South Korean Identities in Strategies of Engagement with North Korea: A Case Study of President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy

Volume I

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Abstract

This dissertation is a theoretically grounded empirical study aimed at shedding light on the multiple dimensions of South Korean President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy of engaging North Korea. It questions the ontological viability of conventional strategies and theories of engagement and produces a framework of comprehensive engagement based on realist, liberal and, most importantly, constructivist approaches. The study focuses on identifying the new tools of engagement employed by South Korea's policy elites, who created a social environment for South Koreans' shift of identities vis-à-vis North Korea in the course of implementing this engagement policy. To support the thesis of a momentous shift in identities as a result of the Sunshine Policy, this study uses a wide range of interviews with policy elites and sets of opinion polls published by news organizations and government agencies, while at the same time analyzing the policy from a theoretical and historical perspective.

In order to provide concrete evidence of the identity shift, this dissertation analyzes three major policy issues during the Kim administration: North Korea's improvement of diplomatic relations with Western powers; the Hyundai Business Group's Mt. Kumgang tourism project and its link to the inter-Korean summit in June 2000; and North Korea's revelation of a nuclear weapons programme in October 2002.

The key research findings of this study are as follows: first, the Sunshine Policy, implemented by South Korea's policy elites, who projected North Korea as a 'partner' or a 'brother', enabled a majority of South Koreans to develop positive identification with the South's enemy, as defined by the National Security Law; second, the policy played a significant role in preventing crises and maintaining the political status quo on the Korean Peninsula; and third, the policy laid the groundwork for a new era of inter-Korean economic cooperation and integration.
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Note on the Text

All East Asian names are given in their original form, that is, the family name is followed by the given name. In romanizing Korean names and words, this dissertation follows the modified McCune-Reischauer system, except in cases where a different method has been established, such as juche and Syngman Rhee.

For positions and titles of government officials cited in the text, this dissertation uses those held at the time of the event instead of the present one.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Agreed Framework</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agence France-Presse</td>
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<td>ANEC</td>
<td>Association for National Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAI</td>
<td>Board of Audit and Inspection</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
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<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium</td>
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<td>HFO</td>
<td>Heavy Fuel Oil</td>
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<td>HMM</td>
<td>Hyundai Merchant Marine</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IFANS</td>
<td>Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>Institute for Far Eastern Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>KAPPC</td>
<td>Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee</td>
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<td>KDB</td>
<td>Korea Development Bank</td>
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<td>KDI</td>
<td>Korea Development Institute</td>
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<td>KEDO</td>
<td>Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KINU</td>
<td>Korea Institute for National Unification</td>
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<td>KNTO</td>
<td>Korea National Tourism Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LWR</td>
<td>Light-Water Reactor</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Millennium Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most Favoured Nation</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Missing in Action</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defence</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>MOGAHA</td>
<td>Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Ministry of Unification</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>National Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>NLL</td>
<td>Northern Limit Line</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSL</td>
<td>National Security Law</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defence Forces</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>Supreme People's Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCOG</td>
<td>Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCR</td>
<td>Trans-China Railway</td>
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<tr>
<td>TKR</td>
<td>Trans-Korean Railway</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADP</td>
<td>Tumen River Area Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>Trans-Siberian Railway</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULD</td>
<td>United Liberal Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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Chapter One. Introduction

1. Introduction
To place the Sunshine Policy, the brainchild of President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), into a certain category of policies is not an easy job in view of its diverse dimensions and conflicting interpretations in both the policy and academic communities. Nevertheless, this dissertation will draw on 'identity politics' as a way to analyze the origins of the Nobel Peace Prize winner’s policy, while building on strategies of 'engagement' to capture a more nuanced and complete picture. By doing so, this study does not rule out or play down power politics or the power politics side of the policy. Power politics has long been a catchword in the discourse of International Relations (IR), partly because the discipline had nurtured itself in the historical conditions of the Cold War, during which state identities were well reflected in the formation of alliances and rivalries. However, the Soviet Union's voluntary retreat from eastern Europe, an historic event that closed one chapter of humankind’s turbulent history in a peaceful manner, made many IR scholars divert their attention away from Cold War issues of conflict towards elucidating the underlying reasons for the end of the Cold War. In spite of the dominance of realist and liberal approaches, a group of scholars have started offering an alternative analytical framework by explaining the momentous shift of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policies from the perspectives of ideas and identities vis-à-vis the West.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc unravelled the past's tightly-woven state
relations, prompting many states, mostly from the former Communist bloc, to search for new identities, since their conventional identities vis-à-vis the Western world became obsolete as a means to serve their interests after the abrupt end of the East-West divide. At the turn of the 21st century, a number of states from eastern Europe underwent or were undergoing identity shifts in a desperate effort to join the European Union (EU), a club of capitalist states that once lay the other side of the Berlin Wall. In Asia, Vietnam could be singled out as a model case of identity shifts, given the fact that it established diplomatic ties with the United States, shedding the legacies of the Vietnam War, and joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless, a few states were left behind in a labyrinth of frustration and dilemma over what course of action they should take to ensure their survival and, undoubtedly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to as North Korea or the North) was one of them. The crisis in the North Korean state has not merely resulted from the failure of its socialist command economy, but also from a crisis of state identity, which was not of its own making. Since identities are formed in an endless cycle of interactions between self and other, the presence of the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereafter South Korea or the South) across the narrow strip of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as an archrival competing for hegemony on a relatively small land mass, called the Korean Peninsula, has been a prime factor affecting North Korea’s identity formation.

In fact, identity crisis has been a shared problem of the Korean nation as a collectivity exposed to a new post-Cold War situation. Like in North Korea, the end of the Cold War ushered in an era of unprecedented confusion and uncertainty in South Korea over whether to define North Korea as a friend or a foe. In this intense public discourse between groups with contesting identities vis-à-vis North Korea, a series of policies were launched by Presidents Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) and Kim Young-sam (1993-8), exhibiting inconsistencies and fanning the further polarization of public opinion. Brushing aside this never-ending debate in South Korea’s public sphere, President Kim Dae-jung, who took office in February 1998, embarked on his own policy agenda in the name of the Sunshine Policy. Most of all, President Kim strengthened those South Korean domestic groups that positively identified with North Korea and opened the way for ordinary people to bandwagon with them. This identity politics, targeting both North and South Koreans, emerged in the shadow of power politics, whose feasibility was in question especially when the target state was viewed as a bankrupt, but heavily armed, state finding itself in the centre of the world’s

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4 For a debate on state identity and security, see Katzenstein (1996a) and Chafez, Spirtas and Frankel (1999).
economic powerhouses.

Throughout history, one of the fundamental projects, undertaken by a state, is how to define its own identity vis-à-vis its neighbours, since it is the first thing to consider when it enters an alliance with them or decides to balance against them. However, it is not easy to label a state as a friend or a foe, since identities are elusive and transitional. Animosity seldom lasts hundreds of years in state-to-state relations. In many cases, it lives short officially, but lurks in human emotions or collective memories, camouflaged under the veneer of overt friendship, as seen in the relationship between such neighbouring countries as Japan and its former colonial victim, South Korea. In the world of realpolitik, yesterday's enemy could change overnight to become today's friend. Nevertheless, an intense sense of animosity, shared by a majority of South Koreans vis-à-vis North Korea during the decades-long Cold War confrontation, did not fade away even after the end of the Cold War, restricting the options of policy elites when they tried to introduce strategies of engagement.

In the face of this policy quagmire, President Kim endeavoured to create a positive dynamics in inter-Korean relations as both a guarantee of fledgling economic integration and a kind of safety net that would permit the gradual removal of persistent problems, such as North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes. Most of all, North and South Korea entered into a phase of unprecedented interactions, which contributed to the whittling away of an acute sense of animosity among a growing number of South Koreans positively exposed to these new developments. Though weakened, there was still a bastion of anti-Communist forces intact in South Korea, along with laws and regulations enforcing the conventional rules of the game. The Sunshine Policy, as an expression of identity politics, was subject to a fierce debate between groups with competing identities vis-à-vis North Korea, especially when North Korea showed signs of violating international norms. When the Kim administration strove to justify its policy by articulating redefined national interests on the basis of emerging identities vis-à-vis North Korea, political actors in the opposition camp struggled to contest state policies and maintain their established privileges and vested interests deriving from Cold War identities and logics. However, the growing nationalist sentiment, nurtured by the Kim administration in the post-Cold War situation, could maintain a momentum, even at difficult moments when the positive interactions between the two official enemies were not welcomed by neighbouring powers and a large number of domestic

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5 The National Security Law, enacted in December 1948 and still in force in 2004, is regarded as one of the most draconian laws aimed at penalizing pro-North Korean movements in South Korea. See Appendix II.
constituents.

With the domestic opponents of new identity groups waging 'ideological warfare' and foreign powers intervening in inter-Korean interactions, the process of South Koreans' identity shifts was a road strewn with stumbling blocks and landmines. The old guard, which enjoyed privileges under the established system, never yielded voluntarily to the emerging forces with new identities vis-à-vis North Korea. In times of momentous change, the conventional logic, conceived in the strategic and emotional setting of the past, was still valid in many senses. Therefore, state policy elites with new identities were required to launch strenuous efforts to imbue the domestic public with new information and perspectives on the changing realities, on the one hand, while endeavouring to bring about the enemy's behavioural and attitudinal changes, on the other. In the fields of diplomacy and national security, South Korea's changing identities emerged as direct obstacles to the time-honoured alliance with the United States (US). South Korea and the United States are treaty allies, which means that they are ready to share the same fate in times of war and peace. For South Koreans, however, President George W. Bush's administration (2001- ) was increasingly seen as posing a greater threat than their legal enemy, North Korea, particularly if it had attacked what it called part of the 'axis of evil' and unleashed an uncountable amount of human and property losses. In this new strategic calculation, it was rational for South Korean policy elites to play the role of the devil's advocate rather than a faithful ally.

It is still to be seen whether these two enemies can move to forge a pan-national community, which was once unimaginable between them. In spite of the uncertainty of the future course of the Korean nation, this study seeks to analyze the Sunshine Policy, highlighting the process in which South Korea's national interests and identities vis-à-vis North Korea have been reconfigured in order to engage the enemy state. In particular, this dissertation places primary emphasis on elucidating how the government and social forces embodying new identities could nurture a collective identity shift by mobilizing various strategies and tactics.

2. Research Questions and Objectives
The aim of this dissertation is to produce a model of comprehensive engagement vis-à-vis an enemy state that can be used to analyze empirically the Sunshine Policy as an engagement policy. To successfully elucidate the role of the Kim administration in promoting new identities and attendant norms, this research will first raise two fundamental questions: vertical and horizontal. By vertical, this thesis means to explore where to situate the Sunshine Policy historically among a multitude of different
initiatives and policies carried out by successive South Korean governments vis-à-vis North Korea along a long spectrum of national division. By horizontal, this research means to analyze what policy options were available to the Kim administration at a particular historical juncture.

More specifically, the first question focuses on the historical context in which the Kim administration exercised entrepreneurship to reconstitute state identities in a process of launching strategies of engagement. In the course of answering this question, this research seeks to uncover the necessary conditions for the successful revamping of state identities. To call a state an enemy or a friend, it is indispensable to take into account personal emotions, collective memories, state policies and regulations, and most importantly the interactions taking place with the potential to create identity shifts. Therefore, altering state images or identities accompanies an unprecedented level of policymakers' personal devotion, structural shifts, or acute crises and, sometimes, all of them. This study investigates whether the social setting was ripe for the implementation of the Sunshine Policy and the alteration of South Koreans' identities vis-à-vis North Korea.

The first question leads to a more strategic second question that centres on identifying the theoretical and empirical framework of the Sunshine Policy as a particular type of engagement policy. Even in the confusion of the post-Cold War world, the paramount mission of each state is how to keep its own people safe from a wide range of threats emanating from the international structure or individual states seeking to alter the status quo. Nevertheless, a state's blind pursuit of security-first policies, in the absence of a strategic reformulation of national interests and state identities, runs the risk of yielding more threats, thus undermining the very foundation of its own security. Traditionally, strategies of engagement have been defined as a mix of incentives and punishments to ameliorate the behaviour of enemy states (Litwak 2000). However, history tells us that these strategies do not necessarily result in the behavioural change of the target states and improvement of the bilateral relationship in the foreseeable future. Even in the case of relatively successful strategies, the use of coercive tactics, including economic sanctions, accompanied far-reaching civilian suffering and the devastation of the target states. These shortcomings of the existing strategies of engagement lead to this dissertation's central argument; namely, that an innovative approach is in demand in dealing with those states, even though such an approach could be subject to criticism by opponents for being no more than 'appeasement'. Sir Winston Churchill's remarks, made on 14 December 1950 in the House of Commons (quoted in Morgenthau 1948: 66-7), offers a clue to discriminating between 'appeasement from
strength' and 'appeasement from weakness':

Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.

Even though the Sunshine Policy was criticized for being an appeasement policy, it could be rather defined as what Churchill referred to above as 'appeasement from strength'. Morgenthau (1948: 64) noted that appeasement is a foreign policy that attempts to deal with an imperialistic state with methods appropriate to the policy of the status quo. In this sense, the criticism of the Sunshine Policy as an appeasement policy does not take into account the subtle differences pointed to by Churchill and Morgenthau, since North Korea was hardly an imperialistic state by any account. Taking into consideration the criticism of the Sunshine Policy as an appeasement policy, this dissertation will add a new dimension to the conventional understanding of strategies of engagement, thus making it possible to analyze the policy in the wider context of 'comprehensive engagement'.

3. Hypotheses
In an attempt to answer the second question relating to the theoretical and empirical framework of the Sunshine Policy, this dissertation requires a conceptualization of the policy based on three hypotheses: first, that the Sunshine Policy was premised on the belief that a state's identity shifts vis-à-vis an enemy state are possible, at least to some extent, if policy elites make consistent efforts; second, that the Sunshine Policy is a status quo policy; and third, that the Sunshine Policy is an integration policy.

In connection with the first hypothesis, there is some disagreement over whether a government is capable of modifying or switching existing norms based on a given identity. Posner and Rasmusen (1999) argue that a norm is usually regarded as something that cannot be altered arbitrarily by the government to meet its policy preferences, while liberal norm scholars, such as Sunstein (1997), alert us to the entrepreneurship of an activist government in transforming social norms on a national scale. This thesis adopts Sunstein's approach in the belief that a government's efforts to change norms deriving from a given identity are an indispensable part of strategies of

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6 For a debate on norms, see the excellent journalistic review in The New Yorker, 20-27 October 1997: 170-81.
comprehensive engagement. Sunstein (ibid: 19) argues that a state system might lose a
golden opportunity for social improvement if it makes future political choices only on
the basis of existing preferences and norms. His ideas are rooted in the belief that it is
justifiable for state policy elites to intervene and engage in ‘norm management’ for
public interests because individuals have been given only limited access to information
and are supposed to follow existing social norms and institutions, shaped partly by the
government (ibid: 34).

To test the second and third hypotheses that the Sunshine Policy is a status quo
policy and, at the same time, an integration policy, this dissertation puts forward a fresh
characterization of the conventional understanding of the status quo and integration,
since the two statements appear incompatible with each other. In particular, it needs to
elaborate on the scope of the status quo and integration, as envisioned by the Sunshine
Policy.

A debate on the status quo traditionally belongs to the sphere of political realism,
which seeks to explain international affairs based on state-centric perspectives. In a
realist definition, the status quo literally means the existing state of affairs, while status
quo states or status quo powers refers to those states striving to retain their existing
privileges or resources against any forces attempting to alter the present situation
(Morgenthau 1948: 40). Therefore, they are categorized as high-status actors determined
to suppress or ignore low-status actors or issues jeopardizing the current distribution of
power in their favour. In this vein, high-status actors are those which have already made
a major investment in the existing structure (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981: 153). As the
fear of a possible loss of position or resources arouses more powerful emotions than the
prospect of gaining something new in the logic of the realists, state actors are all out to
retain their established status.

Given its economic difficulties and collapsing security alliances with China and
Russia after the end of the Cold War, North Korea was destined to become a revisionist
state seeking to shatter the prevailing post-Cold War status quo unfavourable to it. In
fact, North Korea had attempted to revise the status quo by exploring the possibility of
normalizing diplomatic ties with the United States and other Western states and
experimenting with the capitalist mode of production. However, the lack of progress in
its diplomatic and economic initiatives forced it to resort to the development of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to ensure self-protection (Noland 2000).
Nevertheless, the WMD programmes became another source of insecurity for North
Korea since they invited repeated threats of pre-emptive strikes from the United States,
forcing the international non-proliferation regime.
With North Korea muddling through in an increasingly hostile international environment, President Kim needed to declare two principles in managing inter-Korean relations: the status quo and integration. To signal his adherence to the political status quo on the Korean Peninsula, President Kim declared that South Korea would not unify the peninsula by the absorption of North Korea, but help it to improve relations with the international community. His policy, in short, means South Korea’s graduation from the relative gains dilemma, preached by neo-realists, as it was ready to accept the relative costs of the status quo as the cost of peace. While alleviating its security dilemma and upholding the principle of the political status quo, the Kim administration endeavoured to induce North Korea to divert its revisionist zeal to its resocialization into the international community and economic reconstruction.⁷

In sum, this thesis, contending that the dichotomy between the status quo and revisionist options for a state is unfruitful, sets out a new proposition that revision is realizable through the status quo and the status quo is possible through revision. As a revisionist or imperialist course taken by a state out of territorial, political or economic ambitions incurs enormous human and property losses in the contemporary world of close interdependence, this study seeks to offer an alternative option in which the target state’s economic integration with the rest of the world could be realizable on the sound foundation of the territorial and political status quo. Moon (1999: 40) calls it ‘a simultaneous pursuit of engagement and security’, while Park Kun-young (2000: 56) described it as a ‘two-track approach’. Therefore, such a status quo policy as posited by this dissertation does not seek to freeze the situation completely, but aims to prevent the regression into the Hobbesian logic of the ‘struggle of all against all’ in order to maintain the Lockean culture, which is the predominant face of today’s status quo world composed of rival states.⁸ Meanwhile, integration, pursued by the Sunshine Policy as an engagement policy, refers to an inter-Korean economic and social integration short of political unity.⁹

4. Approach, Methodology and Contribution
This research uses a theoretically grounded empirical approach to explore the diverse dimensions of the Sunshine Policy and offer a conceptual framework for comprehensive engagement. In fact, the Sunshine Policy is an outgrowth of time-honoured philosophies and strategies of engagement employed to transform an enemy state into a responsible

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⁷ This dissertation favours the term, ‘resocialization’, instead of ‘socialization’, since North Korea was once a vibrant economy and an active player in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). See Chapter Four.

⁸ For a further debate on the Hobbesian and Lockean structures, see Wendt (1999) and Wight (1977; 1991).
member of the international community. However, the existing studies on the Sunshine Policy fall short of capturing the policy in its entirety, since their theoretical grounding and analytical frameworks have been narrowly conceived to elucidate mainly the political and economic dimensions of the policy, thus playing down the social dimension of developments unfolding before and during President Kim’s five-year tenure.

The Western and South Korean scholarship has been heavily biased in favour of theories and approaches developed by the realist and liberal schools, reflecting the Cold War template lingering on the Korean Peninsula. Based on the proposition that the international system is anarchy without the presence of overarching authority, realism injected an acute sense of fear and threats to the South Korean policy-making process, forcing state policy elites to put priority on national security and act in a tit-for-tat manner against North Korea’s provocations. 9 Meanwhile, liberalism spawned unrealistic images and agreements in inter-Korean relations, while its traditional ideal of liberal democracy led to the intolerance of an authoritarian state, like North Korea, and the mobilization of coercive measures, such as economic sanctions. 10

Analyzing the Sunshine Policy, some realists and liberals reached rather premature conclusion that the policy, despite the leadership’s good will, failed to achieve its goal of transforming North Korea’s behaviour in view of the resurgence of the nuclear weapons problem in October 2002, or was bogged down in the cash-for-summit scandal, eroding the morality of the Kim administration. 11 Meanwhile, Moon (1999: 2001: 2002) approaches the Sunshine Policy in a balanced manner to explain the diverse dimensions of the policy, but still lacks a framework of analysis that could be subject to rigorous empirical tests.

This dissertation reinvestigates the various dimensions of North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme, the cash-for-summit scandal, and other cases as a study of the Sunshine Policy from the perspectives of constructivism, which puts emphasis on identities and norms. Such a study has not been carried out before. Nevertheless, this research does not aim to maintain theoretical purity, but rather draws

9 Chapter Two will review realist, liberal and constructivist approaches.
10 For a further debate on ‘democratic peace’ and conflicts between liberal democracy and authoritarian states, see Doyle (1986). The shortcomings of liberals are well illustrated in this New York Times (18 February 2003) column as follows: ‘The big problem with liberals in international affairs is that ever since Woodrow Wilson, they’ve been too idealistic. Liberals hamstring the C.I.A. (thus impairing intelligence collection), scorned the military (undermining a humanitarian force in places like Bosnia and Afghanistan), campaigned against sweatshops in Bangladesh and Cambodia (forcing teenage girls out of manufacturing jobs and into the sex industry), and imposed economic sanctions on Myanmar (destroying the middle class and propping up military dictators)’.
11 See Levin and Han (2002); Yoo (2003); and Kim Sung-han (2003a; 2003b).
on necessary analytical tools from both realism and liberalism, which are indispensable to formulate strategies of engagement. In the process, this study answers the question of whether the Sunshine Policy, a unique blend of various policy tools on hand, helped South Koreans to collectively shift their identities vis-à-vis North Korea in the direction of creating a harmonious national community from the legacies of decades of war, confrontation and rivalry. If then, what implications did these identity shifts and ensuing inter-Korean rapprochement have for the policy elites of the countries concerned and the international community as a whole? To answer these questions, this thesis embarks on an intellectual and empirical journey in which the reader should be able to witness the changing identities between North and South Korea from enemies to would-be partners or brothers after a myriad of interactions between them.

As a method to build a theoretical framework, this dissertation reviews a wide range of literature on theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism, as well as strategies of containment and engagement. Overall, this thesis is heavily inclined towards a constructivist approach and an engagement option to highlight the shift of South Koreans' identities vis-à-vis North Korea and the policy implications to follow. For the case studies, it uses various primary sources and secondary materials, both in English and Korean, to illustrate the South Korean administrations' policy shifts, as well as South Koreans' identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea. First, it surveys speeches and statements by policy elites, businessmen and other opinion leaders, as published in official documents, newspapers and other printed materials, to supplement academic publications in analyzing the shifts of policies and opinions. This analysis of public discourse is an indispensable approach in shedding light on the key actors' shifting articulation of state interests and identities over time. Second, a collection of opinion polls by both government and private agencies is presented to illustrate the shift of South Koreans' identities and norms vis-à-vis North Korea on the popular level. Third, a wide range of interviews has been conducted with policy elites and businessmen to shed light on the intentions and beliefs of these major actors, which were not published in official documents or other printed materials. In particular, the interviewees include top policymakers in the Kim administration: national security advisors, foreign ministers and unification ministers.

By doing so, this thesis formulates a generic process of state identity shifts, which could be applicable to the relationship between former and present enemies, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States and Vietnam, China and Taiwan, and other similar cases. Modern IR scholarship has paid due attention to state identity and its policy implications, but has failed to fully address the process of identity
shifts. In this sense, this study is groundbreaking or at least pioneering in that it seeks to find the causal link among such factors as the evolving historical setting, human endeavours, policy initiatives and identity shifts in South Korea's relationship with the North.

5. The Structure of the Dissertation
This introductory chapter, which outlines the research questions, hypotheses and methodologies of this study, is followed by seven more chapters, which aim to analyze various facets of the Sunshine Policy. Chapter Two is a literature review on the past policies of containment and engagement from both theoretical and historical perspectives. In particular, this chapter reviews the US Cold War policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, as well as its policies towards so-called 'rogue states' with the aim of identifying their strengths and weaknesses and laying the groundwork to formulate a new framework to analyze the Sunshine Policy in the following chapter. In addition, this chapter surveys some examples of engagement in the relationship between the United States and China, between the United States and Vietnam, and between East and West Germany, to identify the underlying principles in such successful cases of engagement. In sum, it shows that the problematization of the conventional theories and practices of containment and engagement could open a new window for conceptualizing comprehensive engagement.

Chapter Three puts forward a new framework of comprehensive engagement, formulated in order to capture the diverse dimensions of the Sunshine Policy. It features a unique combination of historical and theoretical approaches to create a set of policy tools to analyze the Sunshine Policy from various perspectives. In this process, it outlines a core proposition of this dissertation by identifying the three levels of comprehensive engagement, namely, identity shifts, the status quo and integration. It is followed by an analysis of South Korea’s policy-making process, which made the implementation of the Sunshine Policy possible. It also sheds light on the Kim administration's information processing, a system that was not susceptible to outside stimuli, as well as the key actors of the Kim administration’s policy-making process.

Chapter Four is an historical overview of South Korea's policies towards North Korea, as implemented by the following six successive administrations: Syngman Rhee (1948-60), Park Chung-hee (1961-79), Chun Doo-hwan (1981-8), Roh Tae-woo (1988-93), Kim Young-sam (1993-8) and Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003). This chapter outlines the similarities and differences of each administration’s policies and, subsequently, South Koreans’ shifting identities vis-à-vis North Korea. By illustrating the vicissitudes of
inter-Korean relations from such an historical perspective, this chapter uncovers the causal relationship of various structural and domestic factors in the process of identity shifts. By shedding light on South Korea's dissident and student movements, this chapter illustrates the slow, but steady, growth of domestic groups in South Korea that identified North Korea positively.

The next three chapters are the empirical case studies to test the approaches and hypotheses outlined in the previous chapters. Chapter Five is an analysis of North Korea's external relations with the United States, Japan and the European Union. This chapter elucidates what role the Sunshine Policy played in helping North Korea to improve its diplomatic relations with those countries. In the process, the chapter highlights the South Korean policy elites' sweeping identity shifts, which enabled them to free themselves from the Cold War mentality and practices of isolating North Korea diplomatically. This case study shows that, in spite of an activist government's strenuous norm entrepreneurship and diplomatic efforts, the United States and Japan chose to maintain their established identities vis-à-vis North Korea, since they concluded that, based on their immediate interests, it was beneficial to continue to project North Korea as an enemy state.

Chapter Six investigates the Hyundai Business Group's Mt. Kumgang tourism project, the flagship scheme of the Sunshine Policy. In particular, this chapter sheds light on such key incidents and events during the Kim administration as the West Sea naval skirmishes, the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000, and the following cash-for-summit scandal to explain their relevance to the Kim administration's strategies of engagement and South Koreans' identity shifts. The invisible partnership between the government and a private company and, in particular, the use of bribes, will help to establish the notion of an activist government that struggles to engage an enemy state through all available means. It sheds light on the negative side of government-business collusion and the positive side of inter-Korean interactions that were made possible on an unprecedented scale as a result of this controversial tourism project.

Chapter Seven analyzes North Korea's brinkmanship in the form of its admission of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in October 2002. This chapter probes what role the Sunshine Policy played in preventing the escalation of tensions between North Korea and the countries concerned, especially the United States, and encouraging them to sit round the negotiating table instead of mobilizing economic sanctions and adopting other coercive measures. The chapter highlights how the Kim administration, in tandem with the effort to maintain the political status quo, endeavoured to retain the cumulative process of inter-Korean integration in the face of
interference by the United States. It confirms that identities matter in a state's foreign policy to the extent that an enemy state can be embraced and turned into a partner for cooperation, which in turn can serve to erode the solid foundation of a traditional alliance.

Chapter Eight draws together the arguments of this dissertation and reviews the legacies of the Sunshine Policy under the next administration, led by President Roh Moo-hyun. On the basis of this dissertation's empirical findings, the concluding chapter argues that the process of South Korean's identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea is in progress and can be expected to remain robust in the foreseeable future.
Chapter Two. Containment and Engagement: Literature Review

1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an historical account of various strategies of containment and engagement and elucidate their theoretical grounding in order to uncover parallels and discrepancies between those strategies and identifying the key conceptual components of comprehensive engagement, as proposed by this dissertation. The twin concepts of containment and engagement have long been used by state policy elites to formulate strategies towards their enemy states. In fact, the history of containment and engagement is synonymous with the history of US foreign policy since World War II (WWII), given that the hegemonic state in the Western hemisphere had mobilized all available means of statecraft to frustrate any expansionist attempt by the Soviet Union and other adversaries. In the fierce ideological competition of the Cold War period, foreign policies adopted by the allies of the United States were part of the grand strategy drawn by the hegemonic power. Even after the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies faced another group of smaller but still menacing states, namely 'rogue states', which they needed to contain in some cases or engage in others.

Despite the seemingly clear-cut definition of the two concepts, however, containment and engagement are far from invoking identical images when theorists or policymakers use them. In fact, we may notice that they are evolving terms in the long span of the post-WWII history against the backdrop of structural and domestic opportunities and constraints. This complexity frustrates IR students when they try to define clearly the terms and lump past policies and initiatives together as either containment or engagement. In fact, most policies and initiatives are somewhere on the continuum between containment and engagement. In the face of these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, theorists and specialists have rejected a containment-engagement dichotomy and instead called for the formulation of country-specific strategies (Litwak 2000; Haass and O'Sullivan 2000; George 1993).

This chapter will analyze the two concepts of containment and engagement by dividing the post-WWII era into the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. While the focus of this chapter is on the post-Cold War period when the debate on whether to contain or engage 'rogue states' has become a particularly salient policy issue, the

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1 The term, 'rogue states', will be defined in greater detail later in this chapter.
contemporary debate on containment and engagement is without doubt closely linked to Cold War policies and initiatives, making it fruitless to merely delve into the post-Cold War situation. In particular, the Korean Peninsula, which in 1950-3 experienced the first 'hot war' of the Cold War period, is where both the structural and ideological legacies of the Cold War remain more or less intact.

2. Containment and Engagement in the Cold War Period

Containment is a by-product of the Cold War in which the United States and other Western states made all-out efforts to contain the ever-multiplying sphere of 'red' stretching across the Eurasian continent. In his seminal book, Strategies of Containment, Gaddis (1982) sought to analyze containment in terms of 'strategies' as a way to elucidate this illusive concept, which had undergone mutations and transformations through successive US administrations. As part of its global strategies of containment, the United States needed to build close alliances with democratic states worldwide, virtually establishing a wall around the Soviet Union and its allies and giving birth to such metaphors as Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain'. Even though the United States placed priority on rebuilding Western Europe, it also allocated limited resources to Asia. First, it turned to Japan in an attempt to find a key security partner in the region, while trying to make the war-devastated South Korea a frontline bulwark against communism (Iriye 1977; Ikenberry 2001a). In particular, the United States opened its market to Japanese and South Korean exports to help to reconstruct the two war-torn states, which could counterbalance the expansion of Communist states in East Asia. Nevertheless, the United States did not remain steadfast in its strategies of containment, as it deviated from its original roadmap to introduce strategies of limited engagement, as seen in the case of its engagement with China from the early 1970s onwards. This section will first offer an historical overview of strategies of containment and engagement, followed by a review of Cold War-related theories from the three perspectives of realism, liberalism and constructivism.

2.1. Historical Overview of Containment

The emergence of Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union as a powerful socialist state prompted US officials to grasp the vague idea of containing it from 1941 onwards. Even before the concept of containment took life as a type of policy, the United States had already put into practice a kind of containment in both the Central European and East Asian theatres in the closing days of World War II in an automatic response to Soviet expansionism. For example, the US's hasty occupation of the southern half of the
Korean Peninsula was mainly aimed at denying the Soviet military control over the whole peninsula, as Washington defeated another of Moscow's territorial ambitions in the Japanese archipelago (Oberdorfer 2001: 6).

On 22 February 1946, George Kennan, then-minister counsellor at the US Embassy in Moscow, sent his famous 'long telegram' to Washington to explain Soviet foreign policy, but the term, 'containment', was not coined until July 1947 when Kennan published an article in Foreign Affairs, entitled 'The sources of Soviet conduct'.² Kennan (1947) called for the implementation of a long-term policy of containment to thwart the Soviet Union's expansionist penchant, enabling the term 'containment' to win prominence as a post-war US policy. Ambrose (1991: 86) argued that the policy of containment acted as a guiding light for the United States to emerge from isolationism and make a strong commitment to intervention in global affairs for the first time 'in a period of general peace'.

Orthodox realist explanations of the Cold War are based on the structural and materialistic division of power between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II, which many saw as making conflicts between the two powers inevitable (Halle 1967; Schlesinger 1967; Yergin 1978). Some believed the confrontation to be a tragedy of misperceptions and missed opportunities (George and Smoke 1974; Jervis 1976). Meanwhile, revisionists and critics have focused on the economic dimensions and the expansionist US political culture. Explaining the stability and longevity of the Cold War template, Galtung (1971) attributed it to material impediments to change, caused by the imperialist structures of the international system, while Galbraith (1978) shed light on the ominous workings of military-industrial complexes in both superpowers.

This section will review a set of US strategies of containment to illustrate that they had alternated between concepts of symmetrical and asymmetrical response to Communist encroachments in the face of structural and domestic constraints. For the advocates of asymmetrical response, such as Kennan, the Eisenhower administration (1953-61) and the Nixon administration (1969-74), the major policy instruments on hand were economic aid and nuclear deterrence. Conversely, the authors of NSC-68, the Kennedy administration (1961-3) and the Reagan administration (1981-9) advocated flexibility in mobilizing resources to act at all levels. Kissinger (1977) noted that the US approach to the world had oscillated between isolationism and overstretch and what was needed was a sense of realism to accept the world as given. Gaddis (1982) contended that the prime reason for these oscillations derived from internal forces operating within

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² Kennan used the name of 'X' to preserve his anonymity.
the United States, such as the Congress and the military-industrial complex, rather than
the attitude or actions of the Soviet Union. Kaldor (1995) argued that the Cold War was
an 'imaginary war' created by the leaders of the two competing blocs as part of their
political strategies to divert public attention from domestic problems by spawning
periodic threats.

**Truman Doctrine.** Although there is still a debate over the origins of the Cold
War, President Harry Truman (1945-53) needed at least a public excuse to offer aid to
Greece, which was suffering from communist insurgencies. Therefore, the Truman
Doctrine, announced in March 1947, was conceived to achieve the immediate aim of
preventing the communization of Greece and Turkey as a rudimentary step in the
practice of containment. In the course of drafting the doctrine, however, its authors
came to champion America's 'grand heroic crusades on a worldwide scale, a struggle
between light and darkness with the fate of the world hanging on the outcome'
(Ambrose 1991: 85) and signal the US willingness to support anti-Communist forces
anywhere in the world (Halliday 1986: 3). Truman exaggerated the situation to the
extent that he portrayed 'the Greek civil war as part of a global struggle between the
forces of freedom and totalitarianism' (Larson 1985: 327). From the outset, Truman
needed to imbue the American public with a sense of danger in order to garner support
for anti-Communist campaigns worldwide, which might require a huge amount of
political, economic and military aid to be put to use by the United States (Ambrose

Nevertheless, the Truman Doctrine, as a strategy embodying Kennan's idea of
containment, was deceptive because it did not result in the proliferation of US
commitments across the world but a 'reordering of priorities which emphasized
economic assistance to Western Europe at the expense of interests in the Far East and
elsewhere' (Gaddis 1977: 281). For example, the US troops left South Korea in 1949
and Acheson's National Press Club speech in January 1950 publicized South Korea's
exclusion from the US defence perimeter. The withdrawal of both US and Soviet troops
from the Korean Peninsula and their ambiguous commitment to security resulted in the
transfer of 'the power of decision from the major power to small allies', inviting
challenges against the US implementation of containment from its early years
(Flemming 1961: 608).

The idea of Kennan's containment, based on the concept of the balance of power,
centred on maintaining US hegemony by frustrating Soviet expansionism worldwide.
While calling for 'a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment', Kennan
(1947: 575) was both pessimistic and optimistic over the future international order: pessimistic since he thought that the US-Soviet rivalry was inevitable because of Soviet expansive tendencies; and optimistic since he believed the United States had enough power and resources to induce the Soviet Union to ameliorate its behaviour. As a specific step to achieve this goal, Kennan (ibid: 581) called for the establishment of 'unalterable counter-force at every point where they [the Soviets] show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world', which became the tactical foundation of the Truman Doctrine. Kennan's ideas were based on strategic calculations in which 'distinctions had to be made between what was vital and what was not' since US capabilities were finite (Gaddis 1982: 32-3). In his grand strategy, based on his notion of five vital centres of industrial and war-making capability, Kennan (1947; 1954) formulated a set of key strategies of containment, including the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan to counterbalance Soviet expansionism on a global scale, the exploitation of tension between the Soviet Union and China for the purpose of hampering the unity of the Communist powers, the obstruction of Soviet ability to project its power beyond its borders, and the modification of Soviet behaviour and worldview through dialogue, which could put an end to the Cold War.

_{NSC-68._} Following his re-election in 1948, President Truman was forced to review his foreign and defence policies in light of the Communist triumph in mainland China in 1949, the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons, and rising McCarthyism (Ambrose 1991: 113). In a new document drafted in 1950 in the name of the National Security Council (NSC) policy paper No. 68, Kennan's strategy of defending strong points asymmetrically gave way to an emphasis on perimeter defence in which all points are equally important to US interests. Although Kennan believed that it was crucial to defend only vital interests since US resources were limited, the new document, authored by Paul Nitze, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Bureau, was based on a new interpretation of the scale of Soviet threats and the possible mobilization of US resources. NSC-68 declared that, in view of its economic power, the United States could spend US$50 billion or 20 per cent of its gross national product in 1950 for military expenditure (ibid: 114). The document is regarded as having established the parameters and rationale for post-war US foreign policy (Campbell

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1 The five vital locations of the world, which enjoy good conditions of climate, industrial strength and population, are the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan (Kennan 1954).

2 For the divide-and-rule approach adopted by the United States towards the Soviet-China alliance, see Burr (1998) and Chang (1990).
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 apparently validated one of NSC-68’s premises that if the US tolerates any shift in the balance of power, it could invite similar aggression elsewhere (Smith 1998: 62).

‘New Look’. President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61), who won the 1952 presidential election with a pledge to liberate the enslaved countries of the world under Communist rule, did not endeavour to fulfil his commitment to ‘rollback’ but implemented the policy of containment in the name of the ‘New Look’ (Ambrose 1991: 134-5). The major premise of Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ principle, supported by his Cabinet figures who stressed the importance of a balanced federal budget and tax cuts, was that an insurmountable increase of security burdens might cripple the domestic economy.

The New Look spawned the idea of ‘massive retaliation’, which signalled the message to the Communist powers that, rather than accepting casualties and costs while defending the land of the communist periphery in a protracted war, the United States might resort to strategic nuclear attacks on the communist heartlands, as it threatened to do at the end of the Korean War to speed up the process of signing an armistice agreement (George and Smoke 1974: 28). Despite the inception of the Cold War, however, the concept of containment was lacking in any strategy or theory linking military planning to foreign policy objectives prior to 1950. Therefore, the idea of ‘massive retaliation’, approved in 1953 by Eisenhower, can be regarded as the first systematic theory of deterrence in the Cold War era. Deterrence is a policy aimed at thwarting an enemy state from aspiring to change the international status quo in its favour. Its basic idea was to encircle the Soviet Union and China with a ring of states aligned with the United States either by treaty or unilateral declaration, with the hope that an American security umbrella over them would discourage the Communist countries from launching attacks. George and Smoke (ibid: 48) noted that in its simplest form, ‘deterrence is merely a contingent threat: If you do x, I shall do y to you. If the opponent expects the costs of y to be greater than the benefits of x, he will refrain from doing y’. In spite of the introduction of the concept of deterrence, the New Look became known for containing fundamental flaws because of its excessive dependence on the potential use of nuclear weapons to compensate for manpower shortages vis-à-vis the Red Army, thus limiting effective responses (Ambrose 1991: 71) and running the risk that the Soviets might dismiss it as US bluffing (Haass 1999: 11; George and Smoke 1974: 30).
Flexible Response. In a significant departure from the New Look strategies, President John F. Kennedy (1961-3) sought to expand the range of options to counter Soviet expansionism. Kennedy embraced the spirit of Kennan’s balance of power by introducing flexibility, but stressed bold steps on the basis of a more expansive perception of means. In particular, Kennedy called for the strengthening of both conventional and unconventional military capabilities and the build-up of strategic missiles. However, the ‘flexible response’ strategy, which favoured counter-insurgency operations by a small number of ‘military advisors’ over direct combat against adversaries, was again bogged down in the Vietnam War because efforts to find a middle ground between a nuclear war and appeasement were frustrated since the war in Vietnam required more US military assistance over time (Smith 1998: 71). Deterrence theory also shifted its focus from an ‘attack out of the blue’ by the Soviet Union to the prevention of escalation of small-scale warfare (Schelling 1960; Holsti 1972; and Brodie 1966). With the Soviet Union achieving nuclear parity with the United States, the Kennedy administration introduced the concept of ‘sufficiency’, based on the idea of ‘mutually assured destruction (MAD)’. 5

Détente. Halliday (1986: 205-6) viewed the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of détente as an attempt to preserve US hegemony with a comprehensive package of punishments and inducements, while Gaddis (1982: 314) stressed that the initiative, based on Kennan’s strategy of containment, was aimed at integrating the Soviet economy with that of the Western world to such an extent that the Soviet Union would have no motive for shattering the status quo. President Richard Nixon’s credentials as a staunch anti-communist political figure helped him to thwart criticism from the right when he sought to build better relations with the Soviet Union and China (Garthoff 1985). In short, détente could be defined as ‘a mixed competitive-collaborative relationship between global superpowers’ with contrasting ideologies and different worldviews (Breslauer 1983: 336).

To implement this new strategy, the United States was first required to free itself from the stereotypical view of the balance of power as a zero-sum game in which gains for one side meant losses for the other. Therefore, the Nixon-Kissinger approach, based on ‘linkage’, could be regarded as the first attempt at engaging the Soviet Union, though it has been classified as a strategy of containment. Hoffmann (1978: 46) described ‘linkage’, a sophisticated mix of pressures and inducements, as follows: ‘There would

5 The idea of MAD was to leave one’s population vulnerable to the other’s attack because, regardless of whoever attacks first, the results are mutual annihilation.
be incentives for good behaviour, rewards if such behaviour occurred, and punishments if not'.

Nixon and Kissinger set forth the broad concept of their strategy publicly with candour and clarity, but coupled this with a reliance on secrecy and outright deception at the tactical level (Gaddis 1982: 305). The two attempted to isolate the bureaucracy from the policy-making process, centralizing decisions to an unprecedented degree in their own hands and thus eroding the principle of transparency (Garthoff 1985: 26). Under the rationale of linkage, the bureaucracy, driven by its own parochial interests, was regarded as a set of organizations incapable of evaluating separate issues in relation to each other.

Like any other conciliatory steps, détente needed domestic compatibility, especially Congressional support, as a condition (George 1993: 59). Despite the implementation of the sophisticated strategies of détente by the Nixon-Kissinger team, the surge of the right wing in the United States from 1974 eliminated the public space for norms of restraint to settle down. Kissinger became the victim of his own success, when Senator Henry Jackson 'linked' Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union with US trade deals, such as the granting of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status and the extension of Eximbank credits (Dunbabin 1994: 23). The linkage brought an adverse impact on the strategies of détente, curtailing bilateral trade and prompting Moscow to reduce Jewish immigration (Ambrose 1991: 280). Even though the Nixon-Kissinger team tried to bring about changes in Soviet attitude by implementing détente, the Congress made détente hostage to Soviet changes, thus stripping Kissinger of his chance to test his theory that economic interdependence would give the Soviet Union an incentive to exercise political restraints (Gaddis 1982: 315).

Even though détente was offered as a viable strategy, long-cultivated enemy images and biased understandings of world politics had apparently blinded high politics (Guzzini 2002). During the 1976 presidential campaign, for instance, both Jimmy Carter of the Democratic Party and Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party attacked détente for its acceptance of the international status quo through the establishment of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which had consolidated the post-WWII boundaries in Europe, long sought by the Soviet Union (Garthoff 1994: 526-33). The collapse of détente was inevitable since the strategy, despite its initial success, failed to contain a series of Communist challenges in Vietnam and other parts of the world (Halliday 1986: 210). The strategies of President Carter (1977-81) initially embraced the Nixon-Kissinger team's asymmetrical approach of discriminating between vital and peripheral interests, but evolved into symmetrical response after the Soviet invasion of

**Reagan Doctrine.** President Ronald Reagan (1981-9) highlighted the US's historic mission of promoting the superiority of democracy over totalitarianism in his initiative, known as the Reagan Doctrine, in a direct rebuttal to the Brezhnev Doctrine (Smith 1998: 130). Reagan was the first post-war president to argue that the Soviet Union had gained superiority in terms of strategic weapons because of the results of arms control talks in the past (Nogee and Spanier 1988). Therefore, the Reagan administration rejected the idea of détente and implemented what could be called a 'neo-conservative evangelism of fear', ushering in the second Cold War (Smith 1998; Halliday 1986). In one of the most perilous moments of the Cold War, Reagan called the Soviet Union an 'evil empire', prompting the Soviet leadership to think that the United States might launch a nuclear strike against it. In 1981, for instance, the Soviets, in an apparent intelligence failure, was gripped by the fear that Reagan would order a preemptive nuclear attack and put its own forces on alert for a nuclear showdown (Bearden and Risen 2003).

The Reagan administration touched off an arms race, ostensibly threatening to create a satellite-based missile defence system (the Strategic Defence Initiative [SDI]), in its judgement that the fragile economy of the Soviet Union could not sustain massive parallel investment in the military build-up (Garthoff 1994). Critics called it an attempt to erect a non-nuclear 'astrodome' over the United States to step up security for the American public (Nogee and Spanier 1988: 176).

### 2.2. Theories of the Cold War

Realism and its neo-realist variants dominated the theories of the Cold War, as they were theories of wars, confrontations and alliances. The ideological precursor of Kennan’s containment harks back to the contributions of Reinhold Niebuhr, who revived the pessimistic Augustinian view of human nature to challenge the Lockean view of benign human nature (Cox 1981). Morgenthau (1948), who espoused determinist realism, believed that history would repeat itself in an endless struggle for power, nurtured by the self-fulfilling prophecy in which the worst-case thinking

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6 In a speech given in November 1968 at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia and stressed the Soviet Union's mission of protecting communism from outside encroachments, which was known in the West as the 'Brezhnev Doctrine'. See the text on the website, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/14/documents/doctrine/ (accessed 15 April 2004).
generates the very worst case. Despite the hegemonic status of realism within IR theories, the Cold War also gave birth to a myriad of different theories and interpretations. Among them, this section will shed light on the realist, liberal and constructivist contributions to the interpretation and analysis of the underlying causes of the Cold War.

2.2.1. Realism and the Cold War

Realism has dominated international relations theory since World War II, thus playing the role of a paradigm (Wæver 2002). During the Cold War, realist thinkers attributed international conflicts to the existence of an imposing structure of what they called 'anarchy' as an absence of an overarching authority (Waltz 1979). For realists, the primary means of resolving conflicts has been the mobilization of power, coercion and military force.

The realist thinkers were generally concerned with why and how the Cold War, which is also interpreted as a 'cold peace', was possible on a global scale in spite of the occurrence of wars of lesser scale, like those in Korea and Vietnam (Haass 1999: 3). The origins and developments of the Cold War have also raised many questions. Did nuclear deterrence work? Did bipolarity help to ensure peace? Was the long peace possible in the framework of hegemonic stability? Are states driven by relative gains concerns?

Nuclear Deterrence. There has been a long-running debate among realists as to whether nuclear weapons were the key variable that contributed to the maintenance of peace during the Cold War. It appears, however, that a majority of scholars agree on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, bolstered by a flurry of relevant concepts such as 'massive retaliation' and MAD, as observed in the previous section. Supporters of nuclear deterrence theory contend that the imperative of fending off a nuclear war had apparently prompted the superpowers to take great caution in their decisions which might have led to major wars or the possible escalation of small-scale wars (Bundy 1988; Waltz 1981; Mearsheimer 1990; Haass 1999). In particular, mainstream neorealists like Waltz and Mearsheimer could be categorized as core believers of the deterrent power of nuclear weapons to the extent that they would endorse a world of multiple states armed with nuclear weapons, checking and balancing each other. Waltz (1979; 1981) notes that the controlled proliferation of nuclear weapons would help to promote international peace and stability. In particular, Mearsheimer (1990) advocated Germany's possession of nuclear weapons because the economically powerful state
might be again tempted to threaten international peace if it felt insecure.

Meanwhile, other scholars, including Robert Gilpin and John Mueller, are sceptical about the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. Gilpin (1981: 218) noted that ‘the thesis that nuclear weapons have made hegemonic war or a system-changing series of limited wars an impossibility must remain inconclusive’. Mueller (1989), an advocate of the obsolescence of great power war, argues that a large-scale war between the superpowers had been impractical even before World War II because they experienced the calamities and costs of World War I. Hence, he called World War II an exceptional case, Hitler being an evil genius and Japanese militarists romantic risk-takers who had not experienced World War I (ibid).

**Bipolarity.** In parallel with the debate on nuclear deterrence, the realists have also grappled with whether bipolarity had contributed to systemic stability during the Cold War. Waltz (1979) is a staunch advocate of the belief that bipolarity contributed to a long peace during the Cold War in a definite departure from the beliefs of classical realists, including the founding father of containment, Kennan, and his practitioner, Kissinger, who were in favour of multipolarity as a bedrock of peace and stability. Even though conventional wisdom advocates a concert of five powers in a typical balance-of-power system, with one playing the role of balancer, Waltz (ibid: 163-4) dismissed this as an historical generalization, stemming from Britain’s role in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rather than a theoretical concept. Waltz (1964) argued that politicians might make a misjudgement on the intentions and actions of enemy states, because a multipolar world results in greater uncertainty. In contrast, Singer and Deutsch (1964) contended that a multipolar system tends to be stable because uncertainty encourages decision-makers to make calculations in consideration of the larger number of actors involved, and thus become cautious of the consequences of their actions. Meanwhile, Bueno de Mesquita (1978) dismissed both accounts by claiming that as long as the system’s structure remains intact regardless of bipolarity or multipolarity, there is little uncertainty because decision-makers are able to anticipate the likely results of similar actions under similar circumstances.

**Hegemonic Stability.** The debate over bipolarity is closely related to hegemonic stability theory. This theory has been built on the following two premises: order in world politics is created by a single dominant power and cooperation relies on the perpetuation of hegemony (Keohane 1984: 76). At first glance, this theory looks irrelevant to Cold War bipolarity. If one accepts the idea of ‘dual hegemons’, however,
this theory offers a viable account of Cold War stability and cooperation (Gaddis 1992: 176). In fact, the two superpowers, like ‘duopolists’, learned gradually how to cope with each other for their mutual benefits, which sometimes made China accuse the Soviet Union of seeking world domination through collaboration with the United States (Waltz 1979: 175).

Relative Gains. In a two-power competition, like the Cold War, losses for one party are immediately translated into gains for the other. As states are extremely sensitive to their relative erosion of capabilities under anarchy in which survival is the foremost goal, realists contend that their primary concern is to stop rival states from making advances rather than to endeavour to achieve absolute gains. Carr (1946: 111) noted that ‘[t]he most serious wars are fought in order to make one’s own country militarily stronger or, more often, to prevent another country from becoming militarily stronger, so that there is much justification for the epigram that the principal cause of war is war itself’. Echoing this view, Waltz (1979: 126) contended that ‘the first concern of the states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system.’

2.2.2. Liberalism and the Cold War

Liberal thinkers survived the dominance of realism during the Cold War and maintained their independent research projects, such as economic integration and institutional building. Ikenberry (2001a: 382-8) argues that ‘liberal grand strategy’ has played a more crucial role in US foreign policy during and after the Cold War than its realist counterpart, as manifested in its engagement with the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. The liberal visions of modernization and progress have been reflected in strategies of engagement when the United States sought to foster political and economic development in the backward Communist states with the aim of changing their worldview and behaviour. Ikenberry’s (ibid: 393-7) liberal strategies of engagement are focused on efforts to ‘open up’, ‘tie down’ and ‘bind together’ potential adversaries.8

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7 The three case studies of this dissertation investigate South Korea’s departure from these relative gains concerns in order to launch strategies of engagement with the North.

8 ‘Opening up’ refers to the creation of linkages between the democratic and Communist blocs through trade and investment, exchanges, and interdependence, as seen in the US’s ‘constructive engagement’ with China during the era of President Bill Clinton’s administration (1993-2001). ‘Tying down’ means fostering Communist states’ involvement in such international organizations as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Finally, ‘biding together’ stands for creating security communities, involving enemy states, as Germany was incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
**Game Theory.** Axelrod (1984: 153), using a computerized Prisoner's Dilemma tournament, argued that the strategy of tit for tat, based on reciprocity, is the most desirable way to achieve cooperation, which could equally be applicable to deterrence. For example, the United States can deter any encroachment by the Soviet Union if it can build a reputation as a country that actually carries out its threats (ibid: 154). The three requirements of deterrence are: '(1) the full formulation of one's intent to protect a nation; (2) the acquisition and deployment of capacities to back up the intent; and (3) the communication of the intent to the potential aggressor' (George and Smoke 1974: 64). US signals of commitments are especially important because, as seen in the Korean War, an official exclusion of South Korea from the sphere of US interests made North Korea feel free to attack it (ibid: 65-6). The importance of US commitments is crucial in a game theoretical model of a deterrence situation, as seen in Figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1 Game-Theory Example of a Deterrence Situation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>attack</th>
<th>No attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>defend</td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-100</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>+20</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defence</td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: George and Smoke (1974: 68).

Suppose that the US has offered indications that it would defend, say, South Korea, from an attack and the USSR is now calculating whether to make such an attack.
Possible payoffs are as shown: in the event of a Soviet attack and US defence, both sides lose heavily (−100); however, in the event of a Soviet attack and no US defence, the Soviets win moderate gains while the US suffers moderate losses in credibility (+20 and −20 respectively). In the absence of the Soviet attacks, it could be assumed that the US gains very slightly, as world opinion may believe that US deterrence is successful (+1 and −1, respectively).

An interesting aspect of this model is that the US should convince the Soviet Union that it would choose to defend South Korea under any circumstances. If not, the Soviets might choose to attack South Korea in the belief that the US is unlikely to defend it because, in the event of a US defence, it will lose heavily (−100), while no action will incur only a moderate loss of −20. In sum, a defending power must display the ability and willingness to wage war if it wants to avert a major war, because moderation and conciliation are likely to be taken for weakness (Jervis 1976; George and Smoke 1974; Schelling 1976; Boulding 1966).

Even though game theory provides a 'framework for analysis' (Schelling 1967: 219-20), its assumption of rationality has been challenged because the decision-making process is not always rational (George and Smoke 1974: 76; George 1993: 9). As preferences and payoffs are not obvious in many cases, Adler (1992) questioned the basis of rational choice models. Furthermore, success in deterrence encourages the defending powers to ignore the need for using other policy options to find viable and mutually acceptable solutions to the conflicts of interests (George and Smoke 1974: 508).

**Regimes.** Liberals and neo-liberal institutionalists have worked on strategies for promoting cooperation and interdependence between states suffering from security dilemma and relative gains concerns in an anarchical international structure. In principle, they agree on the realist notion that hegemonic power is important in fostering international cooperation, since a large number of regimes and institutions were formed under US leadership after World War II. In a departure from the realist premise, however, Keohane (1984: 246) believes that international regimes can replace a hegemonic power to ensure cooperation after the decline of the hegemonic power. For example, Keohane (ibid), dismissing the pessimistic conclusion of realism, argues that rational choice theory shows that cooperation between states, assumed to be rational egoists, is possible if they share common or complementary interests. In the same vein, Nye (1988: 250) contends:
The ability to communicate and cooperate can provide opportunities for the redistribution of interests and for the pursuit of strategies that would not be feasible in a world where the only information available to states was about other states' preferences and the power resources at their disposal. Just as allowing players in Prisoners' Dilemma games to communicate with one another alters the nature of the game, so a systemic process that increases the capability of states to communicate and to reach mutually beneficial agreements can add to the repertoire of state strategies and thus alter political outcomes.

As to the durability of a regime, Keohane (1984: 50) argues: 'Cooperation is possible after hegemony not only because shared interests can lead to the creation of regimes, but also because the conditions for maintaining existing regimes are less demanding than those required for creating them'. Since Ruggie (1975) introduced the concept of the regime as a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments accepted by a group of states, different theorists have given different meanings to it. Keohane, for example, shares Krasner's (1982) definition:

[R]egimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.

Nevertheless, realists and liberals hold diametrically opposed views on whether economic interdependence or linkages help to promote cooperation between states or lead to war. While realists contend that cooperation is hampered by relative gains concerns and the possibility of being cut off from trade in an anarchical international system (Grieco 1995; Mearsheimer 1990), liberals argue that the level of interdependence conditions the extent to which relative or absolute gains motivate actors (Keohane 1984: 123). Although states tend to assess the intentions of other states as well as their relative capabilities, the constant calculation of relative gains is impractical and almost impossible should states have diverse relations with many other
countries (ibid). However, it would be misleading to characterize realists as concerned only with relative gains and liberals as preoccupied with absolute gains. Keohane (1993: 275), developing his idea of institutionalism, conditionally recognized the possibility that states' interests in relative gains might inhibit cooperation, but noted that relative gains are motivating forces 'only when gains in one period alter power relations in another, and when there is some likelihood that subsequent advantages in power may be used against oneself'. Partly because of the questions of relative gains in the process of forming and operating international institutions, neo-liberals embarked on a project of rationally designing institutions to promote effective cooperation (Koremonos et al. 2001). Nevertheless, Mearsheimer (1994/5: 7) dismisses the argument as having 'minimal influence on state behaviour' and holding little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world. As institutions are not a form of world government, Mearsheimer (ibid: 9) argued that it is not the organizations that compel states to obey the rules, but states that choose the rules to obey.

Liberals also insist that economic interdependence diminishes the likelihood of war because it opens the way to maximize state interests through trade rather than resort to war (Rosecrance 1986). Hence, liberals sought to interweave a 'mass of cobwebs' across state boundaries to create a borderless society, which can eliminate states' motivations towards war (Burton 1972: 43).9

2.2.3. Constructivism and the Cold War

Constructivism, regarded as an outgrowth of critical theory (Reus-Smit 2001: 215), problematizes the basis of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which focus on war and cooperation between states in a fixed international system and treat the identities and interests of states as exogenously given (Wendt 1992). For example, US realists, like Morgenthau and Waltz, carved out a form of 'problem-solving theory' during the Cold War, a specific historical situation in which international relations relied on bipolarity and the overriding US concern was the defence of its power as a bulwark of the international order (Cox 1981: 131). Therefore, constructivists, questioning neo-realism's historical sense, argue that its a-historical stance erodes its explanatory power when it attempts to analyze a changing reality (ibid). In contrast to the rationalist assumption that actors are atomistic egoists, constructivists regard them as social actors 'in the sense that their identities are constituted by the institutionalized norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act' (Reus-Smit 2001: 219).

9 President Kim introduced these liberal approaches in his policies of engagement to promote inter-Korean economic interdependence and integration. See Chapter Six.
According to Reus-Smit (ibid), there are three forms of constructivism: systematic, unit-level and holistic. The first form, as demonstrated in Wendt's (1992; 1994; 1999) systematic constructivism, focuses on the structural level, while ignoring those that exist within the domestic political realm. Conversely, the second form, unit-level constructivism, focuses on the relationship between and among domestic, social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states. This approach, represented by Katzenstein (1990; 1996b), illustrates variations of identity, interest, and action across states. The holistic constructivists, in the meantime, treat the domestic and the international as two faces of a single social and political order. This perspective is epitomized by Ruggie's (1993) work on the rise of sovereign states out of medieval feudalism and Kratochwil's (1989; 1993; 1994) writings on the end of the Cold War, which stress the role of ideas regarding international order and security.¹⁰

Despite its rich understanding of some aspects of international life, Ruggie (2000: 37) harbours scepticism about the possibility that constructivism could develop out of its inherent limits into an explanatory tool of international life, since it lacks rigour and specification. However, scholars, such as Reus-Smit and Klotz, see the possibility of a scholarly division of labour because their approaches are basically complementary. They find the possibility of convergence, as constructivism focuses on how state identities evolve over time and institutionalized norms shape their identities and interests, while rationalism works on how states pursue their interests strategically. Klotz (1995: 20) notes: 'Combined with theories of institutions and interest-based behaviour, this approach offers us a conceptually consistent and more complete understanding of international relations'.

One of the major research projects of constructivists has been to problematize and reinterpret the whole developments of the Cold War from its origin to its end. Campbell (1992) argues that the Cold War, a name coined by a fourteenth-century Spanish writer to describe the rivalry between Christens and Arabs, was not rooted in the specific existence of the Soviet Union, but more or less a struggle by the United States to build its own identity as a state through historical interactions with its adversaries. Questioning the realist view that the Cold War stemmed from the rivalry of the two superpowers, Campbell (ibid) contends that US foreign policy, based on a zero-sum game, dangers emanating from the other and the tendency to militarize all responses, was not specific to one state or one ideology. Instead, he argues that US foreign policy has been constructed throughout history by linking American identity to difference, danger and 'otherness'. Rejecting realism's notion that the world comprises

¹⁰ This dissertation adopts both systemic and holistic constructivist approaches in Chapter Three.
objects whose existence is independent of ideas or beliefs about them, Campbell (ibid: 195) contends that the interpretation of threat emanating from the Soviet Union played the crucial role in forming American identity, as well as its foreign policy, during the Cold War, because containment was a strategy associated with the logic of identity. In sum, Campbell (ibid: 196) hinted at the possibility that ‘rogue states’, terrorism or some other potential challenger to American hegemony might replace the Soviet Union after the Cold War era as sources of threats to the United States, thus enabling it to move forward in its identity-building process. Halliday (1990) echoed this view by noting that the Cold War could persist even after the demise of the Soviet Union in the sense that the United States requires the existence of a common enemy as part of its identity-building process.

Building on Campbell (1992)’s work, Wendt (1999: 274-5) describes how the United States and the Soviet Union needed each other to play the roles of enemies in a Hobbesian anarchy, creating the phenomenon of ‘adversary symbiosis’. Showing how interests, norms and identities are internalized in this Hobbesian culture, Wendt (ibid) names three cases of adversary symbiosis: the military-industrial complex, in-group solidarity and projective identification. The case of the military-industrial complex explains how domestic interest groups in the United States and the Soviet Union were created and how these groups affected state policies, helping to constitute state identities especially during the Cold War. The second argument concerning ‘in-group solidarity’ is apt for illustrating the US’s projection of Iraq as an enemy state. Wendt (ibid) shows how state elites periodically invent threats to the state to justify the existence of their state. The third argument on projective identification is based on psychoanalytic theory, in which the enemy’s role is a site for the disposal of unwanted feelings about the self. Stein (1985: 250) argues: ‘We do not relate to the Soviet Union as though it were separate, distinct, from ourselves; rather we act toward it as though it were an unruly, unacceptable part or aspect of ourselves’.

Guzzini (2002) regarded deterrence theory as being predisposed to a particularly stereotypical understanding of the world, which automatically reproduces perceptions of threats. Therefore, the arms race was not accelerated in the context of action and reaction, but the product of a self-generated momentum of inertia and autonomously produced threat perceptions by the two autistic superpowers (ibid). Kaldor (1995) argued that the leaders of the two blocs, namely, ‘Stalinism’ and ‘Atlanticism’, had generated the threat of ‘the other’ for domestic purposes. The build-up of conventional and nuclear arsenals was to create an imaginary war that enabled the leadership to control domestic political life and manage internal conflicts through the swings between
détente and confrontation (ibid).

Realists attempt to explain the end of the Cold War from their observation that the overstretched Soviet Union could not maintain its status as a superpower in a fierce material competition with the United States (Wohlforth 1994/5; Copeland 1999/2000; Schweller and Wohlforth 2000). Nevertheless, Zubok (2001: 41) argued that it was wrong to approach the collapse of the Soviet Union from the perspectives of 'economic crisis and external pressure', since the country had never been an economic superpower. In line with this thought, constructivists are active in explaining why the Cold War was brought to an end in a peaceful way by using such ideational variables as cognitive learning, political entrepreneurship, identity politics, transnational networks and internalization of Western norms and values (Checkel 1993 and 1997; Mendelson 1993; Risse-Kapp 1994; Lebow 1994; Evangelista 1995). In particular, these analysts attempt to identify what motivated the Soviet Union in the late 1980s to abandon confrontational modes of behaviour and retreat from eastern Europe voluntarily by highlighting the New Thinking of the Soviet leadership (Herman 1996; Katzenstein 1996a; Kowert and Legro 1996; Checkel 1998a). Herman (1996: 275) argues that the proponents of the New Thinking jettisoned the self-defeating Marxist-Leninist ideology and dreamed of restructuring the Soviet Union as a 'democratic and peaceful member of the world'. In the process of translating the New Thinking into actual policies, the Soviet leadership effectively changed the antagonistic US attitude, thus ending the Cold War. Gorbachev's initiatives, the Russian version of engagement with the Western world, were successful in mellowing the attitude of the United States, a 'rogue state' in the Russian view. One notable thing is that the Moscow leadership had voluntarily restructured its way of thinking and acting before the United States changed its attitude towards the Soviet Union, a process of engagement that will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Three.

3. Containment and Engagement in the Post-Cold War Period

The disappearance of the Soviet bloc and the newborn freedom in Russia and eastern European states sent seismic shockwaves across the world, touching off debates ranging from Fukuyama's (1989) 'end of history', with the triumph of democracy and the market economy, to Mearsheimer's (1990) gloomy forecasts of confusion and instability, unseen by humankind in the bipolar world. Even though the Soviet Union, the prime

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11 For example, the Reagan administration played the role of a rogue state by seeking to develop the space-based anti-missile system, which ran against the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration has also been described as a 'rogue state'.
target of containment, no longer exists, it did not take much time for the practitioners of containment to locate new targets, much smaller in size but more unpredictable in their behaviour and possible risks to security for the Western world. In the hotbed of disorder, called the post-Cold War world, a group of ‘rogue states’ arose, drawing concerns from both policymakers and theorists. If the Soviet Union, given its size and expansionist penchant, had been a relatively clear target of containment, it is even unclear whether a group of ‘rogue states’ should be objects of containment or engagement. Haass (1999: 3) attributes the emergence of ‘rogue states’ to the loss of political control, formerly exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, it is not certain whether China or Russia has leverage to deter North Korea, their former client, from developing nuclear weapons.

In spite of the end of the Cold War, the logic and practices of containment and deterrence lingered in the US Defence and State Departments, forcing Washington to go adrift without a guiding intellectual and strategic roadmap fitting the post-Cold War situation. The unravelling of blocs and alliances led the United States to launch more frequent military intervention as a ‘globocop’ than before the Cold War, given so little fear of major superpower conflicts (Dumbrell 1997: 43). In a sense, US strategists transformed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into a fearsome enemy equivalent to the Soviet Union by ‘following organizational routine and mobilizing on a scale commensurate with a Cold War scenario’ (Kaldor 2002: 142). Despite mounting opposition from Russia, as well as from France and Germany, for example, the Bush administration launched the Iraq invasion to topple Hussein in 2003, because it was convinced that the military action would not develop into a major war with Russia and the advancement of US military technologies could ensure an early victory without inflicting large military and civilian casualties. The next target was arguably North Korea or Iran, as both countries were known to be engaged in nuclear weapons programmes, posing the most urgent non-proliferation threats to the Bush administration (New York Times, 20 June 2003). Nevertheless, the United States refrained from invading North Korea, despite the presence of a relatively mature nuclear weapons programme, since military intervention could set off a large-scale conventional war and inflict far-reaching damages on South Korea and, possibly, Japan.

Despite the apparent proclivity towards options of containment or even a pre-emptive strike during and after the Cold War, the United States also pursued strategies of engagement on a limited scale across the world. Noting that the American system was not tailor-made for pushing a policy of containment, Ikenberry (2001a: 387) argues that the United States is ‘institutionally predisposed to engagement’. In parallel with
strategies of containment, the United States endeavoured to transform the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries by engaging them with such liberal tools as ‘economic integration, democratization, and institution building’ (ibid: 383). In fact, US strategies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union changed from comprehensive to conditional containment after the death of Stalin because it was seen to be necessary to launch substantial engagement on such an issue as arms control, given the Soviet Union’s destructive nuclear power (Litwak 2000: 105). As US policies towards the Soviet Union oscillated between symmetric and asymmetric responses, its policies vis-à-vis ‘rogue states’ were similarly confused. For example, the Clinton administration’s Iraq policies continued to oscillate between keeping Hussein ‘in his box’ and unseating him from power (ibid: 101). On the Korean Peninsula, the United States concluded that an attempt to isolate North Korea completely might worsen its already troubled economy, thus increasing the likelihood that it would invade South Korea (Neilan 2000).

This section will first offer a new look at the term, ‘rogue states’, and then critically analyze the use of economic sanctions as a main policy tool against those states, before proceeding to review strategies of containment and engagement after the end of the Cold War.

3.1. ‘Rogue States’
One of the main problems facing theorists or practitioners of containment and engagement is what to call a group of states violating international norms. For example, ‘rogue states’, used repeatedly by the United States, have also been called ‘renegade states’, ‘outlaw states’, ‘pariah states’, or ‘states of concern’. Nevertheless, the term, ‘rogue states’, seems to enjoy popularity, although the phrase originally referred to such regimes as Pol Pot’s Cambodia and Idi Amin’s Uganda, notorious for their brutal internal repression (Litwak 2000: 50). Regardless of what they are called, the United States and like-minded countries assume that this group brackets a band of states ignoring or openly overriding international norms and practices by seeking to develop or trade WMD, suppressing their own peoples by brutal means, sponsoring or committing acts of terrorism, or using illegal means to meet their own national interests (George 1993: 49). Given the inclusion of Cuba in the US list of ‘rogue states’, which does not fit the criteria outlined above, another major factor in categorizing this group of states is domestic politics in the United States, which reflects the Cuban émigré

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12 For the Carter administration, which valued the worldwide promotion of human rights, President Park Chung-hee’s South Korea was a ‘pariah state rather than an example of Asian success’ (Gleysteen 1999: 20)
community's animosity toward the Castro regime (Litwak 2000: 76).

The Cuban case indicates that the US’s classification of 'rogue states' stemmed from its negative identification with those states regardless of whether they were proliferators or international norm breakers. North Korea and Cuba are the legally designated enemies of the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Meanwhile, Iraq, Iran and Libya were the primary targets of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 in which the US president is granted authority to 'deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States'. In particular, Iraq has been the US’s main enemy since they fought against each other during the Gulf War. The George W. Bush administration argued that it decided to invade Iraq in 2003, since it felt an imminent threat from the state that allegedly denied the existence of the United States. However, critics of the war in Iraq believe that the United States exaggerated the threats of Iraq's WMD programmes to make the case for war (New York Times, 6 June 2003).

Since the designation of a certain state as a 'rogue' has been a rather arbitrary decision by the United States, there is no consensus even among Western countries over how to name these states and how to deal with them. Therefore, the term, 'rogue states', was unable to offer any clear guideline for policies, since the United States and other Western states held conflicting identification with these states. When the United States attempted to isolate Iran and Iraq economically, some western European countries, especially France and Germany, maintained close economic contacts with them. Even Britain and Germany went on to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea and stayed the course of engagement in spite of North Korea’s admittance of a nuclear weapons programme in October 2002.

The United States also exhibited inconsistency in imposing the hegemonic norm of nuclear non-proliferation across the world, further compounding this question of

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13 The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, administered under the Act, established economic sanctions against North Korea from the start of the Korean War in 1950. In fact, North Korea and the United States are technically still at war because they signed only the Armistice Agreement in 1953, not a peace treaty. Therefore, North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programmes have often been cited as the direct threats to the security of the United States by the Bush administration. Meanwhile, Cuba was also subject to similar sanctions by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, issued by the US government in 1963 under the same Act.


15 President Bush highlighted clear and imminent threats from Iraq's WMD on many public occasions before the war, including his State of the Union address in January 2003. As for the theoretical debate on enemy images, see Wendt (1999: 260-63) and Wolters (1962: 25-35).
categorization. In retrospect, the eradication of WMD was not the top priority issue for the United States in spite of its commitment to non-proliferation, insofar as proliferators did not directly threaten its national interests (Tellis 2001). For instance, the Clinton administration did not place India and Pakistan on the list of ‘rogue states’, even though they conducted nuclear tests in 1998 in flagrant violation of the NPT regime. For the Bush administration, international terrorism was an even bigger concern than the prospect of nuclear proliferation after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US mainland. Since the Pakistani government had cooperated with the United States in capturing al-Qaeda operatives, the Bush administration refrained from taking punitive actions which might undermine the authority of President Pervez Musharraf.16

This convergence of national interests between the United States and Pakistan is reminiscent of the US political backing of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War. The Reagan administration, for example, overlooked Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran in the 1980s and the provision of sanctuary to terrorists. It stayed on the path of engagement with Baghdad by offering military and economic assistance and recognizing the regime politically and diplomatically, since its priority was neither the prevention of WMD proliferation nor terrorism at the time, but a halt to the spread of the Islamic revolution from Iran to other Muslim states.17 According to declassified State Department documents, made public by the National Security Archive on 18 December 2003, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who was Reagan’s special envoy to Baghdad back in 1984, played down the significance of Washington’s official condemnation of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and stressed to Iraqi leaders that ‘our interests in 1) preventing an Iranian victory and 2) continuing to improve bilateral relations with Iraq, at a pace of Iraq’s choosing, remain undiminished’.18 Meanwhile, President Reagan, whose top priority was the containment of the Soviet Union, cleared the way for Pakistan’s nascent nuclear programme in the 1980s, since the pro-US state played the role of the main route for the transfer of US weapons to Afghan mujahideen guerrillas fighting the Soviet troops after their invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Under Reagan’s pressure, the US Congress voted in 1981 to exempt Pakistan from US laws banning assistance to any non-nuclear state engaged in illegal

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16 The Bush administration, praising Pakistan’s handling of the nuclear proliferation controversy involving Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, even announced that it would designate the country a ‘major non-NATO ally’ (New York Times, 18 April 2004). The decision gives Pakistan diplomatic prestige and access to US military technology.

17 Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran posed a potential threat to successive US administrations which subscribed to the thesis of ‘clash of civilizations’.

procurement of equipment for nuclear weapons programmes. Pakistan also secured a six-year aid package from the United States worth US$3.2 billion.\(^{19}\)

Some opponents of the US's use of the term, 'rogue states', contend that any state undertaking policies against the United States are categorized as 'rogue states'. George (1993: 49) and Litwak (2000: 74), in particular, argued that this US political approach of lumping a group of states under this pejorative rubric had marred meaningful progress in dealing with these states primarily because this approach neglects the particularities of each state and limits strategic flexibilities. The other group claims that the United States itself is a 'rogue state' since it has been accused of the same policy patterns of recklessness and brutality in transgressing international norms and treaties such as the ABM Treaty, the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.\(^{20}\) For Chomsky (2000), the United States is the very incarnation of a prototype 'rogue state' in view of its open contempt for the rule of law, its support of oppressive regimes worldwide and its frequent resort to coercive means to resolve any conflicts of interests.

In sum, 'rogue states', is hardly neutral language that has any standing in international law and practice. In many cases, the term has been used to denigrate the enemies of the United States. Since 'rogue states' is not appropriate as a general description of those states, this dissertation will use the term only in the context of US foreign policy in order to avoid confusion. In inter-Korean relations, for example, we will refer to North Korea as South Korea's 'enemy state', a term with a basis in South Korean law.

### 3.2. Economic Sanctions

As an arguably single superpower after the end of the Cold War, the United States has mobilized a wide range of measures to enforce hegemonic norms, such as nuclear non-proliferation (Ikenberry 2001b; Johnston 2001). For successive US administrations seeking to punish their adversaries transgressing such norms, economic sanctions have been the most readily mobilized policy tools to the extent that it was virtually impossible to rule out their use (Litwak 2000: 105; Haass 1997). In fact, the United States has imposed economic sanctions to fulfil a wide range of other purposes, including the promotion of human rights, the condemnation of terrorism, the prevention of drug trafficking, and even the ousting of a specific regime (Haass 1997). For the

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\(^{19}\) Detailed accounts for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programmes were published on *The Asia Times* (29 January 2004), *The New York Times* (2 February 2004) and *The Times of India* (3 February 2003).

United States, economic sanctions have been relatively easy policy instruments it can resort to as part of its efforts to affect the policies of those states short of war. For example, the United States imposed multilateral sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War and succeeded in delaying the reconstruction of Hussein’s military machine (Litwak 2000: 106). The United States also imposed comprehensive unilateral sanctions on Libya in 1986 for supporting international terrorism (ibid: 107). Despite the limited success in denying those states the opportunity to rearm themselves, this option could not lead to any meaningful change of their policies and contributed only to the further isolation of those states. As the change of the target state’s policies might be slower than expected, it was theoretically necessary to set the duration of the sanctions. In most cases, however, sanctions have been applied indiscriminately and indefinitely. In an analysis of 115 cases of economic sanctions since World War I, Hufbauer et al. (1990: 101) contend that the phased strategy is less likely to succeed than a quick, comprehensive use of economic sanctions since 'time affords the target the opportunity to adjust: to find alternative suppliers, to build new alliances, and to mobilize domestic opinion in support of its policies'.

There is also a controversy over whether unilateral or multilateral economic sanctions are more effective. Some scholars emphasize that multilateral cooperation is the key to the successful implementation of economic sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; Mansfield 1994 and 1995; Martin 1992). The logic of this view is that a significant number of strong states can dominate the international system and prevent defection if they are able to collaborate (Snidal 1985). However, Hufbauer et al. (1990) find that international cooperation does not bring about desirable outcome, despite the cost the prime sanctioner should pay to drum up multilateral support. Drezner (2000) argues that multilateral sanctions are sabotaged by enforcement difficulties, rather than bargaining problems between the primary and secondary sanctioners. In particular, the difficulties in multilateral sanctions resemble the prisoner’s dilemma, because sanctioning states are supposed to shoulder the costs of banning trade or economic cooperation with the target state, while ‘sanctions busters’ could reap huge benefits (ibid).

One of the major obstacles to this sanctions strategy is its failure to win support at home and abroad. Domestically, for example, US oil companies protested against economic sanctions preventing them from investing in Iran, while allowing their European counterparts to make lucrative deals (Litwak 2000: 106). Internationally, US policies could not be compatible with European approaches emphasizing political dialogue and economic relations as inducements for behavioural change. While the
United States was inclined to put in place comprehensive sanctions, its European allies advocated a limited use of embargoes only against items of military significance, such as dual-use goods (Rodman 1995). In particular, Europe and Canada attacked the United States for infringing their sovereignty by applying the Trading with the Enemy Act and the Export Control Act, which give the administration the authority to apply embargoes and export controls in foreign operations of US companies (ibid). The Helms-Burton and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act also caused conflict with European allies, because they were targeted at foreign companies trading with Iran, Libya and Cuba (Litwak 2000: 84). Rodman (1995) attributed Europe's rising negative voices to the hegemonic decline of the United States, in particular, its economic status relative to Japan and Western Europe, and the fading Cold War ideologies, which posed a challenge to the US's governability vis-à-vis multinational corporations, as well as foreign states.

The controversy over the effectiveness of economic sanctions led to public calls for an end to the use of economic embargoes as a foreign policy tool, because they mostly harm the civilian population, especially children and the elderly, rather than the leadership they target (Stremlau 1996: 44). Even though humanitarian exemptions are granted under a majority of UN sanctions, the issue of civilian suffering was a major challenge to the supporters of the sanctions option (ibid). In sum, economic sanctions did not yield significant foreign policy achievements for the United States, while being costly and counterproductive (Haass 1997). Thus they have been used as a 'default option' when there is no policy alternative (Litwak 2000: 79). To punish those states seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons or export missiles, the United States has been compelled to take action, but options were limited because official interdictions or more coercive military actions might require stronger determination and readiness to fight a war (Haass 1997). In most cases, the target state did not change its policies but summarily rejected those sanctions resulting from the conflicts of interests between norm breakers and enforcers (Schroeder 1994).

3.3. Strategies of Containment and Engagement

When it comes to strategies of containment and engagement after the end of the Cold War, a myriad of terms describing the different levels of containment and engagement have been used by theorists and practitioners. Since the containment/engagement dichotomy is impossible to maintain both theoretically and practically, as mentioned above, many theorists and practitioners have coined such terms as 'comprehensive containment', 'conditional containment', 'conditional engagement', 'limited engagement', 'quid pro quo engagement', 'engagement', 'unconditional engagement',

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and 'comprehensive engagement'. As they are all somewhere on the spectrum of containment and engagement, this section will first identify the three main strategies the United States has employed to deal with its enemy states: rollback, comprehensive containment and conditional containment (engagement).\(^2\) It will be followed by some cases of successful engagement implemented by the United States and West Germany.

In fact, an analysis of cases of engagement seems like reviewing a collection of failed initiatives, except for a few cases, since the implementation of engagement policies is such a tall order that a state or a group of states cannot successfully push them through in many cases. The purpose of this section is thus to illustrate the major cases of containment and engagement and identify their frameworks in order to analyze what have been the shortcomings of those initiatives. Therefore, the identified weaknesses of past cases in terms of both theory and practice will offer clues to how a different type of engagement could be conceived in Chapter Three.

### 3.3.1. US Policies vis-à-vis ‘Rogue States’

Ritwak (2000: 103), who regarded the US’s policies vis-à-vis ‘rogue states’ as an offshoot of the realist tradition, divided the various strategies adopted into three categories: rollback, comprehensive containment and conditional containment. Hence, he classified the Clinton administration’s policies vis-à-vis North Korea as a case of conditional containment, although it is widely called an example of engagement. As most policies undergo mutations and transformations over time, the Clinton administration, in fact, moved on the containment-engagement continuum from conditional containment to conditional engagement in the waning months of his presidency. This section will review the three cases of US policies vis-à-vis ‘rogue states’: rollback, comprehensive containment and conditional containment (engagement).

**Rollback.** This strategy aims to alter the status quo in order to reverse regional aggression or replace a ‘rogue’ regime with a benign one (Ritwak 2000: 103-5). One of the typical examples of this strategy is the Bush administration’s overthrow of the Hussein regime in 2003. As one of the main architects of this strategy, President Bush’s National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice embodied the idea that ‘the United States would act pre-emptively against any power that threatened the United States, or

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\(^2\) Conditional containment will be bracketed along with conditional engagement because actual policies are found to oscillate between them, as seen in the Clinton administration’s strategies vis-à-vis North Korea.
threatened to put nuclear material into the hands of terrorists' (*New York Times*, 20 June 2003). Originally, this term was used by the critics of the Truman administration's containment policy, who sought to liberate eastern Europe under Soviet occupation rather than recognizing the status quo (Ritwak 2000: 103-5). As it involves war or military operations in some cases and covert intelligence operations in others, it has been subject to criticism for its imperialist motives.

**Comprehensive Containment.** As observed in the previous section, Kennan called for comprehensive containment of the Soviet Union because he saw little chance of dialogue with Stalin. Even after the Cold War, this option remained as one of the main strategies for the United States when it dealt with such states as Iraq and Iran (Litwak 2000: 105). This strategy uses economic sanctions as a primary policy instrument, as analyzed earlier in this chapter.

Following the Gulf War, Iraq faced the most extensive containment regime in four areas: 'UNSCOM inspections to monitor the destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities, multilateral economic sanctions, no-drive and no-fly military exclusion zones in northern and southern Iraq, and the threatened use of force to deter Iraqi aggression and ensure Baghdad's compliance with Security Council resolutions' (ibid). In the case of Iran, the United States resorted to unilateral sanctions when it failed to win multilateral support for sanctions. Nevertheless, it was almost impossible to penalize Iran economically because of its oil trade and close relationship with Russia and Europe (*New York Times*, 20 June 2003).

**Conditional Containment (Engagement).** In a significant departure from comprehensive containment, this strategy combines the traditional elements of containment with those of engagement to induce changes in the target state's policies. Hence, this strategy, under the principle of 'conditional reciprocity', mobilizes both

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22 Reporting on the US intelligence failure in the discovery of WMD in Iraq on 11 February 2004, *The New York Times* quoted a European official as saying, 'Pre-emption was an idea created for Iraq. It has now died in Iraq'. Following the intelligence fiasco, which dealt a blow to the Bush administration, there was a rising view that the United States would find it hard to make a case for war against other countries, such as North Korea, on the basis of its intelligence findings. Nevertheless, Professor John Lewis Gaddis, in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations on 6 February 2004, argued, 'As a result of September 11, I think that the shift in foreign policy to a strategy of pre-emption -- that supplements but doesn't replace the Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence -- is the most dramatic and most significant shift in American foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War'. Gaddis compared this strategy to the warning Mayor Ed Koch used to prevent illegal parking in New York City, reading 'Don't even think about parking here'. Gaddis said this strategy has given a clear signal to the world that any state harbouring terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda, would face the fate of the Taliban. The text is available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6755 (accessed 11 February 2004).
sticks and carrots to motivate the target state to drop its unacceptable foreign policies and open the way for its resocialization into the global community (George 1993: 51). During the Cold War, the Nixon-Kissinger détente policy was a good example of this strategy.

In the post-Cold War era, the Clinton administration, under the name of a 'strategy of engagement and enlargement', took a conditional containment policy toward North Korea and eventually veered into conditional engagement in the final months of his presidency. At that time, the US government sought to improve its relations dramatically with North Korea upon the recommendation of the South Korean government, which was pursuing the Sunshine Policy. Many experts agree that, because of North Korea's mature nuclear programmes, the artillery Pyongyang amassed within range of Seoul, and the possibility of a large-scale conventional war, the Clinton administration opted for negotiations and signed the AF in 1994 (Sigal 2000a: 70; Ritwak 2000: 111; Kim H.J. 1996). Under the agreement, the United States agreed to provide North Korea with two reactors in return for its suspension of all nuclear activities. In fact, this deal was heavier on incentives than sticks, but the willingness to spend financial resources by South Korea, Japan and the United States to fund the project represented a successful case of preventive diplomacy (Mazarr 2000). Although this strategy was denounced as 'appeasement' by the US Congress and other critics, Ritwak (2000), building on George's (1993: 55-6) hypotheses on behavioural modification and learning theory, contends that it is distinguished from appeasement in three respects:

First, the inducement must be tied to specific changes in the target state's behaviour, not general expectations of improved behaviour. Second, the reward should come only after the specific change in behaviour. If the reward is provided in advance of behaviour modification or is not linked to a specific behavioural change, it may be legitimately criticized as a bribe. And third, such an approach depends on mutual adherence to the specific conditional reciprocal steps in the sequence.

Following the nuclear deal, the United States had temporarily dropped North Korea from its list of 'rogue states' in 1996. However, this strategy, based on quid pro quo reciprocity, failed eventually to put an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes. Among the many reasons for the collapse of this agreement were the

23 The North Korean nuclear weapons programmes will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
Pyongyang government's security dilemma and nuclear ambitions, the lack of systematic US efforts to root out the causes of North Korea's security concerns, the delays in the construction of LWRs and the end of the Clinton administration's term which had, all of sudden, closed the window of opportunity for engagement.

Despite the Clinton administration's successful bargaining to freeze North Korea's nuclear programmes, it had lacked any steady efforts to enlarge and strengthen the domestic support base for the implementation of the engagement option and failed to pay attention to North Korea's desire to build better relations to alleviate its security dilemma resulting from periodical threats from Washington (Mazarr 2000: 309). Once the threats of nuclear proliferation were gone in 1994, US attention to North Korea ebbed rapidly without following through on its commitment to upgrade 'bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level', as stipulated in the AF (Appendix V). In particular, the Clinton administration failed to create a support base in the Republican-led Congress, which annually hampered the administration's efforts to win the appropriation of heavy oil for North Korea as alternative energy sources (Ritwak 2000: 231). Therefore, a thorough understanding of the internal politics of a state pursuing engagement, as well as that of the target state, is crucial for the formulation of an engagement policy (Reissner 2000: 45; Suettinger 2000: 28).

Meanwhile, the Kim Young-sam government of South Korea, which was the main partner of the Clinton administration's engagement with North Korea, was notorious for its policy inconsistency, which perplexed both the United States and North Korea (Paek 2000; Choi 2000; Mazarr 2000; Barry 1998; Moon 1998). As the United States had oscillated between containment and engagement vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the Kim Young-sam government exhibited the typical dilemma in coping with the economically weak, but militarily menacing, North Korea. In sum, the lingering scepticism over the intentions of the North Korean regime in both the United States and South Korea served as stumbling blocks for the successful implementation of an engagement option, a situation that was further hampered by North Korea's periodic military provocations, including the 1996 submarine incursion into South Korean waters. George (1993: 54) argued that resocialization, unlike the symmetrical tit for tat, is an asymmetrical game, since a state seeks to achieve a fundamental change of the target state's behaviour, which requires much more refined and calibrated strategies.

### 3.3.2. Cases of Successful Engagement

As noted in Chapter One, this study aims to formulate a model of comprehensive engagement on the basis of the Sunshine Policy. The previous section has already
reviewed the process of Soviet leaders’ identity shifts that made them drop the past’s antagonistic policies towards the West and perceive their state as part of the West, which in turn expedited the process of unravelling the Cold War bipolarity in a peaceful manner. In a sense, the end of the Cold War was the triumph of the Soviet leadership’s engagement policy vis-à-vis the United States. This section will analyze three other cases of successful engagement: the US policies towards China and Vietnam, and West Germany’s policy towards East Germany.

**US-China Relations.** Successive US administrations have been ambivalent over whether China is a partner or a potential enemy amidst an intense rivalry between competing policy and academic communities: the neo-liberal school advocating economic engagement and its neo-realist counterpart subscribing to the ‘China threat’ thesis (Gurtov 2002: 115; McGrew and Brook 1998: 151-5). As a result of this polarization, Sino-US relations have experienced ups and downs since the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, but evolved in a rather positive direction over time (Ni 2000). After President Nixon’s policy of détente, the following US administrations opted for the engagement option vis-à-vis China in contrast to their hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In particular, the Clinton administration maintained a policy of engagement in a steadfast manner despite its misgivings over the rise of Chinese power (Nye 1995). Under President George W. Bush’s administration, the two countries further deepened economic interdependence and cooperation as partners in a war against terrorism (CRS 2003a).

In fact, this US attitude means a significant departure from the initial stage of the Cold War era in which the United States was gripped with fear, witnessing the Communists’ victory over the Nationalists in a civil war. The United States and China regarded each other as enemies mainly because of their conflicting positions during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the US’s support of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s (Ni 2000: 52; Yahuda 1996: 193). However, the US’s strategic calculations, which led to its efforts to take advantage of China’s secondary Communist power status to counterbalance Soviet hegemonism, prompted it to take a differentiated approach towards Beijing (Gaddis 1982). China’s attitude towards the United States has also changed over time from hostility to somewhere between rivalry and partnership, since it perceived the US’s engagement in Northeast Asia as a counterweight to Soviet threats (Yahuda 1996: 202).

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The United States embarked on engagement from 1971 when it acquiesced in a United Nations vote to grant China a seat on the Security Council, held previously by Taiwan’s Nationalists (Mann 1998). In 1972, President Nixon made an historic visit to Beijing at the invitation of Chairman Mao Zedong. The ‘farsighted geostrategic visions of the Chinese and American leaders’ enabled the two countries to establish the Shanghai Communiqué, a monumental document in bilateral relations, which upheld Beijing’s status as the only legitimate government of China (Ni 2000: 53; Yahuda 1996). Despite fluctuations in bilateral relations, the two countries could maintain their relations on track, since mutual cooperation was translated into mutual interests.

China’s US policies were set up on the premise that since the United States has been a dominant power after the Cold War, China’s long-term strategic and security interests lie in avoiding direct military confrontation with the United States and fostering good working relations to create a benign environment for steady economic growth (Bueno and Story 2001). In fact, China has no option but to maintain close ties with the United States, which has been the major market for Chinese products, as well as the major source of cutting-edge technologies (Nye 1999). These geopolitical and economic considerations enabled China to stick to the status quo principle in its relations with the United States, North and South Korea, and other countries, which is one of the major conditions for the strategies of comprehensive engagement to be elaborated in greater detail in Chapter Three.

US-Vietnam Relations. Despite the lingering misgivings between Washington and Beijing, US-China relations marked one of the successful cases of the US’s strategies of engagement. To aid in formulating a sophisticated framework of comprehensive engagement in Chapter Three, it is meaningful to investigate how the United States and Vietnam ended their two decades of frozen relations after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and moved to establish diplomatic relations in 1995. Strategically, the US government needed to revamp its policies vis-à-vis Vietnam after the end of the Cold War.25 Since China was an emerging economic and political power in Asia, the US strategists needed to find a counterweight to it, as they did during the Cold War. When Vietnam started withdrawing its troops from Cambodia in 1989, the atmosphere was ripe for the lifting of US economic sanctions, which were imposed after the start of the Vietnam War in 1964 and stiffened after the communization of Vietnam.

in 1975 and its invasion of Cambodia in 1978. The Bush administration set up a roadmap for diplomatic normalization with Vietnam in 1991, even though the plan still held US relations with Vietnam hostage to the resolution of Cambodia-related issues (Richburg 1991).\textsuperscript{26} Economically, the United States was running the risk of losing its potential market, since European countries and Japan had already normalized relations with Vietnam, which assumed a strategic status in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea (Herring 1996: 319). Even though the improvement of bilateral relations could serve US national interests, President Clinton’s engagement policy faced stiff opposition from the Congress and other opponents, who claimed that Vietnam maintained a poor human rights record and failed to show sincerity in accounting for US soldiers missing in action (CRS 2001b). When Clinton lifted the economic embargoes against Vietnam in 1994, the detractors of the engagement policy proclaimed ‘Black Thursday’ and Senator Robert Smith, a Republican from New Hampshire and a Vietnam veteran, criticized the administration for rewarding Vietnam for ‘twenty years of intransigence’ (Herring 1996: 320).

One of the salient factors on the part of the United States, which made the process of normalization maintain momentum, however, was the pioneering activities of pro-normalization forces, which had already embraced new identities vis-à-vis Vietnam. They included broad-based groups of businessmen, Vietnam War veterans and journalists, who supported rapprochement with Vietnam in a consistent manner. In particular, the involvement of Republican Senator John McCain and Democratic Senator John Kerry, both Vietnam War veterans, served as the ‘political cover’ for the arduous normalization process (Sidel and Gray 1998). A growing number of US businessmen also pressed the Bush and Clinton administrations to improve relations with Vietnam in their pursuit of business interests, enabling the Bush government to set up the four-stage roadmap leading to diplomatic normalization (CRS 1994). Since Vietnam, unlike North Korea, did not pose serious security challenges to the United States in the absence of any WMD programmes, the conservative policy actors from the US defence and intelligence communities did not interfere with the Clinton administration’s efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam (Sidel and Gray 1998). Even though it was not easy for successive US presidents to overcome the deeply embedded trauma resulting from its defeat in the Vietnam War, regarded as the only defeat in US history, President Clinton championed the engagement option during his

\textsuperscript{26} In 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, toppled Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge and installed a pro-Vietnamese regime there. Since Vietnamese leaders visited the Soviet Union to sign a friendship treaty shortly before the invasion, US policymakers concluded that the Soviet-Vietnamese connection offered Moscow a strong foothold in Southeast Asia.
eight-year presidency (Le 2001).²⁷

In August 1995, the two countries established diplomatic ties. For the three consecutive years since 1998, President Clinton issued a waiver from the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, which restricts interactions with socialist countries, even though the president faced joint resolutions by the Senate and the House disapproving his action (CRS 2001a). Clinton's reconciliatory measures opened the way for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Eximbank to extend support to American businesses in Vietnam. Culminating in President Clinton's efforts of engagement, the two countries signed a trade agreement in July 2000, which led to Clinton's trip to Vietnam in November, the first trip by a US president since 1969.

In fact, the amelioration of the lingering animosity and improvement of relations were possible through mutual steps, since Vietnam also introduced sweeping economic opening and reform, cooperated with the search and location of MIA, and withdrew its troops from Cambodia. Vietnamese leaders accepted a series of US demands to the extent that US policymakers might conclude that Vietnam was willing to make concessions on issues of importance to US national interests (Manyin 2003). Vietnam's new initiatives, marking a sweeping departure from the ideology-based foreign and economic policies of the past, stemmed from the strategy of doi moi (renovation), announced in 1986 in the pursuit of 'more friends, less enemies' (Le 2001; Alagappa 1998).

It might still require many years of efforts to construct a working post-normalization relationship between the two countries (Sidel 1996). There is a lingering perception in Vietnam that the US government might seek to overthrow the Vietnamese Communist Party and its leaders. Nevertheless, the US-Vietnam relationship has been transformed remarkably from the days when the two regarded each other as threats to peace and stability to today when each sees the other as a partner for peace and stability. The United States had long maintained the position that it is unthinkable to improve relations with Castro's Cuba or Hussein's Iraq, as long as these leaders remained in power. The lesson from US-Vietnam relations, however, is that the amelioration of

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²⁷ President Clinton, announcing the US-Vietnam bilateral trade agreement on 13 July 2000, praised the contributions to the normalization process of his Congressional 'allies', Senator John Kerry and Senator John McCain. Clinton said: 'it is my opinion that none of this would have been possible had it not been for the visionary and brave and reconciling leadership of the Americans in the United States Congress who served, many of whom suffered, in Vietnam; especially those who are here with me and the others whose names I mentioned earlier. Our debt to them as a nation is immense. This agreement is one more reminder that former adversaries can come together to find common ground in a way that benefits all their people, to let go of the past and embrace the future, to forgive and to reconcile' (http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/vietnam/cltrd713.htm, accessed 15 April 2003).
decades-long animosity and improvement of bilateral relations are possible to some extent even before a transition in leadership (Sidel and Gray 1998). At the same time, President Clinton’s adherence to the engagement option and the activities of pro-normalization forces have been the indispensable components of successful engagement.

Inter-German Relations. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-74) sought to overhaul the confrontational inter-German policy implemented by his predecessor, Konrad Adenauer (1949-63), who pursued German unification through the annexation of East Germany and caused friction with the United States, which sought the reduction of East-West tensions (Dunbabin 1995: 279). Nevertheless, Brandt’s original version of Ostpolitik (East Policy), which envisioned the goal of reunification, ‘damaged the credibility of Bonn’s détente policy and made the goals of Ostpolitik suspect in the East’ (Rosolowsky 1987: 64). After realizing any hasty unification attempt was doomed to failure as long as the Soviet Union regarded East Germany as its western border, Brandt initiated a new version of Ostpolitik, which is in essence a status quo policy aimed at achieving better relations not only with East Germany, but also with the Soviet bloc (Tilford 1975: 2).

Brandt travelled to the East German city of Erfurt for a summit in 1970 and hosted a return visit by his East German counterpart, Premier Willi Stoph (1964-73), even though their summit diplomacy was not initially successful (Dunbabin 1995: 276). Nevertheless, the two Germanys managed to establish the Basic Treaty in 1972, which opened the way for regular official and private contacts, as well as for the exchange of television programmes and correspondence (Schmidt 1993). Bonn made a strategic decision to secure limited opportunities for inter-German communication and travel in exchange for its recognition of East Germany (Giessmann 2001). In spite of these achievements, the Social Democratic Party was subject to intense criticism by the Christian Democratic Union for abandoning the goal of reunification (Rosolowsky 1987: 68).

Despite some parallels between the West German and South Korean approaches, Giessmann (2001) distinguished between South Korea’s policies and Ostpolitik as follows:

‘Ostpolitik’ never tried to trade one system for another. It simply started from the assumption that the gradual opening up and change of the ‘closed system’

28 President Kim (1994) believed that the West German policies vis-à-vis East Germany had been more critical in achieving German unification than external factors, such as Gorbachev’s perestroika.
in the East would (given a favorable European environment) eventually prepare East German society for a systemic transformation and the opportunity to decide in freedom about their future in Germany. When compared with the ‘Ostpolitik’ the new South Korean ‘North Policy’ initiated in 1972 started from a different perspective. Whereas the ‘Ostpolitik’ deliberately left open the future status of Germany and postponed the solution of the ‘national question’, the North Policy of South Korea from the outset became focused on the goal of reunification.

In this vein, Giessmann (ibid) declined to call the Sunshine Policy a status quo policy because the goal of unification was specified in the Joint Declaration, issued by the two Korean leaders after their summit in 2000. Meanwhile, other scholars argue that it is impossible to replicate the German unification formula in the inter-Korean situation. Yang (2002) noted that substantial changes in inter-German relations had been underway long before unification took place. Schmidt (1993) contended that, unlike the two Germanys, the two Koreas fought a ferocious war. Nevertheless, German unification, which was speedily achieved after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, offers the lesson that it is desirable for the two Koreas to launch a gradual process under controlled conditions instead of rushing into unification. The German unification process also highlights the importance of the status quo principle in inter-German relations and the shift of identities between East and West Germans through their institutionalized contacts and communication.

4. Conclusion
Soviet spokesman Georgi Arbatov, jokingly warned the United States in 1987 that Moscow would do a terrible thing: ‘we are going to deprive you of an enemy’ (quoted in Dumbrell 1997: 3). Nevertheless, the United States has never faced a dearth of new enemies after the end of the Cold War, as observed above. In parallel with the process of

29 Giessmann’s opinion is not compatible with this dissertation’s hypothesis that the Sunshine Policy is a status quo policy, as discussed in Chapter One. Traditionally, the two Korean governments had no option but to pay lip service to the goal of unification, because it is a highly political issue separate from whether all Koreans really have a yearning for reunification. President Kim had been under suspicion from the conservative forces in South Korea for failing to move to achieve unification or sympathizing with the North Korean unification formula, based on a federal system that pursues the coexistence of two different governments in one state. As President Kim needed to garner public support to pursue his reconciliation policy towards North Korea, he had to embrace the goal of unification pushed by the conservative forces. Even in the German case, the West German government rejected the notion that East Germany constituted a foreign territory and abstained from establishing full diplomatic relations provided under international law (Tilford 1975: 3).
creating new enemy states for the continuation of its internal identity dynamics, as elucidated by Campbell (1992), the United States also launched the policies of engagement with China and Vietnam and embraced them as members of the international community.

By analyzing various strategies and theoretical foundations of both containment and engagement, this chapter discovered a set of strategic and theoretical parameters, which will be crucial for formulating a new framework of engagement for real-life application and refining the theoretical approaches to the concept of comprehensive engagement in Chapter Three. First, the containment/engagement dichotomy is meaningless because the concepts of containment and engagement are elusive terms in real-life situations. In particular, it is questionable whether Kennan's concept of containment and Kissinger's policy of détente should be categorized under the rubric of containment. In contrast to Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation', Kennedy's 'flexible response' and Reagan's SDI, which stressed the strict application of deterrence and an unlimited spending of American resources, those approaches by Kennan and Kissinger are rather similar to the post-Cold War strategies of engagement with enemy states.

Second, strategies of containment and engagement, exercised by the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, were based on the theoretical frameworks of realism and liberalism, characterized by a mix of incentives and penalties. Even though the concept of engagement has been used by the United States in devising strategies to deal with 'rogue states', they were actually based on the same ontological framework as strategies of containment, given that the Nixon-Kissinger administration's policy of containment was also a mix of penalties and inducements. The strategies of containment and engagement also contained fatal flaws in establishing themselves as working strategies at the stage of implementation, because their means were not properly chosen to achieve the specified ends: behavioural change of those states and their eventual integration into the international community. In fact, history tells that policies based solely on a mix of carrots and sticks, a typical realist recipe, were unable to change the behaviour of those states. For example, the Agreed Framework, lauded as a successful case of engagement, broke down without bringing about meaningful changes in North Korea's behavioural patterns. In spite of the tactical flexibility, however, détente was also a policy sought by a realist like Kissinger and fell short of addressing the root causes of the Cold War (Herman 1996: 291).

Third, any policy implemented in pursuit of reconciliation and realization of mutual interests should be based on the status quo principle. Both Kennan's containment and Kissinger's détente pursued the status quo in political and military
affairs between the two superpowers. West Germany’s Ostpolitik also envisioned the status quo rather than seeking to achieve unification. The AF was also a good example of a status quo policy because the United States and North Korea agreed to establish ambassadorial relations if all the suspicions over the North’s nuclear weapons programme were cleared.

Fourth, the interactions between a status quo state and a target state should be freed from the strict rules of the zero-sum game to create the environment for the use of economic incentives. The Nixon-Kissinger administration’s détente policy sought to integrate the Soviet Union into the global economy with the goal of preventing it from realizing any ambition to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, it used a sophisticated mix of pressures and inducements in the framework of ‘linkage’. The aforementioned successful cases of engagement have also resulted in the expansion of economic relations between the United States and China, between the United States and Vietnam, and between East and West Germany.

Fifth, this literature review shows that strategists of engagement need to understand the internal politics of the target state, as well as that of states pursuing engagement. Domestic opponents could emerge as the major obstacle to an engagement option, as seen in Nixon’s détente and Clinton’s engagement vis-à-vis China, Vietnam and North Korea.

Sixth, this literature review has discovered that working strategies of engagement undoubtedly accompanied strategic recalculations involving some degrees of identity shifts vis-à-vis the target states from enemies to partners. For example, the Clinton administration pursued its policy of engagement on the basis of the shifted identities vis-à-vis Vietnam, as promoted by various pro-Vietnam activists in the United States.

In conclusion, a significantly different framework of engagement needs to be formulated, if its final goal is to change the target state’s behaviour running against international norms and enable it to join the international community. Such a new framework is in demand because the conventional approaches toward engagement cannot adequately account for the theoretical puzzle of the Sunshine Policy, as adumbrated in Chapter One. 30

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30 Despite the strategic similarities of détente and the Sunshine Policy, both of which emphasized political dialogue, Nixon did not rush to hold a summit with a Soviet leader. Kissinger even threatened to cancel a summit in December 1971 unless the Soviet Union pressed India not to invade West Pakistan (Gaddis 1982: 293). Another difference is the tight linkage of political progress and economic benefits. While Nixon’s White House was determined to control trade with the Soviet Union prior to political progress (Kissinger 1979), President Kim’s Chong Wa Dae (Blue House) was all out to expand economic linkages between the two Koreas regardless of any improvement in political relations.
Chapter Three. The Concept of Comprehensive Engagement: Theoretical Framework

1. Introduction

Delving into the myriad of strategies of containment and engagement during and after the Cold War, the previous chapter concluded that a majority of these strategies were variants of containment and both practitioners and theorists of containment and engagement had worked on a narrow scope of policy tools that are questionable in terms of viability and effectiveness. Indeed, their negative identification and short-sighted devotion to a mix of incentives and penalties in dealing with adversaries heightened international tensions. In particular, the practitioners of containment promoted an undue domestic antagonism against adversaries and stirred up a sense of insecurity emanating from their potential threats, which in turn fended off proactive steps to ready the domestic public for a changing international environment. Now that mankind has been liberated from the heavy psychological burden of the Cold War, this study aims to demonstrate that comprehensive engagement, like the Sunshine Policy, is one of the viable policy options in alleviating long-running animosities and promoting exchange and cooperation between adversaries. We have already reviewed three successful cases of engagement in Chapter Two in which the strong adherence to an engagement option by President Clinton and Chancellor Brandt led to the alleviation of mutual animosity and the establishment of constructive relationship between the former foes. The purpose of this chapter is to draw on what has been learnt in Chapter Two to formulate strategies of comprehensive engagement.

In an interview with CNN in May 1999, President Kim himself referred to his initiative as ‘a comprehensive engagement policy’, noting that it was the most practical policy for South Korea in order to make the North give up its war option and opt for peaceful coexistence (Korean Overseas Culture & Information Service: 1999). To achieve this goal, Kim pointed to five possible approaches: first, the reactivation of the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (hereafter the Basic Agreement); second, North Korea’s diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan; third, the international community’s strengthening of interaction with North Korea; fourth, the elimination of WMD from the Korean Peninsula; and fifth, the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace regime between the two Koreas (ibid).
In fact, the Korean Peninsula has been an empirical test site for a wide range of policies and initiatives launched jointly by South Korea and the United States, or sometimes independently by South Korea, with the aim of containing or engaging North Korea. Nevertheless, all previous policies made only marginal achievements in making North Korea abandon antagonistic policies towards South Korea and join the international community, while only the Sunshine Policy demonstrated the potential to bring about limited but nevertheless significant behavioural change. Building on the analysis of the Sunshine Policy, this study defines comprehensive engagement as a process in which a status quo power employs all possible means of statecraft to induce an enemy state to change its behaviour running against the norms shared by the international community. Its ultimate goal is the enemy state's integration into the global community as a responsible member.

As mentioned in Chapter One, this study aims to make a contribution to the extant literature by clarifying how the process of promoting a fundamental change in the behaviour of an enemy state is an interactive process which needs to entail the identity shift of the status quo power's policy elites and domestic public vis-à-vis the enemy state. This process of building a structure of peace is analogous to what constructivists dub 'collective identity formation' in which former adversaries become homogenized to the extent that they feel like they share a common fate (Wendt 1999: 343). Moon (1999) argues that the Sunshine Policy was rooted in the concept of social exchange that precludes an immediate balancing of reciprocal relations such as that in the tit-for-tat game, while critics (Levin and Han 2002; Han Y.S. 2002; Ha 2000) warned that the policy would end up as unrequited love or appeasement because of its failure to give due consideration to the security dimension. This chapter will first illustrate the concept of comprehensive engagement, focused on the analysis of the Sunshine Policy, and then map out a South Korean decision-making process to examine how this concept was put into practice in the context of domestic and international constraints.

2. Three Levels of Comprehensive Engagement
As argued in Chapter One, this study contends that an eclectic approach combining realism, liberalism and constructivism, but focusing in particular on ideational factors, enables us to capture the diverse dimensions of comprehensive engagement. Cooperation theories of realism and liberalism, such as hegemonic stability theory and regime creation, cannot be applied to the case in point, since they deal mainly with interactions within the sphere of a hegemonic power or between friendly states. Meanwhile, the constructivist approach to international cooperation is still
underdeveloped and cannot give a clear answer to this question of promoting close interaction between adversaries. Hook et al. (2001: 38) argue that tight paradigmatic frameworks of IR should be jettisoned, and insights from realism, liberalism and constructivism combined in order to offer a more profound understanding of different forces affecting a state's behaviour, when rightly mixed. Alagappa (1998) notes that, in spite of the salience of realism, no single international relations theory is able to capture the various features of security practices in Asia.

If strategies of engagement pursue a behavioural change on the part of an enemy state, realism and liberalism, called 'problem-solving theories' (Cox 1981: 128-9), cannot address the problems properly because they are based on the fixture of time and space, for example, the Cold War template or a clear enemy/friend concept, thus tolerating no room for any substantial change in policies or attitudes in the post-Cold War situation. Hence, the appropriate use of a constructivist approach, which is keen to identify clues to historical change, is indispensable in order to conceptualize comprehensive engagement. At this juncture, a constructivist approach demonstrates the potential to offer an analytical account of the process of rapprochement between adversaries by identifying signs of structural and domestic change and guiding policies in the right direction during the murky moments of change, while realism and liberalism are apt to solve problems in a rather static international environment.

The conventional strategies of engagement, epitomized as the right mix of inducements and penalties, are based on a simple causal relationship, which has limitations when applied to defiant states with their own systems of governance and ideologies. History tells that such policies sowed mistrust between the United States and its adversaries without bringing any meaningful behavioural change on the part of the target states. In fact, strategies of engagement, based on a mix of carrots and sticks, were devised based on the Cold War template, whose pressing priority was not the enemy state's behavioural change, but the reinforcement of security based on the principle of the status quo. With regard to a theory's validity, Cox (1981: 128) insists:

Theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, or dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future. Of course, sophisticated theory is never just the expression of a perspective.
The more sophisticated a theory is, the more it reflects upon and transcends its own perspective; but the initial perspective is always contained within a theory and is relevant to its explication. There is, accordingly, no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective.

Under Cox's rationale, problem-solving theories take the constellation of social and power relations and institutions as a given and their ultimate purpose is to make these established dynamics work smoothly in dealing with sources of trouble, while a critical theory questions its origins and scouts for signs of possible change, thus opening up the possibility of creating an alternative world based on a different perspective (ibid: 128-9). Echoing the idea of the division of labour between rationalism and constructivism, Wendt (1999: 367) notes that rationalist models are superior to constructivist models if identities and interests are not supposed to change over the course of interaction, but constructivist models will demonstrate ample explanatory power if they are expected to change. In sum, constructivism provides a ground for explaining conceptual shifts to bring about an alternative order, while problem-solving theories are designed to devise tactics to maintain the established order (Cox 1981). Therefore, constructivism is particularly relevant for the analysis of the Sunshine Policy, since this dissertation seeks to illustrate strategies of engagement from the perspective of what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888) termed 'strategic social constructivism' in which 'actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context'. This section identifies three levels of comprehensive engagement: domestic, inter-state and global. The three levels correspond respectively to the three parameters of comprehensive engagement: identity shifts, the status quo and integration. In a similar way, the three parameters of engagement cover respectively the spheres of the social, the politico-military and the economic. In fact, the three parameters, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, are mutually reinforcing in a dialectic manner in the course of deepening engagement vis-à-vis an enemy state.
This configuration is similar to Cox's (1981:136) three forces interacting in a structure: material capabilities, ideas and institutions, as shown in Figure 3.2. In conceptualizing strategies of comprehensive engagement, the force of 'material capabilities' is exercised in the form of enforcing the status quo, while the clash of 'ideas', defined as 'collective images of social order held by different groups of people' (ibid), leads to identity shifts and normative change in an historical context. If 'institutions' are 'amalgams of ideas and material power' (ibid: 137), integration is the crystallized form of the two parameters of the status quo and identity shifts. To the extent that institutions reduce the probabilities of the use of force to resolve conflicts (ibid), integration, envisaged by liberals, heightens the costs of defection from international cooperation.
In his analysis of collective identity formation, Wendt (1999: 343-63) also mentioned four master variables: interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint. In this framework of comprehensive engagement, interdependence corresponds to integration; common fate and homogeneity refer to the process of identity shifts; and self-restraint can be understood to mean the status quo.

2.1. The Domestic Level: identity shifts

As analyzed in Chapter Two, theories of containment had been created based on the Cold War template in which states pursuing democracy and the market economy were pitted against those upholding communism. Amid the perception of mutual destruction and an escalating arms race, both blocs were caught in a security dilemma, or in what Wendt (1999: 274-5) called ‘adversary symbiosis’. Partly because of the deeply embedded perception of threats and negative identification, the domestic level was the least explored and somewhat untouchable sector when theorists or policymakers conceived strategies of engagement. Nevertheless, there is an overall consensus that domestic support, especially from the parliamentary branch of government, is the key for the smooth implementation of any engagement initiative (Haass and O’Sullivan 2000: 178-81; Litwak 2000: 87-90; Moon 1999: 41-2). In the post-Cold War world, in particular, Haass (1999: 7) says that the US administration faced difficulty in building domestic political consensus around specific foreign policies, as it finds the assertive but decentralized Congress difficult to work with. The situation is compounded by heightened media scrutiny, thus making policymakers refrain from embarking on controversial policies (ibid). For example, the United States contemplated adopting a strategy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards Iran in 1992, such as the lifting of economic sanctions against oil sales, but dropped it eventually because it was politically impossible at home (George 1993: 60). As the statecraft of democratic countries has long promoted negative identification vis-à-vis enemy states in the form of laws and regulations, as well as public propaganda, any significant departure from the conventional course of action by state policy elites invited resistance and criticism from the parliament and the conservative media.

This section will venture into the murky cognitive domain of ideas, identities and norms, a frontier least developed by theorists and practitioners of engagement. It will seek to explain the causal relationship among ideas, identities and norms as the rudimentary foundation of comprehensive engagement. This section will draw on the tradition of ‘conventional constructivism’, nurtured by Wendt, Finnemore and Sikkink, who are ‘largely positivist in epistemological orientation and strong advocates of
bridge-building among diverse theoretical perspectives; the qualitative and process-tracing case study is their methodological starting point' (Checkel 2004: 230).

2.1.1. Ideas
The power of ideas in making policy choices has steadily attracted attention from many theorists.\(^1\) Weber (1958: 280) states:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently 'world images' that have been created have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest.

In fact, world images, based on identities fossilized in the course of the long span of history, have tied up the options of state policy elites when they have attempted to launch strategies of engagement that inevitably accompany economic incentives for enemy states, as well as punishments. In many cases, they abandoned new initiatives over time and returned to the domestically safe conventional policies aimed at containing enemy states, resulting in the reproduction of old enmities and confrontations instead of opening up new possibilities of resolving the protracted conflict of state interests through dialogue.

The architects of the Sunshine Policy were the protagonists who realized earlier than others that the conventional approaches could no longer address the entangled inter-Korean relationship, caught in a vicious cycle of dialogue, confrontation and crisis.\(^2\) They had 'new ideas' about how to alleviate the long-running enmity and pave the way for an eventual integration of the two Koreas. In the process of translating their ideas into policies, the architects of the Sunshine Policy endeavoured to shift South Koreans' identities and their attendant norms vis-à-vis North Korea.

Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 3) argue that 'ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide roadmaps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions'. Gill (1990: 231) notes that ideas are the key to the understanding of political identity and the creation of domestic interests, while Sikkink (1993) and

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1 See Checkel 1997; Jacobsen 1995; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Goldstein 1993; and Sikkink 1991.
2 Long before taking office as president, Kim Dae-jung and his followers championed the idea of peaceful coexistence and unification, a departure from the conventional concept of inter-Korean ideological rivalry and competition for legitimacy. See Kim D.J. (1997).
Holsti (1962) contend that states react differently to similar material situations because they have fundamentally different beliefs about specific circumstances. In demonstrating the power of ideas, President Kim and his advisors reacted differently to a series of provocative North Korean actions and pursued consistent policies along their own roadmap. Thus, the South Korean policy elites, guided by a roadmap based on their new ideas, sought to imbue South Koreans with new identities vis-à-vis North Korea to reach their goal of inter-Korean reconciliation.

In the 1970s and 1980s, when President Kim and his followers belonged to the opposition party or academia, they were branded as 'communists' or 'socialists', and faced prosecution by South Korea's predominantly anti-communist administrations. When Kim became president in 1998, they seized the chance to translate their ideas into a set of policies to bring about inter-Korean rapprochement. In Checkel's (1997: 130) view, the current trend of idea-based research has the potential to explain the anomalies left unsettled by structural or interest-based theories. As the Sunshine Policy is based on new ideas, therefore, the employment of an ideational approach to analyze it can be expected to shed new light. In fact, the Sunshine Policy is an anomaly, if analyzed by traditional structural approaches. In particular, these approaches cannot explain the ideational motives behind the facts that South Koreans travelled to a North Korean mountain resort in spite of an exchange of fire between the naval vessels of the two Koreas and the Kim administration risked the deterioration of a traditional alliance with the United States in order to keep friendly ties with North Korea.

2.1.2. Identity Shifts

As an individual has many identities related to his/her roles, such as brother, son and journalist, so a state has multiple identities as an ally, an enemy, a neutral, and so on. As different ideologies 'not only coexist, compete, and clash, but also overlap, affect and contaminate each other' (Therborn 1980: 79), different identities also find themselves interacting incessantly with the result that the boundaries of identity lines become blurred. Constructivists argue that the dynamics of international relations are not imposed by the international system, as insisted by neo-realists, but are socially constructed (Katzenstein 1996a; Wendt 1992; Onuf: 1989). These social interactions give birth to state identities and interests. Furthermore, constructivists contend that identities are malleable and thus subject to change through further social interactions. Chafetz et al. (1999) note that repeated social interaction is the key for the transition from negative to positive identification.

When do state identities change then? Chafetz et al. (ibid) stress that a given
identity remains robust if it fits the social setting and rewards the actor. Hence, a state is compelled to seek a new identity if the given identity, which has become inappropriate in the new social setting, does not meet state interests. In the process of pursuing new identities compatible with state interests, identities and interests are co-constituted (Hall 1999: 147). If the interaction goes without interruption, a state comes to regard its destiny as tied to that of another state, creating group loyalty which is emotional, rather than rational (Hampton 1999: 239). In doing so, the state becomes free from relative gains calculations and negative identification with the other state, thus being liberated together from the Hobbesian anarchy of the struggle of all against all (Wendt 1994).

Constructivists have used this process to account for the process of building peace and cohesive security communities between democratic countries, rather than to explain relations between adversaries. This dissertation aspires to apply this logic to relations between antagonistic states, because identities are malleable and state interests are also subject to change. In fact, it is hard for state policy elites to promote the general public's identity shifts vis-à-vis an enemy state, if the two states find themselves in the Hobbesian world of suspicion and enmity, but not entirely impossible if a status quo state makes extraordinary efforts.

A state identifies itself in relation to foreign states as a result of collective experiences. For example, South Koreans' identification of North Korea as an enemy state dates back to the collective memory of the fratricidal Korean War. However, the war was one isolated historical incident. What made South Koreans fortify their negative identification vis-à-vis North Korea were not only the actions of North Korea, such as a series of attempts to assassinate South Korean political leaders, but also the policies and propaganda machines of successive South Korean governments that needed the presence of North Korea as an enemy in the process of solidifying their otherwise fragile legitimacy. Hence, institutionalized norms, deriving from negative experiences and interactions, give birth to and fortify an enemy identity, as observed in Chapter Two.

South Koreans' collective identity guided them to adopt specific attitudes towards North Korea in the form of identity-derived norms. These norms, which were internalized in the provisions of laws and institutions, such as the National Security Law (Appendix II), banned all unauthorized contacts with North Koreans. This law is so draconian that it even punishes citizens for praising the North Korean system or ideology, and has become the object of criticism from international and domestic human rights organizations (Kim and Park 2001). Internalized norms also guided the South Korean government to adopt a tit-for-tat-style strict reciprocity and resort to the tactics of threatening military means in resolving the conflict of interests. As the United States
demonized the Soviet Union in political hyperbole and expansive rhetoric to win public support for its containment policies (Litwak 2000: 87), successive South Korean governments reproduced enmity against North Korea during the Cold War by inflating the threat the latter posed (Moon 2001: 304). In fact, South Korean laws and institutions, which pinpoint North Korea as a prime enemy and threaten to punish any act of sympathizing with or supporting North Korea, were mirror images of their North Korean counterparts (Lee J.S. 2000: 111). The Pyongyang regime also maintained laws and institutions hostile to South Korea, envisaging the communization of the Korean Peninsula as its ultimate goal.

In retrospect, the existing norms, which restricted all forms of contacts with North Koreans, became an obstacle to South Korean policymakers who embodied new ideas in the post-Cold War world. These existing identity-driven norms (hereafter identity norms) limited the scope of action the government could choose, because the society, in a micro-economical sense, was already in a Pareto-efficient equilibrium in which it is impossible to make one identity group better off without making the other identity group worse off. In fact, the group identifying North Korea negatively enjoyed privileges during the Cold War as a ruling class, while those with positive identification faced persecution.  

As identities cannot be switched overnight, a government, upon discovering that the dominant identification vis-à-vis an enemy state does not serve national interests, needs to embark on a project to dilute and phase out the established identity norms, which could eventually lead to identity shifts through positive interaction between adversaries. Kowert and Legro (1996: 452) call those norms ‘behavioural norms’ as ‘behavioural prescriptions for the proper enactment’ of given identities. Hence, the Kim administration had no choice but to re-educate individuals about North Korea, reverse public perceptions, and promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. As trust building is of paramount importance in the process of comprehensive engagement (Ha 2000), this process of re-education and persuasion might enable the ‘killing two birds with one stone’. It aims not only to enlarge the domestic support base for an engagement policy, but also to convince the enemy state that the status quo power is

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3 As a piece of remarkable evidence regarding the existence of a privileged group based on the established identity and its impediment to any reform drive, North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-il, regarded as a dictator, told visiting South Korean media executives in Pyongyang on 12 August 2000: ‘We have not revised the Workers’ Party platform, authored in 1945. Since it was authored in the 1940s right after national liberation, it contains a lot of radical expressions. Among the party cadets are those in advanced age who worked side by side with the President (Kim Il-sung). Therefore, we cannot revise it easily. If we revise it, a lot of people working in the sector will have to step down. If we revise the platform, they will think I have decided to purge them’ (Munwha Ilbo, 14 August 2000).
serious about launching new policies based on a different identification. If the government’s efforts are successfully translated into action, the former enemies are set to enter into the phase of close interaction, which would help to get rid of the established identity norms and eventually lead to the shift of identities between them.

In fact, it is impossible to engage an enemy state while depicting it as a constant source of threats. As the interpretation of threats from enemy states is an inalienable part of the identity held by the status quo power and there are no stable identities (Campbell 1992: 10), the United States has oscillated in implementing strategies of engagement vis-à-vis enemy states. In Campbell’s (ibid) view, the identity of a state, which is ‘contained and reproduced by foreign policy’, serves as the basis for norms by which future conduct is judged and threats are translated. Therefore, the practitioners of comprehensive engagement need to peddle new identity norms in order to achieve the goal of collective identity formation. Only a status quo power is capable of taking this step, since an enemy state, like North Korea, alienated by stronger states around it, is prone to be gripped by fears and to exaggerate threats from the outside world to promote its internal solidarity. In fact, a state needs to change its attitude and behaviour first, if it wants to change those of the other state (Horne 2001).

This process of re-education and persuasion is crucial since a democratic state cannot pursue a policy without solid domestic support. Having praised some good behaviour of an enemy state as a sign of progress in bilateral dialogue and interaction, the state then needs to project positive images of the target state to the domestic and international public. In fact, the history of the Cold War was a history of vilifying and demonizing enemies. Therefore, it is important to launch efforts to give the public a balanced picture of enemy states, especially about their strengths as well as their weaknesses. A different picture of enemy states and the subsequent interactions with them might then lead to a new conclusion that they are no longer enemies. In sum, the Sunshine Policy can be seen as a set of identity norms based on a different identification of North Korea, just as the ‘New Thinking’ of the Soviet elites was a ‘norm’, based on a strategic reconceptualization of national interests (Kowert and Legro 1996: 452).

2.1.3. The Life Cycle of Identity Norms
A norm is generally defined as ‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors’ or ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Identity politics, guided by identity norms, is a logical endeavour by the status quo power to engage an enemy state. As identity norms make much more powerful claims on behaviour than causal beliefs (Herman 1996: 285),
it is not an easy job for the state elites to embark on this process of shifting identity norms. However, the window for a specific policy opens when the state feels the dire need to revamp national interests based on established identity norms, the outside environment is conducive to the emergence of new identity norms, and an increasing proportion of the domestic public is ready to embrace them.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), international norms evolve in a three-stage life cycle: emergence, cascade and internalization, as shown on Figure 3.3. This norm life cycle is based on Sunstein’s (1997) idea of ‘norm cascade’, which takes place after a ‘tipping point’.4

**Figure 3.3 Norm Life Cycle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm emergence</th>
<th>‘Norm cascade’</th>
<th>Internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Tipping Point</td>
<td>Stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


However, this thesis finds that the three-stage process of international norm life cycle, devised to explain such norms as women’s suffrage and the special status of medical personnel and those wounded in war, cannot be equally applied to the life cycle of norms guiding state identities. Although the identification and measurement of norms are a formidable task, this section will explain why and how the life cycle of identity norms takes a distinct dynamic, unlike those of international norms. In a small but significant departure from the dynamics of international norm life cycle, this thesis proposes a stage of ‘norm collision’ between those of norm emergence and cascade to capture the moments when existing and emerging norms are in contention for predominance. This modification is indispensable because the shift of identity norms, unlike that of international norms, requires structural transformation, such as the end of the Cold War, or domestic crises, and the contending identity groups in the domestic society are particularly sensitive to the shift of state policies. In sum, this dissertation

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4 In sociology, the tipping point theory suggests that if a certain behaviour, like drug use, rises above a certain point, it is set to rise rapidly, reflecting normative changes.
argues that identity norms evolve dynamically in four stages: emergence, collision, cascade and internalization, as shown in Figure 3.4.

**Figure 3.4 Identity Norm Life Cycle**

This thesis does not argue that all identity norms undergo this distinctive four-stage life cycle. Furthermore, all new identity norms cannot proceed to the stage of cascade, if they are not promoted jointly by norm entrepreneurs and an activist government in a favourable historical and social setting. Nevertheless, this study contends that new identity norms, as seen in President Kim’s Sunshine Policy and President Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’, emerge and grow in this four-stage life cycle through fierce competition with their rival norms, deeply embedded in society.

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5 Norm entrepreneurs are able to ‘frame’ norms in such a way that they ‘resonate’ in a given society (Nadelmann 1990: 482). Meanwhile, a government could be named an ‘activist’ government, if it pursues a policy with ‘an explicit plan of action tailored to serve specific purposes’, just like the chancellorship of Willy Brandt, who implemented Ostpolitik (Clarke and White 1989: 6-7).
Stage 1: Emergence of Identity Norms

Unlike international norms, which are actively built and promoted by norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), different identity norms already exist, having resulted from diverse interactions between the domestic and the foreign. In this stage, individuals or domestic groups, which embrace nascent identity norms prescribing unconventional attitudes vis-à-vis an enemy state, exist as minority groups in pluralistic societies without a voice in the policy-making process or face persecution in authoritarian societies by governments armed with dominant, conventional identity norms. The main forces peddling new identity norms or 'norm entrepreneurs' can be students, a dissident movement, the church or other actors, based on the positive identification with the enemy state. For example, student and dissident movements in South Korea, driven by leftist or nationalist ideologies, had been subject to harsh crackdowns by law-enforcement authorities for several decades, because, in calling for a dramatic increase of contacts and cooperation with North Korea, they clashed with the dominant, anti-Communist norms. Until the late 1980s, opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, who had devised the so-called 'three-stage approach to unification', had been labelled a 'pro-Communist' and faced persecution by South Korea's military regimes, including being kidnapped from Japan by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (Kim D.J. 1997). In the Soviet Union, dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and a network of committed activists, who identified the Western world positively, faced the same fate (Herman 1996: 292). Nevertheless, the decline of tension by the end of the 1960s and the détente of the 1970s enabled more Russians to positively identify the West, which began to be projected as an object of emulation among them owing to freedom and material abundance (Zubok 1994).

As negative identification is institutionalized in the form of laws and regulations, it is too early for ordinary citizens to 'bandwagon' the new identity norms. In most cases, a majority of citizens and media organizations, sharing the same identity norms with the ruling elites, are also critical of the behaviour of the groups with new identity norms, describing them as rebels or insurgents posing a threat to state security. In a sense, the harsh treatment of dissidents reflects the state authorities' inability to embrace the diversity of public opinion, and thereby allows new identity norms to gain force throughout society to the extent that political or civic groups embodying the new norms can be created and consolidated sooner or later. Some members of parliament in the

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6 Chapter Four will deal with South Koreans' identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea in greater detail.
7 The term, 'norm bandwagons', was coined by Sunstein (1997: 38).
establishment also start embracing new identity norms at this stage. 8

Stage 2: Collision of Identity Norms
The first stage evolves into the second stage of norm collision when new identity norms meet the requirements of newly unfolding international and domestic environments. Even though international norms are posited to evolve directly from the stage of norm emergence to norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), identity norms are destined to undergo the stage of collision since, unlike international norms, any shifts in identity norms are detected by domestic groups with opposing identities in an early stage, thus creating a heated discourse on the national scale. Such international norms as human rights and protection of medical personnel in battlefields represent noble causes without much bearing on individual actors’ well-being. In contrast, the shift of identity norms leads to the deprivation of vested interests and privileges enjoyed by the ruling class of a state that dwelled in the formerly predominant identity norms, and heralds the emergence of a new leadership armed with new identity norms.

Structural or domestic shocks loosen actors’ commitments to existing identities and norms, providing ‘political capital for the proponents of change within a political system’ (Kowert and Legro 1996: 473). At this stage, states are obliged to seek new identity norms and reconfigure their national interests reflecting the new realities. Since a changing international environment offered a window of opportunity to policy entrepreneurs (Checkel 1997), the stage of norm collision started on the Korean Peninsula with the crumbling of the Cold War template. In South Korea, opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, and intellectuals closely associated with him, founded the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation for the Asia-Pacific Region and the Forum of Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific in 1994 to conduct joint research on national reconciliation (Kim D.J. 1997). In the Soviet Union, the political, ideological and moral crises of the overstretched empire forced state elites to modify their preferences and interests (Herman 1996; Checkel 1997), laying the ground for the collision of competing identity norms vis-à-vis the West from the final years of the Brezhnev regime. In particular, the intellectual community, primarily those belonging to the Institute of the World Economy and World Politics, played important roles in offering a radically different framework of interpretations for Soviet foreign policy, which did not project the West as an enemy (Checkel 1997; Herman 1996).

At this stage, it is still too early for new norms to achieve dominance over the
established norms. The domestic society starts exhibiting the phenomenon of 'norm lag', since a majority of individuals are still guided by the established identity norms as dictated by the old structure, such as the Cold War template, despite their search for new standards of behaviour. As Sunstein (1997: 37) argues, individuals have little control over normative change, thus requiring the intervention of a government.

Activist Government. In some cases, the stage of norm collision could be divided into two phases. The initially murky phase of norm collision enters into a rather dynamic phase, when a political group with new identity norms takes power or the incoming power elite accepts new identity norms. In the other cases, the two phases are merged into one, if an activist government starts norm entrepreneurship immediately with the emergence of a new social setting, such as the end of the Cold War or domestic crises. For example, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) kicked off the Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) soon after the end of the Cold War and managed to establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992. In other cases, the inauguration of an activist government could be delayed, as President Kim took power more than 10 years after the end of the Cold War. Also in the Soviet Union, the policy shifts started when President Gorbachev came into power in 1985, although the pressures for the introduction of the New Thinking had been present since the final years of the Brezhnev era (Herman 1996: 277).

After the inauguration of an activist government with new identity norms, 'norm bandwagons' take place, as individuals feel freer to reject old norms (Sunstein 1997: 38). The evolution into the stage of norm cascade, however, is an uphill battle for an activist government because the society remains polarized between opposing identity communities for the time being, and social groups subscribing to the established identity norms are all-out to protect their vested interests stemming from those norms. Unlike the dynamics of international norms, the roles of norm entrepreneurs and organizational platforms are played by dissidents and opposition political groups in the first phase of identity norm collision and by state elites and statecraft in the second phase. President Kim and his followers, armed with ideas suggesting a clear roadmap, could remain steadfast to the course they had initially set, playing the role of an activist government, while the Clinton administration’s efforts to engage North Korea were subject to close scrutiny and opposition from the Congress, which virtually terminated the life of fledgling identity norms.

As trust-building is one of the most important variables in forming a common identity, the activist government is required to maintain consistency in its policy making
and implementation processes. In the past, South Korean presidents had taken office vowing to forge better relations with North Korea but backed away whenever they encountered troubles caused by the isolated regime or opposition by the domestic constituents. Even though an activist government vows to maintain consistency, it is almost impossible to remain consistent in every contact and negotiation with the target state. The Kim administration also showed tactical inconsistencies and oscillations, which hampered the progress of identity shifts.\(^9\)

In order to change norms on the domestic front, an activist government could use various means, such as education and persuasion (Sunstein 1997: 56). In fact, President Kim and his advisors did not spare efforts to convince South Koreans that there was no other feasible option than the Sunshine Policy in mellowing North Korea's attitude towards the South (Kim 2002; Moon 2001; Kwon 2000; MOU 2000; MOU 2003).\(^10\) Rather than resorting to 'arguing'\(^11\) in changing people's mind in a polarized society, the Kim administration tried to 'persuade'\(^12\) the public by making use of their privileged institutional platform.

On the inter-state level, however, a social process, which is able to create a communicative environment, is more important than the framing of specific messages

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\(^9\) Because of its comprehensive and proactive nature and its aim of bringing about sweeping changes in North Korea, the Sunshine Policy could not appeal to the North Korean leadership at first (Suh 2002; Choi 2001; Park H.J. 2001; Paik 2000). Against the wishes of South Korean policymakers, the first inter-Korean official dialogue, held in Beijing in April 1998, ruptured because North Korea, sceptical of South Korea's intentions, declined to make a commitment to the exchange of separated families in spite of South Korea's willingness to offer a large-scale shipment of fertilizer (Chung S.H. 2001). Since it was the first official dialogue, the South Korean government also stuck to the principle of strict reciprocity, losing a valuable chance to engage the Pyongyang regime (Lee W.S. 2003). Later, the Kim government switched its tactics from strict reciprocity to flexible reciprocity to pave the way for more inter-Korean contacts.

\(^10\) Discursive dynamics, such as the employment of the Aesop Fable's metaphor 'sunshine', plays a significant role in motivating the public to embrace new ideas, thus making contesting discourses and policies unacceptable over time. The frequent use of the term, \(\text{chŏnggyŏngbŭi}\) or the separation of economy from politics, also won a commanding position in the inter-Korean discourse, which will be analyzed in detail in Chapter Six. For the effect of discourse, see Price (1997).

\(^11\) 'Arguing' draws upon Habermas (1984)' theory of 'communicative action', defined as a process in which people interact to respond to the crisis of modern society failing to meet individual needs and come to reach a reasoned consensus on common actions to address the ills created by modern society. According to Risse (2004: 288), 'Arguing constitutes a learning mechanism by which actors acquire new information, evaluate their interests in light of new empirical and moral knowledge, and – most importantly – can reflexively and collectively assess the validity claims of norms and standards of appropriate behaviour'. Also see Risse (2000). Nevertheless, Habermas's theory, based on the notion of rationality, presupposes and emphasizes the role of consensus, while neglecting the 'politics of difference' that draws attention to the marginalized identity groups of the society.

\(^12\) The mission of norm entrepreneurs is 'persuasion', defined as a process by which 'agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 914). The key tool for persuasion is to craft a 'frame' used to 'fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems' (Barnett 1999: 25). Also see Checkel (2001).
Therefore, an activist government needs to create social and institutional frameworks leading to the increase of the domestic public’s positive interaction with those from the target state. As an activist government, the Kim administration promoted cross-border exchange and cooperation by streamlining and abolishing practices hampering interaction. It championed such new identity norms as ‘more contacts’, ‘more dialogue’ and ‘more cooperation’ to create the social setting for South Koreans’ identity shifts and North Korea’s voluntary behavioural change (MOU 2003: 36). In the course of increasing interactions, both sides became convinced that they were no longer enemies, a realization that opened up the possibility of building a common identity.

In the second phase of norm collision, new identity norms cause the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance by clashing with the existing norms and institutions. In the life cycle of international norms, norm violators suffer from cognitive dissonance in the stage of cascade, which leads them to change their attitude and behaviour in search of self-esteem and conformity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). As far as identity norms are concerned, however, it is appropriate to view cognitive dissonance as taking place in the stage of norm collision rather than in the stage of cascade, owing to the early detection of state policy shifts by domestic groups with opposing identities. Therefore, new identity norms, promoted by state elites in the form of state policies, cause individuals, who cling to the established identity norms, to suffer from cognitive dissonance even before the tipping point, which is the threshold between norm emergence and cascade.

**Stage 3: Norm Cascade**

The third stage of norm cascade, defined as a stage of ‘rapid shifts toward new norms’ (Sunstein 1997: 38), unfolds as the enemy state starts to abandon its antagonistic attitude in response to an activist government’s successful norm entrepreneurship. A majority of individuals change their identities vis-à-vis the enemy state, which in turn leads to a surge in mutual exchange and cooperation. Norm cascade is not a unilateral process limited to one state, but an interactive one between the two former adversaries. Attitudinal changes are motivated through close interactions and parallel reform of each other’s images and policies. In inter-Korean relations, the historic summit between President Kim and Chairman Kim in June 2000 marked the watershed of bilateral relations, or a tipping point, which caused ramifications of multi-level dialogue and cooperation. As the summit brought profound changes in inter-Korean relations with new institutions set in motion and new interests vested in new interests groups positively identifying North Korea, Moon (2001: 316) argues that a return to the old
way of doing business is politically and morally unthinkable and unacceptable. In the Soviet Union, the Gorbachev administration’s unilateral elimination of nuclear weapons, withdrawal of troops from East Germany and toleration of the collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe received a favourable reception in the United States and other Western states, creating a momentum for a norm cascade. Russians were convinced in terms of redefined national interests and worldview that the motherland was no longer an enemy of the Western world, but an important part of it (Herman 1996).

As South Korea experienced troubles and setbacks, the process of losing an enemy was not easy for North Korea as well. The dilemma of the North Korean leadership, which had previously identified Kim as a democratic leader fighting dictators in South Korea, was exacerbated because Kim’s election as the South Korean President removed one of the major rationales for its propagandistic attacks on the South Korean government. The Pyongyang regime also feared that his election might fan a movement for democratization and power shifts in North Korea (Lee J.S. 2000). Despite its initial hesitation, North Korea started showing signs of emerging from its post-Cold War isolation, because its outlaw status plunged it to an endless cycle of military and economic crises and the Pyongyang leadership became convinced that the Sunshine Policy, unlike those of the previous South Korean governments, might help to ease its economic hardship and contribute to regime survival. Since identity shifts involve reciprocal steps by the former enemies, North Korea’s timely response to the Kim administration’s efforts to promote identity shifts in South Korean society was crucial in creating a positive domestic environment for inter-Korean rapprochement (Kim and Park 2001: 327; Kim and Yoon 1999: 108-112; KINU 2000a; KINU 2000b; Hwang 2000; Ku 2000). President Kim and his advisors pursued policies aimed at eliminating the structural templates of the Cold War such as ‘ideology, institution, and mind sets deeply embedded in the region’, eventually winning the hearts of North Korean leaders (Moon 2001: 305; Choi and Jung 2000).

One hazard in this stage of norm cascade is the possible occurrence of the phenomenon called ‘norm perturbation’.13 This phenomenon, which hampers the smooth progression of the identity norm life cycle, may take place when new identity norms face what has been identified as ‘structural interception’. This temporary regression to the Hobbesian structure, epitomized as fear and suspicion of each other, unfolds when states involved in the evolution of identity norms come to believe that the

13 The term, norm perturbation, was originally used to describe a simultaneous existence of different norms when an activist government makes efforts to change the existing norms by ‘seeding lots of pilot projects’ (New Yorker, 20-27 October 1997, pp. 170-181).
adoption of new identity norms is not readily translated into the realization of their state interests. Even though the possibility of structural interception is endemic in the process of identity shifts, it also depends on the propensity of a hegemonic power. For example, the United States as a polity requires the presence of an enemy as part of its identity creation process (Campbell 1992) or out of the need to maintain its military-industrial complex (Wendt 1999). Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union or North Korea does not meet the state interests of the United States or at least the sectarian interests of certain privileged groups in the United States, identity politics runs the risk of being hampered by the power politics of the hegemonic power. Since the presence of North Korea as a state attempting to develop nuclear weapons and missiles met the immediate interests of the Bush administration seeking to build a missile defence system, the resurgence of a North Korean nuclear weapons problem was seen by the South Korean leadership as a balancing act by the United States to deter the process of inter-Korean rapprochement leading to North Korea's resocialization into the international community. This phenomenon caused a heated debate among South Koreans about whom they believe themselves to be as a polity and whether they should remain docile in the arms of US patronage or break free and stay the nationalist course of integration. The progress of normative evolution also depends on whether an activist government could remain in power.

Nevertheless, as detailed in later chapters, this thesis finds that identity norms in the stage of cascade do not go loose overnight but wait for the arrival of a more favourable international environment. In some cases, the structural interception may offer a valuable opportunity to solidify the 'we' identity between former adversaries. In his research on the creation of a transnational identity among Italian city states in the mid-nineteenth century, Cronin (1999) found that the collective experiences of the city states during their fight against the intervening foreign power, the Austrian Hapsburgs, helped to create a new national identity among themselves and accelerate the Italian integration. In the case of Russia, the positive identification with the West suffered a temporary regression when President Boris Yeltsin warned of a looming 'cold war', which reflected Russians' trauma resulting from its weakened international status and internal conflicts over whether it could re-emerge as a master of its own fate (Hennan 1996). In this mature stage of collective identity formation, actors increasingly find themselves facing a common fate, which will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter

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14 Ironically, West Germany also had diplomatic troubles with the United States in the late 1970s when East-West relations deteriorated with Washington discarding the policy of detente. Chancellor Schmidt, who was committed to the principles of Ostpolitik, called for more US responsiveness to the 'good Brezhnev who is promoting détente and who needs our help' (Dunbabin 1994: 280).
Stage 4: Norm Internalization
The final stage of norm internalization comes in the form of the institutionalization of new identity norms vis-à-vis an enemy state. The established laws and regulations give way to new institutions reflecting their emerging friendship, partnership or brotherhood. South Koreans' identity norms, portraying North Korea as a partner or a brother, have not yet reached this stage partly because of the 'norm perturbation' identified in the previous stage. Whether they will reach this stage depends on how a norm cascade picks up momentum again, since internalization is located only at the extreme of a norm cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904). Meanwhile, Russia's integration with the global economy rendered obsolete 'the two-camp view' among Russians (Herman 1996: 275), a proof that new identity norms have reached the stage of internalization. Despite the painful restructuring process and economic troubles, Russia, a country which was vilified as the 'evil empire' by President Reagan in the 1980s, ended the twentieth century as 'a normal middle-income, capitalist economy' (Shleifer and Treisman 2004: 38). If so, what might be the driving force to make the identity norm cycle proceed to the phase of internalization? As constructivists have already found, consistent and strenuous entrepreneurship by policy elites in a favourable social setting is behind such successful identity shifts, as championed by norm entrepreneurs like Kim and Gorbachev.

2.2. The Inter-State Level: the status quo
The domestic level of comprehensive engagement, involving identity shifts, might be no more than a sand castle if it is not bolstered by a set of policy tools to maintain the status quo, because comprehensive engagement is basically a strategy implemented by a status quo power in order to ameliorate the behaviour of a target state. As soon as a status quo power takes coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, the conceptual framework of comprehensive engagement is seriously eroded. Therefore, the adoption of coercive measures is only a tactical choice to warn an enemy state against launching certain actions transgressing international norms. However, the status quo power, once on a path of comprehensive engagement, would find it hard to change its course of action, because the other two parameters of comprehensive engagement, identity shifts and integration, will impede it from deviating from the status quo trajectory. To outside observers familiar with the strategic mix of carrots and sticks, this intransigence in the choice of policy options makes comprehensive engagement, based on the dialectical
interaction of the three levels, look anomalous, if not totally abnormal. As comprehensive engagement is a process of building trust between adversaries, the maintenance of the status quo is the only possible strategic option. In fact, enforcing the status quo requires an adequate mix of incentives and punishments, as demonstrated in the international control of fissile materials or dual-use products through economic sanctions. However, the implementation of this approach is heavily inclined to the use of incentives rather than punishments, while coercive means are applied only to maintain the status quo principle.

On the part of the enemy state, if it takes over means to shatter the status quo, for example, nuclear weapons, this development heralds an end to the engagement option, because the other state or a group of the other states are no longer a status quo power or status quo powers. Nevertheless, the status quo does not change overnight, even though an enemy state obtained nuclear weapons. Although the decision on whether the status quo was broken should be made strategically, the simple possession of nuclear weapons does not change the overall constellation of power, given the overwhelming size of the status quo powers, some of which already possess a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, as illustrated by the recent cases of India and Pakistan. The decision over whether the status quo is still in shape is also heavily affected by the policy elites’ identities vis-à-vis the target state. As Wendt (1999: 255) put it, ‘Five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones’. Therefore, North Korea’s nuclear weapons, regardless of their number, are unlikely to pose imminent threats to the South, if the former is no longer an enemy to the latter, as illustrated in the previous section.

This new interpretation of national security, influenced heavily by the shifting identities vis-à-vis North Korea, led the South Korean policymakers to introduce new prescriptions for the trauma arising from North Korea’s declared possession of ‘nuclear deterrence’. For them, the North Korean nuclear weapons programme was not the target of a surgical strike, but an agenda in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, which could be traded with security guarantees and economic benefits (MOU 2003). As their identification of North Korea has been shifting from an enemy to a partner or a brother, South Korean policymakers were relieved of a perception of imminent threat and terror, which in turn made them rule out a military strike as a policy option, unlike Israelis who attacked and demolished a nascent Iraqi nuclear weapons site in 1981.

This section will elaborate on the importance of the status quo as a parameter of comprehensive engagement from a constructivist perspective and then identify a set of policy tools to maintain the status quo, namely deterrence, limited sanctions and
political dialogue.

2.2.1. A Constructivist Worldview
As demonstrated in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is not easy for a status quo power to renounce military options, when it came to believe that an enemy state was on a revisionist course by, for example, attempting to develop WMD. Morgenthau (1948) identified the fear of an adversary's potential military attack or steady but significant economic growth, which could be translated into military power in the future, as the main causes of war. Nevertheless, Wendt (1999: 261) differentiates enemy images into 'real' ones, as the Nazis were to the Jews, and 'chimeras', as the Jews were to the Nazis. In the case of 'chimeras', a sense of fear is not an adequate interpretation of realities, but the product of negative identification based on an ill-conceived worldview or enemy images. This section will draw on Wendt's structural constructivism to paint a worldview from a constructivist perspective and then refine his approach by introducing insight from the English School, mainly from Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, since Wendt's world remains impoverished despite his improvement of the neo-realist worldview. In fact, the English School was one of the main sources of inspiration for Wendt (ibid: 247) when he borrowed Wight (1991)'s metaphors of Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian structures. The aim of this section is to highlight why the status quo needs to be one of the key principles in strategies of comprehensive engagement for a status quo power, when it seeks to transform the dynamics of state-to-state relations from the Hobbesian culture of enmity to the Lockean culture of rivalry.

Questioning the neo-realist argument that the self-help system is prevalent in the international system, defined as anarchy, Wendt (1999) envisions three different structures of anarchy, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian, and explains how interests, norms and identities are internalized in each structure. Wendt (ibid: 247) argues that states in each structure view each other as enemies, rivals or friends, respectively, as a role determinant. Wendt (ibid: 270) concludes that the Westphalian system is not the Hobbesian structure because temporary regression to a Hobbesian condition occurs only when a powerful state, such as France (the Napoleonic Wars) and Germany (the rise of Hitler), had an internal revolution and jettisoned Lockean norms. Even in these examples, what those revisionist states wanted was the surrender of other states, not a war (ibid). According to Wendt, those states are also forced to comply with Hobbesian

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15 On the English School, see Wight (1991) and Bull (2002).
16 Anarchy, referring to a self-help system without any centralized authority, is an ambiguous term (Milner 1991). Wendt (1999: 141) uses the term, 'culture', defined as 'socially shared knowledge', to convey the same meaning as anarchy.
norms, because the interests of revisionist states lie in conquering other states.

In the Lockean anarchy, meanwhile, states recognize each other’s sovereignty as a right, thus turning it into an institution shared by many states (ibid: 280). Therefore, states behave in a status quo fashion toward each other even in the event of conflicts. Wars, motivated to conquer other states, are rare and, when they take place, other states tend to act in a collective manner to restore the status quo (World War II, the Korean War and the Gulf War) (ibid: 283). Hence, the deeply internalized sovereignty norms in the Westphalian system make states heavily biased toward the status quo (ibid).

Finally, friendship in the Kantian anarchy guides states to follow two rules: ‘(1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid)’ (ibid: 298). These two rules of friendship enable states to form ‘pluralistic security communities’ and ‘collective security’ (ibid). In the Lockean culture, states are prevented from conquering other states out of their respect for sovereignty, but under the system of pluralistic security communities, states are prevented from even attacking, partly because of deterrence or sanctions by status quo states against revisionists. If the Kantian culture is deeply internalized, ‘states identify each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own’ (ibid: 305). In this situation, international interests are their own national interests, thus generating other-help.

In spite of its rich philosophical and historical hue, Wendt’s systematic constructivism has been subject to criticism from fellow theorists. Ringmar (2001: 285) attacked Wendt’s constructivism as one-sided because the formation of identities is seen only from the perspective of the system, thus ignoring the fact that identity is a problem each state and each statesman has to grapple with. Wæver (1998: 94) noted:

If constructivism works from within instead, it can for instance try to explain how a concept like ‘Europe’ is stabilized by its inner connections to other – perhaps more powerful – ‘we-identities’ such as states and nations. This demands that one is open to the fact that multiple we-identities overlap.

Having considered the criticism that his structural constructivism runs the risk of reductionism, Wendt (1999: 156) stressed the concept of ‘supervenience’ as a non-causal, non-reductive relationship between structure and agency. According to Wendt (2004: 300), structure could be realized by many different states, but is still supposed to supervene on those states in this ‘asymmetric, one-way dependence’.
This dissertation draws on Wendt’s structural constructivism but departs from Wendt’s arguments that fall short of addressing the shifting identities of individual states and their potential impact on structure.\textsuperscript{17} Basically, Wendt’s three structures are ideal prototypes that cannot be operationalized in international politics in which the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian dynamics unfold simultaneously.\textsuperscript{18} When the United States invaded Iraq, for example, an invasion is a typical form of the Hobbesian dynamics, but Britain’s involvement in the war to fight the common enemy could be interpreted as a form of Kantian dynamics as a partner of collective security. At the same time, France, Germany and Russia remained as rivals sceptical of the legitimacy of the war, which is a form of Lockean dynamics.

Wendt (1999)’s claim that today’s world, the Westphalian system, is a Lockean culture, which might undergo an historically progressive transformation over time into the Kantian culture through, for example, collective identity formation, is as vague as Waltz (1979)’s argument that the international system is the Hobbesian anarchy throughout history. As Smith (2000: 160) pointed out, Wendt’s world is devoid of any process for the construction of agents, since his attention is focused on the structural level that is dominated by a single culture. Wendt also failed to pay due attention to the aforementioned multiple realization of different cultures on the structural level at the given time, while treating ‘structures of interaction’ between states as a description of the world from agents’ point of view.\textsuperscript{19}

In a departure from the neo-realist logic that anarchy has only a single logic of self-help, Wendt developed a sophisticated theory of social construction by envisioning three different anarchies and explaining how identities and norms are internalized in each anarchy. However, Wendt (ibid: 246)’s adherence to systematic theory forces him to regard states as given and argue that there is only one culture in a given structure at a given time in a parsimonious manner, precluding the possibility of the simultaneous existence of different cultures on the structural level. Most importantly, Wendt fails to explain the contemporary world by contending that this world is a predominantly Lockean world of rival states and the temporary regression to the Hobbesian world is

\textsuperscript{17} In this line of thought, see Smith (2000).
\textsuperscript{18} According to Wight (1977), the best example for the coexistence of the international system, international society and world society is the Greek city states. Basically, Greek cities form an international system because each city takes into account the behaviour of other cities before making decisions. However, the cities, at the same time, form an international society, as they are bound by common rules, interests and institutions under the pan-Hellenic order. Furthermore, the Greek city states are held together by a common culture, effectively forming a world society. For example, Persia was part of a single international system with Greek city states, but did not belong to the Greek international society. Also see Bull (2002: 14).
\textsuperscript{19} See Wendt (1999: 147).
exceptional and takes place only when powerful states dump Lockean norms. This observation exposes a sizeable fault line in interpreting the reality unfolding in the post-Cold War world, since it fails to account for the US's frequent military interventions worldwide and the prevalence of the self-help system on the part of the target states.

To better illustrate the simultaneous existence of different cultures on the structural level and offer a better analytical account of the configurations of the world at the turn of the 21st century, this section presents an imaginative map. On this map, shown in Figure 3.5, the world, lacking in a singular dynamics tantamount to a Kuhnian paradigm, is divided into three different zones, the realist zone, the realist/liberal zone, and the liberal zone, even though it does not posit that states, for example, belonging to the realist zone or the liberal zone, purely embody the ideals of political realism or liberalism. States in the realist/liberal zone are supposed to feature both tendencies almost evenly, but still with different proportions. This zoning is also compatible with Bull's (2002: 39) argument that the modern international system reflects all three of the elements singled out by Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian traditions, as it simultaneously represents the elements of war and struggle, trans-national solidarity, and cooperation.

Figure 3.5 Fractal World Map

Source: modified from a fractal in Edgar (1990: 77).
Therefore, the EU belongs to the liberal zone, while a majority of states in the world find themselves in the realist/liberal zone. This classification reflects the reality facing the contemporary world, as Keohane and Nye (1977) noted in their seminal work, *Power and Interdependence*, that most situations unfolding in this world fall somewhere between the two portraits drawn by realists and neo-liberal institutionalists. In this zoning, the United States belongs to the realist/liberal zone, since it is the main player acting in accordance with the rules of the international system, resorting to violence to resolve conflicts. At the same time, the United States is one of the most developed states maintaining close economic interdependence with the rest of the world, bolstered by a solid foundation of collective security. In the same vein, China and Russia belong to this zone, although their level of interdependence, which started with the end of the Cold War, is not mature. Meanwhile, a handful of states, including North Korea, belong to the realist zone. Insofar as those states form the realist zone, the Hobbesian culture is an endemic part of international life, as those belonging to the realist/liberal zone are tempted to resort to Hobbesian norms, as demonstrated in the US’s frequent military intervention in other states.

This map employs the metaphor of a mathematical theory, called fractal geometry\(^{20}\) to illustrate the simultaneous existence of Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures – in the world as a system, in a state as a unit belonging to the system and in an individual as an entity belonging to the unit. If we apply this theory to the explanation of international relations, as seen in this modified asymmetric fractal world map, the image of the international structure, which embodies Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures, is reflected in each state, or vice versa, thus meaning that every state possesses both realist and liberal features, although their proportions vary. On this fractal map, the black lines, forming endlessly repeated octagons, represent the demarcation of state boundaries or Hobbesian norms blocking interdependence between states and even clogging communication within a state. In a rather exaggerated manner, Europe is seen as an entity without borders,\(^{21}\) while North Korea appears completely clogged by

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\(^{20}\) According to Lauwerier (1991: Introduction xii), ‘Fractals are characterised by a kind of built-in self-similarity in which a figure, the motif, keeps repeating itself on an ever-diminishing scale. A good example is a tree with a trunk that separates into two branches, which in turn separate into two smaller side branches, and so on’. Efforts to introduce the concept of fractals to explain human society are underway in many fields. For more information, visit the Internet site, [http://www.geocities.com/arno_3/4/4-22.html](http://www.geocities.com/arno_3/4/4-22.html) (accessed on 30 December 2002).

\(^{21}\) Burton’s (1972: 43) ‘cobweb model’ of global structure is in full bloom in Europe, where ‘there are so many direct communications, or systems, that a world map which represented them would look like a mass of cobwebs superimposed on one another, strands converging at some points more than others and being concentrated between some points more than between others. The boundaries would be hidden from view’.
Hobbesian tendencies, evoking the image of a billiard ball. Hence, Europe is an anomaly in this predominantly Lockean world of rival states, while North Korea is a legacy of the Hobbesian world of the past. As it is a map of imagination, we can arbitrarily designate the big octagon in the centre as the United States or North America, or the vast territories combining Russia and China.

Even though it offered a fresh insight by recognizing the coexistence of the international system, international society and world society at the given time, the English School reached a rather premature conclusion that the whole world is an international system, siding with the realist thinkers. If we borrow Wight's (1977) metaphor of Greek city states, the unified Europe corresponds to a world society, while Europe and a majority of states outside Europe forms an international society as entities sharing common rules, interests and institutions. For example, they are the members of the WTO. Lastly, the whole world, which comprises North Korea, forms an international system, or the Hobbesian structure in Wendt's terms.

Anarchy is another name for chaos (Milner 1991: 69), but Waltz (1979) and Wendt (1999) presumes a single dynamics in a parsimonious manner, thus sacrificing the explanatory power of their perspectives. If there were only a single dynamics on the structural level, states have no reason to make strategic calculations over whether to use material power or enter into cooperation. In a nutshell, this dissertation finds it apt to conclude that the structure is not realized by a uniform culture but an amalgam of competing cultures that exist simultaneously at a given time. Since the structure supervenes on agents, it contains the attributes of those agents, which cannot be reducible to each agent. This argument of a multicultural structure does not preclude the possibility that a single culture could be dominant on the structural level at any given time. In fact, we are able to observe that there is a predominant culture, which is constantly challenged by the less potent cultures. The Lockean culture has become dominant after the end of the Cold War, but the culture of Lockean rivalry is genetically unstable since it finds itself somewhere on the enmity-friendship continuum and thus runs the risk of being degenerated into one extreme course, enmity or friendship. In this vein, Bull (2002: 50) recognized the existence of order in international society, but stressed that the order is 'precarious and imperfect'. In sum, the world we see does not

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In an international society, the minority rule and racial discrimination, which took the form of apartheid, is intolerable, as seen in the South African case. This shared norm prompted states to take sanctions against the Afrikaner-dominated South African government, an action that had apparently eroded their short-term strategic calculations and economic benefits. If we apply Klotz's (1995: 19) argument on 'autonomous systemic norms', such as property rights or racial equality, to this case, international society's response to the South African policy could be interpreted as a competition between two norms: sovereignty and racial equality.

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feature homogeneity, but only embodies a dominant culture, buttressed by such an institution as sovereignty in the Lockean culture. Since it is only a dominant institution, it is challenged by Hobbesian tendencies at some times and Kantian dynamics at others. As proof of this argument, we can witness NATO's military intervention in Kosovo or the European integration process. Nevertheless, the dominant culture is born, maintains its status, and loses its influence through what Wendt (1999: 313-69) defined as a process of structural change, highlighted by 'complex learning' and internalization of norms and identities.

Drawing a map is an effort to harness reality into the frame of time and space. In other words, it shows what the world looks like at a given time and gives a hint as to how the world will undergo transformation. History tells us that the maps, drawn at the time of the Westphalian system or the Cold War, have different configurations. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China have apparently changed the configurations of the map, as they could be interpreted as political events which expanded the realist/liberal zone dramatically. In this vein, the configuration of the three zones in Figure 3.5 is a feature that was captured when the status quo is in shape in this predominantly Lockean world. When the United States invaded Iraq and like-minded states joined the war in 2003, the realist zone became temporarily enlarged to engulf all the warring states, turning the Hobbesian culture into the dominant feature of this particular world map.

This form of theorizing could bridge the gap in the discourse between structure and agency. While maintaining the respective qualities of structure and agency, this theorizing makes room for dynamic interaction and inter-permeability between them. Since structure is represented by a dominant culture at a given time, the dominant culture constrains the behaviour of individual agents but cannot completely control their possible deviation.

Given all these features of structure and agency, historical transformation could not be characterized as Wendt (1999)'s linear progression from the Hobbesian structure to the Kantian structure via the Lockean structure, but as the transformation of proportions and qualities among the three cultures existing simultaneously on the structural level, with the Hobbesian culture losing the share of the past and the Kantian culture gaining vigour over time.

A map on the three different zones might still be a simplified view of the world with multiple characters. However, this thesis finds it efficacious to illustrate the global}

21 In contrast to 'simple learning' that results in behavioural change, 'complex learning' constructs identities and interests. See Nye (1987).
distribution of three major forces: material capabilities, ideas and institutions (Cox 1981). The different proportions of both realist and liberal tendencies mean that each state or zone has different identities, which are in turn expressed in the form of realist or liberal tendencies on the structural level. Wendt (1999: 170) notes: 'To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation, and as such the concept of identity fits squarely into the belief side of the desire plus belief equation'. Therefore, identities can correspond to regime types, like capitalist states, fascist states or monarchical states (ibid: 226). In other words, fascist or monarchical states show strong realist tendencies, while capitalist states exhibit inclinations towards interdependence in a liberal manner or towards dependency in a Marxist manner in which their aim might be the exploitation of those in the periphery. Ruggie (2000: 34) explains the way each state with a given identity interacts at the international level by noting that the world is a structure made up of 'socially knowledgeable and competent actors who are subject to constraints that are in part material, in part institutional'. Even though individual states could feature distinct behavioural patterns vis-à-vis a foreign state, their membership in each zone and internalized identities and norms also serve as a standard of behaviour. As an expression of their collective identities, for example, European states, which find themselves in the liberal zone, are less inclined to use coercive measures against such states as Iraq and North Korea in comparison with the United States.

If the United States and a majority of states in the realist/liberal zone resort to forcible means to resolve conflicts of interests, the whole world might return to the Hobbesian culture. If the European experiment eventually succeeds and other states follow in the footsteps of Europe, this phenomenon, once considered an anomaly, could take over the status of quasi-universality. It might be interesting to witness who will eventually win the bet between Keohane (1993: 297), who predicted the success of the European integration project, and Mearsheimer (1990), who warned the world of a dawning crisis in his famous article, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War'.

Any given structure is subject to transformation since interactions between agents belonging to the different cultures create what Bull (2002) defined as 'tension'. We can witness the prevalent tension between the Lockean culture and the Hobbesian culture. Though smaller, there are also some forms of tension between the Lockean culture and the Kantian culture, as demonstrated by one between the United States and some EU states, such as France and Germany, which were generally reluctant to mobilize force to resolve the Iraqi issue despite the pressure of the United States. When
the United States embarked on the path towards war with Iraq in 2003 in an ultimate expression of its material power.\textsuperscript{24} Europe, the liberal zone, witnessed not only ‘a great divide’ in its relations with the realist/liberal zone, represented by the United States, (\textit{New York Times}, 18 February 2003), but also a serious division within its own zone into Old and New Europes (\textit{New York Times}, 13 February 2003).\textsuperscript{25}

Despite its normative supremacy in this predominantly Lockean world, the logic of the status quo has frequently been challenged by the United States resorting to coercive actions to address conflicts worldwide and by Europe seeking to solidify the grand scheme, similar to Burton (1986)’s ‘global society’. Given the dominant but still precarious status of Lockean norms and the potent residue of the Hobbesian norms of the past, this dissertation argues that the status quo principle vis-à-vis an enemy state is a desirable option for a status quo power, since it is crucial for the creation of an interstate environment for the target state’s voluntary change and integration with the rest of the world. In this line of thought, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s subsequent economic interdependence with the Western world are defined as a salient example of the simultaneous realization of this dissertation’s twin ideas of the status quo and integration on the basis of identity shifts. This approach is similar to the ‘gradualist, non-revolutionary methods’ taken by the Fabians in the process of promoting social democracy in Britain (Britain 1982: 269).

\subsection*{2.2.2. Tools for Maintaining the Status Quo}

The aforementioned worldview is the guiding principle in devising policy tools to implement the politico-military level of comprehensive engagement aimed at maintaining the status quo. The most decisive way of settling disputes with enemy states is the mobilization of force, because they are not prone to cave in to the outside diplomatic pressure or coercive means short of war. This was what the international

\textsuperscript{24} This shift of US policies from containment to dominance was clearly seen in President George W. Bush’s 31-page strategic statement to the Congress, titled ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (\textit{Washington Post}, 21 September 2002). The report called for the unilateral, preemptive use of force to protect the United States from potential attacks by ‘rogue states’, such as Iraq and North Korea. In spite of US assertiveness, the trans-Atlantic schism is partly due to the relative decline of American hegemony over other states (Kennedy 1988; Calleo 1987; Bell 1976; Rosecrance 1976), especially over key European states, although the United States sustains its relative preponderance in four structures of the world economy: security, production, monetary and knowledge structures (Strange 1987; Gill 1990). Since Gaddis (2003: 175) argues that ‘authority relies on legitimacy’ and ‘hegemony rests upon a foundation of consent’, the Bush administration has apparently sacrificed its authority and hegemony in its pursuit of a questionable form of ‘justice’.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{The New York Times} (4 June 2003) quoted the director of a survey firm, which conducted a poll in 21 countries, as saying: ‘The war had widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era — the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance’.
community witnessed during the 1990-1 Gulf War and the following war against Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, the notion of comprehensive engagement rules out the use of military action as a means to resolve conflicts, since there are other ways to serve the same purpose. In fact, the questions of legitimacy and civilian suffering arose over the use of military force even against a despotic leader, like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Sandole (1988: 39) argued that it would be in the best joint interests of all actors to pursue cooperative resolution of their conflicts, given the high costs of destructive conflict. Rosecrance (1986: 88) noted that the contemporary world’s destructive power had made large-scale territorial ambitions an impossible strategy, unlike the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that represented the ‘apex of the military political system’.

Then what are the next possible means of preventing crises and maintaining the status quo? Snyder and Diesing (1977: 10) note that the ‘central problem of crisis statesmanship is how to achieve an optimum blend of coercion and accommodation in one’s strategy, a blend that will both avoid war and maximize one’s gains or minimize one’s losses’. Nevertheless, the so-called ‘carrot-and-stick’ policy, used by the South Korean government during President Kim Young-sam’s five-year tenure (1993-8), was ineffective in changing North Korea’s behaviour, sporadically heightening crises on the Korean Peninsula. The attitude of North Korea or Iraq shows that these states are particularly resilient against the threat of force even by a superpower like the United States.

Then comes a peaceful conflict resolution based on the principle of the status quo, although this approach always takes time and its feasibility is constantly under close scrutiny and criticism by hard-liners. Nevertheless, the status quo principle, if pursued jointly with identity shifts and integration, could serve as an important pillar for strategies of comprehensive engagement. In fact, the maintenance of the status quo is an interactive process, because South Korea’s efforts to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula are not feasible unless the Pyongyang regime makes equally strenuous efforts to survive as an independent state. Taking into account North Korea’s identity, as well as regime durability, South Korean policymakers sought ways to establish a structure of peace as part of their efforts to guarantee the coexistence of the two Koreas without a military crisis (Moon 2001). Basically, the status quo power needs to adopt measures to thwart any revisionist action by the enemy state, while endeavouring to alleviate its security concerns that it might be absorbed in the course of expanding interactions. This section will identify three tools for the maintenance of the status quo: deterrence, limited sanctions and political dialogue. By preventing crises and
'transforming' conflicts, these tools help to forge an international environment for the resocialization of enemy states.

**Deterrence.** As comprehensive engagement is defined as a policy employed by a status quo power, any significant change in power constellations, shattering the status quo, leads automatically to an end to engagement. Therefore, Neville Chamberlain’s policy towards Nazi Germany was not called engagement, but appeasement, because Britain was not a status quo power both economically and militarily, which could enforce the rules of the game vis-à-vis the Third Reich. Even though a state, which embarks on strategies of comprehensive engagement, enjoys the position of a status quo power, any engagement policy must start on the basis of a strong sense of deterrence. Without any strong commitment to its interests and a clear-cut warning against any action infringing on its interests, the status quo power might give a wrong signal by employing strategies of engagement and invite an enemy state to launch an attack to shatter the status quo, as Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 against US interests (George 1993: 71-8).

In implementing comprehensive engagement vis-à-vis an enemy state, therefore, deterrence is the bedrock for the maintenance of the status quo. As North Korea is basically a revisionist state dissatisfied with the current status quo, the outside world needed to implement a wide range of measures, employing both military power and psychological warfare. As seen in the inter-Korean exchange of fire between naval ships in the West Sea in 1999 and 2002, analyzed in detail in Chapter Six, the South Korean military needed to thwart territorial encroachment by North Korea by military means, an incident that demonstrated the principle of in-kind response and specific reciprocity in the event of military provocation (Moon 2001). At the same time, the South Korean government demonstrated its strong alliance with the United States based on the Mutual Defence Treaty and held joint military exercises (ibid). In this vein, the Sunshine Policy’s first principle, ‘no tolerance of armed aggression’, is aimed at conveying a strong message of deterrence to North Korea, because the signalling of its willingness to employ military means to keep its interests is one of the key requirements of deterrence (KINU 2000b; George and Smoke 1974). In the course of exercising deterrent measures, however, the status quo power is required to act in order not to escalate an isolated warfare into a major one.

Nevertheless, it is hard to take an optimal level of deterrent measures, since states suffer from a wide range of predicaments and security dilemmas such as fear.

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26 In most cases, conflicts are not resolved, but transformed (Miall et al. 2000: 21).
suspicion and relative gains dilemma, imposed by an anarchical international order. Logically, the first step for a status quo power to take to transform an enemy state is to ameliorate its dilemmas, although realist theorists are unlikely to agree with this idea, because they believe these dilemmas are intrinsic among states in the anarchical international system.\textsuperscript{27} North Korea is a state gripped by fear of a possible outside attack because of its dwindling state capabilities in both military and economic terms. In this situation, the primary goal of the North Korean government was not political domination or economic growth, but survival in an adverse environment (Kang 1998: 257). On the basis of this observation, the Kim Dae-jung government did not give much significance to North Korea's military provocations and maintained its economic engagement in order to avert possible collapse.\textsuperscript{28} The Kim government focused on preventing a crisis since it also took into account the fact that North Korea's military firepower was deadly enough to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire' anytime it wants.\textsuperscript{29} Once a dispute escalates into a crisis, it believed North Korea, caught in a security dilemma, might be forced to resort to military means, which are simple and clear-cut, rather than any other options. At the same time, it could not be ruled out that hard-liners in South Korea might resort to military means, which might escalate tension in an irreversible manner.

In fact, South Koreans also suffered from similar security dilemmas. Han (1998: 125) argued that inter-Korean relations represented a textbook case of security dilemmas. The five major security agendas that have to be addressed by South Korea are the prevention of war; the prevention of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons; the implementation of policies addressing North Korea's fear of collapse; conventional arms control; and multilateral arms control and security cooperation (ibid). Jervis (1976: 424) pointed out that states regard other states as more centralized and calculating than they are, while perceiving others' actions as autonomous rather than reactive to their own actions. In the past, South Korean policymakers had this perception of North Korea and took strong counteraction.\textsuperscript{30} Even though it is highly

\textsuperscript{27} Jervis (1976: 82) noted: 'The security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated'.
\textsuperscript{28} In his book, Korean Endgame (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Selig Harrison shows how the ill-based scenario of North Korea's possible collapse paralyzed US policy. In fact, an absolute majority of publications predicted North Korea's imminent collapse after the death of North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, but recent books, like Harrison's, started to foresee North Korea's gradual opening up and transformation, which will help the regime to survive the current economic hardship.
\textsuperscript{29} The threat was issued by Pak Yong-su, chief North Korean delegate, during an inter-Korean dialogue in 1994, escalating tension on the Korean peninsula.
\textsuperscript{30} One of the cases is the 1996 North Korean submarine infiltration into South Korean waters. See the opposing views at the websites, www.koreascope.org/english/sub/2/nk10_7.htm and www.kimsoft.com/korea/nk-sub.htm (accessed 15 August 2003).
risky to mistake an enemy for a friend, but not so costly to take a friend for an enemy, Jervis (ibid) argues that the cost of overestimating the other state’s hostility is also high. As a prescription for this dilemma, he (ibid: 82) stressed that actors should care about the way the others feel and make efforts to develop trust for mutual benefit by noting: ‘The first step must be the realization, by at least one side but preferably by both, that they are, or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires’.

Then, how should states deal with weapons possessed by an enemy state? Jervis (1976: 83) argues that if each side is freed from its unwarranted fear of the other, it is permissible to maintain some level of arms in order to grant both sides a reasonable means for deterrence. On the Korean Peninsula, permitting North Korea to keep its conventional weapons is inevitable for mutual deterrence, although its WMD should be traded for the outside world’s secure guarantees (Kim K.N. 2002a). In fact, North Korea’s admittance of a nuclear weapons programme could be seen as a response to President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address in January 2002, when North Korea, Iraq and Iran were designated as states constituting the ‘axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world’.

As analyzed in Chapter Seven, North Korea is believed to have spurred its secret nuclear weapons programme in violation of the 1994 agreement with the United States, since it had no option but to resort to the self-help system in the face of threats of an attack by a superpower which denies its existence. Harrison (2002: 277-8) claims: ‘The North is likely to accept limits on its missile program only in return for changes in aspects of the U.S. conventional military presence that it regards as threatening, and the willingness of the United States to modify its nuclear posture will critically affect whether and when Pyongyang gives up its nuclear option’. Noting that the real question is not what North Korea will do, Harrison (ibid: 270-71) advised the United States to give up its threat to use nuclear weapons against North Korea as a policy option first, thus inducing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. In this vein, the Kim administration did not pay much attention to the reduction of conventional weapons, but focused on the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programmes.

Limited Sanctions. Engagement does not rule out the imposition or threat of sanctions (Suettinger 2000: 28; Reissner 2000: 46). Since certain types of economic cooperation, including the export of militarily sensitive technologies, can quickly change a military balance (Liberman 1996), embargoes on such items as dual-use goods

are an important tool for the maintenance of the status quo. As observed in Chapter Two, the United States imposed a total embargo on exports to North Korea right after the breakout of the Korean War. A wide range of sanctions, under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act, had been in force for five decades, virtually isolating North Korea from the international community. It was in 1999 when President Clinton lifted restrictions on trade, travel and banking against North Korea in return for North Korea's declared moratorium on ballistic missile tests. Despite the lifting of some sanctions, Rennack (2003) said that the US administration kept other sanctions against North Korea for four primary reasons: '(1) North Korea is seen as posing a threat to U.S. national security; (2) North Korea is designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism; (3) North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government; and (4) North Korea has been found by the State Department to have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'. Under the criteria, the United States restricts 'some trade, denies trade in dual-use goods and services, limits foreign aid, and opposes entry into or support from international financial institutions' (ibid).

Since his inauguration, President Kim requested the United States to lift economic sanctions against North Korea in a consistent manner to pave the way for the North's resocialization into the international community (Park K.Y. 2001: 73). In fact, Kim was responding to North Korea, which criticized the US government for inflicting the current economic debacle through its decades-long imposition of economic sanctions. Even though it had raised no objection to the imposition of sanctions on the trade of military products and dual-use goods, the Kim government called on the United States to lift restrictions to facilitate North Korea's entry into such international financial organizations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), but to no avail (Moon 2001: 312).

The Kim government's position is based on the conviction that the use of economic sanctions against the world's arguably most closed economy could not bring about any tangible effects (Elliott: 1997: 100). The problem has been further compounded as North Korea has been ruled by an authoritarian government, which is less responsive to the pain inflicted by economic sanctions than a democratic government (ibid: 106). In particular, the United States exhausted almost all possible leverages as it has virtually banned all trade and financial ties with North Korea since the Korean War. Therefore, any US attempt to impose economic sanctions requires international cooperation, particularly support from North Korea's neighbouring countries. However, China has been very reluctant to join other countries in introducing
sanctions against its socialist ally (Kim S. 1999). One exceptional step was its three-day suspension of oil shipment to North Korea in March 2003 in an attempt to press the North to agree on a three-way dialogue to diffuse the nuclear weapons tension (New York Times, 16 April 2003). However, it was a symbolic step and China still remains the most recalcitrant state, as far as the imposition of economic sanctions is concerned.

The effectiveness of a sanctions strategy depends on what North Korea really wants by attempting to develop nuclear weapons. If North Korean leader Kim wants to use them as a bargaining chip in its endeavour to revive its moribund economy, a combination of carrots and sticks will work to enlist his cooperation in resolving the nuclear issue. If he wants to keep nuclear weapons as a vital means of deterrence, however, any attempt to impose sanctions will only expedite the North’s secret programme (Elliott: 1997: 109). Therefore, the resolution of the nuclear weapons problem is possible only through the alleviation of North Korea’s security concerns.

**Political Dialogue.** Once deterrence and limited sanctions are in force, the next step is to launch dialogue, both official and unofficial. In fact, previous South Korean governments managed to open dialogue with the North Korean regime, but could not maintain it to produce tangible results. To forge an atmosphere for dialogue, the status quo power needs to reshape its attitude towards the enemy state. One remarkable step the Kim administration took before and during dialogue was to show respect to the Pyongyang regime. According to Wendt (1999: 171), ‘Actors learn to be enemies, for example, by being treated by others in ways that do not recognize their right to life and liberty’. Meanwhile, positive image emerges from mutual respect and recognition, especially through the recognition of sovereignty, which means a state has an equal status in the eyes of other states (ibid: 237). Prior to the inter-Korean summit in June 2000, President Kim kept praising North Korean Chairman Kim as a reliable leader. For example, Kim stated in an interview with Japan’s Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) on 9 February 2000: ‘I understand that Kim Jong Il, general secretary of North Korea Workers’ Party, has good judgment and insight as a leader’ (Park K.Y. 2001: 85). The comment, made on the eve of an announcement on the inter-Korean summit, apparently helped North Korea to change its attitude in a reciprocal manner and to pursue its course of dialogue with the South. Even in the middle of a controversy over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme, President Kim called Kim Jong-il the ‘most intelligent’ leader (Financial Times, 25 January 2003).

Political dialogue, especially at the highest levels, is important because North Korea is a state that fits nicely into the realist mould of a unitary actor which denies
penetration by the outside world. Although Scott (1965) noted as long ago as the mid-1960s that states are being penetrated to an unprecedented degree in the contemporary world, the North Korean 'billiard ball' is not the case. It is true that some forms of penetration are taking place in North Korea, as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly engaging in humanitarian activities to feed starving North Koreans. However, it is hard to define it as a genuine form of penetration because these activities are under tight state control.

Because of North Korea's closed state system, the most appropriate option is to open the highest-level channel of dialogue, preferably a summit meeting, which would reduce the 'ratification' process of Putnam's (1988) 'two-level game.' Former US ambassador to South Korea, Donald Gregg, who called North Koreans 'rank-conscious', supports this approach. Gregg cited a North Korean vice minister during a meeting in Pyongyang as saying, 'you know, you and I get along very well, but you and I can't solve these problems. It's got to be somebody at a much higher level'.

A summit is not merely a meeting between top leaders, since the various stages of organizing a summit, including preparations, the meeting itself and the follow-up process, involve multiple contacts and negotiations between the two sides (Han Sung-joo 2001: 192-3).

It is also recommended to expand channels of dialogue to enable the state to express its possible grievances through dialogue, not through violent means.

Therefore, South Korean policymakers put priority on the opening of government-level dialogue, preferably a summit, rather than approaching the other sectors of North Korean society (Levin and Han 2002). They showed a lack of enthusiasm over the resumption of the idling four-party peace talks, which involve assistant minister-level officials from North and South Korea, the United States and China. The Kim government kept the process of organizing the summit secret partly because of the possible intervention of the powerful opposition party and media organizations, as well as the neighbouring powers. In fact, the success of inter-Korean

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32 According to Putnam, there are two levels in negotiations: international and domestic. The term 'ratification' means the domestic process in which proposed international deals are approved or rejected by the pertinent domestic constituents.

33 This interview with Gregg was conducted by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for the Council on Foreign Relations on March 7, 2003. It is available from www.cfr.org (accessed 15 April 2003).

34 In a reply to a lawmaker at the National Assembly, Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong said, 'The four-party talks had been held a few years ago when there was no channel of dialogue with North Korea. Now that South and North Korea operate various channels of dialogue, I don't find it useful' (Yonhap News Agency, 30 December 2002). The four-party talks, aimed at replacing the current Armistice Agreement, which ended the Korean War, with a peace treaty, was once lauded as the sole channel of strategic dialogue between the United States and China, although the topic of the meeting was confined to the replacement of the Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.
dialogue, just like inter-German dialogue before unification, depended on how to maintain secrecy regarding details of agreements because the South needed to save the face of the North (KINU 2000b: 75).

2.3. The Global Level: integration
All major wars in the past, including the Napoleonic wars or World War II, were provoked by revisionist states which, dissatisfied with the status quo, pursued territorial ambitions. However, the post-Cold War era, which witnessed the triumph of democracy and the market economy, has more or less tamed states' territorial ambitions and motivated them to pursue economic ambitions, thus creating a world of close interdependence and integration. Even in the case of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration endeavoured to foster democracy and the market economy and devise an effective 'exit strategy' rather than to prolong territorial occupation.

As argued in the previous section, integration is closely linked to the progress of the other two levels of comprehensive engagement: the status quo and identity shifts. As the ultimate goal of comprehensive engagement is the enemy state’s resocialization into the global community, the process requires the construction of a structure of peace to induce a fundamental change in the enemy state (Han Sung-joo 2001).

The schemes of integration by liberals and constructivists converge in their emphasis on how state or regional identities affect the process. Ikenberry (2001a: 402) said that the expansion of economic, political and security bonds would help to create a sense of common political identity, thus facilitating interdependence and integration. Wendt (1999: 364-5) hinted at the convergence of liberalism and his theories in explaining interdependence, although he noted that liberal democracy is not the only pathway to a Kantian culture. Unlike realists, who believe interdependence might increase a state's vulnerability, liberals and constructivists believe that interdependence helps to foster a common identity. In sum, the two theories are mutually complementary in explaining the creation of an interdependent entity with a common identity.

However, the process of engaging an enemy state is not analogous to industrialized states' efforts to create a well-articulated regime or institution. Therefore, the initial stage of integration with an enemy state is possible through the asymmetrical exploitation of cheap labour or natural resources, i.e., oil in Iraq or tourism in North Korea, or in the form of economic assistance or compensation for the dismantlement of WMD. These economic and humanitarian actions are analogous to what Ikenberry (2001a) describes as efforts to 'open up' and 'tie down' an enemy state.

Since this dissertation deals with strategies of engagement with an enemy state,
regime and integration theories have only a limited explanatory power. Nevertheless, many theorists analyzed inter-Korean economic cooperation from the perspectives of integration theories. Therefore, this section will first review integration theories and constructivists’ contributions to them before identifying the tools for an enemy state’s integration into the global economy.

2.3.1. Integration Theories
Since many scholars defined the Sunshine Policy as a functionalist or neo-functionalist approach aimed at integrating the two Koreas (Moon 1999; Kim and Yoon 1999; Ku 2000; Park K.Y. 2001), this section will first review the theory of functionalism. Preached by David Mitrany, functionalism departs from the conventional approach to political conflicts and prevention of war, since it did not try to approach war and peace directly by ‘organizing around the points of national conflict’, but indirectly by binding together the common interests of the states involved (Claude 1971: 380). In principle, functionalism recommends the logical course of taking up the less difficult job first before tackling the harder ones. In Mitrany’s (1966: 38) terms, functionalism is an approach which could ‘overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated’. As Haas (1964: 6) notes: ‘Functionalists, in the specific sense of the term, are interested in identifying those aspects of human needs and desires that exist and clamour for attention outside the realm of the political’. Haas (ibid) calls for the need to weave an ever-spreading web of international institutions, starting initially with the less controversial issue areas and then moving to the political sphere. Claude (1971: 384) singles out two underlying theses in functionalism: the separability-priority thesis and the ramification or spill-over thesis. The former assumes that it is possible to separate economic and social dimensions from political ones. Under

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35 Claude (1971: 381-2) notes the three basic assumptions and prescriptions of functionalism as follows: First, war is viewed as an objective condition of human society, rather than man’s native instinct, in a departure from the perspectives of realists who attribute the causes of war to human factors, such as fear. Hence, such factors as poverty, misery, ill health, illiteracy, economic insecurity, social injustice, exploitation and discrimination are regarded as the underlying causes of war. Once the causes are defined, the prescriptions for these symptoms are also clear: the elevation of living standards and attainment of higher levels of health, literacy and social justice. Second, functionalism attributes war to the institutional inadequacy of the states system in its belief that states are increasingly inadequate organizations to handle and promote the economic and social health of mankind. Therefore, functionalism calls for the demolition of the artificial zoning arrangements of nation states in favour of organizing layers of social nets in accordance with their particular requirements. Third, functionalism calls for an overhaul of man’s attitude, habit and feeling on war, as well as allegiances fostered by the states system. It envisages a world in which loyalties will be shared by states and international organizations capable of providing commodities that states are no longer able to offer.
this assumption, functionalism stresses that the treatment of economic and social problems should take priority. The other thesis presumes that economic or social interactions could develop into political ones.

The priority of politics in the Cold War era, marked by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, gave birth to neo-functionalism, notably in the works of Haas (1964) and Lindberg (1963). As Claude (1971: 405) says, 'If some version of political unity should develop in Western Europe, this happy result will have to be entered on the record not as a political by-product of economic and social cooperation but as a consequence of the skilful use of such cooperation as a political tactic, a consciously adopted means to a political end'.

The Sunshine Policy has many parallels with the functionalist or neo-functionalist approach. Under what he termed as a 'flexible dualism', Moon (1999: 39) summarized the functionalist side of the Sunshine Policy as follows: '(1) Easy task first, and difficult tasks later; (2) Economy first, politics later; (3) Non-governmental organizations first, government later; (4) Give first, and take later'. As previous South Korean governments failed to resolve the inter-Korean stalemate partly because of their adherence to the principles of 'government first, civil society later', 'politics first, economy later' or 'political-economic linkage', and the primacy of mechanical reciprocity', Moon (ibid) noted that President Kim's 'incremental, pragmatic and functionalist' approach symbolizes a paradigm shift in Seoul's policies towards Pyongyang. The Sunshine Policy also encouraged North Korea to promote cooperation with the international community in pursuit of its own interests rather than to compromise its interests. As Claude (1971: 386) observes, '[f]unctionalism proposes not to squelch but to utilize national selfishness; it asks governments not to give up the sovereignty which belongs to their peoples but to acquire benefits for their peoples which were hitherto unavailable, not to reduce their power to defend their citizens but to expand their competence to serve them'.

Though a neo-functionalist approach reflected the ideas of President Kim and his advisors, real inter-Korean integration, albeit in a fledging state, failed to follow the envisioned nexus between the government and the civil society and between politics and economy. In the Korean situation, the neo-functionalist metaphor of spill-over did not proceed smoothly, partly because each pressure for spill-over has been closely monitored and checked by the North Korean government, still stuck in a realist penchant for survival and security (Park M.L. 2000: 159; Ku 2000: 163). In this sense, intergovernmentalism is amply relevant in the Korean situation, because all efforts have been made through direct or indirect negotiations between the two governments.
representing North and South Korea in the absence of a supranational body. Intergovernmentalism, associated with the work of Hoffman (1966), is a realist integration theory, which stresses the role of state governments in supervising the direction and pace of integration. In a rebuttal of the neo-functionalist spill-over thesis, Hoffman (ibid) notes that national governments control the possible spill-over to areas of high politics, while tolerating it in areas of low politics, where spill-over does not directly affect national interests.

Furthermore, the Korean situation has, from the beginning, denied the formation of supranational entities or officials. In fact, there has been no political space for supranational entrepreneurship, described by Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) as a necessary condition for European integration, since it transforms ad hoc agendas, pursued by each state, into common European interests. In the absence of such a supranational figure as European Commissioner Jacques Delors, the inter-Korean process of integration was largely coordinated by President Kim’s right-hand man Lim Dong-won and his North Korean counterpart Kim Yong-sun, a close associate of Chairman Kim, as discussed in Chapter Six.

In sum, functionalism is too idealistic to be applied to the Korean situation. As Stone Sweet et al. (2001: 4) argued that traditional approaches to international regimes by Keohane (1984) and Krasner (1983) and even integration theories, such as intergovernmentalism, do not explain European integration, it is even harder to analyze the Sunshine Policy from the perspectives of neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism. Haas (1989: 37) noted that integration theory is a Euro-centric one without relevance elsewhere. Furthermore, it is almost impossible to test the Sunshine Policy against the two theories, because the improvement of inter-Korean relations failed to reach the level of the European integration in spite of some progress made during President Kim’s five-year tenure.

2.3.2. A Constructivist Approach to Integration

By the early 1970s, neofunctionalism had become somewhat lacklustre, and even one of its creators, Haas, acknowledged the theory’s shortcomings on both the theoretical and empirical frontiers.36 Moravcsik (1998: 16) notes the predictions of neofunctionalism were indeterminate because a list of alternative outcomes arose: spill-over, spill-back.

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36 Haas (1964: 9) views that the functionalist tradition dates back to the pre-industrial and pre-national era of Guild Socialism when occupational groups were able to take up practical problems, a practice which is no longer possible because of the rise of the territorially-bounded states. Haas (ibid: 20) also sheds light on the Marxist legacies in the functionalist theory of war in which the chief cause of interstate conflict is the unequal distribution of economic benefits.
spill-around and encapsulation. Portraying the rise and decline of neofunctionalism, Moravcsik (ibid) contends: ‘when integration stagnated, scholars criticized neofunctionalism; when integration progressed, they rediscovered it’. Keohane and Hoffmann (1991) conclude that spillover is not automatic, but necessitates prior intergovernmental bargaining. Haas (1975: 86) proposes that ‘the study of regional integration should be both included in and subordinated to the study of changing patterns of interdependence’, while Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Henry Nau and many other leading authorities in the discipline of international relations conclude that the European Union should be viewed as an international regime to manage interdependence (Moravcsik 1998: 15).37

In the middle of this disarray, constructivism started to offer insights for European integration scholars (Marcussen 2000; Christiansen et al. 1999; Checkel 1998b; Riss-Kappen 1996). As Wendt (1999: 344) argued that interdependence is one of the key variables for collective identity formation, one of the main constructivist research projects has been to explain the causal relationship between the formation of collective identities and the process of integration as a European polity (Christiansen et al. 1999). In fact, integration resulting from identity shifts is an area that cannot be adequately covered by neo-liberal institutionalists. Checkel (2004: 237) contended that the EU process had outgrown the research boundaries of regime theorists and entered into the domain of ‘a polity in the making’.

Unlike the time-consuming bargaining between industrialized states to build mutually agreeable regimes or institutions, the promotion of interactions, based on identity shifts between adversaries, takes apparently different dynamics. Given the nature of an enemy state, there are a set of policy tools to improve bilateral relations, which include humanitarian aid, large-scale investment and even bribes. As economic interactions between adversaries are routinely subject to close scrutiny by the parliament and the media, states pursuing comprehensive engagement might have to rely on secrecy or deception at the tactical level, as observed in Chapter Two. As comprehensive engagement is an asymmetrical interaction between a status quo power and an enemy state, the initial outcome of economic interactions takes the form of one-way investment and assistance.

In the process of Korean integration, the crucial watershed might be whether South Korea could be projected as the ‘reference society’ for North Koreans embodying

37 Nevertheless, regime theory has limitations in offering insight to integration between states of asymmetrical status in terms of power and the size of the economy. Since the theory, just like classical integration theories, is based on interactions between equals.
a pan-Korean ideal, just as Italian principalities emulated Piedmont as their ‘reference society’ (Cronin 1999: 286). As inter-Korean interactions have broadened North Koreans’ knowledge about the outside world, especially about South Korea, their possible efforts to emulate their South Korean counterparts will become a catalyst for interdependence and the construction of a transnational identity.

As observed above, this section will use both liberal and constructivist approaches to explain the process of inter-Korean integration. The Sunshine Policy, in some instances, was operationalized in accordance with functionalism’s separability thesis, since, despite the heightening tension and security concerns, prompted by North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme in October 2002, inter-Korean economic interactions kept up momentum. We could find historical parallels from the cases of Anglo-German and US-Japanese trade that persisted in the years leading up to World War II (Liberman 1996). Even though political and security problems hampered the smooth and speedy implementation of economic and social projects, President Kim’s leadership made it possible for those projects to be implemented amidst security risks. To complement this separability thesis, this section uses the concept of identity shifts as the underlying force to promote integration between the two Koreas.

2.3.3. Tools for Integration
Taking into account the possibility of asymmetric inter-Korean interdependence in terms of the size of the two economies, the Kim administration envisaged the creation of an inter-Korean economic community, which would in turn contribute to the process of fostering a regional community in Northeast Asia (MOU 2003: 36). Before the inauguration of the Kim administration, a large amount of investment in North Korea had been unrealistic, but the identity shifts between the two adversaries during the Kim administration, observed in the previous section, opened new possibilities in inter-Korean economic cooperation and integration. The Kim administration mobilized a wide range of tools from humanitarian aid to bribes as an activist government propagating new norms of more contacts, more dialogue and more cooperation. Even though the administration had been subject to criticism by political opponents for propping up a dictatorial state which was known to keep thousands of its own citizens in concentration camps and millions under the poverty line, the Kim administration firmly believed that inter-Korean economic integration would ameliorate North Korea’s behaviour and improve North Koreans’ quality of life for the eventual prosperity of the Korean nation (MOU 2003: 30).

Bribes. Bribes seek to move the bribee to serve the briber's interest (Noonan 1984). Even though they raise ethical questions, bribes have been part of a state's policy tools for a long time. As seen in the headline of The Times (8 March 2003), 'US Bribes Pushing UN Waverers Into Support of War', bribery has been one arm of a modern state. Of course, the US case does not necessarily mean the transfer of cash, but a wide range of benefits, comprising 'substantial trade, aid packages and security guarantees', which are tantamount to bribery (ibid).

In the case of inter-Korean dealings, shrouded in secrecy, an actual payment of cash was made to the North Korean regime via secret channels, which will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Six.38 South Korean prosecutors, who probed the alleged cash-for-summit case, concluded that the Hyundai Group paid US$100 million to the North Korean regime on behalf of the Kim administration before the inter-Korean summit in 2000, which was part of Hyundai's remittances amounting to US$450 million (Yonhap News Agency, 25 June 2003). Although Kim's key aid, Lim Dong-won, contended that it is nonsensical to link what he called 'the voluntary, policy-level assistance' to the summit, prosecutors noted that the remittance of the cash was part of the deal between North and South Korean officials which made the summit possible.

Large-Scale Investment. Another important step for strengthening economic interdependence between adversaries is to make large-scale investment to make use of

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38 Moon (2002: 29) noted, 'Seoul's traditional North Korea policy was guided by two sets of implicit operating logic. One is the clandestine management of inter-Korean relations and the other is its domestic political utilization. A breakthrough in inter-Korean relations via Park Chung-hee 4 July communiqué, Chun Doo-hwan's near success at the summit meeting with Kim Il-sung, and Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik and inter-Korean rapprochement were all engineered through clandestine operations'.

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the target state’s cheap labour, natural resources or land. This process will help to increase linkages between the enemy state and the outside world, while offering the state an opportunity of experimenting with the capitalist mode of production.

As the North Korean economy was fragile and the level of inter-Korean economic interdependence extremely low, the Kim administration attempted to expand South Korean companies’ investment in North Korea with the ultimate goal of creating an economic community on the Korean Peninsula (MOU 2003). For example, Hyundai’s development of a tourist resort on the eastern coast and an industrial complex in Kaesong, close to Seoul, were among the major South Korean investments in North Korea. To protect its investment, Hyundai required a government-level safety guarantee, thus working to broker a summit meeting between the leaders of the two Koreas (Chosun Ilbo, 12 June 2003). This may be regarded as an example of functionalist ramification or spill-over. Haas (1989: 50) says that functionalist theory has no set order between political and military talks and economic and social talks, although political breakthroughs are in demand before developments in one sector will spill back into further measures for détente.

Infrastrucure. In what it called the ‘Iron Silk Road’ project, the Kim administration sought to connect inter-Korean railways, which will be eventually extended to the Eurasian railway networks via the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) and the Trans-China Railway (TCR) (MOU 2003: 168; KINU 2000b: 64). The project was part of the 2000 summit agreement between the two Korean leaders who pledged to link inter-Korean railways and roads, which have been severed since the Korean War. In fact, this project has the potential to revolutionize transportation in Northeast Asia by linking the Trans-Korean Railway (TKR) to the TSR and the TCR and turn South Korea into a transportation hub (MOU 2003: 168). The Kim government also made efforts to fulfil its obligations, specified in the 1994 US-North Korea nuclear deal, under which North Korea suspended nuclear activities in return for the provision of two LWRs. Despite escalating tensions over North Korea’s admittance of a nuclear weapons programme in October 2002, the Seoul government exhibited a strong will to continue the construction work, in defiance of the Bush government’s efforts to stop the project as a punitive step against the North. As of January 2003, about 1,400 engineers and construction workers, including 713 South Koreans, were based at the construction site in Yongbyon, North Korea (MOU 2003: 321).
3. The Goals of Three-Level Engagement

A status quo power embarks on strategies of comprehensive engagement vis-à-vis an enemy state to achieve a set of policy goals, namely, the improvement of bilateral relations and the enemy state’s resocialization into the international community. In the absence of this process of resocialization, as mentioned in the previous sections, it is impossible to ameliorate an enemy state’s behaviour violating international norms, such as proliferation, terrorism, counterfeiting or drug trafficking.

3.1. National Goals: institutionalization and federalization

Although the status quo thesis of comprehensive engagement, observed in the previous section, envisages the expansion of cooperation between a status quo power and its enemy state as independent entities, the process of collective identity formation and economic integration between them might make the territories of a closed-off enemy state become porous, eventually blurring their territorial integrity. Even though a status quo power works to maintain the status quo as part of a trust-building process, it is up to the two states, involved in this new dynamics of identity shifts and economic integration, whether to choose peaceful coexistence, leaving borders robust, or further integration, weakening the importance of the borders between them.

In the case of the Sunshine Policy, it had two clear goals in inter-Korean relations: institutionalization and federalization. Since North and South Koreans belong to one nation despite territorial division and unification remains a paramount national goal for both North and South Korea, President Kim and his advisors sought to institutionalize inter-Korean affairs as part of their efforts to achieve a more ambitious goal of federalizing the two Koreas.

*Institutionalization.* One of the most tangible outcomes of President Kim’s efforts to institutionalize inter-Korean affairs was the North-South Joint Declaration (Appendix IX), issued after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. As mentioned above, President Kim sought to reactivate the 1991 Basic Agreement, a document similar to the 1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germany. Although the German treaty legally protected bilateral relations from any disruptive actions taken at home and abroad in a positive international and domestic environment (Giessmann 2001), the inter-Korean agreement failed to survive the 1994 nuclear crisis and the lack of trust between the two Koreas. Therefore, President Kim focused on creating a binding framework between the two Koreas, which was able to weather any international or domestic shocks. For President Kim, the reactivation of all steps specified in the Basic Agreement was a
shortcut to the institutionalization of inter-Korean relations. In this sense, the Sunshine Policy achieved disputable outcomes, although the policy, in practice, managed to foster exchange and cooperation between the two sides even in the middle of the resurgence of the North Korean nuclear weapons problem in October 2002.

**Federalization.** In his analogy to the US federalist process, Claude (1971: 439) noted: 'The facts of life in the United States are that the federal government will compromise with a recalcitrant state, not threaten to bomb its cities; it will consult with labour leaders and revise a controversial legislative policy, not send the army into pitched battle against the nationwide membership of aroused labour unions'. Convinced that the state of decades-long national division and confrontation cannot immediately develop into the stage of unification, the Kim administration envisioned the creation of a confederation as an interim stage leading up to unification (MOU 2003: 38). According to President Kim's 'three-stage' approach to Korean unification, a 'union of republics' or a confederation, which makes it possible for the two Koreas to keep their current systems and ideologies, is the first step on the road to unification, while a federation, which is based on one system, namely democracy and the market economy, is only possible after the lapse of a considerable time (Kim D.J. 1997; Kwon 2000).

One of the most controversial points of the inter-Korean summit declaration of 2000 was an agreement to initiate a debate on unification by envisioning an inter-Korean confederation, since there are common elements in the South's proposal for confederation and the North's proposal for a loose form of federation as the formulas for unification (Moon 2001; KINU 2000b). In the past, successive North and South Korean governments have authored and revised unification formulas for propaganda purposes rather than as a concrete step for unity. One of the reasons why the two Korean leaders talked about federalization during the summit was that it looked safe for both of them, since it involves the delegation of clearly defined powers over time. As Claude (1971: 425) puts it, '[g]overnment is a big, brave word; federalism is the little, cautious word'.

3.2. International Goals: resocialization

By noting that 'the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together', Mitrany (1966: 28) envisioned a working peace system based on a horizontal linkage between states. Since the erosion of alliances and deepening diplomatic and economic isolation are the main sources of

39 The summit debate on confederation will be featured in greater detail in Chapter Six.
insecurity for a state, the status quo power needs to open the way for an enemy state to expand its relations with the international community. On the international level, South Korean policymakers paved the way for North Korea’s resocialization into the international community by helping it to normalize diplomatic relations with the world’s key powers and join major international and regional organizations.

Diplomatic Normalization. The culmination of efforts to maintain the political status quo and create the environment for economic integration is the target state’s diplomatic normalization with the world’s powerful states. The Kim government succeeded in enlisting support for North Korea’s resocialization from its allies and friends across the world in a favourable international milieu. It nudged the United States and Japan to improve ties with North Korea, realizing the exchange of high-level envoys between the United States and North Korea in October 2000 and paving the way for Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to visit Pyongyang in September 2002. In particular, President Kim called on European leaders during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Seoul in 2000 to normalize relations with North Korea, enabling Britain, Germany and many other European states to set up official ties with the North. North Korea’s external relations with the world’s major powers will be analyzed in detail in Chapter Five.

Accession to World Organizations. A state endeavours to join international organizations as a way to win prestige and economic benefits. The process of North Korea’s diplomatic normalization with the Western powers proceeded in parallel with its accession to regional and international organizations. From the outset, the Kim administration sought to create a favourable international atmosphere to enable North Korea to join as many international organizations as possible, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Korea Times, 11 May 2000). In fact, North Korea’s accession to the ARF offered it a rare chance of resocialization with the international diplomatic community. North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun, who participated in the seventh ARF meeting in Bangkok in July 2000, held first-ever bilateral talks with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei and other dignitaries, as well as with South Korean Foreign Affairs-Trade Minister Lee Joung-binn. The Kim administration also pursued diplomatic normalization between North Korea and the world’s major donor countries, since it would lead to the lifting of economic sanctions imposed against it for half a century and its accession to international lending institutions, i.e., the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB (Moon
However, North Korea’s stalled process of diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan could not result in any progress on this frontier.

4. The South Korean Decision-Making Process
The legacies of the failure of liberalism, which had blossomed in the 1920s and 1930s, are still intact worldwide in the form of the ‘distaste for appeasement, the disillusionment with idealism’ (Banks 1988: 9). As noted in Chapter Two, the US administration is virtually in a straitjacket as far as its engagement policy vis-à-vis an enemy state is concerned, because of Congressional scrutiny and objections. As Haass and O’Sullivan (2000: 179) identified in their research, any strategies seeking to offer incentives to an enemy state are prone to touch off intense rivalries between the executive and congressional branches of government. Nevertheless, George (1993: 13) stressed the need to create a ‘systematic, empirically grounded, and differentiated theory of appeasement’ in order to successfully engage an enemy state.

With South Korean society entering into the stage of mature democracy, how could the Kim administration pursue comprehensive engagement in the face of close scrutiny by the opposition parties and media organizations? From the outset, Moon (1999: 41) called for transparency in order to build a domestic consensus in the process of implementing the government’s North Korea policies. Nevertheless, a democratized society has not always been a liability to the Kim administration seeking to shift the conventional policies vis-à-vis North Korea. In fact, democratization in South Korea opened the way for the overhaul of the government’s policies, a development which was impossible in the past when the political culture, which had been heavily authoritarian and bureaucratic, hampered fundamental changes vis-à-vis the North (Kim, I.P. 1998: 12). In this sense, the Sunshine Policy was a definite departure from the inconsistent, sentimental and erratic policies of past South Korean governments, which had been receptive to the equally frivolous, unpredictable policies of the North (Moon 1999: 38).

This section will identify the Kim administration’s key political actors and processes for information processing and crisis prevention. The Sunshine Policy, pushed by President Kim and his advisors, would have been impossible unless South Korea’s governing system had been organized to implement it. President Kim could preclude a debate on any alternative to the Sunshine Policy thanks to the peculiarities of the South Korean political system, characterized by a top-down policy culture (Kim J.Y. 2003).

4.1. Actors
Challenging the rationalist premise that a state is a unitary actor, decision-making
theories decode the ‘black box’ of a state’s domestic political processes (Holsti 1995: 47). Behaviouralists find that policymakers are not rational individuals, but ordinary people swayed by personal ambitions, misperceptions, bureaucratic interests and so forth. Their findings shed light on the complex processes of budgeting, weapons acquisitions and, especially, crisis management.

The bureaucratic politics model portrays policymakers and government agencies as entities with conflicting perceptions, values and interests, thus putting priorities on personal or bureaucratic interests (Allison 1971; Halperin 1974). The saying, ‘Where you stand depends on where your sit’, best explains this tendency (Holsti 1995: 49). Hence, organizational norms, prior policy commitments, organizational inertia and standard operating procedures are supposed to shape and distort the flow of information, decision-making and implementation of these decisions. However, critics of the bureaucratic politics model pointed out that the presidential system inhibits bureaucratic bargaining and haggling to a certain extent, because the president in the United States, for example, is not an ordinary player in a bureaucratic game, but the final decision maker who is also capable of appointing the members of the core decision making group (ibid: 50). In the South Korean presidential system, in particular, the president reigns over the three branches of the state, administration, legislature and judiciary, and wields enormous power in a predominantly Confucian society. As Moon (1998: 269) says:

The most salient aspect of developmental statism is executive dominance and bureaucratic unity. Security decision making during the Cold War period was centralized in the hands of a few political elites such as the president, the presidential staff, the Ministry of National Defence, and the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP, formerly KCIA). Legislative intervention, bureaucratic fragmentation, and politicization of security practice were virtually blocked.

Moon (ibid) observes that executive dominance was alive and well in South Korea where the president and his staff commanded enormous influences over the formulation and the implementation of security policy. However, he did not fail to mention that democratic reforms had fostered the delegation of power to bureaucratic agencies. In particular, the dilemma of security policy coordination was aggravated when President Kim Young-sam, predecessor of President Kim Dae-jung, showed not only lack of commitment to but also lack of expertise in security affairs. As George (1993: 15) says,
‘When the game of bureaucratic politics cannot be tamed by strong leadership at higher
levels, information and knowledge become instruments of the struggle between
competing policy advocates’. Kim and Park (2001: 335) argued that the political
leadership of the President is indispensable for efficient policy coordination between
various government agencies.

*President and Bureaucracy.* By forming an inner group of key policymakers,
President Kim had personalized South Korea’s policy-making and implementation
process to meet the requirements of his policy of engagement with North Korea (Levin
and Han 2002; Moon 1999). Since President Kim and his key followers took office with
ready-made policy principles on how to deal with North Korea, the policy elites had
virtually neglected the process of pooling public opinion (KINU 2000b). Reminiscent of
the Nixon-Kissinger team, the Sunshine Policy was conceived and implemented by the
two key players, President Kim and Lim Dong-won, called the policy’s ‘architect’.
Throughout President Kim’s five-year term, Lim served as senior presidential secretary
for foreign affairs and national security (February 1998 – May 1999), unification
minister (May 1999 – December 1999), director of the National Intelligence Service
(NIS) (December 1999 – March 2001) and again unification minister (March 2001 –
September 2001) until he was forced to step down after the National Assembly’s no­
confidence motion. However, he was installed one week later as special advisor to the
president for national security and unification, virtually dominating the process of
policy implementation and injecting a sense of consistency to Seoul’s North Korea
policy for five years (Kim J.Y. 2003).

To enhance inter-ministerial policy coordination, the administration restructured
and regularly convened the NSC standing committee, comprising the heads of the
Ministry of Unification (MOU), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT),
the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS).
Although military officers did not personally embrace the Sunshine Policy, the military,
as an institution, showed moderate support of the policy (Levin and Han 2002) or ‘were
born to serve superiors’ (*Korea Times*, 25 June 1998). Among the Cabinet members, the
unification minister, whose bureaucratic interests lie in the promotion of inter-Korean
exchange and cooperation, was empowered to chair the NSC standing committee. In
particular, Unification Minister Lim Dong-won contributed to producing well­
coordinated policies by preventing any inter-agency rivalry (Kim J.Y. 2003). As a result
of this coordination, the public announcements made in the wake of those meetings had
always been dull but consistent, because they repeated the same phrases: a peaceful
solution of any problem involving North Korea and the continuation of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.

**Opposition Party.** President Kim's party, representing the southwestern province of Cholla, retained minority status vulnerable to close policy scrutiny by a powerful opposition party throughout his five-year tenure. Even though Kim's Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) formed a coalition with Kim Jong-pil's United Liberal Democrats (ULD) before the 1997 presidential election, the ULD, led by the diehard conservative politician, had been an impediment rather than a supporter of the Sunshine Policy. Therefore, the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) incessantly attacked the Kim government during his five-year tenure for making 'one-sided' concessions to North Korea and manipulating the inter-Korean summit for domestic political purposes (KINU 2000b; Levin and Han 2002). The opposition party's arguments centred on the principle of strict reciprocity in inter-Korean dealings and the verification of North Korea's WMD programmes, striking the same chord as President George W. Bush's administration. Therefore, the Kim government sought to avoid parliamentary involvement in pursuing strategies of engagement in the same way as the Clinton government signed an agreement, not a treaty, with North Korea in 1994 to bypass a ratification process by the Senate, which might have raised objections to the inclusion of incentives worth US$4.6 billion (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000).

The presence of powerful opposition groups erected hurdles to the smooth implementation of the Sunshine Policy. For example, the Kim administration failed to revise or repeal the draconian National Security Law (NSL) hampering inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Nevertheless, the opposition party was regarded as failing to come up with a viable alternative to the Sunshine Policy because of the lack of information and expertise and its focus on domestic political considerations rather than a genuine improvement of inter-Korean relations (KINU 2000b).

**Press.** Democratization in Korea has elevated the status and influence of the press in South Korean society to the extent that Park H.W. (2002) argues that the media has become one of the power centres by taking over the status of the once unrivalled military in the South Korean power structure. The enhanced status of the media, however, was one of the liabilities for the Kim administration because the three mass-circulation newspapers, Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo and Donga Ilbo,\(^{40}\) represented

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\(^{40}\) The three newspapers, which claim more than one million in circulation respectively, take a lion’s share in the South Korean newspaper market.
conservative voices and Cold War mentalities in South Korean society (KINU 2000b). The only alternative voice was Hankyoreh, which had carried progressive, pro-North Korean views since its founding in 1988 (Levin and Han 2002; Park H.W. 2002; KINU 2000b). In his contents analysis of the two rival newspapers in South Korea, Chosun Ilbo and Hankyoreh, which epitomized the polarization of public opinion, Park H.W. (2002) noted that the former, the oldest and the largest in terms of circulation, devoted its space to criticizing the Sunshine Policy for being naïve and idealistic, while the latter, by contrast, upheld the policy as a realistic option for inter-Korean rapprochement. The discrepancy of opinions, represented by the two newspapers, however, was attributable to their selective quotations of news sources, which resulted in consistently biased reports throughout the five-year period of Kim’s presidency (ibid).

In the face of the critical voices of such influential press organizations, President Kim and his advisors had no option but to maintain secrecy in their dealings with North Korea, as shown in Hyundai’s transfer of US$450 million to North Korea, discussed in Chapter Six. They pursued major policy accomplishments in a relatively short time rather than paying attention to transparency and morality in the process (Levin and Han 2000). As long as the Kim administration achieved notable progress in inter-Korean relations, such as a summit and the reunion of separated families, all South Korean media organizations welcomed them regardless of their editorial policies (KINU 2000b).

Private Sector. Given North Korea’s poor infrastructure and political and economic insecurity, South Korea’s private sector did not show much enthusiasm in pursuing business deals with the North in the past. After President Kim’s inauguration, two South Korean business organizations, the Federation of Korean Industries and the Korean Federation of Small Business, sent investment teams to North Korea to explore the possibilities of launching new business projects, but their initial attention was not translated into actual investment (Levin and Han 2002). The only exception was the Hyundai Business Group, led by the North Korean-born tycoon Chung Ju-yung, which had attempted to virtually monopolize all business deals with North Korea, including tourism and the construction of an industrial park. Before the inter-Korean summit in 2000, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, which enabled South Koreans to travel to North Korea from November 1998 for the first time in the history of national division, was the only tangible achievement of the Sunshine Policy. Furthermore, Hyundai executives, who wanted to secure political guarantees for their future investment in North Korea, brokered the inter-Korean summit. Hyundai’s activities and their connection to the summit meeting will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Six.
Civil Society. Amidst fierce ideological confrontation during the Cold War, state-sponsored anti-Communist organizations had been created to assist the South Korean government's ideological warfare with its North Korean counterpart. However, South Korea's 'bureaucratic-authoritarian regime' has become the victim of its own success, since the state's economic development, engineered by the military regimes, resulted in the growth of the middle class, thus fostering civil society in an expanding public sphere with contesting identity groups (Han Sang-jin 2001). The rise of South Korea's international economic status, coupled with steady democratization, offered a fertile environment for the growth of civil society to which a South Korean government of any political background needed to pay attention (Steinberg 2003). Even before the end of the Cold War, various South Korean student and dissident organizations identifying North Korea positively started to contest the anti-Communist regimes' monopoly of the unification debate. With the inauguration of President Kim, they were given freedom to launch their various agendas, including inter-Korean festivals, cultural exchanges, and humanitarian assistance, which will be illustrated in detail in Chapter Four.

As the emerging civil space represented various ideologies and ideas, the South Korean government and newspaper organizations conducted a number of public surveys to measure public opinion, even though all the actors attempted to interpret public opinion to meet the interests of their own ministry or agency (Levin and Han 2002). As public opinion was regarded as one of the key factors affecting South Korean politics, the Kim administration conducted opinion polls more frequently than previous governments in order to justify its policy of engaging North Korea (MOU 2003: 334). In particular, it made use of public polls to demonstrate citizens' support for the engagement option. The MOU (ibid) contended that an average 70 per cent of South Koreans supported the Sunshine Policy during the five-year period of Kim's presidency.

4.2. Information Processing

Facing the presence of diverse interest groups in society, the Kim administration adopted a unique way of information processing, similar to Kohl's (1975) 'Royal-Court Model' in which the foreign policy-making process is highly centralized by the president and core advisors. Critics, like Levin and Han (2002), noted that the policy-making process had been closed to the President's aids, thus blinding the administration and alienating domestic political actors. As suggested by Holsti (1995), the group

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41 Among the major groups are the Korea Freedom League, the National Council for Freedom and Democracy, the Korea Veterans Association and the Constitution Law Advocates.
dynamics model investigates the decision-making process in a small-group context, given that foreign policy decisions are normally made by a small group of key policymakers. In some instances, the group, made up of personnel with expertise and experiences, perform much better than individuals in evaluating the situation and making a recommendation to the Chief Executive. However, the group dynamics exhibit inherent weaknesses because the members of the group are under pressure to work in a team, thereby restricting extensive information searches, hampering efficiency, suppressing minority opinions inside the group, and prematurely ruling out policy options running against group norms. Challenging the conventional wisdom that strong cohesion among the members of a group enhances performance, Janis (1972) coined the term 'groupthink' to argue that this cohesion might hamper reality testing and sound information processing and judgement. Snyder and Diesing (1977: 333) divide bargainers into two groups: the rational and the irrational. Rational bargainers have low confidence in their initial judgement at the start of a crisis, and then constantly modify their assessments when new information is received; while irrational bargainers, similar to Steinbruner's (1974: 131-53) cybernetic theory, rely on a rigid belief system because they are confident of their sufficient knowledge of their opponents’ ultimate aims, bargaining styles, preferences and internal problems. The following figures show the two models.

**Figure 3.6 The Rational Bargaining Module**

Source: Snyder and Diesing (1977: 333).
Figure 3.7 The Irrational Bargaining Module

Compared with the rational bargaining module, the irrational bargaining module shows a simplified process, because the phases of expectations and strategy are immune to change. As bargainers are supposed to know all about what is going on and assume everything falls into their belief system, they only change tactics, if necessary, before sending their messages. Though slightly idealized, this irrational bargaining module fits into the typical information-processing pattern of the Kim administration, which adopted a rigid belief system and automatically responded to the new information or provocation by North Korea under an already set strategy. In sum, President Kim and his followers, shrouded in secrecy and bolstered by their conviction on the legitimacy of the engagement option, could ensure consistency and efficiency in information processing. Their beliefs in the viability of the Sunshine Policy worked as ‘information screens’, thus determining the selection and use of North Korea-related information (Kim J.Y. 2003: 288). Snyder and Diesing (1977: 337) point out there is a high possibility that this category of bargainers might be betrayed by their colleagues or allies, who take from them control over strategy. In fact, the Kim administration, which had implemented engagement strategies jointly with the Clinton administration, lost its partnership with the US administration soon after President Bush’s inauguration.

4.3. A South Korean Model of Crisis Prevention
A rational approach posits that policymakers are able to determine and list what are the national interests in an hierarchical order and examine all alternatives, while the
behaviouralists argue that it is impossible to make such calculations involving an enormous cost in time and intellectual resources, especially in a crisis, which leads them to choose shortcuts in place of an analytic model (Halperin 1974). Snyder and Diesing (1977: 6) defined an international crisis as 'a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war'. The first act, potentially causing a crisis, is called the 'challenge', while this challenge may be motivated by a 'precipitant'. There are two kinds of precipitants. The general precipitant is an intolerable situation caused by a variety of reasons, while the specific precipitant is the direct pretext for the challenge. Once a challenge is launched, there should follow 'resistance' by the challenged party if a crisis is to occur. For example, a crisis breaks out when one party launches a specific challenge with a specific demand, which is responded to by the other party in the form of an ultimatum for the withdrawal of the demand. The standoff leads to the stage of 'confrontation', which is followed by war or resolution of the crisis in the form of capitulation or compromise. These crisis phases are illustrated in Figure 3.8.

**Figure 3.8 Crisis Phases**

![Crisis Phases Diagram](image)

- **Crisis Threshold**
- **Challenge**
- **Conflict of interest**
- **Mild conflict behaviour**
- **Precipitant**
- **Resistance**
- **Capitulation or Compromise**
- **Confrontation**
- **War**
- **Resolution**

Source: Snyder and Diesing (1977: 15).
In contrast, the practitioners of the Sunshine Policy created a unique mechanism in which there is no confrontational response or resistance to the challenge by North Korea, thus effectively preventing it from developing into a crisis. Hence, the challenge is transformed or remains intact, without crossing the crisis threshold, as shown in Figure 3.9. US Secretary of State Colin Powell, regarded as a dove in the hawkish Bush administration, was supportive of President Kim's Sunshine Policy and shared the notion that it was not desirable to provoke a military crisis by setting deadlines or issuing an ultimatum for North Korea to meet US demands.42

Figure 3.9 Crisis Prevention Phases of the Sunshine Policy

This crisis prevention mechanism, put into practice to deal with North Korea’s repeated violations of the western sea border, as well as its brinkmanship in connection with nuclear weapons programmes, will be featured in greater detail in Chapter Seven.

42 At the height of international tension after North Korea’s admittance of a nuclear weapons programme in October 2002, Powell even refused to characterize as a crisis North Korea’s expulsion of nuclear inspectors and declaration that it would begin manufacturing plutonium from spent nuclear fuel (New York Times 30 December 2002). Guardian (30 December 2002) also reported, ‘China isn’t worried about North Korea. Russia is openly scornful. There is a well grounded assumption that too much attention merely inflates a problem into a crisis’.
5. Conclusion

This chapter proposed comprehensive engagement as a theoretical framework for analyzing the Sunshine Policy. Given its hefty requirements without any immediate *quid pro quo* from North Korea, the Sunshine Policy was lauded by Steinberg (1999: 58) for being an initiative that could not have been taken by an ordinary politician, but by a statesman able to look beyond the near future and wait for the judgement of history. Since the judgement of history is a time-consuming process and the Sunshine Policy could not produce a quick behavioural change on the part of North Korea, the Kim administration has been subject to criticism at home and abroad. In fact, the moments of euphoria following the inter-Korean summit were short-lived and President Kim faced the harsh reality that the window of opportunity was closing with the inauguration of President Bush and North Korea's failure in making timely decisions in response to the South's initiatives. As the détente policy of the Nixon-Kissinger team could not fare well partly because of Congressional obstacles, as observed in Chapter Two, President Kim's Sunshine Policy could not proceed smoothly owing to policy changes resulting from the shift in US leadership. The opposition party-dominated parliament also forced President Kim to bypass the National Assembly and bring politics directly to the people (Chang 2001). George (1993: 57) noted that the process of resocialization might encounter problems in securing domestic and international understanding and support, as well as bureaucratic failure in implementing policies, envisioned by top policymakers. History, as Gaddis (1982: 344) says, does not tolerate the coincidence of strategic vision with strong authority for very long, which apparently decorated the first half of Kim's presidency. Even though it could not fare well throughout President Kim's five-year tenure because of the changing international and domestic milieu, the Sunshine Policy achieved a remarkable improvement in inter-Korean relations. South Koreans' identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea were in progress, as manifested in the election of President Roh Moo-hyun, the continuation of inter-Korean contacts on various levels, and fledgling economic integration between the two Koreas, which will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter Four.
Chapter Four. Historical Overview of the Korean Divide: structure and norms

1. Introduction

As adumbrated in Chapter Two, rationalist theories, based on the assumption that the state is a unitary, rational actor, offered a set of analytical tools to produce compelling explanations of the Cold War confrontations between the two opposing blocs. By the same token, North and South Korea, the two contesting states on the Korean Peninsula, represented a microcosm of the global ideological divide. The relevance of these theories, based on material power, has been seen to be so convincing as to all but preclude parallel research on inter-Korean relations from the perspectives of such ideational factors as identities and norms. Nevertheless, the post-Cold War situation gave rise to efforts to investigate security practices in East Asia with a new set of tools that mixes both material and ideational factors.¹

Taking into account the changes in the security landscape in East Asia, this chapter aims to analyze and illustrate a number of dramatic moments when ideational factors emerged salient over material factors in both North and South Korea. It argues that the rationalist approaches are necessary but not sufficient for explaining the entirety of the post-Cold War situation on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, such rationalist theories fall short of examining why South Korean President Kim implemented the Sunshine Policy and how markedly South Koreans shifted their identities vis-à-vis North Korea, as well as their perception of unification, after Kim's inauguration as president in 1998.² Hence, this chapter focuses on shedding light on ideational factors to explain the Sunshine Policy, implemented by President Kim in a consistent manner in spite of constant attacks by a phalanx of critics who called it an ‘appeasement policy’, ‘buying-off North Korea’ or nothing more than a ‘give-away policy’ (Paik 2002: 35). During President Kim’s five-year tenure, the identity shifts of South Koreans vis-à-vis North Korea became so dramatic as to put the traditional Seoul-Washington alliance at stake in pursuit of friendly inter-Korean relations and provide a robust defence against periodic attempts by President George W. Bush’s administration to use coercive means against North Korea (New York Times, 3 March 2003; Yonhap News Agency, 19 March 2003).

¹ For pioneering research in this field, see Alagappa (1998); Hook (1996); and Katzenstein (1996b).
² In an opinion survey conducted in 2003, for example, 92 per cent of the respondents renounced any use of force against North Korea to stop it from developing nuclear weapons and opted rather for rather delayed unification (Korea Times, 25 June 2003).
The Sunshine Policy reaped rewards, culminating in an inter-Korean summit and President Kim's winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. During this period, ideational forces reigned supreme over structural forces in inter-Korean politics, partly because the Clinton administration cooperated with the Kim administration in launching an engagement policy in spite of the lingering anti-North Korean sentiment in the Republican-dominated Congress and other sectors of American society, which stemmed from the Korean War, as well as North Korea's violation of such international norms as non-proliferation, anti-terrorism and human rights.

The heyday of the Sunshine Policy did not last long following President Bush's adoption of hard-line policies towards North Korea, which changed fundamentally the atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula, subjecting the two Koreas to the domain of the Hobbesian culture, stemming from the deeply embedded negative norms held by the United States vis-à-vis the North. In the State of the Union address in January 2002, for example, President Bush reinforced the US's negative identification of Iraq, Iran and North Korea by demonizing them with the term, the 'axis of evil'. Since North Korea was pinpointed by the superpower as one of the main enemy states in a global war against terrorists and proliferators, the Hobbesian structure, reminiscent of the Cold War era, was poised to regain sway over the Korean Peninsula, deterring South Koreans' shift of collective identities vis-à-vis North Korea and stirring up anti-Americanism in South Korea where many resisted the Bush administration's approaches towards North Korea. These developments effectively turned the Korean Peninsula into a battlefield between different identity norms regulating the behaviours and policies of South Korea and the United States. This chapter aims to analyze these contending norms, since the overall argument of this dissertation, as dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Three, is that these shifting identities and their attendant norms played a decisive role in shaping the policies of the Kim administration.

This chapter provides an historical overview of structural and ideational forces to stress why ideational approaches offer insights and understanding their structural counterparts are unable to provide in analyzing the Sunshine Policy. First, this chapter reviews North Korea's key policies in the international and domestic context. In this process, we will trace the origin of the norms which had enabled North Korea to build the present political, economic and social system, and analyze whether these norms could remain salient in North Korean society after the end of the Cold War. On the basis of this analysis, this chapter will juxtapose the policies of successive South Korean governments, thus seeking parallels and, in particular, clues as to why they have
changed their strategies and tactics in dealing with North Korea. By using the identity norm life cycle, proposed in Chapter Three, this chapter will highlight the process of South Koreans’ identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea under the leadership of President Kim.

2. North Korea: structure and norms

The most frequently used level of analysis to account for the behaviour of small states is the international system. This is because foreign policy decisions, made by small states, are considered to be reactions to external conditions. Neo-realism determines that weak states, like North Korea, are preoccupied with the question of survival in a self-help system, as they lack the necessary means for self-defence (Waltz 1979: 111; Handel 1981: 36). Even though this neo-realist approach can be viewed as apt in explaining North Korea’s endeavours to survive in an adverse international environment, it lacks in accounting for the underlying ideational forces which made North Korea pursue isolationism and self-reliance in spite of the structural shifts in the international system resulting from the end of the Cold War. Here, political realism loses its explanatory power, thus offering room for constructivism to explore North Korea’s motivation to opt for an isolationist course. This section aims to illustrate how the structural shifts affected North Korea’s political and economic destiny and what made North Korea remain resilient to the structural changes, thereby identifying the salient ideational forces in North Korean society. Overall, it aims to explain how the Sunshine Policy emerged as a set of South Korean policymakers’ strategies to deal with a state exhibiting two seemingly incompatible features: economic fragility and political stability.

2.1. North Korea and Structure

The end of the Cold War prompted many Western scholars to paint a pessimistic future for East Asia, since they viewed states in this region as ‘ripe for rivalry’ because of disparities in economic and military power, the existence of a wide range of political systems, the underdevelopment of regional institutions and, most importantly, the absence of the structural stability previously enjoyed in the bipolar world (Friedberg 1993/4; Betts 1993/4; Christensen 2001). In particular, North Korea’s WMD programmes have been cited as one of the major threats to regional stability along with Japanese rearmament and Chinese adventurism (Eberstadt 1999; Betts 1993/4). Despite

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3 After the collapse of the Communist bloc, North Korea found itself in a hostile environment, surrounded by capitalist states. North Korea shares the same official ideology of communism only with China, which itself has moved towards the capitalist market economy, while the other states in this region, South Korea, Japan and Russia, are now all capitalists.
such gloomy forecasts, however, East Asia in the post-Cold War period has in fact enjoyed political stability and economic growth, making some experts raise questions about the validity of these perspectives (Kang 2003a).

In Europe, the unification of Germany in 1990 was precipitated by a structural shift resulting from the collapse of the Soviet bloc. If this structural transformation was powerful and far-reaching enough to end the division of Germany, what impact did it have on the Korean Peninsula? Compared to the German situation, its impact cannot be said to have been decisive, because the division of the peninsula persisted despite the collapse of the Communist system in the Soviet Union and eastern European states.

One of the most evident post-Cold War developments on the Korean Peninsula has been North Korea's economic collapse, which opened the possibility of both unification and another war. The end of the Cold War metaphorically dragged North Korea down to the status of an orphan who lost her ideological parents overnight. Even though North Korea's economic growth had been showing signs of fatigue from the 1970s onwards, in fierce competition with the capitalist South, the overall situation was not critical until the end of the Cold War. Another striking feature, however, is the miraculous health and stability of North Korea's dictatorial political system in spite of the well-known economic hardships. This section will demonstrate how North Korea emerged as a vibrant industrial state in East Asia in the 1970s and then crashed to become one of the world's poorest states.

2.1.1. North Korea's Rise
The seemingly irrational pride held by North Koreans in their state and the system they built is not totally unfounded if we consider that the North had been superior in terms of per capita income to South Korea until the early 1980s (Harrison 2002: 26-28). It is not clear exactly when South Korea caught up with North Korea in terms of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) because of difficulties in securing reliable North Korea-related data. According to South Korea's National Unification Board, which was renamed the MOU in February 1998, South Korea was already superior to North Korea with US$591 to US$579 in 1975. Although North Korea's economic policy originating from the Soviet model of planned economy showed signs of slowing down because of structural problems in the 1960s (Kim I.P. 1998: 3-4), the dire situation it has faced since the late 1990s is a recent development requiring close scrutiny.

North Korea was founded on 9 September 1948 during the Soviet occupation of the northern part of the peninsula aimed at disarming the Japanese colonialists. Since Japan's 1910-45 occupation of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea, relatively rich in
natural resources, had been an industrial region with a number of facilities it inherited from the Japanese colonial period, while South Korea’s main industry was agriculture (Kim H.J. 1998). With the blessing of the Soviet Union and China, which was translated into the provision of assistance, such as oil and other raw materials, North Korea could spur its industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, while its southern rival was still at the fledging stage of economic development amid years of political turmoil and social instability (Gills 1996; Kang 1998: 242-3). Joan Robinson, a Cambridge economist, lauded North Korea’s economic growth after her visit in 1964, saying ‘all the economic miracles of the postwar world are put in the shade by these [North Korean] achievements’, and Harrison Salisbury, an American journalist of East Asian affairs who visited North Korea in 1972, noted, ‘On a per capita basis it is the most intensively industrialized country in Asia, with the exception of Japan’ (quoted in Kim H.J. 1998).

Unlike eastern European states, which depended on the Soviet Union for their security and economic stability, North Korea exercised diplomatic skill in balancing the Soviet Union and China against each other (Kang 1998; Kim H.J. 1998) and extracted every possible form of assistance from the two powers. In sum, one of the rationales for North Koreans’ pride in the system they created is the legacy of this earlier developmental stage.

2.1.2. North Korea’s Decline
North Korea’s heyday in a favourable international climate did not last long, dogged by a planned economy no longer able to achieve remarkable results in competition with the capitalist market economy of South Korea (Kang 1998: 243). By the mid-1980s, indeed, North Korea had fallen far behind South Korea in terms of every indicator, causing widespread fear and an acute security dilemma in the North. The economic collapse resulted from the fragility of North Korea’s economic system, based on heavy industry without a balanced capability of producing consumer goods, and the failure to introduce timely reforms in order to adjust to the changing international environment (Gills 1996: 265). The situation was exacerbated when its two patrons, the Soviet Union and China, reduced their assistance during the finals years of the Cold War (Park H.J. 2001). The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the dramatic decline of Soviet aid to North Korea from US$260 million in 1980 to nil in 1990 (Kang 1998: 244).

These changes forced North Korea to test the capitalist mode of production, but on a very limited scale. In 1984, the North Korean parliament first enacted the Joint Venture Law, which led to the establishment of the Chosun International Joint Venture General Company in 1986 aimed at attracting foreign investment (Kim and Koh 1998:
58-9). After the collapse of the communist bloc, the North Korean government introduced further reform programmes in December 1991 by adopting a law to establish the Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (Kim I.P. 1998: 6). This action was taken soon after North Korean President Kim Il-sung and Premier Yon Hyong-muk made inspection tours of the special economic zones in China in October 1991 (Kim P.S. 1998). A senior North Korean economic official reported that the Rajin-Sonbong zone attracted 65 investment contracts totalling US$370 million in 1997 (Kim J.P. 1998: 8), but the internal rivalry between conservative hard-liners and moderate pragmatists persisted as to whether the state should discard its isolationist policies, eroding the confidence of overseas investors. Eventually, the Rajin-Sonbong zone showed the symptoms of what Rozman (1998) called 'flawed regionalism' and failed to create an attractive environment for foreign investment due to the Pyongyang government's dubious commitment to an open-door policy and the poor infrastructure in the area (Hughes 2002a: 137).

North Korea's failure to introduce sweeping economic reforms has partly been attributed to the system of hereditary succession, called the first Marxist dynasty in the history of mankind. As the senior Kim pursued isolationist policies based on self-reliance, the junior Kim was not in a position to discard his father's legacies overnight. These hereditary legacies were compounded by eight traits of a totalitarian dictatorship: (1) a single official ideology, (2) a single party led by one man, (3) a secret police which controls through terror and violence, (4) a monopoly on the media, (5) a monopoly on the effective use of all weapons of armed combat, (6) a centrally planned command economy, (7) the control of law and justice, (8) a tendency towards expansionism (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965). North Korea is believed by many commentators to embody all of these characteristics (Kim H.J. 1998: 19), although the last trait regarding the tendency towards expansionism has been marred by the structural and economic reasons despite its expansionist official goal of 'liberating South Korea from its status as a US colony'.

North Korea's decline brought about crises on three fronts: diplomatic, economic and military (Oh 1998). On the diplomatic front, Seoul and Pyongyang had been locked in a fierce competition to win international recognition since the establishment of their respective governments in 1948 (Ahn 1986: 183-5). As part of

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4 The Rajin-Sonbong zone is linked to the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and participated in by South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and Mongolia. Nevertheless, the TRADP has made no significant progress because of the 'over-proliferation of varying regionalist conceptions' and 'mismatched economic and political interests' (Hughes 2002a: 118).
this competition, North and South Korea waged a game of numbers in their efforts to win diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible across the world, but North Korea has been soundly defeated since 1976, when the numbers drew even. A decisive blow to North Korea, however, was its failure to establish diplomatic relations with the two most important powers across the ideological divide, the United States and Japan, whilst South Korea succeeded in normalizing ties with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992. North Korea's diplomatic failure deepened its isolation, since the United States continued to impose a wide range of economic embargoes in response to the Korean War and a series of terrorist attacks launched by North Korea, as examined in Chapter Two. On the economic front, foreign analysts estimate that the operation rates of North Korean factories dropped to 30 to 50 per cent in the mid-1990s due to a lack of electricity and raw materials. This situation was inevitable partly because Russia decided to discontinue barter-based trade with North Korea in 1991 and China followed suit in 1993 (Cha 1998: 161; Park H.J. 2001: 69). The economic crisis was exacerbated by chronic food shortages, caused by a series of natural calamities in the late 1990s, such as floods and droughts, and lack of irrigation facilities and agricultural chemicals. On the military front, the end of the Cold War resulted in the disappearance of North Korea's allies, which made the government look elsewhere for modern weapons and relevant technology. North Korea's overall economic hardship hit the military sector hard, scaling down military budgets, reducing training hours, and eroding fighting morale. The decline of North Korea's conventional military power gave rise to its ambition to develop nuclear weapons from the late 1980s onwards. Noland (2000) suggests that North Korea had sought to strategically reposition itself within the international community and ensure its long-term viability as a state by possessing WMD, vital for deterrence purposes, while scaling down its conventional forces and pursuing economic reforms.

In sum, the North Korean leadership, fearful of the impact of the overthrow of Communist Party rule in eastern Europe, chose to stick to the established authoritarian system, given that the maintenance of the political status quo was less risky than a process of political and economic reforms that might run out of control (Kim P.S. 1998: 68). Therefore, North Korea had no choice but to pursue a path of ‘muddling through’, while holding the nuclear card, after the international environment became unfavourable to it following the inauguration of President George W. Bush. In the realm of neorealism, North Korea's confrontational attitude towards the superpower is an anomaly, given that the theory views the policy of a small state as reactive to structural shifts and outside influences. While confronting the Bush administration, which was threatening to
take coercive actions in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapons, North Korea maintained relatively close relations with South Korea. Strategically, the North tried to keep either Seoul or Washington on its side and drive a wedge between them.

North Korea's decline, in fact, offered a unique rationale for the proponents of the Sunshine Policy, since the policy itself aimed to help North Korea to tide over the economic hardship and to move towards integration with South Korea and the international community. Basically, South Korean policymakers assumed that North Korea had no option but to take the course of China or Russia, which is a choice between controlled opening and reform while keeping its political system intact or a comprehensive opening and reform while substituting communist rule for a democratic system. In either case, South Korean policymakers were ready to assist North Korea to ensure its 'soft landing' (Office of the President 2001).

2.2. North Korea and Norms

With a level of analysis based on the international system showing signs of weakness despite its powerful interpretation of North Korea's place in the world during the Cold War period, as seen above, ideational approaches offer a compelling approach to analyze the attitude and behaviour the state adopted after the Cold War. As detailed in Chapter Three, a state is not purely made up of the material capabilities it possesses, but a socially constructed organism, which has its own identity and charts its own future course of action. The North Korean leadership carved out juche sasang (the ideology of self-reliance) as a set of powerful domestic norms, which guided the whole nation to pursue an isolationist course. As these domestic norms have been deeply embedded in the North Korean society, the development of nuclear weapons was an evitable choice for self-defence in the face of the permanent threats of a nuclear strike from the United States.5 Hence, North Korea's mobilization of the self-help system, which is basically isolationism, clashed with the prevailing international norm of nuclear non-proliferation, which is a form of interventionism. This section investigates how identities and their attendant norms guided North Korea and the international community, in particular the United States, to adopt specific attitudes and actions towards each other.

2.2.1. International Norms

Some international norms are not produced on a consensus basis, but created and

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5 The sporadic threats of invasion by the United States provided the rationale for the necessity of what a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman referred to as 'nuclear deterrence' against possible US attacks (Yonhap News Agency, 10 January 2004). North Korea's nuclear weapons programmes will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
promoted by hegemonic powers. Since World War II, American grand strategy could be characterized as much by the mobilization of its military power as by the creation of international norms serving its national interests and propagation of liberal democracy (Ikenberry 2001b; Johnston 2001). Once these hegemonic norms are established, other states are persuaded, socialized, or forced into adopting them. Therefore, nuclear non-proliferation renders a powerful constraint against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states (Paul 2003).

For the United States, North Korea is identified as a war criminal (the Korean War), a terrorist state (the 1987 bombing of a civilian airliner and the 1983 attempt to kill the South Korean president) and a 'rogue state' (because of its attempt to develop WMD). In fact, North Korea had been mostly a neglected state in the bipolar Cold War world. It was only in the early 1990s, when it started winning extraordinary attention from the United States and other states because of its suspected nuclear weapons programme, that the salience of the North rose internationally. The non-proliferation issue helped North Korea to rise from near invisibility to a major trouble spot with which the international community had to come to terms (Barry 1998). For the United States, North Korea is regarded as a perennial 'rogue state', which is basically different from other states, like India and Pakistan, now armed with nuclear weapons after the 1998 nuclear tests. As observed in Chapter Two, the military-led Pakistani government was cooperative with the US efforts to fight terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, thus transforming its image as a pariah state. Washington even lifted many of the sanctions, introduced following its nuclear testing, in return for Pakistan's authorization of the US's use of its airspace and military bases during its invasion of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Cameron 2002: 136). Historically, the United States has tolerated authoritarian regimes, such as those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as long as they are pro-American (Gaddis 2003: 171).

North Korea's sudden visibility on the international radar screen as a state simultaneously seeking to develop nuclear weapons as it neglected its starving population fortified negative images of the North as an enemy state or a failed state (Yang S.C. 1999: 178-9). The situation was exacerbated because of its use of brinkmanship in negotiations with the United States and South Korea, which were seeking to neutralize its nuclear programmes. In dealing with North Korea, successive US administrations have shown ambivalence and have oscillated between two policy options: engagement and containment. Former US ambassador to South Korea, James Laney, said, 'American policy (toward North Korea) is shaped out of a collage of

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6 For further information, see Oberdorfer (2001).
various sectors of opinions and some are more impatient than others' (Quoted in Barry 1998: 96). The hard-liners in the US administration had better access to conservative journalists such as Lally Weymouth, Charles Krauthammer and William Safire, who played a crucial role in spreading negative images of North Korea as a state whose leadership thinking and decision-making process are unfathomable and whose behaviour is an outcome of an utterly different value system (ibid: 101-2).

The first nuclear crisis was eventually settled with the United States and North Korea signing the AF in October 1994, which had not only frozen North Korea's nuclear programmes but also outlined a course of action for diplomatic normalization. However, the Clinton administration moved at a snail's pace in improving ties with North Korea despite the agreement; and, when the time finally came to consider normalizing relations seriously, the impending 2000 presidential election meant it was too late to put the proposed roadmap into practice. Therefore, the AF, which charted US-North Korea relations, amounted to naught after the winner of the election, President George W. Bush, designated North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil' in 2002.

What factor has frozen US-North Korea relations in the frame of Cold War antagonism, eliminating any chance for the two states to move on? In fact, the antagonism between North Korea and the United States since the 1990s can be viewed as an outgrowth of the deeply embedded suspicion and hatred of each other since the Korean War. Although the numbers are not certain, the widely accepted casualty figures during the three-year war are that 900,000 Chinese and 520,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or wounded, as were about 400,000 U.N. Command troops, nearly two-thirds of them South Koreans. The number of US soldiers killed amounted to 36,000, leaving a deep scar in the American psyche (Oberdorfer 2001: 9-10).

For the United States, the main rationale for the stationing of 37,000 troops in South Korea since the armistice in 1953 has been the prevention or deterrence of possible North Korean provocations. Regardless of the nuclear crisis, North Korea has been regarded as an enemy state, which poses security threats to the United States and its allies. As a punitive action against the Communist regime following the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States has maintained 'blanket sanctions' for the past five decades under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as analyzed in Chapter Two. It was September 1999 when President Clinton announced his decision to ease a number of sanctions against North Korea, but this decision did not affect other sanctions regarding counter-terrorism or non-proliferation controls on North Korea, which prohibit the
export of military and sensitive dual-use items and most types of US assistance.\footnote{For further information, see the website of the US Department of State: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/nkor917.htm (accessed 20 February 2003)}

The process of building a negative image of North Korea as an enemy state was not simply an independent process propelled by the United States and like-minded countries. On the part of North Korea, the United States was also the archenemy that had foiled its attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula by force and perpetuated national division by stationing its forces in South Korea. For half a century, its state-run propaganda machines have demonized the United States as 'imperialist'. This residual hatred, stemming from historical antagonism and grievances, is what appears to be the most influential force driving US-North Korea relations (Barry 1998). In sum, North Korea remained an outlaw state without complying with such international norms as non-proliferation and anti-terrorism. Certainly, there have been huge costs that came with being labelled a 'rogue state' in international society, since it entails a loss of reputation, trust, and credibility for the North (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

2.2.2. Domestic Norms
What made North Korea become what former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher called a society 'caught in kind of a time warp' or 'the most isolated country in the world, unmoved by the winds of change that have swept the region'? (Quoted in Barry 1998: 103). To answer this question, this section will analyze the powerful domestic norms governing all walks of life in North Korea, which had cut the state completely off from the rest of the world and yielded the two major outcomes mentioned earlier: political stability and economic devastation. As outlined in the previous section, North Korea had been a 'free rider' during the Cold War, positioning its diplomatic locus skilfully somewhere between the Soviet Union and China and securing large amounts of military and economic assistance from these two bordering Communist powers. In spite of this material reliance on its neighbouring states, North Korea kept some distance from the Soviet Union and China in terms of Communist ideology and carved out a set of norms, known as juche (self-reliance),\footnote{North Korean leader Kim Il-sung first proclaimed the ideals of the juche ideology to the public on 28 December 1955 (Kim I.S. 1960). Many scholars refer to juche as an ideology, since North Korea calls it juche sasang (juche ideology) (Park H.S. 1996; Gothel 1996; Dh and Hassig 2000; Armstrong 1998). This chapter, however, describes juche as a set of norms as the 'standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891).} superseding the Marxist doctrines with a blend of nationalism and Confucianism (Park H.S. 1996; Kim, I.P. 1998; Harrison 2002: 15-18). Park H.S. (1996: 2) noted that juche is not simply an ideology, but a belief system which made North Korea 'politically centrist, ideologically paternalist,
economically collectivist, ethnically racist, diplomatically isolationist, and culturally nationalist'. In fact, the definition of *juche* was evolving over time in the face of new challenges and opportunities to incorporate new ideas and resolve contradictions arising from the conflicting ideas of nationalism and socialism (Gothen 1996).

Eventually, *juche*, as 'constitutive norms', transformed North Koreans, espousing its ideals, into a unique identity community, or the *juche* clan. Gothen (1996: 24) argues that *juche* helped North Koreans to 'discover their own identity in the construction of the country'. One of the remarkable cases in which *juche* evolved into a tool for national identification was the introduction of a slogan, *urisik sahoejuui* (socialism of our style). Building on the ideals of *juche*, North Korean ideologues sharpened its ideological focus and policy orientation in the name of 'socialism of our style'. In fact, they coined the new slogan after the collapse of socialist states worldwide to stress that the North Korean style of socialism, which is not based on those of the Soviet Union or its satellite states in eastern Europe, but on *juche*, would remain robust despite the new wave of structural changes, which resulted in the worldwide retreat of the socialist movement. By declaring its adherence to the twin ideas of socialism and isolationism, North Korea also resisted the intervention of the United States and other states in its domestic affairs and pursued 'a policy of military self-defence, economic self-sufficiency and ideological nationalism' (Park H.J. 2001: 93). Armstrong (1998: 32-4) noted:

[S]ocialism of our style is a defensive attempt at national identity mobilization, the legitimation of an incomplete nation-state which finds itself besieged not only by stronger external powers, but by a powerful competitor for the mantle of national legitimacy on the Korean peninsula in the form of an affluent, hostile Republic of Korea to the south.

Nationalism is one of the underlying ideas of *juche*. By the 1980s, North Korea shifted the focus of its governing ideology from Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism to 'a solipsistic nationalism which emphasized the uniqueness of the Korean experience, represented by the Great Leader and the expanding cult of the Kim Il Sung family' (Armstrong 1998: 32-4). Eckert (1996) traces the roots of this ideology

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9 Constitutive norms refer to those which 'create new actors, interests, or categories of action' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891).

10 The term, *urisik sahoejuui*, first appeared in the North Korean magazine *Worker* in December 1990 in a direct reaction to the collapse of socialism in Russia and east European countries, even though it was the outgrowth of the decades-long North Korean discourse of self-reliance (Kwak 1998).
to the nation’s history by noting: ‘Juche was, in effect, a passionate and unrestrained *cri de coeur* against centuries of perceived incursion or subjugation by external forces that had sought to weaken or destroy the country’. In 1998, this nationalist penchant evolved into another slogan for national mobilization, dubbed *kangsŏngdaeguk kŏnslŏl* (construction of a strong, prosperous country)’ (Park H.J. 2001; Kim H.J. 1996). While traditionalists stressed North Korea’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union and China, the revisionist school, which is based on a leftist interpretation, recognized Kim Il-sung as the leader of an anti-Japanese movement during the colonial period and his efforts to build an independent state, different to those satellite states in eastern Europe where the Soviets transported their system and personnel directly and exercised complete control. This initiative to create an autonomous, self-reliant state, coupled with North Korea’s economic superiority in the initial developmental stage over South Korea, derided as a ‘colony of US imperialists’, has given the Communist regime a sense of pride as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula (Kim H.J. 1998: 24-7). In fact, the Soviet troops pulled out of North Korea soon after the establishment of the North Korean Communist regime in 1948, while US troops have prolonged their presence in South Korea. Although the South Korean military took over peacetime operational control from the United States in 1994, wartime operational control is still in US hands to date, offering a rationale for North Korea’s propaganda offensives.

Drawing on these historical experiences, North Korean ideologues incorporated the nation’s traditionally strong Confucian ideologies, eventually elevating *juche* to a national religion (Park H.S. 1996). Here arises the holy trinity unique to North Korea: Kim Il-sung the father, Kim Jong-il the son and *juche* the holy spirit (Harrison 2002). Cumings (1993) notes that the first statue of Kim Il-sung was unveiled on Christmas Day in 1949, suggesting a systematic attempt to present him as a secular Christ. Since Kim Il-sung was North Korea’s founding father and architect of *juche*, the North Korean leadership took advantage of the nation’s strong Confucian tradition as a means of creating the emotional bondage between Kim Il-sung and every citizen of North Korea and strengthening the personality cult of the Kim family (Gothel 1996: 24-5).

At first, espousing *juche* as the governing ideology was a domestic process of **

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11 *Rodong Shinmun* (22 August 1998) first used the term, *kangsŏngdaeguk kŏnslŏl*, charting the future course of the state centring on building an economically strong state on the basis of political, military and ideological foundations, represented respectively by such slogans as the consolidation of the Kim Jong-il regime, the military-first policy and ‘socialism of our style’.

12 North Korea also employed the ideals of *juche* in film-making, since ‘art is no more than a revolutionary instrument’, according to North Korean ideologues (Lee H.J. 2000: 31).

13 ‘Since Confucianism placed excessive emphasis on both the ruler in the society and the father in the family, Kim Il-sung was easily assigned the status of Father of the Nation’ (Gothel 1996: 26).
solidifying the regime through political mobilization, even though it had been, at the same time, a reaction to outside conditions and pressures. While stressing self-reliance, the North Korean propaganda machine derided the United States as an 'evil' state, which ran a puppet regime in South Korea (Moon 2001: 304). This was bolstered in the memory of middle-aged North Koreans, who could not forget the ferocious US bombardments during the Korean War. This hatred was reproduced and instilled into younger generations, who were socialized through the education system to stab puppets of US soldiers with toy rifles and bayonets (Barry 1998). Hence, the end of the Cold War pitted North Korea against the United States, but the North Korean leadership had little room to manoeuvre in its policies towards the United States because of the deeply embedded public identification of the United States as an enemy state. The 1994 nuclear crisis further bolstered the belief of North Korean policymakers that the United States might launch a military strike against their nuclear facilities, if they do not abide by the NPT. For several decades, North Korea has always stood under the threat of the US first-use of nuclear weapons despite the 1978 US declaration pledging not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear state party to the NPT (ibid).

Could this norm of self-reliance be sustainable in North Korean society for the foreseeable future? In fact, North Korea has given rise to both social coherence and incoherence after the end of the Cold War. Even though its economic vulnerability as a bankrupt state depending on assistance from the capitalist West and South Korea caused a dilemma for North Korean policymakers, nationalism, coupled with Confucian traditions, has given the state durability and longevity (Harrison 2002: 6). In spite of the presence of potent domestic norms, there were some pockets of pragmatists in North Korea who wanted to establish better relations with the United States, but their attempts could not overcome the dominant norms in North Korean society, thus propelling the state to seek to develop nuclear weapons as the only means of guaranteeing its survival and the only bargaining chip it could use in future negotiations with the United States to win huge compensation to jumpstart its moribund economy, as well as diplomatic recognition (Laney 2003; Kim Sung-hyoung 2003). Even though the North Korean leaders created and propagated the ideals of juche, they could not 'adapt it to changing conditions', since it is a dogma assumed to be true all the time, as well as the source of authority and legitimacy (Oh and Hassig 2000: 13). Once indoctrinated, 'the masses are not a revolutionary force but a great conservative impediment to change in North Korea' (ibid: 39). Nevertheless, North Koreans’ pride in their own system and hatred harboured against the United States give clues to what North Korea really wants. According to some analysts, the international community's recognition of the legitimacy of North
Korea as a sovereign state is the key. Former US President Jimmy Carter (Quoted in Barry 1998) said in an interview after his 1994 trip to North Korea where he tried to arrange an inter-Korean summit at the peak of the nuclear crisis:

The North Koreans are not on their knees begging for economic aid from the United States, and they’re not begging that the United States have diplomatic relations. They look upon themselves as a proud and respected and sovereign nation who would like to have this relationship on a mutually respectful basis because they think it would be better for the United States to have normal relations with North Korea and it would be better for North Korea to have normal relations with the United States. But they don’t look upon those things as rewards or bribes to be given to them if they yield on something.

North Koreans interpreted Carter’s trip to their capital as an expression of respect to their state, because he was the first former US president to visit North Korea. In particular, the way North Koreans perceived Carter’s visit might be far different from the general belief, showing signs of possible normative changes in North Korea, in case the international community treats North Korea as a sovereign state. Chun (2001) argues that the process of identity formation should not be viewed endogenously on the Korean Peninsula, because exogenous influences have been more influential throughout history. Coupled with these exogenous influences, contradictions took place in North Korea as the population had no choice but to rely on food aid from the international community from the late 1990, setting the stage of the further erosion of the North Korean norms of self-reliance.

3. South Korea: structure and norms
Since the inauguration of President Kim in 1998, the South Korean government pursued a set of consistent, conciliatory policies towards North Korea, refraining from taking any provocative steps against the Pyongyang regime and offering steady humanitarian and economic assistance. Despite the superiority in its relative power over North Korea, South Korea did not adopt any measure to bully North Korea into accepting concessions. This behaviour is anomalous from the perspective of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which see state actions as being driven by rational responses to pressures

14 According to MOU (2003: 30), South Korea is in a position to play a central role in charting the future of the Korean nation, since the gap between North and South Korea is enormous in terms of economic power and military strength, given the sufficient deterrent power of the combined US-South Korean forces.
emanating from the so-called anarchical international system. Despite the Bush administration's demand for the coordinated adoption of coercive actions against North Korea to press it to give up its nuclear weapons programme, the South Korean government resisted the introduction of any punitive steps against North Korea in an effort to maintain inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.

This section will argue that an analysis based on the realist proposition of the international structure falls short of explaining the Sunshine Policy. It employs the constructivist approach to analyze South Koreans' identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea, which created the public space for the Kim administration's adherence to the Sunshine Policy in spite of a series of international and domestic obstacles. Before embarking on an analysis of South Koreans' identity shifts by using the identity norm life cycle, proposed in Chapter Three, this section will first shed light on how the international structure, represented by bipolarity and the 'balance of terror' during the Cold War, had constrained the behaviours and policies of major actors on the Korean Peninsula. Then it will provide an historical review of the policies of successive South Korean administrations and the evolution of South Koreans' identity norms vis-à-vis the North.

3.1. South Korea and Structure
The Korean Peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel in 1945 when the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a division of labour to disarm Japanese colonial forces. At first, the United States possessed no ambition or plan to occupy the southern half of the peninsula, but Soviet territorial ambitions, demonstrated in the East European theatre, especially in Poland, prompted it to send troops to minimize the amount of territory to come under Soviet control (Henderson: 1968: 121). In spite of the breakout of the Korean War in 1950, the structural stability of bipolarity stemming from the 'balance of terror' between the democratic and communist blocs had constrained the imperialist options of major actors on the Korean Peninsula, perpetuating the division of the peninsula even after the end of the Cold War. Although the peninsula was gripped by localized Cold War confrontations sporadically, successive South Korean governments endeavoured to deter possible North Korean aggression and ensure security by taking either strategies of containment or engagement. The conditions imposed by the international structure were so dominant and far-reaching that no South Korean government could be completely free from it. Therefore, it was after the end of the Cold War that South Korea started contemplating various ideas and policies to resolve the outstanding problem of national division (Westad 2001).

Despite the stated goal of unification in the post-summit declaration issued by
President Kim and Chairman Kim in 2000, South Korea’s Unification White Paper (MOU 2003: 31) puts more weight on a ‘virtual unification’, which is attainable through free travel and exchange between the peoples from the two Koreas, than any form of legal and institutional integration in the near future. It rules out the possibility that the two Koreas, which had been in a spiral of conflicts as states with different systems and ideologies for five decades, could achieve institutional, ideological and territorial unity through peaceful means in the short term. Therefore, the goal of the Sunshine Policy, defined as a status quo policy in Chapter Three, was to maintain national division rather than to pursue unification by absorption (Moon 2001, 1999; Lee C.M. 2001). The Sunshine Policy won international endorsement, especially from China and Russia, former socialist friends of North Korea. In particular, China, which pursued a ‘two-Korea policy’, offered support to the idea of the status quo because the collapse of North Korea might result in a large-scale influx of refugees and the disappearance of a buffer zone (Kim, Samuel 1999).

In retrospect, the history of the Korean division has been a history of outstanding endeavours to maintain the status quo on the peninsula since the Korean War, despite periodical deviations by ambitious North and South Korean governments and the United States (KINU 2000b). In this respect, the Sunshine Policy is in tandem with past South Korean governments’ policies vis-a-vis North Korea. The first example of the status quo, demonstrated in the closing months of the Korean War, was the superpowers’ efforts to maintain the status quo ante bellum. In spite of South Korea’s ambition to unify the peninsula by force, the United States moved on to sign the Armistice Agreement with China and North Korea in 1953 (Kim H.J. 1992; 2003). Since then, the two Koreas entered into fierce competition in order to emerge as a standard bearer of the Korean nation in an intense ideological and economic rivalry, on the one hand, while endeavouring to take the upper hand in addressing the Korean Peninsula-related issues amid the constant intervention of neighbouring powers, on the other. As observed in the previous section, North Korea enjoyed relative superiority over South Korea in the first three decades after national division, but its centrally planned economy started declining in the early 1980s, while South Korea achieved rapid economic growth. Despite the reversal of the economic equilibrium, the two Koreas enjoyed a ‘cold’ peace in the shackles of the Cold War for five decades.

In the middle of this cold peace, however, President Park Chung-hee’s administration seriously considered invading North Korea in January 1968 when North

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15 For information on the Korean War, see Kim H.J. (1989); Cumings (1981); Lowe (1986); and Acheson (1969).
Korean commandoes attacked his presidential house in a foiled attempt to assassinate him, and Pueblo, a US military intelligence ship, was seized by North Korea. Nevertheless, the United States thwarted South Korea from striking back in retaliation, working again to maintain the status quo (Kim H.J. 2003: 7; Han S.J. 2002: 631).

With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Cold War ended in the European theatre, but not in the political landscape of East Asia. The legacies of the Cold War were intact in East Asia in a localized form, as seen in the sporadic tensions in the Taiwan Straits (Alagappa 1998: 1). On the Korean Peninsula, the fall of the Soviet Union and the death of North Korea’s founding father, Kim Il-sung, prompted fears of the state’s possible collapse in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, North Korea showed an unswerving will to survive famine and the collapse of its centrally planned economy. From the structural point of view, the presence of China, which remains as a socialist ally of North Korea, has been one of the main reasons that made the state’s survival possible in an adverse international environment. Since the division of the nation, elites on both sides of the DMZ had no desire to relinquish their vested interests to change the status quo (Haas 1989: 39; Young 1989: 96; Sohn 1989: 63).

The North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, touched off by its 1993 declaration to leave the NPT, brought North Korea and the United States to the brink of war once again in 1994, when Washington had seriously considered a ‘surgical’ strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities in Yongbyon (Oberdorfer 2001: 323; Haass 1999: 51; Kim Sung-hyoung 2003). President Kim Young-sam and his advisors, shelving their earlier hard-line stance towards North Korea, endeavoured to stop the Clinton administration from launching a pre-emptive attack, thus working to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula yet again. As shown by this nuclear weapons crisis, the Kim Young-sam administration came under criticism for inconsistency in its policies towards North Korea, although it used the term, the carrot-and stick policy (Oberdorfer 2001: 282). As North Korea’s economic situation worsened further, South Korea was forced to choose one among the options of containment, benign neglect, or engagement. If it had chosen a containment policy, it would have risked war. Even if it had adopted for a policy of benign neglect, it would have helped North Korea earn more time to develop WMD, potentially creating a bigger problem for the future. Hence, it chose an engagement policy in the name of the Sunshine Policy, believing no viable alternative existed.

In spite of structural constraints, the two Koreas entered into cooperative arrangements many times over half a century, which seemed to be very durable in their initial stage. Nevertheless, they defected easily from the arrangements, in response to changes in the international or domestic milieu. What made them leave the agreements,
which they had so painstakingly negotiated and created? Some analysts compare this quagmire to a zero-sum game, mired in numerous but fruitless rounds of negotiations and agreements (Kang 1998; Oh 1998). According to political realism, a state, worried or uncertain about the relative gains of other states in the anarchical international system, chooses a less durable cooperative arrangement to facilitate its defection (Grieco 1995). In fact, inter-Korean cooperation had been hard, if not almost impossible, throughout history partly because North and South Korea assessed the benefits of interaction in relative gains terms. This game theoretical approach is convincing in explaining the end product of decades-long interactions between the two Koreas.

Nonetheless, the structural impact of the end of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula resulted in some short-term, positive developments in inter-Korean relations. Sensing the end of the Cold War, the Roh Tae-woo government (1988-93) introduced the so-called Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) aimed at establishing diplomatic ties with such Communist states as the Soviet Union and China, as well as improving relations with North Korea. The new policy, making use of structural shifts, awarded South Korea diplomatic recognition by the Soviet Union in 1990 and by China in 1992. Inter-Korean relations also enjoyed a heyday, culminating in the signing of the Basic Agreement in 1991 (Appendix III). However, inter-Korean rapprochement did not last long because the subsequent crisis, provoked by North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, invited the intervention of the United States. In fact, the Basic Agreement, lauded as a Magna Carta in inter-Korean relations, was a gentlemen’s agreement without any provision for penalties in the event of defection (Cha 1998). When the nuclear crisis heightened in 1993, North Korea decided to defect from the Basic Agreement because it had nothing to gain and there was no mechanism to prevent its defection. After the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il-sung in July 1994, South Koreans also suffered from recurring threat perceptions because of ‘the fact that North Korea launched the Korean War and is prepared to do the same again; the fact that North Korea has maintained its offensive strategy envisaging a surprise attack with the objective of a communization of the entire peninsula; the military advantage maintained by North Korea; the North Korean quest for long-range missiles combined with a clandestine nuclear weapons programme’ (Han Y.S.1998:114). The previous Kim Young-sam administration, upon facing the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim in 1994, further aggravated inter-Korean relations by disclosing Soviet documents that pinpointed him as the very person behind the Korean War and preventing South Korean dissident groups from dispatching a mourning delegation to Pyongyang.

Surveying the history of inter-Korean relations, Cha (1998) argued that a
necessary condition for the initiation of inter-Korean dialogue had been a change in the external security environment. For example, the 1972 Joint Communiqué came after Sino-American rapprochement and superpower détente, while the 1991 inter-Korean breakthrough also was preceded by the end of the Cold War. If so then, what has broken up bilateral negotiations? First, the change in the international environment hampered the development of inter-Korean relations. The inter-Korean rapprochement after the 1972 Joint Communiqué was hijacked by the demise of superpower détente and Sino-American rapprochement. Second, the rupture of inter-Korean dialogue could be attributed to the disparity in the strategic objectives of the two Koreas. South Korea sought a functionalist approach to start exchange and cooperation in non-political areas first, where the two sides are able to reach an agreement easily, while North Korea tried to tackle political and military issues directly by seeking to sign a peace treaty with the United States, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and an arms reduction agreement (KINU 2000b). Meanwhile, the two Koreas acted in the direction of keeping the status quo through what Wendt (1999) called ‘adversary symbiosis’ rather than forging a friendly relationship in their belief that any hasty improvement of inter-Korean relations would be detrimental to the interests of their respective states.

In sum, both structural and normative analyses shed new light on the continuity of the Korean division, but the structural approach fails to explain the ‘discontinuity’, demonstrated by the durability of inter-Korean cooperation that started with the inter-Korean summit in June 2000 with the potential of bringing about far-reaching consequences on inter-Korean relations and the regional political landscape. The following section will employ the constructivist approach to explain why the inter-Korean relationship changed markedly during the Kim administration and how the momentum of rapprochement could be maintained under the new Roh Moo-hyun administration.

3.2. South Korea and Norms
The previous section explained how structural forces held sway over inter-Korean relations, while indicating that structural explanations could not adequately account for the momentous shift in South Koreans’ attitude vis-à-vis North Korea and the inter-Korean relationship during the Kim administration. In particular, the structural approach marginalizes the social processes that spawned new thinking among South Korea’s state policy elites and private actors vis-à-vis North Korea.

This section will employ a constructivist approach in order to explain the evolution of the South Korean governments’ policies vis-à-vis North Korea and capture
the moments when normative forces emerged salient over structural forces. In fact, norms exert crucial influences upon a state’s behaviour, far more than allowed for in the orthodox neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches to international relations (Hook et al. 2001). Katzenstein (1996a: 2) contends that issues dealing with norms, identities and culture have become more salient in the debate on national security following the end of the Cold War.

This section will demonstrate the robustness of ideational forces, promoted by the Kim administration in spite of structural constraints, in order to set in motion the new dynamics of positive identification between the two formerly antagonistic states. Although a state’s policy is a set of decisions made in the constraints of evolving structural and normative environments, this chapter argues that the Sunshine Policy moulds conveniently into the case in which a group of policymakers imbued their ideas with legitimacy and endeavoured to internalize them within national and international society. As elaborated in Chapter Three, their roles are similar to those of norm entrepreneurs, defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as activists working to propagate international norms, such as the protection of medical personnel in battlefields. In the same vein, President Kim and his key followers endeavoured to establish a new modus operandi in South Korea’s relations with the North Korea, thus generating a remarkable shift in South Koreans’ perception of North Korea from an enemy to a partner or a brother. The administration’s projection of North Korea as a partner or a brother helped South Koreans to free themselves from the decades-long obsession of containing or balancing their Northern neighbours. Witnessing the shifts in public perception, the Kim administration made it clear that South Korea would pursue de facto unification, rather than de jure unification (Moon 1999: 42; Han Y.S. 2002: 60).

By using the identity norm life cycle, proposed in Chapter Three, this section will elucidate the driving force in the progress of inter-Korean relations and, in particular, how the Kim administration had worked to inspire the domestic constituents and the international community to change their identities and norms vis-à-vis North Korea. To answer these questions, this section will introduce an historical overview of South Korea’s policies vis-à-vis North Korea and the changing identity norms of South Koreans from the division of the Korean Peninsula to the end of the Kim administration. Especially after the introduction of the Sunshine Policy, the image of North Korea as the South’s enemy has been on an irreversible decline in terms of intensity and magnitude (Yang S.C. 1999: 181), as illustrated in the public opinion survey discussed in Chapter Seven. The Sunshine Policy, albeit short-lived in its real sense if we count only President Kim’s five-year tenure, is a stark reflection of the political and economic
vicissitudes of the two rival states on the Korean Peninsula. In the course of a history spanning half a century, we can clearly witness the two stages of 'emergence' and 'collision' of South Koreans' new identity norms projecting North Korea as a partner or a brother. Therefore, this chapter offers a radically new understanding of the genesis of these new identity norms and their emergence in fierce competition with the established identity norms. In the middle of the 'norm cascade' stage, however, identity norms clashed with structural forces, which hampered the process of their consolidation. Nevertheless, this section shows that the process of collective identity shifts remained robust despite structural constraints, propelling further inter-Korean integration.

Stage 1: Emergence of Identity Norms
Since the dawn of the Cold War, South Korean politics have featured an ideologically unipolar culture in which a conservative, anti-Communist orientation enjoyed unrivalled domination in the absence of any political party representing progressive ideas (Kim and Park 2001: 332). This ideological propensity reached such an extreme that Han Hong-gu (2001) was able to portray South Korean society as a sterilizer of any Communist ideologies. Buttressed by this ideological unity in South Korean society and ordinary citizens' hatred of North Korea, the Cold War structure forced successive South Korean governments to maintain the status quo in inter-Korean relations for several decades, thus failing to start any process of constructing a pan-national identity.

As analyzed in Chapter Two, constructivism can help to explain this phenomenon of 'adversary symbiosis' with its emphasis on deeply embedded norms (Wendt 1999: 274). For several decades, the two Koreas had needed each other to solidify their own systems and purge opponents in the name of state security, which was, at heart, nothing more than regime security (Moon 1998: 268; KINU 2000b). At the same time, the two states have sought to maintain the status quo on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War, entering into periods of cooperation at times but defecting from cooperative arrangements at others. Once negative identification was institutionalized in the form of laws and regulations, this type of collective identification remained influential and sporadic military crises further consolidated negative identification on both sides (Kahl 1998/9: 123-24). In this ideologically sterilized environment, this section sheds light on the moment that the seed for the sprouting of new identity norms embodying pan-national ideals and the penchant for inter-Korean cooperation and exchange had been sown.
President Syngman Rhee’s Policy: Northward Invasion

For nearly two decades following the Korean War, North and South Korea had no record of significant contacts, because neither recognized the legitimacy of the other. South Korea’s inaugural president, Syngman Rhee (1948-60), stuck to his ambition of unifying the Korean Peninsula, thus refusing to sign the Armistice Agreement in the closing months of the Korean War and holding onto the option of a northward invasion (Kim H.J. 2003: 4; Kim and Park 2001: 326; Harrison 2002: 157; Wada 2001: 84). Rhee’s decision to walk away from official negotiations to establish the Armistice Agreement provided a basis for North Korea’s refusal to hold dialogue with South Korea to discuss a peace treaty for the next several decades under the rationale that South Korea is not a signatory to the agreement (Choi 2001: 108).

During his 12-year-long term of office, President Rhee explicitly expressed his intention to invade North Korea to topple the communist regime, although his remarks were seen as political rhetoric, made in the absence of both military capabilities and US support for an option that would inevitably shatter the status quo (Lee H.J. 1969: 311-12; Cha 1998: 150). Okonogi (1977: 313) said that radical policies aiming to unify Korea by force served both Rhee and Kim II-sung in consolidating domestic power and legitimacy. The ensuing asymmetric development of military strength between North and South Korea resulted in Pyongyang’s invasion in 1950 to start the first hot war of the Cold War (ibid: 313-15).

Following the war, the South Korean National Assembly revised the already draconian NSL in December 1958 to add provisions to muzzle the rising voices critical of the Rhee government and crack down on anti-government activities as well as on any pro-Pyongyang movements (Kim H.J. 2003: 3). Once identity norms were

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16 The NSL was enacted on 1 December 1948 right after the birth of South Korea. When the South Korean parliament revised the NSL on 24 December 1958, which authorized law-enforcement authorities to exercise arbitrary power upon anti-government forces, the United States recalled its Ambassador Walter C. Dowling in 1959 in a show of displeasure. This was the first time that the United States had recalled its ambassador to protest against the South Korean government. If we apply the identity norm life cycle to this dynamics of negative identification, the enactment of the NSL marked the moment that South Koreans’ identities and their subservient norms, projecting North Korea as an enemy and denying any form of dialogue and contact, were internalized, which is the final stage of the four-stage life cycle outlined in Chapter Three. These identity norms were born when the United States and the Soviet Union divided the peninsula in 1945 to disarm Japanese colonialists. In spite of the artificial division, inter-Korean exchange went on, although the people started feeling a sense of ‘otherness’ in regard to each other. The stage of norm emergence proceeded to the second phase of norm collision in 1948 when North and South Korea established independent governments, which in turn played the role of activist governments propagating identity norms prescribing a set of attitude and behaviour toward each other. The stage of norm cascades came with the Korean War in 1950, an historical incident that had irreversibly strengthened the negative identification of each other. Wrapping up this identity norm life cycle, the South Korean National Assembly codified identity norms banning any acts or behaviours sympathizing with North Korea, let alone communication and contact.
internalized in the form of laws, the Rhee government adopted harsh measures to enforce them to the extent that opposition leader Cho Pong-am, who founded the Progressive Party and called for peaceful unification rather than unification by force, was executed in 1959 after being indicted for engaging in espionage activities for North Korea (Han H.G. 2001). In fact, Cho was rather a centrist politician who founded the nation's first social democratic party renouncing both capitalism and communism (Donga Ilbo, 18 March 1999). While accusing his political opponents of collaborating with communists, the Rhee administration created anti-communist organizations, including the Anti-Communist Youth Corps, as a vanguard to mobilize the 'hegemonic ideology', often accompanied with brutal violence (Han 1974: 26-31).

**President Park Chung-hee's Policy: Economy First**

President Park Chung-hee (1961-79) diverted his attention to South Korea’s economic development and achieved rapid industrialization (Gills 1996: 145-89), even though it was within the context of building a strong state to achieve unification by force (KINU 2000b). His policy shared a common ground with Rhee’s approach because both governments considered unification to be achievable only by overthrowing the North Korean communist regime.

Despite the presence of antagonism in the public sphere, the North and South Korean governments managed to open a secret channel of dialogue beginning in May 1972 between the South's intelligence chief Lee Hu-rak and his North Korean counterpart Kim Yong-ju, creating the 4 July Joint Communique. This first major document regulating inter-Korean relations stipulated that unification should be sought through (1) the independent efforts of the two Koreas, without intervention by external powers; (2) peaceful means without using force; and (3) the promotion of national unity that transcends the ideological divide (Cha 1998). The communique became the basis for the establishment of the North-South Coordinating Committee, the primary government channel of dialogue, and the hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang (KINU 2000b). In 1973, President Park also issued a special foreign policy statement, called the 23 June Statement, in which his government pledged not to oppose Pyongyang’s participation in international organizations and the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations.

This unprecedented attempt to forge reconciliation between the two Koreas, which came after the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, did not last long and the government-level dialogue became eventually deadlocked in August 1973 (Ahn 1986: 235). Instead of launching serious talks on the future of the two
Koreas, the delegates clashed over who provoked the Korean War and why the South Korean intelligence agency had kidnapped then-opposition leader Kim Dae-jung, reflecting the lingering animosity and suspicion towards each other (Cha 1998). While South Korea sought to achieve a phased increase of inter-Korean exchanges to build trust and promote mutual understanding, North Korea called for drastic measures, including the suspension of the arms race, the withdrawal of US forces and the establishment of a peace treaty (KINU 2000b).

In the backyard of President Park’s ‘iron-fisted rule’, chaeya, a group of dissidents who covered a wide spectrum of ideological positions from leftists to nationalists to rightists, emerged, marking a notable chapter in the history of South Korea’s democratization movement (Chung Chul-hee 2002). Included in the list of dissidents were Chang Jun-ha (editor of Sasanggye), Paek Ki-wan (leader of a grassroots movement), Ham Sok-hon (civil rights activist), Rev. Moon Ik-hwan (pastor and civil rights activist), Kye Hun-je (civil rights activist) and Ri Young-hee (professor and writer), who had become a spiritual fountain for the leftist and nationalist student movements in the 1980s. In particular, the Coalition for Human Rights Movement in Korea, formed in 1977 and headed by Ham Sok-hon and Rev. Moon, issued a statement, entitled ‘The Human Rights of Fifty Million People’, to present a new idea that unification is a key step for the improvement of human rights for both North and South Koreans (Sohn 1989: 130). The dissident leaders defied the government’s authority, which was expressed in the form of a monopoly on the unification debate, and called for more proactive initiatives for national unification (KINU 2000b; Han Sang-jin 2001). In the context of this dissertation, the rise of the dissident movement in defiance of President Park’s authoritarian rule can be said to have marked the birth of new identity norms vis-à-vis North Korea, which prescribed new behavioural standards in inter-Korean relations in support of more contacts, more dialogue and more cooperation.

With President Park sticking to security-first policies, Kim Dae-jung, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, came up with a series of progressive ideas in the 1970s, including ‘the establishment of a South Korean national institute to plan an appropriate unification policy; open discussion of unification based on liberal theories; and the encouragement of academic and political studies of Communism; tension reduction between the two Koreas; non-political exchanges of journalists and athletes; free letter exchanges; and the guarantee of the surrounding four powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China – to deter a major war on the Korean peninsula’ (Kang 1999: 5). However, these nascent movements faced harsh crackdowns by the law-enforcement authorities because South Korea’s authoritarian system could
not tolerate ideological diversity and private inter-Korean exchange. Kim’s pursuit of inter-Korean reconciliation as a dissident leader during the era of South Korean military regimes won him a reputation as a ‘dangerous pro-North Korean agitator’ (Kim H.J. 2003: 36). The organizational platform of the dissident and opposition movements was also too weak to propagate new identity norms.

**President Chun Doo-hwan’s Policy: Pragmatism**

A series of pragmatic actions by President Chun Doo-hwan (1981-8) yielded some achievements in inter-Korean relations, but faced the same fate as other zero-sum game approaches because of the lingering mistrust and animosity between the two Koreas. According to an opinion survey, conducted in January 1985, 61.3 per cent of South Koreans responded that war is possible between the two Koreas (Ahn 1986: 254). Inter-Korean dialogue under President Chun came unexpectedly when North Korea expressed the intention to offer relief aid to South Korean victims of a severe flood in September 1984 (ibid: 233). Although it was questionable whether the North Korean offer was a gesture of compatriotic love or simply a piece of propaganda offensive, the South Korean president surprisingly accepted the offer. This unexpected turn created the atmosphere for a spate of inter-Korean meetings and exchanges in 1984 and 1985, including vice-ministerial talks, inter-parliamentary conferences, and discussion of athletic exchange. In total, sixteen meetings took place, including five economic council meetings, three Red Cross sessions and two parliamentary meetings (KINU 2000b). The highlights of these contacts were the exchange of performance troupes and reunions of separated family members (Foley 2003). In fact, these inter-Korean exchanges were a surprise to many observers because they came right after the 1983 North Korean terrorist attack, which killed half of the South Korean cabinet during President Chun’s visit to Rangoon, Myanmar, an incident underlining the deeply embedded enmity between the two Koreas. Chun barely escaped the attack and returned home cancelling his remaining itinerary. This second major inter-Korean dialogue in the history of national division was brought to a standstill in February 1986 when North Korea suspended future talks, protesting against Team Spirit, a joint US-South Korean military exercise. In fact, the joint military exercise has been one of North Korea’s main reasons for suspending inter-Korean dialogue thereafter.

*Domestically, President Chun attempted to muzzle any public debate on his*

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17 For instance, about 200,000 South Korean and US troops participated in the joint military exercise south of the DMZ, involving ground, sea and air forces, which put North Korean forces on full alert (Oberdorfer 2001: 152).
government's North Korea policies, thus implementing extensive political repression. In the early 1980s, opposition leader Kim Dae-jung was indicted on charges of anti-state activities and sentenced to death before being freed under US pressure, and the two other opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, were banned from engaging in political activities (Levin and Han 2002: 64). During his imprisonment, Kim Dae-jung, called 'a communist' by the South Korean ruling elites at that time, devoted himself to devising the 'three-stage approach' to the Korean unification (ibid).

The 1980s had been marked by an unprecedented upsurge of street demonstrations by students calling for national unification and the withdrawal of US forces, even though their slogans were still interpreted as too radical to appeal to ordinary citizens (KINU 2000b: Bedeski 1994: 27). South Korea remained an ideological wasteland to the extent that an incumbent National Assemblyman was arrested in 1986 for contending that 'the nation's goal is not anti-Communism, but unification'.

Stage 2: Collision of Identity Norms
The end of the Cold War provided fertile ground for South Koreans' new identity norms to gain robustness and be able to challenge the predominant norms regulating inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Entrepreneurs of new norms obtained more visibility in the public sphere through their bold actions, such as secret trips to North Korea, and media reports that had reflected the diverse features of South Korean society after being freed from the censorship of the past's authoritarian regimes. Even though the early norm entrepreneurs faced crackdowns by state authorities, their movements assumed the central stage of public discourse in South Korea, brightening the possibility that those groups could be emancipated eventually from the rule of the dominant groups sticking to the norms reflecting the Cold War mentality.

President Roh Tae-woo's Policy: Nordpolitik
Timed with the end of the Cold War, President Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) orchestrated a policy of inter-Korean rapprochement, although it did not last long because of a crisis, touched off by North Korea's nuclear weapons programme in 1993. President Roh issued the '7 July Declaration' in 1988 through which Seoul expressed its intention to normalize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, while offering to help North Korea to improve its ties with Seoul's allies (Kim D.C. 1990: 191). The declaration envisioned the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China as part of the efforts to ensure stability on the
Korean Peninsula (ibid: 192). Roh's Nordpolitik, aimed at normalizing ties with North Korea's allies, the Soviet Union and China, was possible amidst the structural shifts, expedited by the end of the Cold War, which also prompted North Korea to reluctantly change its policies. For example, China shocked North Korea in May 1991 by conveying the message that it would not veto South Korea's entry into the United Nations, which opened the way for the two Koreas' simultaneous accession to the world body in September (KINU 2000b).

The Roh administration managed to create two agreements of great significance in the history of inter-Korean relations in December 1991: the Basic Agreement (Appendix III) and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Cha (1998) noted that the Basic Agreement is an improved version of the 1972 Joint Communique: first, it followed the format of an international treaty, including the parliamentary ratification process, in an effort to make it a binding document; second, the agreement acknowledged the legitimacy of each system and called for, among other things, the suspension of defamatory propaganda, the negotiation of a peace treaty, the linking of severed railways and highways, the reunion of separated family members and the revival of postal and communication links; and, third, the agreement laid out an institutional roadmap for unification by specifying the timetable for the creation of a liaison office and joint committees for security affairs and cooperative exchanges. It also included the establishment of a hot line between the two military authorities, arms reduction talks, prior notification of troop movements and exercises, and the exchange of military personnel and information. Amid the heightening North Korean nuclear crisis, however, further inter-Korean contacts were deadlocked in January 1993 when North Korea declared the suspension of dialogue, citing the joint US-South Korea Team Spirit military exercise.

The end of the Cold War has seen an upsurge of intensified activities by South Korean students and dissidents seeking to directly contact their North Korean counterparts, but the NSL, which has been in force to thwart all forms of inter-Korean contacts, erected hurdles for these movements. In 1989, a series of secret trips by South Korean students and dissidents to North Korea came as a shock to the Roh administration and ordinary South Korean citizens, touching off a heated debate on unification and the possible revision or abolition of the stiff law. Rev. Moon Ik-hwan, a long-time dissident, visited North Korea and met North Korean leader Kim Il-sung in March, followed by novelist Hwang Sok-young in April, Rep. Suh Kyung-won in June and student activist Im Soo-kyung in the same month (KINU 2000b; Hart-Landsberg 1998: 198). In particular, an unprecedented trip by the female student to Pyongyang to
attend the thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students was regarded as one of the greatest achievements by Hanchongnyon, a pro-North Korean umbrella student organization, and turned the discourse on unification into a mainstream debate in South Korea's public sphere (ibid: 199). For student activists, the nationalist penchant of North Korea's governing ideologies, as observed in the previous section, was seen as an alternative path to South Korea's dependence on the United States and pursuit of consumerism denying distributive justice (Bedeski 1994: 103). The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' rulings in a strong punitive action against the unauthorized travellers to North Korea for violating the NSL. The rulings of the South Korean courts were interpreted as reflecting the Roh government's belief that it was premature to authorize civilian unification movements, despite the end of the Cold War (Korea Daily News, 26 September 1990).

Another milestone in the dissident and leftist movement in the 1980s was the spread of the minjung (masses) movement that draws on ‘shamanism, traditional folk tales and peasant rebellions in an attempt to create a uniquely Korean liberation theology’ (Bedeski 1994: 104). The new grass-roots movement added a significant dimension to South Korean society and led to the establishment of Chonminnyon, a pan-national body of dissidents, in 1989 and Pomminnyon or the Pan-National Alliance for the Reunification of Korea, in 1990, which had branch offices in Japan, Europe and North Korea. In particular, Pomminnyon's main objectives included the peaceful reunification of Korea, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, abolition of the NSL and the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. As their specified goals were almost identical with those of the North Korean regime, it has been branded as an anti-state organization, benefiting North Korea, under Article 7 of the NSL. Significantly, the rise of student and leftist movements in the 1980s put an end to the South Korean government's monopoly on the unification debate (Cho-Han and Lee 2000: 71). In spite of the golden opportunity for national unity, bestowed by the end of the Cold War, however, South Korea remained caught in an intense ideological polarization, which perpetuated its status as the last vestige of the Cold War, along with the North.

President Kim Young-sam's Policy: Inconsistency
The five-year term of President Kim Young-sam (1993-8) was eventful, spanning the North Korean nuclear crisis and South Korea's worst economic crisis in history in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Every indication showed that President

18 For more information, see Han Sang-jin (1986).
Kim harboured the ambition to emerge as the first president of a unified Korea because North Korea’s economic situation was in tatters and the state lost its founding father in July 1994 (Kim H.J. 2003: 12; Kim K.S. 2002: 100). In his inauguration speech on 25 February 1993, Kim declared: ‘No allies can be better than the nation. We are ready to meet at any time and any place’ (Donga Ilbo, 26 February 1993). Moon (1998: 275) interpreted this remark as the emergence of minjok anbo (national security), comprising both North and South Koreans, as a new security identity in South Korea, where kukga anbo (state security) had been predominant thus far. Under the new guideline, the MND redefined its security policy by expanding the scope of security from the protection of South Koreans to the preservation of the political and territorial integrity of the entire Korean nation, comprising North and South Koreans, as well as overseas Koreans (ibid).

Despite President Kim’s initially conciliatory steps towards North Korea, his government failed to maintain momentum mainly because South Korea’s strong anti-Pyongyang forces, assisted by the conservative media organizations, as touched on earlier, dominated the policy-making process and the public sphere, taking advantage of the Kim government’s lack of clear goals and principles regarding North Korea policies (KINU 2000b: Park K.Y. 1998). As public opinion turned negative in the face of North Korea’s provocations, including the nuclear weapons crisis of 1994, the Kim government became increasingly sensitive towards them and eventually succumbed to the hard-line, conservative voices in society.

The normative forces shackling South Korea’s policy options were vividly illustrated by the action taken by the Kim government after the death of North Korean leader Kim Il-sung. Kim died only a few weeks before he was scheduled to meet the South Korean leader for a summit, which was agreed upon for the first time in the history of the divided nation. Despite its initial acceptance of the North Korean leader as a dialogue partner, the South Korean government exhibited profound disarray in reacting to his death and yielded to the conservative normative forces, which lurk deep in the mentality of South Koreans especially in times of crises. Chosun Ilbo, a mass circulation newspaper in South Korea, played a pivotal role in driving public opinion in the direction of labelling the late Kim as the very ‘culprit’ of the Korean War, effectively restraining student and dissident efforts to send a delegation to his funeral in North Korea (Han Sung-joo 2001: 195). Sensing the rising anti-Pyongyang sentiment, the Kim government ruled out the possibility of expressing condolences over his death. Instead, it put its armed forces on high alert, publicized Soviet documents pinpointing Kim for provoking the Korean War, and launched a crackdown on attempts to express tributes to Kim’s death, events that froze inter-Korean relations for the remainder of the Kim
administration (Chun 2000: 78; KINU 2000b).

President Kim’s attitude assumed the height of inconsistency in the South Korean government’s North Korea policies (Mazzar 2000: 313). South Korean policymakers swayed between the ambition to achieve national reunification and the wisdom that unification by absorption might turn out to be disastrous to the prosperity of South Korea. The United States was also taken aback by occasional wholesale South Korean shifts to the right, including the incident after Kim’s death (Barry 1998). Chun (2000: 77) and Paek (2000: 33-5) collected key statements by President Kim, testifying to the remarkable inconsistency of his attitude and policies towards North Korea. For example, Kim made conciliatory remarks, such as ‘No alliance partner is better than compatriots (25 February 1993)’; ‘Within my term, I will make utmost efforts to achieve an inter-Korean confederation (20 January 1994)’; ‘I want to meet (North Korean) President Kim at any time. We have rice to donate (4 April 1994)’; ‘We would not spare any efforts to extend a helping hand to North Korea regardless of whatever it wishes (7 March 1995)’; and ‘We are willing to buy foreign rice to assist North Korea (22 June 1995)’. In almost the same period, however, Kim made anti-Pyongyang remarks: ‘I cannot shake hands with a partner armed with nuclear weapons (3 June 1993)’; ‘Now is the most dangerous moment when North Korea might provoke any contingency (27 May 1994)’; ‘In an interview with CNN, (Kim Il-sung) stated three times that North Korea would not collapse, a strange act that made me presume that he has a health problem (20 July 1994)’; and ‘Washington is too naïve and flexible in its talks with North Korea (27 October 1994)’.

On top of this inconsistency, the Kim government maintained a virtual diplomatic doctrine for five years: ‘All roads to the world go through Seoul’. Although the doctrine was originally intended to help North Korea to improve its relations with the international community, the South Korean government did not want the United States to improve its relations with North Korea ahead of inter-Korean relations (Barry 1998; Moon 1998). As North Korea had attempted to improve ties with the United States and other Western countries while refusing to hold dialogue with South Korea, the Seoul government’s doctrine only served the role of impeding North Korea’s contacts with Western countries.

President Kim Dae-jung: Emergence of an Activist Government
This section sets the stage for an analysis of the dramatic policy shift that led to inter-Korean rapprochement. In fact, the demands for new ideas, which could lead to South Koreans’ identity shifts toward North Korea, had been already in the offing in South
Korean society. As witnessed in the previous section, the dominating Cold War template left the South Korean public divisive and antagonized against different groups sharing different ideas, which perpetrated the symbiosis of different identities and norms (Moon 1999; Kim and Park 2001). In particular, a majority of South Koreans exhibited two contrasting features: 'a strong Cold War ethos (anti-Communist and anti-North Korean sentiment) and a strong desire to overcome such an ethos' (Kim and Park 2001: 320).

To shatter this equilibrium, South Korean society required the emergence of an activist government, armed with a new set of policy tools, as illustrated in Chapter Three. President Kim's knowledge and adherence to non-violence are attributed to his access to the great ideas and philosophies of Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King (Kim H.J. 2003: 36). President Kim's policy is a logical outcome of his knowledge-based ideas, since he was a member of an international network of pro-democracy leaders and human rights activists, which could be regarded as a form of what Haas (1992) identified as an epistemic community, defined as a network of professionals equipped with policy-relevant knowledge and experiences in a particular domain.

The Sunshine Policy was not conceived overnight. As early as September 1994, Kim (1994a: 33), then-opposition leader, called on the United States to 'be patient and stick to the "sunshine policy" which proved to be the only effective way to deal with isolated countries like North Korea'. Kim, speaking at the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, also praised Carter's efforts to broker reconciliation between the two Koreas. Moon (2001: 281) said that Kim invoked the analogy of sunshine to press the US government to take a soft-landing policy towards North Korea. Throughout his career as a democracy fighter, Kim Dae-jung (1994b: 223-4) had been a champion of peace, which is well documented in his three principles of peace: peaceful co-existence, peaceful exchange and peaceful unification. In particular, the objective of peaceful exchange was the 'restoration of a common national identity through political, economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian interactions and expansion of common interests through increased economic exchanges' (Moon 2001: 288). Under these principles, President Kim sought to shift South Koreans' identities vis-à-vis North Korea by promoting a wide range of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.

Upon taking office as President, President Kim embarked on a quest to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula. President Kim's new ideas and public support on his engagement option were evidently demonstrated in his speech made at the University of London on 4 April 1998 immediately after his inauguration (Office of the President 1999):
The Republic is now able to push a North Korea policy with self-confidence arising from firm public support. I have been steadfast in advocating what I call ‘sunshine policy’ which seeks to lead North Korea down a path toward peace, reform and openness through reconciliation, interaction and cooperation with the South. As President, I will carry out such ideas step by step.

Basically, previous South Korean governments shared the ideas of ending hostilities between the two Koreas and laying the groundwork for peaceful coexistence, although they could not stick to such ideas in the face of domestic and international constraints. Despite its unique features as an engagement policy, the Sunshine Policy is in line with the engagement policies or initiatives of the previous South Korean governments: the 4 July Joint Communiqué under President Park Chung-hee; Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) and the 7 July Declaration under President Roh Tae-woo; and President Kim Young-sam’s engagement policy in the first half of his administration (Kim and Park 2001: 328-9). However, Moon (1999: 36-46) argues that the policy represented a sweeping departure from those of the previous governments in terms of consistency and integrity, elevating it to the level of President Kim’s philosophy.

The central argument of this section is that the momentous turn in inter-Korean relations under President Kim’s five-year tenure was the product of normative evolution and consistent policy entrepreneurship by President Kim and the administration’s key policymakers, boosted by the readiness of the public sphere to embrace their ideas to a greater extent. Redefining state interests in a new post-Cold War milieu, the leadership jettisoned confrontational policies and advocated a consistent engagement option to soften North Korea’s attitude. As identity is the link between norms and interests that motivate behaviour (Herman 1996: 283), the South Korean leadership attempted to inspire the public with the way they identified North Korea and reduce South Koreans’ endemic security dilemma. As elucidated in Chapter Three, President Kim, as a norm entrepreneur making use of his organizational platform and information, repeatedly portrayed North Korean Chairman Kim as a ‘reliable figure’ and resorted to ‘persuasion’ rather than ‘argument’ in an effort to craft a new frame in the South Korean psyche, thus fixing meanings and proposing solutions to inter-Korean problems.

Kim’s inauguration as President, ending his career as a life-long dissident leader armed with his own ideas and principles of inter-Korean relations and unification, helped to open new policy windows (Lee W.S. 2003). When President Kim took office
in February 1993, he was ready to announce the three core principles of his Sunshine Policy (MOU 1999). The first principle is no tolerance of armed provocation by North Korea. As seen in the exchange of fire between the naval vessels of the two Koreas in June 1999, South Korea showed its strong determination not to tolerate any armed provocation by North Korea.\footnote{The West Sea naval incidents will be examined in detail in Chapter Six.} In fact, the naval clash gave a boost to the Sunshine Policy's credibility, proving that it was not merely an appeasement policy but a security policy with teeth. Despite its triumph in the naval skirmishes, South Korea did not make use of the North Korean provocation as an excuse to launch a stepped-up counterattack against North Korea, thus maintaining the principle of the status quo. The second principle is the abandonment of any attempt to unify the nation by absorption in a formula similar to German unification. In fact, German unity heightened the prospects of a similar integration process on the Korean Peninsula, apparently frightening the North Korean elites who were struggling to remain in power through the maintenance of the current system. As this fear negatively influenced inter-Korean relations, it was necessary for the Kim government to officially declare that it had no intention of absorbing North Korea by any means. The third principle is the promotion of exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas. Right after taking office, President Kim called for the expansion of inter-Korean relations through the revival of the 1991 Basic Agreement. Even though he failed to revive the agreement, President Kim signed the Joint Declaration with Chairman Kim after their summit in 2000 and maintained exchange and cooperation even after the North's admission to a nuclear weapons programme in October 2002.

In spite of the collision of competing identity norms in the public sphere, President Kim and his advisors remained steadfast to the course of engaging North Korea. Even though South Korea has a strong presidential system, President Kim faced fierce criticism from the opposition GNP and conservative media organizations, which remained tied to established norms and emphasized the enemy side of North Korea. There were also differences in policy priorities among key actors of his own presidential house, the bureaucracy and the ruling party (Steinberg 1999). Nevertheless, they could not defeat the unswerving willpower of President Kim and his advisors, given the closed, streamlined South Korean policy-making process, as discussed in Chapter Three.

The new identity norms, pushed by the leadership, clashed with the established norms in South Korean society, which were predominantly anti-Communist and security-oriented (Paik 2002: 21). As remarkable examples of 'norm collision', this section identifies two phenomena: cognitive dissonance and a clash with existing
institutions.

A. Cognitive Dissonance.
It did not take much time for the proponents of the Sunshine Policy to disrupt the cognitive framework of South Koreans, who had been indoctrinated for decades by successive anti-Communist regimes to react in a tit-for-tat manner to any provocative step taken by North Korea and to believe that the Seoul government holds the monopoly over assessing and making decisions on any issues related to North Korea (Korea Times, 25 June 1998). In fact, the identity of South Korea as a major actor on the Korean Peninsula has been constituted in its constant interpretation and, in many instances, exaggeration of threats posed by North Korea during the Cold War and onwards, just like the discourse of American identity constitution was impossible without Soviet threats during the Cold War (Campbell 1992). Since stasis in identity constitution means death to a state (ibid: 11), South Korea experienced fierce confrontations between groups with contending identities at times of great change after the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War led to the ‘bipolarity of the political orientation’, spawning political and social confrontations and tension between the state and the business circle over the autonomy of inter-Korean business activities (Kim and Park 2001: 332). Only four months after President Kim’s inauguration, the South Korean government faced crucial moments of judgment with regard to two sensitive inter-Korean issues: a tourism project pushed by Hyundai, one of South Korea’s largest business conglomerates, on Mt. Kumgang in North Korea and the discovery of a North Korean submarine in South Korean territorial waters. At that time, the late Hyundai tycoon, Chung Ju-yung, announced that his group had signed an agreement with North Korea to organize pleasure boat services to Mt. Kumgang. Initially, the project did not look feasible because the previous South Korean administrations made it a rule for businesses to secure the North Korean government’s official guarantee of the safe passage of South Korean travellers. According to conventional beliefs, such a trip would be possible only after the North and South Korean authorities first held official talks to address all related issues. Vice Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, who later became unification minister in January 2002 and retained the post under the new Roh Moo-hyun government, raised the possibility that the government would not officially meddle in the process, while allowing such a state-run agency as the Korea National Tourism Organization (KNTO) to sign a deal on the safe passage of South Koreans. The vice minister’s remarks came as a shock to both the political and business worlds, as well as the public, because a similar project by a South Korean ferry company was aborted
under the Kim Young-sam government due to the stiff requirements.

As for the North Korean submarine infiltration, the Kim government also showed a completely different attitude from that of the Kim Young-sam administration. Without labeling it as an 'infiltration' into South Korean waters, the government rather accommodated the North Korean insistence that it was an accidental violation of territorial waters because of a 'mechanical problem'. In September 1996 when another North Korean submarine ran aground in South Korean waters, then-president Kim Young-sam immediately defined it as a 'provocation' by North Korea and ordered every possible action to punish the infiltration, including sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. Facing a similar incident in 1998, the MND sought to adopt the same hard-line action against the infiltration, but the presidential house stopped the ministry from taking additional steps. Since professional military organizations display strong adherence to organizational behaviour leading to deterrence failure because of their 'common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests' (Sagan 1994: 68), the presidential house needed to intervene immediately to prevent the escalation of tension. Contemplating the attitudinal changes of the South Korean government, a MOFAT official commented at the time: 'Up to now, the people have been brainwashed by the past regimes. It will take time for them to adapt themselves to the new government's policies' (Korea Times, 25 June 1998).

Since multiple identities co-exist in society, the projection of North Korea as a partner or a brother was not the creation of the Kim administration, as demonstrated in the previous section. Throughout history, South Koreans’ images of their North Korean neighbours have been positioned somewhere between the two extremes of brothers and enemies, showing ideational dualism (Moon 2001; Kim and Park 2001). Therefore, the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance can be seen as part of the process in which those in power, making use of their advantageous status and various state organs, tried to reframe the public’s cognitive structure, thus bringing about noticeable identity shifts. In particular, the Sunshine Policy served to propel the public to perceive the North Koreans as brothers.\(^{20}\) In fact, the Sunshine Policy was the first policy to place greater emphasis on the brother side of North Korea than the enemy side in resolving problems stemming from national division and foreign intervention. As North Korea was supposed to be a brother, the policy focused on how to foster brotherhood to effectively lay the groundwork for unification in a phased manner, since immediate unity was seen

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\(^{20}\) A series of surveys conducted by South Korean newspapers and government branches indicated that an absolute majority of South Koreans supported the Sunshine Policy and started holding positive images on North Korea. Those survey results will be presented later in this section.
as detrimental to national interests (Office of the President 2001). In fact, national division, which had lasted for half a century, made the divide something natural to the younger generations, while the trauma-struck generations would retire or die before long (Galtung 1989: 14; Haas 1989: 39).

If we introduce a fraternal twin brother metaphor to the Korean situation, it reflects the fact that the tilting economic capabilities in favour of South Korea apparently formed a hierarchical relationship on the Korean Peninsula in terms of economic power, thus turning North and South Korea into a mischievous little brother and a benevolent big brother. Therefore, the Sunshine Policy was, on the one hand, an attempt to free inter-Korean relations from the constraints of the international structure, while, on the other, an endeavour to turn North Korea into an identical twin brother, a state similar to South Korea based on democracy and the market economy. Under this rationale, South Korea, the stronger elder brother, should be patient for the time being despite North Korea's periodic attempts to undermine the process in order to allow it to reciprocate South Korean measures at an undetermined time and in an underdetermined way, rather than applying the principle of strict reciprocity, used by the previous South Korean governments (Han Y.S. 2002: 59).

B. Clashes With Existing Institutions.
Although the United States dropped North Korea from its attention whenever it was off the front pages of the newspapers (Barry 1998), South Koreans faced different realities as cohabitants of the peninsula and sought to put an end to the long-running inter-Korean tension. As new norm entrepreneurs, President Kim and his advisors sought to remove anti-North Korean laws and regulations to win the heart of the North Korean leadership and facilitate future inter-Korean exchange. In fact, the anti-North Korean attitude is deeply inscribed in the South Korean Constitution, as its Article 3 states, 'the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the peninsula and its adjacent islands'. Since the South Korean government is the only legitimate entity under the Constitution, the North Korean regime is an illegitimate and anti-state organization (Kim and Park 2001: 329). When the Kim administration set out to tear down institutionalized anti-Communist and anti-North Korean norms in South Korea's laws and regulations, public attention became focused on two major documents, the National Security Law and annual defence white paper, which embodied the spirit of the Constitution.

**National Security Law.** For an activist government seeking to promote exchange and cooperation between adversaries, established laws and regulations, which are in
force to prevent cross-border interaction, have been the greatest obstacles. Therefore, the Kim government tried repeatedly to revise the National Security Law, which was once regarded as a bulwark of South Korea's democratic system against North Korea's ideological onslaughts. Even before Kim's inauguration, South Korea's left-wing camp had long launched an offensive to eliminate the NSL, the Anticommunist Law, and the Military Secrecy Act (Moon 1998: Kim and Park 2001). The government stepped up efforts to revise the law after the U.N. Human Rights Committee, an arm of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, told it that the Supreme Court's ruling on a case involving violations of the law runs counter to the civil rights covenant because it infringes on the freedom of expression (Korea Times, 25 December 1998). In particular, the law's Article 7, which aims to punish those who praise North Korea or instigate anti-state activities, has been used as a legal tool by authoritarian regimes to crack down on dissident movements and promote their own regime security (Kim and Park 2001: 33).

Despite his wishes, President Kim could not push ahead with the revision of the law partly because his party was in a shaky coalition with the ULD, a conservative party with a strong anti-Communist ideological background. Therefore, it had no option but to suspend the parliamentary process in the face of strong resistance by the coalition partner and the main opposition GNP, led by Lee Hoi-chang. Instead of pushing for a revision of the law, the Kim government simplified and loosened the regulations governing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, particularly those regarding the prior notification of inter-Korean contacts. It also dropped North Korea from the category of anti-state organizations through a new interpretation of the NSL, as long as Pyongyang did not take steps to jeopardize the South Korean system and security (MOU 2000). By making use of his prerogative power, the Kim government granted a large-scale special amnesty, including the restoration of all civil rights of former student activist Im Soo-kyung, pastor Moon Kyu-hyun, former National Assembly member Seo Kyung-won and novelist Hwang Suk-young, all of whom had been imprisoned by previous administrations for making unauthorized visits to North Korea in violation of the NSL (Chosun Ilbo, 21 February 1999).

The irony involving the NSL was that there was no public demand for the prosecution of President Kim Young-sam and his followers for contacting North Korean

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21 Kim Jong-pil, a former Army officer who joined the 1961 military coup to topple the democratically elected government, later became the chief of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency. During the presidential campaign in 1997, Kim Dae-jung had no option but to enter into a coalition with Kim Jong-pil, because he represented a minority political force in the Korean political landscape. See also Kim and Park (2001).
leader Kim Il-sung in 1994 to organize a summit or President Kim Dae-jung for travelling to North Korea in 2000 for a summit, although the NSL was in force to punish arbitrary contacts with North Korea (Kim and Park 2001: 321). In fact, South Koreans were already prepared to accept new realities after the Cold War in spite of the existence of out-dated laws and institutions banning such acts, which demonstrated the reality that the established legal framework was not compatible with the changing inter-Korean relationship (ibid). As mentioned in Chapter Three, norm lag takes place simultaneously with norm collision, as the dominant identities and their subservient norms cannot immediately reflect structural shifts and domestic pressures, created through new types of social interaction. Even though the established identities and norms are outmoded, it takes time for new identity norms to emerge dominant in a given society. In particular, the conservative forces, enmeshed in a Cold War mentality, were still in every corner of society. Kang (2001: 26-30) noted that the characteristics of the ‘Cold War forces’ are their affiliation with dictators and aversion to democratization; the classification of North Korea as an enemy; their alliance with foreign forces for the purpose of maintaining their political, economic and social status; and their loathing of peaceful unification and preference for unification in the form of invasion or absorption.

Defence White Paper. In a major peace gesture, the Kim administration stopped issuing the annual defence white paper in 2001, which had pinpointed North Korea as the ‘prime enemy’ of South Korea. At first, the Seoul government sought to delete the ‘prime enemy’ part from the white paper, an attempt that touched off a major controversy in South Korean society. At that time, conservatives strongly opposed the elimination of the term, which was first included in the white paper in 1995.22 In fact, the Kim government faced mounting pressure from both North Korea and the conservative forces in South Korea. When the MND issued the white paper in 2000 right after the inter-Korean summit, Rodong Shinmun, the official newspaper of the North Korean Workers’ Party, denounced it as a ‘declaration of another confrontational policy’. The MND decided not to issue the white paper in 2002 for the second consecutive year to avoid a controversy, although Chong Wa Dae and the MOU requested it to delete or revise the expression ‘prime enemy’ (Hankook Ilbo, 24 May 2002). Despite some newspapers’ criticism of the decision as a ‘cowardly act’, the Kim government strove to maintain conciliatory policies towards North Korea in a consistent manner.

22 The term was introduced to the white paper after a North Korean delegate to an inter-Korean meeting at the truce village of Panmunjom threatened to turn Seoul into a ‘sea of fire’ at the climax of the nuclear weapons crisis in June 1994.
manner throughout his presidency.

Despite partial achievements in these attempts, the Sunshine Policy could pass through this stage of norm collision, because the administration made strenuous efforts to the extent that it even promoted the private-level unification debate and activities (Chung H.B. 2002). The administration published a wide range of books and leaflets to publicize the Sunshine Policy and promote the understanding of the policy’s key principles in both Korean and English. President Kim and his advisors were confident that they could change or at least mitigate domestic opposition to his engagement policy through education and persuasion. Convinced there was no other option than the Sunshine Policy, they thought that if there were opposition to the policy, it must have derived from ‘ignorance and misunderstanding’ of the policy (Moon 2001: 292).

Stage 3: Norm Cascades

The Sunshine Policy, which opened an era of inter-Korean rapprochement through an inter-Korean summit in June 2000, dramatically broadened and strengthened the foundation of pro-reconciliation forces in South Korea, creating a solid basis for cooperation between the two Koreas in the future (Paik 2002: 34)\(^2^4\). Joongang Ilbo (1 January 2002), a conservative newspaper that maintained an anti-Sunshine Policy stance, published an opinion poll on New Year’s Day of 2002, showing 59.9 per cent of those surveyed supported the Sunshine Policy. As to the question, ‘Do you think the Sunshine Policy should continue in the next government?’ 34.5 per cent said it should continue, while 53.7 per cent were of the opinion that it should continue with modification (ibid).

The turning point of South Koreans’ identity shifts vis-à-vis North Korea and its leadership was the inter-Korean summit. According to surveys released immediately after the summit, 97 per cent of the respondents noted that they came to hold a positive image of North Korea and its leadership, while an absolute majority dismissed the possibility of North Korea launching a war against South Korea (Moon 2001: 307; Korea Herald, 19 June 2000). The summit played a pivotal role in changing the images of North Korea ‘from a rogue state to a rational and normal state’ and its leader Kim from a ‘monstrous, erratic dictator’ to a ‘rational, competent leader’ (Moon 2001: 307). The images of North Korea and its leader, Chairman Kim, underwent so drastic a

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\(^{23}\) For more information on books written in English, see MOU (1999).

\(^{24}\) According to MOU (2003: 341-3), the government offers various assistance to South Korean private organizations working to promote exchange and cooperation with North Korea. As of December 2002, a total of 103 organizations were registered with the ministry, which comprise 42 (general unification activities), 25 (research), 18 (humanitarian assistance), 17 (exchange and cooperation) and one (education).
change that the supporters of inter-Korean rapprochement created an Internet website fan club, devoted to Kim Jong-il (*Monthly Joongang*, August 2000), a phenomenon which provoked both optimism over future inter-Korean ties and pessimism over the possible ‘ideological chaos after the Summit’ (Kim and Park: 2001: 320).

In addition, the election of Roh Moo-hyun in a presidential election in December 2002 symbolized the public endorsement of the Sunshine Policy because he had vowed to carry on the policy as one of his campaign promises (*New York Times*, 21 December 2002), while his rival Lee Hoi-chang vowed to launch a hard-line policy to terminate North Korea’s nuclear programmes (*Financial Times*, 17 December 2002). Right after the election, *The New York Times* (21 December 2002) reported, ‘the election results show, encouragingly, that Mr. Kim’s basic goals of expanding democracy and reaching out to the North enjoy continued support, especially among an affluent younger generation’.

**Interactive Process of Norm Cascades.** One notable feature in the stage of norm cascades was an interactive process between the two Koreas, given that the remarkable attitudinal change of South Koreans had been very much dependent on the behavioural changes on the part of the North Korean leadership. On the day of his arrival in Pyongyang, President Kim received a red carpet welcome from Chairman Kim, while the frantically cheering citizens lining the roads in Pyongyang were telecast live to the world, leaving a deep impression on South Koreans (Moon 2000). Before and after the summit, North Korean leader Kim visited China twice in May 2000 and in January 2001 to witness China’s economic developments and subsequently introduced *shinsago undong* (new thinking movement) designed to implement economic reforms (Moon 2001: 312). In addition, state-run North Korean newspapers stopped carrying articles critical of South Korea. Two major North Korean newspapers – *Rodong Shinmun*, the organ of the North Korean Workers’ Party, and *Minju Choson*, an official paper of the North Korean government – abolished a section devoted to criticism of the South (ibid: 306). Chairman Kim alluded to the possible revision of the by-law of the Workers’ Party, which called for the liberation of South Korea by revolutionary forces (ibid: 304), a gesture welcomed by President Kim with his pledge to revise the NSL.

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the 2000 inter-Korean summit, former President Kim Dae-jung contended in an interview that the summit had brought about far-reaching consequences in North Korea in which new laws were enacted to introduce the market economy in 2002 and North Koreans have increasingly become ‘positive and friendly’ towards their South Korean counterparts (*Yonhap News Agency*
15 June 2003). A statement by James Hoare, who set up the British Embassy in Pyongyang and served as charge d’affaires for two years, upheld Kim’s remarks. In a seminar, Hoare said:

After the Sunshine Policy, a large number of South Koreans visited North Korea. You can see South Korean fertilizer bags everywhere. More and more North Koreans are seeing South Koreans as brothers, not enemies.

*International Reactions.* The Sunshine Policy received an accolade from the international community, with President Kim winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his contribution to promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. President Kim and his advisors had not only attempted to improve inter-Korean relations, but also helped North Korea to establish diplomatic ties with major countries around the world. Although it failed to nudge the United States and Japan to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea, South Korea succeeded in helping North Korea to set up official ties with European powers, including Italy (4 January 2000), Britain (12 December 2000), and Germany (1 March 2001). By the end of the Kim administration’s term, North Korea had established diplomatic ties with 13 European Union (EU) members, except for only France and Ireland. The Kim government’s policy was a significant departure from the previous government’s policy, which called on Seoul’s allies to improve relations with North Korea in parallel and harmony with inter-Korean relations, often souring its relations with the United States and Japan (Yang S.C. 1999). Other events, which could be regarded as the Sunshine Policy’s achievements, were North Korean chief military officer Jo Myong-rok’s trip to Washington and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2000 (Oberdorfer 2001: 435-441). In fact, the Kim administration was on the verge of depriving the United States of its perennial enemy, North Korea, through its successful implementation of the Sunshine Policy.

*Norm Perturbation*. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the evolution of South Koreans’ identity norms plunged into the pitfall of ‘norm perturbation’ in the stage of ‘norm cascades’ because they faced an adverse international environment, created by...

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25 The seminar, titled ‘Reflections on Two Years in Pyongyang, North Korea’, was hosted by the School of East Asian Studies, the University of Sheffield on 7 May 2003.
26 North Korea’s external relations will be featured in detail in Chapter Five.
27 In a special statement marking the third anniversary of the 2000 summit, Kim Dae-jung recalled that North Korea and the United States had a remarkable chance of improving their relations, with Washington guaranteeing Pyongyang’s security and economic survival and Pyongyang discarding its nuclear weapons and missile programmes *(Yonhap New Agency, 15 June 2003).*
the US government's war on terrorism and categorization of North Korea as part of the 'axis of evil'. The dramatic consolidation of new identity norms was not welcomed by powerful states surrounding the Korean Peninsula, which do not regard North Korea as a friendly state, resulting in a collision of identity norms held by South Korea and such the powerful countries as the United States and Japan. The Sunshine Policy also faced a temporary setback on the domestic front, losing its once overwhelming support from the South Korean public because North Korea, threatened by the Bush administration's hard-line stance, failed to respond to South Korean initiatives in a timely manner and South Korea's poor economic outlook made citizens lose enthusiasm in offering assistance to North Korea (Levin and Han 2002; Moon 2001; Chung S.J. 2001). When US leaders strengthened their anti-Pyongyang rhetoric especially during President Kim's trip to Washington in March 2001, North Korea unilaterally called off the fifth inter-Korean ministerial talks and declined to form a single team for the international table tennis championship, held in Osaka from April 23 (Chung S.J. 2001).

The policy discrepancy between South Korea and the United States, exacerbated by North Korea's admittance of a nuclear weapons programme, provoked South Koreans' endemic security dilemma and eroded the foundation for the bilateral alliance. Conservative columnist William Safire (New York Times, 3 March 2003), criticizing South Korea's stance in regard to the North's HEU programme, called it a 'neutral' state, while classifying Japan and the Philippines into the category of US allies. In fact, Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, witnessing the collapse of the 1994 AF, took a neutral stance, when he told the parliament in July 2003 that 'I cannot say with conviction who is responsible for the breakdown of the Geneva nuclear agreement' (Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2003). This policy gap stemmed from the fundamental differences of the two countries' approaches towards North Korea. With Seoul sticking to a status quo policy, Washington pursued regime change in North Korea that, in the worst case, might involve an invasion. This US stance was not compatible with the South's status quo policy, advocated by the other major powers in this region, China, Japan and Russia (Moon 1999). China, which regards North Korea as a buffer zone, is the staunchest supporter of a status quo policy because it does not want to see North Korea break down or absorbed by South Korea (Han Sung-joo 2001). Japan and Russia, more or less, adopted similar policies. The three states also favoured North Korea's gradual opening and reform, as well as its integration into the international community.

Washington's displeasure over inter-Korean rapprochement was expressed in the form of obstructing the inter-Korean process of linking the severed railways across the border (Yonhap News Agency, 13 November 2002). Earlier, the North and South Korean
authorities created an agreement designed to facilitate the construction works inside the DMZ. According to the agreement, the dispatch of officials supervising the construction works was to be notified to each other through a military hotline between the North and South Korean authorities. However, the US-led U.N. Command, citing the Armistice Agreement, called on North Korea to notify a list of officials through the channel of the Military Armistice Commission, inviting a hysterical reaction from both North and South Korea.28

The shifting identities between North and South Koreans also attracted a cynical comment from Japan. Ishiba Shigeru, director general of the Japanese Defence Agency, told South Korean Prime Minister Goh Kun during his visit to Seoul on 29 March 2003, ‘As far as we know, North Korea’s Rodong missiles cannot reach the United States and they will not be used against their compatriots, South Koreans. Therefore, the Japanese share the fear that they might be aiming at Japan’ (Yonhap News Agency, 29 March 2003). Earlier in Tokyo, the director general suggested in a testimony to parliament that Japan needed to acquire long-range missiles possibly to make a pre-emptive attack on North Korea in case Pyongyang prepares to launch its missiles, although he softened his position later in the face of Japan’s predominant anti-militarist norms.

Despite the propagation of new identity norms in South Korea, North Korea’s confrontation with the United States and Japan hampered the process of norm cascades, because this stage was highly dependent on North Korea’s good behaviour, given the interactive nature of norm cascades.

Robustness of ‘Norm Cascades’. What made the New York Times columnist see South Koreans as ‘neutrals’ was the Kim government’s increasing efforts to separate inter-Korean relations from the constraints of the international structure, primarily from US-North Korea relations. Steinberg (1999: 63) said that crucial differences of priority and emphasis between the two countries are inevitable because South Korea’s national interests are defined, first, by the peninsula, and second by Northeast Asia, while those of the United States are worldwide, as seen in its global efforts to stop nuclear proliferation. In this phase of ‘norm cascades’, South Korea witnessed the rise of anti-Americanism stemming from President Bush’s hard-line stance vis-à-vis North Korea and the death of two schoolchildren in a road accident caused by a US military vehicle, which led to widespread anti-American rallies. Upon facing mounting US and domestic pressures, the practitioners of the Sunshine Policy promoted inter-Korean rapprochement in the direction of the unshackling of inter-Korean relations from the

28 This dispute will be featured in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
volatile US-North Korea relations.

First of all, the new security and social environment on the Korean Peninsula, forged by the inter-Korean summit and increased inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, posed serious challenges to South Korea’s security alliance with the United States and touched off a debate on the restructuring of the US-South Korea security framework. During the Cold War, South Korea’s foreign and military policies have been one arm of the US’s global strategies aimed at containing communist states. Even after the end of the Cold War, Seoul’s policies could not be free from the constraints of US influences, because East Asia remained a region caught in lingering Cold War rivalries mainly due to the presence of the communist states, China and North Korea. Hence, any policy towards North Korea required close consultations and joint strategies among the United States and its two treaty allies, South Korea and Japan, with the assistant minister-level Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOC) playing the coordinating role on a regular basis. The inauguration of US President Bush and his subsequent hard-line policy towards North Korea undermined the process of fine-tuning the policies of the three countries, creating a schism in coordination especially between Seoul and Washington. The South Korean government attempted to maintain its exchange and cooperation with North Korea even in the middle of the US-North Korea confrontations over Pyongyang’s HEU programme. Although the US government’s efforts to stop the North Korean nuclear programme had required strong support from both South Korea and Japan, Seoul’s determination to keep close inter-Korean relations on track profoundly frustrated US policymakers.

This insurmountable gap in North Korea policies led to a review of South Korea’s diplomatic and security relations with the United States under the new Roh Moo-hyun administration. In public speeches and press briefings, President Roh and his advisors increasingly mentioned such phrases as ‘independent national defence’, ‘independent diplomacy’ and ‘the establishment of a horizontal US-South Korea relationship’ (Yonhap News Agency, 19 April 2003; 16 January 2004), all referring to South Korea’s efforts to restructure its diplomatic and security relations with the United States in order to embrace the new environment unfolding on the Korean Peninsula. In a sense, these developments supported the validity of alliance theory in that, once a common threat withers, alliances are often torn apart or lose their raison d’etre (Feske 1997; Walt 1987, 1989). However, the reason why South Korean policymakers and the public sphere were caught in a lengthy debate regarding its alliance with the United States was that they wished to restructure the alliance in a mutually beneficial way, as in the case of NATO.
While stressing the principle of peaceful resolution of all North Korea-related problems, the South Korean government remained steadfast in its attachment to an engagement option, maintaining government-level meetings and private exchanges with North Korea. Since the inter-Korean summit in 2000, the evolving inter-Korean relationship gave birth to a new word, minjok kongjo (coordination as the same nation).\textsuperscript{29} In the face of the Bush administration’s hard-line stance against North Korea, Moon (2001) called for the strengthening of minjok kongjo to overcome the challenges resulting from the shifts in US policies. At the eleventh inter-Korean ministerial meeting held in Seoul in June 2003, the North Korean delegates stressed the importance of kongjo in the face of US pressure, although the South Korean delegates, expressing consent on the proposal, endeavoured to persuade the North to agree to the resumption of a six-party meeting to resolve the nuclear issue (Yonhap News Agency, 11 July 2003). The use of the word in inter-Korean relations caused profound bewilderment to many observers, with the proponents of the Sunshine Policy interpreting it as evidence of the development of inter-Korean cooperation and the opponents dismissing it as North Korea’s strategy to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States (Yonhap News Agency, 10 January 2003; 15 May 2003; 29 January 2004). In sum, the progress of inter-Korean dialogue and the consolidation of an inter-Korean channel as a venue to address various issues facing the whole nation have increasingly driven South Korea and the United States to reinterpret or revise their traditional security framework to reflect the changes in inter-Korean relations.

South Koreans’ changing identities vis-à-vis North Koreans were also reflected in their perception of whether North Korea might provoke war against South Korea. According to a series of opinion surveys by Gallup Korea, 69.2 per cent of respondents expressed concern over the possibility of war in 1992 but the figure dropped continuously to 52.7 per cent in 1995, 43.1 per cent in 1999 and 32.8 per cent in 2002 (ACDPU 1/4 2003). However, the figure rose slightly to 37.1 per cent in a survey, conducted on 25 February 2003, because of the US-North Korea dispute over the HEU programme. Asked whether they anticipated unification within the next ten years, 68.4 per cent reacted negatively, while 20.7 per cent responded positively (ibid). This means a significant drop in South Koreans’ anticipation of unification, compared with the previous Gallup survey in 1993 when 37.9 per cent were optimistic over the possibility of unification with ten years.

\textsuperscript{29} The term, kongjo, was originally used to describe the three-way process of formulating North Korea policies among South Korea, Japan and the United States.
4. Conclusion
This chapter offered a comprehensive overview of the diverse norms reigning supreme on the Korean Peninsula amidst structural constraints. In particular, it sought to demonstrate why North Korea’s isolationist policies have not changed even after the structural upheaval of the international system, prompted by the end of the Cold War, and what made South Korean governments and the public revamp their identities vis-à-vis North Korea in a phased manner over the lapse of half a century.

So far, many analysts have approached inter-Korean issues with a rather monolithic belief that the sea change in inter-Korean relations stemmed basically from the shifts in the structural parameters of the relationship, as with the end of the Cold War. They also resorted to the metaphors of the zero-sum game to explain the changes of inter-Korean relations by noting that the ‘basket case’ of the North Korean economy in the wake of the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and South Korea’s rise as one of the world’s economic powerhouses provided South Korean policymakers with the confidence to adopt in their bold engagement policy vis-à-vis North Korea. Accommodating the realist approach in an eclectic manner, this chapter argued rather that the most salient factor, which prompted the change of South Korea’s strategies of engagement with North Korea, was a normative revolution, engineered by President Kim and his advisors, given that the previous Kim Young-sam administration did not bring about changes to inter-Korean relations in the same structural template.

By juxtaposing the North and South Korean cases, this chapter pointed out that the entrepreneurs of new identity norms had fought fierce battles against the prevailing norms regulating the behaviour of North Koreans (self-reliance) and the international community (North Korea as nuclear weapons proliferator) to achieve their goal of security and integration. It is to be seen whether these remarkable identity shifts, which took place during the Kim administration, were an anomaly limited to this period. Nevertheless, it is not hard to find evidence, which suggests that the identity shifts of South Koreans would persist during the Roh Moo-hyun government. Even conservative forces acknowledged that the rightist and conservative forces which had emerged triumphant in the ‘war of ideologies’ against the leftist forces during the 1945-53 period, buttressed by the United States, and remained as the mainstream forces until very recently, succumbed to the progressive and leftist forces, led by the Roh government, which now enjoys ideological preponderance (Han Sung-jo 2003; Lee K.S. 2003).
Chapter Five. Case Study I: The Sunshine Policy and North Korea’s External Relations

1. Introduction
If Chapter Four highlighted the historical trajectory of identity shifts set in motion by successive South Korean governments and adopted by the general public vis-à-vis North Korea, this chapter seeks to establish an understanding of one of the Sunshine Policy’s international goals: North Korea’s diplomatic normalization with the world’s major powers. As argued in Chapter Three, the Sunshine Policy not only strengthened inter-Korean relations, but also opened a window of opportunity for North Korea, when it pursued diplomatic normalization with the United States, Japan, European countries and others. Its main objective was the recovery of diplomatic equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula, which was heavily tilted in favour of South Korea owing to its rising international status after the Cold War. As a status quo power, South Korea was prepared to help North Korea to achieve its long-cherished dream of establishing diplomatic ties with the Western powers, since it was already enjoying political and economic cooperation with China and Russia, the former allies of North Korea, in a solid framework of formal diplomatic ties. In this process of resocialization, the South Korean leadership believed that inter-Korean relations could gain stability, thus preventing North Korea’s collapse and promoting the Korean nation’s collective prosperity, as well as meeting South Korea’s immediate state interests.

The first section of this chapter reviews the South Korean leadership’s ideas and identity shifts, which helped North Korea and the world’s major powers to forge better relations. The second section proceeds to analyze developments in bilateral relations between North Korea and the world’s major powers. First, in terms of US-North Korea relations, this section aims to examine the heyday of the Sunshine Policy from the inter-Korean summit in June 2000 to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2000. The next section, on Japan-North Korea relations, will discuss Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s surprise trip to Pyongyang in September 2002, which marked a momentous shift in Japan’s foreign policy. Finally, it will document North Korea’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the EU and its key members. In each case, this chapter will shed light on the Kim administration’s attempts to nudge both North Korea and the other parties towards the establishment of diplomatic ties, which demonstrated the South Korean leadership’s identity shifts and
embodiment of new policy options to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Although the Kim government’s efforts were not successful in helping North Korea to obtain diplomatic recognition from the United States and Japan during its period in office, this chapter focuses on the South Korean policy elites’ identity shifts vis-à-vis their North Korean counterparts, which freed them from the dynamics of a zero-sum game and the shackles of the relative gains dilemmas, preached by realists. Therefore, the Kim government pressed the United States, Japan and other states to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, even ahead of inter-Korean rapprochement (Yang S.C. 1999: 183).

Since this chapter intends to analyze the momentous change of foreign policies by the United States, Japan and the EU members towards North Korea after the introduction of the Sunshine Policy, it is not appropriate to test all three levels of comprehensive engagement proposed in Chapter Three to analyze the South Korean government’s policies. Therefore, it will focus on testing the domestic level of three-level comprehensive engagement by shedding light on the identity shifts of the South Korean leadership, which helped those countries to revolutionize their policies towards the North. Each case study will be followed by the ‘findings’ section to sum up the discussion.

2. Ideational Changes and Policy Shifts in South Korea

If the Sunshine Policy were a moving vehicle, it had definitely two wheels like a bicycle. In other words, the Sunshine Policy’s smooth progress depended not only on the advancement of inter-Korean relations, but also on North Korea’s improved ties with such key foreign powers as the United States and Japan, thus helping to end the long-overdue Cold War confrontation on the peninsula (Moon 2002; Kang 1999). In particular, the policies of successive US administrations vis-à-vis North Korea have been a prime determinant of the overall security atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Cold War. In dealing with North Korea-related issues, Japan, immersed in an inherent inertia resulting from domestic and international constraints, played more of a secondary or supporting role (Hughes 2002b; Kamiya 2003).

During the Cold War, North Korea faced an insurmountable barrier in improving its relations with the Western countries despite its sporadic efforts to tap Western resources through diplomatic normalization, basically because the Korean Peninsula was caught in confrontation and rivalry on the diplomatic front. North Korea’s diplomatic forays were partially successful during the Cold War, when it could establish
official relations with neutral states, such as Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, and four NATO members, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Portugal (Foster-Carter 2000). However, a majority of Western countries that enjoyed friendly ties with South Korea were reluctant to follow suit. Even after the end of the Cold War, North Korea faced overwhelming obstacles both at home and abroad, when it launched initiatives to improve relations with the Western countries. In sum, the two Koreas and other key actors had devised their security policies based on deeply embedded animosity and mistrust, which hampered the smooth progress of post-Cold War rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula.

2.1. Ideas of Cross-Recognition by the Four Powers
The policy of détente, which was on the continuum of metamorphosing US policies during the Cold War, gave birth to the idea of the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the surrounding four powers: the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. Even though the Korean Peninsula had been the centre of superpower rivalries, the basic idea behind this new initiative was that North and South Korea should become masters of their own fate. In an address to the 30th UN General Assembly in 1975, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to revive the stalled process of inter-Korean reconciliation by proposing a ‘conference among all countries directly involved in the Korean Armistice Agreement’ and ‘the cross-recognition of North and South Korea and the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations’ (Kim H.J. 1984: 105). Nevertheless, North Korea rejected the offer, insisting it would stick to bilateral negotiations with the United States, since South Korea is not a signatory of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which ended the Korean War, and thus not a ‘real power’ (ibid). At that time, North Korea, which had a grand design of unifying the Korean Peninsula on its own terms, viewed the idea of cross-recognition as a conspiracy by South Korea, the United States and Japan to perpetuate the division of the nation (Kim H.N.1994: 112). President Park Chung-hee also became uneasy over Kissinger’s attempt to use Beijing as a channel to persuade North Korea to accept the presence of US troops in the short term with its commitment to an eventual pullout over the long term (Oberdorfer 2001: 144; Chin 2003: 303). President Chun Doo-hwan, who took power after Park’s assassination in 1979, echoed Kissinger’s vision of the simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations and their cross-recognition by the four powers. During a summit with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who visited Seoul in May 1986, for instance, President Chun articulated these ideas and secured her support (Hoare 2002).
The idea of cross-recognition was revived with the end of the Cold War. In a policy statement in 1988, dubbed the ‘7 July Special Declaration’, President Roh envisaged the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four powers as a preparatory step to launching his ambitious Nordpolitik, designed to establish diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and China. Nonetheless, North Korea, which sought rather to develop nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, as well as a foundation for political survival, was not ready to end the decades-long mistrust. It therefore started to sow the seeds of trouble with the United States and Japan, which were equally unprepared to draw closer to the Communist state struggling to survive (Lim 2002).

The end of the Cold War on a global scale presented the South Korean government, led by President Roh, with a chance to markedly improve its relations with the Soviet Union and China. In particular, Roh’s surprise summit with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in San Francisco on 4 June 1990 came as a shock to North Korea. Seoul set up diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1990 and with Beijing in 1992, irreversibly altering the balance-of-power structure on the Korean Peninsula, which had been based on the two-plus-four arrangement in which North Korea, on the one hand, enjoyed strong backing from the Soviet Union and China; and South Korea, on the other, from the United States and Japan. This diplomatic triumph for South Korea was translated into humiliation for the rival regime, a situation that aggravated the already tilting equilibrium between them in terms of both political and economic power. Witnessing the South’s successful diplomatic ties with its former and present allies, North Korea poured its diplomatic energy into restoring the strategic balance on the Korean Peninsula (Kim H.N. 1994: 115). What North Korea faced on its diplomatic frontier were strong Western economies with a list of preconditions for diplomatic normalization, a far cry from the Soviet Union, which accepted South Korea’s pledge to offer US$3 billion in loans in return for early diplomatic normalization.

As observed above, ideas of cross-recognition floated around for decades on the Korean Peninsula, but there had been no political actor capable of consolidating those ideas into actual policies with a clear roadmap. During the brief periods of inter-Korean rapprochement in the early 1970s and in the early 1990s, the South Korean government had been rather ‘ambiguous on how it conceived Pyongyang’s identity’ (Woo 2003: 525). In this sense, this dissertation argues that the Kim administration, as an activist government and entrepreneur of new identity norms in the project of promoting North Korea’s resocialization into the international community, could offer principled ideas with policy relevance to North Korea and the Western states, when they struggled to search for ways to end their decades-long enmity. As a leader embodying a
nationalist zeal, President Kim had not spoken in the voice of the Cold War leaders, but articulated a completely different set of national interests, which could be realized through North Korea's rapprochement with those countries.

2.2. Stumbling Blocks for North Korea's Resocialization

As demonstrated in Chapter Four, North Koreans have been socialized into thinking of themselves as dwelling in an earthly paradise guided by a genius leader, thus establishing 'self-reliance' as powerful norms in a totally isolated society. Nevertheless, North Koreans had the potential to emerge from this cocoon of isolation, if the international community showed them more respect, as demonstrated by former US President Jimmy Carter's trip in 1994. Even though North Korea wished to regain its place in the world, the process of its resocialization into the international community faced a large array of obstacles. This section identifies three prime obstacles for North Korea with the aim of elucidating what happened when the Sunshine Policy removed one of them.

First, the two post-Cold War South Korean administrations, led by Presidents Roh Tae-woo (1988-93) and Kim Young-sam (1993-8), welcomed North Korea's improved relations with the Western countries as part of their state propaganda projects. In many cases, however, the South Korean leadership was not fully ready to embrace rapprochement between them. Energetically pushing his Nordpolitik, President Roh focused his policy on establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China, hampering the other side of the cross-recognition equation: North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan. For example, President Roh urged Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in January 1991 not to push ahead with normalization talks with North Korea, which could outpace the speed and depth of the inter-Korean rapprochement process, a request that became 'a de facto condition of all Japan-North Korea normalization attempts' (Hughes 1999: 73).

The situation worsened when President Kim Young-sam, in spite of the notorious inconsistency of his North Korea policies, maintained one principle throughout his five-year tenure: all roads lead to the world via Seoul. This doctrine was an insurmountable hurdle for North Korea, when it sought to improve relations with the Western powers, since South Korea demanded that inter-Korean relations be improved before North Korea was given a chance for any meaningful dialogue with its allies and friends. Mindful of South Korea's attitude, the United States, Japan and the European countries were reluctant to start the process of diplomatic recognition. In addition, the North Korean regime was not in a position to promise any immediate return for these
possible diplomatic forays, while South Korea remained a sizable market and security partner for them (Akaha 2002b). It is worth recalling that the 1994 AF (Appendix V), a nuclear agreement between the United States and North Korea, called for upgrading bilateral relations to the ‘ambassadorial level’. From the beginning, however, the Kim Young-sam government, enmeshed in Cold War enmity, was critical of the deal, given that it could buttress the fragile North Korea regime against its wishes of an early inter-Korean reunification. In short, the Kim Young-sam administration harboured misgivings about US-North Korea contacts and frequently erected hurdles in their path. Even at the zenith of the nuclear crisis in 1994, for example, Kim opposed the third round of diplomatic talks between the United States and North Korea until North Korea agreed to the inter-Korean exchange of special envoys. South Korean Ambassador Jang Jai-ryong (Interview: 2003) noted:  

If there were no Sunshine Policy, Secretary Albright’s trip to North Korea would have been impossible. We could not agree to the idea of sending her to North Korea under the Kim Young-sam administration, because we were very much concerned over such an idea itself.…. When the United States was locked in a course of confrontation with North Korea and escalated tension, we worked to alleviate it. When the United States showed signs of getting close to North Korea, we intervened to stop the process. Under the Kim Dae-jung administration, we offered a free hand to the United States. 

The Kim Young-sam government also intervened in the negotiations between Japan and North Korea, since President Kim was not in favour of the progress of Japan-North Korea relations ahead of inter-Korean rapprochement (Shigemura 1999: 284; Nakanishi 2001: 65). When Japan offered 500,000 tons of rice to North Korea in a peace gesture in 1995, Kim strongly denounced the action as an act of interference in the improvement of inter-Korean relations. Regarding the diplomatic constraints imposed on Japan’s efforts to improve ties with North Korea, Hughes (2002b: 70) noted:  

The effect of Japan’s increasing de facto submission of its bilateral diplomatic policy to developments in North-South relations, and trilateral coordination

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1 Ambassador Jang, who served in the two key MOFAT posts, director general of the North American Affairs Bureau under the Kim Young-sam administration and deputy foreign minister under the Kim Dae-jung administration, is in the best position to compare the two governments’ policies.
amongst the US, South Korea and Japan has been to both open up and constrict its channels for engagement with North Korea. In one sense, Japan’s cooperation with the other two powers has legitimised its more direct involvement in Korean Peninsula security affairs. In other ways, however, it has limited its room for diplomatic manoeuvre by handing a near veto to South Korea over normalization efforts, if not dialogue and summitry, based on the renkei [linkage] policy, which is itself also subsequently contingent in practice upon progress in US-DPRK relations. Japan has thus imposed a near international ‘double-lock’ on its diplomacy towards North Korea, which comes at the bottom of the pile. The practical outcome of this situation for Japan has been that it has been obliged to synchronise attempts to restart normalization talks with North Korea in step with improvements in North-South and North-US relations.

Second, what Western countries called North Korea’s ‘rogue’ policies and behaviour, ranging from the development of WMD and missiles to terrorism, prevented it from meeting the criteria of the United States and other Western countries for establishing diplomatic ties. Nuclear and missile programmes that North Korea regarded as both pivotal to its survival as an independent state and indispensable as bargaining chips for normalization talks were, at the same time, stumbling blocks for North Korea, when it pursued diplomatic recognition and the supply of Western capital and technology for its economic recovery and eventual political survival. When Vietnam, for example, started experimenting with the market economy and sought a better relationship with the United States, its staunch enemy since the Vietnam War, a number of US veterans groups and parts of the Vietnamese-American community opposed the idea of diplomatic normalization, but their opposition was not strong enough to thwart the Clinton administration from moving towards the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1995, as discussed in Chapter Two. Vietnam, unified by the Communists, had no archrival like South Korea, thus feeling no need of nuclear weapons to guarantee its survival.²

Third, the United States and Japan showed inconsistency in their policies

² It is still to be seen whether the US-Vietnam rapprochement process has parallels with the US-North Korea relationship. However, the development of US-Vietnam relations from adversaries to partners has a significant bearing on US-North Korea relations, given how quickly structural changes, like the end of the Cold War, can transform relations between the two former adversaries in spite of the lingering animosity, unless there are conspicuous obstacles like nuclear programmes. For more information, see Sidel and Gray (1998).
towards North Korea, resulting in oscillations in their basic approaches about whether to engage or contain North Korea. The Pyongyang regime’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes attracted excessive attention from Washington and Tokyo, while its cooperative gestures failed to win due reception from them. As seen in the 1994 AF, North Korea apparently tried to trade off its nuclear programmes for better relations with the Western countries on the basis of the recalculation of its national interests in the post-Cold War situation, but the process of easing tension and building trust between them was time-consuming and thus vulnerable to the changing policies of different US and Japanese administrations.

2.3. Identity Shifts and North Korea’s Window of Opportunity

As a frontline state whose paramount mission was to contain Communist expansionism, South Korea could not think about any independent diplomatic initiative towards North Korea during the Cold War. When President Kim took office in 1998, however, there had been conspicuous signs that South Korean diplomacy was becoming more independent and proactive in its aim of dismantling the lingering Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula (Paik 1999). In fact, President Kim and his followers were deeply aware of how the peninsula’s division was imposed by the outside powers at the end of World War II against the wishes of the Korean people and how they could emerge from this quagmire. To remove the legacies of the Cold War on the peninsula, they were convinced that it was essential to forge better relations not only between the two Koreas, but also between North Korea and the Western powers through the establishment of diplomatic relations. Contending that North Korea’s security dilemmas could not be alleviated by South Korea’s endeavours alone, President Kim sought to achieve two aims at the international level: Pyongyang’s diplomatic normalization with the United States, Japan and other Western countries, on the one hand, and the creation of an international milieu conducive to its economic opening and reform, on the other (Kim J.Y. 2003; Kim K.R. 2000). Even though the situation in North Korea was not receptive to an engagement option, the Sunshine Policy paved the way for key neighbouring states to opt for engagement with the North (Cha 2001). In this respect, President Kim’s policies marked a significant departure from those of previous South Korean governments.

Soon after his inauguration, President Kim removed one of the three major obstacles, mentioned above, which had obstructed North Korea’s attempts to improve its relations with Western countries, and emerged as an honest broker for diplomatic ties between them. Kim ended the doctrine of the past administrations, namely, ‘all roads to
Pyongyang must go through Seoul’, in which diplomatic contacts with North Korea became hostage to the non-operational inter-Korean dialogue.\(^3\) Kim gave a freer hand to Western countries in launching diplomatic negotiations with North Korea. When progress was tedious, Kim even imbued them with ideas on how to build better relations with North Korea. Witnessing the rapprochement process between North Korea and the Western states, the South Korean public welcomed it in principle, convinced that this process would create a favourable effect on inter-Korean relations. The opposition parties and conservative newspapers raised some doubts and concerns about the consequences of these diplomatic processes, but did not raise strong objections to the Kim government’s endeavours to accelerate Pyongyang’s rapprochement process with Seoul’s allies.

3. North Korea’s Bilateral Relations

This section will elucidate how a momentous ideational shift and voluntary jettisoning of antagonistic policies by one of the two states, caught in a long-running intense spiral of rivalry and confrontation, could help the other state to escape diplomatic isolation and reach a new horizon in its relations with the rest of the world. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the US’s diplomatic recognition of North Korea could be regarded as a step tantamount to guaranteeing the isolated state’s political status quo and integration with the global community. North Korea, which needed US security guarantees before starting to reform itself, sought to sign a peace treaty or a non-aggression pact with the United States. In this sense, the Sunshine Policy fared well until the end of the year 2000 when North Korea was one of the rare success cases of a joint engagement strategy by South Korea and the United States and the Clinton administration was moving to establish diplomatic ties with Pyongyang (Mazarr 2000). The inter-Korean summit in June 2000 boosted confidence in South Korea, which wanted to expedite the process of inter-Korean rapprochement through North Korea’s resocialization into the international community. Before and after the inter-Korean summit, North Korean strategists also demonstrated their masterful diplomatic skill. Just before the summit, for example, Chairman Kim unexpectedly visited China to further consolidate North Korea-China ties in anticipation of sweeping changes ahead. Following the summit, Kim invited Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang to patch up the floundering relationship with Russia. With the blessing of its traditional allies, the North Korean

\(^3\) The citation is from a seminar publication, 'Japan’s Policy Toward North Korea’, held at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC on 1 March 2000 under the auspices of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Social Science Research Council. The text is available at http://www.jpf.go.jp/j/region_j/cgp_j/intel/abe/original/report_08.pdf (accessed 12 November 2003).
leadership mulled over taking the next step: a North Korea-US summit and a North Korea-Japan summit. Chairman Kim proceeded with confidence toward resolving the Korean Peninsula questions by stepping up bilateral negotiations with those enemy states (Yoo 2000).

Pundits say that there is no ‘if’ in history. Nevertheless, this dissertation cannot help but raise the question: what might have happened if Al Gore had defeated George W. Bush in the 2000 US presidential election? The external environment for the Sunshine Policy started to falter when Bush was elected as the new US president, and the outgoing President, Bill Clinton, abandoned his engagement option in the waning months of his presidency. Even though he found it hard to persuade the United States to revitalize its normalization process with North Korea, President Kim did not lose his enthusiasm and diverted his attention to urging the EU and Japan to start the process of diplomatic normalization with the North.

3.1. The United States and North Korea
After the end of the Cold War, the debate on the decline of US hegemony was quickly replaced with another discourse over whether it had emerged as a ‘hyperpower’ (Kennedy 1989; Ikenberry 2002). Given the US’s preponderant status in global politics, it was quite a natural course of action that North Korea, which lost its allies after the end of the Cold War, should focus its foreign policy on normalizing relations with the United States (Snyder 2000: 62; Ahn 2002: 46). Despite its desire to forge an improved relationship with the United States, however, North Korea had gained a reputation for being a master in playing South Korea off against the United States, or vice versa, since its main leverages were WMD and both the South Korean and US policies vis-à-vis North Korea had oscillated (Sigal 2000b). With the Kim administration launching the Sunshine Policy, the Pyongyang regime felt no need to use the same tactic, since Seoul renounced coercive steps in dealing with North Korea. This section will probe the remarkable progress in US-North Korea relations at the end of the Clinton administration and underline the role of the South Korean government when the two states moved to put the long-running enmity behind them and exchanged high-level officials as a preliminary step towards diplomatic normalization.

3.1.1. The United States: an apathetic superpower
When successive US administrations gave priority to addressing North Korean questions as part of their global strategies of non-proliferation of WMD after the end of the Cold War, they seldom paid attention to the improvement of bilateral relations with
North Korea, an enemy state since the Korean War. Therefore, the United States dispatched Undersecretary of State Arnold Kantor for a high-level meeting with North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun on 22 January 1992 in New York to assist South Korean President Roh Tae-woo’s diplomatic initiatives aimed at the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four surrounding powers, rather than launching serious talks to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea (Barry 2000; Kang E. 2002). On the one hand, the US administration’s diplomatic overtures towards North Korea demonstrated receptivity to the policy shifts of respective South Korean governments, as demonstrated in this example, while, on the other, it maintained inertia by showing a lukewarm response to the North Korean proposal that they hold regular high-level talks. 4

In spite of US inattention to such diplomatic overtures, North Korea launched a number of initiatives to ensure its survival by seeking US security guarantees. The two states opened the first round of official talks in June 1993 to discuss a wide range of issues, including the North’s nuclear weapons programme. During his talks with US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju devoted his time and energy to securing written assurances regarding the suspension of Washington’s hostile policies towards Pyongyang, the end to threats of nuclear strikes and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty. Wrapping up the talks, the two sides agreed to ‘[a]ssurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, including impartial application of fullscope safeguards, mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; and the support for the peaceful unification of Korea’ (Appendix IV). 5

The nuclear crisis, which started in 1993, brought them to the brink of a second Korean War but the process of resolving the crisis in a package deal was, in fact, a golden chance for them to end the decades-long enmity and establish diplomatic

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4 Taking a stand against the US administration’s neglect of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam, chairman of the standing committee of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), cancelled his trip to the UN General Assembly in September 2000, complaining of American Airlines’ excessive security checks against his delegation (Segye Ilbo, 10 September 2000). Kim, the head of state according to the North Korean Constitution, was on this journey to participate in the Millennium Summit, but the US airline staff launched strict security checks mandatory for nationals from states on the US terrorism list.

5 North Korea opened an Internet site, www.uriminzokkiri.com, on 5 November 2003. According to one of the articles on the site, titled ‘From the March of Hardship to the March of the Paradise (sic)’, US chief delegate, Robert Gallucci, initially declined to include such words as ‘mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty’, since the two states, which fought a war, had no diplomatic relations. However, he made concession on this later. In return, North Korea decided to suspend formal withdrawal from the NPT.
relations. Nevertheless, North Korea chose to keep its nuclear weapons programmes intact, as it continued to face hostile policies from the United States, including more threats of the use of force, which in turn created a vicious cycle of threats of the use of force, commitments to mutual respect, and then the breaking of those commitments. Therefore, such phrases as 'mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs' have become cited frequently in major US-North Korea documents, including the 2000 US-North Korea Joint Communiqué (Appendix X), but were never translated into action.

3.1.2. President Clinton's Policy of Engagement

As George Kennan's insight was reshaped into President Truman's strategies of containment at the beginning of the Cold War, Clinton, as the first post-Cold War US president, sought to find a grand catchword for his foreign policies and eventually settled on the concept of 'democratic enlargement' (Brinkley 1997). Nevertheless, the Clinton administration could not come up with a coherent policy vis-à-vis North Korea during its first term, partly because it attempted to act in concert with South Korea, which was ruled by conservative forces swaying between the options of containment and engagement (Harrison 1997). In a sense, the Clinton administration had no reason to hurry in establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea, since the latter was abiding by the provisions of the AF, thus alleviating US concerns on nuclear proliferation (Paik H.S. 1999). Throughout US-North Korea relations, the US administration's top priority had been to prevent North Korea from arming itself with nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, rather than to launch steps to improve relations with North Korea (Sigal 2000a).

Against this conventional belief, however, President Clinton's policy towards North Korea took a turn in his second term, which led to serious efforts to normalize diplomatic ties with the reclusive state. Heralding this policy shift, US Ambassador to Seoul, James Laney, made a speech in May 1996, titled 'Beyond Deterrence', which called for the use of economic incentives to signal the shift of Clinton's policies towards active engagement (Harrison 1997). Nevertheless, it was still premature for Washington to make full-fledged efforts in the direction of improving ties with Pyongyang partly because of the presence of a South Korean administration hostile to such a development. The Republican-dominated Congress also erected hurdles to the implementation of the AF and the improvement of bilateral ties (Paik H.S. 1999).

Since he wished to wrap up his tenure as president with a notable diplomatic

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6 North Korea's nuclear programmes will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
achievement and put his name on an important chapter in US post-Cold War diplomacy, Clinton diverted his attention to the world’s two flashpoints: the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. The president sensed the window of opportunity opening wide when President Kim made an historic trip to Pyongyang for a summit with Chairman Kim in June 2000. Clinton endorsed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s plan to hold a tête-à-tête meeting with North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun on 28 July 2000 on the sidelines of the ARF in Brunei, the first of its kind in history. Clinton’s strategy of engagement was rewarded when senior-level talks between North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and US Ambassador Charles Kartman starting on 27 September 2000 created a breakthrough in bilateral relations. On 6 October, the two sides announced the Joint US-DPRK Statement on International Terrorism in which North Korea renounced all forms of terrorism and the United States declared it intended to drop the North from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states. The statement had virtually cleared all obstacles for the dropping of North Korea from the US list of terrorism-sponsoring states, except for North Korea’s continued provision of shelter to Japanese Red Army Faction terrorists.7 In October 2000, the two countries exchanged high-level officials, National Defence Commission Vice Chairman Jo Myong-rok and Secretary of State Albright. Vice Chairman Jo’s trip, designed to reciprocate former Secretary of Defence William Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in 1999, had been decided at the Kim-Kartman talks (Kim K.S. 2001). The Joint Communiqué (Appendix X) issued at the conclusion of Vice Chairman Jo’s four-day visit to Washington on 12 October 2000 resolved to look into the possibility of converting the Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty. It also included a commitment to the improvement of bilateral relations through mutual respect and non-interference in domestic affairs, a moratorium on North Korea’s missile tests for the duration of the bilateral negotiations, and Secretary of State Albright’s trip to Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for President Clinton’s future visit.8 Albright arrived in Pyongyang on 23 October for a three-day visit and met Chairman

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7 In 1970, the nine members of the group hijacked the Japan Airlines’ plane, Yodo, which left Haneda Airport for Fukuoka, and took it to Pyongyang. Three of them remain in North Korea to date (Donga Ilbo, 1 April 1998). In fact, President Kim was the main actor behind the US move to drop North Korea from the terrorism list, since the US action would clear the way for North Korea’s admission to the IMF and the World Bank. The US International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118) requires the US administration to oppose any move by the IMF and World Bank to extend loans or financial assistance to states on the list. In spite of President Kim’s efforts, the Clinton and Bush administrations kept North Korea on the list, primarily because Japan urged them not to drop it from the list until the North Korean government resolves all Japanese concerns, including the Red Army hijackers and the kidnapping of Japanese citizens (CRS 2003b; Nakanishi 2001).

Kim twice. Since Albright received a red carpet welcome but failed to address technical details about the North’s missile programmes, the two states held expert-level talks in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur in November the same year. Even though he did not relinquish his plan to visit North Korea until the last days of his presidency, Clinton was in some senses unlucky since the United States faced the first potential constitutional crisis because of a delay in the announcement of presidential election results from Florida, making it almost impossible for him to leave for North Korea. To his dismay, George W. Bush, who was hostile towards North Korea, was declared winner, dashing any hopes of a visit to the North. This section will examine the major diplomatic events from the Perry process to Clinton’s final judgement on his visit to North Korea and highlight what role President Kim and his advisors played in persuading the two enemies to start talking and move towards normalizing their relations.

Congressional Gridlock and the ‘Perry Process’. The Clinton administration, which had successfully defused the nuclear crisis in 1994 through a bilateral deal with North Korea, faced increasing pressure in its second term from Republican Congressmen who called for the repeal of what they described as a policy of ‘appeasement’ or a bad precedent, which rewarded the North’s ‘rogue’ behaviour (Wit 2002a: 177). Harbouring scepticism regarding North Korea’s commitment to the controversial deal under which it agreed to freeze its nuclear programme in return for the annual delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) and two 1,000-megawatt LWRs, the Republican-controlled Congress erected obstacles to the shipment of HFO. When in 1998 North Korea fired a rocket over Japan and drew international suspicion regarding the nature of its underground facility in Kumchang-ri, President Clinton was subject to a more specific demand: a comprehensive review of his administration’s policy toward North Korea. In fact, a ‘North Korean crisis scenario’ was tailor-made for Washington’s hawks, who wanted to increase US defence budgets to erect a costly missile shield, reminiscent of President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ missile defence system (Cheong 1999).

In the face of this pressure, Clinton appointed former secretary of defence William Perry as North Korea policy coordinator on 12 November 1998, who was regarded as a man of integrity and drew bipartisan respect and support (Frye 2000). At first, Perry’s appointment was seen as Clinton’s political tactic to alleviate the mounting attacks by the Republican-dominated Congress against his North Korea policies, since he wanted to salvage the troubled 1994 agreement, regarded as one of his foreign policy
achievements.

Once appointed as policy coordinator, however, Perry embarked on a nine-month review of US policies, eventually authoring a report, which was ‘a product of trilateral coordination rather than of a unilateral deliberation by the United States’ (Moon and Kim 2000: 117). While producing the report, Perry conducted extensive consultations with those from South Korea and Japan, making use of the framework of the TCOG, a channel of assistant minister-level officials created to fine-tune the policies of the three countries, and other high-level channels of communication. Perry also travelled to North Korea in May 1999 on a fact-finding mission, becoming the highest-ranking US representative to visit since former US president Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang in June 1994 to broker an inter-Korean summit. Perry met North Korean officials, including No. 2 man, Kim Yong-nam, and held discussions on missile and nuclear issues, as well as the improvement of US-North Korea relations. Even though the contents of his proposal during his visit were kept secret for the time being, it was later disclosed that Perry proposed a comprehensive plan, including a package of political and economic incentives, if North Korea abandoned its nuclear and missile programmes (Korea Times, 21 May 1999). At that time, there was controversy about whether Perry had set a ‘red line’ that North Korea was not supposed to cross and, if it did, what might be the response of the United States, South Korea and Japan. At first, Perry was ambivalent, since he faced a series of requests and demands from both domestic and international actors. On some occasions, Perry hinted at the possibility of implementing economic blockades or taking military action if North Korea refused to cooperate and continued to pursue its clandestine programmes (New York Times, 12 March 1999), while emphasizing, on the others, that it was necessary to exhaust all diplomatic means first, since there was no time limit for US engagement with North Korea (Korea Times, 26 March 1999). The publication of the Perry Report was initially expected in early 1999, but was delayed to incorporate the result of the Kumchang-ri inspection in May 1999 and North Korea’s response to the US overture for a better political and economic relationship (International Herald Tribune, 27 March 1999).

Perry, who wanted to keep the military option open, faced trouble in fine-tuning the different positions of the countries involved. In particular, he faced the recalcitrant Kim Dae-jung government, which ruled out any use of military means and strongly advocated comprehensive engagement (Yonhap News Agency, 3 March 1999). Perry also launched consultations with Japan, which supported tougher action against North Korea, and with China, which raised objections to any US hard-line stance. As for the process of Perry’s consultations with the South Korean government, then-South Korean
National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won (Interview: 2003) recalled:

Since President Clinton was seen to be very soft on North Korea, Perry was appointed as a policy coordinator upon the request of the Congress because he was the very man who planned to attack North Korea in 1994 as secretary of defence. We launched many rounds of consultations. As national security advisor, I alone had eight rounds of talks with him. I urged him to introduce a comprehensive engagement policy as part of President Kim's scheme to dismantle the Cold War structure and launch steps for mutual threat reduction. Eventually, Perry accepted this initiative, creating a turning point in which the policies of the United States and South Korea hit the identical chord.

When Perry finished his report, the United States and North Korea reached a landmark agreement in a meeting between Ambassador Charles Kartman and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan in Berlin on 12 September 1999 by exchanging commitments to the relaxation of economic sanctions and a moratorium on further missile tests, regarded as one of the important accomplishments of the Perry process. Buoyed by this diplomatic feat, Perry submitted his report, entitled 'Review of United States Policy toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations' (Appendix VII), to President Clinton and the US Congress on 15 September. On 17 September, the President announced the partial lifting of economic sanctions, followed by North Korea's announcement on 24 September that it would suspend missile tests to create a favourable environment for the impending negotiations with the United States.

The Perry process had produced many desirable consequences for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. First, it alleviated the security concerns caused by North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. The Perry Report sets the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes as its short- and mid-term goal, while the long-term goal was to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. In this process, it stressed the prevention of another war, the preservation of the 1994 nuclear deal, trilateral Seoul-Tokyo-Washington coordination, and policy consistency. As an immediate outcome of the Perry process, the Berlin missile agreement succeeded in harnessing North Korea's long-range missile programmes, which had come to be regarded as global security threats since the test of the Taepodong I missile in August 1998. The Perry Report also worked as a shield against attacks by hawks in Washington wishing to nullify the AF through which the North's nuclear programmes were restrained.
Second, the partial lifting of economic sanctions, which were a monument of North Korea's enmity with the United States (Sigal 2000b), demonstrated the serious commitment by the United States, South Korea and Japan towards launching engagement with North Korea. Even before the announcement of the Perry Report, the United States and North Korea started exploring the possibility of improving their relations, once the Kumchang-ri underground facility was inspected by a US team and found to be an empty tunnel. As suspicions over North Korea's nuclear facilities were partially cleared, the two states intensified talks on the issue of addressing North Korea's development and exports of ballistic missiles. Perry's visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 also spawned the idea of a reciprocal visit to the United States by a high-level North Korean official in late 1999.

Finally, the Perry Report could be regarded as a vindication of President Kim's Sunshine Policy in the sense that both envisioned comprehensive engagement with North Korea. In the process of three-way consultations, Perry was apparently convinced that there was no option but to take a comprehensive approach in cooperation with South Korea and Japan. In his report, Perry acknowledged the importance of Seoul's policy shifts towards North Korea, by noting that the Sunshine Policy 'creates conditions and opportunities for U.S. policy very different from those in 1994'. Even though Japan did not fully embrace the approach because of the North's missile programmes, it chose to remain in the framework of three-way coordination to jointly cope with North Korea's future provocative actions (Moon and Kim 2000). In the report's concluding remarks, Perry stressed consistency by noting:

We should recognize that North Korea may send mixed signals concerning its response to our recommended proposal for a comprehensive framework and that many aspects of its behavior will remain reprehensible to us even if we embark on this negotiating process. We therefore should prepare for provocative contingencies but stay the policy course with measured actions pursuant to the overall framework recommended.

Thanks to the close consultations with South Korea, the analysis of the current situation and future steps envisioned by the Perry Report matched those of the Sunshine Policy. Therefore, South Korea and the United States could produce a 'fairly smooth working relationship' (Wit 2002a: 187). Wendy Sherman (2002: 136), who succeeded Perry as US policy coordinator, noted that the three architects of the Perry process, the United States, South Korea and Japan, presented North Korea with two paths: a positive
path heading for its resocialization into the international community and a downward path leading to 'further isolation and even greater deterrence'. Chairman Kim took the positive path, even though 'the path has never been straight, never been steady, sometimes has taken a serious detour' (ibid: 137).

Against the wishes of the Clinton administration, the Perry Report failed to win support from the Republican-dominated Congress that opposed the partial lifting of economic sanctions in return for North Korea's moratorium on missile tests. Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, was one of the outspoken critics of the Perry Report, harbouring scepticism about the North's intentions on nuclear and missile programmes and dismissing the Berlin agreement as nothing more than another US concession to North Korean brinkmanship (Frye 2000; Paik 1999; Kim S.H. 1999). The Republican hawks viewed the Clinton administration as having failed to deal with North Korea's clandestine programmes, in spite of the fact that North Korea emerged as the largest recipient of US assistance in East Asia.9

*President Kim's Role in High-Level Exchange. The Perry process created a grand conceptual roadmap for US-North Korea rapprochement, but the actual progress in bilateral relations was slow-moving, since the US government's attention to North Korea ebbed quickly, while waiting for a North Korean envoy to reciprocate Perry's earlier trip (Barry 2000: 44). Nevertheless, the historic inter-Korean summit in June 2000 created a new momentum in US-North Korea relations, since Chairman Kim's images and statements, telecast to the world during President Kim's three-day visit to Pyongyang, convinced the countries concerned that North Korea was seriously on the course of reforming its policies and joining the international community. Upon returning to Seoul on 15 June 2000 from his three-day stay in Pyongyang, President Kim did not waste time in reproducing his breakthrough in inter-Korean affairs on the other front: North Korea's resocialization into the international community. Kim called President Clinton the next day to explain the outcome of his visit to North Korea, while Clinton offered to keep in touch to discuss the next steps by the two countries (Kukmin Ilbo, 17 June 2000). For an additional debriefing on his visit, Kim dispatched his National Security Advisor Hwang Won-tak to Washington DC. In his meeting with Clinton, Hwang conveyed Chairman Kim's oral message to Clinton, leading to speculation in Washington's diplomatic community that the message covered such issues as the status

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9 As of June 2002, the total US food assistance to North Korea since 1995 amounted to 1.9 million metric tons, worth approximately US$620 million (Lee H.K. 2002: 74). Although the aid was made mostly via the World Food Programme (WFP), the US was the largest donor state to North Korea in terms of scale (ibid).
of US forces in South Korea, the stalled high-level contacts between the United States and North Korea, and Chairman Kim’s desire to improve relations with the United States (Donga Ilbo, 19 June 2000). Hwang (Interview: 2004) noted:

President Kim believed that, given North Korea’s system, talking to lower-echelon officials hardly produced results, since the message was not properly conveyed to the leadership. Therefore, President Kim asked the United States to send a person who can talk directly with Chairman Kim Jong-il.

In a show of support, the United States partially lifted economic sanctions against North Korea on 19 June 2000, which was, in fact, a step fulfilling the previous commitment, made in 1999 during the US-North Korea talks in Berlin. Despite this, the United States kept intact key sanctions regarding the exports of military products and dual-use goods, MFN favours to North Korean products, and loans by international financial institutions to North Korea (Munwha Ilbo, 19 June 2000). Only one week after National Security Advisor Hwang’s trip to Washington, Secretary of State Albright made a surprise trip to Seoul, touching off speculation that the secretary needed to survey the opinions of key policymakers in Seoul since the process of inter-Korean rapprochement had made remarkable progress in terms of speed and scale and thus might hamper Washington’s efforts to stop North Korea from pursuing nuclear and missile programmes (Hankook Ilbo, 19 June 2000; Chosun Ilbo, 24 June 2000). Nevertheless, the general atmosphere in Seoul was gripped by the euphoria resulting from the historic summit. When asked about whether she planned to meet her North Korean counterpart Paik Nam-sun on the sidelines of the ARF in July, Albright did not rule out such a possibility in a joint press conference in Seoul with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 24 June 2000). Assessing the developments following the summit, US Ambassador to Seoul, Stephen Bosworth, quipped that even though the United States appeared to have taken the front seat, South Korea was actually ‘in the driver’s seat’ (Hankook Ilbo, 29 June 2000).

Meanwhile, Chairman Kim was mulling over the next step: the dispatch of senior North Korean officials to the United States to reciprocate Perry’s trip to Pyongyang in 1999. In an exclusive interview with US-based Korean journalist Moon Myung-ja, Chairman Kim clearly hinted at his intention of improving bilateral relations with the United States, noting he wished to ‘make two friends rather than one [South Korea]’ (Chosun Ilbo, 12 July 2000). As touched on earlier, even though North Korea’s nominal leader Kim Yong-nam’s trip to New York for the UN Millennium Summit was
cancelled as a result of a controversy over excessive security checks by a US airliner. President Kim, who attended the summit in New York, was given opportunities to secure endorsement on the inter-Korean rapprochement process from US President Clinton, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Commenting on North Korean Vice Chairman Jo's trip to Washington DC in an interview with *Naeil Shinmun* (9 October 2000), President Kim floated the possibility of Secretary of State Albright visiting North Korea. Kim revealed that when he asked Secretary Albright, who visited Seoul right after the inter-Korean summit in June, to send to North Korea a senior official who could talk directly to Chairman Kim, Albright replied she would visit Pyongyang first (ibid). Later, Clinton also confirmed the fact in a press conference that President Kim requested him to hold a direct meeting with Chairman Kim to create a breakthrough in bilateral relations, as he already had done with Chairman Kim (*Segye Ilbo*, 10 October 2000). When Clinton made a congratulatory call to Kim, who was announced as the winner of the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize, President Kim also urged Clinton to visit North Korea for the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia (*Hankyoreh*, 16 October 2000). When they met again in Brunei on the sidelines of the APEC summit on 15 November 2000, President Kim told Clinton: ‘I hope you will take up this issue with confidence on the basis of the outcome of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to North Korea. We will welcome whole-heartedly if you make up your mind to visit North Korea’ (*Donga Ilbo*, 16 November 2000). Clinton responded that he was still considering visiting North Korea.

The sequence of events outlined above demonstrates that President Kim was the driving force of US-North Korea rapprochement. Specifically, the exchange of special envoys between the United States and North Korea came at the request of President Kim, who told President Clinton that high-level contact was a shortcut to any in-depth discussion of pending issues, given the nature of the North Korean system. Albright told a press conference at the National Press Club after her trip to Pyongyang:  

> Our approach was developed in close consultations with our allies in Seoul. President Kim Dae-jung has said publicly that the best way to move forward with Pyongyang is to focus on specific security, economic and humanitarian issues. He has also made clear that, given the DPRK's authoritarian structure, progress can only come through direct discussions with Chairman Kim Jong-

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il and his closest advisors.

In fact, the historic June summit between President Kim and Chairman Kim laid the groundwork for the dramatic turn in US-North Korea relations in October 2000. Further noting, ‘I would never have been able to go to Pyongyang if President Kim had not gone there first’, Albright said that President Kim’s Sunshine Policy and Chairman Kim’s response to it had changed the political dynamics in Northeast Asia. Albright even emulated President Kim’s approach towards North Korea and its leader Kim by describing Kim as a superb dialogue partner with a sense of determination and leadership (KyungHyang Shimmun, 25 October 2000). Just as President Kim had repeatedly lauded Chairman Kim as a man of trust, Secretary Albright, based on her personal contact with him, expressed her own impression of Kim as being ‘practical, decisive, and well prepared for our discussions’.  

President Kim and his advisors took an increasingly proactive policy to broker relations between North Korea and the United States. At the height of South Korea’s diplomatic success, Time magazine (13 October 2000) noted:

Kim Dae Jung not only persuaded North Korea’s notoriously recalcitrant leadership to engage in talks towards normalizing relations; he also managed to convince the United States — which had been far from convinced by his ‘Sunshine Policy’ — that a sea-change was possible in relations between the two Koreas. The fact that a North Korean leader made a first-ever visit to the White House this week, and that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright plans to visit Pyongyang later this year, would not have been possible without the South Korean leader’s efforts.

South Korean media organizations also interpreted the US-North Korea rapprochement as a positive development for inter-Korean relations, although some conservative newspapers remained suspicious over the North’s intentions. In an editorial,

12 When North Korea postponed inter-Korean programmes for over a month, such as the exchange of separated families, citing its lack of time and manpower owing to a series of talks with the United States, including Albright’s visit, South Korean newspapers started reporting the negative side of US-North Korea rapprochement (Segye Ilbo, 26 October 2000; Hankook Ilbo, 27 October 2000). However, North Korea’s notification on the resumption of inter-Korean exchanges soon helped them alleviate this scepticism. Taking a cautious attitude, some newspapers called for the centrality of the three-way coordination among the United States, Japan and South Korea and diverted attention to concern about North Korea’s human rights record (Munwha Ilbo, 25 October 2000). Chosun Ilbo (27 October 2000)
Hankyoreh (26 October 2000), a progressive newspaper, 'whole-heartedly welcomed' Albright's trip to Pyongyang, hoping her visit would further help inter-Korean rapprochement, while Chosun Ilbo (27 October 2000), a conservative newspaper and staunch critic of the Sunshine Policy, attempted to strike a balance by carrying both positive and negative comments by Joel Wit from the Brookings Institution, who called for the necessity of Clinton's visit to dismantle the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia, and by Larry Wortzel from the Heritage Foundation, who opposed any US efforts to expedite rapprochement with the state, ruled by a 'dictator'.

Former South Korean National Security Advisor Yim Sung-joon (Interview: 2003) noted:

South Korea played the role of a facilitator for US-DPRK negotiations to discuss the establishment of diplomatic ties. Following the 15 June inter-Korean summit, US-DPRK negotiations were making substantial progress. When the United States considered the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea, we have clearly given the go-ahead to the United States.

The national security advisor stressed that the resolution of concerns over North Korea's WMD through diplomacy was clearly compatible with US national interests, and President Clinton and Secretary Albright did not hesitate to take the path, initiated by the Perry process. In the past, South Korea's blockade and North Korea's WMD programmes were the largest obstacles to diplomatic normalization between the United States and North Korea. Therefore, Seoul's engagement policy and Pyongyang's commitment to non-proliferation and anti-terrorism created the same environment as one which the United States faced when it tried to normalize relations with Vietnam. Since a unified Vietnam did not have an archrival as South Korea and WMD programmes, the United States could proceed more quickly to normalize relations with it.

North Korea's Flexibility in Missile Talks. The Perry process and the subsequent exchange of high-level envoys between the United States and North Korea created a

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reported the establishment of a special body of French human rights activists which called on the United States to stop the process of rapprochement with North Korea, a totalitarian system that incarcerated 150,000 residents in concentration camps. A conservative columnist mentioned US Secretary of State Albright's failure to raise North Korea's human rights record during her visit to Pyongyang (Munwha Ilbo, 31 October 2000).
breakthrough in their missile talks to the extent that President Kim's special advisor Lim Dong-won (Interview: 2003) contended that President Clinton had planned his trip to Pyongyang since the settlement of all remaining differences was on the horizon. Citing US government officials, The New York Times (6 March 2001) reported that Chairman Kim 'promised in confidential talks not to produce, test or deploy missiles with a range of more than 300 miles'. Regarding the exports of missiles, North Korea offered to suspend the sale of missiles, missile components, technology and training, while dropping an earlier demand that it be compensated US$1 billion in cash annually for three years. The negotiators from the two countries launched further talks on the detailed methods of US aid in order to compensate North Korea's financial losses resulting from the suspension of missile exports with US food or economic assistance. It was a precious chance to stop North Korea's missile exports, since the state was at the 'center of proliferation ripples', with Iran and Pakistan heavily dependent on the North's missile technology (Kim C.S. 2001). As for the long-range missiles, North Korea hinted at the permanent suspension of missile tests if a third country were to agree to launch its satellites, a suggestion that was taken up during a meeting between Chairman Kim and Secretary Albright and that opened the way for expert-level talks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 1-3 November 2000. Secretary Albright, who visited Pyongyang to prepare for Clinton's trip, succeeded in securing Chairman Kim's personal commitment to the moratorium on missile tests. Albright noted in a press conference following her trip:

Indeed, during the October 23 mass performance we attended together, an image of the DPRK Taepodong missile appeared. He immediately turned to me and quipped that this was the first satellite launch and it would be the last.

Earlier, Vice Chairman Jo, in his meeting with Clinton, called for diplomatic normalization, while expressing Pyongyang's willingness to stop the development of long-range missiles in return for the international community's financial assistance in helping North Korea to launch satellites. At that time, US-North Korea diplomatic normalization was not seen as a matter of 'possibility', but a matter of 'time', as both

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sides were nearing an agreement on the North's development and export of missiles, the key issues to be tackled before diplomatic normalization.

In an article, titled 'How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea', *The New York Times* (6 March 2001) reported that the Clinton administration, in fact, made an excessive demand going beyond the commitments Chairman Kim made to Albright by calling on Pyongyang to 'ban the production, testing and deployment of all missiles with a range of more than 180 miles that could carry a 1,000-pound payload - the same standard that Mr. Perry had cited in his 1999 talks'. Despite some progress in discussions over financial help for the launch of satellites in a third country and compensation for the suspension of exports of short- and medium-range missiles, the two countries failed to iron out all their differences over details on the control of the range of missiles, North Korean technicians' participation in the satellite launch, verification methods, and the destruction of the already-deployed missiles (Kim K.S. 2001). In particular, the North Korean leader declined to accept inspection as a method of verification, since the United States operates other means to monitor compliance with satellite and other technical devices. He also refused to include the already-deployed missiles as targets for removal despite the US position that they pose serious security threats to Japan and US troops stationed in South Korea and Japan.

If Clinton had visited Pyongyang, he would no doubt have had an opportunity to secure further concessions from Chairman Kim. The Clinton administration, which sought to secure a watertight commitment from North Korea ahead of the summit, had apparently no understanding of the decision-making process of the authoritarian state in which 'agreements should first be resolved at the highest level, leaving details to be worked out later by subordinates' (*New York Times*, 6 March 2001).

*Clinton's Final Decision.* A policy outcome is an amalgam of various factors affecting the decision-making process. President Clinton's decision not to visit North Korea epitomized the level of frustration the top policymaker experiences when his advisors were seriously divided over the pros and cons of the trip. The time frame, allotted to the decision-making process, also affected the final outcome significantly since the window of opportunity was closing with the end of his tenure and with the winner of the 2000 presidential election not having been declared because of the vote recount in Florida. Clinton himself was also to blame for failing to take swift action partly because of the confusion over the result of the US presidential election and partly because of his lack of determination to follow through. However, the decisive factor that had ditched Clinton's plan was the election of George W. Bush, whose transition team,
including Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, refused to endorse any deal created by an outgoing president.

Chairman Kim dispatched Jo as part of his efforts to dramatically improve North Korea’s relations with the United States by inviting President Clinton to Pyongyang (Kim K.S. 2001). President Clinton also responded to this peace gesture by sending Secretary Albright on 23-5 October to prepare for his future visit. Albright conferred with Chairman Kim on two occasions to remove all obstacles for President Clinton’s visit to North Korea. The exchange of high-level envoys created a remarkable air of rapprochement between the two countries, since it led to serious talks on removing the last obstacle to diplomatic normalization between the two countries: ballistic missile programmes. During her visit to Pyongyang, Albright and Chairman Kim also discussed terrorism, human rights, security issues, easing of tension on the Korean Peninsula and the future exchange of diplomatic missions. Albright’s trip was a milestone in a roadmap envisioned by the Perry process. Thanks to her visit, there was the strong likelihood that Washington would soon remove Pyongyang from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states.

Despite such progress in bilateral negotiations, however, President Clinton faced an insurmountable division among his advisors. Following her trip, Secretary Albright reported favourable outcomes to President Clinton, recommending his trip to Pyongyang for a summit with Chairman Kim. Clinton told reporters during a photo opportunity with President Kim in Brunei on 15 November 2000 on the sidelines of the APEC summit, ‘Secretary Albright, as you know, had a very good trip to North Korea’, indicating his desire to follow through. During his summit with President Kim, nevertheless, Clinton said he had not yet reached a decision on whether to visit North Korea, although he was reviewing all developments since the inception of the Perry process, including Albright’s visit to Pyongyang and the follow-on missile talks in Kuala Lumpur. On the other side of the spectrum, Clinton faced a group of opponents to his trip, including National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, let alone the Republican-dominated Congress. Berger suggested it was not appropriate for the president to make an overseas trip at the time of a potential ‘constitutional crisis’ resulting from the Florida vote recount (Harnisch 2002; New York Times, 6 March 2001). Defence Secretary William Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also erected obstacles, contending that North Korea should agree first to destroy existing missile stocks threatening Japan and US troops in South Korea (ibid). At the same time, Clinton faced criticism from conservative academics. Nicholas Eberstadt, a scholar at the American

Enterprise Institute, claimed that Clinton’s trip to North Korea was not convincing since North Korea had not taken any significant step indicating it was serious about improving bilateral relations (Time, 6 November 2000). Kongdan Oh, a research staff member of the Virginia-based Institute for Defence Analysis, and Ralph Hassig, a consultant in Washington, who are co-authors of North Korea Through the Looking Glass, noted that the US and South Korean officials ignored human rights conditions in North Korea, while rewarding and strengthening the Pyongyang regime (ibid).

As last-minute measures, Clinton mulled over sending Ambassador Wendy Sherman to North Korea for direct talks with Chairman Kim to resolve the remaining issues in bilateral missile negotiations held in Kuala Lumpur (New York Times, 6 March 2001). As his trip had become impossible, Clinton even sent an invitation to Chairman Kim to visit Washington, to be cordially turned down by Pyongyang (ibid). On 28 December 2000, Clinton announced his decision not to visit North Korea, citing the lack of time to conclude missile talks. Clinton did not fail to mention, ‘The engagement policy of President Kim Dae-jung and his personal leadership have spurred this process and earned the world’s admiration.’16 As illustrated by Secretary Albright (2003), the proponents of the missile defence system took advantage of North Korea’s potential threats as a clear vindication for the construction of the costly ‘Star Wars’ system instead of engaging the state to remove one of the key sources of the threats. President Kim’s Sunshine Policy created an environment for North Korea and the United States to proceed to establish diplomatic relations, but the election of George W. Bush has effectively derailed the process.

3.1.3. Findings
North Korea and the United States were on the threshold of materializing President Clinton’s trip to Pyongyang, which could alleviate their decades-long enmity and help establish diplomatic relations in the foreseeable future. This case study pinpoints the driving forces of and the impediments to this process. First, President Kim’s Sunshine Policy was the catalyst for this process of US engagement from the authoring of the Perry Report. Even though the exchange of high-level envoys between the United States and North Korea involved strong determination by the leaderships of the two antagonistic states, President Kim’s groundbreaking trip to Pyongyang contributed to changing the political dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, enabling President Clinton to interpret this as an historic opportunity to end the Cold War and foster peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Second, North Korea was prepared to normalize

relations with the United States by dispatching Vice Chairman Jo to Washington with a mission to invite Clinton to Pyongyang and make concessions over its missile programmes. The isolated state clearly recalculated its state interests, which were, in the past, based on self-reliance and the fear of threats from the outside world, and chose to join the international community by abandoning its missile programmes in return for economic assistance. Third, the largest obstacle to Clinton’s trip, therefore, was not North Korea’s position regarding its missile programmes, but the opposition of the US policy community and the election of George W. Bush. Both sides had managed to iron out outstanding differences in their negotiations on North Korea’s production, deployment and exports of ballistic missiles. If Clinton had visited North Korea, he would have been provided with an opportunity to reach a compromise and secure clear commitments from Chairman Kim. Fourth, the South Korean public, despite some scepticism, reacted favourably to the process of rapprochement between the United States and North Korea, since South Koreans’ perception and identities vis-à-vis North Korea and the United States were undergoing profound changes. Newspapers in South Korea positively reported Albright’s visit, even though scepticism lingered over the possibility that North Korea might accelerate the process of rapprochement with the United States, while shunning South Korea.

In fact, the Sunshine Policy was introduced not because North Korea had already started changing its behaviour, but because a comprehensive engagement would enable North Korea to alleviate its security dilemma, ameliorate its confrontational approaches towards the outside world, and eventually take steps to embrace the request by the international community regarding its nuclear and missile programmes. In this respect, the Kim and Clinton administrations showed short-term convergence of their policies, but the Sunshine Policy could not appeal to the conservative forces in Washington in the longer term, which called for North Korea’s decisive shift of security policies as a precondition for any meaningful dialogue.

3.2. Japan and North Korea
If the US-North Korea enmity stemmed from the Korean War, the Japan-North Korea animosity dates further back to Japan’s 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has officially settled bilateral issues and problems arising from the colonial past through a normalization treaty with South Korea in 1965, but failed to create a breakthrough in its negotiations with North Korea to date. North Korea is the only state with which Japan could not liquidate its colonial past, which hampered Japan’s independent political role as a regional power (Yang and Kim 2002: 56). Even though
North Korea was notorious as an unpredictable state, Japan’s diplomacy vis-à-vis the North equally exhibited inconsistency and contradiction to the extent that Okonogi (2000) described this syndrome as ‘the long swing between dialogue and deterrence’. When North Korea launched a Taepodong missile in 1998 or sent spy ships into Japan's territorial waters in 1999 and 2001, the Tokyo government suspended humanitarian aid and stepped up deterrence by launching joint research on missile defence with the United States and ordering the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to take stern measures against espionage ships. Nonetheless, Japan shifted gear to adopt strategies of engagement with North Korea whenever South Korea and the United States moved quickly to improve ties with the Pyongyang regime. Trapped by what Hughes (2000) called ‘strategy-less North Korea strategy’, Japan has shown ambivalence about whether it really wants to improve ties with North Korea and whether it is capable of launching consistent strategies to achieve its goal of diplomatic normalization. North Korea has equally shown unfaithfulness in its relations with Japan by demonizing it through a series of reports by state-run media organizations, on the one hand, and by soliciting aid and showing gestures for normalization talks, on the other. Cha (2001: 555) noted that ‘[a]ntagonistic images are passed down generationally through family folklore, chauvinistic histories taught in secondary schools (probably much more in the DPRK than in the ROK and Japan), and government propaganda-perpetuated stereotypes, as a result of which such negative stereotypes become a part of one’s identity’. After the two Koreas entered a phase of rapprochement after the 2000 summit, North Korea has almost suspended its invectives against South Korea, while picking Japan as a target of intensified vitriolic propaganda whenever it found Japan’s attitude and behaviour unacceptable.¹⁷ In return, Japan’s rightist politicians and opinion leaders have taken advantage of the North’s propaganda offensive as a pretext to suspend the engagement option and introduce measures to strengthen security preparedness, such as the joint US-Japan research on missile defence and the launch of two spy satellites on 28 March 2003 (Yang and Kim 2002: 59-60; Yonhap News Agency, 30 March 2003). The Japanese media also played a decisive role in solidifying negative identification with the North (Kim Y.C. 2002: 24).

Since Japan showed no sign of emerging from its diplomatic inertia, President Kim needed to create a favourable environment on the Korean Peninsula and press Japan to adopt resolute initiatives towards improving relations with North Korea.

¹⁷ For example, North Korea steps up its propaganda offensives against Japan, when there are controversies over the past history issue, such as the whitewashing of colonial brutalities in history textbooks and Japanese officials’ visit to Yasukuni Shrine dedicated to, among others, war criminals, such as Tojo Hideki, the wartime premier who ordered the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941.
Unlike the previous South Korean governments, the Kim administration supported Koizumi’s engagement without any reservation, since it would constitute a significant step towards the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the surrounding four powers (Shin 2002: 66-7). In addition, the influx of Japan’s large-scale economic assistance into North Korea after their diplomatic normalization could significantly reduce the huge ‘unification cost’ South Korea would have to shoulder in the future and expedite North Korea’s economic interdependence with the international community (Lee W.D. 2002: 62-3). This section will first review Japan-North Korea relations historically and then shed light on President Kim’s role in paving the way for Prime Minister Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang in 2002.

3.2.1. Japan: the pendulum swings from deterrence to dialogue
The end of the Cold War and the South Korean government’s shifting policies allowed Japan to launch diplomatic initiatives to normalize relations with North Korea, regarded as one of the two grand tasks of Japan’s post-World War II diplomacy along with the settlement of a long-running dispute with Russia over the return of the Northern Territories (Yang and Kim 2002; Park C.H. 2003). For Japan, it was an ‘historical responsibility’ to resolve all pending issues and set up official relations with Pyongyang, since North Korea, part of its former colony, is only separated by a narrow band of water, called the East Sea or the Sea of Japan, and Japan faced a series of political and security challenges posed by North Korea.18

Japan’s Perception of Threats from North Korea. Accommodated safely under the US nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, Japan had not felt an immediate threat emanating from the neighbouring Communist states, such as the Soviet Union and China. The end of the Cold War and the unravelling of bipolarity, however, posed a new challenge to Japan, since it faced threats from North Korea, known as a renegade state seeking to arm itself with nuclear weapons (Katzenstein 1996). North Korea’s test of what it termed a rocket carrying the ‘Gwangmyongsong’ satellite on 31 August 1998 has irreversibly eroded the Japanese sense of security, as it flew over Japan and landed in the Pacific. Gripped by fear and frustration, Japan imposed sanctions against North

18 Announcing Prime Minister Koizumi’s trip to North Korea on 30 August 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo said in a statement, ‘For over half a century since the end of the Second World War, diplomatic relations with North Korea have yet to be normalized, and it can be said that it is the historical responsibility of the Government to resolve the various issues between Japan and North Korea and to normalize diplomatic relations’. The text of Fukuda’s statement is available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/ccs0830.html (accessed 30 November 2003).
Korea, including the suspension of chartered flights, stoppage of humanitarian assistance, suspension of financial contribution to KEDO and a halt of normalization talks, while agreeing with the United States to launch joint research on the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) (Paik H.S. 1999). Nevertheless, Japan's reaction to the missile test was ill-founded since the real threat to the Japanese archipelago was not the multi-stage Taepodong missile, but the Rodong missile with a range of 1,300 kilometres, tested in 1993 and deployed in 1997 (Cha and Hwang 2002: 178). Therefore, the fuss was rather the outcome of the media's sensational reporting and political leaders' exaggeration of the actual threat. In the wake of the controversy over the missile test, the so-called North Korean spy ship incidents took place in March 1999 and in December 2001. The March 1999 incident was symbolic since the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces fired warning shorts at two North Korean vessels, which infiltrated into Japanese territorial waters, for the first time since World War II.

During the Cold War, Japan's security policies were focused on the defence of the Japanese archipelago, but the end of the Cold War prompted Japan to expand its military role to support the operation of US forces in Asia and the Pacific region. Japan cited imminent threats from North Korea when it revised a series of defence-related documents to strengthen military activities in the framework of its military alliance with the United States. The process was partly a response to the US efforts to restructure a security framework in East Asia, orchestrated by Assistant Secretary of Defence Joseph Nye. The United States announced the Security Strategy for the East Asia Pacific Region in February 1995 to implement Nye's (1995: 91) vision, epitomized by his famous line: 'security is like oxygen – you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about'. In November 1995, Japan revised the National Defence Programme Outline for the first time in 20 years to cope with the new security environment in the post-Cold War era. In April 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and US President Clinton issued the 'U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security' that redefined their alliance for the 21st century. In September 1997, Japan further strengthened its alliance with the United States by revising the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation of 1978 with the aim of enhancing Japan's rear area support for US military operations. Culminating in this process, which started in April 1996, the Japanese Diet passed a package of bills in May 1999, submitted by the government in April 1998, to implement the revised guidelines and provide a legal framework for the Japan SDF to strengthen its logistical support of US forces during emergencies in areas surrounding Japan (Pae 2001). The joint US-Japan efforts were designed to rectify and update the fragile side of the security alliance.
When the United States seriously considered preventive military strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in 1994, for example, Tokyo neither showed any political will nor ability to offer military support under the constitution.

Nevertheless, many observers dismiss North Korea's threats as a pretext for Japan's military buildup to counterbalance the rising Chinese political and military power in East Asia (Kim Y.C. 2001; Garrett and Glaser 1997). Even though the United States and Japan insisted in an unequivocal manner that their military cooperation in 'areas surrounding Japan', specified in the US-Japan Guidelines, is not a geographical concept but situational, China's suspicion was never alleviated, since it feared possible US-Japan military actions in the event of a cross-strait crisis (Guardian, 9 June 1999).

Apart from the revision of security-related arrangements, Japan took a number of steps towards engagement with North Korea. For example, Japan agreed to offer US$1 billion to KEDO, which required $4.6 billion to build two LWRs in North Korea in return for its suspension of all nuclear activities. On 4 May 1999, it signed a contract with KEDO on the provision of the loan, which was endorsed by the Japanese Diet on 29 June (Joongang Ilbo, 1 July 1999).

Diplomatic Normalization Talks. In spite of the presence of unresolved security and bilateral issues, such as a controversy over the 'past history', Japan has seen its relations with North Korea in light of the multiple relations unfolding on and around the Korean Peninsula (Akaha 2002b: 80). In particular, its initiatives towards North Korea came largely in the aftermath of the shifts of South Korea's policies, given that the success of its initiatives was impossible without the blessing of South Korea, an important partner in terms of economy and regional security (Kim Y.C. 2002). It was also important to secure consent from the US government as part of the three-way policy coordination between the United States, Japan and South Korea (Hughes 2002b; Hiramatsu 2003). Even though it was theoretically possible for Japan to normalize its relations with North Korea during the Cold War, as it did with the Soviet Union and China, it actually faced stiff objections from South Korea and the United States (Park C.H. 2003). In particular, South Korea wielded a virtual 'veto power' over Japan's initiatives towards North Korea (Oh and Hassig 2000: 162).

Japan took its first major step to discuss diplomatic normalization with North Korea after South Korean President Roh Tae-woo issued the '7 July Declaration' in 1988 under which Seoul pledged to help North Korea to improve diplomatic ties with

Western countries, such as the United States and Japan (Kim Y.C. 2002). Seoul's decision was taken with the hope of realizing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. The Tokyo government made use of the new window of opportunity by dispatching a two-party delegation, led by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) strongman Kanemaru Shin and Japan Socialist Party Vice Chairman Tanabe Makoto, to Pyongyang in September 1990. The visit created the controversial 'Three-Party Joint Declaration' between the two Japanese parties and the North Korean Workers' Party, which, among others, called on the two governments to take steps for diplomatic normalization and urged the Japanese government to provide appropriate 'compensation' for its colonial misdeeds. The use of the term, 'compensation', ran against the official Japanese policy of renouncing any provision of compensation or reparations for acts committed during the wartime and colonial periods. The agreement also meant preferential treatment to North Korea over South Korea to which Japan offered US$500 million in grant and loans in the form of 'economic cooperation' after diplomatic normalization in 1965. When Kanemaru visited Seoul to mitigate South Korean officials' concerns, President Roh did not reject the normalization process in an outright manner, but demanded that 'Japan should engage in prior consultations with South Korea regarding negotiations with North Korea; improve relations with North Korea in conjunction with similar progress in North-South dialogue; request North Korean acceptance of IAEA inspections; not extend economic cooperation to North Korea until after normalization; and encourage North Korea to become a responsible member of the international society' (Hughes 1999: 83). Even though the three-party declaration created an uproar in both Japan and South Korea, the atmosphere for the start of normalization talks was ripe with Prime Minister Kaifu announcing on 1 October 1990 that Japan was ready for talks with North Korea.

The first round of official normalization talks opened in January 1991 and proceeded into the eighth round until November 1992, to be only ruptured in a dispute over whether a Japanese abductee had taught a North Korean terrorist who bombed the KAL 858 passenger airliner in 1987. In 1991, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department contended at a press conference that there was a high probability that a Japanese woman, Taguchi Taeko, who had disappeared in 1978, was the woman, called Lee Eun-hye by the self-confessed North Korean terrorist, Kim Hyun-hee. Despite Japan's discovery of solid evidence about the abduction, North Korea continued to deny the existence of any kidnapped Japanese and called for a halt to a discussion on the issue (KCNA, 18 May 1998; 6 May 1998). During the Kim-Koizumi summit in 2002,
however, Lee and Taguchi were confirmed to be the same person, but among those who
died in North Korea after their abduction by North Korean agents in 1970s and 1980s
(Korea Herald, 26 September 2002).

As North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993,
establishing tension on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government indicated it would
suspend normalization talks indefinitely. Japan’s status as a bystander in regional
security issues has persisted since then, because such events as US-North Korea nuclear
negotiations, the four-party peace talks and the exchange of senior officials during the
waning months of the Clinton administration further aggravated Japan’s sense of
diplomatic incapacity (Paik H.S.1999). To break the diplomatic deadlock with North
Korea, Japan further resorted to the same ice-breaking role of parliamentarians’ visits by
sending a delegation of the then three ruling parties -- the LDP, Social Democratic Party
of Japan, and Sakigake -- led by former Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe Michio of the
LDP in March 1995 and a mission of the same three parties led by LDP General Council
Chairman Mori Yoshiro in November 1997. Even though the Watanabe mission reached
an agreement on the unconditional resumption of normalization talks in a meeting with
Workers’ Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun and the Japanese government offered 500,000
tons of rice to North Korea, they failed to resume official talks amid a succession of
incidents, including the start of US-Japan negotiations to revise the Defence Guidelines
in April 1996, the infiltration of a North Korean submarine into South Korean waters in
September 1996, the defection of North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Hwang Jang-
yop in February 1997 and North Korean defector An Myong-jin’s claim in March 1997
that he had seen Yokota Megumi, a Japanese abductee, in Pyongyang (Kim Y.C. 2002:
20-1). At that time, Japan’s diplomatic initiatives could not win South Korea’s blessing,
since President Kim Young-sam insisted that the inter-Korean rapprochement should
come first before North Korea could improve relations with Japan. In particular,
President Kim expressed strong displeasure over Japan’s attempt to outpace South
Korea in the improvement of relations with the provision of 500,000 tons of rice, a
volume that dwarfed South Korea’s shipment of 150,000 tons in the same year. In a
summit with Prime Minister Murayama Toshiichi in Osaka on the sidelines of the APEC
summit on 18 November 1995, President Kim contended that Japan’s provision of
500,000 tons of rice gave the impression that Tokyo was ‘interfering with the Korean
unification process’ by being duped by the North Korean regime attempting to drive a
wedge between Seoul and Tokyo (Hankyoreh, 19 November 1995). In reply, Prime
Minister Murayama, calling the assistance ‘exceptional’, backed away from an
engagement option and promised not to make additional assistance to North Korea
without consultations with the Seoul government (Donga Ilbo, 19 November 1995).

With President Kim Dae-jung taking office in February 1998, Seoul tried to mend ties with Tokyo, damaged during the Kim Young-sam administration, by signing the Joint Declaration on the New Korea-Japan Partnership in the 21st Century. Dumping the previous administration’s policy of thwarting Japan from moving to improve ties with North Korea, President Kim started requesting Tokyo to take a proactive stance in improving relations with Pyongyang (Nakanishi 2001; Paik H.S. 1999). Following a US-North Korea deal on a moratorium of missile tests in September 1999, Japan partially lifted economic sanctions on North Korea in November, including a ban on chartered flights, and began preliminary contacts with North Korea for the resumption of normalization talks in December. A small breakthrough was recorded in December when a suprapartisan mission of Japanese parliamentarians, led by former Socialist Prime Minister Murayama, visited Pyongyang and signed a joint announcement with the Workers’ Party urging their respective governments to resume talks on the normalization of diplomatic relations at an early date. The event led to the resumption of normalization talks in April 2000. Even though these ninth normalization talks could not yield a meaningful outcome, the two countries succeeded in organizing a meeting between their foreign ministers three months later in Bangkok on the sidelines of the ARF. In their first-ever meeting, Foreign Ministers Kono Yohei and Paek Nam-sun agreed to resume diplomatic normalization talks, paving the way for the tenth round of talks in August and the eleventh round in October. The talks, however, ended without an accord, as the two sides exhibited differences over Japan’s wartime misdeeds and North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals. Izumi (2002: 224-5) noted that North Korea had apparently given priority to its improving relations with the United States during the fall of 2000 instead of maintaining the process of normalization talks with Japan. After another period in the doldrums, the twelfth round of talks took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 29-30 October 2002 right after Koizumi’s historic trip to Pyongyang, as shown in Table 5.1.
### Table 5.1 Diplomatic Normalization Talks between North Korea and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Venue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30-31 January 1991</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11-12 March 1991</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20-21 May 1991</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29 August – 2 September 1991</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>18-20 November 1991</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>30 January – 1 February 1992</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13-15 May 1992</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5-6 November 1992</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4-7 April 2000</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>21-24 August 2000</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>30-31 October 2000</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>29-30 October 2002</td>
<td>Kuala Lumpur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 3.2.2. Prime Minister Koizumi’s Policy of Engagement

Traditionally, Japan followed in the footsteps of the United States, as it did in the normalization of relations with China. When President Kim urged Prime Minister Mori to improve relations with North Korea to assist inter-Korean rapprochement during his trip to Japan in September 2000, three months after the inter-Korean summit, Mori, in principle, agreed with Kim’s request, but expressed concerns that the Japanese public would not endorse the government’s assistance to North Korea, since it might buttress the North’s military build-up (*Japan Times*, 25 September 2000; Kim H.S. 2003: 81). Even though Mori sent a letter to Chairman Kim requesting a summit and both sides were on the verge of agreeing to meet through a secret contact between former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nakagawa Hidenao and First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju in Singapore on 27 January 2001, the unpopular Mori administration failed to push ahead
with the summit plan, since he created no breakthrough on such issues as the abduction of Japanese nationals and ‘Japan’s liquidation of its past’\(^{20}\) (Cha 2001: 562; Nakanishi 2001: 72; Chosun Ilbo, 2 September 2002; Donga Ilbo, 2 September 2002). When Koizumi took office as prime minister, his administration placed priority initially on aligning itself with Washington’s North Korea policies, while paying little attention to any independent initiative towards Pyongyang (Kim H.S. 2003: 81; Lee W.D. 2002: 53). Therefore, Koizumi’s trip to North Korea in September 2002 was seen as a rare diplomatic initiative Japan exercised as an independent state to the extent that it was called a political ‘gamble’ (Hughes 2002b; Hiramatsu 2003).

Koizumi appeared to have made up his mind to visit Pyongyang around May 2002, soon after North Korea made a commitment to a thorough probe into alleged cases of abduction and a notification of the outcome in the near future at the Red Cross talks between the two countries held in Beijing on 29 April 2002 (Park C.H. 2003: 10). To lay the groundwork for the summit, Japan’s Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko first met her North Korean counterpart Paek Nam-sun on the sidelines of the ARF meeting in Brunei in July. The Red Cross societies of the two countries also held negotiations to discuss pending issues, including the abduction of Japanese nationals, in August. At last, the summit was agreed upon in Pyongyang during the two-day talks from 25 August between Tanaka Hitoshi, director general of the Asia and Pacific Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), who had supervised the preparations for Koizumi’s trip, and his North Korean counterpart. Before that, there had been more than 30 informal contacts between the two sides, involving Chairman Kim’s close associates and those from the Prime Minister’s Office and MOFA from Japan (ibid). On 30 August, Japan and North Korea officially announced their agreement to organize a summit on 17 September in Pyongyang.

Nevertheless, Japan’s engagement with North Korea involved great political and diplomatic risks. Koizumi thought he had resolved the decades-long controversy over the abduction of Japanese nationals through his surprise engagement with North Korea, but the very abduction issue derailed the process of diplomatic normalization, when North Korea notified Japan of the fact that eight of 13 abductees died prematurely. At home, Koizumi faced trouble with conservative forces opposing his engagement approach amidst a rising demand for a probe into the premature death of the abductees. On top of the domestic restraints, the United States sought to restrain Japan’s diplomatic initiative especially after the revelation of North Korea’s HEU programme in October

\(^{20}\) North Korea has urged Japan to ‘liquidate’ its colonial past by issuing a clear-cut apology for its misdeed and making compensation.
President Kim’s Role in Koizumi’s Trip. According to a survey in February 1998, when Kim took office as president, the country detested most by the Japanese people, regardless of their profession, was North Korea (Donga Ilbo, 10 February 1998). The anti-Pyongyang animosity, shared by the Japanese, worsened in August 1998 when North Korea test-fired its ballistic missile over the Japanese archipelago and in 1999 when the Japanese Diet passed a set of bills to extend the scope of Japan’s military activities to ‘areas surrounding Japan’ and North Korea interpreted the action as a declaration of war (Rodong Shinmun, 1 May 1999). As public opinion in Japan had been hostile to North Korea and Japanese leaders were not inclined to take any risk on the diplomatic front, there were not many people expecting a breakthrough in Japan-North Korea relations in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the historic inter-Korean summit in 2000 prompted the Japanese press and politicians to urge the Tokyo government to become more proactive in pursuing diplomatic normalization with North Korea in spite of the presence of a series of obstacles, including the abduction cases involving Japanese nationals (Kim Y.C. 2002).

Since Japan showed no evident sign of taking peace gestures towards North Korea despite his breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, President Kim dispatched Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo to Tokyo in January 2002 to press Japanese leaders to start dialogue with North Korea (Segye Ilbo, 17 January 2002). President Kim further made use of Koizumi’s trip to Seoul in March 2002 to request him to adopt actions in the direction of normalizing ties with North Korea. President Kim was quoted by Mainichi Shimbun (1 September 2002) as telling Koizumi: ‘He [Chairman Kim] is regarded as a weird man, but I don’t think so. It may be fruitful to talk with him, since he is well versed in various affairs taking place in the world’. In a joint press conference with Kim following the summit, Koizumi (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 March 2002) told reporters:

We will resume diplomatic normalization talks with North Korea based on the principle of the negotiated and peaceful resolution of all issues. However, we have such a thorny issue as the abduction of Japanese nationals. We will deliver our position clearly to North Korea and hold negotiations in a resolute manner.

Soon after Koizumi’s trip to Seoul, the two Koreas announced a South Korean
presidential envoy’s trip to North Korea on 25 March, interpreted by the South Korean media as a desperate effort by President Kim to prevent the security environment on the Korean Peninsula from further deteriorating following President Bush’s State of the Union address in January when he classified North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ (Chosun Ilbo, 26 March 2002; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 26 March 2002). Koizumi revealed that he had been already told by President Kim about the envoy’s trip to Pyongyang during his summit with him, hoping that North Korea would show sincerity in resolving the abduction issue (Hankyoreh, 27 March 2002; Hankook Ilbo, 28 March 2002). There were more indications that North Korea and Japan were moving to resume dialogue, brokered by President Kim. On 25 March, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo said that Japan and North Korea were seeking to convene Red Cross talks at the earliest possible date to discuss the abduction issue. It was a response to the 22 March announcement by the North Korea Red Cross society that it would resume efforts to locate what it called ‘missing Japanese nationals’.

Before Koizumi’s trip to Seoul, Japan took a number of hard-line steps against North Korea at the request of the Bush administration, such as searches of the headquarters of Chongryon, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, and financial institutions, run by pro-Pyongyang residents, in November 2001, and the sinking of a so-called ‘mysterious ship’, believed to be a North Korean spy vessel, in December. In a protest against those incidents, the North Korean Red Cross society had suspended its search for missing Japanese. Noting Koizumi’s trip to Seoul was the turning point of Japan’s policy towards North Korea, Hankyoreh (27 March 2002) reported that, timed with Koizumi’s trip, President Kim and Koizumi apparently prepared ‘countermeasures’ against the Bush administration’s unilateralism in East Asia by playing an independent card: the dispatch of a South Korean envoy to Pyongyang. Celebrating the final match of the World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan, President Kim and Prime Minister Koizumi held another summit meeting in Tokyo on 1 July. Despite the second inter-Korean naval skirmishes in the West Sea, which took place at the end of the World Cup festival, President Kim declared he would maintain the Sunshine Policy and Koizumi also expressed his strong support of the engagement policy (Hankyoreh, 2 July 2002). In a meeting with ethnic Koreans residing in Japan, Kim said: ‘Even though North Korea showed much more fierce reactions than now and threatened to make 100-fold, 1,000-fold retaliations following the 1999 Yonpyong Naval Battle, we were able to organize a summit meeting the next year’ (Kyunghyang Shinmun, 2 July 2002). When Japan announced Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang, President Kim, welcoming the news, told Koizumi over the phone: ‘It is very important to resolve
all problems through dialogue for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. If the two leaders hold talks directly, I am confident that there would be significant progress in Japan-North Korea relations' (Chosun Ilbo, 31 August 2002). Prime Minister Koizumi also called US President Bush to brief him on his forthcoming visit, while garnering his support. The United States, Japan and South Korea also held a TCOG meeting in Seoul on 6-7 September to coordinate their policies prior to Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang. A MOFAT official said on condition of anonymity that Seoul and Washington were notified of the actual agreement on the summit just two days before the formal announcement. However, the Seoul government was ready to welcome it despite the short notice, even though the United States was embarrassed despite its official statement of welcome. Professor Park Cheol-hee of the MOFAT-affiliated Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), said Koizumi appeared to have taken the initiative without close consultations with the United States, thus eroding the basis of bilateral policy coordination on North Korea (Hankyoreh, 31 August 2002).

Even though President Kim’s decisive, back-stage role in paving the way for Koizumi’s trip was reported by Japanese newspapers following the announcement of his visit, the reports did not receive attention since the visit itself was a shock to many in view of the lingering animosity between the two states. Asahi Shimbun (31 August 2002) reported that President Kim persuaded Chairman Kim via his envoy in April to normalize relations with Japan as soon as possible. Among Kim’s recommendations were: first, recognize the abduction of Japanese nationals by explaining it was committed by some militant elements in North Korea; second, expel the hijackers of the Yodo airplane to enable the United States to lift economic sanctions and secure loans from the World Bank and other financial institutions; third, stress practicality and tangible gains over honour in the ‘liquidation of the past’; and make a compromise on the issue of compensation for Japan’s colonial rule in accordance with the South Korean example (ibid). A Chong Wa Dae official noted that President Kim made utmost efforts to persuade both parties to hold the highest-level talks, even though the actual summit was based on a decision reached by themselves (Donga Ilbo, 2 September 2002).

One factor, which was unnoticed by the media and the academic community, was that Chairman Kim had actually accepted the envoy’s advice and told Koizumi during a summit in Pyongyang that some ‘rogue’ elements of the past government had committed these crimes, expressing his apologies. Lim Dongwon (Interview: 2003), President Kim’s special advisor on diplomacy, security and unification who visited North Korea as a presidential envoy, revealed further about his conversation with
Chairman Kim:

At that time, I played a role of conveying President Kim's advice to Chairman Kim. I counselled Chairman Kim to tell Japan that the North Korean authorities had conducted a thorough probe into the allegations and found that the abductions were committed by some rogue elements of the past government. I added, 'You can say this, since you are not responsible for these abductions'. As for the issue of Red Army Faction members who hijacked the Yodoho, I told him: 'Don't take it as an issue of negotiations. Everything will be resolved if they are sent to a third country quietly. It is enough since you had protected them for decades'. In sum, I told him to introduce a new thinking and improve relations with Japan, since Japan's assistance is crucial for North Korea's economic reconstruction.21

*Domestic Variables for Koizumi's Engagement.* To explain Prime Minister Koizumi's policy choice in a comprehensive manner, President Kim's role must be augmented with an analysis of Japan's domestic politics, which prompted Koizumi to set out on a risky course of rapprochement with North Korea. Koizumi, who had once enjoyed unprecedented approval ratings of more than 80 per cent, faced ebbing popularity among the Japanese public since his dismissal of popular Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko in January 2002. He was also under fire for failing to implement economic and political reforms, making many Japanese commentators contend that his motives for travelling to North Korea were tied in with his domestic troubles (Lee W.D. 2002: 53; Rozman 2003). Koizumi attempted to secure a major political reward by taking a decisive step towards diplomatic normalization with North Korea. His adherence to the engagement option and North Korea's positive reception prompted many observers to speculate that Tokyo might establish ties with Pyongyang before the end of 2002 (Lee W.D. 2002: 55; Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 2002).

In the past, successive Japanese administrations had attempted to adopt some proactive approaches towards North Korea, but it was Prime Minister Koizumi that grabbed the opportunity when the window of opportunity opened with President Kim's Sunshine Policy and visited North Korea to create a breakthrough in bilateral negotiations. *The Mainichi Daily News* (31 December 2002) picked Koizumi's trip to

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21 Following the talks, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman showed flexibility on the issue of the Japanese hijackers' return to Japan by saying that North Korea is not in a position to exercise authority over the issue (Lee W.S. 2003: 191).
North Korea as No. 1 among Japan’s top ten news of the year under the headline ‘N. Korea Shocks Nation with Spy Ship, Abductions and Historic Meeting’. In contrast with the previous Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori administrations, which placed priority on the return of the Northern Territories from Russia, Prime Minister Koizumi, who took power as the leader of the anti-Hashimoto coalition, diverted attention to diplomatic normalization with North Korea (Park C.H. 2003).

*Koizumi’s Ambition and Japan’s Diplomacy.* Since the Bush administration’s Japan policy was shifting from ‘burden sharing’ to ‘power sharing’, Japan’s room for independent diplomacy has significantly expanded in East Asia, which could favourably affect Japanese efforts to normalize relations with North Korea (Nam 2002: 46). Prime Minister Koizumi himself endeavoured to carve out Japan’s role in East Asia by suggesting the idea of an ‘East Asian community’ in his major policy speech in Singapore at the end of a week-long, five-nation tour of Southeast Asia on 14 January 2002, even though his inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in his envisioned community touched off a controversy (Soeya 2002; *South China Morning Post*, 15 January 2002). Koizumi harboured a personal ambition to be recorded in history as a pioneer of friendly Japan-North Korea relations. Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang, compared to former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Beijing in 1972, marked a rare case of diplomatic autonomy from the United States, which has exercised great influence over Japan since the end of World War II. Professor Kitaoka Shinichi of the University of Tokyo described the visit as ‘a historic success for post-war Japanese diplomacy’ (*Chuo Koron*, November 2002). Rozman (2003: 529) argued that Japan’s independent move lies in its frustration over its low political profile on the international stage, which made Ozawa Ichiro (1994) put that Japan is not a ‘normal state’.

Similar to President Kim’s strategies of engagement, the Koizumi government attempted to inform the Japanese public of the progress in Japan-North Korea relations as part of the efforts to create a new image of North Korea (Hiramatsu 2003). Testifying to the progress in bilateral dialogue, the Koizumi government secured the custody of Takashi Sugishima, a former *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* reporter who had been detained in North Korea for two years, in February 2002, followed by the North Korean Red Cross society’s announcement in March on the resumption of a probe into Japanese ‘missing persons’, the Japan-North Korea Red Cross talks in April and the foreign ministers meeting in July.

When Japan briefed the United States on Koizumi’s trip to North Korea, the United States was not in a position to welcome his plan, since it came when the
administration was intensifying efforts to press North Korea to drop its nuclear and missile programmes. At that time, however, the Bush administration's top priority was the coming war in Iraq and the Koizumi administration could find a space for its independent diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea (Chin 2002). When Japan notified US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was in Tokyo for strategic dialogue on 27-8 August 2002, of an agreement on the summit, he requested the prime minister not to limit his discussion with Chairman Kim to bilateral issues, but cover a wide range of security issues Washington was interested in: (1) development and export of missiles, (2) nuclear weapons programmes, (3) production and trade of narcotic drugs, (4) printing of counterfeit money, (5) production of biological and chemical weapons, (6) withdrawal of forward-deployed army, (7) freedom of religion and (8) human rights (Weekly Post, 9 September 2002). Armitage also told Japanese officials that the United States had secured evidence that North Korea had been operating a second nuclear weapons programme based on enriched uranium in violation of the 1994 nuclear deal (Rozman 2003). Even though Washington's requests were partially reflected on the summit agenda, Koizumi's summit with Chairman Kim was largely focused on abduction and other bilateral issues. In 1990, when Japan was moving to begin normalization talks with North Korea, the United States criticized the late Kanemaru whose visit to Pyongyang created a diplomatic breakthrough because the Japanese action was a violation of the common US-Japan policy line (Shigemura 1999). Unlike Kanemaru's initiative, Koizumi had his own pressing humanitarian agenda, the resolution of the abduction issue, which helped him to secure the Bush administration's understanding of his visit (Nam 2002: 43). In sum, Koizumi desired to increase Japan's influences over the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic normalization with North Korea, which will eventually boost its status in East Asia (Chin 2002).

Diplomatic Breakthrough and North Korea's Flexibility. The process of organizing the Japan-North Korea summit featured, among other things, policy innovation, outright secrecy and significant concessions. First, it was neither the LDP nor other Japanese parties but the MOFA, which played a central role in organizing the summit. Since the start of bilateral negotiations after the Cold War, Japanese politicians had played major roles as emissaries shuttling between Tokyo and Pyongyang, which made North Korean strategists think that, in view of their political influences, it was more important to foster good working relations between political parties rather than to engage in diplomatic talks to secure assistance from Japan. Since they commanded little expertise in the field of diplomacy, Japanese politicians created misunderstanding and
made blunders, for example, by agreeing to use the term, 'compensation', in the 'Three-Party Joint Declaration' in 1990 (Kim Y.C. 2002: 27-8) and by telling North Korean officials repeatedly that 'the abduction issue is not problematic' (Shigemura 1999: 290). A significant change took place in 1997 after the Hashimoto administration started placing emphasis on governmental dialogue rather than the relationship between political parties. Second, the Japanese government kept the process of organizing a summit secret to the United States and South Korea by notifying them of only the agreement just days before its announcement. Previously, Japan's diplomacy endeavoured to remain in sync with those of the United States and South Korea, thus subjecting itself to the shifts of policies and priorities of those countries. Third, the summit was the outcome of shifting policies by Japan and North Korea, with the two states taking a more active posture in a departure from their conventional approaches on diplomatic normalization. Nevertheless, the prime catalyst, which made Prime Minister Koizumi make up his mind to hold a summit with Chairman Kim, was North Korea's unprecedented flexibility and shift in attitude over the abduction issue (Yang and Kim 2002). Hiramatsu Kenji (2003), who was director of the Northeast Asia Division of the MOFA during the preparatory talks for the summit, recalled that the Japanese delegates had given a clear message to their North Korean counterparts that Japan would not proceed with negotiations unless North Korea fully addressed the abductee issue. Japan's two prominent experts on North Korea, Professor Okonogi Masao of Keio University and Professor Izumi Hajime of the University of Shizuoka, noted that Koizumi made up his mind to visit North Korea, since he secured Chairman's Kim's prior commitment to the resolution of the abduction issue on Japanese terms (Hankyoreh, 31 August 2002). Okonogi noted that Pyongyang opted for diplomatic normalization with Tokyo as part of its efforts to avoid the worst-case scenario after a US war on Iraq and secure economic assistance, while Izumi stressed that the settlement of the abductee issue was just the beginning of time-consuming diplomatic talks over such pressing issues as North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes (ibid). In sum, North Korea's agreement on a summit is regarded as a two-pronged strategy aimed at ameliorating the US attitude through its rapprochement with Japan and securing large-scale assistance for the reconstruction of its ailing economy (Lee W.D. 2002: 52).

The Outcome of Summit Diplomacy. In many respects, Koizumi's trip to North Korea can be regarded as successful, since he could hold a frank, constructive discussion about pending issues with Chairman Kim and produce the Pyongyang Declaration, including Kim's commitment to regional security and the resolution of
bilateral issues. First, Koizumi managed to clarify who had been responsible for the abduction of Japanese nationals and the appearances of ‘mysterious ships’ in and near its territorial waters, which were major hurdles for efforts to improve bilateral relations. In particular, the alleged abduction of Japanese nationals was the biggest issue between the two sides, because North Korea’s previous denial of any misdeed led to the rupture of normalization talks. Determined to resolve the two pending issues with Japan, Chairman Kim, labelled as ‘the apologetic kidnapper’ by The Economist (21 September 2002), admitted to the astonishment of the outside world that his subordinates had abducted 13 Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s to train spies about Japanese language and culture, but eight of the 13 were dead. Satisfied with his achievement in Pyongyang, Koizumi said in a statement after his trip to Pyongyang that Chairman Kim, in extraordinary frankness, acknowledged that ‘persons affiliated with North Korea’ had committed these abductions and offered clear-cut apologies, promising to prevent the recurrence of similar events. As for the infiltration of spy ships into Japanese territorial waters, Kim also admitted that ‘certain elements of the military authorities’ had been involved in the incident. Okonogi called it part of Chairman Kim’s efforts to tidy up its past affairs in order to avoid having his country branded as a terrorist state and a target for regime change by the Bush administration (Chuo Koron, November 2002). Chairman Kim’s admission of the past’s wrongdoing and apology was a great surprise even to the South Korean public to the extent that the Kim Dae-jung government had faced criticism for his failure to raise the issues of South Korean abductees and North Korea’s past terrorist acts during his summit with Chairman Kim in 2000.

Second, Koizumi’s trip helped to alleviate tension arising from North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes. Koizumi secured Kim’s commitment to maintaining the moratorium on future missile tests without any time limit. Kim also expressed his intention to abide by the AF in 1994 to help to clear the suspicion of North Korea’s nuclear programmes. Kim further requested Prime Minister Koizumi to convey his message to US President Bush that North Korea wants to reopen negotiations to

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23 The monitoring of a mysterious vessel followed a report from the US military on 18 December 2001 that it had spotted an unidentified ship approaching waters near Amami-Oshima Island via its reconnaissance satellite. Japanese patrol boats chased it before sinking it in the East China Sea on 22 December 2001 after an exchange of fire. Originally, North Korea denied its connection with the vessel. According to a verbatim between Kim and Koizumi, Kim ordered a probe into the incident and found that it was a military drill by some North Korean special forces conducted without his knowledge (Munwha Ilbo, 18 September 2002).
improve bilateral relations. North Korea’s commitment to international security obligations gave confidence for Koizumi, who was hardly a foreign policy expert, to the extent that, right after his visit to Pyongyang, Koizumi stressed Japan’s new role as an important player in addressing the region’s security problems (Economist, 21 September 2002).

Third, Japan and North Korea have reached a virtual agreement on the nature of its future grant aids and loans to be made in connection with its 1910-45 colonial rule. North Korea dropped its earlier demand that the money transfer be made in the name of ‘reparations’ or ‘compensation’ and agreed on the concept of ‘economic cooperation’ and the mutual waiver of rights of property and claim, similar to those agreed upon with South Korea when they normalized relations in 1965 (Hiramatsu 2003). The declaration reads, ‘Both sides shared the recognition that, providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side, including grant aids, long-term loans with low interest rates and such assistances as humanitarian assistance through international organizations, over a period of time deemed appropriate by both sides, and providing other loans and credits by such financial institutions as the Japan Bank for International Co-operation with a view to supporting private economic activities, would be consistent with the spirit of this Declaration, and decided that they would sincerely discuss the specific scales and contents of the economic co-operation in the normalization talks’. If the negotiations are successfully wrapped up, a normalized relationship with Japan means a windfall of an estimated US$4 billion to $10 billion for the Pyongyang regime (Yang and Kim 2002: 78). When South Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965, South Korea secured US$500 million in grant and loans in the name of ‘economic cooperation’ but, at that time, the logic and rhetoric of South Korea’s economic reconstruction and the solidarity of the anti-Communist bloc, led by the United States, reigned supreme over the ‘liquidation of the past’ in a legitimate way. Even though it is significant for the economically troubled North Korea to secure large-scale economic assistance, the Kim-Koizumi agreement meant the repetition of a ‘distorted’ model of compensation for the settlement of Japan’s colonial rule and, therefore, a serious concession on the part of North Korea, which had demanded ‘compensation’ for several decades (Lee W.D. 2002: 54; Shin 2002: 68).

Fourth, it is significant for Japan and North Korea to have authored a written document in the form of the Pyongyang Declaration, since Chairman Kim’s statements carry higher authority than anything else in North Korea. In inter-Korean relations, the 2000 Joint Declaration by President Kim and Chairman Kim is a document, which has been most frequently referred to whenever the two sides tried to resolve problems.
Koizumi said in his arrival statement from Pyongyang, 'I believe that as long as the principles and spirit of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration are sincerely abided by, relations between Japan and North Korea will begin to make great strides from hostile relations to cooperative relations'.

The Aftermaths of the Summit Diplomacy. In a show of consistency, Prime Minister Koizumi exhibited determination to pursue better relations with North Korea even after the North’s admission of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Koizumi said, ‘Japan is not considering changing its plan to resume Japan-North Korea normalization talks on 29 October’ (Yonhap News Agency, 17 October 2002). When they resumed normalization talks on 29 October in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, however, the delegates from the two countries made little headway because they exhibited differences over the two main issues: the abduction of Japanese nationals and the North’s nuclear weapons programme. North Korea made it clear that the nuclear issue could be resolved through its negotiations with the United States, not Japan (Rozman 2003). Whilst North Korea viewed that diplomatic normalization and the extension of economic assistance could lead to the resolution of nuclear and missile issues, Japan prioritized the settlement of security issues over economic assistance. The only moderate progress in the negotiations was an agreement to set up a panel to discuss security issues from November, but it was foiled in an escalating tension over the North’s HEU programme.

Primarily, Chairman Kim’s confession to the abduction issue could not placate anti-Pyongyang antagonism in Japan and only provoked further inquiries into the premature death of some of the kidnapped Japanese nationals, developments that hampered the Koizumi administration from further proceeding in the direction of normalizing relations with North Korea. The MOFA also faced criticism for failing to properly convey information on the dates of death of eight abductees to their family members and the Japanese Red Cross society, even though it secured the list, containing information on the dates of their death, hours before the summit started in Pyongyang. The fact that two of the abductees died on the same day made their parents in Japan raise the possibility that they might have been murdered. The other abductees also perished from mysterious illness or accidents in evidently premature deaths in their 20s, 30s or 40s, which prompted their family members to dismiss the North Korean accounts as ‘laughable lies’ (Mainich Daily News, 2 October 2002). A suprapartisan organization of Diet members calling for the swift return of Japanese abductees passed a resolution to demand that the Tokyo government not reenter normalization talks until the abduction
issue was completely resolved. Taking issue with North Korea’s abduction cases and Tokyo’s hasty move to resume normalization talks, Koike Yuriko, a Diet member from the now defunct New Conservative Party, heightened her criticism of Koizumi for signing the Pyongyang Declaration in an article, entitled, ‘Why the Rush to Reopen Normalization Talks with This Barbaric State?’ (Seiron, November 2002).

The resurgence of the anti-engagement bloc reflects the nature of Japan’s public sphere, influenced heavily by the conservative forces. Japan’s conservative media generated intense anti-North Korean sentiment and produced sensational reports that helped solidify the already deep antagonism of the general public towards North Korea (Hughes 2002b). For example, Japanese newspapers, citing an internal document of the North Korean People’s Army, reported that Chairman Kim described Prime Minister Koizumi’s trip to Pyongyang in September 2002 as the ‘signal of capitulation’, which poured cold water on the spirit of rapprochement between the two countries (Yonhap News Agency, 13 May 2003). In a column, carried on Hankyoreh (9 December 2002), Professor Wada Haruki called for balanced reporting on North Korea, since the ‘negative campaign’ against the state, launched by Japanese television companies and magazines, had been detrimental to bilateral relations.

As a result, the process of rapprochement between the two states was put to an end, weakening Koizumi’s desire to create an early breakthrough in bilateral relations. In spite of Chairman Kim’s surprise confession, the deeply embedded mistrust between the two states hampered the progress in bilateral negotiations to resolve the abduction issue. On 15 October 2002, the five surviving victims of the abductions returned home for tearful reunions with their family members, but the abductees, who married while in North Korea, came home leaving their children behind. In a response to the public uproar over the abduction issue, the Koizumi administration took a hard line by announcing the five abductees, who were authorized by North Korea to travel to Japan for up to two weeks, would remain in Japan indefinitely in breach of its agreement with Pyongyang. Negotiating the fate of the surviving abductees and their family members in North Korea, the two countries showed convergence around the notion that they must be allowed to make ‘free decisions’ about their own future, but differed over how the environment should be forged to allow them to make such free decisions. The MOFA stressed the creation of an environment that would allow the abductees and their family members to make ‘free decisions’, apparently presuming that they could not make decisions out of their free will once in North Korea. Facing Japan’s demand that the family members of the five abductees be sent to Japan immediately, North Korea also stressed the ‘free will’ of the abductees and their family members, noting that the five
abductees should return to North Korea first to hold discussions with their family members about their future. Basically, North Korea holds a different mindset on the abduction issue. Pak Ryong-yon, deputy director general of the North Korean Foreign Ministry, told Japanese journalists that the issue is not a stumbling block to the improvement of bilateral relations, since Chairman Kim recognized the fact of abduction and promised to punish those responsible and to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents (Joongang Ilbo, 25 October 2002). The North Korean official went on to say that the abduction is no match with Japan’s ‘colossal crime’ during its colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula in terms of scale and atrocity (ibid).

On top of its domestic constraints, the United States pressed Japan to abandon its engagement option after the resurfacing of the North Korean nuclear weapons problem. Japan had little room to manoeuvre in order to move forward since the Bush administration put pressure on Japan to stop offering economic aid to North Korea until it agrees to forgo its nuclear programme (New York Times, 30 October 2002). Japan was also forced to urge North Korea to abandon efforts to pursue the HEU programme whenever the two sides held official negotiations. With its principle leverage in the negotiations abandoned, Japanese negotiators could not find any incentives to change North Korea’s attitude over the abduction issue, making North Korea, disenchanted with Japan, solidify the belief that a breakthrough with the United States is the only solution to resolve pending issues. Prime Minister Koizumi told Presidents Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in a three-way summit on 27 October 2002 that Japan could not complete the process of negotiations to normalize ties in the absence of the resolution of security issues, including North Korea’s HEU programme.

Japan criticized North Korea’s nuclear admission but did not declare a suspension of bilateral negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations in spite of the North’s apparent violation of the Pyongyang Declaration issued by Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim. Even though Japan called on North Korea to take steps to alleviate international concerns over its nuclear programme as one of the issues of the normalization talks, the Tokyo government has rather prioritized the abduction case over the nuclear issue (New York Times, 29 October 2002). Then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo noted that the process toward diplomatic normalization will never proceed if North Korea does not abide by the Pyongyang Declaration, but added that Japan needs to maintain a channel of dialogue because, ‘if we do not talk with North Korea and leave it alone, its nuclear development program may advance further’ (quoted in Kamiya 2003: 19). The Japanese government’s attitude mirrored the relatively calm response by the Japanese public to Pyongyang’s overt nuclear ambitions,
in contrast to the intense level of fear, provoked by the ballistic missile test in 1998 (ibid). When a North Korea Foreign Ministry spokesman warned on 5 November 2002 that it would resume ballistic missile tests unless Japan moves quickly to normalize ties with it, Koizumi played it down and expressed his intention to stick to the course of diplomatic engagement with North Korea by noting: ‘I believe North Korea will not do anything to trample the spirit of the Pyongyang Declaration’ (New York Times, 5 November 2002).

In spite of the upsurge in public antagonism against North Korea, one notable thing is that the public support of the Koizumi cabinet increased from 51 per cent to 61 per cent after his trip to North Korea, according to a survey by the Asahi Shimbun (19 September 2002). Among those surveyed, 81 per cent approved the Kim-Koizumi summit, meaning that the general public was in favour of the engagement option in spite of the demand by some Diet members and newspapers to suspend talks with Pyongyang. In another survey, however, 88 per cent expressed distrust over North Korea's explanations regarding the abduction issue, showing deeply bedded animosity towards North Korea (Asahi Shimbun, 7 October 2002)

3.2.3. Findings
Prime Minister Koizumi’s failure in strategies of engagement with North Korea testifies to one of this thesis's main propositions that limited engagement, initiated with a mix of military deterrence and economic incentives without policy consistency leading to the public’s identity shifts, runs the risk of only invoking old enmities. After a short period of engagement, Japan returned to the past’s oscillations between containment and engagement, since it faced a set of obstacles: first, a dearth of strategies in dealing with North Korea mainly because of its geographical proximity and the North's ballistic missiles capable of hitting any target in Japan; second, the pressure from the United States calling for conformity in bilateral steps; and finally, the domestic constraints, caused by the deep seated animosity towards North Korea.

The Sunshine Policy provided Prime Minister Koizumi with an opportunity to launch summit diplomacy, rare in the history of Japan’s external relations. As Foreign Minister Kono Yohei noted in March 2000, Japan's basic approach to its diplomatic normalization talks with North Korea was the maintenance of renkei (linkage) with those of South Korea and the United States (Chosun Ilbo, 7 March 2000). Since President Kim created an international environment for the improvement of Japan-North Korea ties by embarking on a rapprochement process through the 2000 inter-Korean summit and offered a free hand to the Tokyo government to move forward, Koizumi
could achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. In particular, President Kim advised Koizumi to consider summit diplomacy as an effective way of engaging North Korea in view of the scale of the pending issues, such as the abduction of Japanese nationals and security threats (Hiramatsu 2003). Thanks to the summit in which some stumbling blocks to the improvement of their relationship were cleared by Chairman Kim’s unexpected confession on the abduction and the spy ship infiltration, the two states have come to squarely face decades-old realities. This kind of candour is rare in diplomatic talks, even though it had an adverse impact on Japan’s perception of North Korea.

Nevertheless, Japan, predominantly an economic power, faced political and diplomatic constraints when policy elites sought to engage North Korea. The structural constraints were compounded by North Korea’s deeply embedded animosity toward Japan, a factor that made Japanese strategists believe that North Korea might be tempted to launch missiles at Japan in the event of another war on the Korean Peninsula. The final report of the Task Force on Foreign Relations for Prime Minister Koizumi adequately reflects the situation by noting that ‘the prime objective of Japan’s North Korea policy is not to overthrow Kim Jong Il’s regime but to persuade Pyongyang to stop taking harmful actions externally and to initiate gradual reform of its political and economic system domestically’ (Kamiya 2003: 21). Like Seoul, Tokyo feared its possible involvement in an inadvertent war against North Korea, which might be started by the United States after the war in Iraq. Even though the United States is located far away on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the entire territories of Japan are within the ranges of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

Japan’s policies exhibited vulnerability to the shifting US policies towards North Korea. Whenever the United States intervened to resolve North Korea-related problems, Japan faced the cancellation of its negotiations with the North, as seen in the suspension of three waves of normalization talks after the nuclear crisis in 1994, President Bush’s inauguration in 2001, and the emergence of the second nuclear weapons problem in 2002. Heavily biased towards policy coordination with the United States, Japan failed to carve out its own room to manoeuvre as an independent actor (Yang and Kim 2002). Referring to this situation, Shigemura (1999: 281) argued Japan has no ‘foreign policy’, but ‘following policy’.

While the Kim administration showed enthusiasm and tenacity against all odds, the Koizumi government lost control over its North Korea policy amid the media bombardments. In particular, the ‘missing persons’ pressure groups and the mass media were emboldened to dictate North Korea strategies (Hughes 2002b). Without focusing on the settlement of Japan’s colonial rule, the prime issue of normalization talks,
Professor Okonogi argued in a column that the Japanese government diverted its attention to the resolution of the abduction issue, reflecting the domestic public's antagonism vis-à-vis North Korea (Hankyoreh, 14 October 2002). Unlike the progress of US-Vietnam normalization talks in the absence of serious security issues, illustrated in Chapter Two, the Japan Defence Agency and other conservative forces, which shared the same hard-line approach on North Korea's nuclear and missile issues as the United States, meddled in the normalization process and called for the prior resolution of those issues (Kim Y.C. 2002: 30).

Therefore, it will still take time for Japan to inject consistency into its policies towards North Korea because of structural and normative constraints. Japan's failure in diplomacy vis-à-vis North Korea reflects the fact that there is no consensus in Japan's public sphere as to whether to contain or engage North Korea. Even after it embarked on the course of engagement, the Koizumi administration exhibited inconsistency in its policies, since its identification with North Korea has been in confusion and oscillating between the images of enemy and partner. In a survey, reported by The Asahi Shimbun (7 October 2002), 44 per cent of respondents approved the resumption of diplomatic normalization talks with North Korea, while 43 per cent objected it. Amid this polarization of domestic opinion, Japanese politicians and diplomats found it safe to remain inactive without taking any proactive action. Coupled with this problem of identification, Japan has been long embroiled in a debate over whether to discard its passive defence posture and shift gears into an assertive stance to actively deal with regional security problems. In this long-running debate, the Japanese conservative forces made use of Pyongyang's potential threats to put an end of its traditional norm of anti-militarism and improve the SDF's capability in the direction of introducing more offensive posture.

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of an activist government in South Korea bestowed Japan with a chance to normalize relations with North Korea, one of the top foreign policy goals of post-war Japanese administrations. Nevertheless, the Koizumi administration exhibited an inability in formulating and pursuing a consistent policy with a clear roadmap in relations with North Korea.24

24 Breaking a two-year stalemate in bilateral relations, Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea on 22 May 2004 for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Even though Koizumi secured the release of five children of the Japanese abductees, he faced criticism for rewarding North Korea with 250,000 tons of food aid and US$10 million worth of medical supplies without making any progress on the nuclear weapons dispute or fully resolving North Korea's abductions of Japanese citizens.
3.3. The European Union and North Korea

In contrast to the ill-fated strategies of engagement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Koizumi, the EU’s policies vis-à-vis North Korea featured more steadiness and consistency. When they were convinced that the window of opportunity was opening wide owing to President Kim’s Sunshine Policy, the EU and its member states, except for France and Ireland, seized the moments and markedly improved their relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001. Uninfluenced by the Bush administration’s scepticism and mistrust harboured against the Pyongyang regime, the EU pushed ahead with the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2001, following in the footsteps of its major member states, including Britain and Germany.

To outside observers, the EU and its member states were able to move rather swiftly to set up diplomatic ties with North Korea since they held a smaller stake on the Korean Peninsula than the United States and Japan. Even though this observation is correct, the diplomatic initiatives by the EU and its members require further elaboration. In fact, the European diplomatic stance represents a clear distinction from the US’s perception and worldview, epitomized by the simplistic classification of states into friends and foes. Europe’s typical worldview has been coloured by an insightful consideration into the coexistence of different types of states on a long spectrum between the two poles, which helped them to expand the manoeuvring room in their diplomacy.

This section will investigate which factors motivated the EU and its member states to take decisive actions leading to full diplomatic normalization with North Korea, while the United States and Japan fumbled on their way to the destination they once envisioned. As shown in Table 5.2, North Korea and European states normalized their relations in the form of two strong waves, reflecting the changing international environment and shifting policies by both North and South Korea. In the first wave, a group of five EU members set up ties with North Korea in an international atmosphere of détente in the early 1970s and temporary inter-Korean rapprochement, which produced the South-North Joint Communiqué on 4 July 1972. The second group of eight EU states established ties with North Korea in 2000 and 2001 when President Kim’s Sunshine Policy fared well, leading to the first inter-Korean summit. This section will highlight what factors motivated the EU states to move proactively to set up diplomatic ties with North Korea, especially in the second wave coinciding with President Kim’s tenure.
Table 5.2 Diplomatic Normalization between North Korea and EU Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Dates of Normalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>April 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>June 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>July 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>December 1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>February 1975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4 January 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>12 December 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15 January 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>23 January 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7 February 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1 March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>5 March 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8 March 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MOFAT

3.3.1. Europe: a new role as supporting player

Historically, North Korea, which was caught in an intense rivalry with South Korea, attempted to set up diplomatic ties with as many countries as possible as part of its efforts to boost the legitimacy of the regime and attract capital and technology from advanced countries. Since the late 1950s, North Korea sought to increase contacts with western European countries in a departure from its old diplomacy confining itself to the Communist bloc, but its economic slowdown in the 1970s, coupled with trade deficits, default and incidents of illegal smuggling, hampered the development of bilateral relations (Kim H.S. 2001). After the end of the Cold War, North Korea strengthened its contacts with European countries and, in 1992 alone, dispatched delegations of government and party officials three times to a total of 12 countries (Han C.S. 1998).
The EU has also strengthened its presence in East Asia politically and economically after the Cold War, especially through bilateral and multilateral frameworks of dialogue, including the biennial Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit (Gilson 2000). Summarizing its principles and strategies, the Commission of the European Communities issued an Asia strategy report on 4 September 2001, titled 'Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership'. The new report, focusing on strengthening the EU's political and economic presence in the region, was a revised version of its first Asia strategy paper, issued in 1994 under the title 'Towards a New Asia Strategy'. The report underlined, among other things, the EU's strengthened contribution to peace and security in Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula and East Timor.

Historically, the EU's initiatives toward North Korea were part of its forward-looking policy of engagement in the region, which is the locus of the world's major sources of military tension. The EU's North Korea policy has featured several characteristics, reflecting geopolitical and ideational factors. First, geographical distance and dearth of capabilities to project its power beyond Europe made the EU and its member states play a marginal or supporting role rather than a central role in resolving such serious security issues as North Korea's development of WMD and missiles. When South Korea, the United States and Japan resolved the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994 in a package deal and formed the KEDO in 1995 for the construction of two nuclear reactors and provision of heavy oil to North Korea, the EU belatedly joined it in 1997 as a member of its executive council at the request of the United States and Japan, which desired the EU's increased role in nuclear non-proliferation and, especially, burden-sharing for the costly nuclear project (Drifte 2002: 158). As of November 2002, the EU had paid a total of 115 million euros in funding for the organization since 1996. Even though the EU's financial contributions to the KEDO were not sizable compared with those by other board members in the US$4.6 billion nuclear project, its participation in the US-led organization paved the way for its involvement in security issues on the Korean Peninsula (Park C.B. 2002). Second, the EU, recognizing its marginal status, focused its efforts on non-security issues, such as the transfer of know-how on market economics to North Korea, with the aim of transforming the command economy into a free market economy. It could be viewed as a division of work with the United States, which placed priorities on security issues. According to the EU's Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004, issued in 2000, the EU identified three priority areas in its

North Korea projects: (1) institutional support and capacity building; (2) sustainable management and use of natural resources; (3) reliable and sustainable transport sector. Finally, the EU’s involvement in Korean Peninsula issues featured a steady evolution in the direction of strengthened engagement, whilst the policies of the US and Japanese governments showed severe fluctuations. Even though it was a latecomer, the EU could gradually shift its policies in a relatively short time to the extent that it could recognize the North Korean regime in the form of diplomatic normalization.

Those characteristics of the EU’s policies were favourably received by North Korea in spite of its inherent reservations about any discussion of security and human rights issues. Since it considered the EU as a rising power, which could be potentially at odds with the United States over many international issues, North Korea welcomed the EU’s multipolarization efforts, increasing attention to East Asia, and propensity toward engagement (Kim H.S. 2001; Rodong Shinmun, 3 May 2001). Nevertheless, North Korea has dealt with its expanding relations with Europe in the context of its relations with the United States. With the United States remaining as its archenemy, North Korea sought to use strengthened ties with the EU as a preliminary process leading to its long-term goal of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States, while securing the EU’s humanitarian and economic assistance for its short-term gains (Ahn 2002: 51). Its intention of maintaining diplomatic relations with the EU was also seen as its efforts to play it off against the United States, even though the depth of its ties with the EU did not reach the point that it could use its relations with the EU to win concessions from the United States (Chung S.J. 2002; Ku 2001).

3.3.2. The EU’s Policy of Engagement
The EU’s policy towards North Korea has not adopted any markedly different tones or dimensions when President Kim took office in 1998 to implement the Sunshine Policy, which eliminated any preconditions hampering the Western countries from improving relations with North Korea. Therefore, the momentous shifts of policies by the EU and its member states can be said to be the outcome of President Kim’s policy entrepreneurship, which had become more conspicuous after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000. Kim Il-soo (Interview: 2003), minister at the Korean Embassy in London, noted:

In the previous administrations, we did not raise an outright objection to

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diplomatic normalization between our European allies and North Korea. Once European states took a serious step towards diplomatic normalization, however, we dissuaded them from following through, alleging the timing was not appropriate. It was only after President Kim Dae-jung took office that we requested them to improve ties with North Korea in a consistent manner. Unlike the United States whose foreign policy was based on a black-and-white logic, European countries faced no domestic obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea partly because of the presence of socialist states from the Cold War era.

Since the EU’s North Korea policies have been supplementary and evolutionary with a heavy inclination towards non-security issues, its policies of engagement could fare well during and after the tenure of President Kim, who was reputed to have created an international environment for engagement by injecting consistency into South Korea’s policies. Despite its relatively meagre status on the Korean Peninsula, the EU had a vision that the advantage of being a distant power without strategic interests on the peninsula could enable it to play the role of a mediator between the United States and North Korea. In fact, the EU took a series of steps to engage North Korea, especially when it was encouraged by the Kim administration. The Sunshine Policy started bearing fruit when the EU shifted its old tactics of keeping some distance in its diplomacy with North Korea and opened the first round of political dialogue with North Korea in Brussels on 2 December 1998 (Segye Ilbo, 3 December 1998). As seen in Table 5.3, the political dialogue developed into a regular channel of negotiations between the two sides, with a total of five rounds of talks held during President Kim’s tenure on an annual basis.

The inception of the EU-North Korea dialogue came amid the deadlock in US-North Korea negotiations to address North Korea’s underground facilities in Kumchang-ri, suspected to be accommodating nuclear facilities. Since the agenda of the EU-North Korea political dialogue comprised security issues as well as economic issues, such as the improvement of North Korea’s agricultural structure and humanitarian assistance, the North’s diplomatic initiative was interpreted as part of its efforts to increase pressure on the United States to agree to its demand for compensation in return for the US access to the underground facilities (Kukmin Ilbo, 1 December 1998).
Table 5.3 EU-North Korea Political Dialogue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Major Topics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 December 1998</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Nuclear and missile issues, 4-party talks, economic reform, human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 24 November 1999</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Establishment of liaison offices, food shortages, human rights, security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 25 November 2000</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Improvement of bilateral relations, economic assistance, human rights, WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 27 October 2001</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Human rights, WMD, economic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 15 June 2002</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Human rights, WMD, economic assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Individual Initiatives by EU Members.* Despite a series of political dialogues with North Korea, the EU did not have any definite policy guideline on when and how its member states could establish diplomatic ties with North Korea. An EU spokesman said: ‘The EU does not have collective relations with North Korea and it has been the policy up to now, and likely to remain, that it is up to member states. It is a bilateral issue’.

When an increasing number of EU members were convinced that it was time to set up ties with North Korea, it turned quickly into a race among them, exhibiting the lack of internal coordination among the member states.

Before the inauguration of President Kim, North Korea held diplomatic ties with only five EU members, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Sweden. Launching his Sunshine Policy, President Kim started encouraging EU members to improve ties with North Korea. The Pyongyang regime, on its part, paid attention to normalizing ties with EU members, especially after President Bush took a hard-line stance on North Korea. European countries were initially cautious in improving ties with North Korea, raising questions of WMD and human rights, but became more enthusiastic after the inter-Korean summit in June 2000 (*Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 21 October 2000). Nevertheless, major European countries did not respond immediately to North Korea’s overture in September 2000 when Foreign Minister Paik Nam-sun proposed diplomatic normalization in a series of letters to France, Germany, Britain, Belgium and the EU (Chung 2002). In a surprise turn, the ASEM summit, hosted by President Kim in Seoul

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27 The statement was reported on CNN.com on 20 October 2000 (accessed 22 December 2003).
in October 2000, was a venue for the European leaders’ endorsement of his Sunshine Policy. On the sidelines of the ASEM summit, President Kim held bilateral summits with 14 participating leaders, urging them to improve relations with North Korea in a show of support for the current process of inter-Korean rapprochement. During the summit period, five EU members, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium, announced their plan to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea, giving a boost to President Kim’s Sunshine Policy. The EU states made another collective commitment to the improvement of relations with North Korea by participating in the adoption of the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula issued after the ASEM summit. The last sentence of the declaration reads, ‘Leaders also underlined the importance of strengthening efforts to improve relations between ASEM, its individual partners and the DPRK through dialogue, people-to-people exchanges, economic links, as well as through DPRK participating in multilateral dialogue.’ The North Korean Foreign Ministry welcomed the special declaration in a statement issued on 24 October, noting that European countries expressed their support for the implementation of the inter-Korean summit declaration in June 2000 (Munwha Ilbo, 25 October 2000).

Since Britain noted on 16 October officially that it was premature to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea (Hankyoreh, 21 October 2000), the shift of Britain’s official positions in three days was closely related to a strong request by President Kim, who wanted to make use of the ASEM as a venue to send the signal worldwide that engagement is the only option for the resolution of pending security issues and integration of North Korea into the international community. Revealing that Britain was approached by North Korea in September 2000, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said that his country wished to help inter-Korean rapprochement to gain momentum, since President Kim was ‘very keen that other countries help to engage North Korea by bringing it in from the cold’. Former British charge d’affaires in Pyongyang, James Hoare (Interview: 2004), noted:

The ROK government had been pressing European governments for some time before the ASEM meeting to improve relations with the DPRK. Unlike previous South Korean governments, this time it seemed serious. It is from

28 Among the leaders of the European countries with which North Korea did not have diplomatic relations were Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar.
that, I think, that the decision was made by Mr. Blair and Mr. Cook to establish diplomatic relations. All the legal requirements had been there for years. All that was needed was the political will to go ahead. That is what came in September 2000.

Among the EU members, which had newly set up ties with North Korea, Britain established a resident embassy in Pyongyang, while Germany upgraded its existing interest section into an embassy, which brought the number of embassies of Western countries from one to three. Before that, only Sweden maintained a resident embassy there. The normalization talks between North Korea and Germany showed how Pyongyang was ready to make unprecedented concessions to set up ties with Berlin. North Korea, among other things, agreed on four points: (1) a guarantee on the free travel and activities of German diplomats and aid group members; (2) a guarantee on aid agencies' access to the monitoring of distribution; (3) a guarantee on the entry of German journalists and provision of assistance to their activities; and (4) discussions of such issues as human rights, regional security, disarmament, and non-proliferation of WMD and missile technology (Chung S.J. 2002). In a press conference following the ASEM closing ceremony, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said: ‘The EU has no common policy towards North Korea. However, the reason why many European states expressed their plans to establish diplomatic ties with North Korea simultaneously was that we wanted to support the South Korean policy seeking to open North Korea’ (Hankyoreh, 22 October 2000).

Unexpectedly, the independent actions by EU members towards North Korea caused schism within the 15-nation EU. In particular, Britain and Germany announced their decisions to normalize relations with North Korea without properly consulting with the then-EU president France and without awaiting a common EU stance on North Korea. Spain and Belgium also followed in the footsteps of Britain and Germany in a strong wave of rapprochement. Despite President Kim’s recommendations and North Korea’s diplomatic overture, a disgruntled France refused to normalize ties with the North by setting preconditions, such as the improvement of North Korea’s human rights conditions, the removal of WMD and the lifting of restrictions on foreign NGO activities.

President Kim’s Role in EU’s Comprehensive Engagement. Whereas hardliners in the US administration and Congress pursued regime change, the EU’s basic policy towards North Korea stemmed from its observation that the Pyongyang regime enjoys
political stability despite its economic and social troubles. The EU’s Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004, issued in 2000, reads: ‘The political situation remains stable, with the current regime firmly in place, but, on the economic and social front, North Korea is facing major difficulties and now wants to address these in order to improve the living conditions of its population’. The EU’s observation is basically in line with the position of Seoul’s policy elites who pursued the Sunshine Policy to help the Pyongyang regime to overcome its economic and social problems instead of undermining the foundation of the regime.

Even though the Sunshine Policy could be the prime determinant which opened the door for the EU’s comprehensive engagement vis-à-vis North Korea, the EU has also endeavoured to carve out its profile as an active player in international diplomacy in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one of the pillars for the formation of the EU after the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 (Drifte 2002).\(^{31}\) Witnessing the rise of East Asia as an economic powerhouse, the EU wished to demonstrate its intention and capability of making positive contributions to peace and security in the region as part of its long-term efforts to give a facelift to the image of Europe among Asians (Cho and Kim 1998: 55). As the individual interests of the EU members converged on the EU’s increased role in Asia, its North Korea policy has become a test case for the successful implementation of the CFSP (Park C.B. 2002).

In this emerging international atmosphere favourable to North Korea’s resocialization, President Kim expedited his efforts to encourage the EU to normalize relations with North Korea. On a trip to Sweden in December 2000 to receive the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize, President Kim held a summit with Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson and called for European countries’ improved relations with North Korea. In particular, he supported Persson’s tentative idea of visiting North Korea in 2001 for a summit with Chairman Kim (Chosun Ilbo, 13 December 2000). Persson’s trip to North Korea carried substantial weight since Sweden was to take over the EU’s rotating presidency in 2001. In an address at the Swedish parliament, President Kim said: ‘I hope that Sweden, which will become EU president next year, would take an initiative to help North Korea to open up to the international community’ (ibid).

The EU’s engagement with North Korea culminated in a high-profile trip to Pyongyang by the EU troika, President Persson, External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten and Foreign Policy High Representative Javier Solana, on 2 May 2001, the first of its kind in bilateral relations. During his stay in Pyongyang, Persson held a lengthy

\(^{31}\) The EU’s position on its relations with North Korea is well documented on its Internet homepage, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm (accessed 20 December 2003).
summit with Chairman Kim to discuss a wide range of issues. In a highly celebrated inter-Korean visit, the EU delegation flew into Seoul and held a meeting with President Kim for debriefing. Shortly after the visit, the EU signed diplomatic relations with North Korea on 14 May. The EU troika visit yielded significant achievements in many respects. First, Chairman Kim promised to keep a moratorium on ballistic missile tests in place until 2003 and abide by the AF, which was welcomed immediately by the US Department of State. However, the EU delegation exhibited its lack of bargaining leverage over the issue of North Korea's exports of ballistic missiles, since Chairman Kim reiterated Pyongyang's position that it would continue to export missiles since it is a 'form of trade' (Hankook Ilbo, 5 May 2001). Chairman Kim, expressing his displeasure over the Bush administration's protracted North Korea policy review, expressed his strong desire to reopen dialogue with the United States in a peace gesture, which prompted Seoul's newspapers to proclaim, 'Now the ball is in the US court' (Hankyoreh, 4 May 2001; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 5 May 2001).

Second, the EU delegation's trip helped rekindle the process of inter-Korean rapprochement, hampered by the inauguration of the Bush administration. Chairman Kim, describing President Kim as a 'good friend and leader', made it clear that he would make a return visit to Seoul, which is one of the agreements included in the Joint Declaration signed by President Kim and Chairman Kim after their summit. Nevertheless, Chairman Kim made it clear that his return visit to Seoul would be possible only after the United States wrapped up its policy review.

Third, Chairman Kim agreed to open dialogue with the EU about human rights issues, one of the EU's key concerns in the process of normalizing its relations with North Korea. Following the establishment of diplomatic ties, North Korea dispatched a delegation to Brussels on 13 June to hold a discussion on human rights.

Since the EU's steps came after the inauguration of President Bush, who shelved the previous administration's engagement option in favour of the construction of a missile defence system that would protect the United States from attacks by 'rogue' states, its diplomatic recognition of North Korea caused potential conflicts of interests with the United States. Despite its traditional alliance with the United States, the EU decided to 'counter' this new development, initiated by the Bush administration (Drifte 2002: 166). An EU official was quoted as saying: 'This is the context in which our visit is taking place. We wanted to do something to prevent the momentum of the 'Sunshine Policy' being lost'\(^{32}\). The EU apparently wished to bolster the Sunshine Policy, even

though the Bush administration abandoned engagement. Swedish Prime Minister Persson noted: 'The aim is to express support for the process started by (South Korean President) Kim Dae-jung, a process aimed at bringing to an end one of the last conflicts with origins in the Second World War' (AFP, 25 March 2001). To minimize frictions with the United States and Japan, the EU sent envoys to Washington and Tokyo to offer a debriefing on the delegation's trip to Pyongyang. Nevertheless, US newspapers carried such headlines as 'EU Seeks to Fill U.S. Role in Koreas: Envoys Will Attempt to Ease Missile Risk, Build Reconciliation' (Washington Post, 25 March 2001) and 'Storm Clouds over U.S.-Europe Relations' (New York Times, 26 March 2001).

Meanwhile, North Korea's change in attitude and policies were also an important variable for the EU's engagement. The EU took into account five factors as criteria for its improvement of ties with North Korea: (1) North Korea's measures for inter-Korean reconciliation and dialogue with the countries involved; (2) North Korea's commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear and missile issues; (3) North Korea's improvement of human rights and observance of relevant UN conventions; (4) North Korea's guarantee on civilians' access to external aid and free activities by foreign NGOs; and (5) North Korea's economic opening and issuance of visas to European journalists (Lee J.S. 2002). Since the EU's diplomatic recognition meant it met these criteria, North Korea was able to send the message to the United States via the EU that 'terms similar to those accepted in Europe could also apply to a relationship with the United States' (Ahn 2002: 52).

*The Aftermaths of EU's Engagement.* The EU, a distant power without serious strategic interests or colonial legacies on the Korean Peninsula, satisfied itself by playing roles 'complementary' to efforts by major players to terminate North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. Even though it had no notable leverage to persuade North Korea to stop its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, the EU has not abandoned its engagement option towards North Korea even in the face of the North's breach of its commitments. After the onset of a controversy over the North's HEU programme, the EU, which had been a strong supporter of President Kim's Sunshine Policy, shifted from comprehensive engagement to conditional engagement, while waiting to see the nuclear programme being addressed by South Korea and the United States in a peaceful manner (Asia Times, 10 July 2003). Even though it felt betrayed by the Pyongyang regime, the EU was officially committed to its engagement course, hoping diplomacy would prevail over bellicose options sought by the Bush administration.

While the EU fell short of formulating any common policy on the US-led
invasion of Iraq despite its ideals for the CFSP, it could produce a rather uniform voice on North Korea-related issues, condemning its propensity for arming itself with nuclear weapons but seeking to address the problem through dialogue and economic incentives. A nine-member European Union delegation that travelled to North Korea for three days from 9 December 2003 delivered a straightforward message to the Pyongyang leadership regarding the linkage between Europe’s economic cooperation and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. The head of the delegation, Guido Martini of Italy, noted that the EU ‘made clear we stand ready to develop relations and to expand economic ties, but only after the nuclear issue is settled’ (International Herald Tribune, 12 December 2003). EU Ambassador to Seoul Dorian Prince also emphasized: ‘The EU has the capability to help a state-run economy adapt to market values, as it has experienced the central and eastern European cases’, while Guy Ledoux, another EU official in Seoul, stressed that the EU is prepared to offer more support to the impoverished country, if it scraps its nuclear programmes (Korea Times, 18 December 2003). Ledoux’s comments referred to the typical economic incentives the international community could offer in exchange with North Korea’s confrontational approaches. Another outcome of the visit was Ireland’s diplomatic normalization with North Korea, announced on 20 December 2003. In fact, the announcement was overdue, since the two countries seriously considered establishing ties in 2001 in the second wave of diplomatic normalization. According to a South Korean official, ‘I think Ireland decided to set up diplomatic ties with North Korea, since it needs to play an increased diplomatic role once it takes over the EU presidency next year [2004]’ (Yonhap News Agency, 21 December 2003).

3.3.3. Findings
The EU’s engagement with North Korea is one of the success stories of the Sunshine Policy, since it managed to establish diplomatic ties and their interactions were maintained even after the North’s brinkmanship with the HEU programme. The close link between the Sunshine Policy and the EU’s engagement can be shown by the following facts. First, the Kim administration used every possible opportunity, including the ASEM summit, to urge the EU and its members to improve relations with North Korea with the aim of transforming North Korea into a responsible member of the international community. Even though the EU and its member states had independent strategies and agendas, such as the improvement of human rights in North Korea, they reached the conclusion that accommodating President Kim’s request and boosting his Sunshine Policy would not only help the two Koreas to solidify a process of
rapprochement but also eventually meet the EU’s collective interests. In an interview with the BBC, President Kim even noted that it is not desirable for the EU to provoke the Pyongyang regime by raising human rights issues, while urging it instead to work to ‘liberate North Koreans from the terror of war and famine first, which are genuine human rights issues’ (Kukmin Ilbo, 25 October 2000). Second, the EU’s policymakers could shed their animosity towards North Korea quickly, unlike those of the United States and Japan, which made the EU and its member states more receptive to Seoul’s request and more far-reaching in their own initiatives toward forging better relations. North Korea also harboured less antagonism towards the EU and viewed it as a reliable partner for future cooperation (Park H.K. 2001; Chung 2002). While negotiating a normalization treaty, the two sides had a lesser number of obstacles resulting from historical incidents during the Cold War. In addition, they did not have the intense rivalry and the love-hate relationship that could be found between neighbouring countries. Third, the EU’s key policymakers, as seen in the Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004, shared the same assessment as South Korean policy elites regarding the political stability of the North Korean regime. By launching political dialogue and establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea, the EU offered political legitimacy to the Kim Jong-il regime and strengthened the political status quo on the Korea Peninsula. Fourth, the EU leaders, like Seoul’s policy elites, sought to embrace the Pyongyang regime by offering economic assistance in order to gradually transform it into a benign system respecting human rights and the rule of law instead of pursuing an immediate regime change. Since its first humanitarian intervention in 1995 to help alleviate North Korea’s flood damages, the EU provided a total of 393 million euros in aid to North Korea as of November 2002, including food aid (222 million euros), humanitarian assistance (52 million euros) and contributions to KEDO (115 million euros). In March 2002, North Korea sent a team of officials to Europe to learn about the EU’s economic policy models.

Since the EU was not the major player on the Korean Peninsula, its engagement with North Korea did not bring about profound change in the region’s security environment. North Korea remained a diplomatically isolated state owing to its troublesome relations with the United States and Japan over security issues. Since the EU is unlikely to play decisive roles militarily, politically or economically on the Korean Peninsula, it is premature to expect the EU to expand its diplomatic presence in the short term (Lee J.S. 2002). Nevertheless, the EU could play the role of a stabilizer as

a rising diplomatic power in the event that the United States attempts to resort to coercive means to resolve a crisis on the Korean Peninsula (Park C.B. 2002).

4. Conclusion
President Kim’s five-year tenure coincided with North Korea’s heyday in terms of diplomatic achievements, in contrast to the previous five-year period of President Kim Young-sam, marked by a nuclear crisis and South Korea’s strained relations with the United States and Japan stemming from differences in approaches towards North Korea. Despite his vision and tenacity on the diplomatic front, President Kim fell short of achieving his envisioned goal of North Korea’s diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan, thus experiencing setbacks in his Sunshine Policy. The policy’s relatively modest achievements in North Korea’s external relations are, in fact, the limitation of identity politics, which is not backed up by material power. Despite his strenuous norm entrepreneurship at home and abroad, the Bush administration, armed with a different set of norms, pushed ahead with power politics, based on negative identification with North Korea. Rozman (2003: 535), comparing Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ metaphor to President Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ hyperbole, noted that the two US presidents attempted to elevate their policies vis-à-vis enemies to the level of moral struggles between good and evil.

The Sunshine Policy, as an engagement policy, failed to fully demonstrate its potentials in forging better relations between the antagonistic states. Following President Kim’s tenure, bilateral dialogue for diplomatic normalization gave way to the multilateral six-party talks to address the North Korean HEU programme. Depending on the progress of this multilateral channel of dialogue, there is a strong possibility that bilateral negotiations might restart from where they left off and regain momentum in the direction of tearing down the remnants of the Cold War structure in East Asia.