**The Advocacy Activities of**

**the Japanese Rescue Movement (1997-2006): To What Extent did They Impact Japanese Foreign Policy toward North Korea?**

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# ABSTRACT

Japanese foreign policy toward North Korea shifted over a relatively short period of time between 1998 and 2006. North Korea conducted missile tests close to Japan in 1998 and in 2006 but Japan`s reaction was different in each situation. In 1998, although the missile launch was considered regrettable from the viewpoint of security, and peace and stability of the region, the Japanese government did not impose long-term sanctions, nor respond with coercive accusations. However, in 2006, after an event similar to the one in 1998, Japan imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea, therefore punishing a neighbouring state, for the first time since World War II.

This thesis offers an explanation for this shift in the Japanese government`s policy toward North Korea focusing on civil society groups, and in particular on the Japanese Rescue Movement and the way in which the comprising groups advocated their cause to various audiences: government, public, media, and other state or non-state actors.

Based on the findings of the research, the thesis argues that the Japanese Rescue Movement had an instrumental role in shaping the government's policy toward North Korea in 2006 to impose unilateral economic sanctions. Alongside the instrumentalization of the abduction issue and of *Kazokukai* by *Sukuukai* and Satō Katsumi, the Head of Modern Korea Research Institute and Chairman of *Sukuukai*, young, conservative politicians, who came to hold positions of power in the 2000s, used the Rescue Movement and its advocated goal as an instrument in the policy toward North Korea, in order to promote a certain political agenda. Moreover, the thesis highlights the strategies and tactics of the civil society groups towards various audiences, drawing on the concept of "advocacy" with its four types: political, social, media and transnational. Finally, the dissertation underlines the circumstances in which civil society can successfully contribute to policy-making in Japan.

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# Abbreviations

AAH Action Against Hunger

ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement

AFVKN Association of the Families of the Victims Kidnapped by North Korea

AIPAC American-Israeli Public Affair Committee

CANF Cuban American National Foundation

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CCS Chief Cabinet Secretary

CGP Clean Government Party

CLB Cabinet Legislation Bureau

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DSP Democratic Socialist Party

EC European Community

EPA Economic Planning Agency

EU European Union

FEFTCL Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law

FPA Foreign Policy Analysis

G7 Group of Seven Major Industrialised Countries

GOJ Government of Japan

IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

INF Intermediate Nuclear Force

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

IR International Relations

JAS Japan Agricultural Standard Law

JCP Japan Communist Party

JDA Japan Defense Agency

JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces

JSP Japan Socialist Party

KAL Korean Airlines

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

LPPESS Law to Prohibit Port Entry to Specific Ships

LWR Light-Water Reactor

MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

MDB Multilateral Development Banks

METI Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MHW Ministry of Health and Welfare

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry

MOC Ministry of Construction

MOE Ministry of Education

MOF Ministry of Finance

MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOJ Ministry of Justice

MOL Ministry of Labour

MOT Ministry of Transportation

MPD Metropolitan Police Department

MPT Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications

MSF Medcins Sans Frontiers

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NARKN National Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NDPO National Defense Program Outline

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NHK Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)

NPA National Police Agency

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSC National Security Council

NSK Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai (Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association)

NTT Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

ODA Official Development Assistance

PKO Peacekeeping Operations

PRC People's Republic of China

PSIA Public Security Investigation Agency

ROC Republic of China

SDF Self-Defense Forces

SDP Social Democratic Party

SDPJ Social Democratic Party of Japan

SII Structural Impediments Initiative

SNG Subnational Government

SPT Six Party Talks

TCOG Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

US United States

WFP World Food Programme

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WPK Workers' Party of Korea

WWII World War Two

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# NOTES

Japanese names are written in Japanese order, the surname first, given name second. Japanese names and terms, such as place names, are transcribed with macrons, except where the name of the place is well-known in English.

# 

# INTRODUCTION

One of the two post-war problems of Japan that remain unsolved, beside the territorial dispute with Russia, is the normalization of relations with North Korea. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has tried to normalize its relations with North Korea; however, there has been significant change in its policy orientation. Two similar events, the launching of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 1998 and 2006, had different responses from the Japanese side.

In 1998, although North Korea’s missile launch was considered deeply regrettable and a very serious situation of concern from the viewpoint of peace and stability in Northeast Asia, Japan’s position was to act in coordination with the United States and the Republic of Korea and not impose sanctions (MOFA, 1998a).

In 2006, after an event similar with the one in 1998, Japan took the initiative and proposed a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council that would impose sanctions on North Korea. The Government of Japan also stated its decision to implement a number of measures against North Korea on a unilateral basis (MOFA, 2006a). The measures included a ban on Mangyongbong-92 ferry, between Japan and North Korea, a ban on North Korean charter flights, as well as on the entry of North Korean officials to Japan, tighter restrictions on trade and strict restrictions on the entry of North Korean nationals into Japan (*Sukuukai*, 2006a).

Moreover, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, in his Policy Speech from September 29, 2006 stated that Japan would seek resolution of the missile issues through the Six Party Talks, in coordination with the United States, but there could be no normalization regarding relations with North Korea until the abduction issue is resolved (Kantei, 2006).

The abduction issue (*rachi mondai*) refers to the kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s from various regions of Japan, as well as from Europe, and it became the main reason for the formation and the activities of the Japanese Rescue Movement, as well as a facilitator for the public's awareness of Japan's policy toward North Korea.

## 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

The aim of the dissertation is twofold. One is to explain the Japanese government’s decision to impose economic sanctions against North Korea in 2006, after an event similar with the one in 1998 when Japan acted in coordination with the United States and the Republic of Korea. The explanation will be provided by focusing on the role of civil society actors and their contribution to the government's decision in 2006. In this regard, the other aim of the dissertation is to highlight how the chosen civil society groups participated and contributed to the government's decision in 2006. Thus, their activities since their formation in 1997 until 2006 will be analysed in order to identify the strategies and tactics they utilized to make their voices heard to the Japanese government, the Japanese public, and abroad to the international community. Moreover, the dissertation will underline the factors that contributed to civil society playing a significant role in Japan's policy toward North Korea. Based on the findings, the circumstances in which civil society can successfully contribute to policy in Japan will be identified. To this end, the following questions will be explored:

* What was the role of civil society groups in Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea in the period 1998-2006?
* In which circumstances do civil society groups influence foreign policy in Japan?

The civil society actors selected for the purpose of this thesis are:

* *Kazokukai* (The Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea)
* *Sukuukai* (The National Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea)
* *Seinen no kai* (The Youth Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea)

Both *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, alongside *Seinen no kai*, represent the Japanese Rescue Movement, for the purpose of this thesis. The reasons for selecting the Japanese Rescue Movement, and mainly *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai,* include the fact that they have been intensely involved in the struggle to rescue the Japanese nationals kidnapped by North Korea, family members for some, and, in their struggle they have succeeded in raising awareness regarding the abduction issue and North Korea, with the Japanese and international public. Moreover, before the formation of these groups, the abduction issue was completely unknown, as were the government's policy plans towards North Korea (interview Secretary General *Sukuukai)* Lastly, although apparently weak and lacking advocacy (Pekkanen, 2006), Japanese civil society has played a major role in formulating the national discourse regarding North Korea and further in the government’s adoption of a coercive stance in 2006.

Nonetheless, the primary reason for conducting the present research is to explain Japan's position of imposing unilateral economic sanctions against North Korea in July 2006, and announcing a policy of "no normalisation of relations with North Korea unless the abduction issue is resolved" (Koizumi, 2004) domestically, as well as internationally, linking the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea with the resolution of the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in the Six Party Talks in June 2004 (MOFA, 2004a). Such actions were undertaken by the Government of Japan (GOJ), despite the fact that North Korea is regarded as one of the major destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region (Hagström and Söderberg, 2006) and Japan has been trying to normalize its relations with the state since the end of the Cold War.

Japan's policy toward North Korea and specifically the abduction issue, have attracted considerable scholarly interest (Sugita, 2005; Hughes, 2006; Lynn, 2006; Arrington, 2007; Itō, 2008; Kaseda, 2010; Williams and Mobrand, 2010; Samuels, 2010; Hagström and Hanssen, 2015). Scholars have explained Japan's North Korea policy by relying on either domestic or international factors, or on comparisons with South Korea's policy, as both countries have been confronted with citizens' abductions, but had different responses, as will be seen in Chapter 2. Thus, Japan's adoption of a hard line position towards North Korea is attributed to a change in the opportunity structure available to civic groups (Arrington, 2007), to the "restorationist nationalism" (Williams and Mobrand, 2010), or, furthermore, to parochial interests hijacking the country's foreign policy (Samuels, 2010). However, one can note the overall tendency of the studies to acknowledge the importance of civil society groups, and to account for their success in shaping the country's policy toward North Korea by referring to the support of political actors, either due to changes in the power of the executive, or due to ideological beliefs, or revisionist principles. In their study, Hagström and Hanssen (2015) argue so much as the abduction issue being part of an ongoing identity change in Japan, from “abnormal” to more “normal”. However, the way in which civil society actors have attempted to influence the government in adopting a hard line position toward North Korea, or the change in the government's attitude toward the North from 1998 to 2006, after two similar incidents has not been addressed by the literature.

## 1.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH

The present research aims to address the gap in the literature discussing Japan's policy toward North Korea and the role played by civil society actors within it. The way in which civil society actors have advocated their cause in order to achieve their goals contributes to the understanding of the decision-making process and of their role in it, making it possible to highlight the factors conducive to the accomplishment of their partial goal in 2006, the imposition of economic sanctions toward North Korea. Thus, this thesis dedicates attention to the advocacy activities performed by the selected civil society groups towards various audiences, in order to delineate strategies and tactics employed, and relations built with other actors. In this manner, the thesis aims to contribute to the scholarship on civil society by highlighting the reasons for the effectiveness of the civil society actors' activities in the second case discussed, and thus, highlighting the circumstances in which civil society can influence foreign policy in Japan. Furthermore, the thesis intends to link studies on Japanese civil society and foreign policy, in order to understand the activities and the role of civil society actors in the process of foreign policy-making. Additionally, if the Government of Japan decided to change its policy orientation, not in coordination with the international stance, especially the United States and the Republic of Korea, the present thesis will challenge the “reactive state” concept (Calder, 1988) supported by numerous studies, and will emphasize the role of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region.

With regard to the theoretical approach, the present thesis includes the concept of advocacy to complement the two-level games framework, in order to explain how societal actors advocated their cause to the national leaders, as well as other domestic and transnational audiences. Thus, apart from offering an explanation of how diplomacy and domestic politics interacted, it explores the politics of the decision-making process in the domestic context, and emphasizes the ways in which societal actors pursued their goals, alongside the leaders’ strategies.

## 1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

The dissertation consists of eight chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the extant scholarly work in the area of foreign policy, both in general and in the Japanese context, with special emphasis on works discussing the role of societal groups in the foreign policy-making process and Japan's policy towards North Korea. Thus, the first part of the chapter provides an overview of the study of foreign policy, paying particular attention to the focus of the efforts to explain foreign policy behaviour, and the second part presents the most significant accounts of post-war Japanese foreign policy, as well as Japan’s foreign policy towards North Korea, and identifies the variables found to contribute most to the decision-making process.

Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical approaches utilized in order to explain the two case studies, as well as the research design of the dissertation. Therefore, the first part of the chapter introduces the main theoretical approach to be utilized and the original literature that it draws from, and continues with introducing several applications of the theory towards various regions including Japan. After identifying the weaknesses of the main theoretical approach with regard to this research, the chapter proceeds toward a presentation of a second concept, which complements the explanation of the two case studies, the concept of advocacy. It further justifies its applicability and highlights its contribution to the explanation. The second part of the chapter presents the research methods utilized in gathering the data, as well as the main sources of information.

Chapter 4 provides a description of the international and domestic scenes in 1998, followed by a description of the civil society actors, as part of the domestic scene, and their advocacy activities in the period 1997-1998, in Chapter 5. Similarly, Chapter 6 provides a description of the international and domestic scenes in 2006, followed by a description of the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement in the period 1998-2006, in Chapter 7, with the purpose of determining and comparing the win-sets after North Korea's missile test of 1998 and of 2006. Along these lines, Chapter 5 and 7 present the main empirical findings of the thesis that are further summarized and discussed in Chapter 8.

The thesis ends with a conclusion, which underlines the role played by the Rescue Movement in Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea in the period 1998-2006, as well as the circumstances in which civil society groups can make a contribution to the foreign policy-making process in Japan.

# CHAPTER 2

# LITERATURE REVIEW:

# FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

## 2.1 OVERVIEW

Having identified and explored the research objective and questions of the thesis, namely the impact of civil society groups on Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea in the period 1998-2006, as well as the circumstances in which civil society groups influence foreign policy in Japan, the present chapter will describe the extant theoretical literature and scholarly work in the area of foreign policy, both in general and in the Japanese context, as well as relevant work on social movements.

The first part of the chapter willprovide an overview of the study of foreign policy, paying particular attention to the focus of the efforts to explain foreign policy behaviour. Thus, it will focus on the factors that explain the foreign policy behaviour of states, and their location.

The second part of the chapter will present the most significant accounts of post-war Japanese foreign policy, as well as Japan’s foreign policy towards North Korea, and identify which variables had been found to contribute most to the decision-making process.

The chapter will conclude by highlighting the research focus, as well as the contribution of the thesis to the existing body of literature.

## 2.2 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

This part provides an overview of foreign policy studies with a particular emphasis on explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states and the factors that determine it.

### 2.2.1 Definitions: system-level factors and state-level factors

Various definitions of "foreign policy" exist. Rosenau (1971) defines it simply as the external behaviour of states. White (1989) defines it as “government activity conducted with relationships between state and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system”, and according to Hill (2003), foreign policy is “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations”. Hudson (2012) defines foreign policy as the strategy chosen by a national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities.

Foreign policy as a field and an academic subject was established shortly after World War Two. However, the study of foreign policy was not a new consideration. Scholars had studied the relations between existing political groups as part of the study of international relations or comparative politics. Some scholars still argue that the foreign policy of a state can be explained with the help of broad International Relation (IR) theories (Beach, 2012), while others argue that there are aspects of foreign policy that IR theories cannot predict, and are better explained by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (Hudson, 2007). FPA is considered a sub-discipline of IR by some academics (Hudson, 2007), and a separate field by others (Neack *et al.*, 1995). It emerged in reaction to Realism and its assumption that the state is a unitary actor pursuing clear goals, in a rational manner (Alden and Aran, 2012). FPA focuses on the foreign policy-making process, arguing that it has the capacity to indicate the extent to which the process determines the outcome of foreign policy. It is based on the argument that all that occurs between nations is grounded in human decision makers, and is, therefore, considered a decision-making approach to the study of IR (Hudson, 2005). Although scholars do not argue that decision-making factors can thoroughly explain the foreign policy of states, these approaches are considered to contribute to the evolution of the IR theory (Hagan, 2001).

Who makes foreign policy? In an attempt to answer this question, scholars have found numerous factors affecting foreign policy.

These factors can be divided into two groups, based on the levels of analysis concept (Singer, 1961), which refers to the location of the foreign policy determinants. Thus, two levels of analysis can be distinguished: the international system-level and the nation state-level.

The system level of analysis focuses on the international system and the relations between the states in the attempt to explain foreign policy behaviour. Thus, it points to factors external to the nation state, such as organization of the international system, or characteristics of international relations, that can determine the behaviour of states. Analyses at this level advance a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy of nation states, assuming that all “statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1960). Although international system level analyses had been criticized for providing simplistic explanations of international relations, they are the only ones that allow examinations in the whole, without a focus on a lower level (Singer, 1961).

The state level of analysis focuses on factors internal to the state to explain foreign policy, thus on citizens and groups within the domestic political system, such as government organizations or individual leaders, domestic constituencies (interest groups, ethnic groups, public opinion), economic conditions, the state’s national history, or the state’s culture (Hudson, 1997). The state level of analysis allows differentiation among actors in the international system, thus permitting in-depth examinations of states’ foreign policy behaviour. Moreover, Singer (1961) asserts that the state level of analysis is the only one within which the decision-making approach can be usefully applied.

#### 2.2.1.a System level factors

For a long time, scholars focused on the system level of analysis in their effort to explain foreign policy behaviour. Generally, systemic theories rely on the assumption that the states are rational, unitary actors, thus allowing scholars to produce conclusions based solely on systemic variations.

##### 2.2.1.a.1 Realism and foreign policy

Realism, as a main IR theory, is able to explain important aspects of foreign policy, such as the primacy of security interests and the drive for power of all states. The core assumptions of Realism are the anarchy of the international system and the struggle of states to survive and maintain autonomy: “the struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy” (Gilpin, 1981). Realists argue that in the absence of a higher authority in the international system, states are forced to defend themselves and protect their national interest. Moreover, realists argue that states are more concerned with relative gains, how much they will gain relative to others, than with absolute gains, how much they will gain themselves. Thus, the main argument of realists is that in order to understand foreign policy, the relative power of the state and its position in the international system must be considered (Beach, 2012). However, in response to debates among realists, two sub-schools have derived: Structural Realism (Neorealism) and Neoclassical Realism.

Structural Realism, founded by Kenneth Waltz, holds that in order to understand foreign policy only the system level matters, and the relative power of a state in the international system (Waltz, 1979). Differences between the conceptualizations of the main assumptions of Structural Realism, however, led to the formation of two sub-schools: Offensive Realism, first advanced by John Mearsheimer of Chicago University, and Defensive Realism, founded by Kenneth Waltz and his *Theory of International Politics* (1979).

Offensive Realism argues that the anarchic nature of the international system pushes states to pursue policies to maximize their power and influence, as best ways to handle future security problems. On the other hand, Defensive Realism holds that states do not pursue policies to maximize their influence, unless faced with clear threats.

The second sub-school derived from Realism, Neoclassical Realism, argues that in order to explain foreign policy, state-level factors must also be considered. Thus, neoclassical realists hold that relative power establishes the main criteria for foreign policy, but as foreign policy choices are made by leaders, their perceptions, as well as the strength and the structure of states in relation to their societies must also be examined (Rose, 1998). Neoclassical realists do not try to create a single theory of international politics, but they try to find the most relevant theory to analyse specific foreign policy issues, at specific times.

Nevertheless, both Structural and Neoclassical Realism consider relative power and the position of the state in the international system, as the basis for their explanations of states’ foreign policy.

##### 2.2.1.a.2 Liberalism and foreign policy

In comparison with realists, liberal scholars agree on the importance of three factors for explaining how states behave internationally: interdependence, international institutions and democracy. Furthermore, there is also a variance among liberal scholars, similar to the one in Realism, regarding the locus of the factors that can explain foreign policy. Thus, some scholars such as Robert Keohane (1984) focus on system-level factors, while others, such as Andrew Moravcsik (1997), also consider state-level factors and the impact of state-society relations in explaining a state’s behaviour in world politics.

However, the most important effect of Liberalism upon foreign policy is considered the peace among liberal states. Michael Doyle of Columbia University formulated the theory, based on Kant’s Perpetual Peace, that liberal states do not go to war with each other (Doyle, 2012).

Nevertheless, some liberal scholars such as the ones mentioned above, have much in common with realists, not denying the existence of anarchy, but considering that states are more interested in cooperation rather than conflict.

##### 2.2.1.a.3 Constructivism and foreign policy

Constructivist scholarship challenges both realist and liberal theories of IR, arguing that there are other factors more important than power and anarchy for the explanation of state behaviour. The main assumption of constructivists is that the international system is “socially constructed”, thus consisting of “the ways in which human beings think and interact with one another” (Chernoff, 2008). Different from Realism, which explains states’ foreign policy based on its relative power and position in the international system, and from Liberalism, whose focus is on interdependency and international institutions, Constructivism regards international politics as shaped by the actors’ identities and changing normative structures (Griffiths, 2008).

Constructivist scholarship has different foci, therefore, being found at various levels of analysis. Systemic Constructivism, illustrated by Alexander Wendt, focuses on the interactions between unitary state actors and the relations between them. Wendt argues that anarchy and the distribution of power between states matters, but is insufficient in explaining state behaviour. The way in which the distribution of power affects a state’s behaviour depends on the “distribution of knowledge” in Barnes’s (1988) terms. Thus, the structures that determine the behaviour of states are made of collective meanings, which lead to an identity formation. Therefore, anarchy matters depending on the way it is interpreted (Wendt, 1992). Nonetheless, Ted Hopf (2002) focuses on the state level, and advances the belief that domestic identities significantly affect the foreign policy behaviour of a state. He argues that the views of decision makers are shaped by various domestic identities that compete in the formation of a national identity. Moreover, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) focus on norms, as principles that shape society, and play a role in shaping the identities and the behaviour of an actor on the international stage.

Thus, system level analyses focus on various aspects of the international system in order to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states. Realism focuses on the relative power and the position of states in the international system, Liberalism on interdependence, international institutions and democracy, and Constructivism pays particular attention to socially created meanings that develop into norms and identity.

However, although some scholars from the Realist, Liberal and Constructivist schools consider state-level factors in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states, advocates of each school agree that the basic parameters of a state’s foreign policy are set up by systemic factors, and that foreign policies are the result of states’ position or relations to other actors in the international system.

System level theories were found to be inadequate and limited, however, in explaining the behaviour of states with similar international circumstances, but different foreign policies, or the behaviour of one state, that changes its foreign policy behaviour, in spite of the international circumstances remaining the same.

Therefore, scholars have started looking at factors internal to the state and how their variation affects foreign policy behaviour across states or across time in the same state.

#### 2.2.1.b State level factors

As the existing literature does not provide one broad theory to explain the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy, this section will offer a synthesis of various arguments discussed by scholars.

One of the earliest explanations of foreign policy behaviour questioning the unitary-actor assumption and challenging existent research is the work of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954), *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*. Snyder and his colleagues emphasize decision-making as opposed to foreign policy outcomes, and argue that in order to understand state behaviour, it is necessary to understand the context in which decision makers operate and the factors that influence their behaviour.

##### 2.2.1.b.1 Groups

The idea of groups making foreign policy decisions, advanced by Snyder *et.al* (1954) and further developed by Snyder and Paige (1958), has been extended by other scholars who referred to different group sizes in this respect. Foreign policy-making in large organizations and bureaucracies had begun to be studied, building on Snyder *et al.*’s work. For organizations and bureaucracies, their own survival was considered to be a top priority and the objectives of the actors involved in foreign policy decision-making, to influence their choices. Representative works in this regard are the works of Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974). Allison (1971) explains the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and shows that the unitary rational actor model of foreign policy is not sufficient in this respect. Thus, he offers two additional models: the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Model. The organizational process argues that foreign policy choices are the result of the actions of self-interested organizations within the government, while the bureaucratic model sees foreign policy choices as the result of competition among decision makers, within government bureaucracy. Moreover, he asserts that explanations at different levels should not be separated, but integrated. Halperin (1974) uses some examples from the American defence policy-making in order to make some generalizations about bureaucratic behaviour and its influence on foreign policy. Small group dynamics have also been the focus of considerable foreign policy research, as most high-level foreign policy decisions are made in small groups (Hudson, 2007). Thus, Hermann (1978) analyses the structure of the group and holds that elements such as the distribution of power within the group can influence the group process, and further the foreign policy choice. Therefore, a difference in behaviour was found between groups with the leader as the main power holder and groups with the leader sharing the power with other members. Irving Janis (1982) introduces “groupthink”, or small group dysfunction, in order to show the consequences of making foreign policy decisions in small groups. He discovered that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group can decrease the quality of decision-making.

Research on groups, organizational processes and bureaucratic politics questioned the assumption of state unity and showed how political entities through which decision makers work, influence foreign policy (Hudson and Vore, 1995).

Decision-making in small and large groups remains the subject of ongoing research. A new research issue had been advanced in scholarship about small groups dynamics, namely the way in which the groups understand and frame a given foreign policy situation. Construction of meaning and framing of situations by human agents is one of the themes that developed the theory in decision-making.

Mintz, Geva, Redd and Carnes (1997) use a computer interface in order to understand how decision makers analyse different alternatives. They have shown a two-step decision process: in the first step, options that would become serious political loss are eliminated, and in the second step, alternatives are analysed against each other. Purkitt (1998) introduces the technique of “think aloud” protocols, in order to find out how decision makers decide their reaction to a foreign policy problem. Thus, the ideas and the order in which they flow in a decision maker’s mind can be analysed. Beasley’s (1998) work represents an advancement of the research on small group dynamics. He asserts that the dynamics of small group decision-making are more complex than presented in Janis’s (1982) work, and that several types of decision-making may appear. Sylvan and Haddad (1998) analyse the group environment over problem representation and suggest that the “story-telling” technique is utilized mainly in cases of conflict. The participants, each create a “story”, arguments regarding a specific issue, and, in the end, the most persuasive will be considered by the group in the decision-making process.

##### 2.2.1.b.2 The psychological, situational, political and social contexts of the individuals

Alongside the bureaucratic politics literature, which questions the assumption of the state as a unitary actor, the political psychology literature questions state rationality. Thus, starting with the Sprouts (1956), who argued that foreign policy can only be explained by referring to the psychological, situational, political and social contexts of the individuals involved in decision-making, much attention was directed towards the psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy decision-making. The milieu of decision-making included culture, history, geography, economic, political institutions, ideology and many other factors, which shape the societal context in which the decision makers operate (Hudson and Vore, 1995).

Individual characteristics were found to be crucial in understanding foreign policy choice. Arguably, the study of the individual characteristics of leaders sets the subfield of FPA apart from mainstream IR (Hudson and Vore, 1995). Leites (1951) introduced the concept of operational code, which was further developed by George (1969), to refer to the values, worldviews and repertoire that an individual acquires and shares with members of an organization. Hermann (1974, 1980) provides a more complete picture of how a leader’s personal characteristics affect his/her behaviour in foreign policy decision-making. The leader’s personal characteristics may play different roles in decision-making. Thus, depending on the leader’s interest in foreign policy, he may or may not delegate authority to subordinates. In the first case, the leader’s characteristics are not particularly relevant. Moreover, a leader’s emotional response to a problem might lead to a personal influence on foreign policy. The context (crisis situations, ambiguous situations) may also allow the leader’s individual characteristics to play a bigger role in decision-making. Diplomatic training is also a factor that can determine the role played by personal characteristics in decision-making. A leader with diplomatic training is not as likely to rely on his/her personal views when making a foreign policy choice as a leader with no diplomatic training (Hermann, 1984). The expertise and the leader’s style of leadership are also considered when establishing the influence of a leader’s personal characteristics on foreign policy.

The political psychology literature extended as technology has allowed further developments in assessing a leader’s foreign policy orientation. More systematic tools have been constructed and automated content analysis has enabled researchers to perform fast and accurate analyses. New research in the field of neuroscience could also influence theories of human decision-making and therefore, the development of foreign policy analysis. The work of neuroscientists brings evidence to the limits to human rationality. Human beings appear to have a preference for simplicity and consistency, being considered poor estimators (Dawes 1998 cited in Smith, *et al.* 2012), and more “averse to loss” than gain seeking (Stein, 2012). These attributes, therefore, affect the leaders’ abilities to make decisions and contest the capacity for rational choice. New findings about emotions, pain, illness, and their effect on one’s reasoning and thus, decision-making, are also considered to have implications for foreign policy analysis research and development (Crawford, 2000, cited in Smith *et al*., 2012; Schwartz, 2004, cited in Smith *et al*., 2012). Although there is not much work on emotion in IR, contributions from other disciplines highlight its important role.

Alongside individual characteristics, the perceptions and images of the elites also appear on the research agenda of scholars. Thus, Jervis (1976) and Cottam (1977) analyse the consequences of misperception in foreign policy and provide advice and suggestions for improving policy-making. The impact of cognitive and psychological factors on foreign policy-making has been further studied by various scholars. Leaders’ motivations, cognitive maps, cognitive style and life experiences were found to be important when analyzing foreign policy.

Scholarship about perceptions and images in foreign policy developed in the late 1980s with the work of Lebow and Stein (1990), Richard Hermann (1985, 1986, 1993) and others. Work from other fields had also informed scholars regarding cognitive constraints. Simon (1985) explored bounded rationality, Heuer (1999) conducted research on cognitive bias etc. Some scholars were interested in the way perceptions were linked to form images and further develop image theory (Walt, 1992).

National and societal characteristics were considered important in understanding foreign policy choice. The decision maker’s perception of his nation’s role in the international arena began to be studied and perceptions of national role were considered prominent for foreign policy choice (Holsti, 1970). The national role conception approach advanced by Holsti (1970) was continued by Walker (1987), Shih (1993) etc. However, the use of methods such as discourse analysis, process tracing and computational modeling allows the connection between culture and society, and a nation’s foreign policy, and connects the general beliefs in a society and the beliefs of foreign policy decision makers (Breuning, 1997).

Whereas not as popular as research about the national character, cultural influences on foreign policy also received the attention of various scholars (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pye and Verba, 1965). However, the effects of culture on foreign policy might have been overlooked as the differences between nations were underplayed by the bipolar system of the Cold War. The study of culture affecting foreign policy has faded in the 1960s and was redeveloped near the end of the 1980s. It has been found that culture might influence cognition (Motokawa, 1989, cited in Smith *et al*., 2012) or the structures of institutions (Sampson, 1987, cited in Smith *et al*., 2012). Moreover, different cultures have been found to have different patterns of horizon visualization, which influence foreign policy decisions (Cushman and King, 1985, cited in Smith *et al*., 2012).

The literature considering state level factors in explaining foreign policy behaviour, such as bureaucratic politics model, as well as the political psychology literature, have questioned state unity and rationality, but, according to some scholars, it has largely disregarded the state-society relations. Thus, although the factors determining foreign policy were found to lie inside the political system, the outcome, the foreign policy choice, is considered a product of the state itself (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993), and the term “domestic politics” has been mostly utilized as an inclusive terminology, while in reality the investigations examined the role of the elites (Mueller and Risse-Kappen, 1993).

#### 2.2.1.c State-Society Relations

There is, however, extensive literature that incorporates state-society relations in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of a state.

Some scholars have argued against the external-internal grouping of factors that determine foreign policy, as neither one nor the other can successfully explain a state’s behaviour in international politics, and favoured a model that includes the international system, the domestic political system and the society (Mueller and Risse-Kappen, 1993).

Robert Putnam (1988) has sought to integrate both the international and domestic spheres in order to explain their interaction by focusing on the negotiations between the United States, Germany and Japan at the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978. Thus, Putnam uses the “two-level games” metaphor for describing international negotiations and for providing an important account for the connection between domestic and international politics.

Evans *et al.* (1993) provide larger empirical evidence about the “two-level games” and the relationship between domestic and international politics. Their project includes various cases mainly focusing on statesmen and their options for action, but which include attention to domestic groups that might affect the statesmen’ options. Thus, the cases analysed reinforce the necessity of more complex analyses of foreign policy behaviour that include both the domestic and the international level.

In the above analyses, foreign policy is considered a resultant of domestic politics, in the way that it represents the inputs of various domestic structures, channelling the societal demands into the political system.

Furthermore, with respect to including state-society relations in explaining the foreign policy behaviour states, the role of public opinion, media and societal groups has been analysed in relation to the foreign policy-making process. Although there is criticism regarding the clarity of the models and the evidence of the linkage between the society and the foreign policy-making process (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993), societal variables have been included in analyses of foreign policy.

##### 2.2.1.c.1 The Role of Public Opinion

Accordingly, public opinion’s role in foreign policy has been debated mostly in the American context. In a democracy, public opinion is expected to be reflected in government policy, and therefore in foreign policy. Public opinion can influence policy through opinion polls, direct elections or representation of public concerns via media (Robinson, 2012). Most research in the 1950s and 1960s supported the so-called Almond-Lippmann consensus, which claimed that public opinion was incoherent and divided regarded foreign policy issues. Almond (1950) differentiated between a small public with knowledge and rational views on foreign affairs and a larger public, ill-informed and with irrational views on foreign affairs. Therefore, there was an academic consensus that advocated the elite model, which assumes that power is concentrated within elite groups, as opposed to the pluralist model, which holds that power is dispersed throughout society. According to the pluralist model, public opinion and media are independent of political influence and can constrain the government, while in the elite model, public opinion and media are subservient to political elites and have a less independent form of influence.

However, by the early 1970s, in the context of the Vietnam War, the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy was analysed differently. Research argued in favour of the pluralist model, as public opinion became more rational and stable (Robinson, 2012). Mueller (1973) found out that support for the Korean War and the Vietnam War declined among the US public, as the number of casualties increased. Moreover, the public response was observed through opinion polls, protests and political damage. Nevertheless, although considerable research around both pluralist and elite models had been conducted, no consensus has been achieved among scholars.

More recent work on the role of public opinion in foreign policy-making often appears contradictory. Some scholars continue to support the idea that public opinion does not impact foreign policy choice, while others provide arguments to the idea that public opinion plays an important role in foreign policy or act as a constraint to policy formulation. Hagan (1987, 1994) found that domestic opposition to foreign policy behaviour greatly influences the overall policy choice for a large number of countries, irrespective of their political system. Moon (1995) argues that in order to understand the role of public opinion in foreign policy, the position of the state in the global context must be considered, as well as the relation between the state and its population. Other scholars argue that public opinion can play different roles according to the circumstances or the type of issue. Foyle’s (1999) account of the role of public opinion in foreign policy explains that the public influence on foreign policy in the United States depends on the president’s position regarding its desirability and necessity. Thus, if the president considers public opinion desirable and necessary, it may have a significant influence, while in the opposite case, foreign policy choice is not influenced by public opinion. Hinckley (1988, 1992) argues that public opinion influence can only be predicted with reference to specific foreign policy issues.

##### 2.2.1.c.2 The Role of Media

The role of media in a democratic state is to provide unbiased information and to facilitate open debate on important issues, while in authoritarian states, the media system is considered to be controlled by the state (Robinson, 2012). There is, however, a debate among scholars over the actual role of the media in a democratic state. Cohen (1963) argued that the media drew the attention of politicians to different issues, but it had little impact on decision-making. However, the Vietnam War provided a new context for the analysis of the role of the media on foreign policy decision-making.

The number of studies that consider the media independent of political influence and able to act as a constraint upon the government has increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The so-called “CNN effect”, or the degree to which media attention on an issue forces the state to act, highlights the ability of the media to influence foreign policy decisions (Robinson, 1999).

There has also been considerable research based on the elite model, drawing attention to the relationship between the media and official sources and, although with some variety, all recognize the media as subservient to political elites. Hallin (1986) argues that the United States mainstream media rely on US official sources and therefore their reports are included in the elite-legitimated debate, while Bennet (1990) asserts that US media coordinate their news agenda and the framing of foreign affairs issues with the elites.

Due to the fact that it is difficult for researchers to accurately measure media influence on foreign policy, there are two apparent opposing positions on the subject. However, both positions on the role and influence of the media may be partly true, the difference being the level of criticism and influence considered (Robinson, 2012).

##### 2.2.1.c.3 The Role of Societal Groups

Researchers have also considered the role of societal groupsin foreign policy-making. Key theoretical concepts about the relationship between domestic pressure by societal groups and foreign policy have been advanced by Dahl (1973) and further developed by other scholars. Dahl (1973) points out that the nature of the regime is very important when analyzing the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. However, other actors are also considered important, alongside the regime, when analyzing domestic politics, in order to understand its influence on foreign policy. Therefore, other actors include: the executive branch of the government, the legislative branch, the judicial branch, political parties, businesses, interest groups, the media, unions, influential individuals, epistemic communities, religious groups, criminal forces (Hudson, 2007).

In the 1980s, scholars began to examine the relation between state autonomy and other societal groups in the foreign policy-making process.

Societal groups are elements outside the formal state structure of foreign policy-making, but who can influence the foreign policy process in line with their concerns. Although foreign policy is produced and legitimized by the state, the legitimacy is derived from the domestic context and the authority of the decision makers depends on domestic sources (Alden and Aran, 2012). Furthermore, albeit the number of groups trying to influence foreign policy has increased, their role has not been the object of numerous studies (Hobbs, 1994). Moreover, the way in which societal groups influence foreign policy, and the relations between state actors and societal groups, whether it is cooperation, resistance or compromise, has been largely overlooked by the literature (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993).

Uslander (1995) explains that the number of interest groups has increased with the end of the Cold War and there is not a clear demarcation line between domestic and foreign policy. Furthermore, most influential and notable societal groups influencing policy are considered ethnic interest groups (Uslander, 1995).

Various scholars have focused on the role of ethnic interest groups in the US foreign policy (Garrett, 1978; Said, 1981; Longmyer, 1985; Richardson, 1985; Sadd and Lendenmenn, 1985; Ahrari, 1987; Rogers, 1993; Dent, 1995). Considerable research has focused on analyzing the role of the American-Israeli Public Affair Committee (AIPAC) and the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), as two of the most influential groups in United States.

There is, however, little consensus about the conditions that favour the success of such interest groups in influencing foreign policy. With a focus on the representative literature, this section will further gather some circumstances found to favour the success of interest groups in influencing foreign policy decisions.

Thus, a prevalent condition for the effectiveness of a group was found to be its organizational strength, which refers to the internal characteristics such as group unity, professionalism or financial resources (Ahrari, 1987; Said, 1981; Watanabe, 1984; Hudson, Sims and Thomas, 1993; Rogers, 1993; Uslander, 1995). The salience of the issue that the group advocates, as well as the support for the issue within the public, were also found to be important for the effectiveness of the group (Watanabe, 1984; Hudson, Sims and Thomas, 1993; Rogers, 1993; Skidmore, 1993). Moreover, Watanabe (1984) adds the circumstance in which the groups advocate an issue about which there can be little or no disagreement about the goal, but considerable disagreement about the way to reach it. Other circumstances argued to favour the success of groups in influencing foreign policy are: a weak and divided opposition (Watanabe, 1984; Skidmore, 1993), advocating a policy already favoured by the government (Dent, 1995), groups’ access to government (Skidmore, 1993; Hudson, Sims and Thomas, 1993), and a mutually supportive or a collaborative relationship with the government for a common purpose (Watanabe, 1984).

There are also relevant studies about the formation of ethnic interest groups, which influence foreign policy. The literature refers to the importance of access points to the government (Clough, 1994) and group leadership (Salisbury, 1969; 1984).

These studies, however, focus on the influence of interest groups on the formulation of foreign policy in the United States. Moreover, there is little focus on how the groups became effective in influencing foreign policy. Thus, this chapter will further include relevant studies on the methods used by groups to influence policy, employing the concept of advocacy.

##### 2.2.1.c.4 Advocacy

Advocacy is defined as “the act of pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting or recommending a position” (Hopkins 1992, cited in Jenkins, 2003). The concept of advocacy includes attempts to influence governmental decision makers, as well as the larger public, thus engaging with the terms “political” and “social” advocacy (Jenkins, 2003). In addition to political and social advocacy, societal actors could attempt to plead for their cause through other means, such as mass media or transnational advocacy. The concept of advocacy, thus, for the objective of this thesis, is considered to include political, social, mass media and transnational advocacy.

“Advocacy” can be found in various forms of collective action that seek to generate political change (Chan, 2008). Thus, although without clear reference to the concept of advocacy, most of the social movements literature discusses the methods employed by actors in enabling policy change (Kolb, 2007; Kriesi, 1995; Tarrow, 1998; Andrews and Caren, 2010).

Tarrow (2011) defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities”. Tarrow’s definition engages with to the concept of *political advocacy* presented above, which refers to the actors’ attempt to advance their cause and influence governmental decision makers. The interaction between a movement and the state is historically seen as a “duet of strategy and counterstrategy between movement activists and power holders” (Tarrow, 2011).

Strategy is defined as “the way in which a social movement pursues its political goals with certain tactics” (Kolb, 2007). In this respect, the tactics are the methods utilized by the actors to reach their goals, and can be divided into “insider” and “outsider” tactics. Insider tactics refer to positive relations between the actors and the decision makers, as well as close consultations, while outsider tactics involve protest and confrontation (Jenkins, 2003). Some scholars argue for the success of the latter (Gamson, 1990), whereas others consider them to have little direct effect on policy (Burstein 1985, cited in Jenkins, 2003). Outsider tactics, such as protest, can, however, increase the salience of the issue among the larger public, and thus, contribute to policy change (Burstein 1985, Costain 1992, cited in Jenkins, 2003 and Costain and Majstorovic, 1994). Furthermore, the combination of both insider and outsider tactics is considered the most effective way of influencing policy (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1984, Silverstein 1996, cited in Jenkins, 2003).

Thus, through various tactics, a social movement seeks to reach its goal of influencing policy. However, the effectiveness of the tactics is determined by the political environment, which can be evaluated with the help of the “political opportunity structure” concept (Kriesi, 1995; Tarrow, 1998). The effectiveness of the tactics, and thus, the outcomes of social movements can be influenced by various political opportunities, such as: the political institutional structure, partisanship of the government, elite conflict, instability of political alignments, public opinion, mass media, strength of counter-mobilization and windows for reform (Kolb, 2007).

Alongside political advocacy, *social advocacy* is also employed by societal actors in their attempt to advance their cause and influence policy. It their pursuit, societal actors target the public opinion, a variable frequently analysed in relation to social movements and their success in influencing policy (Giugni, 2004; Kolb, 2007; Giugni and Yamasaki, 2009), as well as in relation to foreign policy, as previously seen.

Thus, the support of the public is considered to be highly dependent on the issue and its salience, as well as on the public’s preferences (Kolb, 2007). Accordingly, the low significance of an issue and the public’s lack of interest in it, can lead to public’s lack of support for the movement. However, the societal actors can influence the public’s interest, as well as the issue salience in various ways, such as mass media, study meetings, lectures, seminars (Kolb, 2007).

The purpose of mass media is arguably to maintain or increase the saliency of a given issue in order to provide legitimacy for societal actors (Wallack, Woodruff, Dorfman and Diaz, 1999). Thus, *mass media advocacy* refers to attempts of societal actors to influence the mass media in their effort to advance their cause, and have an impact on policy-making. The role of media, as the role of public opinion, has also been discussed previously in relation to foreign policy decision-making.

Societal actors seek to be represented in the media by organizing demonstrations, press releases or press conferences, which are especially created to attract the media (Rucht, 2007). Media representations depend on the “newsworthiness” of the issue, which is shaped by several news values, such as drama and action, immediacy, violence, celebrities, and sex (Greer, 2007). Moreover, the news values are considered to be culturally specific, thus reflecting the historical and social moment in which they are situated. As the media and the society change, accordingly do the criteria that influence the selection and production of events as news (Naylor 2001, cited in Greer, 2007). One of the most significant qualitative changes in media representations since World War Two is the leading position of crime victims in the media (Reiner *et al*. 2000, 2003, cited in Greer, 2007). Moreover, “the media resources are allocated to the representations of those victims who can be portrayed as ideal” (Greer, 2007). The attribution of “ideal victim” status and therefore, corresponding levels of media interest, is influenced by class, gender, race, age, sex. On that account, persons perceived as vulnerable, defenseless, innocent, such as elderly women or young children, are suggested to match the status of a typical ideal victim.

Furthermore, the “newsworthiness” of an issue increases in the media with visual representations, such as photographs of victims, diagrams of route taken, geographical areas, weapons, crime scenes, or the family of the victim weeping on camera. Therefore, the visualization of the news increases the accessibility, the interest and the general impact of the news on the public (Chermak, 1995). As “seeing is believing” (Doyle, 2003), photographs humanize the victim, having “an insuperable power to determine what people recall of events” (Sontag, 2004). The victim can also acquire symbolic value, when it becomes representative of wider issues and debates on public safety. In such cases, when the victim symbolically represents a problem that resonates with many in the society, the media campaign receives a high level of public support (Greer, 2007). Thus, a key element in media’s coverage is the responsibility or the blame, and its attribution (Sparks, 1992). Blame can be attributed to individuals, as well as to institutions, and it is in the latter case that the victim acquires symbolic value and maintains media interest and public support high (Greer, 2007).

Alongside traditional media, the Internet offers opportunities for societal actors to make their voices heard, and thus, advance their cause. The use of Internet has been analysed in relation to social movements by Tarrow (2011), who points out important characteristics of the movement, such as vision and skills, for the effective use of Internet.

Alongside political, social and mass media advocacy, *transnational advocacy* refers to the societal actors’ involvement in transnational activism, in the attempt to plead for their cause. In this respect, various developments have been facilitating transnational activism: increased ties between states, governmental officials and non-governmental actors; increased vertical links between subnational, national and international levels; and an increased formal and informal structure that encourages the formation of networks between non-state, state, and international actors (Tarrow, 2006). Societal actors may be involved in transnational activism, or in “political activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts” and continue to belong to a national context (Tarrow, 2006). This description can, thus, refer to domestic societal actors, whose cause was not successfully addressed in the domestic context and is being addressed in the international context.

Methods utilized by societal actors for addressing the international sphere in order to advance their claims include: the strategic use of information, the support of powerful actors, the reference to international commitments made by their targets, and the symbolic interpretations of major events, leading to a focus on specific issues (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

The concept of advocacy, with all its forms: political, social, mass media and transnational, is particularly relevant for the present thesis, that seeks to highlight the methods used by societal groups in order to advance their claims regarding foreign policy.

Thus, as previously mentioned, the concept of advocacy can be identified in various forms of collective action that seek to influence policy, even without clear reference to it. One such example is the social movements literature, which discusses the policy impact of social movements. In this regard, some studies have found the impact dependent on the groups’ internal characteristics (Gamson, 1990), while others, on the external conditions (Lipsky, 1968; Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1999). Accordingly, several more recent studies emphasize the role of political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni, 1995; Tarrow, 1993, 1998; Amenta, 2005, 2006; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky, 2005), and public opinion (Costain and Majstorovic, 1994; Burstein, 1998, 1999; Soule and Olzak, 2004), which can act as facilitators or constraints on the policy impact of social movements.

The “political opportunity structure” concept has been discussed in relation to explaining the mobilization of social movements, as well as their outcomes. Moreover, the factors influencing the mobilization of a movement may differ from the ones influencing outcomes (Kolb, 2007). In a study that analyses the impact of social movements on policy in general, precisely, movement outcomes in their political context, Giugni (2004) has found that both political opportunities, specifically powerful political allies, and a favourable public opinion, can facilitate the movements’ impact on policy. The same study was replicated by Marco Giugni and Sakura Yamasaki, in 2009, using a different method, with the aim of testing if distinct techniques lead to similar or contradictory results (Giugni and Yamasaki, 2009). They concluded that the two studies provided similar results, thus, offering additional methodological possibilities alongside validating the results of the original study.

Reconsidering the definitions of foreign policy, presented in the beginning of this chapter, foreign policy can be, thus, understood as the product of all the factors discussed above. Some cases can be explained by focusing on internal factors, others by focusing on external factors, while for others there is the necessity for a bigger framework that incorporates society, the political system and the international environment. The approach used to explain each foreign policy case depends on the situation, as well as on how the researcher perceives the respective situation and formulates it. However, all cases’ analyses contribute to the goal of gaining generally applicable knowledge about how foreign policy decisions are made. The case analysed in the present thesis focuses on the societal actors in order to explain Japan’s North Korea policy in the period 1998-2006.

## 2.3 JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

### 2.3.1 Cold War period

Japan’s defeat in World War II was a turning point in the country’s foreign policy. While the immediate pre-war diplomatic course of Japan can be characterized by an alliance with fascist powers and a desire to dominate the East Asian region, post-war Japan pursued a policy of prosperity and security for its citizens. The foundations for the post-war Japanese foreign policy were set by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-1947; 1948-1954) and his “Yoshida Doctrine”, which included dependence on the US for security, limited rearmament and focus on economic development. Prime Minister Yoshida was the first to discover that Japan could benefit from the revised constitution and the limitations imposed by it (van Wolferen, 1990). The new post-war constitution, rewritten during the US occupation of Japan (1945-1952), by General MacArthur together with Japan’s Cabinet, considerably limited Japan’s foreign policy, outlawing war as a means to settle international disputes. Thus, Japan’s post-war foreign policy had developed in a restrictive frame, with economic, political and security guarantees from the United States. The integration of Japan on the US side in the Cold War divide was confirmed with the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty, in the same time with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951.

As a result of multiple factors, such as the peace constitution, the close economic and military ties with the US, and preoccupation with domestic reconstruction, Japan’s role in post-war politics is considered modest, while its international actions, constrained by the nature of the policy-making process (Hellmann, 1969). In his analysis of the dynamics of Japanese policy-making in the negotiations of the Soviet-Japanese Peace agreement of 1956, Hellmann (1969) concludes that foreign policy formulation in the 1950s was centred on the intra-party decision-making process of the conservatives, without any influence from other major actors in Japanese politics. Thus, the intra-party decision-making process of the conservatives is considered the most important single factor of Japanese politics that influences foreign policy, its nature being shaped by the factional structure of the party (Hellmann, 1969). Factional (*habatsu*) struggle is often centred on specific policy questions, and issues can be considered for their value for advancing the factional leaders’ party position. As the consensual style of Japanese decision-making is widely acknowledged, major foreign policy decisions are accompanied by consultation among faction leaders, in an effort to reach consensus, a fact that further weakens the fragmented structure of the party. In this regard, the direction of policies is not decided boldly by Prime Ministers, unless they are willing to risk disturbing the factional balance that keeps them in power. Thus, exceptions, such as Prime Minister Hatoyama’s (1954-1956) 1956 initiative for normalization of the Soviet-Japanese relations and Prime Minister Kishi’s (1957-1960) decision regarding the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1969, contributed to the leaders’ subsequent downfall (Hellmann, 1969).

Various accounts of the Japanese post-war policy-making process emphasize the tripartite elite model of policy-making. The principal actors: the bureaucracy, big businesses and the governing party, are seen as an “iron triangle” which governed the country without including other actors in the decision-making process (Hook *et al.*, 2001). Different scholars argue for the dominance of different actors of the iron triangle in the policy-making process. Thus, in 1982, Chalmers Johnson emphasizes the power of the bureaucracy in policymaking and argues that alongside the Japanese national "consensus", it supported the rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover, politicians are seen as a "safety valve" for the bureaucracy, “insulating it from political and interest group pressures so that it could autonomously carry out the main task of the developmental state – economic growth” (Johnson, 1982). The four elements of the Japanese model of developmental state are outlined by Johnson (1982) in his influential *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*: 1) an elite bureaucracy, 2) a political system in which the bureaucracy rules and the legislative branch is restricted in power, 3) “market-confirming methods of state intervention in the economy”, and 4) a “pilot organization like MITI” (Ministry of International Trade and Industry; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2001).

The bureaucracy maintained its pre-war power and lasted through the Occupation period, thus allowing the ministries considerable freedom in formulating and administering foreign policy (Fukui, 1977). Before 1980, the ministries and agencies involved in Japan’s foreign policy-makingwere: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2001), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) (Fukui, 1987). The policy initiation and formation are based on recommendations and advice from the bureaucracy, although there are some exceptions when the Prime Minister had a decisive role in formulating foreign policy. For example, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei was able to open negotiations towards diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972 (Fukui, 1977).

In the 1970s, with the decline in the power of the United States and rise in multipolarity in the international system, Japanese foreign policy entered a new phase (Sudo, 1992). The withdrawal of US military forces from Asia (1976), the decline in economic growth as a result of the first oil crisis (1973) and the political instability with the LDP’s loss of majority in the lower house election (1976), pushed Japanese policy makers to address a new course in foreign policy. Thus, the leadership of Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo (1976-1978) brought more clear and independent foreign policy. While the terms of the Yoshida doctrine remained, Japan pursued stronger relations with other parts of the world, as well and a role of a stabilizing force in the world, which was termed omnidirectional diplomacy (*zenhōi gaikō*). The omnidirectional diplomacy referred mostly to Japan’s political role in bridging relations between Southeast Asian nations. In this regard, the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977 expressed Japan’s willingness to assume a positive role in the political, economic and cultural relations with Southeast Asia (Sudo, 1992). Fukuda’s “heart-to-heart” policy was developed in order to promote cultural exchange and establish a better relationship with the Southeast Asian region. According to Sudo (1992), the Fukuda Doctrine was “neither a case of bureaucratic dominance nor one of factional politics”, but a decision centred on the Prime Minister. Fukuda’s characteristics as a strong LDP leader and support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials, as well as from Southeast Asian leaders, made it possible for the MOFA to implement the policy.

During the 1980s, the so-called process of “internationalization” (Fukui, 1987) is considered to have influenced Japan’s foreign policy-making system and the bureaucrats involved in the process. “Internationalization” is defined as a process that “internationalizes the political-economic system”, but is also “likely to provoke a series of often bitter and violent nationalist reactions from a number of domestic interests” (Fukui, 1987). Thus, as this process of “internationalization” was unfolding, other ministries joined in the process of foreign policy-making as new actors**.** The first ministry to become involved in foreign policy-making was the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), followed by the Ministry of Transportation (MOT), the Ministry of Construction (MOC), the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW), the Ministry of Education (MOE), the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Ministry of Labour (MOL). After the revision of the National Government Organization Law (1983), all ministries had the opportunity to have a new international section (Fukui, 1987). Moreover, in some cases, businesses (*zaikai*) had a role in foreign policy-making. In areas such as trade or investment, businesses negotiate directly with foreign government agencies, with little involvement from the Japanese government (Fukui, 1987).

Another group of actors with influence in the foreign policy-making process were the official and unofficial advisers**,** organized especially under Prime Minister Nakasone’s (1982-1987) leadership, who were chosen mainly from academia, mass media and the corporate world and made policy recommendations to the Prime Minister and other ministers. Thus, with the involvement of more actors in the foreign policy-making process, the necessity to coordinate their diverse interests arose. As a result, in 1986, the Cabinet Secretariat was reorganized by Prime Minister Nakasone to include a Cabinet Councillors’ Office on External Affairs (headed by a MOFA official), in order to better coordinate foreign policy-making between the Cabinet and the ministries. However, Fukui (1987) observes the important role and influence of LDP politicians, in contrast to the decreased role of bureaucracy in the coordination of foreign policy-making: “decision-making authority has shifted increasingly away from bureaucrats toward politicians” (Fukui, 1987). According to Fukui (1987), the rising influence of politicians can be attributed to the declining strength of the top leadership, rather than to the strength of the ruling party. When the LDP’s leadership was strong (Ikeda (1960-1964), Satō (1964-1972)), the bureaucracy’s policy recommendations had to be approved by a few top party leaders, while during weaker leadership the process of foreign policy decision-making became more complex. Nevertheless, the LDP has been a key actor in the foreign policy-making process as a dominant political party in post-war Japan (Hook *et al.*, 2001).

Pempel (1987) in his analysis of Japanese policy formation also argues for a rise in the influence of the LDP and its members, in the 1980s, alongside the decrease in the power of the bureaucracy. Further, he concludes that the Japanese policy-making in the 1980s is more complex, but less coherent than 20 years before and that there are important divisions over the directions of foreign policy. Furthermore, in 1992, Pempel concludes that despite the increased interest and influence of LDP members on a wider range of policies, there are close ties between politicians and bureaucracy, similar to “intra-family quarrels” and finally, the values and objectives of both actors are compatible (Pempel, 1992).

These attempts to emphasize the dominant role of one elite over another highlight the pluralistic nature of policy-making in Japan at the time.

Muramatsu and Krauss (1987)argue that Japanese policy-making had changed since the 1950s and 1960s toward a greater influence for politicians, parties, and theDiet, and challenge Johnson’s (1982) model of developmental state, by the pluralist model, to which they refer as “patterned pluralism”. They challenge the view of the dominance of bureaucracy arguing that it is limited, as the bureaucracy could not operate in a political vacuum. Further, Muramatsu and Krauss argue that the Japanese post-war policy-making system contains a growing number of pluralist elements, being characterized by a strong state with autonomous interests, but which interacts with pluralist elements. Thus, the state and the bureaucracy are strong, but the boundaries between state and society are not clear, as interest groups and political parties can have access to the policy-making process. As economic interests were represented and Japan is considered a "producers" society, economic interest groups mainly, participated in the policy-making processes (Tsujinaka and Pekkanen, 2007). The bureaucracy is still strong, but shares power with other influential actors. The LDP enhanced its ties with interest groups and its politicians developed their policy expertise. Thus, the role of politicians has changed from “insulating bureaucracy” (Johnson, 1982) to intermediating between interest groups and the bureaucracy.

Japan’s foreign policy behaviour in the 1980s has been also discussed by Calder (1988) in his influential essay on Japan’s foreign economic policy. The foreign policy of the Yoshida Doctrine was described as "reactive" by Kent Calder in 1988, who argued that Japanese foreign economic policy is made in response to outside pressure and “reaction prevails over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict” (Calder, 1988). Japan’s passivity and reactivity is arguably possible to explain by focusing on the international system and the US-Japan relationship, during the 1950s and 1960s, but starting with the 1970s, when Japan’s economic, technological and even military capability have grown considerably in comparison to other reactive states, it is harder to offer an explanation focusing on structural factors. Therefore, Japan’s reactive foreign policy behaviour in the 1980s is presented as rooted in domestic politics: weak central executive, factionalism in ruling LDP and bureaucratic sectionalism. Calder argues that the role of the LDP in policy-making had increased in the 1980s due to divisions in the bureaucracy, improved expertise, information and staff support. Thus, the LDP is considered increasingly important in policy formulation. However, there are few incentives within the party to propose independent foreign policy initiatives because of its complex factional structure, grassroots constituency-sensitive orientation and strong domestic interest-group ties. The role of bureaucracy and big businesses is still considered important in areas in which they are interested and where their responsibilities are clear. Calder further asserts that the increasing influence of the LDP in the policy-making process has accentuated the reactive standpoint of the Japanese state. Thus, Japan’s reactive state is seen as having a dual character: difficulty in taking independent foreign policy initiatives and flexibility toward outside pressure.

### 2.3.2 Post-Cold War period

There was a high level of scholarly interest in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy in the early 1990s, seeking to understand how the change in the international system influenced Japan and to predict its future foreign policy direction. The accounts offered by Japanese observers refer to the broadening context of Japanese foreign policy (Inoguchi, 1991; Fukushima, 1999), as well as to the role of Japan in Asia (Funabashi, 1991) and the US-Japan relations. English language scholarship (Schoppa, 1997) tends to focus more on the bilateral relations with the United States or with regions in Asia (Inoguchi and Jain, 2000). Most recent studies of Japanese politics are published in the US and Japan and tend to be comparative in nature (Pempel and Muramatsu, 2014).

This section will focus on how Western and Japanese academia have interpreted Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War and on the main actors participating in the process of foreign policy-making in Japan since the end of the Cold War. In this regard, there has been constant debate between scholars whether Japan’s reactive and passive post-war foreign policy has become more assertive since the end of the Cold War. Some scholars argue for continuity and for the fact that Japan is following a different logic in conducting its foreign policy, despite the international system change, while others concur on the idea that the post-WWII Japanese foreign policy based on the Yoshida Doctrine has undergone an essential shift and Japan’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has become more assertive and proactive. Moreover, there are also various opinions regarding the role of the main actors in the post-Cold War foreign policy-making process. Thus, this review presents the relevant literature divided according to the positions of scholars regarding change in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy, along arguments regarding the main power holders in the foreign policy-making process.

#### 2.3.2.a Reactivity and continuity in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy

The ‘reactive state’ concept introduced by Calder (1988) is backed by Inoguchi and Jain (2000), who adapt it by characterizing Japanese foreign policy style as "karaoke diplomacy". As in karaoke, where a singer chooses from a list of songs and sings along the lyrics shown on the screen, it is argued that Japan can choose from a list of foreign policy options offered by the US, its only input being the style of delivery or the implementation. Although the contributions to the volume edited by Inoguchi and Jain (2000) show that Japan has had numerous new initiatives with regard to its foreign policy, the majority concentrated in ODA, environmental management and monetary contributions to international institutions, and new actors have become part of the foreign policy-making process, such as local governments and NGOs, all of these initiatives and actions are considered to have happened within the broad framework set by the United States and its “karaoke” list (Inoguchi and Jain, 2000).

The parallel with karaoke is further applied in the domestic context, as arguably, although in the 1990s politicians have a stronger role in shaping policy, the bureaucracy creates the “list” from where politicians choose legislation. Politicians are considered to have been more interested in domestic policies than in foreign policy, and thus they are more responsive to the bureaucracy’s karaoke “list” in foreign policy, than in other policy area. However, the “karaoke diplomacy” is arguably an adaptive diplomacy in a changing international system, and foreign policy is considered “the product of compromise between competing domestic and international interests” (Inoguchi and Jain, 2000).

An overview of the characteristics of domestic actors who affect foreign policy-making in Japan is provided by Tanaka Akihiko (2000). In this overview, the role of the Prime Minister is considered relatively weak, although the changes towards strengthening it are acknowledged, and the major role in the decision-making process is still considered to be held by the bureaucracy. The bureaucracyis seen as relatively strong and independent, but the ministries that form it are seen as not acting in coordination. Thus, because of the relative weakness of the Prime Minister and the vertically divided administration (*tatewari gyōsei*), external pressure still plays an important role in the decision-making process, when the jurisdiction is not clear.

In the 1990s, the decision-making within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, usually in charge of policy issues with international implications, expanded. A Foreign Policy Bureau was created in 1993, in charge of planning foreign policy and coordinating policies formulated by other bureaus. Moreover, in the 1990s, a small number of politicians are considered to have impacted on foreign policy decision-making, due to the political fragmentation resulted from the coalition politics, where the LDP did not hold a majority. Tanaka concludes that although there is no fundamental change in Japanese politics, the role of the bureaucracy is starting to be challenged and more actors are becoming involved in the decision-making process.

Jain (2000) analyses two new types of actors, whose involvement in foreign policy has begun to expand in the 1990s: Subnational Governments (SNGs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). He argued that both SNGs and NGOs were becoming legitimate actors in Japan’s foreign affairs and that previous tensions with the central government were decreasing. Partnership and cooperation between these new actors and the central government are emphasized, and although the national government, via the foreign ministry, is considered to have the main role in Japan’s foreign policy, SNGs and NGOs are considered to contribute to the foreign policy-making process, thus including Japan in the “international trend toward pluralism in international relations”.

Calder’s reactive state thesis is also supported by Miyashita (1999) with his analysis of the US role in Japan’s foreign aid policy. However, different from Calder’s argument that foreign pressure works in Japan because of domestic political constraints, such as fragmentation in the Japanese government, Miyashita argues that the government was unified under MOFA’s leadership and was responsive to foreign pressure out of concern for the bilateral relations with the US. Thus, the Japanese government changed its initial position regarding the foreign aid policy as “a result of choice rather than inability to act” (Miyashita, 1999).

#### 2.3.2.b Assertiveness and proactivity in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy

While some scholars emphasize and support the reactive state thesis of Kent Calder, the idea that Japan is now a "normal power", with a more proactive foreign policy is often circulated. In this respect, most Japan specialists find important changes in the security aspects of Japanese foreign policy. Studies by Michael Green, Christopher Hughes, Kenneth Pyle and Richard Samuels establish the current dominant trend of research on Japan’s foreign policy. This new body of literature argues that Japan is becoming an important military actor in the international context, pursuing its national interests in a cautious and defensive way. This school of thought, however, is more normative, seeking to argue for the direction of Japan’s foreign policy, rather than to explain it. Pyle (2007) argues that Japan “will be deeply engaged in political-military affairs”, while Hughes (2004) is discussing Japan’s “re-emergence as a ‘normal’ military power”. Moreover, Roy (2005) asserts that Japan is becoming a “full-fledged great power” and Tanter (2005) holds that “Japan is proceeding toward full normalization”. There are also some extreme positions such as the one of Matthews (2003), who expects that the nationalist sentiment in Japan could give rise to “a militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan”.

The debate regarding Japan’s role in the international arena is not restricted to academia. In the 2000s, there are multiple assessments of the change in Japan’s foreign policy in the international media as well, discussing Japan's "gradual abandonment of pacifism and its return to the status of "normal" country" (Mallet, 2007).

An early study of Japan’s new emerging foreign policy orientation is Yasutomo’s “The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy”. Yasutomo (1995) recognizes the reactive nature of Japan’s foreign policy, but argues that “there are also concurrent indications of greater activism and even hints of leadership, especially since the last half of the 1980s”. In his analysis of Japan’s performance toward multilateral development banks (MDB), Japan’s activism is based on its efforts to cooperate with Europe and improve relations, its ability to act as an intermediary between the other participants on a specific issue, and participate in burden-sharing among G7 countries. However, as the MDB policy-making process had bureaucratic and not political leadership, activism is believed to continue to be cautious and incremental.

Starting with the end of the Cold War, Japan’s foreign policy began to undergo various changes. The end of the Cold war eliminated the communist threat, but the Asian region is still characterized by uncertainty from the point of view of security, with threats such as China’s rapid increase in military spending, North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile development, tensions over the Taiwan Strait, between South Korea and Japan, China and Japan. Moreover, the Japanese domestic context in the 1990s had been characterized by economic recession and political instability, further completed by domestic crises and natural disasters. This situation was similar in international relations. The Gulf War of 1991 was considered a diplomatic failure for Japan and it was highly criticized by the United States and the international community. The lack of a political consensus and of a legal framework to proceed did not allow Japan to support the international coalition. The mere financial involvement of Japan in the international arena was further criticized as “checkbook diplomacy” outside Japan. Thus, the 1991 Gulf War was the first sign that, in the changed international context, Japan cannot rely solely on its economic power in order to achieve its foreign policy interests.

The first significant change, away from the Yoshida doctrine, was the Diet’s passage of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill in 1992, which allowed the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces abroad, for logistical and humanitarian support for United Nations missions. Therefore, Japanese troops were deployed for the first time after WWII to Cambodia, in 1992, to join the UN peacekeeping mission and thereafter to participate in different UN peacekeeping activities (Dobson, 2003).

The US criticism regarding Japan’s inability to provide assistance in case of a conflict, after the North Korea’s decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993, as well as China’s three-stage exercise in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996, which added to Japan’s perception of threat from China, led to the enhancement of the US-Japan security relationship in the 1990s. Therefore, in 1997, the revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation provided a new framework for the security alliance, which included also areas surrounding Japan that had an influence on its peace and security. Japan’s role in case of a crisis was slightly increased, in order to create a more effective alliance. North Korea’s ballistic missile over Japan in August 31, 1998 represented a further threat to Japan and led to its decision to develop its own surveillance system, another change from the Yoshida doctrine. Moreover, it motivated Japan to cooperate with the US on ballistic missile defence, thus reducing the constraints effective during the Cold War period.

The US war on terrorism prompted by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 put further pressure on Japan for support. Therefore, during Prime Minister’s Koizumi’s administration, Japan tried to meet its ally’s expectations and expanded the SDF activities in order to provide support in Afghanistan and Iraq.

All these changes in Japan’s foreign policy-making prompted analysts to offer various arguments with regard to Japan’s assertiveness and proactivity.

Even before the US war on terrorism, scholars had observed and discussed the shift in Japan’s foreign policy. Green (2001) finds Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War increasingly independent, although he considers that the alliance with the United States remains central to its diplomacy. He further considers it still reactive, but much less passive, with areas of continuity and areas of change. The continuity can be seen in the centrality of the US-Japan Alliance, the focus on economic power, the constraints of the use of force and the lack of an alternative for Japan’s role in the world, while the change is observed in a number of trends: shaping foreign policy by consideration of the balance of power in the region; the domestic pressure that foreign policy decisions face and the need for justification in terms of national interest; more sensitivity to security and even readiness to take unilateral actions independent from the US, in the case of threats; a drive for a more independent foreign policy; initiatives in Asia, such as expansion of trade and investment; and the fluidity and pluralism of the foreign policy-making process. Green asserts that Japan’s role in international affairs will grow as the country is changing and adopting a “reluctant realism”, a strategic view shaped by the changes in the “international environment, insecurity about national power resources and aspirations for a national identity that moves beyond the legacies of World War II”.

Hirata (2001) also considers Japan cautiously proactive in certain areas and reluctantly reactive in others. In examining Japan’s relations with Vietnam and Cambodia, Hirata analyses the applicability of the reactive and proactive models to Japanese foreign policy and argues that both models have strengths as well as weaknesses. Thus, Hirata’s study proposes a hybrid reactivism/ proactivism model. The reactivist and hybrid model seem to concur on the fact that the US pressure has a crucial influence on Japanese foreign policy, while the proactivist and hybrid model concur on the fact that the cautiousness of Japanese foreign policy does not mean reactivity.

The three editions of *Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security,* byHook *et al.* (2001, 2005, 2012), provide comprehensive analyses of Japanese foreign policy according to its evolution over the years. Thus, in the first edition Japan is characterized as a quiet but normal state that can be explained, with foreign policy-making actors pursuing their own goals based on the domestic and international norms. The second edition acknowledges a more proactive Japanese foreign policy starting with the 2000s, and an eagerness on the Japanese government side to take initiatives in key areas of foreign policy. Furthermore, in the third edition the authors point out more notable changes in Japan’s foreign policy behaviour in the 2010s. Japan is no longer seen as a state with a proactive quiet diplomacy, but as a “state in retreat”, looking to re-emphasize its relations with the US. The structural changes as well as the lack of domestic direction are believed to have weakened Japan’s international standing in the 2010s. Moreover, significant changes are noted with regard to policy-making actors. Non-state actors are considered to influence the foreign policy-making process more than ever before. However, in the post-Cold War era, Japan is considered to have begun behaving like a responsible actor internationally, starting to pursue a foreign policy more proactive and multilateral than before. In regard to the reactive state thesis, the authors do not deny this characterization of Japan, but believe that it reflects a focus on the performance of policy-making actors in crisis situations and further, argue that policy makers in any country face the same difficulties. Moreover, in the long-term, two goals considered fundamental for any industrialized country were achieved by Japan, peace and prosperity. Therefore, Hook *et al.* conclude that Japan adopts a “long-term perspective on diplomacy and the pursuit of state interests”. The authors characterize this diplomacy as "quiet", describing the foreign policy-making process as “a range of consistently low-risk and low-profile international initiatives”, with policy makers who prefer to exert their influence from behind the scenes. The proactivity of Japanese foreign policy is thought to be driven both by pressures from the international system and by the domestic policy-making system. Regarding the domestic policy-making system, the authority of the core executive (the Prime Minister’s Private Office and officials from the Cabinet Office and the Cabinet Secretariat) has arguably increased. The Cabinet Secretariat was reorganized in 1986 by Prime Minister Nakasone, to comprise Cabinet Councillors’ Offices on Internal Affairs (headed by a MOF official), External Affairs (headed by a MOFA official) and National Security Affairs and Crisis Management (headed by a JDA official). This reorganization, however, did not bring the expected changes in the foreign policy-making process. Nonetheless, on some occasions, Prime Ministers had the decisive role in shaping foreign policy. For example, Miyazawa Kiichi (1991-1993) accomplished the passage of the PKO Bill in 1992, Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996-1998) achieved the reconfirmation of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the initialization of the revision of the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan defence Cooperation, and improvements in Russo-Japanese relations, Obuchi Keizō (1998-2000) concluded the passage of the Revised Guidelines through the Diet in 1999, Koizumi Junichirō (2001-2006) achieved to despatch the SDF in Afghanistan and Iraq for US support, as well as summits with North Korea in 2002 and 2004. The core executive was further reorganized by the revised Cabinet Law of 1999 with reforms that went into effect in 2001. Thus, the three previous offices of the Cabinet Secretariat merged and an Office of Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries was created. This reform increased the *Kantei*’s (Prime Minister’s Official Residence) ability to coordinate foreign policy, under the leadership of the Prime Minister. During Prime Minister Koizumi’s leadership, the role of the LDP in the policy-making process had been decreased, legislation being submitted directly to the Diet. Moreover, Koizumi’s popularity in the domestic context, allowed him to address common voters and take foreign policy risks, bypassing the bureaucracy and the LDP. Therefore, all these factors allowed Koizumi to pursue a proactive foreign policy.

An analysis of the role of the Prime Minister in the policy-making process is provided by Shinoda (2000), who examines the Prime Ministership after the end of the LDP rule in 1993. Shinoda offers a case study analysis and argues that despite the limited legal authority of the Prime Minister, his role in the policy-making process is crucial. As the administrative jurisdiction is divided among cabinet members, the influence of the Prime Minister over the executive is limited. Although according to the Constitution the Prime Minister appoints Cabinet members freely, the intra-party politics constrain him in most cases. Shinoda further identifies different sources of power that the Prime Minister can utilize, in order to achieve policy goals: institutional power sources and informal power sources. As legal authority vested in the Prime Minister is considered to be limited, the significance of the informal power sources is acknowledged for the effective use of the institutional sources of power. Therefore, the effectiveness of the Prime Minister as a leader is considered to depend on his support within the ruling party or coalition, his experience and accomplishments before assuming office, such as the relationships with the bureaucracy and the opposition parties, but also on public support. Support from the business community and the United States is also considered important after the Prime Minister had assumed office. Moreover, Shinoda analyses the institutional changes that took place in the 1990s: the 1994 electoral changes, the 1999 Diet and government reform and the 2001 administrative reform, and their impact on the Prime Minister’s power. He concludes that these changes can strengthen the Prime Minister’s leadership, but do not necessarily guarantee his strong leadership, which further depends on the individual, his background, experience, political skills and personality.

Shinoda (2004) also analyses the role of Ozawa Ichirō, whom he considers the most visible Japanese politician in the 1990s, in the foreign policy-making process. He argues that although Ozawa did not have a position with legal authority, he utilized his informal sources of power in order to achieve his goals. Ozawa is considered the central figure of Japanese politics in the 1990s. He entered politics in 1969, after winning his father’s seat in the Lower House, then rose steadily in his political career. Ozawa supported a larger role for Japan in its foreign affairs, position that he also expressed in his book *Blueprint for a New Japan* (1994). Shinoda analyses the way Ozawa was involved in the foreign policy decision-making process in the period 1987-1994, from the Takeshita administration (1987-1989) to the Hosokawa administration (1993-1994) and the crucial role he played in the formation and negotiation of foreign policy. Thus, although he did not have institutional authority, he influenced the decision-making process relying upon his informal sources of political power: power base within the ruling party, ties with the bureaucracy and with the opposition parties, and support from the business community and from the United States.

The increased influence of the Prime Minister and his office (*Kantei*) in Japan’s foreign policy-making process since the end of the Cold War is also emphasized by Shinoda (2007a).Japanese Prime Ministers were considered weak figures in post-war politics. However, the foreign policy-making process was slowly changing starting with the 1980s. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987) attempted to strengthen his role and influence in the policy-making process. Thus, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet Office have gradually become more powerful, but they still faced struggles in cases of major policy changes. With the government’s reorganization and the reforms that went into effect in 2001, the functionality of the Cabinet was increased and the leadership of the *Kantei* had been consolidated. Shinoda (2007a) argues that due to a strengthened *Kantei*, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (April 2001- September 2006) exercised a strong leadership in Japan’s foreign policy-making process. Thus, unlike past ministers, Koizumi effectively used the consolidated *Kantei* and succeeded in passing various bills in order to support its ally, the United States, through military and nonmilitary measures.

Christopher Hughes (2004)alsoargues that Japan is likely to become more assertive on the international level and demonstrate greater military proactivity, as a consequence of the challenges posed to the Yoshida Doctrine since the end of the Cold War. Thus, the threat of North Korea, the rise of China, the "war on terror" and various domestic crises are considered to have pressured Japan and to have been the impetus for its "normalisation". However, Hughes infers that Japan will strengthen its relationship with the US, as “its main framework for the utilisation of military power”, but it will also become a more active and powerful player within it. Hughes offers a valuable description of the "normalisation" process, arguing that the mainstream vision of Japan’s future security direction is represented by those in favour of strengthening Japan’s military capabilities, as well as the US-Japan alliance. The most influential LDP, MOFA and JDA policy makers are in support of Japan becoming a "normal" nation, although their perceptions over how radical the changes should be, differ. Thus, the senior LDP politicians favour a more cautious approach, while the younger generation supports a more radical change in Japan’s defence role. However, there is unanimity over the exclusively defensive security policy. The "normalisation" debate has been further supported by private think tanks and the mass media. Furthermore, the Japanese public opinion became supportive of the US-Japan alliance, as well as of a greater involvement in the international affairs, thus being in accordance with the elite policy makers. The public opinion’s support for Japan’s "normalisation" is considered essential for the policy-making choices.

An alternative vision of Japan’s future security policy direction is the concept of Japan as a global civilian power, advanced by *Asahi Shinbun* journalist and commentator, Funabashi Yōichi. The concept advocated the maintenance of the US-Japan alliance as a base for Japan’s security, emphasizing Japan’s contribution to the international environment through economic power. However, the concept faded away in the face of Japan’s decline in economic power and perceived rise of regional threats.

The "normalisation" process and a more proactive Japanese foreign policy were enabled by a transformation of the policy-making system. Overall MOFA maintained its leading role in the formulation of security policy, however, it started to face increased competition from politicians and the Japan Defence Agency (JDA). The JDA began to "normalise" its role in foreign policy-making and was affirming its aim for status as a full ministry. The Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) became authorized to testify in the Diet in 1997 and to offer advice on security issues to the Cabinet Office, thus increasing the voice of the military in policy-making. The role of the core executive had also been strengthened, increasing the authority and influence of the Prime Minister in the foreign policy-making process (Hughes, 2004). The rapid response that Japan offered to the US after the 9/11 attacks shows the significance of the policy-making system reforms. Hughes concludes that these reforms, the "normalisation" of the JDA, the JSDF and the core executive, made Japan’s vision of becoming a "normal" military actor, possible.

Kenneth Pyle (2007) challenges Calder’s reactive state thesis, arguing that although the external environment had influenced Japan from the beginning of its modern history, it does not alone determine the behaviour of the Japanese state. He further asserts that foreign policy choices are driven by the perceptions and abilities of decision makers. He also challenges the views about Japan’s adherence to a culture of antimilitarism, arguing, like Green (2001), that Japan is moving toward a greater realism in its foreign policy, willing to use its military in order to pursue its objectives. The end of the ban on overseas dispatch of Japanese forces, closer bilateral military cooperation with the US, acquisition of new military capabilities are evidences of change from the limitations of the Cold War era and proof that, incrementally and cautiously, Japan has started to adapt to the new environment of the post-Cold War era. Pyle considers Japanese foreign policy as the interaction of pressures from the international system and the response to these pressures from a group of conservative elites, who guided foreign policy-making over the last 150 years. In the 1990s, however, the parameters of Japanese policy-making have been changing. With the various political and economic problems of the 1990s and the decreasing power of the bureaucracy, the policy-making process began to open to broader societal pressure. Thus, public opinion has become more important and politicians have started to gain more power in the policy-making process. There was a new generation of young politicians who took the initiative in order to establish the universal values of democracy and human rights as guiding principles for Japan’s foreign policy. However, although the influence of politicians has increased, the bureaucracy is still considered powerful. Japanese foreign policy-making is considered to have become more democratic than before and although Japan has not fully embraced the universal values of democracy and human rights, the desire and openness to change and to adopt a new course are significant. However, Pyle predicts that Japan is aiming for a new self-generated strategy, instead of following the US strategy or its relations with China and Korea. Pyle argues that Japan is abandoning the Yoshida Doctrine and its low-key approach to foreign affairs and is “preparing to become a major player in the strategic struggles of the twenty-first century”. Furthermore, although the changes may be incremental, they are not considered peripheral changes, but “rather, point toward a comprehensive revision of the Japanese system”.

Regarding the influence of public opinion on Japanese foreign policy, Shinoda (2007b), in his analysis of the opinion of mass media through the editorials of five major Japanese newspapers, also argues that the 21st century mass media had become more concrete and realistic (opposition to SDF dispatch became nearly silent) regarding national security. Moreover, he argues that although there is not a consistent synchronization between media and public opinion, media did influence public opinion, and the changes in public opinion created a political environment in which the government pursued a more active foreign policy. His study considers the rational actor model analyses and domestic politics factors insufficient for providing a full picture of Japanese foreign policy and thus examines the media and the public opinion as factors linking the two.

In order to understand the relation between public opinion, mass media and societal groups in Japan, the organizational structure of mass media deserves particular attention.

The establishment press in Japan, from which magazine reporters and independent journalists are excluded, is institutionalized in the form of press clubs (*kisha kurabu*) attached to government offices, ministries, and corporations. The journalists from major newspapers, as well as television stations are assigned to a specific press club, where they have a guarantee for access to information. However, according to insiders, important information is obtained from the unofficial conversations with politicians, with whom relatively close relationships are developed over time (Farley, 1996).

The press clubs system assures the equal treatment toward each newspaper and television stations; however, it wards off independent investigation and leads to a news uniformity. Noncompliance with the regulations, such as publishing banned information, leads to the respective journalist’s loss of membership in the club (Farley, 1996). The reporters from press clubs, therefore, discern information in order not to lose access to information or the trust of their source. Furthermore, some information is not covered due to the media’s consideration and respect for the subject (e.g. the voluntary three months break in coverage of the crown prince’s search for a bride in February 1992), or due to the subject being considered unworthy of coverage (e.g. yakuza). The media coverage can also be influenced by big advertisers or the relationship between the business world and the ruling party.

The journalists and reporters outside press clubs, such as independent journalist, magazine reporters, journalists from small newspapers, have more freedom to investigate, as well as the possibility of being more aggressive in their coverage. Usually the journalists outside press clubs cover political scandals first, as they do not have close relationships with the ruling party. For example the geisha story of the former Prime Minister Uno Sōsuke was covered first by Washington Post, although the story had reached *Mainichi* *Shinbun* beforehand. Therefore, the press outside the press clubs is considered to have more responsibility of reporting objectively, and not as a reflection of the *tatemae-honne* culture as the press clubs journalists. Moreover, the Japanese press in the 1980s and 1990s had a dual role in Japanese society, one investigative, mainly fulfilled by the media outside press clubs, and one coverage role, fulfilled by the mainstream media, who continues to report on already disclosed information (Farley, 1996).

The majority of the journalists of major news organizations being assigned to press clubs, the focus of the media coverage was on the political centre. In this respect, two key institutions, the newspaper industry *kyōkai* (trade association) and media *keiretsu* (business groups), assured that the outside media did not access the political centre (Freeman, 2003).

The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (*Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai*, NSK) is an independent organization funded and operated by the mass media of Japan, to promote media’s common interests. It, therefore, ensured that its members had exclusive access to the press clubs, and thus to the news sources. Media groups’ (*keiretsu*) ability to significantly determine the behaviour of other news media, alternative to the mainstream media, such as local newspapers and magazines, or television networks, reflects their control over the information available to the public (Freeman, 2003).

One alternative for the information to reach the public, and thus, outside the political centre, is the Internet. However, Japan was found to be behind many industrialized countries, and even behind many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, according to population online percentage. Internet usage rates were found to be connected to age of household head, size of the city, income, gender, and education level (Freeman, 2003). Nevertheless, it had been suggested that the potential for the Internet to become an alternative information source for the public is real, and is the key for citizens to get round the mainstream media and the uniformity of the news assured by the three institutional arrangements: the press clubs, the newspaper *kyōkai* and the media *keiretsu* (Freeman, 2003).

Although Japan’s first Internet provider started business in 1994, two computer networks had previously been established in 1987, and 1988 respectively (DAISAN and NIFTY). These networks had been established in the form of bulletin boards, after a model initiated in the United States, to assist grassroots activists in achieving political and social goals. However, the first time that the Internet played a significant role in Japan was in the wake of the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kōbe Earthquake), when it had been utilized for finding or bringing together people or collecting resources nationally and internationally. Nonetheless, the usage of Internet by the civil society sector in Japan appears to having been limited due to increased cost of usage, caused by the NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation) monopoly over telephone cables used for Internet access, and Japanese text encoding difficulties. There had been efforts of national and local governments to establish networks (community or local networks); however, with the aim of creating connections between citizens, governments and business, not as an alternative way of information to reach the public (Freeman, 2003).

Considering the organizational structure of the media, societal groups cannot gain coverage easily in the beginning. However, once they gain access to the news media, they receive the consideration of the reporters, who seek to discern the information published in order not to lose access to information or the trust of their source. Moreover, the uniformity of the news leads to a large coverage of the same message.

The media and public opinion have, thus, been analysed as factors linking international and domestic factors in providing an explanation for Japan’s foreign policy (Shinoda, 2007b). Nevertheless, contrary to Shinoda (2007b) and Pyle (2007) who argue that public opinion has undergone changes and has become more important since the 1990s, Midford (2011) holds that Japanese public opinion “was never pacifist” and its support for the more assertive foreign policies, such as deployments to Iraq or the Indian Ocean, does not reflect a change, but the noncombat nature of the deployments. The public is considered to have gradually opened to the idea of deploying personnel overseas to participate in peacekeeping operations. Thus, Midford argues that Japanese public opinion has a significant influence on foreign policy because of its stability and coherence regarding the use of military force.

Kohno Masaru (2007)rejects the “reactive state” concept and argues that the changes in Japan’s foreign policy have been triggered by an interaction of international pressure and domestic dynamics. He agrees that external pressure exists and has a considerable impact upon states’ behaviour, but he further argues that external pressure always interacts with the domestic political context to determine the course of foreign policy. Thus, he analyses three actors in Japanese politics and the influence they had on foreign policy after the end of the Cold War: the MITI, the LDP and the JSP. He analyses the changes that these actors have undergone in order to show that domestic dynamics had a great impact on Japan’s international behaviour. Therefore, the MITI, which tended to resist economic liberalization, was renamed and reorganized as the METI in 2001, and became more open to multilateral norms and institutions for free trade. Similarly, the LDP moved away from its passive international stance. The largest opposition party, the JSP had pressured the governing LDP in the 60s, 70s and 80s not to take a more assertive initiative in foreign affairs, as it was the promoter of a pacifist foreign policy. The LDP had also used the JSP as an excuse for not contributing more in the international and regional security. However, the realignment of Japan’s party system and the demise of the JSP allowed and encouraged a more proactive foreign policy. Kohno chose to analyse the MITI, the LDP and the JSP, as these actors have previously been reluctant about Japan’s proactive international role. Exploring the changes that these actors have undergone, he considers the external pressure a mere incentive for Japan assuming a larger international role. In the end, the change in the domestic context can justify Japan’s changing foreign policy and international contribution.

Richard Samuels (2007) argues that Japan is in the process of creating a consensus, a deeply coherent national security strategy, as it had done on three different occasions in the past: the 19th century consensus on constructing a “rich nation and strong army”, the early 20th century consensus on imperial Japanese hegemony in Asia, and the Cold War consensus on Japan as a “cheap-riding trading state”. Further, he argues, that the successful achievement of a fourth consensus, a “Goldilocks consensus”, “a grand strategy that is not too hard but not too soft, not too Asian and not too Western”, will create new security options for Japan, balancing strength and autonomy. Samuels recognizes the centrality of the US-Japan alliance, but sees it, together with the “Goldilocks consensus”, as a transition to a new phase, when the Yoshida doctrine can be abandoned and new security options will be created. Currently, in the process of replacing the Yoshida Doctrine, Japanese strategists are slicing away the “pacifist loaf that Yoshida Shigeru baked in the post-war period”. Samuels argues that the revision of the Yoshida Doctrine started due to the emergence of new threats, such as a rising China, a nuclear North Korea, the possible end of the US-Japan alliance and a decline in the Japanese economy, as well as the actions of countries in the region to insure over perceived risks. Moreover, he notes that all actions were taken “within constraints”, more specifically, domestic institutions and domestic debate. The Japanese domestic discourse was defined by a new generation of “revisionists”, Koizumi Junichirō and Abe Shinzō amongst them, who gained control of the LDP, thus of the government, in early 2000s. The assertiveness of the new leaders brought the transformation of domestic institutions in ways that affected the foreign policy-making process. The role of the bureaucracy had been cut down, while the role of the Prime Minister had been strengthened, in order to be able to act more decisively in international affairs. Moreover, the structure of the Cabinet Secretariat had been reformed, and a Cabinet Office established. These reforms have created a more flexible policy apparatus and stronger executive leadership. As part of cutting down bureaucracy’s power in the foreign policy-making process, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) became another target of the “revisionists”. The CLB had played a major role in the Yoshida Doctrine, disapproving of the dispatch of the SDF to the Gulf War of 1991. During the Koizumi administration the CLB was not eliminated, but brought under political control. Another major change in the policy-making process had been the change in the control of the Japan Defense Agency. Thus, politicians, and especially younger politicians with knowledge about security issues were given influence in the policy process.

Mochizuki (2007) offers a clear-cut analysis of Kenneth Pyle’s and Richard Samuels’s assessments of the Japanese grand strategy. Thus, both seek to assess the change in Japanese strategy, explain it and predict Japan’s foreign policy direction. Moreover, both agree on Japan’s post-war foreign policy parameters being set by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and the subsequent grand strategy, the Yoshida Doctrine. However, Pyle’s and Samuels’s analyses of Japan’s departure from this grand strategy differ. Pyle asserts that Japan’s departure from the Yoshida Doctrine was brought about by the changes in the international system, specifically the end of the Cold War and argues that during the Cold War, Prime Minister Nakasone’s failed attempt to move away from the Yoshida Doctrine was due to domestic resistance, which, in turn, occurred because of the persistence of the Cold War international structure. Therefore, Pyle argues that the changes in the international structure provide an impetus and a possibility to move away from the Yoshida Doctrine and pursue a new grand strategy. On the other hand, Samuels argues that Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy change is determined by multiple factors, not just the international structure as Pyle asserts. He, thus, emphasizes international events, domestic political struggles, societal and institutional change, and the transformation of the US defence establishment. Samuels does not emphasize such an abrupt change with the end of the Cold War as Pyle does. He does not consider Nakasone’s attempt as failed, but as the start of the “strategic slicing” of the “pacifist loaf” baked by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Moreover, Samuels sees the domestic context as important as the international environment for Japan’s change towards proactivity in its foreign policy. He suggests that the departure from the Yoshida Doctrine is a strategic consensus, a “Goldilocks consensus”, which is just a transition phase, until the Yoshida doctrine can be fully abandoned. Pyle concludes that the change Japan will undergo is fundamental, not just “peripheral adjustments”, but a “comprehensive revision of the Japanese system”. He further suggests that Japan is seeking to form a new, self-generated strategy and shape its new image, but questions the ability of the new Heisei generation to do this.

Mochizuki argues that although with the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union had collapsed, there are still tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and the US-Japan alliance was maintained and strengthened. Thus, the changes in the international structure have not been as fundamental to lead to a new strategy for Japan. In Mochizuki’s opinion Japan is adapting its foreign policy to external changes and pressures, thus continuing to act as a "reactive" state. Japan is considered to be active and assertive on some foreign policy issues, such as North Korea’s abductions issue, but it is not considered to be shaping or influencing the international order. Samuels’s focus is on the threats that challenge Japan in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that Japan’s strategy will be to rely on the US for security, as well as to seize the commercial interests in the region. However, Mochizuki considers this an “updated version of the Yoshida Doctrine” and not a new strategy. He believes that no matter how significant the changes in Japan’s foreign policy may be, they do not make Japan a great military power. Moreover, he holds that Japan is likely to maintain “strong constraints on the use of military force”.

Hagström and Williamson (2009) analyse Japanese foreign security policy and the recent arguments about Japan’s “remilitarization”, focusing on the period 1989-2008. They argue that the changes in Japan’s foreign security policy are not as drastic as many scholars assert and the evidence of “remilitarization” is overall absent. Moreover, they seek to provide a general assessment by analysing three indicators of foreign policy change: normative change (e.g., change in public opinion), policy change and capability change (e.g., military procurement). Thus, it is suggested that normative change facilitates policy change, which, in turn, requires capability change. Furthermore, as most changes are considered to have been normative, the authors predict future capability changes, and although they reject the bold arguments regarding Japan’s assertiveness and proactivity, they contend that the “remilitarization thesis” should be reconsidered and discussed in the future.

Japan's foreign and security policy under the second Abe administration (2012-present) is analyzed by Christopher Hughes (2015), who argues for the dynamism of the "Abe Doctrine", a doctrine "capable of displacing the 'Yoshida Doctrine'". Hughes emphasizes that Japan's foreign policy is clearly more proactive under the "Abe Doctrine", but over the medium to long term, it is characterized as "short-sighted" and "counter-productive to Japan's national interests", likely to damage the relations in the region. The "Abe Doctrine" is finally presented as strengthening the "Resentful Realism" of Japan's foreign policy, a term which refers to its tendency of "unpredictability, obduracy and antagonism" in relation to its neighbours, as well as the United States (Hughes, 2015).

Consequently, there are various scholarly opinions regarding the factors influencing Japan’s foreign policy change in the post-Cold War era. Some scholars (realists) argue that Japan needs to take an active role in international politics in order to keep the alliance with the United States, others (liberals) emphasize international cooperation and interdependence, while still others focus on domestic politics, or on the interaction between international pressure and domestic dynamics.

#### 2.3.2.c Constructivist approaches to Japan’s foreign policy

The end of the Cold War played an important role in validating constructivist theories, which provided an explanation for the shift in the international system, focusing on ideas and identity. Constructivism challenged the realist and liberal theories of IR, which focused more on material factors and are considered to have failed to explain the end of the Cold War. This challenge was especially strong in Japanese security affairs (Katzenstein, 2008).

Scholars such as Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger have tried to open the way and underline the importance of identity and norms. Their earlier works (1993, 1996, 1998) emphasize continuity in Japan’s foreign policy-making and are considered cornerstones of constructivist scholarship. They explore the norms and political culture of post-war Japan in order to find a causal relationship between non-material factors and Japan’s foreign policy, mainly seeking to explain Japan’s reluctance in using military force.

Katzenstein and Okawara (1993) draw on insights from the fields of foreign economic policy, international political economy and comparative politics, and argue that for an analysis of foreign policy choice, domestic, and not international structures are significant. However, together with domestic structures, the normative context is also important in shaping the actors’ interests in the foreign policy-making process. The domestic structures and norms are, in turn, considered to be shaped by history, thus, the process of foreign policy-making is considered to be indirectly shaped by history. It is further argued that the normative context is the most important for analyzing how Japanese foreign policy adapts to change, more important than the specific foreign policy issue. The changes in the international system brought by the end of the Cold War are believed not to fundamentally affect Japan’s security policy. The expected change is considered incremental and is characterized by a mixture of flexibility and rigidity: flexibility in the case of economic security and rigidity in the case of military security. Moreover, Japan’s role in the international system is considered likely to be shaped by the strengthening of the US-Japan relations and a growing economic involvement in Asia.

Consistent with Katzenstein and Okawara, Berger (1993) argues that Japan is highly unlikely to become a major military power, due to its post-war culture of antimilitarism. Berger (1996) argues that “an adequate explanation of Japanese antimilitarism requires us to look beyond international structures and examine the domestic cultural-institutional context in which defence policy is made”. This culture of anti-militarism is further argued to be grounded in collective memories regarding the destructive role of the military, later seen as a dangerous institution. This view has been institutionalized in the Japanese political system and supported by the public opinion, as well as by the political and economic elites, and is now part of the Japanese identity. Berger (1993, 1996), however, asserts that the Japanese defence policy will change in response to the changing international environment, but, similar with Katzenstein and Okawara, he considers the change to be slow and incremental, and the direction to be influenced by the Japanese public and leaders. Berger (1996) also argues for Japan’s preference to ignore regional threats and its insistence regarding the exclusively non-military contributions to the international order. Berger (1998) maintains his argument regarding Japan’s reluctance to use military force, in terms of a political culture of antimilitarism, which developed over time on the domestic level. He stresses that it is highly unlikely that Japan will “aspire to the status of great military power for some time to come”. Similarly, Katzenstein (1996) argues that Japan is a peaceful trading state, obeying a central maxim “violence does not pay”, and considers that institutionalized norms shape the interests of political actors in the foreign policy-making process.

These studies with a focus on institutionalized norms and a culture of antimilitarism document the continuity in Japan’s foreign policy throughout the Cold War and after its end, up until today. However, later works of these scholars acknowledge the changes in the Japanese post-Cold War foreign policy, but the essence of their arguments prevails.

Katzenstein and Okawara (2004) take a different approach compared to their earlier works in order to explain the changes in Japanese security policy: analytical eclecticism. The use of analytical eclecticism in the analysis of security strategies of Asian States is considered to generate a more comprehensive perspective of specific outcomes that no single research tradition could provide (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004). They argue that the "explanatory sketches" generated by different research traditions can offer a better understanding of Japan’s foreign policy direction, while, in the same time, maintaining the role of norms and identity in the explanation. The testing and comparison of multiple "explanatory sketches", that research traditions generate, are considered more interesting intellectually and more relevant for policy. Their argument is, thus, in line with the trend in academia of developing more eclectic perspectives in order to offer explanations for the complex international relations, that no single research tradition is considered to offer. Moreover, the authors argue that analytical eclecticism will develop the analysis of "discursive politics", the politics of naming, which is considered to be “at the center of the domestic basis of Japan’s changing security policy”.

Berger (2007) suggests that, as Japan’s role in the world has been changing since the end of the Cold War and more since 9/11 terrorist attacks, there is a need for a new model for analyzing Japan’s foreign policy. Berger recognizes Japan as a more active player in the international system and considers many of the constraints regarding Japanese security removed. However, he argues that the use of military force in Japan continues to be limited and is likely to be limited for some time. Therefore, he develops the model of Japan as a “liberal adaptive state” in order to explain Japan’s foreign policy and its changing domestic political environment. The “adaptive state” concept considers the Japanese political system democratic, but fragmented. Moreover, policy-making is argued to be more open than in the past, fact that led to the possibility of implementing various reforms, which conducted to significant shifts in Japan’s foreign policy approach. The adaptive state model holds that Japanese foreign policy is guided by a liberal view of international politics and a “widely shared political consensus among Japanese elites and the broader public”. "Liberal" in this model implies Japan’s contribution to a progressive shift in international relations by promoting democracy and human rights, international trade, as well as establishing strong multilateral institutions. The domestic changes undergone by Japanese politics with the end of the Cold War, such as the decreasing authority of the bureaucracy, the decline in the degree of ideological polarization, and the subsequent increase in the role of the Prime Minister, led to a softening of the constraints in foreign policy-making. Moreover, the process of foreign policy-making began to open and include nongovernmental actors. Thus, Berger asserts that although the changes in the Japanese domestic context have been drastic, Japan is adapting and gradually becoming more internationally oriented and prepared to play a role in world affairs. It is further argued that the emotional factor can occasionally play a role in foreign policy-making, as the foreign policy-making process has become more open to the participation of the public.

In these later works, Katzenstein and Berger seek to explain the changes in Japan’s foreign policy by generating new approaches and models, such as analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein) and the “adaptive state” model (Berger).

Dobson (2003) highlights sources of reactivity and activity in Japan’s foreign and security policy, focusing on domestically embedded norms (anti-militarism) as well as internationally embedded norms (US bilateralism, East Asianism and UN internationalism). Thus, he argues that since the end of the Cold War, the traditional domestic norm of anti-militarism has weakened and changed, in contrast to the international norm of bilateralism, which remained and had been further strengthened. The anti-militarism norm had "mutated" in order to allow certain force acceptable to the Japanese government and society. In this respect, the role of the United Nations system is considered central, as it justifies Japan’s contribution to the international community. Therefore, the UN is presented as having a significant role in Japan’s proactivism in the area of peacekeeping, as well as in the normalization of the SDF. Unlike the norm of anti-militarism, Japan’s bilateral relation with the US is considered central to Japan’s foreign policy, having been institutionalised in the US-Japan Security Treaty and strengthened by the Revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (1997) and Japan’s support for the US after the terrorist attacks of September 2001.

### 2.3.3 Summary: Japan’s foreign policy: Cold War and post-Cold War

The literature analyzing Japan’s foreign policy during the Cold War has highlighted various factors that influenced the decision-making process. Therefore, while some scholars argue that Japan’s foreign policy was a representative case of factional politics and politicians in general, others emphasize the main role of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, different explanations of Japan’s Cold War foreign policy underline the role of the Prime Minister. In addition, the role of businesses, advisers to the Prime Minister, and even economic interest groups is acknowledged in the foreign policy-making process.

Regarding change in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy, scholarly positions are divided. Some studies support the “reactive state” thesis, holding that Japan’s foreign policy is formulated in response to outside pressure, while others consider it more assertive, and moving towards a transformation in a “normal” country. Among the scholars who argue for reactivity, some emphasize the dominant role of the bureaucracy, and others are noting that its role was being challenged and more actors were starting to participate in the foreign policy decision-making process. Scholars emphasizing proactivity, acknowledge both the pressure from the international system, as well as the domestic policy-making system, as important in driving Japan’s foreign policy. With regard to the domestic context, most studies emphasize the strengthened role of the Prime Minister and the *Kantei*, as well as the role of politicians. The bureaucracy continues to be considered powerful by some, but its role is seen as decreasing. Moreover, the support of think tanks, mass media and public opinion for a more assertive foreign policy is noted by several scholars.

Earlier constructivist approaches to Japan’s foreign policy focus on institutionalized norms and a culture of antimilitarism, thus documenting the continuity of Japan’s foreign policy throughout the Cold War until the present. On the other hand, later works acknowledge the changes in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy and seek to explain them through new approaches, such as analytical eclecticism and the “adaptive state” model. Consequently, there are various interpretations of Japan’s foreign policy during the Cold War, as well as after its end. Scholars have highlighted the role of various actors in the foreign policy-making process, along with the emphasis on continuity and reactivity or change and assertiveness in Japan’s foreign policy. However, as Mochizuki (2007) argued, Japan’s assertiveness with respect to foreign policy depends on the issue, and therefore, this chapter will further provide some scholarly accounts of Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea, as the main topic of this thesis.

### 2.3.4 Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea

As shown above, contemporary scholarship has provided persuasive interpretations of Japanese foreign policy and has contributed to a better understanding of the foreign policy-making process, as well as the role of various actors within it. However, a research area that received less attention is the role of societal actors in the Japanese foreign policy-making process. Although scholars acknowledge the importance of societal actors in the formulation of Japan’s foreign policy, and precisely toward North Korea, the focus, as well as the approaches, differ. As an example, Christopher Hughes (2006) challenges the dominant view that Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea is non-existent or responds to US pressure, and focusing on both domestic and international political concerns, argues that Japan’s North Korea policy can only be explained by focusing on domestic factors. He utilizes domestic sanctions theory in order to highlight the domestic dynamics regarding the imposition of sanctions toward North Korea, and concludes that because of aggregate domestic pressure, it is difficult for Japan to converge with the United States strategy towards North Korea. Hughes, however, focuses on “domestic political coalitions’ and their nature within the domestic context.

Japan'spolicy toward North Korea has also been explained by Lynn (2006), who focused on the role of media, especially television, in generating public perceptions on North Korea. Thus, he argues that media has shaped public opinion with regard to North Korea, which, in turn, has constricted the government’s policy choices toward North Korea. Moreover, public opinion is believed to have been maintained by conservative lobbies that have “hijacked” the abduction issue and the abductees’ families in order to help their conservative agenda. However, although the paper discusses the abduction issue and the civil society organizations lobbying for its resolution, Lynn argues against a focus on the abduction issue, considering it problematic. He asserts that all media representations about North Korea had a role in shaping the national agenda, and consequently the policy toward North Korea. Nonetheless, Professor Sugita Yoneyuki of Osaka University argues that precisely the emotions over the abductions of Japanese citizens carried out by North Korea, as well as the domestic economic conditions, created a domestic frustration, which, in turn, impeded the Japanese government to normalize relations with North Korea, as well as adopt a more active foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, Sugita (2005) holds that public opinion and “popular passions” have generated an irrational foreign policy toward North Korea.

Itō Takashi (2008) also considers the influence of the media on Japan’s foreign policy, by testing the “CNN effect” model, introduced by Piers Robinson (2002), in the Japanese context. The CNN effect refers to “a generic term for the ability of real-time communications technology, via the news media, to provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to both global and national events” (Robinson, 2002). Itō, however, is testing Robinson’s model by referring to a specific change in Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea. After the first summit between Japan and North Korea in September 2002, when Kim Jong-Il admitted the abductions of thirteen Japanese citizens by North Korea, the five abductees, still alive, returned to Japan in October 2002. Although the plan was that the abductees would go back to North Korea in approximately ten days, the Japanese government changed its policy and announced that the five would remain in Japan. Thus, Itō analyses the effect of the news media, *Asahi*, *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* newspapers, on the government’s North Korea policy, and concludes that it had an important negotiation power, in the sense that it forced the political elites to consider the public opinion formed, and thus, the public as eligible voters. However, he considers it unwise to assert the direct influence of the media in the decision-making process.

On the other hand, Kaseda Yoshinori (2010) emphasizes the international factors as principal in Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea, in his pursuit of providing an explanation for Japan’s adoption of a hard-line stance, which proved ineffective for the resolution of outstanding issues, as well as for promoting the peace in the region. Therefore, Kaseda argues that Japan’s North Korea policy has been most strongly influenced by the US policy toward North Korea. He further holds that Japan has generally pursued the same position as the United States regarding North Korea, given its ally’s economic and military importance. However, Kaseda’s work also acknowledges the role of domestic factors in Japan’s North Korea policy, especially the support of hawkish politicians, media, and businesses.

Several scholars have analysed Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea in comparison with the one of South Korea, as both countries have confronted with the same issue, the abduction of citizens by North Korea, but have responded differently (Arrington, 2007; Williams and Mobrand, 2010; Samuels, 2010). This section will further provide an overview of the arguments advanced with regard to Japan’s shift toward a more hard line policy towards North Korea, and although, the studies have a broader scope and represent comparisons between two countries, for the purpose of this thesis, I will focus on presenting the Japanese case. Thus, Arrington (2007) provides a comparison of the foreign policies of Japan and South Korea toward North Korea, focusing on the domestic context, particularly on the abduction issue, civil society groups in both countries, and their influence in the decision-making process. The paper emphasizes the changes in domestic political structures, which have modified the opportunity structure available to the civic groups, and seeks to account for the variation in influence of the civic groups in the two countries. Thus, Arrington attributes Japan’s adoption of a more hard line policy toward North Korea to a shift in the power of the executive. Consequently, the politicians became empowered to work towards their preferred policy toward North Korea, and thus supported the civic groups in their cause regarding the abduction issue.

Williams and Mobrand (2010), in a similar study, analyse the distinct policy approaches of Japan and South Korea toward North Korea, in response to an issue experienced by both: the abduction of citizens. Focusing on the explanation provided for the Japanese case, the article places emphasis on the relevance of ideology. The authors argue that the Japanese “restorationist nationalism” has shaped the country’s hard-line approach toward North Korea. They further show that the demands of the civil society groups, represented by the families of the abductees, have been seized by politicians, who connected the abduction issue with a broad nationalist agenda, and the establishment of Japan as a “normal” country. Thus, Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand conclude that the political actors are strong enough to push Japan towards containment of North Korea, and towards undermining its own national interest.

Richard Samuels (2010) also compares the cases of Japan and South Korea, two states with the same adversary, North Korea, which violated their sovereignty and kidnapped citizens of both countries, seeking to account for the different foreign policies of similar states under similar structural circumstances. Samuels argues that the hardening of Japanese foreign policy toward North Korea cannot be explained by focusing on the international system, but on the domestic context. In this respect, the study argues against the similar studies of Celeste Arrington (2007), and Brad Williams and Erik Mobrand (2010), thus against an institutional explanation, and an ideological explanation respectively, for Japan’s adoption of a more hard-line policy toward North Korea. Moreover, the case is considered “more than a story of successful and unsuccessful “mobilization” of (and “capture” by) interest groups”. Instead, Samuels relies on Jack Snyder’s (1991, cited in Samuels, 2010) explanation of the way in which “parochial interests can hijack foreign policy”, and argues that the civic groups, which mobilized to gain political support, allied with politicians, particularly with the revisionist group of politicians from the LDP, and “hijacked” Japan’s policy toward North Korea. In their pursuit, the civil society groups have been associated with nationalist activists, who favoured a more aggressive national policy. Thus, Samuels’ findings are similar with Arrington’s (2007), who found Japan’s diplomacy toward North Korea to have shifted due to the civic groups’ support from politicians, who came to dominate the bureaucracy and promote the policy they favoured. However, the pragmatist group of politicians from the LDP did not support a hard-line policy toward North Korea, but normalization of relations between the two countries, in line with the bureaucrats. Accordingly, Samuels’ argument refers to the revisionist politicians from the LDP, who gained power through elections, and not administrative reform, as Arrington (2007) argued. Samuels concludes that it was when the revisionist group from the LDP gained power that the abduction issue took over the national discourse and “hijacked” Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea.

Similarly with Samuels (2010), Vogel (2003) and Wada (2004) have previously argued that Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea has been “abducted” by the abduction issue, and by the civil society actors constantly lobbying the government, thus placing the issue on the political agenda, and making it almost impossible for anyone to have an alternative view.

The work of Hagström and Hanssen (2015) has a broader focus, of determining whether or not Japan is becoming a “normal” country, while investigating about the role of the abduction issue in such a foreign policy change. Therefore, they argue that the abduction issue is part of an ongoing identity change in Japan, from and “abnormal” to a more “normal” state. Furthermore, in this ongoing identity change, Japan is trading places with North Korea, becoming a victim, instead of former aggressor, while North Korea becomes an aggressor, instead of former victim. The emotions related to the abduction issue are believed to contribute to the internalization of the new identity and become shared by the entire community. Hagström and Hanssen (2015) conclude that the reason why Japan is prioritizing the abduction issue in its foreign policy toward North Korea is the role of the issue in the process of identity change.

All the works presented above are explanations of Japan’s foreign policy approach toward North Korea or Japan’s foreign policy behaviour, using North Korea as an example. Some studies rely on comparisons of two countries with similar adversary and international circumstances, and others focus on Japan and the Japanese identity. Nonetheless, the present research relies on comparisons over time of the same country’s foreign policy toward North Korea. The reason for such an approach is based on the fact that Japan had not always favoured a hard line approach toward North Korea, on the contrary, in the 1990s it pursued normalization of relations between the two countries. Moreover, two similar incidents, the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea close to Japan, at different moments in time (1998 and 2006), were met with different responses by the Japanese government. Furthermore, focusing on the domestic context and the civil society actors, they have not been influent from the beginning, in the foreign policy-making process toward North Korea. The present research, thus, links the two developments, the change in Japan’s diplomacy toward North Korea, and the development of the Abduction Movement in Japan, which refers to the civil society groups pressuring the government regarding the abduction issue, and seeks to provide an explanation of the circumstances in which civil society actors can influence diplomacy in Japan, and the methods they employed. It, thus, analyses both the internal characteristics of the movement, as well as the external conditions. In this respect, the theoretical approaches introduced in the following chapter are considered particularly useful.

## 2.4 SUMMARY

The aim of the present chapter was to locate the dissertation within a particular strand of scholarship on FPA and Japanese foreign policy, and assess the literature regarding the role of societal groups in the foreign policy-making process.

The chapter first discussed the field or sub-discipline of FPA referring to two groups of factors analysed by scholars in order to explain the foreign policy behaviour of states: system-level factors and state-level factors. It further pointed out that state-society relations have been addressed during this attempt, but the role of societal groups in the foreign policy-making process and especially the way in which they influence policy has been overlooked. In sum, the role of societal groups has been mainly analysed in the US context and there is little consensus with regard to what favours the success of such groups in influencing foreign policy.

Secondly, the chapter presented and assessed the most important factors that influenced Japanese foreign policy-making in the Cold War and post-Cold War period respectively, with special emphasis on the reactivity and proactivity in Japan’s post-Cold War diplomacy. Moreover, the chapter critically examined the extant literature on Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea, which constitutes the focus of the present thesis. The important points that have emerged from the review are as follows. The explanations of Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea employ both international factors and domestic factors, with most attention concentrated on the latter. Thus, domestic political coalitions, media, a change in the domestic political structures, ideology, the power of revisionist LDP politicians, and identity change have been offered as explanations for Japan’s foreign policy approach toward North Korea. The literature, nevertheless, does not sufficiently address the civil society organizations and the methods they employed in trying to advance their cause and to contribute to the state’s foreign policy toward North Korea. In short, how do they conduct their activities in order to reach their goals. The present dissertation addresses this point in question through an in-depth analysis of the civil society actors active in the North Korea policy process. The theoretical approaches that will be particularly useful for addressing the problem areas mentioned above will be introduced in the following chapter.

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# CHAPTER 3

# THEORETICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODS

## 3.1 OVERVIEW

The aim of the present chapter is to outline the theoretical approach adopted in this study and its research design.

As the main explanations for Japan's foreign policy toward North Korea have been introduced in Chapter 2, this chapter starts by presenting the main theoretical approach utilized for explaining the selected case studies, as well as the original literature that it draws ideas from, followed by a discussion of several applications of the theory towards various regions including Japan. After identifying the weaknesses of the main theoretical approach with regard to this research, the chapter proceeds toward a presentation of a second concept, which complements the explanation of the two case studies. It further justifies its applicability and highlights its contribution to the explanation.

The last section of the chapter briefly introduces the research methods utilized in gathering the data, as well as the main sources for the respective data and its analysis.

## 3.2 TWO-LEVEL GAMES: ROBERT PUTNAM (1988)

The present thesis relies on the theoretical framework of “two-level games” introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988, as it provides an important account for the connection between domestic and international factors in explaining international politics. Putnam’s theory originates in game theory, but it was modified to include domestic politics. The author himself upholds that the “two-level games” is a metaphor, and invites researchers to further develop it and derive “analytic solutions”. Putnam moves beyond foreign policy interpretations focusing on the state as a unitary actor, or domestic factors influencing international affairs and vice versa. He emphasized the role of central decision makers, not because they serve as a unitary actor representing the state, but because they are exposed to both the domestic and the international spheres and mediate between the two. Thus, Putnam’s theory seeks to integrate both spheres and provide an explanation for their interaction by focusing on the negotiations between the United States, Germany and Japan at the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978. Although other scholars, such as Walton and McKersie (1965) have recognized the interaction of the international and domestic spheres, as Putnam himself acknowledged in his paper, the main contribution of the “two-level games” framework is towards understanding that interaction simultaneously.

In order to account for the use of Putnam’s theory to explain the case studies of the present dissertation, the following points must be taken into consideration.

The "two-level games" is a theory of international negotiations, which focuses on the chief negotiator, as a mediator between the international and domestic spheres. Thus, although Putnam’s theory is a theory of international negotiations, the focus of the present research is not the way in which the domestic politics of Japan and North Korea interact, the focus is rather Japanese domestic politics and its contribution to the government’s foreign policy decisions toward North Korea. In this regard, the present study accounts simultaneously for the interaction between domestic and international factors that could influence Japan’s policy toward North Korea. Therefore, the two-level games theory is a suitable framework in order to understand the way in which foreign policy and domestic politics interact.

Subsequently, as mentioned above, the two-level games theory emphasizes the role of central decision makers, as they are exposed to both the international and domestic spheres, mediating between the two. Moreover, the theory relies on the assumption that central decision makers are not unified in their views, and are pressured by various groups at the national level, while seeking “to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures” at the international level (Putnam, 1988). Thus, the chief negotiator, who is the focus of the present theory, generally represented by the national political leader, “plays” two games, the international, with fellow leaders or diplomats, and the domestic, with various domestic actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, advisers, societal groups etc. Along these lines, the present research focuses on the way in which the choices of the Japanese chief negotiator in the international sphere had been expanded or restricted by domestic politics. Specifically, within the domestic context, the thesis focuses on the role of civil society organizations in altering the choices of the Japanese chief negotiator. Hence, this approach allows the analysis of both international and domestic factors in order to explain foreign policy choice. Moreover, the two-level games approach allows the understanding of how domestic and international factors interact in order to explain the chosen case studies. In his attempt to link the international and domestic spheres, Putnam identified the first as Level I and the latter as Level II, and introduced a linkage concept, namely the “win-set” in order to allow the chief negotiator to negotiate at both levels simultaneously. Therefore, as Karen Mingst from the University of Kentucky presented, Putnam’s theory emphasizes governmental negotiators as linkage actors, out of seven different established actors, and the win-set as linkage concept (Mingst, 1995). Other concepts proposed in order to link the international and domestic spheres through negotiations were side-payments (Mayer, 1992), issue redefinition (Friman, 1993) or Putnam’s concept of synergistic strategies further developed by Leonard Schoppa (1993) (in Mingst, 1995). Thus, Frederick Mayer suggested that the nation state consists of domestic factions with different interests, which negotiate among themselves, in the domestic sphere, on which position to support in the international sphere. Mayer’s approach, thus, different from Putnam’s, considers the division in the domestic context and emphasizes the use of “side-payments” in order to bridge this division among factions. Moreover, Richard Friman focuses on the choice of government officials or policymakers between two bargaining tactics to facilitate international cooperation, namely side-payments and issue redefinition. The first one refers to policymakers offering compensation in order to draw support for a certain issue, while the second one refers to the policymakers "redefining" a certain issue in order to draw support. In his attempt to address the second issue, Friman analysed the redefinition of economic issues as national security concerns. Lastly, Leonard Schoppa introduced two additional synergistic strategies, “participation expansion” and “alternative specification”, important in explaining policy outcomes, and discussed the circumstances in which these strategies produce positive results when utilized by a chief negotiator.

For the present research, a focus on the “government negotiators” as linkage actors and “win-sets” as linkage concept has been found comparatively useful, as the study follows the alteration of the Japanese win-set from 1998 to 2006 and how this alteration might have modified the choices of the Japanese chief negotiator internationally in order to account for the different foreign policy decision following two similar events. In this respect, Putnam argued that leaders face opportunities and difficulties in building support for international cooperation and that solutions could be found in “win-sets”, term that refers to the range of agreements at the international level (Level I) that are acceptable to a majority at the domestic level (Level II). He further argues that by analysing the international negotiations through win-sets, from the perspective of one country, it is possible to assess the impact of domestic politics on the outcome of international negotiations, which represents precisely the focus of the present study. However, the focus of the study moves away from international negotiations, to the domestic context and how it changed to expand or restrict the choices of the Japanese chief negotiator on the international level.

The "two-level games" theory emphasizes the process that occurs when the “chief negotiator" or the national leader is trying to reach an agreement at both the international (Level I) and simultaneously at the domestic level (Level II), having separate discussions with each group of constituents about the ratification of the agreement. Putnam holds that decision makers disagree about the national interest and the international context, and thus the executive is not unified in its views, a fact supported by his analysis of the 1978 Bonn Summit of the G7.

Figure 3.1 The outline of the Level II win-sets




Figure 3.1 graphically presents the three possibilities of achievable or non-achievable agreements between countries X and Y, with their respective win-sets. Thus, in example 1, (X1 – Xm) represents the win-set of country X, and (Y1 – Ym) represents the win-set of country Y. As the win-sets overlap between Y1 and Xm, any agreement between Y1 and Xm could be ratified by both countries. However, if the win-set of country Y became (Y2 – Ym), as in example 2, the agreements between Y1 and Y2 would not be achievable anymore and the range of achievable agreements would be in country Y’s favour. If, however, country Y decreased the win-set to (Y3 – Ym), as in example 3, the win-sets would not overlap and thus there will be no international agreement, according to Putnam’s terms.

As follows, the larger the win-sets, the more likely that the international agreement and conversely, the smaller the win-sets the more likely the negotiations will break down. Moreover, the relative size of the Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains at Level I. Thus, a smaller win-set at Level II can be a bargaining advantage for a country at Level I and the larger the perceived (Level II) win-set of a negotiator, the higher the possibility that the respective negotiator will be challenged by other countries. Along these lines, applied to the present case studies, the larger the Japanese win-set, the more choices for the chief negotiator on the international level, namely for the country’s policy toward North Korea, and the smaller the win-set, the fewer choices for the Japanese chief negotiator on the international level. Moreover, in order to understand the circumstances that affect the size of the win-set, Putnam proposes and analyses three sets of factors which can be helpful in predicting the outcome of international negotiations: the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents, Level II political institutions and Level I negotiators’ strategies. Therefore:

* The size of the win-sets depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents. Thus, the lower the cost of “no-agreement” to constituents, the smaller the win-set. Similarly, the more heterogeneous the conflict between constituents, the more likely that the government will reach a deal internationally. Moreover, in a multi-issue negotiation, economic interdependence is considered to multiply the opportunities for altering domestic coalitions and creating political involvement across national boundaries. Therefore, synergistic linkage – issue linkage at Level I that alters the feasible outcomes at Level II – is expected to become more frequent as interdependence increases.
* The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions. Thus, ratification procedures can affect the size of the win-set, as well as the discipline within the governing party. Strong discipline can increase the win-set by expanding the range of agreements for which the Level I negotiator can expect support. Moreover, the autonomy of central decision makers and the state strength can also affect the size of the win-set. The greater the autonomy of decision makers from their Level II constituents, the larger the win-set, and thus the more likely the international agreement. The stronger a state is, as in autonomous from domestic pressure, the weaker its bargaining position internationally.
* The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators. In order to expand the win-set and thus increase the likelihood for a Level I agreement, the Level I negotiator may use conventional side-payments and generic “good will”. Thus, the side-payments can result from unrelated domestic sources or as part of an international negotiation. With respect to generic “good will”, it is considered useful, but not a guarantor of ratification. Thus, a negotiator with high political standing at home is believed to win ratification more easily.

For a better understanding of the theoretical framework to be utilised and its application, the next section will analyse the negotiations for normalization of relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1972, through the lens of two-level games. The example is relevant for the application of the theoretical framework, as it analyses the international agreement between Japan and China through the countries’ respective win-sets, from the Japanese perspective, and allows the assessment of the impact of domestic politics on the outcome of the agreement.

### 3.2.1. The issue

Japan’s policy toward the PRC had been generally passive and inactive until 1971. US President Nixon’s announcement in the summer of 1971 of his forthcoming visit to Peking created a sense of crisis among Japanese domestic political actors and pre-empted similar Japanese efforts. However, the PRC was addressing charges at Japan for alleged militarism, which only stopped after President Nixon’s visit to Peking in February 1972. Moreover, the PRC government clearly stated that the normalization of relations would be discussed with the administration that would follow Satō.

### 3.2.2 The domestic level (Level II): actors, institutions, coalitions

The participants in negotiations on the Japanese side have been a small number of Diet members and ministry officials. Particularly significant has been the participation of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, a few individual Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and opposition party politicians and a small number of Foreign Ministry officials.

Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi took the leading roles in the negotiations, with considerable help from LDP and opposition party politicians. Tanaka was elected Prime Minister with an advanced public commitment to accomplish normalization of relations with the PRC (Fukui, 1977).

LDP politician Furui Yoshimi, a pro-China advocate, played a crucial role in the negotiations for normalization. He cooperated with Tanaka and Ōhira, and visited China multiple times, showing his commitment to the normalization of relations between the two nations. Japan Socialist Party (JSP) Chairman Sasaki Kōzō also visited China to reassure the Government of Japan’s commitment to reconciliation, and worked together with Tanaka and Ōhira for the purpose of normalization of relations between the two countries. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) politician Kasuga Ikkō led a delegation to China working toward the normalization of relations, despite division and dissatisfaction among its party members. Moreover, Clean Government Party (CGP) Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu had a significant role in the negotiations, working closely with Furui, Tanaka and Ōhira. He was personally eager for the accomplishment of the agreement, considering the normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC very important and beyond partisan politics. The Diet, however, as a group, played no role in the negotiations, due to the division between the mainstream groups in the ruling LDP and the opposition parties.

The Foreign Ministry bureaucrats had an important role in the decision-making process, working together with the politicians for reaching an agreement with the PRC about the normalization of relations. The bureaucrats did not initiate the activities toward normalization; however, they used the activities conducted by politicians, in order to compose the text of the final joint communiqué, acceptable to both sides.

Big businesses have supported the government in its policy toward the PRC. Some scholars argue that the support of the zaikai had had the largest influence on the normalization of relations with the PRC (Halliday and McCormack, 1973). However, others argue that the government had the support of many actors in the domestic arena and it is difficult to separate the support of the zaikai from that of the others, such as public opinion, mass media or opposition parties (Fukui, 1977). Nevertheless, although the interests of different sectors of the business community differed and there was an initial desire to preserve the status quo, leaders of the business community decided to work toward normalization once the diplomatic relations between the two countries were normalized. Thus, they decided to support and conform to the government’s policy (Fukui, 1977).

The significant opposition met by the leading negotiators, Tanaka and Ōhira, came from the pro-Taiwan groups within the LDP. However, the pro-Taiwan groups did not oppose the actual normalization, but the deterioration of political and economic relations with Taiwan. In order to deal with these groups and achieve intra-party consensus, the negotiators attempted to contain them in a party committee controlled by mainstream groups, as well as soften them through concessions. Therefore, their final position was that in case of normalization, the political and economic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) should not be damaged, because of the economic importance for Japan, as well as moral principles and ideological convictions.

### 3.2.3 The Japanese win-set

The Japanese win-set included recognition of the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China, recognition of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan “in principle” and “as a long term view", no abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty or the Japan-ROC Treaty, omission, for the time being, of the problem of reference to Taiwan in the 1969 Nixon-Satō Communiqué (“maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area” is “the most important factor for the security of Japan”), and no damage to the Japanese political and economic relations with Taiwan after normalization.

### 3.2.4 Level I: international negotiations

Even before Tanaka’s nomination as Prime Minister, in May 1972, the PRC expressed its eagerness to negotiate normalization between the two nations. However, during the Satō administration, the Chinese and Japanese win-sets did not overlap as Japan experienced lack of response or rejection from the PRC. The Chinese win-set was too small and included change of the Japanese administration and acceptance of the Three Principles (recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, recognition of Taiwan as part of China, and acceptance of the nullity of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty), as conditions among others. Following Tanaka’s election as a Prime Minister, preparations for the negotiations and the terms of normalization developed among individual politicians, as well as the Foreign Ministry. CGP Chairman Takeiri, who brought China’s message from May 1972 with the intention of normalization of relations without delay, did not receive an answer for the PRC from the Prime Minister and thus drafted, himself, a proposal of twenty points, which he presented to the Chinese side in July 1972. The proposal included points such as no abrogation of the US-Japan Security Treaty or the Japan-ROC Treaty, and omission, for the time being, of the problem of reference to Taiwan in the 1969 Nixon-Satō Communiqué (“maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area” is “the most important factor for the security of Japan”). Takeiri’s proposal received a counterproposal from the PRC government containing 10 points, which surprised the Japanese side with its flexibility and further acceptance of Japan’s reservations. The reservations referred to the PRC’s demands for explicit reference to the termination of war between the two countries, the abrogation of the Japan – ROC peace treaty and the suspension of economic relations with Taiwan after normalization. These points, thus, became the basis for the official negotiations, which were to take place in September 1972, during Tanaka’s trip to Peking (Fukui, 1977).

JSP Chairman Sasaki also visited Peking in July 1972 and returned with an invitation for Prime Minister Tanaka to visit the PRC for the purpose of normalization of relations. He also emphasized the PRC’s eagerness and flexibility on the terms of the negotiations.

The Chinese ten-point proposal brought back by Takeiri was analysed by the Foreign Ministry, which, together with Tanaka and Ōhira concluded a final draft by early September 1972. Having the Chinese consent for a joint communiqué instead of a full treaty, the revised Japanese text of the communiqué included 8 points, which corresponded to the Chinese proposal, but omitted reference to the abrogation of the Japan-ROC peace treaty and to the PRC’s intention to respect Japanese lives and property in Taiwan after normalization.

### 3.2.5 The international agreement

The joint communiqué issued on September 29, 1972 represented a compromise between the Japanese and the Chinese positions. Thus, regarding the first of the Three Principles advanced by the PRC, Japan recognized the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China. Regarding the second principle, the PRC stated that Taiwan was an inalienable part of its territory and Japan conveyed its respect and understanding, due to the fact that the position was consistent with the peace treaty with Taiwan. The position was based on Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which states that articles of the Cairo Declaration should be implemented. According to one article of the Cairo Declaration, Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores should be returned to the Republic of China. With respect to the third of the three principles advanced by the PRC, Japan changed its win-set from "no abrogation of the Japan-ROC peace treaty" in Takeiri’s draft proposal that he presented to the PRC in July 1972, to no mention of the peace treaty in the eight-point draft of the joint communiqué which was ready in early September 1972. The treaty was considered legal by Japan and having ended the state of war between the two countries and thus, Japan could not accept the end of the state of war being stated again in the communiqué. Therefore, the PRC also changed its win-set, and the final text of the communiqué stated the end of “the abnormal state” between the two countries instead of the end of the state of war. The preamble of the communiqué, however, mentioned the end of the state of war without reference to when it had been accomplished. Regarding Japan’s political and economic relations with Taiwan after normalization, the domestic pro-Taiwan groups’ demand was partially met, as, although the official diplomatic relations with Taiwan ended, the informal relations survived. The fact was not mentioned in the joint communiqué, but it had been accepted by the Chinese side.

Therefore, the agreement was ratified on the Japanese side due to the large win-set and the concessions offered by Tanaka and Ōhira to the pro-Taiwan groups in the LDP, the major opposition to ratification. Both sides modified their win-sets in order to overlap and reach an agreement on the international level.

## 3.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

Putnam’s "two-level games" framework has been subsequently developed by various scholars in relation to various contexts.

Several scholars from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences in Stanford, California, sought to develop Putnam’s “two-level games” theory and started a project to investigate whether Putnam’s findings could be applied to negotiations with non-Western countries or to negotiations with issues other than economic. Thus, the edited book produced, *Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, includes eleven case studies examining issues of security, economic disputes and North-South relations, which document the interaction between domestic and international politics, and further extend the use of the theory. Putnam had emphasized the fact that domestic politics could restrain the choices of a chief negotiator internationally, but did not address the questions of which are the political actors and what is their influence on the chief negotiator’s choices. Similarly with Putnam, the cases analysed in *Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* also focus on the chief negotiator, but, in addition, emphasize domestic politics and the domestic political actors, each contributor to the volume underlining a certain domestic factor as having influenced foreign policy. As an example, Richard Eichenberg determined public opinion as a domestic factor to have influenced the leaders’ international (Level I) actions in his analysis of the diplomacy of NATO’s intermediate nuclear force (INF) position (Eichenberg, 1993). Helen Milner identified four groups, including the independents, within the United States as domestic factors explaining the failure of the Anglo-American oil negotiations that took place roughly between 1943-1947. The domestic independents used their allies in the Congress to oppose the agreement, thus, leading to the loss of initial support from the international firms (Milner, 1993). Lisa Martin and Kathryn Sikkink point to four factors which led to successful negotiations between the US and Argentina, as opposed to the negotiations between the US and Guatemala, namely: 1) a small US win-set; 2) the US President’s, thus the chief negotiator’s, sympathy for the proposed strategy; 3) transnational lobbying of nongovernmental human rights organizations; and 4) a faction within the other negotiating government supporting the reduction of human rights violations in order to pursue its own political goals mingled and facilitated the agreement between the US and Argentina, allowing Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to visit the latter (Martin and Sikkink, 1993). Among others, the study of Martin and Sikkink also emphasized the importance of “transnational linkages”, specifically international human rights organizations, which provided the main information about the issue and had a considerable impact on policy (Martin and Sikkink, 1993).

The scholars who participated to the *Double-edged Diplomacy* project, however, paid less attention to the process behind the international agreement and to the fact that leaders’ aim to support an international agreement might be hindered by domestic factors, as Jeffrey Lantis (1997) observed. Lantis drew on Putnam’s and Evans *et al*.’s ideas to offer an explanation for domestic politics hindering a state’s leaders’ intentions to support international cooperation. In this regard, Lantis suggested that the “international cooperation is the product of a sequential process – not just a simultaneous alignment of domestic and international conditions”. Thus, Lantis, unlike Putnam, assumes that the chief negotiator has few or no information about the domestic political support for an issue before making the initial agreement. However, in the present research, the assumption does not apply, as both chief negotiators, in 1998 and in 2006, were completely aware of the domestic political support, more appropriately said – the lack of it – with regard to the normalization of relations with North Korea and the imposition of sanctions. As it will become clear from the political advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement, presented in Chapter 4 and 5, the civil society organizations analysed constantly advocated their opposition to normalization of relations with North Korea as well as their explicit support for economic sanctions. Furthermore, Lantis suggested that leaders build domestic support for the international agreement after the agreement and that the durability of the agreement depends on major party unity, ruling coalition consensus, symmetry of effects of foreign policy decisions, election performance and public support. Moreover, according to Lantis, the impact of these conditions on foreign policy can be established by their proximity to the ruling elite. Nevertheless, the latter arguments are not particularly applicable to the present research as the focus is not on non-governmental actors and the way they might influence the leaders in their foreign policy decisions.

In his analyses of eight cases in West Germany and the factors affecting the final decisions of West German leaders’ commitments to NATO policies and EC positions, Lantis found that major party unity and ruling coalition consensus are the domestic factors that hinder an international agreement the most (Lantis, 1997).

Putnam’s theoretical framework has been further developed by Lee Ann Patterson (1997) into a three-level analysis to explain the agricultural policy reform in the European Union. Two attempts of the European Community (EC) to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (in 1988 and in 1992) had very different outcomes, with the first attempt being a mere incremental change, and the second, a fundamental one. Patterson’s study provides an explanation for the policy shift that occurred with the implementation of the CAP reform in 1992, by examining negotiations at three levels: the domestic level, the EC level and the international level. Furthermore, the author builds on Putnam’s idea that negotiations do not take place in a linear fashion, but at all levels, and argues that, as domestic coalitions affect the Community policy, Community policy affects world markets, and world market conditions affect domestic coalitions and Community policy, the explanation of the 1992 policy shift must consider the changes that took place simultaneously at all levels. Along these lines, the study emphasized the importance of interest groups at various levels, as well as the cost of no agreement and the interactive strategy for the achievement of an agreement accepted at each level of the game.

An adapted version of the “two-level games” framework is also employed by Sarah Collinson (1999) in combination with the "issue-systems" framework, to examine the European Union (EU) as an international actor, and the policy-making and governance processes that define the EU’s external commercial and associated policies. Collinson argued that the combination had been possible, as Putnam’s model did not address the nature of the political systems within which "two-level games" could be observed, and as Putnam himself suggested that “it could be married to diverse perspectives”. It is further argued that the adaptation of the "two-level games" framework was necessary as it drew a clear line between domestic and international politics, and viewed them as two distinct spheres controlled by clearly identifiable high-status actors. However, it is considered that in the case of the EU policy system such a clear line between levels of policy-making does not exist. Thus, Collinson suggested that it is useful to consider three levels in the case of the EU negotiations and decision-making processes: level I, the international, level II, the Union level, and level III, the domestic level. In the case of the European Union, the Commission negotiates at the International level (level I) on behalf of the Union (level II), and thus on behalf of the member states (level III); however, the agreements negotiated by the Commission must be concluded by the Council of Ministers, composed by ministers and officials representing the member states. The Commission, therefore, is not considered to be above the member states, which compose the Union, and the Council’s conclusion of agreements negotiated by the Commission is considered equivalent to Putnam’s notion of “ratification”. Collinson further argued that the difference between the Council’s conclusion and Putnam’s “ratification” lied in hierarchy. While Putnam’s model involves a vertical relation between domestic and international interests, the nature of the EU as a governance system is defined by the potential for horizontal interaction between issue-systems. Thus, Collinson argues that one way to explain the constraints and facilitators between the different levels of the EU system is in terms of horizontal interaction between issue-systems.

The "two-level games" framework has also been developed in relation to the United States’ context. Avery (1996) relies on Putnam’s framework in the analysis of the negotiations leading to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), focusing on the agricultural aspects of the negotiations between the United States and Mexico, in particular on the way in which agricultural interests and strategies at the domestic and international levels influenced the negotiations. Therefore, the US domestic coalitions appear to have been divided between those in favour of the NAFTA and those against it. It is argued that the only significant division among Level II constituencies, according to Putnam’s terms, was whether a trade agreement with Mexico was better than no agreement at all. Thus, in order to reach an agreement at the international level, the US negotiators made use of side-payments to broaden their win-set for ratification. In consequence, the constituencies that have been in opposition were won over with the help of the side-payments and other concessions, fact that expanded the win-set of negotiators and created a sufficient win-set for ratification of the agreement. Along these lines, Avery’s analysis shows the suitability of Putnam’s approach in explaining the NAFTA negotiations.

Leonard Schoppa (1993) built on Putnam’s framework in connection to the Japanese context, examining how United States pressure (international variable) intertwined with internal politics (domestic variable) to open the markets in Japan. Schoppa focused on the US-Japanese talks, known as Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), which began in May 1989, when the US exerted pressure on Japan to reform some key areas of the Japanese economy that the US government identified as structural barriers to expanding US exports to Japan. The talks produced results in some areas and not in others, although they were carried out at the same time and Japanese political elites had opposed all of them (using Putnam’s terminology, they did not fall within the Japanese negotiators’ win-sets). Therefore, Schoppa argued that the explanation to why the US pressure was successful in some areas and not in others, can be found in the ability of American negotiators to change the political game inside Japan to their advantage; thus, the way in which domestic and international politics interact during international negotiations. The negotiators utilize a variety of strategies in order to shape domestic politics to their advantage. Schoppa’s analysis focuses on the conditions, which make the application of synergistic strategies possible, an aspect of Putnam’s two-level games model that is considered underdeveloped. Putnam focuses on two strategies that arguably “fail to capture the important ways in which a chief negotiator can change the domestic political game facing his counterpart” (Schoppa, 1993). Furthermore, Schoppa suggested two additional strategies in order to explain the variation in SII, and concluded that when those strategies resonate in certain ways with domestic politics (when there are groups in support of the requested policy change, not necessarily from the government) US pressure succeeds and can lead to policy changes otherwise not adopted. Schoppa’s study provides a valuable example of the utility of Putnam’s two-level game approach and also contributes to its development.

Through these developments and critiques, Putnam’s framework and its application has been applied to multiple contexts and has broadly evolved as a fundamental theory in international relations.

The two-level games approach is particularly useful for the present research as it emphasizes the interaction of the domestic and international spheres. A system-level explanation alone cannot explain the change in the Japanese government’s policy from 1998 to 2006, because despite the strategic consideration of the Japanese government to pursue an engagement policy toward North Korea, in 2006 it imposed economic sanctions on the North. Furthermore, the government’s reaction in 2006 was different from the one in 1998, after a similar event, and thus, cannot only be considered a reaction to the missile test. The engagement policy was a strategic consideration, but one no longer available due to domestic pressure in 2006. Therefore, the domestic context and the existing actors need to be analysed. However, a domestic-level explanation alone either cannot explain the change in the government’s policy and the international level must be considered, as the Government of Japan’s policy statement was in coordination with the United States and South Korea.

Putnam’s “Two-Level Games” focuses on the chief negotiator and the leaders’ strategies utilized in simultaneously managing both international and domestic factors’ effects on foreign policy. As presented above, the aim of the present research is to assess the impact of domestic politics on the Japanese government’s policy toward North Korea, in the context of international collaboration among Japan, the United States and South Korea. In this respect, this research has identified other domestic actors who participated in the foreign policy decision-making process, such as civil society groups, media, public opinion etc. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasize the ways in which these actors pursued their goals and in which they might have influenced the foreign policy-making process, alongside the leaders’ strategies emphasized by Putnam’s model. Whereas Putnam’s model did not explore the politics of the decision-making process at Level II, which is required for the Level I agreement to happen, such analysis could be useful in many respects. In this regard, the present thesis focuses on the domestic context, the consisting actors and the way they participated in the politics of the decision-making process at Level II to form the Japanese win-set. Among these domestic actors, particular attention is paid to the role of civil society groups and the ways in which they contributed to the formation of the Japanese win-set in both cases: 1998 and 2006. To this effect, the two-level games theoretical approach is complemented by the concept of "advocacy", a concept explained in the next section.

## 3.4 THE CONCEPT OF "ADVOCACY" – THE "HOW"

As previously presented in Chapter 2, the way in which societal groups influence foreign policy and the relation between societal groups and other state actors has been largely overlooked by the relevant literature (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993). Moreover, the majority of the existing studies focus on the identification of conditions that favour the success of interest groups in influencing foreign policy, or on the formation of such groups. There is, however, limited research on how such societal groups become effective in influencing foreign policy, thus on the methods they use to become effective. In this regard, the present thesis will draw on the wider social movements literature and the concept of "advocacy" to elaborate on the methods utilized by the civil society groups targeted by this thesis to advocate their cause and to contribute to the broadening or constriction of the Japanese win-sets in 1998 and 2006.

For the purpose of the present research, the concept of advocacy, defined as “the act of pleading for or against a cause, as well as supporting or recommending a position” (Hopkins 1992, cited in Jenkins, 2003), is considered to include political, social, mass media and transnational advocacy. Along these lines, civil society actors attempt to advocate their cause and influence governmental decision makers, the larger public, mass media or other states’ decision makers, thus engaging with the four advocacy concepts introduced above. Therefore, in order to highlight the methods they utilized, these four kinds of advocacy will be discussed in detail, in relation to the audiences they were directed at.

Political advocacy refers to the actors’ attempt to advance their cause and influence governmental decision makers, who are considered responsible for their suffering and injustice. The actors, therefore, pursue political goals, with outcomes considered most relevant in establishing the success or failure of the movements (Kolb, 2007). In his effort to explain the (domestic) political outcomes of social movements, more precisely which processes lead social movement activities to political change, Kolb (2007) highlighted the importance of the actors’ strategies and tactics. In this respect, strategy is defined as “the way in which a social movement pursues its political goals with certain tactics” and tactics, as the means with which goals are achieved (Kolb, 2007). The tactics utilized by societal actors to pursue their goals are divided by scholars into insider and outsider, with the first category including non-confrontational action, such as boycotts, distributing leaflets, letter-writing campaigns, petitions, press conferences, and lobbying, and the second one, sit-ins, demonstrations, marches, strikes, symbolic actions, blockades etc. (Snow *et al.*, 2004). The insider tactics are considered the ones that "attempt to exert influence within the confines of the institutionalized political system", while the outsider tactics are thought to be confrontational and are associated with protest and disruptions (Soule *et al*., 1999). However, certain tactics can be considered confrontational in some societies, while non-confrontational in others (Andrews and Caren, 2010). The use of confrontational or non-confrontational tactics can contribute to establishing political outcomes, according to Kolb (2007), however, it is difficult to establish the extent of their efficiency. It is, therefore, difficult to establish the influence of the actors’ choice of tactics on the political outcome. Furthermore, there is no consensus regarding the political effectiveness of various tactics, and the extant literature suggests that according to the case, insider or outsider tactics might prove more effective. Thus, scholars who argue for the effectiveness of insider tactics argue that the mobilization of public opinion and access to the policy process constitutes the source of power of social movements, while the ones who argue for the effectiveness of outsider tactics argue for the ability to cause institutional disruption as precisely the source of power (Kolb, 2007). In this regard, Soule *et al*. (1999) accounted for insider tactics as most effective, while others, such as Balbach *et al*. (2000, cited in Kolb, 2007) considered them entirely ineffective and argued for the success of outsider tactics. According to Giugni (1999), however, the effectiveness of outsider tactics varies in relation to the circumstances in which they are utilized, while Amenta (2005) makes a more general suggestion, that "less assertive strategies are likely to work only in the most favourable circumstances", and "more assertive strategies are likely to work in many circumstances". Along these lines, the aim of the present research is to highlight the strategies and tactics utilized by the civil society actors in order to better understand the process of advocating their cause to decision makers and the dynamics of the domestic context. Furthermore, underlining the strategies and tactics of the civil society actors contributes to understanding their role in the domestic context and in the constriction of the Japanese win-set, thus their contribution to the foreign policy decision-making process.

Social advocacy is also employed by civil society actors in their attempt to advance their cause to the larger public. The support of the public is generally targeted, however, for its use when addressing the governmental decision makers (Kolb, 2007). Although the present thesis includes an analysis of the public opinion as part of the domestic contexts of both cases under consideration, the methods utilized by the civil society actors to build public awareness and obtain the support of the public are particularly useful in highlighting their role in constricting the win-set and participating in the foreign policy-making process. Nonetheless, the fact that the public’s awareness and opinion is not only built by civil society actors’ actions is indisputable. Various methods of civil society actors’ raising awareness with the public and trying to obtain support for their cause have been identified and include: media, printed materials, mail (traditional and electronic), study meetings, lectures, seminars etc. (Kolb, 2007).

The third type of advocacy discussed by the present research, mass media advocacy, refers to the attempts of civil society actors to influence the mass media in their effort to advance their cause and contribute to policy-making. Media is an important target audience as it has an impact on both the policy makers and the public. Similarly with public opinion, the role of media will be included in the analysis of the domestic contexts of both cases considered, in relation to foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, scholars acknowledged several methods utilized by civil society actors to seek media representation, and these include demonstrations, press releases or press conferences, and the development of relationships with journalists (Rucht, 2007). Apart from various ways to make their voices heard in the traditional media, civil society actors make use of the internet as well. Tarrow (2011) pointed out that the internet represents a great opportunity for skilled civil society actors, who are able to use it effectively.

Alongside political, social and mass media advocacy, transnational advocacy refers to the civil society actors’ involvement in transnational activism, in the attempt to plead for their cause. Thus, considering the definition of "transnational civil society" provided by Florini (2000), civil society actors engage in “linkages across national borders”, in various forms, such as an international non-governmental organization (INGO) or informal coalitions of organizations and associations. Consequently, transnational advocacy refers to pleading for a cause across national borders, and according to Keck and Sikkink (1998), it is most commonly designed to change the behaviour of states. Along these lines, when governments do not respond to civil society actors’ claims, the latter seek a response outside the state and attempt to bring international pressure on the states, a model that Keck and Sikkink (1998) named the "boomerang pattern". Furthermore, the authors consider that non-state actors interact with each other, with states or with international organizations, and these interactions are structured in networks, which they refer to as "transnational advocacy networks". These networks arguably function similarly with other political groups or social movements in seeking influence, but use different strategies and tactics, as they do not hold power in its common understanding. Thus, the strategies and tactics identified as being used by transnational advocacy networks include the ability to use convenient information, the ability to use symbols to gain the support of various distant audiences, the ability to gain the support of powerful actors and compel them to stand by their advocated policies (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In addition, Rebecca Johnson (2000) recognized consumer boycotts as tactics through which civil society actors exercise significant power.

The use of convenient information refers primarily to informal methods such as telephone, e-mail, fax, newsletters, pamphlets and bulletins, which provide otherwise non-available information, and besides facts, they provide testimonies of people who have been affected in order to persuade people and encourage them to act. The ability to use symbols refers to civil society actors creating awareness and persuading their audiences by narrating and explaining certain key symbolic events in relation to the cause they advocate. Furthermore, in order to seek leverage over more powerful actors, be they governments, international institutions, or private actors, civil society actors can identify two types of leverage, material and moral. Material leverage refers to connecting an issue to something valuable such as money or goods, while moral leverage refers to publicizing the behaviour of the targeted actors, also referred to as “mobilization of shame” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Lastly, compelling powerful actors to stand by their advocated policies refers to bringing to light the contrast between rhetoric and practice (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

The concept of advocacy, in all its forms: political, social, mass media and transnational, is particularly relevant for the present thesis, that seeks to highlight the methods used by civil society groups in order to advance their claims regarding foreign policy. However, as establishing the influence of the actors’ choice of methods on foreign policy is particularly difficult, the present study aims to highlight these methods employed towards various audiences, in order to better understand the process of advocating their cause politically, socially, to the media, and transnationally, as well as how these advocacy activities altered the Japanese win-set, thus engaging with the main framework utilized by the thesis, "two-level games".

## 3.5 RESEARCH OUTLINE

The present section begins by providing an overview of the research methods utilised in gathering the data, the main sources for the respective data, as well as its analysis.

### 3.5.1 Research Methods

As previously presented in the introductory chapter, the main aim of the present study is to explore the roles played by civil society organizations in the Japanese government’s decision to adopt a coercive stance toward North Korea in 2006. In this respect, it focuses on the methods utilised by the targeted civil society actors to advance their claims and contribute to the process of foreign policy-making towards North Korea.

The actors evaluated by the two case studies for the purpose of answering the research questions are:

* The Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) or *Kazokukai*
* National Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN) or *Sukuukai*
* The Youth Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea or *Seinen no kai*

The three organizations are commonly referred to as the Rescue Movement. Along these lines, in order to collect the necessary data, the study employed qualitative research methods consisting of semi-structured interviews and examination of materials from primary and secondary sources. For the purpose of gathering the necessary data for the present research, the author was based at the University of Tsukuba from September 2014 until August 2015, sponsored by a Japan Foundation fellowship.

### 3.5.2 Data Sources

The primary sources of information on the activities of the Rescue Movement and the methods the groups employed to make their voices heard to various audiences include:

* Records of the groups’ activities since their formation until 2002, edited by Araki Kazuhiro, executive member of *Sukuukai*, and published in 2002, in a book entitled *Rachi Kyūshutsu Undō no 2000 Nichi*.
* Records of the groups’ activities since 2002 until 2006, published as reports in *Modern Korea* magazine
* Records of the groups’ activities 1999-2006, available on the Movement’s webpage
* Pamphlets, booklets, flyers, posters published by the Rescue Movement
* Publications by members or former members of the Rescue Movement:
  + Hasuike Tōru (2009) – *Rachi. Say*ū *no kakine wo koeta tatakai e*
  + Yokota Sakie (2014) – *Ai ha, akiramenai*
  + Nishioka Tsutomu (2002b) – *Rachi Kazoku to no 6 nen sens*ō*. Teki ha Nihon ni mo ita!*
  + Satō Katsumi (2002) – *Nihon gaik*ō *ha naze Ch*ō*sen Hant*ō *ni yowai no ka*
  + Hirata Ryūtarō, Eya Osamu, Shimada Yōichi, Nishioka Tsutomu, Lee Young-hwa (2005) – *Kim Jong-Il ni tadashii messeeji wo! Keizai seisai no gimon ni kotaemasu*
  + Nishioka Tsutomu (2002a) – *Kim Jong-Il ga shikaketa ‘Tainichi dai b*ō*ryaku’ rachi no shinjitsu*
* Diet records

The secondary sources of information that the present research made use of include:

* Aoki Osamu (2011) – *Rupo Rachi to hitobito*
* Tanaka Hitoshi and Tahara Sōichirō (2005) – *Kokka to Gaik*ō
* Hirasawa Katsuei (2004) – *Rachi Mondai tai Kitachōsen Gaikō no arikata wo tou*
* Funabashi Yōichi (2007) – *The Peninsula Question. A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*

The materials from primary and secondary sources were supplemented by semi-structured interviews with members of the two groups, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, politicians, ministry officials, academics and journalists. Thus, the interviewees included eleven current and former members of the Rescue Movement, including one Japanese national abducted by North Korea who returned to Japan in 2002, one member of other related civil society organization, one current and one former MOFA official, one member of the Diet from the DPJ, two journalists, one video camera operator and nine academics.

The number of interviews conducted for the present research is twenty-seven, with a majority conducted face-to face (21), five by e-mail and one by telephone. However, some informants were interviewed more than once for clarification purposes or for uncovering different information than previously disclosed.

The interviews conducted face-to face took place in the offices of the interviewees or in public places previously agreed upon. All interviews were conducted in Japanese language, with the oral consent of the interviewees. Some interviews were recorded and some were not, according to the choices of the individuals. Although there were not many objections to recording the interviews, the author observed considerable apprehension and reluctance about it from the family members of the abductees, and focus on the publicity of the issue from the other members of the Movement, and therefore did not perform it.

The potential informants were provided with information about the research project and its purpose when approaching them for conducting the interviews. Thus, at the moment of the interviews, informants were fully aware of their role and what the interview implied for the larger research. Interview notes had been recorded by the author after each interview, notes that were later analysed for the purpose of the research.

With respect to the content of the interviews and considering the sensitivity of the issue discussed, certain hesitation had been expected by the author. However, the majority of the informants proved eager to speak about their activities and goals, hoping that the present research would bring more interest in their activities and their goals, and thus give them bargaining power. In this respect, the instrumentalization of the author to a certain extent is taken into consideration, while ensuring an objective analysis of the data provided. In this direction, the present thesis will not disclose the names of the informants, but their affiliation and position.

### 3.5.3 Data Analysis

The materials from both primary and secondary sources were analysed in order to identify relevant data regarding the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement toward various audiences. The data identified as relevant was further classified and discussed according to the target audience, in political, social, media and transnational advocacy activities.

Similarly, the data gathered through interviews was analysed focusing on the activities conducted by the Movement in relation to the different audiences, as well as on the potential factors that contributed to the Rescue Movement’s influence on the foreign policy decision.

## 3.6 SUMMARY

The present chapter outlined the theoretical approach of the study and its research design. The main theoretical framework utilised to explain the case studies chosen for the present thesis is the two-level games approach introduced by Putnam in 1998, which emphasizes the interaction between domestic and international factors in explaining international politics. However, as Putnam’s approach did not examine the politics of the domestic decision-making process, which is essential for the international agreement to take place, this chapter suggested the advocacy concept to complement the main theoretical framework for the explanation of the ways in which civil society actors participated in the politics of the domestic decision-making process. Furthermore, the chapter introduced the research methods utilized in gathering the data, as well as the main sources of information that the present research made use of.

The following two chapters provide the an outline of the international and domestic contexts of both case studies analysed (1998 and 2006 missile tests), with particular focus on the domestic context and empirical findings regarding the participation of the civil society actors (the Rescue Movement) in the politics of the domestic decision-making process. Accordingly, the following chapter introduces the groups that comprise the Rescue Movement, their formation, and strategies and tactics for making their voices heard by the decision makers.

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# CHAPTER 4

# THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SCENES - 1998

## 4.1 OVERVIEW

In order to assess the impact of domestic politics, and particularly of civil society organizations on the Japanese government’s policy toward North Korea, in the context of international collaboration among Japan, the United States and South Korea, which is the aim established in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide a description of the international and domestic scenes in 1998, followed by a description of the civil society actors, as part of the domestic scene, and their advocacy activities, in the next chapter. A similar description will be provided for 2006 in chapters six and seven, with the goal of analyzing and comparing the Japanese win-sets after the 1998 missile test and after the 2006 missile test. It will determine and analyse the Japanese win-sets in each case, relying on the explanations provided by the theoretical approach in Chapter 3, in pursuance of the role and impact of civil society in Japan’s North Korea policy.

The present chapter is divided into two larger sections, which discuss the international scene and the domestic scene, with the exception of the civil society actors, which are examined in Chapter 5.

## 4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (LEVEL I)

The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new reality in international relations. The Gulf War (1990-1991), a major challenge for Japan’s foreign policy, questioned Japan’s preparedness for this new reality, and in spite of its substantial financial contribution of thirteen billion US dollars, Japan received considerable criticism from the international community. The Gulf War made Japan aware of its responsibilities and the necessity for reconsidering its position in the international community, for reviewing its overall foreign policy in terms of objectives and instruments to achieve such objectives (MOFA, 1991). In this regard, the International Peace Cooperation Law was passed in 1992, to allow the participation of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Moreover, in 1995, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), first drawn in 1976 had been revised to include a clause according to which, if situations that would impact the peace and security of Japan arose in surrounding areas, Japan could handle them according to the Constitution, by supporting UN efforts and the implementation of the Japan-US security arrangements. In 1996, Japan and the United States signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which enabled Japan to provide logistical support to US forces during joint US-Japan exercises, UN-led peacekeeping operations and international relief efforts. Moreover, in 1996, the Joint Japan-US Declaration on Security was issued, to reconfirm the significance of the Japan-US Security Treaty, while in 1997 Japan reviewed the 1978 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. According to the New Guidelines, the SDF could be dispatched overseas in an emergency, in areas surrounding Japan (Hughes, 1999). Therefore, Japan’s defence position had been developed in order to become a more "normal" actor in the international community, as well as an efficient US ally.

The following section discusses Japan’s attempt to build an amicable relationship with North Korea as part of its larger attempt of playing a more important role in the international community. Thus, when referring to "Japan", the information will regard the official position of the state in the international context, as opposed to the Japanese government, politicians etc., which will be used when referring to particular actors in the domestic context in Section 4.3.

### 4.2.1 Japan-North Korea Relations. The positions of the United States and South Korea after the 1998 missile test

This section provides an overview of Japan-North Korea relations before and after the end of the Cold War, and outlines the context and the background to the position of the United States and South Korea after the North's missile test in 1998.

After signing a treaty to normalize relations with South Korea in 1965, Japan maintained limited relations with the North, in line with the policy of the United States, ally of the South. Japan’s attitude is considered unsurprising given the importance of the attached bilateral relations with the US, as epitomized by the Japan-US Security Treaty (Kim, 1997). Although there were no diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, Japan maintained its framework for economic and cultural exchanges (MOFA, 1988).

In the early 1980s, Japan has expressed a firm attitude toward North Korea in response to terrorist acts perpetrated by the state, where following the Rangoon incident of 1983[[1]](#footnote-1) and the Sea of Japan incident of 1984[[2]](#footnote-2), it adopted several measures to restrict relations (MOFA, 1984). However, the measures were removed in January 1985, and several policies became more relaxed. Nakasone government (1982-1987), thus, promoted a flexible policy toward North Korea, considering the gradual development of relations between the two countries advantageous. It was further considered that, contrarily, in a position of isolation from the international community, North Korea’s irrational behaviour could further exacerbate (Kim, 1987).

Until the end of the Cold War, there was limited official, as well as unofficial communication between Japan and North Korea. There existed, however, a limited amount of trade, which, subsequently worsened with North Korea’s inability to pay its trade debt to Japan in the 1980s. As a result, Japan suspended its trade insurance program with North Korea in 1986, which led to the latter’s obligation to manage trade on a cash basis.

Since the end of the Cold War, as part of its attempt to play a more significant political and military role in international affairs, and especially in the Asia-Pacific region,Japan made efforts to construct more amicable relations with the DPRK. Japan had expressed its intention to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, and in the wake of Russia and China establishing relations with the South, North Korea, in need of economic assistance, accepted Japan’s policy without difficulty. Here, a short period of informal diplomacy was followed by eight rounds of government-level normalization talks with North Korea. However, this came to an end in 1992 without significant accomplishment.

The delegation led by Kanemaru Shin, former Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to North Korea in September 1990 concluded with a joint declaration, on the basis of which eight government-level talks were held between Tokyo and Pyongyang, from January 1991 to November 1992. The talks, however, were suspended without significant progress in the relations between the two countries. Moreover, the Kanemaru delegation, as well as the joint declaration adopted, were criticized in Japan and referred to as “kneeling diplomacy” (*dogeza gaikō*) (Gomi, 2010), with financial support promised to the North, but the abduction issue going unmentioned throughout the talks during the delegation’s visit.

The government-level talks (1991-1992) took into account four themes: basic problems, economic issues, international issues and other matters. Their failure was due to the opposing positions of the two countries, particularly with regard to the economic and international issues. While North Korea demanded wartime reparations as well as compensation for the forty-five years of post-war, Japan advanced that the thirty-six years of Japanese rule be settled as an issue of property rights and claims. Moreover, Japan attributed the postwar relations to the Cold War structure, not considering them the responsibility of Japan. The failure of the negotiations can also be attributed to Japan’s demands that North Korea comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear inspections, allow the *Nihonjinzuma[[3]](#footnote-3)* to visit their families in Japan, and investigate the suspected abduction cases of Japanese citizens (MOFA, 1992). During the 3rd and 8th rounds of talks, the Japanese side had mentioned the "suspected abduction" case of Lee Eun-Hee, whom, according to a North Korean agent’s confession, was a Japanese woman abducted from Japan by North Korea.

On November 29, 1987, Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 858 bound for Seoul, exploded over the territory of Myanmar. It was concluded that the incident had been caused by two North Korean agents, carrying false Japanese passports. One had committed suicide and died on the spot, while the other, Kim Hyon-Hee, had been arrested and taken to South Korea. On January 15, 1988, during a press conference held by the South Korean government, Kim Hyon-Hee confessed the details of the KAL flight bombing and Kim Il-Sung’s involvement, as well as the fact that during her training as a secret agent, she had had a Japanese trainer, called Lee Eun-Hee. The Japanese woman, who had been abducted from Japan, taught her Japanese language and customs for almost two years (1981-1983) (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).

The Japanese side’s request of information regarding Lee Eun-Hee’s case during the government-level talks with North Korea in May 1991 and November 1992 respectively had triggered the end of the normalization talks. While in 1991, North Korea considered the request an insult, denying any involvement in the case, in 1992, it suspended the normalization talks, without responding to the request of resumption from Japan (MOFA, 2002b).

Furthermore, after the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1993-1994), when North Korea refused to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities and announced withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as launched a Nodong-1 missile in May 1993, the United States was considering containment of North Korea, thus pressuring Japan in the same direction. The pressure on Japan decreased when former US President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in 1994 and assured North Korea that the United States would not seek the imposition of sanctions at the United Nations. In return, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and to start normalization talks with the United States. As a result, the two countries signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. In order to implement the Agreed Framework, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was formed by the United States, Japan and South Korea in March 1995, with the aim of providing financial support for a light-water reactor (LWR) project in North Korea, the provision of fuel oil to North Korea, as well as other objectives of the Agreed Framework (Edström, 2012).

The launch of KEDO and the Four Party Talks diplomatic initiative between the United States, China, North Korea and South Korea, provided the momentum for Japan to resume its own dialogue with North Korea. Two delegations of ruling coalition party members, led by LDP leaders Watanabe Michio and Mori Yoshirō visited Pyongyang in March 1995 and November 1997, respectively, in an attempt to resume government-level talks for the normalization of relations, talks that had been suspended since 1992.

Japan's policy toward North Korea at the time included two aspects: the revision of relations between the two countries after World War II, and the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula (MOFA, 1996).

In August 1997, representatives from North Korea and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials agreed in Beijing to resume normalization talks. However, the Japanese side emphasized the need for North Korea to address the “missing” Japanese citizens issue, as a compromise term was used instead of “abductions”. North Korea allowed *Nihonjinzuma* to visit Japan in November 1997 and January 1998 and agreed to investigate about the “missing” Japanese citizens, while Japan provided $28 million assistance through the UN World Food Program to North Korea. Nevertheless, government-level talks for the normalization of relations were not resumed, as the two parties did not agree on the bilateral issues and North Korea refused to hold talks without preconditions. Furthermore, North Korea canceled the *Nihonjinzuma* visits and declared in June 1998 that the investigation for the "missing" Japanese had ended and there was no “missing” Japanese in North Korea (Izumi, 2000).

The relations between the two countries further degenerated with North Korea’s August 1998 launch of a Taepodong-1 missile, which crossed Japan and fell into the Pacific Ocean. In response, Japan introduced a number of sanctions including the freeze on its KEDO contribution and all food aid to North Korea. Nonetheless, under pressure from the United States and South Korea, on October 21, 1998 Japan announced its resuming of contribution to KEDO, considering it “the most realistic and effective framework for preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weapons” (MOFA, 1999). In the same month, Japan announced its participation in research on joint theatre missile defence with the United States.

Both the United States and South Korea continued to support KEDO after the missile launch, convinced of its effectiveness to contain the North’s nuclear development, and pressured Japan in the same direction. Furthermore, in April 1999, Japan, the United States and South Korea agreed to establish the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in order to institutionalize the process of consultation and policy coordination among the countries.

As regards the United Nations, the Security Council had a weak response to North Korea's missile launch, solely condemning it and expressing concern through a press statement (United Nations, 2006).

## 4.3 THE DOMESTIC SCENE (LEVEL II): DOMESTIC ACTORS

In order to determine the Japanese win-set as noted above, this section will analyse several domestic actors (Level II) relevant to the case studies selected, and their position in the North Korea policy in the 1990s. It will, thus, provide information on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the National Police Agency (NPA), the Prime Minister and the *Kantei*, politicians, *Chōsen Sōren*, businesses, academia, media and public opinion. The civil society actors and their position towards the North Korea foreign policy will be introduced and examined in the following chapter.

4.3.1 *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),* as the central actor in the formulation and implementation of Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea, had pursued an engagement policy toward the North in the 1990s. However, in the beginning of the 1990s, MOFA was not able to pursue a consistent policy of engagement due to the activities of politicians who were taking the lead in normalizing relations with North Korea (Hughes, 2006).

Responsibility for the formulation of policy towards North Korea was assigned to the North East Asia Division of the Asian Affairs Bureau (reorganized in 2001 into the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau) of MOFA. In 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was partially reorganized and a Foreign Policy Bureau was created with the purpose of planning foreign policies “from wider points of view” and coordinating “the policies formulated by other bureaus” (MOFA, n.d.b).

Towards the end of the 1990s, as part of the Central Government Reform (1999), the position of Deputy Minister was introduced in order to upgrade the position of Parliamentary Vice Minister (*seimu jikan*), and thus increase the control of the Cabinet over the bureaucracy, as the actual power had belonged to the Administrative Vice Minister (*jimu jikan*) (Shinoda, 2000). The appointment of Kōmura Masahiko as *seimu jikan* (Parliamentary Vice Minister) for Foreign Affairs during the Hashimoto Cabinet (January 1996 – July 1998), followed by Machimura Nobutaka during the Obuchi Cabinet (July 1998 – April 2000) supports the institutional change as a departure from the norm of appointing junior politicians to the *seimu jikan* posts (Tanaka, 2000). Hence, the reforms introduced in the late 1990s alongside the appointment of senior, more experienced politicians within the ministry, demonstrate the intention to increase the role of politicians over MOFA to garner control over foreign policy. However, after the Kanemaru-led delegation to North Korea in September 1990, and the resulted agreement, which had been criticized back in Tokyo, the control over the North Korea policy began to shift towards MOFA. Government-level normalization talks with North Korea began at the end of January 1991 and ended in November 1992, without notable accomplishment.

MOFA maintained its engagement policy position even after North Korea had declared its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993. Foreign minister Mutō Kabun expressed this view at the 126th Diet the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee meeting from April 1993: “I don’t approve, as a foreign policy, the isolation of one country in the context of international cooperation with other states. I think it is better to avoid, as much as possible, imposing sanctions right away, for everything” (Kabun, 1993). This position was representative of the Diet and of the Government of Japan.

With the goal of resuming normalization talks between the two countries, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials met North Korean officials in Beijing, in August 1997. However, government-level talks for the normalization of relations were not resumed on the basis of disagreements over bilateral issues, North Korea refusing to hold talks without preconditions. Moreover, in June 1998, North Korea declared there was no “missing” Japanese in North Korea, prompting Vice Foreign Minister Yanai Shunji to assert that Japan would not resume talks unless North Korea provides information about the missing Japanese citizens (Lee, 2002).

After the 1998 missile test,MOFA decided to postpone the KEDO agreement, only to later consider the chance of KEDO breaking down and the high threat of North Korea resuming its nuclear development, and therefore, decide to resume contribution to KEDO, consistent with the long-term objective of the Japanese government (Sakai, 2001). In addition, according to a statement made by the Vice Minister of Transport, Kawasaki Jirō, the national government had no authority to impose sanctions in the form of limiting port entry to ships, as port entry was covered by a notification system, not a license system, and the authority to permit port entry and manage port facilities belonged to the local government (Miyamoto, 2004).

4.3.2 Whereas MOFA managed Japan’s security policy towards other states, the *National Police Agency (NPA)* had been responsible for Japan’s domestic security in the postwar period (Oros and Tatsumi, 2010). The Police Law commissions the Police to “protect people’s rights and freedom, and maintain public safety and order” within the country (The Police Law, Article 1). However, the NPA might engage in international activities in a situation that “damages, or has the risk of damaging Japanese people’s lives, physical safety or assets, and Japan’s critical national interests” (The Police Law, Article 5.6-b).

Apart from the NPA and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Japan’s domestic security is overseen by several government ministries, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutors Office, the Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA), the Defense Agency, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Although the importance of the police stands out, dealing with groups that might threaten state security poses significant difficulty. Thus, the lack of sufficient investigation about the abduction cases, allegedly coordinated by North Korea, can be connected to fear of protests and violence directed at the police, as well as terrorist attacks from *Chōsen Sōren*, the main organization of Koreans residing in Japan, which had links with North Korea (Katzenstein, 1996a). Clashes between *Chōsen Sōren* members and the police in May and June 1994, in Kyoto and Osaka, reveal the poor surveillance and information gathering work of the police (Katzenstein, 1996a). However, it shows the pressure that the government had started to put on the organization, aware of the possible risks it posed to internal security. The concern about domestic law and order increased due to the organization’s links to organized crime, as well as due to fear of conflicts between the North Korean community in Japan and Japanese right-wing organizations (Hughes, 1996). Moreover, the police had been prevented from inspecting *Chōsen Sōren* Headquarters by politicians with close links to the organization (Johnston, 2004). According to a senior government official, the major foreign policy goal of normalizing relations with North Korea partly explains Japan’s inaction regarding the abductions and the lack of a thorough investigation (interview government official).

4.3.3 *The Prime Minister,* the head of the Japanese government, and the *Kantei*[[4]](#footnote-4) had less influence in foreign policy-making in the 1990s than the present day, as the control of the policy-making system was divided between the ruling party and the bureaucracy (Shinoda, 2000). As the executive power is vested in the Cabinet, according to the Japanese Constitution, the Cabinet, not the Prime Minister, is in charge of foreign affairs and other similar functions (Tanaka, 2000). Various legal, political and organizational limitations to the power of the Prime Minister led to considerations that the role of the Prime Minister in foreign policy-making was weak in the 1990s. In theory, the Prime Minister appointed the ministers, members of the Cabinet, and with respect to the unanimity of Cabinet decisions, he could dismiss the dissenting members. However, in reality, such behaviour could have had consequences in the Diet and the Cabinet’s depending on the Diet for passing various bills. Therefore, in theory the Prime Minister possessed legal power over individual Diet members, but the respective power had not been exercised in the 1990s (Tanaka, 2000). With respect to political limitations, the example of Murayama Tomiichi of Social Democratic Party of Japan, after becoming Prime Minister in July 1994, of declaring the Self Defense Forces constitutional in order to maintain his Cabinet, is a useful example. Regarding the organization of the Cabinet, the most important position was held by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS), followed by two Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, one chosen from the bureaucracy (administrative) and one from the young politicians of the ruling party (political). The administrative deputy chief cabinet secretary was a powerful position linking the Prime Minister with the bureaucracy. During the 1990s, there had been two administrative Deputy CCS appointed, in contrast to seven Prime Ministers, thus pointing to the importance of the position and the continuity of the Japanese government, as Tanaka Akihiko (2000) emphasized. The political or parliamentary deputy chief cabinet secretary mainly supported the Prime Minister regarding relations with the ruling party. The number of political deputy chief cabinet secretaries was increased to two, one from each house of the Diet, in 1998 (Shinoda, 2000).

The Prime Minister also received support from the Cabinet Secretariat (*Naikaku Kanbō*), with its offices, the Councilor’s Office for Supporting External Affairs and the Office of Security Affairs, created in 1986, in order to provide support for foreign policy. The heads of these offices were appointed from MOFA officials and Defense Agency officials respectively, thus pointing to the Prime Minister’s activities’ coordination with those government bodies (Tanaka, 2000).

The 1990s witnessed the establishment of the first non-LDP administration in 38 years in Japan, as the LDP failed to obtain a majority in the Lower House in 1993. Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro (August 1993-April 1994) led a coalition of eight parties and parliamentary groupings, compelled to consult with the heads of the coalition partners for deciding policies. However, the new reality of the international relations after the Cold War had advanced the need for a bolder top-down policymaking (Makihara, 2013). The administration of Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō (1996-1998) was the first administration to address the need of a more powerful *Kantei* and fewer Cabinet agencies and ministries. The Basic Law for the Reform of Central Government Ministries and Agencies was passed by the Diet in March 1998 and the reforms, which included increasing political posts in the Ministries and Agencies, limiting the role of bureaucrats in Diet debates, increasing policy advice posts for the Prime Minister, and empowering the Prime Minister to propose policy guidance, went into effect in January 2001 and increased the ability of the *Kantei* to support foreign policy-making (Tanaka, 2000).

With respect to the foreign policy toward North Korea, the *Kantei*’s position was expressed through the statement of Deputy Cabinet Secretary Ishihara Nobuo, during the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1993-1994), who evaluated the United States’ pressure on the Japanese government to engage in proactive activities towards the containment of North Korea as “totally impossible” for Japan (Ishihara, 1995).

Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1994-1996), as a long-time advocate of improving relations with North Korea, supported the engagement policy and, in September 1995, announced formally his intention to normalize relations with the North (Fouse, 2004). Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who followed Murayama in 1996, continued with the proceedings towards normalizing relations with North Korea, while reassuring South Korea that Japan’s actions would not harm the dialogue between the North and the South or the four-party talks.

In April 1998, in the Diet, Prime Minister Hashimoto (January 1996-July 1998) made an appeal to North Korea to make a serious attempt to resolve the issue of ten "missing" Japanese citizens, whose kidnapping by North Korea had been suspected by the Japanese authorities. The government considered the negative North Korean response regarding the issue as “unacceptable and most regrettable” (MOFA, 1999) and expressed its intention to work towards a serious response from North Korea.

This was followed by the Obuchi Cabinet, which was formed in late July 1998, and comprised twenty-one members, representatives or councilors, with one exception, Sakaiya Taichi, Director General of the Economic Planning Agency. Prime Minister Obuchi chose the Secretary General of the LDP at the time, Nonaka Hiromu, as the CCS, and together with him and other LDP leaders began discussing strategies for strengthening the administration, as the LDP did not hold a majority in the House of Councillors. The administrative Deputy CCS position was held by Furukawa Teijirō, who was in charge of the administrative functions of the Prime Minister’s office since 1995, while Furukawa Toshitaka was appointed to the political Deputy CCS position by Prime Minister Obuchi (Funabashi, 2007).

In his policy speech to the 143rd session of the Diet, Prime Minister Obuchi referred to the foreign policy toward North Korea, stating that his administration would “seek to rectify the anomalous relations between Japan and North Korea, in a manner conducive to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and in close contact with the Republic of Korea and other countries concerned, while seeking to resolve the various outstanding issues” (MOFA, 1998b).

North Korea’s missile test from August 31, 1998, prompted both Houses of the Japanese Diet to issue a resolution condemning North Korea’s actions and the Japanese government to impose sanctions, including freezing the country’s contribution to the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and all food aid to North Korea.

Nevertheless, shortly after, in September 1998, when Prime Minister Obuchi met with US President Clinton at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, the cooperation among the two countries, as well as with South Korea, with regard to preventing North Korea’s development of nuclear capabilities, was reaffirmed. In that regard, contribution to KEDO was seen as a crucial factor for the shared efforts of Japan, the United States and South Korea, alongside other joining members (LDP, n.d.).

The strategic cooperative relationship of Japan with the United States and the Republic of Korea was particularly emphasized by the official announcement of CCS Nonaka, on October 21, 1998, regarding Japan’s resumption of cooperation to KEDO (MOFA, 1998c).

4.3.4 *Politicians'* role in foreign policy in the 1990s had been more proactive in comparison with the Cold War period. In this period, the Liberal Democratic Party played an especially important role in Japan’s policy toward North Korea through individual politicians such as Kanemaru Shin, Watanabe Michio, Mori Yoshirō, Yamasaki Taku, Katō Kōichi. The dominant camp in the LDP, in the 1980s until the middle of the 1990s, was the liberal camp, a comprehensible situation, considering the end of the Cold War. Notwithstanding, the conservative camp of the LDP, in the 1990s recognized Japan’s interest and the fact that in order to respond to the growing international expectations and acquire a bigger role internationally, Japan had to move forward, without being held back by past problems. Thus, even the strong revisionist politicians, such as Nakasone, understood that the history issues with China and Korea, which had become real issues in the 1980s, must be dealt with, and in order for Japan to have a bigger international role, its neighbors, China and Korea, needed to be satisfied. Thus, in 1993, after a governmental study that found that the Japanese imperial army forced women to work in military-run brothels during World War II, Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time, Kōno Yōhei, released a statement acknowledging that the Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the "comfort stations". Moreover, Kōno stated that the recruitment of the "comfort women" was conducted in response to the request of the military. The statement included an apology on behalf of the Japanese Government, and a call for education aimed at remembering the historical issue (MOFA, 1993).

The Kōno statement led to the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund, in 1994, to provide compensation and support to women forced into prostitution during World War II. The Fund was set by the Japanese Government and it was under the supervision of the Cabinet and MOFA (MOFA, 1995). However, there was no compensation for Chinese or North Korean women, as part of the Asian Women’s Fund. The Chinese government refused to help in establishing an authorization system for women, in the way that the South Korean government did, while, with respect to North Korea, there were no diplomatic relations established between the two countries (Wada, cited in Hogg, 2007).

Furthermore, in August 1995, the statement of the Prime Minister at the time, Murayama Tomiichi, issued following a Cabinet Decision, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, expressed remorse and apology for the damage and suffering caused by Japan to its Asian neighbors (MOFA, 1995).

In addition, in 1996, the textbooks prepared by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) for use in 1997 in junior high schools, included reference to the "comfort women".

However, in the second half of the 1990s, starting with the Hashimoto administration (1996-1998), the revisionist camp in the LDP, angry and frustrated at such a course of events taking place inside Japan, decided to get organized. Such a decision had been accompanied by a generational change in the LDP, consisting of the presence of young politicians who did not have the experience of war and wanted Japan to become more independent. One of those young politicians, opposed to the internationalist consensus, was Abe Shinzō, who first entered the Diet in 1993, thus finding himself in opposition, with LDP’s fall from power. From Abe’s point of view, the Kōno and the Murayama statements were unforgivable.

Apart from the generational change, the LDP had been pushed to the right of the political spectrum by the electoral system reform passed in 1994, hoping to transform the country’s politics from a one-party dominant system, where elections were centred on the candidate, to a competitive system, with elections centred on the party.

Consequently, there was an abrupt change in the political mood in 1997, characterized as the first year of the revisionist backlash by Professor Nakano Koichi of Sophia University. In 1997, the Japanese conservatives, until then divided, decided to change their tactics and group together. Individual conservative politicians who made offensive comments were urged to apologize and even resign their posts in the ministries. However, the respective tendency changed once the conservatives decided to gather and act as a group. Thus, in January 1997, *Tsukuru kai, "Atarashii rekishi kyoukashō wo tsukuru kai"* (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform) was launched, in order “to teach the Japanese children a history that makes them proud” (Japan Society for History Textbook Reform, nd). In February 1997, Abe Shinzō, Nakagawa Shōichi, and other young Diet members, mostly from the LDP, created the Group of Young Diet Members Concerned with Japan’s Future and History Education (*Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku wo Kangaeru Wakategiin no Kai*). The association was mainly a revisionist group, specifically reacting to the inclusion of the reference about the "comfort women" in the junior high schools textbooks since 1997, with the objective of removing it. In a book published by the group in December 1997, Abe Shinzō attributed the "comfort women" to a "prostitution culture" in Korea (*Nihon no Zento to Rekishi Kyōiku wo Kangaeru Wakategiin no Kai*, 1997). The Group of Young Diet Members Concerned with Japan’s Future and History Education started to become very active and to collaborate closely with various other organizations.

In May 1997, *Nihon Kaigi* or "Japan Conference" was formed from the alliance of a group of nationalist public intellectuals and media figures with a group comprised of various Shintō associations, new religions with revisionist views and certain mobilizing power. *Nihon Kaigi* had media support in *Sankei* group’s magazine *Seiron* and *Bungei Shunju*’s *Shokun*!.

Along these lines, the conservatives had gradually become organized and accumulated more power, a fact that can be noticed in the smaller number of resignations from ministries, despite the offensive comments.

The abduction issue, which made Japan a victim in front of North Korea, was an ideal opportunity for people such as Abe Shinzō, as it could be utilized in response to the liberalist, internationalist tendency in Japan, during the 1990s. This came as somewhat of a change in attitude among the LDP towards North Korea, as right after the end of the Cold War, the LDP initiated dialogue with the North.

In September 1990, Kanemaru Shin, former Vice President of the LDP, led a team of Diet members (13 from the LDP, 9 from the JSP) to North Korea, together with Tanabe Makoto, Vice President of the JSP, and MOFA officials. The delegation was an initiative of the Kaifu Cabinet, in order to benefit from the opportunities created by the end of the Cold War, and normalize relations with its neighbor. The agreement resulted from the talks, the Three-Party Declaration, prompted the two governments to begin negotiations for the normalization of relations, and further prompted Japan to apologize and compensate North Korea for the hardships and the losses suffered during the colonial rule and the subsequent forty-five years after World War II (Hughes, 1999). The Three Party Declaration raised concerns from the United States and South Korea over some of the conditions agreed upon by the Japanese delegation, such as the use of the financial aid or the harm that Japanese negotiations could cause to the South-North negotiations. Certain conditions of the Three Party Declaration, such as the compensation for the postwar period, were considered problematic also by the Japanese government back in Tokyo.

The control over the policy regarding North Korea, therefore, shifted from politicians to MOFA and the eight rounds of government-level normalization talks, in the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, Kanemaru’s name had been associated with a large sum of money allegedly received from the *Chōsen Sōren* (Johnston, 2004), with *Sagawa Kyūbin* scandal in 1992, and with a bribery case involving unmarked gold bars allegedly from North Korea in 1993. Kanemaru took responsibility and resigned from the LDP and from the Diet in 1992, being arrested in 1993. The fall of Kanemaru, who was the actual leader of the *Keiseikai* (the Takeshita faction), the largest faction in the LDP, triggered the division of the faction into the Ozawa group[[5]](#footnote-5) and the anti-Ozawa group, and further, the end of the LDP dominance. After the 1993 elections, the political structure changed significantly from LDP dominance to multiparty coalition politics, as briefly mentioned above. The various coalition governments formed until 2005, placed greater emphasis on multilateral strategies for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. The LDP had to cooperate with other parties and agree to a more progressive foreign policy. As the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), Sakigake, Kōmeitō, had a strong anti-military position, the foreign policies developed had been more flexible and more independent from the US (Sugita, 2005).

Another delegation organized by politicians to North Korea took place in March 1995, when former LDP Vice Prime Minister Watanabe Michio, JSP President Kubo Wataru, and Sakigake Chairman Hatoyama Yukio led a group of Diet members from the three governing coalition parties. The purpose of the delegation was to resume talks for normalization between the two countries. As the two sides agreed there were no preconditions for the resumption of the negotiations, in the following period, Japan provided North Korea with 500,000 tons of rice as well as humanitarian assistance through UN organizations.

The ruling LDP was willing to create favourable conditions for bilateral talks with North Korea, alongside the government’s position of promoting normalization of relations, as Mori Yoshirō, Chairman of the LDP Executive Council, stated in a monthly magazine in 1997 (The People’s Korea, 1997). In this regard, Mori led a LDP-SDPJ-Sakigake mission to North Korea in November 1997, which reaffirmed the agreement to resume normalization talks.

However, the North’s June 1998 report that there was no “missing” Japanese citizen in North Korea, although Japan replaced “abducted” (*rachi)* with “missing” (*yukue fumei)*, as a compromise, in order not to hold North Korea responsible for illegal abductions, prompted Mori, an advocate of normalizing relations with North Korea, to doubt North Korea’s real intentions and its position toward the normalization of relations with Japan. Obuchi Keizō (LDP), also a strong advocate of the normalization of Japan-North Korea relations was disappointed with the lack of progress in the relations between the two countries (Hughes, 1999).

Along these lines, the LDP’s position toward North Korea had been one of engagement, and although the LDP factions had been competing among themselves, the common aim was to engage North Korea and normalize the relations between the two countries. The LDP factions were competing for various interests, such as links with *Chōsen Sōren*, financial gains, agricultural interests or position in domestic politics.

However, after the 1998 missile test, when the government stopped the initiatives for normalization talks and imposed limited sanctions on North Korea, LDP politicians became less interested in utilizing their power for pursuing normalization with the North. In the persistence of the missile, abduction, and *nihonjinzuma* issues, it became politically risky and without financial benefits for politicians to support normalization of relations with North Korea. Nevertheless, certain older politicians, such as Nonaka Hiromu, were determined to continue seeking engagement of North Korea: “It is only older politicians like me who have nothing to lose by getting hurt politically that can persevere with this task” (Hughes, 1999). Nonetheless, as a Chief Cabinet Secretary and government representative, Nonaka Hiromu issued an official statement condemning North Korea’s missile launch and announcing the suspension of normalization talks, food and other support, as well as KEDO contribution, among other measures (MOFA, 1998d).

Accordingly, although the LDP had to cooperate with other parties and agree to a more progressive foreign policy since 1993, Japan’s opposition parties also compromised significantly regarding security policy. The changing security environment in Northeast Asia, as well as the public awareness of the change and perception of military threat, contributed to a gradual shift in the balance of power toward the revisionist conservatives within the LDP, as opposed to the pacifists who represented the mainstream during the Cold War (Samuels, 2007).

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP, renamed Social Democratic Party – SDP, in 1996) members had strong connections with North Korea and therefore, as a member of the coalition government in 1993, the JSP influenced the policy toward North Korea, resisting the imposition of sanctions during the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1993-1994). Besides political considerations, the JSP also had financial interests for pursuing engagement with North Korea (Hughes, 1999).

However, in the 1990s, the JSP was starting to lose support within the Japanese public and decline, due to abandonment of the party’s stated values. When the former members of the LDP, led by Ozawa Ichirō, who supported a more assertive role for Japan in international relations, failed to take charge of the government in June 1994, Murayama Tomiichi, the head of the JSP, became Prime Minister, as the JSP formed a coalition with the LDP. Thus, the decline of the JSP in the 1990s, also contributed to the gradual power shift toward the revisionists within the LDP (Samuels, 2007).

After the 1998 missile test, due to lack of political strength mainly, alongside negative public feelings against North Korea, the JSP had been constrained in promoting normalization of relations with North Korea (Hughes, 1999).

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), formed in April 1998, comprised various positions toward the North Korea policy, as it was a combination of members from various political parties initially. Kan Naoto and Hatoyama Yukio provide examples of DPJ members supporting Japan’s engagement policy toward North Korea. However, after the 1998 missile test, Kan supported Japan’s strengthening of defence against North Korea and other regional threats (Hughes, 1999).

The Japan Communist Party expressed neither a pro-containment nor a pro-engagement position toward North Korea. It, however, criticized North Korea, in its effort to have the Kim Il Sung cult accepted by the international community, including Japan, in the 1970s, and opposed the planned “southward advance” policy, which referred to a great revolutionary change in the South. The JCP further criticized the terrorist attacks of 1983 and 1984, leading to a break in relations with the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), and to North Korea’s further strengthening of relations with other political parties in Japan, such as the JSP and the *Kōmeitō* (Japan Press Weekly, 2004). In addition, the JCP criticized these parties’ so-called “liaison diplomacy” with North Korea, used for confirming North Korea’s intention in the lack of government-level talks, and condemned North Korea further for the abduction incidents, raising the issue in the Diet. In response to a JCP member’s question, a government official admitted for the first time that the cases were abduction cases, with a high possibility of involvement from North Korea, and not mere disappearances (Japan Press Weekly, 2004).

Thedomestic political context in Japan until 1998, had been dominated by politicians who preferred a policy of engagement toward North Korea, promoting normalization between the two countries. Nevertheless, after the 1998 North Korean missile test, all politicians expressed deep frustration over Japan’s inability to prevent such incidents (Togo, 2005). Some members of the LDP pressured the Obuchi Cabinet to maintain the sanctions and passed a resolution in the Lower House, in September 1998 to denounce North Korea’s missile test (Sakai, 2001). At the Diplomatic Study Committee meeting on September 7, 1998, the LDP decided to examine the amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL), as there was no legal way to impose sanctions on North Korea independently and obtaining the cooperation of the US or other countries was deemed difficult (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1998). Reasons for the support of the FEFTCL revision included providing a regulation of exports and stopping remittances to North Korea, as both Japanese products and Japanese capital could have been used for the production of weapons by the North. For equivalent reasons, there had been support for the Law to Prohibit Port Entry to Specific Ships (LPPESS) after North Korea’s 1998 missile launch. In this regard, the Council to Consider Strategic Diplomacy against North Korea was formed in February 1999, and comprised LDP and DPJ Diet members, such as Ishiba Shigeru (LDP), Abe Shinzō (LDP), Yamamoto Ichita (LDP) and Asao Keiichirō (DPJ), who promoted the amendment of FEFTCL. Although the Council arranged to submit a legislative bill on the amendment of FEFTCL in August 1999 (Yomiuri Shinbun, 1999), the government adopted a more flexible attitude toward North Korea, after the North’s release of a statement about its policy toward Japan (Miyamoto, 2006).

Regarding the national security environment, a gradual change was starting to be noticed in the balance of power between the pacifist and revisionist conservatives within the LDP. As noted above, due to a changing security environment in the region and the Japanese public’s perception of a military threat, a gradual shift toward revisionism was starting to be noticed. Moreover, the decline of the pacifist JSP contributed to the overall decline of the pragmatists and hence the rise of the revisionists.

Certain politicians from the LDP, as well as the JSP had strong connections with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, the *Chōsen Sōren.*It had been pointed out by various scholars, that the politicians, as well as the police in Japan, had covered and ignored the cash flows to North Korea, and even illegal activities, including organized crime, due to their own involvement in such activities. Confrontation with *Chōsen Sōren* might have exposed the politicians’ own abuse and misconduct to the public.

4.3.5 *The Chōsen Sōren* is a political and social organization established in 1955, and mainly includes descendants of Koreans who moved to Japan in 1930s, as part of the forceful recruitment of laborers from Korea (Morris-Suzuki, 2011). *Chōsen Sōren* represents a minority of the approximately 600,000 Koreans who remained living in Japan after Korea’s liberation in 1945, the total number of its members being estimated between 50,000 and 180,000 (Chanlett-Avery, 2003). Moreover, *Chōsen Sōren* unofficially represents the North Korean government in Japan, having 12 affiliated associations, 140 schools and one university, which promote and emphasize Korean language and culture. *Chōsen Sōren*, contrary to the pro-South Korea Korean organization in Japan, *Mindan*, holds a strong national identity with North Korea (Chanlett-Avery, 2003). In late 1950s, *Chōsen Sōren* supported the “repatriation project”, a project for the repatriation of Koreans in Japan who wished to return to North Korea, despite intense opposition from South Korea. As the Japanese government revoked the Japanese nationality of former colonial subjects in Japan, and further, foreigners were excluded from the new welfare system initiated in 1959, the conditions for Koreans living in Japan had not been particularly secure (Morris-Suzuki, 2011). Due to these tight relations between the Koreans living in Japan and the Japanese government, as well as to the historical relations between Japan and the Korean peninsula, the Japanese government had avoided taking any action with regard to *Chōsen Sōren*, in order not to be accused of violating the liberties of Koreans in Japan, or not to strain the relations with North Korea. In this respect, the Japanese government allowed the links between *Chōsen Sōren* and North Korea, in the form of cash flow, or transports between Japan and North Korea without tight inspections, as well as the tax-free diplomatic status (Chanlett-Avery, 2003).

4.3.6 With regard to *businesses*, Japanese large companies did not express much interest in North Korea, mainly for its poor record of paying its bills to foreign investors. Japanese construction companies were interested in the mineral resources of North Korea, also expressing some interest in North Korea’s Rajin-Sonbong Free Economy and Trade Zone, which started in 1991; however, due to the poor paying record, as well as lack of support from the Japanese government, large companies did not pursue any action to seek business opportunities in North Korea. Japanese medium and small-scale companies, which carried out trade with the North showed some resistance to the sanctions imposed in 1998, after the missile test (Hughes, 2006). In 1998, Japan’s trade with North Korea amounted to less than one per cent of Japan’s total external trade (Lee, 2005, cited in Mason, 2014).

4.3.7 In the 1990s, as the suspicion of North Korea developing nuclear weapons surfaced and negotiations with regard to the nuclear weapons development started between the United Stated and North Korea in 1992, *Japanese academia* generated abundant discussion regarding the way in which North Korea’s military power might influence Japan. This gave rise to the North Korea threat discourse from the 1990s. However, subsequent to the establishment of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, between North Korea and the United States, the atmosphere among academia in Japan had started to change. The number of arguments speculating the possibility of negotiations and dialogue with North Korea started to increase and gain influence among academics. Moreover, although there had been much debate about the possibility of North Korea being on the brink of collapse, after 1994 there was less discussion about it, and more debate about whether or not North Korea would abandon its nuclear development plan. In addition, the undisclosed circumstances of policy decisions, power structure and leaders of North Korea sparked further debate.

Prominent North Korea specialists active in the 1990s include Professor Izumi Hajime of Shizuoka Prefectural University, Professor Takesada Hideshi of Takushoku University, Tokyo University Professor Wada Haruki, Keio University Professor Okonogi Masao, Kokushikan University Professor Komaki Teruo, and Satō Katsumi, the head of Modern Korea Research Institute, a small think tank on Korean Studies. Satō, a former Communist and North-Korean supporter, who had been actively involved in the repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea starting in 1959, became disillusioned with Communism after visiting China during the final stages of the Cultural Revolution, and after becoming aware of the hardships the repatriates faced back in North Korea. Satō’s ideology changed and a right shift in his views and writings started to become visible. The change in Satō’s ideology is connected to a post-Cold War order where North and South Korea started to re-establish relations and unite against Japan, which they were condemning for various historical issues, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki (2009) observes. Moreover, Satō signaled Japan as suffering from an “apology disease”, criticizing public apologetic statements on behalf of the Japanese government (Morris-Suzuki, 2009). Furthermore, his publications were critical of the government’s attempts to normalize relations with North Korea, as well as of the financial aid offered by Japan, arguing that there was no necessity to normalize relations with a terrorist state. Thus, in the 1990s, various opinions about North Korea and Japan’s relations with North Korea can be observed among academics (personal communication with Professor Takesada Hideshi).

4.3.8With regard to the *media* coverage of North Korea and the abduction issue in the 1990s, the two figures below provide specific information.

Figure 4.1 Coverage of “North Korea” and "the abduction issue" in major newspapers 1990-1998

Author's original work based on Nikkei database

Figure 4.2. Coverage of “North Korea” and "the abduction issue" in major newspapers before and after the North Korean missile test (August 31, 1998)

Author's original work based on Nikkei database

Figure 4.3. Coverage of “North Korea” and "missile" in major newspapers before and after the North Korean missile test (August 31, 1998)

Author's original work based on Nikkei database

Figure 4.1 shows the media coverage of the abduction issue in relation to North Korea in five major Japanese newspapers: *Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Sankei, Nikkei,* over the period 1990-1998. As regards *Nikkei Shinbun,* only the morning edition was considered, as the content of the articles in the evening edition was most of the times similar. As it can be noticed from the figure, there was no media coverage of the issue in relation to North Korea until 1997. Moreover, there was no increase in the coverage of the issue in 1998, the year when the North Korean missile test took place. However, unsurprisingly, the most coverage was provided by the *Sankei Shinbun*, traditionally considered the most right-of-centre newspaper in Japan.

The scarcity of media coverage of the abduction issue after the August 1998 missile launch can further be noticed in Figure 4.2.

According to a quantitative as well as content analysis of the newspaper articles, however, media did report on North Korea’s missile launch, as it can be noticed from Figure 4.3, expressing considerable criticism. Furthermore, *Asahi Shinbun*, traditionally left-of-centre among Japanese newspapers, expressed straightforward criticism toward North Korea after the August 1998 missile test. Mason’s (2014) analysis of Japan’s recalibration of risk similarly points to an increase in media’s criticism toward North Korea after the 1998 missile test.

With respect to the imposition of sanctions against the North*, Sankei Shinbun* regarded sanctions such as freezing normalization talks and food aid as necessary in the future (Sankei Shinbun, 1998)

The abduction issue was not granted much attention by the media during the 1990s, as it will be noticed from the experiences of the civil society groups in the following chapter. Although initially the media showed interest in certain abduction cases, the confidence and interest was rapidly lost and the issue was started to be referred to as “*rachi giwaku*” (abduction suspicion) (interview journalist *Kyodo* *News*, interview Kazokukai members). In the beginning of the 1990s, the media showed considerable support to certain cases, such as the case of Yokota Megumi, Taguchi Yaeko, the three couples kidnapped from the Sea of Japan coast, and Arimoto Keiko. Extensive support was provided by individual reporters and journalists as well as certain newspapers, such as *Sankei Shinbun*, which contributed to making the cases known to the Japanese public for the first time.

4.3.9 As seen in Chapter 2, the relevant literature acknowledges the role of *public opinion* in Japan’s foreign policy-making process. Public opinion is determined by public attitudes. The attitudes of the Japanese public with regard to North Korea were not included in the Cabinet Office surveys about foreign policy in the 1990s. However, *Jiji* Press, a news agency established in Japan since 1945, had conducted monthly surveys across Japan, regarding the public’s liked and disliked countries, since June 1960. The sample group included 2000 persons, adults of both sexes, who were asked to choose three favourite countries, as well as three disliked countries from a list. During the 1980s, less than half of the people questioned disliked North Korea (30.6 per cent in the first half of the decade, and 38.8 per cent in the second half). However, in the 1990s, the percentage of Japanese people who disliked North Korea significantly increased, reaching 80 per cent in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear crisis 1993-1994 (Central Research Services, 1995).

According to opinion polls conducted by *Asahi Shinbun*, from a sampling group of 3000 people, randomly chosen out of the entire population, with a response rate of 76.8 per cent, 49 per cent disliked North Korea in 1995, compared to 31 per cent in 1984. Moreover, according to the same source, in 1993, only 1 per cent of the population surveyed, considered it a necessity to have good relations with North Korea, while 45 per cent stated North Korea as their principal concern with regard to foreign policy. However, in 1995, more than 50 per cent of the sampling group considered that Japan should normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea (*Asahi Shinbunsha Yoron Chōsa*, 1996).

According to public opinion polls conducted by *Yomiuri Shinbun* in November 1994, from a sampling group of 3000 people, randomly chosen out of the entire population, with a response rate of 70 per cent, 27.8 per cent considered that Japan should normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea as soon as possible, 55.5 per cent agreed with normalization, but did not recognize the need for it to develop quickly, while 6.9 per cent believed there was no need for normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea (*Nihon no yoron*, 2002).

Although public opinion polls are a tool for determining people’s opinions, and the results of the polls are not identical with public opinion, it can be concluded that the majority of the Japanese population surveyed favoured normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea in the 1990s. Moreover, the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 prompted the Japanese population to dislike North Korea and regard it as a threat to Japan.

After the 1998 missile test, the hostile public opinion towards North Korea increased and alongside it the opposition from the public to resuming Japan’s aid to KEDO (Johnston, 2004).

## 4.4 SUMMARY

The main purpose of this chapter has been to describe the state of the international situation after the end of the Cold War until North Korea’s 1998 missile launch, in connection to Japan and its relations with North Korea, as well as the domestic situation and the position of various Japanese domestic actors towards North Korea. Furthermore, the chapter aims to contribute to the understanding of the Japanese government’s decision, after the missile test from August 31, 1998, to impose sanctions against North Korea and lift them after a short period of time. In this regard, the present chapter, together with the next one, which describes the civil society actors and their advocacy activities, are instrumental in the determination of the Japanese win-set in 1998, and further in understanding Japan’s foreign policy decision.

# CHAPTER 5

# THE CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES 1997-1998

## 5.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter begins by introducing the civil society actors that constitute the focus of the present thesis and their activities before and after the formation of the civil society organizations in 1997, until North Korea’s missile test from 31 August 1998. The description will further be utilized in order to determine the Japanese win-set in 1998 and the role of these actors in its formation, and therefore, in the government’s policy toward North Korea. In the presentation of the actors’ activities, the chapter attempts to engage with the concept of advocacy and its four types introduced in Chapter 3: political, social, media, and transnational advocacy, to highlight the methods utilized by the actors in their attempt to advance their cause: the rescue of the Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. For a better understanding of the advocacy activities, the description of the domestic political context provided in the previous chapter must be summoned.

## 5.2 THE ACTORS

The civil society groups concerned with the abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s (Appendix 1), represent the focus of the present thesis, and are hereafter presented as relevant domestic actors in the analysis of Japan’s North Korea policy. Before the formation of such groups concerned with the rescue of the abducted Japanese citizens, the families of the victims had struggled to make themselves heard at the government level. Their struggle, as well as the methods they employed and the actors they interacted with, are firstly presented, followed by a description of the relevant civil society groups formed in 1997, and a further analysis of their goals, activities and strategies. The description of the families of the abductees and of the civil society groups formed in 1997, as relevant domestic actors will additionally contribute to the determination of the Japanese win-set in 1998, and further, to offering an explanation for the shift in the Japanese Government’s North Korea policy in 2006, the main objective of the present research.

### 5.2.1 The Families of the Abductees before the formation of the Rescue Movement

Since the disappearances of their family members, each family had tried to pursue various ways of rescuing the victims, appealing to the police, government officials, politicians, the public and the media. In several cases, the families received considerable assistance and support from various individuals, whether politicians, journalists, academics or government bodies. This section presents the individual struggle of the victims’ families and their interactions with other domestic actors, in an effort to highlight the emerging advocacy and the origins of the Rescue Movement. However, an analysis through the lens of the advocacy concept is not yet possible, as the families were not a completely formed organization at the time. The domestic political context presented in the previous chapter provides background information on the environment in which the interactions between the families and the policy makers took place.

Whereas some of the victims are believed to have been kidnapped precisely because they had no family, and thus not much information is available regarding their cases, there is abundant information regarding other victims’ cases and their families’ struggle for their rescue. One example of the former situation is the case of Kume Yutaka, who had admittedly been abducted by a North Korean carrying illegal residence documents in Japan, following orders to abduct an unmarried Japanese man aged 52-53. Despite the fact that evidence had been discovered, the North Korean citizen could not be arrested at the time, due to the possibility of Kume leaving Japan by his own will (*Sukuukai*, n.d.). The latter situation, when there is much information regarding the victim’s family struggle, is represented by the case of Yokota Megumi, the 13-year-old girl disappeared in 1977 from Niigata Prefecture. After Megumi’s disappearance, the family reported the case to the police, who started an investigation on the same day. The media, the local *Niigata Nippō*, and the national *Mainichi* newspaper, reported about the case. The police, as well as the media and the public aware of the case, considered the possibility of Megumi running away, and implicitly trouble and unhappiness in the family.

Although the family pursued every possible clue in order to find their daughter, the Yokotas did not have any reliable information until two decades later, in 1997. On January 21, 1997, the family learned from Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, secretary of JCP member of the Diet, Hashimoto Atsushi, that Megumi was alive in North Korea. The evidence that Hyōmoto showed the Yokota family was an article published the previous year in Modern Korea magazine based on information from South Korean intelligence agents. The article was published in October 1996, by Ishidaka Kenji, a reporter form *Asahi* Broadcasting in Osaka and told the story of a 13-year-old girl abducted from Japan to North Korea, probably in 1976 (Modern Korea, 1996).

Ishidaka became aware of the abduction issue while gathering materials about the *Nihonjinzuma,* in the summer of 1994. The materials included information about the cases of Hara Tadaaki, the three couples from Niigata, Fukui and Kagoshima prefectures, and Arimoto Keiko, as well as North Korea’s involvement in the incidents. The results of Ishidaka’s investigation were broadcast in a documentary[[6]](#footnote-6) in May 1995, by TV *Asahi*. Moreover, a book[[7]](#footnote-7) written by Ishidaka based on his investigation was published by *Asahi Shinbunsha* at the end of September 1996. Right after the publication of the book, Ishidaka had sent the manuscript to Modern Korea magazine, published by the Modern Korea Research Institute. Although he was not familiar with the magazine, he considered that the appearance of his manuscript in a specialized magazine constituted an opportunity for advertising and calling attention to North Korea’s involvement in the disappearances of Japanese citizens, and further discover new information about the issue. Therefore, Ishidaka’s article[[8]](#footnote-8) about his book appeared in *Modern Korea* in October 1996.

The story was connected to Yokota Megumi in December 1996, when Satō Katsumi, the director of the Modern Korea Research Institute, referred to Ishidaka’s article during a meeting in Niigata. The study meeting, which took place on December 14, 1996, was organized by Kojima Harunori, the owner of a small dry-goods store in Niigata city, and a former Japan Communist Party activist. Both Kojima and Satō, as members of the JCP, were involved in the repatriation of Koreans living in Japan to North Korea, which started on December 14, 1959, believing without any reservation that it was to their best interests. Subsequently, they both changed their views leaving the Communist Party and becoming concerned and deeply involved in the resolution of the abduction issue (Aoki, 2011). Thus, at the study meeting, organized in Niigata after 37 years since the beginning of the repatriation project, an officer from Niigata Prefectural Police in the audience recognized Yokota Megumi’s case.

Furthermore, in January 1997, the article written by Ishidaka Kenji, as well as a 1977 article from a local newspaper describing the disappearance of Yokota Megumi from Niigata prefecture appeared on Modern Korea’s homepage. With the help of Kurosaka Makoto, a professor at Osaka University of Economics, the information reached Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, who was investigating about abduction cases across the country, and who, in turn, contacted the Yokota family in January 1997 (e-mail correspondence Kurosaka Makoto).

Despite the fact that there were some differences between the real case and Ishidaka’s article, such as the date of the incident, 1976 instead of the real 1977, and the reference that the girl was a younger twin, instead of the older sister of younger twins, the inexact information constituted the reliability of the story, according to Yokota Shigeru, Megumi’s father, as it had been passed from people to people.

Ishidaka Kenji, visited the Yokota family on January 23, 1997, and related the story in detail. On the same day, Nishimura Shingo, member of the House of Representatives from the New Frontier Party, and one of the most right-wing politicians in Japan, submitted a document with questions regarding Yokota Megumi’s case to the Cabinet (*Kokkai*, 1997:156). Further, on January 25, Satō Katsumi’s article “The abducted girl identified” was published in the January/February issue of Modern Korea[[9]](#footnote-9).

The family was subsequently visited by journalists from Aera magazine, Newsweek and *Sankei Shinbun*, who further reported about Megumi’s abduction. The *Aera* and *Sankei* *Shinbun* articles published on February 3, 1997 included Megumi’s name, as the parents considered it would make the case more reliable and appeal more to the public (*Sankei Shinbun*, 1997). Furthermore, Shigeru believed that revealing Megumi’s name would contribute to her safety (interview Kazokukai members). On the same day, Nishimura Shingo made enquiries about Megumi’s abduction in a budget committee session of the Diet (Nishimura, 1997a). The politician referred to information provided by Kim Hyon-hee’s memoirs[[10]](#footnote-10) published in June 1995,and by the South Korean intelligence agency in 1996, without mentioning the Modern Korea article.

In response to Nishimura’s question, Prime Minister at the time, Hashimoto Ryūtarō, expressed doubt over the existence of the cases of suspected abductions carried out by North Korea, as well as the belief that the responsible authorities were pursuing the necessary investigation (Hashimoto, 1997).

Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko also refered to the “suspected” abduction cases in agreement with the Prime Minister, adding that MOFA was also contributing to the collection of information for the cases, alongside the investigating authorities. Regarding Yaeko Taguchi’s case, the Foreign Minister noted the inclusion of the case in the negotiations for normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea, and North Korea’s lack of cooperation, as well as a setback of negotiations as a consequence (Ikeda, 1997).

Nishimura presented his understanding regarding the breakup of the negotiations, but further expressed his disapproval that, despite the fact that there were no negotiations, in 1995 rice aid was provided to North Korea, a country that abducted Japanese nationals (Nishimura, 1997b). Moreover, Nishimura criticized the decision to offer half million tons of rice aid to North Korea, without mentioning the breach of sovereignty and the violation of human rights, connected to the abduction cases. LDP’s Secretary General Katō Kōichi was also the target of criticism, accused for selling his country, sacrificing the citizens of his own country, and helping North Korea, generalizing that such a politician could only be called "a traitor" (Nishimura, 1997c).

Prime Minister Hashimoto replied referring to the cases of “suspected” abductions as naturally being taken care of by the investigating authorities, with cooperation from the government, while regarding the rice aid provided by Japan to North Korea in 1995, he asserted it was considered part of an international emergency situation and an exceptional measure from a humanitarian point of view (Hashimoto, 1997b).

Other newspapers and broadcasting stations began investigating the issue as well, thus contributing to the start of the Yokota Megumi story becoming a national sensation.

The Yokota family had also met a North Korean defector, An Myong Jin, in South Korea, on March 15, 1997, who told them details about their daughter in North Korea. An Myong Jin had recognized Megumi in the publications of Aera magazine and *Sankei Shinbun*, shown to him by Takase Hitoshi, a reporter from *Nihon Denpa* News.

The Yokota family, therefore, had received the assistance and support of various individuals in uncovering information regarding their missing daughter. Accordingly, politicians, journalists, as well as academics supported them and sought to advance their cause to the government, the public and the media. As presented above, among these people there were Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, Ishidaka Kenji, Satō Katsumi, Kojima Harunori, Kurosaka Makoto, Nishimura Shingo. In this regard, these various individuals played an instrumental role in advocating the case of Yokota Megumi’s abduction to the policy makers, the media and the larger public, and in the later formation of the national association of the families of victims kidnapped by North Korea, *Kazokukai*, and its support organization, *Sukuukai* (interview Professor Osaka University of Economics, interview Kazokukai members, interview representative Sukuukai).

On the other hand, other cases received greater support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Police Agency. Such is the case of Taguchi Yaeko, disappeared in June 1978. The family reported her disappearance to the police in July 1978. Taguchi was a single mother, with two small children, working in a cabaret in Tokyo. After her disappearance, her brother, Iizuka Shigeo, and his wife, started to take care of her children, hoping for her return. However, the situation had not changed until almost a decade later, in January 1988, with Kim Hyon-Hee’s confession.

Subsequent to both Japan’s and South Korea’s announcement of Kim Hyon-Hee’s testimony, every newspaper in Japan started reporting about the case of Lee Eun-Hee. *Yomiuri Shinbun* reported about the violation of Japan’s sovereignty by North Korea, with cases such as the one of Lee Eun-Hee, while *Asahi Shinbun* speculated about the Japanese police being abducted by North Korea (*Yomiuri Shinbun*, 1988; *Asahi Shinbun*, 1988). Thus, after Kim Hyon-Hee’s confession, the National Police Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started an investigation to discover the identity of the Japanese woman abducted by North Korea. Fifteen thousand portraits, drawn based on Kim Hyon-Hee’s memories, were distributed across the country, together with the announcement that she had two small children when she had been kidnapped. Yaeko’s brother, Shigeo, considered the possibility of Lee Eun-Hee being his sister, but out of concern for her children did not announce the police. Moreover, he denied his sister resemblance with Lee Eun-Hee, when later questioned by the police. However, the police further investigated Shigeo and his family, based on new information from Kim Hyon-hee, in March 1990, and reached the conclusion that there was a high possibility that Lee Eun-Hee was Taguchi Yaeko. The National Police Agency and Saitama Police announced the conclusion in a press conference on May 15, 1991. Although, Yaeko’s name had been announced, the press were prevented from disclosing it to the public (Funabashi, 2007).

After the announcement, the media had become very interested in Taguchi Yaeko’s family, who received a considerable coverage in the following period. The media, therefore, also supported the case, raising awareness with the public. Shigeo, however, felt the media presented his sister as an accomplice to the bombing of KAL 858, forming a negative public opinion about the case. He, therefore, anonymously requested the media’s consideration with respect to his sister’s case.

During the 3rd round of government-level Normalization Talks between Japan and North Korea, held in Beijing, on May 20, 1991, the Japanese side raised the issue of investigating Lee Eun-Hee’s case. The issue prompted North Korea to accuse Japan of wanting to break the bilateral talks, as well as to claim that Kim Hyon-Hee did not exist, and that South Korea was responsible for the KAL incident (MOFA, 2002b).

Japan’s further mention of Lee Eun-Hee’s case at the 8th round of Normalization Talks, in November 1992, caused North Korea to leave the negotiation table, refusing to listen to Japan’s claims, thus leading to the suspension of the talks (MOFA, 2002b).

The case of Taguchi Yaeko, therefore, received the interest and the support of MOFA, as Taguchi had been identified as the Japanese teacher of Kim Hyon-Hee, who had been kidnapped by North Korea from Japan. In this respect, MOFA felt compelled to take action with a view to protecting a Japanese citizen (interview government official). Moreover, the results of the MOFA and NPA investigation regarding the case have triggered considerable media interest, which in turn raised the public awareness about the issue.

Similarly to the Yokota family, the families of the three young couples that disappeared in the summer of 1978 from three prefectures along the Sea of Japan coast received the help and support of individual journalists and politicians. In the cases of Chimura Yasushi and Hamamoto Fukie from Fukui prefecture, Hasuike Kaoru and Okudo Yukiko from Niigata prefecture, and Ichikawa Shuichi and Masumoto Rumiko from Kagoshima prefecture, key roles were played by Abe Masami, reporter at *Sankei Shinbun*, and Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, as in the Yokota Megumi case, who advocated the case to the public and to the politicians.

The families of the young couples have reported their disappearances to the police and searched for them constantly without any satisfactory response, however. The police claimed that there was not sufficient evidence and therefore no possibility to investigate.

In 1980, the families were contacted by Abe Masami, who was investigating the disappearances of the three couples and who wrote an article in the *Sankei Shinbun*, on January 7, discussing the similar cases of mysterious disappearances from Fukui, Niigata and Kagoshima prefectures (Abe, 1980). The article represented the first reference in the national media to the possibility of involvement of a North Korean spy organization in the disappearances of three couples from different coastal towns in Japan (Araki, 2002). It also included photos of four of the six missing persons: Chimura Yasushi and Hamamoto Fukie, and Ichikawa Shuichi and Masumoto Rumiko, as well as a note regarding an attempted kidnapping in Toyama prefecture[[11]](#footnote-11), believed to have been carried out by foreign agents. Therefore, the possibility of a connection with the disappearances of the three couples was established.

The families were also contacted by Hyōmoto Tatsukichi in early 1988. Hyōmoto started investigating the young couples’ cases, intrigued by the mysterious, sudden disappearances of several innocent persons, in July and August 1978. Moreover, the KAL flight bombing (1987) and Kim Hyon-Hee’s confession (1988) contributed to his interest and awareness of the issue (Araki, 2002).

In early 1988, Hyōmoto assured the young couples’ families of his support and effort toward the resolution of the cases. Based on the results of Hyōmoto’s investigation, the JCP representative Hashimoto Atsushi raised the abduction issue in the Diet for the first time. In the 112th Session of the Diet, on March 26, 1988, he asked a series of questions regarding the disappearance of the three couples, as well as regarding Lee Eun-Hee’s case, the attempted kidnapping from Toyama prefecture, and the case of Hara Tadaaki, revealed in 1985. In response to Hashimoto’s questions, the National Public Safety Commissioner at the time, Kajiyama Seiroku, acknowledged the strong suspicion that the three couples had been kidnapped by North Korea (Kajiyama, 1988). Despite the acknowledgement of the strong suspicion of North Korea’s involvement in the abductions, the government took no further action, and the press lost interest in the issue. An analysis of the main media outlets, *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Yomiuri, Sankei, Nikkei,* NHK news, *Jiji Tsūshin* news, *Kyōdō Tsūshin* news, shows coverage of 150 articles about “abduction” and “North Korea” from January to March 1988, while only 10 articles from April to June 1988, in the same media outlets.

As the police blamed the lack of evidence as the reason for not being able to further investigate the cases, the families had tried to bring evidence to the police. The documentation included Abe Masami’s article from January, 1980, the case of Hara Tadaaki, revealed in April 1985, the confession of Kim Hyon-Hee from January 1988, and the statement of Kajiyama Seiroku from the March 1988 Diet Session. However, the police continued to claim lack of evidence and unattainable progress. Moreover, despite the fact that the some cases clearly proved North Korea’s involvement in abducting Japanese citizens, and the involvement was acknowledged in a Diet Session, there was no action from the government and no progress regarding the issue.

Some of the families had taken steps in contacting government officials or politicians. For example the Hasuike family had sent letters to government officials, as well as to politicians, asking for help to find their son, while the Masumoto family used their connections with *Soka Gakkai*[[12]](#footnote-12) to petition a local *Kōmeitō* representative in the Diet. They all recall, however, the cold treatment received from the officials, the politicians, the public and the media. Nevertheless, the above-presented actions taken by the families of the young couples represent an emerging political advocacy trend among the victims’ families.

The emerging advocacy trend can also be noticed in the following case, of Hara Tadaaki, who was kidnapped in June 1980 by a North Korean spy. Hara’s only family, his older brother Kōichi, heard about his abduction from the TV, after Shin Kwang-soo’s arrest in 1985. The last time he had seen Tadaaki was three years before his kidnapping, when Tadaaki had asked for his support in opening a restaurant in Osaka.

After learning about the abduction, Kōichi had sent letters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and politicians to ask for help. However, he recalls the lack of replies, as well as the lack of action from the government and the police, even after Shin Kwang-soo’s 1985 arrest or his release in 1999. Moreover, although Hara’s case was discussed in a session of the Diet on March 26, 1988, there was no subsequent action.

A representative statement was made by Hara Kōichi regarding the domestic context in the 1980s, early 1990s and in the 2000s respectively. According to Kōichi, in the 1990s, Doi Takako's, Chair of the JSP, denial of North Korea’s involvement in the disappearances of Japanese nationals was common, with the situation having changed in the 2000s, when North Korea’s involvement was unanimously recognized. Such developments gave Hara Kōichi faith in the government at the time (ReACH, 2007a).

The emerging political advocacy trend among the victims’ families that is similarly emphasized by Hara Kōichi’s actions toward MOFA and politicians, is further highlighted, more actively, by the Arimoto family.

Arimoto Keiko, the third girl of the Arimoto family, left Japan on April 10, 1982, to study in London. In June 1983, Keiko informed her parents of her plans to return to Japan on August 9, 1983. However, the family later learned that Keiko had found a job and postponed her return. As they received no news from Keiko, the Arimotos had first contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of 1983, and further filed a report to the police at the beginning of 1984. However, there was no subsequent action from neither of the two (ReACH, 2007b).

After five years without any news about their daughter, the Arimotos received news about Keiko on September 6, 1988. According to a letter that the Ishioka family received, Keiko was living in Pyongyang, North Korea, together with their son, Ishioka Toru, and Matsuki Kaoru, other two Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea from Spain. The letter included Keiko’s signature, her passport number, her parents’ occupation, as well as three photographs. The circumstances of the abductions had been subsequently disclosed, through the confession of the person responsible, Yao Megumi, and further confirmed by the intelligence service of a western country investigating North Korea’s spy activity.

After receiving the news about Keiko’s survival, the family had announced the police, and started considering ways of rescuing their daughter. They appealed to politicians, first seeking the help of the Socialist Party and its leader Doi Takako. The lack of reply, led them to the ruling LDP, including the Prime Minister at the time, Takeshita Noboru (Araki, 2002).

However, the only one who offered to help the Arimoto family was Abe Shintarō, former ministerof Foreign Affairs and Secretary-General of the LDP at the time. A secretary of the politician repeatedly accompanied the Arimotos to the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They have been rejected in both places, however, as the police lacked the authority to investigate overseas cases, while MOFA first blamed the lack of diplomatic relations with North Korea, and further persuaded the family to maintain silence about the case as the opposite could endanger their daughter.

The Prime Minister’s announcement from 1989, that Japan was prepared to discuss with North Korea, raised Arimoto family’s hope of rescuing their daughter. The belief that negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations would be a favourable opportunity to discuss their case led Akihiro to send letters to the Prime Minister’s office, to Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru (Nov. 1987 – June 1989), as well as to Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki (Aug. 1989 – Nov. 1991).

In spring 1990, Akihiro had also scheduled a meeting with Tanabe Makoto, the Vice Chairman of the JSP, who was going to be part of the Kanemaru-led delegation to North Korea in September 1990, and with Ishii Hajime, member of the LDP from Akihiro’s town, at the time, and a key member of the delegation to North Korea. However, both politicians failed Arimoto Akihiro: Tanabe did not attend the scheduled meeting, while Ishii, despite the promise to include Arimoto’s case in the talks with the North Korean government, failed to keep his promise, not considering the letter sufficient evidence (ReACH, 2007b).

Although, thereafter Akihiro had protested at MOFA regarding the issue, the Kanemaru-led delegation took place as planned without reference to any abduction.

In summer 1990, an officer from the foreign affairs section of Hyōgo Prefectural Police Department showed the Arimoto family a photograph with Keiko in the lobby of the Copenhagen Airport with a North Korean spy, kept under observation by the National Public Safety Commission. Thus, although the photograph, as well as the letter from North Korea provided reasonable evidence with regard to Arimoto Keiko’s location, there was also the suspicion that Keiko was not a victim, but an accomplice of the North Korean spy, and for some, such as politicians, it was not sufficient evidence (interview Kazokukai members).

The media, however, showed significant interest in the issue. *Shukan Bunshun, Sankei, Nihon Keizai*, *Mainichi*, *Asahi* and *Yomiuri* newspapers reported for the first time about the letter from North Korea and the three abductees, on January 7, 1991.

The families of the three abductees (Arimoto, Ishioka and Matsuki) gathered in Kōbe in January 1991, in order to prepare a petition with all their signatures for MOFA, as well as to organize a press conference. They had been pursued, however, by a publisher of a left-wing publication, who had connections with the *Yodo-gō* hijackers[[13]](#footnote-13), not to make the issue public, as it will ruin Japan’s negotiations with North Korea. The families did not disclose any names or important information during the conference, as previously planned, and as a result, there was no news about the subject and all the media lost their interest (ReACH, 2007b).

Another path that the Arimoto family followed in their struggle to rescue their daughter was contacting Hashimoto Atsushi (JCP), who had discussed the abduction of three young couples in the Diet in March 1988. At that time, Arimoto Keiko’s case had not been revealed, therefore, the Arimoto family hoped that Hashimoto would bring their case up in the Diet as well. The positive reply and the event being scheduled on February 1, 1997 gave hope to the Arimoto family. However, the Diet discussion never took place, and due to its cancelation, the arrangement of Hashimoto’s secretary, Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, for the families of the three abducted couples to meet with the Arimoto family, also failed. Nonetheless, Hyōmoto used the opportunity to persuade the families to form an association and act together, in order to support each other (Araki, 2002).

The Arimoto family, thus, strengthened the emerging political advocacy trend by advancing their plea to MOFA, the political parties, starting with the socialist party and continuing with the ruling LDP, and the JCP, as well as to the acting Prime Ministers. Their actions centred on direct visits, established meetings, letters or petitions with signatures for the rescue of their daughter. The Arimotos, however, received the help and support of one individual politician, Abe Shintarō, the Secretary-General of the LDP at the time, and later, of Ishidaka Kenji, reporter at *Asahi* TV Osaka. Moreover, besides political advocacy, this case provides an example of emerging social and media advocacy as well.

Searching for other ways to appeal to the media and the public, Arimoto Akihiro made hundreds of copies of the articles about the abductions that appeared in newspapers and magazines in January 1991, as well as one article published in 1994, that included a photograph of Ishioka Toru, the Japanese who sent the letter from North Korea, with two *Yodo-gō* wives. He sent letters to the media, together with all the copies, asking for support in order to appeal to the government for confirming and taking steps in solving the abductions. However, all the media disregarded his attempt (interview *Sukuukai* member).

The following year, 1995, in January, Akihiro was contacted by Ishidaka Kenji, who had seen one of Akihiro’s letters sent to the reporters’ club in the police department, and encouraged to contact MOFA again. Ishidaka Kenji was writing a documentary about North Korea at the time, and, while collecting data, he met a North Korean defector An Myong Jin, who defected in 1993 to South Korea. During this investigation, Ishidaka learned from An Myong Jin, who had been trained as a spy in North Korea, that the school had Japanese language trainers kidnapped from Japan. Changing the focus of the interviews to the abductions, Ishidaka, uncovered details about numerous abductees. His reports faced criticism, as MOFA was attempting to resume negotiations for normalization talks in North Korea, and feared the issue might be hindering the attempt. On that account, in March 1995 the Arimotos petitioned MOFA and held a press conference with the aim of advancing their rescue claim to the government. However, *Sankei Shinbun* and a local newspaper were the only media outlets to have written about the abductions.

Thus, the emerging social and media advocacy actions were concentrated on sending letters to the various news media, press conferences and petitions with signatures. The family also sent an allegation of violation of human rights through Osaka Bar Association, to the Human Rights Protection Committee of Japan Federation of Bar Association. Although they were promised investigation into the issue, there was no subsequent activity or result. However, when Akihiro threatened to contact the media about their lack of action, the Human Rights Protection Committee suddenly showed interest in the issue and helped the family write a proposal letter to the government.

Along these lines, the Arimoto case includes three types of emerging advocacy: political, social and media, which had further been consolidated by the formation of the families’ association.

This section had shown the determined effort of the families of the victims, since the disappearances occurred until 1997, when the Rescue Movement was formed. It presented their struggle to appeal to government officials, politicians, as well as media, highlighting the emerging theme of advocacy, and also the support they received for their cause from various sources. Therefore, the emerging political advocacy can be observed in the majority of the cases, in the form of letters or petitions to MOFA and politicians, as well as direct visits and meetings with policy makers, in the effort to support their cause. Moreover, there can also be noted the emerging social and media advocacy, centred around letters to the media and press conferences organized by the families.

Certain families, however, received assistance and support in discovering the truth about the abductions from various individuals, whether politicians, journalists or academics, who further provided them with support and advocated their cause. In this regard, instrumental roles were played by Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, Ishidaka Kenji, Abe Masami, Satō Katsumi, Kojima Harunori, Nishimura Shingo, Kurosaka Makoto and Abe Shintarō. Such individuals have advocated the abduction issue to the politicians, as well as to the media and the larger public. Besides this, certain cases received substantial interest from MOFA and the NPA, as well as the media, who contributed to raising the awareness of the public.

### 5.2.2 The Rescue Movement: Organization, goals, strategies

The purpose of this section is to introduce the relevant civil society organizations involved in the abduction issue and thus, in Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea, focusing on their emergence as well as aims. It further addresses the way in which these actors advocated their cause to various audiences, and how they related to different groups in the society. Thus, their activities, tactics and strategies will be outlined, as well as the opportunities and constraints they encountered in achieving their goals.

#### 5.2.2.1 The Civil Society Organizations. Emergence. Aims

For the purpose of this thesis, the three civil society groups, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* constitute the Japanese Rescue Movement. *Seinen no kai*, established later, in August 1999, is also considered to be part of the Japanese Rescue Movement as its members joined the activities organized by *Kazokukai and Sukuukai*.

*Chōsakai,* is considered here as a group collaborating with the Rescue Movement, but not part of the main movement, as it was formed later, in December 2002, and its aim was slightly different than the main aim of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, namely to investigate the disappearances and suspected abductions of numerous Japanese citizens, whose cases became doubtful after Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgement in 2002.

The other two groups established by politicians, *Rachi Giren* and *Chihō Giin no kai*, will be referred to separately, as groups that offered support and cooperated with the Rescue Movement. Albeit they contributed to the activities of the Rescue Movement, the two groups comprised politicians, members of the Diet or the local government, thus, being positioned outside the civil society sphere.

#### 5.2.2.2 Kazokukai

Literally the “Families’ Association”, the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN), known in Japanese as *Kazokukai* for short, was formed on March 25, 1997, when the families of the abduction victims met for the first time in the conference room of a hotel in Tokyo.

With advice from Hyōmoto Tatsukichi and Ishidaka Kenji, both introduced above, the Yokota couple, Shigeru and Sakie, had contacted other families in situations similar with theirs, in order to act together for the rescue of their children. Considering the advice of Hyōmoto, that their cause was difficult to pursue individually, the Yokotas contacted the families of the three couples abducted from the coast of Japan: Hasuike and Okudo families from Niigata prefecture, Chimura and Hamamoto families from Fukui prefecture, Ichikawa and Masumoto families from Kagoshima prefecture, and Arimoto family from Hyōgo prefecture, and together they formed a liaison group of all the families of the abductees in order to appeal to the government and the public. The representative of the group was chosen Yokota Shigeru, father of kidnapped Yokota Megumi. The location of the first meeting was arranged by Ishidaka Kenji, producer at *Asahi* Broadcasting in Tokyo, at the time (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.2.2.3 Sukuukai

While *Kazokukai* was being organized in Tokyo, Kojima Harunori, a former Japan Communist Party (JCP) activist, and a central figure of the *Association for collaboration on the repatriation of Koreans in Japan*, who later changed his views and left the Communist Party and the association, launched a rescue movement for Yokota Megumi in Niigata, establishing a support group, called *The Association for the Promotion of the Rescue and Investigation of the Abduction of Yokota Megumi*.

Kojima had been an activist with vast knowledge about the formation of a movement and campaigning for a certain cause. Moreover, he was aware of the situation in North Korea and felt remorse for participating in the repatriation movement in the 1950s and 1960s, together with his old friend, Satō Katsumi. Therefore, as a means of promoting the cause of the Yokota family, Kojima organized a support group in Niigata, with the consent of the Yokota couple.

Shortly, similar groups were organized all across Japan, and as the *Association for the Promotion of the Rescue of Yokota Megumi* started in Niigata by Kojima was spreading across the country, the formation of a support group in the capital was considered essential. Kojima, an experienced activist, considered the political and social circumstances of the time, and acknowledged the need for a support group located in Tokyo. Without such support, he regarded it difficult for the victims’ families to make an appeal to the national government and the wider public. Therefore, on August 2, 1997, a gathering of the supporters of the rescue of the abductees was held in Tokyo as a preparation meeting for the formation of a support group in the Kantō region. The participants included the Yokota, Hasuike, Masumoto and Arimoto families, the acting representative of *Rachi Giren*, Nagano Shigedo, the President of the *Association for the Promotion of the Rescue and Investigation of the Abduction of Yokota Megumi*, Kojima Harunori, organizer of the *Association for the Rescue of Abducted Japanese in Kansai*, Kurosaka Makoto, professor at Osaka University of Economics, and the head of Modern Korea Institute, Satō Katsumi. The supporters expressed their sympathy to the families of the victims and presented the state of events regarding the abduction issue. Furthermore, a preparatory committee, that would make arrangements regarding the process and the content of the activities of the support group to be formed, was decided. Satō Katsumi, lawyer Miyoshi Katsuya and Manabe Sadaki from Kodaira city council were elected in the preparatory committee.

The support group in the Kantō region, the *Association for the Rescue of Japanese Abducted by North Korea*, was officially established on October 4, 1997, located in Tokyo and having Satō Katsumi as Chairman. The aim of the association, as presented in the proclamation of formation from October 4, was to conduct actions in order to save the Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, and restore Japan’s dignity. The abductions were presented as unacceptable acts, which greatly violated Japan’s sovereignty as well as human rights. Moreover, with regard to the resources of the association, the costs were covered through fundraising and donations and no annual fee was collected. The accounting reports were public and displayed on the homepage of the group.

Similar associations had been organized in Hokkaido, Kyushu and Chugoku regions. Satō Katsumi, Chairman of the Kantō Rescue Association participated in all the local formation meetings, lecturing about the purpose of the movement and the planned activities.

In April 1998, the rescue associations from all over the country gathered in Tokyo, to form a *National Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea,* NARKN (*Kitachosen ni rachi sareta nihonjin wo kyūshutsu suru tame no zenkoku kyōgikai*). The roles of representatives of the NARKN were fulfilled by Satō Katsumi, Chairman of *Sukuukai* Kantō and Kojima Harunori, Chairman of the *Association for the Promotion of the Rescue of Yokota Megumi*, Niigata. In reality, this Nationwide Association came to be represented by the support group established in Tokyo, hereafter generally referred to as *Sukuukai*. The relationship between *Sukuukai* and the other local rescue associations formed across Japan is not a hierarchical one, the local branches being able to govern themselves as independent bodies. However, they meet once or twice a year at an executives’ meeting hosted by *Sukuukai* in order to coordinate the policy for reaching their common aim of rescuing the victims and supporting the victims’ families in their pursuit (Aoki, 2011).

*Sukuukai* had the office inside Modern Korea Institute, in Tokyo, and the executive staff of the Modern Korea Institute were in charge of its management.

The Modern Korea Research Institute originated in the *Japan Korea Research Institute* established in November 1961, by Terao Gorō, a historian and a dedicated member of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), significantly engaged in friendly activities between Japan and China and North Korea respectively, as well as in activities against the US-Japan Security Treaty, in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1961, Terao established the *Japan Korea Research Institute*, where he welcomed Furuya Sadao, member of the House of Representatives from the Socialist Party, and lawyer, part of an independent legal group, who was supporting movements of workers and farmers across the country. Therefore, the *Japan Korea Research Institute* was originally a leftwing, united front group of the Communist and Socialist parties. The magazine published by the Institute, *Chōsen Kenkyū,* became the space for debates against the promoted agreement between Japan and South Korea, as well as for communicating information about the surprising developing speed of North Korea, and about the repatriation movement. The repatriation of Koreans lasted for 25 years (1959-1984), during which period 187 ships with 93,340 people crossed the Sea of Japan towards North Korea. The peak period is considered to have been 1960-1961, when 70 per cent of the Korean population in Japan returned to North Korea (Aoki, 2011).

Satō became friends with Terao while supporting the repatriation project in Niigata, as a member of the Japan Communist Party, as well as a member and the head of the secretariat of the *Japan-North Korea association*, an NGO that aimed for the friendship between Japan and North Korea. After the peak of the repatriation project had passed, in November 1964, Satō had moved to Tokyo, and since 1965, had started working as the head of the secretariat of the Japan Korea Research Institute, led by Terao. Satō had been dismissed from the JCP after joining Japan Korea Research Institute, due to his identification as Terao Gorō’s disciple, who belonged to the “Chinese faction” of the JCP. The two factions of the JCP at the time, the Soviet faction and the Chinese faction, were confronting with respect to their ideology. The Chinese faction, to which Terao belonged, had supported the Cultural Revolution developing in China. However, the JCP opposed the Revolution and broke off relations with the Chinese Communist Party, consequently, dismissing both Terao and Satō from the party.

Influenced by the respective events, the Japan Korea Research Institute scaled down due to various confrontations among members, and around 1970, Satō became the central figure in the management of the institute. At the time, he was significantly engaged in the problems of discrimination against South and North Koreans in Japan. However, around the mid-1970s, Satō’s ideological position shifted from the very left to the very right of the political spectrum. He motivates his change with becoming aware of the fact that Communism and Socialism had no future. He also mentioned his past involvement in the repatriation project, which had become a trauma, after the real circumstances in North Korea had been revealed. His beliefs and thoughts are expressed in the book “The nuclear strategy of oppressed North Korea – the logic of the world’s poorest strong country” [*Kitachōsen han no kaku senryaku: Sekaiichi mazushii kyōkoku no ronri*] published in 1993, by Kobunsha.

The Japan Korea Research Institute was renamed "Modern Korea Research Institute” in April 1984, with Satō as its leader. Modern Korea Research Institute was, however, no more than a civil private organization, not controlled nor protected by law (Aoki, 2011). The organization’s bulletin was also renamed “Modern Korea”, in which Satō’s right shift tendency became noticeable and even criticized as "strange" or "fanatic". His discourse included the possibility of North Korea waging war to South Korea, or Japan’s necessity of cruise missiles and nuclear weapons in order to protect itself (Aoki, 2011).

This kind of “fanaticism”, as the journalist Aoki Osamu called it, was common to the members of Modern Korea Research Institute. Satō’s disciple, Nishioka Tsutomu, a Korean affairs specialist, who worked as editor-in-chief of the *Modern Korea* magazine 1990-2002 and further involved in the management of the institute, has considerably similar views to Satō.

Since the formation of *Sukuukai* in Tokyo, the staff of the Modern Korea Institute and Satō took the initiative in the Rescue Movement and the support for *Kazokukai*.

#### 5.2.2.4 Rachi Giren

Another group formed in the same period, which collaborated with the Rescue Movement, was the *Diet members’ League for the Rescue of Japanese allegedly Kidnapped by North Korea* (*Kitachōsen rachi giwaku nihonjin kyūen giin renmei*), *Rachi Giren* hereafter, established on April 15, 1997. Several politicians who were part of the executive staff included: Chairman Nakayama Masaaki (LDP), Ozawa Tatsuo (New Frontier Party), Nishioka Takeo (New Frontier Party), Murakami Masakuni (LDP), Yoshida Yukihisa (New Frontier Party), Kakizawa Kōji (LDP), Harada Shōzō (LDP), Yashiro Eita (LDP), Kurata Hiroyuki (LDP), Uesugi Mitsuhiro (LDP), Kano Michihiko (New Frontier Party), Nakano Kansei (New Frontier Party), Futami Nobuaki (New Frontier Party), Hayashi Hiroko (New Frontier Party), Hata Eijiro (Taiyo Party), Hatoyama Kunio (DPJ), Sakurai Shin (LDP), Nagano Shigekado (New Frontier Party), Yoshikawa Yoshio (LDP), Tamura Hideaki (New Frontier Party), Maeda Takeshi (Taiyo Party), Fukuda Yasuo (LDP), Hirasawa Katsuei (LDP), Noda Takeshi (New Frontier Party), Nishimura Shingo (New Frontier Party), Abe Shinzō (LDP). In total 78 members of the House of Representatives and 45 members of the House of Councillors became part of *Rachi Giren*.

*Rachi Giren* acknowledged the resignation of the President, Nakayama Masaaki on March 27, 2002, and announced its temporary dissolution.

The new *Rachi Giren* (*Kitachōsen ni Rachi sareta Nihonjin wo Sōki ni Kyūshutsu suru tameni kōdō suru Giin Renmei*) was established on April 25, 2002, with Ishiba Shigeru (LDP) as President. The Assembly donated half of the sum of the membership fees collected to *Kazokukai*.

Members included Yoshida Kōichi (DPJ), Yoneda Kenzō (LDP), Ueda Kiyoshi (DPJ), Shiota Susumu (Liberal Party), Koike Yuriko (Conservative Party), Nishimura Shingo (Liberal Party), Takaichi Sanae (LDP), Matsuzawa Shigefumi (DPJ), Haraguchi Kazuhiro (DPJ), Hirasawa Katsuei (LDP), Matsubara Jin (DPJ). There were, however, no members from the Kōmeitō, the Social Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party. Moreover, the New *Rachi Giren* had the support and approval of the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Hiranuma Takeo, and Deputy CCS, Abe Shinzō. After Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to North Korea in September 2002 and Kim Jong Il’s admission of the abductions, the number of Diet members participating in the New *Rachi Giren* started to increase.

On September 30, 2002, as Ishiba Shigeru entered the Cabinet, the new chairman of the New *Rachi Giren* became Nakagawa Shōichi (LDP).

Nakagawa Shōichi became Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Koizumi, in September 2003, and thus at the request of Nakagawa and Deputy CCS Abe, in October 2003, Hiranuma Takeo, who resigned from the post of cabinet minister, became chairman (Modern Korea, 2004a).

#### 5.2.2.5 Seinen no kai

*Seinen no kai* (*the Youth Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea)*was formed in August 1999 and comprised the youth who participated in the Rescue Movement until that time. They joined the activities organized by *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, and also took the initiative in organizing additional activities for the rescue of the abductees.

#### 5.2.2.6 Chihō Giin no kai

*Chihō Giin no kai**(the Prefectural Assemblymen Association)* was established in January 2000, in order to collaborate with the other groups for the rescue of the abductees from North Korea. The members of the group participated in the majority of the activities organized by *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, cooperating in raising public awareness and further taking the initiative in organizing various advocacy activities. One such example is the organization of a movement to request responsible action to the government, by collecting opinions from each local government and pursuing National Diet members from each region. Members included: Tsuchiya Takayuki, President of the association and Koga Toshiaki, Vice President.

#### 5.2.2.7 Chōsakai

*Chōsakai* (*Tokutei shisōsha mondai chōsa kai)* was established on December 30, 2002, during a conference held by *Sukuukai*, and represented by Araki Kazuhiro, former Head Secretary of *Sukuukai*. *Chōsakai* was formed in order to deal with investigation activities regarding missing Japanese citizens, whose number was constantly increasing. *Sukuukai* and the newly formed *Chōsakai* were to cooperate as part of the Rescue Movement, and continue with the activities for the rescue of all the abductees from North Korea.

## 5.3 THE ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES (1997 – 1998): POLITICAL, SOCIAL, MEDIA, TRANSNATIONAL

This section will focus on the civil society groups’ advocacy activities toward various audiences, their strategies and tactics, as well as the opportunities and constraints they encountered in order to achieve their goals. The period to be addressed in this chapter is the one since the formation of the groups until 1998, after North Korea’s missile launch, event that represents one of the two case studies discussed by the present thesis.

The activities pursued by Rescue Movement are classified into seven categories, according to the proclamation of formation of *Sukuukai* Tokyo, the support group for *Kazokukai* and the representative of all the local rescue associations in Japan:

1. Signature-gathering activities
2. Fundraising campaigns
3. Petitions and appeals to the government, Diet and institutions in charge
4. Appeals to the domestic and international media, as well as to the public opinion
5. Information gathering and analysis
6. Educational activities
7. Coordination with *Kazokukai*, *Rachi Giren*, and regional organizations with the same purpose

These activities will be discussed in detail below, in relation to the audiences they were directed at, and the tactics utilized, as defined by the extant literature and introduced in Chapter 3. Apart from their immediate established goal to rescue the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea, the activities were considered to contribute to the peace and safety of the East Asian region.

Following the establishment of the support group in Tokyo, as presented above, the activities of *Kazokukai* had been entirely led by Modern Korea Institute and Satō Katsumi. *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* had joint signature on the statements they released; therefore, Satō and Nishioka’s statements and remarks represented the position of both organizations. As they acquired the victim position, their statements and opinions tended to be extreme (Hasuike Toru, cited in Aoki, 2011). Moreover, as the victims’ families were people without any kind of knowledge about North Korea, before long, they adopted Satō's and Nishioka’s views regarding the country and its regime.

Numerous scholars and journalists considered Satō and Nishioka, and Modern Korea in general, as advancing ideological statements with regard to North Korea. The fact that they became central figures in the newly formed *Sukuukai* strongly influenced the families that formed *Kazokukai*, as well as the people supporting them.

The activities of the Rescue Movement are further addressed in accordance with the audiences they were directed at, thus engaging with the four types of advocacy: political, social, media and transnational, described in Chapter 3. Therefore, political advocacy refers to the actors’ attempt to advance their cause and influence governmental decision makers; social advocacy refers to societal actors targeting public opinion, in their attempt to advance their cause and influence policy; media advocacy refers to attempts of societal actors to influence the mass media in their effort to advance their cause, and have an impact on policy-making; and transnational advocacy refers to societal actors’ involvement in transnational activism, in the attempt to plead for their cause.

### 5.3.1 Political advocacy activities

The political advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement were mainly directed at the national government, thus, comprising the executive, legislative and judicial branches, but also at the local government, at the prefectural, district, city and ward level.

Therefore, from the executive branch of the government the civil groups targeted MOFA, which was in charge of the foreign policy formulation, as well as the Ministry of Justice and the NPA. Moreover, as the powers of the executive are vested in the Cabinet, they also directed their activities towards the relevant ministers of state, such as the Foreign Minister, as well as towards the Prime Minister and the *Kantei*. The groups also targeted the local government, directing their activities towards prefectural or district governors and mayors.

With respect to the legislative branch of the government, the Rescue Movement targeted politicians from both houses of the Diet, and from all political parties, albeit mainly the ruling LDP, while as concerns the judicial branch, the Movement’s cause was advocated to the Japan Federation of Bar Associations.

Along these lines, the activities of the Rescue Movement were directed at every part of the government. Nevertheless, the ways in which they advocated their cause politically, toward all the branches of the government, varied, and include: requests in diverse forms, such as petitions, appeals, decisions, declarations, written documents, letters or submissions of signatures; verbal criticisms at public gatherings; written criticism in public documents or news media; surveys; hearings; formal and informal meetings; various kinds of protests such as sit-ins; speeches etc. Furthermore, the activities had been conducted as a group, as well as individually, by certain members.

This section further presents the political advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement according to their type, and in chronological order, since the formation of the civil groups until 1998, after North Korea’s missile launch. The chronological representation of the activities and the succession of events are particularly useful for determining the evolution of the Rescue Movement’s activities and for identifying, to a certain extent, the moments or periods when change was produced. All the activities conducted in this period fall within the insider tactics category, as defined by the extant literature, hence non-confrontational. Figure 5.1 presents the types of activities conducted by the Movement in the period analysed as well as the point in time when they took place.

#### 5.3.1.1 Petitions

The next day after its formation, on March 26, 1997, *Kazokukai* petitioned MOFA and the NPA for the rescue of the victims kidnapped by North Korea.

Local governments had also started to request the clarification of the situation regarding the abductees, through written arguments and petitions to the national government. Hyōgo prefectural assembly endorsed the petition submitted by Arimoto Akihiro, the father of Arimoto Keiko, kidnapped from Europe, by North Korean agents. The assembly also adopted a written argument seeking the rescue and the investigation of the abduction of Arimoto Keiko. The petition submitted by Arimoto Keiko’s father explained the situation in which Keiko disappeared, as well as the way the family found out about her living in North Korea together with two other Japanese nationals. Moreover, the impossibility of the family to contact their daughter is mentioned, as a consequence of the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Despite such circumstances, the Arimotos had struggled to advocate their cause by contacting lawyers, petitioning MOFA, but without any result whatsoever. Since March 1997, the Arimoto family has joined the families of other ten missing persons recognized by the government as “suspected abductions” in order to campaign for the rescue of their children. The petition concluded with the family’s request for the help of the local assemblies so that their daughter can safely return to Japan (ReACH, 2007b). The Arimoto family’s actions are an early example of an emerging advocacy trend that continued with the formation of *Kazokukai*.

#### 5.3.1.2 Signatures and appeals

The acting governor of Niigata met the Yokota couple, who were advocating their cause, asking for support in their effort of rescuing their daughter. The encounter had taken place with help from Kojima Harunori, who had formed the “Association for the Promotion of the Rescue and Investigation of the Abduction of Yokota Megumi” in Niigata. The signatures collected through the campaign initiated by him and the association he was heading, were submitted by *Kazokukai* to the Prime Minister’s office on August 27, 1997, and were received by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yosano Kaoru. Alongside the signatures, *Kazokukai* also submitted an appeal addressed to Prime Minister Hashimoto from the three groups: the Association for Promotion of the Rescue and Investigation of the Abduction of Yokota Megumi (Niigata), the Association for the Rescue of Japanese Abductees (Kansai), and the Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Kantō). The appeal requested the effort of the government for the rescue of the Japanese kidnapped by North Korea, emphasizing the considerable public support in that respect. Moreover, it expressed contentment with the Prime Minister’s April refusal to provide food aid to North Korea if the abduction issue was not addressed, and assured the encouragement and support of the victims’ families, in the same direction. Nevertheless, it also criticized MOFA’s attitude in the preliminary talks with North Korea, as well as the consideration of providing food aid through the United Nations. The appeal concluded by asking the inclusion of the abduction issue as a highly important topic in the negotiations with North Korea (Araki, 2002).

In April 1998, one million signatures for the rescue of the abductees were submitted to Foreign Minister Obuchi, together with an appeal from *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*. The signatures had been gathered by the families of the victims together with the rescue organizations established all over the country, who were criticizing the government for twenty years of inactivity and demanded a firm attitude for the rescue of the abductees and the restoration of Japan’s dignity. Similar appeals had been further adopted at citizens’ gatherings organized by *Sukuukai* in various locations. In August 1998, in Niigata, such a gathering was held, having as a guest speaker An Myong Jin, the North Korean defector who testified about seeing Japanese abductees in North Korea. The appeal adopted at the gathering in Niigata addressed the Prime Minister as well as the politicians, criticizing the approach taken toward North Korea, and especially the politicians’ promise toward the North to use the term “missing persons” instead of “abductions”. Moreover, the appeal included the example of the Lebanese government who rescued the four Lebanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea, by protesting and conducting a firm foreign policy toward the North, and concluded that it was not possible that the Japanese government could not take an action that the Lebanese government could take. Furthermore, in the same month, the gathering for the rescue of the abductees organized in Kyoto, adopted an appeal demanding two things: that Japan did not provide food aid to North Korea and did not establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, a terrorist country which kidnapped Japanese citizens (Araki, 2002).

In September 1998, *Kazokukai* submitted a written appeal to MOFA asking for cooperation with respect to the abduction issue. The appeal was signed by Yokota Shigeru, representative of *Kazokukai*, and addressed to Takemi Keizo, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, targeting North Korea’s dishonest statement about the "missing citizens" not found in North Korea. The appeal also referred to the missile test conducted by North Korea the previous month, expressing support for the government’s reaction to such a reckless action, but at the same time expressed concern regarding the lack of progress regarding the resolution of the abduction issue. Lastly, the appeal concluded with a request to raise the abduction issue in the United Nations, as well as to request the United States to raise it in bilateral talks with North Korea (interview Kazokukai members).

The Vice Minister’s response was supportive and sympathetic to the families’ requests, emphasizing the fact that the government and the politicians are applying pressure towards North Korea from various positions. He also mentioned the fact that due to the missile test, the relations between the two countries became tensioned, but attention to the abduction issue had not decreased. With regard to the United Nations, he advised the families to raise the issue themselves, offering to search for the procedures which must be followed. He also stated that he would consider the issue together with Ogata Sadako, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1990-2000), and Akashi Yasushi, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (1996-1998). The Vice Minister further stated that Japan’s position regarding North Korea and the abduction issue had been clearly transmitted to the United States, who had included the abductions into the bilateral talks. Moreover, the LDP Foreign Policy Investigation Chairman, Nakayama Tarō, made the abduction issue advance in the US Congress, by connecting it to the missile problem. The concluding statement of the Vice Minister referred to the Rescue Movement becoming a great force that could move the government, stressing the fact that continuing it was key to succeeding.

Taking the Vice Minister’s reply into consideration, in October 1998, *Kazokukai* visited the Bureau for the Protection of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice, demanding action to be taken at the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The Ministry of Justice recognized the abductions as violations of human rights, but as the incidents were connected to North Korea, the only way to present the facts would be in diplomatic negotiations and international meetings, in their view. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice could not act in the respect, as MOFA took initiative regarding the issue, and the ministry could not deviate from the government’s initiative (Araki, 2002).

In November 1998, at the Japan-South Korea Cabinet Ministers meeting in Kagoshima, the families of Ichikawa Shuichi and Masumoto Rumiko, kidnapped from the prefecture, met Foreign Minister Kōmura Masahiko present at the meeting. The families submitted 10,000 signatures and appealed for the rescue of their children. Moreover, *Sukuukai* Kagoshima submitted a written demand addressed to Prime Minister Obuchi and to Foreign Minister Kōmura for the resolution of the abduction issue. In the same month, the families of the victims also appealed to the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, through their representative Yokota Shigeru, who submitted a written application for a rescue statement to the chairman of the Human Rights Protection Committee. The statement requested the Federation to take action together with the government for the resolution of the abduction issue (interview Kazokukai members).

#### 5.3.1.3 Participation in political parties' meetings

At the Foreign Policy meeting held at the LDP head office in October 1997, *Kazokukai* were also invited to present their activities. Hasuike Toru, the older brother of Hasuike Kaoru, kidnapped from Niigata, expressed his strong criticism toward the government’s handling of rice aid. The executive staff of the then recently fromed *Sukuukai* Kantō, Satō Katsumi and Nishioka Tsutomu, participated as well and directed their appeal at MOFA, requesting Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizō to deal with the problem assertively. Foreign minister Obuchi promised to devote his power to solving the issue. Further, Satō, Nishioka and Kojima had informal talks with with Nakayama Masaaki and other executive members of *Rachi Giren* regarding the abduction issue. Later that month, Satō was invited to participate in the North Korean Problem Subcommittee established in the LDP’s foreign policy examination meeting, to talk about the abduction issue (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.1.4 Protest documents

On October 30, 1997, *Sukuukai* prepared a protest document which they delievered to MOFA and Foreign Minister Obuchi, in response to the comment of Anami Koreshige, Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, during an informal meeting with a journalist. The comment, that the abduction issue must be considered with caution, as there was no solid proof, was published by *Sankei Shinbun* on October 30, 1997. *Sukuukai*’s protest emphasized the official’s opposition with the government, who had recognized “7 cases, 10 persons” of suspected cases of abductions by North Korea. Moreover, the government recognized the case of Lee Eun-hee as an abduction, including it in the negotiations with North Korea in 1992. Thus, the protest document criticized the official’s attitude of supporting the government’s point of view in public, while in informal meetings, guiding the media in a different direction, and demanded severe measures to be taken toward the high official. An identical protest document was delivered to the Foreign Minister by Kojima Harunori, Chairman of the Rescue Association in Niigata, on November 1 (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.1.5 Meetings

At a general meeting on August 4, 1998, *Sukuukai* protested Nakayama’s conversation with *Jiji News*, which referred to the fact that there was no proof North Korea was the “criminal” in the abduction cases, and that the North could only be called "criminal state" due to the four *Yodo-gō* criminals’ residence in it. *Sukuukai* requested the withdrawal of Nakayama’s statement in a strong protest meeting (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.1.6 Speeches

The Chairman of *Sukuukai* Kantō, Satō Katsumi, held a speech regarding the North Korea problem at a workshop for prefectural assemblymen, organized by Tokyo Diet members of *Nippon Kaigi*, in October 1998, acknowledging the need for a network of prefectural assemblymen (Araki, 2002).

The political advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement until 1998, in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch are presented by the following figure according to their type.

Figure 5.1. Political advocacy activities 1997-1998

Author's original work based on the records of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* published by Araki (2002)

### 5.3.2 Social advocacy activities

Social advocacy activities were mainly directed at the public, in order to raise awareness and gain support for appealing to the government. In this respect, ways of advocating the rescue of the abductees to the public included: signature-gathering campaigns, citizens’ gatherings and wider assemblies, study meetings, lectures and symposiums, letters to appeal to the public, but also to protest the ones who had a distinct view about the abduction issue than the Rescue Movement, question documents, demonstrations, publications, such as news media articles or manuscripts. The social advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in the period under examination include, alongside others, the activities identified by the extant literature as methods of civil society organizations to raise awareness and support from the pubic, as introduced in Chapter 3. The activities are further grouped according to their type and subsequently presented in Fgure 5.2.

#### 5.3.2.1 Signatures

The social advocacy activities started with the signature-gathering campaigns organized by Kojima Harunori on the streets of Niigata in spring 1997, as a means of promoting the cause of the Yokota family. The campaigning activities continued in April and May 1997, involving both Yokota and Hasuike families, and furthermore until they expanded all across the country and received considerable public support. Thus, the signature-collecting campaign initiated by Kojima and the Association for the Promotion of the Rescue and Investigation of the Abduction of Yokota Megumi, in Niigata, had spread, and the families of the abductees together with various citizen groups formed around the country, collected approximately 575,000 signatures seeking the rescue of the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea.

Other signature-collecting campaigns include: October 4 1997, after the formation of the Association for the Rescue of Japanese Abducted by North Korea, in Kantō, when the victims’ families together with volunteers had gathered signatures on the streets of Tokyo; every year on November 15, the day when Yokota Megumi had been kidnapped from Niigata, *Sukuukai* Niigata, as well as *Sukuukai* from each prefecture organized signature-gathering campaigns, as well as study meetings for raising the awareness of the public (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.2.2 Public hearings and study meetings

The signature-collecting campaigns were associated with public hearings and study meetings for raising the awareness of the people and gaining their support for the Rescue Movement’s cause (interview executive staff Sukuukai).

#### 5.3.2.3 Citizens' gatherings/ wide assemblies/ lectures/ speeches

Citizens’ gatherings were held across Japan to raise the awareness of the public regarding the abduction issue and ask for support. A first such meeting was held in Niigata, on June 7, 1997, where the victims’ families presented their cause and Satō Katsumi of Modern Korea Institute held a speech about North Korea and the abduction issue. Moreover, a support song, “*Kimi ni todoke*”, for the Rescue Movement was introduced with the occasion.

On November 16, 1997, after twenty years since the disappearance of Yokota Megumi, a gathering was held at the elementary school she used to attend in Niigata. Journalist Sakurai Yoshiko held a lecture about Japan’s foreign policy and also harshly criticized the statement of MOFA’s Anami Koreshige, regarding the “suspicious abductions” and the need to consider them with caution. The main points of Sakurai’s lecture were published in *Sankei Shinbun*, on November 17. Furthermore, Abe Masami who won the Newspaper society prize, Ishidaka Kenji, head of department at *Asahi* Broadcasting, Satō Katsumi, President of Modern Korea Institute, and Chairman of *Sukuukai* Kantō held speeches regarding the abduction issue and the activities of the Rescue Movement (interview Kazokukai members). Similar gatherings were held by the Kansai *Sukuukai* and Kantō *Sukuukai* in December, where speakers included professor Kurosaka Makoto from Osaka University of Economics, politician Nishimura Shingo, and Nishioka Tsutomu, executive staff of *Sukuukai* (interview Professor Osaka University of Economics).

A wider citizens’ assembly was held in Tokyo, on December 18, 1997 organized by *Sukuukai* Kantō, and focusing on creating awareness for the rescue of Japanese abducted by North Korea and the restoration of the violated sovereignty of Japan. The speakers included Satō Katsumi, Kojima Harunori, and Sakurai Shin, and the topics discussed included the progress of the Rescue Movement. The resolution adopted by the meeting criticized the government for shelving the abduction issue and considering the provision of food aid to North Korea, when, in reality, the highest responsibility of the government must be to protect the life and safety of its citizens. Moreover, the resolution stressed the fact that the responsibility is not bore only by the government, but by the nation as well. In this respect, the citizens had organized groups, such as *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* in numerous prefectures, *Rachi Giren*, and had been cooperating for holding gatherings, educational activities, collecting signatures, appealing to the people and the media, petitioning local assemblies, thus urging the government to take concrete measures and solve the abduction issue (Araki, 2002).

An assembly gathering all the rescue associations across Japan in Tokyo, took place on April 18, 1998, in an attempt to coordinate their policies for the rescue of the Japanese kidnapped by North Korea, their common purpose. In this regard, one million signatures had been gathered by the established rescue associations all over Japan (Araki, 2002).

In summer 1998, numerous gatherings of the rescue associations to raise awareness with the public and strive for the rescue of the abductees took place around the country, in Kumamoto, Miyazaki, Fukui, Niigata, Kobe, Kagoshima, Fukuoka. The families of the abductees had presented their appeal at each meeting, while the executive staff of *Sukuukai* around Japan held lectures and speeches regarding North Korea and the progress of the Rescue Movement. The August 1 1998 citizens’ meeting in Niigata had An Myong Jin, as a guest speaker, the North Korean defector who had confessed about seeing Yokota Megumi and other Japanese abductees in North Korea. The appeal adopted at the meeting was, among others, addressed to the public, asking for their support and cooperation. An Myong Jin held lectures in various locations in August 1998: Tokyo, Kobe, Kagoshima, Fukuoka. At each gathering, he was accompanied by the Chairman of *Sukuukai*, Satō Katsumi, in his declaration of the facts related to North Korea and the abductions. Later that year in November, an awareness campaign was held in Hokkaido, by the Hokkaido Rescue Association, including lectures and signature-collecting activities, attracting much media interest (Araki, 2002).

The social advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement until 1998, in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch are presnted in the following figure according to their type.

Figure 5.2 Social advocacy activities 1997-1998

Author's original work based on the records of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* published by Araki (2002)

### 5.3.3 Media advocacy activities

The media advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement had centred around press conferences, contributions to the news media, as well as appeals and protest letters directed at the media. Similarly with the social advocacy activities, the media advocacy activities include alongside others, the methods acknowledged by scholars as being utilized by civil society organizations to seek media representation, as introduced in Chapter 3. The activities are further organized according to their type and outlined in Figure 5.3.

#### 5.3.3.1 Press conferences

The first press conference held by *Kazokukai* was at the House of Councillors, on March 26, 1997, right after they had petitioned MOFA and the NPA. The location for the press conference was arranged by Hyōmoto Tstsukichi, who, at the time, was working as a secretary for a Diet member. During the conference, every family was holding picture panels with the abductees, which were provided by the art division of the *Asahi* Broadcasting Corporation, through Ishidaka Kenji. At the conference, the representative of the group, Yokota Shigeru, read an appeal of *Kazokukai* to the government pleading for help in rescuing their sons and daughters.

The appeal presented by *Kazokukai* first introduced the issue, followed by its development and the acknowledgement of North Korea’s involvement, in the Diet, in 1988. Moreover, it noted the government’s inactivity and lack of investigation regarding the issue. Further, the appeal presented the testimony of An Myong Jin, the North Korean defector according to whom several missing Japanese nationals had been seen in North Korea. The testimony represented valuable information for the families, who asked for the government’s effort and cooperation in order to rescue their sons and daughters. Moreover, the appeal mentioned the food aid offered by Japan to North Korea from a humanitarian perspective and emphasized that *Kazokukai* did not oppose it, but considered it reasonable to ask that their children first returned to Japan (Araki, 2002). The families appeal to the government is a polite plea for help and assistance for the rescue of the abducted Japanese.

At another press conference, organized after the submission of the signatures, on August 27, 1997, Satō Katsumi, member of the preparatory committee for the *Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea* in Kantō region, spoke about the decision to form the association, emphasizing North Korea’s repeated violation of national sovereignty and human rights, as well as the fact that the estimated number of abducted Japanese citizens was considerably higher than the one acknowledged by the Japanese government. He also presented the purpose of the soon-to-be-established organization as the rescue of the abducted Japanese nationals and the reestablishment of the country’s dignity. Moreover, Satō presented the type of activities planned by the organization, and asked for the government’s support and cooperation (Araki, 2002).

The signature-collecting campaign on October 4, 1997, after the establishment of *Sukuukai* in the Kantō region, was followed by a press conference where the families’ pleas, as well as the development of the group’s activities were presented. Furthermore, following the submission of one million signatures to Foreign Minister Obuchi, in April 1998, a press conference was held at the House of Representatives, centred on the appeals of the families. Another press conference centred on the abduction issue was held on July 31, 1998, at the Niigata airport where An Myong Jin had arrived from Seoul to support the Japanese Rescue Movement. During the press conference, the actual conditions of the abductions had been explained (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.3.2 Contributions to the media

Contributions to the news media included articles such as the one written by Kojima Harunori and published in the *Sankei Shinbun*, on March 13, 1997, “Let’s form a circle to support the “Rescue of Megumi”. The engagement with the media attracted considerable public attention, which contributed to the Rescue Movement’s broadening nationally (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.3.3 Protest statements

Nevertheless, apart from contributions to the media, the members of the Rescue Movement had also relied on protest statements toward the media to emphasize their position. Thus, in June 1998, the families of the abductees, as well as the support rescue associations released enraged comments and protest statements in the media, against the North Korean Red Cross Society’s public statement denying the abductions. Moreover, on August 1, 1998, the meeting organized in Niigata where An Myong Jin was a guest speaker, adopted an appeal also addressed to the media, and especially to the NHK, which was reporting about the lack of food in North Korea, but ignoring the abduction issue. The appeal demanded public news that people could trust, as their fees were paid by the public. Nevertheless, very few journalists were interested in the abduction issue and supported the activities of the Rescue Movement. One such example is journalist Sakurai Yoshiko, also member of the revisionist lobby *Nippon Kaigi*, and president of the think tank Japan Institute for National Fundamentals established in 2007. In 1990s, Sakurai became interested the case of the fisherman abducted by North Korea and later returned to Japan, case that brought her interest in Japan’s policy toward North Korea. She, thus, supported the Rescue Movement since its formation, actively participating in their meetings and assemblies, and contributing to the research regarding the abductees (Araki, 2002).

The media advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement until 1998, in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch are outlined below, in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 Media advocacy activities 1997-1998

Author's original work based on the records of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* published by Araki (2002)

### 5.3.4 Transnational advocacy activities

Alongside political, social and media advocacy activities, the Rescue Movement had pursued transnational advocacy activities as well. These activities will be further classified in accordance to the target audience, as pointed out by Keck and Sikkink (1998) introduced in Chapter 3 on the theoretical approach. Hence, this section will present the interactions of the Rescue Movement with other states and with international organizations, paying attention to the interactions with other no-state actors in the process. Thus, in the period examined, the Movement appealed to the United States, as well as to North Korea, and to the United Nations for the return of the abducted Japanese citizens.

#### 5.3.4.1 To the United States

In response to the United States’ pressure towards Japan to provide rice aid to North Korea, the Rescue Movement appealed to the United States, by protest advertising in US newspapers, questioning the handling of the situation by the United States, had US citizens been abducted (December 1997). Another appeal to the American press was represented by an advertisment in the *New York Times* on April 2, 1998. It was a call upon the American people to urge the US government to take appropriate measures toward the North Korean government, and to join the rescue associations in Japan in requesting the United Nations to set up a commission for investigating those violations of human rights: “We appeal to all the freedom-loving American people, Justice to our Children and Fellow Citizens”. The appeal was signed by the representatives of *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* Tokyo, *Sukuukai* Osaka, *Sukuukai* Hokkaido and *Sukuukai* Fukuoka (Araki, 2002). Furthermore, advocacy activities were conducted by Araki Kazuhiro, executive member of *Sukuukai*, who visited the United States, in June 1998, for a meeting with various researchers, who focused on Japan and North Korea. The focus of the meeting was the exchange of ideas regarding the abduction issue and the attitude of North Korea. Araki stressed the fact that the abductions were not surprising to the US researchers, considering the North Korean state and regime. During the visit, Araki also appealed to Amnesty International and the State department for the rescue of the abducted Japanese (interview Chairman *Chōsakai*).

#### 5.3.4.2 To North Korea

The activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in Japan had indirectly advocated to North Korea. An example in this direction is the signature-collecting campaign conducted in Japan, criticized in the North Korean media on the 26th and 28th of March, 1998, and the characterization of the Rescue Movement as “low class intrigue” (interview Chairman *Chōsakai*).

The Rescue Movement had also advocated its cause directly to North Korea and the North Korean regime. Such an example is the direct appeal to the North in November 1998, when *Sukuukai* Tokyo had sent a postcard, addressed to Kim Jong Il, seeking the rescue of the kidnapped Japanese. The group acknowledged the low possibility of the postcard being seen by Kim Jong Il, but they had no doubt that it would be seen by various staff at the post office and persons responsible for public safety, and thus fulfill its purpose. The purpose of *Sukuukai* was to raise the awareness of North Korean people about the determination of Japanese regarding the abduction incidents. The postcard politely asked for the quick return of all the fellow Japanese (Araki, 2002).

#### 5.3.4.3 To the United Nations

As part of the Rescue Movement’s advocacy activities, the Japanese civil society groups also appealed directly or indirectly to the United Nations. In October 1998, *Kazokukai* visited the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, submitting an appeal to the to the Chairman and the Secretary General. The appeal included a request to the Federation to discuss the issue in the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and to cooperate when the families petition for the monitoring of human rights at the Human Rights Protection Committee of the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, the groups appealed for the abduction issue to be introduced by a lawyer, when raised at the United Nations Human Rights Committee, as they believed the approach to be more influent.

Following *Kazokukai*’s appeal, the intention to investigate the abduction issue was transmitted to the Federation of Bar Associations Committee of Human Rights Protection. If the issue was recognized as a human rights violation, a warning and a demand would be prepared, as well as a declaration from the federation. Moreover, the Federation committed to the fact that a lawyer would introduce the abduction issue, when *Kazokukai* petitioned for monitoring human rights at the United Nations (Araki, 2002).

In order to raise more awareness internationally, the Rescue Movement also translated the appeals adopted at their larger meetings, in order to make their requests known to the world.

To sum up, since its formation until 1998, the Rescue Movement had advocated its cause transnationally to other states, appealing to both the government and the people, as well as to international organizations, such as the United Nations. With regard to the strategies and tactics identified by other scholars as being used by transnational advocacy “networks” when seeking a response outside the state, the Rescue Movement relied on the use of convenient information in relation to the United States and North Korea, as well as the United Nations, further seeking support from powerful actors in all the target audiences discussed above.

The transnational advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement until 1998, in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch are presented in Figure 5.4, according to their target audience.

Figure 5.4 Transnational advocacy activities 1997-1998

Author's original work based on the records of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* published by Araki (2002)

## 5.4 THE 1998 WIN-SET

The main theoretical approach utilized to explain the case studies of the present thesis is centred around the "win-set", explained as the range of agreements at the international level (Level 1) that are acceptable to a majority at the domestic level (Level 2). The approach emphasizes the process that occurs when the national leader or the chief negotiator is trying to reach an agreement at both the international level and the domestic level. In this respect, the present research emphasizes the process that occurs when the Japanese chief negotiators reach an agreement both internationally and domestically regarding the North Korea policy. This process is observed and described in the context of Japan’s cooperation with the United States and South Korea for a common purpose of promoting peace in the Asia Pacific region. The focus of the thesis, however, is not the negotiations between the three countries mentioned above, but the role of the domestic Japanese context in the respective cooperation, and more specifically, within that domestic context, the role of the civil society actors in the process of deciding the foreign policy toward North Korea. Thus, with respect to the "win-set", the larger it is, the more likely the agreement, and conversely, the smaller it is, the more likely the negotiations will break. Adapted to the present thesis, the above explanation can articulate that the larger the Japanese win-set, the more likely Japan’s agreement with the United States and South Korea towards the North Korea policy. Contrarily, the smaller the win-set, the less likely that Japan can agree and follow the position of the two countries toward North Korea. A small win-set can be a bargaining advantage for a country at the international level, while a larger perceived win-set of a negotiator can increase the possibility that the respective negotiator will be challenged by other country.

Consequently, this section will delimitate the Japanese win-set in 1998, as well as the role of the relevant civil society actors in the described domestic context, in order to compare it with the 2006 Japanese win-set and account for the shift in the government’s policy toward North Korea.

Prime Minister Obuchi, as Japan’s representative, thus chief negotiator in Putnam’s terms, agreed to maintain close consultation with the United States and South Korea with regard to discussing KEDO, but Japanese officials had internationally emphasized the need for imposing punitive measures against North Korea, as well as the inability to cooperate due to domestic opposition (*Asahi Shinbun,* 1998a). Therefore, according to Putnam’s model, Prime Minister Obuchi had tried to utilize a small win-set to Japan’s advantage at the international level, simultaneously reconfirming support for the Agreed Framework (*Asahi Shinbun,* 1998b). On the domestic level, however, Japanese officials highlighted the inability of maintaining the KEDO freeze for long as it would lead to its collapse and further to bigger repercussions for Japan and its national interest (*Asahi Shinbun,* 1998c).

The discourse of the Japanese government changed in the light of the US negotiators’ strategy of underlining the future North Korean threat if the KEDO would not be resumed. The US focus on the long-term peace and stability that would result from resuming KEDO, made the Japanese government renounce its request for an apology from North Korea for the missile test carried in August 1998 and lift the freeze on KEDO. In Putnam’s terms, the US negotiators attempted to restructure the game and alter the Japanese government’s perceptions of the cost of no-agreement. Thus, one of the principles that govern the size of the win-sets is that “the lower the cost of no-agreement to constituents, the smaller the win-set”. In the present case the opposite appears to apply: the higher the cost of no-agreement, the larger the win-set. Therefore, no-agreement for Japan represented a higher threat from North Korea, in case KEDO collapsed completely and North Korea resumed its nuclear development. Therefore, although initially against resuming KEDO, in the end, all Diet members decided to follow the government’s decision (*Asahi Shinbun*, 1998d).

Moreover, according to Putnam, the autonomy of central decision makers can also affect the size of the win-set: the higher the autonomy of decision makers from their Level II constituents, the larger the win-set, and thus the more likely the international agreement. In the present case, MOFA is believed to have been autonomous in the policy initiative, while domestic opposition is considered insufficient. The international agreement reached was consistent with Japan’s long-term goal of stopping North Korea’s nuclear development, as well as engaging it with the international community.

In conclusion, the Japanese win-set in 1998 had been rather large, as the opposition to resuming KEDO was not sufficient for the Obuchi Cabinet to maintain sanctions against North Korea. Thus, the main domestic actors have been pro engagement of North Korea and normalization of relations. MOFA pursued an engagement policy in the 1990s, and after the missile launch in 1998, postponed the aid to KEDO, only to later resume contribution, consistent with the long-term objective of the Japanese government. The Prime Ministers supported an engagement policy toward North Korea, as well as the objective of normalization of relations with the North. The majority of the politicians had been supporting the policy of engagement in the 1990s; however, after the missile launch, in 1998, all politicians expressed frustration over Japan’s inability to prevent such incidents and some LDP members pressured the Obuchi Cabinet to maintain the sanctions. Large companies had shown little interest in North Korea, and, therefore, only medium and small-scale companies, which carried out trade with the North, showed some resistance to the sanctions imposed in 1998.

With respect to civil society groups and the abduction issue, although the families of suspected abducted citizens have individually called on the government and various politicians to solve the issue and help them towards bringing the victims back to Japan, the Rescue Movement that represents the focus of the present research had only formed in 1997. Consequently, the groups comprising the Rescue Movement have pressured the government in various ways to include the abduction issue into the normalization talks with North Korea.

To conclude, the limited opposition to a policy of engagement of North Korea came from the Diet, in particular from certain LDP conservative members, some opposition from medium and small companies, as well as from the media and the public, and the Rescue Movement, who supported sanctions, as diplomatic negotiations were not considered sufficient to bring the victims home. In addition, both the United States and South Korea had been supporting KEDO, pressuring Japan to lift the sanctions, resume aid and deal with North Korea with care.

## 5.5 SUMMARY

This chapter presented the emergence of the civil society groups concerned with the rescue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea, namely the Families’ Association, *Kazokukai*, the families’ supporting association, *Sukuukai*, and the later formed youth association, *Seinen no kai*. These three associations constitute, for the purpose of the present thesis, the Rescue Movement, as previously stated. The Rescue Movement further benefitted from the support of other organizations, such as the *Rachi Giren* and *Chihō Giin no kai*. The advocacy activities conducted by the Japanese Rescue Movement were further discussed, organized according to their target audience in political, social, media and transnational. The findings illustrate methods adopted from the repertoire of political, social, media and transnational advocacy used by non-state actors according to the extant literature. The success of these methods in communicating requests to the decision makers, disseminating information to the public, the media and other states or international organizations, however, is difficult to assess. As stated in the theoretical chapter, the decision makers, the public, the media, and other states or international organizations are not only influenced by the efforts of the civil society actors, in this case, the Rescue Movement. Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter was to highlight their methods, strategies and tactics, in order to determine their role in the formation of the win-set in 1998, and further analyse the eventual change in comparison to the win-set in 2006. The description and comparison are necessary in order to explain the shift in the Japanese government’s policy toward North Korea after two similar events in 1998 and 2006.

To sum up, there have been numerous advocacy activities of all types, directed at the government, politicians, the public, the media, as well as the United States, the United Nations, and even North Korea.

Ministry officials, politicians, as well as everyone with a divergent position than the Rescue Movement had been the target of growing criticism in various forms.

The Movement received certain support from the local governments, the public and certain media, as well as some participation in meetings organized by the ruling party. Nevertheless, although an increasing number of MOFA officials and politicians expressed their support, the Movement’s role in delimitating the Japanese win-set and in the government’s policy toward North Korea appears to have been minimal.

Along the same lines,the next two chapters will move on to describe the international and domestic scenes in the 2000s and in 2006 after North Korea’s missile test (Chapter 6), and the role of the Rescue Movement within the domestic scene, by focusing on the methods utilized to advance their cause to various audiences (Chapter 7). The principal aim is to establish the win-set in 2006 and determine the role of the Rescue Movement in the eventual change observed, with the final goal of explaining the shift in the Japanese government’s policy toward North Korea.

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# CHAPTER 6

# THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC SCENES - 2006

## 6.1 OVERVIEW

Having addressed the international and domestic scenes in 1998 in Chapter 4, followed by an exploration of the civil society actors, as part of the domestic scene, and their advocacy activities, in Chapter 5, the aim of this chapter is to provide a description of the international and domestic scenes in 2006, with the same goal of providing a background for the interaction between the civil society actors and other domestic actors in the 2000s and especially in 2006 after North Korea’s missile test.

## 6.2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (LEVEL I)

This section elaborates on the circumstances of the international scene in order to understand the way in which international and domestic politics interact with regard to the North Korea policy. It further emphasizes the position of the United States and South Korea with regard to North Korea, in order to identify the international factors that the chief negotiator is exposed to in the period under examination.

### 6.2.1 Japan-North Korea Relations

The relations between Japan and North Korea had deteriorated especially after the missile launch in August 1998. However, Japan had declared its readiness to work towards improving relations through dialogue, as long as North Korea addressed the international concerns of ballistic missiles and nuclear program, as well as the suspected cases of abduction of Japanese citizens. In this respect former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi led a mission to North Korea in December 1999, with the purpose of facilitating inter-governmental relations. The mission had a positive impact on the Japan-North Korea dialogue, prompting the Government of Japan to lift the remaining sanctions imposed after the 1998 missile test. Moreover, the joint press statement of the Red Cross talks between Japan and North Korea, also held in December 1999, stated that North Korea would investigate thoroughly the issue of abducted Japanese citizens (Bae and Kim, 2009).

In the 2000s, three more government-level talks in April, August and October 2000 ended without major accomplishments. In April, North Korea insisted that relations be normalized after a “settlement of the past”, which, in its view, included apology, compensation, return of cultural assets taken from Korea during occupation, and offering legal status to ethnic Koreans living in Japan. The North suggested separate panels to deal with other issues, such as the missile and abduction issues, proposal that the Japanese side rejected. In August, Japan suggested for the first time an "economic assistance package", as an alternative to "compensation", but as there were no figures discussed, there was no response from the North. In the October talks, however, North Korea rejected Japan’s proposal of "economic assistance package" in place of compensation, and Japan rejected North Korea’s proposal to discuss the abductions outside the normalization talks, ending the 11th round of normalization negotiations without any progress (Manyin, 2002). However, when Koizumi Junichirō took office as a Prime Minister in April 2001, he initiated negotiations for a summit meeting with North Korea. As a result, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang in September 2002 for the first Japan-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Summit. The summit concluded with the Pyongyang Declaration and Kim’s admission of the abductions of Japanese nationals, accompanied by an apology and promise that such cases would not occur again. The Pyongyang Declaration included a moratorium on missiles after 2003 and North Korea’s pursuing of nuclear and missile issues within a multilateral framework. Thus, although various judgements regarding the success of the summit had been articulated, Koizumi’s initiative showed Japan taking a leadership role in the region, and most importantly, dealing with an issue that represented a major political obstacle to the normalization of the relations between the two countries. Koizumi pursued an engagement policy and offered economic assistance to North Korea, which, in return, agreed to respect the international law and not repeat regrettable incidents from the past. After the summit, Japan acted in bringing back the five surviving abductees for a temporary visit, according to the agreement with North Korea. However, Japan announced its decision that the returnees would not go back to North Korea and demanded the return of their families.

As these events were developing, the United States revealed Pyongyang’s acknowledgement of a secret uranium-enriching program for developing nuclear weapons, followed by North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. Moreover, in early 2003, North Korea launched two anti-ship missiles in the direction of Japan. Following these incidents, Japan requested that North Korea freeze work on nuclear facilities and allow inspection teams promptly. Moreover, in May 2003, Japan announced its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) shipments to and from countries such as North Korea.

Nevertheless, in a second attempt to engage Pyongyang, Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea in May 2004 for the second Japan-Democratic People's Republic of Korea Summit. The summit concluded with the return of five of the abductees’ family members and Japan’s promise not to impose economic sanctions as long as the terms of the Pyongyang Declaration were respected. The second summit was an exercise of dialogue with North Korea from Japan’s side, as part of the policy Japan was pursuing toward the North “dialogue and pressure”. Koizumi reinforced Japan’s support for the “dialogue and pressure” policy at a meeting with US President Bush in the same month. Therefore, Prime Minister Koizumi had preferred dialogue with regard to Japan’s policy toward North Korea, and continuation of food aid, emphasizing the importance of normalization of relations between the two countries. Sanctions had been dismissed on the premise of respecting the cooperation with Japan’s allies.

The abduction issue had been raised by Japan in the international framework of the Six Party Talks (SPT) from its first round in August 2003, with strong emphasis on the importance of its resolution (MOFA, 2003; MOFA, 2004b). Moreover, during the third round of the SPT, in June 2004, the normalization of relations and the provision of economic cooperation to the North were conditioned upon the resolution of the abduction issue, and various others, such as the nuclear and the missile issues (MOFA, n.d.a). In addition, the abduction of Japanese citizens, as well as the nuclear program and the missile test of 1998, have raised Japan’s conscience regarding the threat that North Korea posed. In this regard, certain legislation had been passed prompted by changes in Japan’s defence position, such as the law to ban port visits by vessels believed to be engaged in espionage from June 2003 and the 2004 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL), according to which Japan can unilaterally impose economic sanctions on North Korea, independent of UN Security Council. Moreover, the Law to Prohibit the Port Entry of Specific Ships (LPPESS) and the Japan Agricultural Standard Law (JAS) were passed in June 2004. The JAS required importers to indicate the country of origin of the products, therefore, allowing consumers to boycott marine products imported from North Korea.

With respect to the cooperation among Japan, the United States and South Korea regarding the policy toward North Korea, at a 2000 meeting of the Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group (TCOG), the three countries stressed the cooperation for peace on the Korean Peninsula. The cooperation continued although all sides had different priorities: the United States, the long-range missile program, Taepodong, South Korea, the heavy artillery along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and Japan, the short and medium-ranged missiles, especially Nodong. However, after the beginning of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, at a Trilateral Cooperation Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in November 2002, the three participatory countries agreed to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea starting with December 2002 (Cha, 2001).

The North Korean launch of 7 missiles including a Taepodong-2 missile, directed towards the Sea of Japan, on July 5, 2006, in breach of the Pyongyang Declaration, which included a moratorium of North Korea on missile tests, prompted Japan to immediately impose unilateral economic sanctions. The sanctions included a ban on Mangyongbong-92 ferry, between Japan and North Korea, a ban on North Korean charter flights, as well as on the entry of North Korean officials to Japan, tighter restrictions on trade and strict restrictions on the entry of North Korean nationals into Japan. Moreover, Nakagawa Shōichi, Minister of Agriculture, stated that food aid would not be provided to North Korea and that Japan would also consider agricultural trade restrictions (*Sukuukai*, 2006b). Japan considered the missile launch a matter of “grave concern from the viewpoint of security”, being “directly related to the security of Japan” and “a violation of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration” (MOFA, 2006b). Additionally, Japan drafted a resolution for the UN Security Council, backed by the United States, but opposed by China and Russia. The latter would not support punitive sanctions against North Korea, as requested by Japan’s draft resolution (Jeffries, 2010).

On July 15, 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1695, condemning the missile launch and demanding the suspension of all ballistic missile activity from North Korea, urging the country to immediately return to the SPT without preconditions. The Resolution demanded that UN members banned exports and imports of missile-related materials to and from North Korea (United Nations, 2006). In order to avoid a veto from China or Russia, the Resolution did not mention Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is legally binding and can authorize sanctions and even military action (Jeffries, 2010).

Japan, therefore, reacted more strictly than other countries in the aftermath of the North’s missile launch. With respect to the abduction issue, it had been orally included among the reasons for the imposition of sanctions by Japan, by CCS Abe Shinzō, during a press conference on July 6, 2006: “The sanctions had been imposed after the missile launch of North Korea, but the fact that North Korea did not have a sincere response to the abduction issue had also been taken into consideration” (*Sukuukai*, 2006a). Furthermore, on July 10, 2006, CCS Abe, as leading government spokesman, stated that Japan needed to consider whether the pacifist constitution would allow pre-emptive attacks on North Korean missile sites as an act of self-defence. He emphasized: “if we accept that there is no other option to prevent a missile attack, there is an argument that attacking the missile bases would be within the legal right of self-defence. I think we need to examine this from the perspective of defending the Japanese people and nation” (Fackler, 2006).

Notwithstanding that Abe Shinzō was a dominant voice in calls for revising the constitution for a more "normal" and assertive Japan, the Koizumi administration pursued a policy of engagement toward North Korea, willing to normalize the relations between the two countries and solve the missile and the nuclear problems. Koizumi considered the abduction issue important, but did not prioritize it over the nuclear issue, choosing dialogue over sanctions as a policy toward North Korea. However, after the July 2006 North Korean missile test, Japan had immediately imposed a number of economic sanctions, through the United Nations and unilaterally, not in coordination with the United States or the international posture.

### 6.2.2 The positions of the United States and the Republic of Korea

Considering Japan’s position was to act in coordination with the United States and the Republic of Korea regarding North Korea, this sub-section details on the relations between the United States and North Korea as well as the United States’ position after the latter’s missile test from July 2006.

With respect to its relations with North Korea, the United States released a policy statement in June 2001, conveying “a comprehensive approach” which included “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework of 1994” and “less threatening conventional military posture” (Kelly, 2001). However, no action plan had been put in place in order to accomplish those goals. Furthermore, after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States it had been difficult for the Bush administration to imagine a dialogue with North Korea and, thus, at the beginning of Bush administration, the United States adopted a hard-line position. Moreover, at his State of the Union speech in 2002, Bush identified North Korea as part of the "Axis of Evil" (BBC, 2002). The second North Korean nuclear crisis (2002-2003) triggered a worsening of the situation and brought up the fear of a military attack on North Korea. With his trip to Pyongyang in 2002, Koizumi had tried to reveal the importance of an engagement policy toward North Korea, although the visit was considered a challenge of the US and the international position regarding North Korea. However, the United States was not prepared to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea and therefore, the nuclear issue had been framed as a "regional" issue and led to the formation of Six Party Talks (SPT) between the United States, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, China and Russia. The aim of the SPT had been to find a peaceful resolution to North Korea’s security threat as a result of the nuclear weapons program. At the first round of the SPT in August 2003, in Beijing, the United States offered no concessions, while Japan offered to resume fuel oil supplies, as well as a support framework to deal with North Korea‘s energy needs, in return for North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear program and acceptance of IAEA inspections. The first round, as well as the second in February 2004, had produced little accomplishments as all parties expressed deep frustration with North Korea’s nuclear development. However, after a meeting of US President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi in 2004 at the G8 Sea Island Summit in Georgia, United States, when Koizumi tried to convince Bush that North Korea’s intentions to negotiate were serious, the United States made a serious offer to North Korea at the third round of the SPT, in June 2004, which produced concrete proposals. In exchange for North Korea’s freeze of the entire nuclear program and permission of international inspections, the US would begin discussions about removing North Korea from the Axis of Evil list and South Korea would resume energy supply provision. The United States’ ease on sanctions and offer of aid and security guarantees to North Korea shows the US’ shift toward a diplomatic solution with regard to North Korea. Therefore, the fourth round, in July 2005, ended with a Joint Statement, which addressed ways of achieving denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. The fourth round also included bilateral meetings between the US and North Korea which point to a change of tactics in the US position, from the preferred multilateral context. However, in 2005 North Korea declared itself a nuclear state as well as conditioned the return to negotiations in the SPT to a mutual disarmament with the US. Moreover, the last round of SPT before the July 2006 missile test, ended with North Korea accusing the US of violating the Joint Statement (Snyder, 2007).

After the North Korean missile test of July 2006, the United States position had been in solidarity with Japan only in the United Nations diplomacy, respectively for the passage of UN Resolution 1695. Alongside the United Nations diplomacy, the US had been clear in its pursuit of a diplomatic solution without any military pressure.

As regards, the Republic of Korea,it pursued a policy of engagement towards the North, the “Sunshine policy”, introduced by President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), with the main aim of reconciliation and encouraging interaction and economic assistance. As part of the “Sunshine Policy”, President Kim Dae-jung visited North Korea in June 2000, working out a five-point Joint Declaration including steps for the common goal of national unification. The Sunshine Policy had been continued by President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), although under a different name, “the Peace and Prosperity Policy”, maintaining engagement toward North Korea even after the missile test of July 2006. South Korea’s pursuit of the engagement policy was due to the belief that North Korea’s aggression and hostility had been caused by its insecurities (Cha, 2012).

## 6.3 THE DOMESTIC SCENE (LEVEL II): DOMESTIC ACTORS

Similar with the analysis of the domestic context in the 1990s and after the 1998 missile test, this section will provide a description of the Japanese domestic context in the 2000s and after the 2006 North Korean missile test. In this respect, it provides information on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the National Police Agency (NPA), the Prime Minister, politicians, *Chōsen Sōren*, businesses, academia, media and public opinion, and their position towards the North Korea policy.

6.3.1*The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)*,in the 2000s, favoured dialogue with North Korea, through several key officials, such as Tanaka Hitoshi, Director General of MOFA’s Asian Bureau (2001-2002) and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (2002- 2005), Yabunaka Mitoji, Director General of MOFA’s Asian Bureau (2003-2004) or Sasae Kenichirō,Director General of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (2005) (Uchiyama, 2007). MOFA’s overall central role in foreign policy-making, however, was starting to fade. Financial scandals, such as the mishandling of public funds by former director of the MOFA’s Overseas Visit Support Division, Matsuo Katsuyoshi, led to a sharp decline in public confidence. Furthermore, the connection between MOFA and House of Representatives member Suzuki Muneo, who used government’s authority for his personal gain, was considered abnormal and unacceptable. These events prompted MOFA to work towards restoring public confidence in Japan’s diplomacy and the ministry itself. In this respect, a Committee to promote reform programs was launched and a Reform Advisory Board was established to ensure that administrative fairness and transparency were provided to the public (MOFA, 2002a).

As stated above, Tanaka Hitoshi was a key MOFA official to pursue the dialogue between Japan and North Korea. In this respect, Tanaka conducted secret negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries, in close consultation with Nogami Yoshiji, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fukuda Yasuo, CCS, and Furukawa Teijirō, Deputy CCS and head of the central bureaucracy (Funabashi, 2007). Takeuchi Yukio, who succeeded Vice Minister Nogami, and Kawaguchi Yoriko, who succeeded Tanaka Makiko as a Foreign Minister, joined Tanaka Hitoshi’s plan. MOFA’s major bureaus were informed of the secret negotiations in August 2002, when the Pyongyang Declaration had already been drafted. Although there was a general concern that the Pyongyang Declaration draft did not refer to the abductions, Tanaka assured the Director General of the Foreign Policy Bureau and the other bureaus that he had the consent of the Prime Minister. Deputy CCS Abe Shinzō, who dedicated himself to solving the abduction issue, was informed about the secret negotiations with North Korea one day before Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was officially announced.

After North Korea’s admission of the abductions, the dialogue was alternated with pressure, as a policy towards the North, with the final purpose of normalizing relations. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko emphasized the dependence of the normalization upon the resolution of the abduction and nuclear issues, in an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2003.

In February 2004, Tanaka Hitoshi, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Yabunaka Mitoji, Director General of MOFA’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau visited Pyongyang in order to resume negotiations for the normalization of relations. The visit was considered one of the secret channels through which Prime Minister Koizumi planned his second visit to Pyongyang. During the talks, Yabunaka emphasized Koizumi’s top priority, the return of the eight family members of the five abduction returnees, as a precondition for diplomatic normalization negotiations. However, the North Korean side had an unapproachable attitude, considering the issue settled (Funabashi, 2007). Furthermore, in May 2004, Tanaka and Yabunaka met the North Korean chief negotiator with Japan in Beijing to negotiate Koizumi’s second meeting to Pyongyang. The meeting delivered fruitful results as on May 14, 2004, North Korea announced MOFA that Prime Minister Koizumi was welcome to Pyongyang on May 22, 2004.

6.3.2In October 2002, after the first Japan-DPRK Summit and Kim Jong-Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions, *the National Police Agency (NPA)* announced that the abduction cases involved a total of fifteen Japanese citizens. Nevertheless, the police continued the investigations, as the possibility of abduction could not be ruled out in various other cases. One such case was the case of Tanaka Minoru, recognized by the Japanese Government as an abduction case in April 2005, based on the Law supporting abduction victims. Similarly, Matsumoto Kyoko was recognized as an abduction case in November 2006 (NPA, n.d.).

On January 6, 2003 the Government of Japan recognized fifteen Japanese nationals as victims of abduction by North Korea. However, prior to certification, the government referred to the victims as “suspected abductions”, outlining ten persons, and at a later time, in March 2002, eleven Japanese nationals. The conditions that had to be met for government recognition as an abduction case were: Japanese nationality, the certainty that the person is in North Korea and that the person went against his or her own will (MOFA, 2002b).

6.3.3In the 2000s*,* the general position of the *Prime Ministers* towards North Korea had been one of engagement, pursuing the normalization of relations. However, the abduction issue and the action taken by the Rescue Movement started to be acknowledged officially by the government, with Prime Minister Obuchi, who met the families of the abductees in March 1999 and made a statement regarding their influence on the public’s awareness and interest. Prime Minister Obuchi further promised measures to be taken by the government for solving the abduction issue, but categorically dismissed the possibility of not pursuing negotiations with North Korea, aiming at normalization of relations between the two countries, a policy considered principal by the Prime Minister and the Japanese government (Araki, 2002).

Furthermore, Prime Minister Mori (April 2000-April 2001) also expressed the government’s position to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea, but promised not to ignore the abduction issue, assuring the families of the abductees of the pursuit to simultaneously solve both issues (Araki, 2002). However, one remark made by Prime Minister Mori regarding the abduction issue, during his talk with British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Asia-Europe meeting in Seoul, in October 2000, attracted criticism not only from the Rescue Movement, but also from the members of the ruling coalition, as well as the opposition camp. Prime Minister Mori discussed a secret proposal made in 1997 to North Korea about the return of the allegedly abducted Japanese nationals in a third country, where they would be found and the problem thus solved. The Prime Minister’s remark was seen by some as one more gaffe to be added to his record, while others considered it “a reflection of (his) desire to settle the issue in any way” and reach the clearly stated goal of normalizing relations with the North (The Japan Times, 2000).

Prime MinisterKoizumi (April 2001-September 2006) had a key role in coordinating the North Korea policy, relying on a small group of advisers. An important part of the North Korea policy was carried out from the *Kantei*, especially preceding the 2002 and 2004 summits. Koizumi had relied particularly on Tanaka Hitoshi, Director of MOFA’s Asian Affairs Bureau at the time (2001-2002) and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (2002-2005), Fukuda Yasuo, Chief Cabinet Secretary (2000-2004), and later on Yamasaki Taku (LDP), who became Special Adviser to the Prime Minister in 2004. The Prime Minister’s foreign policy toward the North was thus initially "dovish", CCS Fukuda, a bureaucrat-type politician, having played a key role in designing it. However, after the first Japan-North Korea Summit, the abduction issue had become a political advantage and conservative politicians alongside civil society organizations objected to Koizumi’s attempts to normalization. In this regard, the relatively unknown politician Abe Shinzō, was increasingly taking hold of the abduction issue and given leeway by the Prime Minister to pursue a harder stance towards the matter (Edström, 2012). In September 2002, after the summit, the government established its position regarding the North Korea policy as “no normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea until North Korea itself resolves the many problems that it has caused: abductions, development of nuclear weapons and missiles, spy boats, narcotics smuggling etc. The resolution of these problems would bring peace, which would lead to greater prosperity for East Asia as a whole” (*Kantei*, 2002). Moreover, special measures were taken in order to deal with the abductions of Japanese citizens, admitted by the North Korean leader during the summit. Nakayama Kyōko, former ambassador to Uzbekistan, was appointed special adviser to the Cabinet Secretariat to connect with the families of the victims, and Abe Shinzō, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, chaired the newly formed Special Working Group on the Issue of Abduction of Japanese Nationals by North Korea.

Regarding the policy of “dialogue and pressure” pursued by the government towards North Korea, there were divisions even among government officials. Some officials, such as Tanaka Hitoshi, supported dialogue and the discreet use of pressure, while others, such as Abe Shinzō, supported the application of pressure openly. Prime Minister Koizumi encouraged Abe’s argument, and, therefore, the press conference following the 2002 summit referred to both dialogue and pressure clearly.

Following the return to Japan of five abductees in October 2002, for a two-weeks visit, Abe argued for their permanent stay. His demand was supported by the families of the abductees and their support group, and, therefore, on October 24, the government decided for the five returnees’ permanent residence in Japan and demanded the return of their families from North Korea.

At the end of October 2002, at the 12th round of Japan-North Korea normalization talks in Malaysia, the Japanese side laid high emphasis on the abduction issue and security issues including the nuclear weapons program. However, the talks ended without any conclusion as North Korea accused Japan of breaking its promise of sending back the five returnees and argued that it could not offer an explanation for the nuclear program because of the threat from the United States. Japan held the abduction and the nuclear issues as top-priority matters, thus ending the talks without any progress.

The status of the five returnees as victims of abductions had been ascertained by the government based on a law on providing assistance to the abduction victims, into effect in January 2003 (Uchiyama, 2007).

The return of the family members of the five returnees was negotiated by Prime Minister Koizumi during his second visit to Pyongyang, in 2004. The visit was planned through another secret channel, alongside the MOFA officials’ secret negotiations. To the dissatisfaction of CCS Fukuda Yasuo, Koizumi had utilized the links between the *Kantei* and the *Chōsen Sōren* to prepare the second summit meeting with North Korea. *Chōsen Sōren*’s top leader, Ho Jong Man, approached Koizumi and suggested that North Korea would return the family members of the five abduction victims if Koizumi visited Pyongyang and resumed normalization negotiations (Funabashi, 2007). Hence, Prime Minister Koizumi met the North Korean leader on May 22, 2004 and negotiated the return of the abductees’ family members, alongside the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. During the talks, Koizumi emphasized the importance of solving the nuclear issue and of maintaining the Six Party Talks. Koizumi and the Japanese delegation returned to Tokyo with five children of the abducted victims, causing various reactions among the members of the AFVKN (*Kazokukai*), NARKN (*Sukuukai*) and *Rachi Giren* (Parliamentary League For Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea), who were waiting for the outcome of the talks. Koizumi had been warned to offer a brief report of the talks due to the criticism he might receive; however, he had welcomed all the questions and comments, facing the criticism of the media and the civil society groups, attitude that was proved to have determined an increase in his popularity (*Asahi Shinbun,* 2004a).

To sum up, Prime Minister Koizumi pursued an engagement policy toward North Korea, normalization of relations through "dialogue and pressure" and coordination of relations with the other participants in the SPT. He admitted the importance of the abduction issue, acting toward bringing back the abductees; however, he considered the abduction issue as important as the nuclear issue, and continued to pursue normalization of relations with the North and to dismiss economic sanctions. In this respect, the Prime Minister linked the normalization of relations between the two countries with the resolution of the abduction, the nuclear and the missile issues, during a session of the Lower House of the Diet on May 25, 2004 (*Asahi Shinbun*, 2004b). Aiming to solve the abduction issue, Koizumi also appointed Abe Shinzō, a hardliner and an advocate of the abduction lobby, as Chairman of the Special Working Group on the Issue of Abduction of Japanese Nationals by North Korea.

6.3.4 In contrast with MOFA officials, *politicians* had had numerous incentives to move away from the engagement policy toward North Korea. As regards the LDP, personnel changes and retirement of old members, criticism and threats from the media and the public, as well as Koizumi’s great involvement in the issue contributed to the party’s shift toward containment.

The most remarkable politician to press for solving the abduction issue and to support the abductees’ families was Abe Shinzō, as Deputy Cabinet Secretary (2001-2003) and Chairman of the Special Working Group on the Issue of Abduction of Japanese Nationals by North Korea, and later Chief Cabinet Secretary (2005-2006). Abe had been interested in the abduction issue since 1988, when the parents of one abductee, Arimoto Keiko, had visited his father’s office. Abe Shinzō was a secretary to his father Abe Shintarō, Secretary General of the LDP at the time. Hirasawa Katsuei, Chairman of the Parliamentary League for the Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea, was also a hardliner towards North Korea and joined Abe in his support of the abductees’ families. However, Hirasawa had been criticized with regard to the secret diplomacy with North Korea, that he conducted in April 2004 together with Yamasaki Taku.

Hirasawa Katsuei (LDP) and Matsubara Jin (DPJ) met with North Korean officials in Beijing at the end of 2003, in order to pursue negotiations. Later, in April 2004, Yamasaki Taku, former LDP Vice President, an ally of Koizumi and an early advocate of normalization of relations with North Korea, and Hirasawa Katsuei informed North Korea’s chief negotiator with Japan, of Koizumi’s intention to visit Pyongyang. This was considered another secret channel between the two countries, and further caused frustration with Fukuda and Tanaka, who believed that Japan should only communicate with North Korea through MOFA (Funabashi, 2007).

LDP members Nakagawa Shōichi and Hiranuma Takeo followed Hirasawa at the top of the Parliamentary League for the Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea, after the latter had resigned due to increasing media criticism.

As an official statement, the LDP expressed its position that “there should be no normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea without a resolution of the abduction issue” (LDP, 2002). Moreover, the LDP’s position was clearly stated towards the containment of North Korea at the meeting of the LDP Countermeasures Headquarters for the North Korea Abduction Issue on December 10th, 2004, when numerous Diet members agreed that North Korea was acting "in extremely bad faith” regarding the remains of the two abductees Yokota Megumi and Matsuki Kaoru, and there was “no alternative to sanctions” (LDP, 2004).

The Countermeasures Headquarters of the LDP submitted a proposal to implement five-stage economic sanctions on North Korea, proposal approved by the Prime Minister in November 2004. The sanctions included: freezing or postponement of humanitarian assistance, tighter supervision or embargo on remittances and capital transactions, partial suspension of trade, a ban on some North Korean ships entering Japanese ports, and a total ban on North Korean ships (Son, 2011).

As regards the JSP (SDP since 1996), it had been in electoral decline in the 2000s and the new members had less sympathy toward North Korea. Moreover, Doi Takako, the party’s leader (1986~1991, 1996~2003) lost her directly elected seat in the Lower House in 2003 and was replaced by a politician who supported the families of the abductees.

The DPJ members also preferred sanctions and containment of North Korea to engagement. Several members who favoured engagement had shifted their positions toward containment, such as Hatoyama Yukio, who became the leader of DPJ’s own countermeasures team on abductions. Additionally, at the general elections in 2003**,** noting the LDP’s success, allegedly due to the abduction issue, the DPJ introduced plans for sanctions toward North Korea in their election platforms as well (Edström, 2012). Therefore, unlike the 1990s, when politicians gained support from the public by promoting engagement toward North Korea, in the 2000s domestic support came from advancing containment and sanctions.

6.3.5Due to the inexistence of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, *the Chōsen Sōren*, in the 1990s, had been used as a back channel contact by North Korea, in order to reach various agreements with Japan. The North frequently approached political parties, especially the LDP, as presented in the previous chapter, and attempted to reach agreements, which were subsequently presented as facts to the Japanese government. Government officials such as Tanaka Hitoshi or Fukuda Yasuo attempted to eliminate such “dubious” back channel contacts, and follow the “proper course” of negotiations with North Korea, through MOFA. However, the Prime Minister’s second visit to Pyongyang had been arranged through such a back channel, with the help of *Chōsen Sōren*. A top leader of the association had approached Koizumi with an offer to return the abductees families and pursue normalization between the two countries, an offer later acknowledged to have been accepted by Prime Minister Koizumi. Thus, as opposed to the previous decade, when *Chōsen Sōren* approached politicians, and mainly the LDP, the leadership of *Chōsen Sōren* started to approach directly the Prime Minister and the *Kantei* in the 2000s. Koizumi even recommended the future use of such channels in the relations with North Korea (Funabashi, 2007). Nevertheless, subsequent to requests from the Rescue Movement, several local governments started to charge *Chōsen Sōren* for the fixed property tax for its regional headquarters, tax that the association had been exempted. Such actions, however, did not develop considerably as only eight regional headquarters of *Chōsen Sōren*, out of forty-eight central and regional headquarters, were charged the fixed property tax, according to an examination of *Mainichi Shinbun* (Modern Korea, 2003b).

6.3.6With respect to the *zaikai,* Japanese small and medium-scale companies and *Chōsen Sōren*-affiliated companies, which were interested in trade with North Korea had showed a certain amount of resistance to sanctions and to the containment policy toward the North, especially to the 2004 Japan Agricultural Standards Law (JAS) and the Law to Prevent Designated Ships from Visiting Japanese ports. However, due to their lack of allies they had little influence on the domestic context.


6.3.7 The diversity of arguments and opinions regarding Japan’s North Korea policy that could be noticed in the 1990s among Japanese *academia*, continued to be noticed in the 2000s as well. After the 2002 summit in Pyongyang, the arguments of academia became even more diversified. According to one of the arguments, the continuity of the dialogue with North Korea was necessary, while according to another, there was no need to improve relations between Japan and North Korea, as the latter would not stop its nuclear weapons development. An additional argument regarded the abduction issue as a priority against the improvement of relations between Japan and North Korea (interview Professor Takushoku University).

6.3.8 *Media* coverage of Japan’s foreign policy towards North Korea and the abduction issue had dramatically increased after the first Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002 and Kim Jong-Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions of Japanese citizens (Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). In addition to the fact that coverage on the issue had maintained “near-saturation levels” for several years (Lynn, 2006), a consensus had been created among the Japanese media, in the form of an “abductee hysteria” (Lewis, 2003), making it almost impossible for anyone to have a divergent view. Right-wing media contributed to creating an anti-North Korea mood throughout the country, constantly criticizing the North and opposing diplomatic normalization. Weekly magazines, such as Shūkan *Bunshun*, and monthly magazines, such as *Shokun!* and *Seiron*, began a negative campaign against North Korea. An article published in *Shūkan Bunshun* magazine, in October 2002, expressed criticism towards several government officials as well as politicians who pursued normalization of relations with the North, asking them to apologize officially. The names of the persons accused included MOFA’s Anami Koreshige and Makita Kunihiko, as well as LDP politicians such as Kanemaru Shin, Katō Kōichi, Nonaka Hiromu, Nakayama Masaaki, DPJ’s Kan Naoto, Ishii Hajime, Hatoyama Yukio, SDP’s Doi Takako, and academics such as Wada Haruki of Tokyo University (*Shūkan Bunshun*, 2002). Similar articles appeared in *Bungei Shunjū*, *Shokun!* and *Seiron*. Moreover, Satō Katsumi’s book, *The Abductees’ Families: the Conflict with Kim Jong-Il*, published in December 2002, further criticized pro-North Korea politicians and academics, and emphasized the fact that with firm political principles, the abduction issue could have been solved earlier.

Professor Wada Haruki was especially targeted for criticism regarding certain remarks about the abduction issue published in the January and February issues of *Sekai* magazine, as he himself described them in the January 2004 issue of *Sekai*. Thus, Wada’s remarks that for certain cases, such as the one of Yokota Megumi, there was not sufficient proof to include them in the negotiations as abductions, and the cases must be examined as cases of suspicion and negotiated correspondingly, led various journalists and even academics, to make severe accusations. One such example was Professor Shigemura Toshimitsu of Waseda University, who accused Wada of traitor-like activities, interpreting his remarks from 2001 as “the abduction issue does not exist”, and Ishii Hideo of *Sankei Shinbun*, who similarly reported Wada’s statement as “there are no abductions” (Wada, 2004).

In his article from *Sekai* magazine (January 2004), Professor Wada regarded the national public opinion as “abducted” by such weekly and monthly magazines representing mostly right-wing media. His belief was previously articulated by Professor Steven Vogel of Berkeley University, who warned the Japanese government not to allow the abduction issue to “kidnap” diplomacy and Japan’s aim of strengthening the peace and security of the East Asian region (Vogel, 2003).

Figure 6.1. Coverage of “North Korea” and “the abduction issue” in major newspapers 1998-2006




Author's original work based on Nikkei database

Figure 6.1 shows the media coverage of the abduction issue in relation to North Korea in five major Japanese newspapers: *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Yomiuri, Sankei* and *Nikkei*. As regards *Nikkei Shinbun*, only the morning edition was considered, as the content of the articles in the evening edition was most of the times similar. According to the figure, a high increase in the coverage of the abduction issue can be noticed in 2002, the year of the First Japan-North Korea Summit when Kim Jong Il admitted to the abductions of Japanese citizens, and thereafter.

The media had a great role in promoting the issue within the Japanese society after 2002, as a way of compensating the scarcity of the coverage before 2002 (interview journalist *Kyodo* *News*). As mentioned in the previous chapter, in the 1990s, the media did not show confidence in the abduction issue, not granting it much attention and even referring to it with “*rachi giwaku*” (abduction suspicion) instead of “*rachi mondai*” (abduction issue). However, after 2002, television set the agenda, providing considerable coverage of the human drama connected to the abduction issue (Lynn, 2006), therefore prompting the newspapers to follow and report on the human drama instead of the Pyongyang Declaration. The Declaration had been signed between Japan and North Korea during the First Summit and represented a considerable step forward in the relations between the two countries, as well as an example of Japanese diplomacy independent from the United States. Nevertheless, it was not provided with the appropriate attention by the media, who sustained the drama of the abduction issue, supporting the civil society groups that were advocating the rescue of the abductees, and contributing to increasing the interest of the public in the issue. Drama and action are key criteria that influence the selection, production and prioritization of events as news, according to Professor Greer (2007) from City University London, as discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2). Certain crimes can have lasting influence on media reporting, as they do not affect only the immediate participants, but also the wider society, with results in reshaping beliefs or behaviours (Innes, 2003, cited in Greer, 2007). In the present case, the abduction issue impacted on the wider society with concerns regarding public safety and security, and family feelings that every member of the public could relate to. Moreover, the media attributed a symbolic value to Yokota Megumi, the 13-year-old girl kidnapped from Niigata prefecture, and emphasized the tragedy of the Yokota family by all possible means. Visualisation of the news, in the form of photographs, further humanized the victims and increased the “emotional” side of the issue, emphasizing the evil and immorality of the criminal, North Korea.


Figure 6.2. Coverage of “North Korea” and “the abduction issue” in major newspapers before and after 2002



Author's original work based on Nikkei database


As observed from the previous figure (Figure 6.1), there was a considerable increase in the coverage of the abduction issue in 2002 and thereafter. Figure 6.2 presents the increased interest in the abduction issue of each major Japanese newspaper after 2002, with a total of thirteen times higher number of articles over the period 2002-2005, compared to 1998-2001. In the first period, *Sankei Shinbun* contributed to the coverage with the highest number of articles about the abduction issue; however, in the second period investigated, there is almost no difference among the coverage of the issue by most major newspapers. The only exception is provided by the *Nikkei Shinbun*, the coverage of which accounted for approximately half of the coverage of the others, taken individually. However, this difference can be explained by the fact that *Nikkei* is mainly a financial newspaper, more focused on economic issues in Japan. Therefore, regardless of the position of the newspaper in regard to the political spectrum, all major newspapers showed an increased interest in the North Korean abduction issue after 2002.

Figure 6.3. Coverage of “North Korea” and “the abduction issue” in major newspapers before and after the North Korean missile test (July 5, 2006)



Author's original work based on Nikkei database

Figure 6.4. Coverage of “North Korea” and “missile” in major newspapers before and after the North Korean missile test (July 5, 2006)

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Author's original work based on Nikkei database

Figure 6.3 demonstrates that there was not considerable coverage of the abduction issue in the major Japanese newspapers: *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, *Yomiuri, Sankei, Nikkei* (morning edition), in the wake of the North Korean missile test from July 2006. However, according to Figure 6.4, there was a switch of focus in the media’s coverage, from the abduction issue to the missile launch.

Following a content analysis, not only substantial criticism towards the North’s missile launch could be clearly observed, but also a connection with the abduction issue and the Rescue Movement advocating the resolution of the issue. In this respect, the missile test was used as an opportunity to outline other problems connected with North Korea, and to point to the “real nature” of the North Korean regime. Various newspapers presented the views of the Rescue Movement, which had been constantly and energetically requesting the government the imposition of sanctions, as well as the views of individual families struggling for the rescue of their children. One *Asahi Shinbun* article from July 5, 2006 can be offered as an example in this respect. The article reported the view of Arimoto Akihiro, father of the abducted Arimoto Keiko, who praised the government’s imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea, and emphasized the singularity of the choice.

6.3.9 In the 2000s, and especially after the 2002 summit, *public opinion* regarding North Korea and the abduction issue started to change. After Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002, opinion polls conducted by MOFA showed that 74 per cent of the Japanese people were not satisfied with the results of the summit and Kim Jong-Il’s apology. A mere seven per cent considered the summit to reflect a sincere apology and a change in the North’s intentions (Cha, 2002). Therefore, although North Korea considered the abduction issue settled with Kim Jong-Il’s apology and the way clear towards normalization of relations, the Japanese public, far from considering it a success, was outraged at the confession and the North’s attitude.

Figure 6.5. Areas of interest regarding the North Korea policy (2000~2006)

Author's original work based on Nikkei database

As the attitudes of the Japanese public with regard to North Korea started to be included in Cabinet Office surveys about foreign policy in the 2000s, the above figure (Figure 6.5) shows the percentage of people interested in each issue related to North Korea, among those who expressed interest in the North Korea policy, in the period 2000-2006. The sample size was of 3000 people, with ages over twenty, and the response rate was 70 per cent.

The figure clearly shows that the issue accorded the highest importance had been the abduction issue, followed by the North’s nuclear development and missile testing. The issues with the least importance for the Japanese public were the North’s political system and the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Several other public opinion surveys related to North Korea had been conducted by the print and broadcast media. In this respect, specific surveys had been conducted following the reshuffle of the second Koizumi government (September 27, 2004-September 21, 2005) by various newspapers. According to the results, the opposition to humanitarian aid to North Korea and the agreement for imposing economic sanctions increased. In response to the growing voices seeking economic sanctions against North Korea, Prime Minister Koizumi emphasized the importance of both dialogue and pressure, showing a cautious attitude toward sanctions (*Sankei Shinbun*, 2004).

In October 2004, NHK also conducted a national public opinion survey with participants over the age of twenty, and a response rate of 58.4 per cent, equivalent to 1158 persons. Regarding the government’s attitude toward North Korea, 19 per cent of the respondents believed that Japan should aim at the resolution of the abduction issue through dialogue, while 73 per cent considered that according to the situation, Japan should aim at a strong and strict attitude that included economic sanctions (Modern Korea, 2005b). Moreover, according to another public opinion survey, conducted by *Nihon Terebi* in November 2004, 74.3 per cent of respondents supported the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea (Rescue Modern Korea, 2005e).

Public opinion supporting the imposition of sanctions against North Korea rose especially after the NPA announced, in December 2004, that the remains provided by the North as belonging to Yokota Megumi were false (Modern Korea, 2006a).

In response to the government’s strong reaction toward North Korea after the 2006 missile test, approximately 80 per cent of the respondents to a random telephone survey conducted by *Kyodo* *News* supported the decision, contributing to the popularity of its promoters (The Japan Times, 2006).

## 6.4 SUMMARY

The main purpose of this chapter has been to describe the state of the international situation in the 2000s until North Korea’s 2006 missile launch, as well as Japan’s relations with North Korea in the context of its coordination with the United States and the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the chapter moves on to discuss the domestic context and several relevant actors and their position towards the North Korea policy in the 2000s and in the wake of the 2006 missile test. A description of both the international and domestic spheres is needed in order to provide an explanation for the Japanese government’s decision to impose unilateral economic sanctions against North Korea in 2006, as the two-level games theory, on which the research relies, seeks to integrate both spheres by focusing on the role of decision makers, who must manage both international and domestic factors simultaneously. In addition, the next chapter will discuss the advocacy activities of the civil society actors, as part of the domestic sphere, aiming to establish the Japanese win-set in 2006 and the civil society actors’ role in its formation. By analyzing the Japanese government’s decision through win-sets, it is possible to assess the role of the domestic context, and particularly of the civil society actors, on the foreign policy decision.

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# CHAPTER 7

# THE CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS: ADVOCACY STRATEGIES 1998-2006

## 7.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter presents the Rescue Movement’s activities following the 1998 North Korean missile launch, until July 2006, when, after a similar missile launch from North Korea, the Japanese government imposed unilateral economic sanctions. The activities are presented in accordance with the audiences they were directed at, engaging with the political, social, media and transnational advocacy concepts, structure similar to the one employed in Chapter 5. The exploration will be utilized to determine the Japanese win-set in 2006 and the role of the Rescue Movement in its formation, and, as a result, in the government’s policy toward North Korea.

## 7.2 THE ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES (1998–2006): POLITICAL, SOCIAL, MEDIA, TRANSNATIONAL

### 7.2.1 Political advocacy activities

As previously mentioned in Chapter 5, the political advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement were mainly directed at the national government, but also at the local government. They are hereafter presented according to their type and in chronological order, with a view to bring to light the strategies and tactics of the groups, and when these activities made or did not make a contribution to the government’s policy toward North Korea. Moreover, the subsequent exploration will be useful for emphasizing the facilitating factors in the Rescue Movement’s contribution to the government’s policy. The political advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in the period analysed include, alongside others, the activities identified by the extant literature as methods of civil society organizations to advance their cause to the government. The majority fall within the insider tactics category, as defined by the extant literature, hence non-confrontational, while the citizens protests, sit-ins and street activities fall within the outsider tactics category, as they involve protest and disruption. However, as previously mentioned in the theoretical chapter that certain actions can be considered confrontational in some societies and non-confrontational in others, all the activities of the Rescue Movement, including the ones that involve outsider tactics, are completely peaceful, nonviolent events. Figure 7.1 presents the types of activities conducted by the Movement in the period analysed, as well as the period when they were conducted.

#### 7.2.1.1 Audiences/ Visits to governmental bodies/ Meetings with officials/ Talks accompanied by appeals/ criticisms/ protests/ letters

A significant event for the recognition of the Rescue Movement took place in March 1999, when eight of the victims’ families met the Prime Minister for the first time. The audience was facilitated by Liberal Party member Nishimura Shingo and LDP’s Konoike Yoshitada, who made direct demands and negotiated the issue with Prime Minister Obuchi. The equal representatives of the NARKN, Satō and Kojima, participated in the meeting as well, and submitted a written request to the Prime Minister, alongside the appeal of *Kazokukai*. *Kazokukai*’s appeal pleaded the Prime Minister’s assistance with respect to the following points: to cooperate with the governments of the United States and South Korea to take adequate measures so that the abductees would not be involved in unexpected situations in case of emergency in North Korea, to approach the United States and China, who have power of influence on North Korea, with a strong and firm attitude, in order to make things progress, and to appeal to the international public opinion through the United Nations and other diplomatic channels. *Sukuukai*’s appeal requested the Prime Minister to make the rescue of the abductees a priority of the national government and remove the expression “abduction suspicion” from the government’s discourse. Moreover, the appeal requested that all the materials related to the investigation of the abductions be made public, in order to deepen the national and international public opinion, and, to impose economic sanctions against North Korea as a start, while, if the North did not respond in good faith, to apply physical force. In this regard, *Sukuukai* emphasized that the verification of the goods taken into or out of Japan by *Chōsen Sōren* members, and the mere ban of the Man gyong bong ferry can be a great way to apply pressure against the North.

Prime Minister Obuchi addressed the appeal of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* stating that all measures for solving the abduction issue would be taken; however, the possibility of not pursuing talks or negotiations with North Korea was dismissed, and the fact that the government was pursuing negotiations with North Korea as primary option, emphasized. The Prime Minister also acknowledged the difference made by the activities of the Rescue Movement, in the national public’s perception as well as in North Korea’s perception, noting that a similar face-to-face meeting would not have been possible before. The Prime Minister concluded his response by stating that the abduction issue would be addressed and that the government planned to cooperate in that respect with politicians such as Nishimura Shingo and Sakurai Shin, who were working zealously to solve the problem (Araki, 2002).

In August 2000, various families (Yokota, Masumoto) together with Satō, Nishioka and Araki, executive staff of *Sukuukai*, visited MOFA in order to hear the report of the Foreign Ministerial talks between Japan and North Korea, which took place the previous month. The representatives of the Rescue Movements had an audience with Makita Kunihiko, Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA, and concluded that a clear reference to the abduction issue had not been included in the talks with the North. Makita indicated that the “settlement of the past”, referred to during the talks, was a major premise for normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Moreover, Makita pointed out that the abduction issue could not be shelved due to rising public opinion, which would not allow the normalization of relations without addressing the abductions. Araki Kazuhiro criticized the comment as it reflected the government’s action only in reaction to strong public opinion (interview Chairman *Chōsakai*).

Satō and Araki, executive staff of *Sukuukai*, further criticized Nakayama Masaaki, elected Chairman of the Japan-North Korea Diet Members’ Assembly in August 2000, for his statement at the press conference following the Diet meeting. Nakayama declared that normalization of relations with North Korea was a priority, after which, issues such as the abduction issue would clarify themselves. He emphasized that in a contrary situation, if the abduction were discussed first, there would be no progress in any direction. Nakayama also referred to rice aid as a window for solving numerous problems with North Korea, and a prerequisite for diplomatic negotiations. However, *Sukuukai*’s criticism also referred to Nakayama’s other statements, such as the one made in August 1999, at a press conference after a general meeting of *Rachi Giren*, that An Myong Jin, the North Korean spy who testified of seeing Yokota Megumi in North Korea, was only 9 years old when the event happened, thus leaving room for suspicions. At the time, Nakayama also mentioned that in the future something more significant should be considered as proof. Therefore, Satō and Araki, on behalf of the Rescue Movement expressed strong protest to Nakayama’s statements, and their intention to oppose his actions, as well as the actions of other politicians acting in the same manner (Araki, 2002).

As the decision to provide half a million tons of rice aid to North Korea was making progress despite considerable criticism of the Rescue Movement and the media, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* requested an audience with the Foreign Minister in September 2000. However, as their request was not being addressed, the representatives of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, Yokota Shigeru and Satō Katsumi, visited MOFA on October 2, 2000 and restated the request. As a result, the audience took place on October 4, when *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, as well as the Prefectural Assemblymen Association made an appeal to the Foreign Minister opposing the government’s decision to provide rice aid to North Korea. The groups expressed their doubts regarding North Korea’s need for assistance, in the conditions that the country was investing considerable sums in developing missile techniques. Moreover, they emphasized the obligation of the LDP, as the ruling party, to listen to the voices of the families and the larger public regarding foreign affairs. In response to the Foreign Minister's invitation to expose their claims, the families took turns in expressing their criticism toward the rice aid policy adopted by the government and requested explanations for the decision.

Foreign Minister Kōno explained the negotiations between Japan and North Korea to the families and their supporters, stressing his own responsibility for taking the decision to provide aid and start dialogue with the North, in order to solve the pending issues between the two countries. Moreover, the Foreign Minister mentioned South Korea’s encouragement to Japan to support the North, as it was important for the North-South relationship and the North’s participation and responsibility in the international community. However, the Foreign Minister was further questioned by Yokota Shigeru, father of the abducted Yokota Megumi, and representative of *Kazokukai*, about the removal of the expression “abductions” from the government’s policy speech. As a reply, Foreign Minister Kōno referred to the Prime Minister’s use of the “humanitarian problem” expression and to the fact that he himself considered it appropriate in order to maintain the existing space for negotiations (Araki, 2002; interview Kazokukai members).

Another visit of the representatives of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* to MOFA took place on November 12, 2001, in order to submit a request document and transmit their opposition to the provision of rice aid to North Korea, as well as their criticism toward CCS Fukuda’s comment from a House of Councillors Cabinet meeting on October 30. Fukuda stated that the abductions have a character different than terrorism, statement that the Rescue Movement interpreted as denial of the terrorism of the abductions. Furthermore, the document submitted requested, for the third time, the resolution of the abduction issue through imposing sanctions and adopting a stronger position toward the North. It suggested that the Japanese government replaced the "carrots" with "sticks", and took strict measures for the release of the abducted Japanese.

The rice aid provided to North Korea was not considered humanitarian aid, as it was not reaching the people who needed it the most, but solely supporting the terrorist regime. Thus, the appeal was seeking a set deadline for the resolution of the abduction issue and, in case that was not respected, economic sanctions and bans on North Korean vessels entering Japanese ports or Zainichi Koreans reentering Japan. The appeal also requested the formation of a semi-governmental investigation team, accepted by the North (Araki, 2002).

On November 15, 2001, after 24 years since Yokota Megumi’s disappearance, the Rescue Movement had visited the governor of Niigata prefecture to ask for cooperation for the rescue of Megumi and the other abductees. The following year, in February, Rescue Movement representatives Yokota Shigeru and Araki Kazuhiro, visited Hirasawa Katsuei, member of the House of Representatives, at the Diet, and handed him a letter for Prime Minister Koizumi. The letter contained requests regarding the Japan-US summit talks that were planned for the following week, asking Koizumi to include the abduction issue in the discussions, and requesting a meeting with the families of the abductees. The Prime Minister’s response stated that the programme of the summit talks had yet to be decided, but he expressed his categorical will to meet the families. However, after the summit, it had been confirmed that the abduction issue had been included in talks with President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Araki, 2002).

Furthermore, also in February, several representatives of *Kazokukai* visited MOFA for a meeting with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko. Their main requests regarded the safety of the abductees, gathering information about them and making it accessible to the families. Moreover, they requested the formation of a semi-governmental investigation group accepted by North Korea, and the establishment of a Headquarters for the Abduction Issue in order to handle the rescue of the abducted Japanese. They further emphasized the need for a strong reaction from the Japanese government for the resolution of the abduction issue. The suggested reaction included tough and precise sanctions towards the North, and the emphasis of the abduction issue in talks with other countries and international organizations.

In March, representatives of the Rescue Movement and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association met Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō to request his cooperation. Although it was the first time for the governor to meet the victims’ families, he had expressed his support for the Rescue Movement, hoping to exert influence towards the government and the media. He further indicated the need for pressure toward North Korea, and even the need to overthrow the government, position favoured by the majority of the members of the Rescue Movement. In the same month, the representatives of the groups visited the *Kantei* as well, and appealed to Prime Minister Koizumi and Deputy CCS Abe for the rescue of the abductees. The appeal asked for the rescue of the abductees through sanctions and exertion of pressure toward the North Korean regime, as the measures adopted by then had not been effective, although all the government officials mentioned their perseverance. It also expressed the hope that measures such as the project team formed at the *Kantei* for the establishment of a Headquarters for Abductions, with Abe Shinzō at the top, would advance and contribute to the rescue of the abductees from North Korea. The abduction issue was discussed by the Prime Minister in a press conference later that day, as well as two days later when he visited South Korea (Araki, 2002).

The representatives of the Rescue Movement had several meetings with government officials, including an audience with Prime Minister Koizumi, after the Prime Minister's visit to North Korea and until the end of 2002. The groups mainly requested the verification of the information provided by North Korea regarding the deaths of various abductees and overall asked for the resolution of the issue. They emphasized their gratitude to Deputy CCS Abe Shinzō, for his understanding and devotion towards solving the abduction issue (interview executive staff Sukuukai). In October 2002, during a visit to the Cabinet Office, the groups submitted a document containing all the inconsistencies of the investigation results with respect to the abducted citizens, to Cabinet Office advisor, Nakayama Kyōko. The Japanese investigation team dispatched to North Korea between September 29 and October 2, 2002, led by Saiki Akitaka, Deputy Director-General of the Asian Bureau of MOFA, provided information to the families, which, after careful examination, was considered vague and suspicious. The inconsistencies referred to the death certificates of seven people, which had been released by the same hospital, errors of birth or marriage dates, as well as of address, and incompatibilities with facts from eyewitnesses.

There were also several statements and declarations of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, seeking a strong reaction from the government to bring back all the abducted Japanese citizens. *Sukuukai*’s request also referred to the people kidnapped from South Korea during the Korean War, the Zainichi Koreans who returned to North Korea, and to the twenty million people of North Korea, victims of the regime. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that *Sukuukai* was the main supporter of the victims’ families, the focus of the group’s advocacy was much broader than the one of *Kazokukai* (Modern Korea, 2002a).

In the beginning of February 2004, several members of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* had an informal talk with CCS Hosoda Hiroyuki and Director of Asian Bureau of MOFA, Yabunaka Mitoji, where they expressed their views on the progress of the negotiations with North Korea and the handling of the abduction issue. They expressed distrust toward Tanaka Hitoshi, Assistant Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, for handling any contact with North Korea, as well as regret regarding Prime Minister Koizumi’s statement of not imposing economic sanctions. In response, Yabunaka, made clear the government's position of not normalizing relations with North Korea nor provide economic assistance, without a clear resolution of the three pending issues: North Korea's nuclear development, the missile problem, and the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2004a).

The representatives of the Japanese group in the governmental talks with North Korea regularly met the Rescue Movement representatives in order to report on the content of the talks regarding the abduction issue. On February 16, 2004, during such a meeting between *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* members and Yabunaka Mitoji, Director of the Asian Affairs Bureau of MOFA, the groups had been informed about North Korea’s request to exclude the abduction issue from the SPT. However, Yabunaka emphasized that Japan’s standard position was not expected to change and that it had been transmitted to North Korea. In response, the Rescue Movement emphasized the fact that the continuing statements of the Prime Minister, CCS, and other high government officials that the revised sanctions legislation would not be applied made the value of pressure disappear. Nevertheless, Yabunaka explained that the revision of the legislation, as well as the growing public opinion against the North represented considerable pressure towards North Korea (Modern Korea, 2004b).

At the periodical meeting from March 2004 between the Rescue Movement representatives and the government officials representing Japan in the talks with North Korea, from March 2004, CCS Hosoda made a statement regarding North Korea’s reaction toward the resolution of the abduction issue. Thus, Hosoda asserted that if North Korea did not have a sincere reaction by April that year, economic sanctions would be considered by the government (Modern Korea, 2004d).

On May 18, 2004, the Rescue Movement representatives met the new Deputy CCS Sugiura Seiken and discussed the resolution of the abduction issue in regard to the Prime Minister’s approaching visit to Pyongyang. Among the participants in the meeting there were Hiranuma Takeo, President of *Rachi Giren* and Abe Shinzō, Secretary General of LDP. Abe assured the representatives of the Rescue Movement of communicating their views to Prime Minister Koizumi, who would surely consider them during the talks in Pyongyang later that month (Modern Korea, 2004e).

Following Koizumi's visit to North Korea, at the end of July 2004, the Rescue Movement representatives visited the Cabinet Secretariat Support office for the Abductees and their Families, where they held consultations with the officials regarding their demands. Participants included Cabinet Office adviser, Nakayama Kyōko, Deputy Director-General of the Asian Bureau of MOFA, Saiki Akitaka and head of the Cabinet Secretariat support office for the abductees and their families, Oguma Hiroshi. The Rescue Movement representatives voiced their opposition to the restart of the negotiations for normalization of relations with North Korea, at the stage where there were no results of the reinvestigation (Modern Korea, 2005a). However, in November 2004, the third round of working-level negotiations between Japan and North Korea took place prompting *Rachi Giren* to organize an urgent meeting, with participants from *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, as well as members of the Japanese negotiating group, such as Yabunaka Mitoji and Saiki Akitaka. *Rachi Giren* and the Rescue Movement representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the negotiations and with continuing such negotiations without any meaning and results, asking for the imposition of sanctions against North Korea (Modern Korea, 2005c).

The group of Japanese officials returned from Pyongyang on November 15, 2004, bringing back to Japan what North Korea called the cremated remains of Yokota Megumi, reported to have committed suicide in April 2004 (although the first report stated she died in March 1993). Yabunaka, the representative of the Japanese group, announced that tests would be carried out on the bones in order to confirm the accuracy of North Korea’s report, and the government would carefully examine the materials gathered, as well as the outcomes of the interviews conducted in North Korea during the visit. The information, handed out to each family, was made public in the October 2005 issue of Modern Korea (Modern Korea, 2005d).

In January 2005, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* visited the office of the Director of the Asian Bureau of MOFA, Sasae Kenichirō, seeking economic sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of all the abductees (Modern Korea, 2006a), and in March of the same year, they visited the Oguma Hiroshi, at the Cabinet Secretariat Support Office for the Abductees and their Families, strongly requesting a meeting with the Prime Minister for the immediate imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea. The representatives of the Movement also requested government recognition of all the abduction cases recognized by *Sukuukai,* and withdrawal of the reentry permits of six executive members of *Chōsen Sōren* who were also high officials in the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly (Modern Korea, 2006b).

In October 2005, during a meeting chaired by Abe Shinzō, *Rachi Giren* established its policy regarding the abduction issue, namely to rescue all the abductees as soon as possible. The participants in the meeting unanimously agreed on the imposition of sanctions against North Korea, as well as on continuing the cooperation with the United States (*Sukuukai*, 2005a). In November, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* representatives had visited the Cabinet Secretariat Office for Contact and Coordination regarding the Abduction Issue and submitted a request document for Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Asō with regard to the negotiations with North Korea bound to start on November 3, 2005. However, the document, requesting the immediate imposition of economic sanctions for the rescue of the abductees, was received by the newly-appointed CCS, Abe Shinzō, who further transmitted it to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister (*Sukuukai*, 2005b).

Information regarding the negotiations between Japan and North Korea, which started on November 3, were transmitted to the Rescue Movement by Saiki Akitaka, Deputy Director general at MOFA. According to the report, while there was no new response from the North Korean side, Japan reiterated the plan to adopt a strong reaction in case there was no progress on the abduction issue (*Sukuukai*, 2005c). Later that month, Foreign Minister Asō, reinforced the general position of the government in a meeting of the House of Representatives Special Committee for the Abduction Issue, namely that there would be no normalization of relations with North Korea, if the abduction issue and other pending issues were not solved (*Sukuukai*, 2005d).

In December 2005, the representatives of the Rescue Movement met with Japan’s Ambassador in charge of human rights, Saiga Fumiko, appointed by MOFA on December 6, 2005. The Movement appealed to Saiga to collaborate for the resolution of the abduction issue and convey a strong message to the international community regarding North Korea (MOFA, 2005).

The members of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* had persisted in meeting government officials in order to appeal for the rescue of the Japanese abductees from North Korea. However, according to a report from MOFA officials who participated in further negotiations with North Korea, in February 2006 there were no accomplishments regarding the abduction issue. There were, nevertheless, two things that North Korea expressed concern about, according to the Japanese officials, specifically the Japanese public opinion and the internationalization of the abduction issue (*Sukuukai*, 2006c).

#### 7.2.1.2 Citizens' gatherings/ Assemblies accompanied by requests/demands/ appeals

The request to make the rescue of the kidnapped Japanese a priority of the national government became the main theme of the citizens’ assembly organized by *Sukuukai* in May 1999, in Tokyo. The 1700 participants strongly demanded the government to take a firm position toward North Korea and rescue the abducted Japanese nationals. Moreover, several families of South Korean citizens kidnapped by North Korea participated in such a meeting for the first time. The appeal adopted by the assembly referred to their participation, as well as it resulting in the strengthening and internationalization of the Rescue Movement. Among the points requested to the government there were: to declare the rescue of the abductees a priority of the government and to establish a policy headquarters inside the government for the resolution of the abduction issue; to restate the request to North Korea not to endanger the lives of the abductees; to remove the expression “abduction suspicion” (*rachi giwaku*) when referring to the abduction cases and replace it with a suitable one; to adopt a hard stance toward North Korea, starting with economic sanctions and not to provide any type of aid or conduct diplomatic negotiations with the North as long as the abduction issue was being shelved; to make investigation documents regarding the abduction issue public as much as possible, in order to increase the awareness of the national and international public opinion.

Apart from collective gatherings and appeals to the government and politicians, certain families had continued to appeal to the government individually. Such an example is Hasuike Hidekazu, the father of the abducted Hasuike Kaoru, who had continued to send letters to politicians and Prime Ministers even after the formation of *Kazokukai*. In June 1999, Hasuike received a response from former Prime Minister Murayama, which included superficial remarks according to the receiver, lacking the responsibility of a politician who was going to be part of that year’s delegation to North Korea. However, continuing to advocate his cause, Hasuike Hidekazu asked for the support of Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, through a letter, in October 1999. During the same month, Hasuike received a reply, the Foreign Minister assuring him of his cooperation. Moreover, Hasuike’s letter is considered to have been an impulse in a Cabinet meeting from November 1999, when Foreign Minister Kōno stated that something needed to be done regarding the abductions (Araki, 2002).

At the Second Citizens’ Assembly for the Rescue of Yokota Megumi and the other abductees, in Tokyo, on April 30, 2000, an appeal was suggested by the Chairman of Kagoshima *Sukuukai*, Hamada Shigehisa, and adopted unanimously. The appeal requested that the Kim Jong-Il regime admitted the abductions as national crimes, and returned all the Japanese to their families in the shortest time; that the Japanese government demanded the return of all the abductees and did not provide any economic assistance until then. Moreover, the Rescue Movement requested the government the imposition of economic sanctions on the North, in case no progress was seen on the abduction issue. The appeal also addressed the South Korean government, requesting the acceptance of the appeal of the South Korean abductees’ families, and the pursuit of a resolution with North Korea.

In September 2001, the gathering organized in Tokyo by *Sukuukai*, to seek the complete investigation of the abduction issue from the *Yodo-gō* wives, adopted an appeal requesting the police to fully investigate Kaneko Emiko, a *Yodo-gō* wife, whose return to Japan was planned for September 18. Moreover, the appeal requested the sincere confession of Kaneko Emiko and other suspects regarding the abductions, as well as their cooperation for the rescue of the abductees. The appeal had been submitted to the Police on September 10, by the representatives of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*.

In response, the Police mentioned their change of expression to refer to the abduction issue, using "charge" instead of "suspicion". Moreover, the homepages of the Police in Niigata, Fukui and Kagoshima had included the new terminology. Such developments confirm the fact that the government had clear proof of North Korea’s involvement in the abductions, clearly referring to it when making official statements.

On September 18, 2001, the day of the return of Kaneko Emiko to Japan, the Rescue Movement presented an appeal at the press conference organized in Osaka. The appeal made reference to the terrorist acts that happened in the United Stated that month, relating them to the abduction issue, another terrorist act committed by North Korea. It criticized the Japanese government for ignoring the abductions and for conducting negotiations for normalization of relations with a terrorist country, in comparison with the US government and people, who are taking actions to solve the occurred terrorist incidents. Thus, the Rescue Movement together with the Prefectural Assemblymen Association requested the Japanese government, the Diet, the justice organs, the news media, and the public, to cooperate for solving the abduction issue (Araki, 2002).

The meeting of the Committee for the realization of the Fourth Citizens Assembly, held at the Diet, in July 2002, was joined for the first time by representatives of all the four groups: *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, *Chihō Giin no kai* and the new *Rachi Giren*. The date for the Citizens Assembly was decided, alongside methods to obtain the support of the government and of each political party. The main points decided upon at the meeting included: not investing citizens’ taxes into North Korean banks, the source of funding for North Korea; making public the information regarding the North Korean spy ships; the immediate arrest of the *Yodo-gō* group upon returning to Japan, and a complete investigation about the abduction issue.

The Rescue Movement continued criticizing the government for its weak position toward North Korea and the inability to recover all the abducted Japanese citizens, criticism expressed in May 2003, in a declaration adopted at the Fifth Citizens Assembly for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Modern Korea, 2003c).

Along these lines, *Sukuukai* Niigata had organized an urgent meeting on June 8, 2003, together with the Association of Niigata Assemblymen, opposing the entry into port of Man Gyong Bong 92 ferry, the main link between Japan and North Korea. The meeting and the protest were also supported by *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, *Rachi Giren* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association (Modern Korea, 2003c). The arrival of the ferry was cancelled by North Korea on the same day, the state further criticizing Japan for joining the United States in setting inspections of North Korean ships and aircrafts (The New York Times, 2003, cited in Son, 2011).

Man Gyong Bong 92 ferry was built in 1992 with funds from the pro-Pyongyang General Association of the Korean Residents in Japan, and without any sanctions in place, the ferry was making 20 to 30 trips per year between Japan and North Korea. In summer 2003, a North Korean defector testified to the US Senate Committee that the ferry was the main means of transportation of 90% of the state’s missile parts (BBC 2003, cited in Son, 2011). The Japanese authorities planned a large-scale inspection of North Korean ships, especially Man Gyong Bong 92 ferry, mobilizing numerous police and customs officers. The cancellation of the ferry’s arrival in Niigata was interpreted by the Rescue Movement as a success of its meetings and protest activities (interview Chairman *Sukuukai*). Moreover, the role of the Rescue Movement, although without mentioning the name, was recognized also in China Daily: “A planned visit to Japan by the Man Gyong Bong-92 ferry on Monday (June 9) was cancelled by Pyongyang after opposition from some Japanese angry at the abduction of fellow citizens by DPRK agents, plus a security clampdown by the Japanese Government. The DPRK bitterly criticized Japan for the security clampdown that it blamed for the cancellation of the ferry’s visit, saying that Tokyo’s actions constituted “sanctions”” (Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 2003).

In November 2004, on the day before the working-level negotiations between Japan and North Korea took place, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* had organized an urgent citizens’ assembly and carried out campaigning activities in the streets of Tokyo. They demanded firm negotiations from the Japanese negotiating group and economic sanctions in case of an insincere attitude from North Korea (Modern Korea, 2005c). As there was no progress regarding the resolution of the abduction issue, on September 17, 2005, with the occasion of three years having passed since Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, the Rescue Movement once more presented their view publicly, criticizing the government’s policy toward North Korea, described as "weak diplomacy". Lebanon’s case was provided to exemplify the “ridiculous” situation of Japan, emphasizing that the Japanese government could not do what the Lebanese government did, namely have all the abductees returned to their country. The families and their supporters concluded by expressing their high expectations regarding a “strong reaction” from the Japanese government for the resolution of the abduction issue (*Sukuukai*, 2005a). The Rescue Movement has also been supported by all the presidents of the local assemblies, who gathered in Tokyo on April 18, 2006, to establish the National Convention of the Local Assemblies for the Abduction Issue. Among the resolutions adopted at the gathering, the members decided to urgently prepare the legislation for concretely imposing economic sanctions on North Korea, and to strongly demand the government a hard stance toward the North, a criminal state that repeatedly violated the sovereignty of Japan. In that respect, the executive members planned to request a meeting with CCS Abe and Foreign Minister Asō (*Sukuukai*, 2006d). The following month, in May 2006, *Rachi Giren* adopted a resolution to increase pressure on North Korea and rescue all the abductees. The members of *Rachi Giren* expressed their conviction that Prime Minister Koizumi should make all efforts to increase awareness about the abduction issue internationally, and thus increase the pressure on North Korea. The politicians finally agreed to appeal through all the channels to the wider international society, for cooperation regarding the resolution of the abduction issue (*Sukuukai*, 2006e).

#### 7.2.1.3 Demands/ Appeals/ Requests/ Declarations/ Question documents/ Petitions accompanied by objections/ protests/ signatures

With the occasion of Murayama delegation visiting Pyongyang in December 1999, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* submitted several demands to the visiting group. The most important ones included no normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea before the rescue of the abductees, and communicating the North that Japan would strengthen its approach in case the abductees were not returned.

After the return of the delegation from North Korea, *Sukuukai* had objected the shelving of the abduction issue, as well as the negotiations for normalization of relations, the provision of food aid and removal of the sanctions towards North Korea. The group requested the government to include the abduction issue on the formal agenda for negotiations, and not to provide aid unless progress could be noticed regarding the abduction issue. Moreover, it demanded the government to impose strong sanctions on the North, if a sincere attitude regarding the abductions could not be noted. Furthermore, there was strong protest from the citizens all over Japan in regard to a delegation member’s comment during a TV interview. Aoki Hiroyuki, LDP politician had pretended the abduction problem did not exist, and the national “emotion” (*kanjō*) regarding it was created by the mass media and the Rescue Movement. Hasuike Toru, brother of Hasuike Kaoru, abducted by North Korea, protested directly to the politician, as well as to the LDP Headquarters, alongside numerous citizens (e-mail correspondence *Kazokukai* member).

In the same month, December 1999, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* appealed to the Foreign Minister, requesting that Japan would not provide the food aid demanded by North Korea, if the abduction issue was not addressed. Along with the appeal, the groups submitted approximately one million three hundred thousand signatures in support to their request, and pressured the government with the possibility of a sit-in protest in front of MOFA.

The Foreign Minister’s response addressed the food aid issue, but was not clear regarding its provision to North Korea. He explained that food aid was a means of negotiating with North Korea, a path preferred by Japan, as opposed to cutting all ties with the country. He stressed that the Murayama delegation only created a space for discussion, an effort appreciated within the government. Lastly, he mentioned that he would assume responsibility for the decision, and his judgment would not be influenced by pro or con voices. Araki, executive staff of *Sukuukai*, however, commented that despite considerable opposition to food aid, there still existed proponents of the policy inside the government. Moreover, he condemned the politicians’ lack of explanations regarding the benefits of providing aid to North Korea, or its relation to the abduction issue (interview Chairman *Chōsakai*).

In January 2000, as the *Yomiuri Shinbun* announced (January 5, 2000) that the government confirmed the rice aid policy toward North Korea, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented an immediate message of opposition. The groups also appealed to the NPA requesting that Shin Gwang Su, the North Korean defector who kidnapped Hara Tadaaki from Japan, be brought to Japan and investigated. Shin Gwang Su was caught in South Korea, sentenced to death, but granted amnesty in December 1999, by President Kim Dae Jung. Furthermore, when South Korean President, Roh Tae-woo, visited Japan in 1988, he was handed a petition signed by Diet members from several parties in Japan including Takako Doi, Murayama Tomiichi (JSP), Naoto Kan (Social Democratic Federation) and others, asking for the release of 19 political prisoners. It was later learned that among the prisoners there was Shin Gwang Su, who abducted Hara Tadaaki from Japan in June 1980. *Kazokukai*, all local *Sukuukai* associations, and the newly formed Prefectural Assemblymen Association requested MOFA and all the related institutions to bring Shin to Japan and clarify the situation (Araki, 2002).

Moreover, on the same day, January 23, 2000, the Chairman of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, Tsuchiya Takayuki, announced a decision of the association’s activities in order to support the civil society groups in their pursuit. In this respect, the association planned to collect written opinions from each local government in order to request the national government to take action for the rescue of the abducted Japanese, and in order to create "a wave" for the rescue of the abductees. Moreover they pledged to request responsible action from politicians in the National Diet, elected in the respective region, and collaborate with *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* for creating public awareness about the abduction issue all over Japan.

This decision and the request from all the three groups, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, Prefectural Assemblymen Association, were submitted to MOFA in February 2000.

Uemoto Kazuyoshi, Director General of the North East Asia Division of MOFA, and Tani Shigeyuki, Administrative Official of the North East Asia Division of MOFA, addressed the requests of the groups, asserting MOFA’s preference for dialogue with North Korea. However, Uemoto also acknowledged the possibility of imposing sanctions, in case North Korea did not show a sincere attitude. Thus, contrary to Foreign Minister Kōno’s statement, the Director General of the North East Asia Division of MOFA called attention for the first time to the possibility of applying sanctions toward North Korea, in line with the Rescue Movement’s requests.

Later that year, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Associations submitted a written request to MOFA, NPA and the South Korean Embassy to extradite Shin Gwang Su, the abductor of Hara Tadaaki, to Japan, as there was the possibility of him returning to North Korea, where he was regarded as a national hero. The request was handed to Foreign Minister Kōno, in July 2000, requesting him to raise the abduction issue and strongly request its resolution, during the Foreign Ministerial meeting between Japan and North Korea in Bangkok, Thailand, on July 26. The groups emphasized the Foreign Minister’s earlier remarks regarding the benefits of dialogue and pointed out that the coming meeting was such an opportunity to solve the problem through dialogue. Moreover, the groups warned MOFA about more powerful protests, in case food aid was agreed upon.

Furthermore, in July 2000, *Sukuukai* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association also submitted a document to local governments requesting a cautious handling of the demand to send North Korea the Japanese rice that was approaching its expiration date. The reasons for the request included the fact that, according to the Rescue Movement, the food crisis in North Korea was caused by the failure of the agricultural policy and an abnormal distribution of resources, attaching a high importance to military affairs. The groups considered the situation could change only with changing the regime and although the food aid requested by North Korea was presented as "humanitarian aid", the groups asked the local government to consider the demand with much caution, as North Korea had ignored the humanitarian perspective of the abductions and the abduction issue as a whole.

In September 2000, *Kazokukai* submitted approximately one million and a half signatures to Prime Minister Mori, opposing the shelving of the abduction issue. In response, the Prime Minister addressed the families assuring them that the government was not shelving the abduction issue, and would not normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea without solving the abduction issue. Moreover, he emphasized that in the end both issues needed to be solved simultaneously: the diplomatic relations and the abductions. However, he mentioned that in the process of solving both issues there was the possibility that one or the other came first. Nevertheless, the government assured *Kazokukai* of its full commitment to the abduction issue, and explained that the resolution of problems would be sought through various negotiation routes.

Later that year, in October, representatives of *Kazokukai* together with Satō Katsumi made an appeal at MOFA for the rescue of the abductees from North Korea, including Fukutome Kimiko, the wife of a *Yodo-gō* hijacker. The response came from councilor Satō Shigekazu, from the Asia Bureau of MOFA, who had very similar remarks with the ones of the Foreign Minister from earlier that month. He stated the government’s common objective to rescue the abductees, but stressed that the result depended on the attitude of the Kim Jong Il regime. Accordingly, the representatives of the Rescue Movement pressed the government for a harder position towards North Korea, including sanctions, if the abductees did not return (Araki, 2002).

In April 2001, an executive meeting of *Sukuukai*, held in Tokyo, adopted a declaration asking for the responsibility of Foreign Minister Kōno and Makita Kunihiko, Director of the Asia Bureau of MOFA, regarding the abduction issue. The declaration, signed by Satō Katsumi, but representing the Rescue Movement and the Japanese citizens, requested the resignation of Foreign Minister Kōno and of the Director of the Asia Bureau, Makita Kunihiko. Both, the Foreign Minister and the Director of the Asia Bureau were considered responsible for the provision of food aid to North Korea, regarding it as a chance to normalize relations with the North and a good chance for dialogue and discussion of the abduction issue. However, the judgment of the two leaders was criticized, as North Korea continued to consider the abductions "fabrications", even after the provision of food aid (Araki, 2002).

The Rescue Movement supported by the Prefectural Assemblymen Association released another declaration in May 2001, to express their strong protest toward the government for allowing Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Il’s eldest son who entered Japan illegally, to leave the country. The Rescue Movement considered Kim Jong Nam’s illegal entry to Japan an opportunity that could have been used in Japan’s favour for the rescue of the abductees. However, they criticized Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Tanaka for their will to settle any situation based on the "peace at any price" principle. Despite the Rescue Movement’s and the public’s opposition to Kim Jong Nam’s leaving the country, the government allowed it and even bent the law to make it possible, as according to the law, people who entered the country illegally should be constrained for a period of 60 days and investigated. The government’s reaction to the respective incident was considered a betrayal of the families of the abductees and of the Japanese people. However, the Rescue Movement was seeking to amend the mistaken position of the government and explain the real situation to Koizumi and Tanaka. Furthermore, politicians such as Nishimura Shingo and Hirasawa Katsuei supported the protest of the Rescue Movement, submitting an appeal to the government as well, to criticize Kim Jong Nam’s departure from Japan.

Although the majority of the activities were conducted as a group, and as part of the Rescue Movement, some of the families also continued to appeal individually to various audiences. Such an example is the Arimoto family, who, in May 2001, submitted a questions document to the NHK and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The questions referred to the years 1991 and 1993, and the intention of the family to organize press conferences and appeal for the rescue of their daughter, Arimoto Keiko. In 1991, the family had been contacted just before the press conference and asked by Endo Tadao, the manager of a bookshop, not to disclose information about the abductions as such action would ruin the negotiations between Japan and North Korea, and thus, the chance to rescue the abductees. Endo Tadao also promised the Arimotos to subsequently help them rescue their daughter through different routes. Accordingly, the families did not disclose ample information regarding the abductions, thus, leading to the media’s disappointment and loss of interest. That loss of interest was noticed in 1993, when the Arimoto family once more expressed the wish to organize a press conference, having as proof of their daughter’s kidnapping, a photo shown to them by the police, with Arimoto Keiko and a North Korean spy at Copenhagen Airport. However, no media company was interested in attending the press conference, as they had all been deceived in 1991, by not receiving any useful information. NHK’s reply came in June, explaining that the company arranged the press conference after Arimoto’s request to MOFA. Regarding Endo Tadao, the NHK considered that the information should have been introduced to the Arimotos and thus made the introductions before the press conference, as requested (ReACH, 2007b).

Another case of a family member of one of the abductees taking individual action is the case of Masumoto Teruaki, who, in July 2001, sent a letter to Saito Yūko, a politician from Arakawa Ward Assembly in Tokyo, in response to her sarcastic question during the meeting of the Citizens’ Union that was promoting normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea. Saito Yūko sarcastically questioned the existence of people abducted by North Korea, and argued that there was no necessity for abductions and such acts could not be understood nor explained. Masumoto’s letter enquired about Saitō’s and the others’ disbelief in the abductions, while the Japanese government had recognized various cases of Japanese abducted by North Korea. Furthermore, the letter explained that due to some groups’ support for the normalization of relations between Japan and the North, the situation of the North Korean people was becoming worse (Araki, 2002).

In August 2002, the Rescue Movement and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association delivered a statement about the Red Cross Societies Conference that took place in Pyongyang that month between the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross Societies. The statement referred to the North Korean Red Cross Society’s declaration regarding the investigation about "the missing Japanese persons", asserting that news about the abduction victims had not been reported at all. It, thus, criticized the quantity of rice sent until that time to North Korea (670, 000 tons) and requested the government to limit the flow of persons, things and money between Japan and North Korea, by imposing economic sanctions, as long as the abduction issue was not solved. The groups further requested MOFA that, at the High officials’ meeting taking place in Pyongyang from August 25, 2002, the Japanese government transmitted a strong position regarding the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2002a).

September 2002 represented an important period for the Rescue Movement, the groups having released a statement on September 1 regarding their high expectations about the abduction issue, from Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang on the 17th of the month (Modern Korea, 2002a). Moreover, on September 3, *Rachi Giren* organized an urgent meeting in the Diet, with participants from *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, where a request document addressed to the Prime Minister had been adopted, and handed to CCS Fukuda. The document, signed by the Chairman of the *Rachi Giren*, Ishiba Shigeru, and the representative of *Kazokukai*, Yokota Shigeru, asked Koizumi to resolve the abduction issue, expressing the high expectations of the families and the Japanese people regarding the summit meeting that would take place that month. The things requested to the Prime Minister included having a position of "no normalization of relations and no economic assistance to North Korea unless the abduction issue is resolved" and negotiating, not only regarding the eleven abducted Japanese, but also regarding the several thousand possibly abducted Japanese nationals, according to the Japanese Police. Moreover, the document requested that the Prime Minister interrupted the summit in case no concrete progress was seen regarding the resolution of the abduction issue, and in case the suspicious ships were found to be North Korean, economic sanctions were regarded as mandatory (Modern Korea, 2002a).

The same requests were made to Koizumi before his visit to North Korea by the appeal adopted by the Rescue Movement at their Fourth Citizens Assembly from September 16, 2002. On the same day, representatives of the Rescue Movement and *Rachi Giren*, including Yokota Shigeru, Satō, Nishioka, Nakagawa Shōichi, Nishimura Shingo and Yoneda Kenzō, met CCS Fukuda and Deputy CCS Abe Shinzō at the *Kantei*. Abe assured the families that any information obtained would be first transmitted to them and not to the press. The purpose of the meeting was to transmit their feelings to the Prime Minister and make an appeal for help before he departed for North Korea. During the meeting, Hamamoto Yukō, the older brother of Hamamoto Fukie, kidnapped together with Chimura Yasushi, from Fukui prefecture, addressed Fukuda with the assertion that the abductions occurred when his father, Fukuda Takeo, was the Prime Minister of Japan. He further criticized Fukuda Takeo for not being aware of such developments related to the violation of national sovereignty and human rights. Hamamoto Yukō finally transmitted the families’ plea to the Prime Minister, namely to take the mission seriously and do his job as a Prime Minister (Modern Korea, 2002a).

The actions of the Rescue Movement continued and intensified after September 17, 2002, when Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang and the first Japan-North Korea summit meeting took place. Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions increased the popularity of the movement with the Japanese public, as well as the remorse of those who had doubts regarding the issue.

On September 20, 2002, three days after the return of the Prime Minister from Pyongyang, the Rescue Movement submitted a questions document to Tanaka Hitoshi, the Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA at the time and the main negotiator with North Korea regarding Koizumi’s visit. The documents included the doubts of the families about the summit, as well as about the information provided to them. Concretely, the family members of the abductees reported dead enquired about the transmission of non-verified information to them as well as to the media. Tanaka's response, several days later, included an explanation of the sequence of events that had taken place on September 17, in Pyongyang, as well as information about a list with the names of the abductees, the dates and causes of their deaths received in Korean language at the end of the preliminary meeting. Tanaka further apologized for the provision of the respective information to the families only two days later, on September 19, 2002, as well as for the media’s reports as a "fait accompli". Tanaka concluded with a promise that a government team would be dispatched to North Korea in order to investigate the real situation, and the results would be transmitted to the families without delay (Modern Korea, 2002a).

On October 23, 2002, the Rescue Movement together with the Prefectural Assemblymen Association released a statement regarding the five returnees’ permanent stay in Japan. The statement mainly demanded the *Rachi Giren* and the government not to return the five abductees (Hasuike Kaoru, Okudo Yukiko, Chimura Yasushi, Hamamoto Fukie, Soga Hitomi) to North Korea, as agreed before their return. On the morning of that day, the Yokota couple, Chimura Tamotsu, Hamamoto Yūkō, Deputy CCS Abe Shinzō, and executive members of *Rachi Giren*, as well as *Sukuukai*, during a breakfast meeting, had decided a request to the government based on the statement released by the three groups. *Rachi Giren* endorsed the request and made an urgent announcement about it. All three groups, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association further expressed their conviction that bringing back all the abductees from North Korea was the government’s duty and finally, asked for the cooperation of the government, the Diet, the media and all the Japanese people. The meeting points out the collaboration between certain politicians and the Rescue Movement in requesting the government the five returnees’ permanent stay in Japan.

Following the request of the groups, *Rachi Giren* released an urgent statement opposing the return of the five to North Korea and seeking their permanent stay in Japan. Consequently, the following day, on October 24, 2002, CCS Fukuda announced that the five returnees would not return to North Korea and Japan would seek the return of their family members. In response to the announcement, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented a comment, highly evaluating the government’s decision and the fact that it included all the points requested by the groups (Modern Korea, 2002a). The role of Abe Shinzō, Deputy CCS at the time, was considered invaluable for the returnees’ permanent stay in Japan (interview Chairman *Sukuukai*).

With the occasion of the Japan-North Korea negotiations that took place in Kuala Lumpur on 29 and 30 October, 2002, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, each presented a statement expressing appreciation towards the group representing Japan in the negotiations for maintaining a general position, as well as a request to the government to impose economic sanctions on North Korea for the rescue of all the abductees. The three groups were backed by *Rachi Giren*, which also expressed its expectation that the government would maintain the general principle “normalization of relations is impossible without solving the abduction issue”. However, according to the North Korean side, the issue had already been solved and Japan broke its promise regarding the return of the five returnees. *Rachi Giren* further declared the importance of prioritizing both the resolution of the abduction issue and the cease of the nuclear development, as well as their support for the imposition of sanctions against North Korea (Modern Korea, 2002a).

After the end of the negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, Suzuki Katsunari, representative of the Executive Board of the KEDO and responsible of negotiations with North Korea, and Saiki Akitaka, Deputy Director-General of the Asian Bureau of MOFA, reported the results to the Rescue Movement, thus confirming its growing role in the Japanese politics surrounding North Korea (Modern Korea, 2002a).

The members of the Rescue Movement also appealed to the Japanese government, precisely to Deputy Director-General of the Asian Bureau of MOFA, Saiki Akitaka, to transmit several documents to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. The documents regarded the acknowledgement of the abductions by North Korea and the inconsistencies of the reported death of the eight abductees and were directly submitted to the United Nations by Saiki Akitaka (Modern Korea, 2002a).

The Prefectural Assemblymen Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea provided considerable support to the Rescue Movement and its goals. In December 2002, it protested toward an outer MOFA group, which provided food assistance to North Korea (400,000 tons in November 2002). The food aid had been gathered from local governments across the country, and it represented aid originally designated for children in need all over the world. Moreover, the outer group of MOFA represented a “diplomatic association”, established as a judicial person in 1947, with the purpose of realizing people’s diplomacy under the basic theme of democracy and world peace. The Prefectural Assemblymen Association’s appeal addressed the fact that at that moment, in connection to the abduction issue, all aid to North Korea, including food aid was frozen, and that the abduction issue was considered a priority by the government and handled accordingly. It also addressed the fact that the aid provided by the “diplomatic association” was presented as humanitarian aid, when it was clear that it represented an abuse of the public interest, as the government ceased food support to North Korea. Moreover, the food of the prefectural assemblies was purchased with the taxes of the citizens, representing, therefore, public property, its disposal before the expiration date being suitable for the hungry children of Asia or Africa. Moreover, the Association mentioned the fact that the aid would not be going to the people in North Korea who needed it, and considered telephone confirmations regarding the use of food aid, careless. Thus, the request of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association targeted each prefectural assembly, asking for their attention not to provide food aid before the expiration date to a “diplomatic association” and to announce the administrative authorities in case such aid was requested.

In December 2002, the five returnees met Deputy CCS Abe Shinzō and entrusted him a written request addressed to Prime Minister Koizumi and the government officials who accompanied him to Pyongyang, for the early return of their family members. The meeting emphasizes Deputy CCS Abe’s role in supporting the Rescue Movement and their cause as well as the Movement’s increasing trust in him (Modern Korea, 2002b). The returnees’ plea toward the government had been reinforced by a request from *Sukuukai* for the early return of the family members as well as a return of all the abducted Japanese citizens. As in all requests to the government, *Sukuukai* mentioned the people kidnapped by North Korea from the South during the Korean War, the Zainichi Koreans who returned to North Korea, and all the North Korean people, victims of an authoritarian regime (Modern Korea, 2002b).

The Rescue Movement did not only advocate their cause to the government, demanding the rescue of the abducted Japanese citizens, but it also tried to eliminate any opposite point of view from the political arena, the media and the society in general. In short, attempts to manipulate the public perception and views could be observed. One such example is the request of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, in January 2003, towards two politicians, Yamazaki Masaaki (LDP) and Okada Katsuya (DPJ) to withdraw their statements regarding the abduction issue. Thus, Yamazaki’s statement referred to the fact that Japan could provide economic assistance, if North Korea ceased its nuclear development, even without the resolution of the abduction issue, while Okada considered the government’s decision not to return the five returnees to North Korea, a mistake. With respect to these statements, representatives of *Sukuukai*, Chairman Satō Katsumi and head secretary Hirata Ryūtarō, had organized a meeting with the Diet member from the DPJ, Okada, meeting intermediated by DPJ Diet member Ueda Kiyoshi. *Sukuukai*’s protest referred to Okada’s remarks on the NHK that “there is no need for the government to support the decision of the five returnees not to return to North Korea”. Okada’s response, however, referred to his mere reinforcement of the government’s position toward North Korea, namely "negotiations", arguing that the will of the returnees should have been respected, but the government’s display of support toward the respective will, was not necessary. Nevertheless, Okada finally apologized for combining his own personal position with the one of representing his party, as Secretary-General of DPJ (Modern Korea, 2003a).

In March 2003, the representatives of the Rescue Movement presented a declaration following their visit to the United States, appealing to the government for the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea. Subsequently, *Sukuukai* from each prefecture had organized a movement of protest (April 16-26) towards North Korea’s insincere attitude requesting the government to impose economic sanctions. The activities included street activities, such as gathering signatures, distributing flyers or propaganda, protest meetings and press conferences (Modern Korea, 2003c).

High government officials, such as Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko had started to support the Rescue Movement. In April 2003, Kawaguchi stated, during a Foreign Affairs Meeting of the LDP, that the abductions represented acts of terrorism (Modern Korea, 2003c). Nevertheless, the mere statement of the Foreign Minister was not considered sufficient by the supporter group of the families, *Sukuukai*. In this regard, the view of the *Sukuukai* members was presented during a public hearing held in May 2003, in Kanazawa prefecture, by the Commission on the Constitution of the House of Representatives. At the meeting, Shimada Yōichi, Vice-Chairman of *Sukuukai*, presented clear statements about the importance of employing military power, alongside examples of assertions made by US Congressmen supporting such view. Shimada further taunted Foreign Minister Kawaguchi for not being aware of the strategies that could be employed with the help of military power, and not being able to employ more than "firm negotiations" with North Korea. Shimada’s statement requested a severe attitude from the government, including pressure in the form of economic sanctions. As a conclusion, he referred to Article nine of the Japanese Constitution, and to the fact that it was desirable that it would be eliminated from the Constitution as it separated Japan from the reality of the international scene (Modern Korea, 2003d). Nevertheless, in a June 2003 plenary session of the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Koizumi recognized the abductions as acts of terrorism, however, maintaining the "dialogue and pressure" policy toward North Korea. In this regard, the Rescue Movement sought to the Cabinet as well as to the Diet, the enforcement of strong economic sanctions against North Korea.

The Movement also continued gathering signatures across the country for the support of the rescue of the abductees from North Korea. One million and a half such signatures, representing the signatures collected since the Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002, had been delivered to the Deputy CCS, Abe Shinzō, in July 2003. A similar number of signatures had been delivered to Prime Minister Koizumi before the 2002 summit, showing people’s support and the request to rescue the abducted Japanese citizens. The Rescue Movement report, submitted alongside the signatures, included a request for the imposition of economic sanctions, such as the ban on the entry into Japanese ports of North Korean ships, a ban on trade and remittances with North Korea etc. The report also emphasized that pressure (*atsuryoku*) was necessary for the rescue of the abductees, as it became more and more clear among the public that dialogue (*taiwa*) was not producing results (Modern Korea, 2003b).

Similar reports and petitions for the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of the abductees were periodically submitted to the government by *Sukuukai* (rescue organization) in each region of Japan. There had also been enquiries to local governments regarding the property tax exemption of *Chōsen Sōren* establishments in Japan. The rescue organization that initiated such enquiries was *Sukuukai* Ibaraki, which received a reply from Mito city tax division, in May 2003, explaining the property tax exemption circumstances. Thus, the request from *Chōsen Sōren* about the tax exemption appeared to have been received during a disaster, therefore, the establishment being provided as a temporary evacuation place, free of charge. The establishment, however, was provided free of charge for citizen assemblies or meetings. On those grounds, *Sukuukai* Ibaraki asked *Chōsen Sōren* to provide the lecture hall of the establishment for a planned *Sukuukai* meeting. Nonetheless, the request had been denied, as the establishment was “limited to events with a public interest character” and “whether it represents public interest or not is decided by *Chōsen Sōren*” (Rescue Movement Report 54, Modern Korea December 2003 issue). *Sukuukai* had transmitted the respective response to the Tax Division of the City Hall, together with the mention that the Sōren establishment did not display a signboard confirming its status as an emergency evacuation place. Following an investigation of the City Hall, a notice of payment of taxes had been issued to *Chōsen Sōren*, partly since 1979, and totally since 2000). Nevertheless, according to an investigation by the *Mainichi Shinbun*, out of forty-eight central and regional headquarters of *Chōsen Sōren* across the country, only eight were charged the fixed property tax (Modern Korea, 2003b).

The Rescue Movement with support from *Rachi Giren* had further appealed to the government for the early return of all the abductees and their families, just before the first round of the Six Party Talks (SPT) in August 2003. Thus, a request had been made to Yabunaka Mitoji, the Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA and Japan’s representatives at the SPT. The Rescue Movement’s request was directed at the government asking clarification for the North Korean side that regardless of the progress made about the nuclear development or other issues, Japan would not provide economic assistance if the abduction issue was not solved. Moreover, a separate request for drafting new legislation allowing the ban of North Korean ships into Japanese ports was made to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Modern Korea, 2003b).

In response to CCS Fukuda’s presentation of the SPT results in a press conference, the Rescue Movement made a comment addressed to the government, presenting their conviction that a firm attitude was necessary with North Korea, and in case of non-cooperation, the imposition of economic sanctions (Modern Korea, 2004f).

The Rescue Movement continued to express the conviction that the correct way of solving the abduction issue was through economic sanctions against North Korea. In this regard, the groups presented a statement emphasizing their view, with the occasion of two years since the 9/11 terrorist incidents in the United States, and the relatively new slogan of the Movement: “The abductions are terrorism! Let’s impose economic sanctions!” (Modern Korea, 2004f).

In January 2004, the Rescue Movement requested the Diet to establish a Special Committee for the Abduction Issue, which would contribute to the realization of numerous things, such as inviting North Korean defectors as speakers, as well as persons from the Police, Japan Coast Guard or the Self Defense Forces who had been in important positions at the time when the abductions had been committed. In addition, the Committee could listen to the opinions of *Kazokukai* members, and of specialists, regarding solutions to the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2004g).

The Rescue Movement further protested against an independent administrative institution under the control of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, namely *the National Center for University Entrance Examinations*, which carried out the world history exams. In January 2004, the National Center for University Entrance Examinations included a question regarding the correct interpretation of the "Koreans transportation for forced labor" in Japan, after the latter’s formal annexation of Korea in 1910. The Rescue Movement considered the issue over-emphasized in every circumstance, and provided several examples of government officials stating its misrepresentation. Such examples include the statement of Foreign Minister Kawaguchi that the respective facts did not exist according to a 1959 MOFA investigation, and that the majority of the workers traveled to Japan because of their own will. Moreover, a 1959 White Paper report of the Ministry of Justice Immigration Office contained similar information. Furthermore, at the UN Human Rights Committee meeting from November 2003, when North Korea made the same assertion about the Korean workers, Saiki Akitaka, Deputy Director-General of the Asian Bureau of MOFA, declared that such claims had no basis. Therefore, employing these statements, the Rescue Movement questioned the National Center for University Entrance Examinations’ inclusion of the respective question related to a claim without foundation, but not of the abduction issue, "a matter of national interest and crucial importance". The Movement further requested the urgent removal of the respective question from the exams, as well as the inclusion of the abduction issue, a human rights and national sovereignty issue, in educational circles (Modern Korea, 2004g).

With respect to the imposition of economic sanctions, the revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL), had been adopted by the House of Councillors on February 9, 2004, after previously having been adopted by the House of Representatives on January 29, 2004, thus, making it possible for Japan to independently impose economic sanctions against North Korea. The Rescue Movement expressed gratitude for the cooperation and the support of the politicians from the LDP, DPJ, Kōmeitō, and the SDP, and further asked for cooperation regarding the enactment of further legislation for sanctions, such as the Law to Prohibit the Port Entry of Specific Ships (LPPESS) (Modern Korea, 2004a). The Rescue Movement further presented a declaration emphasizing the fact that the Movement sought the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of the abduction victims since May 1999, and although there were politicians "with a heart" who conducted activities for the establishment of the legislation, there were important pro-North Korea politicians’ machinations. Nevertheless, the overall situation appeared to have changed, as the pro-North Korea politicians had retired, and, according to a questionnaire carried out by the Rescue Movement before the November 2003 general elections, 90 per cent of the candidates considered the abductions terrorist acts, and 80 per cent agreed with establishing legislation for imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. Against this background, there was also the angry voice of the Japanese public, increasingly supporting the Rescue Movement and the imposition of sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of the abductees (Modern Korea, 2004b).

In supporting the Rescue Movement, *Rachi Giren* adopted a written resolution at their general meeting on March 2, 2004, for the application of the revised sanctions legislation, FEFTCL, and the rapid enactment of the LPPESS. The resolution expressed disapproval with the statement of the Prime Minister and the CCS of not applying the revised FEFTCL, as, *Rachi Giren* considered that was the exact purpose for revising the legislation, to be able to apply it in order to exert pressure on North Korea (Modern Korea, 2004c). Another written resolution, adopted at the Sixth Citizens’ Assembly organized by *Sukuukai* at the end of April 2004, was submitted to the *Kantei*, strongly seeking the imposition of sanctions against North Korea for not cooperating for the resolution of the abduction issue. The resolution emphasized the fact that the Japanese government should announce a deadline until when North Korea must show a sincere response, and, in the lack of such response, economic sanctions should be imposed. Concretely, based on the revised FEFTCL, an embargo on luxury goods, withdrawal of permission to reenter Japan for the executives of *Chōsen Sōren*, who were also high officials in North Korea’s Supreme Assembly, and a ban on the export of large quantities of destructive weapons-related materials (Modern Korea, 2004h).

In May 2004, as information about another visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to North Korea was spreading, *Sukuukai* presented a declaration opposing the visit, arguing that if the visit took place and Japan provided humanitarian aid to North Korea, the imposition of sanctions would become difficult and the abduction issue would be shelved (Modern Korea, 2004h). Two days later, on May 12, 2004, *Rachi Giren* expressed its support for the Rescue Movement, presenting a similar declaration, alongside the mention that there was no necessity for an envoy from Japan to bring the family members of the five abductees back (Modern Korea, 2004h).

Alongside the declaration, *Sukuukai* also organized urgent street activities on May 15 and 16, 2004, after the Prime Minister’s May 14 announcement of his second visit to Pyongyang, and presented a statement in which they expressed their anxiety and concern about the visit. The main points regarded the groups' concern about the Prime Minister only aiming at normalizing relations with North Korea, without a resolution of the abduction issue.

The Prime Minister’s visit was also discussed by Hatoyama Yukio (DPJ), who held a speech on the same day as the Rescue Movement, emphasizing the fact that if a complete resolution of the abduction issue was not accomplished, humanitarian aid to North Korea should be eliminated (Modern Korea, 2004h).

Following Koizumi’s visit to North Korea on May 22, 2004, the Rescue Movement together with the *Rachi Giren* had presented a declaration about the results of the visit. Thus, the declaration commented on the fact that all the requests of the Rescue Movement had been ignored and their trust had been betrayed by the Prime Minister, who even promised food aid (250,000 tons) to North Korea, without setting a deadline for the results of the investigation regarding the ten abductees reported dead or with unknown whereabouts. Furthermore, the declaration expressed indignation at the fact that the Prime Minister even made a promise not to impose economic sanctions if the Pyongyang Declaration was respected. The declaration ended by drawing the conclusion that Japan was not interested in saving the Japanese abducted by North Korea and by expressing the interest for interrogating the Prime Minister upon his return to Japan. On the same day, May 22, 2004, *Chōsakai* also released a statement characterizing the Prime Minister’s visit to Pyongyang as having “the worst possible result” (Modern Korea, 2004e).

During the following month, the Rescue Movement had presented several requests to the Japanese government to seek the results of North Korea’s reinvestigation regarding the ten unconfirmed abductees, as well as to carefully collect and analyse the information provided. The Movement also requested both houses of the Diet the enactment of the LPPESS, as well as the establishment of a Special Committee for the Abduction Issue in each House. Further, the groups had decided a deadline, September 17, 2004, representing two years since Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions, for North Korea to provide the results of the reinvestigation. In case the North did not provide the results, the Movement would strongly seek the imposition of economic sanctions. The slogan of the Movement became “We cannot wait anymore! We have set the deadline! Let’s impose economic sanctions!” (Modern Korea, 2004i).

On July 14, 2004, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented a declaration with the occasion of the reunion of the Soga family in Jakarta. The fact that the Japanese government had obtained the reunion of the Soga family indicated, according to the Rescue Movement, the intention to start negotiations for normalization of relations. Moreover, supporting that suspicion was the statement of the Prime Minister that normalization of relations should be done in one year, as opposed to two. The Rescue Movement voiced their opposition to normalization, and highlighted the responsibility of Prime Minister Koizumi as representative of Japan. The declaration further included the request to related government organs that the Soga family could live together in Japan (Modern Korea, 2005a). Nevertheless, Prime Minister Koizumi respected the promise made to North Korea in May, and in August 2004, during a Cabinet meeting acknowledged carrying out food aid (125,000 tons) and medical support (7 million dollars) to North Korea. In response, the Rescue Movement, *Rachi Giren* and the supporting citizens expressed their disapproval, emphasizing their remark that the people’s voice was being ignored by the government (Modern Korea, 2005a).

At the working-level negotiations between Japan and North Korea from September 2004 there had been no report regarding the results of the reinvestigation promised by Kim Jong Il in May. There was, however, scant information about Yokota Megumi, Arimoto Keiko and Ishioka Toru. Regarding Yokota Megumi, unlike the last report, North Korea informed that she lived past March 1993, the date reported two years before. Thus, the Rescue Movement pointed to the credibility of North Korea’s reports regarding the deaths of the abductees, and, in general, regarding the investigation (Modern Korea, 2005a).

The Rescue Movement continued to appeal to government officials, such as Cabinet Office adviser for the abduction issue, Nakayama Kyōko, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka, or head of the Cabinet Secretariat support office for the abductees and their families, Oguma Hiroshi, for continuing the work for the rescue of the abductees, as the Prime Minister gave the impression of abandoning the issue (Modern Korea, 2005f).

As the North Korean Human Rights Act was adopted by the United States, in September 2004 by the Senate and in October by the House of Representatives, and the US Congress had unanimously agreed to stop aid to North Korea, the Rescue Movement criticised the Japanese government for sending excessively large quantities of food aid to North Korea under the name of "humanitarian aid". The Rescue Movement Report questioned the suitability of such action and considered the situation shameful. The Movement also reinforced the request for the return of all the abductees, and the discontinuation of all economic cooperation, if the request was not granted (Modern Korea, 2005b).

In October 2004, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented a declaration regarding the adoption of a North Korea Human Rights Act by both houses of the United States Congress and signed by President Bush on October 18, 2004. The groups expressed respect and gratitude toward the US government, and further condemned the “shameful” attitude of the Japanese government toward North Korea, who was not providing any answers concerning the abductees. They also presented several requests to the Japanese government, as well as to the Diet. The things sought from the government included the establishment of a special bureau to strategically investigate the resolution of the abduction issue, the clarification of what "pressure" meant for the Japanese government, the demand to the Chinese government to stop sending the North Korean defectors back to North Korea, and to entrust the confirmation of their intention, case by case, to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The things they sought from the Diet included the development of vigorous discussions regarding the way to deal with the North Korean Human Rights problem, including the abduction issue, the establishment of a Japanese version of the North Korea Human Rights Act, and the creation of a bureau, inside the government, to investigate specifically and strategically the resolution of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2005g).

In the same month, *Rachi Giren* discussed the establishment of a Human Rights Law during a general meeting with the aim of completely solving the abduction issue. President Hiranuma Takeo invited the members to consider establishing such a law in Japan, and also expressed the intention to examine the concrete application of sanctions towards North Korea, and the creation of a Special Committee for the Abductees in the House of Representatives as well, as the House of Councillors had established one in June 2004 (Modern Korea, 2005g). In this respect, in November 2004, President Hiranuma demanded the presidents of each party’s Committee of the National Diet (LDP, DPJ, Kōmeitō) to establish, as early as possible, a Special Committee for the Abduction Issue in the House of Representatives, as the Diet could not respond to the citizens charge regarding the responsibility of protecting the citizens’ life and human rights (Modern Korea, 2005h).

With the occasion of the third round of working-level talks between Japan and North Korea, in November 2004, the Rescue Movement made several requests to Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Machimura. Thus, the groups requested that he negotiations for normalization of relations between the two countries did not progress, until the rescue of the "*mikikansha*", term decided at a general meeting in June 2004 to refer to the abductees who had not returned to Japan, in order to emphasize the target of rescuing them. Moreover, they demanded that no economic assistance would be carried out towards the North, and that economic sanctions would be imposed if the rescue of all the abductees was not realized (Modern Korea, 2005h). In the same month, the groups prepared a report with all the inconsistencies raised by each family regarding the "Investigation report" from North Korea about the faith of the abductees, requesting the government to conduct a closer investigation, and handed it to the Director of the Cabinet Secretariat Support Office for the Abductees and their Families, Oguma Hiroshi (Modern Korea, 2005e).

After closer examination by the government, there had been no proof to endorse North Korea’s report about the eight announced dead and the two announced not to have entered the country. CCS Hosoda presented the government’s viewpoint in December 2004, that a strong reaction must be taken by Japan, in case North Korea did not have a rapid and sincere response, viewpoint fully accepted and supported by the Rescue Movement (Modern Korea, 2006a).

The remains provided by North Korea have been tested by two institutions in Japan and concluded that they did not belong to Yokota Megumi. They had been declared false, therefore, and the insincerity of North Korea further pointed at. However, there was considerable controversy regarding the accuracy of the tests performed and the possibility of the remains having been contaminated in the process (Cyranoski, 2005). There had also been suggestions that the remains should be tested in a third country, suggestions that MOFA rejected, however (International Crisis Group, 2005).

With the occasion of the decision to establish a Special Committee for the Abduction Issue in the House of Representatives on November 18, 2004, Rescue Movement representatives presented a statement emphasizing the influence of the Movement on the decision, and regarding it as a considerable force for the resolution of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2005e). The House of Representatives Special Committee on the Abductions held a meeting in December 2004, where Diet members from ruling and opposition parties adopted a statement not to provide food aid to North Korea despite the request from the UN World Food Programme, and to freeze the remaining 125,000 tons of food aid. The Special Committee further decided to examine the application of the existing sanctions legislation, FEFTCL and LPPESS. The statement had unanimously been adopted by the House of Councillors Special Committee on the Abductions, in a similar meeting later that month (Modern Korea, 2006a).

In February 2005, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* together with *Rachi Giren* delivered an index with over five million signatures (collected from the beginning of the Movement) to CCS Hosoda for the imposition of sanctions. The index was addressed to the Prime Minister and requested immediate action against North Korea for the rescue of the abductees (Modern Korea, 2006a).

In an attempt to spread awareness of the abduction issue to schoolchildren as well, on March 18, 2005, prefectural assemblies in various prefectures supported the Rescue Movement adopting a petition that sought the selection of junior high school textbooks that included a description of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2006b). The following months, the Rescue Movement as well as *Rachi Giren* had repeatedly appealed to Prime Minister Koizumi for the rapid imposition of economic sanction against North Korea. *Rachi Giren* also visited the Committee Chairmen of three parties from the National Diet (LDP, DPJ, Kōmeitō) demanding the adoption of a decision by the Diet to impose economic sanctions against North Korea (Modern Korea, 2006c). Along these lines, a questions document for the government was submitted in July 2005 by a member of the House of Councillors from the DPJ, Haku Shinkun, regarding Japan’s declared rapid response and strong reaction toward the North. In the response from August 5, 2005, Koizumi explained that the "rapid response" from North Korea mentioned by CCS Hosoda in December 2004 did not indicate a concrete period, while regarding Japan’s “strong reaction” the Prime Minister emphasized that Japan must consider the progress, as well as the adequacy of several pending issues between Japan and North Korea.

The Rescue Movement had clearly expressed anger and critically analysed Koizumi's response, stressing the fact that a will to solve the abduction issue could not observed in the government’s position (Modern Korea, 2006d).

After the first phase of the Fourth Round of the SPT had been adjourned in August 2005, as North Korea did not clarify the intention to abandon nuclear arms, and no agreement had been reached, a report of the Rescue Movement once more criticized the government policy and underlined that if Japan had imposed sanctions, the North would have been forced to negotiate for lifting them. The report concluded with the Movement’s conviction that dialogue without pressure would yield no results in solving the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2006d). The following year, in March 2006, the Rescue Movement issued an urgent declaration regarding the free entry of the North Korean Supreme People’s Assembly members into Japan, but the impossibility of the abducted Japanese citizens to do the same, requesting explanations from the government, in the name of the Japanese people. As Nagoya Immigration Office put on hold the permission of reentry into Japan of the six executive members of *Chōsen Sōren*, also members of the Supreme People’s Assembly in North Korea, a point raised several times by the Rescue Movement appeared to have been taken into consideration. However, two days later, the entry of the six into Japan was permitted, but met with a strong reaction from the civil society groups (*Sukuukai*, 2006f).

In June 2006, the Rescue Movement resumed the appeals for a North Korea Human Rights Act, a Japanese equivalent to the law already established in the United States in 2004. *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* representatives had carried out appeals to the representatives of each party in the *Rachi Giren*, for an Act, which would make the resolution of the abduction issue a duty of the country’s government, and, in case the human rights situation was not improved, it would provide a list with the measures to be taken (*Sukuukai*, 2006g). The Act had been adopted by both Houses of the Diet, and established as a law on June 16, 2006. The Rescue Movement expressed their gratitude to the politicians from the ruling party and the *Rachi Giren* who cooperated for its establishment (*Sukuukai*, 2006h). In the same month, thirty-five local governments decided to establish a network of local governments in relation to the abduction issue, with the aim of cooperating and exchanging information for the quick resolution of the abduction issue. Their planned activities also included support for the families of the abductees and raising awareness about the abduction issue (*Sukuukai*, 2006i).

On July 5, 2006, in response to North Korea’s launch of several missiles directed towards the Sea of Japan, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented an urgent declaration stating that Japan’s decision to quickly impose unilateral sanctions against North Korea was natural, and asked that the abduction issue was included as a reason for the imposition of sanctions by Japan, as well as in the UN Security Council Resolution for the missile launch (*Sukuukai*, 2006b).

On July 6, at a press conference, CCS Abe Shinzō made it clear that the abductions were one of the reasons for imposing economic sanctions against North Korea the previous day: “The sanctions had been imposed after the missile launch of North Korea, but the fact that North Korea did not have a sincere response for the abduction issue had also been taken into consideration” (*Sukuukai*, 2006a).

#### 7.2.1.4 Sit-in protests accompanied by declarations/ requests/ protest documents

The three groups, *Kazokukai* *Sukuukai* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association expressed their strong protest toward the government’s provision of rice aid to North Korea, in a sit-in protest in front of MOFA on March 6, and in front of the LDP Headquarters on March 7, 2000. The groups demanded MOFA not to bend to politicians’ pressure and shelve the abduction issue, while at the LDP, the groups criticized the support for "humanitarian aid" to North Korea, without addressing the abduction issue, a humanitarian issue for Japan, the country they represented. Moreover, the protest referred to the aid provided by Japan as a support for the Kim Jong Il regime, not the suffering North Korean population. The Japanese Rescue Movement did not oppose helping the North Korean population stroke by hunger, but all the groups were assured that the aid was not benefiting the population, but the "terrorist" regime (interview executive staff of *Sukuukai*).

During the protest of the Rescue Movement, a few politicians such as Hirasawa Katsuei, faced the families and explained the decisions taken at the Diplomatic Affairs Section meeting of the LDP. The majority avoided the protesters by entering and exiting the building through the back door or rolling up their car windows when passing by, thus, exposing the insignificant role of the Rescue Movement and its protest at the time (Araki, 2002).

The declaration of the Rescue Movement after the sit-in protest included several requests to the government and the LDP: explanations of the effects of aid provision on the resolution of the abduction issue, and in case there were no such effects, resignations of Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei and LDP Deputy Secretary General Nonaka Hiromu. Moreover the Rescue Movement presented their intended actions for the following period. The actions included: disclosing the results of a questionnaire to the Diet members regarding their attitudes toward the abduction issue, pressuring the Diet members of each district, and lobbying each local assembly to adopt written opinions toward the national government. Moreover, the Rescue Movement pressured the government with the organization of a large assembly on April 30, 2000, in order to raise the public awareness about the abduction issue. Albeit the LDP had acknowledged the opposition to food aid, at the Diplomatic Affairs Section meeting from March 7, the party leader Ozawa Ichiro and the chief secretary Fujii Hirohisa agreed and acknowledged that “diplomacy is the government’s authority” (Araki, 2002).

Another sit-in protest organized by the Rescue Movement took place in front of LDP Headquarters and in front of MOFA, on October 6, and October 11, 2000 respectively, when Satō Katsumi, Chairman of *Sukuukai*, presented a review document with the activities opposing rice aid to North Korea. The document criticized Foreign Minister Kōno for only implementing Nonaka Hiromu’s promises to North Korea about food aid provision. The language of the protest document was very harsh, also condemning the LDP politicians who supported rice aid policy, and characterizing them all as traitors. Moreover, the document provided the names of several politicians who opposed the rice aid policy, and were considered to be on the side of the Rescue Movement. The list included Shiokawa Masajuro, Yamanaka Sadanori, Murakami Seiichirō, Suga Yoshihide, Sasagawa Takashi, Kutsukake Tetsuo, Ishihara Nobuteru, Ogi Chikage, Hiranuma Takeo, Tani Yōichi (Araki, 2002).

In June 2005, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* organized a three-day sit-in protest in front of the National Diet, with the same purpose as the previous protests and requests: the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea (Modern Korea, 2006c).

#### 7.2.1.5 Surveys/Questionnaires to politicians

In its attempt to pursue the politicians, *Sukuukai* sent a survey to 172 members of the Japan-North Korea Diet Members’ Assembly, to enquire their opinion about Nakayama’s statement from September 4, 2000.

In an interview with *Chōsen Shinpo*, the newspaper of *Chōsen Sōren*, Nakayama Masaaki referred to Japan’s hostile position toward North Korea, after the North-South divide, and to the publication about the abduction cases in the Police White Paper, in 1997. According to Nakayama, the North Korean defectors only matched their testimonies to the Police publication from 1997 and caused a surge in public opinion and media interest. He also referred to the United States government as having a predilection toward South Korea, which Japan had tried to match, therefore considering North Korea a threat. He concluded that politicians could not confirm such facts in the lack of diplomatic relations with the North, and, therefore, Japan’s priority should be developing diplomatic relations with North Korea.

The only replies to *Sukuukai*’s survey about Nakayama’s statement came from three DPJ politicians and one LDP politician, Suzuki Muneo, who mentioned he could not have an opposite position to Nakayama, the Chairman of the Assembly.

Before the elections for the House of Councillors, on July 29, 2001, the Rescue Movement had prepared a questionnaire for the candidates, similar to the one in 2000 for the House of Representatives elections. The questionnaires were sent by each prefecture’s Rescue Association to the prefecture’s candidates, while the proportional represented constituency was handled by the NARKN. The questionnaire included questions about the perception towards the abduction issue, towards Kim Jong Nam’s repatriation, and towards the sanctions for North Korea regarding the abduction issue. Moreover, it questioned the candidates regarding their concrete actions for the rescue of the abductees, after the elections. The answer of each candidate was made public on *Sukuukai*’s website (Araki, 2002).

Furthermore, various Rescue Associations, such as *Sukuukai* Fukuoka, had appealed to the candidates participating in the elections for the House of Councillors on July 29, to participate in their gatherings.

#### 7.2.1.6 Publications in the media

In March 2002, the Arimoto family was contacted by phone by Nakayama Masaaki, member of the House of Representatives, and Chairman of the Japan-North Korea Diet members’ Alliance, in order to convince them to continue the rescue activities individually, and not together with *Sukuukai*. His offer was, however, rejected by the family who preferred to continue being part of the Rescue Movement.

Nakayama, who was the president of *Rachi Giren* since its formation in 1997, as well as president of the Japan-North Korea Diet members’ Alliance, changed his attitude after a visit to Pyongyang and started to consider the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea a priority. In March 2002, during a Diet meeting, he referred to the Arimoto case as a kidnapping of a Japanese, by a Japanese, concluding that North Korea had no connection to it. His statement and actions had been criticized by the Rescue Movement; *Sukuukai*, under the name of Satō Katsumi, sent a public questions document to Nakayama, which was never answered. A critical article about Nakayama was later published by Satō in the August 2002 number of the monthly magazine *Shokun!*.

Following growing criticism, on March 26, 2002, Nakayama announced his resignation from the two posts he was holding. His resignation was acknowledged by *Rachi Giren* on March 27, and the alliance was temporarily suspended. The new *Rachi Giren* was established on April 25, 2002 and started its activities with Ishiba Shigeru as president.

The Rescue Movement had continued the appeals to the government for a strong position toward North Korea, including the imposition of economic sanctions, as well as to protest the Prime Minister’s position. In an article published in Modern Korea magazine in December 2005, Satō Katsumi, Chairman of *Sukuukai*, criticized Japan’s foreign policy and argued that the merit for the five abductees’ return to Japan was not of Prime Minister Koizumi, but of the United States. Thus, according to Satō, after President Bush had included North Korea in the "axis of evil" in January 2002, and stated that “after Iraq, North Korea would follow”, Kim Jong Il approached the difficult problem of the abductions between North Korea and Japan, as a strategy, in order to carry out negotiations and receive economic assistance from Japan. Such strategy would avoid an armed attack by the United States on the Kim Jong Il administration, in Satō’s view. Therefore, Satō argued that the families and the Japanese public should express their gratitude to President Bush, and not Prime Minister Koizumi, whose priority was to normalize relations with the North. The article presented the Prime Minister’s emphasis on the Pyongyang Declaration and on the normalization of relations, a contrary result being considered a failure of the diplomacy toward the North. Satō’s article concluded with naming the Pyongyang Declaration the “treason declaration”, as it did not serve the interests of Japan, but sold them to the interests of Kim Jong Il (Satō, 2005).

#### 7.2.1.7 Participation in Diet meetings

In April 2002, the House of Councillors Diplomacy and Defense Committee invited the Yokota and the Arimoto couples at the meeting, where intensive deliberation related to the abduction issue was conducted. The House of Representatives later had a similar initiative to seek evidence from the families of the victims. Such initiatives are notable proof of progress being made by the Rescue Movement and its advocacy activities.

In February 2004, the representatives of *Kazokukai* expressed their views at the second meeting of the Subcommittee for the Abduction Issue and North Korea’s Nuclear Development, established by the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee. Although the three representatives, Yokota Shigeru, Yokota Sakie and Hasuike Toru, expressed their opinions independently, they all agreed on requesting concrete action from the government for the rescue of the abductees, and in case there was no rapid reaction from North Korea, economic sanctions were preferred (Modern Korea, 2004c).

The view of the Movement alongside the testimony of the North Korean defector An Myong Jin was reinforced in a meeting of the Special Committee for the Abduction Issue of the House of Representatives, following a sit-in protest, in June 2005, by Nishioka Tsutomu, Vice Chairman of *Sukuukai*, who requested the imposition of economic sanctions for the rescue of all the abductees from North Korea (Modern Korea, 2006c).

As previously emphasized, political advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement since 1998 until 2006 in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch were taking place periodically all over the country. Figure 7.1 outlines the most representative ones, recorded in the Rescue Movement Reports, according to their type.

Figure 7.1 Political advocacy activities 1999-2006

Author's original work based on the Rescue Movement Reports published by Modern Korea (2002-2006)

### 7.2.2 Social advocacy activities

As previously seen in Chapter 5, social advocacy activities were mainly directed at the public, to raise awareness and gain support for appealing to the government. In this respect, this section presents the Rescue Movement’s ways of advocating the rescue of the abductees to the public, until the imposition of sanctions against North Korea in July 2006. The groups’ activities focused on signature-gathering campaigns, propaganda, demonstrations and other street activities, citizens’ gatherings and wider assemblies, as well as executive meetings of the Rescue Movement, workshops, conferences, study meetings, lectures and symposiums, statements or documents to appeal to the public, as well as letters of protest towards the ones who had a distinct view about the abduction issue than the Rescue Movement, publications, such as articles or manuscripts, and visual media representations. Thus, the social advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in the period under examination include, alongside others, the activities identified by the extant literature as methods of civil society organizations to raise awareness and support from the pubic, as introduced in Chapter 3. The activities are further grouped according to their type and subsequently compiled in Figure 7.2.

#### 7.2.2.1 Signature-gathering campaigns/ demonstrations/ propaganda activities

Various campaigning activities, including collecting signatures, demonstrations and propaganda activities took place in December 2001, in Tokyo and Sendai, as well as multiple other locations across the country.

In March, April and May 2002, with the occasion of the establishment of new rescue associations in Iwate, Nagano and Aichi prefectures, signature-collecting activities were conducted alongside the citizens’ gatherings. A special campaign that lasted one day had been conducted by *Sukuukai* Miyagi, in July 2002. Moreover, numerous campaigning activities that included collecting signatures took place in Niigata, Fukui and Kagoshima, in summer 2002, after 24 years since the disappearance of the three couples from the coast of Japan.

In August 2002, the Youth Association of *Sukuukai* had been at the centre of organizing various campaigning activities, such as collecting signatures and distributing flyers regarding Prime Minister Koizumi’s approaching visit to North Korea. *Sukuukai* considered that the visit had been decided by CCS Fukuda and the Director of the Asia Bureau of MOFA, Tanaka Hitoshi, despite numerous opposing voices even inside MOFA (Modern Korea, 2002a). Later that year, in September, after Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, the Rescue Movement had organized urgent propaganda activities in the streets of Tokyo and Osaka, criticizing MOFA and the Japanese government for the way they handled the situation regarding the abductees, namely not verifying the identities of the surviving ones, nor the circumstances of the deaths of the ones reported dead by North Korea (Modern Korea, 2002a).

Similar street activities were organized in Shibuya, Tokyo, in April 2006, to protest against North Korea and the North Korean Vice-Minister, who was visiting Japan at that moment. The Rescue Movement representatives expressed their anger towards North Korea’s shameless attitude and the fact that the abductees could still not return to Japan, strongly requesting economic sanctions for their rescue (*Sukuukai*, 2006j).

#### 7.2.2.2 Meetings/ Gatherings/ Assemblies/ Workshops/ Conferences/ Study meetings/ Symposiums

Social advocacy was, however, mainly employed by the Rescue Movement through the organization of general meetings, larger gatherings and assemblies, workshops, conferences, study meetings and symposiums.

In the beginning of 1999, various rescue associations across Japan had organized meetings in order to raise awareness and deepen public opinion about the abduction issue. Thus, such gatherings took place in Fukui prefecture, Hyogo prefecture, while *Sukuukai* Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Miyazaki and Kagoshima decided to form the Kyūshū Liaison Conference, in order to strengthen the Rescue Movement in the Kyūshū region. Furthermore, after the end of February 1999, various activities were organized in order to request people to plead for the cause. Through the letters of journalist Sakurai Yoshiko and Yokota Sakie, mother of kidnapped Yokota Megumi, the rescue associations pled to academia and people of culture to take a position as campaigners and appeal for the abduction issue becoming a priority in the government’s policy. Consequently, 117 people had responded and accepted to assume the role and appeal for the cause of the families.

In June 1999, the representatives of every region’s *Sukuukai* gathered in Fukuoka for a meeting, to synthesize and analyse the main points of the May 2 gathering in Tokyo. The meeting included representatives of *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, as well as of the Preparatory meetings from Nagasaki, Oita and Kyoto. The decision adopted at the Fukuoka meeting encompassed enlargement of the movement, pursuit of a ban of North Korean ships into Japanese ports, starting with Man gyong bong ferry, making preparations for a lawsuit to complain about the inaction of the responsible persons in the government and an analysis of the Murayama visit report (Araki, 2002).

Further citizens’ gatherings took place in Mie, Miyazaki, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Hyōgo prefectures, accompanied by signature-gathering activities. The Nagasaki gathering in July 1999 was hosted by the local *Nippon Kaigi* branch, which was at the centre of *Sukuukai* Nagasaki.

At a meeting held in Tokyo in April 2000, *Sukuukai* presented the results of the survey targeting the assemblymen across Japan. The survey targeted 750 members of both houses of the Diet from the whole country. The representative of *Sukuukai* Fukuoka had prepared the survey, while the secretariat of the *Sukuukai* Tokyo collected the results. By the end of March 2000, 116 assemblymen, accounting for less than 20 per cent of the persons questioned, had replied. However, about 80 per cent of the respondents considered that the resolution of the issue should be pursued through sanctions. In the same month, the Second Citizens’ Assembly in Tokyo gathered approximately 2000 people, the majority of which had been doing campaign activities such as distributing flyers or displaying posters about the abducted Japanese citizens. The assembly encouraged the Rescue Movement, as the people’s involvement and interest was clearly noticed (Araki, 2002).

Another executive meeting of *Sukuukai* was held in Osaka in June 2000, with members from both *Kazokukai* and each local *Sukuukai.* The participants reviewed the activities to be conducted for the last half of the year, and selected, based on the results of the survey conducted in spring among the Diet members, "Diet members with similar perception as *Sukuukai*" and "not desirable Diet members” as reference for the voters in the following general elections. The first list included politicians who, as *Sukuukai*, considered the abduction issue a national crime and that the Japanese government should apply economic sanctions toward North Korea: Tasso Takuya, Sasaki Yohei, Nakano Masashi, Nakayama Toshio, Ueda Kiyoshi, Fukunaga Nobuhiko, Katō Takuji, Iwakuni Tetsundo, Hirasawa Katsuei, Eguchi Kazuo, Yamamoto Kazuna, Hamada Seiichi, Matsumoto Jun, Suga Yoshihide, Iijima Tadayoshi, Matsuzawa Shigefumi, Tomisawa Atsuhiro, Yoshida Rokuzaemon, Ogawa Gen, Okuda Ken, Sasaki Ryūzo, Watanabe Shu, Nakano Kansei, Tarutoko Shinji, Nakamura Eichi, Abe Shinzō, Sekiya Katsushi, Matsushita Tadahiro, Wanibuchi Toshiyuki, Genba Koichirō, Imada Yasunori, Hagino Hiroki, Edano Yukio, Kojima Toshio, Hanashi Nobuyuki, Satō Kenichirō, Urushibara Yoshio, Sakaguchi Chikara, Furukawa Motohisa, Nishimura Shōzō, Koga Issei, Gondo Tsuneo, Shimadu Naozumi, Miyaji Kazuaki. The second list referred to Nonaka Hiromu and presented several reasons for the respective characterization. Nonaka Hiromu, was criticized for favouring the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, and the provision of food aid to the North, to solving the abduction issue. Moreover, Nonaka was condemned for conducting activities for the materialization of the plan to send one million tons of food aid to North Korea. As a consequence of his activities, the executives of Kyoto Agricultural Cooperative had visited North Korea four times only in 1997, and starting with them, the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives from all Japan submitted a resolution to the government requesting the provision of one million tons rice aid to North Korea. The meeting further discussed the decision to conduct a month-long rescue movement in July 2000, comprising various activities all over the country. *Sukuukai* gatherings were taking place periodically, at least once a month in Tokyo, as well as in the prefectures. In August 2000, *Sukuukai* confirmed the position of the Rescue Movement during one of its meetings: no normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea without solving the abduction issue, and in September, the association presented an informative report about human rights, during a gathering in Tokyo. Besides the victims’ families appeal and Nishioka’s lecture, for the first time in a meeting organized by *Sukuukai* the participants discussed the issue freely among themselves (Araki, 2002).

At the end of January 2001, *Sukuukai* held a meeting of the representatives across the country, in Tokyo, in order to discuss the previous year’s activities and decide the ones for the following year. The report presented by Satō Katsumi, Chairman of the NARKN, clearly stated that for the resolution of the abduction issue, the Kim Jong Il regime must fall, either due to the death of the leader, or coup d’etat or terrorism. For the year 2001, appeals to the United States, the United Nations, and to human rights NGOs had been decided, alongside the appeals to the Japanese government and raising awareness with the Japanese public through signature-gathering campaigns and conferences. Another executive meeting took place in Tokyo in April 2001, in order to discuss the results of the visits to the United States and Europe. A report presented by Satō Katsumi referred to the difficulties faced by North Korea at the time, and to the fact that its strategy of receiving aid from Japan and South Korea became invalid with the beginning of the Bush administration, in January 2001. It further referred to North Korea’s relations with China and Russia, which became discordant as a result of various decisions of the two countries that displeased the North Korean leader. China had released a crewmember of an US military aircraft, while Russia did not accept North Korea’s purchase of tanks. Therefore, the report concluded that, from the diplomatic point of view, North Korea was in a critical situation. The main decisions emerging from the meeting regarded collaboration with human rights groups from the United States and France, as well as with the South Korean Families’ Association, and requesting the cooperation of countries that have diplomatic relations with North Korea. There were also decisions about the questionnaires to be sent to the candidates participating in the House of Councillors elections, and about the date of the next assembly of the NARKN. A visit to South Korea, matching Kim Jong Il’s visit to Seoul had been decided and pamphlets explaining the abduction issue had been prepared in that respect (Araki, 2002).

On May 15, 2001, the Rescue Movement and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association held an urgent meeting in Tokyo to protest the departure of Kim Jong Nam from Japan. Strong dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister had been expressed, alongside a call for the public’s strength and perseverance (Araki, 2002).

Later that year, in July, Masumoto Teruaki, the younger brother of Masumoto Rumiko kidnapped from Kagoshima, participated in a gathering of a citizens group who were supporting and promoting the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, called "Citizens’ Union", wishing to become familiar with their arguments. Subsequently, Masumoto wrote a report about the meeting, the points discussed and the questions raised. Special attention was directed towards the comment of a politician who sarcastically questioned the existence of the abductions of Japanese citizens.

Furthermore, the complete investigation of the abduction issue from the *Yodo-gō* wives was requested at a citizens' gathering from September 2001, organised by *Sukuukai,* in Tokyo. Alongside the appeals of the victims’ families, the executive staff of *Sukuukai* held speeches about the abductions and the living situation in North Korea.

Citizens’ gatherings and campaigning activities, organized by the Rescue Movement together with the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, were taking place periodically all over the country. Gatherings were, as usual, joined by the executive staff of *Sukuukai*, who held speeches or lectures for the public.

On October 14, 2001, a large gathering, the Third Citizens’ Assembly for the Rescue of the Abductees, was held in Tokyo, hosted by the three groups *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association. The theme of the meeting was the rescue of the abductees and of the people of North Korea. The meeting was coordinated by journalist Sakurai Yoshiko, and included guest speakers such as Pierre Rigoulot, author of “The Black Book of Communism”, and Norbert Vollertsen, German doctor and human rights activist, who had spent a period of time in North Korea. Hirasawa Katsuei (LDP), Nishimura Shingo (Liberal Party), Kaneko Zenjirō (DPJ) were also present at the meeting, supporting the Rescue Movement’s appeal for the rescue of the abductees. An appeal to the people of the world was adopted at the meeting, asking for cooperation in bringing home the abducted citizens by North Korea, and for protecting the rights of all the people in North Korea (Araki, 2002).

Another meeting for the promotion of the rescue of the abductees was held in Osaka, on November 18, organized by *Sukuukai* Kansai and its representative, Kurosaka Makoto. The meeting included panel discussions by Norbert Vollertsen, Kurosaka Makoto, Araki Kazuhiro, and was coordinated by journalist Sakurai Yoshiko. A few days later, the Rescue Movement held another meeting in Tokyo, having as guest speaker, Klein Takako, a Japanese writer and critic, living in Germany. Klein held a speech about the period when East and West Germany were separated, and East Germany used to kidnap people from the West. She also discussed the ways of the West German government to bring back those people (Araki, 2002).

At the executive meeting organized by *Sukuukai* in Tokyo, in February 2002, the representatives of the Rescue Movement discussed various topics including the submission of the collected signatures and appeals to Prime Minister Koizumi, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi and Governor Ishihara; the international activities organized by the Rescue Movement; and the formation of new Rescue Associations across the country.

The confession of Yao Megumi, a *Yodo-gō* wife, on April 12, 2002, of having kidnapped Arimoto Keiko from Europe gave rise to a strong protest allover the country. Arimoto Keiko’s case had been previously officially recognized by the police and included among the abduction cases recognized by the government. The protest had been an impetus for the launch of a project team at the *Kantei*, for the establishment of a Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, with the efforts of Abe Shinzō, Deputy CCS, who became the chief of the team for the resolution of the abduction issue.

In June 2002, *Sukuukai* Niigata organized a symposium for the rescue of the abductees, on Sado Island. Participants included executive members of *Sukuukai*, as well as members of the new *Rachi Giren* and the Association of Diet members from Niigata prefecture. Later that year, in September, just before Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, the Rescue Movement, the Prefectural Assemblymen Association and the New *Rachi Giren* organized a citizens’ assembly in Tokyo, in order to transmit a strong message to the Prime Minister, as well as to North Korea, from the Japanese people (Modern Korea, 2002a). Subsequently, *Sukuukai* held several executive meetings, such as the one in October 2002, prompted by the return of the five abductees, where it was decided to concentrate all the power of the Rescue Movement for the return of the families of the five, and further for the rescue of all the abductees. In that respect, the Blue Ribbon Movement was started at the suggestion of the Youth Association, consisting of a blue ribbon to be worn as a symbol for the rescue of the abductees (Rescue Movement Report 46, Modern Korea November 2002 issue). The Blue Ribbon badge was created and started to be sold for 500 yen in May 2003. The badge had been suggested by *Sukuukai* Tokyo and approved by NARKN (Modern Korea, 2003c).

Another similar meeting was held in November 2002, in Tokyo, where the inconsistencies of the report about the eight abductees declared dead were discussed (Rescue Movement Report 46, Modern Korea November 2002 issue). Later that month, *Sukuukai* organized a special workshop in Tokyo, with executive members from every *Sukuukai*, the families, supporters and the media (Modern Korea, 2002a).

In December 2002, the five returnees organized a meeting in Niigata, for the first time after their return, in order to express their gratitude towards the Japanese people who campaigned for their rescue (Modern Korea, 2002b). In the same month, *Sukuukai* held a conference to discuss the future policy and activities of the organization. It had been decided that a new organization would deal with investigation activities regarding the missing Japanese citizens, whose number was constantly increasing. The organization was to be called *Tokutei shisōsha mondai chōsa kai*, *Chōsakai* hereafter, and the representative of the newly formed organization was appointed Araki Kazuhiro, after resigning his position as Head Secretary of *Sukuukai*. *Sukuukai* and the newly formed *Chōsakai* were to cooperate as part of the Rescue Movement, and continue with the activities for the rescue of all the abductees from North Korea.

*Chōsakai* held a meeting in January 2003, where the executive members had been decided. Thus, Araki Kazuhiro was announced as representative, Manabe Sadaki, Vice President of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, as managing Director, and Aoki Hidemi, the representative of *Sukuukai* Fukuoka, as Director (Modern Korea, 2002b). On January 25, *Sukuukai* held another meeting, where the policy of the Rescue Movement for the year 2003 had been decided. Thus, the main objective of the Movement was recognized as the rescue of all the abductees from North Korea, and not the support of the five returnees. It was also decided not to recognize any other *Sukuukai* affiliated organizations over the thirty-two approved until then. The Rescue Movement was planning on developing cooperation with the larger population, not only with *Sukuukai*-affiliated groups. Moreover, since September 2002, after Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions, many groups without relation to *Sukuukai* had used the name of *Sukuukai* for various activities of fundraising events. During the same meeting, the resignation of the representative of *Sukuukai* Internet association, as well as the dissolution of the association (*Internet kai*) had been acknowledged.

The Rescue Movement’s plan for 2003 included the intention to dispatch a group to the United States for the second time, and a group to Europe; the decision to hold a large-scale citizens’ assembly; and prepare new forms for gathering signatures, seeking for the rescue of the families of the five returnees, the truth about the eight declared dead, as well as the rescue of all the abducted Japanese citizens. The executive meeting also included the presentation and performance of a song about the abductions, composed by Endo Minoru (Modern Korea, 2003a).

Regarding *Chōsakai*, it had been decided that the new organization would cooperate with *Sukuukai* as part of the Rescue Movement, conducting activities as the investigation organ of *Sukuukai*. *Chōsakai* would handle the requests from Japanese families about their disappeared children, brothers or sisters, requests that *Sukuukai* kept receiving after September 2002. *Chōsakai* was formed in order to handle activities such as investigating about the “special missing persons”, not referred to as “abducted”, as in case it turned out they had not been abducted it would become a bad influence on their families, as well as on the Rescue Movement. As the investigative organ of *Sukuukai*, *Chōsakai* would not collect donations from the public and would not have a membership system.

A meeting of *Kazokukai*, held on January 26, 2003, reinforced the points discussed at the *Sukuukai* meeting the previous day. Moreover, the visit to the United States and Europe had been established, although the details were to be decided in cooperation with *Sukuukai* and *Rachi Giren* at a later date (Modern Korea, 2003a).

On February 18, 2003, the Prefectural Assemblymen Association held a meeting for the rescue of the abductees, with participants from *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*. The main point decided at the meeting was to highlight the abduction issue as a state crime, different than the other issues related to North Korea. The executive members of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association were Tsuchiya Takayuki, Chairman (DPJ), Koga Toshiaki, Vice Chairman (LDP), Nakamura Minoru, Head of the secretariat (LDP) (Modern Korea, 2003a).

At an executive meeting in March 2003, *Sukuukai* had decided to dispatch two groups with members of the Rescue Movement to New York and Los Angeles the following month, to ask for cooperation regarding the rescue of the abducted Japanese citizens. At the meeting, the executive members of *Sukuukai* were reconfirmed. Thus, Satō Katsumi continued to act as president of the organization, Kojima Harunori, as agent for president, Nishioka Tsutomu as permanent Vice President, Shimada Yōichi and Kurosaka Makoto as Vice Presidents, Hirata Ryūtarō as head of secretariat, and Fukui Yoshitaka as assistant secretary (Modern Korea, 2003c).

The May 2003 Citizens Assembly held by *Sukuukai* in Tokyo was a great success with over 700 persons participating. The declaration adopted addressed both the Japanese government and the North Korean regime, and was subsequently handed to CCS Fukuda at the *Kantei* (Modern Korea, 2003d).

In June 2003, the Rescue Movement decided, during a meeting, the development of a new citizens’ movement under the slogan “The abductions are terrorist acts. Let’s implement economic sanctions”. Moreover, the signatures-gathering campaigns would be carried out under the same slogan since July 2003 (Modern Korea, 2003d). In addition, the participants decided the establishment of a volunteer room in the office of *Sukuukai*, for all citizens who wished to support the work of the organization (Modern Korea, 2003b). Later that year, in September, *Kazokukai* held a meeting to assess the government’s policy towards North Korea. Contrary to the period until July 2003, when the government expressed the intention to reopen negotiations despite the fact that the family members of the five abductees had not returned to Japan, the policy of the government at the time was to not restart negotiations with North Korea if the family members were not returned. Moreover, the government emphasized the fact that there would be no compensation (quid pro quo) for solving the abduction issue. During the meeting, *Kazokukai* also confirmed the consensus of opinion regarding Deputy CCS Abe Shinzō continuing to be the contact person in the government regarding the abduction issue. The agreement between *Kazokukai* and Deputy CCS Abe was reached in September 2002 (Modern Korea, 2004f).

In the same month, *Sukuukai* held an executive meeting of all the affiliated organizations around the country, where six new organizations working in solidarity with *Sukuukai* since September 2002 and developing the Rescue Movement were acknowledged: Toyama, Gunma, Wakayama, Tokushima, Ehime and Oita. *Sukuukai* also confirmed that the government’s policy toward North Korea was stricter, and the return of the family members of the five abductees became a priority and a prerequisite for negotiations for normalization of relations (Rescue Movement Report 56, Modern Korea March 2004 issue). Furthermore, in October, a large assembly was organized on Sado Island for the rescue of Soga Miyoshi (Modern Korea, 2004a).

In January 2004, *Kazokukai* held a general meeting with all the families, as well as the participants in the informal meeting between Japan and North Korea in Beijing the previous month. There were reports about North Korea’s recent position toward Japan and the abduction issue, and it was concluded that the information received was not even worth the criticism. The policy of the Movement was reconfirmed to continue the struggle for the imposition of sanctions and pressure against North Korea, as the only means to rescue the abductees (Modern Korea, 2004g).

*Sukuukai* also held an executive meeting in Tokyo, in January, with participants from all the thirty-two *Sukuukai* organizations across the country, *Kazokukai* and *Chōsakai*. The participants decided to continue the activities under the slogan “The abductions are terrorism! Let’s impose economic sanctions!”, and to pursue three concrete objectives in the future: urgent action all over the country, in the form of gatherings, written documents, signature-collecting activities, demonstrations etc., seeking the establishment of legislation for the imposition of economic sanctions; to make known the fact that the mastermind of the abductions had been Kim Jong-Il himself; and to dispatch a group of representatives of the Rescue Movement to the United States in order to request the clear specification of the abductions as reason for including North Korea in the list of countries supporting terrorism. The United States renewed the list every year, and the renewal date for 2004 would be April. Moreover, North Korea requested that the US removed the country from the list, in exchange for freezing its nuclear development. However, if the abductions were mentioned as terrorism in the US list, the fact would become great pressure on North Korea for the resolution of the issue (Modern Korea, 2004g).

Another executive meeting of *Sukuukai* was held in April 2004 in Tokyo, with participants from across the country, as well as members of *Kazokukai*, *Chōsakai* and *Rachi Giren*. Among other things, the members discussed the visit of the two politicians from the leading LDP, Hirasawa Katsuei and Yamasaki Taku, to China on April 1 and 2, 2004, and the fact that their endeavor was obstructing the effort for the resolution of the abduction issue. Hirasawa and Yamasaki secretly visited China in order to meet North Korea and seek the resumption of the stalled talks because of the abduction issue (Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 2004). Prime Minister Koizumi expressed dissatisfaction with the visit of the two politicians, explaining that it had not been authorized and that he learned about it from the newspapers. The event was evaluated as disunity inside the LDP and furthermore, led to the questioning of the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi (Asahi, 2004). CCS Fukuda had reinforced the Prime Minister’s assertion, adding that the bilateral talks between Japan and North Korea must be conducted by the two governments and if Hirasawa and Yamasaki gave the wrong message, the situation might become complicated.

The Rescue Movement considered the actions of the two politicians regrettable and demanded they did not engage in aforementioned activities. There was strong doubt that Hirasawa and Yamasaki’s purpose was the resolution of the abduction issue. In March 2004, he stated in front of journalists that the possibility that Matsuki Kaoru and other Japanese abducted from Europe had been executed could not be denied. Such statement was made without any concrete proof according to the Rescue Movement and disrupted the families who continued to fight for the rescue of their children (Modern Korea, 2004d).

In the same month, April 2004, *Kazokukai* held a general meeting to discuss the development of the Movement. It was, thus, confirmed to strongly seek to the government the implementation of economic sanctions against North Korea, having as reason the abduction issue. As first stage sanctions, the families suggested the embargo on luxury foodstuffs, which would not harm the common citizens in North Korea (Modern Korea, 2004h).

On April 30, 2004, a large citizens’ assembly for the rescue of the Japanese abducted by North Korea was held in Tokyo, hosted by the four groups, *Sukuukai*, *Kazokukai*, *Rachi Giren* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association. The assembly adopted a written resolution seeking economic sanctions and confirmed the number of signatures gathered until that time as one million and a half (Modern Korea, 2004h).

An important meeting of the Rescue Movement was the one from the evening of May 22, 2004, between Prime Minister Koizumi and *Kazokukai* members, after the Prime Minister’s return from Pyongyang. The families expressed dissatisfaction with the results of the Prime Minister visit to Pyongyang, and voiced considerable criticism towards it. As the meeting was broadcast on television, in response to seeing such criticism, numerous citizens had sent e-mails, letters and made phone calls condemning the attitude of the families, who appeared to have no gratitude or etiquette towards the Prime Minister. There was particular criticism for the fact that the majority did not even congratulate the families whose members had returned.

With regard to the citizens’ criticism, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented a statement on May 25, 2004, explaining their feelings to the public and the fact that they did congratulate the families whose members had returned, but the respective footage had been cut from the TV transmission, thus creating a misunderstanding. The statement also explained point by point the requests of the Rescue Movement and the fact that none of them was addressed by the Prime Minister. They also expressed the Movement’s strong determination to continue the effort of rescuing all the abductees and asked for the public’s further cooperation (Modern Korea, 2004i).

On June 10, 2004, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and *Rachi Giren* held a joint meeting in Tokyo, to discuss the new policy of the Movement, following Prime Minister Koizumi’s second visit to North Korea. Thus, the main aim of the Movement had been restated as to bring back all the abductees who had not returned to Japan, starting with the ten recognized by the government. As for the method to realize the aim, raising public opinion domestically and internationally, and applying pressure on North Korea through solidarity with the United States and economic sanctions had been named. Subsequently, the activities of the Movement for the following period were presented. Thus, the groups set a deadline, September 17, 2004, for seeking economic sanctions against North Korea, if the abduction issue was not solved, and decided to develop an urgent movement across the whole country, entitled “Megumi and the other abductees are alive! The government should rescue all of them based on the premise that they are alive!”. They also decided to address the abductees who had not returned to Japan as “mikikansha”, with the meaning of having the rescue as a target. The activities of the Rescue Movement would also include seeking the quiet resolution of the difficulties between the United States and Japan regarding the Soga family, so that Jenkins, Soga Hitomi and their children could live in Japan undisturbed (Modern Korea, 2004i).

*Sukuukai* held the fourth executive meeting of the year in July 2004 in order to discuss a plan for the Rescue Movement, which was entering a new stage with the Soga family reunion in Indonesia. Therefore, the Movement would seek the government’s recognition of other eight abductees apart for the fifteen already recognized; the establishment of a Special Committee for the Abduction Issue in the House of Representatives as well, as one had been established in the House of Councillors in June 2004; and oppose the restart of negotiations for normalization of relations until the results of Kim Jong Il’s promised investigation regarding the *mikikansha* were revealed. Furthermore, a new slogan instead of “Megumi and the others are alive! The government should rescue all of them based on the premise they are alive!”, had been decided: “Megumi and the others are alive! Let’s impose economic sanctions NOW for their rescue!” (Modern Korea, 2005a).

On September 17, 2004, after two years since Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgement and apology regarding the abductions, the Rescue Movement organized an urgent citizens assembly in Tokyo, seeking the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of all the abductees. The families of the abductees and their supporters, *Sukuukai* members as well as members of the general public, were further supported by Nakagawa Shōichi, Minister of Economy, Hiranuma Takeo, President of *Rachi Giren*, and Abe Shinzō, general-secretary of LDP, who held speeches regarding the imposition of sanctions and the resolution of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2005a).

In October 2004, under joint sponsorship of *Sukuukai* (NARKN) and *Sukuukai* Tokyo, the consecutive gathering “Let’s rescue Yokota Megumi” was held in Tokyo. In general, the gatherings about the abduction issue included wider issues compared to the "consecutive gatherings", which were meetings organized for one of the abductees, where the family told the story of the abducted family member before it was abducted, emphasizing his/her character and the life of the family after the abduction. At the Yokota Megumi consecutive gathering, besides the family, the executive members of *Sukuukai* and the North Korean defector An Myong Jin also held speeches about Megumi’s case (Modern Korea, 2005b).

*Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* held a joint meeting in March 2005, where the Movement’s policy was reconfirmed. A new deadline was decided, April 24, 2005, when a citizens’ assembly would take place in Tokyo and when, if the government did not impose economic sanctions against North Korea, the position and attitude of the Prime Minister would be verbally attacked and harshly blamed by the Rescue Movement alongside the general public. The groups also decided that *Sukuukai* form every prefecture would continue conducting campaigning activities for requesting economic sanctions against North Korea. Collaboration among the United States, Japan and South Korea was considered very important, as well as organizing activities to maintain such collaboration. Among other points, the groups would focus on raising awareness among citizens regarding the abductees not recognized by the government (Terakoshi cases, Kosumi Kenzo, Fukutome Kimiko) and the two cases not confirmed by North Korea (Soga Miyoshi, Kume Hiroshi), and requesting that the abduction issue would be included in the human rights education regionally and nationally (Modern Korea, 2006b).

Citizens assemblies were organized also by regional *Sukuukai*, such as *Sukuukai* Wakayama, where strong messages for the rescue of the abductees were usually transmitted by the public (Rescue Movement Report 74, Modern Korea April 2006 issue). Another regional citizens’ assembly was organized by *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* in Hokkaido in July 2005, seeking the urgent imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea and focusing on the rescue of Kosumi Kenzo, original from Hakodate, Hokkaido, as well as all the other abductees (Modern Korea, 2006c).

The Hokkaido assembly was followed by another citizens’ assembly in Niigata, in August 2005, and the Kansai people’s assembly, held in Osaka, in December, with the same purpose: to request the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of the abductees (Modern Korea, 2006d).

The Rescue Movement organized a large citizens’ assembly in Tokyo, in December 2005, requesting economic sanctions for the rescue of all abductees from North Korea. Participants included families of abducted citizens from Lebannon, Thailand and South Korea, as well as *Rachi Giren* members, and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Nakagawa Shōichi (*Sukuukai*, 2005e). An executive meeting with participants from across the country was held in February 2006, with the purpose of discussing the results of the Japan-North Korea negotiations. As there were no accomplishments regarding the abduction issue, the Rescue Movement had decided one more time a new policy and objective for the Movement. Consequently, the activities would target strengthening public opinion regarding applying pressure on North Korea through signature-gathering campaigns, meetings, demonstrations, sit-ins etc., as well as through large assemblies planned for May and June 2006. Moreover, the activities would also target strengthening the international solidarity, by agreement with families of abduction victims around the world, and by organizing international activities, starting with the United States and the United Nations. The activities would finally target North Korea, and strengthening the informational activities inside the country, such as radio broadcasts (*Sukuukai*, 2006k).

In May 2006, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* organized a meeting in Tokyo, entitled "Tokyo Assembly for the Japan-South Korea solidarity", followed by a large citizens’ assembly on May 28, 2006, seeking the urgent resolution of the abduction issue (*Sukuukai*, 2006l).

#### 7.2.2.3 Statements/ documents/ letters

Statements or documents to appeal to the public, as well as letters of protest to individual citizens with different opinion about the abduction issue than the Rescue Movement were also used as part of the social advocacy campaign.

At the end of September 2000, Yokota Shigeru, representative of *Kazokukai*, sent a protest letter to Sakamoto Yoshikazu, emeritus professor at Tokyo University, who expressed his dissatisfaction with the families’ opposition to rice aid provision to the North before the abduction issue was resolved. The comments of Professor Sakamoto appeared in a combined number of the Japanese language newspaper of *Chōsen Sōren*, *Chōsen Jihō*.

Sakamoto’s reply, however, disregarded the points made by Yokota Shigeru, as well as the fact that North Korea is a terrorist country (Araki, 2002). According to Araki, if one part of each year’s budget for missile development was used for agriculture, the famine in North Korea would end. He was thus criticizing Sakamoto, noting that if he was not aware of those facts, he could renounce his titles, or if he was aware and maintained his position, he should teach in North Korea, at the Kim Il Sung University (Araki, 2002).

In January 2001, the representatives of the three groups, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, sent a protest letter to another emeritus professor, from Tokyo University, Wada Haruki, directed at his article published in the January/February number of Sekai magazine. The article entitled *Verifying the abduction of Japanese citizens suspicion,* referred to the abduction issue as a fabrication, and an obstacle to the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea. In this regard, the three groups criticised professor Wada for his view, emphasizing the fact that he had not collected any data or information about the abductions. They also requested the professor to discuss the issue with Satō Katsumi, representative of *Sukuukai*, and *Sekai* magazine to publish the respective discussion.

Similarly, in September 2001, *Sukuukai* sent a questions document to the teaching staff of a public junior high school in Tokyo, who denied the certainty of the abduction issue during a deliberation for the textbooks to be used. The questions document had also been sent to the Board of Education and to the mayor of the respective ward. Thereafter, the teacher’s response acknowledged the abduction issue as truth.

In September 2002, after Prime Minister Koizumi’s return from Pyongyang, Nishioka Tsutomu, executive staff of *Sukuukai*, prepared a document with explanations regarding the information provided by North Korea, as an international strategy to avoid attack from the United States. The document was transmitted through the mail news of *Sukuukai* in order to attract support for the Rescue Movement’s position and activities (Modern Korea, 2002a). Furthermore, *Sukuukai* presented a statement, in October 2002, with the occasion of the return of the five surviving abductees, containing information abut the struggle to be taken by the Rescue Movement for the return of the families of the five, and further of all the abductees. It also presented the cooperation of the Rescue Movement with South Korean NGOs related to the rescue of the abductees, and the intention to strengthen that cooperation by seeking the cooperation of the Unites States, as well as of the international society. In addition, the statement introduced the Movement’s target to improve the human rights situation in North Korea (Modern Korea, 2002a).

#### 7.2.2.4 Articles/ Papers/ Manuscripts

As part of raising awareness among the public, the executive members of *Sukuukai* in general, had published articles, papers or manuscripts explaining the abductions or the situation in North Korea.

In October 1999, the mother of Yokota Megumi, Sakie, had published her first manuscript entitled *Megumi, I will surely help you*.

In the May 2003 issue of *Seiron* monthly magazine, Shimada Yōichi, Vice President of *Sukuukai*, published an article entitled *The United States’ strategy toward North Korea seen during the Kazokukai visit to the United States*. Shimada presented the view of Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State that the abductions were acts of terrorism, further classifying them as a human rights problem and considering the fight for the resolution of the abduction issue as identical with everyone’s fight against terrorism (Modern Korea, 2003c).

Nishioka Tsutomu, published an article entitled *Let’s overthrow the terrorist Kim Jong Il regime through economic sanctions*, in the June 2003 issue of Modern Korea magazine, where he stressed the fact that as long as the Kim Jong Il regime was still in place, the abduction issue would not be resolved. He argued for the imposition of economic sanctions to limit the flow of people, things and money between Japan and North Korea. Moreover, in May 2004, Nishioka Tsutomu officially announced his paper entitled *Nihonjin rachi no shinsō to kyūshutsu no hōhō*, [The real situation of the abductions of Japanese citizens and the methods for their rescue]. The paper provided basic information regarding the abduction issue and the methods to rescue the abducted Japanese. Furthermore, it emphasized that the Japanese government had come to abandon the abduction issue, and that in order to rescue the abductees, a deadline must be set and economic sanctions must be announced (Modern Korea, 2004e).

A book, *Kazoku* (The families), with the stories and struggles of all the families that formed *Kazokukai*, was published in July 2003, by the association. The book became a bestseller, helping spread awareness among the public and attracting sympathy and support (Modern Korea, 2003b).

#### 7.2.2.5 Visual media representations

Alongside articles, papers and manuscripts, attention to the abduction issue and the cause advocated by the Rescue Movement had been drawn also by visual media representations, such as videos or films.

In September 2002, before the Prime Minister’s visit, *Sukuukai* together with the Prefectural Assemblymen Association produced a video entitled *For the Citizens’ Assembly, with the occasion of the Prime Minister’s visit to NK*, through which they intended to transmit a message to the people, in order to gain support for their promoted cause. The video had been transmitted to the rescue associations in each prefecture to be distributed until the Prime Minister’s visit (Modern Korea, 2002a).

The documentary film, *Abduction: The Megumi Yokota Story* was shown for the first time in Japan on June 27, 2006. The screening was, however, limited to the persons concerned with its production or the abduction issue, but, as various distribution companies conducted negotiations about the film, there was hope that it would be screened for the Japanese general public in the future (*Sukuukai*, 2006m).

As previously emphasized, social advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement since 1998 until 2006 in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch were taking place periodically all over the country. Figure 7.2 outlines the most representative ones, as recorded in the Rescue Movement Reports, according to their type.

Figure 7.2 Social advocacy activities 1999-2006

Author's original work based on the Rescue Movement Reports published by Modern Korea (2002-2006)

### 7.2.3 Media advocacy activities

The media advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement since 1998 until 2006, after the North Korean missile launch, include, among others, the methods acknowledged by scholars as being utilized by civil society organizations to seek media representation, as introduced in Chapter 3. Thus, media advocacy was mainly employed through the organization of press conferences, where various statements regarding the abduction issue, as well as the domestic political context were being released. By means of the press conferences the groups comprising the Rescue Movement advocated their cause to rescue the abductees from North Korea, to the media, and also to the general public to whom it was further transmitted via various media outlets. In addition to press conferences, other media advocacy activities included contributions to news media, as well as various letters of protest, but also of appreciation, when considered, directed at the media. The activities are further presented according to their type and outlined in Figure 7.3.

#### 7.2.3.1 Press conferences

Press conferences continued to be organized with the occasion of each large Citizens’ Assembly hosted by the Rescue Movement. In this respect, a press conference was held on April 30, 2000, with the occasion of the Second Citizens’ Assembly for the rescue of the abductees in Tokyo. The families of few South Korean abductees who participated in the assembly engaged in the press conference together with the representative of *Kazokukai*, Yokota Shigeru, the President of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, Tsuchiya Takayuki, and the Chairman of *Sukuukai*, Satō Katsumi.

Another press conference was organized in Osaka, by Arimoto Akihiro, the father of Arimoto Keiko, on September 18, 2001, the day of the return of the *Yodo-gō* wife, Kaneko Emiko. Arimoto Akihiro requested the police to make clear the abduction issue in its investigation of Kaneko Emiko and to seek the return of the abductees as soon as possible.

The Rescue Movement organized several press conferences before Prime Minister Koizumi’s first visit to North Korea, on August 30, September 5, and September 13, 2002. The Movement’s representatives mainly explained their position to the media, as well as their future activities.

On September 17, 2002, during a similar press conference in the hotel where the families were accommodated and were waiting for the Prime Minister’s return from North Korea, the Rescue Movement issued a statement regarding the report about the safety of the abductees. The statement harshly blamed the North Korean as well as the Japanese government, expressing deep anger regarding the news about the abductees, according to which six out of the eleven people recognized by the Japanese government as abducted, were dead. The Rescue Movement considered the news unacceptable, and urgently asked explanations from the Prime Minister. The statement also requested the return of the confirmed surviving abductees and information regarding the circumstances of the death of the abductees reported dead. Moreover, it also asked for full apologies and compensation from the “terrorist state” of North Korea, as well as from the Japanese government, who did not solve the issue in over twenty years. Prime Minister Koizumi had been criticized for signing a joint declaration for the normalization of relations, which included apologies of the past from Japan’s side, but nothing about the abduction issue. Such development was considered a betrayal to the Japanese people and, therefore, unacceptable, and the government was requested to immediately withdraw such policy (Modern Korea, 2002a). Accordingly, press conferences were a means of advocating their cause not only to the general public, but also to the government and government-related organs.

*Sukuukai* organized a press conference on September 19, regarding North Korea’s notice about the safety of the abductees, and the way it was transmitted to the families by the Japanese government. The declaration released to the press mentioned the high possibility that the information provided by North Korea was false, giving several examples, such as the one of Ichikawa Shūichi, kidnapped from Kagoshima, reported by North Korea to have died in 1979, but reportedly seen in the 1980s by An Myong Jin, former North Korean spy, collaborating with *Sukuukai*. Moreover, the declaration criticized the Japanese team led by Umemoto Kazuyoshi, Director of the North-East Asian Affairs Division of MOFA, for failing to verify the identities of the surviving abductees, as well as to confirm the others’ death circumstances with reliable evidence, and merely taking North Korea’s statements as sincere. The fact that the information about the death of several abducted Japanese had not been verified and confirmed by the Japanese team was confirmed to the families and *Sukuukai* by Deputy CCS Abe on September 18, 2002. The declaration concluded by requesting the media to report the anger of the families and their criticism of such development of events, to the Japanese people (Modern Korea, 2002a).

Later that month, after an audience with Prime Minister Koizumi, the Rescue Movement and *Rachi Giren* organized a press conference at the Diet (September 27, 2002). The statement prepared by *Sukuukai* for the press conference regarded the Japan-North Korea Summit, and alongside explaining the feelings of the families, it requested that the surviving abductees be returned to Japan as soon as possible. Regarding the abductees reported dead, a verification of their death circumstances by specialists was requested, the mere announcement of their deaths being considered unacceptable. The statement concluded by expressing the families’ distrust in the government and MOFA, further deepened after the Prime Minister’s visit to North Korea (Modern Korea, 2002a).

After the meeting of the Rescue Movement representatives with the representatives of Japan at the negotiations with North Korea in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in October 2002 (Suzuki, Saiki), a press conference was held by *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*. The statement released by the two groups expressed gratitude toward the government, the Diet, the prefectural assemblies, the media and the Japanese people for cooperating with regard to the abduction issue. Moreover, alongside expressing regret about North Korea’s position, the statement presented the determination of the Rescue Movement to continue the struggle for the resolution of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2002a).

At a press conference in January 2003, organized by *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, the Prefectural Assemblymen Association and *Rachi Giren*, the names of forty missing people had been made public, with the suspicion they had been kidnapped by North Korea (Modern Korea, 2002b). Later that month, at a different press conference, *Kazokukai* announced the decision of a second group-visit to the United States, and a first visit to Europe (Modern Korea, 2003a).

In March 2003, on their return from the US visit, the group comprised of members of *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and *Rachi Giren* presented a declaration at the press conference held at Narita Airport. The declaration presented the agreement of the US government, Congress and people with the claim that the abductions were terrorist acts, and the US cooperation with regard to the resolution of the issue (Modern Korea, 2003c).

As a method of advocating their cause, the Rescue Movement also prepared questionnaires and surveys for politicians, mainly before elections. The results of the questionnaires and surveys were subsequently made public, by reporting them to the press clubs in each prefecture and further made public in newspapers and other type of media.

On November 3, 2003, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* held a press conference where the results of the questionnaire to the candidates to the House of Representatives were presented. The questionnaire was distributed by *Sukuukai* in each prefecture in October 2003 (after October 11, when Prime Minister Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives), and regarded the economic sanctions targeted and requested by the Rescue Movement, as well as the candidates’ awareness and position with respect to such sanctions against North Korea. The questionnaire had been sent to the majority of the candidates to the House of Representatives, 1159 persons, and the response rate was 85.2 per cent (987 persons). According to the results, 92.7 per cent of the participants considered the abductions terrorist acts, while with regard to the legislation for the imposition of economic sanctions, 54.8 per cent agreed with the revision of FEFTCL, and 51.6 per cent with the enactment of LPPESS. However, as approximately 36 per cent of all the respondents were from the Communist and Socialist parties, the Rescue Movement considered the fact as a substantial influence on the results. Nevertheless, the majority agreed with revising or enacting legislation in order to impose economic sanctions for the resolution of the abduction issue, and almost all the respondents considered the abductions terrorist acts.

A distinct questionnaire carried out by the Rescue Movement in March 2000, had a different target than the one in 2003. The 2003 questionnaire targeted the candidates to the House of Representatives and not the incumbents; while in 2000, the target were the members of the House of Representatives. Thus, out of 116 respondents, 70 per cent considered the abductions criminal acts, while 7 per cent considered the abduction issue a fabrication. Moreover, regarding food aid to North Korea, only 34 per cent considered that it should not be provided as long as the abduction issue was not solved, 42 per cent considered it humanitarian, thus completely different than the abduction issue, and 23 per cent considered that food aid should be provided to North Korea as the abduction issue was unreasonable. With respect to normalization of relations with North Korea, 39 per cent of the respondents believed that the resolution of the abduction issue should be a prerequisite for the normalization negotiations, 49 per cent believed that the normalization of relations should be accomplished first, and during that process, the resolution of the abduction issue should also be addressed, and 9 per cent of all the respondents considered it unreasonable to bring up the abduction issue in the negotiations for normalization of relations. With regard to the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the resolution of the abduction issue, only 3 per cent thought that the resolution should be pursued through economic sanctions. The majority, 75 per cent, thought that sanctions should be considered if North Korea did not show a sincere attitude in the process of negotiating for normalization of relations, while 9 per cent thought that the resolution of the abduction issue should only be pursued through dialogue.

Consequently, after comparing the results of the two questionnaires, in 2000, only 3 per cent of the respondents favoured the imposition of economic sanctions as a method to solve the abduction issue, while in 2003, more than half of the respondents agreed with the revision or enactment of legislation to allow the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea as a method to solve the abduction issue. The response rate, however, was considerably higher in 2003, compared to 2000 (84 per cent vs. 20 per cent).

As a rule, the Rescue Movement wished and hoped for a large number of candidates who considered the abduction issue should be solved through the imposition of economic sanctions to be elected at the general elections from November 9, 2003. In this regard, at the press conference from November 3, 2003, Nishioka Tsutomu, Vice President of *Sukuukai*, presented a statement alongside the questionnaire results.

The following day after the elections, on November 10, 2003, the Rescue Movement organized another press conference in order to make public the answers to the questionnaire of the successful candidates. Therefore, 91 per cent considered the abductions terrorist acts, 83.2 per cent agreed with the revision of FEFTCL, and 79.3 per cent agreed with the enactment of LPPESS, in order to impose economic sanctions against North Korea. Based on the answers, the Movement presented a declaration asking the elected Diet members to realize the will of the citizens, which was demonstrated through the general elections. The declaration also expressed hope that legislation allowing economic sanctions would be passed by the Diet as early as possible in order to show the position they supported through actions. Along these lines, the surveys point out the increasing support of the politicians for the Rescue Movement and its cause, in their review of the abductions as criminal acts and endorsement of the enactment of legislation allowing Japan’s unilateral imposition of economic sanctions.

The results of a survey carried out by the Rescue Movement on all the candidates to the September 11, 2005 general elections for the House of Representatives, was made public during a press conference on September 13, 2005. According to the results, 66.9 per cent of the successful candidates favoured the urgent imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the resolution of the abduction issue. In that respect, during the press conference, the Rescue Movement representatives issued a declaration expressing high expectations regarding the imposition of sanctions, as a reflection of people’s will (Modern Korea, 2006d).

#### 7.2.3.2 Contributions to news media

In addition to press conferences, the Rescue Movement advocated their cause to the media through various contributions such as articles to newspapers or magazines. One specific example is the article written by Satō Katsumi, under the name of Modern Korea Institute, which he was directing, in *Sekai Shūhō* (World Weekly Report), a publishing company of *Jiji News* Agency, in June 2004. The article commented on the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi had paid a ransom to North Korea for the family members of the five abductees who returned to Japan in 2004, referring to the aid promised by Koizumi at the Second Japan-North Korea Summit, under the name of “humanitarian aid”. He further referred to the respective “aid” as a betrayal of the Japanese people, as well as of the United States, who were strongly fighting terrorism. Satō’s article further referred to Prime Minister Koizumi committing a grave mistake by having promised Kim Jong-Il not to impose economic sanctions as long as the Pyongyang Declaration was respected. According to Satō’s explanations, the Pyongyang Declaration had already been violated, when, in October 2002, North Korea admitted its nuclear development to the US diplomat, James Kelley. Satō also mentioned the comment of an opposition party member, Ozawa Ichirō (DPJ) regarding Koizumi’s diplomacy. Ozawa called the diplomacy conducted by Prime Minister Koizumi toward North Korea “treason diplomacy”, thus, leading Satō to ascertain the atypical character of the situation (Modern Korea, 2005a).

Another article of an executive member of the Rescue Moevenet, Nishioka Tsutomu, was published by the *Sankei Shinbun* on February 21, 2006. Nishioka’s article, entitled *The non-advance of the Japan-North Korea talks is also the responsibility of the Japanese side. Let’s show a clear national intention through the imposition of economic sanctions!* appeared in the *Seiron* column, and emphasized the fact that the talks with North Korea yielded no results. Moreover, it highlighted the fact that North Korea was concerned with the Japanese public opinion and the internationalization of the abduction issue, and regarded as highly regrettable the fact that the government considered and transmitted the intention to impose economic sanctions as a "last measure". According to Nishioka, such affirmations could demonstrate a divided national position regarding the abduction issue, which was not beneficial for its resolution (*Sukuukai*, 2006n).

#### 7.2.3.3 Objections/appreciations towards the media

Apart from contributions to the media through articles, the Rescue Movement also expressed its objections or protest, but also appreciation towards newspapers, especially *Asahi Shinbun.*

In August 1999, *Kazokukai* sent a letter of protest to *Asahi Shinbun*, regarding the article *Taepodong - 1 year lesson*, published on August 31, 1999, which pointed out that in order to change North Korea, food aid should be provided and that negotiations should continue regardless of the abduction issue or other obstacles. Protest letters were also sent by the representatives of *Sukuukai* Fukuoka and Niigata. Moreover, the Japanese version of *Newsweek* magazine, which published on the same topic on September 15, 1999, was flooded with objections and protest letters from readers. Therefore, alongside promoting their cause in the media, the Rescue Movement also harshly criticized opposite views publicized in the media. *Sukuukai* emphasized the fact that there were no measures taken with respect to *Asahi Shinbun* and Newsweek magazine in August and September 1999, but committed to taking measures in the future.

In February 2004, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* presented a protest declaration in regard to an article published by the *Asahi Shinbun*, which stated that the abduction was “an obstacle” to the normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. The protest declaration that was also sent to the *Asahi Shinbun* Company, expressed difficulty in understanding how a Japanese newspaper company could have called the abduction issue, which is clearly a violation of the human rights of the Japanese people, as well as of Japan’s sovereignty, "an obstacle", in relation to other issues. In addition, the Rescue Movement clarified that the attitude of the *Asahi Shinbun* regarding the issue would be made public (Modern Korea, 2004b). Later that year, in May, Nishioka, the Vice President of *Sukuukai*, released a declaration regarding an editorial published by the *Asahi Shinbun* on May 15 about the establishment of a Japan-North Korea Joint Committee to investigate the whereabouts and the situation of the ten unconfirmed abductees and all the other Japanese abducted by North Korea. Nishioka’s declaration referred to the plan as "a serious trap", as such agreement meant that the complete resolution of the abduction issue would become impossible. The Joint Committee plan was brought up in December 2003 during the contact of Hirasawa Katsuei and other politicians with North Korean officials, and was discussed in Beijing during Japan-North Korea contacts since January 2004. Therefore, at the February high-official talks between Japan and North Korea, in Pyongyang, MOFA’s Yabunaka Mitoji officially suggested the establishment of the Joint Committee. Nevertheless, as presented in Nishioka’s declaration, the abductions happened due to clear orders from Kim Jong-Il, and all the people from the North Korean party, government, army etc, believed that Kim Jong-Il’s authority, even to impose death, should be obeyed. Thus, the declaration stressed the fact that by establishing a joint committee with the aforementioned people, Kim Jong Il’s orders for abductions would not be acknowledged. Moreover, the real situation of Taguchi Yaeko, Yokota Megumi and the other unconfirmed abductees would remain unsolved. Nishioka’s statement concluded with the strong rejection of a Joint Committee, and with the conviction that if the Prime Minister approved it, it would become a serious betrayal of Japan and the Japanese people (Modern Korea, 2004e).

Aside from objections and protest declarations mainly directed at *Asahi Shinbun*, the Rescue Movement also expressed appreciation when that was the case.

On October 22, 2004, *Asahi Shinbun* published an editorial, which expressed recognition of the North Korean Human Rights Act, established by the United States. The editorial also expressed the view that the international society should consider the effects of a soft stance on North Korea and warn the latter about the imposition of sanctions. The Rescue Movement appreciated the evaluation of *Asahi Shinbun* editorial and mentioned that, although *Asahi* was regarded as the most left-wing newspaper, it was able to recognize accurately the real situation of North Korea (Modern Korea, 2005g).

Media advocacy activities were periodically conducted by the Rescue Movement since 1998 until 2006 in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch. The most representative ones, recorded in the Rescue Movement Reports, are outlined in Figure 7.3 according to their type.

Figure 7.3 Media advocacy activities 1999-2006

Author's original work based on the Rescue Movement Reports published by Modern Korea (2002-2006)

### 7.2.4 Transnational advocacy activities

Alongside political, social and media advocacy activities, the Rescue Movement had also pursued transnational advocacy activities. These activities will be further classified in accordance to the target audience, as pointed out by Keck and Sikkink (1998) introduced in the theoretical chapter (3). Hence, this section will present the interactions of the Rescue Movement with other states and with international organizations, paying attention to the interactions with other non-state actors in the process. Thus, in the period examined in this chapter, the Movement appealed to the United States, South Korea, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, as well as to the United Nations and the entire international community for the return of the abducted Japanese citizens.

#### 7.2.4.1 To the United States

Numerous advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement had been directed at the United States. At the end of January 2001, the representatives of *Sukuukai* had decided a group visit to the United States in order to appeal to the US government and the US people for the rescue of the abducted Japanese citizens. The trip was immediately planned and decided for February 25, 2001. Before the visit, the Rescue Movement had released a joint statement regarding their plans and expectations. The statement presented the decision of the Japanese Rescue Movement to appeal to the international community through the US government and the US people. Moreover, in their statement, the groups expressed their dissatisfaction with Japan’s cooperation with the United States and South Korea in taking a cordial approach toward the North, and pursuing normalization of relations with a state that committed an intolerable crime. The members of the group advocated their cause through visits at the Department of State, human rights organizations, the United Nations, as well as press conferences and meetings with members of the US Congress. Furthermore, starting with June 2002, the executives of the new *Rachi Giren* had visited the embassies of the United States and Russia, requesting cooperation regarding the abduction issue.

In December 2002, representatives of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* visited the US embassy in Japan for a meeting with Henry Hyde, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The request handed to Henry Hyde referred to the members’ visit to the US, in February 2001, and to the cooperation of all the parties they reached to, such as Congress-related persons, government, human rights groups etc. It further referred to the five abductees who returned to Japan in October 2002, and to the eight abductees declared dead by North Korea, emphasizing the inconsistencies of the report and the high possibility they were alive. The request also expressed the fact that besides the acknowledged abductees, there were much more Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea, alongside South Koreans and other nationalities. Finally, there was clear reference to the suffering of the whole North Korean population and the need for its rescue. *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* asked for the cooperation of all American citizens who valued freedom and democracy, and lastly, pleaded for a special arrangement from the US government for Charles Jenkins, the spouse of Soga Hitomi.

Following the meeting with the Rescue Movement representatives, Hyde, leader of the US Congress delegation, stated the delegation’s understanding and sympathy towards the pain of the victims’ families, and regarded the peace and safety of the North-East Asian region, including Japan, not only a problem for the countries in the region, but also very important for the United States (Modern Korea, 2002b).

Another visit of the representatives of the Rescue Movement to the United States took place in February 2003. The visiting group was comprised of two executive members of *Sukuukai*: Shimada Yōichi, Associate Professor at Fukui Prefectural University and Fukui Yoshitaka, Associate Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University, and the objective of the trip was to ask for cooperation from the US government, US Congress and the American people. The group also visited Michael Green, Director of Asian Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC), who assured them that the United States was not shelving the abductions. The United States included the abduction issue in one of the four problems to be negotiated with North Korea: the nuclear development, the missile problem, demilitarization and the human rights problem, where the abduction issue was included (Modern Korea, 2003a).

A distinct visit to the United States took place in March 2003, with the same objective, to appeal to the US government and the people of the United States for the resolution of the abduction issue. The group included family members of the abductees, executive members of *Sukuukai*, as well as members of *Rachi Giren*, and appealed for economic sanctions and strong pressure to be applied on North Korea (Modern Korea, 2003c).

The efforts of the Rescue Movement to raise awareness and ask for cooperation in the United States were recognized by the Wall Street Journal, which, on June 4, 2003 published a large piece on the struggle of the Hasuike family, to rescue their son, Kaoru. The article also mentioned the efforts made by *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* for the rescue of all the Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, and their persistence despite the North’s insincere attitude, as well as the promise of President Bush to cooperate for the resolution of the issue (Modern Korea, 2003d).

In August 2003, just before the first round of the SPT, Rescue Movement representatives together with *Rachi Giren* members appealed to the temporary representative of the US ambassador to Japan, requesting cooperation regarding the resolution of the abduction issue in the SPT. The supporting documents submitted by the representatives included the Movement’s belief that the abduction issue should be discussed in the same time with the nuclear development (Modern Korea, 2003b).

During a group visit to the United States in September 2003, Rescue Movement representatives had various interviews and activities at the White House, the State Department, the Department of Defense etc. They also met the US representatives in the SPT and asked for their support regarding the resolution of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2004f).

The following year, in January 2004, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* members met with US Senator Sam Brownback, who had a high interest in the abduction issue. With the occasion of the Rescue Movement’s visit to the United States in March 2003, the senator contributed to the spread of awareness to the media and in general. *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* members explained their struggle as a movement and handed him documents regarding the sanctions legislation and its deliberation in the Diet. In response, the senator emphasized the great role played by the Rescue Movement, as well as the importance of maintaining pressure on North Korea at that time (Modern Korea, 2004g).

In February and March 2004, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* members had meetings with US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and the US Ambassador to Japan, Howard Baker. The main request to both US officials was the inclusion of the abduction issue as a reason for recording North Korea on the list of countries supporting terrorism. According to Ambassador Baker, the request would be fulfilled by the United States in April 2004 (Modern Korea, 2004b,c).

Later that year, in October 2004, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and *Rachi Giren* members had another meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, in order to express their gratitude for the inclusion of the abduction issue among the reasons for recording North Korea on the list of countries supporting terrorism, as well as for the adoption of the North Korean Human Rights Act (Modern Korea, 2005f).

During 2005, the Rescue Movement dispatched two groups to the United States, asking for cooperation regarding the resolution of the abduction issue. The first group, in April-May 2005, included Masumoto Teruaki from *Kazokukai* and Shimada Yōichi, executive staff of *Sukuukai*. The two representatives held speeches at the North Korea Genocide Exhibition and met with government officials in order to make the cause of the Movement known and to ask for cooperation. Although the United States’ position had not changed with respect to the abduction issue, the official attitude became “resolution through negotiations” (Modern Korea, 2006c). The second group visited the US in October, with the same objective and message for the US government and the people (*Sukuukai*, 2005f).

The abduction issue, and especially one abduction case greatly explored by the media in Japan, the Yokota Megumi case, became familiar to the US public through the documentary film, *Abduction. The Megumi Yokota Story*, which was nominated for the Slamdance Film Festival in January 2006. The film, directed by two Canadian journalists, was made with guidance and cooperation from the BBC and Fuji TV, and won numerous awards at the festival.

The abduction case of Yokota Megumi was explained in detail to US Ambassador to Japan, Tom Schieffer, in March 2006, when he visited Niigata and was guided to the place where the abduction happened. The Ambassador expressed his intention to cooperate for raising awareness about the abduction issue in the United States and internationally (*Sukuukai*, 2006u). His intention was transmitted later that month directly to Yokota family as a promise to discuss the issue with the executive staff in the US government and cooperate for a resolution (*Sukuukai*, 2006o).

In April 2006, representatives of the Rescue Movement and members of the *Rachi Giren* organized another visit to the United States, having the unaltered aim: to ask for cooperation for the rescue of the abducted Japanese citizens. In that regard, the representatives of the group testified during a Lower House meeting, and met with high-level officials in order to advocate their cause. One important aspect of the visit was the meeting between Yokota Sakie, Megumi’s mother and Yokota Takuya, Megumi’s brother, with President Bush, who promised to pressure North Korea for the return of the abductees and for respecting human rights.

President Bush referred to the meeting with Yokota Megumi’s family later that year, during a news conference at the White House, on October 11, 2006, expressing his sentiments about the encounter: “It broke my heart. And it should break everybody’s heart. But it speaks to the nature of the regime”. In the same news conference, President Bush described the US strategy toward North Korea, emphasizing a diplomatic effort, and a plan to work “within the context of the six-party talks” (CNN, 2006).

Alongside appealing to the United States for the resolution of the abduction issue, as part of the Rescue Movement’s advocacy activities, the civil society groups also targeted South Korea, the government and the families of South Korean citizens abducted by North Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and North Korea.

#### 7.2.4.2 To South Korea

Appeals to the South Korean government include requests for the extradition of Shin Gwang Su, the abductor of Hara Tadaaki, to Japan, and for stopping his repatriation to North Korea. However, Shin Gwang Su was repatriated on September 2, 2000, making the appeals of the Rescue Movement ineffective.

On the other hand, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* collaborated with the families of South Korean abductees and became a stimulus for them to form a rescue movement in South Korea. The first time the South Korean families participated in a gathering of the Rescue Movement in Japan was in May 1999. Subsequently, executive staff of *Sukuukai*, such as Nishioka Tsutomu, Araki Kazuhiro and Kurosaka Makoto, participated in the second assembly of the South Korean Families’ Association in Seoul, in March 2000, where they explained about the Japanese Rescue Movement.

In April 2000, an investigation group of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association visited South Korea for discussions with the South Korean Families’ Association. As a result, at a press conference on April 18, the two associations made a joint statement requesting North Korea to return all the abductees in the shortest possible time. The South Korean government officially reported 454 abductees, while the Japanese government ten abductees. The statement also regarded the South Korean government, demanding the discussion of the abduction issue in the North-South Summit Conference in June 2000, and it concluded with the commitment to gather the international community in order to advocate for freedom and human rights, and the rescue of the abductees from North Korea.

A group of members from *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai*, *Chōsakai* and *Rachi Giren* visited South Korea in June 2003, in order to meet with two organizations of families of South Korean citizens abducted by North Korea and to confirm their solidarity. The groups appealed to the governments and citizens of both countries for cooperation and for the rescue of all the abductees (Modern Korea, 2003b).

The solidarity between the Japanese and South Korean organizations fighting for the rescue of the abductees was reconfirmed in May 2006, during another visit of Rescue Movement representatives to South Korea. During their visit, the families of the abductees also visited the radio station “Free North Korea”, a broadcasting station to North Korea, started by defectors in South Korea, where they recorded messages for their family members. The messages were to be transmitted for four days, and repeated six times each day (*Sukuukai*, 2006p).

#### 7.2.4.3 To the People's Republic of China

The Rescue Movement had also contacted the Chinese Embassy in Japan, in April 2006, in order to offer information regarding abducted Chinese citizens, who were residing in Macao. Members of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* had met the families of the victims in Macao, in January 2006 and listened to their stories, planning to include the abducted victims from Macao in their appeals for the rescue of all the abducted victims by North Korea.

The Rescue Movement representatives were, however, refused the visit to the Chinese Embassy in Japan, and were suggested to send the information by fax. The letter from *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* was sent by fax, as well as by post, and, apart from offering information about abducted Chinese citizens, it respectfully asked for the inclusion of the topic in the discussions between China and North Korea (*Sukuukai*, 2006q).

One previous attempt to appeal to the People’s Republic of China was made by the Rescue Movement in August 2003, when the groups called on the cooperation of the temporary representative of the Chinese ambassador to Japan, just before the first round of the SPT.

#### 7.2.4.4 To North Korea

The Rescue Movement’s advocacy activities also targeted North Korea, directly or indirectly. An example of the abduction issue-related activities in Japan reaching North Korea indirectly is the establishment of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association on January 23, 2000, cooperating for the rescue of the abductees. Information about the establishment meeting appeared in the North Korean media, which referred to Nishimura Shingo, who sent a congratulatory telegram, as the initiator of the movement and leader of the association. The information appeared to have reached the North as a translation of an article from *Sankei Shinbun* (Araki, 2002).

The representatives of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* expressed their intention of advocating their cause directly to a group of North Korean officials visiting Japan in August 2000. The groups together with representatives of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association requested an audience with the Foreign Minister, in order to be in the same location as the North Korean officials, at MOFA. Consequently, the Japanese activists had unfolded a banner with the message *Return our families* in Korean, at the time when the North Korean officials had entered the room. As their request for a meeting with the officials was rejected, *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association submitted a written request for the quick return of the abductees to the Director of the North East Asia Division of MOFA, Uemoto Kazuyoshi, asking him to convey it to the North Koreans. When the Japanese side touched upon that request, the reply was that it could not be accepted immediately, and it would be considered after consultation with the group leader. Although the request was redelivered it was once more rejected; thus, the groups’ attempt to appeal to North Korea rejected.

A report presented by Satō Katsumi at the executive meeting of *Sukuukai* from April 2001 referred to North Korea’s criticism of the Rescue Movement’s activities, through its central news media. On April 9, 2001, the Central North Korean news criticized the intention to include the abduction issue into the Japanese textbooks, as well as Japan’s internationalization of the issue. The inclusion of the abduction issue in the Prime Minister’s talks with every country’s leader was adding more pressure to North Korea, according to the Labor Party newspaper. Furthermore, Satō’s report included informal information regarding Kim Jong Il’s orders to the *Chōsen Sōren* to "solve" the abduction issue. The Rescue Movement interpreted those orders as repressing the issue or making it disappear.

In September 2001, the Central North Korean News released further criticism regarding the declaration of the Japanese Police from September 10, with respect to the replacement of the expression "abduction suspicion" (*rachi giwaku*) with "abduction charge" (*rachi yōgi*). The news release displayed once more the pressure felt by North Korea from the Japanese Police and the Rescue Movement. Moreover, in November and December 2001, three governmental organizations in North Korea presented criticism regarding the Third Citizens’ Assembly organized by the Rescue Movement in Tokyo, on October 14, 2001. The organizations condemned the Japanese attitude towards North Korea, for the first time on such a big scale. The respective reaction was considered to have been caused by various events, which included the activities of the Rescue Movement in Japan and internationally and the establishment of the US-North Korea Human Rights Committee in Washington DC (Araki, 2002).

Nevertheless, in December 2001, the Rescue Movement and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association adopted a declaration in response to the criticism of the North Korean Red Cross Society and its announcement to stop the investigation regarding the “missing people”. The declaration had been translated into Korean and sent to Pyongyang as well as to 150 other places in North Korea. It expressed the groups’ strong anger towards the statement of the North Korean Red Cross Society and the protest toward the North Korean government. It further requested that the Japanese government react strongly to the events. The main requests to the North Korean and the Japanese government included the immediate release of the abductees, and to the Japanese government, the pursuit of the rescue of the abductees through a hardline position. The declaration also asked for the North Korean people’s support, which would contribute to their own rescue from the Kim Jong Il regime (Araki, 2002).

In general, all the declarations adopted at the large Citizens’ Assemblies organized by the Rescue Movement in Tokyo, included demands for the Kim Jong-Il regime. Thus, the assemblies from September 2002, May 2003, April 2004 and so on addressed the North Korean government and requested the immediate return of all the abducted Japanese citizens. Other requests included the cessation of the nuclear weapons development and war preparations, as well as the improvement of the life of the North Korean people (Modern Morea, 2003d).

Several other requests were made toward the North Korean government by *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and *Rachi Giren*. In October 2002, with the occasion of the Japan-North Korea negotiations that took place in Kuala Lumpur, the three groups presented a statement, also addressed to the North. It demanded the return of the family members of the five returnees, including Charles Jenkins and Kim Hye-gyong, the daughter of Megumi Yokota; sincere answers regarding the eight abductees reported dead, as well as the truth regarding the other abducted Japanese citizens, who had not been acknowledged until that time (Modern Korea, 2002a).

The Rescue Movement also repeatedly protested against the entry of the North Korean ferry Man Gyong Bong-92 into the Niigata port. Large protests activities supported by prefectural assemblymen took place in August 2003, October 2004, as well as May 2005. The activities consisted of shouting statements in order to express anger at the ferry’s entrance into port, such as “Turn back Man Gyong Bong!”, “Return the abductees!” etc., and were usually followed by meetings in Niigata city. As Kim Jong-Il arguably feared the Japanese public opinion, the meetings had the aim of raising the public’s awareness regarding the issue and sending the message of anger towards the North. The participants in the meetings also requested the Japanese government to ban the entry of the ferry into Japanese ports, and to impose strict economic sanctions on North Korea (Modern Korea, 2004f, 2005g, 2006c).

To show further protest against North Korea, in January 2005, the Rescue Movement started a movement to boycott the North Korean clams, as a sanction that any citizen could carry out. The support of the government for the Movement’s initiative could be noticed in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries' announcement on January 31, 2005, that it had set out to enforce labels confirming the producing area of clams. Moreover, the imported quantity of clams decreased to ten per cent in one month, and the following month it became nonexistent. In this respect, the cooperation of the citizens represented a great support, with results in the government’s action (Modern Korea, 2006a).

In April 2006, on account of the visit of Kim Gye-gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea, to Japan, the first time after Kim Jong-Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions in 2002 that a North Korean high official visited Japan, the three groups *Kazokukai*, *Sukuukai* and *Rachi Giren* organized a press conference and presented a declaration. The declaration criticized the shameless attitude of North Korea, referring to the lies transmitted by the Kim Jong-Il administration about the abductees and the fact that it considered the abduction issue resolved. It further requested the immediate return of all the abductees from North Korea, and, in case of an insincere attitude of the North, MOFA should impose economic sanctions and clearly transmit such intention to the Vice Foreign Minister. The groups also asked for the cooperation of the four countries, the representatives of which participated in the informal talks at that moment (United States, South Korea, China, Russia), and their understanding of Japan’s position (*Sukuukai*, 2006r).

In the same month, April 2006, the Rescue Movement started the “Free North Korea” radio broadcast, with the purpose of transmitting the concepts of freedom and democracy to the people of North Korea, and of guiding them toward the liberalization from the authoritarian regime through revolution and democracy. The abduction issue was also brought up as one of the aims of the radio broadcast as well as the struggle for its resolution. The radio broadcast further intended to offer hope and courage to the defectors who were looking for rights and freedom, and to contribute to the unification of the Korean peninsula and the democratization of the world. Therefore, the target of "Free North Korea” were the North Korean citizens and the North Korean defectors in other countries (*Sukuukai*, 2006s).

#### 7.2.4.5 To the United Nations

As part of the advocacy activities, the Rescue Movement also requested the help of the United Nations directly or indirectly, and of the entire international community.

The Youth Association for the rescue of the Japanese Abducted by North Korea sent several enquiries about the food aid to North Korea to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in September 2000. The questions regarded the method of investigation of the WFP about the distribution process of the rice aid provided by Japan to North Korea. Moreover, the association enquired about the withdrawal of two non-governmental organizations from North Korea, Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) and Action Against Hunger (AAH), as the director of AAH pointed out that the food assistance provided to North Korea was wrongly applied for diplomatic strategies among the United States, Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, according to a report of the international organization Action Against Hunger, the organization withdrew its teams from North Korea and decided to stop all its assistance programs in 2000, due to the belief that the aid provided was not reaching the people in need, and it was impossible to access the vulnerable groups. Moreover, the report pointed out that all the humanitarian assistance in North Korea targeted government-operated facilities (Araki, 2002).

The response to the Youth Association’s enquiries was a result of the consultations between WFP Japan and the Headquarters in Rome, and confirmed the effectiveness of the food aid provided by Japan to North Korea. The WFP explained in detail the process of delivering the aid to eight million people through 43,000 facilities, such as public schools, kindergartens and orphanages. Moreover, the response pointed out the detailed explanations about the process to the Japanese delegation dispatched to North Korea for the monitoring of the assistance, in August 2000.

With respect to the second question of the Youth Association in Japan, the WFP recognized the restrictions that UN organs, NGOs and countries that offer aid were imposed, and referred to the joint statement released by those organizations in December 1999. However, the WFP considered it necessary to continue the monitoring of the aid distribution process, as the number of those in need had not decreased (Araki, 2002).

In April 2001, Masumoto Teruaki, vice secretary of *Kazokukai*, and Araki Kazuhiro, Secretary General of *Sukuukai* visited the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. The representatives of the Rescue Movement submitted documents about each abductee, explaining the facts and requesting the United Nations’ involvement in solving the cases. During their trip to Europe, Masumoto and Araki also visited the International Red Cross in order to explain about the abduction issue and appeal for cooperation. Additionally, they consulted with journalists and researchers from Europe with regard to the rescue of the abductees.

In the same month, April 2001, the Working meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee held in New York decided to handle the problem of the abduction of Japanese citizens. The decision was made based on the deliberation regarding the document submitted by the group that visited Geneva in the beginning of the month. The document submitted represented all the members of *Kazokukai*, the families of the ten persons officially recognized by the Japanese government as abductees. The decision was considered a promising achievement of the Rescue Movement, which gave the families and the supporters hope regarding the rescue of the abductees. Nevertheless, at the end of January 2002, the United Nations Human Rights Committee noticed the Japanese Rescue Movement about the impossibility to continue the deliberation regarding the confirmation of the whereabouts of the abducted Japanese, as there was not enough information from and about North Korea. The Rescue Movement representatives showed uncertainty with regard to the subsequent course of action regarding the notice, but the high possibility of requesting cooperation through international activities was emphasized. In September 2002, after Kim Jong Il’s acknowledgement of the abductions, *Kazokukai* requested the re-deliberation of the abduction issue to the UN Human Rights Committee on Enforced Disappearances. The following year, in April 2003, the Rescue Movement received the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee regarding the situation of human rights in North Korea. The resolution requested the North Korean government to resolve all the problems regarding the abducted foreign citizens. It was for the first time, that the United Nations, representative of the international society, explicitly tackled the problem of the abductions. Therefore, the resolution was deeply meaningful for the Rescue Movement and their achievements, as it denied North Korea’s assertion that the abduction issue was solved, labeling it “unsettled” (Modern Korea, 2003e). Following the respective meaningful resolution, the members of the Rescue Movement presented a statement to the UN Human Rights Committee on Enforced Disappearances with regard to the re-deliberation on the abductees’ whereabouts. The Chairman of the Committee later announced that the working group would continue to handle the issue until the whereabouts of the victims were acknowledged. The statement presented by the Rescue Movement was supported by Nakagawa Shōichi, President of *Rachi Giren*, representing the legislature, and Nakayama Kyōko, representing the government, as directly appointed by Prime Minister Koizumi to support the families of the abductees. The Rescue Movement, thus, mentioned and welcomed the cooperation of the Japanese government for the complete resolution of the abduction issue (Modern Korea, 2003f).

*Sukuukai* also prepared a document seeking deliberation of the UN Human Rights Committee on Enforced Disappearances regarding the case of Soga Miyoshi. The document was accepted by the Committee in July 2003, and the case included in the deliberations. In that regard, information had been requested publicly to both the North Korean and the Japanese governments, under the name of the UN Human Rights Committee (Modern Korea, 2003b).

In November 2004, members of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* met with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the Cabinet Secretariat Support Office, during the latter’s visit to Japan. The UN High Commissioner expressed his appreciation for the courage and strength of the families, as well as for their generosity, for considering and conducting activities for numerous people and families in the same situation, and offered his support and cooperation (Modern Korea, 2005c).

The following year, at a United Nations Human Rights Committee meeting held in Geneva in April 2005, the human rights situation in North Korea was criticized and a decision requesting the immediate return of the abducted Japanese citizens had been adopted by majority vote. The decision was prepared by Japan and the EU as a joint proposal, adopted by thirty countries including Japan, every EU member and the United States, and requested North Korea the return of the abductees, based on the families’ explanations and documents provided. Nevertheless, North Korea refused to accept the report of the decision (Modern Korea, 2006b).

Furthermore, in December 2005, a United Nations General meeting adopted a resolution criticizing North Korea for the abductions. The resolution was regarded as great pressure towards North Korea, and although it had no legal character, the abduction issue was being criticized internationally, which was one of the Rescue Movement’s objectives (*Sukuukai*, 2005g).

In the direction of appealing to the international community, representatives of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai* participated in an international conference on human rights in North Korea, in Norway, in May 2006. The two representatives of the Rescue Movement were the sister of the abduction victim Matsuki Kaoru and Kawazoe Tomoyuki, representative of *Sukuukai* Kanagawa (*Sukuukai*, 2006t).

To sum up, from 1998 until 2006, the Rescue Movement had advocated its cause transnationally to other non-state actors, attempting to work in collaboration with the Association of the Families of South Koreans abducted by North Korea; to other states, appealing to both the government and the people; and to international organizations and the entire international community.

With regard to the strategies and tactics identified by other scholars as being used by transnational advocacy “networks” when seeking a response outside the state, the Rescue Movement relied on the use of convenient information, employing the majority of the informal methods acknowledged by the literature: telephone, e-mail, fax, newsletters and pamphlets. Moreover, the Movement made use of the stories of the abductees' families, through their testimonies, in order to persuade people and determine them to take action.

Another strategy identified by the extant literature as the ability to gain the support of powerful actors and compel them to stand by their advocated policies was also employed by the members of the Rescue Movement especially with regard to the United States. Thus, the Rescue Movement had sought moral leverage over various high-level officials and members of the US Congress, as well as the support of US President Bush, who, in April 2006, made a promise to pressure North Korea for the return of the abducted Japanese citizens.

Furthermore, consumer boycotts, which have been previously identified as tactics through which civil society actors exercise significant power (Johnson, 2000), were also employed by the Rescue Movement in January 2005, to show strong protest against North Korea. The results of the boycott organized by the Movement displays the considerable support of the government, as well as the Japanese public in the respect, an unlikely development in the previous period analysed (until 1998).

The transnational advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement from 1998 until 2006, in the wake of North Korea’s missile launch are outlined in Figure 7.4, according to their target audience. As previously stated, all declarations and statements adopted at the Movement's assemblies included requests to North Korea and the Kim Jong Il regime. This section had presented the requests and demands recorded in the Movement's Reports, which will be hereafter outlined in Figure 7.4 alongside the requests to the United States, South Korea, People's Republic of China and the United Nations.

Figure 7.4 Transnational advocacy activities 1999-2006

Author's original work based on the Rescue Movement Reports published by Modern Korea (2002-2006)

## 7.3 THE 2006 WIN-SET

As the present research emphasizes the process that occurs when the Japanese chief negotiators reach an agreement both internationally and domestically regarding the North Korea policy, focusing on the role of the domestic Japanese context, and more specifically, on the role of the civil society actors, this section introduces the Japanese win-set in 2006 and the role of the Rescue Movement in its alteration. The delimitation of the Japanese win-set in 2006 is needed for the comparison with the 1998 win-set, with the final goal of accounting for the shift in the Japanese government’s policy toward North Korea in 2006.

Thus, the win-set in 2006 had substantially decreased in comparison with 1998. As detailed in Chapter 6, after North Korea’s missile test from July 2006, the position of the majority of the domestic actors towards North Korea had become one of containment, supporting economic sanctions, contrary to the situation in 1998.

Nonetheless, MOFA and Prime Minister Koizumi favoured dialogue with North Korea and pursued the normalization of relations between the two countries. Koizumi acknowledged the importance of the abduction issue, but did not prioritize it over the nuclear issue, choosing dialogue over sanctions as a policy. Concurrently, Koizumi had appointed Abe Shinzō, a hardliner towards North Korea, as Chief Cabinet Secretary (2005-2006) and Chairman of the Special Working Group on the Issue of Abduction of Japanese Nationals by North Korea, thus becoming an example of a negotiator who tries to manipulate the domestic and the international politics simultaneously. However, the choices of Koizumi, as chief negotiator in the international context, had decreased substantially, due to considerable support for sanctions and hostility against North Korea in the domestic context. In this respect, the Rescue Movement played an important role, increasing the public’s awareness of the abduction issue, as well as of North Korea’s criminal activities, considerably narrowing the win-set. In addition to the public’s support, the Movement had been supported by politicians, and especially young, conservative politicians, who had taken hold of power at the time, and the media, especially after 2002.

The limited opposition to economic sanctions and thus, the Movement’s advocacy activities, came from small and medium-scale companies, and certain academics. Nevertheless, the opposition was limited in comparison to the support for sanctions, and, thus, Japan’s diplomatic choices had decreased, narrowing the Japanese win-set on the international level, and leading to the unilateral imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea, following the latter’s missile test, in July 2006.

## 7.4 SUMMARY

This chapter had presented the advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in pursuit of the rescue of the abductees from North Korea. Activities were organized according to their target audience in political, social, media and transnational, and the findings illustrate the use of methods adopted from the repertoire of political, social, media and transnational advocacy used by non-state actors, as presented by the extant literature. The success of these methods in communicating requests to the decision makers, disseminating information to the public, the media and other states or international organizations, however, is difficult to assess. As previously stated in Chapter 3, the decision makers, the public, the media, and other states or international organizations are not solely influenced by the efforts of the civil society actors. Nevertheless, the aim of the present chapter was to highlight the methods, strategies and tactics utilized by the Rescue Movement in the process of advocating their cause to various audiences, and contribute to the understanding of "how" they make their voices heard. The relative effectiveness of their activities was discussed in connection to the results they triggered and the concurrence of their immediate goal with the government’s decision in July 2006 to impose sanctions against North Korea.

A description of the Movement’s advocacy activities was also necessary in order to determine both the 1998 and the 2006 win-sets, and account for the shift in the government’s policy toward North Korea in the respective period. To sum up, there have been numerous advocacy activities of all types, directed at the government, politicians, the public, media, as well as other non-state actors, other states and international organizations. The majority of the political advocacy activities included appeals, demands, signature submissions petitions, statements, declarations, letters and written requests directed at MOFA, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Cabinet or politicians, either with the purpose of criticizing certain actions or statements, or carrying various requests. The main request the Rescue Movement made towards the government was the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea, a plea that was granted in July 2006. Although the economic sanctions were imposed in response to the missile test from July 5, 2006, the speech of CCS Abe from July 6, 2006 included the abduction issue in the reasons for the imposition of sanctions (*Sukuukai*, 2006a). It is, thus, possible to establish a connection with the aim of the Rescue Movement, who had been advocating for the resolution of the abduction issue since 1997, emphasizing the imposition of sanctions against North Korea as the best method for their aim.

The main social advocacy activities of the Movement had been directed at the public in the form of meetings and large gatherings, assemblies, workshops, conferences, study meetings and symposia. Due, in part, to such diverse and frequent activities, a clear increase in the public’s interest in the abduction issue and support for the rescue of the abductees could be noticed in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s. Thus, as previously stated, although the public is not only influenced by the civil society actors, the emergence of the groups comprising the Rescue Movement in 1997 is connected to the public’s awareness of the abduction issue, and further, the Movement’s advocacy activities are connected to the public’s increased support. In this regard, the media also contributed to raising awareness with the Japanese public regarding the abduction issue, especially after 2002, when Kim Jong Il admitted to having abducted Japanese citizens.

The Rescue Movement conducted certain activities to advocate its cause to the media, but after 2002 the support of the media started to be noticed and even reached unexpected levels of attention. For instance, the right-wing media contributed to creating an anti-North Korea mood throughout the country, constantly criticizing the North and opposing diplomatic normalization, in line with the Rescue Movement’s requests. According to a *Kyodo* *News* journalist, news media played a great role in promoting the abduction issue and the groups supporting it, within the Japanese society after 2002, as a way of compensating the scarcity of the coverage before 2002. Nonetheless, the Movement continued to organize media advocacy activities in the 2000s, mainly in the form of press conferences, where they explained their position as well as their future activities.

With respect to the last method of advocating its cause, namely transnationally, the Rescue Movement conducted activities directed at the United States, South Korea, China, North Korea, the United Nations, as well as other non-state actors and the entire international community. In this way, the Movement confirmed the support of the United States, the United Nations, and the wider international community. However, neither the South Korean government nor the Chinese government showed considerable cooperation regarding the resolution of the abduction issue. North Korea, on the other hand, reinforced the Movement’s activities and outcome, as it repeatedly showed concern regarding the Japanese and international public opinion and it being stirred by the Japanese Rescue Movement.

# CHAPTER 8

# DISCUSSION

## 8.1 OVERVIEW

In line with the objective outlined in the introductory chapter, this chapter will first provide an overview of the Japanese win-sets in 1998 and 2006, followed by a comparison of the respective win-sets, in order to account for the shift in the government’s policy toward North Korea. Particular emphasis will be laid on the civil society actors, namely the Rescue Movement, and its role in modifying the win-sets in both cases, as well as highlighting and discussing the ways in which the Rescue Movement advocated its cause to various audiences, another objective of the present research.

The chapter will further present the factors identified as having contributed to the success of the Rescue Movement in influencing the government’s policy toward North Korea, and conclude by introducing a rationale for the findings.

## 8.2 THE WIN-SETS: 1998 and 2006

As explained in Chapter 3, the win-set represents the core of the two-level games theory introduced by Putnam (1988) and is defined as the range of international level agreements that are acceptable to a majority at the domestic level. Putnam’s approach emphasizes the process that occurs when the chief negotiator, usually the national leader, is trying to reach an agreement at both the international level and the domestic level. The focus of the present research is, however, not the negotiations between the Japanese chef negotiator and the other chief negotiators with regard to the policy toward North Korea, but the Japanese domestic context and how it expanded or restricted the choices of the Japanese chief negotiator on the international level. Thus, within that domestic context, the present research particularly focuses on the role of civil society organizations in enlarging or narrowing the Japanese win-set.

The explanation of the size of the win-set adapted to the present thesis articulates as: the larger the Japanese win-set, the more likely Japan’s agreement with the United States and South Korea towards the North Korean policy, and in contrast, the smaller the win-set, the less likely the agreement.

### 8.2.1 The 1998 Win-set

Having examined the actors comprising the 1990s’ domestic context in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, this section will delimitate and discuss the win-set in 1998, after the North Korean missile test, with particular emphasis on the civil society actors’ contribution to the formation of the respective win-set.

The main domestic actors had favoured an engagement policy toward North Korea in the 1990s. MOFA promoted sanctions against North Korea for a short period after the missile test, including postponement of financial aid to KEDO, only to later resume contributions to KEDO and return to an engagement policy, consistent with the long-term objective of the Japanese government.

The NPA, the body in charge of Japan’s security and the protection of people’s freedoms and safety, had been criticized for insufficient investigation of the abduction issue, arguably due to the government’s goal of normalizing relations with North Korea.

The Prime Minister, although with a limited role in foreign policy during the 1990s, was generally pro-engagement and in favour of normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea.

With regard to the politicians, the majority preferred engagement of North Korea in general. LDP politicians had mostly been pro-engagement, until late 1990s, when a generational change took effect within the party and young, conservative politicians, such as Abe Shinzō and Aso Tarō, not interested in the normalization of relations with North Korea, replaced the older generation and started to accumulate power. A shift in the power balance towards a more hardline position with respect to North Korea could thus be seen. In September 1998, after North Korea’s missile test, the LDP decided to examine the amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL), as well as the enactment of the Law to Prohibit Port Entry to Specific Ships (LPPESS), as, at that moment, there was no legal way to impose sanctions on North Korea independently, and obtaining the cooperation of the US or other countries was deemed difficult. The JSP had been mainly pro-engagement, maintaining connections with North Korea, while the DPJ comprised various positions with regard to the policy toward the North. After the 1998 missile test, however, the JSP was not able to promote normalization anymore due to lack of political strength, whereas the DPJ started to show support for strengthening defence and for sanctions against the North. The JCP maintained a neutral position, neither of engagement nor containment regarding North Korea. Consequently, the political context was dominated by politicians who favoured engagement of North Korea, but after the August 1998 missile test, all expressed frustration and criticism, with a part of the LDP politicians pressuring the Obuchi Cabinet to maintain the established sanctions.

In the 1990s, the old pro-North Korea politicians had also maintained links with *Chōsen Sōren* an organization unofficially representing the North Korean government in Japan. Moreover, the Japanese government allowed the links between *Chōsen Sōren* and North Korea, in the form of cash flow, transports lacking tight inspections or tax-free diplomatic status, as explained in Chapter 4.

Japanese businesses, on the other hand, did not express much interest in the North Korean policy, mainly due to its poor record of paying bills to foreign investors. After the 1998 missile test, however, medium and small-scale companies had shown certain opposition to the short-term sanctions imposed by the Japanese government.

Japanese academia expressed various positions regarding North Korea and its relations with Japan. There had been considerable debate regarding the possibility of dialogue and negotiations with the North, as well as criticism towards the government’s attempts to normalize relations between the two countries.

With respect to the media and the public opinion’s position, there was not much media coverage of the abduction issue in the 1990s, and more than 50 per cent of the population supported the normalization of relations between Japan and the North. The 1998 missile crisis, however, prompted the public to dislike North Korea, and the media to report more, expressing criticism toward the missile test. The hardline position supporting economic sanctions against the North had been mainly promoted by the right-wing media.

With regard to the civil society actors, the two organizations representing the actual focus of the present research have only formed in 1997, and thus, did not have sufficient time to influence the win-set considerably until August 1998, when the North Korean missile test took place.

However, before the formation of the two main organizations comprising the Rescue Movement, the families of the abductees had individually attempted to advocate their cause mainly to the police, certain politicians and government officials, as well as to the public and the media, but without considerable success. Nevertheless, certain families received support from various individuals, whether politicians, journalists or academics, who assisted them and further advocated their cause to relevant audiences, while others drew the interest of MOFA, the NPA and the media.

Important roles were played by Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, Ishidaka Kenji, Abe Masami, Satō Katsumi, Kojima Harunori, Nishimura Shingo, Kurosaka Makoto and Abe Shintarō, who had advocated the abduction issue to the politicians, as well as to the media and the larger public, attempting to support the families of the abductees in their struggle to rescue their loved ones.

The family of Yokota Megumi received the attention and support of media reporters, such as Ishidaka Kenji, and politicians as Hyōmoto in the beginning, followed by various other media, as well as political activists, such as Satō Katsumi and Kojima Harunori, and right-wing politicians as Nishimura Shingo. Similarly the families of the three young couples kidnapped from the Sea of Japan coast benefitted from the support and assistance of journalists, such as Abe Masami, and politicians, such as Hyōmoto. A slightly different case was the case of Taguchi Yaeko, whose family received the support of MOFA and the NPA in discovering and investigating the abduction, as well as including it in the early talks with North Korea.

An analysis of the families’ actions is, therefore, not achievable through the lens of the advocacy concept until the formation of the Rescue Movement in 1997, but an emerging advocacy trend can still be observed in the majority of the cases.

Therefore, the actions pointing to an emerging political advocacy trend were centred on reports to the police, letters and petitions with signatures to government officials and politicians, as well as direct visits and established meetings. The emerging social and media advocacy actions were concentrated on sending letters to the various news media, press conferences, as well as petitions with signatures. The families who started and further strengthened the advocacy trend included the Hasuike family, the Masumoto family, Hara Tadaaki’s brother Kōichi, and the Arimotos.

The emergence of the two main organizations comprising the Rescue Movement, in the present thesis referred to as *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, in March 1997 and October 1997 respectively, allows an analysis of their actions based on the advocacy concept. The Rescue Movement came to include *Seinen no kai* (the Youth Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea)in 1999,and *Chōsakai*, in 2002, as an organization cooperating with *Sukuukai*. However, the focus of the present research had been the activities, strategies and tactics of the two main organizations *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, with the aim of highlighting their contribution to the formation of the Japanese win-set after the missile test in 1998 and 2006. Furthermore, the ways in which these groups advocated their cause to various audiences has been explicitly addressed. As explained in Chapter 3, and further noted in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, the concepts of political, social, media and transnational advocacy have been utilized in order to reach one of the objectives of the thesis, namely to describe the methods employed by the civil society actors to reach their goals.

As mentioned above, the formation of the Rescue Movement in 1997 allows the analysis based on the concept of advocacy, as the creation of *Kazokukai* and its support group *Sukuukai* prompted the development of multiple advocacy activities, directed at various audiences. In this respect, the initiative and the organization of the Rescue Movement belonged to *Sukuukai*, and to a small number of people inside *Sukuukai*, who had vast knowledge and experience regarding the formation of a movement, as well as campaigning for a certain cause. Several central figures, worth mentioning include Kojima Harunori, Satō Katsumi and Nishioka Tsutomu. Along these lines, the activities conducted by the Rescue Movement were classified into several categories according to the proclamation of formation of *Sukuukai*, in October 1997: signature-gathering activities, fundraising campaigns, petitions and appeals to the government, Diet and institutions in charge, appeals to the domestic and international media, as well as to the public opinion, information gathering and analysis, educational activities, and coordination of *Sukuukai* with *Kazokukai*, *Rachi Giren*, and regional organizations with the same purpose.

The main goal of the Rescue Movement has been the rescue of the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea, and thus contributing to the peace and security of the East Asian region. As previously presented in Chapter 5, some of the families have developed extreme positions with regard to North Korea, mainly by following Satō’s and Nishioka’s views regarding the country and its regime.

The political advocacy activities had targeted MOFA, the Ministry of Justice, the NPA, the Prime Minister and the *Kantei*, local governors and mayors, politicians from all the political parties, and even the Japan Federation of Bar Associations. The methods of advocating their cause politically, in the period 1997-1998, included: petitions, formal and informal meetings, submissions of signatures, appeals, participation in political parties' meetings, protest documents, visits to various governmental institutions, speeches and informal talks, all falling within the insider tactics category, as defined by the extant literature, hence non-confrontational.

The Rescue Movement’s political advocacy activities have yielded certain responses, such as support from local governments, or invitations to LDP Foreign Policy meetings where the views and activities of the Movement were presented. The activities also yielded confirmation of the government’s attention to the abduction issue, as well as confirmation of the tensioned relations between the two countries and the pressure applied by Japan towards the North in the wake of the missile test from August 1998. Furthermore, the Movement achieved the recognition of the abductions as violations of human rights by the Ministry of Justice.

It is difficult, however, to state the effectiveness of each tactic or to create a ranking of the most and least effective tactics. Moreover, the focus of the research is the techniques used by the Movement, not how they were received. Therefore, the aim of the present research is to highlight the strategies and tactics used by the Rescue Movement to advocate its cause, and to underline the circumstances in which they have been effective, thus able to influence the foreign policy process. In this respect, the factors that contributed to the success of the Rescue Movement in achieving its partial goal in 2006 will be presented, after an analysis of the international and domestic contexts and the interaction between them.

Social advocacy activities targeted mainly the public, with the purpose of raising awareness and support, and, in the period 1997-1998 included: signature-gathering campaigns, public hearings, study meetings, citizens’ gatherings and wider assemblies, lectures and speeches, appeal letters to the public, as well as protest letters to the ones who had a distinct view about the abduction issue than the Rescue Movement, and publications, such as news media articles or manuscripts. These activities have been identified, alongside others, by the extant literature, as methods of civil society organizations to raise awareness and support from the pubic.

Despite numerous social advocacy activities organized by the Rescue Movement, however, the majority of the public supported normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea in the 1990s, and only the 1998 missile crisis prompted criticism and dislike of the public towards the North. Therefore, in the 1990s, the activities of the Rescue Movement had not reached the desired aim with the public.

The media advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in the period 1997-1998 focused on press conferences, contributions to the news media, as well as appeals and protest letters directed at the media, in order to raise the interest of the media in the abduction issue, which have been identified by scholars, alongside other activities, as being utilized by civil society organizations to seek media representation. However, there were few journalists interested in the problem, and, therefore, notices about press conferences were mainly sent by mail to journalists who had previously contacted the Rescue Movement individually. Moreover, the abduction cases had been presented quite dramatically to the media during press conferences, the families using descriptive photographs and expressing their pain dramatically in words. However, albeit the photographs give a sense of “real” to something otherwise abstract, as presented in Chapter 2, the media confidence in the abduction issue and the Rescue Movement’s activities remained low during the 1990s. Furthermore, experienced activists and researchers such as Kojima Harunori and Satō Katsumi contributed to the news media with various articles regarding the abductions and North Korea’s violation of Japan’s national sovereignty and human rights. However, these publications mainly appeared in right-wing media and remained in minority during the 1990s.

The Rescue Movement’s transnational advocacy activities in the 1990s targeted the United States and the United Nations for support, and North Korea for the return of the abducted Japanese citizens. Regarding the strategies and tactics identified by the extant literature as being used by transnational advocacy “networks” when seeking a response outside the state, the Rescue Movement relied on the use of convenient information and the search for support from powerful actors, in relation to all the target audiences specified above. The Movement appealed to the US government and people through the media, as well as through written documents and direct visits to the United States, and through petitions to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The activities of the Rescue Movement had an indirect impact towards North Korea, whose national media criticized them and referred to the Movement as “low class intrigue”. In a direct manner, the activities of the Rescue Movement targeted the North through a postcard addressed to Kim Jong Il, requesting the release of the kidnapped Japanese nationals. All these activities demonstrate the effort of the groups comprising the Movement to make their voices heard and achieve the common goal established in the beginning.

As a conclusion, the formation of the Rescue Movement brought a clear development in the activities conducted by the families of the abductees. In this respect, although the Movement did not have a great contribution to the formation of the 1998 win-set, the voice of the groups was starting to be heard. The invitation of *Kazokukai* at the LDP's foreign policy meeting held in October 1997, or the reply of MOFA's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takemi Keizo, to *Kazokukai*'s written appeal for collaboration constitute evidence in this regard. Furthermore, the tactics of the families to appeal to various audiences have improved with the help of experienced activists.

To sum up, the win-set in the 1990s and in 1998, after the North Korean missile test, had been rather large, with an overall position of engagement towards North Korea, as it can clearly be noticed from the above review. The limited opposition to a policy of engagement of North Korea and to lifting the sanctions imposed against the North after the 1998 missile test came from certain LDP conservative members, and certain DPJ members who supported a strengthened defence position of Japan. The crisis also prompted the media and the public to develop increased criticism and a hostile attitude towards North Korea, nonetheless not sufficient for the Japanese government to maintain the economic sanctions.

However, Prime Minister Obuchi, as Japan’s chief negotiator, in Putnam’s terms, had attempted to use the domestic opposition as an advantage internationally and emphasized the need for imposing punitive measures against North Korea, as well as the inability to cooperate due to domestic opposition. The Prime Minister had tried to utilize a small win-set to Japan’s advantage at the international level, however, simultaneously reconfirming support for the Agreed Framework and agreeing to maintain close consultation with the United States and South Korea with regard to KEDO.

Nevertheless, as the chief negotiator must handle both the international and the domestic levels simultaneously, with respect to the present case, on the domestic level, the Obuchi administration highlighted the inability of maintaining the KEDO freeze for long, as it would lead to its collapse and further to bigger repercussions for Japan and its national interest.

The discourse of the Japanese government changed in the light of the US negotiators’ strategy of underlining the future North Korean threat if the KEDO was not resumed. The US focus on the long-term peace and stability that would result from resuming KEDO, made the Japanese government renounce its request for an apology from North Korea for the missile test carried in August 1998 and lift the freeze on KEDO. In Putnam’s terms, the US negotiators attempted to restructure the game and alter the Japanese government’s perceptions of the cost of no-agreement. Thus, one of the principles that govern the size of the win-sets is that “the lower the cost of no-agreement to constituents, the smaller the win-set” (Putnam, 1988). In the present case the opposite appears to apply: the higher the cost of no-agreement, the larger the win-set. Therefore, no-agreement for Japan represented a higher threat from North Korea, in case KEDO collapsed completely and North Korea resumed its nuclear development. Therefore, although initially against resuming KEDO, in the end, all Diet members decided to follow the government’s decision.

Furthermore, according to Putnam’s model, the autonomy of central decision makers can also affect the size of the win-set: the greater the autonomy of decision makers from their Level II constituents, the larger the win-set, and thus the more likely the international agreement. In the present case, MOFA is believed to have been autonomous in the policy initiative, while domestic opposition is considered insufficient. The international agreement reached was consistent with Japan’s long-term goal of stopping North Korea’s nuclear development as well as engaging it with the international community. Therefore, as defined in the beginning of this section that the larger the Japanese win-set, the more likely Japan’s agreement with the United States and South Korea towards the North Korea policy, Japan lifted the sanctions on October 21, 1998 and resumed its contribution to KEDO, in coordination with the United States and South Korea, which were pressuring Japan in that respect.

Figure 8.1 The 1998 Win-set


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Figure 8.1 represents the two levels covered by Putnam’s "Two-level games" model, namely the international (level I) and the domestic (level II), as well as the mediating role of the executive, performed in this case by the Obuchi Cabinet. The executive is rarely unified in its views and also not kept apart from domestic politics, such as parties, interest groups, public opinion, media etc, being exposed to both the domestic and the international spheres. As a result, the executive has a special role in simultaneously managing both spheres. In the present case, Prime Minister Obuchi considered the views of CCS Nonaka Hiromu, administrative Deputy CCS Furukawa Teijirō, political Deputy CCS Furukawa Toshitaka, as part of his Cabinet, among others.

MOFA initially supported the imposition of sanctions, but for a limited period of time, further supporting the lifting of sanctions and the resumption of cooperation to KEDO, in line with Japan’s long-term goal of stopping North Korea’s nuclear development. Thus, MOFA supported domestically what was demanded of Japan internationally, by the United States mainly, as well as South Korea, with which Japan was working in coordination with respect to the North Korea policy.

The international pressure was used domestically to account for the need to lift sanctions and resume contribution to KEDO, against the opposition of several LDP members, represented in red in Figure 8.1, who pressured the Obuchi government to maintain the sanctions. Without MOFA’s support, and more precisely domestic resonance of the promoted policy change, the international pressure might not have been enough to produce the change, and persuade Japan to resume contribution to KEDO. Therefore, the domestic and international pressures had been combined in order to reach the foreign policy decision: to resume contribution to KEDO. By utilizing the conceptual framework provided by Putnam (1988) to explain this decision, it is thus possible to understand how diplomacy and domestic politics interacted.

### 8.2.2 The 2006 Win-set

Having examined the actors comprising the domestic context in the 2000s in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, this section will delimitate and discuss the Japanese win-set in 2006, after the North Korean missile test, aiming particular attention at the civil society actors’ contribution to the formation of the respective win-set.

In the 2000s, MOFA favoured dialogue as a policy towards North Korea, alternating it with pressure, especially after Kim Jong Il's 2002 admission of the abductions. Nevertheless, MOFA's final aim had been maintained: the normalization of relations with the North.

The NPA conducted more thorough investigations regarding the abductions in the 2000s, leading to the Government of Japan recognizing fifteen Japanese nationals as victims, in January 2003. There was, therefore, more interest in the issue on the part of the Japanese government, who encouraged investigation and resolution of the “suspected abduction” cases.

In the 2000s*,* the general position of the Prime Ministers towards North Korea had been one of engagement, pursuing normalization of relations. The abduction issue, however, was starting to be offered attention at the governmental level, starting with Prime Minister Obuchi who met the families of the abductees in March 1999 and made a promise to take measures for solving the issue. Obuchi also acknowledged for the first time the contribution of the Rescue Movement to changing the Japanese public’s perception regarding the abduction issue and North Korea. Nevertheless, Obuchi dismissed the possibility of not pursuing negotiations with the North, aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. With Obuchi’s first acknowledgement of the Rescue Movement’s influence on the public, numerous other similar statements had been made by governmental officials. One such example is the Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA, Makita Kunihiko, who, in August 2000, also recognized the rising public opinion and therefore, the government’s impossibility of ignoring the abduction issue.

Prime Minister Mori also supported negotiations with North Korea and the normalization of relations between the two countries, emphasizing that both the abduction issue and the diplomatic relations needed to be solved simultaneously.

Prime Minister Koizumi’s approach toward North Korea had initially been “dovish”, pursuing negotiations and a normalization of relations with the North. After the 2002 summit, however, the government’s policy became “no normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea until North Korea itself resolves the many problems that it has caused: abductions, development of nuclear weapons and missiles, spy boats, narcotics smuggling etc. The resolution of these problems would bring peace, which would lead to greater prosperity for East Asia as a whole” (*Kantei*, 2002). Prime Minister Koizumi further supported a policy of “dialogue and pressure”, at times encouraging dialogue, while, at times, clearly supporting pressure. The final goal of Koizumi remained, nevertheless, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, and although he considered the abduction issue important, he did not prioritize it over the nuclear or the missile issue, and dismissed economic sanctions and a hardline position towards the North. He relied however, on both hardliners, such as Abe Shinzō, and liberals, such as Fukuda Yasuo who supported dialogue, as advisers, and simultaneously pursued coordination of policy with the other participants in the SPT.

With respect to politicians, they started to gain support from the public for supporting a hardline position towards North Korea and the imposition of economic sanctions for the rescue of the abducted Japanese nationals. Young LDP politicians who favoured containment of North Korea started to organize and replace old politicians with links to North Korea, in power positions. The role of Abe Shinzō, Deputy CCS and later CCS was particularly important in pressing for the resolution of the abduction issue and a hardline position towards North Korea. Furthermore, Abe Shinzō supported the Rescue Movement since its formation, becoming aware of it in 1988, while a secretary to his father Abe Shintarō, Secretary General of the LDP at the time. Nevertheless, not only LDP members shifted towards a containment position; DPJ members also started to favour a more hardline position and at the general elections in 2003 even introduced plans for sanctions toward North Korea in their election platforms. Even the JSP, which had been mainly pro-engagement and supported connections with North Korea, had been in decline in the 2000s, but otherwise started to show support for the families of the abductees.

*Chōsen Sōren*, the organization functioning as a de facto embassy of North Korea in Japan, had started to approach the Prime Minister and the *Kantei* directly in the 2000s, as compared to the 1990s, when it maintained links with several Japanese politicians. On the other hand, *Chōsen Sōren* was targeted by the Rescue Movement’s criticism, accompanied by requests to the government regarding the tax exemptions of the organization.

Similarly with the 1990s, after the 1998 missile test, medium and small-scale Japanese companies had shown some resistance to sanctions against North Korea in the 2000s as well. Nevertheless, their opposition had little influence on the domestic context of the government’s policy due to lack of allies. In a similar manner, the position of academia continued to be diversified in the 2000s as well, some academics favouring negotiations with North Korea, while others, the prioritization of the abduction issue.

The media and the public opinion, on the other hand, changed dramatically in the 2000s, and particularly after the 2002 summit when the abductions were acknowledged. The issue had been particularly discussed by the right-wing media immediately after the summit, with particular verbal and physical attacks towards the government officials and politicians who pursued normalization of relations with the North. Certain specialists went so far as to consider the public opinion “abducted” by right-wing media, and even Japanese diplomacy “kidnapped” by the abduction issue, as presented in Chapter 6. Moreover, the abduction issue was considered an instrument utilized by *Sukuukai* to manipulate public opinion and restrict free speech. However, not only the right-wing media provided coverage of the abduction issue after 2002, but all news media promoted the issue with the public, as a way of compensating for the scarcity of coverage and lack of confidence in the issue in the 1990s. After the 2006 North Korean missile launch, not only missile–related criticism could be noticed in the media, but also a connection with the abduction issue and the Rescue Movement advocating its resolution. In the same manner, opinion polls showed that the abduction issue had been considered of highest importance by the Japanese public in the 2000s, among issues related to North Korea. Moreover, opposition to humanitarian aid to North Korea and support for the imposition of economic sanctions increased, with approximately 80 per cent of the Japanese public supporting the government’s decision to impose economic sanctions against the North in July 2006 (The Japan Times, 2006).

With respect to the civil society actors, The Rescue Movement which represents the focus of the present research, continued its advocacy activities for the rescue of the abductees towards the four types of audiences: political, social, media and transnational.

The political advocacy activities, had, as before, been directed at the various ministries, especially at MOFA, the Prime Minister and the *Kantei*, and the politicians, at the national as well as the local level, both via protests towards the government’s actions and requests for future actions. Thus, the activities of the Movement included: audiences with government officials, collective and individual appeals, demands, submissions of signatures, petitions, statements, declarations, letters, written requests, protest meetings, citizen protests, sit-ins, surveys to election candidates, subsequently made public, lobbying, contributions to the media, participation in Diet meetings, street activities and informal meetings with ministry officials and politicians. All these activities were identified, alongside others, by the extant literature, as methods of civil society organizations to advance their cause to the government. The majority fall within the insider tactics category, while the citizens' protests, sit-ins and street activities fall within the outsider tactics category. However, as previously mentioned in the theoretical chapter and in Chapter 7, as certain actions can be considered confrontational in some societies and non-confrontational in others, all the activities of the Rescue Movement, including the ones that involve outsider tactics, were completely peaceful, nonviolent events.

A significant event in the activity history of the Rescue Movement can be considered the meeting of the families of the abductees with Prime Minister Obuchi, in March 1999, event that showed a slight change in the attitude of the government towards the Movement. *Sukuukai*, as a group comprising the Rescue Movement participated in the meeting and articulated several requests to the Prime Minister. These demonstrate that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Rescue Movement had a clear idea of its goals, as well as of the ways in which those goals could be reached. Therefore, the main points of the groups’ requests in this period were:

1. The rescue of the abducted Japanese citizens to become a priority of the government
2. The expression “abduction suspicions” to be removed from the government’s discourse and the abductions to be treated with the utmost seriousness
3. The imposition of economic sanctions and if necessary, physical force for the rescue of the abductees
4. Opposition to food aid to North Korea if the abduction issue was not addressed

The families of the abductees and their support group, *Sukuukai*, had the assistance of *Rachi Giren*, a group of politicians established in 1997 to support the rescue of the Japanese allegedly kidnapped by North Korea, and further of the New *Rachi Giren* established in April 2002, as well as the support of the Prefectural Assemblymen Association, a group established in 2000, with the same purpose, to collaborate with the Movement for the rescue of the abductees.

Since the early 2000s, the representatives of the Rescue Movement started to have audiences with MOFA officials, including the Foreign Minister, in order to listen to reports on the development of the North Korea policy, as well as to make their views and suggestions known to the government. Several families of abductees were also invited to Committee meetings held by both Houses of the Diet in order to participate in deliberation talks regarding the abduction issue. Such development brings proof of the impact of the Rescue Movement’s actions, as well as the government’s increased effort with regard to the issue.

The activities of the Rescue Movement continued and intensified after the First Japan-North Korea Summit in September 2002. The acknowledgement of the abductions increased the Movement’s popularity and attracted much public interest and support, thus, making it comparatively easier for the members to appeal to all their audiences. The main request of the Rescue Movement after Prime Minister Koizumi’s return from Pyongyang in September 2002, was a complete verification of the information provided by North Korea regarding the deaths of several abductees. Moreover, as the Prime Minister continued to support dialogue with North Korea and normalization of relations between Japan and the North, the Rescue Movement started to request no normalization of relations before the abduction issue was solved. Moreover, the extreme positions of *Kazokukai*’s supporters, such as Satō Katsumi, Shimada Yōichi, Nishioka Tsutomu were repeatedly presented to government officials. Such positions included severe criticism of the government’s “weak diplomacy” and requests for the employment of military power. Furthermore, as the initiative in the Rescue Movement was, since the beginning, taken by *Sukuukai*, the principal claim of the Movement was the use of pressure by the government toward North Korea, emphasizing the imposition of sanctions as the only way of solving the abduction issue. Alongside the imposition of sanctions, the Rescue Movement advocated the enactment and amendment of legislation that would make such actions possible. The FEFTCL and the LPPESS, two pieces of legislation initiated by lawmakers, were adopted in 2004, with support from politicians from both the ruling party and the opposition, thus making it possible for Japan to impose sanctions on other country independently.

After the Second Japan-North Korea Summit in May 2004, the Rescue Movement felt betrayed by the government and characterized Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang as having “the worst possible result”, as presented in Chapter 7 (Rescue Movement Report 62, Modern Korea October 2004 issue). The Movement, thereafter, intensified its activities, and adopted a slogan that strongly required the imposition of economic sanctions.

Another event that strengthened the Movement’s position and increased the public’s confidence in it was North Korea’s provision of Yokota Megumi’s cremated remains, in November 2004. Although there had been considerable controversy regarding the remains, the tests performed by the Japanese government demonstrated that they did not belong to Yokota Megumi, thus pointing to North Korea’s insincerity and enforcing the Rescue Movement’s stance of taking a strong attitude and impose sanctions against the North.

The Movement had also campaigned for the creation of a Special Committee for the Abduction Issue in both Houses of the Diet, and the adoption of a North Korea Human Rights Act, succeeding the adoption of such a law by the United States in September 2004. The Special Committee was established in November 2004, triggering a statement of the Rescue Movement regarding its considerable influence on the matter, while the Act had only been adopted in June 2006, with cooperation from the new *Rachi Giren* and the politicians from the ruling party.

Following North Korea’s missile launch in July 2006, the request of the Rescue Movement for the imposition of sanctions against the North had been reinforced, and further extended to the inclusion of the abduction issue among the reasons for the sanctions. Their request had been subsequently granted, although only verbally, by CCS Abe Shinzō, whose role is considered invaluable by the Rescue Movement for their political advocacy activities and the progress made with the abduction issue.

The social advocacy activities organized by the Rescue Movement in the 2000s targeted, as before, in general, the public, with the aim of raising awareness about the abduction issue and Japan’s policy toward North Korea, and the main means of conducting these activities was through signature-gathering campaigns, demonstrations, propaganda activities and other street activities, gatherings, workshops, conferences, study meetings, lectures and symposiums, various statements or documents, to appeal or to protest the ones with different views, as well as manuscripts, and visual media representations. The activities had been organized across the entire country, with considerable support from the Prefectural Assemblymen Association and the *Rachi Giren*, and were identified alongside others, by the extant literature, as methods of civil society organizations to raise awareness and support from the pubic, as introduced in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7.

As reflected in Chapter 6, section 6.3.9 on public opinion, in the 2000s the Japanese public was mostly interested in the abduction issue among all issues related to North Korea, and the opposition to aid and support for economic sanctions considerably increased. There is no doubt that Kim Jong Il’s admission of the abductions, as well as North Korea’s subsequent insincere attitude in treating the issue contributed to forming the Japanese public’s opinion and views; however, the groups comprising the Rescue Movement, *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, were the ones that made the public aware of the problem, constantly reminding it of it and of North Korea’s atrocious regime. In this pursuit, considerable emphasis was laid on the violation of Japan’s national sovereignty and of human rights by the North Korean regime, as well as on the actual issue itself, which the majority of the population could relate to. Moreover, there was little to almost no disagreement regarding the goal to be reached, namely the rescue of the abductees, a circumstance that contributes to the effectiveness of a movement, according to previous research, as presented in Chapter 2.

Media advocacy activities in the 2000s were, as before, centred on, but not limited to press conferences. In addition, the Rescue Movement employed media advocacy through contributions to the news media, as well as letters of protest or appreciation towards various media outlets. All these methods have been identified, among others, by scholars, as being utilized by civil society organizations to seek media representation.

In order to contact journalists for the press conferences, the Rescue Movement used to send individual notices by mail, to the journalists who had previously demonstrated interest in its activities and the abduction issue. However, after the 2002 summit, when the interest of the journalists from all the news media increased to the utmost limits, the Metropolitan Police Department Press Club became the window for transmitting information about the press conferences organized by the Movement. The respective press club had been chosen based on the rationale that it could best represent the interests of a movement advocating the criminality of the abduction issue. Moreover, after September 2002, the Rescue Movement stopped the appeals for media interest, as the abduction issue had already become a matter of national interest (interview Chairman *Sukuukai*).

The strategies of the media, therefore, contributed to the Rescue Movement’s transmission of information to the public, and simultaneously to the government. Immediately after the Japan-North Korea Summit from September 17, 2002, the abduction issue had been selected for coverage by the media to the detriment of the Pyongyang Declaration, signed on the same day by the representatives of the two countries, and an important step forward in the stalled relations between the two, as well as for the peace and stability of the region. In this regard, the media had been attracted by the drama of the abduction issue, a key news value, that, according to previous research (Greer, 2003) shapes the "newsworthiness" of events. The victims, namely the families of the abductees, had been portrayed as victims of crime, with the help of numerous visual representations, strategy more effective than mere words for familiarizing the audience with the victims. Moreover, as previous research had shown, photographs humanize crime victims, making them "real" and easier to invest in emotionally (Doyle, 2003), and also serve to highlight the "evil" of the offender (D’Cruze *et al.*, 2006).

Most times, media allocates resources to the victims who can be portrayed as ideal (Greer, 2007), an idea reinforced by the present research, as the media had designated considerable time and coverage to Yokota Megumi, the 13-year-old girl, kidnapped by the North in 1977. As indicated by research and outlined in Chapter 2, the attribution of the "ideal victim" status is influenced by demographic characteristics, such as class or gender, and it includes persons who are vulnerable, defenseless, innocent, and worthy of sympathy and compassion (Greer, 2007). Yokota Megumi impersonated all those characteristics found necessary by the media for allocating her the "ideal victim" status (interview Chairman *Chōsakai*), and thus becoming the symbol of the abduction issue, symbol also promoted by the Rescue Movement.

Furthermore, the abduction issue was not only a matter of concern for the families of the victims, but it became a concern for the whole Japanese population, as such crimes could impact on the wider society and generate debates, which could change beliefs or attitudes (Innes, 2003). The Rescue Movement’s activities also focused on criticizing the regime in North Korea, activities transmitted by the media and changing people’s perceptions on North Korea and Japan’s policy toward it. Along these lines, as Yokota Megumi’s case as well as all the other abduction cases represented a problem that resonated with the majority of the society, media and implicitly the Rescue Movement received high levels of support from the public.

Transnational advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement in the 2000s targeted other non-state actors in South Korea and the People's Republic of China, other states, such as the United States, South Korea, China, North Korea, as well as the United Nations and the entire international community.

With regard to the strategies and tactics identified by previous research as being used by transnational advocacy “networks” when seeking a response outside the state, the Rescue Movement relied on the use of convenient information, employing the majority of the informal methods acknowledged by the literature: telephone, e-mail, fax, newsletters and pamphlets; on the stories of the abductees’ families, in order to persuade people and determine them to take action; on their ability to gain the support of powerful actors and compel them to stand by their advocated policies; as well as on consumer boycotts, as tactics through which civil society actors exercise significant power.

In this respect, the representatives of the Movement had organized visits to the US with the purpose of appealing for cooperation in the resolution of the abduction issue, meetings with US government officials in Japan for the same purpose, appeals to the South Korean government and collaboration with the families of the South Korean abductees, appeals to the Chinese embassy in Japan and cooperation with the families of the abductees from Macao, various requests to North Korea, enquiries, as well as visits to the United Nations and general appeals to the entire international community. In the majority of their attempts the representatives of the Rescue Movement had the assistance and support of *Rachi Giren* and the Prefectural Assemblymen Association. Furthermore, in some cases, the Movement received support from the Japanese government, such as in 2003, for their statement to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, or in 2005, for the initiative to boycott North Korean clams.

The contribution of the advocacy activities conducted by the Rescue Movement nationally and transnationally cannot be overstated, as North Korea had repeatedly showed concern regarding the Japanese and international public opinion and its being stirred by the Japanese Rescue Movement. One such example was the criticism towards the intention to include the abduction issue into the Japanese textbooks, as well as the internationalization of the abduction issue, expressed by the Central North Korean News in April 2001. Furthermore, similar criticism was released by the Central North Korean News in September 2001, displaying criticism felt from the Japanese Police and the Japanese Rescue Movement.

To sum up, the Japanese win-set in the 2000s and in 2006, after the North Korean missile test, had substantially decreased since 1998, as it can clearly be noticed from the above outline. After the 2006 missile test of North Korea, the overall position of the main domestic actors had been one of containment, favouring economic sanctions against the North. In this respect an important role was played by the Rescue Movement, whose uninterrupted advocacy activities increased domestic and international awareness regarding the abduction issue and North Korea’s attitude and regime, narrowing the win-set substantially. In their pursuit, the groups comprising the Movement benefitted from the support of the politicians, whose position had considerably shifted towards containment in the 2000s. As previously mentioned, the organization of young conservative politicians and their taking hold of power positions can account for this shift to a high extent. Moreover, the Rescue Movement benefitted from the support of the media after 2002, in the transmission of its views as well as information to the public and simultaneously to the government.

The small opposition to sanctions shown by small and medium-scale companies was rapidly discarded due to their lack of allies, while the position of academia remained diversified as in the previous decade.

Prime Minister Koizumi provides an example of a negotiator who tried to manipulate the domestic and the international politics simultaneously, appointing hardliner Abe Shinzō to deal with the abduction issue, while simultaneously pursuing normalization of relations with North Korea. However, the choices of Koizumi, as chief negotiator in the international context, had decreased substantially, due to considerable support for sanctions and hostility against North Korea in the domestic context. Japan’s diplomatic choices had, thus, decreased, narrowing the Japanese win-set on the international level, and leading to the unilateral imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea, following the latter’s missile test, in July 2006.

Figure 8.2. The 2006 Win-set




Figure 8.2, similarly with figure 8.1, represents the two levels covered by Putnam’s "Two-level games" model, as well as the mediating role of the executive, performed in this case by the Koizumi Cabinet. As previously stated, the executive is rarely unified in its views and moreover, not apart from domestic politics, being exposed to both the domestic and the international environments. The important role performed by Prime Minister Koizumi during his mandate was particularly represented by the ways in which he simultaneously managed both the domestic and the international contexts with regard to the North Korea policy. In this respect, the Prime Minister took into account the advice provided by CCS Fukuda Yasuo, Political Deputies CCS Abe Shinzō and Ueno Kōsei, and Administrative Deputy CCS Furukawa Teijirō, in the first cabinet (April 26, 2001), and later by Abe Shinzō as CCS, Nagase Jinen, Suzuki Seiji as Political Deputies CCS, and Futahashi Masahiro as Administrative Deputy CCS, in the third realigned cabinet (October 31, 2005), among other government officials and advisers. Prime Minister Koizumi, therefore, had allowed for and contemplated both a tolerant and a hardline position towards North Korea, supporting a policy of "dialogue and pressure", but simultaneously pursuing coordination in the international context with the other participants in the SPT, and particularly with the United States and South Korea.

In contrast with 1998, however, the domestic context in 2006 was substantially changed and the support for a hardline position towards North Korea had increased, undoubtedly narrowing Japan’s win-set and therefore, the Prime Minister’s choices internationally. Furthermore, the international environment and the United States and South Korea’s support for an engagement policy had been insufficient to prevent Japan from unilaterally imposing sanctions on North Korea after the missile test from July 2006. Moreover, although MOFA continued to support an engagement position toward the North, in the form of dialogue and negotiations, in coordination with the US and South Korea, the ministry’s fading role in foreign policy decision-making constitutes one of the differences when compared with the 1998 case, when MOFA’s support for lifting the sanctions on North Korea made it possible for Japan to coordinate its policy with the United States and South Korea.

Another significant difference from the 1998 case is, as mentioned above, the increased domestic opposition to an engagement policy toward North Korea, and a considerably smaller win-set, altered in particular by the Rescue Movement and its advocacy of the "abduction issue". Thus, as it can be noticed in Figure 8.2 in red, the Movement gained the support of the politicians, as well as the media and the public opinion, whose criticism and hostile position form 1998 had substantially transformed into support for sanctions against North Korea. In this way, alongside focusing on the leaders’ strategies in simultaneously managing both the international and the domestic factors’ effects on foreign policy, the present case had identified other political actors participating in foreign policy decisions, as well as the ways in which they pursued their goals, namely the groups comprising the Rescue Movement. In this respect, the present case can be considered a contribution to Putnam’s model, which mainly emphasizes the leaders’ strategies at the international negotiating table.

### 8.2.3 The 1998 Win-set vs. the 2006 Win-set

The shift in the Japanese government’s policy towards North Korea from 1998 to 2006 can be explained with the help of the respective win-sets, where a change in the domestic context can be noticed. The majority of the domestic actors changed their attitude, from supporting an engagement position in 1998, with few exceptions (few LDP politicians and the Rescue Movement), to supporting a hardline position and the imposition of sanctions towards North Korea.

The pro-containment position of few LDP politicians and the Rescue Movement in 1998 was a minority position, and the Rescue Movement, which represents the focus of the present research had just formed in 1997, thus, lacking sufficient time for fully advocating its cause.

Nevertheless, the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement after 1998, and until 2006, contributed to the formation of the hardline position predominant in the domestic context in 2006, after North Korea’s missile test. Although the Rescue Movement had not reached its final goal, of rescuing the abducted Japanese citizens from North Korea, its suggested method of accomplishing that goal, namely the imposition of economic sanctions, was reached in 2006, when the Japanese government unilaterally imposed sanctions against North Korea. It can be concluded, therefore, that the Movement had been successful in one of its objectives, as the groups comprising it have advocated for sanctions since the beginning of 1999.

In July 2006, the Japanese government imposed unilateral sanctions on North Korea, despite the Prime Minister's and MOFA’s preference for dialogue and normalization of diplomatic relations with the North, and the international coordination of policy with the United States and South Korea. Such result was reached as the Prime Minister’s diplomatic choices had decreased with the narrowing of the Japanese win-set. As mentioned above, the Rescue Movement’s contribution to such narrowing of the win-set was considerable. However, several factors supported the Rescue Movement in pursuit of its objectives and are presented below, alongside the circumstances of 1998.

#### 8.2.3.1 The support of politicians

The young, conservative politicians, supporting a hardline position and the imposition of sanctions against the North were holding positions of power in 2006, as compared with 1998, when they were in the minority. However, the change in the political context started to take place gradually, since 1997, when the young, conservative politicians began to organize, as presented in Chapter 4. Furthermore, following 1998, the amendment of legislation to allow Japan the imposition of sanctions against other countries was suggested and debated, and further promoted by the Council to Consider Strategic Diplomacy against North Korea, which was established in February 1999. Additionally, the new *Rachi Giren*, established in 2002, also comprised the new generation of politicians, who substantially set out to work together with the Rescue Movement. A key role, repeatedly acknowledged by all the members of the Rescue Movement, was played by Abe Shinzō, who showed his support since the beginning of his political career. Abe was described by the family members of the abductees as a "different kind of politician", a "compassionate" person, that "truly cared" and was "always fighting" for them (Walsh, 2006). This characterization is a clear example of Abe's support for the Movement, and how much he was valued by the abductees' families.

Due to the politicians' support, legislation allowing Japan to impose sanctions on other country unilaterally was adopted, making it, thus, possible for Japan to impose sanctions against North Korea in 2006, as opposed to 1998.

#### 8.2.3.2 The support of the media and the public

The Rescue Movement had benefitted from the support of the media, after the Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002, which contributed to the transmission of information to the public, and simultaneously to the government. Alongside information regarding the abduction issue and North Korea, the media provided considerable coverage of the Movement’s advocacy activities, thus contributing to its success in 2006 with regard to the imposition of sanctions. Thus, the period 2002-2005 saw an increased interest of the media in the abduction issue, compared to 1998-2001, with a thirteen times higher number of articles about the abduction issue in each major Japanese newspaper. The media, a factor absent in 1998, was an important factor in the 2006 win-set, further influencing the public opinion alongside the Rescue Movement. The surge in public opinion’s support for sanctions and hostility against the North is, therefore, worth mentioning in explaining the success of the Movement.

#### 8.2.3.3 The internal characteristics of the Rescue Movement

The third factor that contributed to the success of the Rescue Movement in reaching its partial objective, namely the imposition of sanctions against North Korea, was the actual Movement itself, its organization, its leadership, knowledge, experience and power. As substantial previous research had already shown, a prevalent condition for the effectiveness of a movement is its organizational strength, as presented in Chapter 2. The organizational strength refers to the internal characteristics of the movement, such as group unity, professionalism or financial resources. The individual families lacked such organizational strength until 1997, when *Kazokukai* was formed, and continued to lack it to a certain extent, until the formation of *Sukuukai* later the same year. *Kazokukai* was characterized as a “disorderly crowd” with everyone saying things at their own convenience, without any knowledge about campaigning or organizing a political movement (Satō Katsumi interview with Aoki Osamu, independent journalist). Before 1998, when Satō Katsumi, an experienced political activist, became the Chairman of the NARKN, *Kazokukai* and the other rescue organizations did not hold a strategy for their cause, nor established tactics for reaching the common goal. Nevertheless, after 1998, the Rescue Movement’s organizational strength increased, with Satō as a leader, as did its professionalism and power for advocating its cause to the government and requesting the support of the politicians. Thus, although *Kazokukai* had been used for the external appearance of the Movement, the actual "brain" of the Movement was *Sukuukai*, and especially its leader, Satō. As remarked in Chapter 5, Satō’s extreme political views, referred to as “fanaticism” by some, might have diverted the Movement from its initial purpose of rescuing the abducted Japanese citizens from North Korea, interpretation that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

#### 8.2.3.4 Other factors that contributed to the success of the Rescue Movement in reaching its partial objective

According to previous research, some factors that contribute to the success of a movement are the salience of the issue that the group advocates and the circumstance in which the groups advocate an issue about which there can be little or no disagreement about the goal, but considerable disagreement about the way to reach it. In the present research, the salience of the abduction issue contributed to the Movement’s success in 2006, as it came to represent an issue, which the entire Japanese society could resonate with, a highly emotional issue, highlighting the “evil” of North Korea, and thus, the threat to the whole Japanese society. Such representation was possible due to the Rescue Movement’s advocacy activities over the period 1998 – 2006. Moreover, there was no disagreement about the goal of the Rescue Movement whatsoever, namely the rescue of the Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. Nevertheless, there was disagreement regarding the way to reach the respective goal. As presented in Chapters 4 and 5, and Chapters 6 and 7, and summarized in the present chapter, certain domestic actors favoured dialogue and negotiations with North Korea, while others, led by the Rescue Movement, favoured a hardline position and the imposition of sanctions.

Other factors that arguably contributed to the success of the groups in influencing foreign policy are: a weak opposition, the groups’ access to government or advocating a policy already favoured by the government. With regard to the present research, the Rescue Movement attempted to eliminate any opposing views, via criticisms, verbal and even physical attacks, leading to an “abducted” public opinion and even diplomacy, according to some. A consensus against North Korea and pro-Rescue Movement had been created nationally, making it difficult, and almost impossible for anyone to oppose the views of the civil groups, leading to thoughts about free speech and democracy. Regarding the access to government, as described in Chapter 7, the Movement started to benefit from the help of politicians, and of particular benefit is considered the support from revisionist politicians who, in the 2000s, came to hold power positions, thus, being able to facilitate the Movement’s access to government, as explained above in 8.2.3.1. Moreover, starting with 1999, the Rescue Movement had been offered attention at the governmental level, its contribution to the Japanese public’s perception on the abduction issue and North Korea, starting to be acknowledged. With respect to advocating a policy already favoured by the government, it will be further discussed by the following section, alongside the rationale of the present research.

Figure 8.3 below graphically summarizes the win-sets in 1998 and 2006, highlighting the change that led to the shift in government’s policy toward North Korea, as explained above. Thus, in 1998, the win-set, J1-J2 was rather large, with limited opposition coming from certain LDP politicians (J2-Jn), as presented in Figure 8.1. In 2006, however, the win-set, J1-J2, decreased, and opposition to an engagement policy and support for sanctions increased (J2-Jn), as it can be observed in the figure below.

Figure 8.3. The Win-set. 1998 vs. 2006

**1998**

J1

Jn

J2

**2006**

J1

Jn

J2

## 

## 8.3 THE POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALIZATION OF THE ABDUCTION ISSUE

As previously presented in Chapter 5, the abduction issue (*rachi mondai*) received scarce attention from the Japanese government, as well as from the Japanese public, in the 1990s, until the emergence of *Kazokukai* and *Sukuukai*, despite the determined effort of the abductees’ families to rescue their loved ones. Specific people had key roles in promoting the abduction issue as an issue of national interest and one of utmost importance to the government. Among them there was Kojima Harunori and Satō Katsumi, who, as explained in Chapter 5, were experienced activists with wide experience about campaigning and advocating for a cause. Kojima, who, together with Satō, had participated in the North Korean repatriation movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and felt remorse for his deeds, as well as anger towards the North Korean regime, started to support the Yokota family and further the formation of the Rescue Movement. In this respect, he recommended his old friend Satō to lead the National Association for the Rescue of the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea, the establishment of which was considered highly necessary for the victims’ families to successfully appeal to the national government and the public. However, Kojima later observed that the abduction issue was being manipulated by Satō Kastumi for his own interests and the political claims of the Modern Korea Institute, and expressed regret for having asked him to become the head of *Sukuukai* (Aoki, 2011, personal communication Kojima). Both Kojima and Hyōmoto Tatsukichi, who also offered support to the abductees’ families since the beginning, disapproved of the situation and of the fact that *Kazokukai* were made victims of *Sukuukai* (Aoki, 2011)

Satō Katsumi, who, as previously discussed, had shifted his ideological views from the extreme left to the extreme right of the political spectrum, due to his disappointment with Communism and to becoming aware of the situation in North Korea, had started to describe the nature of the North Korean regime, its human rights abuses and the suffering of the people, in his writings from the 1980s. Furthermore, following the end of the Cold War and Japan’s several apologies to its neighbors regarding historical issues, Satō’s criticism increased, starting to refer to an “apology disease” that Japan was suffering from (Morris-Suzuki in Ryang, 2009). On that account, the development of events taking place inside Japan during the 1990s, including the Kōno statement, the establishment of an Asian Women’s Fund, the Murayama Statement etc, was considered unacceptable by Satō, who at the time was leading the Modern Korea Research Institute. Satō’s feelings and beliefs were shared by Araki Kazuhiro, a younger political activist who originally belonged to the Democratic Socialist Party (*Minshatō*) and, who joined the Modern Korea Institute in 1993. Led by such feelings and beliefs of strong criticism against the direction taken by Japan during that period, Satō and Araki, and essentially the entire Modern Korea Institute, were advocating against North Korea, its regime, and mostly against Japan’s apologetic image internationally. The proposal of Kojima Harunori to Satō, to lead the NARKN came against this particular background. Satō and the other members of the Modern Korea Institute with extreme right ideological views took the abduction issue on board, and formed the Rescue Movement in 1997. The evidence provided in the previous chapters in the form of the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement, as well as statements from various persons related to the Movement, and Satō himself, allow the interpretation of the facts as *Kazokukai* and the abduction issue having been used for the own political campaigning of Satō and the Modern Korea Research Institute. Apart from Kojima and Hyōmoto, who, as presented above, expressed regret regarding the fact that *Kazokukai* were being utilized and were in fact made victims of *Sukuukai*, for the personal interest of Satō and the political claims of the Modern Korea Institute, Hasuike Toru, the brother of Hasuike Kaoru who was abducted by North Korea, and Secretary General of *Kazokukai* until 2005, criticized *Sukuukai* for its manipulation of the victims’ families and the prioritization of its political goal of changing the regime in North Korea over the interests of the abductees and their families, as claimed (Hasuike, 2008).

Satō himself, during an interview with the independent journalist Aoki Osamu, in November 2009, admitted to having been involved in the North Korean problem for over 50 years, and although he did not clearly admit to having utilized the abduction issue for reaching personal goals, he characterized *Kazokukai* as a disorderly crowd, whose opinions regarding campaigning were not taken into consideration by *Sukuukai*. Satō further stressed the fact that *Kazokukai* were used only as appearance, for the image of the Rescue Movement, while all the decisions were taken by *Sukuukai*. He argued such behaviour with the families’ lack of strategies and tactics, as well as lack of analysis of the state of affairs, or of powerful individuals to negotiate with the government. Moreover, Satō repeatedly characterized North Korea as a terrorist country from which Japan needed protection, and considered that the abduction issue can only be solved with military pressure. He further supported the collapse of the regime in North Korea, arguing that such an event would solve both the North Korean threat and the abduction issue (Aoki, 2011). In consequence, it can be argued that the abduction issue was an instrument, used for Satō’s and the Modern Korea Institute’s own political agenda.

Alongside the *Sukuukai*’s instrumentalization of the abduction issue and *Kazokukai*, the other instrumentalization process took place at the governmental level. At first, this stage of the instrumentalization started with the young, revisionist politicians, previously mentioned in Chapter 4 as well as in the present chapter, who, similarly with Satō, Araki, and the other staff of Modern Korea Institute, found Japan’s apologetic position and development of events in the 1990s, unacceptable. Young, conservative politicians, such as Abe Shinzō, who held revisionist views and favoured a more independent Japan, with a more active and notable international role, focused on the abduction issue and the Rescue Movement advocating the rescue of the abductees from North Korea, in order to promote a more independent Japan and to draw attention to national security. These conservative politicians began to organize together as a group in 1997, as explained in Chapter 4, and established several organizations with the purpose of creating a more independent Japan and teaching the Japanese public to be proud of its history, not to apologize for it. Abe Shinzō, as well as various other revisionists, had views deeply rooted in the Japanese history and Japanese cultural values. They were also part of *Rachi Giren*, the Diet members’ League for the Rescue of Japanese allegedly Kidnapped by North Korea, that was established in 1997 and supported the Rescue Movement in its advocacy activities towards the government, the public, the media, as well as towards the international community. Furthermore, the new *Rachi Giren*, established in 2002, continued to assist the Rescue Movement in its pursuit, with growing support and approval from the government. The revisionist politicians supporting the Rescue Movement’s cause came to hold power positions and important roles in the government in the 2000s, such as Deputy CCS and later CCS, Abe Shinzō, minister of economy, trade and industry, Hiranuma Takeo, and later Nakagawa Shōichi, Director General of Japan Defense Agency, Ishiba Shigeru etc. Such politicians, as well as the government, had thus set up to conduct an extensive campaign informing the Japanese public of the abduction issue and magnifying the threat posed by North Korea. Hasuike Toru, the brother of abducted and returnee Hasuike Kaoru, associated the government’s campaign trucks with “the vehicles of right-wing campaigners”, arguing that the government “manufactured an abnormal nationalism over North Korea” (Fujimoto, 2009). The “abnormal nationalism” referred to by Hasuike had captured the majority of the Japanese public and media, whose support for economic sanctions against North Korea and a hardline position substantially increased. It can be, thus, argued that the revisionist politicians in power positions within the government had utilized the abduction issue as an instrument for creating such “abnormal nationalism” and emphasize the North Korean threat, in order to reach their own political agenda. The abduction issue, therefore, was used as an important instrument in the diplomacy toward North Korea, and in order to reach the objective of recovering Japanese independence and create a stronger country on the political and military level.

## 8.4 SUMMARY

This chapter outlined the win-sets of 1998 and 2006, followed by their comparison, in order to account for the shift in the Japanese government’s policy toward North Korea in 2006. It was, therefore, argued that the shift in the Japanese government’s policy towards North Korea from 1998 to 2006 can be explained with the help of the "win-set", which decreased significantly in 2006, compared to 1998. Furthermore, it was argued that the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement after 1998, and until 2006, contributed to the formation of the hardline position predominant on the domestic scene in 2006, and, thus, to the contraction of the win-set.

The chapter further identified the factors considered to have contributed to the success of the Rescue Movement in reaching its partial objective, of influencing the Japanese government in imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. Thus, the support of various politicians, of the media and the public opinion, as well as the organization, leadership, knowledge, experience and power of the Movement itself were identified as the main factors contributing to the Rescue Movement's success. Furthermore, other factors that arguably contributed to the Movement’s success in 2006 include the salience of the abduction issue, the lack of disagreement about the Movement's goal in the Japanese domestic context, namely the rescue of the Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea, but sufficient disagreement regarding the way to reach the respective goal, the attempt to eliminate any opposing views on the issue and the creation of a national "consensus" against North Korea, as well as the access to the government facilitated by the young revisionist politicians who had come to hold positions of power.

The chapter concluded by providing a rationale of the research, namely the political instrumentalization of the abduction issue, by *Sukuukai* and by the government.

This chapter has discussed the empirical findings of the research and, subsequently, the Conclusion will outline the role of the Rescue Movement in Japan's policy toward North Korea, the circumstances in which it could contribute to the decision-making process and how it did it, specifically the strategies and tactics employed in order to reach its objective.

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# CONCLUSION

## 9.1 FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION

The main aim of the thesis was to identify the role of the Rescue Movement in Japan's foreign policy toward North Korea and how it contributed to the government's decision to impose unilateral economic sanctions against the North in 2006. In this regard, the thesis provided an analysis of the groups comprising the Rescue Movement, their organization, goals, strategies and tactics, over the period 1997-2006. More specifically, the thesis explored the ways in which the groups advocated their cause to various audiences (the Japanese government and public, the Japanese media, and other non-state actors or other states) in order to reach their partial goal discussed here, the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea for the rescue of the abducted Japanese nationals.

Chapter 2 outlined the extant scholarly work in the area of foreign policy, both in general and in the Japanese context, focusing on the role of societal groups in the foreign policy-making process and in Japan's policy towards North Korea. Chapter 3 introduced the theoretical approaches utilized to explain the two case studies, and the research design of the dissertation. It started by introducing the main theoretical approach of "two-level games", as well as several of its applications in various contexts, and continued with a description of the "advocacy" concept, further employed in order to highlight the methods utilized by the groups to make their voices heard to different audiences. Consequently, Chapter 4 described the international and domestic scenes in 1998, followed by a description of the civil society actors, as part of the domestic scene, and their advocacy activities in the period 1997-1998, in Chapter 5. Equivalently, Chapter 6 and 7 provided a description of the international and domestic scenes in 2006, followed by a description of the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement in the period 1998-2006, with the purpose of determining and comparing the win-sets after North Korea's missile test of 1998 and of 2006. As follows, the empirical findings of the research introduced in Chapter 5 and 7 were summarized and discussed in Chapter 8.

Based on the findings of the research, the Rescue Movement had an instrumental role in the government's policy toward North Korea in 2006 to impose unilateral economic sanctions. Alongside the instrumentalization of the abduction issue and of *Kazokukai* by Satō Katsumi and *Sukuukai*, young, conservative politicians, who came to hold positions of power in the 2000s, used the Rescue Movement and its advocated goal as an instrument in the policy toward North Korea. In this manner, they emphasized North Korea as a threat, in order to reach a certain political agenda (Chapter 8). Furthermore, the Rescue Movement's contribution to narrowing the win-set, and thereby the range of international level agreements acceptable to a majority at the domestic level, was considerable. The responses of the government, public, media, as well as of other states or non-state actors, to the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement provide evidence of their impact. The inclusion of the Rescue Movement representatives in official meetings where decisions were taken about the governmental talks with North Korea, the support of the politicians in passing the sanctions legislation, the public's preponderant support for a hard attitude including economic sanctions toward the North, the media's increased coverage of the Movement, its activities and the abduction issue, or the UN's labelling of the abduction issue as "unsettled" in April 2003 after multiple requests from the Rescue Movement constitute examples in this regard. There is, however, the difficulty in determining the effectiveness of these activities in communicating requests to the decision makers, disseminating information to the public, the media and other states or international organizations, as they are not solely influenced by the efforts of the civil society actors. However, the main aim of the research has been to highlight the input of the civil society actors, not the output; in other words, the techniques they used and not how they were received.

## 9.2 REASSESSING THE LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS

As observed in Chapter 2, the reviewed literature was divided into two types: the literature on foreign policy analysis and the literature on Japan's foreign policy, with particular focus on the literature discussing the role of societal groups and advocacy in the first type.

### 9.2.1 Contribution to FPA literature

In an attempt to answer the question "Who makes foreign policy?", numerous factors have been identified by various scholars. Thus, the literature points out factors external, as well as internal to the nation state, as previously described in Chapter 2. The latter group includes citizens and groups within the domestic political system, such as government organisations or individual leaders, domestic constituencies, such as interest groups, ethnic groups or public opinion, economic conditions, the state's national history or its culture. The role of civil society groups in foreign policy has not been the object of numerous studies although the number of such groups has increased. Most of the studies, however, focus on ethnic interest groups and on foreign policy-making in the United States (Garrett, 1978; Said, 1981; Longmyer, 1985; Richardson, 1985; Sadd and Lendenmenn, 1985; Ahrari, 1987; Rogers, 1993; Dent, 1995). Furthermore, scholars do not agree on the conditions that favour the success of such groups in influencing foreign policy. This thesis focused on the role of civil society actors in the process of foreign policy-making and also explored the politics of the decision-making process in the domestic context, emphasizing the role of societal actors, alongside the leaders' role. It thus contributes to the literature by highlighting an instrumental role of societal actors in the foreign policy process, as well as an interaction of diplomacy with domestic politics. Moreover, it reinforced the findings of certain previous studies on interest groups influencing foreign policy, regarding the conditions that favour the success of such groups.

### 9.2.2 Contribution to Japanese Studies

As regards Japan's foreign policy, the question "Who makes foreign policy?" has been answered by various scholars in various ways. The main role is argued to be played by the intra-party decision-making process, the iron triangle or one of the three: bureaucracy, *zaikai* or the government party, the prime minister, official or unofficial advisers to the prime ministers, or politicians, thus arguing for the dominant role of one elite over the other. In addition, numerous scholars in the 1980s supported the "reactive" state thesis introduced by Calder (1988), who argued that Japanese foreign policy was made in response to outside pressure and that "reaction prevails over strategy". Later on, Calder's thesis was supported and adapted by other scholars, but also disputed by others, who found important changes in Japan's foreign policy and established the current dominant trend of research: Michael Green, Christopher Hughes, Kenneth Pyle, Richard Samuels. Also, the question "Who makes foreign policy?" has been answered by emphasizing different actors: the prime minister and the Kantei, individual politicians, LDP, MOFA. Certain scholars (Midford, 2011) argued for the contribution of public opinion to the government's pursuit of a more active foreign policy. The role of societal actors in the foreign policy process in Japan has been, however, largely overlooked. Nevertheless, the importance of societal actors, particularly with respect to Japan's foreign policy toward North Korea, has been acknowledged, most studies focusing on the civil society groups dealing with the abduction issue. Thus, several studies attempt to offer an explanation for the increased influence of such groups on the government's hard policy toward North Korea, many in comparison to similar groups in South Korea. The present dissertation focused solely on the civil society groups dealing with the abduction issue in Japan, analysing the government's policy toward North Korea over time, more exactly after two similar events in 1998 and 2006, the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea in the direction of Japan. The research, thus, unlike the literature reviewed, attempted to account for the change in the Japanese government's policy toward North Korea, from 1998 to 2006, comparing two moments in time. The findings reinforce the explanation provided by Samuels (2010) that the civic groups dealing with the abduction issue in Japan took over the national discourse when revisionist LDP politicians gained power. Alongside this factor, the present research provides several other factors to explain the change in the government's policy from 1998 to 2006, focusing on the interaction of both international and domestic contexts. The underlined factors can be generalized with a view to determining the circumstances in which civil society can have an impact on policy in Japan. Therefore, based on the empirical findings examined in the previous chapters, the thesis identified the circumstances in which civil society can successfully contribute to policy in Japan.

The explanation provided by this dissertation also supports the arguments for proactivity in Japan's foreign policy, as shown by the decision to impose unilateral economic sanctions against North Korea in 2006. The dissertation, thus, contributes to the field of Japanese Studies in two ways: by highlighting the significant role of civil society groups in Japan's foreign policy toward North Korea, and by reinforcing the arguments supporting the proactivity of Japan's foreign policy and Japan's pursuit of its national interest, as opposed to the narratives supporting Japan's "reactivity" to external pressure.

### 9.2.3 Contribution to the understanding of advocacy

This dissertation contributes to the understanding of advocacy in that it explores "how" the groups comprising the Rescue Movement made their voices heard, highlighting the strategies and tactics utilized in the process of advocating their cause to various audiences.

The political advocacy activities included, alongside others, the activities identified by the extant literature as methods civil society organizations use to advance their cause to the government, the majority falling within the insider tactics category, with very few in the outsider tactics category. Thus, the most utilized tactics have been the insider tactics, such as appeals, demands, signatures, petitions, statements, declarations, letters, written requests, all directed to the national or local government. The Movement also made use of outsider tactics, such as citizens' protests, sit-ins and street activities, however, in the most peaceful way.

The social and the media advocacy activities included, among others, the activities identified by the extant literature as methods of civil society organizations to raise awareness and support from the pubic, and methods to seek media representation respectively. Thus, the tactics that proved to have been most resorted to are meetings in general, whether large gatherings or assemblies, workshops, conferences, study meetings and symposia; and the organization of press conferences respectively.

With regard to the strategies and tactics identified by other scholars as being used by transnational advocacy “networks” when seeking a response outside the state, the Rescue Movement relied on the use of convenient information, the stories of the abductees’ families, through their testimonies, the ability to gain the support of powerful actors and to compel them to stand by their advocated policies, as well as consumer boycotts.

The focus on the methods utilized by the groups comprising the Rescue Movement to advance their cause, and the use of the concept of advocacy in this respect have proved helpful in analysing the role of the Movement in the formation of the win-sets in 1998 and in 2006, and thus, in Japan's policy toward North Korea. As follows, the advocacy activities of the Rescue Movement over the period 1998-2006 have raised awareness with the Japanese and international public and media, constricting the 2006 win-set, as explained in Chapter 8. When comparing the two win-sets, 1998 and 2006, a decrease in support for normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea and an increase in support for sanctions against the North could be noticed. The diplomatic choices available to Prime Minister Koizumi in 2006, after North Korea's missile test had, thus, decreased, in comparison to 1998. In this regard, the activities of the Rescue Movement have proved to be one of the most important influencing factors. This thesis, thus, contributes to the understanding of advocacy by presenting "how" the groups became successful in influencing the Japanese government's policy toward North Korea. Although the final goal of the groups, namely the rescue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea, is yet to be achieved, this thesis considered the achievement of their partial goal, namely the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea, a success. Moreover, alongside highlighting the process of the groups becoming successful, this dissertation found several factors that contributed to their success:

1. the support of politicians
2. the support of the media and the public
3. the internal characteristics of the Movement (organizational strength, leadership, knowledge, experience, power)
4. other factors: the salience of the issue, no disagreement about the goal to be reached but significant disagreement about the way to reach it, weak opposition, access to government).

As the present thesis attempted to link studies on advocacy and on foreign policy focusing on the role of societal groups in foreign policy-making, it contributes to the civil society and advocacy literature by emphasizing the ways in which societal groups advocate their cause to various audiences. In this respect, the findings sit alongside certain previous literatures (Ahrari, 1987; Said, 1981; Watanabe, 1984; Hudson, Sims and Thomas, 1993; Rogers, 1993; Uslander, 1995; Skidmore, 1993; Dent, 1995; Gamson, 1990; Tarrow, 1993, 1998; Amenta, 2005, 2006; Giugni, 2004) on the influence of societal groups on foreign policy and on advocacy in general, showing that the success of groups in influencing foreign policy decisions is favoured by the support of politicians, the support of the media and the public, as well as by the internal characteristics of the movement, the salience of the advocated issue, the circumstances in which the groups advocate an issue, a weak opposition, and the groups' access to the government or advocating a policy already favoured by the government. The thesis, thus, contributes to the understanding of the advocacy process carried out by civil society groups towards various audiences, underlining the strategies and tactics utilized in contributing to the policy-making process. However, although the groups comprising the Rescue Movement have organized significant advocacy activities toward multiple audiences and have managed to obtain certain results with the Japanese government, reaching their final goal is not only contingent on Japan, but also on North Korea, one of the most secretive countries in the world. Moreover, the current revisionist approach undertaken by Japan curtails cooperation in the region, and might reduce the prospects of a solution to the abduction issue.

## 9.3 FUTURE RESEARCH

There are a number of possible areas of future research on civil society in the context of Japanese Studies. One such direction would be to explore whether the factors found by the present dissertation to favour the success of civil society actors in influencing policy can be applied to other civil society groups in pursuit of their cause. Such research would be meaningful, as it would allow the generalization of the findings of the present thesis.

A separate direction of research regards an investigation of the activities of other civil society groups in Japan, of similar scale with the ones analysed in this dissertation, pleading for or against a cause, such as the anti-base groups in Okinawa or the anti-nuclear power movement. Citizen activism against nuclear energy post-Fukushima has been the object of previous studies; however, the current decision-making process regarding nuclear energy policy in Japan and the specific attempts of the civil society to participate in it are areas that could be explored in more detail.

After the Fukushima accident, Japan had initially phased out all the nuclear power plants, and sought to greatly reduce the role of nuclear power. However, after a victory in the national elections for the Diet’s House of Representatives in December 2012, the LDP confirmed nuclear energy as a key source of power for reviving the economy, despite considerable citizen opposition. A draft plan of the government for electricity generation to 2030 was approved in June 2015, pointing the percentage of nuclear power to 20-22. The first two reactors were restarted in August and October 2015 (Sendai 1 and 2 in Kagoshima prefecture), followed by Takahama 3 in January 2016 and Takahama 4 in February 2016, in Fukui prefecture (both offline at the moment), with the last power reactor to resume operation, Ikata 3 (Ehime prefecture) in August 2016. Moreover, other 40 reactors are operable and potentially able to restart and 24 in the process of approval for restart, at the moment. Thus, despite large citizen protests against nuclear power plants in Japan, the government continued its plan for nuclear energy production. Possible future research could focus on the process of reaching the decision and on the role of the social movements in the establishment of the nuclear policy in the end. Moreover, it might highlight the ways in which activism against nuclear power took place, as well as the characteristics of the movements. It, thus, hopes to contribute to the civil society literature by highlighting the factors that favor or hinder the success of social movements in influencing policy decisions, as well as the direction toward which Japanese civil society is moving. Focusing on the methods employed by the relevant groups in their advocating for a cause would allow a better understanding of the way they function, as well as of the type of activism in Japan. However, whichever direction future research based on this thesis takes, the one thing that seems certain is that a hard line position towards North Korea, including "no normalisation of relations with North Korea unless the abduction issue is resolved", as advocated by the Rescue Movement, will not bring a resolution to the abduction issue, nor peace and stability in the region.

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# Appendix 1: The suspected abductions

The appendix presents the 8 cases involving 11 Japanese nationals “disappeared” in the 1970s and 1980s, considered “suspected abductions” by the Japanese government. Ten cases were announced by the National Police Agency in May 1997, and the 11th (Arimoto Keiko), in March 2002 (MOFA, 2002). The suspected abductions are presented in the order of their disappearances.

1. Kume Yutaka, 52, disappeared from Ushitsu, Ishikawa prefecture on September 19, 1977. According to North Korea, Kume Yutaka had never entered the country. However, the Japanese Police issued an arrest warrant for a North Korean suspect in Kume’s abduction in 2003, and asked for the suspect’s extradition to Japan, through MOFA (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2007).
2. Yokota Megumi, a 13-year-old girl from Niigata prefecture disappeared on November 15, 1977, on her way home from school. North Korea subsequently claimed that Megumi had deceased in April 1994 and handed her remains to Japan (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2007).
3. Taguchi Yaeko, from Saitama prefecture, disappeared “in or around June 1978” at 22 years old. According to North Korea’s ulterior report, Taguchi Yaeko married Hara Tadaaki in 1984, and died in a car accident in 1986, shortly after Hara had died due to illness (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).
4. Chimura Yasushi and Hamamoto Fukie disappeared on July 7, 1978 from the coast of Wakasa Bay in Obama, Fukui prefecture, when they were both 23 years old. They married in 1979 in North Korea and, in 2002 returned to Japan. They have one daughter and two sons, who returned to Japan in May 2004 (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).
5. Hasuike Kaoru and Okudo Yukiko disappeared on July 31, 1978 from Kashiwazaki Central Beach in Kashiwazaki, Niigata prefecture, at 20, respectively 22 years old. They married in 1980 in North Korea, and returned to Japan in 2002. They have one son and one daughter, who returned to Japan in May 2004 (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).
6. Ichikawa Shuichi and Masumoto Rumiko disappeared from Fukiage beach in Kagoshima Prefecture on August 12, 1978, at 23 and 24 years old respectively. North Korea ulteriorly reported that they married in 1979, and both deceased of heart attack in 1979 and 1981 respectively (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).
7. Hara Tadaaki, 43, from Osaka, was kidnapped in June 1980 by a North Korean agent, Shin Kwang-soo. The North Korean agent testified to having kidnapped Hara with the help of *Chōsen Sōren* members. Shin was arrested in 1985 in South Korea, carrying Hara’s passport. He was sentenced to death on charges of spying, but, in December 1999, he was acquitted and released. North Korea subsequently reported that Hara had deceased in 1986 because of illness. Moreover, contrary to Shin Kwang-soo’s testimony, the report stated that Hara had wished to go abroad, exchanging his identity certificate for money (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).
8. Arimoto Keiko, 23 years old, from Kobe, was abducted from Europe “in or around July 1983”. North Korea subsequently reported that Ms. Arimoto had died in a gas poisoning accident in November 1988 (Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, 2011).

The above-mentioned cases were outlined by the Japanese Government as “suspected abductions” in May 1997, and March 2002 respectively. However, according to the National Police Agency the correct number is 19 (NPA, 2003), while according to the Investigation Commission on Missing Japanese (*Chōsakai*), the number reaches several hundreds, in which the probability of having been kidnapped by North Korea is high (interview *Chōsakai* member of staff, September 2014).

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# Appendix 2: Interviewees and Interview Dates

* Arita Yoshifu, Independent Journalist and Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ) (since 2010). 6 February 2015.
* Hasuike Kaoru, Returnee from North Korea. 24 January 2015.
* Hirata Ryūtarō, *Sukuukai*, Secretary General. 22 September 2014.
* Ikeda Katsuhiko, *Tsukurukai.* November 2014, April 2015.
* Kawazoe Tomoyuki, *Sukuukai* Kanagawa, Representative. 30 January 2015, 6 February 2015.
* Kazuhiro Araki, *Chōsakai*, Chairman. January, February, March 2015.
* Kojima Harunori, former Chairman of *Sukuukai.* July 2015.
* Kurosaka Makoto, Osaka University of Economics, Professor. November 2014, January, February, April 2015.
* Mibae Taisuke, Secretariat of the Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, Director Policy Planning Division. 18 February 2015.
* Michishita Narushige, GRIPS, Professor. 20 February 2015.
* Mori Satomi, *Asagao no kai*, PR assistant. 4 February 2015.
* Murao Tatsuru, *Chōsakai*, member of staff. 24 September 2014.
* Nakamoto Hiroyuki, *Kyōdō News*, Journalist. 10, 12 February 2015.
* Nakano Kōichi, Sophia University, Professor. 2 June 2015.
* Nishioka Tsutomu, *Sukuukai*, Chairman. 26 November 2014, 23 July 2015.
* Okonogi Masao, Keio University, Professor. 31 March 2015.
* Sakurai Yoshiko, Japan Institute for National Fundamentals, President. 7 May 2015.
* Satoru Miyamoto, Seigakuin University, Associate Professor. 21 September 2014, 29 July 2015.
* Sebastian Maslow, Tohoku University, Assistant Professor. 25 September 2014, 23 February 2015.
* Shimada Yōichi, *Sukuukai*, Vice Chairman. November, December 2014, April, June, July 2015.
* Sugita Yoneyuki, Osaka University, Associate Professor. October, November 2014.
* Takenaka Yoshihiko, Tsukuba University, Professor. 16 June 2015.
* Takesada Hideshi, Takushoku Univeristy, Professor. March 2015.
* Tanabe Nobumichi, Kyoei Ltd. Recording Studio, Cameraman. 6 February 2015.
* Tanaka Hitoshi, Japan Center for International Exchange, Senior Fellow. 18 June 2015.
* Yokota Sakie, Yokota Shigeru, *Kazokukai*, parents of abducted Yokota Megumi. 24 November 2014.

1. A bomb explosion by North Korea, in an attempt to murder the South Korean president, Chun Doo-hwan, who was visiting Rangoon, the capital of Burma, at the time (now Yangon, in Myanmar). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. A North Korean patrol boat in the Sea of Japan fired upon a Japanese fishing boat, killing the captain. North Korea had arbitrarily established a demarcation line in the sea and claimed that the Japanese fishing boat had crossed it. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Japanese-born spouses of Korean citizens, residing in North Korea. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Prime Minister’s Official Residence [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ozawa Ichirō– former General Secretary under the Kaifu Cabinet, and the acting leader of the *Keiseikai* [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. [*Yami no hato kara*]“From a dark large wave ” [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. [*Kim Jong Il no rachi shirei*] “Kim Jong Il’s abduction orders” [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. [Watashi ga [Kim Jong Il no rachi shirei] wo kaita riyū] “The reason why I wrote “Kim Jong Il’s abduction orders”” [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. *Mimoto no kakunin sareta rachi shōjo* [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Wasurarenai onna* – *Lee Eun-Hee sensei to no nijū ka getsu* [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Torizaki Yuji, 28 years old and Saeki Satomi, 21, from Takaoka, Toyama prefecture, escaped an attempted abduction on August 15, 1978. The evidence gathered with the couple’s escape raised suspicions about the possible involvement of foreign intelligence (*Sankei Shinbun*, 1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Soka Gakkai* – lay Buddhist movement who follows the teachings of Nichiren, a 13-century Japanese Buddhist priest. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Yodo-gō* group refers to nine radical Japanese students of the *Kyosando Sekigunha* (The Red Army Faction of the Japan Communist League) who hijacked a passenger plane of Japan Airlines in 1970, known as ‘*Yodo-gō’*, and directed it to North Korea. Six Japanese women, wives of 6 *Yodo-gō* group members, became responsible for the abductions of Japanese citizens. The activities of the group were based on orders from the North Korean government.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-13)