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Abstract

This thesis explores the complexity, divisions and eventual fragmentation of the parliamentary right of the British Labour Party in the late 1960s and 1970s, and its implications for Labour’s intra-party politics. It argues that the Labour right in this period, in contrast to the Labour left, has been comparatively under-researched. It further stresses that the detail of inherent complexity and divisions on the parliamentary Labour right was previously concealed within broad agreement around an adhesive framework of Keynesian social democracy and the basic principles of ‘1950s revisionism’. As the core pillars of this adhesive ideological and political framework collapsed in the particular economic and political context of the late 1960s and 1970s, the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right were made explicit. Attempts at intra-party organisation on the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s further reveal its ideological and political fragmentation. The nature and development of this endeavour served only to emphasise the depth of ideological, policy and political divisions on the Labour right, to marginalise an influential segment of Labour right thought and practice, and to indicate the possibility of a (future) split with the Labour Party. The study adopts case studies of four critical policy themes to demonstrate the emergence of these divisions from the late 1960s onwards: European membership, industrial relations and trade union reform, issues of public expenditure and attitudes to race and immigration policy. The study concludes that ideological and political divisions and fragmentation severely undermined the cohesion and unity of the parliamentary Labour right. In the circumstances, the Labour right was unable to mount a credible coherent intellectual or institutional challenge to the Labour left, and the seeds of secessionist activity on the Labour right were sown long before Labour’s introspective 1979-81 period. Given recent debates concerning the nature and relative novelty or otherwise of New Labour, a postscript argues that one important consequence of the failure to reconcile the complexity and fragmentation of the ‘old’ Labour right has been an inability to conceive of significant parallels and continuities between elements of this coalition and New Labour.
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Chapter One

Introduction: The Parliamentary Labour Party Right in Context

'So much public attention has been riveted upon the dilemmas of the Labour Left by journalists and scholars that the layman may be forgiven for believing that the Left-wing represents more than a minor faction of the Party as a whole. At certain periods the Left has played a crucial role in Labour's development, but normally the Party is governed and controlled by the Right. To understand the contemporary Labour Party one must first understand its Right-wing'.

(Haseler, 1969: ix)

'The Labour Right in the 1970s and early 1980s was too fragmented, and politically and intellectually ill-equipped to take the Party on a revisionist course.'

(Daly, 1993: 282)

1.1 Introduction: Context and Scope of the Study

Shaw (1994: 7) argues that 'just as the IMF loan marked the disintegration of Keynesianism... so too the Winter of Discontent signified the collapse of corporatism. Without these two pillars, revisionist social democracy fell to pieces'. Broadly, this study explores the ideological and political tensions and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right - Labour's so-called 'dominant coalition' and 'governing elite' - within the context of the wider problems and crises of social democracy and the Labour Party and Labour government during the 1970s. The parliamentary Labour right is important in this context because it has embodied the principles and politics of the emergent (revisionist) social democratic politics of the Labour Party and Labour governments of the post-war period, and has provided the core membership of Labour's governing coalition.

The central focus of the study is the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s, drawing upon earlier periods such as the 1950s and 1960-64 as historical background and context, and as far as they illustrate or typify distinct ideas, traditions, strategies, policies or groups on the parliamentary Labour right in the later period. In terms of the periodisation
of the study, however, particular developments and debates of the late 1960s represent an indispensable element of the case studies, given their importance to later debates and divisions of the 1970s in relation to issues of European membership, industrial relations and trade union reform, and race and immigration policy. Particularly relevant in this respect are two developments in the spheres of industrial relations and trade union reform and race and immigration policy: the failure of the Labour government's proposed 'In Place of Strife' legislation in 1969 and Callaghan's 'illiberal' Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 respectively. To some extent, both developments overshadowed and shaped the later debates and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s in their respective policy spheres, the nature of which is reflected in the balance of the relevant case studies. In fact, Taverne (Interview with the author, 18/1/01) believes that, in a number of controversial and divisive key policy contexts such as industrial relations reform, it is difficult to understand the debates of the 1970s without reference to the 1960s. However, the debates and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s remain the main focus of the study. The dominant Keynesian socio-economic paradigm (see Hall, 1993: 279-81, 283-7) largely concealed the detail of the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right. It was the collapse of this paradigm in the 1970s that exposed Labour's 'dominant coalition' and 'governing elite' to be a complex, heterogeneous rather than monolithic, loyalist culture, unable to compromise and co-ordinate its ideas, strategies and organisation, particularly within the context of the economic and political discord of the 1970s. In this sense, the seeds of significant disputes and divisions (and possible secession) not just between right and left but within the parliamentary Labour right itself, were sown well before the tumultuous events of 1979-81.

In the longer term, the internal diversity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right contributed directly to the formal split in the Labour Party in 1981 and the creation of the SDP. In this sense, the roots of the SDP split are not to be found solely in the ideological and constitutional disputes that polarised the party after the 1979 election defeat. The response of the 'social democrats' to these developments represented the culmination of longer-term trends. Something which has partly been revealed is that the Labour right
was divided over Europe in the 1970s, which led to the gradual marginalisation of an important element of the elite Labour right and the departure of some of their number to the SDP (see Desai, 1994). As this study will attempt to demonstrate, Europe represented a significant bone of contention for the parliamentary Labour right from the early 1960s, but was only one of a number of divisive policy issues which contributed to its ideological, organisational and political fragmentation in the 1970s; so-much-so that the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s might be described as a loose coalition of tendencies.

Furthermore, one consequence of the failure to acknowledge the complexity and divisions of the ‘old’ Labour right has been an inability to perceive important parallels and continuities between so-called ‘Old’ and New Labours. Given the recent triumph of ‘modernisation’ in the Labour Party and the emergence of New Labour, conceived by the modernisers in almost bi-polar opposition to some tenuous idea of homogeneous ‘Old’ Labour (see Shaw, 1996b: 206, 212, 217-18), the study would hope, in the form of a postscript and as the basis for future research, to reveal certain links between emerging themes and ideas on the disputatious parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s and New Labour.

Much recent scholarship on the Labour Party has focused on analyses of the nature of its recent transformation and, particularly, the origins, character and (likely) trajectory of New Labour (see Bale, 1999; Ludlam, 2000 for useful review and critique of some of this recent material). The precise origins of Labour’s transformation after 1983 have been the subject of some debate (see Heffernan, 1998; Lent, 1997a). There has also been considerable recent academic debate concerning the factors, ideas and processes that have fashioned the origins, character and development of New Labour itself (see, for varied interpretations, Hay, 1994, 1998, 1999; Heffernan, 1996, 1999; Jones, 1996; Smith, 1992, 1994; Wickham-Jones, 1995). They represent some of the varied ways in which the ‘modernised’ Labour Party and the development of New Labour can be understood: as a capitulation to Thatcherite-style capitalism (Hay, 1994, 1998, 1999; Heffernan, 1996, 1999), as a return to or the culmination of an earlier revisionist tradition and approach in
the Labour Party (Jones, 1996; Smith, 1992, 1994), or as something qualitatively new, a
'post-Thatcherite', modernised social democracy, 'ideologically' underpinned by the
Third Way (see, for instance, Blair, 1998; Driver & Martell, 1998; Giddens, 1998b).

In a recent attempt to historicise New Labour, Fielding (2002; also see 2000a) argues that
too much of New Labour's rhetoric has been taken at face value and that recent
developments need to be placed within a broader historical context (also see Bale, 1999c:
196-201): the 'Labour Party is forever changing – though generally within long-
established parameters. 'New' Labour is but the latest example of this process'. Fielding,
as do others, emphasises New Labour's revisionist antecedents (also see Jones, 1996;
Larkin, 2000a, 2000b). Particularly, he (2002: 70-84) argues that the creation and
development of New Labour has been a 'staged transformation' that began in the 1970s,
and links New Labour to the emergent social democratic response to the problems of the
1970s. He suggests that the similarities are just as compelling as any differences and an
important strand in the argument, in an overall attempt to historicise developments since
1994, is that the 1970s are very important to understanding New Labour, at least as
important perhaps as Thatcherism in the 1980s. In this respect, the development of New
Labour represents neither a simple capitulation to or accommodation of neo-liberalism
and a largely Thatcherite agenda, nor a largely new, 'post-Thatcherite', modernised or
Third Way social democracy, nor even the culmination of a single, continuous revisionist
tradition in the Labour Party. Instead, New Labour could be interpreted (at least in part)
as representative of certain themes and ideas emerging from within the 'old'
parliamentary Labour right during the 1970s, which were temporarily diverted through
the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

Despite its significant position and role in recent Labour Party history and politics, then,
the parliamentary Labour right, perhaps because of its traditional position close to the
parliamentary leadership and less explicit dissenting or factional behaviour, has not
received the same attention from commentators as the Labour left. There is a substantial
body of literature devoted explicitly to the various traditions, ideas, groups, dissent and
frequent conflict of the Labour left. With the exception of studies of intra-party left-right
conflict, in which the Labour right has been presented as a largely homogeneous unit loyal to the parliamentary leadership (see Rose, 1964), and particular studies of the so-called Gaitskellite revisionist tradition in the Labour Party (Haseler, 1969) and its relative contribution, firstly to the formation of the SDP (see, for instance, Crewe & King, 1995b: 3-127, Desai, 1994) and, more recently, to the creation and development of New Labour (see, for example, Fielding, 2000, 2002; Jones, 1996; Larkin, 2000a, 2000b), the character and diversity of the Labour right has received comparatively less explicit attention, although (or perhaps because), historically, it has provided the core of Labour’s ‘dominant coalition’ and ‘governing elite’. ¹

This study seeks to rectify this gap in the literature on the history of the Labour Party by analysing the nature of the right of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), focusing on the 1970s. Traditionally, the right of the PLP, with the significant support of the major trade union leaders, had dominated the intellectual and political strategy of the Labour Party. However, in the wake of the perceived failures of the Wilson governments of 1964-70 and the realignment of important trade union support, left-wing influence in the Labour Party increased during the 1970s. This study seeks to explain why the Labour right was unable to respond cohesively and effectively to these developments by analysing the diversity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right as they emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s. The 1970s are important because, in a sense, they represent a lost decade for the Labour Party. Compared to other periods of Labour history and government, such as 1945-51, the Wilson administrations of the 1960s and even the periods of opposition and transformation in the 1950s and 1980s, the 1970s have received relatively less attention when, in a sense, they represent a link between them and, as this study hopes to show, they retain considerable relevance for understanding the longer-term development of New Labour (see 1.4.2 for further discussion of the significance of the 1970s). Essentially, the argument contends that under the pressure of events and its

¹ Published work on the Labour left, for instance, includes Jenkins (1979), Pimlott (1977) and Seyd (1987) to name just a few, while studies of the revisionist Labour right are limited to what Harrison (1991: 11) describes as Haseler’s (1969) ‘brass-faced apology’ for the so-called Gaitskellites between 1951 and 1964 and, only in the aftermath of the secession of the Social Democrats from the Labour Party in 1981, studies such as Crewe & King (1995) and Desai (1994) added to the work of Haseler. For a critical review of Desai’s (1994) perspective in this respect, see Brivati (1996).
own internal divisions the parliamentary Labour right offered little cohesive resistance within 'the formal structure of the Labour Party', as developments in this sphere overtook them in the 1970s. As the diversity and divisions became explicit in the face of specific policy issues such as Europe, industrial relations and debates over public expenditure, and issues of organisation and leadership, including effective factional organisation against the left and the 1976 party leadership election, co-operation and compromise proved difficult and presented a weak, divided front that further undermined the unity and efficacy of the Labour right in Parliament. The divisions of Labour's centre-right 'dominant coalition' became particularly apparent and problematic as simultaneous developments contributed to a shift in the intra-party balance of power after the 1970 election defeat, which was a crucial turning point in terms of Labour's intra-party politics.

This chapter sets out the broad scope of the study. Firstly, it reviews and offers a critique of the conventional left-right dimension of political analysis, and introduces the conceptual and analytical limitations and anomalies of standard presentations of the parliamentary Labour right, which will be pursued in more depth as the substance of chapter two. The chapter further introduces the core methodology and context of the research. This takes the form of a detailed rationale of the political context and policy case studies selected to form the empirical substance of the study. Finally, it offers a brief concluding summary and an indication of the further structure of the thesis.

1.2 Left and Right: 'A Bogus Dilemma'?

'It is unfortunate that ideological diversity within the Party has been distilled into the hoary imagery of a left-right continuum. While serviceable enough in everyday usage, the distinction becomes a liability in precise, historical analysis. One of its failings is that it imposes non-existent continuities, by neglecting to specify the content of alternative strategies and philosophies at stake. Hence the fact that the right has been, variously, socialist, utilitarian, and liberal, with distinct and important consequences for British politics, is lost from view.'

(Warde, 1982: 3)
There has been a tendency to write Labour Party history within the broad confines of the simple, conventional left-right dimension. Heffernan (2000a: 246) sums up the orthodoxy of writing Labour’s political history when he describes the Labour Party as ‘a left–right political coalition fashioned by its labourist political culture... The historical division most often alluded to is that between a majority right and a minority left, most recently modernisers and traditionalists in new and old Labour’. He describes the PLP as a ‘centrist, indeed predominantly right-wing institution... an organisational hierarchy – a leadership support base – presided over by a quasi-collegial leadership within the Cabinet or the Shadow Cabinet.’ While many historians, at least, correctly recognise that the Labour Party has always represented, in Harold Wilson’s famous phrase, a ‘broad church’ of traditions, ideas, policies, strategies, groups and individuals, Minion (1998: 1-2) suggests that ‘the debate has still remained fixed within the boundaries of left-right’. The terms ‘left’ or ‘left-wing’ are problematic: ‘[o]ften they were (and are) used as a result of ‘self-election’, or as a group encompassing all the critics of the Labour leadership: individuals who have usually been popularly ascribed as ‘the Left’ of the Labour Party’. In fact, the left of the party is ‘multi-faceted’ and represents ‘the sum total of... disparate and ‘ideologically heterogeneous’ groups’. It has represented ‘a diversity of ideas inherent [in] its members numerous roots. This single section of the Labour Party brought together socialist fundamentalists... Christians and pacifists... former radical Liberals... trade unionists who had been influenced by the preachers of “direct action”... and Marxists’. A similar analysis could be applied to the coalition of traditions and interests on the Labour right, the collection of individuals and groups who have been popularly ascribed as ‘the Right’ of the Labour Party and supposedly encompassing all those loyal to the parliamentary leadership.

Labour’s divisions, then, like those of other parties, are often simply denoted in terms of left and right, and even those who adopt these basic dimensions often recognise that they are little better than convenient shorthand and fail to reveal enough about the nature of the beliefs and values in question (see Garnett, 1996: 11; Warde, 1982: 3). Accounts of Labour’s divisions, for instance, are often represented in terms of a fundamental left-right dichotomy, resulting historically from divergent attitudes to such once symbolic totems
as nationalisation, a commitment explicitly manifested in Clause IV of the Labour Party constitution (Maor, 1997: 155-6; also see Dunleavy, 1993; Jones, 1996), or a similarly basic distinction between socialists and social democrats (see Garnett, 1996: 11-16). While they might usefully summarise political groupings, complex issues and party programmes (Brittan, 1973: 354, 369-70; Taverne, 1974: 9), such broad distinctions offer only a limited, general narrative and explanation of possibly complex perceptions and preferences of political actors. David Marquand (1991: 169) has remarked, for instance, that historians of the Labour Party in the 1970s, in contrast to certain reminiscences, should note the ‘divisions and jealousies which in fact characterised that motley coalition of future Social Democrats and old-style Labour right-wingers’.

The idea that the Labour Party is formed around a simple left-right political spectrum fails even to account for what Minkin (1978: 11) terms the ‘large amorphous centre’ or for what Greenleaf (1983: 473-4) describes as a more flexible type of Morrisonian ‘consolidation’. Developing Minkin’s point, Wickham-Jones (1996: 31) suggests that it is misleading to regard Labour as inevitably split into two monolithic blocs of left and right. The ‘large and amorphous’ centre in the party is not committed to either side. The position taken by those within the centre varies from one issue to another and over time. As well as the legatees of Morrisonian ‘consolidation’, here were found the ‘Labourist’ majority, distrustful of revisionist ‘intellectualism’, not over-committed to collectivism and nationalisation as the holy grail of socialism (Greenleaf, 1983: 473-4), but committed instead to incremental gains ‘here and now’ and with scant regard for Jerusalems old or new (see Elliott, 1993; Thompson, 1993).

Bale (1999a: 89, 1999b: 26-28), for instance, adapting Mary Douglas’ so-called Cultural Theory as a framework for the analysis of the internal life and culture of political parties, contends that the Labour Party is not a monolithic political culture, and that the grid-group typology intrinsic to Cultural Theory both complements and enriches ‘the normal left-right dimensions with which most analysts of inter-party and intra-party politics...operate.’ The Labour right, he suggests, although ‘it contains a few individualists...is clearly made up of hierarchs’, while the Labour left ‘again with the
exception of the odd individualist...can be clearly identified with egalitarianism.’ The
typology, he (Bale, 1999b: 27) suggests, ‘lies, as it were, beneath [the] more conventional
dimensions...this could be a crucial advantage...as the traditional issues which
constituted our ideas of what was ‘left’ and what was ‘right’ change and dissolve (public
ownership is a good example in Britain), we will need schemas which can still make
sense and predictions from people’s tendency to ‘bundle-up’ their preferences’. He
similarly questions the potentially nebulous idea and classification of the centre: Cultural
Theory, he suggests, offers ‘a fivefold typology rather than a two-winged continuum’ that
forces us ‘to account for the position and behaviour of that significant minority in any
party’ who are difficult to classify and explain unless we are content ‘to file and forget
them in a convenient (but arguably unrealistic) no-man’s land’ that we call the centre.
Verweij (1997: 423-4) suggests that the particular strength of Cultural Theory lies in the
‘illuminating and encompassing typology of the basic ways in which actors think and
act...the categories of individualism, fatalism, egalitarianism and hierarchy seem very
well suited to describe the often contradictory rationale and actions of different agents.
They seem to convey political preferences more clearly than the standard categories of
left-wing versus right-wing, conservative versus liberal or reformist, etc.’

Brittan (see 1968, 1973), a critic of the conventional left-right distinction, argues that
such broad dimensions are both misleading and damaging, and that the choice between
left and right in British politics constitutes a ‘bogus dilemma’. Brittan (1973: 354, 358-9;
also see Leach, 2002: 11-13) contends the classification of political positions according
to a spectrum running from left to right ‘obscures more than it illuminates’. ‘Groupings
of attitudes’ do exist among the ‘politically conscious minority’, but the analysis of their
strength and character is harder to assess. The basic, orthodox left-right classification
excludes much that we need to know about political attitudes and so suffers from a
number of obvious limitations. Firstly, there are some political issues that are difficult to
classify in simple left-right terms. Secondly, actors can be identified with the left on some
issues and with the right on others or, for instance, they can be considered extreme left on
some issues and moderate left or, even, moderate right on others. Therefore, ‘a general
average of attitudes can...be very misleading’. Finally, even in relation to individual
issues to which the terms left and right can be applied, such a basic measurement scale can be distorting: for example, it allocates the same 'centre' position for an actor who 'merely splits the difference between the extremes and another...with a different approach of his own'. The conventional left-right spectrum is unable to explain and predict the views of MPs on many subjects and often leads to the 'downgrading of issues which cannot be easily expressed in these terms - which for practical purposes means issues other than those related to the views on the distribution of income or wealth'. The question of personal freedom, for instance, ‘cannot be easily reduced to these terms; and it is therefore natural...to feel dissatisfied by excessive concentration on issues and political divisions expressible in left-right terms', and even broad economic themes such as views on the market economy are often ‘inexplicable in left-right terms’.

In the case of the PLP, the left-right spectrum and conflict, which seemed to weaken during the 1960s, appeared to resurface in the early 1970s in the ‘eruption of...hostility between the ‘Tribune Group’ and the ‘Jenkinsites’, with a centre interested in keeping the peace’, but ‘whether a Labour M.P. stood in the centre-right range of the Parliamentary Party depended far more on his views on the leadership and on the single issue of the E.E.C. than on any closely linked network of beliefs’ (Brittan, 1973: 367-9).2 Brittan (1973: 354, 364), then, objects to the use of the left-right axis as a ‘one-dimensional calibrating scale suitable for all purposes’. These concepts have been overworked and should be used more judiciously: his main objection is not to the use of left and right per se ‘but rather to their employment when other distinctions would be more useful’.3 In Labour Party terms, Taverne (1974: 8-9, 13-15), whose ‘political career has involved [him] to an unusual extent in the conflicts between the different groups that make up the

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2 Although Brittan (1973: 372) correctly recognises that this particular issue was not clear-cut in either inter- or intra-party left-right terms. As we shall see, EEC membership proved to be a divisive issue on the parliamentary Labour right, and even within the so-called revisionist, social democratic right.

3 For further detailed critique of this basic political distinction, see Brittan (1968, 1973). For a more positive account of its potential utility, see Bobbio (1996; also see Danley, 2002). While he defends the continuing relevance of the left-right distinction as the basic parameters of political action and debate, particularly in relation to ideas of equality and inequality, perhaps the best that can be said is that it 'functions as a generalised mechanism for understanding what is going on in the political realm, helping to reduce the complexity of the world of politics...It can be used to summarize the programmes of political parties and groups, and to label the important political issues of a given era...[It] is thus a taxonomic system...' (Knutsen, 1998: 6). The danger, of course, is that it oversimplifies, concealing more than it reveals (Brittan, 1973: 354) in terms of more complex typological, causal and explanatory significance.
Labour Party', and who recognises the limitations of the 'rather unsatisfactory terminology of 'Left' and 'Right' particularly in relation to 'the dangers of oversimplifying, within the coalition that makes up the Labour Party', suggests that, within the coalition, the adjective of 'left-wing' can be applied more recognisably and less normatively to groups and individuals in the party than its 'right-wing' counterpart:

'They are hardly precise adjectives. In fact they are very much Humpty-Dumpty words which mean what the user 'intends them to mean, neither more nor less', and... their use can be seriously misleading in a number of contexts... When it comes to 'Left' and 'Right' anyone in the Labour Party has a rough idea of what is meant by... 'left-wing'... By contrast... within the Labour Party 'right-wing' is generally a form of abuse used by 'left-wingers'.

Recent work by historians (Black, 1999b; Minion, 1998; also see Francis, 1997) warns against both the limitations of understanding Labour Party divisions and factionalism in broad left-right terms and the simple interchange of terms such as 'revisionist', 'Gaitskellite', 'social democrat' and 'right-wing'. Crosland's approach during the IMF crisis, for example, appeared to defy a simple left-right dimension, and one commentator believes that Crosland's 'radical agenda was a synthesis of left and right that helped to inspire a generation to look beyond the achievements of the Attlee Governments' (Carter, 2001: 147). The case of Crosland perhaps represents the classic example of the problematic nature of the orthodox political dimensions of left and right as applied to the Labour Party (John Tomlinson, Interview with the author, 27/3/01). In the media and elsewhere he was widely described as "being on the right of the Labour party", based on issues such as 'the nuclear deterrent (which he strongly supported) and...the Common Market (about which he was lukewarm)...[as] the defining issues of political belief" but, on what he considered to be the real test or defining theme of political association, equality, he might be considered an orthodox democratic socialist or even traditional left-wing or radical egalitarian if it was not for his explicit negation of public ownership as a means of achieving such redistribution and the pursuit of equality (see Hattersley, 2002; also see Hattersley, 1997b).
Francis (1997: 61) argues that one of the more negative consequences of the identification of Crosland's *magnus opus* as simply a Gaitskellite manifesto is that it has simplistically been labeled 'right-wing' when, in fact, many of its themes and assumptions were shared by a range of opinion within the party, including 'left-wing' figures such as Richard Crossman. Moreover, Crosland's emphasis on equality as opposed to public ownership in the work was as offensive to some of the old guard on the right, such as Morrison, as it was to the left. Perhaps it is not so surprising, then, that it was the candidate of the left, John Prescott, rather than the self-conscious moderniser, Tony Blair, who revived the spirit and influence of Crosland during the 1994 Labour leadership campaign. 'Crosland's post-materialist agenda was not exclusively 'right-wing', but was shared by figures across the party spectrum' (Francis, 1997: 50), and it was Crossman himself who recognised the essentially radical nature of Crosland's proposals:

‘Your proposals are in fact far more revolutionary in their effects than an electoral promise to nationalise ICI... I would say that they are diabolically and cunningly left-wing and Nye... should have been clever enough to think them up. But you put them forward as ways of ensuring a calm evolution towards higher living standards and more personal freedom.’

(Crosland Papers, 13/10, R.H.S. Crossman to C.A.R. Crosland, 23 October 1956, cited in Francis, 1997: 61-2)

Indeed, Goodman (1997: 30-1) observes that, despite the alleged ideological and personality gulf that existed between them during Bevan’s lifetime, ‘there were, on reflection, many striking parallels of thought and analysis’. The political journalist, Anthony Howard (2002) has also recently reflected on the problematic nature of simple labels and distinctions in relation to the PLP and to Crosland in particular. As a consequence of the analysis and prescriptions of *The Future of Socialism*, Crosland was regarded as a ‘socialist heretic’ and ‘dubbed a “revisionist”’ which ‘in the reviviser climate of that time... was not intended as a compliment. But, to his credit, he never allowed himself to be intimidated by the label’ as he continued with a trenchant analysis of Labour’s ideological programme and electoral status and prospects. Crosland, then, might be expected to provide a natural legacy for Blairite New Labour, but they were
uncertain of 'the ideological approach he brought to politics', the fact that, for Crosland, 'there were always absolutes – that public expenditure had virtue in its own right, that equality was what socialism was about, that redistribution of wealth mattered even in a modern society and remained an end that had to be pursued'. What marked Crosland out throughout his life was his unwavering 'allegiance to traditional party values. This was a faith in which he never wavered... as late as 1974 he was found to be proclaiming: “Equality and higher public expenditure are what divides us from the Tories”.' In this sense, Crosland’s ideological position marked him out not just from the Blairites of New Labour, but also increasingly from erstwhile colleagues of the so-called Gaitskellite revisionist Labour right.

The tendency to conflate ideological traditions in the Labour Party in a crude left-right model has been exacerbated by a further tendency to imbue Labour Party history and politics with the language of personalities, often expressed again in simple left-right terms. Lawrence (2000: 344, 357-9), for instance, argues that ‘complex patterns of political disagreement have often been simplified to conform to mythic accounts of the party’s past’. The ‘language of personalities’ has meant that Labour leaders have often tended ‘to imbue their accounts of complex disagreements over policy and ideology with a bold, mythic quality that echoes dominant popular understandings of the party’s past’ and ‘in this sense... they may be thought of as ‘myths of division”’. Labour’s closer proximity to state power in the post-war period, it is argued, has increased the scope in which to develop powerful myths of division. For example, few ‘disputes... have been as intensely personalised as the ‘Bevanite’ left opposition movement of the 1950s’ and many accounts of these divisions after 1951 ‘offer a crudely black-and-white picture of relations between Aneurin Bevan and his principal right-wing rival, Hugh Gaitskell’ (also see Dell, 1999: 237). Each has been demonised in turn by the other’s supporters (and their own in Bevan’s case) as part of the supposedly sectarian (left-right) spirit of much internal Labour Party conflict. Moreover, the ‘internal feuds that beset the Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s have also generally been retold more as personal than as political confrontations. Even where the substantive political issues at stake are clear-cut, most observers choose to highlight the personal dimension. Lawrence observes,
then, that ‘Labour’s myths of division have, for the most part, been intensely personal affairs’.

Moreover, within this broad left-right context, the parliamentary Labour right has often been perceived as a monolithic loyalist faction (see Rose, 1964: 41-2; Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 205-6, 221). As far back as the mid-1960s, Rose (1964), in his classic treatment of political parties as ‘policy parties’ rather than as merely ‘electoral parties’, identifies the existence of factions (and tendencies) as an integral part of the internal life of parties. The significance of these party groupings was such that it was as crucial to know the internal balance of power between the factions as to know the relative strengths of the parties themselves when attempting to predict the strategy and behaviour of a party. Realignments between the factions were often as, if not more, important in policy decisions and change as alternations of government. 4

Rose (1964: 41-2; also see Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 205-6) suggests that although Labour is a party of factions and its counterpart, the parliamentary Conservative Party, a party of tendencies, the factional behaviour of the PLP has tended to endure on relatively stable, monolithic left-right lines. Moreover, while the Labour left faction has been ‘notoriously schismatic’ and ‘Left factions’ have persisted ‘from generation to generation’, the Labour right, largely based on the assumption that a moderate leadership and policies have traditionally dominated the parliamentary party (see Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 221; also see Larkin, 2000a: 44), has been represented only intermittently by a single ‘moderate’ loyalist faction which, at the time of Rose’s study, comprised of the Gaitskellite Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS). In terms of Labour’s intra-party politics, then, the general perspective suggests that the left of the PLP has been frequently and highly organised on factional lines while, on the right, there have been fewer factional groupings. These have included the pro-Gaitskell CDS of the early 1960s, the Manifesto

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4 For the purpose of linguistic clarity, factions can be delineated by their formal, organised structure, their persistence over time and the consistency of their membership and attitudes over a range of issues. Tendencies are defined as ‘a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable group of politicians’. They represent ‘a body of attitudes expressed in Parliament about a broad range of problems; the attitudes are held together by a more or less coherent political ideology’, but they exhibit less formal and stable group consciousness and political organisation (Rose, 1964: 37-8).
Group formed during the embattled Wilson-Callaghan premierships of the mid 1970s, and the Solidarity Group campaign of the fratricidal years of the early 1980s. Further factional activity was exerted in the form of the Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV), a pressure group of the (largely extra-parliamentary) organised right (in support of the parliamentary Manifesto Group) that foreshadowed the formation of the SDP (see Daly, 1993) (see Chapter Three for a discussion of group and factional activity on the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s).

The relative lack of formal organisation on the right probably reflects its relative strength in the PLP, needing to resort to organised faction only when it perceived itself and the centre-right orthodoxy of the parliamentary party to be under threat. Consequently, in its close links with the parliamentary leadership, the complexity and potential divisions of the parliamentary Labour right have remained largely concealed and integrated within what Rose (1964: 42) describes as the ‘loyalty to the leadership’ of the ‘moderate faction’. Larkin (2000a: 44) suggests that the general absence of formally organised groups does not signify that the right has not featured within it recognisably distinct traditions, strands and ideas. Warde (1982: 9-24), for instance, looks beyond the formal organisations of party faction to conceptualise intra-party division in terms of various ‘segments’ and ‘strategies’ within the post-war Labour Party. These segments are defined by their adherence to shared strategies and these strategies relate to both ends and means: they are concerned ‘with both the elements of the ‘good society’ to which policy should be directed, and the approach to achieving those elements’.

More than a cursory glance beneath the surface of political parties, then, reveals the veracity of Rose’s (1964: 46) general claim that ‘[t]he surface cohesion ... reflects an equilibrium between forces pulling in different directions, not a unity obtained by a single, united thrust.’ However, the equilibrium, beyond any very general sense, does not always entail a simple, stable, monolithic left-right dichotomy. As Rose (1964: 42) himself ponders, speculating on the likely character and trajectory of intra-party factionalism and behaviour on the accession to the leadership of the PLP of Harold Wilson in 1963, will it ‘lead to the re-emergence of old factional differences, the
emergence of new factions, or the conduct of intra-party disputes by *ad hoc* collections of men rallying to different tendencies': '[c]onflict cutting across [conventional] factional lines had begun to show itself in the debate on the European Common Market at the 1962 Labour Party Conference, a few months before...Gaitskell's death'. The generalised idea of a homogenous parliamentary Labour right, like the idea of a uniform and unified 'Old Labour', is clearly misleading. As Larkin (2000a: 45) observes, 'the Party's infamous 'broad church' contains within it a variety of competing factions and groupings, with rival perspectives about the way in which the party should be organised, what it should stand for, who it should seek to represent and on what basis it should seek to represent them.' Given the tendency of the leadership faction of New Labour to indulge in the 'generalisations involved in talking about Old Labour', the examination of some of these competing conceptions of Labour has acquired added significance as a means of gauging 'more accurately the extent to which...1994 marked year zero for the new model Party'.

1.3 Case Study Rationale

1.3.1 Introduction

As the empirical basis of the research, the study adopts a number of case studies of key ideological and policy themes to illustrate divergence and divisions not just between left and right of the parliamentary Labour Party in the 1970s, but within the parliamentary Labour right itself. The major case studies include the crucial issue of European membership, industrial relations and trade union reform, debates and divisions around the issue of public expenditure in the 1970s, and a social dimension in the form of attitudes to race and immigration. The case studies are supported by extensive use of elite interviews, newspaper reports, relevant diary and memoir material, and archival and documentary evidence where appropriate and available (see Bibliography and Sources). Comment on the relative merits and limitations of the selected methodology and sources is provided in a methodological appendix (see Methodological Appendix). The following sections will discuss the general and particular significance of the 1970s for this study together with the rationale dictating the choice of case studies.
In addition to representing key ideological and policy themes, the case studies have been selected because they reveal intra-party debates, disputes and divisions not simply or even predominantly on left-right lines. Attitudes to public expenditure and race and immigration represent, at their most basic, the two dimensions used for so long in political science, that is the distinction between left and right and between liberal and authoritarian. Some of the limitations of the former are discussed above, and the latter has been adopted as an elementary means of distinguishing between libertarians such as Roy Jenkins and more authoritarian politicians such as James Callaghan and illiberal right-wing trade union leaders such as Joe Gormley and Sid Weighell.

The European issue (in common with the issue of devolution in the 1970s) has been selected as one of the empirical case studies as it reflects the centrality of Westminster/Parliamentary sovereignty in intra-party divisions. It also adds a foreign policy dimension which, given the centrality of foreign policy to many of Labour’s internal disputes both between and within left and right, might be considered essential. According to one commentator, the two issues that caused the most serious divisions within both main parties during the 1974-79 Parliament were British membership of the EEC and the devolution of certain powers to elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. Moreover, while drawing strength in large part from the Tribune Group on the former issue and to a lesser extent on the latter, opposition to the government’s measures was led by non-Tribune Group members. Douglas Jay and Nigel Spearing, among others, were prominent in opposition to EEC membership and Tam Dalyell and George Cunningham (a Manifesto Group member) were in the vanguard of opposition to devolution proposals (Norton, 1980: 429, 438).

These two ‘constitutional’ issues produced disputes and divisions within the PLP that fail to conform to a simple left-right split. The European issue had represented a crucial division within the parliamentary Labour right since the days of Hugh Gaitskell and, as a number of right-wing and centrist leaders were involved in the anti-Market movement, explanations which claim that it was a simple left-right split in the party on the Common...
Market issue (see Clarke, 1992: 263) fall short of the mark (Nairn, 1972: 67). The arguments over European entry in the early 1970s began to reveal some of the diversity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right. As Desai (1994: 171) suggests, a degree of organised factional unity on the parliamentary Labour right, in the form of the Manifesto Group, 'could only be had by agreeing not to raise important issues such as the Common Market'.

In the area of industrial relations and trade union reform, Minkin (1991: 208-13) further identifies emerging frustration and divisions on the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s over the centrality of the trade unions in both British politics and the Labour Party. This frustration was felt particularly in the wake of the failure of Labour's own 'In Place of Strife' attempt to reform the context of industrial relations in 1969, and Minkin emphasises aspects of trade union collectivism and trade union influence that provided a fundamental challenge to the emerging political philosophy of the liberal revisionist strand of the parliamentary Labour right. The following section places these key, divisive policy themes within the general socio-economic and political context of the 1970s, before introducing each of the policy case studies in more detail.

1.3.2 The 1970s: Labour's Lost Decade

'If the 1964-1970 Labour Government represented the failure of social democracy to cope with economic difficulties, the 1974-79 government was in terms of social democracy, whether of the right or left variety, a total disaster. Not only did this period see more economic failure, this time on a grander scale, but also the formal abandonment of the social democratic commitment to full employment and increased social welfare and the abandonment, again formally, of its Keynesian underpinnings and assumptions. No one should doubt the constraints, external and internal, that the government faced, but nor should they doubt that almost every economic response of the government was away from social democracy and towards an orthodox conservative approach to economic crisis. By the end of its period of office it was clear that the government had no policy except to ride out the crisis. Labour Party economic policy was back to the pre-Keynesian position.'

(Tracy, 1983: 25)
Judgments of the 1974-79 Labour government have commonly been harsh, particularly from the perspective of the left-wing critique of Labour movements old and new (see Coates D, 1980; Coates K, 1983: Ch. 1; Hodgson, 1981) but, as Phillip Whitehead's (1985: xiii-xv) wide-ranging study of the decade observes, the 1970s generally, particularly after the high hopes of the 1960s (for Labour 'in the opportunity and the failure of 1966' that reached 'its climax... in 1981'), are 'remembered for their reactive pessimism as well as for their sharper conflicts' (also see Booker, 1980 for a broad cultural and sociological perspective; Coopey & Woodward, 1996 for an appraisal of the workings and failings of the British economy in the 1970s; Tracy, 1983: 17-24, 25-36 for some of the particular political implications and consequences). Overall, the 1970s represents a decade of political, economic and social upheavals, what Booker (1980) describes as 'in their own way 'the most important decade of the twentieth century''. Particularly, the 1970s highlighted the failings of the British economy and has been viewed as a turning point in the post-war economy. It witnessed significant developments and debates concerning themes that have since become central to strategic political economy: for instance, the decline of British economic performance, the origins of monetarism and deregulation, the role of inflation and the importance of external forces in influencing and shaping the British economy. Bitter political debates and divisions over these and other significant themes and issues, including industrial policy, trade union relations and reform and entry into the Common Market, have provided the 1970s generally with the soubriquet of the 'troubled decade' (Coopey & Woodward, 1996).

Whatever the normative judgment of these years, particularly of the performance of the 1974-79 Labour government, the period represents one of transition in the 'intellectual direction' of 'post-war economic policy-making' and 'in attitudes to the expectations and effectiveness of government stimulus to the economy', and in the politics of the Labour Party (Fielding, 2002: 70-1; Holmes, 1985: 163, 179-82). The 1970s have been characterised as a period of crisis of the traditional (revisionist) social democracy that had broadly underpinned Labour's socio-economic and political statecraft in the post-war era (McKee, 1988: 35-46; also see Tracy, 1983: 9-32; Warde, 1982: 149). The Labour Party, given increasing disaffection with its governing doctrine both in its parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary organs, witnessed further discontent with and the declining authority of the parliamentary leadership and, in the absence of significant social democratic intellectual additions to 'Croslandite revisionism' (Marquand, 1991: 170-1, 175, 177), the left was able to reassert itself both intellectually and organisationally to challenge existing power bases in the party. During the 1970s the brand of social democracy generally identified with the parliamentary leadership and breadth of opinion on the centre-right of the PLP underwent a crisis of confidence. Forces within the world economy had a debilitating effect on Britain as they did elsewhere. Additionally, the debates and disputes arising from the recurrent distractions of the British economy, low investment and the inability to achieve sustained economic growth - a feature of Britain's economic tradition unanticipated by Crosland's central revisionist thinking of the 1950s (Crosland, 1956: 517) - allied to related developments within the trade unions and on the left of the parliamentary party, revealed the underlying composite and discordant nature of Labour's supposedly homogenous governing elite. If it was ever part of their agenda, the so-called intellectual, revisionist social democrats' attempt at hegemony within the party had been thwarted (see Desai, 1994: 6, 99-126, 182).

By early 1977 the challenge to traditional revisionist social democracy in the Labour Party, from without and within, had reached an advanced stage. The Labour government had encountered serious difficulties of both economic management and wider manifesto commitments, and relations with the party and NEC deteriorated significantly. Crosland's earlier optimistic predictions and consequences of consistent economic growth had not materialised, the rate of inflation had reached double figures, unemployment rates had increased steadily and public economies were painfully enforced following the IMF crisis. The government had carried the nation but not its own party decisively through the referendum on the Common Market two years earlier: a broad left coalition had opposed membership of the EEC, while there remained significant divisions, both substantive and tactical, within Labour's centre-right coalition. Neither had the Labour government-TUC 'social contract' fulfilled expectations. During the first two years of its existence the trade

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5 In Germany, for instance, the SPD under Helmut Schmidt, were forced to defer some of its more ambitious programmes during this period (see Padgett & Paterson, 1991: 149-50).
unions had broadly co-operated with government dictates on wage demands as a means of containing inflation but, after 1976, modest wage claims were eventually abandoned which augured for a disruption of industrial relations and the deterioration of the relationship between the Labour government and the trade unions (see Ludlam, 2001a: 13, 2001b: 112-13). Moreover, the 1976 Labour Party leadership contest after Wilson’s surprise resignation in March 1976 offers an indication of the diversity and fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right by this time, and of ‘the extent of and support for ideological alignments within the parliamentary party’ (McKee, 1988: 36; also see Radice, 2002: 4-5, 212ff).

1.3.3 The Indicative 1976 Labour Leadership Contest

Daly (1992: 88) suggests that the ‘leadership election of April 1976 was a turning point for the Labour Right’, as ‘an opportunity for the Right to reassert itself’. There had been considerable dissatisfaction with Wilson’s leadership on the Labour right, but Wilson’s tenure was largely secure because of significant rivalries on the right and the failure to agree and support a single candidate to challenge Wilson’s leadership. Daly (1992: 88) suggests that, by April 1976, ‘Crosland, Callaghan and Jenkins, each represented different constituencies of support on the Labour Right, with conflicting personalities, styles and policies.’ Crosland was never a serious contender for the leadership, but perhaps his candidature represented a final breach with the Jenkinstites and revealed the miscellany and fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right: in a 1971 memorandum to himself, Crosland reveals that ‘not for 1st time, but more acutely, uncomfortable. Ambivalent relationship: CDS, Euro, Right, who now totally Jenkinstite’, and concludes ‘after all, don’t desperately want to be leader’ (Crosland Papers 6/2). Moreover, the differences and divisions between Crosland, Jenkins and Callaghan were reflected in the response of the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs during the 1976 leadership contest. It had to abstain from supporting a particular candidate because significant bodies of support existed both for Callaghan and Jenkins as well as a smaller body of support for Crosland.
The enmity between erstwhile ‘revisionist’ colleagues, Crosland and Jenkins (and, to some extent, Healey) inevitably divided and weakened the parliamentary Labour right. In spite of the differences between them, advisers and friends of Crosland frequently counselled some sort of rapprochement with Jenkins and his supporters, if only ‘in the name of a united opposition to the Left. But attitudes to Europe, personal rivalries and attitudes to the Party prevented unity on the Labour Right’ (also see Marquand, 1991: 169; Radice, 2002: 3-4).6 Crosland’s own position and strategy in the campaign for the leadership is illuminating in this respect: he inevitably presented himself as a unity candidate, but also ‘to draw my support from those who are looking for the common ground which unites both right and left in my Party’ (Crosland Papers 6/3, Statement to the Press Association 17/3/76), fostering the impression in others that, by 1977-8, ‘he had become much more of a straight party man’. The so-called Jenkinsites had come to view Crosland with some suspicion, certainly on issues such as Europe, and as an unreliable ally in, what they considered to be, the significant causes of the Labour right (see Daly, 1992: 89-92; Marquand, 1991: 169; Bill Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).7

In the circumstances, it was Callaghan who, in McKee’s words, ‘more than any Right wing Labour politician, personified social democratic Consolidationism, with his twin emphases on pragmatism and party loyalty’, who was able to defeat the nominal parliamentary factional figureheads of right and left, Jenkins and Foot from the Tribune Group, along with Healey, Benn and Crosland (1988: 36; also see Howell, 1976: 296). Later in the same year, it was reported that the ‘Crosland of today rejects the fundamentalism of the right. He is the man of the centre, the democratic socialist. He has already put the Right’s nose out of joint over Europe, and this may account for some of the falling off of his stock within the parliamentary party’ (see Crosland Papers, 6/3, 6/4, ‘Crosland Votes - David Lipsey’s Final Guess at 8/4/76’).

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6 Also, if he was to effect a more significant role in elections for party office, he would need to develop a greater phalanx of personal support. For example, David Lipsey’s speculations about Crosland’s core support in his poor performance during the 1976 leadership contest revealed a small number of relatively unknown Labour back-bench MPs (see Crosland Papers 6/3, 6/4, ‘Crosland Votes – David Lipsey’s Final Guess at 8/4/76’).

7 For instance, his close friend (and biographer of Gaitskell), Philip Williams, complained that Crosland had publicly supported the official Labour Party candidate against Dick Taverne in the Lincoln by-election in 1973, in which it was thought by some on the Labour right that a Labour victory would justify the bullying tactics of left-wing constituency activists towards sitting Labour MPs (Daly, 1992: 90, 91-2).
It is probable that the majority of Crosland's votes in the leadership election (few as they were) transferred to Callaghan, but perhaps the major surprise (and disappointment for the Jenkinsites) of the leadership election was the poor performance of the talismanic Jenkins. He scored a mere fifty-six votes in the first ballot compared, for instance, to ninety for Michael Foot. The combined first round tally of one hundred and fourteen votes for Callaghan and Healey indicated the complexity and fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right, and the inability of its major representatives to co-operate. Crosland's basic support, for instance, was composed of 'motley collection of screwballs and crackpots', including at least one Tribunite, Bruce Grocott, and conspicuously the lack of any backing from pro-European Labour MPs signifying the lack of 'an alternative power base inside the party'. Similarly, Healey, as a 'loner', who, unlike Callaghan or Jenkins, had not bothered to build up a network of allies in the PLP', lacked a requisite level of support to make an effective showing. The candidature of both Healey and Crosland obviously impacted upon the votes which Jenkins required if he was to challenge Callaghan and emerge as the main candidate of the centre-right to fight Foot in a second or third ballot. Even 'more serious for the Jenkins cause was that between fifteen and twenty pro-European MPs who would have voted for him four years before now went to Callaghan. They included...Hattersley...John Smith...Cledwyn Hughes, the chairman of the PLP, and Ernest Armstrong' (Radice, 2002: 212, 234-40).

The election of Callaghan as leader of the Labour Party in 1976 appears to have been a victory for the perceived benefits of unity, pragmatism and moderation, a 'comfortable candidate for the moderate Right' and 'those elements on the Labour Right and in the Centre who were unconcerned with ideas and were pragmatists who also wanted a 'unity' candidate' (see Daly, 1992: 92-3; McKee, 1988: 36). Radice (2002: 234) suggests that 'in the febrile state of the Labour Party in spring 1976, Callaghan was the natural unifying candidate, more so than either Foot on the left or Jenkins on the pro-market right, more

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8 Radice (2002: 236-7) suggests that Hattersley's reason for failing to support Jenkins' candidature was ideological, stemming from his unease with a speech made by Jenkins in Anglesey in which he claimed that the public spending level compatible with a pluralistic democracy would soon be reached. 'Hattersley...an intellectual disciple of Crosland, gave this as his reason for not voting for Jenkins, though he also told Crosland that he was supporting Callaghan for fear of splitting the vote and letting Foot in.'
personally approachable than Healey and with more weight than Crosland.' Within the context of powerful constraints, such as a strong left and powerful trade unions in the 1960s and 1970s, 'credible 'consensus' leaders from the centre of the party, like Wilson and Callaghan', were 'better able to unite the warring party factions' (Radice, 2002: 4). Jenkins (1991: 436) himself explains that, given his relatively poor showing, he 'immediately decided to withdraw' and, 'in effect releasing my votes to Callaghan' who 'I...greatly preferred...as Prime Minister to...Michael Foot, the only practical alternative.' However, Jenkins also clearly indicates his substantial differences with Callaghan as 'believing him to have been wrong on devaluation, East of Suez, immigration policy, most libertarian issues at the Home Office, trade union reform and Europe', although he was at least 'sound on the Atlantic Alliance, was no dogmatic supporter of nationalisation and had a built-in respect for the rule of law.' Radice (2002: 239-40) further suggests:

'even if two out of Crosland, Healey and Jenkins had stood down, there is no guarantee that their combined vote could have been transferred to the one candidate. There were certainly many Labour MPs on the centre-right...who wondered why...the three men...could not get together ... But there were others who only emphasised the differences. A number of pro-European Jenkinites still had not forgotten the behaviour of Crosland and Healey over Europe in 1971 and 1972, while Croslandites charged Jenkins not only of not being a real socialist but, even worse, a 'crypto-coalitionist'. Supporters of Healey claimed that Jenkins was now too divisive and Crosland not decisive enough to be elected as leader... In one way these divisions...only highlighted what a formidable candidate for the leadership... Callaghan was, given the divided nature of the Labour Party in the 1970s and the existence of a strong left wing... many observers believed that, even if only one of the three had been running against him, he would have still carried the day. However, undoubtedly the intense rivalry between the three most prominent revisionist modernizers in the party made it absolutely certain that the least challenging candidate of the centre-right was the one who became leader of the party and Prime Minister.'

The result of the leadership election was to have some interesting short and long-term implications for the parliamentary Labour right. Firstly, in the immediate aftermath of the election, Callaghan made Crosland Foreign Secretary in preference to Jenkins because the former 'was not nearly as committed...to Community membership and would not
arouse much suspicion when he took the necessary decisions, as he must, that would link Britain with the Community' and, therefore, less likely to fatally divide the party. The ‘wounds had not healed since his resignation as Deputy Leader during the European Community battles, and as he had been the leading protagonist on one side, every action he would have taken as Foreign Secretary would have been regarded with deep suspicion by the anti-Marketeers on our benches’ (Callaghan, 1987: 399). Anyway, Callaghan himself had not been a great enthusiast of the EEC (Kellner & Hitchens, 1976: 164; Morgan, 1997: 180; and see, for example, Callaghan, 1971: 1-4). The decision was also to hasten Jenkins’ departure from the Labour Party to become President of the European Commission which, as a committed European, would allow him ‘the opportunity to help lead the re-launch of the European Community after a stagnant period following the oil crisis’ (Jenkins, 1989: 3; Radice, 2002: 240-1). In the longer-term, for ‘Jenkins and his supporters, the election marked the end of his bid to become leader and the Jenkinsite project was to find new pastures’ even resulting, after Jenkins’ departure to Brussels, in ‘a fragmentation of the Jenkinsites’ themselves, ‘not to regroup until after the May 1979 election defeat’, when a combination of the perceived failures of the Labour government, magnified in the 1978-9 ‘Winter of Discontent’, loss of the 1979 general election and the prospects of success of the left’s programme of constitutional change that would inevitably undermine the autonomy of the parliamentary party and leadership in relation to other, extra-parliamentary organs of the party’s federal structure provided the impetus (Daly, 1992: 93-97).9

The 1976 leadership election appears to reflect the relative complexity and fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s, particularly the rupture of its earlier Gaitskellite revisionist tradition. McKee (1988: 36) proposes that it ‘underlined the extent to which Consolidationism had replaced Revisionism as the dominant creed on the Labour Right’. Although this suggests an unambiguous and retrospective representation of the diversity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right (see Chapter Two), the

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9 Although Daly (1992: 95, 97) is keen to emphasise that the disarray and fragmentation of the Jenkinsites in the wake of their leaders defeat in the 1976 leadership election, and his subsequent departure to Brussels, indicates that there existed no solid foundation among this group for any sort of breakaway from the Labour party at the time.
context and result of the leadership contest reveals the extent to which the key representatives of Labour’s recent tradition of revisionist social democracy were becoming increasingly fractured and undermined.

1.3.4 Left-wing Advance and the Emergence of an Organised Labour Right

One important corollary of the weakness and apparent decline of revisionist social democracy was a corresponding resurgence of the (new) Labour left and, given the relative significance of this development for the immediate and long-term future of Labour politics, it might be worth taking a moment to contextualise this trend. While it took events and developments inside the Labour Party after the 1979 election defeat to confirm it, the ascendancy of the Labour left in the party was a more or less continuous process through the decade and, by February 1977, had acquired a solid momentum (see Kogan & Kogan, 1982: Chs. 2-3). For instance, the 1973 Annual Conference had abolished Labour’s list of proscribed organisations, facilitating a greater degree of left-wing entryism. In 1975 the Secretary of State for Education, Reg Prentice, was deselected in his Newham North East constituency, followed a year later by Frank Tomney in Hammersmith and a sustained period of ‘ultra-Left activity’ within the Labour Party (see McKee, 1988: 40-3). The two general elections of 1974 also witnessed the recruitment of MPs within Parliament by the Tribune Group and, although never a majority of the PLP, delivered sufficient votes to elect Ian Mikardo as chairman of the PLP the same year. The parliamentary profile of the Tribune Group was augmented by three further developments: firstly, significant (if strategic) left-wing Cabinet representation in the form of Foot, Benn and Booth; secondly, organised and sustained expression of factional dissent in the Commons (see Norton, 1980: 431-2, 434-7) and, thirdly, Foot’s election over Shirley Williams as deputy leader in 1976.

10 Dick Taverne had already been deselected by his constituency Labour party in Lincoln, which precipitated his battle to regain the seat in a by-election as an independent candidate (Crewe & King, 1995b: 55; also see Taverne, 1974; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01).
11 Moreover, the combined first round vote for the left-wing candidates in the 1976 leadership election, Foot and Benn, registered a respectable 127 (90 for Foot and 37 for Benn).
Conference also came to represent an increasingly important forum for a broad left alliance, and the general left-wing resurgence was accompanied by a growing proliferation of factional groupings of the left, perhaps the most significant of which was Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) whose raison d'etre was, primarily, to lobby for the internal constitutional change broadly favoured by the left. The demand for constitutional change was threefold: firstly the mandatory reselection of Labour MPs; secondly, control of the Labour Party manifesto by the NEC rather than the PLP and, thirdly, an electoral college to replace the existing exclusive franchise of the PLP in the election of the leader of the Labour Party. By 1977 CLPD held the affiliations of over one hundred and seventy party organisations, including seventy-four constituency Labour parties (CLPs) compared to only six in 1974 (Kogan & Kogan, 1982: 35-7, 46). At the 1977 Annual Conference, seventy-nine CLPs submitted resolutions in favour of mandatory reselection of Labour MPs and, on the basis of the report of a working party of the NEC instructed by the 1976 Annual Conference (Composite Resolution No. 18), three alternatives for the election of party leader were to be processed ‘in suitable form to enable the Annual Conference in 1978 to make a decision following which a subsequent amendment to the Party Constitution would be placed before the subsequent Conference’ (LPACR 1977: 11, 379-82; Kogan & Kogan, 1982: Ch. 4). As later battles were to demonstrate, the proposed constitutional changes represented precisely the ground on which some on the Labour right attempted to defend their sacred autonomy of the PLP in such matters (see LPACR 1977: 381, Appendix 3 Report of the Working Party on the Election of the Party Leader). As Hodgson (1982: 135) suggests, for ‘a significant group opposition to the Left was to prevail over loyalty to the Party... when the Left was to make structural and policy gains after the 1979 defeat, this group in the Right was set on a course leading to their exit from the Party.’

In response to these developments, there were signs of group and factional organisation and activity on the right of the PLP by 1976 (see Chapter Three). The Manifesto Group of centre-right Labour MPs was launched in December 1974 as an attempt to support the government, to uphold its manifesto against attacks from the left and to provide balance against the Tribune Group after its success in the elections to the PLP Liaison Committee
and domination of other PLP subject groups. Although it was not a direct descendent of CDS, it occupied the moderate centre ground of the party through the mid-to-late 1970s and early 1980s. Among its aims and objectives, as stated in its founding documents, were, firstly, to ‘work for the implementation of the policies set out in the Labour Manifesto and to support a Labour Government in overcoming the country’s acute economic difficulties’, secondly to act ‘as a forum for active discussion designed to relate democratic socialist philosophy to the needs of the present age’ and, thirdly, to ‘endeavour to achieve a truly democratic socialist society through our democratic and representative parliamentary system’. Although it possessed no regular publishing programme, its primary means of disseminating its ideas came in a series of statements and pamphlets such as What We Must Do: A Democratic Socialist Approach to Britain’s Crisis (1977), The Wrong Approach: A Critique of Tory Policy (1978), The Future of Counter-Inflationary Policy (1979) and Priorities of Labour (1979). Within two years of its formation, around eighty broadly centre-right Labour MPs had been recruited to the cause, and Cledwyn Hughes had been elected to replace Mikardo as Chairman of the PLP. The Manifesto Group worked along with the Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV) from its formation in February 1977. CLV shared broadly similar views as the Manifesto Group, supporting the Labour government while upholding a broadly social democratic perspective. Although there were no formal connections between the two organisations – CLV, a primarily extra-parliamentary organ of the Labour right and, eventually, an organisational catalyst for secessionist activity, worked at the level of the constituency Labour party and its aims included the regeneration of the party membership and organisation – they worked together on a number of occasions, notably in the issue of a joint statement, Reform and Democracy (see Daly, 1993).

In addition, a number of ‘small – rather elitist – organisations’ functioned outside Westminster on the social democratic fringe. These included the Labour Committee for

12 There is an irony in the name of the group. The 1974 Labour Party manifesto was a relatively radical document. The name of the Manifesto Group was coined by Jim Wellbeloved to indicate that ‘when we call ourselves the Manifesto Group, we don’t mean that we like the manifesto, what we mean is that the manifesto is as far as we’re prepared to bloody well go’ (cited in Desai, 1994: 171).

13 Although Desai (1994: 170-2) notes that the membership of the Manifesto Group was too diverse and divided over crucial issues such as Europe to enable it to organise effectively against the Tribune Group.
Europe, which included a small number of Labour MPs such as Hattersley and Denis Howell, some trade union leaders and was directed by an organiser, Jim Cattermole. Its rationale ‘sharply revived following the anti-EEC sentiments inherent in the 1976 Conference document. There were also other groups such as the pro-NATO Labour Committee for Trans-Atlantic Understanding, run by its secretary, former Labour MP and party NATO lobbyist, Alan Lee Williams, and the Social Democratic Alliance, launched in 1975, which ‘provided the first sign of authentic extra-parliamentary counter campaigning on the Labour Right’. On the down side, ‘it proved ideologically too narrow and politically strident to command a broad Right wing appeal, and never rose beyond the level of a small hard Right faction’. The social democratic ‘house’ journal, Socialist Commentary, and the associated group, Friends of Socialist Commentary, offered a further outlet for the dissemination of views and ideas but, from 1978, declining funds and circulation underpinned the demise of the journal which, in turn, hastened the social democratic intellectual malaise (McKee, 1988: 43-5).

In the face of left-wing resurgence in the party, the problems of corresponding right-wing organisation and activity seemed to be one of dimension. Seyd (1968: Ch. 3) suggests of CDS that, although it embraced a variety of so-called revisionist causes, it campaigned primarily (and with leadership approval) on one specific platform, namely that of multilateral nuclear disarmament. By contrast, the 1970s presented the parliamentary Labour right with a more comprehensive set of challenges based around a tide of external and internal opposition to its failing bedrock of traditional revisionist social democracy. Nor was group organisation and activity on the parliamentary Labour right now sanctioned by the party leadership, and the political realignment of major trade unions further undermined its cause. This is to say nothing of the ideological, policy and political divisions that were to undermine the cohesive and effective organisation of the parliamentary Labour right. Moreover, the general crisis of revisionist social democracy and the general intellectual malaise that surrounded it was hastened by the departure and death of some of its most senior and articulate proponents. Taverne was finally defeated at the October 1974 general election after leaving the Labour Party to fight his seat as an independent. Brian Walden left Parliament for an alternative career in television. Jenkins
left British politics to become President of the European Commission, taking David Marquand with him as a personal adviser. Crosland was to die from a sudden stroke in February 1977 and, anyway, Marquand (1991: 170, 174-5) contends that he had, by then, undergone ‘the transition from revisionist enfant terrible to responsible Labour statesman’ and that the ‘symbiosis between Croslandism and Labourism was a symbiosis of exhaustion.’ He argues that the ‘times cried out for a further instalment of revisionism which would do for Croslandite social democracy what The Future of Socialism had done for Clause Four socialism’, but the ‘Crosland of the 1970s was too distracted by the responsibilities of office and too encumbered by the claims of party loyalty to make the attempt’. Additionally, the death of John Mackintosh in 1978 contributed to the decline of Socialist Commentary and to the general intellectual malaise on the broad Labour right. Again, Marquand (1975: 398) had, perceptively, in one respect at least, observed the potential consequences and prospects for the Labour Party, ‘that it will succumb to a kind of ideological paralysis and cease to do anything worthwhile with the majorities it wins’.

For much of the 1970s, therefore, the Labour Party and government experienced significant challenges from both external structural and internal institutional sources to its long-term operational framework of what can be conveniently summarised as Keynesian (welfare state) social democracy (see Plant, 1989 for a useful summary). For Labour’s traditionally centre-right ‘dominant coalition’ and ‘governing elite’, considerable problems in the structural political economy were accompanied by the manifestation of growing left-wing dissent and revolt against the perceived failure of post-war Keynesian social democracy and its association with the gradual reformism of the ‘pragmatic centrist’ approach of Labour’s centre-right ‘governing elite’. As Mackintosh (1982 [1972]: 155), a prominent intellectual influence on the so-called social democratic right of the PLP, has suggested, ‘those normally labelled as the Right, who have provided most of the ideas since the late 1950s, have been so upset and thrown off balance by their

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14 According to Bill Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01), the expression of left-wing discontent was a direct consequence of the perceived inadequacies of the 1964-70 Labour governments and was, at least partly, facilitated by the fragmentation and disorganisation of the right resulting from deep-rooted splits over the European issue.
recent defeats that they appear to be divided and somewhat demoralized and have managed only to fight rear-guard actions.'

Labour’s fortunes during the 1970s, especially from the mid 1970s onwards, appear to offer an apposite case from which to pursue Harrison’s (1991: 9) recommendation to approach Labour history through the ‘study of what are taken to be crucial periods or moments. Plant (1989: 8) argues that by the mid 1970s ‘some of the tensions between different beliefs within the movement had to be resolved because post-war social democracy and traditional Marxist beliefs... had both been undermined’. The ‘pragmatic centrist approach characteristic of the Wilson and Callaghan era’ and the temporary sense of unity it had enabled both seemed very ragged by the mid 1970s. Keynesian demand management assumptions on which its economic approach rested had been decisively undermined by economic changes in the early 1970s resulting from the world economic crisis and recession following oil price rises after 1973. The 1976 IMF crisis and loan placed severe public spending restrictions on the Labour government, and the increasingly monetarist character of Denis Healey’s budgets led to a ‘loss of intellectual confidence in the assumptions of what might be called post-war Keynesian social democracy on which the Labour party had in practice built its policies’.15 The 1970s offer the backdrop to circumstances in which the constituent traditions, beliefs and strategies of Labour’s broad church were often strained to breaking point. Certain key ideological and policy themes – European membership, industrial relations and trade union reform, public expenditure and issues of equality – exposed serious divisions not just between left and right, but within the parliamentary Labour right itself.

1.3.5 Europe

The issue of British membership of the EEC has been a perennially divisive issue in Labour politics (and across the political spectrum) in the post-war period. It has been an issue central to internal disputes and divisions not simply on left-right lines, but both

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15 See Ludlam (1992) for a qualified perspective of the impact of the IMF deal on the necessity for the Labour government to launch an all out attack on public spending and to begin to replace traditional demand management full employment policies with the introduction of monetary targets.
between and within Labour's left and right (see Broad, 2001; Young, 1998: 257-305). The European issue, perhaps more than any other, starkly reveals the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right, and presented a serious threat to its unity and cohesion in the 1970s.

The issue aroused strong passions on all corners of the Labour benches. Jenkins' large minority of right-wing pro-Marketeers regarded the issue as one of high principle. To ensure that the European Accession Bill was safely guided through Parliament, they were even prepared to sustain the Heath Government in office. Directly opposed to this group was an equally determined minority of anti-Marketeers, mainly but not exclusively from the left. They were bitterly opposed to the life raft provided to the Conservative government from the Labour benches that enabled it not only to take Britain into the EEC but also to introduce legislation on issues such as industrial relations and housing finance.

Other influential members of the Labour right, including Callaghan, Crosland and Healey, displayed attitudes to the issue that were characterised by a much greater degree of indifference, pragmatism and indecision. Of these, Crosland had been most closely identified with the so-called Gaitskellite revisionist tradition, and his characteristically capricious refusal to regard EC membership as a matter of principle infuriated former close allies such as Jenkins and Rodgers. The nature and expression of Crosland's 'Labourism' differed fundamentally to that of Jenkins. For Crosland, voting for entry into the Common Market was not worth the risk of splitting the Labour Party and maintaining the Conservatives in office and, from his perspective, 'some who thought of themselves as Gaitskellites had moved so far to the Right that they disappeared from view' (Crosland, 1982: 222) and '[t]hus divided, the capacity of the right to resist the advance of the left - its ranks temporarily swelled by right-wing anti-Marketeers - was enfeebled' (Shaw, 1996: 116).

Therefore, the European issue was a crucial division on the parliamentary Labour right, particularly within its so-called revisionist social democratic element, between Gaitskell and others and between Jenkins, Jay and Crosland. Analysis of the European membership debate on the parliamentary Labour right further offers an opportunity to reassess the
conflicting accounts concerning the relative significance of the issue in the formation of
the SDP. One recent set of commentators claim that ‘devotion to the European cause
[wasp] not the ideological cement that bound the twenty-eight SDP defectors together’
(Crewe & King, 1995b: 106-14), while another has suggested that ‘allowing for some
deaths, and many retirements from politics, the division of 1971 prefigured almost
exactly the later split’ (Desai, 1994: 146). A case study of British membership and
involvement with the Common Market offers an important aspect of foreign policy that
has been central to Labour’s intra-party debates and disputes since the 1960s, provoking
serious internal divisions both between and within left and right, and which has been
debated as a key feature in the formation of the SDP.

1.3.6 Industrial Relations and Trade Union Reform

Crewe and King (1995b: 104, 106), in their major study of the origins and progress of the
SDP and, in an attempt to resolve the ‘considerable defector-loyalist puzzle’, suggest that
the issue of trade union reform was one of those ‘that had divided the Labour right during
the 1970s’. Again, it was not simply a division between left and right in the party: in
terms of ‘the issues that had divided the Labour right during the 1970s – notably Scottish
and Welsh devolution and trade-union reform – the twenty-eight were as divided as
everyone else...The divisions on the issue of trade-union reform were just as great, as
events inside the SDP were to show.’ Because of its centrality to tradition and structures
of feeling in the Labour Party and Labour alliance, the question of industrial relations and
trade union reform, as a potentially divisive issue of both policy and internal party
management, offers an apposite case study. Again generally understood in simple left-
right terms, it reveals cleavages that often transcend the conventional dimensions of
Labour’s essentially contested political culture.

Barbara Castle’s attempt to persuade the trade unions to accept measures which would
restrict unofficial strike activity in exchange for the extension of union rights in the
workplace, incorporated in the proposed 1969 ‘In Place of Strife’ legislation, divided the
Labour right in interesting ways. Callaghan, backed by Dick Marsh and Ray Gunter, was
the main opponent of the bill, while Jenkins, although his position gradually became more ambiguous because 'he no longer thought that the fight was worth the cost' (Castle, 1990: 342-3), initially supported the proposed legislation with the added proviso that it 'should be rushed through immediately as he did not want the consultations dragging on' (Castle, 1994: 419). Crosland thought that it was ill-timed. As Susan Crosland (1982: 202) observes: 'Tony...was incredulous...he agreed with her on issues about 70 per cent of the time; but to contemplate a policy like this late in a Parliament was mad... As Chancellor, surely Roy would help persuade the Prime Minister of the folly of putting through a Bill you could not enforce'. However, as Crosland was soon to discover, 'the Chancellor was on the Cabinet Committee which had already discussed In Place of Strife, and Roy supported it.'

Minkin further indicates a division within the erstwhile 'revisionist' Labour right in relation to industrial relations, and to the issue of trade union reform in particular. He describes the different attitudes of so-called 'ex-Gaitskellite revisionists' to the trade union issue in terms of the 'broad crisis of revisionist social democracy [which] stimulated and coincided with a crisis over power within the Party' and especially of those elements of Labour's traditions such as the post-war settlement and 1950s revisionism which had 'formed the basis of agreement.' Thus, faced with the new uncertainties surrounding the central economic assumption of the ex-Gaitskellites - that continuous economic growth would facilitate social objectives through the mechanism of increased public expenditure – and the emergence of a new trade union militancy led from the left and a characteristic of the political terrain unanticipated in the 1950s:

'Faced with a reappraisal of means and ends the majority of ex-Gaitskellite revisionists met the new political problems with an uneasy mixture of moderation, adaption and pragmatism. The early death of...intellectual leaders, Allan Flanders in 1974 and Tony Crosland in 1977, left Roy Jenkins as the senior ex-Gaitskellite. Flanders and Crosland had sought to preserve their socialist values and Labour's special link with the organised working class but to reorder priorities and reaffirm distinctive institutional responsibilities - and passed on this legacy. But Jenkins was much readier to shed the socialist ascription, some of the main commitments and ultimately the fundamental values and 'rules' of the Labour Movement.'

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In the context of wider British economic decline, 'the trade union question', as it became known, was a fundamental aspect of contemporary British politics. The bitter internal divisions that accompanied 'In Place of Strife', the further industrial unrest that accompanied the Heath government's Industrial Relations Act (1971) and the critical role of trade unions in both the production and implementation of government economic and industrial policy and strategy and the internal politics of the Labour Party guaranteed the trade union question a central position in contemporary political discourse and debate. Nowhere were debates and divisions concerning the trade union question more profound than on the parliamentary Labour right.

1.3.7 Ideas and Practice of Equality

As part of a general appraisal of the philosophy, ideas and traditions of the parliamentary Labour right, chapter two examines the tension between and relative position of ideas of equality and liberty in Labour right thought and practice. Chapter six further explores this tension, and offers a case study of formulations of equality on the parliamentary Labour right. Particularly, it examines attitudes to equality as they emerged and developed in debates over public expenditure during the 1970s, and indicates the social dimension of such divisions through the lens of race and immigration issues. Additionally, a conclusion and postscript to the study will expand upon qualitative differences and divisions on the parliamentary Labour right over the interpretation and application of ideas of equality as they emerged in the 1970s, in order to indicate the problematic nature of the simple Old-New Labour dichotomy and to locate aspects of New Labour within the context of emerging ideas in a strand of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s.

a. The Economic Dimension: Public Expenditure

Public expenditure represents an elementary dimension used for so long in political science as the basic left-right dimension. However, attitudes to public expenditure do not
coalesce simply on left-right lines. The issue of public expenditure reveals a more complex and diverse set of perceptions and preferences on the Labour right towards economic policy that often dissect the views ordinarily represented on a simple left-right scale. For example, John Tomlinson (Interview with the author, 27/3/01), a former junior minister to Tony Crosland at the Foreign Office, claims that ‘[i]f you took public spending as being the touchstone of the left, then Tony Crosland was a hard left radical and others who would regard themselves as instinctively on the left were much more conservative.’ On the other hand, Roy Jenkins, after taking over as Chancellor from Callaghan after the forced devaluation of 1967, demonstrated ‘Crippsian austerity and unyielding determination until the balance of payments moved into the black.’ Admittedly, as Marquand (1999: 187) points out, ‘[t]here his task was as simple as it was forbidding: the forced devaluation...had come at the wrong time and in the wrong way...what mattered was to make devaluation work’, but he was, it seems, very well-suited to the task at hand with his ‘near Gladstonian programme of economic stringency at the Exchequer’ familiar to his tradition of ‘radical liberalism’ (with ‘its intellectual roots in the thinking of the so-called ‘New Liberalism’ of the Edwardian era’) that ‘adopted an interventionist economic role for the State, although public expenditure was to be held in check’ (Daly, 1992: 48-9). Jenkins’ apparent suitability for such a task may, in Harold Wilson’s eyes, even have been one reason for his elevation to the Chancellorship ahead of Crosland after Callaghan’s reputation there had been tarnished by the devaluation crisis. Jenkins (1991: 217) own account of the reshuffle suggests that it crucially damaged ‘the cohesion of the Labour right over the next eight or nine years. Had he and I been able to work together as smoothly as did Gaitskell and Jay or Gaitskell and Gordon Walker a decade before it might have made a decisive difference to the balance of power within the Labour Party and hence the politics of the early 1980s.’

The pragmatic outlook of politicians such as Callaghan and Healey, allied to their so-called respective traditions of trade union ‘economism’ and ‘centrism’, encouraged a willingness to pursue financial orthodoxy and economic stringency in the perceived cause of confidence and party unity (see Daly, 1992: 56-62), while for Crosland public spending formed a core instrument of his wider programme of egalitarianism and major
social change. Healey regarded Crosland as a theoretical economist who paid scant attention to financial realities and practicalities. During the prolonged Cabinet debates over the terms of the IMF loan in 1976 there were, in essence, two groups similarly opposed to the IMF terms of substantial public spending cuts. One group consisted of members of the party left and centre-left, such as Tony Benn, Michael Foot, Stan Orme, and Peter Shore, while the other consisted of Crosland, Roy Hattersley, Harold Lever, Shirley Williams, David Ennals, and Bill Rodgers from the right and centre-right of the PLP, who also opposed the proposed spending cuts. However, the opposition of Ennals, Rodgers, and Shirley Williams was qualitatively different to that of Crosland in that their opposition was based on the premise of protecting their respective departmental budgets. Crosland, like Hattersley and Lever, believed the whole exercise to be unnecessarily deflationary. Throughout the crisis, Crosland remained less than convinced of the rectitude of the intended cuts in public expenditure (see Crosland, 1982: 375-82; and, for a useful synopsis of the IMF discussions and outcome, see Whitehead, 1987: 256-8). Crosland’s resistance to the principle of spending cuts was indicative of his ‘democratic socialist’ philosophy of a society characterised by a high measure of egalitarianism and major social change (see Daly, 1992: 51-5). It is clear, then, that debates and divisions surrounding the issue of public expenditure revolve around more complex feelings and positions than those represented by a simple left-right continuum. The economic problems and debates over public expenditure in the 1970s offer a particularly apposite moment to examine the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in this respect.

b. **The Social Dimension; Race and Immigration**

Given the introduction of controversial legislation concerning the immigration rules and race relations policy in the late 1960s, these issues remained a sensitive political topic. They concern a moral dimension and have long been seen to represent a crucial division on the parliamentary Labour right between the liberal, intellectual or revisionist element and the more authoritarian, ‘old’ trade union right. This distinction has been most explicitly represented in policy terms by the nature of the respective occupancies of the Home Office by Roy Jenkins and James Callaghan during the latter half of the 1960s.
In his period as Home Secretary, Jenkins had made his reputation by sponsoring and supporting reformist, and often controversial, legislation dealing with capital punishment, homosexuality, censorship, and abortion. The fundamental difference between the successive occupants of the Home Office was that Callaghan displayed little of Jenkins’ libertarian passion (Kellner & Hitchens, 1976: 77). It was under Callaghan’s direction that the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 was introduced, which calibrated the varying rights of British Commonwealth citizens to enter the U.K. and was regarded by many at the time as ‘probably the most shameful measure that Labour members have ever been asked by their whips to support’ (Kellner & Hitchens, 1976: 78-9).

Whether Jenkins, had he not exchanged roles with Callaghan after the 1967 devaluation and had he remained in post at the Home Office, would have overseen the same illiberal and ‘highly divisive legislation’ is a moot point (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01). It is possible, given Jenkins’ authorisation as Home Secretary of the preparation of a draft bill, that he would have introduced similar legislation, and it is true that many such as David Owen swallowed their feelings, but perhaps not with the same ‘indecent haste’ as his successor. ‘Revisionist’ hopes of liberal reform that had been kept alive by the tenure of Jenkins and his social reforms at the Home Office were thus subsequently disappointed by the perceived illiberalism and authoritarianism of his successor from the parliamentary Labour right as Home Secretary. To many of Jenkins’ liberal revisionist colleagues, Callaghan was regarded as a disgrace for his perceived capitulation to racist demands to restrict the right of entry of Kenyan Asians in 1968. John Mackintosh, for instance, was prominent in his disgust with the government’s immigration legislation, which he openly expressed to the House of Commons during the perceived immigration crisis of 1968 (Foote, 1997: 234; Howell, 1993: 178; also see Chapter Six). The issue of race and immigration policy potentially fosters differences and divisions not merely of left and right. This basic dichotomy between the progressive and the traditional, between the liberal and the authoritarian, has generally been seen to represent the core ideological distinction on the parliamentary Labour right in relation to social and moral questions.
1.3.8 Conclusion to Case Study Rationale

The case study method offers a flexible and inclusive research design. The unique strength of the case study method is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence, including interviews, documents and historical sources. The multiple case study method has been selected in preference to a single, discrete case, as the evidence obtained will either provide compelling support for the initial hypothesis, or produce sufficient contrasting results for the revision of the propositions advanced and some explanation for the questions posed as the basis for further research (see Yin, 1994: 44-51; for further discussion of the case study method, see methodological Appendix 1). Moreover, episodes within the life of the party encompassed by the case studies afford 'the opportunity to explore a number of units of analysis within the whole' that are, of themselves, deserving of an attempt at explanation and allow us to further explore some of the themes outlined above (see Bale, 1999b: 31-3; also see Yin, 1994: 18-32).

Particularly valuable, it is argued, are those cases that are 'rooted in 'hard-times', in one or more periods of political-economic stress' those points in history 'of critical choice, moments of flux when several things might happen but only one actually does...Moments of flux are fruitful for evaluating theoretical debates and for analyzing historical patterns' (see Gourevitch, 1986: 9; also see Bale 1999b: 32). As Gourevitch (1986: 9-10) further notes:

'The fat years and the lean ones are, of course, interconnected...Lines of cleavage may develop, along with ambitions and hopes, points of possible conflict, and areas of disagreement. The good times will thus produce their own challenges over new ways of organizing society, new values, and rising aspirations. And they create fault lines that may emerge in the next downturn. But more obviously, it is the crisis years that put systems under stress. Hard times expose strengths and weaknesses to scrutiny, allowing observers to see relationships that are often blurred in prosperous periods, when good times slake the propensity to contest and challenge. The lean years are times when old relationships crumble and new ones have to be constructed.'
Royden Harrison (1991: 11), in a review of Labour Party historiography, identifies a number of useful approaches to the study of Labour history. These include the need to approach Labour Party history through the study of tendencies and factions, of which the literature is only partially representative. Harrison further recommends ‘approaches and interpretations of party history which are born in the study of what are taken to be crucial periods or moments’ or approaches to ‘Labour party history through its specific policies’. He also bemoans the fact that, ‘in the case of such an eminently parliamentary party’, there has been little in the way of study of ‘the PLP as such’. The subject and cases of this study aim to meet at least some of these concerns, and also hopes to explain certain episodes and processes in the life of the party worth explaining for their own sake.

1.4 Conclusion

In the course of this chapter I have presented the broad scope and argument of the study, and introduced some of the general conceptual shortcomings relevant to an analysis of the parliamentary Labour right. This core task will be pursued more particularly and in more detail as the substance of chapter two. I have further outlined the rationale dictating the choice of policy case studies. In summary, the individual case studies have been chosen to cover key areas of foreign, economic, industrial and social policy. The cases reflect areas of debate central to so many of the party’s internal disputes and divisions over the years, between and within left and right. Essentially, the flexible case study method and the choice of case studies aim to demonstrate the diverse political culture and intrinsic ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right, which helped to underpin its relative ideological, political and organisational fragmentation in social democratic ‘hard times’ in the 1970s.

1.5 Organisation of the Thesis

The remaining structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter two undertakes a broad appraisal of the general philosophy, ideas and traditions of the Labour right. It examines the theoretical underpinnings of the Labour right, provides a critical overview of the
major conceptual and analytical constructions of the Labour right, and offers an appraisal of standard models and typologies of the parliamentary Labour right. Chapter three considers the organisational activity and behaviour of the Labour right in the 1970s. It suggests that intra-party group and factional organisation in the PLP was not the preserve of the Labour left, nor was it expressed in simple oppositional-leadership/loyalist left-right terms (see, for instance, Norton, 1980; Wood & Jacoby, 1984). Rather, group and factional organisation and activity on the parliamentary Labour right were often a further indication of its complex and disputatious nature that often transcended conventional alignments. Chapters four to six introduce the empirical substance of the policy case studies as formulated above. Together they hope to reveal and explain some of the ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s. The study concludes with a summary of the core elements and findings of the research and, as a basis for further research, a postscript will briefly address the implications of the emergence of parliamentary Labour right divisions in the 1970s for the interpretation of links and continuities in the recent history and development of the Labour Party within the context of contemporary debates concerning the relative novelty or otherwise of New Labour. Finally, a methodological appendix considers some of the methodological issues of the study.
Chapter Two

What is the Labour Right?

2.1 Introduction

So, what is the Labour right? What has been the conceptual, historical and ideological basis that has sustained presentations of the parliamentary Labour right? The previous chapter was intended to introduce the context and scope of the study, to outline the limitations of the conventional left-right dimension in the analysis of the Labour Party, to indicate the inherent complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right and to describe the methodological approach and empirical substance of the study. Chapter two adopts a broader historical and ideological flavour. It will revisit the ideological and political territory of the parliamentary Labour right. Firstly, it will review core elements of its theoretical and ideological disposition and conflicts, including the implications of the tension between the concepts of liberty and equality in Labour right thought and practice. This tension was to become particularly explicit in the 1970s, as it underpinned debates and divisions on the parliamentary Labour right over issues such as industrial relations and trade union reform and public expenditure. This important ideological tension on the parliamentary Labour right will be explored further within the context of the relevant case studies. Secondly, it will offer a critique of principal conceptualisations of the Labour right, particularly the conceptual and analytical limitations of 'revisionism' and related concepts. Again, the 1970s offered the backdrop to a critical fracture of the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist tradition and personnel, with serious implications for the unity and cohesion of the parliamentary Labour right. Thirdly, it will provide a critical survey of conventional accounts and typologies of the parliamentary Labour right. In response to the rigidity and certain anomalies and contradictions that arise in existing conceptualisations and analytical presentations of the parliamentary Labour right, the aim here is to argue in favour of a more fluid, contextual analysis of the diversity and divisions which undermined the unity and efficacy of Labour's 'dominant coalition' and 'governing elite' in the combative political context of the 1970s. This approach is given
empirical substance in the following chapters concerned with organisational behaviour and activity on the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s and the ideological and policy case studies. In the first instance, the broad aim is to critically review general conceptual, analytical and historical/ideological presentations of the parliamentary Labour right.

2.2 The Concept and Definition of the Labour Right

The nebulous and amorphous concept of the 'Labour right' has been difficult to define in any generally agreed and objective sense. One of the difficulties of identifying the character and trajectory of the parliamentary Labour right is, as Drucker (1981: 371) suggests, that 'few in the Labour Party admit to being on its right unless they are about to jump ship'. In their ideological battles with the Tribunites in the 1950s, for instance, the Gaitskellites claimed to represent the centre of the party in their loyalty to the parliamentary leadership against the so-called democratic socialist left. Wickham-Jones (1996: 31) suggests that 'it is misleading to regard Labour as inevitably split into two monolithic factions of left and right. While factions exist, there is also [the] 'large and amorphous' centre in the party which is not committed to either side. The position taken by those within the centre varies from one issue to another and over time.' The centre of a political party has been described by one analyst of intra-party culture(s) as 'the convenient (but arguably unrealistic) no-man's land that is the so-called centre', that requires a more systematic account of the position and behaviour of its (often temporary) inhabitants (Bale, 1999a: 89). It is not always easy to clearly distinguish between the centre and right of the PLP. Where do the 'large and amorphous' centre identified by Minkin (1978: 11; also see Wickham-Jones, 1996: 31), or even the Morrisonian consolidators (see Greenleaf, 1983: 474), give way to the 'firm right' (Crewe and King, 1995a: 80)? Bill Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01) has acknowledged this problem of definition: in terms of the Labour right and the Labour centre, 'it's always very difficult to decide where the line is'.

Crewe and King (1995a: 63-4, 80) provide definitions of varying degrees of specificity. On a broad level, they define Labour's right-wing as 'all those...who did not think of themselves as left-wingers and did not belong to left-wing organisations like the Tribune Group or the
Campaign for Labour Party Democracy.' According to this broad definition, there were 'about 150 MPs on the Labour right in 1981, comprising most of those who did not vote for Michael Foot on the first ballot in the 1980 party leadership contest...A somewhat narrower definition of 'right wing' might reduce the size of the right in parliament to about 120, somewhere between the number who voted for Denis Healey on the first ballot in 1980 (112) and the number who voted for him on the second (129)' (Crewe and King, 1995a: 63; 1995b: 105). They suggest that a 'different indicator produces a similar number. There remained in the 1979 parliament 118 MPs who in July 1975 had signed a letter of support for Reg Prentice when he faced deselection by his local party in Newham North-East' (Crewe & King, 1995b: 534; also see 1995b: 17).

Of course, not all those who voted for Healey in 1980 might be considered to represent the Labour right. There were also a number of partly overlapping right-wing groups and organisations in the PLP during the 1970s. These included the Jenkinsites, the Manifesto Group and even the Britain in Europe campaign in 1975 but, as Crewe and King (1995b: 105) suggest, they do not readily identify or adequately encapsulate the range of right-wing opinion and organisation in the PLP. The Manifesto Group, which organised the so-called right-wing slate for annual elections to the shadow cabinet, could depend on a core of around 80 members. Also, the combined vote of ‘the two indisputably right-wing candidates, Jenkins and Healey’, in the first round of the 1976 party leadership contest totalled eighty-six, although Crewe and King (1995b: 534) again suggest that ‘this was in the previous parliament when the PLP was larger and more right-wing in its make-up’.

Given the problems of defining the parliamentary Labour right numerically, it might prove more fertile to attempt to capture the broader theoretical and ideological identity of the Labour right.
2.3 What is the Labour Right? Theory and Ideology of the Labour Right

2.3.1 Introduction: The Formative and Cohesive Influence of ‘The Future of Socialism’

In spite of the supposed pragmatism of the predominantly centre-right Labour leadership that abjures theorising, Burns (1961) has identified a distinct literature of Labour right theory ‘in the writings of such ‘new thinkers’ as...Strachey...Crossman...Crosland and...Gordon Walker, as well as in Labour Party policy statements’ during and after the period of the post-war Attlee governments. The ‘new thinkers’ set to work in the aftermath of defeat in 1951 (Burns, 1961: 14). Although not composed exclusively of theorists from the Labour right, one of the most significant contributions to this body of Labour thought was New Fabian Essays (1952), to be quickly followed by Crosland’s *magnum opus*, The Future of Socialism (1956). Further ‘revisionist’ Labour right thinking came in other writings by Douglas Jay (1962, 1969), Jenkins (1953) and Gaitskell (1956). Essentially, the core of this ‘new’ Labour thinking was broadly aimed at revising traditional socialist analysis in the context of the perceived socio-economic changes of the immediate post-war years, particularly in Crosland’s central case, in the nature of pre-war capitalism (Crosland, 1952: 33-8; also see Burns, 1961: 15-16).

It was, of course, Crosland’s major work, The Future of Socialism, which offered by far the most articulate synthesis of post-war social democratic thought. It offered both a political analysis and strategy that influenced and inspired successive generations of democratic socialists and social democrats, and provided a much-needed central revisionist framework around which broadly similar ideological traditions might coalesce (Hattersley, 1987: xix, 1995: 173, 179; 2002; Marquand, 1997: 11-12; 1999 [1991]: 166-7; Owen, 1999; Plant, 1996: 165-6; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). Crosland (1956, also see 1952: 33-45) forcefully deconstructed traditional Marxist/socialist arguments concerning the nature of capitalism and capitalist society as it had manifested itself ‘in post-war British or Scandinavian society after several years of Labour government’. The severe, private and profit-driven character of pre-war
capitalism had been dismantled and replaced by 'a qualitatively different kind of society' (see Burns, 1961: 15-16; Crosland, 1956: 63). In light of the apparent metamorphosis of capitalism, he proposed a significant revision of traditional socialist means and ends — a social democratic revisionism — in which, on the basis of the changes in the economic order, he predicted continuous economic growth on a scale sufficient to produce an adequate fiscal dividend and to underpin the case for the redistributive egalitarianism at the centre of his ideological and political project (see Marquand, 1997: 11). On this basis, the particular economic arrangements became less important; it was the social management of economic growth that now mattered. Public ownership and nationalisation as almost a means in themselves were relegated in favour of the ultimate priority of redistributive social equality. The new priorities of this reformulation of democratic socialism indicated the importance of consistent and stable economic growth, the expansion and equalisation of educational opportunities and a mixed and balanced public-private industrial sector that reflected changing social trends and developments.

His political project was defined by the desire to recast socialism as an ethically driven set of political ideals devoid of some of its Marxian teleology and discourse. The core value and objective of socialism was equality, and not Labour's navel-gazing obsession with public ownership. Crosland articulated a view of the kind of equality appropriate to a modern democratic society based on a mixed economy, together with an account of the appropriate economic basis and social policies necessary to enhance this version of equality (see Plant, 1996: 165-94; Wicks, 1996a: 204-11). It was an attempt to change the conceptual balance of Labour's doctrine and programme from an economic to an ethical socialism. In this respect, 'his book came to stand for the platform of the Right within the party'. His 'willingness to confront directly the issues of public ownership and equality' 'gave an intellectual expression to the concerns and aspirations of many on the right wing of the party', and in the hands of the Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, 'Crosland's writings became an important weapon against the Bevanite Left' in the intra-party disputes of the period. His concern was to move 'from an economic to a social conception of equality' and, in the process, to negate many of the traditional socialist arguments and means of equality, which was regarded with some distrust from within the traditional left.
In the political context of the time, Crosland’s work was caricatured as a right-wing Gaitskellite manifesto (see Francis, 1997). Like the ethical socialism of Tawney before him, Crosland transcended the conventional ideological concerns and divisions of left and right (see Runciman, 1983: 8-9). Although simply labelled a ‘revisionist’ (not always a expression of endeannent in Labour Party terms), Crosland offered a vision of democratic socialism that many consider well to the ‘left’ of the present Labour government. Although the basis of his social and economic analysis broke to some extent with Labour’s established means, Crosland’s evaluation largely ‘pursued traditional socialist lines: both inequality and class feature strongly’. Although a champion of some degree of redistributive equality of outcome, his critique of sacred means to that end angered traditionalists ‘even when his ideas were radical in their policy implications (his approach to education policy, for example), or when they expressed concerns which were shared by the Left’. Crosland did not possess and did not claim ‘a monopoly on the idea of equality in Labour’s ideological debate. Many on the Left, including Bevan, also put equality at centre stage’. Crosland could also ‘become impatient with the Right because of its cautious approach to implementing the policy recommendations of The Future of Socialism’, and he failed to wholeheartedly support Gaitskell’s attempt in 1959 to replace Clause IV of the Labour Party constitution, a touchstone of the ideological divisions and conflict between left and right, although this response can perhaps be traced to his consistent concern (as in the case of his later ambivalence towards the issue of European membership that resulted in the antagonism and final split with the Jenkinsite group) that ‘the serious risk to the unity of the party outweighed the possible benefits of rewriting its objectives’ (Wicks, 1996a: 205, 208, 211-12).

Crosland intended a thoroughgoing transformative equality that sought to overthrow traditional patterns of status, privilege and wealth in British society. To view him as simply ‘on the right’ or as a ‘revisionist’ conceals more than it reveals of his fundamental ideological character. It was his clear egalitarian philosophy and vision of socialism that was to distinguish him from less explicitly egalitarian colleagues on the erstwhile Gaitskellite ‘revisionist’ Labour right who were brought together as much by the force of
Gaitskell's charismatic and messianic personality and leadership (Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/0; also see Abse, 1973), and the promise of Labour government after thirteen 'wasted years' in opposition between 1951-64, as much as by a shared egalitarian fundamentalism. As the events of the 1970s appeared to undermine core facets of Crosland's egalitarian philosophy, a significant school of thought within Labour's revisionist tradition were already moving away from (if they had ever fully accepted) the elemental ideological glue of Crosland's egalitarian principles.

2.3.2 The Tension between Equality and Liberty in Labour Right Thought and Practice: Contradictory Perspectives and Emerging Divisions of the 'Revisionist' Parliamentary Labour Right in the 1970s

'if the pursuit of equality had always involved the restriction of certain personal freedoms, some social democrats now believed this trade-off had become especially problematic...equality 'may have gone far enough' and it was probably time to 'reassert' the 'freedom of the individual'.'

(Fielding, 2002: 71; also see Mackintosh, 1982: 189)

A further 'revisionist' theme to emerge from the New Fabian Essays, which was to have future resonance in the debates and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right over trade union reform and public expenditure in the 1970s (see Chapters Five and Six), was discussion of whether the pursuit of equality is a danger to individual liberty (see Jenkins, 1952; also see Dell, 1999: 229). The stark distinction presented (largely by emerging new right theory) between the respective notions of freedom and collectivism, particularly in relation to the trade union 'problem' of the 1970s, exposed underlying philosophical tensions and priorities within the parliamentary Labour right. Respective affiliations to the seemingly irreconcilable concepts of liberty and equality further underpinned ideological and policy differences between emerging strands of the 'revisionist' Labour right in the 1970s over the appropriate role and extent of public expenditure. Minkin (1991: 212-13) refers to the 'unresolved problem of reconciling [the] individual-focused and negative concept of freedom – absence of restraint – with trade union collectivism and the culture that sustained it' in the industrial sphere. One revisionist strand, he suggests, had 'always defined freedom in positive terms as 'something that needs to be
enlarged' rather than as simply the absence of restraint. Such a perspective could more readily appreciate the benefits to the individual of collective capacity in the face of the powers of the employers.' Thus the 'problems of these two concepts of liberty became accentuated for the Right of the Party in the 1970s as they discussed the electoral liabilities of various labour institutions'.

Ideological divisions over the relative relationship between liberty and equality in democratic socialist thought and practice had long occupied the Labour right. Jenkins (1952: 69) wrote that the 'desire for greater equality has been part of the inspiration of all socialist thinkers and of all socialist movements. The absence of this desire, indeed, provides the most useful of all exclusive definitions of socialism. Where there is no egalitarianism there is no socialism.' However, Jenkins (1952: 88-9, 90) further noted that the protection of liberty was still necessary, 'ensuring that our new society of near equals is left confronting a state machine in which power, both economic and political, is as widely diffused as possible. This is...why...the ownership of enterprises, when it passes from wealthy individuals, should go, not to the state, but to less remote public bodies'. He concludes that while it is the duty of the Labour Party to remain true to its faith, 'to be radical in the context of the moment...that demands a high degree of priority for further measures of equalisation' but, 'when the aims in this field come near to fulfilment, there will be others which will open up and provide an adequate basis of support for a reforming party which remains open-minded and undazzled by its own success'.

W. G. Runciman (1983: 1-2; also see Freeden, 1996: 464-9; Greenleaf, 1983: 452-63), in a pamphlet produced for The Tawney Society, the 'house' 'think tank' of the SDP, poses the question, 'where is the right of the left?' His answer rests on the premise that, within each of the broad categories of political principles of left and right, there can be identified 'broadly speaking, four basic ideologies...Right of Right, Left of Right, Right of Left and Left of Left'. Moreover, the fundamental difference of principle between left and right (and, to some degree between the 'Left of the Left' and the 'Right of the Left') is, he suggests, 'the difference in the relative priority assigned to the traditional ideals of liberty
and equality’: ‘for the Left of the Left, equality has unequivocal priority over liberty...for the Right of the Left, equality has priority over liberty provided that both are constrained by the ancillary value of justice.’ Runciman (1983: 5) contends that, on the egalitarian left, ‘the priority given to equality can genuinely follow from a conviction that without a restriction on the liberties of the better-off...the absolute as well as the relative position of the disadvantaged is bound to worsen’. While, on the liberal left, ‘the appeal to justice can genuinely follow from a conviction that all inequalities have to be defensible to those who are disadvantaged by them and that all institutions ought therefore to be so designed and controlled that privilege is distributed as widely as is compatible with basic individual freedom’.

This fundamental philosophical distinction underpinned the respective ideological dispositions of the parliamentary Labour right as they manifested themselves explicitly in the policy divisions of the 1970s. In a sense, it also helps to develop Crewe and King’s (1999b: 113-14) contention that it was the nature and strength of respective roots in the organisational and cultural structure of the Labour Party that help to explain the differential response of the parliamentary Labour right to the creation of a new social democratic party and the ‘considerable defector-loyalist puzzle’ contained therein. Hattersley, for example, although sympathetic with the founders of the SDP on the critical issue of European membership, remained in the Labour Party in 1981 allegedly on the grounds that ‘by his background and...path of entry into the Labour Party...[he] was very much a party machine man’ (Crewe & King, 1995b: 104; Desai, 1994: 146).

But what does that make Bill Rodgers? He remains ‘someone who believes in social justice and don’t find acceptable the social inequalities which were all around me, and growing up in the 1930s this was absolutely plain...Because I’m basically a Labour man and I joined when I was sixteen (Bill Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/02/01; Rodgers, 2000: 1-22; and see Rodgers, 1982: vi). Crewe and King’s (1995b: 104-14) framework of defection appears to acknowledge but not to fully explain this apparent paradox. In addition to his ‘emotional attachments’ to Labour Party culture and institutions, Hattersley, in a different way to the so-called ‘Gang of Four’, possessed a fundamental belief in a Croslandite analysis of the egalitarian foundations of liberty and
freedom based on a substantive equality of outcome (Hattersley, 1999, 2001, 2002). Hattersley (1987: xix) clearly outlines his fundamental ideological principles. He informs us that the ‘ethical framework which can give shape and coherence to our programme was defined for me by Tony Crosland’: socialism “is about the pursuit of equality and the protection of freedom – in the knowledge that until we are truly equal we will not be truly free.” It is that self-evident truth that Choose Freedom seeks to demonstrate’. He has latterly suggested, in his condemnation of New Labour inaction on inequality, that the belief that ‘the good society is the equal society’ offers ‘a morally and intellectually compelling theory of socialism’ (Hattersley, 1997c).

In the debate about how the government should make up the IMF package of cuts, for instance, Hattersley (1995: 173-8) admits that he was Crosland’s ‘man from the start’. The Croslandite position, among a number of others not necessarily indicative of a simple left-right division, broadly argued for the reasonable protection of public expenditure levels in the service of employment and public services. Others on the broad Labour right such as Edmund Dell, Roy Mason and Eric Varley, were part of the group, described by Hattersley as ‘the soi-disant realists, who supported Healey’s initial proposals, while even Shirley Williams, initially a part of the Croslandite camp, fell away ‘to rally to the besieged Chancellor’. Rodgers (Interview with the author 18/02/01; also see Rodgers, 2000: 291-2) invokes a critical view of both the Croslandite position and of Crosland as a political leader and strategist during the IMF negotiations. Although he generally believed that it is difficult to ‘deal with problems of social justice unless you are prepared to have levels of taxation consistent with proper levels of public expenditure’, and believed that the IMF terms were too stringent and felt unhappy with Healey’s initial proposals, Rodgers felt that Crosland’s ‘policies were not credible as the alternative’ and, after leading us ‘all up the top of a hill’, Crosland capitulated rather than fighting to the end (see Chapter Six).

For Rodgers, a general belief in the social value of appropriate levels of taxation to fund proper levels of public expenditure is qualified, particularly in the lean times of economic hardship, by the need to be ‘hard headed enough to do the sums...to recognise that in the
end we have to find a solution that the IMF found acceptable...you have to have balance’. Rodgers’ egalitarian inclinations of consistent levels of taxation and public expenditure to underpin social justice appear to have been more tempered than Hattersley’s (1997c) professed belief in ‘loyalty to the idea - the first political obligation’. In fact, it was left to Crosland himself to persuade Hattersley of the need to accept the collective decision during the IMF Cabinet debates for the political survival of both the Chancellor and Prime Minister and of the Labour government (Hattersley, 1995: 176). It may be that Hattersley was even more ‘Croslandite’ than Crosland himself. Hattersley (1995: 178-9) captures the significance of these events from his perspective: ‘After the ‘IMF Crisis’, Labour was no longer the party of public expenditure...The whole idea of public expenditure – both its social merits and its economic advantages – was suddenly challenged. Labour began to examine precepts that it had previously taken for granted. And for a political party that is only one step away from acknowledging the possibility that its long-held beliefs are wrong’. ‘Socialism is about equality and we cannot have greater equality if we cut public spending’.

The emerging division of the parliamentary ‘revisionist’ Labour right in the 1970s over the continued viability of Croslandite first generation revisionist ideas of equality proved crucial in terms of respective attitudes to key policy themes in the 1970s. Rodgers, along with others of the Jenkinsite persuasion of the parliamentary Labour right, were generally more ambivalent to Croslandite notions of equality underpinned by high levels of public expenditure, particularly as levels of economic growth receded. Rodgers, for instance, was prominent in his opposition to high public expenditure: it should be ‘dependent on achieving economic growth and rising personal living standards first’. Rodgers argued that individuals desired more control of their own lives and that this demanded greater attention to individual liberty, including lower personal taxation and a clearer role for individuals in greater industrial democracy. He argued that Labour should recognise that most individuals now placed personal consumption and individual freedoms above the pursuit of equality, an approach that indicated a departure from ‘Crosland’s commitment to equality as the central feature of Labour’s vision of the future’ (see Ellison, 1994: 199-200; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).
This theme is pursued further in the later case study chapters and in a postscript to the study. Debates over public expenditure, within the context of 'fiscal crisis' and increased trade union visibility and industrial unrest in the 1970s, rendered underlying philosophical tensions concerning ideas of equality and liberty and questions concerning the relative ideological balance and legitimacy of particular policies more explicit and contentious. The postscript then attempts to link the resistance to traditional Croslandite egalitarian themes and some of the core arguments of this emerging liberal revisionist strand of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s to the ideas and practice of New Labour (see Chapters Five, Six and Postscript). It is the purpose of the final two sections of this chapter to provide a critical appraisal of key conceptual and analytical constructions of the Labour right. The conclusion to be drawn is that they are limited by a tendency to present the parliamentary Labour right as a homogenous and cohesive loyalist unit, or simply divided between the old, authoritarian, labourist Labour right and intellectual revisionist social democrats. Moreover, these standard categories appear to exist routinely and persistently regardless of the political and policy context. It is argued that standard presentations fail to distinguish the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in particular political and policy contexts, particularly emerging ideological and political divisions within Labour’s broad ‘revisionist’ tradition in the 1970s.

2.4 What is the Labour Right? Analytical Limitations of Revisionism and Related Concepts

2.4.1 Introduction

Drucker (1981: 374-5, 388) adopts an approach analogous to many commentaries of the parliamentary Labour right. For instance, he appears to treat the Labour right as a homogeneous entity, intent in the post-war period on preserving the power and relative autonomy of the parliamentary leadership and the PLP against the constitutional and policy demands of the left. He further appears to trace an unambiguous, continuous
historical lineage between, and progression through, the Gaitskellites of the 1950s and early 1960s to the social democrats who left the Labour Party to found the SDP in 1981. Influenced retrospectively by the convenient analytical framework provided by the SDP split, there has been some contraction in the literature of the complexities of pre-1981 Labour Party revisionism and revisionists, to be formally split asunder by the formation of the SDP.

Desai (1994: 99-100, 145-6), for instance, in a major study of the intellectual revisionist tradition in the Labour Party in the post-war period, displays a tendency to conflate and generalise post-war Labour Party revisionism and revisionists as a single, homogeneous, intellectual tradition and project. Based on the implicit objective to acquire intellectual hegemony within both the Labour Party and British politics generally, Desai’s (1994: 12-29, 34-60, 99-124) theoretical framework dictates that the revisionists evolve unambiguously through the Gaitskellite revisionists of the 1950s, to the Jenkinsites of the 1970s, to those who eventually departed the Labour Party in 1981. In the process, there is a tendency to conflate some of the contextual, ideological and personal particularities, antipathies and divisions that characterised Labour Party revisionism and revisionists. For instance, Crewe and King (1995b: 105-7) suggest that there was no obvious single issue on the Labour right such as Europe that bound together even those who left the Labour Party to join the SDP: Labour’s ‘defectors were not even united in their views’. Conversely, the SDP defectors were marked by their ‘ideological disparateness’:

‘They certainly did not constitute an ideologically distinct group within the Labour right. On the issues that had divided the Labour right during the 1970s – notably Scottish and Welsh devolution and trade-union reform – the twenty-eight were as divided as everyone else. Most... were in favour of or indifferent to the Callaghan government’s devolution proposals; but [some]... were leading figures... in the main rebellions against the legislation... The divisions on the issue of trade-union reform were just as great, as events inside the SDP were to show.’
2.4.2 Misreading Labour Party Revisionism?

Even the promotion of a rigid analytical framework such as Desai’s, as an aid to organisation, explanation and understanding of complex political subjects, relationships and motivations, must allow for some change in the influence of relative socio-economic and political contexts, and the disorderliness of individual psychology, perceptions and preferences. Based on Gramscian notions of ‘traditional’ intellectuals and the struggle for ideological hegemony, Desai’s argument suggests that the relationship between the Labour Party and the tradition of ‘revisionist or social democratic intellectuals’ endured a long historical trajectory that broke down in the 1970s, so much so that the formation of the SDP anticipated not so much the broken mould of British politics as ‘the terminal manifestation of a particular intellectual project, rooted in the Labour Party’, the culmination of the failure of the long-term revisionist project and an attempt to preserve their intellectual influence at the centre of British politics (Desai, 1994: 1, 3-5, 7-8).

Throughout the study the ‘‘revisionist’ social democrats’ are distinguished and characterised as a single, continuous intellectual tradition, and the ‘social democrats’ departure from the Labour Party in 1981 marked the close of a longer trajectory traced by the post-war - ‘revisionist’ – generation of intellectuals in the Labour Party’.

Brivati (1996b: 110-12) identifies further problems with Desai’s approach and methodology, specifically with the empirical base adopted for the study. Firstly, the concept and role of intellectuals in the history of the Labour Party are not always so easily identifiable, often changing, defying neat categories and failing to fit neatly with theorising. For example, Dick Crossman (partly recognised by the author) certainly encompassed an intellectual and even revisionist role in the Labour Party but was not formally part of the Gaitskellite revisionist coterie. Instead, Crossman retained a roving role within the changing party groupings and was not attached to a particular policy position: in fact, Crossman typifies ‘the role of intellectuals within the Labour Party much better than…Gaitskell, Crosland or Jenkins – who all behaved as apparatchiks as much as intellectuals. Moreover, he proposes that the ‘close-knit groups around Gaitskell in the 1950s and Jenkins in the 1960s and 1970s differed in ideology, personnel, purpose
and relationship to the Labour Party’ and ‘the same people played different roles through
time’. To meet the theoretical imperatives of the study, Desai presents Labour’s post-war
‘revisionist’ tradition as a single, homogeneous, unambiguous and constant project intent
on establishing intellectual hegemony within the party and British politics. Consequently,
it exaggerates the neatness and continuities of anything as complex and untidy as the
post-war Labour Party, and minimises the complexity and divisions of Labour’s so-called
intellectual revisionist tradition in changing political and policy contexts. As Brivati
(1996b: 10-11) suggests, ‘there were groups of intellectuals with different political
allegiances and…groups on the same ‘wing’ of the party changed through time’.

Although (or perhaps because) it is the ‘most influential perspective concerning social
democracy in the UK since the second world war’ and, during the 1950s, ‘became
established as the basis of Labour’s social democracy’ (Wickham-Jones, 1996: 14, 34-5),
‘the Revisionist approach’, is often presented as a single, cohesive intellectual and
political socialist tradition, doctrine and strategy. However, as David Lipsey (1999: 14-
15; Interview with the author, 17/1/01) cautions, it is important ‘to be clear what this
means’: ‘revisionists revise’ and revisionism, as a relative and historically contextual
expression of Labour Party thought, comes in a variety of guises, shapes and sizes:
‘Revisionism was not and is not a body of doctrine. It was not what…Bernstein [or, for
that matter, Crosland] thought. Revisionism was and is a cast of mind…that says: here is
the world, here are the most important facts about it, here are the values we bring to bear
on the facts, here are our conclusions…[Crosland himself] was always looking to see
who would be writing the new Future of Socialism for a changing world’.

The ‘classic’ revisionism of the mid-1950s, not without its own ‘internal differences of
opinion’ (see Ellison, 1994: 73ff), is described by Coates (1983: 10-11) as a ‘complex of
ideas associated with this grouping’ of ‘self-styled ‘revisionist’ thinkers’ ranging from
‘the ‘ethical’ revisionism of Allan Flanders’ (and the Socialist Union) to ‘the

16 Lipsey (Interview with the author, 17/1/01), former political adviser and confidant to Crosland, explains
that he would consider himself ‘post-Croslandite’; that ‘it is a terrible mistake to adhere to a set of policies
and views that applied when…Crosland died in 1977 and say…those apply wholesale…part of my quarrel
with Roy Hattersley was that Roy…identified himself with a certain period and he refuses to revise his
revisionism’.
sociological’ current of... Crosland’, with Rita Hinden’s Socialist Commentary offering some sort of intellectual bridge to the different ‘social democratic networks’ (also see Black, 2001: 43; Wickham-Jones, 1996: 14-15, 226 fn. 7). Ellison (1994: 73-4) suggests that Labour’s thirteen ‘wasted’ years of opposition between 1951 and 1964 witnessed ‘the early signs of a future division within Keynesian socialism which was later to prove extremely damaging’. Many of the so-called revisionist intellectuals around Gaitskell, such as Jay and Jenkins, ‘developed an increasingly liberal bias, stressing individual freedom, a predominantly free market economy and a broad equality of opportunity... Crosland developed rather different ideas’. In contrast to a seemingly turbulent and incoherent Labour left in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the group around Gaitskell united in the ‘conviction that ‘equality’ should be regarded as the centerpiece of socialism.’ In practice, however, embryonic divisions were discernible in education policy and approach to industrial relations, stemming from Crosland’s ‘understanding of the egalitarian future that stressed the subjective aspects of social equality as much – indeed more – than the ‘objective’ redistribution of material resources’. Hence, by the early 1970s, ‘personal and policy disagreements, and the obvious difference of vision in which they were rooted, had developed to the point where Keynesian socialism terminally divided between a Croslandite and ‘Jenkinsite’ or liberal Keynesian variant’.

Labour Party revisionism has incorporated diverse, historically specific varieties of revisionist thought, ideas and strategies ranging, chronologically, from Bernstein, Tawney, Jay, Durbin, Crosland (see Beech, 2002), through to the neo-revisionism of those such as Hattersley, Radice, Bryan Gould and Austin Mitchell (see Fielding, 2002: 70-73; Thompson, 1995: 251-66), and even the Blairite, Third Way development of New Labour. It refers to a general process of re-thinking the contemporary character and applicability of socialist/social democratic ideology and practice that integrates different, contextual forms, ideas, strategies and prescriptions, rather than a single, homogeneous, unbroken revisionist ideology. Beech (2002) argues that Labour Party revisionism is a historically dependent process of (re)emphasis and modernisation, as opposed to a broader ideological approach in itself (also see Radice, 1988: 406-7). It is a tradition only insofar as it possesses a history that is a continuous reflection or representation of specific
practices: the practices of scrutiny of means, the wider analysis of contemporary perspectives and policies and a certain radicalism in the willingness to embrace change constitute a guaranteed process; within the context of the Labour Party, and in broader political terms, revisionism represents not a homogeneous ideological tradition or project but rather a historically informed political task or process. In short, revisionism does not possess a set of core principles but is, rather, a practical means of accommodating change.

Even Crosland’s influential revisionism, based on an apparently uncritical advocacy of public expenditure in pursuit of his central objectives of greater equality, contained limits to its analysis and became subject to the need for further reassessment in the economic climate of the 1970s. Behind the emerging ‘revisionist’ divisions of the 1970s lay a critique of public expenditure that ‘sees as a central feature of a new socialism an opposition to bureaucracies, and a greater emphasis on individual liberty, deregulation, a smaller scale for industrial production and an increase generally in self-management. On Labour’s Right, Evan Luard calls his book Socialism without the State, Giles Radice writes on Community Socialism, and David Marquand wants a ‘libertarian, decentralist social democracy’. In this sense, the revisionist approach analyses ‘what is actually happening as opposed to a particular dogma says ought to happen or what one would like to happen...subjecting values and methods to scrutiny and, if necessary, being prepared to modify these in the light of changing conditions...revisionism is a radical cast of mind, a critical way of evaluating known affairs and politics, in order to develop strategies and policies which take account of change’ (Lipsey, 1981: 35; also see Radice, 1988: 407; 1989: 1-15; 2002: 332-3). Within Labour’s ‘tradition of socialism, ‘revisionism’ has been defined largely [and simply] by views of a particular socialist method (nationalization) and a broader economic perception (the belief in a reformed capitalism)’ (see Dunleavy, 1993; Jones, 1996). However, the term ‘is itself problematic, a short-hand for a clutch of sometimes disparate approaches’ (Brooke, 1996: 29, 52). Given Labour’s later ideological and political conflicts of the 1970s, and debates over the meaning of Labour’s modernisation process and the emergence of New Labour thereafter, its analytical value
depends on 'remembering the historical disjunctures and complexities of that very tradition' (Brooke, 1996: 52).

2.5 What is the Labour Right? Models and Typologies of the Parliamentary Labour Right

2.5.1 Introduction

Further attempts to analyse and classify the parliamentary Labour right can be located in terms of variations on three broad themes. Examples of the three broad schemes of analysis are presented in tabular form below. Firstly, in spite of Labour's 'broad church' of theoretical and ideological influences, there are those who emphasise a fundamental left-right dichotomy and, occasionally, a nebulous, non-aligned centre motivated, in Haseler's (1969: 9-10) summary, mainly by the desire 'to hold the ring and reconcile the warring factions' in the cause of party unity. As noted, this scheme of classification has often been framed crudely in terms of divergent attitudes to the role of public ownership (see Jones, 1996: vii, 2; also see Garnett, 1996: 11-16) (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Fundamental Left-Right Distinction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Derivation</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>Behaviour/Policy - Party Factionalism</td>
<td>Original/Contemporary</td>
<td>Characterise Policy Importance of Intra-Party Alignments and Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1964)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>History</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brand</td>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>Behaviour - Party Factionalism</td>
<td>Contemporary History</td>
<td>Categorise Intra-Party Factions</td>
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<td>(1989)</td>
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<td>(1965)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>Fundamentalists-Revisionists</td>
<td>Behaviour – Ideological/Policy Divisions (Symbolic Status of Public Ownership)</td>
<td>Contemporary History</td>
<td>Chart Revisionist Ideological Position (from Gaitskell to Blair) in Debate Over Public Ownership in the Post-war Labour Party</td>
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<td>(1996)</td>
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Secondly, more focused studies of the Labour right, often from different perspectives and often as an addendum to the fundamental left-right dimension in relation to ‘the debate on nationalization’ (Miliband, 1972 [1961]: 332-3), or Labour’s different constituent ‘doctrinal positions’ on the nature of socialism (Drucker, 1979: 44-9), adopt a rudimentary distinction between variations of the intellectual, revisionist right and unintellectual, pragmatic, Labourist centre-right. Beer (1965: 236-9), for instance, adopts the ‘revisionist’-‘fundamentalist’ distinction to distinguish respective differences of ideology, programme and principle on the familiar territory of conflict over economic theory and the question of public ownership. He suggests that ‘far from being merely a set of ad hoc responses to governmental and electoral problems [revisionism] consisted of a body of doctrine – fairly coherent doctrine – and that these ideas challenged many of the fundamentals of Labour’s old orthodoxies. Each faction of the party...had an ideology and each sought to commit Labour to its ideological position’. Drucker (1979: 44-6) interprets the different ‘doctrinal positions’ that have developed in the Labour Party since the Attlee government’s ‘loss of heart in the winter of 1947-8’ as: the ‘fartherest-
left position' that holds 'that socialism is about nationalisation'; Morrisonian 'consolidationism', introduced in 1950-51 but 'now occupied by much of the Tribune Group', that 'urges the careful protection of gains already made with...limited further takeovers'; the 'revisionist definition of socialism' based on Crosland's 'egalitarian doctrine' that holds that 'socialism [is] about equality'. This 'doctrinal position' has been 'known variously [almost interchangeably] as revisionism, social democracy and democratic socialism'. It was based around 'the Gaitskellites', such as Jay, Jenkins, Mackintosh and Gaitskell himself amongst others. The final, incomplete or imperceptible 'doctrinal position' was the 'corporate socialism' 'taken up by the Labour government elected in 1974'. It was a product of a series of ad hoc policies perceived to be in the contemporary national interest as defined by agreement of the TUC leadership and the Labour Cabinet. If it were to be expressed in vaguely 'doctrinal' terms, it would constitute 'a form of extreme pragmatism'. According to this interpretation, the parliamentary Labour right during the 1970s would conventionally be located in the latter two broad 'doctrinal positions' (also see Beer, 1965: 236-9; Desai, 1994: 8-9; Haseler, 1969; Jupp, 1981: 254; McKee, 1988, 1991).

Again, such distinctions imply the existence and progress of homogeneous, perpetual ideological (or doctrinal) blocs or factions that cohere around a single theme or issue. They often appear not to account for 'internal' anomalies or complexity contingent on particular contexts or circumstances. Not only does the schema identify the parliamentary Labour right with a specific revisionist tradition, it appears as if members of the non-revisionist Labour right are lumped together in the 'fundamentalist' camp, and it says little about the internal diversity and inconsistencies of 'revisionism' (or, for that matter, 'fundamentalism'). Moreover, this rudimentary distinction has been consolidated, against the backdrop of the 1981 SDP split, by the temptation to adopt a 'loyalist and secessionist' framework (see Jones, 1996: 111-12). In the immediate context of 'the crisis in the British Labour Party' and the SDP split, Jupp (1981: 253-6), for instance, has adopted a distinction between 'the Fabian intellectual Right'/revolutionist Right', as an intellectual tradition that inspired the 'ideological formation' of 'the Right' in its earliest years and provided 'the agency for bringing together several of the new social-
democrats’, and ‘the machine-union Right’, to explain the crucial ‘ideological rather than organisational’ factor in ‘the Labour Party dispute’ and subsequent split (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Labour Right Traditions: Revisionist-Labourist/Intellectual-Pragmatic, Loyalist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Derivation</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haseler</td>
<td>Intellectual Gaitskellite Revisionists – Non-intellectual Loyalist</td>
<td>Behaviour - Ideological/Organisational Divisions and Weakness</td>
<td>Contemporary History/Politics</td>
<td>Analysis of Gaitskellite Revisionists and Role of Labour Right in Labour’s ‘Crises’ of 1970s</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trade Union Right</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marquand</td>
<td>Behaviour - Ideological/Organisational Divisions and Weakness</td>
<td>Contemporary History/Politics/Participant Observation</td>
<td>Explanation of Divisions and Crisis in the Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual Radical Social Democrats – Pragmatic Trade Union Right</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drucker</td>
<td>Ideology – Labour Party/Socialist Doctrine</td>
<td>Contemporary History/Politics</td>
<td>Labour’s Different ‘Doctrinal Positions’ in Relation to the Interpretation and Nature of Socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fabian Intellectual Right/Revisionist Right – Machine-Union Right</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Desai (1994)</td>
<td>Ideological/ Organisational Behaviour</td>
<td>Original (Theoretical)/Contemporary History</td>
<td>Analysis and Trajectory of British Political/Labour Intellectual Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellectual Revisionist Social Democrats – Non-intellectual Trade Union Right</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revisionists – Consolidators – Populists (Extra-Parliamentary)</td>
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Thirdly, there has been some attempt, characterised by recognition of recurrent, systematic intra-party segmental competition and conflict that often transcends orthodox
party lines (see Ellison, 1994; Warde, 1982), or by an exploration of the variety of intellectual ideas and traditions underlying the politics of the parliamentary Labour right (see Daly, 1992), to offer wider analysis of Labour’s broad social democratic tradition and representation (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Intra-Party ‘Social Tendencies’ and Intellectual Traditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Derivation</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middlemas (1990)</td>
<td>Fabian Statist – European Social-Democratic – Trades Union-Labourist</td>
<td>Ideology – Location Within Labour’s Historical Traditions</td>
<td>Contemporary History</td>
<td>Political History of Post-war Consensus and British Economic Decline</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5.2 ‘Revisionists’ and ‘Consolidators’

Jupp (1981: 254-6), occasioned by the event of the SDP split, encapsulates the orthodoxy and problems of defining the Labour right: ‘[u]ntil the 1970s the term ‘Right’ was simply
used in the labour movement to denote the established leadership of that movement and its policies. However, this is no longer good enough, although some on the extreme Left cannot shrug off old habits. For over sixty years ‘Right’ has meant those who wish to move slowly, if at all, towards a socialist society in which the major part of the economy will be collectively owned, while ‘Left’ has meant those who wish to move quickly in that direction. Otherwise, the Labour right has taken two forms: ‘the machine-union Right’ and ‘the Fabian intellectual Right’. Historically, both have shared support for parliamentary democracy, belief in limited nationalisation and opposition to forms of revolutionary socialism and communism. The ‘machine-union Right’ ‘was sustained throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s by union leaders like Bevin, Citrine...and by party organisers like Morrison and Morgan Phillips’. The ‘Right controlled the party at all crucial points and had little need of intellectual justification. Almost the only attempt to elaborate a gradualist position after MacDonald’s defection in 1931 was made by Evan Durbin who died in 1948, having influenced Hugh Gaitskell...More important influences came from outside the party, particularly from Keynes and Beveridge’. By the 1950s the Labour right could be identified by its support for the policies of the Attlee government, particularly Bevin’s foreign policy and Morrison’s public corporation method of nationalisation. In short, it ‘was anti-Soviet, favoured German rearmament, wanted to limit nationalisation and to ‘consolidate’ the achievements of the Attlee government’. In industrial relations ‘it favoured close relations with government’ and, for the most part, opposed industrial action. However, Gaitskell, as the new party leader, desired to reinvigorate the intellectual and ideological case of the Labour right (perhaps in competition with an increasingly ideological Labour left) that can be seen to have precipitated a clearer ideological distinction on the Labour right: Gaitskell ‘felt it necessary to redefine the party’s ideology and purpose. In so doing he elaborated a specifically ‘Right’ ideology which has served those calling themselves social-democrats ever since. Nearly all the present-day defectors are those who followed Gaitskell in this exercise between 1955 and 1963’ (Jupp, 1981: 254).

Similarly, McKee (1988: 8-23, also see 1991) has provided a typology of the variations and divisions of the Labour right as they emerged and were made explicit during the
latter years of the 1974-79 Labour administrations. In essence, McKee develops a variation of the standard model of basic Labour right dimensions, particularly as a retrospective of the divisions and secessionist discourse of the late 1970s. He identifies two distinct tendencies and variations of social democracy on the right of the PLP: ‘revisionists’ and ‘consolidators’.

a. ‘Revisionists’

Revisionism, he suggests, was largely an inheritance from the late Tony Crosland. As noted, it was Crosland’s central socio-economic analysis and prescriptions that provided the core of the ‘new’ revisionist thinking. However, it was perhaps the association with Gaitskell, as leader of the PLP, which provided ‘revisionist’ theory in the Labour Party with an overtly personal and political tone, expression and prominence (see Dell, 1999: 237). In spite of this leadership endorsement and support, it failed to attain a consensus within the broad Labour right coalition (see Haseler, 1969: Chs. 7-11). In the wake of Gaitskell’s premature death in 1963, the influence of intellectual and political revisionism appeared to recede in the Labour Party (although some of its themes were evident in the Wilson administrations) and, by 1974, appeared to be a minority concern of only the increasingly marginalised Jenkinsite group (McKee, 1988: 12-13).

As noted, the case of European membership betrays the idea of a homogeneous, hegemonic revisionism. It reflected a range of opinion from the outright support of those such as Jenkins, Rodgers, Marquand and Shirley Williams to the studied or pragmatic ambivalence of those such as Crosland and Healey, to the outright opposition of those such as Douglas Jay, Peter Shore and Gaitskell himself. The ‘place of the European conflict in the internal politics of the Labour Party was not straightforward. It did not fit into the left-right divide as this had expressed itself since 1951 in the differing views of the best way for Britain to maintain her global leadership role, or over the defence issue at the Party Conferences of 1960 and 1961, or over the future of public ownership and Clause 4

in the aftermath of the 1959 general election', and it resulted in a significant division between pro- and anti-Common Market revisionists (see Brivati, 1996: 405-7, 412-13; also see Haseler, 1969: 228; LPACR 1962: 155). This was to hold important consequences for the longer-term unity and efficacy of so-called revisionist social democracy, which was to reveal critical limitations by the mid-1970s. The fervent pro-Europeanism of the Jenkinsite group was to seemingly eclipse the traditional party loyalty of the Labour right. Evidence of this development can be seen in the House of Commons vote on the principle of British entry into the Common Market when Jenkins led 69 pro-EEC rebels into the Conservative government division lobby, followed swiftly in 1972 by his resignation as deputy leader of the Labour Party when Wilson agreed a compromise between the pro- and anti-European factions to hold a referendum on the terms of entry agreed by the Heath government. During the 1975 referendum, the cross-party, pro-European platform of Jenkins and his supporters was pursued in opposition to official Labour Party and TUC, although not necessarily government, policy (McKee, 1988: 13; Robbins, 1979: Chs. 5-7; also see Chapter Four).

The trade union question presented a further problematic and divisive issue for the 'revisionist' Labour right. Very generally, 'revisionists' were cautiously opposed to the trade union role and power in the Labour Party. As early as 1959 Douglas Jay had recommended a partial separation along the lines of the German SPD, a proposal that was rejected by Gaitskell, although antipathy to trade union corporatism and dependence on the TUC remained (see Haseler, 1969: Chs. 7-8). The libertarian emphasis of some of Labour's 'revisionists' balked at restrictive practices such as the closed shop, strike calls without ballots and the violence of some picket lines. They were also uneasy about the legal immunity of trade unions, and what they perceived to be the restrictions and conditions placed on the parliamentary party and on successive Labour governments by the nature of the relationship.

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18 There is also evidence of much earlier signs of dissent from Jenkins to official Labour Party policy in relation to membership of the EEC. While Gaitskell was still leader of the Labour Party, after Macmillan's launched Britain's bid to join the EEC in July 1961, Jenkins resigned from the Labour front bench in response to 'the conditions which Harold Wilson laid down in the House of Commons as being essential to the Labour Party's acceptance of EEC membership' (Brivati, 1996: 404).
The issue of parliamentary sovereignty was an important one in this respect, and the pro-European revisionist strain remained bitter at memories of TUC attempts at obstruction of British accession to the Common Market (McKee, 1988: 14). Moreover, the 1970s generally, with memories of the failure of ‘In Place of Strife’ still fresh, were a particularly problematic period in the relationship between the trade union movement and the Labour Party and government in the face of the acute economic issues of the day, problems of incomes policies and the so-called ‘social contract’ between the Labour government and the trade unions. Marquand (1975) noted that ‘it is the unions that will determine the party’s fate, not the Tribune group; and the facts of economic life, as well as the pressures...are now pushing the Government and the Unions closer together, not further apart’. Peter Jenkins (1975) further captures the essence of the liberal revisionist resentment: ‘the gut position of the Unions is that they expect the Labour Party – which they view sentimentally, and historically correctly, as well as sometimes arrogantly – as their party, to assist in, or, at very least, refrain from in any way obstructing the practice of trade unionism. That concern, which includes crucially the general economic conditions in which collective bargaining is conducted, far outweighs any other concern with the Labour Party’s pursuit of its formally socialist objectives, which include equality’ (see Chapter Five).

b. ‘Consolidators’

McKee (1988: 16-18, also see 1991) identifies a further tendency of the parliamentary Labour right, the ‘consolidators’. He suggests that consolidators were less cohesive than revisionists, lacked the intellectual and theoretical foundations of revisionism and lacked a firm organisational basis, ‘but possessed enough stable characteristics to merit separate recognition. Differences between both Tendencies centred on policy priorities and campaigning tactics’. In spite of (or because of) its intellectual heritage and contribution to socialist theory, revisionism had, in a sense, proved to be a divisive force in the politics of the Labour Party. Earlier Gaitskellite and revisionist concerns over the doctrinal status of public ownership in the Labour Party, nationalisation and unilateralist policies transmuted into disputes over trade union reform and European membership during the
leadership of Wilson. There was common policy ground but others on the parliamentary Labour right such as Callaghan, Healey and even Crosland developed a studied caution of the Jenkinsite group.

Labour’s tendency of social democratic consolidators was significant as much for its variety of personnel as strategy. Parliamentary representatives of this tendency included a broad spectrum of experience and opinion on the Labour right, ranging from Callaghan, Healey, Hattersley, Eric Varley, Fred Mulley and John Golding, ‘leader of the party’s trades union right wing’ (Farrelly, 2001: 214) and, more recently, the likes of Gerald Kaufman and Austin Mitchell. Even ‘Crosland drifted towards this camp after tactically deserting Jenkins around 1972’, and Labour right and centre-right trade union leaders ‘all proved firm advocates’, among whom there was solid ‘hostility towards the Left, but also a will for keeping Jenkins at arms length’.

Key consolidator themes included a broad preference for constitutionalism and antagonism towards Marxist and other rigid, doctrinaire political philosophy, and a ‘marked distaste’ of factionalism, both of the left-wing and revisionist variety. The issue of Europe had failed to provoke the enthusiasm of so-called consolidators while, on issues of defence, there was more agreement between the two groups. In the absence of an overt and innovative ideological position, consolidators relied upon ‘other, less sophisticated, identities. They were essentially Labour loyalists, orthodox and moderate, working class in personnel and character... Their primary concerns have been Labour unity, halting the Left, winning elections, and consolidating Labour in public office...

Accordingly, though Revisionism and Consolidationism occupied much common ground, nevertheless their accents, styles and priorities differed. So too did their ultimate destinations’ (McKee, 1988: 18).

19 McKee (1988: 17) suggests that the revisionist lobby of centre-right trade unions met with little success; only a very small contingent from APEX and EETPU ‘flirted with Revisionism’, largely in the form of the extra-parliamentary Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV) and, at the party grassroots level, ‘where Europeanism was weakest and unilateralism strongest, it followed that Revisionism made little headway.’
Issues of contention between ‘revisionists’ and ‘consolidators’ included the apparent ‘Euro-zeal’, social elitism and suspect party loyalties of some revisionist social democrats (McKee, 1988: 16-17). However, given the apparent (ideological and political) diversity of the so-called consolidators of the parliamentary Labour right, questions arise about its value as an analytical category. For instance, a number of so-called consolidators cut their ideological and political teeth as prominent erstwhile revisionists. The problem of EEC membership may have been a sticking point between so-called revisionists and consolidators. For the consolidators, the issue of Europe was not top of the political agenda of the Labour right but, as Crewe & King (1995b: 106-14) note, and something that much of the literature seems to underplay, European membership did not offer an unambiguous reflection of divisions between revisionists and consolidators on the parliamentary Labour right. Hattersley, for instance, who is considered by McKee (1988: 16) to be a significant representative of the consolidator tendency of the parliamentary Labour right in the late 1970s was, barely a few years earlier, a committed European rebel as one of the 69 pro-European dissenters of October 1971, although he did not leave the Labour Party to join the SDP in 1981. Although his future remained to fight in a defeated and divided Labour Party in 1981, as a self-professed, unreconstructed Croslandite egalitarian (Hattersley, 2002), Hattersley could not be considered to be a ‘consolidator’ in the Morrisonian or, even, the Callaghanite sense. Crosland himself, although he was to perhaps develop a less ideological, more pragmatic stance as a politician and minister in the context of the debates and divisions of the 1970s (see Marquand, 1991: 167, 170, 173-4, 176-7), uneasily straddles the conventional distinction between the ‘revisionists’ and ‘consolidators’ of the parliamentary Labour right.

The diversity and divisions of both so-called ‘revisionists’ and ‘consolidators’ are retrospectively compressed in the context of the SDP split. Beyond a general appeal to party loyalty and unity which, often retrospectively, distinguishes them from ‘revisionists’ or, at least, Jenkinesite revisionists, ‘consolidators’ are, themselves, a coalition of ideological and political traditions and perspectives on the parliamentary Labour right. McKee (1988: 12-23, 1991: 25) appears to equate and reduce the revisionist tradition in the Labour Party from the 1950s onwards to a small and increasingly
marginalised coterie around Roy Jenkins in the 1970s (also see Desai, 1994). Significant erstwhile revisionists such as Crosland, and even Hattersley and Healey, are lumped together with the more traditional so-called consolidators such as Callaghan, Varley and Mulley. A significant element of the revisionist strain in the post-war Labour Party, those such as Hattersley, Radice and even Healey remained or, in Crosland's case, would have remained in the Labour Party had they lived to fight the internal battles after 1981 (Marquand, 1991: 170, 177-8; Radice, 2002: 329).

Although McKee (1988: 19-22, 49-89, also see 1991) identifies a further tendency of 'populists' largely on the extra-parliamentary Labour right during the 1970s, consisting 'largely of disaffected Labour Councillors and constituency activists (no MPs), hoping for a social democratic realignment even before the Jenkins Dimbleby lecture', and in the organisational form of Stephen Haseler's Social Democratic Alliance,²⁰ the classifications of 'Revisionist' and 'Consolidator' (as a 'model' of 'complex divisions...on the Labour right') appear to be broadly representative of the orthodox basic dimensions and distinctions on the parliamentary Labour right, particularly as the basis for some sort of retrospective explanation of the SDP secession from the Labour Party in 1981. As noted, the idea of a homogeneous revisionist project is problematic and, as further noted, a straightforward, undiluted distinction between 'revisionists' and 'consolidators' is not fully supported by, and does not adequately explain, Labour's so-called 'defector-loyalist puzzle' (see Crewe & King, 1995a: 61-83; 1995b: 104-16; also see Marquand, 1991: 170, 177-8). What is clear, however, is that the explicit manifestation of the different currents of the parliamentary Labour right during the 1970s indicated not only its inherent complexity and divisions, but also the decline and crisis of revisionist social democracy.

²⁰ The 'populist' tendency on the Labour right, McKee (1988: 22; also see Haseler, 1980) suggests, had little social affinity with the core personnel and themes of revisionism: most 'populists' 'were not Oxbridge educated, many lived outside London, and nearly all felt alienated by Revisionist elitism. Europe was far less important than defence and the rule of law. Also the humanist libertarianism of middle class Revisionists was unappealing to the more working class, provincial character of many populists.' In light of what appeared to be an evident 'anti-British stream in Labour Party politics' in the 1970s, the absence of 'the patriotic constitutionalism of earlier Attlee and Gaitskell eras' and the over-riding concern of the revisionists 'with Europe and their own Westminster power base', the raison d'être of the populists was to re-invoke 'anti-Communist, patriotic sentiment from a bygone era'.
2.5.3 Intra-party ‘Social Tendencies’ and Competition

A number of studies of particular aspects of Labour Party history and/or politics consciously attempt to avoid a reductionist, acontextual account and typology of traditions and dispositions as a framework of analysis. Warde (1982: 9-24), for instance, in his attempt to chronicle the main currents of Labour’s ideology and the development of Labour’s strategy in the post-war Labour Party, identifies a typology or ‘construction of pure types of strategic orientation, defined by the anticipated consequences for a social structure of implementing a concrete programme’ (Warde, 1982: 21). These intra-party ‘segments’ and ‘strategies’ he defines as ‘Social Reformism’, ‘Fundamentalism’ and ‘Technocratic-Collectivism’. ‘Social Reformism’, as the ‘architecture’ of the post-war consensus, consisted primarily of ‘the New Thinkers’, the ‘Gaitskellite’ or ‘Revisionists’ who, ‘instead of reviving socialism, substituted a quite distinct tradition of political thought – New Liberalism’ (Warde, 1982: 43-5, and see 125-40 for the demise of this ambiguous ideology and tradition in the period 1970-78). Socialist ‘Fundamentalism’, as noted, has been presented largely as the antithesis of, and subordinate to, ‘Social Reform’ in this period (Warde, 1982: 75-7; also see Coates, 1975: 177-217). ‘Technocratic-Collectivism’ is described as largely a temporary expedient of the time, as a product of those who frequently ‘seek to procure a compromise between various segments in the Party’: ‘fewer identifiable individuals were associated with its emergence, compared with Social Reformism or Fundamentalism; Wilson, Shore, Benn, and the personnel of the Labour Research Department seem to have been its principal exponents… it has been deemed either an opportunistic pragmatism, or a ‘centrist’ tactic aimed at establishing unity’. Moreover, ‘Technocratic-Collectivism never developed the kind of ideological coherence of Social Reformism. It was a hybrid combination of various themes, which bore some relationship to classical Fabianism, but which drew on several traditions of thought within the Labour heritage’ (Warde, 1982: 94-5, 211). It is Warde’s general contention that ‘intra-party conflict can best be understood in terms of competing strategies, where strategy is more than ideology and where segments, as bearers of strategy, are not reducible simply to organized groups with boundaries identifiable
through the conscious appropriation of a group identity’. Thus to ‘understand the cleavages and the trajectory of the Party its members must be seen as collective bearers of social interests within a complex social system which is a severe constraint on both consciousness and action’ (Warde, 1982: 24).

However, implicit in such a model is the denial of the relative or absolute autonomy of the political sphere and, like much other work on the Labour Party, there is a willingness to interpret ‘pre-packaged texts as representative of ideologies and groups, which, lacking any corporeal reality, simply rise and fall in accordance with the appropriateness of their respective response to impersonal social forces rather than actually engage each other or the Conservative opposition’ (see Bale, 1999b: 4-5). As Bourdieu (1991: 184) notes at a more general theoretical level, political parties, ‘like tendencies within these parties, have only a relational existence and it would be futile to try to define what they are and what they profess independently of what their competitors in the same field are and profess’. Moreover, Warde’s typology of pure types only partially manages to complexify what he frustratingly describes as ‘the hoary imagery of a left-right continuum’ that underpins interpretations of Labour’s ideological diversity. His types appear to equate to the conventional, static post-war Labour Party genres of revisionism, ‘Old Left’ fundamentalism and the supposed compromise between the two of centre-left technocratic ‘modern socialism’ or ‘Wilsonism’ (Warde, 1982: 3; also see Ellison, 1994: ix, xii, 52ff; Favretto, 2000: 54-5;).

Ellison (1994: ix-xiii) shares Warde’s concern to understand and explain Labour’s inevitable and recurrent experience of systematic intra-party competition and conflict, this time through the prism of disagreement about its central organizing principle’, ‘the nature of equality and the egalitarian socialist society’. Ellison’s (1994: ix-x) core argument is that Labour’s internal debates took place around three roughly defined visions of the egalitarian future. In a similar approach to Warde, these are broadly defined as ‘technocratic’, ‘Keynesian socialist’ and ‘qualitative’. The ‘strands of thought are referred to as ‘visions’ because each offered not so much a fully worked-out doctrine than a hope for the future which employed different understandings of equality to develop and
sustain particular policy preferences'. Again, if we are allowed to lend these broad
categories a personal flavour, they correspond broadly with 'Wilsonian', 'Croslandite'
and 'Footite' conceptions of equality. However, unlike Warde (also see Foote, 1997),
Ellison sees little of the chronological progress of Labour Party doctrine. Rather he
suggests that the 'visions' were intimately and continually involved in debates about
policy and principle and the fact that if one or other enjoyed temporary dominance this
did not eclipse its competitors (also see Bale, 1999b: 5). Ellison (1994: x, 73-4, 187-200)
further acknowledges the broad bifurcation of Keynesian socialism into 'liberal' and
'socialist' strands, 'the first signs of which emerged in the 1950s, though the major split
occurred in the early 1970s'. At different times, each of the 'visions' divided, 'producing
an additional or alternative understanding of equality from within the original'. However,
both Warde and Ellison to some extent locate the parliamentary Labour right within the
context of wider ideological debates in Labour Party politics that broadly mirror
conventional left, right and centrist dimensions and disputes (see, for example, Warde,
1982: 43-4, 94-5). The parliamentary Labour right is located broadly within either single,
historical 'Social Reformist' or 'Keynesian socialist' traditions although, within the
'Keynesian socialist' dimension, Warde identifies, at different times, its Croslandite
'socialist' and Jenkinsite 'liberal' strands and manages, to some extent, to complexify
what he describes as 'the hoary imagery of the left-right continuum' (Warde, 1982: 3;
also see Bale, 1999b: 4-5).

2.5.4 Intellectual Ideas and Traditions on the Parliamentary Labour Right

In spite of the 'intellectual stockpot' of Labour's political thought throughout the course
of its development, 'with old and new ingredients mixed together in an often haphazard
manner' (Jones, 1996: 2), Labour Party histories have often 'tended to ignore the political
thought underlying its development'. Accepted views of the Labour Party, at least in
Parliament, as a 'non-ideological party, intent merely on gaining parliamentary power
irrespective of principle' have tended to neglect 'the diversity and limitations of its
political thought' (Foote, 1997: 3). Possibly, this is a consequence of the dominant
interaction of the broad strands of socialism and labourism in Labour’s political thought and practice.

Finally, therefore, there has been some attempt to identify the different ideas, traditions and general ‘intellectual milieu’ that challenge ‘the received opinion of the Labour Right being a homogeneous group’ and which go ‘a long way to explain subsequent events and divisions within the Party’s hegemonic group’. In one of the few such attempts, Daly (1992: 48–63) summarises these traditions as the ‘radical liberalism’ associated with Jenkins, with its intellectual roots in the thinking of Edwardian New Liberalism; the ‘Fabianism’ supposedly personified by Gaitskell; the ‘democratic socialism’ best represented in the thought and work of Crosland; the ‘trade union economism’ and ‘non-intellectual gradualism’ represented in the PLP by the likes of Callaghan and George Brown; and the ‘pragmatic radicalism’ of such diverse ‘centrists’ as Wilson, Healey, Crossman and Shore whose ‘rhetoric [was] often at variance with their practice’, who believed that ‘radical policies should be adopted to serve pragmatic ends’ and who shared a ‘technocratic approach to problems and a belief in statism in the sense of running the economy and social welfare provisions’. In the majority of the literature these ‘groups of ideas’ have often been conflated in the more manageable political chunks or expressions outlined earlier. However, the ‘interaction of ideology and political actors’ appears to rely on the assumption that actors are able to pluck abstract, ‘rootless’ and ‘exogenous, pre-existing ideological preferences’ as the intellectual basis of their political perceptions, preferences and priorities, rather than attempting to explain ‘how the variations in those preferences’ are, at least in part, created and recreated ‘by variations in institutional location’. Bale (1999b: 23, 25) offers a note of caution in posing an overly instrumental link between ‘the ideologies and the interests of the various components of a party’, to help to avoid the artificial separation of ‘the world of power struggles evidenced in the nitty gritty of manoeuvres over rules, roles and regulations’ on the one hand and, on the other, ‘some disembodied universe we call ‘political thought’’, as expressed in the ‘holy’ tracts and texts (also see Drucker, 1979: 46, 65-6; Wildavsky, 1987: 4-5).
2.5.5 What is the Labour Right? Conclusion

The orthodox interpretation of the parliamentary Labour right in much of the post-war period appears to distinguish, in Drucker's (1979) terms, between 'pragmatists' and 'dogmatists'. Marquand (1979: 9, 17-18), as part of his explanation of the limitations of the Labour Party as a vehicle for radical social democratic progress and of the need for some kind of new formation of social democratic representation, derives an implicit distinction between intellectual, radical social democrats and the 'old Right' of the Labour Party: '[w]hat is needed now is to abandon both socialism and the kind of social democracy we have known since the war, and to do so in a way which would upset the old Right of the Labour Party at least as much as it would upset the Left. So far...the social democrats have been careful not to upset the old Right. Their chief aim has been to prevent the party from falling into the hands of the Left; and they have correctly calculated that the only way to do that is to build a coalition of all the anti-Left forces in it...But that strategy is clearly incompatible with thorough-going revisionism of the sort now required...the job of revising traditional welfare-state social democracy can [not] be done within the formal framework of the Labour Party'. Again, Maor (1997: 155-60; also see Dunleavy, 1993: 137), in an attempt to offer an ideological map of the two major British political parties to illustrate their 'ideological breadth' and respective 'internal groupings', relies on a similarly broad distinction between the 'trade union right' and 'Fabianism' in the ideological space produced by cross-cutting the basic left-right dichotomy, traditionally interpreted as a division between those supporting public ownership and 'deprivatisation' and those in favour of a broadly mixed economy, with a division between 'the industrial and welfare state wings of the party'.

The main problem is that such presentations often produce rigid, uniform accounts of the parliamentary Labour right, and often underplay the complexities and divisions within Labour's so-called 'governing elite' and 'dominant coalition' and their implications for intra-party politics. Attempts to ideologically map a diverse, often adaptable combination of traditions and tendencies suffer, to some extent, from a degree of caricature or compartmentalisation. Like the problematic dimensions of 'left' and 'right', they may be
taken to imply that such groupings possess a uniformity of outlook (see Wickham-Jones, 1996: 8-9). This study hopes to show that a simple distinction between labourists and revisionists fails to reveal the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right as they developed and emerged in the political context of the 1970s, with damaging political consequences for the Labour Party.

2.6 Conclusion: Narratives of the Labour Right

It is no easy task to identify and classify ideological groupings in a political party, particularly, as Gilmour (1969: 51) observes, political parties 'are multiple marriages of convenience, not of ideological love'. The major constructions of the parliamentary Labour right, the relevant traditions and examples of associated narratives are presented above. Attempts to analyse the parliamentary Labour right have broadly followed a number of distinct patterns. Firstly, a monolithic left-right typology offered by those such as Rose (1964) as a guide to organisational forms and behaviour within the major British political parties, with its promise of comparative potential (see Bale, 1997: 25-7, 1999b: 28). As Baker et al (1994: 279-80) note, 'Rose’s classification indicates nothing directly about the content of ideological groupings but focuses attention...on the institutional mechanisms by which ideological differences can be sustained. It pointed political scientists towards the need for a much more detailed exploration of the beliefs and values which politicians hold. Rose directs attention to the political contexts in which ideas are held and shaped, but Greenleaf’s emphasis on the grand narratives of the British politics tradition produced a left/right ideological axis that has informed most typologies of Conservatism.' The same holds broadly true of ideological mappings of the Labour Party. Secondly, general policy and institutional preferences and priorities have underpinned a rudimentary distinction on the parliamentary Labour right between a radical, modernising tendency of revisionists, providing a critical and coherent set of ideas concerning party policy and development and a more cautious, pragmatic, authoritarian trade union or consolidator right (to borrow the most widely used terms). However, it is not always clear where or when the boundaries of the distinction apply. As one notable participant observes, it is 'much more complicated than' the standard model and dichotomy of the
parliamentary Labour right suggests (Marquand, Interview with the author 16/1/01). It invites ‘one of the fundamental problems of political science, perhaps of the social sciences in general…our business is to classify to a very large extent…provide taxonomies…provide typologies…and no classification is ever going to do justice…to the incredible complexity of real life…It is not a reason for not engaging in classification, you have to…if you want to compare…so anything is going to have rough edges…its always more complicated than that’. The standard taxonomy approximates to the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right as they revealed themselves from the late 1960s in only ‘a very, very rough and ready kind of way…if you take the so-called radical revisionists…it’s not the case that they all went over to the SDP where as the trade union right did not all go over to the SDP. How would you classify somebody like [James] Wellbeloved for example? He certainly isn’t…at first sight one of the intellectual revisionist social democrats, but he did go over to the SDP. On the other hand, how would you classify Giles Radice who did not go over to the SDP or Philip Whitehead who did not go over to the SDP…so…there are a lot of nuances for that picture’. Thirdly, there has been some attempt to classify the parliamentary Labour right and its key representatives in terms of a variety of historical intellectual influences, which do not always translate simply or consistently into the political and institutional debates and divisions of the 1970s.

There is some degree of veracity in each of the selected organisational frameworks, distinctions and their verification. However, what is required is substantial analysis of Labour’s ‘dominant coalition’ and ‘governing elite’, based on specific political and policy contexts, which does not settle for rigid rudimentary, unambiguous or retrospective classifications, and which avoids both simple and often ahistorical amalgams and a typology of pure types that may further result in an abstraction from the historical experience (see Warde, 1982: 21). As Baker et al (1994: 280, 286) again note, ‘policy’ typologies are more complicated ‘because ideology and behaviour that are relatively straightforward to identify or quantify deviate most unpredictably from traditional core positions in response to political and external factors and events’. If we are to offer a more nuanced, differentiated account of the perceptions and preferences of
Labour's elite political actors, we need to consider the interaction between orthodox or traditional core positions and political context. After all, a combination of attitudes is not easily classified and thus requires a more fluid taxonomy (Tivey, 1989: 2), and a set of perceptions and preferences developed in actual political life and competition might only approximate to a pure orientation. Bulpitt (1991: 14-16; also see Baker et al, 1994: 286) suggests that it is preferable to analyse political identities and affiliations both 'through time' and 'in time'. It is important to think relationally as well as categorically.

So far, the intention has been to identify key presentations of the parliamentary Labour right, and to indicate the weaknesses - apparent ambiguities, inconsistencies or contradictions – and limitations of existing models and analyses of the parliamentary Labour right as the basis for further examination in the key ideological and policy themes of the case studies. The examples offered here are by no means exhaustive, but intended to illustrate a line of argument and enquiry rather than to systematically document each framework and narrative. Within the context of the selected case studies, it is the aim to contextualise and particularise the traditions, differences and conflicts of the parliamentary Labour right, in order to develop an analysis that transcends the conventional left-right orthodoxy and static, rudimentary conceptions of the Labour right. By situating the study in critical political and policy moments, the study hopes to promote a more fluid, contextual and integrated analysis of the ideological and political character of the parliamentary Labour right. Next, it is the intention to analyse the ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right through the lens of group and factional organisation and activity in the 1970s.
Chapter Three

Ideological and Organisational Fragmentation on the Parliamentary Labour Right in the 1970s

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the underlying theoretical basis of the Labour right as it developed in the immediate post-Attlee years. It further identified a latent critical tension between concepts of liberty and equality in 'revisionist' Labour right thought and practice. Finally, it offered a critical appraisal of various conceptual and analytical presentations of the parliamentary Labour right. It argued that, generally, these models are limited by a tendency to compress the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right. In the main, they offer a rigid, uniform continuity in the analysis of the basic character and dimensions of the parliamentary Labour right, and largely overlook the emergence of critical tensions within the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist strand of the Labour right. While serviceable as a generalised shorthand of the broad dimensions of the parliamentary Labour right, such typologies are unable to reveal the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in all political and policy contexts. It has also been argued that the fractious political and policy environment of the late 1960s and early 1970s offers an apposite context in which to locate the emerging diversity and divisions of Labour’s centre-right governing coalition. It is the purpose of the following four chapters to provide a context in which to locate and explain the ideological, political and organisational complexity, divisions and eventual fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s. Firstly, a study of its group and factional character and behaviour offers some insight into the relative complexity and discord of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s, and its implications for the relative unity, cohesion and intra-party strength of the Labour right. The following policy case study chapters present further evidence of the emerging diversity, divisions and relative fragmentation of the Labour right in critical ideological and policy spheres in the 1970s, which do not conform fully to standard models and narratives of the parliamentary
Labour right. Firstly, it is to the (possibly atypical) organisational character and activity of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s that we now turn.

As far back as the mid-1960s, Rose (1964) identified the existence of factions (and tendencies) as an integral part of the internal life of British political parties. He argued that realignments between the factions were often as, if not more, important in policy decisions and change as alternations of government. Moreover, the PLP has been more prone to faction, while the parliamentary Conservative Party has been largely a party of tendencies (Rose, 1964; also see Bale, 1997b: 26). The standard interpretation of factional behaviour and competition in the PLP has been one of broad left-right conflict. Particularly, the left of the PLP has often been highly organised along factional lines while, on the broad right of the PLP, there have been fewer factional groupings. These have included the Gaitskellite Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) during the early 1960s and, more recently, the Manifesto Group during Callaghan's premiership and Solidarity during the early 1980s, the latter two perhaps a reflection of anti- or non-left opinion than positively right-wing, revisionist factions (see Brand, 1989: 155, 161). Rose (1964: 41-2; also see Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 205-6) suggested that although Labour was a party of factions and its counterpart, the parliamentary Conservative Party, a party of tendencies, factional behaviour in the Labour Party tended to endure on relatively stable monolithic left-right lines. While the Labour left faction has been 'notoriously schismatic' and 'Left factions' have persisted 'from generation to generation', the Labour right, largely based on the assumption that a moderate leadership and policies have traditionally dominated the parliamentary party (see Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 221), has been represented only intermittently by a (single) 'moderate' loyalist/leadership faction (which, at the time Rose was writing, comprised of the Gaitskellite CDS).

As Larkin (2000a: 44) suggests, however, this relative lack of formal organisation on the right probably reflects its relative strength in the PLP, needing to resort to organised faction only when it perceived itself and the centre-right orthodoxy of the parliamentary party under threat, and the general absence of formal groups and organisations on the right of the PLP does not signify that the right has not featured recognisably distinct
sections and traditions within it. More than a cursory glance beneath the surface of ‘old’ Labour reveals the veracity of Rose’s (1964: 46) general claim that ‘[t]he surface cohesion ... reflects an equilibrium between forces pulling in different directions, not a unity obtained by a single, united thrust’. However, the idea of a monolithic, homogenous Labour right, like the idea of a uniform and cohesive ‘Old’ Labour, is clearly misleading.

This chapter has two related main themes. Firstly, it proposes that the Labour right has been more prone to group and faction, more ‘schismatic’, than Rose (1964) and others (see, for instance, Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 221) have presupposed. Ryan (1987), for example, has argued that ‘the social democrats in the Labour Party had a more advanced form of factional organization in the 1970s than scholars have generally recognized’. This was, he argues, because a number of ‘economic and social trends played a major role in undermining social democracy’s formerly dominant position in the Labour Party. Economic crisis and the rise of the post-industrial economic sectors and classes formed the context for both a new kind of Labour Left and a new model of social democracy’. Secondly, it offers an analysis of broadly right-wing groups and factions within the PLP during the 1970s, focusing particularly on the Jenkinsites and the Manifesto Group. The Manifesto Group offers an example of right-wing factional organisation and activity in the PLP in the 1970s. Given its internal disagreement over certain key policy themes such as European membership, it also reflects the complexity and fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s (see Crewe & King, 1995: 24, 90, 105; Desai, 1994: 170-2). Similarly, the Jenkinsites, a more informal and loosely arranged grouping around the influential Roy Jenkins, represented an example of an ‘organised’ coterie of opinion and activity on the PLP right during the 1970s, which set them apart from others on the broad centre-right of the PLP (see Desai, 1994: 145; Marquand, 1991: 169; also see Bell, 1997: Ch. 7).

3.2 Factionalism on the Parliamentary Labour Right: Models of Fractionalism

As noted, cleavage based simple left-right dimensions is clearly inadequate (Brittan, 1968, 1973; Warde, 1982: 10, 12). Daly (1992: 69-70) contends that the ‘intra-party
conflicts which came to a climax after the 1979 election defeat, were a later stage of a process that began in 1974'. Moreover, although it was ‘a government in which some of those who were active on the Labour Right were also members of the administration… it is wrong to equate the organized Labour Right which was emerging during these years with the Labour Party Establishment – the leadership and its acolytes in the Party organisation’. In fact:

‘While the newly organised Labour Right defended the Labour government from its Left-wing critics on the NEC and at conference, some groups on the Labour Right were hostile to the Party Establishment or to the policies of the Labour government. The Party leadership kept the organized Right at arms length, and others who were potentially sympathetic to these groups were either alienated in some way or believed that the spectre of a Left-wing take-over of the Party was exaggerated. Others agreed that something should be done to combat the growing influence and power of the Left, but were fearful of actively supporting any…organisations of the Right.’

Like Rose, Hine (1982: 36, 37, 44-5) has proposed that the internal lives of individual political parties and their cohesion bear considerable significance: ‘it has long been recognised that lines of party cleavage may be imperfect guides to a society’s real political divisions. Parties are visible, measurable and comparable, but they are not always the lowest common denominator for policy aggregation. Group conflict inside parties, and its frequent corollary, policy agreement across party lines, are often of equal importance…Party labels such as ‘social democrat’…are concealing an ever wider range of realities’. Moreover, although they do not perhaps display the same ‘well-financed, tightly-knit, capillary organisational links running from parliamentary leadership to ordinary membership’ found, say, in the Italian Socialist or Christian Democrat parties, the Labour Party in the 1970s witnessed ‘the development of a number of new, organised factions – the Militant Tendency, the Manifesto Group, the Campaigns for Labour Party Democracy and for Labour Victory, the Labour co-ordinating Committee and so on’.

Partly as a result of the increasing ideological gulf between right and left and the proliferation of such conflict to the wider party organisation, ‘the incentives to factional organisation have increased substantially and, since the early 1970s, the Labour Party has
witnessed 'an increase in the number of factions, and an extension of their organisational networks to many more areas of the party.'

Building on Rose’s (1964) seminal study, Hine (1982: 38-9) developed a framework for the classification and analysis of intra-party divisions and group behaviour. The classifications can be summarised as factions, tendencies and 'single issue groups'. Hine (1982: 37) assesses the dimensions of group organisation and behaviour in terms of both policy goals and cohesion. ‘Factions and tendencies are not...exhaustive categories on the scale of organised groups’. Single issue groups are significant in this respect too and, frequently, cross broad left-right alignmens: examples might include Labour Life Campaign or Labour Committee for Electoral Reform (McKee, 1988: 6). Moreover, ‘[m]any of the most important divisions in a party may, for quite extended periods (the EEC issue in the Labour Party for example) transcend tendencies and even factions...single-issue groups are not necessarily at the base of a hierarchy (issue group, tendency, faction) running from least to most organised. The issue group may for brief periods may be highly organised, as in the case of pro- and anti-EEC groups in both British parties in 1974-5’ (Hine, 1982: 39).

It is perhaps more difficult to establish the parameters or boundaries of organisations and groups that campaign beyond a ‘single issue’ goal. Hine (1982: 37, 38), like Rose, distinguishes between factions and tendencies in terms of degrees of internal cohesion and organisation, although quite 'what level of organisational cohesion and continuity a group actually has to display before it can be known as a faction is of course problematic'. Nevertheless, it is, he suggests, 'useful to distinguish between different dimensions of group conflict in a party...between on the one hand what divides groups, and on the other how much groups, once divided, are organised. These dimensions – policy and organisation – are, at least analytically, quite separate...the distinction is not always easy to identify, but it would be misleading to assume that there is a direct correlation between the intensity of policy differences between intra-party groups and the degree of organisational coherence and complexity these groups display.'
Hine (1982: 37), much like Rose (1964: 37-8), describes a tendency as a stable set of attitudes, political predispositions and, over time, a range of policies. Some central cohesion and corporate structure is often evident, but not in the same sense as 'official' party organisations. Significantly, tendencies rarely survive over a long period without incurring objective and corporate changes and 'membership' turnover, often in response to changing events and currents within the party. Factions, on the other hand, are subject to 'more consciously organized political activity' (Rose, 1964: 37), and extol the virtues of self-awareness, discipline and stable, loyal membership which, in turn, generates some degree of ideological and corporate cohesion and a greater degree of identity and stability than tendencies. Hine's (and indeed Rose's) model has obvious applicability to the study of intra-party parliamentary organisation and competition, to Labour Party factionalism generally and to the group and organisational behaviour of the Labour right (see Bale, 1997b: 25-7; Brand, 1989: 149-51; Hine, 1982: 17, 44-5; also see McKee, 1988: 7-8, 236-7). Revisionism and the revisionists in the Labour Party appear to have followed the model of a broad tendency, while organisations such as CDS, the Jenkinsites, the Manifesto Group and even Labour Solidarity tread a more fluid line between that of faction and tendency and, in the case, of the Jenkinsites, combine the policy motivations of a single issue group with the cohesion of a more organised grouping (see Hine, 1982: 39).

As noted, Rose (1964: 37, 38, 39, 46) points to the importance of internal group competition below the surface of British political parties. In the case of the two major electoral parties, he claimed that Labour, since its foundation, has been largely, although not exclusively (and he suggests that 'the left-wing faction has been notoriously schismatic'), a party of factions while the parliamentary Conservative Party has been preeminently a party of tendencies (Rose, 1964: 40-1; also see Norton, 1980: 431, 436). Rose (1964: 41-2) appears to identify only factional organisation and behaviour based on stable, monolithic left-right conflict, between what he terms the 'Labour left as a faction' and the 'moderate faction', with the 'non-aligned partisans' providing a resource to be mobilised by the two broad factions (also see Seyd, 1980; Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 206). Underlying his observations was the implication that the Labour left was (potentially)
more prone to faction than the Labour right and that the principal motivation for incidences of right-wing organisation in the PLP was loyalty in the defence or support of the parliamentary leadership against other organs of its federal structure. For example, it has been suggested that, during the period of Labour government of 1974-79, a Labour left was more identifiable than a Labour right. On the parliamentary Labour right 'the faction is submerged within the larger body of “non-aligned” supporters of the party leadership'. Hence a separate 'moderate faction' could not confidently be identified, an observation explained by the fact that 'because Labour was in power and moderate official party policies were prevailing, it was more likely that the left wing would seek to display separate factional identity than would the party moderates'. Based on a selection of House of Commons divisions in the 1974-79 Parliament, the analysis fails to fully account for the complex organisation, activity and relationships of the parliamentary Labour right away from the division lobbies in this period (see Wood & Jacoby, 1984: 203, 207, 217, 221; also see McKee, 1988: 3-4).

Some recent historical work has challenged the simple presentation of group and factional organisation and behaviour within the PLP as that based on stable, monolithic left-right lines (see Black, 1999b; Minion, 1998; also see Francis, 1997). Largely, this work questions the simple characterisation and explanation of groups and factions (and individuals) as either left-wing or right-wing. Moreover, for a supposedly monolithic, non-factional 'faction', a number of groups and organisations broadly associated with the Labour right have developed. These have included the Socialist Vanguard Group in the 1940s, the Socialist Union in the 1950s and, as noted, CDS in the early 1960s. The 1970s witnessed factional and group activity from the Jenkinsites, the Manifesto Group, the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Campaign for Labour Victory (CLV), as well as from other groups associated with the broad (centre-) right of the PLP such as the Trade Union Group of Labour MPs and the Labour Committee for Europe (see Brivati & Wincott, 1993b). In the early 1980s, Labour Solidarity (see McKee, 1988: 185-225) and the Labour First group (see MacIntyre, 1999: 265) were active on the parliamentary

21 The latter two groupings were both largely extra-parliamentary organisations concerned with secessionist activity on the Labour right (see Daly, 1993; McKee, 1988: 49-89, 97-174).
Labour right. An examination of its two main groupings of the 1970s, the Jenkinsites and the Manifesto Group, reveal that the parliamentary Labour right was far from the homogeneous, supportive vehicle of the parliamentary leadership. The internal dynamics and trajectory of the two groupings reveal the complex and fragmentary character of the parliamentary Labour right within the context of the key political and policy issues of the 1970s.

3.3 Organising Against the Left and Beyond: Right-wing Groups and Factions in the PLP in the 1970s

On the parliamentary Labour right, then, we can identify a number and range of groups and factions rather than a single, intermittent, loyalist/leadership faction. As noted, two of the most prominent groupings of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s were the formally organised Manifesto Group of Labour MPs and the more loosely arranged group around Roy Jenkins, colloquially known as the Jenkinsites. The growing influence of the Labour left in the party in the period of opposition after 1970, partly in response to the perceived failures of the Wilson administrations of 1964-70 (see Coopey et al, 1993; Ponting, 1990), both precipitated a number of developments on the parliamentary Labour right and illustrated its inherent diversity and divisions. The period witnessed the development of an organised Labour right in the form of a number of factional groupings and their respective campaigns in the party, both to counter the Labour left and to pursue specific policy agendas.

The Labour Party in opposition after 1970 witnessed a significant shift to the left, accompanied by a number of weaknesses – ideological, organisational and leadership - on the Labour right that undermined its ability to counter the campaigns of the Labour left (Joyce, 1999: 195-203). Moreover, Wilson’s behaviour as Prime Minister, particularly over the seminal issue of Europe, was to have a profoundly disillusioning effect for elements of the parliamentary Labour right. Wilson drew a sharp distinction between divisions on ‘an important policy issue, not an article of faith’ (Labour Party, 1971: 48-9). Some of the parliamentary Labour right found his stance (or lack of it)
unacceptable. Jenkins described his departure to Brussels as President of the European Commission in 1976 as ‘something quite new for me and in which I believed much more strongly than the economic policy of Mr. Healey, the trade union policy of Mr. Foot or even the foreign policy of Mr. Callaghan’ (cited in Minkin, 1991: 231). The party’s general hostility to the EEC was made explicit at Labour’s Annual Conference later in 1971, at which it was opposed by many of the trade unions, the majority of the Labour left and among elements of Labour centre-right.

A further tide of left-wing initiatives within the Labour Party arose with the publication of Labour’s Programme 1973 (see Labour Party, 1973: 13-39, also see 40-2), and the subsequent pre-manifesto refutation by the parliamentary leadership of some of its more radical proposals of nationalisation, economic planning and wealth redistribution. Consequently, the perceived unconstitutional behaviour of the party leadership (see Labour Party, 1973: 6) and the apparent lack of accountability in Labour’s internal party democracy led to the foundation of the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) in 1973. One by-product of these developments was that, among some of the parliamentary Labour right, the seeds of disillusion with the Labour Party were to set in through the period of opposition between 1970 and 1974. Mackintosh (1972b: 484), for example, expressed the concern of a number of social democrats over the direction of the Labour Party. In the face of the leftwards shift in the party, the onset of aggressive industrial action and the challenge to the rule of law, he warned against the ‘populist socialist’ appeal to sectional and class-based politics and supported a ‘renewed emphasis on parliamentary democracy’: ‘[i]f these objectives are not successfully pursued...the Labour Party...will become merely the puppet party of those powerful union leaders whose first interest is not socialism or social justice but simply the well-being of the particular groups of wage earners whom they represent. Then the Party will not only suffer further electoral defeats but it will deserve them’. Jenkins (1972: 21-2) further spoke of the need for the Labour Party to shed its class-based, sectional image and appeal. 22 Others emphasised the apparent weakness and incoherence of the Labour right

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22 Electoral studies and statistics of the time were beginning to reveal significant evidence of what has been termed ‘class dealignment’. Concern among elements of the parliamentary Labour right for the future
itself: Walden believed that "the Right was clapped out and ideologically incoherent". In the circumstances, "[t]he Right did not know what to do" (cited in Daly, 1992: 75).

In the context of the divisions of opposition between 1970 and 1974, it was a surprise, even to many in the Labour Party, certainly to many on the Labour right, that Labour, even unconvincingly, emerged victorious from the general election in February 1974. However, election victories in February and October 1974 only served to conceal trends that indicated the decline of Labour's electoral support, the gradual rise of the Labour left and a growing trade union militancy that included a shift to the left among some trade unions. As Butler and Kavanagh (1974: 268) suggest of the February 1974 general election result, the 'election withdrew a seal of approval from the Conservatives. It did not give one to Labour which for once was favoured by the lucky working of the electoral system, and gained power with a much lower share of the vote than it had secured in any of its post-war defeats'. Moreover, the broad economic and industrial context in which Labour took office was such that the new government had to reach some form of agreement with the trade unions. After all, this was the key theme of its election campaign; that only the Labour Party could bring industrial peace and restore a harmonious working relationship between government and the trade unions. However, the difficulties and conflicts of the Labour Party were to be compounded rather than moderated by its experience of office.

It was in this febrile political environment that elements of the parliamentary Labour right divided to coalesce and organise, at least in the short term. Ryan (1987: 10) suggests that one consequence of and response to the general breakdown of revisionist Keynesian social democracy and the associated political repercussions and dilemmas was the notable growth or restatement of dormant social democratic factionalism. The implication that the Labour right remained unorganised and existed as a tendency or collection of tendencies is inadequate: the 'Labour Right was both better organized than is often assumed and less organized than it needed to be to retain control of the party. In electability of the Labour Party was based on the increasing domination of organs of the party by both the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary left and its association with industrial disorder, resistance in local government and the apparent threat to the rule of law.
retrospect... the Labour Right contained factional organizations from 1974 onwards, and... social democracy developed into a pre-party faction and, later, a party’. Ryan (1987: 1-5, 11-12, 13) argues that, in the face of profound socio-economic changes in the 1960s and 1970s, which impacted particularly upon political parties of the centre-left, a social democratic element of the British Labour Party moved, utilising Rose’s (1964) terms, from the position of ‘dominant tendency’ within the Labour Party (in ‘the period of the 1964-1970 Wilson Government’), to that of ‘declining tendency’ (following ‘Labour’s loss of the 1970 election’), to ‘embattled’ and ‘pre-party’ faction (following ‘Labour’s return to power in 1974... in order to protect their position in the party against the rising Labour Left’), to party. A combination of economic and social trends and divisive ‘policy issues and disputes over organizational matters propelled factional development’. The ‘very appearance of a social democratic party requires research into the notions of tendency and faction’. It is also useful to refine traditional models of factionalism to take account of ‘such phases of factional development as the pre-factional tendency and the pre-party faction’.

Within the context of Labour Party politics in the 1970s, the factional character and activity of the parliamentary Labour right can be divided into two broadly distinct, but occasionally overlapping, types, perhaps influenced by Labour’s government-opposition dichotomy, which do not conform neatly to an all-inclusive “amorphous” majoritarian tendency of the ‘entire unorganized non-Left of the party’, or even the narrowly defined revisionist social democratic mono-factionalism that often appear as convenient contractions of the factional disposition of the parliamentary Labour right (see Beller & Belloni, 1978: 423; Brivati & Wincott, 1993b; Cyr, 1978: 292-3; Desai, 1994; Haseler, 1969; Rose, 1964: 41; Ryan, 1987: 1-13, 15, 19-31). These were the ‘oppositional’ pre-secessionary faction represented by the Jenkinsites and the more inclusive critical ‘loyalist’ faction of the Manifesto Group, itself subject to the internal diversity and discrepancies of its membership. The emphasis here is less on the particular technical expression of this activity as either faction or tendency, but rather on the identification of the ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right inherent in its organisational expression.
3.4 Right-wing Factionalism in the PLP in the 1970s: The Jenkinstes

‘by the end of the 60s... those who might have been Gaitskellites and Croslandites were Jenkinstes... I don’t think that within that group there was any core until the 70s... that was the core of people who were now Jenkinstes who had voted for Europe... it wasn’t only those who voted for Europe but there was a core of people who began to work together and see a lot of each other, and we used to have monthly meetings in people’s houses and so forth... it was a group to which some people came and went, but that was the first time... that I would identify anything within what was already, of course, a split in the right of the party’.

(Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01)

‘a very simple thing that held the Jenkinstes Group together was admiration for Roy Jenkins... the core group thought that Roy Jenkins was the right person to lead the Labour Party... if you think of the Bevanites... in the 50s, you can’t disentangle the Bevanite Group philosophically from Bevan’s own personality and charisma... the Jenkinstes in the 70s were people who... when no longer associated with the leadership of the party were... regarded as being opposed to it by the actual leader Harold Wilson.

(Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01)

3.4.1 Introduction

In the years of opposition 1970-74, an element of parliamentary Labour right opinion and personnel coalesced around the influential figurehead of Roy Jenkins, occasioned by the controversial and divisive issue of Europe (see Chapter Four). There was a wider attempt among key intimates to groom Jenkins as the future leader of the Labour Party. To this end, a Jenkinstes position and agenda, beyond the narrow issue of Europe and around the broad themes of injustice and deprivation in society, was published in a collection of essays. Aimed at expanding the base of Jenkins’ support inside the party, the Jenkinstes manifesto was based on a series of ‘promotional’ speeches delivered to Labour Party and trade union audiences between March and September 1972, and was drafted by the likes of David Marquand, David Owen and John Mackintosh (Jenkins, 1972: 13-15, 115). However, the Labour right was far from united behind the Jenkinstes vehicle. Jenkins’
resignation from the deputy leadership in April 1972, combined with the appearance of an increasing disillusionment with the Labour Party (Jenkins, 1989: 1), contributed to the disorganised and leaderless character of the parliamentary Labour right. Refuge for the Labour right was not to be found in a single personality. Leading social democrats such as Crosland demonstrated their ambivalence to the European cause and, in the name of party unity, willingness for some form of compromise with the left. Aspiration of office in the Labour Party further prevented close factional identification, and partly explains Crosland’s reluctance to act as a figurehead for the Labour right (Crosland Papers 6/2, Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Crosland MP; also see Crosland S, 1982: 238-44).

In his decision to stand for the deputy leadership of the Labour Party after Jenkins’ resignation (along with Harold Lever and George Thomson) over the referendum proposal on European membership in April 1972, Crosland explained his commitment to the priority of party unity in order to defeat the Conservative government. Just ‘at the moment when grass-roots Labour opinion sees the over-riding aim as being to get rid of a reactionary and repressive Tory Government, the Parliamentary Labour Party seems divided by personalities and polarized into factions. We are set on a course of self-destructive madness. I am standing in protest. I was in Japan when the... factional warfare broke out. Similar internal feuding has kept the Japan Socialist Party out of power for 25 years...whatever our views about Europe or about particular personalities, the over-riding need for the country is to return a strong Labour Government, and the over-riding need for the Party is to prepare and present a distinctive, radical social-democratic programme – on full employment, housing, education, redistribution of wealth and an attack on social and economic privilege and inequality. The huge majority of the Party would unite on such a programme. I am running...on a non-sectarian ticket...It is desperately urgent to re-create Party unity on the basis of a radical, egalitarian socialist programme. The Party should elect the Deputy Leader who can best contribute to this aim’ (Crosland Papers 6/2, Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Crosland MP). Incidentally, ‘the gang quality of the Jenkinsites’ lobbied for and ensured the election of ‘their’ candidate, Ted Short in the deputy leadership contest. According to Susan Crosland (1982: 241, 244), ‘the Jenkinsites had concentrated on rounding up the Right and working on the Centre to
commit them to elect Ted Short as Deputy Leader. The rationale appears to be that Short was considered to be a 'nonentity' by the Jenkinistes: 'he would keep the seat warm for Roy, step down when asked...If Tony got it...he wouldn’t be a caretaker who would move aside if Roy wanted the job again'.

Apprehension over group and factional organisation and activity was common on the parliamentary Labour right. Partly, this was fear of accusation of creating 'a party within a party' and claims of illegitimacy. After all, various internal party groupings and organisations of the left had been subject to the criticism of attempting to establish a party within a party (Brivati & Wincott, 1993a: 365). CDS had established a successful precedent, but its remit was limited to singular circumstances. Perhaps with the exception of Bill Rodgers, the core members of CDS were not natural campaigners or apparatchiks. The social democratic position and cause was pursued through the dissemination of ideas in journals such as Socialist Commentary and Forward (Rodgers, cited in Brivati & Wincott, 1993a: 283-4). However, Brivati suggests that CDS left certain legacies to the Labour Party: this included 'an overtly social democratic grouping loyal to Gaitskell and which can be characterised as the organisational expression of revisionist ideology (Brivati & Wincott, 1993a: 365). It changed the nature of the internal party division. After CDS this was no longer between the leadership and a critical left, but between articulated groups on the left and right with self images as being socialists and social democrats, with the leadership in a sort of ill-defined centre role playing one group off against the other'.

Jenkins (1991: 310) explains that 'the nucleus of a campaign organisation' and 'the continuous focus of the committed pro-Europeans in the parliamentary Labour Party' emerged out of a meeting of about twelve MPs on 25 June 1970, a week after Labour's 1970 election defeat, hosted by Dick Taverne and attended by, among others, Jenkins, Taverne, George Thomson, Bill Rodgers, David Owen and David Marquand (also see 315-21, 324-34; Owen, 1991: 167; Taverne, 1974: 102). The focus of the initial meeting was discussion of whether Jenkins should contest the deputy leadership of the Labour Party after George Brown had lost his seat at the election and the potential attitude of the
party to the Common Market in opposition. The ‘group became the “Walston

group”…which continued at least until the leadership election of March 1976, and even a
few times thereafter’. Taverne traces the origins of the Jenkinsite group back to the core
members of the 1963 Club ‘which was a Jenkinsite group…there was a Jenkins section in
the party no doubt about it’, a strong section too. Jenkins provided leadership ‘because
for sixty nine people to defy the tree-line whip and vote for entry in 1971…they took
their lead from Roy Jenkins. He was their leader that is why he had a strong position
because he was seen as a leader and is also why it gave him a lot of standing in the
country because although they didn’t agree with him on the Common Market, they
respected his toughness. It was definitely a group’ (Taverne, Interview with the author,
18/1/01).

Two weeks after this initial meeting Jenkins was elected to the deputy leadership of the
Labour Party. Jenkins’ core support in the PLP included Marquand, Rodgers, Taverne,
Thomson, Tom Bradley, Roy Hattersley, Dickson Mabon, Robert Maclennan and, after
1973, Giles Radice. Owen, although a supporter, was not a natural Jenkinsite. In his
memoirs, Owen (1991: 167) explains that ‘my political heart belonged to Tony Crosland.
I did not make a wholehearted commitment to Roy as the future leader…until the
summer of 1971, when it became clear…that…Crosland was not prepared to recognize
that Britain’s entry into the European Community was a major issue’. This core
parliamentary support was supplemented, perhaps surprisingly for a politician of the
Labour right, by a coterie of extra-parliamentary supporters. Crewe and King suggest that
‘[p]robably the only other modern British politician to have had a similar entourage for a
time is Tony Benn’. Moreover, although most of the Jenkinsites were not politically
important of themselves, the very existence of the group caused problems inside the
Labour Party: ‘[t]o insiders the Jenkinsites appeared serious, dedicated, even selfless; but
many outsiders regarded the Jenkinsite group as…cliquish and stand-offish, almost too
good to be true. Its high moral tone was widely regarded as a thin disguise for its leader’s
personal ambitions’. For instance, the existence of the group importantly affected
Jenkins’ relationship with the media, and Jenkins’ activities, ideas and plans received
significantly more publicity than others: ‘to find out what Jenkins was thinking you could
talk to anyone of half a dozen people, each of whom had some reasonable claim to be his spokesman – and, if you did not talk to one of them, there was a very good chance one of them would talk to you. The Jenkinsites in this way constituted a formidable propaganda machine...Few other politicians could rival it’ (Crewe & King, 1995: 55-6, 529-30).

According to conventional definitions of faction (see Hine, 1982; Rose, 1964), it would be problematic to view the Jenkinsites in the same mould as, for example, the Tribune Group in terms of membership, structure or organisation (Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01). For instance, the minutes of regularly organised Tribune Group meetings reveal its membership, frequency and time of meetings and the conduct and contributions to proceedings. In contrast, no such records exist for the rival Jenkin site group, except perhaps for individual personal memories and chance notes taken by participants. One of the group’s core supporters, Bill Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01) remembers the informality of the set-up: ‘it was a much smaller group of people...it consisted for example of David Marquand and David Owen and Bob Maclennan...Dickson Mabon...it had as a non-parliamentarian John Harris...We sometimes met in the flat of Harry Walston who...had been a Junior Minister in the Labour government, but mainly we met at my house and David Marquand’s house, Bob Maclennan’s house and I’m sure there were others as well’. Although it lacked what might be considered a formal structure, membership and defined roles, nevertheless Rodgers identifies a core membership of the Jenkin site group who met and spent a lot of time working together: ‘it was a group of around ten or a dozen people and this was a core of what you might call [the] Jenkin site centre’. Representative of factional attributes, Rodgers describes the essence of the Jenkin site organisation as ‘people...who shared the same views...[and] judgments’.

In effect, two groups piloted and facilitated activity in support of Jenkins in opposition. As noted, the first was the 1963 Club, a dining club established by Rodgers and Denis Howell in memory of the death of their former leader and mentor, Hugh Gaitskell. The group met monthly for informal discussions during the parliamentary session and, among others who attended on a regular basis, were Jenkins himself, Douglas Jay, Patrick
Gordon Walker, Owen, Marquand, Maclellan, Dickson Mabon, Taverne, Tom Bradley, Charles Pannell and Jack Diamond, although some members of the group, most prominently Tony Crosland, were less than enamoured with the idea of Jenkins as a potential factional figurehead of the parliamentary Labour right (Crosland S, 1982: 250-3). Perhaps more directly underpinning the Jenkinsite cause were the activities of Rodgers' shifting group of 'around ten or a dozen' core supporters who held regular lunchtime meetings at their various homes. As an extension of those hosted by Lord Walston, these meetings were attended certainly by Rodgers, Marquand, Owen, Maclellan and Mabon, initially by Taverne and by a number of other Labour MPs who were not among the sixty-nine European rebels of 28 October 1971, but who had previously confessed their pro-Market views. As noted, the group met regularly to discuss strategy and tactics and owed more to close friendships and a sense of kinship and shared values than to a desire, at this stage, to match the more formal organisation and procedures of the Tribune Group (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/02). The Jenkinsites, then, can be characterised by the informality of their parliamentary networks; they remained colleagues and friends in regular contact who shared some common values and goals. Although there was the absence of a formal structure and procedures, such as group minutes, demarcated roles, rules or decisions, the Jenkinsite group, perhaps given the nature of its personnel, inevitably engendered suspicion and intrigue within the Labour Party in terms of hidden agendas and secretive campaigns. If anything, the Jenkinsites were both explicit and open about their twin goals to establish Jenkins as leader of the Labour Party in succession to Wilson and for Britain to join and consolidate its membership of the Common Market.

3.4.2 Jenkinsite Marginalisation: Establishing a Factional Group Identity and the Rupture of Labour's Centre-right 'Governing Coalition'

Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01) has suggested that the Tribunite left were tempted to see in their opponents those structures mirroring their own. Like members of CDS, however, the majority of Jenkinsites were never natural apparatchiks but, particularly in the wake of his precision-like organisation of Labour's pro-European
rebels in the vote of 28 October 1971 (see Brivati & Wincott, 1993c: 386-9), Rodgers’ reputation appeared to go before him, indicating for some the revival of CDS in the Labour Party. Although the respective contexts are different, certain parallels can be drawn between CDS and the Jenkinsites in opposition. As CDS were diverted from a wider ‘modernisation’ of the Labour Party by internal debates and disputes over defence, the Jenkinsites were diverted from the ‘modernising’ agenda that would hopefully follow Jenkins’ succession to the leadership by debates and internal divisions over Europe. The pursuit of their European ideal appeared to be at the expense of party unity and Jenkins’ own leadership claims. The European issue hastened a specific identity for the Jenkinsites in the Labour Party: if ‘the revisionists had lacked an organised presence in the Labour Party after 1964, the European issue precipitated them once again as an identifiable intellectual tendency, the social democrats’ (Desai, 1994: 145-6; also see Benn, 1988: 358; Nairn, 1972: 75).

In the first instance, predictions of Jenkinsite, or at least Jenkins’, marginalisation proved unfounded. In the November 1971 ballot for the election of the deputy leader, Jenkins was re-elected in preference to Michael Foot. In addition, fellow Euro-enthusiasts Douglas Houghton was elected to the chairmanship of the PLP and, in December, Shirley Williams, Harold Lever and George Thomson, were each convincingly re-elected to the shadow cabinet (LP/PLP, 10 November 1971, 2 December 1971). The deputy leadership and shadow cabinet elections appear to suggest that Jenkins’ argument that a principled stand on Europe would not unduly undermine the position of the PLP in relation to the other organs of the party retained some residual strength in the PLP (although the tension in the relationship with the trade unions remained). Benn (1988: 384) notes that ‘the Common Marketeers have been able to defy the PLP and get re-elected and there is something very interesting in that. It means Bill Rodgers CDS group have got a majority in the PLP and that is something one will have to accept’.

However, the pro-Market revolt of 28 October 1971, and their pro-Europeanism more broadly, was an important factor in the longer-term marginalisation of the core Jenkinsite group in the Labour Party. Desai (1994: 127-63) argues that, along with opposition to
Labour’s ‘most left-wing’ programme of economic and industrial strategy resulting from the policy process set up in the party in 1970 ‘under the auspices of the left’, it represented ‘the political marginalization’ of a core group of revisionist intellectuals, or what Desai (1994: 129) describes as ‘Labour’s principal intellectuals in their final form – the social democrats’, that led directly to the 1981 split and formation of the SDP. As noted, the conceptual basis of this analysis is problematic. Notably, the apparently easy metamorphosis ‘from Croslandite revisionists to Jenkinsite social democrats’, as the respective heirs of the Gaitskellite revisionist crown, presents a difficulty that appears to inflate the homogeneity, cohesion and continuity of Labour’s post-war revisionist tradition (see Desai, 1994: 136-41). Moreover, the task of locating a point of origin (and the individual motivations) for the SDP is even more hazardous (see Crewe & King, 1995b: 104-16). Their individual commitment to the Labour Party at this stage remains a subject of debate, but a core pro-European Jenkinsite group had identified itself clearly with a particular cause that their factional opponents could argue held first call on their loyalty, questioned their commitment to party unity and led to claims of the creation of a party within a party, usually an accusation reserved for the factional left.

Although Wilson, on the eve of the momentous vote, issued a call for party unity and a promise that there would be no suggestion of reprisal toward the Euro-rebels (LPACR, 1971: 162), Rodgers, as the key organiser of the pro-European group, was a prime target of recrimination. Wilson had given his personal reassurance that Rodgers’ pro-Market views would not be the subject of his removal from Labour’s front bench (Ziegler, 1993: 384) but, along with a number of pro-European colleagues, he was dismissed on 19 January 1972. Owen (1991: 187) describes this as ‘a direct challenge to...Jenkins for Bill had acted as chief of staff of the pro-market campaign...cleverly, Wilson did reappoint Dick Taverne. It was a neatly judged knifing of...Jenkins, diminishing him without provoking him’. Wilson’s decision may have been a direct reprimand to Rodgers who, in his role as the key arbiter of Jenkinsite pro-European opinion, had seemingly been impervious to the authority of the party’s elected leader. Nevertheless, it also appeared to

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23 See, for example, The Times, 6 October 1971, in which he was described as ‘Bill Rodgers: Supreme Marketeer’ and as ‘plus Royalist que le Roi’.
be a signal for the wider marginalisation of the Jenkinsite faction within the PLP, a development accentuated by a centre-left realignment and alliance on the issue of Common market membership.

In spite of the success of Jenkins and pro-European colleagues in election to various PLP positions during 1971 and 1972, the Jenkinsite pro-European group began to lose ground in the party soon after the 1970 general election defeat. The rising tide of opinion within the party and its associated institutions, largely the product of an orthodox left-wing position on the Common Market as a capitalist mechanism that would inhibit the opportunity to implement socialist economic policies and would lead to the exploitation of developing economies, made it increasingly difficult for Jenkins and his supporters to maintain their position in the Party (LP/LCE Minutes, 1964-80, Alan Lee Williams, Europe Left 2 (3) May 1971). A Socialist Commentary (October, 1971: 1) editorial, for instance, suggested that the Common Market issue provided the left with a 'peg and a pretext for an attempt to make life in the Party as difficult as possible for... an important part of the coalition of views that the Party must contain’. Of course, their position was compounded by the absence of majority pro-European sentiment in any of the party’s key institutions: the shadow cabinet, PLP, conference, NEC and TUC all came out in opposition to membership on the terms negotiated by the Heath government. Opposition to the Common Market in the CLPs owed much to the traditional Labour concern of higher food prices. In their best Bevanite tradition, many CLPs took their lead on the European issue ‘from who said what, not necessarily what was said’ (Cattermole, cited in Brivati & Wincott, 1993c: 405).

To some extent, the pro-European Jenkinites were victims of their own consistency in transcending some of the differential rhetoric of Labour’s government-opposition dichotomy. In opposition they continued to argue the same consistent case for British membership of the EC they had in opposition but, in so doing, they appeared to reflect the arguments and beliefs of ‘intensely unpopular’ Conservative ministers and policies (Stephenson, cited in Brivati & Wincott, 1993c: 402). Nor did it help that the Jenkinites were to receive the praise of the pro-European establishment press, and that Labour’s
major pro-European organisation, the Labour Committee for Europe (LCE), of which Jenkins was joint president with George Brown and Michael Stewart, possessed significant resources, the source of which was not the Labour Party. Equally damaging to the pro-European Jenkinsites was a parallel tendency to inadvertently undermine their own position. Initially in opposition, Jenkins found his position on the NEC 'just tolerable' (Jenkins, cited in Brivati & Wincott, 1993c: 412). Along with Wilson, he sought to resist the gradual increase of anti-Market sentiment in the party. However, Jenkins' resistance, along with that of Wilson, to the proposal to hold a special conference on the Common Market on 23 June 1971 was defeated by the principles and action of a pro-European colleague. It was Shirley Williams 'who gave us a special conference': 'she was absolutely sound on the merits of the issue, but she decided on democratic rights that we have a special conference. So she suddenly defected and by a majority of one we had a special conference' (Jenkins, cited in Brivati & Wincott, 1993c: 412). Jenkins (1991: 86) had still hoped that Wilson might adopt the 'hard, difficult, consistent, unpopular line' and remain with the pro-European policy of the previous Labour government. According to Jenkins (1991: 320), the major consequence of Williams' decision was that the special conference required a speech from Wilson that 'took him quietly out of intellectual hailing distance with us'.

Without the support of the party leader, the Jenkinesite position in the party was significantly undermined. In effect, Wilson had largely 'shadowed' Callaghan on the Common Market issue, and so too did 'much Centrist, non-intellectual, and trade union opinion' (Pimlott, 1992: 581). As two of Labour's front-bench heavyweights, Jenkins and Callaghan, in pursuit of their respective ambitions, were always cautious colleagues and potential rivals. Jenkins was always aware of Callaghan's ominous and powerful presence (Jenkins, 1991: 310) and, effectively, it was his decision to oppose entry on the terms negotiated by the Heath government that coerced Wilson to follow suit. The European dimension, as the next chapter reveals, reflected significant diversity and
divisions within the parliamentary Labour right and in Labour’s centre-right governing coalition (see Chapter Four).

Essentially, the gradual marginalisation in the party after 1970 of the influential element of Labour right opinion represented by the Jenkinstone faction reflected a rupture in the broad and largely dominant centre-right alliance in the PLP. After all, Jenkins had been a central figure within the Gaitskellite faction that began to acquire some degree of dominion in the party after 1955. In alliance with broadly centrist opinion in the PLP and, with the exception of the Labour Party leadership itself, it had dominated the majority of senior positions in the parliamentary party, a trend that continued after Labour’s election defeat in 1970. Jenkinstone marginalisation after 1970 can be said to reflect the double rupture of the broad alliance that had first brought Gaitskell the party leadership. After 1956, for instance, the Gaitskellite unit in the party had lost important trade union support in the form of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) under the leadership of Frank Cousins. After 1970 the Jenkinstone pro-European right experienced a fracture in their alliance with the Labour centre and centre-right over the Common Market issue.

The seeds of such a fracture first appeared in 1962 as Gaitskell’s decision to oppose British entry jeopardised the political support (although not the personal loyalty it seems) of many of his pro-European factional supporters but not broadly centrist opinion of ‘moderate trade union MPs’. As ‘opposition to the Community was wide-spread’ in the PLP and in the party at large, in ‘contrast with the defence issue when Gaitskell could count on an overwhelming majority in the PLP, if he had come out in favour of the Common Market he would have faced a battle with all sections of the Labour Party: the

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24 At the heart of Labour’s centre-right governing coalition were the formidable political figures of Jenkins and Callaghan. The former had been a key representative of the Gaitskellite ‘revisionist’ tendency and the latter has been described as ‘the articulate voice of homespun Labourism’ (Taylor, 1993: 349). Obvious personal differences and styles were exacerbated by their rivalry for the succession. Neither was willing to challenge Wilson for fear of allowing the other an advantage (Pimlott, 1992: 543-4). However, Wilson’s ambiguity and indecision on the European question allowed Callaghan to tip the balance against Jenkins, allowing him the opportunity to draw Wilson in the direction of an anti-Market position: ‘if... Callaghan had supported entry in 1971, as he had as Chancellor when it was debated in 1967 and as Home Secretary when Labour formally applied in 1970, then Harold Wilson would not have come out against the terms of the negotiations’ (Owen, 1991: 177).
PLP, the trade unions and the constituency Labour parties. On the other hand, if he came out against the Common Market he risked alienating his more loyal supporters. As with Wilson later, it could be said that 'Gaitskell's stance on Europe was primarily designed to unify the party' (see Brivati, 1996a: 404-22).

In this context, however, fate dealt its hand: the British application to join the Community was rejected and, by January 1963, Gaitskell was dead. For a time, at least, the European issue in the internal politics of the Labour Party receded in importance, but the fault lines of future divisions and realignments, together with the potential for an increasingly isolated pro-European faction on the parliamentary Labour right, had been identified. As the Common Market re-emerged as a significant political debate after 1970, the pro-European Jenkinsite faction were marginalised in the face of a centre-left majority opposing entry, temporarily bolstered by both Wilson and Callaghan. One important by-product of the Jenkinsite pre-occupation with Europe and the subsequent centre-right split was that they did not see the left coming and, in the process, transforming the immediate future of the Labour Party (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). For the Jenkinsites, it was Callagan rather than Wilson who represented the 'real villain of the piece over Europe. He was the first of the top leaders to take an anti line' (Pimlott, 1992: 581).

3.4.3 The Implications of Jenkinsite Marginalisation in the Labour Party

Jenkins’ resignation from Labour’s shadow cabinet and as the party’s deputy leader appeared to remove both himself and his supporters from the spheres of influence and

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25 Moreover, although pro-Marketeers represented a majority of the Gaitskellite group, there was an effective minority of opponents, including leading figures such as Douglas Jay. In addition to Jay, CDS anti-Marketeers in 1962 included Tam Dalyell, Guy Barnett and William Blyton (Brivati, 1996a: 407; Haseler, 1969: 228-9).

26 However, as the hangover from Labour’s proposed ‘In Place of Strife’ legislation still infected the Labour Party-trade union relationship, it is possible that Wilson would have struggled to hold the party to a pro-European line even if Callaghan had not adopted an anti-Market stance. It was not until the initial meeting of the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee in February 1972 that more cordial relations were established. Therefore, it is doubtful if Wilson could have risked the further alienation of the trade unions by ignoring the opposition of the NEC, conference and TUC to entry without further endangering fragile party unity and Labour’s future electoral prospects.
centre of power in the party. As a consequence of this decision he further forfeited his place on the NEC and his influence in Labour’s research and policy programme. In effect, a significant element of parliamentary Labour right opinion had been excluded from the parliamentary leadership, which had increasingly come under the influence of Callaghan, Healey and a pragmatic centrist response to encircling external economic and internal institutional challenges. In spite of what was to be his principled stance in the infamous IMF cabinets, even Crosland had long since adopted what was perceived to be the pragmatic centrist posture of the responsible Labour minister and statesman (see Marquand, 1997: 11-12; 1999: 166-78; Owen, 1999; Plant, 1996: 165-6; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).

For the Jenkinsites, resignation made sense only if it held out the prospect of the party leadership and significant influence in the party’s research and policy agenda and development. Initially, this appeared to be a guiding motive with the pre-resignation publication of the targeted collection of speeches that spelled out a potential Jenkinsite agenda (Jenkins, 1972). In retrospect, Owen (1991: 189-90) describes the timing and purpose of the speeches as ‘straightforward and political’. With reference to Joseph Chamberlain’s radical series of speeches in 1885, delivered without the approval of Gladstone, Owen describes Jenkins’ modern version as his ‘Unauthorized Programme’. As a major contributor to the series of speeches, Owen suggests that Jenkins ‘accepted that we were embarking on an outright challenge to Wilson and all that his style of leadership implied’. Others, including Jenkins (1991: 339) himself, have reported the nature of the speeches differently: ‘[t]he intention was to set out an across-the-board range of policies which would strike a more serious and more principled note than the short-term party manoeuvring which, in contrast with his performance in 1963-4, had by this time become the stock-in-trade of... Wilson’s leadership. They would show that I had not become obsessed with Europe to the exclusion of all else’.

Implicit in Jenkins’ explanation, too, was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Jenkinsites to present their candidate, on the basis of a broader, post-European agenda and a different, more principled, long-term view of party leadership and policy, as a
potential successor to Wilson. Others still, by attempting to extend the perception of their agenda beyond a purely European platform and perspective, have interpreted the collection of speeches as a necessary means of preserving the pro-European Jenkinsite position in the party after 28 October 1971: ‘although we had voted against the party on the Market, we had wider interests...although I was a good European, I never thought we could rally the party on the basis of Europe’ (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). In spite of Jenkins’ formulaic repudiation of thoughts of a leadership challenge at the time and after (Jenkins, 1991: 621; Owen, 1991: 190), influential elements of the contemporary press were quick to interpret the seeds of a Jenkinsite bid for the party leadership and, indeed, the subsequent standard denial (Sunday Times, 12 March 1972; The Times, 13 March 1972; also see Jenkins, 1991: 340).

In Labour Party terms, however, Jenkins’ refusal to consider a challenge to Wilson for the party leadership even if, in retrospect, he believed (and ‘half regretted’) that in ‘1972-3 it might have been better for the future health of the Labour Party’ (Jenkins, 1991: 621), left him and his core supporters with nowhere to go. The grand sweep of Jenkins’ ‘Unauthorized Programme’ offered the Labour Party a credible, coherent and essentially radical alternative agenda to the policies emerging from the increasingly left-wing research programme that were to be expressed in Labour’s Programme for Britain 1972 (see Socialist Commentary, April-July/September-October 1972; also see Marris, 1972 and, for the Tribune view, see Clements, 1972). At the time, Mackintosh (1972b: 480), for one, welcomed Jenkins’ timely contribution in terms of the careful thought necessary ‘if the desired results are to be obtained’ from ‘government intervention to diminish class barriers in education or to end homelessness’ ‘in a highly complex society’.

The subsequent publication of the collection of speeches based on the ‘challenge of injustice’, the principle and conviction ‘to sustain a more effective assault on poverty and injustice’ and, in effect, ‘a coherent and credible strategy of social progress, capable of winning support, not only from our own ranks, but from a majority of the society around us’, appeared to present a clear idea of progress for both the Labour Party and the country as a credible alternative to the perceived ‘dexterity’ of Wilson’s pursuit of ‘the transient
twists and turns of public opinion' and the 'vehemence' of Foot's 'perorations'. Thanks to the contribution of Jenkins' key aide, David Marquand, they also contained the 'break the mould' message that was to underpin part of the rationale for the formation of the SDP. In a pre-New Labour appeal to combat the 'centuries old in substance', but 'new and more subtle form', of injustice with the creation of a coalition beyond traditional class origins, loyalties and 'past political affiliations', Jenkins called for 'a new kind of politics' based on 'the politics of compassion...the politics of injustice...the politics of principle' (Jenkins, 1972: 9, 22; Jenkins, 1991: 339). However, Jenkins' programme was dependent on a position of influence in the higher echelons of the party and its policymaking apparatus, either as party leader or as a senior figure of a future Labour government. Outside Labour's shadow cabinet and no longer chairman of the NEC Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-committee and, given the Jenkinsite pro-European sources of the series of speeches, Jenkins' 'Unauthorized Programme', in spite of its eloquence and coherent radical potential, would lack influence and purpose.

Jenkins' disinclination to compete with his factional opponents from within the shadow cabinet and the research programme after 1972 was to have important implications for the Labour Party. Jenkins' renunciation of the parliamentary leadership was resented by others on the centre-right who remained, and it helped to cement some of the gains made by the left in terms the Labour Party's economic and industrial policy and attitude on Europe. For one, it left Crosland and Edmund Dell isolated on the NEC Industrial Policy Sub-committee. In addition to Crosland's perception that Jenkins was now offering advice from on high about the Labour Party's apparent malaise and on 'three rules which the Labour Party ought to apply in its policy-making and presentation', Susan Crosland complained that her husband was attending up to nine weekly committee meetings 'to fight against the Left getting its way, while Roy stood on the sidelines...berating Labour's collective leadership for giving way to the Left...and wrote elegant biographical pieces for The Times for a fat fee'. To some it appeared as if Jenkins' desire was to be Prime Minister rather than party leader (Crosland S, 1982: 252; Jenkins, 1991: 308, 621; Wickham-Jones, 1996: 126; The Times, 10 March 1973).
If Jenkins did not appear to want to be the saviour of the Labour Party, neither did he seem to have significant compunction about denying Crosland the prospect of party office. Crosland had, belatedly, provided some response to the intellectual challenge offered by left-wing domination of the research programme, but the Jenkinsite hard core (who had also ‘punished’ Roy Hattersley, but not Shirley Williams, for accepting promotion in the shadow cabinet after Jenkins’ resignation) conspired to sabotage the chances of Crosland’s candidature for the deputy leadership as a direct punishment for his failure to vote favourably for the terms of entry to the Common Market and ‘to avoid supersession by an alternative potential leader on the reformist/internationalist wing of the Labour Party emerging as a result of [Jenkins’] temporary withdrawal from the central councils’ (Crosland S., 1982: 243-4; Jenkins, 1991: 352). In the circumstances, the Jenkinsites marshalled the centre-right vote in support of Ted Short in the ballot for the deputy leadership of 20 April 1972 following Jenkins’ own resignation from the post. In the first ballot, Crosland received 61 votes compared to 110 for Foot and 111 for Short. In the second ballot, Short defeated Foot by 145 votes to 116 (LP/PLP Minutes, 20/27 April 1972).

On the whole, Jenkins’ post-resignation behaviour demonstrated a largely negative attitude to the Labour Party and its electoral fortunes. He was returned to the shadow cabinet in October 1973, but the earlier promise of the ‘Unauthorized Programme’ had receded and, in the face of increasing left-wing domination of the party’s research and policy programme, it appeared that he neither expected nor wanted the Labour Party to win the next general election (see Jenkins, 1991: 364). Although they shared his belief that the Labour Party in the years of opposition between 1970 and 1974 had become undeserving of power, some of his younger acolytes in the PLP disagreed over the desirability of a Labour victory as they held a fundamental belief in the influence of government (Laser, 1976: 274; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). In the final judgment, Jenkins’ contribution to party unity and electoral prospects in opposition was a

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27 However, even Hattersley gloomily expressed his firm belief to Crosland that ‘only Ted Short could defeat Michael Foot’ in the contest for the deputy leadership (Crosland S., 1982: 243).

28 In the ballot, Jenkins gained fifth position with 144 votes behind Callaghan (150), Foot (147), Prentice (146) and, ironically, Crosland with 145 votes (LP/PLP Minutes, 1 November 1973).
negative one. As they were resolved on a course of action in pursuit of their European ideal that carried them beyond the politics of the Labour Party, the process of marginalisation was almost an inevitable fate for the Jenkinsites. Their position within the party and as an integral element of Labour’s dominant centre-right governing coalition was further tarnished by Jenkins’ resignation from the deputy leadership at a critical juncture and by the loss of several other pro-Europeans such as Taverne, Thomson and Ray Gunter. Ultimately, Wilson did little to save them because he could afford to. The Economist (10 July 1971) observed of his fluctuating approach to the European issue in the face of conflicting party pressures that it ‘is always easier for a Labour leader to fall out with his right wing than with his left... for the right can be relied upon to be as moderate in its bitterness as in its policies’. However, the Jenkinsites were perhaps the most likely (minority) faction in a position to divide the Labour Party in opposition and to fatally endanger Labour’s immediate electoral prospects. In the circumstances, they became the most significant impediment to party unity and, ultimately, for this reason, they lost, temporarily at least, their place at Labour’s high table.

Although the Jenkinsites may have lacked the ‘organisational solidity’ important in Rose’s (1964: 37-8; also see Hine, 1982: 38-9) classic distinction between factions and tendencies, the Jenkinsites constituted more than a tendency or issue group of ‘ad hoc combinations of politicians in agreement upon one particular issue or at one moment in time’ (Hine, 1982: 39; Rose, 1964: 37). Anyway, Hine (1982: 39) argues that some ‘of the most important divisions in a party may... transcend tendencies and even factions... they may even change pre-existing group alignments quite substantially, and in any case single-issue groups are not necessarily at the base of a hierarchy... running from least to most organised’. Hine here cites the European issue in the Labour Party as a case in point, and suggests that the ‘issue group may for brief periods be highly organised, as in the case of pro- and anti-EEC groups in both British parties in 1974-5’. Certainly by Rose’s definition of ‘a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable group of politicians’, the Jenkinsites represented more than a political tendency. Hine (1982: 38-9; also see Belloni & Beller, 1976) again suggests that precisely because the distinction between faction and
tendency 'is an analytical distinction there is an element of ambiguity. Factions may be
based on people, and tendencies purely on ideas and attitudes, but...we cannot have a
clear idea of which ideas and attitudes combine together to form a tendency, unless we
observe the real-world behaviour of practising politicians'. Moreover, while it is a useful
distinction for 'drawing attention to the different levels of organisation which intra-party
groups may display' quite 'what level of organisational cohesion and continuity a group
actually has to display before it can be known as a faction is of course problematic...a
group's need for organisation will depend on the rules sand conventions governing party
life' and, in any case, 'there are substantial problems in measuring the solidity of
factional organisation'. For instance, Rose's (1964: 40-1) contention that the
'Conservative electoral party is pre-eminently a party of tendencies' and the 'Labour
electoral party has been since its foundation a party of factions', 'while intuitively
plausible, and widely followed, is essentially impressionistic' (Hine, 1982: 39; also see
Bale, 1997b: 25-6, 37-8).

The Jenkinsites perhaps fall somewhere between Rose's analytical categories of faction
and tendency. The Jenkinsites did not possess the factional criteria of solid organisation
or self-administered disciplinary procedures (although the group was keen to indirectly
punish those such as Crosland who it perceived to have abandoned the critical causes and
relationships). Alternatively, from the evidence presented above it would appear that the
Jenkinsites, given their increasingly marginal existence in the PLP, were a 'self-aware'
group that enjoyed 'a relatively stable and cohesive personnel over time' and, in the
central cause of European membership and the wider prospectus of Jenkins'
'Unauthorized Programme', pursued a range of political issues and policies inside the
Labour Party in at least some form of consciously organised political activity (see Hine,
1982: 38; Rose, 1964: 37). Berrington (1980: 14) further questions the value of Rose's
original distinction between factions and tendencies based on their formal organisational
solidity. In a proviso applicable to the Jenkinsite group, he suggests that 'it is wrong to
divide groups too starkly into the organised and unorganised, the formal and the informal.
Organisation is a matter of degree. An informal network of friends in the House of
Commons may co-ordinate their work as effectively (or more so) as a formally
constituted group' (see Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01). Moreover, Berrington (1980: 2, 15) argues that the 'study of cleavages within parties is likely to profit more from an examination of the inter-action between tendencies and issue-groups than from investigation into organised groups per se' as formal structure 'may actually dilute the parity, and perhaps the effectiveness, of a tendency'.

On Rose's scale, the Jenkinsites can perhaps be said to represent a Labour right faction within Labour's right-wing tendency. Certainly, the expression of a Jenkinsite current – and, increasingly, a factional identity and activity - in the party after 1970 reflected a significant degree of organisational (and ideological) fragmentation within Labour's traditionally dominant centre-right coalition, and within the parliamentary Labour right itself. Moreover, Jenkins' resignation as deputy leader in April 1972, to advocate his group case from outside of Labour's shadow cabinet, not only further tested the patience of former centre-right Cabinet and shadow cabinet colleagues and allies, it lost him any role on influential NEC policy sub-committees. Subsequently, it helped, not only to undermine the wider Jenkinsite 'Unauthorized Programme', but to enable an increasingly prominent and organised left to consolidate their position of influence in the party's power structures and policy-making apparatus that was to inevitably have significant implications for the context and constraints of a future Labour government.

3.5 Right-wing Factionalism in the PLP in the 1970s: The Manifesto Group

3.5.1 Introduction

However, the 'loose and informal grouping' of the Jenkinsites that 'had no minutes...no papers...no officers...no structure' did not offer the only parliamentary factional activity on the Labour right in the 1970s. The left-wing factional organisation and influence of the Tribune Group in the PLP was met on the centre-right by the formation of the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs. Although there was significant overlap with the Jenkinsite group in terms of personnel, 'the Manifesto Group was not the same as the
Jenkinsite group'. The Manifesto Group was established after the 1974 election and some of its leading figures included Jim Wellbeloved, John Horam, David Marquand, John Cartwright and Alan Lee Williams. The Manifesto Group, presumably because of fear of left-wing reprisals in the CLPs, refused to publish lists of its members (Berrington, 1980: 14; Brand, 1989: 152), but did constitute 'a formal group' in terms of membership and organisation (George Cunningham, Interview with the author, 21/11/01).29 It 'met in... a committee room in the House of Commons and it did have officers and an agenda' (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01).

3.5.2 The Origins and Development of the Manifesto Group

In the absence of a single leader of the Gaitskell variety who might be able to unite the parliamentary Labour right, a number of concerned lieutenants took it upon themselves to initiate organised representation of the Labour right in the PLP. The election of Ian Mikardo as chairman of the PLP had demonstrated the increasing organisational unity of the parliamentary Labour left and had alarmed many of the traditional Labour right majority of the PLP. As appeared to be the case more generally in this period for elections to important positions within the PLP, the Labour right vote had been split between two candidates and had allowed the highly organised minority Tribune Group to elect their chosen candidate. Given the inroads already made in the research and policy spheres of the party, it now appeared even more possible that the programme of a Labour government could be undermined by potential left-wing economic and anti-EEC measures. In the various offices and significant channels of the PLP, the left-wing Tribune group appeared to be at the height of its power. In addition to their success in the election of the candidate to chairman of the PLP, Tribune Group members dominated both the Liaison Committee of the PLP, the important channel of opinion between Labour backbenchers and the Labour Cabinet, and the leadership of backbench subject groups (LP/MANIF/18, What We Must Do; Financial Times, 9 March 1977). Hence a

29 Brand (1989: 152) explains that the Manifesto Group 'operated controls who joined and the membership list was never published'. There was an even more confidential category of membership: members 'received minutes and other literature of the group, but their association with the Group was not notified even to their fellow members'. These are the characteristic actions of groups who 'feel that they are threatened' and so will 'restrict their membership'.

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small group of Labour right MPs, among them John Horam, Dickson Mabon and Giles Radice, met soon after the election of Mikardo to establish a group that would support and campaign for a single candidate of the Labour right for the next election of the chairmanship of the PLP and to organise candidates of the Labour right for election to other important PLP positions such as those on the Liaison Committee.

The chosen name of the Manifesto Group possessed a certain irony, given the relatively left-wing nature of the manifesto upon which Labour had been elected (largely the product of the relatively radical document, Labour's Programme 1973), but it was broadly indicative of two themes. Firstly, it was representative of the defensiveness of moderate opinion in the PLP and their attempt to emphasise their loyalty to the moderate party leadership and to locate themselves broadly within the Labour Party tradition (LP/MANIF/18, What We Must Do; Financial Times, 9 March 1977). Secondly, it represented a reluctant acceptance of, rather than explicit support for, Labour's manifesto. Although it was as far as most members of the Manifesto Group were prepared to go, it offered something of social democracy to defend (John Horam, Interview with the author, 16/2/01). A wider perspective of the role of the Manifesto Group sees it as not a mere ‘rubber stamp for the Government. We see our role as that of reasserting the democratic socialist principles of the party’ (Ian Wrigglesworth, cited in Financial Times, 9 March 1977).

Initially, the Manifesto Group campaign to overturn Tribune Group victories in elections to important posts of the PLP met with success. In the PLP elections held after the October 1974 general election, Cledwyn Hughes was elected to the post of PLP Chairman as the single candidate of the Labour right, together with a significant increase in representation on the Liaison Committee. Buoyed by such successes, the Manifesto Group broadened its purpose and objectives beyond the organisation of the right-wing

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30 The inherent paradox of the Manifesto Group appeared to be that, as an organisation of broad centre-right Labour MPs, it wanted to repudiate the more extreme measures of collectivism advocated by the Labour left but stood ‘squarely in support of the 1974 Labour Party Manifesto, an extremely collectivist document influenced by Left-wing strength in the party’s institutions and committees’. Moreover, implicit in the existence of the Manifesto Group was a weakness derived from the fact that, while it deplored increasing left-wing domination of the party, it needed to ‘support party policy and a Government that can only survive by placating the Left’ (LP/MANIF/18, What We Must Do; Financial Times, 9 March 1977).
slate in PLP elections. Elected officer posts for the Manifesto Group were established and, under the auspices of its secretary, John Horam, a researcher was appointed to collate material for the purpose of publishing Manifesto Group statements of policy position. The wider objective was to broaden the scope and purpose of the Manifesto Group to include a contribution to the battle of ideas in the party (see LP/MANIF/18, What We Must Do; LP/MANIF/20, Priorities for Labour).

The first of such statements published by the Manifesto Group in 1977, What We Must Do: A democratic socialist approach to Britain's crisis (LP/MANIF/18), drafted largely by Bryan Magee, Horam, Marquand and Mackintosh, set out what it hoped would be an alternative programme to the Bennite left: the 'Marxists...advocate a programme which has resulted in bureaucratic dictatorship wherever it has been tried...The democratic socialist approach alone can bring about the radical changes we need, while at the same time preserving the fundamental liberties of our people' (LP/MANIF/18, What We Must Do, p. 36). Essentially, it was an attempt to establish a conventional moderate democratic socialist 'middle way' or 'a third possible course' between 'Marxist socialism, and..."devil-take-the-hindmost" Conservatism' (Telegraph, 9 March 1977). Indeed, the Manifesto Group proposals received a largely negative reception in the contemporary press. The proposals were viewed as a return to the past or 'that we go on doing what we are, with minor modifications and in a more aesthetically pleasing style': Peter Jenkins (Guardian, 19 May 1977; also see Financial Times, 9 March 1977), for instance, described the proposals as 'Plus ca change' on the basis that the same statement might have been made fifteen years previously. Both inside and outside the party, it seemed, the tide of ideas was against them. Moreover, the majority of the Manifesto Group membership were not concerned with developing a coherent set of ideas and principles to replace the failing basis of a Croslandite analysis. The majority of the membership lacked an overall intellectual perspective and were more concerned with the immediate tactics necessary to maintain the Labour government in office and to impede the advance of the left in the party. Additional attempts were made to augment the radical credibility of the Manifesto Group with the publication in June 1978 of a further pamphlet, entitled The Wrong Approach: An Exposition of Conservative Policies. Essentially, this was a broad
attempt to provide the Manifesto Group with an offensive anti-Thatcherite as well as a defensive anti-left position.

3.5.3 Internal Dynamics and Divisions of the Manifesto Group

Moreover, the Manifesto Group was sometimes eager to display its relative independence from the government and voted against it on a number of occasions between 1974 and 1979, as it was important to be seen as conditional supporters of the government (Horam, Interview with the author, 16/2/01). However, the group was to struggle with significant internal constraints and diversity. One major problem for the Manifesto Group was the departure of some of its key membership. The departure of Horam to the Department of Transport in 1976 and the resignation of Marquand to join Roy Jenkins as an adviser in Brussels in 1977 deprived the Manifesto Group of two key figures interested in ideas. The group retained some such as Radice who were interested in the influence and impact of ideas but, for the most part, driven by the organisational ability of those such as Ian Wrigglesworth and John Cartwright, the membership focused on consolidating its early successes in elections of the PLP and cultivating an effective media profile rather than a full frontal ideological assault on the Labour left. Additionally, the election of Callaghan to the leadership of the Labour Party in 1976 had important implications for the Manifesto Group. Callaghan was reported to caution that he would ‘not be willing to accept a situation in which minority groups in the Parliamentary Labour Party manoeuvre in order to foist their views on the party as a whole (The Times, 22 April 1976). The Manifesto Group suffered in two respects: firstly, the group contained ambitious politicians who feared that explicit and active membership would jeopardise their prospects of promotion; secondly, promotion of a number of key members of the group to government posts deprived it of some its most active and able resources.

As noted, the perceived need to keep its membership list secret for fear of reprisals and de-selection of right-wing Labour MPs at the hands of their CLPs, restricted a more frontal challenge to the Labour left. The small number of Manifesto Group members such as Horam, Wrigglesworth, Marquand, Dickson Mabon and John Mackintosh who were
prepared to adopt a high profile and risk the often bitter criticism of the left felt disappointed by others who did nor. Moreover, the impact of the group was also limited by the reluctance of influential representatives of the centre-right such as Hattersley, John Smith, Gerald Kaufman and Bryan Gould to join its ranks. Although they were not sympathetic to the left-wing cause in the party and, privately, supported the Manifesto Group position, publicly they distanced themselves from the group and denounced its appeal as ‘right-wing’. For instance, after 1979 Hattersley and Gould were said to want Bill Rodgers to remain in the Labour Party because there would always be someone to the right of them (Horam, Interview with the author, 16/2/01; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).

The Manifesto Group, founded initially for organisational and strategic reasons to resist the advance of the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) and as a counterweight to the Tribune Group within the PLP, contained within its (seventy plus) membership a diverse range of broadly centre-right Labour MPs and opinion, including Jenkinsites such as Bill Rodgers, David Owen and Ian Wrigglesworth, and others such as Roy Hattersley and Harold Lever. Consequently, there was a lack of cohesion and consistency in its thinking on certain key political and policy themes such as Europe and the appropriate role of public expenditure and the redistribution of wealth in the pursuit of equality at the expense of wealth creation and individual freedom. In essence, some of the diversity and divisions of the Manifesto Group reflected the ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right itself in the post-1974 period. For instance, the group’s initial policy document, What We Must Do: A democratic socialist approach to Britain’s crisis (1977), restates its faith in limited planning and the mixed economy but repudiates increased public expenditure and simple redistribution of wealth. Instead, its emphasis is placed squarely on wealth creation: ‘[p]rogressive taxation and increased public expenditure have been pursued with too little regard for overall cost and too optimistic a view of the likely benefits’. Bryan Magee, one of the principal authors of the proposals, described how wealth creation must be given a priority that it had never previously achieved in socialist thinking and the pamphlet as an attempt to update and stimulate support for the principles of moderate democratic socialism. In addition to
attempting to sustain the Callaghan government through its difficulties and into the
general election, it was ‘firmly committed to’ what it saw as ‘the central democratic
socialist values of personal freedom and social equality’ (LP/MANIF/18, *What We Must

British status in Europe also provided a thorny issue for the Manifesto Group, illustrating
the diversity of its membership and undermining its ability to organise effectively to
oppose the growing strength of the Tribune Group and the advance of the left inside the
Labour Party. One significant illustration of the underlying weakness of the group was
the surprising dearth of support for Roy Jenkins in the 1976 leadership election (see
Chapter One). Desai (1994: 170-2) suggests that the Manifesto Group’s:

‘active core of about twenty members mostly joined the SDP after 1981. The rest of its paralysingly
diverse members did not have the same primarily intellectual relationship to the Labour Party... Apart
from getting their slates elected to committees and having ‘agonized discussions’ about the
government’s series of public expenditure cuts, the Manifesto Group achieved little, least of all in the
way of proposing policy alternatives. Having chosen to support the government in the interests of
right-wing unity against the new Labour left, the Manifesto Group focused its criticism mostly on the
minutiae of anti-inflationary policy – demanding more firmness and consistency. In the face of new
and unanticipated problems, the group’s policy statement is more interesting as (another) measure of
the social democrats’ intellectual and political decline than for the merits of the arguments’.

3.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter, then, has been to show that it was not the case that the
parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s lacked group mentality and factional
organisation, and that such group behaviour could not take ‘oppositional’ form within the
context of Labour Party politics of the period, but rather that such psychology and
behaviour took place within a party and political environment that was passing them by.
The development and efficacy of factional activity on the parliamentary Labour right was
constrained by a number of factors, not least among them an alien, unforgiving party
environment and the ideological and political diversity and fragmentation of group
membership. Consequently, attempts to cohere and organise on the parliamentary Labour
right lacked significant impact on the internal politics of the Labour Party. Rather, at least indirectly, group activity and organisation on the parliamentary Labour right in this period consolidated for some their increasing frustration with the constraints and trajectory of Labour Party politics and offered the prospect of an alternative social democratic vehicle and agenda.

In opposition, the Jenkinsite faction took a stance that divided them not just from the Labour left, but also from the centrist leadership. The ‘oppositional’ form of Jenkinsite behaviour further weakened the cohesion of the parliamentary Labour right in the face of enhanced left-wing activity and emphasised increasing divisions within Labour’s centre-right governing coalition. Moreover, it also offered an early indication of the potential (and promise) of a social democratic breakaway from the Labour Party. The complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right were further illustrated within the context of the internal dynamics and limitations of the Manifesto Group, established to offer a critically supportive perspective of the Labour government and to act as a counterweight to the Tribune group in the PLP. Its diverse membership reflected a broad range of centre-right opinion and, while it was temporarily effective in stemming the flow of success of the Tribune Group in elections for Labour Party office, a number of divisive policy themes such as Europe, the trade union question and public expenditure prohibited detailed discussion of such issues and restricted the latitude and impact of its policy agenda and statements. Again, the experience of the Manifesto Group for some confirmed the divisions within Labour’s dominant centre-right coalition and the inalienable trajectory of the Labour Party further to the left.

The factional organisation and activity of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s does not correspond unconditionally to conventional models of left-right factionalism outlined by Rose and others. Certainly, parliamentary Labour right forces did not coalesce in a purely loyalist or supportive amalgamation of its ideological differences in the form of ‘some undifferentiated non-Left tendency’ (Ryan, 1987: 26-8), nor even did they give rise to a homogeneous, focused revisionist faction in the mould of CDS dedicated to the defence of the parliamentary leadership. The factional behaviour and
efficacy of the parliamentary Labour right rather reveals the extent to which it had fragmented ideologically, politically and organisationally by the 1970s. It is to the ideological and political inconsistency of the parliamentary Labour right in the late 1960s and 1970s that we now turn through the lens of critical policy case studies.
Chapter Four

Case Study: The Parliamentary Labour Right and Europe

4.1 Introduction

The reluctant and shifting relationship of post-war British governments with the idea of European integration is well known (George, 1998; Young, 2000, 2002: 15-16). These developments have provided a central theme of recent British history and Britain’s post-war, post-imperial experience (Broad, 2001; Daniels & Ritchie, 1995: 84). Moreover, throughout much of the post-war period, through to recent years, the British Labour Party has displayed complex and shifting attitudes towards European integration (Brivati, 1994: 16-17; 1996a: 405-8; Daniels & Ritchie, 1995: 84-5, 86-7; Robbins, 1979). For thirty years or more the party has experienced significant internal conflict, disputes and divisions over EC membership, and the party itself has fluctuated back and forth, between pro and anti, when in and out of office.

As Jefferys (1993: 85) explains, the first two years of Labour’s return to opposition in 1970 were overshadowed by protracted disputes over the party’s attitude towards the EEC. A minority of pro-Market MPs, mainly from the ‘revisionist’ wing of the party, supported Heath to secure British entry, despite increasing scepticism at grass-roots level about the benefits of membership. So, in an attempt to reconcile divisions, ‘Wilson adopted a compromise: Labour would renegotiate the terms of entry and hold a referendum on British membership – a formula which prompted the resignation from the front-bench of the Shadow Chancellor [and Deputy Leader], Roy Jenkins’. However, this was more than a simple split along orthodox left-right lines. Tom Nairn (1973: 94, also see 1972: 75) noted that:

‘the Common Market schism is only partly between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the classical Labourist sense. Far too many right-wing and centrist leaders joined the anti-Market movement for this to be an adequate explanation. It corresponds more closely to a split between old ‘party men’ (with a strong phalanx of opportunists and right-wing populists around them) and ‘new men’ of bourgeois origin less
dependent on the party machine and the Old Labourist spirit... The 'old faithfuls' (both right and left) of Labour national-socialism and those who thought they still needed the old cow for career motives were on one side – except for a few pensioners like Lord George-Brown – while the nouvelle vague of middle-class professionals (much closer in both appearance and spirit to continental social democracy) stood on the other.'

Nairn (1973: 94) suggests that the split over the principle of entry to the Common Market resulted 'in the formation of a new leadership for the social-democratic right wing – around Jenkins and Thompson – and in a general strengthening of that faction's fibre and spirit' . Similarly, Desai contends that the significant split of October 1971 represented 'the most serious to wrack the party since the days of Bevanism'. Moreover, it offered the so-called intellectual, revisionist social democrats their first visible, organised presence within the party since the days of the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) in 1964; so much so, that the split of 1971 both 'signalled the beginning of their marginalization' and 'also precipitated their identity as intellectuals more clearly than before' (Desai, 1994: 145-6).

Although the problems of identifying the increasingly marginal Jenkinsites as Labour's principal intellectual tradition and as singularly representative of Labour's revisionist tradition have previously been discussed, a recurrent theme of the thesis has been that the issue of European membership divided the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s and precipitated the increasing marginalisation of an important element of parliamentary Labour right opinion, both within the Labour Party and within Labour's centre-right 'dominant coalition'. Together with the impact of further divisions in key policy spheres such as industrial relations and public expenditure (see Chapters Five and Six), the parliamentary Labour right represented a discordant, fragmented component of the PLP in the intra-party debates and conflict of the 1970s. The previous chapter noted the importance of the European issue to the Jenkinsite cause and factional activity on the parliamentary Labour right. This chapter examines attitudes more broadly on the parliamentary Labour right to the issue of British membership of the Common Market in the 1970s, and the fault lines and divisions contained therein. Firstly, it briefly explores the broad dimensions of the European debate within the Labour Party. Secondly, as
essential context to Labour Party debates and divisions over Europe in the 1970s, it examines the nature of earlier revisionist disagreements over Europe. Thirdly, it explores the second British application to join the Community in 1967 by the Wilson Labour administration, as a prelude to the bitter debates and conflict that shook the party in opposition after 1970 as it changed its formal position on British membership of the EC. Fourthly, an examination of disparate attitudes to the European question on the parliamentary Labour right, and their relative creation or accentuation of differences and divisions within Labour's governing coalition, is undertaken with reference to 'historic' European developments in British politics after 1970, such as the October 1971 parliamentary debate and vote on the principle of British entry and the 1975 referendum on continued membership on Labour's 'renegotiated' terms. Underpinning this analysis are two relevant questions: firstly, to what extent do the differences and divisions of the Labour right over the European issue during the 1960s and 1970s confirm or contest orthodox interpretations of the parliamentary Labour right and, secondly, how far did European divisions augment the fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s?

4.2 The Labour Party and Europe: Dimensions of the Debate

Labour's divisions reflected the general divisions in British politics created by the process of European integration. The essence of the Common Market issue was the nature of Britain's relationship with the rest of the world. There were three main dimensions to the debate. Firstly, the peculiarity of Britain's post-war alignments, comprising of the sterling area as an economic unit, the Commonwealth as a political entity and the 'special relationship' with the United States, had to be balanced with Britain's role as a European power. The potential conflict of its European and world roles begged questions of Britain's likely commitment to the Community and, on the other hand, of the potential losses to accrue from the failure to join the European dynamic. Secondly, divisions arose over the form the community of nations should take. Many in the Labour Party viewed the Treaty of Rome as a capitalist association that presented an external force that could inhibit the potential of a future Labour government to plan the
British economy (Berrington, 1980: Daniels & Ritchie, 1995: 86). This view also influenced anti-Marketees such as Douglas Jay on the so-called revisionist Labour right and centrists such as Peter Shore (Interview with the author, 3/3/99). Alternatively, only if the Labour Party could be harnessed to EC institutions would it develop in a way compatible with the precepts of democratic socialism. A third theme concerned the danger that EC membership presented to the Commonwealth and the rise of disproportional losses in Commonwealth trade (Brivati, 1994: 20; 1996a: 406; Young, 1997: 149). Pro-Marketees argued that entry would open up European markets and that Commonwealth interests could be safeguarded.

The debate over British membership of the EC gave an important impetus to the politics of opposition. Although many Labour members were indifferent to the European issue, it offered a welcome opportunity to attack the Macmillan Conservative government. Although EC membership was not strictly ruled in its policy statements, Labour became identified with an anti-European position (Young, 1997: 149). Within the PLP as a whole there was a majority of anti-Marketees (Brivati, 1994: 20; 1996a: 407-8). Opposition to the Community was also widespread in the party at large (Janosik, 1968: 42; Kitzinger, 1961: 150-1). Broadly, those on the left tended to be anti-European except for those who came from an ILP background, who tended to be in favour of the Community as an international organisation. Among the so-called Gaitskellites, the pro-Marketees were a majority but there was an effective minority of anti-Marketees, including leading figures like Douglas Jay' (Brivati, 1994: 20; 1996a: 407-8; Haseler, 1969: 228). Labour Party divisions over Europe were the antithesis of recent debates over defence: moderate trade union MPs and the leader this time supported those who were suspicious of the nature and effects of the Community. In contrast to the defence debate, in which he could rely on a large majority of the parliamentary party, if Gaitskell had come out openly in favour of the Common Market he would have faced opposition from all sides of the Labour movement. Alternatively, if he explicitly rejected the principle of the Common Market, he risked alienating the majority of his most loyal supporters.
Gaitskell’s failure to approach the Community as an ‘article of faith’ could be regarded as an attempt to unify the party in the face of the emerging fissure. Gaitskell’s personal view of the Community was based on an acceptance of the underlying aspirations of the European movement, tempered by a profound suspicion of the implications of membership for Britain. This approach expressed itself most clearly in a deep concern for the precise terms of entry that any British application for membership should make (Williams, 1979: 705), a similarly pragmatic approach as party leader to Wilson’s later attempts to maintain party unity in the face of serious intra-party divisions over Europe (Young, 1997: 150-1). Gaitskell was ‘not against the Common Market in principle, but he argued that the economic case was not proved and he was a great believer in the Commonwealth. He felt it was a factor of stability in the world’ (Goodman, 1979: 337). Gaitskell insisted on rigid terms of entry and, believing that talks would ultimately fail, felt he had little to lose by representing vital British interests. The ‘famous five conditions’ of British membership outlined by Gaitskell included guarantees to British agriculture, a fair deal for European Free Trade Association (EFTA) partners, the ability to plan national economic policy, the freedom of an independent foreign policy, and safeguards for Commonwealth trade (Brivati, 1994: 21-2; 1996a: 408-9; Haseler, 1969: 230).

4.3 Gaitskellite Revisionist Labour Right Divisions over Europe

Within the broad dimensions of Labour’s European debate, the ‘revisionist’ Labour right has been subject to acute divisions over the issue. These ranged broadly from Gaitskell’s initial scepticism (and Jay’s outright opposition) and ‘more general ambivalence…to the place of Britain in the process of European integration’, on the basis of a ‘concern for practical details rather than abstract principles’ (Brivati, 1994: 16; Jay, 1968: 11-15; 1980: 339; Williams, 1982: 395) and a claim that ‘I don’t believe in faith. I believe in reason and you have not shown me any’ (Gaitskell to Monnet, 1962, cited in Brivati, 1994: 16; 1996a: 404; Williams, 1979: 708; Young, 1998: 151; also see Jay, 1980: 282; Jenkins, 1991: 145); to the later strategic manoeuvring, according to the relative intra-party position and alignments, and apparent pragmatism of Callaghan and Healey; to the
studied ambivalence in the face of more pressing priorities of Crosland (Brivati, 1994: 16; Healey, 1989: 210-12, 329-30; Young, 1998: 148); to the enthusiastic support for entry of George Brown, and the ‘article of faith’ that British membership represented to Jenkins and his supporters (Marquand, 1967: 21-35; also see Chapter Three).

Gaitskell was taken ‘to be a cautious supporter of entry’ as the issue first began to surface during 1960. In the wake of the Macmillan application, he maintained a ‘public agnosticism’ to the issue that he thought should be the basis of the Labour Party position. Such a position should be dependent on the terms of entry secured by the Macmillan government. Gaitskell’s attitude was soon to be characterised by an ‘economic rationalism’ that was hostile to the ‘irrational’ pro-European faith of ‘flighty prophets’ (Young, 1998: 149-50, 151-2; also see Williams, 1979: 702-49). Although Gaitskell’s initial handling of the issue caused few problems for some of his pro-European friends who had been central to his position in both the Clause IV and unilateralism debates, his emerging position on Europe meant that signs of unrest soon became apparent (Jenkins, 1991: 143-4). In response to the conditions that Harold Wilson laid down in the House of Commons as essential to Labour’s acceptance of EC membership, Jenkins resigned his front bench post (Brivati, 1994: 17; 1996a: 404; Young, 1998: 150-1). While he explicitly rejected the general argument of the left of the party, with Wilson to the fore, that the EEC represented a capitalist cartel that would signal the end of socialism, Gaitskell ‘shared their generally sceptical, suspicious, very British attitude…it was his enemies rather than his friends he finished up by pleasing’ (Young, 1998: 151; also see Brivati, 1994: 17).

As noted, the question of party unity and Labour’s future electoral fortunes were crucial considerations. Initially, Gaitskell approved a compromise that accepted the principle of membership given that the conditions for British entry were satisfied but, eventually, much to the chagrin of friends such as Jenkins, Gaitskell turned increasingly against the bid for entry. He was conscious of ‘the prospect of another huge split in the Labour Party, so soon after the 1960-61 battle over defence’, which ‘had the likelihood of ending Labour’s bid for electoral victory’, and the ‘anticipation of another five years in
frustrating opposition weighed heavily with the ‘government minded’ Gaitskell’ (Brivati, 1994: 17; 1996a: 404-5; also see Williams, 1979: 706, 777-8). Both Gaitskell and Jay were also sceptical of or opposed to British membership of the EC because of the implications for ‘the nature of Britain’s relationship with the rest of the world... Britain’s relationship to the Commonwealth and the ‘special relationship’ with the United States would have to be reconsidered’. Gaitskell possessed ‘a residual belief in Britain’s global responsibilities, especially where the Commonwealth was concerned’, and he ‘regarded the... European Community as something of an irrelevance in the context of this global role’. The continued belief in a global perspective reflected ‘two overriding’ assumptions. Firstly, ‘much the greater part of our trade and investment overseas is conducted with countries outside Europe’. Secondly, our ‘closest political and human links have been for generations... with those nations which were largely created by British emigration, capital, and economic development over the last two centuries’, such as Australia and New Zealand (Jay, 1968: 13-14). This differed from younger Gaitskellite such as Jenkins who believed that ‘the future lay in achieving closer links to the Community because... Britain could not sustain its international role and... needed to develop a more realistic sense of its position in the world’. This was ‘a powerful lobby in the Labour Party... arguing against the idea of Britain having a global leadership role and proposing a strategic readjustment: cutting the international cloth to fit the domestic economic reality’ (Brivati, 1994: 17-19; also see 1996a: 404-6; Foot, 1973: 575; Healey, 1989: 210-11; Jay, 1968: 13-14).

The divisions within the Gaitskellite revisionist right were made explicit in the wake of their leader’s emotional anti-Community appeal to the 1962 Labour Party Conference. Famously, Gaitskell disappointed many of his pro-European revisionist supporters with his speech of 3 October, which argued dramatically against the prospects of a federal Europe (LPACR, 1962: 155, 159, 166; Labour Party, 1962b; also see Brivati, 1996a: 413-15; Brown, 1972: 218; Williams, 1982: 403-8):

'We must be clear about this: it does mean, if this is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent European state ... It means the end of a thousand years of history... And it does mean the end of the Commonwealth. How can one seriously suppose that if the mother country, the centre of the
Commonwealth, is a province of Europe... it could continue to exist as the mother country of a series of independent nations? It is sheer nonsense... If we carry the Commonwealth with us, safeguarded, flourishing, prosperous, if we could safeguard our agriculture, and our EFTA friends were all in it, if we were secure in our employment policy, and if we were able to maintain our independent foreign policy and yet have this wider looser association with Europe, it would indeed be a great ideal. But if this is not possible... then we must stand firm by what we believe, for the sake of Britain and the World; and we shall not flinch from our duty if that moment comes.'

The ovation for the speech in the auditorium was 'unparalleled', but Dora Gaitskell remarked that all 'the wrong people are cheering' (Williams, 1982: 390). Bill Rodgers, the pro-European organiser of the Gaitskellite CDS, remained firmly in his seat. From an anti-Market perspective, Jay (1980: 286) described the character and effect of Gaitskell's speech as 'unique among all the political speeches I ever heard; not merely the finest, but in a class apart... It can only be described as an intellectual massacre. Nobody had anything else to say. For its uniqueness rested in its ring of truth'. The 1962 Conference revealed clear divisions in the interpretation of a core 'revisionist' theme, the so-called 'power-political creed' that believed that 'politics was primarily the art of attaining, maintaining and using power' (Haseler, 1969: 234). Revisionist pro-Marketeers developed this theme in their argument, put forward forcefully by Jenkins at the Conference, that British interests would be severely curtailed if it did not attempt to exert influence in what was fast becoming a new centre of power. Britain could influence the future direction of Europe much better from inside the EEC than from without. Part of this argument also suggested that Britain's world role would be better protected from within the Common Market; if Britain failed to join the fear was that it would become an economic and political backwater (LPACR, 1962: 173). Gaitskell, on the other hand, argued that British influence would decline markedly if Britain joined the EC and would be subject to the overall control of policy by 'the Six': there is a possibility of 'majority decisions on political issues, just as we are to have majority decisions on economic issues... we would be able somehow or other to outvote those we disagree with. I would like to be very sure of that before I committed myself' (LPACR, 1962: 158-9). The nature of Gaitskell's anti-Europeanism was further evident as he predicted the federalist
thrust of the EEC when he told the House of Commons (HC Deb, 1962, 666, Col. 1018, 7 November):

'The government are arguing more and more that the case for entry into the Common Market is political. The Prime Minister... spoke of the European Community 'with the ability to stand on an equal footing with the great power groupings of the world'... the government propose... say that Europe is going to be the great new force standing equally with Russia and the United States. How can we conceive this happening unless there is a single Foreign Secretary to express that policy and a single Prime Minister, and therefore a single Legislature? This is federation. This is the logic of it. At least, if it is not that, it is the supranational majority decision Council.'

Until 'the emergence of the Common Market as a major political event revisionists had found themselves united on virtually all the practical policy decisions that had faced the Party both as a government and as an opposition since the war' (Haseler, 1969: 231). Differential interpretation of the 'power political creed' represented just one dimension of Gaitskellite revisionist divisions over Europe. Much of the argument was conducted on the level of sophisticated economic analysis of the potential effects of entry on economic growth, efficiency and enterprise. Pro-European revisionists identified British entry to the Common Market as concomitant with the desire to promote a more dynamic, efficient and enterprising economy. Anti-European revisionists such as Douglas Jay argued that European protection of food and raw material imports would damage the British economy. Far from aiding the creation of a competitive economy at home, entry to the Common Market would hinder the capacity of British industry to compete in certain areas of its home market (see Jay, 1962c). Jay further emphasised the likely effects of British entry on 'revisionist' totems of equality and social justice. He argued that entry would mean a more regressive taxation system on the grounds of a comparison of the percentage revenue collected from direct taxation in the member states. The capacity to control core social services was held as an important right by Gaitskellite anti-Marketeers, while pro-Market revisionists argued that the Treaty of Rome provided for progressive 'social harmonisation' rather than mitigating against principles of equality and social justice. Jay's concern was that it depends on what you are harmonising to, but
they argued that the level of pensions and rate of family allowances in Germany, for instance, were far in advance of those in the U.K (see Jay, 1962b).

The concept of internationalism provided a further dimension of Gaitskellite revisionist divisions over Europe. The manifesto of the Gaitskellite CDS organisation considered that it would be a betrayal of such a concept and would represent a conservative, inward-looking and regressive attitude if Britain remained outside the EEC. The resultant loss of sovereignty, whether economic or political, from the British signature of the Treaty of Rome was interpreted by pro-European revisionists as intrinsically beneficial in the sense that it would lead to a less insular, more international perspective. Anti-Market revisionists claimed equally internationalist credentials. Jay argued that membership would result in the 'biggest step backwards towards protectionism in 100 years' rather than expand Britain's global perspective and relationships (see Jay, 1962b). Healey argued that the important issue was not a settlement of British relations with Europe but agreement on arms control and disarmament between the major cold war states, and the integration of the new nations into the wider international system. It was not a question of loss of British sovereignty, but whether the European context was the most appropriate in which to integrate. The prospects of security and stability would be better served by the development of a number of genuinely international groups and organisations rather than the emergence of a few super states. British membership of the Common Market would only help to initiate the latter development (Healey, 1961; also see Haseler, 1969: 233-4).

A pro-American, Atlanticist mindset had long been a broad preference of Gaitskellite revisionists and others on the Labour right, the basis of which was an ideological opposition to communism and related defence and security issues, as well as political and cultural preferences (Haseler, Interview with the author, 23/1/01; Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/01; also see Black, 2001; Jones P, 1997). There were those, then, who identified a conflict inherent in British membership of the EC from an Atlanticist perspective, while others such as Jenkins were more sanguine about the prospects of entry to the EEC in addition to Britain's Anglo-American commitments. This group contended that 'just as Britain had been forced to re-examine its post war attitudes to the
Commonwealth and Europe, and reconsider the relative priorities that each should be
given in terms of British thinking about foreign policy...the time had also come to
reconsider the trans-Atlantic relationship'. Jenkins himself hinted at the ‘inherently
unequal nature’ of the Anglo-American relationship and suggested that there was ‘a
certain lack of enthusiasm, for exclusivity at any rate, on both sides of the Atlantic’. In
fact, the U.S. was generally supportive of British entry (Jones P, 1997: 164).

There was, then, a division over the relative priority to be afforded to the Common
Market in relation to other international commitments. Many on the revisionist Labour
right, Jenkins, Rodgers, David Owen, Shirley Williams, were all very certainly pro-
European as well, but some others on the Labour right, who were great supporters of
NATO, were not in favour of it. There ‘was a group of right-wingers...social
democrats...people like Douglas Jay...John Gilbert...Bruce George...and others...in the
early ‘70s [who] took the view that entry into the Common Market by Britain would
cause transatlantic rifts. So it was because we were pro-American on this issue that we
were hostile to entry into the Common Market’. The problem was that ‘when the
referendum came in 1975, that became to some extent a left-right issue, and Reg Prentice
and I and...some others who had been sceptical about Europe thought that with the right
led by Jenkins at that time we had better throw our lot in with him...our opposition to the
Common Market tended to dissolve around the mid ‘70s and we got on board with it’
(Haseler, Interview with the author, 23/1/01). Parliamentary Labour right divisions were
also underpinned by a wider distinction between international and national perspectives,
between those ‘who saw the world as the area they wanted to work in’ and those ‘who
saw the UK in that way’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). The
question of the democratic character of EC institutions was a further issue of principle
that conditioned the respective arguments of revisionist Labour right protagonists. The
question of the representative nature of European institutions loomed large among
Gaitskell’s political concerns. Particularly, he was concerned about Commission powers
in the EEC constitution and the real capacity of the Assembly to respond to them. Pro-
Market revisionists argued that membership was the first priority to be followed by
attempts to exert influence upon the democratic deficit of European institutions.
The strength of feeling in the Labour Party was never fully tested, as government negotiations over British entry broke down. Gaitskell’s opposition to the 1962 negotiations marked a sense of departure with some of his political allies who were disappointed in the lack of enthusiasm towards Europe contained in official Labour policy. Haseler (1969: 234-5) suggests ‘that those who agree upon first principles can... come to totally separate conclusions on matters of policy’. Labour right revisionists found themselves on opposing sides of the European divide. It was estimated that there was roughly a three to one division of pro-Market to anti-Market revisionists in the PLP, while some remained undecided (Haseler, 1969: 228-30; The Times, 8 March 1963). In the PLP as a whole pro-Marketeers were in a minority and, of those, few ‘carried their opposition to Gaitskell’s policy into the open by signing a pro-Market motion placed on the order paper by Jenkins, [Jack] Diamond and [Roy] Mason’. Revisionist support for Gaitskell could be identified in Labour’s shadow cabinet amongst those such as Healey, Michael Stewart, Patrick Gordon Walker who, along with Callaghan and others such as Wilson, provided a powerful enough grouping to ensure adequate votes against the adoption of a more positive approach to British entry. Within the shadow cabinet it was only George Brown, Ray Gunter and Douglas Houghton who offered any opposition to the Gaitskellite line (Haseler, 1969: 229-30).

Possibly, there was the question of the generation gap between Gaitskell and ‘his younger revisionist followers’ who ‘were impressed and excited by the modernisation and technological advance involved in European co-operation’. Gaitskell’s intense patriotism, expressed in his 1962 Brighton speech with references to ‘Vimy Ridge’ and ‘Gallipoli’, offered his disappointed younger supporters the ‘strange spectacle of a modernising radical appealing to... old-hat sentiment’. Gaitskell’s public performance established his reputation as a national leader, but at the expense of ‘the comfort of the friendship of those who, on Europe, bitterly disagreed with him’ (Haseler, 1969: 235-6; Morgan, 1997: 254). Some attempted to explain his attitude in terms of the electoral popularity and party advantage to be gained from a hostile attitude to Europe. Although Gaitskell’s anti-European speech managed to unite the party as a whole behind his leadership, he left
many of his close supporters shocked and confused in the process. Gaitskell’s verdict on the Common Market, culminating in his speech at the 1962 Brighton Conference, exposed a serious political fissure in the revisionist Labour right. Subsequently, European divisions were ‘to cut right across the Labour right’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). Labour right and revisionist divisions over Europe were to become entrenched and were to be carried in to further developments and intra-party debates in more pressing circumstances for the Labour Party, as respective positions on the issue became a test of loyalty to the party itself.

4.4 The Wilson Application 1967

Divisions were evident as a Labour government undertook to take Britain into the EEC. Initially, both major parties regarded a renewed application as impractical after De Gaulle’s veto of Macmillan’s bid for entry in January 1963. Labour had not ruled out EEC membership in principle, as long as the terms of entry were favourable. If Commonwealth interests were protected, and Britain retained its independent foreign policy, Wilson acknowledged that the EEC offered access to a considerable market in which growth rates had recently far outstripped those of Britain (Young, 1997: 149-50). Eventually, the Wilson administration instigated a second application for British entry in 1967 (Castle, 1980: 12; Daniels & Ritchie, 1995: 86; Pimlott, 1992: 432-42; Ponting, 1990: 204-6).

By the end of 1966, the Wilson government had begun to explore the possibility of entry to the EEC. Wilson’s inability to secure a close relationship with President Johnson and the perilous state of the Commonwealth because of the Rhodesian issue encouraged the belief that the British future was in Europe. The sterling crisis of July 1966 suggested that a wholly independent policy would only result in continuing economic decline, and the idea of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area with the United States and Canada could never be considered practical politics. Politically, the general mood was swinging toward Europe (Marquand, 1967: 21): key ministers such as George Brown were ardent Europeans and the new intake of Labour MPs in March 1966 were also more generally
disposed towards Europe. Although he could not be considered to be an enthusiastic European, Wilson supported the idea of a European ‘technological community’ that might enable Britain, in co-operation with European partners, to compete with the U.S. in the technical arena (Young, 1997: 150).

The positions of Labour right Cabinet members became clear in the process of the Wilson government’s deliberations over Europe. The European Committee of the Cabinet, established by Wilson to consider the prospects of Britain joining ‘the EEC within two or three years’, consisted of George Brown, Callaghan, Healey, Jay, Bert Bowden, Fred Peart and George Thomson (Jenkins was a significant omission). Of these, only Brown strongly supported EEC entry at this stage, Healey, Peart and Jay were opposed and the others unclear or ambiguous in their views. Brown’s move to the Foreign Office in August 1966 increased the pressure within the government to take the initiative for entry (Ponting, 1990: 206-7; also see Brown, 1972: 197-218). At a Cabinet conference on 22 October 1966 ministers revealed their personal preferences in an afternoon session without officials present. The Foreign Office line of Brown and Stewart argued strongly that Britain needed to apply to join the EEC, ‘not for economic reasons but to keep up its international status and its place ‘at the top table’. They were looking for a ‘declaration of intent’ to join the Community. At the meeting, the Labour Cabinet divided in the following ways: those who spoke in favour of entry included Brown, Jenkins, Crosland, Houghton, Hughes, Gordon-Walker, Lords Gardiner and Longford, and Benn. Those who spoke against membership included Jay, Healey, Peart, Bowden, Dick Marsh, Tony Greenwood, Ross, and Castle. Callaghan remained uncommitted to the idea of membership, and Crossman was willing to accept an application for entry only on the basis that ‘“the General will save us from our own folly”’ (Ponting, 1990: 207). Similarly, others adopted the view that the debate was a distraction as it was clear that De Gaulle would again use his veto. Healey explains that neither he nor Crosland:

‘ever shared [Jenkins’] dedication to the Common Market – an issue which had also strained his relations with Hugh Gaitskell... Unlike Tony, I supported Douglas Jay’s determined campaign against making a second application for membership in 1966, not least because I was certain that Wilson would be no more successful than Macmillan, so long as de Gaulle was alive...like Tony, I found the
extremism... distasteful. Our agnosticism on the Common Market won us no friends in either camp.
On issues which arouse strong feelings, like nuclear weapons or the Common Market, politics awards no prizes to pragmatists'.

(Healey, 1989: 329-40; Interview with the author, 9/2/99; also see Jay, 1968: 104)

Healey's pragmatism can be contrasted with Jenkins' liberal internationalism in arguments over Europe and to the wider social environment (Jenkins, 1991: 143). Even Gaitskell was prompted to describe Jenkins 'as an extremist... when it comes to the question of Europe'. Jenkins had published a short manifesto expressing his commitment to the European project on the grounds that it would enable Britain 'to escape from our 'great-power complex' which made us play at being in the same league as the United States and Russia while in reality being rapidly overtaken by the German and other lesser European economies' (Jenkins, 1959: 10-11; 1991: 105, 109, 117; Powell, 2001).

Alternatively, other Labour right revisionists such as Jay maintained that Wilson's application to join the Common Market was misguided (see Jay, 1968, 1980: 339-408). The Common Market controversy after July 1966 severely weakened the Labour government, particularly after the abandonment of the National Plan and wider economic problems. July 1966 represented a turning point in both British economic history and in the fortunes of the Wilson government: 'the Wilson Government never recovered from July 1966. And the main reason for this was the conflict and gratuitously added economic strain, which both sprang from the futile attempt to join the Market in 1966 and 1967' (Jay, 1980: 339, 347-8). Jay offered a case against entry that included such alternatives as a wider industrial free trade area, to embrace the Commonwealth, EFTA and North America, in a more flexible association of independent nations that would benefit them all (Jay, 1968: 111-26). For those such as Jay, Healey and others, the Common Market question provided an unnecessary distraction from more pressing domestic issues and problems, particularly as it was widely predicted that De Gaulle would again veto any British application for membership: it 'merely added to the stream of necessary administrative activities, and to several other explosive conflicts' (Jay, 1980: 347, 395).

Additionally, differences over the likely economic consequences of British membership, particularly the 'oppressive' impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on the
British economy and the balance of payments, further divided the revisionist Labour right as the respective economic arguments had done previously under Gaitskell. Jay notes some of the consequences of revisionist disagreements over Europe. Crosland, at this stage, was ‘trying to minimize the whole issue by casting doubt on the [balance of payments] figures…His case and that of Jenkins consisted…of reviving the argument that since the economic damage could be not exactly estimated, it therefore did not exist. Jenkins…had committed himself for so long that he could hardly admit himself to be in doubt’, but Crosland, although ‘Jenkins had pressurized him for years, was fully as able to understand the economic consequences as Gaitskell…Nothing basic had changed since that speech of Gaitskell, except that the CAP had been made deliberately much more oppressive to the UK…I was saddened to be forced thus into conflict with Jenkins and Crosland, since I had been such close friends and colleagues with both for so long in the 1950s’ (Jay, 1980: 387).

In the final week of argument in late April/early May 1967 ‘Stewart and Gordon-Walker had sunk into the pro-Market camp without trace’, but Healey adopted a similar position to that of Jay, while Callaghan was ‘in the middle, though ‘wobbling’’. Those who came out in favour of an application included Wilson, Brown, Callaghan, Crosland, Jenkins, Crossman, Benn, Gardiner, Gunter, Hughes, Longford, Stewart and Gordon-Walker’, while those against included Healey, Jay, Castle, Greenwood, Bowden, Marsh, Peart and Ross. Ultimately, the narrow majority of the Cabinet in favour of an application, which was to include Callaghan, Crossman and Benn, ‘was decided by those who, having no firm views of their own, voted with the PM’ (Jay, 1980: 387, 389). After July 1966, however, it became clear to a number of senior Labour figures that British economic decline needed fresh impetus and new markets. Even Callaghan, who had never been an enthusiastic European, recognised along with Wilson ‘the need for Britain’s economic future to aim for a different and more secure course…Both Chancellor and Prime Minister were pragmatists on Europe as on most other issues, prepared to see how discussions would go’. Callaghan had previously accepted the insular Gaitskell line, but the majority of the Cabinet now ‘saw the political, and perhaps economic, advantages of a new shift of policy’. Callaghan, along with Crosland, Healey and others, was sceptical,
but 'he was happy to endorse an attempt to enter the Market – that is, if the terms were right' (Morgan, 1997: 252-4).

Labour’s application for membership again hit the barrier of De Gaulle’s formal veto on 27 November 1967 (Ponting, 1990: 212-13) but, in light of the emerging belief that the British future remained with Europe, Wilson left the second membership application 'on the table’. The forced devaluation of sterling and the decision to withdraw from east of Suez during late 1967 reinforced the general impression that British membership of the EEC was now essential. During 1969-70, after De Gaulle’s resignation, it was the Wilson application that was taken up again by the EEC. Formal negotiations for British entry did not start until after the June 1970 election, but the new Conservative government’s negotiations were based on the briefs prepared by the Wilson administration. However, parliamentary Labour right divisions over Europe were already in evidence. These consisted of distinct anti- and pro-European positions, together with the more agnostic positions of Callaghan and Healey’s pragmatism and Crosland’s ambivalence. The dimensions of the parliamentary Labour right over Europe cannot be understood in conventional left-right terms or as variations of a general revisionist-labourist distinction. In opposition, parliamentary Labour right divisions became even more explicit and bitter as the European issue again came to the fore of British party politics during the Heath government’s negotiations for entry and Labour’s lurch to the left after 1970.

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31 Callaghan represented a tradition of ‘instinctive historical and emotional commitment to the Commonwealth idea’, having been ‘brought up as children of the empire... As shadow Colonial Secretary, Callaghan had voiced this instinctive commitment on behalf of a united party’. In addition to the Atlanticist tradition to which the Labour Party had been broadly aligned since the days of Ernest Bevin, there remained an even longer commitment to the Commonwealth in terms of trade and political and economic development (Morgan, 1997: 252-4; Interview with the author, 17/10/97; Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/01).
4.5 Heath Entry and Membership Terms: The Common Market Parliamentary Debate October 1971

4.5.1 Labour in Opposition after 1970: The Emergence of Labour's European Divisions

So, the question of European membership had long been a divisive issue for Labour revisionists and others on the parliamentary Labour right. Both Gaitskell and certain of his senior lieutenants such as Douglas Jay failed to demonstrate the strong pro-Europeanism of some of their younger revisionist colleagues (Brivati, 1996a: 404-5, n.d; Jay, 1968, 1980: 408, 424). Other key figures of the parliamentary Labour right such as Callaghan, Crosland and Healey had demonstrated a more ambiguous, fluid approach to the issue. The litmus test of Labour Party attitudes and unity over Europe was to arrive in the debate over the Heath government’s terms of entry, culminating in the vote on the principle of entry of October 1971 and its repercussions.

In opposition after 1970 the question of European membership began to seriously divide the Labour Party (Taverne, 1974: 102ff). For Wilson and a substantial proportion of Labour MPs the issue was largely a pragmatic one. They possessed no strong emotional opinion on the question and the politics of opposition demanded that they challenge the Conservative government come what may. Again, Labour’s official approach in opposition was based on the terms of entry. Although Wilson was unable to reject the principle of membership, given his own 1967 application, he was able to argue that the terms of entry negotiated by Heath in 1971 were unsatisfactory. In the February 1974 general election Labour promised to renegotiate the terms of entry agreed by the Conservative government, which led to some minor changes in the financial arrangements of membership and better access for certain Commonwealth products in 1974-75 (Labour Party, 1974b). The Jenkinstite group of Labour MPs believed much more strongly in the principle of membership ‘as a way to bolster British power…secure better access to European markets and bring the country into line with post-imperial realities’ (Young, 1997: 150-1; also see Chapter Three). On the other side of the polarised
debate, a diverse grouping, including those on the left such as Foot and centrists such as Peter Shore, were opposed to the principle of British membership of the EC on a number of grounds. These included the possible destruction of the Commonwealth, a challenge to parliamentary sovereignty and to the pursuit of domestic socialist policies; ‘it would make Britain part of a ‘capitalist club’ where working-class interests would be harmed by higher food prices...and unemployment caused by the need to deflate’ (Young, 1997: 150-1; Shore, Interview with the author, 3/3/99).

In the heat of Labour’s internal Common Market disputes after 1970, the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right and its leaders became explicit. In the second half of 1971, Europe became the catalyst of a damaging split between two erstwhile leaders of the revisionist Labour right (Jefferys 1999: 152-3). Crosland, who had adopted the strategy of attempting to broaden his political base to include the ‘anti-European right + Centre’ while moving away from the 1963 Club, found European membership to be ‘an issue on which it was impossible to remain on good terms with both the centre and the right of the party’ (Crosland S, 1982: 229; Crosland Papers 4/9, Dick Leonard, Memorandum, ‘The Case for Abstention’, 22 October 1971; Jefferys, 1999: 160). Crosland was to become further estranged from the strongly pro-European element around Roy Jenkins, and it represented a serious blow to the cohesion and unity of the Parliamentary Labour right: Crosland was heard to claim that their ‘idea of a Labour Party is not mine...Roy has come actually to dislike socialism’ (Crosland S, 1982: 229; Jefferys, 1999: 160).

Crosland thought Europe ‘less important than a host of other issues – incomes policy, devolution – and therefore could not use language of extreme pros’. Crosland stated that he was not prepared ‘to “stand up and be counted”’ in support of causes he didn’t believe in such as Tavernite claims of an extremist left-wing takeover of the party, ‘fanatical Europeanism’ and ‘virulent anti-trade unionism’ (Crosland Papers 6/3, David Lipsey, Memorandum, ‘Panorama Profile’, 4 March 1976; Memorandum 29 March 1976). Dick Leonard later described Crosland’s only connection to the Jenkinside group as ‘an intellectual one’: if an appeal to them on this basis fails ‘there is not much which you can do with them’ (Crosland Papers 6/3, Dick Leonard, ‘Memo on Leadership Election and its
Implications for the Future*, 1 June 1976). The ‘Europe debate...left deep scars, with a combination of policy and personality clashes occasioning a division that had been on the cards since 1967. Crosland and Jenkins had parted company irrevocably’ (Jefferys, 1999: 160-1). The ‘crisis over Europe which was to engulf the Labour Party in 1971-72’ was to ‘fatally divide’ Labour’s three key revisionist representatives, Crosland, Jenkins and Healey. The ‘summer of 1971 was a crucial moment. If Crosland, Jenkins and Healey had managed to agree on a modus vivendi over Europe, the history of the Labour Party in the 1970s and the 1980s might have been different...if the three men had stood together, the divisions in the party over Europe could well have been accommodated without isolating the Jenkinsonites and without undermining the cohesion of the centre-right in the Labour Party. Their failure to work together fatally weakened the forces of revisionism and opened the door to the left’ (Radice, 2002: 186, 189-91, 195). Fragmentation on the right meant that the Labour left was able to make the running in a way that had been impossible in the 1950s and 1960s’ (Jefferys, 1993: 85).

4.5.2 The Special Conference July 1971: Renewing Divisions

A special conference of the Labour Party on the Common Market on 17 July 1971 presented a further forum for Labour’s European divisions. The special conference was called in July 1971 as ‘the proper constitutional course to secure a test of opinion...on the greatest single issue facing both our Movement and this country today’ and, as the ‘Conservative Party and the C.B.I. have taken their decision, our decision is overdue’. The resolution for debate read as follows: ‘This Conference, while taking note of the N.E.C. statement on the Common Market, (i) opposes British entry to the Common Market on the terms negotiated by the present government and set out in the White Paper; (ii) believes that the question of entry should be submitted to the British people at a general election’ (Labour Party, 1971a: 4).

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32 Leonard explained that a ‘characteristic feature of many of the Jenkinsonites is that they have intellectual pretensions – and many of them feel that you do not give them sufficient credit’. Giles Radice’s ‘argument was that they were trying to do, perhaps not as well as you had done, the type of job which you did for the party 20 years ago’, but ‘you refuse to listen to them’ (Crosland Papers 6/3, Dick Leonard, ‘Memo on Leadership Election and its Implications for the Future’, 1 June 1976).
In the period leading up to the parliamentary vote on the principle of entry, Labour's pro-
Europeans now argued that the successful Heath application to join the Community had
been foreshadowed and underpinned by the preparation for entry of the previous Labour
government (Radice, 2002: 190-3; Young, 1998: 223-5). The former Labour Minister for
Europe, George Thomson, stated publicly that the terms negotiated by the Heath
government for entry into the EEC were not very different from those that Labour might
have obtained had his negotiations continued, and he point was forcefully pursued by
both Thomson and John Mackintosh in their speeches to Labour's special conference
(Labour Party, 1971a: 11-12, 28-9; Whitehead, Interview with the author, 20/1/01). The
pro-European Jenkinsite position has been portrayed as follows (Radice, 2002: 191; also
see Young, 1998: 260-5, 305):

'Roy believed it would be morally wrong for Labour to take one view in government and then adopt a
different position in opposition... membership of the European Community was absolutely crucial,
both economically and for Britain's role in the world. It was not only a vital element in the policies of
a modernising, revisionist Labour Party; it had also become one of those great issues which transcend
party. If it came to a clash between his party's short-term interests and Britain's European future,
Jenkins would choose Europe.'

The anti-European perspective, largely dormant in the previous period of Labour
government, increased in strength and voice, particularly among the trade unions and
influential trade union leaders such as Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon (Taverne, 1974: 103-
4). At the 1970 Labour Party Conference delegates only narrowly rejected a resolution
opposing British entry to the EEC (Radice, 2002: 190-1). At the July 1971 special
conference of the Labour Party, Peter Shore represented the anti-Common Market view
that the Heath terms were not just inappropriate to the needs of the country, but were
negotiated against developments that were 'not there in 1967' when George Thomson
and George Brown negotiated on behalf of the Labour government (Labour Party, 1971a:
18-19, 44; Shore, Interview with the author, 3/3/99).

In addition to the 'extreme pros' and the 'extreme antis', there were 'those in the
middle...including Callaghan, Wilson' (Crosland Papers 6/3, David Lipsey,
Memorandum, ‘Panorama Profile’, 4 March 1976). Wilson had opposed Macmillan’s original application in 1962 but, in government, had broadly favoured entry. In opposition ‘his priority, given his style of leadership, was always likely to be to keep the party together and to maintain his leadership. As the hostility to the Common Market grew, Wilson gradually began to shift his position again’ (Pimlott, 1992: 585; also see Jenkins, 1991: 319-20). Wilson’s delicate attempt to balance the respective forces was, to a large extent, dependent on Callaghan. As his actions over ‘In Place of Strife’ demonstrated he was always a shrewd judge of wider party opinion. Although he was an Atlanticist by instinct, Callaghan had judiciously supported the attempts of the Labour government to join the Community. However, his tone on Europe again changed according to the general swing of the party in opposition with a markedly anti-Market speech at Bitterne Park School, Southampton on 25 May 1971, followed by others in Bradford, Cardiff and Portsmouth in September 1971 (subsequently published by the Labour Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market). The gist of his argument was a sweeping (anti-French) appeal on behalf of British culture and traditions, opposition to the potentially detrimental economic consequences of a ‘rigid relationship with the E.E.C.’, the likely implications for British relationships with ‘old friends’ in ‘the Commonwealth, old and new, and the United States’, and problems with the Heath government’s general strategy (Callaghan, 1971: 1-4ff; Morgan, 1997: 394-5). For some Labour pro-Marketeers, it was Callaghan who was ‘the real villain of the piece on Europe’, not Wilson (Pimlott, 1992: 581). It may not have been his finest hour, and Callaghan himself paid no retrospective attention to it in his memoirs, but ‘Callaghan’s move had a significant impact not just on Wilson but on Healey and Crosland as well’ (Radice, 2002: 191-2; also see Morgan, 1997: 395; Young, 1998: 273).

Healey had developed a sceptical approach toward British membership of the European Community. He had opposed both the 1962 and 1967 applications on the pragmatic grounds that they would be subject to De Gaulle’s veto. Healey’s appointment as Shadow Foreign Secretary in 1970 appeared to engender a more positive approach to Britain’s role in the Community and, on 11 May 1971, he was one of over a hundred Labour MPs who gave his signature to a pro-European letter published in ‘The Guardian’. By July
1971, however, Healey had again swung against entry on the terms negotiated by Heath, and announced his attention to vote with the anti-Marketeers in the crucial Commons vote in October. To the partisans on either side of the debate, Healey’s oscillation appeared to be highly opportunistic rather than merely pragmatic. Given his decision to join the pro-European ‘Guardian’ signatories in May, ‘it is difficult not to conclude that his July position was as much dictated by the swing of party opinion as by an analytic consideration of the terms’ (Radice, 2002: 192-3; also see Crosland S, 1982: 220; Healey, 1989: 359-60; Healey, Interview with the author, 09/2/99). Young (1998: 267-70) identifies more consistency in Healey’s indifference to the Common Market question. In a similar sense to Crosland, Healey developed ‘professional indifference’ as a ‘way of dealing with the passions that raged around him left and right. He thought Europe and the zealotries it induced were a distraction from what he regarded as the ‘real issues’”. This was the line that ‘persisted through all the arguments in the Labour Party for the decade following the 1967 application’. To some extent, it reflected the ‘agnosticism’ of the British people in an attempt to ‘find a way of fending off the wild obsessions over Europe which have been an enduring difference between the political class and the voters’. In terms of the relative cohesion of the parliamentary Labour right leadership, Young (1998: 270) describes Healey’s approach to the question as ‘almost as far removed from Jenkinsism as it would be possible to invent, short of outright Bennery’.

Crosland, however, had previously demonstrated pro-European credentials (Crosland, 1962: 8). He had both argued strongly against the position adopted by Gaitskell in 1962 and supported the Labour government’s application for entry to the EEC in 1967, but Labour’s internal debate in opposition presented Crosland with a something of a dilemma. His response was, that while he generally favoured entry, the issue was a relatively minor one that detracted from the more important domestic priorities of his Grimsby constituents. Moreover, the Common Market argument should not be allowed to imperil Labour Party unity nor maintain the Conservative government in office. Crosland’s dilemma was not an uncommon one among Labour MPs: should ‘he line up with Jenkins who regarded British entry as a matter of high principle or should he back
the majority who argued that opposing Heath came first?’ (Jefferys, 1999: 153-6; Marquand, 1999: 166-78; Radice, 2002: 193).

As noted, Crosland’s lack of explicit engagement with the Common Market issue engendered resentment among Jenkins and his supporters, particularly as he had always ‘been known as European and had equivocated’ and ‘wobbled over Europe in 1971-2’ (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; also see Crosland S, 1982: 221-2). Although still a committed European, he was not prepared to maintain the Heath government in power, and his long-term policy priorities of increased public expenditure, greater equality, the reduction of poverty, educational reform, housing policy and the environment would not ‘be decisively affected one way or another by the Common Market’ (Crosland Papers 4/9, The speech that was never delivered!, early July 1971 – after talking to Hatt, Owen, Leonard, July, 1971; also see Crosland S, 1982: 218-20; Jefferys, 1999: 154-5). He was also increasingly aware of the danger posed by the formation of an elitist, potentially separatist, pro-European ‘intellectual’ faction on the parliamentary Labour right. For their part, the pro-European Jenkinsites were less concerned with the opportunism of Healey than Crosland’s ‘apostasy’ on Europe; his intellectual credentials, they felt, presented a significant threat to their case (Crosland S, 220-2; Jefferys, 1999: 155-6; Radice, 2002: 194-5).

Jenkins himself, prevented from airing his views at Labour’s special conference on the Common Market, and in light of Wilson’s anti-Market speech to close the conference, attempted to redress the balance at a meeting of the PLP on 19 July 1971. Swimming against the tide, as he saw it, Jenkins (1991: 322) offered an unapologetic ‘uncompromising, even inflammatory’ contribution that made ‘no attempt to paper over cracks’. In his address, Jenkins disagreed openly with Wilson that a Labour government would not have necessarily pursued the same terms as those accepted by the Heath administration. He further criticised Callaghan’s position and contribution to the debate. Economic growth, he argued, was no replacement for British entry to the EEC; it is an aspiration rather than an explicit policy initiative. Even opponents rhapsodised over the effect of Jenkins’ speech and interpreted it as a ‘direct attack on... Wilson and also on
Healey and Crosland, who had climbed off the fence against the Market’. Jenkins’ speech had so galvanised his pro-European supporters that it might even be necessary to organise in the constituencies and at Conference against the Jenkinsters in the sense that the potential for factional conflict ‘took you right back to 1951 or 1961’ (Benn, 1988: 358; also see The Times, 20 July 1971).

4.5.3 The Common Market Vote, 28 October 1971: A Stake Through the Heart of the Labour Right?

In the parliamentary debate on the Common Market between 21 and 28 October 1971, Labour’s divisions over Europe became explicit. On 28 October, Jenkins led sixty-nine Labour MPs into the division lobbies in support of Heath’s attempt to ratify the principle of British membership. In the process the Labour rebels defied a three-line whip, imposed by a narrow vote in both the shadow cabinet and the PLP in spite of Rodgers’ best efforts to gain for them a free vote in the critical division (Radice, 2002: 198-9; also see Crosland S, 1982: 221; Kitzinger, 1973: 328-9; Rodgers, 2000: 128-31). The hardcore Jenkinsters interpreted British membership of the EEC as more important than traditional party loyalty, and were not willing to use this issue of principle, as they saw it, as a cynical opportunity to defeat the Heath administration. In this sense, they were perhaps evolving, in Wilson’s terms, in to a faction within the party (Radice, 2002: 198; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01; Taverne, 1974; also see Chapter Three).

Some Labour right pro-Europeans, including Fred Mulley, James Wellbeloved and even David Owen, urged Jenkins and Rodgers to lead their troops to abstain in the critical division (Radice, 2002: 199; Rodgers, 2000: 128-9). This would produce the effect of carrying the government motion in favour of entry, but with a much smaller majority and without the stigma of large-scale Labour dissension in the division lobbies. Crosland urged Jenkins to make his pro-European stand without voting explicitly for the government, and accused him of irresponsibility for refusing to allow his group of supporters to contemplate the possibility of abstention in the vote. Crosland warned ‘that
in the long run you are damaging yourself as well as the Labour Party’ (Crosland S, 1982: 221; also see Rodgers, 2000: 131, citing similar advice from Crossman). Jenkins responded that he was not prepared to have to continually reply to the question of what he did in one of the great divisions of the century with the reply that ‘I abstained’. For Jenkins, the issue was as important as ‘the first Reform Bill, the repeal of the Corn Laws, Gladstone’s Home Rule Bills, the Lloyd George Budget and the Parliament Bill, the Munich Agreement and the May 1940 votes’ (Jenkins, 1991: 329; also see Hattersley, 1995: 105-7; Kitzinger, 1973: 372, 400).

Opening the debate for the Labour Party in the House of Commons, Healey argued that the case for entry was heavily dependant on economic considerations and had yet to be made.33 Particularly, the cost of tariff changes would be between £200 million and £300 million and the British contribution to the EEC budget would mean that it would have to carry a foreign exchange burden of £100 million in 1973 and £500 in 1977. Healey posed the question of how was the UK to meet the foreign exchange burdens that the government had imposed as a result of its Brussels negotiations against the background of rising costs, increasing unemployment and industrial stagnation. It could only be achieved through deflation or devaluation (HC Deb, 1970-71, 823, cols. 2211-18). As was the case with Labour’s special conference on the Common Market in July, Jenkins was unable to speak from the front bench in the debate because he did not now represent the official position of the Labour Party. A similar fate befell other pro-European shadow cabinet members, including Douglas Houghton, Harold Lever, George Thomson and Shirley Williams (Radice, 2002: 199; Rodgers, 2000: 130; also see Jenkins, 1991: 329-30).

Labour’s pro-Europeans possessed a good number of surrogate speakers. In addition to the active Jenkinsite organisers of the pro-Europeans such as ‘Rodgers and Taverne, Marquand, Maclennan and Owen’, these included ‘a number of ex-ministers, such as

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33 After detailed prior discussion with a small number of Labour’s pro-Europeans over the precise wording in order to maximise potential votes, Douglas-Home, the Foreign Secretary, moved the motion ‘That this House approves Her Majesty’s Government’s decision of principle to join the European Communities on the basis of the arrangements which have been negotiated’ (Kitzinger, 1973: 371).
Michael Stewart, Patrick Gordon Walker and Roy Mason, who remained staunchly on the side of the European commitment which had been entered into by the Wilson government' (Jenkins, 1991: 330). In the Lords, George Brown represented a pro-European force who, after the three-day Lords debate had resulted in an overwhelming vote of 451 to 58 in favour of the principle of entry, offered some encouragement to his former pro-European colleagues in the corresponding Commons debate (Brown, 1972: 11-12, 197; Kitzinger, 1973: 372). Roy Mason, motivated by long and consistent pro-European sentiment and intense opposition to the left within the wider party, privately welcomed Heath’s initiative in June 1971. His support for British membership in the decisive parliamentary vote was ‘the only time [he] ever defied a three-line whip and... didn’t much enjoy it. Apart from anything else, it gave more ammunition to... Scargill, whose hatred for the European project was almost as intense as his dislike for me’ (Mason, 1999: 117, 140-1). The parliamentary stand of Labour’s pro-Europeans was generally unpopular in the constituencies with party activists, particularly after Labour’s Brighton Conference had decided the party line against entry. The position of the (pro-European) Labour right was already weak in the constituencies as ‘a number of MPs, including... Taverne... Thompson, Dick Leonard... Crosland’s PPS... and Jim Tinn... Rodgers’ neighbour on Teeside, were in trouble with their constituency parties’ (Radice, 2002: 198, 200; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01; also see Taverne, 1974).

Nevertheless, during the course of the six-day debate, a number of backbench MPs (on both sides of the House) rose to dissent from the front bench party line. For Labour, Rodgers argued that the negotiated terms were likely to be the best available in 1971 and that they were unlikely to be improved even on a future date. Another former Gaitskellite, Charles Pannell, chose to emphasise the argument that membership of the Community would help to stimulate British industry and economic performance and that it ‘would no longer be the sick man of Europe’. Owen’s motivations for entry were essentially political as he argued that, through membership of the EEC, Britain would be better able to offer a constructive influence in international and east-west relations than if it remained on the periphery of Europe. Hattersley suggested that the potential benefits of
entry outweighed the drawbacks and, for Marquand, the ideals of democratic socialism could only be realised through entry as he argued that membership of the EEC could lead to further economic growth. Mackintosh tackled the sovereignty aspect of the argument. The core of his argument suggested that 'untramelled' national sovereignty is largely an illusion; what matters more is not the legal power to act but whether the consequences may mean anything' (HC Deb, 1970-71, 823, cols. 2211-18; also see Norton, 1975; Marquand [Mackintosh], 1982: 244-8; Radice, 2002: 199-200). In the parliamentary vote itself, called at 10.00pm on the night of 28 October, Jenkins, along with Houghton, the chairman of the PLP, and sixty-seven other committed European Labour MPs, entered the government division lobby. Crosland, who ‘thought so long and hard about complex issues that he was often in danger of falling between stools’, decided to abstain in the vote and, having ‘performed his double somersault, Healey voted with the Labour Opposition’ (Radice, 2002: 200-1; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). The result of the crucial division was a comfortable majority of 112 votes for the government. 69 Labour votes were cast for the government and 20 Labour MPs abstained (Kitzinger, 1973: 372-3, 400-5). Jenkins’ desire to parallel his historical precedents appeared to have been satisfied as the Labour Europeans, led by Jenkins’ himself, ‘had written themselves indelibly into history’ (Radice, 2002: 201).

For Labour ‘loyalists’ among the pro-European rebels it was not an occasion to celebrate ‘breaking ranks with the Labour Party’ (Hattersley, 1995: 104-6; also see Radice, 2002: 203). The plan of the European rebels after the vote of principle was to ‘then gracefully submit to the will of the whips during the days and nights of detailed debate which followed’, representing ‘the need to balance conviction and loyalty’, but it was not an arrangement accepted wholeheartedly by some Labour right pro-Europeans such as Jenkins. He did not exactly agree with the position of ‘the majority of our group’ who ‘positively wanted to go back to voting with the Labour Party on the legislation’: ‘I knew that I was going to be miserable voting against the legislation, and I knew too that if by
chance we defeated the Government on any aspect of the issue we would have made absolute asses of ourselves' (Jenkins, 1991: 332).34

Underlying the respective choice of strategy adopted by pro-European rebels in the subsequent divisions following the vote of principle were wider differences concerning attitudes to the party and on policy. Outside of the Jenkinsite core, it was by no means clear that the sixty-nine European rebels were a united, cohesive group on other issues of policy. Although brought together by a shared commitment to the principle of British membership, the post-vote hiatus and fragmentation of the Labour pro-European rebels and divergent responses to the post-vote political and party environment represented an early indication of 'the disintegration of the Labour Party'. Hattersley offers an example of an emerging ideological fissure within the pro-European tendency: although 'I agreed...with his position on the Common Market and...sympathised with his growing reluctance to vote against his conscience', it 'was his views on domestic policy which had begun to worry me. Although I did not know it at the time, the drift to the political centre had begun...I believed that comprehensive education – freed from the disability of a competing selection system – mattered a great deal more than he was prepared to allow'. Although the ‘disagreement ended with a sterile dispute about the rival merits of ‘more equality’ and ‘less inequality’”, they remained ‘expressions of deeply held feelings which are too painful to express openly. Roy and I were drifting apart’ (Hattersley, 1995: 104, 106-9; Jenkins, 1991: 332-4).

The Common Market debate and vote of October 1971 further served to consolidate growing ideological and political divisions between Crosland and Jenkins, a development that was to help prohibit any serious challenge by 'the pro-European Jenkinsite faction' to the wider constituency of support in the parliamentary party of 'both...Callaghan and...Foot in a future leadership election' (Radice, 2002: 201). The Jenkinsite pro-Europeans were to claim that Crosland had ‘behaved like a shit’ in the Common Market

34 Hattersley (1995: 107), not without reservation, declared that he would be willing 'to vote for every amendment that the Labour Party composed – absurd though some of them were'. This was similarly the position of those such as Houghton and Joel Barnett. Jenkins (1991: 332) records that the way they were able to rationalise their position was to suggest 'that it was the duty of a government to provide its own majority on all routine divisions and that they must get through by disciplining their own rebels'.

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vote and that he must be punished. For his part, Crosland was determined that they would not win over the party: even ‘if I was prepared to chuck my own values and strengthen their group, they still couldn’t win over the Party – shouldn’t win it over. The most that would happen is that the Party would be split for a generation. It is Roy’s misfortune that because of his father, he’s in the wrong Party. As a Liberal or Conservative, he might make a very good Leader’. Crosland had begun to heed Callaghan’s advice to him on the eve of the Commons vote on the Common Market that his intention to abstain on the vote would be a terrible mistake and that, however mixed his feelings about Europe, he ‘should establish [himself] in people’s minds as a Party man, forever distinct from the Jenkinsite Right’ (Crosland S, 1982: 224-30; also see Jefferys, 1999: 156-7, 158; Radice, 2002: 200, 201ff).

Neither did there appear to be much ideological and political love lost between Callaghan and Jenkins. Jenkins initially stood to be re-elected as deputy leader of the party (to resign five months later), at least in the spirit of attempting to retain some sort of relationship with, and influence in, the Labour Party. He managed only narrowly to defeat Foot in the second ballot because some Labour MPs, including Callaghan and his close allies, ‘abstained so as to prevent [Jenkins] achieving too great a triumph’ (Radice, 2002: 203-4). Because of their dislike of his inconsistency and apparent opportunism during the Common Market debate, Healey was also now increasingly estranged from the Jenkinsite camp. Not only did Healey’s ‘blatantly opportunistic’ change of tack offer ‘the most damaging’ episode of his ‘entire career’ (Healey, Interview with the author, 9/2/99; Healey, 1989:359-60; Whitehead, 1985: 66), it further added to the mutual jealousy and suspicion that prevented these two major representatives of the parliamentary Labour right from co-operating more successfully. Healey’s opportunism was anathema to the ‘politics of principle’ practised by the Jenkinsites over Europe. For Healey, Jenkins lacked the tribal instinct appropriate ‘to the politics of class and ideology’ of the Labour Party (Healey, 1989: 329). The increasingly overt tensions associated with the European debate in opposition were to open up ‘the prospect of a damaging division on the right of the Labour Party’ with fateful consequences for the intra-party balance of power (Radice, 2002: 101, 163-5, 202).
4.6 NEC Decision to Hold a European Referendum, March 1972: A Jenkinside, Social Democratic Watershed?

The consequences for the cohesion, unity and relative position of the Labour right in the parliamentary party were both immediate and lasting. Immediately, however, the NEC decision to adopt the Benn proposal that the Labour Party introduce a referendum, based on renegotiated terms of entry when in government, to decide the future of British involvement with the EEC eventually led to the resignation, and partial marginalisation, of Jenkins (and his key support) from Labour’s front bench. Wilson’s decision to climb aboard the ‘left-wing bandwagon’ and support the referendum motion on British membership, as a possible solution to Labour’s internal divisions, ‘proved the last straw for Jenkins’, who ‘resigned the deputy leadership of the party in 1972 in protest’. This decision severely weakened Jenkins’ personal position and influence in the parliamentary party, possibly as a unifying force of the Labour right and centre and potential future leader of the Labour Party (Jenkins, 1991: 350; Lipsey, 2002: 111; Pearce, 2002: 397; Radice, 2002: 204-8; Young, 1998: 277-8). More broadly, the events surrounding the referendum decision and Jenkins’ resignation from Labour’s front bench led to further fragmentation of the fabric of the parliamentary Labour right and, according to both participants and observers, was to have long-term implications for both the Labour right and the Labour Party.

Callaghan’s pragmatism was again evident in Labour’s post-October 1971 intra-party environment. He was ‘careful not to let his opposition to Europe carry him too far’ as, from 1 January 1973, British membership of the EEC would be ‘a political and constitutional fact’. Callaghan was also predisposed to endorse the formula of a referendum to give the people the opportunity to decide Britain’s European future after a Labour administration had ‘renegotiated’ the terms of entry. This strategy, it was hoped, would both ‘preserve Labour’s principled opposition and ensure party unity. It also made it more unlikely that British withdrawal from the EEC would in fact take place. However unenthusiastic, grudging and insular it felt, Britain was in and was likely to stay in’.
Healey (1989: 359-60; Interview with the author, 9/2/99) is characteristically inexpressive about his reaction to the referendum decision. He acknowledges that, in the shadow Cabinet elections that followed the October debates, he paid the price for his ‘pragmatism’. In part, this was a reflection of the fact that he did not consider himself to belong to any of the respective group alignments of the European debate in the Labour Party. Having replaced Jenkins as shadow Chancellor after the latter’s resignation, his priority was his challenging new post as he was launched, for the first time in his life, ‘on the stormy and shark-ridden seas of economic policy’ (Pearce, 2002: 397). Crosland voted against the referendum amendment at the shadow cabinet but had no intention of resigning over the issue but, in their appointment to their preferred posts of shadow Chancellor and shadow Foreign Secretary respectively in the reshuffle that followed, it was Healey and Callaghan who were the immediate beneficiaries of Jenkins’ resignation. Wilson was also able to ‘rid himself of an increasingly troublesome deputy’, and Callaghan was able to witness the elimination of Jenkins, his main rival for the post-Wilson Labour leadership, from the Labour Party game (Crosland S, 1982: 239-40; Jefferys, 1999: 163-4; Radice, 2002: 208-10).

The dilemma of Jenkins’ post-July 1971 position, was that the ‘more he upped the stakes on Europe, the more he endangered his own position and that of the pro-European minority within the party’ (Radice, 2002: 197-8, 206-7). Not only did Jenkins resign, complaining bitterly about the inconsistency of the NEC and shadow cabinet on Europe and the issue of a referendum, he was joined by Thompson and Lever from the shadow cabinet and, from Labour’s front bench, by Owen, Taverne and Dickson Mabon. Rodgers had already been removed by Wilson as a punishment for his effective organisation of Labour’s pro-European rebels in the earlier debate (Rodgers, 2000: 133), although Hattersley and Shirley Williams remained to take up positions in the shadow cabinet vacated by Thompson and Jenkins (Hattersley, 1995: 110-11; Rodgers, 2000: 134; Young, 1998: 277). Both Williams and Owen were not opposed to the case for a referendum (Radice, 2002: 208), and Hattersley, increasingly disenchanted with emerging attitudes to equality among the Jenkinsites, was worried about the potential impact of Jenkins’ resignation on the Labour Party (Hattersley, 1995: 107-9; Owen,
The degree to which the revisionist Labour right had fragmented over Europe can be seen when the Jenkinsite group, with the possible exception of David Owen, voted *en masse* for Ted Short as Jenkins’ replacement as deputy leader. This was to prevent Crosland from winning the contest as a ‘punishment’ for his actions over Europe, and to undermine his position as a potential leadership rival to Jenkins (Crosland Papers 6/2, Note on talk with Bill Rodgers in Italy, 6 September 1973; Jenkins, 1991: 352-3; Leonard, Interview with the author, 23/1/01; Radice, 2002: 210). Crosland’s reasons for offering himself as a candidate in the deputy leadership contest included his desire to register a protest because just ‘at the moment when grass-roots Labour opinion sees the over-riding aim as being to get rid of a reactionary and repressive Tory Government, the Parliamentary Labour Party seems divided by personalities and polarised into factions. We are set on a course of self-destructive madness’. His reason to stand for election was ‘to express the strong feeling in the Party, at every level, that whatever our views about Europe or about particular personalities, the over-riding need for the country is to return a strong Labour Government, and the over-riding need for the Party is to prepare and present a distinctive, radical social-democratic programme – on full employment, housing, education, redistribution of wealth and an attack on social and economic privilege and inequality’. He was ‘not running in order to keep someone else out. I am running to win – on a non-sectarian ticket’ because it ‘is desperately urgent to recreate Party unity on the basis of a radical, egalitarian socialist programme’ (Crosland Papers 6/2, Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Crosland M.P., n.d.; speech to a conference of the Labour Political Studies Centre, 16 April 1972; William Hamilton, Press Statement, 17 April 1972; Jeffreys, 1999: 165-6). As a consequence of the Jenkinsite sabotage of Crosland’s candidature, the result of the initial ballot for the election of deputy leader for the remainder of the session 1971-72 was 111 votes for Short, 110 votes for Foot and 61 votes for Crosland. Crosland, possibly losing as many as fifty pro-European votes ‘controlled’ by Jenkins, was eliminated from the contest as Short defeated Foot in the second ballot (LP/PLP Minutes, 20 April 1972; Jeffeys, 1999: 166; Radice, 2002: 210).
From the moment of the pro-European resignation from Labour's shadow cabinet over the decision to hold a referendum on Europe, 'Labour Europeans were to be outsiders in the party'. It 'weakened the party's ability to resist the dangerous drift to the left during the 1970s. The vote of 28 October 1971 and Roy's subsequent resignation had rearranged the pieces on a chessboard of the Labour Party, separating the European knights from the anti-European bishops of the right and centre. It took a long time to put them back together again' (Rodgers, 2000: 134-5; Interview with the author, 18/2/01). The occasion of Jenkins' resignation 'was not the day on which the Social Democrats were born', and it 'was not even the morning when they were conceived', 'it was the moment when the old Labour coalition began to collapse'. Jenkins' resignation in April 1972 (and the events that preceded it) was an inevitable precursor of the 'creation of a new Centre Party'. Although Jenkins probably did not realise 'that he was acting as a catalyst to a cataclysm', it represented a 'turning point in Labour's history'. Afterwards, 'the Labour Party was never the same again' (Hattersley, 1995: 109-11). In Radice's words (2002: 210-11):

'What happened at the vote of 28 October 1971 and then over Roy's resignation in April 1972 and the subsequent deputy leadership election highlighted the split on the centre-right of the Labour Party between those who gave priority to Europe and those who were either anti-European or at least prepared to put their party loyalties and personal ambitions before their European beliefs. The fracture of the old Gaitskellite coalition on the European issue (already foreshadowed at Labour's 1962 party conference) was to have momentous consequences, leading to a dramatic increase in the influence of the left in the early 1970s and early 80s and, arguably, in 1981 to the SDP breakaway'.

The method and progress of Jenkins' 'principled' opposition to official Labour Party policy on Europe after October 1971 'helped accentuate the divisions over Europe'. Neither, it seems, was Crosland and Healey's behaviour motivated purely by party loyalty. Their respective non-committal and opportunistic approaches both held out the potential, at least, of personal advancement within party and government hierarchies. There was little attempt within the 'Wilson-Callaghan-Healey position...to accommodate the pro-Europeans in the party, an omission that was to have highly damaging
consequences for the future’ (also Haseler, Interview with the author, 23/1/01; Lipsey, 2002: 111, Interview with the author, 17/1/01; Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01).

4.7 The 1975 Referendum and Beyond

‘There was a... cause which united politicians from all three main parties in the 1970s and which produced far deeper divisions within parties than between them’ It was, of course, Britain’s membership of the EEC.’

(Bradley, 1981: 31)

4.7.1 Introduction

Although lacking the febrile polarised tone of previous debates, this was clearly not the end of Labour’s European travails over Europe. Following the earlier commitment by the party in opposition, largely to hold the Labour Party together, Wilson agreed to hold a national referendum in 1975 to decide whether to remain in the EEC on the Labour government’s renegotiated terms (Radice, 1992: 165). Campaigning in the referendum included cross-party collaboration on either side of the argument after Wilson suspended collective Cabinet responsibility on the issue for the duration of the referendum campaign (Young, 1997: 151). Although Jenkins and Thomson had resigned from the shadow cabinet in 1972 when Wilson agreed to Benn’s referendum proposal, others on both sides of the debate accepted the idea of a referendum to decide the outcome of Britain’s relationship with the EEC. Peter Shore supported the referendum as ‘one of the five so-called ‘defence ministers’...of the Wilson Cabinet in the 1974-76 period who had faith in the referendum against the terms brought back by...Callaghan and endorsed for staying in the Common Market’ (Shore, Interview with the author, 3/3/99). Shirley Williams explains that, unlike her colleagues, Jenkins and Thomson, she did not resign in response to the referendum proposal because she believed that ‘it was absolutely right...[Benn] was quite right to say that people should be consulted, and...it also gave us the opportunity to get across a lot of the arguments in a way that we would not have had another way of doing it...we did not agree about the referendum; that was a major

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disagreement between us because I did not resign...it was not for reasons of personal advance, it was because I really thought we were going wrong and judging from there' (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). Williams was 'torn between disapproval of the tactical cynicism of the reversal of the previous decision and her democratic populist feeling that it was difficult to oppose a referendum' (Jenkins, 1991: 343-4). Whatever the philosophical merits of the episode, the whole debate and huge rift of the referendum 'was a great, ghastly and shaping experience', in the wake of which 'the party would never be the same again' (Lipsey, Interview with the author, 171/01).

4.7.2 The 1975 Referendum Campaign: The Implications of Cross-Party Collaboration for the Parliamentary Labour Right

The referendum itself was a radical constitutional departure in British politics. It had first been mooted by the Gaitskellite anti-Marketeer, Douglas Jay, in 1970, and was later taken up by Benn as a freshly converted anti-Marketeer (Goodhart, 1971: 59-66), but the outcome of the referendum campaign was not the one the anti-Marketeers expected. Wilson's renegotiated terms of entry were approved by nearly two-thirds of the electorate, as a well-funded and well-organised pro-Market 'Britain in Europe' campaign, supported by the majority of the press, helped to secure victory. The anti-Market campaign appeared to be composed of a more disparate grouping from the extremes of British politics that lacked a 'convincing alternative to the EC if Britain were to remain a secure, influential power' (Young, 1997: 151; also see Bradley, 1981: 34; Butler & Kitzinger, 1976: 68, 95-6, 114-15).35

For the Labour Party, there was an apparent paradox at the heart of the referendum issue and campaign. Principally the referendum was a Labour Party management device to maintain party unity. Callaghan described the instrument of the referendum as 'a life raft which we would all have to climb aboard' as the only means by which the Labour Party could be held together over Europe (Broad & Geiger, 1996: 83) but, ironically, it

35 For detailed discussion of the context, progress and outcome of the referendum campaign, see Broad & Geiger, 1996; Butler & Kitzinger, 1976; Young, 1998: 286-99).
precipitated the further alienation and eventual secession of a number of pro-European representatives of the Labour right from the Labour Party. The cross-party formula of the referendum campaign encouraged the feeling that they possessed more in common with the pro-European Liberals (and even some Conservatives such as Heath, Peter Walker or Ian Gilmour) than with their own Labour Party colleagues (Bradley, 1981: 33-4). For those such as Benn on the Labour left, Labour’s Euro-enthusiasts ‘cared more about Europe than they did about socialism’ (Broad & Geiger, 1996: 82-3, 105; Jenkins, 1991: 405). As he announced the press launch of the Britain in Europe campaign in the St. Ermin’s Hotel, Jenkins was flanked by a coalition of Willie Whitelaw, Reginald Maudling, Cledwyn Hughes and Jo Grimond (Jenkins, 1991: 407). For the likes of Jenkins, Shirley Williams and other Labour pro-Marketees, the experience of sharing the ‘Yes’ platform with political opponents such as Heath and David Steel was significant in reinforcing their ‘own innate centrism’ or converting them ‘to the idea of coalition politics’ in the context of the perceived sterility of the two-party system (Bradley, 1981: 35-6; Jenkins, 1991: 399-418; Morgan, 1997: 426). In his initial opposition to the idea of a referendum in 1972, Jenkins had warned that it would have ‘a loosening effect upon the tribal loyalties of British party politics’. After June 1975 things ‘were never quite the same for the Labour Party’. Previously, ‘peacetime cross-party co-operation could never be discussed without raising the spectre of Ramsay MacDonald. After then it called up for about a third of the party the much more benevolent image of referendum success’ (Jenkins, 1991: 418; also see Bradley, 1981: 36). These were the unforeseen consequences of the referendum campaign for the Labour Party.

4.7.3 Further European Tensions: Controversy over CAP Reform and Disputes over Entering the Exchange Rate Mechanism

Although the referendum was intended as a device to keep the party together, and the apparently decisive popular verdict served to resolve the question of Europe in British politics for a time (Young, 1998: 299), it failed to heal the divisions of the Labour Party in the way that Wilson had hoped. A number of anti-Marketees such as Benn, Foot and Shore remained in the Cabinet, Jenkins left British politics in 1977 to take up the post of
the President of the European Commission, and the reliance of the Callaghan administration on pro-European Liberal support in order to maintain a majority in the Commons complicated matters further. The parliamentary party divided fifty-fifty in the Commons vote on direct elections to the European Parliament in 1977. Further controversy soon surrounded the increase in Britain’s net financial contribution to the Community, which had reached a figure of almost £800 by 1979, largely as a result of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and which, as an industrial nation, benefited Britain to little effect. Callaghan himself became more predisposed to the principle of a system of stable exchange rates than some of his Cabinet colleagues, but further tension was fostered as his government avoided membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) as it was launched in 1979 as the result of Jenkins’ initiative to relaunch ‘the Community’s monetary project in the late 1970s’ with ‘the creation of the European Monetary Union System (EMS) in 1979’ (Radice, 1992: 165; Young, 1997: 151-2; Young, 1998: 300-02; also see Marquand, 1997: 93-109).36

After the 1979 general election defeat, Labour changed its European ‘position of qualified acceptance to one of outright rejection’ as the party swung unmanageably to the left. The Bennite initiative of 1980 to withdraw from the EEC, part of a general repudiation by the left of the Wilson-Callaghan years, became a key issue in Labour’s post-1979 intra-part conflict (Young, 1997: 151-2; Radice, 1992: 165). Although it may be difficult to quantify the precise influence of Labour’s European divisions in the SDP breakaway from the Labour Party (see Crewe & King, 1995b: 106-7; also see Bradley, 1981: 54-6), its relative role in serving to expose the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right and in the formation of ‘the collective consciousness of the social democrats in the Labour Party’ was an important one (Bradley, 1981: 53-4, also see 31-6; Taverne, 1974: 50).

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36 This project was the ‘forerunner…of the system that was to come to full flower in the 1990s, leading…to many of the developments which ensured that ‘Europe’ would remain for the duration a festering source of division in British politics’ (Young, 1998: 300).
4.8 Conclusion

Parliamentary Labour right divisions over Europe do not fit neatly into conventional dimensions and typologies of the parliamentary Labour right outlined in chapters one and two. The issue of European membership was not, as many saw it, a simple division between left and right. The European issue also divided the parliamentary Labour right within itself (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). A range of opinion has indicated the importance of the European issue in the formation of the SDP. Although some suggest that a ‘passionate commitment to Europe was not ... the ideological cement that bound the...SDP defectors together’ (Crewe & King, 1995b: 106-7), others contend that the bitter arguments inside the Labour Party over British membership and integration in the EEC represented more of a ‘battleground’ than a simple debate about policy (Desai, 1994: 145-6, 162; Jenkins, 1987: 137; Young, 1998: 302-5). It is also problematic to conceive of a simple revisionist-labourist distinction on the parliamentary Labour right over Europe. To some extent, there was a distinction between the ‘principled’ approach of ‘revisionist’ social democrats led by Jenkins, including the likes of Marquand, Rodgers and Taverne, who were ‘very much motivated by pro-European sentiment’, and the more phlegmatic approach of ‘the whole group around...Callaghan, Merlyn Rees’ who were ‘not particularly interested in Europe [n]or particularly keen on it’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). However, there were also divisions within the respective ‘revisionist’ and ‘labourist’ camps over Europe. With the likes of Mason and Brown also in the pro-European camp and, for the most part, Healey and, to a lesser extent, Crosland (and earlier, of course, both Gaitskell and Jay) adopting relatively detached pragmatic and ambivalent perspectives, neither was it a clear division between the intellectual, revisionist right and the old, trade union right. European divisions helped to undermine the fragile alliances of the parliamentary Labour right. The divisions of the parliamentary Labour right over Europe are clearly illustrated in the character and progress of the Manifesto Group, an attempt ‘to unite the various anti-left tendencies in the PLP’. As noted, its main success came in the form of organising the right-wing slate of candidates for various backbench policy committees (Desai, 1994: 170; Tomlinson,
Interview with the author 27/3/01), but the group’s major policy statement avoided any mention of the EEC, a problematic omission made necessary by the fact that the sub-committee of Manifesto Group Labour MPs responsible for the set of proposals included not only pro-European social democrats but other Labour right-wingers opposed to the Common Market (LP/MANIF/18, ‘What We Must Do: A Democratic Socialist Approach to Britain’, 1977; LP/MANIF/20, ‘Priorities for Labour’, 1979). Manifesto Group membership was too diverse for effective organisation against the highly motivated Tribune Group and the general advance of the left inside the party (Desai, 1994: 170-2; Shaw, 1996: 115-6).

Behind the emotional rhetoric of Gaitskell’s Conference speech and the political expediency, lay a core of ambivalence. Gaitskell’s approach revealed an underlying agnosticism on the substantive question and a political decision by which he could unite the party in opposition, after the earlier battles over Clause IV and unilateralism. Issues of such political significance are routinely presented as theological choices or articles of faith. The problem has been compounded by the traditionally adversarial character of British party politics, which has made it necessary for politicians to develop clearly defined and demarcated positions that can be seen to contrast with opposition positions. If the question is posed simply as for or against this convention is made easier, although the nature of the institution to which the question refers may evolve over time. Although the periods of intense political activity that have characterised the question of Britain’s role in Europe have often been presented as divisions between pro- and anti-European camps, the picture is often more complicated. Agnosticism has often been as much in evidence as faith or atheism in debates over the relative merits of the European Community. Motivations have often included political expediency as much as the principles or merits of the issues themselves. Although Labour leaders have revealed moderate pro- or anti-European preferences, political choices have often ‘been made on good old-fashioned party political advantage’. The Labour Party, for example, appeared more strongly united by Gaitskell’s speech on Europe than it had previously been under his leadership, and Gaitskell himself found that his career reached its height in the weeks after the Brighton Conference (Brivati, 1994: 24-5, 27-30; 1996a: 410-11, 413-19).
In terms of parliamentary Labour right divisions over Europe through the 1960s and 1970s, agnosticism was as much in evidence as distinct pro- and anti-European positions. The pro-Europeanism of Jenkins, Rodgers, Taverne, Hattersley and others was balanced on the revisionist Labour right by the profound anti-Europeanism of Jay and, to some extent Healey, supported by centrists such as Peter Shore. This polarised debate was compounded by varying degrees of agnosticism over Europe. These ranged from the arch-pragmatism of Callaghan, to the initial scepticism and pragmatic ‘opportunism’ of Healey, to the studied ambivalence of Crosland in the face of more pressing priorities. Together they resulted in ambiguous, pragmatic and fluid approaches to the European question in the Labour Party in the 1960s and 1970s, to some extent conditioned by the respective politics of statecraft and opposition. Consequently, the Jenkinstite core of pro-Europeans was increasingly alienated not just from the anti-Europeanism of the Labour left, but also from colleagues of the (revisionist) Labour right who refused to treat the issue of British membership of the EEC as an article of faith and as one which transcended the adversarial character of party politics.

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the European issue was immensely significant in dividing the parliamentary Labour right within itself. It contributed to the marginalisation of a committed group of Jenkinstite pro-Europeans within the Labour Party. In combination with further divisions in other key policy spheres, the question of European membership precipitated the increasing alienation of the Jenkinstite group from the general mood and disposition of the Labour Party in opposition, and from erstwhile colleagues on the parliamentary Labour right. In this sense, the seeds of the SDP split were sewn earlier than accounts of the post-1979 intra-party constitutional and power struggles suggest. In the context of parliamentary Labour right divisions over Europe, industrial relations and trade union reform, and issues of public expenditure, the split had a longer gestation period. Arguably, its roots could be traced as far back as the 1969-71 period and the bitter conflicts over industrial relations reform and Europe. It is to these other divisive ideological and policy themes that the study now turns in the form of a case
study of parliamentary right attitudes to the contentious issue of industrial relations and trade union reform.
Chapter Five

Case Study: Industrial Relations and Trade Union Reform

5.1 Introduction

The previous case study chapter explored the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in terms of attitudes to British membership of the EEC. It identified significant and serious divisions on the parliamentary Labour right, which ranged from distinct pro- and anti-European positions to varying degrees and expressions of agnosticism. These had critical implications for the cohesion and unity of the parliamentary Labour right within Labour’s intra-party politics of the 1970s, particularly the marginalisation and alienation of the Jenkinsite group and the constraints imposed by European divisions on the solidity of Labour right attempts to organise against the left. In terms of the earlier discussion of typology and divisions of the Parliamentary Labour right, the case study of Labour right attitudes to European membership demonstrates that, while serviceable as a general route map of some of the underlying political culture of the Labour right, conventional distinctions fail to convey the contradictions, complexity and divisions apparent in specific political and policy contexts. The European debate in the Labour Party after 1962 gave rise to divisions that cut right through orthodox interpretations of the Labour right. This chapter examines parliamentary Labour right attitudes to a similarly contentious issue for the Labour Party after 1964, that of industrial relations and the Labour Party-trade union relationship (see Ludlam, 2000a: 220).

In their retrospective of Labour Party history and politics, the position and role of the trade unions are perceived by New Labour ‘modernisers’ as representative of some of the worst excesses of ‘old’ Labour during the Wilson and Callaghan administrations of the 1970s, and as justification for more stringent party management and party leadership (Bale, 1997a: 159-60, 166-7, 174-5). However, argument over the relative position and influence of the trade unions is hardly a novel exercise in Labour circles. Given the socio-economic context of the late 1960s and 1970s and debates over the means by which to
arrest long-term British economic decline, ‘the trade union question’, as it became known, became a fundamental aspect of contemporary British political argument for both Labour and Conservative governments. The bitter internal divisions of the Labour Party that accompanied the Wilson government’s proposed reform of industrial relations, enshrined in Barbara Castle’s White Paper, ‘In Place of Strife’ (1969), the further industrial unrest that accompanied the Heath government’s Industrial Relations Act (1971) and the critical role of trade unions in both the production and implementation of government economic and industrial policy and strategy and in the internal dynamics of the Labour Party, guaranteed the trade union question a central position in contemporary political discourse and debate. In the Labour Party, the ‘labour alliance’s internal settlement produced in the social contract’ and the creation of a new TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee’, although witnessing a ‘new calm’ in the union-party relationship after the bitter disputes of the ‘In Place of Strife episode in 1969, was problematic given the centrality of incomes policy to Keynesian social democratic economic strategy (see Ludlam, 2000a: 223-4). Historically, the centrality of trade union constraint and the implicit division between the political and the industrial wings of the Labour movement, with the affiliated unions by tradition setting the party’s industrial relations policy and nothing else, made the unions’ formal domination of the party compatible with the parliamentary leadership’s pursuit of electoral majorities and national interest government. It was when one or other of the partners crossed this line for example, ‘In Place of Strife’ on the one hand or, eventually, some union block votes lining up to reform the autonomy of the PLP on the other – that conflict was worse (see Minkin, 1991: 3-22). Minkin’s ‘centrality of constraint’ argument within the relationship was certainly challenged in the period after 1969. Nowhere were debates and divisions over the trade union question more profound than on the parliamentary Labour right.

Minkin identifies divisions on the parliamentary Labour right over the central position of the trade unions and trade unionism in both British politics and the Labour Party, and identifies aspects of trade union collectivism that offered a fundamental challenge to the emerging liberal political philosophy of some on the Labour right. The trade union question was a crucial factor behind the ‘fundamental estrangement’ of the ‘social
democrats' from the Labour Party and subsequent departure to the SDP. Although the threat of party institutional reforms and the challenge of the left on the NEC and in the constituencies, together with their deeply held commitments to membership of the EEC and multilateral nuclear defence, led them to question their political bond and future in the Labour Party, it was the 'rules of the Labour Movement' that provided 'the frustrating context of their growing disenchantment', and 'it was the trade union role in society and in the Party which formed a crucial sub-text of their departure. Only when they came to shape their own public policies towards the unions as the SDP would it become clear just how far this alienation had gone' (Minkin, 1991: 208-13). In the respective political testaments that supported their decision to leave the Labour Party to form the SDP, each of the so called 'gang of three' considered the reform of industrial relations, the decentralisation of political power and support, and the mixed economy as central tenets of their political philosophy (Owen, 1981: 97-113, 114-27; Rodgers, 1982: 94-106, 107-24; Williams, 1981: 126-40).

The 'new' socio-political environment of the 1970s provided the backdrop to nascent debates and divisions within Labour's 'governing elite'. During the 1950s some degree of consensus around the post-war settlement and 1950s revisionism offered the basis of agreement and obscured points of dispute, but the shifting socio-economic context of the next twenty years or so severely undermined such an agreement 'as a broad crisis of revisionist social democracy stimulated and coincided with a crisis over power within the Party'. Prior optimism about economic growth and economic management had disappeared in the face of 'persistent inflation, diminishing international competitiveness and repetitive' balance of payments problems. Fresh trade union militancy, led from the left and unanticipated in the 1950s, helped to reshape the general political terrain and to underpin a 'new political configuration...within the Party'. Neither were these emerging tensions helped by the political expression of a 'new Rightwing Conservatism'. The 'politics of ideology, class and industrial conflict, thought to have been buried by the post-war consensus, suddenly emerged as a dominating element in political life' (Minkin, 1991: 208-9). Faced with a further 'reappraisal of means and ends', the 'revisionists' of the 1950s:
‘met the new political problems with an uneasy mixture of moderation, adaptation and pragmatism... Flanders and Crosland had sought to preserve their socialist values and Labour’s special link with the organised working class but to reorder priorities and reaffirm distinctive institutional responsibilities – and past on this legacy. But Jenkins was much readier to shed the socialist ascription, some of the main commitments and ultimately the fundamental values and ‘rules’ of the Labour Movement. As a group on the now more consciously Social Democratic... Right made its continuing reappraisal, so ‘the trade union question’ began to loom large as the source of problems and as an obstacle to their solution... the pull and push of [other] pressures traversed time and time again the terrain of trade unionism, its defects and culpabilities.’

(Minkin, 1991: 209)

This chapter examines the key themes and developments of industrial relations and trade union reform that gave rise to debates and disputes on the parliamentary Labour right. Contextually, it begins with the debates and divisions over Labour’s proposed ‘In Place of Strife’ legislation in 1969 that divided the Labour right in unorthodox ways. Given the subsequent absence of governing constraints in the period 1970-74, some contrast with the later Industrial Relations Act would be useful, for instance, in the form of any public support for Heath’s legislation from the Labour right. The chapter further considers the development of the social contract in the trade union relationship with the 1974-79 Labour government, and the crucial tension between aspects of trade union power and collectivism and questions of individual freedom. The overarching question that the chapter addresses is to what extent did disputes around the ‘rules of the Labour Movement’ and ‘the trade union role in society and the Party’ foster and accentuate divisions on the parliamentary Labour right, further marginalise an emerging liberal element of the Labour right and further undermine the unity and cohesion of Labour’s ‘dominant coalition’. To what extent does it support Minkin’s claim that it was the trade union question that formed the ‘crucial sub-text’ of the departure to the SDP?

5.2 The Contemporary Context of Industrial Relations: ‘In Place of Strife’ 1969

‘Awareness of Britain’s relative economic decline led Social Democrats to a series of economic questions, each of which involved trade unionism... It was in seeking answers to these questions
that... 'The Old Order' – the post-war consensus – 'crumbled' and the first crack occurred in its weakest area – namely over the role expected of trade unions. And it came not under a Conservative Government but from the Labour Government of 1964 to 1970 with its statutory incomes policy and its attempt at legislative reform of industrial relations – In Place of Strife. Where once Gaitskell and Crosland had urged that legislation should be kept out of industrial relations, now a significant section of Labour Ministers became quietly sympathetic to a range of permanent legislative solutions to industrial problems. Constrained by a newly assertive trade unionism within the Labour Party in the early 1970s, the ex-Labour Ministers were unable to pursue either the industrial relations reforms or the detailed incomes policy commitments that they favoured.'

(Minkin, 1991: 209-10; also see Jenkins, 1982: 45-6; Radice, 1978: 67)

5.2.1 The Context

The White Paper of January 1969, ‘In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations’, presented a serious threat to the internal politics of the Labour Party and to the struggling Wilson administration in particular. It was the first (recent) attempt ‘to confine industrial relations within a framework of law’ (Hattersley, 1995: 67; also Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/01). The ‘1969 government was tearing itself to pieces over In Place of Strife... The parliamentary party - which was viscerally opposed to "penal sanctions on trade unions" - had begun to fear that the continual dispute between the government and the TUC could only end in electoral disaster’ (Hattersley, 2003; Hattersley, 1995: 68-9; Healey, 1989: 341, 407; Radice, 2002: 172-3). Ponting (1990: 351) reflects that it is 'difficult to understand why a Prime Minister with a reputation for adroit handling of awkward political issues and a minister well-known for her left-wing sympathies ended up with an agreement with the TUC which even Wilson himself regarded as 'not worth the paper it was written on' and in the process caused the most bitter and damaging divisions yet in the party and the Cabinet'.

The proposed reform of industrial relations was part of Labour's wider desire to 'modernise Britain's institutions' and to 'humanise the whole administration of the state', not least as a solution to the country's recurrent economic difficulties, after it returned to power in 1964 (Labour Party, 1964; Ponting, 1990: 257, 350-1). Increasing strain in the relationship between the government and the trade unions over wage restraint, and the
generally poor state of British industrial relations, particularly the debilitative level of unofficial strikes, led to the creation of a Royal Commission on Trade Union and Employers' Associations under the chairmanship of Lord Donovan.37 The subsequent report, firmly rooted in the 'British laissez-faire style', rejected any idea of a legal framework or state intervention for industrial relations. It recommended a purely voluntary reform of industrial relations on the shop floor. The only move towards 'intervention' was the proposal to establish a Commission for Industrial Relations (CIR), 'which would be a voluntary body to prod the system into self-reform by disseminating ideas about good practice' (Morgan, 1997: 330-1; Ponting, 1990: 351-2; Radice, 2002: 173).

5.2.2 The Legislative Proposals and their Impact

The controversial industrial relations proposals enshrined in the 1969 White Paper, 'In Place of Strife', provide both the immediate context of Labour's approach to industrial relations, and an insight into the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right over trade union reform. The leading actors of the parliamentary Labour right divided on relatively unorthodox lines. While Callaghan inevitably defended the voluntarist nature of industrial relations, the issue 'divided Jenkins and Crosland, though Healey was on Jenkins' side of the argument'. It also 'laid bare a structural fault...which, over the next two decades, was to call into question its credibility as a governing party...how could the Labour Party, so closely tied to the unions, also claim to represent the national interest' (Radice, 2002: 172-3).

The report of the Donovan Commission was welcomed by some leading figures in the Labour Cabinet such as Callaghan. However, Barbara Castle, the newly appointed Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, believed that the recommendations of the Donovan Commission represented a missed opportunity in industrial relations and that the report was not the basis of a sensible industrial policy (Castle, 1994: 413-14).

The central issue was whether the Donovan recommendations were adequate, given the increasing number of unofficial strikes in key industries and the inflationary pressures of the British economy. An interventionist by instinct, she decided that something more substantial was necessary. The pressure of a forthcoming general election and an opportunity to outflank the Tories on the issue meant that the Prime Minister offered Castle enthusiastic support in her attempt to reform industrial relations (Castle, 1984: 625; Morgan, 1997: 331-2; Pimlott, 1992: 528; Ponting, 1990: 354; Radice, 2002: 173-4).

The outcome at the end of 1968 was the draft White Paper, 'In Place of Strife'. It adopted some of the Donovan themes, but also included proposals for pre-strike ballots in disputes that could threaten the economy of national interest; an enforced conciliation period of twenty-eight days in unofficial disputes; and the referral of unofficial action arising from inter-union disputes to the TUC, and ultimately the CIR, to impose a settlement, with appropriate financial penalties if the order was breached. The underlying rationale of the proposed legislation was to develop a labour relations framework that 'would both provide the unions with legal recognition and protection, and also ensure that industrial discipline would be imposed on them to avoid unofficial strikes, irresponsible wage demands, disruptions caused by inter-union disputes, and the other plagues endemic to British labour relations' (Morgan, 1997: 332; Ponting, 1990: 352ff; Radice, 2002: 173; also see Cmnd 3888, 1969: 18-21, 25-35). The purpose of the White Paper was to offer 'a charter for tackling the causes of strikes. It seeks too to tackle these causes in ways which will strengthen the trade union movement's authority...Far from wanting more Ministerial intervention in disputes, I want the unions themselves to face up to their responsibilities in preventing unnecessary disputes which can do wanton damage to other members of the community. The same approach lies behind...proposals for a "conciliation pause". This has one purpose only: to ensure that workers do not down tools before they have used the procedure for examining disputes which their own union have negotiated' (Tribune, 7 February 1969; also see Cmnd 3888, 1969: 25, 35).

In the hostile trade union response to Castle's White Paper, and the subsequent divisions of the Labour Cabinet and parliamentary party, the more balanced nature of the proposals
were overlooked, containing as they did a number of pro-trade union measures as the basis of 'a charter of trade union rights'. In addition to the apparently punitive paragraphs of the White Paper, it contained proposals for the recognition of trade unions and trade union rights in the workplace, the creation of a development fund, with government support, to encourage and assist in union mergers, and measures to combat unfair dismissal by employers. The White Paper further rejected the idea that collective bargains should be legally enforceable and that unofficial strikers could be sued for any damages that they incurred (Jenkins, 1970: 26-43; Ponting, 1990: 353-4; also see Cmnd 3888, 1969: 9-12, 18-21, 22-4).

It was the penal aspects of the proposed legislation, providing the government with increased powers to limit the scope of trade unions to engage in industrial action, which led to dismay within the trade union movement and elsewhere (Jenkins, 1970: 44-74; Minkin, 1991: 114-15). The significance of the proposed legislation was that for 'the first time since 1927, a government – a Labour government – was proposing to interpose the force of the law into hitherto unfettered collective bargaining. For the TUC...this was the ultimate heresy, a betrayal of hard-won union freedoms going back to the mythical heroism of the Tolpuddle martyrs. The fact that almost all the applause came from the right-wing press intensified their fury' (Morgan, 1997: 333).

While Castle’s proposals did incorporate measures that would strengthen the position of the trade unions, they simultaneously ‘provided for an unprecedented degree of government power to intervene directly in industrial relations’. Jack Jones was clearly opposed to a framework of government intervention and legal sanctions: the ‘idea of legally enforced “conciliation pauses”, and official ballots on strikes, provides further opportunities for delay and frustration within a system of bureaucratic state intervention. In particular, the idea that fines may be enforced by allowing employers to deduct them from the pay packet may well spark off further strikes even when the original strike has been settled...We need faster settlement of disputes, not more Ministerial intervention, which can often be influenced by employer-backed alarmist press campaigns on a particular dispute. The sort of costly, time-consuming, harmful intervention by punitive
measure and legal sanction is certainly likely to cause many more strikes than they prevent’ ((Tribune, 24 January 1969; also see Ponting, 1990: 354; Radice, 2002: 173-4).

Within the Labour Party, the issue encouraged major divisions within the Cabinet and press speculation of conspiracies to remove Wilson as Labour leader and Prime Minister (Jefferys, 1999: 137). In the enforced series of Cabinet meetings of early January, opposition to the proposals initially took two forms. The first, led by Callaghan, but with support from Crosland, Dick Marsh and Judith Hart, was opposed to the proposed legislation in principle. Callaghan explained to Castle that ‘it is absolutely wrong and unnecessary to do this... what you ought to do is set up the Commission, put the trade unions on their honour and do what you can’. It was a ‘minimalist position that would have provided some actions on trade unions whilst not alienating the TUC and the Labour party’, but it was not enough and would not satisfy public expectations of the government (Castle, 1984: 582-3).

The second form of ‘opposition’, expounded by Crossman and Jenkins, focused on the tactical handling of the issue rather than the fundamental philosophy behind the reforms. It would be politically disastrous to publish firm proposals in a White Paper in January and wait to the late autumn to legislate, as this would allow the requisite time to establish a campaign of opposition and necessitate defending the proposed legislation ‘at every trade union conference in the early summer, followed by the TUC and Labour conferences in September and October’. Legislation that would have to be passed in the months leading up to a general election could be damaging to Labour’s electoral prospects. The alternative would be either a White Paper of possibilities rather than firm proposals that could be put forward for consultation until the autumn, or to rush through a shorter bill before the summer and hope to dispose of the issue quickly (Ponting, 1990: 354-6; Taverne, 1974: 42-3).
5.2.3 Labour Right Divisions over 'In Place of Strife'

Callaghan’s opposition was more intransigent. As the ‘keeper’ of Labour’s ‘cloth cap’, Callaghan was fundamentally opposed to legal controls and penal sanctions from the outset (Callaghan, 1987: 272-7; Jenkins, 1970: 79-97). Callaghan reports that Jenkins, the Chancellor, gave his backing to Castle’s broken promise of several months of discussion of the proposals and eventual insistence in April that ‘a Bill be passed during the remaining months of the current Session... as a fallback position when the Prices and Incomes legislation should expire later in the year, as did the Prime Minister. ‘In Place of Strife’ was suddenly to be turned into instant government’ (Callaghan, 1987: 274).

Callaghan’s ‘commitment to the trade union movement’ had provided him with a bulwark against the political and economic uncertainties of the 1930s. Thereafter, he was linked consistently ‘with the unions in his political career’ as ‘their principled defender over In Place of Strife, their ally in drawing up the social contract in 1973-4 and retaining the Labour alliance in 1996. His rebuff by union members during the winter of discontent in 1978-9 was wounding for him as it would have been for no other Labour leader’. Callaghan regarded the matter as one of fundamental principle, reinforced by his long personal links with key trade unions. He regarded Labour’s 1946 repeal of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act, which imposed financial and legal penalties on trade unions, and against which, as a young trade union official, he had campaigned, as ‘another Magna Carta for the union movement’. He had welcomed the Donovan report ‘as a safeguard for free collective bargaining and for industrial freedom... Donovan had rightly endorsed a voluntary system; the only reform possible of the industrial system must necessarily come from the unions themselves’. He agreed with Jack Jones that ‘rather than the heavy-handed pressure of the courts’, it ‘was the only way to control unofficial strikes. Legal penalties would make the temper of labour relations much worse, and make a successful attack on the balance of payments impossible’. He believed that Castle and Wilson were ill-informed about the nature of industrial relations and ‘oblivious to the intensity of the TUC’s reaction’ (Morgan, 1997: 20-39; also see Callaghan, 1987: 40-64; Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97). Callaghan explains that, from ‘the moment I set eyes’ on the White Paper, ‘I knew that such a proposal, which ran counter to the whole
history of the trade union movement and to the ethos of the Donovan Report, could not succeed...I declared my opposition to the legal sanctions...on three grounds'. They 'would not stop unofficial strikes', they 'would not pass through Parliament' and the 'proposals would create tension between government and unions at a time when morale was low, to no real effective purpose' (Callaghan, 1987: 274; Morgan, 1997: 333-4; Radice, 2002: 174).

Callaghan's opposition to 'In Place of Strife' was soon to acquire support in the parliamentary party as well as in the trade unions. In early March, eighty-seven Labour MPs refused to support Castle's White Paper and, at an unprecedented meeting of Labour's NEC on 26 March, Callaghan's refusal to accept the conventions of collective responsibility led to a significant public display of Cabinet division over the issue. In the NEC, Callaghan, the Home Secretary, cast his vote publicly against the policy proposals of his Cabinet colleague on a motion which proposed that the NEC reject 'legislation designed to give effect to all the proposals contained in the White Paper' (LP/NEC Minutes, 26 March 1969; also see Morgan, 1997: 334; Ponting, 1990: 356-7; Radice, 2002: 174).

Although accounts of the strength of Wilson's admonishment of Callaghan for his public departure from principles of collective Cabinet responsibility differ, others such as Jenkins and Healey 'spoke of Callaghan's 'shabby' behaviour' (Morgan, 1997: 334). In practice, Callaghan was now too powerful an influence in the Cabinet to be forced out. He could also call on 'the support of the TUC and the NEC, while opposition was growing inside the PLP' (Radice, 2002: 174; also see Jenkins, 1991: 288). Jenkins (and his 'dedicated...band of desperados from the right of the Labour Party', such as Marquand, Mayhew and Gordon Walker) had been willing to engage 'in an unlikely alliance' with the sponsor of the White Paper, Barbara Castle. As Chancellor, preoccupied with a restrictive economic context, he was 'convinced that the economy

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38 Wilson's memoirs do not refer to any subsequent meetings of this nature and 'are generally brief on Callaghan's role at this time' (Morgan, 1997: 334, 357). The author of 'In Place of Strife' was not convinced by Wilson's delivery of a 'constitutional homily' to Callaghan on the duties and responsibilities of being a minister (Castle, 1984: 625-6, 630-2; Ponting, 1990: 357; Radice, 2002: 174).
could not recover without an effective wages policy and machinery to enforce it’ (Morgan, 1997: 331-2; also see Callaghan, 1987: 274; Jenkins, 1991: 287-9). Although he was unhappy with ‘the leisurely timetable of consultation followed by legislation in the following session proposed by Wilson and Castle’, Jenkins had offered strong support to Castle’s proposals from the outset, ‘partly because of his Cabinet alliance with Barbara Castle and partly because he saw the need for action on industrial relations’. The ‘problem which became acute over the turn of the year 1969-70 was that of wage inflation’ and that the ‘form which it took was to a considerable extent a result of the sad failure of Mrs Castle’s trade union policy’ (Jenkins, 1991: 287; Radice, 2002: 174-5; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).

Although it was not a formal Jenkinsite cause and ‘they kept their heads down’ as a group over the issue, Dick Taverne explains that his break with his local party in Lincoln had ‘as much to do with the attitude to the unions as it did with the Common Market…I was in favour…and they were violently opposed to ‘In Place of Strife…A very strong left-wing trade union constituency and my stand on ‘In Place of Strife’, which was not public but was private inside the party, was one of the things them very bitter towards me’. The unions needed reform and ‘the arguments that Barbara Castle produced were correct…it was an important issue…that and the Bennite plan for massive nationalisation, increasing emphasis on CND, the anti-Market theme all combined…to say…the Labour Party is going in a direction that I will not support…I felt a great sense of liberation when I did resign. I could speak my mind because when you are a member of the party you don’t speak your mind’ (Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01; Taverne, 1974: 42-3). For others of this persuasion, Castle was ‘absolutely right’ to attempt ‘In Place of Strife’.

Given the rise of the radical shop stewards movement and some of the excesses of the 1970s, it ‘would have saved the unions from themselves’ and would not have ‘helped to destroy the Labour government of Jim Callaghan and helped to destroy the Labour Party’. ‘What we actually did…was to produce the situation where Mrs Thatcher was able to come in on the back of trade union abuse and essentially get rid of much trade union power, and there was an awful lot of support for her among the public and some in
the Labour movement who had not had the guts to do what she did’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02; also Whitehead, Interview with the author, 20/1/01).

Bill Rodgers discerns two relevant themes concerned with the trade union role: the ‘closeness’ of the trade unions to the Labour Party and the general question of trade union reform. He believed that the ‘trade unions had too dominant position in the Labour Party… it was ridiculous that they were often casting votes in the Labour National Exec[utive] Committee or the Conference which were votes… determined by people who were not members of the Labour Party’. He advances a similar view to that of Williams and Taverne, and identifies a more explicit Jenkinsite position on the question of trade union reform that indicates the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right over key party and governing themes. He argues that the need for reform was clear from that time ‘and then, of course, was clear from the report which led to ‘In Place of Strife’: ‘we were all in favour of reform at the time of ‘In Place of Strife’ and Roy Jenkins… did support her a long way on reform and that was the revisionist right supporting the soft left at a time, of course, when Callaghan had gone off to say no change’ (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).

Crosland, however, had been sceptical about the timing of the proposed reform. His attitude to Barbara Castle’s White Paper was pragmatic. In light of increasing industrial unrest, he was not personally opposed to the need to modernise the trade unions, but considered it politically imprudent to legislate on the issue late in a parliamentary term. He expressed his concern in this respect in the Cabinet discussions of early January, proposing instead that the minority recommendation to the Donovan report, that the CIR be awarded powers in relation to unofficial strikes, be considered. He was further concerned that the proposals, as drafted, would be ineffective and could possibly lead to a situation in which the intended penal clauses would fail to achieve their intended objectives and unofficial strikes would continue to grow (Crosland Papers 5/4, Notes ‘For Cabinet on Industrial Relations Bill’). Although not uncritical of Callaghan’s open public defiance of Wilson, his abdication of collective Cabinet responsibility and personal meetings with trade union leaders, Crosland supported his opposition to ‘In Place of
Strife’ in Cabinet. Crossman reports that, in combination with Douglas Houghton, the chairman of the PLP, Crosland and Callaghan formed a triangle to endanger Wilson over ‘In Place of Strife’. According to Crossman, Crosland was increasingly allying himself with Callaghan as a potential sponsor and successor to Wilson in the hope of replacing Jenkins as Chancellor (Crosland S, 1982: 202-3; Jefferys, 1999: 137-9; Owen, 1991: 157; Radice, 2002: 175).

The major figures of the Parliamentary Labour right were again at loggerheads over a critical issue of policy (see Crosland S, 1982: 202-3). Like Jenkins, Healey accepted the broad philosophy of ‘In Place of Strife’. Healey’s initial attitude to the proposed legislation was that it would be better to attempt to get at least some of it on the statute book during 1969 rather than wait until the following year. As party and trade union opposition to the proposals grew more open and confrontational, Healey, ever the pragmatist, developed a more circumspect approach to the issue. In Cabinet, he advised of the need for discussions with the TUC and remarked that ‘if he had realised the impact the proposed Bill would have on party morale he would not on balance have supported it in the first place’. His view was that the Labour government ‘had wasted six months on a hopeless fight, which had caused permanent damage to our relations with the trade unions, without making them any less necessary to our survival. In Place of Strife did for Wilson what the hopeless attempt to delete Clause Four from the Party Constitution had done for...Gaitskell’, although he was aware that the ‘trade unions were now emerging as an obstacle both to the election of a Labour Government and to its success once it was in power’ (Healey, 1989: 341, 345, 346; also see Haseler, 1980: 121; Mason, 1999: 110; Radice, 2002: 175-6).

5.2.4 A Missed Opportunity? Labour Right Divisions and Party Leadership

Beyond his public denunciation of Callaghan’s ‘shabby’ behaviour over ‘In Place of Strife’, ambiguity and a ‘lack of excitement on the question’ pervaded Healey’s stance on ‘In Place of Strife’ (Pearce, 2002: 378-9). He considered the trade unions to be a restrictive force on a Labour government, but he appeared to be unwilling to promulgate
radical solutions in the face of hostile and potentially divisive opposition. He also viewed the protracted debates and public opposition to the proposals as Callaghan’s attempt to replace Wilson ‘when the next crisis came’, and as part of a general atmosphere of plotting against Wilson in the parliamentary party. Callaghan’s public campaign against ‘In Place of Strife’ constituted an attempt to win ‘enough trade union support to force Wilson out and take his place’ (Healey, 1989: 341). Hattersley, Castle’s deputy during ‘In Place of Strife’, identifies a similar desire on the part of key Jenkinsites to promote their champion as an appropriate replacement for Wilson in the wake of the ‘In Place of Strife’ fiasco. He further explains that it is now very difficult to understand why Castle’s essentially modest proposals aroused ‘so much passion’ but, like other politicians of moderation and common sense, such as Callaghan and Houghton, he ‘believed that industrial relations should be regulated by good intentions, enlightened self-interest and the occasionally flexed muscle, not the law’. Clear ‘association with the Luddites helped to secure’ his release to join Healey as his deputy at the Ministry of Defence (Hattersley, 1995: 67-70; 2002b; 2003).

Given the divisions of the Cabinet and PLP, and talk of Wilson’s resignation over the issue, Hattersley, along with other ‘plotters’ such as Tom Bradley, his Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS), was keen to persuade Jenkins that this was his opportunity to succeed Wilson, if only he would abandon his support for Castle and her hugely unpopular ‘In Place of Strife’ bill. There were now two, seemingly irreconcilable, rival camps of the parliamentary Labour right in competition to replace Wilson, the Jenkinsites and the ‘Callaghanites’, and even a very brief flirtation with the idea of a leadership challenge from Denis Healey that failed to secure recognition from Callaghan (Owen, 1991: 155, 156-7; Radice, 2002: 176). Kenneth Morgan, Callaghan’s biographer, offers a vignette of the conspiratorial groupings that surfaced to replace Wilson. He concludes that explicit evidence of a specific Callaghanite conspiracy to replace Wilson during the months of ‘In Place of Strife’ is impossible to identify, not least because it is by no means clear that such a group existed. Some senior colleagues such as Douglas Houghton and Merlyn Rees, and his PPS assistance of Roland Moyle and Gregor MacKenzie, were an undoubted source of support, but they did not constitute any kind of coherent group.
Cabinet colleagues such as Crosland and George Thomson were perhaps even less open to this kind of group identification. It was the more readily identifiable Jenkinsite group, those Callaghan identified as the ‘Mackintosh/Alan Lee Williams group of 1964/66 “intellectuals”’, who were more active in intra-party intrigue and manoeuvring than any recognisable Callaghan grouping. Jenkinsite identity and positioning was much more in evidence: the group included a number of very able younger members like Taveme, Mackintosh, Marquand, Owen, Rodgers, Maclennan and Hattersley, with some senior figures like...Mayhew and...Gordon Walker’ (Morgan, 1997: 339-41, 475; Interview with the author, 17/10/97; also see Crosland Papers 6/4, Dick Leonard to Crosland, 1 June 1976; Heffernan, 2000: 261; Radice, 2002: 234).

By early May the mood and divisions of the PLP were severe, and there was considerable discontent with Wilson’s leadership, particularly among anxious Labour MPs in marginal seats, but no one was sure how to remove Wilson. Some wanted a meeting of the parliamentary party to debate the leadership, but ‘the Callaghanites wanted the Jenkinsites to move first and vice versa’ (Owen, 1991: 156; also see Jefferys, 1999: 139; Mayhew, 1987: 187; Morgan, 1997: 339). Callaghan saw himself as a possible pawn in a Jenkinsite challenge for the leadership. He reports that John Mackintosh asked him if he would be willing to stand for the leadership and displace Wilson as Prime Minister, not because they necessarily wanted him to succeed Wilson, but as a stalking horse ‘in opening up a contest’ for the benefit of Jenkins (Callaghan, 1987: 275; Owen, 1991: 155). Jenkins refused to forsake his principled support for Castle for the sake of a leadership challenge. He felt that he was unable to challenge for the leadership using the Wilsonite tactics of which he was so critical: ‘I was not tempted to reneg on the Bill in order to replace Wilson...this would be fatal for the future. The real count against Wilsonism was that it was opportunistic and provided leadership by manoeuvre and not by direction. To replace him by outdoing his own deficiencies would make a discreditable nonsense of the whole enterprise’ (Jenkins, 1991: 288-9; Owen, 1991: 156-7). Rivalry and mutual suspicion between Jenkins and Callaghan, as well as the growing personal and political chasm between Jenkins and Crosland and the detached, pragmatic furrow ploughed by Healey, also stood in the way of a determined attempt from the
parliamentary Labour right to usurp Wilson. Given the political and personal differences of Callaghan and Jenkins, it was perhaps unsurprising that they were unable to agree on a suitable candidate to replace a discredited and weakened Wilson. Jenkins revealed to Rodgers that he was unwilling to serve under Callaghan’s leadership. So, in spite of his evident weakness during the ‘In Place of Strife’ episode, Wilson’s leadership was salvaged by political and personal divisions within the parliamentary Labour right and the inability of the leading contenders to co-operate to replace him.

A further important implication of ‘In Place of Strife’ for the parliamentary Labour right was its consolidation of emerging divisions between erstwhile Gaitskellite colleagues, Crosland and Jenkins. Whether in pursuit of Callaghan’s patronage as a means of achieving his aim to become Chancellor, or because of his increasing disillusionment and disassociation with the ‘Jenkinsites’, Crosland had clearly identified himself with the Callaghan camp during the ‘In Place of Strife’ debates. His approach engendered criticism from both left and right of the parliamentary party. Crossman suggested that he had switched ‘from demanding stronger anti-trade union measures to being 100 per cent pro-Callaghan’. Former devotees on the Jenkinsite right such as Bill Rodgers suggested that he had ‘lost some of the fearless, visionary independence of his earlier years’ and that he was now ‘more calculating in his political judgements, often making the opinions supposedly held by his working-class constituents in Grimsby the touchstone of his own’.

For the Jenkinsites, Crosland’s populism soon became an excuse for awkwardness, petulance and retreat from the idea of ‘group loyalty’ (see Castle, 1984: 351; Crosland S, 1982: 205-6; Jefferys, 1999: 138-40; Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Owen, 1991: 156-7; Radice, 2002: 176-9; Rodgers, 2000: 113-15, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). The ‘In Place of Strife’ episode in the Labour Party was an important reflection of Crosland’s gradual shift towards the (Callaghanite) centre of the party, and his further deviation from the emerging Jenkinsite liberal Labour right.

Parliamentary Labour right divisions over ‘In Place of Strife’ provided a source of impasse within the Cabinet and party during the critical period of discussions and the eventual climb down from the proposed legislation: ‘Callaghan’s purely voluntarist
position may have been popular with the unions but was hardly a viable long-term response to the UK's industrial relations problem. Crosland’s argument about the detail and timing of *In Place of Strife* was more tenable, while Jenkins can be criticised for not holding out to the last, though at least he was the last rat to leave an already sinking ship’ (Radice, 2002: 329) In a similar vein to European divisions, ‘In Place of Strife’ divided the Labour right within itself, making explicit the inherent complexity and ambiguities which had largely been concealed during the earlier period of focused ‘revisionist’ development and Gaitskellite hegemony in opposition. Conceptually, it exposed a clear lack of cohesion on parliamentary Labour right.

5.3 The Heath Government Industrial Relations Act

5.3.1 Introduction

After Labour’s subsequent election defeat in 1970, the reform of industrial relations was to be left in the hands of the incoming Conservative government. This came in the form of the Heath government’s Industrial Relations Act. The Conservatives ‘believed that, if Britain was to be modernised, to achieve real economic growth in the bracing climate which awaited its industry in Europe, they needed simultaneously to reform industrial relations and to break away from the muddled compromises, restrictive practices and wildcat strikes which, in their view, had characterised the Wilson era’ (Whitehead, 1985: 70). Robert Carr who, as the new Secretary of State for Employment, was handed the responsibility to carry the Bill through Parliament explained that ‘we were an old country in desperate need of physical renewal. We could only do this if we could get economic growth, and the Industrial Relations Bill fitted into this pattern because we believed we would not succeed in getting growth going. One of the conditions was to bring a greater degree of stability and orderliness into the conduct of...industrial relations...It wasn’t too much trade union power; it was really too little constitutional trade union power. The shop floor had taken over’ (Whitehead, 1985: 70).

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The substance of it offered the trade unions a combination of benefits and restrictions, but the bill sought to introduce legal controls of industrial relations by the compulsory 'registration' of trade unions and the regulation of union-employer agreements, enforceable by fines or imprisonment. Inevitably, it aroused great hostility within the Labour movement. The trade union leadership felt that it struck at the very heart of the gains and immunities fought for over seventy years of industrial struggle and, at best, its advantages would place them in no better position than the trade union leaders of the 1950s but 'clamped in corporatist embrace and legal restraint' as they were informed that the central pillars of the Bill were non-negotiable. The concept of registration in exchange for benefits or favours, and in favour of penalties, was bitterly opposed by the unions and interpreted as 'state-licence' (Radice, 1978: 71-5; Whitehead, 1985: 71-2). The TUC organised a 'Kill the Bill' demonstration in February 1971, and at a special conference the following month advised member unions to de-register.

The Labour Party, too, was hostile to the proposed legislation. Much of the dense, 'complex package' of the Industrial Relations Bill, initially published in 1970, was forced through the guillotine procedure in Parliament without debate. On one occasion, the Labour opposition, led ironically by Barbara Castle, voted solidly through twenty-four divisions against a mass of clauses contained in the bill that there had been no time to discuss. However, some on the parliamentary Labour right were highly critical of the tactics adopted by the Labour Party to oppose the bill, given that it reflected and 'partially implemented...Labour's own In Place of Strife' (Rodgers, 2000: 121; Interview with the author, 18/2/01; also Hattersley, 1995: 96-8; Leonard, Interview with the author, 23/1/01; Marquand, 1991: 195-6). Nevertheless, the Industrial Relations Act was placed duly on the statute book against a cacophany of opposition. Rather than constituting largely ritual opposition and falling in with the new legal framework as the government believed, and

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39 It included both the right to belong to a trade union and the right not to, a development 'which struck at the heart of the pre-entry closed shop which many unions had established'. Under the Bill, trade unions also won the right of recognition and improved protection against unfair dismissal, but these had to be pursued as 'registered' unions through the new National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) and the CIR. Unregistered unions lost tax concessions and were left open to unlimited claims for damages if they were accused of the 'unfair industrial practices' established in the Bill (Whitehead, 1985: 71-2).

40 It was assumed by the government that all recognised trade unions were automatically registered for the proposed legislation.
in the face of mounting unemployment and arguments over public sector pay claims conducted within the context of states of emergency, the industrial sector witnessed an intensive period of unrest and conflict from the autumn of 1971 that ultimately undermined and discredited important elements of the Conservative industrial relations legislation (Heffer, 1973: 231; Whitehead, 1985: 71, 72-80).

5.3.2 Still ‘The Keeper of the Cloth Cap’: Pragmatic Labourism Re-stated

As spokesman on employment in succession to Barbara Castle between 1971 and 1972, Callaghan was again a prominent force in directing Labour’s opposition to the Heath government’s industrial relations legislation, which, involved the introduction of the kind of penal sanctions that he had opposed previously in Labour’s own attempt to reform industrial relations. As noted, for Callaghan, the issue of industrial relations was not one for the courts and ‘the full panoply of the law’, and he attacked the new government’s approach as one that would make ‘for greater divisions on the shop floor’. Given what he now considered to be the ineffective character of the solemn and binding covenant agreed in the wake of the collapse of ‘In Place of Strife’, Callaghan combined his attack on the Industrial Relations Act with an appeal for still greater voluntary discipline on the part of the trade unions. He believed that they should operate a proper framework for the conduct of collective bargaining and avoid self-seeking and unruly stoppages that were resented by the public. The potential dangers of the political victory he had won in 1969 were becoming all too apparent. Like other Labour Party leaders he maintained a prudent distance from the miners’ strike of January-February 1972 and, although he sympathised with the claim of the miners that they had fallen behind in the pay stakes and welcomed the significant increase in their wages following the Wilberforce arbitration of the strike, some of the perceived excesses of the strike came as an unappealing reminder of the problems of any government in the face of unfettered trade union power (Morgan, 1997: 383).

Within the context of industrial policy of the time, however, Callaghan appeared to be moving broadly to the left: it was ‘remarkable to see a former Home Secretary defending
the right of workers to resist the operation of 'bad laws', constitutionally passed through parliament'. This general shift to the left was accompanied by a move to a more explicit anti-European position in intra-party debates over British membership of the Common Market (see Chapter Four). Some speculated that he was realigning himself with the new grass-roots radicalism in the party and trade unions, possibly with the intention of a future leadership bid (Morgan, 1997: 383-4). Although old guard 'Labourist centre-right' figures symbolised by Callaghan were obvious targets of the 'powerful new forces of industrial, political and generational revolt', 'he...was a pragmatic politician, less concerned with ideology than with common sense solutions...perhaps more so than any previous Labour leader' (Jefferys, 1993: 93-7; Howell, 1976: 297; Morgan, 1997: 384-5).

He always 'positioned himself in such a way that he could strike out in a number of different directions' which 'brought him some rather unexpected alliances, notably when in the period of opposition when he does...tactically appear to move to the left both on trade union matters and on Europe in 1971-2' (Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97). For Callaghan, 'as for Labour leaders in general, this was a relatively unfocused and unattractive period, in which it seemed difficult for the party to define its objectives or its strategies effectively while in Opposition' (Morgan, 1997: 384). Callaghan 'belonged to the generation of Labour leaders which had come to depend on the trade union block vote for protection against extremism in the constituencies...the trade unions had provided his main political base in the previous decade' (Healey, 1989: 467). Callaghan was representative of that 'whole trade union task-based' tradition, which 'particularly people like Attlee relied upon'. To be fair, it was 'not unradical, but not revolutionary in any sense'; it was an 'incremental social democrat tradition, but it wasn’t [an] intellectual tradition'. This was different from the 'Fabian element which, in some cases, [was] quite far to the left...basically a social engineering division, represented by the Webbs and so on' (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author 25/6/02).
5.3.3 The Continuing Trade Union Dilemma: A Point of Departure?

Some on the parliamentary Labour right lacked the outright natural hostility of some of their comrades in the Labour movement towards the attempt at trade union reform, and were keen to emphasise the similarity of the Industrial Relations Act to Labour's own proposed 'In Place of Strife' legislation and to present a 'constitutional' line for their lack of opposition to the Conservative legislation. The Jenkins position can be read off from his response to Castle's 'irrational' opposition to the Conservative government's Industrial Relations Bill: 'I considered that she had just been making a most appalling ass of herself, and of the Labour Party, by frenziedly opposing the Government's Industrial Relations Bill as a monstrous piece of class oppression, despite the fact that it owed about 80 per cent of its inspiration to her own In Place of Strife' (Jenkins, 1991: 322). Taverne reports that the Conservative Industrial Relations Bill was the source of the first major dispute with his constituency party officers after the 1970 election defeat. He was prepared to keep his opposition to the general party stand quiet when the Conservatives introduced their trade union reform bill in 1971, but when his local constituency party announced a one-day strike in opposition to the Conservative legislation he made his views explicit: 'I said you can't strike against a measure which is adopted by an elected government and they said we've got no time for this middle class constitutionalism and we are going ahead with our strike'. So, 'I said to them if you go on strike I will denounce it as your MP in public [and] they didn't strike, but in return I agreed to go on an anti-trade union bill march which was ridiculous but I was one of the few MPs that actually marched against the Bill. I did that as a compromise':

'I told them I was totally and utterly opposed to strike action... To strike on this issue would be undemocratic and unconstitutional. However much they disagreed with the Bill, industrial action was totally unjustified because the Government was carrying out policy which had been part of the election manifesto. Strike action would increase, not diminish, public sympathy for the Bill... it was a method of protest that in the end could only lead to Fascism... I said that overall it was a bad Bill... I was questioned about my attitude to strike action and simply stated that I agreed with the Labour Party and T.U.C. view, which was against it... Having attacked unconstitutional forms of protest, the least I could do... was to support a peaceful protest march. But the row confirmed the feelings of the
leaders of the Lincoln Labour Party that I did not see politics primarily as a class struggle. Increasingly they did.'
(Taverne, 1974: 52-5; Interview with the author, 18/1/01)

The penal severity of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was not considered to be an effective or enforceable means by which to conduct industrial relations (Marquand, 1991: 196; Morgan, 1997: 383; Radice, 1978: 71-5; Taverne, 1974: 52, 54), but neither did they enjoy tribal or sectional opposition for its own sake. The principle of trade union reform was still considered to be necessary. It ‘didn’t mean not having a decent, proper working relationship’ with the trade unions, ‘it was simply a matter of being...far too dominant in the Labour Party...you only have to look back now to see how dominant they were and how much the Labour government tended to cringe in front of them’. Labour’s own failure to reform the context of trade union activity was a significant factor in the later conduct of industrial relations and the difficulties of the Labour government after 1974 (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01).

5.3.4 Pragmatic Populism on the Labour Right

Other influential figures of the parliamentary Labour right appeared to adopt the standard party line on the issue. Apart from identifying the power and influence of local shop stewards and ‘pressures from local trade union activists’ in trade union affairs, Healey’s memoirs present an ambiguous, inconclusive approach to the issue of trade union reform (Healey, 1989: 399, 406, 467). In retrospect, he realises that the trade unions presented a danger to the election and success of a Labour government and, in the 1970s, possessed too much power and influence, with powerful trade union leaders immune to the democratic control of their members but, at the same time, he recognised the potential damage of reform to Labour’s mutually beneficial relationship with the trade unions (Healey, 1989: 341, 346, Interview with the author, 9/2/99; Mason, 1999: 109-10). Crosland was more attached to the important trade union relationship than some of his erstwhile ‘revisionist’ colleagues. He certainly ‘never advocated breaking with the trade unions’, and considered the trade union link to be very ‘important in keeping the party
rooted in...what was then called the working-class movement, which he believed in’. In the context of Labour Party of the time, he ‘basically took a Callaghanite view, which was that the trade unions might be awful but they were the only real balance to keep the ship upright and if it were not for the trade unions we would be the mercy of the activist left’ (Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01).

As a hangover from the failure of Labour’s own attempt to reform industrial relations at the end of the 1960s, the parliamentary Labour right remained divided on the trade union question in the new radicalised industrial and political environment of the early 1970s. Old trade union centre-right figures such as Callaghan remained wedded to the trade unions as an irrevocable element of the historic Labour alliance. Pragmatists such as Healey acknowledged some of the excesses and constraints of the trade unions on the Labour Party and Labour government, but also recognised the problems implicit in any attempt to reform industrial relations and the trade unions. Crosland viewed the trade unions as representative of Labour’s working-class credentials and culture, and as a bulwark against the excesses of the activist left in the constituencies. For the Jenkinsite liberal strand of the parliamentary Labour right, the expression of trade union power and collectivism was increasingly incompatible with issues of personal freedom, and the increasingly explicit role of the trade union movement in the conduct of government economic and industrial policy represented a fundamental test of the democratic process. These tensions came to a head during the period of Labour government after 1974. This period witnessed an enhanced role for the trade unions through the Labour Party-TUC social contract, agreed with the trade unions in opposition to improve unity and electoral credibility and to provide a credible wages pact to help ‘control inflation and achieve sustained growth in the standard of living’ (Ludlam, 2000a: 223-4).

5.4 The ‘Social Contract’ and the 1974-79 Labour Government

The experience of the 1974-79 Labour government reinforced the misgivings about the industrial role of trade unions and about trade union political leverage through the Labour Party for an element of the parliamentary Labour right most concerned with the dangers
of trade union collectivism. The ‘loose and general social contract appeared... to be incapable of dealing with escalating wage claims and spiralling inflation. For a period, 1975-8, the TUC’s co-operation brought a degree of control but the accommodation was always predicated, on the union side, on the assumption of a return to free collective bargaining. This assumption was not shared by some of Labour’s Ministers for whom it now represented a dated perspective inconsistent with the pursuit of policies conducive to the prosperity of the economy’ (Minkin, 1991: 210).

Originating from 1971 in the new Labour Party-TUC Liaison Committee, the social contract represented the internal settlement of the Labour alliance after the disaster of ‘In Place of Strife’ (Ludlam, 2000a: 223). Both parties agreed to adopt ‘a wide-ranging agreement’ over inflation and the cost of living under a Labour government. In exchange, the Labour government would pursue economic and social policies congenial to the trade unions and their members in terms of conciliation and arbitration procedures in industrial disputes, the redistribution of wealth and progressive social policies such as higher pensions. The social contract represented ‘a somewhat uneven agreement in that, while a potential Labour government detailed its future programme, ‘and in a way that perhaps compromised its role as voice for the entire nation’, the trade union side of the bargain and contract was more ambiguous. There ‘was no mention of incomes policy... no reference to productivity, industrial efficiency, or economic modernization, little attention to the generation of wealth rather than its redistribution’. Callaghan, chairman of the NEC Home Policy Committee in the discussions leading to the inception of the social contract was initially sceptical of some aspects of its likely value. Particularly, he questioned the likely success of a ‘tripartite incomes policy’ feeling that it would be better to rely on ‘fiscal and monetary’ policy instruments. It was ‘an attempt to give political flesh and blood to the skeletal agreement between the party and the unions sketched out during the crisis over In Place of Strife in 1969. It was corporatism in its most undiluted form’. It was in the context of the collapse of Heath’s industrial relations policy during 1973-4, the three-day week and the national miners strike that the social contract with the trade unions appeared as ‘a better way’ and ‘Labour’s only strategic option if it hoped to win the next election’. However, ‘on the right there was grumbling
that we had handed the economy over to the unions’, adding pressure to public spending expectations and commitments in a highly problematic economic environment (Barnett, 1982: 49; Callaghan, 1987: 416-17; Morgan, 1997: 389-90, Interview with the author, 17/10/97; Taylor, 2000b: 201-2; for further details of the construction and development of the social contract, see Ludlam, 2000a: 223-9; Taylor, 2000b: 201-33; Whitehead, 1985: 116-28).

Critics on the parliamentary Labour right remark that one of the disasters of the trade union role and influence of this period of Labour government ‘was the social contract’, which ‘was a product of Labour’s…perceived failure between ’64 and ’70’, and it gave a Labour government coming in in ’74 a horrific manifesto which there was no chance at all of delivering in those circumstances’ (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). Some even believed that ‘Labour did not deserve to win’ in 1974, ‘given its behaviour on Europe and the inflationary Social Contract it had agreed with the trade unions’, and ‘questioned the party’s institutional links with the unions and was critical of the role of Hugh Scanlon and Jack Jones’ (Rodgers, 2000: 136-7). In addition to moving further to the left in opposition, Labour had become far more dependent on the trade unions, and it was almost ‘inevitable that Labour would be committed to repealing the Conservative Industrial Relations Act’, although it owed many of its clauses to Labour’s own ‘In Place of Strife’. This rapprochement continued well beyond the industrial sphere, and the joint declaration of aims published in February 1973 included ‘a wide-ranging system of price controls, big increases in public spending on pensions, health, housing and transport and substantial extensions of public ownership’. Although Wilson declared it a ‘great compact’ between a future Labour government and the trade unions, ‘it was a deal on the union’s terms. Labour was promising to deliver on a whole range of costly items; the unions merely agreed to take these commitments into account when bargaining for their members’ (Radice, 2002: 213).

Jenkins (1991: 427-8) has reflected that this period of government represented the ‘last scene of ‘Labourism’, for such it was much more than socialism or radicalism…played out by one of the most experienced and intelligent Cabinets of recent British
history... with an amazing lack of imagination combined with a dogged but unconvinced determination'. Both Crosland and Healey shared some of these misgivings about trade union power. The increased significance of the trade unions in the party's and government's general strategy concerned Crosland, who commented that it was not Marxism that presented the problem, because no-one really believed in Marx, but the question of whether the Labour Party should be so closely linked to the trade unions. Crosland had been one of the first senior Labour ministers to advocate a prices and incomes policy after the 1970 election defeat, arguing that it was essential to secure higher growth as a basis to pursue egalitarian policies. Healey, too, was concerned that trade union power might undermine the prospects of a Labour government. However, both Crosland and Healey, in their different ways, were more generally predisposed to the cultural and political significance of the trade unions in the Labour Party. Healey, particularly in his role as shadow chancellor, saw it as one of his main responsibilities to be on good terms with the most powerful trade union leaders, especially Jack Jones of the Transport Workers and Hugh Scanlon of the Engineers'. During the so-called 'winter of discontent', when even Callaghan 'was so disenfranchised with the behaviour of the unions that he was contemplating legislation to control them, Healey, only half in jest, told him 'in that case I would 'do a Callaghan' on him', a reference to his own role during the party's 'In Place of Strife' arguments ten years previously. As Healey explains, even the Thatcher governments' 'draconian curbs on union freedoms have been no more effective in curbing excessive pay...In Britain it is difficult to operate a pay policy even with the co-operation of the union leaders...the real power lies not in the union headquarters but with the local shop-stewards, who tend to see a rational incomes policy as robbing them of their functions. Moreover, the TUC has no real power over its constituent unions, unlike its equivalents in Scandinavia, Germany and Austria' (Healey, 1989: 346, 398-9; also see Crosland, 1971a: 7; Jefferys, 1999: 168-9; Radice, 2002: 213-14, 278; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).
5.5 Trade Unions and the Question of Liberty/Freedom: A ‘small ‘l’ liberal...social democrat’ cause

5.5.1 Introduction

The trade union question in the politics of the 1970s helped to amplify the emerging philosophical tension between the relative position of freedom and equality in Labour right thought and practice (see Chapter Two; also see Minkin, 1991: 212-13). The issue of personal freedom across a range of policy spheres had been a key tenet of Gaitskellite ‘revisionist’ thought in the 1950s, which ‘turned into one of the few clear success stories of the 1964-70 Labour Government’ (see, for example, Jenkins, 1959: 135-46; LPACR, 1956: 82-96, debating the Labour Party document, Personal Freedom; Minkin, 1991: 212). In the industrial sphere ‘there was always an unresolved problem of reconciling this individual-focused and negative concept of freedom – absence of restraint – with trade union collectivism and the culture that sustained it... One strand of revisionism always defined freedom in positive terms as ‘something that needs to be enlarged... rather than as simply the absence of restraint. Such a perspective could more readily appreciate the benefits to the individual of collective capacity in the face of the power of the employers’ (Minkin, 1991: 212-13; also see Haseler, 1969: 93; Socialist Union, 1952: 32-7; 1956: Ch. 4). The conflictual difficulties of the two concepts of liberty were accentuated for the Labour right in the 1970s as they reflected on ‘the electoral liabilities of varying labour institutions’. So, a ‘new and introspective awareness grew on the Right of the Labour Party of the trade-off between equality and liberty – a trade-off the older revisionist leaders, ‘children of the successes of war-time collectivism’, had not fully appreciated’ and, if ‘a choice had to be made between freedom and equality, then...revisionists would plump for freedom’ (Haseler, 1969: 93; Minkin, 1991: 212).

5.5.2 Trade Union Power: Collectivism versus Individual Freedom

Central to the problem now was the behaviour of the trade unions, as they had been given new facilities through 1974 and 1976 Acts that ‘made it legal for employers who were
party to a closed shop agreement to refuse to employ or to dismiss employees who refused to join a trade union’. In light of some highly publicised cases of ‘closed shop victimisation’, a protracted struggle developed within the Labour government over the application of the legislation to the case of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ). In the Cabinet both Jenkins and Shirley Williams were highly prominent in contesting this aspect of the legislation (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). Foot’s decision to bring forward closed shop provisions in the autumn of 1975 was ‘dangerously inimical to press freedom’ and his ‘own editorial background seemed to count for nothing compared with his union worship’. In his pantheon the dead Lord Beaverbrook had been superseded by the living Jack Jones’. Foot’s plans for trade union legislation ‘continued as an overarching menace’: ‘I had got him in bilateral discussions to retreat from his worst proposals which would have given strike pickets the same authority as the police, and one possessed by no one else, to stop vehicles on the highway’. Generally, ‘on these sort of issues’, Jenkins was only able to rely on ‘a beleaguered minority of four’ of Shirley Williams, Harold Lever, Reg Prentice and himself in Cabinet (Jenkins, 1991: 392, 427). However, right-wing attacks on the trade union closed shop and collectivist values as a threat to personal freedom ‘found an anxious sensitivity on Labour’s Right’, as it was acknowledged that the question of freedom was now high on the political agenda across Europe ‘with the ethical credentials of Socialism under scrutiny’. Although it remained ‘unproven that the Labour Party will be incapable of redressing the balance between collectivism and individualism’, ‘that it required redressing was not in doubt’. For some on the parliamentary Labour right, the next priority ‘should be to reassert the value of the freedom of the individual’ (Minkin, 1991: 213; also see The Guardian, 16 September 1977; Mackintosh, 1982: 182-9).

Marquand identifies the issue as a critical division of the parliamentary Labour right, and within the ‘revisionist’ right, during the period of Labour government 1974-79, particularly the concern that, because of an overly intimate relationship with the trade unions, the government was moving in illiberal directions that were potentially dangerous to the principles of democratic government’ (Marquand, Interview with the author,
There were two particular developments that were resonant in this respect. The first concerned the issue of the so-called ‘Shrewsbury Two’, Warren and Tomlinson who had been jailed for picketing offences in December 1973. On the left, there was widespread belief that Jenkins, in his second stint as Home Secretary, should automatically release them. However, against opposition including that of the TUC, meetings of the PLP and even some difference of opinion within Cabinet, he ‘believed that the ‘Shrewsbury Two’ were claiming to be above the law at a time of great trade union power’: ‘I could not go round the country fulminating about the rule of law and even contemplate taking a purely political decision to commute these sentences...I had the impression that the bulk of the [TUC] deputation was not so much angry as amazed that I would not accede. The climate of the time was that of ministers finding out what the TUC wanted and giving it to them...Foot, with whom as Employment Secretary they dealt most frequently, was totally of this disposition, but he was not alone’. So Jenkins, as Home Secretary, adopted ‘a line that really incensed the trade unions and got very little support from his Cabinet colleagues. I think we all felt Jenkins was right about that’ (Jenkins, 1991: 19-19, 391-3; Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Whitehead, 1985: 344).

The second illustrative issue concerned the important question of a closed shop in journalism, which developed out of the repeal of the Conservative Industrial Relations Act. Marquand describes its significance for a section of the parliamentary Labour right who deemed the protection of liberal freedoms to be a priority:

‘Arguably, in the end, it was all a bit of a storm in a teacup, but it didn’t look so at the time because it did look as though the way in which the Bill was drafted was going to make it possible to establish a closed shop not only amongst the print unions, which of course have always had to have it, but amongst journalists as well. The NUJ would have a closed shop... (which was at this point very much

41 It is interesting to note that Jenkins’ speech in Haverfordwest in 1974, in which he explained that no-one ‘is entitled to be above the law’, was also ‘an implied reproof to his erstwhile friend Anthony Crosland – who had lifted the penalties on the rebel Clay Cross councillors, imposed on them for their defiance of the Conservatives’ Housing Finance Act - as well as to the Labour Left’. In the same speech, he argued that Labour would only find new support to break the stalemate of British politics by looking to the middle ground, an appetite for non-sectarian, cross-party politics which was increased by his role in the Britain in Europe Campaign during the 1975 referendum on British membership (see Whitehead, 1985: 344-5).
under Trotskyite influence)...that seemed to us to be a very serious denial of...the...life-blood of the free society, and we formed...a deputation to...Foot, who we thought was absolutely dreadful and simply tamely followed the line of the TUC and, in fact, we did, in the end, because the government was so weak, actually force them to accept a modest amendment...straight away. I'm not trying to claim it was a huge and major issue, but it did loom quite large at the time and...it was important for us. For those involved in this, it was actually quite a touchstone issue.'

(Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01)

Similarly, Shirley Williams 'was very, very opposed to the Trade Union Labour Relations Bill at the time in the sense that, among other things, it included control over editors and I thought that was an absolutely unacceptable invasion of freedom of information and civil liberties' (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). In addition to Europe, she identifies the whole issue of trade union power (particularly over a democratically elected government) as a corrosive and divisive influence on the parliamentary Labour right (also see Minkin, 1991: 212, 214; Williams, 1989: 6):

'I did not think the trade unions anymore than...the CBI had any right to be part of a committee which determines the legislative programmes of government. I am...purist on that; I think it is dangerous and corrupting. By the late Wilson, '75-'76, the trade unions were actually calling the shots to a great extent in terms of what legislation they would accept and what they wouldn't...what they wouldn't accept was treated as an almost un-overtumable veto, and I...thought this was a very dangerous road to go...the central issue of the constitutional responsibility of the executive to parliament and not to any other body is something I hold as a very central principle...so the old trade union right did not see the point of people like Roy Hattersley and me who were saying that you mustn't have complete trade union power'.

(Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02)

It was not so much the economic role of the trade unions that was problematic for this 'small 'I' liberal wing of social democrats'. The economic role of trade unions remained important. 'Some of us were very much in favour of an incomes policy and thought...that there needed to be more effective policing of wage claims etc. to make an incomes policy effective...it certainly was important when you reflect on the huge rate of inflation that there was when the government came into power, which was then of course greatly exacerbated by the way in which the miners' strike was ended in 1974, it really did look
as though the country was heading for...hyper inflation for a while. More serious to some were the ‘libertarian aspects of trade union power’ (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Rodgers, 1982: 107-8, 124):

‘the trade unions got into an extremely bad attitude in that period from the point of view of freedom of speech and conscience, and...the attitude of a large number of members of the Cabinet on the right...what I used to think of as the Callaghan right didn’t care about all this...they were anxious to get the approval of Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon to the incomes policy and they didn’t mind how many concessions they made to illiberal policies in other fields...I think that was quite an important distinction between Crosland and Jenkins too.’

Marquand contends that this is where Shirley Williams began to consider the need for some sort of ideological and political realignment or, at least, became more closely associated with Roy Jenkins. Earlier she would have probably been ‘a bit suspicious of Jenkins...thinking of him as not really her kind of radical egalitarian’. In addition to her passionate pro-Europeanism, this tension represented a touchstone issue for an emerging group of liberal revisionists on the parliamentary Labour right ((Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02; also see Chapter Six;).42

5.5.3 The Question of Trade Union Power: The ‘brooding shadow’ for Labour’s Social Democrats?

Although some of the more extreme social democratic positions could ‘overstate the power of union leaders and...ignore the extent to which Scanlon and Jones played by the old ‘rules’ of the relationship’ (see Taverne in The Observer, 8 October 1972), the perception of the unions ‘and the claims of ‘solidarity’’ among some Labour ministers represented ‘a brooding, oppressive shadow whose approval was as undesirable as it was

42 In the 1976 leadership election, when the right-wing vote in the PLP divided between the four candidatures of Callaghan, Healey, Jenkins and Crosland, she voted for Jenkins, primarily as a staunch pro-European against a left-wing anti-European threat: ‘By this time Europe was becoming a major issue everyday. We have had the 1975 referendum, the country voted two to one to remain in, but already...the left was moving away from accepting the referendum that they themselves had actually sworn they would live by, and so you could see the new battleground opening up and that meant that there was no question I would not have voted for Roy’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).
deeply resented', and represented something of a dilemma for Labour’s ‘social democrats’ (Mackintosh, 1978: 264; Minkin, 1991: 213-14, 220-5). For Jenkins and those who shared his perspective, particularly in the wake of his poor performance in the 1976 Labour leadership election, the ‘road to power and a very different style of Labour leadership now seemed permanently closed’. After his departure for Brussels, his allies and supporters in the PLP ‘continued to experience deep frustrations within the ‘rules’ of the Labour Movement’ (Minkin, 1991: 213-14).

The ‘brooding shadow for Social Democrats’ of trade union power within the context of wider individual freedoms manifested itself in a further minor, but portent, episode (Minkin, 1991: 214-16). This concerned the proposal for a Bill of Rights, a long-term Liberal cause, which was given a new lease of life in December 1974. It was also supported by Lord Hailsham as a potential check against the ‘elective dictatorship’ of a Labour government, and who ‘referred specifically to trade union legislation as likely to be caught by any Bill of Rights (Minkin, 1991: 214, 233, fn 41; The Times, 19 May 1975). The conflict over the Bill of Rights was fought out largely in private in the Human Rights Sub-committee of the NEC. To an element of the Labour right, ‘concerned as in the past with personal freedom from the State but now as much concerned...at the threat to freedom thought to be posed from the Left by trade union practices, including the closed shop’, a Bill of Rights became progressively more attractive. Jenkins, as Home Secretary, encouraged by his Home Office advisor, Anthony Lester, was known to be sympathetic and, under his stewardship, the Home Office produced a Green Paper, ‘Legislation on Human Rights: With Particular Reference to the European Community’, in June 1976 (Jenkins, 1991: 375; Minkin, 1991: 214, 233).

There was strong reaction to the idea of passing power from a democratically elected parliament to the judiciary, and, within the Labour Party, the social democratic right was equally torn over the issue. Roy Hattersley was strongly opposed to the proposal and the Home Office Minister, Alex Lyon, objected on the grounds of handing ‘the English judiciary more power’, but the NEC sub-committee on Human Rights was dominated by sympathisers of a bill, with Shirley Williams in the chair. In fact, the majority of
sympathisers on the sub-committee in the period 1975-77 were to defect to the SDP in 1981: in addition to Shirley Williams, these included Jenkins, Lord Harris, Bruce Douglas-Mann, Edward Lyons, John Lyttle and Ian Wrigglesworth, as well as Anthony Lester, the Home Office advisor (Minkin, 1991: 215, 233).

The proposal for a Bill of Rights was to eventually fall on the sword of the NEC Home Affairs Committee, based on the wider lack of support within the party. Although the NEC agreed to the publication of the discussion document, ‘Labour’s Programme 1976’ established that the party ‘will not finally commit... to this step until and unless we are satisfied that it has the support of the Party’ (Labour Party, 1976). This support was not forthcoming in resolutions to the 1976 and 1977 Labour Party Conferences: in 1976 there was only one supporting resolution and, in 1977, none at all. As elements of the right-wing wrote of the evils of collectivism and welcomed a charter ‘specifically as a means of dealing with the victims of trade union legislation’, alarm bells were ringing at the TUC over the potential implications of such a development (see Sunday Times, 15 February 1976). A TUC memo on the subject counselled caution, ‘crucially on issues relating to the right to join or not to join a trade union’, but also in relation to the difference between the positive rights of such a charter and ‘the immunities... central to the present ‘highly acceptable framework of British labour law”, and the inherent ‘dangers from the judiciary, given ‘their social background’ and ‘mistrust of collective action’’ (Minkin, 1991: 215, 233).

The TUC thrust its weight decisively against the proposals of the NEC Sub-committee on Human Rights. On the NEC Home Policy Committee, the majority and minority positions of the Human Rights sub-committee were reversed, and Shirley Williams found herself without allies from the trade unionists and out-voted by the left led by Michael Foot. The senior committee decided not to submit evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee that had invited evidence on a Bill to incorporate the European Convention

43 Commentators such as Paul Johnson talked of trade union collectivism and ‘the brute power of the group’ as a totalitarian threat to freedom. He wrote of the great division between ‘those who put their trust in the individual and those who insisted on the moral righteousness of the collective (see New Statesman, 11 February 1977; also see Minkin, 1991: 213, 215-16). Much of this critique found a reflective audience in the liberal Jenkinsite arm of the parliamentary Labour right.
into British law. Consequently, Labour’s pro-Bill of Rights lobby found itself in a political cul-de-sac: the TUC ‘had spoken; its word... conveyed to the NEC. The NEC with its left-wing majority agreed that there was a potential threat to party policy and to trade unionism from court intervention. This was decisive. But to change the composition of the NEC required trade union co-operation. Catch 22. Furious at the rebuff, and at their own imprisonment within Labour’s power structure, the subcommittee majority broke all precedents and sent their memorandum to the House of Lords under their own names’ (Minkin, 1991: 215-16).

This was a portent of things to come. Frustrated with the apparently unlimited expression of trade union control within the party apparatus and over the Labour government, the ‘trade union question’ represented a fundamental dilemma for Labour’s liberal social democrats (Minkin, 1991: 214; also see Marquand, 1979: 13-14; Williams, 1989):

‘the 1974-9 Government... for the Right... was a Government where too often they would ‘wander through the Lobby... in a reluctant position’... the Liaison Committee... for many on the Right of the PLP... remained a disturbing new arrangement—a new way of institutionalising union power and a potential threat to Parliamentary accountability... for the Right it continued to be a Government tied in a connection to the unions by which they were at the beck and call of vested interests and of further excessive demands for public expenditure commitments, while being unable to firm up a certain and lasting arrangement over industrial productivity and inflation. This assertive trade union presence within the Labour Party was experienced by the social Democrats not only in the obligations of policy but as an expression of class, style, and culture. The preoccupation with manual worker trade unionism was seen by some on the intellectual Right as... ‘a strange, inward-looking proletarianism’ whose proponents imagined that the Movement could ‘rely exclusively on the strong right arm of the working class’.’

Issues of trade union collectivism and the closed shop during the period of Labour government were a highly problematic and alienating factor for some on the parliamentary Labour right. There was significant opposition from those such as John Mackintosh and Brian Walden in Parliament to the Labour government’s attempt to extend the provisions of the Dock Labour Scheme and the dockers’ closed shop, embodied in the Dock Labour Bill, on the grounds that it catered for a special group
rather than the population as whole. It was mockingly described as an attempt to ensure that 'anybody who worked within three miles of a dockyard had to be a member of the dockers' closed shop'. Like many other liberal social democrats, Mackintosh favoured a statutory incomes policy and opposed uncontrolled collective bargaining. During the period of Labour government, he 'spoke out for a return to statutory wage controls at a time when it was still heresy to question the social contract, tried to emasculate...Foot's proposals to legalize the closed shop in journalism...and, together with Brian Walden, sabotaged the so-called Dock Labour Bill with a brilliantly-timed last minute abstention' (Mackintosh, 1982b: 177; Marquand, 1982: 12; Whitehead, Interview with the author, 20/1/01). More generally, the critique of free collective bargaining was extended to its impact on unemployment. Reflecting an almost neo-liberal critique, the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs argued that there had been a failure to distinguish between unemployment from lack of sufficient demand and unemployment due to 'organised Labour using its bargaining power to push wages beyond what the economy could stand'. There was a view that the assertive power of the trade unions in industrial relationships had shifted too far in their favour; management, it was argued, had become too weak and defensive, and too willing to believe that it would lose and industrial confrontation. According to this critique, the unions represented a particular reflection of 'the national cultural weaknesses of conservatism and resistance to change'. It was the trade unions who were taking the Labour government 'down the path of a 'half-hearted statism' where intervention was, more often than not, directed towards the subsidy of the inefficient' and, in their present state and attitudes, were a considerable constraint on industrial modernisation (LP/MANIF/18, 'What We Must Do: A democratic socialist approach to Britain's crisis', 1977: 14; also see Brivati & Cockett, 1995: 86-102; The Guardian, 9 March 1977; Mackintosh, 1982a: 215-17; Rodgers, 1983: 94-106).

For the liberal social democratic Labour right, the trade union question became one of how the Labour Party was to prise itself free of the constraints of trade unionism which, in turn, became 'linked with a second question of how to achieve a realignment of British politics and a change in the adversarial two-party system' (Minkin, 1991: 210; also see Mackintosh, 1982b: 177-8; Marquand, 1980: 78; Owen, 1981: 179-80). It was partly a
reaction to what Minkin describes as the 'political role of the unions as 'an estate of the realm' within a set of neo-corporatist arrangements', which made it important to have a more representative trade union leadership and to regulate on behalf of the public interest ((Minkin, 1991: 211; also see LP/MANIF/18, 'What We Must Do: A democratic socialist approach to Britain's crisis', 1977: 33). Some still insisted that government with consent had to develop these processes and involve the trade unions as 'social partners', but in 'any pluralist society, the leaders will have to win the agreement of their followers, and this is the central issue (Marquand, 1988: 242-3; Williams, 1981: 134). However, another view interpreted corporatism, with its emphasis on consultation and consensus, as a significant aspect of British decline and, for any sort of revival, the primacy of corporatism must be discarded and democracy allowed to flourish (Owen, 1981: 55). It was the experience of Labour governments since the late 1960s which encouraged some on the parliamentary Labour right to believe that an inherent danger to democracy, liberty and economic efficiency lay in the ability of the trade union movement to bend governments to their will over industrial relations policy. In 'the ten years from 1969 to 1979, the rumbling concern on the Right...about trade union power over Government moved to a climax...the Callaghan Government was the third 'to have been destroyed, essentially, by the trade unions...[and] it raised a spectre which haunted the Social Democrats' (Minkin, 1991: 211-12, 222-3; also see The Guardian, 30 March 1979).

5.6 Conclusion: A Framework of Defection?

As noted, conventional typologies of the parliamentary Labour right focus on variations of three broad themes: firstly, variations on the basic political dimensions of left and right; secondly, variations on an intellectual revisionist and unintellectual labourist distinction on the parliamentary Labour right; thirdly, typologies based on an abstract world of ideas, often divorced from specific political and policy context. While serviceable enough as conceptual or analytical starting points, such typologies do not always conform neatly to the complexities and divisions of particular contexts, which present inconsistencies and contradictions in conventional general presentations of the parliamentary Labour right. One crucial extra-dimension over both European
membership and industrial relations and trade union reform was that within the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist element of the parliamentary right, which divided fundamentally over these controversial policy and political issues. It was this critical ‘revisionist’ division and impasse that went a long way to undermining the cohesion, unity and credibility of the parliamentary Labour right in the intra-party context of the 1970s.

Further case studies of the public expenditure debate in the Labour Party in the 1970s and race and immigration policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s reveal that the parliamentary Labour right was further divided on key issues of policy. It was not merely a simple labourist-revisionist division. Outside of the pragmatic, centrist leadership, peopled by those such as Callaghan and Healey, the Gaitskellite revisionist Labour right of the 1950s and early 1960s was fundamentally split between emerging and competing liberal and egalitarian perspectives in the political context of the 1970s.

Like the issue of Europe, the trade union question of the late 1960s and 1970s cut right through the parliamentary Labour right. Led by Callaghan, the keeper of Labour’s cloth cap, there were the obvious defenders of the so-called rules of the Labour movement who viewed the Labour alliance in almost cultural terms; it was against all of their instincts ‘to create a situation in which the trade unions movement was not regarded as the flesh and bone of the Labour movement’. Although they may have balked at the left-wing infiltration and extremist elements of trade unionism in the 1970s, they deemed the relationship to be essential to their preferred vision of central control of the Labour Party through the parliamentary leadership in conjunction with the trade unions. A close liaison with the trade unions was an essential stabilising force for the party, particularly against the advent of a resurgent radical left in the 1970s. Attempts to reframe and regulate the context and conduct of industrial relations would undermine traditional trade union rights and privileges, and potentially lead to a damaging split in the Labour alliance (Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/01; Morgan, 1997: 333-4, 389-90, Interview with the author, 17/10/97). Callaghan was perhaps the most representative of ‘traditional Labour’, and valued the historic partnership of the trade unions and the Labour Party, as expressed in ‘the traditional moderate, centrist role [the TUC] had exercised in the pre-Frank Cousins days in the 1940s and early 1950s’. Callaghan’s instinct was for party unity and
believed that 'the business of creating socialism was also the business of subordinating individual views to those of the party' (Michie & Hoggart, 1978: 87-8). Like many of Labour's traditional supporters, 'by no means all of them on the left', he believed that the 'ideological roots' of the 'new spokesmen' of New Labour, some of whom advocate the end of Labour's 'formal ties with the unions', 'appeared to lie more with the SDP defectors of the early 1980s than with traditional Labour' (Morgan, 1997: 744-5).

A pragmatic and populist element of Labour's 'governing elite, represented most markedly in their own ways by Healey and Crosland, which might have lacked the 'cultural' understanding and attachment to the Labour alliance, also foresaw the need to maintain the 'special link' with the trade unions as the representatives of the 'organised working class'. They recognised some need to reorder priorities and rework more distinctive institutional roles, but within the framework of the 'rules' of the Labour movement. In terms of the potential reform of industrial relations, they adopted a pragmatic, adaptive perspective according to political and party context and timing. To some extent, they upheld the earlier 'revisionist' position of Crosland and Allan Flanders who argued that the central problem and the primary responsibility for industrial success lay with management, intent as they were on maintaining party unity and the essence of its Labourist spirit (see Crosland S, 1982: 202-4; Healey, 1989: 341, 406-7; Jefferys, 1999: 137-8; Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01; Minkin, 1991: 209, 210, 211).

A third key view was that the major problem of British industry lay in the cumulative assertive and confrontational power of the trade unions. This was the perspective of the emerging and relatively cohesive Jenkynsite pro-European, liberal revisionist strand of the parliamentary Labour right, in the form of those such as Marquand, Mackintosh, Owen, Rodgers, Taverne and Shirley Williams. It 'was much readier to shed...the fundamental values and 'rules' of the Labour Movement'. The seemingly irreconcilable trade union question in the Labour Party and British politics became a central feature of their thinking about the party and on policy. Increasingly, they were to feel frustrated and constrained within the so-called 'rules' of the Labour movement, and it was their confinement within these rules, seemingly confirmed by the intra-party constitutional disputes after 1979
which emphasised the constitutional significance of the trade unions in the party, which provided a crucial sub-text of the departure of some of their number to the SDP in 1981 (see Mackintosh, 1982a: 215-17; Marquand, 1979, 1980; Minkin, 1991: 209, 210, 216-20).

As the problems and divisions within and between the party and movement engulfed the Labour government in the period leading to the ‘winter of discontent’ and the subsequent general election defeat in 1979, they found it both an embittering and formative experience, exemplifying their most profound fears about the structural attachment to the trade unions. While some still argued that the association with the trade unions remained one of the party’s greatest assets and that there were continental role models for a successful partnership, and even some who argued that only more rather than less trade union participation in the party would offer a ballast against an increasingly left-wing NEC and constituency parties (Minkin, 1991: 216-18; Radice, 1981), for others there remained an irreconcilable ‘underlying tension ‘between the economic objectives of trade unionism with their emphasis on self-help, free collective bargaining and rampant individualism and the wider Socialist perspective of Labour with their appeal to fraternity and equality. These features of trade unionism filled out a growing disenchantment on the Right of the PLP, provoking discreet but urgent discussions on their future within the Labour Movement’ (Minkin, 1991: 217; Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). The distance between the preferences of moderate but radical social democracy and the ‘rules’ of the Labour movement now represented perhaps the deepest gulf in British politics. Their aim would be to create a permanent shift of power from organised labour to democratic government, which would involve a departure from the present party system to strengthen the ‘radical centre’ (Marquand, 1979: 16-17; 1980: 81; Minkin, 1991: 217).

Increasingly unwilling to dance to the tune of the party’s paymasters, three important factors further alienated the ‘radical’ liberal social democratic Labour right from the party mainstream after 1979. Firstly, it found itself voting against the first Thatcher
administration's trade union legislation, which involved the provision of public funding for ballots that many of them supported. Following the Labour Party and TUC line, they were further called on to vote against restrictions on secondary union action, again a measure for which they could demonstrate increasing sympathy. Secondly, in light of the 1980 Conference decisions and the announcement of a Special Conference to discuss the process of election for the party leader, the leadership appeared unwilling to do little but to 'seek accommodation with the advancing Left and with the 'unacceptable’ union voting arrangements'. Thirdly, the related development of the election of Foot as party leader in November 1980 only served to suggest that a similar pattern of political subservience was inescapable. The 'faults in the Labour Movement appeared endemic, incurable and worsening fast. At every turn they felt constrained by the 'rules' of the relationship. They could not initiate the industrial relations policies nor the incomes policy they felt to be necessary; nor could they produce a Bill of Rights. Each in some way breached the 'rules' of freedom’, and they were ‘convinced that the Labour Party was beyond salvation for the sort of things that [they] believed in’ (Minkin, 1991: 218-20; Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01). The wider constitutional changes represented ‘command democracy...it was all about trying to replace parliamentary control with party control’, the ‘attempt to try to gain party control over responsibility for Parliament’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). With their defection to the SDP, the new Social Democrats could now make the question of trade union power a central tenet of the political rationale outlined in the Limehouse Declaration, which emphasised the deeper, long-term concerns and principles underlying their discomfort with the immediate constitutional changes in the party: ‘The calamitous outcome of The Labour Party Wembley Conference demands a new start in British politics. A handful of trade union leaders can now dictate the choice of a future Prime Minister. The Conference disaster is the culmination of a long process by which the Labour Party has moved steadily away from its roots in the people of this country and its commitment to Parliamentary government’ (Stephenson, 1982: 185-6).

Having considered the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in relation to two critical issues of policy during the late 1960s and 1970s, European
membership and industrial relations and trade union reform, and their implications for relative cohesion and unity of the parliamentary Labour right in the intra-party context, the following, final substantive chapter examines formulations of equality on the Labour right in the 1970s. Particularly, it focuses on issues of economic and social equality as expressed in attitudes and divisions over public expenditure in the 1970s and race and immigration policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was this liberal-egalitarian dimension that came to divide the two major representatives of the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist Labour right in the 1970s (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01), and to signify a move away from the Croslandite ideological revisionism of the Gaitskellite heyday to the Jenkinsite political revisionism of the 1970s (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; also see Marquand, 1991: 166-78, 1997: 11-25).
Chapter Six

Case Study: Issues of Equality; Public Expenditure and the Social Dimension

'if [you] look at a kind of geometric shape that represents the Labour Party and where it stood... there is an east-west line, a horizontal line... which runs from the so-called left to right used by the media. There is another line which runs from north to south, a vertical line, which runs between authoritarian and libertarian. Now you can be a libertarian left, you can be libertarian right, you can be...authoritarian left, you can be...authoritarian right... So I think one never gets a real picture by looking only at the left-right syndrome, it doesn’t tell you very much... it won’t do to use the simple left-right category... I would describe myself as...radical social democrat... Jenkinsite maybe... the closest description, though I think I was probably always more egalitarian than Roy, and that’s the bit that was more Croslandite... comprehensive schools and all that. So, egalitarian radical but moderate nonetheless.'

(Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02)

6.1 Introduction

The previous case study chapters revealed the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right in particular policy and political contexts that do not always conform neatly with conventional general analysis of its political dimensions. These chapters addressed key issues of foreign and industrial policy respectively. They pointed to divisions both between and within the conventional dimensions, and particularly to a debilitating division of the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist Labour right which is not always evident in standard typologies. This chapter provides a further case study of parliamentary Labour right dimensions and divisions over key issues of economic and social policy.

Shirley Williams argues that the unsatisfactory terminology of Labour’s left-right political spectrum should be merged with a libertarian-authoritarian dimension to take account of social and moral issues. For example, she reports how she found consensus on ‘everything to do with race, international affairs, overseas aid, immigration, refugees’ with Barbara Castle:
‘she was supposed to be on the left and I was supposed to be on the right, and you come round the corner and you do the authoritarian-libertarian end, then on everything to do with race relations and criminal justice, and overseas development and internationalism, and anti-apartheid, we were completely at one, but on some issues on nationalisation we might have been at odds. That is why the terminology is so unsatisfactory. You have to look at the issue I think’.

(Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02)

The addition of the authoritarian-libertarian dimension offers a four-fold typology to represent the Labour Party and where it stood. Labour’s left-right axis refers broadly to issues of economic management and economic goals, particularly attitudes to public ownership, and the authoritarian-libertarian axis relates to social and moral divisions.

This chapter examines the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right along both axes. Particularly, it analyses debates over public expenditure during the 1970s, and then the social and moral dimension through a brief case study of race and immigration issues. In the latter case, the key debates and divisions emerge during the late 1960s with the bitter disputes in the party over the Labour government’s management of the Kenyan Asian crisis. As critical disputes arose over Europe, industrial relations and public expenditure, race and immigration issues appeared to recede in importance. Again, the organising question for the chapter revolves around the extent to which these core issues of economic and social policy foster and accentuate the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right, particularly within its erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist tradition, and further marginalise an emerging liberal revisionist element of the Labour right.

6.2 The Pursuit of Equality: The Case of Public Expenditure

6.2.1 Introduction

The classic Croslandite revisionism of the 1950s stated that socialism was essentially about equality, a theme he was to reiterate more defensively perhaps in later writings (see Crosland, 1952, 1956, 1974, 1975: 5; Jefferys, 1991: 170-4), itself underwent a degree of revisionism from the mid-1970s, particularly over the appropriate role and extent of
public expenditure in the pursuit of equality. Minkin (1991: 231), for instance, identifies one such ‘major point of division on the Right’. In a speech in Anglesey in January 1976, Jenkins publicly questioned the wisdom (and dangers) of further increases in the proportion of GDP taken up by public expenditure. Revealing his personal political credo, he suggested that ‘I do not think you can push public expenditure significantly above 60% and maintain the values of a plural society and freedom of choice. We are here close to one of the frontiers of social democracy’ (although alternative figures suggest that Treasury presentations exaggerated the proportion of gross domestic product represented by public expenditure) (Whitehead, 1985: 346). This was not a view supported by all on the Labour right, was anathema to the Labour left, and for ‘the Crosland faction in the party it marked a[nother] point of departure, a time to drop the pilot’ (also see Dell, 1991: 185; Mullard, 1987: 6). Hattersley, for example, cited the speech as an important part of the emerging ideological difference that prevented him from voting for Jenkins in the 1976 Labour Party leadership election. Hattersley relayed to Jenkins that he was experiencing a ‘growing lack of sympathy with [his] political position’, which was reinforced by Jenkins’ recent speech on the illiberal implications of high public expenditure and which was ‘quite the opposite of what Tawney and Crosland had written and Hattersley himself believed’ (see Crosland S, 1982: 315-16; Hattersley, 1995: 162; Jefferys, 1999: 191; Jenkins, 1991: 430-31; Radice, 2002: 236).

Indeed, as Labour entered opposition after 1970, Crosland’s social democratic political economy appeared to diverge with that of Jenkins. In 1971 Crosland published a Fabian pamphlet that was ‘primarily a restatement of Croslandism’ and ‘represented an attempt to stake out a middle ground in the Labour Party between what he saw as Jenkinsite economic orthodoxy and the so-called ‘new politics’ of Benn, who was beginning his move to the left’. Crosland argued against ‘some great shift of direction’ and for a reaffirmation of ‘those agreed ideals’ such as high priority for the relief of poverty, a wider ideal of social equality and strict social control over the environment. Economic

44 Some of the ‘younger Jenkinsites such as Giles Radice, were trying to build bridges [with Crosland] by promoting new definitions of socialism appropriate for the 1970s’. Crosland, for his part, was perceived to be dismissive of their efforts ‘on the grounds that none of this new thinking matched his own work’ (Jefferys, 1999: 195).
growth, about which he had previously been too complacent, was ‘an essential condition of any significant re-allocation of resources’. Growth should now be given priority as ‘the key, if squeeze and deflation were to be avoided, was a prices and incomes policy agreed between party and unions’ (Radice, 2002: 188-9; also see Crosland, 1971a, 1971b; Daily Telegraph, 8 January 1971).

6.2.2 The Public Expenditure Debate and the IMF Crisis

Although levels of public spending were a generally divisive issue during the decade, the key development around the theme of public expenditure during the 1970s was the IMF crisis and loan. The infamous IMF crisis, and the party and government debates that surrounded it, have been the subject of a considerable academic literature and argument over the extent to which it represented a shift in post-war British economic policy and a move towards the neo-liberal monetarism associated with the Thatcher era (see, for instance, Burk, 1994: 351-2; Coates, 1983: 9-11; also see Burk & Cairncross, 1992; Dell, 1991; Harmon, 1997a, 1997b; Hickson, 2002b; Ludlam, 1992; Oliver, 1998). Hattersley (1995: 178-9; 2002), for instance, a self-proclaimed Croslandite egalitarian, captures the significance of these events: ‘After the ‘IMF Crisis’, Labour was no longer the party of public expenditure... The whole idea of public expenditure – both its social merits and its economic advantages – was suddenly challenged. Labour began to examine precepts that it had previously taken for granted. And for a political party that is only one step away from acknowledging the possibility that its long-held beliefs are wrong.’

The conventional view, then, is that the mid-1970s broke social democratic trends in tax and spend, and that the later years of the 1974-79 Labour government witnessed ‘the abandonment of social democratic policy’ in this respect (see, for instance, Clark, 2001: 5-12; Holmes, 1985: 182). Mullard (1987: 149-50) suggests the 1974-79 period generated ‘an alternative discourse of public expenditure’ that brought about its public transformation from the ‘healer of the nation’ to economic ‘villain’. The process of the government’s apparent macroeconomic conversion ‘also created Labour’s most bitter internal disputes’. The uneasy alliance of the Labour Party in 1974 at least gained some
succour and cohesion from its general association with enhanced social provision through public expenditure financed by high taxation of wealth, but by 1979 the scale and direction of public spending cuts had been the subject of fierce internal party debates and divisions (Clark, 2001: 3-4, 35; also see Dell, 1991: 13; Donoughue, 1987: 51).

Within these intra-party deliberations, particularly in arguments over whether spending cuts or tax rises should provide the main instrument for the reduction of the public deficit, elements of the Labour right ceased to believe that the Labour government necessarily had to spend more than their predecessors and had abandoned high tax-and-spend as an article of faith even for the long-run. Some on the Labour right became anxious about the rapid spending growth of 1974-5, and Jenkins’ speech in Anglesey in early 1976 signaled a note of ‘Hayekian alarm’ about the creeping threat to pluralism and liberty implicit in uncontrolled public expenditure. Rodgers, for instance, comments that Jenkins’ warning that even a 50% rate of public expenditure was too high spoke for an increasing number of those on the social democratic Labour right who argued for sensible restraint in the growth of government and were gradually shifting away from Labour’s Keynesian tax and spend tradition (Clark, 2001: 4, 23, 35-6; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).

During the prolonged IMF Cabinet debates, Rodgers further relates that he ‘was not a fully paid-up member’ of ‘what was emerging as the Crosland-Lever group’ because he ‘needed to be persuaded that the Crosland analysis could be sold to the IMF, thus ensuring the loan without the strings’. At the Cabinet meeting of 23 November, Healey announced his proposal for meeting the IMF demands for cuts amounting to £3 billion, of which £1 billion would come from public expenditure. Initially, Rodgers found the Crosland case, that the July measures of savings of £1 billion were working and that further cuts would bring on higher unemployment and could not be defended on any reasonable grounds, more compelling. Eventually, however, he was lost ‘on the impracticality of [Crosland’s] game of bluff with the IMF’, and it became clear that his proposals did not present a credible alternative. In any case, following Callaghan’s example of declaring his personal support for Chancellor Healey’s package of cuts,
Crosland ‘tamely’ came into line, as did the other moderate rebels, Lever, Ennals and, less willingly, Shirley Williams and Hattersley. Moreover, Rodgers has declared that he was ‘hard-headed enough to do the sums’ and ‘hard-headed enough to recognise that in the end we had to find a solution that the IMF found acceptable…you have to have balance’ (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; also see Rodgers, 2000: 164-7; Shore, Interview with the author, 3/3/99).

Indeed, Clark (2001: 36) argues that it was during the IMF debates that the extent and depth of the conversion of some on the Labour right became clear, and that ‘[u]nderlying the Right’s abandonment of statism was their rejection of what had earlier been its chief rationale, egalitarianism’. According to Shirley Williams (Interview with the author, 25/6/02), however, the IMF Cabinet debates were not a simple left-right division. As noted, Williams was generally supportive of the Crosland position during the debates and was also sympathetic of the position held by Peter Shore: ‘I did not go along with…Healey or…Callaghan from the beginning…I thought that the IMF was asking for more than they needed to have…they were asking for about 5 billion, we thought it would be reduced to 2.5 and half of that could be found from the sale of BP shares…I thought…Benn’s position was impossible because it was based on import restrictions, and those…would have hit the Commonwealth hardest of all…it would have hit some of the poorer countries and I did not think there was justification for that, which…you could say was left in position…it certainly wasn’t a purely right-wing position’.

Shore (Interview with the author, 3/3/99) explains the nature of the crisis and the positions held. He saw the need for ‘a protective state’ but also suggests that it was unavoidable that assistance was sought from the IMF, for the very simple reason that all other sources of foreign currency had been used up or were no longer available: ‘we had to borrow from the IMF in order to simply pay for our imports’. The major problem at the time was the oil shock which served to quadruple the price of oil a few weeks before the first general election of 1974, so-much-so that ‘we had to drop our own North Sea oil, which had reached a point of being developed and, coming to office in February 1974 as Secretary of State, [I] faced the largest trade deficit in our history…our imported oil bill
had gone up...from £800 million in the previous year to £3,200 million the following year...we did our utmost but we ran out of money, so we had to finance necessary imports’. This was the basis of the Shore position in favour of import controls, ‘not as a permanent feature of our economy but simply to tide us over because we could see the element in the North Sea and we knew that in two to...four years at the most...tremendous strengthening of our economy would take place’. Tony Benn was very much in favour of a general siege economy, while Shore was not. Alternatively, Crosland was anxious to avoid cuts in public expenditure but, ‘if you did not do something pretty drastically and directly with imports, frankly the IMF would not lend you the money if you invent particular public expenditure’. Williams (Interview with the author, 25/6/02) further explains that the original Shore position ‘was essentially what we wanted, import restrictions and controls back in a big way, even at the level of rationing’. However, the final compromise was somewhere between the Crosland ‘middle position’, which argued that the IMF was asking too much and to stand up to them, ‘but make part of what you give them, cut what you can reasonably afford to do without really major damage and then add to that the BP shares, which is...largely what happened’, and the ‘leader position’ that ‘you have got to meet what they have asked for’ (also see Whitehead, 1985: 189-201 for a general account of the Cabinet debates and respective positions).

On the ‘broader issue of public expenditure’, however, ‘we were much influenced by Roy [Jenkins] having been the Chancellor. This was ‘a recognition that because we were a Labour government we had to maintain a balance of payments, at least equilibrium, because the world financial markets just jump on any Labour government that does not do that...that is why I think Gordon Brown is right’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). The question of international confidence appeared to play a significant

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45 Williams (Interview with the author, 25/6/02) appears to advocate a middle position between a balanced budget and generally progressive taxation: ‘but then within that framework where you cannot allow yourself to have a huge deficit, you have got to look at the taxation which enables you to maintain public services out of deficit and make sure it is generally progressive’. Of New Labour, she suggests ‘that it is not a sufficiently progressive taxation position because it starts to bite too soon. People earning £10,000 are paying tax and we think that is crackers; they should not pay before £15,000, and you get that by charging fifty per cent on people who are over £50,000. I would have thought that was what I call a social democratic policy, but it is our policy not Labour’s at the moment’.

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role in the thinking of some on the Labour right. Rodgers, for instance, had been arguing that the question of confidence presented the central economic reason to prefer spending cuts rather than tax rises and, by the time of the IMF crisis, even Crosland accepted that the sole case for government expenditure cuts was that of international confidence (see Clark, 2001: 23; Crosland S, 1982: 307, 343, 377; Dell, 1991: 227; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; Whitehead, 1985: 201). John Tomlinson (Interview with the author, 27/3/01) further reveals the development of this 'orthodox' economic thinking on public expenditure issues on the Labour right:

'I took a… different view to those who were critics inside the Labour Party and, in fact, I had an almost peculiar identity of view on that aspect with Enoch Powell where we came from very different directions… I had been arguing during the 1975 period that we needed to get the public sector borrowing requirement under control. I argued very much the case that it should be done by cuts on capital accounts rather than current accounts on the grounds, for example, that you could have good teaching in old schools that had good teachers and new equipment… rather than… in new schools with inadequate teachers and equipment… you can practice good medicine in old buildings if you have the staff but you can’t in new buildings if you have to sack the nurses… Powell was one of the few people who was taking a very similar conclusion, but from a different perspective. His was one of much more monetarist theoretical basis and, in that sense, I was in a fairly low furrow in the Labour Party… Powell speaking in one of the economic debates… said some very kind things about my speech, and I said to him afterwards that that was not particularly helpful to me.'

Some of the general loss of enthusiasm on the parliamentary Labour right for traditional redistributive tax and spend policy was reflected in some of the various proposals for spending cuts during the IMF discussions. Clark (2001: 37) suggests that proposals for benefit and pension cuts revealed the emergence of a 'more general inegalitarianism'. According to the left, support on the Labour right for aspects of the emerging ‘leader position’, such as the untapped potential of benefit cuts for meeting the IMF’s terms and concern with the unchecked rise in pensions, directly contravened some of the key commitments of the 1974 manifesto (see, for instance, Benn, 1989: 596, 668-9, 672-3). Thus Clark (2001: 37) observes the abandonment of traditional social democracy among elements of the Labour right, to be replaced by a more pragmatic managerialism or some sort of ‘Conservative-style promise of competence’. One minister ‘admitted the passing
of Croslandism but "confessed that a new philosophy was not available from the Labour revisionists. What distinguished Labour from the Conservatives he could best define as a 'feeling'." This neatly sums up the post-ideological position of the Labour Right in these years: it might now be called 'Blairite' (also see Cole, 1995: 166).

Even Crosland himself possessed reservations about the intrinsic value of indeterminate public expenditure. Crosland was never the uncomplicated and unreconstructed high spending egalitarian of some Labour Party mythology, and he acknowledged the limits of public expenditure in achieving egalitarian aims. In this sense, he advocated more discriminate use of public social expenditure and developed a distinction between its progressive and regressive dimensions: 'the principle [of high public expenditure] remains valid... We need to reform the practice; we need in our public spending decisions to ask not only; how much? But also: to whom? In particular, we must give a higher priority to social expenditure which is unambiguously progressive – for example, cash benefits to the old, the sick and the unemployed -- and restrain that which is regressive – for example, some forms of indiscriminate subsidy, or excessive highway construction, or (in Europe) higher education. Only then will public expenditure play the progressive role which we expect of it (Crosland, 1975: 4-9; also see 1962: 28-9; 1976; Fielding, 2002: 70, 177-8, 204; Lipsey, 1999). His former political adviser and confidant, David Lipsey (Interview with the author, 17/1/01; also see Crosland, 1974), explains Crosland's reservations concerning public expenditure, but also an important difference with other Labour right 'revisionists':

'Tony revised his view on public spending... in the 1970s for two chief reasons... one, it was pretty evident why we had the domestic reason for stagflation... was because living standards have barely risen for people; people's basic take home pay had barely risen in real terms because they had put a lot of money into public expenditure and they didn't like that. The second and more sophisticated reason was that there was an increasing weight of academic evidence that a lot of the public spending was not going to the worst off, which was the idea from his point of view, but to the better off... from both these points of view he had revised his view on public expenditure. What he hadn't done was to go to the Jenkinstite extreme and raise some ludicrous hotch-potch figure of 60% of GDP going on public spending; absolutely misleading and must be cut back and was a threat to liberty... Tony didn't believe any of that... Basically people who believed that have been in charge ever since.'
At the height of the economic difficulties facing the 1974-79 Labour government, in a speech tackling the seemingly unremitting social democratic dilemma of the political space realistically available for radical economic and social measures in the face such significant structural constraints (see, for example, Przeworski, 1985; Wickham-Jones, 1996: 23-6), Crosland (1976; also see Jefferys, 1999: 207) presents the case for a wider interpretation and compass for the pursuit of equality. He suggests that there ‘is a growing realization that government alone cannot solve the nations problems’ and that the ‘gulf between people’s expectations of what government can deliver, and what in the real world it can actually deliver, has always been one of the greatest threats to our democratic system.’ In the face of the inevitable limits imposed by the economic crisis, he proposes a more general remit in Labour’s programme in the progress towards a more equal society: when the purse strings are tight and restrictions on public expenditure prohibit a more focused idea of redistributive economic equality, a Labour government should pursue measures of social equality ‘to outlaw racial or sexual discrimination [that] cost little in terms of public expenditure’.

This should be accompanied by ‘a better sense of priorities within public expenditure. Total public expenditure is inevitably limited. So it is all the more vital that we concentrate...on those areas where it redistributes most sharply in favour of the less well-off.’ In this respect, ‘[l]ocal Government as well as Central Government must be relentless in pursuit of maximum value for money.’ Moreover, in terms of taxation, it is not good enough to simply increase taxes on the wealthy; rather, the priority is ‘to build on the progress...already made towards creating a fairer tax system...[which] might well lead to increased revenue and a lower PSBR; and could therefore positively help our economic situation.’ In difficult circumstances and within certain constraints, it ‘encapsulates a sense of purpose within the bounds of the practical’.

Crosland’s revisionist egalitarianism undoubtedly influenced successive generations of democratic socialists and social democrats (see Hattersley, 1987: xix, 1995: 173, 179; 2002; Marquand, 1991: 166-7; 1997: 11-12; Owen, 1999; Plant, 1996: 165-6; Rodgers,
Marquand (1997: 11-12) contends that it was neither a particularly radical nor durable strategy. Croslandite revisionism presupposed 'no need for a revolutionary transformation, but there was every need for steady incremental improvement...Life chances could be equalized; class distinctions could be eroded; public expenditure could be increased; welfare could be enhanced; society could be made more just and more contented...In retrospect...[i]t took the institutions and operational codes of the British state for granted, and assumed that if revisionist ministers pulled the right Whitehall levers, the desired results would follow. It presupposed continuing economic growth on a scale sufficient to produce an adequate fiscal dividend' (also see Marquand, 1999: 170-1, 174-5, 176-8; Plant, 1996: 165-6, 173-4).

Moreover, while he recognised that the drastic public expenditure cuts deemed necessary in the wake of the 1976 IMF crisis would undermine the very fundamentals of his quest for equality based on recurrent economic growth and public spending and, indeed, fought a rearguard Cabinet battle against the terms of the IMF loan (see Crosland, 1982: 376-82; Hattersley, 1995: 172-8; Marquand, 1999: 175-6), Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01), for instance, adopted a more critical view of both the Croslandite position and of Crosland as a political leader and strategist during the IMF negotiations. Although he evolved, more generally, ‘from a school that believes in public expenditure’, because it is always difficult to ‘deal with problems of social justice unless you are prepared to have levels of taxation consistent with proper levels of public expenditure’ and, therefore, believed that the IMF terms were too stringent and felt unhappy with Healey’s initial proposals, Rodgers has argued that it became clear that Crosland’s ‘policies were not credible as the alternative’ and, after leading us ‘all up the top of a hill’, Crosland capitulated rather than fighting to the end (also see Marquand, 1999: 175-8; Owen, 1999). Hattersley (1995: 176) reports that it was, in fact, Crosland himself who was left to persuade him, for the political survival of both the Chancellor and the Labour government, of the need to back down and to do his duty now that the Prime Minister had come to a decision and proposed to request the Cabinet to accept the Chancellor’s proposals (also see Dell, 1991: 285). If anything, Crosland’s strategy and eventual
decision during the IMF crisis was consistent with Marquand's (1999: 166-78) perceptive encapsulation of him as 'The Progressive as Loyalist' and his deep-rooted commitment to the wider Labour movement. In essence, the 1976 IMF crisis offers a useful vignette of the limits of Crosland's egalitarian philosophy. Hattersley stuck doggedly to his mantra that "Socialism is about equality and we cannot have greater equality if we cut public spending" to the bitter end and, ultimately, appears to have been more 'Croslandite' than Crosland himself. Within the parliamentary Labour right there remained some essence of egalitarianism and belief in the intrinsic value of public spending as a central instrument in the pursuit of equality and, to some extent, diverging approaches to the use of public expenditure in these terms produced a further rift within this coalition of embattled colleagues.

6.2.3 Conclusion

The IMF episode, and issues of public expenditure more broadly, revealed the emerging divisions of the parliamentary Labour right. Beyond the pragmatic 'leadership' position of the IMF crisis, there appeared to be a division between the new, liberal or 'radical' Labour right represented by Jenkins and his key supporters and the 'social-democratic centre' represented by Crosland and Hattersley (together with the likes of Barbara Castle and the TUC, at least in their consistent shared opposition to spending cuts) over the relative virtues and future of public expenditure as a particular tool of economic management. The Crosland position retained clear loyalty, in principle at least, 'to the long-run goal of higher spending' and, unlike the Right remained clear that the eventual aim should be a return to steady public spending growth, which would probably have seen it grow further in GDP'. This consistent long-term goal of the centre and centre-left helped to produce a 'shared alarm at the apparent philosophical shift which the Labour Right had undergone', some of whom, in line with the emerging 'new Right-wing philosophy', believed that cuts were now 'positively socially desirable' (see Castle, 1990: 678; Clark, 2001: 40; Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01).
Respective attitudes to public expenditure from the mid-1970s represented a further fracture in the unity and ideological cohesion of the erstwhile ‘revisionist’ Labour right. The divisions of the parliamentary Labour right coalition revealed three broad positions within the debate on public expenditure: the ‘pragmatic’ leadership position pursued by Healey, his ‘Treasury men’, Joel Barnett and Edmund Dell, and, eventually, Callaghan; to the ‘left’, the so-called ‘Keynesian dissenters’ of Crosland, Hattersley, Lever and, to some extent, Williams; and to the ‘right’, some of the younger elements of the ‘revisionist’ Labour right, schooled in the Jenkinsite ‘economic orthodoxy’ and willing to countenance a re-evaluation of public expenditure in Labour’s economic and political pantheon (also see Crosland S, 1982: 343; Dell, 1991: 226-8; Donoughue, 1987: 89-90).

Crosland, for example, reflected on the cost of ‘the detested cuts and the wider economic climate’ in a series of rhetorical questions in his commonplace book:

‘(a) Demoralisation of decent rank-&-file: Grimsby L.P. … (b) strain on T.U. loyalty … Outstanding success of last 2 yrs. has been implication & involvement of T.U.s in national economic policy. If this survives, will struggle thru: if not, disaster. (c) breeding of illiterate & reactionary attitude to public expenditure – horrible. (d) collapse of strategy which I proposed last year … Now no sense of direction and no priorities: only pragmatism, empiricism, safety first, £ supreme. (e) and: unemployment, even if politically more wearable, = grave loss of welfare, security, choice: very high price to be paid for deflation & negative growth.’
(Crosland S, 1982: 355-6, also see 354)

Implicit in Crosland’s analysis was the belief that the surrender of ideological conviction to a pragmatic, empiric, safety first attitude had bred a horrible, illiterate and reactionary attitude to public expenditure among elements of the Labour right coalition, a belief that also underpinned Hattersley’s strong reaction to Jenkins’ Anglesey speech on public expenditure and his decision to sever a long-standing alliance (Clark, 2001: 41; Crosland S, 1982: 315; Jenkins, 1991: 431). Given the similar denunciation of Crosland by the Jenkinsites during the intra-party struggles over Europe (see Chapter Four), it would appear that serious ideological differences and priorities were emerging within this important segment of the parliamentary Labour right in response to the key, divisive events and developments that signalled the shift away from traditional Keynesian social
democracy (possibly scuppering 'whatever slight opportunity there might have been of a Gaitskellite inheritance, even in the 1970s') (Howard, 1999).

Underlying some of the emerging ideological differences was a divergent approach to continued egalitarianism on the parliamentary Labour right. In spite of his caution in some respects over public expenditure, Crosland’s egalitarianism cajoled him to find alliance with the left in December 1976 to oppose benefit cuts and, despite ‘hard times’, he continued to argue for greater state redistribution in the form of a ‘fairer tax’ that represented one of the priorities that must be pursued even more urgently now that times were hard (see Benn, 1989: 684; Crosland, 1976; Crosland S, 1982: 357). Thus in the spending cuts debates of November 1975, the key Gaitskellite ideologist found his ‘strongest ally’ to be the devoted Bevanite, Barbara Castle and, together, ‘they came within two votes of defeating...Healey’. Together they argued that it was not clear that the public ‘would automatically prefer cuts in public expenditure to higher taxes’ (Castle, 1990: 633-4; Clark, 2001: 41; Crosland S, 1982: 307-8).46 Tomlinson (Interview with the author, 27/3/01) has suggested that Crosland was ‘somebody who, in a number of ways, didn’t readily fit into...left-right. If you took public spending as being the touchstone of the left, then...Crosland was a hard left radical and others who would regard themselves as instinctively on the left were much more conservative’ (see Chapter One).

As Clark (2001: 43) remarks, the Croslandite position became a solitary voice in an increasingly polarised debate as ‘Britain’s recurrent mid-1970s crises combined with post-war disappointments to suggest a more drastic prescription was needed…for “defensive battle to preserve post-war achievements against the rising threat of New Conservatism.” Labour’s centre was thus weakened, as the 1976 leadership election

46 Although, of course, there were differences between them, Crosland ‘accepted some short-term cuts as the largesse of the mid-1970s offended his gradualism…This view lay behind his famous warning to local government that current spending growth was too fast – “the party’s over”…This gradualism ultimately made even the IMF cuts acceptable: they were not “a refutation of Croslandism” if seen as a short-run measure. His chief concern in fighting cuts was thus to preserve demand (and so jobs), not to protect social spending: Keynesianism was integral to his approach, and he rejected inflation control through unemployment as unjust.’ Castle, on the other hand, ‘consistently supported higher tax-and-spend even in the short run, as she sought rapid, rather than gradual, change…unlike Crosland, her chief interest was increasing tax-and-spend, not demand. She fought all tax cuts’ as ‘a loss of revenue for public expenditure’ (Clark, 2001: 41-2; Crosland S, 1982: 355-6; Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01).
showed. Crosland’s bid to seek “common ground which unites both” Left and Right brought just 17 votes, whereas each of the other five candidates – all clearly identified with Left or Right - received at least 30. In Cabinet, this same weakness left Hattersley as Crosland’s only loyal backer’ (also see Crosland S, 1982: 315, 356). This section has attempted to demonstrate that the parliamentary Labour right was further divided in the emerging public expenditure debate of the 1970s. Particularly, a division developed in the erstwhile Gaitskellite ‘revisionist’ Labour right over the appropriate role and extent of Labour’s public spending commitments. This discrepancy exposed the development of an underlying ideological tension between ideas of equality and liberty on the parliamentary Labour right, which involved the implicit rejection of the traditional Croslandite conception of equality by the emerging liberal revisionist strand. In addition to significant discord over Europe and industrial relations and trade union reform, public expenditure and wider issues of equality presented a further point of division and de-stabilisation on the parliamentary Labour right. A brief examination of emerging differences over the principle and application of equality on the parliamentary Labour right from the mid-1970s, and its relevance for identifying a clear relationship with New Labour, will be undertaken in a postscript to the study. The next section of this chapter examines ideological differences along a libertarian-authoritarian axis on the Parliamentary Labour right. Particularly, it notes a clear distinction between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Labour right in attitudes to race and immigration policy, but also identifies a distinction or, at least a difference of priorities, between committed liberal revisionists and those who adopted a less committed or more populist approach to ‘liberal’ social issues.

6.3 The Social Dimension: The Case of Race and the Immigration Rules

‘The 1960s were the liberal hour of modern British politics - but the liberating zeal was almost all directed towards middle-class causes.’

(Hattersley, 1997a: 174)
6.3.1 Introduction

Issues of race and immigration policy represented a sensitive political theme and point of division for some on the Labour right, particularly in light of the bitter political disputes aroused by the Labour government’s handling of the Kenyan Asian crisis and Labour’s own Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 (Morgan, 1997: 306-08). Consequently, this section focuses particularly on this period and its legacy as it presents the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right over race and immigration policy in sharpest focus. Race and immigration themes were also to some extent submerged by the critical issues of Europe, industrial relations and public expenditure in the intra-party politics and disputes of the 1970s. Nevertheless, they reveal a clear difference of ideological positions and priorities on the parliamentary Labour right, and within the loose alliance of ex-Gaitskellite ‘revisionists’. Of the former, this constituted a standard distinction between the libertarian ‘revisionist’ Labour right and the old, authoritarian or illiberal Labour right and, within the latter, a clear demarcation between committed liberal revisionists and those for whom liberal social issues represented less of a priority; between so-called ‘middle-class’ liberal concerns and a type of working-class Labourist populism, and between those who value liberty and personal autonomy in a more decentralised, participative political environment and those who identify economic equality as the only proper aim, even at the expense of individual liberty, involving further growth of the modern bureaucratic state perceived necessary to redistribute wealth (Sykes, 1990: 39, 91; Zentner, 1982: 105; also see Owen, 1981; Williams, 1981: 205; Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).47

47 Shirley Williams (1981: 43, 205; also see Sykes, 1990: 91), for instance, empathised with the so-called ‘new romanticism’ of those concerned with the quality of life because ‘[p]overty is in the person as well as in the purse’. This revealed a concern with non-material as well as material welfare, which transcended the bounds and exposed the alienation of living under the modern bureaucratic state. It represented a concern with more than the economic redistribution of the British class structure, and one which hoped to restore a sense of self-respect and human dignity to the disadvantaged through a decentralised political system that ‘engages the activity and serves the interests of the community’. This perhaps could be interpreted as a reclaimed Tawneyite tradition, ‘characterized by mutual cooperation and fraternal sentiments’, in contrast to an orthodox, rigid Fabian bureaucratic tradition; an ethical socialism or social democracy derived from the New Liberalism of Hobson, Hobhouse and T.H. Green (see Carter, 2003: 1-20; Foote, 1997: 253-5).

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6.3.2 The Context of Labour and Immigration: The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 - Callaghan versus Jenkins?

'The passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, 1968 was among the most divisive and controversial decisions taken by any British government. For some, the legislation was the most shameful...ever enacted by Parliament, the ultimate appeasement of racist hysteria. For others it was the Labour Party and, particularly, Callaghan at their finest – purposeful and decisive in the face of immense pressure, and at last in touch with the working- and lower middle-class voters to whom the government owed its office.'

(Hansen, 2000: 153)

As noted in chapter one, Callaghan’s anti-immigration measures of 1968 were deeply resented by liberal ‘revisionists’ as well as other parts of Labour’s broad coalition, and represented a significant point of departure on the parliamentary Labour right (Haseler, Interview with the author, 18/1/01; Whitehead, 1985: 13-14). The passage of the bill was both controversial and divisive, and the crisis surrounding it ‘casts light on competing strains within the ... Labour Party’ (Hansen, 2000: 153, 155; Karatani, 2003: 162; also see Morgan, 1997: 308-14). According to Ponting (1990: 330), it was only in the late 1950s that black and Asian immigration first became a sensitive political theme although it had been taking place since the late 1940s. Under Gaitskell in the late 1950s Labour’s position had been clear. Gaitskell had stated in 1958 that ‘the Labour Party is opposed to the restriction of immigration as every Commonwealth citizen has the right as a British subject to enter the country at will’ (also see Hattersley, 1997a: 125, 135). Given increasing constraints of public pressure to restrict entry, the tone had changed by 1963 as Wilson declared that we ‘do not contest the need for the control of Commonwealth immigration into this country’ (also see Hattersley, 1972: 182, 184-6; Hattersley, 1997a: 175-6). Although the Labour Party fought the 1964 general election ‘on a platform of keeping the 1962 Act whilst they negotiated with Commonwealth governments for a system of controls in the country of origin’, Labour was nevertheless regarded ‘as the party that was sympathetic to immigrants and this had its effect in the 1964 election’, as it lost a number of seats to anti-immigration candidates, most notably the defeat of Patrick Gordon-Walker in Smethwick (Ponting, 1990: 330-31; also see Hattersley, 1972: 185-7).
To some extent, the Callaghan measures served to undermine the weight of Labour's race relations achievements under Roy Jenkins at the Home Office, a period which had come to be characterised as the 'liberal hour' (see Hansen, 2000: 155; Saggar, 1993: 253, 277-8; also see Jenkins, 1991: 188-9, 199ff). Indeed, Saggar (1993: 265-6, 272-3) suggests that the appointment of Jenkins as Home Secretary in December 1965 gave the 'liberal race lobby...reason to look to Jenkins as their man in government, not least because of the new Home Secretary's known progressive views on race and immigration as well as other areas of social policy'. In this respect, there were both practical and philosophical issues of policy: these included preparation for a new, extended Race Relations Act and the broader 'philosophical question of the long-term objectives of public policy in a multiracial society. Jenkins hinted at his own doubts over the notion of assimilation as an objective of policy and, in doing so, helped to set in motion a wider debate concerning the challenge of racial and ethnic pluralism'. Jenkins' approach represented a challenge to the 'traditional, somewhat suspicious, framework within which political debate was conducted' which, at best, 'viewed the role of public policy as a means to a fully assimilated society'. It was further a challenge to the anti-immigration elements of both the Labour and Conservative parties, whose interjections had been a familiar feature of the political debate since the late 1950s, and whose collective resentments and protestations 'were now challenged directly by a model which conspicuously celebrated the pluralisms of ethnicity, language culture and religion'. Jenkins commended his race relations legislation assisting integration as 'not a flattening process of assimilation, but as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' (Whitehead, 1985: 221).

However, more pessimistic interpretations 'have emphasised the obvious limitations and apparent contradictions' of the Labour government's race relations strategy. Such critical approaches suggest that Labour's strategy was destined to fail because, however hard progressive politicians pushed for the legal protection of the rights of immigrants, their efforts were eventually 'undermined by the exposed flank of the appeasers in the party who wished to fall into line with public opinion deeply opposed to black immigration', 
particularly ‘in the context of the stains under which the strategy was placed following
the 1967-68 Kenyan Asian immigration scare’. Moreover, it could be argued that
Jenkins’ liberal race coalition ‘were only able to introduce the reforms…they did on the
basis of a stable immigration climate that resulted from Labour’s acceptance once in
office not to repeal the Conservative’s 1962 [Commonwealth Immigration] Act’ (Saggar,
1993: 274, 276, 278-9; also see Miles & Phizacklea, 1984; Ponting, 1990: 330-32). 48

A significant external development was to have a direct impact on the domestic political
situation as, from mid-1967, the Africanisation policies of the Kenyatta regime soon
began to escalate into a major nationality-centred political crisis. During Kenyan
independence, the Asian minority had been granted the right to a British passport and
therefore to the automatic right of entry into Britain. This development was identified as
a potential problem by ministers as early as July 1965, but little detailed work took place.
Immigration from Kenya continued to grow, generated partly by the threat of restrictions,
and a campaign for the imposition of strict controls was being run, ironically, by Duncan
Sandys who, as a Conservative minister, had offered the right to a British passport’
(Ponting, 1990: 332). Domestically, it witnessed ‘the resurgence in late 1967 of the old
immigration debate-cum-panic’, and the ‘result was that the winter-spring debate on the
Race Relations Bill was conducted against the backdrop of the growing menace of
reactionary, anti-immigrant sentiment at both mass and elite levels’. It now appeared as if
the ethos of the ‘liberal hour’ was at an end. Jenkins, the public champion of the period of
liberal reform, was replaced as Home Secretary by Jim Callaghan in late November 1967
in the wake of the devaluation crisis and, according to Saggar (1993: 274-5), a ‘new and
ultimately final phase in the government’s strategy had thus begun’.

Work on prospective legislation to limit the influx of Kenyan Asian immigration had
begun under Jenkins at the Home Office in October 1967. Jenkins presented an
inconclusive paper that acknowledged the potential increase of Kenyan Asian
immigrants, but also recognised their legal possession of British passports. Jenkins was

48 The 1962 Conservative government’s Commonwealth Immigration Act had set up a scheme of vouchers
to regulate the rate of entry.
thus ‘instructed to work out possible legislation to withdraw the automatic right of entry byinvalidating the passports’. However, it was Callaghan who became indelibly associated with the ‘illiberal hour’ associated with the anti-immigration measures that were presented in such a short space of time, particularly in the wake of Jenkins’ previous supervision of liberalising reforms in a number of social spheres. Callaghan took over work on the immediate problem of the large number of Kenyan Asians who, as British passport holders, might choose to exercise their right of entry to the UK as he arrived at the Home Office in November 1967. So, in February 1968, a bill was introduced within a week of presentation to the Immigration Committee and hurried through Parliament in an attempt to prevent any last minute rush of immigration. Effectively, the legislation invalidated the right of British passport holders to enter the UK. It also discriminated against British passport holders according to race, as the right of automatic entry to the UK was only retained by British passport holders who had one parent or grandparent born in the UK. This was an obvious protection of the position of most white Commonwealth citizens but not the Kenyan Asians, who would be the subject of a strict entry quota. Further, the opportunity was also taken to reinforce other provisions, so that the entry of Dependents aged between sixty and sixty-five and of children joining single parents was prohibited (Ponting, 1993: 330, 332-33; Whitehead, 1985: 13-14). Whitehead (1985: 14-15, also see 221-2) describes the impact of the indecent haste of the legislation: the ‘precipitate action to exclude the Kenyan Asians...cost the Labour Party dear among its own activists, did not calm internal tensions in Britain. Instead, it poisoned the atmosphere in which the Race Relations Bill was being debated. There was a new hardness in the discussion of race issues’. Moreover, those Conservative politicians who had campaigned for the new immigration controls were not appeased, and it became clear that the fears and rhetoric of Enoch Powell ‘had a direct appeal to part of Labour’s natural constituency’. Consequently, immigrant workers ‘found a painful contrast between Labour’s past rhetoric and the way in which their white fellow workers now behaved...On race Labour seemed to have forfeited the sympathy of its most committed as well as its most traditional supporters, whilst alienating potential new ones in the immigrant communities’.
The context and process of the legislation illustrates the classic distinction on the parliamentary Labour right between the libertarian Labour right and the old, authoritarian trade union Labour right, as represented by Jenkins and Callaghan respectively (see, for example, Hansen, 2000: 155). One of the former claims that social issues such as race, immigration, divorce and abortion law reform represented the distinguishing element of the 'libertarian Labour right', and judges that the various liberal private members bills 'which Jenkins had taken through were...along with the Open University...the...highpoints' of that particular Labour administration. However, he also recounts how some of the cross-party civil liberties activity in Parliament in which he was involved brought them straight up against the most reactionary elements of the Labour government, often found in the Home Office, such as Merlyn Rees, who he has described as 'a well-meaning, gullible man...gobbling up the civil service brief' (Whitehead, Interview with the author, 20/1/01; also Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/01; Haseler, Interview with the author, 13/1/01).49 Whereas the ‘main focus of Jenkins’ tenure had been the consolidation and extension of the liberal race policy experiment’ as well as securing parliamentary approval for progressive legislation on a range of social issues, Callaghan, who unexpectedly replaced Jenkins at the Home Office, was known ‘for a generally unsympathetic position on immigration matters particularly’ (Saggar, 1993: 276). More broadly, Callaghan exhibited a profound distaste for what he regarded as the moral permissiveness of the developments at the heart of Jenkins’ social reforms, and immigration was to be ‘an issue to be handled in a way attuned to public opinion, rather than on the basis of abstract liberal political theory. He was unsentimental on the principle of restricting immigration into Britain. Civil servants felt that the issue of the passport rights of Kenyan Asians did not excite or offend him. It was a question of political and social management rather than striking moral postures…prudence would appear to dictate that some kind of control…was needed to regulate a possible endless flow of people from east Africa’ (Morgan, 1997: 308-09; also Abse, Interview with the author, 20/6/01). Most immediately he was responsible for guiding the new Race

49 Haseler (Interview with the author, 23/1/01) suggests that immigration ‘was something that did divide the right to some extent because the Labourists were...rather hostile to immigration, people like Bob Mellish...some of the Labour people, Jim Callaghan and so on, would say, look immigration is into our areas not into Shirley Williams’ area, that is the kind of view that they took’ (also see Hansen, 2000: 153-4).
Relations Bill through Parliament, and he ‘appeared less reluctant to listen to the objections of trade unionists to the new legislation’. He adopted ‘a firm line on the mounting Kenyan Asian turmoil’ that was to preoccupy the attention of the government throughout 1968 and beyond (Saggar, 1993: 276-8). The 1968 Act was, then, ‘the product of a Home Secretary who, though viewed with intellectual disdain by Jenkins, closely reflected the preferences of...his core constituency. After indulging a year of...Jenkins’s social liberalism, the party had returned to its roots’ (Hansen, 2000: 155). Callaghan also defended the legislation as being necessary to avoid the deterioration of race relations, and argued that the reduction of political controversy surrounding immigration after 1968 was a reflection of its success (Callaghan, 1987: 267; Hansen, 2000: 174-5).

Marquand (Interview with the author, 16/1/01) has suggested that the respective Jenkins and Callaghan occupancies of the Home Office in this period offer a useful vignette of general differences on social issues such as race and immigration on the parliamentary Labour right. On ‘broad liberal issues’ it reflects ‘the difference between the revisionist right...the revisionist liberal small ‘I’ right and the more traditional centre-right. Callaghan would always have been seen by the left as on the right, but he would probably have been more happy calling himself centre’ (Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). Taverne (Interview with the author, 18/1/01) goes further and suggests that ‘Callaghan had no sympathy for the liberalising measures of...Jenkins. He was a...conservative figure. He believed in the old family values’. Reforming the obscenity laws ‘was appalling to him’ and he was not particularly enamoured with ‘homosexuality reform or abortion law reform...he certainly had none of that reformist drive which...Jenkins had, and the same was true of Europe...Europe was the other divide because a lot of right-wing Labour Party people were not pro-European. Callaghan personified that’.

However, on this particular issue, there is some ambiguity surrounding Jenkins’ role in the process of the legislation. In spite of his stewardship of the so-called ‘liberal hour’, it

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50 Marquand (Interview with the author, 16/1/01) simplifies the distinction thus: ‘Jim came across as being, if you like...the coppers friend, whereas Jenkins came across as being a bit suspicious of coppers’. 

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is unclear whether, in practice, he could have resisted the constraints of public concern and popular support for government action to combat the perceived threat of immigration. Ponting (1990: 333-4) argues that, under Callaghan, the Home Office produced only ‘stricter controls on immigration and limited provisions to deal with... racial discrimination. Ten years earlier the Labour party had favoured unrestricted immigration as a fundamental right. In power it passed draconian legislation to withdraw the legal entitlement of British passport holders to enter the country and increased the controls on immigration’. However, in appealing to the ‘liberal intelligentsia’, ‘Jenkins was a bit naughty in a way to Callaghan; it is not clear ‘what Jenkins would have done on the East Asian thing if he had stayed in office, and... he probably, from his point of view, thanked his lucky stars he wasn’t there’ (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01). Taverne (Interview with the author, 18/1/01) recalls how the ‘resentment at immigration [was] enormous’, and... how even left-wingers in the party like Renee Short were arguing that something must be done to allay public fears over immigration. Marquand offers a further insight into the ‘enormous’ ‘constraining factors’ on the Home Secretary in terms of immigration:

‘Somebody I knew very well... was a man called Edward Lyons who was MP for one of the Bradford constituencies... Jewish, liberal... a very, very great admirer of Jenkins who in fact did join the SDP... I remember him saying to me... about 1966-7... we, meaning, if you like, the establishment in Bradford, are keeping the lid on an absolutely explosive situation by not talking about it. We are sweeping under the carpet really profound popular resentment of immigration and actually... we can’t go on. We can’t go on doing this forever, we are getting away with it, but something’s going to explode in our faces, and what exploded in his face was Kenyan Asians. When the issue came up I was an MP for a constituency where there was probably one coloured person in the whole place, so it was easy... for me to be a liberal on this issue...[But for] MPs in those sorts of constituencies... remember the dockers’ march in support of Enoch Powell, this is that period, the political forces were very powerful. I don’t know what Jenkins would have done at all, I just don’t know.’

In principle, however, it is clear that Jenkins would have abhorred such a task. After the advancement of work on a Race Relations Bill under his tenure, with the intention to outlaw discrimination in employment, housing and the provision of services, Jenkins
himself has denied that he would have introduced Callaghan’s immigration legislation, at
least with the same ‘indecent haste’ (see Whitehead, 1985: 13-14). Abse (Interview with
the author, 20/6/01) suggests that, for Jenkins, although political pressures were building
up ‘the shadow of Gaitskell would have been upon him, he would have been...hesitant,
whereas Callaghan would have found it easier to proclaim the cessation...his attitude on
that type of question...goes back a long way’. Callaghan, given his history and outlook,
‘had no inhibitions about the restrictive act, whereas...Jenkins...certainly would not have
done it with any zeal...I doubt if he would have done it’ Abse, as a city councillor in
Cardiff, had previously been influential in instigating schemes to end the ‘ghettoisation’
of immigrant communities in the Tiger Bay area of Cardiff. He advocated a policy of re-
housing and integration of the ethnic communities on working-class estates. However,
Callaghan, a Cardiff MP and who was Commonwealth Secretary at the time, begged him
‘to desist in this campaign...he did not go on this at all. He knew it was going to cause
trouble because I said they have got to be re-housed and...the policy of re-housing them
where they were is wrong...they should be able to go on the working-class estates, their
children to integrate themselves with the others’ (Abse, Interview with the author,
20/6/01). Although Jenkins remains largely silent on his views of the episode in his
memoirs, focusing instead on the problems and priorities of his new responsibilities as
Chancellor, he has reflected equivocally that ‘I can’t say that it is inconceivable that I
would have done it, because I did say that a draft bill could be prepared. But I certainly
gave no approval in principle to a bill being brought in, and I do not think I would have
taken the view that the influx or the threat of influx was such as to justify this highly
divisive legislation’ (Jenkins, 1991: 214-72; Whitehead, 1985: 13). Taverne (Interview
with the author, 18/1/01) concurs that, even within such constraints, Jenkins would have
acted differently, ‘because Jenkins had said he wasn’t going to take action because to
take action would lead to panic...it was as soon as he left the Home Office Callaghan
announced that he was going to limit the rights of British passport holders, and he
immediately had a tremendous pressure of people fleeing trying to get in while they
could’. Taverne acknowledges that it was a very difficult issue and that it might have

51 For details of the degree of horror felt by Jenkins for Callaghan’s ‘illiberalism’ at the Home Office, see
happened anyway, but also thinks that ‘it was partly precipitated by the action which Callaghan took’. He concludes that ‘it was much more difficult for Callaghan to handle than...Jenkins, but...Jenkins was handling it differently’. According to Shirley Williams (Interview with the author, 25/6/02), Jenkins ‘wouldn’t have introduced’ the bill. Jenkins was very strong as a liberal, reforming Home Secretary, so much so that he doesn’t fit neatly into the simple, standard political categories of left and right:

‘Roy was smashing on things to do with race and penal policy and so on, he was very, very strong. Isn’t it left then...So that in a way encapsulates how does one describe Roy as Home Secretary. It encapsulates the problem, doesn’t it. By any north-south level he is right to the north, but on any east-west level he is pretty far to the east...It is very hard to put Roy into the category of right-left, and usually he is put into the category right...it is very striking in the case of Roy because it is very clear that it was not just language it was also actions and the legislation from gay rights to race relations...it was consistently very, very ‘left-wing’, but on economic issues...Roy would not be reckoned to be left...They gave him no credit for all that, but their own Home Secretaries were much more conservative with a little ‘c’.’

Although Jenkins is attributed with the responsibility of starting the process which led, directly or indirectly, to Callaghan’s 1968 Act, in the final analysis in Cabinet he was now less enthusiastic about the contents of the bill. He argued for a quota that limited immigration to what it had been prior to the recent haste to enter the UK, but Wilson insisted on a reduction of twenty-five per cent below this level. Elsewhere in Cabinet, there was opposition from George Brown and George Thomson that reflected the advice of their respective departments that there should, at least, be the prior façade of consultation to improve, at least marginally, the presentation of the Labour government’s solution (Hansen, 2000: 162; Ponting, 1990: 333).

The subsequent bill produced a storm of protest in the Commons, as it was rushed through Parliament with a three-line whip in three days. In total, thirty-five Labour MPs voted against the government and, as noted, the whole episode surrounding the hasty legislation badly damaged party morale and amplified certain party divisions (Ponting, 1990: 333; Whitehead, 1985: 13-14). An important element of this protest came from members of this liberal revisionist tradition on the parliamentary Labour right.
Mackintosh, for instance, was both explicit and contemptuous in his response to Labour government policy on immigration: ‘I do not know who has put the wind up the Home Office and destroyed the reputation of the Labour Party for non-racialism by suggesting that we could not absorb 26,000 people this year into a humane and reasonable society. I will certainly not listen to any more speeches from either Front Bench advocating multiracialism in other countries. I feel humiliated to have to stand here and make this speech’ (HC Deb, 1967-8, Vol 759, Col 1591). Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01), for instance, has expanded on the essence of the Gaitskellite liberal revisionist tradition:

‘...my starting point on immigration is let all people come...I think that the free movement of peoples is the starting point and this country has benefited greatly from people coming in, and I'm not afraid of...migrants because I think...if they can get out of their country and earn money and so forth well good luck to them and also because they’ve added greatly to this country. Now I have accepted the restraints on immigration...some people may say well why should you let anybody in, but my starting point is why should you keep anybody out, but...that’s moderated by the fact that I realise that an open immigration policy would never have been accepted...Gaitskell was very, very reluctant to accept the Commonwealth Immigration Act of the late 1950s. In the same way, I’m glad we let in the Kenyan Asians, we should have let in more. So I’ve accepted restraint, I don’t want to pretend I haven’t, but my basic instinct is to be much more open door.’

Taverne (Interview with the author, 18/1/01) further reveals his own deep unease with ‘the Callaghan measures of 1968’. He states that he ‘was delighted to leave the Home Office at the time’ as he was unable to ‘oppose them publicly’. He argues that ‘the left panicked, they panicked, they got them panicked...if we had made it clear that we were not going to take away their passports the great emigration would not have taken place...actually the Conservatives played it much better with the Uganda flight, when Idi Armin was attacking the Asians and the Ugandan Asians came to this country. They got better treatment from the Conservatives than the Kenyan Asians did from the Labour Party in 1968, and I was very unhappy about that (also Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97).’

Similarly, Shirley Williams (Interview with the author, 25/6/02)

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52 Hansen (2000: 204) claims that the later Ugandan Asians crisis ‘is in itself significant for the extent to which it highlights the 1970-74 Conservative government’s liberality relative to that of’ the previous Labour administration under Harold Wilson.
explains her own liberal approach to race issues, in contrast to some of her colleagues on the left, and recalls that she had a constant ‘running battle’ with Callaghan, who was her Home Secretary, over immigration policy, and told him that she ‘was prepared to resign on the ’68 bill’. Williams claims that ‘on race issues I have always been way over, that is the north-south [libertarian-authoritarian] line. Some of my colleagues on the left are no good at all, not to mention just hopeless’ (Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).53

‘He finally said, and about six of us were pressing very hard for this... in the House of Commons that if the East African Asians had nowhere else to go... he said very ungraciously, we’ll have to take them...that was what it all turned on. If he hadn’t made it quite clear... without that commitment we couldn’t support the bill. With that commitment which finally allowed... Robert Carr in particular... four years later...to get up and say to a Conservative Party conference bellowing its head off [that] a commitment was made by the previous government, we have to honour that commitment. If that commitment hadn’t been made by the previous government it would have been very difficult for Carr to hold what was a very unpopular line with the Conservative Party, and all credit to him...he is a brave man because he was bellowed at from every corner but he hung on and he absolutely accepted the very half-hearted commitment...but he built on it and brought in the thirty thousand East African Asians to the great benefit of the country.’

Hattersley (1995: 63-4) reveals how both Williams and himself should have resigned in February 1968 ‘when the Commonwealth Immigration Bill was rushed through the Commons in seven days’. The bill, he argues, had only one purpose, which was ‘to prevent East African Asians coming’ to the UK. Hattersley believed that ‘Britain had more than a moral obligation to welcome the refugees to the mother country. We had promised them refuge at the time of East African independence. The bill broke that promise’. Consequently, on ‘every night of the extended Committee Stage, Shirley Williams...and I agonised about whether we should go or stay. We took the wrong

53 Hansen (2000: 153-4) suggests that ‘the legislation enjoyed majority support among Cabinet ministers’, and that the bill ‘had strongest support... among MPs such as Richard Crossman representing constituencies (notably in the Midlands) with a high concentration of Commonwealth migrants’. Abse (Interview with the author, 20/6/01), the back-bench sponsor of much of Labour’s progressive social legislation of the 1960s, argues that the Gaitskellites were traditionally far more concerned with libertarian issues ‘than the people on the left. Most of the left were not so’. For example, Abse, in order to influence support for his homosexuality legislation, was required to integrate himself with different groups, and found that ‘the whole of the miners’ groups were entirely against any changes in the law, fiercely homophobic’.
decision'. In retrospect, he reflects that, although Williams 'had privately persuaded the Home Secretary to introduce the Special Voucher Scheme by which the East African Asians came gradually to Britain', it 'has been very gradual. Some are still waiting'.

More generally, however, Hattersley adopted a wider, balanced perspective of race and immigration, bound up in the concept of integration. The Gaitskellite Labour position of the 1950s, under little pressure from large-scale immigration, was an 'unswerving opposition to immigration control', but the party accepted the need for the control of Commonwealth immigration in the wake of the introduction of the Conservative 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act and increased public anxiety over greater immigration.54 Already some Labour members such as Frank Soskice, Christopher Mayhew, Crosland and Gordon-Walker were advocating 'cautious opposition' rather than 'forthright condemnation' of the Conservative immigration bill. Control of immigration 'had become the policy of both major parties. Labour still nailed its colours to the shaking mast of bilateral agreements' but, 'whilst such agreements were negotiated, a Labour government would continue the 1962 Act' (Hattersley, 1972: 184-5).

Labour's race relations policy after 1964, then, had two distinct and separate strands: the continuation of entry controls, which had been bitterly opposed in 1962, and the attempt to promote the integration of immigrants into the community (Hattersley, 1972: 187). Hattersley himself, for instance, MP for the Sparkbrook constituency of Birmingham, the subject of the first detailed study of race relations in Britain, attempted to link these two separate strands, the desirability of integration with the necessity for entry controls: 'Without integration, limitation is excusable; without limitation, integration is impossible' (see Whitehead, 1985: 221). Even Taverne (Interview with the author, 18/1/01) comments that Hattersley adopted a balanced perspective on immigration. Although he had a Birmingham constituency, 'generally speaking...Hattersley...stood

54 Hattersley (1972: 182) suggests that in 'the early fifties it was easy to be enlightened about immigration - easy both for the progressive middle class, who have always judged immigration policy with the objectivity that comes from rarely seeing a black face...and for the industrial workers of Bradford and Birmingham into whose streets the West Indians and Pakistanis came during the second half of the decade. For until 1955 immigration was barely an issue...The politicians could afford to stand on principle'.
very firmly against racists or any sort of whooping up of the immigration issue’. In essence, he was able to keep ‘a sense of proportion towards immigration’. Of the other prominent members of the erstwhile Gaitskellite ‘revisionist’ right, Crosland appeared to be less interested in and paid less real attention to such issues. He would have adopted a more pragmatic centrist approach and ‘would have been pretty well a Callaghanite on this, perhaps with a little more distaste than Callaghan, but he wouldn’t have liked Roy’s position which was to be vaguely against it while recognising the importance of really having to do it because otherwise you couldn’t really win elections. Crosland ‘wouldn’t have taken quite as hard a line as Callaghan’, but neither would he be thought to have much patience with what he considered to be middle-class Jenkinsite preoccupations (Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01). Haseler (Interview with the author, 23/1/01) suggests that ‘Crosland flirted with the Callaghan position because he was close to Callaghan [and] Callaghan wanted him as a successor...Crosland, who would normally be, because of his background, a more liberal type, was not on these things...Callaghan represented traditional Labour heartland conservative...conservative with a small ‘c’, and Jenkins the much more metropolitan liberal view’.

Desai (1994: 138-40) notes that Crosland’s apparent affectation of some sort of ‘romantic populism’ further signalled his distance from his erstwhile ‘revisionist’ colleagues and increasing intimacy with the ‘populist par excellence’, Jim Callaghan. Subsequently, it ‘led him along a solitary and not always consistent path in the course of the 1970s’ and, by the late 1970s, he was ‘distinguishing himself from his former revisionist colleagues by calling himself a ‘democratic socialist’, and ‘even went so far as to describe a ‘social democrat’ as ‘somebody about to join the Tory Party’” (also see Marquand, 1991: 169-78). Moreover, this ‘romantic populism’ manifested itself against arguments of principle on social and political issues particularly concerned with libertarian questions and foreign

55 Hattersley, although he was pro-European, was not always popular with other Jenkinstite social democrats, particularly when he failed to resign in 1971 over Europe because Wilson offered him the post of Shadow Defence Secretary after George Thomson resigned. He ‘was always seen as a man who would compromise everything, wrapping it up in words but not a man who really stood behind his principles’. He ‘was known amongst his colleagues in the social democrats as ‘king rat’’ (Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01; also see Hattersley, 1995: 63-4).
policy, which apparently, 'he brushed aside' to concentrate on the 'gut' issues' of most importance to his Grimsby constituents. His refusal to vote with other 'revisionists' on the question of Europe, much to their chagrin, was largely based on the case 'that it was not the most important issue to working-class voters'. The other striking example of his attachment to a kind of working-class populism came in the form of his indifference, if not opposition, 'to many of the progressive social reforms that...Jenkins initiated during his tenure at the Home Office'. Anthony Lester Q.C., an adviser to Jenkins on race relations issues at the Home Office, contends that the 'Croslanders and the Jenkintites took fundamentally different positions on the race question as they did on many libertarian questions. Jenkins was regarded as a namby-pamby soft liberal who was out of touch with the real world, who wanted pornography, homosexuality and race equality...the Croslanders felt that they had a much closer link with working-class values'. He further reports that, while lobbying Labour peers in the House of Lords to vote for the East African Asians Bill, Crosland’s response to criticism from the Jenkins camp was 'something along the lines of 'You people in NW1 make me sick with your libertarian values” (cited in Desai, 1994: 139; also Haseler, Interview with the author, 23/1/01; Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01; Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01). Marquand (1999: 177) explains such perceived political inconsistency in terms of Crosland’s developing identification with and loyalty to the 'people of Grimsby' and to the Labour Party, which provided ‘the unquestioned structure giving meaning to his life; the embodiment of a commitment which was now beyond argument’.

Marquand (Interview with the author, 16/1/01) sums up the key ideological and political tensions that developed between Jenkins(ites) and Crosland(ites) through the late 1960s and 1970s, and which reflected the development of an important schism in the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist Labour right between the liberal and egalitarian dimensions of social democracy. He suggests that there might not have been much to choose between Crosland and Jenkins in the early 1960s, but their trajectories developed in different directions in the course of the 1960s and early 1970s ‘under the pressure of events’. Although it may be difficult to ascertain whether the personal factor and the force of personal ambition was more important than any profound philosophical difference
between them, they ‘developed in different directions subsequently’ (also see Nuttall, 2001; Preston, 2002; Radice, 2002). Marquand suggests that Jenkins was perhaps more of ‘a small ‘I’ liberal than Crosland... I don’t know that Crosland cared much really about those libertarian civil liberties issues, he didn’t, he wasn’t against them, but I don’t think he had as much as a firm a commitment to them as Jenkins had... and it could be argued Jenkins was less committed to the egalitarian side of social democracy than Crosland’ (also see Desai, 1994: 136-41; Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01). Moreover, there was also some sort of deliberate attempt on Crosland’s part to differentiate himself from Jenkins in terms of strategic advancement within the Labour Party hierarchy, notably for the purpose of leadership contests: ‘Jenkins was by this time the senior partner in terms of the pecking order of the posts in government... the former Chancellor of the Exchequer out-ranks the former Secretary of State or the former President of the Board of Trade, so that possibly he had a bigger incentive to build up a constituency of support that would be different from Jenkins’ (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; also see Jefferys, 1999: 166-7, 169-170, 171, 195). Whatever the reasons for their later deviation it resulted in the seemingly irreconcilable division of the two major erstwhile Gaitskellite ‘revisionists’ within Labour’s parliamentary leadership. Jenkins (1991: 217; also see Radice, 2002: 330-32) reflects on the significance of this relationship and its breakdown that:

‘Nonetheless it would be idle to pretend that these events of November 1967 did not leave a scar on Crosland which had the effect of crucially damaging the cohesion of the Labour right over the next eight or nine years. Had he and I been able to work together as smoothly as did Gaitskell and Jay or Gaitskell and Gordon Walker a decade before it might have made a decisive difference to the balance of power within the Labour Party and hence to the politics of the early 1980s.’

56 Although in the early 1960s they may have been more or less equally committed to Europe, obviously Jenkins became more prominent in the European debate and more prominent in some of the liberal issues like the reform of the obscenities laws. Later on, of course, as Home Secretary, the decriminalisation of homosexuality and abortion were two of the major reforms that were passed. Their origin, of course, was in private members’ bills, ‘but they would never have been passed at all but for the very active support of Jenkins as Home Secretary and, indeed, the Race Relations Act too, the first Race Relations Act’ (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; also see Whitehead, 1985: 344).
6.3.3 Issues of Race and Immigration in the 1970s

Whitehead (1985: 234-5) suggests that immigration remained important during the 1970s because, if you were not seen to advocate tight and absolute immigration controls, 'you would be seen as the enemy of the ordinary people of Britain'. In 'populist political terms' it was one of the social issues which commentators identified as fertile ground for the opposition of Mrs Thatcher, as it 'cut deep into the white working-class vote' and 'rallied those Conservatives who had been disaffected by Heath's admission of the Ugandan Asians, some to the point of joining the National Front'. Hansen (2000: 179) argues that 'the relative liberality of British governments' until the 1980s, in contrast to the 'restrictionist' stance adopted by the British public, was most striking under the Heath government of 1970-74 'during a period in which anti-immigration sentiment reached near-hysterical levels'.

To the irritation of the British government, the experience of the Kenyan Asians crisis repeated itself again four years on from the passage of Labour's controversial 1968 legislation. In August 1972, Idi Amin announced the expulsion of Ugandan Asians from the country. The legal position of the Ugandan Asians was identical to that of their Kenyan counterparts in 1968: it was originally determined by the 1962 Commonwealth Act, released from restrictions through the independence process, and placed under a new set of controls through Callaghan's 1968 Act. However, the relative treatment they received from the respective Labour and Conservative administrations could not have been different: whereas the Wilson government recognised the Kenyan Asians as legal citizens, 'yet differentiated between them and a close ethnic connection to the UK, Heath accepted the consequences of their citizenship that they could not be denied entry to the UK - while making clear that the experience would not be repeated. It was a politically riskier move, and led to a temporary resurgence in support for the extreme right, but it spared Heath the shame visited upon Wilson (Hansen, 2000: 179-80).

The 1971 Immigration Act, which effectively equated Commonwealth citizens with aliens for the purpose of immigration control, aimed to clarify finally the legal position of
citizens of the UK and colonies abroad (Hansen, 2000: 180). Whitehead (1985: 223) argues that the Labour opposition protested at the discriminatory features of the bill, and promised to repeal them. Callaghan opposed the new immigration bill on the basis that the 'new system of control is not an improvement on the existing system...It is not about controlling numbers, whatever else it may be said to be about' (HC Deb, Vol 813, Cols 58-9, 8 March 1971; Karatani, 2003: 165). In effect, however, they went no further than to remove the retrospective power to deport illegal immigrants resident in the UK before 1971, and to allow entry to partners of women already living there. Jenkins (1991: 373-4) reflects the problems of balancing the commitment to the 'three measures of administrative liberalisation' concerned with immigration that he had inherited, on his return to the Home Office, 'with enthusiasm from Shirley Williams's period as shadow Home Secretary (also see Radice, 2002: 224-5). Simultaneously, a review of immigration and nationality law was promised, and a new Commission of Racial Equality was established under the 1976 Race Relations Act in an attempt to outlaw discriminatory acts on the basis of their effect as well as their intention. However, it was far from clear that such 'well meaning' legislation had the effect of producing better race relations quickly. One key rationalisation of immigration legislation had been to stop primary immigration in order to placate fears in the host community and to 'improve the lot of the 'immigrant-descended population'. This was not how matters developed' (Whitehead, 1985: 223).

There remained significant opposition in the country to the liberalising race relations measures of Jenkins as Home Secretary. Widespread fear of immigration, reinforced by the palpable evidence of communities of immigrants, contributed to the relative failure of such policies. On the other hand, activists in the black communities described the legislation 'as intended to produce 'a class of collaborators who would manage racism and its social and political fallout'’ (Whitehead, 1985: 223-4). As Home Secretary in 1975, at a meeting in support of Reg Prentice at Newham who was undergoing the threat of de-selection from his left-wing constituency party, Jenkins (1991: 428-9) recalls how he was the recipient of a demonstration by supporters of the National Front 'who had come specifically to demonstrate against [him] because of the imminent Race Relations
Bill’. This was followed in the autumn by a number of further demonstrations against him from the extreme right.

The respective views and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right followed closely those core positions that emerged in the debates and reaction to Labour’s own 1968 legislation. From the evidence, or rather lack of evidence, in various political memoirs, issues of race and immigration, along with other broadly social issues, appear to have been a major concern and priority only for the primarily liberal ‘revisionist’ Labour right following the example established by Roy Jenkins. Whitehead (1985: 236) is representatives of liberal critics on the parliamentary Labour right of the restrictive immigration policy of British governments of the late 1960s and 1970s, based on tight control of the numbers game seemingly in order to appease public opinion and resentment: politicians ‘have convinced themselves, from the 1960s onwards, that there is a vast mass of racist opinion outside waiting to be appeased, and if only they can throw another chunk of flesh, the sharks will go away. In fact all it does is to confirm the sharks in their belief that they’re on the right track, and there’s more where that came from’.

As noted, a number of social liberals on the parliamentary Labour right have been far more complementary of the Heath government’s attempts to manage the Ugandan Asian immigration crisis of 1972 than their own Labour government’s response to the Kenyan Asian immigration crisis in 1968. On social issues such as race and immigration policy, perhaps, Labour’s liberal revisionists were closer in outlook to political Liberals and to progressive liberal Conservatives such as Iain Macleod, Edward Boyle and Ian Gilmour, who were part of the minority which opposed the second reading of the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in February 1968, than they were to arch social conservative colleagues on the so-called old, authoritarian Labour right (see Hansen, 2000: 155-7; Morgan, 1997: 309-10; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).

However, the Jenkinsite ‘liberal hour’ was a relatively short-lived phenomenon in both the party and the country, particularly in the emergent response to the immigration question. The liberal revisionists appeared to be fighting against the tide of party and
public opinion in this respect. The liberal revisionist position was increasingly marginalised as ‘there was a good consensus of views in the party in the 1970s... on the one hand you accepted a policy of limitation... so really it was a matter of trying to get harmonious race relations with the immigrants the community already had... so the Callaghan government’s main approach was to pass a new Race Relations Board to set up the new apparatus on new community relations which was really very much tougher and had... sanctions which [it] didn’t have in the late 1960s, which... probably was not a great division’ (Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97). Morgan further contends that, in fact, eventually, the way that he ‘handled race strengthened Callaghan’s position across the party... an awful lot of people in practice... on the left... were really quite glad that he restricted immigration seriously... and the whole... Race Relations Board approach... was popular and so that would have... given him a broader strength’. Again, Callaghan appeared to demonstrate a ‘sufficiently balanced’ perspective between a lack of dogma and what he considered to be the practical necessities of a given situation. His outlook was one of ‘very considerable caution’ on most of the controversial issues (Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97; also see Callaghan, 1987: 269; Morgan, 1997: 309).

Although he received considerable criticism from liberal and civil liberties sentiment for his 1968 measures which ‘had been enacted by a Labour government dedicated to human equality’ (see Morgan, 1997: 309-11), Callaghan’s position contrasted with the downturn in the fortunes of the liberal revisionists as the ‘liberal hour’ gradually receded into the distance. As they were increasingly marginalised by the European debate within the party (see Chapter Four), the authority of their position was further undermined by the restrictive emphasis of public and political opinion on key social issues such as race and immigration policy. In this respect, some erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist colleagues on the Labour right demonstrated a distinct disinterest in such issues as they further pursued pragmatic, populist courses and further consolidated their distance from this liberal revisionist position.
6.4 Conclusion

The two important issues of public expenditure and race and immigration policy demonstrate a clear disparity of opinion and approach on the parliamentary Labour right. Along both axes of political affiliation the Labour right concealed fundamental divisions over both economic and social policy in the 1970s, underpinned by differential responses to issues of equality and liberty. In terms of the public expenditure, particularly in the wake of the Labour government’s financial difficulties, there were essentially three positions on the parliamentary Labour right. Firstly, the orthodox pragmatic party leadership position accepted the need in principle to undertake a review of the extent and commitment to public expenditure in the light of recurrent economic difficulties which, in any case, would not have been such a departure from the cautious, pragmatic and flexible approach of Callaghan and Healey (Healey, Interview with the author, 9/2/99; Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97; also see Radice, 2002: 329-30, 332, 334). However, there was a further significant division over public expenditure between egalitarian and liberal revisionists on the parliamentary Labour right. Egalitarians on the Labour right such as Crosland and Hattersley proclaimed the necessity of public expenditure to Labour’s egalitarian project, such as it was, whereas some liberal revisionists were, from the mid-1970s, questioning the very principles of injecting large doses of public expenditure into the economy. With their emphasis squarely on the ‘values of a plural society and freedom of choice’, they appeared to be willing to undergo a further revision of socialist principles and to rethink the traditional role of public expenditure and Labour’s egalitarian commitments (see Chapter Seven, Postscript).

On race and immigration issues, the parliamentary Labour right leadership divided three ways, partly in line with the standard dimensions of the Labour right outlined in the typological discussion in chapter two. These divisions were represented by libertarian ‘revisionists’ who held liberal views on almost every aspect of race and immigration policy, the more conservative, old, trade union Labour right, epitomised by Callaghan, who, while very aware of public opinion, also held deep-seated anti-permissive and anti-immigration views, and those who adopted pragmatic and populist sentiments that pushed
them more flexibly in the direction of public and mainstream party opinion. There was an attempt by some such as Roy Hattersley, MP for a Birmingham constituency, to combine the desirability of integration with the necessity for entry controls as the basis of more harmonious race relations, but this was not that far removed from the wider Callaghanesque approach to race relations (Morgan, 1997: 309; Interview with the author, 17/10/97). Such issues exposed an important ideological distinction between the 'radical', liberal revisionist Labour right and the conservative, illiberal Labour right, but they also further revealed the gradual shift of important erstwhile Gaitskellite 'revisionists' such as Crosland and Hattersley away from the former grouping towards the new mainstream of Labour Party opinion. The priorities and associations of egalitarian revisionists such as Crosland and Hattersley increasingly diverged with those of the liberal revisionists (Jefferys, 1999: 169-70). Their ideological priority was firmly established as the defence and maintenance of public expenditure in pursuit of their 'working-class' egalitarian aims, and these reflected a relative disinterest in 'Jenkinsite' liberal and civil liberties concerns. So, too, the arch pragmatist and loner, Healey, demonstrated some distaste for the Whiggish concerns (and style) of Jenkins. It is evident that the key episodes of party policy and politics of the late 1960s and 1970s divided as much as unified the parliamentary Labour right. They were divided by many of these critical aspects of policy as much as they were united by any vague anti-left sentiments, their relative agreement over defence issues and opposition to developments such as CND (Healey, Interview with the author, 9/2/99; 1989: 329; Jenkins, 1991: 617; Morgan, Interview with the author, 17/10/97; Radice, 2002: 2-4).
Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Postscript

7.1 Conclusion: The Division and Fragmentation of the Parliamentary Labour Right and the Implications for Intra-Party Politics

‘Fragmentation on the Labour right helped to open the way for the left to make much of the running inside the party.’

(Jefferys, 1999: 167)

Labour’s self-proclaimed ‘radical right’, were actively ‘actioning to differentiate [themselves] from what [they] saw as the... hard right...or... trade union right’.

(Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; also see Foote, 1997: 238-9, 243ff)

7.1.1 Introduction

If the Labour left has been notoriously schismatic, neither has the Labour right been a standard homogeneous, loyalist unit. For much of the post-war period the complex combination of ideological and political predispositions of the Labour right were able to coalesce loosely around the adhesive, unifying framework of Keynesian social democracy, which largely concealed the complexity and potential divisions of the parliamentary Labour right. However, as this framework crumbled in the 1970s, giving rise to ‘new’ political and policy concerns, including European membership, the character of industrial relations, the appropriate role of public expenditure, a new radicalised realignment of influential trade unions and a more organised, confident Labour left, the relative ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right were exposed. The lack of intellectual and organisational coherence in the face of contentious divisive policy and political issues fundamentally divided, weakened and undermined the parliamentary Labour right within the context of Labour’s inta-party politics. In this context, the departure of members of the parliamentary Labour right to the SDP in 1981 had its roots in a longer, gradual process of alienation from the wider party and erstwhile colleagues on the Labour right during the 1970s, when Labour’s response to various crises in public policy exposed profound
philosophical and emerging policy differences. The roots of this split reached further back than the immediate intra-party constitutional disputes after 1979 (Whitehead, 1985: 339). It was not merely a split over Europe (Desai, 1994: 145-52, 162; Whitehead, 1985: 340-41), but was the culmination of a combination of diverging ideological and policy positions in terms of the trade union question and industrial relations reform and attitudes to the desirability of public expenditure as an egalitarian tool, within a wider framework of philosophical differences over the relative merits and practical expression of ideas of liberty and equality.

This study has attempted to demonstrate the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right. It has argued that conventional general dimensions of the Labour right fail to engage fully with this complexity in particular political and policy contexts. It was argued that conventional typologies of the parliamentary Labour right focus on three broad themes of ideological and political dimension. Firstly, a monolithic left-right typology based on broadly economic perspectives and preferences. Secondly, a general, rudimentary distinction between a radical, modernising tendency of revisionists, providing a critical and coherent set of ideas concerning party policy and development, and a more cautious, pragmatic, authoritarian trade union or consolidator Labour right (to borrow the most widely used terms). Here, it is not always clear where or when the boundaries of the distinction apply, as it is ‘much more complicated than’ standard distinctions of the parliamentary Labour right imply (Marquand, Interview with the author 16/1/01). Thirdly, there has been some attempt to classify the parliamentary Labour right and its key representatives in terms of a variety of historical intellectual influences, which do not always translate simply or consistently into the policy and political debates and divisions of the late 1960s and 1970s. While serviceable as general conceptual shorthand of the political and cultural traditions and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right, they do not conform neatly and unambiguously to the complexity of particular policy and political circumstances. Essentially, they present typologies of pure types which may further result in an abstraction from the historical experience (Warde, 1982: 21), and it may be preferable to analyse political identities and
affiliations both ‘through time’ and ‘in time’ (Bulpitt, 1991: 14-16) (see Chapters One and Two).

For this purpose, the study adopted case studies of particular political and policy contexts selected for their centrality to Labour’s internal debates, and representative of disputes and divisions beyond the orthodox political dimensions of left and right. It is argued that the contentious policy issues of Europe, industrial relations and trade union reform, public expenditure and race and immigration policy within the socio-economic and political context of the late 1960s and 1970s reveal some of the detail of the intrinsic ideological and political complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right previously concealed within the loose cohesive framework of Keynesian democracy. As this governing framework began to breakdown in this period, the complexity and divisions of Labour’s ‘dominant coalition’ and ‘governing elite’ were made explicit, with important consequences for intra-party politics and alignments. In this context, it was deemed appropriate to move beyond general conceptual and analytical presentations of the parliamentary Labour right to analyse its relative complexity, divisions and alignments in specific policy and political contexts in what has been considered to be, retrospectively at least, a critical juncture in the history and politics of the Labour Party.

The study has argued that, in the selected policy case studies, the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right do not conform neatly or unambiguously, to conventional typologies of its ideological and political dimensions. The European debate in the Labour Party was not a simple reflection of left-right divisions, nor was it simply a reflection of a basic distinction between revisionist and labourist social democrats in the Labour Party. Parliamentary Labour right divisions over Europe reflected both pro- and anti-European positions, which transcended a general distinction between the labourist and revisionist Labour right, and were combined by varying expressions of agnosticism as the debate within the Labour Party progressed. A particularly harmful division for the parliamentary Labour right over Europe was that within its so-called Gaitskellite revisionist strand. This ran right through from Macmillan’s initial application for membership and the polarised divisions between Gaitskell himself, Jay, and his younger supporters such as Jenkins,
Rodgers and others, to the critical period of opposition in the 1970s which fatefully divided and alienated the Jenkinsites, who took the issue of European membership to be an article of faith and one that transcended the crudities of adversarial party politics and Labour’s government-opposition dichotomy, from the pragmatic, opportunistic and ambivalent agnosticism of Callaghan, Healey and Crosland respectively, which they so despised (see Chapter Four).

Similarly, in terms of industrial relations and trade union reform, the parliamentary Labour right divided in different and often unorthodox ways. The trade union question in Labour politics in the late 1960s and 1970s cut right through the parliamentary Labour right. Led by Callaghan, the keeper of Labour’s cloth cap, there were the obvious defenders of the so-called rules of the Labour movement who viewed the Labour alliance in almost cultural terms; it was against all of their instincts ‘to create a situation in which the trade unions movement was not regarded as the flesh and bone of the Labour movement’. They deemed the relationship to be essential to their preferred vision of central control of the Labour Party through the parliamentary leadership in conjunction with the trade unions. A close liaison with the trade unions was an essential stabilising force for the party, particularly against the advent of a resurgent radical left in the 1970s. Attempts to reframe and regulate the context and conduct of industrial relations would undermine traditional trade union rights and privileges, and potentially lead to a damaging split in the Labour alliance. Callaghan was the most representative of ‘traditional Labour’, and valued the historic partnership of the trade unions and the Labour Party. A pragmatic and populist element of Labour’s ‘governing elite, represented most markedly in their own ways by Healey and Crosland, which might have lacked the ‘cultural’ understanding and attachment to the Labour alliance but also foresaw the need to maintain the ‘special link’ with the trade unions as the representatives of the ‘organised working class’. They recognised some need to reorder priorities and rework more distinctive institutional roles, but within the framework of the ‘rules’ of the Labour movement. In terms of the potential reform of industrial relations, they adopted a pragmatic, adaptive perspective according to political and party context and timing. A third key view was that the major problem of British industry lay in the cumulative
assertive and confrontational power of the trade unions. This was the perspective of the emerging and relatively cohesive Jenkinesite pro-European, liberal revisionist strand of the parliamentary Labour right, in the form of those such as Marquand, Mackintosh, Owen, Rodgers, Taverne and Shirley Williams. It 'was much readier to shed...the fundamental values and 'rules' of the Labour Movement'. The seemingly irreconcilable trade union question in the Labour Party and British politics became a central feature of their thinking about the party and on policy. Increasingly, they were to feel frustrated and constrained within the so-called 'rules' of the Labour movement, and it was their confinement within these rules which provided a crucial sub-text of the departure of some of their number to the SDP in 1981 (see Chapter Five).

In the economic context of the 1970s, public expenditure provided a further point of division on the parliamentary Labour right. A pragmatic party leadership position accepted the need in principle to undertake a review of the extent and commitment to public expenditure in the light of recurrent economic difficulties, there was a further crucial division over public expenditure between egalitarian and liberal revisionists on the parliamentary Labour right. Egalitarians such as Crosland and Hattersley proclaimed the necessity of public expenditure to Labour's egalitarian project, such as it was, whereas the liberal revisionists associated with Roy Jenkins were, from the mid-1970s, questioning the very principles of injecting large doses of public expenditure into the economy. With their emphasis squarely on the 'values of a plural society and freedom of choice', they appeared to be willing to undergo a further revision of socialist principles and to rethink the traditional role of public expenditure and Labour's egalitarian commitments (see Chapter Six).

There was also a clear division on the parliamentary Labour right over social issues such as race and immigration policy. Essentially, the parliamentary Labour right leadership divided three ways, partly in line with the standard liberal-authoritarian dimension of the parliamentary Labour right and, to some extent, conditioned by pragmatic responses to public opinion and the concentration of immigration in particular areas These divisions were represented by libertarian 'revisionists' who held liberal views on almost every
aspect of race and immigration policy, the more conservative, old, trade union Labour right, epitomised by Callaghan, who, while very aware of public opinion, also held deep-seated anti-permissive and anti-immigration views, and those who adopted pragmatic and populist sentiments that pushed them more flexibly in the direction of public and mainstream party opinion. The issues exposed a key ideological and political distinction between the ‘radical’, liberal revisionist Labour right and the conservative, illiberal Labour right, but they also further revealed the gradual shift of important erstwhile Gaitskellite ‘revisionists’ such as Crosland and Hattersley away from the former grouping towards the new mainstream of Labour Party opinion. The priorities and associations of egalitarian revisionists such as Crosland and Hattersley increasingly diverged with those of the liberal revisionists. Their ideological priority was firmly established as the defence and maintenance of public expenditure in pursuit of their ‘working-class’ egalitarian aims, and these reflected a relative disinterest in ‘Jenkinsite’ liberal and civil liberties concerns (see Chapter Six).

The study has further suggested that the 1970s witnessed unusual group and factional organisation and activity on the parliamentary Labour right, to some extent conditioned by divergent responses to Labour’s official shift in its European policy in opposition after 1970. It was not the case that the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s lacked group mentality and factional organisation, and that such group behaviour could not take ‘oppositional’ form within the context of Labour Party politics of the period. Attempts to cohere and organise on the parliamentary Labour right lacked significant impact on the internal politics of the Labour Party. Instead for some, group activity and organisation on the parliamentary Labour right in this consolidated for some their increasing frustration with the constraints and trajectory of Labour Party politics and offered the prospect of an alternative social democratic vehicle and agenda. In opposition, the Jenkinsite faction took a stance that divided them not just from the Labour left, but also from the centrist leadership. The ‘oppositional’ form of Jenkinsite behaviour further weakened the cohesion of the parliamentary Labour right in the face of enhanced left-wing activity and emphasised increasing divisions within Labour’s centre-right governing coalition. It offered an early indication of the potential (and promise) of a social democratic
breakaway from the Labour Party. The complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right were further illustrated within the context of the internal dynamics and limitations of the Manifesto Group, established to offer a critically supportive perspective of the Labour government and to act as a counterweight to the Tribune group in the PLP. Its diverse membership reflected a broad range of centre-right opinion and, while it was temporarily effective in stemming the flow of success of the Tribune Group in elections for Labour Party office, a number of contentious policy themes such as Europe, the trade union question and public expenditure prohibited detailed discussion of such issues and restricted the latitude and impact of its policy agenda and statements. Again, the experience of the Manifesto Group for some confirmed the divisions within Labour’s dominant centre-right coalition and the inalienable trajectory of the Labour Party further to the left. The factional organisation and activity of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s does not correspond unconditionally to conventional models of left-right factionalism outlined by Rose (1964) and others. Parliamentary Labour right forces did not coalesce in a purely loyalist or supportive amalgamation of its ideological differences in the form of some undifferentiated non-Left tendency’, nor even did they give rise to a homogeneous, focused revisionist faction in the mould of CDS dedicated to the defence of the parliamentary leadership. The factional behaviour and efficacy of the parliamentary Labour right rather reveals the extent to which it had fragmented ideologically, politically and organisationally by the 1970s (see Chapter Three).

7.1.2 Fragmentation of the Parliamentary Labour Right Leadership and ‘Revisionist’ Divisions in the 1960s and 1970s

The study also argues that these increasingly explicit divisions possessed important implications for the fragile cohesion and unity of the parliamentary right in the party political context of the 1970s. The antagonism between erstwhile colleagues on Labour’s ‘revisionist’ right, Crosland and Jenkins (and, to some extent, Healey) inevitably divided and weakened the parliamentary Labour right in the intra-party politics of the 1970s. In spite of emerging differences between them, advisers and friends of Crosland frequently counseled some sort of rapprochement with Jenkins and his supporters, if only ‘in the
name of a united opposition to the Left. But attitudes to Europe, personal rivalries and attitudes to the Party prevented unity on the Labour Right' (Marquand, 1991: 169; also see Jefferys, 119-21, 166-70; Radice, 2002: 3-4, 330-34). In the revealing 1976 Labour Party leadership election, Radice (2002: 238-9, also 4-5) identifies clear differences of approach between the three men of the 'revisionist' right, Jenkins, Healey and Crosland (also see Chapter One):

'Jenkins was the believer in Europe, concerned about the inadequacy of the government and about the drift to the left in the party. Healey was the tough pragmatist, now intent on getting the country out of the mess for which his decisions (or lack of them) in 1974 had been in part responsible. Crosland was the government's leading revisionist thinker and Keynesian intellectual who thought he could bring together right and left.'

Radice (2002: 3-4, 329-32) further argues that, by the 1980s, 'revisionist social democracy of the 1950s' Gaitskellite vintage, under whose banner Crosland, Jenkins and Healey, in their different ways and styles, had marched, was threadbare'. Although the reasons for its failure inside the Labour Party are complex, the undoubted rivalry and divisions between the three leading 'revisionist' protagonists 'contribute to the decisive defeat of social democracy in the 1980s' (also see Healey, 1989: 329; Jenkins, 1991: 217):

'...if Jenkins and Crosland in the 1970s, and Jenkins and Healey in the 1970s and 1980s had been able to sink their divisions, then the situation inside the Labour Party might not have deteriorated so alarmingly and the SDP split might never have occurred...greater co-operation between them would have made a crucial difference...to the social democratic position inside the Labour Party and to the fate of Labour itself. But the three men did not work together...In the 1970s Tony and Denis believed that Roy was wrong to put the European issue above party. In 1976 they did not see why Jenkins, who had severely damaged his chances by resigning the deputy leadership in 1972, should be allowed a clear run in the leadership election'.

More broadly, the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s was divided between competing political positions and priorities on a wide range of key policy themes. As the case study chapters have demonstrated, divisions manifested themselves in issues such as
Europe, industrial relations and trade union reform, public expenditure debates, and in attitudes to race and immigration policy, based on emerging differences and priorities in the nature of their respective ‘socialisms’ that debated and gave precedence either to collective and comprehensive egalitarian or pluralistic, decentralist, anti-corporatist and individual principles and concerns. Most notably and critically for the cohesion of the parliamentary Labour right, the latter signalled a radical departure and break with old-style ‘revisionism’ (see, for example, Foote, 1997: 235-55; Owen, 1981; Williams, 1981). Crosland (see 1971a, 1974), for example, argued that there was little need to redefine socialism based on a concern with equality and welfare, although there may be a need to reappraise means in the light of disappointing failures to modify class differences. He was unwilling to reject his initial belief that capitalism no longer presented a fundamental danger to socialist objectives of equality, and he believed that government action could meet and overcome any potential dangers. Crosland emphasised the original revisionist dictum that the ultimate objectives of any Labour government must be an overriding concern with the poor and deprived working-class, and to promote greater social and economic equality. The key problem had been the failure of the 1964-70 Labour governments to obtain the increasingly elusive goal of higher production and growth levels, which he ascribed to its deflationary policies caused by the initial obsession with the parity of sterling. Thus he still advocated ‘a move to the left...not in the traditional sense of a move towards old-fashioned Clause IV Marxism but in the sense of a sharper delineation of fundamental objectives, a greater clarity about egalitarian priorities, and a stronger determination to achieve them’. Both Crosland (and, initially, Jenkins in the aftermath of the 1970 election defeat) refused to fundamentally ‘question their own Keynesian beliefs’ (Crosland, 1974: 34, 44; also see Foote, 1997: 235-8).

However, the mood of the Labour Party and the perceived failures of Labour governments demonstrated to some former ‘revisionists’ the need to adapt to changing circumstances. For a start, the Jenkinsites and Jenkins himself faced increasing isolation in the Labour Party, largely as a consequence of their commitment to Europe and the Common Market. Part of this consistent support for the European idea was based on the belief that the British economy would only overcome stagnation and regain a sense of
purpose, and Britain itself gain a sense of influence in world affairs, as a member of the European coalition. However, these principles were out of tune with the general mood of the Labour Party of the early 1970s, and was ‘evidence of a decline in revisionist influence in the party, and the advance of a new Left which was succeeding in winning Labour to a policy of increased public ownership and hostility to the Common Market’ (Foote, 1997: 238, 243; also see Chapter Four). The 1974-79 Labour government was a further disappointment to some ‘revisionists’ as its ‘initial sensitivity to the Left and the more militant unions was replaced from the summer of 1975 by yet another lurch to more conservative economic policies as inflation rose to 25 per cent and unemployment to over a million’. There were some hints of a new politics in the abortive proposals for devolution to Scotland and Wales or in the indication of centrist coalition government in the short-lived Lib-Lab pact of 1977-78 but, overall, ‘the failure of the government only reinforced the glaring need for a break with the revisionist politics of a bygone era’. This was further underlined by the ultimate failure of the voluntary incomes policy enshrined in the Labour-trade union ‘social contract’, and in the failure of the trade union leadership to control rank-and-file militancy during the ‘winter of discontent’ of 1978-79. In short, the ‘electoral liability of the Labour Party’s links with the trade unions was evident to many revisionists by this time’. Labour’s electoral fate in 1979 ‘appeared to be a final proof that the party’s unique relationship with the unions was not capable of delivering the incomes policy felt to be essential by the social democrats’ (Foote, 1997: 239, 243, 251; Owen, 1981: 147; also see Chapter Five).

Throughout the decade of the 1970s there had been calls on the Labour right to go beyond traditional revisionism in protest at the rise of the new left and increasing trade union power (see, for example, Gyford & Haseler, 1971; Taverne, 1974). Gyford and Haseler (1971), for instance, had broadly argued for the old Gaitskellite revisionist element of the Labour Party to adopt a new, more populist strategy that would help to come to terms with the new desire for participation. They also described themselves as ‘Social Democrats’ to differentiate their approach from that of traditional ‘revisionism’, and emphasised the point that inequality in power and status should be reduced by a more local, grass-roots approach. Taverne (1974: 147) further took up the call for Labour to
rethink its relationship with the large trade unions and to endeavour to develop community politics and small business. Again, Taverne emphasised the guiding principles of pluralism, independence and freedom, and further argued for the Jenkinsites to establish a new, breakaway political party as Labour had, beyond redemption, become too left-wing and union-dominated (also see Foote, 1997: 238-9, 249-51; Owen, 1981: 5, 295).

In the political and party circumstances of the 1970s, a significant element of the 'revisionist' parliamentary Labour right developed acute anti-left, anti-labourist and anti-corporatist sentiments. Mackintosh was perhaps the most notable theorist of this emerging position. Before his untimely death, he had become convinced that the failures of Labour in power were an indication that the 'revisionist' politics of the 1950s were now out-dated and irrelevant, and he had begun work on a restatement of revisionist socialism (Foote, 1997: 239-43; also see Rosen, 1999). His basic critique of traditional 'revisionism' was that it lacked a sophisticated economic understanding of or prescription for the mixed economy. Central to this analysis was the case that Labour's failure, and British decline generally, were defects of the very growth of corporatism that Labour had done so much to bring about, and which led to a feeling of impotence and indifference in the electorate and its governing institutions. Moreover, he suggested that Croslandite revisionism itself had contributed to the devaluation of parliamentary democracy in favour of corporate pressure groups such as the CBI and the TUC. For Mackintosh, Crosland's libertarian rejection of nationalisation had not gone far enough. It had been unable to break sufficiently from the statist strategy of the corporate socialists and the Fabians in its demands for equality and welfare. Essentially, for Mackintosh, principles of democracy, participation and citizenship were being compromised by the corporate interests which 'governed' the country, including the very trade unions upon which the Labour Party was dependent: he was not going to allow party political considerations to relax his 'primary emphasis on putting the mass of community before the interests of those with a monopoly-hold on economic power, be they key financiers, multinational corporations, or unions controlling key sectors of the labour force' (see, for example, Mackintosh, 1982a [1978]: 203; 1982d [1972]: 167; 1982e [1974]: 115). Foote (1997: 248
243, also see 246) remarks that in his critique of 'the corporate power of organised labour, Mackintosh was developing the anti-labourism implicit in revisionist thinking to a new and more dangerous stage. The social democratic wing of the Labour Party, as it was now called, was reaching a point where the 'revisionists' could find no home in the Labour Party' (see Chapter Five).

These fundamental philosophical differences, as they emerged in the 1970s, coalesced around a number of important policy and political themes. In the key policy spheres of European membership, industrial relations and trade union reform, public expenditure debates, and race and immigration issues, the ideological and political divisions of the parliamentary Labour right became apparent. The intra-party European debate, for instance, was not, as many saw it, a simple left-right division. Extended party hostilities over European membership exposed significant disparity and divisions within the parliamentary Labour right itself, and possessed serious implications for its unity thereafter (see Chapter Four). Similarly, the trade union question and the so-called rules of the Labour Movement cut right across the Labour right in the 1970s and, as noted, the position of the trade unions, both within the Labour Party and within the corporatist arrangements of the wider governing structure, represented a significant point of departure for the emerging liberal revisionist element on the parliamentary Labour right (see Chapter Five). Again, debates surrounding the critical issue of the appropriate role and extent of public expenditure in the 1970s illustrated particularly the emerging fissure within the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist faction of the Labour right between egalitarian and liberal revisionists, based around competing conceptions of equality and liberty as the philosophical basis of their respective political strategies (see Chapter Six).

Broadly, therefore, the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right manifested themselves across a range of issues in the 1970s as follows. On the one hand, the 'hard', authoritarian trade union Labour right, epitomised by Callaghan and key lieutenants such as Houghton, Mellish and Merlyn Rees, 'always tied to the trade unions whatever the situation' and who were attuned to the Labourist demands of certain key policy and political circumstances (Healey, Interview with the author, 9/2/99). The centrist, corporatist
leadership position was often reinforced by the flexible, hard-nosed ‘pragmatism’ of those such as Healey who lacked affiliation and commitment to particular groups, much to the chagrin of ‘principled’ Jenkinsite liberal revisionists (see, for example, Foote, 1997: 246; Healey, Interview with the author, 9/2/99; Radice, 2002: 329-30; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01). As noted, however, the most critical division for the Labour right in the 1970s developed in the form of a serious rupture of the erstwhile Gaitskellite revisionist Labour right between egalitarian, often consolidatory, Labourist and sometimes ‘populist’ (often more of an accusative than a descriptive or analytical classification) ‘old’ revisionists such as Crosland and Hattersley, and pro-European, liberal ‘new’ revisionists such as Jenkins, Rodgers, Marquand, Mackintosh and Taverne (Marquand, 1999: 166-78; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01). The latter group of ‘revisionists’ objected both to the illiberal conservatism and corporatist inclinations of the pragmatic, Labourist ‘anti-Common Market and pro-trade union’ old Labour right, and to the unwillingness of egalitarian revisionists to revise their strategy and priorities in light of the changing circumstances of the 1970s and the perceived failure of recent Labour governments to achieve egalitarian aims on the basis of such an approach (in addition to the perceived willingness of their former mentor, Crosland, to compromise his earlier pro-European credentials for the sake of party and personal political reasons) (Marquand, 1999: 166-78; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01). Of course, there remained some cross-fertilisation of views that owed something to common roots. Hattersley, of course, was a prominent pro-European supporter of Jenkins before his views on public expenditure and equality took him away from the emerging Jenkinsite position.57 Shirley Williams perhaps retained more recognisably fundamental egalitarian values than other essentially liberal revisionists (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02) but, ultimately, they were both to pursue their respective egalitarian and liberal principles and priorities (see Foote, 1997: 246-8, 325-6; Hattersley, 1987; Williams, 1981). Foote (1997: 252-5) argues that ‘Social Democracy grew out of

57 He had been subjected to the same accusation as Crosland of demonstrating ‘the triumph of expediency over principle’ by the emerging social democratic group around Jenkins, not for his failure to support the Labour Europeans in the vote of October 1971, but both for his failure to resign and for accepting advancement from Wilson when Jenkins and others later resigned over Labour’s stance on European membership (Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01).
the revisionist movement of the 1950s in terms of ideology and even personnel... However, the differences between revisionism and social democracy, often reflected in differences between Jenkins and the new leaders, were profound... The old demands for equality were replaced with new demands for freedom, and the old belief in economic growth led by large and socially responsible corporations had been replaced by the new belief that 'small is beautiful'... It was in their calls for freedom that the specific nature of the Social Democrats was revealed most starkly. In harking back to the decentralist traditions of... Cole and William Morris, they were throwing a veil over the class nature of those traditions... the Social Democratic calls for freedom were expressed in the conservative calls for more small business firms and voluntary social work...[the] response that the market should be freed from the fetters of state control was an indication of the retreat from the revisionist values of social equality and welfare. It was an almost inevitable result of the divorce of freedom from its social context of a class-divided society... Their direct political influence was relatively short-lived, but in the longer term the new ideas of Mackintosh, Williams and Owen, elaborated by writers such as... Marquand, were to exert a major influence over New Labour theory' (also see Whitehead, 1985: 339-46).

7.1.3 Implications for the Parliamentary Labour Right and Intra-party Politics

As a number of participants remark, the immediate consequences of the fragmentation of the parliamentary Labour right for the internal politics of the Labour Party were profound. Taverne (Interview with the author, 18/1/01) argues that the relative fragmentation and weakness of the Labour right in the 1970s were both a cause and effect of the rise of the Labour left in the internal structures of the party. In these circumstances, talented representatives and competent administrators from the parliamentary Labour right, who were often able to naturally flourish in government, ‘couldn’t flourish in the Labour Party at the beginning of the 1970s because the left had control of the party. In opposition they were lost because the mood was too strong against them... The battles against the left could be won, were being won, if people stood firm and were courageous, but by the earlier 1970s it was too late. The Party had gone the wrong way, it was the
Bennite way of control by then'. While some Labour 'revisionists' such as Crosland did not appear to perceive the left as such a threat, those such as Taverne recognised, from a relatively early stage, the potential damage to the Labour Party in the form of a likely split (also see Taverne, 1974; Whitehead, 1985: 339-46).

Marquand (Interview with the author, 16/1/01) suggests that the Labour right, perhaps with the exception of the relatively successful organisational and lobbying period of CDS in the early 1960s, was organisationally ineffective. Although much of the power in the Labour Party 'was on the right...they weren't a united group' (Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01; also Taverne, Interview with the author, 18/1/01). He argues that the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s lacked the comfort of their central position in the 'nexus' of 'the trade union leadership plus the parliamentary leadership which controlled the Labour Party' of Hugh Gaitskell in the 1950s. Consequently, the Labour right 'were not used to playing internal Labour Party politics...they didn't have to, nor were they very used to playing conference politics...All they had to do was to phone up Arthur Deakin, or have dinner with Arthur Deakin, and decide on what they were going to do, and then Arthur Deakin had the vote. But that changed'. Changes in the nature of the trade union movement and the position of the trade union leadership, and the experience of and reaction to the 1964-70 Wilson Labour governments, in which leading representatives of the Labour right were perceived to be the ministers responsible for failing the working-class, left them with 'a weak hand...in terms of internal Labour politics given all that history' (also Haseler, Interview with the author, 23/1/01; Rodgers, Interview with the author, 18/2/01; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02).

Then, of course, came the split over Europe, which so provoked the mutual antagonism between Crosland and the pro-European social democrats. Crosland accused Marquand and his colleagues of being frivolous and of hawking their consciences around from conference to conference, achieving only the outcome of letting the left in:

'So the unity of the right was broken in the post-1970 period about Europe...also it was psychologically and intellectually...on the defensive, it didn't have a story to tell...People like me...and...John Mackintosh...would...have liked to have managed somehow to find a story to tell.'
That’s why we were keen on calling ourselves the radical right, so not lining up with the old, centrist right... not lining up with Michael Foot, not lining up with the increasingly left-wing Benn, but at the same time also making it clear that we too were very dissatisfied by much of what the Wilson government had done. But we never managed it... probably that was our biggest failing. We were rather young and junior, probably nobody would have taken much notice of us if we had done us, but we didn’t find a satisfactory story to tell... it was partly because of all the Common Market business... that overwhelmed us... its very hard in politics to fight two battles at once, and if one of the battles is an immediate one where you are really fighting for your life politically speaking and the other one is a much more theoretical and long-term battle, of course one is always going to take precedence.’

(Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01)

Marquand claims that the Labour right had the fundamental problem that they ‘didn’t have anything to say’ as the adhesive ideological framework of Keynesian social democracy collapsed around them. In the circumstances, they were left high and dry, divided and ‘really without any ideological base’. Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01) similarly agrees that the general shift to the left in both the trade unions and the constituencies after the unsatisfactory experience of the Labour administrations of 1964-70, and the excess activity of the Labour left as the party entered into opposition after the 1970 defeat, found the Labour right with little to offer as an alternative, particularly in relation to the country’s persistent economic difficulties (also Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01; Shirley Williams, Interview with the author, 25/6/02). Rodgers reflects that ‘we all felt and admitted that and, then, on Europe, the right of the party was fragmented’. He identifies these factors, ‘disillusionment with the 1964-70 government and then the split and fragmentation of the Labour right on Europe’, as ‘the two things that gave the left their opportunity’. There was a shift to the left after the 1970 election defeat, as there was (an even greater) one after 1979, and on both occasions ‘part of the right was slow at getting organised and was weakened by different positions’ (Lipsey, Interview with the author, 17/1/01).

Along with the other divisive issues for the Labour right in the 1970s, particularly industrial relations and the question of trade union reform and divisions over public expenditure, the rupture of the European debate in the early 1970s helped to divide the
parliamentary Labour right within itself. In this sense, the ‘split in the Labour Party had been a long time coming’. As Whitehead (1985: 339-41) suggests:

‘Most of the participants see the long row over British membership of the EEC as the start of the fundamental split. It did not begin that way. The argument produced some strange allies... It might have remained no more than the honest division of opinion between those on the one hand who saw the choice as one between internationalism and insularity, and those on the other who saw it as between the Third World and a selfish rich nations’ club. But that would be to ignore the personalities involved, as well as the depth of personal commitment which the struggle was to evoke... Jenkins... stuck to his long-held convictions in favour of entry... he... was progressively alienated from the other members of that government in turn, as each peeled away from the European cause, first Callaghan, then Wilson, finally even Healey and Crosland. For the first time in a generation the right was split.’

Simultaneously, the persuasive voice of Tony Benn was heard in the constituencies as he embarked upon his influential period as party chairman. Consequently, the ‘pro-Europeans’ loss of influence in the Labour Party after 1971 was precipitate. Jenkins resigned the deputy leadership in 1972... He lost at once both his place on Labour’s National Executive and the post of Shadow Chancellor. With him into the wilderness, for a crucial period, went a number of others: Lever, Thomson, Owen and Taverne... As the party moved left in the debates which led up to the formulation of the 1973 programme, Jenkins and his allies seemed even more isolated’. On issues of industrial relations and public expenditure, the ardent Jenkinsite pro-Europeans were similarly departing from the party mainstream and erstwhile colleagues on the parliamentary Labour right. Jenkins himself left the Labour Party to take up the EEC presidency after his poor showing in the 1976 Labour leadership contest while, at Westminster, ‘those of Jenkins’s old persuasion clustered together for comfort in a cold climate in the Manifesto Group of Labour MPs. The Jenkinsite chapter seemed over’ (Whitehead, 1985: 346).

Under the pressure of events and its own internal divisions, the parliamentary Labour right offered little cohesive resistance to the Labour left within ‘the formal structure of the Labour Party’ (Marquand, Interview with the author, 16/1/01; Tomlinson, Interview with the author, 27/3/01). The parliamentary Labour right was not a single, homogenous,
cohesive unit within the context of Labour’s intra-party debates and politics of the 1970s, but a diverse, sometimes fluid coalition of ideological, policy and political perspectives, preferences and priorities. The complexity and the divisions of the parliamentary Labour right were particularly exposed in the problematic and changed political context of the 1970s, as the adhesive and unifying ideological and political framework of Keynesian social democracy, which had, for the most part, concealed the inherent diversity and divisions of the Labour right, gradually unravelled and fell apart. As the internal diversity and divisions became increasingly explicit in the face of specific policy issues such as Europe, industrial relations and debates over public expenditure, and issues of organisation and party management and leadership, including coherent, effective factional organisation against the left and the context of the 1976 party leadership election, co-operation and compromise proved difficult and presented a weak, divided front that further undermined the efficacy and unity of the Labour right in Parliament.

The divisions of Labour’s centre-right ‘dominant coalition’ and ‘governing elite’ became particularly apparent and problematic as simultaneous developments contributed to a shift in the intra-party balance of power: ‘after the 1970 defeat, which was a crucial turning point, both the left and the unions became more powerful... With the defeat of *In Place of Strife* and the successful assault on the Conservative Industrial Relations Act, the unions’ political clout... increased substantially which made governing, especially for a Labour administration, more difficult’ (Radice, 2002: 329-30). It ‘took quite a long while’, and ‘the shock of the formal split of the Labour right in the creation of the SDP, before the centre-right re-grouped and started looking for solidarity each with the other’. Those that were left ‘either had to develop the hard-nosed cutting edge or drift, give up and surrender’ (Tomlinson, Interview with the author, 27/3/01).
7.2 Postscript

The Parliamentary Labour Right in the 1970s: Labour’s ‘Old’ and ‘New’?

7.2.1 Introduction

As noted at the outset, much of the recent literature on the Labour Party has been concerned to identify and explain the origins, nature and (likely) trajectory of New Labour. Some of this literature (see Hay, 1994, 1999; Heffernan, 1996, 1999) has emphasised a so-called ‘accommodationist’ explanation of the New Labour phenomenon; others (see Jones, 1996; Smith, 1992, 1994) have adopted a ‘revisionist’ perspective and explanation of the gradual transformation to New Labour, and others still describe the Blair party as ‘post-Thatcherite’ (Driver & Martell, 1998) or as a renewed social democracy, a modernised centre-left position particularly in economic terms (see Blair, 1995, 1996, 1998: 1; Blair & Schroder, 1999; Giddens, 1998b; Wickham-Jones, 1995).

Within this debate, a small body of literature (see particularly, Fielding, 2000, 2002; Larkin, 2000a, 2000b) has recently emphasised New Labour’s revisionist antecedents on the parliamentary Labour right. Fielding (2000: 375-9) traces a lineage from pre-1914 New Liberalism, through Labour’s post-war revisionist tradition, to New Labour: ‘whilst not publicly acknowledging their debt, forty years before New Labour there had been another group in the party profoundly influenced by New Liberalism. Described as the ‘central example’ of socialist-liberal ‘intermingling’, they were Labour’s post-war social democrats or ‘revisionists’’. Although not without its complexities, New Labour echoes key revisionist themes: the ‘revisionists had…distinguished between time-bound means and fundamental ends; asserted that public ownership was not necessary to achieving equality; broadly accepted the market; and disavowed class appeals’ (Fielding, 2000: 383). Larkin (2000a, 2000b) also identifies significant parallels and continuities between the so-called revisionists of the 1950s and the modernisers of New Labour. He concludes that the themes that Blair, as party leader since 1994, has chosen to pursue ‘have a long pedigree within the party. That he has been so successful in setting the agenda…has more
to do with emasculated internal opposition than with any inherently novel approach’ (Larkin, 2000a: 48).

Fielding (2002: 70-2) further suggests that New Labour has more immediate ‘neo-revisionist’ antecedents, which are a particular product of the complexity and divisions of the parliamentary Labour right during the 1970s and of the emergent social democratic response to the problems of the 1970s. In this sense, the 1970s is very important to understanding New Labour, at least as important as Thatcherism in the 1980s (also see Jefferys, 1999: 195). What does the research presented in the preceding chapters suggest about the origins, character and ideological and programmatic trajectory of New Labour? A derivative of the study is to locate New Labour within a recent historical context, particularly that of the emerging ‘new’ liberal revisionist strand as it developed out of the fracture and residue of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s. One important consequence of the failure to acknowledge the complexity and divisions of the ‘old’ Labour right has been an inability to conceive of significant parallels and continuities between so-called ‘Old’ and New Labours.

7.2.2 The ‘Old’ Labour Right and New Labour: The Significance of Complex Political Culture and Intra-Party Competition

Firstly, if we conceive of the Labour Party as a complex organisation and political culture containing, within it, a number of ‘ways of life’ that continuously interact and compete for dominance or hegemony (Bale, 1999a: 77-8), we are less likely to explain New Labour in terms of a definite break or departure with the past, or as ‘year zero’ in New Labour modernising language. In this sense, it will help us to avoid both the amnesia and caricature current in the study of Labour politics and history and help to historicise New Labour itself (Bale, 1999c; Fielding, 2002; Powell, 2000). Rather than signifying a complete break with the past, (the ascendancy of) New Labour represents the present (and possibly temporary) dominance of just one of the ‘ways of life’ or competing ‘segments’ and ‘strategies’ associated with Labour’s diverse and complex political culture (see Bale, 1999b: 250; also see Larkin, 2000; Warde, 1982). We are, then, likely
to be more sensitive to the patterns weaved into Labour’s complex political culture and the continuities inherent in Labour history and politics (also see Meredith, 2003).

Moreover, to recognise the inherent diversity, fragmentation and factional nature and activity of the parliamentary Labour right as an integral element of Labour’s intra-party divisions of conflicting and competing groups and factions with their respective and rival perspectives of how the party should organise and what it should stand for (‘competing conceptions of Labour’), would enable us ‘to gauge more accurately the extent to which Blair’s victory in the leadership contest in 1994 marked year zero for the new model Party’ (Larkin, 2000a: 45). For instance, Larkin (2000b: 13), in a recent unpublished study of the similarities between the revisionist and modernising traditions (as a continuation of Labour’s social democratic ‘segment’) in the post-war Labour Party, suggests that if we acknowledge the importance of intra-party divisions and different groupings in the Labour Party (and to the internal workings of all political parties), it will affect how we approach the question of relative continuity and change in the Labour Party and of New Labour’s place within it. Larkin argues that ‘the change in the direction of policy has little to do with ideological change per se but a change in the internal configuration of power within the party’. As evidence of this position he cites Labour’s relatively ‘economically interventionist’ 1983 general election manifesto which, he argues, was a consequence of ‘left wing dominance of the Party’s organisational and policy making structures…that had generally been under the control of the centre and right’ rather than of more general ideological movement or change within the party. Larkin (2000b: 21, and see 180) further suggests that if we accept that the changes made to the revisionist model that emerged during the 1950s have been consistent with the broad ideology of the social democratic segment of the party, ‘the ideological newness of New Labour has as much to do with the demise of currently viable alternatives within the Party and the social democrats ability to determine the direction of the Party unencumbered as it does with ideological renewal.’ In this sense it calls to mind Rose’s (1964: 35, 36) observation that policy groups and factions within ‘electoral parties’ are often the crucial factor in policy change.
Larkin (2000b: 182-3) thus suggests that once we have established the need for a more profound examination of Labour's past as a means of locating New Labour's place within it, and go beyond the simplistic conception of an unambiguous idea of 'Old' Labour, to acknowledge the diverse, competitive traditions and 'segments' therein, 'certain similarities between the modernisers and the revisionists...emerge [and] [t]he circumstances surrounding the 'modernisation' of the Party in the 1980s and 1990s were broadly similar to previous attempts...So too were the processes by which this modernisation occurred.' Adopting Bale's (see 1997a: 12) Cultural Theory perspective and analysis of culture and leadership in the PLP, Larkin argues that the modernisers and revisionists emanate from the same 'cultural' tradition within the party that includes a 'shared conception of the 'hierarchical' way in which the Party should be organised with a strong leader and minimal public dissent.' Larkin (2000b: 182-3) suggests that there are significant similarities in the way that Blair and Gaitskell (and even Wilson, inspite of his Bevanite heritage)\(^{38}\) have approached the issues of discipline and decision-making in the party. This similar hierarchical line represents a shared concern and reasonably responsive approach to the perceived wishes of the public together with the determination to get tough with the party in order to maintain discipline and unity. From this perspective it may be that recent party reforms amount less to a new style and character \textit{per se} than to the presence (or lack of it) of an emasculated left-wing opposition. In this sense Cultural Theory allows us to treat with some scepticism the claim of New Labour's modernising coterie that they have transformed the party and left behind the traditions and 'the stale left/right divisions of the past' (see Bale, 1999b: 27).

In addition to the organisational similarities, Larkin (2000b: 183) further contends that there is some notable continuity between the revisionist and modernising elements at an even more fundamental level: this reflects similar conceptions of what the party should be and what it should represent. A 'social democratic ethos', he suggests, 'has, for the time being, replaced the labourist ethos.' Bale himself (1997a: 12) suggests that '[w]e need waste little time arguing Blair's resemblance to Gaitskell, the archetypal

\(^{38}\) Although Bale (1997a: 8) has noted Peter Clarke's (1992: 258) interesting encapsulation of Wilson as 'neither Left nor Right but a Bevanite revisionist. Socially, too, he fell outside the traditional stereotypes.'
hierarchical leader of the Labour Party. There are just too many systematic similarities …with regard to their notions of what the Party should stand for and how it should organise itself: Labour should aim not to change society fundamentally, but to correct market failure by long term supply-side intervention…its parliamentary representatives must not allow their individual opinions to undermine either party unity or the leadership’.

From the cultural theoretical framework offered by Cultural Theory, then, Labour’s complex political culture has always been (and is) a combination of mutually dependent, continuously competing ‘ways of life’ each in search of dominance or even hegemony (Bale, 1999a: 77-8, and see 1997b, 1999b). Although not a Cultural Theorist himself, Warde (1982: 1 and see 9-24) describes the Labour Party as an ‘organization sheltering a mixture’ of cultures and traditions (or ‘segments’ in his terms [see Warde, 1982: 12]) ‘whose divergent interests and aspirations frequently brought them into conflict’ and were often incompatible. He refers to ‘the systematic basis of intra-party cleavage’ and tells us that ‘[i]nternal conflict is neither unusual or eradicable.’ Warde (1982: 11-12) contends that most studies of factionalism and internal party divisions treat cleavage as ‘a pathological condition, a deviation from some ideal party unity, engineered by organized cabals’ and thus fail to properly explain the rationale behind intra-party division. Instead, he argues that ‘cleavage is a perfectly normal state of affairs, particularly in a two-party system, and is most often loosely co-ordinated.’ Warde (1982: 24) argues that:

‘intra-party conflict can best be understood in terms of competing strategies, where strategy is more than ideology and where segments, as bearers of strategy, are not reducible simply to organized groups with boundaries identifiable through the conscious appropriation of group identity. To understand the cleavages and the trajectory of the Party its members must be seen as collective bearers of social interests within a complex social system which is a severe constraint on both consciousness and action.’

From this perspective, it is inaccurate to conceive of Labour’s history and recent development as a simple dichotomy and departure between homogeneous ‘Old’ and New Labours: this targeted presentation of ‘New’ Labour may be seen as an invention of the
modernisers in their haste to patent a new, dynamic and electable party (see Shaw, 1996a: 52, 1996b: 206, 212, 217-18). New Labour rather represents the manifestation or expression of the (perhaps temporary) dominance and attempted hegemony of one of these ‘ways of life’ or, in Warde’s (1982: 12-14) terms, ‘segments’ and ‘strategies’. The other ‘ways of life’ continue in more or less attenuated form. As Bale (1999b: 250-1) suggests:

‘no one way of life is capable of fully capturing a reality which is only completely described by all ways of life in combination. As we have seen in the past, the decisions made by the adherents of the temporarily dominant strain will at some point result in structures, practices, rhetoric and acts which prove incapable of coping with novel and unforeseen circumstances. At that point both the party and the public are likely to begin listening to the ‘I-told-you-so’s’ of those ways of life that currently seem to make so little sense. Not for no reason are the most successful parties often the broadest churches.’

7.2.3 Misreading ‘Revisionist’ Equality? The Manifesto Group, Equality and New Labour

Moreover, if we acknowledge the ideological, organisational and political complexity, fragmentation and group/factional character of the parliamentary Labour right in the 1970s – particularly in the form of the Jenkinsites and Manifesto Group – we can identify both the heterogeneous and disputatious character of the parliamentary Labour right and some nascent themes, thinking and policy that pre-empt the development of ‘New’ Labour fifteen or so years later (which were temporarily submerged in the post-1979 intra-party disputes and in the departure of key advocates to the SDP). One consequence of the failure to reconcile the complexity and divisions of the ‘old’ Labour right has been an inability to perceive important parallels and continuities between elements of this coalition and New Labour. During the crisis years of traditional Keynesian social democracy, which helped to discredit many of its core pillars and principles during the 1970s, a significant degree of divergence and divisions over the idea and practice of equality are revealed, for instance, in the lack of ‘Croslandite’ egalitarian spirit and the evidence of nascent thinking around more tempered interpretations and applications of
equality in organisations allegedly set up within the party in the 1970s to champion the cause of traditional 'Keynesian socialism'.

As noted, the Manifesto Group, founded in 1976 initially to resist the advance of the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES) and as a counterweight to the Tribune Group within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), contained within its membership a diverse range of broadly centre-right Labour MPs including Jenkinsites such as Bill Rodgers, David Owen and Ian Wrigglesworth and others such as Roy Hattersley and Harold Lever. Its major policy document restates its faith in limited planning and the mixed economy but repudiates increased public expenditure and simple redistribution of wealth. Instead, it emphasises wealth creation: '[p]rogressive taxation and increased public expenditure have been pursued with too little regard for overall cost and too optimistic a view of the likely benefits' (LP/MANIF/18, 'What We Must Do: A Democratic Socialist Approach to Britain’s Crisis', 1977). Perhaps in themes that pre-date New Labour by fifteen years or so, the Manifesto Group pamphlet advocates that the 'principal object of economic and industrial policy is to produce an atmosphere in which innovation thrives, risks are worth taking, profitability is satisfactory, and efficiency is a habit'. It rejects both Conservative monetarist policies and the idea of a laissez-faire society and the idea of a significantly planned economy and society and the alleged 'destruction of individual initiative and choice, and therefore of freedom, which that brings'. It further attacks the 'inept use' of weapons on which democratic socialists have traditionally placed too much reliance'. Focusing on the problems of wealth creation rather than wealth distribution, the proposals represent new ground in socialist thinking and revise the priorities of Crosland’s earlier work which had presented economic growth as a given. In attacking the 'oversimplifications' of the 'neo-Marxist' demand economy and the Conservatives' vicious free market, it claims to offer a middle course towards economic recovery and social and democratic prosperity (LP/MANIF/18, 'What We Must Do: A Democratic Socialist Approach to Britain’s Crisis', 1977; Daily Telegraph, 9 March 1977; The Guardian, 9 March 1977). Perhaps, then, we can identify here the seeds of nascent themes and thinking of an emerging revisionist element of the 'old' Labour right in the form of social
democratic responses to the problems of the 1970s, which have been taken up and developed more recently by ‘New’ Labour (also see Fielding, 2002: 67-73). Recent debates over New Labour’s relative espousal of traditional Croslandite egalitarian principles have demonstrated that there remain significant differences of understanding and interpretation of Labour’s ‘central organising principle’ of equality within its centre-right governing coalition, which reflect the debates and divisions of the earlier revisionist generation (see Brown, 1997; Hattersley, 1997; Kellner, 1997 and various contributions to Leonard, 1999; also see Ellison, 1994: 187-200). Then, Jenkinsite members of the Manifesto Group were very wary of ‘doing a Crosland’: Rodgers (Interview with the author, 18/2/01; also see Rodgers, 2000: 291-2), for instance, was prominent in his opposition to the high public expenditure that, he suggested, should be ‘dependent on achieving economic growth and rising personal living standards first’. Rodgers argued that individuals desired more control of their own lives and that this demanded greater attention to individual liberty, including lower personal taxation and a clearer role for individuals in greater industrial democracy. Reprising an earlier (perhaps recurrent) theme resonant of the anxiety on the left during the late 1950s and early 1960s concerning the likely impact of the so-called ‘affluent society’ on the political culture and future electoral success of the Labour Party (see Black, 2002), the core of the argument was that Labour should recognise the fact that most individuals now placed personal consumption above the pursuit of equality and, regardless of the merits of the approach, it certainly ‘lacked any sense of Crosland’s commitment to equality as the central feature of Labour’s vision of the future’ (Ellison, 1994: 199-200).

It is, then, a misreading of first generation ‘revisionism’ or, at least, neglect of Labour’s ‘neo-revisionism’ of the Callaghan administration, ‘something that was itself a critical response to post-war revisionism’ (Fielding, 2002: 70-3), that inevitably helps to draw a stark contrast between Croslandite and New Labour conceptions of equality. Self-professed Croslandite egalitarians such as Hattersley (see 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002) have emphasised the distinction by proffering idealistic reminiscences of a so-called social democratic ‘golden age’, the existence of which has been questioned by commentators.
such as Bale (1999b: viii, 3) who argue that accounts of New Labour that see 'Blairism' as 'a break with the supposed 'Keynesian Welfare Statism' of 'Old Labour', overlook the fact that 'barring the period 1945-8, Labour leaderships...were cagey about public ownership and higher direct taxation, flaky on universal welfare and by the late sixties less than sanguine about the possibility and even the desirability of continued full employment'. New Labour's apparent desire to 'think the unthinkable' about welfare policy, for instance, 'may be part of a wider attempt to distance the Party from its past, but that distance is largely rhetorical if one recalls what Labour has done in office rather than promised in opposition...the Labour Party under Tony Blair is not so much suie generis as reverting perhaps to type' (also see Bale, 1999c: 196; Fielding, 2002: 204).59

59 This, of course, also brings to mind the essence of the so-called left-wing critique of Labour governments old and new, of which Miliband (1972 [1961]; also see Coates, 1996) represents the paradigmatic text.
Methodological Appendix

8.1 Case Study Methodology

Possible methods for research could include a survey-based approach, experimental research or a historical method. As the research questions require no control over behavioural events, survey research or any kind of experimental method would be inappropriate. The purely historical method makes its most distinctive contribution when dealing with the ‘dead past’, that is when no relevant actors are alive to report on what occurred, and when the researcher is pressed to rely on primary and secondary documents as the main sources of evidence, although, of course, histories can take place on contemporary events when the strategy starts to overlap with that of the case study method (Yin, 1994: 7-8). Therefore, detailed case studies of key ideological and policy themes and issues, supported by semi-structured interviews with appropriate political actors and by documentary and archival analysis given the historical aspects of the study and the obvious benefits of triangulation of sources in the research, appear to be the most appropriate method of providing sufficiently rich data to confront the conceptual and analytical concerns of the study.

Contrary to some views that support the idea that case studies are merely an exploratory tool and have no use in describing, explaining or testing hypotheses and propositions, and that an experimental approach is the only means of pursuing explanatory or causal research, a more appropriate perspective on the various research strategies would be a pluralistic one. Each strategy, including the case study method, can be used for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory purposes (Yin, 1994: 3-4). It has been suggested that the case study method is appropriately mobilised to respond to the ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions of research, and that such questions direct attention toward explaining events (Yin, 1994: 5-8). ‘How’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and prompt the use of case studies, histories and archival analysis as the preferred research strategies. Such questions deal with operational links that need to be analysed over time, rather than mere incidences or frequencies (Yin, 1994: 6; also see Johnson and Joslyn, 1995: 144).
Moreover, the case study method offers a flexible and inclusive research design. However, the case study approach does not simply imply the production of a descriptive account of one or more cases. Case studies can be applied to combine exploratory work, description, and the testing of hypotheses and ideas in varying combinations, and their capacity to utilise a variety of data collection techniques can help produce a more rounded, holistic study than any other design. Exploratory case studies, for instance, may be conducted when little is known about a political phenomenon. Initial observation of one or a few cases of the phenomenon may suggest possible general explanations or hypotheses for the behaviour or attributes that are observed, which can then be tested more systematically by observing more cases (Hakim, 1987: 61; Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 144). As a research strategy, the case study method makes a unique contribution to the knowledge of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena. In a number of social science disciplines, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social and political events, causes and motivations. In short, the case study method allows a research project to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 1994: 2-3), a particularly useful approach in a study that attempts to marry or seek a connection between the ideological, organisational and political attitudes, interests and behaviour of (Labour’s) elite political actors. The case study approach appears to offer an appropriate method by which to investigate the complex relationship and ‘interaction between institutional structure and world-view that we call political culture’ (see Bale, 1999b).

However, like experimental and other non-experimental research designs, the case study method has a number of variations. Case studies may involve both one or more than one case. The comparative or multiple case study design is, however, considered to possess greater explanatory power than a single case study design because it provides the opportunity for replication, in the sense that it enables a researcher to test a theory more than once. For some cases, similar results will be predicted while, for others, different results will be anticipated. Multiple cases should not be chosen to form a representative sample from which the frequency of a particular phenomenon will be calculated and
inferences regarding a larger population drawn. Rather they should be chosen for the presence or absence of factors that a political theory has indicated to be important and, as in the instance of a single case study, a multiple case study may be either holistic, in the sense of focusing on a single unit of analysis, or embedded, in which the study involves studying sub-units within the single case (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 145-6).

As noted, the unique strength of the case study method is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence, including interviews, documents, observations and artifacts, beyond what might be available, for instance, in the conventional historical study, which would be the preferred strategy when there exists no degree of access or control. Again, the multiple case study method has been selected on the grounds that each case itself has been chosen on the basis that they predict similar results. In the selection of multiple case studies, the evidence obtained will either provide compelling support to the initial propositions of the research or produce sufficient contrasting results for the revision of the hypothesis and some explanation for the questions posed and propositions advanced as the basis for further research (Yin, 1994: 44-51).

For this study, multiple cases have been selected on the basis that the important factors indicated by the initial hypothesis are present. These are ideological, organisational and policy differences and divisions in the Labour Party that do not merely conform to a conventional left-right distinction, and which imply the intrinsic heterogeneous and disputatious nature of the parliamentary Labour right on the basis that they predict similar results. Moreover, the deployment of a multiple case study design also goes some way to responding to a common criticism of the case study method, that it is impossible to generalise from a single case. 'Case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a 'sample', and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies.

60 Each case has been selected on the basis that it predicts similar results (literal replication). If all cases turn out as predicted, they will provide compelling support for the initial set of propositions (multiple case replication design) producing sufficient replications to provide convincing evidence of a general phenomenon, or they will produce contrasting results for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication) when the initial propositions must be revised and retested with another set of cases (see Yin, 1994: 44-51).
(statistical generalisation). Also, we should not forget the case study themes, issues and episodes selected afford us 'the opportunity to explore a number of units of analysis within the whole' and are, in their own right, deserving of an attempt at explanation (see Bale, 1999b: 31-2; also see Yin, 1994: 18-32). Pursued properly, any case study is a useful contribution to knowledge of 'government at the top' and, 'even if the method inevitably abstracts an issue out of 'the combined pressure of events' into a 'somewhat spurious isolation', 'the great strength of the case-study approach is that, more than any other, it is able to illuminate the living reality of a political system'.

8.2 Qualitative Methods

This leads to further questions of methodology and the rationale of the particular methods of the study; that is, the need to consider the distinction and relative choice between a qualitative and quantitative methodology. While quantitative analysis of measurable political behaviour, such as division lists, early day motions (EDMs) and private members bills (PMBs), is an increasingly important tool of political scientists in their attempt to observe, characterise and explain the ideological and policy identity of individuals, groups and parties in Parliament (see Berrington, 1982; Leece and Berrington, 1977; Marsh and Read, 1988; Norton, 1975, 1980; also see Berrington, 1973; Finer et al, 1961), much of the parliamentary Labour right in the period selected, partly because of a traditional position close to the parliamentary reins of power and, partly because of such notions as collective responsibility, has not exhibited similarly measurable (dissenting) parliamentary behaviour as, for instance, some of the Labour left (Norton, 1980: 432; Seyd, 1987: 79-81).

Ministers, for example, do not sign EDMs, nor do they introduce or campaign for PMBs and, for the most part, are unlikely to express their dissent in the division lobbies; measurable statements and indicators of parliamentary behaviour may thus be constrained by career, discipline or convention factors. Therefore, in the case of the parliamentary Labour right, it may appear appropriate to follow McLean's (1995: 136) dictum that 'it is more fruitful to find political dimensions, or candidates for political dimensions, from
some external source and investigate whether legislators' ideologies fit these dimensions, than to attempt to derive dimensions from legislators' votes themselves. Moreover, given the nature of the study, it would need to incorporate appropriate qualitative sources - what the principle actors have written and said and what has been written and said about the principle actors - which, in terms of the unit(s) of analysis, their attitudes and behaviour and the relationship between them, would provide a richer collection of sources and evidence. As Kitzinger (1973: 405) has written of the complex factors surrounding the actions of those parliamentary Labour representatives who defied a three-line party whip to vote with the Conservative government for the principle of entry to the EC in late October 1971, '[a]ctuarial tables or political science correlations are useful in their way: but only documents and interviews can give us the feel of events, and of just what compound of heroism and villainy individual human beings are made'. A combination of such methods would help to overcome the narrow scope of measurable behavioural indicators on the parliamentary Labour right (see Baker et al, 1994: 284). Moreover, Shaw (1995) has suggested that:

"The positivistic trend in political science is understandable. Yet ultimately the notion... that the canons of the natural sciences are equally applicable to the analysis of political life is misconceived. In its drive to identify quantifiable indicators, to test hypotheses and to establish correlations, positivist methodology overlooks the complexity and ambivalence of human behaviour and the extent to which political phenomena - unlike natural phenomena - are part of a socially structured reality. For instance, content analysis of party programmes is bound to reach misleading conclusions since it takes no account of the multiple purposes they serve, the significance of fine distinctions of tone and the intentional ambiguities of much of their phrasing."

In a similar vein, Jacobsen (2001: 12-13), in relation to the increasing influence, particularly in economics and political science research, of mathematical modelling, statistical methods and their foundations in 'dogmatic, unworldly' rational choice theory, argues that the most appropriate of a plurality of methods should be adopted according to the complexity of the object studied. The problem should dictate the method rather than the reverse and, although formal methods or mathematical models have their place..."
and usage, this should not be at the expense of 'cultural, historical and psychological understanding'.

As noted, the selected case studies are supported by extensive use of elite interviews, newspaper reports, relevant diary and memoir material, and archival and documentary evidence where appropriate and available. Qualitative interviews took the form of semi-structured 'elite' interviews on the basis that such 'elites' would have access to and provide information not available elsewhere, and that they would provide a particularly rich and detailed source of evidence based on the respondent's participation in and interpretation of particular complex events. In the course of conducting the interviews, a number of common problems were encountered. These included problems of access (I was granted fifty per cent of the interviews requested), the fact that some respondents focused only on particular issues or events, and the presentation of a particular perspective or interpretation. The availability of other sources of evidence, together with the relatively broad range of interviews conducted allowing for detailed comparison of responses and perspectives, made it possible to overcome some of these limitations. In this sense, the flexible nature of the interview method and its ability to provide a deep level of understanding of complex issues, relationships, motivations, and the meaning of a particular context as the respondent understands it, outweighed the drawbacks.

Similarly, the use of primary documents, newspaper material and published diaries and memoirs again present particular challenges of access and representation. For instance, government records at the Public Record Office were unavailable under the thirty-year rule for the majority of the period of this study, as were some important collections of private papers. Occasionally, important developments and decisions are not recorded and revealed in the documents, and often they can just be plain difficult to read (for example, hand-written material in the Crosland Papers was sometimes impossible to understand). However, some of these limitations were overcome by the availability of some key archives and documents for important aspects of the study relating to the parliamentary Labour right and, in combination with elite interviews, their general utility as an invaluable source of information and representation of events and relationships. Of
course, much useful information and evidence has also been gleaned from a large range of relevant secondary literature, diaries and memoirs, including much new material published in recent years. The range of source material has been organised and collated within a case study framework of significant ideological and policy themes which, as noted, offer an appropriate method for the combination of a variety of qualitative sources and evidence.

8.3 Conclusion

The case study method allows a research project to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Yin, 1994: 2-3). The case study method is a non-experimental research design in which the researcher examines one or a few cases of a phenomenon in considerable detail, typically utilising a number of data collection methods, including personal interviews, documentary analysis and, if possible, observation. Previously, the case study method has been considered an inferior form of research strategy, but now there is common consent as to its utility as a means of empirical enquiry and is recognised as an important design, for instance, in the development and evaluation of public policies, as well as in the development of explanations for, and testing theories of, political phenomena (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 143).

Yin (1994: 8) has defined the case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 'real-life context', when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are utilised. He has further distinguished between histories and case studies, reserving the latter term for the study of contemporary events that, by their nature, allow the use of a full variety of data collection methods such as observation and interviewing. Moreover, the relatively contemporary nature of the research meets with Yin's criteria for case study research in terms of the use of a range of complementary data collection methods, such as the combination of semi-structured interviews and more conventional documentary and archival sources of evidence, which, in turn, allow the research and its
explanations to be situated within a more holistic interpretation of real-life events and the triangulation of appropriate sources. The use of oral evidence, for instance, has been described as an invaluable tool ‘in recovering the tone and texture of lived experience’. Commenting on Pimlott’s (1992: 345) lucid description of ‘Marcia yelling at Harold was the only kind of discussion we ever heard them have’, for example, Clarke (1993: 173) asks ‘[h]ow else could those insights into the conduct of Wilson’s private office have been captured?’. In short, the case study method, and its capacity to utilise various sources of evidence, allows the opportunity to explore the human face of political situations - the motivations and constraints of political actors within a ‘real-life context’ - which, in the final analysis, provide the very essence of explanations of any given political phenomenon.

The case study method thus offers a flexible type of research design. The use of case studies as a method for analysing research questions and propositions does not, however, simply imply the production of a descriptive account of one or more cases. Case studies may be used for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory purposes. They can be applied to combine exploratory work, description, and the testing of hypotheses and ideas in varying combinations, and their capacity to utilise a variety of data collection techniques can help produce a more rounded, holistic study than with any other design (Hakim, 1987: 61). Exploratory case studies, for instance, may be conducted when little is known about a political phenomenon. Initial observation of one or a few cases of the phenomenon may suggest possible general explanations or hypotheses for the behaviour or attributes that are observed, which can then be tested more systematically by observing more cases (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 144).

In summary, then, the case study design can provide an informative and appropriate method in many circumstances. It permits a deeper understanding of causal processes, the elucidation of general explanatory theory, and the development of hypotheses concerning observationally difficult phenomena, and should be regarded as complementary to, rather than inconsistent with, other research designs (Johnson & Joslyn, 1995: 147). As a research strategy, therefore, the case study method makes a unique contribution to the
knowledge of individual, organisational, social, and political phenomena. In a number of social science disciplines, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social and political events and motivations, and much of our understanding of politics and political processes derives from case studies of individual 'political' units. Particularly relevant here, is the capacity to retain the holistic and profound characteristics of real-life events in a study that seeks to unravel underlying explanatory and causal relationships among Labour's elite political actors. The unique strength of case study methodology is the capacity to deal with a complete variety of sources and evidence in this respect; if necessary, more than one method or strategy can be utilised in any given study (a survey within a case study, for instance, or vice versa). To this extent, various strategies are not mutually exclusive (Yin, 1994: 9). Indeed, in the desire for a science of politics which is diverse and fertile in theory and method, it has been suggested that there is a need for 'a political science that captures the richness of human experience and not one that, in the search for professional esteem, makes a fetish out of particular techniques or forms of knowledge production' (Marsh & Stoker, 1995: 289).
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