determined by a series of factors, i.e. age of compulsory schooling, qualification
requirements of the industry, female schooling (Erikson et al., 1979). Birth cohort, on the other hand, bears the closest meaning to generation. Nevertheless, even if the cohort is used in the birth cohort sense, still a subtle nuance, which relates to the second difference, distinguishes cohort from generation. It is argued that the difference between birth cohort and generation originates from data organizing preferences (Ryder, 1965: p. 846-48; Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 23). Marshall made perhaps the most convenient analogies to explain the differences between birth cohort and generation. He resembles the difference between a generation and a cohort to the difference between the expressions of the same actual temperature either by using Fahrenheit/Celsius or qualitative break points such as freezing and boiling. In both ways the same fact is addressed, yet the latter does it by referring to some predetermined critical thresholds. Similarly, while a birth cohort divides time into objective intervals by employing a quantitative categorization, a generation divides it into subjective time periods by referring to qualitative break-points (Marshall, 1983: p. 53-4). Two important questions arise at this point. The first one deals with the source of the socialization and the second one with its subject. Let us ask the first question immediately. What are these break-points that are referred while specifying generations? In the sociology and political science literatures, major tumultuous politico-historical events such as war and economic crises are referred as factors that play role in the formation of generations (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 104). Take for example, the ‘hard timers generation’ which involves those who come of age during the First World War conditions and faced all difficulties of the most cruel war until that time. Similarly, ‘the Good Warriors’ generation is characterized by devastating conditions of the Second World War and ‘the Baby Boomers’ generation is a product of affluent conditions
of post-war period. All these generations, one way or the other, refer to the important events of the time their members come of age. There exists empirical evidence searching the underlying reasons of this fact. Shuman and Scott’s 1989 research provides that people mostly recall and deem important the events which took place in their adolescence or early adulthood. They asked a sample of Americans to identify national or global significant events in the last fifty years, and why they deem these events significant. Their research revealed that the majority of the respondents viewed the Second World War and the Vietnam war as the two most important politico-historical events in the late fifty years of American history. They reported that wars are viewed as the only reminiscent events in the formation of their respondents’ memories, such an extent that, no generational lines are discovered in the recalling of events other than wars. Wars, on the other hand, appeared to be equally dramatic for respondents from the entire age ranges; however, for those who have a direct experience with wars, they become even more salient. (Shuman & Scott, 1989: p. 363, 370-372; see also Ryder, 1965: p. 848-9; Jennings, 1996: p. 240-41).

A very important mechanism, political socialization, is suggested as central to the relationship between macro-scale contemporary politico-historical events and formation of generations. Political socialization is important for generations because the notion of ‘generation as a cohort’ is based on the idea that idiosyncratic conditions happen to take place and impinge upon the members of a generation coming of age and limit them with similar experiences which ends up with their adoption of similar characteristics and values. As the father of the term, Hyman defines political socialization as ‘learning of social patterns corresponding to ... social positions as mediated through various agencies of society’ (Hyman, 1959: p. 25). Ryder, from a constructivist point of view, argues that
socialization is ‘… a process of committing an individual to a term of service in a group, by progressively confining his behavioural potentialities within an acceptable range and by preparing him for the types of role he will be expected to play’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 852). Similarly Langton defines it as ‘the way society transmits its political culture from generation to generation’ (Langton, 1969: p. 9).

Discussions on political socialization can be dated back to Plato’s stimulating arguments on citizens’ education. However, in modern times political socialization first entered into the political science literature as a particular field of study in 1950s. Herbert H. Hyman’s 1959 review of the previous works is viewed as the beginning of political socialization as a distinct field of study. In this essay, Hyman primarily dealt with stratification of age-groups, political learning, the origins of political behaviour and political socialization agencies. Marriam (1931), Newcomb (1943) Hollingshead (1949) and Stevenson and Stuart’s (1958), Greenstein (1960), Hess and Torney (1967), Easton and Dennis (1969), Inkeles and Levingson (1969) are some other prominent works in the field (Sears, 1975: p. 94). Political socialization studies then faded into the background in 1970s. Niemi and Hepburn argued that this is due to over-deterministic approach it brings to pre-adulthood. According to them, although it is difficult to reject that generations are formed due to important contemporary events and things that are learned in early phases of life have influence on future attitudes in one way or another; assuming that things happened in pre-adulthood are fully responsible of how one behaves in the future is ‘a gross oversimplification’. This is one of the important underlying causes of abandoning the theory. Nevertheless, a new wave of revitalization is observed concerning especially the Eastern European countries, which is linked with the concerns in these countries about
whether the upcoming generation will be supportive of the new political systems (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995, p. 9-12).

For the purpose of comparison, it should be noted that, in the realm of ‘generation as a cohort’ contemporary events are not associated with the short-winded reactions they give rise to but with the results they yield in the long run by means of generations they socialize. Thus, unlike the far-reaching period effect, cohort effect corresponds to the influence that historical events exert on a particular age segment (Alwin, Hofer & McCammon, 2006: p. 22). To set an example, an economic crisis was faced by an individual who was at a particular stage of his life in which he was most receptive. He has experienced all the difficulties of being impressionable to such a crisis during this period. In response to the formative power of this event, he might have developed an economically unsecure character. The assumption pertaining to the cohort effect is that the influence is likely to persist and reflect on future attitudes and behaviour.

2.3.3. The impressionable years hypothesis versus later life experiences hypothesis

Having clarified its source, we may now continue with the second question which relates to the subject of socialization. In the literature, two rival hypotheses are tailored to answer this question: ‘who is socialized?’. They are; the impressionable years hypothesis and later life experiences hypothesis.
2.3.3.1. The impressionable years hypothesis

The impressionable years hypothesis, also known as the primacy principle basically suggests that not all the members of the society who experienced the same event are influenced equally. Instead, those who are in their adolescence and early adulthood at the time of the event are at their most receptive period which makes them more impressionable to the influence. What is more, it is also suggested by the impressionable years hypothesis that this early influence strongly roots into one’s value system and serves to shape future political attitudes and behaviours. As can be seen, the impressionable years hypothesis relies on two basic assumptions. The first one relates to the establishment of political values and is heavily reliant on the theories of the development of the human mind (Hyman, 1959: chapter 6). On the other hand, the second assumption is associated with stability of values acquired early in life and their potential to take effect in the future. According to the first assumption, most political orientations are adopted early in life. The idea behind this assumption is that adolescents who are on the verge of adulthood are not matured and experienced to hold stable values, which makes them more impressionable to the influence. A large volume of published studies draws attention to adolescence and early adulthood as the period in which most political values and orientations are learnt. Mannheim highlighted the approximate age of 17 as the most impressionable period. Mannheim viewed this period important because individuals make their ‘fresh contact’ with the cultural heritage in this period and all later experiences receive their meaning from this early encounter (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 293, 298; see also Grasso, 2013; Ghitza & Gelman, 2014). His argument parallels to that of Ryder, who argued that ‘all those alive at the same time are contemporaries, but they respond and contribute to social history in
different ways unless they are also coevals’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 848). For him, those who are ‘old enough to participate directly in the movements impelled by change, but not old enough to have become committed to an occupation, a residence, a family of procreation or a way of life’ are the most vulnerable to the influence of formative events and bears the highest potential to change social history. It is also claimed that high instability in adolescence is underlined by ‘role transitions’; such as, graduating from the high school and entering to the university or starting to work bring about huge changes in individual perspectives. Contrarily, memberships in the established organizations such as marriage and occupation in the following years reduce the chances of individual transformation because the roles given by these institutions require avoiding unstructured and unattached behaviours (Ryder, 1965: p. 857). Niemi and Hepburn pointed out between the ages 14 and 25 as the most impressionable period on the grounds that the most rapid change is observed between these ages (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995: p. 4). Krosnick and Alwin employed zero-order correlations and SES models to test the impressionable years and the increasing persistence hypotheses. They investigated a range of social and political attitudes and found that the youngest (18-25) and the oldest (66-83) age groups’ average correlations are smaller than that of the middle-age (26-65) group (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989: p. 420-21). Their findings are informative in that the reliability of the measurement decreases in the very young and very old groups and the most consistent age group appears to be the one consist of respondents with the middle ages (See also Sears, 1981). With these results in hand, they conclude that individuals are the most unstable and so impressionable to attitudinal change during early adulthood. They regard the impressionable years hypothesis more powerful than persistence hypothesis, since stability
increases until the age of 33, but after this point it stops increasing (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989). Similarly, Beck and Jennings investigated the impact of socialization in pre-adult years on adult political activity in a longitudinal setting. Data are derived from the first two successive rounds (1965 and 1973) the Socialization Panel Study. Having a series of SES models employed, they ascertained four linkages operating between early adulthood and adult political participation. They are; status of the parent, youth involvement in high school activities environment in the school, parent’s organizational involvement and parent’s participation in politics. However, the most powerful direct impact comes from youth involvement in high school activities with correlations of .18 (Beck & Jennings, 1982: p. 14-29). Empirical evidence comes from Jennings and Markus, who investigated partisanship and voting behaviour of high school seniors and their parents using the four-wave Socialization Panel Study. They found that offspring generation’s social-political responses are disproportionately more erratic than that of their parents. Political orientations increasingly persist with age, however, with a diminishing magnitude (Jennings & Markus, 1982; see also Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Markus, 1979).

The second assumption, that the impressionable years hypothesis relies on, which is called the stability hypothesis, is associated with the persistence of political attitudes. It implies that political values and orientations that are acquired in early life hold such a strong position in human character that they endure and function in shaping the attitudes and behaviour throughout one’s life. A great deal of research has claimed that a systematic relationship occurs between crystallization of party identification and age (Newcomb et al., 1967; Converse, 1964; Markus, 1979; Glenn, 1980; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Jennings & Markus, 1984; Alwin et al., 1991; Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Jennings & Stocker, 1999).
Partisanship is indicated as one of the most stable attitudes. It is found that as one gets older partisanship becomes more impermeable to political events (Jennings & Markus, 1984: p. 1016; Jennings & Stocker, 1999). What is more, each voting experience (Jennings & Markus, 1981: p. 1004-5) as well as early participation and interest in politics (Jennings & Stocker, 1999: p. 3) lead to a higher level of stability in partisan attitudes. The impressionable years hypothesis regards attitudinal instability as an indicator of high receptivity which put early adulthood, in which attitudes appear to be relatively less stable, under the spotlight. However, it should be noted that there is no one way of measuring stability that is agreed upon in the literature. Bivariate correlations (Sears, 1981), simple correlations, mean fluctuations (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976), zero-order correlations (Beck & Jennings, 1982), structural-equation models (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991) are some frequently employed statistical methods to explore stability over time.

2.3.3.2. Later life experiences hypothesis

The later life experiences hypothesis was raised as a contrary argument to the impressionable years hypothesis. The adherents basically argued that socialization is not limited with the adolescence and early adulthood but continues after the adolescence. Opposing the impressionable years hypothesis, Ryder argued that ‘Clearly, childhood socialization cannot prepare a person for all the roles of his later years. Indeed, parents effectively inhibit many types of learning by selectively sheltering their children from and exposing them to the world outside the home. Many types of economic, political and social participation are effectively limited to later life…’ (Ryder, 1965: p. 859). Inkeles, in his attempt where he compared the early and late learning influences, found that late
socialization experiences, i.e. type of occupation, living standards, urbanization and media exposure supersedes early socialization experiences such as education, ethnic background and family education in determining individual modernity (Inkeles, 1974: p. 331).

Searing Wright and Rabinowitz, in their examination of party identification, party efficacy and political trust, achieved important evidence for the later life experiences hypothesis. They analysed five-wave follow-up data from the University of Michigan Survey Research Centre’s election studies conducted between 1952 and 1968. Relying on mean fluctuations they found confirmatory evidence for the later life experiences hypothesis, however, when compared to the learning at the adolescence, adult learning occurs at a low level. Regarding party identification, their findings identified that the highest fluctuation was 18 percent for Democratic and 16 percent for Republican cohorts while the average rate of change appeared to be as 7 percent in Democratic and 4 percent in Republican identifications. On the other hand, their analysis lends support to the idea that efficacy orientations are less stable than party identifications. Mean fluctuations for responsiveness, benevolence and complexity do not exceed 9 percent, while the highest fluctuation for a single cohort over four years is 29 percent. Their third examination concerned stability in political trust. It is demonstrated that political trust is as stable as political efficacy, although different items of political trust differ greatly. Overall, when compared with religious affiliations and issue beliefs, political party identification, political efficacy and political trust appear to be less stable than religious affiliations and more stable than issue beliefs. As a result, they reach the conclusion that learning continues throughout the adult life which, nevertheless, does not refute the validity of the impressionable years hypothesis. What is more, their comparison of age and period effects further demonstrated
that adult change does not appear due to major social events, but as a result of gradual age-related changes (Searing Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 84-101).

Another important discussion revolving around the issue of socialization is the difference between symbolic versus non-symbolic attitudes. Sears’ (1981, 1983) symbolic attitudes theory suggests that symbolic attitudes such as party identification and ideological orientations crystallizes at early adulthood and is not based on deep knowledge while non-symbolic attitudes originate from information gained during later stages of life and remain erratic during the lifespan. What is more, the former group of attitudes is more likely to persist with the passage of time; the latter group is impressionable to change due to new information. Similarly, Glenn (1980) argues that one needs to be selective while discussing the stability of attitudes. Attitudes that hold a more central position are more stable over the years. Jon A. Krosnick is another scholar who supported the argument that attitudes which hold central positions in human character are more resistant to change. Krosnick (1988) in his investigation where he employed data from American presidential election campaigns shows that attributes to important attitudes make them more resistant. However, he does not rule out the possibility that the relationship may also work the other way around and suggests that it is not unlikely that people decide whether an attitude is important by looking at its stability. According to Krosnick there are some reasons why important attitudes to people must remain stable. Important attitudes may tend to persist because they are possibly related to belief systems and values. Another reason is could be that, important attitudes are linked with larger amounts of experience and knowledge which makes it difficult for them to fade away. In addition to these, it is also likely that people spend time with like-minded ones which help these attitudes to settle down. Last
reason could be that, people may associate themselves with attitudes they think are important (Krosnick, 1988: p. 240-52; see also Glenn, 1980). Lastly Duane F. Alwin and Krosnick’s work is worth mentioning. Alwin and Krosnick tested impressionable years, ageing stability’ and symbolic attitudes hypotheses on over fifty different attitudes. They employed a nationally representative sample derived from the American National Election Study’s (ANES) three-wave panel surveys. They found that youngest group’s attitude are the least stable, however the difference is not statistically significant. What is more symbolic attitudes are not significantly more stable than non-symbolic attitudes. However, their analysis revealed that the stability of the intensity component of partisan attitudes declines over the years, on the other hand, the stability of the direction component of partisanship does not decrease but increases or persists. They also made a distinction in terms of the direction and intensity of attitudes. With a parsimonious interpretation, their findings reveal that attitude stability is the lowest in young ages, it increases in middle age, but no profound decline is found in older ages (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991: p. 179).

As a final word, it should be noted that much of what has been discussed thus far suggests that period effect holds a strong theoretical and empirical position in the realm of attitude change which makes it worth considering. Yet, we should be conscious about its implication before considering period and age effects. Especially for democracy preference, tolerance to out-groups and political participation, which may not be categorized as strong loyalties and attachments, cohort effects might be more vulnerable to the effects of period and age.
3.4. Mannheim’s Theory of Generations

Karl Mannheim’s views on the concept of generation has been discussed previously in this thesis. This section involves Mannheim’s ideas regarding the concept in much greater detail. Mannheim, the founding father of the theory of generations, introduces the main aspects of his theory in his 1927 essay, The Problem of Generations. Enjoying a great deal of theoretical and empirical support from the works of Hyman (1959), Greenstein (1965); Hess and Torney (1965), Easton and Dennis (1967), Kohlberg (1969), Merelman (1973), Liebschutz and Niemi (1974), Niemi and Sobieszek (1977), Shuman and Scott (1987), Krosnick and Alwin (1989), Niemi and Hepburn (1995), Jennings (1996), the theory of generations holds a strong position in the literature. Mannheim’s theory reflects his broader relationist perspective and can be viewed as a part of his sociology of knowledge studies. The departing point of relationism, which is also known as the philosophy of space and time, is the idea that the knowledge about existence can only be achieved by considering spatial and temporal factors (Kaipayil, 2009). Sociology of knowledge, on the other hand, as a school of thought within this research line, investigates the bases of human knowledge. It basically tackles with the question, ‘how knowledge is constructed’. According to the adherents of this school of thought, i.e.; Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, human knowledge is largely shaped by social and historical influences.

Mannheim applies the basic principle of relationism in the particular area of generations. Mannheim defines the concept of generation as ‘one of the basic factors contributing to the genesis of the dynamic of social development’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 320). Crediting
the argument raised by the prominent art historian Wilhelm Pinder, Mannheim suggests that the combined effects of constant and transient factors produces the historical progression of which generation is an important carrier (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 284).

One of the first points Mannheim clarifies in his essay about generation is its difference from concrete groups. A concrete group, as Mannheim suggests, is ‘… the union of a number of individuals through naturally developed or consciously willed ties’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 289). Mannheim alleges that, while family and tribe, which are based on ascribed statuses are examples of the former, modern companies which are established by its participants own will are examples of the latter. Generation, however, is neither comparable to family and tribe nor to modern companies according to Mannheim. In this regard, Mannheim draws a parallelism between generation and social class, in that both limits human experiences in particular ways. Mannheim states that:

The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action. (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 291).

According to Mannheim biological factors play the most fundamental role in the formation of generations. Mannheim argues that:

Generation location is based on the existence of biological rhythm in human existence – the factors of life and death, a limited life span of life, and ageing. Individuals who belong to the same year of birth, are endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimensions of the social process (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]:p. 290).

However, as Mannheim maintains, while the biological factors provide the elementary conditions for their formation, the overall process should not be reduced to the biological base. This is the point where Mannheim’s ideas diverge from those of the French
positivists. Unlike them, Mannheim claims that generations emerge as a result of the joint contribution of biological and non-biological factors. Mannheim argues that:

The fact that people are born at the same time, or their youth, adulthood, and old age coincide, does not in itself involve similarity of location; what does create a similar location is that they are in a position to experience the same events and data, etc., especially that these experiences impinge upon a similarity ‘stratified’ consciousness (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 297).

As can be seen, according to Mannheim, a generation does not come into existence for the mere sake of contemporaneity. Instead, in the process of the formation of generations, contemporaneity is completed with being imposed to the same social and historical events. Moreover, as Mannheim claims, the socio-historical events socialize individuals only if they are experienced by those individuals in the early phases of their lives. This is because, Mannheim argues basing on the theories of development of the human mind that, individuals only start to get to know life, make their first contact with it and its problems during adolescence and early adulthood. The period about the age of 17 is particularly championed by Mannheim in this regard. He suggests that this is the age in which individuals are the most receptive. As Mannheim maintains, the impressions acquired during this period set the basic values what later experiences receive their meaning from (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 299-300; see also Grasso, 2013; Ghitza & Gelman, 2014).

In a modern society which harbours many complexities, accounting contemporaneity and imposition to the same socio-historical context as sole responsible factors for the formation of a homogenous value set is at all not realistic. For that reason, it would not be surprising to observe education, income or social class-based heterogeneities within generational categories. The importance of Mannheim`s theory is located right at this point. Realizing that generation as location is still a too heterogeneous group and needs a further internal
stratification, Mannheim, as the next step of his theorizing, carries on with his decomposition of the generation as location. Mannheim notes that:

In order to share the same generation location, i.e. in order to be able passively to undergo or actively to use the handicaps and privileges inherent in a generation location, one must be born within the same historical and cultural region. Generation as an actuality, however, involves even more than mere co-presence in such a historical and social region. A further concrete nexus is needed to constitute generation as an actuality. This additional nexus may be described as participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303).

To support his more fine-tuned argument, Mannheim raises the question whether peasants living in isolated areas should be put in the same actual generation category with urban youth and answers his own question as ‘Certainly not!’(Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). The justification of this certain answer lurks in his strong belief that the members of the former group maintain an isolated life which is by little chance influenced by important events. On the other hand, while the members of the latter group mostly find themselves in the hub of social and historical events which makes them more vulnerable to their formative influences. As a result, regardless of the common generational locations, the differences in the socialization histories of the two groups generate two different velocities of change. In this connection, Mannheim propounds ‘generation as actuality’ which corresponds to participating ‘… in the common destiny of this historical and social unit’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). Mannheim notes that:

We shall therefore speak of a generation as an actuality only where a concrete bond is created between the members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization. Thus the young peasants we mentioned above only share the same generational location, without, however, being members of the same generation as actuality, with the youth of the town. They are similarly located, in so far as they are potentially capable of being sucked into the vortex of social change, and, in fact, this is what happened in the wars against Napoleon, which stirred up all German classes. For these peasants’ sons, a mere generation location was transformed into membership of a generation as an actuality (Mannheim, (1952 [1928]: p. 303-4).
Here, we understand that Mannheim regards social class as a form of generation as actuality. The difference between ‘generation as location’ and ‘generation as actuality’ likens, as Mannheim maintains, to the difference between ‘class’ and ‘consciously constituted class’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303).

In the following pages of his essay, Mannheim completes this argument by arguing that, actual generations can also be internally stratified into generation units which constitute even more heterogeneous groups. What may play a role in the formation of generation units is, according to Mannheim, being imposed to the same formative event but interpreting it differently. Moreover, as Mannheim maintains, in some cases generation units may represent rival or even antagonistic forces. Mannheim gives conservative and rationalistic/liberal youth groups in the 19th century Germany as examples of generation units (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 304-307).

As can be seen, in Mannheim’s mind the generation phenomenon consists of three imaginary concentric circles, namely; generation as location (generationslagerung), generation as actuality (generationszusammenhang) and generation unit (generationseinheiten). In this representation, generation as location which is symbolized by the large outmost circle that corresponds to the widest criterion of a generation. The next inner-circle, on the other hand, symbolizes generation as actuality and the second inner-circle, which is surrounded by generation as location and generation as actuality respectively, symbolizes generation unit. According to Mannheim, as one moves from the outmost circle to the innermost one, attitudinal heterogeneousness of the categories gradually decreases. This means that, even if they were imposed to the same formative
forces as a result of sharing the same environment; individuals who share a generation location do not necessarily fall into the same category with respect to our focus of investigation. Lastly, it should be noted since it relates to one of the main points of the present thesis that, according to Mannheim some important macro scale events, like wars, can transform generation as locations into generation as actuality. Mannheim states that:

Thus the young peasants we mentioned above only share the same generational location, without, however, being members of the same generation as actuality, with the youth of the town. They are similarly located, in so far as they are potentially capable of being sucked into the vortex of social change, and, in fact, this is what happened in the wars against Napoleon, which stirred up all the German classes. For these peasant’s sons, a mere generation location was transformed into membership of a generation as an actuality (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303-4).

As can be seen from the above paragraph, Mannheim implies that some important macro events like wars can socialize the members of generations in a way that the class-originated differences among them are homogenized.

3.5. Lipset’s Working Class Authoritarianism Thesis

Having introduced the historical and ideological foundations of modernization theory, the key arguments raised by its adherents and critics, the generation phenomenon and the theory of generations of Karl Mannheim, in this final part a final argument is addressed. Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis is reviewed systematically as a reference guide in the analysis of social class gaps in Turkish pro-democratic culture.

Before moving on with Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, we need to take a quick look at the development of authoritarianism studies in the 20th century. The second World War provoked serious interest in Fascist regimes. Researchers wanted to understand individual psychology underlying support for fascist parties. It was thought that one of the
most distinguishing feature of fascists were their authoritarian characteristics. Adorno, et al.’s 1950 book *The Authoritarian Personality* was one of the first academic works on the authoritarian personality. Adorno and his colleagues developed a scale what they called F-scale to gauge anti-democratic values and authoritarianism on the individual level. The scale was constructed by nine basic components. They are: (1) conventionalism (rigid adherence to conventional, middle class values), (2) authoritarian submission (submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the group), (3) authoritarian aggression (tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values), (4) anti-intraception (opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender minded), (5) superstition and stereotypy (the belief in mystical determinants of the individual’s fate, the disposition to think in rigid categories), (6) power and toughness (preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimensions; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventional attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of the strength and toughness), (7) destructiveness and cynicism (generalized hostility, vilification of the human), (8) projectivity (the disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses) and (9) sex (exaggerated concerns with sexual ‘goings-on’).

Some alternative scales were developed to overcome F-scale’s shortcomings. Bob Altemeyer’s Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale is one of the most influential ones. Altemeyer modified the F-scale by adding new questions to develop its ability to capture authoritarian characteristic. RWA consists of 22 questions while half of the questions have authoritarian and the other half have non-authoritarian predispositions. The inter-item
agreement of the scale was over .90 in the US and Canada. The questions aimed to test respondents’ predispositions on radicals, the role of the woman in the family, dissident groups such as homosexuals, atheists and feminists, institutionalized authorities like the government and religion as well as political leaders, traditional and moral values. According to Altemeyer right wing authoritarian character has three major characteristics; authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism. In his theorising authoritarian submission corresponds to submissiveness to all sorts of authorities, authoritarian aggression corresponds an aggressive reaction towards deviant groups of the society and conventionalism involves adherence to traditional norms and rules as well as willing others to adhere to the same rules (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988).

Recently, Karen Stenner, in her 2005 book, has suggested social conditions as important determinants of authoritarian characteristic which was not detected by neither Adorno and his friends’ F-scale nor Altemeyer’s RWA scale (Stenner, 2005). It was also reported that higher education is a stronger determinant of high F-scale score than authoritarian characteristic (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954). Perceived threat is another factor recognized in the literature as an important determinant of authoritarianism. Recently, Feldman and Stenner (1997) did not find a direct relationship between perceived threat and authoritarianism, but found an interaction between the two. According to them perceived threat plays different roles for authoritarians and non-authoritarians. Lastly, it should also be noted that recent studies praise child rearing values as one of the measures of authoritarianism (Feldman and Stenner, 1997: p. 747). This view was also shared by Adorno and his colleagues who suggested that those individuals who were raised by using strict, critical and harsh methods and thought to respect for parents are not able to display
their anger to their parents but to other weaker individuals and groups in the society (Adorno et al., 1950).

Having discussed the development of the concept of authoritarianism shortly now we turn to introduce Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis. As discussed in the above sections, modernization theory is an important system of thought linking the economy with the social sphere. The very essence of modernization theory is the idea that attitudinal variations can be largely explained by referring to infrastructural indicators. Therefore, the modernization theorist is accustomed to explaining human attitudes through attributes such as class position, education, income, etc. Seymour Martin Lipset; a leading theorist of the modernization school, in his seminal 1959 work *Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism*, raised perhaps one of the clearest arguments concerning to the relationship between social class structure and authoritarian propensity. His thesis is strong in its argument. Lipset notes that:

Before 1914, the classic division between the working-class left parties and the right was not based solely upon stratification issues, such as redistribution of income, status, and educational opportunities, but also rested upon civil liberties and international policy issues. The workers, judged by the policies of their parties, were often the backbone of the fight for greater political democracy, religious freedom and minority rights, and international peace. The parties backed by the conservative middle and upper class in much of Europe, on the other hand, tended to favour more extremist political forms, resist the extension of the suffrage, back the established church, and support jingoistic foreign policies.

Events since 1914 have gradually eroded these patterns. In some countries working class groups have proven to be the most nationalistic and jingoistic sector of the population. In a number of nations, they have clearly been in the forefront of the struggle against equal rights for minority groups, and have sought to limit immigration or to impose racial standards in countries with open immigration (Lipset, 1959: p. 483).

As can be seen from the above quotation, Lipset claims that authoritarianism is disproportionately spread among the social classes. More specifically, according to Lipset
working class members of the society since the start of the century have become more reactionary and more likely to adopt an authoritarian outlook than their middle class counterparts. According to Lipset, political inclination towards autocratic regimes, intolerance against civil liberties and rights of unpopular groups constitute some of the dimensions of the working class’s authoritarian predisposition. Lipset links working class authoritarianism, with a series of factors, i.e. low educational attainment, economic insecurity and isolation at the workplace. Lipset suggests that low educational attainment among the working class members prevents them from comprehending complicated relationships and gradual mechanisms of politics. They search for quick solutions to economic and political problems and are attracted by radical movements that pledge revolutionary changes. Another point Lipset stresses is the economically insecure feeling of the working class members. Lipset claims that relatively easy replacement of unskilled workers at the workplace causes tension and aggression, which are directed either to the family members or to the ‘dissident’ groups in the society. Isolation of the workplace is another working class feature that Lipset points out in his analysis. Lipset argues that being surrounded by those who share the similar backgrounds make the occupants of the jobs, i.e. miners, fishers, farmers and small businessmen living in the provinces, politically less tolerant of people from different ethnic, religious and national groups (Lipset, 1959: p. 483, 491-92).

Lipset’s argument concerning the relationship between the middle class share of income and democracy was tested in both nation and individual levels. Robert J. Barro (1999) in his study analysed data from over 100 countries and found a positive relationship between
the middle class share of income and democracy. With these results, he credited the role of
the middle class as the primary promoter of societal segment of democracy. However,
from a historical perspective Göran Therborn raises a counter argument regarding the
relationship. Therborn suggests that no bourgeois democracies did neither born out of a
bourgeois revolution nor wealth, literacy and urbanization. Instead, in countries, such as
Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan and Sweden bourgeois democracies grew out of a
defeat against a non-democratic country (Therborn, 1997: p. 17-21).

On the other hand, many criticisms levelled against Lipset’s particular thesis. S. M. Miller
and Frank Riessman in their 1961 essay criticized Lipset on several grounds. Their first
criticism is on the usage of the question inquiring respondents' preference of the number of
parties in a political system. They argue that this question may well be interpreted either as
a question asking the respondents’ general views of the political system or their day-to-day
views about the ongoing political debates in the country. Their second criticism is on the
mutually exclusiveness of democratic and authoritarian concepts. Not necessarily
authoritarianism is associated with undemocratic practices while democracy is associated
with non-authoritarianism. They also criticize the use of the data from Stouffer’s study.
They suggest that intolerant attitudes may not necessarily imply an ignorance of dissident
groups’ civil liberties, but may reflect an incompatibility with their world-view. Another
point Miller and Riessman make is that lower class persons’ uncertainty in their opinions
does not necessarily show that they view the world in black-and-white terms. They suggest
that their authoritarian-equalitarian (A-E) scale which is a modified version of the F-scale
is not able to discriminate different levels of authoritarianism among working class
members as it does among middle class members. Therefore, a high percent of middle-class members appeared to be authoritarian in their analysis. Their last criticism is that preference of a strong leader, anti-intellectualism, punitive attitudes towards the children and a definite world-view do not necessarily reflect authoritarianism but may originate from traditionalism and pragmatism in American cultural contexts. They suggest that if democracy is measured by egalitarian, anti-elitist, cooperative measures, which are compatible with working class characteristics, the working class would not appear to be too non-democratic (Miller & Riessman, 1961).

Another criticism of Lipset’s thesis came from Edward G. Grabb. Grabb, in his attempt to test Lipset’s argument, approved that the working class individuals are less likely to show tolerance to out-groups than the middle class members. However, in his analysis, Grabb revealed that, the difference is neither dramatic nor does it arise directly from the type of occupation *per se*. He demonstrated that no statistical difference between blue and white collar employees is found when education, income and cynicism are controlled. Based on these results, he supported the view that the low tolerance of blue collar workers is attributable to their relatively lower education, income levels and high distrust (Grabb, 1979). More recently, Dick Houtman, in his review of the Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, has noted that education incorporates class and cultural capital. Moreover, income is also as an indicator of class, but to a lesser extent. By employing low income, wage dependence and job insecurity as ‘unambiguous’ class indicators and cultural participation as the second ‘less ambiguous’ indicator of cultural capital after education, Houtman attempts to distinguish education effects from the social class effects.
He argues that if there is a particular class effect, the first group of indicators should play role in authoritarianism but cultural participation should not. His analysis shows that the class effect on authoritarianism is largely explained by education and cultural participation. In this regard, Houtman distinguishes economic liberalism from conservatism and authoritarianism from libertarianism (See for a contrary argument Napier & Jost, 2008). He argues that while the economic market position is associated with the former ones, cultural capital is associated with the latter ones. Houtman’s more recent findings signal similar results. In his 2003 study Houtman finds that when education and cultural participation are controlled, the class effect largely fades away (Houtman, 2003).

Remember, the purpose of the current chapter is to introduce main aspects of the modernization theory, Mannheim’s theory of generations and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism to the reader. In the beginning of the first section, which tackles with the modernization theory, the industrial and French revolutions were briefly discussed with respect to their role in the First Modernization. Following this part, the question ‘what is modernization’ was answered by referring to prominent thinkers of the modernization theory. Positivist, Marxist and structural functionalist origins of the modernist thinker were also briefly discussed. At the end of this section some discussions pertaining to the concept of modernization and the modernization theory, including the great dichotomy and the convergence thesis were discussed. The second sub-section started with raising the question ‘what is generation?’ In order to find an answer to this question first a rivalry between French positivist and German romanticist approaches regarding to the formation of generations were introduced by referring to the first part of Mannheim’s classic work.
Following this, four forms of generation, (a) generation as a kinship descent, (b) generation as a life stage, (c) generation as a historical period and (d) generation as a cohort were discussed based on Kertzer’s categorization. Next, the impressionable years hypothesis and the later life experiences hypothesis were introduced with the same purpose. In the third subsection, Mannheim’s theory of generations and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism were introduced to guide our search of attitudinal differences across generational and class categories in the upcoming empirical chapters.

Based on this theoretical ground, the following two groups of hypotheses lead the thesis. The first set of hypotheses aims to test Mannheim’s general insight in the Turkish context. Relying on Mannheim’s argument on the formation of generations, it is expected that the members of generations socialized by authoritarian and non-authoritarian governments exhibit different levels of pro-democratic attitudes. More particularly, it is hypothesized that, owing to the politico-juridical order during their socialization, the members of the post-1980 generation are less likely to assess democracy as the best form of government, tolerate the dissident members of the society and participate in politics than the members of the previous generation. The second set of hypotheses employs a more particular argument of Mannheim as a theoretical guideline. In Mannheim’s theorizing the generation phenomenon emerges as three imaginary concentric circles, namely: generation as location (generationslagerung), generation as actuality (generationszusammenhang) and generation unit (generationseinheiten). In this representation, generation as location which is symbolized by the large outmost circle corresponds to the widest criterion of a generation. The first inner-circle, on the other hand, symbolizes generation as actuality and the second inner-circle, which is surrounded by generation as location and generation as actuality.
respectively, symbolizes generation unit. As one moves from the outmost circle to the innermost one, attitudinal heterogeneity of the categories represented by the circles is expected to decrease. Social class occupies an important part in Mannheim’s theorizing in this model. According to Mannheim, social classes constitute more coherent units of a generation and therefore should be regarded as ‘actual generation’. Mannheim suggests that peasants living in isolated areas should not be considered within the same actual generation category with urban youth even if they share a generational location (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303). Although Mannheim attaches importance to social class in further decompositions of generations, his theory lacks an explanation of how social classes differ from each other in the same generational location. Nevertheless, Mannheim provides the example of a situation which could abolish the differences between social classes. Mannheim argues that social classes may blend in with one another as a result of being socialized by an extraordinary event. According to Mannheim, this is what happened to German classes during the wars against Napoleon (Mannheim, 1952 [1928], p. 303-4).

Based on this insight, the second set of analysis initially aims to understand the relationship between social class structure and pro-democratic orientations in Turkey. With this objective in mind, Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis is used as a theoretical guide. As a pioneer thinker of modernization theory, strongly informed by positivist and Marxist ideologies, Lipset, in his landmark *Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism* essay, argues that the members of the lower classes, particularly the manual workers, miners, fishers and farmers are more likely to develop an authoritarian characteristic than their middle class counterparts. According to Lipset, the working class’s authoritarian predisposition is reflected in a wide range of attitudes, i.e. their scepticism
about democracy and intolerance of minorities. Basing his thesis on a series of measures, i.e. surveys inquiring preference of the number of political parties in the Parliament, support for extremist parties, the F scale and his own observations, Lipset acknowledges that a series of factors, i.e. low education, economic insecurity, low income, low participation in politics, isolation in the workplace and authoritarian family background, underlie the working class’ authoritarianism (Lipset, 1959). Thus, here it is hypothesized in the light of Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis that the manual class individuals in Turkey are disproportionately less likely to adopt pro-democratic attitudes than their non-manual class counterparts. More specifically, the manual class members are expected to be less likely to prefer democracy over its autocratic alternatives, show tolerance to the members of the minority groups and participate in politics than the non-manual class members. In the third group of analysis, having assessed Lipset’s theory in the particular case of Turkey, it is moved on to test it across generations. Combining Mannheim’s general idea on the formation of generations and particular claim on the homogenization of the social classes with Lipset’s thesis, it is investigated whether social classes are homogenized with respect to their pro-democratic culture as a result of being exposed to major scale events. It is expected that the social class effect on pro-democratic attitudes is largely determined by system level authoritarianism experienced during socialization period. More specifically, social classes are expected to be homogenized with respect to their likelihood of displaying pro-democratic attitudes if the generation they belong to was socialized under authoritarian governments and legal order. On the other hand, if the given generation was not socialized under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, it is expected
in line with Lipset’s argument, that the non-manual class members of those generations are more likely to develop pro-democratic orientations than their manual class counterparts.
CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODS

This chapter is designed to introduce the data that were used for the analysis of the present thesis, the survey items that were used in the construction of the dependent and independent variables and the method that was employed to investigate the relationships between the variables.

4.1. Data

The five waves (1990, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011) of repeated cross-sectional World Values Survey (WVS) data for Turkey were employed in the analyses of the present thesis. While in the first and third empirical chapters, the data from all the five waves; in the second empirical chapter the data from the last four waves were employed due to the absence of the battery that was used in the construction of the dependent variable of the second empirical chapter in the 1990 survey. The WVS is selected because it is the only available data for Turkey containing the measures of interest to this study. The WVS monitors people’s values, beliefs and ideas regarding to politics, government, society, religion, economy, culture, family, the other individuals and etc. It consists of data from almost 100 countries, representing almost 90% of the world population. The surveys are administered by the World Values Survey Association (WVSA), which is a global network of social scientists (World Values Survey, 2016).

The Turkish surveys began in 1990 and extended through 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2014. Five waves of the Turkish survey were conducted by face-to-face interviews with Turkish respondents at the age of 18 and over. In general, Turkish surveys followed a three-staged
sampling procedure. In the first stage, statistical blocs, including a certain number of households are selected. In the second stage, households are selected randomly within blocs. In the final stage, individuals are selected randomly within households.

As reported in the methodological questionnaire of the 2001 survey, the first stage involves a series of steps. First, provinces were selected as self-representative as Primary Sampling Units (PSU). Next, they are stratified according to income. Then, districts are selected within provinces. Finally, within districts, urban/rural locations, i.e. villages (in rural locations), neighbourhoods and streets (in urban locations) are selected following Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method. The second stage involved random selection of households within locations and the final stage involved the random selection of individuals within households (WVS Methodological Questionnaire for Turkey, 2001).

As reported in the subsidiary documents of the 2011 survey, the blocs are selected as Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) following the Turkish Statistical Institute’s ‘blocking’ system which divides the population into blocs involving a certain number of households. The blocs were distributed ‘at the highest possible level’ across NUTS1 regions, which divides Turkey into 12 regions. For instance, in the 2011 survey, 134 blocs each involving 300 households (150 in the 2007 survey) were randomly selected. The second stage involved the selection of 12 out of 300 households within each bloc. Following the selection of households, in the third stage, individuals are randomly selected within households by using a Kish grid method, which uses a pre-assigned table of random numbers to decide the person to be interviewed. The Turkish sample is generally well-distributed across sex and age categories and across the regions of the country. Yet, it was
noted that response rates were lower in urban than it is in rural settlements (WVS Sampling Frame for Turkey, 2011; WVS Methodological Questionnaire for Turkey, 2007).  

4.2. Variables

The variables of the analysis employed in this thesis were derived from the Turkish respondents’ valid answers. While constructing the sample, ‘no answer’ and ‘don’t know’ answers were set to missing and those cases holding missing values on any of the variables of our interest were deleted. It should be noted that, the deletion of ‘no answer’ and ‘don’t knows’ is not expected to change the representativeness of our sample. This is because, before and after these were deleted, the distribution of the categories within our key variables did not change considerably. The final samples of the three subsequent empirical chapters are representative of the Turkish population. Since the independent variables were largely protected across the empirical chapters, the number of respondents who answered the question that the dependent variable was derived from largely determined the sample size in each chapter. While the first empirical chapter holds 5701, the second and the third empirical chapters contain 4970 and 6488 cases respectively.  

4.2.1. Dependent Variables

Pro-democratic culture was quantified by means of the three groups of variables, each for one empirical chapter. They are: political participation, democracy preference and out-

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4 Turkish surveys are conducted by Boğaziçi University under the Chairmanship of Professor Dr Yılmaz Esmer.
5 A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices section.
group tolerance. These three groups of variables’ relation to system level democracy is discussed widely in the theory chapter. These variables were designed to measure the respondents’ participation in politics, their preference of democracy as a way of governing the country over its autocratic alternatives and tolerance towards unpopular groups in the society. These three groups of variables resided at the dependent end of the analysis and were investigated as a function of two key independent variables: generation and social class.

The dependent variable of the first empirical chapter is derived from a battery type question inquiring respondents’ participation in politics. Political participation was assessed in the question by means of three repertoires: signing a petition, joining a boycott and attending a lawful demonstration. All the three items were routinely replicated in five successive rounds of the survey. Each repertoire of action was employed as a separate dependent variable owing to huge discrepancies in the rates of respondents’ participation to each. The answer categories were designed to involve information regarding whether the respondents have done, might do or would never do these political actions. While recoding the answers, have done answers were distinguished from hypothetical might do and would never do answers. This way, only actual participation was specified as the success category.

In the second empirical chapter democracy preference was employed as the dependent variable. The variable was based on a battery-type question asking the respondents’ ideas regarding four forms of political regimes. Relying on previous theoretical advice, and our own factor analysis results, while constructing the variable, the respondents’ legitimization
of democracy is subtracted from their delegitimization of army rule which was found to be the strongest alternative of democracy.

The dependent variable of the third empirical chapter inspects the respondents’ ideas concerning having a neighbour from several groups that are known to be unpopular in the Turkish society. A total number of the six groups were repeated in the last five waves. They are; heavy drinkers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, people of a different race and immigrants/foreign workers. Our factor analysis findings revealed that the first four and the last two groups tap in two separate factors. This means that the idea of having neighbours from the first four groups occurs differently than the idea of having neighbours from the last two groups in the minds of Turkish respondents. Moreover, the rejection rates pertaining to the two sets of groups also differ hugely. Based on this empirical ground, two composite type variables were designed. They were called nationalistic out-group tolerance and social out-group tolerance.\(^6\)

### 4.2.2. Independent Variables

The construction of the two key independent variables, namely generation and social class are elaborated in the following lines. In addition to generation and social class, the model also encompasses a series of controls to isolate the proper effects of these two independent variables on the dependent ones.

\(^6\) Further information on the construction of the dependent variables are presented in the data and methods section of each empirical chapter.
4.2.2.1. Generation

In order to analyse a potential generational divide in the three measures of pro-democratic attitude, generation was employed as the first key independent variable. The generation variable was obtained from the WVS question asking the respondents’ year of birth. It should first be noted early that generations sketched in this study should be perceived as ‘generation as cohort’ since they basically represent age-groups stratified by major politico-historical events. They neither represent ‘a principle of kinship descent’, nor ‘a life stage’ or ‘a historical period’ (Kertzer, 1983). Moreover, our successor generations are also by no means future time representatives of the predecessor ones since the data does not hold a longitudinal characteristic. It is widely recognized in the literature that age, period and cohort (APC) effects can intertwine (Glenn, 1976; Pilcher, 1994; Grasso, 2014). In cross-sectional designs like ours disentangling of the age, period and cohort effects is a big problem (Pilcher, 1994). However, to tackle this problem cohort analysis serves as a ‘quasi-panel technique’ (Searing, Wright & Rabinowitz, 1976: p. 86).

While constructing the generation variable, the below two-staged analytical strategy was followed to locate each respondent in the right generational location. As is known, generations are replaced in a gradual manner in the flow of history, which makes pulling them apart a difficult task. As a result of this, it is always difficult to find quantitative responses to generational differences. To prevent artificial demarcation of generations and increase the changes to capture inter-generational differences, major scale important events are frequently used as splicing points (Spitzer, 1973: p. 1358; Roscow, 1978: p. 69). This research refers the 1960 and 1980 military coups, two landmark events in the recent
Turkish political history, in this regard. It should be noted that, unlike Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz (1976: p. 89), this work did not treat major formative events as points in history, but as intervals because although our events came all of a sudden, they are important not in terms of their sudden appearance, but in terms of their consequences spread across a long time period. Having the two military coups pinpointed, as the next step, with reference to these two noticeable events, the Turkish 20th century political history was divided into three periods, what we labelled as ‘the foundation’, ‘the interim’ and ‘the post-1980’. After splitting apart the three periods, following Beck and Jennings (1979: p. 749) advice, ‘an explicit political factor’ was considered while distinguishing the interim period from the foundation and post-1980 periods. Our explicit political factor is system level authoritarianism. As discussed extensively in the background chapter, the foundation and the post-1980 periods are more authoritarian than the interim period with respect to its politico-juridical atmosphere. Therefore, while the foundation and the post-1980 periods are labelled as authoritarian, the interim period was labelled as non-authoritarian.

Given that, each period remains shorter than an average human life and a respondent may well live through two, even three periods, we needed to decide how to associate each respondent with one political period. At this point, we followed the guidance of Mannheim’s theory of generations. Mannheim argues that individuals first encounter with the life problems ‘round about the age of seventeen, sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 300). According to Mannheim, this is a period in which individuals are the most receptive since they face a bombardment of information while not having little prior knowledge about things. Mannheim’s point is
supported by other students of socialization. Nie et al (1996) defined the formative period as an interval between mid to late adolescence. According to Erikson (1950), the period from fourteen to fifteen is important for the formation of political views and attitudes. Niemi and Hepburn (1995) proposed the age range between fourteen and twenty-five as being crucial for the formation of participatory behaviour. Following this tradition, especially Mannheim’s and Erikson’s advises on the formation of political attitudes, fifteen was specified as the peak age of socialization (see also Grasso, 2013; Ghitza & Gelman, 2014). The reason underlying the selection of one particular age was to avoid overlapping generational locations. Logically, fifteen is the age at which young individuals are old enough to acquire from life experiences, but still too young to emancipate themselves from authoritarian pressures coming from the family and the school. Thus, each respondent was located in the period, which he/she spent his/her fifteenth year in and by this means the whole sample was divided into three generational categories. Generations were named after their related periods. As a result, while those respondents who were born before 1944 constituted the foundation generation, those who were born between 1945 and 1964 constituted the interim and those who were born after 1965 constituted the post-1980 generations. The unbalanced number of the generations doesn’t show an under-representation, but which was something naturally expected because the foundation generation involves the oldest respondents. Yet, the two younger generations, namely interim and the post-1980, are comparable due to the numbers of cases they include. Therefore, the comparison of these two comparable-in-size generations is particularly focused in the analyses.
4.2.2.2. Social Class

The second key independent variable is social class. Social class measurement employed in the analyses is an objective class measurement since it relies on the answers given to the WVS question asking respondents’ current or last occupation. The question asks: *In which profession/occupation do you work? If more than one job, the main job? What is/was your job there?* Following the question, fifteen occupations were given to the respondents to express their own statuses. As the battery, in its original version, largely overlaps with John Goldthorpe’s 11-digit version of the class schemata (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992), while obtaining the class variable Goldthorpe’s guidance was followed. The Goldthorpe schema is a widely recognized categorization of social classes in the Western context and preferable, especially due to its ability in capturing the associations in attitudes and behaviour, to some of its alternatives, including the Registrar General’s classification of occupations or theory-oriented Marxian categorizations (Evans, 1992). Within the scope of this analytical strategy, first, the original 15-point scale version was downgraded to three main clusters, namely *manual, non-manual and service/self-employed*. However, in addition to these, the large number of respondents, who assessed their occupational status as unemployed, agricultural worker and has own farm, compelled the inclusion of *unemployed* and *farmer* categories. In most cases, agricultural worker and has own farm categories exhibit close levels of pro-democratic attitudes so they were included in the same category.
4.2.3. Controls

The configuration of the controls was guided by the theory and the empirical findings of the previous works. In order to reveal the pure cohort effect, three variables, *age, age squared and survey years* were included in the analysis. *Age* was employed in its original linear format, *age squared* was included as a quadratic term to capture the curvilinear age effect which tends to follow parabolic shape and *survey year* dummies were included to account for the period effect. As it is widely discussed in the literature, social class measurement can obscure other socioeconomic factors foremost education and income (Dekker & Ester, 1987; Mishler & Rose, 2001: p. 54; Evans & Rose, 2012 p. 510-11; Grasso, 2013). Therefore, to isolate the proper social class effect, *education* and *income* variables were employed as controls. The *education* variable was coded into three categories by looking at the three basic stages in the Turkish national education system; elementary, secondary and university (See, Evans & Rose, 1996:502-503; Weil, 1987; Bratton, 2005). The *income* variable was left in its 10-digit original model. In addition to these, in the second empirical chapter, which predicts the respondents’ level of participation in politics, four variables, namely *political interest, politics important, self-political positioning* and *post materialism* were included to control for the respondents’ personal interest in politics. Similarly, in the third empirical chapter *distrust* variable was employed to isolate a group-specific intolerance from the general feeling of distrust (Graab, 1979). As right-wing authoritarianism and religion are known to be important determinants of some pro-democratic attitudes, in all the models a 7-item *authoritarian child-rearing* (Kohn, 1977; Feldman & Stenner, 1997) and also 7-item *perform prayer* variables were recruited to isolate system level authoritarianism effect from individual-
level right-wing authoritarianism and control religiosity. Lastly, Gender (female) was employed as a classical control variable in all the models.7

4.3. Method

Multivariate logistic regression, ordinary least squares and ordered logistic regression are applied to measure relationships between the dependent and the independent variables in three respective empirical chapters. The reason underlying the selection of the type of the analysis is, as expected, directly related to the character of the dependent variables. Multivariate logistic regression is used in the analyses of the first empirical chapter. Multivariate logistic regression is a probabilistic model used to predict binary-type dependent variables. A binary variable is a special categorical variable with two possible outcomes. The variable takes on the value ‘1’ if event happens ‘success’, and ‘0’ if the event does not happen ‘failure’ (coding depends on what one would like to measure as success and failure). The logistic regression estimates the probability of a binary outcome’s taking on value 1 as a function of a one or more than one explanatory variable. The ordinary least squares (OLS) is used in the analyses of the second empirical chapter. The OLS, on the other hand, is used to model relationships between a scalar dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Basically it aims to minimize the sum of squares of the differences between the observations. Finally, since we don’t know whether the distances between the various categories of the dependent variable are identical or not, ordered logistic regression is recruited to predict the relationships between the dependent

7 Further information on questionnaire wording, original and re-coded versions of the variables see Table 3.1 in the Appendices.
and the independent variables in the third empirical chapter (Long & Freese, 2006). All the analysis were executed with the help of the STATA 11.2 software programme.

In each empirical chapter four groups of model were run. While the first models test Mannheim’s hypothesis, the next two test that of Lipset. In the fourth models, Mannhaim’s and Lipset’s models are combined. In the fourth models the data is split into three generational categories and the same model was run repeatedly with three samples coming from three generations. This procedure was preferred to interactions due to its several advantages. First, splitting the overall sample into three generational categories and running separate regressions for each disentangles the cohort effect from the age and period effects effectively. Second, this procedure reduces the likelihood of the emergence of a sampling error since each generation involves respondents from several survey waves. Third, this procedure allows pitting the manual class category against each occupational category separately, which allows understanding of the relative influence of being a manual class member to being a non-manual class member. In our models, the three dependent variables reside at the dependent end of the causal relationship as a function of two key independent variables: social class and generation. The generation and class measures were treated in the analysis concomitantly following Hans Jeager’s advice. Jeager likens studying history from the generational and class perspectives to studying ‘the path of longitudinal and diagonal threads of a rather messily produced fabric’. Jeager continues and suggests that ‘we therefore have to deal with a coordinating system with two axes, in which the social historical location of each individual can be determined through information both about his age and his class membership.’ (Jeager, 1985: p. 285). According to Jeager two basic difficulties are likely to occur while following this
methodology. First, this method may give way to many groups which make the sampling impossible. In the counter scenario, having larger generational and class categories may not give clear results about the groupings. So, neither an excessive elaboration nor a synthetic fusion of the generational and class categories is advised. Jeager suggests that the second difficulty regarding to this methodology may stem from the fact that there are no universal rules to investigate the relationship between generation and social class. Expectedly, he argues, three types of relationship are likely to occur between generation and class. Class and generational memberships either bolster or impede each other’s role, or no relationship occurs between the two (Jeager, 1985: p. 285).
CHAPTER 5. A PARTICIPATORY GENERATION? THE GENERATIONAL AND CLASS BASES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY

Today, political participation is on the rise all over the world. Individuals want to make their voices heard by the central governments in America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Thousands of protesters take part in demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins against socioeconomic inequality, austerity measures, and governments` authoritarian practices. Occupy Movements, Colour Revolutions, the Arab Spring are but some examples of attempts made in this direction. Turkey is no exception to this global trend. The Gezi Protests (GP), which took place in the 2013 summer, sparked as a resistance against the Turkish government`s decision to reconstruct of historical military barracks in the Taksim Gezi Park, İstanbul. A small number of environmentalists engaged in the protests in the beginning, but the police`s severe suppression of the first wave of protests through the use of tear gas and water cannons transformed them into a nationwide movement.

The GP put Turkey in the limelight of the political participation research. Many local as well as foreign researchers took an interest in the protests. To better understand the underlying circumstances of the protests, parallels were drawn between the GP and other youth-led movements in the recent history. Nilüfer Göle, a leading Turkish sociologist contends that ‘The Gezi Movement is both all of these movements, and none of them. It borrows from them all, and has similarities with each. However, it is also distinct and unique’ (Göle, 2013: p. 8). Göle draws a parallelism between the anti-De Gaullist
characteristics of the May ’68 movement in France and the anti-Erdoğanist motives of the GP, and to a lesser extent, likens the GP to the new anti-system movements in the Western countries. However, rejecting the comparisons between the GP and Arab Spring, Göle suggests that Turkey diverges from the countries in the Middle East through its democratic tradition (Göle, 2013).

An analogy can also be drawn between the macroeconomic circumstances preceding the 1960s youth-led movements in Western Europe and the GP in Turkey. According to the post-materialist theory, which is perhaps as the most popular theorizing of the impact of secular changes in post-war Europe, the individuals who were born into the physical and economic security environment of the post-WWII Europe did not need to struggle for their material needs. Instead, enjoying material security from birth, what those individuals seek for is a higher set of needs, i.e. direct political participation, self-esteem, self-actualization, aesthetics, well-being and life satisfaction. Eventually, by means of the generational replacement mechanism, these individuals became the majority in the 1970s, which paved the way for a sociological transformation in the Western European advanced industrial societies labelled as ‘the silent revolution’ (Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart & Deutsch, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 43-44). Arguably, macroeconomic stabilization in Turkey in the post-1980 period, which, to a large extent, overlaps with the period in which the majority of the Gezi protesters came of age, can be likened to the economic development in post-war Western Europe. Making such an analogy is important because a participatory Turkish generation which was socialized during this period, if any, may breathe fresh life into Turkish democracy, as did the 1960s youth movement in Western Europe.
Beginning with the liberalization of the market in the early 1980s, the Turkish economy has grown by about five percent in average and the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) has quadrupled till 2010s. The share of the middle class increased from 18 to 41 percent between 1993 and 2010. Turkey signed the Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 which increased Turkish exports to the European region by about twenty times (World Bank, 2016). By drawing parallels between this period in the Turkish history and the post-war period in the Western European history in the light of Inglehart’s post-materialist theory (Inglehart, 1977; 1990; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002), one can argue that the members of the generation which have enjoyed relatively affluent economic conditions of the post-1980 Turkey during their formative years are more likely to participate in politics than the members of the preceding generations.

5.1. Theory

In the literature, the effects of both macroeconomic and macro political socialization of generations on political actions have been recognized. Starting from early 1970s, a group of scholars has focused on the declining levels of electoral turnout and party membership in the advanced industrialized nations of the West, which, according to them, if not prohibited, may lead to governability problems which may constitute appreciable risks for democracy (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1973; Putnam, 1995; 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Putnam & Gross, 2002; Huntington, 1981). Opposing to this startling picture, another stream of scholars has argued that this ‘political cynicism’ was a mis-detection. They have claimed that it is not true that political participation is shrinking. On the contrary, it is undergoing a reformation and change in traditional repertoires, structure and
objectives of political action lead to an even higher level of participation. Ronald Inglehart, from this stream, explains the shift in the forms of political participation as a result of an overall shift from materialist to post-materialist values in the advanced industrialized societies of the West. According to Inglehart, the members of the post-WWII generation, who had born into an economic and physical security environment of the post-war era, took economic and physical security granted. As a result of being born into a relatively more affluent life, the members of this generation prioritize a higher set of values, i.e. well-being, self-actualization, self-development and self-expression. Thus, it is suggested that the rise of the ratio of the members of this generation paved the way for a transformation from materialism to post-materialism. In the particular realm of political activism, Inglehart maintains that, rising levels of physical and human capital undermine the conventional forms of political action and introduce new avenues to participate in politics. More elite-challenging, flexible and direct forms of political action substituted conventional forms since the latter have substantially lost their ability to respond needs of a new post-materialist generation (Inglehart, 1971; Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 43).

The shift from institutionalized to novel forms of political action is also recognized by some other prominent students of participation. In line with Inglehart, Pippa Norris suggests a change in the ‘agencies’, ‘repertoires’ and ‘targets’ of political action in the Western democracies and argues that novel forms of political action, right alongside the conventional ones provide substitute channels for individuals to contact the state. According to Norris ‘the reinvention of civic activism, allows political energies to flow
through diverse alternative avenues as well as conventional channels’ (Norris, 2002: p. 11-2). In the same vein, Russell J. Dalton recognizes the same shift in the US and other advanced industrial democracies. According to Dalton, this does not put democracy at risk, instead enhances democratic participation. Dalton shows that while older Americans are more likely to adopt duty-based citizenship norms, namely voting and other institutionalized forms of political action, younger Americans are more likely to adopt new and emerging norms, i.e. joining in boycotts, buying products with political reasons. In his attempt to use generational patterns to understand changing norms of political action, Dalton finds that a shift in citizenship norms changes citizens` attitudes and behavior in general and political actions in particular (Dalton, 2008).

Alternative to the macroeconomic socialization which was outlined above, another group of researchers has focussed on macro political socialization. A period ranging from the late 1960s to the early 1970s in the US worths a particular attention in this regard. Beck and Jennings in their study where they investigated data from the 1965-1973 Socialization Panel Study and the 1956-1976 Michigan Presidential Election Surveys show that the American youth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which they recognize as ‘a deviant period’, constitute a particular generation with respect to their high level of political participation. According to them the general theories of participation are not able to explain the generation-participation relationship for this generation. The youth of this period, which was socialized by some remarkable events, i.e. anti-Vietnam war protests, Civil Rights Movement and McCarthyism, developed a more activity-prone characteristic than the youth of the preceding periods and also the adults of their time. To capture this
deviance period, Beck and Jennings suggest adopting ‘an approach which can handle ‘deviance’ as well as ‘normality’ by adding an explicit political factor, the opportunities for involvement, into the participation equation’ (Beck & Jennings, 1979: p. 749; see also Beck & Jennings, 1982).

Departing from this theoretical ground we set our research hypotheses accordingly. First, it should be noted that the situation in the post-1980 Turkey is quite different than in the post-war West. When macroeconomic development is considered as the sole factor, the post-1980 Turkey and the post-war Western Europe can be likened, nevertheless, an important feature of the former, which may also have influenced the socialization of the Turkish youth, distinguishes it from the latter. It is system-level authoritarianism. As discussed in the background chapter in details that along with macroeconomic stabilization, the post-1980 period in Turkey has also witnessed authoritarian governmental practices introduced on the plea of re-establishing the state authority and the security environment in the country. Unlike the situation in the post-war Western Europe in which socioeconomic development was accompanied with the empowerment of the individual against the state; in post-1980 Turkey, macroeconomic development was accompanied by the adoption of an authoritarian political system which did not pay enough attention to the protection of many fundamental rights and freedoms. Taking this fact into consideration, our first hypothesis is based on the main argument of Karl Mannheim`s theory of generations. Recall that the theory of generations recognizes adolescence and early adulthood as the period in which one is the most receptive and the values that were acquired during this period occupy an important place in one`s value system (Mannheim
1952 [1928], p. 298). From Mannheim’s perspective, we predict that the members of the post-1980 generation who were exposed to the system-level authoritarianism during an early stage of their lives are less likely to adopt an activity-prone characteristic than the members of the previous generation (*Hypothesis I*).

So far, we have discussed the direct generation-participation relationship. However, our data show that the gaps between the likelihoods of participation pertaining to each social class differ across generations. This implies a potential indirect generational effect on participation, which presumably operates via the social class structure. Examining this indirect generational effect requires first clarifying the class-participation relationship in Turkey and then testing it across generations. With this objective in mind, a reputed theoretical guideline explaining the class-participation relationship, Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, is exploited. As it was discussed in the theory chapter, Lipset’s thesis postulates that one of the elements of working class authoritarianism is low participation in politics, which implies that the working class members are less likely to participate in politics than their middle class counterparts (Lipset, 1959: p. 498).

Having the main arguments of Mannheim’s theory of generation and Lipset’s thesis reminded, now we turn to design our second hypothesis. In order to design a hypothesis testing Lipset’s thesis across generations, we combine Lipset’s thesis with Mannheim’s theory and his argument on the transformation of generation as location into actual generations. As can be remembered from the theory chapter, Mannheim defines the generation concept as a combination of three interwoven clusters: generation as location,
generation as actuality and generation unit. Mannheim argues that individuals who share a
generation location are not necessarily the members of the same generation as actuality,
while the members of the same generation as actuality are not necessarily the members of
the same generation unit. However, in some particular circumstances, Mannheim
maintains, generation as location can transform into generation as actuality.

In his modelling of generation as actuality, Mannheim implies that important macro-scale
events can homogenize social classes. From this perspective, combining Mannheim’s
general idea regarding the formation of generations, his argument on the transformation
of generation as location into actual generation with Lipset’s understanding of the class-
participation relationship, we predict that Lipset’s thesis is valid for the generations
which have come of age during an ordinary time; in our case in a period in which an
authoritarian politico-juridical order did not prevail. On the contrary, we suggest that
Lipset’s thesis does not hold for those generations that have socialized by an
extraordinary event; in our case the prevalence of an authoritarian politico-juridical order
because social classes are homogenized in this scenario (Hypothesis II).

5.2. Data and Method

This section introduces the data, the construction of the key variables and the methods
employed in the analysis of the present chapter.
5.2.1. Data

The analysis of the present chapter employed five waves of WVS data for Turkey. After deleting cases, holding ‘no answer’ and ‘don’t know’ answers for any of the variables of our interest, a final sample which consists of 5071 cases is obtained. Construction of the dependent and the independent variables are presented below.8

5.2.2. Variables

5.2.2.1. Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable was based on a question inquiring into the respondents’ participation in politics. The question asks: Now here are some forms of political action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Following the question, three repertoires of political action, which were repeated in all the five subsequent waves of the Turkish survey, are given as options to the respondents. They are: signing a petition, joining in boycotts, and attending lawful demonstrations. These three repertoires of action constitute the three dependent variables of the current investigation. The dependent variables are recoded so ‘1’ is assigned for participation and ‘0’ for non-participation (see Grasso, 2011; 2014).

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8 A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices section.
5.2.2.2. Independent Variables

Two key independent variables are employed in the analysis: generation and social class. The two variables were largely discussed in the data and methods section. In this chapter three additional controls, namely political interest, importance of politics and self-political positioning were employed to control for the respondents` general interest in politics.

5.2.3. Method

Since each of our three dependent variables has two possible outcomes, logistic regression models were sketched to empirically test the hypotheses set previously. Three groups of multivariate logistic regressions were run to predict the likelihood of three repertoires of political action. Each group of regressions consists of four models. The first model tests the Mannheim’s theory versus that of Inglehart’s. The next two models test Lipset’s thesis. The last model runs separate logistic regression analysis for three separate samples coming from three distinct generations. This way, it aims to test Lipset’s thesis across generations.

5.3. Findings

Before moving on with inferential findings descriptive findings are presented below. Table 5.1 demonstrates the percentage shares of the answers given to the petition, boycott and demonstration questions.
As it can be seen from Table 5.1 actual political participation, as is represented by the three repertoires of action, is generally low in Turkey. Even petition signing, which is known to be a ‘low cost’ political action, does not seem to be very appealing for Turkish citizens. Although the Turkish citizens’ right of petition has been recognized by all the Turkish constitutions since the First Constitutionalist Period, Birinci Meşrutiyet, in 1876, and today, the internet further facilitates exercising this right, the percentage of Turkish respondents who have signed a petition still remains quite low. At this point, one could argue that the Turkish population is considerably young and a ‘have you ever’ type of a question makes the inquiry biased against the young population. This might be true to a certain extent since in our sample the 25th percentile age is 26, the 50th percentile age is 34 and the 75th percentile age is 44. Nevertheless, the mean ages for each category are quite revealing. While for those who answered the question as ‘have done’ it is 35.50, for those who stated that they ‘might do’, it is 35.53. On the other hand, the mean age of the ‘would
never do’ group, which constitutes the largest category, is 37.55. In short, the public’s timid approach towards signing a petition is well distributed across age categories in Turkey. The picture is quite the same for the boycott and demonstration variables. Actual participation is considerably low, decreasing to the single digit-level in both cases. For both boycott and demonstration, the percentage of ‘would never do’ answers surpasses the sum of the percentages of ‘have done’ and ‘might do’ answers. Exceeding the 50 percent, the percentage rate of the ‘would never do’ answers is particularly high for demonstration.

Next, **Table 5.2** presents the ‘have done’ answers across the generational and social class categories.

**Table 5.2**

Percentage rates of ‘have done’ answers for three repertoires of political action by generation and class categories (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>Interim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing a petition</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>17.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Att. a demonstration</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>10.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the first panel of Table 5.2 the percentage of the respondents who signed a petition varies considerably across the generational categories. While it is the lowest for the foundation generation, it reaches to a peak in the interim generation and drops in the post-1980 generation. In the second panel of the table the participation rates are broken down by the categories of social class. The non-manual category appears to be the most participatory one and it is followed by the service category. These two classes are followed respectively by manual, farmer and unemployed classes, for which, the participation rate slightly exceeds ten percent. When we look at patterns pertaining to the boycott and demonstration items, we see that although both items share a similar trend with the petition, their participation level is lower than that of petition. For the generational categorization, the ranking remains exactly the same with the order that is for the petition variable. The interim generation appears to be the most participatory generation which is followed by the post-1980 and foundation generations respectively. For the class categorization, the order of the first three classes remains the same. The non-manual class ranks the highest and is followed by service and manual classes respectively. The only difference in the ranking is that while in petition, the farmer category surpasses the unemployed category marginally, in boycott and demonstration they switch their orders and farmers rank the lowest under the unemployed category.

The findings reveal that with respect to our three repertoires of political action the members of the interim generation are more participatory than the members of the foundation and the post-1980 generations. Figure 5.1 supports this idea visually by presenting lowess (locally weighted scatterplot) analysis of the predicted values of
three repertoires of political action against birth year after all the necessary controls are applied.\textsuperscript{9}

\textbf{Figure 5.1}

Predicted likelihoods of petition boycott and demonstration against birth year

As \textbf{Figure 5.1} shows, the predicted likelihoods of each repertoires of political action, when contrasted on a two dimensional plane against birth year, start off from a low level, reach to a nadir in the middle and level off in the end. Reverse parabolic shapes indicate that, the younger generation in Turkey is less participatory than the interim generation. This

\textsuperscript{9} Variables that were controlled are: age, age squared, female, survey year dummies, education, income, politics important, political interest, post-materialism, self-political positioning.
finding lends support to the macro political socialization argument which is based on Mannheim’s theory of generations against the macroeconomic socialization argument which is based on Inglehart’s post-materialism theory.

To investigate whether the class-participation relationship differs across generations, Figure 5.2 plots the likelihoods of participation into three forms of political action against birth year for each social class.

**Figure 5.2**

Predicted Likelihoods of petition boycott and demonstration against birth year by social class

**Figure 5.2** reveals that for all the three forms of participation the total absolute participation gap between the non-manual and manual classes is greater between the
years the members of the interim generation were born than it is between the years the members of the foundation and the post-1980 generations were born.

The above descriptive findings foreshadow, to some degree, the upcoming results. However, for a more robust investigation, three groups of logistic regression, each for one repertoire of political action, were run. Owing to important differences in generation and class categories’ participation in petition and the other two repertoires of political action, each repertoire is treated as separate dependent variable.

**Table 5.3** presents a series of multivariate logistic regressions predicting respondents’ likelihood of signing a petition.
### Table 5.3 Multivariate logistic regression models predicting signing petition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mannheim’s Model</th>
<th>Lipset’s models</th>
<th>Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Logit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.02 (.01)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.01 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age(^2)</td>
<td>-0.00 (.00)*</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-0.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-0.31 (.09)**</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.20 (.10)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Years (1990 omitted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.65 (.15)**</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.52 (.15)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>.39 (.15)*</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>.37 (.14)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>.32 (.17)</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.27 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-.02 (.18)</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>-.09 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance in politics</td>
<td>.42 (.05)**</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>.40 (.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-positioning</td>
<td>.20 (.04)**</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>.20 (.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist</td>
<td>.19 (.03)**</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.19 (.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>-.18 (.03)**</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>-.16 (.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>-.04 (.02)*</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>-.03 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Elementary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>-.02 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>1.03 (.13)***</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>.34 (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>-.02 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Ref: Manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.08 (.12)</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>-.08 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>.08 (.20)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.14 (.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>.46 (.11)**</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.03 (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td>.30 (.13)**</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.10 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (Ref: Interim)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>.22 (.24)</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td>-16 (.14)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (obs.)</td>
<td>5701</td>
<td>5701</td>
<td>5701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo (R^2)</td>
<td>.1193</td>
<td>.1247</td>
<td>.1391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: \*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: Entries are multivariate logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios (exponentiated \(B\)). Data: World Values Survey, rounds: 1990-1996-2001-2007-2011.
After introducing all the controls, the coefficient scores and odds ratios pertaining to the categories of the generation variable show that there is no significant difference between the interim and foundation as well as between the interim and the post-1980 generations with respect to their members’ likelihood of signing a petition (p= .358 and .257 respectively). When the reference category is set to foundation, it is also seen that the foundation and the post-1980 generations are not significantly different too (p= .216). Thus, our first hypothesis concerning the relationship between generation and political participation is rejected for petition signing.

The second and the third models test Lipset`s working class authoritarianism thesis. It is seen from the second model that the members of the non-manual category are 1.58 times more likely to sign a petition than the members of the manual class (p<. 000). However, when education is controlled, the significant difference between the manual and the non-manual categories disappears (p= .727). Nonetheless, when income is controlled alone, the difference remain to be significant (p<. 001). Thus, in this scenario the ratio attenuates to 1.47. Therefore, it could be argued that income too mediates the class-petition relationship, but not as strongly as education does.

The fourth model, on the other hand, tests Lipset`s thesis across three subsequent generations. Before interpreting the findings, it should be noted that since under this model each generation is investigated individually, especially the number of individuals that fall into the oldest foundation generation is low as it might be expected. However, since the two younger generations that we focus on are comparable in size, this does not cause a problem.
No significant differences were found between the non-manual and manual classes in the foundation generation (p=. 913). In fact, no other significant difference is observed between any two classes in this generation. The difference between the two classes is still insignificant when the education and income are removed out of the analysis (p=. 769). In the post-1980 generation the non-manual and manual classes are not significantly different than each other with respect to their likelihoods of singing petition (p=. 451). However, when education and income are removed, the non-manual class seems to have higher odds of signing petition than the manual class (p<. 000). Finally, when the interim generation is observed, there seems to be no significant difference between the two classes of interest (p=. 451). No significant difference is observed between the manual and non-manual categories even after the education and income factors are removed out of the analysis (p=. 310). Unemployed becomes the least likely group to sign a petition in this case. Apart from the significant differences between the unemployed and all the other classes, no significant difference was observed between any class pairs.

Table 5.4 presents the models predicting boycotting.
Table 5.4 Multivariate logistic regression models predicting joining in boycott

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mannheim’s Model</th>
<th>Lipset’s models</th>
<th>Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logit OR</td>
<td>Logit OR</td>
<td>Logit OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.05 (.03)</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.06 (.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.01 (.00)</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.00 (.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-.59 (.13)***</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-.58 (.14)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Years (1990 omitted)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.69 (.22)**</td>
<td>.58 (.21)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.35 (.22)</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.35 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.45 (.26)</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>.47 (.23)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.19 (.27)</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.17 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>.54 (.08)***</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>.52 (.08)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.35 (.06)***</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.36 (.06)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.18 (.02)***</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-.18 (.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.34 (.04)***</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>.33 (.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>-.19 (.04)***</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>-.17 (.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>-.05 (.03)</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>-.05 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Elementary)</td>
<td>.60 (.17)***</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>.58 (.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.64 (.20)***</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>1.28 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-.02 (.03)</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.07 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Ref: Manual)</td>
<td>-.03 (.18)</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>-.09 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.92 (.44)*</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-.92 (.44)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>.51 (.15)***</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>-.13 (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td>.07 (.18)</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>-.21 (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (Ref: Interim)</td>
<td>-.44 (.39)</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>-.44 (.39)</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td>-.16 (.20)</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.578 (.73)***</td>
<td>-.627 (.60)***</td>
<td>-.676 (.66)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1150.68</td>
<td>-1139.54</td>
<td>-1098.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (obs.)</td>
<td>5701</td>
<td>5701</td>
<td>5701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.2194</td>
<td>.2270</td>
<td>.2550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first model, as in the previous analysis, tests Mannheim`s theory of generations. It is seen from the table that, the interim generation does not differ with respect to their members` likelihood of joining a boycott from the foundation and post-1980 generations (p=. 252 and . 416 respectively). Switching the reference category to foundation also reveals no significant difference between the foundation and post-1980 generations (p=. 559). This finding refutes the first hypothesis which predicts generational differences for boycotting. The second and the third models test Lipset`s thesis. The finding reveals that the members of the non-manual class are 1.66 times more likely to join in a boycott than the members of the manual class (p=. 001). However, the first significant difference between the non-manual and manual classes disappears when the education is controlled for in model 3 (p=. 409). On the other hand, when the income is controlled, the difference between the non-manual and manual classes still remain significant (p=. 006).

In order to test Lipset`s thesis across generations, the fourth, fifth and sixth models run the same analysis for split samples coming from each of the three subsequent generations. It can be seen from the table that no significant difference between the two classes of primary interest can be observed neither in the foundation generation (p=. 405). In fact, when the reference categories is switched to other classes it is found that no significant difference can be observed between any two classes in the foundation generation. When the education and income variables are removed out of the analysis, the difference between the non-manual and manual classes of the foundation generation is still insignificant (p=. 181). In this case, still no significant differences can be observed between any two classes. When the last two columns of the third panel of the table are looked, it is seen that in the post-1980 generation, the non-manual and manual classes are no different than each other with
respect to their likelihoods of joining in a boycott (p=. 795). In this scenario, there exist no significant differences between any pairs of class. Only after removing the education and income factors, the non-manual class becomes 1.73 times more likely to join in a boycott than the manual class (p=. 013). Lastly, it is seen from the table that the non-manual class of the interim generation is not significantly different than the manual class (p=. 068). The situation does not change when the education and income variables are removed out of the analysis (p=. 263). In this case, the manual class is more likely to join in boycott than the unemployed and farmer classes as well (p=. 002 and . 035 respectively).

Table 5.5 presents the results of the analysis done for attending a lawful demonstration.
Table 5.5 Multivariate logistic regression models predicting attending a lawful demonstration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mannheim’s Model</th>
<th>Lipset’s models</th>
<th>Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logit</strong></td>
<td><strong>OR</strong></td>
<td><strong>Logit</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.02 (.02)</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-.61 (.12)***</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Years (1990 omitted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.50 (.21)*</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>.44 (.21)*</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>.47 (.25)</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>.20 (.21)</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>.45 (.07)***</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of politics</td>
<td>.35 (.06)***</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-positioning</td>
<td>-.17 (.02)***</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist</td>
<td>.30 (.04)***</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>-.24 (.04)**</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>-.07 (.02)*</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Elementary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Ref: Manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.13 (.16)</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>-.14 (.43)**</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>.20 (.15)</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td>-.20 (.18)</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (Ref: Interim)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>-.33 (.38)</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td>-.45 (.19)*</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.425 (.68)***</td>
<td>-5.22 (.57)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-1242.45</td>
<td>-1237.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (obs.)</td>
<td>5701</td>
<td>5701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.2084</td>
<td>.2117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


181
The first model shows that the members of the interim generation are no different than the members of the foundation generation with respect to their likelihood of attending a lawful demonstration ($p=0.380$). However, they are 1.57 times more likely to attend a demonstration than the members of the post-1980 generation ($p=0.021$). This finding lends support to the first hypothesis which predicted a generational difference between the interim and post-1980 generations. It is seen from the second model that the levels of odds of attending a lawful demonstration pertaining to the manual and non-manual classes are not significantly different than each other ($p=0.130$). The situation does not change when the education and income variables are removed out of the analysis ($p=0.175$).

The fourth model tests the class-demonstration attendance relationship for each generation respectively. The analysis revealed no significant difference between the non-manual and the manual members of the founding generation ($p=0.859$). The difference is still insignificant when the education and income factors are removed out of the analysis ($p=0.462$). The last two columns of the third panel of the table show that in the post-1980 generation, the manual and non-manual classes are no statistically significant than each other ($p=0.170$). As it was the case in the foundation generation, none of the classes are different from each other with respect to their demonstration behaviour in the post-1980 generation. When the education and income factors are removed, the manual and non-manual classes are still not different regarding to their likelihoods of attending a lawful demonstration ($p=0.866$). In this case the same is true for any two classes of the post-1980 generation. Lastly, when the results pertaining to the interim generation are observed, it is seen that, the odds of attending a lawful demonstration for the non-manual and manual classes are not statistically different ($p=0.451$). However, the manual class seems to be
more demonstration-prone than the farmer class (p=. 046). When the education and income are removed from the analysis, the difference between the manual and non-manual classes remain insignificant (p=. 205).

5.4. Conclusion and Discussion

The present chapter primarily aimed to investigate generational and class bases of political participation, which is suggested as one of the indicators of a pro-democratic culture. The first hypothesis which was based on Mannheim’s theory of generations, argued that due to their socialization under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, the members of the interim generation are different from the preceding and succeeding generations with respect to their likelihood of participating in the three repertoires of political action. Our analysis found only limited empirical evidence supporting this argument. It was found that the post-1980 generation is less likely to attend a lawful demonstration than the interim generation. Apart from this, no significant difference was found between interim and post-1980 generations which clearly runs counter to Mannheim’s theory of generations. This finding also has a bearing on the current ‘rising participatory Gezi generation’ discussions in Turkey. By looking at this finding, we can argue that a new rising participatory Turkish generation thesis does not hold true for all the three repertoires of action analysed here. There might be several reasons underlying this. Arguably, the lack of significant differences between the generational categories for petition and boycott might be related to the fact that these two are ‘low cost’ political actions in comparison to attending a demonstration. Unlike demonstration, signing a petition and joining in boycott does not necessarily require a generation to develop a participatory character. Alternatively, positive
macroeconomic circumstances that the post-1980 generation faced in Turkey might have counterbalanced macropolitical effect for the youngest generation. Another potential reason could be that traditional culture in Turkey has dampened the generational effects on political participation. The last alternative potential reason underlying this generational indifference could be the fact that the Gezi generation, is too young to appear in our analysis. Each explanation requires further scrutiny and presents avenues for further research. On the other hand, the finding regarding that post-materialist values has significant positive impact on all the three forms of political action supports Inglehart’s thesis against that of Mannheim’s.

The second and third groups of models, on the other hand, were designed to test Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis. The analysis run with the pooled data from all the generations supported Lipset’s thesis to a large extent. It was found that, for two out of three repertoires of political action, namely for petition and boycott, the members of the non-manual class are more likely to exhibit a participatory behaviour than the members of the manual class and the differences between the two classes disappear or become reversed when the education factor is controlled for. By looking at this finding, one can argue that Lipset’s thesis is applicable to our particular case. Nevertheless, the whole picture changes when Lipset’s thesis is tested across subsequent generations.

Table 5.6 shows significant differences between social classes in all the three generations for three forms of political actions.
Recall that, the original argument of the present research, which was designed in the second hypothesis, suggested that for the members of the generations which reached to maturity under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, the social classes are homogenized with respect to their level of participation in politics. As it can be seen from Table 5.6, all the significant differences between social classes appear in the interim generation. This finding lent support for the second hypothesis. It supports our idea that socialization of the foundation and the post-1980 generations under authoritarian political and juridical orders homogenized social classes in terms of their level of political participation. By looking at this finding, we can argue that the present finding challenges Lipset’s working class authoritarianism from a generational perspective.

What is more interesting is that, the results pertaining to the analysis of the interim generation, for which we expected Lipset thesis holds true, are different than how Lipset
would predict. As can be seen from the table, in the interim generation, the number of the significant differences between the manual class and the first two classes (which is 4) is higher than the number of significant differences between the manual and the last two classes (which is 1). This shows that the manual class resembles to the last two social classes to a greater extent than it resembles to the first two classes. Remember that, in Lipset’s categorization of social classes manual class is regarded as low class with i.e. farmers and minors. Differently, modernization theory while locating the manual class in the modern end of the traditional/modern dichotomy, envisages a positive relationship between replacement of traditional modes of production with modern ones and higher level of participation in politics in a society. Thus, this finding favours the modernization theory’s categorization of the social classes which was based on the traditional/modern dichotomy over Lipset’s categorization of the classes. It seems that the notable cleavage in the class-based participatory behaviour in Turkey is between those classes which take part in the modern production mechanisms and which remain out of it.

**Table 5.7** shows the significant differences between the social classes when education and income factors removed out of the analysis.
Table 5.7
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for three repertoires of political action (education and income removed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Service/self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signing a petition=1, joining a boycott=2, attending lawful demonstrations=3
Foundation generation, interim generation, post-1980 generation

Note: The differences are those produced by multivariate logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer, interest in politics, importance of politics, self-positioning and post-materialist variables held controlled.
(Significance levels: *p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001)

As can be seen from the Table 5.7, the previous picture has slightly changed when the education and to a much lesser extent income factors were removed out of the analysis.

While the total number of significant differences between classes was 8 in the previous case, now it increases to 20. By looking at this, one can argue that most of the class-based participatory behaviour in Turkey can be explained by the education factor.

On the other hand, even after removing the education and income factors out of the analysis, still the number of differences between the manual class and the first two classes of the interim generation (which is 4) is higher than the number of differences between the manual class and the last two classes of the interim generation (which is 2). This finding supports our initial hypothesis which argued that the manual class resembles to the non-manual/service/self-employed classes in greater degree than it resembles to the unemployed/farmer classes even after the education and income factors are ignored.
CHAPTER 6. A DEMOCRACY-PRONE GENERATION? THE GENERATIONAL AND CLASS BASES OF DEMOCRACY PREFERENCE IN TURKEY

In today’s world, an extensive body of literature presents democracy as the most publicly desired form of government. Democracy outnumbers, by far, its alternatives with respect to the number of its supporters in many countries of the world. However, democracy’s popularity is a very recent phenomenon. For a considerable portion of the recorded human history, from classical ages down to modern times, the ideal of democratic government was pursued by only a handful of idealistic men, whose ideas serve as a basis for the democratic government model as we understand it today. In parallel to that, in no small part of the history, mankind was governed by authoritarian governments which were equipped with extensive powers. This relatively recent democratization trend is conceptualized by Samuel Huntington, a leading student of democratization, within his ‘three waves of democratization’ argument as the third wave of democratization. Pointing out the historical rivalry between democracy and its authoritarian alternatives, Huntington, argues that the modern history has witnessed three phases between democracy and authoritarian regimes thus far. He claims that the first democratization wave started in the 1820s with the suffrage movement in the US and expanded to 30 countries of the world in a century's time. This movement was responded by the rapid rise of authoritarian regimes in the Europe in the beginning of the 20th century and the number of democratic countries declined to 12 in 1942. Following this anti-democratization movement, Huntington continues, a new democratization wave emerged by the end of the First and the Second
World Wars, and by 1962 the total number of democratic countries rose to 36. Between the early 1960s and mid-1970s, Huntington claims, the number of democratic governments declined, but immediately after this short interim period, democratization gained a new momentum again. The most recent global sway towards democracy, ‘the third wave of democratization’ as Huntington labels it, started with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974 and was followed by democratization movements in Spain, Poland and Hungary from the European continent and Mexico and Chile from South and Central America (Huntington, 1991). Further to the points made by Huntington, the third wave of democratization thesis was supported by more recent developments. The collapse of communist governments and their replacement with new democracies in the Central and Eastern Europe, current requests for democracy in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East, all together indicate a new wave of democratization.

One might ask at this point whether the two trends, the recent rise in the global popularity of democracy and the increase in the number of democratic countries in the world, are linked. The adherents of the legitimacy approach within political culture research, would give an affirmative reply to this question by suggesting to a bottom-up causal mechanism operating from the increased demand for democracy to the increased number of democratic countries in the world. According to the legitimacy approach the greater the popular acclamation of democracy in a society, the greater the changes that the society in question will be governed by a democratic government (see Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Chaley et al., 2000; Diamond, 2003; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Selingson, 2002; Shin & Wells, 2005). However, data show that, when system level democracy is predicted by this approach, the publics of some fledgling democracies appear to be more pro-democratic than the publics
of some established ones. Turkey constitutes perhaps one of the most interesting cases in this regard. Empirical data from 1990 to 2011 reveal that Turkish respondents endorse democracy as fairly and very good way of governing the country by above 90 percent. This is higher than the rates in all the established democracies in the world. This chapter aims to make sense of the bases of this high predisposition towards democracy in Turkey by looking at generation and social class structures.

This chapter is composed of six sections. The remaining part is organized in the following way. The next section lays down the theoretical dimension of the research by delving into the literature on political support and legitimacy. It also briefly mentions Mannheim’s theory of generations and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis by referring to the theory chapter. The third section discusses the data, construction of the variables and the method of the research. The fourth section presents the findings, particularly focusing on the generational and class effects on democracy preference. Finally, the fifth section discusses the findings in relation to the extant theory and the research hypotheses set previously.

6.1. Theory

The main issues addressed in the theory section are: (a) the legitimacy approach as one of the tripartite approaches operating within the political culture research and its emphasize on overt popular endorsement of democracy for the establishment of a well-functioning democratic political system, (b) the origins of the concept of legitimacy and its historical development as an idea, (c) political support, its objects and types and association with
legitimacy, (d) the potential bases of political support and (e) Mannheim’s and Lipset’s theories.

A considerable amount of published work within the domain of political culture research has cast light on the relationship between aggregate-level value orientations and macro-level systems. In fact, some of the most prominent works in the recent-era political science literature have investigated this relationship. Max Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* are perhaps the most reputed ones of this kind. Common to these works is the argument that some particular values and orientations prevalent in a given society are directly responsible for the macroeconomic or political systems established by its members. Although an inclusive theory, investigating this relationship comprehensively does not exist, a couple of approaches examine it from different perspectives. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel in their 2005 book, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, introduce three approaches at a great length. They label them: ‘the legitimacy approach’, ‘the communitarian approach’ and ‘the human development approach’. While the communitarian and human capital approaches, as Inglehart and Welzel argue, highlight some rooted values intrinsic to the culture, the legitimacy approach emphasizes overt popular acclamation of democracy and confidence in its institutions as determinants of system-level democracy. Central to the legitimacy approach is the idea that as the popular endorsement of a given political system and confidence in its institutions increase, so too does its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Inglehart and Welzel have also examined
whether the orientations suggested by the legitimacy approach are conducive to formal as well as effective democracy. Their analysis revealed that while confidence in state institutions in the early 1990s do not statistically correlate with formal democracy in early 2000s, a positive and mild correlation between confidence and effective democracy holds. On the other hand, having countries’ prior democracy experiences controlled, a weak negative causal relationship operating from overall confidence in institutions in early 1990s to formal democracy in early 2000s attracts the attention. Nevertheless, their autocracy-democracy preference measurement appears to be as a stronger and more significant determinant of both formal and effective democracy. Thus, their findings provide some evidence that the autocracy - democracy preference is preferable to the confidence measurement with respect to its power to predict system level democracy.

As can be seen from above, there are both theoretical as well as empirical grounds to argue that the majority of the public’s preference of democracy over its alternative forms of government is associated with democracy at the system level. The importance of preference of democracy resides in the issue of legitimacy since all forms of systems necessitate legitimacy. Legitimacy has been viewed as particularly important for democratic governments since democratic governments, unlike the authoritarian ones, do not rely on coercive measures, but on people’s consent to maintain their survival (Easton, 1965; 1975; Przeworski, 1991: p. 26; Linz and Stepan, 1996: p. 16; Inglehart, 2003: p. 55). Mark C. Suchman defines legitimacy as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some socially constructive system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: p. 574). Suchman continues and argues that ‘legitimacy is socially constructed in that it reflects congruence
between the behaviours of the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some groups…” (Suchman, 1995: p. 574). From an organizational perspective, Dowling and Pfeffer view legitimacy as ‘the congruence between the organizational and social values’ (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975: p. 112). From a sociological aspect, Talcot Parsons defines it as the ‘appraisal of actions in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system’ (Parsons, 1960: p. 175). As can be seen, it is common to all these authors’ arguments that legitimacy represents congruence between the individual and the system.

In the political science literature, the centrality ascribed to political legitimacy roots in the question of survival. It is likened to a ‘reservoir’ which serves to maintain political stability (Dahl, 1971; Easton, 1965; Almond, 1980) and therefore it is viewed as a fundamental component for all types of government. Citing the eminent British idealist Thomas Hill Green, Sharma and Sharma states that: ‘even the most powerful and the most despotic government cannot hold a society together by sheer force; to that extent there was a limited truth to the old belief that governments are produced by consent’ (Sharma & Sharma, 2006: p. 104). In the political science domain, the intellectual roots of the concept of legitimacy can be traced back in the ancient philosophers’ writings. It is argued that the debate on legitimacy dates back to Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* (Zelditch, 2001). Thucydides’ imaginary dialogue between the Melanians and the Athenians who surrounded their city, involves the Melanians’ objection to the Athenians’ antagonistic action. As Thucydides notes, the Melanians said that the Athenians may attack and conquer their city, but this would not be a legitimate action. The idea of legitimacy has also been discussed in Plato’s writings. According to Plato, the legitimacy of a state is
originated from the qualification of its rulers. For his contemporary Aristotle, however, legitimacy is linked with the legitimate distribution of the rewards. Cicero, the great Roman linguist, philosopher and politician, uses the term *judicial legitima*, which stands for fair judgement. The idea of legitimate government was comprehensively studied in the pre-enlightenment and enlightenment periods too. Machiavelli, in his seminal book, *The Prince*, advises that ‘the best possible fortress is not to be hated by the people’ (Machiavelli, 1532 [2005]: p. 106). In the same vein, John Milton (1649 [1953]), in *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*, states that:

The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else but is only derivative, transferred and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all, in whom the power yet remains fundamentally and cannot be taken from them without a violation of their natural birthright (Milton, 1649 [1953]: p. 278-79).

During the period of enlightenment, especially three prominent students of the social contract school, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, devoted a considerable amount of their attention on the issue of legitimacy. Hobbes, perhaps under the influence of his personal experience of fierce political disintegration during the English Civil War, puts the prevention of disorder and civil war in the centre of his ‘social contract theory’. In *Leviathan*, he argues that everyone should avoid ‘the condition of mere nature’, which, as he argues, is equal to ‘the state of war’ and commit to a common absolute authority what he describes as ‘sovereignty by institution’. According to him, nothing but only a strong and legitimate authority which is able to protect its subjects can prevent this happening (Hobbes, 1691 [1969]). John Locke, another prominent philosopher of the social contract school, introduces his positive theory of government in his seminal work, *The Second Treatise of Government*, where he notes, so to speak, the motto of the social
contract school: ‘The source of legitimacy is the consent of the governed’. According to Lock, in the ‘state of nature’ where there is no government, equal individuals have natural rights, i.e. the right to have life, liberty, health and property. However, different than Hobbes, Lock does not equate ‘the state of nature’ with ‘the state of war’. Lock idealizes the state of nature, but since, as he claims, it is still vulnerable to mean-spirited actions, he proposes civil society as superior to it. According to Lock, the main function of the civil society is to preserve rights when they are violated by some malevolent persons. The requisite of a legitimate government emerges from this point. The protection of the rights can only be practiced by a legitimate governmental body, either a magistrate or a king, or alternatively a group of administrators or the representatives of the people. Only a legitimate government can judge those who violate the others’ rights and execute their punishments. An illegitimate government, on the contrary, fails to protect its citizens' rights, what is worse than this is that it may claim them (Lock, 1689 [2001]). The issue of legitimacy occupied a great proportion of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s attention as well. In his prominent work, *The Social Contract*, Rousseau delves into the question of legitimacy and argues along the same lines with his successors in the social contract tradition. He notes that a state is legitimate only if it is based on the ‘general will’ of its members which ‘come from all and apply to all’. In line with Hobbes and Lock, Rousseau also considers living under the protection of such a legitimate and sovereign power as superior to living in the state of nature (Rousseau, 1762 [1920]).

In the 20th century, the legitimacy question protected its centrality in the political science literature. The idea that legitimacy is derived from the consent of the governed gained further prominence and served as the nucleus of today’s democratic government model.
Lively debates in the theoretical sphere yielded results in the practical world. The issue of legitimate government is undertaken in the article 21 of the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The article reads: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government’. The question of legitimacy, in this context, evolved into the question of political support in democracies. David Easton, a prominent student of political support, became the first person who demonstrated political support as a multi-faced phenomenon by distinguishing between its types and objects. According to Easton, political support is decomposable and can be incorporated into the political system through three objects: ‘the community’, ‘the regime’ and ‘the government’. According to Easton these three types of political support are not necessarily positively associated and can be distinguished by the people. In Easton’s theorizing, support for the community corresponds to the feeling of being a part of one’s own community; support for the regime to a widespread commitment among members of a society to an agreement defining the rules of the community; and support for the government to an agreement to give incumbent authorities legality to use power required to design general policies. Easton also distinguishes between two types of political support: ‘diffuse support’ and ‘specific support’. In his analysis, diffuse support implies subjective and emotional confidence in the authorities or the regime or an inclusive allegiance feeling towards the community. On the other hand, specific support denotes a rational evaluation of the incumbent authorities, a particular regime or appropriateness of living in a community (Easton, 1957; 1975; see also Parsons, 1967).

At the beginning of the last quarter of the 20th century, the declining levels of political support and confidence in state institutions and the authorities in the Western democracies
fuelled ‘the crises of democracy’ discussions led by a group of scholars, i.e. Jurgen Habermas, who conceptualized this situation with the term ‘legitimacy crisis’ (See also Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1975; Huntington, 1991). Thus, Easton’s decomposition of political support into its objects and types gained prominence among those who opposed these sceptics (see Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Klingemann, 1998; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Weil, 1989; Lehman, 1987). In response to the crisis theories, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1998), in his individual-level analysis, demonstrated that ‘support for political community’, ‘approval of democracy as a form of government’ and ‘evaluation of current performance of democracy’ represent three distinct types of system support. Klingemann argued that there was no evidence of a crisis of democracy when global trends of dissatisfaction with democracy were scrutinized, also no evidence of that 

_dissatisfied democrats_, those who think the current level of democracy falls short of the ideal form in their minds, posed a threat to democracy. Similarly, Weil (1989) demonstrated that the poor performance of the state may decrease confidence, but it is not likely to cause a crisis of democracy, at least in a direct manner. He argued that the crisis of democracy could be a matter of debate only if citizens begin to view that democracy as an overall political system did not work at all (Weil, 1989).

One may not avoid asking the following question at this point: If political support is so important for a democratic political system, what are the factors underlying it? The factors underlying support for democracy have been explored empirically in several regional studies. Evans and Whitefield, in their analysis where they compared economic and non-economic factors with respect to their influences on support for democracy, came to the conclusion that neither economic nor non-economic factors are solely enough to explain
support for democracy in the Eastern Europe. However, political factors, the evaluation of the functioning of democracy in the first place, explain the differences in support for democracy across countries more strongly than economic ones. Yet, economic factors still play a significant influence on support for democracy. Therefore, they suggest that economic and political factors underline support for democracy concomitantly (Evans & Whitefield, 1995). Similarly, Evans and Rose, in their analysis investigating micro bases of the education-democracy relationship in eighteen African countries, demonstrated that education effect on preference of democracy and the rejection of its alternatives (separately) supersede the effect of other indicators pertaining to modernization, i.e. occupation, economic resources and urbanisation (Evans & Rose, 2012). On the other hand, Mishler and Rose, in their research investigating support for democracy in five Central and European countries, showed that evaluations of the current and future macro-economy and future living standards, as well as fears related to the old regime are strong determinants of the support for the current regime. Testing ‘the Churchil hypothesis’ in the Central and Eastern European political context, they found that the communist legacy is the strongest determinant of the rejection of authoritarian rule, followed by the political performance of the current regime. Their analysis revealed that most of the macro and micro economic factors seem to be unrelated to the rejection of the authoritarian alternatives of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 1996). In their comparative study, where they employed data from Ghana, Zambia and South Africa, Bratton and Mattes contend that support for democracy in these three African countries is supported by intrinsic motivations representing a genuine desire for democracy per se, not by instrumental motivations representing a desire for democracy in exchange for other conditions. (Bratton
& Mattes, 2001; see also, Schumpeter, [1950] 1975). Parallel to one of the hypothesis of the present chapter, Weil pointed to political upbringing as an important determinant of one’s future level of support for democracy. Weil’s analysis revealed that the generation which came to maturity during the Nazi period, are more likely to support Nazi government and less likely to show support for the new regimes than the younger and older generations (Weil, 1987). Similarly, Klingemann in his work, where he mapped support for democracy in Eastern Europe, demonstrated that political socialization played a role in support for democracy. In his analysis, older citizens of ex-communist countries who have lived a large part of their life under Communism seem to support democracy in lower levels than the members of the younger cohort who socialized under democratic political system. However, Klingemann also drew attention to that support for democracy does not necessarily originate from socialization under a democratic government since prevailing pro-democratic support can also be observed in non-democratic countries (Klingemann, 1999).

In this final section, we turn to mentioning briefly the two theoretical arguments which underpins our research hypotheses. The first one is Mannheim’s theory of generations. Remember from the theory chapter that the central premise of the theory of generations is that individual’s future attitudes and behaviour are shaped by major politico-historical events which took place during one’s most receptive period, namely adolescence and early adulthood. The first assumption of this argument is that those individuals who share a generational location also share alike values and can be discerned with regards to their attitudes and behaviours. Mannheim notes that ‘members of a generation are ‘similarly located’, first of all, in so far as they all are exposed to the same phase of the collective
process’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 297). However, it should be noted that, according to Mannheim, simply belonging to the same generational location is not enough criteria for individuals to consist a generation. In addition to that, those coevals should also share similar experiences. As he suggests: ‘mere contemporaneity becomes sociologically significant only when it also involves participation in the same historical and social circumstances’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 298). The second assumption, on the other hand, is that the experiences acquired in the early phase of life are so deep rooted that they persist throughout life shaping future attitudes and behaviour. In Mannheim’s own words: ‘early impressions tend to coalesce into a natural view of the world. All later experiences, then tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set’s verification and fulfilment or as its negation and antithesis’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 298). Mannheim contends that the critical age for the formation of the first impressions of life is ‘round about the age of 17, sometimes a little earlier and sometimes a little later’ (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 300).10 Finally, it should be noted since it is related to our inquiry that, according to Mannheim, social classes which corresponds to his generation as actuality phenomenon may react to macro-scale formative events such as wars and merge with other social classes which fuses them into the same generation as location (Mannheim, 1952 [1928]: p. 303-4).

10 Nie and his friends defined this period as an interval between mid to late adolescence (Nie et al., 1996: p. 138). Niemi and Hepburn proposed the age range between fourteen and twenty-five as being crucial for formation of participatory behaviour (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995: p. 4-5). Powell and Cowart specified this period between ages twelve and thirty (Powell & Cowart, 2003). Erikson suggested the period from fourteen to fifteen for the formation of political views and attitudes (Erikson, 1950).
The second key theory that our hypotheses were derived from is Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism. Recall that, Lipset, as a modernization theorist, tends to account for social attitudes by referring to their infrastructural bases. In his 1959 work, where he laid out the principles of his working class authoritarianism thesis, Lipset regards social class as responsible for authoritarianism discrepancies in the society. According to Lipset, the working class is more authoritarian than the middle class due to a series of factors, i.e. lower education, income insecurity, isolated work environment, family tension and etc. According to him, one of the distinguishing features between the working and middle classes is the relatively lower level of support the latter provide for democracy. Lipset, in his descriptive analysis of the German data, shows that the working class members and farm workers were less likely to support a multi-party system in Germany (Lipset, 1959: p. 489).

Based on this theoretical background, first, the question whether high popular appraisal of democracy in Turkey follows generational lines is raised. To find an answer to this question, the guidance of Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations is followed. In line with the main argument of the theory, it is predicted that the members of the generations, who have spent their formative years under a democratic government and a juridical order, are more likely to prefer democracy over its authoritarian alternatives than those members of the generations who have socialized under an authoritarian politico-juridical order (Hypothesis I).

In the second step, social class variable is included in the analysis in order to measure the indirect generational effect on democracy preference which operates via social class.
Initially, an answer is sought to the question whether this high inclination towards democracy is distributed homogenously across the social classes. Herein, Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, which suggests that the members of the middle class are more likely to prefer democracy than the members of the working class, is exploited. Then, combining Mannheim’s general idea on the formation of generations as well as his particular argument on the transformation of generation as actuality into generation as location, with Lipset’s perspective on the class-democracy preference relationship, it is hypothesized that Lipset’s thesis may hold true for the members of those generations which came of age under non-authoritarian politico-historical context, but, not for the members of those generations that socialized under an authoritarian one, for which social classes are homogenized with respect to their appraisal of democracy (Hypothesis II).

6.2. Data and Methods

This section discusses the data, key variables and the methods employed in the analysis of the present chapter.

6.2.1. Data

The data of this chapter come from the five successive waves in the WVS which held in 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011. The variables for the analysis employed in this chapter are derived from the Turkish respondents’ valid answers. While constructing the sample, ‘No answer’ and ‘don’t know’ answers were set to missing and those cases holding missing values on any variables have been deleted. The final sample consists of 4970
cases. A brief introduction of the dependent and the independent variables of primary interest is presented in the following.\footnote{A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices section.}

6.2.2. Variables

6.2.2.1. Dependent Variable

In WVS, a battery-type question was administered to the respondents, which inquiries into their ideas about several government forms. The English translation of the question is as follows: \textit{I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?}

Several government types are then listed to allow respondents to assess their ideas about. Four government types are repeated on successive four rounds of the Turkish surveys. They are:

(a) \textit{Having a democratic political system},

(b) \textit{Having the army rule},

(c) \textit{Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country},

(d) \textit{Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections}. 

\footnote{A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices section.}
First, in order to elicit variation between the battery items a Principle Components Factor Analysis (PCF) is performed. PCF is a multivariate technique to investigate the dimensionality between related variables and their association with latent factors (Jackson, 2005). The results are presented in the Table 6.1.

Table 6.1  
Factor analysis of regime types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery Items</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Rule</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Rule</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Leader</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eigenvalue</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.09</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Principal component analysis, \(N=4.970\)

Our factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues over 1.00 which means that the Turkish public’s support for these four types of regime can be categorized into two factors. The first factor is tapped by army rule, expert rule and strong leader by over the critical alpha value of .60. This means that support for army rule, expert rule and strong leader constitute three related dimensions of the same unobserved factor in the eyes of the Turkish public. However, democracy does not seem to be associated with this factor since it only tapped into it by -. 32. On the other hand, the second factor which was tapped by democracy by . 81, was not tapped by any other items by over . 60. This supports the idea that democracy is viewed by the Turkish public distinctly than the other three forms of government. Nevertheless, army rule, seems to be the most powerful mirror concept of
democracy since it taps most strongly (yet negatively) into the factor which democracy loads strongly with. **Figure 6.1** presents the same story visually.

As can be seen from **Figure 6.1**, while expert rule and strong leader items are located very closely on the right hand side of the platform, although still associated with these two items as factor analysis table has showed, army rule is located slightly far from them. On the other hand, democracy seems to be located distinctly from all these three items and army rule seems to be the most distant item to democracy which means that support for these
two regime types are conceptually further away in Turkish respondents’ minds. In other words, supporting army rule as the best form of government is the most powerful alternative of supporting democracy in Turkey. Following this empirical finding and a series of theoretical arguments and previous empirical findings in the literature (see, Rose, 1995; Klingemann, 1999; Bratton & Mattes, 2001: p. 457; Inglehart, 2003; Sin & Well, 2005: p. 94; Ingleart & Welzel, 2005: p. 252), a dependent variable that combines legitimization of democracy and delegitimization of army rule is constructed. This procedure consists distinguishing the respondents, who concomitantly stated that democracy is a fairly/very good and army rule is a fairly/very bad way of governing the country from the rest of the sample. This parsimonious analytic strategy saved us from misleading results pertaining to the exaggerated proclivity towards democracy which might have originated from a rhetorical commitment to democracy, or a belief that it is the most socially acceptable form of government, or alternatively a cognitive complexity between economic and social development in general and democratization as discussed in the previous literature. This way, it is believed that a more realistic measure of support for democracy is achieved.

6.2.2.2. Independent Variables

Two independent variables are of primary interest for our models. They are social class and generation. The construction of these variables were largely discussed in the data and methods chapter.
6.2.3. Method

Ordered logistic regression models are called for to investigate the relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Ordered logistic regression is a statistical model used to predict unknown parameters of an ordered dependent variable. An ordered variable is a special categorical variable for which possible values that the variable can take on are ordered. In cases where the difference between the categories are ordered but not identical, ordered logistic regression is used to estimate logs of being in a higher level of the dependent variable.

6.3. Findings

Table 6.2 presents the distribution of the answers given to the questions which the dependent variable is derived from.

Table 6.2
Descriptive statistics for regime types (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery Item</th>
<th>Very Bad</th>
<th>Fairly Bad</th>
<th>Fairly Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>39.74</td>
<td>51.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Rule</td>
<td>32.54</td>
<td>37.75</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>8.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=4,970

The first line of Table 6.2 indicates the percentage of respondents who identified democracy as very bad, fairly bad, fairly good and very good way of governing Turkey. It is seen from the table that the percentage of those who predicated support for democracy is considerably high in Turkey. Over the half of the respondents stated that they view democracy as a very good way of governing the country. Together with about the 40 percent fairly good answers, those who consider democracy is a good way of governing the country exceeds 90 percent of the overall sample. On the other hand, slightly less than 9 percent of the respondents stated that democracy is fairly bad or very bad way of governing the country. The second line similarly shows the percentage of respondents who stated their different ideas about army rule. It can be seen that, more than two third of the respondents stated that army rule is a fairly/very bad way of governing the country. Our analysis shows the percentage of respondents who assessed democracy as either fairly good or very good and army rule as either fairly bad or very bad is more than 70%.

Having investigated the distribution of the answers pertaining to the items of the dependent variable, now we turn our attention to the cross-tabulation of the items used in making the dependent variable across the categories of the independent variables.
In the first line of the Table 6.3 the respondents who legitimized democracy are broken down into three generational and five social class categories. It is seen that the legitimization of democracy is well-distributed across both generational and social class categories. While the interim generation appears to be the most pro-democratic generation, it is followed by foundation and post-1980 generations respectively. On the other hand, all the class categories see democracy as either fairly good or very good by over 90 percent, except for the manual class which only marginally remained below the 90 percent line. The
second line of the table, similarly, shows the percentage values pertaining to army rule. As can be seen, a more varied picture emerges for this item. The interim generation legitimized army rule almost 7 percent lower than both foundation and post-1980 generations which do so by over 31 percent. The differences between generational categories are greater for army rule. This holds true for the differences between social class categories as well. While over the one third of the farmer and unemployed respondents approved the statement that army rule is a good way of governing the country, they are followed by manual and service/self-employed classes and the non-manual class ranking the lowest. The third line shows the percentage of respondents who legitimized democracy and delegitimized army rule. The values show the percentages of the generation and class members who viewed democracy as fairly or very good as well as army rule as fairly or very bad way of governing the country. It is seen that when the two items are combined, support for the two forms of government counterbalance each other with respect to their distribution across the generational categories. The fourth line, on the other hand, shows mean scores of an additive scale constructed by democracy and army rule items by generation and social class. Similar findings can be observed by looking at mean scores.

Table 6.4 presents the results pertaining to six ordinary least square analyses.
Table 6.4  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models predicting democracy preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mannheim’s model</th>
<th>Lipset’s model</th>
<th>Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>Coeff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.01 (.00)</td>
<td>.02 (.00)**</td>
<td>.03 (.00)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)*</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-.19 (.04)***</td>
<td>-.18 (.04)***</td>
<td>-.12 (.04)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Years (1996 omitted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-.13 (.05)*</td>
<td>-.06(.05)</td>
<td>-.11 (.05)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-.10 (.06)</td>
<td>-.01 (.06)</td>
<td>-.06 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-.10 (.06)</td>
<td>-.03 (.05)</td>
<td>-.08 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>-.08 (.01)***</td>
<td>-.07 (.01)***</td>
<td>-.04 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>-.02 (.00)**</td>
<td>-.02 (.00)*</td>
<td>-.01 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Elementary)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.31 (.04)***</td>
<td>.26 (.17)</td>
<td>.34 (.07)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.65 (.06)***</td>
<td>.55 (.32)</td>
<td>.72 (.11)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>-.02 (.01)*</td>
<td>.00 (.04)</td>
<td>.02 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Ref: Manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.06 (.05)</td>
<td>.07 (.05)</td>
<td>.26 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>-.08 (.09)</td>
<td>-.05 (.09)</td>
<td>-.56 (.28)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>.37 (.05)***</td>
<td>.15 (.06)*</td>
<td>.17 (.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td>.11 (.06)</td>
<td>.04 (.06)</td>
<td>.25 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (Ref: Interim)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>-.28(.12)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td>-.08 (.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.34 (.32)***</td>
<td>.91 (.15)***</td>
<td>.59 (.16)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (obs.)</td>
<td>4970</td>
<td>4970</td>
<td>4790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>.0216</td>
<td>.0300</td>
<td>.0490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001. Note: Entries are multivariate ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard error values in parentheses.

The first model illustrates the results of the analysis, which measures the direct generational effects on democracy preference. The analysis revealed that after variables measuring age, age squared, gender (female), year dummies, authoritarian child-rearing and perform prayer are held controlled, the members of the interim generation are more likely to prefer democracy than the members of the foundation generation (p=.024), but they are not significantly different than the members of the post-1980 generation in this regard (p=.194). On the other hand, the members of the post-1980 generation are also not significantly more likely to prefer democracy than the members of the foundation generation (p=.218). The second model presents the results of analysis, which was fit to investigate the social class effect on democracy preference. The analysis shows that the non-manual class is more likely to prefer democracy than the manual class (p<.000). Moreover, as the third model shows, the difference between the two classes still remains to be significant even after the education and income factors controlled (p=.013).

Our fourth model applies the same sort of analysis to three adjacent generations. The analysis of the data from the foundation generation revealed that belonging to the non-manual or manual class is irrelevant to the legitimization of democracy and delegitimization army rule (p=.524). Yet, it seems that the farmer class is significantly less likely to prefer democracy than the non-manual class (p=.048) and the service/self-employed classes (p=.021 and .007 respectively).

The findings are quite different for the post-1980 generation. The non-manual class prefers democracy at higher odds than the manual class. The difference between the two classes is significant (p=.024). When the education and income variables are removed, the difference between the two classes becomes even more significant (p<.000). In this
scenario, the non-manual class seems to have higher odds than the unemployed and service/self-employed classes too (p=.000 and .000 respectively).

Finally, when the results pertaining to the interim generation are observed, it is seen that there is no significant difference between the non-manual and manual classes (p=.357). In fact, there is no significant difference between any two classes. Removing income and education makes the difference between the manual and non-manual classes significant and powerful though (p=.000). In this scenario, the non-manual class becomes the most likely class to prefer democracy.

6.4. Conclusion and Discussion

The current chapter focused on one type of pre-democratic orientation: democracy preference, which includes the legitimization of democracy and the delegitimization of alternative forms of government. There are strong theoretical and empirical grounds to argue that the majority of the citizens’ favourable assessment of democracy and unfavourable assessments of its alternatives bolster the establishment and continuation of a democratic political system (Roses, 1995; Klingemann, 1999; Bratton & Mattes, 2001: p. 457; Shin & Well, 2005: p. 94; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005: p. 252). Since the influence of democracy is pervasive in almost every aspect of life, it is expected that democracy and in our particular case pro-democratic culture is influenced by a large array of factors in return. In order to reduce complexity, democracy preference was analysed with respect to the two bases which were suggested previously as strong determinants of many human attitudes and behaviour: generation and social class. To assess generational and class effects on democracy preference, two theories’ guidance was exploited. They are: Karl
Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism.

It was suggested in the first hypothesis, which was designed in line with Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations that due to their political upbringing in a relatively less authoritarian political environment, the members of the interim generation are more likely to prefer democracy as a good way of governing the country than the members of the foundation and post-1980 generations. Our analysis found only limited empirical evidence for this hypothesis. It was found that the interim generation is more likely to prefer democracy than the foundation generation. However, this finding should be read with caution due to small sample size of the foundation generation. On the other hand, the two comparable-in-size generations did not differ from each other with respect to their levels of democracy preference. This finding is telling about the new rising generation question in Turkey. By looking at this finding, one can argue that the youngest generation in Turkey is not more likely to prefer democracy than the previous one. It is believed that the lack of difference between democracy preference levels of the interim and the post-1980 generations can be explained by at least three alternative explanations or a combination of them. First, democracy is the most popular regime all over the world for decades. Thus, it is not too surprising that the members of the succeeding generations support democracy in close degrees. Second, in the Turkish case the military governments did not remain in power too long and passed the power to civilians as soon as possible. As a result of this, Turkey did not face too sharp regime changes which as a result might have produced relatively smaller gaps between Turkish generations by comparison with greater gaps between Weil’s generations in Germany and Klingemann’s generations in ex-communist countries. Third,
Turkish traditional culture might have dampened the attitudinal differences across generations which were generated by changes in the system level. It is recommended that further research be undertaken in these areas.

The second and the third regression analysis tested Lipset’s thesis with data from three subsequent generations. Two successive models testing Lipset’s argument revealed that members of the non-manual class are significantly more likely to prefer democracy than the members of the manual class as Lipset discussed. Moreover, the significance and the power of the difference between non-manual and manual classes’ likelihoods of preferring democracy attenuates when education is controlled. Potentially, including some additional variables measuring urbanization, family tension and workplace isolation, which were suggested by Lipset as underlying factors of working class authoritarianism, would further reduce the magnitude and the significance of the class effect. By looking at this finding only, it is possible to argue that the Lipset’s thesis is largely confirmed in our case. However, the third group of analyses, testing Lipset’s thesis across generations provides completely different results.

The second hypothesis suggested a mechanism operating with the joint contribution of the two theories. Combining Mannheim’s main argument on the formation of generations, his idea on the transformation of generational location into actual generation with Lipset’s argument on the relationship between the class structure and pro-democratic attitudes, it was hypothesized that authoritarian upbringing distorts the class-democracy preference relationship suggested by Lipset and homogenizes the social classes with respect to their democracy preference. The third group of analyses provided ample evidence that this is not
the case for democracy preference. Table 6.5 shows all the significant differences between social classes in the three generations for democracy preference.

Table 6.5
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for democracy preference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Service./self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Foundation generation, † interim generation ‡ post-1980 generation

Note: The differences are those produced by ordinary least square analysis after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer, education and income variables held controlled.
(Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001)

As it can be seen from Table 6.5, in the foundation generation three, in the interim generation zero and in the post-1980 generation two inter-class differences were found. This finding refutes our second hypothesis which envisaged homogenization of the social classes in the foundation and post-1980 generations in response to a macro-level authoritarian socialization. When the two comparable-in-size generations are considered, the higher number of the significant differences in the post-1980 generation relative to that in the interim generation supports disprove.

Table 6.6 illustrates the significant differences between the social classes after the education and income variables are removed out of the analysis.
As can be seen from Table 6.6, the number of significant differences increased for all generations when education and income are removed out of the analysis. Thus, it can be argued by looking at this picture that, education and, as our findings showed, to a lesser extent income, play important roles in the stratification of the social classes in all generations and explain most of the class-based democracy preference in Turkey. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these two variables are not responsible for the whole class effect on democracy preference as shown in the previous table. It should also be noted that, after education and income were removed out of the analysis, the number of differences between the manual class and the first two classes of the interim generation (which is one) becomes lower than the number of differences between the manual class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Service./self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** The differences are those produced by multivariate ordinary least square analysis after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, authoritarian child-rearing and perform prayer variables held controlled.

(Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001)
and the last two classes (which is three). This finding support the modernization theory’s classification of the social classes against that of Lipset’s.
CHAPTER 7. AN INCLUSIVE GENERATION? THE GENERATIONAL AND CLASS BASES OF OUT-GROUP TOLERANCE IN TURKEY

As discussed broadly in the theory chapter, Inglehart and Welzel argue that three approaches within the political culture research, namely legitimacy, communitarian and human development prioritize different sets of values and claims that the prevalence of these values in a given society indicates the extent of the presence of the social foundations entrenching democracy. In their examination of the human development approach, Inglehart and Welzel suggest that out-group tolerance (represented by tolerance of homosexuality), together with post-materialist liberty aspirations, political participation, life satisfaction and self-expression values syndrome serves as a significant determinant of system level democracy. In parallel to this argument, their examination of the data reveals evidence showing that country-level aggregated scores of tolerance of homosexuality are significant determinants of formal and effective democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

The present chapter investigates the generational and social class bases of out-group tolerance in Turkey. While investigating a potential generational divide in out-group tolerance, Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations is followed as the theoretical guideline. Mannheim lays down the foundations of his theory in his 1923 essay. Remember, his main argument is that macro politico-historical events that one has faced during formative years, which corresponds to adolescence and early adulthood, shape future attitudes and behaviour. Similarly inter-class differences in out-group tolerance are investigated
following the theoretical guidance of Lipset’s working class authoritarianism. The working class authoritarianism thesis postulates that the working class members are more likely to develop authoritarian characteristics due to several reasons, including their low level of education and income than their middle class counterparts. One of this authoritarianism is intolerance against the dissident groups in society.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, the literature on the tolerance - generation relationship is examined in the theory section. At the end of the theory section, the research hypotheses are developed. Next, in the data and methods section, the data, variables and the method are introduced. In the analysis section, the above-mentioned ideas are put to empirical test and the findings are presented accordingly. Finally, in the conclusion and discussion section the findings acquired in the previous section are discussed and further avenues for research are recommended.

7.1. Theory

A large volume of published studies applies the generation phenomenon in the particular realm of tolerance. Samuel Andrew Stouffer’s landmark work, *Communism Conformity and Civil Liberties*, was the first empirical attempt made in this direction. Stouffer’s work is not only important because it is the first empirical study in the field, but also because it reflects American attitudes towards communism during the McCarthy period in which an explicit war was declared against domestic communism in the US. Using data derived from a 1954 survey, Stouffer examines to what extent Americans are ready to grant rights to the members of three popular disfavoured groups; communists, atheists and socialists. He asks the respondents should the members of these three groups be allowed to speak in
the public, to teach or they should be thrown into the jail, should a book written by them removed from the library, should their telephone conversations be taped and citizenship be evoked. Stouffer finds that intolerance in the US is particularly high towards communists while it is relatively lower, yet still high, towards socialists and atheists. However, by looking at ever increasing trends in education, urbanization, mobility, exposure to mass media, Stouffer predicted a rise in tolerance in the future. He attributed particular importance to the role of generational replacement mechanism in this regard. According to him, generation effect, operating both directly and indirectly via education, would serve as the main mechanism for rising tolerance (Stouffer, 1955).

A great deal of studies took an interest in testing Stouffer`s prediction of rising tolerance in the US. Some of these, i.e. Davis (1975), Nie et al. (1996), Nunn, Crocket and Williams (1978) and Mueller (1988) found evidence supporting Stouffer`s prediction. On the other hand, others, i.e. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979; 1982), Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman and Piereson (1981), Barnum and Sullivan (1990), Mondak and Sanders (2003) found evidence opposing Stouffer`s thesis.

James A. Davis (1975) found empirical evidence supporting Stouffer`s predictions. From 1954 to 1972-73, Davis detects a 23% overall increase in tolerance. He reports that this increase is underlined by both direct and indirect generation effects as suggested by Stouffer. While a 5% increase is due to the direct generation effect, a 4% increase is due to the indirect generation effect operating through education. On the other hand, a 13% increase originates from the changing pattern of tolerance in all educational and cohort groups (Davis, 1975). Davis`s 1992 research also provides support for the generation
effect on tolerance. Analysing liberal and conservative changes in the US between 1970s and 1980s, Davis reports a slight liberalization trend in values which occurs as a consequence of the replacement of generations (Davis, 1992).

Thomas C. Wilson’s (1994) findings are parallel to that of Davis. In his analysis, where he decomposes tolerance across target groups, Wilson finds supportive evidence for Stouffer’s prediction regarding direct and indirect generation effects on tolerance. He employs three questions, derived from the GSS data between the years 1976 and 1988, asking whether militarists, racists, communists, atheists and homosexuals should be allowed to make a public speech, should teach in a university and should their book kept in the public library. His analysis reveals that while the large proportion of the generation effect on tolerance is direct and one third of the effect is originated from young cohorts’ higher education attainment. However, distinguishing between the rightist and leftist groups, Wilson draws a varied picture of the changing pattern of tolerance. He reports that between 1976 and 1988, while the tolerance in the US toward the leftist groups increased, the tolerance towards militarists remained stable and tolerance towards racists decreased. What is more, tolerance toward leftists increased only between 1976 and 1984 and between 1984 and 1988 it followed a constant course. Further decomposing the leftist group, he shows that between 1984 and 1988 while the tolerance toward atheists and homosexuals followed a stable trend, the tolerance toward communists decreased (Wilson, 1994).

Sullivan and his colleagues levelled perhaps the most powerful criticism against Stouffer’s work. Their criticism focuses on Stouffer’s methodology as well as his
prediction of the rise in tolerance. The criticism of his methodology is based on the idea that the given groups that were found in the past by the public as the most disagreeable are replaced by some new ones. In other words, they argue that intolerance towards atheists, communists and socialists no longer represented the general intolerance in the US. To overcome this problem, they suggest their least-liked group measure, in which they allow respondents to designate their target group in advance, as an alternative to Stouffer’s fixed-group measure. Following the respondents` specification of their most disliked group, they direct them a battery of questions asking whether they would tolerate six different activities performed by the group members. By looking at their own findings, Sullivan and his friends argue that, when it is measured by their method, tolerance in the US does not seem to be increasing between 1955 and 1973. This is because their findings report a decrease in intolerance towards only a few groups, i.e. communists, atheists and homosexuals, but does not reflect an overall decrease in tolerance (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979; 1982; Sullivan et al., 1981).

Alternative to Stouffer’s rising tolerance thesis, Duch and Gibson’s (1992) findings, relating to the democracy-tolerance relationship with a reference to generation as the main carrying mechanism, are particularly important for the current research. In their cross-cultural analysis of micro and macro-level determinants of political tolerance, Duch and Gibson (1992) ask their European respondents should fascists be allowed to run for public office, hold public office and should fascist political parties be banned. Their findings are informative for the relationship between democracy and tolerance on individual as well as system levels. Their analysis of the macro-level determinants of
tolerance reveals that the democratic experience correlates negatively with political tolerance. Contrary to their findings at the system level, their individual level analysis revealed a positive relationship between exposure to democratic values and tolerance. They divide the respondents from Greece, Spain and Portugal into four age groups by looking at what age they spent the year 1971, which is the beginning year of democratization processes in these three countries. The first age group was younger than 10 in 1972, the second one was between 10 and 19, the third one was between 20 and 29 and the fourth age group was older than 29. They find that those who were between 20 and 29 ages at the beginning of the democratization period constitute the most tolerant age group. They conclude that social learning of democratic values by means of re-socialization affects tolerance positively (Duch & Gibson, 1992).

Based on the theoretical background introduced above, hereby we develop the following two hypotheses to investigate the generational and social class effects as well as their combined effect on out-group tolerance in Turkey. If Stouffer’s rising tolerance thesis is applicable in Turkey, we should find a rising trend as we move from the foundation to the interim and from the interim to the post-1980 generations. Alternative to this, it is hypothesized in line with Mannheim’s theory of generations which was discussed broadly in the theory chapter, and Duch and Gibson’s (1992) particular findings discussed above, that the members of the interim generation are more likely to tolerate out-groups than the members of the foundation and post-1980 generations (Hypothesis I).

Having the direct generational effect on out-group tolerance is assessed; in the second step of the investigation first the inter-class differences on out-group tolerance are examined. In
line with Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, which was also introduced in the theory chapter, it is expected that the non-manual class is more likely to tolerate out-groups than the manual class when the generations are not considered. However, when the generation factor is at work, we expect a completely different picture to emerge. Thus, combining the main argument of Mannheim on the formation of generations, his particular argument on the transformation of generation as location into actual generation with Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, it is predicted that Lipset’s thesis is only valid for the interim generation which was socialization by relatively less authoritarian politico-juridical order. On the contrary, for the foundation and post-1980 generations, the social classes are expected to be homogenized with respect to their out-group tolerance due to their authoritarian socialization (Hypothesis II).

7.2. Data and Method

7.2.1. Data

The present chapter employs five waves of cross-sectional World Values Survey (WVS) data for Turkey. After deletion of the cases holding missing values, the sample consists of 6,488 cases.\(^{12}\) Construction of the dependent and independent variables are discussed below.

7.2.2. Variables

As mentioned in the above sections, our investigation requires measurement of the dependent variable, out-group tolerance and the key independent variables, generation as

\(^{12}\) A detailed overview of survey items used in the analysis is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendices section.
well as social class in the first place. The construction of the dependent and the key independent variables are discussed in the following lines.

7.2.2.1. Dependent Variable

We derived our out-group tolerance measurement from a battery-type question, which was replicated over the five succeeding waves of the World Values Survey in Turkey. The question asks: *On this list are various groups of people. Could you please indicate any that you would not like to have as neighbours.* Following the question the following groups are given to the respondents. Six groups are repeated in the five waves of the Turkish surveys. They are: drug addicts, people of a different race, people who have AIDS, immigrants/foreign workers, homosexuals, heavy drinkers. In order to assess the dimensionality across the battery items, a Principle Components Factor (PCF) Analysis is performed. The PCF analysis is an efficient scale reduction technique to reveal variability between variables and their association with unobserved factors (Jackson, 2005). The findings of the PCF analysis are shown in Table 7.1.
Our analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues over 1.00, which means that tolerance against six out-groups can be categorized into two separate clusters. It can also be seen from the values in the first and second panels of Table 7.1 that the first four and the last two questionnaire items tapped into the first and the second factors respectively by over the critical alpha value of .60. While the first factor contained ‘heavy drinkers’, ‘people who have AIDS’, ‘drug addicts’ and ‘homosexuals’, the second one contained ‘people of a different race’ and ‘immigrants/foreign workers’. Figure 7.1 shows how each questionnaire item tapped into each factor visually.
Empirical findings imply a meaningful distinction. By looking at the strong face validity of the items, it is clearly seen that while the first four items have a social and the last two items have nationalistic connotation. Based on empirical and logical grounds, we generated two separate dependent variables; ‘nationalistic out-group tolerance’ and ‘social out-group tolerance’. Additive scales are constructed for each variable. While for the nationalistic out-group tolerance the scale ranges from 0 to 2, for social out-group tolerance it ranges from 0 to 4.
7.2.2.2. Independent Variables

Two key independent variables are employed in the analysis of this chapter. They are generation and social class. The construction of the generation and social class variables were discussed widely in the data and methods chapter. Different from the previous empirical chapters’ here *cynicism* was employed to isolate a group-specific intolerance from general distrust.

7.2.3. Method

The ordered logistic regression procedure was employed in the analysis of this chapter. This is due to the ordered character of the two dependent variables.

7.3. Findings

*Table 7.2* presents the distribution of the answers pertaining to the each item. In the last two lines, it shows the percentage of respondents who exhibited tolerance to all the groups and who failed to do so.
Table 7.2

Descriptive statistics of the out-groups (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery Item</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinker</td>
<td>84.22</td>
<td>15.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>78.81</td>
<td>21.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>93.34</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>87.35</td>
<td>12.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different race</td>
<td>28.53</td>
<td>71.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immig./foreign worker</td>
<td>30.72</td>
<td>69.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social out-group tolerance*</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic out-group tolerance*</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=6,488


* Mean scores for social and nationalistic out-group tolerance (Additive indexes rank from 0 to 4 for social out-group tolerance and from 0 to 2 for nationalistic out-group tolerance).

Table 7.2 indicates a dramatic gap between the percentage of respondents who showed tolerance towards the first four and the last two groups. While the latter groups were tolerated by 69% and 71% of the respondents, toleration of none of the former groups surpassed 22%. This, along with the factor analysis findings presented above, reinforces the appropriateness of our decision to distinguish between the two forms of out-group tolerance. The discrepancy is reflected in the remarkable difference between the percentage of the social and nationalistic toleration as well. While almost 60% of the respondents showed nationalistic out-group tolerance, only around three percent showed social out-group tolerance. Table 7.3 cross-tabulates the tolerance items with generation and class categories.
A general increasing trend can be observed in the first panel of Table 7.3. As we move from the foundation to the interim, and from the interim to the post-1980 generations, social out-group tolerance, on average, rises in large percentages while nationalistic out-group tolerance`s average rise remains relatively small. The second panel of the table, on the other hand, presents the percentage of tolerant respondents across social class categories. While farmers appear to be the most intolerant segment of society, the non-manual category is the most tolerant of all the groups save with regards to the drinkers. On
the other hand, the manual class is located at the middle of these two extremes. While service/self-employed members hold only a sledge edge over the manual class members, unemployed members marginally surpass the farmers. Having the descriptive statistics presented, next we turn to run two sets of ordered logistic regressions predicting the two dependent variables, nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. **Table 7.4** presents the results pertaining to our first dependent variable, nationalistic out-group tolerance.
Table 7.4 Ordered logistic regression models predicting nationalistic out-group tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mannheim’s Model</th>
<th>Lipset’s models</th>
<th>Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Model 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coef OR</td>
<td>Coef OR</td>
<td>Coef OR</td>
<td>Coef OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>.00 (.00) 1.00</td>
<td>.02 (.01)* 1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>.00 (.00) 1.00</td>
<td>-.00 (.00) .99</td>
<td>-.00 (.00)* .99</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gender (female)</td>
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<td>-.27 (.07)*** .76</td>
<td>-.19 (.07)*** .82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Years (1990 omitted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-.10 (.10) .90</td>
<td>-.15 (.09) .85</td>
<td>-.19 (.10) .82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-.09 (.09) .91</td>
<td>.05 (.08) 1.06</td>
<td>.01 (.08) 1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>.03 (.10) 1.03</td>
<td>.18 (.09) 1.19</td>
<td>.10 (.09) 1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-.26 (.11)* .76</td>
<td>-.12 (.09) .88</td>
<td>-.46 (.09)*** .62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>-.25 (.01)*** 1.29</td>
<td>-.23 (.01)*** 1.26</td>
<td>-.17 (.02) 1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>-.13 (.01)*** .87</td>
<td>-.12 (.01)*** .88</td>
<td>-.10 (.01) .89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust</td>
<td>.13 (.07) 1.14</td>
<td>.15 (.07)* 1.17</td>
<td>.12 (.08)* 1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Elementary)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>.55 (.06)*** 1.74</td>
<td>.43 (.21)*** 1.54</td>
<td>.68 (.11)*** 1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>.96 (.10)*** 2.62</td>
<td>1.69 (.49)*** 5.45</td>
<td>.89 (.20)*** 2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>.08 (.01)*** 1.08</td>
<td>.07 (.05) 1.08</td>
<td>.07 (.02)* 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Ref: Manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.27 (.07)*** .75</td>
<td>-.24 (.07)*** .78</td>
<td>-.34 (.30) .70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>-.53 (.11)*** .58</td>
<td>-.41 (.11)*** .65</td>
<td>-.30 (.29) .73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>.38 (.08)*** 1.46</td>
<td>-.05 (.09) .94</td>
<td>-.55 (.33) .57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td>.05 (.09) 1.05</td>
<td>-.16 (.09) .84</td>
<td>-.49 (.30) .60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation (Ref: Interim)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>-.52 (.14)*** .58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td>.04 (.09) 1.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>-.213 (27)</td>
<td>-.199 (22)</td>
<td>-.91 (24) 8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>-1.02 (27)</td>
<td>-.87 (22)</td>
<td>.23 (24) 9.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-5969.04</td>
<td>-5931.85</td>
<td>-5835.93 -586.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (obs.)</td>
<td>6488</td>
<td>6488</td>
<td>6488 605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.0341</td>
<td>.0401</td>
<td>.0556 .0626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: Entries are ordered logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios.
Our hypotheses stipulated fitting six ordered logistic regressions on nationalistic out-group tolerance. The first panel of the table illustrates the results of the first regression, which was fit to analyse the generation effect on nationalistic out-group tolerance. The analysis reveals that the members of the interim generation are significantly more likely to exhibit nationalistic out-group tolerance than the members of the foundation generation (p<. 000) but no significant difference can be observed between the interim and the post-1980 generations (p=. 607). When the reference category is switched to the foundation, it is also found that the members of the post-1980 generation has higher odds to show nationalistic tolerance than the members of the foundation generation (p=. 002).

The second model assesses class effects on nationalistic out-group tolerance. The second regression reveals that the manual class is more likely to exhibit out-group nationalistic tolerance than the unemployed and farmer classes (p<. 000 and . 000 respectively) but less likely to do so than the non-manual class (p<. 000). In fact, farmer seems to be the lower-most tolerant class. Following the farmer comes the unemployed class which is also significantly less likely to exhibit nationalistic out-group tolerance than all the remaining three classes. The third regression, on the other hand, analyses pure class effects. The analysis reveals that, when education and income are controlled no significant difference remains between the manual and non-manual classes with respect to their nationalistic tolerance (p=. 536). However, the manual class is still more likely to exhibit nationalistic out-group tolerance than the unemployed (p=. 002) and farmers (p<. 000). Similarly, the non-manual class is also more likely to show nationalistic tolerance than the unemployed and farmer classes (p=. 046 and .007 respectively).
The fourth panel of the table is divided into three sub-panels, each containing the results of a regression analysis that was run with data coming from separate generations. It reports the impact of belonging to the manual class on nationalistic out-group tolerance relative to belonging to the other social classes across three adjacent generations. When the results pertaining to the foundation generation are viewed, it is seen that the manual class is no different than the non-manual class (p = .100). The situation does not change when education and income factors are removed out of the analysis. The insignificant difference between the manual and non-manual classes remain insignificant in this scenario too (p = .983). The results of the post-1980 generation also show that there is no significant difference between the manual and non-manual classes and no other class pairs as well. However, when the significant education and income factors are removed, it is seen that the members of the non-manual class is 1.32 times more likely to display nationalistic out-group tolerance than their manual class counterparts (p = .011). When the reference category is switched to the non-manual class, it is seen that the manual class is significantly more likely to display nationalistic tolerance than the unemployed, farmer and service/self-employed classes (p > .000, .001 and .011 respectively). Finally, the interim generation’s results reveal that there is no significant difference between the manual and non-manual classes (p = .206). However, the manual class is more likely to display nationalistic out-group tolerance than the unemployed and farmer classes (p = .001 and .000 respectively). Similarly the non-manual class is also more likely to show nationalistic out-group tolerance than these two classes (p < .000 and .000 respectively). However, when the education and income factors are removed out of the analysis, the non-manual class becomes almost twice more tolerant than the manual class (p = .000).
Moreover, in this scenario, the non-manual class becomes more tolerant than the unemployed, farmer and service/self-employed classes (p<.000, . 000 and .007 respectively).

**Table 7.5** presents the results pertaining to our second dependent variable, social out-group tolerance.
Table 7.5 Ordered logistic regression models predicting social out-group tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Mannheim’s Model</th>
<th>Lipset’s models</th>
<th>Mannheim’s and Lipset’s models combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
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<td>Coeff</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.02 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00 (.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-.37 (.06)**</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.22 (.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Years (1990 omitted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>.74 (.11)***</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.66 (.11)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-.38 (.10)***</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>.46 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>.60 (.12)***</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.67 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>.82 (.12)***</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.89 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust</td>
<td>-.11 (.08)</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.08 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>- .29 (.02)***</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-.27 (.02)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>-.16 (.01)***</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.15 (.01)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (Ref: Elementary)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
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<tr>
<td>University</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Class (Ref: Manual)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>-.48 (.15)***</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.39 (.15)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td>-.02 (.09)</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
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<td>Cut 3</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-.6179.74</td>
<td>-.6150.44</td>
<td>-.6094.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (obs.)</td>
<td>6488</td>
<td>6488</td>
<td>6488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.0487</td>
<td>.0532</td>
<td>.0618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: Entries are ordered logistic regression logit estimates with standard error values in parentheses and odds ratios.
The first regression looked at the direct generational effect on social out-group tolerance. It revealed no significant difference between the foundation and interim (p= .061) as well as between the foundation and the post-1980 generations (p= .173). Similarly, the interim and post-1980 generations did not appear to be discernibly different (p= .778). The second regression on the other hand, is designed to test the social class effect on tolerance. The analysis revealed that the members of the non-manual class are more likely to exhibit social out-group tolerance than their manual class counterparts (p< .000). While the manual class is significantly more likely to exhibit social tolerance than the unemployed and farmer categories, it is less likely to do so than the non-manual and service/self-employed ones. In the third model, however, the significant difference between the manual and non-manual classes disappeared when education and income are controlled (p= .581). Yet, the members of the manual category remain to be significantly more tolerant than the foundation and farmer categories (p=.035 and .011 respectively). The fourth model presents the results of the three regression analysis run with data coming from three adjacent generations. The analysis revealed no significant class-based social out-group tolerance disparities in any of the generations except for the significant differences appeared between the farmer class and the unemployed, manual, non-manual and service/self-employed classes of the post-1980 generation (p=.018, .002, .023 and .001 respectively). However, it seems that different than the nationalistic out-group tolerance, social out-group tolerance is more widespread across generational and class lines.
7.4. Conclusion and Discussion

First, it should be noted that, our analysis distinguished between two types of out-group tolerance. They were called nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. This unexpected finding relates to ‘the independence of social and political intolerance’, which was suggested by Gibson (2006) as one of the enigmas of tolerance. Since we were restricted by the availability of the data, we were unable to distinguish more forms of tolerance, but future surveys involving a higher number of potential unpopular groups may well develop a wider picture of the tolerance phenomenon. The future studies, can also take the breadth and depth of tolerance, which we also ignored due to the limitations of our data, into consideration.

The first finding to emerge from our research is related to the socialization of generations. Our first hypothesis, which was designed in line with Mannheim’s theory of generations in general and Duch and Gibson’s (1992) argument in particular, suggested that coming of age under authoritarian politico-juridical order makes individuals more likely to develop intolerance towards out-groups. The analysis showed that the interim generation is more likely to show nationalistic out-group tolerance than foundation generation. This finding supported our hypothesis based on Mannheim’s theory of generations as well as Stouffer’s rising tolerance thesis. Yet, this finding must be read carefully due to the foundation generation’s small sample size, which shifts our essential focus to the comparison of the interim and post-1980 generations. The insignificance of the difference between the two comparable-in-size generations, namely the interim and the post-1980, prevents us from accepting either theory. Moreover, it should also be noted that no significant differences were detected between any two generations for social tolerance. In practice, this finding speaks to the new rising Turkish generation debate. Although our investigation is insufficient for raising a comprehensive
argument about the new rising generation, by limiting our focus on the issue of tolerance, we can confidently say that our finding, in no way, heralds a new rising tolerant generation.

In the second and third groups of models, Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis was tested with pooled data from all the subsequent generations. It was found that members of the manual class are less likely to exhibit both forms of out-group tolerance than their non-manual class counterparts. It was also found that higher intolerance in the manual class is linked to lower level of education attainment and income as Lipset suggested (see also Grabb, 1979). This finding seems to show that Lipset’s thesis holds true in our case. However, testing Lipset’s thesis across generations drew a more complicated picture. In the second hypothesis, which combined Mannheim’s theory of generations, his argument on the transformation of generation as location into actual generation and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, it was predicted that the class - tolerance relationship is conditional to the generational location. More particularly, it was suggested that the members of the interim generation which were socialized by a relatively less authoritarian governments and legal order is more likely to show tolerance than the members of the foundation and the post-1980 generations which were exposed to authoritarian politico-juridical order. Table 7.6 shows the significant differences between social classes in the three generations for nationalistic and social out-group tolerance.
As it can be seen from Table 7.6, the number of significant differences of nationalistic tolerance in the interim generation (which is 6) is higher than those in the foundation generation (which is 0) and than in the post-1980 generation (which is 0). This finding supports our argument that a generation`s exposure to authoritarian governments and legislations during its socialization period plays a role in the homogenization of its members` nationalistic out-group tolerance discrepancies in the future. The finding is telling about how authoritarian governments in Turkey homogenize social classes a with respect to their nationalistic out-group tolerance. When considered from this point of view, one can argue that this finding challenges Lipset`s static working class authoritarianism thesis from a generational perspective. Nevertheless, the same hypothesis was not supported for social out-group tolerance. The number of significant differences pertaining to social out-group tolerance in the post-1980 generation (which is 4) is higher than those in the interim generation (which

**Table 7.6**

Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for nationalistic and social tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Service./self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Image" /></td>
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<tr>
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<td><img src="image14.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image15.png" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td><img src="image16.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image17.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image18.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image19.png" alt="Image" /></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td><img src="image21.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image22.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image23.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image24.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image25.png" alt="Image" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nationalistic out-group tolerance=1, social out-group tolerance=2

- Foundation generation, interim generation, post-1980 generation

*Note*: The differences are those produced by ordered logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer and distrust variables held controlled.

(Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001)
This can be explained as a recent clash between social classes in intolerance against socially ‘dissident’ groups. It can also be seen from the table that in the interim generation in which we expect Lipset’s thesis may hold true, the number of the differences between the manual class and the first two classes is higher than the number of the differences between the manual class and the last two classes for both nationalistic and social forms of out-group tolerance. This finding implies that the modernization theory’s categorization of the social classes which is based on the traditional/modern dichotomy explains better the nationalistic out-group tolerance in Turkey than does Lipset’s categorization of the social classes which locates manual in the low class category.

Table 7.7 shows the significant differences between the social classes when education and income factors are removed from the analysis.

**Table 7.7**
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for nationalistic and social tolerance (education and income removed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Service./self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Non-manual| 1 2        |        |        | 1 2        | 2                      |}

Nationalistic out-group tolerance=1, social out-group tolerance=2

Foundation generation, interim generation, post-1980 generation

Note: The differences are those produced by ordered logistic regression analysis after age, age squared, gender (female), survey year, education, income, authoritarian child-rearing, perform prayer and distrust variables held controlled.

(Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001)
As can be seen from Table 7.7 the number of significant differences between class categories increases when education and income are removed out of the analysis. From this, it could be argued that mostly education and, as shown by our analysis, in some cases income, stratifies the social classes’ nationalistic out-group tolerance in all generations. Most of the class-based out-group tolerance in Turkey can be explained by the education factor alone. On the other hand, it was found that after removing education and income from the analysis the number of the differences between the manual class and the last two classes is now higher the number of the differences between the manual class and the first two classes for both forms of out-group tolerance. Remember the the situation was reverse before removing the two variables. This finding shows that when education and income were left uncontrolled, the manual class becomes further different from the last two classes. In other words, normally manual class resembles to lower classes in a greater degree than it does to higher classes, but when education and income variables are considered it resembles to the higher classes than it does to the lower classes. This shows that much of the modernization effect that stratifies the social classes as unemployed, farmer and manual on one side and non-manual and service/self-employed on the other can be largely explained by education, and to a lesser level income, factor.

Another point that should be mentioned is that an unexpected finding to come out of the analysis was the underlying dimensionality distinguishing between two types of out-group tolerance; nationalistic and social out-group tolerance. This finding speaks to ‘the independence of social and political intolerance’, which Gibson (2006) discussed as one of the enigmas of tolerance. The empirical distinction between the two types of out-group tolerance should come as a complete surprise since rejecting an immigrant neighbour and rejecting a
homosexual neighbour can reasonably be understood to originate from different types of value bases. Our analysis showed that while tolerance in Turkey is considerably higher for nationalistic groups, it is very low for the social ones. Although, it is a positive finding that Turkish people are ready to welcome foreigners in their immediate surroundings, the extent how intolerant Turkish public towards the socially ‘deviant’ groups is concerning. Given rapid socioeconomic change, it is unrealistic to expect a significant rise in social out-group tolerance in Turkey in the near future. However, as younger generations replace older, more conservative ones that are dying out the socialisation of a new, younger generation with more liberal social values may speed up this socio-cultural change in the country through inter-generational replacement in distant future.

A few points regarding the methodology need to be clarified here. It should not be ignored that the methodology we employed while constructing the nationalistic and social out-group tolerance measurements was slightly biased against the latter. This is because the number of items combined for this variable is higher than the number of those for the nationalistic out-group tolerance variable which generates a larger gap between the percentage of ‘social tolerents’ and the mean percentage of the tolerants of the groups making the variable. Yet, this does not conceal the fact that tolerance against nationalistic groups is way higher in the Turkish society than tolerance against social groups. There were also some problematic points that should be expressed about the wording of the question that we derived our dependent variables from. The first one relates to its face validity. We understand the respondents’ unwillingness about sharing a neighbourhood with people from the groups they tick from the list, but we don’t know whether a respondent’s rejection of a group is due to some bad prior neighbourhood experiences with people from these groups or some abstract prejudice. After
all, there is no chance of knowing what respondents` reactions would be if they had neighbours from the groups in question in real life. My impression is that real face-to-face neighbourhood relationships may alter these preferences considerably. Therefore, lack of real neighbourhood experience should be noted as an important factor that would have caused somewhat overestimation of the results. Conversely, one should also be aware of the possibility that some respondents might have been hiding their true ideas about these groups to give the socially acceptable answer which would this time cause to an underestimation of the true scores. Another point is that, here we only assume that mentioning a group` s name in the unwelcomed neighbour list indicates intolerance towards the members of this group. Yet, a more detailed examination investigating respondents` support for the political, civic and economic rights of the members of the unpopular groups might have ascertained different results. People may only be not happy with sharing the same social domain with a particular group`s members, but at the same time be supportive of their rights. Last but not the least, there is also no way of knowing with data in hand, whether a respondent sympathize with a group because he or she belongs to the group in question himself/herself.
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This chapter is composed of a brief summary of the findings of the empirical chapters, their theoretical and practical implications and some suggestions for potential avenues for future research. Several theoretical and country specific implications can be drawn from the findings of the present research. As it can be remembered, the main aim of the current thesis was to investigate the generational and social class bases of pro-democratic culture in Turkey. In pursuit of this objective, Karl Mannheim’s theory of generations and Seymour Martin Lipset’s working class authoritarianism were tested in the Turkish political context. In all empirical chapters the first hypotheses were set in line with Mannheim's understanding of the formation of generations. On the other hand, the second hypotheses were designed following the implications of both Mannheim’s theory of generations and Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis.

In the analyses, the first group of models which were designed to predict six different indicators of pro-democratic culture found limited empirical evidence for the first group of hypotheses. Significant differences were found between the foundation and interim generations in democracy preference and nationalistic out-group tolerance. However, due to the low number of the cases in the foundation generation, we essentially focused on the comparison of the interim and the post-1980 generations. The findings showed evidence of a significant difference between the interim and the post-1980 generations only for attending a lawful demonstration.

The lack of significant differences between the interim and post-1980 generations for five out of six orientations implies that Mannheim’s theory of generations is largely not applicable to
our particular area of investigation. This finding can be accounted for by means of two groups of potential explanations or a combination of them. While the first group of potential explanations relates to the insignificance of the event which was expected to socialize, the second group relates to those who were expected to be socialized. The first explanation could be that the influence of the post-1980 regime on an average young person was not as dramatic as it was thought to be. If this is the case, the Turkish army’s quick withdrawal from power, unlike its counterparts in the Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, might have played an important role in this. The Turkish military governments’ willingness to give power back to the civilians might be due to Turkey’s intense economic and political ties with the Western democracies or the Turkish society’s or military members’ commitments to democracy. Whatever the reason, the military government’s tendency to give power back to the civilians might have reduced the power of the post-1980 period to socialize the youth. The second explanation could relate to another feature of the regime established after the 1980 coup. Following the coup, the military government went to the polls in three years and a civilian government was established. The civilian government introduced a series of structural reforms which brought prosperity to the economy. Owing to this, beside its authoritarian characteristic, the post-1980 period was also marked by rapid social and economic development. Thus, one can well argue that the negative effect of system level authoritarianism have been counterbalanced by the positive socioeconomic development effect.

Alternative to the first group of potential explanations, the second group relates to those who was socialized. The lowess figures clearly showed that as one moves from the years of birth of the members of the interim generation to the years of birth of the members of the post-1980 generation, four out of six dependent variables show a decrease as predicted but they lack
statistical power. This may indicate that the event was not insignificant, but the post-1980 generation resisted change. If this is the case, at least two potential factors might have played a role in this. The first one is that system level authoritarianism only mattered to a small segment of the society, namely urban professionals and employees who felt directly the economic and political consequences of the event but the effect was hampered when it was averaged for all the social classes. I suggest this by looking at the dramatic differences between the social classes. Then, an overwhelming majority of the Turkish population was living in distant villages and towns and had limited access to the formal education and the mass media. This idea is supported by the Turkish Statistical Institute’s data, which showed that, by 1980, the rate of the population living in the countryside was 56.1%, which declined to 22.7% only recently. The second potential factor underlying the post-1980 generation’s indifference to authoritarian socialization could relate to the embeddedness of the attitudes towards democracy in the traditional Turkish culture. To give an example, the Turkish public’s hesitation to take part in elite-challenging political activities are telling about its respect for state authority. This understanding might have prevented the majority of the citizens to exercise their rights between 1960 and 1980 even if, in Beck and Jennings’ (1979, p. 748-49) words, ‘the opportunities of involvement’ were provided. In addition to its influence on political participation, traditionalism can give results for the preference of democracy and out-group tolerance in different ways as previous research showed (for the negative relationship between traditionalism and support for democracy in Turkey see Tessler & Altınoğlu, 2003: p. 35). The importance that the majority of the Turkish public attached on authoritarian child rearing attitudes also support this view. Yet, more research is needed to understand whether traditional world view dampens the socialization effect of macro-scale developments.
In addition to these two groups of explanations, another, which is worthy of notice, is related to our selection of dependent variables. Note that although we did not detect generational differences, it does not mean that they do not occur in any other attitudes. For instance, authoritarian upbringing of the 1980 generation may show results in its members’ relationship with their family, children or their colleagues or their voting behaviour. All these do not go beyond pure speculations until they are tested. Nevertheless, each of these potential outcomes also portends interesting avenues for future academic research.

It should be noted that our finding showing that generation does not play an important role on the most of the pro-democratic attitudes also relates to the key question of whether a new generation is on the rise in Turkey. After the Gezi Protests in 2013, ‘the new generation in Turkey’ became one of the main topics of political conversations. It was speculated in the media and academic circles that the participants of the protests are the members of the new rising Turkish generation. Portrayed as more participatory, pro-democratic and tolerant than the previous generation, this alleged new generation was indicated as the face of a new Turkey. However, this research did not detect a full-scale evidence of a rising generation in Turkey (except for the finding pertaining demonstrations), within its area of investigation.

With these results in hand, we can either argue that there is no such a generation or alternatively either that the members of this generation are too young to be captured by our data (when the recent rapid rise in social tolerance is considered) or their attitudes are not so clearly differentiated. Only time will tell as new studies with more recent data and focus on younger generation will be able to repeat this investigation for younger individuals and further test for the above effects.
Although the first group of findings revealed that the replacement of generations does not automatically make Turkish respondents more activity prone, supportive of democracy and tolerant against the ‘dissident’ groups of the society, this finding should not come to mean that generation did not play any role at all. In order to investigate indirect generational effects, the second group of analyses included social class in the equation. The analysis of the pooled data from all the successive generations analysed the nature of the relationship between the social class structure and pro-democratic attitudes in Turkey. The analyses revealed that for five out of six indicators (except for attending a lawful demonstration), the non-manual class members are significantly more pro-democratic than their manual class counterparts. Moreover, the significant difference completely disappears for four out of five indicators and attenuates with respect to its power and significance for democracy preference when education and income variables are controlled. The finding implies that when the generational dividing lines are ignored, Lipset’s working class authoritarianism thesis, which suggests that the members of the non-manual class are more pro-democratic than the manual class, holds true in the Turkish context. However, as the third group of analyses revealed, when the generational factor was considered the picture changed considerably. The third group of analyses tested Lipset’s thesis across generations by means of regression models with data coming from three subsequent generations. It should be noted that our treatment of each generation as separate samples served as an efficient technique to estimate cohort effects net of age and period effects. It was found in the third group of analyses that the relationship between social class structure and pro-democratic attitudes differed remarkably across generations. Table 8.1 summarizes the findings of the three empirical chapters regarding to the significant differences between all possible class pairs.
As it can be seen from Table 8.1, the number of the inter-class differences of the interim generation (which is eighteen) is higher than the numbers pertaining to the foundation (which is 4) and the post-1980 (which is 6) generations. The high number of the significant differences in the interim generation shows that inter-class variability is the highest in the interim generation. On the contrary, the low numbers of the significant differences in the foundation and the post-1980 generations show that inter-class variability is low in these generations. This finding lends support to the second group of hypotheses suggesting that exposure to authoritarian governments and legal order homogenize social classes in terms of their pro-democratic attitudes. This finding clearly poses a ‘generational challenge’ to Lipset’s static working class authoritarianism thesis.
Yet, for the interim generation, which was not socialized by authoritarian macro-level effects and therefore where we expect Lipset’s thesis to hold for, the findings are not what the theory would predict. It was found in the analysis with data from the interim generation that for five out of the six orientations, the manual and non-manual classes are not significantly different from each other. There is another important implication of this finding. This is that the manual class resembles to the non-manual and service/self-employed classes in greater degree than it resembles to the unemployed and farmer classes. When looking at the significant differences between the manual and the other classes in the interim generation, it can be seen that the number of the significant differences between the manual class and the unemployed/ farmer classes (which is 7) is higher than the number of the significant differences between the manual class and the non-manual/ service/self-employed classes (which is 2). This contradicts with Lipset’s categorization of the social classes, since in his understanding; the manual class belongs to the lower group of classes together with i.e. farmers, miners and fishers. Instead, it supports modernization theory’s categorization of the social classes which locates the manual class in the modern end of the traditional/modern dichotomy. In line with the categorization modernization theory implies, the present research found that the essential democratic cleavage in Turkey is between traditional and modern classes. Whether they are manual or non-manual, those classes which involve in modern modes of production are more pro-democratic than those who remain out of modern production. This finding is in accord with those studies indicating that as the society transforms from a traditional to a modern outlook, individuals are more likely to prefer democracy (Inkeles, 1974; for the relationship between education and global and specific evaluations of democracy in Turkey see; Dixon, 2008: p. 693, 694), involve in politics (Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995) and show tolerance (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; for the relationship between education and ethnic tolerance in Turkey see Dixon,
2008: p. 697). As a contribution to these works, this thesis demonstrated that generations’ socialization allows for modernization to influence the development of pro-democratic attitudes. This finding, on the other hand, implies that that Lipset’s thesis is not applicable especially for the generations which were exposed to system level authoritarianism. Moreover, it also shows that even for generations which were not socialized by system level authoritarianism, the manual class does not belong to the group of the lower classes as Lipset suggested. Another important finding of the analyses is that education and, to a lesser extent, income are responsible for further stratification of the social classes. Table 8.2 shows inter-class differences for six orientations when education and income factors are not controlled for.
Table 8.2
Significant differences between social classes in three subsequent generations for all the dependent variables (education and income removed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Farmer</th>
<th>Manual</th>
<th>Non-manual</th>
<th>Service./self-employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 4 5 6</td>
<td>4 5 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 3 4 5</td>
<td>5 6</td>
<td>4 5 6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 4 4 5</td>
<td>4 5 6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv./self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 4 5</td>
<td>4 5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

As it can be seen from the Table 8.2, when education and income factors are not controlled for, the total number of significant differences increased from eighteen eight to sixty. This is to say that when these factors are controlled for, the number of inter-class variability decreases. This holds true for all the generations. This is proof that, education and in some cases income, is accounted for most of the inter-class differences. This finding implies that normally there is less difference between social classes, but the social classes’ different levels of education and income play a role in the furtherance of inter-class differences. In brief, these two factors further stratify the social classes. More specifically, it is also seen that these two factors play a role in the differentiation of the manual class from the non-manual and service/self-employed classes. When these factors are controlled for, the manual class’
differences from these classes diminish. This shows that education and income also play an important role in furthering modernization’s stratification of the classes. However, it should not be forgotten that class factor still matters and not all the inter-class differences can be accounted for through education and income alone.
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### APPENDICES

#### Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Recoded Value</th>
<th>Questionnaire Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petition</td>
<td>1=Have done</td>
<td>0=Not done</td>
<td>Here are some forms of political action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott</td>
<td>2=Might do</td>
<td>1=Done</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>3=Would never do</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a democratic political system</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td>I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having the army rule</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having experts, not government, make</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decisions according to what they think is</td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best for the country</td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a strong leader who does not have</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td>1=Very good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to bother with parliament and elections</td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td>2=Fairly good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td>3=Fairly bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td>4=Very bad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 2 of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Recoded Value</th>
<th>Questionnaire Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy drinkers</td>
<td>1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0=Mentioned</td>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who have AIDS</td>
<td>1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug addicts</td>
<td>1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of a different race</td>
<td>1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants/foreign workers</td>
<td>1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social out-group tolerance</td>
<td>Heavy drinkers+People who have AIDS+Drug addicts+Homosexuals (0-4 Scale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalistic out-group tolerance</td>
<td>People of a different race+Immigrants/foreign workers (0-2 Scale)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>1907&lt;Age&lt;1944</td>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>Can you tell me your year of birth please?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945&lt;Age&lt;1964</td>
<td>Interim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965&lt;Age&lt;1994</td>
<td>Post-1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.1  Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 3 of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Recoded Value</th>
<th>Questionnaire Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Class</td>
<td>13=employer manager of establishment with 10 or more employed 16= employer, manager of establishment with less than 10 employed 21=professional worker 22=middle level non-manual office worker 23=supervisory non-manual office worker 24=junior level non-manual worker 25=non-manual office worker 31=foreman and supervisor 32=skilled manual 33=semi-skilled manual 34=unskilled manual 41=farmer: has own farm 42=agrarian worker 51=member of armed forces 61=never had a job</td>
<td>13/16=5 ‘service/self-employed’ 21/22/23/24/25/31=4 ‘non-manual’ 32/33/34=3 ‘manual’ 41/42=2 ‘farmer’ 51=4 ‘non-manual’ 61=‘unemployed’</td>
<td>In which profession/occupation do you work? If more than one job, the main job? What is/was your job there?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Name</td>
<td>Original Value</td>
<td>Recoded Value</td>
<td>Questionnaire Wording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1=Inadequately completed elementary education.</td>
<td>1/2=1 'elementary'</td>
<td>What is the highest education level that you have attained? (NOTE: if the respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Completed elementary education.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Incomplete secondary school (technical).</td>
<td>3/4/5/6=2 'secondary'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Complete secondary school (technical).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5=Incomplete secondary school (university prep.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6=Complete secondary school (university prep.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7=Some university without degree</td>
<td>7/8= 3 'university'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8= University with degree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Name</td>
<td>Original Value</td>
<td>Recoded Value</td>
<td>Questionnaire Wording</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>1/10</td>
<td>Here is a scale of household incomes on which 1 indicates the lowest income decile and 10 the highest income decile in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gender) female</td>
<td>1=Male 2=Female</td>
<td>0=Male 1=Female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18/85</td>
<td>18/85</td>
<td>Can you tell me your year of birth please? This means you are ____ years old.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age squared</td>
<td>Age*age</td>
<td>Age*age</td>
<td>Age squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialist index</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>0/5</td>
<td>In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-positioning</td>
<td>0/10</td>
<td>0/10</td>
<td>How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>1=Very interested 1= Not at all interested 2=Somewhat interested 3=Not very interested 4=Not at all interested</td>
<td>2= Not very interested 3= Somewhat interested 4= Very interested</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust</td>
<td>1=Most people can be trusted 2=Need to be very careful</td>
<td>0=Most people can be trusted 1=Need to be very careful</td>
<td>Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling of responsibility</td>
<td>0=Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please chose up to five!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination</td>
<td>0=Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A.1 Variables of the Analyses (continued, page 6 of 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Original Value</th>
<th>Recoded Value</th>
<th>Questionnaire Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard work</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please chose up to five!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious faith</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td>0= Not mentioned 1=Mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian child-rearing</td>
<td>(Hard work+Religious faith+Obedience)- (Independence+Responsibility+Imagination)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform prayer</td>
<td>1=More than once a week</td>
<td>1=Never, practically never</td>
<td>Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2=Once a week</td>
<td>2=Less often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3=Once a month</td>
<td>3=Once a year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4=Only on special holy days</td>
<td>4=Only on special holy days</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5=Once a year</td>
<td>5=Once a month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6=Less often</td>
<td>6=Once a week</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7=Never, practically never</td>
<td>7=More than once a week</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>