The Problem of Evil in the Philosophy of Leibniz.

Summary.

The continuous theocentric mould of the thought of Leibniz leads us to suspect that "the problem of evil" has a greater relevance to his philosophy than is commonly reputed. This is amply confirmed by an unbiased reading of his writings as a whole and of the neglected Theodicee in particular. "A reconstruction of the system which Leibniz should have written" (B. Russell) cannot take the place of what Leibniz did in fact write and is contrary to the historical development of his thought.

Leibniz approaches the problem as an inheritor of the theological tradition of the Schoolmen. His independence reveals itself in the hazardous attempt to rationalise the Divine Nature and in his virtual abandonment of the traditional answer of "the Fall of Man". The universe is a world of values, of goodness as well as of rationality. The pre-established harmony, with the subsequent later doctrine of the monad, helped Leibniz "to justify the ways of God to man". The idea of God as Creative Love must mean that man is more than incidental to the epic of creation. The harmony between the Realm of Nature and the Realm of Grace, with its implications in a future life, answers the age long problem of the incidence of good and evil in this present world. This world is still "the best of all possible worlds". Where evil is not merely parasitic, it is transubstantiated into the good of the whole after the manner of the ancient Stoic arguments. This is true even of moral evil which is a consequence of man's creaturely freedom, though as evil, outside the Divine antecedent volition.
Summary (Continued).

The answer of Leibniz thus falls within the ambit of ethical theism. But the monadological reading of the universe aggravates the difficulties already latent in the Leibnizian Weltanschauung. His rationalism, not to speak of the crux of the Deity within the monadological schema of the universe, makes his answer dangerously approach the deism of his century. None the less the argument of Leibniz has blazed a trail which the theodicean argument of ethical theism has since been content to follow consciously or unconsciously.
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Synopsis

of

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Introduction.

In an important inedit Leibniz says that nothing can be disguised in his system, because throughout there is a perfect connexion. Proper and exact distinctions are made because they are necessary. Then he goes on to add that he has not always been able to explain himself fully but he has always striven to speak precisely. "I begin as a philosopher, but I end as a theologian. One of my great principles is that nothing takes place without a reason. It is a principle of philosophy. But at bottom it is nothing else than the acknowledgement of the divine wisdom, although I did not speak of it at first." (1) This emphasis of Leibniz on the essential unity of his thought has not always been given the prominence it deserves. It has been recognised by older writers like Ed. Zeller, Kuno Fisher and Émile Boutroux, to name some famous students of Leibniz. But in more recent times many commentators have tended to follow one another in the condemnation, express or implied, of those parts of the system of Leibniz "which most nearly concern human life".

So we are asked to believe that Leibniz the philosopher is one person and Leibniz the theologian is another. The latter is a mere purveyor of "edifying phrases" and "the champion of ignorance and obscurantism" (2). The real Leibniz is Leibniz the philosopher and by philosopher we mean a rationalist pur sang. For this reason we must explain away any non-rational surd in Leibniz's thinking as either a palpable inconsistency or a base, if diplomatic, accommodation to the avowedly theological atmosphere of the 17th. century. This interpretation of Leibniz is one to which, since the days of Hegel, many eminent philosophers have freely lent their names. Of recent years it has been much canvassed in this country by Bertrand Russell and in France by Louis Couturat. In the preface to his book "La logique de Leibniz" the latter says "The philosophy of Leibniz appears as the most complete and the most systematic expression of intellectual rationalism: there is perfect accord between thought and things, between nature and spirit; reality is entirely to reason, because it is penetrated with reason. To characterise this metaphysic in a word, it is a panlogism" (3) According to the Couturat-Russell school of thought logical atomism is the quintessence of Leibniz. Outside Leibniz the logician there is no Leibniz. All else must be discarded."We, who do not depend upon the smiles of princes may simply draw the consequences which Leibniz shunned."
A monism is necessarily pantheistic, and a monadism, when it is logical, is as necessarily atheistic. Leibniz, however, felt any philosophy to be worthless which did not establish the existence of God, and it cannot be denied that certain gaps in his system were patched up by a reference to the Divine Power, Goodness and Wisdom (Russell, p. 172 above). (4)

It is no matter for great wonder that Leibniz constitutes a problem in himself. He is, in a sense, the best illustration of the metaphor he has made a philosophical commonplace "point de vue", or "point de considération"- "as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects". (par. 57. The Monadology. Latte's Ed. p. 248). For this reason he will not fit readily into any schema. But it must be admitted the dazzling complexity of the genius of Leibniz constitutes an almost irresistible temptation to make a simplicity not otherwise patent. In dealing with so eminent a genius it may well be questioned whether a canon of textual criticism "Difficilior lectio potior"- "the harder reading is to be preferred to the easier"- is not more applicable to his case than the hasty and ruthless use of Occam's razor. The all too elucidating emendation of the industrious scribe has often an inverse value to the ease it introduces to the reading. So in the case of a genius like Leibniz the more difficult reading of him may have a greater claim upon our allegiance than the all too logical simplifying of his complexity.

There are different methods of fitting Leibniz into such a bed of Procrustes. Most commentators of this school are content to show that in the end the philosophy of Leibniz and the philosophy of Spinoza lead in the end to the same consequences. According to Secretan e.g. (La Philosophie de Leibnitz 1840) the ultimate difference between the two is a difference in style (5) Others like Ludwig Stein (Leibniz und Spinoza. 1890) have virtually accused Leibniz of plagiarising Spinoza. Rub out the writing of Leibniz and we shall discover the original Spinozistic palimpsest beneath. J.A. Froude in his essay on Spinoza has greatly popularised this impression of Leibniz in England. (See "Short Studies")

But the question may well be asked how far can we advance by following such a method of interpretation. By what right do we gag Leibniz when his utterances do not conform to our small predilections? What will the History of Philosophy read if, with the forthright honesty of Secretan we say that the opinion of Leibniz is one thing and his philosophy another? (6) There is a surgical quality about such remedies which may well make us fear for the subject of them. Apart from any question of the philosophical denigration of Leibniz, no case is made out for treating Leibniz with less respect than we give e. g. to his illustrious predecessor Spinoza. However puzzling we may find the Leibnizian jigsaw, it is a poor beginning to throw away some of the pieces and especially those most valued by the originator himself. Non tali auxilio shall we ever do justice to the many sided nature of the genius of Leibniz. We cannot interpret Leibniz a la carte.
The unfortunate persistence of this interpretation of Leibniz has brought about the almost complete neglect of the only work of Leibniz published in his lifetime—"Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal" (1710). It is almost certainly the most neglected writing of Leibniz and yet it is one to which he himself attached more than ordinary importance. The most commonly read summary of the philosophy of Leibniz is "The Monadology" (1714). The historical fact is not always remembered that it was the Théodicée which was the indirect cause of the writing of the Monadology at the instance of Prince Eugene of Savoy. So little was Leibniz himself conscious of any discrepancy between the larger work and the smaller work that he gives references in the Monadology to the corresponding paragraph of the Théodicée.

It must not be supposed from our preceding remarks that we are forgetful of the serious difficulties in the working out of the philosophy of Leibniz in general and in particular with that part of his philosophy with which we are more immediately concerned. But at all costs these difficulties must not deter us from allowing Leibniz to speak for himself and, as far as may be possible, to be his own interpreter. The inconsistencies and difficulties in Leibniz may in this way find a less tortuous explanation than the drastic treatment so often meted out to them. Still less need we forget that the period marked by the publication of the Théodicée was one whose religious ethos is well summed up in the title of Locke's treatise "The Reasonableness of Christianity." It marked, what Mark Pattison calls, the "seculum rationalisticum" (1688-1890). But reason as yet had not become the substitute for faith. If the religious atmosphere of the time was as pervasive as its philosophical atmosphere, it is only natural to suppose that Leibniz had no more immunity from this than he had from "l'esprit géométrique" of Descartes. In the courts of Princes and in the circles of scholars in which he moved he was perhaps as much subject to influences as any other philosopher of his day. It is no real disparagement of Leibniz to say "Critics have noted that Leibniz, while thinking as a philosopher, never lost the pre-occupation with what might be thought of his positions by the religious authorities" (Prologomena to a New Metaphysics. T. Whittaker. 1931.) p. 89. footnote.) We may find later that the alleged "pre-occupation" of Leibniz in walking delicately in respect of religious dogma is more fancied than real e.g. the doctrine of "original sin" and "the Fall of Man." And of philosophers in general it is true that they owe much more to their age than they realise. Leibniz made so many contracts with intellectual life that it would be passing strange if he did not take some account of those who were most likely to peruse his works. And Leibniz does avowedly express some concern about the reception of the Théodicée among the theologians,(7)

The mistake so commonly made with respect to Leibniz is to suppose that the Théodicée is unique in marking time of his putting a sickle into the field of theology. For the Théodicée is as much a work in theology as a work in philosophy. As Couturat reminds us among the collected MSS of Leibniz it is classed under the rubric "Théologie"(8) Be this as it may, The Théodicée was not born like Athena from the head of Zeus. It was the culmination of a long
period of rumination on the justifying the ways of God to man. Its history can be traced back to his earliest writings. Indeed a strong case can be made to show that it is precisely in those parts of the philosophy of Leibniz "which most nearly concern human life" that a presumption is raised as to the fundamental unity and persistence of his thought. No detailed study of Leibniz will suffer us to say that in these matters on the border line of philosophy and theology Leibniz was consciously or unconsciously hypocritical. To suppose that this is the case is to malign a great genius.

The evidence of the earlier writings of Leibniz is much less a problem on this view of the fundamental unity of the thought of Leibniz. A recent writer in a brilliant book ("Dynamique et Metaphysique Leibniziennes" in. Gueroult. Paris 1934) has put this case for the fundamental unity of the thought of Leibniz against the prevalent one-sided interpretations with convincing clearness; "Outre que ces interprétations unilatérales risquent fort d'altérer les véritables perspectives de la doctrine, elles sont en désaccord avec ce que nous savons de l'activité de Leibniz depuis sa plus extrême jeunesse. Cette activité se révèle, en effet, comme celle d'un génie essentiellement encyclopédique. Il suffit de consulter la liste des premières œuvres pour se convaincre de la diversité originaire des thèmes (logique, mathématique, physique, juridique, moral, religieux, théologique, philosophique, etc.), d'analyser ces œuvres pour les retrouver tous en chacune d'elles, mais à des points de vue différents" (Reference to W. Kabisz, Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz, Heidelberg. 1908.). In agreement with this statement (which we have read after forming our own opinion) we shall see later that the Théodicée does incorporate a good deal of this Leibniz's earlier thought. Leibniz as a youth is the defender of the faith. In 1668 he wrote a work whose title explains itself "Confessio naturae contra atheistas" where he especially exposed the weakness of the Atomists. A year later he attacks the Socinians, "Quorum paupertina fuit philosophia", under the guise of a defence of the dogma of the Trinity "Defensio Trinitatis per nova reperta logica contra epistolam Arian". All this points to the active interest he early manifested in religious controversy. What is, however, even more to the point is that about this time, too, Leibniz contemplated a magnum opus "Demonstrationum catholocarum". Thanks to the researches of M. Foucher de Careil we are able to have some idea of the aim and contents of this projected work. The corresponds to the "Discours préliminaire sur la conformité de la foi avec la raison" of the Théodicée and bears the title "Specimen Demonstrationum catholocarum, seu apologia fidei ex ratione". The first part of the work is probably a MSS. with the title "Dialogus de immortalitate mentis et necessitate rectoris in mundo, et Confessio philosophi, seu de justitia Dei circa praedestinationem, alisque ad hoc argumentum spectantibus". This is almost certainly the early Dialogue Leibniz mentions in the Théodicée (Par. 211. G.e. p. 244) as having shown during his sojourn in Paris to M. Arnaud, the head of the theological faculty at the Sorbonne. (9) As Leibniz himself reminds us at this early period he had already formulated his main theodicean argument. "The principle which I
uphold here, to wit that sin was permitted because it was involved in the best plan of the universe, was already employed there, and M. Arnaud did not appear to be afraid of it" (above). The fragment that remains of this Latin Dialogue shows clearly enough the preoccupation of the mind of Leibniz with the problems of the Mater Théodicée and the extent to which he had already found his solution to the problem of evil. Evil is indissolubly involved in the best plan of the universe and the existing universe is God's choice of the best possible world. There are other unpublished MSS. e.g. "Rationale fidei catholicae" which probably belong to the same contemplated enterprise.

Another interesting point, worthy of mention here, is that one of the subjects Leibniz tells us he canvassed with Spinoza, during his visit to the Hague in 1676, was that of the necessity of the existence of an absolutely perfect being. At this time Leibniz was beginning to feel acute dissatisfaction with the mechanistic outlook of Cartesian philosophy and this shows clearly enough the trend of his thought. (10)

Again in the "Dialogue entierre entre Theophile et Polydore", written before Leibniz was thirty years old i.e. before 1679, we find an anticipation of the argument of the Théodicée. God made the world and all the creatures therein to share in that harmonious perfection of which it is capable. Happiness (pleasure) is the experience accompanying growth in perfection. To be reasonable is to share in the happiness possible in a world of harmony. The sum total of its perfection and happiness cannot apparently be realised without the unhappiness of some who deserve their fate. (11).

The point, we wish to make here, is that we must take all Leibniz into consideration. And, if we do this, then we shall find that his views on the relations of God and man are as vital and as important as any other of his opinions. We must try and remember that the author of the "Monadology", of the "Discourse on Metaphysics" and the correspondent of Arnaud is also at the same time the author of the Théodicée and Three Mystical Dialogues (see Baruzi- Rev. de Met., et M. jan. 1905.) not to speak of the voluminous inedit which throw occasionally a strong but flickering light on a very complex personality. In these inquiries we cannot separate historical fact from philosophic truth. Pursuing the even tenor of our discussion in this way we may find that Leibniz's own words about himself have more than a grain of truth, that beginning as a philosopher he ended as a theologian. Further we may find that the reason for this is that philosophy for Leibniz was ever the ancilla theologiae and that his typical attitude was always fides quaerens intellectum. For this reason Leibniz was much less a rationalist than he realised. The leit motif of much of his writing was an unconsciously realised "piete" to which no doubt the atmosphere of his centurys and his immediate environment contributed in no small
degree. This is not to underestimate the virility of his logic but to do justice to the complex and many sided nature of his genius. (10) The philosophy of Leibniz is like the Leibnizian universe where "tout est lié, tout conspire: "Only by realising this can we do justice to the completeness of the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil. (12).
Chapter 1.

GOD.

No judgment on Leibniz has any value unless it begins with an imaginative realisation of the theo-centric tendency of the 17th. century. As H. Wildon Carr says (Theory of Monads. 1922. p.97-8.) "To the philosophers of the seventeenth century God is the beginning and end of philosophical speculation. It was one of the striking features of the rise of modern philosophy that whatever the special subject-matter the idea of God was the dominant motive. The form in which the problem of the nature of God was debated gives to the arguments of that period a certain remoteness from our actual interests to-day. At times, too, the acrimony of the disputes recalls the bitterness and repeats the ineptitudes of the fourth century. Yet it is not difficult to see that the problem of divine nature which exercised Spinoza and Leibniz is identical with our problem today and nothing but the mode of expression is changed."

We, who live at such a distance from the immediate influences of the Reformation, find it difficult to realise the truth Professor Wildon Carr enunciates. So remote are we from those days that there is some excuse for thinking that what is speculatively unimportant for us was unimportant for them. We do not, of course, mean that God was a kind of household familus to Leibniz but that what Leibniz understands Spinoza to say of himself is equally true also of Leibniz and the 17th. century philosophers as a whole "Vulgar philosophy begins from things, Cartesian from the mind, he himself starts from God". (1) e.g. Thus, Leibniz asserts that the principal aim of philosophy ought to be a knowledge of God and of the soul which can inspire the soul to love God and to practise virtue ("je diray qu'en effet le but principal de la Philosophie doit estre une connoissance de Dieu et de L'Ame qui fuisse excitée l'Ame à aimer Dieu et à pratiquer la vertu" "Clairissement sur les Natures Plastique " GvI. p. 548. after 1704.) It would be difficult to see how philosophers could otherwise escape this theological environment, especially when we remember the acute and widespread nature of the religious controversies in general and of Jansenism in particular. In all this mêlée of religious debate and argument, lived and moved and took an active part.

Leibniz's doctrine of God is a well known crux interpretum. For this reason alone it merits careful scrutiny. But it especially relevant here in the consideration of Leibniz's solution of the problem of evil. The PROBLEMA of evil is one of varying acuteness in different systems of thought. There are obviously systems of thought for which it is non-existent. In the same way there are others where it assumes a form of almost crucial urgency. The philosophy of Leibniz is one of these. He himself shows fully that he realises the crucial nature of the whole problem in his philosophy—"Si Deus est, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum?"
There is all the difference in the world between "evil" in a "cosmodyce" and in a theodicy. (2)

Without God Leibniz's whole system of philosophy must alter its character. The Leibnizian doctrine of the deity in fact is much more than a pied à terre than is commonly realised. "Cette qualité moral de Dieu" is a court of judgment from which there can be no appeal. It is e.g. his final argument for personal immortality. (3) The beneficent choice and fiat of such a deity is the ultimate ground on which "the best of all possible worlds" must keep what is sometimes a rather precarious balance. Of this we shall say more in detail later. Here it is sufficient for us to recognise the essential theocentric character of the approach of Leibniz to the problem of evil. This is not to say that other considerations and arguments do not wield some sway. But the conception of the deity is organic to the whole of his thought, and, broadly speaking, it is from this angle that he envisages the whole problem of evil. For Leibniz the ultimate finality is the notion of God. Like a modern writer we can almost overhear Leibniz saying "It is very strange, and yet, I feel sure, quite sure, most true that all this evil, in each of its several degrees and ways, is most real, is most baffling; and yet that only by thus recognising all this evil as genuinely extant, and yet as inexplicable by us even as regards such existence, do we reach a depth at which a deliberate and final theism is fully possible and entirely assured". ("The Reality of God". Baron F. Von Hugel. 1931. p.67.) The difference between the two being, of course, that for Leibniz the element of inexplicability is not always stressed. The intention of both writers, however, is virtually the same, to assure a deliberate and final theism in the teeth of the flagrant evil and evils of a recalcitrant world.

We have already tried to show in brief, in the matter of historic development, the theocentric tendencies of the early thought of Leibniz. Leaving this historic issue, so far as possible, on one side, we go on to ask the intrinsic importance of the idea of God in the Leibnizian Weltanschauung.

It is at this point great care is required if we are to know the real mind of Leibniz and not father upon him our pre-conceived readings of his monadism. Because it is possible to think out a monadistic scheme of things sans Dieu, we must not therefore conclude that the whole idea of the Deity in Leibnizianism is a vulgar, base and uncritical accretion, in short a mere 17th. century usus loquendi. Still less must the difficulties and sometimes the obscurity of the precise views of Leibniz lead us to a minimising view of its basic importance to him and to the integration of his whole philosophical scheme of things.

Having uttered such a caveat, we may begin with the stress Leibniz lays upon the Personality of God. In an early letter of February, 1676 (published by Ivan Iagodinsky p. 34. Leibnitiana. 1913.) (4) Leibniz has a categorical assertion to the effect that God is not some imaginary metaphysical something,
incapable of knowledge, will action as some try to make out. He is not merely another name for nature, fate, fortune, necessity or the World. "god is something substantial, a Person, a Mind"—"Deus est substantia quaedam, Persons, Mens". In other words Leibniz forswears the "Deus sive Natura" of Spinoza, though he would agree with the latter that there is no distinction between Deus and deitas. In our chapter on "Freedom" we shall see that Leibniz further underlines this statement. For if self-determination is the differentia of personality, then God has this in the highest possible degree. God for Leibniz is Perfect Personality.

God, too, is a Simple Substance and endowed with infinite Attributes. For "This primary simple substance must include eminently the perfections contained in the derivative substances which are its effects" (Par. 9. Princ. of Nat. & of Grace. Lat. p. 416) "Thus" Leibniz goes on to say" it will have power, knowledge and will in perfection, that it is to say, it will have supreme (souveraine) omnipotence, omniscience and goodness". He is the Anselmian "id quo maius nihil cogitari potest". But his real nature is never once in question. God has a constitutional monarchy limited only by his own nature. (5)

The Attributes of this Simple Substance, despite its Simplicity, Leibniz treats with a certain scholastic rigour. One of the good legacies of the Manichaean controversy of the early centuries was to demonstrate once and for all the hazardous nature of separating, even in thought, the Attributes of the Divine Being. To do this is to walk on a slippery slope which in the end must land the avowed monotheist in the slough of Manichaeism. Leibniz, escapes so crude a dualism. But it may well be questioned whether at times Leibniz does not leave himself open to serious criticism in his manner of speaking of the Divine Attributes.

Yet for Leibniz there is a fundamental "interpenetration" of the Attributes. God is suum esse. In an early letter of April 1676 he expresses this truth with great clearness. "The Attributes of God are infinite, but none of them involves the whole Essence of God. For the Essence of God consists in this that it is the subject of all compatible Attributes. Any property or affection of God involves his Essence; as it is certain God has produced anything constant to our sense, however little it may be, it involves the whole nature of God because it involves the whole series of things of that kind" (c.f. Lagodinsky. p.96. ) (6)

In other words God is primarily Essence rather than Substance. For Substance seems inevitably to imply accidents. So, like Augustine, Leibniz is constrained to say that habere and esse in God coincide. "ideo simplex dicitur quonium quod habet hoc est" to use the phrase of Augustine (De civ. xi.10.)

Thus in God, conceived as personal, there is no distinction between essentia and existence. In this respect He differs from all finite being which is invariably a combination of both actuality and possibility or essentia. In God there is no urge to any self-transcendence and on this interpretation God can have no
history. This identity of existence and essence in God explains, as we shall see, the view tacitly assumed and inherited by Leibniz that in God existence and goodness are the one and the same thing. Like Plato in the Republic ii. 379 Leibniz would say "Then that which is good is not the cause of all things, but only of what is as it should be, being guiltless of evil." For both the goodness of God is a vital canonical principle.

Thus no emphasis on God as either the First Cause or the Deus Realissimum must conflict with the truth that he is a spirit and, as such, other than the work of his hands. The difficulties begin to assert themselves here as we shall see later.

"We can even say that it is because he is a spirit that God is the originator of existences, for if he lacked the power of will to choose what is best, there would have been no reason why one possible being should exist rather than any other. Therefore God's being a spirit himself dominates all the consideration which he may have toward created things" (...... Ainsi la qualité de Dieu, qu'il a d'être Être Lui même, va devant toutes les autres considerations qu'il peut avoir à l'égard des créatures". Discourse on Metaphysics. Montgomery's Translation. Open Court Pub. Coy. 1931. p. 61. C.xxvi. See G. iv. P 461.) We may here ask more precisely what is the nature of this 'qualité de Dieu'."

In an interesting comment on the orthodox view of the Divine Attributes Bayle, speaking on the Manichaean side, says "En donnant à votre principe la toute-puissance et la gloire de jouir seul de l'éternité, vous lui ôtez celui de ses attributs qui passe devant tous les autres, car l'optimus precede toujours le maximus dans le style des plus savantes nations, quand elles parlent de Dieu" (See Pauliciens. p.2325. Dictionaire Historique et Critique. 1702.) This idea of the qualitative aspect of the Divine Attributes is particularly germane and crucial for Leibniz. As we have already seen it is from this standpoint that he approaches the whole question of evil. In the words of Boethius he asks "SI DEUS BONUS EST, unde malum?"

The more we read Leibniz the more deeply we perceive that his whole system of thought turns and moves upon the fulcrum of "une bonté souveraine". This is, in the end, the sole ratio sufficiens of the world. It is the major promise of all the arguments of Leibniz and so of practically everything he has written. It is alike the source of his confident optimism and the urge of his apologetic enterprise in the handling of the facts of evil. "God wills nothing without reason" (Deus nihil vult sine ratione). A fragment in Bodemann puts the case with succinctness and meets the anticipated criticism. (7)

What account does Leibniz give of this idea of the goodness of God? Mr Bertrand Russell says "Most philosophers seem to suppose that, if they can establish God's existence, his goodness necessarily follows. Accordingly, though Leibniz does in certain passages, give some argument for what, in a metaphysical sense, may be called God's perfection, he nowhere takes the trouble to prove his goodness" (p. 189 "The Philosophy of Leibniz").
Russell goes on to add that, on this view of perfection, God's infinite goodness is included and his infinite badness excluded, only if a primitive view is taken of evil. This view of evil, we are already beginning to see, Leibniz fully endorses.

It is interesting and instructive to compare Leibniz on this matter of the goodness of God with our own Samuel Clarke, the contemporary of Leibniz. Ultimately they both take the same view of evil but they arrive at the same conclusion by very different methods of argument. It is true that in a remark in Par.71 of the Discours de la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison G.vi.p.91. Leibniz speaks with approval of Bayle's recognition that natural reason is for the unity of Principle against the Manichaean and "that the goodness of God is proven invincibly by the Reason". ("et que la bonté de Dieu est prouvée invinciblement par la Raison"). Again in Par.44. above he tells us that we have no need of revelation to know that there is a unique Principle of all things, perfectly good and wise. Reason informs us of this by infallible demonstrations and consequently all the objections taken from the sequence of things, where we observe imperfections, are only founded on false appearances. (Or nous n'avons point besoin de la Foi révélée, pour savoir qu'il y a un tel Principe unique de toutes choses, parfaitement bon et sage. La Raison nous l'apprend par des démonstrations infaillibles; et par conséquent toutes les objections prises du train des choses, où nous remarquons des imperfections, ne sont fondées que sur de fausses apparences"). But no attempt is made by Leibniz to substantiate in any detail these assertions.

Clarke on the other hand devotes the twelfth section of his famous book "A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God" (1st edit. 1705) to prove "The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of necessity be a Being of infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections; such as Become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the World". Clarke sets out explicitly to prove what B. Russell complains Leibniz never attempts to do, the essential goodness of God. He does this in his own characteristic fashion along the high and dry road of "reason".

According to Clarke's argument there is a demonstrable and rational connection between all the attributes of the Divine Being and it is possible both to prove the existence of the Divine Being and the Necessity of all His attributes by one and the same demonstration. "The Supreme Cause," he says p.113. (7th. edit. 1727. "A Discourse &c.") "must in the first place be infinitely Good; that is, he must have an unalterable Disposition to Do and to Communicate Good or Happiness; Because, being himself, necessarily Happy in the Eternal enjoyment of his own infinite Perfections, he cannot possibly have any other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but only that He may communicate to Them his Own Perfections; according to their different Capacities, arising from that Variety of Natures, which
it was fit for infinite Wisdom to produce; according to their different improvements, arising from that Liberty which is essentially Necessary to the Constitution of Intelligent and Active Beings". If further argument is still required, the infinite Goodness of God follows from (1) His All sufficiency and accordingly His freedom from all malice and envy. (2) His being infinitely Just and (3) His being True and Faithful

Clarke's argument has the merit of recognising with frankness and perspicuity the necessity of argument in a thorough-going rationalism for "the perfect benevolence" (to use Hume's phrase) of God. The question we must now ask is how did Leibniz escape from the necessity of promulgating some such apology for "the goodness of God".

We have already seen that Bertrand Russell has asked this question. Other commentators have also asked the same question. e.g. Boutroux and Renouvier. The latter puts the case with admirable lucidity in his "La Nouvelle Monadologie (Ch. Renouvier et L. Prat. p.310) "At bottom, the thought of Leibniz appears to have been that Sufficient Reason is the principle of the world as well as of the intelligence. By virtue of this concept we pass from the idea of possibility in general to the idea of the universal reality which is God. And from that to all the infinites. The moral character of perfection is strange to this theory (Le caractère moral de la perfection est étranger à cette théorie)". There can be no question that Renouvier is equally right in tracing "le caractère moral de la perfection" to "la tradition théologique". it is not less true that Descartes, before Leibniz, and following the theological tradition, has included in the idea of perfection, on the one hand the perfection of being, or absolute being, with infinite attributes, on the other hand, the moral perfections, without showing that the latter can ally themselves with the first, besides maintaining in this way all the contradictions of the Schoolmen, without seeing them or without trying to avoid them" (p.311. above). (8)

It is interesting to recall at this point the argument of Descartes. "It is impossible that God should ever deceive me; since in all fraud and deceit one meets with some kind of imperfection and although it may seem that to be able to deceive is a mark of cleverness or of power, the wish to deceive always indicates, without a doubt, feebleness or malice; and accordingly such a wish cannot exist in God" (Meditation iv. Veitch's Trans.) The absorbing interest of Descartes in the theological teaching of the Schoolmen has had a greater influence than is commonly realised. It is this teaching which lies at the basis of the optimism of Leibniz.

The persistence of this "theological tradition" from the Schoolmen to Leibniz helps us to understand a great deal of what otherwise is inexplicable. As McTaggart says ("Some Dogmas of Religion"p.253. 1906. ) "if it were proved that there was a person in the universe who greatly excelled all others both in wisdom and power, yet this would not by itself prove the existence of God. For God has not only to be wise and powerful, but also good". How is it possible to prove the goodness of God? McTaggart goes on to
show that any argument for the goodness of "the director of the Universe" can be rebutted by an equivalent argument for his "badness". I cannot see, therefore, that any reason has been given for supposing a director of the universe to be good rather than bad. To suppose "the director of the universe" to be bad, it is only necessary to explain away the good", "in the same way as the existence of evil was by the more cheerful theory". The existence of good in the world, reasoning this way, "would no more prove his goodness than the refreshments administered in the intervals of tortures proved the humanity of the torturers". "Nor would this possibility be removed, even if we could prove that good far outweighs evil in the universe. It would still be possible that the aim of the director of the universe was to produce a much worse result, and that the excess of good merely proved that the conditions under which he worked were unfavourable to his purpose". (p. 256 above.) If our only ground for inference as to the moral nature of God is the present state of the universe, then as McTaggart says, it is possible to make this out both ways.

The continuity of "the theological tradition", to which Renouvier and others draw attention, is especially seen in the way in which Leibniz underlines the Christian meaning of the word. It is possible to speak of "goodness" and to leave the precise meaning suspended in abstraction. Many metaphysicians use the word in a metaphysical sense. By his conception of "metaphysical evil" Leibniz himself has virtually lent himself to this use of the word. But no such meaning is given to his idea of "la bonté". Here there is a definite putting on of the Christian idea of Love. Goodness for Leibniz is what supplies a motive for acting with the happiness of others in view.("amare est gaudere felicitate aliena".) His attitude to the quietist controversies of his day puts this beyond doubt.

Leibniz finds himself, too, in fundamental agreement with Bayle that goodness in God is of the same nature as goodness in man. (See Théodicé, Par. 179. G. vi. p. 221. (9) If there is in God an attribute of "Goodness", then the characteristics of "Goodness" in general must conform to it. And when we reduce "Goodness" to its most general quality we find that it is "la volonté de faire du bien". So far then, from saying with Spinoza that goodness for the deity no more resembles human goodness than the zodiac sign resembles a barking dog, Leibniz agrees that goodness in man and goodness in God are of the same stuff. To say otherwise is to invite metaphysical chaos and complicate still further the problem of evil. The late Dean Mansel, in his "Limits of Religious Thought" 4th. Edit. Preface. p. xiii., regarded this differentiation of goodness in man and goodness in God the only way to solve the problem. He says "the infliction of physical suffering, the permission of moral evil", not to speak of other things, "are facts which no doubt are reconcilable, we know not how, with the infinite Goodness of God, But which certainly are not to be explained on the supposition that its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite goodness of man". In other words there can be no argument for the goodness of God save that of His Omnipotence.
It is noteworthy that Bayle, however much he may flirt with Manicheaeism, never regards the goodness of God as open to any question. Like William King, of whom Leibniz writes (G. vi. p. 406. Par. 6. "Remarques sur Le Livre de l'origine du mal, publié depuis peu en Angleterre"") after having spoken of some attributes of God, the author recognises (reconnoist) that God acts for an end, which is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are well ordered" (10). Bayle, too, is at one with Leibniz on the essential goodness of God.

Like the Schoolmen Leibniz asserts an analogia entis between God and man. The quality we know as goodness exists in God eminenter. For this reason the Schoolmen sometimes spoke of the super-bonitas of God and said that to speak of the goodness of God was to talk not univocally nor equivocally but analogically. This is the only difference Leibniz would make between human and divine goodness, a difference in degree and not in kind. He never wearies of making an attack on Spinoza for his saying that goodness in man and goodness in God are toto caelo different from each other. Leibniz begins, then, his answer to the problem of evil by deepening our awareness of it by his qualitative reading of the Divine Omnipotence as Goodness. It is this accentuation of the Divine Goodness which gave the problem of evil for Leibniz its vital importance and the world of letters its Théodicée.

The well known mot of Luther "The reason knows that God is, but who or what He is, who is truly called God, it does not know" has its application to Leibniz. As Couturat remarks in "La Logique de Leibniz", Leibniz's arguments for the existence of God prove an intelligent rather than a beneficient cause. ("En tout cas, si ce principe (principe de raison déterminante) prouve l'existence de Dieu, comme il le croit, c'est plutôt comme 'cause intelligente' que comme cause bienveillante et bienfaisante".)

We need not delay here to discuss in detail all the influences which led Leibniz to formulate this view of the essential goodness of God. As Erdmann says "Any one who is fond of discovering plagiarisms would have an easy task with Leibniz" (p. 172. Vol. ii. History of Philosophy. 1889.)

Some writers like Jean Baruzi ("Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre 1907") have drawn attention to certain backstairs influences in the thought of Leibniz through his apparent early fondness for mystical writings. In an unedited letter to Morel dated 10th. December, 1696 ("See note 4 Introduction") he says "As to St. Theresa you do well to esteem
her works. I found there one day this beautiful thought, that
the soul ought to conceive things as if there were only God and it
in the world. This gives also a considerable reflection in
philosophy that I have employed usefully in one of my hypotheses
(quoted by Baruzzi. p.494. Above.) As Baruzzi points out such an
opinion cannot be discounted merely on the ground that Leibniz was
writing to a person of mystical temperament, for in the most
rational of all his works, "Discourse on Metaphysics", he has a
passage to the same effect, without forgetting the source of the
inspiration." It is for this reason that a person of exalted
mind and revered saintliness may say that the soul ought to
often think as if there were only God and itself in the world.
Nothing can make us hold to immortality more firmly than this
independence and vastness of the soul which protects it completely
against exterior things, since it alone constitutes our universe
and together with God is sufficient for itself" (Par. xxxii.

If, as Leibniz says so often, "Dieu est Le seul object
immédiat externe des esprits", the way is open to suggest that
behind the logical foundation of his monadism, there is a deeper
mystical experience. Such a suggestion cannot in the nature of
things alike be easily proved or easily rebutted. The language of
Leibniz does at times take on this mystical meaning. "For it
appears clearly that all other substances depend upon God just as
our thoughts emanate from our own substances; that God is all in
all and that he is intimately united to all created things, in
proportion however to their perfection; that it is he alone who
determines them from without by his influence, and if to act is to
determine directly, it may be said in metaphysical language that
God alone acts upon me and he alone causes me to do good or ill,
other substances contributing only because of his determinations;
because God, who takes all things into consideration, distributes
his bounties and compels created beings to accommodate themselves
to one another. Thus God alone constitutes the relation or
communication between substances" ("Discourse on Metaphysics.
Par.xxxii.p.54-5. Open Court Pub. Coy. G.iv.p.457.) It is difficult
to estimate the influence of this mystical strain in the thought
of Leibniz. Otherwise Leibniz is a more rational theologian than
the later Schoolmen!

It will be sufficient for our purposes here to
remember the undoubted presence of this deeper element in the
thought of Leibniz and its possible priority in the developement
of his thoughts. There is a hint of this developement in the
Mét et de M. janvier 1905 (II) where Leibniz makes a rather
obvious reference to himself as being one who delighted in
contemplating God in the marvels of nature. These thoughts were
all different pictures of the grandeur and beauty of God, with
whom he has fallen in love. At the same he had also a mathematical
gift and he wished to try to reach the same certitude in more exalted matters. That this is not an isolated sentiment is made abundantly clear in other similar references. In a letter of 1699, quoted by Baruzi in Revue de Met. et de M.P.4. footnote, to l'Electrice Sophie, Leibniz expresses the wish that discoveries in science were made "par un principe de piété, laquelle serait le fruit d'une science bien entendue, bien loin d'y être contraire" Elsewhere Leibniz makes a reference to the fact that his purpose in mathematical studies was the hope of one day making them serve the cause of piety. ("Je n'ai pas étudié les sciences mathématiques pour elles-mêmes, mais afin d'en faire un jour un bon usage en avançant la piété". Quoted Baruzi p.3. above. Klopp. Die werke von L.éerste Reihe.t.4.p.444.) But however mystical at times Leibniz may appear, he never sets out "to break logic".

We are perhaps on less disputed ground in tracing the dominant influences in the thought of Leibniz to his philosophical inheritance and in particular to the "theological tradition" of the Schoolmen in general and Neo-Platonism in particular. It has already been remarked how "perfection" as applied to God was regarded as including moral as well as metaphysical perfection. In this way an easy transition was made from the "First Cause" to the Pater Noster of Catholic orthodoxy. As an inheritor of this tradition Leibniz found a trail already blazed for him and makes abundant use of it.

The Neo-Platonic element in this tradition is obvious. But Leibniz breaks away from the emanational view of the universe implied by Neo-Platonic writers like Plotinus, Proclus and, in his way, Spinoza. However much Leibniz avails himself of Neo-Platonic help in expressing his ideas, he will not allow it to compromise his idea of God. For this reason Leibniz falls back upon the idea of God promulgated by Catholic orthodoxy and not the monohypostatic deity of philosophy. For this reason the criticisms of Bertrand Russell do not apply to the God of Leibniz at all. "God's good actions then are contingent, and true only within the actual world. They are the source, from which all explanation of contingents by means of sufficient reason proceeds. They themselves, however, have their sufficient reason in God's goodness, which one must suppose metaphysically necessary. Leibniz failed to show why, since this is so, God's good actions are not also necessary." (p.38-9 above) Samuel Clarke puts the issue in the plainest terms. "Though nothing, I say, is more certain, than that God acts, not necessarily, but voluntarily; yet 'tis nevertheless as truly and absolutely impossible for God not to do (or to do any thing contrary to) what his Moral Attributes require him to do; as if he was really, not a Free but a Necessary Agent. And the Reason hereof, is plain; Because Infinite Knowledge, Power and Goodness in Conjunction, may, notwithstanding the most perfect Freedom and Choice, act with altogether as much Certainty and Unalterable Steadiness; as even the Necessity of Fate can be supposed to do" (p.116 "A Discourse concerning the Being & Attributes of God &c" 1727.) All such arguments, however, forget that the mere rationalistic view of the Divine Nature is not the inheritance of Leibniz. Leibniz never doubts that God is Love.
and that the essence of love is the contradiction that it cannot but do what it need not do. About which the final comment is Credo ut intelligam (12) (see also p.27.)

As we shall see later Leibniz's avowal of orthodox views on the Divine Nature, the pre-creative existence of God, the Three Persons, make His relationship to the Universe primarily as Creator and not as Substance. It is the inheritance of this full theological tradition which enables Leibniz to answer such criticisms as those of B. Russell and so escape "Spinozism".

Leibniz's idea of God rests on the presuppositions of Christian theology. God for Leibniz is Creative Love. He sees no necessity for proving the Goodness of God because he begins with it. It is an essential part of Leibniz's argument that God's creation of the world was a free act, as he says, "of choice" and that this is the source of that basic harmony between the world of Nature and the world of Grace. "The ancient philosophers knew very little of these important truths. Jesus Christ alone has expressed them divinely well, and in a way so clear and simple that the dullest minds have understood them. His gospel has entirely changed the face of human affairs". ("Discours on Metaphysics". Par. xxxvii.p.62-3. Open Court. Pub. Coy.)

All this enables us to see the significance of the remark of Leibniz that beginning as a philosopher he ended as a theologian. For Leibniz there was no real hiatus between religion or theology and philosophy. In all this he was a child of his own age. As Clement C.J. Webb has said "It was the error of the 'rational theology' of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that it tended to assume as a factor in a non-religious problem a conception that derived all its significance from an experience which was nevertheless regarded by it rather as a consequence of that conception than as its source" (cf. p.240. Arist. Socy. Supplementary Vol.iv.1924. Symposium: The idea of a transcendent Deity.) Or as Mark Pattison puts it in Essays and Reviews (1861. p.297.) "The defect of the eighteenth century theology was not in having too much good sense, but in having nothing besides".
The Perfection of God.

In the last chapter we have already seen something of the meaning Leibniz attaches to the Perfection of God. We have seen how Leibniz inheriting "the theological tradition" from the Schoolmen has no difficulty in saying that the Divine Perfection includes as part of its meaning the moral goodness of God. Before we advance further it is important to consider this idea of the Perfection of God in more detail.

In one of his letters Leibniz makes the claim that his conception of God gives entirely different idea of perfection from that of other philosophers in general and of Descartes and Spinoza in particular and further that this conception can serve us alike in the physical as well as in the moral sphere. (1) This new idea of the Perfection of God involves a reconsideration of the Divine Attributes.

We have seen that Leibniz, unlike his great predecessor, does not despise the argumentum ex analogia hominis. Accordingly we can say that man is the image of God—"une image de Dieu" and that His goodness, His justice as well as His wisdom only differ from ours because they are infinitely more perfect" (Discours Fred Theodicee, Par.4.G.vi.p.51. (2) It is because of this perfection of the Divine Attributes that we make so many errors when speaking about them. (Response à la Troisième Replique de Clarke. Par.18.G.vii.p.374. (3) Accordingly we must not speak as if we knew the whole compass of the Divine Wisdom. There is something infinite in the scope of the Divine care for the world and what we know of it is almost nothing. How absurd it is to think that we can measure His goodness and His wisdom by our own. (4). For this reason, then, we must not try to push the argumentum ex analogia hominis too far and forget that there is a place for a philosophical agnosticism. For what exists in man exists in God eminently. (5).

The human soul is, then, an image of God. Compared with the rest of the world it has the greater value. "A single spirit is worth a whole world, because it not only expresses the whole world, but it also knows it and governs itself as does God." ("Discourse on Metaphysics" Par.36. p.61. Open Court Pub. Coy.) What this method of government is the psychology of the human soul abundantly reveals. For we are not merely empirical creatures, dependent upon the merely experimental knowledge of the relations of things. We understand the necessity of eternal truths and the reasons of facts and in this way imitate the architectonic activities of God. So man is capable of entering into society with God and becoming a member of the City of God. (6) As Leibniz says elsewhere every rational mind is omniscience confused. "Mihi videtur omnem mentem esse omnisciam, confuse" p.61. Bodemann.)
Roughly speaking Leibniz inherits that idea of God which is the confluence of two streams of influence. On the one hand there is the Aristotelian ideal of the Deity as "thought thinking itself" (νοείς νοείστως) and on the other the Hebrew ideal of the Deity as "Almighty" (Γεννητοκράτω). It is instructive to remember the interplay of these two dominant modes of thought. The more metaphysical writings of Leibniz emphasise the Contemplative ideal and the Théodicée the Monarchial ideal.

Leibniz's idea of Divine Perfection is the result of an endeavour to combine at least these two ideas of God. We find him pillorying Descartes and still more Spinoza for holding that "the perfection of God consists in that amplitude of his working so that nothing is possible or conceivable that He does not actually produce" ("la perfection de Dieu consiste dans cette amplitude de son operation en sorte que rien ne soit possible ou concevable qu'il ne produise actuellement" Letter to Philippi. January. 1680. G. iv. p. 283.) This idea of God he says is "the Ψεῦδος and the foundation of atheistical philosophy which does not permit the saying of good things about God" (above). (C'est à mon avis le Ψεῦδος et le fondement de la Philosophie athée. qui ne lausse pas de dire de Dieu des belles choses en apparence" above.) This idea of God, he says, is Hobism in another form. For it cuts away at once the distinction between the possible and the actual. It makes Providence a misnomer for what Ex hypothesi is an impossibility. For if God makes all and makes no choice among possible alternatives, then Providence on these premises can only be a chimera. In this matter Spinoza was more outspoken than Descartes but in the end their views are identical. "Spinoza incipit ubi Cartesius desinit" (p. 48 An imadversiones ad Joh. G. Wacteri. Hebraeorum philosophia. A.F. de Careil. above.)

It is a moot point how far Leibniz correctly interprets Descartes in this matter. Though statements like -Hoc est ratio eorum bonitatis ex eo pendet, quod voluerit ipsa sic facere (Descartes. Resp. ad object. sext. n. 8.)- seem to support the contention of Leibniz. On the other hand there is more ground for the assertion that for Descartes in God will and intelligence are one. "We should not conceive any preference or priority between the intellect and the will of God" (To Mesland. A.T. iv. 118. Quoted Arist. Socy. 1929-30.) It is Malebranche who puts the case for this fundamental unity of intelligence and will most clearly. "In like manner, if a spiritual or thinking substance were without will, it is clear that it would be quite useless, for it would not Ίνάθει be attracted towards the objects of its perception and would not love the good for which it is made. We cannot, therefore, conceive an intelligent being so to fashion it." (Recherche. i.i.i.) If there is some such unity in the Divine mind between the will and the understanding of God, then it is simply false to say with Leibniz that Descartes holds the world and the eternal truths of the world to have reality by the mere fiat of God. In this way the frequent argument of Leibniz against Descartes is answered. For Descartes as for Leibniz "the eternal truths of metaphysics
and geometry, and consequently the principles of goodness, of justice, and of perfection....follow from his (God's) understanding which does not depend upon his will any more than does his essence." (Discourse c. ii.p5 Open Court Pub. Coy.)

We are not concerned, however, with Descartes but with Leibniz's reading of his philosophy. What this, there can be no doubt. Will is separable from intelligence and the will of God is prior to His understanding and, what is of more importance, determinative of it. According to Leibniz to speak in this way is to deprive the Deity of any real moral attributes at all and to speak instead of a blind necessity. ("une nécessité aveugle") (7)

On this view the goodness, justice, wisdom of God are terms without meaning. For, as Leibniz never tires with the schoolmen of reminding us, every act of will must be an act sub ratione boni. A necessary corollary from the view that God is Perfect Goodness is that such Goodness can only express itself through an act of will. Like the Schoolmen Leibniz regards these two truths so far from being contradictory that they are complementary the one to the other. God's goodness is the ultimate cause of his creative acts but this goodness can only implement itself through the intermediary of the will. And as we have just seen the will can only act sub ratione boni.

If, then, every act of the Divine will must be an act sub ratione boni, it is but a short step to the view that in God there is a regio idearum. This leads us to consider briefly the difficulty there is in the interpretation of Leibniz on this point.

According to Leibniz the regio idearum in the mind of God is not subject to His will but is independent of it. For any other view he professes the utmost abhorrence. On the other hand he seems condemned to some such view of reality and its knowledge as that of Malebranche. For Leibniz seems to be driven to the view that the ultimate reality of which all monads are representations is nothing less than this regio idearum in the mind of God. Malebranche (under the influence of St. Augustine) held the view that the difficulty of representationalism left by Descartes could only be solved by saying that we see all things "in God". For only in the mind of God are the true ideas to be found and to see all things "in God" is to see them as they truly are. Leibniz, in saying that the ultimate reality of all representations is the nature of God as Perfect Omniscience seems to hold a similar view to that of Malebranche. (8)

In the case of Leibniz we escape the consequences of this view by an insistence that "the eternal truths" which are the real essences of things have an independence of their own within the Divine Understanding and are not mere modes of it. Yet they could not have being unless in a Divine Understanding which takes cognisance of them, θοι on this point Leibniz is distinct. (De plus, ces verites memes ne sont pas sans qu'il y ait un entendement
qui en bonne connaissance; car elles ne subsisteroient point, s'il n'y avoit un enten̄dement Divin, où elles se trouvent realīsees, pour ainsi dire " Théodicée Par 189. G. vi. p.229. This must be considered Leibniz's final view. It raises difficulties in his theory of knowledge and of reality. These we must leave, as Leibniz left them, unresolved.

In his anxiety to show that the good is not a merely arbitrary result of the Divine Will Leibniz tends to go to the opposite extreme and to assert the anti-religious alternative that the good is prior to God himself. He avoids this apparently to his own satisfaction by saying that the regio idearum exists in the mind of God. This again requires careful interpretation as we have just seen or our last state is as bad as the first.

For Leibniz the perfection of God reveals itself in the perfect harmony of His attributes. "In us pleasure is the mark of the increase of perfection. In God perfection itself is once for all possessed" (" In nobis Voluptas est 'sensus' augmenti perfectionis, in Deo est ipsa perfectio, tota semel possessa" lagodinsky. p. 126. Letter. April, 1676.) Leibniz has no doubts on the perfect Sovereignty of God and that eternally He is His own Perfection. The Perfection of the Divine Being has no history.

"In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of the best" (Monadology, Par. 48. Latta's Translation p. 244.) In the Théodicée Leibniz tells us that "Power" (Puissance) precedes Knowledge or Understanding (Entendement) and Will (Volonté). (See Théodicée Par. 149. G. vi. p. 199; "Goodness is in the will, wisdom is in the understanding. Wherein is power? Someone will say it is in body or matter. But body is not a substance unless it be taken to be a unity; and moreover there is power in God who is without matter. It is time, however, that power is in what corresponds analogically to matter, that is to say, in the common subject of goodness and wisdom, which is the source of changes or actions. This subject may be called matter in created things." Fragment without title. Bodemann p.70 Translated "Everyman" p. 248.)

It is interesting to see how a more explicit fathoming of the orthodox teaching about the Divine Nature, teaching which Leibniz invariably assumes, might have suggested a more adequate way of escape from some of the inevitable difficulties incident to his resolution of the problem of evil. To begin with the self-sufficing as well as the self-originated life of the One God might have been more clearly explicated by a full recognition of the mutual permeation of the Three Persons of the Godhead. By the same doctrine a reconciliation might have suggested itself of the apparently conflicting views of the divine beatitude and the divine suffering through His self-determined contact with the world. In the same
way Leibniz might have been able to formulate more effectively and more dogmatically his key idea of the PRO-creation of the universe and the choice of "the best possible world". For the actual process of Creation in orthodox doctrine belongs to God the Son, while the act of creation in the sense of initiation belongs to God the Father. The thought behind the Creative Word is the real creative function and is the function of God the Father. The function of God the Spirit is the gradual development and organisation of what has been created.

In some such way as this Leibniz might have made a much fuller use of the orthodoxy he assumed. If he had said that the Divine Essence is incomprehensible, there might have been more reason for his theological prudence. But in this case he would have been forced to abandon his rationalism for an empiricism. Thus there is some truth in this criticism that Leibniz did not work out in detail the precise relation of his solution of the problem of evil to the current orthodoxy and in particular to the Christian idea of God. But to say this is to forget that Leibniz "begins as a philosopher and only ends as a theologian." Further the 17th. century theological climate is very different from that of the 20th. century. This is an obviously truer reason for Leibniz's failure to put the corpus of Christian dogma about the nature of the Deity at the foundation of the Théodicéé. No one can read Leibniz and think that for him there was an advert inconsistency or conscious discrepancy between his philosophical outlook and the orthodox dogma of Catholic orthodoxy. Leibniz prided himself on acting in the role of a defensor fidei, although at times his apologetic help must have been an embarrassment e.g. in the doctrine of 'original sin' and the Fall of Man.

In the relation of these Attributes of the Deity great emphasis has often been laid on the apparent precedence that Leibniz accords to "Connaissance" over "Volonte". In this way it has been made possible to interpret Leibniz as the author of a new "mecanismus metaphysicus" and so destroy at once any pretensions of Leibnitzianism to be an ethical theism.

One good effect however, of Leibniz's view of the rational Nature of the Divine Being is to destroy, so far as he is concerned, that spurious idea of Omnipotence which has often proved a stumbling block. The Deity of Leibniz is not the "omnium potens" of the Deity of a Boethius (9) or a McTaggart. (p.217."Some Dogmas of Religion" F "It is not an unusual position to maintain that God is absolutely omnipotent, and, at the same time to believe that there are certain things he cannot do, and even to be quite certain what those things are. As against such a view as this it seems necessary to emphasise the tolerably obvious fact that, if there is anything which God could not do if he wished, he is not omnipotent ".) Celsus in his famous polemic against the Christian faith made the utmost use of this idea of a God so Omnipotent that He "can do nothing irrational, unnatural or wicked" (Origen. Contra Celsum. i.xiv. 22.) Leibniz's interpretation of the Divine
"Puissance", as guided by "Connaissance" and enforced by His "Volonté", liberates him from the pit-falls which await those who take over the crude Hebrew idea of the Divine Almightyness.

On the other hand the language of Leibniz is often open to serious objection in going to the other extreme and stressing overmuch this rationality of the Divine Nature. e.g. "When God calculates and employs thought, the world is made" ("Quum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet fit mundus". De connexione inter res et verba. (1677. G. vii. 191.)); "... in the very origination of things a certain Divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanics is employed". ("...in ipsa originatione rerum mathesis quaedam divina seu mecanismus metaphysicus exercetur" De rerum originatione radicali. G. vii. p. 304.); "Nihil est regularius intellectu Divino, qui fons est omnium regularum, et producit systema mundi regularissimum seu perfectissimum et quam maxime harmonicum, adeoque plurimarum observationum universalium capax." Letter to Wolf. 1715. p. 171. Mathm. Schriften. Vol. viii.)

Following this trend of the thought of Leibniz we reach an idea of perfection which is entirely logical. In a letter to Wolf (3rd. October 1714) he says "Perfection, about which you ask, is the grade of positive reality, or what comes to the same thing, affirmative intelligibility, so that that is the more perfect in which more things worthy of note are found." ("Perfectio, de qua quaeris, est gradus realitatis positivae, vel quod eodem redit, intelligibilitatis affirmativa, ut illus sit perfectius, in quo plura reperiuntur notatu digna" (Mathm. Schriften. viii.p. 161.)

This logical conception of perfection has, of course, an important place in Leibniz's thought but it in no way exhausts all its meaning. For Leibniz there is no good unless it is a bonum intellectum. But this is not to say that a scientia visionis is the same as a scientia approbationis. This is the point of Leibniz. For him the world is meaningless unless it clothes an intentional causality and all that this implies. We ought not to have the vain subtlety of admitting wisdom without admitting a wise man. (10)

Leibniz's real idea of perfection is to be summed up in two words—"optime agere". On the one hand this allows for the view that "perfection is nothing but quantity of essence" and "that out of the infinite possible combinations and series of possible things there exists that one through which the greatest amount of essence or possibility is brought into existence" (Latta p. 340. On the Ultimate Origination of Things. De rerum originatione radicali)

It is quite clear that Leibniz was feeling after that idea of the Divine Being which affirms the intrinsic nature of God to be Goodness. That the good is not merely good because God wills it nor is the good prior to God himself. Both of these suppositions are untenable for Leibniz. The only way out of this dilemma is to say, as Leibniz tries so hard to say, that God
is intelligent Will and this Will is of intrinsic goodness.

The Glory of God for Leibniz demands the mutual co-operation of the "mathesis quaedam divina" and the "divina Voluntas". Quod Deus omnia dirigat ad suam gloriam, idem est ac dirigere eum ad summam rerum perfectionem, in eo enim vera gloria consistit, optime agere. (L. to Wolf. 21 Feb. 1705. Math. Schriften Vol. viii. p.18.)

For Leibniz there is more in heaven and earth than can be computed more geometrico. He never wearyes in the saying that behind the geometrical there is the moral. ("Il y a de la géométrie partout et de la morale partout, mais c'est la morale qui est la raison de la géométrie même") In other words the further we retrogress the nearer do we find ourselves back at "cette qualité morale de Dieu". Couturat gives us a most important inédit (dated 2 December 1676) to show that the alleged Spinozism of Leibniz is more imaginary than real (Op. et Frag. inédits de L. p. 529-530). Possibility and Existence are very different terms and between them there is a great gulf fixed however we may attempt to bridge it by any computation of reality ("Itaque nulla alia ratio determinandi, quam ut existant potiota, quae plurimum involvant realitatis "p. 530 above); the chasm still remains. (11)

It is clear from a hint in a letter to Remond and elsewhere that Leibniz was aware of some of the defects in his armour in stressing overmuch the role of the Divine Understanding in the creation of the world. Remond had written to Leibniz on the subject of "Dynamique, qui me semble estre le fondement de vostre systeme". Leibniz in reply states that Remond is right in saying that Dynamique "is the foundation of his system. But to express himself fully on the matter would demand a special book because he had not yet said all he had to say on this matter. (12) Leibniz has some consciousness that his rationalism has lead him to over-reach himself.

That Leibniz should be still cogitating five years after the publication of the Theodicee goes some way to show the dissatisfaction he already felt in the statements of his main position. Perhaps he was beginning to see the evident mis-interpretation to which some of his statements lent themselves. But there is no hint that he ever weakened in his main argument. God's will is the will for the best and in this He is guided by His understanding. (13)

It is clear that Leibniz was trying to steer a middle course between the Monarchial (Creator) idea of God and the Contemplative idea. According to Leibniz the view of Descartes is "une profanité dangereuse" because too much is made of the function of the Divine Will as an arbitrary choice. Everything is regarded as its outcome, including the eternal truths of mathematics and morality. This view in the end, Leibniz points out, results in the
deprivation of God of "Will" in any real sense and leaves us only with an unlimited power from which all emanates. This merits rather the name of nature than that of God. ("ne laissant qu'une certaine puissance démesurée dont tout émane, qui mérite plustost le nom de la nature que celui de Dieu" G. iv. p. 344.) How is it possible, Leibniz asks, that God's Understanding should depend on His Will and how is it possible for God to have a Will which has not the idea of good for an object but for an effect. ("Car comment est-il possible que son entendement (dont l'objet sont les vérités des idées enfermées dans son essence) puisse dépendre de sa volonté? et comment peut-il avoir une volonté qui n'a pas l'idée du bien pour objet, mais pour son effet"? (above)

It must be remembered that in so far as the polemical purpose of the philosophy of Leibniz defined itself, it was an attack against the atomism of Cordemoi, Gassendi and others. This will help us to realise the unlikelihood of a determinism, however new fangled, being the final truth about his philosophy. The teaching of Spinoza resulted in "une nécessité aveugle" and this, too, was only the logical outcome of the reasoning of Descartes about the Divine Will. To think in any of these ways was to render meaningless any idea of God as "une providence gubernative" (Dialogue Theophile et Folidore ). According to Leibniz it was as important to know that the Gubernator Mundi was benedictus and not maledictus as to know whether He existed or not.

It may be questioned whether some of the difficulty in the interpretation of Leibniz is not helped by his use of metaphorical language as when e.g. he speaks of essences "striving to exist" or their "need of existence" (14) Existence is the exigentia of essence. For Leibniz it is clearly more than a metaphor. Surreptitiously it introduces an element into his thought which brings him perilously near the abyss of Spinozism with the conception of God as an Ens Realissimum. But this idea of "la tendance", as Boutroux reminds us, is one of the dominant ideas in the philosophy of Leibniz. "La monde de Leibniz n'est qu'une tendance, intermédiaire entre la matière nue, qui n'est qu'une abstraction, et l'acte poprement dit, qui n'est réalisé qu'en Dieu" (p. 169 "La Monadologie" Émile Boutroux). Leibniz removes in this way the conflicts agitating contemporary philosophy only to impart difficulties into his own. How to account for this supra-geometric element can only be "explained" by supposing a Divine Understanding where they exist. (see later).

In a letter to Bourguet written in 1712 Z G. iii. p. 558 (15) he compares the number of possible worlds to the number of possible novels one might write. General intelligibility is enough for possibility but verisimilitude to real life is the deciding quality of the good novel. Something of the same, Leibniz thinks, is true of the way the possible worlds range themselves in
the understanding of God. They too are judged on their merits. For however, we may define perfection as "the harmony of things", or "identity in difference", "grade of considerability", or even "grade of essence", there is no escape from the corollary inevitably involved of the necessity of a Divine Mind capable of judgment. To use Leibniz's own words, written May 1715 in a letter to Wolf, "Hinc pulchre etiam patet, Deum esse perceptione et quidem maxima praeditum seu mentem summam: alioqui non curaret Harmonias" (Mathm. Schrift. Vol. viii. p. 172.)

We are now in a position to sum up this part of our argument. Leibniz goes some length towards a logical idea of perfection and towards an explanation in this way of the creation of "the best of all possible worlds". But any such interpretation of Leibniz must ultimately break down before the explicit statements of his views e.g. in a letter to Bourguet 3 April, 1716 (G. iii.p. 592.)—"Les idées ou essences sont toutes fondées sur une nécessité indépendente de la sagesse, de la convenance et du choix; mais les existences en dépendent"— and the integral place the idea of a beneficent deity has in his system.

It is possible to transmogrify Leibnitzianism so that God becomes a superfluous entity in his philosophy. But to interpret any thinker in this way is to put an end once and for all to the history of philosophy. And what is really the keystone of Leibniz's whole philosophical system cannot be so easily discounted. In the last resort we are always driven back to Leibniz's idea of God. God is the guarantor even of the fact of possibility—"Itaque dici potest OMNE POSSIBLE EXISTITUR, prout scilicet fundatur in UNTE NECESSARIO ACTU EXISTENTE, sive quo nulla est via qua possibile perveniret ad actum" (Résümé de Métaphysique (6). p. 524. Op. et Frag. Inédits de Leibniz. Couturat. 1902.) Such a statement Leibniz often makes. The Deity is not only the touchstone of all reality but also of all possibility. In a letter to Arnauld he calls the Divine Understanding "pour ainsi dire le pays des réalités possibles" (1686. G. ii.p.55.) (16) What reality possibilities or essences have, outside their being made contingently actual, is due to their existence in the Divine understanding. "...neither these essences nor what are called eternal truths regarding these essences are fictitious, but... they exist in a certain region (if I may so call it) of ideas, that is to say, in God Himself, the source of all essence and of the existence of other things" (sed existere in quadem ut sic dicam regione idearum, nempe in ipso Deo, essentialae et existentiaeque caeterorum fonte). That this is not a mere gratuitous assertion of mine is shown by the existence of the actual series of things. For since the reason of the series is not to be found in itself, as has been shown above, but is to be sought in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths, and since existing things can come only from existing things, as we have already remarked, eternal truths must have existence in some absolutely or metaphysically necessary subject, that is, in God, through whom these things, which would otherwise be imaginary, are (to use a barbarous but
expressive word) realised."

(De rerum originatone originatiue radicali. G. vii. p. 304-5. Latta's Translation. p. 343.)

Cf. Monad. Par. 43. To the same effect Leibniz speaks in the Théodicée Par. 184. G. vi. p. 226. The Divine Understanding makes the reality of eternal truths. All reality is founded upon something existant. An atheist might geometrise but without God's existence there would be no object for his geometry. For without God there would be nothing existant and nothing possible. ("Il est vray qu'un Athée peut être Geometre. Mais s'il n'y avoir point de Dieu, il n'y aurait point d'objet de la Geometrie. Et sans Dieu, non seulement il n'y auraient rien d'existant, mais il n'y auraient rien de possible". (above).

The Perfection of God is grounded in His essential Goodness. and this Goodness rules over all. "Si intellectus Divinus aequa bona ac mala producere, illimitatus maneret, perfectus non maneret. Perfectius existere ex possibilibus sola meliora, quam indiscriminatim bona et mala aequa existere. Est tamen et intellectus quoad optimum illimitatus in suo genere, quia infinitas producit harmonias". (L. to Wolf. 18 mai 1715. Math. Schrift. vol. viii p. 170.) We see this more clearly if we ask the question why God created the world. There can be only one answer to this for Leibniz, the answer of King which Leibniz quotes with approval, "L'abondance de la bonte de Dieu en est la cause" (Théodicée G. 6. p. 407.) And King further speaks for Leibniz when he continues "il est de la bonte infinie de choisir le meilleur". This Divine initiative demands explanation, however much we may stress the truth that God makes all by numbers, by measure and by weights. ("Dieu fait tout par nombre, par mesure et par poids" p. 250. Sur l'Immortalité de l'Ame. A. F. de Careil)

With this description of the nature of the goodness of God, as showing itself in the "free choice" of the best, Leibniz reveals how closely he follows the doctrine of orthodox Christianity. In this respect he is different from Plotinus and Erocius to whom it was anathema to think of the goodness of God being expressed in the apparent hazard of any "choice" whatsoever. Unlike these and other writers Leibniz never says that "Divine necessity corresponds with divine volition." For when Leibniz speaks of the Goodness of God, he speaks of the Goodness of a Person and not of an abstract principle.

It is in the essential goodness of God that we perceive the secret of the fundamental unity and harmony of the Leibnizian universe and a portion of the perfection of God. For this reason there can be no hiatus between nature and grace or faith and reason. This idea of God is the foundation of the system of Leibniz. The major premise of Leibniz is the major premise of Christian theology. God IS LOVE. This is the fulcrum of Leibnitzianism. It is to this Divine dynamic that we trace the whole majestic poem of creation, its well ordered harmony and its deep toned symphony.
God is creative love and it is the duty of man to reciprocate love with love, to return the love of God, by observing His laws and furthering His purposes of good. In this way we can surely say "God is an absolutely perfect being" and that... God who possesses supreme and infinite wisdom acts in the most perfect manner not only metaphysically, but also from the moral standpoint. (Discours l. p. 3. Open Court Pub. Coy. G. iv. p. 427.) Because the Goodness of God makes Him more than a mere principle of metaphysical perfection we can not only love Him but trust implicitly in His goodness to give all we can wish for our happiness. (see Dialogue "Theophile et Polidore" p. 36 above ".....nous devons aimer Dieu sur toutes choses, puisque nous trouvons tout en luy avec plus de perfection que dans les choses memes; et puisque sa bonté nous tient lieu de nostre toute puissance. Car par là nous ob⁠stenons tout ce que nous pouvons vouloir pour nostre bonheur"). With such a God in our heaven, all must be right with the world. "It is reasonable and assured that God will always do the best, though what is less perfect does not imply contradiction." ("Discours de Métaphysique" Par. 13. G iv. p. 438.)
Chapter III.

The Universe of Leibniz.

Any consideration of the views of Leibniz on the nature and scope of the universe will serve to elucidate and underline the essential theocratic tendency of his thought. It will help, too, to explain the crucial nature of the problem presented by the facts of evil in his system. For against the background of his monotheism evil cannot be regarded as a mere side issue of little importance. The fact that the Théodicée is the only work of Leibniz to be published in his lifetime and that it is as comprehensive, not to say diffuse, as it is requires little further comment. On such a philosophy there must be no residuum of evil unexplained.

At this point it is vital to remind ourselves that there is, so to say, a pre-monotheological Leibniz. So many commentators persist in regarding Leibnizianism as identical with his monadism that it is salutary to remember that Leibniz had a philosophy before he arrived at his doctrine of created substance expressed in his "Discours on Metaphysics" (1686) and before his letter to de l'Hospital (12-22nd. July 1695—see G. H. ii. p. 294.) where he first uses the term "monad". So far indeed from the "Monadology" being prior in thought to the Théodicée, the converse is the case. It is hardly an exaggeration to say paradoxically that it is the Théodicée which sets the problem which the rest of Leibniz tries to answer in detail. The obvious fact that it incorporates what is admittedly so much of Leibniz's earlier thinking and that it was published as late as 1710 places this contention beyond all cavil. This raises the presumption that the fundamental views of Leibniz about God and the universe remained unchanged and that the monadological point of view so far from being inconsistent with these opinions was, on the contrary, their most satisfying justification. As Leibniz himself says "Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognised when, in his Dictionary (article Roarius), he raised objection to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God, more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them" (Monad. Par. 59. Latta. p. 249-250.)

It is possible to give some account of these abiding philosophical convictions of Leibniz about God and the universe. They have been conveniently summed up under six headings. "We thus see, in Leibniz's early years before he has any conception of the individual substance as a self-contained monad, a definite conception of the universe as a whole as (i) created by God as the most perfect of all compossibles, (ii) pre-established in all its parts so as to involve no further decrees on the part of God, and (iii) yet needing the
general concourse of God to maintain it in existence; (iv). containing among other things, active substances which are creatures and nevertheless free; (v) a complete harmony so that every part of it reflects whatever is happening everywhere; (vi) infinitely varied, so that there is no portion however small which does not contain variety within it." ("Some Problems on the Philosophy of Leibniz." L.J. Russell p. 206-7. Arist. Socy. Proceedings 1922-3.)

These abiding views of Leibniz on the scheme of the universe help us greatly to understand the exact framework the monadology was to fit. For us they are of more than historic interest in the development of the thought of Leibniz. For they are the background against which Leibniz envisages the problem of evil. Abundant confirmation of this view can readily be found by a brief consultation of the earlier correspondence of Leibniz. (1)

Points (ii) and (iii) are especially important. God is not a Deus Negotiosus. There is meaning in the phrase "le plan de Dieu". This means that all the detail of the universe is foreseen and pre-established. There could only be Divine intervention for one of two reasons either (1) there was some imperfection in the plan as originally proposed or (2) there was some imperfection in the Divine foresight. Both of these possibilities, however, are ruled out by the idea of a Perfect Being. "I do not say that the corporeal world is a machine or watch which goes without God's interposition, and I am insistent enough that created things stand in need of His continual influence. But I do maintain that it is a watch which goes without needing His correction; otherwise we should have to admit that God keeps improving upon His own work. God has foreseen everything, He has provided a remedy for everything in advance. There is in His works an already pre-established harmony and beauty" (2nd. Paper. to Clarke. Everyman Edit. of Leibniz p. 196.) For Leibniz as for Augustine, to God futura jam facta sunt. "For all is regulated in things, once for all, with as much order and mutual connexion as possible, since supreme wisdom and goodness can only act with perfect harmony. The present is big with the future, the future might be read in the past, the distant is expressed in the near" (Princs. of Nature and Grace. Latta p. 419.) Above all there is always a reason in the providence of God for the future. (2).

Like Augustine, again, Leibniz holds that conservation means continuous creation."By the continuous creation that I admit in conservation, I understand only the continuation of the first dependence, and in effect creatures always depend equally on God" ("Par la création continuee que j'admets dans la conservation, je n'entends que la continuation de la première dependence, et en effect les creatures dépendent toujours également de Dieu" (Letter to Bourguet. Oct. 1712. G. iii. p. 558.) The contingency of the world not only involves "an" ultimate reason of things "which is called God" (Princs. of N. & Grace. p. 415. Latte) but "the reason which has led to the existence of things through Him makes them also depend upon Him for their continued existence and working". God is pre-eminently not only Existentens but Existentificans
("Résumé de Métaphysique p. 534 Couturat" Op. et Frag. inédits de Leibniz) Thus if God is no Deus Negotiosus neither is He the Absentee Deity. Pascal fathers on Cartesianism, who gave "une chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement; après cela, il n'a plus que faire de Dieu". (Pascal. Pensees, 77. Edt. Leon Bruschvieg. Hachette).

In the same way, too, Leibniz had never any doubt not only of the essential rationality of the universe but also of its inherent goodness. The world might conceivably be perfectly rational without being good. To be good it must provide an arena for the activity of created spirits and manifest the glory of God. We must be able to say, if the world is good as well as rational, that what is contingent and free remains so after the creative fiat as it was before ("Ainsi ce qui est contingent et libre, ne le demeure pas moins sans les décrets de Dieu, que sous la prévision". Théodicée Par. 52. p. 131. G. vi.) Anything in the nature of a Fatum Mahometanum working in and through all the universe might still allow of the rationality of the world but not of its goodness. Leibniz speaks of "une spontaneité merveilleuse en nous" which must have recognition and describes it as a consequence of his system of pre-established harmony. ("Cette spontaneité peu connue jusqu'ici, qui élève notre empire sur nos actions autant qu'il est possible, est une suite du Système de l'Harmonie préétablie". (Théodicée Par. 59. G. vi. p.135.) In other words however much we may rationalise the world in idea, our system of things must allow for the real activity of free creatures and for the world in respect of God "pour manifester sa gloire" (G. iv. p. 439.)

The essential harmonic character of the world Leibniz ever refused to jeopardize. We see this e.g. in the early attempts of Leibniz at a theory of knowledge. Leibniz's interpretation of this harmony took different forms according to his view of mind and of matter but the principle of the harmonic inter-relatedness of the universe was never in any real danger. It is a world of such infinite variety and at the same time laced through and through with such an inexpugnable unity that it becomes easy for us to realise something of the perfection of its Author and Maker. The full teaching of the pre-established harmony was a Copernican revolution in our thoughts of the world and gave another face to the essential harmony of the universe. (3)

The advent of the monadistic point of view for Leibniz meant that this whole idea of the essentially harmonic character of the universe was given a deeper note as at the same time it was given a fuller justification. It gave a unity by its doctrine of God and a variety by its doctrine of monads to which "la philosophie superficielle, comme celle des Atomistes et Vacuistes" (L. to Clarke 5th. Letter. G. VII.p. 395.) was quite strange. At the same time, too, it helped Leibniz to formulate in more detail his answer to the problem of the existence of evils, an answer already implicit in these early foundational opinions of his philosophy. The fact that the Théodicée embodies so much of these early opinions puts the truth of
of this beyond any dispute. In the same way there can be no question that in the dénouement of the problem of evil it is the monadistic point of view which leads Leibniz into his greatest embarrassments. In particular the precise relation of God to the monads provides the greatest crux of his theodicean argument.

There can be no question about the attractive completeness of the articulated universe of the philosophy of Leibniz. Through its conception of the monad it has an affinity to modern scientific thought and in this respect it leaves the systems of many other great philosophers far behind.

When Leibniz said that his atoms were monads he had apparently disintegrated the universe into discrete puncta. How to relate these "spiritual" substances so that what is so obviously a "multiverse" can become a universe is the problem. As we have already seen Leibniz has never any doubt about the fundamental unity of the universe and of the witness of this unity to the reality of God's existence. How otherwise can we explain the agreement between the sequence of representations in the soul ("la suite des representations que l'âme se produit ") and the sequence of representations of changes in the universe itself ("la suite des représentations des changements de l'univers même") unless by some form of the argument ab effectu? As Leibniz says "There is also here a new and surprisingly clear proof of the existence of God. For this perfect agreement of so many substances which have no communication with one another can only come from their common cause" (New System, Far. 16. p. 316. Latta. G. iv. 485.) There is no doubt, then, that the universe is unum quoad Deum, just as our experience shows that it is unum quoad nos. It must, therefore, in some way be unum in se.

Its unity is reflected in the individual monad itself so that Leibniz can say "each monad is a living mirror, or a mirror endowed with inner activity, representative of the universe according to its point of view, and as subject to rule as is the universe itself" (Princs. of Nat. & Grace. Latta. p. 409.) Yet Leibniz refuses to emphasise the unity of the world at the expense of its pluralism. For this reason he says that he has never been able to say that "there is one sole substance of all things, and that this substance is the spirit" ("Je ne diray point, ... quil y a une seule substance de toutes choses, et que cette substance est l'esprit"). (G.vi. p.625.) For there are as many substances as there are monads and neither are all the monads "spirits" nor is the whole which they compose a spirit. ("Car il y a autant de substances toutes distinguées qu'il y a de monades, et toutes les monades ne sont point des esprits, et-y ces monades ne composent point un tout véritablement un, et ce tout si elles en composent, me seroit point un esprit". (above) )

According to Leibniz "matter", like space and time, has a perceptive unity of its own which he describes in the phrase "phenomena bene fundata". The unity of the universe is revealed to the subordinate monad first through its own content which alone is
present to it as it really is existentially and essentially. The contents of the other monads are essentially present to it merely as phenomena bene fundata. Though the unity of the universe is reflected to some degree in all monads from the "bare" Monad to "the soul" and to "the rational soul", it is only God who has the penetration to see all in the least portion of matter. ("Il n'y a que Dieu qui ait la penetration d'y tout voir, mais cela n'empêche point que y soit représentée, et il faut savoir que même dans la moindre portion de la matière, celui qui sait tout, lit tout l'univers, en vertu de l'harmonie des choses" G. vi. p. 626).

The essential unity of the universe, then, can only be fully contemplated by the Divine mind. God has no point of view. For God phenomena such as the phenomena bene fundata must appear in an entirely different light. For the Divine mind there can be no mere total aggregationis. To the Divine Mind the whole monadic universe is present in essence. We might even say that outside the Divine Mind monads have no existential independence, though Leibniz tries to avoid the implications of such a view. For eternal truths are not subject to the Divine Will and the essences of things, though present in and to the mind and Understanding of God, are not dependent upon God, though outside His mind and Understanding they can have no existential independence. They have a kind of amphibious existence.

This difficult position Leibniz held in order to escape the obvious consequence of saying that the monads are merely modes of the Divine Being. Yet to the Divine Mind the grades of monads form an infinite linear series with no lacunae save the "transcreative" gap between soul and rational spirit. In other words the monads lose their distinctness. For by"the principle of indiscernibles" existential differences may be disregarded and essential differences here alone considered relevant. If we are to be loyal to Leibniz's own interpretation of his philosophy we must be content to leave these difficulties, as Leibniz left them, unresolved.

The Divine mind for Leibniz has a reality other than the existing monads which make the universe and the compossible monads of other possible universes. "Accordingly we have the ultimate reason of the reality both of essences and of existences in one Being who is necessarily greater, higher, and older (anterius) than the world itself, since through Him not only the existing things which the world contains but also possible things have reality" ("On the Ultimate Origination of Things". Latta p. 344.) Thus God is at one and the same time the source and the guarantee of the harmonic nature of the universe. Its essential interrelatedness is the reflection not only of His Understanding but
even more importantly is the supreme gesture of His active Goodness. Apart from saying this Leibniz asks from us a reverent agnosticism as to the further working out of the intricacies of the Divine Mind and we may extend it to certain other insoluble difficulties of his philosophy e.g. how a GRAD of Monad can ever become a PART of the universe.

This last remark leads us to say a word about the essentially Leibnizian conception of a graded universe. Here again we are further reminded of the surprising modernity of Leibniz. The graded universe is to-day a philosophical commonplace. But it is a conception for which modern philosophy is greatly indebted to Leibniz.

For Leibniz the whole universe is in travail towards "perfection". It knows not yet what it shall be. It is a universe which has as the expression of its own teleological purpose, "le plan de Dieu". This must be merely another name for "la perfection de l'universe".

In this nisus towards perfection, which Leibniz describes sometimes as the greatest reality with the greatest variety, there are three monadic levels to be distinguished. Each in their own status of existence express the universe. The two lower levels of monads, "the bare monads" or unconscious monads and the conscious monads, need not trouble us here except to say that they too share in their own degree the perfection of "the best of all possible worlds". For it is unthinkable that the world should be "the best of all possible worlds" merely on the whole and not also in its parts in their respect to this whole.

For Leibniz there can be no vacuum formarum. It is just as reasonable to suppose that there are substances capable of perception above us, as there are below us. So that our soul, so far from being the last of the series, really occupies a place mid-way. ("Il est raisonnable aussi, qu'il y ait des substances capables de perception au dessous de nous, comme il y en a au dessus; et que nostre Áme, bien loin d'estre la derniere de dessus toutes, se trouve dans un milieu, dont on puisse descendre et monter; autrement ce seroit un defaut d'ordre, que certains Philosophes appellent Vacuum formarum" (G. vi. 543. Considerations sur les Principes de Vie.) On the upward level above man there are the geniés (genii) and Leibniz's view of the order of the universe leads him to believe that one day we shall be of their number. ("Il est à croire qu'il y a des Ámes raisonnables plus parfaites que nous, qu'on peut appeller Genies, et nous pourrions bien estre un jour de leur nombre. L'ordre de l'univers le paroist demander" Leibniz to Princess Sophie. 6 Février, 1706. G. vii, p. 569.) Contrariwise it is alien to the thought of Leibniz to suppose that the human soul could sink below the level of its true status of existence. To suppose otherwise would be to deny the perfection of the universe. The Monads on this
lower level of "animal souls", however, rise upwards to the higher level of the rational soul but only by a special 'transcreative' act of God.

This Leibnizian idea of "Transcreation" is a profound reconciliation of evolutionism and creationism. It shows the length Leibniz was prepared to go in order to assert the continuity of the universe. The microscopic researches of M. Leewenhoeck and others had unquestionably a great influence upon the mind of Leibniz and, like everything else he read, Leibniz turned it to good use. For the microscope seems to confirm the great truth that the wisdom of God is shown in the harmony of all his works and that the realm of nature is parallel to that of grace ("Aussi ay je fait remarquer plus d'une fois, qu'il est de la sagesse de Dieu, que tout soit harmonique dans ses ouvrages, et que la nature soit patellele à la grace." (Théodicee. Par. 91. G. vi. p.152.)

In accordance with this harmony Leibniz believes that the souls which will one day put on humanity have existed since the commencement of things, but only in a latent condition (dans les semences) and in some kind of organised body. ("ainsi je croirois, que les âmes, qui seront un jour âmes humaines, comme celles des autres espèces, ont été dans les semences, et dans ancêtres jusqu'à Adam, et ont existé par conséquent depuis le commencement des choses, toujours dans une manière de corps organisé". p. 152. above.) They exist in this state and only in animal or sensitive souls until the time for the generation of man. Then they receive the gift of reason. In the view of Leibniz there are only two ways in which we can conceive of this elevation of a sensitive to a rational soul. The first is the way of natural elevation (un moyen naturel d'élèver une âme sensitive au degré d'âme raisonnable). This Leibniz thinks inconceivable. The second is to say that God gives this new endowment to the soul by a particular operation "par une espèce de transcréation". This is a view which must commend itself because Revelation teaches so much about the immediate operation of God upon the soul. But for Leibniz this doctrine of Transcréation has other advantages. For it enables us to escape the difficulties presented otherwise by the "origin of forms" and, more importantly, it is more in accord with the Divine Justice "to give to the soul, already corrupted physically or animaly by the sin of Adam, a new perfection which is the reason, than to put a soul reasonable by creation or otherwise, in a body, where it must be corrupted morally." ("Il est bien plus convenable à la justice Divine de donner à l'âme, déjà corrompue physiquement ou animalement par le péché d'Adam, une nouvelle perfection qui est la raison, que de mettre une âme raisonnable par création ou autrement, dans un corps, où elle doive être corrompue moralement" (Far. 91. Théodicee. G. vi. p. 153.)

This venturesome re-statement of the generation of man and consequently of the doctrine of "original sin" sharply distinguishes itself from the three views then widely prevalent, viz (1) The doctrine of Pre-Existence. (2) Traducianism. (3) The doctrine of Creation. As Leibniz reminds us (1) was the view of Origen and
was held by Henry More and other Platonists. (2) was the doctrine of St. Augustine and is supported by the greater number of the theologians of the Confession of Augsburg. (3) is the most commonly received opinion. These views, according to Leibniz, have difficulty in explaining how the soul can be infected with original sin, which is the root of actual sins, without impugning the Justice of God. ("La première difficulté est, comment l'âme a pu être infectée du péché originel, qui est la racine des péchés actuels, sans qu'il y ait de l'injustice en Dieu à l'y exposer." Par. 86. Théodicée. G. vi. p. 149. Of these views (3) has the most difficulty in explaining "original sin", (2) is really inexplicable and (1) becomes intelligible when instead of Pre-Existence we speak of Preformation and Generation as only a Transformation or Augmentation. (Par. 90. Théodicée. G. VI. p. 152.) (See C. vii)

The great advantage Leibniz sees in the doctrine of Transcreation is the fact that it puts in a clearer light the essential solidarity of the universe to which man is organic. After having shown the regular orderliness of the animal world it is unreasonable to think that man is outside all this and that everything that concerns his soul is miraculous. ("Après avoir établi un si bel ordre, et des règles si générales à l'égard des animaux, il ne paroit pas raisonnable que l'homme en soit exclus entièrement, et que tout se fasse en luy par miracle par rapport à son âme." Par. 91. Théodicée. G. VI. p. 152.) As early as May 1663, in his degree dissertation "De principio individui," Leibniz had adumbrated this view asserting that the human soul includes within itself the vegetative and sensitive soul.

This doctrine of "Transcreation" gives us further evidence as to the sincerity of Leibniz. For it cuts across the dominant 17th. century religious ideas as to the status of man and of "original sin". In particular it avoids that doctrine of Creation which, as Leibniz says, is so widely accepted in his day but has special difficulties with regard to "original sin". ("La troisième opinion et la plus reçue aujourd'hui est celle de la Création: elle est enseignée dans la plus grande partie des Écoles Chrétiennes, mais elle reçoit le plus de difficulté par rapport au péché originel." Par. 86. G. vi. p. 149.) The sin of Adam remains in so far as it has cast a blight upon the universe but its dire human entail is not transmitted in the way orthodoxy teaches.

Thus Leibniz succeeds in keeping intact his important principle that nature does not march per saltum. However miraculous may be the relationship of God to the world of his hands, it is otherwise with creatures themselves. For the relations of the latter as well as their specific differences find some explanation in the laws of motion and continuity.

In the same way this doctrine of "Transcreation" illustrates in an admirable way the typical Leibnizian attitude towards Christianity. For here he marches in step with Christian revelation but towards dogma adopts a rather independent attitude.
This "transcreative" progress of the soul of man not only shows us in what sense man is organic to the universe but also throws some light on the place of man in the scheme of the universe. There are times when Leibniz lends himself to an almost Pauline reading of the epic of creation—Nam expectatio creaturarum, revelationem filiorum Dei expectat. (R. 8. 19.). In his criticism of a remark of Bayle Leibniz goes the length of saying that a world without reasoning creatures would be practically worthless and that "sin" is not too great a price to pay for such a gift. (M. Bayle dit aussi selon Cotta, de Ciceron, que la raison est cause de tous les maux, il ne fafit donc point la donner. Mais pour dire la verite, la raison est une si grande et si belle chose, qu'il semble que le monde n'ait pas valu la peine d'etre cree sans la raison, et si on ne la pouvait accorder aux creatures sans le peche, il fafit mieux, a mon avis que le peche arrivait,"Remarques critiques de Leibniz sur le dictionnaire de Bayle " see p. 182. Lettres et Opuscules inedits de Leibniz. A. Foucher de Careil. Paris 1854.)

But if Leibniz could at times talk in this way, there is a complete absence in his case of anything in the nature of anthropocentric megalomania. The 16th. century recoil from the geocentric universe of Scholasticism had many philosophical reverberations in the 17th century. On every hand we notice a new spaciousness of outlook. This is noticeable in the case of Leibniz. For whatever else Leibniz has to say about man, he never says homo mensura omnium. Like the player King in Hamlet Leibniz would have us believe:—

"Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own". This is a view that Leibniz does not underline, but it is integral to his thought. Like the rest of the 17th. century philosophers Leibniz is still a little bewildered with the spaciousness of a heliocentric universe.

For Leibniz there are two teleologies, the Divine, and the human. The first is the teleologically determined universe. The second is the human teleology inserted, as it were, within this comprehensive whole. This wider teleology through which human teleology is laced is simple and comprehensive. It includes a maximum as well as an optimum. In the building of the universe there are no round stones where squared stones are more adequate. ("Il faut dire aussi que Dieu fait le plus de choses qu'il peut, et ce qui l'oblige à chercher des loix simples, c'est à fin de trouver place pour tout autant de choses qu'il est possible placer ensemble; et s'il se servoit d'autres loix, ce seroit comme si on vouloit employer des pierres rondes dans un batiment, qui nous ostent plus d'espace qu'elles n'occupent" L. a Malebranche. 22 June 1679. G. 1. p. 331.).

According to Leibniz this wider teleology is ontologically determined, and the human teleology is axiologically determined. The common criticism of this distinction as involving a denial of freedom might equally well be brought against any philosophy of a Realm of Ends. It is true, as we shall see, that Leibniz's teleological view of the universe allows of no final thwarting of its end. Even the prevalence of evil in the world ministers inevitably to its greater perfection.
Without evil the universe might have the value six, but with evil it might have the value of eight. In this way God would have no other choice open to him but to allow for the actuality of evil for a greater good. For the perfection of the world implies a harmony and often the best of advance is to take a step back. (4)

That there are serious difficulties in the interpretation of such a point of view is obvious. If evil to man is not absolutely evil to God and in relation to the universe, then the validity of all moral judgements seems to be imperilled. Again such a view seems to identify the judgments of the moral consciousness with the Divine Will as revealed in the causal order of phenomena. Such are some of the difficulties that must be met when the whole teleology of the existential process is regarded as ontologically fixed and determined. The common objection that it involves a virtual denial of freedom is groundless, for within a teleological universe free action is possible. The theism of Leibniz, however, forces us to ask the question whether a still wider teleology is not demanded by the purposive action of the deity in creating the present universe and so on ad infinitum. Leibniz's inheritance of the Christian idea of God as interpreted in the phrase of Anselm nihil quo maius cogitari potest—answers for him this difficulty.

The crux of Leibniz's interpretation of the teleological view of the universe is to be traced to his view of the nature of God. The trouble begins for Leibniz when he insists on separating the attributes of the Divine nature. To separate in particular the Will and the Understanding of God is to do exactly what Leibniz so frequently accuses Descartes of doing i.e. to suppose that God can act irrationally. Here the rationalism of Leibniz overreaches itself.

As we have already seen it almost leads Leibniz to a theological determinism—the arch-heresy of the Schoolmen. For by dealing with the Understanding separately in this way it is possible, as we have already seen, to give a quasi-mathematical interpretation of the principle of the best in terms of "un mecanisme metaphysique". In other words we are dealing with the same maximum and minimum problems for which Leibniz had already invented the infinitesimal Calculus. "And as possibility is the principle of essence, so perfection or degree of essence (through which more things are compossible the greater it is) is the principle of existence" ("Et ut possibilitas est principium Essentiae, ita perfectio seu Essentiae gradus (per quem plurima sunt compossibilia) principium existentiae" De rerum originatione radicali. 1699 1697. G. vii. p.304.) (Latta's Translation. p. 342.) Thus if A B C D are four possibles equally perfect and A B C are equally compossible among themselves but incompatible with D, while D is incompatible with A and B and compatible with C only. A B C will be given existence. For the only alternative to this is C D. But C D as a combination is less numerous and less perfect that A B C. (G. vii. p.194.)
In other cases the problem is more complicated. "The whole matter may be likened to certain games in which all the spaces on a board are to be filled up according to definite rules, so that, unless you can make use of some ingenious contrivance, you find yourself in the end kept out of some refractory spaces and compelled to leave empty more spaces than you intended and some which you might otherwise have filled. Yet there is a definite method by which the most complete filling up of the spaces may most easily be accomplished". (On Ultimate Origination of Things. Latta p. 341.) "But best of all is the illustration we get in ordinary mechanics, where, when several heavy bodies act against one another, the resultant motion is that which produces the greatest fall on the whole. For as all possible things by an equal right tend to exist in proportion to their reality, so all weights by an equal right tend to exist in proportion to their gravity; and as in the case of the latter there is produced a motion which involves the greatest possible fall of the heavy bodies, so in the case of the former there is produced a world in which the greatest number of possible things comes into existence" (On the Ultimate Origination of Things Latta p. 342.) (G. vii. p. 304.) The fact that there is more than analogy here is clear from Leibniz's own admission that the laws of movement themselves suggested this theory and in his view they are only a particular instance of the metaphysical principle of the best.

The extent to which Leibniz carries this is clear from the quasi-mechanical equilibrium he pictures in the Divine Understanding in relation to possible essences. The principle of determination is "ut maximus praestetur effectus minimo, ut sic dicam, sumptu." The possible essences exist in the Divine Understanding and there contend with one another for the right of existence. In a remarkable fragment Leibniz illustrates the tension of the continuous "striving" for existence by the analogy of a compressed liquid which strives to escape from its confinement by every possible way and in the end escapes by its "choice" of the easiest way. (5) In some such way as this do we understand "how in the very origination of things a certain Divine mathematics or metaphysical mechanics is employed and the greatest quantity is brought into existence" (On the Ultimate Origination of Things. Latta. p.342. "Ex his jam mirifice intelligitur, quomodo in ipsa originatione rerum Mathesis quaedam Divina seu Mechanismus metaphysicus exerceatur, et maxim determinatio habeat locum" G. vii. p.304.).

It is true that Leibniz seems to carry this view of "Divine mathematics" and "metaphysical mechanics" to somewhat extreme lengths. In an early memoir on optics, published in 1682, Leibniz tries to show that the laws of reflection and refraction are capable of logical deduction from the mere principle that light follows the easiest path-lumen a puncto radiante ad punctum illustrandum pervenit via omnium facillima. And Couturat has argued that this suggests an interpretation of "final cause" for Leibniz which is
primarily logical rather than moral. In his Nouveaux Essais iv. VII. Par.15. Leibniz speaks of nature as always acting in the shortest ways or by the most determined ways ("par les plus courtes voies, ou du moins par les plus determinées". G.iv.447.) Couturat quotes an illuminative fragment to the same effect that everything in nature is capable of demonstration both by final and by efficient causes and that nature does nothing in vain and works along the shortest and most regular paths. ("Omnia in tota natura demonstrari possunt tum per causas finales tum per causas efficientes. Natura nihil facit frustra, natura agit per vias brevissimas, modo sint regulares". Bodemann p.89. Quoted by Couturat "La Logique de Leibniz" p.230 footnote.) But it is wrong to say, as Couturat does, that because Leibniz gives such an extreme rationalistic interpretation of the workings of nature that therefore logic is the last word of Leibniz. (cf."Cette finalité consiste moins dans la bonté ou convenance morale {comme on pourrait le croire d'après les formules théologiques du principe raison) que dans la determination logique des lois de la nature. C'est ce qui ressort du Tentamen anagogicum, qui est précisément destiné à montrer l'utilité de la recherche des causes finales en Physique." p.230. "La Logique de Couturat") For this is a view Leibniz was concerned to refute not only in his later works like the De Veritatibus but also in an early work like the De Veritatibus (1687.)

It is true that Leibniz flattered himself that for an infinite understanding contingent truth can be derived a priori from eternal truths. Just as the old logic was a logic of possibility, so there was also another logic which was the science of the real-quomodo ex veritatibus aeternis sive essentialibus vel metaphysiciis orientur veritates temporales, contingentes sive physicae. (G. vii. 302.) By the logic of probabilities man can enter in a slight degree upon some knowledge of this "Divine mathematics". But experience is for us here the rough and ready mentor, for experience takes the place of proofs in arithmetic. ("Car l'experience est à l'égard de la raison ce que les preuves (comme celles du nouveau) sont à l'égard des operations Arithmétiques". G.vii. 173.) But to God and even to a superior being the blurred image of experience of natural truth becomes more lucid and intelligible. ("Ante omnia pro certo sumo, omnia fieri per causas quasdam intelligibles, sive quae a nobis possent percipi, si quis angelus eas nobis vellet revelare" De modo perveniendi ad veram Corporum Analysis et rerum naturalium causas. G. vii.265.)

But all this hardly warrants the conclusion of Couturat that the creation of the world for Leibniz emphasises more His wisdom than His goodness (cf. p.227. C'est là cette "mathématique divine" et ce "mécanisme métaphysique" par où s'exerce et se manifeste la sagesse (encore plus que la bonté) du créateur. "La Logique de Leibniz.") This is a conclusion to which Leibniz himself would strongly demur. But it is a charge almost always brought against Leibniz. As Friedrich Albert
Lange says (much in the same manner as Couturat above) the optimism of Leibniz is "nothing but the application of a principle of mechanics to the foundation of the reality of the world" ("nichts als die Anwendung eines Prinzips der Mechanik auf die Bergründung der Weltwirklichkeit" quoted p. 42. Die Theodicee im 18 Jahrhundert. von Hans Lindau. Leipzig. 1911.)

Apart from anything else "Divine mathematics" could never explain the ORIGIN of a world, though they might explain something of the modus operandi of its creation like mechanical physics. And though finality in nature may be construed quasilogically, it is clear that for Leibniz a final cause is a final cause for someone and it is chosen for its value. In his Tentamen Anagogicum and elsewhere Leibniz draws a distinction between "les déterminations Architectoniques" and "les déterminations Géométriques". The latter are such that the contrary implies a contradiction, while the former signifies a necessity of choice, the contrary of which is an imperfection ("Les déterminations Géométriques importent une nécessité absolue, dont le contraire implique contradiction, mais les Architectoniques n'importent qu'une nécessité de choix, dont le contraire importe imperfection. G. vii. 278.") He illustrates the difference by saying that if nature was given the task to construct a triangle and that for this purpose only the sum of the sides was given and nothing more, it is inevitable that it should construct an equilateral triangle. The general principle that nature acts by the most determined ways is only architectonic in effect, while the application of this principle on the data given is geometrically necessary. If nature was purely geometrical the above would not be true unless there was some more determinant than the periphery of the sides of a triangle. But since she is governed architectonically "des demi-déterminations géométriques" are sufficient for it to complete its work. ("Si la nature estoit brute, pour ainsi dire, c'est à dire purement matérielle ou Géométrique, le cas susdit serait impossible, et à moins que d'avoir quelque chose de plus determinant que la seule périphérie, elle ne produiroit point de triangle; mais puisqu'elle est gouvernée Architectoniquement, des demi-déterminations géométriques luy suffisent pour achever son ouvrage, autrement elle aurait esté arrestée le plus souvent" G. vii. p. 279.)

Leibniz's unfortunate dichotomy of the Will and the Understanding of God makes it difficult to see with the clarity he so greatly desires the ultimate necessity for "raisons architectoniques". Especially must this be the case when the relation between the metaphysical principles and the mathematical principles is one not of opposition nor of juxtaposition but of superposition. So far as the phenomena of nature are concerned the laws of mechanics suffice but it is necessary to have recourse to metaphysical considerations in order to account for these laws themselves. Thus in the ultimate
consideration Leibniz is forced to retract his extreme rationalism. The dichotomy of the Will and the Understanding (a dichotomy he otherwise strongly repudiates in the consideration of freedom both human and divine) leads Leibniz far into the wilderness and it is with difficulty he finds his way back.

In all this we must accept Leibniz and not try to make him more lucid than he is. His final word is that behind mechanical and mathematical laws there are metaphysical principles and there is no absolute necessity in natural law. ("Omnia quidem in natura fieri mechanice, sed metaphysics esse principia mechanismi, et constitutas Notuum Naturaæque Leges non absolute quidem necessitate, sed voluntate cause sapientis, non ex mero arbitrio, sed ex convenientia rerum"—Antibarbus Physicus pro Philosophia Reali. G.vii. p. 343.-4) This view is midway between the opinions of Descartes and Spinoza. The laws of nature proceed from the Divine choice of the best, but the three dimensions of space are necessary with a blind and geometrical necessity. ("d'une necessite aveugle et Géométrique" (Letter to Coste, 8 July, 1711. Op. et Frag. Couturat. Phil.ii.p.419)

In spite of this dichotomy of Will and Understanding, God for Leibniz is one—eternally and immutably. Nowhere is this truth of the Divine Nature more significant than sub specie creationis. It is because of this truth that evil for Leibniz is primarily a problem and not merely a fact. In a "strung-along universe" evil would be primarily a fact and not a problem.

Leibniz's implied assertion that the Divine initiative in the act of creation is Love or Goodness and his adoption of the scholastic doctrine that every act of God (as well of man) must be an act sub ratione boni places a primacy on the Divine Will. "Le bien" is always the object of the Divine Nature, however it may be mediated through the Divine Understanding.

It is this mediation of the Divine Understanding which reveals most clearly the unsatisfactory state of the thought of Leibniz on this point. According to Leibniz the Essences behind the universe exist in the Divine Understanding alone and, though not subject to His Will, have no other existence. In a word these Essences are the object of the Divine Understanding.

Like Aquinas, Leibniz would say that God is limited by His own nature. (See Note 5. C.1.) The interpretation of this idea of Divine self-limitation requires careful definition. Otherwise we shall find a teleology within which the Deity itself must act. In his view of compossibility Leibniz almost defines a teleological universe within which the Deity must act. So we prepare the way for an infinite regress. We must needs pre-suppose a supra-Divine Being for the creation of the God of the present universe and so on ad infinitum. The situation for Leibniz is saved by the assertion that though "eternal truths" do not depend upon the Divine Mind, they exist in it. The possible worlds which are infinite in number have no other "existence" than their ideal existence within the Divine Mind.
There is no determinism of the Divine Mind ab extra.
This universe is one of many. It is "the best possible". Behind it
there lies an infinite welter of other possible worlds. We cannot
say that this one universe contains eminenter all the other possible
worlds. All we can say is that this present world polarises in the
most supreme and final way possible all the qualities we know of the
Divine Nature. Just as a good poet does not make all the verses he
might make, be they good or bad, so with God as the architect of the
world. (In a letter to Fontenelle dated 7 April 1703 Leibniz writes
"Et c'est comme si feignant qu'il soit une des perfections de Dieu,
D'estre poete, on voulait que ce poete parfait fist tous les vers
possibles bons et mauvais, il en est mesme de l'architecte et Dieu
l'est veritablement". p.228. A. Foucher de Careil, above.) "God can
do everything that is possible, but He will only do what is best."
(Dieu peut faire tout ce qui est possible, mais il ne veut faire
faire que le meilleur". 5th Paper to Clarke G. vii. p. 408.)

If the words of Leibniz are to have any meaning we must
regard the potentialites of God as transcending this one "best of all
possible worlds". Otherwise the phrase would be void of meaning.
It is this potentiality of God as transcending the universe which
explains the existential independence of the monads, even though
they are essentially related within the universe they compose. For
it is by this potentiality that God himself is distinguished from the
universe, as it seems in the end by the same distinction that "spirits"
are separated from the "bare monads". For though "spirits" are
transcreated "bare monads" they reflect their Creator, while "bare
monads" reflect the universe. Thus "spirits" have the ability to
act outside the immediate determination of God, though not outside
his cognisance or his over-ruling providence. In this way the
rational spirit of man has a footing of its own in the universe. For
the knowledge of man, so that his action can be predicted, cannot
invalidate his freedom.

Thus the ratio sufficiens of the universe lies outside
itself. Only in this way can we explain the apparent fortuitousness
of the world. Its "Grunâ" must be outside the time extension and
every point in the world is related to it in the same manner as every
other point. Reasoning in this way, reasoning, too, in the same way as
Augustine, Leibniz could say that existence is " a continuous
creation". Thus the relationship of God to the world is put on a new
basis and the old supernaturalism of the schoolmen is superceded.

The danger of pantheism on such a view is obvious. But
there is no inherent reason why this should be the case. For the
relation of the "Grunâ" and what is "begrundet" is not necessarily
that of substantial identity. Both pantheism and supernaturalism
make the same mistake of putting the time series on the same level as
the "eternal".

If rational souls were, like the rest of the universe
though in a higher degree, merely modes of the Divine Being, without
the possibility of any axiological determination, two consequences
would immediately follow:- (1) man would be incapable of any action
of ethical value and (2) in the same way could never become a member of the Kingdom of Grace and live in communion with the Divine Being. On the other hand the delegated freedom of man can never imperil the unity of the universe. For the unity of the universe is primarily a unity of nisus and as such can never be outside the Divine cognisance and still less the Divine over-ruling Providence. There is even a sense in which God does not need us and in which the universe can reach its end without co-operation as individuals. ("Il est vrai que Dieu n'a point besoin de nous, et quand nous négligerions notre devoir, les choses ne laisseront pas de se faire parfaitement bien; mais alors ce sera sans que nous y prenions assez de part nous-mêmes, et cette perfection générale se trouvera en partie dans la justice de notre chastiment, qui sans cela se seroit trouvée dans notre bonheur particulier" p. 275 mémoire pour les Personnes Éclairées et de bonne intention. A.F. de Cereil above.)

Leibniz's misunderstanding of Descartes (and through Descartes of the schoolmen) and that there can be no ultimate distinction between the Will and the Understanding of God is the source of much of his ill-informed criticism as well as of the difficulties we have already seen. According to Descartes God is Actus Furus and His nature is fundamentally one. Consequently finalism for the Deity is not as it is for man something we can vivi-sect into the striving and the object striven for. To Descartes finalism for the Deity must be the expression of His indivisible nature. Will and Understanding in the Divine Nature can be separated only in thought and not in reality. Descartes does not say that God wills eternal truths but that God wills them to be necessary. By his study of Aquinas Descartes was able to escape the perils incident to an over-rationalisation of the Divine Nature in the way hazarded by Leibniz. For Leibniz the Deity is never incomprehensible, "immensus" to use the word of Athanasius.

Placing the emphasis Leibniz does upon the argument ab effectu, it is difficult to see how he could altogether escape the counterpart in the world of the immutability and harmony we know to exist within the Divine Nature. "Misercordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi; justitia de caelo prospexit." (Ps. 85. 11, 12.). The universe, too, for Leibniz must shadow forth something of the "perfection" of the Divine Being. So "the source of the mechanical is in the metaphysical "(Leibniz to Remond. 1714. G.3.p. 607.) and efficient causes must point to causes which depend for their motive power "upon the perception of good and evil, or that which is most fitting" (Leibniz too Bierling 1711. 3.7.p.501.)

In thus saying that that which is first is spiritual, then that which is natural Leibniz shows how the essential harmony of the Divine Nature casts the same spell upon the universe. "Thus it is that efficient causes are dependent upon final causes, and spiritual things are in their nature prior to material things, as also they are prior to us in knowledge, because we perceive more immediately (interius) the mind (as it is nearest to us) than the
body; and this indeed Plato and Descartes have observed." 
(above. G.7.p.501.)

It is for this reason, according to Leibniz, that any consideration of the universe must inevitably involve a consideration of the Divine Being who is its source and upholder. "Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God." (Monadology. Par. 38. Latta p. 238.)

Efficient and final causes for Leibniz belong to different levels of existence—the Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of Grace. These two spheres for Leibniz are not contrary the one to the other, rather are they supplementary. For while final causes have their energised field in the Realm of Grace, evidence of their functioning is only to be discerned in the Realm of Nature. We thus look through Nature to God and in the essential goodness of God see the final cause of the universe. Thus there is no hiatus between the Realm of Nature and the Realm of Grace. Thus God as Architect and God as monarch are both true aspects of the one Deity.

As a Kingdom of Nature the world has a definite unity. But besides this unity of fact, it has also an ideal unity as a Kingdom of Grace. In this way there is room for the actions of free beings and the Realm of Nature becomes a stage for the moralisation of free beings in fulfilment of the purposive unity of the universe. This purposive unity is a vital part of the meaning of "the best of all possible worlds". This Kingdom of Grace, in which man is a co-worker with God, and in which he reaches his fullest perfection, is "the most exalted and most divine among the works of God" (Monadology. Par. 86. Latta p.267.) It thus expresses the final purpose of the universe as that purpose exists in the divine mind.

This "harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace" is the counterpart of the distinction we make "between God, considered as Architect of the mechanism of the universe and God considered as monarch of the divine City of spirits" (Monadology. Par. 87. Latta p.268.) Thus the Realm of Grace is the explanation of the Realm of Nature and its raison d'être. For the harmony between the two Realms has its basic source in the harmony of the divine nature. So we can say "God as Architect satisfies in all respects God as Law-giver and thus sins must bear their penalty with them, through the order of nature, and even in virtue of the mechanical structure of things; and similarly that noble actions will attain their rewards by ways which, on the bodily side, are mechanical, although this cannot and ought not always to happen immediately". (Monadology. Par. 89. Latta. p.269.)

In thus making the Kingdom of Grace co-extensive
with, though distinct from, the Kingdom of Nature Leibniz departs from current orthodoxy. Like body and soul they are distinct but harmonious. But just as soul is the real substance, though the body is a phenomenon bene fundatum, so the "moral realm of grace" is the ultimate explanation and meaning of "the physical realm of nature". Thus the term "Grace" loses something of its savour as a technical term of Catholic orthodoxy and a new reapprochement takes place between "the natural" and "the supernatural". The gulf fixed by current orthodoxy between the natural and the supernatural is bridged. The traditional conflict between nature and spirit, a conflict so aggravated by Christian dogma, is finally resolved. For the Kingdom of Grace is co-extensive with reality. The diversified detail of concrete existence, so fully ordered by the laws of geometry and mechanics, and the Kingdom of Grace are aspects of the same world. The importance of this lies not so much in the mere fact of co-extensiveness as in the obvious corollary of such co-extensiveness that nothing can be ultimately outside "le plan de Dieu". There is no ne plus ultra in the Kingdom of Grace. This is Leibniz's less logical but none the less vital way of speaking of the all-inclusiveness of the Divine Being.

Thus for Leibniz the supernatural is really the interiority of the universe. It is something always in nature, though hidden and unknown. For Leibniz the supernatural does not spring from the natural as a flower from its stalk, it is always there in apparent, though masterly, inactivity. Thus for Leibniz there is no frontier between the natural and the supernatural, though we must continue to speak of the realm of mechanism and the realm of finality. Leibniz is loath, however, to let the idea of the supernatural slip out of his scheme of things.(6)

This new view of the complete solidarity of the universe extricates Leibniz at once from many grave difficulties. In a universe where there is such a fundamental unity many difficulties may be resolved but only at the price of adding others equally formidable. If the problem of evil is somewhat softened, we may find the interpretation of the unity of the world too simple expedient for so intractable a crux.

When we ask the question what is the final purpose of the universe, Leibniz's answer to this is definite and unhesitant. The purpose of the world is "the Glory of God". This manifestation of the goodness of God is the result of no necessity, but has its "sufficient reason" in the moral nature of God. (7). For Leibniz the idea of creation involves more than the idea of a beginning in time or a beginning of time. It implies the idea of conservation and "continuous creation" (in the Leibnizian sense). For "the general system of phenomena which God considers good to produce to manifest his glory ("le système général des phénomènes qu'il trouve bon de produire pour manifester sa gloire") is one fully considered from all sides and involves no relation which can escape his omniscience.
Accordingly we have no difficulty in saying that God is the continuous support and ground of the world.

Thus the Glory of God is in a process of constant irruption throughout the whole universe. Every substance shares in this Glory in proportion to its “perfection”. In the case of man this Glory is revealed by his fellowship and co-operation with God. This moral order in the universe Leibniz calls "the City of God" "This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His goodness known and admired by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine city that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere" (Monadology, Par. 66. Latta’s Translation p.267-8½)

Accordingly it follows that in so far as man is a fellow-worker with God, he is promoting the Glory of God. In other words "the general good" is but another name for "the glory of God" ("la Gloire de Dieu"). ("Je crois que le renoncement total à soi même n’est autre chose que de préférer le bien commun, ou, ce qui est la même chose, la gloire de Dieu, à son intérêt particulier... Ce renoncement ne demande pas un repos, mais plutôt une activité". (Unedited letter to Morell. September 1698. Quoted by Jean Baruzzi. p. 497. "Leibniz et l’organisation religieuse de la terre" 1907.)

"The love of God" is the counterpart of the via paternitatis of God."...in relation to them (esprits) He is not only what an inventor is to his machine (which is the relation of God to other created things), but also what a prince is to his subjects, and, indeed, what a father is to his children"(Monadology Par.64. Latta p. 266.) This love of God is man’s reciprocity to the Divine goodness and it puts man in complete harmony with the purpose of the universe. It leads him to surrender self-interest to the common good and in this way promote the glory of God. "He who loves God, that is he who is wise, will love all men, but each in proportion as he hopes to find in him a companion ready and able to promote the common good, or (what comes to the same thing) the glory of God, the Giver of good things" (De tribus juris naturae et gentium gradibus. ...ollat. p.15. Quoted by Latta p. 283 footnote.)

We have seen, that so far as man lives in accordance with his heritage as a member of "the most perfect State that is possible", there can be no disharmony between him and His Creator. But it is obvious that harmony does not always describe this relationship, otherwise there would arise no problem of moral evil.
The place of man in the scheme of things means that there is a contingent human teleology to be inserted, as it were, within the ontological determination of a divine teleology. Human action depends on the law of sufficient reason and when man acts rightly there can be no conflict between his actions and the plan of God. ("le plan de Dieu").

It is when we come to ask what is the value of man in this scheme of things that we notice in Leibniz something of that bewilderment which visits 17th century philosophy when it speaks about the place of man in an heliocentric universe. We are reminded of the words of Descartes. "Though as far as regards morals it may be a pious thought to believe that God made all things for us, and though it is even in some sense true, because there is no created thing of which we cannot make some use, it is by no means probable that all things were created for us in this way, that God had no other end in their creation. This supposition would be plainly ridiculous and inept in physical reasoning". (Principia Philosophiae. pars. 2a. 2. Edinburgh Transl. p. 168.)

This Stoic idea of man's place in the universe has some influence with Leibniz, though it is never underlined. It is not only that the world is not made for us personally. We may find in the world what displeases us but we must remember that it was not made for us alone. ("Nous en trouvons dans l'univers qui ne nous plaisent point; mais sachons qu'il n'est pas fait pour nous seuls". Théodicee. Par. 194. G.vi.p.222.) This is Leibniz's way of saying with Pope:-

"Has God, thou fool worked solely for thy good,
Thy joy, thy pastime, thy attire, thy food?"
(Essay on Man. Ep.iii. 27-8.)

But Leibniz goes further than this. His theocentric tendency of thought refuses to believe that the work of creation draws all its significance from man's life. This is the other side of Leibniz's theistic realism. In some ways it might be called Leibniz's pessimism. Thus Leibniz tells us (Théodicee. par. 119. G.vi.p. 170.) that man's reason was given to him "non pas lui" but to contribute to "la perfection de l'univers". Again he tells us that the happiness of man is not the sole nor the final end of God. ("la felicite de toutes les creatures raisonnables est un des buts ou il vise; mais elle n'est pas tout son but, ny meme son derier but" (Théodicee Par. 119 G. vi.p.169-170.) But this theocentric tendency of thought Leibniz does not over-elaborate. Some of its conclusions are, to say the least, in conflict with the trend of his other conclusions. Thus in Théodicee Par. 118. (G. vi.169.) we are told that it is by no means certain that "un seul homme" is of more value than "toute l'espèce des lions".
How far we are to accept statements like these au pied de la lettre is another matter. A hint as to their consistency with Leibniz's views on the importance of man in the scheme of creation is supplied by a sentence from his early dialogue "Theophile et Polidore". If God is the supreme wisdom, as his wonderful works seem to show, and if his wisdom seeks perfection everywhere it is possible, it cannot be doubted that the most perfect beings and the beings most approaching God are the most considered in nature and that God has a regard for their happiness in preference to every other thing. For this can exist without the order of nature opposing itself. (8)

In this way Leibniz believes it possible to reconcile his theocentric view of the universe with that other view of the universe we find expressed in Section xxxvii of the "Discourse of metaphysics" and elsewhere, "how God has more regard for the least one among intelligent souls than for the whole machinery of the world" (p. 69. Open Court Pub. Coy.) Of this providentia specialissima for man we can say "cela se peut sans que l'ordre de l'universe s'y oppose." In the thought of Leibniz the pendulum swings from one side to the other. Thus it is possible to read into the theocentric argument of Leibniz a thinly veiled pessimism. This is the point that Baruzzi makes (see 478 f. "Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre." "La Théodicée nous présente un optimisme universel et un pessimisme humain-Flus profondément: Si le pessimisme surgit d'une méditation de l'univers, la Théodicée figure un pessimisme".

"Un pessimisme humain" is a hard description for the theistic realism of Leibniz. For Leibniz is simply saying that our thoughts are not God's thoughts neither are our ways. To condemn Divine transcendence as "pessimism" in regard to man is to do violence to language. Anthropo-centricism is not the only form of optimism in regard to man. The mistranslation from the book of Job "Though he slay, me, yet will I trust Him" expresses a theocentric view of the universe, which is at the same time optimistic in regard to the ultimate welfare of the individual human soul.

The proof texts which might be quoted from the Théodicée to prove that man is subservient to the cosmic scheme of things (e.g. "On peut dire que les hommes sont choisis et rangés, non pas tant suivant leur excellence que, suivant la convenance qu'ils ont avec le plan de Dieu." Théodicée Par. 105. G.vi.p.161.) must be interpreted in the light of the essential goodness of the deity. God for Leibniz is essentially philanthropic (to use the adjective of Athanasius). And if it comes to proof texts, it is possible to cite Leibniz to our purpose. "There are people who think that we are of too little consequence, in the sight of an infinite God, for Him to have any care of us: we are supposed to be in relation to God what the worms which we crush without thinking about it, are in relation to us. But this is suppose that God is like a man and cannot think of everything. Just because God is infinite, He does things without labour by a kind of consequence of His will, as it is a consequence of my
will and that of my friend that we are in agreement, no new action being required to produce our agreement, beyond the resolve which each of us has made. Now if the human race and even the smallest thing were not well governed, the universe itself would not be well governed, for the whole consists in its parts" (Meditation sur la notion commune de la justice. Quoted Latta. p.246-9.)

On any view of the deity we cannot regard the claims of man alone as the exclusive determinant of the divine creative activity. But they are a determinant and this is what Leibniz so explicitly asserts. The City of God is not only" the most exalted and most divine among the works of God" but "it is also in relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere" (Monadology. Par. 86. Latta p. 265.).

If God is essentially good, then it cannot be that the claims of the moral order of rational beings are ever a secondary consideration in "le plan de Dieu". They are, of course, part of the wider cosmic purposes of God. But as Leibniz says there is no reason for supposing that there is any incompatibility between this concern for the wider purposes of the world of nature and that part of it which concerns the life of man. On the contrary there is a perfect harmony between the two and "a result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by the very ways of nature". (Monadology. Par. 86. Latta p.265. If the universe is not made for us alone ("pour nous seuls"), it is, however, made for us, if we are wise; it will accommodate us, if we will accommodate ourselves to it; we shall be happy there, if we wish to be so. ("Il est pourtant fait pour nous, si nous sommes sages: il nous accordera, si nous nous en accommodions; nous y serons heureux, si nous le voulons être" Théodicée. Par. 194.G.vi.p.232.) But this, of course, is not to say that we can never break ourselves against the wheel of life. Not that the expression of our whims and desires in prayer will deviate the tranquil operation of God's perpetual providence. The importunity of our prayers has no influence with God. He knows better than we what is necessary for us and He will not grant save what is agreeable to the whole scheme of things. ("L'impartunité des prières ne fait rien auprès de Dieu; il sait mieux que nous ce qu'il nous faut, et il n'accorde que ce qui convient à tout". Théodicée Par. 120. G.vi. p. 174.) But this truth in no way alters the fact that the happiness of rational creatures is the principal part of the purposes of God, even though it is not His sole purpose. ("J'accorde que le bonheur des Créatures intelligentes est la principale partie des desseins de Dieu, car elles luy ressemblent le plus: mais je ne voy point cependant comment on puisse prouver que c'est son but unique" Théodicée Par. 118. G.vi.p.168.)
Thus any profound consideration of the universe and
man's place within it must inevitably drive us back to the
nature of God. God's purposes for the world are all interrelated.
("Tout est lié dans le grand dessein de Dieu" Théodicee, I. r. 113
a. vi. p. 163.). Just as we say that the realm of nature must
minister to the realm of trace, so we must say that the realm of
trace must also accommodate itself to the realm of nature, in
such a way that this keeps the most beauty and order, and renders
their union the most perfect as possible. ("Il est vrai que le
règne de la nature doit servir au règne de la trace: mais comme
tout est lié dans le grand dessein de Dieu, il faut avoir que le
règne de la nature est aussi en quelque façon accommodé à celui
de la nature, de telle sorte que celui-ci veuille le plus d'ordre
et de beauté, pour rendre le composé de tous les deux le plus
parfait qu'il se puisse" above.) and Leibniz concluded from this
that, though each creature has its importance in the way of
perfection and imperfection, this importance is not infinite.
("Chaque perfection a imperfection dans la créature a son prix,
mais il" sty et a point qui sit in prix infinis" above.)

But, in seven purposes God can be accomplishing:
through the creation of the universe, through the knowledge of
man. The "of" of knowledge is in case that the eternal
will demand this to consist, after all that we are of all the other
"Gods", either with God or a child that can be the be to
men. (cf. Metaphysics I. r. 54. LXXX. 150.)

The theoretical basis of all the amount of talking
is never far to say, it conditions, to some extent, the most
religious fervour with which in so otiose writer, even in the
costly metaphysical of "in the nature of the best of all
possible worlds". God's ordinariness in shows an omnipotence of
love. To clinch his argument Leibniz is well content to say
that metaphysically speaking, God can choose or make that which
is not the best, but morally speaking he cannot do it.
("Dieu a choisi entre de différents parts tous possibles; ainsi
metaphysiquement parlant, il pouvait choisir ou faire ce qui ne
fut point le meilleur; mais il ne le pouvait point moralement
Behind the logical outworks of Leibnizian argument there lies the citadel of the intuitive metaphysics of the Christian faith. Because so many commentators have failed to recognize this element in Leibniz at its true value, they have found an apparent, though inexpressible, logical incoherence in his argument. Thus J. H. Morris (Introduction p. xxvi. "The Philosophical Writings of Leibniz. Second Edition") says "Leibniz can show that among the ranges that this is not the best of all possible worlds there is insufficient account of the all-inclusive, all-pervading unity of the universe; but he has no argument to prove that this is the best possible world; the most that he can do is to say that his optimism cannot be finally refuted".

The theoretical basis of all the argument of Leibniz is never far to seek. It explains, to some extent, the almost religious fervour with which he sometimes writes, even in the most mathematical of his writings, of "the best of all possible worlds". God's omniscience is also an expression of love. So when his argument Leibniz is well content to say that metaphysically speaking 'one can choose or seek that which is not the best, but nor is speaking it cannot do it. ("Mais ... choisi entre des diverses possibles; sans un jugement absolu, il se doit choisir ou il ne peut point de jugement absolu". *Philos. Log. ler. 226. "et vi. n. 256."). God's transcendence for Leibniz is bound up with the all of his moral distinction from man. So he can say "seulement nous, en tant que nous sommes hommes, nous avons droit de vouloir non forçablement, ni cromme si nous, qui sommes les possibles, autant existent" (I. 58. On. de "Man. Contaminant").
It is often forgotten that the Essais de Théodicée were not only the fruit of long mental incubation on the part of Leibniz but that is an external interest that they were only an instalment of a long projected plan. In an important letter to Furnett (30th October, 1710, filip. 521) Leibniz tells us that he had meditated on the themes of Théodicée from his youth. (Comm. j'ai médité sur cette matière dans ma jeunesse, j. achèves de l'avoir discuté à fond). He also tells us in the same letter that these essays were only a fore-runner ("ce présent ouvrage peut servir d'avant-courant") of a more ambitious work to establish those elements of general philosophy and natural theology, which constitute all that is most important in this philosophy for theory and for practice ("c'est les Éléments de la Philosophie générale et de la Théodicée naturelle, qui comméndes seulement de plus important dans cette Philosophie pour la Théodicée et pour la Pratique"). Unfortunately the historical labours of Leibniz made the completion of this enterprise impossible.

For a long time, Leibniz had been much occupied by the question of the mind and intellect, intending to chase this problem. In spite of the many essays written on this subject, he had not yet achieved anything significant. (Cf. Letters to Furnett, 30th October, 1710, filip. 521-2.) But on November 15th, he was told that he and the academy were at last able to discuss some of the arguments. So he wrote to Furnett, 15th November, 1710, filip. 522 (lettre 23) to his letters on 'dîsput' discussаем quelques sujets: u'y est de conclure leur œuvre Théod. (lett. 522 filip. 6, vi. v. 285.)

As far back as 1667 Leibniz tells us he had been thinking on all these matters but the time was not yet ripe to set up some solid basis on which to build his conclusions not open to any objection. That was required as...
was something in the nature of demonstrative certainty. This was required as much in metaphysics as in theology. This dream of a perennis, philosophia was never to be fulfilled. The Latin appendix to the Théodicée "Causa Dei Asserta per Justitiam Ejus, Cum caeteris ejus Perfectionibus, Cunctisque Actionibus Conciliatam" shows clearly enough the form such a venture "écrire la Théologie Méthodo Mathematica (letter to Burnett, Feb. 1697. G.iii. p. 190)" would have taken. In a letter to des Bosses as late as 30th. June. 1715 Leibniz still expresses his longing after the accomplishment of this ideal of his youth, to recast all his philosophy "in disciplinae formam" after the model of this appendix to the Théodicée.

The crowded complexity of the interests of Leibniz gave him little leisure to fulfil what he considered to be so necessary. Even the Essais de Théodicée, the only work of Leibniz, published in his life time, were written sporadically. He tells us that the greater part of it was written in fragments ("par lambeaux") and arose out of the philosophical and theological discussions of the courts of Berlin and Hanover, where the Dictionary of Bayle and other works of that acute mind were much in vogue. The Queen of Prussia often asked Leibniz to write his answers to Bayle. And after her death Leibniz gathered these fragments together and added to them to form the Essais de Théodicée.

The prolixity of the Essais reminds one forcibly of Tertullian's remark on Marcion-"languens circa mali quaestionem". (Adv. Marcionem. i.2.). It is quite clear that Leibniz had amassed much material on the subjects of "The Goodness of God, the Liberty of Man and the Origin of Evil" and the endeavour to incorporate all this explains to some extent the patchwork and réchauffe character of the Essais. In particular they incorporate much of the earlier thought of Leibniz.

From what has been said we can realise something of the encyclopaedic scope of the mind of Leibniz. Though he regarded the Essais de Théodicée as fully expressing his mind on the problem of evil and though he was very jealous for its repute (cf. "j'espère que ces Essais de Théodicée ou de la justice de Dieu ne déplairont pas en Angleterre." Leibniz to Burnett, 30th. October 1710. G. iii. p. 321.), yet they were only the prelude to a much more complete enterprise.

We have perhaps said enough to show that the Théodicée of Leibniz is not merely an answer to Bayle, as is so widely thought. It is true that Bayle is never far from the mind of Leibniz and that he regards him in the light of a mediaeval advocatus diaboli if only because of his erudition.

But it is a mistake to think that Leibniz had no other people in view besides Bayle. Without Bayle it would be possible to sketch out in some detail the argument of the Théodicée. For it is an argument implicit in all his metaphysical writing. Leibniz in his own right is one of the fundamental creators of all theodicean argument. As far back as 1673, we have already seen, Leibniz wrote a Latin dialogue which embodied as he tells us in the Preface the same arguments as the Théodicée (cf. Preface G. vi. p. 16.) But just as Origen required the critical acumen of Celsus to bring out his skill as an apologist, so Bayle with an almost parallel acuteness supplies Leibniz with the problems of the Théodicée.

It is on reading the Théodicée of Leibniz that one becomes conscious of the justness of the remark of Adolf Harnack "The power of exclusiveness was lacking to the great thinker who saw everything in one" ("Die Kraft der Exklusive fehle dem grotzen, alles in eins schauenden Denker" quoted p. 47. Die Théodicée im 18. Jahrhundert. Hans Lindau. Leipzig. 1911.) The over-loading of the Théodicée with references both to current and ancient literature has always proved a serious obstacle to its being read. "Leibniz is not strong against ancient rubbish. He throws too little away. He loads himself up with useless weights."

To write an account of the correspondents of Leibniz or to give an account of the works referred to in the Théodicée and elsewhere would be to write a considerable part of the history of this "seculum rationalisticum". As we proceed we shall have occasion to note how closely Leibniz kept in touch with the thought of his age. The correspondence with "the great Arnauld" (1612-94), and with Samuel Clarke (1675-1729.), not to speak of the Nouveaux Essais and the many references to contemporary philosophy and theology in the Théodicée and the two appendices on Hobbes and the "De Origine Pali" (1704) of Bishop Ring are enough vindication of this.

Written so late in his philosophical career and the only work of his to be published in his life time, it is not surprising that Leibniz continued to regard it as furnishing a satisfactory answer to the problems with which it deals. For its subsequent fate as the least read of all his works Leibniz has only himself to blame. But behind its diffuseness there is easily discerned an energetic thinker and one who writes with an almost prophetic fervour. The all embracing character of his argument is not only a reflection of that philosophical charity he so clearly tried to embody but is a witness to the fervency of his own belief in the essential soundness of his argument.
arguments. Though there may be a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God ("il y a mille moyens de justifier la conduite de Dieu") yet it is only by his own system, Leibniz believes, that it can be shown that there is nothing so elevated as the wisdom of God, nothing so just as his judgments, nothing so pure as his holiness, nothing more boundless that his goodness. ("il n'y a rien de si élevé que la sagesse de Dieu, rien de si juste que ses jugements, rien de si pur que sa sainteté, et rien de plus immense que sa bonté" Théodicée. Par. 106.G. vi. p. 161.).
C. V.

Pierre Bayle. (1647-1706.)

We have already seen that Leibniz formulated quite early the main lines of his theodicean argument. Nor is this strange since he had been meditating upon the subjects of the Théodicee since his youth. But though there were many times when he was tempted to write upon the subject ("il a encore eu des raisons particulières assez considérables qui l'ont invité à mettre la main à la plume sur ce sujet" (Preface. Théodicee. G. vi. p. 39.), it was not until Bayle issued his "Opus Merculium" (Preface G. vi. p. 16.) that the stage was set for Leibniz to play his part.

If previously the aim of Leibniz was more didactic and edifying in accordance with the Zeitgeist of his century ("dont le but principal devoit être, la connaissance de Dieu, telle qu'il a faut pour exciter la piété, et pour nourrir la vertu"), now his aim is more polemical to justify my system against the new difficulties of M. Bayle; I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the thoughts I have had for a long time on the difficulties which he brings against those who try to make reason agree with faith in the matter of the existence of evil. Indeed there are few people who have worked on this more than myself ("justifier mon système contre les nouvelles difficultés de l'onsieur Bayle, j'avais dossein en même temps de lui communiquer les pensées que j'ai eues depuis long-temps sur les difficultés qu'il avoit fait valoir contre ceux qui tâchent d'accorder la Raison avec la Foy à l'égard de l'existence du Mal. En effet, il y a peut-être peu de personnes qui y aient travaillé plus que moi" Preface. Théodicee. G. vi. p. 43.) For with all his long sustained polemical thrusts the old forensic and edifying motive is still present. As Leibniz reminds his readers it is God's cause that he pleads. ("c'est la cause de Dieu qu'on plaide" Preface. Théodicee. G. vi. p. 38.) Before we listen to his pleading in the justification of God, it may be profitable to come to a closer acquaintance with the charges.

In a sense Bayle represents the 17th. century better than almost any other writer of note. He is the forerunner of the following sæculum rationalisticum. In his writing he embodies the confluence of influences from the Reformation and the Renaissance. The thought of Protestantism under the influence of persecution had found a new toleration and there was consequently a greater liberty of thinking as well as of prophesying. Among these new ideas Cartesianism was the most dominant. The inevitable
consequence of this ferment was an unstable balance of power between religion and philosophy. As yet there was no prospect of anything else than a declaration of armed neutrality. But where lesser men saw an apparent state of peace, others with profounder insight foresaw the coming of wars and rumours of war. Among these was Jacques Penigne Bossuet (1627-1704), Bishop of Meaux, who said that a great attack was preparing against the Church under the name of Cartesian philosophy. ("un grand combat se préparer contre l'Eglise sous le nom de la philosophie cartesienne")

In the mind of Bayle this conflict had already begun. Never surely did the history of philosophy provide a better example of "a house divided against itself". In Bayle scepticism and faith dwelt together in unity. His scepticism took the form of undermining the authority of reason, especially as that authority was exercised in philosophy and theology. So penetrating were Bayle's criticisms that his influence long survived his death and was a force in the subsequent century. Long after Leibniz had replied to the criticisms of Bayle on the current solution of the problem of evil, Bayle's influence even with regard to this particular issue still exercised much sway on the minds of men.

To read Bayle to-day is to be conscious not only of a rapier like logic but of arguments which have in no way lost their cogency or liveliness. No writer of the 17th. century so rocked the foundations of the ivory castle of dogmatic theology. There was much excuse for the view of some contemporary theologians that Bayle was a mortal enemy to religion masquerading as an angel of light.

The Method of Bayle.

Bayle's antinomy of faith and reason was, strangely enough, a consequence of the orthodox teaching of the dichotomy of the flesh and the spirit. For Bayle reason was bankrupt so far as any constitutive purpose in life is concerned. He quotes favourably Luther's well known saying "In Theologia verum est, Verbum esse carnem factum. In Philosophia simpliciter impossible et absurdum" (Art. "Luther". Dictionaire Historique et Critique. 1702. p. 1946.) The unsolved and unsolvable conflict between faith and reason was a good thing if it reminded man of the rock whence he was hewn and the pit whence he was digged. Progress was only to be made along the lines of the maxim of Tertullian: certum est, quia impossible est. For the point Bayle never
wearies in elaborating is that the tenets of dogmatic theology e.g. the doctrine of "the fall of man" and the general teaching de auxiliis gratiae, are not merely super-rational but anti-rational. These dogmas of catholic orthodoxy cannot be justified at the bar of reason.

Reason for Bayle could be propaedeutic to religion, if it was not merely content to disrupt the edifice of orthodoxy but also to humble man's intransigent belief in his own unaided power of reflection. Faith which was really worthy of the name was in diametrical and inevitable opposition to reason. Thus Bayle's "scepticism" was the handmaid to religion. Revelation through the light of reason might well be compared with what Christian theology teaches of the Mosaic dispensation. It was a schoolmaster (these are their words) to lead us to Christ. Let us say the same, almost the same, of reason; it is only fit to make man know his ignorances and powerlessness, and the necessity of another revelation. ("Elle étoit un pédagogue (ce sont leur terms) pour nous amener à Jesus- Christ. Disons à peu près le même de la raison; elle n'est propre qu'a faire conoître à l'homme ses ténèbres et son impuissance, et la nécessité d'une autre revelation. "Art. "manicheens" p. 2022.)

In a sense we may call Bayle the saint of the 17th century. What Bayle advocates as a practical modus vivendi, saint affirms by argument. Like saint Bayle indulges in a critic of reason and like saint, as for Bayle, there is left over a certain residuum of dogma which reason can neither prove nor disprove. Recognising clearly the disruptive force of reason Bayle finds himself lead to destroy, so far as argument is concerned, what cannot survive this struggle for existence. Bayle is therefore a much more consistent "rationalist" than either Descartes or Leibniz, though a less constructive thinker than either. He knows nothing of the harmonising spirit of Leibniz. Where Leibniz is content to blend the colours of his palette, Bayle, has no colours save black and white. His aim throughout is to embarrass philosophers and to show the weakness of reason. ("Car il passoit aisément du blanc au noir, non pas dans une mauvaise intention, ou contre sa conscience, mais parce qu'il n'y avoit encor rien d'arresté dans son esprit sur la question dont il s'agissoit, il s'accommodoit de ce qui lui convenoit pour contrecarrer l'adversaire qu'il avoit en teste, son but n'étant que d'embarrasser les Philosophes, et faire voir la foiblesse de nostre raison: et je crois que jamais Arcesilas ny Carneade n'ont soutenu le pour et le contre avec plus d'éloquence et plus d'esprit" Théodicee Par. 353. G. vi. p. 324-5.) But as Leibniz continues to add it is not necessary to doubt for the sake of doubting, doubts should serve as a plank to reach the truth. ("Mais enfin il faut point douter pour douter, il faut que les doutes nous servent de planche pour parvenir à la vérite". (above.)
The Cosmology of Bayle.

For Bayle outside "the system of the Scripture" (le système de l'Écriture) there is nothing but confusion of tongues. With the help of Revelation alone is it possible to establish "the solid foundations of providence and the perfections of God". ("les fondements solides de la providence et des perfections de Dieu". Art. "Epicure" Dict. p. 1138.)

From this source Bayle would have us compose our philosophia perennis. God is the Creator of the world both as regards its "matter" as well as its "form". From this at least three conclusions follow:- (1) God disposes of the world as He sees fit (2) He needs only a simple act of will to do what pleases Him. (3) Nothing can happen but what He has put in the plan of His work. ("De ce que Dieu le créateur de la matière, il resulte 1. Qu'avec l'autorité la plus légitime qui puisse être, il dispose de l'univers comme bon lui semble. 2. Qu'il n'a besoin que d'un simple acte de sa volonté pour faire tout ce qu'il lui plait. 3. Que rien n'arrive que ce qu'il a mis dans le plan de son ouvrage") (above). Another consequence of this view is that the heresy of Patripassianism is avoided. For we can say, if this is true, that the course of the world is not a matter which can weary or disappoint God and that there are no events such as can trouble His blessedness. If things happen which He has forbidden and which He punishes, they do not happen, nevertheless, contrary to his decrees and they serve the adorable ends which he has purposed from eternity and which make the greatest mysteries of the Gospel. ("il s'ensuit de là que la conduite du monde n'est pas une affaire qui puisse fatiguer ou chagriner Dieu, et qu'il n'y a point d'évenemens quels qu'ils puissent être qui puissent troubler sa beatitude. Si il arrive des choses qu'il a defendues, et qu'il punit, elles n'arrivrent pas néanmoins contre ses decrets, et elles servent aux fins adorables qu'il s'est proposées de toute éternite, et qui font les plus grans mystères de l'Evangile) Above.)

This clear statement of the views of Bayle enables us to discern more affinity with the views of Leibniz than we might surmise from a cursory reading of the Théodicee. For the apparent arbitrariness implied in (2) above is qualified elsewhere by Bayle in the Leibnizian manner. For in Objection 3 of the Epicurean to the Platonist he says that goodness without judgement is not praiseworthy. ("Je renonce même à cette objection, c'est que la bonte pour être louable doit être accompagnée de jugement") Again in (3) we have almost the quintessence of the ontological teleology of Leibniz. We have the same insistence upon the transcendence of the Divine Being above the travail and sorrow of man. Though the plan of his work ("le plan de son ouvrage") is determined from eternity, it is so embracing that it can include within the ambit of its compass that abuse by man of his freedom which we call moral evil and which can be transmuted to the greater glory of His "fins adorables"
Bayle and Leibniz alike stand aloof from any facilis descensus humanismi. Bayle in his Fensees Diverses sur la Comète expresses views which might almost equally well come from the pen of Leibniz. Religious fanatics saw in the comet of 1680 a sign of divine displeasure as some years later the Lisbon earthquake was to cause similar popular alarm. Bayle's reply is shattering "What service can it render the Church Militant that Jupiter has satellites which move regularly around it" ("De quoi peut servir à l'Eglise militante que Jupiter ait des satellites, qui se meuvent régulièrement autour de lui?" Par. LXi. Continu. des Fensees div.). He deals trenchantly with the opinion of Ealebranch who in his "Traité de la Nature et de la Grace" (1684) regarded man as the sole and chief means for the end that the Creator proposed to himself in making the world. ("comme le seul et le principal moyen de la fin que le Créateur s'est en faisant le monde" above.) If this is so, Bayle asks, why has God placed the fixed stars at such a distance from the earth and why is it that other stars have only come to the ken of man through the invention of the telescope. Bayle agrees with Seneca that the world of nature ministers to a greater and a more sublime end than the conservation of the human race. It is true that man enters into the cares of God and that He wishes to bless them. All this demands recognition but it is going too far and we presume too much on our importance if we think that we are His columns of Heracles, His chief end, the centre round which all the movements of nature work and the ubiquitous reason of all His works. ("mais qu'il va beaucoup plus loin, et que nous présumerions trop de nous si nous prétendions être ses colonnes d'Hercule, son but principal, le centre à quoi aboutissent tous les mouvements de la nature et la raison ubiqu de tous ses travaux" Par. LX. above.

Yet though neither Bayle nor Leibniz hold that man is the only purpose of all things, both are equally emphatic on the essential goodness as well as the transcendence of God; both agree that God's goodness determined Him to create the universe ("sa bonte seule l'a determine à créer cet univers"), though Leibniz interprets this phrase of Bayle's in his own way. If God's goodness determined Him to create this universe, it is necessary to add that His goodness moved Him antecedently to create and produce all the good possible. Also that His wisdom made the choice ("sa sagesse en a fait le triage") and was the cause that He has chosen the best consequently. (Théodicee. Par. 116. G. vi. p. 167.)
Thus Bayle and Leibniz are in fundamental agreement about the infinite Goodness of God. And both (in spite of partial denials) interpret this goodness as being expressed pre-eminently in the relation of God to man. (cf. Théodicée Par. 116. G.vi. p. 168.) Both Bayle and Leibniz experience the same difficulty in expressing this truth, without at the same time saying that the welfare of man is the chief aim of God.

Bayle no more than Leibniz has any argument for this infinite Goodness of God. It is something universally accepted and to think of God without the qualification of moral predicates is to outdistance the sceptics of history. ("Les plus grands Sceptiques de l'antiquité ont dit, que tous les hommes ont une idée de Dieu selon laquelle il est une nature vivante, heureuse, incorruptible, parfaite dans la félicité, et non susceptible d'aucun mal" Art. Spinoza. Dict. n. 2777.) To think this is to lapse into the "athéisme exécrable" of Spinoza. Even those who deny the moral predicates of God often unconsciously bring them in to interpret God's relation to man and speak of "perfections" of the sovereign being, which He does not fail to adjust to the ideas which we have of virtue. ("On ne sera plus certain que sa justice l'engage à punir le mal, et l'on ne saurait refuser ceux qui soutiendraient qu'il est l'auteur du péché, et qu'il punit néanmoins fort justement, et qu'en tout cela il ne fait rien qui ne s'accorde avec les perfections infinies du souverain être, car ce ne sont pas des perfections qu'il faille ajuster aux idées que nous avons de la vertu". above.)

This reliance upon the teaching of the Scriptures helps us to understand the emphasis Bayle places upon the infinite Goodness of God and the corresponding cruciality for him of the problem of evil. For the creation of the world by God is a truth the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. ("Cette vérité est d'une importance nonnulle, car on en tire comme d'une source féconde les dogmes les plus sublimes, et les plus fondamentaux, et l'on ne saurait poser l'hypothèse opposée à celle-là sans ruiner plusieurs grands principes du raisonnement". Art. Epicure. Dict. n. 1140.) Thus it is only by Revelation that this nodus of the problem of evil can be untied. For it is only by Revelation that we can understand that the omnipotence of God is an omnipotence of love. ("car l'optimus précède toujours le maximus dans le style des plus savantes nations, quand elles parlent de Dieu" Art. Panichéens Dict. n. 2325.)

The Panichaeans Answer.

Evil for Bayle is a fact which cannot be explained by explaining it away. There is nothing more stupid than to reason against facts ("Il n'y a rien de plus insensé que de raisonner contre des faits". Art. Panichéens Dict. n. 2022.)
In the same place we are told that we must not suppose Bayle to agree with those who hold that evil to be merely a privation ("le mal n'est qu'une privation).

But if the Scriptures teach us the complete sovereignty of God and His essential unity, this is a lesson which the rest of creation teaches us as well. ("Les cieux et tout le reste de L'univers prêchent la gloire, la puissance, l'unité de Dieu" above.) Thus we have no alternative but to follow the solution to which we are pointed. From effect to cause is an axiom as plain as the proposition two and two equal four. ("l'axiome ab actu ad potentiam valet consequentia, est aussi clair que cette proposition 2 et 2 font 4." above.)

Thus if there is no minimising of the dogmatic insistence upon the omnipotent transcendence of the Deity, so likewise there is no evasion of the plain stark evil of the world. Bayle's insistence upon the juxtaposition of these conflicting truths is refreshingly candid. If we say that evil is impossible in the world created by a power infinitely good and holy, we must reply that it is a fact and therefore very possible ("qu'on nous vienne de dire avec un grand appareil de raisonnements, qu'il n'est pas possible que le mal moral s'introduise dans le monde, par l'ouvrage d'un principe infiniment bon et saint, nous répondrons que cela s'est pourtant fait, et par conséquent que cela est très possible" Art. "Manicheens" above.)

It is this absence of any minimising tendency in the thinking of Bayle that leads him to flirt with Manichaeism. For Manichaeism conforms to the two canons of criticism Bayle proposes for any philosophical system. Firstly it must have clear ideas, secondly it must be adequate to experience and leave no lacunae. Manichaeism survives both these tests as well and better than most monistic philosophical systems. It certainly has clarity of ideas and its value for the a posteriori explanation of the phenomena of daily experience is as great as most rival systems.

There are three separate questions raised by the problem of evil. (1) What is its nature? (2) What is its origin? (3) What does it prove? Though Bayle does not analyse the problem in this way, his appraisal of Manichaeism directly involves them. Manichaeism had direct answers to all three and answers such as might well appeal to a logical mind.
We have already seen that Bayle will have nothing to do with the Spinozistic conception of evil as limitation and illusory. Bayle takes over the pessimistic teaching of the Church on the fallen state of man's nature. Physical and moral evil are facts, even though the Scriptures teach only of a Good Principle. (Art. Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2323.) Knowledge of the world and indeed of oneself are sufficient warrant of their reality.

Again what other system can so explain the origin of evil as Manichaeism or finally what other philosophy can give so totalitário verdict on all the warring and vexatiously discrete phenomena of human life? Thus while Manichaeism may at first inspire horror, yet a little consideration of the failure of other solutions of the problem of evil may make us more sympathetic at least to its stern logic. Thus we note e.g. how easily the Christian Fathers refuted the Marcionites and Manichaeans without themselves giving any satisfactory answer to this problem of the origin of evil. And when a priori considerations give place to a posteriori considerations we realise more clearly the urgency of the problem.

The many contrasts we meet in the world of nature e.g. light and darkness, heat and cold point analogously in the direction of an ultimate dualism. Yet these contrasts are not decisive, for they do not imperil the unity of the universe. It is only when we consider man that this unity is vitally imperilled. For man's unhappy state both in the matter of moral and physical evil requires some explanation. The orthodox teaching of the Fall of Adam only complicates the problem and supplies no answer to the why and wherefore so persistently demanded.

Thus Bayle could say that he did not espouse Manichaeism or any other dualism. But rationally considered it could give as good an account of itself as any other system. The objections of the Manicheans on the origin of evil were difficult to rebut. ("On a tant de peine à répondre as objections des Manicheens sur l'origine du mal." Art. Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2323.) Bayle goes further to say that the Manicheans with an hypothesis completely absurd and contradictory explain experiences a thousand times better than the orthodox, with the supposition, so just, so necessary, so uniquely true, of a first principle infinitely good and all powerful. ("les Manicheens qui avec un hypothèse tout-à-fait absurde et contradictoire, expliquent les experiences cent fois mieux que ne font les orthodoxes, avec la supposition si juste, si nécessaire, si uniquement véritable d'un premier principe infiniment bon, et tout puissant." Art. Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2325.)
The Answer of Origen.

Leibniz, in one of his replies to Bayle, says that if he had to choose between being an Origenist or a Manichaean, he would prefer to be the former and never the latter. ("Cependant s'il fallait choisir entre deux, suivant la raison, je serois plutot pour l'Origeniste, et jamais pour le Manicheen". Réponse aux Réflexions 2nd. edit. Dict. C. de M. Bayle. G. iv. p. 567.) As it is obvious that Leibniz had this discussion of the problem of evil before his mind and in particular the arguments and elucidations of Bayle we may profitably spend a little time on Bayle's handling of the Greek Father.

Bayle reduces the doctrine of the Origenists to three prorositions:— (1). "God has made us free, to give scope to virtue and to vice, blame and praise, reward and punishments. ("Dieu nous a fait libres, pour donner lieu à la vertu, et au vice, au blâme et à louange, à la récompense et aux peines) (2). "He damns no one simply for having sinned, but for not being repentant" ("Il ne damne personne simplement pour avoir péché, mais pour ne s'être pas repenti") (3) "Physical and moral evils are of so short a duration in comparison with eternity that they cannot hinder God passing as beneficient and the friend of virtue. ("Les maux physiques et moraux du genre humain sont d'une durée si courte en comparaison de l'éternité, qu'ils ne peuvent pas empêcher que Dieu ne passe pour bienfaisant et pour ami de la vertu" Art. Origene. Dict. p. 2259.)

It is this last sentence, Bayle reminds us, which contains the essence of Origenism and accounted for its success in refuting the Manichaeeans. Where Augustine and Pelagius had laboured in vain, Origenism succeeded. Hence the popularity Origenism enjoyed in facing the question as formidable in those days as it is still in our own—hence comes evil and what is its origin? ("D'où vient le mal, et quelle en est l'origine?"), quite obviously it lent itself more to orthodoxy than the disruptive dualism of Manichaeism, dividing the world as with a hatchet into two fields of influence, both equally independent and both equally powerful.

It is a far cry from the troubled dualism of Manichaeism to the quietism of Origen. But though Origenism lead to other peculiarities of doctrine, its monism at least left the Godhead of the deity not only intact but supreme. The danger of Origenism came from the opposite direction. It went too far along this monistic path and inclined at times to lapse into the abyss of Spinozism by identifying the spirits of men with the Divinity itself. (Dict. p. 2284.)

For the Origenist "time like a dome of many coloured glass stains the dim radiance of eternity". Life on this earth was so transitory in respect to the everlastingness of eternal
life that its sorrows and wickedness can form no atonement of a
supremely beneficent God. Moreover even the pains of purgatory do
not last for ever and even after God has punished those who have
abused their freedom, there is all the ensuing bliss of eternity
for them to lick their wounds. If a watchmaker makes a pendulum
which journeys regularly on its beat for a whole year, it is no
tarnish on his craftsmanship to point out that at the beginning of
its long career it made one or two unequal strokes. In the same way
if the Deity can reduce the disorders of earthly life in a moment
of eternity, we need not trouble ourselves that He does not
intervene now amid the sins and hardships of men.

But there are many criticisms that a Manichean (according)
to Bayle) could bring against so easy a demouement of the Gordian
knot. Against these three propositions of the answer of Origen there
might be brought three particular criticisms:-
(1). The gift of freedom, with its consequence of purgatorial
propiation for its misuse, contradicts the logical and perfect ideal
of supreme goodness. As the Origenist believes in an eternity of
undimmed and unfading bliss, he is not in a position to deny that
the same bliss is always possibility and consequently no good
reason why perfected liberty with its twin consequences of virtue
and happiness should not coexist on this earth (given an omnipotent
and all loving Deity). Moreover if we are to read Origenism with
any strictness there can be no sort of proportion between the brief
probation of man this earth and the eternity of bliss which awaits
the righteous. So great is this disproportion that we must regard
this bliss as a gift to some and not to all.

(2). Absence of repentance really means a misuse of freedom and
so is an argument in a circle.

(3). The weak point here is the ignorance of the Origenist as to
the alleged proportion of the torments of purgatory to the bliss
of eternity. Moreover a Perfect Being is very different from a
watchmaker however excellent he may be. Goodness in summo gradu
excludes all opposites and defects. Moreover the relativity of
purgatorial pains and torments to the glory that shall be revealed
is an objective consideration which would weigh lightly with the
person most concerned.

But there are other grounds for impugning more directly
the teachings of the Origenists. Is it not true to say that both
experience and metaphysics show that to do evil to a person in
any way even for a greater good, and though the evil be of but
brief duration, is something incompatible with perfect goodness save in the case where it is impossible to lead them aright. The pains of the damned may well be short and sweet in comparison with their ultimate eternal bliss, yet as pains they are incompatible with the infinite and Sovereign Goodness of God. This truth the maxim (so frequently quoted by Leibniz) illustrates: Bonum ex integra causa, maioim ex quocunque defectu.

The difficulty of accepting Origenism as the solution of the problem of evil is simply that we find ourselves back again in the pit whence we thought to have escaped. To make the bliss of heaven dependent on the pains and trials of purgatory and on life as it is upon the earth and to say that God cannot order it otherwise is to lapse again into Manichaeism and to save the goodness of God at the expense of his omnipotence. It is the virtual reintroduction of the doctrine of "matter" over whose recalcitrancy the Deity has no complete control. Moreover there is still unanswered the very difficult argument of the Manichaeans that in any case the greater proportion of the human race are eternally damned and the argument advanced by the Socinians that an everlasting hell and the infinite Goodness of God are incompatible.

With such arguments and counter arguments Bayle once more reiterates the practical moral of faith. That to judge rightly of the conduct of God we must have recourse not to the ideas of metaphysics but to the oracles of Scripture, ("C'est que les notions métaphysiques ne doivent pas être notre règle pour juger de la conduite de Dieu, mais qu'il faut se conformer aux oracles de L'Écriture." (Art. Origene. Dict. p. 2232.) There is no answer to any of the problems of life, much less to the problem of evil unless the ipse dixit of the deus revelatus.

The Answer of Bayle.

Bayle gives the pregnant statement of the problem of evil made by Epicurus (as quoted by Lactantius in De Ira Dei) as a ruthless laying bare of the issues to be faced. In the Latin the pregnant brevity of the argument is inescapable. "Deus, inquit Epicurus, aut vult tollere mala. et non potest; aut potest et non vult; aut neque vult, neque potest; aut et vult et potest. Si vult, et non potest, imbecillis est, quod in Deum non cadit. Si potest, et non vult, invidus; quod neque alienem a Deo. Si neque vult neque potest; et invidus et imbecillis est; idque neque Deus. Si vult et potest, quod solum Deo convenit; unde ergo sunt mala? aut cur illa non tollit?" As Bayle says the problem could not be stated in more pointed words, and if we include moral evil as well as the physical evil, which the words have specially in view, their relevance to the discussion is even more deadly.
The solution of Lactantius is briefly that good and evil are complementary. Without evil God could not have communicated to us neither wisdom nor virtue. (In Bayle's language "il a fallu que Dieu produisit le mal, parce qu'autrement il n'aurait pu nous communiquer ni sa sagesse ni la vertu, ni le sentiment du bien" Art. "Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2324.) For Lactantius there must needs be evil, for unless we first knew evil we could not know good. ("It is untrue that it is not only feeble but full of errors and even heresies." above.)

Bayle's objections to this response of Lactantius is that it is not only feeble but full of errors and even heresies. ("elle est non seulement faible, mais pleine d'erreurs, et peut-être même d'heresies" above.) It is contrary to the orthodox teaching on the fall of man and makes meaningless the idea of heavenly bliss. The psychological grounds for this view are its weakest part and with all the audacity of the coming century Bayle argues that it is untrue that our soul experiences evil before it can taste good. ("que notre âme ait senti du mal, afin de goûter le bien"). It is rather singular that Bayle should have seized upon this criticism of Lactantius. In his criticism of Manichaeism Bayle said that it reduced itself to an effort to save the goodness of God at the expense of his power ("on sauveroit la bonté de Dieu aux dépens de sa puissance." Art. Origene. Dict. p. 2331.) Lactantius does the same thing in a rather different way.

According to Bayle there is not much hope of a solution at the hands of the Fathers of the Christian Church. Unlike the Platonists they could not invoke the Manichæan help of "better" and, belated in this quarter, they turned to the delegated freedom of man. "But this answer, instead of cutting the knot, according to Bayle only serves to strengthen its bonds. If they could not appeal to the latent Manichæism of Platonism, still less could they make the easy pagan denunciation of the rivalries of the pantheon. Again, the solution of personal devil involved more difficulties than it solved. For this involved doing more despite to the idea of God than the dualism of Manichæism. For the devil, being not eternal and being a creature, must have been made. So we have not another Being, neither evil and independent of God but what is infinitely worse, an evil principle created by God himself and allowed to divide the empire of the human race with God- the City of God and the City of Destruction. And to say this is a thousand times worse than to say that he is not the sole necessary and independent Being. ("Or c'est faire mille fois plus de tort à Dieu que de dire qu'il n'est pas le seul être nécessaire et indépendant" Art. Pauliciens. Dict. p. 2330.) In other words we have to face the same difficulties that are involved in the orthodox doctrine of "the Fall of man." In both cases philosophy is beggared. We may as well realise this impotency of our own reason and have recourse to the lights of revelation (lumières de la revelation) where alone we can find a sure and firm anchorage. (l'ancre sure et ferme").

This leads us back inevitably to the Scriptural doctrine of the essential goodness of God. For Bayle there is no other
solvent for the problem of evil than the reiteration of this basic truth of revelation. There is no way otherwise of meeting the argument of dualism. This must needs be the case for here philosophy is at an end, and any contrary argument e.g. against Lanichaeism is equivalent to a bare enunciation of a conclusion without premises. There is only one thing to do under these circumstances and that is to abandon all reasoning and betake oneself to Revelation. Thus we learn that God is Omniscient Goodness and that man has come from his hands innocent and good. This innocence and goodness he has lost through his own fault. This is the origin of moral and physical evil. (The best and only thing for man to do when beset with the intellectual conundrums of the problem of evil is "se retirer dans son fort, c'est-à-dire qu'il doit prouver par la parole de Dieu que l'auteur de toutes choses est unique et infini en bonté et en toutes fortes de perfections; que l'homme étant sorti de ses mains innocent et bon, a perdu son innocence et sa bonté par sa propre faute. C'est là l'origine du mal moral et du mal physique" Art. "Pauliciens". Dict. p. 2325.)

This insistence on the essential Goodness of God in the case both of Bayle and Leibniz is noteworthy. In the case of Bayle the truth is based on revelation, in the case of Leibniz the truth is tacitly assumed by the philosophical inheritance upon which he entered. For both the Goodness of God is the master key to the mysteries of evil. It is a truth to which all other facts must conform. Whether in the case of Bayle there is still remaining a residuum of mystery ("on ne peut nier que l'introduction du mal moral et ses annexes ne soient l'un des plus impenetrables mystères que Dieu nous ait revelez" Art. "Lanichéens" Dict. p. 3145.) For Leibniz man himself is the source of his faults; such as he is, he was in idea. God, mov'd by certain indispensable reasons of wisdom, has perceived that he comes to existence such as he is. Bayle, Leibniz remarks, might have understood this origin of evil that he has established if he had united the wisdom of God to his power, to his goodness and to his holiness. And God's holiness is nothing else than the supreme degree of goodness. ("l'homme est luy même la source de ses maux: tel qu'il est, il étoit dans les idées. Dieu, mu par des raisons indispensables de la sagesse, a decerne qu'il passât à l'existence tel qu'il est, M. Bayle se serait peutére apperçu de cette origine du mal que j'estabilis, s'il avoit joint icy la sagesse de Dieu & sa puissance, à sa bonté et à sa sainteté, j'adjoingray en passant, que sa sainteté n'est autre chose que le supreme degré de la bonté, comme le crime qui luy est oppose, est ce qu'il y a de plus mauvais dans le mal " Théod. Par. 151. 7. vi. p. 200-). The reason for the permission of evil comes from those eternal possibilities, in accordance with which this manner of universe which admits evil and which has come into actual existence, finds itself the most perfect on the whole among the others possible. ("il semble que la raison de la permission du mal vient des possibilites éternelles, suivant lesquelles cette manière d'Univers qui l'admet et qui a este admise à l'existence actuelle, se trouve la plus parfaite en somme parmy toutes les façons possibles" Réponse aux reflexions contenues dans la...article Rorarius 7. iv. p. 567.)
According to Bayle we cannot argue malgre facts and the supreme fact is a providence infinitely good and holy. ("une providence infiniment bonne et sainte") Everything in the world must be subsumed under this major premise of all reasoning. There are thus two considerations of crucial importance (1) ab actu ad potentiam valet consequentia. (2) "this small enthymeme, as Bayle calls it," This has happened, then this is not contrary to the holiness and the goodness of God." ("cela est arrive, donc cela ne repugne point à la sainteté et à la bonté de Dieu"). How very Leibnizian these arguments are suggests that there is more in common between Leibniz and Bayle than is either generally thought or would appear at first sight. Both travel along different routes but in the end reach the same destination.

For Bayle there is no hope of reconciling faith with reason. Only the revelation of the Scriptures and "the principle of submission" ("le principe de la soumission") to their authority will lighten the darkness of these mysteries of life. Non enim cogitationes meae cogitationes vestrae; neque viae vestrae, viae meae, dicit Dominus (1s. IV. 8.) is a verse that Bayle quotes with evident appreciation (referred to Dict. p. 2325.) and it gives the keynote of all his approach to this problem of evil.

It is for this reason that so many solutions of the problem of evil land us in similar or greater difficulties. To explain evil e.g. by the gift of freedom, invokes the reply that it is not usual even for a beneficent prince or an earthly parent to give to their dependents that of which they might make a hurtful use. And as for the argument that God's permission of sin enables him to reveal his attributes of justice and mercy-what we might call the "O felix culpa argument"- this really, on the contrary, points in the opposite direction as the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary points out so clearly. Further, according to Bayle, this "O felix culpa argument" is not so good as the "limited argument of Lanichaeism." For this at least we can assert of the Lanichaean deity, though limited in power He wills the happiness and virtue of mankind and were it not for the entirely thwarting of the Evil One would succeed in this object. Lut to refute this "O felix culpa argument" we do not require metaphysics at all. For a country yokel knows clearly that it is a greater good to hinder a man from falling into a ditch than to let him fall in there and to draw him out at the end of an hour. ("un villageois conoit clairement que c'est une plus grande bonté d'empêcher qu'un homme ne tombe dans une fosse, que de l'y laisser tomber, et de l'en tirer au bout d'une heure." Art. "Pauliciens" Dict. p. 2325.) This enormous costliness of the alleged delegation to man of individual freedom must not be forgotten. The damnation of the greater part of the human race is not a small price to pay. For Bayle it is definitely impossible to reconcile with the undisputed goodness of God. ("Jamais nous ne comprendrons qu'on ait pu lui conserver ce privilège par un effet de bonté, et pour l'amour de la sainteté." Art. "Pauliciens" Dict. p. 2326.)
This enormous costliness of the alleged delegation to man of individual freedom must not be forgotten. The damnation of the greater part of the human race is not a small price to pay. For Bayle it is definitely impossible to reconcile this with the undisputed goodness of God. ("Jamais nous ne comprendrons qu'on ait pu lui conserver ce privilège par un effet de bonté, et pour l'amour de la sainteté. "Art. "Pauliciens." Dict. p. 2326.)

All this leads us to that elevation of faith and abasement of reason (élévation de la foi et de l'abaissement de la raison) which alone can guide man out of the maze of his own meanderings in the realm of controversy. For if the teaching of orthodoxy is beggared, how much more is this true of the teaching of the sects. An old Abbé, Bayle relates, saw before him four ways- the Calvinist, the Jansenist, the Thomist and the Molinist and found them each one respectively conflicting to some authority. "Quem fugiam, quem sequar, non habeo.-La première route est contraire au Concile de Trente, la seconde aux Constitions des Papes, la troisième à la Raison et la quatrième au St. Paul! or As Bayle asserts again neither the method of the Scotists nor of the Fajonistes, nor of Father Malebranche, nor of the Lutherans nor of the Socinians can resolve the objections of those who impute to God the introduction of sin or assert that it is incompatible with his goodness, his holiness or his justice. ("ni la méthode des Scotists, ni celle des Molinistes, ni celles des Remontrans, ni celle des Universalistes, ni celle des Fajonistes, ni celle du Père Malebranche, ni celle des Lutheriens, ni celle des Socinians ne sont capables de souder les objections de ceux qui imputent à Dieu l'introduction du péché, ou qui prétendent qu'elle n'est point compatible avec sa bonté, ni avec sa sainteté, ni avec sa justice." Art. Pauliciens Dict. p. 2327.) It may be noticed here that Bayle fails to see that the difficulty of reconciling the omniscience of God with the freedom of man is much greater than the problem of the alleged concursus of the deity with evil. For the argument of Zoraster (in Art. "Lanichens"), that as the creature depends upon God, therefore God is responsible for evil, has the appearance of cogency only because it confuses as contradictory things which are quite different. Exister par soi même and agir par soi même can never be contradictory. For the fact of existence is toto caelo different from the experience of activity, though Bayle equates the two and passes the argument of Zoraster as valid.

The conclusion of the whole matter for Bayle is that neither the rationalism of orthodoxy nor the rationalism of the sects can lead us out of the crux of the problem of evil. There must be a violent break with the Scholastic tradition. A Theodicee
must not only be built of other materials but also erected on other foundations than arguments of the lumen siccum. But his attempted reconstruction is insignificant compared with his remorseless cross examination. Faith and reason are as different as day and night. In the last resort there must be an act of faith and faith for Bayle is ever a case of seeing oculis clausis. Like the German theologian of our own day Karl Barth, Bayle insists that Scripture is the Word of God and comes to us ab extra. The principle of submission to the Revelation of God is the only way out of the jungle of confusion into which otherwise reason plunges us.

The great value of Bayle is in his own words "piqueur d'honneur" Those who have the genius to form new systems and invent denouements as yet unknown. (quoted by Leibniz Discours Par. 85. 7. vi. p. 99.) There can be no doubt that for Leibniz Bayle with "sa grande penetration" (Par. 84. above) has this propaedeutic value. As a reasoner, consistent and tireless, Bayle is more than the equal eâ€Š of Descartes or Leibniz. But however severe his dialectic he remains a true son of the faith that begat him. He combines in his person the Reformation and the Renaissance. Nowhere is this made more plain than in the question of the conformity of faith with reason in general and in the problem of evil in particular.
It is a point, often overlooked, that to isolate the bare data of evil ipso facto implies a prior synthetic vision of the facts we thus isolate and, consequently, a hope that we can explain their existence. It is in this sense quite true that, in the words of a modern theologian, "all attempts to explain evil end in explaining it away?" (Brunner). And at times Leibniz's solution of the problem of evil takes this form of explaining it away as due to "fausses apparences" (cf. Discours Par. 44. ) cf. also Par. 82.)

So it is that the approach of Leibniz to the phenomena of evil contains implicitly to some extent the solution he is going to offer us. The stark inexplicability of evil in an otherwise well organised world is a sufficient proof of its relative uniqueness. Evil, as Leibniz says, excites our attention more than the good. This proves that it is more rare. ("Le mal excite plutost nostre attention que le bien; mais cette meme raison confirme que le mal est plus rare." (Théodicee. Par. 258. 7. vi. p. 269.)

But if Leibniz was ever tempted to minimise the evil in the world, the Dictionnaire de Bayle at his elbow was a restraining influence. So little merit of Bayle's handling of this issue is the recognition of the ruthless evil in the world. For Bayle, as we have seen, there is no strong a posteriori ground for the dualism of Panichaeism. This staging of the issue has had its effect upon Leibniz and helps to make him one of the fundamental creators of theodicean argument. In this world there is always "le melange du mal" (Leibniz to Bourguet. 3. iii. p. 258.). We know no world that can be described as "un monde sans mal".

It is one thing, however, to admit the factual existence of evil and another to make a quasi-hedonistic calculus on the debit side or to say with Descartes (quoted with approval by Leibniz Théodicée Par. 255. 7. vi. p. 387) "que la raison naturelle nous apprend que nous avons plus de biens que de maux en cette vie". That men make up the books of life on the debit side in this matter of good and evil is primarily due, says Leibniz, to the fact that reflection does not keep pace with our experience of life. Blessings unconsciously enjoyed are never reckoned. There are few, for example, who would not care to live their life again, with the same proportion of goods and ills, always provided that it was
varied and its general conditions unchanged. Thus Leibniz would hold his optimism in the teeth of the Die-ewige Niederkunft of Nietzsche.

It is a great mistake to enlarge upon the ills that man inherits, even though we may have apparent personal cause for so doing. For not only are these complaints ill-founded but in thus complaining we are murmuring against the providence of the goodness of God. It is impossible with justice to be discontent as a member of the City of God. ("Il ne faut pas être facilement du nombre des mécontents dans la République où l'on est, et il ne faut point être du tout dans la cité de Dieu, ou l'on ne le peut être qu'avec injustice." Théodiceé. Par. 15. G. vi. p. 110.). To enlarge upon the litany of mortal ills, apart from its having no foundation in fact, is psychologically wrong. For the blessings of life are more significant, as they are more in number, than its woes.

Such of the alleged evil in life is intermingled with much good. Many so-called evils in life are often the ways towards greater goods. A General of an army makes sometimes a happy mistake which causes the winning of a great battle. ("Un General d'Armée fait quelques fois une faute heureuse, qui cause le gain d'une grande bataille" Théodiceé Par. 15. G. vi. p. 110.)

If there is any truth in these words, then, Leibniz seems to say, we must regard history as the final arbiter of value. It is to some such principle as this that any optimistic philosophy of life is in the end reduced. It is the backbone of Leibniz's answer to the problem of evil and the belief in "the best of all possible worlds"... Leibniz's continuation of the dialogue of Valla makes this clear: then they reach the topmost apartment of the pyramid the goddess tells Sextus, as history knows him, was inevitably involved in the best of all possible worlds." If Jupiter had here taken a Sextus who was happy at Corinth, or who was the king of Thrace, it would no longer have been this world. Yet he could not fail to choose this world, which surpasses all others in perfection, and which forms the apex of the pyramid: otherwise Jupiter would have renounced his wisdom, and would have banished me, his daughter. You see that my father did not make Sextus wicked. He had been wicked from all eternity, and always of his own free will. Jupiter did nothing but grant him existence, which his wisdom could not refuse to the world which contains him. He made him pass from the region of possible to that of actual beings. The crime of Sextus serves great ends: it makes Rome free, from it is born a great empire, which will furnish great examples. But that is nothing compared with the totality of this world, whose beauty you will admire when, after a happy passing from this mortal condition into a better state, the gods shall have made you capable of knowing it" (Théodiceé. Par. 416. G. vi. Trans. by Morris.)

*There is the witness, too, of the great Christian hymn sung in the Latin Office for Easter Eve:-

0 certe necessarium Adae peccatum,
Quod Christi morte deletum est!
0 felix culpa, quaem ac tantum
Memuit habere redemptorem.
The truth, which this great principle of interpretation embodies, reminds us not only of the limited character of our knowledge about the world but also that our personal happiness is not necessarily "the one far off divine event to which the whole creation moves". Also, Leibniz insists, spiritual joys have a supremacy of their own not always reckoned in every calculus. ("Les plaisirs de l'esprit sont les plus purs et les plus utiles pour faire durer la joie" Théodicée, Par. 254. C. vi. p. 267.) It is no light matter to be content with God and the universe; not to fear what is destined for us, not to complain of that which comes to us. (above). It is possible to have such serenity of mind that even bodily torments are despised. For this reason we are often poor judges, as Bishop King says, of the happiness or unhappiness of our fellow men. Poverty and wealth are no criterion as to the presence or absence of happiness. ("On se connait peu aussi en bonheur, et souvent la félicité est méconnue sous les baillons d'un pauvre content, pendant qu'on la cherche en vain dans les palais de quelques Grands"). And Leibniz is in further agreement with Bishop King when he goes on to add that the greatest happiness on this earth consists in the hope of future happiness and that thus one can say that nothing happens to the wicked which does not serve for their amendment or punishment and that nothing happens to the good which does not serve for their greater wellbeing. (1)

This irrefragable interrelatedness of everything in the universe and the principle that value is determined ultimately as a result of process help us to understand such otherwise inexplicable. But they cannot explain away the evil facts of which we are conscious. For in spite of these mollifying considerations there are grave evil things in the world. It is then we ask what is the cosmic significance of these facts that we raise the question which is the real problem of evil.

The milieu in which we place these evil facts becomes all important. It is for this reason that Leibniz is so insistent upon the limitation of our real knowledge as well as the futility of an anthropo-centric view of the universe. The evils of the world are evils in a universe where all is interconnected ("tout est lié"). They must therefore be brought within some kind of schema. For the universe is like an ocean where everything is all of a piece and the least movement in one place has an effect in another place. ("L'univers, quel qu'il puisse être, est tout d'une pièce, comme un Ocean; le moindre mouvement y estend son effect à quelque distance que ce soit, quoyque cet effect devienne moins sensible à proportion de la distance"). Though no fact in the universe is its brother's keeper, yet no fact exists in lonely isolation apart from other facts. So that we can say if the least evil in the world failed to exist, the world could no longer be the same world. ("Ainsi, si le moindre qui arrive dans le monde y manquoit, ce ne seroit plus ce monde...." Théodicée Par. 10. C. vi. p. 108.)
But the development of astronomical science has helped us to form a truer perspective of the universe than the ancients. St. Augustine's preoccupation about the evil in the universe would have been helped by the illumination that comes from the reading of the facts of evil against a wider canvas. We cannot say homo mensura omnium. For the universe is wider than the breadth of man's mind. It is not enough to see the universe sub specie hominis, we must see it, so far as we can, sub specie dei. And for Leibniz to see it sub specie dei is not to see it, as Spinoza taught, sub specie æterni but sub specie universi. At times Leibniz carries this to extreme lengths, as when he says that our world and its inhabitants is of slight consideration in respect of the great universe and all its evils are almost nothing in themselves and nothing in respect of the good in the universe. (2)

The above discussion illustrates the relentless difficulty of all philosophy that no sooner do we begin to describe the phenomena of evil in the universe than we find ourselves attempting a solution of the problem of their existence. In the case of a "cosmodyce" the problem is not acute unless we regard evil as an inherent disorderliness. But in the case of a Théodicée to define evil is ipso facto to explain its existence. For Leibniz it is impossible to speak about the universe unless we view it in dynamic reference to the deity. This theocentric outlook of Leibniz makes all the difference in his answer and approach to the problem of evil. He regards the goodness of God such in the same way as a Greek Father insisted on the òòùφττα of God in combating gnosticism. The existence of God is the decisive factor. For when it happens that there is more evil than good in regard to the human race, it is sufficient that in relation to God there is incomparably more good than evil in the universe. ("Liais quand même il croit écho plus de mal que de bien au genre humain, il suffit par rapport à Dieu, qu'il y a incomparablement plus de bien que de mal dans l'univers". Théodicée. Par. 202. S.vi. p. 272.) Elsewhere we are told evil appears as nothing in respect to good, when we consider the veritable grandeur of the city of God. ("Il faut dire que le mal ne laisserait pas de paraître presque comme rien en comparaison du bien, quand on considèrera la véritable grandeur de la cite de Dieu")

It is true that we cannot follow those who go so far as to speak of Deus sive natura or to speak of God as the anima mundi. But we can say that the world is an organic unity exhibiting an artifice and beauty beyond the imagination, that from this artifice and beauty we can draw important consequences for the wisdom and the goodness of the author of things even in those regions where our own knowledge does not extend. How different is this line of argument from that of those who are ready to disparage the world after knowing it three days and who never see beyond their nose. (3)
We have a key here to unlock our problem. For if the universe cannot be regarded in itself as a substance or an animal with their appropriate unities since it is not only infinite itself but also infinite within itself, yet it has an organic and teleological completeness of its own.

Leibniz groups the phenomena of evil in the world under three categories (1) metaphysical (2) physical (3) moral. It is a classification which has often been used since Leibniz. Probably Leibniz owed it to the teaching of Saïmonides for whom he had a great respect, though it is universally regarded as Leibniz's own. Saïmonides says there are three kinds of evil incident to mankind and they can be thus classified under these heads (1) because man possesses a body (2) such as people cause each other and (3) the results of one's own action (cf. The Teachings of Saïmonides. A Cohen (1927.) p. 39.) Whatever the source of the classification, it illustrates the impossibility for Leibniz of isolating the phenomena of evil without at the same time trying to explain them.

At first sight it seems rather strange that Leibniz does not add a fourth category to this classification of the facts of evil, namely the discrepancy of reward and merit or the question of justice. Leibniz, however, cannot be accused of neglecting this consideration. But his theocentric trend of thought lead him to subsume this under the prior question of the goodness of God. As Leibniz defines justice: "la justice n'est autre chose que la charité réglée selon la sagesse" (Letter to Abbé Bicaise 1899. éd. p. 581.)- we can easily see the direction of his thought. This is made even more clear in a passage in the Théodicée "Tout le monde doit convenir que Dieu est parfaitement bon et juste, que sa bonté le fait contribuer le moins qu'il est possible à ce qui est en ses mains, (possible, dis-je, sauf l'ordre général des choses) que sa justice l'amène de donner des innocents et de laisser de bonnes actions sans récompenses; et qu'il garde même une juste proportion dans les punitions et dans les récompenses" (Théodicée Par. 85. Éd. p. 148-9.) Thus so far from Leibniz relegates this crux to a secondary place in his treatment of the problem of evil, it is, on the contrary, the main theme of the Théodicée. This must be obvious because without "justice" we could have no Divine moral activity and no "goodness" in God.

(1) Metaphysical evil is the mark of all creaturliness ("Le mal métaphysique consiste dans la simple imperfection"). It is that limit without which creation could not take place. It is the prior logical condition of all creation. Unless the deity is going to reduplicate himself what he creates must have a perfection less than the divine. So there must needs be metaphysical evil unless God is to abstain from every act of creation. Metaphysical evil is inextricably involved in every existent less than God himself. It is a prior logical condition attaching to the nature of every existent even when it has being only as a possibility in the Divine mind.
It is hardly necessary here to dwell upon the long history of this idea of metaphysical evil. By no one was it more clearly asserted than by the Schoolmen. "Omne ens est bonum, malum est in bono subjecto" or as Leibniz puts it in a letter to Wolff (L. to Wolff. Dec. 1705. C. L. viii. p. 56.) "origo mali est a limitatione creaturarum". But it is the influence of Plato himself that is probably here most dominant. In the Timaeus, to which Leibniz refers, Plato finds the phenomena of evil in the world explained by the incalculity of uncreated and independent \( \exists \) (matter). And Leibniz believes that with regard to this and other similar lines of thought one can give a good sense. ("Ohe y peut donner un bon sens" Théodicée. Par. 20. G. vi. p. 115.)

This metaphysical evil is the matrix of all other evil, physical and moral. Both physical and moral evil can be traced back ultimately to creaturely imperfection. If we care to use Platonic language we may perhaps be allowed to speak of all evil as due to "matter". But, of course, this "matter" is very different from the stuff with which we deal in our every day experience of life. For Leibniz "matter" is "a medley of confused thoughts" ("un mélange de pensées confuses") and in the last resort it is to this than we can trace all other evil. For confused thinking defects that the evil passions of men batte. Thus the fons et origo of all evil is nothing less than metaphysical imperfection, and this indispensable condition of all creaturliness must find a place even within the Divine mind. But of this we shall say more later.

(2) Physical evil is a term which explains itself. Leibniz does not shut his eyes to the manifest suffering in the world but health after all is more common than disease just as there are, as he says, more dwelling houses than hospitals.

Physical evil has its root cause largely in the fragility of the human body which again is a consequence of the nature of things ("une suite de la nature des choses" Théodicée. Par. 14. C. vi. p. 110.) Man is organic to the created universe and, like the rest of creation, must suffer imperfection by reason of his creaturliness. When the fragility of man's body is considered, it is almost miraculous that, so far from complaining that man is often sick and ill, he is not in this state always.

Leibniz is not unmindful of the protective value of much physical pain. Again we must not forget the solidarity between the Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of Grace, with the resultant parallelism between physical and moral evil. Physical evil is often a punishment for a moral lapse and a warning for the future. ("elle a coutume de servir plustost de châtiment de ce qu'on s'est engagé effectivement dans le mal, et d'admonition de n'y pas retomber une autre fois" Théodicée. Par. 342. C. vi. p. 316.) Jefferson even go the length of saying that if there was no moral evil there would be no physical evil ("Il est fort raisonnable de juger, que sans le mal moral il n'y aurait point de mal physique des créatures raisonnables; le parallélisme des deux, c'est à dire, de celuy des finales et de celuy des efficientes, qui reviennent à celuy de la
God does not wish antecedently physical evil or suffering. For this reason there is no absolute predestination to damnation. Then physical evil is not a punishment for a fault, we must regard it as a means to an end, that is to prevent greater evils or to obtain greater goods. (4) In certain cases, too, pain serves not only for amendment, example and a greater appreciation of the good but can also contribute to the greater spiritual perfection of the sufferer similar to the way a grain of wheat becomes corrupt before germinating and bearing fruit. (5)

It is along these general lines of the greater good that we must explain the apparent cosmic friction between man on the one hand and the laws of nature on the other. It is true that in the Leibnizian universe there is harmony between efficient and final causes and behind the final causes of the universe there is a Deity wholly beneficent to man. But it is evident (pace Hallebranche) that there is a certain recalcitrancy between man and the laws of nature. Sometimes the individual must be sacrificed to the general good. Leibniz quotes with approval the criticism by Leimonides of those who imagine that nature has been made only for them and conclude that, when something happens contrary to their liking, all is wrong with the universe. (6)

(3) Moral evil. Metaphysical evil is a the root of moral evil. It is not enough to say that the Devil is the author of sin, the origin of sin must be sought in that which makes man assailable by the Devil, namely the original imperfection of creatureliness and the circumstances of the nature of things which translates this possibility into deed. (7)

The possibility of moral evil is one thing and the actuality of moral evil another. Moral evil is something we must hold responsible. Otherwise we must say that the sins of the non-regenerate are excusable because they come from the principle of our misery, which is "original sin." (8)

Moral evil for Leibniz takes on the theological colour of sin. And sin, as Leibniz says, makes up the great part of human misery. For, as well as the intrinsic enormity of sin ("la raison vulgaire, que l'offense est infini," Théodicee Par. 367. 7. vi. p. 273.), there are also, as we have seen, its plain evil consequences. An evil will is, in its own sphere, what the evil principle of the Pantheists might be in the universe. Reason, which is the image of God, furnishes the wicked with great means of causing evil. A single Caligula or a Nero has made more than the earth quake with evils. An evil man pleases himself in making suffering and destruction and he finds only too many occasions
for them. (9)

But even in this matter of evil, "le mal de coueur", it is easy to exaggerate and to lose all sense of proportion. Carlyle in particular is guilty of this when he says that human history is nothing but a miscellany of the crimes and misfortunes of the human race. ("un recueil des crimes et des infortunes du genre humain"). If we were to gauge the incidence of virtue and vice in humanity we should find that there was a certain mediocrity. ("il y regne une certaine mediocrite"). Historians, it is true, are often inclined to over-emphasise the vice rather than the virtue of mankind. But Richavelli was a shrewder judge when he said that there are few people very bad or very good and this was the cause of the failure of many great enterprises. ("qu'il y a peu d'hommes fort bons, et que cela fait renoncer bien de grandes entreprises" Théodicée Paf. 148. 2. vi. p. 198.)

If it is said, as indeed Leibniz says, that "the world, especially if we consider the government of the human race, seems rather a confused chaos than anything directed by human wisdom" (On the Ultimate Origin of Things. Latt. 7. 346.), then we must remember that the human race, so far as it is known to us, is only a fragment of the city of God. About this republic of spirits we know too little to be able to note its marvelous order. ("elle a trop d'étendue pour nous, et nous en connaissons trop peu, pour en pouvoir reconnaître l'ordre marveilleux.")

But even in his statement about the fact of moral evil Leibniz evisced anxiety to free himself from any suspicion of imputing the use of moral evil as such to God. God can will metaphysically or physical evil as a means to a greater good. It is quite otherwise with moral evil. Moral evil comes into actuality because it is a sine qua non, a hypothetical necessity to the best. It can never be willed by the antecedent will of God and the consequent will of God which has sin as its object is only permissive. But to develop this issue further here is to transgress on the subject matter of later chapters.
C. vii.

The Fall of Man and "Original Sin".

Part of the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil is of more importance than his attitude to the traditional Christian doctrine of the Fall of man and of "original sin". Apart from the intrinsic importance of such an attitude in general, it also provides a crucial test for the much noised subservience of Leibniz as a thinker to the dogmas of the Christian Church. A slight acquaintance with the Theodicee or even with such an anti-Tridentine work as the Systema theologica will readily show that the alleged truckling of Leibniz to the dogmas of Catholic orthodoxy is a myth, even in an article of faith so crucial as this for the inner structure of Christian doctrine as interpreted by his age and so widely accepted by his generation. We shall find that Leibniz meets Christian theology on its own ground and is content with nothing less than showing the Christian facts of a God of love. The critical daring of Leibniz on this point has not yet had that recognition it deserves.

The doctrine of the Fall and of "original sin" is one of the three classical answers of religion to the problem of evil. The other two are the universality of the Onanists of indolence and the dualism associated with the name of Plotinus and the religions of Manicheism and Mandaeism. But it is the doctrine of the Fall of man and of "original sin" which, though lost in the order of time, has had the greatest influence upon the thought of the modern world. Stressing on the one hand the prevalence of human weakness and sin and on the other the Divine holiness of monotheistic belief, it found an apparently complete solution in the prior doctrine of the Fall of man.

Modern philosophers in dealing with the problem of evil often fail to realise the importance of this answer to the problem of evil both on the ground of whatever intrinsic merits or demerits it may have as well as of the tremendous influence it has exerted upon the whole field of modern philosophy and not least upon such thinkers as Kant and Hegel, particularly the former. At the time Leibniz lived it was an answer to the problem of evil almost universally accepted by the important theologians of the day. In its main essentials it was adopted in all the symbolical books of the Reformed Churches and its elucidation occupied five canons of the Tridentine "Decretum de peccato originali" (1546). Nor was its influence confined to theological and philosophical opinion. It coloured the whole attitude of the 17th century laity to his world. "The Reformation, challenging as it did the whole fabric of mediaeval Church life and thought, had the remarkable effect of dragging the doctrines of the Fall and of original sin from the cloister and the lecture-room into the market-place, and of making them issues of the greatest interest and importance for the religious
life of thousands of ordinary people" ("The ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin". R.P. Williams. p. 419. 1927.) Thus in no way could Leibniz be expected to be immune from these pervasive influences and both in the Théodicee and in his later correspondence, as well as elsewhere, we find abundant evidence that he had long pondered this traditional Christian solution of the problem of evil. It would be hard indeed to conceive how Leibniz could escape the challenge presented by such a complete and a priori answer to the main problem of the Théodicee.

In his modifications of the traditional Christian doctrine Leibniz shows clearly enough the tension between humanism and the Reformation. As Ernst Cassirer puts it ("Die Philosophie der Aufklärung" p. 185. 1932) "The great difference between humanism and the Reformation is founded on their attitude to original sin. Even humanism has never dared openly to attack the dogma of the Fall but it had to strive accordingly to its spiritual direction to loosen this dogma and weaken its power. Even stronger we see in the religious views of humanism the Pelagian spirit, as ever more consciously they strive to throw off the yoke of Augustinianism. Not least the return to antiquity is to serve in this battle. The Platonic doctrine of Eros and the Stoic doctrine of the "independence" of the will are called up against the most important Augustinian view of the radical corruption of human nature and of its incapability to return to the Divine by its own powers. (1)

But there is more in Leibniz than this tension between the Enlightenment and the Reformation. There is a definite heterodox movement so far as traditional Christianity is concerned. .. Bichel in his important book ("Die Theologie des Leibniz" München 1909. Vol. i. p. 319) puts the case none too strongly when he says that in his conception of the Fall of man Leibniz does not belong to the Church doctrines and dogmas of his time but completely to the new science. The orthodox doctrine bears difficulty on difficulty and contradiction on contradiction and explains nothing but only easily enough increases the wonderful and secret teachfulness. i. e. to say considers itself as insolvent. Leibniz finds that the true and original Christianity, the teaching of Christ Himself about sin, is completely reconcilable with science and reason. But, on the other hand he is not completely in agreement with the Tridentine conception or with the conception contained in the symbolical books of the Protestants. But at the same time however, his real striving is not to misunderstand these doctrines as far as possible to reconcile the doctrine of the Church with Christianity and with science. (2)

Leibniz, like Kant, was nurtured on the Lutheran theology and so was familiar with that view of human nature, to be described in the phrase of Augustine, as "ne esse peccati". It was scarcely less than a thinly veiled Pantheism. For it was not merely that man was in himself incapable of any approach to God ("ex se se et propriis naturalibus suis viribus, in rebus spiritualibus nihil increata, operari, aut cooperari potest, non plus quam lupus truncus-cut limus" as the Lutheran Formula of Concord puts it) but that evil itself
was a hylostatic something, pre-eminently a thing. It was a positive deprivation rather a negative deprivation. This was the abyss down which Luther himself stumbled. In spite of all its official anathema against Anichaeism Lutheranism ever kept uncomfortably near this view of hylostatic evil. The evident failure of Leibniz, as contrasted with Rayle, to do justice by the posteriori strength of the Weltanschauung of Anichaeism may perhaps be explained as a reaction against the popular Lutheranism of the day.

The Council of Trent crystallized the issue for Leibniz and made any evasion of the problem impossible. And it was upon the doctrine of the Council of Trent that Leibniz concentrated the destructive rors of his optimism. The hard formulation of its logical statement offered a challenge from which he did not shrink.

In this crucial theological issue it is very difficult to substantiate the opinion of those who hold that "being the champion of orthodoxy against the doctored atheist, Leibniz shrank from the consequences of his views, and took refuge in the perpetual reiteration of edifying phrases" (L. Russell. 3rd. above.) For here at any rate there is no shrinking from the logical consequences of his conception of substance and of God.

It is quite evident that on general grounds the Leibnizian conception of God and individual substance must have very ill with this traditional doctrine of the Fall of man and of original sin. Leibniz certainly leaves us in no doubt of quantum to his own opinion. Not only was it a patent absurdity to make man more dependent on his first parents then his own Creator but it involves a saltus mortale that could obviously have no place in his system. Also the forconkowledge of "od made it certain that the best of all possible worlds included the evil be foreseen and permitted only because it could be turned into a better good. In this sense there was a Fall of Adam. For Leibniz is very careful to state that Adam's sin of his own free will and not because of any necessitous pre-determination. But otherwise the whole central idea of the Fall of man and of the alleged consequences in 'original sin' conflicts with the innate idea of 'od coram to all men. For on this view God cannot be the that pitied all his children and only asked for the reciprocity of his love. Tyrant he must be who neither loves nor wishes to be loved. According to dogm we must regard the world as the worst possible.

Here is always Leibniz tries to pursue a via media. The extreme dogmatic position needs a re-interpretation before the doctrine of the Churches can satisfy not only the requirements of reason but also the teaching of original Christianity. Dr. W.P. Williams in his book "The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin" (1927.) reminds us that since the times of St. Paul five great issues have dominated the discussion of these doctrines. The issues have not all got the same philosophical relevance but some are vital to the present context. The questions we must ask are these:-
"(1) Is the Adam-story historic truth or allegory?
(2). What was man's unfallen condition, non-moral innocence, or 'Original Righteousness'?
(3). What exactly is the undesirable thing, state, or quality alleged to have been communicated by the first man to his descendants?
(4). What was the mode of this communication, physiological or merely social heredity, mystical or physical identity.
(5). What is the resulting state of human nature, with which Redemption has to deal ("The ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin" p. xvi. and 168f.)

It may be interesting to record the answers of Leibniz under these respective heads. Leibniz does not always speak with theological precision, but he says enough not only to enable us to realise his own views on this important answer to the problem of evil but also to admire the courage with which he defends his own opinions.

(1). There is no ground for doubting the reliance of Leibniz upon the Old Testament story of Adam and Eve, especially as this is interpreted in the spiritual experience of the New Testament writers and in particular St. Paul. There is no question of Leibniz riding loose to the classical texts. It is in matters of exegesis that he finds the matrix of error and confused thinking. The Scriptures are liable to misinterpretation and their true meaning is abundantly consistent with reason and the nature of things.

For Leibniz revelation has a place beyond the power of reason. Thus the context of the Fall of Man is the Fall of the Angels. In accordance with the Biblical story, which Leibniz accepts, the Fall of the latter was the remote cause of the Fall of the former. But we cannot hope to see penetrate the penetrabilis of the Divine wisdom and last content ourselves with the story of the Scriptures.

(2). This question raises the whole problem of the status of man in the Leibnizian universe. According to Leibniz man is "trans-created". The souls of those destined to become human have always been in the world but only as "sensitive" souls. By creating man God introduces a new perfection into a "sensitive" soul, already corrupted physically or animally by the sin of Adam. This, according to Leibniz, is much more in accord with Divine justice than the orthodox view that a rational soul is placed in a body where it must become morally corrupt. (4). "Transcreation" in this way both explains the origin of man's soul and gives the quite quietus to the philosophical difficulty of the origin of "Forms".

What, then, is man's unfallen condition? Here Leibniz at once departs from current orthodoxy. Man's original condition was not so angelic as consequently his "Fall" was not so great as religious dogma would have us believe. There is no catastrophic Fall, though there is a Fall. The original weakness of man is as
important as his original perfection.

The Full doctrine received its wide acceptance because of the contingency of the event on which it based its dogma. For Leibniz this event has not the same crucial significance, though he is willing to confess there was an empirical inevitability about the sin of Adam and of his successors.

Leibniz will not agree that man is born a sinner. Original sin is founded in his nature, yet the "posse non peccare" of Adam is "absolument parlant" a real possibility. For we cannot impute moral evil directly to God, not to mention other difficulties. Since there were other possible plans where our first parents would not sin, we cannot say that their sin was necessary. (Théodicee Par. 233 3. vi. p. 256."Puisqu'il y avait des plans possibles, ou les premiers parents ne péchaient point, leur péché n'était donc nécessaire"). We cannot say that God was under a metaphysical necessity to create sinful man as we know him. There is a real contingency about the chequered moral history of man's life. Divine foresight of "Adam péchant librement" "nee rend point nécessaire ce qui étoit contingent en soi, ny impossible ce qui étoit possible" (Théodicee. Par. 231. 3. vi.p. 255.)

The same time sin or moral evil potentially belongs to the nature of man as we know him. Without this we should be completely other than we are. In the other hand sin is not, as the luthenians vainly talked, the very substance of man. Human nature is not decreed in toto nor are the virtues of the 'heathen' in the Augustinian phrase "splendidissima peccata" [5] all that Leibniz will permit is that there is in man an inclination to sin and that this inclination was fully reckoned within the computation and the pre-determination of the universe. This empirical inevitability (and the emphasis is to be placed on the adjective) of man's sinfulness was in some way included within God's idea of the universe before its creation. It was only as potential sinners that men fitted into the scheme for "the best of all possible worlds" [6]

This seems the most adequate way of expressing the views of Leibniz, not always very clear in the Théodicee. It is the only way of answering the dilemma of Boyle. Was Adam sinned freely? If you say yes, then his fall has not been foreseen. If you say no, then he is not blameworthy. To this Leibniz replies as above. In spite of certain prevailing inclinations Adam sins freely, and for this reason merits punishment. [7]

All this is reinforced by the consideration, emphasized by the Scholastics, that God does not create the soul in such a state that it will sin from the first moment of its existence. [8] This Leibniz explains by pointing out that God creates the essence of a thing before its accidents, its nature before its operations. In this we can see how the creature can be the cause of its own sin, even though it can do nothing without the conservation of God. [9]
Had man been created otherwise, there should have been within
him no mere inclination to sin but sin itself. For man still has
his freedom. This is the reason why he still merits punishment, though
as his original state is not as holy as orthodoxy makes out, the
punishment must bear some relation to the crime. This makes it more
easy to understand why the decision of salvation of the world was
made at the same time as the creative fiat. The incarnation of the
Logos outweighs the sin of Adam, just as the salvation of the Logos
mankind outweighs the treachery of Judas. Thus it is that God judges
the universe by its value "on the whole", taking into account His
power to transform the whole which contains evil to a greater good
than a whole without evil. (10)

The imperfection of man's nature has a relevancy in
God's plan of the universe. In this respect Leibniz goes beyond the
popular doctrine that God merely permits sin and does not lend His
co-operation. God is guided by His superior wisdom not only
"à permettre ces raux" but also "mêne à yx concourir" (see previous
note. 10) This is an important point. There are thus two causes
for the sin of man. The secondary and distant cause is his creaturally
imperfection and the primary and proximate cause is the misuse of
his own free will. (11) But the secondary causes only act by
virtue of the primary causes. Thus God is freed from the charge
of being the cause of sin. Thus physical and moral evil can
ultimately be traced to the creatively finitude of man.

With this remote cause of all the ills of mankind
Leibniz is "always in some difficulty. If the real root of the "Fall"
is to be found in the original imperfection of man's nature we
should be careful how we interpret this. We have already seen that
it is impossible for God to create man as such sinful, for this is in-
consistent with His goodness. Accordingly in this matter we must
speak of God as the cause of perfections and realities only. The
free will of man acts through the power of God and it is through the
limitations of this free will that sin comes to birth. (12)
The answer of Leibniz to the question of the original "unfallen"
condition of man recalls the words of Omar Khayyam:
O, Thou who didst with Pitfall and with Sin
Beset the Road I was to wander in,
Thou wilt not with Predestination round
Embrace me, and impute my Fall to Sin?

(3). When we come to the question of the dammossa hereditas we
receive from our first parents, the answer of Leibniz is plain if
we call to mind his conception of individual substance and of God.
Here, again the heterodoxy of Leibniz becomes manifest. The sin of
our first parents was not the decisive act of orthodox theology.
For to follow the doctrine of orthodoxy in this matter we should have to jettison any idea of a beneficent Deity. Moreover the metaphysical considerations involved in the Leibnizian universe make it necessary to scout the alleged damnosa hereditas of the Fall of man as a myth.

Leibniz gives daring and practical emphasis to this view by his attitude towards unbaptised infants. Some theologians were led to take a somewhat similar stand against Augustinianism from motives which did more credit to their heart than head. Leibniz, however, arrives at his heterodox views by following the logical sequence of his own argument. So the damnation of unbaptised infants is plainly stated even in such a work as the much bruited system theological to be plainly unjust. (15)

Thus Leibniz falls foul of popular orthodoxy and especially of the Tridentine decree in holding that there can be no real hereditary guilt of which the fruit is damnation. In an unpublished writing "annotata ad Conc. Trident. (quoted by Riecher in "Die Theologie des Leibniz" p. 532.) Leibniz answers the Tridentine decree in some detail. It is easy, he says, to understand how sin necessarily brings forth guilt and how punishment inevitably supervenews, but how such guilt and punishment can be transmitted by a physico-sexual relationship is insoluble. The so-called 'original sin' is not really sin at all. It cannot have the guilt of sin (peccatum). It is only another name for human infirmity. (14)

The damnosa hereditas man inherits is the liability of falling into sin and this is the natural result of that inclination to evil which was originally present in Adam. Since then the psychological processes of habit and imitation have accounted for such. But man can never be judged for the sins of his first parents nor can it be clearly seen how an infection of guilt can be transmitted in the way popularly thought.

(4) and (5) have already been implicitly answered. But for the sake of definiteness we may try to elucidate further.

(4). Leibniz is fully aware of this question. As he himself says the first difficulty is how the soul can be infected with original sin, which is the root of actual sins, without injustice on the part of God. (15) There are, says Leibniz, three theories invented to overcome this difficulty:-

(1) Pre-Existence. This doctrine, espoused by Plato and Origen and, in the time of Leibniz, by Henry More and others, held that souls pre-existed in another world and were diminished to this world of bodily imperfection because of sin.
(ii) Traducianism. This view, favoured by Tertullian and Augustine, and taught by the greater number of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, held that there was a "seminal identity" between man and his first ancestor.

(iii) Creationism. This is the opinion widely taught in the Christian schools of thought and as we saw above, according to Leibniz, has the greatest difficulty with 'original sin'.

"Transcreation" offers a new alternative to these three. It gives us any explanation of 'original sin' better than all three and one more conformable to our idea of Divine Justice. (See Note 10) at the time of Adam's sin neither will nor intelligence was present with his descendants. Reason is a perfection added later to the "sensitive" or "animal" soul. Accordingly we can say that the human soul in itself is not morally corrupt, though its inner connection with the sensitive or animal soul already present at the time of the sin of Adam leads it inevitably to sin and in this sin to make use of its newly given gift of reason. Yet Leibniz will not follow the lead of Augustine nor of the Council of Trent in saying that 'original sin' can ever in any such way lead to the 'damnation' of the 'innocent'. On this point Leibniz is particularly outspoken and in no way conciliatory. His words are refreshing evidence of his honesty as a thinker. "Il faut avouer que ce sentiment n'est point de fondement suffisant au dans la raison, au dans l'écriture, et qu'il est d'une partie des plus choquantes" (Théodicée Liv. 95, 7, vi, p. 154.)

(5).

Thedamnoas hereditas of 'original sin' is not then sufficient for punishment or damnation. Yet there is some consequence of the sin of Adam. Leibniz likens it to the taint of heredity as in the case of the innate tendency to intemperance in the case of the children of drunkards. (10)

There is some additional infection of the nature of man beyond Adam's natural state. (17) As a consequence of the sin of Adam the natural inclination of man towards evil is increased. The metaphysical imperfection of creatureliness leads Adam to sin. The effect of 'original sin' is to infect still more the source of man's thinking. In this way 'original sin' tends to become an inborn habitus, to make the conflict of the flesh against the spirit greater in degree, though not in kind.

The point that concerns us most here and it is one that Leibniz himself emphasizes is that in all this the reign of Nature serves the Reign of Grace and that God as Architect has made everything as becomes God as Monarch. ("Car la contemplation de la divine sagesse nous porte à croire que le Règne de la nature sort à celuy de la grâce; et que Dieu comme Architecte a tout fait comme il convienoit à Dieu considéré comme Monarque" Théodicée Liv. 112. 3. vi,p.184.) Even the Biblical account of the Garden of Eden
has some hidden meaning. The punishment of the 'original sin' of Adam arrived naturally "sans aucune ordonnance d'un législateur". The ultimate purpose of the world is good, because the Person behind the universe is good. (18)

So Leibniz rather tediously and with some obscurity defines his attitude to the traditional Christian solution of "the problem of evil". In the light of the prevalent teaching of the 17th. century they must have had an important critical significance. For his attitude though intellectually conciliatory is brazenly heterodox. So much for Leibniz the champion of orthodoxy.
C. viii.

The Grounds of Optimism. (1)

Since the days of Voltaire the optimism of Leibniz has often been regarded more in the light of a Divine Comedy than as a serious attempt to justify the ways of God to man and unravel the problem of evil. Accordingly it is not surprising that he has in general been given such a bad hearing. He has often been caricatured by those who dissent from the conclusions of his argument.

Psychologically this attitude to Leibniz is easily understood. The problem of evil is so acute on any reflection that instinctively we turn away from anyone who professes to give us a solution as the whole substance rerum speeae sperandarum. The latent fervour of much of the writing of Leibniz only increases our impatience and deepens our incredulity. Voltaire's Candide, with all its superficiality, is a warning to the philosopher who speaks as "Sir Oracle".

So many critics of Leibniz are content to regard his conclusions as less important than his premises. Thus a new "Leibnizianism" is created and what Leibniz ought to have said is regarded as of equal, if not greater, authority, than what in fact he did say. So regarded the Théodicee, with its perplexities and irrelevancies, becomes part of the problem of evil itself. In this way the essence of Leibniz to the fact of evil has suffered a great discount and Van loss once more comes into his own.

It is important, therefore, that we should here, as elsewhere, allow Leibniz to interpret himself.

In a letter to Forcher (1678) Leibniz states that, unlike Descartes, he has no need of the supposition of a Being who guarantees us against the possibility of deception. For it is in our power to deceive in many things and not least the most important. Among these more important things are the proofs for the existence of God. Leibniz affirms that he can demonstrate the existence of God not only by different ways from those of Descartes but also by arguments that lead much further. (1) (A detailed consideration of these arguments of Leibniz is hardly relevant to our present purpose. The more important points involved will be encountered as we proceed.)

Likewise, and even more importantly, Leibniz says, he differs from Spinoza. Properly speaking, Spinoza makes no recognition of the goodness of God since he teaches that all things exist by the necessity of nature and without "the choice" of God. (2)

We have already seen that the Divine Nature is ultimately the sufficient reason for the actualisation of the world. And the sufficiency of this reason depends not only on the perfection of the Divine Wisdom and power but even more crucially on the perfection of his goodness. It is not enough to say to God that he is causa
Thus Leibniz assumes in the Théodicée what he, in fact, tries to prove. It is clear that the handiwork of God, as interpreted by Leibniz, must be perfectly good. If the world is the handiwork of God, further argument is otiose.

How does Leibniz prove that the world is the handiwork of God? There are two ways open to Leibniz— the a priori and the a posteriori. But by the a priori argument Leibniz virtually assumes the point for which he argues. For an absolute existant is not necessarily morally good. We have already seen above how Leibniz imports moral predicates into the metaphysical idea of Divine Perfection. It is not enough to say "If God is possible, it follows that he exists" and Leibniz realises his argument still further by the suggestion that this ontological argument might be simplified by the omission altogether of any reference to "perfection" at all. (3) But assuming that his a priori argument has cogency, it must follow that this world is the handiwork of such a deity and is therefore perfect, even though the nature of its perfection is beyond our comprehension.

The a posteriori argument attempts to show that the perfection of God follows from the perfection of the world and not vice versa. But these empirical proofs are valid because they virtually presuppose the perfection of the world. "How as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is only one God, and this God is sufficient." (Commentary, Par. 39. Latte p. 239.)

Leibniz lays great stress on the revelation of God we obtain from the world of nature. As Pickier says "The whole of science had therefore a religious and Christian character for him because it led man by better realisation of the works of nature to humanity towards all creatures and to love towards the Creator. While orthodox theology, with their defence of certain theses like absolute predestination and inquisition, through which the Christian God was turned into a Holoch or a Satyr, was therefore acting in the contrary direction of barbarism and inhumanity. (Die Theologie des Leibniz" p. 275.)
"There is also here a now and surprisingly clear proof of the existence of God. For this perfect agreement of so many substances which have no communication with one another can only come from their common cause" (New System, Par. 10, Latta p. 316.) Thus Leibniz is content to shut himself within the assertion that the world is perfect. a posteriori proof of the perfection of the world may be possible, but Leibniz fails to supply it. His argument from the pre-established harmony and his version of the cosmological argument both assume the reality of its perfection.

In this way we are enabled to see to what extent Leibniz depends upon his doctrine of God as the fundamental ground of his optimism. O homo, tu quis es, qui respondes Deo? "Quid dicere?" Si quis est qui dicit: "He sees this in his constant asseveration that the doctrine of 'The pre-established harmony' is the great bulwark against the forces of atheism. Moreover apart from this idea of God, innate in us, there is no sound basis for a totalitarian verdict upon the universe. The universe is so far beyond our comprehension that it is mistaken to argue to its quality from the microscopic section of it familiar to us. It is true that to the materialist a piece of bone or flesh may be highly significant, there to the layman it is devoid of any exceptional meaning. The sure is true of the ideas we form of the government of "God, but to the one here is that his power to enable us to recognize the existence of the universe as a whole, is an object of our faith, our hope and our confidence in God. (4)

The objects of God's benevolence are the whole universe. But we know almost nothing: and it is foolish to judge the goodness of his wisdom by our knowledge. (5) But this is not to say that he has left himself the universe without some witness to the perfection of the universe. We get some idea of the 'teleological' perfection of the universe by the consideration of the beauty of the articled of the construction of a plant or an animal. Such as "lost accord" among the worlds of God gives us a hint and more than a hint as to the perfectness of the universe. (6)

The interval place this doctrine of optimism holds in the philosophy of Leibniz may be seen by the early dates at which it appears in his writings. It antedates the Theodicae by many years. As early as 1673 Leibniz had formulated his great thesis that God had created this "the best of all possible worlds" and it is fully recognized in his correspondence with Arnauld. (1683) But we have already given abundant evidence of this.

When we come to the explicit statements of the Theodicée, we have the constant reiteration of the truth that God's act of creation was a choice among many worlds and the choice made was the choice of the best. The issue is put very clearly in the reply to the syllogistic argument of the Appendix to the Theodicée. In the preterology of Objection I the minor premise reads:-
"God has made a world where there is evil; a world, I say, which could be made without any evil, or of which the production could have been omitted altogether." With this Leibniz is in complete agreement. "For it must be admitted that there is evil in this world which God has made, and that it was possible to make a world without evil, or even to create no world at all, since its creation depended on the free will of God" (see 2. vi. p. 375-7. quoted by Russell p. 295. who omits this last clause.)

The creation of the world is not the blind, necessary act of the Deus of Spinoza. Voluntas non potest cogi. This is clearly seen by the fact that "the better part is not always that which tends to avoid evil, since it may be that the evil is accompanied by a greater good" (above). In other words a value judgment is at the foundation of the creative act of God.

Moreover if this is true, then, we can say that value is prior to all existence. This is a most important consideration and essential to the moral theism of Leibniz. For Leibniz God exists in and for himself. "I maintain that if there were no created things, the immensity and eternity of God would none the less subsist, but without any dependence on times and places. If there were no created things there would be no time or place, and consequently no actual space. The immensity of God is independent of space, as the eternity of God is independent of time". Fifth letter of Leibniz to Clarke. (Everyman p. 337. Sec. vii. 193. and passim in Theodicee).

"La volonte libre de Dieu" is not to be confused with "la seule volonte de Dieu", which, as we shall see in a later chapter, Leibniz condemns. God is a moral person. Thus we can make three definite statements:-- (1) God is the primary ground of all existence. (2) Value and values are the secondary ground (3) in some way these values in their respective hierarchies have being or "exist" in the mind of God prior to all other existence.

Along these lines we shall find it easier to clarify the thought of Leibniz himself as well as seeing the relevance of the more theological part of his writings. It is the merit of doing justice to the fundamental continuity of his thought from the earliest to the latest writings in his correspondence with Clarke during the last days of his life. For the ethical theism of Leibniz, upon which his optimism is based, is an essential and fundamental part of the inner structure of his thought.

It is very tempting at times to simplify Leibniz by stressing the monadic principle at the expense of his ethical theism as the true foundation of his optimism. This is done by some. H. Wilson, Prof. Carr. According to him the optimistic conclusion of Leibniz is a two-fold argument based on the indestructibility of the monads and the moral argument that the ways of nature lead to grace. But after saying this, Prof. Carr is forced to add "it is not a little strange that the philosopher who had rejected so elegantly an outside theory of knowledge and had enunciated so clearly the principle of the self-centralization of the real, should be remembered chiefly for a judgment on the nature of the universe that presumes the possibility of transcending it. The moment we place ourselves at that truer Leibnizian standpoint, adopt what we call the monadic principle...it is impossible to compare the reality of the universe with its possibility and pass a value judgment on it as best or worst." (Leibniz 1939, p. 18-2.) On our interpretation of Leibniz the strangeness of such a view disappears, for the theism and optimism of Leibniz is as prior to his doctrine of monads as are his views on pre-established harmony.
The optimism of Leibniz is essentially the verdict of a religious mind. His arguments are curiously in line with those of the earliest Christian apologists. "In the cosmology of the Apologists the two fundamental ideas are that God is the Father and Creator of the world, but that, as uncreated and eternal, he is also the complete contrast to it". Harnack compares the outlook of Leibniz with that of the Greek Father, Origen. "Evils" says Origen in his answer to the great attack of Celsus ("Contra Celsum, 6.vi. 55. quoted by Harnack, "History of Dogma" Vol. ii.p.344.) "in the strict sense are not created by God; yet some, though but few in comparison with the great, well ordered whole of the world, have of necessity adhered to the objects realised; chips and similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of buildings".

To say that the world is "the best of all possible worlds" does not mean that it possesses a static perfection. Limitation is inseparable from existence. "The creature can never become like its Creator". "Although the universe was equally perfect, it will never be sovereignly perfect; because it changes, hence and ends, perfections, although it looks old "once" (.quoyque l'Univers fut toujours parfait, il ne sera jamais tout-à-fait parfait; car il change toujours et gagne de nouvelles perfections, q'on n'en parle d'anciennes" Letter to Tourget 1715. J.iii.p.370.) Leibniz tells us that there are two hypotheses: one that nature is always equally perfect, the other that it is always growing in perfection. If it is always equally perfect, but variable, it is more probable that there is no beginning, but if it is always growing in perfection (supposing that it is not possible to give it the whole of perfection all at the same time), the matter could be explained in two ways, that is to say by the ordinates of the hyperbola, or by the triangle. The hypothesis of the hyperbola, there would be no beginning, and the instants or states of the world would have been growing in perfection from all eternity; but following the hypothesis of the triangle, there would have been a beginning. The hypothesis of equal perfection would be that of the rectangle.

I do not yet see the way to show demonstratively which we ought to choose by pure reason. However, although on the hypothesis of growth the state of the world could never be perfect absolutely, taken at any given instant, yet the actual sequence would none the less be the most perfect of all possible sequences, for the reason that God always chooses the best possible" (Letter to Tourget. August. 1715.)
Everyman p. 246-7. 3.iii.n. 582-3. Thus whether the world is always equally perfect. (A) or whether it is growing in perfection (Lbr 6.) in neither of these cases can it ever be "absolutely perfect". Yet in all cases it is "the best of all possible worlds". To think of it otherwise would be to give man occasion for blasphemy creationis. God is not limited in monarchical and "the best of all possible worlds" must be interpreted in an absolute and final sense. Metaphysical imperfection is inseparable from concrete existence. But this is altogether different from saying that the world as created is a continual reproach to God himself and to the sovereign happiness of the Divine nature. (Théodicée. Par. 201. 3.vi. n. 236.)

The above considerations may help us to avoid regarding "deism" as the last word of Leibniz. The Leibnizian universe is not a machine. It is inherently dynamic, infinitely progressive. However Leibniz insists that "tout est lié", he gives no suggestion that the activity of Fonds is movement in a circle. On the contrary they are "big with their future". And of man it can be said "we know not yet what we shall be" for it is possible that the human race will reach a greater perfection than that we can imagine now. ("Il se peut même que le genre humain parvienne avec le temps a une plus grande perfection, que celle que nous pouvons nous imaginer présentement". Théodicée. Par. 541. 3.vi.n. 517.)

Even if the universe as a series of events is the best that is possible, each part of the universe may not be the best. ("Outre qu'on pourrait dire que toute la suite des choses - l'infini peut être la meilleure qui soit possible, quoique ce qui existe par tout l'univers dans chaque partie du temps ne soit pas le meilleur. Théodicée. Par. 262. 3.vi.n. 297.") Accordingly it is possible that the universe advances "de mieux en mieux", if that is the nature of things, and that it is not permitted to reach the best all at once. Yet these are problems difficult to solve. ("Il se pourrait donc que l'univers allât toujours de mieux en mieux, si telle était le nature des choses, qu'il ne fût point permis d'atteindre au meilleur d'un seul coup. C'est ce sont des problèmes dont il nous est difficile de juger" (above).

In his "De Nemin Originatione radicali" (1697.) Leibniz has no doubt that progress is the very nature of the whole universe. "Further, to realize in its completeness the universal beauty and perfection of the works of God, we must recognize a certain perpetual and very free progress of the whole universe, such that it is always going forward to greater improvement (cultus). So even now a great part of our earth has received cultivation (cultus) and will receive it more and more. And although it is true that sometimes certain parts of it grow wild again, or again suffer destruction or degeneration, yet this is to be understood in the way in which affliction was explained above, that is to say, that this very destruction and degeneration leads to some greater end, so that somehow we profit by the loss itself. And to the possible objection
that, if this were so, the world ought long ago to have become a paradise, there is a ready answer. Although many substances have already attained a great perfection, yet on account of the infinite divisibility of the continuous, there always remain in the abyss of things slumbering parts which have yet to be awakened, to grow in size and worth, and, in a word to advance to a more perfect state (ad meliorem cultum). And hence no end of progress is ever reached". (Latta.p. 350-1.)

It has often been remarked that Leibniz takes time for granted. But the reason for this is to be found in the dynamic relation between the world and God. For Leibniz God sees all things totum simul. "The best of all possible worlds" is a verdict sub specie temporis totius and not merely a verdict sub specie temporis cuiusdam. It might be more correct to describe it, as we have seen, as a verdict sub totuis universi. As Leibniz says in relation to the controversy between the Unrealsarians and the Unrealsarians, the way to nip this dispute in the bud is to remember that all decrees of God are simultaneous, not only in regard to time but also in syllogistic rationalis. ("Peut-être qu'on pourrait faire cesser cette dispute tout d'un coup, en disant, qu', le bien prendre, tous les décrets de Dieu dont il s'agit sont simultans, non seulement par rapport au temps, en quoy toute la monde convient, mais encore in syllogistic rationalis, ou dans l'ordre de la nature". Medecins. In. (4. 7. p.147.) Accordingly then we speak of "the best of all possible worlds" we must realize that we include the past and the future as well as the present, and that no end of progress is ever reached... to ourselves, although we can never learn by reason of "the details of the "next future" (both are reserved for revelation), we can be assured by this same reason that things are made in a way which exceeds our desires" (Princ. of Nat. III, of Tac. Met. 11. Latte. p.441.)

We have already seen that Leibniz accepts the Christian doctrine that preservation is continuous creation. And of the Deity of Leibniz, as of the Deity of the Schoolmen, we may say:-

"Intra omnia, nec inclusus;
Extra omnia, nec exclusus",
as opposed to the Spinozistic conception "Deus mundus implicitus, mundus Deus explicitus". The world is not a machine or watch which requires correction. Still less can it exist without the continual support of God. (7) This preservation is a continuous persistence of creation and not the endless repetition of discrete creative acts.

Between God and the world there is a relation of causal influence. For there can be no adjectival or substantival relation between them. Given this relation there are two things at least we can say:

(1) The effect is different from the cause.
(2) The effect must resemble the cause.

Accordingly there is more than mere ontological separation between God and the world. In some way the world must mirror the perfection of its Creator and Upholder. In the same way, we have already
seen, the "perfection" of God must express itself in the world.

Leibniz refuses to regard this correlation of creation and preservation as anything in the nature of a demonstration of the existence of God, as did the Cartesians, e.g. Voëlzel. For Leibniz it has no demonstrative value and involves difficulties about the continuous and the relation of the temporal to the eternal. One the less it is a valuable truth. The creature depends continually upon the operation of God. It would not continue to exist, if God did not continue to act. Yet this act of God is free and not a necessary occurrence. Everything real and actual in the world depends upon the continual "concours de Dieu". The concourse of God consists in giving us continually what there is real in us and in our actions, as far as it involves perfection; but that there is therein of limit or imperfection, is a consequence of the precedent limitations which are originally in the creature.

"Le concours de Dieu consiste à nous donner continuellement ce qu'il y a de réel en nous et en nos actions, autant qu'il enveloppe de la perfection; mais que ce qu'il y a de dépendant de limite et d'imperfection, est une suite des limitations précédentes qui sont originellement dans la créature." (Théodore Ver. 372. v.36.)

If the world is a nonadiastic reality in the way conceptualized by Leibniz, it is clear that it can never drift away from the guiding hand of its creator. The world does not live, as the Jacobins so widely believe, "de jour en jour" (e.g. Taine, Histoire de la France, 1872.) as it has rather been made and composed for its own purpose, e.g. for relationships and connexions (above.). For Leibniz there is no break in the creative enterprise of God. We have already seen how this view enabled Leibniz to solve the difficulty involved in the doctrine of the "Fall of Man". God is no "adventurer" Deity.

It is interesting to contrast this view of God with that of Leibniz in his correspondence with Leibniz. According to Leibniz there are no non-acts and the world is a nonadiastic reality. God creates the stuff of the world which is then moulded by him to his design. The crux of this doctrine is the theory of the "Fall of man". It is clear that on this view of the relation of God to the world there is an element of instability and fortuitousness not present in the Leibnizian universe.

This fortuitousness in the plan of creation Leibniz constantly attacks. To believe with Newton, whom Leibniz regards as the high priest of debris, that readjustments in the cosmic machine must be made from time to time is to lapse into "prissim". The imperfections and irregularities of the universe constitute a rather doubtful ground for that alleged activity of God without which the universe falls to pieces. History has shown the truth of
of this criticism of Leibniz by the uprising of the view of Laplace that the world possesses such inherent and self-adjusting stability that the hypothesis of a Deity is unnecessary. If the cosmic machine is self-adjusting, the engineer may take a holiday. I do not say that the corporeal world is a machine or watch which goes without God's interposition, and I am insistent enough that created things stand in need of His continual influence. But I do maintain that it is a watch which goes without needing His correction; otherwise we should have to admit that God keeps improving upon His own work. God has foreseen everything; He has provided a remedy for everything in advance. There is in His works an already preestablished harmony and beauty. (2nd. Paper to Clarke. p. 196-7. Everyman Trans.) To judge otherwise is to have a very low idea of the wisdom and the power of God. Any miracles performed by God are not to supply the needs of nature but those of grace. (8)

God has enough wisdom not only to uphold the fixed stars in their courses but also to create a perpetuum mobile, if such be required. But the point to note is that He is as much at work in the universe as He was at the creation. He is no mere spectator of cosmic life. For there is a complete harmony between the world of nature and of grace. "Nature itself leads to grace, and grace, by the use it makes of nature, brings it to perfection". (Rer. P. Brinca, of Nature and of Grace. Lett. r. 422.) God is one throughout all the universe and in view of the essential harmony between nature and grace His activity is everywhere. So close is this relationship between God and the world that we can say that God is the sole immediate external object of spirits and that there is a sense in which we can say with Malebranche that "we see all in God".

But with Leibniz the intelligible supramundane can never become merely the intelligible mundane. On the contrary, it was the complaint of Clarke that the expression "intelligible supramundane" was "very apt to lead to a wrong notion, as if God was not really and substantially present everywhere" (T. vii. p. 377.) But to say that God is the intelligible supramundane is not to deny that He is in the world. (2nd. Paper to Clarke. T. vii. p. 563.) God's power in the universe manifests itself "par son operation immediat" and is altogether different e.g. from the presence of the soul in the body. For the cooperation of the soul is not necessary to the existence of the body. (6)

Yet the last word of the optimism of Leibniz is the Sovereign Transcendence of the Deity. "Dieu est le seul dont l'action est pure et sans melange de ce qu'on appelle ratir" (Theodicee Par. 32. T. vii). On this point Leibniz will never compromise. He will not cut the knot of evil by the easy doctrine of either a limited Deity of Patripassianism. He takes a via media between deism on the one hand and pantheism on the other. For Leibniz God is still in his heaven and all must be right with the world. His final word is an insistence upon the metaphysical and moral attributes of the Deity. This is the ultimate security for the goodness and rationality of the universe.
The Grounds of Optimism. (ii)

It is often alleged that intellectual systems of philosophy fail because they confine unduly within certain limits the issues to be considered. In particular it is alleged that those imponderable questions of value, which must be raised in any attempt at a comprehensive view of reality, are often neglected or relegated to a secondary place. Such an accusation cannot be brought against Leibniz.

The fact of evil for Leibniz is a problem in the relation of values; it is something which can only be truly envisaged sub specie universi. As we have already noticed the isolation of evil phenomena presupposes a background against which they are inexplicable enough to call for special comment. Were it not for the Iago and the phantoms of the world the problem would never arise. But the answer of Leibniz is in part to point out that there is all the difference between evils in the world and an evil world.

For this reason Leibniz approaches the problem of the evil in the world with good courage and with no desire at evasion. For him it is a problem in the relation of values. For no view of the universe is completely adequate unless and until it takes into account those imponderable considerations which, as practical life can show, are of great and crucial importance. The mesh of rationality, through which we sift the universe, must not be so close as to leave out those considerations which alone contain finitude of explanation.

The universe, as Leibniz reads it, involves much more than the mere conception of the causal relation. Mechanism depends upon teleology. Causal or logical necessity gives no finitude of explanation, though it is true so far as it goes. Naturalism, even when written by Spinoza with a capital letter, is really a cul de sac. For however we use the laws of causation and mechanics to explain particular effects in the world of nature, the general principles of physics and mechanics depend on the working of a sovereign intelligence and cannot be explained without taking it into consideration. ("les principes généraux de la physique et de la et de la mécanique même dépendent de la conduite d'une intelligence souveraine, et ne sauraient être expliqués sans la faire entrer en considération. Letter of Leibniz "sur un principe general" G. ii.p.55.) Behind the universe the-working-of such a will- there is a Moral Person, with a Will that is creative. Mechanism cannot explain the working of such a Will. "The sufficient reason which needs no further reason,
must be outside this series of contingent things, and must lie in a
substance which is the cause of this series, or which is a being that
bears the reason of its existence within itself; otherwise we
should still not have a sufficient reason with which we could stop.
And this final reason of things is called God" (Princs. of Nat. &
Grace. Par. 8. Everyman p.26.)" It follows from the supreme
perfection of God that in producing the universe He chose the best
possible plan, containing the greatest variety together with the
greatest order; the best arranged situation, place, and time,
the greatest effect produced by the simplest means; the most power,
the most knowledge, the most happiness and goodness in created things
of which the universe admitted" (Above. Par. 9. p.27.) Thus the
universe comes into existence as the result of a value judgment
by God.

Efficient causes, then, are the final causes in the
realm of Grace (Causae efficiientes pendent a finalibus" G.vii.p.501.)
and accordingly we must regard the creative activity of the Deity as
the Sufficient Reason for the whole universe. Behind the universe
there must be a Will which is not only "moralitas capax" but
"moraliter optimus" (G. vii.136 Guilielmi Pacidii initia et
specimina Scientiae Generalis). These twin truths carry the argument
a long way. God created the universe, and all that is therein, for
its values. Not only so but, being perfectly good, He made the choice
among a multitude of other worlds. "For as all possible things
have a claim to existence in the understanding of God in proportion
to their perfections, the result of all these claims must be the
most perfect actual world which is possible. Otherwise it would not
be possible to explain why things happen as they have rather than
otherwise". (Princs. of Nat. & of Grace. Everyman p.27.)

The possible worlds, among which God makes a choice,
"exist" in the understanding of God. But as such they are not actual.
Still less are they valueless. The truth that they have some being
within the Divine Mind is proof that they have value of a sort. But
there is all the difference in the world between "value" and "actuality".
For "actuality" adds a plus to some value which already has some
being in the ratio existendi of the mind of God. Yet actuality or
"existence" as Leibniz calls it, is not a "perfection". In an
important inédit Leibniz tries to clear up the confusion in his own
mind on the nature of the predicate of existence but only succeeds
in revealing that confusion more clearly. Existence implies
something "amplus" than possibility, as such it is either some
"grade of reality" or bears some relation to a "grade of reality". Yet
it is itself not "a grade of reality", for such admits itself of
"existence" and "possibility". Accordingly we can say that "existence"
is not a perfection. And this remains true though what exists is
obviously more "perfect" than what does not exist. (6)
In these words, and elsewhere, Leibniz assures us that "existence" is a synthetical predicate and, as such indeed, not a predicate at all. But such a Kantian interpretation of Leibniz breaks down, not only because of such failure to apply this criticism to the ontological argument for the existence of God but also because of his explicit statement "When we say that a thing exists, or has real existence, this existence itself is the predicate." N.E.401. G.v.339.

These possible worlds have, we must suppose, endless gradations in value worth. Just as there is an infinity of possible worlds that are good, so there must likewise be an infinity of worlds less perfect. In the fable at the end of the Théodicée Théodorus finds a vision of all possible worlds in the apartments of a pyramid. They become increasingly beautiful as one approaches its apex and at its apex is found the most perfect of all. The pyramid has a point but no base. It goes up to infinity because there is an infinity of possible worlds but the pyramid has a point because there is one best of all. (2)

The fact that this pyramid has no base is interesting. The privative nature of evil might seem to make the point of the evanescence of all value the more understandable. Leibniz contented himself with saying that it descends "tousjours à l'infini" and we cannot press the illustration. For the Deity it is clear that the possible worlds decrease in value, so ipso facto do they become less possible worlds for Him. For worlds are possible only in proportion to their total quantitative value and "the best" is alone truly possible to God. Accordingly we may disregard the other possible worlds and say with Leibniz the pyramid has no base.

Behind the universe there is the purpose of God. For to say that God brings the world into existence by the fiat of His will is to use a word tautological with Purpose. There can be no act unless it is an act undertaken sub ratione boni. If the indelible mark of all theistic thought is "that the Will of God is a Will for the best possible", (Rashdall "Theory of Good and Evil. Vol. ii.p.292.), then there can be no two opinions about the quality of the theism of Leibniz. This is a very different proposition from "the immoral proposition that the Will of God, as revealed not in the moral consciousness but in the actual course of events, is the ethically best." (above).

Leibniz does, however, try to keep this important distinction clearly in view. It is one thing to say that "the Best" is the determining principle of all existence for God, it is very different to argue from this a priori to the goodness of any particular thing. The harmonious nature of reality emphasises the fact that the goodness of the whole does not necessarily mean the goodness of an individual part. Pope's couplet occurs to one:

"All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good."

As Leibniz puts it, if the least evil, which happens in the world, were taken away, it would no longer be the same world. This world all counted, all deducted, has been found the best by the creator
who has chosen it. ("Si le moindre mal, qui arrive dans le monde, y manquait, ce ne serait plus ce monde, qui tout compté, tout rebattu, a été trouvé le meilleur par le créateur qui l'a choisi" Théodicee. Par. 9. G.vi.p. 108). Thus Leibniz reminds us that the principle of "the Best" requires interpretation and to apply it in an arbitrary fashion is virtually to abandon it altogether. It was this point Plato makes in the opening of the 2nd. Book of the Republic where he says that as well as intrinsic goods in the world, there are also intrinsic goods whose results are good and things of which the results alone are good. In dealing with such a unity as the universe it is clear that some things which are not good in themselves; nevertheless are good in a secondary sense as means to good.

For Leibniz the world has an organic and inexpugnable unity. To suppose some new circumstance or feature is to suppose a different world. ("Mais si vous posés un cas qui ne diffère du monde actuel que dans une seule chose définie et dans ses suites, un certaine monde déterme vous répondera" (Théodicee. Par.414. G. vi.p.363.) Just as mathematicians speak of the locus of a point, so we can envisage a number of worlds which contain an event and vary its circumstances and consequences. ("une suite règlee de l'ondes, qui contiendront tous et seuls le cas dont il s'agit, et en varieront les circonstances et les conséquences. Théodicee.Par.414. 7.vi.p.363.)

It is as such a unity that the world is known and valued by God. Therefore the evil facts of our knowledge do not necessarily mean that the universe is evil. God, as we have already seen, cannot will evil as such. What evil there is in the world is never willed antecedently but consequently. Let us look at this in some detail:-

(1)Metaphysical Evil. The problem of metaphysical evil is nothing less than the fact of existence. The world by virtue of its being other and less than God has metaphysical evil. In this sense evil, as imperfection, is plainly unavoidable. Without this metaphysical imperfection the world could never attain to the perfection proper to it. Just as boats going with the stream have different speeds because of their weight and cargo and not because of the speed of the current itself, so God is the cause of the perfection in nature and in the actions of the creature. The limitation in the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the shortcomings of its action ("Le courant est la cause du mouvement du bateau, mais non pas de son retardement; Dieu est la cause de la perfection dans la nature et dans les actions de la créature, mais la limitation de la receptivité de la créature est la cause des défauts qu'il y a sans son action" (Théodicee.Par. 30. G. vi. p. 120.)
(2) Physical Evil. Physical evil is an inevitable consequence of moral evil. ("Il est fort raisonnable, de juger, que sans le mal moral il n'y aurait point de mal-physique des créatures raisonnables" Letter to Bourguet. 5 Aug. 1715). Often it has an incidence which we regard as anything but just. To this the Théodicee gives a two-fold answer. It points us to a future life as holding the promise of some adjustment of this balance. In the words of St. Paul "the sufferings of this present evil...are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed". Also, after the manner of the seed dying in the ground, they can be made to bear spiritual fruit and so increase our happiness. On the other hand, nothing is more greatly exaggerated than the apparent unhappiness in the world. It is false that ordinarily there is more unhappiness than happiness in life. ("Il est très faux qu'ordinairement il y a plus de malheur que de bonheur dans la vie" Bodemann p.112.) From this interpretation of "le bien physique" many of the misconceptions of Hume and others fall to the ground. Moreover it is quite contrary to the natural state of man to expect that he should ever enjoy a "perfect" happiness, either here or hereafter. ("Car comme un moindre de mal est une espèce de bien, de même un moindre bien est une espèce de mal" T. Par.9.)

Yet physical evils do abound. Leibniz would have us interpret their significance in the light of his great major premise- the essential goodness of God. We ought to hold that physical evils have a meaning and that part of this meaning at least is to prepare us for a greater happiness. ("l'on doit tenir pour certain que ces souffrances nous préparent un plus grand bonheur" Théodicee. Par. 241. C.vi.p.261.) The reason why we should reconcile ourselves to death is not the unhappiness of this life but the greater happiness of another. ("La raison, qui nous peut rendre la mort agréable, n'est pas le malheur de cette vie, mais le plus grand bonheur d'une autre" Bodemann p. 112.). We see that in this way the physical sufferings of mankind are "dans l'ordre" of the universe. They are part of the unity of the universe and as such they must be judged. Just as in mathematics we sometimes find what is apparently an irrational surd resolves its irrationality on further penetration and become clear and distinct, so with the pain and suffering of the world. They are the inevitable result of the working out of the general laws of the universe. And to interpret this we must remember that all individual events, without exception, are the consequences of natural laws. ("dans mes principes tous les événements individuels, sans exception, sont
In all this Leibniz is impressed by the way in which the regular nature of an irregular series or line can be expressed in a law or in an equation. In this way "nous fait jouir, pour ainsi dire, de la veue des idees de Dieu" (G.vi.p.262.) The sentence of S. Bernard expresses his meaning well "Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri aliiquid".

We must remember the complete harmony between the world of Nature and the world of Grace. So that we can say that, while the laws of the universe are inviolable, we must hold for certain that there is no crime which will not receive its punishment in proportion to its wrongdoing present or future. ("les lois de l'univers sont inviolables, et il faut tenir pour assure qu'il n'a point de crime qui ne recevra son chastiment a proportion des maux qu'il a faits, ou qu'on doit juger qu'il pourrait faire" ("Discours sur la Générosité" A.F.de Careil. p. 172. above.) For we must not think "that it is enough for the world as a whole to be perfect, although it may be that the human race is wretched, and that there is in the universe no regard for justice and no care for us, as is the opinion of some whose judgement regarding the totality of things is not quite just" On the Ultimate Origination of Things. Latta p. 348.) This is greatly extended when we are told by Leibniz that indestructibility is not to be confounded with immortality. Immortality is survival of personality. In other words it is that survival of moral identity which makes punishment and reward possible. (3). What profit would there be in becoming of a sudden King of Chine and at the same time forgetting what manner of man one had been (4).

From all this it is plain that God does not will physical evil "d'une manière absolue". When it is not a punishment merited by wrongdoing or as a means of preventing great evils or the obtaining greater good, it serves for amendment and example. Often, too, it serves for the greater appreciation of good and it can contribute to a greater perfection of soul. (5) Moreover the duration of physical evils (and indeed of moral evils) is so short in the light of eternity that they cannot hinder God from passing as beneficent and a lover of virtue. ("Les maux physiques et moraux du genre humain sont d'une durée si courte en comparaison de l'éternité, qu'ils ne peuvent pas empêcher que Dieu ne passe pour bénfaisant et pour ami de la vertu" p. 173.A.F.de Careil. Origene).

(3). Moral Evil.

"If plagues or earthquakes break not Heav'n's design, Why then a Borgia, or a Catiline?"

The conclusion of Leibniz is not unlike this argument of Pope, though the former, of course, recognises that we cannot always "account for moral as for nat'ral things". For Leibniz the crux of
moral evil is the delegated freedom of mankind. This is so important a subject that it requires a chapter on its own. (c.x.)

Moral evil has its place in the organic unity of the universe. To eliminate the possibility of evil is to change entirely the whole world. The universe, we have seen, is like an ocean, all of a piece; the least movement extends its effect far and wide. At times Leibniz carries this view of the essential harmony of the universe to dangerous lengths and jeopardises his ethical theism. (cf. "La perfection consiste dans l'harmonie, et souvent il faut reculer pour mei mieux sauter; il faut aussi considerer que le mal n'est pas mal absoluement c'est-à-dire à Dieu et à l'univers, mais à celui qui le fait".p.180. Remarques critiques de Leibniz sur le dictionnaire de Bayle above.) Yet he is far from endorsing the famous"pecca fortiter" of Luther.

The argument ab effectu is vital in dealing with moral evil. Since God created the world such as it is, it must be better with all its sin and unhappiness than the other possible worlds. We cannot show this in detail and we must rely upon the essential goodness of God. (6)

But it is important to see that God does not will this moral evil directly. Nor is it willed merely as a means to good or to hinder other evils. It is permitted only in so far as it is regarded "comme une suite certaine d'un devoir indispensable"(7) Yet in a sense God co-operates with it. So we can say, as we have seen before in G. vii. "Dieu concourt moralement, au mal moral, c'est à dire au peché, sans être auteur du peché, et même sans en être complice" Théodicée Par. 107. G.vi.p

It is in this light we must regard moral evil. In an important inédit Leibniz says "The principle of evil is not a substance, it is a possibility of things, it is that possibility which declares that among all the possible systems that one, which involves evil, is the best."("Le principe du mal n'est pas une substance, c'est la possibilite des choses, c'est cette possibilite qui porte que parmi tous les systemes possibles celui qui enveloppe le mal est le meilleur" p.184-5. Remarques critiques de Leibniz sur le dictionnaire de Bayle. A.F.de Careil above.)

The values God has in view in making the world, to be estimated in the light of His essential goodness, make it morally impossible for Him not to give a reluctant permission to evil. For to take away unconditionally the evil of the world is to take away the good as well. Moral evil is a hypothetical inevitability to "the best of all possible worlds" and God could not have acted morally otherwise than He has done. The sovereign
goodness of God made it that His antecedent will repelled all evil and moral evil more than any other. It was only admitted for superior and invincible reasons and its bad effects palliated by correctives. (8)

There is nothing accidental in man's sinning. It was clearly foreseen by God when He created man. It is the practical working out of the metaphysical imperfection of creaturliness. (9) But God, by His supereminent power, draws from this permitted sinning great benefits. ("Dieu par sa sureminent puissance tire de la permission des péchés des bâens plus grands" Theodicee Par. 11. G. vi. p. 199.) Yet God can never will moral evil as such. He permits it as an hypothetical necessity for the realisation of the best.

Just as there is nothing accidental in man's sinning, so there is nothing uncertain about the creative decree of God. No one would condone the action of a queen who, to prevent an expected rebellion in the state, committed or permitted a crime. But with God nothing is doubtful or adventurous. It is in this sense that God permits evil. God must choose the best or deny Himself. He must choose the best, even though moral evil is somehow essentially involved in it. (10) God, then, permits moral evil only as a sine qua non and even as such it can never be the object of His antecedent will. The consequent will of God, which has sin for its object, is only permissive. ("il ne veut que permettre le mal moral à titre du sine qua non ou de nécessité hypothétique, qui le lie avec le meilleur. C'est pourquoi la volonté conséquente de Dieu qui a le péché pour object, n'est que permissive" Theodicee. Par. 25. G. vi. p. 117.) It must be so, too, in the nature of things for evil is privative and not substantive. Bonum ex causa integre, malum ex quolibet defectu.

Great help is given to the elucidation of the place of evil in the universe of Leibniz by remembering that it is connected with his views on the laws of movement. For the correct understanding of Leibniz's doctrine of metaphysical, physical and moral evil, we must take into consideration that this whole theory hangs together in connection with his laws of movement. For general development and in order that the world in all its constituent parts, according to its destiny, should be the best - as it is the best before God who with one glance sees all - antagonism must be present; antagonism from which alone movement on physical as on spiritual and moral plane can arise and continue from the beginning of the world to the last conclusion of the realisation of the Divine plan. But from this it follows that over judgement about evil is never right neither in connection with physical or with moral evil, as our knowledge of the development as of physical and of the moral order of things is far too insufficient and limited." ("Die Theologie des Leibniz" Ficher 272.)
We have seen that "minds" are given a great place in the universe. Resembling most closely, as they do, their Supreme Author, "they are related to Him, not (like other things) as machines to their constructor, but as citizens to their prince; they are to last as long as the universe itself, and in a manner they express and concentrate the whole in themselves, so that it may be said that minds are whole parts (partes totales)" (On the Ultimate Origination of Things, p.349. Latta.) This being the case they afford us a key to the interpretation of the reason behind the universe. If human conduct is action undertaken sub ratione boni, the same must be pre-eminently true of the Divine initiative in creating the world.

The world is created by God because of its value. Moreover this value is not merely the aggregate value of its parts but the value of the dynamic and organic whole. Here synthesis and intuition are better guides than mere intellectual analysis. Here intellectual analysis is the cause of the problem of evil looming so large in the eyes of many e.g. Bayle. When we separate things bound together, parts from the whole, the human race from the universe, the attributes of God the one from the other, His power from His wisdom, it is possible to say that God could make virtue exist in the world without any mixture of vice and even that He could do it easily. But since He has permitted vice, it is necessary to believe that the order of the universe, found preferable to every other plan, demanded it. (11) It is along these lines that even moral evil finds its complete justification.

The rational soul is the microcosm of the macrocosm. It is not merely a mirror of the universe of created things but it is also an imperfect image of the Deity. "The (human) mind has not only a perception of the works of God, but is even capable of producing something like them on a small scale" "our soul is architectonic in its voluntary activities...it imitates in its own sphere, and in the little world in which it is allowed to act, what God performs in the great world" (cf. L'homme y est donc comme un petit Dieu dans son propre monde, ou Microcosme, qu'il gouverne à sa mode". Théodicee Par. 147,G.vi.p.197.)

The hedonistic interpretation of human conduct gives a further lucidity to this analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm. "Felicity is to persons what perfection is to things" "Discourse on Metaphysics" "Car la félicité est aux personnes ce que la perfection est aux estres" G.iv.p.462.) Pleasurable experience on action is a proof of the urge to perfection within ourselves. "Everything pleasant is sought for its own sake and whatever is sought for its own sake is pleasant" (Juris et aequi elementa. Mollat. p.50. Quoted Latta.p. 286. footnote). Even disinterested love (amor non mercenarius) can be interpreted in this way. For to love is to take pleasure in the happiness of another and this person's happiness becomes identified with our own. If this "tendency to perfection" is the key to all human action, it also throws a
strong light on the frequent statement of Leibniz that because God has chosen this world, it must be preferable to all other worlds. For if man cannot deny himself, this argument applies a fortiori to God.

If values, then, are final in the human sphere, they are still more so in the Divine. In the last resort they are relevant to Him in a way they can never be to man. For of God we can say, what we cannot say of man, that it is impossible for Him to have acted better than He has done. ("il faut juger qu'il n'est pas permis de faire autrement, puisqu'il n'est possible de faire mieux." Théodicée Par. 124, G.vi. p.178.)

To say that God has a "sufficient reason" for everything he does, is not to say that He has any want or imperfection in Himself. God is absolutely perfect and self-sufficient. God acts from no other motive than to communicate His goodness. But, unlike King, Leibniz refuses to interpret this as a liberty of indifference. The qualities of the objects, comprised in their ideas, make the reason of His choice. (12).

Further we must not assume that all values are moral values, though these must have a predominant place in "the plan of God". The human soul has no windows through which to perceive the world; it is a living mirror of the universe but it can only mirror the universe from a particular point of view. Only God Himself can have a complete knowledge of all the values of the universe.

The reasons for God's choice of this actual universe cannot be traced to a single rule that we are able to conceive, e.g. "dans le bon ou dans le mauvais naturel des hommes" (Théodicée Par. 103, G.vi. p.100.) "Les hommes sont choisis et rangés non pas suivant leur excellence, qu'ayant la convenance qu'ils ont avec le plan de Dieu" Théodicée Par. 105, G.vi. p.161.) We have already seen that for Leibniz "la perfection de l'univers" is the dominant consideration with God and that man has an importance within this ideal. The difficulties in this view need no repetition here. Virtue is the most noble quality of created things but it is not the only good quality of creatures. There are an infinity of other qualities which draw the choice of God. If virtue alone was considered or reasonable creatures alone were considered there would be less good. There is a satiety in the multiplication of the same thing endlessly. (13)

But the infinite "perfection" of God is a safeguard that the interests of man can never ultimately be worsted in the universe. "The one universe will not be sufficiently perfect unless the interests of individuals are attended to, while the universal harmony is preserved" ("On the Ultimate Origination of Things" p. 348. Latta.)
God, then, for Leibniz is the connecting link between "the best of all possible worlds" in idea and the existing universe. The Deity is the guarantor of the dominance in the universe of the highest values. When we come to consider the relation of the values of this and all other worlds of value to God we raise questions to which Leibniz attempts to provide an adequate answer.

We have already seen that, according to Leibniz, values are absolute to God. Unlike Descartes he will not hold that "to say that these truths are independent of God is to speak of God as a Jupiter or a Saturn and to subject Him to Styx and the Fates" (Letter to Père Mersenne-Cousin. Vol. vi.p.109.)

A good illustration of the opinion of Leibniz on this point comes to hand in some remarks he makes in his Jurs et aequie elementa. (see Mollat. p. 24. Quoted by Latta p. 283. footnote). "Justice consists in a certain congruity and proportion, the just may have meaning, although there may neither be any one who practises justice nor any one towards whom it is practised, just as the ratios of numbers are true, although there may be neither any one who numbers nor anything which is numbered, and it may be predicted of a house that it will be beautiful, of a machine that it will be effective, of a commonwealth that it will be happy, if it comes into existence, although it may never come into existence". The same must hold true also of the whole infinite gamut of possible worlds envisaged by God.

For Leibniz there is no such thing as a "bare" possibility. Since possibilities as such have a definite relation to a Necessary Existent it is clear that this can never be the case. As C.D. Broad (in his "Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy. Vol.I.p.55) states the theory of Leibniz:- (1) There is one Existent whose existence is a necessary consequence of its nature. (ii) The being of all possibilities, whether actualised or not, depends on the nature and existence of the Necessarily Existent. (iii). Not all possibilities are realised. (iv). The actualisation of those possibilities which are actualised depends on the volition of the Necessarily Existent"

According to McTaggart possibility as such must have either an epistemic or an ontological meaning. If this is so then "it is not the case, as is sometimes supposed, that what is actually existent is surrounded by a sort of framework of possibilities of existence, which limit what does exist, and do not depend on it". (Par. 40, "Nature of Existence"). As Broad points out, on this point there is a fundamental agreement between Leibniz and McTaggart and "there is plainly nothing in McTaggart's conclusion which might not have been cheerfully admitted by Leibniz" (p.55. above.) For according to Leibniz possibility has a definite relation to the existent both in itself and in the mind of God.
Possibility for Leibniz is not merely a negative something. "Possibles are possible before all actual decrees of God, but not without sometimes supposing the same decrees taken as possible. For the possibilities of individuals or of contingent truths contain in their notion the possibility of their causes, to wit, the free decrees of God; in which they are different from the possibilities of species or eternal truths, which depend upon only the understanding of God, without involving his will" G.ii.p.51. Quoted B. Russell p.27 above. To think of anything, save eternal truths, sub ratione possibilitatis, is to think of a definite relation to things already existing and to time. (see G.ii.39. (14)

God's understanding "is the source of essences and His will is the origin of existences" (Théodicée Par. 7. G.vi.p.107.) Beyond this statement Leibniz never goes. Yet this does not imply that God is the author of essences in so far as they are only possibilities, though it is true that upon God must fall the responsibility for the existing world. (Théodicée. Par. 335. G.vi. p.314.). In other words this world is "the best of all possible worlds" because with the Divine initiative behind the universe the bonum is co-extensive with the faciendum. For the causal relation between the world and its Creator is synthetic and not necessary (though causality itself is necessary in all possible worlds). Moreover it can only be explained in terms of "finality" i.e. by regarding the cause as in some way motivated sub ratione boni.

In other words behind the world there is a Person. This is another way of saying that the world is the expression of a Purpose. But the compossi bility implied by such a purpose inevitably spells the possibility of evil. "There were an infinity of possible ways of creating the world according to the different plans which God might have formed and each possible world depends upon certain principal plans or designs of God that are his own; that is to say upon certain primary free decrees conceived sub ratione possibilitatis, or upon certain laws of the general order of this possible universe with which they agree and whose concept they determine. At the same time they determine the concepts of all individual substances which ought to enter into this same universe". (Letter to Arnauld 1686. Open Court Translat.p.124.) It is in accordance with this that we find the creaturly imperfection of man making the inevitability of moral evil in the universe. It is along these lines that it is possible fully to exculpate God. (15)

Thus we find ourselves back at the major premise of all Leibnizian argument, the nature of God. Without His Understanding values and possibilities could not exist, yet they do not depend on His will. Without Him not only could nothing exist but nothing would be possible. About everything else we can say "c'est parce que Dieu a fait agir toute sa bonté, que l'exercice de sa toute puissance a été conforme aux loix de la sagesse, pour obtenir le plus de bien qu'il étoit possible d'atteindre" (Theodicee. Par. 359. G.vi.p.328.)
The evident care Leibniz bestowed in rebutting anticipated criticism helps us to realise not only the intrinsic importance which he himself attached to his beliefs but also their crucial relevance to his own answer to the problem of evil. These criticisms began to take voice during the later years of his life. In almost the latest of his writings we find him defending himself against these objections. (5th. Paper to Clarke (1). This criticism of Leibniz results largely from a preoccupation with his theory of knowledge. The laws of contradiction, sufficient reason and final causes are held to distinguish three kinds of knowledge. The latter in particular is held to transmute the apparent contingency of the world into the alleged necessity for the working out of the purpose of God.

And, indeed, if freedom is illusory then the problem of evil cannot arise, since it must be a vox nihili. For there could be no other copula for propositions dealing with conduct than "is" and "is not". Nor is there any help in speaking of "metaphysical freedom" and reducing both man and God to "complete nulities." (Unedited Letter without address or date. Bodemann. Trans. Everyman p. 252.) It is only when we gave a rational interpretation of human and Divine freedom alike that we really come to grips with the issues of the problem of evil.

The question of freedom, then, is of more than speculative interest, it is crucial to the solution of the problem of evil. For ever, as Leibniz realised perhaps more than most by reason of the many political and theological interests of his life, it has a practical relevancy to the tasks of daily life and the moral advancement of the human race. As we shall see, it was a question much "in the air" of the 17th c.

It is exceedingly difficult to regard "fatalism" as the last word of Leibniz on the question of freedom. As A. Foucher de Careil points out in his book ("Nouvelles Lettres et Opuscules inédits de Leibniz" 1887. Introduction p.L) Leibniz had an early stage in his philosophical career espoused something like "fatalism"
as his letters to Hobbes reveal. He himself tells us "Mirifice mihi placuerat liber Lutheri De servo arbitrio" (p.xiix.). But after reading the fragment De Libertate (above, p.178.) and bearing in mind the explicit statements elsewhere (including his disavowal of his letters to Hobbes) it is not difficult not to endorse the judgment of P. A. F. de Careil "Je ne puis lire ces paroles, si fortes et si précises sans m'étonner de la facilité qu'on a dans les expositions de son système à lui imputer le fatalisme. En vérité, s'il se retourne à son ancienne erreur, après une dénégation si formelle, il faut supposer ou bien que Leibniz redeviendra fataliste sans le savoir, ce qui est équivalent à un non-sens, quand il s'agit d'un tel homme, ou bien, qu'après avoir échappé à cette première crise, qui fut si terrible, il ira de nouveau se jeter dans ces abîmes dont il est heureusement sorti". (p.L. above).

In his teaching on freedom Leibniz is once again the apostle of a via media between determinism on the one hand and libertinism on the other, and, in comparison with the tenets of both these schools, there can be no doubt about the life and vitality of his ideas. "The dead hand" of the predestinarian doctrines of the Reformers paralysed intellectually, where the reactionary Libertinism paralysed morally. It is no disparagement to the powers of Leibniz as a thinker that the milieu in which he envisaged the problem and indeed the answer he gave it was in some sense dictated by the controversial arguments of the times. Such is only what we might expect.

In his "Theory of Good and Evil" (Vol. ii. p.308-9.) Rashdall reminds us of three senses in which the word "freedom" has philosophic- al usage.:- (1) The Kantian sense of "free" as "rationally determined" (2). "Good and bad acts alike may be regarded as free by all who recognise a difference between mechanical causality and the causality of a permanent spiritual self. In this sense Freedom implies the power of self-determination, but does not necessarily involve the existence of undetermined beginnings in the stream of volitions which make up a man's inner life" (3) "Freedom may be used to imply a power of absolutely undetermined choice in the self, a power of originating acts which have absolutely no connexion with or relation to the self as it was before the act". According to Rashdall "Leibniz has also added much to the confusion by trying to persuade other people, and perhaps himself, that he was an indeterminist when most of his arguments only go to establish freedom in the second of the two senses distinguished in the text."

It may be helpful to bear these three meanings of freedom in mind and especially (2) and (3). Freedom in the sense of (3) as the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae comes in for the special castigation of Leibniz. He regards it as the fertile matrix of much loose thinking and the bane of philosophical argument. This false idea of freedom only pleases, according to Leibniz, those Scholastics who take "the grain of terminology for the grain of reality" ("la paille des termes pour le grain des choses"). It is like the gift with which the Cartesians and the mystics endow God, the gift of doing impossibilities. (2)
For Leibniz freedom is self-determination. There is always a reason which "inlines the will". To show that the will ought to be excepted it would be necessary to have a means of determining the limitation of that principle a priori. This we can never find; and any foundation which might be adduced for such a distinction will always go further than we wish. It, therefore, seems to me that we do not need to seek even this exception, and that free choice is not incompatible with the general principle I have just established" (Unedited letter without address or date. Bodemann. Trans. Everyman. p. 251.)

Bayle, according to Leibniz, had stated the issue on this question of freedom imperfectly when he said that there were two and only two alternatives. Either the distinct causes of the soul which concur with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; or they determine it to act in such a way that it cannot help itself. In his "De Libertate" (See H. Foucher de Careil p. Lii.) Leibniz speaks of being delivered from this last fatalistic view as from a precipice "ab hoc praecipitio me retraxit". The study of Plato had some influence in this direction, though Leibniz himself speaks of the influence of the mathematical idea of infinity as affording an unexpected light "Tandem nova quaedam atque inexpectata lux oborta est unde minime sperabam: ex consideration bus scilicet mathematicis de natura infinite" -("De libertate" p.179-180 L.F. de Careil above.) To these two alternatives, Leibniz says, there is an alternative. This is that the determination of the soul does not come from the concourse of all the distinct causes of the soul but other considerations such as the state of the soul itself, its inclinations; the impressions of the senses have their effect as well. The soul is never necessitated, since it involves no contradiction to think of it acting otherwise. In other words it is inclined and not necessitated. (3)

Freedom, then, for Leibniz is neither absence of restraint nor the liberty of indifference ("la liberte est exempt non seulement de la contrainte, mais encore de la necessite, quoyqu'elle ne soit jamais sans la certitude infallible, ou sans la determination inclinante" Théodicée Par. 280. G.vi.p.288.) This is true both of God and of man, the only difference being that man's choice of the best is often superficial, if indeed, in the case of man, we can always speak of a choice at all. (4).

This freedom is further clarified by psychological analysis. There are three partners in the soul's freedom- 1st. intelligence which involves a distinct knowledge of the object of deliberation, 2nd. spontaneity, with which we determine ourselves, and 3rd. contingency or the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity. But the intelligence is the soul of liberty, all the rest is the body or base. ("L'intelligence est comme l'ame de la liberte, et le reste est comme le corps et la base" Théodicée. Par. 288.G.vi. p. 288.) In all freedom we find these three elements. For practical purposes we may say that "Freedom is Spontaneity & intelligence" (see Latta. p.145), provided we remember always that we are dealing
Freedom in Man.

The Monad character of the human soul makes it independent of everything in the universe save God alone. There is no interaction of any kind. "bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no soul, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other" (Monad. Par. 81.) "Each mind, being like a small divinity in its own sphere." (Monad. Par. 83.)

This Monad and metaphysical isolation of the human soul makes sure its inalienable birth right of freedom. For this reason Leibniz asserts that his system of Pre-established Harmony is the great Cus'todian of the independence and liberty of man (cf. "Jamais système n'a mis nostre élévation dans une plus grande evidence" System Nouveau. G.iv.p.485.) Though all Monads "have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out" (Monad. Par. 7.) and consequently "the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being" (Monad. Par.ii.), and though to this extent all Monads have freedom of a kind, yet it is only in man and a fortiori in God that we see this freedom raised to its highest power. The lowest freedom is appetition (Monad. Par.15.) and the highest the self-determination of God. In the case of man as an intelligent and free substance "appetition" becomes "un Empire sur ses actions" (Théodicée Par.290.G.vi.p 289.)

The human will, as we have seen, has as its "soul" intelligence. In this respect Descartes was mistaken in giving the primacy to the "will" in evil. But "la Réison" between judgment and will is not so necessary as is sometimes thought. In the second place the judgment of the human intelligence has its limitations. (5) So evil rears her hydraheaded body in the world. We find ourselves e.g. often willing a temporary good instead of willing what would really please us if the eyes of our understanding were open. (cf. "Nous ne voulons à la vérité que ce qui nous plaît:mais par malheur ce qui nous plaît à présent, est souvent un vray mal, qui nous déplairoit, si nous avions les yeux de l'entendement ouverts. Théodicée Par. 289. G.vi.p. 289.) Though freedom is thus limited in these two ways, it is not negated. It is primarily an achievement and not a possession.

The freedom of the human will is thus often "un cordon de soye" for man to hang himself. (Par.121.G.vi.p.174.) It is only right that we should ask what justification there can be for such a gift. We have already seen something of the general reply of Leibniz to this question. Briefly the answer is that such freedom is an inevitable part of creaturilness (Par. 120.). To take away freedom is to destroy rational creatures. Moreover God cannot preoccupy Himself with the concerns of man alone.
The true use of the human understanding is the natural means for the good use of man's freedom. Unfortunately man has not always got the good will for such a use of his understanding and is often unwilling to strive after those indirect ways in which such a good will can be cultivated. When we ask God why God has not created man with such "une bonne volonté" Leibniz makes his usual reply that it is not necessary and it is not "faisible" that reasonable creatures should have a perfection which brings them near Divinity. (6)

If the effort to act in accordance with judgement makes the essence of will, as Leibniz says, ("L'effort d'agir après le jugement fait à mon avis l'essence de la volonté. Théodicée. Par. 311. G. vi.p. 301.") it also, in the case of man, makes for its morally unsatisfactory quality. Unlike the clear and distinct perception of a truth which contains within itself an affirmation of that truth, in the case of the will there is a long journey from the spirit to the heart. ("Il y a un si grand trajet de l'esprit au coeur"). During this process many delays, changes of direction and thwartings may occur. The understanding, for the greater part, can only proceed by deaf thoughts, little capable of influence. ("Sur tout lorsque l'entendement ne procède en bonne partie que par des pensees sourdes, peu capable de toucher" Théodicée. Par. 311. G. vi.p. 301.)

Accordingly, apart from the limitations of man's understanding, we must also recognize that the perception of a good does not always lead to its enactment in morally good conduct. If e.g. geometry opposed itself to our own present interests and passions as morality does, then we should dispute and transgress against it in spite of all the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes. These we should regard-dreams and full of paralogisms. (7) It is only in so far as man can overcome his passions that he begins to have freedom. In this sense as the Stoics taught only the wise man is free. For he alone can act with deliberation. (8)

In this way Leibniz gives his explanation of the evil resulting from man's freedom. Not only the limitation of the understanding of man but also the lack of "résolutions efficaces" explain his failure to be better than he is. Accordingly we must strive to make it a rule always to follow the dictates of reason as the only sure and certain guide. (9) Only in this way is it possible to gain the mastery over one's passions and make virtue second nature. We must continually ask the question "dic cur hic, respice finem" (N.E. Bk. ii.c. 21.). The free will of man goes naturally to the good and it does evil because evil is often hidden under and masked by the apparent good. ("ce mal est cache sous le bien, et comme masque") We see the result of this distortion by the passions in the well known words of Ovid:-

Vide meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.

(See Théodicée Par. 154.
G. v.p. 171.)
Thus Leibniz tries to explain how evil results from the nature of man's freedom. It is all capable of explanation. For though the man is never in a state of perfect equilibrium, there is no arbitrariness about his actions. If he is not determined "nécessairement", he is determined "certainement". (Par. 371. Théodicée). It is quite another matter, however, whether man himself can give an account of the reasons for his conduct. As we have seen it is not merely a question of the reasons of his understanding but how those reasons appeal to him at the time, the mood or whim of his soul. And this mood or whim of the soul is the result of past acts of choice and the selective nature of his attention to the world around him. It is an imperfection in our liberty that we can choose evil instead of good, a greater evil instead of a less. It is quite otherwise with God who has perfect knowledge of the good and is immediately determined by it. (10)

The question must now be faced how far there is scope for freedom in the Leibnizian universe. In particular can human freedom co-exist with predictability? The answer of Leibniz is that the doctrine of the pre-established harmony makes no difference to the fact of freedom. The rational soul in its ideal nature has all the reasons for its determinations within itself. By this it is determined from all eternity to act freely when it reaches existence. (11) In other words there can be no conflict between foreknowledge and freedom. The fact of knowledge in advance cannot alter the nature of a future event and the same is true of "le mot tout-puissant de Fiat". ("Ainsi ce qui est contingent et libre, ne le demeure pas moins sous les décrets de Dieu, que sous la prédiction" Théodicée Par. 52.G.vi.p.161.)

It is to be noted that the position of Leibniz is that there is predictability in detail. He is not content to say that the total possibilities in general are fixed. If there was fixity of the total possibilities of the world in general, then as Jard points out contingencies within these possibilities might be open. But this "Pluralist's Via media" cannot be applied to Leibniz.

This "Pluralist's Via Media" mediates between a complete and exhaustive pre-determination in detail, like the creation of a symphony, on the one hand and on the other the adventurous contingency of the actions of creatures to which no prescience on the part of God can extend. "Is God then not the composer it will reasonably be asked: are we not assuming that the world is his creation? Or has he only devised an Aeolian harp and left the winds of chance to call the tune, being himself then only an auditor?" ("Realm of Ends" p. 315.) The answer of Jard is that neither of these extremes is adequate. "All is not decreed: the world is not created like a symphony. Again, all possibilities are not left open: the Many have not severally unlimited freedom, that "freedom of indifference" which is indistinguishable from chance. God's creatures are creators, the pluralist maintains: their nature is partly his doing, partly their own: he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them. Not everything that is possible is possible to any, yet some initiative is open
to every one: none are left with no talent at all. The total possibilities, then, however far back we go, are fixed; but within these, contingencies, however far forward we go, are open" (p. 315 above.)

With Leibniz, however, it is hard to see how any possibilities are open in this Mardian sense. The pre-established harmony leaves nothing to chance as indeed its very name implies. So far from doing any prejudice to liberty, nothing according to Leibniz is more favourable to it.

For according to Leibniz it is not enough to rely on the Cartesian contention of the intuition of freedom as a proof of its reality. For one thing self-consciousness is not co-extensive with life. Moreover we cannot say, as they did, that we know by reason that there is a Providence and we know by experience that we have freedom, while no attempt is made to reconcile these two truths. (12) Not so can we cut the Gordian knot. (Théodicée Far. 293.)

The soul, then, according to Leibniz is "une espèce d'automate spirituel". But it is important to bear in mind his distinction between "metaphysical" and "moral" determination. The future is certain but not metaphysically necessary. Neither the future, all certain as it is, nor the infallible foresight of God, nor the predetermination of causes not the decrees of God destroy this contingency and liberty. (13)

Everything in this much despised argument of Leibniz depends upon one's starting point. If we stress the theism of Leibniz, such an argument as the above seems to be perfectly in line with the metaphysical attributes of the Deity- Omniscience and Omnipotence. It is the old crux of the Many and the One. There is war in the Leibnizian heaven between God and the Monads. To start from the Monads in the "Monadology" e.g. can be made logically lead to a different conclusion from the argument of the Théodicée where we start from God. This difference of emphasis is exactly what our examination reveals. Owing to the continued neglect of the Théodicée as a serious writing of Leibniz, many philosophers have been content conveniently to recognise Leibniz the pluivist and forget Leibniz the theist.

Moreover it is a mistake to regard this problem as peculiarly Leibnizian. The relation of the Deity to the Monads is the old crux of the relation between Omniscience and Freedom writ "monadologically" (so to say). It is a theological difficulty debated in philosophical terms.

There are some denouements of this problem which Leibniz might have adopted but refused. We have seen how he refused to accept the Cartesian attitude towards the problem. Other avenues of escape were closed to him by virtue of his suppositions. In particular the Supralapsarian and the Infralapsarian teachings are
The non-temporal character of the Divine foresight (if one may so speak) safeguards the Sovereignty of the Divine Being more than it elucidates the complex problem of human freedom. It makes the evolution of the universe appear something in the nature of the rehearsal of an already composed symphony. This is apparently the definite conclusion of Leibniz and one which, in his view, does no despite to the cause of freedom but rather gives it an assured rational foundation.

The grave difficulties, if not inconsistencies, in the treatment of Leibniz of the question of freedom are fairly obvious. But they lend themselves to very diverse interpretations. According to Bertrand Russell the Ethics of Leibniz is "a mass of inconsistencies, due partly to indifference, partly to a deference for Christian moralists". (p.191. The Philosophy of Leibniz). Disputatious as this statement is, it is surely hard to continue to speak of his "discreditable subterfuges" (p.197. above.) It is impossible to come to any conclusion of the insincerity of Leibniz. For ever he conceived himself to be a defender of the Christian faith. And his idea of God, the ultimate major premise of his argument, is as much a vital part of his philosophy as any other tenet. His preoccupation with the problem of freedom is a proof of this. At times the Leibnizian machinery may creak and groan under "the burden of the mystery", but this is no unique state of things. On the contrary, it is what we should expect to be the case. The pre-established harmony e.g. may fail to convince us of its usefulness as a philosophical theory. But there is hardly any ground for supposing that to Leibniz it was anything but a new and splendid hypothesis to justify the ways of God with man.

A more balanced verdict on this part of the philosophy of Leibniz and one that does less violence to the ipsissima verba, on which alone we can rely, is that of a recent commentator: "Dans la pensée de Leibniz, l'explication rationnelle de la loi du devoir ne se sépare pas de la foi chrétienne, à laquelle il était..."
fermément attaché, ne du sentiment de la soumission due à l'autorité divine. L'ideal qu'il propose à la volonté de l'homme, comme sa fin suprême, n'a-t-il pas sa pleine réalisation en Dieu, en qui résident souverainement tout bien et toute perfection? ....... intelligence nette, vigoureuse et largement comprensive, Leibniz, il faut le reconnaître, fut un écrivain manifestement moins désireux de plaire et de séduire, que de convaincre. Absorbé par des travaux qui lui laissaient peu de loisirs, il ne disposait pas toujours du temps nécessaire pour les parfaire dans une rédacon pleinement adéquate à sa pensée. Aussi est-il parfois difficile à suivre, à travers les développements un peu touffus d'une oeuvre prodigieusement vaste et diverse" (Preface, p. vi. "La morale de Leibniz" L. Le Chevallier. Paris. 1933.)

Freedom in God.

The correspondence between Leibniz and Arnauld is, as H. Wildon Carr says ('A Theory of Monad's. 1922, p. 108.) an illustration of the way the conception of God not only formed the main problem of the but limited the horizon of the philosophers of the seventeenth century". Arnauld, the theological head of the Sorbonne, singles out the peculiar Leibnizian doctrine of individuality" and shows that it makes creation as taught in the theology of Christianity inconceivable and the whole scheme of redemption unmeaning" (p.109. above.)

Nowhere is this remark more debated than the question of the general freedom of the Divine initiative. We have already seen that the arguments that apply to the case of man apply a fortiori to the case of the Deity. Man is the mirror of the Divine creativeness. As a rational spirit he is a member of the Kingdom of Grace and subject to its laws. Thus the relation of God to man is the relation of a Prince to his subjects or a father to his children. "Minds or rational souls are like little gods, made in the image of God and having within them some ray of the Divine enlightenment". For this reason God governs minds as a prince governs his subjects, and indeed as a father looks after his children; while on the other hand, he deals with other substances as an engineer works with his machines. Thus minds have special laws which put them above the revolutions of matter through the very order which God has put in them; and it may be said that everything else is made only for them. The revolutions of matter being arranged for the felicity of the good and the punishment of the wicked. (New System Par. 5. Latta, p. 304.) Because minds are not only living images of the universe of God created things but also images of the Deity or Author of nature Himself, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and to some extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples (échantillons), each mind being like as small divinity in its own sphere" (Monad. Par. 83. Latta p. 266.); because of this unique fellowship and similarity the freedom of God must be simply the freedom of man writ large,
In his discussion of the freedom of God Leibniz seems to have most in view the Socinian idea of the Deity. This teaching popularised in the 17th century the 12th century doctrine of Duns Scot's on the primacy of the Will among the Divine Attributes. The Will, according to the Socinian idea of God, was an arbitrium imperium and this coupled with Omnipotence meant that God did not require to exercise any foresight and still less any detailed providence of the future. ("la prescience des contingens futurs, et la providence qui regle et gouverne les choses en detail"). 5th Paper to Clarke. G.vii. p. 390.) The sole difference on the Socinian view between the freedom of God and the freedom of man is that the Deity has an absolutum Dominium, while man has not. The Racovian catechism gives a clear statement of this teaching: "God's dominion comprises a right and supreme authority to determine whatsoever He may choose (and He cannot choose what is in its own nature evil and unjust) in respect to us and to all other things and also in respect to those matters which no other authority can reach" (Pcr.3. Eng. Edit. 1652.)

This idea of freedom in God had a great influence upon the 17th century and it is difficult to see the points Leibniz makes unless we remember that it is always in the background of his thinking. It was a tenet that troubled the whole mind of the century. God was not only above but also beyond, all doctrinal statements of his relations with man and the universe. Dextra Domini fecit virtutem.

If Leibniz was opposed to this doctrine of Socinianism, he was equally opposed to the Necessitarianism of Spinoza and Hobbes not to mention others. God for Leibniz, as we have so often seen already, can never be a synonym for an impersonal and ruthless Necessity. "Contingency" in the world is a fact. For this reason there are only "consequences" and not "connexions necessaires" in the world of nature. (Letter to Bourguet. 1716. G.iii.p.419.) Even the laws of motion alone are a sufficient refutation of this teaching for they themselves are a proof of a wise and free Being against the system of absolute and brute necessity of Straton or of Spinoza. ("ces belles loix sont une preuve merveilleuse d'un etre intelligent et libre, contre le systeme de la necessite absolue et brute de Straton ou de Spinoza" Theodicee. Par. 345. G.vi.p.319.) They have no geometrical necessity", "since they originate from the will of God, regulated by wisdom".

So far we have considered two alternatives in regard to the Divine Will:-(1) The Socinian idea of the Divine Will as "quelque chose d'arbitraire absolulement".(2) The Hobbes and Spinozistic idea of "une necessite brute et geometricque" (Theodicee Par. 371.G.vi.p. 336.) whether in the case of Hobbes this is reduced to matter and the laws of mathematics or in the case of Spinoza "une puissance aveugle. de laquelle tout emanee necessairement" (above). The third alternative(3) is "une necessite moral" dependent upon final causes. ("une necessite morale, qui vient du choix libre de la sagesse par rapport aux causes finales" Theodicee. Par. 349. G.vi.p.321.)

On mature consideration we must realise, says Leibniz, that
that (3) is the only solution. A liberty of indifference is impossible. It cannot be found anywhere, not even in God. For God is determined by himself to do always the best. And creatures are always determined by internal or external reasons (Libertas indifferentiae est impossibilis. Adeo ut ne in Deum quidem cadat, nam determinatus ille ad optimum efficiendum, et creatura semper ex rationis externisque determinatur." Initia et Specimen Scientiae novae Generalis. G.vii.p.109. Short Paper on Liberty. See Russell p. 193-4.) Further the second alternative is equally ruled out by a similar argument. For, God being the freest and most perfect substance, is also the most completely determined by himself alone. ("Deus cum sit perfectissimus adeoque liberrimus, determinatur ex se solo" above. G.vii.p.109.) Accordingly we are left only with our third alternative as a means of doing justice to the nature of the Divine freedom.

The confusion of these differing conceptions of the working of the Divine will is in the opinion of Leibniz the most common way of darkening counsel. It is a mistake to regard (1) and (2) as covering the whole ground. "Une heureuse nécessité" is alone worthy of the Divine Perfection. God is inclined and not necessitated in the crude sense.

The "freedom" of the Socinian idea of the Deity in particular as "demonte chaque jour par les événemens, vivant au jour la journée" (G.vi.p.331.)--is unworthy not only of the Divine Being but also of the ability and spirit of the writers of this group. ("Lais l'idée qu'ils ont de Dieu, est indigné de l'auteur des choses, et répond peu à l'habileté et à l'esprit que les Écrivains de ce parti font souvent paraître en quelques discussions particulières" Théodicee. Par. 364. G.vi.p.330-1.) To suppose that the effect cannot be seen in the causes—ce qui est une grande absurdité (above).

For Leibniz the world is the special field of the Divine freedom and the world may be defined as the sum total of existing things (toute la suite et toute la collection de toutes les choses existantes" Théodicee Par.6. G.vi.p.107). With this definition in mind, it is clear, as Leibniz says, that all times and places could be filled in an infinite number of ways and that an infinite number of worlds are possible. But God has chosen the best among all these possibilities. Moreover if there were not a best among all these possible worlds God would not have produced any. ("on peut dire de même en matière de parfaite sagesse, qui n'est pas moins réglée que les mathématiques, que s'il n'y avait pas le meilleur (optimum) parmi tous les mondes possibles, Dieu n'en aurait produit aucun" (above).

Yet a mere mathematical maximum or minimum in itself will produce nothing. It is only when we realise that this supreme wisdom, joined to a goodness which is not less infinite than itself, could not fail to chose the best ("cette suprême sagesse, jointe à une bonté qui n'est pas moins infinie qu'elle, n'a pu manquer de choisir le meilleur") that we reach the soul, as it were, of the Divine initiative. This is to be found in His goodness. As Leibniz
says everyone ought to agree the phrase is noteworthy—that God is
perfectly good and just, that His goodness made him contribute the
least that is possible to render men blameworthy and the most that
is possible to that which can save them. ("Tout le monde doit convenir
que Dieu est parfaitement bon et juste, que sa bonté le fait
contribuer le moins qu'il est possible à ce qui peut rendre les
hommes coupables, et le plus qu'il est possible à ce qui sert à les

It is clear that for Leibniz liberty can be defined as
a modern writer has defined it—"liberty is control of the parts by
the whole which they constitute" (Lens Creatrix. J?Temple. p. 213.) It
is along these lines that we can explain the imperfect personality
of man and the perfect personality of God.

In expounding this view of the Divine freedom Leibniz
meets several criticisms which readily suggest themselves. These
answers we have already seen in part.

The most common objection to this argument of Leibniz to-day
is that formulated by Bayle. Bayle's criticism is that to suppose
the Divine choice to be regulated by the optimum of the Divine wisdom
is the virtual abandonment of there being any choice at all. It is
to regard the goodness and the power of God as shut up within
narrow confines. "que la bonté et que la puissance de Dieu sont
renfermées dans des bornes assez étroites" Théodicée. Par. 227. 3. vi.
p. 253.) The reply of Leibniz is that the power of God extends "ad
maximum, ad omnia" so far as it implies no contradiction and no
limit can be given to goodness since it goes ad optimum. ("l'on ne
donne point de bornes à la puissance de Dieu, puisqu'on reconnaît
qu'elle s'étend ad maximum, ad omnia, à tout ce qui n'implique
aucune contradiction: et l'on n'en donne point à sa bonté, puisqu'elle
va au meilleur, ad optimum." Théodicée. Par. 227. 3. vi. p. 253.)

It is God's goodness which leads Him to create in order
to communicate something of Himself and this same goodness united
with wisdom leads Him to create the best. This is no necessity since
what is not chosen is not impossible. To say that one cannot do a
thing, solely because one does not wish it is to abuse terms. The
wise man wishes the good alone but he is not therefore a slave.
Servitude comes from without, it impels us to that which displeases
and above all to that which displeases with reason. The force of
another and our passions render us slaves. God is never moved by
anything outside Himself, he is not subject to passions and never
swayed to that which displeases him. (15)

So far from this overflow of the Divine nature being
destructive of freedom, it is really its self-expression. Without
it God would be other than he is and would contradict himself.
("ce présentendu fatum, qui oblige même la Divinité, n'est autre chose que la propre nature de Dieu, son propre entendement, qui fournit les règles à sa sagesse et à sa bonté; c'est une heureuse nécessité, sans laquelle il ne serait ny bon ny sage" Théodicee Par. 191. 3. vi. p. 230.) Formerly Payle agreed with Malebranche on this question of God and "la règle du meilleur". But Arnauld's criticism of Malebranche on this point, together with Payle's penchant for doubting, which age seemed to have increased, led him to alter his opinion on this matter. ("son penchant à douter, qui s'est augmenté en luy avec l'âge, a contribué, "Théodicee. Par. 203. G. vi.p.238.)

So far again from "eternal truths" limiting the freedom of God, while they do not depend upon the mind of God for their truth, they do depend upon it for their existence. They make up God's understanding and he cannot but act in accordance with his nature. (See Théodicee Par. 189.3.vi.p.229. ) These "eternal truths" would not subsist, if there was not a Divine Understanding, where they found themselves realised, so to speak.

In answer to the criticism of Arnauld on the Leibnizian doctrine of individuality as making inconceivable the whole Christian teaching on creation, Leibniz replies that such a view is inevitable. Any other opinion would be tantamount to destroying the whole idea of God altogether. As Leibniz says if Arnauld has the leisure to ponder well what he agreed about the concept of an individual substance, he will find that the rest of his interpretation of God and the universe must follow from this premise. ("Si vous pouviez avoir le loisir de revoir un jour ce que nous avions enfin établi touchant la notion d'une substance individuelle, vous trouveriez peut-être qu'en me donnant ces commencements, on est obligé dans la suite de m'accorder tout le reste". Leibniz to Arnauld. Sept. 1687. G.ii.p.127.) In an earlier letter Arnauld had said that he had been much struck with the Leibnizian principle that in every proposition the concept of the attributes is comprised in some way in that of the subject. ("J'ay sur tout esté frappe de cette raison, que dans toute proposition affirmative veritable, necessaire ou contingente, universelle ou singulière, la notion de l'attribut est comprise en quelque façon dans celle du sujet: praedicatum inest subjecto". Sept. 1686.3. ii.p.64.) According to Leibniz the difficulty of Arnauld is that he fails to appreciate that the application of the principle "praedicatum inest subjecto" involves no other connection between subject and predicate than what is involved in the most contingent of propositions. And that these reasons of contingent truths bring about results without necessitation. Sub ratione generalitatis it may not be certain that I will make a journey but a complete concept of myself would reveal that I should do so. (16)
Accordingly we must not seek for God a freedom of undecidedness. There is a continuity in all His acts of Will as well as a universal scope. "Therefore to reason rightly we must think of God as having a certain more general and more comprehensive intention which has regard to the whole order of the universe because the universe is a whole which God sees through and through with a single glance. This more general intention embraces virtually the other intentions touching what transpires in this universe and among these is also that of creating a particular Adam who is related to the line of his posterity which God has already chosen as such and we may even say that these particular intentions differ from the general intention only in a single respect, that is to say, as the situation of a city regarded from a particular point of view has its particular geometrical plan". (Letter to Count E. Von Hessen-Rheinfels. April 12. 1686. Open Court Trans. p. 79.)
The Solution of Leibniz.

The Problem of Interpretation.

As we have already noticed in the Introduction the value we place on the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil must depend on the precise interpretation of his philosophy we adopt. In particular it must depend on how far we regard his ethical theology as an integral part of his thought as well as its consistency or otherwise with his monadological outlook. We have already seen something of the difficulty of envisaging the philosophy of Leibniz as a whole as well as the ever present temptation to simplify the complex by way of a bold and ruthless unilateral interpretation. In assessing the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil we ourselves have encountered the same inevitable difficulty through from a different "point de considérant".

We may conveniently group the main schools of Leibnizian interpretation under two heads. First there is the logico-mathematical interpretation, associated specially in our time with the names of C. S. Lewis, Couturat, Bertrand Russell and Cassirer (in his "Leibniz's System in seinen wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen. Marburg, 1902.") to mention only a few names. Dr. P.C.S. Schiller perhaps describes best the ultimate attitude of this school of interpretation when he says "Leibniz, who had every qualification for philosophic greatness except courage, had marked hankerings after pluralism. It his magic touch atomism blossomed into monadism, and monadism has ever since remained the only philosophically respectable form of pluralism. But Leibniz himself had not the courage to enter the promised land, and to dispel the bogies which were supposed to haunt it. By profession a courtier and by temperament a conciliator, who if he had happened to be born a Parsee would doubtless have devoted his life to the reconciliation of Ormuzd and Ahiram, he only erected a monument which faced both ways. His monadology is still the great landmark on the road to pluralism, but the true pluralist must resolutely pass beyond it and disregard the palimpsest inscriptions graven upon it, which would only conduct him back to the monism from which he seeks to escape. The infinity of God and the world, the absolute determination of every event, the infinite number of monads and their dependence on a central unity in whose magic mirror they discern the workings of the world, are incompatible with a pluralist reading of the monadology, and more than enough to demolish the very conception of the monad" ("Zind" 1909. N.S., Vol 2, p.109-110. Review of "La Nouvelle Monédolgie" Ch. Renouvier).

It is clear that for this school of interpretation the preoccupation of Leibniz with "the problem of evil" is a virtual irrelevancy in
his thought and has no claim to be considered as an integral part of "leibnizianisme essentiel". For evil can be dismissed by saying with Spinoza "By reality, and perfection I understand the same thing" (Russell p.201.)

The second school of interpretation is the traditional one. It is chiefly associated with the names of Zeller (Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz, Lüchen, 1875.), Erno Fischer (Geschichte der neuren Philosophie, Heidelberg 1902), and Émile Boutroux (in his well known introduction to the "Monadologie" Paris 1881. and "Nouveau Essais" Paris 1886.) According to the teaching of this school of interpretation there can be no unilateral interpretation of Leibniz but we must regard the metaphysical and theological aspects of the thought of Leibniz as complementary.

Some writers of this school follow Boutroux in regarding the metaphysic of Leibniz as the inevitable working out of the views of Leibniz on dynamic e.g. N. Gueroult. in his "Dynamique et Métaphysique Leibniziennes", Paris 1924. "La dynamique serait la source des conceptions nouvelles de la substance et de l'harmonie préétablie" p.3. Cf. also C. Milhaud "Leibniz et les Lois du mouvement" Nouv. Études. 1911 2 and A. Rivaud a review in "Revue de Lét. et de Lorraine. 1914." Others like Jean Daruzi in his two well known works ("Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de la terre", Paris 1907 and "Leibniz", Paris 1909) find the logical doctrine of Leibnizian substance to enshrine a truth "essentielllement mystique". Daruzi sums up his view of the system of Leibniz as "Recherche rationnelle d'une réalité mystique" (p.131. "Leibniz").

But without making the extravagant claims of Daruzi, we can follow two important commentators who have consulted in supporting our own contention for the essential unity of the thought of Leibniz both theological and philosophical viz:- Dr A. Fischer in his exhaustive two volume work "Die Theologie des Leibniz", Lüchen, 1889 and the important historical monograph of Dr Joseph Iwanicki "Leibniz et les démonstrations mathématiques de l'existence de Dieu", Strasbourg. 1933. The latter work proves conclusively and with much historical detail the essential theistic leanings of the thought of Leibniz and at the same time does justice by that rationalistic temper he imbibed, according to Fischer and Kabitz, from his teacher Weigel.

Iwanicki's argument gives important historical vindication for that interpretation of Leibniz we have advocated in these pages. In particular he reveals the vital nature of the theological preoccupations of Leibniz. All this indeed is already apparent from the evidence of the early writings of Leibniz we have already in part adduced. The project of the Societas Theophilorum (mooted from 1688 onwards) and the friendship, correspondence and collaboration with Theophile Spizel (author of the Scrutinium Atheismi 1683), to mention only one name out of many, confirm what any historical enquiry into the writings of Leibniz must reveal. As Iwanicki remarks the idea that metaphysics was anything else than natural theology never left Leibniz. "metaphysicam esse ac vocari scientiam" "Notae ad Dan. Stahlion.1683. quoted
Leibniz's constant idea of philosophy is well expressed in the Baconian maxim he placed at the head of his Confessio naturae (1668) "philosophia obiter libata a Deo abductit, et penitus hausta reducit at eundum".

Further historical vindication for the essential continuity of the thought of Leibniz is to be found in the book "Der junge Leibniz" (1909) by Willy Kabitz. According to this writer the essence of Leibniz can be distilled into five propositions which Leibniz constantly affirmed. (2) So far as these propositions imply a theistic Weltanschauung they support our contentions. As we have ourselves already seen, in adequate detail for our present purpose, ethical theism and its inevitable accompaniment "the problem of evil" were constantly present to the thought of Leibniz.

The interpretation of Leibniz is such a living issue of contemporary philosophy that we must be excused for dwelling upon it further, apart from the special reasons of our own. In the case of Leibniz historical enquiry must accompany logical elucidation. It will not do to follow the trail so ably blazed by Secretan in his book already cited and say that the opinions of Leibniz are one thing and his philosophy another.

Certainly Leibniz himself was under no impression that his logical and metaphysical principles evacuated of meaning the essential tenets of his ethical theism. On the contrary the opposite is the case. For Leibniz is just as anxious to safeguard ethics as theism. (cf. Sans doute, et c'est le fondement de la providence et de toutes nos esperances, savoir qu'il y a quelque chose de bon et de juste en elle meme, et que Dieu estant la sagesse meme ne manque pas de choisir le meilleur". Letter to Phillipi. Jan. 1680. G.vi.284.) Only in teleology can we find any finality of explanation "Causae efficientes pendent a finalibus" (L. to Bierling, 1711. G.iii.p.501.) and as Leibniz says "C'est Sanctifier la philosophie, que de faire couler ses ruisseaux de la fontaine des attributs de Dieu" G.iii. p.54.

For this reason Leibniz is tireless in pointing out that the recognition of this truth is of the utmost value in the elucidation of our idea of God. We see this e.g. in the fact that the laws of motion point for explanation to final causes. "And this is one of the most effective and remarkable proofs of the existence of God for those who can go deeply into these things." (Prince. of Nature and Grace. Par.ii.p.418. Latta) It is true that particular effects of nature may be explained by efficient causes but the general principles of physics and mechanics require the explanation of a sovereign intelligence. So far from mechanical explanation leading us away from God, as some think, rightly considered it leads us to God. "mais les principes generaux de la physique et de la mecanique meme dependant de la conduite d'une intelligence souveraine, et ne sc auraient estre expliques sans la faire entrer en consideracion. C'est ainsi qu'il faut reconcilier la piete avec la raison" Letter of Leibniz to Bayle "sur un principe general". G.iii.p.55.) God is then not only the last reason of things but the knowledge of God is also the principle of science since His essence and will are the principles of existing things. ("C'est Dieu qui est la derniere raison des choses, et la
connaissance de Dieu n'est pas moins le principe des sciences, que son essence et sa volonté sont les principes des estres. Above. G.iii.54.)

We need not go the extreme length (G. E. Guhrauer "G. W. Freiherr von Leibnitz. Breslau. 1846.) or of D. Selver "Der Entwicklungsang der Leibniz'schen Monadenlehre bis 1695. "Leipzig 1885) in suggesting that the preoccupation of Leibniz with the problems of speculative theology and in particular with the doctrine of Transubstantiation lead to the ultimate formulation of his conception of the monad. It is true that in his letter to Arnauld of 1671 (see G.iii. p.68.) he mentions the relevance of this movement of his thought to this very debated issue and especially its superiority to Cartesianism in this respect. (3) There is no doubt that Leibniz found this implication of the beginning of his new line of thought a useful side issue. But the extreme claim that here we can trace the origin of the Leibnizian doctrine of substance can hardly be substantiated in the light of the other evidence of its immemorial development in his thought. However this and other similar ultra-theological interpretations, may serve a useful purpose in helping to remind us that Leibniz is a thinker of whom such suggestions as these could be made. Lotze once made the remark that philosophical theory is an effort to justify "a fundamental view of things which has been adopted in early life" and in the case of Leibniz there is abundant evidence for its truth. In this respect he is a complete a contrast to Spinoza as it is possible to conceive. (4)

It is vital, then, to remember the continuity of the theistic views of Leibniz. Leibniz evinces a lifelong hostility to any ateleological view of the universe. (4). It was in teleology where the crucial difficulty for Leibniz lay in the matter of a religious interpretation of the universe. For in teleology Leibniz saw a splendid rapprochement between science and religion where most of his contemporaries saw an internecine conflict. Where others saw a crime or at least an impiety, Leibniz saw a vindication of God. ("C'est de vouloir tout expliquer mechaniquement en Physique, ce n'est pas un crime ny impieté, Dieu ayant tout fait selon les loix de mathematic, c'est a dire selon les verites eternelles qui sont l'objet de sagesse" Letter to Philippi. Jan.1680. G.vi.p.283.) But Leibniz goes much further than this. For he finds the infinite harmony of the universe a perpetual source of religious ecstasy. In this respect we may compare Leibniz with the Cambridge Platonists but he differs from them in a most important regard. For while More, Cudworth and Parker looked at nature through the traditional spectacles of "substantial forms", Leibniz was in complete rapport with the modern scientific outlook on nature. Up to the time of Leibniz this view of nature was regarded as subversive of religion. With Leibniz it was a conviction of youth and one that grew more intense with the passing of the years that nothing elevated the soul more to a knowledge and love of God as the world of nature. This is a recurrent theme of Leibniz to be found in his early and his later writings. "Deo pulchriori hymnus cani non potest, quam si quod naturae miraculum patefist." (G looph.iii. 515. quoted "Die Leibniz'sche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Stellung. " H. Hoffmann
1903.p.44.) See also Letter to Conring. 1678. G. i. p. 185.) As we have already seen Leibniz regarded the study of natural science as propaedeutic to religion. For these reasons we may well regard Leibniz as the father of the "God in Nature" movement of the German Enlightenment "Er wurde dadurch zum Vater einer die ganze deutsche Aufklärung beherrschenden Ueberzeugung. 'Gott in der Natur' das wurde der religiöse Lieblingsgedanke der Wolff und Reimarus, der Brockes und Gellert, und das tonte fort in ungezählten Abhandlungen, Gedichten, Predigten, Briefen und Tagebüchern des 18. Jahrhunderts" (p.46. above.)

This reading of the influence of Leibniz goes to support that theistic interpretation of Leibniz we have tried to vindicate. It is the only interpretation which unites the youthful and the older Leibniz and which as a consequence does less violence to his writings. We need not seek the source of these theistic views of Leibniz. It is enough to recognise them and to see how they polarise his thought.

We see this especially in the case of his formulation of the doctrine of created substance (1686.). So far from this involving the jettisoning of his previous main convictions, on the contrary the idea of monadic substance seemed above everything else for Leibniz the new organon by which all his previous convictions about the universe and God should have that expression which commend them to the world at large and philosophers in particular. We see something of this transition in the main philosophical conception of Leibniz—the pre-established harmony. (5)

In trying to see the philosophy of Leibniz with some sense of perspective we must stress the comparative tardiness of this monadological reading of the universe. e.g. The idea of the pre-established harmony of the universe (though not the phrase) can be traced according to M. Gueroult as far back as 1672. ("L'harmonie préétablie était déjà plus qu'en germe en effet des 1672, à tel point qu'Hannequin a pu voir dans la liaison établie entre la physique nouvelle et la sagesse de Dieu la survivance illogique d'un rapport périmé établi par l'Hypothèse nova" p.177 Dynamique et Métaphysique Leibniziennes. 1934.) We have already seen in more detail how formidable is this pre-monadological Leibniz. Once we recover the historical perspective of the development of his thought we are able to discount a great deal of that unilateral interpretation of Leibniz so ably but so unconvincingly elaborated by the adherents of the logico-mathematical school.

By accepting this historical interpretation of Leibniz we free him from the accusation of speculative legerdemain in the reconciliation of his philosophy with revealed religion. His Logodicee to use the word of Cassirer. This difficulty is well expressed by Professor A. E. Taylor in the article "Theism" of the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. "Unless one is prepared, as the present writer after long study is not, to accuse Leibniz of insincerity, it seems impossible not to recognise here a fundamental inconsistency
between his personal religious convictions, and the logical requirements of his metaphysical system. If all true propositions are identities, philosophy must be atheistic" (p. 273. Art. "Theism").

The answer to this difficulty is twofold. On the one hand we must realise that Leibniz is not a radical thinker like Spinoza. He is thinker more after the manner of Origen in that he is greatly concerned to vindicate certain foundational and abiding convictions about the universe and its Creator. The source of these ethical ideas and intuitions need not concern us here. It is enough to recognise their potency in the constant development of his thought. On the other hand we must avoid an over-simplification in regarding the subject-predicate identity view as the sole origin of the Leibnizian doctrine of "created substance". Questions of dynamic and other considerations enter into it.

This interpretation of Leibniz we advocate here has the singular merit not only of doing justice by his published works, including the only work published during his life time, Théodicé, but also answers those other problems in Leibniz quite unresolvable on any other hypothesis. Unfortunately it reveals something of the complication of this answer of Leibniz to the question of evil.

Overmuch emphasis has been laid upon the logical foundation of the monadism of Leibniz. The doctrine of "created substance" is more the culmination of convergent lines of thought than the product of an insistence upon the purely logical doctrine of the subject-predicate identity. It is hardly relevant here to attempt to unwind the several strands that went to make up the rope of this Leibnizian doctrine of "created substance". Especially as this has been done in an important paper of the Aristotelian Society already referred to, ("Some Problems on the Philosophy of Leibniz" by L.J. Russell 1922-3.) where the writer sums up his opinion: - " in my view it is inconceivable that the pure logical doctrine of itself suggested the monadology. It is much more likely that with all the separate problems in his thoughts, his own statement is literally accurate, 'I was conducted insensibly to a view which surprised me'". (Quotat. from Systeme Nouveau. G.iv.p.477.) In his earlier logical essays, as is pointed out, Leibniz had not attained to the full fledged axiomatic truth for all propositions-"vera propositionis semper praedicatum inest subjecto"- but had confined its truth to categorical affirmative universal propositions. So we can hardly regard this principle as having that basic metaphysical priority so often alleged. It does however supply a logical basis for "created substance" once that doctrine is conceived.

Again, even if we grant the logical origin of the Leibnizian "created substance", this interpretation breaks down internally through lack of connection between this rationalism and the spiritual nature of the monad. As has been well said "When his rationalism comes short active spirit is made to fill the gaps..... His rationalism affords the basal argument for his monadism, but
the monad being further interpreted as spirit, his rationalism is in the resulting system greatly modified to suit this deeper and more adequate conception of the nature of the individual" (p.168,169. "Studies in Cartesianism" N. Smith) Thus logical explanation gives way to explanation sub ratione boni. i.e. desire plus perception. If there are a priori reasons then, as Smith says, they are such as incline without necessitating. "But just as Leibniz fails to explain how the obscurity and confusion in the perception of monads should transform the discrete harmony of the universe into the continuous form of space, so he fails to connect in any real way the laws of motion (which must in the end be regarded as the phenomenal manifestation of the inner striving of the monads) with the choice of the good." (p.171, above.) This internal breaking down between the logical atomism and the spiritual monad might suggest a further argument against the suggestion of the one by the other.

In any case for Leibniz the new idea of "created substance" was a philosophical godsend. By means of it he hoped to clear up some unexpected difficulties in his views and especially the twin difficulties of explaining the dependence of mind-substances for their existence on God and at the same time of vindicating the self-determining nature of their evolution. Not only did it do this but it also gave a more precise and satisfactory explanation of the early conviction of Leibniz about the pre-established harmonic character of the universe. The claims of the Many and the One were fully met. Though the world was so interpenetrated by the mutual relation of substance with substance in accordance with the Divine power and goodness, yet these same substances, so far from having a mere modal existence as parts of the Divine Being, were created substances evolving in their own right.

Thus the doctrine of the monad helped to give precision and intellectual support to the pre-conceived ideas of Leibniz about the nature of the universe and its Creator. In particular it helped to vindicate that teleological view of the universe and the ethical theism which was its basis. For only on this foundation could be built the optimism which asserted that this is "the best of all possible worlds".

There can be no question that the optimism of Leibniz rests on his doctrine of God. It is true that a thinker like McTaggart states that optimism as a philosophic creed does not stand or fall by the affirmation or denial of theism. "My position is merely that the belief in God will not justify optimism, unless it is supported by other metaphysical conclusions (which, as far as our investigation goes, may or may not be true), and that there are metaphysical conclusions (which, as far as present investigation
goes, may or may not be true) which would justify optimism without a belief in God" (p.269-270. "Some Dogmas of Religion") The difficulty of accepting a thesis like this is not in accepting the sense in which it is obviously true but to combat the suggestion falsi it contains. When we use the terms theism and God our "universe of discourse" is almost invariably the orthodoxy of historical Christianity. In this case the omnipotence of love is necessarily involved in any reference to belief in God. So it is, as we have abundantly seen, in the case of Leibniz. It is quite possible to conceive a monadological universe sans Dieu which might be as "optimistic" as say the systems of Fichte, Bradley or Hegel (to use McTaggart's illustrations). But such a monadological universe would emphatically not be "the best of all possible worlds".

God for Leibniz is the ens per se and as such the ground of all possibility, "radix possibilitatis", and actuality. Like Aquinas Leibniz would say "Deus est actualitas totuis possibilitatis". It is for this reason that we can relate the universe directly to God and say "dans un très bon sens que tout est un miracle perpetuel" (Letter to Harsoeter. 1711. G.iii.p.518.) Upon this foundation of God Leibniz built in his pre-monadological days and it is his credo to the last, not the "natura naturans" of Spinoza but the "ultima ratio extramundana rerum" (G.vii.303).

The Théodicée is a writing with which every commentator of Leibniz must reckon. It is a writing of maturity (1710), even though it does embody some of his earlier and pre-monadological views. If Leibniz wished to modify any of his theistic views as a result of his doctrine of created substance, twenty four years was long enough to think of such modifications. A logical victory might be facilitated by explaining away this long and rather exhaustive treatise but for the conscientious interpreter of Leibniz this would be a triumph at too great a cost. For there are special considerations which make it impossible to mete this treatment to the only work of a great philosopher published in his life time. Moreover the tables can easily be turned by an effective "Tu quoque". A strong case might be rigged for regarding the monadological views of Leibniz as an intellectual jeu d'esprit away from the safe shelter of his pre-monadological convictions and as such of merely quasi-transitory and quasi-tentative significance. For the important fact is surely that the interpretative views of Leibniz about the universe have never varied. As a tour de force the significance of the philosophy of Leibniz might be written in such a way that the monadological universe might fall more or less into the background. We are far from saying that this would be an adequate view of the philosophy of Leibniz. But it would be at least nearly as adequate as the interpretation of Leibniz which regards his theism as a virtual irrelevancy. Such arguments, however, merely expose the worthlessness of the high handed and arbitrary method of interpretation.

It is no grave accusation against a philosopher that he has more than one idea in his mind and certainly a philosopher of the awe inspiring eminence of a Leibniz. If our deliberate view is that the new wine of his speculation burst the old wine skins, we must
still ask what was the view of Leibniz himself. When one realises
the focal and determinant nature of theism in the thought of Leibniz
it is not easy to give a reply which violates so much of his
ipissima verba as well one which contradicts the conciliatory nature
of his spirit. The machinery of the pre-established monads may not
provide as smooth working or as satiสfatorily a
vindication of tenets of his ethical theism as Leibniz thought. But
Leibniz is not the only one in the history of philosophy who has
similarly entangled himself. Whether Leibniz might ever have modified
him monadological views it is idle to conjecture. One thing, however
we do know (and here a grain of fact is worth a bushel of arbitrary
special pleading and forced interpretation) and that is the tenacity
with which Leibniz held to his early views of God and his relation
to the universe. These were never substantially altered and when
the influence of Leibniz on subsequent thinkers is computed, it is
these views which have been not the least influential. And, of course,
it is these views which most of all decide the answer of Leibniz to
the problem of evil.
C. XII.

The Classical Tradition.

It will be apparent from the last chapter that our interpretation of Leibniz does not permit us to give a quick and facile elucidation of his answer to the problem of evil. In the case of a Leibniz this might perhaps be considered prima facie evidence of its probable truthfulness than otherwise. It would have been much simpler to follow the well trodden path of a unilateral interpretation and to dismiss all else as irrelevant. But our contention all along has been that we must read Leibniz as he is and not what we think he ought to be. The difficulty of our task has, therefore, increasing rather than diminished.

For these reasons it is not easy to "place" the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil. There are so many stands of thought interwoven with the warp and woof of his argument. In the previous chapters we have given some account of these in so far as they are pertinent to our present discussion. Where these resemblances and reminiscences have not been specially mentioned, it is because they were so obvious. E.G. the special debt of Leibniz to Stoic philosophy either directly or through Scholastic philosophy must be evident. Such indeed must almost necessarily be the case. For the Stoic creed explored all there was to explore in giving a basis for the contention "all partial evil is universal good". And Leibniz was the last person to hesitate to put on the panoply of Stoic philosophy where it was likely to prove helpful. But, then, all theodicean argument as well as the Théodiceé of Leibniz is under a similar debt to Stoicism not only for its answer to the problem of evil but for the very formulation of the problem itself. It is not therefore surprising to find in Leibniz something of the Stoic vision of a universe sub specie aeternitatis. (See next Chapter).

The essential triangularity of the problem of evil is the classical formulation of the problem in the history of philosophy, at least from the time of Plato onwards. It asks with Boethius Si Deus bonus est, unde malum and Boethius-like it regards it as one of the consolations of philosophy to supply an answer. The points of the triangle are (1) the Supreme Beneficence of God, (2) His Divine Omnipotence and (3) the a posteriori existence of evil. The formulation of the problem and the answer of Leibniz fall within this tradition.

Leibniz, as we have pointed out many times already, had no hesitation in the categorical affirmation of the Supreme Goodness of God. Nor will he allow this "Goodness" to be interpreted solely
in a metaphysical manner. He will have no truck with the naturalism of Spinoza or with the supreme expression of naturalism in ancient philosophy, Epicureanism. Still less is there any supra-moral sphere in the Leibnizian heaven or any liberum arbitrium indifferentiae in the Deity.

Again, Leibniz avoids the obvious solution of the cruder forms of dualism. With Leibniz the problem of evil is envisaged as a whole. There is no breaking of the problem of evil into parts. There is no question of a "struggling deity". For pace Mc Taggart we must regard the fact of evil as the particular crux of a theism. But with "a finite deity" we can never reach any finality in the formulation of the problem much less of its solution. For behind "the struggling deity" we must seek for some other veiled "President of the immortals" whom we can indict for all the evil of the universe including "the finite deity" with his unequal struggle, but God for Leibniz is clothed not only with the moral but also with the metaphysical attributes of theological orthodoxy. His consistency in this direction leads, as we have seen, to make havoc of the orthodox doctrine of the "Fall of Man".

Yet, as we have seen in our early chapters, Leibniz's dichotomy of Will and Understanding of the Deity does suggest something which savours of a dualism. Some statements of it are embarrassing e.g. "The ultimate origin of evil must not be sought in the Divine Will, but in the original imperfection of creatures, which is contained ideally in the eternal truths constituting the internal object of the divine intellect, so that evil could not be excluded from the best possible system of things" (G.iii.p.33. B. Russell.p.296.).

A modern theologian has contended indeed that some such limitation of God, as is implied in the above argument, must necessarily be the case. "And it is not necessary because we think of God as limited, to think of Him as limited by anything outside Himself. The limitation springs from His own nature. All the theories by which philosophers and theologians have sought to reconcile the facts of the world's history with the perfect goodness of God really involve a certain limitation of power. This is the conclusion to which the actual existence of moral evil, when taken in connexion with the condemnation of it by the moral consciousness, seems to point. There is a sense in which God is finite. He is finite, not in the sense of being limited by some external law or blind overruling fate, by some thing or some person outside Himself, but in the sense in which everything that is real is limited. It is difficult to see what the negation of this last proposition would really mean... The real is necessarily finite. We may nevertheless think of God as infinite inasmuch as He is not limited by anything outside Himself, inasmuch as everything that is springs from his perfectly righteous will and thought. When theologians have interpreted infinitude as meaning more than this, they have usually fallen into that pantheistic optimism which ends by destroying those moral convictions upon which all theology rests. God is infinite because He is the ground of all
that is; He is omnipotent because He is the cause of all that is, He is infinitely good because He wills the best that He has it in Him to produce". (R.H. Rashdall. "Contentio Veritatis"p. 45-6.) The last phrase of this quotation is unconsciously Leibnizian and open to the same etp- criticism of dualism. And along this argument of Rashdall it might be possible to rehabilitate the answer of Leibniz. As we shall see in the ensuing discussion of this chapter there is no reason to suppose that this must involve a sacrifice of the ethics of Leibniz to his optimism.

In some such way as this Leibniz the theologian might answer Leibniz the philosopher when challenged that this view of God, as limited by "the original imperfection of creatures", must inevitably mean the virtual giving up of the theistic view of the universe and in particular that monistic view of things implied therein. But it may be further argued that orthodoxy is on the side of Leibniz, even on this point. For it is difficult to see any vital difference between the argument of Leibniz here and the well known interpretation of the doctrine of omnipotence by Aquinas. As Baron von Hugel says "Now it does not seem unreasonable to hold that among the things, according to Aquinas's term outside the object of omnipotence, lies the power, even for God, of creating a finite being so absolutely unified within itself and so absolutely strong in willing just this, its utterly adequate insight, and entirely to love only in proportion to the worthiness of the object loved... It would seem that to be able to create a finite being of such a character, would really, even for God, be impossible, for it would be to create a finite infinite, a limited God, an intrinsic contradiction". (p.125."The Reality of God" Baron Von Hägel ).

Whatever the defects of Leibniz's rationalistic expression of this point in the dichotomy of the Will and Understanding of God, it has at least as much merit as the despairing solution of Lotze and others "Let us therefore...say that where there appears to be an irreconcilable contradiction between the omnipotence and the goodness of God, there our finite wisdom has come to the end of its tether, and that we do not yet understand the solution which yet we believe in" (Microcosmos.ii.p.717. Edin.1894.)

It is possible to find a further answer in the philosophy of Leibniz to the problem why God did not allow a mere possibility of evil without its actuality. It may be pointed out, along the lines we have already indicated, that "the best of all possible worlds" must imply a Divine value judgement. Now absolute values as such imply no negation but it is otherwise with their realisation in this world of ebb and flow. Supra-temporal values can only be realised within a finite and temporal mode of being. As the "O felix culpa" arguments remind us history is the final arbiter of value. In other words the evils of the universe can never imperil its destiny as conceived by God. The Immanence of God in the universe must inevitably mean that the value of the past and the present is in some measure conditioned by the process of the future. Leibniz's extension of the verdict to await the ga judgment of eternity gives great point to this contention.
But both this question of metaphysical evil and the world as "a vale of soul making" and value making raises the third point, the a posteriori existence of evil.

How far does Leibniz admit the real existence of evil? This is a question which inevitably proposes itself on any cosmic view of things and especially with any thorough going optimism such as that of Leibniz. As we shall see in more detail in the ensuing chapter an important and vital part of the argument of Leibniz is to assert the solvability of the problem of evil by an insistence upon the solidarity and unity of the world. If God alone has the right to be a pessimist and is not, then we must try and gain something of the breadth of His vision of the universe.

But even if we acquiesce in the old Stoic view that evil is only the villain in the play, who, though offensive in himself, yet adds a spice to our enjoyment, the problem of the particular incidence of evil remains. Evil remains even though it is only a means to an end. This important fact of evil Leibniz answers, as we shall see, not only by pointing to the harmony between the kingdom of Nature and the kingdom of Grace but also by his doctrine of immortality.

With Leibniz it is very difficult at times to resist the conclusion that evil is something negative and not positive. Such a view is commonly held to sacrifice ethics to the service of theology. A strong argument can be made for such an interpretation of Leibniz but to Leibniz-i interpret Leibniz in this way is to read him at his worst.

The precise interpretation of moral evil in the philosophy of Leibniz is a question of unusual difficulty. According to Bertrand Russell &c. "Leibniz's Ethics, like many other ethical systems, suffer from non-existence" (p.197. above) Many texts can easily be quoted in support of such a Spinozistic reading of Leibniz. On the other hand a more recent commentator has rightly drawn attention to the fact that his consideration of the manifold works of Leibniz will reveal his constant preoccupation with the moral life. "Son œuvre tout entière s'inspire d'une préoccupation constante des problèmes fondamentaux de la science morale. Toute sa métaphysique, ses spéculations sur la nature intime de la force, qui est le fond et l'essence même de toutes choses, ont pour fin, dans son esprit, d'assurer à la morale une base solide" ("La Morale de Leibniz", by L. Le Chevallier p.9.) Chevallier draws attention to the words of Leibniz, at the beginning of the Nouveaux Essais, to his interlocutor "Vous avez plus de commerce avec les Philosophes spéculatifs et j'avais plus de penchant vers la Morale. Mais j'ai appris de plus en plus combien la Morale reçoit d'affermissement des principes solides de la véritable Philosophie; c'est pourquoi je les ai étudiés depuis avec plus d'application et je suis entre dans des méditations assez nouvelles" (Nouveaux Essais I.1.0.1.) Certainly Chapter XXI of the Nouveaux Essais does not suggest the alleged "dishonesty" of which Leibniz can scarcely be cleared. Chevallier, on the contrary
suggests, that it was precisely these moral considerations which really express the essential Leibniz and which are marked in his most diverse works in so far as he liberates himself from the metaphysical influences of his youth. This view endorses in his "De vera Methodo Philosophiae et Theologia" 1690 which give us a personal confession of faith. We neglect the science which distinguishes for us the good man from the bad, which reveals the mysteries of the soul, and opens the way to happiness. All our unhappiness is due to the fact that we give thought to everything but life. So men are honest by habit or necessity, rather than by a reflective will. ("Mais on laisse de côte la science qui nous apprend à distinguer l'homme de bien du méchant, qui nous révèle les mystères de l'âme et nous ouvre le chemin du bonheur. Tout notre misère vient de ce que nous pensons à toute autre chose, bien plus qu'à la grande affaire de la vie. C'est ainsi que tant de gens sont honnêtes par habitude ou par nécessité, plutôt que par une volonté réfléchie" Quoted p.18. La Morale de Leibniz, above.)

The primacy of ethics and the moral life for Leibniz is further confirmed by the consideration that action is the fundamental reality of the Leibnizian world. There are few diligent readers of Leibniz who would not agree with the verdict of Baruzzi "Quand Leibniz dit constamment que le Bien général et la gloire de Dieu sont analogues dans son système, il n'est pas victime d'un verbalisme ou d'une habitude religieuse peu consciente; il exprime l'une de ses plus profondes intuitions. Toute connaissance, à mesure qu'elle s'approfondit, tend à devenir constructive; lorsque quelque intuition me porte vers Dieu, j'imite quelque chose de son être" (p.110-111 "Leibniz" J.Baruzi, above.)

The relation of moral evil to metaphysical evil is made tolerably clear be Leibniz. It amounts to the simple fact that the limitation of creatureliness is not sin or moral evil but involves this empirical inevitability. On whatever grounds we may criticise this position, at least we must admit that it is an important distinction in thought. It involves a crux which every theistic answer to the problem of evil must face. With such a critic as Bayle at his elbow Leibniz was seldom allowed to forget its cruciality. The answer of Aquinas is the answer of Leibniz, God "neither wills evil to exist, nor wills it not to exist, but wills to permit evil; and that is a good" (Sum. Theol.1.19.1X) cf. "Dieu est donc oblige par une nécessité morale, qui se trouve en lui même, de permettre le mal moral des créatures" Théodicée. Par. 158. G.vi.p.204.) For if God were to abstain from the creation of a creature such as man because he saw the empirical risk of his sinning, then the rebellion of the creature would be made to prevail against the essential goodness of God. Especially is this position difficult to hold when we remember that even the wickedness of the sinner can be made to serve the ends of God. How the good can efface the evil of the past is, of course, a question that Leibniz does not answer in detail. This is, as we shall see, probably the weakest link in his whole argument.

Quite clearly, then, for Leibniz moral evil is something more than the mere fact of differentiation in the universe, though it
depends upon this fact. "For we must consider that there is an
original imperfection in the creature, anterior to sin, because the
creature is essentially limited; whence it comes that the creature
cannot know everything, and can be mistaken and commit other faults"
(Théodicée. G. vi. p.114-5. Quoted Russell. p.198.) Beyond this
statement Leibniz hardly advances. For Leibniz metaphysical evil may
indeed be a problem about finitude, but moral evil is not a problem
about nothing. Malum est in bono subjecto. "Origo mali est a
limitations creaturarum".

It is difficult in some ways to resist the conclusion of
some commentators that, by his recognition of the inexpugnable nature
of evil in the universe, "the best possible world" of Leibniz becomes
the supreme embodiment of corruptic optimi pessima. Dualism is a
difficult ghost to lay when we deal with" the problem of evil". It
is the skeleton in the cupboard of evry Theodicee. It appears in
Leibniz, as we have just seen, in the doctrine that Divine Omnipotence
is limited by an Understanding which involves the Concomitance of
evil in "the best possible world". Thus apparently after dualism is
banishing through the door it re-enters the universe through the
window. It is interesting to compare Leibniz in this respect with a
Church father like Anselm who gives in some ways a similar answer. In
the case of Anseim the problem of evil is answered in the dualism
implicit in the Divine Nature through the interrelation of the attributes
of Justice and Mercy, instead of the Goodness and Understanding.

But to regard this criticism of Leibniz as serious is, as
we have just seen, a mistake. It is a criticism specially levelled
against Leibniz by Schopenhauer. "Even if Leibniz's demonstration,
that among the possible worlds this one is best, were correct: ey yet
still it would not amount to a theodicy. For in truth the Creator is
the author not merely of the world but of possibility too: he ought
accordingly to have devised this in such a way as to admit of a better
world" (Parerga und Paralipomena" 11. Par.157. Quoted by Ward
"Realm of Ends" p. 354.) But as Ward, in agreement with our own views,
points out "Metaphysic of this sort is not to be met by argument. It is
sufficient to remark that at any rate so long as there is no difference
between possible and impossible so long omnipotence can have no meaning:
two and two may be four or it may be five.... To proclaim creation
restricted by determinate possibilities to be an idea derogatory to
the sovereign majesty of God is but blind adulation; for it really amounts
to denying that God is himself a definite being at all, is either
intellectually or morally consistent. All determination is negation,
Spinoza has truly said, to find in this an evil, a so-called
metaphysical or logical evil, only shows what ambiguity the term may
involve" (p.354-355.)
Leibniz, of course, avoided this difficulty of Schopenhauer by considering the Divine Understanding itself as the source of the "eternal truths". In this way those "eternal truths", which made it inevitable that evil should be a concomitance of "the best of all possible worlds", are themselves in a different light. (cf. "Amplissimus. Kestnerus vester nonnihil Pufendorfianis praecoccupatus mihi obicit, si Deus aeternas rationes sequitur, aliquid datim iri prius Deo. Sed respondendum est, rationes aeternas esse in Divino intellectu, nec ideo quicquam esse prius Deo, sed tantummodo divinam intellectionem esse natura priorem divina volitionem" (Letter to Bierling. 20 June 1712. G.vii.p.507.) So far as it goes this answer is a successful endeavour to show that God, though limited by "eternal truths", is in reality only limited by Himself.

The difficulties of Leibniz were increased by the static and ultra-rationalistic manner in which he conceived the Divine Attributes and especially this dichotomy of Will and Understanding within the Divine Being. On such an interpretation and internal dualism is almost inevitable and Leibniz, as we have seen, has great trouble in trying to extricate himself from its toils. It is interesting to compare this apparent Leibnizian dichotomy of the Divine Attributes with the remark of Archbishop King "These Attributes"—i.e. Omnipotence and Goodness—"amicably conspire together, and yet restrain and limit each other. There is a kind of Struggle and Opposition between them, whereof the Evils in Nature bear the Shadow and Resemblance. Here, then, and nowhere else, may we find the Primary and most certain Rise and origin of Evils" ("Essay on the Origin of Evil" p.296.) In addition, the unconditioned validity of the causal principle even for God leads Leibniz into trouble. So that as Clarke said this argument would prove "that whatever God can do, he cannot but do;...... Which is making him no Governor at all, but a mere necessary Agent, that is, indeed no Agent at all, but mere Fate and Nature and Necessity" (4th Paper of Clarke G.vii.p.385.) In other words, as critics of Leibniz since the time of Clarke have often reiterated, there is very little to choose between the God of Spinoza and the God of Leibniz. We know, however, that such a verdict on his philosophy was anathema to Leibniz.

Difficulties like these would have vanished if Leibniz could have arrived at a more vitalistic conception of the Divine Nature. In this way it would be possible to conceive of the Divine Attributes as a dynamic way of expressing the Divine All-inclusiveness. Only in this way is it possible to avoid the pitfalls of Leibniz and to substantiate that qualitative reading of the Divine Attributes, as the Omnipotence of Love, which Leibniz accepted as his own view.

The weakness of the theism of Leibniz in other directions may be traced to somewhat similar causes. The anxiety of Leibniz to conserve the Sovereignty of the deity leads him into other short cuts in his theism which become evident on close scrutiny. These difficulties are so serious that many commentators have spurned the theism of Leibniz, without any effort at interpretative reconciliation. For reasons which we have already given it is impossible for us to take such a view of Leibniz, though we do not hesitate to agree with some of the criticisms of his theism, patently obvious in themselves.
To begin with, owing to his mathematical idea of knowledge Leibniz gives an interpretation of Divine Omniscience which many theists are more concerned to deny than to defend. According to Leibniz the Omniscience of God is a knowledge in detail of the future. The difficulty on these premises is to see how the time-process can have any value. And if history has no meaning, quite clearly the world is denuded of moral value. The conception of Leibniz regarding the self-evolving character of the rational monads does seem to exclude an element of contingency in the world which most theists are much more concerned to assert than deny. According to Leibniz the historical process is the mere Darstellung of a cosmic drama of which every detail has been pre-arranged. But the difficulty on this view asserts itself—unless creators are created there is no creation. If we are to regard the time-process as real and if "creators create", then we must suppose that God has determined that the contingent future as non-existing shall not be known. This is the point Arnauld tries to make but does not quite succeed (see letter to Leibniz. May 13, 1686. G.ii. p.25.) "I ought to regard as involved in my individual concept only what is of such a nature that I would no longer be myself if it were not in me, while, on the other hand, everything which is of such a nature that it might either happen to me without my ceasing to be myself, should not be considered as involved in my individual concept" p.30-31. above. (Open Court Pub. Co. Translat. p.95.) The anxiety of Leibniz to avoid anything like the voluntarism of Socinianism leads him not only to say "that it is little consonant with the dignity of God to conceive of him (under the pretext of safeguarding his freedom) in the way that the Socinians do, as a man who forms his resolutions according to the circumstances" (p. 27. G.ii), with which Arnauld agrees, but also to interpret all reality in terms of the subject-predicate identity view, with which Arnauld has some difficulty. Leibniz, however, will have no evasion. "In my opinion each individual substance always contains the traces of what has ever happened to it and marks of that which will ever happen to it (Remarks upon Mr Arnauld's letter. May, 1686. G.ii.p. 39. Open Court Trans. p. 107.)

Further this view of the Divine Omniscience must reduce the Divine Experience to nothingness. For on such a view we are dealing with a dramaturge and not a Deity. "Fore knowledge of the future is, we may contend, something of a misnomer. It is either not strictly FORE-knowledge or it is not strictly knowledge" ("Realm of Ends" J. Ward p. 478. ) If Divine Omniscience has such a knowledge of the detailed future as a consequence of his preordination, then Divine Experience is a phrase without much consequence. But on such a view we are far removed from "the God of the living, the God who is Love".

The solution of this crux is to distinguish between the creative intuition and the divine knowledge. This is a distinction which Leibniz cannot make. But as Ward points out p. 478 (above) " created knowledge presupposes the creation, and the relation of creator and created involves just the dependence which the relation of knower and known excludes. For knowledge does not posit or constitute its objects, which for spiritualism are the manifestation
or utterances of free agents or subjects". Only in some such way as
this can Leibniz succeed in retrieving that ethical theism he is so
much concerned to vindicate. The element of contingency in the world
depends on the action of free beings. The actual course of this
action is not part of the Divine Creation, still less is it part of
His knowledge. Within a wider teleology, there is room for another
and smaller teleology.

Leibniz, here as elsewhere, overreaches himself in his
anxiety to avoid doing any despite to the metaphysical attributes of the
Divine Being. But with the qualitative reading of the Divine Attributes,
integral to the Leibnizian idea of God, we must interpret these Attributes
in terms of the self-limitation of Love. For unless the world is to be deprived of all moral value and the
conception of the Deity almost otiose, there must be not an element of
contingency in the Deity Himself but an act of self-limitation and
abnegation. Thus while the general purpose of creation is fixed, yet
within this general purpose the actual process of its fulfilment in
detail is deliberately set outside His knowledge.

But this is an admission which the rationalism of Leibniz
would never permit him to make. In this indeed he is not alone even
among many moderns. In his "Moral Values and the idea of God" (1918)
W.R. Sorely writes "I confess that the ancient arguments about the
inconsistency of freedom with foreknowledge do not appeal to me. If we
remember that the infinite Mind is not limited to a finite span of the
time-process, we must allow that, notwithstanding the free causation
of finite minds, the actions which we call future are yet eternally
present to his knowledge. To a mind which transcends time there cannot be
the difference which exists for us between memory and foresight; the
past and the future must be equally open to his view. Universal deter-
mination contradicts freedom, universal knowledge does not". While
there is no way of denying the logic of such an argument, given the
premises, the more excellent defence of theism seems to be the one we
have suggested (following Ward) and one which, above all, will commend
itself to that view of the universe sub specie pluralitatis... For more
than any ethical monism it enables us to assert (1) the moral value
of the universe (2) the reality of the time process and (3) the meaning
we attach to the life of God. Leibniz might have avoided the more deistic
implications of his argument by a more courageous application of the
qualitative interpretation of Omnipotence and Omniscience. Instead of
a "block universe" we should have a universe of "creative synthesis".
We should have God limiting Himself by the creation of the World, His
world and in a very real sense waiting upon the fulness of time for the
 fruition of His purposes of Love.

In thus criticising Leibniz we must be careful to point out
that it is not merely the idea of created substance which is at fault,
still less the subject-predicate-identity view of propositions.
"The view then of the universe in its relation to God, that it was pre-established in all its detail and yet contained in it, not only matter, but also active created substances, was one which Leibniz held quite antecedently to his monadology, and would probably have continued to hold had he never been a monadologist, as implied in the rationality and goodness of the universe. If it were only pre-established, the world might be rational but would not be good. If it was to be good it would have to involve active creatures. It was in all literalness Leibniz's meditations on the problems of 'fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute' which led him to this view, and set the problem which his doctrine of created substances was to solve."Some Problems on the Philosophy of Leibniz" by L.J.Russell. Arist. Socy. Proceedings. 1922-3.p.203-4.) This is a point of view to which we ourselves have been driven though along a somewhat different route. Our study of the answer of Leibniz to "the problem of evil" has emphasized the essential continuity of his thought both in youth and maturity.

The Leibnizian doctrine of monads is not therefore the fons et origo of his offending as is so commonly supposed. For the doctrine of monads is merely the intellectual expression of the convictions and intuitions of Leibniz about the universe. It claims a verdict for what is primarily an insight. The doctrine of the monads simply exaggerates the difficulties already involved in the Leibnizian Weltanschauung. This statement of the problem the monadology was designed to solve has an importance not yet sufficiently realised. The pre-monadological views of Leibniz called the tune for the monads. It was thus inevitable that the new doctrine of created substance should only serve to vindicate and justify these opinions. As we have already seen the monads also write large the defects of these opinions.

This is especially seen in the difficulty of the place of God in the Monadological scheme of things. Most commentators have been content to repeat the blunder of Hegel and to state that Leibniz called God "monas monadum". It is true that the completed series of monads seems to demand a theistic summit, just as their mutual pre-established harmony seems to demand a cause outside themselves. But there are serious difficulties in this view of regarding God as a monad. For if the monads have a continuity of their own, then on this view we must be able to think of a monad that differs only infinitely little from God. Again, if God is the highest monad, it can only be against the rule that "monads have no windows". Further there remains the old difficulty of the creation of monads. But as Bertrand Russell points out (p. 187-188. above.) there is no textual authority in Leibniz for his use of the phrase of Bruno "monas monadum". Moreover there is some ground for regarding the two places where Leibniz speaks of God as a monad as slips. (G.iii.636.; G.vii.502.) Though Leibniz does not hesitate to approach pantheism with the words "Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment" (Monadology. Par. 47. Latta p. 243-4.), yet he will do nothing to impugn the substantiality of the Monads. For it is this substantiality which alone in his opinion will rescue us from the abyss of pantheism.
Nowhere is his criticism more feel resolute than when reviewing the doctrine "d'un Esprit Universel Unique" ("il me semble qu'une opinion de cette force doit estre prouvee, et ce n'est pas assez d'en avoir une imagination, qui en effect n'est fondee que sur une comparison fort clochante du souffle qui anime les organes de Musique"

Considérations sur la doctrine d'un Esprit Universel Unique. 1702. G.vi.p. 531, ...) Whatever else Leibniz will say about God, he will never admit God, who is in reality an intelligentia extramundum, can by any alchemy ever become an anima mundi. Nor will he allow even a Newton to say that the idea of God is a superfluity in his system ("Ille dedit Serenitate Suae Regiae schedam Anglico sermone a se conscriptam, qua Newtoni sententiam tueri conatur meanque impugnare; libenter mihi imputaret Divinam gubernationem tolli, si omnia per se bene procedant, sed non considerat Divinan gubernationem cira naturalia in ipaa sustentatione consistere nec debere eam sumi

The Interpretative Principle of Organic Unity.

The punctiform nature of the monad has often been the means of obscuring the vital truth that to see the world sub specie pluralitatis is not the last word of Leibniz. It is true, of course, that nothing for Leibniz is absolutely real but these created substances and their states. As we have already seen they are toto caelo different from the individuals of which they form a part and so from the created world considered as an individual whole. In this respect they are quite other than the corpora simplicissima animata of Spinoza.

Yet there cannot be an infinite number of such monads, for an infinite number is a self-contradictory idea. Again, there must be indivisible substances, for if there were no parts there could be no wholes. Now the only number that can be applied to the real is one, for any other number implies that there can be relations other than qualities. This Leibniz denies. Thus we must not say that there is an infinite number of monads, though we may admit there is an actual infinite.

Accordingly the notion of whole and one can only be applied to substance i.e. the monad, A totum aggregationis has no real unity. Their reality is the reality of the individuals monads, and their unity is merely "semi-mental". ("Et ipsa aggregata nihil aliud sunt quam phaenomena, cum praeter monades ingredientes, caetera per solam perceptionem addantur, ec ipso dum simul percipiuntur" Letter to des Bosses. 29 May, 1716. G.ii.p. 517.) "This unity of the idea of aggregates is very true, but at bottom, it must be confessed, this unity of collections is only a respect or a relation, whose foundation is in what is found in each single substance by itself. And so these beings by aggregation have no other complete unity but that which is mental; and consequently their entity also is in some way mental or phenomenal, like that of the rainbow" (New Essays.149. G.v. 133. Quoted B. Russell. p.116. above.)

Now the assertion that there is a plurality of substances does belong to the synthetic activity of the perceiving mind. For this reason too Leibniz denies that the world can ever be one save in a verbal sense. ("Hinc etsi magnitudine infinitus esset mundus, unum totum non esset, nec cum quibusdam veteribus gungi posset Deus velut anima mundi, non solum quia causa mundi est, sed etiam quia mundus talis unum corpus non foret, nec pro animali habere posset, neque adeo misi verbalem haberet unitatem". Letter to des Bosses 17 March, 1706. G.ii.p.305.) In the Théodicée he makes a somewhat similar remark that "l'amas d'un nombre infini de substances" is not a whole. "C'est cela même qui sert à refuter ceux qui font du monde de Dieu, ou qui conceivent Dieu comme l'Ame du monde, le monde ou l'Univers ne pouvant pas être considéré comme un animal ou comme une substance". Théodicée Par. 195. G.vi.p.232. Elsewhere he defines the meaning of the world for us as "l'assemblage entier des choses contingentes".
Statements like these are apparently very damaging to any assertion of the unity of the universe. And we must not try to make Leibniz more consistent than he is in fact. In Chapter iii of our argument we have already seen some of these difficulties. We saw there that, though the universe is not a substance or an animal, yet it has nevertheless a certain inexpugnable inter-relatedness for the Divine Mind. It is not a "multiverse", for "tout est lié". It is not "a strung along universe" for it possesses a certain "holistic" character. It is a universe so rich in harmonic possibilities that we can say in the words of Genesis (as Leibniz quotes) "God saw everything that he made, and behold it was very good."

It is along these lines Leibniz believes that he is able by virtue of his monadistic interpretation of the pre-established harmony to make a positive and distinctive contribution to the problem of evil. To show e.g. that there is a rational basis for the truth of the "O Felix Culpe" argument is to add something other systems of philosophy have grievously lacked. To do this is to remove oneself from the small orbit of all mere reasons and counter reasons and to deal with the broad issues of the general harmony of the universe. God must permit "evil" because it is involved in "the best of all possible worlds". Sometimes it is necessary to run backward to jump forward. Without the sin of man there might have been no incarnation. (Theodicee Par.11. G.vi,p.109). In this way Leibniz approaches the Lutheran doctrine that the substance of man is sin. He even goes the length of saying "Snas le pêche nous mêmes ne serions point; il y aurait des autres créatures." (Foucher de Careil above. p.180. Quoted Pichler "Die Theologie des Leibniz" Vol.1,p.327.)

Thus the monadological interpretation of the universe must emphatically not be allowed to take us further than Leibniz himself intended. To do so is to read Leibniz at his worst and to caricature his philosophy. As we have already seen the doctrine of created substance was the handmaid, as well as the vindicator, of the essentially harmonic nature of the universe and other early correlated opinions of Leibniz. For the unity of the world in the mind of God as a system of inter-relatedness is the ultimate presupposition of the arguments of Leibniz. "Je pense donc avoir de bonnes raisons pour croire que toutes les différentes classes des Etre, dont l'assemblage forme l'Univers, ne sont dans les idées de Dieu, qui connaissait distinctement leurs gradations essentielles, que comme autant d'ordonnées d'une même Courbe, dont l'unions ne souffre pas qu'un en place d'autres entre deux, à cause que cela marquerait de désordre et de l'imperfection." Letter to unknown person. 16 Oct. 1707. See "Leibniz" Baruzzi (above) p. 297. The fact that we cannot always grasp the precise nature of this inter-relatedness does not alter the fact, we have similar situation often with the individual and the laws of a beneficient state.
It is this which supplies the thews and sinews to the theodicean argument. And it is upon this battle field that any Theodicy can best give an account of itself. For any verdict on "the problem of evil" must ultimately rest upon some totalitarian judgment. We must approximate in some way, as Leibniz so often reminds us, to the judgment of God in His creative fiat. This is the Cöpenhdægan revelation of Leibniz to consider things from the point of view of the whole.

We can illustrate this attitude of Leibniz to the facts of evil by comparing it with that of a recent writer. To Me C.D.Broad (Symposium:- "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis" Arist. Socy. Proceedings. 1929-30. p. 262-3.) argues for the following propositions:- (1) That good things and evil things are just facts which we recognise as we recognise black things and white things. (2) That we know little about the nature of the universe as a whole to make any significant assertion about it. (3) That from the fact that among things that exist some are good and some are bad we are not justified in drawing any inference to the effect that the universe is fundamentally the one or fundamentally the other, or that the one preponderates over the other.

It would be difficult to imagine a position further removed from the contentions of Leibniz. "The Problem of Evil", is virtually set aside, for the good reason that it ceases to exist. For if we can make no significant assertion about the universe, it is futile to argue and we must merely concern ourselves with some practical creed.

But for Leibniz process is not everything. God is Sovereign over all and there is "one far off Divine event to which the whole creation moves". Accordingly no verdict of ours on the universe has any validity unless it recognises the essential partiality of our "point of view" and unless it follows those principles which lead through the maze of experience to some recognition of the symphonic solidarity of the universe. It is so easy to judge the world on a few thousand years history, Yet from this we bodily judge the immeasurable and the eternal. Like men born in prison or in salt mines we claim there is other light in the world than the false light of lamps. (De verum originatione. See Pichler p.266)

Like Chrysippus Leibniz would have us to say "The world is a perfect body, but the parts of the world are not perfect since they exist relatively to the whole and are not self-subsistent ". In other words so long as we can be content with explanation in terms of efficient causation there can be no problem about evils and certainly no problem about evil. But when this explanation is found inadequate and some hint of final causation is admitted, we must be prepared to give a reason for the faith that is in us. The problematic quality of evil is the register of
our inveterate tendency to make some comprehensive verdict on the universe in other terms than that of mere process and efficient causation. So we ask if there is some soul of goodness in things evil and with Leibniz we stay for an answer.

The extrinsic teleology of the world implied in the phrase that God choose "the best of all possible worlds" helps us to envisage something of its unity and solidarity. For the world in the Mind of God before creation and after creation does not differ in idea but only in existence. The quality of its unity is unique. We can understand, too, something of its value, for God is no mere Unconditioned nor can we speak merely of a Divine incognito. The modus agendi of the Divine Mind is reflected in the mind of the rational soul, which is a mirror of God. The urge of creation for God is the same sub ratione boni principle of action in man. Accordingly we must content ourselves by saying that the world possesses the greatest possible perfection and so the greatest possible unity in variety.

The moral quality of this unity in variety is seen in the essential at-one-ness of the Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of Grace. For this reason a "miracle" is no more remarkable than a "natural law". The interpenetrative nature of these two Kingdoms means that the Kingdom of Grace explains the Kingdom of Nature. In other words this means the conservation of all the true values for which the world was created. Only in so far as man can align himself alongside the supreme ethical purpose which tranquilly works behind the world will he obtain that serenity and peace he covets so earnestly under the guise of happiness. In this way man learns to know God and knowing God to love Him. Thus we can say of the world "Il nous accommodera si nous nous en accommodons; nous y serons heureux, si nous le voulons être" (Théodiceé, Par. 194. G.vi. p.232.)

We have already touched upon Baruzi's contention that the Théodiceé of Leibniz cantains a subtle pessimism. "Le pessimisme n'est donc pas arraché, Nous revenons à la doctrine du Timée. Dès que l'entendement pose un objet, il pose le mal. Dès là résulte cette idée que de toute méditation de l'univers surgit un pessimisme. Dès que loi, de l'ensemble, je mutilé, j'anéantis ma nature propre, je subordonne à l'Être total mon être partiel" (p.95. "Leibniz" Baruzi.) The answer to this is simply that God cannot deny Himself according to Leibniz and that the notion of "the best" does necessarily imply for the ethical theism of Leibniz that man is more than a mere incident in the epic of creation, though we may not dogmatise about his being the final end of creation in the way he appears as its proximate end. Like Cicero Leibniz would say "if the Gods care for all men, it follows logically that they care for each single man ("licet contrahere universitatem generis humani eamque gradation ad pauciores, postremo deducere ad singulos" Cic. N.D.ii 65 164.) And the difference between the Théodiceé, where the happiness of men is not the "dernier but" of God, and the Discours on Métaphysics, where "seul esprit vaut tout un monde " is, as Baruzi himself points out, not a contradiction but a
difference in expression. But though the happiness of rational beings is subordinate to the general harmony of the universe, this cannot mean pessimism. The reasons for this are abundantly and carefully given in the words of the Monadology. "This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His goodness known and admired by spirits. It is also in relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere." (Par. 86. Latta. p. 267-8).

There can be hardly any doubt that this is the true Leibniz speaking in these words. At times, of course, he uses another tone of voice. But, as we have already contended, we must try and read Leibniz at his best. Apart from this occasional variant in expression of his thought, Leibniz like the rest of the philosophers was rather bewildered at finding himself within the spaciousness of a new heliocentric universe. In trying to avoid any taint of that unclean thing for the 17th. century anthropomorphism Leibniz may overstep the mark. But the principle of continuity saved him an advance from this dreaded pitfall of his century. For it made it necessary to say et non magis datur vacuum forarum quam corporum. Accordingly within the gates of the universe we must assume the possibility of being higher than man as well as beings lower than man.

In the end, however, we must always fall back on the ethical and spiritual implications of our idea of God. This is the solvent for the most intractable questions. It helps us e.g. to answer the question of the coming into existence of a Judas in "the best of all possible worlds". To this question, however, we can expect no answer here on earth excepting to say in general that it is because God has found it good that he should exist notwithstanding that sin which he foresaw. This evil will be more than counterbalanced. God will derive a greater good from it, and it will finally turn out that this series of events in which is included the existence of this sinner, is the most perfect among all the possible series of events. An explanation in every case of the admirable economy of this choice cannot be given while we are sojourners on earth. It is enough to know the excellence without understanding it. It is here that must be recognised altituminem divinitiarum, the unfathomable depth of the divine wisdom, without hesitating at a detail which involves an infinite number of considerations". (Discourse on Metaphysics. Par. XXX p. 50-1 Open Court Trans.) So in the same way as we learn to love God we reach a certain assurance as to the position of mortal man in the vastness of the universe. "Although this love is disinterested, it constitutes by itself our greatest good and interest, even though we may not seek these in it and though we may consider only the pleasure it gives without regard to the advantage it brings; for it gives us perfect confidence in the goodness of our Author and Master, which produces real tranquility of mind, not as in the case of the Stoics,
who forcibly school themselves to patience, but through a present content which also assures us a future happiness. And besides the present pleasure it affords, nothing can be of more advantage for the future than this love of God, for it fulfils our expectations also and leads us in the way of supreme happiness, because in virtue of the perfect order that is established in the universe, everything is done as well as possible both for the general good and also for the greatest individual good of those who believe in it and who are satisfied with the Divine government" (Par. 18. "Princs. of Nature & Grace". Latta p. 423-4.) Whatever conflict there may be with this "general good" and "the greatest individual good" must be referred to the goodness of God.

This love of God which "constitutes our greatest good and interest" wields a dynamic influence with Leibniz. It illustrates again the difficulty Leibniz had of fitting his idea of the purposive nature of the universe within an intellectual schematism. For Leibniz the love of God is inseparable from any knowledge of the true purpose of the universe. And as he remarks "propos of the application of knowledge to the most spiritual problems "Enfin, je trouve partout Dieu et sa gloire" (Unedited Letter to Morell. i. Oct. 1697. Quoted p. 13. "Leibniz" J. Baruzi, above.).

This "Gloire de Dieu" is also given a particular Leibnizian interpretation. The theological conception of the Glory of God (to which Bayle clings—see Théodicee. Par. 109. G.vi.p.163.) is transformed. It is no longer regarded merely as something belonging to the Deity and not to the world. On the contrary it's not only this but also something which realises itself in rational spirits. As we have already seen God " would have no glory were not His greatness and His goodness known and admired by spirits"

Analogous to this Glory of God is the General Good. For this Glory of God is a dynamic initiative in the soul of man that leads him to self-renunciation for the General Good. "Je crois que le renoncement total"soi même n'est autre chose que de préférer le bien commun, ou, ce qui est la même chose, la gloire de Dieu, à son intérêt particulier... ce renoncement ne demande pas un repos, mais plutôt une activité". Unedited Letter to Morell. 29. Sept. 1698. Thus knowledge is not the only way to realise the Glory of God.

In this trinity of the Love of God, the Glory of God and the General Good we reach the foundations of the City of God. For thus is realised the possibility of an amor non mercenarius. "God can be loved with the happiest result, since nothing is happier than God and nothing more beautiful or more worthy or happiness can be conceived. And since He possesses supreme power and wisdom, His happiness not only becomes a part of ours (if we are wise, that is, if we love Him) but even constitutes it" ("On the Notions of Right and Justice" Latta p. 286.) For the world is so ordered by virtue of its pre-established harmony that "all spirits, whether of men or of angels, entering in virtue of reason and of eternal truths into a kind of fellowship with God, are members of the City of God, that is
to say of the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and best of monarchs: in which there is no crime without punishment, no good action without a proportionate reward, and in short as much virtue and happiness as is possible; and this, not by any interference with the course of nature, as if what God prepares for souls were to disturb the laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural things, in virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time between the realms of nature and of grace, between God as Architect and God as Monarch, so that nature itself leads to grace, and grace, by the use it makes of nature, brings it to perfection" (Princs. of Nat. & of grace. Par. 15. Latta p. 481.)

From all this it is plain that the Leibnizian universe has a singular unity and solidarity. In an early letter to Foucher Leibniz has expressed something of the precise nature of its unity. "Vous aurez vu que tout mon système, fondé sur la considération de l'unite réelle qui est indestructible et sui juris et dont chacune exprime l'univers tout entier d'une manière qui lui est particulière, et cela par les loix de sa propre nature sans recevoir de l'influence de dehors, excepté celle de Dieu qui la fait subsister depuis qu'il l'a créée par un renouvellement continuel" (Letter to Foucher 5-16 July, 1695. "Lettres et Opuscules Inédits de Leibniz". A.F. de Careil 1854) From this view Leibniz never departed. It would be hard indeed to see how any such departure was possible without a complete bouleversement of his philosophy. The whole of the Théodiceé would have lost a great deal of its point. It would be impossible to speak of "le meilleur plan possible de l'univers" or to say "il ne luy étoit pas non plus indifferent de croire un tel ou tel monde, de croire un chaos perpetuel, ou de croire un système plein d'ordre" ("Remarques sur le Livre &c." Par. 21. G. vi. p. 424.) or "La sagesse de Dieu ne permet point qu'il y ait un chaos véritable, ce serait un défaut de son art; il s'ensuit qu'on ne saurait point assigner des parties qui n'aient rien d'organique, parce qu'une telle partie exprimant les autres qui sont organiques aura de l'organique" (Inédits, Théologie XX. "Leibniz" J. Baruzzi. above p. 296-7.) or in the words of the Monadology "this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all others, and consequently that it is a perpetual mirror of the universe" (Par. 56. Latta p. 248.)

The question of the precise nature of an organic whole raises important philosophical issues which are germane to the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil. The principle of the organic unity of the universe has been extensively employed in this way. It is a principle which requires careful elucidation unless we are to find ourselves in a moral scepticism which makes our last state worse than the first. Lotze e.g. goes the length of giving an exclusively logical rigidity to this Leibnizian conception of the whole. "The whole world has its reality from God, and indeed in this way that in the mond of God there existed many consistent schemes among which He admitted that which contained the smallest amount of evil and the greatest perfection. Such a scheme he could not alter or
improve, but only admit or reject, as a whole. We see from this that also with Leibniz the whole content of reality resembles a mathematical formula in which each part is rigidly determined by others and itself determines them, so that not only does the past include the future but also the latter the past" (Lotze, "Syllabus of Lectures on German Philos. since Kant," quoted Merz "European Thought in the 19th C" Vol. iii. p. 334 footnote.)

There are two senses in which we can speak of an "organic whole". They are:-(a) "Nothing which is a part of a whole W would have been a part of it if anything else which is a part of W failed to be a part of it" (b) "W is such that no part of it could have existed unless all the other parts had existed and had stood to each other in the relations in which they in fact did stand" ("Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy" 1933. C.D. Broad. Vol. i. p. 316.) The first meaning (a) is, as Broad remarks, true for all wholes and is for that very reason entirely trivial. The second meaning (b) is the more crucial. The importance of distinguishing between these two senses is due to the facility with which one can pass from the one to the other. This is the charge that Broad brings against McTaggart.

In the case of Leibniz there can be no question of using the idea of organic unity in a trivial sense. For, according to Leibniz, the whole of the universe and its parts are equally fundamental. In other words the world could not have existed in the absence of anything which is in fact part of it. And nothing which is in fact a part of the universe could have existed unless all the other parts of it had existed and had stood to each other in the relations in which they do stand. Therefore nothing which is in fact a part of the whole universe could have existed unless the whole universe existed.

Leibniz does not hesitate to affirm what McTaggart calls two plausible but misleading corollaries from organic unities viz: - "the whole is in every part" and "the nature of the whole is expressed in every part" ("Nature of Existence" Par. 146. and 147.). Each simple substance is "a perpetual living mirror of the universe" and "God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can confine it to the representing of only one part of things: though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things in the whole universe, and can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely, those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as regards their object, that the Monads are limited, in a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions" (Par. 60. Monadology. Latta p. 250.)
But for Leibniz the guarantee of the value of the universe is that it is God's choice of the best. Other possible worlds, and they are an endless series, have an "intrinsic teleology" of their own and the fact that they have being in the Divine Understanding might suggest that they have all some value. Yet just as we can imagine "the best of all possible universes" as the highest limit of perfection and reality, so is it also possible for us to think of a series of worlds in the negative direction. But the metaphysical attributes of God and their inseparability from the moral attributes make this last supposition a vain imagination. Be this as it may, the extrinsic teleology, implied in the choice of God, makes it certain that the actual universe has more than the mere value implied in its pre-established compossibility alone.

The ethical relevance of the principle of organic unity has been stated by G.E. Moore in his "Principia Ethica." While not attempting to criticise his particular contentions, it may be helpful to consider it as throwing an interesting side light upon the argument of Leibniz.

The general argument of Moore is the familiar one that "The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts" (Principia Ethica. 1922.) In a sense a somewhat similar argument runs like an undertone throughout the Théodicée. Our ignorance of the unity of "le plan de Dieu" leads us at times to wrong conclusions about His goodness and wisdom. Yet in certain complete wholes we have abundant and clear indication of His infinite wisdom in the creation of the world. "Il est vray que nous en avons déjà des preuves et des essais devant nos yeux, lorsque nous voyons quelque chose d'entier, quelque Tout accompli en soy, et isole, pour ainsi dire, parmy les ouvrages de Dieu. Un tel Tout, forme, pour ainsi dire, de la main de Dieu, est une planṭe, un animal, un homme". (Theodicee. Par. 134. G.vi.p.188) In the same way the complete story of the history of the world would reveal the beauty and order of the whole.

The particular interpretation which Moore gives to this principle is that though the part is part of a larger whole (and therefore in every way different from a mere means), yet the part itself may have no more intrinsic value than a mere means. In other words it is necessary to the whole just as a means is to an end, though the relation is toto caelo different. Yet the whole has an intrinsic value and the part has not intrinsic value but without it the whole would not exist. On the other hand the part itself may have great intrinsic value positive or negative and the same law holds good.

The most important application of "the principle of organic unities" occurs in what Moore calls "Mixed Goods", i.e. "things, which though positively good as wholes, nevertheless contain, as essential elements, something intrinsically evil or ugly". Here we must distinguish two valuations of these wholes:—(a) the total value of the whole, "on the whole" i.e. both the sum of the value of the whole
plus the intrinsic values which may belong to any of its parts. (b) the value of the whole "as a whole".

From this principle we can draw a number of important conclusions. Thus the mere co-existence of two or more evils can never be a positive good ON THE WHOLE. On the other hand by cancelling out one another they may have great intrinsic value AS A WHOLE. Of Leibniz:— "Nous savons d'ailleurs que souvent un mal cause un bien, auquel on ne serait point arrive sans ce mal. Souvent meme deux maux ont fait un grand bien" (Theodicee Par.10. G.vi.p.108.).

Again from the existence of the virtues we seem inevitably driven to conclude that they could not exist without the COGNITION at least of evil and the ugly. Where such awareness of evil exists we can but conclude that the whole "on the whole" has great positive value. On the other hand, if we substitute for the knowledge of evil and ugliness, their corresponding actuality, while the actual evil or ugliness may add to the value of the new whole "as a whole", there is no corresponding reason to conclude that we have added to the value of the new whole "on the whole". The opposite is the more probable. As Moore illustrates "A conscious compassion for real suffering seem to be better, AS A WHOLE, than a compassion for sufferings merely imaginary; and this may weel be the case, even though the evil involved in the actual suffering makes the total state of things bad ON THE WHOLE " (p. 219. Principia Ethica.)

The main principle of this argument is plain and of great importance. It lies behind the familiar argument of Leibniz about the concomitance of evil. "Ainsi le mal, ou le mélange de biens et de maux ou le mal prevaut, n'arrive que par concomitance, parce qu'il est lié avec de plus grands biens qui sont hors de ce mélange. Ce mélange donc ce compose, ne doit point être considéré comme une grace, ou comme un présent que Dieu nous fasse; mais le bien qui s'y trouve mêlé ne laisse pas de l'être. (Theodicée. Par. 119. G.vi, p. 170.)

The precise application of this principle to the fact of evil requires much more care than is customarily given to it. The point at issue is a simple one. Is it necessary that evils should EXIST in order that the corresponding virtues should exist? Would not a posse peccare be enough without concrete sin? May not the actuality of these evils outweigh the value of the corresponding virtuous attitudes towards them? Can we e.g. defend the existence of war because of the corresponding virtues it calls forth? According to Moore this line of argument is totally invalid. "Accordingly we have no reason to maintain the paradox that an ideal world would be one in which vice and suffering must exist in order that it may contain the goods consisting in the appropriate emotion towards them. It is not a positive good that suffering should exist, in order that we may compassionate it;
or wickedness, that we may hate it. There is no reason to think that any actual evil whatsoever would be contained in the ideal" (p. 220 above.)

This warning may serve a useful purpose if it reminds us of the facility we take for granted the acutality of evil. But Moore himself needs a similar warning about the facility of building up a philosophical Utopia without actual evil. Have we any more right to assume that the intrinsic moral values we recognise could exist of themselves in a world without evil?

This question was answered for Leibniz by his doctrine of "metaphysical evil" and also by his reiterated conviction that the goods in the world far outweighed its evils. Moreover the fundamental nature of his theism placed an emphasis on the actuality of the goodness of the world we know which was final for Leibniz. When the goddess Pallas leads Theodorus to the palace of Fates she says: "Here are representations, not only of what happens, but also of everything that is possible. Jupiter reviewed them all before the beginning of the existing world, arranged the possibilities into worlds, and chose the best of them all." (Théodicée Par. 414. G.vi. p. 362.) For Leibniz the actual world of our experience is "un certain monde déterminé" and so far as we are concerned no other world has relevance. About the reasons for such "tout un monde" we cannot add more to the earlier dialogue of Valla when he says of the Deity's choice of this world "We do not know what reasons He may have for it, but the fact that He is very good and very wise is enough to make us judge them good" (Théodicée Par. 412. G.vi.p. 361.) This is the reply to Leibniz to the contention "it might be the case that the existence of evil was necessary, not merely as a means, but analytically, to the existence of the greatest good. But we have no reason to think that this IS the case in any instance whatsoever" (p.220. Principia Ethica.) As has been well said "The method of Utopia, which is somewhat discredited in political thought, deserves summary rejection in metaphysics or cosmology" (J.L.Stocks. "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis" Arist. Socy. Proceedings 1929-1930 p. 272.) Ignorance moreover offers a slender foothold for any positive thesis.

However this point may be considered, the principle of constructive and organic unity does offer us a solution of the obduracy of much of the evil in the universe. It is along these lines that the problem can be most effectively tackled both from the theistic point of view and also without pleading the cause of God at all. This is a point Bergson brings out in touching about the problem of evil in physical suffering in his "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion" (Eng. Trans. 1935.p. 224)."It will be said, of course, that if life is good on the whole, yet it would have been better without suffering, and that suffering cannot have been willed by a God of love. But there is nothing to prove that suffering was willed. We have pointed
out that what, looked at from one side, appears as an infinite multiplicity of things, of which suffering is indeed one, may look from another side like an indivisible act, so that the elimination of one part would mean doing away with the whole".

For Leibniz the world becomes rather than changes. The state of the world at any given moment is no argument against the perfection of the whole. The apparent cruciality of the problem of evil is largely the result of looking at things ab extra and from a finite point of view. As what we have called the "O felix culpa argument" so forcibly reminds us process can never be the last word.

Thus Leibniz seems to hold not only that evil is inherently necessary to the highest form of universe, that as such it is merely a temporal aspect of the time-process and overcome by the good of the whole. But the difficulty remains on the theistic hypothesis how God must work out His divine purpose in the world through such base instrumentality. So we ask if evil has taxed the Absolute's powers of assimilation, is the Deity better placed? For however evil may be viewed and however much its context may alter its character in some sense it must remain. Sub specie temporis we know that the very recalcitrancy of man's environment can often lead to spiritual attainment. But sub specie aeternitatis the issue seems to land us in some form of dualism.

The traditional answer to this is to say that though evil falls within the Divine Purpose, it does not fall within the Divine Will. This scholastic distinction between the "antecedent" and "consequent" Will of God is the backbone of the laborious argument of Leibniz. The stress that this distinction lays upon "composibility" is only another name for that unity in the world which is foundational for the doctrine of optimism. As Leibniz says God wishes order and the good, but it sometimes happens that what is disorder in the part is order in the whole. Such is the witness of the legal maxim "incivile est nisi tota lege inspecta judicare." ("Dieu veut l'ordre et le bien; mais il arrive quelque fois que ce qui est désordre dans la partie, est ordre dans le tout. Nous avons déjà allégué cet axiome de droit: incivile est nisi tota lege inspecta judicare" Théodicée. Par. 128. G.vi. p. 182.) One recalls the description Mephistopheles gives of himself to Faust:

"Ein Theil von jener Kraft,
Die stets das Böse will, und stets das Gute Schafft".

(E.T. Studierzimmer. i.B.T. Vol. i.p.544)
With all its inconsistencies "theistic monadism" is the phrase which must remain as the description of the answer of Leibniz to the problem of evil. Its inconsistencies and difficulties are fairly obvious and have been the bane of most commentators. An additional complication is added by the method of his working illustrated by his remark "Quand j'ai fait quelque chose, je l'oublie presque entièrement au bout de quelques mois, et plutôt de le chercher dans un chaos de brouillons que je n'ai pas le loisir de digérer et de manquer par rubriques, je suis obligé de faire le travail tout de nouveau" (G. Mathm. Schrift. ii.p.228. Qouted "Leibniz" Baruzi p. 12. footnote.) One result of this last remark must be that there is no short cut to the thought of Leibniz by the concentration on one or two of his writings to the neglect of the rest. An over simplification of the thought of Leibniz is to do him grave injustice. The tangled skein of much of his thought and the loose ends must resolutely be faced. Arbitrary selection of the texts of Leibniz must be avoided. There can be no excuse for the obliteration of ipsissima verba of Leibniz to discover a pseudo-Spinozistic palimpsest beneath.

The neglect of the Théodicee of Leibniz has already been mentioned. Certainly the difficulties in grappling with a theistic monadism make such neglect an almost irresistible temptation. But this is a way of darkness. What Leibniz has joined together, no commentator has a right to put asunder. The historical priority of the Théodicee to the Monadology (1714) and the references in the latter to the former are enough to show that Leibniz was never conscious of the alleged discrepancy between a publicly and a privately circulated book. Moreover the incorporation in the Théodicee of the early thinking of Leibniz is enough to clinch this argument for good. There is, however, little need to labour an issue the answer to which is written large in practically every writing of Leibniz, and not least e.g. in the Discours de Métaphysique (1686), written for Arnauld and the letters written to Arnauld. All we can say is that Leibniz has taken such precautions against the divorce of the monad from God as lay within his power or at least the explicitness of the written word.

We are far from suggesting that the philosophy of Leibniz is a perfect Weltanschauung. Rounded completeness and philosophical fecundity in ideas do not always walk hand in hand. The reliance of Leibniz upon metaphors to cover up obscurity in his thought is at times disconcerting. To say e.g. that the Monads have "no windows" and then to say they are "fulgurations" from the Divine Mind is not as helpful as it looks or sounds. (see Monad. Par. 47.) For whatever else "fulguration" may mean, it implies no speculative doubt as to the inexpugnable reality of relations apart from qualities. To speak in fact of a "transcendent Monad" is to reveal the difficulties of Leibniz d'un coup d'oeil. It is hard to resist the verdict of Alexander that such immanent theism creates a suspicion "that without much regard for consistency it speeks to combine the religious
attraction of theism with the speculative attraction of pantheism" (Space, Time and Deity " Vol. ii.p. 391. S. Alexander. 1927.) This fundamental inconsistency is the inevitable result of trying to make God at once the summit and completion of the series of Monads and also the source of the other mutually exclusive Monads.

Sometimes Leibniz has been accused of making God a mere deus ex machina in order that the monads in this way might have some inter-relation. So the universe becomes monistic not by the conversion of the Deity into the Monad but by the taking of the Monad into God. Thus God would reconcile the conflicting legacy of Aristotelian metaphysic to the modern world" the conjunction of attributes and the disjunction of primary substances" ("Adventure of Ideas" p. 171. A.N. Whitehead. C.U.P. 1933.)

But something like this criticism might mutatis mutandis be applied to the Monad itself. Nothing is more clear than that the atomic conceptualism of Leibniz is not firm enough to carry the elaborate superstructure built upon it as foundation. Still less can any philosophic wizardry evolve the concrete and manifold world of space and time from such a source. As we have already seen Leibniz fills the gaps in his rationalism by the doctrine of active spirit.

The great question is how far the doctrine that God is Substance can be reconciled with the doctrine of God as Creator. How are we to interpret such terms as "Monas primitiva" (letter to Bierlingium. 1711. Erdmann p.678.) or "la monade primitive" (letter to Remond de Montmoet. 1715. Erdmann p. 725.)? If we take the expressions with any logical strictness, then clearly we cannot speak of any "fulgurations". How far can we escape from the pantheism of Spinoza? Is it true of the God of Leibniz "ex necessitate divinae naturae infinita infinitis modis (hoc est omnia quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debet? (Ethica. Prop. xvi.) The influence of Malebranche as well as of Spinoza carried Leibniz perhaps further in this direction than he realised. But in no case is Leibniz ever conscious of jeopardising his ethical theism and if we are to follow him we must be prepared not only to speak of God as "the primary unity or original simple substance, (Monad. Par. 47.), to say "the ultimate reason of things is called God. (Prince. of Nat. & of Grace. Par.8.) but also to speak of God in such personal terms that we can say "Dieu se détermine par lui même; sa volonté est active en vertu de la bonté" (G.vi.Par.21.p.423.)

The surgical method of dealing with Leibniz practised by Renouvier and others in more recent times is to introduce indeed "La Nouvelle Monadologie" instead of the old. To say, as Renouvier does, that we must abandon "les principes d'absolue et d'infinite" in the interpretation of our idea of God as "en opposition avec la personnalité, la liberté et la création" is to cut the knot instead of untying it. (see "La Nouvelle Monadologie" p. 535. Note 102. 1899.)

The essential theism of the thought of Leibniz reveals
itself in many ways. The phrase "the best of all possible worlds" shows us something of this. For the vindication of such a thesis is for Leibniz a Theodicy, where it might otherwise have been a "Cosmodicy". God for Leibniz is "a home for intrinsic values". God for Leibniz is the guarantor for any moral overdraft there may be in the bank of the universe.

The idea of "the best of all possible worlds", an idea of great historical importance for its influence upon Kant and subsequent thinkers, is a conception more familiar to the 18th. century than to our own. It implies a universe where virtue not only merits but ultimately receives its reward of happiness and vice the reverse. The world must vindicate the moral order of things and man must not wash his hands in innocency in vain. There must be an at-one-ment between the Kingdom of Nature and the Kingdom of Grace. All other "bests" are ruled out. In the last resort justorum animae in manus Dei. But it is only "in the last resort" that this is so. For Leibniz endeavours to keep in the main stream of all theodicean argument by stressing the fact that it is in this life we already discern the beneficence of Divine Creative Love. The question of compensation is not so much raised as the fact that no judgement can be made on the worth-whileness of "this present world" which does not take all the evidence into consideration and in particular the transitory, though necessary, place of evil in this world. Accordingly the apparent injustices of life in this world are transfigured by the fact that, besides being inextricably involved in "the best of all possible worlds", they are merely incidents in the time-span of just men being made more perfect.

This is the answer of Leibniz to that very important part of the problem of evil, the discrepancy in the world between the incidence of reward and merit. The idea of a future life provides the great sanction for the virtuous life, for as Leibniz, quoting Archbishop King, says "the greatest happiness here below consists in the hope of future happiness" ("la plus grande felicite icy bas consiste dans l'esperance du bonheur futur" G.vI.p.436.). In an ed inedit he puts the issue with admirable lucidity by saying that the eternity to come reserved for all souls will provide a field for the giving by degrees the greatest possible perfection to the universe. ("L'éternité à venir réservée à toutes les âmes, ou plutôt à tout ce qui est animé, est un vaste champ pour donner, mais par degrés, la plus grande perfection possible à l'Univers" Inédits, XXXVII, Nachtrage. Baruzi p. 296 "Leibniz".) Moreover this idea of immortality, contrary to the opinion of some e.g. Socinians, the English Deists, Bayle and others, is innate in the human soul. For it is included in the human soul's innate realisation of the idea of God. For it is unthinkable to contemplate a God who will leave any virtue unrewarded or any vice unpunished. "Il n'y a point d'injustice, quand la continuation de la peine n'est qu'une suite de la continuation du péché". Moreover other innate ideas, such as the desire for happiness, inevitably demand the idea of immortality. Accordingly we are inevitably led to conclude the
truth of immortality as adjusting the discrepancy in the world between reward and merit, and to say that God has made the world such that to be happy, it is sufficient to be virtuous. So if the soul follows reason and the commands God gives it, it can be sure of its happiness, although it may not find enough in this life. "Mais Dieu fait que pour être heureux, il suffit d’être vertueux. Ainsi, si l’Ame suit la raison et les ordres que Dieu luy a données, la voilà seure de son bonheur, quoyqu’on ne le puisse point trouver assés dans cette vie" Remarques sur le Livre &c. G.vi.p.420.) This is an argument which, in the opinion of Leibniz, has not only the greatest cogency but also the greatest evidence. For the idea of God is innate in all men and as a consequence neither it nor the idea of immortality are merely truths of Revelation.

Unfortunately the approach of Leibniz to the problem of evil interpreted in this way leads him at times to espouse, to the great detriment of his main argument, some of the eschatological views of the Schoolmen and popular orthodoxy. To say with the Psalmist, as Leibniz at times virtually does, "Convertantur peccatores in inferno, omnes gentes quae obliviscuntur Deum" is for Leibniz to make himself more of a pessimist than Schopenhauer. For irreparable evil has no place in the philosophy of the latter. At the same time it must be noticed that this is not the final view of Leibniz, though he strives hard to justify the traditional Christian dogma, and clutters the Théodicée with rather futile and hackneyed theological disquisitions. There are an infinite number of ways by which God can satisfy His goodness at and after death and our only objection can be that we do not know them. ("Il y a une infinité de chemins ouverts à Dieu, qui lui donnent moyen de satisfaire à sa justice et à sa bonté, et tout ce qu’on peut objecter, c’est que nous ne savons pas de quelle voie il se sert; ce qui n’est rien moins qu’une objection valable" (Théodicée Par.98. G.vi. p.157.)

The theological environment of the 17th. century dispensed Leibniz from the discipline of formulating his theistic beliefs in more detail and with more clarity and precision. Broadly speaking Leibniz inherits the tenets of Christian theism, as is proven by his early works against the Socinians "quorum paupertina semper fuit philosophia" - and other important works. (See J. Iwanicki Leibniz et les démonstrations motem. de l’existence de Dieu.)

The emphasis Leibniz places upon the pre-creative existence of the Deity shows the unconscious extent of this indebtedness. The pre-creative existence of God as the embarrassment par excellence of the philosophical theist. A modern writer illustrates this point. Prof. A.N. Whitehead e.g. in one of his books is forced to assert that there are two natures in God: - (1) "the primordial nature" or "the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects" and (2) "his derivative nature consequent upon the creative advance of the world". In
other words the pre-creative existence of God is a rather verbal idea. For God and the world are inseparable. The reasoning of Whitehead is the fallacious argument that because the world must have been created by God, therefore God must have created the world. This is a line of reasoning which the tradition of Christian theology Leibniz followed was very much concerned to refute.

For Leibniz the relation of God to the universe is nothing unless a unilateral relationship. God is primarily Creator and secondarily Substance. The existence of the world in no way detracts or limits the Divine Nature. There is no moral or dynamic exhaustion in the Deity and no moral or dynamic accretion to the Deity after the creation of the universe. For the world exists in God eminenter. God is "maxime ens" and not the "maximum ens". He is infinitely more real than the created universe of His hands. Of Him we can say in sober truth "s'il n'y avoit pas le meilleur (optimum) parmy tous les mondes possibles, Dieu n'en auroit produit aucun" (Theodicee Par. 8. G.vi.p.107). His blessedness is always perfect and can receive no increase from within or without. ("sa beatitude est tousjours parfaite, et ne sauroit recevoir aucun accroissement, ny du dedans ny du dehors" Theodicee Par. 217. G.vi p. 247.) The entia of created things only enjoy a participated reality. In other and simpler words Creation implies a unique relationship.

The difficulties of Whitehead illustrate the difficulty of postulating a monohypostatic deity without embracing at the same time pantheism or theocosmism. Leibniz avoided this euthanasia of all theology by his tacit acceptance of the current orthodox view of the Deity. This is the answer to those who, like Secretan, assert that Leibniz made no use of the Christian dogma about the nature of God. The identity of Leibniz with the theological Zeitgeist of his age enabled him to speak with freedom and confidence not only about the nature of God but also of His pre-creative existence. With the current orthodoxy Leibniz could say there was a time before the world was and yet God is actus purus as eternally He must remain. Both before and after the fiat of creation the essential nature of God is not changed. Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est; descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. God for Leibniz is actively transcendent above the universe and at the same time immanently in it, without being servile.

There are three main foci in the answer of Leibniz to the ancient problem cur mala fiant, cum sit providentia. (1) his theory of optimism (2) the order and interconnection of all things in the universe. (3) the privative nature of evil. Round these points his main argument moves but most importance must be laid upon (1). For this is the a priori and basic answer of Leibniz. Curiously his argument on this point bears a singular resemblance, if not identity, to that of Malebranche. "God, as an infinitely perfect being, can accomplish nothing that does not bear the
the mark of His infinite perfection; so among all the works He might perform, His wisdom always determines Him to choose the most perfect. It is true that He is free to act or not act outside Himself, but supposing He does act He must produce whatever is most perfect, being thereto invincibly determined by the order of things. It were unworthy of Him not to confirm to this order" (Fenelon's Réfutation du système de Mâlebranche Ch.1. quoted p. 314. "History of the Problems of Philosophy" by P. Janet and G. Sealilles. Vol. ii.p.314. Eng. Trans.)

How far Leibniz was directly influenced by Mâlebranche is an important problem and one not too easy to resolve. The identity of their views on questions of theodicy is remarkable. It is only necessary to read the 9th. Dialogue of Mâlebranche's important work "Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la Religion" (1688.) to see the extent to which Mâlebranche anticipated the theocentric opinions of the Théodiceé. "Do not, therefore, imagine that God willed to create the most perfect world possible, but merely the most perfect in relation to the ways worthy of Him, for what God wills simply, directly, and absolutely in His designs is always to act in as divine a manner as possible, to make His procedure as well as His work bear the character of His attributes, to act exactly in accordance with what He is and with all that He is. From all eternity God has seen all the possible worlds and all the possible ways in which each of them could be produced; and, as He acts only for the sake of His glory, only in accordance with what He is, He has resolved to will that work which could be produced in ways which in conjunction with the work should honour Him more than any other world produced in any other way. He has formed a plan which is to bear, pre-eminently, the character of His attributes, which is to express exactly the qualities which He possesses, and which He glories in possessing." (p.241. Eng. Translat. "Dialogues on Metaphysics" M. Ginsberg. 1923.). "To God nothing is difficult; but observe, all things are not equally worthy of Him. His ways must bear the character of His attributes no less than His work. It follows that God must attend to the ways as well as to the work. It is not sufficient that His work should honour Him by its excellence; it is necessary in addition, that His ways should glorify Him by their divinity. And if a world more perfect than ours could not be created and maintained except by ways which were conversely less perfect, so that the expression, so to speak, which this new world and its ways would give to the divine qualities would be less than that of our world, I do not fear to say that God is too wise, loves His glory too much, acts too exactly in accordance with what He is, to be able to give it the preference to the world which He has created; for God is indifferent in His plans only when they are equally divine, equally glorious, equally worthy of his attributes, only when the relation consisting in the beauty of the work and the simplicity of the ways is exactly equal" (p. 241-2. above.).
These and other resemblances in his teaching on providence with Leibniz are very striking. Leibniz's criticism of Malebranche is at times beside the point e.g. the occasionalism of Malebranche does not involve a miracle at every moment any more than the pre-established harmony. As Leibniz himself admits the transition from the one to the other is both simple and easy. On the main issue there is a fundamental agreement. (cf. "Je suis tout à fait de vostre sentiment, lorsque vous dites que Dieu agit de la plus parfaite manière qui soit possible. Et quand vous dites dans un certain endroit, qu'il y a PEUTESTRE contradiction que l'homme soit plus parfait qu'il n'est par rapport aux corps qui l'environnent, vous n'avies qu'à effacer ce peut être". Letter to Malebranche. 13 Jany. 1679. G.i.p.328.)

The fundamental difference between them is that Malebranche as a theologian relates his views more closely to the dogmatic and soteriological basis of the Christian religion - in the words of St. Paul "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself". Leibniz is more inclined to insist on the infinite perfectibility of the universe, While, however, Malebranche never approaches the Latter doctrine, Leibniz at times writes very much in the mode of Malebranche, especially in those inédits to which Barzi and other writers have drawn attention.

It is sufficient for our purpose here to note without explaining the fundamental agreement of Malebranche and Leibniz. Unquestionably Leibniz was influenced by him, the extent of that influence lies outside our present scope. Leibniz himself had no apparent desire to underestimate the extent of the influence of Malebranche upon himself. "Vos beaux écrits, mon Réverend Père, ont rendu les hommes beaucoup plus capables qu'ils n' estoient auparavant d' entrer dans les vérités profondes; si je prétends d'en profiter, je ne manqueray pas aussi de le reconnoistre". Letter to Malebranche. Oct. 1698. G.i.p.354.) We may, however, note, as an illustration of our criticism of an extreme kind cancels itself out, that the alleged plagiarism of Leibniz on Malebranche goes some way to refute the alleged plagiarism of Leibniz on Spinoza! But, as we have already remarked, the lover of plagiarisms will find good hunting in the works of Leibniz.

Pichler in his "Die Theologie des Leibniz" Vol.i.p.326 sums up the argument of Leibniz on this point. In answer to the question why moral evil should ever darken the face of the universe, he says: "To this Leibniz has on innumerable occasions a double answer: the best world demanded this, and, God makes no mistakes, He always does the best. We cannot wish that things go better when we understand them. On the contrary it would have been a mistake on the part of the Creator of all things, if He had wished to exclude sin. (Théodiceé Par. 125.) At the same time we must always realise that Leibniz does not take it upon himself to explain these secrets completely and satisfies himself with defending God against the accusation of injustice and cruelty. From a thinker like Leibniz we would wish to obtain explanation of everything. But this also is an important and useful explanation the fact that Leibniz tells us that he does not find everything completely understandable for
the human reason and on the other hand nothing in contradiction with reason. Rather the latter can be quite calm, by reason of that which it does know, about that which it does not. For there must be in the work of God something incomprehensible so that we may remain conscious of our dependent state as creatures. The aim which God has set Himself consists in actively making use of His goodness, and His wisdom has caused Him to choose the most suitable means to reach this goal. A Will which finds it essential to choose the good deserves to be praised. It is sufficient to gain for oneself the assurance that a thing comes from no one else but God in order to be certain that it is the best"

(2) plays a vital part in the answer of Leibniz, though commentators have not yet perhaps assessed it as its true value. It brings Leibniz directly into line with the great heritage of Christian theology from the Platonic tradition and the teaching of the Stoics. As we have seen it constitutes the backbone of the answer of Leibniz to Bayle. It furnishes the outer defence work to all his optimistic belief. It is an answer to the problem of evil which has been pilloried in the well known words of Lotze as "a consolation the power of which depends upon the arrangement of clauses in a sentence." (Microcosmus. ii. p.716.)

According to the Platonic tradition the universe was as near perfection as it could be considering the recalcitrancy of its "stuff". But according to Catholic orthodoxy the universe is an absolutely perfect organic whole. Leibniz by his view that this is "the best of all possible worlds" inclines somewhat to the Platonic tradition but he is at one with both in stressing that the world is the best of all possible organic wholes. Like Aquinas Leibniz would say "It is part of the best agent to produce what is best in its entirety, but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole, in the case of an animal for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be the best as a whole, according to the mode of the creature, whereas He did not make each creature best, but one better than another." (Summa Theologica. Pt.I.Q.47, Art.2. Dominican Translat.) And like Aquinas, too, Leibniz expounds this broad principle in terms of the well known aesthetic or dramatic anaology of Plotinian and Stoic theodicy. "We, are like those who know nothing about the art of painting, and find fault because the colours are not everywhere beautiful, though the painter has given to each part of the picture the colour appropriate to it. Or again we are like those who find fault with a play because the characters in it are not all heroes, but some slaves, and rustics, and rough-speaking fellows. But here, too, the play would not be beautiful if one were to remove the meaner characters and the parts they play" (Quoted by A.G.Fuller. p.209-210. "The Problem of Evil in Plotinus" 1912.)
This provides the answer to the objection that because the world is "the best of all possible worlds", therefore each part of it must necessarily be the best. For as Aquinas adds "The whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this." (Summa. Theol. Pt.1.Q48. Art.2.)

For Leibniz the organic unity of the world is impervious to any mere mathematical explanation. The geometrical illustration (of Boyle) of the straight line $AB$. The geometrical illustration of the straight line from $A$ to $B$ passing through $C$ is the shortest distance between $A$ and $B$, therefore the same must be true of the straight line to $C$, does not really help us. Geometrical illustrations do not help us here. If the straight line $A$ to $B$ is the shortest distance between $A$ and $B$ and if it passes through $C$, then we can say that the line $A$ to $C$ is the shortest distance between these two points. To argue in this way Leibniz points out is to confuse quantity with quality. The part of the shortest road between two extremities $AB$ also the shortest between the extremities of this part; but the part of a best Whole is not necessarily the best that one can make of this part; since the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it must be detached from the whole or comprised in the whole in an irregular manner. If goodness and beauty always consisted in something that was absolute and uniform, such as extension, matter, gold, water and other supposed homogeneous and similar things, we should have to say that every part of the good and beautiful must be good and beautiful, like the whole: but this is not the case with relative things" (Théodicee Par. 213. G.vi.p.245-6.) Like Augustine Leibniz has a strong aesthetic feeling for the unity of the universe. It is this which makes Leibniz, like Augustine, insist so much upon the Omniscience of the Deity as ruling out all mere indeterminacy in the universe.

In the same way it helps to place in a true light the critical remarks of a theologian like M. Diroys and others. In his "Preuves et Prejugés pour la Religion Chretienne" (1683) M. Diroys criticised dualism on the ground that it is impossible to demand that the good principle should produce nothing evil, since by the same reasoning we must also demand that it should produce the greatest good, the lesser good itself being a form of evil. It is necessary then to establish as a first truth touching the conduct of God towards creatures that it is not repugnant to this goodness and wisdom to make things less perfect than they can be. ("Il faut donc établir comme une première vérité touchant la conduite de Dieu à l'égard des créatures, qu'il n'y rien qui repugne à cette bonté et à cette sagesse de faire des choses moins parfaites qu'elles ne pourroient être. Théodicee Par. 198. G.vi. p. 234.) The answer of Leibniz is to point out that the dualists are right in their contention that God can only make the best but they make the mistake of thinking that the best in the whole is exempt from evil in the parts. ("le meilleur dans le tout soit exempt de mal dans les parties et qu'ainsi ce que Dieu a fait n'est point le meilleur"
We must not lose sight of the order and connection of things ("l'ordre et la liaison des choses"). This is the answer to the objection to the demand of things that should contain Gods. For if this were apart from the fact that impossible to create Gods, all the substances would be alike.

This whole line of reasoning, based on the organic unity of the universe, has, as Leibniz himself remarks, an obvious affinity with the teaching of Stoics monism. ("Il se trouve que les anciens Stoiciens n'ont pas été fort éloignés de ce système". Théodicée Par. 209. G.vi.p.242.) According to Leibniz his monadological interpretation of the nature of this unity makes it one of the most original parts of his system and in his own words supplies what is lacking in other systems. ("c'est l'unique remède qui remplit ce manque à tous les systèmes, de quelque manière qu'on range les décrets". Théodicée. Par. 239. G.vi.p.260.)

This whole approach to the problem of evil still supplies the thews and sinews for most theodicean argument as a quotation from a modern writer makes abundantly plain. "The solution that has been presented consists in showing the tenability of the belief that in our developing world all possibility of moral evil and the actuality of its consequences are inevitable concomitants of the 'best possible' evolutionary world. It is not maintained that everything is good, or that 'whatever is, is right', or that partial evil is not evil because it is a condition of universal good. Nor is it implied that every particular evil is directly essential to the emergence of some particular good, or that it has its necessary place, like a dissonance in music, in the harmony of the world-process. When it is asserted that all things work together for good, by 'all things' is not meant each and every single thing, but the sum of things regarded as one whole or complex, the universe as a coherent order". (p. 197.Vol.2. Philosophical Theology. F.R.Tennant.1930.). It would be hard to imagine a more Leibnizian statement than this and one which reveals more clearly the extent of his influence.

(3). The privative nature of evil makes it impossible to think that there can be any principium maleficium such as Bayle imagined. Evil has only a causa deficiens, non efficiens. God cannot will moral evil. It is only permitted because of a greater good on the whole. To permit evil, as God permits it, is the greatest goodness. ("Permettre le mal, comme Dieu le permet, c'est la plus grande bonté" Théodicée. Par. 121. G.vi.p.175.). Thus Leibniz follows in the steps of Plato, Augustine and the Scholastics in saying that the material cause of evil is positive and the formal cause is privative. To use the words of Augustine, often quoted by Leibniz, "Nemo quaerat efficientem causam maleae voluntatis, non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens, quia nec ulla effectio est, sed defectio" De Civita Dei. xii.7. Thus God is as little the cause of sin as the current of a river is the cause of the slowness of a boat. ("Et Dieu est aussi peu la cause du péché, que le courant de la rivière est la cause du retardement du bateau."Théodicée Par.30. G.vi.p.121.) Thus evil is essentially parasitic, the opposite but not the equal of good.
What is positive in Evil comes through concomitance.

The great difficulties in sustaining such a privative view of evil are well known. They have already been commented upon and they are not peculiar to Leibniz. Such difficulties really reduce themselves back to the Thomistic assertions that there is only a logical distinction between goodness and being and that existence admits of degrees. Leibniz cannot easily be cleared of the fallacies consequent on these opinions. Like Aquinas and others he finds it easy, as we saw in our early chapters, to make the transition between the ontological and ethical meaning of perfection. But as we have already seen it is very difficult to take this interpretation of the nature of evil in a purely Spinozistic manner, especially in view of the emphasis. "We have seen, Leibniz places on the importance of "la monade" and in view of the organic interrelatedness of the universe.

There is one difficulty arising out of this last issue which must be faced. Namely how the universe can ever have any perfection, when it essentially involves the taint of creaturlessness. How can we avoid Neo-Platonic dualism? The answer of Leibniz is that what can be said of a creature or a particular substance which can always be surpassed by another cannot apply to the universe which is an infinite extending throughout the eternity to come. Moreover there is an infinity of creatures in the least part of matter, because of the actual division of the Continuum to substance particuliere, infinity. ("Je réponds que ce qui se peut dire d'une Créature ou d'une substance particuliere, qui peut tousjours être surpassée par une autre, ne doit pas être appliqué à l'univers, lequel se devant étendre par toute l'éternité future, est un infini. De plus, il y a une infinite de Créatures dans la moindre parcelle de la matière, à cause de la division actuelle de Continuum à l'infini". Théodicée Par. 195. G.vi. p. 232.) The defectiveness of this answer is apparent in the light of the infinitesimal calculus. For there is always the higher infinite above the lower or created infinite.

The more satisfactory answer of Leibniz is to point out the infinite perfectibility of the universe. The whole infinite series of things might be the best that is possible, though what exists throughout the universe at each point of time is not the best. It may be that the universe always goes on from better to better, if the nature of things is such that it is not permitted to reach the best all at once. But these are problems of which it is difficult for us to judge. ("toute la suite des choses à l'infini peut être la meilleure qui soit possible, quoique ce qui existe par tout l'univers dans chaque partie du temps ne soit pas le meilleur. Il se pourrait donc que l'univers allat tousjours de mieux en mieux, si telle étoit la nature des choses, qu'il ne fut point permis d'atteindre au meilleur d'un seul coup. Mais ce sont des problèmes dont il nous est difficile de juger " (Théodicée Par. 202. G.vi.p.237.)
This last answer of Leibniz reminds one of the view of a modern philosopher "good and evil in the future affect us quite differently from good and evil in the past.... if, therefore, we arrived at a theory of the universe which was unable to deny the existence of evil, or to assert that over the whole good predominated over evil, or that it did so at present, there would be a chance for optimism. If such a theory were able to assert that, whatever the state of the universe now, it would inevitably improve, and the state of each conscious individual in it would inevitably improve, until they reached a final state of perfect goodness, or at least of very great goodness, surely this would be accepted as a cheerful theory" (p. 153-154. "The Relation of Time to Eternity". Philosophical Essays by McTaggart 1934.)

This raises the important question of the meaning of time in the philosophy of Leibniz. In some respects it may appear to be a more remote problem than the problem of evil but argument might easily be made to show that it has a philosophic priority to the latter problem. In the case of Leibniz it raises a crucial issue for the estimation of his philosophy.

Alexander says with reference to evil "Our revolt against the existence of evil appears to spring from two sources, a theoretical fault and a defect of temper. The theoretical fault is that of emancipating God from time" ("Space, Time and Deity" Vol. ii. p. 420.). Alexander would solve the problem by baptising the Deity in the ceaseless transiency of time, Leibniz would solve the problem by stressing its virtual unreality.

Unfortunately Leibniz forgot that while process cannot be the last word, yet it is in this flux that we apprehend the universe and it is in this flux that we live and move and have our being. The universe, as he himself so often reminds us, is not stationary. The rational souls inhabiting it pass from evil to good and from good to evil in an endless variety of ways. While the deity is no officious Parish verger for whom nothing can be done unless by "volontés particulières" such as Malebranche seemed to suggest (Par. 206.), this is very different from saying that time and process do not matter. This was the morass the short cut of Leibniz to ethical theism landed him. Time for us does matter, though God is outside its ebb and flow.

For Leibniz space and time are entia mentalia. They have no final reality. In this respect they differ from phenomena bene fundata like "matter". In his letters to Clake and Bayle Leibniz speaks of space and time as mere ordines coexistendi in contrast to events in the space and time order which are called entia semimentali or phenomena bene fundata. (See "History of Philosophy" Erdmann. Vol. ii. p. 185.)

This view of space as mere appearance and quite inapplicable to the real nature of the monad adds some serious difficulties to the
exposition of his monadism. Theologically it ministers comfort in
avoiding any difficulty which might arise in the doctrine of the
omnipresence of God "comme centre partout, mais sa circonférence est
nulle part". But other difficulties suggest themselves. If space is
to be conceived on almost Kantian lines, what meaning can we give to
the phrase-and is it not more than a phrase?- "point of view". Yet
to give up the punctual simplicity of the Monad or to make that
simplicity qualitative, as Herbert did, is to go back to Spinozism
on the one hand and on the other, with the Herbartian alternative, to
imperil not only the Pre-established Harmony but also the foundation
of any theistic belief. Bayle's criticism of the monad is one that the
subsequent history of philosophy has justified. The difficulties of
Leibniz about space afford an interesting example of the defects of
his merits as a mathematician in the field of philosophy.

The same reasoning applies, Leibniz, states, to the
problem of time. It is something ideal-"une chose idéal". For this
reason it is foolish to ask why God did not create the world a
thousand years sooner. For time is only this relation of succession
and the difference is only a fiction badly understood. Otherwise it
must be confessed that God made something without reason, this being an
absurdity, we must come back to the doctrine of the eternity of the
world. ("Je dis encore là-dessus, qu'il en est de l'espace comme du temps
que le temps sépare des choses n'est pas un être absolu, mais une chose
idéale; et que pour cette raison on ne peut point demander, pourquoi
Dieu n'a pas créé le Monde mille ans plutôt? car le temps n'étant que
ce rapport des successions, ce seroit la même chose, et la différence me
consiste que dans une fiction mal entendue. Autrement il faudroit
avouer que Dieu auroit fait quelque chose sans raison, ce qui étant une
absurdité, il faudroit recourir à l'éternité du Monde" Letter to

Time for Leibniz is not a phenomenon bene fundatum. It has
not that independent reality Newton claimed and which Clarke was so
much concerned to defend. As space is the order of possible coexistence,
so time is the order of inconsistent possibilities, which have yet
some connexion. So the one regards things as simultaneous or existing
together, the other those which are incompatible and yet existing. This
explains succession. ("Mais pour parler plus juste, l'Etendue est
l'ordre des coexistantes possibles, comme le Temps est l'ordre des
possibilités inconsistentes, mais qui ont pourtant de la connexion.
Ainsi l'un regarde les choses simultanées où qui existent ensemble,
l'autre celles qui sont inconsistentes et qu'on connaît pourtant comme
existentes, et c'est qui fait qu'elles sont successives" Réponse aux
réflexions...article Rorarius, sur le système de l'Harmonie préétablie
G.iv.p.568.)

From this the conclusion is inevitable that while the
world is in the flux of time, God is outside it. "Thus the sufficient
reason, which has no need of any other reason, must needs be outside
of this sequence of contingent things and must be in a substance which
is the cause of this sequence, or which is a necessary being, bearing
in itself the reason of its own existence, otherwise we should
not yet have a sufficient reason \( \phi \) with which we could stop. And this ultimate reason of things is called 'God' (Principles of Nature & of Grace. Latta p. 415. Cf. Monad. Par. 45, Theodicee Par. 8 &c.)

But we have already seen how difficult it was to fit the fleeting world into the timeless machinery of the Pre-established Harmony, unless indeed time and process are really unimportant. The Pre-established Harmony murders time. Yet to view the world sub specie temporis is not meaningless. To call time "une chose idéale" is to give it a definite meaning in condemning it as having no final reality. However time still has its serial element. Though time has no absolute reality, we can still say that the future will be better than the past or the present.

Thus though time is "une chose idéale", we must conclude that this "chose idéale" is not itself in time. In other words, if as Leibniz holds the future will be better than the past or the present, then the time series must inevitably close like an inverted telescope, so to say, into a series of adequacy. It becomes not only a series of adequacy of representation but of progressive adequacy.

On this view the only significant meaning we can attach to the future is that it is a more adequate representation of reality than either the past or the present. Clearly on this view the universe may appear to the eternal and synthetic contemplation of God as "the best of all possible worlds", while to the purblind eye of mortal man it may be a vale of misery.

From the above discussion we see the relevance of this discussion of the meaning of time to the problem of evil. Discussing the problem of evil Alexander remarks "...the problem is indeed insoluble either so long as, on the purely pantheistic conception, deity is conceived to animate all parts of the world alike, and not rather that part which in due time is fitted to carry deity; or so long as, in purely theistic doctrines, God is regarded as separate from his world, and existing independently of it, and for imaginative purposes before it. But the problem becomes less of a mystery when Time is conceived to be essential to God, deity and body alike, and when deity is regarded as an outgrowth from lower empirical qualities and succeeding them in time". (Alexander. above. Vol.ii.p.420.) Unfortunately the answer of Alexander involves difficulties almost as great as those it solves but which are hardly relevant here. The answer of Leibniz is along the lines of theistic doctrine but his view of time must prove an insuperable obstacle. Perhaps the best way of rehabilitating the reasoning of Leibniz on this matter of time is along the lines of the argument of McTaggart. On this view we avoid the mistake of Hegel. For even if evil is to be condemned as illusory, it is nevertheless a painful illusion. So we are little advanced. But by regarding the future as "the progressive manifestation of the Eternal" we may combine the teaching of the unreality of time with an optimistic view of the universe.
The ethical theism of Leibniz really breaks down on this point. For no answer to the problem of evil can be considerate adequate which regards time and process as mere ciphers. On the contrary any ethical theism must regard them as the stuff of life.

Just as the theistic belief of Leibniz is historically prior to his monadism, so must we also give the former a logical priority. For this reason there can be no harmony among the monads unless by virtue of a common cause. ("car ce parfait accord de tant de substances qui n'ont point de communication ensemble, ne saurait venir que de la cause commune. Syst Nouveau. Par. 16..) For this reason it is very difficult to conceive how monadism can escape incoherence unless by an insistence upon this Supreme Mind and Being of the Deity. So Leibniz may well say "There is also here a new and SURPRISINGLY CLEAR PROOF of the existence of God". The logical outcome of "window less monads" is the irrationality of solipsism. The theological dogmatism of Leibniz saved him from a situation which otherwise might have been intolerable. As it is the ethical quality of "the best of all possible worlds" differentiates the monadism of Leibniz from the more thorough going forms of the same philosophy. This fact alone, apart from the historical and metaphysical priority of the theism of Leibniz, is enough to show that all verdicts on Leibniz which fail to give some reasonable account of these views are at least over hasty, if they do not raise a suspicion about their essential truth. The character of the Théodicée as the only work of Leibniz to be published in his life time, as written at a time when maturity has come to the minds of most men and, above all, as incorporating so much of his earlier thought must add immense support to this view.

Theology of Leibniz is as much at fault as his metaphysics. The dramatisation of the Divine Choice of "the best of all possible worlds" led Leibniz into the more rarefied regions of theology where he was not really sure of his tread and pitfalls awaited every step. The great difficulties he encounters in his doctrine of God have already in part been mentioned. The prius of eternal truths existing "in the understanding of God" and yet governing the Deity is one example of this. Yet it is here perhaps that Leibniz opened up the most fruitful line for philosophical theology and not least its answer to the problem of evil. It has shown that to imagine a different world is really to imagine a different God. For possibility must depend on some knowledge of the actual. The nature of God must be the sole arbiter not only of the actual but also of the possible. So the diagram thinking of the Divine choice becomes meaningless and unintelligible.

The short cut of Leibniz to ethical theism in his answer to the problem of evil leads him to lose his way and find himself in the valley of the dry bones of deism. In this way we re-discover the truth of the verdict of one of the earliest critics of Leibniz. "En 1739 Jean Georges Abicht, docteur en théologie de Wittenberg, dans sa dissertation intitulée: Einige Mängel der Leibnizischen Philosophie, welche der Theologie zuwider sind, souligne très bien que le point essentiel de la conception leibnizienne consiste à concevoir le monde
comme une machine et Dieu comme un mécanicien, et qu'ainsi Leibniz se croit autorisé à traiter Dieu comme une réalité mathématique. Il a publié, observe Abicht, que les idées mathématiques ont été formées par notre intelligence au moyen de l'abstraction.... la réalité métaphysique ne se plie pas à la rigueur des sciences mathématiques" (p.307-8. "Leibniz et les démonstrations mathématiques de l'existence de Dieu." J. Iwanicki). This gives a new/deeper significance to the remark already quoted "Je commence en philosophe, mais je finis en théologien". For in the last resort there can be no final separation of philosophy from theology. "It is plain that what must be discussed by the theologians must be discussed by the philosophers also" ("Scilicet quod Theologis, idem et philosophis agendum est." Letter to Jacob Thomasius. April 1669. G.i.p.23.) And what Leibniz wrote to Spizel as early as December 1669 supplies the key for the full understanding of all his writings and not least his answer to the problem of evil "Ego tametsi non theologus, nihilominus, quando ut Tertulianus ait, adversus publicos hostes omnis homo miles est". (Quoted p.69. J. Iwanicki. above).
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(1) The whole inédit is worth quotation:

"On ne peut rien déguiser dans mon système, car tout y a une parfaite connexion. Il faut des distinctions bien justes que bien exactes par exemple. il faut distinguer entre l'infini et le tout; le tout est opposé au rien et l'infini est opposé au fini. Il faut distinguer aussi entre une substance et un aggrégé de substances, inter substantiam et substantiae. Les distinctions des Scholastiques ne sont pas à mépriser toujours; par exemple celle qu'ils font entre l'un véritable, unum per se, et l'un aggregative. Les remarques sur M. Gassendi, le P. Malebranche, M. des Cartes, Spinoza, M. Lock servent à préparer les esprits. Je ne puis pas toujours m'expliquer amplement, mais je tâche toujours de parler juste. Je commence en philosophe, mais je finis en théologien. Un de mes grands principes est que rien ne se fait sans raison. C'est un principe de philosophie. Cependant dans le fonds ce n'est autre chose que l'aveu de la sagesse divine, quoique je n'en parle pas d'abord. Selon moi l'organisation ne saurait commencer que par miracle aujourd'hui ou au commencement des choses. C'est parce qu'elle est infinie et que les parties des machines naturelles sont encore des machines. Epicure et M. des Cartes se sont trompés en croyant un corps d'un homme ou d'une beste se puisse former naturellement ou mécaniquement d'une masse organique."

The incomplete character of the published writings of Leibniz has always proved a stumbling block to any attempt at a complete and comprehensive review of his philosophy. The definitive edition of his works now being made by the Akademie der Wissenschaften of Berlin will put all students of Leibniz heavily in its debt. Gerhardt's edition of the works of Leibniz (G) "Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz. 1875-1890." is used in the text, supplemented by several collections of fragments and inédits, as well as by well known translations.

(3) "La philosophie de Leibniz apparait ainsi comme l'expression la plus complète et la plus systématique du rationalisme intellectualiste: il y a accord parfait entre la pensée et les choses, entre la nature et l'esprit; la réalité est entièrement pénétrable à la raison, parce qu'elle est pénétrée de raison. Pour caractériser cette métaphysique d'un seul mot, c'est un panlogisme" p. xi. "La logique de Leibniz". Louis Couturat. 1902.

Couturat lays some stress on a four page énédit of Leibniz. Part of it reads:- "Semper igitur praedicatum seu consequens inest subjecto seu antecedenti, et in hic ipso consistit natura veritatis in universum seu connexion inter terminos enuntiationis, ut etiam Aristoteles observavit. Et in identicis quidem connexion illa atque comprehensio praedicati in subjecto est expressa, in reliquis omnibus implicita, ac per analysin notionum ostendenda, in qua demonstratio a priori sita est."
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(4) It is not necessary to seek back stairs influence in the case of Leibniz to realise how exceedingly difficult it is to reconcile this rationalist pur sang interpretation of his philosophy with the profoundly religious (not to say mystical) note of many of his writings. We notice this e.g. even in his most systematic work the "Discours de Métaphysique" as well as in the "On en voit, fort clairement que toutes les autres substances Monadology and elsewhere passim. In an unedited letter to Morell, 10th. December 1696, Leibniz writes :-

"Quant a sainte Therese vous avez raison d'en estimer les ouvrages; j'y trouvai un jour cette belle pensee, que l'ame doit concevoir les choses comme s'il n'y avait que Dieu et elle au monde. Ce qui donne meme une reflexion considerable en philosophie, que j'ai employe utilement dans de mes hypotheses" (quoted by Jean Baruzi "Leibniz et l'Organisation Religieuse de la Terre". Paris 1907. p. 494.)

It is a mistake to underestimate this side of the philosophy of Leibniz. "Cott ist mir näher angehörig als der Leib" (quoted Baruzi above from "Leibniz's deutsche Schriften").

In a letter to Princess Sophie he gives us some more clues as to other influences upon his thinking not usually reckoned
into account. (C. vii. p. 548-550) "Une des plus fortes marques d'un amour de Dieu qui soit sincère et désintéressé, est d'être content de ce qu'il a déjà fait, dans l'assurance que c'est toujours le meilleur; mais de tâcher de rendre ce qui est encore à faire aussi bon et aussi conforme à sa volonté présomptive qu'il nous est possible. Pour l'aimer, il faut applaudir à sa volonté certaine qui paroist à l'égard du passé, et tâcher de satisfaire à sa volonté présomptive à l'égard de l'avenir." He goes on to state "Mais c'est des ma jeunesse que j'ai formé ces idées. Un grand prince qui estoit en même temps un grand-prélat, une une me recommandant le livre Allemand du P Spée sur les trois vertus chrétiennes, imprime et reimprime plus d'une fois à Cologne y a Contribua beaucoup".

(5) "Les monades particulièrement sont pas plus distinctes de la monade centrale que les rayons du soleil ne le sont de l'astre lui-même. Au fond la monade primitive est l'unité et la totalité du monde comme la substance de Spinosa, car son infinité consiste précisément dans sa fulguration. Spinosa exprime la liaison du principe et des choses dérivées par une image mathématique. Les choses résultent de Dieu comme il resulte de la nature du triangle que ses trois angles sont égaux à deux droits. L'image physique dont se sert Leibniz est plus radoucie, mais ce n'est qu'une différence de style. Quant à la réalité des choses finies et à leur rapport avec Dieu les deux philosophes sont au fond du même sentiment" "La Philosophie de Leibnitz" p. 138-9. O. Secretan. (1840)
This work anticipates a considerable amount of contemporary criticism of Leibniz and ought to be better known.

(6) Secretan puts his interpretation of Leibniz with admirable bluntness. "Il faut donc se représenter Dieu comme un esprit avant tout créateur, et qui se décidant une fois à créer, fait un choix dans le nombre des mondes possibles.... Cette dernière opinion était-elle réellement celle de Leibniz? Je le crois. Le regard de son génie penetrant au-delà des formes dans lesquelles il avait essayé d'abord d'exprimer l'infinie réalité qu'il sentait partout vivante. La Monadologie ne lui suffisait pas. Mais l'opinion de Leibnitz n'est pas ce dont il s'agit ici; l'opinion de Leibnitz, Messieurs, n'est pas sa philosophie. La conséquence de ses principes, voilà ce qui est d'un intérêt universel, voilà ce qui peut devenir le point de départ d'une philosophie subéquente, voilà ce qui forme un anneau dans la chaîne des pensées de l'humanité. Or la conséquence des principes, nous l'avons vu. Le monde dérive de Dieu, il résulte de la nature de Dieu, sans acte: c'est un système d'émancipation. Peu importe après cela que Leibnitz ait déguisé ou non son vrai sentiment dans la Théodicée" p. 89. "La Philosophie de Leibnitz", "La Nouvelle Monadologie" of Ch. Renouvier and Piat makes the same point about the Théodicée. Lesser commentators have repeated the same refrain.

(7) "Messieurs vos Prélats délibèrent à présent sur des matières assez proches de celles de mon livre, et je serois curieux de savoir, si quelques uns des excellents hommes qui entrent dans leur assemblée, ont vu mon livre et ce qu'ils en jugent." Letter to
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(8) "La Théodicée est une œuvre de théologie au moins autant que de philosophie... Elle est à présent classée sous la rubrique THEOLOGIE, où elle est entourée d'œuvres analogues et connexes" p. x. Preface "Opuscles et Fragments inédits de Leibniz" L. Couturat 1903. Théodicée. Par. 211. G. vii. p. 244.

(9) "Etant en France, je communiquay à M. Arnaud un Dialogue que j'avois fait en latin sur la cause du mal et sur la justice de Dieu: c'etoit non seulement avant ses disputes avec le R.P. de Malebranche, mais même avant que le livre de la Recherche de la Verite parut. Ce principe que je soutiens icy, savoir que le pêche avoir été permis, a cause qu'il avoir été enveloppe dans le meilleur plan de l'univers, y etoit deja employé; et M. Arnaud ne parut point s'en effaroucher. Mais les petits demeles qu'il a eus depuis avec ce Bère, luy ont donne sujet d'examiner cette matiere avec plus d'attention, et d'en juger plus sévèrement". Théodicée. Par. 211. G. vi. p. 244.

For another reference to this Dialogue—see G. i. p. 321. Letter of Leibniz to Malebranche: Dated 22 Junii 1679. "Je trouve aussi fort veritable ce que vous dites de la simplicité des décrets de Dieu, qui est cause de ce qu'il y a quelques maux particuliers: autrement Dieu se soyoit obligé de changer les loix de la nature à tout moment. Il faut pourtant dire là dessus quelque chose de plus; et je me souviens d'avoir montré un jour un petit dialogue à Mons. Arnaud et à Mons. des Billettes, qui alloit fort avant, et qui,
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'a mon avis, ne laisserait plus de doute sur la liberté, si ce n'est qu'on en veuille établir une notion absurde et contradictoire.

(10) See G. vii. p. 262 (Quod Ens Perfectissimum existit).

"Ostendi hanc rationationem D. Spinosae, cum Hagae Comitis essem, qui solidam esse putavit, cum enim initio contradiceret, scripto comprehendi et hanc schédam ei praegi".

(11) "Nous avons établi que Dieu fait tout dans la plus grande perfection dont l'univers est capable. Et par conséquent chaque chose a en elle ou aura autant de perfection qu'elle est capable de prétendre à proportion de celle qu'elle a déjà sans faire tort aux autres. Or le plaisir n'estant autre chose que le sentiment d'un accroissement de la perfection il s'ensuit que Dieu donnera du plaisir à toutes les créatures autant qu'elles en sont capables, en sorte que celles qui sont raisonnables se trouvent toutes heureuses autant qu'il est possible sauf (?) l'harmonie de l'univers qui veut qu'il se trouve au bout de compte le plus de perfection et le plus de bonheur qu'il soit possible d'obtenir en somme. Ce qui ne se peut faire peut-être sans la misère de quelques-uns, qui la méritent".


(12) We must interpret the answer of Leibniz in the spirit of his remark "Tout effet exprime sa cause et la cause de chaque substance, c'est la résolution que Dieu a prise de la créer; mais cette résolution enveloppe des rapports à tout l'univers, Dieu ayant le tout en veue en prenant resolution sur chaque partie, car plus on
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Notes.

(1) "Vulgar philosophiam incipere a creaturis, cartesium a mente, se incipere a Deo" (Bodemann. p.103. above.)

(2) In the Résumé by Leibniz of De Consolatione by Boëce there occur these words:— "Je ne m'étonne pas, ajoute-t-il, quo les méchans tâchent de faire du mal, mais je m'étonne qu'ils y réussissent sous les yeux de Dieu; de sorte qu'on a raison de demander avec un ancien sage: S'il y a un Dieu, d'ou vient le mal? S'il n'y en a point, d'ou vient le bien?" (p. 267. A.F. de Careil. above.)

(3) The rational soul cannot lose its franchise in the City of God. "This is why everything is so constructed that the laws of force or the purely material laws work together in the whole universe to carry out the laws of justice or of love, so that nothing will be able to injure the souls that are in the hands of God, and so that everything should result in the greatest good of those that love him; this is why, furthermore, it must be that spirits keep their personalities and their moral qualities so that the city of God shall lose no member and they must in particular preserve some sort of memory or consciousness or the power to know what they are, upon which depends all their morality, penalties and chastishments. Consequently, they must be exempt from those transformations of the universe which would render them unrecognizable to themselves and, morally speaking, would make another person of them." Letter to Arnauld. Oct.6.1678. (Open Court Translation p. 232-232.) cf. also p.195. Letter to Arnauld April 30 1687. Quoted by Latte p. 117 (G. ii. 99.)
Chapter II.

Notes.

(4) "Deus non est quiddam Metaphysicum imaginarium, incapax cogitationis, voluntatis, actionis, qualen nonnulli faciunt, ut idem futurum sit ac si diceres Deum esse naturam, Fatum, fortunam, necessitatem, Mundum, sed Deus est substantia quaedam, Persona, Mens." Leibnitiana (lagodinsky) p. 34.

(5) "Vous demandez pourquoi il seroit borne. Je réponds qu'il se pourroit borne par sa propre nature ou volonté. Comme en effet Dieu n'a point produit tout ce qu'il pouvoit" Fragment-"Sur l'Existence de Dieu." (p. 247. A.F. de Caire)

(6) "Attributa Dei infinita, sed coram nullum essentiam Dei involvit totam; nam essentia Dei in eo consistit, ut sit subjectum omnium attributorum compatibilium. Quaelibet vero proprietatis sive affectio Dei totam eius essentiam involvit; ut Deus certum aliquod nobis sensu constant proutificus; quantulum-cunque sit, totam involvit naturam Dei; quia totam involvit serio rerum illius generis".

(7) p. 61. Bodemann. Cf. "Ce grand Etre qui pense si parfaitement à tout sans que ses pensées soient traversées, et qui produit aussi tout suivant sa pensée, fait les choses comme il veut, c'est à dire selon qu'il trouve bon. On n'objecta qu'il faisoit ce qu'il trouvoit bon pour lui même, mais non pas peut estre pour nous. Je répondis qu'il ne seroit gueres parfait ny habile, s'il ne rendoit tout bon encor pour ses ouvrages, et que je croyois que est la que sans cela elles ne seroient encores bonnes pour lui, ou le même chose, ne le seroient pas assez. Car ce qui seroit encor bon pour eux, seroit meilleur parlant absolument" p. 90. (Fragment without title) Bodemann.
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(8) "Au fond, la pensée de Leibniz paraît avoir été que la Raison suffisante est le principe du monde ainsi qu'elle l'est de l'intelligence. Par la vertu de ce concept, on passerait de l'idée de la possibilité en général à l'idée de la réalité universelle qui est Dieu. Et de là tous les infinis. Le caractère moral de la perfection est étranger à cette théorie (p. 310). Bouteaux, to whom Renouvier refers, makes a similar remark.

"...Il n'est pas moins vrai que Descartes, avant Leibniz et suivant la tradition théologique, a fait entrer dans l'idée de perfection d'un côté, celle de la perfection d'être, ou être absolu, avec les attributs infinis, de l'autre, celle des perfections morales, sans montrer qu'elles se puissent allier avec la première, bien plus, en conservant ainsi toutes les contradictions des docteurs scolastiques, sans les voir, ou sans essayer de s'y soustraire" (p. 311. above.)

(9) "Je trouve que M. Boyle parle très bien alliure de L'application de nous notions de la bonté aux actions de Dieu. (Rep. au Provinc. ch. 81. p. 139.): il ne faut point icy prétendre (dit il) que la bonté de l'être infini n'est point commune aux mêmes regles que la bonté de la créature. Car s'il y a en Dieu un attribut qu'on puisse nommer Bonté, il faut que les caractères de la Bonté en général luy conviennent. Or quand nous réquisons la bonté à l'abstraction la plus générale, nous y trouvons la volonte de faire du bien". (Théodicese Par. 179. G.vi. p. 221.)
(10) "Après avoir parlé de quelques attributs de Dieu, l'Auteur reconnaît que Dieu agit pour une fin, qui est la communication de sa bonté, et que ses ouvrages sont bien disposés. "C.vi. p.406.

(11) "Car il se plaisait à le (i.e. Dieu) contempler dans les merveilles de la nature, il étudiait les simples, dont il savait tirer des essences admirables, et toutes ces belles connaissances qui l'avaient fait brillant dans le monde, purgées de ce qu'elles avaient de profonde, no luy estoient qu'autant de représentations diverses de la grandeur et de la bonté de Dieu dont il était épris. Il avait en un talent merveilleux pour les mathématiques, et il voulut essayer s'il en pourrait imiter la certitude dans les matières plus relevées."

(12) H. Gilson in "Le Thomisme" p. 130-has a revealing note on this paradox"."Le bien est l'objet propre de la volonté; c'est donc la bonté de Dieu, en tant qu'elle est voulu et aimée par lui, qui est cause de la créature. Mais elle ne l'est que par l'intermédiaire de la volonté. Ainsi, nous posons à la fois qu'il y a en Dieu une tendance infiniment puissante à se diffuser hors de soi ou à se communiquer et que cependant il ne se communique ou diffuse que par un acte de volonté. Et ces deux affirmations, bien loin de se contredire, se corroboreront".
NOTES.

(1) "Mais la véritable philosophie nous doit donner une toute autre notion de la perfection de Dieu, qui nous puisse servir en physique et en morale." "Letter to Phillipi Jan. 1680. G. IV. p. 284.)

(2) "Sa bonté et sa justice, aussi bien que sa sagesse, ne différent des nôtres, que parce qu'elles sont infiniment plus parfaites."

(3) "La volonté sans raison serait le hasard des Epicuriens. Un Dieu qui agirait par une telle volonté, serait un Dieu de nom. La source de ces erreurs est, qu'on n'a point de soin d'éviter ce qui dérège aux perfections divines."

(4) "L'objet de Dieu a quelque chose d'infini, ses soins embrassent l'univers. Ce que nous en connaissons n'est presque rien et nous voudrions mesurer sa sagesse et sa bonté par notre connaissance; quelle téméritée ou plutôt quelle absurdité." Théodicée Pt. 2. Par. 134. G. vi. p. 188.

(5) "Ce qui est bon et raisonnable dans les esprits finis, se trouve éminemment en luy (Dieu)." "Discours de Metaphysique" Par. 36 G. iv. p. 461.

(6) "On peut donc dire que chaque substance simple est une image de l'univers, mais que chaque esprit est par-dessus cela une image de Dieu, ayant connaissance non seulement des faits et de leur liaisons experimentales, comme les âmes sans raison, qui ne sont qu'empiriques, mais ayant aussi connaissance de la nécessité des vérités éternelles, entendant les raisons des faits et imitant l'Architecture de Dieu, et aussi capable par la d'entrer en société." Letter to Remond. 1714. G. iii. 623-4.
Chapter 2.

Notes.

(7) "Il y a là (Lausanne) un autre qui a commenté sur Puffendorf du Droit de Nature, et m'a fait un procès sur la manière avec laquelle je parle en passant dans la Théodicée de son Auteur, lequel soutient que les vérités morales dépendent de la volonté de Dieu, doctrine qui n'a toujours paru extrêmement déraisonnable, et j'ai dit là-dedans que Mr Puffendorf ne devait pas être conté sur cette matière" Letters to Burguet 1716, G.iii. p. 590.

(8) "Comme je crois que Dieu est la seule substance, qui soit l'objet immédiat externe des esprits, et qui puisse agir sur eux dans la rigueur métaphysique, et comme toutes leur perfections, leur viennent de lui; je crois qu'on peut fort bien soutenir dans ce sens que nous voyons tout en Dieu et que nos perceptions ont pour objet immédiat externe formel les idées qui sont en lui, quoyqu'il y ait aussi en nous ses modifications qui enveloppent un rapport à ces idées, et ces rapports seraient ce qu'on pourrait appeler les idées en nous, et qui sont notre objet interne formel. Ces modifications dans nos esprits sont toujours une suite naturelle de ces idées qui étaient déjà en nous, comme les modifications présentes de la matière sont une suite naturelle des modifications précédentes de la matière; mais ce passage d'un état à l'autre arriva toujours par l'intervention de Dieu, qui produit toute perfection en nous et ailleurs." Bodemann. Fragment. No. Title. p. 29. Cf. Remarques sur le sentiment du P. Malebranche (1703). G. vi. p. 578. (quoted by Latte p. 55. footnote.)

(9) "Deum, inquit, esse omnium potens non dubitaverit. Qui, quidem, inquam, mente consistat, nullus prosus ambigat. Qui veto
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est, inquit, omnium potens, nihil est quod ille non possit. Nihil, inquam. Num igitur Duo facere malum potest? Minime inquam. Malum igitur, inquit, nihil est, cum id facere ille non possit qui nihil non potest" De Consolatione Philosophiae, Lib. iii. prosa. 12.

(10) "Tout ce qui nous vient du R.P. Malebranche est précieux. Je souhaitte que les philosophes Chinois aient les pensées, qu'on leur attribue sur le ly comme sur le principe de l'ordre et de la sagesse. Je crois qu'après cela on les ferait parvenir aisément à la connaissance de la véritable divinité par l'anime, que rien n'arrive sans un suffisant pour quoy. Et je doute fort qu'ils aient la vainc subtilité d'admettre une sagesse sans admettre un sage" (p. 29) Bodemann. Fragment.)


(12) "Ma Dynamique demanderait un ouvrage exprès; car je n'ay pas encore tout dit ny communiqué ce que j'ay à dire là dessus. Vous avez raison, Monseigneur, de juger que c'est en bonne partie le fondement de mon système, parce qu'on y apprend la différence entre les vérités dont la nécessité est brute et géometrique, et entre les vérités qui ont leur source dans la convenance et dans les finales" Letter to Remond. June 1715. G. iii. p. 645.
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(14) "From the very fact that there exists something rather than nothing, we must recognize that in possible things, or in possibility or essence itself, there is a certain need of existence, or (so to speak) a certain aspiration to exist, and, in a word, that essence by itself tends to existence. Whence it further follows that all possible things i.e. things expressing essence or possible reality, tend with equal right to existence in proportion to the quantity of essence or reality they contain or to their degree of perfection; for perfection is nothing but quantity of essence" Ultimate Origination of things. p. 340. Latte.

(15) "Quand je dis, qu'il y a une infinité de Mondes possibles, j'entends qui n'impliquent point de contradiction, comme on peut faire des Romans qui n'existens jamais et qui sont pourtant possibles. Pour être possibles, il suffit de l'intelligibilité; mais pour l'existence, il faut une prévalence d'intelligibilité ou d'ordre; car il y a ordre à mesure qu'il y a beaucoup à remarquer dans une multitude"

(16) "Les possibles dépendent de Dieu en ce sens que c'est l'essence même de Dieu qu'ils expriment, chacun a sa manière, chacun dans les limites qui lui sont propres l'infinie variété d'aspects que comporte l'essence de Dieu considérée de tel point de vue particulier, tel est le contenu des possibles. Ces essences dérivées, en nombre infini,
resident de toute éternité dans l'entendement divin dont elles
sont l'objet; et la volonté divine n'intervient que pour susciter
le développement des unes, de préférence aux autres".
p.164. "La Monadologie" Emile Boutoux. 1881.
Chapter iii.

Notes.


(2) "Ex providentia Dei sequitur res in causis suis esse determinates. Nam scire aliquid est nosse veritatem propositionis, nosse autem veritatem propositionis est scire ita futura sit. Si itaque Deus perfecte praevidet res, praevidebit non tantum quod futurae sint, sed etiam cur sint futurae, id est habet scientiae suae rationes solidas etc" p.38. Bodemann, Fragment.


(3) "Ce6t artificio divin producit enfin une liaison et harmonie parfaito de toutes choses, en sorte qu'il est impossible de rien concevoir de mieux ni de plus grand. Et c'est ce qui paroit plus
Chapter III.

Notes.

que jamais par le système nouveau de l'harmonie prêtable, explique ailleurs, qui donne une tout autre face à l'univers, aussi différente à son avantage de celle qu'on luy donnait auparavant, que le système de Copernic est différent de celui qu'on donnait ordinairement au monde visible" 1695. Bedermann p. 62.

(4) "M. Bayle objecte que l'auteur des choses estant infiniment bionfaisant doyvoit produire du mal; may je dis que si avec le bien pur, c'est-à-dire sans douleur et sans peché, la perfection des choses ne seroit que comme 6, et si avec le peché et la douleur cette perfection est comme 8. Dieu ne peut se dispenser de permettre le peché. La perfection consiste dans l'harmonie, et souvent il faut reculer pour mieux sauter; il faut aussi considérer que le mal n'est pas mal absolument, c'est-à-dire à Dieu et à l'Univers, mais à celui qui le fait" Remarques critiques de Leibniz sur le dictionnaire de Bayle" p. 180. "Lettres et Oeuvres Inédites de Leibniz" A.F. de Careil. 1854.)

(5) "Deus intellegens non solum omnia quae sunt eruntque, sed et omnia possibilia, sic omnio ostendi potest. Sit liquo aliquid pressus et qui entré consur. Manifestum est tentari semper ab lo vias possibilis omnes successum autem haberis tantum secundum viam omnium facillimae.... "Bedermann p. 74. Fragment without Title.

(6) "Les Théologiens ne demeureraient point d'accord de la Thèse qu'en avance contre moy, qu'il n'y a point de difference par rapport à Dieu, entre le naturel et lo surnaturel. La pluspart des philosophes l'approuvront encore moins. Il y a une difference infinie; mais il
paroist bien qu'on ne l'a pas bien considéré. Le surnaturel suspasse toutes les forces des creatures. Il faut venir à un exemple. Et en voici un, que j'ay souvent employé avec succès. Si Dieu vouloit faire en sorte qu'un corps libre se promenât dans l'Ether en round a l'entour d'un certain contre fixe, sans que quelque autre creature agist sur lay; je dis que cela ne se peut que par miracle, n'estant pas explique par les nature des corps. Car un corps libre s'euarte naturellement de la ligne courbe par la tangente. C'est ainsi que je soutiens que l'attraction proprement dite des corps est une chose miraculeuse, ne pouvant pas entre expliqué par leur nature".  


(8) "C'est pourquoi, si Dieu est la souveraine sagesse, comme ses ouvrages admirables le font voir, et si sagesse cherche la perfection partout autant qu'il est possible il ne faut pas douter que les estros les plus parfaits et les plus approchant de Dieu ne soient les plus considerés dans la nature et que Dieu n'ait eu regard à leur bonheur préférablement à tout autre chose. Car enfin cela se peut sans que l'ordre de l'univers s'y oppose". Théophile et Polidore. p.34. above.
Notes.

(1) "Enfin l'auteur remarque, que la plus grande feličité icy bas consiste dans l'esperance du bonhur futur, et qu'aainsi on peut dire, qu'il n'arrivo rien aux mechant qui ne serve à l'amendement ou chastiment, et qu'il n'arrivo rien aux bons qui ne serve à leur plus grand bien". G.vi.p.436. Remarques sur le Livre ec.

(2) Que deviendra la considération de nostre globe et de nostre habitants? Ne sera ce pas quelque chose d'incomparablement moindre qu'un point physique, puisque nostre terre est comme un point au prix de la distance de quelques fixes? Ainsi la proportion de la partie de l'univers que nous connaissons, se perdant presque dans le néant au prix de ce qui nous est inconnu, et que nous avons pourtant caot d'admettre; et tous les maux qu'on nous peut objecter n'étant que dans ce presque-néant; il se peut que tous les maux ne soyent aussi qu'un presque-néant en comparison des biens qui sont dans l'univers" Théodicee Par. 19. G.vi.p.114.

(3) "Vous ne connoissez le monde que depuis trois jours, vous n'y voyez guere plus loin que vostro nos, et vous y trouves a redire. Attendez a le connaitre davantage, et y considérez surtout les parties qui présentent un tout complet (comme font les Corps organiques); et vous y trouvrez un artifice et une beaute qui va au délè de l'imagincation. Tirons en des consequencès pour la sagesse et pour la bonte de l'auteur des choses, encore dans les choses que nous ne connoissons pas." Théodicee Par.194. G.vi.p.232.)
Chapter vi.

Notes.

(4) "Et pour ce qui est du mal, Dieu ne veut point du tout le mal moral, et il ne veut point d'une manière absolue le mal physique ou les souffrances: c'est pour cela qu'il n'y a point de predetermination absolue à la damnation: et on peut dire du mal physique, que Dieu le veut souvent comme une peine due à la coule, et souvent aussi comme un moyen propre à une fin, c'ont à dire pour empêcher de plus grandes maux, ou pour obtenir de plus grands biens". Théodicee Par. 23. G.vi.p.116.) En "Absolument parlant on pourrait soutenir, que Dieu a permis le mal physique par conséquence, en permettant le mal moral, qui en est la source" Théodicee Par. 378. G.vi.p.

(5) "La peine est aussi pour l'amendement et pour l'exemple, et le mal est souvent pour mieux goûter le bien, et quelques fois aussi il contribue à une plus grande perfection de celui qui le souffre, comme le grain qu'on sème, est sujet à une espèce de corruption pour gommer: c'est une belle comparison, dont Jésus Christ s'est servi lui-même, above. G.vi.p.117."

(6) "ils s'imagine que la Nature n'a été faite que pour eux, et qu'ils comptent pour rien ce qui est distinct de leur personne; d'où ils inferent que quand il arrive quelque chose contre leur gré, tout va mal dans l'univers". Théodicee Par. 262. G.vi.p.273.)

(7) "Et quant à la cause du mal, il est vrai, que le Diable est l'auteur du poche:mais l'origine du poche vient de plus loin, sa source est dans l'imperfection originale des creatures: cela les rend capables de pocher; et il y a des circonstances dans la suite des choses, qui font que cette puissante est mise en acte. " Théodicee, Par. 156. G.vi.p.203.)
Chapter...vi.

Notes.

(8) "Il est vray, que le peché fait une grande partie de la misère humaine, et même la plus grande; mais cela n'empêche point qu'on ne puisse dire que les hommes sont méchants et punissables: autrement il faudroit dire que les pêches actuelles de non-regénérés sont excusables, parce qu'ils viennent du principe de nostre misère, qui est le peché original." Remarques sur le Livre de l'origine du mal G.vi.p.416.

(9) "Il est encore bon de considérer que le mal moral n'est un si grand mal, que parce qu'il est une source de maux physiques, qui se trouve dans une créature des plus puissantes et des plus capables d'en faire. Car une mauvaise volonté est dans son département ce que le mauvais principe des Manicheens seroit dans l'Univers; et la Raison, qui est une image de la divinité, fournit aux âmes mauvaises de grands moyens de causer beaucoup de mal. Un seul Caligula ou Nero en a fait plus qu'un tremblement de terre. Un mauvais homme se plaît à faire souffrir et à détruire, et il n'en trouve que trop d'occasions." Theodicee Par. 26. G.vi.p.116.)
Notes.


(2) "Auch in seiner Auffassung von dem Sündenfalle des Menschen gehört Leibniz nicht der Kirchenlehre und Dogmatik seiner Zeit, sondern durchaus der neueren Wissenschaft an. Die orthodoxo Doctrin hat Schwierigkeiten auf Schwierigkeit, Widerspruch auf Widerspruch, und erklärt gar nichts, sondern vornimmt es nur ohne Roth die wunderbaren und geheimnisvollen Annahmen, d.h. sie erklärt sich selbst für
Chapter vii.

Notes.


(3) "Les Édès Diablos étaient des Anges comme les autres avant leur chute, et l'on croit que leur chef en était un des principaux; mais l'Écriture ne s'explique pas assez là-dessus. Le passage d'Apocalypse, qui parle du combat avec le Dragon, comme d'une vision, y laisse bien des doutes, et ne développe pas assez une chose dont les autres auteurs sacrés ne parlent presque pas. Ce n'est pas ici le lieu d'entrer dans cette discussion, et il faut toujours avouer ici que l'opinion commune convient le mieux au texte sacré" Théodicée Par. 157. C.vi.p.203.

(4) "Il est bien plus convenable à la justice Divine de donner à l'âme déjà corrompue physiquement ou animalement par le péché d'Adam, une nouvelle perfection qui est la raison, que de mettre une âme raisonnable par création ou autrement, dans un corps, ou elle doive être corrompus morallement. (Théodicée. Par. 92. C.vi.p.153.)

(5) "Je ne trouve pas aussi qu'il soit nécessaire de dire que toutes les vertus des Pêvons étaient fausses, ny que toutes leurs actions..."
étaient des péchés; quoyqu'il soit vray que ce qui ne vient pas de
la Foy, ou de la droiture de l'âme devant Dieu, est infecto du
(6) "Mais tous ceux qui reconnoisssent que Dieu produit le meilleur
plan, qu'il a choisi entre toutes les idees possibles de l'univers
qu'il trouve l'homme porte par l'imperfection originale des createurs
à abuser de son libre arbitre et à se plonger dans la misère; que
Dieu empêche le peché et la misère, santant que la perfection de
l'univers, qui est un ecoslement de la sienne, le peut permettre; ceux
là, dis jo, font voir plus disctinentement que l'intention de Dieu
est la plus droite et la plus sainte du monde, que la Creature seule
est coupable, que sa limitation ou imperfection originale est la
source de sa saliice, que sa mauvaise volonté est la seule cause de sa
misère, qu'on ne sauroitêtre destine au salut sans l'autre aussi à
la saintete des enfans de Dieu, et que toute l'espoirance qu'on peut
avoir d'autre elui, ne peut être fondée que sur la bonne volonté qu'on
(7) "Adam a-t-il peché librement? Si vous repondes qu'oui, donc
vous dira-t-on, on choute n'a pas esto provu. Si vous repondes que
non, donc, vous dira-t-on, il n'est point coupable." (Bayle).
"On repondra donc qu'Adam a peché librement, et que Dieu l'a vu
pêchant dans l'état d'Adam possible, qui est devenu actual, suivant
le décret de la permission Divine. Il est vray qu'Adam s'est determine
à pêcher en suite de certaines inclinations prevalantes: mais cette
determination ne détruit pas la contingence, ny la liberte; et la
determination certaine qu'il y a sans l'homme à pêcher, me l'empêche
point de pouvoir ne point pécher (absolument parlant) et puisqu'il péche, d'être coupable et de mériter la punition, d'autant que cette punition peut servir à lui ou à d'autres, pour contribuer à les déterminer une autre fois à ne point pécher" Théodicée. Par. 369. G.vi. p. 334.

(8) "IL est vray que Dieu n'auroit point créé l'âme au commencement dans un état ou elle auroit péché dès le premier moment, comme les Scholastiques l'ont fort bien observe: car il n'y a rien dans les loix de sa sagesse, qui l'y eût pu porter." Théodicée. Par.390. G.vi.p.334.

(9) "Lorsque Dieu produit la chose, il la produit comme un individu, et non pas comme un universel de Logique (je l'avoue); mais il produit son essence avant ses accident, sa nature avant ses opérations, suivant la priorité de leur nature, et in signo anteriore rationis. L'on voit par là comment la creature peut être la vraye cause du péché, sans que la conservation de Dieu l'empêche; qui se règle sur l'état précédent de la même creature, pour suivre les loix de sa sagesse non-obstant le péché, qui va être produit d'abord par la creature. Théodicée. Par. 390. G.vi.p.346.

(10) "Peut-être même que le principal dessein de Dieu dans la création est l'Incarnation de son Fils et que l'ordre de la nature ne sert que d'occasion à celui de la grâce: l'obeissance et le sacrifice du Verbe incarné a plus davantage que la rebellion de l'homme n'a deplu. O certe necessarium Adae peccatum!... O felix culpa quae talem ac tantum meruit habere redemptorem! Dieu agit pour sa gloire et le principal de ses desseins est celui dont il en tire davantage. Et il a plus de gloire de son Fils que de tout le reste de ses ouvrages"
Chapter vii.

Notes.


(11) "Dieu produit la créature conformément à l'exigence des instans précédens, suivant les loix de sa sagesse; et la créature opère conformément conformément à cette nature, qu'il luy rend en la créant tousjours. Les limitations et imperfections y naissent par la nature du sujet, qui borne la production de Dieu, c'est la suite de l'imperfection originale des créatures: mais le vice et le crime y naissent par l'opération interne libre de la créature, autant qu'il y en peut avoir dans l'instant, et qui devient notable par la répétition" Théodicée. Par. 276. G. vi. p. 287.

(12) "Dieu est la seule cause principale des réalités pures et absolues, ou des perfections. Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae."

Mais lorsque on comprend les limitations et les privations sous les réalités, l'on peut dire que les causes secondes concourent à la production de ce qui est limite. Sans cela, Dieu serait la cause du péché, et même la cause unique" Théodicee. Par. 392. C.vi.349-350

(13) "Non eo tamen extendenda est vis peccati originalis, ut parvuli, qui nullum actuale peccatum commiserer, damnetur, quemadmodum multi volunt; sub justo enim judice Deo sine culpa sua miser esse nemo potest" Systema theologicum. p.9. (Quoted by Pichler "Die Theologie des Leibniz " Vol. i.p.331. footnote.)

(14) "Considerandum videtur, quid sit in peccato originis praeter fomitem vel dispositions ad peccandum, seu quid sit in eo, quod reatum involvat poenamque mereatur, etiamsi in bullum actum erumpat. Neque enim apparat, quomodo justitia divina punire possit (nisi poena damnii), quae voluntaria non sunt. An ergo dicimus, peccati originalis naturam consistere in humana infirmitate seu fomite tamquam materiali et imputatione tamquam formali, ita ut decreverit Deus, sub eo conclusos habere pro filiis irae, exclusos haereditate coelestii, non tamen ideo, nisi actu peccent, quemadmodum omnes adulti in gratiam non recepti facient, damnandos. At baptizati declarantur iterum haereses regni coelorum cessatque in iis id quod in peccato originali formale est. Atque ita protestantes, qui volunt, imputationem tantum cessare, cum catholicis, qui reatum tolli volunt, conciliantur. Nihil aliud enim est in reatu illo reale et positivum (nam defectus gratiae privatium quiddam est tantum) quam imputatio. Consentit haec interpretatio cum eorum doctrina, qui arbitrantur, infantes non baptizatos sola poena damnii affici."-Quoted from Annotata ad Conc. Trident. See A. Pichler. "Die Theologie des Leibniz" Vol.i.p.332.
Chapter vii.

Notes.

(15) "La première difficulté est, comment l'âme a pu être infectée du péché originel, qui est à racine des péchés actuels, sans qu'il y ait eu de l'injustice en Dieu à l'y exposer" Théodicee. Par. 86. G. vi. 149.

"Or l'âme étant une fois sous la domination du péché, et prête à en commettre actuellement, aussi tost que l'homme sera en état d'exercer la raison; c'est une nouvelle question, si cette disposition d'un homme qui n'a pas été régénéré par le baptême, suffit pour le damner, quand même il ne viendroit jamais au péché actuel, comme il peut arriver, et arrive souvent soit qu'il meure avant l'âge de raison, soit qu'il devienne hébète avant que d'en faire usage." Théodicee Par. 92. G. vi. p. 153.

(16) "Si les yvrogues engendroient des enfants inclines au même vice par une suite naturelle de ce qui se passe dans les corps, ce seroit une punition de leur progeniteurs, mais ce ne seroit pas une peine de la loy. Et y a quelque chose d'approchant dans les suites du péché du premier homme. Théodicee Par. 112. G. vi. p. 164.

(17) "Peccatum Originale tantum vim habet, ut homines reddat in naturalibus debiles, in spiritualinus mortuos ante regenerationem; intellectu ad sensibilitia, voluntate ad carnalia versis, ita ut natura filii irae sumus" Causa Dei. Théodicee, Par. 86. G. vi. p. 452.

(18) "Il suffit que Dieu a defendu une chose nuisible; il ne faut donc point s'imaginer que Dieu y ait fait simplement le personnage de législateur, qui donne une loy purement positive, ou d'un juge qui impose et inflige une peine par un ordre de sa volonté, sans qu'il y ait de la connexion entre le mal de coule et le mal de peine. Et il
n'est point nécessaire de se figurer que Dieu justement le corps-âme \irrité a mis une corruption tout exprès dans l'âme et dans le corps de l'homme, par une action extraordinaire, pour le punir: a peu près comme les Atheniens donnaient le suc de la cigne à leur criminals" Théodicee. Par. 112. G.vi.p.164.
Chapter viii.

Notes.

(1) "Car s'il n'y avait que des apparences ou songes, on ne seroit pas moins assuré de l'existence de ce qui pense, comme dit fort bien Mons. des Cartes, et moy j'ajoute qu'on n'en pourroit pas moins démonstrer l'existence de Dieu par des voyes differentes de celles de Mons. des Câtes, et qui, à ce que je croy, mement plus loing. Car on n'a nullement besoin de supposer un estre qui nous garantisse d'etre trompés, puisqu'il est en notre pouvoir de nous détromer dans beaucoup de choses, et au moins sur les plus importantes." Letter to Foucher 1676. G.i.p. 374.

(2) "Cependant, autant qu'on le peut comprendre, il ne reconnoit point de bonté en Dieu, à proprement parler, et il enseigne que toutes les choses existent par la nécessité de la nature Divine, amà sans que Dieu faisse choix". Théodicée. Par. 173. G.vi.p.217.

(3) "Sed omessa perfectione aut magnitudine potuissent formari argumentatio adhuc proprior strictiorque hoc modo: Ens necessarium existit (seu Ens de cujus Essentia est Existentia, sive Ens a se existit), ut ex terminis patet. Jam Deus est Ens tale (ex Dei definitione), ergo Deus existit. Haec argumenta procedunt, si modo confutatur Ens perfectissimum seu Ens necessarium esse possible, nec implicare contradictionem, vel quod idem est, possibilem esse essentiam ex qua sequatur existentia". Animadversiones in partem generalen Principiorum Cartesianum. G. iv.p.359.

(4) "Il en est de même du gouvernement, de Dieu: ce que nous en pouvons voir jusqu'ici, n'est pas un assez gros morceau, pour y reconnoître la beauté et l'ordre du tout. Aim si la nature même des
Chapter viii.

Notes.

chooses porte que cet ordre de la Cité Divine, que nous ne voyons pas encor icy bas, soit un objet de nostre foy, de nostre esperance, de nostre confiance en Dieu" Théodicée. Par. 134. G.vi.p.188.

(5) "L'objet de Dieu a quelque chose d'infini, ses soins embrassent l'univers: ce que nous en connoissions n'est presque rien, et nous voudrions mesurer sa sagesse et sa bonté par nostre connoissance. Quelle temerîte, ou plutost quelle absurdité" Théodicée. Par. 134. G. vi.p.188.

(6) "Il est vray que nous en avons déjà des preuves et des essais devant nos yeux, lorsque nous voyons quelque chose d'entier, quelque Tout accompli en soy, et isole, pour ainsi dire, parmy les ouvrages de Dieu. Un tel Tout, formé, pour ainsi dire, est une plante, un animal, un homme, Nous ne saurions assés admirer la beauté et l'artifice de sa structure" above.

(7) "Je ne dis point que le Monde corporel est une Machine ou Montre qui va sans l'interposition de Dieu, et je presse assés que les Creatures ont besoin de son influence Continuelle: mais je soutiens que c'est une montre qui va sans avoir besoin de sa correction: autrement il faudroit dire que Dieu se ravise. Dieu a tout prevu, il a remedie à tout par avance. Il y a dans ses ouvrages une harmonie, une beauté deja prestable (2nd. reply to Clarke. G.vii. p. 358.

(8) "Monsieur Newton et ese ses sectateurs ont encore une forte plaisante opinion de l'ouvrage de Dieu. Selon eux, Dieu a besoin de remonter de temps en temps sa Montre. Autrement elle cesseroit d'agir. Il n'a pas eu assés de veue pour en faire un mouvement perpetual."
Cette Machine de Dieu est même si imparfaite selon eux, qu'il est obligé de la dégrasser de temps en temps par un concours extraordinaire et même de la raccommoder, qu'il sera plus souvent obligé d'y retoucher et d'y corriger. Selon mon sentiment, la même force et vigueur y subsiste toujours, et passe seulement de matière en matière, suivant les lois de la nature, et le bel ordre préétabli. Et je tiens, quand Dieu fait des miracles, que ce n'est pas pour soutenir les besoins de la nature, mais pour ceux de la grâce. En juger autrement, ce serait avoir une idée fort basse de la sagesse et de la puissance de Dieu" (1st Paper to Clarke. G.vii.p.358.)

(9) "Ce seroit bien abuser du Texte de la Sainte Ecriture, suivant lequel Dieu repose de ses ouvrages que d'en inferer qu'il n'y a plus de production continue. Il est vrai qu'il n'y a point production de substances simples nouvelles. mais on auroit tort d'en inferer que Dieu n'est maintenant dans le monde, que comme l'on conçoit que l'Âme est dans le corps, en le gouvernant seulement par sa présence sans un concours necessaire pour le faire continuer son Existence. (5th Paper to Clarke. G.vii.p. 411-2.)
Chapter ix.

Notes.

(1) "Si tamen accurate consideremus nos aliquid amplius concipere cum cogitemus rem existere, quam cum cogitemus esse possibile. Ideo videtur verum esse, existentiam esse gradum quendam realitatis; vel certe esse aliquam relationem ad gradus realitatis; non est autem existentia aliquis realitatis gradus, nam de quilibet realitatis gradu intelligi potest tum possibilitas tum existentia: cur ergo existentia excessus graduum realitatis rei unius supra gradus realitatis rei oppositae; id est quod est perfectius omnibus inter se incompatibilibus existit et contra quod existit est caeteris perfectius. Itaque verum quidem est id quod existit perfectius esse non existente, sed verum non est, ipsum existentiam esse perfectionem cum sit tantum quaedam perfectionum inter se comparatio. Bodemann. p.119. Fragment No Title.

(2) "Les appartemens alloient en pyramide; ils devenoient toujours plus beaux, a mesure qu'on montoit vers le pointe, et ils represen- oient de plus beaux mondes. On vint enfin dans le suprême qui terminoit la Pyramide, et qui estoit le plus beau de tous; car la Pyramide avoit un commencement, mais on n'en voyoit plus la fin; elle avoit une pointe, mais point de base; elle alloit croissante a l'infini. C'est (comme la Deesse l'expliqua) parce qu'entre une infinité de mondes possibles, il y a le meilleur de tous, au tement Dieu ne se seroit point determine a en creer aucun; mais il n'y en a aucun qui n'en ait encore de moins parfaits au dessous de luy: c'est pourquoi la Pyramide descend toujours a l'infini". Theodicee Par. 416. G.vi. p. 354.
Chapter IX.

Notes.

(3) "ils confondirent l'indestructibilité avec l'immortalité, par laquelle on entend dans l'homme non seulement que l'âme, mais encore que la personnalité subsiste: c'est à dire, en distinguer que l'âme de l'homme est immortelle. on fait subsister, ce qui fait que c'est la même personne, laquelle garde ses qualités morales, en conservant la conscience ou le sentiment réflexif interne de ce qu'elle est: ce qui la rend capable de châtiment et de récompense" Théodicee Par. 89. G. vi. p. 151.

(4) "Supposons que quelque particulier doive devenir tout d'un coup Roy de la Chine, mais à condition d'oublier ce qu'il a été, comme s'il venoit de naître tout de nouveau; n'est ce pas autant dans la pratique, ou quant aux effects dont on se peut appercevoir, que s'il devoir estre anéanti, et qu'un Roy de la Chine devoir estre créé dans le même instant à sa place? Ce que ce particulier n'a aucune raison de souhaitter". "Discours de la Métaphysique" Par. 34. G. iv. p. 460.

(5) "On peut dire du mal physique, que Dieu le veut souvent comme une peine due à la coule, et souvent aussi comme une moyen propre à une fin, c'est à dire pour empêcher de plus grands maux, ou pour obtenir de plus grands biens. La peine sert aussi pour l'amendement et pour l'exemple, et le mal sert souvent pour mieux goûter le bien, et quelques fois aussi il contribue à une plus grande perfection de celui qui le souffre, comme le grain qu'on seme, est sujet à une espèce de corruption pour germer: c'est une belle comparaison,
Chapter ix.

Notes.


(7) "Pour ce qui est du pêche ou du mal moral, quoyqu'il arrive aussi fort souvent qu'il puisse servir de moyen pour obtenir un bien, ou pour empêcher un autre mal, ce n'est pas pourtant celle, qui le rend un objet suffisant de la volonté divine. ou bien un objet legitime d'une volonté creee; il faut qu'il ne soit admis ou permis, qu'en tant qu'il est regarde comme une suite certaine d'un devoir indispensable; de sorte que celuy qui ne voudroit point permettre le pêche d'autruy, manqueroit luy même a ce qu'il doit. Théodicee. Par. 24. G.vi.p.117."
Notes.

(8) "La souveraine bonté de Dieu fait que sa volonté antécédente repousse tout mal, mais le mal moral plus que tout autre, elle ne l'admet aussi que pour des raisons supérieures invincibles et avec de grands correctifs, qui en reparent les mauvais effets avec avantage" Théodicee Par. ii4. G. vi. p. 166.

(9) "Car il faut considérer qu'il y a une imperfection originale dans la créature avant le péché, parce que la créature est limitée essentiellement; d'où vient qu'elle ne saurait tout savoir, et qu'elle se peut tromper et faire d'autres fautes" Théodicee. Par.20. G.vi. p. ii5.

(10) "Mais par rapport à Dieu, rien n'est douteux, rien ne saurait être opposé à la règle du meilleur, qui ne souffre aucune exception ny dispense. Et c'est dans ce sens que Dieu permet le péché; car il manqueroit à ce qu'il se doit, à ce qu'il doit à sa sagesse, à sa bonte, à sa perfection, s'il ne suivoit pas le grand résultat de toutes ses tendences au bien, et s'il ne choisissoit pas ce qui est absolument le meilleur; non obstant le mal de coulpe qui s'y trouve enveloppé par la supreme nécessité des verités éternelles. Théodicee. Par. 25. G. vi. p 117.

(11) "Quand on détache les choses liées ensemble, les parties de leur tout, le genre humaine de l'univers, les attributs de Dieu les uns des autres, la puissance de la sagesse; il est permis de dire que Dieu peut faire que la vertu soit dans le monde sans aucun mélange du vice, et même qu'il le peut faire aisément. Mais puisqu'il a permis le vice, il faut que l'ordre de l'univers trouve préférable à tout autre plan, fait l'ait demandé." Théodicee,Par.124.G.vi p.178.
"Il ne luy étoit pas non plus indifferént de créer un tel ou tel monde, de créer un chaos perpetuel, ou de créer un système plein d'ordre. Ainsi les qualités des objets, comprises dans leur idées, ont fait la raison de son choix". Remarques sur le Livre &c. G.vi. p.424.

"La vertu est la plus noble qualité des choses créées; mais ce n'est pas la seule bonne qualité des Creatures. Il y en a une infinité d'autres qui attirent l'inclination de Dieu; de toutes ces inclinations résulte le plus de bien qu'il se peut, et il se trouve que s'il n'y avoit que vertu, s'il n'y avoit que Creatures raisonnables, il y auroit moins de bien. Midas se trouva moins riche, quand il n'eut que de l'or. Outre que la sagesse âa doit varier. Multiplier uniquement la même chose, quelque noble qu'elle puisse être, ce seroit une superfluïté, ce seroit une pauverté: avoir mille Virgiles bien reliés dans sa Bibliothèque, chanter tousjours les airs de l'opera de Cadmus et d'Hermione, casser toutes les porcelaines pour n'avoir que des tasses d'or, n'avoir que des boutons de diamants, ne manger que des perdrix, ne boire que du vin de Hongrie ou de Shiras, appelleroit on cela raison?" Théodiceé. Par. 124. G.vi. p. 179.
"The notion of a species involves only eternal or necessary truths, but the notion of an individual involves, sub ratione possibilitatis, what is of fact, or related to the existence of things and to time, and consequently depends upon certain free decrees of God considered as possible; for truths of fact or of existence depend upon the decrees of God" Remarques sur la lettre de M. Arnaud. G.ii. 39. Quoted Russell. p. 209. above.

"Le mal vient plustost des Formes memes, mais abstraites, c'est à dire des idees que Dieu n'a point produits par un acte de sa volonté, non plus que les nombres et les figures, et non plus (en un mot) que toutes plus les essences possibles, qu'on doit tenir pour eternelles et necessaires; car elles se trouvent dans la region ideale des possibles, c'est à dire dans l'entendement Divin" Théodicée. Par. 335. G. vi. p. 314.
Chapter x.

Notes.

1. "On s'efforce souvent à m'imputer la nécessité et la fatalité, quoique peut-être personne n'ait mieux expliqué et plus à fond que j'ay fait dans la Théodicée, la véritable différence entre liberté, contingence, spontanéité d'un côté, et nécessité absolue, hazard, coaction de l'autre. Je ne say pas encore si on le fait parce qu'on le veut, quoý que je puisse dire; ou si ces imputations viennent de bonne foy, de ce qu'on n'a point encore pesé mes sentimens" 5th. Paper to Clarke. G.vii.p. 389.

2. "Cette fausse idée de la liberté, formée par ceux qui non contents de l'exemter, je ne dis pas de la contrainte, mais de la nécessité même, voudroient encore l'exemter de la certitude et de la détermination, c'est à dire de la raison et de la perfection, n'a pas laisse de plaire à quelques Scholastiques, gens qui s'embarrassent souvent dans leur subtilités, et prennent la paille des termes pour le gran des choses. Ils concoivent quelque notion chimerique, dont ils se figurent de tirer des utilites, et qu'ils tâchent de maintenir par des chicanes. La pleine indifférence est de cette nature: l'accorder à la volonte, c'est luy donner un privilege semblable à celuy que quelques Cartesiens et quelques Mystiques trouvent dans la nature Divine, de pouvoir faire l'impossible, de pouvoir produire des absurdités, de pouvoir faire que deux propositions contradictoires soient vrayes en même temps. Vouloir qu'une détermination vienne d'une pleine indifférence absolument indeterminee, est vouloir qu'elle vienne naturellement de rien. Théodicée Par. 320. G.vi.p.306."
Chapter x.

Notes.

(3) "Sur la matière de la liberté il n'y a que deux partis à prendre: l'un est de dire que toutes les causes distinctes de l'âme qui concourent avec elle, luy laissent la force d'agir ou de n'agir pas; l'autre est de dire, que elles la déterminent de telle sorte à agir, qu'elle ne sauroit en défendre". Par.370. "La détermination de l'âme ne vient pas uniquement du concours de toutes les causes distinctes de l'âme, mais encore de l'état de l'âme même et de ses inclinations qui se mêlent avec les impressions des sens, et les augmentent ou les affoiblissent. Or toutes les causes internes et externes prises ensemble font que l'âme se détermine certainement, mais non pas qu'elle se détermine nécessairement: car il n'impliqueroit point de contradiction, qu'elle se déterminat autrement, la volonté pouvant être inclinée et ne pouvant pas être nécessitée". Théodicee Par. 371. G.vi.p335.

(4) "Ainsi lorsque Dieu choisit, c'est par la raison du meilleur; lorsque l'homme choisit, ce sera le parti qui l'aura frappé le plus". Letter to M. Coste Dec. 1707.G.iii.p.403. "Ce qui détermine la volonté à agir, n'est pas le plus grand bien, comme on le suppose ordinairement, mais plutost quelque inquiétude actuelle, et pour l'ordinaire celle qui est la plus pressante. On luy peut donner le mon désir qui est effectivement une inquiétude de l'esprit, causée par la privation de quelque bien absent, outre le désir d'estre delivre de la douleur" Nouveaux Essais. Bk.ii.cixi. Par. 31. G.v.p.169.
Chapter x.

Notes.

(5) "Errores pendere magis a voluntate quam ab intellectu, non admitto. Credere vera vel falso, quorum illud cognoscere, hoc errare est, nihil aliud quam conscientia aut memoria est quaedam perceptionum aut rationum, itaque non, pendet a voluntate, nisi quatenus obliqua arte tandem efficitur etiam aliquando noblis ignaris, ut qual volunus noblis videre videamar "Réponse aux réflexions... de la philosophie de desäge des gartes" G.iv.p.361.

(6) Aureit "Il faut avouer ce défaut, et il faut même reconnaître que Dieu en aurait peut-être pu exempter les créatures, puisque rien n'empêche, ce semble, qu'il n'y en ait dont la nature soit d'avoir toujours une bonne volonté. Mais je réponds qu'il n'est point nécessaire, et qu'il n'a point été faisable que toutes les créatures raisonnables eussent une si grande perfection, qui les approchât tant de la Divine. Théodicée. Par. 120. G.vi.p.173.

(7) "Si la Géométrie s'opposait autant à nos passions et intérêts présens que la morale, nous ne la contesterions et ne la violerions querès moins, malgré toutes les démonstrations d'Euclide et d' Archimede, qu'on traiteroit de rêveries, et croiroit pleines de paralogismes; et Joseph Scaliger, Hobbes et autres, qui ont écrit contre Euclide et Archimede, ne se trouveroient point si peu accompagnés qu'ils le sont". Nouveaux Essais. Bk.ii.c.xxi.Par.12. G.V.p.87.

(8) "les Stoiciens disoient que le sage seul est libre; et en effect on n'a point l'esprit libre, quand il est occupé d'une grande passion,
car on ne peut point vouloir alors comme il faut, c'est à dire avec la délibération qui est requisé. C'est ainsi que Dieu seul est parfaitement libre, et que les esprits créés ne le sont qu'à mesure qu'ils sont au dessus des passions: et cette liberté regarde proprement nostre entendement, Nouveaus Essais. Bk.ii.c.xxi.Par.3. G.v.p.160-1.

(9) "il faut se faire une fois pour toutes cette loy: d'attendre et de suivre désormais les conclusions de la raison, comprises une bonne fois, quoique n'apperceues dans la suite et ordinairement que par des pensées sourdes seulement et destituées d'attraits sensibles, et cela pour se mettre enfin dans la possession de l'empire sur les passions aussi bien que sur les inclinations insensibles ou inquietudes, en acquérant cette accoustumance d'agir suivant la raison qui rendra la vertu agréable et comme naturelle. N.E. Bk.ii.c.xxi. Par.35. G.v. p.173.

(10) "Mais enfin nous avons asses prouvé qu'il n'y a que l'ignorance ou la passion qui puisse tenir en suspens, et que c'est pour cela que Dieu ne l'est jamais. Plus on approche de luy, plus la liberté est parfaite, et plus elle se détermine par le bien et par la raison" Théodicée. Par. 318. G.vi.p.305.

(11) "Et selon le système de l'harmonie prêteable, l'âme trouve en elle même, et dans sa nature idéale antérieure à l'existence, les raisons de ses déterminations, réglées sur tout ce qui l'environnera. Par là elle étoit déterminée de toute éternité dans son état de pure possibilité à agir librement, comme elle fera dans le temps, lorsqu'elle parviendra à l'existence. Théodicée. Par.323. G.vi.p.308.
5.

Chapter x.

Notes.

(12) "que nous sommes assurés de cette providence par la raison, mais que nous sommes assurés aussi de nostre liberté par l'expérience intérieure que nous en avons; et qu'il faut croire l'une et l'autre, quoique nous en voyions pas le moyen de les concilier". Théodicée Par. 292. G.vi.p. 290.

(13) "Ainsi ny la futurition en elle même, toute certain qu'elle est, ny la prévision infallible de Dieu, ny la predétermination des causes, ny celles des décrets de Dieu, ne détruisent point cette contingence et cette liberté". Théodicée. Par. 52. G.vi.p. 131.

(14) "Mais l'opinion la plus commune aujourd'hui parmy ceux qui s'appellent Reformes, et qui est favorisée par le Synode de Dordrecht, est celle des Infidélités, assés conforme au sentiment de S. Augustin, qui porte que Dieu ayant résolu de permettre le péché d'Adam et la corruption du genre humain, pour des raisons justes, mais cachées, sa miséricorde luy a fait choisir quelques uns de la masse corrompue pour être sauvés gratuitement par le mérite de Jesus Christ, et sa justice l'a fait résoudre à punir les autres par la damnation qu'ils méritoient." Théodicée. Par. 82. G.vi.p. 146-7.

(15) "Je réponds, que c'est la bonte porte Dieu à crérer, afin de se communiquer; et cette même bonte jointe à la sagesse le porte à crérer le meilleur: cela comprend toute la suite, L'effect et les voyes. Elle l'y porte sans le nécessiter, car elle ne rend point impossible ce qu'elle ne fait point choisir. Appellés cela fatum, c'est le prendre dans un bon sens, qui n'est point contraire à la
Notes.

liberte: Fatum vient de fari, parler, prononcer; il signifie un jugement, un décret de Dieu, l'arrest de sa sagesse. Dire qu'on ne peut pas faire une chose, seulement parce qu'on ne le veut pas, c'est abuser des termes. Le sage ne veut que le bon: est-ce donc une servitude, quand la volonté agit suivant la sagesse? Et peut on être moins esclave, que d'agir par son propre choix suivant la plus parfaite raison?...L'esclavage vient de dehors, il porte à ce qui déplait, et sur tout à ce qui déplait avec raison: la force d'autrui et nos propres passions nous rendent esclaves. Dieu n'est jamais mu par aucune chose qui soit hors de lui, il n'est point sujet non plus aux passions internes, et il n'est jamais même à ce qui puisse faire déplaisir". Théodicée. Par.228.G.vi. p. 253-4

(16) "Je croy même que cela nous ouvrira une voye de conciliation, car je m'imagine que M.Arnaud n'a eu de la répugnance à accorder cette proposition, que parce qu'il a pris la liaison que je soutiens pour intrinsèque et nécessaire en même temps, et moy je la tiens intrinsèque, mais nullement nécessaire; car je me suis assez expliqué maintenant qu'elle est fondé sur des décrets et actes libres. Je n'entends point d'autre connexion du sujet avec le predicat que celle qu'il y a dans les vérités les plus contingentes, c'est à dire qu'il y à tousjours quelque chose à concevoir dans le sujet, qui sert à rendre raison, pourquoi ce predicat ou événement lui appartient, ou pourquoi cela est arrivé plustost que non. Mais ces raisons des vérités contingentes inclinent sans nécessiter. Il est donc vray que je pourrois ne pas faire ce voyage, mais il est certain que je le feray". Remarques sur la lettre de M. Arnaud. May. 1686. G.11.p.46.
Chapter Xl.

Notes.

(1) "In ipsa Theologia mathematicum agebam, condebam definitiones ateque inde ducere tentabam Elementa quaedam nihil claritate inferiora Euclideis" G. Vii.p.323. Quoted Iwanicki p.259.

(2) These five propositions according to Kabitz are:—
1. der Gedanke der vollkommenen Vernunftmäszigkeit des Universums, d.h. seiner logischen Gesetzlichkeit; 2. der Gedanke der selbständigen Bedeutung des individuellen im Universum; 3. der Gedanke der vollkommenen Harmonie aller Dinge; 4. der Gedanke der quantitativen und qualitativen Unendlichkeit des Universums; 5. der Gedanke der mechanistischen Naturerklärung." Article "Leibniz" in Philosophisches Worterbuch" by H. Schmidt.p.365. (1934 Edit.)

(3) "Cum primum enim a ne deprehensum est, essentiam corporis non consistere in extensione quod putarat Cartesius, vir alioquin sine controversia magnus, sed in motu, ac proinde substantiam corporis seu naturam. etiam Aristotelis definitione consentiente, esse principium motus (quies enim absoluta in corporibus nulla); principium autem motus seu substantiam corporis extensione carere: tum demum lucidissime apparuit, quid distaret substantia speciebus, ac reperta ratio est, qua intelligi Deus Clare distincteque possit, efficere, ut ejusdam corporis substantia sit in multis locis dissitis vel, quod idem est, sub multis speciebus." Leibniz to Arnauld. 1671. G.ci.p.75.
Chapter XI.

Notes.

(4) Iwanicki’s comment on the relation of Leibniz to the Ethics of Spinoza is interesting and relevant here: "Quant à l’Ethique de Spinoza; Leibniz la vit en manuscrit lorsqu’il se rendit à la Haye en 1676; puis, lorsqu’elle eut été publiée après la mort de l’auteur, elle lui fut transmise, au début de l’année 1678, par Schuller. Après l’avoir lue, il ne cessait de signaler, tantôt à Justel, secrétaire du roi à Paris, tantôt à Vincent Placcius, professeur à Hambourg, tantôt à Walther Tschirnhaus, que dans cet ouvrage, à côté de belles pensées il y avait des paradoxes, des paralogismes et des erreurs. Il est vrai, disait il, que l’auteur de l’Ethique a admis l’existence de Dieu; mais au fond, s’il a gardé le mot, il n’en a pas moins supprimé la réalité, car ayant ôté à Dieu l’intelligence et la volonte, ‘il n’a fait de lui qu’une ‘certaine nécessité’ ou une nature. Voilà pourquoi Leibniz, à l’exemple d’Arnauld, a appelé Spinoza le ‘véritable athée’. Comme l’a bien vu H. Franck Rall (‘Der Leibnizsche Substanzbegroß. Halle. 1899.) Stein a donc eu tort de croire que Leibniz a été porté vers le spinozisme entre 1676 et 1680.” Iwanicki “Leibniz &c” p. 55-6.

In an early letter to Jacob Thomasius (April, 1669) Leibniz thus writes "Nothing, therefore, is to be assumed in bodies which does not flow from the definition of extension and antitypy. But there flow from this definition only magnitude, figure, position, number, mobility, etc. Motion itself does not flow from these. Whence, properly speaking, motion is not given in bodies as a real entity in them, but I have demonstrated that whatever moves is continually created, that bodies at any instant in assignable motion are something, at any intervening time between the instants in assignable motion are nothing, a thing which was unheard of till now, but which is plainly necessary and will shut the mouth of the atheists. From these considerations it is evident that the explanation of all qualities and changes must be taken from magnitude, figure, motion, etc., and that heat, colour, etc. are nothing but subtle notions and figures. As to what remains, I dare affirm that atheists, socinians, naturalists, aceptics, would never have been believe truly met unless by this established philosophy; which I indeed believe a gift of God given to the old age of the world as an unique plank by which pious and prudent men are about to save themelves in the shipwreck of the overhanging atheism. However small my knowledge of learned men after a little time, I nevertheless tremble as often as I think how many men at the same time intellectual and absolutely atheistic I have met". p.648. "New Essays"&c" by A.G. Langley. 1896. G.i.p.26.