CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICY IN ENGLAND: A POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE

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CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN ENGLAND: A POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE

Abstract

The aim of this study is to present a critique of recent citizenship education policy in England and the discourse that it has prompted. It considers the important philosophical and political principles by which both of these are justified, and which often incorporate a commitment to the pursuit of social justice, democratic participation, inclusion and equality. In developing this critique the thesis draws on philosophical ideas which may be referred to as post-structuralism, particularly Foucault’s concept of governmentality, and Derrida’s concept of deconstruction to examine and expose the universalist principles of enlightenment philosophy upon which recent citizenship policy and discourse are based.

In order to achieve this aim the thesis is divided into three parts. Part One provides a narrative account of citizenship education policy in England and considers the enlightenment philosophy on which it has been erected. Part Two develops a post-structuralist critique of enlightenment philosophy and uses this as a basis for reconsidering the project of mass education and schooling in general and citizenship education policy in particular. Part Three of the thesis criticises the discourse that citizenship education has prompted and develops a detailed critique of the particular approach to citizenship education emanating from the position of cosmopolitanism.

Put briefly, the main conclusion to be drawn from the inquiry undertaken in the thesis is that recent citizenship education policy can best be understood as an exercise in liberal governmentality, with the aim of shaping “the conduct of conduct” within a normative, disciplinary rationality. However, although this conclusion renders problematic the ambitions of progressive-radical critique, including cosmopolitanism, to prescribe a citizenship education for democracy and social justice, it is suggested that these ambitions can be usefully reformulated through a deconstructive analysis of policy and discourse.
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DfEE – Department for Education and Employment
DfES – Department for Education and Science
ERA – Education Reform Act
GCSE – General Certificate of Secondary Education
NCC – National Curriculum Council
NfER – National Foundation for Educational Research
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
OFSTED – Office for Standards in Education
PGCE – Post-Graduate Certificate of Education
QCA – Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
SENCO – Special Educational Needs Co-ordinator
TTA – Teacher Training Agency
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
UNCRC - United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
UNDHR – United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
US(A) – United States (of America)
WSF – World Social Forum
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Introduction

1. The research focus

This thesis seeks to consider the contribution of schooling to the formation of future citizens within two recent contexts, one relating to educational policy, the second to philosophical ideas. The first context forms the research field of the thesis, the second the research perspective it employs. It is presented as an exploration of philosophical ideas and a consideration of their implications for aspects of policy and discourse relating to citizenship education in England in the opening decade of the twenty-first century.

An overt framework for citizenship education began to emerge in England at the beginning of the 1990s (NCC 1990) and reached a state of a fully developed policy framework in 1999 (DfEE 1999), which was implemented as a statutory curriculum requirement in English secondary schools from 2002. The policy document which proposed this framework is *Education for Citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools: Final report of the Advisory Group on citizenship* (QCA 1998) (commonly referred to as the Crick Report). This was produced by an advisory group established in 1997 by the then Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett, and chaired by the academic, and long-time advocate of political education in schools, Professor, later Sir Bernard Crick (Crick 2000). The new citizenship education it advocated was a radical and novel exercise of power over schools, teachers and learners with its objectives, the shaping of future citizens, being an overtly defined educational ambition. The review of this policy is the first dimension of the research field of this thesis.

The policy framework articulates its own educational justifications and these will be identified and subjected to critique. However, it will also be analysed in a wider, problematic and dynamic social-political context. The thesis will explore the emergent conditions that prompted the policy, and the ideas and philosophical pre-suppositions that have shaped its form, its prescriptions, the critique it has provoked and its potential effects. This, in turn, will occur within a broader philosophical consideration of the nature of society, the play of power within society and the conditions of citizenship in England in the 21st century.
In addition to analysing policy formulation and enactment, the thesis will review the significant academic discourse that citizenship education policy has prompted concerning the process of citizen formation and the practice of citizenship education (see, for example Davies et al 2005, Enslin and White 2003, Kiwan 2008, Kymlicka and Norman 2000, McLaughlin 2000, Osler 2000, Osler and Starkey 2005, Tooley 2000). In particular, the thesis will focus on a specific text which has responded to citizenship education policy in the context of England. *Changing Citizenship* (Osler and Starkey 2005) offers a significant criticism of the Crick Report, based on concerns with issues relating to citizenship education in the context of a diverse, pluralistic society; concerns principally about racism, inequality and exclusion as barriers to social justice, criticism articulated from a position of *cosmopolitanism*. The review of this academic discourse is the second dimension of the research field of this thesis.

2. The research perspective

The research perspective adopted in the thesis draws on those developments in philosophy loosely labelled *post-structuralism*. The two concepts emerging from post-structuralist philosophy that will be applied to citizenship education policy and discourse are *governmentality* (the understanding of government and power in society as developed by Michel Foucault 1926-1984), and *deconstruction* (the understanding of the role of power in language, developed by Jacques Derrida 1930-2004).

The ideas of Foucault and Derrida sit in a collection of late-20th century philosophical developments which challenge the ideas which have dominated philosophical thinking in the modern period, roughly the last two hundred and fifty years. They propose a post-modern understanding of the world which unsettles some of the central tenets of modernist thinking. In this thesis *modernist* ideas will be referred to as *enlightenment* thought, ideas and philosophy. The challenge of post-structuralist philosophy to enlightenment thought will be introduced below and further articulated in this thesis.

The concept of *governmentality*, developed by Foucault, has a principal focus on the nature and exercise of power in society, on how power secures the governability of the governed (Foucault 1991b, Foucault 2007). Whilst enlightenment thinking considers power as a social phenomenon that provides restraint on the exercise of individual free will, the idea of
governmentality ascribes to power the responsibility, not just to restrain the individual, but to bring the individual into existence and to bear on the body and self-conception of the individual in profound ways. The analytical potential of governmentality will require, in brief, an outline of Foucault's concept, and how it enabled him to develop an analysis of changing governmental rationalities and regimes in the context of European states from the medieval to the modern period. Governmentality will then be used to offer new insights into contemporary social and political conditions, and to education in particular. In addressing citizenship education policy, the thesis will draw on Foucault's analysis of liberal governmentality, importantly distinguished from enlightenment liberal philosophy, which has been the dominant rationality of government for the last two centuries. Additionally, relatively recent social and political circumstances, defined in a Foucauldian way as neo-liberal governmentality, will also be considered as offering insights into educational policy and currents of citizen formation in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Significantly for this thesis, the concept of governmentality sees schools and education policy as an important normative disciplinary technology within society, seeking to secure stability and the optimum development of social resources. The emergence of citizenship education as policy and practice in England will be analysed as such a disciplinary strategy.

The second conceptual tool taken from post-structuralist philosophy is the concept, or rather analytical approach, of deconstruction as developed by Jacques Derrida (Derrida 1994, Caputo 1997). In many ways the ideas of Foucault and of Derrida are diverse. Foucault sets out to analyse governmental rationality as an objective, yet constantly fluid, strategy of power as exercised through the governmental technology available to the state and brought to bear on individuals so as to orchestrate the conduct of conduct. In contrast, deconstruction asserts the centrality of textual discourse in the construction of meaning and reality, and seeks to analyse the role power plays in that textual discourse in its attempt to secure the stability of meaning and a closure of discourse and debate. Deconstruction offers an analytical approach which shows how discourse as power can be opened, questioned and critiqued, with an overt ethical commitment to and responsibility for the future. Whilst the two concepts open up diverse areas of focus, what they have in common is an insistence that universal definitions of meaning and reality, and essentialist elaborations of principles and values, should be challenged. The connectivity between governmentality and deconstruction thus lies in the challenge they both pose to enlightenment thinking, that is the tradition of philosophical
thinking located in the eighteenth century European Enlightenment which underpins ideas of modernity. This modern tradition will be elaborated in further detail Chapter Two.

Because it adopts relativistic definitions of truth and meaning, some have questioned the ability of post-structuralism to secure a basis for social practice (Himmelfarb 1994), or an ethical vision (Guttmann 1987, Inglis 2003). Nevertheless it is the intention of this thesis to assert unequivocally an ethical context for the practice of citizenship education in a society understood in post-modern terms. It will be argued that post-structuralist philosophical ideas assert the centrality of society, of power and of reciprocity between individuals, to the construction and sustaining of life. In a contemporary milieu they challenge the excessive cultural celebration of individualism in recent contemporary times and have the potential to re-assert a sense of collectivity and community. They also insist on the ethical responsibility of the utterance, the iteration of the present, shorn if the irresponsibility of certainty. In a more epochal sense they offer the possibilities of a new enlightenment (Derrida 1990).

In a particular sense for this thesis, Foucault's concept of governmentality, by considering the way power is inevitably brought to bear on the individual, offers a meaningful understanding of the school as a social institution and education as a social practice. It offers also an acknowledgement of the contingent strategies of power. Deconstruction, as developed by Derrida, insists upon the ethical responsibility to subject power, as expressed through discourse, policy and practice, to critique. It is linked to an analysis of language as a system of signs, signifiers, which seek to stabilise meaning in an inevitably unstable world. When language is at the disposal of power, it seeks to stabilise meaning, rationale and principles, which, if approached deconstructively, can be made to open up alternative meanings and possibilities. Importantly, whilst opening power to a post-structuralist analysis, it makes possible alternative conceptions of the possibilities of power. It is this opening which is the expression of ethical responsibility. It is this opening that carries implications for education for citizenship.

Although the research method of this thesis is based on governmentality and deconstruction, it needs to be said that these are far from fixed concepts of stable and clear veracity. Indeed in themselves they represent a grouping of philosophical ideas that actually challenge the claim to stability attached to meaning and truth understood in any universalist, modernist sense. Derridean deconstruction is a critical method of approaching text, but not a formula. It makes only a proposition 'that the methodological policing and purification of language, to
make it behave properly with respect to its superiors, can never succeed' (MacLure 2003). This opens up the potential of a critique of the play of power and language, and raises a challenge for the reading of text, and it also demands a careful reflection on the act of writing a thesis such as this. Similarly governmentality is not a concept claiming any abstract universal truth. It might be best described as a method of analysis which seeks to identify how power works in society in endlessly changing and fluid ways, how power works to create contingent truths, regimes of truth, and to un-create them. These are challenging methods to adopt for a researcher and writer. Foucault described his own research and writing as 'experience books' (Masschelein 2007 p.149), not truth books or demonstration books, neither also books about experience, but books through which the writer and reader discover something new, perceive something differently rather than establish a stable or universal truth. This thesis will also be a work of experience in Foucault's sense. It will learn more about its method and about its field in the very process of its writing. It will also, it is anticipated, change the author. Perhaps all, or much writing is of this nature.

3. The structure

The thesis will argue that policy and mainstream academic discourse related to citizenship education owe their conceptual allegiances to enlightenment thinking. It will then argue that post-structuralism implies significant challenges to enlightenment thinking, and requires us to consider policy, practice and discourse anew. In order to sustain this argument the thesis is organised in three parts.

Part One introduces the historical and theoretical context. Chapter One offers a broad outline of citizenship education in the period of mass schooling in England, becoming more detailed in the period of the English National Curriculum from 1988. Chapter Two reviews the philosophical perspective of modernism indicating how enlightenment thinking conceives of the social and political world in essentialist, universalist ways. Chapter Two will end with an initial expression of doubt about the certainties of enlightenment philosophy.

Part Two consists of Chapters Three, Four and Five. Chapter Three sets out the general principles of post-structuralist philosophy, in particular the concepts of governmentality and deconstruction. It will be made clear where the implications of post-structuralism radically
unsettle the assumptions of enlightenment thinking, yet offer a philosophical outlook that is more reflexive and ethically charged. Chapter Four applies the concepts of *governmentality* to the general development of mass education in England, ending with the mobilisation of *deconstruction* to transcend tendencies for power to preclude contestation. Chapter Five analyses the Crick framework for citizenship education in post-structuralist terms. The outline of this policy has been presented earlier in this Introduction, and is analysed in more detail in Chapter One. The Crick framework calls for the teaching of *democracy* (QCA 1998), and it is at this point in the thesis that concepts that play an important role in a pedagogy of citizenship, such as *democracy, rights, freedom*, will begin to be considered.

Part Three of the thesis consists of Chapters Six and Seven. Chapter Six considers the critical discourse which has been prompted by the citizenship education policy in England. It will discuss a number of texts highlighting their common sharing of enlightenment assumptions. The last chapter of the thesis will concentrate on a particular recently articulated discourse relating to citizenship education. This discourse, it will be argued, draws strongly on a progressive-radical tradition of critique but develops it into the idea of an education for *cosmopolitan citizenship* (Osler and Starkey 2005). This critique has, in recent years, tended to replace the social-democratic progressive-radical critique as an oppositional discourse to national policy, asserting the need for citizenship education to adopt a more radical position in a globalised world based on cosmopolitan principles and a commitment to social justice and inclusion. The text *Changing Citizenship* argues that there are serious shortcomings in citizenship education policy based on the Crick model. *Changing Citizenship* seeks to emphasise the current globalised context of citizenship and the ethical goals of social justice, emancipation, diversity and equality. Chapter Seven will argue that cosmopolitan citizenship is also based on modernist assumptions, and therefore can be reconsidered in important ways from a post-structuralist perspective. The analysis and prescriptions of *Changing Citizenship* are considered through the post-structuralist lens offered by the concepts of *governmentality* and *deconstruction*, so as to assess *Changing Citizenship*’s potential contribution to the ethical objectives of citizenship education. This will, like Chapter Five, consider some pedagogic implications.

The thesis will have indicated the enlightenment nature of the idea of citizenship on which the current citizenship education project in England seeks justification, and also the way enlightenment assumptions inform the discourse and contestations it has provoked. It will
argue that post-structuralist philosophy offers important new insights which ask us to consider educational policy and practice differently.

To summarise, the research questions this thesis considers are:

- What are the philosophical assumptions of enlightenment modernism and how do these conceptualise education for citizenship? (Chapters One and Two)
- How do post-structuralist ideas unsettle and undermine modernist assumptions and offer new insights into educational policy and practice? (Chapters Three and Four)
- What particular implications do post-structuralist ideas have for an understanding of citizenship education policy and practice? (Chapter Five)
- What are the modernist assumptions of discourse relating to citizenship education policy (Chapter Six)
- What are the ethical and practical implications of reconsidering cosmopolitan citizenship in post-structuralist terms? (Chapter Seven)

Enlightenment philosophy and assumptions inform a variety of political positions within western democratic traditions, termed right, left, conservative, liberal, radical. Critique and criticism of political structures and practice, of social conditions and, more centrally for this thesis, of education policy, have a strong presence in the left, progressive-radical political tradition. This thesis will be particularly interested in the way that post-structuralist philosophy challenges many assumptions of the left progressive-radical critique, a critique which this author has in the past considered central to ontological self-definition. It will be argued that the progressive-radical critique of power and policy is fundamentally located in the same enlightenment assumptions as its oppositional ideological target, and that post-structuralist ideas, explored in Chapter Three, provoke a serious unsettling of these assumptions.

This thesis acknowledges the historic compromising and marginalisation of modernist left progressive-radical critiques that has occurred in the last decade of the twentieth century, both in their social-democratic and revolutionary Marxian variants. Post-structuralism, discussed in Chapter Three, contributes to the unsettling of the arguably easy ethical certainties that have underpinned the progressive-radical position. Post-structuralism can offer opportunities for understanding anew the ground on which we stand, and can support a
different analysis and critique of power. This area of consideration has personal resonances for the author who has occupied a left progressive-radical political identity for much of his politically conscious life.

4. The author's position

It is appropriate that this introduction should reveal some aspects of its author's position with regard to the subject of the study. The author is implicit and implicated in the citizenship education initiative as a university-based initial teacher trainer of secondary citizenship teachers. This professional responsibility sits alongside similar responsibilities in the area of secondary history teacher training, and follows twenty years work as a history teacher in English secondary schools in the north of England. This makes the author both an active agent in the development of citizenship education in the English secondary curriculum subject to state prescription, and a member of an academic community to support that development. I work within the frameworks and in many ways have to be considered to be an agent of government policy. However, through this thesis it is hoped that I can stand back from these engagements so as to offer a valid discussion and critique of the policy supporting citizenship education and the discourse that surrounds it. This biography is presented so as to contribute to illuminating the rationale for undertaking this thesis and the research questions it is pursuing, and to acknowledge the way that personal experience and ideological affiliations may well come to bear on the focus and development of its argument.

If life history research brings with it the danger of a descent into narcissism (Sikes 2006, Standish 2004), then it is hoped that this danger is avoided in this section. The purpose of offering up my position for scrutiny is to open my own subjectivity to view, reflecting on the intellectual and professional context that I bring to this study. It will, I hope, serve positively the purpose of highlighting a sense of the struggle for understanding that is a part of all human life, not only in the pursuit of a research project.

The author has an on-going professional role within the citizenship education policy initiative in England as the course leader for a Citizenship Post-Graduate Certificate of Education (PGCE) qualification in an English university, conferring on completing students Qualified Teacher Status as recognised by the General Teaching Council for England. This role is carried out alongside a longer held similar role of leading a PGCE history course. It is
within the history education subject community, initially as a secondary school history teacher, and latterly as a history teacher trainer, that thirty years of professional practice and experience has occurred.

In this section I want to reflect on my experience as a pupil, student, teacher and teacher trainer, and consider how my interest in history education and citizenship education converge. I want to reflect on, and hope to make clear, the ideological and political perspectives on which my professional practice has been based, and consider how they have changed and why. This is a process of self-examination which, I hope, will contribute to the development of the discussion of citizenship education that is to be the focus of this study, but will also contribute to equipping the reader to evaluate and critique the arguments I will propose from biographical reference.

The field of practice and discourse this thesis analyses is secondary education in general, and citizenship education in particular. This biography will assert the significance of the social and political context of the enactment of education. Education is a social practice that the author has experience as a pupil and as a professional stretching back now almost half a century. My experience as a secondary-phase pupil was in a selective grammar school serving a constellation of predominantly working class, small northern towns. I was the first of my immediate family of parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, to enjoy what might be termed educational success. I was one of only two children from my junior school’s final year pupils, numbering about thirty five, to be selected for the local area’s grammar school, the rest being directed to the town’s secondary modern school, a school serving those defined as less-able within the terms of the 11+ selection exam that was the basis of this transition. It seemed to me, even as a child, that this was potentially a life turning moment.

It was a perception that stayed with me through secondary school, and one that deepened in social and political significance as I grew older. I began to question the legitimacy of the segregation that the system had administered, and to seek for an understanding of the purposes and interests being served by it. The curriculum I experienced as a grammar school pupil, arguably efficiently and effectively taught for the purposes of propelling a proportion of the school’s pupils into higher education, and within which I continued to experience relative success, did not allay my concerns about its purposes and legitimacy. The assumptions that underpinned the school and the curriculum were rarely questioned, and were usually justified with reference to the route to university, and the dismal prospects that its
alternative would imply. The most illuminating area of study for me was history, where the insights into political and social development hinted at processes of social governance, community and individual experience and agency that could begin to explain the world I lived in. Schooling, it increasingly seemed to me, worked to restrict rather than enable the full exploitation of personal potential. In the mid-to-late 1960s, when my secondary schooling occurred, there was much talk of the establishment as an elitist and out-dated constellation, and the system as a structure that supported vested interest and privilege; insensitive to the moral imperatives of equality and personal fulfilment. I perceived the system, and the role of education within it, to be complicit in actively promoting inequalities and preserving privileges, albeit offering the prospect of sharing some of those privileges with a few who could be recruited by the system.

In the cultural, or counter-cultural, currents of the late 1960s, I was of a mind that certain locations of education were the preserve of elites, elites that dominated a society that was built on inequality, exploitation and which restrained the full exploration of personal creativity and potential. I reflected on the divide between the social position I was born into, and the social position education was suggesting I aspire to. This concern with social hierarchy and inequalities, with its reasons and meanings, led to the formulation of a more radical critique of education in my mind, seeing it, not just as a system restricting creativity and personal development, but a system actively perpetuating a society based on exploitation and injustice. Just as libertarian counter-cultural influences supported my earlier critique of education, socialist and radical discourse infused the latter.

I went to university following my instinct for the value of history as a subject. As an undergraduate the two perspectives on schooling outlined above continued to resonate in my thinking, with the latter radical critique developing in its conceptual underpinnings with a more intimate reading of radical discourse, alongside the then growth of radical approaches to historical study. A structural-materialist understanding of the movement of history, coupled with a perception of locations of struggle in contemporary society, at political, economic and socio-cultural levels, consolidated in my view of society. I decided to train as a secondary history teacher.

I had decided that schools were a location where I could work with my subject enthusiasm, my critique of society, and even of education, where I might make things better for individuals, and potentially contribute to the development of critical capacities in our
communities, capacities that would work to promote a more equitable and just society. Whilst not being doctrinaire, my teaching had a community and social progress rationale, not simply an academic excellence rationale. My teaching would be an ethical working from within to realise a socially progressive purpose for education, to pursue, through the teaching of history and related humanities, not just academic achievement, but also a critical understanding in learners that would enable them to perceive the limits that society orders for them, and to act to re-order it. This, I theorised, would support collective agency that would contribute to an eventual re-structuring of society on a more equable and just basis. My entry into the profession coincided with a significant shift away from selective education, towards community-based comprehensive education, a move I supported as working against the selection and division of the growing generation at 11 years old that I had experienced, but never been able to justify, a mechanism which, furthermore, I had perceived to be at the heart of the process of the social reproduction of inequality, exploitation and a chronic limiting of critical faculties in the citizenry. I duly took up my first post as a history teacher in a suburban school, converted, the year before I arrived, from a secondary modern school to a comprehensive school.

It is also worth noting that my entry into the profession coincided with a period of rapid change in pedagogical practice, as well as institutional circumstances. In particular the teaching of secondary history was subject to a radical critique, which characterised traditional practice as infused with imperialist and colonial assumptions and nationalist pretensions; a subject where learners were required to passively receive and regurgitate a diet of historical content considered to be conveying the, often hidden, ideological perspectives of an out-dated establishment elite. In its place there was a call for secondary history to become an active, critical, enquiry-based study. Pupils were to be versed in the skills of historical enquiry, with a critical approach to evidence and to testimony, equipped to identify ideological bias, propagandist motivations behind interpretations of historical circumstances, events and developments in society. They were invited to appreciate the play of power, wealth and influence, on the construction of historical reality accounts. To a teacher with a radical perspective, and a moral critique of the excesses of Cold War propagandising, of the perceived elitist pretensions of the political and social establishment, this seemed a pedagogy that supported the development of essential critical capacities in our communities.

As a history teacher I was conscious of my work having a political context. To me history inevitably related to current political conditions, and the history teacher could not work
outside political contexts, which either supported a status quo which tolerated and even supported inequality and exploitation, or sought to question and undermine them. For me these were the civic implications of history teaching. It seemed essentially necessary to combine history teaching with a consideration of current political events and debates. This took me into areas that might, in the current curriculum context, be defined as citizenship education. I organised mock elections in school, to coincide with General Elections in the country. These were active, participatory, cross-curricular, whole-school activities. They involved classroom learning in what might be termed political literacy, and pupil participation in processes which simulated political processes, as mock-politicians, activists, media and voters. In other contexts I choreographed similar whole-school events to coincide with special events such as Red Nose Day\(^1\), with its focus on volunteering, charitable fund raising, and raising awareness about inequality, poverty and international development. I approached these in a studied non-partisan way, but with a theoretical assumption that this learning would support my ambition to contribute to a critical, emancipated citizenry.

In my daily work as a teacher there were many professionally fulfilling periods and moments, but my faith in the socially transformative power of education to promote social justice and emancipation waned. I perceived the continuation, and reassertion, of traditional influences in education, a continuing emphasis on conformity and the academic attainment of the identified few, applying, for example, the principles of selection within comprehensive schools. I first saw this as a challenge which demanded local, school-based struggle, based on professional debate, but there were shifts in the parameters of power that shaped education nationally, allowing, from the 1980s, a radical right agenda for education to become ascendant. This involved, amongst other things, a weakening of local democratic political control of schooling, an imposition of state control of the curriculum through the Education Reform Act of 1988 so as to re-assert traditional methods of teaching and learning, allowing a freer rein of community division to come to bear on schooling by weakening the power of local authorities to apply egalitarian principles to school catchment areas, and a general attack on the values of comprehensive schooling. Above all I began to doubt whether the ambitions I had for education, which I had perhaps mistakenly perceived to be shared by a significant

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1 'Red Nose Day' was first held in 1998 as a national charitable fund-raising event by the charity 'Comic Relief'. It was prompted by concern with famine and economic development in 'Third World' contexts. It was led by film and television celebrities and, through a BBC telethon event, encouraged charitable donations and coordinated individual and community charitable projects. It has become a biennial event. It is said to have raised over £600 million.
section of the profession, were in any way having an effect on the capacity of our communities to analyse society in the critical way that I thought was necessary to promote equality and social justice within a democracy.

In my latter school-based years I witnessed the continuation of the New Right agenda by the New Labour Government elected in 1997. In particular there was a tightening control of not just what schools taught, but also how they taught it. There was the development of a managerial regime which emphasised quality and performance management through rigorous external inspection, target setting for schools, measurement of teacher and pupil performance, and accountability through public league tables to support parental choice, as mechanisms to enable the application of private business models of management to our schools. My progressive agenda seemed to be lost. Education was not doing, or being, what I thought it should do or be. This is a conception of schools as falling short of their ideal form and function that has much currency in progressive-radical critiques of education in the academic world, despite the marginalisation and weakening of this as a political or professional position.

At the turn of the new century I secured a post in higher education as a history teacher trainer. This also coincided with a reform of the National Curriculum in England, which saw citizenship introduced as a new statutory subject. The challenge of history initial teacher education was an exhilarating career development, and has sustained its challenge and interest now for most of a decade. From the beginning I sought also to give due attention to the citizenship education initiative. I considered history teaching to have civic implications through the general aim of raising the level of historical and critical thinking in our communities, linking historical understanding with ethical contemporary issues. Whilst not labouring the point, I made this consideration play a meaningful part in my PGCE history course. Further, I organised a one-day conference for academics, teachers and other educational professionals on citizenship education in the summer before its implementation in the secondary curriculum became a statutory requirement, and in 2004 I took on the role of

\[2\] In 2003 the Department for Education and Science launched the National Strategy for Key Stage 3 (early secondary) to define and disseminate 'good' principles of teaching and learning across all secondary schools in England. The strategy produced an plethora of training materials circulated to all schools and supported the recruitment of an 'army' of teachers at school (Advanced Skills Teachers) and local education authority (Strategy Coordinators) level to lead training in these principles. It was justified by a concern with an apparent fall in attainment as pupils moved from the primary to the secondary phase, and general crisis of confidence in secondary teaching.
leading a citizenship initial teacher education course. These roles in history and citizenship teacher education continue. My confidence in the left progressive-radical critique does not.

This autobiographical section has been offered so as to locate the argument of this thesis into the context of personal experience and the development of educational policy. I have a long standing habit of reflecting on the relationship between education and society. Similarly, I have long standing concerns with the perpetuating experience, by many of my fellow citizens, of relatively impoverished lives, both materially and culturally, and of the persistence of, even increasing experience of, restricted life-chances and opportunities. I bristle at the casual perpetuation and exercise of privilege, especially when it conveys an arrogant cultural superiority and a spirit of condescension. I am concerned with the experience by many of what can be arbitrary, insensitive authority, sometimes in the name social progress, even of justice and right. I am concerned about the often arbitrary effects of economic power and processes on individual lives and communities, both nationally and internationally. I am dismayed by the expressions of ignorance and prejudice that are usually termed racism and the social exclusion, discrimination and divisions this can cause. For most of my politically conscious life these concerns have made themselves at home in the progressive-radical political tradition Post-structuralist ideas unsettle the foundations of this home.

5. Conclusion

It is the concerns with education and society, with history and citizenship education in particular, with the wider humanities curriculum, the work of schools, and the ethical foundations for the practice of education, which I have previously conceived of as being embodied in a left progressive-radical position, that bring me to this study. The discourse around citizenship education which will be reviewed in this thesis bears many of the traces of the progressive/traditional, left/right binaries that I have grown up with. However, the creative tension considered to be present in these contestations, previously assumed from a left progressive-radical perspective, are also to be questioned by the implications of post-structuralist philosophy.

This thesis is a philosophical discussion focused primarily on policy and academic discourse. Education is, though, a social practice, and educational practice is not the primary focus of
this thesis. Nevertheless, philosophical understandings are an inevitable condition of social practice, and whilst often clouded from view, obscured or assumed, play a critical role in the formation of practice. Changing philosophical understandings imply changing social practice. This thesis is not primarily focused on pedagogy, but it is anticipated that its argument has potential implications for pedagogy, and where they arise they will be considered. It is hoped that, in concluding the thesis, the value of the post-structuralism will have been assessed and refined, and the parameters of the discourse around citizenship education traced, so as to contribute to a meaningful and ethical basis for citizenship education in the 21st century.
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICY IN ENGLAND: A POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE

PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT


Chapter Two: Enlightenment philosophy, modernism, liberalism, democracy and citizenship
PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT


1.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide a review of how the relationship between education and citizenship is conceived in the period of the state's involvement in education in England since 1870, up to the period of the National Curriculum which will be dated to the Education Reform Act of 1988 (ERA 1988). It will then move into the period of the recent and current citizenship education project, which can usefully be dated to the publication of Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship (NCC 1990), although it was not until the publication of the Report of the Advisory Group on Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools in 1998 (QCA 1998) that a basis for a statutory citizenship education as part of the English National Curriculum was considered. This is the rationale for the chapter's periodisation. The chapter will provide a broad historical outline of citizenship as a theme in the historiography of English education, as a pre-cursor to a more detailed outline of citizenship education policy since 1988 in the latter part of the chapter. It will be followed, in Chapter Two, by a detailed review of the enlightenment philosophical assumptions that underpin conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education policy.

Beyond the simplistic idea of a history as a settled and uncontested narrative, this chapter will importantly consider how education as a social project can be, and has been, variously narrated. Reflecting E.H. Carr's, then controversial, insistence on the presence of the present-ideological influence in historical accounts (Carr 1961), in some variants the history of education has been defined as a project securing social stability and improvement, in others as serving socially conservative objectives, a form of social control shaped by social hierarchies and favouring elites. Yet further, education has also been narrated as a project seeking to secure individual realisation and fulfilment and, in other versions, a project capable of promoting collective emancipation from unjust dominance, exploitation and inequality. These narrative variants convey ideological contestations over the meaning and purpose of education and belie the single, stable interpretation each claims for itself. These varied narratives of education are acknowledged, but their foundational claims are questioned in the account presented below. This contested interpretations of the purposes of education
have been a presence in the author's previous professional identity, with a commitment to the individualist and emancipatory narratives being embraced.

1.2 Citizenship education 1870 – 1988

The history of education in the period 1870 - 1988 is one where education for citizenship is conceived as an implicit assumption within general educational and curriculum objectives. Thus citizenship objectives are deemed to have been served by implicit elements of the work of the school on its pupils.

State-directed mass education in England began in 1870. The 1870 Education Act secured the provision of primary education for all children in England. It supplemented the provision of voluntary bodies, mainly religious, that had established schools in some areas of England in the earlier period. School Boards were established in localities lacking educational provision, made up of locally established figures with the power to levy a rate to build schools and employ teachers.

This development is seen as having deep political and social significance. The Act followed a significant extension of the franchise that had occurred three years earlier in 1867. Since that date large numbers of working class men would qualify for the parliamentary vote, a vote that was cast for the first time in 1868, and which from 1872 would be cast through secret ballot. The prospect of this social group exercising this influence, and growing in number through natural population growth, with a downward drift of the qualification threshold through economic inflation, was a serious concern for political and social elites. The possibility of further extensions through legislation which would also, formally, reduce the qualification to vote, raised the question of how the vote would be cast. Whilst this concern with the casting of votes had a party rivalry dimension, it also had more general and more consensual aspects which saw educational provision and widening political participation as joint projects. A common reflection, indicative of the uncertainties of the potential consequences for governance and social stability of this strategy of widening of political rights, was that it was essential that the elites educate their masters, i.e. the lower orders, so as to ensure that the vote was exercised responsibly.

'The lower classes ought to be educated to discharge the duties cast upon them. They ought also to be educated that they may appreciate
and defer to a higher cultivation when they meet it, and the higher classes ought to be educated in a very different manner, in order that they exhibit to the lower classes that higher education to which, if it was shown to them, they would bow down and defer. (Robert Lowe 1867, quoted in Bottery 2000, p4)

It is a commonplace of much of the historiography of state education in the late nineteenth century for it to be portrayed, usually pejoratively, as having an unrestrained socially conservative purpose. This interpretation is predicated on the idea that the discipline of schooling and learning, basic reading, writing and arithmetic, along with a study of the Bible, would work to secure the commitment of the working class to the social and political structure. Knowledge of the nation as a community with a historical narrative and a worldwide empire, and an exclusive identity expressed in cultural, historical and often biological terms, would secure the legitimacy of authority, a patriotic pride and the responsible exercise of new political rights.

A second significant extension of the franchise to working class men occurred in 1884. The broad period from 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War saw a deepening commitment to state-sponsored education by the state, establishing it soon after 1870 as free to access, then legally compulsory and eventually, in the early years of the twentieth century, extended into secondary schooling beyond the age of 11 years. At the turn of the century, new concerns relating to the economic competition the nation was facing from the developing economies of foreign competitor nations, alongside concerns about the poor physical condition of the population, gave an added impetus for education to be continually developed and extended as a social project.

Compared to current educational policy with its centrally prescribed curriculum frameworks and programmes of study, the link between education and citizenship was instinctively assumed and reflexively embedded. This implicitness permeated the assumptions and practices of the school curriculum, either hidden (Snyder 1973), or formally conveyed through subjects. History as a curriculum subject can serve as an example. It was often the location of the more visible articulations of education for citizenship. History mobilised a national, nationalist and imperialist narrative, identifying human achievement in the context of the national narrative illustrated by great figures of moral and patriotic example. The power of these articulations is evoked through Slater's (1989) parody of a long view of
history teaching in the state school curriculum. Without the precise prescription from the state which is now the norm, but, it would seem, with remarkable homogeneity, the teaching of history adopted what Sylvester (1994) refers to as the Great Tradition. It was a practice of history teaching that focused on the national narrative, dominated by the achievements of the great and good, and the inexorable progress of the island race. It told of battles won, the triumph of God's will through the nation's development, Monarchy, Parliament, Protestantism, Empire and eventually, but gradually, the evolutionary progress of liberal rights and democracy, free from the revolutionary excesses of the continent. The process of teaching was didactic, pupils were passive recipients, required only to receive this learning, and remember it for occasional factual tests. The comedic caricature below of early twentieth century history teaching is worth quoting;

"Content was largely British, or rather southern English; Celts looked in to starve, emigrate or rebel: the North to invent looms or work in mills; abroad was of interest once it was part of the Empire; foreigners were either sensibly allies, or, rightly defeated. Skills - did we even use the word? - were mainly those of recalling accepted facts about famous dead Englishmen, and communicated in a very eccentric literary form, the examination length essay. It was an inherited consensus, based largely on hidden assumptions."

Slater, J (1989)

The quote is offered as an illustration of an interpretive consensus emerging in the third quarter of the twentieth century regarding the curriculum in the first half of the twentieth century. The stability of this un-prescribed tradition, this assumed consensus, is said to illustrate the strength of hierarchical social relations, class divisions, the imposition of deference, the cultural rigidity and political stability of the period in which they were translated into educational policy and practice. However, this interpretation runs the risk of over-stating its claims, and reducing a history of education to a one-dimensional interpretation which serves the purposes of the curriculum reformers of the 1960s and 1970s, a group to which Slater and Sylvester saw themselves as belonging. The interpretation of the development of mass education as a straightforwardly repressive, socially-conservative project, requires both a conception of power that tends to fixity, stability and unity of purpose, ignoring the contingency of governance, and the complexity of social and intellectual action in the field of education. The unproblematic socially repressive interpretation runs a risk of not acknowledging the nuances and complexities that might
support a more sensitive account of the exigencies of policy and educational practice. It suggests a social stability and homogeneity which certainly can be challenged by the documentary and historical record of social tension and conflict at many times during the period. In this example of a progressive interpretation of the history of education we can note the mobilisation of history by and for a present educational position, exemplified by Slater and Sylvester, indicative of Carr's insistence of the presence of the present-ideological in historical accounts (Carr 1961).

The parody of history teaching quoted above, sitting alongside the interpretation of the general school curriculum as a technique of securing a repressive compliance of the masses in the early part of the century, is an interpretation which serves the interest of later radical critique. The Great Tradition works to consolidate, in later radical critique, a justification for changes in education in the mid to late twentieth century which can be deemed, by reference back to this tradition, socially progressive and emancipatory, in contrast to the repressive and controlling pre-cursor.

It is possible to explore a number of variations of history teaching in the early twentieth century which cannot be characterised through the Great Tradition (Keatinge 1910, Happold 1928). It is pertinent for this thesis to consider some elements of the discourse of education for citizenship from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century which challenge the picture of an imperialist homogeneity presented above (Batho 1990). In this discourse we can see nuances that loosen the fixity of the picture of the repressive transmission of patriotic values to secure an exploitative social discipline. Wicks (1871), for example, combines a concern to promote moral reflection in citizens through social knowledge, certainly legitimising the structure of society and teaching the duties of citizens, but also calling for the cultivation of reflective faculties in learners. Hobart, writing on behalf of the Social Democratic Foundation in 1894, called for teaching to go beyond national, nationalist perspectives, to contain fewer references to war, curb its tendency to indoctrination, lay less emphasis on obedience and promote a more international perspective. Madeley (1920) argued for an explicit focus on citizenship within history teaching, but a history teaching with a wide range of topics, not wars, ministries and bills, but rather technological and craft history, social history, local history and political debate, a perspective which embraced critical engagement, a celebration of common life, aligned also with a vocational perspective.
Bourne (1902) advocated the teaching of the structure of government, consequent duties, and the modelling of those social duties through the school, but he also went on to advocate democracy in schools, mock elections and visits to local political institutions. These concerns within educational discourse existed alongside explorations of the moral imperatives of citizenship education that went beyond the need for obedience, deference and patriotism. The Elementary Code of 1904 referred to moral education character traits; *play the game, give and take* and *fair play*. In 1915, Hughes referred to moral dimensions in education in terms of interest in community welfare, arguing for enlarging intellectual and emotional interest in learners, so as to reach out into service and deepen into love, as the purpose of the school. Going back to Madeley (1920); she called for the cultivation of...

> ‘the power of sympathetic insight... (the) imagination so compelling that we cannot evade realisation of the sentiency of every other human being... safe from lethargy... selfishness... stupidity... (requiring)... intellectual effort... fair-mindedness... sheer hard-thinking.’ (Madeley 1920 p.14)

This is an ambition for education of a moral nature, education for character, which might be interpreted by radical critique as an inculcation of bourgeois morality to secure a false consciousness so as to preserve the dominance of elites, unjust hierarchies and exploitation. But it might also be considered as a challenge to the parody of the school that radical critique needs to refer so as to justify itself. This point is presented to indicate a presence in the discourse of citizenship education in the early twentieth century which is not necessarily repressive, that is as much concerned with the imperative of community, and of a rigorous commitment to social relations based on a moral appreciation of society and of others.

This account of the early decades of state education in England has identified citizenship education as an implicit practice. It has identified a common interpretation which sees the project of education as one of implicit citizen formation around a consensus of what are often, pejoratively, deemed repressive assumptions; teaching aimed at creating a citizenry that was generally disciplined, that was ideologically aligned to the existing political structure and compliant to social hierarchy and authority. Education was a project of social and citizen formation that existed within a national, nationalist and imperialist paradigm. It is an account that now sits in the mainstream of social and educational historiography and, considered as a repressive practice, it creates an ideological counterpoint to the justifications for more
radical-progressive conceptions of education that held influence in schooling after the mid-
twentieth century.

As a new teacher entering the profession in the late-1970s I occupied a professional identity
that drew on the progressive narrative that has begun to be questioned above. I saw the
purpose of education being not to produce a compliant citizenry, but rather a critical one, one
that sought the value of individual enlightenment, and was also equipped to identify the
absences of justice in the exercise of power and authority, the inequitable distribution of
wealth and, what is more, to identify the way injustice was built into the very structure of
society. This professional identity was historically located in the post-war, post-colonial
condition of Britain, with many teachers seeking to distance themselves profoundly from the
patriotic and imperialist objectives that were understood to have characterised the school
curriculum of earlier decades. It also existed within the intensity of the Cold War, perceived
by many as a political circumstance that tended to support uncritical patriotic and xenophobic
attitudes supporting the madness of Mutually Assured Destruction and the excesses of
ideological propaganda. I was part of a significant expansion of education as the school
leaving age had recently been raised and post-compulsory education was increasingly being
encouraged. People from working class backgrounds, who had even earlier found entry into
the teaching profession easier than into many other professional communities, were a
significant part of the recruitment to the profession at that time. This, informed by the heady
cultural currents of the late 1960s, and the radical ideologies that marked the end of that
decade and the beginning of the next, meant that my professional identity was radical. This
personal context has been articulated in more detail in the introduction to this thesis. It is
sketched out again here to make clear that the critique of the progressive narrative that has
begun to be considered above, and which will develop later in this thesis, implies a personal
reflection on and reconsideration of the professional and political identity of the author.

The binary of progressivism versus traditionalism informs a strong ideological contestation;
education in the mid-twentieth century being seen as an emancipatory development from the
progressive standpoint, but a detrimental development as seen from the traditional political
right. This contestation continues to mark much of the discourse of education in the last two
decades of the twentieth century in England. The policy development of the National
Curriculum, given statutory force in 1988, is justified for traditionalists by the failures of the
progressive project, with the menace of progressivism still identified as having a residual
presence in what is termed by traditionalists the *educational establishment*, particularly in
local educational policy makers and in university departments of education. Progressive-radical educational critique, however, still asserts its claim to individual and collective emancipation through education aligned with a definition of social justice. This discussion has sought to deconstruct and loosen the oppositional binary of progressive versus traditional interpretations of educational practice and of educational history so as to open up a different consideration. In doing this it is highlighting and questioning the binaries that are so deeply established and casually deployed in modernist, enlightenment discourse; progressive versus traditional, emancipatory versus repressive.

1.3 Citizenship education 1988 - 1998

The Educational Reform Act of 1988 was the most significant piece of education legislation of the last half of the twentieth century in England, and marked a major change in the relationship between the state and the school. Until 1988 schools had formal independence in how they structured their curriculum. Notwithstanding Great Traditions (Sylvester 1994) and assumed consensus, apart from the rigours of examination syllabi, the recommendations of subject associations, and the lofty comments of Her Majesty's Inspectorate, headteachers and subject leaders had formal independence in curriculum design. The 1988 Act took away that independence at a stroke, and imposed a state-determined curriculum on every secondary school in England. In general terms this initiative reflected the concerns of the New Right, represented by the Conservative governments led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher since 1979, about the influence of progressive education from the 1960s to the 1980s. The New Right identified an educational establishment; teachers, headteachers, educational scholars, local policy makers, infused with a progressive ethos which, they believed, undermined what they felt should be the rigour and purpose of education, linked also to a concern to promote social conservatism as a response to a panics about social morality.

However, the critique of education had been started not by a Conservative government, usually considered as the political expression of traditionalism and social authority, but by a Labour government. As early as 1976 Labour Prime Minister James Callahan had initiated a ‘Great Debate’ about education (Callaghan 1976) in which he criticised what he referred to as the ‘secret garden’ in which education was practised. He called for a more transparent and accountable practice, which took greater account of the economic and social needs of the nation. His New Right successors took this questioning of education and forged it into attack
on progressivism and professional autonomy. This is the ideological field which has marked education in England in the last thirty years, one which has been dominated by the New Right, modified, but not significantly altered, by the New Labour government from 1997. At the level of the state there has not been a left-right, progressive-traditional, emancipator-repressive binary to identify. The only significant location where progressivism still sustains a presence is in educational scholarship.

In the 1990s a statutory National Curriculum was imposed on schools, conceived of in traditional subject terms through the Education Reform Act of 1988. Although the process of determining the content of the National Curriculum became an arena of contestation in its subject working groups (Phillips 1997) and in the media, contests ended in compromises and agreed reports. The National Curriculum as a development in educational policy was essentially a policy designed to secure uniformity and accountability in the name of standards, and it secured strong cross-party political support.

The subject-based National Curriculum that emerged from the various working parties and their reports, was also cross-cut by a number of cross-curricular themes. It is here that education for citizenship enjoyed its first explicit articulation in the recent English context. Education for citizenship was one of five cross-curricular themes to be threaded through the subject-based National Curriculum (NCC 1990). The others were education for economic and industrial understanding, health education, careers education and guidance and, lastly, environmental education. In Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship such an education was defined as essential for understanding the 'duties, responsibilities and rights (of citizens)... and ... the values ... (of) justice, democracy, respect for the rule of law' (ibid. Foreword). It was 'of paramount importance in a democratic society and in a world undergoing rapid change' (ibid. p.1). The document expressed strongly a concern about the 'democratic-deficit' by stressing 'the importance of positive, participative citizenship and provide the information to join in', identifying any previous civics education3, 'focused on the machinery and processes of government' as insufficiently wide-ranging (ibid. p.2).

The essential knowledge of citizenship was organised around three headings; the nature of community, roles and relationships in a democratic society and the nature and basis of duties, responsibilities and rights. Attitudes to be promoted included 'independence of thought' and

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3 In some schools, in the years before a National Curriculum, civics education enjoyed brief appearances. This tended to be focused on teaching knowledge of British state institutions and the conventions of the British constitution.
an 'enterprising ... approach to ... challenges'. Respect was given a broad field; respect for
'law ... rights of others ... and different ways of life, beliefs, opinions and ideas ... legitimate
interests of others ... rational argument ... non-violent ways of resolving conflict'.
Participation was called for in 'community affairs ... active concern for human rights ... the
paramount importance of democratic decision-making' (ibid p.4).

Essential components of content should be focused on three broad areas, the nature of
community, roles and relationships in a pluralist society, and the duties, responsibilities and
rights of being a citizen. Five specific contexts, the family, democracy in action, the citizen
and the law, work, employment and leisure and, lastly, public services were identified.

This prescription of an education for citizenship is detailed, indeed very detailed as cross-
curricular guidance, demanding of a high level of specific subject expertise and knowledge
on behalf of a teacher. This in itself was a challenge to effective implementation, but in
practice its prescriptions were lost in the efforts of schools to respond to the overwhelming
subject-specific prescription demanded by the wide range of traditional subject programmes
of study set out by the National Curriculum, leaving no time or space for the meaningful
development of cross-curricular themes. This in part explains why, seven years later, a new
initiative to develop citizenship education was felt to be necessary, and was launched by the
newly-elected New Labour Government.

One of the new government’s first moves in the field of education was to pledge ‘to
strengthen education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools’ (DFEE 1997 p.
1) and to that end it established an advisory group under the chairmanship of Professor
Bernard Crick. Crick was eminently qualified for this role as he had a track record of arguing
for the importance of teaching citizenship in schools for over thirty years (Crick 2000), and
this was coupled, as noted in the introduction to this study, with an academic relationship
with the new Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett, who had been one of Crick’s
under-graduate university tutees. The advisory group published its report, Education for
citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools in September 1998 (QCA 1998),
henceforward referred to as ‘The Crick Report’.

The final section of The Crick Report, entitled A last word, states ‘... this report will
stimulate discussion or else it has failed ...’ (ibid. p.61), and indeed it has stimulated
discussion. The report’s introduction contains a detailed and considered rationale of the need
for citizenship education (ibid. pp. 7-21), accompanied by recommendations for the structure,
processes and desirable outcomes for citizenship education (ibid. pp 22-34), accompanied also by further detailed consideration of learning outcomes, how citizenship might sit in relation to the wider school curriculum, and specific guidance on the teaching of controversial issues (ibid. pp 35-61). There have been many rigorous reviews and discussions of its contents. Although the following paragraphs will reference some of these reviews, first of all it is important for the Crick Report to be simply described for the purposes of supporting the development of this thesis. At this point it is intended to confine the detailed review of the report to its Introduction (ibid. pp 7-21), and not the Recommendations nor the curriculum framework it suggests in the section Spelling it out. Whilst these sections may be referenced in later parts of this study, it is the Introduction which illustrates the philosophical and ideological rationale contained in the report.

The composition of the Advisory Group was deliberately representative of a wide range of interests. As well as Crick, an open supporter of the social-democratic left in British politics as well as a politics scholar, there were other representatives of academia, a former Conservative Secretary of State for Education, representatives from Local Education Authorities and of schools, a representative of the Church of England, the media, Parliament, the supervisory bodies of the penal system, and representatives of non-governmental charitable associations with a long standing interest in promoting citizenship education (QCA 1998 p. 5). The group was managed by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA), and observed by representatives of the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), all recently established non-governmental organisations related to the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), which also had direct representatives on the working group. The working party’s composition was scrupulously non-partisan in a party-political sense and publicly visible, but was firmly under the gaze of governmental agencies. The following paragraphs will offer an outline of the Crick Report. In later chapters the report will be more critically reviewed.

The Introduction to the final report contains much which illuminates the thinking of the advisory group. It stressed its ‘unanimous’ advice (ibid. p.7), that there must be a statutory requirement on schools to include citizenship and the teaching of democracy in their curriculum so as to secure the idea of ‘common citizenship with democratic values’. It called for the establishment of a monitoring body to oversee the phased development of citizenship education made up of representatives of ‘the public, parents ... teachers and public authorities’ (ibid. p.7). It then made its bold, much quoted, mission statement ...
We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing able and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting ...' (QCA 1998 p. 7)

The report referenced the earlier attempt to embed citizenship as a cross-curricular theme in the 1988 Education Reform Act and Curriculum Guidance 8. It asserted the validity of learning knowledge, skills and values necessary for citizenship (ibid. p.8). It noted significant public concern that education for citizenship could descend into indoctrination and reflect unjustified bias, but insisted that teachers are trained in presenting controversial issues within a context of balance, fairness and objectivity, and that there were already statutory safeguards of the need for teachers to avoid 'biased and unbalanced teaching and indoctrination' (ibid. p.8).

The next section of the Introduction, entitled What we mean by citizenship? makes claim to the antiquity of the concept being present in the practices of the city states of Ancient Greece and the Roman Republic, where citizens had the right and duty to take part in public debate and in shaping the laws and decisions of state. It traces the development of the idea of democratic citizenship in modern times, where demands for a broader franchise, for female suffrage, lowered voting age, freedom of the press, have established the conditions of modern democratic citizenship.

It tracks another modern dimension of citizenship, the protection afforded to the citizen by the law, and the citizen's duty to obey the law. It acknowledges that this system of laws is different in different contexts, and then makes a brief diversion to erase the potential problem of the individual's legal status in Britain as subject rather than citizen, a problem that, in the report's view pedantically, has been made by a number of commentators. The report asserts that this is just a terminological quirk of British history, and that the term British subject and British citizen, 'mean much the same to most people' (ibid. p10).

The report goes on to reference the authority of T. H. Marshall's definition of citizenship comprising three essential elements, the civil, the political and the social (Marshall 1950). However, in a short section (QCA 1998 p.10), it in one gesture commends Marshall's categories, whilst making a second gesture to accommodate changing conceptions of the civil and social, away from the state welfare commitments and the importance of social rights
present in Marshall, and towards a more contemporary, New Right emphasis on non-state voluntary and charitable groups, a newly-emphasised 1980s/90s civic virtue much valued by the Conservative government that dominated those decades, and which the report incorporates and accommodates into the term active citizenship through community involvement. In this it demotes Marshall’s notion of social rights. This gesture is followed by a reassertion of the primacy of political engagement, albeit within a broad conception of citizenship, integrating the political with the moral and civic spheres.

The third section of the report’s introduction is entitled Citizenship: the needs and aims. Here the context that justifies the initiative in the eyes of the advisory group are articulated. It asserts that citizenship education should be an entitlement of all pupils, based on acquiring not just knowledge, but also values, skills and understanding. It places the need for citizenship education in the context of avoiding what is termed, in a quote referenced to an ad hoc group Citizenship 2000, ‘a further decline in the quality of our public life’ (ibid. p.14) accompanied by an acknowledgement of ‘rapidly changing relationships between the individual and government; the decline of traditional forms of civic cohesion; the new political context of Britain in Europe: and rapid social, economic and technological change in a global context’ (ibid. p.14). These concerns are then compounded with a reference to empirical research data illustrating what has been termed a democratic-deficit, meaning low interest and engagement with public issues, low commitment to the electoral process and low interest in political parties, accompanied by a brief reference to youth crime and anti-social behaviour. Whilst noting the point that single-issue politics, pressure groups and environmental issues seem to secure a stronger engagement than traditional political processes, and that youth culture can tend to be unfairly demonised in the media, these are, nevertheless, presented as meaningful causes of concern that support the rationale for the initiative and the report’s recommendations.

The introduction then enters into a reflection on the diverse nature of British society, at first challenging English-centrism in a United Kingdom consisting of three nations and a province, and then describing the context of cultural and religious diversity, linked to recent immigration to the UK. This is a section of the report which has subsequently generated much criticism within the community of researchers and writers in the field of citizenship education (Osler 2000). This criticism will be referenced and reviewed in the discussion that is presented in Chapter Seven of this study. The report argues that society is becoming more complex, referencing ‘cultural diversity’, ‘loss of value consensus’, the ‘collapse of extended
support mechanisms such as extended families', which 'raises the issue of national identity' (ibid. p. 17) calling for a restored ...

'... common citizenship, including a national identity that is secure enough to find a place for the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom ... a multicultural citizenship ... sensitive to ethnic diversity (where) majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority ...' (QCA 1998 p. 17).

It then goes on to put the issue of cultural diversity in an international context ...

'We all need to learn more about each other. This should entail learning not only about the United Kingdom – including all four of its constituent parts – but also about the European, Commonwealth and global dimensions of citizenship, with due regard being given to the homelands of our minority communities and to the main countries of British emigration.' (QCA 1998 p. 18)

The introduction concludes with a return to asserting the primacy of political knowledge and process in the focus of citizenship education, insisting that, despite some responses from schools indicating affinities between citizenship and existing curriculum provision in Personal, Social and Health Education, citizenship education deserves to be seen as significantly distinct.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the idea of citizenship education in the first hundred years of mass education in England, exploring the reflexivity and subjectivity of historical accounts to the influence of what has been termed the present-ideological position of historical authors. The progressive critique of education developed in the third quarter of the twentieth century required a traditional opposite to sharpen its sense of identity as an emancipatory project. The development of education policy in the 1980s and 1990s required a progressive opposite to justify its own project. If carefully used, without resort to caricature, nuances in educational climate might be usefully defined as changing from progressive to traditional, but the tendency in discourse is for the terms to revert to caricature. They both claim a certainty
of focus, a certainty of ethical value, a reference to some absolute essential quality, in one as source, in the other as end point. These are certainties that post-structuralist approaches, to be outlined later in this thesis will question. The generalisations and certainties work to, first of all, over-simplify an understanding of the field of educational practice, and secondly, risk missing the complexities in, what Foucault would call the *genealogy* of policy (Foucault 1975) by reducing historical analysis to a self-justifying traditional-progressive binary. The developments in education in the 1960s/1970s might be usefully analysed beyond their progressive caricature, and the re-assertion of the traditionalists in the 1980s/1990s might be seen as reflecting more than a return to something previous.

The chapter then offered a descriptive narrative of the two founding policy documents of the current citizenship education initiative, *Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship* (NCC 1990) and ‘The Crick Report’ (QCA 1998), interspersed with a brief description of the political context in which they occurred, along with a reprise of the biography of the author’s ontological position. It has argued that the two policy documents represent a continuity of governmental strategy beyond the difference of the latter’s important insistence that citizenship become a statutory subject with a defined programme of study, as against the former’s more vague delineation of citizenship as a cross-curricular theme. The similarities lie in the philosophic justifications, social and political concerns and objectives underpinning the two documents, at the philosophical level, referencing an Aristotelian concept of the citizen, and, at a social level, T.H. Marshall’s definition of citizenship in the mid-twentieth century (Marshall 1950). Both documents, in their very success of achieving cross-party support, are indicative of a suppression of the common political divisions and tensions that often mark political life in the UK.

The next chapter will review the parameters of enlightenment philosophy. It will illustrate how enlightenment thinking underpins commonly held notions of citizenship. It will identify the presence of such philosophical assumptions in the work of influential figures in policy development, particularly Crick. What I want to anticipate in concluding this chapter is that in focusing on the development of citizenship education, the thesis will question citizenship education’s enlightenment pretensions to be a contribution to progress and freedom. It will also reconsider concepts such as power, democracy, freedom, the state, oppression, emancipation, rights and the individual as they are used in the policy, discourse and pedagogy of citizenship education. It is a post-structuralist understanding of how these concepts are used, and what they mean in education, that this thesis seeks to explore.
Chapter Two: Enlightenment philosophy, modernism, liberalism, democracy and citizenship

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter it is the intention to outline the main tenets of the philosophical tradition that stems from the historical intellectual development usually referred to as the European Enlightenment, historically located in the eighteenth century. It is also necessary to offer a brief resume of traditional explanations of the history of the concept of citizen, as a reference point for further discussion about the current citizenship education project in England. It will be demonstrated that citizenship, as a political and as an educational concept, is deeply rooted in enlightenment thinking.

Enlightenment philosophy has had profound effects on all aspects of intellectual, political and social discourse over the last two hundred years, and is so embedded in all those aspects of intellectual life that the claims of enlightenment philosophy might be said to have acquired the status of common-sense. With a constant reflexive referencing of the intellectual achievements of the eighteenth century in Europe, enlightenment philosophy supports the very basis of the understandings of the world that we call modernity; modernity distinguished from the medieval period, which, in enlightenment thinking, is characterised by superstition, irrationality and religious dogma. Modernity, claiming to display the privileged opposites of those characteristics; empiricism, rationality and scepticism, is the product of enlightenment philosophy. This epistemological project based on enlightenment philosophy also distinguishes politics in modernity from the earlier period in which the European Enlightenment had its genesis. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a period where monarchical political power was justified by reference to divine-right, with subsequent modernity positing a more naturalist, rational, secular and empirical basis for political power and social existence. Concepts such as modern, rational, reason, empirical, scientific, evidence, truth, reality, individual, rights, progress, freedom, and democracy, indeed man (Foucault 1970, Derrida 1982), used in common philosophical, social and political senses, are all the offspring of the European Enlightenment.
The term, the *enlightenment paradigm* can refer to the assumptions of enlightenment philosophy, and the liberal political traditions they support, all of which reference enlightenment thinking. The traditions of liberal political philosophy and liberal conceptions of democracy will be reviewed in this chapter. The chapter will also argue that enlightenment thinking is fundamentally embedded in the pre-suppositions of the current citizenship education policy in England (Crick 2000) and also in the discourse that surrounds it.

The political philosophy of liberalism and its variants, along with its most adversarial challenge, Marxism, are both founded, it will be argued, on enlightenment assumptions, ideas and principles. These enlightenment variations of political philosophy inform the current project of citizenship education (QCA 1998, DfES 1999). This will be illustrated by a number of references, first of all through reference to general political discourse and commentary, and then to the writings of the principal architect of current citizenship education policy in England (Crick 2000). After establishing the enlightenment nature of the pre-suppositions of citizenship education, the chapter will offer a review of a significant challenge to enlightenment tenets. Through considering the 'disquieting suggestions' proposed by MacIntyre in his work *After Virtue* (MacIntyre 1981 p.1), the enlightenment paradigm will be prised open to critique and challenge. This will provide a basis for Chapter Three which will benefit from the undermining of enlightenment assumptions achieved by MacIntyre, but move to the further challenge to enlightenment philosophy posed by post-structuralism.

### 2.2 Enlightenment philosophy and modernity

From the eighteenth century onwards a philosophical paradigm, referred to here as *enlightenment* philosophy has become dominant in the western European tradition. This apparently unifying paradigm stems from the work of a diverse collection of philosophers which have subsequently coalesced to form its reference points. Some of their names can be listed; Descartes (1596-1650), Locke (1632-1704), Voltaire (1694-1778), Hume (1711-1776), Rousseau (1712-1778), Diderot (1713-1784), Smith (1723-1790) and Kant (1724-1804). It is impossible, and unnecessary, to present a detailed exposition of the work of these figures. Rather it is intended to summarise the key tenets of modernist thought, fundamentally
informing intellectual and political discourse today, and reveal their roots in the historical Enlightenment.

The notion of the innate universality of human rationality is central to enlightenment thinking. That rationality inscribes the individual as sovereign. The world, inhabited by sovereign rational individuals, is an objective reality that can be ascertained by the application of reason and the scientific analysis of experience. Rationalism, as a challenge to what is seen as the religious dogma and superstition that preceded, is associated with Descartes. Kant is seen as the philosopher who integrated the ideas of rationalism and empiricism. The possibility of the acquisition of objective knowledge is exemplified by the work of Diderot and Voltaire in the production of the first *Encyclopédie* of knowledge, published from 1751.

Enlightenment philosophy asserts the essential rationality of the world and the sovereign subjectivity of the individual. It invests in the idea that the application of reason by the individual can ascertain the essential truth of the natural and of the social world. This truth can be determined by rational questioning, investigation and the method of science. Enlightenment philosophy supports empiricism, and the Kantian idea that in discourse every statement is a construction from experience. It was from this conception of rationalism, of objective reality and of the understanding of the world through the scientific explanation of objective reality, that the twentieth century positivism was developed.

These assumptions posit the ideal of a complete and scientific explanation of physical and social reality, and support the positivist scientific tradition which asserts that scientific method; hypotheses, experiment, objective evidence and observation; can discern the *truth* of the world. Similarly, enlightenment philosophy claims that morality is subject to rational calculation, and that rational calculation can establish moral truths that have *universal* application. Enlightenment philosophy claims the possibility of an objective and universal account of both reality and morality.

Whilst there may be debate and contestations within enlightenment philosophy about the moral, social and physical world, at the heart of these debates is considered to be a core truth to be identified. Indeed the process of rational debate is considered to be the dialectical process that leads to the identification of truth. It claims that *truths* are universal. The application of reason, the establishment of truth, the definition of universal values brings with it the promise of rational social progress.
Enlightenment assumptions became the epistemological foundations of the intellectual disciplines as they followed the historic period of the Enlightenment, formed their identities in the 19th and 20th centuries, and colonised the universities. At the forefront of them were the natural sciences, conceived on the basis of a positivist epistemology, an epistemology which has held influence over all kinds of intellectual activity in the physical, but also, importantly for this thesis, in the human sciences. The concomitant assumptions that come with the positivist paradigm are that there is an ideal of the complete scientific explanation of not just physical, but also social reality, providing a secure knowledge base for social action and social improvement, to be achieved by the application of scientific principles, rationality and reason in the construction of objective knowledge. These subject disciplines claim to offer a secure knowledge base for social action and improvement – enlightenment thinking makes a commitment to a meta-narrative of social progress. Education's prime purpose becomes to initiate the young into these different forms of rational knowledge.

This philosophical tradition supports the modern liberal political idea of the free individual and the modern democratic idea of individual rights. Enlightenment philosophy positions the individual as a free, autonomous, rational agent, social reality as objective and independent of the individual subject. Positivist assumptions relating to the social world strongly inform much of what might be called everyday discourse, common knowledge as well as academic discourse. Universal truths and objective knowledge are available to be determined through the use of reason, and scientific and philosophical rationality leads to human progress. It asserts that reality can be understood through the identification of universal principles, and that language serves as a reliable, stable instrument of explanation, seeking to represent the objective reality of the world.

Enlightenment philosophy posits the inner self, an authentic self, as existing outside of language, and that categories and concepts in language take their meaning from the objective nature of the world. This philosophy sees language as a pragmatic necessity for conveying the universals of reality, of being, of thought; the idea and the world being a priori language.

2.3 Liberalism and democracy

The modern political philosophy of liberalism is conceived as a child of enlightenment philosophy, a political philosophy that conceives of freedom as a natural and universal
condition. The modern liberal version of the political idea of democracy is seen as the ideal model for the existence of the rational, free man, investing in the individual a notion of sovereignty through the possession of political rights to exercise an influence and control over the state and its policies. As well as locating rights to participate in the functioning of the state naturally in individuals, liberalism added a concern with protecting the sovereign individual from the state where appropriate. This supports the importance attached to legal property rights invested in the individual free from state power.

Emerging from this liberal tradition are modern variants such as social-democracy. Social democracy has sought to pursue the development of extended and equal political rights. Furthermore, the social-democratic tradition has latterly given emphasis to the development of a democratic citizen’s social rights as well as legal and political rights (Marshall 1950); rights to health care, to social security and access to cultural engagement and the possibility of social advance through education in the pursuit of social equality. In social-democratic politics there is a strong emphasis on challenging inequality in the pursuit of social justice. These are seen as natural steps in social progress towards a society that is equal and just. Within this liberal tradition a political discourse is prompted about which social areas state activity is legitimate, or is not.

2.4 Enlightenment philosophy and the idea of citizenship

The concept of the citizen is often referenced historically to the ancient world and the development of political practice in the city-states of Ancient Greece as described by Aristotle. This reference supports two traditions in citizenship discourse, the democratic and the republican. In Ancient Greece an elite of propertied men enjoyed privileged rights to active engagement in the affairs of the state which, it was considered, they had an obligation to exercise. Traditional political theorists define this expectation of a citizen’s participation in the affairs of the state as civic republicanism.

Aristotle defined a citizen as someone who participates in public affairs. This called for an active citizenry, which, when considered in the context of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, had revolutionary implications for the absolutist monarchs of the early modern period. Through the influence of the European Enlightenment, the emergence of modern states, via the political turmoil of the French and American revolutions of the late eighteenth
century, is seen as a development asserting the virtues of civic republicanism by individuals invested with rights, in opposition to previous absolute monarchical power. The democratic culture of Athenian politics, and the idea of individual rights, are seen as the principles supporting the development of wider democratic governance in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, as political rights and social rights were extended into national populations.

Recent examples of political discourse about citizenship illustrate the presence of enlightenment assumptions. These are illustrated here in some relatively lengthy quotes from web-based documents.

A recent, 2008, Parliamentary report proposed a Bill of Rights for Britain. The extract below is accessed from the on-line parliamentary report:

'The consensus across the political parties appears to reflect a wider consensus amongst the public. In the 2006 Joseph Rowntree "State of the Nation" survey of opinion, 77% of those polled agreed that Britain needs a Bill of Rights to protect the liberty of the individual (51% agreeing strongly with that proposition). The focus of the classic Bills of Rights, from Magna Carta in 1215 to those of the 17th and 18th centuries (the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 and the American Bill of Rights of 1791), was the protection of the individual's liberty against the intrusive and interfering power of the overweening state. Liberty was conceived as negative liberty, the absence of restraint. It remains the view of many today that the protection of human rights by Bills of Rights should be confined to this set of broadly Enlightenment values, and that this is the only legitimate purpose of a Bill of Rights.'

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/1651165i.pdf

(accessed 24.02.09)

The extract goes on to reference the U.S. President Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' speech of 1941; freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear. This took the basis of the original 1791 Bill of Rights which protected 'negative freedom' – i.e. freedom from restraint by the state, and added freedoms to security in the political and economic sphere. This in turn proved to be a foundational reference for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations after the end of the Second World War in 1948. This discourse of fundamental rights of the sovereign individual can be
illustrated by another example, this time from a political pressure group also calling for a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom;

‘Democracy is not the same thing as mob rule. Human rights and civil liberties are crucial for defining and limiting the role of the state. They guarantee our freedoms and dignity. Without human rights we are subjects, not citizens.

The best way of defending human rights is by entrenching them in a written constitution that cannot be simply revoked by the government of the day. The UK is one of the few countries in the world that doesn’t have a written constitution of any kind; it is high time we caught up.

We must remember that rights are not privileges, but fundamental entitlements held simply by virtue of one’s humanity. They are intended to protect individuals from the state; making them conditional upon law abidance—allowing the state to grant and rescind them as they see fit—undermines their very raison d’être. The judiciary already has sufficient latitude when balancing rights; we do not need to make rights contingent on good behaviour.’

http://www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk/?page_id=1515 (accessed 24.02.09)

In a web-based article posted just in advance of the 2008 U.S. presidential election the enlightenment view of the relationship between the individual, the state and education is articulated;

‘As we prepare for our national elections, it is well worth remembering that the highest office in American democracy is not the President, but the citizen. In a democracy, “we the people” – the body of citizens – must rule. Elected officials, including our President, are only our representatives; they exercise the powers we grant to them. The citizen bears not only rights, but responsibilities. Our vote and our participation in free and fair elections that choose our representatives is not simply the greatest power and right of the citizenry, won by Americans who struggled courageously throughout our history to extend the franchise to all, regardless of class, sex and race. Just as importantly, it is our greatest civic responsibility. The strength and resilience, the purpose and ends, of democracy rests upon the active participation of the citizenry in elections: to the extent that government does not have a clear mandate of the citizenry due to widespread abstention from the electoral process, its authority is greatly diminished. That is the import of Thomas Jefferson’s and John
Locke’s famous notion that legitimate government is based on the consent of the governed.

Teachers have a unique and special responsibility in a democracy: we are citizens in our own right, and we are the educators of the next generation of citizens. Properly understood, these two roles are inextricably linked, one to the other. One does not educate youth into democratic citizenship by lecture and dictate. Rather, it is essential that we teachers model good citizenship and that our classrooms embody the fundamental values of free expression, fairness and thoughtful deliberation that define all democratic decision-making, including free elections. Students learn how to be good citizens by actual practicing the skills of citizenship in the classroom and in the school. In so doing, they develop the capacity to think critically and independently and to engage in dialogue and debate on matters political. In this respect, presidential elections are a special “teachable moment,” in which students are unusually motivated and predisposed to engage in the practice of those skills, taking the first steps in critical thought and political debate. At this and other times, a teacher must be a good democratic citizen to be an educator of democratic citizenship.

http://edwize.org/teaching-democratic-citizenship-and-freedom-of-political-expression

(accessed 25.02.09)

This article’s discussion of the implications of citizenship for teachers, and for pedagogic practice, is an interesting comment particularly regarding the concerns of this thesis with citizenship education.

This enlightenment, western, emphasis on the sovereign and rational individual, can be illustrated clearly when it encounters a different tradition. Below is a transcript extract from an extended interview between John Humphreys (JH), a celebrated British political interviewer and commentator, and three visiting Chinese students (CS), broadcast on the BBC radio’s flagship daily current affairs programme, Today, on Saturday 6th November 2010;

...  

CS: When you consider China you have to take a thing into consideration, the happiness of the whole of China, the happiness not just individual happiness, the happiness of the whole ... at this stage of development we have to concentrate on the happiness of the majority, not a single individual.
JH: (So,) You wouldn’t take the view that it is only the individual freedoms and individual happiness, to use your word, that can make a satisfactory society, a society that, in the end, works for everybody?

CS: Well, I think why it is the case, Chinese culture and tradition is very different from the western. Hundreds of years ago Chinese culture focused on the state, on the group, the benefit of the group is more important than the individual. Westerners emphasise the individual, their freedom, their information, it’s not the case in China.

JH: But you’re not a member of Chinese society first and foremost, are you? You’re an individual, in your own right.

CS: There is the power of tradition, generations and generations and generations, your mother told me, your father told me, your teacher told me, this is right, this is wrong and that’s what you believe.

JH: But you are yourself. You’re an individual.

... 

Whilst not underestimating the powerful constraints exercised by Chinese political power, nor being slavish to the concept of tradition, one gets a clear sense of the divergence of cultural assumptions in the assertive articulation by the Chinese students of their assumptions in the face of one of the UKs most aggressive interviewers. What the interview also illustrates is an insistent articulation of western individualism as universal, absent of doubt, even of reflection, especially when it could be pointed out that such strident individualism is, even in western societies, a relatively recent cultural phenomenon, though located in a longstanding modernist principle.

At this stage it is useful to summarise this chapter’s argument so far. Enlightenment philosophy is the basis for understanding the world in modernist terms. Citizenship is conceived within an enlightenment tradition. This tradition defines the individual as sovereign, capable of rationally understanding the objective nature of reality, and identifying universalist moral principles to secure human progress. These principles are used to justify liberal democracy, and its variants of both left and right, of individualism and social-democracy, as the political philosophy in which the rational sovereign, free enlightenment
man can exist. These assumptions inform discourse around citizenship in a wider political context, and they also inform the thinking of the principal architects of current educational policy.

2.5 The Marxist critique of liberal democracy

Although current education policy itself tends to present an uncontested idea of citizenship, it is nevertheless subject to serious academic critique. The most emphatic philosophical challenge to liberal democracy and liberal individualism in the period of its ascendancy has drawn on the political philosophy of Marxism.

Marxism has, in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries, been the most significant philosophical adversary of the liberal-democratic tradition. Marx argued that individuals were not self-evidently free, but were shaped and shackled by the structure of society. This structure was defined by Marx as being ultimately based on the relations endemic to the capitalist mode of production. Marx drew on the Hegelian idea of dialectics to identify the struggle between the two social classes created by the inherently unstable capitalist mode of production, the bourgeois owners of capital and the proletarian providers of labour. This struggle was defined as being the driver of social development, a 'hidden-hand' that would eventually result in a historic and revolutionary resolution of that class struggle into a more equal and rational communist society. Marx's 'structure' creates a divergence between the rational individual posited by the liberal heirs of the Enlightenment, and the Marxian proletarian individual inhabiting a false-consciousness, that can only come to rational consciousness through the process of class struggle and a realisation of its historic destiny. Marxism identifies in capitalist society a base and a super-structure; the base being the exploitative economic relations and processes that provide the means of capital accumulation and survival, and the super-structure being the legal and political institutions that support and maintain these economic relations. False-consciousness, which obscures for the proletariat the condition of its exploitation and its historic destiny, is further maintained through the hegemonic culture which justifies and legitimates the nature of capitalist society (Gramsci 1971).

Whilst this is a political philosophy of considerable distance from the liberal idea of free individuals, it nevertheless rests on many of enlightenment philosophy's central assumptions.
Rational consciousness is the inevitable and eventual end of social existence; there is an objective world which can be subject to scientific analysis, and the process of history is a process of human progress. There is a meta-narrative of universalism, objective truth and the march of human progress writ large in Marxism. Marxist ideas have been the basis for revolutionary political action, readily identified as failures at the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, they have also inspired a more evolutionary social-democratic politics, when that politics has drawn on more than a Christian conscience, or a pragmatic humanism, in its demands for social justice. Marxist ideas and insights are a significant element in the progressive-radical position in educational practice, research and debate. In their conceptions of power, both classical liberalism and Marxism see power in demonic clothes, with the political injunction of Marxism being to 'seize' power and then eradicate it. Despite their differences, both liberalism and Marxism base their epistemological and moral reference points within enlightenment assumptions.

2.6 Enlightenment philosophy and citizenship education

This section locates the pre-suppositions of the current citizenship education project in England in enlightenment philosophy (Crick 1999). Conceptions of the individual citizen, the nature of democracy and the idea of political participation are based on an assumption of stable universalist principles, a starting point being the insistence that conceptual philosophical language has an apparently stable meaning over centuries of changing circumstances.

It is a rigorous point of insistence by the principal architect of the citizenship education initiative in England, Crick, that whilst civic republicanism and democracy are modern partners, civic republicanism should be seen *a priori* democracy. Civic republicanism is seen as the key idea that provides the link between Ancient Greece, modern citizenship and the aims of the current citizenship education initiative (Crick 2007). Whilst he sees the aim of the citizenship education project as being to create an informed and responsible democratic citizenry in modern circumstances, he has spent much energy insisting that the fundamental model of citizenship, existing before democracy, and also before the historic Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, is civic republicanism (Crick 1999, Crick 2007). Crick sees civic republicanism as encapsulating the citizen's obligation to participate in civic affairs in an informed and rational way.
Civic republicanism calls on the citizen to pursue a tempered self-interest through political engagement, acknowledging the existence of potential conflicts of interest and of values, enabling the resolving of conflicts of interests within the wider community through informed and agreed political processes. In this historical narrative, citizens' rights and responsibilities, in the Ancient Greek context restricted to an elite, increasingly widen, either through revolutionary convulsions as in France and America, or by less dramatic protest, pressure and struggle, as in Britain: one way or another they widen to embrace all the people of a nation. This increasingly democratic citizenship potentially confers equal citizen's rights; rights to participation in the affairs of the state and rights to the protection of the state; to all the people. Furthermore this is seen as the natural progress of human society. Crick's emphasis on the participatory demands of civic republicanism, is linked with curricular notions of active citizenship, and expresses his concern with an over-emphasis on a reduced conception of democracy, that is one conceived as the mere expressing of opinions (Crick 2007).

In these brief references to Crick, I am arguing that his conception of citizenship is wedded to the enlightenment paradigm. He supports certain universalisms, perhaps the most striking being the claimed historical stability and continuity of the idea of civic republicanism over a period of more than two thousand years, referring un-problematically to the inheritance of our civilisation (QCA 1998, Crick 2000). The specifics of the circumstances in which the works of both Aristotle and of the varied collection of Enlightenment period philosophers were written are not considered as having invested those works with particularities that might undermine the straightforward transfer of the ideas into a later, or a contemporary setting, nor whether the contemporary use of them is significantly modified from their original contextual intention. This point implies a wider criticism of modernist philosophy.

Crick asserts the power of rational debate, the inherent rights of individuals, politics as the play of individual self-interest and group interests, seeking and able to find rational resolution. Crick calls for citizens to participate in political life in an informed and rational way. Citizenship education should teach pupils to weigh evidence before speaking and acting, citizenship teachers should teach objectively, to ensure fairness and secure balance. Of five basic concepts Crick thinks a citizenship teacher should understand, three are Freedom, Respect for Truth, Respect for Reasoning (Crick 1999). Opinion is seen as personal and individual, the twentieth century experience of fascism and communism are seen as aberrations of civilisation due to the failure of individuals to exercise rights and civic
responsibilities. He elevates the power of critical debate to secure rational and reasonable resolution and progress. In turning this into an educational programme, the concept of citizen becomes universal, and tends to become an uncontested formulation.

It has been argued above that the idea of citizenship, in particular as expressed by Crick and as embodied in English citizenship education curriculum policy, is conceived within the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment. However despite the tendency for an educational programme to present an uncontested definition of a citizen, the idea of citizenship is contested. Those contestations will be further analysed in Chapter Six.

2.7 The limits of the Enlightenment: MacIntyre's 'disquieting' suggestions

The elevation of rationality and its ability to determine universal truths of a moral nature is a claim of enlightenment philosophy which has been challenged in the late twentieth century. One challenge will be outlined in the last part of this chapter with reference to Alasdair MacIntyre's thesis *After Virtue: A study in moral philosophy* (MacIntyre 1981), in which there is a profound questioning of the pre-suppositions and certainties that have historically characterised the enlightenment paradigm, but which concludes, not with an articulation of a post-modern philosophical position, but with a call for a return to an earlier pre-modern tradition.

MacIntyre begins *After Virtue* by rejecting the two dominant political philosophies that have accompanied enlightenment philosophy, liberal individualism and Marxism. He proposes, in a way he recognises as 'disquieting' (MacIntyre 1981 p.1), that despite the universalist claims of enlightenment philosophy, the world is in a state of moral relativism, and that the historic Enlightenment is where this condition has its roots. Enlightenment philosophy has failed to recognise this 'catastrophe' (ibid p.3), that has been brought into being, in fact the enlightenment paradigm works to conceal the nature and implications of this catastrophe.

He seeks to challenge the modernist inheritance of the Enlightenment. He illustrates the essential 'emotivism' of moral debate in modern conditions (ibid. p.11), which can secure no rational synthesis or resolution, because even though conflicting moral arguments can both have logical qualities, the founding premises on which they are based are essentially assertions the advocates have come to through non-rational processes, and are premises that
cannot be rationally weighed against each other. The language of enlightenment moral
debate uses the pretension of rationality, to hide its essentially irrational, emotive nature.

In supporting this thesis, MacIntyre makes a historicist point that the great names of the
Enlightenment, such as Kierkegaard, Kant, Rousseau, Locke, and Smith, are treated within
the enlightenment paradigm in a profoundly unhistorical way, as if they were contemporaries
of each other, and contemporaries of us, divorced from the particular historical social,
cultural and political circumstances in which they lived (ibid. p11). He argues that the
complexity of the different contexts that produced their arguments, and the concepts
originally articulated in the writings of these figures, have been casually and falsely
subsumed within the enlightenment modernist paradigm.

MacIntyre identifies the impact of the Enlightenment as turning the concept man from a
functional concept, into an abstract one. In the classical period of Aristotle the concept of the
good man had a functional quality; the good man was a man who lived well in the carrying
out of certain roles, as a father, a citizen, a soldier, a philosopher. In the medieval period the
function of man was to be a servant of God (ibid. p56). Thus there existed the possibility for
determining what a good man should be like. In contrast, enlightenment philosophy posits
man as sovereign, as individual, before roles, an abstract concept, taking away any essential
purpose. This makes it impossible to construct any rational ought conclusions for is
premises, making the judgement of whether anything is good or bad impossible. This would
only be possible if a person or thing had some agreed specific function, but such a telos for
man, previously defined in classical roles, or through divine hierarchy, is eradicated by the
defining of man as an autonomous individual. So the gain for man claimed by the
enlightenment project, of freeing him from the constraints of religion, superstition and
fanaticism, is rather a loss of the ability to secure moral judgements.

MacIntyre’s thesis in After Virtue goes on to question a number of assumptions of
enlightenment-based modernity. One is the positivist epistemology that accompanied
enlightenment philosophy and which has shaped the identity of the physical and social
sciences in the period of modernity. In parallel with some other philosophical reflections on
the nature of scientific knowledge, such as Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Kuhn 1962), he draws the limits of positivist empiricism and the universalisms
it can claim in scientific knowledge. He rejects the status claimed for science of being able to
identify universal, generalisable laws, a status which is often compared with a singular lack
of such a claim being able to be made for the human sciences. Beyond the strictly controlled interaction of physical matter, science is completely unable to predict, for example, the future of science. Newtonian physics did not predict Einsteinian relativity. The shift between the two did not rest on the accumulation of objective evidence from experience and experimentation. Rather it was secured through the emergence of unpredicted theoretical paradigms, and the shift from one to the other being based on a great deal of faith.

Having rejected the claims of rationality and the possibility of moral choice he turns to consider nineteenth century utilitarianism as a philosophy of rationalism. In utilitarianism MacIntyre sees an attempt to recreate a telos for morality in the criteria of creating the maximum amount of pleasure and the minimum amount of pain. This attempt to link an enlightened psychology to social action so as to secure the maximum amount of social good was a linkage that some of Bentham’s followers soon had to modify, one such being J.S. Mill, who felt the need to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures, and preferred to associate pleasure with the cultivation and extension of human creative power. However, MacIntyre argues, the multiple possibilities of defining pleasure and happiness makes the concept useless for deciding on the moral course of action. MacIntyre does not doubt the achievements of some of the nineteenth century’s social reforms that were informed by utilitarianism, but he insists that the idea is a ‘conceptual fiction’ (ibid. p. 62).

MacIntyre turns on the utilitarian pretensions of modern bureaucratic management to a scientific objectivity in the claims of the expertise of management science, claims to be able to identify the best ways to make things happen in the most effective way, and in, what is presented as, a morally-neutral way. In reality, asserts MacIntyre, managers are involved in the manipulation of human beings into compliant patterns of behaviour (ibid. p. 71). MacIntyre’s rejection of the validity of the idea of morality being rationally vindicated, and insistence that relationships in the modern world not being morally-neutral but manipulative, rejects the validity of both Kantian rationality and Kierkegaard’s moral choice, and in doing so acknowledges that this elevates power, and the philosophy of Nietzsche and the non-rational phenomena of the will, to a more central credibility (Nietzsche 1968).

There is much in MacIntyre’s argument which offers refreshing, as well as disquieting, re-evaluations of enlightenment tenets, and which support insights into alternative ways of thinking. In the development of the argument in *After Virtue* MacIntyre acknowledges the insights of Nietzsche as ‘the only major philosopher who had not flinched from this
conclusion ... (that) ... the language of modern morality is burdened with pseudo-concepts such as those of utility and rights' (ibid. p240), but rejects the Nietzschean position of defining the will as the basis of existence as an ultimately individualist philosophy, 'individualisms final attempt to escape from its own consequences' (ibid. p241). MacIntyre concludes by placing the tradition of the Virtues, which has its origins in the work of Aristotle, as the only available basis for constructing an understanding of the good. In reaching this conclusion he also has important things to say about narrative, justice, tradition and, briefly, patriotism, all of which play a part in the considerations of citizenship education. The arguments in After Virtue mark MacIntyre's own transition from an earlier Marxism to a later Roman Catholicism. But rather than follow MacIntyre's thesis closely to this conclusion, let us take stock of the ruins of the enlightenment paradigm that his argument has left us with.

There is no possibility of identifying universal moral truth, and conflicting moral statements cannot be concluded and resolved because they, essentially, are always based on an emotivism, or prompted by an exercise of arbitrary will. Although the nature of modern moral argument uses the language of rationality, that language cannot achieve a rational conclusion. As well as undermining the modern claim to be able to determine universal moral truths, this also undermines the pretence of a morally-neutral, objective social practice. This further undermines the modern concept of the autonomous, sovereign, rational individual. MacIntyre claims that the assertion of the sovereign, rational individual by the philosophers of the Enlightenment means that the individual becomes an abstract concept rather than a functional concept. This is in contrast to the clear telos for life that was understood, albeit in different ways, by classical consciousness, and later by the medieval mind. For the classical world the purpose and meaning of life lay in social action, and good was determined in those terms. A man was only a good man in that he carried out his social functions in a virtuous way. For the medieval mind the purpose and meaning of life lay in the preparation for the next life, or in preparation for the second coming and the establishment of God's kingdom on earth. The possibility of the judgement good, or bad being morally valid exists only if the item (person or thing) has some agreed specific function, but when essential purposes as far as human individuals disappear, then moral judgements cannot be made universal. In this way, MacIntyre characterises what is normally considered to be an enlightenment gain, the insistence of the individual as sovereign and rational, as false and a loss.
In the course of the book his argument opens up some powerful insights on modern political and social practice. Modern political discourse or debate is usually couched in terms of either *utility* or *rights* or some combination of these, providing a semblance of rationality to the debate and process which hides its reality, which is a more arbitrary working of will and power.

‘Contemporary moral experience as a consequence (of the failure of utilitarianism and analytical philosophy to provide a meaning for morality) has a paradoxical character. For each of us is taught to see himself or herself as an autonomous moral agent; but each of us also becomes engaged by modes of practice, aesthetic or bureaucratic, which involve us in manipulative relationships with others. Seeking to protect the autonomy we have learned to prize, we aspire ourselves not to be manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own principles and stand-point in the world of practice, we find no way open for us to do so except by directing towards others those very manipulative modes of relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our own case.’ (p.66)

At the level of personal relationships and moral debate, McIntyre sees a manipulative power existing in a paradoxical relationship with individualist pretensions. He identifies two features of modern political and moral discourse which have power as their object of focus, ‘unmasking’ and ‘protest’ (ibid. p.68), and analyses their nature within the concepts of *utility*, *rights*, and *emotivism*, concepts which he has previously identified as central to that modern discourse. Unmasking the arbitrary will and motives of one’s opponents is a commonplace strategy, but each side will not turn that unmasking on themselves. Protest is always a negative reaction to power based on the idea of an infringement of *rights* – but protesters can never win an argument, but neither can they lose one. Protest, he is ready to concede, can be effective, it can secure good things of power, but it cannot be *rationally* effective.

He makes an insightful comment on the notion of *rights*, a concept at the heart of the modern discourse of citizenship. Rights – not those conferred, but those claimed as natural, inalienable, self-evident, that should not be interfered with, have a long-standing enlightenment history of being defined negatively (Berlin 1969); that is, the rights of individuals to be free from the interference of power, usually of the power of the state. Additionally, more recently, rights are defined positively, *rights to* for example education or employment; these are posited as universal in the enlightenment tradition and are used as a
basis for a variety of particular moral and political stances. MacIntyre argues contrary; that there are no such rights, and belief in them is akin to 'belief in witches and unicorns' (MacIntyre 1981 p.69). The assertion of rights is sometimes couched in terms of being self-evident – but truths are never self-evident – rights are fictions, albeit, he argues, fictions with particular properties. In the consideration later in this thesis of the discourse of citizenship, these concepts will be further analysed and explored within the discourse of citizenship education.

I want to end this section by referring MacIntyre’s comments on what he sees as the artificial division between history and philosophy, which he sees as a false duality, with its origins again in the Enlightenment. This false duality is ‘at home almost everywhere in the modern world’ (ibid. p58), and Marxism is characterised as exemplifying that same false dualism in its distinction of the base/superstructure metaphor. This dualism then is itself a function of the loss implied by enlightenment thinking ...

‘There is a history yet to be written in which the Medici princes, Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell, Frederick the Great and Napoleon, Walpole and Wilberforce, Jefferson and Robespierre are understood as expressing in their actions, often partially and in a variety of ways, the very same conceptual changes which at the level of philosophical theory are articulated by Machiavelli and Hobbes, by Diderot and Condorcet, by Hume and Adam Smith and Kant. There ought not to be two histories, one of political and moral action and one of political and moral theorising, because there were not two pasts, one populated only by actions, the other only by theories. Every action is the bearer and expression of more or less theory-laden beliefs and concepts; every piece of theorising and every expression of belief is a political and moral action.’ (MacIntyre 1981 p. 58)

MacIntyre’s call for a re-conception of history free from false dualities and binaries, which usually privileging the purity of the philosophical over the mundane political, finds a resonance in post-structuralist ideas. Abandoning these enlightenment constraints will be a starting point for the consideration, in Chapter Three, of the idea of the historical development of governmental rationalities as analysed by Foucault.
2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to outline the main tenets of enlightenment philosophy, in order, ultimately, to challenge them. It has been demonstrated that the political philosophies of liberal democracy and Marxism, despite their adversarial positions, actually both inhabit the enlightenment paradigm. The chapter has ended by arguing that the universalist claims of enlightenment philosophy, its claim to the rational search for the truth of an objective world, through the sovereign individual outside of the world, can be demonstrated, a la MacIntyre, as hiding a profoundly irrational, emotivist moral relativity which cannot be resolved rationally, and cannot secure moral truths.

MacIntyre's thesis eliminates the sovereign individual of the enlightenment project and the rational, objective nature of knowledge and truth that it claims can secure progress. Having demonstrated this, he calls for a return to Aristotle, a return to a pre-modern philosophical tradition to secure a telos for life and philosophical deliberation. In contrast, this thesis will adopt post-modern philosophical ideas to take the analysis of the social and political world in general, and citizenship education in particular, forward. In doing this it will concur with MacIntyre's elimination of the sovereign individual of enlightenment philosophy. The idea of rational progress towards the identification of truth and the universalisms and individualism of liberalism will be abandoned. In contrast to MacIntyre however, it will not reject Nietzsche and return to Aristotle, but will instead turn to ideas which have drawn positively from Nietzsche to produce a philosophy which rejects the essentialism and universalist pretensions of enlightenment philosophy. In doing this it will seek ways to conceive of freedom, the individual, the state, democracy, power and rights in non-universalist terms and consider the implications of this for citizenship education. The next chapter, Chapter Three, will build on the ruins of enlightenment philosophy as argued by MacIntyre, and move on to present an outline of the post-structuralist philosophy that this thesis will adopt.
PART TWO: EDUCATION, CITIZENSHIP AND
POST-STRUCTURALISM

Chapter Three: The post-structuralist critique of enlightenment philosophy
Chapter Four: Government, the state and education in the era of liberalism
Chapter Five: Citizenship education policy as governmental technology
PART TWO: EDUCATION, CITIZENSHIP AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

Chapter Three: The post-structuralist critique of enlightenment philosophy

3.1 Introduction

After explaining the research field of this thesis, the development of citizenship education policy in England, in Chapter One, Chapter Two sought to outline the main tenets of enlightenment philosophy that have been the dominant philosophical conceptions of the nature of the world and of human existence within the world since the eighteenth century; the very pillars of what we call modernity. The conclusion of Chapter Two left the definition of the individual, and by implication, the nature of citizenship, and the purpose and process of citizenship education in modernist terms, problematic. This chapter seeks to build on the demise of modernity by outlining and evaluating the developments in twentieth century philosophy, particularly in the last quarter of that century, that support the idea of the social world being understood in a post-modern way. Underpinning this are developments in philosophy which have been loosely termed post-structuralism.

In this first chapter of Part Two, the implications of post-structuralist philosophy will be considered so as to explain how they unsettle enlightenment assumptions. Chapter Four will then consider the social project of education in post-structuralist terms. Chapter Five will critique the current citizenship education policy in England from a post-structuralist perspective.

This chapter aims to outline an alternative to enlightenment philosophy. This will be done with particular reference to the concept of governmentality, as developed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in the late 1970s. It aims to identify how governmentality challenges the epistemological certainties of the enlightenment paradigm, in particular how it redefines the concept of the state and its nature, and how it redefines the relationship between government and governed in ways that imply a different understanding of power, freedom, consciousness, truth and citizenship. The chapter will also consider ways in which this has implications for the concept of democracy and the idea of an education for citizenship and democracy.
A further the intention of this part of the thesis is to pursue this post-structuralist approach through the work of another French philosopher and contemporary of Foucault, Jacques Derrida. The work of Derrida relates particularly to an understanding of language and the play of power within discourse in all contexts. In outline, Derrida asks us to see reality not as an objective exterior to the individual, but as a construct of human discourse. Rather than discourse being an expression of a pre-existent reality, it is only through discourse that realities come into being. Derrida calls for language to be subjected to deconstruction to open it up to difference as a project to assert the possibilities of realities (and democracies) which are always to come (a venir). It is hoped that the intellectual tools offered by Foucault and Derrida will enable the analysis of the nature of the policy, discourse and counter-discourse of citizenship and citizenship education to be carried out anew, centred around a reformulation of an understanding of concepts at the heart of any understanding of citizenship such as power, individual, rights, the state, democracy, justice.

3.2 Foucault and the concept of 'governmentality'

The call from MacIntyre for an integration of philosophy and history, illustrated in the last section of Chapter Two (MacIntyre 1981), provides a starting point for an exploration of the concept of governmentality, originally articulated by Foucault in the lecture programme presented at the College De France in the spring of 1978. The overall title of the lectures was Security, Territory and Population (Foucault 2007). Foucault uses the concept of governmentality to trace what he calls the genealogy of the modern state. It is a concept which places power as integral to the analysis of society. However, contrary to traditional enlightenment analyses of the state, governmentality does not see the state and power as above or distinct from society, but rather embedded in society and in the exercise, not just of the power of what might be considered the great policies of state, but additionally and intimately linked, the exercise of an array of micro-powers that connect the state to its population, intimately involved in the management of the 'bio-sociological processes of human masses' (Foucault 1976, cited in Sennelart 2007 p. 381).

This focus on the state and the nature of power is a development of Foucault’s earlier analyses of the play of power on the regulation and discipline of behaviour and sexuality (Foucault 1977, Foucault 1979). Foucault’s sees the play of power in society as operating not just at a transcendent level of the state, but through an array of micro-processes of power that
reach into the very body of the individual or citizen. To restate the important point above regarding the state as distinct from society, Foucault does not see the state as a 'timeless abstraction' (Foucault 2007 p. 4), a 'pole of transcendence' (Foucault 2008 p.358), or an 'instrument of class domination' (Foucault 2008 p. 109), but rather as an assemblage and amalgam of permanently improvised governmental techniques which seek to render the governed governable. In a generalised sense governmentality is defined as the 'conduct of conduct' (Gordon 1991 p. 48, Senellart 2007 p. 389). This dual use of the term conduct, the first as the act of orchestration and direction, the second as the psycho-social definition of the legitimate limits of individual activity and social intercourse, places power relations and the exercise of government as a centrality in social existence. In doing so it serves to deny to the individual the sovereign status afforded it by enlightenment philosophy. The individual is not separate or free from power, but is the object of power, is furthermore the result of power. The conscious individual is not naturally free, nor rational in any universal sense, but is the construction of power, indeed is only brought to social existence by power. Governmentality serves to emphasise a constant play of power on the individual, and the life of the individual as constantly inscribed by power. An individual, especially in developed, western, free societies, is actually surrounded by a constant and contingent play of support, sustenance, encouragement, regulation, direction and prohibition, without which they would cease to exist. This renders the liberal concept of the struggle between transcendent power and universal sovereign individual freedom naive.

Governmentality asserts a pastoral, essentially social, stabilising and civilising agenda of power, a security of power, in the way it manages individuals and builds the contingent regimes of truth in which individual life is constructed and lived. Power is embedded so as to achieve the improvised, contingent security and stability of the population, even at the level of the body, within the field of the territory over which it is sovereign or has influence. This is a conception that locates power at the centre of social existence. When compared to enlightenment conceptions of power, governmentality serves to widen power's inscription, whilst at the same time de-limiting its ascribed enlightenment identity as a threat to, or guarantor of, sovereign freedom. Foucault conceives of the effect of the state as occurring beyond the limits of the exercise of institutional policy, significant though that is, into the very constitution of individuals and their understandings of social reality. Foucault, thus, identifies a significantly different conception of the state and the play of power in society to that conceived in enlightenment philosophy.
In outline, the spring 1978 lectures presented a series of theoretical speculations on the outlines of European history, which referenced the pre-Christian, medieval and early modern periods. The concepts of the state, power and people are central to these speculations, as the title of the lecture series, *Security, Territory, Population*, suggests. In the course of the lecture series Foucault suggests the title could be altered to convey a more precise focus of his argument; altered to ‘security-population-government’ (Foucault 2007 p 108).

It is necessary, and timely at this point, to trace the divergence between the critique of modernism presented by Foucault and that presented by MacIntyre. Like MacIntyre, Foucault sees the eighteenth century and the establishment of liberalism as the birth of the present condition of man and society, a temporal and intellectual convergence with McIntyre’s identification of the historic Enlightenment as the source of the moral catastrophe that is modernism. Foucault defines the context and significance of these developments in ways which, like MacIntyre, transcend essentialist enlightenment philosophy. He, like MacIntyre, indicates divergences between different philosophers often embraced falsely as a collective by enlightenment philosophy, and asserts the importance of understanding their work in the context of its production, not as offering transcendent essentialist universalisms for our, and all, time. However, unlike MacIntyre, Foucault embraces positively the relativist implications that unsettle the objective certainties of enlightenment philosophy, the relativist implications which so alarm MacIntyre. This acceptance by Foucault of the absence of certainty, stability and essentialism in the social and epistemological fields brings very different meanings into view.

Foucault seeks to detail how the exercise of sovereignty by European states passed from the sovereignty over territory, to sovereignty over populations. The problematic identified in the triangle of terms which head the lecture series develops into a revised problematic, ‘security-population-government’, and further, in the lecture of 1st February 1978, Foucault suggests that the title of the lecture series might be better called a history of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 2007 p.108). This is the first precise articulation of the term; a neologism of government and rationality.

Foucault’s approach to history secures the synthesis between history (traditional political history) and philosophy called for by MacIntyre (1981) (see Chapter Two p.57), a synthesis which Foucault would refer to as tracing the rationalities of governmental action and a close analysis of the how of power operating within populations in different, contingent, historical
conditions. Foucault uses the term *genealogy* to distance his speculations on social development from the linear approach to causation and change adopted by more traditional historiography. He asserts that the process of historical development is subject to a much more complex interplay of factors than is usually the subject of causal identification (Foucault 1991a), with power located as an integral theme within, rather than a linear theme above, society. Thus, *regimes of truth* in any particular historical milieu are to be uncovered through studying an *archaeology of power* (Foucault 1972b).

### 3.3 Governmentality and the Foucauldian idea of the state

A consideration of the general implications of the concept of *governmentality* provides the possibility of alternative meanings of concepts such as *state, citizen* and *power* to those offered by enlightenment philosophy. This consideration will be based on a relatively detailed review of Foucault’s lecture at the College De France on the 1st February 1978, in which the concept of *governmentality* was first deployed.

Foucault’s identification of the eighteenth century as constituting a significant development in the *art of government* in the modern period illustrates how Foucault’s approach contrasts with MacIntyre’s thesis. Before the sixteenth century Foucault defines the art of the government of men as being based on the Christian idea of the pastorate, the shepherd. In the sixteenth century, Foucault identifies a contemporary perception of a problem of government. He links this to social developments such as the breakdown of medieval feudal relations, the violence of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, all contributing to raising the questions of how to be governed, by whom, to what ends and through what methods? In the contemporary response to this problem of government, Foucault references a vast array of texts from the sixteenth century, texts which he is ready to describe as ‘monotonous’ (Foucault 2007 p.89), nevertheless indicating how his research focuses on texts in their particular and specific contemporary context, rather than choosing and then universalising certain authors/thinkers that are presented as offering universal insights into our condition, such as happens, as MacIntyre also argues, in the tradition of enlightenment philosophy and the dominant conventions of historiography.

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4 Post-structuralist philosophy, and the post-modern condition it brings into consideration, asks many questions of traditional assumptions of historiography. These questions, relating to the idea of ‘evidence’, of ‘causation’, of ‘change’, of the assumed linearity of historical development, will play a part in the discussion of discourse relating to citizenship education in later chapters (see Jenkins 1991, 1995, 1999).
These monotonous texts of the sixteenth century are, in the main, argues Foucault, a reaction against the early sixteenth century publication of Machiavelli's *The Prince*. In *The Prince* Machiavelli presents the prince as external to his principality, and the purpose of governing as prince is to maintain the fragile link with the acquired principality, that is at once under threat from external enemies and from the population of the principality itself, neither of whom have any reason to accept the prince's rule. The essential element of the prince's rule is the protection of his territory from these threats. The sixteenth century texts referenced by Foucault form an anti-Machiavellian literature seeking to define something different to Machiavelli, seeking to define an *art of government*. They define the art of government as the government of people within the territory, and of that government occurring on many levels; within institutions, monasteries, schools, families, guilds; the government not now essentially of territory, but of things.

Foucault identifies in the literature attempts to explore governing in different social contexts, governing oneself, governing the family, governing the state. The upward line seeing good government of oneself as the basis for the good government of the family and then of the state, and the downward line conceiving the good government of the state being the condition for the good government of families and of individual conduct. He argues that the good management of the family, termed *economy*, is the model that emerges for the good government of the state, and leads to the development, between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, of a *raison d'etat*, with a claim to unlimited regulation (police) aimed at regulating the population, maximising the state's forces, and enabling it to compete with other states.

In a series of broad theoretical leaps, Foucault links the new, sixteenth century thinking about government, an art of governing conceived in the service of those who are governed, to the growth of *statistics* (the science of the state) in the same century. Foucault references the development of economic rationalities, such as *mercantilism* and *cameralism*, which seek to articulate the role and purpose of the administrative monarchical state. The co-existence of new ideas of the art of government along with older ideas of monarchical sovereignty persisted into the seventeenth century. A consequence of this was an increased problematic of sovereignty and the elevation of population (a neologism of *populus* and *regulation*) as the object of government intensified. This prompted consideration of what should be the legal basis for sovereignty, leading to the emergence of systems of juridical constraints on the legitimacy of sovereignty. The stimulus given to the art of government by the growing population and increased wealth of the eighteenth century, challenged the unlimited scope of
regulation claimed by *raison d'état*. The existence, by the eighteenth century, of a triangle of sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which had the population as its target, marks a key transition in the development of the art of government from the government of the territory, through the *police state* of unlimited regulation, towards what Foucault identifies as the modern governmental rationality of *liberalism*.

The sixteenth century idea of *economy* provides a lineage for the later significant development, in the eighteenth century, of the idea of *political economy*. According to *political economy* the exercise of government is to secure beneficial ends of things, not simply by the imposition of regulation, but by the development of tactics of non-intervention as means to ends. This initiates the modern period and *liberalism*, not conceived by Foucault as a *universalist* philosophy of the *sovereign* individual, *natural* rights and a *natural* freedom, but rather as a new form of the art of government, based on economic reflection on the necessary limits of government, determined through the contingent *truth* provided by the market. It is important to clarify that although Foucault uses some of the traditional words of modernism; liberalism, freedom, laissez-faire, truth, power, Foucault invests these words with very different meanings, which will be emphasised below.

Foucault ends his lecture of 1st February by summarising his understanding of the state; the state which is both central to his thesis, but also, he insists, less important in his understanding compared to modernist 'theories of the state' …

"We know the fascination that the love or horror of the state exercises today; we know our attachment to the birth of the state, to its history, advance, power, abuses. I think this overvaluation of the problem of state is basically found in two forms. An immediate, affective, and tragic form is the lyricism of the cold monster confronting us. But there is a second way of overvaluing the problem of the state that is paradoxical because apparently reductive. This analysis consists in reducing the state to a number of functions like, for example, the development of the productive forces and the reproduction of the relations of production. But this reductive view of the relative importance of the state in comparison with something else nonetheless makes the state absolutely essential as the target to be attacked and, as you well know, as the privileged position to be occupied. But the state, doubtless no more today than in the past, does not have this unity, individuality, and rigorous functionality, nor, I would go so far as to say, this importance. (Foucault 2007 p. 109)."
Thus the state is to be conceived of in a lesser but simultaneously broader sense than in modern theories of the state, not as a ‘cold monster’, not as a conspiracy of oppression and exploitation, but lesser and broader as the embodiment of what creates, manages and recreates regimes of truth which determine social reality and seek to secure the conduct of conduct. This reformulation of the idea of state is critically central to Foucault’s thesis. In the above quote, Foucault wants to challenge the state conceived as the ‘cold monster’ in liberal political philosophy, and the state conceived of as repressive function as in Marxism, and seek to open up the space for his own concept of governmentality.

In the lecture series of the following year, on the 31st January 1979, Foucault returns to this fundamental difference between his analysis and that of liberalism and Marxism …

"... if, on the other hand, ‘doing without a theory of the state’ means not starting off with an analysis of the nature, structure, and functions of the state in and for itself … not starting from the state considered as a sort of political universal … of course I am determined to refrain from that kind of analysis. There is no question of deducing this set of practices from a supposed essence of the state in and for itself … the state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect of (a) perpetual … stratifications, in the sense of incessant transactions … the state has no heart … in the sense that it has no interior. The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities …” (Foucault 2008 pp 77-78)

The state is not above society, it is not in essence coercive of society, it does not have an autonomous identity, or an essence that is different to society, or that is hidden from society, it is simply the coordination of the exercise of multiple governmental techniques, incessant transactions aimed at making the governed governable. In claiming this lesser importance for the state than is afforded to it by liberal or Marxist theory, governmentality nevertheless significantly and importantly reconfigures the nature of the state and the function of power in society.
3.4 Governmentality and liberalism

To develop this review of Foucault’s ideas presented in the lecture series of 1978 and 1979, a summary of how the modern period of governmental rationality, namely liberalism, seen as still pre-eminent today, will be offered. It is in the lecture series of the spring of 1979 (Foucault 2008) that liberalism is the subject of a thorough analysis. However, the first reference to liberalism in the course of the lecture series appears in the concluding remarks of the lecture of 18th January 1978; the second of the series (Foucault 2007 p. 48). There Foucault defines liberalism as ‘not interfering’, allowing free movement, laissez-faire, the idea of created and managed freedom becoming central to the modern period. In this way the idea of freedom is brought into focus, however not as a universal value and as a natural condition, but rather as a technique of government, a technology of power, which uses an apparatus of security to support the possibility of movement and circulation of people and things. Thus freedom is a construction of the exercise of governmental technique, subject to incessant evaluations and re-shaping, not the universal, natural condition of liberal theory, nor a false consciousness before true freedom as conceived of in Marxism.

In the very first lecture of the spring 1979 series Foucault states that he does not see concepts such as sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society as ones with universalist meanings. ‘Let’s suppose that universals don’t exist’ (Foucault 2008 p. 3), then, Foucault argues, we can look at the emergence of techniques of government and governmental rationalities and see what they consisted of, and why they were brought into reality. He applies this method to trace the development of governmental rationalities, and in the eighteenth century detects the establishment of a principle of limitation of state activity internal to governmental rationality, not a limitation imposed from outside by juridical law as had existed in the period of raison d'état between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, nor prescribed and limited by the natural freedom inherent in all men, as posited by liberal theory, but rather a freedom prescribed by the very objectives of government. Furthermore, it is a limitation that is not fixed by a once and for all universalist determination of what is inscribed for submission and what is reserved for freedom. It is a division that is constantly re-calculated within governmental rationality of what to do, and what not to do (ibid. p.12). It is a critical, contingent governmental rationality subject to incessant transactions to determine fluid boundaries of the value and non-value of governmental intervention in the interests of the dictates of political economy; political economy being the study of the nature of phenomena, mechanisms and processes that governmental technique acts upon to secure...
population. Economic experts have the task of telling government ‘what in truth the natural mechanisms are of what it is manipulating’ (ibid. p17). This is not an absolute truth, beyond and external to government, ‘but a particular regime of truth’ (ibid. p18). In this regime, the essential judgement made of governmental action becomes success or failure, rather than whether governmental action is legitimate or not (ibid. p16).

Foucault summarises his tracing of the development of governmental rationality from the classical/medieval period to the modern through posing a series of questions that governmental rationality would understand at different times; ‘Am I governing in proper conformity to moral, natural or divine laws?’—(pre-sixteenth century), ‘Am I governing with sufficient intensity, depth and attention to detail so as to bring the state ... to its maximum strength?’—(sixteenth – eighteenth centuries), ‘Am I governing at the border between the too much and the too little, between the maximum and minimum fixed for me by the nature of things’ (ibid. p18-19) (eighteenth century onwards). To ensure that the reader/listener does not confuse this with a naturalistic account of society, of universal reality and truth, Foucault refers to the consistency between his earlier conceptions of madness (Foucault 1972a) and sexuality (Foucault 1979), and this conception of governmentality ...

“The question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, delinquency, and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before finally being discovered, nor of showing how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelled in the light of reason finally having reached its zenith. It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices – from the moment they are coordinated with a regime of truth – was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality), nonetheless become something, something however that continues not to exist. That is to say, what I would like to show is not how an error – when I say that which does not exist becomes something, this does not mean showing how it was possible for an error to be constructed – or how an illusion could be borne, but how a particular regime of truth, and therefore not an error, makes something that does not exist able to become something.” (Foucault 2008 p19).

This is a long way from the understanding of society as the collection of sovereign individuals, with the power of autonomous rationality to discern objective reality, universal
truths and moral values. It also implies a different conception of power, the state and the citizen.

3.5 The divergence in Foucault's and MacIntyre's critique of enlightenment philosophy

We can identify here a rejection by Foucault of the liberal individualist and Marxist variants of modernist thought, which is a feature also of MacIntyre's critique of modernism in *After Virtue*. Foucault sees the eighteenth century as the point of emergence of modernism, similar to MacIntyre. There are other similarities between Foucault's thought and of MacIntyre's in their challenge to modernism, but there are fundamental differences. MacIntyre rejects the idea of the modern, rational, autonomous individual who can discern universal moral principles by rational means. MacIntyre sees the understanding of the *good* as being the casualty of modernism, but he still seeks to establish the individual moral agent but guided by the *virtues* of an earlier age. Foucault too rejects the idea of the sovereign individual and the universals of truth, but in its place locates the individual within the power relations that construct the community, shaped by governmental techniques, constantly improvised and incessantly transacted, without reference to a universal moral schema. MacIntyre sees liberalism as a false rationality, an illusion. Foucault sees liberalism as a very real governmental rationality. Both see the individual as trapped within the conditions of their time and shaped by their circumstances, of human consciousness being provisional on those circumstances. MacIntyre wants to indicate this, and then escape from the modern variant of consciousness which, he feels, denies moral virtue; Foucault wants to indicate this simply as the shifting condition of human existence. MacIntyre argues for a return to Aristotelian virtues, Foucault accepts the implications of Nietzschean philosophy (Nietzsche 1968).

The primary material available in the transcriptions of Foucault's lecture series thus far referenced, offers a rich source for appreciating the nature and significance of Foucault's ideas. This section has outlined the meaning of the concept of *governmentality*, and how it is used to analyse the development and functioning of the state and its relation to population, so as to identify an intellectual tool that can allow us to analyse the policy and accompanying discourse of citizenship education differently from the modernist assumptions in which it is usually couched. It is necessary to offer more general evaluations of the implications of Foucault's ideas before moving on.
3.6 Foucault, structuralism and post-structuralism

Using the term *post-structuralism* calls for an explanation of the structuralism that post-structuralism claims to oppose or transcend. Marxism provides a structuralist bridge between liberal individualism and the post-structuralism of both Foucault and, to be outlined later in this chapter, Derrida. Despite their significant differences, post-structuralism is an appropriate category for the ideas of both of them. The divergence between post-structuralism and structuralism will be explained with significant reference to Marx. The subsequent section will consider structuralism beyond Marx, referencing the structural linguistics of de Saussure, as a way of bringing into view an understanding of the ideas of Derrida.

Foucault is concerned in a central way with the play of power in society, through its discourses, its institutions, communities, groups and individuals. In his early work Foucault was associated with structuralist philosophers in that he, like they, rejected a philosophy of the autonomous, sovereign individual, and rather insisted on a philosophy of the *system*, of *constructed* concepts, truths and realities. This had some complementary features with Marxism’s definition of man being shaped by society, in Marx’s terms by the nature of the mode of production, and in neo-Marxist terms, through, additionally, the cultural constructions of society working to legitimate the capitalist mode of production through a hegemonic construction of sense and reality. Foucault rejected, as did Marxists, the unproblematic enlightenment idea of the free individual.

Having drawn from the structuralists the rejection of the autonomous individual, Foucault nevertheless saw in Marxism a continuation of the idea of a prime causal factor shaping society and development (the mode of production), and the enlightenment idea of rational objective truth, albeit hidden by what Marx termed *false consciousness*. In contrast, Foucault insisted that there are no elementary structures *underpinning* social development which, when revealed, explain its *surface* manifestations. Consequently, the topographical or architectural metaphors of structuralist and Marxist analysis, e.g. depth/surface, base/superstructure, are to Foucault invalid. There is no hidden depth, only the micro-practices of lived experience and what they reveal. There is no a-historical ground plan back to which particular historical phenomena are explained. The structuralist tendency to prioritise the structure over the parts i.e. whereby the parts can only be explained once the essence of the structure, and the *process* of history, is uncovered, for example in Marxism’s reference to the economic mode of
production which *ultimately*, and in the last instance, determines the function of the repressive state, is rejected by Foucault.

In rejecting the enlightenment paradigm, Marxism, and neo-Marxism, Foucault also rejects the structuralist and individualist assumptions present in Existentialism. Individual consciousness is not free or rational, nor is it *false*, requiring of liberation into a truer state, but rather it is a consciousness that is constructed by the play of power, importantly the exercise of the art of government for the conduct of conduct. Foucault turns to Nietzsche to support his concern with history and power, always asserting that his turn to the study of the history of the state and power is not to determine a secret, or an essence, only 'the secret that they have no essence, that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion …' (Foucault 1977 p.142), in other words that power is essentially improvised, contingent and unstable. Foucault argues that structuralism stresses and privileges *synchrony*, coming-together and resolving, as a *natural* principle, whereas he acknowledges the presence of *diachrony*, falling-apart.

Foucault’s arguments acknowledge the materiality of the world, the contingency of power and discourse, and also the relativity of conditions of existence and regimes of truth. That insistent materiality is the context of the development of governmental rationality that Foucault’s conceptualisation of European history aims to illuminate. The play of power on population, essentially improvised and contingent, seeking stability and security, gives rise to changing rationalities and regimes of truth. Within the modern period, liberal *freedom* is a governmental construction, not a natural universal condition.

*Governmentality* is a concept Foucault developed late in his work to discuss emergences and changes in political reason, particularly as an analysis of liberalism and subsequently neo-liberalism in the context of twentieth century governmental reason. Conditions such as liberalism and neo-liberalism represent, for Foucault, distinctive forms of the *art of government*, not an ideology as liberals would claim it. Liberalism is a *strategy* of government to deal with concrete problems at a particular historical juncture. Political reason consists of systems, expertise and technology (or governmental apparatus) to secure a disciplinary power for the purposes of political control and security with the population as its object. Partitions between the governed and government, or between public and private, are not based on some universal idea of the individual as sovereign, or freedom as natural, but are rather constructed spaces for a prescription to rule. Modern *liberal* governmental rationalities
are improvised, restless and involve a constant critique of state reason and politics, based on the idea that it is possible to over-govern and, in doing so, run the risk of undoing the very ends of government, that is securing the governability of the population so as to allow certain transactions of material benefit to occur. People are woven into the social order by the discourses of governmental rationalities, or, if not, marginalised and punished. Society is a contingently governed productive set of relations which, for good or ill, all subjectivity, all agency, all knowledge and action issue. Power is the very essence of society, all its constructed institutions and all its constituted individuals. ‘The individual achieves consciousness and agency as an active subject by being subjected to the disciplinary machineries of discourse’ (MacLure 2003 p. 176). Foucault does not see power as necessarily a system which inevitably and systematically privileges one group over another, as in the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, although it does allow some people to enjoy privilege compared to others. Some groups do achieve success within the normative demands of discourses, e.g. white middle class parent-child success in the field of education. Governmental techniques can have cultural biases that privilege some cultures and exclude other cultures, but they are fundamentally designed to construct a space to make the governed governable. And the exercise of that domination, or power, is not necessarily malign, as it often is in the reflex oppositionalism of the liberal or the progressive-radical.

This analysis has certain implications. The way the state is conceived within Foucault’s governmental theory undermines the cold monster view of the state as a constant threat to natural liberties and freedom, a reflex that is common within liberal democratic theory of classical or radical variants. Similarly, it undermines that progressive-radical reflex which sees in the state the repressive apparatus pathologically ensuring the protection of vested interests, class domination, the reproduction of the relations of production and false consciousness. It suggests an essential conceit in both the radical and liberal critique of the state, both of which, in referencing their idealist universalist principles and visions, fail to appreciate the essential inter-dependency and social context of life as lived, individuals, including liberals, radicals, academics and revolutionaries, dependent for their existence, security and very consciousness, on that play of power within the populations and communities they inhabit. This reinforces the social nature of existence and consciousness, and the contingencies that support survival, maintain community and define reality. It is not possible to exist in a state of natural freedom, to conceive of such is to conceive of something that is beyond life, that is not life. Governmentality divests the state of the inevitable clothes
of repression that progressive radical theory assumes it wears, and it leaves the sovereign individual, existing in, or striving towards a universal objective condition of freedom, a myth.

This conceptual analysis divests the progressive-radical impulse of its common conceptual justifications and its ethical certainties. It leaves the modernist discourse of political debate and political confrontation in need of re-thinking. It requires critiques of social injustice from positions of ethical insistence that base themselves on universalist references in need of reconsideration. It requires a reflection on the definitions of the citizen, their place in a democracy and the implications for education.

3.7 Structuralism, de Saussure, Derrida and deconstruction

This section intends to consider the contribution of Derrida to post-structuralist philosophy. Derrida’s work emphasises the significance of language and discourse in the construction of social reality, challenging the enlightenment insistence that ideas and concepts exist before language. Whereas enlightenment philosophy sees the self as existing outside language, before discourse, and sees concepts in language taking their meaning from the objective nature and experience of the world, Derridean philosophy sees language as a system that shapes and defines meaning in constantly unstable and shifting ways that elude the conscious control, even the intending impulses, of individual language users: Rather than man speaking language, language speaks man (Heidegger 1971). This instability of language and meaning offers complementary considerations to Foucault’s conception of power and truth as contingent.

Before considering Derridean philosophy in further detail, it is necessary to examine another bridge between structuralism and post-structuralism, a bridge which lies in the linguistic theories developed in the early twentieth century by the Swiss theorist de Saussure, and how their full implications were later developed in Derrida’s work. De Saussure developed a linguistic theory which argued that an understanding of language should not be based on individual words and their etymological roots. Instead language should be primarily understood as a system, a system of sound-signs, or signifiers, which convey meanings, the meaning of the sound is that which the signifier confers on what is signified. The sound-signs, signifiers, do not have an intrinsic, or inherent relationship with the signified, they only achieve meaning by being different to other signs. Thus language is a functional system
based on the play of differences. Rather than linguistics studying words in isolation and with stable meanings, it should look for the laws of solidarity and reciprocal relations in language.

De Saussure's theory of linguistics has had important influences on the human sciences, such as anthropology, cultural studies and psycho-analysis. Later Marxists have seen in language a system that reveals the trace of the mode of production, but works to hide it and build a hegemonic culture that renders capitalist society legitimate. In this, human action is underscored by the system, which is hidden, but has an over-determining presence. This is some distance from seeing language, a la enlightenment, as corresponding to truth, as representing the real, as being a pragmatic necessity for conveying the universals of reality, of being, of thought; the idea being a priori language. Enlightenment philosophy posits the inner, authentic self, which exists outside of language, before discourse, whereas, in structural linguistics concepts take their meaning from the nature of language, and these are shaped by the contingent historical forces that come to bear on them. Thought is something learned by the subject, through which a culturally determined basis of meaning is acquired. Thinking requires language, and language is learned. Man does not speak language as an autonomous rational being discerning the objective world, language, and the play of power on language, speaks man.

This then is the basis for the philosophical approach to language developed by Derrida, which is called deconstruction. Derrida accepts the premise of de Saussure's work, but is post-structuralist in the sense that he rejects the idea that there is an over-determining structure which is shaping language. In this he differs from the neo-Marxists who see language as over-determined by the mode of production serving to construct a cultural hegemony which legitimates those relations of production. Derrida's argument is that all our dealings in the world are unrelievedly textual. Whereas enlightenment philosophy assumes universal truths, and language as a pragmatic vehicle to try to convey truths, deconstruction asserts that textuality is the condition of the existence of any truths. Textuality exists in writing and speaking, but also in other cultural signs, and deconstruction is the search for the claims to truth in the text and the opening up of difference for examination and consideration. Just as Foucault calls for us to understand power at its point of enactment, in the prescriptions it opens and closes, rather than in any universal sense, so Derrida asks us to consider language at its point of utterance, and appreciate its attempt to enforce power and assert truth, but also acknowledge and explore its inherent instability.
Deconstruction has played a large part in promoting the cultural manifestations of post-modernism through academic and other cultural practices. As with governmentality, it has a power to unsettle modernist assumptions, and is often the target of critics who see in it an endless play of signifiers and signified, a sport of the ‘frivolous jesters of post-modernism’ (Inglis 2003 p. 120), giving rise to a vulgar relativism of post-modern practice, which pathologically doubts what people say and indulges in the ‘calculated subversion of intended meaning by the discovery of unintended contrary or subversive meanings’ (Inglis 2003 p. 125). It behoves this thesis to offer a justification for the practice of deconstruction.

Deconstruction is not just a game of words, but has the power to be put to serious moral and ethical purposes, to assert moral responsibilities, as it brings with it a political charge of the need to constantly remake, and make anew, democracy to come. Deconstruction opens language for the examination of the play of power it is shaped by. Social circumstances work to privilege certain meanings and truths, and work to exclude or make forgotten others. Modernist discourse works to make constructed truths seem as common-sense; deconstruction can radically undermine this and point to other possibilities. What is implicit in deconstruction is that language, and the truths it claims, are fundamentally contingent and inherently unstable, and the method of deconstruction has the power to open up discourse, for example the discourse of citizenship and citizenship education, to a post-structural emancipatory analysis (Cornell et al 1992).

Thus, for Derrida, language is not fixed. It is employed from an infinitude of possibilities. In some circumstances it becomes stabilised, which is a pragmatic necessity, but those stabilisations, sometimes of long duration, sometimes only short, are always unstable. Language stabilisations produce conventions, traditions, codes, they are servants to systems, to power. The play of language, the text, is our medium for considering the moral and the ethical. Deconstruction offers an ethical responsibility to decide, to be open, a responsibility which is infinite, and cannot be enacted ethically by reference to a convention, a tradition or a system. It insists on the present’s responsibility for the future, rather than asserting the authority of the present by reference to the past. Unless the infinitude of possibility is acknowledged then there is no responsibility. The acknowledgement of the infinitude is the basis for the existence of moral, ethical and political problems. In accepting this infinite responsibility, the ethical decision is always a moment of choice that cannot be avoided, cannot be referred to a pre-existent schema, it denotes the madness of the ethical decision in the field of infinite possibilities taken with infinite responsibility for the other, and which,
Furthermore, once taken, is not closed, because it has to be taken again and again in the same condition of the present moment of madness. The moment of the madness of the decision is always a responsibility to come, a responsibility for, what Derrida calls *democracy to come*. By this Derrida does not mean that democracy is a future state to be achieved, or that any present system holds, in itself, the virtuous pre-requisites of a better or finished democracy to come, but that the ethical decision must always accept the infinite responsibility to pursue an open-ended, forever contingent, reiteration. Democracy, for Derrida, is not a system, it is an ethical responsibility.

This is a responsibility to challenge closures, to question essentialist claims to fixed meanings and values, to open up ethical systems that claim a lineage of authority to the possibilities of *difference*, to uncouple every binary opposition that works to stabilise meaning and value. The only natural aspect of language is that it is chaotic. Justice cannot be reduced to a system. Moral decisions and judgements have no unproblematic foundations which offer any excuse, or diminish any responsibility, for the decision.

‘... this idea of a never-possible-to-attain justice, this impossibility, is precisely the condition of possibility which makes moral positions (and political problems - author) both possible in the first place ... and subject always to the possibility of critique, in that ‘for all we know’ our best attempts at expressing justice always fall short. Thus is opened up forever that critical space between the notion of ‘a never conceivable but necessary justice’ and empirical ‘justices’, a critical space where deconstruction can work or, better still, where deconstruction (the possibility of deconstruction) *is* justice.’

(Jenkins 1999 p. 48)

Binary oppositions seeking to fix meaning and value, such as political left and right, rational and irrational, true and false, reason and emotion, professional and amateur, majority and minority, are ways in which power seeks to stabilise meaning and ascribe value, to create vertical hierarchies of authority and to insist upon a naturalness, when they are in actuality, constructions. These can be deconstructed by making equal, or even privileging, the term which is usually considered hierarchically inferior. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that the categories that are held in binary opposition are not at all fixed in meaning or value, so true and false, fact and interpretation, rational and irrational, can be displayed to be far from precise categories. The establishment of a fixed category seeks to displace to its binary...
opposite a set of attributes which act as a justification for the privileging of the original. Deconstruction looks for the fluidity in this act of stabilising difference. It offers a basis for the possibility of considering anew, which is the condition of democracy and justice to come.

It is necessary, at this point, to note the different emphases present in Foucault’s and Derrida’s thinking. Whereas Derrida sees our understandings of the world as fundamentally textual and considers the ethical implications of this for meaning, ethical statements and decisions, Foucault’s analysis is focused much more on the material conditions of ever-shifting actualities, in which power through governmental technology seeks a contingent strategy for the control of the body, to seek to secure the conduct of conduct. In the Derridean world, discourse works to prescribe what can be thought, said or known, and in Foucault, governmental discourses prescribe the way we are allowed, obliged, to be and act.

Nevertheless, Foucault’s ideas of shifting, contingent regimes of truth, that shape social existence and the possibilities of freedom, and Derrida’s ideas of shifting, contingent difference in language are complementary. They open up a process of analysis which enables policy as power and as language to be analysed as the attempt to stabilise the instabilities of society and meaning, and, through deconstruction, to be able to open closures, to maintain an openness to the future and the other.

It is the ambition of this thesis to consider the potential of both governmentality and deconstruction for an analysis of policy and the discourse of citizenship and citizenship education in England in the years of the National Curriculum. The former to consider citizenship education as a governmental strategy aimed at regulating the conduct of conduct, the latter to consider the language of policy and discourse so as to begin to reflect on the opportunities for education to be open to the possibility of justice and of democracy to come.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to outline the philosophical formulations for social analysis offered by Foucault and Derrida. These approaches to the how of power, policy and discourse have drawn on, first of all a consideration of Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, that is identifying the nature of governmental rationality and the possibilities for social existence it prescribes through the conduct of conduct. Secondly, the method of deconstruction, developed by Derrida as a method in the analysis of text so as to detect the play of power in
language, has also been outlined. Both these methods of analysis recognise the centrality of power in society; power not as a counterpoint to natural freedom, but power as an essential element in the construction of consciousness, truth, meaning, language and agency. For the purposes of this thesis, these theoretical formulations unsettle the philosophy of Liberalism, the cult of individualism and the paradigm of enlightenment philosophy. They demand different understandings of social existence. In seeking to apply them to the policy and discourse of citizenship education they call for a reconsideration of some very powerful concepts; the individual, truth, reality, freedom, justice, democracy, oppression, emancipation, progress. These are concepts which are invested with high stakes in the moral economy of discourse, and to unsettle them is a daunting prospect. If there are no free, rational, sovereign individuals for whom democracy is the natural state to serve freedom and secure progress, then what becomes of an education for democracy? And if there is no stable knowledge or language into which learners are initiated for individual fulfilment or social emancipation, then what of education?

The next chapter will use the concept of governmentality to discuss the development of mass education as a social project. It will use the implications of deconstruction to trace the space for agency and critique within post-structuralist understandings.
PART TWO: EDUCATION, CITIZENSHIP AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

Chapter Four: Government, the state and education in the era of liberalism

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will apply the Foucauldian concept of governmentality more closely to the idea of mass education in the modern period. This has implications for an understanding of the nature of power and the relationship between the state, civil society and the individual. This relationship will be considered in this chapter more particularly in the era of liberalism; where liberalism is conceived in a Foucauldian sense of as a practice of government, not, as is usually the case in enlightenment thinking, as a universalising philosophy. This will lead into a consideration of the development and practice of education, pedagogy and schooling which has been a key area of governmental activity in England for the last 150 years. Drawing on Hunter (1994), education will be analysed as a contingent governmental technique for the exercise of pastoral power to secure the conduct of conduct and the governability of the governed. This will work to locate educational policy as an exercise in the art of government through the governmental technology of the school. The effect of this analysis will be to undermine progressive-radical analyses of the nature of, and possibilities for education, identifying the oppositionalism of much radical educational critique as being other-worldly and in danger of ethical irresponsibility.

4.2 Liberal governmentality

Liberalism, expressed as a universalising philosophy in its many variants (see Chapter Two and Chapter Six), considers government in some ways to be outside, or above civil society. Society is, in enlightenment terms, a natural state consisting of free, autonomous, rational sovereign individuals, and government is seen as a problematic and troubling necessity. This necessity relates to the state’s juridical function in providing a mechanism for the resolving of conflicts of individual interest, and its troubling aspect relates to its potential threat to individual liberty and rights. Thus, debates about the state within liberalism, in its classical and progressive-radical variants, focus on the question of the state’s legitimacy, first of all, in a democracy, on the validity of the representative principle and processes by which it is constituted, and secondly, focused on where the power of the state can legitimately be exercised and where limits should be drawn between the public interest and private freedom,
between the collective and the sovereign individual. Whilst these debates have meaning, they are understood differently through the lens of governmentality.

There is an implicit trend in classical liberal thinking against the legitimacy of power, culminating in the possibility that 'power is evil itself' (Burkhardt 1949, quoted in Rieken 2006 p.127). Attempts to delineate and restrict the exercise of power within the liberal enlightenment paradigm often take the form of seeking and claiming an unmasking of illegitimate intent. Power, in its social and political context, is readily defined as a threat to the freedom of the sovereign individual. Power is considered as a possession that is unequally distributed in society, creating and reinforcing inequality, with an innate tendency to exploitation and oppression. It is conceived as a potential tyranny of one will over another, an iniquitous inequality, with a propensity to cause effects that disturb and debase a natural state of individual freedom. Those who are considered to possess and practice power are generally ascribed with selfish motives. This conception of power is presented as a continuum; from the authority to rule, to force, and then to violence, a tendency that power is pathologically susceptible to. It is necessary for political power's inevitable tendency to violence to be restrained through juridical prescription. This demonic of power is a corollary of the primacy liberal philosophy ascribes to the sovereign individual and the idea of a universal, natural state of freedom.

This conjecture on liberalism and power is considered to be unsettled by post-structuralist ideas. Foucault, in contrast, sees the state in simultaneously a narrower sense, but also a wider sense. He rejects theories of the state as the 'cold monster' of classical liberal philosophy, with its propensity to swallow up the sovereign individual. He also rejects the progressive-radical theories of the state, that claim to unmask its foundational oppressive function of representing and reproducing dominant class interests supporting an exploitative social structure, as in the meta-narratives of Marxian philosophy. He asserts that there is no hidden purpose of the state, and no essence of the state derived from essential properties and understood through universal principles. Rather, understood post-structurally, the state is an assemblage of practices of government aimed at securing the conduct of conduct, aimed at ensuring the governability of the governed. In doing this the state is less than the essence it is invested with in liberal philosophy and conceptions of the state, but also more, in that the state co-ordinates, through an improvised and historically contingent governmental rationality, the exercise of subjugating power through a wide range of governmental technologies, brought to bear directly and indirectly, through a variety of processes, on the
individual subject. For Foucault, traditional theories of the state drawn from enlightenment liberal/radical political analyses focus too much on institutions and a linear conception of their developmental causality, and too little on the web of practices of the art of government and the play of power throughout society in particular historical circumstances (an approach to historical analysis he calls genealogical as opposed to historicist). Power, rather than being a threat to the sovereign, free individual, is a necessary and fundamental presence in human society, an 'omnipresent dimension in human relations and social conduct, (but) power is never a fixed and closed regime, but rather an endless and open strategic game' (Gordon 1991 p.5).

Having attempted to define the state and governmental power as understood in a Foucauldian sense, let us turn to the idea of the individual. In liberal philosophy, the individual is sovereign, autonomous, rational in search of individual fulfilment and freedom, potentially thwarted by the corruptions of power and institution. This free individual is considered a pre-given subject in a natural condition based on universal truths. Foucault's ideas, as he understated in a public debate with the American philosopher Noam Chomsky, are not as advanced as that, in that they do not determine universal, natural truths and conditions. Indeed they deny them.

The individual, conceived under the practice of the art of government, through governmental technology supported by a governmental rationality, is not pre-existent and sovereign, but is constituted by that rationality. Whilst liberal governmentality does, importantly, allow the individual a freedom from the direct state regulation that characterised an earlier, pre-nineteenth century, governmental rationality of police-state, it is nevertheless a freedom that is conditional and conditioned. Governmentality comes to bear on the individual's possibilities of action, of thought, of conduct. This is not a fixed rationality. Governmental rationality has changed over the centuries (Foucault 2007), and whilst different rationalities can be historically periodised and analysed, still, within any of those periods of contrasting rationalities, the art of government is constantly improvised and shifting. In the twentieth century, and since the late eighteenth century, western societies have explored a governmental rationality called liberalism, which, in contrast to previous rationalities, considers the possibilities of the value of limiting state action. Liberal governmentality considers the propensity for self-interest and the consideration of individual self-government and preference to be a mechanism for securing the stability, governability and security of the population. This is not liberalism considered as universal truth, nor individuals considered as
sovereign, autonomous and rational, but rather liberalism, developed since the end of the era of the raison d'état, as a new art of government. It is an art of government which recognises, in certain material and technological conditions, a propensity in the object of government, the population, to follow the pursuit of their interest and preferences in carefully constructed spaces. This is not necessarily rational in any universal sense, and certainly immune to any universal idea of truth, but this constructed and monitored freedom does have the propensity to contribute to the collective stability and prosperity of the whole population. Liberal governmental rationality seeks to secure a convergence of this individual pursuit with the collective or public interest. This understanding of the possibilities of limiting the exercise of government superseded the idea that sovereign power needed to be constantly exercised in the regulation of all social practice, the police-state of the early modern period. Liberal governmental rationality led to the development of the idea of laissez-faire. However, this is a laissez-faire that still requires the constant vigilance and intervention of government, as the freedoms, attitudes, values and exchanges that are brought into existence are not in any way natural, or stable, or intrinsically optimally efficient. Governmental management is exercised at all levels in the bio-management of the population so as to ensure an alignment between how interest is conceived by the individual subject, how this contributes to a collective end and how the security value of submitting to government is correlative perceived by the governed.

This governmental rationality requires an endless, improvised, governmental practice so as to ensure the governability of the governed, the well-being of the population and its security within the territory over which power and influence is exercised. Individuals have the practice and power of liberal governmentality brought to bear on them, not as direct sovereign power pathologically seeking to regulate all aspects of social life, requiring the definition of limits to this through individual juridical rights, but a governmentality which is constantly monitoring and re-constructing spaces for individual subjectivity to be explored, defining possibilities, and shaping conduct. Individuals are inextricably caught in this normalising web of power in society, never autonomous, but exercising a constrained individual subjectivity; yet always potentially unstable in their relation to governmental power.
4.3 Education, schooling and pedagogy

The conceptual framework explored above allows us to consider education and schooling in ways which challenge their conception in liberal philosophy. It implies a need to distinguish between seeing the practice of education, and the development of citizenship education in the circumstances of current policy, as being modelled on universal principles and, instead, to see education as an instrument of governmental technology. In the era of liberal governmentality, since the early nineteenth century, the school has become an institution whereby pedagogy works in a direct way to secure the *conduct of conduct* so as to prepare citizens for an optimum insertion into social life. This understanding supports a rejection, in this thesis, of the idea that the practice of citizenship called for in current social-historical and educational conditions is fundamentally legitimated by being traced back unproblematically to ancient Greece, or to 18th century Europe. Instead schooling in general, and citizenship education policy in particular, is a significant instance of a developing governmental rationality for education in the late twentieth century, specific to the particular territory and circumstances in which it occurs. Furthermore, it is necessary to see education, not as a means to a universal state of individual fulfilment or emancipation (although it can undoubtedly change individual capacities and life chances), nor a means to end false consciousness (although education can relate to resisting power meaningfully in certain circumstances), but rather as a governmental technology for ensuring the conduct of conduct, for making the governed governable and for seeking optimum social capacities to be inserted into the circuits of social life.

Foucauldian ideas have informed analyses of schooling. In *Rethinking the School* (1994) Ian Hunter offers a sustained analysis of the development of modern schooling through the conceptual lens of *governmentality*. Although rarely referencing Foucault directly, the book celebrates the achievements of the bureaucratic-technical experts who established and developed mass education as modelled in western European nations and their off-shoots. Their achievements are defined as a development of governmental technology for the creation of governable citizens. In the process he also maintains a devastating assault on the liberal and radical critiques of educational policy and practice which tend to dominate the critical mentality of the educational theorist.

Hunter criticises the liberal idea that education should aspire to the enabling of the full development of the natural capacities of free individuals. Similarly he dismisses the radical
critique which sees education as, alternately, the mechanism for the reproduction of a social structure to sustain exploitative capitalist relations, and also the obverse radical impulse, to see education as the aspiration of the proletariat to fulfil its historic responsibility to create an equal society of liberated free rational, self-reflecting, self-realising individuals. Both these, through a habit of auto-oppositionalism and moral conceit, consider the actual policy and practice of mass education in modern societies as having 'the appearance of a humble church built out of stones intended for a great cathedral ... the flawed realisation of an ideal form' (Hunter 1994 p.1).

Hunter eschews this reference in educational scholarship to an imagined higher or deeper form of human development to which education should aspire. This principled reflex of much educational critique is defined by Hunter as a privilege of the moral authority and social standing of the intellectual theorist, indulging a prestigious authority over, and a special kind of contempt for, the mundane technicians of educational policy, school management and classroom practice, managers and practitioners who are deemed to acquiesce by liberal and progressive-radical theorists in the actual, but flawed, arrangements of the school. Hunter's contempt for the liberal and radical traditions of educational critique develops as his text unfolds, and becomes severe; educational critique being defined periodically in Hunter's text as self-serving, self-aggrandising.

Divorced from the pretensions of the critical theorists of education, Hunter insists that the genealogy of the modern school lies in a Christian-pastoral principle applied by an expert bureaucratic-technical cadre aimed at citizen formation so as to make the governed governable; an expert intervention in social management. This involved a European-wide direct intervention of governmental practice into the chaotic rural, urban and religiously divided populations of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. It adopted a pastoral principle which aimed at a training in a normative moral and social comportment which conjoined discipline and supervision, surveillance and self-examination, rationality subject to moral discipline, moral self-realisation subject to pastoral guidance. The concept of freedom for the Christian pastoralist was not a natural state, not a principle opposed to government, nor a universalist aspiration, but rather an instrument of government employed in a carefully constructed and supervised environment, the school. This forms the basis for the intimate relationship of surveillance and the development of a self-regulated conscience that characterises the teacher-pupil relationship in the Christian-pastoral school, classroom and playground.
This identification of the limitations of liberal, radical and social-democratic critique of education, and insistence on education being understood as a contingent improvised mundane reality, as a governmental technology for the training of governable citizens, sits squarely in this thesis’s interest in the implications of post-structuralist philosophy for understanding education and the development of citizenship education policy. It is appropriate to draw further on Hunter’s argument in *Rethinking the School*, in particular on the insights he offers into some of the more recent, and still current educational issues regarding the principles of equality and democracy in educational policy, practice and discourse.

The consequences of Hunter’s analysis of schooling undermine classical liberal confusions over the limits to individual freedom implied by schooling. This confusion can be illustrated by the case of liberal concerns for moral reflection to be secured through schooling, but then insistence that this moral reflection is somehow freely self-realised (Gutmann 1987). For the liberal Gutmann, the educational objectives of an unfortunately necessary state system must still be defined as emerging from a conscious, rational, personal choice. The child, Gutmann concedes, has to be guided, not given free choice between moral comportments, but this guidance is, in an exercise of double-think, linked by Gutman to a natural, freely determined moral comportment. This, in Hunter’s view, evades the issue and exists only as an empty circularity.

Turning his attention to radical, Marxian educational theory’s engagement with the actualities of schooling, he acknowledges the differences between liberal and Marxian theory, but also identifies the same empty circularity. Radical critique attempts to reconcile the overt disciplinary nature of schooling with the idea of the free, emancipated individual and democratic decision-making, achieved through the dialectic of resistance to capitalistic schooling, but also the anticipated historic self-realisation, in some ways through education, of the class destiny.

Radical educational theory defines the school as an institution serving the social requirements of the exploitative capitalist economy. Yet, at the same time, the school is also seen as a location of struggle where the oppressed seek freedom and democracy. In this theoretical model an imagined vanguard of critically intellectual teachers and radical theorists are assigned the role of, from within, supporting this resistance to the oppressive nature of schooling. However, this ideological commitment to the moral capacities of the self-realising class encounters problems, both when it encounters the power of the disciplinary, normative
function of schooling, and when it comes across failings in pupil and community attitudes, when, for example, working class communities display racist or sexist dispositions. These are then theorised, within radical critique, as the undesirable consequences of the social division of labour and the distorting nature of capitalistic social relations. It is here that radical critique requires concepts such as *emancipatory authority*, which authorise the radical teacher to intervene so as to criticise and correct these failings in the class.

Radical educational theory also seeks to invest pedagogy with an emancipator edge. It identifies a *becoming-by-acting* principle of pedagogy, whereby learning (considered as natural human development) and choosing (natural human freedom) are integrated in active learning. *Learning for empowerment, developing self-capacities, self-formation through active-learning* in which students *authorise their own voices* and *identities*: to Hunter these are all futile attempts to reconcile the reality of the expert-technical bureaucracy of education to the idealised notions of the natural, sovereign, free individual (see section 4.5 p.90). Such pedagogic concepts are to be found littering the discourse of citizenship education.

According to Hunter, the concept of governmentality allows the school system to be identified more mundanely as a historic specific administrative development which draws on the inheritance of Christian-pastoral conceptions of the development of moral comportment, and enjoined this with new intellectual techniques, statistics (the science of the state), that enabled the schooling of children to be brought under the gaze, and turned into a problem and object, of government.

### 4.4 Education and the pursuit of equality as a governmental aim

It is here that Hunter's analysis brings with it an up-turning of some contemporary interpretative conclusions that liberal and radical theory makes of educational practice. First of all, he insists that the sexism identified in working class attitudes is not the symptom of a distorted ideal and unrealised natural form of moral rationality, a distorted ideal operating unrestrainedly and problematically in schooling as *failure*, but rather as the successful outcome of the way schools require children to problematise their own behaviour and to develop self-governing characteristics within the pastoral milieu of the school. Thus, rather than recording a moral failing of the education system, the identification of sexism as a problem for governmental scrutiny actually marks its ethical achievement. Secondly, and
differently, the racism of some school boards (Hunter’s example is American) which make the normally delegated function of authority from the state to the school board unreliable, problematic, and potentially withheld, is again, not the failure of the distorting system to allow the capacity for rational democratic citizens to make rational choices, but an indicator of the achievement of the insertion of a certain degree of civic competence in the community through governmental training, which can then make the delegation of authority able to be considered, but also carefully calculated, and potentially withheld. These two examples are indications of the achievements of the governmental state, not, as is usually the case in progressive-radical educational theory, of its failure. Similarly, the self-reflective child and future ethical citizen is not the natural foundation of educational practice, but its product. The self-reflective individual is not the source and natural product of the democratic struggle for self-formation, but rather the product of the efforts of Christian pastoral discipline through the governmental technology of the school.

The confusing of governmental educational objectives with currents of enlightenment thinking creates ambivalence. On the question of educational equality, is this objective of equality to be seen as a governmental project to raise the optimal level of social training and development by securing outcomes of the many in line with those of an elite, or is it to enable all self-realising individuals to reach their natural potential? This ambivalence is present in policy statements which try to combine social training and economic objectives with notions of common humanity and rights to educational equality. Hunter will not accept that these differing modes of reflection can meaningfully co-exist because they lead to two different conceptions of the scope of education, different kinds of expectations of schools and teachers.

The uncompromising adherence by radical educational critique to the principle of equality and self-realisation as absolute rights of all persons brings with it a contempt for what schools actually achieve. Whilst some liberal thinkers do consider a compromise between state policies to promote equality with the idea of individual freedom from the state to be valid, and also acknowledge the limits set by scarcity of resources, there is still the theoretical commitment to equality as a moral and natural right of all individuals, rather than acknowledging that moral and social capacity is something that has to be administratively generated within a population. Marxist critics indulge a more profound debunking of the school system; the system is not just unequal because it fails to recognise the innate potential of the rational sovereign pre-existent individual, but because it is specifically designed to produce inequality in the interests of capitalistic exploitation.
Hunter locates the development of the objective of equality as a focus of governmental concern in the 1940s when statistical surveys showed, brought into governmental truth, that working class children had lower participation rates, school success rates, and enjoyed fewer rewards of education in terms of prestigious occupations or entry into higher education than their middle class counterparts. This administrative-technical work, in the context of the need for post-war re-development, problematised the school system from the governmental perspective of the underdevelopment of human resources in the working class. It contributed to a developing regime of truth which brought educational inequality under the gaze of governmental rationality and began to define it as an object of government. However, despite these surveys serving the administrative objective of bringing the issue of equality in the school system into existence as an object of government, inequality is used by critical intellectuals as proof of the failure of the school system. In fact the principle of educational equality, rather than being a transcending moral absolute of the self-realising individual, actually emerges as an objective of the technical-bureaucratic system designed to pursue the goal of optimal social training. The objective of equality was the creation of a new kind of social objective, in the overwhelming context of the needs of post-war reconstruction, not the recognition of an eternal and essential right. The statistical surveys of the 1940s brought the spheres of grammar schools, the location of elite formation, into the focus of the governmental gaze. It allowed, not the recognition that 'all men are created equal', but the objective of government to make them more equal to be brought into being. The statistical definitions of reality are not indications, as interpreted by critical theorists, of proof of the failure of the educational system, but technologies by which a prospect of a more common approach to education as a governmental priority could begin to be envisaged as beneficial.

4.5 Power, pedagogy and the limits of governmentality

Hunter takes a detour into discussing the identification, by radical intellectuals, that the teacher-pupil relationship is unequal and that this is symptomatic of the repression of the self-realising individual, compounded in radical theory as instilling the false consciousness necessary for the reproduction of exploitative capitalist economic relationships. Hunter re-asserts that pedagogy derives its model from the Christian pastorate, a form that pre-dates both the administrative state and capitalism. The ethical inequality between teacher and pupil is an inescapable pedagogical ritual, which has been subject only to modification, never
removal. In the application of Christian pastoral techniques to schooling a certain kind of pedagogically constructed freedom, and pretended equal relation can be mobilised, as in active learning, but this increased freedom is linked, pedagogically, to heightened surveillance, and the only possible consequence of a greater play of an equality game in the teacher-pupil relationship, lies in its potential enhancement of the teacher’s power of moral governance. In the milieu of the school and pedagogy, each attempt to increase freedom can be more routinely exposed as a more subtle form of control.

Consequently, the capacity for self-reflection is not a universal, innate human capacity, but an organisational achievement. Equality is not a right, but a project of securing an optical social capacity through a process of a common formation of citizens. To subject schooling to absolute moral principle, as critical theorists often do, is not only to misunderstand it, but is also to indulge in intellectual irresponsibility and to abandon civic virtue. Re-thinking the School addresses many more educational issues, ability, IQ tests, the family, the community school, issues which are often the focus of progressive-radical critique. Hunter revels in using governmental analysis to expose the conceit of this critique, this ‘intellectualist world rejection’ (Hunter 1994 p.117).

The previous paragraphs have explored the application of governmentality to the social project of education. Hunter’s argument offers a genealogy of the educational system based on the idea that schooling aims to develop social capacities in the population so as to optimise social goods. It does this through the work of pastoral governance on the individual pupil through a pedagogic ritual that demands a reflection by the self on the self so as to develop a moral comportment to social normative goals. This is a powerful critique of liberal and radical educational theory, eschewing the reference in such critique to the idea of the moral ideal of the self-realising individual or the self-realising class, rejecting also the ideas of natural freedom, natural equality or natural expression as the potential objectives of education. Educational critique is identified as the over-indulgence of a morally reflective comportment which is the by-product of the governmental objective of education, tolerated at times, but not always, as a status outcome of the very project of education. It is tolerated only as a status example of the moral self-reflection and academic status that pastoral education sees as one of its objective, but it, progressive-radical educational critique of the other-worldly type, misunderstands the genesis of its own existence and provides no basis for any meaningful evaluation of educational policy and practice.
It is anticipated that this example of the power of Foucault's conceptualisations will offer an entry into an analysis of both policy and discourse of citizenship education. Whilst policy texts embrace the universalism of enlightenment thinking, they are opened to analysis as governmental rationality. Whilst discourse regarding policy mobilises enlightenment principles to criticise policy, its limits as a critique of the possibilities of governmental rationality are opened to view. The discourse of citizenship pedagogy; the teacher as emancipator, facilitator, the investment in the idea of active-learning conceived as a path towards the freeing of the individual learner so as to secure a democratic education within which pupils develop their authentic self, is similarly brought into critical consideration. The idea that learning can be aligned with natural human development and natural human freedom through some notion of choice and action is similarly opened to critique. Favoured concepts such as empowerment, self-expression, self-formation, student voice, self-authorising, playing large in the discourse of citizenship education, are brought into focus as potential objects of post-structuralist critique.

4.6 Transcending the closure of critique

Hunter's application of governmentality to schooling produces an analysis that unsettles the liberal and the progressive-radical critique of education. Education interpreted as a failed project of individual realisation, as a failed project to challenge oppression, as the repressive expression of class domination, is superseded. Hunter's analysis challenges the progressive-radical explanation of the provenance of undesired social expressions such as sexism and racism, seeing them as truths that have been brought into truth through governmental activity, rather than being manifestations of the failure of education to secure an ideal form. Hunter asserts the contingent achievement of the educational system in producing social capacities in individuals that secure a reflective comportment of the self in a social-ethical context.

Nevertheless, despite the power of this analysis to provide a satisfactory explanation of the project of mass education, and to identify the ethical vacuity of much of the auto-oppositionalism that counts as progressive-radical critique, it tends itself to a restriction of the very possibility of critique. This tendency is present in the identification of governmental rationalities in a Foucauldian sense. The concept of governmentality tends to elevate the governmental bureaucratic project to a position where it is beyond question. The governmental pursuit of the stability, security and material well-being of society and
community, seeking to secure a conduct of conduct that is compatible with security and stability, firmly within a communitarian ethic, runs the risk of leaving the individual and the community, the object of government, without a subjective experience that deserves consideration. Individual subjectivities only come to exist through governmental activity. Individual, and community subjectivities might seem accountable to government with much more weight than governmental activity is accountable to subjective experience. Governmental activity is the source of the construction of the individual comportments that are required to relate to social realities which governmental technologies have brought into existence. In acknowledging and welcoming this important, communitarian, ethical, anti-essentialist, un-individualist understanding, welcoming it as asserting the importance of society, of community, of our fathomless debt to the 'other' rather than the self, what then of a concern about equality, of justice, of unfair, insensitive and condescending privilege, of exclusion and exploitation, a concern about the limitations and failures of bureaucratic power? And what becomes of the potential resistant agency of the object of power, the population, the community, the individual?

The governmental project through schooling, seeking to secure the optimal ethical comportment of the individual, thus displays a tendency to leave nothing open to question and criticism. If the project of mass education cannot be held to account by reference to an ideal of the self-realisation of the sovereign individual, or to the coercive systematic service and reproduction of unequal power relations which thwart or repress the self-realisation of society, then wherein can criticism lie? What about the continuing reproduction of educational inequality? What about the continued organisation of elite and exclusive communities of educational practice? Does the provision of schooling not still succumb to gross inequality, to insensitive application, to alienating practice? Where are the ethical parameters and limits of governmental rationality? Wherein lie the spaces for the teacher, or learner, to respond, to question, to challenge in this exercise of governmental rationality? What role is left for critique?

Hunter's account of the development of pastoral technique in pedagogy refers to the smiling teacher, managing supervised freedom and moral surveillance, but wherein lie the unmotivated teacher, the over-manipulated teacher, the brutal teacher, the alienated child, the abused child, the rebellious pupil? If the curriculum is designed to secure the governability of the governed through the regulation of the conduct of conduct, at what point does policy, the curriculum and pedagogy become open to critique for shortcomings or ill-effects? Can
this only be at the level of efficiency, or of success or failure in instrumental objectives? Is there no room at all for the ethical critique of unfairness, injustice or oppression?

Hunter's thesis leaves the role of critique undermined and in need of revival. It also draws short of offering us a consideration of the subjective experience of education, either as a teacher or as a learner, individually or in communities of experience. These groups, or groups of individuals, are given no agency in Hunter's account. Now this may be an effect of his concentration on the objective of his thesis, that is to insist on the redefinition of the project of mass schooling as an exercise of governmental reason as revealed by the application of Foucauldian concepts, and his aim to sketch the futility, ambivalence, if not the arrogance of liberal and radical educational critique.

Nevertheless, there is a tendency, not just in Hunter's thesis, but also in the articulation of Foucault's analysis of power, to leave the object of power in a position of being unable to act, complicit in its own control, bound by our own actions which are only brought into being through being the object of power. That tendency becomes the limiting loci of Hunter's argument. It is not overcome in Hunter's analysis of schooling. This tendency has implications for wider social analysis. Can it be overcome?

Here then is an impasse that must be transcended. That transcendence will come from a reconsideration of freedom as an inscribed obligation in individuals in the period of liberalism understood in post-structuralist terms. Here the obligation for the ethical conduct of the self, emerges as an imperative in the ethical consequences of Foucault's formulations. Foucauldian concepts of power define the individual, not in a universal sovereign state of freedom and independence, but instead in a position of being inextricably trapped in a nexus of power relations. However that entrapment is not, in a negative sense, the end of freedom, but, in a positive sense, it's very beginning. Implicit in the practice of liberal governmentality is a conception of the self in society that, on the one hand, insists that the individual has no autonomous sovereign individuality, that what self is, is a construction of the power relations that envelop us from the beginning of existence, and which bring our selfhood into being and shape it. But on the other hand, the self is constructed within liberal governmentality as an ethical self that the self is called upon to work, a state of ethical consciousness which is inscribed strongly through the technology of schooling. This is the ethical injunction of liberal governmentality. In the period of liberal governmentality, dating from approximately two hundred years ago, the individual has been the object of
governmental activity. Liberal governmental rationality acknowledges that in *leaving to be* (laissez-faire) the individual can pursue a kind of a self-interest that can coincide with a social objective of optimal well-being. This is not to say that this rationality is fixed; it is always fluid, improvised, subject to reflection, debate, resistance and revision as it comes to bear on individuals and groups and as it is constantly evaluated through governmental mechanisms of evaluation that are inserted in society at all levels. This individual is not the sovereign individual of liberal philosophy, endowed with an autonomous rationality to pursue self-realisation, but a constructed ethically-charged self with the responsibility for ethical social action and solidarity.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to redefine our understanding of the practice of mass education through the conceptual lens of governmentality. It has drawn significantly on the argument presented in *Rethinking the School* (Hunter 1994). This argument, in applying the concept of governmentality to schooling, works to undermine the dominant presence in educational critique of liberal and progressive-radical analyses.

Whilst embracing the conceptual tools offered by governmentality, a concern has been identified about where such a post-structuralist analysis leaves space for understanding the subjective experience of education as teacher or learner, where there can still be space for critique, debate and dissent. The response to this concern has been to consider the era of liberalism as an *art of government*, a governmental rationality, rather than a universalist prescription for the freedom of the rational, sovereign individual; liberalism understood as a governmental rationality which charges the individual with the role of ethically reflective citizen, with the responsibility to consider, through the development of *technologies of the self*, what should be done with freedom.

This leaves us with a need to re-consider concepts such as freedom and democracy, concepts central to citizenship and citizenship education. In a period where democracy is conceived by some as a fixed, even exportable commodity, we must ask: what is democracy? In a discourse where democracy is held up as a fixed, stable, virtuous, given, secured end-point, mobilised to measure the limitations of usually *other* societies and sovereignties, can we question what democracy is? In a discourse where global inequalities in material and social
circumstances are often used to criticise sovereignties, what are the ethical possibilities of social equality or global equality? In a discourse where the contingent rationalities of governmental action are capable of being accused of illegitimacy, where is the ethical justification for agency, be it in critique, resistance, protest or revolt? This is an agenda of concepts deeply embedded in any understanding of citizenship within a liberal art of government, and central to considering the policy and pedagogy of citizenship education.

It is at this ethico-philosophical nexus that the work of Derrida will be mobilised to complement the implications of governmentality. Derrida insists that language, text, discourse, form the basis of truth, but always a contingent truth, unstable, open to deconstruction and difference. This deconstruction is to be pursued as an ethical responsibility to seek the democracy which is always to come, a venir, a pursuit that charges the present with the profound responsibility to consider the implications of its textual constructions with an ethical commitment to an openness to the other. The next chapter will review the development of the idea of education for citizenship in the context of England, identifying again its self-referencing in enlightenment philosophy, opening this up to a critique through the concepts of governmentality and deconstruction.
Chapter Five: Citizenship education policy as governmental technology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter, drawing on the theoretical articulations of previous chapters, will return to an account of the emergence of citizenship education policy in England, initially presented in Chapter One, but will emphasise its nature as a development of governmental technology in a Foucauldian sense. This will reject the idea of citizenship, a la Crick, as an essential, pre-existing given, brought into policy through a common-sense insertion of a universal requirement into the school curriculum, referencing historic certainties located in the paradigm of enlightenment philosophy. Instead, broader developments in education policy in England, and the specific citizenship education policy as initiated by the Crick Report of 1998 (QCA 1998) and its implementation and development between 1999 (DfEE 1999) and 2007 (QCA 2007), will be analysed as a contingent response of government to issues related to the security and stability of the population, aimed at securing the conduct of conduct. However, a tension between some of the objectives of citizenship education policy on the one hand, and neo-liberal influences on education on the other, will be identified. Subsequent to this, the chapter will begin to offer a critique of the scope of citizenship pedagogy envisioned by the Crick Report through challenging its tendency to authoritarianism, a restricted conception of knowledge, skills and dispositions and its attempt to secure stability of meaning. This will allow a consideration of the spaces for ethical reflection and teaching that the policy either opens up, or closes down, in a Derridean deconstructive sense.

5.2 The Crick Report as governmental rationality

Reading the Crick Report post-structurally through the lens of governmentality requires no unearthing of hidden meanings or agendas. It does require the removal of the faint disguise of references to the enlightenment philosophical paradigm which serve to suggest that citizenship and citizenship education are pre-given, and that their insertion into educational policy in England in the last decade of the twentieth century is simply a common-sense enactment. Some of these aspects of faint disguise can be listed here; the idea of a direct
lineage of modern citizenship to the ancient Greek city-states and the Roman republic (QCA 1998 p.9), the idea of a meta-narrative of progress from civic rights, to political rights, to social rights (ibid p.10 – referencing Marshall 1950), the idea of civil society being distinct from the state and politics (ibid p.11), and active citizenship as an unproblematic exercise of natural freedom (ibid p.25), of political activity being essentially the action of the rational individual. Post-structuralist philosophy insists on a different relationship between individuals and the state, one where the individual derives its subjectivity, not from a pre-existent natural rationality, but from the constructivist influences of the micro-effects of the play of power through governmental technologies. Whilst there is a debate to be had about the nature and play of governmental power, it is not based on the assumption that the state and civil society are distinct. Post-structuralism also questions the linear determinations of a teleology of progress, and insists that any reality, or actuality, is a contingent regime of truth seeking the governability of the governed. Post-structuralism would also deny the validity of an appropriation of a past actuality, even if that actuality could be objectively determined (which it cannot be), for the purposes of transferring its concepts unproblematically to the present/future.

Leaving these faint disguises behind, the Crick Report is a policy report which makes a strong and coherent case for the introduction of citizenship education into the school curriculum. It makes the case for curriculum development based on promoting democratic values, promoting political knowledge, stimulating political engagement and community involvement, developing common values across cultural diversities and promoting respect for the rule of law. It supports this by making reference to a number of perceptions of the contemporary state of British society, with some, albeit sketchy, references to previous research; an absence of curriculum opportunities for this kind of learning, a concern about the low level of knowledge, understanding and engagement of young people with public issues at local or national levels, declining voter participation in elections, youth anti-social behaviour and low levels of knowledge of the institutions and processes of representative democracy.

From the perspective offered by the concept of governmentality, the report is a detailed identification of the need for a governmental rationality to be developed to address these threats to security and stability, and to use the governmental technology of mass education to promote normative capacities in individuals so as to counter these threats. The report makes a number of recommendations to implement and manage this curriculum development effectively through mobilising a panoply of governmental apparatus. The curriculum
development should have statutory force (entitlement being a favoured term, which has the
power to suggest that this is a right to citizenship education innate in the sovereign
individual, rather than a disciplinary imposition). The learning outcomes should be tightly
defined in order to enable inspection by OFSTED so as to ensure compliance. The
curriculum framework should be set out in a DfEE statutory order, a curriculum framework
document that schools have a legal obligation to implement. There is a sensitive
consideration of curriculum time, timetable structures, possibilities for cross-subject links for
citizenship education, implications for whole-school contexts, suggestions for post-16, post-
compulsory citizenship education and a planned timeline for phased implementation.

It calls for a wide range of people, beyond classroom teachers, who have any involvement in
the education of children to be given a clear statement of their normative obligations and
objectives, of what is meant by citizenship education and their role within it. It requires
public figures and institutions to consider their responsibilities to support citizenship
education and for a standing Commission on Citizenship Education to be created to monitor
the development of citizenship education and make on-going recommendations to the
Secretary of State. This latter recommendation is one which was not realised, and, in one of a
number of ways, weakened the profile of, and element of control over, citizenship education
policy implementation. In its place a National Foundation for Educational Research (NfER)
funded ten year longitudinal research project into the implementation of citizenship education
in schools was initiated, as an alternative disciplinary strategy attempting to secure
compliance to the citizenship curriculum framework. This research project is headed by
David Kerr who was a member of the original Crick Advisory group, and along with Crick,
one of the main contributors to the writing of the report (Pykett 2007, Kiwan 2008). This
research project has contributed to consolidating and emphasising the principles that the
Crick Report advocated, seeking to identify where practice, in terms of curriculum
development in schools and teaching in classrooms, was failing to meet policy objectives
and, having defined shortcomings, setting out a guide to getting there (DfES 2004).

The report is sensitive to the danger of over-burdening schools and teachers, and displays a
genuine understanding of curriculum structures and issues. It holds back from making some
requirements compulsory that might be considered of value, such as requiring schools to
establish representative school councils, but nevertheless recommends that inspection
processes should note and value such features of schools where they do exist. The report
seeks to link citizenship learning into the then existent Records of Achievement that schools
were required to enable pupils to compile, and to various other educational initiatives such as Key Skills. It draws back from requiring citizenship learning to be assessed in the same framework as existing National Curriculum subjects (i.e. through a hierarchy of eight levels of attainment), but warns that this should not be taken as meaning that citizenship lacks rigour or is a soft-option.

The report outlines what it considered to be its implications for all government agencies that surround schooling, the DfEE (department of state), QCA (an NGO monitoring curriculum and qualifications), OFSTED (the organisation charged with the inspection of schools) and the TTA (the agency responsible for teacher training). It calls for training on citizenship education to be linked with developing accreditation awards linked to national standards for subject leaders, SENCOs and headteachers and in the National Professional Qualification for Headship. It acknowledges the role that the internet-based web sites sponsored by government agencies can contribute to implementation and development.

All in all, this is a thorough call for a full mobilisation of a panoply of governmental technology in the pursuit of this curriculum development objective. But let us be reminded of the theoretical paradigm this thesis calls for; an enlightenment reading of the Crick Report might interpret its emergence as an unproblematic, natural expression of the need to acknowledge the rights of the individual, the acknowledgement of the natural engagement of the rational individual in political processes, citizenship education as a pre-existing common-sense idea. A post-structuralist analysis would not rest on any such natural, or essentialist idea of citizenship education as common-sense, nor of the individual as pre-existing and free. It would not accept a rationale for citizenship education based on some essential conception of rights and individual rational sovereignty. Rather, the concept of governmentality calls for the report to be analysed as an emerging governmental rationality aimed at securing the conduct of conduct, through the shaping of the possibilities of consciousness and behaviour, in this case through education reform, in the young and their teachers.

The report emphasises the idea of active citizenship through political and community participation. In doing this it distinguishes the type of citizenship education it aims to promote from earlier practices of civics education (Crick 2000). Maintaining a governmental eye on this, we must hold at arms' length any idea that participation reflects a historically neutral principle of good citizenship (the reflex of the civic republican reference to the Greek city-states and the Roman republic) that is brought, pre-existing as common sense, into policy.
prescriptions through the Crick Report. Rather, participation emerges as a governmental injunction to be inserted into society through the process of education at a particular historical point. Furthermore, we must leave aside any supposition that this objective of participation reflects an opening for the exercise of rational, universal individual freedom. Instead, it is an exercise in the conduct of conduct, having behind it the motivation to bind citizens to community and political institutions in a disciplinary project aimed at securing stability and security. This is not to say that such a policy should be seen in a pejorative sense, an auto-reflex inherent in some progressive-radical positions, instead it is only to view the processes at work here in a way which divests them of their enlightenment pretensions.

It can be added that the curriculum framework for citizenship education underwent a revision, published in 2007 (QCA 2007), due to the emergence of new governmental objectives. Overt concerns about security and stability, heightened by the phenomenon of international terrorism, and by the experience of inter-ethnic conflict in some northern English towns prompted a review of the citizenship curriculum (DfES 2007) which shaped the nature of the revisions. A new ‘strand’ of learning was established for security and stability in the context of a multi-ethnic society perceived as increasingly unstable. The strand was entitled ‘Diversity and Identity: Living Together in the United Kingdom’ (QCA 2007). There was also an attempt to strengthen the framework’s status in the curriculum by defining learning in citizenship in a strict hierarchy of attainment, as was the case with other statutory curriculum subjects.

At this point it is necessary to place the Crick Report in the wider context of the development of governmental rationalities in Britain at the end of the twentieth century. It is this context that continues to open up the report, and the frameworks it proposed, to a more critical appraisal not limited to surface readings.

5.3 Education Reform as the exercise of governmentality

This section will seek to consider education reform in England in the late twentieth-century as the development of governmental rationalities, within which the specific citizenship education policy discussed above should be understood. Adopting a Foucauldian approach, in the era of liberal governmental rationality, roughly since the eighteenth century, the education of the masses has developed as a critical area of governmental activity. Schooling
and pedagogy have been seen as an essential process in disciplining the citizen and developing social capacities. This direct state involvement in education exists alongside the laissez-faire doctrines that relate to the relationship between sovereignty and the economic sphere, between the state and the market, although any over-literal interpretation of laissez-faire economic policy as indicating that economic activity is, or ever could be, free from governmental regulation is surely blinded by an excess of essentialist free-market delusions. However, in contrast to the space created for the market to function, schools, along with hospitals and prisons, are critical locations of disciplinary technology brought to bear on the individual 'which aims to fashion the forms of conduct and performance appropriate to their (individuals) productive insertion into (or exclusion from) the varied circuits of social life' (Burchell 1991).

Although the state’s legal enforcement of education has been seen as essential for some time, until recently the actual content and process of education, certainly in the context of England, has been seen as outside of the state’s remit strictly to prescribe. Thus, in the first century of mass schooling in England, the role of education in the shaping of individual citizens was based largely on a loose consensus of pedagogic aims (see Chapter One), with the objective of securing outcomes of socialised citizens along with demarcated levels of learned expertise and subsequent qualification based on a mastery of the traditional forms of academic knowledge by pupils.

However, in recent decades, originating in the Education Reform Act of 1988, the state in England has taken an overtly prescriptive role in determining first of all what should be taught in schools through a national curriculum, and latterly how it should be taught through precise pedagogic modelling for teachers, strictly monitored and inspected. This marks the community school out, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as a location of crisis, or perhaps less dramatically, a location of scrutiny and development in governmental rationality in the field of education. The development of an overt education for citizenship is indicative of this scrutiny, and an integral product of it. Both the prompt and response to this scrutiny will be briefly explained.

The development of overt state intervention in the curriculum originating in the 1988 Education Reform Act followed a period in the 1960s and early 70s when education was subject to developments in some areas of what, by current standards, was relatively locally determined policy and autonomous professional practice. These developments occurred at
the level of the school system, and at the level of curriculum and pedagogy. The organisation of schooling as a locally devolved system began to abandon an institutional structure based on dividing children of secondary age (11 years to 16 years) into those displaying a high aptitude of mastery of learning and those displaying a lower aptitude. The two identified groups, for the years of compulsory secondary education, had previously been placed into different schools, one termed grammar schools for roughly twenty per cent of the population defined as high *ability*, and secondary modern schools for the rest. Replacing this, there was a move, justified by a concern about a waste of talent and an underdevelopment of national resources (see Chapter Four), to comprehensive schooling based in community locations, predicated on local political conditions. This was prompted by governmental principles aimed at broadening opportunity, securing less stratified outcomes of educational success and the maximising of social and productive potential. In some professional circles of a radical-progressive persuasion, it was embraced as a radical project with the potential to develop critical, subversive and emancipatory capacities in individuals and communities. A more mundane governmental rationality for the policy has been stated briefly here and has been articulated in greater detail in Chapter Four.

At the same time, at the level of the curriculum, there were some instances of radical developments by teachers enjoying a high degree of autonomy, which had the effect of making the traditional subjects less fixed in their identity in the school curriculum. Within the humanities this sometimes prompted cross-subject perspectives, within which were developed radical perspectives such as social studies, gender studies, development studies, peace studies, curriculum spaces which embraced political debate and opened a space for radicalism (Davies 1999). Pedagogic technique began also to celebrate a less authoritarian transmission style of teaching and learning, instead exploring a more learner-centred, critical thinking, constructivist approach. The curriculum became a location where it became possible to consider a progressive-radical ideological insertion into a traditionally conservative field. This occurred during a period of profound cultural change, associated, in England and the wider UK, with the collapse of Empire and imperialist assumptions, a collapse of traditional attitudes of social deference, and a vibrancy and unpredictability of popular culture associated also with unprecedented levels of prosperity and technological change.

However, by the mid 1970s a changing political environment came to consider challenges to economic security, concerns about social cohesion and moral-panics about standards of
personal conduct and artistic expression. This climate led to an overt call for a review of the practice of education by the then Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan (Callaghan 1976). Here lie the beginnings of the response to threats to security and stability through governmental rationalities relating to education which led to the Educational Reform Act (ERA) of 1988, within which the current citizenship education initiative rests.

The ERA proposed a tightly prescribed primary and secondary National Curriculum. It sought to counter the trends towards the radical development of the curriculum by insisting on the identity and rigour of the traditional subject fields of academic knowledge. This reference to traditional subjects was generally supported across the political spectrum, itself indicative of a governmental imperative, rather than party ideology, driving the reforms. The debate about education was initiated by a Labour administration, with policy being carried through by a Conservative government. It was a reform aimed at re-asserting social authority through the curriculum and the school, and it initiated, alongside the curriculum reform, a new regime of accountability to ensure that schools conformed to prescribed curriculum and pedagogic norms; the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) was created and was given the task of carrying out an intensive inspection process across the whole state school system.

Despite the successful achievement of cross-party support for this development of governmental practice in education, and the hope of presenting it in a de-politicised way, the reform did raise the hackles of the progressive-radical left in education who saw it as a neo-conservative initiative marginalising progressive ambitions for education, asserting social discipline, and within that, revealing a clear inflection towards a new market orientation in the practice of government and education (Carr 1991). This argument was focused in particular on the first manifestation of an overt approach to education for citizenship presented as a cross-curricular theme, *Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship* (NCC 1990), to be explored in more detail in Chapter Six. It is of note that despite both *Curriculum Guidance 8* (1990) and the Crick Report (QCA 1998) making a gesture to Marshall’s (1950) progressive model of three elements of citizenship, civil rights, political rights and social rights, there is an emerging insistence in both documents that Marshall’s definition of civil rights need to be more overtly coupled with duties, reflecting the concern with the maintenance of social authority and stability, and also a clear drawing back from Marshall’s third sphere of citizens’ social rights, thus, in the Crick Report itself …
on welfare being not just provision by the state but also what people can do for each other in voluntary groups and organisations, whether local or national.' (QCA 1998 p.10)

This reflects the crisis of the welfare model of social rights which had been a central part of governmental rationality since the 1940s and illustrates the parallel growing influence of neo-liberal governmental rationalities in marked tension to the social-democratic rationalities which underpinned the earlier emergence of the welfare state (Olssen and Peters 2005). Nevertheless, the cross-party nature of the Speaker’s Commission on Citizenship which proposed Curriculum Guidance 8, and the cross-party support for the Crick Report, illustrates the willingness of the opposition parties to come together in the development of this new rationality for education. The developing rationality did not emerge from ideological struggle, but from a developing governmental strategy.

This review of general educational development in England from the 1960s to the last decade of the twentieth century has sought to provide a background to the analysis of education policy as the working of a disciplinary technology, first to reassert social authority and latterly to develop a neo-liberal governmental rationality, a recent variant of liberal governmentality. The nature and implications of neo-liberalism will be explained in more detail in a later section of this chapter. The next section turns to citizenship as an educational concept within this developing governmental rationality in the period after the election of a New Labour government in 1997.

5.4 New Labour, neo-liberalism and citizenship education

Within the context of education, the coming to power of a New Labour government in 1997 did not mark a new direction in governmental rationality, but a development and intensification of pre-existing trends, the New Labour project with regard to education at least might be characterised as a Thatcher-Blair pact. What education policy under New Labour does illustrate, post-1997, is not a turn, or return, to progressive-radical principles in education, as some might have hoped for. Whilst maintaining the assertion of social authority and the disciplining of schools secured by the previous Conservative government, New Labour developed further the nascent neo-liberal themes of choice, marketisation and
managerialism in education. These further developments went beyond securing the disciplining and standardisation of the curriculum, and moved to intensify the measurement of school performance, defining education as a driver of economic development, and a market place of choice for families, all seen as a catalyst for improving standards and holding schools accountable to a quality and performance tribunal. Moreover, the New Labour Government through the development of the Literacy and Numeracy Strategies for primary schools, and the National Strategy for Key Stage 3 (lower secondary – extending into upper secondary by 2005) sought to discipline not just the content of the curriculum but also the process of its delivery (a corporate management informed metaphor for teaching and learning, one of a number of such elevated terms). The individual classroom and teacher were to be constrained by regulating not just what was taught, but also how it should be taught, through a detailed pedagogic prescription which sought to identify and to spread good practice.

Indices of school performance and measurement of learning and progress, termed value-added, were further refined, and school performance was displayed in published and trumpeted school league tables. New definitions of teaching standards, against which to measure teacher performance, were developed and implemented, not just at the level of initial training for those entering the profession, already established in 1992, but latterly developed to cover all stages of a teaching career under a detailed mapping of standards measuring continuing professional development.

This concern for curriculum control, pedagogic control and measurement of school and teacher performance, was accompanied by an overt identification of schooling as a prescription for the cure of perceived social ills. The establishment of the citizenship education working party coincided with the New Labour Government’s first White Paper, Excellence in Schools (DfEE 1997). This document, whilst intensifying the rationalities of markets, managerialism, performance and targets, also sought to introduce communitarian notions of work-related learning, education for citizenship and the need for better parenting. The Crick Report emerged from this developing governmental rationality. Whilst it dresses itself as an exhortation and prescription for the learning of liberal, civic republican practices of citizenship, couched in terms of the essential verities of the ancient world and enlightenment philosophy, it nevertheless operates as an instrument of governmental rationality seeking to utilise schools to create subjectivities in pupils that are more overtly tied to governmental objectives beyond schooling than was the ambition of the return to
subject rigour, curriculum discipline and the careful measurement of learning that initiated
the era of the National Curriculum. The predominant social objectives of the Crick Report,
reflected in the three ‘strands’ (QCA 1998) of citizenship learning it proposed, political
literacy, critical skills and social and moral responsibility, are the concern to reduce a
perceived democratic-deficit (political literacy) and promote political and community
engagement (active citizenship), within an agenda of critical skills (critical citizenship), all
pursuing a disciplinary project of tying the future citizen more closely to existing political
institutions and practices.

This section has placed citizenship education policy within broader governmental rationalities
in the period leading up to its current implementation. However, the application of
Foucauldian governmentality to this analysis does not require policy to be seen as always
coherent and consistent. Indeed governmentality supposes an inherent contingency in the
work of power, which can emerge as contradictions or inconsistencies. Thus, citizenship
education policy, with its communitarian and social cohesion and stability dimensions, sat
alongside other governmental rationalities in education of a neo-liberal character which
worked to develop different governmental objectives.

The development of citizenship education since it became a statutory requirement for schools
in England in 2002 has been uncertain and uneven (Calvert and Clemitshaw 2003,
Clemitshaw and Calvert 2005). This can be understood by considering the way citizenship
education sits within contrasting and potentially conflicting governmental rationalities in the
field of education. In the first decade of the twenty first century, under the New Labour
government, education in England has become the object of an intense neo-liberal rationality
(Olssen and Peters 2005). This has emphasised market principles in the field of education;
choice, competition, targets and accountability for performance described in the previous two
pages. This manifested itself in offering parents greater space to choose the school for their
children, delegating budgets to school managers, carefully measuring value for money
indices, an erosion of teacher professionalism, a construction of vertical managerial
discipline, an intense scrutiny of value-added, through frameworks purporting to accurately
define and measure the progress of learning. This performance scrutiny is then made public
through published league tables of schools, both in their localities and across the country. In
addition to scrutinising the performance of schools, individual pupils and teachers are also
subjected to an intense performance quality tribunal. The curriculum is defined in terms of
key skills for lifelong learning. The market principles of entrepreneurialism are inserted into
the public sphere of education, as pupils are called to become entrepreneurial selves, to define their individual needs and to become the entrepreneur of their lives. This brings to the fore an individualisation of education. Pupils are subjected to the constant requirement to turn to the self as performer, to consider one's own performance, to define one's own needs, to set one's own targets (Masschelein and Simmons 2002). This is a potentially coercive individualism that elevates the self and works to diminish the ethical other, the other that deconstruction would place at the centre of any consideration of citizenship.

The proliferation of neo-liberal economic and social policy accompanying the deregulation of capital is a global phenomenon led by the global economic reach of the advanced industrial states of the western, northern hemispheres. Neo-liberal economic policy operates alongside other technological developments and demographic shifts that constitute globalisation. These forces work to open communities and social institutions, from the school to the family, to a whirlwind of capitalist and market pressures that were previously confined to locations of private employment, even those previously afforded some degree of protection by local and national governance. The imperatives of global capital are now brought to bear on the public sector, community, family and individual lives in ways that, previously, they were to some degree protected. The communitarian impulses in the Crick Report represent a diversion from this neo-liberal dynamic, and can only come to relevance as an accompanying 'antidote', a cure for some of the threats to social cohesion, stability, and political alignment at local or national levels, which neo-liberal rationalities and consequent economic developments put under serious stress.

5.6 Stability, contestation and deconstruction

Having analysed citizenship education in the context of broader educational reform, and suggested a tension between a communitarian impulse and neo-liberal influences, this section will be devoted to considering the attempt of the Crick Report to secure stability of meaning, the limitations of this and the ethical value of deconstructing that search for stability.

There is present in the Crick Report a distance between a rhetoric of universalist liberal enlightenment ideas as the basis of democratic values on the one hand, and on the other, its overt governmental reflexes aiming to regulate the conduct of conduct with a focus on the perceived social ills of political disengagement, declining community participation and
cohesion, along with anti-social behaviour. This faint disguise of referencing the verities of enlightenment philosophy, and the emphasis in the report of its prescriptions as common-sense, does have the deeper significance of serving to depoliticise the process of developing citizenship education and secure the closing down of critique. This strategy of depoliticisation ran overtly, ante-scriptum, through the cross-party composition of the working party that produced the report. Crick makes much of this as a virtue, not in ethical terms, but as a strategy to secure success, in terms of accomplishing statutory effect, and by avoiding unhelpful disagreement. This need to secure success is also used by Crick as a justification against some of the criticisms of the content of the report and the process of its production that have been made of it (Davies et al 2005, Enslin and White 2003, Faulks 2006, Garratt 2011, Kiwan 2008, Osler 2000). However, de-politicisation serves more than a short term strategic gain, it is also aimed at securing stability of meaning and prescription, presenting a prescribed framework for citizenship teaching and learning which does not allow for or invite any kind of contestation.

This seeking after stability of meaning in text is what Derridean deconstruction challenges. A textual representation of reality which seeks stability is always open to being de-stabilised through challenging its construction of meaning and considering alternative readings and meanings. To Derrida this approach is charged with ethical importance and responsibility, an essential aspect of democracy and the possibilities of and responsibilities for democracy to come (see Chapter Three).

With this in mind it is intended consider the idea of responsibility, a concept used significantly in the Crick Report and the subsequent citizenship curriculum frameworks, with the same document’s attempt to close down contestation and, in doing this, it will be argued, diminish responsibility. In Derridean terms, responsibility, personal, social, political, moral, or intellectual, implies reflection, criticality, the openness to contestation and a recognition of diversity and the presence of the other in meaning. Yet these aspects of responsibility are closed down through the report’s reference to common-sense, through an impulse to place citizenship above politics, beyond contestation, making reference to essential and universalist principles in ways that seek to stabilise the injunctions implied in policy, when their very instability should be considered as the beginnings of ethical reflection and responsibility.

This threat to responsibility is particularly ironic in the case of a consideration of education for citizenship, and will be discussed further in Chapter Seven. The Crick Report has been
characterised as existing in a tension of promoting ‘constraint through a discourse of freedom’ (Pykett 2007). This is symptomatic of the ambivalence between the disciplinary nature of citizenship education enacted within a liberal governmental rationality on the one hand, and its interpretation through liberal enlightenment philosophy on the other. Whilst concepts such as the individual, freedom, rights and democracy are used in the report in ways inscribed by enlightenment liberal philosophy, it is a location instead where normative, disciplinary governmental technologies are seeking to create regimes of truth to secure stability and security. It is where the enlightenment rhetoric of the sovereign individual confronts and dissolves against the liberal governmental project’s aim actively to insert knowledge, skills and dispositions for the conduct of conduct, as a capacity for the government of the self in citizens. This flow of disciplinary power disturbs the supposed essence of individual freedom conceived in liberal enlightenment philosophical terms.

5.7 Citizenship education as a denial of the ‘other’

Education for citizenship occurs at the contingent boundary of the liberal governmental project aimed at securing the stability and security of the population by bringing into being disciplined citizens, at the same time as developing their capacity for self policing and critical engagement. This boundary line between the injunction of power and the subjective experience of the individual is where the discourse of power can be opened to deconstruction. This search for difference will consider the authoritarian nature of the report, referred to in earlier paragraphs above, as a starting point for this. It is an authoritarianism (a kind of Blunkett/Crick/Kerr axis) that recent research has commented on (Pykett 2007, Kiwan 2008, Garratt 2011) in that the influence of these three figures over the Advisory Group was powerful. Anyone who is familiar with Crick’s writing on matters relating to education for citizenship, stretching back to the 1960s, recently published as a single volume (Crick 2000), will recognise a striking consistency of vision and purpose from his earliest work through to the Crick Report and the first curriculum framework. Recent research has also stressed the significance of the long-term relationship between Crick and Blunkett, Crick had been Blunkett’s university tutor whilst he was reading for a degree in politics in the 1970s (Pykett 2007), and the significance of the relationship between Crick and Kerr in the writing of the report (Kiwan 2008)
There is some virtue in a policy report being tightly focused and precise in its recommendations, yet it has been rightly criticised for foreclosing debate and contestation in its consideration of democratic citizenship (Pykett 2007). Furthermore, the report's authoritarian character has been criticised as indicative of a particularly inadequate attention to matters of inclusion and diversity from the critical position of cosmopolitan citizenship (Osler 2000, Osler and Starkey 2005). This position will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, but here the implications of the report's attempt to foreclose debate will be considered as ethically restrictive.

In seeking to stabilise and define citizenship simply in terms of a fixed body of knowledge, skills and aptitudes, the curriculum framework for citizenship works, if we are not vigilant, to close down the ethical reflections that democracy should bring into being in its citizens and that it is the purpose of deconstruction to promote. To challenge this closure, it might be argued that another 'strand' (QCA 1998) to the citizenship curriculum might be inserted, such as ideology. This would open the conception of citizenship education to the idea that citizenship can be defined and practised differently, that it can be contested. However, within a modernist proposal of ideology there is a strong tendency to seek a paralysing orthodoxy and rigid purity which, in itself, can be essentially closing, establishing of false and distorting binaries which, in post-modern terms, should be subject to a process of opening-up through education, looking for the limitations, contradictions and inconsistencies that will inevitably break, and deconstruct, the rigidity of ideology.

The above points have been made so as to begin to develop from theory an ethical practice of pedagogy in citizenship education. Drawing on a subject comparison, within the framework for the teaching of history in the English National Curriculum, is the injunction to teach children that history can be, has been, and is always, interpreted variously and differently (although it is often reported that this is an area of historical learning that many schools under-develop). Nevertheless, this provides a model for a more ethically reflective citizenship pedagogy. It has the potential to open up teaching and learning to the contingencies of ifs and maybes and perhaps, not as counter-factual hypothesis, as if factual was certain, but as an acknowledgement of the inevitable uncertainty of historical knowledge. It is to open learning to a variety of perspectives that would mark out a less authoritarian teaching, without losing authoritativeness. Drawing on an experience of leading initial teacher training of history teachers, the virtue of teaching the essential provisionality of historical understanding, for example asking pupils to consider causal categories not as
essential realities but as constructions whose explanatory power can be open to judgement, contestation, re-arrangement and ethical consideration, creates rich learning opportunities. Similarly, the role of evidence in history can be considered pedagogically, not as providing empirical proof, but as suggesting of understanding, as offering a messy insight into the complexity of experience, far from the often sterile consideration of whether testimony is true or biased. These are areas of historical understanding that even young learners, and not only high-attainers, can engage with, although they call for a reconsideration of much history teaching and historical discourse at even the most prestigious level (Jenkins 1999). Such a pedagogical approach, furthermore, is arguably truer to the nature of the subject and inscribes teaching and learning with a humility which in no way diminishes its authoritativeness, indeed adds to it, by avoiding pedagogic authoritarianism. This diversion into history also suggests that the full range of humanities subjects, traditionally in school settings history, geography and religious education, should be considered as essential to the service of citizenship education if this contingent openness to difference and the other is to be central to teaching.

Giving credit to the Crick Report, whilst it argues that political knowledge is important and the framework insists on a list on areas of political knowledge, it shows some pedagogical understandings to advise that political knowledge taught as straightforward transmission of what Parliament does, or what local government does, or what is the criminal law as a list, is likely to be ‘as dull as dishwater’ (Crick 2000). The Crick Report calls for teaching to begin with issues and circumstances, learning about the arguments, how they play in the media, the law, the processes of political debate, this being a way that learning can be more active and a way that political understandings of institutions and processes can be built more effectively. This is good pedagogical advice, although turning it into good pedagogical practice is not easily achieved given the absence of adequate training for citizenship teaching within schools, most schools having to give responsibility for citizenship teaching to existing staff with no experience, expertise or training in these areas.

5.8 Citizenship, the humanities, democracy and the openness to the other

Returning to the authoritarian impulse in the Crick Report, it is worth considering the matter of its authoritarianism within the context of the teaching of the humanities, within which the teaching of citizenship might be considered appropriate. The title of the Crick Report;
Education for citizenship and the teaching of democracy in schools, can be opened for deconstructive consideration. The phrase ‘the teaching of democracy’ appears a clumsy textual construction because of its attempt to stabilise the concept democracy, which, by its nature, implies dynamism, contingency and provisionality. The phrase ‘teaching of democracy’ suggests democracy as a package, to be *delivered*. Can democracy be taught, in the same way as the cellular structure of the spirogyra? Is the title not running the risk of claiming the idea of democracy as an overly fixed, stable concept?

The concept democracy, along with democratic-values, rather than being fixed and stable, is, understood post-structurally, something that changes constantly as social conditions change and governmental rationalities work to develop new regimes of truth, to use Foucault’s term. And how can it be conceived differently, when we reflect on relatively recent changing understandings of democratic values with regard, for example, to sexual morality, to the role of the media, to vernacular culture, to the expression of racist views, to the consideration of equal opportunities for women, to the environment, to parenting, to death, to the university?

Where is the line of meaningful democratic engagement to be drawn in teaching about democratic practices? The Crick Report would locate it in a prescribed definition of political knowledge, coupled with an injunction to participate in political parties, community and voluntary groups, in an informed, responsible, active way, in a primarily national context. This is a restricted understanding of the potential for political discourse and engagement in current cultural conditions, when there is a constant discourse of politics by ordinary citizens through various genre including radio phone-in shows, television discussion shows of the vox-pop genre, even more unpredictably on the internet. A recent contribution to a radio phone-in, explaining that contributing to the flood relief needs of Pakistan was not to be supported because the country had corrupt institutions and possessed nuclear weapons, illustrates informed and active citizenship, but perhaps leaves something to be desired. With political groupings representing trans-national populations and single issue concerns transgressing national boundaries, they have the potential, as cosmopolitanism argues (see Chapter Seven), to be more engaging of citizens than the prospect of traditional national political parties to join and periodic elections to follow and vote in. Yet, that does not imply a freedom from the governmental responsibilities and ambitions that have the nation as a nexus.
It is worth entering a discussion about the implications of post-structuralism for an understanding of democracy that the Crick Report requires to be taught. Democracy is, in enlightenment terms, conceived as an end point in the progressive development of society based on the acquisition of political rights by individuals, connected in a linear way with a prior development of civic rights, and a subsequent development of social rights. It sits in a meta-narrative of progress towards the development of the freedom of the rational sovereign individual, coupled, in a social-democratic narrative, with the achievement of a socialistic equality. The sovereign, rational individual exercises a vigilant watch on political power, to protect themselves from the oppression of the state, to demand a responsiveness to their interests at the level of the state, and to have an individual choice in the formulation, direction and exercise of power. This is sometimes conceived of in terms of the expression of structural group interests, the working class, the middle class, the black vote, the women’s vote, the Muslim community, with these collective, but agonistic, interests competing rationally to secure resolution at the level of the state.

But what if democracy is conceived of as something less universal and more contingent, more fluid? Democracy, conceived through the concept of governmentality, is an essentially contingent and always varied arrangement that can exist in some places in some forms but not so in others, that even in places where democracy is considered to exist, it is essentially different from place to place and time to time, rather than universal. Democracy, as conceived through deconstruction is an ethical openness to the possibilities of different democracies to come. Democracy should not be conceived as fixed. Critique and commentary which uses the term democracy as if it is fixed, readily understood, homogeneous from place to place and from time to time, displays an arrogance and an insensitivity, even as it indulges a promiscuous exhortation of the virtue of freedom. Discourse which claims to inhabit democracy, arrogantly, insensitively, and which considers it as exportable through the power of capital or the gun, as it often has been in western political policy and media discourse, is closed to a sensitive openness to the other as required by deconstruction, and a blindness to its contingent nature as implied by governmentality. The arrogant assertion that democracy is a condition which has been achieved, secured, and which exists as an end-point of virtue, required to be emulated in areas which fail this imposed democratic test, is a distorting pretension of policy, and also, if translated into the classroom, of education. It is an assertion which serves to hide the contingent practicalities and potential duplicities of power. Writing during the throes of the Egyptian revolution of
February 2011, this is not to deny any people’s call for freedom from bad government. It is not to deny that governmental rationality can fail to convince its population, fail to align its governmental objectives with the subjective experience of its citizens. It is not to deny the capacity for power to be seen and felt to work by a people in ways that deny urgent expression and material security. It is not to deny the legitimacy and necessity of protest or rebellion in the circumstances that provoke it. The demand for freedom in conditions of political unrest is also, importantly and concurrently, a demand for responsibility. Post-structuralism does not deny the virtue of people-power in conditions of poor governance.

The implication of governmentality and deconstruction is to ask for a careful, and sensitive use of the term democracy. It is also to require education to be wary of an uncritical self-referencing virtue. It is to avoid a simplification of the complexities and, in some case, destructive and fearsome consequences of social and political conflict. It is to acknowledge that we always have an ethical responsibility, without foundational reference, for democracy which is always a venir.

Democracy, understood post-structurally, is a governmental rationality securing stability and security, potentially unstable and unpredictable, but a liberal art of government that creates a space for freedom between sovereignty and population, a space that can bring social benefits. Its existence and success relies, arguably, on a certain level of material prosperity, a level of education which supports a social and political discourse, and, in a disciplinary society, on the confidence that the exercise of these democratic rights, in some cases deliberately conferred, in others won by protest and rebellion, can be subject to adequate supervision.

The difference between ‘won’ and ‘conferred’ here is indicative of the paradigm shift between a progressive-radical conception of democracy and an understanding of democracy in a post-structuralist way. Progressive-radical thought would valorise the winning through struggle understood in a meta-narrative of progress to natural emancipation. Understood post-structurally through the lens of governmentality, democracy is a political system which secures the agreement of a population to submit to government, sometimes, but not always, after rebellion. Democracy is a condition that adds an important degree of legitimacy, and therefore stability, to the exercise of power within a sovereignty, over a population. It legitimates the exercise of government, and works to secure the submission of the population to government. These benefits exist, and are real, but are not calculated in terms dictated by the pre-existent individual, nor the rational exercise of individual sovereignty or choice. The
democratic act of voting, whilst often couched in terms of free individual choice, is not an act of anyone who is either free or making a free choice in any universal or natural sense, only in the sense that the act is undertaken in regulated ways that hold potential coercion at bay. Neither does the system by which voting is translated into the distribution of power in anyway a true reflection of choice. Voting is an act of subordination and responsibility, more than it is an act of choice.

All this is not to devalue democracy. It is a system, which in the contingent circumstances where it has developed and operates as a legitimate and respected system, secures the consent of the governed to government, contributing to the legitimisation and stability of political power and to the effective administration of the potentially unstable population (itself a governmental neologism of populus and regulation). Yet democracy also calls for a space between the state and civil society, not considered as separate and opposed, but a complementary negotiated space of freedom within disciplinary power. Furthermore, democracy, as a liberal art of government, calls on citizens to exercise a considered critical commentary on government, to hold it to account, and opens up the potential to mobilise the greatest possible expertise in the consideration and practice of government at all levels of society, in many locations, professional, community, family and individual, not just at the formal levels of central and local government. This insertion of responsibility and expertise into the population by power is the very beginnings of critique, rather than, as radical critique sometimes assumes of itself, a rational, individually-based, virtuous antipathy to power.

5.9 Conclusion

The above review the Crick Report from a post-structuralist theoretical perspective has not reverted to radical, progressive critiques of citizenship education which would interpret the report as a super-structural construct hiding the imperatives of economic structures which seek economic exploitation and class domination. It did reject the consideration of freedom as pre-existing individual sovereignty allowing independent rational choice. As we do not exist independently, but as constructs responding to social discourse and activity, freedom as a governmental construction consists of the creation of a space of freedom and the promotion in individuals of the capacity to self-govern, self-reflect, exercise criticality and look for the opportunity to exercise our social and moral responsibility so as to bring ourselves into the reality of social life. Citizenship, understood post-structurally, carries these meanings,
citizenship education ought to initiate the young into these meanings. A framework which denies contestation restricts this.

Let us be reminded that the analysis offered by this thesis does not approach the development of policy as indicating some pejorative hidden hand. Government policy, in all its contingencies, limitations, sometimes its conflicting impulses and even calamities, is seeking to secure a legitimate aim of ensuring the governability of the governed within the territory and population over which it has sovereignty and responsibility. But, in the governmental rationality of liberalism, this is done within a regime of truth which considers freedom to be a productive governmental construction, as an investment in the individual of an ethical responsibility to govern itself, consider its own interests, but also consider the ethical implications of these in relation to the other. The important question this calls into consideration is: how does policy enable, open up, or close down, ethical discourse and reflection?
PART THREE: CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION, DISCOURSE AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

Chapter Six: Discourse and counter-discourse in citizenship education

Chapter Seven: Changing Citizenship - changing citizenship education
PART THREE: CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION, DISCOURSE AND POST-STRUCTURALISM

Chapter Six: Discourse and counter-discourse in citizenship education

6.1 Introduction

Part One set out citizenship education policy as the research context of this thesis, arguing that conceptions of citizenship and thus citizenship education all owe allegiance to enlightenment thinking, influential as the basis for understandings of modernism. Part Two identified the way that recent philosophical ideas, loosely termed post-structuralism, unsettle the certainties of enlightenment philosophy and propose the condition of social existence as more contingent, making the modernist assertion of universal truths and values untenable. When applied to the political sphere, post-structuralism unsettles essentialist concepts of the sovereign individual, truth, democracy, progress and justice. These concepts lie at the heart of conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education and the last two chapters of Part Two applied the post-structuralist concept of governmentality to the project of mass education, schooling and citizen preparation, insisting that education is a normative governmental technology aimed at securing, in contingent conditions, the conduct of conduct, the governability of the governed and the optimum mobilisation of social resources. This analysis was focused in particular on the emergence of citizenship education policy in England at the end of the twentieth century.

Chapter Five completed Part Two with a reflection on the attempts of policy (QCA 1998) to secure a stable definition of citizenship and citizenship education, questioning the appropriateness of such in the context of responsibility and of providing an education for democracy to come, conceived in a Derridean sense. This turn to Derridean deconstruction provided the theoretical basis for reviving the idea of critique, initially discussed in Chapter Four, which the exercise the art of government tends to seek to close. This revival of critique was, therefore, developed from a post-structuralist perspective.

Part Three will discuss the variants of modernist critique that contest the concept of citizenship and support common critiques of current education policy. The two founding policy documents that underpin citizenship education in England are Curriculum Guidance 8:

The ideological positions and educational implications of classical enlightenment liberalism and its variants; conservatism, civic republicanism, social-democratic progressive radicalism, Marxism and, a more recently articulated political position, cosmopolitanism, will be introduced in the first part of the chapter. These ideological positions all have the relationship between the state and the citizen as a central focus which has implications for citizenship and citizenship education. It is the premise of this thesis that these all fall within the paradigm of enlightenment philosophy and, as such, leave the concept of citizenship open to a different analysis in post-structuralist terms. This chapter will consider specific examples of critique that have addressed these two documents as a basis for citizenship education. The latter part of the chapter will begin to bring into focus the cosmopolitan critique of citizenship education policy, which will be the focus of the subsequent chapter.

6.2 Enlightenment variations of citizenship and citizenship education

Let us consider how the state, the citizen and education are conceived in various political dimensions of enlightenment philosophy. The state is, in liberal political philosophy, a nexus of institutional power which is at best an unwelcome necessity. First of all, the state is a location where sovereign individuals require representation, secondly, where their conflicting individual interests are resolved through the application of rational law, invested with claims to universal principles of morality and justice. Liberal political philosophy also, importantly, sees the state as a threat to the natural freedom of the sovereign individual, a ‘cold monster’ (Foucault 2007) that needs to be restrained by reference to the natural rights of the individual. Much liberal political debate is focused on these two areas of contestation; first of all whether the state is appropriately, or inappropriately, representative of the society over which it exists, and secondly where the demarcation line should be drawn between the activity of the state and the sovereign rights of the individual.

Democracy is seen as the ideal political system for the accommodation of the sovereign individual, for the process of representation, for the expression of individual rights and interests, and for the limitation and control of state activity. Classical liberalism calls for citizenship education to initiate learners into their rights as individuals, to understand the
processes by which conflicts of interest are resolved and the universal values that support democratic society. It would also emphasise the idea of individual expression and fulfilment.

As discussed in Chapter Two, there are variants of classical liberal political philosophy but they all exhibit enlightenment assumptions. Traditional Conservatism is a variant which, whilst embracing the idea of the sovereign rational individual and suspicious of the state’s threat to private property, is characterised as particularly sceptical of change, an advocate of social authority, and more stridently normative in its outlook than classical liberalism. State activity is considered to stifle individual responsibility and initiative. Political Conservatism in England has, in recent years, attempted a correlation between a reassertion of social authority and discipline, sometimes referred to as neo-conservatism, and individualistic, libertarian and radical free market economic ideas, understood by the term neo-liberalism. This political project is often referred to as Thatcherism, developed during the ministries of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher between 1979 and 1990 in Britain. Leaving aside for now this recent modulation of Conservatism, traditional conservatism calls for a citizenship education that teaches learners to exercise an antipathy to the idea of state activity, yet to show a due deference for legitimate status, authority and, especially property, to consider the achievements inherited from the past and to recognise the responsibilities inherent in enjoying the rights of a citizen.

Civic republicanism is another variation of liberal political philosophy, which emphasises civic engagement as the prime responsibility of the individual in order to preserve the health of the democratic polity. Sovereign individuals are called upon to exercise the civic obligation, based on the example expounded by Aristotle in the context of the Ancient Greek city-states, of deliberating rationally and in an informed way on the affairs of the state as it works to resolve conflicts of interest between individuals and groups. This is the first principle of citizenship for civic republicanism, identified as being an inheritance of the Ancient World, rediscovered in the historic period of the Enlightenment, and exercised in an increasingly democratic context in the modern period. Civic republicanism calls for a citizenship education that emphasises the importance of political literacy and the virtues of active citizenship. It is a definition of citizenship espoused by the leading architect of current educational policy in England, Bernard Crick (Crick 2007). The exercise of civic republican virtues in a modern democracy is held to ensure that the democratic polity remains healthy, subject to rational scrutiny and natural justice, and active citizenship is central to citizenship education based on civic republican principles.
Another variant of liberal political philosophy, but one which is more distanced from classical liberalism, is progressive-radicalism, supporting both a social-democratic variation, and, in its **scientific** form Marxism, a revolutionary proposal. In the social-democratic variant of progressive-radicalism the state is again seen as being above society, but its representative function leaves it prone to and compromised by the favoured representation of dominant interests, interests which inherently tend to deny social justice and enact oppression. The state is seen as an instrument for the preservation of dominant vested interests, and the potential agent of oppression in defence of vested interests when those interests are threatened. It is the project of progressive-radicalism to expose that nature of the state, and the existence of social injustice, so as to work to change that nature of the state and secure social justice through progressive state action. This focus on social justice, or rather its absence, can take inspiration from religious conscience, or secular humanism, prompting a desire to promote social justice around principles of equality, liberation from oppression and the enabling of freedom. A citizenship education based on progressive-radical principles calls on the teacher to be an active agent in exposing the nature of the state as prey to vested interests and promote in learners the capacity for critical political engagement so as to promote social justice and equality.

Marxism develops the progressive analysis of the modern state as a structure which **systematically** seeks to deny freedom and to exploit through supporting capitalistic relations of production. The state is seen as the political edifice which secures this exploitation and reproduces exploitative social relations. Later Marxist theory identifies what is seen as the development of not just state power to support the conditions of capitalistic exploitation, but of a hegemonic culture which legitimates the relations of production that secure exploitation, normalises them, invests them with the appearance of common-sense, and secures in the exploited individual a **false-consciousness** which is prevented from seeing rationally its true interests. However, Marxian philosophy insists that the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system of production will historically, inevitably, be revealed and **true-consciousness** will enable the individual to effect the changes in the state which will secure a progressive development towards a society characterised by equality, economic efficiency and, through the end of the state, a true freedom. This philosophy has evolutionary and revolutionary variants. A citizenship education based on Marxian principles would seek to help learners see beyond false consciousness and take responsibility for engaging in the class
struggle to secure the historic destiny of society so as to achieve a more rational, efficient and free society.

Finally, recent discourse on citizenship has developed a cosmopolitan dimension. Cosmopolitanism adopts the progressive-radical concern with representation and social justice and, in the same way as social-democratic and Marxian political philosophy, conceives the state as prone to the unfair representation of vested interests which deny social justice, inclusion and equality. This is defined as the essential historical nature of the nation-state, which cosmopolitanism seeks to transcend, emphasising the trans-national aspects of contemporary social conditions. The groups in danger of suffering the absence of social justice, inclusion and equality are identified as sub-groups within society; women, ethnic minorities, the poor, children, recent migrants. The dominant interests are characterised as western, male, rich, white. Cosmopolitanism calls for struggle against systemic exploitation and oppression, seeing the nation-state as fatally compromised in the preservation of these vested interests. Cosmopolitanism calls for a citizenship that transcends the nation-state, carrying as it does the baggage of vested interests, nationalism, imperialism, colonialism, racism, and bourgeois privilege. It seeks to reveal the nation-state and the powerful interests it represents and defends as inimical to social justice and equality, and to work within it, and against it, with a commitment to a global outlook based on universal human rights. This position is buttressed through reference to certain phenomena of recent times that can be placed under the umbrella term of globalisation; the internationalisation of capital, trans-national migration, the development of diverse societies with multi-cultural identities, the development of trans-national digital communication, the growth of supra-national political organisations and the establishment of trans-national frameworks of laws defining universal human rights are the global contexts that support cosmopolitanism as a political position. A citizenship education based upon cosmopolitan principles calls upon teachers to promote in learners an understanding of universal human rights, a global perspective, and a commitment to work for social justice, diversity and equality, against in particular, parochialism, racism and exclusion. This position will be considered in more detail in the next chapter to establish how far it provides a basis for citizenship understood in post-structuralist terms.

This section of the chapter has presented a short analysis of political variations that refer enlightenment philosophy, considering what their implications for educational practice are. The next section will review some of the discourse from such positions that has been prompted by the current citizenship education project in England.
6.3 The discourse prompted by the citizenship education initiative in England

*Curriculum Guidance 8: Education for Citizenship* (NCC 1990) was the first significant policy document in the current citizenship education initiative in England. It prompted a significant response. The responses referenced in the next section relate to the differing conceptions of citizenship represented by social-democratic progressive-radical, conservative and liberal positions.

The first criticism of *Curriculum Guidance 8* is that it presents a definition of the citizen, and of the practice of citizenship in a way that denies its openness to contestation. The document emerged from the cross-party Speaker's Commission on Citizenship which worked as a mechanism to secure its status as enjoying cross-party support. Generously this can be seen as a strategy to secure progress by ensuring all parties are seen to have been represented, and a rational compromise having been reached, a classic liberal rationale, supporting a 'principled pragmatism' (Garratt 2000, p. 335) so as to take advantage of the political opportunity that appeared through the Educational Reform Act (ERA) of 1988 to achieve a common-sense inclusion of citizenship in the school curriculum.

However, this process of de-politicisation of citizenship is not seen so benignly from the standpoint of social-democratic progressive-radicalism (Carr 1991). From this standpoint citizenship is bound to be a contested concept which cannot be de-politicised and, further, the attempt at de-politicisation seeks to conceal a privileging of one position over another, rather than a spurious neutrality. Social-democratic progressive-radicalism places the concept of citizen in a historical narrative of struggle within and outside the state for extended democratic rights, a dynamic of historical struggle, illustrated by key historical references (e.g. the Chartists, the Suffragettes) securing an expansion of citizen rights; civil rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth, social rights in the twentieth (Marshall 1950). This meta-narrative of struggle and progress represents a moral basis for citizenship and citizenship education, a moral purpose it is claimed which is absent from the cross-curricular guidance, which, as policy, is identified as a reactionary re-assertion of privilege against rights.

This absence is explained by reference to the ascendency of the New Right, represented by the Conservative governments which held power in the UK from 1979, through to 1997, and...
who were the instrumental political force behind the 1988 ERA within which *Curriculum Guidance 8* was located. The hand of the New Right is detected in *Curriculum Guidance 8* despite its pretence of neutrality. For example, it fails to give sufficient status to the idea of *social rights* as defined in T.H. Marshall's classic 1950 text, social rights being the achievement of the historic struggle for democratic citizenship occurring in the twentieth century, subsequent to the earlier achievement of civil rights followed by political rights. These social rights are related to such matters as the right to health care, economic security and education through state provision. These are considered to be under threat through the emphasis in *Curriculum Guidance 8* on volunteering and the work of charities, at the expense of the publicly funded welfare services, an aspect of social policy favoured in the discourse of the Conservative Governments in the 1980s and early 1990s, seen through the prism of their ideological position of minimising state activity so as to maximise individual freedom, social and moral responsibility and social engagement.

The argument within the social-democratic progressive-left position is elaborated through contrasting two models of democracy, a *moral* model and a *market* model, the former representing the progressive-radical, the latter the New Right. The moral model of democracy is based on the principle of equality and equal opportunities, which are the object of progress and struggle. Whilst not denying the liberal idea of the individual, nor the enlightenment assumption of progress, it assumes that the state is victim to the grip of vested interests denying social and political justice. Society and education, in the progressive-radical vision, should be morally driven. Furthermore, the moral model claims a historical lineage to the concept of citizen and citizenship developed in Ancient Greece in the writings of Aristotle where the duty of a citizen to engage with public affairs was argued (Carr 1991, p. 375).

The market model, by contrast, is based on the principle that democracy is justified if it maximises individual liberty and the freedom to pursue private interests. This requires a system of which the key feature is the restraint of political power over individuals. It assumes the essential private nature of individuals, who form social relationships only to satisfy individual needs, and requires for this the condition of the competitive market and the minimum-state, circumscribed by the rule of law. Society is empirically driven by the concept of individual freedom and material prosperity securing a project of progress.
This contestation offers two differing agenda for citizenship education. Within the social-democratic progressive-radical paradigm, citizenship is not characterised as the pursuit of individual interests, nor the exercise of individual responsibility through voluntary organisations free of the state, but a commitment to material redistribution though securing the state in the progressive-radical image so as to promote and protect social rights. Here is the mission vision for a social-democratic variant of education for citizenship, for a moral model of democracy taking control of the state, freeing it from the capture of economic vested interests and putting it to the service of social justice claimed as based on rational moral principles. Then a social progress of a natural moral nature will be achieved and individuals will be more able to enjoy their natural freedom from want and the distorting effects of powerful vested interests. It pre-supposes a participatory, critical pedagogy to nurture the knowledge, skills and attitudes which will support this critical participation in the continual striving for a democratic progress.

In contrast, the New Right, conservative market democracy stresses social responsibilities over social rights. Rights are only valuable where they secure the right to be free of the state, and responsibility asserts the importance of law-abiding behaviour, service to the community and national loyalty. Civil rights, relating to individual liberty and property ownership are elevated, but equality is rendered suspicious, and social rights problematic, as they historically pre-suppose extensions of state power, a threat to individual liberty and initiative. Citizenship in the market model is secured by an extension of property ownership, and the efficient working of free markets, marginalising the importance of social security and the welfare state. This definition of the market model refers strongly to the policy commitments of the Conservative New Right of the 1980s, promoting a property-owning democracy through extending home ownership and the sale of social housing, a commitment to monetary management of the economy, market liberalisation, reductions in income tax and privatisation of previously nationalised industries and other state and local government services, and an emphasis on individualism, there being ‘no such thing as society’ (Thatcher 1987).

The reader of this thesis might readily detect where the author’s sympathies lie here, given the biographical exposition that has already been presented (see Introduction). The meta-narrative of progressive struggle for an extended democratic practice reflects previous progressive sympathies and left-wing positions. This argument has referred Carr (1991), an article which is, underneath its composed prose and constructed argument, a rage at the
evolving triumph of the New Right which, by the time of its writing, had been in power in the United Kingdom for 11 years, and was to govern for a further seven. The article ends with an acknowledgement that Curriculum Guidance 8 in itself is not a one-dimensional ideological instrument as it contains elements of both moral and market democratic principles, different parts of which can be interpreted both ways, but as it sits in a …

‘National Curriculum which is a centrepiece of a general set of educational reforms designed to create a free-market system of education and to transform the curriculum into goods and services to be ‘delivered’ to parents and pupils by teachers and schools … clearly embedded in the ideology of a market democracy …’

(Carr 1991 pp.382-383)

…it stands located, labelled and condemned. From a post-structuralist position however, these educational developments are not seen as ideological struggle in such a binary way, rather as a complex and fluid development of governmental rationalities.

The later Crick Report (QCA 1998) displays the same cross-party authorship as Curriculum Guidance 8. Crick, long associated with the concept of civic republicanism, appointed by a Secretary of State in a newly elected ‘New Labour’ government, was joined by a previous Conservative Education Secretary, representatives of the media, think-tanks, the Church and from the teaching profession. This attempt to display political neutrality and compromise does not assuage a progressive-radical critique. There occurs in the report, it is argued, a prioritising of duties and responsibilities over rights (Garratt 2000) and as such this is seen as indicative of the influence of the market model of democracy and citizenship identified by Carr (1991). This emphasis on civic duty and the meeting of social needs by non-political voluntary work opens the Report to progressive-radical criticism, enabling it to be located as playing a part in the reactionary challenge to the post-war consensus represented by Marshall’s progressive schema (1950). The downplaying of social rights opens the citizenship framework to the charge that the importance of social rights is being marginalised, and that the importance of social rights for promoting the social inclusion of groups experiencing exclusion from an equality of citizenship, by dent of class, gender, religion or ethnicity, is being ignored. This progressive-radical critique of the two documents also claims to detect the acquisition of the idea of active citizenship by the market position. The emphasis on active social obligation and civic duty is interpreted as enforcing of social
compliance, supporting of authoritarian social control through education. This within a UK context which, further, gives continued currency to the concept of the political subject rather than citizen. Furthermore, the progressive-radical thesis goes, citizenship education is enacted in schools which are essentially authoritarian in nature, absent of a tradition of educating for active critical citizenship which should have the aim of supporting individual freedom and political engagement (Garratt 2000 p. 334). A post-structuralist analysis would begin with the point that such a policy is bound to have normative disciplinary objectives. That is the nature of the exercise of the art of government so as to secure the conduct of conduct. This binding, seen as a threat to individual freedom, would be rather seen as a form of the management of constructed freedom.

A more traditional conservative impulse can offer a different criticism of Curriculum Guidance 8, the Crick Report and the whole idea of a citizenship National Curriculum. This sees the very idea of a state-prescribed curriculum for citizenship as an illegitimate use of state power over rightly and naturally free and independent individuals and institutions. In this critique the very idea of citizenship education in a national curriculum is intrinsically revealing of a left bias (Tooley 2000). The definition of it as a left-wing instrument is further supported by indicating the legitimacy the report gives to teaching about the European Union, Human Rights, global interdependence, sustainable development, and the embracing of multi-culturalism, all considered by large sections of conservative opinion to reflect a left-wing bias. This critique argues that citizenship formation is not the province of the state, or even of schools in any way beyond a general character development or moral guidance, rather citizenship formation should occur within non-state contexts, such as family, community and looser affiliations in which the individual is located. A post-structural analysis would reject the assumptions of the natural-free sovereign individual, and the idea of a civic society free from the state, but would acknowledge the processes of the management of society through the micro-technologies of institutions beyond the school.

If we move to a liberal analysis, the Crick Report is scrutinised for the relationship it implies between the state and the ideal of the autonomous individual which is at the heart of liberal philosophy. Traditional liberal philosophy seeks to protect the autonomous individual from the state as a pre-condition of maximising individual freedom, therefore arguing for a minimal, or 'thin' definition of citizenship, where the practice of citizenship occurs outside the stronger circuits of personal life and identity, contrasted with 'maximal' citizenship, which calls for a stronger engagement of all citizens with the public sphere, and an alignment...
of citizenship engagement with personal sphere, identity and culture. The idea of minimal citizenship can, in a contemporary variation of liberal theory, be seen as compatible with a culturally diverse, pluralistic democracy, where personal diversity is protected from the circuits of civic engagement (McLaughlin 1992). Yet again, a more maximal definition of citizenship might be seen as required to overcome the cultural and institutional discrimination that can exist in a diverse society, which requires identity and diversity to be key issues in civic engagement.

Features of citizenship defined in the *Curriculum Guidance 8* and the Crick Report can be considered within liberal philosophy as having both maximal and minimal implications for the relationship between the state and the individual (ibid. 1992) requiring, of liberal thought, careful definition and demarcation. Citizenship, conceived minimally, is simply a uniform civil status and associated rights, whereas maximally it defines a condition with deep social, cultural and psychological dimensions of belonging and identity, involving profound individual obligations and responsibilities for civic engagement. A minimal reading of political involvement sees the citizen as essentially a private individual, with the requirement to vote sensibly in periodic elections, whereas a maximal definition requires a more serious and critical engagement with political institutions and civic issues. The minimal conception of the social pre-requisites for citizenship is the existence of uniform legal status, whereas maximal conceptions critically address the complexity in society and require a commitment to overcome the barriers which work to exclude some groups and individuals from access to citizenship. These minimal and maximal definitions of citizenship are not either-or, but rather poles of a continuum along which varying prescriptions and definitions can be placed, and consequently imply a different prescription for citizenship education. But whatever the prescription favoured for citizenship it is seen, in liberal thought, as a continuum between the sovereign individual and the state. A minimal prescription requires the teaching of basic knowledge and information, a maximal prescription requires the development of a concern for and a critical engagement with major social issues. Minimalist conceptions might merely promote a socialisation, an uncritical acceptance of the status quo, but much citizenship educational discourse, certainly within the Crick framework, tends to be located in the maximal range of interpretations, insisting on critical engagement by citizens in a maximal, civic republican sense.

In contrast to Crick's insistence on maximal active participation, liberal theory may insist that no universal, or maximal conception of the ideal citizen, or the public good, can be assumed.
Traditional liberal theory therefore seeks a minimal conception of the public good which maximises individual freedom to pursue diverse private interests through diverse identities, within a framework of assumed justice. The state’s function is to uphold the minimal conception of the public good, the framework of justice and social morality, but be neutral on matters of private good. The function of education is to promote commitment to the minimal conception of the public good, and promote respect for, and reflection on the diverse conceptions of the private good. Citizenship education can be seen as being required to be fundamentally focused on the unifying, minimal aspects of society. However, a minimal conception of citizenship education can be accused of simply promoting an uncritical acceptance of the status quo, having no acknowledgement of the failings of institutions to respect diversity and support inclusion. On the other hand, maximalist conceptions can be accused of defining issues as public that exceed the consensus of what should be defined as public rather than private in a liberal democratic society.

Liberal philosophy can contemplate the state being required to be active in promoting and developing criticality and reflection in individuals through education, as such personal qualities are seen to promote a self-definition and self-autonomy that conforms to a liberal ideal of the individual. Thus personal autonomy and criticality become considered a public good. Contemporary liberalism, even when it makes a commitment to promoting diversity and embracing the implications of a pluralistic society, asserts this reference to individualism. A post-structuralist analysis would acknowledge the development of criticality and self-reflection as valid in as far as they secure the maximal development of social capacities, commensurate with securing the governability of the governed, rather than referencing the self-realisation of the sovereign individual.

These are the critical points of discourse prompted by the citizenship education initiative within liberal theory. Liberal-democratic philosophical analysis criticises the citizenship education policy documents as confusing in the way they leave undefined and unexplored maximal and minimal conceptions of citizenship (ibid. 1992), particularly in the implications this has in a diverse society. Nevertheless, at its heart, this critique seeks to identify the moral implications of differing conceptions of the relationship between the state and the ideal of the sovereign individual, the sovereign individual being at the heart of the liberal philosophical tradition.
Having opened up this examination of the two founding documents of the current citizenship education initiative, and identified within them this tension around progressive-left and New Right, moral and market conceptions, maximal and minimal definitions of citizenship, we might consider again the implications of the documents’ concept of the community in which the status of citizenship is primarily enacted, that is the nation-state. There is, within the documents, an acknowledgement of the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity within the United Kingdom, and that this circumstance demands a renewed search for a common idea of citizenship which recognises diversity. Some would say though that this is chronically under-stated (Osler 2000, Pykett 2007, Kiwan 2008, Garratt 2011). This tension between, on the one hand, the normative thrust of commonality within the concept of citizenship, linked to its concerns with social cohesion, and, on the other, the need to recognise and respect plurality and diversity within society and the potential barriers to the practice of citizenship, is a major tension within the citizenship education project. This is a focus for academic discourse in which McLaughlin represents a liberal focus, and which emerges with different characteristics in cosmopolitan perspectives which will be referenced in the next chapter.

The historic analysis of citizenship referencing Marshall (1950), referred to by Crick and the examples of progressive-radical critique reviewed above, can also be seen as particularly Anglo-centric in its assumed narrative of the progressive struggle and development of modern citizenship in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth-centuries. It is an assumed narrative which can fail to accommodate alternative traditions, represented by the increasingly diverse communities inhabiting Britain since Marshall’s time. These might be unresponsive to such narratives, might not share traditions as conceived within a British narrative, be susceptible to different narratives. Alternative traditions, identities and experiences are potentially marginalised and de-politicised by the Crick model, which has been characterised as essentially white-British. This characteristic of the Crick Report chimes with some recent calls for a revived British historical narrative to contribute to citizenship, claiming a value in a revived civic nationalism (Clemitshaw and Jerome 2010). A British historical narrative could be developed with strong international dimensions and ethical complexities, linked to trade, migration and empire. This might be considered a rich, diverse and responsive heritage, but it can just as readily be seen as a poisonous heritage, and indeed one of the most stinging criticisms of the Crick Report has labelled it ‘imperialist’ and inherently racist (Osler 2000). Some of the calls for historical narrative to support social
cohesion tend also to demand a valorised, sanitised and particularly narrow historical interpretation.

The call for a revived national identity is seen as a limitation of the Crick model by cosmopolitan critique. The report, whilst referring to the importance of respect and toleration for minorities, is identified as essentially assimilationist and condescending in nature. This type of critique can be repeated also from a gendered, feminist position (Arnot 1997, Pateman 1992, Enslin and White 2003), in the way the report assumes a norm of political engagement in the public sphere, a public sphere from which women have traditionally been, and in many ways continue to be, excluded.

These are critical readings of the Crick Report which seek to portray it as an ideological instrument of a particular political persuasion, or a narrow conception of citizenship insensitive to diversity and cosmopolitanism. This critical reading identifies the report as essentially and inevitably a location of tension, a tension which, in itself, the report does not adequately acknowledge, claiming its common-sense, political neutrality. Nevertheless it is a complex amalgam of gestures. A progressive-left position can welcome the internationalist dimensions in the report, its support for multi-cultural respect and toleration and also the report's emphasis on popular active citizenship to counter the state and other social institutions being prone to dominant interests. Leaving aside the practical problems facing schools in developing a policy and practice of active citizenship, the emphasis on active citizenship can support what is generally seen as a progressive pedagogy. Education as action, acting as a citizen, embraces a progressive-left commitment to active as opposed to passive learning, the only way real 'states of character necessary for effective citizenship' can be realised (Garratt 2000 p.341). Garratt points to research which has argued that simply teaching, or learning, or stating, positive 'states of character' is relatively meaningless unless it is turned into action (Mullard 1985, Gaine 1995). Effective citizenship ...

... entails a willingness for everyone to respect and learn from the diversity of social experiences brought to the classroom ... privileging children's experiences (so that) they can be made to feel that their views and beliefs are important, and that their own understandings of citizenship are valued within the context of other shared perspectives. Moreover, by structuring learning experiences in
and around local communities, simplistic notions of identity and nationhood can begin to be challenged (Garratt 2000, p. 343).

However, the most strident criticism of the Crick model comes from the position of cosmopolitanism. This critique insists that the Crick model falls victim to the 'limiting frame of the nation-state and its overarching appeal to common values and goals' (Garratt 2011, p. 27). The report is criticised for only containing two paragraphs on multi-culturalism (Tomlinson 2008) and making no mention of racism. It is accused of reflecting institutionalised racism, conceiving of minorities as possessing a deficit, and displaying patronising and stereotypical assumptions (Osler 2008). It is this critique, from the position of cosmopolitanism, that is the focus of the next chapter.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to examine the nature of the discourse that has been prompted by the current citizenship education policy in England. It has identified the discourse as relating to a number of variants of philosophical and political positions; civic republicanism, conservatism, progressive radical and liberal. The points of tension that have been identified will be re-stated here. One relates to where, on a continuum between the state and the sovereign individual, demarcations between public and private should be drawn. Linked to this is what is an appropriate definition of citizenship along a maximal-minimal continuum. The implications of maximal and minimal definitions of citizenship, for the vitality of democratic society, for the need to promote social justice, particularly for the needs of a complex, contemporary plural and diverse society have been considered. The contestation between market definitions of citizenship, identified as a New Right ideological perspective, and moral definitions of citizenship, identified as a traditional progressive radical perspective, have also been scrutinised. At periodic junctures brief references to the implications of post-structuralism have been made.

The next chapter will consider whether the most radical contemporary critique of citizenship education policy, argued from the perspective of cosmopolitanism (Osler and Starkey 2005). How far this represents an effective break from some of the confines of modernist
assumptions and provides a basis for meaningful policy and practice of citizenship education understood post-structurally will be assessed.
Chapter Seven: Changing Citizenship - changing citizenship education

7.1 Introduction

This final chapter will apply governmental and deconstruction approaches to analysing what is one of the most trenchant criticisms of the Crick Report and the curriculum framework for citizenship education that it prompted. *Changing Citizenship* (Osler and Starkey 2005) presents a critique of citizenship education in England from the position of *cosmopolitanism* and sits in a recent tradition of critique from the same position (Osler 2000a, Osler 2000b, Osler and Starkey 2003, Osler 2008). *Changing Citizenship* will be taken as representative of the arguments for cosmopolitan citizenship and be the focus of this chapter. It authors have an international profile in the discourse of education for cosmopolitan citizenship. Their work appears prominently in reading lists for courses of initial teacher training and continuing professional development. It almost unfailingly prompts a positive response from students.

Cosmopolitanism considers citizenship in a contemporary context of globalisation and diversity. It asserts an agenda aimed at promoting social justice and combating oppression, exploitation, discrimination, exclusion and inequality. In the context of a politically marginalised progressive-radical position with its roots in liberal, social-democratic and Marxist modernist political thought (a position this thesis has argued against philosophically) what can cosmopolitanism offer to transcend a weakened and marginalised progressive-radicalism?

The analysis will consider some of the key concepts and arguments mobilised by cosmopolitanism from a post-structuralist position so as to evaluate the value of the cosmopolitan critique and its prescriptions for educational policy and practice, focusing more strongly than in previous chapters on issues relating to pedagogy. Sections 2 and 3 will summarise the theoretical and philosophical outline of cosmopolitan citizenship as expressed in *Changing Citizenship*. Section 3 will identify cosmopolitanism’s modernist assumptions and attachment to enlightenment ideas and begin to trace some of the limitations of the cosmopolitan critique. The subsequent sections will discuss some of the key ideas which
underpin the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship but from a post-structuralist perspective. Sections 4 will discuss rights and responsibilities, section 5 human rights. Section 6 will review the three elements of cosmopolitan citizenship as defined in Changing Citizenship, status, feeling and practice and section 7 will review the criticism Changing Citizenship makes of the Crick Report's consideration of diversity in a pluralist society. Section 8 will place the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship within a discussion of neo-liberalism.

7.2 Cosmopolitan citizenship

Changing Citizenship (Osler and Starkey 2005) presents a strident and powerful demand for citizenship education to promote equality, diversity and human rights as set out in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) (UN 1948). It expresses deep concerns about social exclusion faced by minority communities in diverse societies, and exclusion caused by gender inequalities. It is prompted by an outrage against inequalities between different parts of the world and against the abuses of power which deny and violate human rights. That abuse of power is illustrated by reference to civil wars in Third World countries, the work of international corporations tending to oppress and exploit communities, and also oppressive state structures of countries in various degrees of economic development, including the most economically developed countries. Changing Citizenship calls on citizenship education to promote a struggle against these injustices.

Cosmopolitan definitions of citizenship draw particular attention to demographic, technological and political developments which place individuals in increasingly complex cultural relationships relating to the nation-state. There are frequent references to the concepts of globalisation and democracy, the former as a new reality, the latter as a virtuous political system to be used to secure social justice based on universal values. It calls for an inclusive citizenship education to enable all to engage with the present and shape the global future. This opens up the Crick conception of citizenship to be judged to be too national in its orientation (and too white and too male) (Osler 2000).

Cosmopolitanism stresses global interdependence and a common humanity, whilst at the same time stressing the need to acknowledge and respect diversity. Communities are described as globalised and multi-cultural. The crux of citizenship is defined as individuals who can 'make a difference' (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.10) in the face of educators,
politicians and the media, referred to pejoratively as powerful manipulators giving citizenship 'new meanings' (ibid p. 2). There is an emphasis on identity and belonging and a wish for citizenship education to be sensitive to these but in the context of diversity, rather than being defined exclusively. The authors want citizenship education to promote human rights and equality. Cosmopolitan citizenship is proposed 'as a means of understanding citizenship as it is experienced in diverse communities and in multicultural settings, whether these be local, national or global' (ibid. p. 2).

Human rights, cosmopolitanism argues, underpin democracy, and education should be put to the service of achieving 'these goals' – i.e. the 30 statements of the UNDHR (UN 1948). The discourse of citizenship education in this text is infused with the notion of rights, specifically defined in the UNDHR and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (UN 1989).

Schools have to change to become more accessible, acceptable and adaptable to diversity. The goal of citizenship education is to enable the recognition of common humanity to build an inclusive society. The school curriculum needs to be aware of and to build on young people's learning in families and communities. It calls for an explicit educational commitment to anti-racism. It envisages a school community based on human rights and democratic participation.

The text asserts that citizens have new opportunities to act based on their 'status and identities as individuals' (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.8), locally, nationally, regionally and globally, meaning that there are more ways to be a citizen than has been the case before. This is illustrated by a graphic account of massacres in Uganda in 2004 (ibid. pp.7-9) which, within hours, had been constructed and broadcast on mainline TV in the UK and abroad. This is used to illustrate how human rights violations are occurring, the responses of international organisations that relate to the UN and human rights, and the new, globalised opportunities available for citizens to know of such events and to do something about them. This section has illustrated the ethical reference points and aspirations of cosmopolitanism.

7.3 Cosmopolitan citizenship as progressive transcendence

This section will make two arguments. One, that cosmopolitan citizenship represents a development of the progressive-radical critique of power and, two, that it rests its
philosophical justifications in enlightenment terms and is thus open to a post-structuralist critique.

*Changing Citizenship* refers three traditional narratives of citizenship, *liberal*, *communitarian* and *civic republican*, that cosmopolitanism claims to draw the best principles from, but also transcend what are defined as their limitations. *Liberal* citizenship stresses rights, individual realisation, fulfilment and freedom, but, for the cosmopolitan vision, does not sufficiently stress equality, and furthermore displays a tendency to see society as a collection of atomised individuals. *Communitarian* citizenship virtuously, for cosmopolitanism, stresses *solidarity*, but its drawback is the way community is sometimes hi-jacked for over-normative and exclusionary purposes, as in nationalist ideologies. *Civic Republican* citizenship, Crick's first point of reference for his pre-suppositions (Crick 1999), emphasises the responsibility to participate in the political sphere, but seeks to exclude identity, or to confine it to a private sphere, where it should be respected and protected, but not brought into the public arena. This, for cosmopolitanism, fails to acknowledge that the private can be political, that identity is a facet of citizenship and can be deemed a basis for denying citizenship. Cosmopolitanism also points out that political power does regularly permeate the private sphere through family law, child protection and other regulatory apparatus.

Nationalism is considered the antithesis to cosmopolitanism. Nationalism carries a historic legacy of imperialism, unthinking patriotism, world war, exclusionary racism and xenophobia. Furthermore, nation-states are now being transcended as juridical locations due to globalisation, the emergence of increasingly diverse populations, multi-faceted identities and the development of trans-national jurisdictions. National identity is considered to have often been conceived of in an exclusive and discriminatory ways. The idea of values particular to a nation are rendered false compared to universal values and human rights. The legal status of citizenship which tends to be defined nationally, does not take account of citizenship *feeling* and citizenship *practice* which can, and should, transcend national barriers and be global. A national perspective can restrict the practice of citizenship education. However, cosmopolitanism does not condemn nation-states completely, it only asks us to see their limitations as a field for the concept and practice of citizenship. Some aspects of the nation-state are embraced by cosmopolitanism; liberal democracy, a state of political development in many nation-states, is held to be a good model, and 'making a difference' at a national level is considered important. Citizens in liberal democratic nation-states can influence and change governments and express their cosmopolitan values through the nation-
state. Nation-states, the text acknowledges, 'still exercise control over and responsibility for most aspects of their economy and society ... taxation, policing and foreign policy' (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.28). The quality of civic life in a nation-state is important and governments subjected to democratic ballot can be made to respond to the ethical vision of cosmopolitanism, which, however, transcends the nation (ibid p. 28).

Cosmopolitanism claims to draw on the three narratives of citizenship, the liberal, communitarian and civic republican, and synthesise their strengths in embracing individual rights, solidarity with a common humanity and the importance of participating and making a difference. These provide a basis, to which human rights are added, so as to develop a cosmopolitan citizenship for a globalised world. These are the impulses of an attempt to secure an ethical vision of citizenship. They seek to transcend some of the limitations of the progressive-radical vision with its roots in the twentieth century and the context of the nation-state. Changing Citizenship wants to challenge some of the closed certainties and national perspectives that characterise the Crick Report. The authors point out that population is fluid across national boundaries, that culture is diverse, that the personal is political, and not confined to a private sphere. They seek a radical critique of power, and a mobilisation of citizens for ethical social progress, in new global circumstances.

This thesis recognises the complexities of diverse identity and the global context of demographic movement and communication. Nevertheless, as a beginning of critique, it questions the idea that these are fundamentally novel circumstances. Demographic movement is hardly a new phenomenon. Trans-national communication neither, although there are technological aspects of communication that are novel to contemporary conditions. The nation-state is still, in contemporary circumstances, the most present context to the practice of citizenship, as Changing Citizenship in part concedes. This thesis acknowledges the inherent injustices in exclusion, discrimination, inequality, oppression but it seeks to consider the prescriptions of cosmopolitan citizenship, and its implications for education carefully and from a post-structuralist perspective.

Whilst cosmopolitanism seeks to transcend earlier definitions of citizenship, it still ties itself to an enlightenment notion of the sovereign individual and natural freedom. In Cosmopolitan Citizenship, citizenship starts from the individual; a status (of the individual), a feeling (of the individual) and a practice (of the individual) (ibid. pp 10-16).
'Cosmopolitanism is a philosophy developed during the period of the Enlightenment, notably by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). It is an extension of liberalism, the moral philosophy underpinning liberal democracy, which is concerned with upholding the dignity and inherent rights of individuals' (Osler and Starkey 2005 p. 20)

This individual has, or is imagined to have, come to the natural freedom of modernity through struggle against oppression (e.g. from absolute monarchy, from colonial rule) (ibid. p10). Post-structuralism views this problematically; whilst the existence, experience and ethical responsibility of the individual is a critical field of post-structural analysis, individuals are not pre-existent of power nor free, or capable of freedom, in any essentialist way. Modernist freedom is not natural. Individuals’ inscribed status, their capacities for feelings, their development of identity and their possibilities for practice are not freely existent, sovereign or natural, but are constructed by governmental technologies and disciplinary rationalities at many levels.

Cosmopolitanism puts great emphasis on the importance of identity, which it insists has to be understood as diverse, multi-faceted and fluid. Yet, it insists, individuals all share a common humanity. This is a tension within cosmopolitanism which is under-explored due to the commitment to a modernist understanding of the individual. Cosmopolitanism identifies no dynamic forces, other than natural expression, or freedom to choose, as a basis for identity. Identity, despite being diverse and fluid, is nevertheless somehow innate and self-defined. Governmentality, in contrast, requires us to consider the play of normative technologies on the self which create identity. The play of regulatory governmental power, whether through overt juridical power, but also through, for example, religious culture, through the micro-technologies of the family, the school, the work place, the neighbourhood, working to regulate the conduct of conduct, are afforded insufficient attention and presence in the cosmopolitan position.

7.4 Rights, responsibilities and power

It is necessary to critique further on the thesis presented in Changing Citizenship, which I hope has been faithfully presented in the previous sections. There is much to consider here. On the one hand, we can acknowledge the urgent commitment in the text to an ethical realisation of equality, acceptance of diversity and the powerful role of the school and
education in contributing to this. But, on the other, we need to reflect on how cosmopolitan citizenship is conceptually defined, what the implications of governmentality imply, and how the text deconstructs.

A point of criticism to make of cosmopolitanism relates to its tendency to become all things virtuously ideal, in danger of presenting an other-worldly idealism. This idealism rests on a melange of references to concepts such as the individual, community, local, national, global, freedom, identity, feeling, solidarity, struggle, equality, rights. These tend to be presented with an uncritical idealist zeal that might have been the preserve of the most fervent of socialist utopians. This other-worldliness sits uncomfortably with the intense materiality of governmentality, and also with the critical ethical challenges of deconstruction.

To continue the post-structuralist critique, the relationship accorded to the citizen and the state in Cosmopolitan Citizenship is defined as, in a virtuous sense rights, and, in a problematic and wary sense, duties. These are considered existing as a binary tension.

The rights accorded to citizens of autocratic states or dictatorships, including their political rights, are likely to be very restricted. In such states, duties, such as military service, may be onerous. In liberal democracies, statutory service to the state may be no more than the requirement to sit on a jury if chosen. (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.10)

Cosmopolitanism reveals its enmeshment in liberal enlightenment philosophy, not only by its specific claim to credibility by referencing the European Enlightenment and Immanuel Kant (Osler and Starkey 2005 p. 20), but also through emphasising the individual invested with rights. In the quote above, duties are presented as the indicator of an absence of rights. Through a deconstructive gesture, this binary of rights and duties should be uncoupled. First of all, rights, rather than being inherent absolutes, threatened by power, are conceived post-structurally as inscriptions for the individual rather than essentialist pre-givens belonging to the individual. Secondly, responsibilities, duties or obligations, do not exist in a tension with rights, but as an accompanying, parallel, debt, consequent upon the existence that power makes possible. As stated, this is a parallel relationship, where the ascendency of one does not imply a diminution of the other. So, whereas rights might be usefully definable as a reference point for considering the well-being of a citizen, responsibility cannot be relegated to rights by the binary assumption as Changing Citizenship argues, rather responsibility is
fathomless. Ethically, responsibilities exist before rights (Derrida 1990). Deconstruction is a philosophy which emphasises responsibility to the other which is before all rights.

‘...rights is not the first word in deconstruction, which is the central point to be considered in figuring the difference between a “new” enlightenment he (Derrida) has called for and the old one defended by Searle and Gutmann. For rights come after responsibility ...’

(Caputo 1997, p.50)

_Changing Citizenship_ does discuss responsibility, primarily in Chapter 9 (Osler and Starkey 2005 pp. 154 – 167) but this is a superficial conception. The first paragraph of Chapter 9 insists, pejoratively, that responsibilities are overly stressed in pedagogy, and that this is to the detriment of education about rights. This is a criticism the book extends to the Crick Report, which is considered to have placed more emphasis on responsibilities than on rights (ibid. p. 155), thus ascribing to the report a fear of the discourse of human rights which ‘can seem threatening to those in authority’ (ibid. p. 154). The use of the word responsibilities can be ‘a bland and de-politicised rhetorical device’ (ibid. p155) according to _Changing Citizenship_, hiding a repressive agenda of citizenship as compliance. This thesis acknowledges the Crick Report as an exercise in governmentality, seeking, among other things, to promote social discipline, commitment to existing institutions and stability through citizenship education. It exhibits an implicit authoritarian reflex (see Chapter Five), of which securing the idea of citizenship education as being common-sense, above politics and beyond contestation are features. Nevertheless, the conceptualisation and discourse of responsibilities, presented in _Changing Citizenship_ as the binary opposite of essentialist, universal rights, is challenged by the implications of governmentality and deconstruction, whereby we only exist in a state of responsibility and debt to society, society through which freedoms are contingently brought into existence and, furthermore, when they have a juridical status, are carefully defined and regulated.

_Changing Citizenship_ regrets that ‘human responsibilities have not been codified in the same way (as rights)’ (ibid p.154). ‘It is thus possible to derive responsibilities from rights’ _Changing Citizenship_ insists (ibid. p156). This thesis argues that the relationship of derivation is the opposite. Following Derrida, obligations are to oneself and the other who is both outside and within oneself, who is always there and overrides the self, the other to whom our debt is fathomless, our responsibility unlimited. This accords also with the Foucauldian
conception of the individual as only being brought into existence through the social insertions of power and society. This is a very different philosophical starting point to seeing rights as an essentialist pre-existent entitlement, the exercise of which demands a reduction of obligation, as argued in the binary relationship between right and responsibility proposed in the arguments of *Changing Citizenship*.

Foucault's ideas would suggest that the duties of a citizen in a liberal democracy consist of carefully constructed normative behaviours, ethically charged with the responsibility for self-government in relation to the other. Within this is the responsibility of discharging one's social obligations, one's own power, be it through employment or other civil contract, but also, importantly, beyond any formal contract, through, what Derrida would argue, our unfathomable debt to the other. The definition of citizenship in liberal democracies, presented in *Changing Citizenship* as

> ‘... simply the status of being a citizen. The state protects citizens through laws and policing. It (the state) provides some collective benefits such as security, a system of justice, education, health care and transport infrastructure.’ (Osler and Starkey 2005 p. 10)

... seems, in its *quid pro quo* suggestion of ‘striking a bargain’, seriously inadequate as a definition of the relationship of the citizen to society, if not also displaying some lack of appreciation of the deep insertion of social capacities and obligations needed to secure the social processes and conditions so lightly referred to. Any attempt at a codification of human responsibilities, as required by cosmopolitanism, would, to Derrida, imply an abdication of the fathomless depth of ethical responsibility.

‘Citizenship is a site of political struggle’ (ibid. p.9) *Changing Citizenship* insists, and if this means reflection, contestation and ethical consideration of our relationship to one another, then it should be so. If it means a constant deconstruction of the present for the ethical pursuit of *democracy to come*, as in Derrida, then it must. But in *Changing Citizenship*, struggle takes on a quasi-Marxist progressivist mantle of militant heroism, without the historic baggage of communism. It is as if ‘power is exclusively understood as restricting freedom’ (Ricken 2007 p.129), or at best power is violence restricted by justice. The text seems imbued with the assumption of freedom (rights) being in a constant struggle with
power, whereas, understood post-structurally rights are a function of power. There is a puzzling reference to struggle as a factor that provides, in some countries, e.g. France, a strong basis for rights, in contrast to Britain where ‘many struggles for rights and recognition of entitlements to rights (have occurred) but these have rarely been undertaken in the name of citizenship’ (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.11). This is a sentence which works as a device (in a text primarily aimed at a British audience, which takes as its reference point the Crick conception of citizenship education in England) for suggesting that Britain, historically, pathologically, falls victim to a weak conception of rights and thus allows British culture to be seen as singularly prey to definitions of citizenship a la Crick, which are deemed exclusive and form a barrier to cosmopolitanism. Whilst this thesis recognises that some discourses of citizenship are mobilised in exclusionary ways, this is not a uniquely British phenomenon nor one of which France is innocent, neither does the sentence do adequate honour to many of the popular struggles against authority and in the name of justice that have occurred in Britain.

Changing Citizenship proposes that citizenship implies a continual battle for justice, and this in some ways might accord with the Derridean notion of democracy to come (although the use of the term battle might be treated cautiously). But justice, in a Derridean sense, is always something that must be considered as needing to be made anew, in the madness of the ethical decision (see Chapter 3, page 17), something that we must be constantly open to, not something that can be referred to as a system or schema. Changing Citizenship places the struggle for rights against a conception of power that is pathologically ready to deny them, in an antithetical relationship. Of course popular disillusion with power does occur. When authority fails to align its citizens with governmental rationality, when the way they are governed requires them to discipline themselves as governed subjects in ways that they cannot accord, when power does not secure the conduct of conduct, does not secure security, then authority can resort to oppression and violence. But this condition is more accurately understood as the opposite, or the absence of power, not its logical extension (Rieken 2007).

In enlightenment philosophical thinking, which Changing Citizenship references as the origin of cosmopolitanism and its commitment to universal principles (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.19-20), individuals are invested with inalienable rights. These are defined in terms of active freedoms and protected liberties, widening to embrace social entitlements (Marshall 1950). They are couched in universalist terms and considered to be invested in the sovereign individual. They are the same reference point as for progressive-radical critique, which holds power to account for transgressing these inalienable rights in the corrupt exercise of power.
for the purposes of exploitation and oppression, and for failing to provide the entitlements that are the social rights of individuals. In Foucauldian terms, we have to re-interpret this discourse of rights, and see its emergence not as an unearthing and realisation of the natural state of the sovereign individual, but as a particular social/political insertion within the governmental regime of liberalism, seeking to contingently secure the governability of the governed and their acquiescence to government.

Is this to devalue the concept of rights? There is undoubted value in a discourse and a politics of rights as, in a practical way, seeking the possibility of social and political benefits. However, understood post-structurally, rights become a very contingent social reality, which have to be understood in the relativity of social and political conditions, where they sometimes can secure good, but in some circumstances need to be, and are always contingently, open to constraint. This opens up, for this thesis, the problematic consideration of where reference to rights in discourse secures ethical good, or where reference to rights descends into a conceited progressive-radical, or cosmopolitan reflex, which is itself insensitive to social, political, cultural diversity or otherness. In some contexts reference to rights can become an arrogant mantle claimed by some jurisdictions, contrasted with an insensitive identification of an absence of rights and freedoms in others. Witness the blinkered, arrogant, historically amnesiac claims to virtue of some western politicians commenting on developments in other parts of the world; witness a summer school where Oxbridge undergraduates teach students from Middle Eastern universities the supposed essential virtues of the protocols of formal debate; where female Middle Eastern students are brought by the same Oxbridge undergraduates to witness a gay pride march and berated for being perplexed, for not acknowledging it as an essential expression of freedom (BBC World television broadcast, August 2010). Indeed reference to rights can often be seen to run the risk of closing discourse, ending analysis and curtailing consideration through the arrogant assumptions of having referred them. We need to consider where, politically, geographically, conceptions of rights need to be culturally sensitive, and where any contingent existence and expression of rights in one cultural milieu, might stand beyond the possibilities of culture, governmental rationalities, the need for security and the stability of the population in others.

This is particularly relevant to political and cultural settings where the insertion of the concept of rights as existent in liberal governmental regimes (yet contingent rights, erroneously defined in liberal universalist terms) is difficult to achieve. This point cuts across many progressive and cosmopolitan petitions based on demanding that individual universal
rights be recognised by some jurisdictions, and asks for the response of critique to the other be considered more reflexively, less essentially, more thoughtfully.

The argument presented here can be charged with running the risk of weakening the identification of certain regimes as illegitimate, and of condoning oppression. Does this offer succour to corrupt, oppressive and exploitative governance? It is possible and necessary to consider some governments as failing their population, but that is different to simply holding them to account for failing to ensure the full schema of rights as understood and expressed in the contingent particularities of modern western democracies, especially when they are couched in universalist terms.

The previous two sections have analysed the concepts of rights and responsibilities, significant in the importance they are accorded in the cosmopolitan position, from a post-structuralist perspective. The next section will consider the central cosmopolitan idea of human rights.

7.5 Human Rights

Cosmopolitan citizenship calls for human rights to underpin all conceptions of citizenship and be the basis for citizenship education. This prescription will be evaluated through the same post-structuralist lens as the previous discussion of democracy in the previous chapter, and of rights and responsibilities in the previous section.

Cosmopolitan citizenship calls for human rights to be the basis for building school communities and shaping the curriculum. The concept of human rights is the most highly developed definition of individual rights. The term refers to a set of judicially defined rights of individuals, civil rights, political rights and social rights, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) (UN 1948), drawn up by the United Nations after the Second World War in 1948. It consists of 30 clauses. These propose a set of standards by which the well-being of individuals should be judged in any political context, and by which political authority can be held to account through the extent to which their citizens are comprehensively secure in those rights.

Offering a critique of human rights is a serious business. They are invested with a moral authority that serves to put them beyond criticism. They are inserted into national and trans-
national judicial systems. They were conceived in a spirit of defining the well-being of human life in the context of the aftermath of the Second World War, the fight against the Nazi occupation of Europe, the response to the undeclared Japanese aggression against the USA, the cost of the fight against Nazi and Japanese expansion, including the uncovering of the excesses of these wartime political powers in their defeat, not least of which was the Holocaust. Human rights are a point of reference for virtually every critique of political (and economic and religious) power which claims the objective of social justice, and are fundamental in providing an identification of oppression and exploitation in a global context. They have been incorporated into the legal codes of most states which claim legitimacy within the context of the international community and the United Nations. Offering a critique of the formulation, and nature of the UNDHR can be seen as tantamount to condoning tyranny.

Nevertheless, let us attempt to consider the implications of governmentality to this historic phenomenon. Let us start with Article One of the UNDHR:

‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ (UN 1948, quoted in Osler and Starkey 2005 p. 184-185)

Leaving aside the injunction at the end of the statement which we might accept as having an unproblematic virtue, the nascent presence of enlightenment notions of the pre-existing individual in a natural state of freedom and reason is articulated succinctly in the first sentence. A response to this point, even from someone of a less essentialist bent than the authors of Article One and of Changing Citizenship, might be that it is pedantic and does not diminish the virtues of the aspirations evoked in Article One and the remaining articles. However, Foucauldian notions of individuality, freedom and reason do unsettle these, and the statement is open to deconstructive analysis and challenge.

This post-structuralist critique of human rights is presented here as a search for a more secure educational project linked to objectives of social justice than that called for by cosmopolitanism. Teaching about human rights has to be undertaken from a position of understanding what they are, what they mean and what their potential, and their limits, might be for meaningful understandings of society and the world.
First of all, we could start by recognising that the bringing of these rights into reality was a historically located development. They have only existed for a few decades, dating from the years immediately after the Second World War. They are not pre-existent, essential, indeed not *universal* in any philosophical sense at all, universal only in their presumption to universal applicability. They emerged from the considerations of the victorious powers of the Second World War, dominated by the USA, and served to give legitimisation to the act of victory and its cost. As such, they are readily couched in the same universal enlightenment concepts which informed the USA’s *Declaration of Independence* of 1776, and which have been a reference point for the USA’s self-justification ever since.

This critique, as might be appreciated, not only lays itself vulnerable to the charge of the toleration of tyranny implied by questioning the universal applicability of the *UNDHR*, and even of opening the relativist door to such ideological positions as Holocaust Denial. The Holocaust is indeed the single most important historical reference point behind the status accorded to the *UNDHR*. To respond, this thesis searches for a less universalist definition of where the *UNDHR* has ethical value, and where the limits of its applicability can be ethically drawn and, by implication, how understandings of the *UNDHR* should be taught to our future citizens in schools.

From a *governmental* perspective we can define the *UNDHR* as a historically located governmental rationality contingently structured to legitimate power by the insertion of rights in individuals to which power makes itself accountable, but which also, in terms of geopolitical relations, becomes available to legitimate some locations of power and define others as illegitimate. In an international perspective this usefully allows some regimes to be rightfully condemned for chronic failures to secure stability and security for, and meet the aspirations of its population. If pointing out how the human rights of its citizens are not met contributes to this then all well and good. If this creates conditions which promote a humanitarian concern and mobilisation of opinion, resources and sometimes policy, against such regimes within the international community, then all the more. However, troublingly, it can also selectively support the foreign policy of dominant western powers, justified by reference to concern about democracy and human rights, when the motivation for foreign policy can be readily defined very differently, and in much more selfish terms. Moreover, those dominant powers ready to legitimate foreign policy by reference to human rights, can also be seen, not uncommonly, to breach human rights themselves in the exercise of their power, justified by reference to security and stability. Furthermore, in some cases the
concepts of democracy and human rights can be mobilised as a good so good that we can be violent in its name.

All this is not to deny the ethical value of active concern about oppression and exploitation, nor the value of human rights as a conception assisting this concern, but it is to question any claim to their philosophical universality. It is to call for careful thought to be given to how they are used in the political arena, and for a sensitivity in considering their absolute applicability in all cultural, social, economic and political contexts. Reference to human rights has the potential not only to resist, in a positive way, poor governance, oppression and exploitation, but the potential to also be culturally conceited and chronically other-worldly in the face of the contingent conditions of life, society, security and the possibilities of power in some contexts.

This, as has been said above, has pedagogical implications for how we teach understandings of human rights. And it is understandings; critical, thoughtful, concerned and historically informed understandings, exercised with humility in the face of the complexity of human society, that need to be taught in the name of citizenship education. This might be considered a different, or broader pedagogical agenda for educating citizens than one which is based on skills, competencies, aptitudes, and a notion of active participation which can be governmental ‘constraint masquerading as freedom’ (Pykett 2007) which is the thrust of the Crick framework. But it is also a different conception of teaching citizenship to that deployed in Changing Citizenship. Rather than teach human rights as fixed and universal, and hence with a tendency to be beyond thought, a benchmark only for arrogant judgement and condemnation, let us, as teachers open them up to deconstruction, or rather, as inevitably happens, let them deconstruct themselves.

The reference to human rights, rather than opening up discourse and consideration, often acts as a closure, putting matters beyond discussion. A different notion of openness to the other could avoid the danger of a dysfunction of rights, but instead explore an open orientation of responsibility, which is the only condition rights can exist in. There must be, in teaching about human rights, a questioning of what they should mean in the response we must make to the other, what they require of us in the singularity of the coming of the other. Only when they are opened critically and responsibly, rather than dogmatically, only when they call us to confess our responsibility and our dependence, do they begin to work meaningfully as
education. This might even avoid the travesty of teaching about human rights when they become articles, devoid of meaning, mobilised to subvert the very act of teaching.

Whilst Changing Citizenship attempts to celebrate diversity, counter prejudice and promote democratic engagement with a great energy and outrage, this thesis questions its conception of the relationship between rights and responsibilities, and is concerned with its tendency to a dogmatic and un-reflexive reference to human rights. The next section of this chapter will analyse the definitions of status, feeling and belonging that Changing Citizenship defines as citizenship's three essential dimensions.

7.6 Status, feeling and belonging

Citizenship, cosmopolitanism insists, is concerned, as above, with status relating to rights, but additionally with feeling and practice. Osler and Starkey interpret feeling as a sense of belonging and identity, and state that some people suffer exclusionary experiences which weaken their sense of belonging. The importance accorded to feeling and identity is strong in notions of cosmopolitan citizenship. These definitions place the individual as the central object under consideration, and as an essential pre-given. This essentialism is then modified by defining identity as fluid and multi-faceted. There is a contradictory tension involved in the placing of identity as a critical dimension of citizenship, as when it is so placed it serves to enact a fixing of the very identity that is subsequently and rightly defined as fluid or hybrid.

On the other hand, as soon as it speaks of education, Cosmopolitan Citizenship has to abandon its individualist moorings ...

'This feeling of community and shared humanity ... is something that has to be experienced and learnt ... to learn which values are culturally specific and which are universal ... to develop a mindset ... cosmopolitan citizens are not born, they become cosmopolitan citizens through formal and informal education.'

(Osler and Starkey 2005 p. 24-25)

... that is, they must be brought within the governmental apparatus of education and be initiated to this rationality; they must be taught.
The importance of feeling and belonging, and the existence of how this is denied by exclusionary educational practices, is illustrated within a British context, by referring to low academic success enjoyed by English school pupils of Caribbean heritage, and also parents of students with special educational needs feeling unable to secure their children’s right to education (ibid p.12). A governmental analysis, whilst not tolerating the conditions described above, would point out, following Hunter (1994), that the identification of special educational needs is an achievement of the educational system which has brought this truth into existence, and has identified it as a legitimate target for governmental strategy to act upon. A similar response can be made to the truth that in 2000 the overall achievement of GCSE grades A* - C was 48%, but in the population of pupils of Caribbean heritage it was only 27% (Osler and Starkey 2005 p.12). This statistic is also part of the creation of a problematic of government by government. Government brings concern about inequality into existence as a problem that needs to be acted upon, but it does not provide any easy causal explanations or solutions. Racial discrimination (I italicise because of the lack of credibility in the concept race in any scientific sense; this does not invalidate the meaning of the term racism or racist to refer to an attitude or practice) and prejudice, fear of the other exists, but their existence, and the possibilities of their being eliminated, is brought into sharper focus by governmental consideration, by power. It is through government that the fact of discrimination is being brought to truth and being subjected to policies seeking to counter it.

This discourse of feeling, of belonging, is related intimately in Changing Citizenship to the idea of identity (ibid p.11). We are asked to consider identity as diverse in a complex society such as the UK, and also multi-faceted due to global demographic movements and new communication possibilities. This is developed to argue that national identity, actively promoted by nation-states, is out of touch with many who feel uncomfortable with some national aspects of identity which they think represents ‘unthinking patriotism, discredited imperialism or an exclusive nationalism’ (ibid p.12). Others, due to demographic movement, may identify with more than one nation-state. This thesis acknowledges that some ethnic cultural groups have encountered racism and discrimination, that this is unjust and that education for citizenship should aim to build in citizens the capacities to challenge this. It is also agrees that the discourse of national identity and of national values tends to simplicity at best, a meaningless timeless abstraction, casually forgetful of the past, or a closed exclusivity at worst. At this point, however, suffice to say that the nation-state is still a nexus of power and governmental technology that has the administration of the population as its object, and
actively does have, in current circumstances, the diminishment of racism and discrimination as an objective. It may encounter difficulties in this objective, it may commit errors, but it is a highly developed governmental rationality, with the nation-state, along with governmental apparatus throughout society, including schools and teachers, mobilised to that end. This is a development within power, using the power that community invests in us, rather than a struggle against power. It is for many, or all of us, a struggle within them(our)selves as the ‘line of conflict’ (Masschelein 2007) between an individual and the other within them as racism becomes the focus of governmental rationalities aimed at managing the conduct of conduct.

Of course, Changing Citizenship is itself a struggle within power, in the form of discourse between respected and high status academics on the one side, and policy makers on the other, but there is a tendency for the struggle for equality and justice as called for in Changing Citizenship to be invested with a virtuous distance from and innocence of power that contributes to its other-worldliness and potentially flailing idealism.

7.7 Crick, cosmopolitanism and anti-racism

The arguments of cosmopolitan citizenship as expressed in Changing Citizenship distance themselves most stridently from the Crick Report in their consideration of ethnic and cultural diversity within society and the appropriate response to this condition. Crick considers an explicit anti-racist strategy in classrooms to be unwise, arguing for a softer multi-cultural approach to recognising diversity.

‘... explicit attacks on racism or teaching anti-racism full frontal can prove inflammatory – just what the racist white lads will look forward to in classroom discussion, or disruption.’ (Crick, 2000 p.134)

This response of Changing Citizenship emerges from the criticism of a section of the Crick Report which has perhaps achieved the status of infamy ...

‘Majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority. ... This should entail learning, not only about the United Kingdom ... but also ... global dimensions of
citizenship, with due regard given to the homelands of our minority communities and the main countries of British emigration.' (QCA 1998 pp. 17-18)

This attempt by the Crick Report at indicating an acknowledgement of cultural and ethnic diversity and the need for mutual respect and understanding has been singled out as one of the main shortcomings of the Crick Report (Osler 2000). Indeed it has been seen as providing evidence that not only is the anti-racist message too weak, but that it is revealing of imperialist assumptions and institutionalised racism in itself. The report's statement relating to diversity is said to privilege the majority, to suggest that minorities fall short of learning and respecting the law, that it is condescending in its consideration of diversity and minorities as indicated in the use of the word 'tolerate' and the phrase 'due regard given to the homelands of our minority cultures' (author's italics).

In responding to this criticism, Crick has justified the term tolerate and the value of toleration in terms of the responsibility of individuals to exercise moral discrimination, and to control their possible disapproval of difference, by being required to 'limit one's reactions' (Crick 2000 p. 135). Thus, toleration becomes an act of self-government in the face of being presented with difference. Crick's response accepts difference, but then legitimates the disapproval that difference can provoke, to be worked out through the politics of a legally based process that is the hallmark of his conception of civic republicanism. Nevertheless he insists on his right to criticise difference; 'it is imperative to be socially tolerant always, but intellectually tolerant never' (Crick 2000 p. 135, referring Ernest Geller). Whilst not demeaning the importance of intellectual rigour, this is a potentially narrow conception of the openness to the other demanded by deconstruction.

The criticism from the cosmopolitan position of the word 'our' to refer to minority cultures is not referred to by Crick in his defence of this part of the report, maybe because he deemed it as un-requiring of justification. It is interesting that the potentially inclusive 'our' is deemed to convey an exclusivity and a condescension towards diversity. Perhaps if it had said of the homelands of the minorities we find ourselves living with or the homelands of the minorities in our midst the charge of condescension would be a more deserving rebuke. It is perhaps unfairly polemical to single out this word.
Nevertheless, ‘socially tolerant always, intellectually tolerant never’ may be a recipe for politeness on the part of a roving academic, but it potentially falls short of being open to the other in a Derridean sense. Furthermore, it is surely valid to detect in the quote from the report set out above, and in Crick’s defence of the term tolerate, a clear assumption of where he sees virtue most strongly residing, in the ‘majority’, where he also places himself, and where he sees some shortcomings existing, in the minorities.

It is worth considering the obstacles to embracing diversity brought to bear by the use of the binary majority-minority. This binary might be valuably jettisoned from the discourse of diversity and education for diversity. It is a binary that has a social and political meaning in the calculations of parliamentary democracy, or other forms of democracy, at the level of voting and subsequent representation. All very well to deserve a place in citizenship education. But when discussing ethnic and cultural diversity then it is pertinent to ask by what is the majority constituted? Ethnic backgrounds of the UK population are notoriously diverse and have been for centuries, such too can be said of culture. There is a dominant and long-established religion, but it is not one that is characterised in any meaningful way as representing a numerical majority, nor is it without its internal diversity. There is a majority of people in the UK who were born here rather than are immigrants during their own lifetime, but that does not produce a majority identity or culture, or ethnicity. To emphasise in discourse and education a space for some to claim to belong to the ethnic majority is to offer a stable category that does not exist, but which runs the risk of bringing with it an exclusive status. Furthermore, ethnic groups are perhaps best understood as only being brought into discourse, into a regime of truth, as governmental categories which seek to manage the population, not as real or fixed definitions of identity or culture. Furthermore, ethnicity carries with it the echoes of the spurious biological definitions of race. The binary of majority and minority is meaningless, and dangerous in the status it confers on the supposed majority. Ethnic groups only have meanings as governmental categories. The implications are that majority and minority, of either cultures, identities and whatever ethnicities might be, would be helpfully diminished in the discourse, and certainly diminished in the practice of citizenship pedagogy.
7.8 Cosmopolitanism and neo-liberalism

The global condition described in *Changing Citizenship* is informed by understandings of neo-liberal economic doctrines and practices. In contrast to the globalised identities celebrated by cosmopolitanism, global neo-liberalist economic policies and practice are seen as primarily serving the needs of dominant economic interests, in particular international corporations, leading to greater inequalities in the world, tensions, conflicts, all of which threaten, deny or violate human rights.

Globalisation has produced winners and losers. Neo-liberal economic agendas undermine ... social protection mechanisms ... globalization has ... greatly increased the forms and scope of social exclusion ... neo-liberalism privileges macro-economic performance over the welfare of citizens ... (that) result in worsening conditions for workers. As the deregulation that accompanies neo-liberal economic programmes removes the safeguards and protection that trade unions achieved in the twentieth century, inequality increases.

(Osler and Starkey 2005, pp 27-28)

In a section of the book’s argument which seems to constantly twist and turn, we are told that ‘globalisation and democratisation are occurring concurrently’ (ibid p.29). The argument tries to steer a course between welcoming globalisation, lamenting the economic consequences of globalisation, referring back to an idealised past, criticising the neo-liberal influence of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, but identifying ‘new forms of global democracy’ such as the World Social Forum (WSF), welcoming the transcendence of the nation-state by an almost innocent celebration of the United Nations Organisation, and twisting again by expressing concern that movements like the WSF, in their focus on economic corporations rather than national governments, can undermine democracy and produce a fatalist disengagement with active cosmopolitan citizenship within liberal democratic nation-states (ibid pp 29 – 31); twisting and turning indeed.

In a post-structuralist governmental reading of globalisation we must consider Foucault’s analysis of the development of neo-liberal rationalities. Contemporary capitalism increasingly requires conditions of global fluidity, and this demands that borders are relaxed both for capital and for people. It demands the movement of people to provide labour and markets where capital sees optimum opportunities for development. This works to weaken national boundaries and promote the development of international jurisdictions, but it also
demands that nation-states mobilise their power to make this happen both internationally and internally. This is not a conspiracy of power against democracy; it is a condition of material development that can promote democracy, although of a contingent, and in some notable cases, imposed form, as in the case of regime change and state creation through occupation and democratic imposition on Iraq and Afghanistan. This is contingent democracy, created by power, rather than won from power. It is not, in any simplistic sense, emancipation. Neo-liberalism has implications for the relationships between nation-states, and also for the work of the nation-state within its jurisdiction. Nation-states are called upon to develop the capacities in their population to submit to the discipline of global capital. Neo-liberalism demands that the nation-state restrains and retreats from the role of the regulator of the market, as it was required to be in a liberal art of government. Neo-liberalism requires the nation-state to become subsumed within the market, and for the functions and institutions of the state to be marketised. Education is no exception. Education is marketised, and is put to the work of preparing future citizens to be ready to accept this new rationality, this new neo-liberal ‘regime of truth’. This is secured in education through a curriculum which is individualised and which demands of learners the development of the entrepreneurial self, where needs are self-defined, and are allied with self-defined targets. This neo-liberal regime of truth demands of consumers of education a responsibility to seek the meeting of these supposedly self-defined needs in the globalised world created by capital. This is a neo-liberal demand for the self-disciplining of the self, in which the self is anything but autonomous.

In this analysis, migration, multi-faceted identities, multi-national citizenship and shifting senses of belonging are not the signs of the emancipated individual, adopting a global vision in the tradition of the pre-nationalist cosmopolitan enlightenment valorised in Changing Citizenship (ibid pp 19-20), but are instead the transformed citizens subjected to the discipline required by the globalisation of capital. This is an inversion of the cosmopolitan thesis which sees the global vision as the sign of an emancipated citizen, free of the constraints of the nation-state, yet somehow separate from the governmental rationalities of global capital, free, only in an other-worldly sense, to demand their rights and to struggle for a cosmopolitan vision.
7.9 Conclusion

In concluding it is hoped that the arguments presented in *Changing Citizenship* have been faithfully summarised. Cosmopolitanism, the conception of citizenship the book promotes, is sensitive to the globalising conditions coming to bear on the nature and exercise of power and the conditions of the life of the population in general, and on the lives of some individuals and communities in particular. The ethical concern with equality, respect for diversity and the dangers of abusive power, within a context of national citizenship seen as limiting and permeable, is also acknowledged and valued.

However, this thesis identifies some aspects of the cosmopolitan critique which render it as other-worldly as the radical-progressive critique it seeks to transcend. Adopting an enlightenment position, cosmopolitanism locates the individual as sovereign and essentially seeking a transcendent freedom. This individual is possessing of rights, which in cosmopolitanism come before responsibility, whereas this thesis has argued that responsibility is the well of existence that gives rise to what the possibilities for rights might be. The centrality cosmopolitanism accords to human rights, as a basis for political action and for education, is based on an understanding of them as universal, an idealised universalist tribunal to which power is to be held account. This thesis sees the *UNDHR* as an exercise of power, rather than a struggle against power. They are an insertion into the notion of governance, by the most powerful of nations at a particular historical juncture, principles to which power should strive to embrace but which also work to legitimate some locations of power. It is noted also how reference to human rights in discourse has a tendency, like the Crick Report in its own way, to demand a closing down of thought, discussion and critique.

Latterly, this chapter has argued that the complexities of identity, belonging and feeling, as they are brought into existence in novel, contemporary ways, are not, as cosmopolitanism suggests, an expression of individualist diversity, but are rather the products of a neo-liberal governmental condition for which education, along with other disciplinary technology, is put to work to create the globalised citizens who will occupy the neo-liberal regime of truth. This is a strategy, a contingency, with aspects of uncertainty and instability inherent to it, but it is a normative strategy to secure the conduct of conduct within the possibilities of power.

It is interesting that despite *Changing Citizenship*’s commitment to an enlightenment, rational, meta-narrative of progress, and its insistence on the sovereign rational individual, when discussing education it cannot do so without acknowledging its essential disciplinary
function. In the same way, the Crick Report, itself an accomplished prescription for securing a normative constraint through education, is dressed in the enlightenment clothes of modernity, rationality and freedom.

This philosophical discussion of a central text within the discourse of citizenship education, essentially within the context of England, also seeks to begin to identify some pedagogic principles. Chapter Eight of *Changing Citizenship* concludes with a list of pedagogic principles which it considers to emerge from an education for cosmopolitan citizenship based on the centrality of human rights. Less authoritarian school structures, schools 'where their (children's) views are taken into consideration (ibid p. 137). Quoting the Council of Europe ...

‘Democracy is best learned in a democratic setting where participation is encouraged, where views can be expressed openly and discussed, where there is freedom of expression for pupils and teachers, and where there is fairness and justice’

(Council of Europe 1985, quoted in Osler and Starkey 2005, p. 140)

Teachers should not abuse their classroom power, they should respect individual pupils and their diversity. Children should have some choice in and responsibility for their own work, they should have the opportunity to develop skills of expression and decision-making, to engage in classroom dialogue. Teachers need to learn from children, pupils to decide what they want to learn more about and be able to arrive at their own judgements. All of these can be concurred with, though not as a pedagogy of emancipation. Let us not underestimate the nature of the school as a disciplinary technology, as outlined in this thesis by reference to Hunter in Chapter Four (Hunter 1990). Democratic schooling based on such principles, rather than being an education for emancipation, is rather a sophisticated pedagogic approach to securing the effectiveness of education in securing its disciplinary objectives, a securing of constraint through a pedagogic process which presents, or disguises, the teacher as facilitator, invests the learner with a freedom, but a carefully inscribed freedom, a delineated choice and a demand for self-reflection within securely prescribed parameters. This may well be a feature of democratic schooling, and may secure more success in promoting the self-government of the pupil, the conduct of conduct, but it is not a process of emancipation in any essentialist way. If these aspects of teaching and learning are invested with an
expectation of essentialist and natural freedom, then their enactment is bound to prove disillusioning.

It has also been suggested that certain binaries which tend to a presence in teaching for citizenship might be productively uncoupled. One is a conception of identity, ethnicity and culture in majority and minority terms. This ascribes a homogeneity and stability to both inscriptions which tends to deny diversity and play to discourses of exclusivity and subordination. Second, citizenship education conceived as having to embrace either an objective of producing passive compliant citizens or, what is deemed the opposite, active critical citizens is also effecting a limitation. We can all be, and are, in different and varied ways, both compliant and critical, passive and active. The suggestion that the product of citizenship education should be a population devoted to strident criticism, political activism, petition organisers, committee apparatchik and protest junkies is as unrealistic and other-worldly as was the case with the most utopian revolutionary socialists. This conception, furthermore, pays too little regard to the importance, and space for ethical consideration and action, possible though living in an unavoidable state of compliance.
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICY IN ENGLAND: A POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITIQUE

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

The aim of this conclusion is to elaborate upon the main findings and insights that emerge from the thesis by returning to the main research questions it sought to address. The specific policy focus has been the development of citizenship education in England in the last decade of the twentieth and first decade of the twenty-first centuries. However, the themes running through this thesis have woven together a number of threads. These have ranged from the personal to the macro-political and philosophical. The discussion has drawn on authorial experience and ontology and a professional life in education. It has focused on recent policy developments both in education and wider social and economic policy, recent historical developments, both in the UK and internationally, all within the implications of recent developments in philosophy that unsettle the assumptions of how social existence is to be understood. The discussion that has traversed these has sought to explore a reformulated understanding of society, a reconstituted understanding of ethical agency, with particular reference to the project of education.

The personal and professional background to the discussion were made explicit in the introduction, where there was also a reference to the anticipated experience of research and writing the thesis. This held the promise of authorial transformation through unpredicted insights and conclusions. In summary, these personal aspects related to a growing concern about the validity of the progressive-radical tradition of political positioning, vision and critique and the search for a revised understanding. This authorial concern had grown against a backdrop of the marginalisation of left-wing politics in the United Kingdom, illustrated by thirteen years of Conservative government from 1979 to 1997, followed by eleven years of, apparently, the only electable alternative, New Labour. This political trajectory persistently worked to render a mid-twentieth century left progressive-radical, social-democratic perspective increasingly irrelevant. This left perspective failed to explain the behaviour of people, the discourse of politics, the development of society. In the international context, the last decade of the twentieth century saw the collapse of the Soviet and East European communist bloc, leaving beyond doubt the failure of the Marxian revolutionary political project. This had the effect of making my previous left critique of society seem otherworldly. It also rendered the progressive-radical critique of education and its contribution to
the possibilities of social justice, itself often based on the social-democratic/progressive political position, increasingly uncertain in the mind of the author.

Macro-political developments had a strong resonance in professional life. The vision of education as a basis for securing the progressive-radical objective of challenging educational privilege, became uncertain. The commitment to maximising individual capacities, promoting community schooling, developing the critical capacities of communities restricted by low educational opportunities, securing social mobility, all based on an assumption of promoting social justice, became uncertain and potentially unattainable. The political developments prompted within a different political tradition to my own, a right-wing conception of democracy and capital, enjoyed a brief period of triumphalism. Consumerism, corporatism, a strident individualism, all seemed to eclipse communitarian and social-democratic objectives and assumptions.

But that triumphalism, though not banished, has faltered. The fortunes of US and its allies’ foreign policy, in the immediate period at the end of the Cold War considered triumphant, might be assessed as uncertain and challenged with reference to military interventions in Iran, Afghanistan, and the potential complexities of the 2011 ‘Arab spring’. US and ‘western’ economies have been in a state of crisis since the turmoil and almost financial meltdown in the autumn of 2008. Whilst this did not usher a revival of the left, it did contribute to an authorial readiness to consider abandoning the whole conception of the world in the terms of a left-right political binary. The pretensions of both to the historic destiny of one or the other to triumph, as meta-narratives relating to historical progress, came to be seen as increasingly meaningless. Yet it left a vacuum of where concerns about social justice and ethical principles might rest.

Citizenship education policy, which in England took a significant turn in 1997 (QCA 1998), seemed to the author at that time to hold the potential for a welcome insertion of political learning into the curriculum which could build political knowledge and promote political debate and participation in the young. As a teacher trainer, I became engaged in both the professional project of promoting citizenship education and, being based in a university, the academic discourse that the policy prompted. A decade later, this thesis has been written with the aim of understanding differently the philosophical foundations of society to those which supported the meta-narrative of progressive-radicalism, and to considering what implications for the project of education this might entail.
In outline, the research questions sought first of all to identify the modern, enlightenment assumptions that underpin conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education and then proceeded to secure an evaluation of the challenge to enlightenment philosophy posed by post-structuralism. They then moved to consider the insights into the project of mass education offered by post-structuralism and what implications this had for an understanding of citizenship education policy. Latterly, the research questions sought to identify the modernist parameters of academic discourse relating to citizenship education, in particular the cosmopolitan critique of citizenship education. This included a re-examining of some of the key concepts at the heart of citizenship education from a post-structuralist position.

In the pursuit of these research questions the thesis considered a more general concern with the validity of the progressive-radical critique of education, and the value of a traditional left-wing ontology and political perspective. The strategies for identifying objectives for social justice claimed by these traditions of political philosophy are identified as *other worldly*, but, it was argued, these objectives can be reconsidered within a post-structuralist perspective.

As a prelude to pursuing the research questions, Chapter One presented an historical review of how education with the objective of citizen formation and particularly in the UK, has been written in the twentieth century. From the beginning the thesis rejected the tendency for a fixed authority of historical interpretation, of either a progressive or conservative hue, and insisted that these authorities were as much engaged in a subjective, present-oriented historical interpretation which would inevitably fail to present a *real* past. This insistence of distancing the history of education from the certainties of either the progressive or the traditional narrative was influenced by the critique of history as a scholarly pursuit offered by post-modernism (Ankersmit 1983, 1989, Jenkins 1991, 1995, 1999). It also drew on the Foucauldian critique of much historicism, which claimed more rigour for a *genealogical* approach, rather than an historicist approach (Foucault 1975). This was not developed into an extensive history of education, as that was not the focus of the thesis. Nor, at that stage, was there developed a discussion of the philosophical basis of the concept of post-modernism. The thrust of Chapter One was to provide an introduction to the field of citizenship education and a gesture towards the intellectual underpinnings of the analysis of policy and discourse to come.

Chapter One indicated how citizenship education became an overt expression of government policy in England at the end of the twentieth century, following an earlier tradition where
education for citizenship was considered an implicit objective of schooling. It explained how the development of overt citizenship education sought to secure legitimacy and stability through an appeal to universal principles which placed it above political contestation. These universal principles were derived from enlightenment philosophy, which has underpinned an understanding of the world in modernist terms for roughly two hundred years. Enlightenment principles enabled the development and implementation of policy to be presented as a 'common-sense' insertion of policy into curriculum practice. The first research question sought to explore the principles of enlightenment philosophy.

2. What are the philosophical assumptions of enlightenment modernism and how do these conceptualise education for citizenship?

Chapter Two built on the context of the thesis presented in Chapter One and discussed the philosophical assumptions of enlightenment thinking. The historical and intellectual significance of enlightenment philosophy is difficult to overstate. Its central tenets underpin the very idea of modernity. These were outlined in detail, with specific reference to the enlightenment assertions that knowledge can claim to offer objective accounts of the natural and social worlds, that the individual is a sovereign autonomous being with the claim to live in a state of freedom, that moral truths of universal applicability can, through rational debate, be identified, that language is a tool for representing objective knowledge, and that there is a process of social progress towards emancipation that rational enquiry will secure. This enlightenment philosophy embraces the idea of individual rights and identifies democracy as the political condition that accommodates the free individual. It was indicated in this chapter that the idea of citizenship and citizenship education, is infused with modernist assumptions.

Enlightenment philosophy sees power as above society, at best an unwelcome necessity which poses a constant threat to the freedom of the sovereign individual. It calls upon the individual to engage with power so as to protect their individual interests from it and pursue their individual interests through it. It also asserts the importance of individuals engaging with power so as to control its inevitable tendency to oppression and violence. This can be translated into a conservative political position, with its insistence on a small state, property rights and individual responsibility. Alternatively, it can support a social-democratic vision to rescue the state from structural vested interests and put it to emancipatory purposes, or to capture the state through a revolutionary act, use it to destroy the inherently oppressive
functions of the capitalistic state, and then see power wither away and true freedom brought to existence.

Thus, within modernity competing meta-narratives of progress exist. These have developed varied identities within a spectrum commonly referred to as political left to political right. The most striking tension within the modernist political tradition exists between the meta-narrative of liberal-democracy and the meta-narrative of Marxism. It was a second purpose of Chapter Two to make clear that, despite these differences, both liberal-democracy and Marxism owe their intellectual referents to the same enlightenment principles. The identification of this alignment opened up the opportunity for to consider recent philosophical challenges to enlightenment thinking.

Initially, the critique of the pretensions of modernist rationality, and of the capacity of modernism to secure universal moral principles was reviewed. MacIntyre insists on the moral relativism that is the condition of social life to which enlightenment pretensions of rationality are a false disguise. It insists that the Enlightenment conceptions of the sovereign individual condemns man to a moral relativism that cannot identify universal moral principles. However, rather than turning to a pre-enlightenment philosophical position to attempt to rediscover a telos for existence, as McIntyre does, and instead accepting the implications of Nietzsche (1968), Chapter Three explored the alternatives to enlightenment philosophy offered by post-structuralism.

3. How do post-structuralist ideas unsettle and undermine modernist assumptions and offer new insights into educational policy and practice?

Chapter Three explained the challenge to enlightenment thinking offered by post-structuralism. In particular, through Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, it considered how reality and the individual should be understood as social constructions in contingent conditions, and appreciate how language works to produce and stabilise those contingent realities. It ended by identifying how this understanding enables the attempt by power to stabilise meaning to be subject to ethical agency through the project of deconstruction.

Drawing on the concept of governmentality developed by Foucault (Foucault 1991b, 2007), the play of power in society was rescued from being conceived of as outside of the sovereign
individual and above society, as in modernist thought, and reformulated as central to society
and to the constructed individual, the individual constructed by an array of micro-regulation
which sought to secure the governability of individuals in the interests of security and
stability. Rather than the individual being sovereign and rational, and the world consisting of
universal objective truths, the social world was conceived as existing in a state of ever-
changing regimes of truth. This understanding insists on the individual being seen as a social
construction, as only being able to exist in a physical and mental sense through the play of
power in society and of reality as being an ever-changing set of contingencies. Now this
philosophical understanding has many implications for the full range of intellectual domains
that rely on modernist assumptions for their epistemological claims, for example history and
science. It also has implications for understanding social practices, for example politics,
education, law and even insurance (Defert 1991). In particular, governmentality undermines
the elevation of the individual as rational, sovereign, the triumphalism of the new Right in
western politics, the cult of individualism in western culture, and restores a communitarian
principle that tended to be buried by the ascendancy of those positions. It insists on freedom,
a concept regularly and casually referenced in western modernist political assumptions, being
understood in a different way, not as a natural and universal condition, but as contingent and
constructed, a carefully constructed and regulated product of liberal governmentality.
However, if this undermines the excesses of the New Right and restores the individual to a
social context and obligation, it also challenges the references to freedom, emancipation,
progress and rights as they are used by the radical-progressive left and the advocates of the
struggle for social justice.

Post-structuralism removes the universal conceptual certainties that underpin modernist
thought and political discourse, both of the right and of the left. For the author, it leaves the
progressive-radical position, previously embraced as a basis for securing progress towards
securing social justice, in need of reconsideration. In order to accommodate the end of
conceptual certainty, the concept of deconstruction developed by Derrida, was embraced as
acknowledging that all ethical reality is a construction of the play of language. Rather than
reality being considered as universal and outside language, and moral concepts and principles
being able to be defined universally, deconstruction insists that language precedes reality,
that any reality and ethical assertion is constructed by language. Power comes to bear on
language and seeks to stabilise it to secure a dominance of interpretation and meaning. It is
the ethical purpose of deconstruction to insist on the instability of language, and to be
constantly open to the other in language, in meaning, so as to bear the ethical responsibility for the world that is the purpose of deconstruction, always ready for the responsibility for Derrida's concept of democracy to come (Derrida 1990, 1994, Caputo 1997). Thus, deconstruction charges the individual with ethical responsibility, but it is a responsibility to be exercised in conditions of constant contingency, rather than universal certainty, and is a responsibility that is inserted into the individual through their debt to and responsibility for the world, rather than innate within the individual as sovereign and free of the world. Thus, there is a congruence of ethical responsibility that deconstruction insists of the individual with the process by which the individual is constituted socially and contingently through governmentality.

Seen through the perspective of governmentality, Chapter Four interpreted the project of mass education differently than either right or left versions of modernity. In the liberal art of government, predominant in western Europe since the mid-eighteenth century, the regulation of the space of liberal freedom was complemented by the development of disciplinary institutions, such as the school, which sought through education to insert the maximum productive capacities and propensity for self-regulation into future citizens. Drawing on traditions of Christian pastoralism, the school became the site of critical disciplinary activity in the preparation of citizens (Hunter 1994). Citizenship and schooling are, in this way, inextricably entwined as a governmental project within a liberal regime of truth. This interpretative principle has implications in two important areas. One is that it undermines the force of the emancipatory vision of education in any progressive-radical meta-narrative of progress in modernist terms; education as the process of ensuring the fulfilment of the sovereign individual, or education as the vehicle for the subversive resistance to power. It subverts many of the presumptions and ethical certainties of much that poses as radical critique of education, radical critique which sees the practical arrangements of education as a flawed version of an idealist project, criticised as falling victim to exploitative oppression, vested interests and ethical compromise. It renders this critique other-worldly, narrowly certaintist, intellectually and ethically indulgent. As a governmental technology it is the ambition, and achievement, of education to create the capacity for self-reflection, self-government and ethical reflection in future citizens with an ethical responsibility to inhabit the space of freedom regulated through a liberal art of government.
4. What particular implications do post-structuralist ideas have for an understanding of citizenship education policy and practice?

These understandings enabled the development of explicit as opposed to implicit education for citizenship, in the context of England exemplified through the Crick Report (QCA 1998) and the development of citizenship as a statutory part of the National Curriculum for England, to be analysed as a governmental initiative in Chapter Five. The first implication of a post-structuralist, governmental analysis was to challenge the historicist references in the Crick Report. One such reference sought to locate citizenship education as a natural implication of a tradition based on the universal concept citizen, referenced to Ancient Greece and then to eighteenth century revolutionary Europe. Through this reference there is an attempt to present citizenship education as a common-sense insertion of an un-contestable policy into the curriculum. The second such reference in the Crick Report lies in citizenship being defined as a meta-narrative of natural progress through the development of legal rights, to political rights, to social rights as postulated by T. H. Marshall in the mid-twentieth century (Marshall 1950). By such a reference, there is an attempt to erase the tensions and contingencies surrounding the development of education policy in the specific context of a developing governmental rationality. It is also worth pointing out that even as the modernist meta-narrative of the progressive development of rights was mobilised, the Crick Report at the same time accommodated a retreat from Marshall’s concept of social rights as demanded by the New Right in the closing decades of the twentieth century (NCC 1990, Carr 1991).

This aside, the Crick Report was analysed as a highly developed prescription for policy. It presented detailed suggestions for the full mobilisation of available governmental technology to respond to the crisis perceived in the community school of the late twentieth century. The school was seen as in need of tighter degrees of regulation, inspection and performance management, and the curriculum required to be mobilised to respond to concerns about youth sub-cultures, anti-social behaviour, political cynicism and disengagement. As a governmental initiative understood in a Foucauldian way, the nature of the report is not a surprise, nor innately illegitimate, oppressive or flawed because of this.

However, in conducting this analysis, it was noted that the communitarian principles that inspire some of the Crick Report displayed an inconsistency with the thrust of other educational reforms which asserted neo-liberal principles working to infuse the school with corporate, entrepreneurial values of individual choice, marketisation and competition.
(Gordon 1991). This inconsistency can be seen as an explanation for many of the uncertainties and weaknesses that have been noted in the implementation of citizenship as a new subject into the curriculum of English schools (Clemintshaw and Calvert 2005).

Moving from an analysis of the development of citizenship education policy, Chapter Five went on to criticise aspects of the deliberations of the Advisory Group and its final report. The Advisory Group's deliberations were strictly circumscribed by the dominant figures of Crick, Kerr and the political overseer, Blunkett (Pykett 2007, Kiwan 2008). Furthermore, this authoritarianism has been criticised as indicative of an un-reflexive, insensitive consideration of issues relating to diversity and pluralism, social exclusion and racism in a diverse society such as the UK. The thrust of this critique, urgent in contemporary conditions of threatened social cohesion, social injustice, insecurity and instability was discussed further in Chapter Seven where the concept of *cosmopolitan* citizenship was reviewed (Osler and Starkey 2005). The *cosmopolitan* criticism of the process and product of the Advisory Group's deliberations seeks to open up an ethical debate. A report which is proposing to define the terms of citizenship for a modern democratic society, but which then places its recommendations beyond criticism and contestation, when the essence of citizenship within a liberal art of government should be to invite debate and reflection, deserves criticism.

This reflection on the Crick Report, in the context of preparing citizens to take a place in a *democratic* society, led to a post-structuralist reflection on the nature of democracy. Doing this can imply some uncomfortable but important insights. The first implication is to divest the concept of democracy from its modernist interpretation as a political system that is the natural home of the sovereign individual, as the conditions of any social context are never *natural*, and the sovereign individual is a modernist fantasy. Neither should the modernist idea that democracy is the natural end-point of progressive political development, an assumption that lies behind many policy pronouncements and some academic discourse, be accepted uncritically. There is a need to understand democratic freedom within the context of the liberal art of government. The implication is that freedom is a space that is created and regulated by power to secure stability and security. Freedom, created in certain social and technological conditions, seeks to mobilise the maximum capacities in the population and secure the legitimacy of government and the submission of the population to government. This argument requires democracy to be conceived through the concepts of *responsibility* and *submission*, not just rights and freedom.
5. **What are the modernist assumptions of discourse relating to citizenship education policy?**

Much of the discourse which has critiqued citizenship education policy also rests on modernist assumptions concerning the concepts of the individual, rights, freedom, power. Initially, Chapter Six identified six political philosophies within the modernist paradigm; classical liberalism, conservatism, civic republicanism and progressive radicalism, in its social democratic and revolutionary variants, and cosmopolitanism. Each of these emphasise different dimensions to citizenship, but all rest on modernist philosophical foundations.

Specific examples of discourse within the modernist paradigm were discussed in detail. In particular, progressive radical critique of education policy in general and citizenship education policy in particular (Carr 1991). This critique identified the neo-liberal inflected version of conservatism, referred to as the New Right in English political terminology, apparent in the Education Reform Act of 1988. However, the claim by progressive-radical critique that policy represents a strategy of asserting social compliance to the market, for which a binary opposite of social emancipation and justice is claimed, is problematic when policy is considered post-structurally.

"A post-structuralist analysis would begin with the point that such a policy is bound to have normative disciplinary objectives. That is the nature of the exercise of the art of government so as to secure the conduct of conduct. This binding, seen as a threat to individual freedom, would be rather seen as the management of constructed freedom." (Chapter Six p.129)

A post-structuralist approach though also has implications for right-wing critique of citizenship education which sees it as an illegitimate, left-wing, state interference into the freedom of the sovereign individual.

"A post-structural analysis would reject the assumptions of the natural-free sovereign individual, and the idea of a civic society free from the state, but would acknowledge the processes of the management of society through the micro-technologies of institutions beyond the school." (Chapter Six p.129)
And a liberal critique of policy, which justifies the process of education only as contributing to criticality, self-realisation and individual fulfilment is considered to be limited as a …

"... post-structuralist analysis would acknowledge the development of criticality and self-reflection as valid in as far as they secure the maximal development of social capacities, commensurate with securing the governability of the governed, rather than referencing the self-realisation of the sovereign individual." (Chapter Six p.131)

Having considered examples of academic critique from a post-structuralist position, the last research question focused specifically on the cosmopolitan critique of citizenship education.

6. What are the ethical and practical implications of reconsidering cosmopolitan citizenship in post-structuralist terms?

Cosmopolitanism is a political/philosophical position which claims to define the objectives of citizenship education in ways which resonate with contemporary, and anticipated future, conditions. These relate to the processes of globalisation, defined in terms of technological developments, particularly communication technology, global demographic movement, and the development of trans-national identities and supra-national jurisdictions which transcend the nation-state. Its critique of current citizenship education policy is urgently concerned with issues of social justice, equality and inclusion. In this it adopts the mantle of a previous progressive-radical political tradition, refurbished for contemporary conditions where diversity and globalisation have become critical dimensions of society. However, cosmopolitanism also bases its critique on enlightenment philosophy, wedded to the centrality of the sovereign individual and the idea of natural freedom. Considered post-structurally, the concepts at the heart of cosmopolitanism, such as rights, responsibilities, freedom, democracy and emancipation become less universalist and more contingent, and this condition has implications for a pedagogy of citizenship education.

Cosmopolitanism argues a simplistic definition of rights, and under appreciates the concept of responsibility, by defining them as binary opposites. It falls victim to an arrogant assertion, or demand for rights. In basing its argument on a strident demand for rights, it closes, rather than opens discourse. This criticism extends to the cosmopolitan call for human rights to be the basis of an education for citizenship.
Cosmopolitanism identifies the tensions inherent in the play of power in a diverse, multicultural society. It is alert to exclusionary forces in the form of racism and sexism and the potential for exploitation and the potential for abusive effects of power. However, in calling for a mobilisation of active citizenship to challenge these, it bases its exhortations on an enlightenment conception of the individual and rights which seriously underestimates the play of governmental power in its construction of individual lives, identities, spaces for agency and normative regulation of the conduct of conduct. This underestimation leaves the cosmopolitan critique prone to vacuous and other-worldly insistence on ethical virtue, liberated from power.

For pedagogy, the implications of this post-structuralist analysis is that human rights must be seen in their historical and contingent context. Whilst the conditions of existence they relate to have value, they must not fall prone to a universalist arrogance which is insensitive to the otherness of cultures and conditions, the very diversity that cosmopolitanism asks us to respect. Reference to human rights must avoid the tendency to close down discussion, reflection, consideration of the complexity of culture and contingent conditions.

Cosmopolitanism calls for an urgent struggle against the exclusionary pressures felt by minorities in culturally diverse societies, and Changing Citizenship comes from a tradition of discourse which finds the absence of this commitment a chronic feature of the Crick conception of education for citizenship. Nevertheless, despite the insistence by cosmopolitanism that identity is multi-faceted and fluid, it offers no understanding of identity formation save in the modernist terms of natural expression or free choice. It fails to recognise the play of normative, regulative, disciplinary power which inevitably comes to bear on identity, with varying degrees of constructive or coercive effects.

Lastly, cosmopolitanism displays an ambivalent attitude to the processes of globalisation that it places at the centre of its claim to relevance. In celebrating the cosmopolitan citizen globalisation encounters, it mistakenly considers global identity as a state of emancipation, rather than a constructed identity within an emerging neo-liberal regime of truth.

7. Conclusion

So, what can post-structuralism offer for a reformulation of education in general and citizenship education in particular? Foucault’s concept of governmentality requires us to see
education policy as an exercise of governmental rationality seeking to secure 'the conduct of conduct' through a disciplinary exercise of power. Rather than an enlightened common-sense insertion of democratic principles understood in a modern sense, citizenship education is a development of that disciplinary, normative governmental function. Is this all a Foucauldian analysis can do? Is this act of revelation which insists that policy can only be this, that education cannot be anything more than normative discipline, the end point of a post-structuralist analysis? Is the conclusion only that enlightened modernism is an idealist illusion? Some recent post-structuralist critique of citizenship education has explored this boundary. Pykett (2007) brings a governmental critique to the deliberations of the Crick Advisory Group. Her argument seeks to transcend the liberal notion that citizenship education is 'free and pre-existing' and also the Marxist notion that citizenship is 'predetermined and structured by the interplay of state and market' (ibid. p.302). She asserts that the practice of citizenship, and the exercise of freedom is not to be understood as the exercise of free will or the ability to make individual free choices, but rather the injunction to take responsibility for bringing something new into being in the condition of an open future, of democracy to come. The argument though does tend to limit itself to an exposure of the disciplinary processes at work both in the deliberations of the Advisory Group and the technologies that surround its inception, e.g. the Excellence in Schools White Paper (DFEE 1997) and its implementation (Kerr et al 2003). The opening of the contingencies of governmental practice is acknowledged as located in the way governmental rationality is translated into technologies of the self in the context, primarily, in the case of education, the classroom. However, an analysis of this field is not presented in the article.

In another recent article, citizenship education and cosmopolitanism are discussed as requiring a transcendence of the nation-state, defined as a 'limiting frame' (Garratt 2011 p.27). Acknowledging the current condition of 'a climate of social, political and economic instability' (ibid. p.27), the article is concerned with 'the perennial issue of 'race' and (the) problem of ensuring that 'difference' is properly recognised and accommodated through the liberal state' (ibid p.27). The argument critiques the liberal notion that democratic society consists of equal and free individuals exercising equal rights, being sometimes compromised by the workings of the market economy. This contributes to the 'absent presence of race within a neutral and de-politicised policy discourse' (ibid. p.28), although it might be said that the even greater 'absent presence' in the Crick Report is the issue of class and poverty. In making this point Garratt reflects the cosmopolitan critique of the Crick Report (Osler
2000, Osler and Starkey 2001, Osler and Starkey 2005). The article, though, in contrast to Changing Citizenship, does embrace a post-structuralist critique. It defines the emergence of citizenship education as a disciplinary governmental technology, within a more long-standing disciplining of education and schools within a growing neo-liberal rationality of marketised education and competitive individualism. Citizenship education’s response to ethnic and cultural diversity being merely to insist on commonality and core values, adopting a ‘colour-blindness (that) is wholly impotent as a means of promoting social justice’ (Garratt 2011, p.31). The ‘Ajegbo’ curriculum review (DfES 2007) and the revised citizenship National Curriculum programme of study (QCA 2007) are seen as a flawed attempt to reconsider diversity existing as the policy documents do alongside a continued assertion of ‘core values of Britishness’ (Brown 2004, cited in Garratt 2011) with an insistence that these can be determined through a study of the ‘golden threads’ of liberty, tolerance and fair play running through British history; a breathtakingly sanitised historical reading.

Garratt calls for a pedagogy which understands the contingency of diverse identity-formation within a ‘multilogue’ (Modood 2007, cited in Garratt 2011) and which works within the assumption that ‘there is no final telos of the community’ only an ‘in-between-ness ... an appeal to uncertainty, which moves away from the classic boundaries of majority/minority, insider/outside, self/Other’ (Garratt 2011 p. 36). This accords with the argument of this thesis, which in Chapter Seven considered a broader range of pedagogic practice than is presented by Garratt. However, whilst acknowledging how contemporary conditions are generating a cosmopolitan discourse, Chapter Seven identified the limitations of cosmopolitanism’s adherence to enlightenment essentialism as in Changing Citizenship. It also asked for the key concepts that are mobilised by Changing Citizenship; rights, freedom, democracy, emancipation, oppression, responsibility, equality, choice, to be divested of their universal certainty, and themselves be opened to deconstructive critique to explore the space within them, and ensure they are not hollow.

Governmentality enables power and policy to be understood in conditions of contingency and to consider its reach into the bringing into social practice of the individual through the exercise of bio-power. It implies that we acknowledge the contingent nature of reality and of social practice, not as a corrupted idealism, but as a disciplinary underpinning of security and stability. This unessential uncertainty brings with it the responsibility to approach social practice, as in education, to a continual openness to a critical exploration of the other as a project of deconstruction, charged with the ethical responsibility for the open future.


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