Dostoevskii and Slavophilism: A New Perspective on Unity and Brotherhood

Sarah Frances Hudspith

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Department of Russian and Slavonic Studies, University of Sheffield

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The question of Dostoevskii's affinity with the Slavophiles has been remarked upon by many critics, but hitherto has not been explored in sufficient depth. It is proposed that an examination of his engagement with ideas central to Slavophilism offers a new understanding of Dostoevskii's ideological stance, of the key concepts of his fiction, of his faith, and of his artistry. This study selects the thinkers Khomiakov and Kireevskii as the proponents of the strand of Slavophilism to which Dostoevskii was closest; it focuses on sobornost', tsel'nost', wholeness and fragmentation as the essential concepts that have resonances in Dostoevskii. Dostoevskii's career as a thinker is examined through the medium of his non-fiction, in order to establish where he stood in relation to contemporary thinkers and to determine his own interpretation of Slavophilism.

Next his fiction is studied, and it is found that Khomiakov's scheme of a tension between the positive and negative categories of Iranianism and Kushitism may be mapped onto Dostoevskii's fiction, and that the principles of these categories correspond to fundamental principles shaping his work. Moreover, the emphasis in Iranianism on unity and brotherhood allows for a fresh perspective of Dostoevskii's faith and its position with regard to Orthodoxy. Finally, attention turns to Dostoevskii's artistry, so as to establish the manner in which unity and wholeness manifest themselves in the structure and composition of his works. It is found that by positing the existence of a Slavophile aesthetic, an alternative definition of form is possible according to which Dostoevskii's works, both fictional and non-fictional, are shown to possess a unity of form and idea. It is concluded that Dostoevskii is an important successor to the Slavophiles and that he developed their ideas in a more consistent fashion, thus broadening their moral and spiritual concerns into a more universal message.
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Note on Transliteration and Transcription

Throughout this thesis, Russian words, names, titles and phrases are transcribed from the Cyrillic according to the Library of Congress transliteration system without diacritics, except in citations from critical works that use an alternative system; in these cases the alternative system is kept.

Where a citation is made from a Russian text printed using the old Cyrillic orthography, for the sake of consistency I have transcribed the text into modern Cyrillic orthography; such instances are indicated in the notes.
Introductory Chapter

The critic and publicist Nikolai Strakhov reminisces about Dostoevskii:
'главное-же тут было то, что он уже сам, по складу убеждений, воспитанных в нег сближением с народом и внутренним поворотом мыслей, был бессознательным славянофилом.' Whenever he would remark to the novelist that the Slavophiles had also expressed an idea of his, Dostoevskii would reply that he did not know that. Dostoevskii's relationship to the Slavophiles and their philosophy was always ambivalent and in my view, extraordinarily complex. In the early 1860s through his journals Vremia and Epokha he entered into debates and polemics as much with the Slavophile camp as with the Westernisers. But as Dostoevskii grew older, it appears that he gradually realised that there was a growing affinity between his ideas and those of the most prominent figures of early Slavophilism, especially Aleksei Khomiakov and Ivan Kireevskii. This engagement with the Slavophiles in fact began remarkably early in his career and lasted all his life, continually growing in importance long after the movement itself had died out. However, he refrained from any outright declaration of allegiance. His writings tease us with the elusiveness of such ironic pronouncements as 'Priznaniia slavianofila' from Dnevnik pisatelia (an article to be studied in more depth in this study), so that, as is typical of Dostoevskii, we are unable categorically to fix a label upon him. We may not call Dostoevskii a Slavophile, although many of his contemporaries, like Strakhov, may implicitly have regarded him as such. And yet the latter was right that there is much that echoes Slavophilism in Dostoevskii's works. Whilst I would seek to avoid the issue of derivation of ideas, toward which Strakhov's appellation would tend to point, I believe that a great deal is to be gained by applying as it were a lens of Slavophilism to Dostoevskii's works, for it may bring into sharper focus some of the fundamental issues with which Dostoevskii was concerned. Therefore the aim of my study is to examine the areas where correspondences between Dostoevskii's ideas and those of Khomiakov and Kireevskii can be discerned, and to demonstrate the way these correspondences lead to a more complete understanding of Dostoevskii's ideas and artistic purpose. In particular, an examination of Dostoevskii in the light of Slavophilism is useful in offering a new perspective on the writer's concerns with unity and
brotherhood, and in my view such an undertaking sets these concerns at the forefront of his world view. In addition, by discussing the aesthetic and artistic aspects of Slavophile thought with regard to Dostoevskii's artistry, I believe that it is possible to bridge what I perceive to be a gap existing between studies of the writer's moral-spiritual universe and studies of his poetics.

In my thesis, I take an approach that makes use of more than one discipline, beginning with intellectual history, progressing through traditional literary criticism to the exploration of theories of poetics. The direction of my thesis moves from an account of statements that actively profess an engagement with Slavophilism, whether sympathetic or hostile, toward an investigation of the more subtle and intricate involvement found in Dostoevskii's artistic works. My first chapter charts the development of Dostoevskii's interaction with the Slavophiles within the milieu of Russian intellectual society. I use his private letters and notebooks in order to establish a background chronology of his views. This work is then followed by a study of Dostoevskii's journalistic works, which for argument's sake I take at face value as an expression of his beliefs, so as to provide a contrast with my analysis of journalism as a problematic literary genre in the final chapter. Placing an emphasis on Dostoevskii as a thinker at this stage, I show where he distanced himself from the Slavophiles as well as where he sympathised with them. My thesis then goes on to explore the question of the extent to which Dostoevskii's fiction supports or contradicts the face-value evidence from the letters, notebooks and journalism. I discuss the dramatisation of Dostoevskii's views in his fiction, focusing on Dostoevskii as an artist, but restricting the discussion to themes and motifs. In this section of my thesis come into play such concerns as rootlessness, fragmentation, faith and the lack thereof, egoism and humility. In my final chapter, I turn my attention to the way Dostoevskii's views are translated into artistic technique and form, so as to suggest that he wrote in a Slavophile way, as well as about Slavophile matters. The points of similarity between Dostoevskii and the Slavophiles are in my view as much to be found in Dostoevskii's artistic technique as in the content of his works. I propose the existence of a Slavophile aesthetic in Dostoevskii's fiction; in my opinion the moral importance for the Slavophiles of organic unity in works of art was upheld by the writer both in his theories of art and in his literary
practice. Here I return to key journalistic works such as Dnevnik pisatelia as something less straightforward, taking into account the role played by irony and other artistic devices. I examine the role of art, the nature of beauty and the variety of genres present in his oeuvre. My thesis concludes with an attempt to balance the superficial evidence with the more elusive picture presented by Dostoevskii’s artistry and demonstrates how the two inform each other.

To begin with, I would like to clarify what for the purposes of this study is to be understood by the term ‘Slavophilism’. It has sometimes been used as a blanket term, both by commentators contemporary with the movement and by later critics, to describe various generations of nineteenth-century Russian conservative nationalist thought, beginning from the so-called Moscow Slavophiles of the 1840s and 1850s, down to the more chauvinist derivatives such as the Pan-Slavism of later decades. Nicholas Riasanovsky acknowledges the problem:

“Slavophilism” was at times stretched to cover all the Pan-Slav friends of Ivan Aksakov, all champions of Russian superiority over the West, such varied contributors to Russian culture as Danilevskii, Dostoevskii, and Leontiev. These inclusions were based on confusion, on the assumption that certain striking and often superficial resemblances to the Slavophile doctrine were sufficient to make one a Slavophile. Indeed, Dostoevskii himself was aware of this loose usage and the negative associations that sometimes accompanied it, hence his ironic use of the term in his ‘Priznaniia slavianofila’. Leaving aside the problems of interpretation associated with Dostoevskii’s Dnevnik pisatelia, it can be said from the aforementioned article that Dostoevskii would prefer, at least publicly, to align himself not with the retrogressive element, nor with the Pan-Slavist element of Slavophilism, but rather with the moral and Orthodox roots of the movement. The writers who best match this definition are the acknowledged founders of the movement, Khomiakov and Kireevskii, whose work may be said to constitute the essence of Slavophilism. Accordingly, I shall restrict my analysis to their ideas.

The question of what Dostoevskii actually read of the Slavophiles, and when he read what he did, is difficult to establish. Most of the books in his library were lost during his prolonged travels in Europe between 1867 and 1871. His wife Anna Grigor'evna made lists of those publications he collected from
then on, and these have been edited and published by Leonid Grossman.\textsuperscript{4} Scholarly opinion, however, suggests that as these catalogues number fewer than a thousand publications, they may not represent all the books he must have read.\textsuperscript{5} Therefore we must reconstruct what we can, given the data in Anna Grigor'evna's catalogues, references Dostoevskii made in letters, notebooks and creative works, and supported by reminiscences of his contemporaries. Another useful indicator is the date and place of publication of key works by the Slavophiles, which we may use in conjunction with what is known of Dostoevskii's life and the availability of literature to him at various times. There is little to indicate with any degree of certainty that at the time of his debut on the literary scene in the mid 1840s, in St. Petersburg where progressive thought from Europe was dominant, Dostoevskii had much direct contact with ideological works written by the early Slavophiles, Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii, Iurii Samarin and Konstantin Aksakov. His letters of this time make more mention of foreign writers. He would on the other hand have been familiar with contemporary opinion on the ideas of the Slavophiles, and would have probably read \textit{about} their works through critics such as Belinskii. The references to the Slavophile movement in Dostoevskii's pre-Siberian work do not name specific authors or works, so there is no way of clarifying what he read himself or what he learned second-hand, although we do know that he was always a voracious reader, particularly of journalism. This has led Robert Belknap to assert that 'it is safer in any given context to assume that Dostoevsky knew the writings of his contemporaries in Russia or France than to assume he did not.'\textsuperscript{6} Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to make certain qualified judgements regarding Dostoevskii's reading of the Slavophiles. For a start, of course, one must take into account the fact that between the end of 1849 and 1854, he was denied access to all literature. It was also during his imprisonment and exile in Siberia that such central works for the Slavophile movement as Khomiakov's \textquote{Quelques mots par un chrétien orthodoxe} trilogy, and Kireevskii's \textquote{O neobkhodimosti i vozmozhnosti novykh nachal dlia filosofii} were published; the former were published in France in 1853, 1855 and 1858, and the latter in Russia in 1856. Dostoevskii's letters from Siberia bemoan the difficulty in obtaining current literature in such a far-flung corner of the Russian empire, and it is highly
unlikely that the aforementioned works were available to him, had he required them.

What is certain is that Ivan Aksakov’s Slavophile publication *Den'* was launched in October 1861, and it published posthumously articles by Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov and Kireevskii. Dostoevskii read *Den'* avidly, as he did newspapers and journals in general, and more specifically because it was a rival publication with which he could polemicise. So we know that at least from 1861 onwards, he was reading the Slavophiles firsthand. However, Vladimir Viktorovich suggests that Dostoevskii initially based his active acquaintance with the Slavophile movement solely on the content of *Den'*; he argues that because of the political interpretation given by the journal to the cultural and philosophical ideas of Khomiakov and Kireevskii, the impression Dostoevskii formed of their ideas was not accurate. Wayne Dowler also concedes that the Dostoevskii brothers and their fellow *pochvenniki* made little distinction in the pages of *Vremia* between the early Slavophilism of Khomiakov and Kireevskii, and the later Slavophilism of Aksakov, an assertion that supports my view that at this time Dostoevskii’s personal experience of these writers was minimal. It is not until 1863 that the most definite indication of direct reading appears; in a letter to his brother dated 8th September 1863, Dostoevskii writes: ‘Скажи Страхову, что я с прилежанием славянофилов читаю, и кое-что вычитал новое’ (XXVIII/ii, 46). The editors of the Academy edition note here that by ‘the Slavophiles’ Dostoevskii meant the works of Khomiakov as well as *Den'* (XXVIII/ii, 385). Ten days later, he wrote to Strakhov himself and gave a guarded appraisal of what he had read, proclaiming that the Slavophiles had pronounced a *new word* (XXVIII/ii, 53). From this point on, in accordance with what I believe to be a more thorough knowledge, Dostoevskii’s appreciation of the Slavophiles becomes more positive. The final clue is that in Grossman’s catalogue of his library is recorded volume one of Khomiakov’s *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, edited by Ivan Aksakov, published in 1861, volume one of Iurii Samarin’s *Sochineniiia*, published in 1877, and *Narodnye pesni* by Petr Kireevskii, published from 1860-1872, although nothing by Ivan Kireevskii. The dates of publication of these works are notable only in that they
show how early they were available to Dostoevskii, and should not be assumed
to be necessarily the years in which he purchased them.

My first task is to set out the specific areas of Slavophilism that are most
relevant to Dostoevskii’s thought and on which I shall be focusing. I shall be
tracing a series of abstract concepts and principles from the work of Khomiakov
and Kireevskii through Dostoevskii’s œuvre, and these require a few words of
explanation. Several studies of Khomiakov and Kireevskii exist. For a full
account of their philosophy reference should be made to works such as these.

The Slavophile movement developed in opposition to the so-called
Westernisers at a time when the Russian intelligentsia felt a pressing need to
assess Russia’s identity and her future both on the domestic plane and in the
global community. Whilst the Slavophile-Westerner debate had run its course
by the beginning of the 1860s, the issues they had been concerned with were still
very much of the essence, though addressed in different ways by the succeeding
generations. Dostoevskii too was deeply concerned with the question of Russian
identity and his manner of approaching the matter was largely similar to that of
Khomiakov, Kireevskii and their fellow like-minded thinkers. Their works all
show a broad, underlying opposition between Russia and the West, with
predominantly positive principles associated with Russia and negative ones
associated with the West. Of course, at a more detailed level, complexities save
both Slavophile thought and Dostoevskii’s ideas from the intransigence of black
and white divisions. Indeed, Kireevskii in particular strove to acknowledge
positive and negative qualities on both sides of the Russia-West spectrum. He
wrote in ‘V otvet A. S. Khomiakovu’:

Сколько бы мы ни были врагами Западного просвещения, Западных обычая
и т. под.; но можно ли без сумасшествия думать, что когда-нибудь, какою-нибудь
силою истребится в России память всего того, что она получила от Европы в
продолжение двухсот лет? Можем ли мы не знать того, что знаем,
забыть все, что умеем? Еще менее можно думать, что 1000-летие
Русское может совершенно уничтожиться от влияния нового
Европейского. Потому, сколько бы мы ни желали возвращения
Русского или введения Западного быта, — но ни того, ни другого
исключительно ожидать не можем, а повелове должны
предполагать что-то третье, должествующее возникнуть из
взаимной борьбы двух враждующих начал.
Khomiakov also spoke out on the subject; and Dostoevskii too took this tone, for example in his *Dnevnik pisatelia* for 1880 (this will be examined later in this study). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that one of the common elements in Slavophile thought and Dostoevskii's work is a polarity between principles aligned with Russia and the West. This makes itself felt throughout the more abstract concepts of Slavophilism which I will be looking at in Dostoevskii.

The notion most important to Slavophile thought, it could be said, is unity: what true unity means and how it may be achieved on a personal, societal and spiritual level. Khomiakov and Kireevskii believed that true unity could only arise organically; it could not be manufactured by man but had to develop freely and naturally. They applied this idea in all aspects of their thought and subscribed to an organic view of creation; they saw all creation as an organism composed of parts, which could not stand separately from the whole and each of which had its own role to play in a collective existence. Within this whole they included human society in all its complexity of organisation, and they asserted that it too should develop along organic lines in order to maintain true wholeness and unity. Kireevskii, considering the application of European ways of life in Russia, emphasised the importance of preserving organic development rather than promoting artificial changes through the application of ready-made formulas: 'Молодой дуб, конечно, ниже однолетней с ним ракиты, которая видна издалека, рано дает тень, рано кажется деревом и годится на дрова. Но вы конечно не услужите дубу тем, что привьете к нему ракиту.' Christoff remarks that such views are reminiscent of the nature-philosophy of Schelling, although the Slavophiles endeavoured not to borrow philosophical ideas from the West but to establish an Orthodox philosophy of Russia's own. Nevertheless, there is a clear element of Romanticism in the emphasis on organic unity. Alex de Jonge, writing on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and nineteenth-century Romanticism, notes: ' [...] where the eighteenth century used mechanical models to describe creativity, the nineteenth used organic ones based on biological images such as plant growth. In the mean time, mechanical terms became pejorative.'

Khomiakov and Kireevskii's theories on human thought were similarly holistic: they considered reason, so clearly at the forefront of Western
philosophy, to be but one of many parts of the human cognitive faculties. Kireevskii's doctrine of *tsel'nost' dukha*, or wholeness of the spirit, asserted that reason was subordinate to faith, and that truth could only be understood when all spheres of understanding – spiritual, instinctive as well as rational – acted together. He expressed disagreement with the Western notion that philosophy and religion were incompatible and that reason and faith contradicted each other. Instead he asserted that it was wrong to compartmentalise the human cognitive faculties. Reason should serve as the path to finding true faith, which operated on a higher level of consciousness, and only a synthesis of all man's powers of understanding could lead to the truth. He wrote, in his essay 'O neobkhodimosti i vozmozhnosti novykh nachal dlia filosofii':

As a consequence of this attitude to cognition, the Slavophiles felt that Western Europe's emphasis on abstract thinking, logical theories and rationalism had destroyed any organic wholeness there and that this was one of the root causes of the problems of sterility and fragmentation they identified in the West. Rationalism at the expense of the other faculties was perceived as a negative quality, and was to be avoided in Russian life. Again, it is Kireevskii who best summarises the subject in his essay 'O kharaktere prosveshcheniiia Evropy i o ego otnoshenii k prosveshcheniiu Rossii':

Но чувство недовольства и безотрадной пустоты легло на сердце людей, которых мысль не ограничивалась тесным кругом минутных интересов, именно потому, что самое торжество ума Европейского обнаружило одноморфность его коренных стремлений [...]. Многовековой холодный анализ разрушил все те основы, на которых стояло Европейское просвещение от самого начала своего развития; [...] между тем как прямою
Organic unity and wholeness, then, could be preserved in the individual through *tsel'nost' dukha*, and the latter principle also contributed to maintaining organic unity in society. However, the Slavophiles focused on another concept, known as *sobornost'*, in stressing the way in which human civilisation should develop. *Sobornost'* a word used predominantly in a theological context, and with no direct translation in English, meant to the Slavophiles principally that which united and informed the true Christian Church; but it also held great significance for society as a whole, because of the organically inseparable role of the Orthodox faith in Russian life. For the Slavophiles, social, economic and political issues could not be separated from religious questions, and therefore, what appears to be only a theological consideration in fact applies throughout Slavophile thought. *Sobornost'* embodies the concepts of free unity, mutual love, and voluntary submission to the whole. Khomiakov in particular concentrated on this principle in his writings. Since he wrote many of his theological works in French, direct references to his view of *sobornost'* are difficult to find, but the principle is the subject of a letter to the editor of the French periodical *L'Union Chrétienne* in 1860. Here Khomiakov reacted to an article by the recently converted Jesuit, Prince Gagarin, who criticised the use of the word *sobornyi* to translate ‘catholic’ in the Nicene Creed. Khomiakov argued that the original Greek *katholikos* did not stand for ‘catholic’ or ‘universal’, in the sense of geographical spread or per capita majority, and he proceeded to define the concept as follows:

This passage contains some of the key elements associated with *sobornost’*, particularly the idea of freedom, congregation and the elimination of class or racial differences. But it is especially the notion of mutual love that is important in *sobornost’*; in his theological essay from 1858, the third in the series
'Quelques mots par un chrétien orthodoxe', Khomiakov described the Church as 'Божественная реальность — Сам Бог в откровении взаимной любви'. This would appear to be the very essence of sobornost'. Moreover, its spiritual element cannot be overemphasised. S. Khoruzhii writes that after Khomiakov, 'sobornost' was steadily profaned with increasing force and potency, and lost its content of grace, only to be reduced to a mere social and organic principle. In one sense, this process may be considered to be the very essence of the ideological evolution of Slavophilism. I shall demonstrate in this study that Dostoevskii returned to the spiritual interpretation of sobornost'. The presence of sobornost' in Dostoevskii's thought has been explicitly noted by more than one critic, including A. Boyce Gibson, and V. A. Nikitin, who asserts: 'В соединении соборности с почвенночеством проявилось, на мой взгляд, своеобразие православия Достоевского.'

The way in which sobornost' was present in Russian life was partly due to the Orthodox Church, but also thanks to the age-old peasant way of life that had existed even before Christianity arrived in Russia. The traditional Russian peasant commune, or obshchina, with its regulating assemblies, was organised around the same principles of organic unity, congregation, tradition based on collective decisions and voluntary submission to the whole. So alongside sobornost', Khomiakov and the other Slavophiles placed the idealisation of the obshchina and emphasised the almost family nature of the whole societal structure. This idealistic view is well captured by Nikolai Zernov in his book on Khomiakov, Dostoevskii and Vladimir Solov'ev:

Russian life was permeated from top to bottom by the family idea. It was expressed through the universal custom of addressing people only by their Christian names; by the open hospitality of Russian homes, where shelter and food were offered free to strangers; by the meetings of the rural community, the Mir, at which both the general and the domestic problems were discussed; by the Škhod, or popular assemblies of the freedom-loving Cossacks; by the moral authority of the National Assemblies; by the willing obedience given to the elders, Starosta, who managed the affairs of the Artels, self-governing fraternities of artisans; by the name “Father” given to the Tsars; and by the widespread conviction of the equality and mutual responsibility of all the children of the great Russian motherland.

The idealisation of the Russian peasant commune was fundamental to the Slavophile philosophy of society, and formed the basis of the their hopes for
Russia and of their criticism of Western society. Thus it went hand in hand with *sobornost’* for Khomiakov and Kireevskii. Christoff explains how the two principles are linked:

To be sure, *sobornost’* was a Christian principle whereas *obščinnost’* was first characteristic of pagan Russian society. However, to the Slavophils it was nothing short of providential that the Russian *obščina* possessed the virtues of organic unity and mutuality, and in general was characterized by socially oriented self-abnegation. This was what, they maintained, prepared the way for Christianity and *sobornost’* in Russia. And when it came, what did it find? Not proud pagan individualism as in Rome, but the commune, pagan yet so close, and so congenial to Christianity.24

At this point it is necessary to indicate that Khomiakov and Kireevskii were not guilty of advocating the resurrection of Russia’s past at the expense of her present, a charge many later critics, including Dostoevskii, levelled at the Slavophile movement. V. A. Koshelev explains Khomiakov’s stance, for example:

В статье Хомякова [«О старом и новом»] нет и намека на то, что «старое» лучше «нового», – главная задача формулируется им приблизительно так: в «старом» есть то, чего нет в «новом», и неплохо бы поглубже узнать это «старое»: можно ли перспективные начала, в нем содержащиеся, осуществить в «новом»? Привнесение элементов «старого» не только не сделает это «новое» хуже, но укрепит его на действительно разумных основаниях, вырабатывавшихся предками на протяжении веков и удачно или неудачно замененных началами прошлыми.25

Thus they were not the blinkered nostalgists they were sometimes accused of being, but sought to enrich the present with elements of the past such as the principles of the *obshchina*.

The values of the commune and the *sobornost’* of the Orthodox faith were significant to Slavophile thought not only because of the natural, organic unity they enabled, but also because that unity was based on freedom. To the Slavophiles, unity was worth nothing if it was not achieved freely and voluntarily. Khomiakov especially focused on freedom in his meditations on Orthodoxy, where it has ramifications for every aspect of his philosophy. He disagreed with the Western political concept of individual freedom, seeing it as sterile and impotent without the voluntary unity of *sobornost’*. In other words, for Khomiakov the individual meant nothing on his own and only found meaning in his individual existence as part of an organic whole. He argued:
This passage is notable for its emphasis not only on the freedom found in voluntary self-renunciation, but also on the importance of humility, which is an element that is prominent in Dostoevskii's thought, as I shall show. Berdiaev has examined the role of freedom in nineteenth-century Russian religious thought; he identifies both Khomiakov and Dostoevskii as the main proponents of the notion of organic freedom within the Orthodox tradition, and explains how voluntary organic unity allows for freedom:

The principles of tsel'nost', sobornost', freedom and the idealisation of the peasant commune as laid out above are the central ideas permeating Slavophile thought, and which will be traced in Dostoevskii's oeuvre. They represent the positive end of the polarity between Russia and the West common to Khomiakov, Kireevskii and Dostoevskii, and all three thinkers also held that the Orthodox faith preserved these elements in the greatest purity, thus imbuing the whole of traditional Russian life with them. At the other end of the polarity, they saw directly opposing principles. Khomiakov and Kireevskii considered the cultural development of the West in contrast with Russia; they identified the precedence of rational analysis as the factor responsible for shaping the directions taken by the Roman Catholic Church and Protestantism, and stressed the influence of these religions in ordering Western societies. Where in Russia they saw tsel'nost', in the West they saw rationalism and fragmented cognitive processes; whilst there was sobornost' and organic unity in Russia, in the West there was either forced unity maintained by external coercion, or atomisation and
isolation; where Russia had the freedom of voluntary submission, the West displayed either tyranny or chaos.

Kireevskii set out his ideas on the cultural development of Europe in terms of three fundamental influences, namely the residue of rational and logical values of the classical and pagan heritage, the absorption of these into the Western Christian Church and its subsequent role in organising civilisation, and the fact that Western political organisations had arisen not through peaceful unanimity and consensus, but through conflict and violence. Particularly interesting is his treatment of the subject of chivalry. He blamed Western Christianity for sanctioning the tyrannical actions of warrior knights and identified the alliances between rival knights, motivated by self-interest, as examples of the development of Western political structures. Chivalry, he argued, was a specifically Western structure, and had not arisen in Russia because of the purity of Orthodoxy:

In Kireevskii's opinion, the role of the chivalric order, together with the adoption from pagan Rome of rationalist principles, allowed the Roman Catholic Church to shift from a spiritual presence to a temporal power, following the Schism. He argued that it was Western rationalism that caused the Schism over the addition of the 'filioque' clause to the Creed. In deviating from the purity of the original faith, the Roman Church had violated the wholeness of the Universal Church, and thereafter was not only defenceless against the dominance of rationalism, but was bound to give rise to the Reformation, which was also based on logical premises. Therefore, for Kireevskii, Christianity in the West was no longer a free consensus of true faith, but a secular organisation, held together out of necessity by external forces and teaching its subjects to seek God with their intellect:

Очевидно, что та же нравственная причина, тот же перевес логической односторонности, который произвел учение о
Khomiakov's views on the Church are very similar to Kireevskii's. He saw Christianity as the Universal Church, from which the Roman and Protestant Churches had seceded after the Schism, and Orthodoxy as the remaining true expression of the original faith. Here a point made by Christoff should be noted, namely that Khomiakov thought of the Orthodox Church on two levels. Although in most of his writings he would refer to Orthodoxy as the one true Christian Church, this did not prevent him from acknowledging the existence of shortcomings in the Church in Russia. However, he put the blame for these on individuals and not on the Church as a whole. The Orthodox Church was for Khomiakov perfect sobornost', a unity of men on Earth with each other, with God and with those who had died or who had yet to be born. This unity was brought about by the working of the Holy Spirit bringing people together voluntarily in mutual love, and the resulting Church was a single indivisible entity which alone could give meaning to the life of an individual.

Khomiakov took the same view as Kireevskii, that the Roman Church violated the sobornost' of the Universal Church by the addition of the filioque clause to the Nicene Creed. They both believed that God's manifestation in the holy tradition of the Church could not be understood by reason alone, but only by the divinely inspired whole of the human spirit. In addition, the Roman See had decided on a change of dogma without consulting its Eastern brethren, thus breaking the bond of mutual love. Khomiakov also wrote extensively on the differences between the Western Christian churches and what he saw as sacrifices made by them in order to repair the damage of the Schism. In order to preserve the unity broken by rational inquiry, Rome imposed upon its Church the external authority of the Pope; decisions were made on a rational, utilitarian basis, theories and formulas were devised through logic and applied from above; they carried the force of judicial laws. In contrast, Protestantism again questioned the established dogma of Rome, by rejecting the papal authority in
favour of freedom of interpretation, but in doing so sacrificed the unity of its Church. Hence Khomiakov also saw Protestantism as a natural continuation of a movement away from the Universal Church begun by Roman Catholicism. He described the two religions thus: 'Единство внешнее, отвергающее свободу и потому недействительное — таков закон Романизма. Свобода внешняя, не дающая единства и потому также недействительная — такова Реформа.' Only in the Orthodox Church, the embodiment of the One True Church, could one find freedom and unity together, liberated from the question of where the Church's authority lay, thanks to the principle of sobornost':

Khomiakov's ideas on the positive and negative attributes of Russia and the West were influenced by his philosophy of history. It was his belief that all of world history had resulted from the everlasting struggle between the two principles of freedom and necessity, which he saw as the essential underlying driving forces of humanity. Khomiakov called societies based on the principle of freedom Iranian, since he believed that their origins were in a race from the Middle East; he identified their religions as being centred round the worship of a single, freely creating divine entity. Conversely, those societies based on the principle of necessity he designated Kushite, after the biblical name for Ethiopia, Kush; these, he asserted, practised often pantheistic religions worshiping gods who gave birth through necessity. On this point, V. I. Kerimov has an interesting perspective that posits an echo of Khomiakov in Dostoevskii:

Khomiakov's logic is simple: if the universal, freely creating principle is acknowledged, then it is a guarantee of freedom in the world (Iranianism); but if in a pantheistic key divinity is dissolved in the world (or conversely, in the Indian manner, the world is dissolved in divinity), then everything is subordinated to 'organic necessity' (Kushitism). In the first case freedom of the will, responsibility, and morality exist; in the second there is place neither for freedom nor for morality. Khomiakov's thought may be illustrated by a paraphrase of Dostoevsky: 'If there is no free creative principle (God), then everything is permitted.'
According to Khomiakov, Iranian societies were characterised by their organic societal structure, by their spirituality and creativity, and by their preference for verbal forms in their religions. Iranians were not concerned with physical matters and drew their strength from communal consciousness (here one sees echoes of Kireevskii's tsel’nost' dukha). Kushite societies, on the other hand, were characterised by formal, external organisation, hierarchical structures, rationalist theories and the worship of graven images. The Kushite peoples were mute, inert masses who venerated the body and often practised bloodthirsty rituals. Their civilisations were mechanically constructed and could be broken down and rebuilt without violating their wholeness, whereas Iranian societies, like a living organism, could not be reduced to their constituent parts.

Khomiakov summarised his description of Iranianism and Kushitism as follows:

From these descriptions it is easy to see how Khomiakov's view of world history related to his opinions of Western Christianity, Orthodoxy and Russian society. In his view Christianity derived from the Iranian principle; thanks to obshchinnost' in pre-Christian Russia, the Iranian principle had been preserved in its purest form in Orthodoxy. In contrast, pagan Rome, a Kushite state, had contaminated Christianity in the West with its rationalism and formalism, and hence Roman Catholicism, and by extension Protestantism, adhered to the Kushite principle. Khomiakov saw the Slavic nations, in particular Russia, as carriers of the Iranian principle, in spite of the Kushite characteristics of rationalism, formalism and individualism that had unfortunately accompanied the reforms of Peter the Great. As Riasanovsky remarks, Khomiakov believed that Russia would return to her true Iranian principles. He held the view that
Western cultures were dying as Kushitism reached its limits, and that Russia would be their Iranian salvation, bringing Orthodoxy and *sobornost'*: the East would succeed the West just as one generation followed another. Thus one can see an element of Russian messianism in his thought. However, this is not to say that Slavophilism was a movement following predeterminist philosophies: this would contradict the emphasis on freedom in their thought. Kerimov concurs:

"But is there messianism in Khomiakov? Hardly. While he is very critical of the past and the present of Russia, he eyes her future with hope, and only hope. [...] By dint of historical factors, a nation may be called upon (but not predestined!) to resolve a “universal task”. But whether it does so depends on its courage and wisdom."

Many aspects of Slavophile thought have resonances in the work of Dostoevskii. Their approbation of the doctrine of *tsel'nost' dukha* and its related issues of the limits and dangers of rationalism find expression in *Zapiski iz podpol'ia*; the concept of *sobornost'* and the ethics of Orthodoxy are taught by Father Zosima in *Brat'ia Karamazovy*; the state-like authority of the Roman Church is an important theme of ‘The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor’. Other attacks on Roman Catholicism for its authoritarian structure and un-Christian principles can be found in *Idiot* and *Podrostok*. The values of the *obshchina* are clearly advocated in *Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniiakh* along with a vehement criticism of Kushite ideals in the West. These are but a few specific examples; of course, these important interrelated themes are almost always present to a greater or lesser extent in virtually all of Dostoevskii’s works. Detailed examinations of the most salient examples of Dostoevskii’s engagement with ideas of the Slavophiles will form the main body of this study.

It is useful to situate my work in the range of material that already exists on Dostoevskii’s views on the issues of unity, brotherhood and freedom. Since Dostoevskii followed Khomiakov and Kireevskii’s essentially religious approach to these matters, for general reading on his religious opinions one should consult such standard works as Konstantin Mochulsky and Nikolai Berdiaev’s studies. Mochulsky mentions in passing the Slavophile movement in relation to Dostoevskii; he acknowledges a similarity between his thought and that of Khomiakov, and talks of Dostoevskii’s ‘Slavophile dream of a Christian empire’. Berdiaev also has a few comments on the subject. Early on in his
book, he rightly remarks that it would be wrong to count Dostoevskii among the Slavophiles, but then goes on to make what are in my opinion erroneous assertions that his views differed in everything from the Slavophiles, including their attitude to Western Europe. More relevant to the questions I have chosen to explore is A. Boyce Gibson’s work; this makes considerable mention of the presence of the principle of sobornost’ in Dostoevskii’s fiction, but Gibson’s concern is with sobornost’ as a characteristic of Orthodoxy, and he does not consider the role of the Slavophiles in promoting this aspect of the faith. There is also a useful study by Nicolas Zernov, who looks in turn at the views of Khomiakov, Dostoevskii and Vladimir Solov’ev on Russia’s spiritual future and relation to Europe. Zernov argues that the thought of these three men ‘shows an impressive convergence and development’ and that ‘they arrived at the same conclusions about the destiny of Europe and of their own country.’ But he correctly asserts that Dostoevskii ‘could not be identified with either the Slavophils or the Westernisers’; what is more, Zernov’s approach does not concentrate on Slavophile thought per se, but on general philosophical similarities. Other works that cover Dostoevskii’s thought and that are contiguous to my theme are the studies of Bruce Ward and Wayne Dowler. Ward deals with the West in Dostoevskii’s world view, approaching it from a strictly philosophical perspective; he has cause to refer briefly to Slavophilism, but his main concern is with Dostoevskii’s engagement with Western philosophical and political ideas. Dowler looks at the movement of pochvennichestvo and the central roles played by Dostoevskii and Apollon Grigor’ev; he too shows how they stood in relation to Slavophilism, but he focuses on the pochvennichestvo period of the early 1860s, and he makes only brief mention of Dostoevskii’s fictional works.

As for specific examinations of Dostoevskii and the Slavophiles, these are comparatively few in number. Studies from the Soviet era are limited in scope; Vladislav Popov, for example, focuses exclusively on the treatment of the obshchina by the Slavophiles and Dostoevskii, and indeed, considers it only from the political and economic perspective. U. A. Gural’nik, by contrast, advances the argument that ‘романы и повести Достоевского объективно опровергали теоретические построения славянофилов’. A. L. Ospovat’s
article, despite concentrating only on Dostoevskii’s statements during the trial of the Petrashevtsy, is more useful in that it suggests an awareness in Dostoevskii of Slavophile thought already at that time in his life, and it asserts that his statements 'говорят о серьезном творческом интересе молодого писателя к идеологии раннего славянофильства'.

Two more recent works, however, adopt the same stance that the current study is to follow and have been helpful in determining its parameters. Vladimir Viktorovich’s article is, in my opinion, the most comprehensive treatment of Dostoevskii and Slavophilism. He addresses the matter from the spiritual point of view and organises his material round three points of engagement: the first being ideological questions discussed in Peterburgskaiia letopis', the second being the interaction with Apollon Grigor'ev, and the third being a growing engagement with Khomiakov on religious matters from the early 1860s onwards. His conclusion, with which I agree, is that 'романы Достоевского, пожалуй, самое значительное по сей день воплощение славянофильских мечтаний'. Whilst I would concur with the majority of his arguments, in my opinion his choice of focus, his omission of various subjects such as similarities with the works of Kireevskii and the role of Dostoevskii’s imprisonment in Siberia as a catalyst in the development of his views, together with his superficial examination of the fiction, demonstrate the need for further study in this field. Tat'iana Blagova’s monograph on Khomiakov and Kireevskii contains a chapter on ‘heirs’ of the Slavophiles, amongst which she numbers Dostoevskii. (Abbott Gleason also refers to Dostoevskii as being ‘the most famous figure who was deeply marked by Slavophilism’; in addition, Riasanovsky includes a few paragraphs on Dostoevskii in the section on the influence of Slavophilism, in his monograph on the movement.) Blagova’s brief consideration of the issue highlights not only the areas of similarity between them, but also the point at which they diverge. She argues that where Khomiakov and Kireevskii wrote in terms of man as he ought to be, Dostoevskii showed man as he is in his duality, his capacity for good and evil. In her view, the Slavophiles avoided the issue of the problem of evil, whereas Dostoevskii addressed it. From these assertions it is possible to draw the conclusion that Dostoevskii applies to individual situations set in ‘real life’ those ideas that in Slavophile philosophy had referred
to mankind in the abstract. Such a conclusion legitimises the examination not only of Dostoevskii's non-fiction, the area where one might expect to find most correspondence with other writers of non-fiction, but also of his novels and short stories. It is my intention to demonstrate the way in which Dostoevskii played out scenarios affected by abstract ideas similar to those developed by the Slavophiles, and indicated their consequences for individuals as well as for society. Thus Viktorovich and Blagova's works form the points of departure for my thesis.

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1. N. N. Strakhov (ed.), *Biografia, pis'ma i zametki iz zapiski knizhki F. M. Dostoevskogo* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia A. S. Suvorina, 1883), pp. 204-05. Because this edition uses the old orthography, for consistency's sake I have transcribed this quotation.


12. I. V. Kireevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 2 tomakh*, vol. 1, ed. by M. Gershenzon (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1911), pp. 109-20: p. 110. Because this edition uses the old orthography, I have transcribed all citations made from it throughout the thesis.

13. See for example A. S. Khomiakov, 'Mneniia inostrantsev o Rossii', *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 8 tomakh*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1900), pp. 3-30. Because this edition uses the old orthography, I have transcribed all citations made from it throughout the thesis.
14 Ibid., p. 110.
18 Ibid., p. 176.
29 Ibid., p. 117.
30 Ibid., pp. 189-90.
31 Ibid., p. 190.
33 Ibid., p. 234.
34 Ibid., p. 53.
35 Khomiakov’s philosophy of history does not resume itself in any single work, but is scattered through three volumes of notes. For a concise account of the Iranian and Kushite principles see N. V. Riasanovsky, ‘Khomiakov on *Sobornost*’, in *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, ed. by E. J. Simmons (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), pp. 183-96; see also Walicki, and Christoff, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism*, vol. 1 for studies of Khomiakov’s world history.
37 It is interesting to note that Khomiakov’s characterisation of Kush has a certain historical foundation, and that ancient historians have remarked on the very aspects with which he was concerned and which Dostoevskii later addressed in his visions of religious temporal power. For instance, Mike Parker Pearson has commented on Kushite burial practices: ‘The moments that human sacrifice as an accompaniment to royal burials occur are actually very short lived but these are crucial moments for the formation of early states. What we’re seeing is the installation of a new hierarchy, a new power structure when political power and religious power are often linked together in the form of one person. That person has the complete power of life and death
over their subjects.’ In ‘Ancient Voices: Empire of Death’ (transcript of TV broadcast), Broadcasting Support Services, 1999, p. 17.


39 Riasanovsky, ‘Khomiakov on Sobornost”, p. 192.

40 Kerimov, p. 53.


44 N. Zernov, Three Russian Prophets, p. 11, p. 152, p. 97.


49 Viktorovich, p. 129.

50 Gleason, p. 289; Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, pp. 206-07.

Chapter One: Dostoevskii’s ideological position with regard to the Slavophile movement.

1.1: Introduction

The discovery of Dostoevskii’s first novel, *Bednye liudi*, by Nekrasov in 1845, was the springboard that launched a sensitive and idealistic young man into the tumultuous world of Russian intellectual life. The initial extravagant approbation of Nekrasov and Belinskii ensured the success of *Bednye liudi* even before its publication, and was Dostoevskii’s entrance ticket to the literary salons of St. Petersburg. It was here that he began a life-long career of debating the condition of Russia, of seeking a way forward for her and of commenting on her literature. It was to be a dramatic career during which he would try numerous, seemingly very different stances as he sought to define his position. His searching would cause him to be caught up in a revolutionary conspiracy; in penal servitude and exile he would find spiritual renewal. Finally, with time he would establish himself not only as one of the leading literary artists of his time, but also as a moral authority on Russia and Russianness. But the ostensible variety of Dostoevskii’s political views is not the mark of rootless or ill-conceived convictions, or even simply of the maturation from left-wing naivety to right-wing intransigence. Rather, it shows his persistence in trying to find the right formulation for his passionate love for his *rodina* and the right solution – in his eyes – to her problems. Dostoevskii never fully committed himself to allegiance to any particular ‘party’ of intellectuals: it is a sign of his faith in the ideas he was struggling to express, that he would not compromise them to remain for any length of time in one camp or another. If the utopian socialism of Belinskii’s circle made no allowance for faith in Christ, he would try a more Christian blend with the Maikov brothers. If there were flaws in Slavophilism and Westernism, he would join with like-minded individuals to found their own ideological movement: *pochvennichestvo*. And if this movement were proven to him to have inconsistencies, he would refine its principles into a more independent viewpoint. Dostoevskii was the great assimilator: Jacques Catteau writes of his ‘powerful ability to synthesise’. He was able to select the positive elements from many of the tendencies he investigated, find areas of common ground between them, and at least appreciate the sincerity in the motivations of
those with whom he could not agree. For this reason it is impossible to give a name to Dostoevskii's ever-evolving, intricate system of beliefs; equally it may be the reason why there exist a range of critical opinions as to whether Dostoevskii may or may not be called a Slavophile, as I mentioned in my Introductory Chapter.

At this early stage, my aim is to set the scene, to provide a background of factual information against which the details of the literary dramatisation of Slavophile motifs may be clearly defined. Whilst some biographical information will be necessary, I shall endeavour not to duplicate the work of such standard biographical studies as those of Joseph Frank and Geir Kjetsaa. Rather, I intend to chart chronologically the history of Dostoevskii's engagement with such themes of Slavophile philosophy as organic unity, sobornost' and attitudes to the West, as outlined in my Introductory Chapter. For the moment, I shall concentrate on the evidence from Dostoevskii's non-fiction, namely his letters, general notebooks and also his journalism. Now there are grounds for caution over the classification as non-fiction of such works as Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniakh, or Dnevnik pisatelia, given their mix of genres and frequent use of narrative irony. However, by this ostensibly artificial exercise of taking at face value the statements from Dostoevskii's journalism, I plan to establish a superficial overview of the development of the attitudes that emerge from such works, on the assumption, justified by the consistency of views and their reflection in Dostoevskii's letters and notebooks, that they can be mapped onto the author's own beliefs. This overview will act as a gauge against which we may determine where in the spectrum his fictional works are situated. It will stand in contrast to the later examination of the works of fiction, together with a re-examination of the journalism as artistic form. Thereby I hope to demonstrate what is to be learned from each approach, and how much fuller an understanding can be gained from going beyond a study of echoed themes.
1.2: Early work.

We must begin with Dostoevskii's first forays into the world of the St. Petersburg intellectuals. At the outset it is important to note the location of his debut: he was studying in the glamorous, highly Westernised capital, rather than in the more traditional, longer-established city of Moscow, where the conservative Slavophile movement flourished. Of course, there was no real degree of alienation between the two principal cities, and ideas and publications circulated freely between these centres of intellectual life. But Petersburg was Russia's 'window on the West', and later, Dostoevskii was on several occasions to remark on its artificial, un-Russian atmosphere. This atmosphere may be one contributing factor to Dostoevskii's chaotic and troubled experiment with socialist ideas, which marked his early career.

At this time, the division within the Russian intelligentsia into the movements of Slavophilism and Westernism was reaching its height. As Dostoevskii was in Petersburg, and as he enjoyed the patronage of Nekrasov and Belinskii, he was soon drawn into circles that were concerned with liberal ideologies. Dostoevskii himself was searching for an outlet for his own sense of the injustice of society and love for humanity, that had been nurtured by the practice of Christianity and by reading the idealistic Romantics Schiller and Hoffman. As with many of his contemporaries who had been attracted to these writers and others such as Schelling, his initial sentimental idealism and preoccupation with the enrichment of human existence on a transcendental level was soon tempered by acquaintance with writers such as Balzac, George Sand, Hugo and Eugene Sue. They brought home to him the urgency with which social problems needed resolving. At the same time, having been brought up in a strictly devout Orthodox home, and having continued rigorously to practice Orthodoxy at the Engineering Academy, Dostoevskii also attached great importance to the figure and teachings of Christ. Thus it is fair to assume that given Dostoevskii's background, highly sensitive character and choice of reading matter, he would have been looking for some practical application of Christianity. This assumption is supported by Frank and Leatherbarrow.
Dostoevskii began his intellectual journey from a stance that paralleled the most prevalent views amongst the Russian intelligentsia before it fell into the two broad camps of Slavophilism and Westernism. Both movements had in common the notion, derived from the philosophies of Hegel, that Western Europe — until then the source of all progress — had reached its peak of civilisation and would eventually fall into decline. Philosophies following the Hegelian school of thought, however, proposed that the movement of humanity’s progression would continue, but from a new source. This was the cue for educated Russians to believe that Russia was that new source and that she was about to come into her own within world society. The division arose over how this was to come about. The Westernisers advocated the cultivation of European principles on Russian soil, whilst the Slavophiles sought to advance Russia by developing her own natural strengths and resources. But it is important to remember, particularly with regard to Dostoevskii, the common origin of the two movements in a hope for a renewal of Russia and her ascendancy as a world power on the moral and cultural plane. Let us consider Alexander Herzen’s summation of the situation: ‘И мы, как Янус или как двуглавый орел, смотрели в разные стороны, в то время как сердце было одно’. This image might also be used to explain Dostoevskii’s apparent volte-face after his exile in Siberia: as I aim to show in my thesis, his heart always beat with the same basic aspirations, although he looked in a variety of directions in order to satisfy them. It may also be the key to understanding Dostoevskii’s call for the reconciliation of the Slavophiles and the Westernisers after his return from exile; for perhaps he, better than his contemporaries, was able to appreciate their shared roots.

Initially Dostoevskii joined the literary circle that had formed around Belinskii. Bruce Ward remarks how the passionate, ‘furious’ Belinskii passed through several phases of attachment to socialism, first arriving on the basis of Schellingian Romanticism at the utopian socialism propounded by Fourier, Leroux and Saint-Simon, then becoming increasingly attached to the atheist, materialist teachings of Feuerbach and Strauss. In this journey, Ward argues, Belinskii represented a condensed form of the trajectory the Westerniser movement was to follow into the 1860s. His friendship with Dostoevskii lasted
little more than a year, for the young writer clashed with him over the figure of Christ. Dostoevskii recalls in *Dnevnik pisatelia* the views held by Belinskii at the time:

— Да знаете ли вы, — взывгивал он раз вечером (он иногда как-то взывгивал, если очень горячился), обращаясь ко мне, — знаете ли вы, что нельзя насчитывать грехи человеку и обременять его долгами и подставными лантами, когда общество так подло устроено, что человеку невозможно не делать злодеял, когда он экономически приведен к злодейству, и что нелепо и жестоко требовать с человека того, чего уже по законам природы не может он выполнить, если б даже хотел... [...] 

Да поверьте же, наивный вы человек, — набросился он опять на меня, — поверьте же, что ваш Христос, если бы родился в наше время, был бы самым незаметным и обыкновенным человеком; так и стушевался бы при нынешней науке и при нынешних двигателях человечества. (XXI, 11.)

Elsewhere in *Dnevnik pisatelia*, Dostoevskii reminisces that the socialism of the time was perceived as an improvement on, if not a correction of Christianity (XXI, 130), but from the above extract it is clear that Belinskii was rapidly moving beyond this thinking and was ready to embrace atheism. His arguments show elements of what Khomiakov classified as Kushitism: they emphasise external forces of necessity that determine a man’s behaviour, either positively through the creation by science of a perfect system, or negatively through the existing detrimental environment. When the two writers found that their differences of opinion were too much, Dostoevskii joined the more moderate, idealistic liberal circles led by the Beketov and Maikov brothers. However, it would seem that he too was following a path of increasing radicalism when at length he joined the Petrashevskii circle and fell under the influence of the scheming Nikolai Spesheev. How much had Belinskii influenced him?

We must be wary of assuming that Dostoevskii’s early association with Belinskii led directly to his involvement with Speshnev, and yet Dostoevskii himself appears to confirm that this is the case. In *Dnevnik pisatelia* he affirms, with regard to Belinskii: ‘Он меня невзлюбил; но я страстно принял всё учение его’ (XXI, 12). But many critics have evaluated this statement as a deliberate exaggeration. Kjetsaa, for example, suggests that the trauma of penal servitude caused Dostoevskii to remember his former activities with guilt and
self-castigation. Frank puts the exaggeration down to an artistic desire for dramatic effect, an analysis that is just when one considers the problematic genre of the ostensibly journalistic Dnevnik, and reminds us that these passages were written out of a polemical aim to show the eventual incompatibility of socialism and Christianity. Leatherbarrow reflects on Dostoevskii's personality, arguing that his attraction first to Belinskii and later to Speshnev, was less intellectual than emotional: both Belinskii and Speshnev were in their own way charismatic, domineering personalities, whilst Dostoevskii was still very impressionable. It is possible that such attractions eclipsed his own intellectual convictions at the time. What is more, the memoirs of his close friend Ianovskii recount that Dostoevskii owed money to Speshnev and felt beholden to him in every way, likening him to Mephistopheles. In fact, Dostoevskii's own recollections in Dnevnik pisatelia bear out this explanation, for in their language they emphasise the emotional content of his involvement. Comparing the Petrashevskii conspiracy with the recent Nechaev affair, Dostoevskii talks of the manipulative nature of such radical ringleaders, accusing them of knowing how to play on the soul of youth as on a musical instrument. He goes on to liken his involvement with socialism as an infection that most people were powerless to struggle against:

[...] всё это были такие влияния, которых мы преодолеть не могли и которые захвачивали, напротив, наши сердца и умы во имя какого-то великодушия. [...] Те из нас тогда еще не знали причин болезни своей, а потому и не могли еще с нею бороться. (XXI, 131.)

Of course, in this extract we again find the same hyperbolic tone that is designed for dramatic impact. Nevertheless, Dostoevskii is drawing attention to the emotions that influenced him, rather than the content of the socialist arguments themselves.

Ward, however, offers a further explanation of Dostoevskii's profession that he had embraced all of Belinskii's teaching. He points to the writer's admission in Dnevnik pisatelia that in his youth he could have become a Nechaevets type, given the right circumstances. In Ward's view, this is Dostoevskii's recognition that his early liberalism contained the potential for development into a more radical stance, that rather than being incompatible with Speshnev's radical atheism, it in fact left him more vulnerable to it. Ward's
argument makes sense, particularly when we consider Dostoevskii's novel *Besy*, in which he showed how the moderate liberalism of the 1840s gave rise to the radical materialism of the 1860s and 1870s.

After discussing the extent to which Dostoevskii was influenced by Belinskii, it remains to establish exactly what were Dostoevskii's views at that time. One of the best sources to this end is his early journalistic work, *Petersburgskaiia letopis'.* This is a feuilleton, of which four instalments were published in *Sankt Peterburgskie vedomosti* in 1847. This was around the time when Dostoevskii was beginning to frequent the Petrashevskii circle, a year after his break with Belinskii. The *letopis' therefore comes at a crucial moment in the development of his views and helps to shed light on his engagement with Westernism. It is quite surprising in that its tone is one of independence, with criticism of both sides of the debate, and a few indications of the beliefs Dostoevskii was to hold in later years. Most obviously, however, it illustrates the differences between his early views and his post-Siberian ideas. One of the things that stand out the most about *Petersburgskaiia letopis' is its exposition of Dostoevskii's attitude to the common people. After Siberia, the Russian people became one of his major interests, and whilst he never overlooked their faults, he was also a vociferous defender of their qualities. In the *letopis',* however, he gives little space to the people, and what there is looks only at their faults. He is content not to refute the remarks of his educated Westerniser contemporaries about the backwardness of the peasantry: 'Но скажут, пожалуй: что же народ? Народ темен и необразован, и укажут на общество, на людей образованных' (XVIII, 25). This statement indicates that, like the Westernisers, Dostoevskii at this stage did not believe that the people were capable of being a source of spiritual regeneration for Russia. Viktorovich suggests that Dostoevskii's pronouncements on the religiosity of the *narod* came as a reply to the Slavophile camp, and I would concur that this is likely. 13 Indeed, Dostoevskii depicts the Slavophiles with sharp satire as blinkered and out of touch, as armchair intellectuals who cannot agree over their basic principles because they are derived from a hazy past (XVIII, 25).

Kjetsaa identifies the *letopis' as an illustration of Dostoevskii's Westernism, pointing out his satirical treatment of the Slavophiles and his faith
in the intelligentsia as leaders of the people. But whilst these elements are to be found in the letopis', the overriding impression it gives is of Dostoevskii’s dissatisfaction with talk and a desire for action, but without a firm idea of the direction such action should take. At times he is critical of the intelligentsia as a whole. In the first issue, of 27th April, he describes Petersburg as ‘не что иное, как собрание огромного числа маленьких кружков, у которых у каждого свой устав, свое приличие, свой закон, своя логика и своя оракул’ (XVIII, 12), and he bemoans the impotence of even the most sincere of these circles. This is an early expression of what was to become a favourite concern of Dostoevskii’s: the fragmentation of society, a theme that echoes the Slavophile call for organic unity. The motif of the impotence and gradual atomisation of the intelligentsia is most strongly continued in the final 15th June issue. Here Dostoevskii begs the educated classes to stop arguing about what the most useful activities are and to unite society with a common goal:

He goes on to show that the consequence of this failure to agree on a course of action is the growing number of ineffectual, feverish dreamers, whom he calls Petersburg’s nightmare. (At that time, the dreamer was also a favourite type used in his fiction, and elements of the dreamer type can be found in much of his later fiction.) These individuals withdraw into their abstract, intellectual dreams for a better society, until they become completely isolated:

What the reader learns from these passages of the letopis’ is that Dostoevskii was already disenchanted with the arguments of his contemporaries, and saw in them a crisis for society, in the form of disintegration. For this reason I believe that at this time of his life, Dostoevskii can no more be called a Westerniser than a Slavophile, in the sense that he could not fully back the
educated classes as effective architects of Russia’s renewal, although it is true that as yet he did not consider the narod as an alternative. But whilst we may discern a certain distance from the main intellectual camps, the undercurrent in the letopis’ is one of communality of a socialist kind, as demonstrated by his emphasis on the importance of common interests: here there is little of the post-Siberian concern for respect for the peculiarities of the individual. On the other hand, Dostoevskii calls for action and unity, but stops short of proposing radical or revolutionary solutions. Of course, one must bear in mind the deterrent of severe censorship under Nicholas I, but it is my feeling that at this point, Dostoevskii was still unsure of his beliefs.

The fiction written by Dostoevskii at this time goes some way toward substantiating the picture presented by Peterburgskaja letopis’. Leatherbarrow’s analysis of two stories published either side of the letopis’ adds to the portrait of a thinker who knew what he disagreed with, but was still searching for viable alternative ideologies. His summation is that in Gospodin Prokharchin, published in 1846, Dostoevskii rejects the impersonal, abstract humanism such as propounded by Belinskii, which overlooks the rights of the individual in favour of the collective good. Instead he offers the Christian humanist ethic of the mutual responsibility of each individual for all.\(^{15}\) This is an element that is not present in the letopis’. Then, in Slaboe serdtse, published in 1848, according to Leatherbarrow’s analysis, there is a shift of views; here Dostoevskii is bidding farewell to Romantic idealism and utopian socialism, and acknowledging that humanism, be it Christian or socialist, is not enough to cope with the intricate depths of the human psyche and bring about a harmonious society.\(^{16}\) Another story, Khoziaika, published in the autumn of 1847 and thus just after Peterburgskaja letopis’, depicts the unhealthy impotence of the dreamer. These three stories underline Dostoevskii’s frustration with the inertia of his contemporary intellectual circles and his growing desire for practical action.

More foreshadowings of Dostoevskii’s future views are to be found in the descriptions of Petersburg in Peterburgskaja letopis’. He seems uneasy with the concept of the city as the apogee of the Western ‘civilising’ influence in Russia, and his images in places contradict each other. In the 1\(^{st}\) June issue, after his discussion of Moscow and Petersburg architecture, which was the vehicle for
his critique of Slavophile retrospection, he praises the conglomeration of styles found in Petersburg as a representation of Russia’s ongoing role in European history. He goes on to applaud the city for being the fount of progress in Russia, as a great idea still in development: ‘И до сих пор Петербург в пыли и в мусоре; [...] будущее его еще в идее; но идея эта принадлежит Петру I, она воплощается, растет и укореняется с каждым днем не в одном петербургском болоте, но во всей России [...]’ (XVIII, 26). However, if this passage is compared with descriptions of the city from the other issues, one may draw the conclusion that here Dostoevskii is overemphasising the modernity of Petersburg and its benefits, in order more strongly to refute the nostalgia for ancient Rus and reverence for Moscow shown by the Slavophiles. For in the 27th April issue he refers to Petersburg as an irritable, jaundiced spinster, worn out and bitter from society balls and gaming tables (XVIII, 15-16), and in the 15th June issue his comparison is with a sickly, submissive, weak and grieving girl. Neither of these portrayals suggests a proud monument to Russia’s progress. Rather, they suggest a power that is both spent and corrupted by materialism; they bring to mind his later accounts of Paris and London. It is possible that these representations in the letopis’ prefigure his more Slavophile opinion of Europe as having had its day, and that they are the precursors to later negative allusions to the rootlessness of the city, such as to be found in ‘Son smeshnogo cheloveka’.

There is additional evidence that in the years following Peterburgskaya letopis’, Dostoevskii drew a little closer to the Slavophile stance. Viktorovich notes that his story Khoziaika contains elements, such as the spiritual state experienced by praying together, which he was to explore in more detail much later. In addition, the novella Netochka Nezvanova, as Viktorovich remarks, shows signs of affirming the power of self-renunciation and humility to unite people.17 What is more, both Viktorovich and Ospovat point to Dostoevskii’s statements at the Petrashevskii trial as evidence that there had been a certain progression towards Slavophilism in his views since the writing of the letopis’.18 In these statements Dostoevskii speaks of the unsuitability of Western-style revolution for instigating change in Russia, due to the different paths of historical development followed by Russia and the West (XVIII, 127). This indeed suggests that he was aware of the early arguments of Khomiakov and Kireevskii
on the subject, and that by 1849 he felt a growing sympathy with their views. Therefore, the picture of Dostoevskii before his exile that the information set out above gives us, is of an independent thinker who was committed to weighing up the problems facing his country, who absorbed and assessed a wide range of views in the ideological spectrum, and who was beginning to fashion his own position in this spectrum. Now it is necessary to consider the way in which his exile acted upon this foundation of views formed in his youth.
1.3: Siberia.

The trial of the Petrashevkii circle and the eventual sentence of hard labour and military service, brought to an abrupt halt Dostoevskii’s involvement with liberal circles. The horrific cruelty of his mock death sentence caused him to find a new joy and wonderment in life, and he faced his penal servitude with stoicism and without bitterness. His time in Siberia was to be a genuine enlightenment, an education that stood in stark contrast to the imported ideologies from the West, which now began to ring false for Dostoevskii. In prison he would find hard evidence grounded on real life to contradict the theories of utopian socialism that had so appealed to him. As he himself acknowledged in a letter to Eduard Totleben in 1856, ‘дологий опыт, тяжелый и мучительный, протрезвил меня и во многом переменил мои мысли. Но тогда — тогда я был слеп, верил в теории и утопии’ (XXVIII/4, 224).

The monotony of prison life belied a seemingly infinite variety of characters, attitudes and crimes, and would convince Dostoevskii that blanket formulas, so favourable with Western influenced intellectuals, would never account for every facet of the broad Russian character that would henceforth become his preoccupation. In particular he would have the opportunity to reassess his opinion of the common people, and would learn from their example that the moral solutions offered by the traditional Christian values of Orthodoxy were superior to the social orientation of Christian humanism. During his imprisonment, Dostoevskii combated his isolation by examining his past life rigorously and sternly, and his harsh self-judgement enabled him to absorb his new experiences into the construction of a new set of beliefs:

Одинокий душевно, я пересматривал всю прошлую жизнь мою, перебирая всё до последних мелочей, вдумывался в мое прошедшее, судил себя один неумолимо и строго и даже в иной час благословлял судьбу за то, что она послала мне это уединение, без которого не состоялись бы ни этот суд над собой, ни этот строгий пересмотр прежней жизни. И какими надеждами забилось тогда мое сердце! Я думал, я решил, я клялся себе, что уже не будет в моей будущей жизни ни тех ошибок, ни тех падений, которые были прежде. (IV, 220.)

This passage comes from Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, Dostoevskii’s lightly fictionalised account of his prison years, written in 1859, five years after his release, and published the following year. Transferring the narrative to the
perspective of a nobleman, Aleksandr Petrovich Gorianchikov, sentenced to ten years for the murder of his wife, Dostoevskii recounts experiences, observations and feelings very similar to his own in a detached, objective tone that is unique in his oeuvre. Apart from a makeshift notebook containing mostly disconnected remarks and peasant turns of phrase, and a few letters after his release in which he spoke of the appalling conditions and referred only vaguely to his state of mind, Zapiski iz mertvogo doma is the only record Dostoevskii left of those traumatic four years. From the evidence of memoirs of other prisoners and prison records, it is possible to accept that the incidents he describes are by and large biographically accurate. As regards the reactions of the fictional narrator to these events, we must recognise that Dostoevskii included artistic and dramatic embellishments in order to fashion bare facts into a work of art. Nevertheless, the ideas expressed through this narrator in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma progress logically into those found not only in Dostoevskii's post-Siberian fiction but also in his journal articles, letters and notebooks. This allows the reader to infer that the observations of the narrator are consonant with the author's own views. What then, may we make of the narrator's stern resolution to reform himself? Allowing for dramatic effect, we may nonetheless surmise that Dostoevskii too appreciated the solemnity of his punishment and sought to assimilate its moral implications. The above excerpt does not specify the kind of mistakes and lapses Dostoevskii swore to avoid. However, given the jolting evidence of day-to-day life with a mainly peasant body of convicts, which challenged the naïve, well-intentioned views he had held prior to his imprisonment, it is fair to infer that this was a time during which Dostoevskii actively and mercilessly put his former beliefs to the test. Finding them wanting, he looked to his new experiences as one source from which to build a fresh vision of life. It was to be many years before this vision crystallised in his mind, but in Siberia, many new seeds were sown, and many old, dormant values, such as traditional Orthodoxy, were reawakened.

The importance of the prison experience in Dostoevskii's life, and of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma in his literary oeuvre, must not be underestimated. An examination of this time through the literary portrayal the author made of it is essential to the present study, because in this purgatory, Dostoevskii found reasons to reject the Westernised approach to solving Russian's problems and
was able to develop into stronger idea-feelings the doubts about utopian socialism that had beset him in his early years. At the same time, Zapiski iz mertvogo doma identifies on the creative plane the issues that would dominate his post-Siberian works; these issues, as we shall see, closely parallel Slavophile ideology. Slavophilism was, as I showed in my Introductory Chapter, a movement concerned with predominantly moral solutions for Russia, as opposed to the socio-political and scientific emphasis in ideologies inspired by Western teaching. So too does Dostoevskii focus on a moral response to the question of what it means to be Russian. Robert Louis Jackson makes the following observation: 'Dostoevsky, then, appeals in House of the Dead to the moral and civic consciousness of Russia. [...] All roads in Dostoevsky lead to and from the dead house. Here Dostoevsky explored the questions of freedom, alienation, and rebellion from the psychological and ethical points of view.'

This is a just remark, for it points out with regard to Zapiski iz mertvogo doma matters that were of great significance to the Slavophiles: freedom, unity, fragmentation and its consequences. It also stresses the role played by the real life experience and the artistic account that resulted from it in Dostoevskii's subsequent life. The writer himself was aware of how Siberia had shaped him both as man and as artist, as he assured his brother upon his release: 'я теперь вздору не напишу' (XXVIII/i, 172). In this chapter I shall concentrate upon the way that the events of prison life affected Dostoevskii's ideas; an examination of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma as an artistic creation will be reserved for a later chapter.

Before setting off for Siberia, Dostoevskii consoled his brother Mikhail at their farewell meeting with the optimistic observation that he would not be encountering wild beasts in prison, but men who might even be better than him. Frank's just analysis shows how Dostoevskii's remark was a formulation of his hope, influenced by the humanitarian socialism of the Petrashevskii circle, that he would find amongst the convicts comrades united in a common misfortune. In this hope he was sorely disappointed, for despite the official levelling effect of penal servitude - the removal of civil rights, the shaven head and the enforced communal living - he remained an outsider, shunned and often persecuted by his fellow prisoners because of his noble status. Nevertheless, Dostoevskii's words turned out to be unwittingly prophetic, for by the end of his four years he had
learned to 'find the gold' (XXVIII/i, 172) in these coarse people and to base his hopes for Russia in the narod. His years in Siberia fundamentally altered his opinion of the common people, for his daily painful contact with them forced him to re-evaluate his previous notions.

We may recall Dostoevskii's statement in the Peterburgskaia letopis' that the people are obscure and ill educated, relying on the gentry for enlightenment. Obscure and ill educated he certainly found them, brutish, foul-mouthed, at times more like the wild beasts he had initially denied them to be. But their relentless hostility to the prisoners from the noble classes made him realise several things. Firstly, the peasants were not as limited and ignorant as he had supposed: they clearly had a well-defined sense of the inherent corruption and injustice in serfdom, and this was what gave rise to their innate resentment of the gentry. 'Вы дворяне, железные носы, нас заклевали. Прежде господином был, народ мучил, а теперь хуже последнего, наш брат стал', Dostoevskii recounts the convicts as saying, in a letter to his brother (XXVIII/i, 169). As Frank points out, it was a common view among Belinskii and his followers that the people had little socio-political consciousness and would live happily from day to day so long as their most immediate needs were met.23 If Dostoevskii held such a view, it was quickly refuted. He also found that far from being superior to the peasant convicts, he was as a helpless child when it came to manual labour or useful skills, and during the working day he would be thrown out of one work group after another for incompetence, until the sergeant found him something more suitable. He soon came to appreciate the convicts' aptitude for handicrafts and skilled trades of all kinds, which kept them busy during the long evenings and even brought in some money; Dostoevskii knew only the skill of reading and writing literature, and that was forbidden.

However, one incident more than any other brought home to Dostoevskii the immensity of the gulf between the gentry and the narod. He found that not even a well-intentioned offer of help and comradeship would make them accept him. Zapiski iz mertvogo doma depicts the incident as follows. One day the narrator Gorianchikov found some of the convicts lining up in the courtyard, and assuming that there was to be a roll call, he fell in with them. But they turned on him rudely, saying that he had no place to be there, and one of them had to lead
him away. It turned out that the prisoners wanted to complain about the poor food to the Major. Gorianchikov was hurt that he and the other gentry convicts had not been allowed to make a show of solidarity with the plaintiffs, and he even expected that he would be reproached for not doing so; later he asked Petrov, a man with whom he was on speaking terms, why this was. Petrov's reply was a harsh lesson to learn.

— Скажите, Петров, — спросил я его, — ваши на нас не сердятся [...] за то, что мы не вышли на претензию? [...] Ну, и нам надо было... из товарищества.

— Да... да какой же вы нам товарищ? — спросил он в недоумении.

 [...] Я понял, что меня никогда не примут в товарищество, будь я разарестован, хоть на века вечные, хоть особого отделения. (IV, 207.)

From what we may infer to be just such an incident as this, Dostoevskii now learned that his previous liberal conception of the noble classes as benefactors to a grateful peasantry was unrealistic and false. He realised that it was because of the peasants’ inability to recognise or desire solidarity from the nobles that the convicts had no appreciation of the political crime for which he had been sentenced. He suddenly understood that it was not the right of the gentry to reform society according to what they assumed was best for the common people, for such reform would never be accepted. He recognised that first, the great void dividing his people had to be bridged, and for that to be possible, the gentry had to earn the respect of the peasants. But how was this to be done?

In prison Dostoevskii encountered other convicts of noble status; many, like him, were political prisoners. But others were guilty of crimes of great cruelty and depravity, and none horrified him more than the informer Aristov. Aristov was totally debauched and depraved, and Dostoevskii describes him as what can result from the complete domination of the flesh over moral sensibilities:

А—в стал и был каким-то куском мяса, с зубами и с желудком и с неутолимой жаждой наигрубейших, самых зверских телесных наслаждений, а за удовлетворение самого малейшего и прихотливейшего из этих наслаждений он способен был хладно-кровнейшим образом убить, зарезать, словом, на всё [...] (IV, 63.)

All these dreadful characteristics were somehow made worse, in Dostoevskii’s opinion, by the fact that Aristov was clever, handsome, educated and well bred.
No amount of education or social comfort had stopped him from his chosen path. The revulsion and moral outrage expressed in Dostoevskii’s depiction of Aristov shows that the writer found him by far the most evil of all the convicts. Aristov had a profound effect on him. He found himself judging all the prisoners by Aristov’s standards, and he became filled with hatred and contempt for them. This bitter, spiteful state of mind tormented and dismayed him, as he wrote later to Madame Fonvizina (XXVIII/i, 177), and it is likely that the example of Aristov stimulated him to search for the positive qualities in the men around him. He was also surprised to see that in the moral vacuum of prison, the peasant convicts did not see the same depth of depravity in Aristov, and many were friendly with him and looked up to him. It is possible that this circumstance helped to impress upon Dostoevskii the importance of the moral example that the gentry should set the peasantry, for it was after his time in Siberia that Dostoevskii began to advocate moral reform of the nobility as a means to heal the rift between them and the narod.

However, it was also in prison that Dostoevskii saw positive cases of the gentry winning over the peasants, and these instances also contributed towards the formulation of his new view. He noticed that there were certain officials whom the convicts respected and even loved. There was for a while a prison governor, Lieutenant Smelakov, of whom the convicts were very fond, despite his administration of the most merciless floggings. They also positively adored an engineering commander, G—v, although Dostoevskii notes that he appeared to have abysmal moral standards. What these two men had in common was an ability to communicate with the convicts on their own wavelength, without condescension or lordly magnanimity. They treated the convicts with respect and trust; they neither tried to exaggerate their own status, nor attempted to terrify the convicts, nor sought to be chummy with them. Dostoevskii stresses that the convicts admired those who were not afraid of them and approved of commanders who acted in a manner fit for their posts, in other words, men who carried themselves with dignity and did not try to elevate or demean themselves. He writes:

Не брезгливы они, не гадливы к подчиненному народу, — вот где, кажется мне, причина! Барюнка-белоручки в них не видать, духа барского не слыхать, а есть в них какой-то особенный
By observing the prisoners' reactions to these men, Dostoevskii came to believe that the common people did not desire a radical reconstruction of society, but instead a parity of simple humane treatment between the classes as they stood: they would respond to a respect for their humanity with similar dignified esteem. On one occasion the narrator finds himself in just such a positive situation with his fellow convicts. He was attending the stage show that the convicts had designed and performed by themselves, for their Christmas entertainment. Suddenly, instead of the usual dismissive, contemptuous treatment, the convicts showed him deference and politeness, ushering him to the front of the makeshift theatre and making room for him to have the best place. He realised that they recognised his worth as an educated, literary man who knew more about the dramatic art than they; they respected his superior knowledge and were eager for his opinion. What is more, the convicts sensed that he had come to the show out of genuine interest and would not offer an opinion based on preconceptions. The reciprocity of respect had for a short while allowed the class divisions to be overcome. Dostoevskii recalls how such events impressed upon him the innate sense of justice in the common people, their genuineness and lack of pretensions, and he appreciated, perhaps for the first time, that they had valuable gifts to offer society:

As the four years passed, Dostoevskii began to see more and more positive qualities in his fellow inmates. To do so often required conscious effort, because, as has already been mentioned, he felt compelled to suppress the instinctive disgust and bitterness that were his initial, involuntary reaction to these terrible criminals, for fear that it should twist him into a worse creature than they. In Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, the reader finds the narrator's
perspective gradually broadening, as he moves from highlighting among the fearsome crowd sympathetic individuals such as Alei and Nurra, to picking out worthy attributes in the majority of convicts. Finally he reaches the admission that here perhaps was 'самый даровитый, самый сильный народ из всего народа нашего' (IV, 231). The characteristics that Dostoevskii the artist chooses to focus on are designed to make the reader appreciate the humanity of the convict. He takes great care to show how men who have stepped beyond society's legal and moral boundaries nevertheless still show signs of adherence to a just and true morality. For instance, on feast days when donations of money, fine foods and cakes are brought to the prison, the convicts do not squabble selfishly for the best piece: they divide everything equally so that each man has the same. Here Dostoevskii was witnessing a freely chosen, self-regulated respect for equality, which thrived without the need for the imposition of phalanstery rules, and he must have been able to guess at the motivations that united the peasant commune so idealised by the Slavophiles. Of course, the perspective of Dostoevskii as a political prisoner is deliberately masked in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, and in it there is no comment on the political implications of the things he observed, but the significant contrast between the peasants' instinctive behaviour and his previous convictions would not have been lost on him.

Dostoevskii also emphasises any display of kindness, however small, on the part of the convicts, such as their tending to men who had been flogged, either by having ready wet towels for his back, or by keeping a sensitive distance. They were, he also notes, kind to animals, and he recommends contact with animals as a means of nurturing the fragile shoot of humanity that crime and the brutality of prison have trampled down. On many occasions his depictions encourage the reader to view the convicts as being like children; he mentions their references to their parents and their need for a parental authority figure, shown by the almost filial affection they showed for the good commander Г—v. Most poignant is the scene of the death of the consumptive Mikhailov, whose dying agony impresses the other convicts in hospital with a sense of their own mortality. One convict pays tribute to the humanity of his dead comrade with the simple words: 'Тоже ведь мать была!' (IV, 141). By encouraging the reader
to see the child in the convict, Dostoevskii points to the fundamental core of humanity in each of them, for Dostoevskii regarded children as the purest members of society, as his fiction consistently shows. This part of the convicts, he came to believe, was still there, maybe buried under layers of ignorance, barbarism and brutishness – but it was there nonetheless, and it needed to be cherished.

However, the reference to the childlike, pure kernel of the convicts also has a religious facet. For it is Christ’s teaching that ‘unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven’ (Matthew 18, 3). Dostoevskii, in recognising the child in the convict, acknowledges not only his humanity, but also his connection with God. The image of the child in man is also the image of Christ, without which salvation is impossible. Thus Dostoevskii demonstrates that the convicts are not damned, not simply the refuse of society, but hold something of immeasurable value. Time and again he mentions their respect for religion, for the Old Believer who would stay awake all night praying, their solemnity in preparing for the feasts of Christmas and Easter. He emphasises how the prisoners’ participation in religious ceremonies makes them feel part of society again, united in worship with the universal human brotherhood:

Арестант бессознательно ощущал, что он этим соблюдением праздника как будто соприкасается со всем миром, что не совсем же он, стало быть, отверженец, погибший человек, ломоть отрезанный, что и в остree то же, что у людей. (IV, 105.)

This spiritual brotherhood is felt especially strongly during the Easter service, in which the convicts respond with instinctive humility to the words: ‘но яко разбойника мя прийми’ (IV, 177). Here they are made aware that even the lowliest sinner is capable – and worthy – of redemption. However, their humility in this instance seems curious when one takes into account Dostoevskii’s frequent insistence in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma that in general the prisoners feel no internal suffering, remorse or pangs of conscience for their crimes. How is the reader to reconcile the genuine recognition of their sinfulness at Easter with Dostoevskii’s assertions that they are unrepentant? The question is further confounded when one considers Dostoevskii’s later reflections on his
Siberian years in *Dnevnik pisatelja*, where in the chapter called 'Sreda' (environment), he directly contradicts his earlier statements and claims:

Ни один из них не миновал долгого душевного страдания внутри себя, самого очищающего и укрепляющего. Я видел их одиноко задумчивых, я видел их в церкви молящихся перед исповедью; [...] о, поверьте, никто из них не считал себя правым в душе своей! (XXI, 18-19.)

Of course, one must not overlook the possible spin Dostoevskii may have attached to both works for the specific artistic purpose of each; this may account in part for the contradiction. However, it is my belief that as the painful memory of the prison camp faded, and as Dostoevskii’s views of the Russian people crystallised, he came to readjust his former pessimistic opinion. At the time of writing *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma*, the shocking memory of the convicts’ lack of repentance for their specific crimes was still uppermost, but he was nevertheless able to convey their deeper, broader awareness of being sinners, of being flawed, weak, erring humans. But fifteen years later, whilst debating the effect of the environment on the causes of crime, he focused on this deeper awareness. In *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma* he had stated that many criminals were in prison because they had rebelled against their environment, sometimes more brutal than prison life, but in *Dnevnik pisatelja* he was now able to appreciate the significance of the convicts’ awareness of sinfulness in general. For it was indicative of a sense of personal responsibility, that their crimes, committed for whatever motivation, were indeed crimes that had damaged the pure image of Christ within them. Thus Dostoevskii refutes the argument that there is no crime, only disorder as a result of poverty and social disadvantage.

There was one event of Dostoevskii’s prison life that Frank stresses as fundamental to the change in his attitude to the common people.24 Dostoevskii’s narration of this event does not come within *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma*, but many years later in *Dnevnik pisatelja*, where he recounts it not through a fictional narrator, but as autobiography. Frank speculates that this may be because it is a deeply personal piece, containing a great deal of psychological exposure; Dostoevskii may not have felt able to relate it for a long while, or he may have decided that it did not fit together with the controlled, objective tone of the former work. Additionally, Frank suggests that Dostoevskii held back in *Zapiski*
iz mertvogo doma because he was not yet able to speak with complete freedom about his experiences as a political prisoner. The event in question is the story of the peasant Marei. One day during an Easter holiday, when the convicts did not have to go out to work and were engaged in drinking, gambling and brawling in the barracks, Dostoevskii escaped the violent atmosphere to walk along the prison walls. There he met a Polish political prisoner, doubtless outside for the same reasons. The Pole muttered to him, "Je hais ces brigands!" and passed on. Suddenly struck by the black bitterness of the Pole, he returned to the barrack and there lay down, pretending to be asleep so that he could think undisturbed. Frank surmises that the Pole's remark must have echoed his own feelings and shocked him into realising 'the extent of his alignment with the Poles against his fellow Russians'. Dostoevskii was by nature xenophobic, and he disliked Poles for their apparent air of superiority at belonging to a more Europeanised society than Russians. Again he was confronted and disturbed by the poisonous sentiments in his own heart, and whether consciously or unconsciously, his mind led him to a memory that soothed the terrible bitterness.

The memory was of a time in his childhood, when, exploring some woods on his father's estates, he thought he heard the cry of "Wolf!" In panic, the young Dostoevskii ran out into the fields towards the first adult he saw, an elderly peasant called Marei, ploughing with his pony. The grizzled old man comforted the frightened boy with gentle smiles, quiet words and the tender touch of one earth-covered finger on his trembling lips, then sent him home, making the sign of the cross over him and promising to watch over him on his way. Dostoevskii never spoke to Marei again after this incident, and never told anyone of the encounter. He reflects on the peasant's actions and writes that although anyone would have comforted a child, Marei had treated him as lovingly as if he were his own son. Nor could it have been to his advantage, as nobody had seen the kindness of the serf towards his young master and he would not be rewarded for it. Dostoevskii marvels at the hidden qualities of the humble peasant:

Только бог, может, видел сверху, каким глубоким и просвещенным человеческим чувством и какою тонкою, почти женственною нежностью может быть наполнено сердце иного грубого, зверски невежественного крепостного русского мужика, еще и не ждавшего, не гадавшего тогда о своей свободе. (XXII, 49.)
Coming out of his reverie, Dostoevskii realised that he was now able to view his fellow convicts with less judgement and more compassion. The recollection of the tenderness shown by one representative of the people he had formerly supposed to be obscure and ill-educated made him believe that any of these brawling, fearsome-looking men could conceal deep within them the same capabilities as Marei. 'Ведь я же не могу заглянуть в его сердце', he concedes (XXII, 49). Later, on meeting the Polish prisoner again, he felt sorry for him that his perspective was so narrow, that he would forever be tormented by his inability to see further than the coarse exterior.

The revelation caused by the remembrance of the peasant Marei, coming as it did at Easter, is linked to Dostoevskii's rediscovery of traditional Orthodoxy. His insight into the essential goodness of the common man is a glimpse of the image of Christ, compassionate and tender to all, within the brutish peasant. He emphasises the transfiguring aspect of his encounter by an almost iconic portrayal of Marei, as Jackson has noted: Marei's image is fixed in the young Dostoevskii's mind as smiling maternally, one finger outstretched to caress and bless, in imitation of the Madonna.27 (The importance of the icon in Dostoevskii's poetics will be discussed in a later chapter.) Dostoevskii's subsequent refusal to judge the narod according to how they appeared may be linked to another moment of supreme spiritual significance in his life. Before he was sent to Siberia, at the staged execution, before it was his turn to ascend to the scaffold, Dostoevskii felt an overwhelming desire to make peace with his comrades; he wrote to his brother of his need to seek forgiveness from people he had wronged. At this moment he felt the ultimate consolation of mutual forgiveness and Christian love, which, as Frank observes, sounded as a truth in response to the most traumatic event of his life28: 'Нет желчи и злобы в душе моей, хотелось бы так любить и обнять хоть кого-нибудь из прежних в это мгновение. Это отрада, я испытал ее сегодня, прощаясь с моими милыми перед смертью' (XXVIII/i, 164). So too, as he looked with opened eyes at the convicts, he remembered Marei's love, and was able to heal the laceration of his own bitterness with the same love. Frank further illuminates the story of Marei with his comment that, in acknowledging the peasants' participation in the circle of mutual love and forgiveness, Dostoevskii grants
them an all-important role in Russian society: 'It was now *they* who had acquired the right — a right he recognised as fully justified by their long history of suffering — to pass judgement and to forgive.'

As I have already mentioned, Dostoevskii gained a special insight into the convicts' attitude to their own crimes, and found if not active repentance, at least a sense of personal responsibility for their actions. The Siberian experience as a whole taught him many things about the importance of the individual, about freedom and responsibility, that contradicted the theories of socialism in which he had previously shown an interest. Already before prison, he showed a grasp of these concepts, as he wrote to his brother in his farewell letter: 'Подле меня будут люди, и быть человеком между людьми и оставаться им навсегда, в каких бы то ни было несчастьях, не уныть и не пасть — вот в чем жизнь, в чем задача ее. Я сознал это. Эта идея вошла в плоть и кровь мою' (XXVIII/i, 162). This may perhaps be an indication that socialism had not effectively taken root in his outlook. However, there was no better environment than the penal colony for providing direct experience of the task of maintaining one's humanity in the face of dire misfortune. The convicts, having once disfigured their individual humanity by their crime, now struggled to preserve it through their sense of individual responsibility, through their participation in religious ceremonies and through their strictly observed codes of equality. In addition, the ever-present example of Aristov was definitive proof to Dostoevskii that it was possible for the most ignorant peasant to have a greater moral sensibility than a well-educated nobleman, as we have seen. The Christian conscience, then, was what could save a man from becoming little better than an animal, and the reader of *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma* can sense Dostoevskii's satisfaction whenever he encountered glimmerings of this conscience in the bestial convicts. It is true that he came across as many if not more instances of the dehumanising effect of the brutal environment and the cruelty of the penal system; this, however, only served to convince Dostoevskii of the necessity of striving to keep alive one's sense of responsibility towards another human being. He stresses the violation of the sacred image of humanity in both the victim and the perpetrator in cases of tyranny and violence (the italics are my own):
Кто испытал раз эту власть, это безграничное господство над телом, кровью и духом такого же, как сам, человека, так же созданного, брата по закону Христову; кто испытал власть и полную возможность унизить самым высочайшим унижением другое существо, носящее на себе образ божий, тот уже поневоле как-то делается не властен в своих ощущениях. (IV, 154.)

Frank comments further on this passage with the remark that Dostoevskii later became such a stalwart opponent of the radicals less because of their socio-political aims than because he believed that there was no place in their doctrines for the importance of the Christian conscience. 30

The concept of individual responsibility is intertwined with that of freedom of the individual. In prison, the importance of this principle for preserving one's human dignity was brought home most forcefully to Dostoevskii. His early fiction shows that he was already concerned about the question of individual freedom in the face of socialist theories, but now he found hard evidence that it was a fundamental principle for distinguishing mankind from animals. He came to realise that the most disheartening aspects of penal servitude were not the threat of corporal punishment, the gruelling work or the rude, insanitary conditions, but the enforced nature of the work and the almost total eradication of individuality in the compulsory communal living. Early on in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma he comments on the absence of solitude:

Например, я бы никак не мог представить себе: что страшного и мучительного в том, что я во все десять лет моей каторги ни разу, ни одной минуты не буду один? [...] Впоследствии я понял, что, кроме лишения свободы, кроме вынужденной работы, в каторжной жизни есть еще одна мука, чуть ли не сильнейшая, чем все другие. Это: вынужденное общее сожительство. (IV, 11, 20-22.)

With regard to the work, he concedes that although it was arduous, tasks such as making bricks, breaking up barges for salvage or clearing snow had a purpose and a value. The convicts could sometimes take a liking to the work and aim to do it better or faster. But the fact that the work is enforced is what weighs on the spirit, and Dostoevskii asserts that he is certain the peasant in freedom readily works much harder and longer.

Therefore, in order to have some escape from the compulsory everyday labour, and so as to distinguish oneself in some way from the other inmates, many prisoners had their own private skill or trade at which they worked in the
evening. Although in many instances this work brought in a little money for the convicts’ personal use, it was performed mostly to give the worker a sense of identity and self-worth. Some were jewellers, others bootmakers, others cooks; a wide range of trades from the most basic to the most skilled are mentioned. Dostoevskii is quite clear about the vital importance of private work, which was officially forbidden in the prison but allowed to take place to keep the peace. He points to the behaviour of those who did not have a personal trade: they were the ones who indulged most in drunkenness, gambling and fighting. If no work at all were permitted, he writes, the result would be disastrous: ‘Без труда и без законной, нормальной собственности человек не может жить, разворачивается, обращается в зверя. [...] Работа же спасала от преступлений: без работы арестанты поели бы друг друга, как пауки в стаканке’ (IV, 16-17). Once again the motif of preserving the image of humanity is dominant. It must be noted that Dostoevskii also refers to the possession of private property as having the same value as private work. Buying their own possessions, whether it be something as simple as a red shirt or a teapot, was another way in which the convicts maintained a separate identity in the herd-like existence of prison. Thus Dostoevskii saw incontrovertibly refuted the theories of utopian socialism on organising society according to the law of the commune or phalanstery. And any interest in their humanitarian motivations that he had previously held, was now discarded.

Anything that allowed the convicts to escape the monotony even for a moment was valuable, sustained in them their hopes for eventual liberty and allowed a modicum of temporary freedom. Self-expression of whatever kind kept alive the sacred image in the convicts and was a means of their redemption. Participation in the Christmas stage show was yet another example of such self-expression. Whether an actor, a musician, a builder of scenery or a stagehand, each man involved gave of his best and struggled to outdo his fellows. Even those who were just spectators gave vent to their enthusiasm in their own way. It is in his depiction of the Christmas show that Dostoevskii sums up the essence of the matter and calls it a truth: the difference such freedom makes is a moral one: ‘Только немного позволили этим бедным людям пожить по-своему, повеселиться по-людски, прожить хоть час не по-осторожному — и
Dostoevskii’s years in prison confirmed for him many of the doubts he had held about socialism whilst he had taken part in the progressive St. Petersburg circles. The essential importance of individual freedom and acknowledgement of individual responsibility now made clear to him the danger to man’s humanity from organised systems for society, based on theories and abstractions. In his statement to the trial of the Petrashevskii circle, Dostoevskii admits to admiring Fourierism for its peaceful, compassionate motivation, but argues that it is an unrealisable Utopia and harmful by virtue of being an artificial system. He also asserts that no system or theory would be effective in solving the problems of the disadvantaged proletariat in Europe (XVIII, 133). Whilst we must be careful of taking these statements at face value, due to the highly delicate circumstances that required their being written, it is unlikely that Dostoevskii would have made claims to any belief that was very far from his actual convictions, and it is fair to accept that the artificial nature of systems was for him a point of contention with regard to socialism. Now, in the penal colony, Dostoevskii found himself in the clutches of just such a rigid system that disregarded the necessary peculiarities of the individual. It was not just the inflexible and forced communal life that horrified him. He reflected on the nature of crime and on the response of the authorities to it in all its many forms, and found the punishment limited in scope and in many cases inappropriate. In Zapiski iz mertvogo doma he considers some of the various motives for murder, comparing the hypothetical case of a cold-blooded killer who is ready to slit a man’s throat for the slightest reason, and an otherwise peaceable man who kills to defend a loved one from evil. In each case the penalty is penal servitude, with possibly a slight variation in the length of sentence. He also discusses the reaction of different men to their punishment: some waste away, their consciences inflicting on them greater suffering than any prison sentence; others take to the prison life as if it were a light burden, maybe because their existence in freedom was twice as brutal. Dostoevskii contends that the one generic punishment cannot be tailored to take into account the circumstances of each case, and that in this respect the system fails. Indeed, given the numerous moral
dangers in prison, ready to dehumanise a convict at every turn, one may even infer that the system may be positively harmful. Dostoevskii admits that the problem may be insoluble, but, he stresses, 'Что характер, то и вариация' (IV, 43).

It is ironic that in a place where every effort was made to treat all men the same, to reduce them all to the lowest common denominator and to quell all rebellious self-assertion, Dostoevskii found that the infinite variety within human nature manifested itself all the more strongly. Towards the end of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma he brings himself up short for offending the individual integrity of his fellow inmates by attempting to impose his own system upon them. In the short passage that follows, one can discern in essence the philosophy that was to underpin all his later moral and social ideas:

Впрочем, вот я теперь силоюсь подвести весь наш острог под разряды; но возможно ли это? Действительность бесконечно разнообразна сравнительно со всеми, даже и самыми хитрейшими, выводами отвлеченной мысли и не терпит резких и крупных различений. Действительность стремится к раздроблению. Жизнь своя особенная была и у нас, хоть какая-нибудь, да всё же была и не одна официальная, а внутренняя, своя собственная жизнь. (IV, 197.)

Here we find respect for the individual by not categorising him; acknowledgement of the limitations of abstract theories and systems; appreciation of the diversification of real life; and finally, insistence on the importance of the individual's own inner life. All of these principles inform to a greater or lesser degree his post-Siberian fiction and journalism.

However, there is a negative side to the diversification of reality that Dostoevskii also experienced in prison, although he does not analyse it in the manner of the above passage in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma. Nevertheless it is reasonable to conclude that his later consideration of this negative side has its roots in Siberia. The notion in question is that diversity may also be fragmentation, atomisation. Dostoevskii was rejected and pilloried for being different from his fellow convicts, and though he was never alone for a minute in prison, he would never be more isolated. The external imposition of convict status was no unifier, and there seemed to be no inner common ground between him and the majority of the prisoners, that might create a bond between them.
Indeed, the impersonal prison system was not responsible for any kind of comradeship amongst the inmates. Dostoevskii often remarks in *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma* that the convicts only tolerated each other's existence, and seemed to get along in an atmosphere of contained irritability. Instead it was their own moral codes of justice and solidarity that enabled them to forge any relationships at all. Prison proved to Dostoevskii that just as artificially constructed systems that attempted to level society could not account for each individual manifestation of humanity, so unmitigated diversity and self-assertion would drive men apart. One might argue that he had first-hand experience of the failings of the kind of Kushite society described by Khomiakov. Thus, like Khomiakov, he reached the same conclusions. Only freely given, mutual Christian love and forgiveness would unite men. The Marei revelation had taught him not to judge the convicts; it had shown him what the common people mean when they call crime a misfortune and criminals 'unfortunates'. The misfortune lay in the suffering resulting from degrading the image of Christ in oneself; Dostoevskii learned to have compassion for this suffering. In addition, his own overwhelming desire to love and seek forgiveness just before his mock execution indicated to him that he was also a sinner in need of the same compassion, and that all sinners are equal in the eyes of God, a truth that the convicts glimpsed in the Easter service. He witnessed the beneficial effect of respect and trust in the convicts by the prison doctors and the commander G—v. If these grim, hardened characters were given the opportunity to express themselves in their own way, in an atmosphere of mutual trust and dignity, away from the rigidity of the prison regime, how might they have flowered! I believe that this is what Dostoevskii has in mind when he writes:

И сколько в этих стенах погребено напрасно молодости, сколько великих сил погибло здесь даром! Ведь надо уже всё сказать: ведь этот народ необыкновенный был народ. Ведь это, может быть, и есть самый даровитый, самый сильный народ из всего народа нашего. Но погибли даром могучие силы, погибли ненормально, незаконно, безвозвратно. А кто виноват? (IV, 231.)

Although he does not reply to his question, the answer is that all are to blame. All are to blame for creating a house of the dead, anywhere that the sacred image of humanity has to struggle to survive: criminals, prison officials, free men, gentry, peasantry. Surely here is the seed of Dostoevskii’s future teaching that each is
responsible for all, and the real beginning of his new view of life that was to take him so close to the Moscow Slavophiles.

It would be a mistake to assume that Dostoevskii left prison with a fully formed new set of beliefs. He still had to serve a term as a soldier and start the long process of catching up with developments in literary, political and intellectual circles. It would not be until the 1860s that he would be allowed to resume journalistic activities and try out his gradually forming ideas in debates with new opponents. It must also be remembered that the views expressed in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma were formulated with five years of hindsight. But this is not to deny the fundamental significance of the prison years as the time in which Dostoevskii was cured of the ‘infection’ of Western-influenced radical socialist thought. It was a time in which every doubt he had felt about progressive Westernism was confirmed, and his old attachment to traditional Orthodoxy reasserted itself in response to his quest for humanitarian solutions for society. The lessons he learned in Siberia prepared the ground for his later development of philosophies strikingly similar to Slavophilism. And, most importantly of all, in prison he established the basis for his faith in the narod as Russia’s hopes for the future. David McDuff refers to Dostoevskii’s political crime as a crime against the Russian people, and the writing of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma as his atonement. It is indeed likely that as each of the convictions that had led to Dostoevskii’s involvement with Speshnev were overturned, he appreciated the meaning of his crime for the people and was prompted to formulate a new opinion of them. Having paid his debt, Dostoevskii now had to learn to build a new life around his nascent beliefs.
Dostoevskii was allowed to return to European Russia in 1859. His older brother Mikhail had for some time been planning to start a literary journal, and once the enthusiastic Fedor had obtained permission to recommence journalistic activities, the new publication, *Vremia*, was announced and subscriptions invited in late 1860. The main editorial board consisted of the Dostoevskii brothers, with the more practical Mikhail chiefly responsible for business concerns, and the critics Nikolai Strakhov and Apollon Grigor'ev. Between the four of them, they devised and promoted through *Vremia* a new ideology that became known as *pochvennichestvo*. The name derives from *pochva* or 'soil'; the movement was intended as a middle way between Slavophilism and Westernism, based on the need to reconcile the common people and the gentry by the return of the intelligentsia to their ‘native soil’. By this, the adherents to the movement, or *pochvenniki*, meant not simply abandoning Western learning in favour of home-grown traditions, but recognising that each could inform the other in order to enable Russia to contribute positively to universal development in her own unique way. In his adherence to *pochvennichestvo*, Dostoevskii had the chance to express the ideas he had developed in Siberia and to situate them in the intellectual debates of the time, in which the Slavophiles and Westernisers still played a significant, though less prominent, role. In doing so, he also found the opportunity to learn more about his opponents and to begin to familiarise himself with the works of Slavophiles past and present. Thus his work on the journals shows a definite assignation of importance to those themes he had in common with Khomiakov and Kireevskii, namely the role of the Russian people, oppositions between Russian and Western culture and religion, and the significance of voluntary organic unity.

It is fair to say that Grigor'ev was the key figure in *pochvennichestvo*. He had for some years been working on ideas similar to those being born in Dostoevskii in Siberia, and he had remained stubbornly independent from the fiercely divided Slavophiles and Westernisers, although Frank contends that he found far less to quarrel over with the former than with the latter and advocated a more open deference for Slavophilism in *Vremia*.\(^{32}\) In addition, whilst the question of influence is frequently difficult to determine, it is probable that in
Grigor'ev Dostoevskii found a like-minded partner for dialogue, which enabled him to refine and consolidate his new ideas. Several aspects of Dostoevskii's post-Siberian thought echo or build upon ideas held by Grigor'ev; in turn, the latter's work shows striking similarities with early Slavophile thought, despite his refusal to be partisan. Frank also suggests other reasons why Dostoevskii would have been drawn to Grigor'ev. Firstly, as a heavy drinker and frequent visitor to the debtor's prison, he was an example of that breadth of Russian nature that enabled lofty spiritual aspirations to coexist with a sordid, disordered lifestyle. Dostoevskii was later to depict such a 'broad' Russian nature in Dmitrii Karamazov, and it has been suggested that Grigor'ev served as one of the prototypes for this character. Secondly, Grigor'ev had interpreted Pushkin as being the first writer to depict the struggle between Western-influenced 'predatory' types and natural Russian 'meek' types, and Dostoevskii would have appreciated his analysis of 'meek' types as the true carriers of Russian moral and social values. By a brief discussion of his views I intend to show those points of Slavophilism taken up by Dostoevskii, and the areas in which Grigor'ev and the pochvenniki depart from Slavophile ideology.

The main theme that runs through all of Grigor'ev's thought, that became the central tenet of pochvennichество and that had arisen from the same roots as Slavophilism, is organic unity. Vladimir Viktorovich writes that Grigor'ev examined through the field of aesthetics those ideas considered by Khomiakov in the field of theology and by Kireevskii in the field of philosophy, so his thought is informed by an aesthetic view of life and often focuses on the relationship of art to life. He insisted on the organic unity of art and literature with Russia's moral, social and political life and valued the artist as the representative of the whole of Russia's inner life, a view that was in keeping with his independent stance and his aim to reconcile the fragmented intelligentsia with its native soil. 'Произведения искусства связаны тем не менее органически с жизнью творцов их, и посредством этого с жизнью эпохи', he wrote. Vremia, too, was very much concerned with the role of literature, and Dostoevskii's attitude to the place of art in society at the time of his involvement with pochvennichество will be examined in detail in a later chapter. Grigor'ev's preoccupation with organic unity derives from a reaction against the rationalism
of Enlightenment philosophy that informed Westernism. He was critical of its abstract theories drawn from rigid scientific laws, which could not account for the diversity of real life. But, unlike the Slavophiles, he also rejected Romanticism for its nostalgia for the past and its failure to appreciate the present. However, he acknowledged one positive element in Romanticism; this was 'historical feeling', by which, according to Dowler, he meant 'sensitivity to the organic unity of thought and life and recognition of the individuality and moral independence of every nation.' Grigor'ev writes that as the reaction that motivated Romanticism, historical feeling 'обнаружилось как боль от прикосновения хирургического инструмента к живому телу. [...] Историческое же чувство пробудилось [...] вследствие того, что коснулись живых мест ножом теории'. In this extract one is struck by the same emphasis on the motif of the living organism and the same aversion to pure science as found in the works of Khomiakov and Kireevskii.

For Grigor'ev, the source of organic unity was faith in the ideal beauty of Christ, a belief that Dostoevskii had also reached during his exile. We have seen how the latter's prison experiences led him to see the image of Christ in man as the basis for brotherhood. Shortly after his release, Dostoevskii wrote to his benefactress Fonvizina with an early formulation of his notion of precisely the beauty of Christ as the stimulus for mutual love:

И, однако же, Бог посылает мне иногда минуты, в которые я совершенно спокоен; в эти минуты я люблю и нахожу, что другими любим, и в такие-то минуты я сложил в себе символ веры, в котором всё для меня ясно и свято. Этот символ очень прост, вот он: верить, что нет ничего прекраснее, глубже, симпатичнее, разумнее, мужественнее и совершеннее Христа, и не только нет, но с ревнивою любовью говорю себе, что и не может быть. (XVIII/i, 176.)

Grigor'ev's similar beliefs gave rise to criticisms of people or organisations who had lost sight of the unifying power of Christ's beauty, and in particular he attacked those targets that Khomiakov and Kireevskii had focused on: the Roman Catholic Church and the official bodies of the Orthodox Church. According to Grigor'ev, these institutions could only produce artificial cohesion by externally imposed forces, a view that echoed the Slavophile leaders:

Все это разрешается утилитарную утопию плотского благополучия или душевного рабства и китайским застоем под
However, he pointed to what he called 'humble Orthodoxy', or the innate religious spirit of the common people, as containing true inner brotherhood.41 This is a concept not unlike Khomiakov's notion of sobornost'. Grigor'ev's appeal to this 'humble Orthodoxy' is particularly interesting when we consider Dostoevskii's reliance on the small figure of the Russian Orthodox monk as the source of redemption. One may also find a correlation between Grigor'ev's criticism of Catholicism and the fact that it was while they collaborated on Vremia that Dostoevskii too began to display anti-Catholic views. At this stage, however, the importance of Orthodoxy was not uppermost either for Dostoevskii or for pochvennichestvo, which is the reason for the relatively small space dedicated to the subject in the journals of the Dostoevskii brothers, as Dowler explains:

[The pochvenniki] regarded the Orthodox faith as only one manifestation of Russia's distinctiveness. The vagueness of this account proved in the future to be unsatisfactory to the pochvenniki. [...] Dostoevsky, too, was soon to find in the Orthodox religion the clue to Russian originality. In Vremia, however, the religious motif remained suppressed.42

Vremia was launched in 1861 and very soon attracted a respectable number of subscribers, thus demonstrating that there was a demand for a moderate journal with a fresh argument. The editors made much of the selling point that the reading public was bored with the old squabbles between the Slavophiles and the Westernisers, and they advertised their publication as showing the way to reconciling the two factions, as well as healing the rift between intelligentsia and narod. The timing of the publication was also to their advantage, as it came in the same year as the long-awaited and much-discussed Emancipation of the Serfs. Optimism was therefore high, and the 'peasant question' was on everyone's minds. Vremia began by situating itself in the debate over the significance of the reforms of Peter the Great. The position the editors took was conciliatory, emphasising the inappropriate nature of the reforms for the common people, but also acknowledging the necessity of those reforms. The Call for Subscriptions published ahead of the journal in 1860 described how the form of Peter's reforms was against the soul and the strivings
of the people, and thus they chose to make their own way in the dark (XVIII, 36). By contrast, for the educated classes the reforms did not turn them into Europeans, but showed Russia her potential and revealed to her the need to find her own national principle to contribute to humanity (XVIII, 36-37). In this announcement, confirmed by Strakhov as authored by Dostoevskii, the pochvenniki even took the unique step of arguing that although the time for the division between the gentry and the people was now past and a new era must begin, this division had been both necessary and a sign of Russia’s unique qualities: ‘[...] способность отрешиться на время от почвы, чтоб трезвее и беспристрастнее взглянуть на себя, есть уже сама по себе признак величайшей особенности’ (XVIII, 37). This bold statement stands out against Dostoevskii’s later proclamations on the subject of Peter’s reforms as being strikingly positive, for in the years to come, although he never went so far as to suggest that there were no benefits to the gentry from the reforms, Dostoevskii did not again assert that the resulting split through Russian society had any worthwhile outcomes. The possibility of pandering to the censor may be dismissed, for Dostoevskii was more likely by nature to err on the side of outspokenness than obsequiousness. It seems more probable that he too was buoyed up by the mood of hope and optimism preceding the Emancipation edict, and that as this mood gradually ebbed in the subsequent years, so did Dostoevskii’s generous attitude towards Peter’s reforms.

Despite its claim to be a journal of reconciliation, Vremia devoted many pages to criticising the arguments of the Slavophiles and Westernisers, and its first year of publication saw more censure of the former than the latter. This bias was in part due to the fact that Dostoevskii, who had the largest share of the input into the journal, had not read the works of the early Slavophiles and based his opinion on the content of the contemporary Slavophile journal Den’, as I have already discussed in my Introductory Chapter. In addition, Dowler suggests that Mikhail Dostoevskii had more sympathies with the liberal journals and that his influence counterbalanced the more conservative leanings of Grigor'ev and Strakhov in editorial decisions. However, I disagree with V. S. Nechaeva, whose argument that ‘Достоевский совсем не двусмысленно соединял, далее, свое направление с западниками’, rather oversimplifies the
complex nature of his tendency, as my analysis will show. In the eleventh issue of *Vremia* Dostoevskii published an article entirely devoted to attacking the tendency of *Den*. Entitled ‘Poslednie literaturnye iavleniiia: gazeta Den’’, the article denounces Slavophilism for being moribund, blinkered and negative. Dostoevskii begins by expressing agreement with the recently deceased Konstantin Aksakov on the worth of the peasant *obshchina*, conceding that his understanding of it as set down in one of his last, unfinished articles, was better than that of any Westerniser (XIX, 59). But this acknowledgement of common ground is overshadowed by the list of faults he finds with the Slavophiles. He writes:

[…] западники не хотели по-факирски заткнуть глаз и ушей перед некоторыми непонятными для них явлениями; они не хотели оставить их без разрешения и во что бы ни стало отнестись к ним враждебно, как делали славянофилы; [...] Западничество перешло бы свою черту и совестливо отказалось бы от своих ошибок. Оно и перешло ее наконец и обратилось к реализму, тогда как славянофильство до сих пор еще стоит на смутном и неопределем идеале своем, состоящем, в сущности, из некоторых удачных изучений старинного нашего быта [...]. (XIX, 60.)

He is particularly frustrated with the attitude of the same Konstantin Aksakov towards Russian literature, which the latter saw as being false, over-Europeanised and hostile to its own native principles. As a writer, Dostoevskii could not help but feel indignant at this accusation. He justifies his profession with the argument that literature is motivated by a spirit of ruthless self-criticism, standing as much against extreme Westernism as do the Slavophiles themselves (XIX, 60), and that the European influence in Russian literature has been given a national perspective:

Да, [...] европейское влияние сильно отозвалось в создании нашей литературы, отражается и до сих пор. Но разве мы рабски воспринимали их, разве не переживали их жизненным процессом, разве не вырабатывали своего русского взгляда на эти иноzemные явления [...]? (XIX, 62.)

‘Poslednie literaturnye iavleniiia’ provides us with as it were a snapshot of Dostoevskii’s interaction with Slavophilism: he was becoming aware of correspondences between his ideas and those aspects of the movement that have been enumerated in the preceding chapter, but at that time the points on which he took issue with the Slavophiles outnumbered these correspondences, thanks to
his as yet limited acquaintance with their works. Frank further elaborates on the issue with the comment that, like many of his contemporaries, Dostoevskii had absorbed certain ideas fundamental to Slavophilism as self-evident truths; for example both Herzen and Chernyshevskii accepted the notion, first put forward by the Slavophiles, that the principle behind the peasant commune was morally superior to Western individualism.\(^47\)

In its first year of publication, *Vremia* gained the reputation for being a relatively progressive publication. The reasons for this included, as we have seen, Dostoevskii's open frustration with what he viewed as the narrow-mindedness of *Den'*, and the brothers' temperance of the more pro-Slavophile tendencies of Strakhov and Grigor'ev. It is also true, as Frank remarks, that the majority of public opinion at that time was hostile to the Slavophile movement, and this may explain the brothers' caution in their initial editorial policy.\(^48\) Offord concurs, noting that Dostoevskii may have felt obliged to tread carefully with the younger generation when referring to the 'authorities of Sovremennik' so as not to alienate his readers. He points out that there was 'a measure of genuine respect' for the likes of Chernyshevskii and Dobroliubov in the early years of *Vremia*.\(^49\) However, during the course of 1862, certain articles indicated that the editors were experiencing a growing sympathy with Slavophile principles, although a measure of criticism was still directed towards the contemporary representatives of that camp. The most important of these articles is 'Dva lageria teoretikov'. It is a remarkable piece, in that, perhaps more clearly than any other *Vremia* article authored by Dostoevskii, it tackles head on the issue of the deficiencies of the main ideological movements within the Russian intelligentsia, and attempts to offer something of an alternative. It also shows how Dostoevskii was beginning to formulate the idea-feelings inspired by *katorga* into a set of beliefs, although it should be noted that at this time these beliefs were still in development and were yet to have the input of many key events of the writer's life.

Written in the wake of the 1861 Emancipation of the Serfs, 'Dva lageria teoretikov' stands in contrast to Dostoevskii's pre-Siberian journalism with regard to his attitude towards the Russian people. In this article he indicates right from the outset that because of the Emancipation edict alone, there is a need to consider the part the *narod* has played and will play in the life of Russia. In
addition to this, he brings to bear on the matter his knowledge gained in Siberia of the relations between the educated classes and the common people, in order to expose the weaknesses in the arguments of the Slavophiles and the Westernisers. He begins by stating that the question of the people is directly linked to the future of Russia, and shows that the connection is organic by speaking of the people and the vitality of society in the same phrase:

Вопрос о народе в настоящее время есть вопрос о жизни [...] есть ли у нас в настоящее время земство как элемент, отличный от служилых сословий, есть ли еще в нем теперь какая-нибудь жизнь, может ли оно обновить наше небогатое жизненностью общество? (XX, 5.)

Dostoevskii concedes in ‘Dva lageria teoretikov’ that both Westernisers and Slavophiles recognise the existence of a gulf between the educated classes and the narod, which must be bridged. Outlining the arguments of each camp, he examines their different attitudes to healing the rift and highlights the inadequacies therein. He portrays the Westernisers as seeking to raise the common people to their level, seeing the people as the needy party and the intelligentsia as a repository of progress and enlightenment. But in Dostoevskii’s view, the situation is the reverse: it is the educated classes who are in need, whilst the people have their own reserves of strength. He refers to the common belief – one that he himself once held – that the narod is stupid and so steeped in routine as to function virtually like machines, citing Uspenskii and Pisemskii, two writers for the progressive journal Sovremennik, as propagating this view, and calls it slander. He sees this belief as expressing in a contemporary form the old antagonism felt by the boyar aristocracy for the zemstvo (XX, 8). Here the reader can feel the resonance of Dostoevskii’s Siberian experience in his assertion that the people will not appreciate any attempt by the gentry to make magnanimous gestures to them, as he writes:

[…] народ не подойдет к нам прежде, нежели мы убавим у себя олимпийского величия, прежде чем сами подадим ему не на словах, а на деле руку. Ведь народ-то не сознает в нас нужды: он будет крепок и без нас... Он не искачет, как чахнем мы, не чувствуя под своими ногами точки опоры, не имея за своими плечами массы народа. (XX, 8.)

On the other hand, Dostoevskii praises the Slavophiles for having raised awareness of the positive attributes of peasant society and for having recognised
the value of the obshchina. Den', he writes, has a deep and honest thirst for the truth, supports the free and independent development of Russian life and upholds Russian interests on issues that are as flesh and blood to society, so much that he finds that Den' plays an invaluable part in literary debate (XX, 9). High praise indeed from Dostoevskii, especially when compared to his comments from just the year before. But he still finds points of disagreement with the Slavophiles, criticising the arguments that stem from such noble motives. In their zeal to emphasise the worth of the traditional peasant way of life, he asserts, they are unjust towards the educated classes and write off all aspects of post-Petrine civilisation as false. In order to refute their claims, Dostoevskii points to the flowering of Russian literature from Pushkin onwards and its ability to absorb the best of European learning as well as to turn a critical eye on the flaws in Russian society (XX, 10).

True to Vremia's claim to hold the middle ground, Dostoevskii acknowledges that a part of the truth is to be found in each camp. In a passage that sets out the position of the pochvenniki on the reforms of Peter the Great, he argues that those reforms were a genuine response to the increasing need felt by all Russians for intellectual development and spiritual renewal. He pays homage to the pre-Petrine period idealised by the Slavophiles for its emphasis on spiritual life, but cautions that renewal cannot come from dreams of nostalgia. By contrast, according to Dostoevskii, the reforms sprang from Peter's correct apprehension of his native people's needs, and so were truly Russian in nature and quite necessary. However, Peter's despotic will caused him to try to reconstruct the whole of society in his lifetime. In opening a window on the West, says Dostoevskii, the reforms allowed Russians to take from Europe not only beneficial education but ideas and structures not appropriate to Russia. The narod, seeing no advantage to them in the reforms, turned their back on them, thus proving that in their implementation they were anti-Russian, as Dostoevskii explains:

Потому Петра можно назвать народным явлением настолько, насколько он выражал в себе стремление народа обновиться, дать более простору жизни — но только до сих пор он и был народен... Выражаюсь точней, одна идея Петра была народна. Но Петр как факт был в высшей степени антинароден... Во-первых, он изменил народному духу в деспотизме своих реформаторских приемов,
Thus Dostoevskii shows that the price paid for the benefits of Peter's reforms was an ever-increasing rift between the educated classes and the people, a rift that had become so large that the intelligentsia did not know how to bridge it, as typified by the squabbling of the Westernisers and the Slavophiles. Dostoevskii's solution is based on the deep appreciation for the peasant classes that he learned in Siberia. He underlines the native principle of voluntary unity in the peasant commune, the innate wisdom shown by the people in their response to the Emancipation edict, and their ability to recognise and judge their own faults. These, he writes, are proof that the narod has something to offer and is capable of growth (XX, 21). Also interesting is Dostoevskii's contention that the Raskol demonstrates the Russian people's ability to create their own indigenous cultural forms in preference to accepting changes imposed by the authorities (XX, 20-21). Here he shows that his fervent faith in Christ does not preclude him from departing from official church teaching; on the contrary, this comment, in my interpretation, indicates that Dostoevskii preferred to look to the people as the true authority on Orthodoxy and that he sympathised with Grigor'ev's concept of 'humble Orthodoxy' as outlined above.

To contrast with his portrayal of the people, Dostoevskii depicts the gentry as running out of fresh energy because, thanks to their separation from their native soil, their range of activity is too limited to take Russia far. He lays the blame on the upper stratum of society for the poor regard the peasantry has of it; it is because of the gentry's former lack of concern with the peasantry and because of its dubious moral standing that the people do not understand them (XX, 17). Therefore, Dostoevskii proposes three necessary courses of action. Firstly, literacy must be disseminated among the common people as a means to their moral and spiritual self-improvement. Secondly, the system of estate borders, which prevents the free movement of the peasantry, must be abolished. Thirdly, the gentry must also be prepared to undergo moral reform and learn to respect the peasant in a manner that transcends abstract theories (XX, 20). He concludes: 'Неужели мы настолько задохнулись, настолько замерли,
It is very interesting that Dostoevskii should make this observation as much with regard to the Slavophiles as to the Westernisers, because the former thinkers themselves showed a dislike for theories and formulas, as I have shown in my Introductory Chapter. Whether or not Dostoevskii was aware of this aspect to their thought at this stage cannot be made certain, but in his interpretation the Slavophiles become hypocrites. By contrast, Dostoevskii appears to have taken on one idea that is fundamental to Slavophilism and has followed it with more consistency than he sees in that movement. In other words, he seems to be a 'better' Slavophile than the Slavophiles themselves. Of course, it must be reiterated that during the early days of Vremia Dostoevskii was still in the initial stages of his direct acquaintance with the works of Khomiakov, Kireevskii and the other key figures of Slavophilism. In his portrayal of them as rigidly rejecting all post-Petrine society he is undoubtedly unjust, as the early Slavophiles, as I mentioned in my Introductory Chapter, were more moderate and recognised the benefits of Western knowledge. Nevertheless, Dostoevskii's great talent for polemicising with his opponents lay in his ability to test their arguments by taking them to extremes and by exposing their inherent contradictions. Whilst showing that a Romantic aversion to abstract theories and rigid formulas is inconsistent with a denial that anything positive resulted from the Petrine reforms, Dostoevskii himself demonstrates an attachment to freely developed organic models. This attachment informs both his critique of the reforms of Peter the Great and his choice of proposals for the reconciliation of the divided sections of Russian society. Instead of calling for sweeping changes or major societal reconstruction according to prescribed exemplars, with the exception of estate reform, he opts for measures that allow natural change and encourage the native Russian way of life to flourish. Such tactics would appeal more to the narod because, as he writes, 'Он слишком миролюбив и любит добиваться своих целей путем мира, постепенно' (XX, 15). The promotion of literacy as a means to self-improvement for the peasant classes, and moral development for the gentry, are gradual solutions that begin from within the individual with a common aim in mind, and the benefit to society will appear as part of its natural growth.
that no hope for our revival? But if our life is extinguished, then it is not
incomprehensible that in a manner of speaking there is still national soil... this
cleanse our conviction' (XX, 22).

In Dostoevskii's summation of the problem facing Russian society, of the
pitfalls in the arguments of the Slavophile and Westerniser movements, and in
his proffered solutions, it is possible to discern several points that indicate his
increasing awareness of common ground with the Slavophiles and his growing
admiration for them. Of particular interest for the purposes of this study are the
role he accords to the narod in renewing Russia and the peasant commune, for
these matters are central to Slavophilism. In his esteem for the people he sides
with the Slavophiles, and implies as much by his parting criticism of the
Westernisers in 'Dva lageria teoretikov': 'We recognize in the people many
shortcomings, but never agree with one and the same group of theoreticians,
that people profoundly stupid, nothing he achieved in a thousand years of
their life' (XX, 22). He also shows a partial agreement with the Slavophiles on
the question of the disruptive and anti-Russian implementation of Peter the Great's
reforms, although he puts more emphasis on their benefits than can be found in
the works of Khomiakov or Kireevskii. But there is one other issue highlighted
by Dostoevskii in this article that demonstrates his closeness to Slavophilism at
this point, and that is his aversion to theory. The very title brings the issue to the
forefront, and he confronts it in the opening pages. He calls the matter of the
relation of the gentry to the people a 'zhezennyy vopros' that cannot be
solved by a theory. In this way he makes a contrast between what he sees to be
an organic part of Russian life and the artificiality of the reactions of the main
groups of the intelligentsia. Theories, he says, are all very well provided they do
not try to offer a formula for life. But Dostoevskii believes the Slavophiles and
Westernisers to be judging reality by their own preconceived formulas, and
therefore neither camp can perceive facts objectively:

Западники, составив себе теорию западноевропейской
общечеловеческой жизни и встретясь с вовсе не похожей на нее
русской жизнью, заранее осудили эту жизнь. Славянофильы, приняв
за норму старый московский идеал, тоже враз осудили в
русской жизни всё, что не укладывалось в их узкую рамку. (XX, 5-
6.)
In the summer of 1862 Dostoevskii had a new, important experience that had a further shaping effect on his developing views of life: he went abroad for the first time. The official reason for his trip was to consult foreign doctors about his epilepsy, although Kjetsaa suggests that this was likely a convenient pretext for obtaining a visa, judging by his packed schedule. Dostoevskii had for a long time wanted to see Europe for himself and visit the origins of those writers he admired from his early youth. He was away for three months and took in the major cities of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, France and England. On his return, he wrote an account of his impressions from his travels, and the result was published in Vremia's first issue of 1863. Entitled Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniakh, it is a work that is in my opinion of crucial importance in Dostoevskii's oeuvre. It foreshadows the arguments of Zapiski iz podpol'ia and marks a significant degree of crystallisation in the author's views on Russia and the West; it echoes Slavophilism in its concern with themes of organic unity as opposed to artificial union or fragmentation.

Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniakh is a subjective, ironic, provocative work, in which the author puts forward a persuasive case for the corruption underlying Western European culture. To distance himself from the 'guide-book' style of travel writing, he concentrates on observing people, rather than places, and so Zimnie zametki becomes a moral, rather than a social, indictment. Dostoevskii's impressions were undoubtedly coloured by his own prejudices about the West, but nevertheless they show a clear insight into the sources of the malaise which he felt Europe was producing in Russia. Zimnie zametki is a highly complex work that does not easily submit to a straightforward interpretation of it as Dostoevskii's own beliefs. He writes in the popular style of the feuilleton, interwoven with imaginary dialogues, biting irony reflecting as much on himself as on his objects of scrutiny, and statements deliberately designed to undermine the authority of his discourse. The reader must recognise that this style is designed with awareness of a readership in mind, and Dostoevskii's artistic rendition of his material demands cautious analysis. Nevertheless, when taken in the context of his letters of that time, it is possible to follow those arguments that reflect his personal opinions.
Dostoevskii acknowledges the legacy of the Petrine period early on in *Zimnie zametki*: ‘Ведь всё, решительно почти всё, что есть в нас развития, науки, искусства, гражданственности, человечности, всё, всё ведь это оттуда, из той же страны святых чудес!’ (V, 51). However, his comment is double-edged, since his reference to Europe as ‘the land of holy wonders’ is highly ironic; Dostoevskii is quoting from the poem *Mechta* by Khomiakov, who used this phrase in a lament for the West, which he saw as a dying civilisation to be replaced by the East. The poem was an expression of his view that Kushitism had run its course in Europe, and that the West could only be revived by the Iranian East (in particular Russia). Dostoevskii’s use of irony exemplifies the paradoxical attitude that many Russians held towards the West as a result of the veneration of its culture. The awe felt for European thought and society went hand in hand with a sense of inferiority, which in turn engendered bitterness, displayed in Dostoevskii’s own account of his suppressed rage at the seemingly arrogant pride of the Germans in their newly built Cologne bridge.

Dostoevskii’s indignation aroused by his European hosts was inflamed by his entrenched xenophobia, which is manifest in *Zimnie zametki*. Any study of his attitudes to European society must take account of this fact. Admittedly, Dostoevskii himself openly acknowledges the bias of his opinions, but he is not above, for example, dismissing the German race in one sweeping statement: ‘[…] поскорее улизнул в Дрезден, пытая глубочайшее убеждение в душе, что к немцам надо особенно привыкать и что с непривычки его весьма трудно выносить в больших массах.’(V, 47) Whether xenophobia was characteristic of educated Russians at the time is not a subject for this study, but it is worth recognising the extent to which Dostoevskii’s mind could remain closed to non-Russians. Malcolm Jones discusses Dostoevskii’s attitude to his hosts in his article on the writer’s travels in Europe, and remarks how during Dostoevskii’s later four-year-long stay in Europe he remained isolated from the cultural scene, made no friends either among the Russian émigrés or among his hosts, and with the exception of French, did not become proficient in any European languages. Jones argues that Dostoevskii needed to keep himself distant from European culture in order to back his ‘whole ideology about Russia and Europe’:
It was important, in order that the ideology should be sustained, for Dostoevsky to have first-hand evidence to convince him that he was right, to shut out evidence that he might be mistaken, and to keep at bay what a mind of his intelligence must have known: that life, and European civilisation, were a good deal more complex than he was prepared to allow... All in all, there is irrefutable evidence that Dostoevsky wanted to preserve a distance between himself and European life, and the fact that he did so for four years during which it swept and whirled around him is some evidence of a strong emotional need. Although he probably learned less about Russian peasant mentality in Siberia than he would have liked to think, he probably learnt a great deal more than he did about European mentality in his four years abroad.53

The main theme of the third chapter, entitled 'Completely Superfluous', is the impact of European civilisation and culture on Russia. Dostoevsky deliberately undermines the very ideas that he intends to highlight, prefacing them with the instruction, 'Не думайте, что я стану доказывать...' (V, 61), and thereby stressing them the more with inverted irony. For this so-called superfluous chapter is the kernel of the work, in which he criticises the hypocrisy of Russia's attempted adoption of Western civilisation. In this chapter Dostoevsky attempts to answer the question that he puts himself: 'Насколько мы цивилизованы, и сколько именно нас счётом до сих пор отцивилизовалось?' (V, 55) His central line of attack is that one powdered wig does not a civilised man make; the adoption of European styles of dress has done nothing to prevent the traditional Russian practices of wife-beating and oppression of the peasantry. Indeed, he argues that the apparent barbarities of both Russian gentry and peasantry, performed out of ignorance and simplicity of the soul, are no worse than the arrogance and hypocrisy of those who try to emulate Western Europeans. As an example he contrasts the peasant practice of showing a bride's bloodstained wedding-night garment to her parents, with that of inserting padding into the dresses of high-society ladies, in order to flatter their figures. He claims that in forsaking their Russian heritage and adopting a European culture, the Russians have simply exchanged one set of prejudices and abominations for another, and he derides those who call traditional Russian behaviour uncivilised:

Ведь смешна, смешна уморительно эта вера в непогрешимость и в право такого обличения. Вера это или просто кураж над народом, или, наконец, нерассуждающее, рабское преклонение именно перед
Echoes of Khomiakov's idealistic image of the Russian peasant *obshchina* can be heard here, in the view that the Russian people live in simplicity according to age-old customs. Indeed, the third chapter of *Zimnie zametki* shows remarkable similarity to certain passages from Khomiakov's letter to the Serbs, written in 1860, which intended to warn the country against Western influences, although, as I have already indicated, it is difficult to determine whether Dostoevskii had actually read it at this stage. Both Dostoevskii and Khomiakov have noticed the flaw in the ahistoricist premise that it is possible to transplant ideas and ways of life between historical or cultural circumstances as if they were absolutes. Khomiakov resumed the essence of the problem of Russia's Europeanisation when he wrote:

> Но то, что в одном стройно и ладно (потому что согласно с его существом), делается началом нестройности и разладицы, когда оно привито в другому, которого существо основано на ином законе. Никто не может петь чужим голосом или красиво ходить чужою походкою.⁵⁴

Khomiakov went on to give as an example the adoption of Western styles of dress. The Europeanisation of the gentry has had several negative effects, according to Dostoevskii. The common people look on the gentry as foreigners, and all understanding between them has been lost. As a result, the gentry have become divorced from their native origins, from the soil and the people, and are losing their national identity. Dostoevskii writes in self-mockery,

> [...] как свыока решаем вопросы, да еще какие вопросы-то: почвы нет, народа нет, национальность — это только известная система податей, душа — tabula rasa, вощичек, из которого можно сейчас же вылепить настоящего человека, общечеловека всемирного, гомункула [...]. (V, 59.)

The gentlefolk with this outlook develop into 'superfluous men' of the type frequently portrayed in literature of the early 1800s; Dostoevskii cites Griboedov's Chatskii as an example of the rootless gentleman whose dissatisfaction with Russia sends him to the West. Dostoevskii observes the restlessness and anxiety of the educated classes, who seem to be seeking something and who may turn to Western Europe, but he maintains that for these Chatskiis the solution does not lie there. However, as if it were a digression, he
cuts short this line of thought and closes the chapter. Here one can see the outlines of ideas which Dostoevskii would later build upon: there is a hint of his sympathy with the *pochvennichestvo* movement; more obvious are themes developed in *Zapiski iz podpol’ia*, his following work, such as the influence from Europe of rationalism and mathematics, the reduction of individuals to the raw material from which a perfect state could be built (reminiscent of Khomiakov’s theory of the structure of Kushite states), and a desperate yearning for something unknown which reason alone fails to satisfy.

Dostoevskii could almost be offering a reply to Petr Chaadaev’s first *Philosophical Letter* here, blaming the fragmentary influence of the West for the aimless restlessness of the Russian upper classes, in contrast to Chaadaev’s view that Russia’s isolation from the West is to blame. Dostoevskii’s comments show scorn for the Western emphasis on rationalism, which Chaadaev so admired. Whereas the latter argued that Russia’s salvation lay in uniting itself with Western Europe and undergoing the same religious and cultural developments as it, Dostoevskii is more in line with Khomiakov: he stresses that it is no use turning to Europe for help. Just as Khomiakov saw rationalism as breaking the *sobornost* of Russian society, so Dostoevskii shows how assuming a European way of life has split the classes and cut off the gentry from what it means to be Russian.

Having criticised the Europeanisation of Russia, Dostoevskii now turns his attention to Europe itself. His observations centre on London and Paris. London appeared to him as a city of stark contrasts, lacking the overriding sense of order and decorum present in Paris. In the chapter entitled ‘Baal’, Dostoevskii gives an apocalyptic description of London as epitomising the consequences of capitalism and individual isolation. He sees industry and scientific progress as being virtually deified, particularly at the second World Exhibition, which seemed to him to be frighteningly arrogant in its glorification of man’s achievements. Kireevskii, too, felt that industry was playing too central a role in the life of mankind. He wrote:

[Промышленность] в наше время соединяет и разделяет людей; она определяет отечество, она обозначает сословия, она лежит в основании государственных устройств, она движет народами, она объявляет войну, заключает мир, изменяет права, дает
Dostoevskii compares this pagan idolatry to the worship of the Old Testament god Baal, the god of material wealth, who failed to show mercy to its followers despite their desperate human sacrifices. At the World Exhibition, housed in the Crystal Palace, Dostoevskii finds it hard to resist the feeling that through science, man has achieved Paradise on Earth. In the following passage one can see one of the first instances of Dostoevskii's use of apocalyptic imagery to express the nature of Western Europe, which features particularly in *Idiot* and *Besy*:

[...] вы чувствуете, что тут что-то окончательное совершилось, совершилось и закончилось. Это какая-то библейская картина, что-то о Вавилоне, какое-то пророчество из Апокалипсиса, в очень совершающееся. Вы чувствуете, что много надо вековечного духовного отпора и отрицания, чтоб не поддаться, не подчиниться впечатлению, не поклониться факту и не обоготворить Баала, то есть не принять существующего за свой идеал... (V, 70.)

The cost, however, of this terrible achievement is to the masses, who in London appear as a herd of dispensable automatons, desperately trying to seek some kind of unity, even in an anthill-like society. Dostoevskii describes them as hungry souls, groping around in the underground darkness for something to unite them, who turn in their hundreds to drink, debauchery or religious sects like the Mormons or the Shakers, in order to escape their despair and find oblivion. This is one of Dostoevskii's bleakest descriptive passages, filled with haunting images of a suffering populace and a society that does not care, so long as progress continues, and interspersed with glimpses of tragic beauty and innocence, such as the beautiful woman in the casino or the battered child begging in the Haymarket. London presents exactly the scenario that Dostoevskii's next creation, the Underground Man, was to dread: here we find the images of the anthill, the dark underground and a supposedly perfect society of quasi-humans created from the rationalism of science. In addition to this, Dostoevskii uses London to portray one of the fundamental principles that he felt were responsible for corruption and suffering in Western societies: the insistence upon individual self-interest which renders impossible the creation of a true brotherhood. This, he argues, is the reason for the plight of London's masses: 'А между тем и тут
та же упорная, глухая и уже застарелая борьба, борьба на смерть всеобщезападного личного начала с необходимостью хоть как-нибудь ужиться вместе, хоть как-нибудь составить общину и устройться в одном муравейнике’ (V, 69). This is a central Slavophile idea, and one which is evident in the thought of Khomiakov; there are elements here of his call for the subordination of reason to the mutual love of the Church, in order to have the true brotherhood of sobornost’.

Ward, examining Dostoevskii’s works as a whole, sees another side to the prevention of true brotherhood in English society:

The conflict between the Whigs and the Tories is conducted on the basis of a fundamental consensus which actually excludes a large part of the English people from genuine membership in English society. According to Dostoyevsky, the solid English unity is, in fact, a unity of the upper-class minority inspired by a fear of the new social phenomenon which English industry had engendered – the proletariat [...] In Dostoyevsky’s view, England was actually made up of two different peoples. The parliamentary and legal institutions had become the instruments by which the lower class was prevented from discovering an exit out of the “subterranean darkness.”

Evidence of this idea is shown in Zimnie zamelki when Dostoevskii writes of London’s working class: ‘И вы чувствуете, глядя на всех этих париев общества, что еще долго не сбудется для них пророчество, что еще долго не дадут им пальмовых ветвей и белых одежд и что долго еще будут они взывать к престолу всевышнего: «доколе, господи»’ (V, 71).

In Zimnie zamelki one finds one of the first instances of Dostoevskii’s preoccupation with the theme of Western Christian denominations, as he makes mention of the moral ills he associates with them. In London he found fault with the works of the spiritual authorities of all denominations. His account of a black-clad woman distributing leaflets proclaiming Christ’s resurrection among the poor leads him to condemn Roman Catholics for their persistent propaganda, accusing them of luring the poor into their faith with the bait of material comforts: food and fuel. (In fact, it has been argued that the woman Dostoevskii took for Catholic was more likely an early Salvation Army volunteer.58) This is the sort of activity which Khomiakov would have seen as demonstrating the lack of sobornost’ in the Roman Church; people were brought into the Church with bribes instead of coming freely, inspired by mutual love. Indeed, the promise of bread as the unifying principle in the Roman Church is one of the themes of ‘The
Legend of the Grand Inquisitor'. Later in Zimnie zametki Dostoevskii writes of Roman Catholic material greed, in an account of a court case against some monks over a legacy of land; the association with legal procedures again reminds one of Khomiakov’s negative comments on the state-like nature of Catholicism. Dostoevskii appears to take Khomiakov’s view here.

The Anglicans do not escape Dostoevskii’s criticism either; according to him they have no time for the poor, since the latter can contribute nothing to the Church, while Anglican bishops are corrupted by wealth and calm their consciences by turning their attention to overseas missionary work. Indeed, in his Dnevnik pisatelia for March 1876, Dostoevskii accused the English of turning to Anglicanism for utilitarian reasons, and called this religion ‘a church of atheists’ which worshipped humanity instead of God (XXII, 97). Khomiakov also believed Protestantism to be in error, but through no fault of their own, having inherited the error from the deliberate secession of the Roman Catholics. He was particularly sympathetic towards the Anglicans, whom he felt were closer to Orthodoxy; in 1847 he wrote to William Palmer, an Oxford don with leanings towards Orthodoxy, that he saw indications of a community of spiritual life in England, thanks to the solemn, traditional forms of worship in the Anglican Church. Dostoevskii like Khomiakov was of the opinion that Protestantism was a by-product of the Roman schism.

In the remainder of Zimnie zametki, Dostoevskii goes on to develop his themes of individual isolation, the evils of capitalism and the lack of true brotherhood, and now his focus is on Paris. For him, Paris represents the supremacy of the bourgeoisie in society. Unlike London, Paris emits a sense of decorum and orderliness. Dostoevskii calls it with great irony, ‘самый нравственный и самый добродетельный город на всем земном шаре’(V, 68), but as his account goes on to show, it is far from this. The superficial air of virtue, claims Dostoevskii, comes from the bourgeois’s refusal to accept that corruption exists in Paris, because there society is supposed to have achieved Paradise on Earth and the bourgeois is meant to be completely satisfied with the regime that he has created. However, Parisian society is in fact riddled with sham and hypocrisy. Just as in London industry and progress are worshipped, here materialism and personal gain are held up as the only moral
pursuits. Whereas stealing because of one’s poverty is punished, extortion masquerading as business is condoned, since it is considered proper to make one’s fortune. What is more, the materialist ethic has an effect on the bourgeois nature: ‘Лакейство въдается въ натуру буржуа всё более и более и всё более и более считается добродетельно’ (V, 82). Meanwhile, in the theatres, melodramas are played out to convince the bourgeois of his marital fidelity, his lack of avarice and his love of true morals. Even in the French parliament the pretence continues; the speeches for the deputies of the opposition are lauded for their eloquence, but have no real effect on politics, and so the renowned French democracy is a deception. One should remember that Dostoevskii viewed the French parliament from the perspective of a citizen of an autocracy and Frank remarks that his opinions of the French system would be well received at home:

Such ridicule of the parliamentary system as nothing but a school of rhetoric was calculated to appeal to a wide gamut of readers: those progressives who would appreciate the exposure of the sham democracy of the Second Empire, but also those Russians who preferred an unabashed and benevolent autocracy – one capable of abolishing serfdom with the stroke of a pen – to hypocritical and class-biased constitutions and the windy futility of party debate.60

So it would appear that the bourgeoisie rules Parisian society, but Dostoevskii’s keen eye perceives a hidden fear, a certain uneasiness in the bourgeois. It is possible, he suggests, that the bourgeois is afraid of losing everything: ‘[…] всего боится, именно потому, что всего достиг. Когда всего достигаешь, тяжело становится всё потерять’ (V, 82). However, in Zimnie zametki Dostoevskii does not propose a reason why the bourgeois might lose everything. One must turn to Ward’s study for a suggestion found in Dostoevskii’s other works. He writes:

The increasing fragmentation being brought about by liberal nationalism in practice was exacerbated by the apparent emptiness of the promise of worldwide community contained in the dynamic economic activity of the bourgeoisie. To Dostoyevsky it was increasingly apparent, by the latter part of the nineteenth century, that the West’s commercial and industrial activity entailed, instead, a divisive economic imperialism which could very easily plunge the world into conflicts of immense magnitude “for the sake of some trivial stock-exchange interests…” 61

Ward sees in Dostoevskii’s later writings, particularly in Dnevnik pisatelia and the Pushkin Speech, the fear that bourgeois society, through its
insistence on self-interest and its lack of true brotherhood, could destroy itself in rivalry, violence and even war. Moreover, according to Ward, Dostoevskii could see increasing dissatisfaction in the lower classes, who as in London were effectively excluded from satisfying their needs in the capitalist order.\(^6^2\) Ward has touched upon one of the key issues of *Zimnie zametki*, namely fragmentation as a result of rationalist, materialist, utilitarian thinking. There is no spiritual principle to unite society in Europe; instead classes are divided and every man is for himself, so that there is always the fear that people will turn on each other, as Dostoevskii mentioned with regard to London. Clearly Dostoevskii is looking with the eyes of a Slavophile, seeing that an overemphasis on rationalism has destroyed the principles of *sobornost’* and *obshchinnost’*.

Dostoevskii now continues his analysis of Parisian society, expressing ideas that are more and more Slavophile in content. He indicates the true source of the bourgeois’ malaise: lack of true brotherhood. He begins by attacking the French socialist slogan ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’. He soon dismisses liberty and equality, as these are not possible for the lower classes in a capitalist society. Then he turns to brotherhood. But this is also unachievable, because brotherhood is alien to the nature of the Western bourgeois: ‘А в природе французской, да и вообще западной, [братства] в наличии не оказалось, а оказалось начало личное, начало особняка, усиленного самосохранения, самопромышления, самоопределения в своем собственном Я [...]’ (V, 79).\(^6^3\) Just as in London the masses desperately sought unity, so the French socialist desperately tries to create a true brotherhood, and to placate the innate bourgeois self-interest he offers the enticement of personal advantage in return for the subordination of the individual to the collective. However, to create a brotherhood on such terms would have dreadful consequences. From his experiences in Siberia Dostoevskii knew how precious a man’s individual freedom is to him; he knew that to be asked to surrender even a tiny drop of one’s freedom, even in return for personal gain, is anathema to mankind. This is how he describes the response to the offer of the socialist:

Ему всё кажется слуру, что это острог и что самому по себе лучше, потому – полная воля. И ведь на воле бьют его, работы ему не
Here we see once more a precursor to *Zapiski iz podpol'ia*; this 'strange chap' is just like the Underground Man in his insistence on his individual freedom, though it bring him nothing but misery. Dostoevskii concludes by asserting that socialism is possible anywhere but France. It is my opinion that by this he means not that socialism does not exist in France, but that it is contradicted by the bourgeois mentality and cannot succeed in fulfilling its slogan of 'liberté, égalité, fraternité.'

At this point it is useful to turn for a moment to Dostoevskii's *Dnevnik pisatelia* for January 1877 for a more detailed discussion of the themes being examined in *Zimnie zametki*. Here Dostoevskii talks about the link between socialism and Catholicism, with reference to France. He suggests that socialism is but an atheist form of Catholicism, which has supplanted the religion as its rationalist principles took over and destroyed faith. His ideas are remarkably similar to those of Khomiakov, as the following passage shows:

In the light of this statement, written some fourteen years after *Zimnie zametki*, it is possible to see the influence of Roman Catholicism in the Parisian society that Dostoevskii is describing, although he does not draw such parallels here. Just like Khomiakov, he refers to the externally enforced unity of Catholicism and socialism, a unity without freedom, and that is why in *Zimnie zametki* he says that the socialist slogan cannot truly be achieved. Finally Dostoevskii offers as an alternative solution that which the Slavophiles and Khomiakov upheld as the ideal towards which all societies should aspire: *obshchinnost*.

He has painted a bleak picture indeed for Western Europeans, who do not contain in them the natural impulse to true brotherhood. This is to be found instead in members of
the traditional Russian peasant commune (Dostoevskii does not spell this out, but it may be accepted that this is what he implies). True brotherhood can only come about from the Christian ethic of love and self-sacrifice, from the voluntary submission of the individual to the collective without expecting anything in return. The collective then acknowledges this self-sacrifice by committing itself to the welfare of the individual, so that the unit and the whole come together in free unity. This, says Dostoevskii, in fact gives a higher, more developed degree of individuality and freedom than is known in the West:

ПОЙМИТЕ МЕНЯ: САМОВОЛЬНОЕ, СОВЕРШЕННО СОЗНАТЕЛЬНОЕ И НИКЕМ НЕ ПРИНУЖДЕННОЕ САМОПОЖЕРТВОВАНИЕ ВСЕГО СЕБЯ В ПОЛЬЗУ ВСЕХ ЕСТЬ, ПО-МОЕМУ, ПРИЗНАК ВЫСОЧАЙШЕГО РАЗВИТИЯ ЛИЧНОСТИ, ВЫСОЧАЙШЕГО ЕЕ МОГУЩЕСТВА, ВЫСОЧАЙШЕГО САМООБЛАДАНИЯ, ВЫСОЧАЙШЕЙ СВОБОДЫ СОБСТВЕННОЙ ВОЛИ. (V, 79.)

Such a Christian ethic is the unknown factor that the masses in London seek without knowing it, that the Underground Man seeks, and that the bourgeois feels is missing in his life, causing his uneasiness. It is the only solution to avoid the chaos of a society populated by Underground Men, and its lack is the primary fault in Western European society.

It can therefore be seen that *Zimnie zamekki o letnikh vpechatleniakh* is a key work in Dostoevskii's creations, where he displays sympathies with Slavophile ideas as expounded by Khomiakov and Kireevskii. Here he rehearses many of the most important themes of his novels, such as the dangers of rationalism and utilitarianism as expressed in *Prestuplenie i nakazanie*; we encounter the seeds of the dystopias conceived by Shigalev in *Besy* and Ivan Karamazov in *Brat'ia Karamazov* and we are given an explicit argument for the Christian principle of self-sacrifice as taught by Father Zosima in the same novel. The concepts of unity, fragmentation, *tsel'nost'* and *sobornost'* are all important in this work and underlie those more specific themes to be found in later works. Dostoevskii's fascination with Europe was to continue all his life and influenced his subsequent works; he would return the theme of Europe many times for comparisons, evidence for his theories and confirmation of his fears.

For the last few months of 1862 and the beginning of 1863, *Vremia* continued to enjoy success, and Dostoevskii was very busy writing critical articles mostly concerning literature and editorial remarks to preface
contributions from other authors. But in May 1863 disaster struck and the journal was closed down for what was seen as a rather vague and lukewarm response, written by Strakhov, to the establishment's bloody suppression of the Polish uprising. Shortly afterwards Dostoevskii returned to Europe for another period of three months' travelling, again partly to consult with epilepsy specialists, but also to indulge his two newfound passions, gambling and chasing after Polina Suslova. When he returned to Russia in the autumn, he was obliged to take up residence in Moscow to care for his dying wife, and this duty hampered his efforts to help Mikhail, himself burdened with the death of a child, to resurrect their journal. Eventually, permission was granted for a new journal, named *Epokha*, but due to the legal delays and the various family pressures on both brothers, it was only advertised early in 1864, by which time most of the reading public had decided on subscriptions elsewhere. To further confound matters, publication was delayed and the first issue was not released until April. *Epokha* did not flourish in the way its predecessor had, and 1864 saw the deaths of Mikhail Dostoevskii, Apollon Grigor'ev and Fedor's wife. The grief stricken Dostoevskii struggled almost single-handed to keep *Epokha* afloat, and published *Zapiski iz podpol'ia* there, but it was not a financial success, and Strakhov's role in restricting it to a less controversial pro-establishment tendency meant that it lost *Vremia*'s advantage of originality. It folded in early 1865. It is therefore not surprising, given the interruptions and distractions to Dostoevskii's journalistic activity, that his notebooks and letters from this time offer a more fruitful field for exploration, than his contributions to *Vremia* and *Epokha*. Thus it is to these sources that I now turn my attention.

As I have already mentioned, 1863 was the year in which Dostoevskii set himself to becoming more familiar with the works of the Slavophiles, and he wrote from abroad to his brother and to Strakhov that he had discovered something new in their writings. He was nonetheless guarded in his praise of them to Strakhov, and expressed a certain distaste for what he saw as an aristocratic complacency in their solutions to society's problems (XXVIII/ii, 53). From what we have already learned of his reactions to *Den'*, one may interpret this remark to mean that he still saw the Slavophiles' veneration of pre-Petrine Muscovy as a hankering after the old days of the boyar aristocracy. The most
prevalent themes of his notebooks and letters of 1863, however, are the condition of Europe and the importance of Roman Catholicism in determining that condition. That Dostoevskii should be concerned with these questions is by no means surprising, given the recent Polish uprising and his own trip to Europe, and it is interesting that his approach to these issues, at a time when he was making a point of reading the Slavophiles, should echo their ideas in so many respects.

In June 1863 Dostoevskii wrote to Turgenev and explained to him Vremia's intended take on the Polish uprising. In this letter he states with frankness that the tendency of his journal is 'русское и даже антиславянское' and that he had hoped that this well-known fact would have set Strakhov's article in the proper context (XXVIII/ii, 34). He goes on to elucidate the contents of this article, misunderstood as it was for certain clumsy phrases and allusions, for which he accepts responsibility. The article, he claims, was intended to emphasise that the rift with Poland was exacerbated by their greater degree of Europeanisation, which gave the Poles grounds to believe themselves superior to Russians. However, it was not meant to imply that Russia was in actual fact inferior to Poland, and this interpretation should have been avoided by Strakhov's assertion that 'польская хваленая цивилизация носила и носит смерть в своем сердце' (XXVIII/ii, 34). The offending article was not, as we know, written by Dostoevskii, and yet in this letter he defends it not only as part of his journal, but as if he is in complete accord with Strakhov's ideas. We can perceive this by his astonishment that anyone should have thought that Vremia might side with Poland and express anything but a completely patriotic stance. Why then was Dostoevskii not more careful as an editor and require that his journal's response to the matter be couched in more conservative terms? One must assume that he was perceptive enough to recognise the deficiencies of Strakhov's article before he allowed it to be published. Kjetsaa's angle on this problem is that as an editor Dostoevskii had to tread a narrow line between showing condemnation for the Poles and maintaining Vremia's reputation as a moderately progressive publication that offered an alternative to the likes of the staunchly conservative Russkii vestnik. Another thing to consider is the prime concerns of Vremia. As I have already shown, Dostoevskii and his colleagues
chose to focus on moral aspects of society as a force for change, rather than political measures. According to Dostoevskii, Strakhov’s article addresses the Polish question in moral terms, highlighting the spiritual bankruptcy and inherent decay of a society that has chosen to follow the European model, in contrast, naturally, with Russia. Such a stance is consonant with Vremia’s general tone and indeed with Dostoevskii’s current ideas generally, as shall be seen from his notebooks for 1863 to 1865.

Dostoevskii’s notebooks for these years display an increased interest in the questions of Russia’s relation to Europe, socialism, and the differences between Eastern and Western Christianity. What is more, on several occasions he mentions ‘the Slavophiles’ in relation to these matters, and occasionally he refers to Khomiakov, thereby suggesting that he is making links with things he has recently read. There is also a note about a planned article entitled ‘Nashi napravleniia. Zapadniki. Slavianofily i realisty’, after which he rehearses to himself the Slavophiles’ anti-European ideas and their insistence upon an indigenous Russian principle that is inherently right (XX, 181). The Polish uprising seems to set him thinking about Roman Catholicism, and he writes that the rebellion is down to the underlying principles behind this religion and Orthodoxy:

Польская война есть война двух христианств — это начало будущей войны православия с католицизмом, другими словами — славянского гения с европейской цивилизацией. Итак, развитие у нас и развитие не официальное (по голландской программе), а народное. (XX, 170.)

The phrasing of this comment indicates that Dostoevskii’s approach to this subject was very similar to that of Khomiakov and Kireevskii. His remark draws a contrast between Slavic native genius — an organic, natural characteristic — and European ‘official’ civilisation, implying that the latter is contrived according to a formula. Further on, in what again appears to be a plan for an article, Dostoevskii reflects that the institution of the Papacy has had a profound effect on the development of Western culture, and that it is responsible for the Reformation, Rousseau’s thought, the French Revolution and socialism (XX, 190). The reason for this, he decides, is that the Catholic Church has constructed
itself according to logical principles, resulting in the temporal power of the Pope,
and he cites Khomiakov in connection with his remark:

Совершенная логичность в постройке идеи: что если папа владыка
dуховный и если церковь совмещает в себе ответы на всё и ключи
будущего, то ясно, стало быть, что кому ж и подчинены должны
быть все, как не папе (логистика в характере римской постройки.
Хомякова). (XX, 190.)

At the same time, Dostoevskii foresees the eventual downfall of the Papacy, a
subject that was to occupy him greatly in the pages of Dnevnik pisatelia, and the
alliance of the Catholic Church with its offspring, the socialists. But he marks
with a nota bene the fact that socialism and Christianity are fundamentally
incompatible, and again he mentions Khomiakov (XX, 189-90). It is clear from
Dostoevskii’s other notes that by this statement he means that as Catholicism has
spawned socialism, with which Christianity is incompatible, the Catholic Church
itself is not consonant with Christianity. He states that the Pope has no faith and
that people serve the Catholic Church out of superstition (XX, 189). Elsewhere
he emphasises the coercive nature of socialism, in terms that are reminiscent of
Khomiakov’s distinction between Iranian and Kushite systems:

Социалисты хотят переродить человека, освободить его,
представить его без бога и без семейства. Они заключают, что,
изменив насилием экономический быт его, цели достигнут. Но
человек изменится не от внешних причин, а не иначе как от
перемены нравственной. (XX, 171.)

Dostoevskii then develops his ideas on the fundamental differences
between true Christianity and socialism in a plan for an article entitled
‘Sotsializm i khristianstvo’. This passage is remarkable for its closeness to the
writings of Khomiakov on the peasant obshchina. Dostoevskii begins with the
assertion: ‘В социализме – лучиночки, в христианстве крайнее развитие
личности и собственной воли’ (XX, 191). This one phrase constitutes the
essence of the whole passage, and it is followed by Dostoevskii’s reasonings that
lead him to this stance. To start with, he contends that during the time of the
ancient patriarchal obshchina, people lived in a spontaneous state of
communality. This state, however, has been destroyed by civilisation, which he
styles the furthest development of the individual consciousness. This results in
the loss of faith in God and the denial of spontaneous communal laws, and
therefore, civilisation is a painful state. But it is only a transitory state because
Christ came to show mankind the ideal to strive for, which will put an end to the pain and longing (XX, 192). In Dostoevskii’s visualisation, the ideal proven by Christ is to return to the spontaneous communal life, not because one is compelled to, but because one instinctively knows that to do so is good. He muses:

Человек возвращается в массу, в непосредственную жизнь, следовательно, в естественное состояние, но как? Не авторитетно, а, напротив, в высшей степени самовольно и сознательно. Ясно, что это высшее самовольие есть в то же время высшее отречение от своей воли. В том моя воля, чтоб не иметь воли, ибо идеал прекрасен.

В чем идеал?

Достигнуть полного могущества сознания и развития, вполне сознать свое я - и отдать это всё самовольно для всех. (XX, 192.)

Socialism is different, Dostoevskii argues, because it cannot understand the voluntary renunciation of the self for all, without any motive of self-interest. The socialists, he writes, can see no further than gratifying their bellies and will only renounce their ego for materialist reasons. They will even try to persuade their adherents that absolute obligation to the antheap is for their own good. In this way Dostoevskii highlights the contrast between the voluntary, selfless submission for the sake of the whole in Christianity, and the enforced submission to the whole supposedly for one’s own sake in socialism. He concludes, with an uncharacteristic appeal to mathematical logic, that Christianity will prevail as a model for life:

Патриархальность было состояние первобытное. Цивилизация — среднее, переходное. Христианство — третья и последняя степень человека, но тут кончается развитие, достигается идеал, следовательно, уж по одной логике, по одному лишь тому, что в природе всё математически верно, следовательно, и тут не может быть иронии и насмешки, — есть будущая жизнь. (XX, 194.)

What are we to understand by this declaration of the ultimate triumph of Christianity (by which Dostoevskii means, of course, Christianity of the Eastern variety)? Is Dostoevskii implying that civilisation will fall away and that the Kingdom of God will be built on Earth? For the answer to this question we must turn to another passage in his notebooks for this period, where he formulates on a more personal level his concept of the ideal of self-renunciation as proclaimed by Christ. Written on 16th April 1864, the passage in question contains
Dostoevskii's spiritual search for answers following the death of his wife only the day before. This extraordinary document, written as it was in a state of deep pain and expressive of a need to make sense out of a personal tragedy, is as effective a credo as can be found in all of Dostoevskii's writings, in that it is entirely private, written with no identifiable reader in mind and therefore free from deliberate artistic shaping. It builds upon the notion of Christ as the beautiful ideal as expressed in the letter to Mme Fonvizina (XXVIII/i, 177) and considers man's relation to that ideal. Starting from the agonising question 'Увижуся ли с Машей?', Dostoevskii, as if acknowledging the shortcomings of his marriage, then states that man cannot fulfil Christ's commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself, because the ego stands in the way (XX, 172). This recognition of the power of the ego is consistent with what Dostoevskii learned from the struggles of the Siberian convicts to assert in however futile a way their individuality. It was also a subject uppermost in his mind, for he had just finished writing the first part of Zapiski iz podpol'ia. Only Christ was able to love another as himself, writes Dostoevskii, but Christ was an eternal ideal, and man must therefore strive towards this ideal, which consists of the voluntary total annihilation of the ego for the sake of all others. This, he insists, is the highest development and the greatest use of the ego, and all history is simply the struggle toward the realisation of the ideal of Christ (XX, 172).

However, Dostoevskii reasons to himself, if the ideal of Christ is man's ultimate goal, were he to achieve this goal in this lifetime, he would have no further reason to live and develop. This must mean that human earthly life is no more than a transitional phase, after which must follow another life:

Но достигать такой великой цели, по моему рассуждению, совершенно бессмысленно, если при достижении цели всё утасает и исчезает, то есть если не будет жизни у человека и по достижении цели. Следственно, есть будущая, райская жизнь. (XX, 173.)

Here one finds the answer to my earlier question, and it is in the context of this passage that we must understand Dostoevskii's contention of the ultimate triumph of Christianity: it will be, but in this life man must struggle with his ego in the effort to sacrifice it for the whole, until the next life when the return to the spontaneous brotherhood will be achieved.
Dostoevskii then goes on to debate a variety of problems, including the existence of suffering in this life, the nature of the afterlife and man’s state in this heavenly existence. Frank has devoted great attention to the examination of these notes, so for the purposes of this study it is sufficient to focus on those points that stand out with regard to the Slavophile concepts of voluntary unity, organic wholeness and aversion to artificial structures. I have already shown how in these notes and in ‘Sotsializm i khristianstvo’, Dostoevskii’s prime concerns are the kind of voluntary, mutual self-renunciation for the sake of the other as found in the traditional peasant commune, and the incarnate ideal of such self-renunciation in Christ. In addition, in his reflections on his wife’s death, Dostoevskii pays great attention to the notion of synthesis, which in my opinion has resonances in the Slavophile concept of *tsel'nost*. Whilst considering the nature of God and paradise, he proposes a definition of man’s life that demonstrates his belief that the goal of humanity is spontaneous unity: ‘Человек по великому результату науки, идет от многоразличия к Синтезу, от фактов к обобщению их и познанию. А naturа бога другая. Это полный синтез всего бытия, саморассматривающий себя в многоразличии, в Анализе’ (XX, 174). Frank interprets this statement to be an echo of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic understanding. He writes that analytic understanding depends on the data gathered by the senses, while synthetic understanding represents a godly intellect that does not absorb outside data but creates the objects of its knowledge. This interpretation suggests that Dostoevskii views man as moving from analysis toward synthesis until he reaches the ultimate synthesis of paradise in the next life. Later notes support such a suggestion, where Dostoevskii writes, with regard to man’s nature in the afterlife, ‘Это слитие полного я, то есть знания и синтеза со всем’ (XX, 174), and again, ‘Но живое, не умершее даже до самого достижения и отразившееся в окончательном идеале – должно ожить в жизнь окончательную, синтетическую, бесконечную’ (XX, 174).

Dostoevskii’s emphasis on synthesis as a positive ideal toward which man should strive is strikingly similar to Kireevskii’s notion of *tsel'nost*. As I outlined in my Introductory Chapter, Kireevskii denied the Western idea that reason and faith contradicted each other, and asserted that it was wrong to
compartmentalise the human cognitive faculties. Instead, he argued that reason should serve as the path to finding true faith, which operated on a higher level of consciousness, and only a synthesis of all man’s powers of understanding could lead to the truth. Dostoevskii’s ideas mirror Kireevskii’s arguments, but in his formulation they reach further than the human mind and operate on the level of earthly and heavenly existence. One might be surprised by Dostoevskii’s frequent reference here and in ‘Sotsializm i khristianstvo’ to laws of nature and to nauka (both ‘science’ and ‘learning’ in Russian), given his distaste for formulas and reliance on scientific proofs. However, if we examine the Masha notes in the light of Kireevskii’s philosophy of tsel’nost’, it is clear that these avenues of understanding are by no means discarded out of hand, but have their role to play in leading man beyond their confines both to greater mental and spiritual harmony and to eternal happiness in the next life. As Dostoevskii himself acknowledged, he was a ‘child of his century’ (XXVIII/i, 176), and was not about to reject knowledge that had originated in the rational West. Indeed, this may explain why his consideration of the nature of God and the afterlife is not couched in the traditional terms of Orthodox dogma, but has more in common with philosophy and science. What he did firmly believe, and here he is of the same mind as Kireevskii, was that to depend entirely on rationalist principles without seeking the wider, spiritual picture, meant decay, and so he concludes his fascinating reflections:

Учение материалистов — всеобщая косность и механизм вещества, значит смерть. Учение истинной философии — уничтожение косности, то есть мысль, то есть центр и Синтез вселенной и наружной формы ее — вещества, то есть бог, то есть жизнь бесконечная. (XX, 175.)

The early 1860s were a very profitable time for Dostoevskii, ideologically speaking, as well as in terms of productivity and reputation. Having engendered his new ideas about the narod, the relation of the individual to the community and the importance of voluntary moral reform in the harsh conditions of Siberian prison and exile, he used his journalistic activities to develop these ideas. He learned ways to express his ideas from dialogue with like-minded thinkers such as Grigor’ev and Strakhov. He entered into polemics with both Slavophiles and Westernisers and through these debates he found his own position. His arguments with his contemporary Slavophiles spurred him to
understand the founding leaders of the movement and to consider points of correspondence with them. It was during this time that Dostoevskii's engagement with Slavophilism really came into its own. If Siberia was his ideological puberty, then the time of *Vremia* and *Epokha* was his growth towards maturity. The second half of the decade proved to be a more tempestuous time. Remarriage, financial hardship, sojourn abroad all added their input into the development of his beliefs. At this time he also wrote some of his greatest fiction. But he did not return to non-fictional writing until, back in Russia, he took up the editorship of *Grazhdanin* and began his monthly column *Dnevnik pisatelia*. The fiction will be examined in the next chapter, so it is to the *Dnevnik* that I now turn my attention.
1.5: Dnevnik pisatelia and the Pushkin Speech.

Dostoevskii began his Dnevnik pisatelia in 1873, as a column in Prince Meshcherskii's conservative journal Grazhdanin. Due to Dostoevskii's struggle with the burden of editorial work for the journal and his disagreement with the owner's reactionary views, he gave up editing Grazhdanin, and after a break of three years, he resumed his Dnevnik as an independent monthly publication from 1876 to 1877. Ill health and the writing of Brat'ia Karamazovy caused publication to be suspended again, and finally he brought out a single issue in 1880 and one in 1881. Dnevnik pisatelia is a fascinating work that Dostoevskii would have undoubtedly continued had he lived beyond 1881; despite its interruptions for years at a time, the style, tone and subject matter are remarkably consistent, suggesting that the author intended that it should be possible to read it as a single work. Gary Saul Morson has argued convincingly in favour of this approach to the work,\(^6^7\) and his arguments together with an examination of the Dnevnik as an integral whole will be the subject of a later chapter. The Dnevnik combines feuilleton-style comment in a confiding tone, fiction, embedded texts from real or imaginary adversaries, literary criticism and even open didacticism. With the exception of Zimnie zamečki o letnikh vpechatleniakh, it differs from the articles of Vremia and Epokha because of this overall avoidance of one category of genre. For this reason, the task of drawing out statements that may be believed to be consonant with Dostoevskii's own views is more complicated than with the journals of the 1860s. The nature of such problems will be addressed in a later chapter; for the time being, it is sufficient to continue by focusing on those parts of the Dnevnik that are the least generically problematic and by leaving aside the fiction. With substantiation from letters and notebooks, I believe it is possible to gain from the Dnevnik an idea of what were Dostoevskii's views on the subjects he dealt with therein.

Dnevnik pisatelia might be best described as a study in Russianness. In this work, Dostoevskii was able to share with his readers his passion for all that moved, shaped and threatened Russian society. The Dnevnik is fixed firmly in the here and now, drawing on events reported in the newspapers, remarking on foreign affairs, contemplating religious and ethical matters, as broad in its scope as it is intimate in its attention to ordinary individuals. Here Dostoevskii puts
everyday people of all ranks at the heart of his project. Anything that might affect the unity, moral standing or destiny of Russia and her people comes under his watchful eye. He gives ample space to his favourite themes of the *narod* as a repository of moral and spiritual values, unity and its absence in all levels of society, Russia’s relationship to Europe and the importance of Orthodoxy. Dostoevskii’s tone is one of assured independence from any ideological movement; he was by now one of the most prominent figures on the literary landscape and did not need to create his own position in the ideological spectrum, as he did in the previous decade with *pochvennichestvo*. However, there is much less of the optimism that pervades the pages of *Vremia* on the subject of uniting the noble classes with the common people. Here, instead of confident proposals, there are denunciations of the forces fragmenting Russian society and continued, insistent appeals to the value of the *narod*. We also find concern for the meaning for Russia of contemporary events in Western Europe and the Balkans and a growing sense of the advent of a new world order. In all these issues, Dostoevskii focuses on those aspects that by now I have established as having Slavophile resonances: wholeness of spirit and society, voluntary brotherhood, organic unity and moral improvement as a means of social change.

Given that *Dnevnik pisatelia* spans the last nine years of Dostoevskii’s life, albeit with interruptions for two or three years at a time, it is fair to wonder how much the writer’s beliefs developed during this time. Is there, for example, a great difference in thought between the 1873 *Dnevnik* and the 1881 *Dnevnik*? The answer, to a certain extent, strangely, is no: compare for instance the passages on the hidden, innate truths of the *narod* in issues three and five of 1873 (XXI, 17, 38) and in chapter one, part four of 1881 (XXVII, 18-19). One finds that the underlying idea of all the passages is almost identical. It is therefore possible when studying the central notions of the *Dnevnik* largely to disregard the chronology. However, it would be a mistake to assume that Dostoevskii’s views were by this stage completely stagnant. Both in his fiction of this time and in the *Dnevnik* he continuously honed and refined his ideas, developing them in depth and detail, but without making any significant advances or departures in direction.
It is possible to determine several aspects of the *Dnevnik* which can be described as Slavophile. The most obvious of these is what Gary Saul Morson calls ‘the moral sin of dissociation.’

Dissociation, in Russian *obosoblenie*, is a term Dostoevskii uses to describe the fragmentation of a society or an individual. It stands in opposition to the Slavophile concepts of *iselnost* and *sobornost*. Morson is right to call it a ‘moral sin’, for the Slavophiles did not separate notions of morality from those of societal structure or human cognition. The *Dnevnik* repeatedly expresses views on the beginnings of the disintegration of Russian society, of the isolation of the intelligentsia from the people, of the entrenched atomisation of Western society, of an upsurge in suicides, and of the longing in people to find something new to give shape to their lives. In both Russia and the West this meant an increasing interest in sects and spiritualism or a reliance on science to provide all the answers. Dostoevskii believed that the cause of the dissociation in Russia and her people was the influence of Western Europe through Enlightenment ideas imported after the reforms of Peter the Great; it was not, he argued, a natural Russian characteristic to give way to disintegration:

In other words, he believed that the history of the West was different from that of Russia, in that its dissociation was a result of the historical process. Russia’s history, on the other hand, was characterised by something else. Speaking of Russia’s potential role in Europe, he writes:

[...]

(XXII, 84.)
In this passage, echoing Slavophile thought, Dostoevskii signals that Russia held something unique, something which since the Enlightenment had been regarded as an obstruction to progress or as a dissociation from Europe, but which was in danger of being lost through the actual disintegrating effect of Europeanisation. In a notebook entry from 1876-77, he jots down a few words that capture the essence of his concern: 'Духовное единение. Православие. Взамен матерьяльного единения, силой католичество, римского единения' (XXIV, 214).

That which was unique to Russia, that which Dostoevskii feared would be lost, is another thematic characteristic of Dnevnik pisatelia and one of the central tenets of Slavophilism: sobornost'. The result of a Westernised intelligentsia was a divided Russia and hence its unique innate spirit of brotherhood and mutuality, which had grown naturally since Russia's beginnings, was under threat. Increasing incidences of individualism and profiteering meant that people were ceasing to love their neighbour and were instead acting towards each other in a proprietary or coercive manner. Viacheslav Ivanov has noted this concern of Dostoevskii's, that to objectify the Other is to violate a moral and religious principle, which Ivanov designates 'proniknovenie' or spiritual penetration:69 this principle may also be called sobornost', which requires mutual love and the voluntary submission of one's will to the whole.70 Only in the common people did Dostoevskii see Russia's original and unique ethic of brotherhood. He gives a touching example of his personal experience with such brotherhood in the issue for April 1876. One Easter during his childhood, he recalls, his father's estate bailiff arrived unexpectedly, to announce that the estate had been badly damaged in a fire. Never a wealthy family, the Dostoevskiis were struck with panic at this terrible news. But then the children's nurse approached them. She had not drawn her salary from the family for several years, claiming she did not need it and preferring to have it invested with a moneylender for her retirement. Humbly, and in a completely spontaneous gesture of love, she offered the family her savings (XXII, 112). However, this episode is offset by the previous month's discussion of sobornost"s antithesis, obosoblenie, where Dostoevskii laments the disintegration of the intelligentsia into rootless, disconnected fragments. He writes:
Here Dostoevskii shows that he conceives of society in purely organic terms, for like a living organism, he sees it to be greater than the sum of its parts. Without the living force of natural brotherhood, in Dostoevskii's view, society becomes impotent and necrotic.

According to Dostoevskii, the great things for which the people yearn stem from the image of Christ preserved within them, of which they are unconsciously aware. In the third issue of 1873, he asserts that in the common people there lie ideas, fused with the heart, that are unexpressed but strongly felt, and that the whole energy of the people's life goes into striving to bring these concealed ideas to light (XXI, 17). He builds on this theme in the fifth issue of this year, contending that in spite of their lack of religious education, the people 'unconsciously' know Christ, from carrying his image in their hearts and passing it down from generation to generation (XXI, 38). In these arguments we may identify strong elements of Slavophile thought; the emphasis on unformulated
ideas 'felt' in the heart but not intellectualised is especially reminiscent of Kireevskii's notion of *tsel'nost' dukha*, and also has resonances in the Hesychast tradition of Orthodoxy, which arose from the concept of prayer with the heart (to be examined in the next chapter).

Dostoevskii calls this unformulated repository of knowledge and Christian love the truth of the *narod*, and it is this truth that the educated classes need from the peasantry: 'это мы должны преклониться перед народом и ждать от него всего, и мысли и образа; преклониться пред правдой народной и признать ее за правду [...]’ (XXII, 45). However, he does not deny that the intelligentsia must share its education with the people, and stresses that the latter must accept this too (XXII, 45). In this way he reconciles his pre-Siberian belief that the educated classes should lead the people out of barbarous ignorance with his later views; here he clearly shows that for the divide to be bridged, each side must accept the positive qualities of the other. In my view, these comments of Dostoevskii's demonstrate that he assimilated many of his early ideas into his later ones, thus displaying a constantly evolving world view, rather than a change of direction. Therefore, even in his thought processes, Dostoevskii shows a predisposition towards synthesis and organic growth, which are characteristics of Slavophile philosophy.

The people's striving towards a noble ideal, the ideal of Christ carried within them, was their moral ethic. Dostoevskii calls this moral ethic 'личное самосовершенствование в духе христианской любви' (XXVI, 161). In the *Dnevnik* he argues that such personal improvement is the only way to improve society, and that it can only be done little by little, through each person's microscopic efforts. It is clear that here he is continuing to maintain the stance he held on the reconciliation of the gentry and the peasantry in the pages of *Vremia* in the 1860s. His emphasis is still on moral rather than socio-political change. Dostoevskii believed that the influence of science and Western Enlightenment ideas was encouraging the educated classes to apply an abstract theory to moral and social issues, to take the tenth step without taking the preceding nine steps, or in other words to ignore the established Russian heritage and to create their own cultural forms. In the *Dnevnik* he does not deny the benefits of science and industry learned from the West, and he devotes a significant part of the issue for
April 1876 to defending the necessity and positive outcomes of the reforms of Peter the Great (XXII, 110-11). Later, in the 1880 issue, he distinguishes between material enlightenment, in other words sciences and trades, and spiritual enlightenment, saying that Russia is grateful to the West for providing the former, but that she does not need a foreign source of the latter (XXVI, 150). But to rely on rational theories and generalisations would be to emphasise one aspect of the human condition above others, and this would violate both individual and societal тsel’nost’, ending in dissociation. Reliance on theories, in Dostoevskii’s opinion, also tended towards a determinist view of life, of a life regulated by external, coercive constructs which denied the freedom to be responsible for oneself and for all. In his notebook for 1875-1876, Dostoevskii states more clearly than anywhere else at this time his distaste for rational theories founded only on science, and the terms he uses are strikingly similar to those that recur throughout the works of Khomiakov:

Знает ли наука натуру человека. [...] Закон разумной необходимости есть первее всего уничтожение личности [...]. Христианство же, напротив, наиболее провозглашает свободу личности. Не стесняет никаким математическим законом. Веруй, если хочешь, сердцем. (XXIV, 170-71; italics added.)

In particular in the Dnevnik Dostoevskii considers the nature of crime and how it should be understood. He paid great attention to the celebrated court cases of his day, especially those concerning child abuse, and in his work he speaks out against the utilitarian theory that all crime is simply a result of a materially unsatisfying environment. This concern was not new for Dostoevskii; we have already seen how it affected his depiction of the convicts in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, and he gave the idea its most thorough development in Prestuplenie i nakazanie. His insistence that each criminal case should be addressed according to its individual circumstances becomes most apparent in his discussion of the Kornilova case. Kornilova was a young peasant woman, pregnant, who threw her stepdaughter out of a fourth floor window, to protest against her husband’s persistent unfavourable comparison of her with his first wife. The child was not harmed, and Kornilova immediately turned herself in. Having previously protested at the acquittal of Kroneberg, another child abuser, on the grounds of poor environment, Dostoevskii now riles against Kornilova’s sentence, arguing that in this case, there was a mitigating circumstance, the psychological effect of
which diminished her personal responsibility: her pregnancy. As he compares his
different reactions to two basically similar crimes, he contends that to apply
blanket theories without considering individual peculiarities is a force of
dissociation:

[...] напротив, как бы возвещается, да еще судом же, что совсем,
дескать, и нет преступления, что преступление, видите ли, есть
только болезнь, происходящая от ненормального состояния
общества, — мысль до гениальности верная в иных частных
применениях и в известных разрывах явлений, но совершенно
ошибочная в применении к целому и общему, ибо тут есть
некоторая черта, которую невозможно переступить, иначе
пришлось бы совершенно обезличить человека, отнять у него
всякую самость и жизнь, приравнять его к пушинке, зависящей от
первого ветра [...]. (XXIII, 137-38.)

In this passage Dostoevskii again uses the image of a piece of chaff or fluff
whose fate is determined by the external impersonal force of the wind, in order to
show both the fragmentary and determinist nature of the application of abstract
theories to people, without accounting for their individuality. His approach of
personal moral reform, on the contrary, does allow consideration of individual
particularities, thus encompassing both the freedom of personal responsibility
and any special mitigating circumstances, as in the Kornilova case. Therefore it
proves itself to be an ethic with Slavophile overtones.

The nineteenth century was an era of change and reorganisation in
Western Europe, both politically and ideologically. The successive revolutions in
France, the Napoleonic Wars, the declining influence of the Church and the
upsurge of positivism, the struggles undergone in most countries between
monarchical, dictatorial and republican forms of government — all these had
repercussions which were felt in the Russian Empire as much as in the West. The
1870s marked the beginning of a new epoch in European history, as J. Marriott
comments: 'The characteristic work of the nineteenth century was by then
accomplished. Europe was at last exhaustively parcelled out into a large number
of independent, self-conscious, self-contained nation-states'. At this time
Dostoevskii was preoccupied with the role of the Roman Catholic Church in
Europe's political powerplays, and at the same time with the ideological and
political motives behind Russia's increasing involvement in the Balkan States.
He saw on the one hand his mother country gearing itself towards an ultimate
expression of Russianness and Orthodoxy, to shine like a guiding light for the rest of Europe; on the other hand he interpreted the shifting alliances of France, Germany, England and Austria as the rousing of a sinister force to challenge that guiding light.

In the March 1876 issue of the *Dnevnik*, Dostoevskii expressed his concerns about the stability of France. His interpretation of French society was much the same as it had been in his *Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniiakh*, and in his view French society was fragmented, presenting only an illusion of wholeness to its people and the rest of Europe. He saw a dominant bourgeoisie which had ousted the aristocracy only to take its place, and an unsatisfied proletariat who in turn were a potential threat to the bourgeoisie. He believed that none of the socio-political ideas circulating in France, from Bonapartism to utopian socialism, would satisfy the needs of the whole country and unite it. Utopian socialism was one movement which attempted to offer a solution for the whole of society, but it was based entirely on scientific reasoning, and for Dostoevskii that meant it would never be able to account for all of human nature. Here we can see that, as in *Zimnie zametki*, Dostoevskii's views continue to incline towards the teachings of the Slavophiles Khomiakov and Kireevskii in their concern for the true unity of society and in the recognition of the limitations of science.

Alongside the comments about France, Dostoevskii placed in the March 1876 *Dnevnik* some remarks about the Roman Catholic Church. In particular he was concerned with the loss of support for the Church amongst Europe’s ruling classes, as exemplified in Italy and Germany. The health of Pius IX was faltering and in him Dostoevskii saw embodied a dying Catholicism. In his interpretation the proclamation of Papal Infallibility was the ultimate expression of the third temptation of the Devil, issued at the time when the Church was most vulnerable. It represented the Catholic Church’s renunciation of Christ in favour of worldly dominion, which had begun with the Pope’s temporal power over the Papal States and which was a reformulation of the ambitions of pagan Rome. We have already seen how as early as 1864 Dostoevskii was making notes on the same theme; it clearly was never far from his mind, for he wrote to Strakhov from
Dresden about the Papacy’s renunciation of Christ and impending downfall (XXIX/i, 214). Now he was able to give these ideas his full attention. He wrote:

И вот, в самом последнем мгновение, когда отнимали от него последнюю десятую его земного владения, владыка католичества, видя смерть свою, вдруг восстает и изрекает всю правду о себе всему миру: «[...] Знаите же, что я всегда считал себя владыкой всего мира и всех царей земных, и не духовным только, а земным [...]; и вот я всемирно объявляю это теперь в догмата моей непогрешимости». (XXII, 88-89.)

But Dostoevskii was convinced that Roman Catholicism would refuse to go quietly, and that in order to gain a new lease of life, and indeed to realise the temporal possibilities of Papal Infallibility, the Church would seek an alliance with the discontented masses, beginning in France where the proletariat longed for a binding idea to unify society. Writing prophetically, Dostoevskii envisaged the Church exhorting the people to force all levels of society into a brotherhood with the cry of ‘fraternité ou la mort’ and promising them forgiveness of sins on the grounds of poverty, if only they looked to the Pope as their earthly leader. The alliance of these unexpected partners would prove to be a force capable of overturning Western Europe’s recently acquired stability:

Слова эти льстивые, но без сомнения демос примет предложение: он разглядит в неожиданном союзнике объединяющую великую силу, на всё соглашающуюся и ничему не мешающую [...]. Тут же вдруг и точка приложения силы готова, и рычаг дают в руки, стоит лишь налечь всей массой и повернуть. (XXII, 90.)

The idea that the Pope might head an alliance of Catholicism and socialism was not new in Dostoevskii’s thought. He had already uttered it through the mouth of the character Petr Stepanovich Verkhovenskii in the novel Besy (X, 323). Here, however, he made the view his own, and stated categorically that he believed this conspiracy would come to pass (XXII, 90).

By 1877, Dostoevskii was still concerned with the idea of a Papal conspiracy with the socialists to gain world hegemony, and insisted in his Dnevnik that the idea should be taken seriously. In the January issue he developed his theme and began to explain how socialism should be compatible with Roman Catholicism, expressing the ideas that, as we have seen, he worked out in his notebook for 1864, and how it would be in France that this alliance would first be forged. He argued that France was the nation which had always
most adhered to the Catholic idea, and by this he meant the worldly power of the Pope, not Christianity. France was also the country which had tried numerous experiments with forms of socialism; in an echo of Khomiakov, Dostoevskii asserted that this was because the socialist formula for the organisation of society was a product of the Catholic idea: ‘Ибо социализм французский есть не что иное, как насильственное единение человечества — идея, еще от древнего Рима идущая и потом всеполо в католичестве сохранившаяся’ (XXV, 7). His message becomes even clearer in the Dnevnik for May and June of the same year. Here he declared that both socialism and Roman Catholicism had world supremacy as their goal; the socialists would accept even the most despotic banner under which to advance their cause, while the Pope would offer the socialists unity in return for the chance for temporal power (XXV, 160). Bruce Ward offers further clarification of what Dostoevskii believed the Church had to offer socialism:

[Dostoevskii] thought that the eventual triumph of socialism could be consolidated only if it were able to provide a moral enticement of sufficient strength to appease the protest of individuality which may not want to sacrifice itself for the common good. In Dostoyevsky’s view, the chief source in the West of such a moral enticement remains the Church. Roman Catholicism has traditionally been the most effective bearer of the morality of individual self-renunciation — precisely the sort of morality which a future socialist order will need.72

Ward’s comment requires a little clarification. Dostoevskii did not see in Catholicism the kind of voluntary self-renunciation for the sake of others that he saw in the obshchina; it was instead an enforced self-renunciation on the grounds of self-interest. Ward’s argument for socialism’s need for a moral enticement can be substantiated by reference again to Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniakh, in which Dostoevskii showed that the flaw which prevented the realisation of the socialist formula lay in the refusal of a ‘queer fellow’ to renounce his individual freedom for the benefits promised by the socialist (V, 81). The character of the ‘queer fellow’ is further developed in Zapiski iz podpol’ia, the protagonist of which longs for some idea to provide him with an alternative to his underground protest.

Western Europe and the possibility of a Papal conspiracy were not the only things which concerned Dostoevskii in his Dnevnik. His attention focussed
as much on the East as on the West, and he saw in Russia’s involvement in the Balkan Crisis a new hope for Europe as a whole. (Russia entered the war with Turkey in April 1877.) In the June 1876 issue, well aware that England and other countries feared Russian intervention, he wrote in favour of Russia entering the war and fervently denied that his motherland’s interest was purely acquisitional. It seems doubtful that a man of Dostoevskii’s intelligence and perception might take such an apparently naive view of his country, given that only two decades previously Russia had displayed her expansionist hopes in the Crimean War. More likely, he chose to interpret events in a way that lent credence to his theories of Russia’s future role in the world. It is in his writings on the Eastern Question that Dostoevskii’s messianism is most patently expressed. In the June 1876 issue, he stated that Orthodoxy was the only religion that still preserved the true image of Christ, and that Russia as the largest Orthodox nation was the guardian of that truth. Moreover he believed that the future of Orthodoxy, led by Russia, was in the universal service of humanity, inspired by a brotherly love for all nations which would bring them into a harmonious unity:

[...] а тут действитель но будет что-то особое и неслыханное; это будет не одно лишь политическое единение и уж совсем не для политического захвата и насилия, – как и представить не может иначе Европа; и не во имя лишь торгашества, личных выгод и веченых и всè тех же обоготворенных пороков, под видом официального христианства, которому на деле никто, кроме черни, не верит. Нет, это будет настоящее воздвижение Христовой истины, сохраняющейся на Востоке, настоящее новое воздвижение креста Христа и окончательное слово православия, во главе которого давно уже стоит Россия. Это будет именно соблазн для всех сильных мира сего и торжествовавших в мире доселе, всегда смотревших на все подобные «ожидання» с презрением и насмешкою и даже не понимающих, что можно серьезно верить в братство людей, во всепримирение народов, в союз, основанный на началах всеслужения человечеству, и, наконец, на самое обновление людей на истинных началах Христовых. (XXIII, 50.)

Dostoevskii’s preoccupation with Russia’s destiny may seem to some to contravene the Slavophile ethic of freedom and voluntary unity, as one could mistake elements of determinism in it. Morson asserts that the apocalyptic overtones in the passages on the resolution of the Eastern Question and Russia’s part in it run counter to the spirit of open-ended time and gradual improvement through personal effort. I would disagree; one only needs to see Dostoevskii’s messianism in Slavophile terms to find that it is integral with the rest of the
Dnevnik. As I have already said, it was fundamental to Slavophilism to believe that Russia would one day come into her own and regenerate the West. This is indeed a belief in a goal-directed purpose, but one which is free and organic, which will come about because of the natural growth of a society rooted in wholeness of spirit and voluntary brotherhood. Therefore, it is not a determinist outlook, because the Slavophiles understood determinism as involuntary submission to abstract laws and theories. For the Slavophiles and for Dostoevskii, Russia's mission was of a different order from the growth of the Western powers hitherto, because they had achieved their position through strife, externally imposed coalitions, self-interest and the loss of true freedom. It is important to note that Dostoevskii himself recognised that the fulfilment of Russia's destiny would not instantly bring about a perfect world society, since Europe would not understand Russia's 'new word' for a long time (XXV, 198); although he often referred to Russia's mission as a 'denouement', he saw it not as the conclusion of history but as a new beginning, from which people might learn to improve themselves through the ethic of sobornost.

To understand how Dostoevskii arrived at his view of the universal role of Orthodoxy, it is useful to look elsewhere in the Dnevnik for the strands of thought which, entwined, constitute his national messianism. In January 1877, whilst asserting the existence of three opposing ideas in Europe – the Catholic, the Protestant and the Slavic ideas – Dostoevskii argued that every great nation of the world believes that it is destined to save the world and stand at the head of a harmonious unity of all nations. This, he wrote, was the driving force behind socialism in France, behind the freedom of enquiry represented by Protestant Germany, and behind Russian intervention in the Eastern Question (XXV, 17). However, the pages of the Dnevnik reveal that Dostoevskii believed that only one of the three ideas truly had the potential to create a new world brotherhood, – and this was of course the Slavic idea. Dostoevskii was not a complete idealist; he knew that there was much to be done in his country before it could accomplish its mission. One thing was most important: Russia needed to stop trying to emulate Europe and become truly Russian, and the only way to achieve that was for the gentry to be reunited with the People. Only then would Russia be able to enter into the universal service of humanity:
The principle of nationality, then, was of great importance to Dostoevskii, and he found that the Balkan Crisis inspired in Russia feelings of nationality, unity and patriotism (XXV, 136). Nationality was a theme which had arisen before in his novels, particularly in the nationalist Shatov in Besy, and in contrast, in the liberal Versilov in Podrostok, who avowed that a Russian could not be of service to mankind unless he renounced his Russianness in favour of a universal Europeanness. It was precisely the movement of the Russian gentry towards a blurred obshchechelovek (who could be a Frenchman in France, a German in Germany thanks to his adoption of Western habits), that Dostoevskii abhorred and that he knew the People could not comprehend. This he clearly stated in Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniiakh.

However, nationality by itself was not enough to promulgate the Slavic idea and bring Russia to the fulfilment of her mission. It was not only a feeling for fellow Slavs which Dostoevskii saw in Russia’s desire to fight against Turkey, but an empathy with fellow Orthodox Christians (XXV, 73). The first practical application, as Dostoevskii saw it, of Russia’s mission to serve and unite humanity must be to liberate the Slavs in the Balkans and unite them under a banner of Orthodoxy. For Dostoevskii, religion and nationality were inextricably linked. In a single Dnevnik issue for 1880, an issue which he called his profession de foi, he explained how the morality which constituted the basis of a religion became the starting point for the nationality of a people:

При начале всякого народа, всякой национальности идея нравственная всегда предшествовала зарождению национальности, 
ибо она же и создавала ее. Исходила же эта нравственная идея всегда из идей мистических, из убеждений, что человек вечен, что он не простое земное животное, а связан с другими мирами и с вечностью. Эти убеждения формулировались всегда и везде в религию, в исповедание новой идеи, и всегда, как только
100

This passage contains the solution to the hopeless position of Shatov, the nationalist from Besy. It demonstrates how, in Dostoevskii’s opinion, religion is what determines the nationality of a people, and not vice versa. Shatov was the mouthpiece for many of Dostoevskii’s own beliefs, and professed like his creator that salvation for the world would come from Orthodox Russia; however, his argument fell short of a convincing messianism because he lacked complete faith in God, and was open to Stavrogin’s accusation that he had reduced God to a simple attribute of nationality. The passage also gives a further indication of why Dostoevskii had become so averse to the insistence of the educated classes on Western philosophies and customs at the expense of Russian ones; his view of the development of national ideologies is essentially a historicist approach, as Leatherbarrow explains: ‘[The Westernizers’] prescription of Western remedies for what they perceived as Russia’s ills betrayed the fatal ahistoricism of the Westernizing position, the belief that universal principles could supplant those that had emerged organically from a nation’s unique historical and cultural evolution’.74

The profession de foi also stands as Dostoevskii’s final word in a dialogue with Nikolai Danilevskii that had spanned more than ten years. Dostoevskii had known Danilevskii from the 1840s in St. Petersburg, where he had encountered him on occasion in the Petrashevskii salon. The latter had followed an ideological journey not dissimilar to that of Dostoevskii’s, eventually renouncing his original left-wing progressive beliefs and coming round to a more conservative nationalist view. He caught Dostoevskii’s attention again in late 1868 when he began serialising his long treatise on the future glorious role of Russia in Europe, called Rossiia i Evropa, in the broadly Slavophile journal Zaria. Dostoevskii remarked to Maikov in a letter from Florence, ‘Я припоминал, какой это был отчаянный фурьерист. И вот из фурьериста обратиться к России, стать опять русским и возлюбить свою почву и сущность!’ (XXVIII/i, 328). He was bound to feel sympathetic towards a man who had embraced his native soil after a period of Westernism, and he followed Danilevskii’s articles with great interest, writing to Strakhov of his eagerness to receive each new issue of Zaria as soon as it could be sent.
abroad to him. The main thrust of Danilevskii's argument was that the Slavic peoples should take advantage of their common ethnic origins and unite in the pursuit of national goals, turning away from Europeanism. This aim was to be best achieved by the seizure of Constantinople, which would resolve the Eastern Question and set Russia at the head of a united federation of Slavic nations. Dostoevskii was enthusiastic at first, but already by March 1869, he was beginning to feel that Danilevskii's arguments did not have the same foundation as his own hopes for Russia. He wrote to Strakhov:

Dostoevskii's fears proved to be well founded, because Danilevskii followed a similar argument to the one Dostoevskii gave to Shatov; he put his emphasis on nationality, rather than on Orthodoxy.

The argument with Danilevskii made its way both implicitly and explicitly into the pages of *Dnevnik pisatelia*, usually whenever Dostoevskii made reference to the possible fate of Constantinople in the resolution of the Balkan crisis. In the issue for November 1877, he set out his reasons for disagreeing with Danilevskii's point of view on Constantinople and reasserted his belief in the importance of Orthodoxy as the determining factor of Russianness. Disputing Danilevskii's notion of a Constantinople governed jointly by a federation of Slavic states, Dostoevskii argues that Russia alone must govern the city. Her authority to do this, in his view, is her capacity for universality, her ability to assimilate all nationalities into a natural, organic brotherhood. D. V. Grishin offers a clarification of this notion:

По мнению Достоевского, русский человек не имел той угловатости и замкнутости, которой отличался западный человек. Русский может понять все, он сочувствует всему человеческому вне различия национальности, крови и почвы. [...] Он выдвинул
Dostoevskii draws the distinction between the existing Muslim rule of the city, which he describes as an oppressive force that allows no freedom, and the self-sacrificing role of Russia in protecting the interests of her Eastern brethren. The key characteristic that would allow Russia to achieve this mission without the use of coercively imposed dominion, is of course Orthodoxy, as he explains:

To anyone, including Danilevskii, who believed that Russia’s interests in the Balkans were purely expansionist, Dostoevskii gives the reply that Orthodoxy is the distinguishing element that would make Russia’s government of Constantinople the foundation for a free unified society, from which Christ’s message of self-renunciation and love would be proclaimed. It would appear that he envisaged the establishment of a perfect Iranian society that would triumph over the Kushite forces of Western Europe and Muslim Turkey, reflecting Khomiakov’s ideas of world history.

So Russianness, or nationality born of Orthodoxy, was at the forefront of Dostoevskii’s Slavic idea. The unity which this idea was destined to bring first to the Balkans and then to the whole of Europe and the world, was according to him quite different from the unity proposed by the unholy alliance of Roman Catholicism and its bastard offspring socialism. Unity was inherent in the Slavic idea, stemming from the mutual love that had developed organically through the Orthodox faith; because it was based on the moral ideas which engendered nationality, it was spiritual unity above all, and would be a natural part of the Russianness Dostoevskii advocated through the return of the uprooted gentry to the People. Conversely, the Catholic idea sought to impose an external, political unity on society with the exhortation ‘fraternité ou la mort’; as Dostoevskii put it in *Zimnieзаметки o letnikh vpechatleniakh*, it was trying to make juggled hare
without first having the hare (V, 81). In the *Dnevnik* of May and June 1877 he set out the opposition between the two ideas:

Таким образом, в восточном идеале – сначала духовное единение человечества во Христе, а потом уж, в силу этого духовного соединения всех во Христе, и несомненно вытекающее из него правильное государственное и социальное единение, тогда как по римскому толкованию наоборот: сначала заручиться прочным государственным единением в виде всемирной монархии, а потом уж, пожалуй, и духовное единение под началом папы, как владыки мира сего. (XXV, 152.)

Of the remaining idea of the three, the Protestant idea, Dostoevskii had much less to say. This may primarily be because he, like Khomiakov, considered Protestantism as well as socialism, to be an unfortunate consequence of Roman Catholicism, and not a positive, new idea in its own right. Just as he saw France as the main representative of the Catholic idea, so he saw Germany as the nation which most corresponded to the spirit of Protestantism. According to Dostoevskii, Protestantism had its origins in the resistance of the ancient Germanic tribes to the hegemony of the Roman Empire; this was translated over time into a protest for freedom of enquiry against Roman Catholic domination, and thence into the birth of Lutheranism. Since the Protestant idea was born of rejection, Dostoevskii speculated that it could not exist on its own without the object of its rejection and would immediately deteriorate into atheism (XXV, 8). Dostoevskii’s allegory in January 1877 of the smashing of a vessel which contained a precious liquid showed how he believed that Protestant freedom of enquiry led to fragmentation into sects; elsewhere he had cause to comment on Anglicanism, calling it ‘a church of atheists’ (XXII, 97). However, his main concern with the Protestant idea was the immediate role that Germany, as its main representative, would play in the ‘last battle’ between the Catholic idea and the Slavic idea.

For indeed Dostoevskii foresaw a terrible conflict between the ideas behind which were aligned East and West, and he attached an almost apocalyptic significance to his prophecy. He interpreted the events in Europe as a sign that this struggle was about to begin. Firstly, he recognised that Catholicism, particularly in its militant, ultramontane incarnation, was a divisive force in Bismarck’s hard-won united Germany, and time and again he wrote of Bismarck
as one of the few people who might truly appreciate the potential danger of Roman Catholicism in its death throes, allied with a France resentful after the Franco-Prussian War:

It was hardly surprising, then, that Dostoevskii should devote so much of his May and June 1877 issue of the Dnevnik to the three rival ideas, when in May of that year, the President of France, Marshal MacMahon, dismissed the mostly republican Chamber of Deputies and replaced it with a new one composed of monarchists and clericals. The press at the time speculated that MacMahon was acting under pressure from the Vatican, via the ultramontanists, and Italy too feared that the new French government might threaten its newfound unity. MacMahon also had the support of the French army and the Jesuits, and there was concern across Europe that he might stage a coup d’etat at the French parliamentary elections set for the autumn.\(^7^6\) In addition to this was the failing health of Pius IX, which made the election of a new pope seem likely in the near future. As the year drew on, Dostoevskii wrote with increasing urgency about the conflict, which would begin in France: he predicted that France would want a war of revenge with Germany, that German unity would be threatened, and that Russia, whose mission had begun to be realised in the Eastern Question, would rise up and confront the Catholic idea in a war involving the whole of Europe, a war destined to usher in a new era of rebirth for Europe with Russia and Orthodoxy at its head. His Dnevnik issue for September 1877 is, in my view, where his messianism reaches its apogee, and contains a concise account of all his arguments tracing the development of his prophecies. Here he concluded:

3) Только что бой начнется, как тотчас же и обратится в всевопроситеый. Восточный вопрос в восточный бой, силою судей, сольется тоже с всевопроситеым боем. [...] Но сама существенная и важная часть этой последней и роковой борьбы будет состоять, с одной стороны, в том, что ею разрешится тысячелетний вопрос римского католичества и что, волею провидения, на его место станет возрожденное восточное христианство. Таким образом, наш
Dostoevskii returned to the same themes in November 1877 and reiterated his urgent predictions of a terrible struggle involving all of Europe in which Russia would accomplish her mission. But the end of the year came and the pressing political problems in Europe began to subside. The French elections returned a republican majority to the Chamber of Deputies in spite of MacMahon’s threats. Pius IX died in February 1878 and a new pope was elected straight away; Leo XIII was less irascible than his predecessor and relations between the Vatican and Germany improved under him. The following month a victorious Russia dictated to Turkey the Treaty of San Stephano, and a shaky peace returned to the Balkans for the rest of Dostoevskii’s life. During his last four years he was able to publish only two more Dnevnik issues: one in August 1880 after his celebrated Pushkin Speech, and one, just before his death, in January 1881. He was still very much concerned with the need to develop true Russianness through a return to the People, and with Russia’s Christian mission; he wrote to General Radetskii in 1878 that a great Slavic flame was rising, and that Orthodoxy would bring a light from the East to Europe (XXX, i, 20). However, his ideas were no longer so urgently applied to contemporary political life. Nevertheless, although he moved away from these themes in the Dnevnik pisatelia, he wove them into the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor and into the teachings of Father Zosima in Brat’ia Karamazov, thus showing that the issues of Roman Catholicism and salvation from Russian Orthodoxy continued to be of paramount importance to him. However, it is in the Dnevnik that he expressed himself on these issues most plainly.

The Pushkin Speech deserves some special attention because in just a few pages it condenses all the most salient points of the whole Dnevnik pisatelia that, as I have demonstrated, reflect the main concerns of Slavophile thought. At the same time, indeed, in my opinion it acts as a resumé of all those ideas that I have
traced right through Dostoevskii’s non-fiction, from the first glimmerings in *Peterburskaia letopis’*, through the fertile experience of Siberia to the ideology of pochvennichestvo and reaching maturity in the *Dnevnik*. This shows that Dostoevskii’s thought followed a path of organic evolution, in which the roots remain visible even when the newest shoots are far from the point of origin. Synthesis and organic unity as Dostoevskii’s *modus operandi* is an important question in the subject of his engagement with Slavophilism, and it will be dealt with in a later chapter. For the moment, it remains appropriate to study the culmination of the themes that echo Slavophilism in the speech. Published under the title ‘Pushkin (Ocherk)’, it forms the centre of the single issue for 1880, accompanied by an explanatory preface and a polemic with the critic Gradovskii regarding his response to the speech. Dostoevskii’s preface at once facilitates the scholar’s work by providing the author’s own synopsis of the key points made in the speech. He lists these as follows: that Pushkin was the first to appreciate the significance of the detachment of the gentry from the native soil and to realise that the solution lay in the Russian people; that he was also the first to depict the positive Russian type, rooted in the soil and living in the spirit of the narod; that he represented Russia’s characteristic of universality, the capacity to understand the nature of other nations that made Russia the bringer of universal brotherhood; that this moral characteristic was what Russia had to offer the rest of Europe and that it was part of the people’s innate desire for universality. Dostoevskii also contends that his speech was intended to demonstrate the possibility of reconciliation between the Slavophiles and the Westernisers, thus indicating a resurgence of one of his aims for pochvennichestvo. However, he expresses misgivings that despite the acclaim he received from all sides, the Westernisers will not really accept the idea that Russia’s capacity for universal brotherhood, contained in the people, is enough for her to proclaim a ‘new word’ to Europe. In his trademark style of reporting the hypothetical argument of his opponents, he writes:

Мы же утверждаем, что вмещать и носить в себе силу любящего и всеединяющего духа можно и при теперешней экономической нищете нашей […]. «А, — скажут, может быть, западники […], — в народе русском, так как уж пришло время высказаться вполне откровенно, мы по-прежнему видим лишь косную массу, у которой нам нечему учиться, тормозящую, напротив, развитие России к прогрессивному
In the speech itself, Dostoevskii presents his case for the refutation of the Westernisers' imagined argument, using reference to Pushkin's creations as illustrations of the points he makes. He indicates Aleko and Onegin as 'homeless Russian wanderers', lacking roots in their native soil and detached from the well of homegrown values resident in the people. Once again we find a recurrence of his favourite metaphor for the individual reduced to a meaningless fragment and controlled by the blind, external force of fate: ‘Он пока всего только оторванная, носящая по воздуху былинка’ (XXVI, 138). Pushkin's stories show these dissociated Russian types chasing after a variety of novel ideas in order to satisfy their longing for order and direction: in Aleko's case it is the gypsy lifestyle, or as Dostoevskii points out it could equally be European science or socialism. In contrast to these types he picks out Tat'iana, who, he notes, had a simple upbringing in the provinces with a beloved peasant nurse and who has the moral advantage of an unshakeable foundation of native beliefs. For Dostoevskii, Evgenii Onegin is a perfect example of how true, native Russian wisdom morally surpasses 'civilising' Europeanism, and its superiority is demonstrated by Tat'iana's final rejection of Onegin. He interprets her act as a recognition of Onegin's spiritual sterility, since Pushkin's character fails to see that beneath the veneer of high society etiquette, Tat'iana is still the same simple country girl he initially rejected, and instead is attracted only by what he believes to be a Europeanised social butterfly. At the same time, Dostoevskii shows that Tat'iana's moral fibre lies in her refusal to seek her own happiness at the expense of that of her husband, and that in doing so she not only affirms the worth of the native Russian way, but also invalidates utilitarian arguments for the reorganisation of society. For she will not allow the foundation of any edifice that disregards the suffering of even just one individual for the sake of the good of the majority; on the other hand her own voluntary self-sacrifice for the sake of all is the model for achieving a unified community. Thus Tat'iana finds peace and consolation in her childhood memories, which taught her:

Не в вещах эта правда, не вне тебя и не за морем где-нибудь, а прежде всего в твоем собственном труде над собою. Победишь себя, усмиришь себя — и станешь свободен как никогда и не воображал себе, и начнешь великое дело, и других свободными
Dostoevskii then moves on from specific works by Pushkin, and considers the artist as a phenomenon representing Russia. He sees him as a model of *tsel’nost*, comparing him to a complete, integrated organism whose origins come from within itself, not from external sources (XXVI, 145). Again, we find Dostoevskii using organic terminology in a similar manner to Khomiakov and Kireevskii. In Pushkin’s ability to portray non-Russian characters with a greater veracity than any other writer (in Dostoevskii’s opinion), he sees a reflection of the Russian people’s capacity for universal brotherhood because of their ability to accept that which is ‘other’ without objectifying it. As we have already seen, Dostoevskii believed that this capacity was the determining national characteristic of the Russian spirit. Thus he also posits Pushkin as a model of *sobornost*, combining the most essential elements of Slavophile philosophy. But then one encounters what I believe to be the only problematic assertion of the speech. Dostoevskii begins to discuss the Petrine reforms, and appears to argue for the first time that the *narod* accepted these reforms, albeit unconsciously, in the spirit of furthering Russia’s mission of bringing universal brotherhood to the West:

Is Dostoevskii here refuting his long consistent contention that the cost of the Petrine reform was the division between the educated classes and the peasantry? In order to answer this question, we must first of all remember that Dostoevskii brought his artistic talent to bear on everything that he wrote for a readership, and in doing so was wont to emphasise different elements of a belief of his to serve the overall artistic effect of a particular work. Secondly, this remark may be best understood in the light of his statements in ‘Dva lageria teoretikov’, written nearly twenty years earlier. There, it may be remembered, he wrote that the content of Peter’s reforms was Russian in spirit, but anti-Russian in form, and that it was the form of the reforms to which the people took exception (XX, 15).
This assertion, therefore, does not preclude him from arguing that the people *unconsciously* accepted the reforms in spirit, when his aim is to show the manifestation of Russia’s striving for universal brotherhood in all strata of society. As the speech concludes, Dostoevskii demonstrates that there is hope for unity between the dissociated gentry and the common people, despite all the fears and dangers he has outlined throughout *Dnevnik pisatelia*. This hope lies precisely in the fact that for him, Peter’s reforms and the Westernism movement were motivated by the same Russian trait of aspiring to global unity as has always existed in the *narod*, although their methods were misguided. Thus he proclaims that the Slavophile-Westerniser debate may be resolved and that Russia’s moral resource may act as a ‘new word’ for humanity:

И впоследствии, я верю в это, мы, то есть, конечно, не мы, а будущие грядущие русские люди поймут уже всё до единого, что стать настоящим русским и будет именно значить: стремиться внести примирение в европейские противоречия уже окончательно, указать исход европейской тоске в своей русской душе, всековалочной и весеодейной вместе в ней с братскою любовью всех наших братьев, а в конце концов, может быть, и изречь окончательное слово великой, общей гармонии, братского окончательного согласия всех племен по Христову евангельскому закону! (XXVI, 148.)

The response of the critic Gradovskii to the Pushkin Speech forced Dostoevskii to consider the statements he had made in it and reassert them. In doing so, I believe that he himself may have realised how well the speech sums up the essence of his thought, for at the end of his polemical reply, he offers an interpretation of the chapter as a creed according to which he will continue to publish *Dnevnik pisatelia*:

Но, повторю, ваша статья послужила только предлогом: мне хотелось кое-что вообще высказать. Я намерен с будущего года «Дневник писателя» возобновить. Так вот этот теперешний номер «Дневника» пусть послужит моим profession de foi на будущее, «пробным», так сказать, номером. (XXVI, 174.)

Of course, Dostoevskii only succeeded in publishing one more issue before his death, but his so-called ‘profession de foi’ stands as such, in that, in the same manner as the Pushkin Speech, it addresses the central concerns of the *Dnevnik* in a most condensed fashion. In this chapter, Dostoevskii begins with the question of enlightenment from the West, reiterating that whilst it was necessary and desirable to accept scientific and economic instruction from Europe, Russia
has never needed moral or spiritual enlightenment, thanks to the true image of
Christ preserved in the narod. He acknowledges once again the countless
shortcomings of the common people, but continues to emphasise their value in
having the capacity to unite not only Russian society but all humanity. He then
contrasts the essential purity of the people with the corruption and dissociation of
the educated classes who have misused Western enlightenment and turned their
back on their native heritage in the name of progress. Next he argues the case for
individual moral reform according to the spirit of Christianity, and shows how
this is the only route to creating a freely unified brotherhood, whereas broad
social reforms with no moral basis create only atomisation and the need for
coercive union. This argument leads him to demonstrate that the morally
unifying idea of Orthodoxy is Russia's determining trait, which stands in contrast
with the secular cohesion imposed externally by the Roman Catholic Church in
the West. Finally he repeats his belief that Russia is capable of pronouncing a
new word of universal brotherhood, and justifies the passionate tone of his
speech for its ability to awaken hope in his audience. There is nothing new here,
but in a few pages, Dostoevskii reinforces his Pushkin Speech and revisits with
increased certainty, because responding to criticism, his favourite themes of
obosoblenie, tsel'nost' and sobornost' both in Russia and in Europe. Thus the
whole issue for 1880, with its preface, speech and afterword, provides the most
complete statement of Dostoevskii's interpretation of the central concerns of
Slavophilism, and as such may be considered to be the pinnacle of his ideological
expression in his non-fiction.

It now remains to ask: if Dostoevskii infused Dnevnik pisatelia with key
Slavophile concerns, how did he now view the Slavophile movement and his
own ideological position with regard to it? The Dnevnik contains several
references to Slavophilism and Westernism, some more favourable than others,
as well as mentions of leading figures of both movements. What is most
noticeable about the Dnevnik is that its overall tone is one of confident
impartiality. In Vremia it is clear that Dostoevskii needed to demonstrate the
stance of his journal and pochvennichestvo vis à vis Slavophilism and
Westernism; the later publication needs no such definition, assured as it was by
Dostoevskii's name, and he moves towards or away from these movements as it
suits his purposes. One must also bear in mind that by the mid-1870s, Slavophilism and Westernism were no longer so clearly defined, their main protagonists having now died, and Pan-Slavism, Populism and radical nihilism were among those ideologies in ascendency. Dostoevskii’s letters from this time give the impression that privately, he regarded himself now as a Slavophile: in a letter to his wife from Moscow during the preparations for the Pushkin celebrations, he refers to Ivan Aksakov as being ‘from our side’, and says cryptically that even Katkov, ‘человек вовсе не славянофил’, was exhorting him to stay and speak (XXX/i, 169). It may of course be that by 1880, Dostoevskii had gained a reputation as a Slavophile, despite no clear declaration of allegiance, and that it is this reputation, rather than his actual sympathies, to which he alludes here. Certainly, in the Dnevnik, he wrote about individual Slavophiles with great respect, including an obituary for Iurii Samarin in the issue for March 1876, and describing Konstantin Aksakov as ‘незабвенною и дорогого всем русским покойного’ (XXII, 42).

There are a few places in Dnevnik pisatelia where Dostoevskii returns to the subject of the division in the intelligentsia between Slavophiles and Westernisers. In these passages he is much more detached than in, for example, ‘Dva lageria teoretikov’ and does not analyse the arguments of each movement in as much detail. However, he is still concerned with the reconciliation of the parties, and focuses on the points they have in common. In the issue for February 1876, he remarks that they could have been reconciled on the question of the role of the common people in Russian society, but that they interpret the matter differently:

И вот, славянофилы и западники вдруг сходятся в одной и той же мысли, что теперь нужно всего ожидать от народа, что он встал, идет и что он, и только он один, скажет у нас последнее слово. На этом, казалось бы, славянофилам и западникам можно было и примириться; но случилось не так: славянофилы верят в народ, потому что допускают в нём свои собственные, ему свойственные начала, а западники соглашаются верить в народ единственно под тем условием, чтобы у него не было никаких своих собственных начал. (XXII, 40.)

As I have already shown, he returned to the problem of the Westernisers’ notion of the people in the Pushkin Speech and indicated that it was an area for concern. In his reply to Gradovskii, he acknowledges the work of Pushkin and the
Slavophiles in uncovering and publicising the true nature of the *narod*, mentioning Khomiakov, Samarin and Aksakov (XXVI, 156). But before then, in the issue for June 1876, he subjects Westernism to an intense scrutiny and finds there the essence of the common ground with the Slavophiles. He sees in Westernism a fundamental paradox, expressed in the fact that those members of the intelligentsia who embraced European ideals, frequently adhered to the most radical movements that aimed to destroy existing European societal structures. Dostoevskii argues that in their adoption of European radicalism, the Westernisers are unwittingly displaying their innate Russianness and their desire to defend the native Russian spirit by doing away with harmful institutions. He gives Belinskii as an example, claiming that for all his passionate attachment to European socialism, he was the most ardent defender of the Russian cause. The paradox, he writes, lies in the Westernisers’ misinterpretation of Russia:

Тут вышла одна великая ошибка с обеих сторон, и прежде всего, что все эти тогдашие западники Россию смеяли с Европой, приняли за Европу серьезно и — отрицая Европу и порядок ее, думали, что то же самое отрицание можно приложить к России, тогда как Россия вовсе была не Европа, а только ходила в европейском мундире. (XXIII, 40-41.)

This love for Russia that motivates Westernism, however unconsciously, is what Dostoevskii highlights as the source of a potential reconciliation with Slavophilism. For this reason in the Pushkin Speech he presents the other side of the coin, that a real Russian loves Europe as much as her homeland, because of the Russian capacity for universality, and proclaims that the division between Slavophiles and Westernisers is no more than a misunderstanding (XXVI, 147). Nevertheless, as we have seen, he was unable to shake off the doubt that the Westernisers’ view of the people would prevent a reconciliation.

The possibility that Dostoevskii had gained a reputation as a member of the Slavophile movement is strengthened by a letter he wrote to Katkov in 1866. The letter was written in response to the repressive stance of Katkov’s journal *Moskovskie vedomosti* following an attempt on the life of the Tsar by a young Russian student, and in it Dostoevskii affirms: ‘Откровенно говорю, что я был и, кажется, навсегда останусь по убеждениям настоящим славянофилом, кроме крошечных разногласий’ (XXVIII/ii, 154). This statement requires a careful approach for several reasons, and must not be taken
at face value. Firstly, as Frank demonstrates, Dostoevskii is using the label ‘Slavophile’ for a particular purpose in an argument with Katkov where he makes his point with as much diplomacy and obliqueness as possible. In the context of his argument he is intending to show that to be a Slavophile means to trust that the Russian people are in essence loyal, God-fearing subjects of their Tsar, and that repression is not the ideal position to adopt in the wake of the assassination attempt. Secondly, one should not overlook the ‘slight disagreements’ that he professes to have with Slavophilism; it should be clear from my arguments in this chapter where these disagreements lie. Finally, it may be possible to draw from the qualifier ‘nastoiaschchii’ a certain inference: that Dostoevskii had his own very particular idea of what it meant to be a Slavophile. For a description of this particular idea, it is necessary to turn to a section in the issue for July and August 1877 of Dnevnik pisatelia.

In this issue, the reader comes closest to an idea of Dostoevskii’s own perception of his ideological position. The section is entitled ‘Priznaniiia slavianofila’, surely an ironic title designed to mock any opponents (and readers!) who would dismissively put a label on his views. Dostoevskii admits that there are elements of Slavophile thought in his convictions; nevertheless, he was aware that to many intellectuals, Slavophilism meant reactionary extremism, or was akin to Pan-Slavism. Here, he takes the opportunity to emphasise that his beliefs are centred around a moral and spiritual ideal, not simply a desire to return to the past or deny progress, nor a nationalism aiming to further the social and economic power of Russia. He aligns himself with those who believe in Russia’s destiny to establish a spiritual brotherhood based on the pure model of Christianity preserved in the Russian people, and that, he writes, is the kind of Slavophilism to which he belongs (XXV, 195). Immediately, then, he anticipates the response of his opponents that such a proclamation is the expression of religious mania and crazy dreams, and he assumes the appellation ‘Slavophile-dreamer’ with irony. But to Dostoevskii it is precisely because his beliefs, in contrast to those of Westernisers, arise from an idea-feeling rather than from facts or economic developments, that they are all the more precious:

Никогда вы, господа, наши европейцы и западники, столь не любили Европу, сколько мы, мечтатели-славянофилы [...]! Нет, нам дорога эта страна — будущая мирная победа великого
христианского духа, сохранившегося на Востоке... И в опасении столкнуться с нею в текущей войне, мы всего более боимся, что Европа не поймет нас [...]. Ей надо фактов теперь понятных, понятных на ее теперьшний взгляд. (XXV, 198.)

For Dostoevskii, it appears that to be a Slavophile in the truest sense means to uphold the Russian idea, founded on Orthodoxy, and to assert one’s Russianness, as he explained later in the Pushkin Speech, by loving Europe with a spiritually motivated love that expresses the innate Russian desire for universal brotherhood. One may substantiate this interpretation with an entry in his notebook for 1875-1876. Here, he stresses the importance of the religious and folk elements in Slavophilism, and indicates not only his degree of closeness to the movement, but also how long he has been interested in similar concerns:

Я принадлежу частию не столько к убеждениям славянофильским, вернее, к православным, то есть к убеждениям крестьянским, то есть к христианским. Я не разделяю их вполне — их предрассудков и невежества не люблю, но люблю сердце их и всё то, что они любят. Ещё в каторге. (XXIV, 107.)

These remarks, together with those above from the Dnevnik, situate with regard to the intellectual debates of the time the ideology that Dostoevskii had fashioned for himself, and which is so well encapsulated in the Pushkin Speech. Dnevnik pisatelia, then, not only furnishes the reader with a comprehensive exposition of his beliefs, but also their position on the ideological spectrum of nineteenth-century Russian thought.

4 Frank, The Seeds of Revolt, see especially ch. 8.
7 Ward, p. 25.
8 Kjetsaa, A Writer’s Life, p. 54.


13 Viktorovich, p. 115.

14 Kjetsaa, A Writer’s Life, p. 58.


16 Ibid, pp. 536-37.

17 Viktorovich, p. 116.

18 Ibid., p. 116; Ospovat, p. 181.

19 See for example S. Tokarzewski, Siedem lat katorgi (Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1907). G. Kjetsaa also notes in A Writer’s Life, p. 99, that the Omsk prison records show that the only name Dostoevskii changed was his own.


23 Ibid., p. 97.

24 Ibid., pp. 114-27.

25 Ibid., p. 114.

26 Ibid., p. 122.


28 Frank, The Years of Ordeal, p. 63.

29 Ibid., p. 126.

30 Ibid., p. 150.


32 Frank, The Stir of Liberation, pp. 53-54.


34 Frank, The Stir of Liberation, pp. 43-45.

35 For a comprehensive account of Grigor’ev and Dostoevskii’s roles in the pochvennichestvo movement, see Dowler.

36 Viktorovich, p. 120.


38 Dowler, p. 53.

40 A. A. Grigor'ev, Letter to A. N. Maikov, Materialy dlia biografii A. Grigor'eva, ed. by V. Kniazhnin (Petrograd: Pushkinskii dom, 1917), p. 217. Because this edition uses the old orthography, for consistency's sake I have transcribed this quotation.

41 Cited in Dowler, p. 58. Despite following Dowler's references, I have been unable to find the original source for this citation.

42 Dowler, p. 81.

43 As cited by the editors of F. M. Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochenii v 30 tomakh, vol. 18, p. 229.

44 Dowler, p. 73.


46 It is uncertain to which article Dostoevskii is referring, although the editors of the Academy edition make various suggestions in vol. 19, pp. 259-60.


48 Ibid., p. 53.


50 Kjetsaa, A Writer's Life, p. 143.

51 It should be noted that Russians, when referring to 'Europe', mean Western Europe; there has long been much debate over whether the Russians consider themselves to be Europeans or not, and indeed this is one of Dostoevskii's themes.

52 See for example a letter to Strakhov (XXVIII/ii, 26-28), in which Dostoevskii complains that Paris is boring and comments on falsity and lack of ideals behind the Frenchman's façade of politeness and propriety.


55 For a detailed study of Chaadaev's views and writings, see Walicki, especially Chapter 3.


57 Ward, p.78. Ward's mention of Whigs and Tories is interesting, because Khomiakov saw Whiggism as being rationalised individualism which detached the individual from historical traditions, embodied in Toryism. For more explanation on this matter see Christoff, An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism, vol. 1, pp. 217-18, and Walicki, pp. 227-30.

58 Frank, The Stir of Liberation, p. 188.

59 W. J. Birkbeck, Russia and the English Church During the Last Fifty Years, vol. 1 (London: Rivington, Percival and Co., 1895), p. 78.

60 Frank, The Stir of Liberation, p. 185.

61 Ward, pp. 89-90.

62 Ibid., pp. 90-91.

63 The principle of bratsvo or brotherhood was central to the philosophies of N. F. Fedorov; Dostoevskii became interested in his thought later in his career and corresponded with one of Fedorov's disciples.

64 Kjetsaa, A Writer's Life, p. 147.


70 Dostoevskii does not actually use the word *sobornost* anywhere in his writings, a fact that I have verified using V. N. Zakharov’s *Konkordansy vsekh proizvedenii F. M. Dostoevskogo*, most of which are available on the internet at http://www.karelia.ru:8083/-Dostoevsky/dostconclalpha.htm However, his formulation of the principle is so similar to that of Khomiakov’s, that it is appropriate to use the same term with reference to Dostoevskii.


72 Ward, p. 97.


77 Frank, *The Miraculous Years*, pp. 50-54.
Chapter Two: The Dramatisation in Dostoevskii's Fiction of Themes Found in Slavophile Thought.

2.1: Introduction.

There is a famous passage in the notebooks to Podrostok where Dostoevskii rails against his critics and defends the rationale for his works and his method, proclaiming that his glory is in depicting the Underground, the true life of the Russian majority. In this passage he also gives the impression that there is a connection between his motives and the underlying concerns of Slavophilism; he picks out the aspects of Russian life that preoccupy him most, and relates them to his position in the ideological spectrum of the intelligentsia. The text, although familiar, is worth revisiting in the context of the arguments of this study:

Факты. Проходят мимо. Не замечают. Нет граждан, и никто не хочет понатужиться и заставить себя думать и замечать. Я не мог оторваться, и все крики критиков, что я изображаю ненастоящую жизнь, не разубедили меня. Нет оснований нашему обществу, не выжито правил, потому что и жизни не было. Колоссальное потрясение, — и всё прерывается, падает, отрывает, как бы и не существовало. И не внешне лишь, как на Западе, а внутренне, нравственно. [...] Из этого-то (гражданского) чувства я передалось было к славянофилам, думая воскресить мечты детства (читал Карамзина, образы Сергия, Тихона). [...] Как герои, начиная с Сильвио и Героя нашего времени до князя Болконского и Левина, суть только представители малого самолюбия [...]. Причина подполя — уничтожение веры в общие правила. «Нет ничего святого». Недоконченные люди (вследствие Петровской реформы вообще) вроде инженера в «Бесах». (XVI, 329-30.)

It is my belief that in this passage Dostoevskii provides a résumé of the main themes of his work and ties them into a particular ideological viewpoint, that of Slavophilism. He focuses on the rootlessness of Russian society, the lack of a moral connection to his country and the individualism that has taken hold of the educated classes, so that morally, they are no longer Russians. He cites the lack of moral ideals, whose destruction began with the Petrine reforms, as the reason for the existence of the Underground and of fragmented individuals. In other words, he posits obosoblenie, or a lack of unity, as his prime concern. By contrast, he points to his own reverence for his Russian heritage, as exemplified by Karamzin and the Orthodox Holy Fathers, and implies that this awareness of
history has prompted his preoccupation with his country's troubles. Thus he makes the statement that out of 'civic' feeling he nearly joined the Slavophiles.

There is much to be inferred from this statement. Firstly, it is clear from the context of the passage that for Dostoevskii, to have a 'civic' feeling for one's country is to be concerned with it in the moral, rather than in the political or social, sense. There are no 'citizens', he argues, because all are obsessed with petty egoism and have lost reverence for everything that has given Russia her Russianness. However, Dostoevskii's own moral-civic sentiment led him towards the Slavophiles - but he has refrained from joining them. Why is this? In my opinion, Dostoevskii is indicating here that he recognises those aspects of Slavophile ideology that are morally similar to the themes that drive and inform his own work. At the same time, he is acknowledging the problems associated with a particular ideological label, just as he does later in 'Priznaniia slavianofila'. Both here and in the latter article, as I have shown in the previous chapter, Dostoevskii attests to his own interpretation of Slavophilism, which focuses on the moral and spiritual, on the Russian folk heritage and on the essence of Orthodoxy. What is important about the passage from the Podrostok notes, in my view, is that here he establishes this interpretation of Slavophilism as the fundamental rationale of his entire oeuvre, with particular emphasis on his fiction.

In the previous chapter I identified and examined several themes and ideas that are of primary importance to Dostoevskii's non-fiction, and showed how they correspond to the central concerns of Slavophile thought. These themes - organic wholeness, voluntary unity, freedom and brotherhood, and their antitheses - are developed relatively straightforwardly in the non-fiction, and, the artistic bent of Dostoevskii's journalism notwithstanding, they are rarely hidden and usually provide the subject for a polemical discourse. The same themes are also discernible in his fiction, where they function as part of the dramatic structure. Dostoevskii's characters are frequently obsessed by ideas, and in these cases the action of the novel or novella is driven by the way in which the idea affects or motivates the character. Thus Dostoevskii challenges the validity of the ideas as characters come into conflict with each other. It should be noted, nevertheless, that Dostoevskii does not compromise the integrity of his
characters in order to serve the expression of an idea, and this practice often complicates the process of tracing his treatment of certain ideologies, as in the case of the multilayered motives for Raskol'nikov's crime.

The majority of Dostoevskii's post-Siberian fiction is underpinned by the opposition between the same categories as are found in his non-fiction. Just as in his non-fiction, Dostoevskii is primarily concerned with the dissociation of educated Russians from their native soil and thus with the lack in these people of any moral idea that offers unity with their fellow Russians, with their heritage and with their land. The dramatic structure of his fiction functions according to the interaction of those who lack such a unifying idea with those who possess it. Therefore it is possible to examine his fiction in terms of two opposing categories that arise from the beliefs and actions of the characters and the circles in which they move. They may be termed the Kushite category and the Iranian category, because the absence or presence of a unifying moral idea forms the basis of and perpetuates the governing principles of Khomiakov's Kushite and Iranian societies. The essential principles of the Kushite category, as with Khomiakov's Kushite society, are coercion, necessity, and fragmentation or obosoblenie. The great atheists of Dostoevskii's novels belong to this category, as well as characters who have taken on board a variety of ideas derived from European Enlightenment thought. Theoretical or fantastic societies are showcased in the fiction as the result of logical development to the extreme of the ideologies proposed by Kushite characters, and these societies are foreshadowed by Dostoevskii's depiction of Kushite elements in the contemporary setting he gives to his fiction. By contrast, the Iranian category is determined fundamentally by freedom in unity and organic wholeness, or sobornost' and tsel'nost'. Into this category fall the proponents of the Christian faith, the meek characters and those rooted in the Russian traditions of the narod. In addition, ideal societies are given credibility by the depiction of working examples of the Iranian principle in the setting of the novels.

In this chapter I have endeavoured to select the most appropriate examples from Dostoevskii's fiction to illustrate my argument, concentrating for the most part on the post-Siberian works, for it is after this time that the themes I am examining are most prominent. Whilst these themes recur broadly throughout
Dostoevskii's *oeuvre*, constraints of time and space have dictated that some works receive little or no attention, and I have preferred to concentrate on the better known novels and short stories.
2.2: The condition of rootlessness: the Kushite category.

'Недостаток общей, руководящей идеи, затронувшей все образования и все развития [...]. Потеря эта связь, эта руководящая нить, это что-то, что всех удерживало' (XVI, 68). So writes Dostoevskii in his notebooks for Podrostok, apropos of the egoism and lack of faith among the younger generation, elucidating the central theme of his novel. It is a theme that may as well apply to the majority of his post-Siberian fiction, and it illustrates that he was deeply concerned for the future of the educated classes. This concern is expressed in his novels by the portrayal of individuals who latch on to some other pernicious idea to replace that which has been lost, and by demonstration of the effects of these new ideas on their lives. Thus a whole host of different but frequently interrelated ideas obsess his disaffected heroes. The cultural effects of Peter the Great's reforms have cut them off from the rich moral-spiritual heritage of their native soil, and the more they court the prestige of European philosophy, the wider becomes the gulf between them and the common Russian people. That this is the case Dostoevskii has argued powerfully in his non-fiction; in his fiction he dramatises the consequences. The ideas that so consume and damage his heroes originate in Europe, which, in Zimnie zameiliki he has depicted as corrupt and dying. But because these ideas are transplanted into an alien environment, because they have not grown up as part of the development of Russian culture, they become 'HeKoTophIIM cTpaHHhIM H.n.eJlM, KOTopbIe HOCJlTCSI B 03.n.yxe' (XXVIII/ii, 136). By this very phrase Dostoevskii underlines the unhealthiness, rootlessness and ill-thought out nature of the ideas to which the equally spiritually unhealthy and rootless intelligentsia turn for something to live by. However, such ideas cannot provide the same path to true integration with one's fellow men, as can the organic, living values that have grown naturally from the beginnings of Russian society. Instead they are divisive, as Geoffrey Kabat has noted:

Ideas, as they are held by Petersburg man, no longer serve the purpose of communication but rather intensify the individual's isolation by giving him the illusion of completeness [...]. Dostoevsky reveals the origin of these ideas and exposes them as substitutes for "living life".²
The European economic ethic of capitalism is one of the many ideas seized upon by the educated classes. The practice of amassing money takes on a special significance in Dostoevskii's *oeuvre*: as Frank points out, Dostoevskii's Russian characters do not revere it as a mere material commodity, a means of exchange, as do his European characters. Instead they view it as a means to power and self-determination. The contrast between Western and Russian capitalists is most clearly delineated in the novella *Igrok*. The French characters de Griech and Mademoiselle Blanche not only gamble so as to increase their wealth, but associate with the Russian General only in the hopes that he will soon receive a large inheritance. When the source of the inheritance, Babushka, refuses to die and fritters away her fortune at the roulette table, they lose interest in the General. The central Russian character, Aleksei, perceives the moral vacuum in the materialistic motivations of the Europeans and delivers a blistering satirical denunciation of them. He begins with a statement that directly echoes a pronouncement from *Zimnie zametki*, that 'в катехизис добродетелей и достоинств цивилизованного западного человека вошла исторически и чуть ли не в виде главного пункта способность приобретения капиталов' (V, 225). He then continues by describing a typical German household in which the potential of the children is sacrificed to the service of the accumulation of the father's fortune. Such a practice is undertaken willingly by each member of the family, who accept it as honest virtue that a daughter should go without a dowry, or that a younger son must join the army, or that the elder son marries only when he is wealthy enough, even if by then he and his bride are past their prime. Aleksei's satire throughout has resonances in *Zimnie zametki*, especially in the latter work's final chapter depicting the themes of Parisian melodramas; his 'touching' detail of the rustling chestnut trees and the stork on the roof bring to mind the babbling of the Parisian fountains that Dostoevskii connects with the bourgeois's sense of self-satisfaction. These images of outward orderliness and domesticity represent for the author a gloss concealing inner sterility.

Aleksei himself at first does not gamble, unless it is to place a bet on Polina's behalf. But his behaviour is soon affected by the humiliation continually inflicted upon him by the General and his retinue, in whose household he is
engaged as tutor. He begins to gamble with the aim of winning a considerable sum, so as to appear a more impressive suitor in the eyes of Polina, already courted by the mercenary de Grieux and the sympathetic but still stolidly dull English businessman, Mr. Astley. In this respect Aleksei resembles Arkadii Dolgorukii, the hero of Podrostok. Arkadii’s secret ‘Idea’, by which he plans to live his life, is to amass a fortune through a combination of miserly living, calculated buying and selling, and gambling. The possession of this fortune would, he believes, erase the insult of his illegitimacy and accord him a self-image of which to be proud. He does not even plan to spend or flaunt his millions, but to go about in rags, enjoying the secret knowledge of his actual position. This intention demonstrates that the money itself is not the goal, but rather the power, status and pride he imagines it would bring. Both these characters, together with the pawnbroker protagonist of the short story ‘Krotkaia’, and Gania Ivolgin of Idiot, in fact see the acquisition of money as a way of defining themselves and of avenging themselves on a society that has become too preoccupied with material and social status. Such characters have featured in Dostoevskii’s fiction since his early creation Gospodin Prokharchin, published in 1846. Prokharchin is so crushed and downtrodden an individual that his only means of self-determination is a secret hoard of vast wealth, the awareness of which gives him a shred of strength to defend himself from the upbraiding of the clique of lodgers who exclude him. In the post-Siberian fiction, however, the emphasis shifts to an overweening offended vanity as the basis for avarice. Cut off from the wellspring of Russian folk wisdom, the money-seeking characters have no innate faith in themselves as Russians and reinvent a persona founded on pride. When Aleksei finishes his attack on German materialism, he proclaims: ‘Мне деньги нужны для меня самого, а я не считаю всего себя чем-то необходимым и придаочным к капиталу’ (V, 226). It is indeed as an accessory to himself, for his identity, that he needs capital. He is the inverse of that which he has just denounced. Each of these men then devises a distorted morality based on his artificial self-image. For Aleksei, wealth is the entrance to an equal and therefore virtuous marriage; for Arkadii, virtue is to be found in the strength of character needed for the conscious concealment of wealth. Gania expects even more from money: the fortune he is to contract from a marriage of convenience to Nastas’ia Filippovna
is to stand in for the personality and strength of character he has always lacked. Vanity drives his lust for money, for he cannot bear to be thought of as insignificant. For the pawnbroker, money allows him the possibility of lofty magnanimity towards others. His daydream of the future sums up the attitude of all four:

The acquisition of money, especially through gambling, allows Aleksei and Arkadii an additional way of determining themselves; it gives them the opportunity to challenge fate. One of the symptoms of the state of dissociation is the tendency to fatalism, and to believe both in fate, a blind, immutable force capable of crushing the weak, against which individuals are powerless, and in chance, a meaningless, arbitrary force whose vagaries control men’s lives. Such a perception is typical of life by the Kushite principle, expressive of coercion and necessity. It stands in contrast to the attitude of those who live by the Iranian principle, such as Father Zosima and Makar Dolgorukii, who voluntarily and joyfully submit to the will of God and who are empowered by doing so. In gambling, Aleksei and Arkadii see the chance to challenge and perhaps cheat fate. Only by doing this do they believe they can assert their wounded personalities. Substantial wins do not satisfy them; indeed they are simply spurred on to take ever greater risks with their money, intoxicated with the thrill of the situation. Arkadii resolutely denies in his notes that this is the reason for his play (XIII, 229), but argues that cool reasoning and calculation will enable him to be the master of fate. His behaviour contradicts him, however, when a successful day at the tables awakens in him the desire to act outrageously in the face of the other players’ disapproval and say, ‘на все плону!’ (XXIII, 229). Aleksei, too, is overcome by the excitement of the game and plays recklessly, suddenly fearless when luck goes his way and it appears to him that he has truly controlled chance. His attitude to the game is reminiscent of the Underground
Man’s vain rebellion against the determinist principles of utilitarianism: ‘во мне родилось какое-то странное ощущение, какой-то вызов судьбе, какое-то желание дать ей щелчок, выставить ей язык’ (V, 224). His actions and those of Arkadii also find a parallel in the behaviour of the convicts described in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, who suddenly go on a spree of drunkenness or violence, simply to assert their crushed personalities in the face of the meaningless, inexorable force of penal servitude. Naturally, Aleksei and Arkadii’s bravado does not last, nor does it in the end bring them anything but more humiliation. Indeed the struggle against fate or chance only serves to reinforce the impression of their unconquerability, and they become the victims of their own misconceptions.

Thus, the fruits of the sterile seed of material wealth are isolation, cynicism and despair. Arkadii shuns his family whilst in pursuit of his ‘Idea’, convinced that independence and a radical break with all society is necessary for its implementation. His gambling loses him friends as well as money as he quarrels with Prince Sergei. Aleksei is blind to the fact that Polina loves him regardless of his social status and that she is insulted that he should believe wealth would distinguish him in her eyes. Gripped by the lust for the power he feels at the roulette table, he becomes insensible of anyone else’s needs but his own. After taking advantage of Polina, who is hysterical after an insult from de Grieux, he runs away to Paris with Mademoiselle Blanche for a life of debauchery. Frank’s analysis is that this act is also motivated by the drive to take risks and dare to challenge fate.6 Aleksei ends up eventually alone, having to take jobs as a manservant, embittered, defensive, and dependent on the false sense of glory provided by a win to mitigate for a time his growing self-loathing:

Если б они знали, до какой степени я сам понимаю всю омерзительность теперешнего моего состояния, то, конечно, уж не повернулся бы у них язык учит меня. [...] Тут дело в том, что – один оборот колеса и всё изменяется, и эти же самые моралисты первые (я в этом уверен) придут с дружескими шутками поздравлять меня. И не будут от меня все так отворачиваться, как теперь. Да наплевать на них на всех! (V, 311.)

The pawnbroker, too, finds no consolation in his dream of a Crimean villa after his wife, the ‘Krotkaia’ of the title, commits suicide, driven away by his self-centred calculations and his pride. He also is left alone with his despair, his futile
protests against fate that he arrived too late to stop her, and his inability to perceive any possibility of communion with other men: 'ЛЮДИ НА ЗЕМЛЕ ОДНИ — ВОТ БЕДА! [...] ВСЁ МЕРТВО, И ВСЮДУ МЕРТВЕЦЫ' (XXIV, 35). Gania Ivolgin's self-invented identity dissolves the minute it is put under strain. When Nastasia Filippovna throws a hundred thousand rubles into the fire for him to pluck out, he is riven by the struggle between his vanity and his avarice, and he collapses, thereafter left to play a much less significant role in the novel, which serves to emphasise the failure of his plan to stand out. In this way Dostoevskii demonstrates that the Kushite way results in obosoblenie, the dissociation of individuals from society and the fragmentation of personality. Only Arkadii Dolgorukii succeeds in seeing beyond the narrow confines of his 'Idea', thanks to the love and support of his family. Although the novel concludes with his hesitation over whether to go to university or pursue a completely new but undescribed version of his 'Idea', the reader has every reason to hope that he will follow the sound advice of Tatiana Pavlovna and Nikolai Semenovich and choose the broad path of education.

Closely related to the notion of capitalism is the theory of self-interest. I do not call it enlightened self-interest, as its proponents referred to it, because Dostoevskii shows in his fiction that there is little of true enlightenment in it. The theory was given its Russian form by Nikolai Chernyshevskii, who advocated that although human beings primarily desire the satisfaction of their own interests, reason would enlighten mankind that it is more 'useful' to identify personal interests with those of the majority. This so-called 'enlightened' self-interest formed part of Chernyshevskii's utilitarian ethic, which proposed that thought and will in man were subject to the laws of physical science. From this basis he argued that crime results from a poor environment, and that only that which is useful is good. It is well known that Dostoevskii strongly disagreed with Chernyshevskii's views, and engaged in a polemic with him that shaped both his fiction and non-fiction for many years. This polemic reached its height in the works Zapiski iz podpol'ia and Prestuplenie i nakazanie. The character Luzhin in the latter novel adheres to the theory of self-interest, and in the novel he functions as a mirror that reflects back to Raskol'nikov the ugly consequences of his beliefs. Seen from the perspective of Slavophile thought, Chernyshevskian
self-interest and utilitarianism deny the existence of a spiritual element in man's nature. Kireevskii roundly condemned the dominance of rationalism over other forms of cognition, which had given rise to rational egoism, in his 1839 article ‘V otvet A. S. Khomiakovu’. Limiting man to a product of physics, chemistry and biology has the effect of negating spontaneous emotional responses such as compassion, and of making man more in the image of the mute, fleshly Kushites, who concern themselves with the body and all that is external, as envisaged by Khomiakov. This is the approach taken by Dostoevskii in his portrayal of Luzhin, a man devoid of fellow-feeling and entirely self-serving.

Luzhin expresses his ideology as follows:

Если мне, например, до сих пор говорили: «возлюби», и я возлюблял, то что из того выходило? [...] Выходило то, что я рвал каftан пополам, делился с ближним, и оба мы оставались наполовину голы [...]. Наука же говорит: возлюби, прежде всех, одного себя, ибо всё на свете на личном интересе основано. [...] Стало быть, приобретая единственно и исключительно себе, я именно тем самым приобретаю как бы и всем и веду к тому, чтобы ближний получил несколько более равного каftана и уже не от частных, единичных щедрот, а вследствие всеобщего преуспеяния. (VI, 116.)

He indeed lives by the utilitarian maxim ‘love thyself’, for his motives are governed by a desire for self-aggrandisement, sought in the engagement to the noble-hearted Dunia and in his despicable scheme to discredit Sonia. His pompous, inflated manner and contemptuous treatment of Raskol'nikov’s mother and sister, as well as Sonia, instantly raise Raskol'nikov’s hackles. But the latter is unaware of the suppression of his own spontaneous compassionate instincts, resulting from his own adoption of the utilitarian ethic. Throughout the novel, whenever he finds himself responding with sympathy to the plight of another, he immediately checks himself or curses his action. For example, his instinctive response to the sight of a teenage girl, who has clearly been the victim of some kind of abuse and who is being pursued by an elderly lecher, is to call a policeman and offer money for her safe return home. But almost straight afterwards, he regrets his kindness and questions its ‘usefulness’, reasoning to himself:

Это, говорят, так и следует. Такой процент, говорят должен уходить каждый год... куда-то... к черту, должно быть, чтоб остальных освежать и им не мешать. Процент! Славные, право, у
As he stifles his compassion, his perception of the girl as a human being changes to that of a number, an impersonal percentage. Stripping her of her humanity, he denies the image of God in her and damages it in himself as he excises his spontaneous love for his neighbour. The ultimate conclusion of his self-deception with utilitarianism is of course the double murder. He himself identifies murder, the literal destruction of humanity, as the direct consequence of the figurative destruction of humanity inherent in Luzhin’s argument: ‘А доведите до последствий, что вы давно проповедовали, и выйдет, что людей можно резать’ (VI, 118). However, he fails consciously to associate this conclusion with his own actions.

Dostoevskii’s rootless characters have no connection with their spiritual heritage, and thus are prone to disregard moral responses traditionally associated with the heart, such as compassion or Christian charity, which is motivated by respect for the image of God in the other. Instead they place their faith in the mind, in science and rationalism, and attempt to construct their own moral systems based on logical argument. But when rationalism supersedes or dominates the impulses of the heart, disorder and fragmentation result. The Ridiculous Man, the protagonist of the short story ‘Son smeshnogo cheloveka’, drives himself to the brink of suicide through his slavery to rationalism. He is a self-confessed ‘современному русскому прогрессисту и гнусному петербуржцу’ (XXV, 113), in other words a man contaminated by Western principles. His life has been dominated by rational enquiry, which could not offer him more than a limited view of his existence as absurd, hence his conclusion that he is a ridiculous man: ‘Так что для меня вся моя университетская наука как бы для того только и существовала под конец, чтобы доказывать и объяснять мне, […] что я смешон’ (XXV, 104). The awareness of his absurdity cuts him off from his fellow men and invites their ridicule. His pursuit of rationalism leads him to suicide. But the inclination to suicide is interrupted by a little girl, destitute and begging in terror for his help. Despite a moment of pity for her, he brushes her aside, and on his return home, surprised at the flicker of an emotion not dominated by rationalism, he puts off his suicide in order to analyse the reason for his suppression of compassion. His
logical mind causes him to argue to himself that in spite of his natural impulse to help the child, he deliberately refused to do so in order to be consistent; if life is so absurd that nothing matters to him and he is about to end his life, why should he be concerned with another? His subsequent dream, which begins with his shooting himself in the heart, rather than in the head as he had planned, indicates the beginning of an awareness that rationalism destroys the traditional centre of moral-spiritual values.

Versilov is another character whose dependence on his own mind almost results in self-destruction. He has the same obsession with self-interest as Luzhin, although by far more subtly expressed: the sentiment of the bald statement of the notebooks, 'хочу жить в свою задницу' (XVI, 43), has been softened into an underlying attitude by the final version. In the notebooks Dostoevskii takes him through many incarnations, envisioning him committing a variety of nefarious deeds, but the closer he comes to the final version of Versilov, the more the character is associated with ideas rather than actions. Edward Wasiolek asserts that Dostoevskii's intention is to show that Versilov may well adhere to some just ideas, but that in the final analysis, the worth of the idea itself is immaterial if the attraction to it stems from the mind and not the heart:

It may seem strange for Dostoevsky to give Versilov some of his precious ideas, but here – at least in germ – and in the final version, Dostoevsky shows us how "truths" can become "errors" in the words of Versilov. Versilov often has the right ideas, but always the wrong movement of his heart, or no movement at all (italics added).9

As an educated man, Versilov’s governing ideology is to look to his own mind and will for moral guidance, and so he follows the path already trodden by Western culture and society, as identified by Kireevskii and Khomiakov: he attempts to devise a faith based on reason. This is demonstrated by his dream of the Golden Age, in which he arrives at Christ from a starting point of a religion of humanity (XIII, 378-79), and by his insistence to Arkadii on the impossibility, and therefore the necessity, of loving one’s neighbour:
From these examples of his ideology, it can be seen that not only is it an abstract, theoretical ideology — for it is not based on an interaction with real people — but its rational foundation destroys the voluntary aspect of Christian love, suppresses the heart-centred emotional response, and returns the emphasis to the self.

However, Versilov is tormented by his spontaneous and largely irrational love for Katerina Nikolaevna. He therefore becomes a man whose actions are diametrically opposed to his beliefs. Although his love is sexual, rather than charitable, he still struggles against it, tries to rationalise his own and Katerina’s behaviour. As Wasiolek comments: ‘One way or another she too must be brought under his command: either by loving him and acknowledging his perfections, or by being unworthy of his love. She must be the best of women — if she loves him — or the worst of women, if she does not.’ At the same time he mostly disregards the charitable love he feels towards Sonia and his family. Consequently his personality splinters and he becomes divided against himself, hence the appearance of the so-called ‘double’ Versilov, by which he and his family explain his turmoil. Mochulsky makes the interesting but surely misguided assertion that ‘Versilov’s personality [...] is organically collective’, explaining in a note that by this phrase he means sobornyi; my arguments, however, demonstrate that there is no sobornost’ or tsel’nost’ in Versilov. The only path for him out of such fragmentation is self-destruction, and so he tries to shoot himself. Once again, Dostoevskii depicts with convincing power the sterile flower of rationalism, self-interest and suppression of the heart.

Those of Dostoevskii’s characters who commit themselves to a life organised around rational or scientific principles frequently find themselves, sometimes much to their own surprise, as is the case with Shigalev, devising a system for the categorisation and control of mankind, in order to create the perfect society. Raskol’nikov has his Superman theory, Kirillov believes in the age of the man-god, Shigalev despairingly advocates unlimited despotism and Ivan Karamazov invents the world of the Grand Inquisitor. All of their systems have in common logical argument and rationalism as a basis for one’s attitude towards one’s fellow men. Since the individual features of these systems have
been thoroughly examined throughout the critical literature, I wish to focus on
the fact that they are systems, to consider what constitutes a system and how the
nature of system may affect the individual.

In Dostoevskii’s oeuvre, system has negative associations. It seeks to
create order and to regulate life, ostensibly for man’s benefit, according to the
dictates of reason. It is formulaic and is designed so that all of mankind has a
place in it, with no exceptions. It is man-made, and therefore artificial, and rather
than having developed naturally and spontaneously, it needs to be imposed from
without, usually by force. Thus it is a formal order, not an organic order. It is, in
other words, Dostoevskii’s own version of Kushitism. Under such a system, the
individual, whom it is intended to benefit, must be stripped of his essential
humanity so as to be part of the order; this requires either the removal of his free
will, or the denial of his compassion, or sometimes both. Needless to say, there is
no room for Christian principles, for the image of God in man is not recognised.
All of the aforementioned systems share these characteristics. In Dostoevskii’s
novels, the characters who dream up such systems may incur disaster as they try
to implement them, or they may simply be driven to despair by their own beliefs,
unable to break out of their circle of logic. However, there is one novella in
which the author depicts with frightening veracity how the individual may be
tortured and crippled by life under a man-made system. That is Zapiski iz
podpol’ia. Sometimes referred to as a prologue to Dostoevskii’s mature fiction, I
would argue that it is rather an exposition in concentrated form of the motif that
is an essential part of the dynamic of later novels. Many comprehensive studies
and interpretations of this work exist, including Frank’s thorough analysis in the
third volume of his Dostoevskii series, and so I do not consider it necessary to
offer here a complete reading of this highly complex novella. Instead I shall
attend only to those aspects of Zapiski iz podpol’ia that portray the Underground
Man’s struggle against the system depicted in the work, while wishing to
emphasise that my examination leaves untouched many of its vital elements.

The Underground Man is, like the Ridiculous Man, a lifelong inhabitant
of St. Petersburg, which in Dostoevskii’s language means that he is a follower of
progressive ideas. To live in Petersburg is to live in ‘самом отвлечённом и
умышленном городе на всем земном шаре’ (V, 101); thus the city is
designated the origin of abstract ideologies and 'intentional' or artificially constructed systems. The system to which the Underground Man is subject is governed by the principles of scientific determinism and self-interest, as propagated by Chernyshevskii at that time. Although the system does not exist as a socio-political structure, it has arisen on the level of an ideology whose logic the Underground Man finds irrefutable. As an educated man, brought up on European enlightenment principles, he is completely detached from his Russian heritage and has no defence against the influence of such ideas. His Petersburg mind tells him that it is true that all human actions can be categorised or codified by the laws of science, and that this will enable man to act only in his own best interest. However, although his human nature cannot accept such a 'truth', he is not equipped to find an adequate answer to it.

The ideological system that traps the Underground Man renders his every action invalid. The determinist 'laws of nature,' which are supposedly the reason for everything he does, eliminate any need for compassion or altruism, for these are spontaneous, voluntary responses to another human being. Also denied are any grounds for taking offence, because the offender's actions too are governed by determinist laws. The Underground Man therefore consciously and deliberately suppresses any impulse that is not egoistic, despite a natural tendency to respond amiably to friendly gestures:

[...] в сущности никогда не мог сделать злым. Я поминутно сознавал в себе много-премного самых противоположных тому элементов. Я чувствовал, что они так и кишают во мне, эти противоположные элементы. Я знал, что они всю жизнь во мне кишили и из меня вон наружу просились, но я их не пускал, не пускал, нарочно не пускал наружу. (V, 100.)

His deliberate egoism is visible in his encounters – not quite interactions – with his colleagues and his old schoolmates. His egoism has from an early age been exacerbated by a consciousness of intellectual superiority and greater moral awareness, by which he can justify his aloofness and despotism. In his dreams of glory, which strongly resemble those of Arkadii Dolgorukii and the pawnbroker in 'Krotkaia', he admits that love for another is unnecessary:

Но сколько любви, господи, сколько любви переживал я, бывало, в этих мечтах моих, в этих «спасеньях во всё прекрасное и высокое»: хоть и фантастической любви, хоть и никогда ни к чему человеческому на деле не прилагавшейся, но до того было ее
много, этой любви, что потом, на деле, уж и потребности даже не ощущалось ее прилагать: излишняя б уж это роскошь была. (V, 133.)

His attempts at relationships with other people do not allow for free two-way exchanges: all his actions, including the preposterous bumping duel with the officer in the street, are designed to make the other respond to him, whether by provoking the other with magnanimity or humiliation. Friendship for him is a question of tyranny; with his colleagues he engages in pointless disputes and with his old schoolmates he foists his obviously unwanted company on their festivities. Finally, his egoism culminates in his deliberate cruelty to Liza, the prostitute who offers him compassion.

Human emotional responses are not the only casualty of the Chernyshevskian system: free will is also rationalised away by those pitiless scientific laws. Just as the Underground Man begins to protest that independent volition is dearer to man than his own best interests, he is brought up against the stone wall of science: 'Я только что хотел было прокричать, что хотелъ вдь черт знает от чего зависит и что это, пожалуй, и слава богу, да вспомнил про науку-то и... оселся' (V, 114). He knows that the system is directing mankind towards the tabulation of wants and desires so that they will coincide with man's best interests, and that this is 'действительно математика' (V, 115). All he can do is vainly bang his head against the stone wall and persist in what he knows is an irrational and degrading revolt: to act out of spite, or in other words, for no reason at all. A rebellion against a system of necessity, and thus born out of that system, will never transcend necessity. His heightened awareness of the intricacies of the system paralyse him; it is because he understands the implications of its laws so well that he is imprisoned in the Underground:

Ведь прямой, законный, непосредственный плод сознания - это инерция, то есть сознательное сложа-руки-сиденье. [...] Повторяемо, усиленно повторяю: все непосредственные люди и деятели потому и деятельны, что они тупы и ограничены. (V, 108.)

But even as he spitefully cries that two times two make five, he concedes that the inertia of the Underground, his only solution, is no solution (V, 121). As Robert Louis Jackson demonstrates in his comparison of the treatment of reason in Zapiski iz podpol'ia and Zapiski iz mervogo doma, 'Reason has become
irrational; it not only has ceased to serve the individual as a guide, but – as an incarnation of seemingly ineluctable order – threatens to annihilate the individual. To which the individual responds with... convulsions.\textsuperscript{12} The nullity of free will and all emotional responses, whether love or hate, kindness or resentment, means that the Underground Man is not any kind of man: he longs to be able to say something about himself, even something negative, for example that he is lazy. But his despairing adherence to the system and denial of the validity of natural human responses has stripped him of his humanity. He is not any kind of man, he is an organ stop, or a piano key, doomed to click in time to the workings of the system. The novella is Dostoevskii’s grim testimony to the dehumanising effect of the system.

At this point it is fitting to examine the short story ‘Krotkaia’ in more detail, as a contrast to \textit{Zapiski iz podpol’ia}. The pawnbroker protagonist shares many traits with the Underground Man, particularly his sense of indignant hurt pride and his egoistic approach to relationships. He also lives according to a system, but one of his own intentional creation. The story can be interpreted as a study of the consequences of Western principles governing the pawnbroker’s life and his relationship with the meek girl. It is striking that the pawnbroker exhibits many of the characteristics mentioned by Kireevskii as pertaining to Western society, these characteristics being the weakness of family ties and an emphasis on materialism.\textsuperscript{13} The pawnbroker’s life is organised entirely according to self-interest and the acquisition of material wealth. He is a solitary character whom, he claims, nobody has ever liked. The reader learns almost nothing of his background; there is mention of a married sister and a godmother, but only in relation to how he acquired or lost money, so any family he might have had functions for him only as a means to a material end. Like many of Dostoevskii’s dissociated, Westernised characters, such as Svidrigailov for instance, he imagines the final solution to his problems to lie outside of Russia, somewhere in the West – in his case in Boulogne. He is also given to the kind of smugness which Kireevskii states is a Western trait, in contrast to the Russian’s natural humility. Kireevskii wrote: ‘Западный, говоря вообще, почти всегда доволен своим нравственным состоянием; почти каждый из Европейцев всегда готов, с гордостью ударяя себя по сердцу,
The pawnbroker's frequent justifications for his behaviour, his efforts to command respect and awe from his wife, and his indignation that she might not love him, are evidence of this kind of self-satisfaction.

The pawnbroker's Western traits make him a man living in dissociation, cut off from his fellow men and motivated by selfish drives. Therefore his relationship with the meek girl is also one of dissociation. He can only relate to her as something he can possess: he thinks of her as his own; he claims he needs a friend but only one whom he can fashion according to his own selfish design. Every one of his actions towards her is calculated to have a certain effect, to bend her to his will or to coerce her into loving him; should he fail, his next action is intended as revenge. This cycle of battle, victory and injury is like a duel, as both Jackson and R. N. Poddubnaia have noted, and he forces her to fight with him by rebutting every attempt of hers to relate to him with love and selflessness. Their duel also is a reflection of Kireevskii's view of the development of European society as arising out of conflict, hatred and oppression. The pawnbroker is like the nobleman who, as Kireevskii wrote, 'стремилась сделатьсь сама верховным законом своих отношений к другим', whose heart was 'со всех сторон защищенное железом и гордостью' and who formulated rules to govern his external relations with other noblemen; he thinks up a system for dealing with his young wife and sticks to it. When his attempts to reify her fail, he can only conceive of their relationship as continuing in the reverse of his system, with him as her object, her lapdog. When things go wrong for him, he demonstrates his dissociation by blaming blind chance, an immutable external force, rather than recognising his part in the mutuality of relationships, of which the moral universe is composed. Both the pawnbroker and his precursor, the Underground Man, base their personal interactions on the powerplay between tyranny and slavery. Such relationships depend on the domination of one individual will over another, and the antagonism of the duel is the process whereby the domination is decided, as with the Underground Man's bumping duel with the officer. The Underground Man's analysis of his own attitude to relationships aptly describes the pawnbroker's marriage to the meek
girl, and demonstrates the egoism that underlies the motivations of a Kushite and degrades the obraz of the other:

Был у меня раз как-то и друг. Но я уже был деспот в душе; я хотел неограниченно властвовать над его душой; я хотел вселить в него презрение к окружающей его среде; я потребовал от него высокомерного и окончательного разрыва с этой средой. Я испугал его моей страстной дружбой; я доводил его до слез, до судорог; он был наивная и отдающаяся душа; но когда он отдался мне весь, я тотчас же возненавидел его и оттолкнул от себя, – точно он и нужен был мне только для одержания над ним победы, для одного его подчинения. (V, 140.)

However, the meek girl escapes the system into which the pawnbroker tries to force her. She is not of the Western kind; her life is not governed by materialism, as she needs money and work so that she may help to support her family. She does not create systems or justify her actions with rational argument, and therefore her husband cannot make himself understood; he notes with contempt, 'Тут прямолинейность, незнание жизни, юные дешевые убеждения, слепота куриня «прекрасных сердец»' (XXIV, 16). In fact her simplicity, her convictions and her awareness of 'beautiful hearts' are not immature, cheap or blind, but show her personal tsel'nost'. She retains the wholeness of her image, in spite of the pawnbroker's attempts to possess it, and notwithstanding the desperate actions to which he drives her. Her pawning of the icon to him symbolises her initial voluntary submission of herself, of her obraz, to him. But she does not find sobornost', because the action is not reciprocated; the love and the voluntary renunciation of the self are not mutual. For a short period of time she manages to transcend his system, and expresses her freedom by forgetting his presence and singing. Her anguished cry, 'А я думала, что вы меня оставите макс' (XXIV, 28), is an expression of her pain of being forced into a new system, not a reproach for his neglect, as he interprets it. So when her husband insists that the roles of tyrant and victim be reversed, her only way out is to throw herself from the window, clutching the icon she pawned, thus symbolising the escape of her image from his objectification.

The pawnbroker is left trying to comprehend what has happened. He cannot assimilate her death into his rational, self-centred interpretation of their relationship. He evades his responsibility for her suicide by blaming blind chance that he did not return home in time to stop her. The story is his attempt to make
sense of their marriage and her death, but his dissociation, his reliance on reason and analysis lead him to a distortion of the truth. Dostoevskii’s preface to the story is intriguing, because the author suggests that the pawnbroker really does achieve an understanding of the events: ‘Мало-помалу он действительно уясняет себе дело и собирает «мыслы в точку». Ряд вызванных им воспоминаний неотразимо приводит его наконец к правде […] Истина открывается несчастному довольно ясно и определительно, по крайней мере для него самого’ (XXIV, 5). However, this is clearly ironic, because Dostoevskii’s italics suggest a particular significance to the process of ‘making clear’, and a deeper meaning of ‘truth’. Also, the full force of the phrase ‘по крайней мере для него самого’ is not apparent until the end of the story. The so-called truth to which the pawnbroker’s Western mind leads him is not real truth; all he is able to discover is the lifeless despair of his dissociation, and a vague recollection of sobornost’ means nothing to him: ‘Одни только люди, а кругом них молчание — вот земля! «Люди, любите друг друга» — кто это сказал? чей это завет?’ (XXIV, 35).

In other later creations, Dostoevskii explored in greater depth many of the characteristics that he had studied closely for the first time in the Underground Man. This character’s protest on behalf of his individual will, and his pride, are found particularly in Raskol’nikov, Kirillov and Stavrogin. These three characters have in common the fact that they all try to direct their lives according to the assertion of their will. This desire is based on pride, as Wasiotek writes with regard to Versilov: ‘But for Dostoevskii the effort of will is the work of pride. What looks like self-sacrifice and self-command are really self-indulgence and self-satisfaction.’17 The self-will and pride of Versilov is much more subtly expressed than in Raskol’nikov, Kirillov and Stavrogin; however, all these characters arrive at their ideology of self-will because, as educated noblemen, they do not have the support of traditional Russian values. Without the heritage of instinctive sobornost’, which has instead been replaced by European principles based on egoism, they look to the self as a starting point for a code of morality, and this practice leads to pride. Pride then gives rise to a breakdown in normal relations with other people, and the characters become isolated fragments who cannot interact on a social, moral or spiritual level. The Western cult of
Rationalism encourages the perception of others as objects or numbers, and pride demands that these objects be controlled or possessed. Hence Versilov must shape Katerina Nikolaevna according to his own design, just as the Underground Man tries to do in his attempts at friendship and as the pawnbroker does in his marriage to the meek girl. As I mentioned in my previous chapter, Viacheslav Ivanov noted that in Dostoevskii's opinion, to objectify the Other is to violate a moral and religious principle. I have shown that this principle is sobornost', or mutual love and voluntary self-abnegation.

Raskol'nikov is afflicted with the same consciousness of his own superior intelligence and perception as the Underground Man. Like his fictional predecessor, he remains aloof from his fellow students and does not make friends easily. He sees the moral disorder around him and his sensitive disposition is outraged and offended. As he shies away from the chaos of Petersburg's poorer quarters and shuts himself up in his coffin-like room, the new, 'strange, unfinished ideas' of Western origin take a hold in his mind. In this stifling, irritable and isolated atmosphere, he draws up his theory of the Napoleonic superman, permitted to step across conventional moral boundaries in pursuit of glory, whilst the ordinary masses are compelled to live within the restrictions of these boundaries. His theoretical view of society smacks of Kushitism: it is based on a distinct hierarchy where the masses are obliged to follow external laws, rather than voluntarily regulate their behaviour for the sake of others. His theory is contaminated by Chernyshevskian utilitarianism, which encourages him to view acts, and then people, in terms of their usefulness to society. Raskol'nikov's theory and his resulting double murder stem from and exacerbate his overweening pride. This pride is expressed in a contempt for all who surround him, which, together with his acceptance of rationalism, frustrates his spontaneous compassionate impulses. He despises Alena for her dishonourable profession, her miserly behaviour and her cruel treatment of Lizaveta; he is ready to despise his sister if she marries Luzhin; he sneers at the efforts of the police to trap him into confessing. He wants to help the girl who has been seduced, but then pours scorn on the feebleness of the necessary 'percentage' that must go to rack and ruin; he leaves some money at the Marmeladovs', but scolds himself for a gesture that in economic terms is a useless drop in the ocean. When everything
around him in the stinking heat of the Petersburg summer appears degraded and deformed, his arrogant desperation not to be part of the masses combines with his outrage at their existence.

Thus Raskol'nikov's superman theory combines with utilitarianism and he conceives of a crime that will not only prove him to be above the conventions that regulate the masses, but by ridding the world of a 'useless' individual and providing him with wealth (a means of doing good deeds), it will also give him the resources to 'correct' the dysfunctional society he despises so much. There are grounds for believing that Raskol'nikov's moments of compassion are connected to his pride and his contempt for people around him; the notebooks to *Prestuplenie i nakazanie* frequently repeat the exclamation: 'Как гадки люди!' (VII, 82). This is followed on one occasion by the phrase: 'Нет! Сброси их в руки и потом делать им добро. А тут: гнуть как гнеды в их глазах и возбуждать только насмешки' (VII, 83). Wasiolek comments that Raskol'nikov feels compassion when people are groaning in their weakness before him and that he committed his crime not to help them, but to 'tower above them.' The notebooks also make much of his 'satanic' or 'diabolical' pride. Thus he murders, as a test of his will, to prove to himself that, like God, he can grant or dispose of life at will, whether or not he then choose to use his power to help or damn society, as he eventually confesses to Sonia (VI, 322). His pride stays with him to the very last, and even his horror at his crime stems at least in part from the conceit that to kill a wretched money lender is not a grandiose enough test of his will (VI, 319).

However, Raskol'nikov's pride, his Kushite conception of society and the suppression of his compassion - in other words, the very principles that motivate his actions - work directly against him. As is the case with all of Dostoevskii's self-willed heroes, his theory contains the seeds of its own disproof and of his downfall. Instead of opening up to him the possibility of participation in modern society, whether as an intellectual embracing scientific rationalism, or as a Napoleon, or even as one of the louse-like masses, Raskol'nikov's ideas cut him off from all of humanity. He cannot bear the company of his friends and family, he wanders, wraith-like, through the streets of St. Petersburg contemplating suicide (the ultimate act of self-isolation) and even his fellow criminals in Siberia
shun him. Society does not function in the way that European enlightenment has led him to believe, and until he accepts this fact and learns the precious Russian way, he cannot be a member of the human brotherhood. Pride and rationalism objectify the Other, thus denying the image of God in him and removing the principle of equality. But the process is reciprocal: if all men are not brothers in Christ, then they are meaningless, disconnected atoms, fated to destroy each other and themselves, as Raskol'nikov’s dream of the microbes demonstrates. Zosima in Brat’ia Karamazovy teaches that each is responsible for all and that all life is interconnected; pride and the assertion of self-will disrupt the mutuality of relationships and break the link of sobornost’. If he cannot learn to renounce the self, Raskol’nikov must follow the path of Svidrigailov, that is to test the will with ever more base actions, until only the final test of suicide remains.

In Besy, the characters of Stavrogin and Kirillov display the qualities of pride and self-will extrapolated to a more intense degree than in Raskol’nikov. Nancy Anderson identifies the difference between Stavrogin and Raskol’nikov as follows:

In his turn to crime as a means of demonstrating his superiority to anything which might constrain his will, Stavrogin is reminiscent of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment; but there is a crucial difference. Raskolnikov’s crime reflects a distorted morality: he repeatedly describes the predatory old pawnbroker who was his victim as unworthy of pity, and argues that his action not only caused no harm to humanity, but was perhaps even a benefit. Stavrogin’s crime reflects a total, conscious rejection of morality: he has chosen the victim who most deserves pity [Matresha], and chosen her for that reason; he is trying to kill the very sentiment of pity within himself.20

Stavrogin’s deliberate rejection of morality is evidence of the total rootlessness of the Russian educated classes that Dostoevskii depicts so strikingly in this novel. Here the reader finds a whole menagerie of dissociated characters, whose life-long experience of obosoblenie leaves them groping in all directions for a point of anchorage. Besy is Dostoevskii’s portrait of nihilism: not simply of the political movement, but of nihilism as he understood it, in moral and spiritual terms.21 He saw nihilism as the convulsions of the gentry whose lack of roots in the Russian soil was producing only sterility and eventual death. This went beyond the advocacy of radical, destructive revolution as proposed by Nechaev and Dostoevskii’s own Petr Verkhovenskii; nihilism as an ‘idea-feeling’ was present in the self-willed rejection of morality of the Stavrogins, in the logical
atheism of the Kirillovs and in the hapless nationalism of the Shatovs. He wrote to Maikov in March 1870: ‘Про нигилизм говорить нечего. Подождите, пока совсем перегниет этот верхний слой, оторвавшийся от почвы России’ (XXIX/i, 119). This remark clearly contains the essence of Dostoevskii’s thinking behind the inspired choice of the miracle of the Gadarene swine as the novel’s epigraph and Stepan Trofimovich’s commentary on it (he made plain the connection in another letter to Maikov later that year (XXIX/i, 145). The total immersion of the youth of the educated classes in principles derived from obosoblenie can only result in self-destruction.

_Besy_ is the novel where the characters are furthest from the saving powers of the Russian heritage, and the vast distance is illustrated in the starkest expressions of pride, self-will, unbelief and despair. Stavrogin is a character whose detachment from the spiritual current of human existence is so complete that Dostoevskii depicts him as having barely any life at all: thus his mother catches a glimpse of an apparent corpse in place of her sleeping son. His pride lies in his certainty of the mastery of his will; he believes he can turn it to any purpose, or choose not to employ it at all. This attribute, one might think, should furnish him with unlimited strength; instead, Stavrogin is utterly impotent, paying the price of complete indifference for unchecked freedom. His self-constructed persona is hollow, for it lacks the moral centre of a spiritual heritage, and in the end it can only collapse in on itself. His suicide note to Dasha attests to this vacuum: ‘Обо всём можно спорить бесконечно, но из меня вылилось одно отрицание, без всякого великолушия и безо всякой силы. Даже отрицания не вылилось’ (X, 514). The notebooks for the novel reinforce Dostoevskii’s emphasis on Stavrogin’s total indulgence of the self, and show how he links it to the state of being uprooted from the Russian soil. The following passage at the same time stresses Stavrogin’s persistent refusal to adhere to any set of beliefs or standards at all, and so presents the reader with an encapsulation of his negation of negation, bankruptcy and rootlessness:

Он высока и умеет быть сам по себе, т. е. уклониться и от бар, и от западников, и от нигилистов [...] Он отделяется мыслью, что не находит надобности быть русским, но когда ему доказывают нелепость того, что он сказал, он уклоняется в фразу — что он сам по себе. [...] Мысль же автора: выставить человека, который сознал, что ему недостает почвы. (XI, 134-35.)
Pride and self-will therefore become in Stavrogin more than the unwitting disruption of *sobornost'* as they are in Raskol'nikov: they represent a deliberate rejection both of morality and of nationality. For Dostoevskii, the two concepts are inextricably linked. This notion will be explored in due course; but first, let us turn to the other character who embodies pride and self-will in *Besy*: Kirillov.

Kirillov's conceit is to save all mankind through the exertion of his will. In this he is more akin to Raskol'nikov: he has conceived a distorted morality, whilst living in solitary conditions, significantly, in America. Dostoevskii has boldly endowed him with many ideas similar to those preached by Zosima, in particular that mankind could find happiness through the understanding that life could be paradise, if only one were to want it. Shatov's comment on Kirillov is in this respect remarkably accurate: 'Если б вы могли отказаться от ваших ужасных фантазий и бросить ваш атеистический бред... о, какой бы вы были человек, Кириллов!' (X, 436). For, as with Versilov, although several of Kirillov's ideas may in themselves be worthy, his approach to them from the starting point of the self and his denial of God corrupt and invalidate the ideas. Kirillov's main belief is that the concept of God has arisen purely as a result of man's fear of death; but man should be master of his own fate, and thus, god-like. Kirillov intends to perform the ultimate self-willed act, suicide, and thereby destroy the fear of death and usher in the age of the man-god for the rest of humanity. His plan is ostensibly altruistic; however, it is subverted into a satanic pride by his desire to control his own existence and prove himself a god. Timothy Ware notes that in Orthodox theology, salvation is spoken of as deification: 'God became man that man might become god.' Kirillov denies the first part of this equation and tries to become divine of his own will. It is possible to read between the lines of his argument and see the rampant egoism behind the alleged self-sacrifice; when Petr suggests to him that he kill someone else as a demonstration of his will, he declines, not out of love for others, but because it requires a greater effort of will to kill oneself. Therefore we may not call him 'truly good', as does Frank, because so many of Dostoevskii's characters amply demonstrate that any morality based on the self is always fatally flawed.

Kirillov is a true child of Kushitism, a man in whom most traces of spirituality, apart from a love for children and sticky green leaves, has died out.
For good reason does the narrator of Besy remark on his black eyes ‘без блеску’ (X, 75), dark windows on a soul that is barely there. Kirillov’s insistence on the self logically derives from a determinist outlook on life that conceives of death as an immutable, coercive force, and of life according to God’s will as a state of slavery. He can only consider absolute tyranny – if God exists – or boundless freedom – if He does not. The concepts of sobornost’, of freedom found in the joyful submission to Christ’s laws, and of the mutuality and interconnectedness of relationships thanks to the image of God in every man, are alien to him:

- Если бог есть, то вся воля его, и из воли его я не могу. Если нет, то вся воля моя, и я обязан заявить своеvolие.
- Своеволие? А почему обязаны?
- Потому что вся воля стала моя. (X, 470.)

As if he had seen that fateful Holbein painting that so disturbs Ippolit in Idiot, he refutes Christ’s triumph over death and thereby His transcendent nature, all the while lamenting the loss of the greatest man ever to have existed, for he does not believe that the necessity of death can be spiritually overcome. Instead, his advocacy of suicide as an act of self-will intends the physical, rather than spiritual, transformation of man. His feverish tirade to Petr is worth quoting at length:

Слушай большую идею: был на земле один день, и в средине земли стояли три креста. Один на кресте до того веровал, что сказал другому: «Будешь сегодня со мною в раю». Кончился день, оба померли, пошли и не нашли ни рая, ни воскресения. Не оправдывалось сказанное. Слушай: этот человек был вышний на всей земле, составлял то, для чего ей жить. [...] А если так, если законы природы не пожалели и Этого, даже чудо свое же не пожалели, а заставили и Его жить среди лжи и умереть за ложь, то, стало быть, вся планета есть ложь и стоит на лжи и глупой насмешке. (X, 471.)

What Kirillov has not spotted, however, is the ironic veracity of his denunciation. The adoption of a Kushite attitude to existence, that is, a belief in necessity, coercion, determinism, does indeed turn life into a meaningless lie, and a lie cannot beget truth. Kirillov will never extract a rational solution to his despair from such a stance. A deliberately willed suicide will not conquer the fear of physical death, as his own increasing anguish before the act proves, nor will it elevate man to god-like status. Rather, Kirillov descends into a bestial state in a grim fulfilment of the narrator’s quip about the progression of humanity
from the annihilation of God to the gorilla. What is more, he is blind to the senselessness of the existence his ideology of self-will proposes. He argues that if death holds no fear and man is in control of his own fate, then it makes no difference whether to live or not to live and all is good, from the spider crawling on the wall to the man who rapes the child (X, 93, 189). But he cannot see that there is no meaning in his endlessly parroted 'всё равно, всё хорошо': if 'it is all the same', then good has no meaning, and if it is all the same to live or to die, then there is no true freedom. For Stavrogin's dark destiny proves that unchecked freedom will eventually self-destruct, and Kirillov, Stavrogin's ideological offspring, is, in his own words, obliged to kill himself.

Shatov is another of Stavrogin's ideological offspring, and through his desperate proclamations Dostoevskii raises the issue of the relationship between morality and nationality. In the finished novel, Shatov tells Stavrogin about the ideas that have grown in him since a conversation they had two years previously; these ideas centre round the importance of religion in determining nationality, and of the God-bearing nature of the Russian people. In the notebooks for the novel, in contrast, we find longer, more comprehensive discussions between the Stavrogin prototype, the Prince, and Shatov. When Stavrogin's meeting with Shatov in the chapter 'Night' is read in conjunction with these passages in the notebooks, it becomes possible to consider the draft material as the conversation that in the finished version is relegated to two years before the time of the narrative. The notes present the Prince uttering statements about the importance of Orthodoxy and the damage to standards of morality in the absence of faith. His pronouncements closely parallel ideas expressed in Dostoevskii's journal articles, both earlier and later, as well as in earlier notebooks, and are likely to have close similarities with the author's own views. However, they are couched in such terms as to expose the seed of doubt upon which Shatov's final views founder.

The passages in the notebooks that devote most space to the conversations between the Prince and Shatov are preceded by the heading 'Общий главный план романа (окончательно)' (XI, 144). Thereafter the issues of Christ, Orthodoxy and Russia are rehearsed at length, so it is clear that Dostoevskii attached great importance to the dramatisation of this theme in Besy.
The Prince raises the question of how a nation may attain a firm self-assurance, as possessed by Germany. He compares Germany, whose guiding idea, he says, is the accumulation of capital, with Russia, which appears to have no certainty of foundation. His words show the significance Dostoevskii attributes to an unbroken heritage:

However, a little later, the Prince then demonstrates that Russia does have her own guiding idea, and in a passage that anticipates Dnevnik pisatel’ia, he prophesies the triumph of this idea and its messianic role in Europe. The idea is of course Orthodoxy; in a series of slightly disjointed statements, he links Orthodoxy and the peasantry, and indicates that the dissociated gentry have betrayed Russia’s idea. The tone of this passage has clear parallels with Slavophile thought, focussing on the natural brotherhood of traditional peasant life:

This passage also brings out the notion that Orthodoxy is the force that determines the national character of Russia.

The Prince then considers the consequences of unbelief and asks whether it is possible to have morality without faith in Christ. Here we find him bringing to life what must surely be questions that plagued Dostoevskii himself, as he hinted in his famous letter to Mme. Fonvizina (XXVIII/i, 176). The author has styled the Prince as a child of his century, and the role of science as a counter
force to Christianity comes to the fore in his discourse. He explores the possibility that rational enlightenment may conflict with faith, offering 'opposite proofs', and whether Christianity can sustain its function as a source of morality when approached from an 'enlightened' point of view:

Можно ли веровать, быв цивилизованным, т. е. европейцем? — т. е. веровать безусловно в божественность сына божия Иисуса Христа? (ибо всё вера только в этом и состоит). NB На этот вопрос цивилизация отвечает фактами, что нет, нельзя (Ренан), и тем, что общество не удержало чистого понимания Христа (католицизм — антихрист, блудница, а лютеранство — молоканство). Если так, то можно ли существовать обществу без веры (наукой, например, — Герцен). Нравственные основания даются откровением. Уничтожьте в вере одно что-нибудь — и нравственное основание христианства рухнет всё, ибо всё связано. Итак, возможна ли другая научная нравственность? (XI, 178.)

This passage is striking in its emphasis on issues that were of prime concern to Khomiakov and Kireevskii. It refers to the clash of cultures between secular, enlightened European life and the age-old tradition of Orthodoxy in Russia; it condemns Western interpretations of Christianity; it indicates the limitations of a rational approach to Christianity by using the word 'facts' and mentioning Renan, who hailed Christ as an exemplary human being but not as God incarnate. Particularly interesting is the stress on the organic nature of faith, that it cannot be broken down into constituent parts without destroying it completely.

It is fruitful to pause here and consider in greater detail the Prince’s concern for the ability of the enlightened to have faith, in conjunction with Dostoevskii’s letter to Fonvizina. A. Boyce Gibson makes the perceptive observation that in the aforementioned letter, with regard to the choice between Christ and the truth, Dostoevskii uses the term ‘istina’ throughout, ‘a word technically specified to denote theoretical truth’. In contrast with ‘istina’ Gibson places ‘pravda’, whose meaning includes the concept of righteousness, and he points to Khomiakov, significantly, as well as N. K. Mikhailovskii, as having written on this interpretation of the term ‘pravda’.25 Whether Dostoevskii consciously selected the term ‘istina’ over ‘pravda’ or not cannot be definitively established, but it is clear that ‘istina’, being to do with rationalism, may exclude the idea of Christ. On the other hand, truth as righteousness encompasses and even transcends merely theoretical truth, and this is surely consonant with the
idea of Christ. Similarly, the Prince has the mind of a Westernised intellectual, and appears to be making the same distinction between the truth furnished by rational enlightenment and faith in God. But when truth is righteousness, or, to use the term with which I began this discussion, when truth is morality, the dilemma between faith and enlightenment melts away. By dramatising this dilemma through the character of the Prince, Dostoevskii is in my opinion doing two things. Firstly, he is demonstrating how an attitude in which faith and reason are diametrically opposed makes it possible to exclude faith. Secondly, it is reasonable to suppose that in these rough notes he revisited his own past state of mind in an attempt to exercise a more recently developed ability to reconcile faith and reason. From this supposition, it is to be inferred that the letter to Fonvizina represents a stage in a journey of spiritual development. For these notebooks shed as much light on the letter as vice versa: what, therefore, must we make of this famous statement of faith, if that indeed is what it is? To begin with, we must emphasise the validity of the first part of his profession, that his faith in Christ is borne out of a God-given sense of mutual love: ‘И однако же, бог посылает мне иногда минуты, в которые я совершенно спокоен; в эти минуты я люблю и нахожу, что другими любим, и в такие-то минуты я сложил в себе символ веры, в котором всё для меня ясно и свято’ (XXVIII/i, 176). This criterion alone, if viewed from the perspective outlined by Zosima in Brat'ia Karamazovy, is enough to confirm the truth of Dostoevskii’s faith. Next, we must remember, as Gibson rightly does, that the problem of Christ and the truth is put hypothetically; Dostoevskii is flagging his awareness of the opposition between faith and reason, and indicating that should he be called upon to choose between them, he would rather choose faith. Whereas in the notebooks for Besy, the Prince’s discourse is an exposition of the process of that choice, a choice that in my opinion Dostoevskii himself refrained from decisively making. By making the Prince consider the two alleged options and choose one of them, Dostoevskii is indicating that the apparent necessity of such a choice is problematic. The way in which it is problematic will be discussed below.

Having raised the question of the possibility of a secular code of morality, the Prince explores the hypothetical consequences of such a code in practice. His
argument is that if science (by which the reader must understand: dependence solely on reason) falls short of expectations and does not organise society to have sufficient food and living space, then science will also condone the culling of humans. Thus he concludes that Christianity is the only acceptable source of morality:

По-моему, одна наука, доходя до равнодушия к младенцам, омертвит и одичит человечество, а потому лучше жечь, чем умирать. С другой стороны, я твердо верую, что христианство спасло бы человечество. [...] В христианстве даже и недостаток пищи и топлива был бы спасен (можно не умерщвлять младенцев, но самому вымирать для брата моего). (XI, 182.)

Here the Prince points to the fundamental selflessness of Christianity, of the importance of voluntary self-sacrifice for the good of others. This attribute is contrasted with the egoism and scope for tyranny of any system of ethics based on reason alone. In this extract, as well as in the notebook pages surrounding it, the Prince also demonstrates how rational enlightenment without faith in Christ may give rise to radical nihilism: faced with a flawed, limited, and thus worthless, existence outside of Christ, man may choose another alternative, that is to burn or destroy all now. In this way, through the mouthpiece of the Prince, Dostoevskii examines the issue of faith and unbelief, together with the manner in which different secular attitudes in nineteenth-century Russian society are connected.

Taking the position of the Prince at face value, one might be forgiven for thinking that he represents a positive standpoint, carrying ideas that are dear to Dostoevskii and close to the author’s own views. However, in the finished novel, Stavrogin is an empty husk, incapable of believing or propagating anything but decay. Yet even though Dostoevskii endowed his prototype with great insight and allowed him to explore the author’s most beloved ideological territory, the cracks that eventually lead to Stavrogin and Shatov’s demise are present in the Prince at the earliest stages. The Prince’s discourse is continually undermined by references, sometimes directly following his words about Orthodoxy, to his impending suicide. Indeed, it is at the very stage in planning Besy, where Dostoevskii began to probe more deeply into the possibility of the Prince as a character in search of, or proclaiming, faith, that the idea of his suicide first makes its appearance. What is more, it is evident that the Prince’s faith is not
true; he frequently ends or begins his discussions about belief with the question, ‘Is it possible for a civilised man to believe?’ By constantly challenging the ability for enlightenment and faith to coexist, he casts doubt upon the surety of his own alleged faith and gives it the air of elaborately constructed sophistry, rather than a conviction that comes straight from the heart. In the same way, the character that becomes Versilov in the notebooks to *Podrostok* on many occasions utters true-sounding statements about the Christian faith, but Dostoevskii’s intention right from the start is to portray him committing an act that discredits his proclamations, namely the iconoclasm. This intention is clearly stated in the notebooks, followed by Arkadii’s analysis of his father’s condition:

Ведь не притворялся же ОН, когда усиленно Христа проповедовал, напротив, наивысшим образом искренне. Сам себя уверял, что верит. Самому себе доказывал, что есть вера, с чудовищем сомнений своих боролся, давил его, но тот наконец и сожрал его (чудовище). (XVI, 33.)

Here we reach the nub of the matter that Dostoevskii subjects to the closest scrutiny in *Besy* and also to a considerable extent in *Podrostok*: natural, or organic, faith, versus intellectualised faith. Wasiolek concurs: ‘[…] Versilov is neither a hypocrite nor a believer. The situation is more subtle, for Versilov is both sincere and an unbeliever. He wants to believe but he cannot. He thinks like a believer, acts like one, but does not *feel* like one. His is a forced faith, and as such not faith at all.’29 In the finished version of *Besy*, Shatov, who has seized his idea of Orthodoxy from a sterile, external source, the same source that spawned Kirillov’s nihilist atheism, can only conceive of God as an attribute of national identity, despite his protestations to the contrary: ‘Бог есть синтетическая личность всего народа, взятого с начала его и до конца’ (X, 198). He cries: ‘Я… я буду веровать в бога’ (X, 201), with, the reader senses, as much despair as defiance at his final inability to be convinced by his own perfectly legitimate argument. It fails him precisely because it is an argument, designed to convince, rather than an innate spiritual state that transcends proof and disproof.

The dissociation of the educated classes from the people is the reason Dostoevskii posits for the existence of a quasi-faith adhered to by many of the intelligentsia. In the notebooks, when the Prince counters that Shatov in fact does not believe, the latter is able to pinpoint the reason for his own and his
interlocutor’s inability to have true faith: ‘Это оттого, что оторвался от народа!’ (XI, 180). This is not to say that the author is therefore answering the Prince’s question about the possibility of faith in the negative; for elsewhere, as I have shown in my previous chapter, Dostoevskii clearly professes a conviction that a reconciliation between the estranged strata of society is possible, and that this can be done without the rejection of Western knowledge. Nevertheless, Besy puts forward the notion that the rootless gentry is cut off from the natural wellspring of Orthodox tradition preserved in the life of the people, and that while they remain so detached, they cannot find in themselves a spontaneous, organic faith that does not elicit questioning and is as natural as breathing. Shatov expresses this thesis in the notebooks: ‘Если бы вы были действительно русский, то не замечая бы веровали, просто считали бы даже без рассуждений, что иначе и не может быть, без заносчивости и с смирением, как всякий русский’ (XI, 132).

By emphasising the need for faith to be spontaneous and organic, Dostoevskii would seem to be upholding principles of Slavophile thought. However, it is on this very issue that he directs criticism against the movement, and not only against Slavophilism contemporary with him, but also against the classical Slavophiles, and notably Kireevskii. Several references are made in the notebooks to ‘Kireevskii and the icon’. This is Dostoevskii’s shorthand for an artificially constructed faith, or in other words for a faith that is not connected to the living source of Orthodoxy, the common people. The phrase refers to an incident related to Herzen, and recounted in the latter’s memoirs, involving Kireevskii’s contemplation of and response to an icon. According to Herzen, Kireevskii considered first the ‘childlike faith’ of the elderly and infirm peasant worshippers praying on their knees, and then began himself to see the hidden miraculous power of the icon and to fall on his knees before it. In Dostoevskii’s opinion, Kireevskii’s reaction did not show evidence of true faith. Eberhard Müller’s analysis of the same incident expresses what Dostoevskii must have felt:

The difference between Kireevsky’s attitude and the piety of the simple people whom he described is clear at once: they pray naively to a wonderworking image of the Mother of God, which derives its power from itself, that is, from the real, present Mother of God, according to the orthodox teaching
on icons. For Kireevsky, however, above all an outside observer, she comes alive only through an inverse intellectual auxiliary construction: the icon itself has no inherent reality; it draws its power, its meaning, only from the prayers of the simple believers. 31

Hence he implies that Slavophilism as an ideology is as subject to obosoblenie as Westernism, for all its worthy arguments. In the novel, Shatov declares himself a Slavophile because he is unable to be a true Russian, due to his separation from the people (X, 436). This suggests that Dostoevskii interpreted Slavophilism as a posture of Russianness, an intellectually mediated Russianness, which would be unnecessary if the intelligentsia had its roots in the same rich cultural humus as the narod. In the notebooks, he interweaves this critique of the movement with the Prince and Shatov’s debates about the nature of belief, thereby further undermining the Prince’s virtuous proclamations with such an association:

Шатов объясняет разницу, славянофилы — барская затая, икона (Киреевский). Никогда они не могут верить непосредственно.

– Славянофил думает выехать только свойствами русского народа, но без православия не выдешь, никакие свойства ничего не делают, если мир потеряет веру. (XI, 186.)

It is almost as if Dostoevskii is trying to be more ‘slavophile’ than the Slavophiles themselves, that is, a more stringent defender of genuine Russianness, in his strict interpretation of their beliefs. Whether the charge he levels against them in Besy is justified or not is a matter beyond the scope of the present study; nevertheless, that he should find fault on a fundamental level with the very premise for the movement’s existence, should not deter the Dostoevskii scholar from using resonances with Slavophilism as a means of shedding light on the author’s works.

Thus far, I have examined the way in which a lack of roots in the soil and an espousal of the Western values of rationalism and egoism prevent the organic growth of innate, spontaneous faith and discredit the self-made Christianity of the likes of Versilov and Shatov. However, Dostoevskii’s oeuvre shows how the same conditions also spawn a different kind of unbeliever: the rebel who smarts at the apparent injustice of God’s world, as depicted in Ivan Karamazov and Ippolit Terent’ev. Many studies have been written on the ideology of Ivan and his Grand Inquisitor in Brat’ia Karamazovy; I shall not rehearse the minutiae of his argument, but shall endeavour to pick out those aspects of it that have a
significance in relation to Slavophile thought. Ivan is another child of his century, a 'civilised' man who, like Stavrogin and his prototype, has toyed with several theses in his quest to solve what is surely also his riddle: is it possible for the civilised man to have faith? He has considered an argument essentially akin to Kirillov's, with an admixture of Versilov's dream of the Golden Age, that if belief in immortality were extinguished, men would become gods and would love each other without need of a reward. Such is the theme of his early article, 'The Geological Upheaval', as ironically parroted back to him by his devil-hallucination. Another, contrasting idea of Ivan's, thrown back at him by Miusov after a salon debate, is that without belief in immortality, love would dry up and self-interest would rule. He has experimented with two formulas for the ordering of society, one as expressed in another early article on ecclesiastical courts, and the other, of course in 'The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor'. These searchings for logical, formulaic order are the product of Ivan's self-confessed Euclidean mind, a mind, in other words, that is dependent on logic and rationalism and that is a result of his so-called enlightenment.

Much has been made of whether Ivan is an atheist and if so, of what kind. One of the most perceptive analyses is that of Stewart Sutherland, who writes:

The God whom Ivan accepts is a finite God, he is the god who is the invention of a Euclidean mind, and of whom one can only think and talk in anthropomorphic terms. The setting for such a conception, the context which indicates what can be said of such a god, is the speculations of the Russian boys passing the time of day over a pint of beer. As such it is a setting in which the language of belief is quite detached from the life of the believer. It is in this sense that Ivan is quite happy to accept God: Why not, for what hangs on it? Also useful is Gibson's assertion that Ivan is 'not an atheist, but an anti-theist. He does not deny God, he defies him.' There is truth in both these statements; certainly, Ivan's mental torture derives in some part from the fact that he cannot conceive of God in the same way that Alesha and Zosima do, and that this leads to his feeling of outrage at 'God's world' and rebellion against it. Elsewhere he more categorically states that there is no God at all (XIV, 123), and he has explored the hypothetical consequences of the non-existence of God in 'The Geological Upheaval'. That he has entertained the notion of no God, as well as a God of some kind, albeit different from the God believed in by Alesha, is a result
of his Euclidean mind attempting to make sense of an existence that it can only partially apprehend. What Zosima tells Ivan of his article on the ecclesiastical courts may well be true of all his formulations: 'Пока с отчаяния и вы забавляетесь – и журнальными статьями, и светскими спорами, сами не верю своей диалектике и с болью сердца усмехаясь ей про себя' (XIV, 65). Denied access to the joy of true faith, Ivan has trouble believing his own arguments and vainly tries out a variety of ideological postures. A Euclidean mind is a Kushite mind, capable of recognising only the principle of necessity, seeking order in externally imposed structures and dissecting problems into constituent arguments that cannot stand up alone. Each of Ivan’s attempts to explain the world to himself exposes the limitations of the mind of the Russian man educated in Western models of thought. This is not to say that Ivan is reduced to a one-dimensional caricature, in which his rational mind is focused on and exaggerated; he is a fully rounded character and has more heart and passion than Stavrogin, Svidrigailov and even the highly committed Kirillov. But his lust for life, his strong sense of moral outrage and thirst for justice, much as they drive his striving for an answer, are in the final analysis equally provoked and frustrated by his finite intellectual capabilities.

'The Geological Upheaval' and the ‘salon’ argument repeated by Miusov both begin from the premise that it would be in mankind’s interest to do away with belief in God and immortality. From this point the two theses diverge. Ivan’s devil reminds him that he wrote that a world without God is intended to make men unite, in order to make the best of a single earthly life, and that as they conquered existence through their will and intellect, men would love each other by virtue of the brevity of life. Miusov, however, picks out of Ivan’s salon party piece that he believes it is impossible to love one’s neighbour, and that if any such love exists, it is purely out of hope for eternal reward. With the prospect of heavenly reward eliminated, life would operate on the basis of self-interest, and the notions of crime and immorality would become meaningless. Both the devil and Miusov are mocking Ivan in their recollection of his ideas and by doing so they discredit them; the devil can see through the proposition that mankind would unite in love without God to the same essential conclusion of the salon argument: 'Но так как, ввиду закоренелой глупости человеческой, это,
пожалуй, еще и в тысячу лет не устроится, то всякому, сознающему уже и теперь истину, позволительно устроиться совершенно как ему угодно, на новых началах. В этом смысle ему «вечé позволéно» (XV, 83-84). Miusov, too, scoffs at a system that effectively results in anarchy, or in other words, unchecked freedom.

Ivan's article on the ecclesiastical courts is a formulation that appears much closer to some of Dostoevskii's own pronouncements on the future of the Orthodox Church in Dnevnik pisatelia. However, the reader must be wary of accepting it as valid, in the same way that the professed Christianity of Versilov and the Prince-Stavrogin are worthy ideas sown on sterile soil. Zosima and Paisii take up Ivan's refrain about the State dissolving into the Church, but in their capable hands it shines with the understanding of sobornost. Ivan, by contrast, centres his argument not on universal brotherhood, but on retribution for the criminal: he calls for excommunication instead of civil punishment. But Zosima exposes the flaw in this argument. In his interpretation, excommunication as a method of enforcing the law is a divisive principle, whereas the Church as he sees it is the one institution that offers total integration for all, because it recognises that human fallibility is universal:

Главное же потому устраняется, что суд церкви есть суд единствено вмещающий в себе истину и ни с каким иным судом вследствие сего существенно и нравственно сочетаться даже и в компромисс временный не может. [...] Но в том и дело, что, кроме установленных судов, есть у нас, сверх того, еще и церковь, которая никогда не теряет общения с преступником, как с милым и всё еще дорогоим сыном своим [...]. (XIV, 60-61.)

Zosima's response makes it clear that a system that is able to cut off individuals with such finality, on the basis of sin, is a travesty of the idea of the Church; for he knows that each is responsible for all. Ivan's vision of the ecclesiastical courts is despotism masquerading as brotherhood. Gibson writes, 'The article throws light on the concept of sobornost' but it achieves the sense of togetherness at the expense of the sense of spontaneity.' To put it another way, it represents unity without freedom.

Now we come to Ivan's admission of the acceptance of God, his rejection of God's world and his attempt to reorder it in 'The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor'. We must at this point recall Sutherland's remark (quoted above) and
reiterate that the God Ivan professes to accept is a God who may be debated and
dissected by the rational minds of Russian boys over a pint of beer, a God devoid
of much of his divinity and therefore more readily defied or disposed of. In the
notebooks to Brat'ia Karamazovy Ivan adds another element to his acceptance of
God, which is not explicit in the finished version, but may be drawn out of his
discourse. He says: ‘Эвклида геометрия. А потому прийм бо́га, тем
более что это вековечный старый боженька и его не решишь. Итак,
пуст боженька. Это стыднее’ (XV, 231). Ivan would appear to be
expressing a preference for the Old Testament notion of God; but what has this to
do with Euclidean geometry, and why is it more shameful? (Note also use of the
diminutive for ‘God’: it expresses scorn and trivialisation.) The answer may be
gleaned from the finished version, where he cries to his brother:

О, по моему, по жалкому, земному эвклидовскому уму моему, я
знаю лишь то, что страдание есть, что виновных нет, что всё одно
из другого выходит прямо и просто, что всё течет и
уравновешивается, — но ведь это лишь эвклидовская дичь, ведь я
знаю же это, ведь жить по ней я не могу же согласиться! (XIV, 222.)

What this passage tells us is that the rational mind of a Westernised intellectual
may accept the idea of a wrathful God who moves in mysterious ways, who
giveth and taketh away, seemingly with little regard for virtue or vice, a God who
delivers worthy servants into the hands of the devil, and whose followers demand
an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. In the world of this God, suffering
exists and no one is to blame, and that is why it is more shameful, however
rational and logical such a world may appear to Ivan. As Robert Louis Jackson
points out, Ivan will not relinquish reason, yet his strong moral sense will not
allow him to accept its consequences.37 The injection of rationalism into God’s
world drags along with it connotations of egoism and self-interest, with their
associations of materialism and capitalism so derided through earlier
Dostoevskian characters such as Luzhin. The notebooks have the Inquisitor say:
‘Бог как купец. Я люблю человечество больше тебя’ (XV, 230). Even
without such a bald assertion in the final version, Jacskon notes, Ivan’s
vocabulary is replete with references to buying and selling — the price of an
admission ticket to eternal harmony is too high.38 God’s world as Ivan conceives
of it is not based on voluntary, mutual emptying out of the self, but on necessary
expenditure for individual gain.
Horrified at the cruel vision presented to him by his Euclidean mind, Ivan sets his powers of reason and logic to the correction of the vision. 'The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor' is the outcome. In this prose poem, Dostoevskii's attack on the principle of necessity and all that characterises Khomiakov's Kushitism reaches its apogee. The Grand Inquisitor has taken up the mantle of pagan Rome and turned the Church into a regimented State where the majority readily buy material security and unanimity of worship with their freedom. The need to choose between good and evil has been removed, for all live according to the Grand Inquisitor's law, people no longer fight or persecute each other, and even sin has been incorporated into his scheme because it is permitted and the punishment is taken by the ruling elite. All has been thus arranged because the Inquisitor believes that the vast majority of mankind cannot rise to the challenge of true Christian life, and, feeling sorry for those who are not strong enough to save themselves, he relieves them of their burden of freedom. The people over whom the Grand Inquisitor rules are, according to his portrayal, a herd of limited beings, the very lumps of matter governed by the laws of physical science that Dostoevskii saw in Chernyshevskii’s works, with all the characteristics described by Khomiakov in his analysis of Kushite cultures. Khomiakov, it may be remembered, identified veneration of the flesh as a Kushite attribute; this finds its equivalent in the satisfaction of material needs in the Grand Inquisitor's system. The proliferation of obscure religious practices in Kushite cultures, taken by the people as mysterious talismans, is reflected in the 'Legend' by the Inquisitor's emphasis on miracle, mystery and authority in binding the masses. What is more, the Inquisitor's desire to build a new Tower of Babel recalls Khomiakov's assertion that the Kushite hierarchical states enslaved the masses for the purposes of building grandiose religious edifices:

Это всё то же племя, легко смыкающееся в государственные формы, строящее роскошные жилища и безмолвно движущее гранитными массами в какой-то восторженной борьбе с вещественною природою. [...] Памятники [...] представляют характер религиозный. Они созданы волею народного, но они возможны только под властью жреческой касты, сосредоточившей народную силу и дававшей ей цель и направление, освященные религиозною мыслью.

The Inquisitor's attitude towards his subjects and his ordering of society demonstrate that his conception of man is limited to the non-spiritual. Not once
does he mention in his monologue the doctrine that man is made in the image of God, and his system indicates that he does not believe this doctrine. He claims to love mankind, but he envisages man without that image of God, hence his assessment that men are weak, rebellious, unable to follow the teaching of Christ, and not destined for an afterlife. Therefore his professed love turns out to be no more than condescending pity. Taking into account the evidence from Dostoevskii’s other works as discussed above, it is clear that there is no room in Kushite society, that is, a society governed by necessity, coercion, rationalism and materialism, for the image of God in man: it is a society of bezobrazie, a world without obraz. Jackson, discussing Dmitrii Karamazov’s assertion that man’s nature is too broad, observes:

Certainly here is one of Dostoevsky’s most important insights: it is not the devil, but man himself who gives birth in the suffering of his moral immaturity to the idea of his own narrowing, his own self-limitation. The Grand Inquisitor is not a figment of Ivan’s imagination; he is an integral part, an authentic manifestation, of man’s moral consciousness in recoil against its own disorder. 

Ivan and the Inquisitor indeed narrow man to the point of denying the spiritual element in him, man’s capacity to conquer himself and follow the teaching of Christ. Ivan’s statement on God’s creation of man actually stresses the limitations by which he believes man is bound: ‘Но вот, однако, что надо отметить: если Бог есть и если он действительно создал землю, то, как нам совершенно известно, создал он ее по эвклидовой геометрии, а ум человеческий с понятием лишь о трех измерениях пространства’ (XIV, 214). It is the inability to see the image of God in man, the belief only in man’s existence as a state of bezobrazie, that gives rise to Ivan’s rebellion. Symptomatic of this stance is his conviction that it is impossible to love one’s neighbour. He says to Alesha: ‘По-моему, Христова любовь к людям есть в своем роде невозможное на земле чудо. Правда, он был Бог. Но мы-то не боги’ (XIV, 216). In a sense he is right: we are not quite gods. But Dostoevskii’s oeuvre evinces a profound sense of the image of God in man, of the existence of an other-worldly part of us that presages the eternal harmony of paradise. Ivan’s statement denies this aspect of man’s nature as well. It has already been shown that there is an interrelationship between reason, compassion and the acceptance of man’s obraz: reason interferes with the perception of obraz
and destroys compassion; alternatively reason rules out compassion and damages the image of God in oneself and the other.

Closely connected to Ivan's inability to perceive obraz is another fundamental facet of his atheism that underpins his rebellion and his 'Legend'. It is possible to detect in his discourse the fact that he does not believe in the resurrection of Christ, in the possibility that Christ, whether he was divine or not, was able to conquer death. The notebooks support this supposition, for there the Inquisitor declares: 'те, претерпев крест его, не найдут ничего, что было обещано, точно так же как и он сам не нашел ничего после креста своего' (XV, 236). In the finished version there is no such blasphemous contention, but the figure of Christ in the 'Legend' points to the same conclusion. Just before he recounts the 'Legend', Ivan responds to Alesha's introduction of the question of Christ by acknowledging that he shed his blood - but he does not develop the matter by continuing to the resurrection. The role of Christ in the 'Legend' is extremely problematic and open to many interpretations. However, it must be emphasised that he too is Ivan's creation, and this fact alone indicates the need for caution approaching him. In many respects he is Christ as the Christian would expect him: meek, silent, he heals the sick and raises the dead, and the people are drawn to him as to an icon. Even his reply to the Inquisitor seems appropriate; the silent kiss resonates with compassion and humility and demonstrates active love as a way of overcoming the human condition. Nevertheless, Ivan imagines that it is possible for the Grand Inquisitor to burn him, and does not include in his discourse intimations of what may follow the burning; this Christ is a new incarnation, but apparently one whose immortality the Inquisitor dares to challenge. By failing to consider the resurrection of Christ, and by denying the image of God in man, Ivan refutes the Orthodox principle that 'God became man that man might become god.' If Christ did not conquer death, humanity cannot be saved; if there is no image of God in man, mankind is forever doomed to be unworthy of salvation, for a vast gulf then exists between the Creator and his creation. Orthodox theology proposes that there exists 'a personal and organic union between God and man - God dwelling in us, and we in Him';\(^\text{42}\) this is the essence of sobornost' and tsel'nost'. Ivan's Euclidean mind cannot entertain these concepts. Death is the ultimate force of necessity in the
Inquisitor's world, and it is a determining parameter of Ivan's rebellion. His thirst for life is by his own admission a poignant emotion, because his argument expresses an implicit resignation to the finality of this life, in the way he posits despair as an opposition to his desire to live, in his reference to Europe as a graveyard, and throughout the 'Legend'. Without the resurrection, and without obraz, eternal harmony will, in Ivan's formulation, be permanently priced out of man's reach, and death alone remains.

However, this is not the end of it for Ivan. Refusing to rise above the limitations of his rational approach to life, he cannot partake in the unity of life with God and other worlds proclaimed by Zosima and experienced by Alesha. His personal тseл'nost' is shattered and that facet of himself that he insists on denying drives him to insanity through hallucinations of the devil. Ivan's devil is a manifestation of irrationality, which may be seen as a by-product that results when reason is separated from, rather than integrated into, man's powers of cognition. (Irrationality, it may be remembered, is the governing factor in the Underground Man's revolt against a life ordered by reason.) Ivan's devil is given to superstition and the partaking of old wives' remedies for ailments. He talks of flying through space in evening dress and mocks Ivan's logical approach to existence with his discussion of what would happen to an axe in space. However, though he may be a symptom of Ivan's mental illness, we must not underrate him as an authoritative voice on Ivan's condition. He represents an outburst of everything in Ivan that the latter has suppressed in himself for the sake of an order for existence based on the intellect. These suppressed characteristics are by no means Ivan's most vile and vulgar traits, as he insists (XV, 72). F. F. Seeley has convincingly demonstrated the devil's positive attributes, and points out that Ivan does not challenge the accuracy of his account of 'The Geological Upheaval'. Therefore, it is significant that the devil is the only one of Ivan's creations to mention the resurrection of Christ; but he contends that he cannot respond to it because of common sense:
The devil, as a facet of Ivan, speaks with irony of his sentimental reaction to the resurrection, thus indicating Ivan’s scorn for such an idea, and, importantly, points to the constraint of reason as something unfortunate. It is indeed unfortunate for Ivan, for it leads to his mental and emotional disintegration. His experience with hallucinations recalls Svidrigailov, who tells Raskolnikov he sees the ghosts of those he persecuted, and who kills himself after a night fraught with waking nightmares. Svidrigailov explains the visitation of ghosts as a symptom of illness, in which contact with other worlds becomes possible. But he understands good health to mean a life restricted to exclude the possibility of a spiritual element in man; such is the natural conclusion for a man who has placed all his trust in anatomy: ‘здоровый человек есть наиболее земной человек, а стало быть, должен жить одной здешнего жизнью, для полноты и для порядка’ (VI, 221). Dostoevskii is indicating, through the fate of Ivan and Svidrigailov, that the semblance of health and stability offered by an emphasis on all that is not spiritual, that is, the intellect and the flesh, is in fact the beginning of a sickness in which visions of other worlds are dismembered from the whole and become tormenting instead of joyful. As Bruce Ward comments,

The knowledge of the eternal, accessible to human beings by virtue of the spiritual principle within them, is knowledge also of the "seeds" — that is the "essences", "ideas" or logoi — of everything which "lives and is alive" on earth. (It is noteworthy that Dostoyevsky thus denies to reason operating independently of the heart a genuine knowledge even of non-human nature.)

Consistently throughout Dostoevskii’s works, the Kushite way leads to bezobrazie and obosoblenie.

One precursor to Ivan’s rebellion is the ‘Necessary Explanation’ read by Ippolit Terent’ev in Idiot. Ippolit shares Ivan’s thirst for life in the face of despair and, significantly, his contempt for those who misuse their allotted time, demonstrating a blindness to obraz in others. He is equally defiant regarding the idea of eternal harmony and argues that it cannot compensate him for the impending untimely end to his life. In his eyes, the finity of this life invalidates any good deeds one may have performed, and feeling mocked by inevitable death, he resolves to cheat it by taking control of his own fate and dying...
according to his own terms. The centrepiece of his ‘Explanation’ is his reaction to the Holbein painting of Christ in the Tomb. It is the powerfully realistic portrayal of a corpse that convinces Ippolit of the invincibility of death and the impossibility of Christ’s resurrection:

Тут невольно приходит понятие, что если так ужасна смерть и так сильны законы природы, то как же одолеть их? Как одолеть их, когда не победил их теперь даже тот, который побеждал и природу при жизни своей, которому она подчинялась, который воскликнул: «Талифа кумий», — и девица встала, «Лазарь, гряди вон», — и вышел умерший? (VIII, 339.)

Ippolit is therefore also a fragmented character, riven by his inability to recognise the spiritual aspect of man’s nature. As a result he too is visited by strange, supernatural apparitions, including a manifestation of Rogozhin, that earthbound man of the flesh. One of his hallucinations takes the form of a poisonous insect-cum-reptile. This creature clearly represents death, which, significantly, has been deliberately sent for him. He dreams that a long dead pet dog, Norma, comes to his aid, catching the creature and biting it, but is mortally stung in doing so.

Robert Hollander offers a useful interpretation of this nightmare. He writes:

[…] the reborn savior, while having the power to defeat its adversary, is at the same time mortally vulnerable to that adversary (Norma is, after all, dead in Ippolit’s account of her). Ippolit’s savior, like Holbein’s Christ in the Tomb, is conquered by nature and death. […] Ippolit’s version of a Redeemer is of a flawed and mortal one.45

In Ippolit’s dreams and in his arguments nature triumphs over the forces of good that seek to transcend it. Nature here is a term used negatively, standing in contrast with the hymns to nature offered by Makar Dolgorukii, Zosima and his brother Markel; in this context it represents the forces of Kushitism: necessity, coercion and absence of spirituality. Ippolit’s encounter with nature is as a dark, savage, immutable force; after viewing the Holbein painting, he firstly likens it to an unfeeling machine. Here his experience is similar to that of the Underground Man, for whom the laws of nature are a mechanical force waiting to be tabulated. Later he has a vision of this force as a repulsive tarantula. His account of this vision is full of resonances regarding the dwelling of God in his creation, and elucidates the issue of tsel’nost':

Может ли мерещиться в образе то, что не имеет образа? Но мне как будто казалось временами, что я вижу, в какой-то странной и невозможной форме, эту бесконечную силу, это глухое, темное и
In these instances we find that nature has been bereft of its transcendental qualities; it no longer acts as an incarnation of the unity of all creation in God. Aghast at the naturalist realism in the depiction of the dead man in Holbein’s work – only a man, for the Godhead is absent in this picture – Ippolit makes the connection between bezobrazie and spiritual death, which leaves mankind in thrall to the Kushite principle of necessity.

The character of the Russian who has lost his roots in the soil dominates Dostoevskii’s oeuvre. Such figures as Stavrogin and Versilov, two of the most detached of all his dissociated intelligenty, represent a type that Dostoevskii despised most of all, the pinnacle of rootlessness towards which all his rootless characters are growing: the obshchechelovek, or generic man. Dostoevskii was so attuned to the spiritual unhealthiness of rootlessness that he greatly feared the increasing loss of national identity within the educated classes, to the point of associating it with the Apocalypse. In his copy of the New Testament he wrote the word ‘obshchechelovek’ beside verse eleven of Revelation 17: ‘И зверь, который был, и которого нет, есть осмый, и из числа седми, и пойдет в погибель.’ The verse he marked is striking. It speaks of an altered and paradoxical existence; John sees the beast, which was, and is not. So too, for Dostoevskii, does the uprooted gentleman lead a kind of existence that is not, detached as he is from the lifeblood of traditional Russian values. What is more, his fate is certain: he plays a role in the reign of Antichrist, and is heading toward destruction. Nothing could be more true of Stavrogin, whose symbolic significance as the Prince of Darkness has been made plain by many scholars, including Harriet Murav and Leatherbarrow.

The obshchechelovek is the wholly nondescript man, the man who lacks a proper place, a heritage, a nationality. He is the un-Russian Russian, a chimera composed of sterile Western ideas and fruitless attempts at self-definition. Stavrogin is exactly that, as I have already shown; empty to the point of being a moral vacuum, he speaks imperfect Russian, has gained Swiss nationality but cannot bring himself to live there, is both morally and ideologically lukewarm.
and is thus condemned, as Tikhon reminds him by quoting Revelation 3, 14-17 (XI, 11). Dostoevskii is very clear in the notebooks for the novel regarding the nullity of the obshchechelovek, denoting Stavrogin's prototype as follows:

[... ] вопрос остается для него — что же он сам такое? Ответ для него: ничто. У него много ума, чтоб сознаться, что он и в самом деле не русский. [...] Шатов ему доказывает, что он и любить не может, потому что он обще человек, а способностью любить одарены только национальные люди. (XI, 134, 135.)

Stavrogin, the ultimate moral nihilist, is descended from an equal obshchechelovek, his spiritual father, Stepan Trofimovich Verkhovenskii. Stepan Trofimovich, that effete 'liberal idealist', for all his professed love of Russia, is as dissociated from it as the members of the younger generation in the novel. He has lived abroad for many years, a practice that in real life Dostoevskii abhorred; during his difficult travels around Europe, the writer shunned the company of those Russians who had voluntarily emigrated, despising them for their lack of patriotic loyalty. Stepan Trofimovich's speech is peppered with French phrases; he enjoys the status of an exile in his own land, and he has built his dubious academic career on specialising in the more obscure points of European and Asian history. He is a character whom Dostoevskii has endowed with certain right ideas; his oration on the need for beauty to inspire and transfigure man morally (X, 372-73), is in essence similar to the author's 1861 article 'Gospodin — bov i vopros ob iskusstve'. However, in his mouth the idea becomes high-flown and ridiculous, because Stepan Trofimovich, having been a poseur all his life, does not speak with the weight of organic Russian sobornost' behind him. His ideas are discredited because they are postures, as detached and illusory as the 'half-baked ideas' that grip Raskol'nikov. Bakhtin formulates a similar idea regarding Stepan Trofimovich: 'Он сыплет отдельными «истинами» именно потому, что у него нет «влачущейшей идеи», определяющей ядро его личности [...].'48 He has dabbled with utopian socialism in order to appear progressive, not realising that the flirtation of the liberal men of the forties with such foreign ideological imports has shaken Russia's foundations. As the fissure between the strata of Russian society widens, the path is cleared for the likes of Petr Verkhovenskii. Stepan Trofimovich is aghast after reading Chernyshevskii's Chto delat' when he sees how the fragmentation has grown:
The importance of Stepan Trofimovich’s words lies in the fact that his generation’s idea needed to be implanted (nasaditi); it was never a natural fruit of Russian soil. Now its unhealthy tendrils are breaking rather than strengthening Russia’s moral infrastructure.

Versilov also represents the obshchechelovek, despite his own protestation in the notebooks that he cannot be one because there is no such thing. Here, in the same breath, he admits that he does not want to be a Russian (XVI, 420). Like Verkhovenskii, he has lived in Europe for many years and has a tendency to use French in his speech. He is associated with liberalism and the so-called Geneva ideas, and is rumoured to be a Roman Catholic. What is most interesting about Versilov’s obshchechelovek nature, however, is that it illustrates the way the obshchechelovek differs from the Russian capacity for universal reconciliation, put forward by Dostoevskii in the Pushkin Speech. Versilov appears to make claims towards having this capacity himself, asserting that in France he is a Frenchman, with a German he is a German. His interpretation of universality is as follows: ‘Один лишь русский, даже в наше время, то есть гораздо еще раньше, чем будет подведен всеобщий итог, получил уже способность становиться наиболее русским именно лишь тогда, когда он наиболее европеец’ (XIII, 377). This pronouncement is so close to certain parts of the Pushkin Speech that the reader must be cautious, bearing in mind nevertheless that rarely is anything what it seems with Versilov. The key is that Versilov advocates becoming European, in order to become Russian. He does not begin with Russianness. Dostoevskii clarifies the matter in his reply to Gradovskii after the Pushkin Speech. Here he refers to a brutal courier, but he may just as well have been describing his creation Versilov: ‘Это был хоть и русский, но уже и «европейский» русский, только начавший свой европеизм не с просвещения, а с разрыва, как и многие, чрезвычайно многие начали’ (XXVI, 156). The Europeanisation, such as was begun by the reforms of Peter the Great, is not the way to universal reconciliation because it
denies the natural Russian characteristics, and thus it corrupts. Bruce Ward concurs: ‘If the universalism of Russian liberals is not directed towards a positive new order, then it is merely a rationalization of disorder.’\textsuperscript{49} True Russian universality is innately Russian, it is a national attribute, derived from the Christian principle of brotherhood, preserved in the \textit{narod}. Dostoevskii contends that the religious foundation determines national traits and civic structures; this process of development must be preserved, and cannot be reversed without causing fragmentation: ‘Стало быть, гражданские идеалы всегда прямо и органически связаны с идеалами нравственными, а главное то, что несомненно из них только одних и выходят. Сами же по себе никогда не являются [...]’ (XXVI, 166). Versilov may be striving for the same goal posited in the Pushkin Speech, but his starting point is wrong. Without the solid foundation of Russian \textit{sobornost’}, his aspiration towards universality dissolves into a will-o’-the-wisp, flickering here and there, but ultimately illusory. He is \textit{obshchechelovek}, whereas a genuine universally inclined Russian is \textit{vsechelovek}, as Dostoevskii stresses in the Pushkin Speech: ‘Стать настоящим русским, стать вполне русским, может быть, и значит только (в конце концов, это подчеркните) стать братом всех людей, всечеловеком, если хотите’ (XXVI, 147).

The \textit{obshchechelovek}, therefore, might also be called a Kushite; for he is unable to participate in mutual brotherhood. He is a meaningless fragment, devoid of roots in a moral and spiritual heritage, stripped of the image of God and thus enslaved by necessity. Dostoevskii feared the disintegration of his country into a herd of \textit{obshchechelovek} beings, and he fought against it through the medium of his works. In \textit{Igrok} he depicted his vision of a kingdom of the \textit{obshchechelovek} when he created Roulettenburg, the fictional location of the novella’s action, and a fantastic Kushite society in its own right. Robert Louis Jackson’s analysis of Roulettenburg perfectly sums up the essence of Dostoevskii’s vision:

As the fictitious name suggests, the city is nowhere or anywhere in Europe. The mixed French and German components of the name suggest the illegitimate and rootless character of the place. This is the land of Babel, a place without a national language or culture. The gambling salon – the heart of Roulettenburg – is situated, symbolically, in a railway station where people
are coming and going, where all is in continuous movement. Everything is in
flux in this city: people, languages, currencies, values.\textsuperscript{30}

Dostoevskii foresaw St. Petersburg becoming like Roulettenburg. The home of
progressive ideas, it was in his words, ‘самом отвлеченному и умышленном
gороде на всем земном шаре’ (V, 101). He continued his critique of
Petersburg both in his fiction and his non-fiction, concluding in \textit{Dnevnik pisatelia}
in 1881:

\begin{quote}
Но Петербург совсем не Россия. Для огромного большинства
русского народа Петербург имеет значение лишь тем, что в нем его
царь живет. Между тем, и это мы знаем, петербургская
интеллигенция наша, от поколения к поколению, всё менее и менее
начинает понимать Россию, именно потому, что, замкнувшись от
нее в своем чухонском болоте, всё более и более изменяет свой
взгляд на нее, который у иных сузился, напротив, до размеров
микроскопических, до размеров какого-нибудь Карлсруэ. […]
Танцуй и лоша паркеты, создаются в Петербурге будущие сыны
отечества, а «чернорабочие крысы», как называл их Иван
Александрович Хlestakov, изучают отечество в канцеляриях и,
разумеется, чему-то научатся, но не России, а совсем иному,
подчас очень странному. (XXVII, 15.)
\end{quote}

Peter the Great’s pride and joy, his window on the West, does not look out onto
Russia. It is for Dostoevskii the gateway to Khomiakov’s Kush. It is the place
where one day Shigalevshchina may be realised, that system of tyranny over the
herd, unity without freedom, ruled from the Crystal Palace. Alternatively, it
could shatter into thousands of conflicting factions that tear each other to pieces
in an excess of self-interested individualism, as prophesied in Raskol'nikov’s
dream of the intelligent microbes. This is the result of the absence of a native
unifying idea, of the condition of rootlessness and the domination of the Kushite
principle. In \textit{Dnevnik pisatelia} Dostoevskii described it as the Catholic Idea, or
unlimited despotism, and the Protestant Idea, or unchecked freedom. In his
fiction it is embodied in the theories of Raskol'nikov and Ivan Karamazov, of
Kirillov and the Underground Man.
2.3: Living in sobornost': the Iranian category.

The reader of Dostoevskii may be forgiven for thinking that the fiction of this writer is overrun with sinister characters who presage a gloomy and perhaps fatal future for Russia, such is the number, strength and weight of the personages who lack roots in their native soil. However, Dostoevskii’s talent enables the positive elements in his works to shine all the more brightly in spite of, indeed because of, the abundance of darkness around them. Characters such as Sonia Marmeladova, Tikhon, Makar Dolgorukii, Zosima and of course Alesha Karamazov may, with the exception of the latter, occupy fewer pages than the struggling rootless heroes of the novels, but they bring to the works a balance and an undeniable sense of hope belied by their technically minor status. Many critics have called into question the effectiveness of such positive characters in offering an alternative to the rule of tyranny and egoism; in particular, Zosima and his teaching have been criticised famously by Konstantin Leont'ev in Dostoevskii’s own time, and by Sergei Hackel a century later. However, Eliseo Vivas comments that ‘genuine goodness and saintliness are harmonious, unassertive and hence undramatic, dull, affairs. But this is not a comment on them or on Dostoevsky but on us, his readers.’ What is more, the effectiveness of meekness and gentleness in overcoming coercive artificial structures is prefigured in Khomiakov’s scheme of Iranian and Kushite societies. Khomiakov emphasises the simplicity and peacefulness of the Iranian principle, as well as its apparent fragility and the ease with which it can be contaminated by Kushitism, but he stresses that the principles of brotherhood, communality and love eventually win out:

Иранское учение, [...] учение мира, любви [...]. Его власть не слабеет, и в его руках судьба человечества. [...] Сила внешняя есть плод силы внутренней; [...] в многолюдстве племени (математическом превосходстве над другими), живет свидетельство о духе братства, общения и любви.

In addition, it is my view that Dostoevskii gave us the key to understanding the power of these characters in the epigraph to his last and arguably greatest novel. Let us examine this epigraph from John 12, 24, in the context of the present study: ‘Verily, verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth
much fruit.' It is significantly an organic metaphor chosen by Dostoevskii for *Brat'ia Karamazovy*, stressing the importance of the natural, and of growth from roots. A corn of wheat is a simple thing; it is also extremely small, especially when one considers its ostensible value in comparison with all the might of man-made technological civilisation, embodied in, say, a Crystal Palace. But it has the potential to bring forth much fruit, unlike its sterile and unchanging counterpart. In order to do this it must go through what some may regard as a failure: it must sacrifice its life and die. However, the words of Christ are quite clear. Life reaches its full potential only when the self is overcome; to guard the self is to remain isolated. Dostoevskii could not have chosen a better motto to illustrate the opposing poles of Kushitism and Iranianism, of *obosoblenie* and *sobornost'*. It may as well be the epigraph to his whole oeuvre. The qualities he emphasises for living in *sobornost'* are meekness, humility, self-effacement and voluntary submissiveness or self-sacrifice. He holds up these qualities as attributes of true Russianness that develop naturally from a rooted position in a heritage of traditional values. For Dostoevskii, rootedness does not preclude being educated or of noble birth; Tikhon, Zosima and Alesha are all of gentry stock and are well-read, and even Sonia has read Lewes' *Physiology* (VI, 16). The connection with Russia's traditional heritage comes from emulating the qualities displayed best by the *narod* and from a belief in the Orthodox faith, instinctively preserved by the common people.

Meekness, and the related but subtly different quality of humility – in Russian *krotost'* and *smirenie* – are characteristics present in the majority of Dostoevskii's positive figures. They are among the attributes he emphasises in his analysis of Pushkin's Tat'iana (XXVI, 143), whom, as I mentioned in my previous chapter, he posits as the ideal of true Russianness. They are also qualities that Dostoevskii associates with the *narod*, whom he viewed as the repository of moral and spiritual worth, as numerous passages from *Dnevnik pisatel'ia* testify. For example, in a tacit nod to Grigor'ev's literary theory of meek and predatory types in Russian literature, he argues that the majority of positive characterisations in Russian literature have been developed thanks to inspiration from the people:
The importance of meekness and humility lies in the fact that they predispose a character to the ability to empty out the Self and look to the Other. Prince Myshkin is alleged to have said, 'смирение есть страшная сила' (VIII, 329). However, these are words relayed by Ippolit during his 'Necessary Explanation'; in his interpretation, humility becomes a force for self-laceration, a double edged sword, a kind of inverted pride, better represented by the term 'humiliatedness', since it stems from the painful awareness of an insult. (A detailed treatment of Myshkin will be undertaken later in this chapter.) True humility or meekness is able to withstand offence without raising the hackles of injured pride - a reaction of the ego - because the meek person is able voluntarily to abnegate his ego. Sonia Marmeladova endures endless insults and humiliation as a prostitute, and is even more greatly insulted by Luzhin when he brands her a thief, but although her constitution is not strong enough to avoid an attack of hysterics, there is no seething resentment in her heart at his treatment. On the contrary, her consistent reaction to ill-treatment is to meet it with love and an acknowledgement of her own unworthiness, as her account of family life with Katerina Ivanovna testifies: 'A хоть бы и била, так что ж! Ну так что ж? Вы ничего, ничего не знаете... Это такая несчастная, ах, какая несчастная! [...] А сколько, сколько раз я ее в слезы вводила!' (VI, 243-44). In the same way, Makar Dolgorukii responds with gentleness and self-effacement when he falls after Liza's spiteful order to get up (XIII, 304). Prince Myshkin too, after Gania has struck him, is prepared to take a blow so long as another, Varia, is spared, and his reaction is to grieve for the shame Gania will feel afterwards: 'О, как вы будете стыдиться своего поступка!' (VIII, 99).

In Besy, Tikhon's reply to constant offensive remarks from Stavrogin demonstrates the Christian import of humility: 'Креста твоего, господи, да не постыдусь' (XI, 10). Just as Christ met his torturers with submissiveness and prayers for forgiveness for them, Tikhon strives to react to mental cruelty
with as much meekness, absence of judgement and indignation. To be ashamed of the Cross, that is, of being wounded and humiliated, is a reaction of the ego, and Tikhon prays for divine help in keeping his focus on the Other, that is, on Stavrogin. He struggles to maintain a voluntary submission to Stavrogin’s hostility, in the effort to establish a relationship of sobornost’, and there are a few instances in their conversation where he succeeds, albeit momentarily. For example, he asks Stavrogin if it would help him to imagine that a complete stranger had read his confession and forgiven him in his heart. This oblique suggestion, which avoids the offensive magnanimity of offering to forgive Stavrogin himself, coaxes Stavrogin into admitting he would like Tikhon’s forgiveness. The bishop then continues to avoid setting himself above the penitent by asking for Stavrogin’s forgiveness in return. The latter scoffs at Tikhon’s humility, but all the same reiterates his need for forgiveness (XI, 25-26). Here the reader sees a concrete enactment of Zosima’s doctrine that each is responsible for all; Tikhon says that he is only able to offer forgiveness if he is humble enough to accept it himself, and indeed, such is the only situation in which a proud temperament like Stavrogin’s will be able to accept forgiveness without feeling ashamed and humiliated, as Stavrogin hints:

— [...] Согрешив, каждый человек уже против всех согрелил и каждый человек хоть чем-нибудь в чужом грехе виноват. Греха единичного нет. Я же грешник великий, и, может быть, более вашего.

— Я вам всю правду скажу: я желаю, чтобы вы меня простили, вместе с вами другой, третий, но все — все пусть лучше ненавидят. Но для того желаю, чтобы со смирением перенести... (XI, 26, italics added.)

Sonia has a similar effect on Raskol’nikov. Her awareness of guilt is striking to the reader, since it is apparent that she has turned to prostitution for the sake of her starving family. But as Gibson has noted, she does not shrink from the comparisons Raskol’nikov makes between his crime and her self-sacrifice;54 she feels her part in the mutuality of responsibility for evil in the world, and this is the source of her meekness and humility. The fact that she does not set herself above anyone makes it easier for Raskol’nikov to come to her and confess his crime. Murav observes that Sonia’s ‘humble authority’ stands in contrast to the official authority of Porfirii Petrovich, who tries his best to make Raskol’nikov
confess, but in whom the latter senses a degree of condescension: ‘Porfirii urges Raskolnikov to confess by telling him that he will find peace thereby. Raskolnikov challenges him, asking him what sort of prophet he is and whether he utters this prophecy of “peace” from “on high”’ (VI, 352).

The humility of such characters as Sonia and Tikhon should not be confused with the slavish self-abasement of other personages, like Lebedev in *Idiot*, for example: his repeated ‘низок, низок’ expresses a delight in shame and a posture of false meekness. In particular, the contrast between true lowliness and false self-abasement that relies on the tyranny of another is played out in the final stages of the drama in ‘Krotkaia’. Here the pawnbroker seeks to prolong his duel of domination and submission with his wife, the gentle girl referred to only by her defining characteristic, and he takes upon himself the role of abject slave, thus projecting on to her the role of tyrant. He begs to be ignored, to be her plaything, her lapdog; he heaps praise upon her, stressing her intelligence and moral superiority. She, however, is confused and upset by his behaviour. Dostoevskii’s depiction of the scene exposes the flaws in the pawnbroker’s posturing and reveals the damage it does to the meek girl, the significance of which her husband fails to understand:

The meek girl struggles to find the right response to her husband’s melodramatic effusions, rightly noticing that he is exaggerating. He, conversely, cannot see the importance of his deliberate abdication of self-control or recognise that it does not bring her joy. His overblown adulation of her is inappropriate to her, because she is humble, and acknowledges her own sinfulness, embodied in her temptation to shoot him earlier in their marriage. When she attempts to establish a relation of mutual self-abnegation, shared responsibility and forgiveness, by owning up to her temptation, he replies with more exaggerated behaviour, kissing her ‘как
безумный' (XXIV, 32). It is after this final failure to enter into sobornost' with him that she commits suicide. Edward Wasiolek correctly identifies the nature of true humility with regard to the individual's part in the organic unity of mutual responsibility; his words refer to Dostoevskii's view of the narod, but they apply perfectly to the meek characters Sonia, Tikhon and the meek girl:

Their humility consists of acknowledging that their lives have a dimension deeper than the depth of their empirical acts, and in acknowledging that they silently acknowledge that their beings — and by implication the beings of others — are beyond their own judgement and the judgement of others. In short they are humble before the sacredness of being, theirs and others.\(^{56}\)

The fact that this comment about the Russian people should also apply so aptly to Dostoevskii's positive, meek characters, suggests that these characters possess the same spiritual connection to the traditional Russian heritage that Dostoevskii so valued in the common people. Finally, Dostoevskii underlines the importance he places on meekness and humility in the sermons of Father Zosima, who proclaims: 'Из народа спасение выйдет, из веры и смирения его' (XIV, 286).

I observed that the pawnbroker in 'Krotkaia' played at humility through a conscious loss of self-control; the quality of self-control is an important part of the positive make-up of Dostoevskii's rooted characters. Zosima is a master of self-control, as befits his role as a starets. Brat'ia Karamazovy tells us that elders take disciples in order to help them achieve such a high level of self-conquest that they attain the absolute freedom that is freedom from self (XIV, 26); it is therefore to be inferred that the elders themselves have already reached this level of freedom to be able to pass on the discipline to others. Here we find the very foundations of sobornost': it is stressed that the disciple's submission to the elder's strict instruction is completely voluntary, and yet through such discipline of self true freedom is to be found. This is the freedom in the unity of voluntary selflessness described throughout the writing of Khomiakov on the Orthodox Church.\(^{57}\) Zosima as a starets displays exemplary control of himself, never losing his composure in the face of the trials of coping with the troubled Karamazov family at a time when his health has all but deserted him. That this is an acquired discipline and not an innate characteristic in him we know from his tales from his youth, where the reader encounters a boisterous young man, free with his temper
and given to sensuality and drink. However, his self-control is to be distinguished from the rule of self-will followed by Stavrogin. Stavrogin’s self-discipline is motivated by pride and selfishness: he practises it to prove and take glory in his strength, and he does not care who he hurts in the process – Maria Lebiadkina, Matresha, countless others, and in the end himself. By contrast, Zosima’s self-control is directed outwards, towards his fellow-men. A man who is always calm, meek and kind cannot offend anyone, and indeed can soothe a ruffled countenance; the suppression of any selfish impulse in him makes him utterly approachable. Zosima’s self-control is also permeated with self-respect, which gives him a personal dignity that saves selflessness from becoming self-abasement. He can give of himself without becoming a slave, as we see in chapter three of Book One, where as Sven Linnér has noted, he moves from supplicant to supplicant with lightning rapidity, spending just enough time to console or enlighten, but not allowing anyone to stifle him with thanks or entreaties. This characteristic is part of the way in which true meekness, humility and abnegation of the ego differ from the posturing of Lebedev and the slavishness of the pawnbroker, both of which stem from self-indulgence. The pawnbroker abdicates control of his emotions because he finds it intoxicating and perversely pleasurable, as well as in order to coerce his wife into a new system; this is evident from his frequent use of the word ‘vostorg’ to describe his emotions.

The most remarkable example of Zosima’s outwardly directed self-control has been discussed by Linnér; this is his bow to Dmitrii. Linnér contrasts Zosima’s acknowledgement of the great suffering in store for Dmitrii, with Tikhon’s prophecy of Stavrogin’s further crimes, and commends Zosima’s control, silence and tact while Tikhon openly displays horror and nearly breaks down. He writes: ‘Tixon and Zosima have in common the ability to see the plans their young visitors conceal within them and a feeling of horror at what they thus perceive. But only the starets retains his composure. Tixon loses his grip on himself [...].’ Zosima’s bow is a deliberate action, as the text affirms (XIV, 69), whereas Tikhon cannot restrain the prophecy that bursts out of him like a spasm (XI, 30). The resulting difference between Dmitrii and Stavrogin is dramatic. Dmitrii’s reaction – covering his face with his hands – is one of shame,
and significantly Zosima stresses the humility behind his own gesture by begging forgiveness of all his guests, including Dmitrii. As the novel progresses, Dmitrii is brought to the brink of parricide, but holds himself back at the last minute, because ‘слезы ли чьи, мать ли моя умолила бога, дух ли светлый облюбызал меня в то мгновение’ (XIV, 425-26). Could the spiritual glimmer that shines in him for a moment be Zosima’s bow? It is never made explicit, but the fact remains that Dmitrii steps back from the threshold of crime, and finds the resources within himself to accept suffering. Stavrogin, on the other hand, is enraged by Tikhon’s insight. He goes on to allow murder after murder to be committed in his name or because of his actions, until finally he kills himself. Linnér cites Tikhon’s lack of self-control as grounds for considering him a less morally excellent character than Zosima.60

The ability voluntarily to empty out the ego allows Dostoevskii’s positive rooted characters to love their neighbour more effectively. The love shown in particular by Sonia, Zosima and Alesha stands in sharp contrast to the love for humanity professed by the likes of Kirillov, Versilov and Ivan Karamazov. The difference is that the Iranian characters love in a concrete, active way, whereas the Kushite personages love in the abstract. That love should be active and directed towards specific objects is a vital component of life in sobornost’. If we give love its ethical name, charity, it is possible to see how it fits into an organically unified approach to moral-spiritual life, as emphasised by Khomiakov. He discusses the relationship between true faith and active good works:

Как тело бездушное не есть уже человек и человеком назваться не может, но трупом; так и вера, не творящая дел, истинной верой назваться не может, но ложною [...] ибо вера истинная есть живая, творящая дела: она есть вера во Христе и Христос в вере.61

This excerpt shows how the above mentioned characters fail in their attitude to love, and how this attitude is related to the faith they claim to profess. Kirillov’s drive to suicide is, according to his own argument, for love of mankind, who needs liberating from the fear of death. But his act is not one of love, but of despair and destruction. Versilov and Ivan Karamazov both find it difficult to love their neighbour as an individual, rather than as an abstract concept. In Versilov’s case this is due to his artificial, self-constructed faith; Ivan’s faith in
God falls at the hurdle of the risen Christ. In general, as I have already shown, the characters who follow the Kushite principle cannot love actively, and thus truly, because they cannot see the image of God in their fellows.

By contrast, Dostoevskii’s characters with roots in the Russian spiritual heritage value individuals as they encounter them, recognising their obraz regardless of their outward state and loving them in a positive and identifiable way. Sonia is a paragon of love; she is devoted to her drunken wastrel of a father and her crazed shrewish stepmother, and she falls for Raskol’nikov as she pours out her compassion onto the hostile, spiteful murderer. That she can love those whom society would likely reject is evidence of her faith in God and Christ, which is a truly unified faith imbued with tsel’nost’. She is able to focus on the good, on the image of God, in whomever she encounters, as her impassioned description of Katerina Ivanovna testifies (VI, 243-44); moreover, her outburst to Raskol’nikov, ‘Что вы, что вы это над собой сделали!’ (VI, 316) demonstrates not only her compassion for his suffering, but her acknowledgement that he has damaged the obraz within him. Her love imitates the love of Christ, who associated with drunkards and prostitutes; it parallels the love of St. John the Merciful, who warmed a diseased beggar by embracing him and breathing into his festering mouth, as Ivan Karamazov recounted (XIV, 215). Most significantly, her love enacts the exhortation of Dostoevskii in Dnevnik pisatel’ia to love the narod for their lofty ideals, in spite of their superficial barbarism:

В русском человеке из простонародья нужно уметь отвлекать красоту его от наносного варварства. [...] Повторяю: судите русский народ не по тем мерзостям, которые он так часто делает, а по тем великим и святым вещам, по которым он и в самой мерзости своей постоянно воздыхает. (XXII, 43.)

Alesha too loves actively and is able to love those who appear unlovable, like his odious father, of whom he says: ‘Сердце у вас лучше головы’ (XIV, 124). Considering Alesha’s compassion for all the troubled members of his family, the narrator describes his attitude as follows:

[…] характер любви его был всегда деятельный. Любить пассивно он не мог; возлюбив, он тотчас же принимался и помогать. А для этого надо было поставить цель, надо твердо было знать, что каждому из них хорошо и нужно, а утвердившись в верности цели, естественно, каждому из них и помочь. (XIV, 170.)
The ability to perceive the image of God in even the apparently worst of people is bound up with true faith, because, as I have outlined above, it is part of an integrated belief that God dwells in man and man in God, that the conquest of death by Christ demonstrates the organic unity between God and his creation. Such a love also requires humility, for only by accepting one's own sinfulness can one love another in spite of their sinful state. In my previous chapter I examined Dostoevskii's notes made at the bier of his deceased first wife; here he begins with a statement that seems to prefigure Versilov and Ivan Karamazov: 'Возлюбить человека, как самого себя, по заповеди Христовой, — невозможно. Закон личности на земле связывает. Я препятствует. Один Христос мог' (XX, 172). However, he quickly asserts that man's eternal task is to struggle to realise the ideal of Christ by voluntarily annihilating the ego: '[...] высочайшее употребление, которое может сделать человек из своей личности, из полноты развития своего я, — это как бы уничтожить это я, отдать его целиком всем и каждому безраздельно и беззаботно' (XX, 172). How this is to be achieved is expressed in Zosima's exhortation, learned from his brother Markel, to recognise the mutuality of responsibility for evil, which requires loving humility. He says: Пред иною мыслью станешь в недоумении, особенно видя грех людей, и спросишь себя: «Взять ли силой или миренною любовию?» Всегда решай: «Возьму миренною любовию». [...] Одно тут спасение себе: возьми себя и сделай себя же ответчиком за весь грех людей. (XIV, 289, 290, italics added.) Zosima's sermon stresses the relationship between the emptying out of the ego and the ability to love one's neighbour in spite of their sin. Sonia follows this doctrine to an extremely well-developed degree. She is aware of her contribution to humanity's state of sinfulness, and will not judge others who contribute too. But she does not just offer compassionate words to those she loves; her love for her family leads her to sacrifice her own innocence, and her love for Raskol'nikov takes her to Siberia with him. Indeed, her active love with its roots in her genuine faith finally begins to sway Raskol'nikov. Her example of active love eventually awakens love in him too, which, as Gibson comments, is the beginning of his journey to salvation: '[Raskol'nikov] does not envisage a Christian frame of reference and then love: he loves first, and it so changes his...
own frame of reference that he asks himself whether he might possibly come to share Sonya's convictions.62

In the teachings of Father Zosima we find further evidence of the organic link between active love and faith, when he advises Khokhlakova how to strengthen her belief in the afterlife. He says to her:

Постарайтесь любить ваших ближних деятельно и неустанно. По мере того как будете преуспевать в любви, будете убеждаться и в бытии бога, и в бессмертии души вашей. Если же дойдете до полного самоотвержения в любви к ближнему, тогда уж несомненно уверуете, и никакое сомнение даже и не может зайти в вашу душу. Это испытано, это точно. (XIV, 52.)

Here it can be seen that just as true faith gives rise to charitable deeds, so specific acts of love engender faith and reinforce it. Ward explains:

To penetrate to another's essence, to know that person as he is "in himself," it is necessary to somehow "become" that person; it is necessary to love him. Only reason informed by love can penetrate to the highest principle within a human being, can truly "know" him. And, for Dostoyevsky, to know a human being truly is to know him as claimed by God. Thus, while he eschews any attempt to "prove" the existence of God by rational argumentation, he does offer the "proof" through love formulated by Father Zosima.63

The fact that Zosima's emphasis on active love does not offer a proof of Christian doctrine underlines an idea that is fundamental to Bratia Karamazovy: the idea that Christianity is not a theory or a formula, but a practice, as many critics have noted, including Gibson and Linner.64 It is not something that can be argued, expounded or deconstructed; it can only be experienced or lived. For this reason, Zosima sends Alesha out into the world, to work and be useful. For the same reason, Tikhon advises Stavrogin to seek the guidance of an elder, but still to live in society. Whilst Dostoevskii is firm in his support for the tradition of startsy and Russian Orthodox monasteries, he is also clear that holy orders are not the path for the majority and that asceticism for its own sake is fruitless. The portrait of Father Ferapont emphasises this point. A rigorous ascetic who fasts, keeps a vow of silence and wears chains, Ferapont is depicted as unsympathetic, judgmental and bordering on insanity. In contrast to Zosima, who keeps a busy schedule of receiving visitors and blessing the public right into his last hours, Ferapont, full of vigorous good health, allows himself scarcely any company and is quite rude to those he does admit. He leaves his cell only to pour triumphant condemnation on those who believed Zosima's death would produce a miracle,
and his outburst contributes to Alesha's crisis of faith. Ferapont's brand of Christianity is, to be sure, a way of life, but it is centred on himself; it is insular and atomised, not at all conducive to brotherhood. Even his one public appearance at Zosima's funeral spreads only dissent and invites adulation for himself (XIV, 303-04). Zosima on the other hand unites those around him, just as Alesha tries to effectuate reconciliation between his brothers and their lovers. True active Christian love thus becomes zhivaia zhizn'; this is Dostoevskii's expression for the motivating force of sobornost'. He makes the most use of this phrase in Dnevnik pisatel'ia, where in the issue for September 1876 he writes:

Вникните в православие: это вовсе не одна только церковность и обрядность, это живое чувство, обратившееся у народа нашего в одну из тех основных живых сил, без которых не живут нации. В русском христианстве, по-настоящему, даже и мистицизма нет вовсе, в нем одно человеколюбие, один Христов образ, — по крайней мере, это главное. В Европе давно уже и по праву смотрят на клирикализм и церковность с опасением: там они, особенно в иных местах, мешают течению живой жизни, всякому преуспеянию жизни, и уж конечно, мешают самой религии. Но похоже ли наше тихое, смирённое православие [...]? (XXIII, 130, italics added.)

In this passage we find emphasised all the points I have mentioned with regard to Dostoevskii's rooted characters who live in sobornost': humility, meekness, active love and a sense of the image of Christ all combine into a force that is lived in the fullest sense of the word. Zhivaia zhizn' is totally alive and organic and it is the experience that Dostoevskii posited in answer to Ivan's rebellion. It is the only possible answer, because by focusing on practice rather than on theory, he transcends the boundaries of the self-contained fortress of logical argument. As Gibson asserts, 'Dostoevsky did not deny the conclusions of reason; he even accepted them (Alyosha did not dissent from Ivan's argument); but he found them to be relative in the context of Christian action.'

There is a particularly Eastern colouring to Dostoevskii's conception of the Christian faith as a living life to be practised not learned. It taps into the tradition of Orthodoxy that rejected the kind of scholasticism followed by Western Christianity under the auspices of theologians like St. Augustine. Jones concurs that Dostoevskii's religious views 'are rooted not just in a Christian soil but in a specifically Russian Orthodox soil, which [...] is inimical to the predilection of Western Christianity for rational argumentation and for its
repeated attempts through the ages to accommodate theology to the prevailing secular culture. As I have already shown, it was central to Slavophile thought to advocate the integration of reason into faith and to seek a more holistic apprehension of existence through all the cognitive faculties: this was Kireevskii’s tsel’nost’ dukha principle. Dostoevskii expresses his own virtually identical idea through his positioning of zhivaia zhizn’ as a counter point to Ivan’s intellectual dilemma. Linnér has also made the connection between zhivaia zhizn’ and tsel’nost’ dukha as formulated by Kireevskii; he notes the emphasis on rational and supra-rational levels of understanding in an early mention of zhivaia zhizn’ from Dostoevskii’s notebooks of 1864, where the writer discusses the effects of atheism: ‘[...] человек в этом состоянии чувствует себя плохо, тоскует, теряет источник живой жизни, не знает непосредственных ощущений и всё сознает’ (XX, 192). This note of Dostoevskii’s could rather aptly describe Ivan Karamazov, whose insistence on his rational mind cuts him off from the living life he loves so much. Ivan loves life, but his doublespeak declaration of his love for life shows that he cannot love it regardless of logic, try as he might. His Euclidean mind cannot see the beautiful wholeness of zhivaia zhizn’, and so his thirst for life is to spite the bezobrazie he sees instead:

[...] не веруй я в жизнь, разуверься я в дорогой женщине, разуверься в порядке вещей, убедись даже, что всё, напротив, беспорядочный, проклятый и, может быть, бесовский хаос, порази меня хоть все ужасы человеческого разочарования – а я все-таки захочу жить [...]. (XIV, 209.)

Alesha, on the other hand, truly loves life regardless of logic. For him, a shift of emphasis away from a rational perception of life allows him to see coherence and sense in the world. He replies to Ivan, ‘Непременно так, полюбить прежде логики, как ты говоришь, непременно чтобы прежде логики, и тогда только я и смысл пойму. Вот что мне давно уже мерещится’ (XIV, 210). The one brother is torn in two by a desperate thirst for a life that his rationalism tells him is corrupt and nonsensical; the other brother apprehends life through faith and love, and has a kind of instinctual feeling of meaning in life. Here is the difference between the Kushite and the Iranian principles as they affect individuals.
It has therefore been demonstrated that a faith practised through active love is a fundamental part of life in sobornost’, but the precise nature of this faith needs to be explored in more detail. The question of denominational bias in Dostoevskii’s religion as expressed in his fiction has occupied scholars since the writer’s own time: whilst his denunciations of Western Christianity, his aversion to scholasticism and his emphasis on particularly Eastern motifs suggests an adherence to Orthodoxy, it has been noted on many occasions that the religious ethos of his novels is far from belonging to the Russian Orthodox mainstream. Hackel’s well-known article speaks of ‘evasion’ of Orthodoxy proper and of ‘Christian cosmetics’ applied to ‘little more than nature mysticism’; Richard Peace has drawn attention to Dostoevskii’s fascination for schismatic groups and asserts, ‘The hint of heresy is never far away’. Even Jones’s article ‘The Death and Resurrection of Orthodoxy in the works of Dostoevskii’, which in my opinion offers a more measured perspective, considers the religion portrayed in the writer’s novels as a rejection of official Orthodoxy so as to allow the germination of a new Orthodoxy. It seems to me that whilst there is merit in all these perspectives, they do not provide an entirely satisfactory answer. At the same time, there is danger in trying to claim Dostoevskii wholeheartedly for the Orthodox Church as it was in his time. But if we examine his fiction by the criteria of the main motifs of Slavophile thought, as laid out in this study, a more comprehensive picture emerges. Khomiakov and Kireevskii had a certain vision of what true Orthodoxy meant, whether or not that vision corresponded to the position of the Church in their day. I shall attempt to show that Dostoevskii’s attitude to Orthodoxy has much in common with their perspective.

In my previous chapter I mentioned Apollon Grigor’ev’s appeal to ‘humble’ Orthodoxy, or the inner spirit of brotherhood in the Russian people. I find this to be the principal determinant of the religion expressed in Dostoevskii’s fiction. His references to Orthodoxy are most usually in relation to the narod, who in his opinion have preserved the true ethos of Christianity. He also stressed the importance of the Raskol in the pages of Vremia, suggesting that it epitomised the people’s preference for creating their own indigenous cultural forms rather than accepting changes imposed from above (XX, 20-21). The overall impression from fiction and non-fiction is that Dostoevskii would not
accept an organised religion that did not grant as much credence to the combined wishes of the people as to the decisions of ruling committees. Such a view of his attitude to religion suggests a belief in the importance of universal sobor or consensus; that Orthodoxy should not reside solely in the hands of a few educated theologians, and that within the unity of the Church there should be freedom. Khomiakov also held this view, declaring that the Church should represent ‘идею единства во множестве’ and that its unity was ‘не иное что, как согласие личных свобод’. This view makes admissible the admixture of certain sectarian and even pagan elements such as kissing the earth and watering it with tears, elements noted by Peace to have origins in pre-Christian forms of religion. Indeed, Peace concurs: ‘Moreover, the old believers with their rejection of the state are actually nearer to the ideal Church envisaged by Zosima than is contemporary Russian Orthodoxy, under the watchful eye of the Procurator of the Holy Synod. (The Procurator was a layman appointed by the Tsar.) The fact that pre-Christian traditions should survive in some form in Christianity is, from the Slavophile view, not necessarily a bad thing, and the reader of Dostoevskii should not automatically read heresy into his portrayal of Orthodoxy. Tat’iana Blagova remarks: ‘Хомяков совершенно справедливо замечает, что новая религия не могла полностью изгладить следы старых верований, которые еще долго продолжали обусловливать характер христианской веры.’ What is important are the principles underlying the pagan characteristics absorbed into Christianity. As both Khomiakov and Kireevskii stressed, in the West the heritage of pagan Rome and its principles of rationalism and hierarchy distorted Catholicism, whereas in ancient Russia Christianity took root in an environment already highly similar to the religion, embodying principles of brotherhood and mutual love.

Nevertheless, caution must be exercised when examining Dostoevskii’s interest in sects; when specific organised sects are mentioned, they are more often than not associated with characters in turmoil than with positive characters. Thus Rogozhin is connected with the Castrates through his father, a sympathiser, and the sinister looking house he lives in; Shatov and Kirillov, the two misbegotten progeny of Stavrogin’s evil mind, live in the house of Filippov, the
leader of the Castrates and Flagellants. Smerdiakov is also described as looking like a Castrate. Conversely, suggestions of sectarianism and heresy in connection with Zosima must be treated carefully. Peace draws attention to Fedor Pavlovich’s accusation of flagellation at the monastery, and notes that the name Zosima recalls a fifteenth century Metropolitan who practised heresy and lewd behaviour. However, Linner points out that Zosima was a common name among Russian Orthodox saints, and we must take note of what Gary Saul Morson has called ‘the irony of origins’ when considering the value of Karamazov’s judgement of the monk.

Therefore, what we find in Dostoevskii is not so much a positive interest in well-defined extreme sects with their connotations of violence and distortion, although a respect for Old Believers is evident. Instead we see a leaning towards aspects of Orthodoxy that are out of the mainstream, but belong to ancient Orthodox tradition, thus remaining as close to the origins of Christianity – and hence to the source of rootedness – as possible. The aspects that appear most important to Dostoevskii are the institution of starchestvo; two interrelated theological concepts: Hesychasm and apophatic theology; and iurodstvo or holy foolishness. The role of the elder in monastic life is important in Brat’ia Karamazovy not just because of the character of Zosima, but because it exemplifies a facet of Orthodoxy that may be regarded as questionable, but is extremely popular with the common people. The time taken by Dostoevskii to have his narrator give a few words of explanation about the institution shows that in the novel not just one elder, Zosima, is significant, but the whole tradition. From this passage we learn that starchestvo is a tradition over a thousand years old, especially prevalent in the Orthodox east; that it may have existed in ancient Russia too but fell out of practice until it was revived by Paisii Velichkovskii towards the end of the eighteenth century. The narrator stresses that in spite of the suspicion of official Church bodies, ‘старцев тотчас же стали высоко уважать в народе’ (XIV, 27), and that simple and aristocratic people alike sought advice and forgiveness in those few monasteries where the institution took hold. From what we know of Dostoevskii’s opinion of the Russian folk, there is no greater endorsement for him than the approval of the narod. In addition the qualities of starchestvo that are picked out in the narrator’s
explanation are the freedom to be found in voluntarily submitting oneself to the will of an elder and the special bond that develops between the elder and his disciples, of a kind recognised even by Church officials to transcend earthly authority (XIV, 26-27). In this way, the institution is held up as an instrument for creating sobornost', and it is referred to as 'орудие для нравственного перерождения человека от рабства к свободе и к нравственному совершенствованию' (XIV, 27). Thus Zosima is portrayed as not only an exceptional man, but one who is part of a great spiritual tradition of special benefit to mankind, trusted by the Christ-bearing people of Russia. Dostoevskii’s narrator is realistic enough to point out that even this worthy tradition is not infallible and remarks that a practice requiring such obedience is open to abuse. Thus the emphasis is that the motivation of the individuals involved is essential to make starchestvo work. This is consonant with all of Dostoevskii’s moral philosophy; he will not accept that any system, however morally sound, is in itself a panacea for the human condition.

The focus on starchestvo and the part it plays in the life of Russian monasteries provides a link between the works of Dostoevskii and the writings of the Slavophiles, in particular of Kireevskii. Kireevskii was also very interested in the function of the monasteries in Russian spiritual life and wrote of their importance in his essays ‘V otvet A. S. Khomiakovu’ and ‘O kharaktere prosvesheniia Evropy’. According to Blagova and Gleason,78 he frequented Optina Pustyn, the monastery to which Dostoevskii made pilgrimages in his later life, and he was especially interested in the work of Paisii Velichkovskii, who himself had not resided there, but who had many disciples and followers there.79 Kireevskii in fact published the first Slavonic version of the Life of Velichkovskii, in Moskvitianin in 1845.80 He was involved with a project to translate and publish the literature of Orthodox spirituality, alongside other contributors, one of whom was Apollon Grigor’ev, whose influence on Dostoevskii I have already discussed in my previous chapter.81 The editors of the Academy Edition of Dostoevskii’s works suggest specific publications from Optina Pustyn, well known to the writer, from which he too would have become acquainted with the monk mentioned by name in Brat’ia Karamazovy (XV, 528). However, what is most significant about Kireevskii’s and Dostoevskii’s mutual
interest in Velichkovskii is that this monk was involved in a revival of the tradition of Hesychasm, based at Optina Pustyn, and that their knowledge of his writings may account for the common strand of Hesychast principles in Slavophile thought and Dostoevskii’s moral-spiritual views.

Hesychasm is a traditional aspect of Orthodoxy which teaches that the nature of God cannot be apprehended by reason alone, but rather by inner contemplation and prayer with the heart, suggesting a need for faith rather than reason. Ware says this on the practice of prayer with the heart: ‘But if he perseveres, praying continually with recollection, his intellect and his heart become united: […] It becomes something not merely said by the lips, not merely thought by the intellect, but offered spontaneously by the whole being of man […]’.82 This is very similar to Kireevskii’s formulation of tsel’nost’ dukha:

Первое условие для такого возвышения разума заключается в том, чтобы он стремился собрать в одну неделимую цельность все свои отдельные силы, […] чтобы постоянно искал в глубине души того внутреннего корня разума, где все отдельные силы сливаются в одно живое и цельное зрение ума.83

Such inner prayer enables a Hesychast to experience a transfiguration with divine light, akin to the transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor. This transfiguration acts as a revelation of divine truth, and the Hesychast becomes part of that truth as it is revealed to him. Hesychasm is an aspect of Orthodoxy which stands in direct opposition to the scholasticism of St. Augustine, which predominates in Western Christianity and which was one of the main objects of criticism of that creed by the Slavophiles. Per-Arne Bodin also mentions ‘the concept of the deification of matter and, more generally, a weakening of the dichotomy between heaven and earth’ as characteristics of the tradition.84 It should by now be quite clear why this tradition appealed to Kireevskii and why its attributes are the facets of Orthodoxy that Dostoevskii preferred to emphasise in his fiction. I have already discussed how characters who give precedence to the mind over the heart experience fragmentation, and how tsel’nost’ dukha informs Slavophile thought and Dostoevskii’s poetics.

The inner discipline of Hesychasm is very similar to the self-discipline practised and advocated by Zosima. Appreciation of the Hesychast tradition helps the reader to understand the role of Zosima and elders in general within the
Church, and offers an answer to the criticism of Hackel that ‘Zosima’s recommended path to salvation [...] concerns the individual rather than the group, the body or the Church’ and that ‘it is a path which does not necessarily demand a lifelong discipline on the part of those that tread it.’ The inner discipline of Hesychasm, which Zosima expresses as obedience, fasting and prayer (XIV, 285), is a discipline without walls, free from dogma and the prescriptions of official ritual, and therefore universally accessible, as possible for a layman as for a monk. What is more, as I noted earlier, the discipline involved in loving one’s neighbour in spite of their faults fosters unity and brotherhood, creating a spiritual church that transcends the geographical restrictions of parish and diocese. Zosima himself encourages this interpretation of a life dedicated to God:

Кто же из них способнее вознести великую мысль и пойти ей служить — уединенный ли богач или сей освобожденный от тиранства вещей и привычек? Инока корят его уединением: «Уединился ты, чтобы себя спасти в монастырских стенах, а братское служение человечеству забыл». Но посмотрим еще, кто более братолюбию поусердствует? Ибо уединение не у нас, а у них, но не видят сего. [...] Праведник отходит, а свет его остается. (XIV, 285, 292.)

The elder could be said to have his own ‘humble church’, embodied in the people who come to him regularly for advice and comfort, and who grow in spiritual stature after heeding his words. This is very close to Khomiakov’s description of the true Church: ‘Действительно, Церковь — не в более или менее значительном числе верующих, но в духовной связи их объединяющей’. In addition, there is a certain pragmatism to Hesychasm that also features in Zosima’s way of life; there is a flexibility that David Prestel identifies as diacrisis or holy discernment of the needs of the spiritual son. An example is when Zosima advised a monk suffering from visions of evil spirits to take a medicine in addition to fasting and prayer; also he advises Alesha to leave the monastery, sensing that for his disciple God’s purpose would be best fulfilled in the secular world. Thus what Hackel sees as a tendency towards laxity is, according to Hesychasm, a spiritual wisdom that allows individuality to flourish in harmony with the demands of a life in sobornost'.
The theme of transfiguration, the aim of the Hesychast prayer discipline, is significant in Dostoevskii's portrayal of faith, most particularly in *Bra’t’ia Karamazov*. It demonstrates man’s potential for becoming deified, of the connection between God and man and of the dwelling of God in man; thus it is a refutation of the Grand Inquisitor’s belief that man is pitiful and unworthy of Christ’s salvation. In the notebooks for the novel, we find two references to transfiguration, among the preparatory notes for Zosima’s sermons: ‘Изменится плоть ваша. (Свет фаворский.) [...] Свет фаворский: откажется человек от питания, от крови – элаки’ (XV, 245, 246). Here it is clear that Dostoevskii is acknowledging the unity of man’s relationship with God and how he is different from the rest of creation thanks to the salvation of Christ. It should be noted that Dostoevskii was no expert on theology, despite an interest in theological works, and these statements in his notebooks should not be taken as an open adherence to Hesychasm as a theological tradition. Nevertheless they indicate that he absorbed those aspects of traditional theology that he found valuable, and built them into his works. In the finished version of the novel, these references of the light of Tabor do not appear. Hackel alleges that this omission causes the final version to lose ‘an important gloss and validation.’ However, the essence of the transfiguration idea is present in Alesha’s vision of the wedding feast at Cana, and in his subsequent resurgence of faith (XIV, 327-28). Alesha sees Zosima at the feast, albeit in his everyday clothes but showing signs of transfiguration: ‘Лицо всё открытое, глаза сияют’. The elder speaks quietly and joyfully of the celebration of eternal life, and points to the presence of Christ in his transfigured form, referring to Him as ‘солнце наше [...] страшен величием пред нами, ужасен высотою своею’. (Bodin notes that Hesychast liturgy makes use of light metaphors for describing Christ, thus demonstrating the acceptability of what Hackel terms an ‘effective absence’ of Christ. The sight is so awe-inspiring that Alesha fears to look: only Zosima in his newly deified state can look freely. As the elder reassures him, Alesha begins to be transfigured himself, as the communion between heaven and earth takes place within him:

Что-то горело в сердце Алеши, что-то наполнило его вдруг до боли, слезы восторга рвались из души его [...]. Но с каждым мгновением он чувствовал явно и как бы осязательно, как что-то
Closely related to the concept of Hesychasm is apophatic theology, another facet of Orthodoxy with overtones of the themes found in Slavophile thought, and relevant to Dostoevskii’s interpretation of faith. Jones describes it as follows:

It is the tradition associated with Dionysius the Areopagite for whom God is essentially mysterious and unknowable. God may ultimately be approached only by the negative route, by defining all the things which he is not, and may be known not in his essence but, paradoxical though this may seem, through his energies, as the sun is known in its rays. It is thus a mistake to try to apprehend God through the categories of human understanding and reason, or through dogmatic formulations.90 Once again in this aspect of Orthodoxy it is notable that man’s intellect is perceived as deficient when it comes to a relationship with God. Therefore according to apophatic theology, we find that attempts to define, describe or explain the idea of God are fruitless, because He is beyond all vocabulary and all understanding. This is not to make Him remote or inaccessible, because there are ways to knowing God that transcend rational understanding, as for example the revelation experienced during Hesychast prayer with the heart. It is into this category that Zosima’s advice to Khokhlakova falls: she must become aware of her relationship with God by loving his image in her neighbours, and thereby acknowledging it in herself, not by seeking proof of the afterlife. Charges of avoiding talk of God have been levelled at Dostoevskii in the past. Hackel notes that Zosima proclaims love, joy, mutual forgiveness, and the Russian Christ, but very little about God, and that Alesha’s resurgence of faith is in response to a Creator apprehended only through his works.91 However, according to the apophatic tradition, this is entirely appropriate. Gibson enlarges on the matter:

We are expecting Dostoevsky to recognize God first, and to discern Christ as God afterwards. […] Dostoevsky’s natural approach to God was through his manifestations; at the end of his life, through the joy and gladness of nature, but all through by way of Christ and his gospel. Like Peter, he saw Christ as man transfigured; with Peter he was one of those ‘who by him do believe in God, who raised him up from the dead, and gave him glory’ […]. If he came to the Christian faith in this way […] he had some Christian precedent behind him.92

Many of Dostoevskii’s characters remain inarticulate on the subject of God (I choose this term deliberately over Hackel’s use of the negatively slanted...
‘evasion’). They prefer to say little or nothing rather than expound on a dearly held ideal. Sonia’s speech is hesitant at the best of times, and she aptly lives with a family who suffer from speech impediments. She is barely able to fend off Raskol’nikov’s challenge concerning God’s goodness and existence, resorting to reproachful silence, then telling Raskol’nikov, ‘Молчите! Не спрашивайте! Вы не стоите!’ (VI, 248) when he asks what God does for her. She can answer no more than ‘Всё делает’, and then her most coherent expression of faith is a reading from the Bible, which as such is not her own word. The Bible reading is the most she ever says at once. Significantly, her only forthright utterance is on the subject of action: failing to debate with Raskol’nikov on the reasons for his crime, she is suddenly as clear as crystal when it comes to what he should do about it (VI, 322). As a woman of few words, she is most effective as an icon; Raskol’nikov needs only to look at her face and consider her life to find the resolve to confess. Myshkin is a man who eschews explanations. When asked questions, he answers indirectly, professing ignorance, as in his response to Aglaia about beauty (VIII, 66), and often relating something else instead, usually a story, as in his reply to Rogozhin’s question about faith (VIII, 182-84). Indeed, he has a greater effect on his audience with this tactic than when he holds forth in an uncharacteristically didactic way about the Roman Catholic Church, at his engagement party (VIII, 452-53). Even Alesha has no satisfactory answer to Ivan’s discourse and is forced to agree with his brother on death for the nobleman who set his hounds on a child (XIV, 221). Dostoevskii knew instinctively that explicit argument, words and reasoning work only against God; hence his famous declaration to Pobedonostsev to portray his answer to Book Five not point by point but in an artistic picture (XXX/ii, 122). This decision to use images rather than words, also evident notably in Dnevnik pisatel’ia, suggests that the writer had taken on board principles common to apophatic theology and Slavophile thought, namely a wariness towards plain exposition of argument and rational explanation, and a preference for revelation.

The essence of apophatic theology, together with Dostoevskii’s awareness of the power of the image in contrast to that of the verbal arguments, signals the necessity to consider the theme of silence. The avoidance of loquaciousness and discursive speech in rooted characters is one of many forms
of silence in Dostoevskii's novels, and these must be carefully distinguished so as to understand fully the strand of Slavophile thought in them. Characters such as Sonia, and the Ridiculous Man after his redemption, appear inarticulate because of an inability to find the right words. This does not signal ignorance, but rather an awareness of the difficulty of expressing what they hold as the ultimate truth in words. (This concept will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.) Sonia turns to reading the raising of Lazarus when she shies away from explaining her faith in her own words to Raskol'nikov, and even this indirect expression of her ideal is painful for her, causing her voice to falter:

Он понял, что чувства эти действительно как бы составляли настоящую и уже давнюю, может быть, тайную ее [...] Но в то же время он узнал теперь, и узнал наверно, что хоть и тосковала она и боялась чего-то ужасно, принимается теперь читать, но что вместе с тем ей мучительно самой хотелось прочесть, несмотря на всю тоску и на все опасения, и именно ему, чтоб он слышал, и непременно менень [...] (VI, 250.)

Sonia's trouble with words is different from the lack of articulation that marks out other characters, from Stavrogin and Kirillov to the pawnbroker in Krotkaia. The first two characters are distinguished by their grammatically inaccurate and clumsy speech, which is a symptom of their lack of rootedness: they do not even have a full command of their mother tongue. The pawnbroker, conversely, chooses to maintain a silence with his young wife, even when she initiates free and easy conversation. Therefore when he reverses his system so as to become her slave, he finds he has lost the art of communication: 'Поговорим... знаешь... скажи что-нибудь!' (XXIV, 28). His silence is similar to Ivan Karamazov's tendency to be silent; it is a silence of conscious repression that gives rise to negative consequences. Jones has analysed Ivan's silence in detail, and argues that Ivan's outburst of rebellion to Alesha parallels the Grand Inquisitor's tirade to Christ: both have kept silent about the idea in their hearts, culminating in an outburst. Jones also draws a contrast between the repressive silence of Ivan and his Inquisitor, and the tranquil quietness of Alesha and Ivan's Christ; he calls the one molchanie and the other tishina. There is more to add to this useful analysis. When Ivan and his Inquisitor speak out, they do so in a torrent of words that formulate a rational argument, and the outburst originates from a self-centred motivation. Jones's molchanie is clearly a Kushite pattern of
silence and speech, encompassing as it does the factors of coercion (the repressive silence), rationalism (the form of the outburst) and focus on the self (the reason for speaking). Moreover, Khomiakov actually used the word молчание with reference to the Kushite peoples. However, when Alesha and Zosima speak, they do so not for their own sakes but for the sake of their interlocutor, and the rest of the time they are content with silence. Indeed, their speech is frequently motivated by communication on an emotional or spiritual level: they see into people’s hearts, or something instinctively prompts them to speak. Such is the case with Alesha when he tries to give money to Snegirev: ‘О, он понимал, что тот до самого последнего мгновения сам не знал, что скомкает и выбросит кредитки’ (XIV, 193); and when he confronts Ivan about the murder: ‘Я тебе всю жизнь это слово сказал: не ты! Слышишь, всю жизнь. И это Бог положил мне на душу тебе это сказать, хоть бы ты с сего часа навсегда возненавидел меня’ (XV, 40).

On some occasions, the communication is given without words, as with Zosima’s bow to Dmitrii. Characters given to тишина in fact experience many kinds of wordless communication, such as when Alesha has his moment of transfiguration at Zosima’s funeral, or the spiritual communion with nature lived by the inhabitants of the Ridiculous Man’s dream world. Thus tishina is shown to be an Iranian quality.

Akin to the concept of the inadequacy of reason, logic and verbal argumentation to fully understand existence, is the peculiarly Orthodox notion of iurodstvo or holy foolishness, sometimes called foolishness for Christ’s sake. The holy fool is an eccentric, sometimes exhibiting confrontational, anti-social or irrational behaviour, whose differentness from the mainstream, often assumed voluntarily, is intended to challenge the establishment in order to prevent stagnation and complacency. At the same time, the holy fool is not so marginalised as to be ostracised or disregarded. Murav’s comprehensive study describes the phenomenon thus: ‘[…] the holy fool is understood to function within the community, to share in its central values, as defined by the church. He or she is seen to bring the image of God closer to man, to provide that “example” of which Dostoevsky’s Zosima speaks.’ It is important to stress the inclusion of the holy fool within the tradition of Russian society, for it demonstrates the way
in which individuality is allowed to flourish within the unity of Orthodox Christianity; this undoubtedly would have appealed to Dostoevskii. Many of his characters have been classed as holy fools, including Sonia, Myshkin, Makar Dolgorukii, Zosima and Alesha. In my opinion, the character who best illustrates iurodstvo is Maria Lebiadkina in Besy.

Maria Lebiadkina shows attributes typical of holy foolishness: she is both mentally and physically disabled, she behaves inappropriately in public, and lives in squalor, unkempt and barely eating. The lowly if not utterly destitute status of the holy fool is significant because it forges a link between God and man in a special way. Murav explains that the holy fool imitates Christ, although 'not Jesus enthroned but the sufferings of “the word made flesh.”' The holy fool takes on the form of a fool, thereby inviting the mockery and abuse that are symbolised by the cross.' Therefore, 'the holy fool, as he is represented by the hagiography, seems to be an emblem of both the incarnate God and the most fallen man.' In such instances we see an example of the way in which God dwells in even the most repugnant of his creation, and an exhortation to accept and love such people who carry the image of God like everyone else. As I have already stated, this was a central refrain in Dostoevskii's moral ideals, expressed in fiction and non-fiction alike. Maria is looked on with contempt by most of society and cruelly misused by Stavrogin, which evokes the reader's sympathy. From the narrator's meeting with her, it is clear that there is something special about her, because of the gentle joy in her eyes; in Dostoevskii's oeuvre this is often a sign of great spiritual stature; the same is said of Makar Dolgorukii and Zosima. Thus, it is from this pathetic figure who plays at guessing fortunes, that the first true denunciation of Stavrogin comes. Beneath the façade of nonsensical discourse and detachment from reality lies an insight lacking in other more intellectual characters like Shatov and Kirillov. Her speech may be disjointed and peppered with rhyming folksy expressions, but the meaning of her conversation with Stavrogin is clear. She sees her husband for what he really is, a hollow, worthless pretender who can give nothing to anyone, and so she pronounces the ecclesiastical judgement of anathema on him, as if speaking with a higher authority casting out any hope for his desolate soul.
Maria’s place within Orthodox folk tradition is further intensified by her adherence to peasant semi-pagan beliefs, specifically reverence for Mother Earth and nature as manifestations of God, and the practice of watering the earth with tears. She says:

«Богородица что есть, как мнишь?» – «Великая мать, отвечая, упование рода человеческого». – «Так, говорит, богородица – великая мать сыра земля есть, и великая в том для человека заключается радость [...].» Запало мне тогда это слово. Стал я с тех пор на молитве, творя земной поклон, каждый раз землю целовать, сама целую и плачу. (X, 116.)

As I have already outlined, from the Slavophile perspective, such marginal beliefs and practices do not invalidate the Christianity of Dostoevskii’s believing characters. Maria is shown to have an awareness of the spiritual unity of all life in her reverence for the earth, and to have firm roots in popular spiritual tradition; this is a source of strength for her in her confrontation with Stavrogin. The spiritual element in the natural world is a recurring theme in Dostoevskii’s fiction and is a further manifestation of the importance for the writer of an all-pervasive sobornost’. It counters the negative perception of nature by characters living under the rule of Kushitism, such as the Underground Man and Ippolit, as I discussed earlier. It is often portrayed through moments of ecstasy granted to the positive characters: we recall Alesha Karamazov’s devotion to the earth under a starry autumn sky, the dying Markel’s prayers for forgiveness from the spring birds, and Makar Dolgorukii’s nights in the open air while on pilgrimage. What is remarkable about these passages is firstly that a religious emotion is evoked by communion with natural creation, and secondly that contemplation of the beauty of nature makes the spectator aware of the interconnectedness of all life, human, animal and plant, past, present, future, worldly and other-worldly. Such is Zosima’s teaching:

 Любите всё создание божие, и целое и каждую песчинку. Каждый листик, каждый луч божий любите. Любите животных, любите растения, любите всякую вещь. Будьте любить всякую вещь и тайну божию постигнешь в вещах. [...] Бог взял семена из миров иных и посеял на сей земле и взрастил сад свой, и взошло всё, что могло взойти, но вращенное живет и живо лишь чувством соприкосновения своего таинственным мирам иным [...]. (XIV, 289, 290.)
This awareness draws the subject into that holy communion, and his realisation of his part in it is his transfiguration, as we see from Alesha’s moment of bliss (XIV, 328).

Passages such as this illustrate the Romantic trend in Dostoevskii’s work by the special significance assigned to natural, organic symbols, but they also emphasise the Slavophile _tsel’nost_ inherent in his ideology. In Dostoevskii’s more overtly religious scenes, we still find natural images which have a particular significance for the hero. For instance, Alesha remembers his mother holding him before the icon of the Mother of God when he was a small child, but what he remembers particularly is the slanting rays of the setting sun that illuminated the scene. Similarly, Arkadii Dolgorukii remembers a dove which flew across the cupola when his mother took him to church. These are Dostoevskii’s way of reminding the reader of that interconnectedness experienced by Alesha, Markel, Zosima and Makar Dolgorukii during their moments of transfiguration.

I have devoted considerable attention to the way in which rational understanding is shown to be inadequate in Dostoevskii’s works, but this is not to say that Dostoevskii advocated irrationalism. One must be careful to draw the distinction between instances on the one hand where a dependence on reason alone leads to fragmentation and isolation, and on the other hand where the author approves a healthy, down-to-earth attitude to life, so long as it does not exclude the awareness of higher moral and spiritual planes. The Underground Man rebels against the confines of rational egoism and materialist determinism, by choosing irrationalism and spite; but he is not happy and yearns for ‘что-то другое, совсем другое, которого я жажду, но которого никак не найду!’ (V, 121). This case clearly underlines the fact that Dostoevskii was as aware of the dangers of irrationalism as of the pitfalls of a reliance on the intellect. The character of Razumikhin in _Prestuplenie i nakazanie_ illustrates the balance to be found in practical good sense. Frank asserts: ‘Raskolnikov’s loyal friend, the open-hearted, generous, and boisterous Razumikhin, whose name contains the Russian word for “reason”, razum, indicates Dostoevskii’s desire to link the employment of this faculty not only with the cold calculations of Utilitarianism but also with spontaneous human warmth and generosity.’ Later,
in his last novel, Dostoevskii took care not to combat Ivan's intellectual rebellion with unrealistic mysticism: Zosima and Alesha, the bearers of the spiritual message, are well-educated. Alesha is the picture of sensible level-headedness; the narrator takes great pains to insist on his sharp wits, his realistic attitude to life and lack of fanaticism or mysticism (XIV, 17, 24). Zosima is not averse to turning to modern science for help, prescribing medicine alongside fasting and prayer for a disciple with hallucinations (XIV, 303).

Until now I have made little mention of Prince Myshkin, arguably one of Dostoevskii's most controversial characters, judging by the range of interpretations existing of him in the critical literature. I have chosen to examine this character separately because of this plethora of opinions, through which it is necessary to navigate a complex course. If one considers Myshkin as the fulfilment of Dostoevskii's intention to create a 'положительно прекрасного человека' (XXVIII/ii, 251), an intention further intensified by the notebook entry 'Князь Христос' (IX, 249), then one would expect him to feature highly in my arguments about his positive characters. However, the weight of critical opinion is against this simplistic interpretation of Myshkin, either denying anything divine in him, as do Murray Krieger, Ronald Hingley and Konstantin Mochulsky, or at best acknowledging a far-reaching duality in him that leave his failures mitigating his successes, as do Gibson and Maurice Friedman.99 Friedman asserts that 'one must see Prince Myshkin not in terms of Dostoeievsky's stated intention but of his actual achievement'.100 I do not wholly agree; in my opinion, we must also keep in mind Dostoevskii's intention, for it has to be acknowledged that Myshkin is like no other of the writer's characters, and was not planned as such; not again until 'Russkii inok' in Brat'ia Karamazovy, where the writer aimed to portray the real possibility of a 'чистый, идеальный христианин' (XXX/i, 68), does Dostoevskii make such an extraordinary and, it has to be said, ambitious project. Therefore we must make Myshkin a special case in the writer's oeuvre, and hence my decision to devote a special section to him in my study.101

My task, then, is to evaluate whether Myshkin is a character who lives in sobornost', is motivated by the Iranian principle, or whether he is controlled by the forces of Kushitism. This is similar but not entirely identical to the task of
proving that Myshkin is indeed a ‘positively beautiful man’, and I shall
endeavour not to duplicate the studies that tackle this question, such as that of
Howard Keller, among others. At first sight the matter is far from
straightforward, as Myshkin is not rooted in any discernibly Russian tradition,
nor does he demonstrate an obvious faith in Christ. Neither does he appear to
have any kind of iconic function in the novel, and the fact that he is isolated by
continual misinterpretations by other characters and ends by reverting to idiocy
adds further complications. Let us begin by addressing the issue of Myshkin’s
rootedness or lack thereof.

Myshkin’s strangeness, his lack of congruity with the society he finds
himself in, is universally acknowledged. The peculiarities of his personality are
compounded by the fact that he sees Russia as for the first time, having spent a
great period of his life in the West, in a state of greatly reduced mental
awareness. Janet Tucker identifies this rootlessness as being ‘tied in with the
awkwardness of trying to function in a culture “foreign” to him because of long
years abroad.’ It therefore may seem to the reader that Myshkin, arriving as he
does in his impractical Swiss cloak and gaiters and with his ignorance of Russian
social graces, cannot really be considered a Russian. This perception of him is
exacerbated by Aglaia’s association of him with Pushkin’s ‘Rytsar’ bednyi’, a
model of the Western chivalric tradition, which, as described by Kireevskii, is
based on self-interest rather than ascetic virtue. Is Myshkin then an emissary of
Kushitism? This is not the case. To begin with, Tucker has not considered the
irony that Myshkin finds the culture of Russian gentry society foreign, because
that is precisely what it is in Dostoevskii’s conception. As I have demonstrated in
the preceding chapter, Dostoevskii was concerned about the Europeanisation of
the educated classes and believed that a foreign culture was being forcibly
imposed upon the true Russian tradition. Therefore it is to Myshkin’s credit that
he seems a stranger in his own country: he stands out in an environment
populated by westernised aristocrats. His time in Switzerland has not damaged
him in this respect: it has not turned him into the kind of Russian émigré
Dostoevskii so despised (Turgenev being the first example of such to come to
mind). It is feasible that his mental condition protected him from this fate, an
interesting possibility that suggests that his idiocy may be viewed as a positive
attribute. Secondly, the reader should be wary of accepting Aglaia’s interpretation of Myshkin as the poor knight-errant. Leatherbarrow emphasises the irony associated with this incident, noting, ‘The mockery that informs her reading of the poem reminds us that her admiration for Myshkin’s selfless love of Nastas’ia Filippovna must be understood in the light of her own jealousy and personal love for the Prince.’ Myshkin then is as unlikely to be a crusader acting in the name of false morality and temporal power as he is a deracinated émigré.

However, whilst Myshkin is not a typical westernised gentleman, neither does he have much at all to connect him with Russia. He has no family, despite a thorough knowledge of his ancestry; he admits his memories of his childhood in Russia are meaningless for him because of his illness (VIII, 25). These circumstances point away from the pattern of strong family values or positive childhood influences linked with Dostoevskii’s rooted characters and would seem to set Myshkin apart from them. But as soon as the Prince arrives back in his native land, he appears to start absorbing the values of the narod and shows a depth of perception that is unexpected for someone so ostensibly disconnected. Reacting to a peasant woman’s blessing on her child, he says:

Это мне баба сказала, почти этими же словами, и такую глубокую, такую тонкую и истинно религиозную мысль, такую мысль, в которой вся сущность христианства разом выражалась, то есть всё понятие о боге как о нашем родном отце и о радости бога на человека, как отца на свое родное дитя, – главнейшая мысль Христова! [...] Но главное то, что всего яснее и скорее на русском сердце это заметишь, и вот мое заключение! Это одно из самых первых моих убеждений, которые я из нашей России выношу. (VIII, 184, italics added.)

This is just the kind of reaction one might have expected from the later incarnations Zosima and Makar Dolgorukii, and it posits Myshkin as a character with a greater connection to the traditional Russian heritage than any of the others in the novel.

The primary characteristics that mark the Prince out are his meekness and humility; indeed, in Frank’s analysis of ‘a discontinuity that springs from a total surrender of self in each human encounter’, not only do they mark him out but they are one of the reasons for his strangeness. I have already discussed his meek acceptance of a blow from Gania, and there are numerous other incidents in Idiot
where he puts up with insults and unfair treatment from other characters with the
greatest degree of patience and understanding, including the mercurial moods of
Aglaiia, and especially during the incident with 'Pavlishchev's son'. In this
protracted episode, Myshkin falls over himself trying to make allowances for the
obnoxious Burdovskii and his cronies, arguing that this man is as much a victim
of a swindle as himself, and endeavouring to identify with him. His approach, as
the narrator concedes, owes more to well-intentioned sincerity than to tact or
diplomacy (he does not possess Zosima's talent for handling delicate situations);
however, when the Prince instantly realises his clumsiness, he is filled with
remorse: 'Надо было бы переждать и предложить завтра наедине, —
tотчас же подумал князь, — а теперь, пожалуй, уж не поправишь! Да,
я идиот, истинный идиот! — решил он про себя в припадке стыда и
чрезвычайного огорчения' (VIII, 230). His thoughts are only for Burdovskii's
wounded pride, and he has no thoughts for his own pride or reputation; he
experiences none of the righteous indignation expressed so splendidly by
Epanchina, a reaction one would normally expect in such a situation. On the
contrary, he thinks nothing of effacing himself so that Burdovskii may be
pacified, satisfied and redeemed.

This intense abdication of self and overriding concern for the happiness
of others means that Myshkin becomes very closely linked with the people he
meets. Everyone is drawn to him, often in spite of themselves, even those who
are initially hostile to him. The frustration and ridicule he frequently evokes in
people are usually the result of disappointed expectations of him. For those who
are able to overcome these expectations, the friendship with Myshkin becomes
more fulfilling. This is the experience of many of the minor characters, such as
Burdovskii and Keller, who become loyal to the Prince. Gania also becomes his
ally after overcoming his opinion of the Prince as an idiot who may be
manipulated to his own ends. Aglaia, Nastas'ia Filippovna and Rogozhin,
however, are caught in a constant unresolved struggle between their various
expectations of Myshkin to behave with pride, arrogance, or self-interest, and
their subconscious admiration for his purity, selflessness and humility. But
whatever the ups and downs of their relationship with him, all those who come
into contact with him cannot but help an involvement with him. Myshkin clearly
offers something so attractive that it cannot be refused. What is this quality? Frank terms it a ‘total absence of vanity or egoism, a unique capacity to take the point of view of his interlocutor – to such an extent, indeed, that he fully understands the other’s view of himself.’ One may also call it sobornost’. Myshkin’s attractiveness is that he offers an invitation to sobornost’ to everyone he encounters; unfortunately their human faults prevent them from fully accepting his invitation. Myshkin’s call to sobornost’ is so strong that one wonders whether he depends upon close relationships for survival. Mochulsky makes the rather exaggerated but nonetheless interesting assertion that Myshkin cannot exist in isolation: ‘One has only to tear him away from the world in which he lives, to consider him separately, and at once his image becomes obscure. In effect, alone, separately, he does not even exist. He lives not in space, but in the souls of the people surrounding him [...]’. Whilst I would not go this far, I would still note that Myshkin’s idiocy occupied the time after the death of his parents and during his care by strangers; he began to come out of it when he formed relationships with the children and Marie in Switzerland, and most importantly he descends again into idiocy when Rogozhin has severed the bond between Myshkin, Nastas’ia Filippovna and himself by murder.

The Prince’s profound awareness of sobornost’ is also his tragic flaw. In his understanding of the experience of the Other, he is also overwhelmed by his responsibility towards that Other. Myshkin is the first of Dostoevskii’s characters fully to understand the notion that each is responsible for all; for this reason he is so ready to say he is to blame, and to forgive all who wrong him; for this reason he tells Radomskii that he should not only forgive Ippolit, but also accept Ippolit’s forgiveness (VIII, 281-82). This point needs to be stressed as a reply to critics who debate whether Myshkin is responsible for the fates of Nastas’ia Filippovna, Rogozhin and Aglaia, Krieger, for example, arguing that he is, whilst Seeley, on the other hand, asserts that he is not. The important question is not whether his actions cause the demise of these characters, but whether Myshkin accepts responsibility for it: surely he does, as he lives the ethic of mutual responsibility so utterly. It is quite possible that this burden of responsibility is one of the causes of his return to idiocy, as the Prince empties out every drop of his compassion in the acceptance of the sins of others – a truly Christ-like
gesture. Fr. Alexander Webster refers to this event as Myshkin’s crucifixion, a moment of triumph, and writes that he ‘was not really destroyed by the world but rather emptied his personal existence for the world.’

Myshkin’s insistent assumption of responsibility is linked to his clumsiness in dealing with people, and his failure to choose between Aglaia and Nastas’ia Filippovna. Frank traces this characteristic back to Myshkin’s unique understanding of human existence, contending: ‘Both his joyous discovery of life and his profound intuition of death combine to make him feel each moment as one of absolute and immeasurable ethical choice and responsibility.’ This leads the Prince to find himself torn in opposing directions, as with Aglaia and her rival: he is so aware of the impact of one person’s actions on another that he hopes, foolishly in the opinion of Radomskii, that both women will behave in the same utterly self-giving way as he, thus avoiding the possibility of anyone being hurt. That this is his hope is clear from his conversation with Radomskii, when he stresses that the confrontation between the women did not dwell on the thing he considered most important – sobornost’, although this word is never actually used: ‘Видите, обе они говорили тогда не про то, совсем не про то, потому так у них и вышло... Я никак не могу вам этого объяснить; но я, может быть, и объяснил бы Аглае... [...] Она поймет, она поймет!’ (VIII, 483). But Aglaia cannot allow for Nastas’ia’s pain, and Nastas’ia is too proud to surrender Myshkin graciously, and he becomes paralysed by the responsibility for hurting both of them and the human impossibility of consoling them both. Myshkin’s handling of this situation has induced Friedman to argue that there is no real mutuality or equality in his love, and that his love for Nastas’ia is not active:

Jesus’ relation to Mary [Magdalene] is one of active love without personal involvement; he accepts her and does not judge her for what she has done, but at the same time he places a demand upon her and expects from her a new way of life. Myshkin places no demand on Nastasya but accepts her as she was, as she is, and as she may become […]. In place of Jesus’ active love is a passive fascination and terror before her suffering and her demonic beauty which entangles him beyond hope of extrication.

Let us answer these charges in turn. Myshkin’s love for both women is an expression of his call to sobornost’: it is precisely a relationship of complete mutuality and equality that he offers and seeks. His humble abnegation of self
has nothing to do with the lacerating self-abasement of the kind practised by Lebedev, as I have argued above. It is true that he does not satisfy or eliminate either Aglaia's need to feel a sense of social pride in her relationship, or Nastas'ia Filippovna's need to indulge her inverted pride in her pain; but this is because in *Idiot* Dostoevskii set *sobornost'* as ultimately incompatible with everyday human nature, just as he did in his private notes before the body of his late first wife (XX, 172). Frank also notices the similarity between the mood of the novel and 'Masha lezhit na stole' as he writes, 'The inner logic of [Myshkin's] character now requires that the absolute of Christian love should conflict irreconcilably with the inescapable demands of normal human life.' To the criticism of passive love, I would respond by referring to my own discussion of active love above, and by quoting again Dostoevskii's own description of active love as practised by Alesha Karamazov:

Myshkin goes a great way towards loving as Alesha does; he perceives the need for help in Burdovskii, Ippolit, Rogozhin and, most prominently, Nastas'ia Filippovna, and is convinced of the worthiness of trying to help them renounce their individual kinds of pride and sense of humiliation. He is able to see the image of God in these difficult, often unlikeable characters and to value them for that reason, and therefore his love is not of the false, abstract kind professed by Versilov and Ivan Karamazov. However, Myshkin, it is true, does not succeed in helping many of those he loves. He opens Burdovskii's heart, and has a degree of success in softening Ippolit, but he cannot dissuade Rogozhin from murder and we are not told of whether Rogozhin came to find repentance and peace in prison as Raskoľnikov did. Finally, of course, he never completely heals Nastas'ia's wound, despite moments such as her kiss of Epanchina's hand where she is able to let go of her humiliation. Nevertheless, this is not because his love is not active, but because he does not have the self-control of Zosima, or the robust normality (potential to succumb to vices) of Alesha. He is more akin to Tikhon, whose desire to help Stavrogin is thwarted.
I shall end my discussion of Myshkin with a mention of the qualities of *iurodstvo* in him. Since this is a subject commonly remarked upon by critics, including Webster and Murav, I shall devote only a few lines to it here. The Prince may be seen as a holy fool because of the way in which his strangeness, naïve honesty and humble purity challenge the conventions of an aristocracy corrupted by pride, egoism and materialism. For these qualities he endures mockery and hostility, but this fact should by no means deter the reader from having faith in Myshkin as the locus of good and the force for moral change. Jacques Catteau explains: ‘No one has understood better than Dostoyevsky the great lesson of the Passion: spitting, the crown of thorns, flagellation, mockery, even more than death by crucifixion, mark out the person who speaks the truth.’ Moreover, the association with *iurodstvo* places Myshkin within the Orthodox tradition, despite his background and his reticence on the subject of faith. It is within the context of holy foolishness that I would like to refer to Myshkin’s tirade against the Roman Catholic Church (VIII, 450-53), delivered in his pre-fit ecstatic state, and which sits so incongruously in the novel’s structure. This is not the place to discuss the appropriateness of this monologue of views extremely similar to the author’s own in the text; suffice it to say that the strangeness of the outburst is vindicated if one considers Myshkin a holy fool. The perplexity, disapproval and ridicule it invites from the listeners, including the narrator, paradoxically affirms it as a message of truth, to a great extent free from the complexity of shaping given by other characters such as Raskol’nikov and Ivan Karamazov to their ideas. It is my belief that the author gave the speech to Myshkin for just this reason. It is perhaps as a holy fool that the Prince has the most success in *Idiot*, shocking the vain Petersburg society into a new awareness with his ideal of *sobornost*, and it is Epanchina who most fully realises his role as she proclaims: ‘Довольно увлекаться-то, пора и рассудку послужить. И всё это, и вся эта заграница, и вся эта ваша Европа, всё это одна фантазия, и все мы, за границей, одна фантазия...’ (VIII, 510). As Webster points out, ‘She seems to be asking, “Who, in the long run, are the real fools?”’

Therefore I would argue that Myshkin can be described as a character of the Iranian category. His meekness and humility, his complete belief in and hope
for the ideal of total mutual love and renunciation of self, his active acceptance of the ethic of mutual responsibility show him to be an incarnation of sobornost'. His qualities as a iurodivyi and his separateness from the westernised Russian educated classes indicate a connection to the Russian spiritual heritage that is belied by his alien habits and appearance. To say that he aims to live in sobornost' is separate from the question of whether he is a success or a failure; indeed I have noted areas in which Myshkin's ideal does not succeed. However, the bleak fate of most of the novel's principal characters should not detract from the significance of Myshkin's message. Frank draws a parallel between the Prince's values and the common motif in his stories of the faith of the narod. I would concur with his conclusion: 'The values of Christian love and religious faith that Myshkin embodies are, in other words, too deep a necessity of the Russian spirit to be negated by his practical failure, any more than they are negated by reason, murder, or sacrilege.'

I believe that Myshkin is extremely important as a creation in Dostoevskii's oeuvre, for he demonstrates the author's understanding of the Christian ideal identified as sobornost' by Khomiakov, as well as the importance Dostoevskii attached to it.

The characters who live in sobornost' in Dostoevskii's novels do so in a world dominated by the Kushite principle. Only in 'Son smeshnogo cheloveka' do we find the depiction of a society totally infused with the Iranian principle. The Ridiculous Man's dream of his suicide, his burial and his transportation to an idyllic world of instinctive love and harmony engenders his transformation from a man limited by Western principles into a man in whom love is the central force. The fact that the dream begins with his death and portrays experiences beyond the grave, is indicative of his move beyond the limitations of rational experience. The world of which he dreams stands in sharp opposition to his earthly life, for there science and logic have no meaning, and the inhabitants are united in love for one another and for the world around them. Here, everything matters to everyone, even the trees and the stars. Communication takes place almost wordlessly, 'не мыслию только, а каким-то живым путем' (XXV, 113), transcending rational cognitive processes. The Ridiculous Man's attitude of questioning and seeking comprehension is contrasted with the inhabitants' acceptance and instinctive knowing. He remarks on the difference between his
level of understanding and theirs, due to the absence of scientific inquiry: 'Но знание их было глубже и высшее, чем у нашей науки; ибо наука наша ищет объяснить, что такое жизнь, сама стремится сознать ее, чтоб научить других жить; они же и без науки знали, как им жить' (XXV, 113). The dream world is, in fact, the most ideal fulfilment of the Slavophile principles of sobornost' and tsel'nost': it is just like a Khomiakovian Iranian society. However, just as Europeanisation contaminated Russia, so the Ridiculous Man's intrusion into the dream world corrupts its inhabitants. The dream society soon loses its unity; the inhabitants form alliances against each other and construct external governing forces to maintain a degree of order. They turn to science and rational enquiry to recapture their happiness, and self-interest overrides their former self-effacement. Meanwhile, the Ridiculous Man can only offer them compassion and self-sacrifice.

On his awakening, the Ridiculous Man is filled with an awareness of the importance of the dream world's original principles, and sets out to bring a message of truth to the world. He has now renounced rationalism and self-interest, and instead espouses love for one's neighbour and intuitive knowledge. As Christopher Pike has written, the Ridiculous Man's turn from rationalism is demonstrated by his inability to explain his experience or find the right words to justify his mission.117 The hero laments: 'Но как устроить рай - я не знаю, потому что не умею передать словами. После сна моего потерял слова. [...] Но пусть: [...] потому что я все-таки видел воочию, хотя и не умею пересказать, что я видел' (XXV, 118). Because of his new rejection of Western principles, the ridiculous man still attracts ridicule. Since he remains isolated, Pike questions the validity of his conversion.118 But one must ask: for whom is he still a ridiculous man? It would be fair to assume that only other 'modern Russian progressives' such as he was before, would laugh at his new-found sense of sobornost', and that he would no longer seem absurd to, say, the destitute little girl, whom he tracks down. One might also believe that he would not be isolated in the company of simple Russian people or peasants. His experience has helped him make the transition from Kushitism to Iranianism.

'Son smeshnogo cheloveka' brings together the points I have discussed concerning the Iranian category, presenting a picture of an ideal society that has a
dramatic reforming effect on the protagonist. The Ridiculous Man learns from the inhabitants of his dream world meekness and humility, active love for his neighbour, a sense of responsibility for all sins and an awareness of zhivaia zhizn'. Gibson points out that to begin his new life the Ridiculous Man must first admit his responsibility for corrupting the dream world, thus acknowledging a moral code that prefigures the teaching of Zosima, and then he must set out on an active path by tracking down the little girl he refused to help.119 Also present in this tale are elements that may be described as apophatic: whilst full of essentially Christian morality, the story makes no direct mention of Christ or religious faith. Instead the Ridiculous Man preaches 'вечной истине' and 'живой образ', phrases that suggest a divine figure in much the same way that the Gospel of St. John refers to Christ as the Word.

'Son smeshnogo cheloveka' depicts an ideal society, one that the Ridiculous Man has to admit is a paradise that may never come to pass; it is witnessed only by him and he is the only beneficiary, within the bounds of the tale, of the moral vision. The reader is not permitted to find out how he succeeds with his mission to spread the word. Thus as a lesson in living in sobornost', its results are somewhat limited. However, in Brat'ia Karamazovy we encounter a similar conversion grounded not in a higher reality but in everyday life, and it affects a group of people, thus engendering brotherhood for the reader to appreciate. This group is Alesha's society of boys and the experience that binds them is the death of Iliusha. The foremost among the boys, Kolia Krasotkin, shares many characteristics with the Ridiculous Man, despite his young age. A highly intelligent and sensitive boy, he has learned the basics of socialism from the unpleasant seminarist Rakitin, and professes the progressive ideas of Voltaire and Belinskii. And yet, as much as he excels in his scholarship and tries to show off his learning, he is, like the protagonist of the earlier short story, quite convinced that everyone considers him ridiculous: 'Я воображаю иногда бог знает что, что надо мной все смеются, весь мир, и я тогда, я просто готов тогда уничтожить весь порядок вещей' (XIV, 503).

Left unchecked, the nihilist streak in Kolia would lead to self-destruction, just as the Ridiculous Man planned to commit suicide. But friendship with Alesha turns him round. Alesha is the ideal for which Kolia has been longing:
' Любил, ужасно любил, любил и мечтал об вас!' (XIV, 504). Alesha brings Kolia and the other boys to be reconciled with Iliusha, not through cajoling or reproach, but naturally, as though they had thought of it themselves; brotherhood arises spontaneously from mutual goodwill and trust: 'Всё искусство его в этом случае состояло в том, что свел он их с Илюшей, одного за другим, без «телячьих нежностей», а совсем как бы не нарочно и нечаянно' (XIV, 485). Kolia and the other boys attend Iliusha's funeral, memorable for the terrible grief that drives Snegirev to distraction and that so impresses the mourners. The funeral is also notable for the picture it presents of the unity and continuity of life and all creation, in this world and the next: Iliusha is covered with flowers, and requested before his death that crumbs of bread should be scattered on his grave so that the sparrows should come down and keep him company. These details recall the death of another boy, Zosima's brother Markel, his fondness for the spring buds and his prayers of forgiveness from the birds. They also remind the reader of the higher communion with creation shared by the inhabitants of the Ridiculous Man's dream world. Having witnessed the suffering of Iliusha and his family, and moved by compassion for them just as the Ridiculous Man was moved by the suffering of the dream world people, the boys respond to Alesha's exhortations to remember the moment and each other forever, so as to ward off evil impulses. Alesha cries to them: 'Мало того, может быть, именно это воспоминание одно его от великого зла удержит, и он одумается и скажет: «Да, я был тогда добр, смел и честен»' (XV, 195). So too does the Ridiculous Man insist: 'Уклонюсь, конечно, даже несколько раз, и буду говорить даже, может быть, чужими словами, но ненадолго: живой образ того, что я видел, будет всегда со мной и всегда меня поправит и направит' (XXV, 118). In addition, the Ridiculous Man's promise to go on — 'И пойду!' (XXV, 119) — is echoed by Alesha's invitation: 'Ну пойдемте же! Вот мы теперь и идем рука в руку' (XV, 197). In this way Dostoevskii transfers the ideas of 'Son smeshnogo cheloveka' out of the fantastic setting and shows that all that is needed to begin to establish the ideal of the dream is to realise the existence of the bond of sobornost' between men.
Alesha's speech at the stone has further significance within *Brat'ia Karamazovy*. Robert Louis Jackson has shown that it offers an answer to Ivan's rebellion. He argues that Ivan's tirade embodies solitariness, being self-orientated despite addressing someone; it is full of references to 'ia' and centres on Ivan's refusal to participate in universal harmony - he sets himself apart. By contrast, according to Jackson, Alesha's speech refers only to 'my' and 'vy' and is about a spiritual bond between fellows proclaimed in a chorus of brotherhood. In addition, he asserts that Ivan's speech is premeditated and is a product of his intellect, his head, whereas Alesha's is a spontaneous impulse of the soul: 'Что-то как бы сотрясось в его душе' (XV, 194). Jackson points out that these contrasts between the two speeches are especially important given that both of them have as their basis the suffering and death of a child: Ivan's rebellion promotes isolation, whilst in Alesha's hands the suffering child becomes the motivation for unity and harmony. Jackson's analysis highlights aspects of the speech that have resonances in Slavophile thought, namely the connection between the guidance of the heart, spontaneous love and brotherhood, and between limited rationalism, fragmentation and despair.

Therefore it is clear that what Dostoevskii's positive, rooted characters have in common is an overarching, unifying idea that guides them and links them into all life, offering a part in a brotherhood with the living and the dead and the natural world, a brotherhood that is voluntary, mutual and imbued with freedom. This is the nature of his Slavic Idea, as mentioned but barely described in *Dnevnik pisatelia* (XXV, 9). It may be that Dostoevskii held back in this issue of the *Dnevnik* because he sensed that the journal form was not suitable for best depicting this idea, and that he instead presented it in an artistic picture in his fiction. It is possible that he recognised that the lengthy and explicit passage about brotherhood in *Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniakh*, surely Dostoevskii's own expression of the concept of *sobornost'* (V, 79-80), does not have the convincing power of Sonia's humility and voluntary self-sacrifice, Zosima's inner freedom, Alesha's gift for creating bonds of love between people. The Slavic Idea is unity with freedom, latent in the hearts of the common people, and transmitted via Orthodoxy, which from Dostoevskii's perspective must allow a variety of traditional forms so as to provide a true consensus. It is the essence
of true Russianness and it is the source of salvation for Russia's dissociated
gentry and for the rest of the world, as both Dnevnik pisatel'ia and Brat'ia
Karamazovy testify. On this point Dostoevskii was in agreement with
Khomjakov and Kireevskii, and in his fiction, through his rooted characters, he
illustrated the ways in which sobornost' might be brought about.

1 Mikhail Bakhtin has written persuasively on the idea in Dostoevskii. He explains
the relationship between characters and their ideas as follows: 'Достоевский, говоря
прадоксально, мыслил не мыслями, а точками зрения, сознаниями, голосами. [...] Две
мысли у Достоевского — уже два человека, ибо ницых мыслей нет, а каждая
мысль представляет всего человека.' 'Поэтому высшие принципы мировоззрения —
те же, что и принципы конкретнейших личных переживаний. Этим достигается
столь характерное для Достоевского художественное сливание личной жизни с
мировоззрением, интимнейшего переживаний с идеей.' M. M. Bakhtin, Problemy poetiki

2 G. C. Kabat, Ideology and Imagination: The Image of Society in Dostoevsky

3 Frank, The Miraculous Years, p. 176.

4 Compare: 'Накопить фортуну и иметь как можно больше вещей — это обратилось в
самый главный кодекс нравственности, в катехизм парижанина' (V, 76).

5 William Leatherbarrow has examined the dynamic of utopian socialism, miserliness and
Christian brotherhood that shapes this story, concluding that only Christian mutual love will offer
a refuge to Prokharchin's degraded personality, respect him as an individual and awaken his
ability to interact with others. Gospodin Prokharchin therefore proves to be an early rejection in
Dostoevskii's oeuvre of Kushite values in favour of sobornost'. See W. Leatherbarrow, 'Idealism
and Utopian Socialism'.

6 Frank, The Miraculous Years, p. 179.

7 For a synopsis of Chernyshevskii’s socio-political views, see W. Leatherbarrow and D. Offord
(eds.), A Documentary History of Russian Thought from Enlightenment to Marxism (Ann Arbor:
Ardis, 1987), pp. 193-227. For a fuller account of Dostoevskii’s reaction to Chernyshevskii, see
D. Offord, 'Dostoyevsky and Chernyshevsky'.

8 Kireevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1, p. 112.

9 F. M. Dostoevskii, The Notebooks for A Raw Youth, ed. by E. Wasiolek, trans. by V. Terras

10 The Notebooks for a Raw Youth, p. 440.

11 Mochulsky, p. 506.


212-13.

14 Ibid., p. 216.

15 See Jackson, The Art of Dostoevsky, pp. 237-59; and R. N. Poddubnaia, 'Geroi i ego
literaturnoe razvitie (Otrazhenie "Vystrela" Pushkina v tvorchestve Dostoevskogo)', F. M.
pp. 54-66.


17 The Notebooks for a Raw Youth, p. 10.


William Leatherbarrow makes a similar observation: see *The Devils: A Critical Companion*, p. 28.

T. Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), p. 236.


This is a free quotation from 1 Corinthians 7:22: ‘For he who was a slave when he was called by the Lord is the Lord’s freedman.’

Gibson, pp. 23-24. His reference to Khomiakov is taken from Christoff, *An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Slavophilism*, vol. 1, p. 135. On closer inspection of Christoff’s study, the said reference is in fact to Kireevskii’s ‘O neobkhodimosti i vozmozhnosti novykh nachal dla filosofii’, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, pp. 223-64.

Whether this evolution came about as a result of reading Khomiakov or Kireevskii, or indeed Mikhailovskii, is, as ever, a matter that cannot be definitively settled. What is certain is that Dostoevskii lived and wrote in a time and a place where faith and reason were accepted as contradictory forces, as Gibson remarks (p. 209), and that Kireevskii was a near contemporary of Dostoevskii’s whose work on the subject was both pioneering and influential.

Gibson, p. 23.


*The Notebooks for A Raw Youth*, p. 336.


Gibson, p. 179.


It is particularly fitting to posit the fundamental Slavophile concept of sobornost’ here. Other critics have noticed the similarity between the argument on ecclesiastical courts as developed by Zosima and Paisii and the writings of Khomiakov, namely the commentators for vol. 15 of the Academy edition of Dostoevskii’s complete works (see XV, 535), and A. M. Bulanov (see op. cit., p. 134).

Gibson, p. 190.


Ibid., p. 327.
42 Ware, p. 236.
44 Ward, p. 152.
48 Bakhtin, p. 162.
49 Ward, p. 45.
50 Jackson, The Art of Dostoevsky, pp. 210-11. The Kushite value of the railway station also brings to mind Lebedev’s interpretation of the Apocalypse in Idiot and his designation of the railways as the embodiment of a rationalist, materialist spirit that is polluting Europe as the star Wormwood poisoned the waters. In the context of the Kushite category, Lebedev’s words of buffoonery ring true.
54 Gibson, p. 94.
55 Murav, p. 69.
57 See especially his letter to William Palmer of 6th June 1851, in Birkbeck, p. 102.
59 Ibid., p. 79.
60 Ibid., p. 78.
62 Gibson, p. 91.
63 Ward, p. 139.
64 Gibson, p. 176, p. 186; Linnér, p. 196.
66 M. V. Jones, ‘The Death and Resurrection of Orthodoxy in the works of Dostoevskii’, in Cultural Discontinuity and Reconstruction: The Byzanto-Slav Heritage and the Creation of a

67 Linner, pp. 146-52.

68 Hackel, p. 164.


72 Ibid., p. 7.

73 Blagova, p. 68.

74 See for example Kireevskii, 'O kharaktere prosveshchenii Evropy', Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1, p. 185. As regards specific sectarian or pre-Christian rituals, such as watering the earth with tears, Khomiakov and Kireevskii have very little to say, but certain of Khomiakov's writings suggest that they should not automatically be dismissed as heretical. His essay 'Tserkov' odna' states that every Christian community has the right to practise its own forms and ceremonies, so long as it does not presume to prescribe them as absolute, and that no man should condemn another's different expression of love for God, for the Church blesses all various expressions of love sincerely meant (Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 2, p. 6, pp. 22-23). Clearly individual freedom of worship within the central Orthodox tradition is important to Khomiakov, so long as it is not at the expense of unity and takes place in an atmosphere of mutual consent.

75 Peace, 'Zosima's "Orthodoxy"', p. 5, p. 22n.

76 Linnér, pp. 89-90.

77 Morson, The Boundaries of Genre, p. 77.

78 Blagova, pp. 168-76; Gleason, pp. 236-57.

79 Ward gives a concise account of the role of Velichkovskii and Optina Pustyn: see pp. 129-33.


82 Ware, p. 74. For a fuller analysis of Hesychasm, see Ware, pp 70-81.


85 Hackel, p. 150.


87 Prestel, pp. 50-52.

88 Hackel, p. 152.

89 Bodin, p. 38; Hackel, p. 160. The light metaphor used here should not be associated with Petr Verkhovenskii's designation of Stavrogin as his sun; the latter emphasises the quality of all-powerfulness, rather than the glory of full unity with God and all creation. In addition, Uspenskii mentions that the False Dmitrii was also given the description 'sun of righteousness', as more usually applied to Christ in the liturgy. See Iu. Lotman and B. Uspenskii, The Semiotics of Russian Culture, ed. by A. Shukman (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1984), p. 261. Thus, whilst it must be
acknowledged that the sun may be an ambiguous symbol, in the case of Stavrogin it implies imposture, as opposed to its implication as assigned in my argument.


91 Hackel, p. 158, p. 164.

92 Gibson, p. 196. The Biblical quotation is from 1 Peter 1, 21.

93 Jones, 'Silence in The Brothers Karamazov', pp. 35-38.


95 Murav, p. 25.


97 For a discussion of the importance of the symbol of the slanting rays of the setting sun in Dostoevskii's fiction, see S. N. Durylin, 'Ob odnom simvole u Dostoevskogo', in Dostoevskii: Sbornik statei, vol. 3 (Moscow: Nauka, 1928), pp. 163-99.


100 Friedman, p. 372.

101 E. Egeberg also considers whether the reader should approach Myshkin from the perspective of Dostoevskii's intention, questioning whether the author's private remarks in letters and notebooks should be taken as advice for the reader. He makes the shrewd observation that in contrast to Dostoevskii's professed intentions stands his own reaction to the finished novel, 'но романом я не доволен; он не выразил и 10-й доли того, что я хотел выразить' (XXIX/i, 10), and that this reaction must be remembered when taking into account the intentions. See E. Egeberg, 'How then should we read The Idiot', in Celebrating Creativity: Essays in Honour of Jostein Børtnes, pp. 163-69: p. 165.


105 Frank, The Miraculous Years, p. 317.

106 Ibid., p. 318.

107 Mochulsky, p. 353.


111 Friedman, p. 380.

112 Frank, The Miraculous Years, p. 327

113 Webster, p. 197, and Murav, especially pp. 85-97.

115 Webster, p. 209.


118 Ibid., p. 59.

119 Gibson, pp. 165-66.

Chapter Three: The Iranian Text: Slavophile Principles Applied to the Practice of Writing.

3.1: Introduction.

In *Idiot*, the young nihilist Ippolit, after a meditation on the depiction of the dead Christ in the painting by Holbein, asks: 'Может ли мере́ться́ в образе́ то, что не имеет образа?' (VIII, 340). He answers himself with a description of chaos personified, a hideous, giant, all-powerful yet deaf and dumb spider that laughs at his insignificance; this is his representation of the ultimate disorder of death with no promise of afterlife and the absurdity of existence without God. Dostoevskii was also preoccupied for most of his mature years with Ippolit's question. Unlike Ippolit, however, he believed in the redemption of disordered earthly life by paradise, and he was determined both to see and to portray the promise of this potential perfection latent in mankind and its society. Right from his earliest works he made it his mission to write about Russian society, and later in life he challenged the view of Goncharov that art could only successfully present 'a life fixed in some image', such as the lives of the aristocracy in previous decades. In the *Dnevnik pisatelia* for January 1877 he wrote:

По крайней мере, ясно, что жизнь средневысшего нашего дворянского круга столь ярко описанная нашими беляротистами, есть уже слишком ничтожный и обособленный уголок русской жизни. Кто ж будет историком остальных уголков, кажется, страшно многочисленных? И если в этом хаосе, в котором давно уже, но теперь особенно, пребывает общественная жизнь, и нельзя отыскать еще нормального закона и руководящей нити даже, может быть, и шекспировских размеров художнику, то, по крайней мере, кто же осветит хотя бы часть этого хаоса и хотя бы и не мечтая о руководящей нити? (XXV, 35.)

Whilst acknowledging the difficulty of bringing to life in fiction the disordered Russian majority, Dostoevskii felt that here lay his calling, his duty, and indeed his glory, as the well-known passage from the notebooks to *Podrostok* testifies (XVI, 330). But how was it to be done? The question of the right artistic form for his innovative subject matter obsessed him with every work he wrote; the notebooks show a mind struggling to bring order to a plethora of
contrasting and often conflicting ideas, interspersed with exhortations to self-discipline in style. This struggle has been thoroughly examined by Robert Louis Jackson and Jacques Catteau among others.\(^2\) I would like to explore the notion that many of Dostoevskii’s works show evidence of a consonance between form and idea, and that there is a deliberate coherence in that form, whilst acknowledging that, as is generally agreed, his novels do not display the classical form that he so revered in Pushkin and Shakespeare. In other words, I propose to examine the paradox in his works of depicting, in a whole image, that which has no form, and in this chapter I shall argue that the key to the paradox lies in Dostoevskii’s adherence to concepts that underpin Slavophile thought. For here Slavophilism offers a new way of understanding Dostoevskii as an artist, as well as a thinker. Firstly I shall discuss his philosophy of art in relation to Khomiakov and Kireevskii’s ideas on art, tracing the common elements that I have emphasised throughout this study. Then I shall examine examples of how this philosophy is put into practice and how Slavophilism provides a fresh perspective on Dostoevskii’s fiction and non-fiction as works of art.
3.2: Dostoevskii and the Slavophile Aesthetic.

In my introductory chapter I gave an account of the fundamental ideas of Slavophilism as expressed in the thought of the early leaders of the movement, Khomiakov and Kireevskii. Throughout this study I have focused on the principles of sobornost', tsel'nost', wholeness and fragmentation, and have made use of Khomiakov's model for cultural development based on the interaction of the Kushite and Iranian principles. From these basic ideas grow Khomiakov and Kireevskii's notions of art and aesthetics; it is necessary at this point to examine them in a little more detail, in order to understand how similar principles inform Dostoevskii's attitude to aesthetics. To begin with Khomiakov, this original thinker paid attention to the role of art when developing his theory of Kushitism and Iranianism, and considered it an important facet of life in sobornost'. According to his 'Zapiski o vsemirnoi istorii', Iranian cultures were based on free creativity. Their works of art tended to be verbal in form, such as poetry and song; their written language reflected the spoken language. The organic unity of all aspects of Iranian society meant that art expressed faith and had a moral purpose. Conversely, in Kushite cultures, mute, physical forms of art proliferated, such as architecture and sculpture, and their written language was expressed through obscure hieroglyphics. There was no moral or spiritual dimension to their art, because it concentrated on external qualities.

Working with his dual system of Iranian and Kushite cultures, Khomiakov proposed that true art was an expression of communal, inner life. He explained how sacred art, such as icons and liturgical chants, were among the highest forms of art because of their moral and spiritual content, and because they were expressions of a renunciation of individualist tendencies in favour of sobornost'. He wrote:

[...] ибо искусствв, невольное и, так сказать, незамеркное воплощение жизненных и духовных законов народа в видимые и стройные образы, невозможно при отделении лица (как бы ни было оно одарено художественными способностями) от самой жизни народной. [...] Говоря в прежней статье о школах живописи, я уже указал на зависимость их от народной жизни; это указание относилось по преимуществу к пластике бытовой, в которой заключаются все другие роды [...] кроме иконы. Высшее развитие этого высшего рода подчиняется отчасти тем же законам, но отчасти оно повинуется и другим законам, менее зависящим от
Kireevskii’s pronouncements on art are not based on such a complex philosophy of history, but he made similar distinctions to Khomiakov between principles of freedom, unity, moral and spiritual qualities, which he associated with Russia, and principles of coercion, disintegration and moral stagnation, which he associated with Western Europe. He too attributed these qualities to the cultural development of the peoples, and argued that this affected the development of their art. He asserted that tsel’nost’ was the foundation both for producing true art and for understanding it:

What is interesting about Kireevskii’s statement is that he makes the link between art, beauty, and truth. His holistic outlook suggests that real aesthetic enjoyment can only be attained if the work of art allows an apprehension of truth, and for this to be possible, the work of art must be grounded in tsel’nost’. In short, real beauty is a portrayal of truth, and truth is beautiful. If the artist is affected by cognitive fragmentation, or if he tries to separate beauty and truth, the resulting work of art is a failure. These views are strikingly similar to Dostoevskii’s as we shall see.
expressed in their celebration of *tse'l'nost*', and their insistence on truth and spiritual morality in art is a rejection of the Utilitarian aesthetic. Their aesthetic terminology is also typically Romantic, as I discussed in my Introductory Chapter. Dostoevskii was to take the same essentially Romantic position. The relation between Dostoevskii and Romanticism has already been well documented, most notably by de Jonge.⁵

We have seen how both Khomiakov and Kireevskii saw art and aesthetics in terms of two opposing principles; Khomiakov envisaged a conflict between Iranianism and Kushitism, Kireevskii a battle between Western and traditional Russian principles. Dostoevskii too had his own concept of a dual manifestation of aesthetic principles. He wrote of the positive attributes he believed art should have, and upheld beauty as something pure, ideal and imbued with moral qualities. He also described what would become of art if its true qualities were compromised, and his fiction posits the existence of two kinds of beauty: that of the Madonna and that of Sodom. Robert Louis Jackson has extensively analysed this feature of Dostoevskii's aesthetic;⁶ what I propose to do is to examine the points of similarity between the positive and negative poles of the theories of Dostoevskii, Khomiakov and Kireevskii.

All that is positive in Dostoevskii's aesthetic can be referred to by Dmitrii Karamazov's expression 'the ideal of the Madonna'. This phrase succinctly encompasses the notions put forward by Dostoevskii throughout his work, both fictional and otherwise. Above all, the ideal of the Madonna is concerned with form; ideal form for Dostoevskii constituted harmony, measure, proportion. But the concept of the ideal of the Madonna can be better understood if we use the Russian word for 'form': *obraz*. This means not only form, but image, or icon. We can immediately see points of correspondence between Dostoevskii's idea and Slavophile philosophy when we consider that *obraz* denotes something whole, something shown to the observer all at once, with both form and content, if we allow that an image has content. When the meaning 'icon' is incorporated into this definition, the already positive characteristics are elevated to a spiritual plane. So the notion of *obraz* brings together the aesthetic and the religious in Dostoevskii's thought, as Jackson has observed.⁷ For Khomiakov, as has been shown, the icon was the most perfect unity of the beautiful and the sacred. I shall
develop the idea of the icon in relation to Dostoevskii's aesthetic later in this chapter.

In considering embodiments of his ideal, Dostoevskii does not make value judgements on specific media, as did Khomiakov by aligning poetry and song with the positive Iranian principle and sculpture and architecture with the negative Kushitism. Nor does he find that the nationality of the artist is the source of negative characteristics in a work of art, in the way that Kireevskii, and indeed at times Khomiakov, scorned Western art. For Dostoevskii, painting, such as Raphael's Sistine Madonna, sculpture, such as the Venus de Milo, and literature, such as the works of Pushkin, all represent ideal form. But leaving aside these differences, we see that what is positive for Dostoevskii is prefigured in Slavophile themes. Let us look at this issue more closely.

The ideal of the Madonna is an expression of \textit{tsel'nost'} and unity. Jackson makes the following analysis: "Reality strives toward fragmentation," the narrator remarks in \textit{Notes from the House of the Dead}. On the other hand, art imposes order upon reality – not mechanical order, but the order of organic form.\footnote{Jackson has rightly made the distinction between mechanical and organic; true art has a form in which all elements – moral, spiritual aesthetic, emotional, intellectual – comprise an organic, unified whole, which cannot be broken down into its constituent parts, for to do so would destroy the very nature of the ideal of the Madonna. This wholeness is also manifested in a unity between the artistic idea and the form of a work of art. Dostoevskii argued that such a unity was the mark of artistic quality in his essay 'Gospodin —bov i vopros ob iskusstve' (XVIII, 80). The principle of \textit{tsel'nost'} in art thus allows for the presence of truth, for it follows that if there is in art a synthesis of all facets of human cognition, then art is able to portray more than simple superficial details perceptible only to the naked eye. Dostoevskii was against the trend of realism that allowed art to be passive, like a mirror; he asserted that art was capable of exploring a broader notion of reality, a reality which encompasses ends and beginnings as yet unknown to man. Discussing Jacoby's painting 'Convicts at a Halting Point' in his article 'Vystavka v Akademii khudozhestv za 1860-61 god', Dostoevskii calls for a grander purpose for art and rejects art that does not achieve such a purpose, such as Jacoby's painting:}
Here we find the Romantic aversion to the mechanical, and an advocacy of the kind of wholeness in art put forward by Kireevskii. Truth in art, however, is not just a function of *tsel'nost* within a specific work of art, but also arises from a unity with all humanity and all time. In ‘Gospodin —bov’, Dostoevskii challenges the utilitarian argument that art should describe only contemporary matters, with the assertion that true art is always contemporary and relevant, no matter what historical period it may refer to, because of its universality and transcendence of time. He cites Fet’s poem ‘Diana’ and observes that although the subject belongs to the past, it has come to life through the poet’s interpretation and even points to the future through anguish for the ideal of the beautiful statue:

Бесконечно только одно будущее, вечно зовущее, вечно новое, и там тоже есть свой высший момент, которого нужно искать и вечно искать, и это вечное искание и называется жизнью, и сколько мучительной грусти скрывается в энтузиазме поэта! Какой бесконечный зов, какая тоска о настоящем в этом энтузиазме к прошедшему! (XVIII, 97.)

Elsewhere he echoes Khomiakov by stating his belief that literature is one of the main manifestations of Russian conscious life, and thereby acknowledges art as a repository of communal ideas (XIX, 150). In this way, Dostoevskii demonstrates that truth in art is a synthesis of all that is within man and wider than man.

The striving toward the future motivated by true art in Dostoevskii’s conception, comes about because of the ideal beauty of such art. The ideal of the Madonna for Dostoevskii means beauty which inspires unconditional worship, because it is the beauty of a higher, spiritual truth. As we know, it was Dostoevskii’s belief that the most perfect embodiment of this ideal beauty was the figure of Christ. In Dostoevskii’s aesthetic, real art is able to reveal higher truth because of its active role in interpreting reality: art is a transfiguration of reality. By virtue of *tsel’nost*, art presents not a passive reflection of reality, nor a formulaic analysis of it, but an *obraz*, an image with a spiritual content. Therefore, art transcends the boundaries of that which only reason can perceive,
and 'partakes of the ineffable', as Jackson puts it. The holistic nature of the ideal of the Madonna not only transfigures reality but also allows man to be transformed through contemplation of its beauty and longing for its perfection; for example, the Ridiculous Man is brought back to living life by his vision of a dream world made beautiful by sobornost’. A. S. Kurilov and V. P. Meshcheriakov note that only a few years earlier than 'Gospodin — bov', Slavophile critics were discussing a very similar point in the journal Russkaia beseda:

Одним словом, искусство обязано показывать жизнь такой, какой она должна быть в идеале, чтобы все люди, все человечество стремилось к воплощению этого идеала в жизнь, причем идеал этот должен отвечать формам, «выработанным самой жизнью», а не быть плодом умозрительного, абстрактного фантазирования. 

Several scholars have discussed Dostoevskii’s emphasis on aesthetic appreciation over rational education as a means to moral re-formation, Jackson and Robin Feuer Miller to note but two; what is particularly relevant to this study is the parallel between art as a teacher in Dostoevskii’s aesthetic and the function of icons in Orthodox theology. In my previous chapter I considered the concept of obraz in terms of the image of God in man, the image of man’s spirituality and potential for wholeness and perfection. Now, by adding in the meaning ‘icon’, this notion becomes important not just in respect of man, but also in respect of beauty, giving art a moral function. Therefore, it is possible to say that for Dostoevskii, the ideal of the Madonna meant obraz: beauty, and thus art, should be iconic. Zernov writes of icons:

They were dynamic manifestations of man’s spiritual power to redeem creation through beauty and art. [...] The artistic perfection of an icon was not only a reflection of the celestial glory — it was a concrete example of matter restored to its original harmony and beauty, and serving as a vehicle of the Spirit. The icons were part of the transfigured cosmos. 

The icon thus has two main functions. It does what words are unable to do adequately: it reveals God, or truth, in the form of transfigured reality. The venerator of the icon comes closer to God by the contemplation of beauty, which permits a leap of faith, enabling the venerator to become transfigured also. Here we see that Hesychast theology, with its emphasis on transfiguration, revelation and wordless contemplation, as I stated in my previous chapter, has an importance for artistry as well as for thought. In Dostoevskii’s view, to reveal a
higher truth in order to permit a leap of faith is the true purpose of art; the leap of faith also lies at the heart of his belief in the ideal of Christ, as Jackson has shown.14 When we recall Khomiakov’s remark that the icon is ‘the highest development of the highest form of art’, we find a correspondence with Dostoevskii’s understanding of the essentially iconic role of art. For instance, ‘Son smeshnogo chełoveka’ is not only an example of how the experience of beauty changes the protagonist, but the story itself also plays an iconic role within Dnevnik pisatelia. It draws together themes and issues explored in a more analytical way in the ostensibly journalistic parts of the Dnevnik, and synthesises them into an organic whole, an obraz which acts first upon the reader’s aesthetic sensitivity, and only then reveals its hidden moral message. In addition, the story ‘Muzhik Marei’, a piece of aestheticised fact, is iconic throughout. The memory of the peasant, who is already transfigured into an icon himself, with his maternal smile and fingers outstretched in blessing like the Madonna, is embedded in the recollection of life in prison. This memory transfigures the convict Dostoevskii and reveals to him the truth that it is possible to look with more love on his fellow inmates. Moreover, the story itself is an artistic synthesis of recurrent Dnevnik themes intended to reveal to the reader the same higher truth. The scene also takes place in a tranquil, natural setting, again linking natural creation to moments of spiritual insight.

To create truly iconic art is a daunting endeavour; Dostoevskii knew there were problems associated with doing so, and he flagged these problems both in his fiction and in his non-fiction. Firstly, in order to perceive the higher truth, one must know how to look; secondly, one’s creation must express that truth. The difficulties of perceiving truth or beauty become the subject for debate in Idiot and are reformulated in Brat’ia Karamazovy through Dmitrii. In the earlier novel, Myshkin and the Epanchin ladies are discussing Adelaida’s painting hobby, and the Prince is asked to suggest a subject for a painting. Myshkin replies, and the discussion develops as follows:

— Я в этом ничего не понимаю. Мне кажется: взглянуть и писать.
— Взглянуть не умею.
— Да что вы загадки-то говорите? Ничего не понимаю! — перебила генеральша. — Как это взглянуть не умею? Есть глаза, и гляди. Не
Jackson has analysed this important passage and emphasises the key question of revelation. Myshkin does indeed know how to look: he achieves happiness because he perceives the higher, spiritual truth of the beauty of life when regarding the Swiss countryside. The Ideal of the Madonna is revealed to him. Adelaida, on the other hand, cannot see beyond the surface reality of life. Jackson also points out here that Myshkin finds he cannot explain how to look. Instead, the Prince can only give examples of his looking, by relating stories from his past and impressions he has formed. However, in doing so he really is fulfilling the request of the Epanchin sisters to teach them, despite his protestation that he cannot teach them, for the pictures he describes are illuminated by a beauty that indicates a spiritual truth. He talks of the yearning for unity with a transfigured creation in his description of the mountains, in his story of the man condemned to death contemplating the church domes shining in the sun, and his tale of Marie presents an icon of suffering innocence redeemed by love (VIII, 51-65). Once again we find here the stress on image rather than explanation, the importance of the artistic picture in conveying a higher message. Myshkin knows how to look, and is able to create such artistic pictures; however, whether the Epanchins are able to perceive the beautiful message in his stories, given that Adelaida for one does not know how to look, is another matter.

However, knowing how to look is not all that is required for the creation of iconic art. If one’s medium is literature, then the artist must be able to transcend the inadequacies of language. Dostoevskii complained on more than one occasion of the difficulties of expressing his idea. As early as 1839 he wrote to his brother, ‘Душа всегда затаит более, нежели сколько может выразить в словах, красках или звуках. Оттого трудно исполнить идею творчества’ (XXVIII/i, 63). On completion of Idiot he complained to his
Ippolit and Arkadii Dolgorukii both reflect, when creating their personal discourses, that one’s deepest and most serious thoughts are impossible to convey in words and lose something in the creative process (VIII, 328 and XIII, 36 respectively). Nevertheless, the more Dostoevskii considered the problem of effective expression, the more he saw that it may actually be to a writer’s advantage. I have already explored in my previous chapter the concept of verbal expression and characters’ choices and difficulties regarding it. Jones has drawn attention to two of the author’s meditations, written only a couple of months apart, on Tiutchev’s well-known aphorism from his 1836 poem Silentium. These passages, in Jones’s analysis, show how Dostoevskii was thinking not only of the difficulty of expressing an idea in words, but also of the appropriateness of doing so:

Да правда, что действительность глубже всякого человеческого воображения, всякой фантазии. И несмотря на видимую простоту явлений — страшная загадка. Не от того ли загадка, что в действительности ничего не кончено, равно как нельзя присказать и начала, — всё течет и всё есть, но ничего не ухватишь. А что ухватишь, что осмыслишь, что отметишь словом — то уже тотчас же стало ложью. «Мысль изреченная есть ложь». (XXIII, 326.)

А впрочем, с другой стороны, если б многие из известнейших остроумцев, Вольтер например, вместо насмешек, намеков, полуслов и недомолвок, вдруг решились бы высказать всё, чему они верят, показали бы всю свою подкладку разом, сущность всю, — то, поверьте, и десятой доли прежнего эффекта не стяжали бы. Мало того: над ними бы только посмеялись. Да человек и вообще как-то не любят ни в чем последнего слова, «изреченной» мысли, говорит, что «мысль изреченная есть ложь». (XXIX/ii, 102.)

These statements would seem to indicate that Dostoevskii had come to the conclusion that to preserve the truth of an idea, its expression should remain open-ended or unfinalised. When the reader looks at his fiction, there is much evidence that he tried to avoid finalisation as much as possible. This attitude towards the expression of ideas is reminiscent of apophatic theology, which I discussed in the previous chapter. Bakhtin has written extensively on unfinalisability in Dostoevskii; it suffices here to present a few examples to illustrate my argument.
The narrator of *Idiot* is widely agreed to be one of the most unreliable and reticent of Dostoevskii’s narrators. There are many events to which the narrator is not party and about which he is unable to comment, most notably the six months that elapse between Part I and Part II. The reader is left in the position of frustration that the already remarkable but mysterious character of Myshkin is in no way illuminated by the view of the narrator. However, if we consider Dostoevskii’s thoughts about the expression of an idea, it is possible to argue that he was right to choose a narrator who is only partially informed. The notebooks to *Idiot* present several drafts of the character of Prince Myshkin, and, strangely, they seem to become less concrete as the plans progress. Once Dostoevskii discarded the idea of a great sinner who was to be redeemed, and decided to begin with the positively beautiful man, Myshkin appears to recede into the mist. An entry for 10th March 1868 shows that Dostoevskii was still intending to make Myshkin more easily open to interpretation: ‘Главная черта в характере Князя: забитость, испуганность, приниженность, смирение’ (IX, 218). However, the following day he appears to have had doubts: ‘Не вести ли лицо Князя по всему роману загадочно, изредка определяя подробностями (фантasticнее и вопросительнее, возбуждая любопытство), и вдруг разъяснить лицо его в конце’ (IX, 220). A month later, he rejected the concept of a final revelation of the Prince’s nature: ‘А не выставить ли Князя беспрерывным сфинксом?’ (IX, 242). Finally, at around the same point in the novel’s development as the precision of the idea ‘Prince Christ’, Dostoevskii decides: ‘Князь сфинксом. Сфинксом. Сам открывается, без объяснений от автора, кроме разве первой главы’ (IX, 248, italics added). So it is through a progressive paring down of material from the notebooks, and effectuated by narratorial ignorance among other techniques, that Dostoevskii ensures the unfinalisability of Myshkin.

The most successful way in which Dostoevskii tackles the problem of expression of truth is, in my view, with Alesha Karamazov. In contrast to Ivan, who, like his younger brother, is taciturn by nature, Alesha does not speak out on the subject of his personal ideas, except in his speech at the stone, which I have already shown to be more of a celebration of a common feeling. Ivan gives his account of his rebellion, together with his Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, which
the reader witnesses as if at first hand, the narrator-chronicler fading into the background at this point. Alesha, on the other hand, like Sonia, has no answer to Ivan's argument, but finds recourse to the word of another – Zosima's sermons. These, however, are not read by him in the real time of the novel, but inserted in the form of a manuscript by the narrator, whose presence is clearly signalled here. This fourth-hand presentation of a set of values leaves both Alesha and indeed Zosima as more unfinalised characters than Ivan. Ivan breaks his usual silence in order to pronounce what, at that time, he doubtless imagines to be his final word. Conversely, by couching the discourse of Alesha / Zosima in several layers of transmission, Dostoevskii successfully removes as much of the 'utteredness' (to coin a phrase) as possible, in order to distance himself from the problem identified by Tiutchev. Or, to put it as Robert Belknap has said, 'At two removes, the extraneous data drops out, and only what is universal and essential is left.' Leatherbarrow disagrees; he argues, 'These various narrative “layers” allow Dostoyevsky the opportunity to slip away unnoticed from the scene of that most heinous of the novelist’s crimes – direct and overt moral idealism and didacticism.' This is not the case. The possibility of moral didacticism is dissipated by the unfinalised nature of the text, because of its avoidance of monologism. Didacticism is very much the product of one voice, it is an uttered thought. A message shaped and affirmed by the voices of many different narrators, idealistic though it may be, has the power of a still small voice in a whirlwind.

The sermons of Zosima solve the puzzle set by Tiutchev in an additional way that also has resonances in Slavophile thought. It may be remembered that according to Khomiakov's theory of Iranian and Kushite cultures, Iranian art was based on the aestheticised word, such as poetry and song, and because of its moral-spiritual content it was part of an organic whole with the life of its people. Zosima's sermons are also presented in the form of aestheticised word: they can be categorised as hagiography. Hagiography may be described as the record of the life of a saint retold for the spiritual benefit of its audience and in order to consecrate the memory of the saint. It shares many characteristics with the icon as a form of art, in that a Life must transfigure its subject and its audience by aesthetic and spiritual beauty. Kristin Eikeland, writing on the hagiographic
nature of Zosima’s sermons, speaks of the stylised tones of the Life of Zosima as presented by Alesha. She identifies Dostoevskii’s hagiographic discourse as *skaz*, ‘an artistic blend of traditional Orthodox elements and the didactic narrative style of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century edificatory literature’. Moreover, she asserts that the narrative mode of the sixth chapter of *Brat’tia Karamazov* does not represent, as Hackel has argued, ‘Dostoevsky seeking to absolve himself from at least some of the responsibility for his elder’s teaching’, but is in fact a skilful play on ‘the vast register of the rhetorical and poetic potential of the hagiographic discourse’. Thus, the register of hagiography is able to preserve truth because it is a moral-aesthetic utterance, and so Tiutchev’s conundrum is broken.

Dostoevskii firmly believed that for art to fulfil its iconic role, it had to be free. His emphasis on freedom for art is in line with Slavophile teachings on freedom. At the same time, both Dostoevskii and the Slavophiles also rejected the notion of art for art’s sake. Kurilov and Meshcheriakov assert: ‘Все без исключения славянофилы отвергают творчество ради творчества, искусство ради искусства; они всёцело за искусство активное, полезное, действенное, осмысленное, воодушевленное идеалом народной жизни.’ However, the issue of freedom specifically with regard to art is in my opinion more overt in Dostoevskii’s writings. In many of his journal articles, ‘Господин —bov’ being the most prominent, he attacked the calls of the utilitarians for the imposition of a ‘contemporary’ tendency on art, in order to make it more useful to society. Dostoevskii countered that external prescriptions and contrived laws for art would affect the creativity of the artist and so damage the natural organic beauty of the work of art. This in turn would sabotage the message of the work of art and render it useless. (A parallel may be seen here between Dostoevskii’s earlier refusal to renounce the spiritually beautiful person of Christ despite Belinskii’s exhortations to view the Saviour as an ordinary human who would have bowed to modern science and socialism, as I mentioned in my first chapter.) In his attack on external laws for art, and his defence of freedom in art, Dostoevskii shares with the Slavophiles an insight which is deeply Romantic. His rejection of tendency has echoes of Khomiakov’s rejection of Kushitism; this can clearly be seen in the following passage: ‘Всё же
His advocacy of freedom of creativity is imbued with Slavophile tsel'nost' in that he presents creativity as an inherent, organic attribute of human nature, inseparable from man, that must be left to develop freely in order that it remain true and beneficial to humanity. Man craves the ideal of the Madonna and seeks it through free, organic creative art; the ideal cannot be realised if the organic nature of creativity is stifled by the loss of freedom. Dostoevskii assures us: 'Идеал красоты, нормальности у здорового общества не может погибнуть; и потому оставьте искусство на своей дороге и доверьтесь тому, что оно с нее не собьётся' (XVIII, 102). What is more, art should be free not only in the sense of being unhampered by tendency or socio-political dictates. It should be free in the sense of not being closed or finalised – it should not be monologic, to use Bakhtin’s terms. Murav writes that an icon should be 'a model, not a law, something whose meaning cannot be exhausted in advance but must be continually interpreted, something that points the way but never fully discloses itself.'\(^{24}\) If art is to be iconic, it should be a continuous source of inspiration; rather than provide an answer or a prescription, art should interact with man to enable him to strive toward the ideal, unattainable in this life, and to achieve this it must be unfinalised.

In opposition to the ideal of the Madonna stands the negative pole of Dostoevskii’s aesthetic: the ideal of Sodom. Jackson explains that this is an unhealthy, false beauty, to which man in a state of moral turpitude may also be attracted. Dmitrii Karamazov may refer to it as beauty, as an ideal, thus conferring ambiguities on those terms, but Jackson demonstrates that in fact, for Dostoevskii, it is not beauty which is problematic, but man whose aesthetic sense becomes blunt when his moral standards fall.\(^{25}\) In the same way that we see characteristics similar to the Slavophiles’ positive aesthetic theories in the ideal of the Madonna, so we find attributes akin to Kushitism and Western ideologies in the ideal of Sodom. In addition, just as the primary notion inherent in the ideal of the Madonna is obraz, that of the ideal of Sodom is bezobrazie. Literally ‘formlessness’, bezobrazie also has connotations of monstrosity and disgrace. Something that is formless has come apart, or was never whole, and thus
bezobrazie stands for disintegration and non-integration: of the individual, of society, of man with nature. When one’s moral sense becomes dissociated from one’s other faculties or from the repository of communally held beliefs, a state deplored by Khomiakov and Kireevskii, one becomes liable to perceive beauty in evil.

Bezobrazie lacks tsel’nost’; in art this can lead to a lack of form, or a lack of truth. The result is fragmented art. Dostoevskii discusses both these cases in his work. In ‘Gospodin —bov’ he takes the example of Marko-Vovchok’s story Masha, and argues that her poor artistic craftsmanship obscures her worthy point of view on serfdom, rendering it absurd and unconvincing (XVIII, 93). Dostoevskii believed that art is the best teacher, and without aesthetic appreciation, a work cannot reveal its hidden truth. However, artistic talent alone is not enough to imbue art with the ideal of the Madonna. In ‘Vystavka v Akademii khudozhestv za 1860-61 god’, Dostoevskii considers a painting by Klodt which depicts a girl dying of tuberculosis (XIX, 167). Dostoevskii is fascinated with this picture because he finds it a well formed, remarkable piece of craftsmanship. But the painting has portrayed only surface reality: it depicts the grim physical realities of impending death and no more, no suggestion that death may be experienced on the spiritual plane. For this reason, although the painting is irreproachably executed, Dostoevskii considers that it lacks beauty: the absence of tsel’nost’ means that it has no inner, transfiguring beauty so as to reveal the truth. Kireevskii’s comment on the ‘fancifulness and dissociation’ of Western art comes to mind. Indeed, when an artistic work is grounded only in superficial realism, it may even become monstrous. Such is the case of Holbein’s painting ‘Christ in the Tomb’, which so horrifies Ippolit Terent’ev and fascinated Dostoevskii himself. Ippolit’s description of the desecrated form of Christ the man brings home the full force of the painting’s bezobrazie: ‘На картине это лицо страшно разбито ударами, вспухшее, со страшными, вспухшими и окровавленными сияками, глаза открыты, зрачки скосились; большие, открытые белки глаз блещут каким-то мертвенно-стеклянным отблеском’ (VIII, 339).

A fragmented work of art loses its moral content; a work which cannot transfigure superficial reality cannot transfigure its audience. Without moral
beauty, man has nothing to strive for. This leaves open the possibility of increasing concern with immediacy, from which arises sensuality. Caryl Emerson considers the danger of sensuality as shown in Dostoevskii's work as 'the blackout that sensuality imposes on the future, its impatient and trivialising demand that everything essential be squeezed into the present.' Such is the nature of the ennui of Svidrigailov and Stavrogin. In this moral vacuum, man is in a state of fragmentation and his aesthetic sense may no longer lead him to the ideal of the Madonna, but instead to perceive beauty in evil. In other words, he has lost the ability to 'look'. Thus Ivan Karamazov comments on the 'artistic' cruelty of the Turks in Bulgaria, and his tormented brother agonises over his ability to see beauty in Sodom. In 'Otvet Russkomu vestniku' Dostoevskii provides a detailed analysis of the sensualism which overtook the regime of Cleopatra, as depicted in Pushkin's 'Egyptian Nights'; his account displays all the characteristics of a typical Khomiakovian Kushite society: mute subjects, the absence of independent thought and faith, submission to the brute forces of necessity, a fixation on the body, bloodlust and human sacrifice (XIX, 135-6). It is striking that Egypt was for Khomiakov a prime example of the workings of the Kushite principle. This passage functions as the antithesis to the Ridiculous Man's dream world in Dostoevskii's moral-aesthetic universe.

Just as the ideal of the Madonna can only thrive in an atmosphere of freedom, so the ideal of Sodom grows from the restriction of freedom. The demands of social or political tendency, as advocated by the utilitarians, stifle creativity and art becomes a function of necessity, subject to external law. Without spontaneous organic creativity, art is not whole, nor is it living: tendency objectifies art, so that it becomes a dead thing, rather like the graven images worshipped by the Kushites, and man cannot enter into communion with it. Both Dostoevskii and Khomiakov, it may be remembered, believed in art as an expression of the ideals of the people; art is therefore an integral part both of its individual creator and of humanity as a whole. For art to be detached from man is to dehumanise him, and he too is reified, the divine image in him deformed. Thus a restriction of freedom in art leads to bezobrazie. Dostoevskii's words in 'Gospodin —bov' illustrate the harm done to man by the imposition of an alien
tendency. The suggestion that an artist forced to write according to prescription is not himself is quite plain in its implication:

Нельзя же так обстрелич человека, что вот, дескать, это твоя потребность, так вот нет же, не хочу, живи так, а не так! [...] но деспотизм нашей критики пройдет; станут писать по охоте, будут более сами по себе и, может быть, и в обличительном роде напишут что-нибудь прекрасное. (XVIII, 99, 100.)

Many of Dostoevskii's views on art, beauty and creativity are coloured by his own experience as a writer. All his life he struggled to bring into his work as much of the ideal of the Madonna as was within his abilities. He conceived of the creative process as being driven by two forces: that of the poet, who brings forth the idea of a work of art, and that of the artist, whose role is to a greater or lesser degree to devise the form which would express the idea. With regard to his own work, Dostoevskii had great faith in the poetic ideas of his works and would always defend them on that score, but he had less confidence in his innate ability to incarnate those ideas artistically. In his notebooks to Podrostok are frequent exhortations to find the right form for his novel: ‘Форма! Форма! Простой рассказ à la Пушкин!’ (16, 122). He envied the gentry writers Turgenev and Goncharov their leisure to revise and polish their works endlessly, and bemoaned the pressures of financial hardship or ill-health which dictated his own writing schedule. In the final analysis it is generally maintained that his artistic works are not an embodiment of that perfect, harmonious form he held as an ideal, but have a dynamic form of tension between contrasting forces.27 I would like to consider the issue of the form of Dostoevskii's fiction in the light of my proposal of similarities with the Slavophile aesthetic. For having demonstrated that in Dostoevskii's aesthetic theory there are strong elements of Slavophilism, it remains to evaluate the way he put those ideas into practice. To what extent is there a discrepancy between Dostoevskii's notions of obraz and bezobrazie, and the artistic form in which he expressed those notions?

In order to answer this question, I would like to turn to the critic and symbolist poet Viacheslav Ivanov, who in my view sums up the matter most succinctly. He writes: ‘[Dostoevskii's] work is the most striking example we know of the identity of form and content — in so far as by content we mean the original intuitive perception of life, and by form the means of transmuting this by
art into the flesh and blood of a new world of living entities.\textsuperscript{28} Ivanov uses terminology that has noticeably Slavophile overtones. He emphasises the non-analytical approach in Dostoevskii’s apprehension of reality, and he underlines the organic, holistic nature of his writing.\textsuperscript{29} He also makes it clear that form according to Dostoevskii’s aesthetic need not mean Homeric classical measure and harmony. Form according to the ideal of the Madonna means \textit{obraz}: the unity of moral, spiritual and aesthetic elements with the power to transfigure. So it is according to these terms that I judge the form of Dostoevskii’s works. Dostoevskii perceives life in all its diversity and through the transfiguring touch of his artistry he creates a world that is fresh, emergent and authentic. His works represent the cutting edge of creativity. They encompass the breadth of the Russian nature which so troubled Dmitrii Karamazov, a breadth with enables man to entertain both the ideal of the Madonna and the ideal of Sodom. Catteau comments on the uniqueness of Dostoevskii’s artistry:

Why should simplicity be preferable to complexity, if genius is more inclined to express the increasing complexity of modern life? How can we blame an author for introducing too many characters, if the future is with the crowd and the city? Why is the interweaving of ten or twenty subjects a fault if the writer is trying to penetrate the texture of motives which are naturally entwined? Why celebrate the artistic perfection of the monophonic novel when Dostoyevsky, an innovative and original genius, was constructing the polyphonic novel with its \textit{infinite possibilities}\textsuperscript{30}

Dostoevskii’s artistic world is one of accidental families and underground men, fragmented, suffering individuals, holy fools existing alongside nihilist monsters, above all one of a reality that ‘strives toward fragmentation.’ In depicting the most contemporary reality, or the news, as it were, just breaking, Dostoevskii employs a form that is equally vital and new, but at the same time, because of its transfiguring power, the form is not tied to his century: it transcends time and will always have relevance. Just like Arkadii Dolgorukii, he is obliged to guess, at the risk of making mistakes, but in his guessing, Dostoevskii makes a leap of faith: somewhere in the morass of \textit{bezobrazie} into which the inhabitants of his world are disintegrating, lies a fervent hope in the Russian people. Dostoevskii wished to depict contemporary life, but also to seek the existence or resurgence of a moral strand in the new way of life. Just as the measured form of Pushkin and Shakespeare is not Dostoevskii’s form, so the disorder he saw around him, which may have been his subject matter, is not the
poetic idea of his works. He hoped it was not the symptom of deep-rooted 
bezobrazie; through the transfiguring power of his art maybe it was possible to 
find and nurture the germ of true Russian spirituality. In *Dnevnik pisatelja*
Dostoevskii exhorts us:

Нет, судите наш народ не по тому, чем он есть, а по тому, чем 
желал бы стать. А идеалы его сильны и святы, и они-то и спасли 
его в века мучений; они срослись с душой его искони и наградили 
ее навеки простодушием и честностью, искренностью и широким 
всепротым умом, и всё это в самом привлекательном 
гармоническом соединении. А если притом и так много грязи, то 
русский человек и тоскует от нее всего более сам, и верит, что [...] 
кончится тьма и что непременно воссияет когда-нибудь вечный 
свет. (XXII, 43.)

Here Dostoevskii highlights those qualities in the Russian people which also 
motivate his artistic style: the Russians are a people of potential, of *becoming*, in 
whom the ideal of the Madonna certainly exists, and in whom, in spite of their 
bezobrazie, there is harmony and unity. Dostoevskii, poet of the darkness, shapes 
his creation with a hope in the light. The freedom of his art, his refusal to write to 
the historical prescriptions of a Goncharov or a Turgenev, allow for his works to 
be living, organic, forward looking. The *becoming* of his form is consonant with 
his poetic idea: Dostoevskii’s works show an essential, Slavophile *tsel’nost’*. The 
paradox lies in the fact that this harmonious wholeness is not fully integrated 
with ideal beauty, as one might expect from the arguments I have laid out above. 
What is still more interesting, is that Dostoevskii’s approach to art resolves a 
double standard in Slavophile attitudes to art, observed by Kurilov:

Славянофилы хотели, чтобы искусство изображало не 
действительную жизнь народа, считая ее «неправдой», искашением 
подлинно русской жизни, а такую, которая отвечала бы их идеалу. 
[...] Принимая и одобряя изображение отрицательных сторон в 
жизни «образованного класса», они в то же время никому не 
прощали подобного критического отношения к жизни простого 
народа и «отрицательного» художественного изображения деревни, 
крестьянского быта.31

Dostoevskii succeeded in preserving the ideal of the redemptive qualities of the 
Russian people, whilst at the same time portraying the reality of his 
contemporary life, and all through concentrating on aesthetic standpoints found 
in Slavophile thought. Once again, it appears that the writer was more 
’slavophile’ than the adherents to that movement themselves.
The ideal of the Madonna is present in Dostoevskii's works as we have seen, as the highest form toward which he maintained art should strive, and as the moral-aesthetic goal that motivates his positive characters and transforms them in occasional, brief moments of ecstasy. That Dostoevskii's art does not have the measured, classical form he so admired in Homer and Pushkin is not the question. The icon that is Dostoevskii's oeuvre portrays a disfigured subject, and yet it still retains its transfiguring power thanks to its Slavophile organic wholeness, its living form and its sense of hope. As an artist, Dostoevskii is not unlike his Ridiculous Man, whose ideal dream world became corrupted, but who loved it all the more for its fall, and who with that poignant, burning vision in his heart, looks amid the bezobrazie toward the future, proclaiming: 'И пойду! И пойду!' (XXV, 119).
3.3: Examples of Slavophile writing in Dostoevskii’s oeuvre.

I have by now made it clear that when examining the form of Dostoevskii’s writing, the reader must concentrate on form as a moral-aesthetic all-pervading design. The writer may not have realised it himself – indeed his letters and notebooks suggest that he did not – but in fact he had created the ideal form for his poetic ideas: his pronouncements on art and the evidence in his works testify to this fact. From the arguments I have laid out above, it is therefore possible to posit the existence of an artistic form, centred on the ideal of the Madonna, which I would like to call ‘Iranian art’. This is art that is an obraz, whole, iconic, transfiguring both reality and the appreciator of art to reveal a higher truth, and free from external coercion. Harmony or simplicity of form become secondary issues. It now remains to ask how frequently and how successfully Dostoevskii realised Iranian principles in his art. To some extent this question has already been answered in the preceding chapter, through my examination of Kushite and Iranian themes in his fiction. But as I stated earlier, the ideal of the Madonna in art requires that there is a unity between the idea and the form of a work. Therefore it is necessary to judge the form of Dostoevskii’s writings according to the criteria of ‘Iranian art’. However, to examine every work would be a Herculean labour beyond the scope of this study, and so I intend to focus on a few selected works in which the salient points of the ‘Iranian art’ category are most clearly discernible. One way to achieve this is to look in these works at the writer’s use of a variety of experiments in or combinations of different genres, narrative techniques and formal structures. This then, shall be my next subject for study.

I shall consider three works of non-fiction, and only one fictional work; this is not, as it may seem, an emphasis on the non-fiction over the fiction, and it should not be inferred that I consider the form of the non-fiction to be more important. Rather, the study of Dostoevskii’s works according to the criteria of ‘Iranian art’ means that both fiction and non-fiction may be judged as works of art; so I have simply selected the works which, in my opinion, best illustrate the principles of ‘Iranian art’. Therefore the distinction between fiction and non-fiction (which often in the critical literature is used as grounds to devote less attention to the latter) becomes unimportant. The concept of ‘Iranian art’,
suitably all-embracing rather than selective, enables the significance they
deserve, in my view, to be ascribed to the major non-fictional works. The key
works Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatielakh and
Dnevnik pisatelia are of note in that they are of indeterminate genre; the former
is widely accepted to portray experiences very similar to Dostoevskii’s own, and
yet it is not autobiography; the latter two cannot really be categorised as
journalism in the same way as Dostoevskii’s non-fiction articles for Vremia and
Epokha because of their distinct artistic structure. (This is not to say that when
Dostoevskii wrote articles for journals he did not do so artistically; however, the
works mentioned above convey to the reader a sense of the importance of the
chosen form and artistic purpose.) I would argue that precisely because of the
uniqueness of genre of these works, they may be read as Iranian texts, in which
the ideal of the Madonna provides a unity for material depicting often shocking
scenes of obosoblenie.

In my first chapter I argued how in Siberia Dostoevskii saw convicts
struggling to preserve their obraz under conditions of great moral and social
bezobrazie, and how this sight helped him to reshape his view both of the
Russian common people and of humanity in general. In Zapiski iz mertvogo
doma Dostoevskii uses the artistic medium of writing to demonstrate that
process. This piece of prose is like no other in his oeuvre, and it is this very
originality that is its strength and the locus of its importance. To begin with, its
genre is uncertain. Based so closely on autobiography, one hesitates to call it a
novel, yet the deliberate use of fictional narrators distances the work enough
from the real life of the author for it to be neither a memoir. Secondly, it is
widely agreed that the tone of the work is very different from that of the majority
of Dostoevskii’s fiction, being as it is controlled, measured, to the point of being
oddly impersonal at times. Gone is Dostoevskii’s usual passionate prolixity, his
tendency to melodrama. Indeed it seems ironic, that when Dostoevskii depicts
scenes of barbarity and cruelty to rival the horror stories of Ivan Karamazov,
scenes very similar to those that he witnessed first hand, he should find his
greatest level of control and elegance. Clearly the classical proportion he
idealised was not so beyond him after all. Thirdly, the text makes use of several
narrators; the first is the anonymous first person narrator who introduces the text;
the second is Gorianchikov, the convict narrator of the story proper, and then there are a number of other convict narrators, including most notably the narrator of the horrifying tale 'Akul'kin muzh', embedded in the text as an overheard reminiscence. However, despite this cocooning in fiction, the text is transparent enough for Dostoevskii's contemporary readers to be aware that he was essentially relating his own experiences. Let us consider the reasons for Dostoevskii's choice of form and narration for his story.

Obviously to remember such a painful experience was difficult for the author. His private reticence, broken only by one letter to his brother, testifies to this fact. Therefore it must have been quite a task for him to share it with the public. What was his motivation for doing so? To make the public aware of the harsh conditions of prison life – to be sure; but Dostoevskii had a higher purpose for his work: he wanted to restore the image of the people he had come to understand as 'самый даровитый, самый сильный народ из всего народа нашего' (IV, 231). But the question for him was how to achieve this purpose; for surely in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma the appalling, upsetting subject matter is the epitome of disorder. The question facing Dostoevskii was that posed by Ippolit Terent'ev: how to present in an artistic picture that which has no form. To put it another way, he had to know how to look at his subject and perceive the inner truth under the terrible surface reality. Jackson raises this question in his discussion of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma; he points out that the central concern for Dostoevskii was to present his material 'not only with ruthless honesty but as a poet with an ideal', and that the choice of artistic form was crucial. Dostoevskii had the option of writing a memoir with himself as the central figure, but as his letter to Mikhail demonstrates, his personal experience was one of insult and bitterness. A fictionalised form was necessary to separate his painful private memories from his deeper spiritual understanding. This is where not only the narrator Gorianchikov comes in, but also the fictional editor-narrator.

On one level, Dostoevskii stepped back from his experiences by giving them to someone else: Gorianchikov, a nobleman like him, ostensibly the perpetrator of a crime of passion, but who evidently undergoes the experience of a political prisoner. However, it was still possible that the memoirs of 'someone else' would have a purely subjective slant and would not be able to present the
wider picture of a people transfigured. Therefore the nameless editor, who has 
not been a convict, is introduced. He is presented as a man of compassion, taking 
an interest in the distrustful Gorianchikov, and a man of education, being able to 
offer his acquaintance literary journals and books. This makes him a worthy 
candidate for the task of editing Gorianchikov’s manuscript. As if to emphasise 
to his readers the painful process of recalling his prison experience, Dostoevskii 
has the original manuscript interspersed with another text, ‘какими-то 
странными, ужасными воспоминаниями, набросанными неровно, 
судорожно, как будто по какому-то принуждению [...] они писаны в 
сумасшествии’ (IV, 8). This opinion of the manuscript, given by the editor-
narrator, in addition to the general portrait of Gorianchikov as a fearful recluse, is 
evidence of the profound disturbing psychological effect prison may have on a 
person. So even the fictional Gorianchikov’s memoirs needed a degree of 
selective processing by a more objective personality. No doubt critics of the 
psychoanalytical school would find something to say about the creation of 
successive narrators to maintain a distance from a distressing experience, but 
without wishing to consider such implications, it is sufficient to say that this 
technique allows Dostoevskii the possibility of focusing on a broader plane. 
Jackson sums up the matter and asserts that the choice of narrator not only helped 
the writer in his poetic task, but also healed a wound within him; writing Zapiski 
iz mertvogo doma transfigured the artist as well as the subject:

But the use of an unknown narrator made it possible for [Dostoevskii] to 
structure his experiences and impressions on the basis of his deepest insights. 
He freed himself from the exacting and distracting demand of adhering to the 
temporal and spiritual timetable of his own personal experiences. Removing 
himself from the center of attention, Dostoevsky was able artistically to shape 
himself. Above all, he sought to eliminate as far as possible the contradiction 
that had clearly rended his own spirit: the contradiction between subjective 
bias and objective insight, personal hatred and loving understanding [...] .33 

What is more, Gorianchikov is a pleasantly self-effacing narrator, who 
devotes only a few pages of the whole work to his thoughts on his own situation 
and misery, and instead concentrates on the stories, feelings and lives of his 
fellow convicts. He weaves them into a wider context illustrating the importance 
of work, or of church-going, or of looking after animals; this wider context raises 
the question of man’s humanity and his spiritual unity with God’s creation. The 
editor-narrator claims to find Gorianchikov’s notes ‘бесшвазное’ (IV, 8), but
there is a structural unity that ensures that what remains with the reader is not the individual suffering of Gorianchikov or the specific cruelties and bestialities of individual convicts, but the timeless theme of man's struggle to retain his dignity, his spirituality and his moral centre. The unity lies in several factors. Had Dostoevskii chosen to write a straightforward, linear, day-by-day account of his experiences, the result would not be an artistic picture. Therefore, whilst the more specific chronology of ten years of imprisonment is disregarded, the text is attached to the very broad chronological sequence of the pattern of seasons. This is an organic pattern, and therefore significant in terms of Slavophile thought. It brings to mind the seasonal implication of the famous epigraph to Brat'ia Karamazovy concerning the life cycle of the corn of wheat. The image of the death and resurrection of the wheat also relates to another thematic structure that runs parallel to the seasonal chronology, this being the notion of spiritual death and resurrection, as Jackson concurs: 'The continual cycle of death and resurrection [...] expresses the tragic optimism of House of the Dead, its triumph over the finite.' Gorianchikov enters the prison in December, where the promise of rebirth appears briefly during the Christmas festivities. The text then moves into the atmosphere of sickness and death with the hospital chapters, where physical infirmity is a metaphor for spiritual sickness; its darkest point is reached in 'Akul'kin muzh'. After this, however, follows Easter with its associations of redemption, the summer with increased optimism, less bleak chapters about animals and friends, and finally freedom, again at the start of winter. Moreover, the story 'Muzhik Marei' from Dnevnik pisatelia adds emphasis to the significance of the Orthodox feast of Easter at this point in the narrative. Jackson has made a case for seeing Zapiski iz mertvogo doma in terms of a Dantesque set of circles of hell, remarking particularly on the bath-house scene; Vladimir Zakharov has written on the symbolism of Easter and the Orthodox calendar in Dostoevskii's works. It is not necessary to duplicate these studies; it is enough to stress that the overall unity of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma is provided by both organic and Christian structures, and that these reinforce spiritually the artistic transfiguration of subjects, reader and author.

A few words must be said at this point about 'Akul'kin muzh'. It is significant that at the bleakest and most horrific point of the text, Gorianchikov,
whose narrative, as I have said, acts as one layer in the transfiguration process, abdicates the position of narrator. This layer of perspective is removed and the story is left as a self-contained episode narrated by the convict Shishkov; Gorianchikov offers no comment either before or after the story. It is located in the realm of fever and delirious dreams experienced by Gorianchikov in the hospital, and thus is strongly associated with sickness and abnormality. Nevertheless, its situation on the fringe of dreams does not detract from its terrifying veracity: the removal of Gorianchikov’s mediation only serves to intensify it. The reader’s awareness of the large body of authenticity underlying Zapiski iz mertvogo doma reminds one that whether or not there was a Shishkov who had committed this crime, Dostoevskii undoubtedly heard many true stories to rival its horror. It is a tale told without a flicker of remorse as the only spiritual beauty in the story is snuffed out mercilessly. It is the epitome of all the bestial degradation Dostoevskii witnessed in the common people, but without the gold under the surface. Jackson notes that the style of ‘Akul’kin muzh’ is that of the natural school, which Dostoevskii disliked. As a piece of literature, it has the same effect as Holbein’s painting of the dead Christ: it presents only the surface reality, the brutality of Shishkov and Morozov and the mental and physical torture inflicted on the innocent Akul’ka. The reader can derive no enjoyment from reading this chapter as there is no higher truth revealed here, only the immediate truth of brutal peasant life. It could be described as Kushite art, centring on physical passions and lust for blood, on the immediacy of sensual debauchery and cruelty and the annihilation of all human obraz in the stupefaction such debauchery produces. The repetition of verbs such as ‘beat’, ‘scream’, the use of the present tense and the reference to Akul’ka as a calf being slaughtered help to achieve this effect:

Трепал я ее, брат, трепал, часа два трепал, доколе сам с ног не свалился [...] Голову-то ей загнул назад да как тилисну по горлу ножком... Она как закричит, кровь-то как брызнет, я нож бросил, обхватил ее руками-то спереди, лег на землю, обнял ее и кричу над ней, ревма-реву; и она кричит, и я кричу; вся трепещет, бьется из рук-то, а кровь-то на меня, кровь-то — и на лицо-то и на руки так и хлещет, так и хлещет. (IV, 170, 172.)

Why is this piece of Kushite art embedded in Zapiski iz mertvogo doma? Akul’ka’s sacrifice seems futile, unatoned for by Shishkov’s imprisonment, as he
is presented lacking all repentance or understanding of his crime. Why did Dostoevskii let the tale stand in its naturalistic form, in a text that was intended to restore the image of God to the narod? The answer is that 'Akul'kin muzh' plays a part within the drama of death and resurrection: Gorianchikov, the common people symbolised by the convicts, and the reader, must pass through the depths of bezobrazie in order to be reborn, as the corn of wheat must fall and die before producing fruit. Only by the awareness of total inhumanity is it possible to hope for heavenly communion with God and all his creation. Taken on its own 'Akul'kin muzh' cannot offer any hope of transfiguration, but integrated into the whole of Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, its grim surface reality is transcended by the overall Iranian power of the text. Situated just before Easter – and again here we must remember the significance of 'Muzhik Marei', into whose heart, Dostoevskii reminds us, we cannot see – the tale does not overcome the resonance of the convicts' sense of humility or identification with the crucified robber (IV, 176-77). Jackson argues:

Yet [Akul'ka's death] is a moment atoned for – and this is implicit in the central position Dostoevsky gives 'Akulka's Husband' in the overall work – by the terrible suffering of the Russian people. [...] The incompleteness of Shishkov's truth is demonstrated by Goryanchikov's deep and many-sided exploration of the personality and life of the Russian peasant convict [...].37

In addition, the Kushite nature of the tale provides a powerful artistic contrast to the work as a whole; it makes all the more clear what art can achieve. As a work of art in itself, 'Akul'kin muzh' has no moral purpose, no power of transfiguration, no inner truth. But Zapiski iz mertvogo doma as a work of art depicts many acts of terrible barbarity and still retains its power to reveal the truth about the narod.

Zapiski iz mertvogo doma therefore meets many of the criteria for the category of 'Iranian art'. It expresses Dostoevskii's faith in man's potential for unity with God, and its moral purpose is to demonstrate this to his readers. Its narrative structure elevates it away from the limited scope of the purely personal into the timeless sphere of eternal truth about the human condition. It is a work that is enduringly relevant beyond its subject of the nineteenth-century Siberian prison camp. The beautiful truth about the inner dignity of the convicts gives aesthetic enjoyment because it transcends the surface reality of harsh conditions
and cruel behaviour. The form, with its unusual narration and its underlying thematic and chronological unity, is at one with the poetic idea of resurrection and restoration, so that the work has a pervasive tsel'nost'. Moreover, it acts as an icon: its higher beauty transfigures its characters, the reader and even the author. This is a work where the ideal of the Madonna triumphs unequivocally over the ideal of Sodom, and where Dostoevskii demonstrates his grasp on the artistic as well as the ideological plane of concepts that were also central to Slavophile philosophy.

Let us now turn to Dostoevskii’s key journalistic writings, Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniakh and Dnevnik pisatel’ia. In my first chapter I showed how these works express ideas that have close similarities with Slavophile thought. Now I propose to consider them from the artistic point of view. I would argue that to do so is a valid exercise, unlike Bakhtin, who located such works outside the artistic context of Dostoevskii’s oeuvre.38 In both the aforementioned works, Dostoevskii experimented with a mix of genres so as to present his ideas in an artistic picture, in which other voices — be they genuine or of imagined readers and critics — enter into a dialogue presenting many sides of an issue. Bakhtin grants that in the journalistic works,

However, he does not acknowledge these characteristics as contributing towards the artistic structure of the journalistic texts. To my mind this is an error, and in my opinion the structure of these works displays an artistic design imbued with Iranian principles.

Zimnie zametki is ostensibly a work of travel literature, but from the outset Dostoevskii makes it clear that his intention is not to describe the geographical interest of the places he has visited. Already responding to the imaginary voice of his readers, he proposes to abandon the guide-book style of presenting information (by which we may infer point-by-point cataloguing of
material) and to give only his sincere personal impressions (V, 49). At this point in the text it can be seen that Dostoevskii had given thought to the question of how to look at his subject, Europe. If one reads between the playful lines of the first chapter, one can see that *Zimnie zametki* will present a picture of emotional, and indeed spiritual, content:

Пусть не разгляжу ничего подробно, — думал я, — зато я всё видел, везде побывал; зато из всего виденного составится что-нибудь целое, какая-нибудь общая панorama. Вся «страна святых чудес» представится мне разом, с птичьего полета, как земля обетованная с горы в перспективе. Одним словом, получится какое-нибудь новое, чудное, сильное впечатление. (V, 46-47, italics added.)

I have emphasised the words ‘whole’ and ‘wondrous’ here to show Dostoevskii’s intent to create an artistic picture that will have an impact on the spirit. His choice of quotation from Khomiakov has the effect of pointing to the spiritual perspective he will take on Europe. In addition, his readers would recognise this quotation and would be aware of its ironic context in Khomiakov’s poem; the irony is thereby transferred into Dostoevskii’s piece so that the reader knows that this is to be a lament over the spiritual decline of Europe. Dostoevskii then goes on to parade his ‘inadequacy’ as a travel writer, by showing how the vagaries of his mood and health determine his interpretation of a place’s physical attractions. In this way he alerts us to his moral purpose of discussing the spiritual state of Europe and its implications for Russia, and to his artistic plan to present a whole picture, in which the voices of other authors as well as his readers and critics will feature.

*Zimnie zametki* describes the dissociation and fragmentation into which Europe has fallen, and depicts both the brutal, debauched life of the London proletariat and the moral bankruptcy of the Parisian bourgeoisie in powerful terms. However, unlike in *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma*, Dostoevskii’s aim is not to restore the image of a fallen people, but to lament the decay of Europe as he saw it, and to warn his own country of the dangers inherent in the European way of life. Therefore, although there is a moral purpose to the creation of *Zimnie zametki*, the artistry shaping it is not there to transfigure its subject. This is evident in that its artistic dominant is parody: the genre of travel writing is parodied in many ways, including the use of obscure or ironic chapter titles, the author’s deliberate digressions away from his promised topic and his frequent
protestations of being ill-equipped for his task. Gary Saul Morson writes of the piece: 'The Remarks may be taken to imply the inappropriateness of the chatty feuilleton and of sentimental and confessional types of travel literature in an age of apocalyptic disintegration; the work may, in other words, be read as a sombre parody of what it initially announces itself to be.' Transfiguration calls for the perception of inner beauty or truth and a commitment of faith; these elements are largely lacking from Zimnie zametki, except in the passage where Dostoevskii puts forward his idea of true brotherhood. Nevertheless, Zimnie zametki may also be seen as an artistic triumph over the problems it identifies in Western Europe, and this is due to the presence of factors of the 'Iranian art' category in its structure.

The artistic design of Zimnie zametki embodies the Iranian principle of freedom in its structure. This is achieved in several ways. Firstly there is the freedom of genre. The work as a whole occupies a place where the boundaries of autobiography, travel literature, feuilleton and prose drama blur into each other, and this is in part down to the polyphony of voices inserted into the text. These voices may be imagined readers or critics; the voices of other authors in the form of quotations, of which there are many used both to serious and ironic effect; retold dialogues and plays. In using so many free voices in the artistic structure, Dostoevskii makes a moral point about plurality: the artistry works as a counterpoint to the theme of external imposition of order in Western society and the suppressed voices of the London masses. David Patterson concurs:

The point is that the love required for such a human community cannot be fabricated by formulas or dictated by authority; it is more a matter of dialogical relation than monological prescription, more a question of interaction than reaction. [...] We note that its thematic opposition to materialism and bourgeois culture is of a piece with its structural features, so that the literary experiment is a formal expression of the ideological response.

Secondly, there is both a geographical and temporal freedom in Zimnie zametki. Dostoevskii deliberately avoids a place-by-place account of his foreign experience, and does not follow his original itinerary in chronological order, since his intention is to focus on man and his moral-spiritual condition. It is for this reason that he persists in moving away from his promised topic of Paris and does not offer any but the most passing account of his visits to German and
Italian cities. The temporal freedom consists in an avoidance of chronology, just as in *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma*, but it is also more far-reaching. Bakhtin discusses how Dostoevskii's artistic vision is categorised in terms of coexistence and interaction. This leads to the use of juxtaposition and counterposition in an attempt to portray the simultaneous interrelationships of a single moment of reality.\(^4^2\) The features that Bakhtin describes here with regard to Dostoevskii's fiction are evident in *Zimnie zametki*, most particularly in the fifth chapter, 'Baal', which deals with Dostoevskii's experiences in London. This short chapter crams several distinct, contradictory and yet interdependent images into its few pages, and even leaps between London and Paris at its beginning and end. Dostoevskii in fact writes as he introduces his reader to London, 'Каждая резкость, каждое противоречие уживаются рядом с своим антитезом и прямо идут рука об руку, противореча друг другу и, по-видимому, никак не исключая друг друга' (V, 69). Thereafter follows an account of the struggle between the coexisting forces of materialist individualism and the need for brotherhood, the juxtaposed images of the splendour of industrial progress and the squalor of the poor areas, fine ladies and child prostitutes, biblical awe and profane debauchery. In this chapter we can see both in terms of content and form how Dostoevskii displays his insistence on simultaneity; he does not offer any historical explanation of the situation in London, but seems to expose every layer of its society in a cross-section, visible in a single moment. In addition, the experimental genre of *Zimnie zametki* reflects the immediacy of the piece. Thus Dostoevskii focuses his attention on creating an artistic picture of contemporary reality, and his artistic technique and design as well as his thematic concerns help to emphasise the dark *becoming* of Western society embodied in the work.

There is also freedom in the narrative of *Zimnie zametki*. Just as with *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma*, it is not possible to say for certain that the identity of the narrator is that of the author; in places, namely in the first, fourth and seventh chapters, he takes on the persona of a dramatised Dostoevskii. The narrator throughout is presented in the first person but in these places, although he ostensibly gives an account of Dostoevskii's own experiences in Europe, he appears to have a distinct and separate identity from the author: it is as if Dostoevskii the artist were relating the adventures of Dostoevskii the journalist.
The hero of these episodes is self-conscious, conscious of how his readers will perceive him and of how those he encounters on his adventures perceive him. His self-consciousness is not only a trait of his character but is also the ‘художественная доминанта построения героев’, as with the Underground Man, so that the possible fixed features of his personality become the objects of his introspection, prevent him from becoming finalised and thus the final word on him comes from himself. This can be seen in the following passages:

А в Дрездене я даже и перед немками провинился: мне вдруг вообразилось, только что я вышел на улицу, что ничего нет противнее типа дрезденских женщин [...]. Через два часа мне всё объяснилось: воротясь в свой номер в гостинице и высунув свой язык перед зеркалом, я убедился, что мое суждение о дрезденских даахах похоже на самую черную клевету. Язык мой был жёлтый, злоказаченный... «И неужели, неужели человек, сей царь природы, до такой степени весь зависит от собственной своей печенки, — подумал я, — что за низость!» [...] Теперь рассудите сами: преодолей я себя, пробудь я в Берлине не день, а неделю, в Дрездене столько же, на Кельне положите хоть три дня, ну хоть два, и я наверно в другой, в третий раз взглянул бы на те же предметы другими глазами и составил бы об них более приличное понятие. [...] Итак, вы видите, друзья мои: в два с половиной месяца нельзя верно всего разглядеть, и я не могу доставить вам самых точных сведений. Я поневоле иногда должен говорить неправду, а потому ... (V, 47-48, 49.)

These parts of the text have the independence from authorial subjective vision as found in Dostoevskii’s novels, because the position of the narrator is that of a separate hero who is not finalised by the author’s field of vision. Bakhtin argues, regarding Dostoevskii’s avoidance of using his authorial power to finalise his heroes, ‘[…] главный пафос всего творчества Достоевского, как со стороны его формы, так и со стороны содержания, есть борьба с овеществлением человека, человеческих отношений и всех человеческих ценностей в условиях капитализма.’ I would agree that Zimnie zametki combats the reification of man in terms of artistic form, through the self-consciousness of the narrator-hero, as well as thematically, as for example in chapter three: ‘душа — tabula rasa, воощичек, из которого можно сейчас же вылепить настоящего человека’ (V, 59).

Whilst freedom is the main Iranian trait of the artistic structure of Zimnie zametki, the unity is provided by the overall construction of the piece as a moral
journey. This journey, however, does not end in redemption, like the journey of death and resurrection undergone in *Zapiski iz mertvogo doma*. Rather, it works like a travesty of such a journey. The narrative begins while still in Russia; in this first chapter, the reader encounters conflicting emotions regarding the destination of Europe. There is a thirst for the place of origin of so much influential culture; one has the sense of being tempted by a vision. Along with this, there is a flash-forward to initial negative reactions that call forth a burst of Russian patriotism. It is as if we are witnessing the dramatisation of a moral dilemma between the negative force of Europe and the positive force of Russia. This theme is developed in the chapter entitled 'V vagone': as the physical journey begins, the chapter opens with a somewhat condescending remark about the French (V, 50). But then the question is raised of the nature of true Russianness and the role of European influences in shaping the Russian nature. Admiration for European intellectuals is juxtaposed with pride in the native land of Russia, to give an unsettling effect of insecurity and lack of identity. This effect is heightened by giving the physical location of a train car the metaphorical association of Russia being carried along in a direction she is powerless to avoid:

Ах, как скучно праздно в вагоне сидеть, ну вот точь-в-точь так же, как скучно у нас на Руси без своего дела жить. Хоть и везут тебя, хоть и заботятся о тебе, хоть подчас даже так убаюкают, что, кажется бы, и желать больше некого, а все-таки тоска, тоска и именно потому, что сам ничего не делаешь, потому что уж слишком о тебе заботятся, а ты сиди да жди, когда еще довезут. (V, 52.)

The metaphor is extended as the train moves farther and farther away from Russian soil. The third chapter charts the ever-growing dissociation of the Russian gentry from the native heritage. The chapter title, which contributes to the decoy whimsy of the overall text, could in fact refer to the noble classes: it is they, not the account of Dostoevskii's view, who have become completely superfluous. As if to accentuate the metaphor of the runaway train, the narrator deliberately 'forgets' that he was supposed to begin his tale in Eydkuhnen, where the train leaves Russia, and realises that he is now coming into Paris.

As the train enters French territory, the atmosphere changes to one of suspicion. Details of observation by French secret police, together with the red tape required to keep tabs on foreigners remind us that we are now in a Kushite
nation where external coercive forces keep society together. The descent begins. We move into the fifth chapter – jumping inexplicably from Paris to London in a deliberate confusion of the itinerary – to find ourselves in a kind of hell ruled over by the heathen idol of material progress, to whom the suffering masses are enthralled, waiting vainly for their deliverance. Apocalyptic imagery dominates:

 [...] вы чувствуете, что тут что-то окончательное совершилось, совершенчесь и закончилось. Это какая-то библейская картина, что-то о Вавилоне, какое-то пророчество из Апокалипсиса, в очино совершающееся. Вы чувствуете, что много надо вековечного духовного отпора и отрицания, чтоб не податься, не подчиниться впечатлению, не поклониться факту и не обоготворить Ваала, то есть не принять существующего за свой идеал... [...] И вы чувствуете, глядя на всех этих париев общества, что еще долго не будет для них пророчество, что еще долго не дадут им пальмовых ветвей и белых одежд и что долго еще будут они взывать к престолу всевышнего: «доколе, господи». (V, 70, 71.)

Passing out of the other side of hell, one expects to find paradise. It is at this point that Dostoevskii finally brings his readers to their promised destination, as if Paris were the hub of the ‘land of holy wonders’, the supposed summit of everything great about Europe. But we are shown a false paradise. Dostoevskii exposes the sterile, worthless sham behind the façade of elegance and civilisation. The sham is made all the more evident by the passage positing true brotherhood as the voluntary renunciation of the self reciprocated by the freedom allowed by the collective. This is where Dostoevskii locates real paradise, as the reader is challenged: ‘Как вы думаете? Утопия это или нет?’ (V, 80).

The poignant glimpse of true paradise does not last, however, as the illustrations of French socialism, atomisation as a result of individualism, and bourgeois hypocrisy prove. There turns out to be no escape: in order to reinforce his warning about the possible future of Russia, Dostoevskii uses repetitive dialogue and images to suggest a sense of being trapped. The narrator becomes trapped in a tour of the vaults of the Pantheon – here the allusion to the underworld is clear – with a guide like some mythical low demon, characterised as ‘как человек’ (V, 89), who cannot break out of his ritual chanting commentary and will not tolerate interruption. The repetition of his words ‘Ca­git’ and his refusal to let the narrator speak, together with the tomb location, contribute to the effect. In the final chapter, the reader becomes trapped in a Parisian melodrama about marital infidelity. The names of the principal players,
Bribri and *Ma biche* stand out for being foreign words, and their constant use in the text makes the atmosphere claustrophobic. This atmosphere is heightened by the continual return to the image of the babbling spouts of fountains, by which the complacent and hypocritical heroes of the melodrama stroll. Dostoevskii uses this image five times in the last two chapters; after a while he deliberately cuts the description short with 'и т. д., и т. д.' and 'и проч., и проч.' (V, 97, 98). This makes his image appear even more repetitive and boring. The last words of the text become quite chilling when seen in the context of the journey from which there is no escape: 'Всё идёт как следует' (V, 98). For it is clear that this is far from the truth, but for the reader, whom Dostoevskii has successfully ensnared in his text, there is no one who will listen. The voice of the hypothetical reader, at first so intrusive in *Zimnie zametki*, and to whom the narrator is so ready to acquiesce, grows less and less audible, until it is barely apparent, and the narrator's discourse dominates. In a world where the Parisians are too busy maintaining their charade to stop and consider problems, there is no opportunity for dialogue, just as the narrator found with his guide to the Pantheon. What is more, Dostoevskii's train turns out to go only one way. There is no train home to Russia in *Zimnie zametki*.

Many attributes of 'Iranian art' are to be found in Dostoevskii's *Dnevnik pisatelia*. The *Dnevnik* is an extraordinary work incorporating a wide variety of genres, ranging from fiction to feuilleton to journalistic commentary. Because of its time span of roughly eight years, the interruptions in its publication and the diversity of topics and genres, the reader may find it a daunting task to view this work as a single whole. However, Morson has argued to great effect that it is possible to consider the *Dnevnik* as a single work. Dmitrii Grishin also writes on the subject: 'Очерки, фельетоны и статьи «Дневников» не имели объединяющей идеи, тогда как в основе «Дневника» Достоевского была положена определенная идея, связывающая все части в одно целое.' Therefore, I propose to follow this approach. Morson begins his essay 'Dostoevsky's Great Experiment' with the statement: 'In issue after issue of the *Dnevnik*, Dostoevsky stresses that Russian history is and must be different from that of any other country, and his strange work seems to match this Slavophile sense of history with a radical "Slavophilism" of literary form.' This is an
intriguing statement; Morson’s useful study argues that the Dnevnik is a new, experimental literary form, but he does not go on to justify the designation of that form as ‘Slavophilism’. This section aims to do that by asserting that in Dnevnik pisatelia Dostoevskii created an ‘Iranian text’.

To begin with, in Dnevnik pisatelia Dostoevskii used a specific technique for expressing time as open-ended and not predetermined, and this gives the work the freedom of ‘Iranian art’. Frequently, whenever he made an observation from real life or related a true story, he would imagine possible continuations of the incident, thus blending fact into fiction. He did this to show that each passing moment of time opens up many possible futures, so that nothing is fixed, however necessary the sequence of events might appear. Morson has dubbed this technique ‘sideshadowing’. For example, in the Dnevnik for March 1876, Dostoevskii takes an account of a meeting with an old lady, related to him by his wife, and then imagines how this scene might turn out: ‘[...] вдруг вспомнил про эту старушку и почему-то мигом дорисовал себе продолжение о том, как она дошла к своим пообедать: вышла другая, может быть, очень правдоподобная маленькая картинка’ (XXII, 77). In the phrase ‘может быть, очень правдоподобная’ there is a suggestion that the story he goes on to recount may have happened, or that in fact something entirely different may have happened. To intensify the effect, Dostoevskii litters his story with qualifications of uncertainty; in the first paragraph alone the word может appears four times and вероятно twice. Such insistence upon uncertainty demonstrates that the story could be varied countless times. The effect of sideshadowing is to propose an attitude to time that conforms with Slavophile thought; there is an insistence upon freedom in the natural passage of time and a denial of necessity in the outcome of events.

Dostoevskii employed other artistic techniques in the Dnevnik which give grounds for judging it according to the criteria of ‘Iranian art’. It is an expression of the Iranian nature of the text that form and content in the Dnevnik often reflect each other, or cannot be separated. The Dnevnik is interwoven with several recurring themes, some of which have been discussed in a previous chapter, and each of these themes is explored through different perspectives and different genres. Grishin writes: ‘Достоевский создал новый жанр сам не зная об
His choice of the word 'splat' (fusion) is particularly apt because of its connotations of unity and organic wholeness that cannot be broken into constituent parts. Within a given issue or within the work as a whole (Dostoevskii often referred back to previous issues), a theme might be introduced via a news item, extended into fiction, discussed in dialogues with real or imaginary readers holding opposing views, or linked to an apparently unrelated event, often by simple juxtaposition. The reader may gain new insights into many of the chapters and subchapters by reading the parts which precede or follow them. Morson notes that it is frequently the place where ends and beginnings of parts meet that the most understanding is to be gained.

The variety of genres within the Dnevnik is not only a medium for Slavophile themes but is itself an Iranian principle. Dostoevskii knew that plain, simple explanation was not enough to convey his message, and so he experimented with the different effects of fiction, polemic, serious and ironic commentary. Kenneth Lantz, the translator of the Dnevnik, remarks on Dostoevskii's wariness of expressing himself too plainly, which resulted in his use of circumlocutions and qualifications; he also notes Dostoevskii's reflections on the difficulty of formulating an idea in words. Lantz quotes the critic P. M. Bitsilli to illustrate his argument, and I would like to borrow this quotation, as it seems to me to capture the essence of tsel'nost' of human cognition. Bitsilli stated that Dostoevskii had an 'awareness of the impossibility of finding any comprehensive formula to express all the complexity and inner contradictions of this or that element of reality'. Indeed, a formula would be too rational a tool for expressing truth in all its diversity. In order to represent truth, Dostoevskii turned to several different artistic genres, and set these genres off against each other. The result is an embodiment of diversity, with the elements somehow organically connected; each part grows out of a previous one and into another, or into many others, via a subtle shift of theme or genre; the whole work has its roots in contemporary real life and reaches out to include the reader in its debates. The Dnevnik is not a collection of essays which bear no relation to each other; each part makes more sense when taken as part of the whole. Indeed the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This is surely an artistic expression of
the Slavophile notion of *tsel'nost*. Morson raises the question that the *Dnevnik*’s unifying theme may be ‘dissociation’.53 I would say that the unifying theme is wholeness in diversity. The *Dnevnik* presents not a rational theory of Russianness, not an analysis of Russian life, but an image, an *obraz* of Russia. This is why the form of the *Dnevnik* was so important to Dostoevskii; it was organically linked to the themes he wished to develop.

To demonstrate the unity of the *Dnevnik* it is useful to examine one issue in detail. Whilst such an exercise is obviously limited in scope, I believe that the conclusions drawn from it can be applied to the *Dnevnik* as a whole; it could be said that each issue forms a miniature of the whole work. The issue which I have chosen is for March 1876. It is divided into two chapters, each with five subchapters. The first of these begins with a response to a critical comment on the February *Dnevnik*, in the form of a dialogue with the critic. The subject is the Russian people; in relation to this topic Dostoevskii raises questions about conservatism and morality, and mentions an impending ‘denouement’. The next part contains the story ‘Stoletniaia’, which begins as I have said as a real-life account related by Dostoevskii as his wife related it to him, and which Dostoevskii continues with a hypothetical ending. The story is proposed as an example of a life lived in accordance with simple moral values. The third part discusses dissociation in Russia and includes an extract from an article written by the young thinker N. P. Peterson. The article would seem to express views similar to Dostoevskii’s, but the latter still finds it dissociated. The fourth and fifth subchapters answer imaginary reactions from readers, and deal with dissociation in Europe, Russia’s contrasting uniqueness, and the coercive nature of Catholicism. The second chapter’s first part comments on an apparently irrelevant news item – the flight of the Spanish tyrant Don Carlos to England – but Dostoevskii uses this event to make further observations on self-interest and coercion in European government, and to introduce the subject of fragmentation in Protestantism. He quotes the Procurator of the Holy Synod on Protestantism, and ends the subchapter with an extract from his own novel *Podrostok*, in which a vision of an atheist brotherhood is described. The next three parts discuss respectively sects, spiritualism and the influence of the Enlightenment on
Russian thought; the final subchapter is by way of being an obituary to the Slavophile Iuri Samarín.

Within the *Dnevnik* for March 1876, a diversity of themes and genres can be found. In terms of genre the issue spans polemic, reported speech, fiction, the conversational tone and wry humour of the feuilletonist, embedded literary text and elegy. All the interrelated Slavophile themes that I have already discussed are present: the moral example of the Russian people; the opposition of Russia and the West; the moribund state of Europe and its corrupting influence on Russia; condemnation of the Western Christian faiths; the advent of a new order. Each part offers a new perspective, a reflection or contrast to one or many of the other parts. Dostoevskii substantiates his reply to the critic Mr. Gamma with the story of the hundred-year-old woman. This story in turn stands as a contrast to the comments about the 'new man' in Russia. The four lengthy quotations form a dialogue of a range of different views on the subject of society and morality; this dialogue is made all the more subtle by Dostoevskii's choosing to substitute his own personal opinion with an extract from one of his novels, for the author's position with regard to the dream of Versilov is unspecified. The passages on the different religious groups can be taken together as an exposition of religion in general, and at the same time they provide examples for the theme of dissociation in both Russia and the West. The first and last parts of the issue form a kind of frame, in which the comments on the value of conservatism, the morality of the people and the refutation of Mr. Gamma's arguments are reflected in the praise for the conservative Samarín, for his love for Russia and for his deep, steadfast thinking. In addition, Dostoevskii pondered the difficulty of conveying his message in the March issue. He claimed that 'неясность не всегда происходит от того, что писатель неясен, а иногда и совсем от противоположных причин' (XXII, 75.) He apologised for his story 'Stoletniaia' because of the impossibility of faithfully retelling something of interest. The second chapter begins by remarking on the difficulty of incorporating unusual or fantastic elements into fiction, but then goes on to stress the depth and power of *Don Quixote*. Altogether, the issue is a collection of examples, of illustrations of different points of view, through fiction, real-life incidents, quotations of other thinkers or Dostoevskii's own beliefs. These
illustrations make up a broader picture, an obraz, for which the form of the issue is crucial. It is particularly noteworthy that Dostoevskii chose this technique rather than a rational analysis of the state of Russia and Europe; here is a Slavophile form expressing Slavophile ideas. Dostoevskii was to return to the technique of example rather than argument as the answer to Ivan's rebellion in Brat'ia Karamazovy.

I have already examined the short stories 'Krotkaia' and 'Son smeshnogo cheloveka' from a thematic point of view in a previous chapter. It now remains to make a few remarks about their artistic function within the Dnevnik. Firstly they act as two different perspectives on the Russia-West polemic established in the Dnevnik. The former story serves as a warning; it portrays a man's total dissociation, the personal despair and the damage to others that this dissociation entails. The latter offers a message of hope; through contact with preternatural forces of love and intuition, dissociation may be overcome. Because they are fiction, the stories stand as images which illustrate the philosophy of the Dnevnik, rather than as explanations or proofs of this philosophy, and for this reason they are both functions and embodiments of the Slavophile genre. As illustrations or examples, the stories are iconic; this is particularly the case with 'Son smeshnogo cheloveka', in which the ecstatic prose and the parallels with the Fall from Paradise make it seem at times more like an Old Testament bible story. At the same time, the most is to be gained from these stories by considering them within the context of the Dnevnik. It may be argued of 'Krotkaia' that the pawnbroker does not know how to look at his life, and so he cannot reach the inner truth about the need for voluntary mutual self-renunciation. He sees only the surface reality and remains dissociated in his despair. In this way the story is reminiscent of 'Akul'kin muzh'; both stories depict the futile sacrifice of an innocent soul, together with a narrator locked in the limited world of bezobrazie. But, as with her predecessor, the meek girl's death is atoned for by the suffering of the narod portrayed in the Dnevnik and by the transfiguration of their image achieved by the Iranian nature of the whole work.

By taking the stories in context, one may allow for extremism within them, such as for example the total ideal of sobornost' and tsel'nost' as portrayed
in the dream world. ‘Son smeshnogo cheloveka’ should not be taken at face value, but as an ideal, the striving toward which will bring about personal and mutual fulfilment. Indeed, the Ridiculous Man acknowledges the importance of the effort, rather than the realisation of the ideal. The extreme nature of ‘Son smeshnogo cheloveka’ makes it all the more necessary to take the story in the context of the Dnevnik as a whole; for one might be forgiven for thinking that here Dostoevskii was fully condemning reason, science and the technological advances imported from the West. This was not the case. In many other parts of the Dnevnik he was quick to stress the importance of the material fruits of Europeanisation, as for example in the issue for 1880, where his comments echo Kireevskii’s ‘V otvet A. S. Khomiakovu’, as mentioned in my Introductory Chapter. In response to a critic of his Pushkin Speech, he wrote:

Сказано, конечно, игриво; но вы произнесли и важное слово: «Просвещение». Позвольте же спросить, что вы под ним разумеете: науки Запада, полезные знания, ремесла или просвещение духовное? Первое, то есть науки и ремесла, действительно не должны нас миновать, и уходить нам от них действительно некуда, да и незачем. Согласен тоже вполне, что неоткуда и получить их, кроме как из западноевропейских источников, за что хвала Европе и благодарность наша ей вечная. (XXVI, 150.)

It was the so-called spiritual enlightenment from the West which he condemned, in other words the ethic of self-interest which came with industrial modernisation, and the soul-destroying narrowness of rationalism which accompanied scientific progress. So, within the Dnevnik as a whole we find examples and perspectives of varying degrees of intensity; this is a consequence of the work’s essential tsel’nost’, an expression of Dostoevskii’s refusal to present a simplified argument, and his insistence upon portraying Russianness in all its complexity. Therefore Dnevnik pisatel’ is another prime example of Slavophile principles at work in the category of ‘Iranian art’. The freedom in the structure of the work, together with its overall unity, its moral purpose of conveying the spiritual truth about the Russian people and its iconic, transfiguring power all testify to this fact.

My final choice for study from Dostoevskii’s works is Brat’ia Karamazovy. It is fitting to examine this novel particularly because it draws together many of the most important themes and artistic devices of the earlier novels, and thus allows for the exploration of Dostoevskii’s fictional work in
microcosm. In it can be found the theme of an intellectual possessed by a nihilistic idea about humanity, the notion of the destructive potential of self-will, the positively beautiful man, the consequences of the accidental family, the redemption of the great sinner and atheism. The fragmented bezobrazie portrayed in the novel is a distillation of the ingredients of familial and social disorder, self-interest, dependence on the rational mind, man’s challenge to God’s authority and a lack of roots in the Russian spiritual heritage. At the same time, Dostoevskii selects, develops and polishes artistic and structural features with which he experimented in previous works. The technique of sideshadowing – the demonstration of the open-ended nature of time by showing that other outcomes are possible – was made explicit in Dnevnik pisatel’ia, where Dostoevskii invited his reader to witness his method of creation, as in the story ‘Stoletniaia’. However, it is also underlying in the structure of Idiot, as Morson has shown. Morson highlights the presence in Idiot of several plot lines or suggestions of plot lines, indicated by events and characters that initially appear to hold significance, that are then not developed and frustrate the reader with their apparent meaninglessness. He points to the notebooks for the novel as a penumbral text that offers extra sideshadows of events that could also have happened. He writes: ‘In The Idiot, events carry no sense of inevitability, which, as it happens, is precisely one of the major ideas of this book. [...] The Idiot, we sense, is only one of many possible Idiots, just as events in life could have been infinitely other.’ Morson is correct: the theme of time, treated in Myshkin’s thoughts on the last moments of the condemned man, in his ecstatic aura preceding a fit and in Ippolit’s Necessary Explanation, is reflected in the narrative structure, so that Idiot becomes a work that avoids Kushite determinism and exemplifies Iranian organic freedom. Events grow spontaneously, but naturally, out of each other.

The same technique is used in Brat’ia Karamazov. The first two books of the first part build the reader up to expect a great deal from the character of Miusov, since much of the scene at the monastery is observed from his perspective; one expects some climactic clash between him and either old Karamazov or Zosima as one of the main events of the novel. But after the monastery scene, Miusov slips into the very background of the action, just as
Gania Ivolgin takes a back seat after playing a major role in the first book of *Idiot*, and possible plot lines involving these characters are unresolved. Belknap focuses upon a slightly different structural feature: the introduction of quite extraneous characters, such as the girl who drowned herself to be like Ophelia (XIV, 8), the toothache-suffering wife of the public prosecutor and the birthday-concealing granddaughter of the police inspector (XIV, 408), and the unexpectedly pregnant maid of the doctor's wife, whom Kolia Krasotkin's mother cares for (XIV, 467). Of these personages Belknap writes: 'They are introduced in much the same way as those who do play a part [in the novel], and then drop out again, as so many people do in everyday life and fail to do in “well-made” novels.' This is an accurate observation: other characters introduced in passing, as if they were figures existing for the most part in the world outside the novel, turn out of be of great significance. For instance, Kolia Krasotkin, first mentioned in the fourth book as the victim of Iliusha's knife attack, and expected by the reader to function only as an example of Iliusha's temper, turns up in book ten in order to play a central part in the plot line about Alesha's brotherhood of boys. Therefore, in *Brat'ia Karamazov*, it can be quite difficult to predict which of the multitudinous events of the novel will produce an important result for the plot, and the novel is made free from determinism.

Earlier in this chapter I discussed the ignorance of the narrator of *Idiot* concerning the nature of Myshkin, and how it leaves the character of the positively beautiful man unfinalised, this being another aspect of the freedom inherent in 'Iranian art'. In *Brat'ia Karamazov* certain key characters also evade the insight of the narrator. This has the effect of suggesting some hidden, higher truth about these characters that the narrator cannot express with his human, limited skills. As I outlined before, in this novel less is more: truth is saved by the avoidance of utterance about the nature of these characters. Belknap writes:

When the reasons and desires, doubts and regrets of a character are shown in relation to the world about him, he becomes a humanly motivated, psychologically understandable being, his humanity exceeding his goodness or badness or any other quality. But when a character is seen only from the outside, especially when his actions are obscurely or complicatedly related to the outer world, the reader tends to remember him not as a person, but as a token of some force or quality transcending humanity. [...] Zosima is rather the receptacle and source of divine grace than a humanly controlled person. His influence on Aleša, his teaching, his prescience, and the powers he
exercises as an elder all proclaim that the human aspect of his nature is secondary to the charismatic. This being so, and the substance of grace being beyond analysis, the narrator can have no direct insight into Zosima's mind without overemphasizing the human element at the expense of the half unknown.56

Belknap goes on to demonstrate that as characters reach a personal understanding of higher truths, so the narrator loses his insight into their minds: this happens, he asserts, after Dmitrii's dream of the babe and after Alesha's transfiguration through the vision of Cana of Galilee. His argument shows how the role of the narrator is organically linked to the novel's higher moral purpose of revealing inner truth: the use of a narrator with limited insight is a technique for creating an Iranian text. In addition, Belknap suggests that the existence of a hidden truth is emphasised by the use of several secondary narrators, who may relate the same event from different perspectives. Such is the case with Dmitrii's trial, where several witnesses present their version of the events surrounding the murder. This has the effect, he claims, of turning attention away from the contest between prosecution and defence and enhancing the importance of the underlying truth.57

This truth, one may infer, is not so much what Dmitrii did or did not do, or where he got three thousand rubles from, but that he is a repentant sinner who has recognised his need for suffering and learned the value of true brotherhood. This is why the reader has the sense that at the investigation and the trial, those involved are 'not talking about that at all'.

Not only does Brat'ia Karamazovy make use of a partially ignorant narrator and other secondary narrators; it employs a variety of narrative genres, making it structurally reminiscent of Dnevnik pisatelia. There are embedded texts of many kinds: poetry, as quoted by Dmitrii in his 'confession of an ardent heart'; fables, Bible stories and parables retold by characters ranging from Ivan to Grushenka to Zosima; Ivan's historical and philosophical texts, and his accounts of newspaper stories. Then there are different discourses such as the hagiographical account of Zosima's life and teaching, and the legal discourse of the trial lawyers. The way in which these different narratives are organised within the novel demonstrate a moral purpose underpinning its creation. William Mills Todd has studied how this moral purpose is fulfilled and posits the existence of an 'ethical narratology, a body of teaching on how narrative might be organized to further [...] loving harmony [...]'.58 Todd focuses on the
narratives of Ivan and Zosima in order to illustrate his argument. Earlier in this chapter I outlined ways in which the narratives of these two characters differ, noting the analytical pronouncement of Ivan’s ‘final word’, compared to the aestheticised word of Zosima presented at several removes. Todd develops this argument more fully, and it is worth quoting at length:

The pragmatic intent of Ivan’s narratives is to accuse, to reject, and ultimately to attack [...]. Zosima intends that his narratives take part in a project of healing and reconciliation. Ivan’s narratives work to isolate their subjects (hence their genre designation “little pictures”); Zosima’s narratives work to link with other stories, to show that nothing is lost. [...] Ivan’s stories are locked within the temporal co-ordinates of past and present; Zosima’s open out from these dimensions into the future. Ivan’s spatial co-ordinates are those of known Euclidean space; Zosima’s open out into contact with “other worlds” (XIV, 290). Ivan is at once egocentrically invested in the impact of his narratives, yet distant and isolated from their human subjects: he has gathered the material for his “little pictures” from the newspapers, his Grand Inquisitor deals with large, impersonal numbers of people. The ultimate result of Ivan’s logical operations of analysis and categorization is to enclose people within an elitist hierarchy and within a definition of human nature as vicious, devil-like. Zosima’s sense of the mysterious allows for an open-ended understanding of people that precludes isolating hierarchies and allows for human change [italics added].

Todd’s piece aptly describes the way in which the discourses of Ivan and Zosima embody the principles of Kushite and ‘Iranian art’ respectively. Everything in Ivan’s selection and presentation of material points to obosoblenie. His text is the product of self-interest and the fragmentation resulting from the emphasis on one facet of human cognition. Zosima, on the other hand, (with the help of Alesha’s editing skills) has created a text that structurally and artistically, as well as ideologically, represents sobornost’ and tsel’nost’, by preserving freedom in its open-ended nature, and by the organically unified way in which his stories grow from personal recollections into selfless concern for his flock. His text reaches out into the surrounding novel, not only through his exhortations to his listeners, amongst whom are characters familiar to the reader, but also by the way it parallels other events in the novel. Markel’s death parallels that of Iliusha; Zosima’s youthful tempestuous nature and his attack on his batman recall Dmitrii and his humiliation of Snegirev; the patient way Zosima listens to his mysterious visitor echoes Alesha listening to Ivan’s rebellion. It is also possible to say that the record of his life and teachings is the product of communal effort, since Alesha selected the information; his is a text formed in
brotherhood, whereas Ivan’s text is a solo effort, and hence distorted into bezobrazie. Leatherbarrow has also focused on these characteristics of the chapter ‘Russkii inok’; however, in his analysis, Zosima’s narrative ‘never really belongs. It remains a cuckoo in the nest, a piece of artistic sleight-of-hand, testifying to Dostoyevsky’s belief in an overriding divine order without ever becoming a satisfactory answer to Ivan’s rejection of that order [...].’ I would disagree. These features, together with the use of devices to allow for the open-ended development of events, and the use of a narrator of limited insight, demonstrate that Brat’ia Karamazov is structurally as well as thematically a piece of ‘Iranian art’. This in itself makes it the only possible way of countering Ivan’s argument without falling foul of the flaws that undermine it.

Can we therefore conclude that Dostoevskii may be dubbed an artist of Slavophilism? This would be unwise, as it would be to ignore the subtleties of his artistic universe, his deeply ambivalent attitude toward the Slavophiles and his deliberate distancing of himself from their ideology, whilst remaining sympathetic to their beliefs. It remains to reiterate that Dostoevskii’s aesthetic operates on a dual system which shares with the dualistic aesthetic expressed in Slavophile philosophy the characteristics of wholeness, moral content and the power of transfiguration, as opposed to fragmentation, spiritual stillbirth and moral impotence. However, Dostoevskii surpasses the Slavophiles, for in his innovative artistic form Dostoevskii has created an aesthetic that corresponds to his vision of Russianness, one that, paradoxically, is totally in harmony with the discord of his time, and yet at the same time has universal significance. Mindful of the Slavophiles’ tendency to nostalgia and of the Westernisers’ habit of focusing too narrowly on Europe, on the aesthetic plane Dostoevskii transcends the Russia-West polemic (something he was not always able to do in the socio-political sphere) and achieves the realisation of his pronouncements in his Pushkin Speech.

1 Dostoevskii’s polemic with Goncharov over the validity of portraying the chaotic new Russian majority in art is discussed in detail in R. L. Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form: A Study of his Philosophy of Art (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 108-18.
2 Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form, and Catteau, Dostoyevsky and the Process of Literary Creation.


6 Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form.

7 Ibid., p. 47.

8 Ibid., p. 76.

9 Ibid., p. 13.


11 See Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form and R. F. Miller, ‘Dostoevskii, the Peasants and Problems of Representation’ in Celebrating Creativity: Essays in Honour of Jostein Bortnes, pp. 170-83.

12 For a fuller analysis of the role of icons in Orthodoxy, see Ware, pp 40-43.


14 Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form, pp. 37-38.

15 Ibid., p. 52.

16 Jones, ‘Silence in The Brothers Karamazov’, pp. 31-33.

17 See Bakhtin, especially pp. 78-169.


21 S. Hackel, pp. 139-68.

22 Eikeland, p. 153


24 Murav, p. 148.

25 Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form p. 64.


27 See especially Jackson, Dostoevsky’s Quest for Form

28 Ivanov, p. 7.

29 I might also mention that Bakhtin’s model of dialogism, as we know, expresses similar connotations of communion and mutuality in Dostoevsky’s works. See Bakhtin, Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo.

30 Catteau, p. 152.


33 Ibid., p. 54.

34 Ibid., especially chapters two and three.

Jackson, The Art of Dostoevsky.

Ibid., p. 96, 113.

Bakhtin, p. 155.

Ibid., p. 157, 160.


Bakhtin, pp. 47-50.

Ibid., p. 84.

Ibid., p. 106.


Morson, ‘Dostoevsky’s Great Experiment’, pp. 82-85.

Grishin, pp. 169-70.

Ibid., p. 18.


Ibid., p. xiii.


Belknap, p. 94.

Ibid., p. 86.

Ibid., p. 102.


Ibid., p. 83.

Leatherbarrow, The Brothers Karamazov, pp. 80-81.
Concluding Remarks

In this study I have attempted to show correspondences and points of engagement between Dostoevskii's works and key aspects of Slavophile thought. Focussing on the concepts of sobornost' and tsel'nost' has enabled me to identify unity, brotherhood and freedom as fundamental to Dostoevskii's world view, and to trace the development and interconnecting relationship of these notions in his oeuvre. I have used Slavophilism as a lens with which to gain a new perspective on these ideas and to place them at the forefront of Dostoevskii's concerns. By doing this I have shown that Dostoevskii's ideas derive from a distinct strand of nineteenth-century Russian thought and stand as a natural successor to the philosophies of Khomiakov and Kireevskii. By concentrating initially on views found in Dostoevskii's non-fiction, letters and notebooks, and by deliberately leaving aside the issue of the complexities of establishing authorial opinion, in my first chapter I have offered a picture of what Dostoevskii may be reasonably assumed to have believed with regard to Slavophile thought. I have shown how Dostoevskii drew from the ideological environment of his time and defined his own position. By examining his active engagement with Slavophile figures and his pronouncements on issues with which they were commonly concerned, I have established with a new degree of precision where the writer stood in relation to both Slavophiles and Westernisers, and the thinkers that succeeded the proponents of these movements.

I have determined Dostoevskii's position to be predominantly based on moral, over and above socio-political, principles. His concern for Russia is motivated by a desire to see a moral principle with a spiritual basis unite and guide all the people into a free brotherhood. Dostoevskii's desire to see spiritual unity and his view of the locus of the wellspring of that unity are what places him close to the Slavophiles. What marks him out from them, however, is his ability to see the far-reaching consequences of an idea, and this is the reason why he found discrepancies in the philosophies of the Slavophiles. His talent for assimilation enabled him to sense the most vital parts of their ideas and follow them through in his own unique, and arguably more consistent, way. The evidence from the non-fiction is that rootedness was of prime importance for Dostoevskii; having found signs of fragmentation in Russian society at the early
stage of his career before katorga, he learned from his Siberian experience that Russia's true wealth lay in the innate values of humility and self-sacrifice preserved in the narod. Here was the guiding principle that would bring sobornost' while respecting the freedom of the individual, another value confirmed in Siberia. Dostoevskii's emphasis on rootedness carried his ideas further than Slavophilism had been able to go; it took him even beyond the limits of pochvennichestvo, since both these movements were largely products of the conditions of their era. In Dostoevskii's interpretation, the concepts of free unity and brotherhood became more universal, more able to transcend the constraints of time, as he focused firmly on the future with his Russian Idea, the culmination of which in his non-fiction was his Pushkin Speech.

In my second chapter, I have looked at the ways in which Dostoevskii dramatised living situations out of the idea with which he interacted in his non-fiction. With regard to his fictional works, I have shown how he explored the concepts of unity, brotherhood and freedom from all sides, by considering the consequences of their absence or suppression, by projecting the outcomes of applications of Slavophile and anti-Slavophile ideas in different circumstances and through different characters and temperaments. In the fiction, as I have demonstrated, we see how the writer modelled and refined his personal understanding of Slavophile ideas, showing himself to be more 'slavophile' than Khomiakov and Kireevskii. Here Dostoevskii's talent as a dramatist provides the contrast between the findings of my first and second chapters, for the ideas that I mapped out in the former are put to the test in the latter, rather than put forward discursively. Not only that, but the fiction displays Dostoevskii's idea-feelings less in terms of the polemical interaction between positive and negative, Russian and non-Russian, sobornost' and obosoblenie, as is the tendency in the non-fiction, but with more compassion and hope for redemption. In particular, through the emphasis on the key themes of Slavophilism, a clearer picture of Dostoevskii's faith emerges. For Dostoevskii, Orthodoxy should furnish the spiritual aspect of the moral guiding principle he sought, but true Orthodoxy for him arose from the instinctive humility of the narod and did not come down from the structure of the official Church. In his fiction Dostoevskii was bolder, exerting his belief that the oblique perspectives of the novelistic form allowed
one to present a truer, more whole picture that the polemical discourse of straight journalism. He was not afraid to explore aspects of religious spirituality that were not mainstream, that were associated primarily with the people, or that were opaque; these are the facets of his work that have resonances in Hesychast and apophatic theology, and that look to the traditions of iurodstvo and starchestvo. In the light of the aspects of Slavophilism that I have emphasised, Dostoevskii's faith, long a subject of much controversy, is shown to be consistent and situated firmly within the Orthodox tradition. What is particularly notable is that using the criteria of Slavophile thought establishes a pathway between Dostoevskii's religion and Orthodoxy, and thus it is possible to show the writer's position in relation to it.

In my third chapter, I have concentrated on the artistic process, and the way in which wholeness, unity and moral concerns impact upon it. I have shown how Dostoevskii used his art not only as a medium for projecting his message of voluntary brotherhood, but also as a living example of that message. By positing the existence of a Slavophile aesthetic, according to which, as I have argued, Dostoevskii organised his work, I have demonstrated that his chosen forms for his works are consonant with the ideas expressed therein. This approach has enabled me to re-examine non-fictional pieces looked at in my first chapter, so as to show that the form of these works, far from muddying the issue of how to establish what the author himself thought, actually goes a long way to confirming the initial evidence presented at the beginning of my thesis. An emphasis on the concepts of obraz and bezobrazie, and a broad approach to the meaning of form has allowed me to transcend the paradox that Dostoevskii wrote about the disorder of the Russian majority in a way in which unity and beauty are preserved.

Therefore, my thesis brings together aspects of Dostoevskii studies that are usually treated separately: critics who focus on his thought make little reference to his artistry, and whilst in the case of studies of his artistry, his thought does generally receive more treatment,¹ in my view the interrelationship has not been studied in sufficient depth. I have considered the writer both as a religious thinker and as an artist, and have studied in detail the areas in which his ideology and his poetics converge, namely, unity and brotherhood. My findings
from each section of my thesis inform each other, showing that Dostoevskii's ideological beliefs extend beyond the sphere of philosophical thought or political tendency. Indeed they underpin, and are borne out by, his artistic practice. The polemical side of his oeuvre is resolved by the embodiment of the principles of wholeness, unity and obraz in the form and composition of his works. Here, Iranianism transfigures and redeems Kushitism; the one-sidedness Dostoevskii saw in the label of Slavophilism is overcome by the essential concepts that label stood for. By selecting the moral-religious and aesthetic elements of Slavophile thought and tracing the way in which Dostoevskii assimilated and interpreted those elements, drawn from the same cultural heritage as Khomiakov and Kireevskii, I have shown that Dostoevskii the thinker and Dostoevskii the artist can – indeed, should – be viewed as one, for such an approach is most appropriate for a writer whose works marry ideology and artistry in such a unique way.

There are subjects upon which my thesis touches, but the necessary limitations of time, space and precision of focus have dictated that my analysis cannot be exhaustive in every case. A study just of Dostoevskii's religious thought might be expected to contain more detail on his views on the relationship between Church and State; I have shown how he considered this issue with regard to Roman Catholicism, but not with regard to Orthodoxy, because my primary concerns have been with the abstract concepts of unity and brotherhood, and not with Dostoevskii's opinions of specific religions per se. Therefore, my study acts as a potential point of departure for further examinations of Dostoevskii's stance in relation to the official Orthodox Church and its role in the societal structure of Russia. Furthermore, eschatology and messianism, aspects of Dostoevskii's religious thought which are related to his beliefs about Russia and her role in mankind's spiritual destiny, are also significant areas of his worldview that merit further investigation. For it is possible that the issues of the belief in the spiritual progression of humanity, one people's part in it and the reasons why such beliefs arise, may offer additional perspectives on Dostoevskii's position in the ideological climate of the time. This, however, may perhaps be better suited to the field of cultural studies, which has not been my chosen approach. From the perspective of intellectual history, which forms part
but not the entirety of my approach, it would be fruitful to examine Dostoevskii's engagement with Petr Chaadaev, who shares a degree of common ground with the early Slavophiles; with Nikolai Fedorov, in whom Dostoevskii took an interest in later life and whose notion of *bratstvo* bears similarities to *sobornost*; and Vladimir Solov'ev, a close friend of Dostoevskii who also considered questions of religious thought in the light of the Slavophile-Westerniser debate. Moving away from the purely factual, my thesis also invites more research to be done on the subject of the ideal, and its attainability in this life or the next. The moral concerns of *sobornost* and the importance of the figure of Christ in Dostoevskii's beliefs point to this subject, although it falls outside my remit of a Slavophile perspective of unity and brotherhood. Thus my work not only bridges a gap in the critical literature, but also opens new directions which may require more analysis.

Many of Dostoevskii's concerns are still relevant today. This is why I hope that my study may be timely. It returns to an emphasis on the spiritual, placing Dostoevskii's hope for a true, voluntary, Christian unity in his country as a significant part of Russian culture, at a time when Russians today are again looking for a new direction and reassessing their role in world society. Dostoevskii teaches us that the values of humility, meekness and self-abnegation have a special meaning in the Russian context as well as having universal worth. His *oeuvre* stands as an important interpretation of Russianness; my study has been to show how Dostoevskii achieved this through a focus on unity and brotherhood.

1 For example, Jackson, *Dostoevsky's Quest for Form*.

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