The History of Post-war Religious Education, with Particular Reference to the Relationship between Religious and Moral Education. A Study in Pluralism.

Volume Two.

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CHAPTER FIVE

PLURALISM AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION: The Seventies

INTRODUCTION

i. The seventies were the decade in which panaceas disappeared. Much had been asked of education in 1944. By the end of the sixties, however, it seemed to be becoming clear that education was not making a significant attack upon deprivation, and by the mid-seventies the implications of economic and child-population contraction were disposing of the vestiges of the optimism of the fifties. The growing polarisation between the Black Paper conservative backlash and the radical de-schooling critique, with the Marxists adding their point of view, fostered unease and the lowering of morale among teachers. Uncertainty increased with the suggestion that the Progressive Movement may not have been so worthwhile after all, in view of complaints about poor achievement by many pupils in the 'basics'. In addition, schools seemed to be becoming more stressful places, as indeed did society generally. The country was coming to face the possibility that Britain's supposed national character of decency, tolerance and moderation offered no immunity to violence and social unrest, as regular TV news-programmes featured student-militancy, Northern Ireland terrorism, violent crime or industrial picketing. Racial disharmony was leading to fright and even to hysteria, and the prospect of this disharmony turning into violence which could spread through inner-city areas was growing stronger. The prospect also of a steady rise in unemployment was increasing in probability.
ii. Yet against this somewhat depressing backdrop, some steady gains seem to have been made for RE. By the start of the decade, the first wave of realistic re-appraisal had been faced, and, though recovery and re-instatement were to take time, changes had been made which were to help to this end. At the very least, it was becoming apparent what RE could not be. But in addition clarity was emerging about the nature and parameters of the various forms of RE which could be offered, and in which parts of the system they might best function. It is in the manner of British education that change proceeds slowly, so there was no sudden emergence of any one form of RE likely to be the eventual dominant mode. But a new vocabulary was percolating, as terms such as neo-confessionalism, phenomenology, experientialism, implicit religion, life-stance education and pluralism infiltrated initial and in-service courses in RE. Towards the end of the decade it began to appear as if a large measure of consensus about aims might be achieved. The aims debate was part of larger discussions about RE, a not-unimportant topic of which was how a teacher's own religious beliefs, or lack of them, might relate to his handling of RE in the classroom. There seemed to be a steady improvement in the academic standards of the colleges, and the supply of qualified RE teachers from college and University also showed improvement. Publications for RE continued, reflecting the wider range of approaches now being envisaged. Syllabus-making proceeded, reaching a landmark in 1975, and curriculum-development secured both the money and personnel for some major schemes. The number of RE Advisers increased, and LEAs began to provide RE centres for the wider dissemination of resources. The DES did not shed RE from its concerns.
iii. It was in this decade that RE personnel took very seriously the possibility that the more valid societal assumption for education was that of a plural rather than a Christian society. This led to Syllabuses which advocated religion in breadth as the appropriate content for RE, and to a marked tendency to differentiate RE and ME. These moves were fully within the definition of pluralism underlying this study, namely the belief that plurality of religious and moral belief- and value-systems is a desirable social feature, especially in a democracy, and that this plurality should be fostered in the Maintained schools. The conceptual changes involved in these moves were debated, and in the process a new rationale both for RE and for ME was sought. One of the purposes of this chapter is to analyse this debate and the ensuing suggestions for the respective rationales. But the study is basically historical, and the core-element is the relationship between RE and ME. So considerable attention will be given to the place of the Schools Council's curriculum-development in RE and ME in the course taken by RME in the seventies. One way of viewing the decade is to see it as still occupied with the 'religious difficulty', in the three aspects suggested in the first chapter of this thesis. The content-aspect was now about resolving the problem posed by the presence of different religions in the country, as distinct from the problem of different denominations within Christianity. The administra-tive aspect was indicating the possibility of a forthcoming problem if various religions interpreted the 1944 Education Act to entitle them to their own Voluntary Aided schools. The aspect of the RE/ME relationship seemed to require that an ME be formed which would satisfy both the secular and the religious. The problem for the would-be historian is how to select his material from events which have not yet had time to settle into historical
perspective. It is proposed to handle the themes of the RE/ME debate, the developing concept of ME and the role of the Schools Council in RE and ME curriculum-development. By so doing several issues vital to the relationship between RE and ME will become clearer.

iv. Clarification will occur, first, in that it will be seen that one of the outcomes of pluralism and secularism is that education becomes primarily a matter for professional educationists who are that by training and experience. The seventies might almost be called the decade of the professional. Second, as the nature of RE and ME become better defined, so it will be seen that the two areas may not be able to exist alongside each other without some interaction. The Schools Council's view of complementarity between RE and ME ostensibly made this point, but in practice it is to be doubted if the publications from this body saw complementarity as anything other than total separation. Hence, it will be maintained that a better way of viewing the relationship is that of intersection, and it will be suggested that the Schools Council might have themselves deduced this from their own data. Third, the complexities of the two concepts, RE and ME, became more visible in the seventies, but these complexities might well tell against both the total separation of RE and ME as well as the old simplicities of total equation.

v. It is acknowledged that to pick out the theme of the relationship between RE and ME is to narrow the examination of seventies' RE/ME quite severely. But this is an inevitability. The closer one comes to the present, the more rigorous must be the process of selection.
5.1. THE RE/ME DEBATE

5.1.1. Philosophical Spadework

i. It was seen how, in the sixties, there was a readiness on the part of some to allow that christianising aims might be inconsistent with an educational approach to RE. But it has also been seen how the 'new' Syllabuses were to remain attached to the view that RE was primarily about bringing children to an acceptance of Christianity. The seventies opened with this issue unresolved and it soon became a major subject for debate as RE came under pressure to justify itself as a valid area of the curriculum.

ii. A series of articles appeared in a London University journal between 1972 and 1974 (1) which are of special interest in that the central issues of RE's educational justification are all handled succinctly. While no claim is being made that they were either barometric or influential, they are valuable in that the writers were as aware as any of the pressures of pluralism, secularisation and current research. The general tone was one of optimism that RE had a continuing important contribution to make to education, and it may be noted that the writers included Humanists who were finding themselves in agreement with the views expressed by their colleagues, who, in turn, were developing positions which were more humanistic than the former rationale for RME.

iii. Martell's opening article was dismissive of Christian aims, of compulsory acts of worship and of the need to seek agreement from the churches (2). While Gates was not so ready to dismiss the church from any further participation in
Maintained school RE, he welcomed church participation only if it were part of a common cause to help children understand what is meant by being religious (3). It may be noted that the church had in fact paved the way for such a position by its Durham Report (4), although in that publication it had called for a rather different approach to ME than that emerging from the U.L.I.E. articles.

iv. Jones (5) and Hemming (6), the two Humanists, were more interested in ME than RE. However, Jones praised Martell's pluralistic concept of RE, and Hemming was more positive again in his evaluation of RE's contribution. Jones was anxious that ME should proceed without 'unhelpful accretions' from the past. Hemming repeated his point made earlier (7) that the cosmos as a physical source of wonder can stimulate the imagination to a dynamic type of morality, based on search and discovery. Both these writers were leading up to Hemming's recommendations for ME. He called for truly caring schools in which the search for a consensus of principles, within a variety of viewpoints, was everyone's shared goal.

v. These articles illustrate that Humanists and religious people could engage in a common enterprise, if the crucial question were not 'What are the religious beliefs or lack of them of the participating parties?'. Were the pivotal question to be 'Is the enterprise educational?' then common ground was possible. A theme running through all the articles is the view that RE must justify itself educationally. This is most explicit in Gates, who drew on Hirst, Smart, Loukes, Phenix and Tillich to reach the conclusion that to examine religion as a form of knowledge and as a 'locus of ultimacy' made RE a 'proper humanism'. This represents a very appreciable
move away from forties' positions, in which Humanism and religion
were, more often than not, contrasted with each other and placed
in polarity. Straughan continued in a similar way to
Gates (8). He argued that, in view of the long tradition of
both RE and ME, it was near indoctrinatory and certainly anti-
educational to deprive children of acquaintance with either
tradition. Very aptly he pointed out that the supposed
agreed criteria testing a moral judgement might be no more
clear than those testing a religious claim. These two writers
were showing that RE and ME, as related processes, could appeal
validly, at least in principle, to humanistic premises for
their justification. But it was also clear that to do so
RE had to be what its title described it - Religious Education,
not Christian Education.

vi. These London University articles formed part of a wider
philosophical debate that was developing a view of education
which would give weight to the notions of rationality and
personal autonomy, and which would not be dependent upon
metaphysical underpinnings (9). Peters' view of education
as initiation into publicly worthwhile traditions, and Hirst's
defence of the traditional differentiation of knowledge into
logically distinct forms had been percolating since 1965 (10).
In 1968 Dearden furnished the primary schools with a
philosophy of education which showed affinities with Hirst,
and which steered between the authoritarianism of the old
elementary tradition and the thoroughgoing 'needs and interests'
approach of unrestrained Progressivism (11). In various
ways these three writers were addressing themselves to a
secular, plural society, and were advocating pluralism,
the conditions in which the merely plural become the desirably plural. Peters wanted the plurality of public traditions to be subordinated to the criterion of worthwhileness. Hirst wanted the plurality of knowledge to conform to the structures required by logic. Dearden wanted the plurality of individuality to issue in 'personal autonomy based on reason'.

vii. Peters' analysis of education distinguished it from either training or instruction, and also turned away from instrumental, moulding and growth models (12). He argued for the importance both of intrinsic ends and of public objectivity. He stressed the value of initiation into forms of knowledge, of which Religion was one. He avoided the equation of happiness with worthwhileness. He held out for the 'crunch of standards'. There may be a weakness in his position in that the notion of worthwhile public traditions is highly debateable, and diversity of moral content is a problem which may not be resolved by focusing on form rather than substance. He did grapple with ethical diversity while expounding the view that rational moral principles can be found (13). But it may be questioned whether he really closed with the problem that morality might have to have designated a specific content, as well as being accorded a distinctive form of thought.

viii. Hirst's outlook stemmed from his belief that the ground of values was to be located in Man's conception of the diverse forms of knowledge he had achieved (14). He saw liberal education as a process of developing rational mind through the pursuit of knowledge of what is the case, its justification being found in the justification of rational mind. His defence of the forms of knowledge meant also a defence of Religion as a form of knowledge, with benefits to RE. But the
question might still have to be raised as to how far Hirst gave
sixties' RE an answer to its problem of justification. It must
surely have been important that Hirst held out for Religion as a
form of knowledge and developed a position on RE which fitted a
secular rational educational context. But this position seemed
to rest upon an acceptance that rational mind was its own
justification, the apparent circularity being defended on the
grounds of the inter-relationship between concepts of rational
justification and of the pursuit of knowledge (15). Yet even
were this allowed as a valid way out of the difficulty, a further
problem would still occur in that religion may only partially be
able to appeal to rationality for support. Some religious tenets
may indeed be beyond reason, while not necessarily being
unreasonable. Also, there are those who would argue that a
religious outlook on life is an irrational perspective. In
addition, by insisting on a narrow view of truth (16) Hirst might
have gone some way in weakening his own argument for Religion as
a form of knowledge. For he himself pointed out that the
verification-procedures for Religion were then as yet undeveloped,
the inference being there to be drawn that they might remain so.
Also, if religion has to borrow validation-procedures from another
form it can hardly carry full weight as a form of knowledge in its
own right (17). Furthermore, religion may not be sufficiently
unitary a phenomenon to be regarded as a form. It seems that
Hirst was talking about Christianity rather than about religion.
These considerations then would seem to cast a certain amount of
doubt upon Hirst's argument for Religion as a form of knowledge,
however valuable such a view from such a source may have been to
RE teachers at the time. Yet in that Hirst had developed a case
for RE's continuance, which in no way depended upon ecclesiastical
or legal underpinning, he was pointing RE in the direction of
academic respectability and educational propriety.
There may be a further question to consider in addition to the matters discussed in the previous paragraph. This concerns the way in which the forms of knowledge might relate to the world of ordinary people. Hirst was insistent that knowledge of the forms carries back into the common world of persons. It is true that this claim is made at the end of an article which was pitched at a high intellectual level, no doubt because Hirst reckoned, and surely rightly, that the issues with which he was engaged were more discernible at that level. It may therefore not have been the most appropriate place to give a developed treatment of the 'subtle as well as the simple ways' in which knowledge of the forms carries back to ordinary people. Yet RE teachers might well have found themselves hoping for a sequel in which this topic received a fuller discussion.

Although Hirst encountered criticism (18) it may be presumed his influence was strong, in that he was arguing for the traditional English approach to education but making his appeal to non-metaphysical criteria in the process. In doing so he was constructing a philosophical justification for RE which both gave it status academically and indicated the way in which RE teachers might successfully move with the times. But in that he seemed to be arguing for Christianity, rather than for the whole dimension of religion, he was not fully aligned with the course which was to take RE into World Religions. Also, although he did not contend for a hierarchical structuring of the forms, in most schools there is such a structuring, and in Maintained schools Religion is usually not very high in the rank-order. Yet where RE is valued this is very often for its personal and social implications. That is, at the very point at which Hirst's case seems a little under-developed. Nonetheless
when the force of the philosophers' demands for educational justification came to be felt in RE, in the early years of the seventies, Hirst was an ally of some standing. His views had had time to achieve dissemination since 1965, and he had developed a position which was appropriate to a secular plural society.

xi. Peters and Hirst had been supportive of RE, but Dearden was not able to be supportive to the same extent. His basic argument about RE was that, because the truths of religious doctrines are debateable, it is wrong to present them in the schools as unquestionably true (19). Hirst and Peters would both have agreed with this proposition. Where Dearden contrasted with his fellow-philosophers was that, while he accepted that the alternative to indoctrinatory RE was valid educationally (i.e. teaching about religion), he did not seem disposed to advocate this position with any degree of thoroughness. He showed no anticipation of Smart's programme, although the data were there for him to have considered. This omission was paralleled by an apparent lack of awareness of the creative outburst of RE research and writing in the sixties (20). Although Dearden allowed in principle that Religion was a form of knowledge he did not develop the point. Yet even if he had misgivings about Religion as a form, he could nevertheless have given it some consideration as a field of knowledge, as Holley suggested (21). It does seem a little unbalanced for him to have shown rather more sympathy to the comparable difficulties of validating Aesthetics and History, than to validating Religion (22). However, on the topic of the RE/ME relationship his analysis was more extensive, and his advocacy of ME was careful and illuminating.
xii. In his discussion of the relationship between RE and ME Dearden analysed some basic issues, and his handling of the topic must rank as a valuable contribution to the debate. His position on the relationship between RE and ME was in keeping with his thesis that personal autonomy based on reason be regarded as the central aim of the educational process. In examining the case for the autonomy of morals, he accepted the view that actions are the product of choice and decision, and are the autonomous acts of the will. He was aware that he might have seemed a little arbitrary in assuming freedom and responsibility, but if his defence might have appeared lame he could reasonably have asked if there were any way out of the difficulty which would appear otherwise (23). For he also had to base his justification on the proposition: rationality is rationality is rationality (24). Once grant that his view of rationality is self-evidently valid, a feature of which was to regard others as free and responsible beings, then his case for the separation of morals and religion is surely well grounded. Perhaps however he might have been on less sure ground when he placed individual morality in the area of personal opinion, while making social morality obligatory in public education. Clearly he is making an important point in that he is finding an acceptable moral role for schools, without at the same time undermining the principle of individual autonomy. Yet it may be asked whether to differentiate in such a clear-cut fashion between the individual and the social in morality is to underestimate the strength of the link that may exist between individual and social behaviour. This may be an important question for ME.
In this emerging rationale for the traditional view of education as initiation into academic disciplines there seemed to be no room for an RE interpreted as induction into one particular religion. But there did appear to be a justifiable place for classroom Religious Studies where these paid due attention to the requirements of openness, pluralism and freedom of choice, although school worship appeared to be unsavable (25). The really difficult problem occurred in the area of truth-claims. In that respect, Phenix's scheme urging that education should be about the development of meanings (26) might have offered a better way forward for RE than did Hirst. For Phenix allowed the validity of existential knowledge as real knowledge, valid because it contained a personal element. But Hirst attacked him on this point, maintaining that Phenix was not talking about knowledge in the philosophical sense but about states of perception, awareness and feeling (27). Yet Hirst's reduction of knowledge to only two valid classifications, knowledge-that and knowledge-how, would seem to question the validity of the view of Religion as a form of knowledge, especially as Hirst had to concede that verification-procedures for religion had some way yet to go before they were authoritative. Phenix's acceptance of existential knowledge was to posit a looser view of truth than that of Hirst but it was also to give a certain amount of support to a central area of content in religion. It may perhaps be questioned whether, in a situation of pluralism, an exclusively tight view of truth can really be permitted. Such a suggestion might perhaps be made in view of the fact that Phenix obtained backing against Hirst on the grounds that Phenix's position was logically
the looser of the two, his looser schematisation being a positive merit in curriculum-planning (28). While usefulness for curriculum-planning does not make something true or verifiable, there may be times when relationships and care for persons must be given at least as much consideration as the strict verification of truth (29). If Barrow's unease with the criterion of usefulness is borne in mind (30) then there may be good reason for developing a rationale for RE which locates as central the view that the fundamental human motivation is search for meaning (31). It may be noted, however, that both Hirst and Phenix distinguished between morality and religion (32). But it should also be noted that Hirst tried very hard to bring traditionally minded Christian RE teachers to see that they could move forward with a changing educational pattern and not lose their integrity in the process (33).

5.1.2. RE and Pluralism

i. It has already been seen how the churches were moving with the times in the Othen Report (34). This process continued as the seventies opened with a more comprehensive and substantial report than Othen, in the publication of the Durham Report (35). This document attempted to grapple with the topic of the role of RME in a secular society. It put forward a rationale which argued from a functional definition of religion as essentially meaning construction, and maintained that as such it would form a significant element in the human condition. Paragraphs 204 and 205 lay at the heart of the report's argument. Paragraph 204 identified the religions of the world with Man's response to the 'enigma of his origin and destiny', as he sought explanations for his suffering and his finitude, and as he turned to value-systems for his dignity and his direction. The report went on in paragraph 205 to posit a recognisable spiritual
dimension in Man's nature, requiring to be expressed through religion, this last named term being taken to cover any meaning/value-system constructed in response to 'the questions of man's ultimate concern' (36). Flanking these central points were the assertions that Man could not fully be explained by reductionist theories, and that Peters' view of education as initiation (37) could readily take on board the view of education being expounded in the report.

ii. This report might almost be a microcosm of the history of RME from 1870 onwards. As indicated in the first chapter (38), the 'religious difficulty' forced pluralism of a limited kind upon education, the Anglican church having to accept reduction of its privileges as alternative religious and secular groups strengthened numerically and politically. The 1970 report can hardly be seen as the work of a church pioneering a pluralistic approach to RE. It seems much more the product of a church realistically accepting that the existence of alternative belief- and value-systems meant withdrawal of evangelising aims, and inclusion both of religions other than Christianity and of secular belief-systems as valid material for the RE lesson. The reluctance to abandon Christianity's dominant RE role in the curriculum and to discontinue school worship would suggest a church which was putting its weight into restraining any trends which were showing too radical a departure from the traditional. If so, it could not be expected to meet with complete approval. Elvin was particularly critical, seeing the report as a device designed to give the church an even greater hold over the young (39). Cox believed that in some important respects the report begged a number of questions (40).
iii. But if the church had shown readiness to modify its conception of RME in the Durham Report, it also showed, in the Birmingham Syllabus controversy, that there were limits to which it was prepared to change under pressure from contemporary secular groups. For the Birmingham Syllabus and Handbook of 1974 (41) together signified a radical departure from previous LEA provision, in that non-Christian religions and some secular belief-systems were allowed to stand alongside (not underneath) Christianity in their own right. The Conservative group on the committee were angered that communism had been given a place in the Handbook, and they allied with the National Society, which had secured a legal opinion that the Syllabus was inconsistent with the 1944 Education Act, an opinion which was substantiated when the LEA pursued its own legal enquiries. The outcome was a compromise in which a new Syllabus was issued, making RE specifically concerned with religion, but in which the Handbook was accepted as it stood.

iv. The implicit assumptions of the Syllabus and Handbook were secular rational. As well as a stated rejection of the aim of inculcating any one set of beliefs, great attention appeared to be given to the objectives of critical assessment, objectivity and plurality. As Newbigin pointed out, the Syllabus itself had a life-stance which was taken for granted and raised above criticism (42). Cox suggested that the unit on humanism had propagandist undertones (43), and Taylor that the Handbook was an initiation into agnosticism (44). Cole however was enthusiastic and found that the Syllabus and Handbook were 'shot through with religious pluralism
from beginning to end' (45). Yet the Handbook is in fact quite selective of the religious groups recommended for examination. Also, the approach is so cognitive that the result might be merely descriptive without a real closing with the issues with which religions are preoccupied. Jones prophesied minimal attention to Christianity and negligible to the Bible (46).

v. The Birmingham production, as the first major implementation of Smart's phenomenological approach, might be pardoned for the alleged faults of not fulfilling its own objectives fully, and of creating different impressions on different readers as to what exactly it was about. But it can perhaps validly be charged with not handling adequately two central areas which were points of controversy in the seventies. It did not tackle the question of what religion was, and it did not, because of the 'flattening' of religions, offer sufficient help in evaluating religions on grounds other than personal preferences. These criticisms point to what is perhaps the most fundamental problem of all for RE teachers, namely what does the 'flattening' of religions do to the quest for truth, and for the self-understanding of religious people, particularly Christians and Muslims? Truth seems to be a very live issue for adolescents. When teaching the phenomenology of religion the teacher's fears about imposing his own views and his avoidance of the question of truth might foster inertness of a similar kind as was supposed to reside in the old Bible-knowledge approach on occasions.

vi. It is noticeable how the language of aims changed, with
the coming of the Birmingham Handbook. The subsequent Syllabus-productions of the second half of the seventies uniformly avoided, if not actually specifically disowning, the language of confessionalism (47). RE was now about understanding religion, about appreciating what it means to be religious and to take a religion seriously, and about appreciating the human significance of religious phenomena. It was also about something wider than Christianity.

5.2. MORAL EDUCATION: A DEVELOPING CONCEPT

5.2.1. Theoretical Perspectives

i. The psychologists who had most to offer Moral Education in the seventies were those in the cognitive developmentalist tradition and those in the behaviourist. Piaget, influential to RE in the sixties (48), put forward a fecund theory which was developed by later researchers. His basic thesis was that moral thinking develops through stages, each characterised by a certain quality of reasoning, the general development being from heteronomy, in which social relations are governed by a one-sided respect for his elders by the child, to autonomy, in which mutual respect and co-operation lead to social relations based on a maturely rendered agreement (49). Kohlberg refined and filled out this theory, his first work appearing as early as 1959 (50). His method was to present individual interviewees with standardised stories, each posing a moral dilemma for which there was no obviously 'right' answer, with the requirement that the means of resolving the dilemma be justified on specific grounds. Given a large enough sample, an adequate age-spread, with some longitudinal depth and some across-culture investigations, the responses
could be grouped into categories, and the results compared with those of Piaget. Kohlberg's three levels, each containing two stages, amplified Piaget's simpler scheme. The cognitive developmentalists could claim to have demonstrated that moral development can be expected to take place, that children can be helped through the stages (51), and that ME can be effective to this end. Although Kohlberg was a psychologist, it should be noted that his work had philosophical implications (52), particularly in suggesting that the naturalistic fallacy should not be regarded as ruling out any sort of correspondence between the 'is' and the 'ought' (53).

ii. The alternative psychological school preferred to focus attention on the environmental variables by which behaviour can be manipulated. The behaviourists would probably see Skinner as archetypal, although behind him is the Pavlovian tradition. From his experiments with rats and pigeons, using operant conditioning techniques, he theorised that desired behaviour can also be produced in humans scientifically, by means of reinforcement-techniques (54), this applying even to language (55). On such a view moral behaviour must be regarded as an environmental product, produced according to a set of criteria which are in some sense themselves an environmental product also: words like purpose, freedom, responsibility and autonomy refer to no more than a history of reinforcement (56). Although, in Britain, Eysenck has espoused behaviourism and interpreted conscience as a set of conditioned reflexes (57), Wright has been dismissive of the 'circus tricks' type of morality (58). However, considering how well the Piaget/Kohlberg approach relates to
the British acceptance of developmentalism in education, especially in the primary schools, and how recent philosophers have pressed for 'rational moral principles' as a mark of the autonomous person, it may seem a little surprising that the theoretical perspective which has found greater favour in Britain is that of behaviourism.

iii. The sociologists can also be accorded a contribution to seventies' ME. The philosopher Dewey gave them a lead when he attacked any attempt, either to isolate a supposed entity, Moral Education, from the total life of the school, or to isolate the Moral Education supposedly given by the school from the larger circle of social activities of which the school forms a part (59). Durkheim developed a theory of morality specifically slanted to schools (60). He pressed for a scientific approach to morality, which started with it as a social fact rather than a theoretical construct (61), embracing relativism without apparent serious misgivings. While Musgrave found his analysis difficult for modern sociologists because of Durkheim's emphasis upon authority, his assumption of social unity and his lack of stress upon the non-cognitive (62), it would nevertheless seem to be the case that Durkheim still has a current validity. His search for a secular rational morality, neither rooted in religion nor needing religion for its credibility, maintenance and authority, is a contemporary search also. Again, his insistence upon a science of morals, starting in the empirical and striving to build up a knowledge and understanding of moral rules and why people accept them, is a congenial notion to many moderns.

iv. But in addition to these voices from the past, several
seventies' writers, taking a sociological perspective, contributed to the developing ME concept. Kay made a distinction between true Moral Education and socialisation into a specific set of cultural norms (63), and contended that, as middle-class homes seemed to develop the preconditions of and the primary traits of morality better than working-class homes, ME should ensure that working-class children should make the best use of life-enhancing possibilities (64). He was one of the few writers who seemed equally to be concerned, both with the development of moral judgement and with the production of moral behaviour. He frankly involved, the moral educator in 'personality engineering' (65) and saw himself to be stretching the naturalistic fallacy to allow the validity of deductions of moral imperatives from moral statements (66). Another writer, Sugarman, was involved with the work of the Farmington Trust ME unit (67), and made it his specialism to relate sociological findings about the nature of the school as a social system specifically to ME. Kay drew attention to his studies and articles 1966-69, but found him 'sadly conservative' in wishing to inculcate sensitivity to authority (68) (a Durkheimian idea, be it noted). Sugarman's 1973 position (69) was to invest a great deal of hope in the influence to be exerted by the Farmington Trust's model of the Morally Educated Person (70), seeing this, not as a moral absolute, but as representative of the values common to a number of societies within the cultural tradition of Judaic-Christian humanism and liberal democracy.

v. The writers examined so far would fall within the broad category of those who approach education as an institution,
analysing it as one of the major social phenomena. Musgrave took a different stance, this being the social action perspective which focused on the meanings held by the participants in a given situation. He was more interested in the creation than the transmission of social reality, faulting Kay for alleged deterministic tendencies (71). The research-survey Musgrave conducted, although small, is of particular interest, for he claimed to have found evidence of a moral code held by a sample which showed awareness of moral problems, but contained no respondent who mentioned any need for Religious Education. This code was strongly based on the importance of the individual, but tempered with a desire for good personal relationships, being applied in a situational manner (72).

It would have been of interest also had Musgrave given an account of the way in which the schools he surveyed actually conducted ME, for his stress on the importance of the 'reflective creative process' encouraged by novel situations suggests this as an important part of the sample's ME. It was therefore a method about which ME teachers generally could have learned with some profit.

vi. Seventies' sociologists helped towards an appreciation that direct teaching may not be the only constituent of ME. The many factors additional to formal lessons, in their complex permutations, came under scrutiny for their implications for Moral Education. Nevertheless it seemed clear that a sociologist would take seriously the nature of the pupils' own beliefs about morality, however immature, inadequate or inconsistent he might find them to be. This would encourage the view that direct teaching, on a sociological showing also, would contribute to Moral Education, in so far as it engaged with pupil-belief. It would seem the case that, in so far
as the sociologist scrutinises the organisational structures, relationship-networks and societal interfaces of the school, for their implications for Moral Education, he is rendering ME a service. The sociologist might, however, have only a very limited, and limiting, view of ME as he does this. For he is thereby primarily concerned with the immediate and with the environmental. The larger questions of purpose and beliefs about the nature of the universe are not ruled out by the sociologist, in that, as Musgrave has shewn, the meanings held by participants are factors of social importance. But the sociologist who has foresworn, seemingly against Durkheim, the reification of society might be uneasy about handling the possibility of a link between beliefs about the cosmos and moral behaviour (Musgrave's research, it should be noted, did not specifically probe this), and uncertain of its place in ME.

5.2.2. ME and Secularism

i. It has been seen how the Durham Report made concessions on RE (73). Reference must now be made to its position on ME. The basic contention was that Moral Education was incomplete if aiming only at a common-denominator type of morality, for, without reference to fundamental questions of meaning, purpose and value, such a morality might be no more than the conventional wisdom of a particular period (74). As there was a reluctance to move too far from a traditional Christian approach to RE, so there was a comparable reluctance to move too far from using the Christian ethic as a base for ME. But there were concessions to the plural and the secular, as when the report averred that ME should be 'less authoritarian' and must take account of 'significant differences' of
opinion in society on moral principles and/or practices, that induction of young children into morality should be such as to be capable of rational justification (75). But, while emphasising that Christians have no monopoly of concern for moral matters, it is noticeable that there is no mention of World Religions. Also, the differences of opinion among Christians on specific issues such as premarital sex, homosexuality, marriage, divorce, drugs, race, war and the bomb seemed to be rather skated over, while a four-line reference to situation-ethics hardly seems an adequate base to put forward the conclusion that any current moral confusion would only mistakenly be seen as 'sinister'. While it should be noted that the report gave due attention to the place of the school generally, and to each teacher in particular, in the process by which pupils developed morally, it regarded the contribution of the RE teacher to be that of exploring the moral implications of Christianity. The exclusiveness of that statement was acceptable enough in 1970, but it was hardly an anticipation of the strength of either pluralism or secularism. Among its 47 recommendations was the negative one that a separate subject called 'moral education' be not introduced (76).

ii. It fell to the lot of Hirst to advocate a fully secularised ME (77). He argued that, as in engineering and agriculture, so in education, the principles governing the practice must be decided on autonomous, rational grounds, independent of religious belief. Christian education, he maintained, was an anachronism. Curtis attempted a reply that RE was a pleonasm (78) (a not untypical characteristic of the early seventies was to continue to blur the distinction between RE and Christian Education) stressing the point that
moral as well as rational grounds were needed for the total educational process. But such a reply relied upon a closer identification of religion and morality than seemed warranted by the times. Also, Hirst certainly did not need reminding that education was a moral process, for he was to argue in 1974 (79), this being an amplification of his 1965 article, that morality was not grounded in religion but in rationality, and that society could give no other remit to educationists than to proceed on this understanding.

iii. In attempting an evaluation of Hirst's contribution to the development of a concept of ME appropriate to the seventies it would seem necessary to distinguish between two aims which he appeared to have set himself. First, he wished to analyse the nature of Moral Education in secular terms. Second, he wished to commend this analysis as not inconsistent with 'certain interpretations of Christian belief'. This being so it is immediately clear that the former aim is the more relevant to this study, for the course of RME in the seventies was not influenced to any great degree by the consideration as to whether it was consistent with Christian belief. However, it remains the case that Hirst reckoned there to be a sufficiently strong enough Christian element among RME teachers for him to devote his attention to persuading them to accept secular ME. The forthcoming appraisal therefore will hold these two aims apart, and although it will be suggested that Hirst may have been less than convincing in his theological aim, it is nonetheless recognised that this would not invalidate his analysis of Moral Education, under his first aim.

iv. To take his theological aim first it may be said that Hirst was not attempting an apologia in the manner of the
sixties' radical theologians (81). His intention was not to suggest a synthesis between Christianity and humanism, but to interpret Christianity as traditionally understood in a way which would be consistent with his proposals for Moral Education. Yet it may be questioned whether he aligned with Deism rather than with Christianity. There are two considerations which suggest this to be the case. First, he exhibited an apparently unqualified confidence in the power of reason to arrive at solutions to moral problems without the need for dependence upon divine help. This would be consistent with his view that the central feature of morality is the making of rational moral decisions, which must presuppose the capacity of reason to be able to make such judgements. Yet it is doubtful if Christianity in any form can avoid positing some limitations upon the competence of unaided reason to solve human problems. Even those Christians who are the most reluctant to use the former terminology of original sin might nonetheless be obliged to advocate a sophisticated version of this very notion. Hirst is prepared to argue however that morality can be hammered out in a comparable way to the rational hammering out of agricultural or engineering science. Yet this comparison may be valid only if the 'hammering out' is a term to denote 'knowing what should be done'. It may certainly be the case that Man can arrive at a correct intellectual analysis of human problems in the same way as he can arrive at an analysis of agricultural or engineering problems. But the application of moral knowledge is at least as important as the application of agricultural or scientific knowledge, and it may be that something extra is needed by morality at this point than by agriculture or engineering. It is here that Christianity might be expected to say something distinctive.
v. Second, Hirst found a role for 'grace' only by restricting it to Christians. He drew a comparison between the position that justification for morality did not rest upon Christian belief, which he had argued previously, and the position that it is a mistake to think of Christian faith as 'providing an extra element in the moral life, which is missing on a purely natural approach' (82). He thus appeared to remove God from any direct involvement with the psychological, biological and social mechanisms of moral behaviour. By so doing he seemed to be further bringing his position nearer to that of Deism than Christianity. It may be doubted if many Christians could be altogether happy with a view which seemed not to be giving sufficient allowance to the traditional doctrine of God as sustainer as well as creator.

vi But these two points are more in the nature of theological criticisms, justifiably so in view of the fact that Hirst was addressing himself to the task of commending his position to Christians. But, as has been indicated, this was not his sole aim. His central argument was that rational moral principles do exist and should form part of school ME. Yet this would raise a question of central critical importance to this study. It must be asked whether the very generality of the principles for which Hirst argued so cogently makes him vulnerable to a charge similar to that which he directed against the concept of Christian education. He maintained that this was a vacuous term prone to cultural conditioning. But his own position on rational moral principles may be comparable in that, while universal moral principles do raise morality above particular cultures, these principles may be so general that they could fail to indicate how a
rational morality might be expressed in particular situations. However desirable it may be to put forward a system which breaks free from moral relativism, if this system can itself be criticised as being ill-equipped to handle the uncertainties of moral content, then it may validly be asked if the matter has been advanced in any appreciable way. But perhaps there is no way of solving the problem of deciding on moral content short of settling for a particular morality and championing, even enforcing, it against all comers. This was the solution advanced in the forties, but that solution was not appropriate to the seventies. Yet if the problem cannot easily be solved at least some headway might be achieved by an ME which advocated discussion of moral issues in a rational manner, aiming at understanding the issues involved if not at complete resolution of the problems under consideration. Hirst showed how Christians and secularists could enter meaningful dialogue with each other both on the topic of the autonomy of morality and of the natural mechanisms which may be involved in the process of producing moral behaviour. He also placed ME in some relationship with RE in that he focused on the religious significance which morality could acquire. Furthermore, in declining to go the way of those radical theologians who reduced religious belief to mere moral teaching he gave to religious belief a strengthened role at the psychological level of personal involvement in morality. In addition, as his 1974 publication was the culmination of a series of articles and addresses given over ten years (83), he may be said to have anticipated and prepared his readers for the debates and changes of the seventies.

vii. Hirst had done for ME something similar to that which he had done earlier for RE. This was to show how each area
might validly fit an educational scene in which aim, method and content were decided upon rational, secular grounds. This was in turn comparable to what he was doing for education as a whole in that he was arguing for the traditional subject-curriculum but by appealing to non-metaphysical criteria. Hence, for RE an objective, cognitive approach to religion as an area of study was a proper concern for the Maintained school, but a personal engagement in religious practices was not, this being the province of religious institutions formed to foster an individual's commitment to a particular faith. For ME morality as an autonomous domain, perceived and implemented rationally, was essential to education, but a morality dependent upon religion for its authority and implementation was not. Yet Hirst did not want the two areas to go completely out of relationship with each other when each had secured its independence. He suggested various benefits for RE that came from an autonomous ME. These were found not so much in the prospect that RE would then be released to do its proper job of teaching about religion, a view later to be emphasised by the Schools Council, but that religion could be better seen for what it really was. The corollary would then also obtain that morality would be better seen for what it really was. Hirst did not address himself, however, to examining how an autonomous RE and ME might operate each in its own right and yet interact with each other. But it must be remembered that he was writing at a time of crisis for both RE and ME when it was crucial that each be satisfactorily conceptualised. Any criticism that he too encouraged an unnecessarily severe severance of RE and ME must take account of this. Now that the debates of the sixties and seventies have settled more into a historical perspective, the time may have come to explore the notion of 'intersection' as a designation of the RE/ME relationship which encourages the possibility of mutually beneficial interaction.
5.3. CURRICULUM-DEVELOPMENT

5.3.1. Religious Education

i. Although the Birmingham Handbook could be described as a curriculum-development project, it was the Schools Council which occupied the major role as RE and ME curriculum-developers in the seventies. The Council had already given attention to some of the issues that were stimulating debate about RE (84), and in 1969 had turned to Smart to direct a secondary RE project, followed by one for primary RE, with parallel ME projects under the directorship of McPhail. Thus, although criticism had been levelled at the old Syllabuses that they had been too heavily dependent upon University Theology, it was nevertheless from a University that fresh guidance was sought, a start being made in the secondary rather than in the primary schools. However, Smart's intention was to locate the schemes firmly in the schools themselves and to consult teachers on a wide basis. A series of booklets was produced for classroom-use, but they appeared only after a long delay and then some were of a rather indifferent quality. But the 1971 Working Paper was a very valuable publication, clarifying many of the problems confronting RE (85).

ii. It advocated following the lead given by Smart. Both the confessional and the anti-dogmatic approaches were rejected in favour of the phenomenological, or undogmatic, approach, which 'uses the tools of modern scholarship in order to enter into an empathic experience of the faith of individuals and groups' (86). Goldman was set aside as 'neo-confessional', Loukes received qualified commendation, Cox had leanings to the neo-confessional, but Smart was hailed
with plaudits, and Smith was commended for combining the positions of Loukes and Smart (87). Those engaged in teacher-training were urged to break away from traditional patterns of University Theology, to provide courses more suited to the RE recommended in the paper and to reflect Lancaster University's innovations. The question that was continually pressed, as the paper drew out the implications of its view for RE, was: What is the most appropriate approach in a multi-faith, but mainly secular society for an RE which aimed at understanding of, toleration for and sympathy with many viewpoints, both in their cognitive and affective aspects?

iii. A chapter was devoted to the relationship between RE and ME. Elsewhere, Horder, the deputy-director of the project, had made it clear that the scheme was to make a conscious separation of Moral and Religious Education (88). But the position taken by the paper was to see both areas as complementary, and to welcome co-operative ventures on this basis.

'Many of those concerned with RE are fully aware that morality is an autonomous area of study, that religious perception and moral perception are as distinct as historical perception and aesthetic perception. Likewise, many whose interest is moral education recognize that the insights and accumulated wisdom of the great world religions cannot be ignored in any comprehensive scheme of moral education' (89).

The paper spelt out its position in a final summary of eight propositions, which accepted the autonomy of ME and stressed that RE had a place in the schools whether or not it was a 'fount of virtue'. Yet it seemed to be smuggling in a plea for religion still to figure in ME's base, for 'you cannot get far by an appeal to self-interest, or by appealing to the child as a rational moral being' (90). Perhaps any
attempt to bring RE and ME into some sort of relationship will take on the appearance of special pleading for one or the other. For, although Horder's earlier point that the ethical is nearer the heart of religion than the ritual or doctrinal (91) seems to have been quietly dropped, the impression might be taken from the paper that a truly autonomous ME is not really being envisaged. For the point is made that a religion's moral teaching cannot be divorced from its religious dynamic, and the Humanists are described as having 'got into the pool' of common morality by Christian springs (92). The paper may be regarded as an extension of the Durham Report in the direction of pluralism, in that autonomous ME was accepted in principle, with the whole school to be involved in its exercise. The RE teacher's special contribution was to show the links between moral problems, moral concepts and religious belief, whereas Durham had restricted this to Christian belief. But in the suggestion that a base for ME was not to be found solely in self-interest nor in rationality alone, may this not have been to influence ME back towards a religious base? The assertion had already been made that an organic connection existed between religion and religious morality. It is tempting to wonder whether the real message of Working Paper 36 was that, while in theory a non-religious base to morality might be formulated, in practice this was not feasible.

iv. The Working Paper for primary school RE was published a year later (93). It grew out of a research-survey and carried the work of formulating an educationally appropriate RE for the seventies into the primary sector. The paper drew a distinction between the evangelist and the educationist, and laid it down as a principle that henceforward any attempts at Christian involvement should be left to the Voluntary
As there was evidence that many teachers who had confidently adopted Goldman's thesis were no longer so sure of its wisdom, the paper, while itself criticising Goldman for being vulnerable to the unintended effect of separating religion and life, nevertheless held out for a 'more viable kind of theme teaching', and suggested criteria for selecting appropriate Bible-stories, and for constructing educationally valuable assemblies. At the top of its recommendations calling for further investigation was the topic of the relationship between Moral and Religious Education, which only highlights the paper's inadequate treatment of this area. No statistics were produced on this subject in Appendix C, and the reader is left to glean that 28% of the 422 members of staff of the schools visited said they would wish to teach ME if RE were abolished, and 70% said they preferred to include ME in their schemes of work (94). The two questions on ME in the questionnaire were somewhat unsophisticated (95). The section discussing the relationship between RE and ME did little more than refer to the work of the Farmington Trust, the Social Morality Council (96) and the Schools Council, while indicating that ME and RE were related but not identifiable with each other.

v. The two Working Papers each prepared the way for further material. That for the secondary school comprised a Teacher's Handbook (97) and a set of teaching units (98). Reviewers were not very sympathetic (99), and Rabbi Charing drew attention to thirteen factual errors in the booklet on Judaism (100). However, the booklets were attractively produced, and had made an effort to construct teaching material for the seventies. It was soon to become clear that this material would be overtaken by better from various
quarters, not least from the religions themselves. The further contribution to primary RE was a publication growing out of discussions with and reports from teachers, and designed to help teachers foster the understanding of religion among primary children (101). It operated on a definition of religion that was part phenomenological and part functional, according RE a role in both areas. It contained echoes of the Durham Report in agreeing that RE should help a pupil's search for a faith by which to live and in evaluating Christianity as important in the school's socialising process. It settled for the terms 'open', 'plural', 'exploratory' and 'aiming at understanding' as those most relevant for an 'appropriate' RE. All the major areas of debate were discussed, but the final chapter on ME and the relationship between RE and ME must be deemed a further inadequacy from the Schools Council on this matter. Certainly the statement 'making children good is not the purpose of religious education' (102) makes sense in the context in which it occurs. This context made the claim that RE's proper role was to teach religion. It was not about the behavioural outcomes that might be looked for from education. But the question may perhaps be validly asked whether the pendulum has not started to swing too far in the direction of total severance of RE and ME, to the neglect of the moral dimension of religion. However, in the treatment of aims and objectives, in its invitation to teachers to adopt a considered, educational approach to RE, and offering help to this end, and in its resolve to point the way forward the book must surely be considered a contribution to the advancement of the subject.
5.3.2. Moral Education

i. The Lifeline project for secondary schoolchildren was begun in 1967, under the direction of Peter McPhail for the Schools Council, the published material appearing in 1972 (103). This material grew out of survey-work and comprised three sets of discussion-cards and three teacher-handbooks. The sets were broadly developmental, but this was development in complexity of the material itself, rather than developmental in the sense of matching material to psychological maturation. Unlike Wilson, McPhail did not focus primarily upon moral reasoning, considering emotional response to be a vital part of moral behaviour. His approach was to construct a scheme which started from believed adolescent needs, ascertained empirically, in defiance of the naturalistic fallacy, rather than from a worked-out philosophical ideal. By basing everything upon the principle of consideration of others, which was both a desirable moral characteristic and a feature of adolescent thinking, McPhail believed he had given the word 'ought' a new authority (104).

ii. The correspondence between the philosophical and the empirical which McPhail believed he had discovered went some way to reducing the criticisms invited by his treatment of the naturalistic fallacy. When Downey and Kelly, for example (105), say that, just because adolescents find certain qualities desirable this does not form a ground for teaching them to emulate such qualities, they should surely have added that, if the quality in question is something like consideration for others, then there may be reason for believing that there is more than a chance correlation between this particular 'is' and 'ought'. However, their criticism that McPhail has given
pupils no help in distinguishing between the truly moral and
the merely expedient consideration for others, is more telling,
as is their additional point (citing Peters) that consideration
for others is emphasised at the expense of other aspects of
morality, such as courage, determination, justice and
impartiality (106).

iii. It perhaps should be borne in mind that McPhail's
refusal to espouse a particular philosophical stance was
dictated by a desire to involve as many people as possible
in ME, in particular to recommend materials and encourage
further co-operative development that would be acceptable to
both the religious and the secular moral educator (107).
So the criticism that his scheme was thin on philosophical
justification, as it certainly was, was incurred not too
unworthily, and he undoubtedly indicated an awareness of both
moral philosophy and developmental psychology (108), even
though he pays little attention to either. His preference
for behaviourism, although not spelt out, is everywhere
inferable, whether in the importance placed upon reward, or
reinforcement, or upon morality being caught rather than
taught, or the equation of the terms Moral Education and
Social Education, or the claim that 'Habit is a great,
perhaps the greatest, motivational force' (109). Farr drew
attention to the 'Durkheim-like social conditioning mechanism'
implied to the project (110). Actually McPhail included
some defence against the charge of brainwashing (111), seeing
the repudiation of teacher-neutrality, except as an occasional
procedure, as a guard against indoctrination as well as
being what the pupils appeared to want anyway (112). He
asserted the values of autonomy, altruism, rationality and
democracy, but, as Quinn pointed out, autonomy seems to be
regarded as freedom from coercion rather than adherence to self-evaluated and internalised moral principles, and democracy may be no more than a convenient method of social control (113). But the major irony does seem to be that, while McPhail claimed that a 'major criterion' to decide which of his material to recommend for the classroom was the development reached by the pupils (114), the nearest he comes to drawing on the, by that time, quite considerable cognitive developmentalist research was to suggest a 'passive' to 'mature-imaginative' continuum as a minor ingredient of his scheme (115). The criticism of Downey and Kelly seems fair that

'To have linked a programme such as his with Kohlberg's findings, for example, would have given the whole project the firm psychological base it needs' (116).

iv. The 1978 Startline project for the primary school (117) was comparable in rationale, method and materials to Lifeline. The survey, conducted by Jasper Ungoe-Thomas, was published with the other material (118) producing a fascinating store of material provided by the children, although indicating some meagre a reference to religion as to exclude the religious as a separate category in the recording (119). Ungoe-Thomas found the overall pattern of children's reactions to be 'fairly comforting to any who are pessimistic about the moral state of the nation's children' (120), but this optimism is somewhat belied when it is seen to reside in the uncritical confidence that the children act 'within a widely accepted social moral framework' and by a rather baffling statement which seems either to be sloppy wording or unexamined inconsistency

'Provided that adults are prepared to identify why children behave in particular ways, there appears little reason for fearing that the moral behaviour of children
should be eroded by lack of that caring understanding which necessarily must provide the foundation for satisfactory moral development of children' (121).

Can a foundation really be both necessary and optional at the same time?

v. The rationale of Startline is that of Lifeline, but made more firm. There is a comparable disinclination to philosophise, Ungoed-Thomas' one chapter on 'rationale' being not unfairly described by a reviewer as a 'mercifully short and quite irrelevant sortie into historical positions in moral philosophy' (122). Inductive categorisation from empirical research is again seen as a more fruitful way forward than the establishment of a base in moral philosophy. The theoretical framework is that of social learning, but this time more strongly advocated, in thirty pages on the nature of social conditioning (123). Kohlberg's work this time receives a mention (but almost a damning with faint praise), but his approach is rejected as overorganised, undersubscribing the importance of feeling and positive motivation, and concerned with verbal subscription rather than behaviour. McPhail's rationale, as might be expected in a scheme for British primary schools and lower secondary forms, endeavoured to relate to the Progressive School Movement, by stressing informal school organisation, divergent rather than convergent thinking, creativity, flexibility, dynamic rather than static attitudes, the importance of the 'hidden' curriculum being made to serve the growth and self-confidence of the pupils, and the crucial value of play. Where this line of thinking seems to be running away with itself is the surely astonishing statement that 'Man's seriousness and intellectualisation of his
experience are probably the greatest barriers to children's social and moral learning, social flexibility and creativity' (124).

This surely smacks of anti-intellectualism and suggests a denigration of moral judgement.

vi. There seems to be little doubt that the Startline material, especially with its focus on happiness and unhappiness, would be of immediate interest to children, although perhaps it might have erred too much to the cosy (125). The project showed a commendable realisation that, at the end of the day, ME may be judged on its effectiveness in actually producing moral behaviour, not in producing young people able to discuss moral dilemmas with skill and ease but unable to match this knowing with doing. This did not have to result in a neglect of Kohlberg's work and suggestions for classroom-ME, however, nor did it have to run out into quite such a marked denigration of the intellectual and the philosophical. For, though the isolation and elevation of one moral principle, consideration for others, made the scheme readily usable in the schools, this might make for a rather thin ME with a not very adequate conception of the range of moral principles that might enter a moral decision. However, the scheme was not presented as a fully orbed ME programme, but as more in the nature of a starter-unit. As such, it would link very well with situational approaches, with Utilitarianism and with religious approaches which operated a situational love-ethic. Its empirical starting point also offered a useful complement to Wilson's philosophical approach in the MEP, although it is noticeable that, like Kohlberg, he too is neglected by McPhail.
2.4. RE, ME AND 'COMPLEMENTARITY'

i. It would seem that the Schools Council's approach to the RE/ME relationship could be fairly summarised in the following five propositions.

   a. Religion must not be reduced to, although including, morality, and RE must give serious attention to the many other aspects of religion than the moral dimension.

   b. Religious moralities are too organically linked to the wider number of elements in religion for them to be validly taught in isolation from those other elements.

   c. Morality is an autonomous domain of thought and knowledge, issuing in a distinct perspective on life, thus enabling ME to be taught independently of religion.

   d. Although RE and ME are separate educational exercises they nevertheless complement each other.

   e. ME cannot exclude the objectives of behaviour-change and production of desired behaviour.

These propositions made good sense in the seventies (they still do), but the question must be pursued as to whether the term 'complementarity' is the most appropriate way of describing the relationship between RE and ME. In that the moral dimension of a religion could be expected to overlap with secular-rational morality, or even with particular socio-moral systems, the term is adequate enough. But the term 'complementarity' might imply, not overlap, but parallel practice without any form of interaction. The result might therefore be total separation, to the impoverishment of both RE and ME, each being denied mutual support and criticism. It would seem thus to be in order to query
whether the term 'complementarity' is too weak, and indicates a swing away from the former confusions surrounding the notion of an equated RE and ME which has gone too far in the opposite direction towards the extreme of total separation. If so, then a stronger word such as 'intersection' might be preferable. For if justice is to be done to the idea of an interacting RE/ME then the production of religio-moral and religio-social units for ME and P.S.E. courses is not only proper but desirable. The survey in the following chapter will take up this point and seek for evidence that RE teachers share this view. Before looking at the survey-results, however, it is necessary to enquire about what the published material implies for the Schools Council's understanding of the term 'complementarity', with ME and P.S.E. especially in mind.

ii. In principle, the Journeys into Religion booklets could be of service to an interacting RE/ME/P.S.E. The titles Buddhism, The Life of Man: The Family, The Man from Nazareth as They Saw Him, and Exploring Belief offer possibilities in this area. But in general the booklets do not explore very adequately the moral and social implications of the religions. It would be a little unfair to criticise the booklets for not being what they were not intended principally to be. But that is not what is being done at this point. The present argument is that the Schools Council, in their literature, have made clear that they consider religion to be a significant domain of human experience, many-faceted yet in an important sense related to moral behaviour. But the published material does not seem to reflect this stance. For on the School Council's own understanding of religion it can be said that this phenomenon should not be portrayed as an esoteric hobby confined to small coteries of people withdrawn from society, but as a highly important and widespread human
preoccupation, with implications for the whole of life. With such a concept, the booklet-producers should surely have borne in mind more fully than they appeared to have done the social and moral implications of religion. It is one thing to enlarge RE content, it is another to enlarge it at the expense of those meeting points between religion and secular rational life.

iii. Looking at the material from the ME projects it would seem that so little reference is made to religion that the underlying view is that RE and ME should not interact. They are finally to be separated and links that may exist between the two are to be ignored. This is consistent with McPhail's professed disinclination to philosophise, but it is inconsistent with his stress upon the importance of strengthening motivation towards moral behaviour even if this motivation is more emotional than cognitive. In view of this latter consideration it would seem not unfair to criticise the ME material for not being sufficiently aware of the importance of religious motivation to moral behaviour. In view of the former consideration it seems that McPhail might have weakened his scheme educationally, in that links between belief and behaviour cannot be ignored without risk of superficiality in the ME concept undergirding the classroom-practice. The result of both these factors is to make the ME material inadequate for an interacting RE/ME. Yet there is evidence from Ungoed-Thomas' survey that implicitly religious questions are sometimes raised by children without their being prompted to do this, and it hardly seems educationally desirable to construct ME or P.S.E. courses which set out deliberately to exclude the possibility of these questions arising in the course of examining moral issues from socio-humanistic perspectives. ME can contribute to an interacting RE/ME as well as RE. The Schools Council should in
fact have advocated this, if Working Papers 36 and 44 were to be regarded as guides. That they were not so regarded seems to constitute a message from McPhail that interacting RE/ME is to be located in RE, not in ME. This strengthens the suspicion that McPhail is not really talking about ME at all: he is really talking about a Social Education which conditions children into a prudential outlook that cannot bear to look deeply into moral beliefs, and how these beliefs relate to religious beliefs.

iv. There are scattered references to religion in the Lifeline material: card number 54 in the Consequences set brackets R.C.s, Protestants and Pakistanis; in the Points of View set 1 card features a church wedding, 1 the problem of R.C.-Protestant marriages, 1 Jewish observance of religious events, 1 Muslim observance, and 1 a general reference to religion and politics; in the What Would You Have Done? booklets, 'Birth Day' places a compassionate situation in the context of a missionary dispensary, and 'Arrest' deals with the arrest of Anne Frank and her family. Yet the general areas of consideration are those which engender beliefs which relate to religion: consideration for others, the formation of the self-concept, the place of authority in behaviour, group-and community-living, race-relations, commitment, persecution, conflict, civil rights, suffering, personal responsibility and community-service. So it can hardly be argued that an ME or a P.S.E. course which is structured on McPhail's suggestions must exclude links with religion to be true to itself. What can be argued is that, because McPhail has not himself developed the point as to how an interactive RE/ME could fit into his scheme, he has left teachers to draw the inference that it does not and should not. It may be that teachers would then feel that it is unprofessional to offer religio-moral and religio-social units for ME and P.S.E.
5.5. THE RE/ME RELATIONSHIP

i. There were two clearly marked tendencies in this decade which directly affected the relationship between RE and ME. The first tendency might, actually, have been found more in the literature than in the actualities of classroom-RE, although it may be presumed that the literature eventually pervades the classroom. This was the suggestion that RE teachers decline the role of moral educators. While such a proposal was a break with the past, it was in keeping with the emerging rationale of RE as education into the understanding of religion, both as a general area of human experience as seen from the standpoint of 'ultimacy', and as specific phenomena as seen in the various religions of the world. But to decline this role was in effect to say that the moral dimension of religion was no more important than the other dimensions. This might be a serious misunderstanding at least in the case of Christianity for, although individual Christians may sometimes prefer religious ceremonies and discussions about doctrine to the practice of good neighbourliness, it would seem that to accord this preference priority would be denounced by Jesus as the New Testament portrays him. In addition, although by refusing to allow RE to be regarded as primarily ME the RE teacher could avoid the charge that he was failing to produce moral behaviour in pupils, he was also severing a link with the general public, who can safely be presumed to have evaluated RE for its supposed contribution to public morality.

ii. The second tendency was to construct specifically ME programmes, not to replace RE but to complement it. The sixties had produced some notable theorists about ME and about moral development, and the way had seemingly been cleared
for an ME project to build upon this work. When the project which was set up by the Schools Council went into publication, it was seen that Wilson, Peters, Hirst and Kohlberg were not followed to any great extent, the lead being taken more from Durkheim and Argyle. Empirical research was deemed to be a better groundwork than moral philosophising. One result of this approach seemed to be that the absence of explicit reference to religion in the surveys was apparently taken to justify its absence from the later published material. But this might be doing no more than point up the weaknesses of the research. For lack of conscious reference to religion is a very simple matter to elucidate from an empirical survey. But perception as to how religion might operate at a more unconscious level would require a more sophisticated and more penetrating survey than McPhail and Ungoed-Thomas employed, perhaps even contemplated. Yet it is at this level that the relationship between RE and ME may be highly significant. Information about this area would throw light on a topic which McPhail stressed as important, namely motivation to moral behaviour. It was the importance to him of this area that encouraged him to see in social learning theory a psychological base to his projects. But motivation to moral behaviour is highly complex, and certainly means more than habit or prudential calculation of consequences. It impinges on beliefs, and upon the links between beliefs and behaviour. It is here that ME and RE might interact, and to fail to allow such interaction might be productive not only of misunderstanding, but of waste, in that sources of moral energy might lie unappreciated and untapped. Perhaps the Schools Council projects in ME were too intent on avoiding previous problems stemming from the equation of RE and ME, when they should have been evolving a valid process in which RE and ME intersected.
To press for the term 'intersection' rather than 'complementarity' as epitomising the relationship between RE and ME is to press for more than academic niceties. There are important practical implications which stem from the following considerations. In the first place, although the Schools Council's literature implies that complementarity involves some form of joint pursuits, the published material seems to operate on the principle of near-divorce of RE from ME. Such an inconsistency is very unsatisfactory, because, second, the stress laid upon non-cognitive motivation towards moral behaviour by the Schools Council's projects would seem to require, as part of ME, the sensitising of the pupils to the range of motivation available, of which the God-concept forms part. This is not necessarily to say that religious motivation does not possess cognitive elements, nor is it to say that the former, perhaps crudely drawn 'sanctions' which may have been used in RME to induce desirable behaviour should be immediately re-introduced. It is rather to say that, on the Schools Council's own understanding of RE, as multi-faith and multi-dimensional, and on its own understanding of ME, as concerned with the strengthening of motivation to moral behaviour, even when such motivation is not entirely cognitive, practical classroom-work in ME should seek to indicate to the socio-humanistic the strengths that may come from religion, as it would to the religious the strengths that may come from the socio-humanistic. Such a proposal implies more than that, because religious moralities, in so far as they relate to rational moral principles, are subject to and can promote rational discussion about behaviour, then there can be some overlap of material in RE and ME. In other words, certain topics can be discussed rationally in either RE or ME. It is a proposal, on the contrary, that might
well find the 'overlap' approach somewhat superficial, although essential as an element in RME. It is a proposal that more nearly represents the historical processes which have been examined in this study, in that the link between belief and behaviour continues to be postulated without recourse this time to metaphysical justification. It must surely be to the benefit of social behaviour to bring it under a critique from absolutist positions, if this serves as a check upon relativism, just as it must surely be beneficial for absolute standards to encounter a humanistic critique directed towards exposing their possible incompatibility with individual need.

iv. A third consideration should also be examined, in view of the recent trend towards courses in Personal and Social Education. A complementary RE/ME such as the Schools Council constructed in practice might well leave RE teachers wondering about the propriety of using religious material in such exercises. But, if the argument in the previous paragraph stands up then RE teachers must surely be wrong to feel that they might somehow undermine P.S.E. by the use of religious-moral units in these courses. Such units would seem almost to be a necessary inclusion on the Schools Council's own interpretation of complementarity given in the theoretical parts of that body's schemes. For example, the following units might well be a very valid offering from RE for P.S.E. courses for fourth- and fifth-year pupils, if the criterion of 'intersection' of RE and ME is allowed: Religion and Welfare; Religion and Political Action; Human Life - What is it Worth?; Attitudes to Death; Rites of Passage. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Evidence will be presented later from the survey to suggest that there is little risk that RE teachers would exploit P.S.E. courses for partisan RE purposes. It
would seem unfortunate if this professionalism became a blockage to a proper interaction between RE and ME.

vii. The time seems right for an exploration into how RE and ME might relate in ways which result in interaction rather than parallel practice. For the position that each is autonomous now seems to be generally accepted by educationists, and as the survey will show RE teachers themselves may be expected to be in agreement also, while not seeing autonomy to be synonymous with total severance. It would seem impossible to deny that there will at least be overlap between morality and the moral dimensions of the religions. Also, in that RE has moved from being a means to promote the acceptance by pupils of one particular faith, this has opened up the way for RE to move closer to ME. Such a move could well help to keep religious moralities aware of the continuing necessity to keep themselves truly moral and of the obligation to recognise the good wherever it is to be found. In a comparable way ME might profitably move closer to RE in that each is surely equally concerned to clarify the beliefs underlying the respective practices, for an ME which is unaware of the link between belief and behaviour might not only be superficial but might not be ME at all. It might be no more than social conditioning into a set of mores carefully protected from searching criticism from any quarter, religious or moral. Furthermore, it would seem that there is now a better understanding of the complexities that surround the making of moral decisions, and, if so, this would tell against the rigid severance of RE and ME into water-tight compartments, as it would tell in favour of the conceptual separation of the two areas.
2.6. SUMMARY

i. The decade had opened uncertainly. Both pessimist and optimist could advance reasons for his position. The major research-schemes of the sixties had underlined the seeming general ineffectiveness and apparent ineptitude of the Agreed Syllabus tradition, and the revised Syllabuses of the late sixties had not yet had a chance to prove themselves to be any better. While the Shap Working Party had pointed an alternative way forward, they were breaking new ground, and carried no standing other than that of self-appointment. Even the occasional research-finding which might have heartened RE teachers, such as that dealing with indoctrination in the Alves report (126), could be submerged in the general depression of the time, as in Matthew's judgement that Alves 'did nothing to redress the pessimism' (127). Wright and Cox replicated their 1963 research and concluded that there had been 'a very considerable decline in support' for RE among sixth-formers (128). Opponents of RE were not slow to hammer away at what was seen as a decline towards extinction, so that the editor of Learning for Living could begin his March, 1975, editorial with the words

'We are sick and tired of hearing people say that there is no future in religious education' (129).

ii. But the optimist could have his say also. Hilliard felt able to write that the signs were pointing to RE's imminent entry upon a second century 'as fruitful as that which is now closing' (130). H.M.I. Eric Lord wrote of the indestructibility of the religious dimension to life, finding that the pluralistic nature of society was opening up new areas of need for RE (131). Smart averred that the
prospects for the study of religion had scarcely been brighter than at the then present time (132). The editor of Learning for Living could be presumed to be in a good position to speak knowledgeably, when she reported that there were teachers scattered over the country, in schools and colleges, who were reflecting profoundly on the place and function of RE in education, and there were many who were experimenting at grassroots (133).

iii. The seventies was a decade of clarification for ME. In 1970 Loukes had made the point that everyone seemed to talk about Moral Education as if they were all agreed as to what it was that they were talking about, and asked whether such assumed unanimity was justified (134). A year later, May reported from his research that many teachers were 'somewhat at sea' in their thinking about ME, but nonetheless there were many teachers throughout the country who were coming to support the case for more specific moral teaching in schools, and that, in this, they were joined by a 'considerable majority' of 14–16-year-old pupils (135). As the decade proceeded, however, research-findings in the theories of moral development began to filter through to educationists, and two major curriculum-development projects from the Schools Council focused attention on both theoretical and practical issues. In addition, insistent demands that the philosophy of education be taken with utmost seriousness, not only helped to reshape the rationale of RE in the direction of pluralism, but filled out the concept of ME, also in the direction of pluralism in that no one moral content was designated as incumbent on all schools. The relationship between RE and ME was analysed as never before. By the end of the decade certain conclusions had apparently been reached
which were to form part of the basis for the eighties.

iv. First, there was a widening readiness to acknowledge that ME did not require, and even may suffer from, a strong link with RE. The corollary that RE did not require and may even suffer from a strong link with ME, was also coming to be examined in the RE world, not out of a sense of pique, but more out of the discovery that there was an almost immense range of religious material that might have to be included in an RE worthy of the name. Also, a moralistic RE might unnecessarily create resentment among pupils. The sort of separation which seemed to be commending itself was not the divorce that both Knight and Tribe (136) had advocated as Secular Humanists, nor was it the neutrality of the Farmington Trust unit (137), nor even the consensus hoped for by the Social Morality Council upon a set of universal moral principles (138) - although such principles had at least a prima facie link with religious moralities. The position taken by the Schools Council was a middle way, RE and ME being seen as complementary, with RE being thereby released from the responsibility of being ME's guarantor so as to be able to concentrate upon its proper task of Religious Education (139). Such a position would seem to imply a separate subject, Moral Education. But McPhail was against the timetabling of ME as a subject, although he had argued that ME was a field of study in its own right, with particular concepts, skills and techniques (140), this opposition stemming from his belief that the majority of teachers should come to recognise 'the responsibility that all educators have in this field' (141). Both the Durham Report and the 1965 Joint Statement (142) had disavowed the setting up of separate courses, especially if parents had to choose
between them. With such a line-up, it might be expected that grassroots' practitioners might gravitate to a mediating position. The survey reported in the next chapter may be of interest here.

v. Second, the complexities of ME became ever more apparent. The simple days when ME could be construed as the learning of the Ten Commandments and discipline in a set of virtues, could only be deemed simplistic as the decade advanced. Kohlberg was scathing about the 'bag of virtues' approach, and could draw upon some meticulous empirical evidence to support his beliefs about moral development occurring in stage-sequence and moving towards a non-relative morality. It was the combination of the entrance of the psychologists and sociologists and the extrication by the theologians from simple sounding platitudes, that highlighted some of the complex factors that had to be considered in the construction of ME programmes. Although this study has examined only the cognitive developmentalist and the behaviourist psychological schools, because of the widespread welcome to the former and the influence of the latter upon British ME curriculum-development, other approaches were coming under consideration (143). Perhaps it was the Williams who indicated, in the most elegant of fashions, the complexities that might surround ME (Norman Williams had been a member of the Farmington Trust team) (144). Sociologists were also exploring issues relevant to ME, at a time when sociology was everywhere proclaiming the intricacies involved in analysing modern industrial societies. Psychologists and sociologists sometimes appeared to be proceeding with scant regard for theology, yet neither of them could ignore that people did have cognitive needs to make sense of reality, in the interests
of individual and social wellbeing. Those writers, therefore, who insisted that there was an organic link between beliefs about the nature and purpose of the universe and beliefs about the nature of morality, would seem to have shown a sure touch in their understanding of the RE/ME relationship, and to have helped to safeguard it from the extremists of both polarities. Also, while personal autonomy was acknowledged to be a valuable ME aim, by both the religious and the secular, no one wished to advocate this without putting some qualification upon its absoluteness.

vi. Third, it seemed that the nearest to a solution of the problem of deciding upon moral content was the positing of rational moral universals. These were, however, rather general principles, although they offered some hope that relativism would be checked. As the times were not conducive to an acceptance of the Durham Report's implication that Christian morality be continued as the basic content for ME, the church's cause not being helped by disagreement among Christians on some current moral dilemmas, focus had to shift from content to form. Something of value would be achieved presumably, if pupils could be brought to discuss behaviour in a rational and informed manner. But this did not guarantee that moral action would, in the event, be forthcoming, and there was a degree of uncertainty manifest as to whether ME should confine itself to the development of moral judgement, or whether it should take the further step of trying to produce moral behaviour in pupils. To do so it would hit two problems: the first was that of 'Which moral content?'; the second was that of indoctrination. All that had been said about indoctrination and RE seemed now as applicable to ME, if Moral Education were to be involved in the production of
behaviour-change by any means other than the cognitive.

Peters had maintained that the use of reason has to grow out of the inheritance of traditions (145). Did this mean that, inevitably, there had to be some moral indoctrination in the primary school?

vii. Indoctrination was foresworn by almost everyone connected with RE in this decade. The language of christianising aims disappeared and objectivity became an important aspect of methodology, especially as the appreciation grew both of the plurality of belief-systems within the category 'religion', and of the actual increase within society of a plurality of religious groups. School worship seemingly could carry no justification, if it were Christian worship, and little justification if it were an attempt at plural religious worship, although school assembly continued to be valued if re-interpreted in secular, educational ways (146). Yet, the move away from teaching for commitment produced an unease for some that RE was not being true to itself if it were confined only to an objective appraisal of the multiplicity of religious systems, while any recommendations about teaching from commitment had to be made in the context of plurality of beliefs and values, including those of the atheist and agnostic (147). One form in which unease over this situation manifested itself, in the eighties, was the appearance of numbers of Christian confessional schools, set up independently of the State system, as a reaction to the very objectivity and plurality of some State school RE. Muslims also pressed for Voluntary Aided provision, arguing that the logic of the 1944 act necessitated their being granted this concession.
By the end of the decade two factors at least seemed to be encouraging signs for RE's continued presence in the Maintained schools. First, it seemed to be becoming less and less a matter of urgency to justify RE's place in the curriculum on educational grounds, for that hurdle seemed now to have been surmounted. Second, despite educational cuts, RE did retain its presence in the schools, if much reduced in the colleges. The prevailing economic gloom might, actually, have indirectly helped RE, for it seems to be the case that in times of insecurity and hardship religion can gain a hearing denied it in times of prosperity and materialistic happiness. The supply of people coming forward to colleges and Universities for R.S. courses has not dried up, and these courses might now be gaining a reputation for being 'harder' than in the old monistic days.

It may also be the case that students in teacher-education courses have no antipathy to undertaking the RE which is now asked of them, although it seems that in many primary schools the only recognisable RE conducted is the assembly, and school worship is increasingly being questioned for its educational propriety, even though a Conservative government is unlikely to allow a repeal, or even a re-phrasing, of this part of the 1944 Education Act. The DES has retained its long-standing support for RE, and the term 'spiritual education' seems to be becoming part of the present currency. RE in-service work continues, and the LEAs throughout the country have shown some willingness to set up RE centres. The diocesan RE agencies also provide a resource-service which is made available to and used by teachers in the Maintained sector. RE research has continued throughout the seventies and proceeds into the eighties (148). Resource-material has been unstemmed,
with productions appearing on World Religions, on Christianity as a World Religion, in video, and on computer.

The Schools Council added to its previous initiatives with Groundplan, in 1977 (149). A Religious Education Council was formed in 1973 for England and Wales, with subsequent publications (150), and an Association for Religious Education, in 1969 (151).

ix. The seventies produced some useful contributions to ME. As well as the Schools Council projects, the Social Morality Council (founded in 1966) launched a journal (152), and established a resource-centre at St. Martin's College, Lancaster, in 1980 (153). The wave of Personal and Social Relationships courses, which swept the secondary schools (though not all) can be counted as a promising development, and the survey in the next chapter will look at how RE teachers might relate to these courses, and will indicate that there may be the makings of a similar trend in the primary schools. While the attempt to replace compulsory RE by compulsory ME failed (154), and while there are not many schools which have separate RE and ME departments, the survey will also indicate that ME as a subject in its own right is gaining acceptance as a concept, if not as a practical policy. The survey will also show that RE teachers might not exploit their position by attempting to advance RE on the back of ME.

x. Yet, despite the promising developments in RME in the seventies, the decade nevertheless ended under a question mark. While there had been talk about and projects aimed at dispelling the confusion that had come to surround the RE/ME relationship, it may be doubted whether confusion had been displaced to any great extent. One point could be said to have been established,
namely that ME was not synonymous with RE. But this had not led to any agreement as to what constituted a valid base to and rationale for ME. It might still be argued, for example, that the proper role of RE in ME is for it to prepare for an autonomous ME (though this may now not be a view held by many): the function of religion, in other words, is to be that of prelude for morality. A continuing case for a religious base to ME might perhaps therefore be constructed on these lines. If, however, a religious base is rejected as inappropriate then whichever alternative base is suggested runs into the major difficulty of deciding which view of Man is to lie at the heart of that base. This is a fundamental problem for those who advocate a 'humanistic' base to ME, for they must first decide what is humanistic Man. Those who interpret Man largely in economic terms, and those who interpret him largely in deterministic terms might be out of step with those seeing him in Hirstian secular-rational categories, while the religious view of Man is separate again. The pressures would therefore seem to be in the direction of eclecticism, which hardly seems promising material for a rigorous rationale for ME. What is likely to happen along that route is for those conversing studiously to avoid the topics of moral content and moral basis. It begins to look as if the seventies produced a not-dissimilar answer to the forties to the questions about moral foundations - they are to be decided by that group who can secure the power, the money and the influence to impose their political will on the nation. While the realism of this statement might be applauded by the relativist, it can scarcely offer much comfort to those who believe, but cannot prove, that morality is grounded in universal and timeless principles. To say that the way out of this problem is for ME to purvey as many different moral positions as is practicable is only a partial answer to this dilemma, however. For every schoolteacher encounters the situation in which children must be
obliged to display behaviour that might not be forthcoming on the strength only of balanced classroom-discussions about various moral viewpoints. Classroom-discussion and school behaviour may well complement each other, but in requiring certain behaviours a school has settled for a particular moral position and backed it with its authority. Yet there may be tensions between the sort of discipline a school imposes and some of the aims a moral educator may hold, and there may be differences of opinion among the staff of a school as to what constitutes moral behaviour on some issues. It can scarcely be argued that society has a common mind on what comprises moral behaviour. These considerations can make an ME teacher feel very insecure and can foster uncertainty about aims, methods and content of ME teaching. Furthermore, although Hirst (155) and Wilson (156) were to argue strongly for a direct form of ME as an identifiable part of the curriculum, a strong case could also be put up for ME, not as a separate entity, but as conducted through existing curriculum-areas (157). In addition, the nature of the school organisation and the teacher-pupil relationships and staff relationships may be of greater possibilities for ME than the discussion of moral issues in the classroom. To these uncertainties must be added the major problem of where specialist teachers of morality are to be found, if ME is to be conducted by people with comparable expertise in this area as in any other (158). Hence, the seventies closed with a noticeable uncertainty about the way in which school courses in ME should be constructed, as they opened with a comparable uncertainty about RE courses. In particular there was no rigorous analysis as to how ME related to personal education or to social education. This point will to some extent be pursued in the remaining two chapters.
REFERENCES


7. See: above, p. 112.


9. While the following material might have been better located in chapter 4 on strict chronological grounds, it is dealt with here, partly to avoid heavier loading of an already full chapter, and partly because it was not until the seventies that the ideas of these writers spread to the wider grassroots.


Hirst, Paul H. 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge', in Archambault, Ibid., pp. 113-138.


16. See: below, p. 222.


20. The only reference to this being a few lines on the radical theologians (p. 55), and on some philosophers (p. 75).


31. As was later appreciated. See:


32. See: above, pp. 169f., p. 221.


33. See: below, pp. 232f.

34. See: above, pp. 138f.


38. See: above, pp. 3f.


41. The Syllabus and Handbook were produced between March, 1970, and January, 1974. The Syllabus had to be revised and was not published in its eventual form until 1975.


47. See, for example: *Religious Education in Norfolk Schools*, Norfolk Education Committee, 1977, p. 14.

48. See: above, pp. 141 f.


61. See: Pickering, W.S.F. (Ed.). Durkheim: Essays on


64. Kay. Ibid., p. 153.

65. Kay. Ibid., p. 335.


67. See: above, pp. 172f.


73. See: above, pp. 225f.


75. Op. Cit., p. 84.


77. Hirst, Paul, H. 'Christian Education: A Contradiction in Terms', L. for L., 11, 4, 1972, pp. 6-11. (This article was first given as a lecture at the Victoria Institute, 6.2.71).


86. Ibid., p. 21.


Founded in 1966 to provide a common meeting point at which religious believers and non-believers could discuss and act together upon moral issues.


Ibid., p. 108.


Downey and Kelly. Ibid., p. 188.


119. Ungoed-Thomas. Ibid., p. 68.

120. Ungoed-Thomas. Ibid., p. 148.


277.


136. See: above, pp. 114f.


142. 'Religious and Moral Education in County Schools', *L. for L.*, 5,2,1965, pp. 6-10, especially pp. 6-7.


145. Peters would not have seen this as necessitating indoctrination.


151. This association merged with the Professional Committee of the C.E.M. to form the Professional Council for Religious Education (1.1.84).


154. A campaign to establish compulsory ME in non-denominational State schools, as a replacement for compulsory RE, was launched in London on Wednesday, 12 February, 1969.

   See: *T.E.S.*, 14.2.69, p. 488.

155. See: above, pp. 233f.

156. See: above, pp. 172f.


INTRODUCTION

1. The study so far has charted the course of post-war RME, not in a descriptive fashion but to provide a context in which to analyse the relationship between RE and ME. To have the RE/ME relationship as a specific area of investigation has aided coherence in selecting and marshalling the material, for the available sources provide quite a sizeable body of data. It has also helped towards a contribution to the RE literature for this particular aspect of RME has been unjustifiably neglected. But it would be unsatisfactory to make use of the topic of the RE/ME relationship as a historiographical device, without also seeking to say something useful about its place in the contemporary RME scene. Little can be said of historical value about the eighties as yet, so it would seem that a survey is called for, among teachers actually engaged in, or with some responsibility for RME in primary, middle and secondary schools. Certain significant issues in the RE/ME relationship could then secure a current response, the results of which might provide a record of some value in contributing to knowledge about RME in the eighties. Such a survey was conducted in 1983, and the aim of this chapter is to describe the course of the project and to present its findings. It was designed to ascertain how a sample of serving teachers viewed aspects of the RE/ME relationship, especially in the light of trends towards P.S.E. It is recognised that, while this is a fitting way to close the study, it is to become exposed to the problems inherent in small-scale, unofficial research, as well
as being subject to the considerations enjoined on such research by the naturalistic fallacy.

ii. However, empirical research of the sort that will be recorded in this chapter now forms a valuable part of the body of RE literature. Although a scheme which is designed as a conclusion to a thesis would not expect to carry the same weight for its findings as, for example, the Loukes' investigations, this coming chapter nevertheless stands in the Loukes' tradition and employs a comparable sampling technique, in that, although the secondary sampling was total within a given authority, the primary sampling was selective according to known interest in the topic being investigated. (1). Question 5 has some affinities with Hilliard (2), but preferring the term 'incentive' to 'sanction'. While Working Paper 44's research was not without some reference to the relationship between RE and ME, the forthcoming project advances considerably on that publication in detail, breadth, complexity and sophistication. There is a comparable advance also on Working Paper 36, and even on Alves (3), although the latter's investigation was so admirably detailed and complex in other areas.

iii. The reasons for concluding on an empirical note, therefore, are as follows. First, the study required some reference to the eighties, but such a reference would be little more than a personal appraisal if there were a dearth of source-material within the historical sweep of the thesis. Second, as teachers stand at the interface of educational theory and classroom-practice, their views should be taken into consideration in any examination of curriculum-components. Third, a research-survey such as the one that
is being presented deals with a neglected aspect of RME in the research-tradition and would so gain strong justification on these grounds alone, quite apart from its intrinsic relevance to this particular investigation. Fourth, the structural balance and finesse gained by rounding off a historical study in this way, by generating as well as consulting primary source-material, is a not-unimportant consideration.

iv. The scheme itself will furnish information about whether the sample could be expected to be hospitable to the argument of the study that the RE/ME relationship is best conceived of in terms of intersection. The use of the term 'intersection' did not appear in the questionnaire, for this would be to lead the witnesses. This added to the problems of interpretation, but it was hoped that the choice of question, especially that dealing with P.S.E. and that with moral incentives, would help towards a valid interpretation, albeit with a degree of obliqueness. The narrowness of the sample, while a disadvantage were the survey to have been the main point of the study, was appropriate to a project which had reviewed the arguments for an autonomous ME, and which then investigated how far teachers accepted them as successors of those who felt most threatened by the notion in the forties and fifties, i.e. RE teachers. The survey-questions themselves all relate to aspects of the topic which have been analysed and discussed in the previous parts of the thesis. Continuing the format of the study, a section of the recording of the research-survey will be devoted to what may be deduced from this chapter about the RE/ME relationship.
6.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY

i. The aim was to seek some contemporary information relating to the central concern of the study, by ascertaining how a sample of teachers and headteachers viewed aspects of the relationship between RE and ME. Ideally the sampling would have taken account of the main teaching areas of Humanities, Sciences and Aesthetics, and of different teaching levels of responsibility held in a wide variety of schools. Also, personal taped interviews would have added useful data. But such a scheme would have been a doctoral thesis in itself, as well as calling for time and resources far beyond that which was available to the present investigation.

So, a more modest programme had to be contemplated. It was decided to circulate a postal questionnaire, among a sample of primary and middle school headteachers selected according to LEA advice as to known interest in the topic, and among heads of RE departments in all secondary schools in a given authority. While this sampling was restrictive, it nevertheless balanced width against likelihood of response. The bias of the sample was not a disadvantage provided that the investigation remained scrupulously within its own brief, this being to see how far RE teachers were disposed to accept the theoretical separation of RE and ME, and how far they would operate in a context of separated RE and ME in such a way as to suggest that they nonetheless saw the two as intersecting.

ii. The first pilot-scheme was conducted in Sheffield City schools, and encountered a response of an unexpectedly highish order (67.1%). This may have been accounted for, to some extent, by the sense of identification felt by Sheffield
schools with the University of that city. For the covering letter made it clear that the research was being conducted for a Sheffield University degree, and the Division of Education had kindly agreed to act as a posting address.

The second pilot-scheme was conducted in a mix of city, town and rural schools in the Derbyshire LEA. The resultant response was 34.6%. Perhaps the summer is not a good time to send a questionnaire which necessitated a firm deadline for completion, for secondary schools are very much occupied with public and internal examinations. However, despite the modest response, sufficient information was gained on the points which made necessary a second pilot-scheme for a questionnaire to be formulated for circulation throughout an LEA as a main survey.

iii. Some difficulty was encountered finding an LEA which would include yet another survey in its schools' programme. After several disappointments, however, Nottinghamshire agreed to the request to circulate the questionnaire. From the start the RE Inspector was approving. After further explanation, the administrative officer responsible for monitoring such schemes acceded to the request, and smoothed the way for the project to proceed. Distribution of the questionnaire was to a fairly large sample of primary schools, selected again on LEA advice as to known interest in the topic, and to all middle and secondary schools, Nottinghamshire providing quite a good mix of city, town and rural schools. The covering letter indicated that the LEA had given full approval to the project, but the RE Inspector, while remaining in agreement with the survey, did not wish to add any endorsement which might seem to be putting official pressure upon the teachers and headteachers to respond. The resultant replies amounted to 45.9%.
iv. A major problem with any questionnaire for busy teachers posed to the circulator is for him to contrive to prevent its immediate or eventual consignment to the waste-paper basket. It seems that teachers are increasingly being called upon to co-operate in research-schemes, so that a private project without the backing of a national or regional agency does not stand a high chance of success. The simple solution of circulating a short questionnaire which made minimal demands upon the respondent was not an option, such being the complexity of the topic under investigation. Even a two-page questionnaire would have been inadequate. But selection from the many aspects that offered themselves for examination had to be made. It was decided to concentrate on the following five areas, the subsequent response seemingly justifying both their selection and the degree of depth to which they penetrated.

a. Reaction to the suggestion that RE and ME should be separated into different school departments, or conducted as separate exercises.

b. Relative weighting that might be attached to the two areas, RE and ME, if these two elements were to form a composite subject.

c. Levels of participation by RE staff in socio-moral courses, when these formed distinct curriculum-components, additional to and separate from RE.

d. Evaluation of a set of suggested aims for Moral Education, including some with specific religious content, in the context, first of ME as part of RE, and, second, as an exercise in its own right.

e. Evaluation of a set of incentives that might help pupils to acquire motivation towards moral behaviour. These also included specific religious content.
v. Information relating to the further area of actual teaching schemes would have resulted in a valuable store of material. Regretfully, it had to be decided that such an area would have over-loaded the questionnaire, which had already run to four pages. Similarly, an investigation in detail of teachers' beliefs about the many elements of the relationship between RE and ME would have been a profitable exercise, but it was estimated that to do this with any degree of adequacy would have necessitated a questionnaire at least as long again. Also, it would have pushed what was intended as a statistical survey towards the impressionistic, even if the information gathered would have provided an illuminating commentary upon the sections of the earlier parts of the study which dealt in detail with how Moral Education was viewed in the forties and with Hirst's case for autonomous ME. The areas delineated in the previous paragraph seemed to be a sufficiently sophisticated set of topics upon which to proceed with the construction of a questionnaire which aimed to balance substance with elegance, economy with detail, ease-of-completion with allowance-for-complexity, and which allowed for a certain refinement of measurement. All the questions were to be capable of answer by a simple tick in an appropriate box, but space was to be provided in each question except the first for respondents to make their own comments. Anonymity was assured, but some respondents were untroubled about declaring themselves.

vi. Much reflection was given to the matter as to whether it would be advisable to circulate both primary and secondary schools with the same document. With misgivings, a dual questionnaire was sent out in the first pilot-scheme, but the response from the primary sector suggested that any apprehension
was unjustified. Headteachers of infants schools were able to respond to points (a), (b), (d) and (e) of paragraph iv above, but for the obvious reason that a primary teacher is a class- rather than a subject-teacher point (c) was not particularly relevant. In the event, primary and middle school staff were more conscientious than were their secondary colleagues in replying. Perhaps the use of the wording 'departments/specialists' helped to make the project relevant to both primary and secondary schools.

vii. The composition of the survey was as follows.

TABLE 1

PILOT A

Spring, 1983, Sheffield

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55 (67.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2

PILOT B

Summer, 1983, Derbyshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>28 (34.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3

MAIN SURVEY
Autumn, 1983, Nottinghamshire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circulation</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>84 (45.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The secondary response figure of Table 3 includes 1 sixth-form college.
2. There were 14 respondents from Voluntary primary schools, 2 from Voluntary middle schools and 5 from Voluntary secondary schools.
3. Overall figures were as follows:
   Total circulation: 346 schools.
   Total response: 167 schools (48.3%).

6.2. TABULATION AND ANALYSIS

6.2.1. Question 1

1. 1. INTRODUCTION

1.01. Please tick the appropriate boxes.

Teacher Headteacher Infant First Primary Middle Secondary
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

1.02. Do you consider that, ideally, schools should have separate Religious Education and Moral Education departments/specialists?
Yes ☐ No ☐

1.03. Do you know of any school which has separate departments/specialists? Please specify:

The important part of this question was 1.02, which carried a standard wording in each of the 3 surveys, so making it possible to record a total response of 166. In this case a
sampling which was designedly restricted to those with a responsibility for RE was probably more valuable than a wider sample drawn from a variety of teaching areas. For the questioner was then in a better position to discover how far the arguments for the separation of RE and ME had been accepted by those who might fairly be presumed to be most resistant to the proposition. The result was a substantial rejection of the proposal.

TABLE 4 (a)

'YES' RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Overall Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3s</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10d</td>
<td>10d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8n</td>
<td>1n</td>
<td>12n</td>
<td>21n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Overall Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17s</td>
<td>9s</td>
<td>14s</td>
<td>40s</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18d</td>
<td>18d</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35n</td>
<td>5n</td>
<td>22n</td>
<td>62n</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The following key will operate throughout the reporting:
       * s = Sheffield;  d = Derbyshire;  n = Nottinghamshire.

2. 1 return was unusable.

3. Of the Voluntary schools, 1 infants and 2 primary
ticked the 'Yes' box, 18 ticking the 'No' box.
ii. Implications. It would seem to be an open question as to whether the figure of 27.5% indicated a hopeful sign that the arguments for the separation of RE and ME were spreading, or whether the figure of 71.9% indicated that they were not spreading fast enough. The expectations were that there would be more primary and less secondary respondents in the 'No' vote, than turned out to be the case.

6.2.2. Question 2

i. 2. GENERAL POLICY ON RE/ME

2.01. Which do you personally regard as the most valid policy for Religious Education and Moral Education in schools?

a. RE AS A SUBSIDIARY TO ME

Education in morals, which would include the ethical teachings of the religions as supportive, but minor, elements.

b. ME AS SUBSIDIARY TO RE

Education in religion, which would regard the ethical teachings of the religions as the main material for ME.

c. RE AS A MAJOR PART OF ME

Education in morals, which would include a major study of the ethical dimensions of the religions, but with little attention to the other dimensions.

d. ME AS A MAJOR PART OF RE

Education in religion, which would include specific ME material having no direct connection with the religions, but in greater measure than might occur in (b).

e. THE STUDY OF CHRISTIANITY

Education in Christianity to provide a perspective on all other moral and religious systems.

2.02. Please specify any further category nearer your own views.

2.03. Which of the above categories does your school come nearest to operating? a. □ b. □ c. □ d. □ e. □

2.04. Please indicate if and why you may consider that none of the above categories, in 2.01, applies to your school. DO NOT SPECIFY WHICH SCHOOL.

The assumption underlying this question was that RME would be taught as a composite subject by the sample, even in those schools in which ME and Social Education courses operated in addition to RE. The aim was to ascertain the quantitative
in preference to the status-weighting, as this was less likely
than the other to result in pious but perhaps meaningless
platitudes. The structure of the question also afforded an
opportunity to see if respondents were teaching according to
school policy, while holding different personal views. There
was a chance that this might throw light on how they saw the
relationship between RE and ME. As this question underwent
revision during the pilot-stage, separate tables are presented.

**TABLE 5**

**PILOTS A & B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10s 18d</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5s 1d</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6s 5d</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5d</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3s 4d</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 6**

**MAIN SURVEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24 (28.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: 1. Option (e), Table 5 was inserted in Pilot B upon hints occurring in Pilot A that it should be included.

2. Of the options, (a) was unchanged in Pilots A & B and Main Survey; (b) was unchanged in Pilots A & B, but sustained a minor (insignificant) modification in Main Survey; (c) was unchanged in Pilots A & B, but also sustained a minor (insignificant) modification in Main Survey. None of these modifications altered the sense or the emphasis of the options. Each was designed to clarify the meaning. Option (e) did not appear in Pilot A, and its wording in Pilot B was as follows.

'Education in Christianity, with incidental references to other religions and ethical systems'.

3. Of those respondents ticking (e), 1 was from an R.C. secondary, 1 from a middle and 11 from a primary Voluntary school. The respondent from an infants school in Note 3, para. 6.2.1., ticked option (e), as did 1 primary respondent of the same Note. Both these respondents also ticked (e) in 2.03. The other primary respondent of Note 3 (para. 6.2.1) ticked (b) in both 2.01 and 2.03.

ii. The table for Main Survey would suggest that the sample was reluctant either to make RE too moralistic or to make ME too religious, or to embrace a thoroughgoing pluralism in RE. The last named point, however, would have to take into account the primary 'vote' which gave a strong endorsement to (e), as well as indicating a readiness to allow a strong moral element to feature in RE. Although Pilot A specifically referred to religions (in the plural), and although there was
no comment from either primary or middle sectors about the omission of Christianity as a distinct category in the options in Pilot A, it may nevertheless be queried whether Sheffield primary and middle schools are as hospitable to pluralism as this might suggest in view of the response to questions 3.06 and 3.07. A repeat-survey in Sheffield, using the revised questionnaire, might well show support for option (e).

iii. There was some evidence in the surveys that teachers preferred a different policy on RME than that operated by the schools in which they taught. This was contributory evidence for one of the general conclusions from the survey-findings that the sample would be unwilling to operate unprofessionally, that is, they would make a conscientious attempt to teach courses according to what they saw the official brief to be. If this is a valid deduction then the question becomes of particular importance as to whether they might unnecessarily debar reference to religion from P.S.E. courses in the interests of an autonomous ME. The argument of this thesis would urge that such scrupulosity is misconceived.

iv. In the pilot-surveys 16 respondents indicated a mismatch between personal preference and school policy (19.3%). In Pilot A there were 4 primary, 4 middle and 5 secondary respondents who did not tick the same option in 2.02 as in 2.01. Among this number some made further explanatory comments.

A primary headteacher (who ticked none of the options in either 2.01 or 2.02) explained that he regarded RE to be in partnership with ME in his school, each having equal status. 'Education in morals, which would include the ethical teachings of the religions as supportive, (but equal) elements' was his description,
but he acknowledged that in quantitative terms ME took more of the content than did RE.

A nursery-infants headteacher also could not tick any options in 2.01 (as, indeed, she was not able to fill in most of the remainder of the questionnaire) and stressed that 'atmosphere was all-important'.

A secondary respondent reported that there was no RE department, there being instead a 'fully integrated General Studies Course, with Social, Moral, Political, Religious and Careers Education as facets of it'.

Another secondary respondent reported that option (b) was nearest to his own viewpoint, but that 'several of our staff who deal only with Values Clarification, would be offended if they thought that this element had its sources based in religion. This school aims - it may not succeed - at a religious education with a strong spiritual element', (italics respondent's: 'spiritual' not defined). In a comment at the end of the questionnaire the same respondent said that he had found it enjoyable to fill in, but that in another mood he might have filled it in quite differently. While this is a comment upon the 'soft' nature of survey-evidence, it is to be hoped it is not a comment upon what the respondent understood by the term spiritual.

Another secondary respondent replied that RE was taught in the first and second years, and thereafter ME took over.

v. In Pilot B 3 respondents disclosed a difference between their preference and school policy. In addition, there were 6 who found question 2 impossible to answer as it stood. 1 left it blank and informed the investigator in a comment at the end
of the questionnaire that 'This isn't the way of finding out what busy teachers think about a complex subject'. No suggestion was made as to what he thought was the way to find out, but at least he did complete and return the questionnaire. Another informed the investigator that 2.01 was 'unfairly loaded' (without going into what he meant by the criticism), left the question blank, but ticked (d) as school policy and commented that he would like to see 'distinct areas, the overlap (being) in the ethical dimension of religion'. Another indicated that RE and ME were conducted as 'separate entities', having ticked the 'No' box in 1.02 and (d) in 2.01. The sixth respondent indicated that his courses were plural religious, moving into GCE and CSE examination work, with all fourth- and fifth-year pupils following a Social and Personal Education course.

vi. In Main Survey there was rather more evidence of a disparity between personal viewpoint and school policy.

1 infants headteacher (of a Maintained school) considered that parents should opt in rather than opt out, RE to be extracurricular, ticking (a) as school policy. Another respondent operated (e) while giving (d) as a personal viewpoint (this in a Maintained school). A first school headteacher preferred (d) but operated (a). Of the primary-school headteachers, 6 indicated a difference between personal viewpoint and school policy, but none made comment. In the secondary sector there were 10 respondents who clearly stated a mismatch on the basis of the options specified in the questionnaire, and a further 5 indicated a preference for options not fully corresponding to school policy, but also not fully corresponding to the specified options. Of the 10 clear mismatches, 2 personally preferred option (d) but both having to operate (e), although in
Maintained schools. The third personally preferred (e) but had to operate (b). Of the further 5, 3 wanted a complete separation between RE and ME, but had to operate (b), 1 wanted 'the study of ME and RE in equal partnership', but had to operate (e) (in a Voluntary school), and 1 merely wrote that 'it seems to me that RE and ME is a case of 'East is East and West is West'. It is unwise, almost dishonest, to mix or confuse the two'. 2.03 was then left blank. The comment of a further respondent who ticked (a) and (e) as school policy seems worth recording.

'It is wrong for RE to march on moral legs (as can and does happen in c). Conversely ME does not stand on religious legs. When ME/RE are mixed it is virtually impossible to unscramble the omelette. Hence I regard ME and RE as notionally distinct but in many areas are coincidental. I consciously avoid confusing theological and moral categories'.

vii. Implications. There are three general conclusions which might be drawn from the answers to this question which have a bearing on the study. First, the necessity to include an option devoted entirely to Christianity as interpretative of all other beliefs and values was unexpected and indicates that pluralism in RE may be still a very patchy practice. It is tempting to speculate that the church still exerts an appreciable influence on RE through its rank-and-file membership. Second, the readiness of about 28% of the main-survey sample to operate in an RE/ME situation in support of a school policy which did not accord with their viewpoint suggests that professionalism in this sense mattered strongly to them. This raises the query as to how far the sample would fight for RE's continuance (a very proper and professional thing to do) if it appeared to be school policy for ME to take its place. This leads to the further point that
Some respondents revealed such a conscientious desire to avoid an RE and an ME dependent upon each other (a commendable desire, it should be said) that in practice it would appear possible that some operated on the basis of total separation. But to do so may be misconceiving the concept of autonomy. It may also be assuming that a 'mix' always means an irreversible 'mix'. Omelettes certainly cannot be unscrambled but the cast of a play can. These points are picked up elsewhere in the thesis.

6.2.3. Question 3

i. 3. SPECIFIC RE/ME POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

3.01 Does your school mount Personal Relationships Courses, which are separate from anything mounted as part of the school's RE programme?

Yes [□]  No [□]

3.02 If 'yes' to 3.01, please outline the aims and scope of the course(s).

There seems to have been much activity recently in secondary schools to initiate courses in Personal Relations, and the like. As such courses would relate to, and might overlap with, equivalent areas in the religions, it would seem a useful field of enquiry to ascertain how RE teachers reacted to these newcomers. This thesis has suggested that there are appropriate units for such courses in which both the religious and the moral intersect without either losing its integrity or autonomy. Also, there seems point in trying to discover if there are signs that such courses are penetrating primary schools. Sub-question 3.01 was standard in each survey so enabling a total of over 160 respondents to be reported. 6 schools left the question blank so reducing the response to 161. Only 2 primary schools reported an interest in the courses, both these being in Nottinghamshire.
TABLE 7 (a)

'YES' RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot A</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot B</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Survey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>67 (42.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7 (b)

'NO' RESPONSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot A</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot B</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Survey</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>94 (58.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The primary bias is clearly a factor to be allowed for. Secondary percentages are: 'Yes': 72.1%
   'No': 27.9%

2. Of the 2 primary schools reporting an interest in Personal Relationships courses, 1 described the course as a 'Growing-up Club' for fourth-years, the other referred to a Health Education programme, entitled 'Ourselves'.

3. Of those secondary schools in Main Survey which responded negatively, 1 was an R.C., another a Voluntary, and the remainder each being a Maintained school.
ii. 3.03 If 'yes' to 3.01, are these courses

☐ a. mounted and staffed exclusively by the RE Department?
☐ b. mounted, but not exclusively staffed, by the RE Dept.?
☐ c. contributed to, but not directed, by the RE staff?
☐ d. not open to an RE contribution?
☐ e. not contributed to by RE staff as a matter of RE departmental policy?

3.04 Please add further comments, especially upon those reasons which resulted in answers (d) and (e). Please do not specify which school.

Sub-question 3.03 was also standard throughout the surveys, but, as was expected, the primary schools found it too inappropriate to be answerable. No respondent in any school ticked option (a), and the majority of replies favoured option (c).

**TABLE 8 (a)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot A</td>
<td></td>
<td>4(b), 8(c), 3(d), 2(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot B</td>
<td></td>
<td>3(b), 7(c), 5(d), 1(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Survey</td>
<td>1(e)</td>
<td>2(b), 13(c), 4(d), 2(e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 8 (b)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: 1. The reasons given for ticking (d) were, either that timetable-load made an RE contribution an impossible extra for RE staff, or that Personal Relationships
courses were regarded as the responsibility of the Pastoral staff, or that the RE department was regarded as a separate department by the school.

2. Of the 6 schools reporting option (e), 1 middle and 2 secondary made no further explanatory comment, 1 said that the RE department was a separate department, another that it was 'not policy, just the way it is staffed', and 1 reported that 'R.E. has its own long established course in Personal Relationships which preceded these other courses, which is examinable. The other courses are not. The R.E. is a two year course'.

3. A comment from a middle school respondent who left 3.03 blank stated that Personal Relationships courses were the responsibility of Pastoral heads, and a secondary respondent who also left this section blank stated tersely that there was no RE department (this was the school with an RE component in an integrated General Studies).

iii. 3.05 If 'no' to 3.01, does the RE Department feel it necessary to provide Personal Relationships Courses as part of the material for RE?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

Sub-question 3.05 was another standard question, but the total response that can be reported this time is that of 84, which, with the total response to 3.03 being 64, makes the number of respondents who did not send in returns for these sub-questions to be 19.
### TABLE 9 (a)

**'YES' RESPONSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Survey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Total: 31 (36.9%)**

### TABLE 9 (b)

**'NO' RESPONSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot A</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot B</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Survey</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Total: 53 (63.1%)**

**Note:** 1. While the primary bias would again have to be taken into account, it is of interest that there were 7 primary schools who were mounting Personal Relationships courses as part of their RE programme.

iv. 3.06 If 'yes' to 3.05, does the material of these courses
   a. seek to commend only Christian values?
   b. seek to make explicit the links that may exist between the P.R. material and the religions?
   c. seek to avoid direct references to the religions?

Sub-question 3.06 was near standard throughout, the only change being the insertion of the word 'only' in Main Survey 3.06 a.
TABLE 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>2s, 1n</td>
<td>2s, 2n</td>
<td>3s, 4d, 1n</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a + b).</td>
<td>1s, 1d, 1n</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>1s, 3n</td>
<td>1n</td>
<td>6d, 3n</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>2n</td>
<td>2n</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The key is as before (see Tables 4(a) and (b)).

2. This particular section of the sample were quite ready to link Personal Relationships material with the religions.

3. While the numbers are too small for meaningful percentages, it seems noteworthy that option (a) drew a response of 41.7% (N = 36).

v. 3.07 If 'no' to 3.05, would you consider that, in schools where P.R. Courses were operated, (i) as part of RE, they should aim at 3.06a? □ 3.06b? □ 3.06c? □ (ii) separate from RE, they should aim at 3.06a? □ 3.06b? □ 3.06c? □

TABLE 11 (a) Response to 3.07 (i)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>10s, 3n</td>
<td>2s, 2n</td>
<td>1s, 1n</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a + b).</td>
<td>2n</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>1s, 1d</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>4s, 7d</td>
<td>2s, 2n</td>
<td>4s, 4d, 5n</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>1s, 4n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 11 (b) Response to 3.07 (ii)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>2s®, 1n®, 1s(b)</td>
<td>1s®, 2n®, 1s(b)</td>
<td>1s(nr), 1d(nr), 1d (a+b)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a+b),</td>
<td>1n®</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>1s®, 3n®, 4s(a), 1s(c), 1n(a), 1n(c), 1n(a+b)</td>
<td>1s®, 1n®</td>
<td>3s®, 2n®, 3d®</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>1s(b), 3n® 2n(nr), 1n(b)</td>
<td>1s(a)</td>
<td>1d(nr), 1n(a), 1n(b)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The additional key to Table 11(b) is as follows:
   @ = identical response to that given in 3.07 (i),
   nr = no response made to 3.07 (i),
   (a), (b), (c) = corresponding response to 3.07 (i).

3. There is a similarity of response, forming a pattern, between Tables 10, 11(a) and 11(b), option (b) scoring consistently the highest. In Table 11(b) a greater comparative preference was shown for option (c), apparently at the expense of option (a).

vi. Sub-question 3.08 was near standard throughout, the two forms being as follows.

Pilots

3.08 It has been said that it is too risky to link Moral Education closely with Religious Education, for, loss of religious faith might encourage a loss of moral values. Would you see this opinion as a stimulus to
a. strengthen the religious base to Moral Education?
   b. find a non-religious base to Moral Education?

3.09 Please add any further comments you wish.

Main Survey

3.08 It has been said that it is too risky to link Moral Education too closely with Religious Education, for,
rejection of religious belief might encourage rejection of moral values based upon that belief. Would you see this opinion as a stimulus to

a. strengthen the religious base to Moral Education?
b. find a non-religious base to Moral Education?

3.09 If you have ticked 3.08a would you say this involved commending the acceptance of religious belief, rather than its appraisal? Please comment.

3.10 Please add any further comments you wish.

TABLE 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Pilot A</th>
<th>Pilot B</th>
<th>Main Survey</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>10p, 5m, 10s</td>
<td>12s</td>
<td>15p, 4m, 11s</td>
<td>67 (55.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>7p, 3m, 5s</td>
<td>11s</td>
<td>12p, 1m, 14s</td>
<td>53 (44.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The additional key for this table is as follows

p = primary;  m = middle;  s = secondary.

2. The question designedly put the matter starkly, as this is so often the way in which it is put. The middle way, by which both bases are presented alongside each other, was mentioned in 3.10 by 2 respondents.

3. Of those respondents ticking 3.08b, 1 primary and 2 secondary were from Voluntary schools.

While the primary vote was expected, the secondary findings showed a higher number of RE teachers opting for option (a) than was expected. This would seem to call for a table relating these findings to type of school, with a recording of comments made in response to 3.09 and 3.10. This table may be found in Appendix 2, p. 363. It will be found that a desire to strengthen the religious base to Moral Education was not restricted to members of staff from Voluntary schools, and that such strengthening was not seen inevitably to involve the commending for acceptance of religious belief (as distinct from appraisal).
vii. Implications. The two general points that could be taken from these findings are, one, that there was a readiness by RE staff to contribute to P.S.E. courses and that where this did not take place it was not due to an embargo by the RE department; and, two, that where P.S.E. courses were in the RE context of the department's work the material would be related to the religions, but that where these courses to be operated outside RE then there would not be such a readiness to relate the material to the religions. This last named point would link with the finding that in those schools where P.S.E. courses were mounted separately from the RE department, only a few were left to the RE department to direct and none was exclusively staffed by RE personnel. Thus, there were continuing grounds for suspicion that P.S.E. courses, if operated separately from RE might avoid reference to religion. There was also continuing evidence that the sample was professional in the sense of wishing honestly to implement what they were asked to do. There was no evidence from 3.04 that non-RE P.S.E. courses contained religio-moral units. Yet there was clear evidence from 3.08 and 3.09 of a strong wish to strengthen a religious base to Moral Education. So it would seem a valid inference that the reduction of subscription to options (a) and (b) in 3.07(ii) was because P.S.E. course-directors did not consider religio-moral units as appropriate. It is part of the argument of this thesis that they are appropriate, not out of a desire to empire-build for RE but on the grounds that complete separation of RE and ME is an impoverishment to both. If the press for religio-moral units in P.S.E. courses is interpreted as a new version of the old evangelising aims of RE, then this is totally to misunderstand what is being urged. The contention is that to view RE and ME as intersecting means that
each can benefit from the other's critique and can enlarge understanding of the relationship between belief and behaviour.

6.2.4. Question 4

i. 4. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RE/ME AIMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY</th>
<th>C = considerably</th>
<th>M = moderately</th>
<th>U = uncertain</th>
<th>S = scarcely</th>
<th>N = not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4.01 How do you evaluate the importance of the following aims for Moral Education, when taught as part of Religious Education?

- a. to support school rules
- b. to relate skill-acquisition in morality to the additional help that may be gained from religion, in this area
- c. to foster understanding of the term 'rational moral principles'
- d. to foster a pupil life-style based on consideration of others' interests, but appealing to religion to support acceptance of such a life-style
- e. to foster the ethic of 'enlightened self-interest' but bringing this under a religious critique
- f. to provide information about the moral stances of the main world religions
- g. to help pupils to an acceptance of the Judaeo-Christian ethic, as summarised in the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount
- h. to encourage pupils to look on God as a helper towards moral development
- i. to handle the argument that the existence of moral consciousness in man is evidence of the existence and moral nature of God

The purpose of this section was to continue to look for the inclusion or otherwise of religious motifs in ME, when part of RE and when separate. In addition, it would serve as a pointer to how the work of Hirst and of Wilson and of McPhail might be evaluated, so referring some of the earlier theoretical parts of the study to something of a classroom-screening. Option (e) was included in the alternatives on the assumption that enlightened self-interest operates to a greater or lesser extent in
contemporary society in tandem with a hedonistic materialism, and it was a matter of interest to see how teachers reacted.

ii. The chief disadvantage of this question was that it had to be assumed that the respondents would have been reasonably clear as to what each option meant, and that this understanding would correspond to that of the investigator. Brief summaries, in the manner of 2.01, would have been too simplistic, while a glossary of sufficient adequacy would unfortunately have been impractical. There turned out to be some evidence that suggested that option (e) might have drawn the response of 'unsure', not because of uncertainty as to the value of the suggestion, but of uncertainty as to its import. This evidence did not emerge in connection with the other options, but it might nevertheless put the 'unsure' measurement under a general query about its reliability. However, in the pilots 'unsure' did not turn out to be a heavily subscribed category, and its location at the mid-point of the scale did give some confidence that it might serve its intended purpose.

iii. The recording of the findings from this question are somewhat complex, and so it seems preferable to move the appropriate tables to the appendices, in order to maintain more coherently the flow of analysis. Tables 14-16 are, therefore, to be found in Appendix 2, and Tables 18-20 also to be found in that appendix. Tables 17 and 21 are included in the text as being more readily comprehensible, for they indicate only the rank-order of each option on each measurement. As the sole change in the question was the inclusion of option (h), the tables can be presented in pilot, main-survey and composite forms. Where the composite tables relate to the scale-order, they are included in the text.
### TABLE 17

**SCALE-ORDER OF OPTIONS/MEASUREMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Scale-order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>d, f, h, g, c, i, a, e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>a, d, c, f, i, h, g, e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>e, c, i, h, d, g, a, f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarcely</td>
<td>a, e, i, g, f, h, c, d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>i, e/g, a, h, f, d, c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Option (b) has been omitted as this did not appear in the pilots.
2. The letters in the Scale-order section refer to the options in 4.01, and are placed on a descending scale from left to right.
3. This information is taken from Table 16, Appendix 2.

The high rating of (d) in the considerably and moderately scales, with a correspondingly low rating in the scarcely and not-at-all scales was a predictable outcome. (This option was higher in the unsure scale than anticipated, especially as the wording did not seem unclear). McPhail's approach, with its empirical starting point, its eschewing of moral philosophising, and its concentration upon what appeared to be pupil-concern, was likely to appeal to teachers who knew of his work. To those who did not, the simple universal would make good practical as well as moral sense, while its affinities with religious moralities would make it an agreeable companion in RE teaching. Likewise, the popularity of (f) could be expected. The presence of alternative religions to Christianity has penetrated the
pedagogic, and probably the national, consciousness by this time, and it seems that RE teachers may be coming in increasing numbers to regard them as allies in their work, rather than the reverse, in that they help to keep alive religio-moral categories. Nevertheless option (g) scored fairly highly, 52 respondents placing it on the considerably scale, and 47 on the moderately scale. Its low rating on the unsure scale would call for comment, for, in this case, the unreliability that might have to be attributed to this measurement in relation to some of the ratings, would seem not to apply. For it is difficult to see how the question could have been more unambiguously phrased than in the terminology of the questionnaire. Yet it would have to be borne in mind that option (g) also came well up on the not-at-all scale. Perhaps it may fairly be surmised that, despite the bias residing in the sampling, in actuality the sample was more diverse in opinion than might have been expected. This would be a gain for the survey. A similar diversity showed itself in option (h) and its grading. It drew 57 on the considerably and 49 on the moderately scale, with 20 on the not-at-all scale, this latter figure suggesting that the concept of a secular morality had gained a place in the sample. In this case, however, the bias of the secondary vote would have to be taken into account, there being only 3 primary respondents selecting this rating for this option. Option (c) did well on both the 2 positive and the 2 negative scales (rating very low on the latter), with a good spread of primary, middle and secondary schools. It seems that the work of Wilson, of Hirst, of Peters and of Dearden may not have been unknown to the sample, as it related to this option, although the high scoring on the unsure scale would advise caution about this interpretation. It may perhaps be safely assumed that,
as the wording of the questionnaire at this point was unambiguous, then a firm response suggests some acquaintance with the literature. Option (e), it may be noted, scored consistently poorly.

v. 4.02 How would you evaluate the above aims, in 4.01, for Moral Education as an exercise in its own right, independent of RE?

a.
b., but omitting any reference to religion
c.
d., but making no appeal to religion
e., but making no religious critique
f.
g.
h.
i.

Note: Unfortunately a typing error omitted an 's' from the word 'religion' in option (b). This omission regrettably makes this option somewhat spurious, for, as it stands, it hardly makes sense. The thinking behind the option was directed to seeing whether a teacher handling an ME course would consciously refer moral behaviour back to the individual's beliefs about the universe and Man's place within it. This would be regarded as general religious belief by many people (so the assumption ran), and did not require an anchorage in specific religions. Second thoughts by the investigator made him come to regard such a concept as too complex for the simplicity of the option, and the returns at this point must be discounted.
TABLE 21

SCALE-ORDER OF OPTIONS/MEASUREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Scale-order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>d, c, a, f, e, g, h, i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>a, f, i, e, c, h, d/g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>e, i, h, f, c, g, d, a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarcely</td>
<td>i, g, f/a, h, e, d, c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>i, h, g, f, a, e, d, c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Option (b) has been omitted.

2. The letters in the Scale-order section refer to the options in 4.02, and are placed on a descending scale, from left to right.

3. This information is taken from Table 20, Appendix 2.

As in 4.01, option (d) was the clear favourite, with the low showing on the moderately scale relating to the high showing on the considerably scale, this score being the highest of all the responses to any of the options in both 4.01 and 4.02. The high rating of (d) on the moderately scale (4.01), this being the third-highest score of any of the options of that question, might perhaps justifiably be interpreted as indicating a reticence to score it more highly because of the specific reference to religion. Was this an indication of a feeling that a very desirable aim (the fostering of a pupil life-style based on the consideration of others' interests) might be rendered more difficult of success by linking it to religion?
Yet, on the other hand, option (f) scored quite well in the grid. The wording of this option, however, was more 'neutral'. Option (h) did rather much as expected, as did (i), although it should perhaps be noted that (i) came out top of both the scarcely and not-at-all scales: (a) did rather better in 4.02 than in 4.01: (c) did slightly better in 4.02 than in 4.01. The higher incidence of (c) in the unsure scale of 4.01, compared with 4.02, may also be noted, but whether this suggests that those choosing this option in 4.01 were not sufficiently aware of the points of contact between rational moral principles and religious moralities can only be speculation. Option (e) fared better in 4.02 but not markedly: it came out top of the unsure scale for both 4.01 and 4.02.

vii. Implications. The answers to 4.01 and 4.02 were suggestive of strong support for McPhail's work, but also indicated a belief that reference to religious moralities should be included in ME which was conducted independently of RE. The latter point would be supportive of the view that RE and ME intersect, by reason of the nature of each, and the former point would also relate to at least the Christian ethic and the Buddhist ethic, and probably across the main world religions, that to fail to so relate it in an ME course would suggest that that course was not even operating on the 'complementary' hypothesis, but was applying a strict 'separation' criterion. The sample might be taken to have agreed with this suggestion. The response to option (i) might be taken as further evidence that the sample was reluctant to use ME as a buttress for RE, or it may indicate a sense of futility in the particular argument's effectiveness. As has been indicated there may be a suggestion of caution that RE entering ME might be counter-productive, but this would depend on how it was handled.
6.2.5. Question 5

5. MORAL INCENTIVES

5.01 As a general rule, without considering individual cases, how would you grade in importance the following answers to the pupil's question 'Why be good?'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

a. pleasurable consequences to oneself of one's 'good' actions
b. unpleasant consequences to oneself of not being 'good'
c. pleasurable consequences to others of one's 'good' actions
d. unpleasant consequences to others of one's not being 'good'
e. pleasurable consequences to oneself if everybody were 'good'
f. unpleasant consequences to oneself if no one tried to be 'good'
g. love is self-evidently right
h. God is pleased when one is 'good'
i. God is displeased when one is not 'good'

Note: No respondent commented on the omission of 'duty' or 'fairness' from this catalogue of incentives.

The objective behind this question was the quite simple one of seeing how far specifically religious motivation to moral behaviour, that is, behaviour issuing from a believed relationship with God, might be advocated by teachers to their pupils. While option (g) would be seen by some as 'specifically religious motivation', it was options (h) and (i) which were deemed the crucial criteria, on the grounds that the word love means too many things to different people, the meaning of agapē not being sufficiently generally appreciated in the pop-culture, for love to be seen as a religious characteristic, at least in an explicitly religious sense. Option (g) might, however, throw some light on how the sample might respond to situation-ethics.
ii. The Skinnerian model of Man is very evident in the wording of the options, this being chosen for its relative straightforwardness, and, therefore, for its relative unambiguity. To have introduced an option dealing with the pupil's self-concept seemed to be discountable on the grounds that the theory of the basic goodness of Man (likewise the opposite doctrine) needed more detailed definition than the questionnaire allowed for. Also, the hunch that teachers in the heat of the moment are very likely to appeal to the Skinnerian model, seemed to be verified in the event, as only 1 respondent commented that he would tell children not to be false to their true selves. Perhaps a more relevant consideration was whether the options should be related to a developmental sequence. Kay has indicated that researchers in the area of moral sanctions have produced evidence that there may be stage-sequence from the prudential to the personal (4). But he also indicated that this evidence was relevant only to the dominant sanction in any particular activity, and that all the sanctions were operative to a greater or lesser extent in all the stages. His own survey, in the 7-16-year age-range, led him to the conclusion that moral sanctions seemed to emerge chronologically in the order: prudential, authoritarian, reciprocal, peer-society, ideal self, personal. But he excepted the sanctions of religion and conscience. With this in mind it seemed that the pilot-scheme could proceed without a specific reference to the question of relating sanctions to stages of development, for a general correlation was available from the information given by the respondent as to whether he or she was in the primary, middle or secondary sector, and there was opportunity for comment. In the event, no pilot-respondent commented on this issue. The options do actually proceed in a general sequence, (a) and (b) referring to the prudential, (c), (d), (e) and (f) referring to
the reciprocal social, and (g) to the situational personal.

The authoritarian sanction was omitted in the belief that, although children may find it compelling, especially at a particular stage of early development, teachers would not wish to make use of it, running contrary as it does to the tenor of educational advocacy of rationality and autonomy. Again, this seemed justified in that no one suggested its use. As has been indicated the religious sanction appears as if it may be stage-independent, Swainson particularly favouring this view (5).

Kay suggested that the argument was gaining currency that people are 'good' only when under fear of divine judgement. While there are better ways of seeing the relationship between religion and morality than to view it in this light, it seemed worth checking to see how far the sample would make use of this argument.

iii. Again, the recording is complex, and so Tables 22-24 will be found in Appendix 2. A measurement/scale-order report will be tabulated from Table 24 and recorded in the same format as Tables 17 and 21.

**TABLE 25**

**SCALE-ORDER OF OPTIONS/MEASUREMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Scale-order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>c, d, f/g, e, a/b, h, i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>a, b, f, e, d, c/g, h, i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>h, g/i, b, d/f, e, a, c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>i, h, g, e, b, a, d, f, c.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Option (c) was the clear, if not runaway, favourite, and betokened the sample's preference for a positive, society-related incentive to morality. Impressions gained from preparing students for ME in schools by the investigator would endorse this finding. However, the high showing of (a) and (b) on the moderately scale indicated that an appeal to a negative self-concern would not be displaced by a preference for the positive and corporate. In this connection it is to be noted that (f) did quite well on the considerably and moderately scales, perhaps indicating that exposure to children makes for realism. The consistent unpopularity of options (h) and (i) reflects the trend, probably, that was noted by Kay and researched by Cox (6), in which young people are showing a decreasing attention to specifically religious incentives to moral behaviour. Yet there was some positive response to these options. Perhaps it should be pointed out that the whole atmosphere of 5.01 is pragmatic, in that the wording implies that the incentive chosen will be the one that will be likely to work, rather than the one which the teacher may see it as his or her duty to develop in an ME course.

It was not just in the Voluntary schools that approval of these options was to be found. In the Maintained schools, 4 primary, 1 middle and 2 secondary respondents ticked (h) on the moderately scale, and 2 primary, 1 middle and 4 secondary ticked (i) on the moderately scale. The response from the Voluntary schools was: 4 primary respondents, and 1 middle ticked (h) on the considerably scale, and 3 primary and 2 secondary ticked (i) on the moderately scale. (But 1 Voluntary primary respondent drew lines through all the grid-measurements on the (h) and (i) options, presumably signifying total disapproval). The high showing of (g) on the considerably scale was not matched by low showings on the scarcely and not-at-all scales, and there was also a high showing for (g) on the unsure scale. This
perhaps suggests that the sample had not yet worked out its approach to a situational ethic. As it may perhaps be surmised that a situational ethic is operating in society in conjunction with hedonism such seeming uncertainty may be a cause for disquiet.

iv. Implications. There was little evidence of positive evaluation of specifically religious incentives to moral behaviour, but much evidence of a preference for society-related incentives. While this would not be grounds for debarring the examination of religious incentives from any ME course, it would seem to be grounds for ensuring that such a topic was carefully restrained from becoming, or appearing to become, the principal element in any such course. The survey thus ends on a very satisfactory note, in that 'ought' and 'is' come together without the problems that arise from their identification. On theoretical grounds the RE/ME relationship contains a wider and more varied range of elements than are contained in the notion of religious incentives. On empirical grounds there is good reason to believe that the relationship is seen to contain this wider range, in the work of this sample.

6.3. GENERAL SYNOPSIS

i. An overall picture can now be built up as follows. The sample ranged from infants school to secondary school, the response reflecting this coverage, being composed of approximately equal numbers of primary/middle and secondary schools. Just over 70% did not consider it ideal to have separate RE and ME departments/specialists. A quarter considered that ME would be satisfactorily carried out if based on the ethical teachings of the religions. Just over a quarter considered that Religious and Moral Education would be satisfactorily conducted as
'education in Christianity to provide a perspective on all other moral and religious systems'. There was, however, a cautiousness to be discerned about an RE which was too moralistic and an ME which was too religious. Although personal views as to the right policy on relating RE to ME differed at times from school policy, the deduction to be taken from this would seem that the sample were desirous of doing the job they were asked to do rather than of acting as saboteurs for their own viewpoint. Over half the sample had no Personal Relationships courses operating independently of RE, but there were over 70% of the secondary schools which did mount these courses separately from RE, and there some signs that a few primary schools were moving in that direction also. There was no evidence of strong resentment towards, or a desire to boycott, these courses on the part of RE staff. Sometimes Personal Relationships courses (as separate curriculum-features) were mounted and staffed by RE personnel, but never exclusively staffed by RE teachers. More usually RE staff contributed to these courses. If they were not invited to do so this was very likely to be because such courses were seen as the proper responsibility of the pastoral staff, with the corollary that the RE department was seen to be engaged in a separate exercise. Where Personal Relationships courses were not mounted by the school, about a third of the respondents in this situation thought it necessary to include short Personal Relationships courses as part of RE. Perhaps this might have accounted for the absence of such courses outside the RE ambit, in some cases. Personal Relationships courses within RE were usually related directly to the religions, and often commended Christian values, and those respondents who did not include these courses in their RE usually thought that, if included, they should relate
directly to the religions and commend Christian values. In general, this same attitude was held towards Personal Relationships courses, if they were to be mounted separately from RE, although there was a shift towards the view that, in this situation, the courses should avoid direct references to the religions. Over half the sample were for strengthening the religious base to ME, in response to the suggestion that rejection of religion might lead to rejection of the morality based upon that religion. But there was little evidence that they considered that such a view involved teaching religion for acceptance (as distinct from for appraisal). Where teaching for acceptance was the objective, this was usually accompanied by statements seeking to dissociate from the implication that this involved crude proselytising which undermined freedom of choice in the pupils.

ii. In the evaluation of aims for RME, when taught as a composite subject, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the sample considered that the fostering of a considerate life-style, with appeal to religion as support, was important (82.3%, N = 158). Back-up to school rules was seen as moderately important by 82.3% (N = 159). The ethic of enlightened self-interest (under a religious critique) was not seen as an important objective, but the provision of information about the moral stances of world religions was. Opinion was unevenly divided as to whether RME should be designed to help pupils to an acceptance of the Christian ethic. About a third thought this to be very important, a further third thought it moderately so, and the remainder were unsure or considered it unimportant. In replying to the question as to whether it was important to encourage pupils to look on God as a helper towards moral development, 37.1% (N = 156) considered this to be very important, and a further 31.4% thought it to be moderately so.
Nearly half the sample did not consider it important to handle the argument from morality for the existence of God, although 33.5% (N = 152) thought this moderately important. About two-thirds thought it important to foster understanding of the term 'rational moral principles'.

iii. In the evaluation of aims for ME, when taught separately from RE, again the fostering of a pupil life-style based on the consideration of others' interests was the clear favourite (84.9%, N = 139). There was a very slight increase in the view that ME should support school rules. When enlightened self-interest lost its religious critique, it gained in estimated importance, although still provoking uncertainty from about a quarter of the sample of 123 respondents. The provision of information about religious moral stances lost in importance, as did the belief that pupils should be helped towards acceptance of the Christian ethic, although there were still 37.4% (N = 131) who continued to think that this latter point was important. There was a noticeable drop in support (at best not very substantial support anyway) for the view that the argument from morality should be handled. It seems a fair generalisation to say that the sample would make a sincere effort to teach secular Moral Education, were this demanded of them, without seeing the situation as an opportunity to make religious capital out of the exercise.

iv. There was no strong support for urging religious incentives upon children, but it may be noted that the postulate of divine pleasure drew support from over a third of the sample (38.8%, N = 147), and that of divine displeasure from exactly a third from a slightly higher return (33.3%, N = 153). The general preference was for a positive, community-related incentive, but negative fear of consequences was not thereby
displaced to any great extent. The appeal to the self-evidently right nature of love drew support from over half of the sample (64.3%, N = 154), and of this number 41 were junior/middle and 48 secondary. But it is of interest that this option also came nearly top of the unsure scale, and there may be grounds for believing that the endorsement of the importance of self-evident love might be tinged with a reluctance to pursue situation-ethics as an ME offering for pupils.

6.4. THE RE/ME RELATIONSHIP

i. The implication of the survey for this study is that it afforded grounds to pursue the notion of 'intersection' as the best way currently to describe the relationship between RE and ME. These grounds are to be found in two considerations, both stemming from the conservatism of many of the responses in the sample.

ii. First, the teachers in the sample (the term 'teachers' will be taken to include headteachers as well) showed themselves to be responsible and professional in a range of attitudes to RE and to ME, and yet they were reluctant in practice to separate RE completely from ME (although more ready to do so in theory). Their professionalism showed, amongst other ways, in a desire not to use ME as a device for the maintenance of RE. The significance of this point is strengthened in view of the weight that has been attached to the supposed moral benefits accruing from RE, particularly in the forties. It appears that we are dealing with a group of teachers who appreciate the importance of ME to the extent that they would teach ME as a secular, autonomous curriculum-area without feeling obliged to 'drag in' RE (their own subject) in the hope of its securing some reflected glories. If so, the
reluctance of the sample completely to separate RE and ME is likely to originate in the belief that complete severance is not required by the logic of the situation. The natures of RE and ME, in other words, do not compel total divorce between the two. Certainly there were those in the sample who did believe that RE and ME should proceed in independence of each other, but there was nevertheless a large majority against the provision of separate RE and ME departments, and a further majority who favoured a strengthening of the religious base to ME. The sample were generally for some sort of interaction between RE and ME.

iii. Second, the response to the questions about P.S.E. courses indicated that where these courses were taught independently of RE there might be a weakening of the desire to include religio-moral units in them. When bearing in mind the disclosures that some teachers operated school policies on RE/ME which did not accord with their own personal viewpoint, the question does present itself whether P.S.E. courses, independent of RE, would probably not contain religio-moral units. This might be so despite the conservatism of the sample (although it seems clear that P.S.E. courses under the sponsorship of RE would include such units). When it is further borne in mind that McPhail's ME material for classrooms is more than a little scanty on religio-moral units, the necessity to develop the position that P.S.E. courses very properly contain religio-moral units whether or not these courses are operated under RE aegis becomes more pressing. It is the position of this thesis that there is no inconsistency in having the socio-moral and the religio-moral acting upon one another in a common social education programme. This, it is to be stressed, is a conclusion that has been arrived at not just because the survey encouraged it, although that was a factor. It is a conclusion that seems to be demanded also by the historical course
taken by RME which has always given a chance to explore the links that may exist between moral behaviour and beliefs underlying that behaviour. The reluctance of the sample to advocate total severance of RE and ME is more than likely to stem from an appreciation of this point.

iv. Separation of RE and ME, when interpreted as total severance, then, would seem invalid both to the survey-results and to the historical drive of the study. While there may be reasons for a drastic severance amounting almost to complete divorce, as, for example, if a popular understanding of the RE/ME relationship might be damaging to both areas, it is surely desirable that this sort of severance be made only until such misunderstanding is cleared up. Misunderstanding might be better cleared up by the careful teaching of RE and ME with a view to clarifying the link between belief and behaviour, rather than by producing courses which, by their independence of each other, fudge the issue as to how the two relate. It is very possible to convey the impression, either that there are no such things as moral beliefs upon which moral behaviour rests, or that, because these beliefs seem to relate to religious beliefs they are suspect and behaviour must somehow be made to be *sui generis*. Both these impressions seem as intolerable as they are impossible.

v. It is plausible to say that the word 'complementarity', as used of the RE/ME relationship meets this point. But in fact it does not, if McPhail's material is anything to go by. It seems far preferable to make use of the word 'intersection' which excludes the possibility of parallel independence and makes necessary some form of (beneficial) interaction.
REFERENCES

1. See: above, pp. 139-141.


CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1. SOME DEFINITIONS

i. The previous chapters have concentrated upon making a valid selection from the available historical data by which a history of post-war RE might be constructed, if viewed from the perspective of the relationship between Religious Education and Moral Education. In the belief that anything educational must by its very nature be studied in a broad context, an endeavour has been made to place the period under investigation (1944-1983) in the setting of some of its important historical origins, stretching back seventy years or so, and to identify the major social factors and their implications that have exerted pressure upon RE from the forties to the eighties, to encourage a re-definition of the RE/ME relationship. Depth, breadth, substance and objectivity have been the main methodological aims: the actualities of, constraints upon and stimulants towards classroom-practice being the more specific content-objectives. Hence the study has concentrated mainly upon the body of research relevant to the central issue, and has offered a contemporary contribution to the research-tradition. The essence of the argument has been that the traditional, long-established practice of equating RE and ME need not be re-interpreted to result in total severance; RE and ME can validly interact with each other to their mutual benefit. The material supporting this contention has been collected from as wide a supply of data as possible, being evaluated more by the principles of relevance to and significance for the main
theme, than of personal interpretation. The point would now seem to have been reached however when some opinions and value-judgements may be expressed.

ii. This is not, it is to be hoped, due to any belief that having reviewed the evidence under the canons of objectivity these canons can now be dismissed as of minor consequence. It is because, partly, certain judgements do seem to suggest themselves from the data examined, and, partly, because RE and ME seem to invoke personal opinions rather readily in so far as the two are perceived to be in relationship. But before going on to make something of an individual appraisal of the evidence, at the same time as presenting a concluding summary of the study, some comments would appear necessary about the absence so far of a definition of the word 'moral'. Without engaging in a full-length philosophical discussion of this multi-faceted word, it can nevertheless be said that, historically for English schools, the term, when used to refer to Moral Education, must include the idea of universal ethical principles as well as social codes of behaviour. When ME meant induction into Christianity this was certainly the case, and since that time various writers such as Hirst and Wilson have emphasised the universalistic aspects of rational morality. The correspondence between these rational universals and some Christian moral principles provides some indirect grounds to strengthen the case that total severance of RE and ME may be an inconsistency. Furthermore, the arrival of Social Education in its various forms would seem to make it the more necessary to keep in view the possible existence of moral universals. This would help to head off any tendencies that Social Education might have towards restrictive manipulation and brain-washing.
iii. To include in RE the notion of moral universals gives it an element of transcendence in that it is raised above the social continuum. This would put it into comparison with RE, though not necessarily into relationship, in so far as RE is properly occupied with meaning systems and their associated practices which have referrents to a non-material, transcendent reality, believed actually to exist. While it may be tempting to link morality and religion in a transcendental scheme so as to preclude the idea of complete separation of the two, that argument is not advanced here for such linking may be entirely fortuitous. It does seem valid, however, to insist that RE should be primarily concerned with religion, that word being so defined as to emphasize the notion of a transcendent referrent. An interesting aspect of Sir Alister Hardy's research was that rather more people than might have been expected claimed to have had experiences which could be classified as experiences of the transcendent, so encouraging the assumption that, in common usage, ordinary people would tend to define religion to include a necessary referrent to transcendence. It may well be at the end of the day that religion will come to be seen generally as a human phenomenon, the transcendent dimension coming to be regarded as an aberration for the marginal. But that does not seem to be the case at the moment. So, while naturalistic life-stances such as Marxism or humanism may properly form elements in RE, as might surrogate religions, they would not seem to be the essence of RE, for such stances by their nature grow out of, and have no other reference than to the natural material reality open to sense-validation. Implicit religion could be deemed validly religious, on the other hand, especially if it contained some explicit pointers to a believed non-material reality. So, in
RE and ME then the curriculum has two components both of which deal with the notion of transcendence. While this would not form a major argument for retaining the two in relationship, it would surely add further caution before the suggestion that the two be divorced is implemented. Bull would seem to have been right in pointing up the transcendent links between RE and ME, even though some of the inferences he drew seemed not to have advanced the matter of how RE and ME relate beyond the forties' position.

7.2. ON DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

i. The evidence that has been reviewed in this study, although marshalled to analyse the relationship between RE and ME, could equally be used to argue the thesis that State schools are the reflectors of society, and have little influence as innovators of social change. The failure of the M.E.L., at the time, and the subsequent acceptance of its aims, in recent years, would suggest that it was too innovatory too soon. The belief that was apparently held by many M.P.s in the forties, that school religion was an effective buttress for democracy and public morality, did have wider social support than that enjoyed by the M.E.L. and this support did continue for some twenty or so years. But once that argument had faded because seeming to lose general credence, an autonomous ME could emerge with little condemnation or opposition.

While there seems to be evidence from communist countries that a State educational system can be very effective in establishing the principles and practices of the revolution among the second generation, it would have to be borne in mind that in such countries schools are of a piece with other opinion-forming agencies, all of which are made to conform at least
ostensibly to the prevailing value-system dictated by the ruling coterie. Was there sufficient recognition of this in Britain in the forties, and was there sufficient awareness of the greater complexities and subtleties surrounding values-transmission in democracies? The stirrings for social change, accelerated by the war and exemplified in the election of Attlee's Government, and the previous struggles of RE to establish itself even with the benefits of social approval might have been factors to suggest caution about a too-simple reliance upon schools to spearhead the production of a desired social order. But the day of the sociologist was not yet.

ii. There does seem truth in the view, mentioned earlier in the study, that the morality inculcated in the nineteenth-century elementary schools was a morality that served the interests of the upper classes, and that religion was useful in bringing the 'lower orders' to accept their places. Indeed, the whole of the nineteenth-century educational enterprise, in public, grammar and elementary schools, might be justly regarded as a reflection of and support for middle-class, or even upper-middle-class dominance. This is not necessarily to indict those churchmen of the time who strove earnestly to teach morality through RE as sycophantic and self-interested. For the acceptance of a tightly structured, hierarchical society can stem from a sincerely held belief in the concept of a Christian commonwealth, in which each has his assigned place and in which both the lower and the higher achieve self-fulfilment in each other. But it may be to indict the RE theorists of the forties with a deficient historical perspective, when they invested so much hope in the schools as key-agents in the perpetuation of religio-moral values in a twentieth-century world which afforded evidence of its having lost
its previous valuation of religion. This hope became the more ironic when they openly admitted that for many children the schools were the only places in which the articulation and practice of these values would be encountered. The subsequent discrediting of the theory that the schools could be properly and effectively used as the evangelistic arms of the churches seemingly has accompanied a greater readiness to allow the validity to church growth of large-scale evangelistic campaigns. Like Wesley, Billy Graham appears to be becoming more acceptable to the churches with advancing age. It may be that the churches have been encouraged to accept, from the failure of confessional RE to fill the pews, that the transmission of particular religious values must be spearheaded by the churches themselves, striving to become independent social variables, and not by the schools under the make-believe pseudonym of 'Christian communities'. Collective Christian social responsibility might now be allowed to depend more heavily upon a context of felt personal conversion, scarcely possible to construct in the schools. Clear-sightedness on this issue must surely be a gain for both church and State. This might also be part of a wider religious trend by which the churches, and in particular the Church of England, feel they must decline any role which casts them as automatically implements of Government policy, and which therefore curtails their expression of criticism of Government action.

7.3. THE CHURCHES' ROLE IN RME

1. The intriguing question that would obtrude at this point is whether the churches were right, in any sense other than the pragmatic, to negotiate and implement the 1944 settlement. It is not altogether unfair to urge criteria additional to the
pragmatic upon the churches. After all, they do stand for a transcendent ethical position, and it is not necessarily petard-hoisting to ask if the 1944 settlement was in keeping with their own ethical formularies, which, they insisted at the time, were to be found in the New Testament. While the answer to this question would have to be a full-length examination of the theology of education as the churches then saw it to be, it may nevertheless be possible to make some observations on this matter, in the short space of a concluding postscript. If the question were to be re-phrased to be 'Could the churches have anticipated and allowed for any of the later objections which overthrew confessionalism, by applying their own formularies more rigorously?' then maybe some interesting speculations could be made.

ii. On the matter of the pragmatic it would seem that the churches would have to be given high marks for making use of the advantageous circumstances they encountered at the time of the 1944 Act. For educational provision in England and Wales had not only grown out of church provision but was still to some appreciable extent dependent upon church schools. Also, the Anglican church was a legally established institution, the mainstream churches had worked together and with fellow-citizens to defeat nazism, church teaching was no new esoteric doctrine (in fact, it seemed to be a useful counter-indoctrinatory programme to fascism and communism), Butler himself was a churchman seemingly appreciative of a continuing church presence in and contribution towards State education, and school RE and assembly were practices already generally established throughout the country, albeit not taken very seriously in some schools. Perhaps, above all, there lurked the threat that the 'religious difficulty' might come to regain
its old force and disruptiveness. To have failed to make use of these favourable circumstances might have shown the churches to be lacking in intelligence, rather than to be abounding in saintliness. But there was a debit side, even on pragmatic criteria. For the churches did seem to show a serious disregard about the problem of providing the human resources to carry out their rather grandiose scheme for national christianisation, and there were few signs of the sort of church/school/community co-operation necessary to the successful implementation of this design. Also, there may have been a tendency to assume too readily that Parliamentary approval of the religious clauses of the 1944 Education Act signified enthusiasm on religious grounds. While it would be too cynical to dismiss the substantial Parliamentary welcome given to the religious settlement as being no more than the product of horse-trading, it would also have to be allowed that Parliament's chief concern was the improvement of educational provision, religious dissension having to be minimised for this to take place.

Complacency at this point would have festered dullness of perception of the forces of secularism and pluralism which were operating at the time, and were to become strong determinants not only of what took place in RME but of what took place in all aspects of the curriculum. But it would also have to be remembered that the churches were finding themselves in the relatively new position of actually agreeing among themselves on quite substantial areas of RME content, as well as of meeting general approval in the country apparently for their policy on an equated RE and ME. It seems to be true of the church that sweeping and ambitious aims do, on occasions, inspire its members to at least limited achievements, whereas 'realistic' aims often produce nothing. This may have been the unspoken
intuition of church leaders involved with negotiating the 1944 settlement, encouraging them to launch out into a scheme that not only could be seen to be an acceptable 'deal' by their members, but which lent itself to appropriate theologising.

iii. But an endemic danger with theologising is for it to loosen the theologiser's hold upon reality. The suggestion has already been made that to have invested evangelising hopes in schools as Christian communities might have shown a deficient historical perspective. A further suggestion might now be made that, in some important areas the educational theologising of the time might have been a compound of this deficiency and of a too-ready disposition to work from a set of social circumstances, without bringing these circumstances themselves under a theological critique - to make theology a dependent variable, in other words. While it would be too sweeping to say that Leeson's claim that Britain was a Christian country as of Parliamentary decree lay at the heart of the churches' outlook on RME, it certainly formed one of the foundation-blocks of both Leeson's and his fellow-apologists' rationale for RME. With hindsight, of course, this claim seems naive, but, even at the time, it must surely have smacked of nostalgia for the medieval synthesis, and have seemed somewhat foreign to the realism of the New Testament. It could no doubt be argued that legal compulsion and a Christian State religion had to be absent from the New Testament, these documents being written at a time when the church was in no position to demand such things. But it may be asked in reply whether the church was really in a position, in 1944, to demand such things, in view of the admitted secularity and declining church attendance that generally marked the nation, not to go into the matter of the sub-standard accommodation of many church
schools. It may further be argued that the theological rationale put forward as a philosophical undergirding for forties' RME was not only in keeping with certain New Testament ideas about the value of individual personality and the importance of its development, but was accorded a general acquiescence by educationists throughout the country as an acceptable base for their work. This argument would certainly underline a point which could become neglected, namely that the churches' recommendations for RME were rather more than an ad hoc response to favourable social circumstances. But it would not take into account the failure of this rationale to anticipate the appropriate responses to circumstances in which RME might have to separate out RE and ME. Freeman sounded a warning on this point.

iv. There may have been two areas at least in which the churches could have anticipated later criticism of the Agreed Syllabus approach to RME, were they to have applied their own formularies to the situation. The first is that of biblical knowledge. Certainly the New Testament is emphatic that the church must teach the faith, in the sense of a body of doctrinal content. But it would seem even more emphatic that safeguards be raised against regarding doctrinal knowledge, as an intellectual acquisition, to be the esse of Christianity. The churches' appreciation of this point seemed to amount to little more than disclaimers about the value of inert biblical knowledge, and to extolling the merits of school worship in the assembly. Disclaimers and plaudits are rather weak influences, however, in the realities of school situations, in which factors such as poor subject-status, limited teacher-expertise and lack of concerted support from the totality of a school staff may be the dominant actualities of the 'Christian
community of some institutions. These factors were acknowledged to be relevant at the time, but they were not deemed to be significant enough to warrant the query whether they rendered the whole enterprise as misconceived.

For the Syllabus-makers did rate very highly the acquisition of biblical knowledge, and there is even some reason to believe that school worship was encouraged by some because it was felt to be a very useful device for the deeper implantation of doctrinal knowledge. This belief was sometimes articulated, and it may also have been a quite widely held unspoken intuition. It is true that the Syllabus-makers were under pressure to deflect the criticism that school religion was nothing more than an emasculated version of the real thing. But a frankness in acknowledging that, to expect RME to be anything other than a limited exercise in pre-evangelism was to expect too much, might have given the teacher-representatives on the Syllabus-bodies more confidence in pointing out to the scholars that an experiential approach might be more effective in the long run. It is, after all, a recurring theme in the New Testament that biblical knowledge requires an allied experience for it to become meaningful and authoritative to the recipient. While this experience would be described as 'spiritual', and located in the context of church fellowship and gospel-proclamation, it would seem to relate better to the later 'neo-confessional' Syllabuses, even though some of these documents might well be criticised on Christian presuppositions as having swung too far against the teaching of biblical concepts. Perhaps the words of Professor Fraser Mitchell might have been taken more seriously when he wrote as follows in the Expository Times, February 1947, (p. 125).

'The persistent defect in all syllabuses remains the
failure to pass beyond Biblical instruction or Church History so as to relate religion to the children's daily experience .... for thousands of children religion means stories about rather odd people one hears about in the Scripture lesson or at Sunday School and is dismissed with other 'childish things' as the years go on. If History teaching can at times start in the present and go backwards, so too might Scripture'.

v. The second area in which greater attention to realities and to the New Testament might have been expected was in the realm of assumptions. To reckon that everyone is in principle Christian, and needs only to be brought to be what he truly is, might bring warm emotional comfort to some Christians, but it can only be strongly denied by many non-Christians, ranging from atheists to followers of other religions. The confessional approach thus engendered resulted in Christianity being presented as to a believing community, which could have the effect of fostering anything from embarrassment through resentment to contempt, on the one hand, or of fudging issues relating to commitment and decision about which the New Testament is clear-cut, on the other. The presentation of Christianity in the manner of witness would accept the personal integrity of self-conscious unbelievers, so reducing and even avoiding resentment, and would make for clarity of thought about the status of Christianity in the modern world. It may also be thoroughly Johannine. Perhaps a significant footnote on the eighties is that Christian material continues to be produced for RME, apparently selling well. Although such material might in the main be better labelled phenomenological, in that what is studied is Christianity as a current world religion albeit with extensive historical origins, it is surely simplistic to think that the phenomenological can and must exclude every element of the evangelistic. For while such an approach allows schoolchildren to be what they are - non-Christians - and invites them to investigate for themselves what faith means
to Christian people, the material itself cannot but convey both challenge and advocacy. As others have pointed out, this is neither preaching, nor indoctrination, nor unfair pressure. If the result is that some pupils respond positively to the material, this is no more unprofessional than Mathematics teaching helping to produce people whose lives are devoted to a branch of Mathematics.

vi. It might be asked, however, whether the churches should really have done anything other than what they did, given the particular situation of 1944. They might, it could be urged, have contributed to the disappearance of RE had they not taken advantage of their position and pressed for statutory provision. Also, the country was familiar with the spectacle of an established church endeavouring to make use of its legal status, whereas it was not used to the notion of that church offering the servant-leadership befitting a 'witnessing' community. Perhaps there may have been resistance to this approach. For there was a real sense in which many citizens considered the Anglican church as their possession, on the strength of only the slightest links with its services, and felt that the clergy represented them on some issues. Yet these considerations might not give due account to the seeming fact that school RE was valued by many leading figures in the State, especially in the Houses of Parliament, and that this support was given because of RE's social and political usefulness in and of itself. Many people seemed to be saying that school RE must achieve something that the churches cannot, namely the christianising of British youth. It would seem possible that RE would have continued in the schools for this reason alone, even had the churches not insisted on its legal enforcement. RE had not disappeared in the inter-war years, and many teachers and educationists in the State system were persuaded of its value, and seemed more than
content to subscribe to a Christian philosophy of education. It is relevant also to point out that the churches did eventually have to relax their hold on school RE, without the result being RE's demise.

vii. While the churches might well have anticipated later objections to Bible-knowledge acquisition as the epitome of RE, and to assumptions that British citizens were in principle Christian, it can scarcely be said that they could have foreseen the course that society was to take into multi-faith domains. This may, actually, have been predictable even in the forties for there were small Muslim communities in existence in Britain in the inter-war years and immigration did not encounter strict legal regulation until the early sixties. But predictable or not the growth in society of religious plurality was bound to raise difficulties for a 'believing community' form of Christian RE. For the churches were only being true to their formularies in interpreting religious phenomena under christological categories. Yet, even so, a 'witnessing' approach might have been a better base for such interpretations. As it turned out the 'believing community' approach had already been abandoned by the time RE personnel had to address themselves to the challenge of a multi-religious society, and the churches showed some readiness to enter into genuine dialogue with other religions as an expression of Christian love. The Church of England in particular saw dialogue as intrinsic to its role of ministering to the nation as a whole. Smart was himself a churchman and his initiative at Lancaster was more usually seen as a guide and an inspiration than as a threat.

viii. All these considerations lead up to a basic, not to say intriguing question as to whether the churches would have been
more in keeping with their formulas to have ceded their schools to the State, and to have put their energies and finances into (echoes of Blamires) totally Christian schools (albeit in the private sector) and into direct kerygmatic evangelism in the country at large. A voluntary Christian presence could have been promoted in the schools, as in other areas of the national life, this, in fact, materialising in the S.C.M., C.E.M. and I.S.C.F. School RE would almost certainly have been guaranteed by a grateful State, and RE's perpetuation might well have been better safeguarded by leaving it entirely in the hands of educationists from the start, especially educationists in the school sector. But quite apart from this suggestion smacking of Nonconformity, it would have been asking a great deal of Anglicanism to adopt such a course. Yet perhaps another significant footnote to the eighties is that some church schools in the Maintained sector are now facing difficulties which must surely tempt their governors secretly to wish that they had never been manoeuvred into their current situation. An Anglican school with a proportion of its pupils Muslim is into problems: one with a majority of its pupils Muslim is into bigger problems. There is, for example, a school in Derby which, although Anglican, has had to discontinue the use of the Lord's prayer in assembly because of the objections raised by the Muslim majority in the school. Even an Anglican school with all its pupils and parents broadly in favour of its religious aims, must nevertheless face pressures from educational, even moral, criteria calling those aims into question in the current situation. Also, the presence of Anglican Aided schools has strengthened the Muslim and Hindu case for Aided provision, and we are likely to see mounting pressure from the Muslims at least for such favours.
Unlike church schools these institutions might be highly sectarian, inculcating their children with Islamic religious teaching, with no concessions to any philosophical objections to indoctrination such as have been made by church Aided schools. Certainly the churches negotiated about twenty years of borrowed time in which they were able to use the schools as vehicles for the propagation of the Christian message, and for recruitment for church membership. But it may be doubted if in either case there was any significant success, and it is also doubtful if Aided schools today make any momentous contribution to these objectives, or even if they want to.

7.4. PLURALISM

i. Attention has been drawn in this study to the importance attached by men such as Temple to the believed connection between Christianity and democracy, and to the significance of this belief to the justification of RME in the schools. But the question had to be raised as to whether a desire to promote democracy might not be better served by advocating pluralism. For if pluralism is defined as the belief that plurality is desirable, rather than as the mere fact of plurality, then the changed social circumstances from the fifties to the eighties would seem to have pluralism firmly embedded in the mutation-process. While the advocates of a secularised RE in the sixties appealed specifically to the increased secularity of society for justification, and the advocates of multi-faith RE in the seventies appealed to the increased plurality of belief-systems in society, both these appeals at base represented appeals to democracy. For if democracy means anything it surely means the upholding of two principles, namely, the right accorded to majorities to impose
their will on minorities, but also the right of minorities to enjoy recognition, consideration and full citizenship-equality before the law. It is debateable, therefore, whether the teaching of one particular faith and one only, and the induction into one ethical system and one only, in the schools of a supposed democracy, can really be justified as democratic. But quite apart from any consideration of principle, the practical outcomes in pupil-misbehaviour and even in the encouragement of racism that might arise from imposed monism were further powerful reasons to move towards pluralism. If to these reasons were added the educational consideration that pupil-autonomy was of paramount importance, then any suggestion that pupils be required to believe and practise a pre-determined set of (debateable) values could scarcely be given a hearing.

ii. If the history of RME from the nineteenth century to the Second World War was the history of a process reflecting social change, then the post-war history must surely have writ this notion large. Yet it was in the very changes that took place as a result of society's prompting that enabled RE to discover that pluralism could afford it a rationale that was both educational and democratic. An appreciable amount of this study has focused upon social considerations, not to argue that RME was totally lacking in a developed theoretical base, but to indicate that the actualities of society had to be given careful attention in the construction of any undergirding rationales. In full awareness of the complexity of social data, the study risked over-simplification by picking out certain key-areas which were instrumental in clarifying the social factors necessarily to be included in the working-out of a justification for RME. These comprised the changes brought
about in attitudes to work, leisure, morals and religion by industrialisation, modernisation, technology, immigration, mass-communications, affluence, the salience of youth, changing educational theory and practice and by pluralism and secularism generally. These factors contributed to the challenge that already was being mounted to the idea of a Christian society by reason of the declining credence given to Christian belief, their contribution tending to be in the direction of a proliferation of alternative life-styles, codes of conduct and belief-systems. While this tendency might well have conferred moral benefits, in that with the expansion of choice went the possibility of individuals acquiring a greater maturity as they were obliged to think out for themselves decisions which could not be made by recourse to pre-packaged solutions handed down by authorities which were above criticism. But it led to moral uncertainty and confusion for those not equipped to handle such decision-making, and it cast serious doubt on the possibility of the schools continuing to be agents for induction into a single moral content. Concern was shown in the fifties by a number of people connected with education that the traditional vehicle for ME - RE - was ill-equipped to respond to the problems posed by the changes occurring in society. The tenor of their criticisms was that traditional statements of Christianity might need re-interpretation to remain meaningful to a society on the move from former monistic perspectives (i.e. one nation under God, one religion and one ethic). But the criticism of most relevance to this study was that thought should now be given to implementing an ME with a humanistic rather than a religious base and with mechanisms for encouraging desirable behaviour that were more society-related than orientated to religious belief.
iii. But the fifties were not a decade of pluralism, for there were no moves of any consequence designed to remove Agreed Syllabus, Bible-based RE from the curriculum on the grounds that it was undesirable in a modern society. RE continued to hold public, Parliamentary and educational confidence, and the country generally, although showing signs of advancing pluralism, was homogenous, free of class-antagonisms, although not of class-awareness, and contentedly enjoying high employment and improving materialistic standards of living. It was in the sixties that dissatisfaction with RME took on a sharpness, even an orchestration, not previously seen in the post-war period. This stemmed partly from research conducted from within the RE domain, which suggested that the Agreed Syllabuses were harmfully inadequate in organising a developmental RE which paid proper regard to children's readiness for religious concepts, and partly from without, in that legal compulsion and induction into one belief-system became targets for obliteration on educational grounds. Both these factors gained impetus from being the products of a society developing with quickening pace into a secular/ rational/ democratic community, with the churches forming only a minority-sector within that community. The social mutations of the sixties encouraged theological and ethical mutations within church religious teaching, these changes making some impact upon school RE, although the 'new' Agreed Syllabuses remained determinedly confessional, and made little concession to the idea of an autonomous, secular ME being accorded proper educational status. Yet the notion of just such an ME was developing, to receive a strong encouragement from a research-project, sponsored by the Farmington Trust, which drew upon the expertise of a philosopher, psychologist and sociologist, but not of a theologian. The project was not biased against religion, however, and though its recommendations were
not intended to be partisan it suggested that, given the right application of rational criteria, 'right' answers to moral problems could be found.

iv. The seventies were much more a decade of pluralism. For by the end of that decade christianising aims for RE had been disavowed, agreed Syllabuses were appearing which gave scope to the teaching of non-Christian religions as phenomena in their own right, and a Moral Education freed from dependence upon Religious Education had been accorded educational standing. This had taken place without a single change in the law, and with the collaboration of the main Protestant denominations. Religious Studies in colleges and Universities expanded to include the study of non-Christian religions, and school RE began to move in this direction also. While such innovations were certainly significant advances into pluralism, they were also responses to the secularisation of society in the sense that multi-faith RE was a reaction to the secular RE of the sixties, and autonomous ME was but a logical deduction from secular-rational premises. The result of these responses to secularity was, it has been maintained in this thesis, an unnecessarily marked severance between RE and ME, and it is to be hoped that the eighties and beyond will redress this over-reaction by exploring more fully the ways in which an autonomous ME nevertheless interacts with an autonomous RE for mutual benefit. There are grounds for such interaction other than the perhaps subjective hunch that polarities are usually not very good for education, though maybe such a hunch is a not-unimportant consideration. For religious polarities are appearing. If Muslim schools become a feature of the educational scene then they may be expected to offer a very decisive opposition to secularism, sternly refusing the role
of dependent variable. Such schools would also be resistant to pluralism by the same token. Time will tell whether these schools would, in the end, go the way of modern British society, but the indications at the moment appear to be that Islam might well succeed, where the churches seem to have failed, in making their schools spearheads in their religious crusade. Comparably, the numbers of independent Christian schools appear to be on the increase, these being at odds with a secular society and with a secular-rational philosophy of education. It is surely intriguing to see two movements, while never contemplating any sort of common front, yet being in alliance against a common opponent. But the emergence of polarities such as these might constitute a reason to urge ME to remain in relationship with RE, if only in the hope that such a course would better help to keep corresponding polarities within the educational system in communication with each other.

7.5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RE AND ME

i. As the study has endeavoured to focus upon the ways in which the relationship between RE and ME has been viewed, and the social and educational factors underlying the various viewpoints, it is fitting that the concluding paragraphs be devoted to a discussion of this central topic. This will not be undertaken with any intention of pronouncing in a final fashion upon the exact nature of the RE/ME relationship, for, while it is not difficult to identify the five main positions that can be taken on the matter, it is rather more difficult if not impossible to claim that any one position should compel universal consent. The positions are: that they are totally inseparable; that they are totally separable; that they are autonomous but overlapping; that they are autonomous but complementary; that they are mutually destructive. Whichever
perspective comes nearest to the truth of the matter, in an individual's opinion, a measure of cogency would have to be allowed to the others. Finally, there will be a summary of the reasons why this thesis has urged the use of the term 'intersection' to describe the relationship.

ii. Certain straightforward statements can be made about RE and ME, if these are viewed as separate exercises. For ME it may be said that schools cannot but engage in some form of this activity; that it probably stands at the head of the list of 'subjects' whose importance can be gauged by the necessity for everyone to continue in their 'study' from school leaving to death, morality being optional for no one; but that it comes high up in the group of 'subjects' with weak bases in empirical certainty; also, that consensus on moral content is currently impossible, and might always be so in a pluralistic society; and that possibly some form of indoctrination, in the sense of acceptance on authority alone, is necessary at least in the early stages of ME, if it is to include desirable behavioural outcomes, as well as facility in moral reasoning. With comparable straightforwardness certain statements can be made about RE. It can be said, for example, that RE is concerned with all aspects of religion, not with the moral dimension alone; that, as such, it achieves educational justification as a necessary part of general education for a liberal democracy, especially in its contribution to an understanding of the belief-systems of ethnic minorities; that this justification is now generally accepted as valid, upon RE's renunciation of evangelising aims on behalf of any one particular system of religious belief; that despite this justification RE also does not possess a strong base in empirical certainty, and that in some schools it is still little
more than of 'Cinderella' status. With two such sets of statements it hardly seems on the face of the matter to be worth bringing RE and ME into any sort of synthesis, for it is tempting to say 'Why invite problems when the important point must surely be to proceed with the actual teaching of each area?'. Such a temptation will, it is hoped, be resisted in these closing paragraphs, which will discard the arguments for the complete severance of RE and ME on the grounds that such arguments are too simple, and which will seek for an expression of the relationship which avoids making either dependent upon each other for its educational justification, and yet which recognises that each may be able to make a contribution to the other without sacrificing its autonomy.

iii. The view that RE and ME are mutually destructive can surely be dismissed without difficulty. When the charge is made, the question may perhaps be validly asked as to how far the charge conceals special pleading. For no one would deny that religions have failed to honour their own moral systems, and, on occasions, have been sometimes quite appallingly destructive of moral behaviour - murder, torture, racial hatred and dehumanisation have all, at times, been given a religious justification, and continue to be given one, in various parts of the world. Conversely, examples are not lacking of religious people, engaged in truly caring activities, who have become victims of atrocities committed in the name of some other moral system. In all these cases: the real cause may not lie in the nature of religion or of morality, but in the nature of people themselves, and in the nature of their departure from the moral principles which a profounder understanding of their religious and/or moral systems would lead them to respect, even though in the heat of the emotional
moment they might still not obey. That this is not the cause in all cases is a true but not a relevant consideration for RE and ME in British schools at the present time. For it would seem prejudice indeed to argue that there can be any serious threat of mutual RE/ME destruction. This, after all, is a democracy that roots into a Christian tradition, with an RE which, until recently, helped to perpetuate that tradition, perhaps continuing to do so. Also, incoming religious communities seem anxious to settle as law-abiding citizens, as well as to preserve their own religious moral principles. If there is something in ME which is destructive of RE, this is surely destructive only of those immoral elements which all religions appear to pick up at times, and of which they need to be purged. In this case, far from ME being destructive of RE, it provides a service by which the true nature of a religion's morality is clarified. To claim that such clarification would serve only to show that the religions as practised in Britain today are morally untenable would seem to be as ingenuous as it is objectionable.

iv. In a rather similar fashion the view that RE and ME are inseparable, although providing for the theist a profounder analysis of the matter, must also be regarded as too simple an answer, if not to the philosophical questions involved, at least to the situation in current British schools. At a stroke it would exclude from participation in explicit ME those teachers who, while not hostile to a theistic outlook, could not themselves subscribe to such a view with the sort of conviction that would carry weight with their pupils. Yet ME must surely be the concern of every teacher. That they would not nonetheless be excluded from implicit ME is not really the point, for, although ME must be seen as very much more than classroom-study of morality, the place of classroom-ME as a specific part of the timetable is an important feature of Moral Education. For it
to make an impact upon pupils it should, it would seem, result
in improved behaviour as well as improved moral judgement. If
so, it would seem to be counter-productive, as well as absurd,
for Moral Education to pretend that diversity of outlook on
moral issues does not exist in a school. More particularly,
ME should not bring pupils to feel, if only inadvertently, that
religiously-motivated behaviour cannot be truly moral, just as
RE must not bring them to feel that, lacking religious motivation
to moral behaviour, they need not summon up incentives
from other sources. It is surely an intolerable situation
if immorality can be excused on the grounds that the 'ought'
loses its compulsive force for the non-religious. In this
sense Knight was right, even if she may have been wrong that
religiously based ME was fostering such a conclusion.

v. By the same token the view that RE and ME are totally
separate and independent of each other runs into almost
comparable problems. For this view excludes from explicit ME
those teachers who, while allowing a measure of autonomy to ME
cannot themselves subscribe to the totally separable thesis.
The survey conducted as part of the overall study, and recorded
in the previous chapter, suggests that such a fear may not
be entirely groundless. In fact, the situation may be worse
than the corresponding problem outlined in paragraph iv above.
For it is impossible for an RE teacher to do justice to his
material and exclude any reference to morality. A school
proceeding on the totally separable thesis would seem to be
posing something of a threat to the RE teacher's integrity, as
well as putting before pupils a position which in practice might
not appear true, for it is obvious that religions are about
behaviour as well as about belief-systems. Also, there may be
serious problems raised for a school's assumption of a unified curriculum, this notion hardly being able to tolerate the totally separable thesis. Moreover, it might be asked if there is not something wrong with any claim to total independence. For a modern outlook would surely require the assumption that everything is, in the last analysis, related to everything else, and nothing can be proved without the prior assumption of at least some relationships.

vi. The two views remaining for consideration are distinguishable only on the most refined differentiation. They are the autonomy with overlap, and the complementarity theses. The case for the autonomy of morals and of religion, and therefore of ME and RE, provided this autonomy is not equated with total independence, would seem to have been established. Yet autonomy in any sphere usually has to be a qualified autonomy. An autonomous RE, for example, would not necessarily be free to give the same timetable-weight to an examination of scientology and satanism as to Islam or Christianity. Nor would an autonomous ME be free to commend the values of apartheid as on a par with those of humanism. It is also usually the case that what is distinguishable at a theoretical level has a tendency to lose some of its sharpness in the everyday world of ordinary people. Provided such qualifications are borne in mind the advantages can be appreciated of an autonomous RE and ME. The immediate benefits are that teachers can interchange as RE and ME personnel without loss of integrity. Furthermore, the clarification of the exact natures of religious and secular moralities should be made more likely and more possible if the context is mutual respect and tolerance of differences. Another factor, simple but nevertheless crucial, is that money is very unlikely to be
made available to set up separate ME departments alongside RE departments (the survey produced very few examples). This would seem to point to the need for RE staff and their colleagues from other teaching areas to increase their efforts at co-operation in ME.

vii. As to whether the qualified nature of the autonomy of RE and ME implies overlap or complementarity poses a more than academic question. For overlap may mean no more than arbitrary correspondence and complementarity may mean parallelism without interaction. There is, for example, a statistic which correlates the national incidence of schizophrenia with the import and export of bananas, as Kay points out. If the correlation between the moral dimension of a religion and autonomous secular morality were of this nature, then it would seem incumbent upon educationists to propagate this view forthwith. But it would seem difficult to refute the argument that morality is part of the essential nature of religion, or at least of Christianity, as it is part of the essential nature of society. If this contention is allowed then it would seem that neither 'overlap' nor 'complementarity' are strong enough terms to do justice to the links between religion, morality and society.

viii. There are two main considerations which would seem to call for a stronger term again. First, although it seems difficult to come by evidence that a religious person is likely to be more moral than if he were not religious (this is the point, even though it appears that researchers so far have toyed only with the notion of testing whether religious people are 'better' than their non-religious counterparts), the common-sense conclusion that this is likely has something to commend it. Christian behaviour, for example, is a test of true Christianity.
That professed Christians sometimes seem to belie this in the event does not remove the proposition from the New Testament. Also, religious motivation can be very strong motivation indeed, and when this is directed towards religio-moral behaviour, although the dangers of bigotry, self-righteousness and fanaticism are ever present, it would seem to be a motivation to be respected and encouraged if the end-result is genuinely moral practice. Surely only a shortsighted or prejudiced teacher would tinker with such motivation, so long as religion remains an open question, if only out of considerations of self-interest, for education is dependent upon well-behaved and co-operative pupils. He would be ready to help a pupil find alternative motivation, were this to become necessary, and would wish all his pupils to be aware that other motivation is available. But deliberately to weaken religious motivation to morality would seem to be a wrongful attack upon a pupil's self-concept, quite apart from its scarcely being in the teacher's interests either. Second, moral issues do lead to the raising of ultimate questions, dependent as they are upon particular beliefs about the nature of the universe, of human life and of reality. An ME which had self-consciously to avoid such questions has to be an impoverished educational experience, in that it could deal only with particular behaviours in particular situations, and not with larger issues of purpose and value. But purpose and value are part of the raw material which religions fashion into systems of ritual and doctrine, and there are comparable secular—or 'surrogate' religious, as some would prefer to term them—systems from the same raw material. Religious and Moral Education seems the only term adequately to describe the study of this area. This being so, one wonders whether a brand new term, in the manner of Wilson's coinage, should be devised, which would embrace the idea of complementarity
but which would imply that to conduct RE and ME as parallel exercises does not satisfy the requirements of the idea, and which would encourage an interaction of the two. It is for this reason that the term 'intersection' has been urged in the course of the study.

ix. The problem with the term 'overlap' is that, while it allows for some interaction between RE and ME at the level of morality, it might imply that correspondence between religion and morality is fortuitous. There would be those who would argue that this is indeed the case, but such a view would seem to be too cavalier of the self-understanding of religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The problem with the term 'complementarity' is that it, too, does not give sufficient attention to organic links between religion and morality. In theory such links might be allowed, but in practice, at least as the seventies' curriculum-development from the Schools Council defined this practice, RE and ME might be conducted as parallel exercises, the implication being that this is the educational way of viewing the matter. Yet it would seem difficult to deny that religion has something distinctive to say about morality, just as morality has something distinctive to say about religion. To urge the term 'intersection' as the best description of the RE/ME relationship would give ME the remit to proceed with a moral critique of religion, as it would give RE the remit to explore the underlying beliefs which lie at the base of behaviour, indicating a religious perspective on these beliefs. If this is done in the parameters of a subject-area entitled Religious and Moral Education, then the risk of polarisation is reduced and the chances of ME becoming no more than social conditioning may be reduced also.
x. What, then, of the suggestion that love being the essence of religion and morality the relationship between RE and ME occurs at this point? Without wishing to challenge the view that love is the essence of religion (although it certainly would be challengeable, as, indeed, it may be questioned whether there is such a thing as the essence of religion), it is hoped that the following remarks may be made without conveying an atmosphere of cynicism. Because 'love' is the greatest hurrah-word of all time, it would have to be handled with caution in the context of school RME. Few words can have such a diversity of meaning, and few words can so easily engender the situation in which everyone thinks he knows what everyone else is talking about, without this being anything like the case. Family-love, for example, might be interpreted by one family as covering up for a criminal off-spring, to another it may mean helping the off-spring to face up to the consequences of his actions. Moreover, love is probably the most extensively used word of the current pop-culture. Those who argue the view that, although there is no necessary logical dependence of morality upon religion, there is a logical identity in the concept of love, usually do so from within the Christian tradition, and then usually subscribe to situation-ethics as the summum bonum of religion and morality. But it would seem that, for this ethic to be anything more authoritative than a commentary upon a situation-specific set of circumstances, it has to have a prior understanding of the nature of rules and some training in their application. Without wishing to decry this latest manifestation of Christian Humanism, as an inspiration and credible theological position for some Christians, it has to be asked whether such a position is rather exclusively Christian, with which other religions may not so easily identify,
and whether it requires a degree of maturity which cannot realistically be expected on a wide scale in the schools. It would seem inconceivable that any school could operate on only one articulated rule - love - without having to invest that rule with a range of sub-rules for the purpose of definition and clarification. While there is much to be said for situation-ethics, especially for their facility in handling social change and in pointing out the benefits of extending a static, authoritarian moral code into a dynamic, needs-based programme of moral action, the danger of rampant subjectivism is a serious hazard. An ethic of fixed moral principles, brought under rational examination and compassionate application, does not have to be either static or authoritarian, and may relate very well to moral codes across the religions, and across societies. It also is not necessarily destructive of agapē, and in fact may point to that supreme quality, if only when determining how a hierarchy of moral principles has to be agreed. The drawback is that 'fixed moral principles', at least as Peters and Hirst have conceived them, are general statements without offering detailed elaboration in specific circumstances. They are therefore subject to a comparable criticism that has been levelled in this paragraph at agapē: they need further definition and clarification. Yet by reason of the fact that they are a set of principles they provide a less ambiguous and more precise conceptualisation on first acquaintance than does agapē. It may well be that agapē is the most mature moral position available. But maturity presupposes prior development, and the contention of Turiel that moral development is better effected by focusing on the next, rather than the ultimate, step may be very relevant here. It is worth
noting, however, that 4.01(c) and 4.02(c) achieved approximately similar placings to 5.01(g) in the survey-results.

7.6. ON INTERSECTION

i. The survey was conducted among a sample of teachers who could have been expected to have believed in the value of RE and whose views on the RE/ME relationship would therefore have been coloured by this valuation. It was not necessarily a disadvantage that this should have been so. For it was of greater importance to the study to discover how far the arguments for a separation of RE and ME had been accepted by those standing in the tradition of an equated RE/ME, than to canvass the views of those who might never have accepted this position (of equation) or have never been directly involved in its teaching. RE teachers not only handle direct ME material as part of their teaching content, but they have usually been regarded as the schools' ME teachers. In the event, the sample turned out to be more conservative than was expected. But that fact must be taken in conjunction with the strong possibility from the survey-evidence that the sample was generally appreciative of the need for ME, supportive of P.S.E. courses and accepting of a secular ME, if necessary, which could be undertaken without dependence upon RE for its educational standing. There was a reluctance to make RE too moralistic and to make ME too religious. Yet there was also a reluctance completely to separate the two areas. It would seem valid to interpret the evidence as indicative of a sample which subscribed to the 'intersection' hypothesis without their saying so in as many words.

ii. This thesis has maintained that to describe the RE/ME
relationship as intersection is desirable on historical and philosophical grounds. The survey therefore encouraged the development of this point of view, although it must be stressed that the plea for 'intersection' is not based on the survey-evidence. It is made on the grounds that the historical linking of the two areas is not arbitrary, but safeguards an important philosophical consideration that behaviour rests upon belief, and that belief is as important in the production of desired behaviour as are conditioning techniques. To divorce RE from ME could obscure this point as well as denying to ME the consideration of religious motivation as a factor in promoting moral behaviour, and denying to RE the benefits of a moral critique upon religion. Furthermore, in the current multi-faith situation of many of Britain's schools it would seem desirable to encourage whatever makes for co-operation. In that religions have moral dimensions they have an area which, in principle, offers common ground with each other and with the secular rational. Also, in that religions have social links and implications they have a further area of possible common ground both with each other and with society generally. Religio-moral units would seem very properly located in P.S.E. courses, and they may be much more likely to be found there if the RE/ME relationship is seen as intersection rather than as complementarity. The time seems right for a pursuit of this notion and of its implementation in the classroom. For this study has endeavoured to show that there has been much analysis of the RE/ME relationship during the post-war period, and that an over-reaction against the traditional position of equating the two is unnecessary. RE and ME can continue to satisfy the intentions of 1944 for a creative engagement with each other, though the social conditions and the nature of that engagement have changed.
iii. This is an optimistic conclusion, justifiably so if only because the tenor of the whole study has been validly optimistic. To some, such optimism might seem highly inappropriate, for the general opinion about RE seems to be one of pessimism in the manner of Koerner's description of it as early as 1968 as 'an important failure', in an appendix of his book Reform in Education. Yet, while many both inside and outside education might echo Koerner's judgement, there is good reason to believe that they would be wrong. One of the rewarding aspects of having undertaken this study is to have seen how RE apologists rose to the challenge of new conditions and new knowledge, and one of the satisfactions to have seen how a good case can be made for their having succeeded in constructing a sound rationale for RE in the eighties. It may not be possible to accord similar praise to those constructing a rationale for ME, for there still seems to be a high degree of uncertainty as to what ME is and what comprises its content. To equate ME with P.S.E., for example, would not seem to be doing justice to the depth and possible universality of rational morality, nor to the element of non-relative prescriptiveness that seems to reside properly in that domain. Perhaps this may be a further reason for retaining Religious and Moral Education as a composite curriculum-area, rather than to insist that, because each area can be differentiated philosophically, this should entail a practical divorce between the two. That way, it has been maintained in this thesis, leads to mutual impoverishment and misleading classroom-practice. To argue that the risks involved in anything less than a complete divorce outweigh the advantages is, I believe, to place oneself in an earlier decade. This seems a quite unnecessary desire to put the clock back.
APPENDICES


A.2. Survey-tables.

A.3. Survey-questionnaire and Associated Correspondence.

A.4. Abbreviations.
A1. THE CAMBRIDGESHIRE AGREED SYLLABUS, 1949

i. This Syllabus drew upon a number of eminent people in its production. Included were Dr. T.S. Hele, Master of Emmanuel College, who chaired the conference, Professor C.H. Dodd, Morris-Hulse Professor of Divinity, and A.V. Murray, Principal of Cheshunt College. There were also four college fellows, two training college principals, two more principals of theological colleges, five headmasters (including Oakeshot of Winchester) and four headmistresses. The document ran into 195 pages, of which 118 were devoted to outlining teaching content from nursery to sixth-form.

ii. The Introduction began with the clear statement that

'Parliament has decided that instruction in the Christian religion shall be a recognised and indispensable part of the public system of education' (p. 1).

There followed an essay of 9 pages on the nature of freedom, asserting this to have been the basic issue of the recent war, and sketching the struggle for individual, social and national freedom over the last four centuries, from the medieval 'world in pupilage' to the modern western claim for 'the privileges of majority'. Communism and democracy were said to offer different solutions to the problems of political power: the place of Christianity was seen, not as the bulwark of a democratic social order, but as the root and ground of democratic principles, its mainspring being faith in God.

'The ruling pattern of Christian education must therefore be to commend ... such a faith in the God and Father of Jesus Christ as will bear fruit in service' (p. 8).
iii. This was followed by an essay of 6 pages, entitled 'Religion in the School', claiming that schools should be Christian communities. It was claimed that religion, rather than the arts and sciences, was able to say what the proper end of Man comprised. The standards of 'Beatitudes and Parables' were to prevail, the general 'tone' of the school being more important to the success of RE than the classroom-abilities of its scripture teachers. The bulk of the essay was devoted to a consideration of school worship, with an analysis of the nature of prayer and recommendations about the conduct of assembly.

iv. The main body of the Syllabus followed, after a short paragraph stressing that 'the object of the syllabus is to serve as a guide and not as a hard and fast scheme of actual lessons', the teacher being encouraged to adapt or add to the material 'in accordance with his own ideas and the needs of the pupils' (p. 16). Eight age-groups were specified. Recommendations started with the proposition of God as Loving Father (under-fives), moving through Stories of Jesus (5s-7s and 7s-9s) to the addition of some Old Testament, Acts and non-biblical biographical material for secondary school pupils. Christian Biography and Church History featured for 13s-15s, with a course on Personal and Corporate Religion for 15s. Five and a half pages were given to suggestions for a simplified course for 'backward' 11s-15s.

v. The section for the sixth-form was a scheme of 30 pages, outlining Christian belief about God, the church, forgiveness of sins and eternal life. A specific book might be studied 'on a strictly scriptural theme' or on a subject 'of definitely religious associations', and alternative courses might be
formed 'in which contemporary ideas are more prominent'. There
was no reference to the explicit study of comparative religion
(to use the terminology of the day).
### APPENDIX TWO

#### TABLE 13 (see p. 304)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Comment (3.09)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>1 - 'No'; 2 - 'Yes'; 2 - left blank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>I would commend acceptance of religious belief through personal experience and example allowing flexibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>YES although in our situation we have had very little deviation from the Christian faith.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>No, our &quot;western&quot; values are Christian based without total acceptance of religious belief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Individual development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1 - 'No'; 1 - 'Not necessarily'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>I would commend the acceptance of Christianity, but not without the child appraising and testing for him/herself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Education should aim to enable man to achieve his ultimate end - God. Without morality this is impossible. RE and ME can't be separated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>2 - 'No'; 1 - 'Not necessarily'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>It would involve commending - but not being in any way dogmatic about - the acceptance of religious belief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>I do not believe that R.E. teachers should aim to persuade pupils to accept religious belief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>No - knowledge of and understanding of religion should not be induction but a means of identifying for themselves the fundamental questions of human existence. It may well be an introduction to a personal religious quest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>I feel that when Religious Education is honestly attempted ME follows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>No. As a general rule humankind has always, and still does, find its moral systems within the context of religious belief. Man's highest ideals are to be found in systems of religious belief. That these ideals are often corrupted is irrelevant.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: P = primary; M = middle; S = secondary.
### TABLE 14

**PILOTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Considerably</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Scarcely</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>7p, 5m, 2ds  (14)</td>
<td>7p, 4m, 7ss, 9ds (27)</td>
<td>1ss  (1)</td>
<td>5p, 1m, 9ss, 7ds (22)</td>
<td>7ss, 7ds (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>7p, 4m, 8ss, 7ds (26)</td>
<td>4p, 5m, 7ss, 10ds (26)</td>
<td>2p, 2ss 4ds (8)</td>
<td>3p, 5ss, 4ds (12)</td>
<td>2p, 2ss, (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>9p, 4m, 2ss, 4ds (30)</td>
<td>9p, 5m, 8ss, 18ds (40)</td>
<td>1ss, 2ds (3)</td>
<td>1p, 2ss (3)</td>
<td>1ss, 1ds (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>2p, 1ss, 2ds, (5)</td>
<td>4p, 5ss, 7ds, (16)</td>
<td>4p, 3m, 4ss, 5ds (16)</td>
<td>4p, 5m, 8ss, 5ds (22)</td>
<td>2p, 1m, 5ss, 5ds (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>6p, 4m, 11ss, 9ds (30)</td>
<td>4p, 4m, 7ss, 11ds (26)</td>
<td>1m, 1ds (2)</td>
<td>5p, 2ss, 4ds (11)</td>
<td>2p, 2m, 3ss, (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>7p, 2m, 9ss, 10ds, (28)</td>
<td>3p, 3m, 8ss, 7ds (21)</td>
<td>1p (1)</td>
<td>5p, 3m, 4ss, 1ds (13)</td>
<td>3p, 2m, 3ss, 7ds, (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>11p, 2m, 9ss, 8ds (30)</td>
<td>8p, 6m, 1ss, 8ds (23)</td>
<td>1m, 2ss (3)</td>
<td>2m, 8ss, 3ds (13)</td>
<td>2ss, 6ds (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>5p, 5ss, 4ds (14)</td>
<td>8p, 4m, 2ss, 9ds (23)</td>
<td>4m, 1ss (5)</td>
<td>3p, 9ss, 6ds (18)</td>
<td>2p, 7ss, 6ds (15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

- **p** = primary school
- **m** = middle school
- **s** = secondary school
- **ss** = Sheffield secondary school
- **ds** = Derbyshire secondary school

This key applies to all tables in this appendix.
### TABLE 15  MAIN SURVEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Considerably</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Scarcely</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>11p,1m,1s   (13)</td>
<td>23p,3m,13s (39)</td>
<td>1m,2s (3)</td>
<td>6p,10s (16)</td>
<td>2p,1m,7s (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>11p,3m,14s  (28)</td>
<td>12p,2m,13s (24)</td>
<td>11p,1m,6s (18)</td>
<td>4p (4)</td>
<td>3p (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>10p,1m,13s  (24)</td>
<td>18p,3m,11s  (32)</td>
<td>8p,1m,7s (16)</td>
<td>1m (1)</td>
<td>3p,1s (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>22p,5m,9s   (36)</td>
<td>10p,1m,13s  (24)</td>
<td>3p,6s (9)</td>
<td>2p,2s (4)</td>
<td>4p,3s (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>5p,1m,1s    (7)</td>
<td>7p,2m,6s   (15)</td>
<td>13p,3m,14s (50)</td>
<td>7p,4s (11)</td>
<td>7p,6s (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>17p,1m,15s  (33)</td>
<td>11p,1m,16s  (28)</td>
<td>3p,1m (4)</td>
<td>5p,1m,2s (8)</td>
<td>4p,1m (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>13p,3m,8s   (24)</td>
<td>15p,3m,8s   (26)</td>
<td>5p,5s (10)</td>
<td>2p,5s (7)</td>
<td>4p,7s (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>16p,3m,8s   (27)</td>
<td>14p,2m,10s  (26)</td>
<td>5p,6s (11)</td>
<td>2p,1s (3)</td>
<td>3p,1m,8s (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>9p,2m,4s    (15)</td>
<td>12p,2m,14s  (28)</td>
<td>9p,1m,5s (15)</td>
<td>2p,3s (5)</td>
<td>6p,1m,7s (14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 16  COMPOSITE (omitting option b. which did not appear in the pilot schemes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Considerably</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Unsure</th>
<th>Scarcely</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>18p,6m,3s   (27)</td>
<td>30p,7m,29s (66)</td>
<td>1m,3s (4)</td>
<td>11p,1m,26s (38)</td>
<td>2p,1m,21s (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>17p,5m,28s  (50)</td>
<td>22p,8m,28s (58)</td>
<td>10p,1m,15s (24)</td>
<td>3p,1m,9s (13)</td>
<td>5p,3s (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>31p,10m,25s (66)</td>
<td>19p,6m,39s (64)</td>
<td>3p,9s (12)</td>
<td>3p,4s (7)</td>
<td>4p,5s (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>7p,1m,4s    (12)</td>
<td>11p,2m,18s  (31)</td>
<td>17p,6m,23s (56)</td>
<td>11p,5m,17s (33)</td>
<td>9p,1m,16s (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>23p,5m,35s  (63)</td>
<td>15p,5m,34s  (54)</td>
<td>3p,2m,16s (6)</td>
<td>10p,1m,8s (19)</td>
<td>6p,3m,3s (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>20p,5m,27s  (52)</td>
<td>18p,6m,23s  (47)</td>
<td>6p,5s (11)</td>
<td>7p,3m,10s (20)</td>
<td>7p,2m,17s (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Scarcely</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>27p,5m,25s (57)</td>
<td>22p,8m,19s (49)</td>
<td>5p,1m,8s (14)</td>
<td>2p,2m,12s (10)</td>
<td>3p,1m,16s (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>14p,2m,13s (29)</td>
<td>20p,6m,25s (51)</td>
<td>9p,5m,6s (20)</td>
<td>5p,18s (23)</td>
<td>8p,1m,20s (29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 18 PILOTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th>7p,5m,2ss,5ds (19)</th>
<th>6p,3m,7ss,11ds (27)</th>
<th>1ss (1)</th>
<th>1p,1m,4ms,5ds (11)</th>
<th>8ss,2ds (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>6p,4m,9ss,11ds (30)</td>
<td>6p,4m,7ss,10ds (27)</td>
<td>2p,1m,1ss,7ds (5)</td>
<td>2p,2ss (4)</td>
<td>2ss,1ds (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>6p,6m,14ss,17ds (43)</td>
<td>8p,2m,4ss,2ds (16)</td>
<td>1m (1)</td>
<td>2p,3ss,1ds (6)</td>
<td>1ss,2ds (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>1p,1m,1ss,8ds (11)</td>
<td>4p,1m,8ss,4ds (17)</td>
<td>1p,3m,3ss,3ds (10)</td>
<td>3p,3m,6ss,2ds (14)</td>
<td>4p,1m,2ss,1ds (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>3p,1m,6ss,2ds (12)</td>
<td>5p,4m,3ss,12ds (24)</td>
<td>1p,1m (2)</td>
<td>3p,3m,6ss,2ds (14)</td>
<td>2p,6ss,6ds (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>4p,1m,5ss,3ds (13)</td>
<td>3p,2m,5ss,6ds (16)</td>
<td>1p,1ds (2)</td>
<td>4p,4m,3ss,2ds (13)</td>
<td>4p,2m,8ss,9ds (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>6p,2ss (8)</td>
<td>4p,3m,2ss,4ds (13)</td>
<td>1p,1m,1ss (5)</td>
<td>2p,3m,4ss,5ds (14)</td>
<td>2p,1m,11ss,12ds (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>3p,1m,2ss (6)</td>
<td>7p,3m,3ss,4ds (17)</td>
<td>1p,2ms,2ds (5)</td>
<td>2p,4ss,4ds (10)</td>
<td>1p,2m,12ss,11ds (26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 19 MAIN SURVEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th>13p,2m,7s (22)</th>
<th>17p,2m,9s (28)</th>
<th>2p,1m,7s (10)</th>
<th>1p,2m,5s (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>11p,3m,15s (29)</td>
<td>11p,1m,5s (17)</td>
<td>9p,2m,7s (18)</td>
<td>4p,1m,1s (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>17p,4m,20s (41)</td>
<td>6p,2m,6s (14)</td>
<td>5p,3s (8)</td>
<td>1p (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>21p,5m,23s (49)</td>
<td>5p,1m,4s (10)</td>
<td>4p,3s (7)</td>
<td>1p,1s (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>8p,1m,6s (15)</td>
<td>9p,3m,9s (21)</td>
<td>10p,2m,7s (22)</td>
<td>3p,1s (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Scarcely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>7p, 9s</td>
<td>9p, 2m, 10s</td>
<td>7p, 3m, 2s</td>
<td>2p, 1m, 4s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>7p, 2m, 1s</td>
<td>5p, 1m, 4s</td>
<td>6p, 4s(10)</td>
<td>3p, 1m, 8s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>4p, 2m, 2s</td>
<td>9p, 2m, 4s</td>
<td>6p, 1m, 5s</td>
<td>4p, 2s(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>4p, 1m, 2s</td>
<td>10p, 2m, 9s</td>
<td>8p, 2s(10)</td>
<td>3p, 1s(4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 20** COMPOSITE (omitting option b. which did not appear in the pilot schemes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th>20p, 7m, 14s (41)</th>
<th>23p, 5m, 27s(55)</th>
<th>1s (1)</th>
<th>3p, 2m, 16s (21)</th>
<th>1p, 2m, 15s(18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>23p, 8m, 40s (71)</td>
<td>12p, 6m, 23s(31)</td>
<td>7p, 1m, 5s (13)</td>
<td>2p, 2s(4)</td>
<td>1p, 3s (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>27p, 11m, 54s(92)</td>
<td>13p, 3m, 10s(26)</td>
<td>4p, 1m, 3s (8)</td>
<td>3p, 5s(8)</td>
<td>5s (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>23p, 3m, 15s (26)</td>
<td>13p, 4m, 15s(32)</td>
<td>3p, 5m, 16s (32)</td>
<td>6p, 3m, 9s (18)</td>
<td>5p, 2m, 8s (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>10p, 1m, 17s (28)</td>
<td>14p, 6m, 25s(45)</td>
<td>8p, 4m, 4s (14)</td>
<td>5p, 4m, 12s (21)</td>
<td>5p, 16s (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>11p, 3m, 9s (23)</td>
<td>8p, 3m, 15s (26)</td>
<td>7p, 1m, 4s (12)</td>
<td>7p, 5m, 13s (29)</td>
<td>11p, 4m, 28s (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>10p, 2m, 4s (16)</td>
<td>13p, 5m, 10s(28)</td>
<td>7p, 2m, 6s (15)</td>
<td>6p, 3m, 11s (20)</td>
<td>8p, 4m, 37s(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>7p, 2m, 4s (13)</td>
<td>17p, 5m, 16s(38)</td>
<td>8p, 3m, 15s (26)</td>
<td>9p, 5m, 21s (35)</td>
<td>12p, 6m, 51s (69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 22** PILOTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th>5p, 6m, 3ss, 6ds (20)</th>
<th>7p, 3m, 15ss, 13s (38)</th>
<th>1ds (1)</th>
<th>3p, 1m, 4ss 4ds (12)</th>
<th>2p, 1ss, 1ds (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>2p, 3m, 5ss, 7ds (17)</td>
<td>8p, 4m, 12ss, 12s (36)</td>
<td>1p, 1ds, (2)</td>
<td>5p, 2m, 3ss 4ds (14)</td>
<td>1p, 3ss, 1ds (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>15p, 8m, 17ss, 16ds (56)</td>
<td>3p, 4m, 12ss, 8ds (36)</td>
<td>1ds (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Scarcely</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>10p,6m,16ss,15ds</td>
<td>5p,2m,6ss,6ds</td>
<td>1p,2ds</td>
<td>1p,1m,6ds</td>
<td>1ss,1ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>8p,4s,9ss,7ds</td>
<td>5p,2m,6ss,6ds</td>
<td>1p,1ss,1ds</td>
<td>6p,1m,2ss</td>
<td>2ss,4ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>7p,4m,9ss,11ds</td>
<td>5p,4m,10ss,9ds</td>
<td>1p,2ss,1ds</td>
<td>3p,1m,2ss</td>
<td>1ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>11p,1m,7ss,5ds</td>
<td>3p,6m,8ss,9ds</td>
<td>2ss,1ds</td>
<td>5p,2m,3ss,6ds</td>
<td>3ss,5ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>5p,4ss,1ds</td>
<td>5p,1m,3ss,8ds</td>
<td>1m,1ss,1ds</td>
<td>5p,6m,6ss,6ds</td>
<td>2p,1m,4ss,8ds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>5p,5ss,1ds</td>
<td>2p,1m,3ss,8ds</td>
<td>1m,1ss,1ds</td>
<td>7p,6m,8ss,6ds</td>
<td>3p,1m,5ss,9ds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 23 MAIN SURVEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th>12p,2m,2s</th>
<th>22p,5m,18s</th>
<th>4p,4s</th>
<th>1p,3s</th>
<th>2p,1s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>15p,2m,2s</td>
<td>18p,4m,16s</td>
<td>7p,1m,4s</td>
<td>5s</td>
<td>1s,2p,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>30p,5m,18s</td>
<td>9p,2m,9s</td>
<td>2p,2s</td>
<td>1p,1s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>22p,4m,15s</td>
<td>11p,3m,10s</td>
<td>6p,4s</td>
<td>1p</td>
<td>1p,1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>13p,3m,9s</td>
<td>22p,3m,8s</td>
<td>4p,4s</td>
<td>1p,5s</td>
<td>1p,1m,1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>15p,4m,10s</td>
<td>16p,2m,11s</td>
<td>6p,3s</td>
<td>1s</td>
<td>1m,1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>18p,4m,14s</td>
<td>7p,1m,6s</td>
<td>8p,1m,7s</td>
<td>6p</td>
<td>2p,1m,3s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>8p,2m,2s</td>
<td>7p,3m,8s</td>
<td>11p,1m,5s</td>
<td>6p,5s</td>
<td>10p,1m,10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>6p,2m</td>
<td>7p,2m,8s</td>
<td>11p,1m,4s</td>
<td>6p,1m,6s</td>
<td>12p,1m,12s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>Considerably</td>
<td>Moderately</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Scarcely</td>
<td>Not at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>17p, 8m, 11s (36)</td>
<td>29p, 8m, 46s (83)</td>
<td>4p, 5s (9)</td>
<td>4p, 1m, 11s (16)</td>
<td>4p, 3s (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>17p, 5m, 14s (36)</td>
<td>26p, 8m, 40s (74)</td>
<td>8p, 1m, 5s (14)</td>
<td>5p, 2m, 12s (19)</td>
<td>3p, 5s (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>45p, 13m, 51s (109)</td>
<td>12p, 4m, 23s (39)</td>
<td>2p, 3s (5)</td>
<td>1p, 1s (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>32p, 10m, 46s (88)</td>
<td>16p, 5m, 22s (43)</td>
<td>7p, 6s (13)</td>
<td>2p, 1m, 6s (9)</td>
<td>1p, 3s (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>21p, 7m, 25s (53)</td>
<td>27p, 5m, 20s (52)</td>
<td>5p, 6s (11)</td>
<td>7p, 1m, 11s (19)</td>
<td>2p, 1m, 7s (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>22p, 8m, 30s (60)</td>
<td>21p, 6m, 30s (57)</td>
<td>7p, 6s (13)</td>
<td>3p, 1m, 5s (9)</td>
<td>1m, 2s (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>29p, 5m, 26s (60)</td>
<td>10p, 7m, 22s (39)</td>
<td>8p, 1m, 10s (19)</td>
<td>11p, 2m, 9s (22)</td>
<td>2p, 1m, 11s (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>13p, 2m, 7s (22)</td>
<td>12p, 4m, 19s (35)</td>
<td>11p, 2m, 7s (20)</td>
<td>11p, 6m, 17s (34)</td>
<td>12p, 2m, 22s (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>11p, 2m, 6s (19)</td>
<td>9p, 1m, 21s (32)</td>
<td>11p, 2m, 6s (19)</td>
<td>13p, 7m, 20s (40)</td>
<td>15p, 2m, 26s (43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX THREE

A.3. SURVEY-QUESTIONNAIRE AND ASSOCIATED CORRESPONDENCE

A.3.i. Survey-questionnaire (4 pages).

A.3.ii. Covering letter to primary school headteachers,
       Main Survey.

A.3.iii. Covering letter to secondary school headteachers,
        Main Survey.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND MORAL EDUCATION

It would be a great help if this questionnaire were returned by 20 September, 1983. But better late than never!

1. INTRODUCTION

1.01. Please tick appropriate boxes.

Teacher Headteacher Infant First Primary Middle Secondary

1.02. Do you consider that, ideally, schools should have separate Religious Education and Moral Education departments/specialists?

Yes ☐ No ☐

1.03. Do you know of any school which has separate departments/specialists? Please specify:

2. GENERAL POLICY ON RE/ME

2.01. Which do you personally regard as the most valid policy for Religious Education and Moral Education in schools?

a. RE AS A SUBSIDIARY TO ME

☐ Education in morals, which would include the ethical teachings of the religions as supportive, but minor, elements.

b. ME AS SUBSIDIARY TO RE

☐ Education in religion, which would regard the ethical teachings of the religions as the main material for ME.

c. RE AS A MAJOR PART OF ME

☐ Education in morals, which would include a major study of the ethical dimensions of the religions, but with little attention to other dimensions.

d. ME AS A MAJOR PART OF RE

☐ Education in religion, which would include specific ME-material having no direct connection with the religions, but in greater measure than might occur in (b).

e. THE STUDY OF CHRISTIANITY

☐ Education in Christianity to provide a perspective on all other moral and religious systems.

2.02. Please specify any further category nearer your own views.

2.03. Which of the above five policies does your school come nearest to operating? a. ☐ b. ☐ c. ☐ d. ☐ e. ☐

2.04. Please indicate if and why you may consider that none of the above categories, in 2.01, applies to your school. DO NOT SPECIFY WHICH SCHOOL.
TEXT BOUND INTO THE SPINE
3. SPECIFIC POLICY RELATIONSHIPS IN RE/ME

3.01. Does your school mount Personal Relationships Courses, which separate to anything mounted as part of the school's RE program?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

3.02. If 'yes' to 3.01, please outline the aims and scope of the course.

3.03. If 'yes' to 3.01, are these courses:

a. Mounted and staffed exclusively by the RE department
b. Mounted, but not exclusively staffed, by the RE department?
c. Contributed to, but not directed by, the RE staff?
d. Not open to an RE staff contribution?
e. Not contributed to by RE staff as a matter of RE dept. policy?

3.04. Please add further comment if you wish, especially upon those reasons which have resulted in answers (d) and (e). PLEASE NOT SPECIFY SCHOOL.

3.05. If 'no' to 3.01, does the RE department feel it necessary to provide short Personal Relationships Courses as part-material?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

3.06. If 'yes' to 3.05, does the material of these courses:

a. Seek to commend only Christian values?
b. Seek to make explicit the links that may exist between the P.R. material and religions generally?
c. Seek to avoid direct references to the religions?

3.07. If 'no' to 3.05, would you consider that, in schools where P.R. courses were operated, (i) as part of RE, they should aim at:

3.06a? [ ] 3.06b? [ ] 3.06c? [ ]

(ii) separate from RE, they should aim at:

3.06a? [ ] 3.06b? [ ] 3.06c? [ ]

3.07. It has been said that it is too risky to link Moral Education closely with Religious Education, for rejection of religious belief might encourage rejection of moral values based upon the belief. Would you see this opinion as a stimulus to

a. Strengthen the religious base to Moral Education?
b. Find a non-religious base to Moral Education?

3.08. If you ticked 3.07a would you say this involved commending the acceptance of religious belief, rather than its appraisal? Please comment.

3.09. Please add any further comments you wish.
### 4. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RE/ME AIMS

**KEY**
- C = considerably
- M = moderately
- U = Uncertain
- S = scarcely
- N = Not at all

#### 4.01. How do you evaluate the importance of the following aims for Moral Education, when taught as part of Religious Education?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>M</th>
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<th>S</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. To support school rules</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. To relate skill-acquisition in morality to the additional help that may be gained from religion, in this area</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. To foster understanding of the term 'rational moral principles'</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. To foster a pupil life-style based on consideration of others' interests, but appealing to religion to support acceptance of such a life-style</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. To foster the ethic of 'enlightened self-interest' but bringing this under a religious critique.</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. To provide information about the moral stances of the main world religions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>g. To help pupils to an acceptance of the Judaeo-Christian ethic, as summarised in the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>h. To encourage pupils to look on God as a helper towards moral development</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. To handle the argument that the existence of moral consciousness in man is evidence of the existence and moral nature of God</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.02. How would you evaluate the above aims, in 4.01, for Moral Education as an exercise in its own right, independent of RE?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b., but omitting any reference to religion</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c., but making no appeal to religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>d., but making no religious critique</td>
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<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.03. Please comment further
5. MORAL INCENTIVES

5.01. As a general rule, without considering individual cases, how would you grade in importance the following answers to the pupil question 'why be good'? ?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
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<td>c</td>
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<td>h</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Pleasurable consequences to oneself of one's 'good' actions
b. Unpleasant consequences to oneself of not 'being good'
c. Pleasurable consequences to others of one's 'good' actions
d. Unpleasant consequences to others of one's not 'being good'
e. Pleasurable consequences to oneself if everybody were 'good'
f. Unpleasant consequences to oneself if no one tried to be 'good'
g. Love is self-evidently right
h. God is pleased when one is 'good'
i. God is displeased when one is not 'good'

5.02. How would you handle this question 'why be good?', when put by the pupil, if differently from the suggestions in (a) - (i)?

5.03. Please add any further comments you wish about any point in the questionnaire, in particular if your school mounts socio- moral course not fitting the description 'Personal Relationships Courses' as used in this questionnaire.

5.04. Please indicate whether school is voluntary or maintained.
I do hope you will be able to participate in this research-scheme, which has the approval of the Nottingham L.E.A., and is so designed as to guarantee anonymity.

The experience of your school would be of help, and, although your time must be occupied with many demands, it may be possible for you to complete and return the questionnaire. Certainly it would be much appreciated and very valuable if you would do so.

I look forward to your kind co-operation.

With thanks,

Yours sincerely,

Norman A. Richards.
Senior Lecturer, Derbyshire College of Higher Education.
Religious and Moral Education Survey

Address as per s.a.e.

August, 1983.

May I ask that you pass this questionnaire to your Head of RE, with the request that he/she complete and return it, as part of a research scheme in religious and moral education?

The survey has the approval of the Nottingham L.E.A., and is so designed as to guarantee anonymity.

I do appreciate the heavy demands made upon secondary schools, and, therefore, should be particularly grateful for your kind co-operation.

With thanks,

Yours sincerely,

Norman A. Richards.

Senior Lecturer, Derbyshire College of Higher Education.
APPENDIX FOUR

A.4. ABBREVIATIONS

A.E.C. Association for Education in Citizenship.
Association of Education Committees (pp. 13, 14).

A.E.W.C. Association for Education in World Citizenship.

A.G.M. Annual General Meeting.

A.R.E. Association for Religious Education.

A.T.C.D.E. Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education.

B.B.C. British Broadcasting Corporation.

B.C.C. British Council of Churches.

B.F.B.S. British and Foreign Bible Society.

B.H.A. British Humanist Association.

B.J.E.P. British Journal of Educational Psychology.

B.J.E.S. British Journal of Educational Studies.

B.J.R.E. British Journal of Religious Education.

C.A.C.E. Central Advisory Council for Education.

C.C. County Council.

C.C.P.R. Central Council of Physical Recreation.

C.E.A. Conference of Educational Associations.

C.E.C. Catholic Education Council.

C.E.M. Christian Education Movement.

cf. confer (compare).

C.I.O. Church Information Office.
C.O.I.  Central Office of Information.
DES  Department of Education and Science.
D.R.R.  Durham Research Review.
E.A.  Education Authority.
E.C.  Education Committee.
Ed.  Edition (when immediately preceded by a number).
Ed. (s).  Editor (s).
eg.  exempli gratia (for example).
E.R.  Educational Research.
et al.  et alii (and others).
E.U.  Ethical Union.
G.C.E.  General Certificate of Education.
H. and S.  Hodder and Stoughton.
H.M.I.  His/Her Majesty's Inspector.
H.M.S.O.  His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Ibid.  Ibidem (in the same work).
I.C.E.  Institute of Christian Education.
ILEA  Inner-London Education Authority.
inter al.  inter alia (among other things).
I. of E.  Institute of Education.
I.S.C.F.  Inter-School Christian Fellowship.
I.T.A. Independent Television Authority.
I.T.V. Independent Television.
I.V.P. Inter-Varsity Press.
LEA Local Education Authority.
L. for L. Learning for Living.
MACOS Man: A Course of Study.
ME Moral Education.
M. Ed. Master of Education.
M.E.L. Moral Education League.
MEP Morally Educated Person.
M.P. Member of Parliament.
M. Sc. Master of Science.
N.F.F. National Froebel Foundation.
N.O.P. National Opinion Poll.
N.S. National Society (for Promoting Religious Education).
N.S.S. National Secular Society.
N.U.T. National Union of Teachers.
C.T. Old Testament.
O.U.P. Oxford University Press.
p. (p.) page(s).
P.R. Personal Relationships.
P.S.E. Personal and Social Education.
R.C. Roman Catholic.
RE Religious Education.
R.E.P. Religious Education Press.
R.I. Religious Instruction.
R. in E. Religion in Education.
RME Religious and Moral Education.
ROSIA Raising of the School Leaving Age.
S.A.C.R.E. Standing Advisory Council for Religious Education.
S.C. Schools Council.
St. Saint.
S.P.C.K. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.
T.E.S. Times Educational Supplement.
T.U.C. Trades Union Congress.
T.V. Television.
U.L.I.E. University of London Institute of Education.
U.L.P. University of London Press.
U.N.I.E. University of Nottingham Institute of Education.
U.S.A. United States of America.
U.T.P. University Tutorial Press.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES

B.1. Agreed Syllabuses and Handbooks.
B.3. Dissertations and Theses.
B.5. Periodicals.
B.6. Reports.
B.7. Research-surveys.
B.8. Survey of Teachers and Headteachers.
B.9. Texts Consulted and Referred to in Script.
B.10. Texts Consulted but not Referred to in Script.
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Church Times.

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Durham Research Review.

Economist.

Education.

Education 3-13.
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In 1983, 346 schools were approached with a questionnaire about the relationship between RE and ME. There were 167 respondents, ranging from infants teachers to secondary teachers. The project involved two pilot-schemes, one in Sheffield, the other in Derbyshire. The Main Survey was conducted in Nottinghamshire. Primary schools in each area, along with Sheffield middle schools, were selected on the criterion of known interest in RE and/or ME. Secondary schools, along with Nottinghamshire middle schools, were circulated in toto. The Derbyshire scheme was among
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