Norms and their Implications for the Making of China’s Foreign Aid Policy since 1949: Case Studies of Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America

by

YEH Hui-Chi

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ABSTRACT

This thesis will apply the constructivist theory of International Relations (IR) to the study of Chinese foreign policy, beginning with an examination of the IR theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism, and how each theory explains Chinese foreign policy and its aid behaviour. It will focus on norms and their implications for the making of China's foreign aid policy. Four norms, Asianism, internationalism, sovereignty, and developmentalism are discussed and related to their specific roles in China's policy making. Asianism involves the construction of an Asian identity within Asia, internationalism involves the development of international responsibility, sovereignty entails non-interference in other countries’ affairs, and developmentalism involves the transmission of the Beijing Consensus. The analysis continues by linking China’s identity to each norm in an historical overview of Chinese foreign policy since 1949. The overview demonstrates how China’s identity has become transformed at critical stages throughout the history of the PRC, from victim to neutral actor, to its present great power state, and how these changes in identity have influenced China's subsequent behaviour. By examining three cases, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, this thesis seeks to explain China’s foreign policy within each region and highlights how China’s policies have been guided by its identity and the mutually constituted norms during its periods of regional activity. The Southeast Asia study is focussed on all four norms, whilst the African and Latin American studies address internationalism, sovereignty and developmentalism. Particular attention is placed upon China’s changing identity and its impact on China’s future foreign policy and application of foreign aid.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my supervisor Professor Tim Wright. Without his knowledge, expertise and encouragement, I do not believe I could have completed this thesis. His support in providing resources and material crucial to my research is greatly appreciated. I would like to thank Professor Wright for his understanding, patience, and endurance in reviewing and commenting on my drafts, along with the encouragement and advice he offered during my field surveys and research trips to China.

I would also like to thank Professor Hugo Dobson for his undying effort in keeping me focused and on track. He was very understanding and generous with extensions and late submissions of my drafts. Without his knowledge and guidance on IR theory, I would not have been able to make a theoretical analysis of the research. I consider myself fortunate to have had Professor Tim Wright and Professor Hugo Dobson, two experts in China and IR Theory, supervise my PhD and provide me with the confidence to see it to completion. Their kindness and support I will carry with me for the rest of my life. Thank You.

I would like to express my appreciation to the University of Sheffield with special thanks to the School of East Asian Studies and its staff for its financial and academic support. I would also like to thank the University Excellence Scheme for providing me with a scholarship to carry out my fieldwork at the Shanghai Institute for international Studies (SIIS) Sept.-Dec. 2006. Finally, I would like to thank the Universities’ China Committee in London (UCCL) for providing me with a research grant to conduct fieldwork at Peking University and Renmin University of China in Beijing Sep. 2007 – Feb. 2008.

I am also grateful to the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Peking University and Renmin University of China’s Schools of International Studies, for hosting me and providing me with access to their research and experts on Chinese foreign aid policy. Let me also thank the interviewees who took time off their busy schedules to answer my questions. Their candid responses and insights were extremely valuable to my research, knowledge, and understanding of China’s foreign aid policy. Special thanks to: Professor Chen Yue, Professor Li Baojun, Professor Li Yihu, Professor Guo Shuyong, Professor Yu Xintian, and Professor Zhang Haibing, for their kindness and support. Their aid and support in making it possible to interview policy planners and scholars was crucial to my
research.

Finally, I would like to thank my internal and external examiners Professors Glenn Hook, Zhang Yongjin for their time and guidance towards the completion of this thesis.
A NOTE ON THE TEXT

All Chinese sources, including interviews, have been translated into English by the author, with Chinese pronunciation translated into English via the Pinyin method. Key Chinese terminology has been written according to the pinyin system and written in italics. It is the convention in China to use family names first followed by their given name. This thesis adheres to this convention, unless the author has adopted an English name, where the given name precedes the family name.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALADI</td>
<td>Latin American Integration Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMBDC</td>
<td>ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>ASEAN Ministerial Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (forum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
<td>ASEAN, South Korea, China, and Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3+3</td>
<td>ASEAN, South Korea, China, and Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-10</td>
<td>Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Beijing Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICSAM</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico</td>
</tr>
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<td>CABC</td>
<td>China-Africa Business Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAFTA</td>
<td>China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (Agreement)</td>
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<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>China Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Consultative Group</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Chiang Mai Initiative</td>
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<td>COREMO</td>
<td>Comite Revolucionário de Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>The Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>(US) Congressional Research Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>(OECD) Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<td>EALAF/FEALAC</td>
<td>East Asia-Latin America Cooperation</td>
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<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>(UN) Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHP</td>
<td>Early Harvest Program</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EXIM Bank</td>
<td>Export &amp; Import Bank of China</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOCAC</td>
<td>Forum on China-Africa Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GMS</td>
<td>Greater Mekong Sub-region</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>United States and China</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven industrialized countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight industrialized countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDCPC</td>
<td>International Department of Central Committee of CPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>international governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIC</td>
<td>Inter-American Investment Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPRCC</td>
<td>International Poverty Reduction Center in China</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>international relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomingtang (Chinese Nationalist Party, ROC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur/Southern Common Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MOCOM</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Mekong River Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIEO</td>
<td>New International Economic Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>non-governmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>(Myanmar) National League for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Parti Kommunis Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMB</td>
<td>Renminbi</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEZs</td>
<td>Special Economic Zones</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLORC</td>
<td>(Myanmar) State Law and Order Restoration Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>South-South cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West African People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAZARA</td>
<td>Tanzania-Zambia Railways Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICAD</td>
<td>Tokyo International Conference on African Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECLAC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations peacekeeping operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WC</td>
<td>Washington Consensus</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

Chinese

chengdan daguo zeren  
undertaking a big power's responsibility

daguo  
great power

daguo guanxi  
great-power relations

dingwei  
to define one's position

fuguo qiangbing  
prosperous nation and powerful military

fu zeren de daguo  
a responsible great state

mingzheng yanshun  
when names are right, speech is consequential

mulin, anlin, fulin  
an amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighbourhood

huoban guanxi  
partnership relations

san ge daibiao  
Three Represents

san ge tiejin  
Three Closeness

yiji  
a systematic great power

youhao de daxiang  
a friendly elephant

yulinweishan, yilinweiban  
becoming friends and partners with neighbours

zou chuqu  
go out
PART ONE
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The intention of the thesis

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly becoming recognised as an emerging significant aid donor (Chin and Frolic 2007; Glosny 2006a; 2006b; Lum et al. 2008; Manning 2006; Woods 2008). Following a decline in the levels of financial support from ideological allies that typified the Cold War, developing nations over the last two decades have had little or no alternative but to accept the advice and aid of the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). This has induced a significant transformation in the topography of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as nascent aid donors have become important actors in challenging the Western-oriented aid paradigm through their provision of support to developing countries. Disputes have arisen over how the role of aid from emerging donors may have subverted not only the position of the traditional donor community, but also the importance of good governance, environmental assessment, and poverty reduction. ODA from China represents a particular case that has received increased attention. China’s elevated international status, due largely to its economic growth and potential, has led many in the developing world now to believe that there is an alternative to the Western economic model. This alternative model of development, as will be discussed in depth later, has become known as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ (Dirlik 2006; People’s Daily 2004a; Ramo 2004).

The designation of China as an emerging aid donor, however, is a misnomer, as the PRC’s role in aid donation has remained prominent since the early 1950s (MOCOM 2008). This role expanded during the 1960s and 1970s before decreasing in the 1980s, when its role as a donor was moderated by its role as a recipient of development assistance. By 2006, however, according to reports from the United Nation’s World Food Programme, China had transformed itself from an aid recipient into the world’s third largest food aid donor (WFP 2006). These variations in aid activity are linked to the changes that have transpired within China over the past sixty years. These changes have affected China’s subsequent behaviour and have resulted in the reshaping of its aid policies. Chinese policy planners and researchers have nurtured an interest in Chinese development assistance since the early 1970s, in an attempt to explicate how such
assistance has transformed from advancing international communism and the Maoist model of economic growth and modernization, into ensuring regime survival in China along with its alignment of international assistance with national interests (Interview 2006a; 2006h; 2006i; Liu 1998; Yang 2006). Debates have proliferated over how the country pursued such rational developmental goals while remaining both a socialist state and protagonist of developing countries’ interests (Xiao 2002). In light of these discourses, there was a shift in official policy from the mid-1980s onwards towards development assistance projects aimed at generating mutual economic benefits for both China and recipient countries (Wei 1999; Xing 1996). During this period, China has, through the disbursal of its foreign aid, enhanced its interest in acquiring natural resources from across the developing world (Zha 2005; Zweig and Bi 2005). As its interest in meeting its resource needs has increased, the PRC leadership has placed greater importance on diplomatic and business relations, in order to make up for its lack of experience in international trade bodies and other organisations (Interview 2006f). The impact of this foreign policy adjustment has resulted in enhancing the PRC’s image, and is reflected in the visibility of Chinese trade and diplomatic representatives at international trade meetings and the tables of multinational corporations. However, the PRC’s continued status as an aid recipient country perpetuates the idea that internally, the ‘Chinese tend to see themselves as currently weaker than outsiders do’ (Lampton 2001: 78); therefore, China’s ‘particularly heightened sensitivity to status’ shows that it views ‘international status’, in some ways, as ‘better than power’ (Deng 2004: 51, 53). This view is likely to change as China is destined to become more powerful as its international status becomes enhanced and its position more secure.

Given this sensitivity, China’s economic advancement has continued to help it maintain strong control and influence over its politics, values, and ideas (Xiang 2008). Perceptions and opinions of its growing presence, ‘befitting a power of its stature’, are noticeable both inside and outside of China (Pang 2006: 10). As such, China will assume a greater leadership role, through ‘developing the norms, rules, and institutions that will define the international order of the 21st century’ (ibid.). China’s awareness of its increasing presence internationally has caused it to become increasingly preoccupied with the trajectory of its own ascent (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 2005). Though lacking superpower status, China has, by its own achievements, become a regional power in Asia and, as a result of this ‘power shift’, its neighbours have become increasingly interested in China’s activities at home and abroad (Shambaugh 2005: 23). As such, China’s march towards great-power status can be followed by considering its relations with other
regions. As Rex Li (2004: 23) argues, since ‘the profound effects of China’s growing process cannot be underestimated’, the suggestions in the 1990s about how to deal with China presupposed the belief that it would become a particularly significant actor (Burstein and Keijzer 1998; Kristof 1993: 59-74).

1.2 Question

The question of the thesis concerns whether or not norms shape China’s standards of appropriate behaviour, which in turn inform its interests and policies. The answer to this question attempts to go beyond power-based explanations that rely upon the international structure, such as balance of power, and adopts a norm-based social constructivist perspective, to address the effects of norms on China’s foreign behaviour. The aim is to identify which norms shape China’s approach to its international relations, particularly its foreign aid policy, whilst gaining a better understanding of the norms China espouses. In this respect, this thesis goes beyond the boundaries of International Relations (IR) studies, which concentrate on the role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy (Copper 1976; Hook 1995; Packenham 1966).

The question arises from the fact that China does not belong to the group of traditional aid donors, generally known as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and as such, has operated its aid programme overseas largely independently of the rest of the donor community. Therefore, Chinese foreign aid policy is often viewed suspiciously by the dominant traditional aid donors, who highlight, for example, Chinese support for corrupt governments as a means of criticising China’s foreign aid policies (The Guardian 2007a; 2007b; The New York Times 2007). It is not argued that these perceptions are false, but rather, that the concentration on the role of norms that China follows in the process of providing foreign assistance makes a discussion of China’s views possible. Therefore, by focussing upon the norms which China follows to formulate its foreign policy, this thesis identifies and investigates four salient domestically and internationally embedded norms in its foreign behaviour. The internationally embedded norms pertinent to this thesis, Asianism and internationalism, originate from China’s interaction with the outside world, and the domestically embedded norms which are pertinent, sovereignty and developmentalism, originate from China’s domestic desire to maintain its own autonomy and development. These norms will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and then in their regional contexts throughout the case studies.

Since ‘the state’s identity in international relations is acquired, constructed and reconstructed’, this highlights the importance of the role of social
construction within state affairs. Much of Deng Yong’s (2000:44) analysis of China’s foreign behaviour similarly stressed the explicit ‘drawing on constructivist theory’. While the logic of the approach adopted by Chinese policy-makers may be perceived as straightforward, the process of promoting and strengthening the norms through their interaction with external conflict, as discussed in Chapter 3, is complex. This thesis studies the interaction of Chinese foreign relations with the following three regions: Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.

1.3 The contribution to Chinese Studies

By studying the foreign aid policies of China, during the period between 1949 and the present day, this thesis contributes to understanding of the ideational factors affecting China’s foreign aid behaviour, and consequently, its relations with its aid recipient countries. This thesis will facilitate an interpretation of China’s foreign aid policy from its own perspective, since foreign perceptions of China may be influenced subjectively, as ‘China’s concern for its international image’ has become a major influence on its foreign behaviour (Foot 2001: 15; also see Wang 2002) and is reflected in its identity. Gries (2005: 235) highlighted this point when he stated: ‘Who do we see? A cuddly panda or a menacing dragon?’. This author argues that the use of the normative approach ‘can start with the recognition that nations like individuals […] develop visions, dreams and prejudices about themselves and the world that shape their intention’ (Iriye 1990: 100-1).

During the Cold War, international security was a priority, with many of the world’s developing nations looking to one of the ‘superpowers’ for guidance and aid in their economic development. In the early years following the Communist victory in 1949, the PRC was under the patronage and tutelage of the Soviet Union (Bo 1992). However, after China’s separation from the Soviet model of economic development, following irreconcilable differences between the two personality driven systems, the PRC opted to go it alone and modernise by developing what has become known as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, in order to reinvent itself as the guarantor of the people’s “economic livelihood” and defender of China’s position in the world’ (Gittings 2005: 2-3; also see Peng 2002: 57-64).

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) success in its economic reforms, which led to the opening of its market to international trade, has strengthened the confidence of the Chinese leadership, showing that ‘the emergence of China as a great power is arguably the single most important development in the post-Cold War world’ (Li 2004: 23). With increasing awareness of the effects of reforms on
China’s economic development, the CCP leaders are firmly conscious of the inherent danger of political reform (Goldstein 2005: 49). When the communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe sought economic reform to solve structural problems within their economies, their people demanded corresponding political reforms. These factors contributed to the ultimate collapse of their communist governments. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe acts as a reminder to the CCP, that changes in economic policy must not be made at the expense of political control and authority. The PRC also recognises that they remain under constant scrutiny from the international community. As Zheng Yongnian (1999: 138) highlighted, China was positioned to establish a novel precedent demonstrating that it was ‘capable of pursuing power in the international system’. China’s pursuit of power posed a challenge to the global balance of power, through their discerning of how China would react to the change that its presence would induce. In line with this view, the study of norms expands the understanding of Rozman’s (1999:383-402) notion of ‘China’s quest for great power identity’. By addressing China’s rationalisation of its power relations in terms of increased multilateralism, greater tolerance of US strength through adherence to sovereignty, and an expectation of the mutual improvement in its international relations, these rationalisations reconcile the continued counter-balancing of cooperation and conflict, in light of China’s perception of the motivations of other powers.

The study of China’s foreign aid policy through constructivism broadens the understanding of its relations with developing countries and its response to Western agendas. This makes an important contribution to Chinese Studies, since an investigation of the changes and continuity in China’s international position is helpful in comprehending its involvement in the global economy and international relations. While increasingly opening up its markets to international trade, China remains a relatively unknown and secretive state. For this reason, governments, policy planners, and businesses alike, look to China researchers for insight into China’s behaviour. While predictions about ‘China’s rise’ and impact on the global economy and international relations abound, academic research illuminates the changes taking place in China, and how these changes affect its foreign behaviour (Keyser and Lin 2007: 41-62; Pu and Zhang 2007: 63-82).

Contributions to the field of foreign aid research in Chinese Studies began to appear from the mid-1960s onwards. Most studies, such as the works of Eckstein (1966), Muller (1964), Goldman (1967), and Kovner (1968), focus primarily on its communist ideology and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The instrumental perspective focus was shared in both Van Ness’s (1971) Revolution and Chinese
Foreign Policy and Copper's (1976) China's Foreign Aid. Bartke's (1975) China's Foreign Aid includes information on the mechanics of China's overseas economic assistance and foreign aid statistics, and also provides information on China's foreign aid agreements and projects. There are several studies that focus upon Africa, such as Hutchinson (1975) and an extensive number of essays in Weinstein’s (1975) Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa. Yu (1970), Hall and Peyman (1976), and Bailey (1976) all focused on in-depth studies, such as the Tan-Zam Railway’s economic importance for Africa. Law's (1984) Chinese Foreign Aid relates the features of China’s aid projects to China’s own development experience, that is, self-reliance and independent economic development. Generally speaking, these early studies mostly analyse China’s foreign aid by discussing China’s political and economic interests. The most prominent analysis is the notion of viewing China’s aid as an instrument, by enhancing the weight of its geo-political and economic considerations, while additionally, supporting its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people, and of China’s seat in the United Nations. There are no recent publications that focus specifically on foreign aid. In fact, it is only referred to in research in the field of China’s foreign policy in general, or China’s ‘soft power’ or ‘natural resources’ in particular (ICG 2008; Taylor 2006b; The Washington Post 2006b; Zhang 2008). Recent studies (Chin and Frolic 2007; Kassenova 2009; Manning 2006; Woods 2008) observe China as an ‘emerging’ aid donor, whilst focusing on its oil interests to fuel its own economic growth or its perceived threat to the existing dominant powers, for example, the US and Japan. This has led some to suggest that in the regions ‘where China is most active, access to energy resources and raw commodities to fuel China’s domestic growth plays a dominant role in Beijing’s [aid] activities’ (Dumbaugh 2008: 5). In addition, media announcements in China appear to indicate there are clear patterns where the investment and aid from China is greatest. Countries that supply China with primary resources, such as oil, metals and wood are strategically important, and appear to receive more in both aid and investment than countries that are less resource rich.

While the study of China’s foreign relations serves as a comprehensive platform for a more focused investigation of China’s foreign aid policy, the norms that expedite these policies facilitate an assessment of international relations from a Chinese perspective, and will be investigated in Chapter 3.

1.4 The importance of the research findings to IR theory

Another area of importance in this thesis relates to its contribution to IR theory. It raises the question of whether the existing mainstream theoretical frameworks in
IR can render adequate insight and understanding of Chinese international relations, which in this case focuses on China’s foreign aid policy.

China’s enhanced role as an aid donor, in both regional and international affairs, has consequentially prompted a growing number of scholars to focus upon the analysis of China’s economic assistance behaviour. However, these IR approaches for interpreting Chinese foreign policy mainly employ realist and liberal perspectives, and attempt to compete with an alternative paradigm like constructivism. Although the constructivist perspective has been recently embraced as an important agenda, the incidence of its application to the norm-based analysis of Chinese international relations remains limited.

The analysis of norms is significant in reflecting the changing nature of China’s self-perception and its relationship with the rest of the world. Therefore, by looking at the period from 1949 to the present, and forward into the future, this study argues that various ideational strands affect tangible actions and events at play between China and the world. Consequently, China’s identity ‘influences attitudes and policies alike, being the psychological foundation for the role and behaviour patterns of a country in the international arena’ (Scalapino 1993: 215). In this regard, a change in a state’s foreign behaviour is also triggered by a shift in the identity variable, a point that realists have neglected in their analyses.

While norms play a role in shaping and maintaining aid provision, the manner in which aid is framed by those norms is also important. Since the end of the Second World War, international norms have been concerned with development assistance, particularly that of an official nature, and have matured and assumed a distinctive shape. The international norms, such as internationalism, have emerged and been adopted by the Western aid donor community as a whole. Yet, while donors may not always adhere to or comply with these norms, major donor states in the OECD at least feel compelled to explain away their deviances from these norms and generally accepted practices, thereby implying acceptance of the legitimacy of these norms. Today, however, these norms are subjected to greater pressure from many forces such as the different consensus of aid norms that China is promoting. A major implication of these findings is that although the rendering of aid to poor recipient countries by the donor states is promoted as coordinated and benevolent, the norms that shape the motivations and competitive interests of the respective donor governments are subject to differing interpretations. Clarification of these differences and their implications will contribute to our understanding of IR with substantial insight into China’s foreign aid policy.

This raises the questions of what constitutes the norms influencing
Chinese foreign aid, and where these norms originated. It thereby highlights the explanatory identities that correspond to the norms. The study of China’s identity transformation provides insights across a range of topics. It serves to demonstrate how these changes affect its foreign behaviour, as well as contributes to the study of international relations through the increased understanding of the norms influencing its behaviour. A key indicator of the norms influencing Chinese international behaviour is therefore reflected through its involvement in foreign aid. This thesis examines the roles of norms in China’s foreign aid policy through three regional case studies based upon empirical evidence for the claims made. Each case study addresses how norms guide, or do not guide, Chinese foreign behaviour, and how they interact with spheres of interests and power from the constructivist perspective. The impact of both internationally and domestically embedded norms on China’s foreign behaviour is considered.

Mainstream approaches to studying China’s international relations identify some of the extant issues such as power seeking or cooperation, which will be illustrated later in the next chapter. However, they have yet to exclusively provide a thorough explanation of all of the observed changes. These shortcomings arise, in part, from the perception of the importance of factors, such as norms, in causing the changes. By highlighting the potential benefits that may result from applying IR theory to the examination of Chinese foreign policy, this thesis serves as a valuable contribution to the continued expansion of traditional IR theory, by not only relating the importance of norms and identity to foreign policy planning, but also by demonstrating how foreign aid is used in foreign policy. This thesis seeks to explore this issue from an alternative perspective, namely through a norm-based constructivist approach. Its aim is to supplement the current findings of the existing traditional approaches, thereby highlighting the importance of additional factors, namely, how the changes in identity affected the uptake of norms that informed China’s subsequent foreign policies, which may enhance their future evaluations and provide more thorough explanations of the observed changes in China’s foreign policy.

1.5 The organisation of the thesis

This thesis is comprised of two main parts: Part One focuses on the introduction of the theoretical aspects of the discussion, while Part Two provides case study evidence and conclusions drawn from the investigation.

Part One comprises the introduction (Chapter 1) and two substantive chapters, which build upon the published literature on general Chinese foreign policy and foreign aid policy. Chapter 2 begins with a detailed review of IR
theories. This overview provides the background for the following three mainstream IR theory perspectives utilised to study Chinese international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism. This review examines Chinese foreign policy and serves to provide insights into the development and interactive nature of the main approaches used to understand China’s foreign aid policy. Following the review, a constructivist norm-based approach is adopted as the principal method of investigation for this research, and is used as a foundation for constructing the framework in the following chapter. Chapter 3 constructs a framework of the role of norms to help explain the shaping of China’s international relations, initially by mounting the definition of the norms and their relation to China’s foreign aid, in order to provide a structure for the detailed case studies outlined in Part Two. The chapter concludes with an overview of the trajectory of identities and norms in China’s foreign relations since 1949, which offers a precursory review of the background to the case studies.

Part Two is comprised of three case study chapters and a conclusion. The case study chapters, chapters 4, 5 and 6, draw largely upon primary sources of data in order to illustrate and develop the overall framework from Part One. These primary sources include numerous interviews, as well as extensive analyses of both government documents and media resources from within China, for both local and international consumption. The case studies focus upon Southeast Asia (Chapter 4), Africa (Chapter 5) and Latin America (Chapter 6), with the emphasis in each chapter placed on particular episodes and issues. The choice of the case studies in this thesis is dependent upon the significance of China’s role in the different geographical areas, and upon a history of Chinese foreign relations to provide substantial material for the enquiry. Each case study provides a précis of the historical background to the region’s bilateral relations and importance to China. Without neglecting the materialist implications, the normative approach highlights how internationally and domestically embedded norms have influenced China’s aid policy decisions. The conclusion (Chapter 7) brings together the findings of the norms to the understanding of China’s international relations and foreign aid policy from the three case studies.
In order to establish a framework of analysis to explain Chinese foreign aid policy, it is necessary to examine and integrate relevant concepts, drawn from the literature available on Chinese foreign policy and IR theory. This chapter conceptualises the research and different interpretations of Chinese foreign policy and foreign aid in the context of international relations. It provides a review of past literatures, which outline the backgrounds of existing IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) and their applications to China's foreign relations.

2.1 IR theory and the Chinese case

IR theories have been, and continue to be, articulated as conceptual hypotheses for explaining and understanding phenomena, such as the behaviour of states. By drawing on the examples of history and the works of its recorders, writers concerned with explaining the behaviours of states have focused primarily on the causes and consequences of war in forming the manner by which states interrelate.

The quality of human nature has remained a central topic in IR theory discussions. Each of the IR theories discussed in this chapter will deal with varying views on the nature of human relations, and how they contribute to the behaviour of states. Organized war, as it is known, is a corollary of civilization and the grouping of communities on a mass scale. Any discussion of the nature of relations between organized groups, in this case states, will naturally draw upon the complexities of human social relations, whether it focuses upon the individual, family, kin, tribe, community, or state. This examination of IR theories will begin with a review of realism, which is considered the pioneering theory of IR. It has long enjoyed a 'hegemonic position' in the discipline, especially during the Cold War when the insecure nature of the international system could credibly be seen to dictate the prioritisation of security through military power and relative gains over

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1 Foreign aid (assistance) is also often referred to in other terms such as economic aid (assistance), development aid (assistance) or Official Development Assistance (ODA). Official Development Assistance (ODA) is termed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD).
others (Walt 1998: 31). Realism and its concentration on power, distinct human nature, and anarchy will be investigated, to determine its relevance to Chinese foreign policy generally and Chinese foreign aid more specifically. Secondly, this examination of IR theory will consider liberalism, which recognizes the anarchic nature of international relations, but concentrates on the cooperation of states, rather than on power and state security. A factor that is intrinsic to liberalism is cooperation and involvement in international organisations and institutions. The chapter will conclude with an examination of constructivism. Due to the change of international structure at the end of the Cold War, social constructivism has featured significantly in the study of IR since the 1990s. According to certain scholars in the field, constructivism facilitated the rise in prominence of the rationalist (neo-realism and neo-liberalism) versus constructivist debate (Price and Reus-Smit 1998; 263; Zehfuss 2002). Constructivism does not support the idea that the existence of conflict can be accounted for by the presence of anarchy alone, but rather because there is no inherent nature to international anarchy. The fact that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ provides an explanation for the nature of international anarchy (Wendt 1992). Therefore, if states behave in a conflictive manner towards each other, then the nature of anarchy appears conflictive, whereas when they behave in a cooperative manner, the nature of international society becomes cooperative. In order to understand conflict and cooperation in international relations, attention must be focused upon what states actually do, rather than upon the supposed nature of international anarchy. As a result of this, constructivism attributes significance to a state’s behaviour in the determination of the nature of, and transitions in, international relations.

Reviewing the IR theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism will contribute to the explanations of a state’s international behaviour, in this case, Chinese foreign policy and foreign aid.

2.2 Realism

Realism considers international relations in the light of three core assumptions, as concluded by Robert Keohane (1986: 7). Firstly, sovereign states, rather than international institutions, non-governmental organisations, or trans-national corporations, are the primary actors in international affairs. Secondly, each state seeks to maximize its power. Uncertainty is pervasive because knowledge of other states is limited, and therefore, states are motivated fundamentally to survive, with the primary goal of each state being to ensure its own security. Thirdly, each state is a rational actor that always acts in its own self-interest, thereby restricting international cooperation. The behaviour of a state is primarily determined by its
concern for permanent security, and results in the focussing of military power towards goal resolution. The enhancement and sustaining of such power by a state is deemed fundamental for not only its security, but also for its ability to influence other nations. This requirement to regulate power against perceived threats is manifested through a combination of increasing a state’s military potential, alongside the construction of mutual alliances with other states facing similar security threats (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 5-7, 44, 58). The primary goal under such anarchic conditions is to survive. Hence, while classic realism postulates that the source of international insecurity lies within the egotistical human desire for power, the concept of neo-realism, which evolved from these theories, determines that the anarchic nature of the international system in the ‘absence of super-ordinate power to impose order’, and therefore prevent war, creates this source of insecurity (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 41).

Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, stress the centrality of national interest, by arguing that states are like human beings who have an innate desire to dominate others, which, therefore, leads them to fight wars (Walt 1998: 31). The concept of ‘interests’ is defined in terms of ‘power’, which provides ‘reason and facts’ to show how interests dominate the actions of men and states (Morgenthau 1973: 4-17, 38-9). Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz (1979: 16-41, 80-123) disagrees with the argument that human nature was responsible for causing wars. He argues that the structure of the international system, rather than human nature itself, is the dominant factor that leads states into war. Since the structure of the international system shapes behaviour, this inherent insecurity pressures all states, ‘independent of wishes and actions’, into the pursuance of power (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 40, 47, 62). Due to this, states behave in the same way as ‘like units’, viewing each other as ‘black boxes’, and therefore pay attention to other states’ observable behaviour, rather than the nature of their governments, along with the decision-making processes of the leadership (Waltz 1986: 71). In this structure, the distribution of power, multi-polar or bi-polar, at a specific point in time, dictates the overall state of insecurity. Waltz (2000) argues, in contrast to the views of Morgenthau, that the bi-polarity observed during the Cold War became the optimum structural order ensuring international peace and stability. The imbalance of this structure, resulting from the end of the Cold War, has led to a period of American domination internationally that has created instability and led to enhanced interstate competition. Attempts to redress this balance by other great powers will create further instability in the international security environment (Walt 1998: 31).

When a rising power challenges the security environment, the supremacy
of a hegemonic state becomes insecure, causing the hegemony of the dominant state to become destabilized. Christopher Layne (1993: 9) highlights that this ‘structurally based phenomenon’, whereby any hegemonic power that formulated its strategies more on benefaction than on coercion to maintain its leading status, will be confronted by great powers with different preferences and interests. The international power structure becomes subjected to constant and inevitable interstate challenges due to the rise of the great powers, whose economic success enhances their economic growth as a rising state’s international interests and commitments grow. Consequently, its economic growth fuels its ambitions and capacity to challenge the global status quo (Gilpin 1987), thereby, impacting upon the dominance of the hegemonic powers. Advancement within this anarchic state only becomes achievable by the rising power competitively balancing its position relative to the hegemonic power by seeking to imitate its rival, and by nurturing an inherent ‘sameness’ (Li 2004: 25). This induces a ‘structural impact’ upon the international system causing a transition from a hegemonic-centred to a multi-polar world order (Li 2004: 25). Economic power becomes a critical factor as it transforms the primacy for security, where military power becomes fundamental to security resolution, by inducing a relative zero sum game on international trade and economics (Berger 1996: 323). Fear of disproportionate economic cooperation motivates players to usurp distinct power advantages, rather than attain mutually beneficial positive sum games. Following the end of the Cold War, Europe, Asia and the Third World shared mutual concerns of the United States’ unchallenged dominance in international politics (Layne 1993: 35-7), with China expressing its greatest suspicion of the US-centred world, indicative of the behaviour of a rising power (Li 1999: 115-49).

The nature and accretion of power may also result in states adopting more optimistic strategies for handling such transitions in their power structure. Defensive realists, such as Taliaferro (2000/01: 128-61), argue that a state will primarily adopt moderate strategies for attaining optimum security, as this ensures the least offensive means of defending itself. Through such an approach, a state’s goal is to survive, and great powers secure their own security through optimal alliances, which choose to engage defensive military force only on retaliatory terms (Walt 1998: 31). Due to this, a state engages in actual conflict only when this option becomes the sole resolution for threats to its interests or cooperation (Glaser 1994: 50-90; Jervis 1999:42-63; Kydd 1997: 114-55). The modal behaviour of a state, in the case of great powers, is to counterbalance dominant, or opposing and threatening powers. In the case of weaker states, they may occasionally opt to align with greater powers, through seeking conciliatory or
collaborative goals (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). Such coalitions and balancing may occur through the alignment of a state with a distant great power in order to reduce potential hostility, and counterbalance more immediate proximity threats, such as those from their neighbours, and results in the lesser state becoming subservient to key foreign policies of the greater power (Walt 1987). Under particular conditions, primarily those with limited options for alliances, the incidence of alignment increases along with the desire to pacify the hegemonic power. In these circumstances, rational calculation of material threats and interests form the fundamental basis for security policies and alliance partnerships (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979).

As the realist school argues that conflict is the result of states securing their vital interests, they view such conflict as inevitable. Power tools such as foreign aid become an option for states to promote their interests. Foreign aid is described as being a policy tool that originated during the Cold War in order to achieve donors' foreign policy objectives (Wall 1973: 9). In the Cold War context, therefore, foreign aid was considered to be a foreign policy instrument used by both sides as a means of gaining influence with Third World regimes (McKinlay and Mughan 1984; Morgenthau 1962; Hook 1995). An example of this is the Nicaraguan conflict, between the Contras and Sandinistas, each of which were supported by their respective patrons, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and American support for the Mujahideen, are examples of Cold War powers promoting their foreign policy interests, whereby both powers were accused of fighting proxy wars against each other using other states. For most of their post colonial history, the majority of African states became battlegrounds for US-Soviet ideological warfare. Aid was also frequently linked to military assistance in these scenarios, as observed in the foreign aid debates that promoted US national security, and countered the communist threats that were used by both supporters and opponents of the bills, during the 1963 and 1964 debates in the US House of Representatives (Vorys 1967: 3). This view is also supported by Huntington (1970-1: 161-89), who analyses the situation from a donor's perspective. He concludes that foreign aid is being used primarily as a foreign policy tool to achieve donors' goals. In his review of US foreign aid, he argues that aid is intended to serve U.S. foreign policy interests.

Morgenthau (1962: 301-4, 309) argues that aid serves interests 'which can not be secured by military means'. In his six types of foreign aid (humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and economic development), he cites two strategies of influence: 'propaganda' and 'bribes'. 'Propaganda' involves the attempt to create 'psychological' relationships for international recognition and
prestige, whereas ‘bribes’ involve a more direct exchange of goods for loyalty by seeking a price paid for political rewards. The propaganda that Morgenthau argues is an instrumental component of foreign aid that was ideological in nature during the Cold War. In the case of the Soviet Union, an ideological propaganda campaign was maintained, through its leadership in the Comintern, within its Soviet-sphere of influence, which mirrored its commitment to world revolution.

Through this, the Soviet Union encouraged Soviet-style socialist revolutions across the globe. With the European powers devastated by WWII, the hold on their colonial empires became weak, and as each former colony gained its independence the Soviet Union and the US began to occupy the vacuum produced by their departure. The superpower economic assistance in the de-colonized regions enabled the superpowers to battle for the support of these newly independent states. Another foreign aid tool ‘bribes’, places importance on influence in realist backed foreign policies. Few states admit involvement in bribery as a tool of foreign policy, yet diplomatic scandals and kickbacks abound. Since aid was viewed as a tool for buying favour or influence, restricted and/or non-transparent aid has been correspondingly viewed with suspicion, particularly by traditional aid donors. The Iran–Contra Affair involving some of the highest ranking leaders of the American Government is evidence of the influence of ‘propaganda’ and ‘bribes’.

In line with this insight, Maizels and Nissanke (1984: 870-900) further highlight that there are different self-interest variables for different donors. Their study of donor-interest models provides a convincing explanation of the allocation of bilateral aid for the period between 1978 and 1980. In the United States, for example, strategic considerations were most important, whereas in France and Britain, the link with former colonies motivated their concerns and models. In Japan, markets of importance to Japanese exporters were the priority and therefore became the focus of their policies. These ideas are supported in Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor’s (1998: 297-8) cross-national analysis. They demonstrate that although the four donor states (United States, Japan, Sweden, and France) share democratic values, and support recipient countries’ economic development, their aid policies are all influenced by realist strategic interests.

**International relations are conducted in a Hobbesian state of nature in which national security and self-preservation become the primary aim. As a result, foreign aid is perceived as only minimally related to [the] recipient[’s] economic development and the humanitarian needs of [the] recipient countries are**
Under the realist paradigm, foreign aid policy is concerned with serving the main concerns of state security and the maintenance and securing of power. Humanitarian needs are often considered only in response to pressures from civil action groups concerned with fighting corruption and mistreatment of people in the recipient country.

2.2.1 What does realism reveal about China’s foreign relations?

Realists, such as Yan Xuetong (1996), argue that the context of Chinese strategic interests shapes its foreign policy. Due to this, its economic power will eventually transform into military strength, once its primary factors of size, population, resources and military potential converge. This has been accelerated in China in recent years by its sustained economic growth. This led Segal (1995: 70) to predict that ‘in 2020, the world [would face] a united, authoritarian China with the world’s largest GDP, perhaps the world’s largest defence budget’. Without acquiring greater power, China would ‘be exploited by the hegemon’ (Layne 1993: 12), mirroring historical events in China when it was ‘invaded and exploited by foreign powers during the nineteenth century because it failed to attain great-power status while Japan and the European states did’ (Li 2004: 26). This has fuelled and motivated generations of Chinese to erase the memory of their ‘Century of Humiliation’ at the hands of Europe, the US and Japan, and so restore their pre-eminent global position. A rise in Chinese nationalism and confidence has matched its building of a ‘prosperous nation and powerful military’ (*juguo qiangbing*) (Zhu 2004). The central strategy of the CCP is consequently focussed on creating ‘a strong military appeal to nationalist sentiments within the current leadership as well as the general population’, causing realists to surmise that its potential for aggression and conflict becomes enhanced/elevated (*ibid.*). With the United States as the only superpower, realists envisage China will seek to ensure its security, thereby challenging the predominance of the US in the process of defending its perceived vital economic and security issues. Shambaugh (1996: 187) argues China’s goal was to ‘weaken American influence relatively and absolutely, while steadfastly protecting its own corner’, while in more recent times, Rex Li (2004: 25) has suggested that China ‘perceived the US as a major rival’.

China’s foreign policy has not been solely driven by the concept of power alone. Neo-realist scholars emphasize that the structure of the international system

(Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998: 297-8)
also sheds light on the behaviour of the Chinese state. Waltz (2000: 30) views China as one of the candidates capable of challenging the dominance of the United States, since structural change at the end of the Cold War encouraged China to perceive its great-power status. Realists argue that ‘a state’s freedom to choose whether to seek great-power status is in reality tightly constrained by structural factors. [...] eligible states that fail to attain great-power status are predictably punished’ (Layne 1993: 9). China’s economic expansion since the 1980s has made it easier to challenge America’s central position in the post-Cold War period, since there is a natural desire for a stronger economic power to assume a more significant military role (Waltz 1993). Mearsheimer (2001: 402), in particular, sees a confrontation between the US and China as a structural inevitability. This view has been echoed by Huntington (1996: 147) who states that China is the leading challenger to the West, where ‘centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China’s military power and its means to create military power’. Roy (1994: 149-68) even described that China as the ‘hegemon on the horizon’. In addition, while reminding the world of its political and military obligations to bring about unification with Taiwan, by force if necessary, its commitment to North Korea’s security, and its sovereign territory disputes, China’s rise as a great power would coincide with attempts to attain greater security for survival in the East Asian security environment, due to tension on the Korean Peninsula, Japan’s influence and power, and the potential conflict across the Taiwan Straits, as demonstrated in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis (see Ross 2006: 13-49). China also has had territorial disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu islands and with several Southeast Asian countries over islands in the South China Sea, such as the Chinese occupation of Philippino-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995 (MFA 2004a; People’s Daily 2003a). According to Chung’s (2004: 127-40) observation, China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in the 1990s were fuelled by its search for rich natural resources, which remain vital to the survival and prosperity of China.

By adopting a social revolutionary approach in understanding China’s place in the realist world order, Tang (2007: 28-9) is more convinced that China will adopt a ‘defensive realistic’ policy, which means that it is ‘unlikely to use its gained power to intentionally threaten other states’. However, the proponents of ‘civilizational realpolitik’ like Samuel Huntington (1993: 22-49; 1996), continue to see China’s strong sense of cultural superiority and self-confidence as precipitating a challenge to the existing international structure. Johnston (1998a: X) further argues that ‘precisely because realpolitik behavior may be strategic-culturally rooted, these system-wide strategic predispositions may be
more mutable and susceptible to purposeful change than realists may expect'. The
Chinese are no less concerned with the use of military power than any other
civilization.

The realist approach, as previously stated, advocates a defined structure
within international relations, such that the ‘texture of international politics
remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly’
(Waltz 1979: 66), and as such, each state perceives and acts upon its interests in a
predictable manner. Despite being criticised for attributing little importance to the
role of ideas in shaping the world system, the use of the ‘strategic culture’
approach, as well as historical legacy or culture, all contribute to the
determination and re-enforcement of understanding China’s position within the
realist world order (Johnston 1998a). Though the strategic culture realist approach
is considered ‘more rigorous in conceptualisation and methodology’ than
conventional realism, it is equally unable to explain the transitions in a state’s
behaviour purely through ideational changes, particularly in terms of social
learning (Johnston 1996b: 221; Levy 1994: 297-8). In general, the rationalisation
of Chinese international relations, from realist perspectives, focuses the primacy
for security and importance of military power as the ultimate resolution for
security threats.

2.2.2 The implications of realism for the understanding of China’s foreign aid

As discussed earlier, realism makes foreign aid possible when it is related to a
donor’s pursuit of political objectives. In the case of China, realists look for an
explanation of China’s economic assistance in its foreign policy goals, as it is both
an aid donor and recipient. Zha Daojiong (2005: 1) highlights three goals of
Chinese foreign aid, which suggest a realist Chinese foreign policy. These
comprise: firstly, ‘an instrument for serving the country’s diplomatic agendas’;
secondly, ‘serving the country’s economic development needs’; and thirdly,
‘promoting national re-unification’, namely, how China views foreign aid as a
tool to persuade and prevent more countries from recognizing Taiwan as a
sovereign state.

In the first goal, China’s foreign aid policies were viewed by realists as the
rivalry and struggle for influence in the Third World between the PRC and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War (Eckstein 1966; Goldman 1967; Kovner 1968;
Larkin 1971; Muller 1964). This can be observed by China’s cultivation of
partnerships in developing countries in its drive to form a sphere of its own,
independent of both the Soviet sphere of communism/socialism and of the
emerging Non-Aligned Movement, by promoting wars of national liberation as a
tool for its political purpose (Van Ness 1971). Many argue that the Tan-Zam railway project was a political gesture to aid the restoration of diplomatic ties which were disrupted during the Cultural Revolution, and in making new contacts in the field of international relations by demonstrating how Chinese aid was more capable of achieving the goals that other donors had failed to achieve (Yu 1970). China's economic relations and technical aid programmes served as 'a tool of its external relations' (Copper 1976: 14) to facilitate state-to-state contacts and people-to-people exchanges (Vang 2008: 37). Foreign aid donations from China were based on the basic principles of 'proletarian internationalism' which, at that time, was 'the guiding principle of China's foreign policy and also her foreign aid' (Peking Review 1974b: 16). For most of their post colonial history up until the 1980s, the majority of developing states, especially newly independent African ones, became battlegrounds for primarily US-Soviet ideological warfare, which occasionally involved China as a third alternative. Chinese involvement in sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War period paid dividends for China's political relations in Africa, as support from the region had provided it with access to the United Nations General Assembly. As evidenced by the support China received from developing country members of the United Nations, the Chinese Government saw aid donation as an effective means for achieving its political goals. Mao was often quoted as saying: 'it was China's African friends that carried China into our seat at the United Nations headquarters' (Interview 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 2007c; 2007d; 2007g).

In its second goal, as China's economy expands, realists argue that China will tend to become more ambitious in using its new-found power to extend its influence and defend its economic interests, thereby disrupting the dominance of the world's major power (Harris 2003; Segal 1999). China's economic advance continues to help its wider political and strategic position, such that, following Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, Chinese leaders have been developing China's 'comprehensive national strength' to compete with other great powers (Chan 1999: 28-33). Laliberté (2005: 17) points out that China's 'emergence as a major economic power with global reach cannot but evoke the spectre of hegemonic transition and its political fallout'. Therefore, Chinese foreign policy, including aid, is directed towards states that can supply the resource materials for China's economic development. China itself makes it clear that economic development is its priority, as the stressing of mutual benefit, built upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, was first outlined between China and its aid recipient countries (Peking Review 1974a: 6-11; 1974b: 16; Xu 1996). The Chinese 'go out' (zou chuqu) policy, as first proposed by Jiang Zemin following
China’s ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, was aimed at helping Chinese firms access a range of start up incentives, joint ventures, and aid-to-profit schemes, in the form of government backed soft loans and export credit for businesses internationally (MFA 2002e). The Chinese Government’s recent activity in foreign aid is regarded as an attempt to secure natural resources to meet its domestic needs. Such reasons are supported by the realist viewpoint, as demonstrated when Chinese troops were sent to help its major aid recipient, Sudan, maintain control of its vital oilfields against rebel attacks in 2000 (Economy and Monaghan 2006). Thomas and Zhu (2004: 4) argue that the dispatch of troops to the Sudan was not just part of China’s push for resources, but was also part of China’s political, diplomatic, and military objectives.

Moreover, with regard to its third goal, throughout the CCP Government’s struggle for recognition from the international community between 1949 and the early 1970s, the PRC used economic assistance as a means to draw international support and recognition away from Taiwan, and towards the PRC. China’s support of state sovereignty, the realists would argue, is in keeping with the IR theory that states conduct themselves in a manner that is self-serving, and where sovereignty and security can only be ensured by power. While the international community may view trouble spots and conflicts as international crises, China has shown time and again that what the international community deem an international concern, it views as domestic, such as Tibet and Xinjiang; a view that also extends to its policies on Taiwan. The ‘one-China’ policy is an example of how China’s power is used to draw agreement from the international community. China’s active participation in persuading the states recognizing Taiwanese sovereignty to switch their recognition and support to the PRC, is an example in keeping with the realist theory that foreign policy is conducted in a way to further a state’s objectives. The very real threat of force by the PRC against any declaration of independence from the Taiwanese, in light of the American deterrent, shows again the lengths to which China will go in protecting its vital interests, as demonstrated in 1995-6 when Beijing held a series of large-scale military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Straits. While the Chinese Government has insisted that the Cross-Strait crisis was an ‘internal affair’, realists argued that China’s willingness to achieve its national goals militarily proved that the stability of the Asia-Pacific region continued to be at risk. China had sent a clear signal that ‘it now feels strong enough to play Asia’s power game by its own rules and win’ (Ross 2000: 87-123; The Economist 1996; Whiting 2001: 103-31).
2.3 Liberalism

In comparison with realism, liberalism shares the view that the international system is anarchic, and comprises rational states pursuing their own self-interests. However, unlike realists who tend to stress the importance of structural constraints in state action, liberals deny that state capabilities, or power struggles, are the primary interest which determines a state's foreign behaviour. While acknowledging the reality of anarchy, liberals object to the view that human nature is fundamentally bad and conflict among states is inevitable. Liberalism bases its view on cooperation, rather than on power and security. There is no hierarchy to international issues so state preferences may change while the interdependencies among nations increase. Accordingly, the more dependent a state is upon a greater power, for trade, aid, or protection, the more responsive it is likely to be. The behaviour of a state is also determined by its domestic concerns, such as its economy, which, according to Oneal and Russett (1999: 5), as it is ‘fearful of the domestic political consequences of losing the benefits of trade, policymakers avoid the use of force against states with which they engage in economically important trade’.

Post Cold-War international relations represent a departure from the bi-polar Cold War period, in that changes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union have allowed states the manoeuvrability to develop their foreign relations while providing an opportunity for increased state-to-state cooperation. Where neo-realism views international cooperation as 'harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power' (Baldwin 1993: 5), liberalism supports a different viewpoint by recognizing the value of cooperation. This difference leads liberals to different conclusions over states' foreign behaviour, namely, that while states may indeed be prone to disputes in the pursuit of self-interest, their governments, behind the apparent 'black box', can learn to settle disputes peacefully. The increasingly 'complex interdependence' of the modern capitalist economy makes war too costly and reduces the effectiveness of traditional military force (Keohane and Nye 1998: 83-7). In the liberal view, a state that is more interested in economic development and trade is unlikely to invade its trading partners, thereby alleviating the effects of anarchy and promoting international cooperation (Ikenberry 2000: 103-4).

Although appearing similar to realism in viewing states as the central players in international affairs, international organisations can play a variety of roles in the liberal paradigm. As Keohane and Martin (1995: 47) state:

Realism's insistence that institutions have only marginal effects
renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and logically unsound, and leaves it without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations.

Liberalism does not assume that states are either absolute sovereign actors or 'closed black boxes'. Instead, liberals believe that the qualitative change in the relationship of states under 'complex interdependence' permits the creation of international regimes, organisations and laws that facilitate cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is through this interdependence that states can seek the collective security needed to tame the struggle for power (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 236-42). In a situation supporting 'complex interdependence', the importance of transnational actors increases. There are also many communication channels such as 'epistemic communities', which are 'networks of knowledge-based experts', engaged in 'articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues of collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation' (Haas 1992: 2). This minimizes the uncertainties and misconceptions, and broadens the information networks between nations. These international organisations facilitate the creation of regimes and maintain a system of cooperation in the anarchic system. Therefore, wars and conflict are the products of bad institutions and structural arrangements such as the Cold War bipolar structure of two opposing powers locked in deadly conflict with one another. The strengthening of international institutions and the construction of an international society can eliminate such structural conditions (Kegley and Wittkoph 1997: 4). In Keohane's words, institutions are 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane 1989: 3). Therefore, international institutions or regimes can affect the behaviour of states or other international actors. In accordance with this view, liberals claim that, despite anarchy, there is cooperation on various issues such as environment, human rights and collective security.

The expansion of the European Union to include former Soviet and communist states in Eastern Europe was made possible following the end of the Cold War. Further expansions of organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU), also benefited from changes in international politics. Cooperation between states and regional bodies has also increased in order to deal with the destabilizing effects resulting
from the end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism. Issues such as climate change, poverty and trade have also necessitated an increase in cooperation, with international summits and conferences rivalling meetings of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.

Liberals view foreign aid as a set of programmatic methods intended to enhance the social, economic and political development of recipient countries (Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian 2005; Chenery and Strout 1966; Packenham 1973). They view foreign aid as a resource for the development of poor countries suffering from economic backwardness and poverty, therefore, external assistance to maintain political stability in the newly independent countries was deemed a necessity in the post-war period. In the years immediately following the Second World War, US President Truman expressed these ideas by stating that ‘[o]ne of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions, in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life that is free from coercion’ (The Truman Doctorine, cited in Grillo 2003: 50). The Marshall Plan, which was an extension of the Truman Doctrine, provided liberals with an early ideal model of foreign aid, and was believed to produce success since it ‘allowed Western European nations to achieve peace and stability’ (Watson, Gleek, and Grillo 2003: 53). The Marshall Plan encouraged European nations to work together for economic recovery after the war, which is in line with the liberal view, that foreign aid reflects the tendency of states to cooperate in addressing problems of interdependence. Growing amounts of aid channelled through international institutions during the 1970s, such as the World Bank, was viewed by many proponents of liberalism as evidence of cooperation at work in the international system. The increasing role of multilateral aid organisations became more visible with the establishment of the concessional loan window at the World Bank, which became known as the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960, and supported the ongoing roles of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), following their foundation in 1959, 1964 and 1966 respectively. In contrast to these loan-providing multilateral banks, the UN Development Programme, founded in 1965, consolidated existing UN grant programmes (Poats 1985: 65-88).

Additionally, and in line with the concepts of multilateralism, aid actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB, are all supposed to be institutions that facilitate communication between aid donors and recipients. Despite the goodwill of these institutions, the criticism of the inefficiency of aid has been raised since it underwent structural change at the end of the Cold War. Major
donors and international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, increasingly base their aid and loans on 'conditionality' of Structural Adjustment Policies which ensure that reforms and good governance are undertaken. These traditional donors turned to legal and political reform in aid recipient countries as a possible cure for poverty after their aid programmes were criticised in terms of 'failure' (Stiglitz 2002). This is generally supported by liberals with their claim on humanitarian assistance, as they would tend to believe that human potential for good governance is natural. Political will, combined with a national commitment, is needed by states and civil society organisations to root out corruption and mismanagement. Foreign aid itself originates from good will, but it has not been utilized effectively in the recipient countries. For liberals, the best way to avoid criticism is to ensure good economic and political governance which conforms to generally accepted norms of political and public behaviour (Fagelson 2004: 1-46). The concrete ideas advocated by liberalism are often taken to be representative of traditional donors, such as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), who have gradually built up approaches and norms, such as good governance, sustainable development, democracy, and respect for human rights, in addition to the ‘Washington Consensus’, which comprises a list of policy proposals approved among the Washington-based international economic organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank.

2.3.1 What does liberalism reveal about China’s foreign relations?

Whilst diversifying foreign policy concerns such as foreign aid, liberalism focuses upon the role of international regimes in promoting cooperation, and views Chinese participation in various regional and international organisations as examples of managing issues and disputes that enhance cooperation. Therefore, an analysis of China’s policy related to issues such as human rights, as well as environmental protection and peacekeeping, highlights independent variables rather than solely power-dependent factors that affect China’s foreign policy choices. By taking Choedon’s (2005: 53, 55) analysis of China’s peacekeeping as an example, decision-making on Chinese peacekeeping operations not only depends on security and strategic concerns, but is also dependent upon economic and social aspects. With respect to the impact of interdependence towards foreign policy mechanisms, Choedon (2005: 55) argues that:

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1 Liberals have been divided over the idea of self-determination and intervention; the split between (Bryanite) non-interventionists and (Wilsonian) interventionists reflected the Bryanites predominant supposition of a cooperative and stable global environment compared to the view held by Wilsonians, who believed intervention and force were necessary to achieve reformist and democratic ends (Gerstle 1994: 1046; Shimko 1992: 282).
China’s stand on UNPKO [UN Peacekeeping Operations] reveals its progressive integration in the international system and a transformation from a revolutionary state challenging the global status quo, to a more mature and active participant in international relations.

The escalating force of interdependence constrains China’s foreign policy choices, which is evident in China’s concerns about human rights. Regardless of the level of compliance with the UN human rights mechanisms, China officially proclaims its active participation in human rights discussions at the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (MFA 2004b).

In the liberal paradigm, China’s growing economic power and its increasing number of links with global markets, sufficiently temper China’s behaviour, thereby making disputes and aggressive behaviour counterproductive. Cable and Ferdinand (1994: 259) recognise this when they highlight that:

[T]he nature of current Chinese development has involved building up strong economic linkages with its neighbours through trade and investment flows [...] which would make military confrontation all the more costly.

Therefore, both China and its trading partners have common interests in maintaining stability and prosperity, and should seek to maximize their absolute gains through international cooperation (Li 2009: 34). In line with this view, Kristof (1993: 68-9) notes that China’s ‘territorial and military aspirations are reasonable’. However, the importance of a peaceful environment to Chinese economic modernization has resulted in China becoming unwilling to destabilize the existing regional and international order. As Rex Li (2009: 13) points out:

Given its multidimensional contacts with the outside world, liberals believe, China is becoming gradually involved in the global process of ‘complex interdependence’ and is restrained by its participation in international institutions and regimes.

Since the end of the Cold War, China has gravitated towards cooperative relations with its Asian neighbours. Shambaugh (2004/05: 64-99) demonstrated active Chinese participation in the regional institutions of Asia, such as the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus one (ASEAN and China), and the ASEAN plus three (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea). It has also initiated new regional regimes, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Boao Forum for Asia and China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) (ibid.: 73-4), the latter of which will be launched in 2010 (Zhu 2000). The Boao Forum has held annual meetings in China’s Hainan province since 2002, where political elites, business leaders and experts from around the region, have gathered to discuss economic cooperation in Asia (BFA). The liberal approach assumes that this economic cooperation is caused by economic interdependence in a region. In line with this insight, Kwan (1994) argues that intraregional interdependence among Asian economies is the rationale for deepening cooperation among Asian governments. In addition, ASEAN+3 is an institution that contributes to stabilization, because it includes Southeast Asian states and all three major security actors in Northeast Asia, each of which have historically engaged in military conflicts with the other two at some point. This view is also supported in Johnston’s (1998b: 1-30) data analysis, where he observed that the number of Chinese military disputes, either territorial or border, have declined, as a direct result of China’s greater involvement in the international system. This demonstrates liberalism’s argument, that increasing integration into international trade and politics affects the cooperative behaviour of a regime.

Having illustrated how and why Chinese integration with international economic organisations helps its cooperative behaviour, this discussion will focus on how proponents of liberalism view how China and the International security regime would work in a cooperative manner. Taking China’s membership in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as an example, Kent (2007: 100) comments that:

[China] has become an integral part of the CD and of the arms control and disarmament regime more generally. It has moved from narrow, instrumental policies contrary to arms control norms to accepting the norms, principles, and rules of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

The cooperation between China and the International security regime, as Robinson (1998: 193-216) argues, shows how interdependence in one sphere helps facilitate interdependence in others spheres. This view is shared by Kim (1996: 433), who observes that ‘judging by the phenomenal growth of Chinese IGO and INGO membership, positive participatory experience, and a number of
policy adjustments and shifts over such global issues as arms control and disarmament, UN peacekeeping, North-South relations, human rights (until Tiananmen), and science and technology, ‘complex global interdependence and interpenetration’ has occurred in Chinese international relations.

2.3.2 The implications of liberalism for the understanding of China’s foreign aid

In the case of China’s foreign aid policy, proponents of liberalism would divert attention away from a donor’s pursuit of power to the more beneficial side. The liberal approach allows China’s foreign aid to be viewed from a moral perspective, such as China’s involvement in disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance. China’s foreign aid to the 2004 tsunami relief effort in Southeast Asia is such an example of the liberal paradigm. The Chinese media made a point of reporting China’s contributions to the relief effort as an obligation to international society, and Chinese populations were encouraged to actively participate in aid donation to international organisations such as the Red Cross (BBC 2005; Xinhua 2004b). It is widely known to be China’s largest non-governmental donation, surpassing even those donations provided following the highest-level aid-related visits (Pan, Han, and Liu 2005: 26-7; Xinhua 2005b). Shih (1993: 243) agrees with the moral aspect of China’s foreign policy behaviour, stating that Chinese leaders like to ‘present themselves as the supreme moral rectifiers of the world order’. As such, its Third World policy is intended to be a model for emulation.

When responding to China’s foreign aid behaviour, proponents of liberalism highlight its aid contributions and integration into international aid operations, such as initiatives led by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Since 2006, this programme has also taken the lead in working with the Chinese Government to establish the China-Africa Business Council (CABC). This multilateral development assistance initiative ‘reflects China’s current approach to development cooperation’ (Chin and Frolic 2007: 18). The major aid donor countries also invited China to the G8 meeting at Heiligendamm, Germany in 2007, since China was increasingly being viewed as part of the ‘next generation of potentially’ significant aid donor countries (BBC 2007b). Liberals believe that both China and other major aid donors share common interests in maintaining stability and prosperity in aid recipient countries, and seek to maximize their absolute gains through international cooperation. The international community needs to make a greater effort to promote dialogue and collaboration with the PRC, with the ultimate aim of encouraging it to act more constructively and responsibly (Breslin 1997: 497-508).
Given the importance of international organisations as mechanisms of communication and cooperation between states, liberals point out that since the end of the Cold War, China has developed multilateral trends in its development assistance (Chin and Frolic 2007: 3). Chin and Frolic highlight that Chinese support for multi-donor-supported South-South dialogue and international research for development is beneficial to the field of development assistance. They are confident that Chinese technologies in developing countries will benefit the economic development and contribute to the improvement of the technological levels of recipients (ibid.: 9). Liberals would argue, that Chinese commitments at the 2005 Millennium Review Summit in New York demonstrate China’s contribution to international development, assistance, and cooperation. Manning (2006: 376) summarised the summit’s concluding commitments as follows:

1. The introduction of a zero tariff on key exported, China-bound, products from all thirty nine of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) that have current diplomatic relations with China.

2. The expansion of aid to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and LDCs, along with a commitment to cancelling all outstanding, pre-2005 interest-free and low-interest government loans to HIPC, which held current diplomatic relations with China, by the end of 2006.

3. A three-year time span for implementing the provision of US$10 billion, in concessional loans and preferential export buyer’s credit, to developing countries for the purpose of improving infrastructure and promoting mutual cooperation between enterprises, an increase in assistance of anti-malarial and other medications, aimed at establishing and improving medical training and facilities, in addition to the training of 30,000 personnel in various professions throughout the developing countries to assist with their human resource development.

The willingness to interlink multilateral foreign aid has required China to engage in a balancing act in its foreign aid policy between its obligations to the donor community and its own agenda of interests. Although China is not entirely supportive of the economic reform agenda or the use of policy conditionality agreed by major aid donors, proponents of liberalism are more optimistic about China working with traditional aid donors, and advocate a pragmatic Chinese
response to international criticism of its aid behaviour.

2.4 Constructivism

Constructivism regards human nature as neither being naturally prone to conflict, as advocated by realism, nor to cooperation, as proposed by liberalism, but rather remains dependent on the socially constructed identities and interests of the involved actors (Alagappa 1998: 5). The nature of international anarchy is not stable or pre-disposed but is determined by states directly. ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt 1992: 408-9), and whether it takes a Hobbesian or more benign form of culture, such as Lockean or Kantian, it is the result of how states interact, and the norms they are inclined to construct. Since there is no single state of ‘rationality’ within a regime, ideational factors such as their individual national identities, shared expectations and norms, have been attributed to the non-homogeneity of states’ behaviours (Hook et al. 2001: 42, 47; Smith 1997: 183), in contrast to the external, material factors such as power or trade as emphasized by realism and liberalism. According to the constructivist interpretation, identities are not exogenous, but are constructed through interaction with other states in historical, cultural, political and social contexts (Hopf 1998: 176; Wendt 1995: 72-3). Since identities are constructed through social practices, so consequently are the interests upon which they are based. Identities directly influence the kinds of interests or preferences with respect to the context that states find themselves in. As Wendt states: ‘[i]dentities are the basis of interests’ (Wendt 1992: 398), which led Weber (2001: 60) to show that ‘what states do depends upon what their identities and interests are, and identities and interests change’. The interest of states, therefore, cannot be simply deduced from the realist or liberal structure of anarchy, namely through the maximisation of power. Threat perception is a function of identity, and a sense of shared identity rather than the power of other states, would, therefore, decrease the perception of a threat from another state. Thus, contrary to maximization of wealth and power of interests, constructivism facilitates an understanding of interests that are in relation to where particular interests originate, and why particular interests are absent in some states. As Hopf (1998: 176) states:

By making interests a central variable, constructivism explores not only how particular interests come to be, but also why many interests do not. The tautological, and therefore also true, most common, and unsatisfying explanation is that interests are absent where there is no reason for them, where promised gains are too
By observing the explanations of the constructivist approach, it becomes apparent that constructivism does not refute realist and liberal arguments, such as rationalism and security, as explanations of the international behaviours of states (Wendt 1992: 391-2). The major dispute with rationalism from the constructivist perspective is that it assumes the identities and interests of states are evident, that states ‘acquire identities-relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self’ which shape their ‘intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests’ (Wendt 1992: 397, 401; 1999: 231). Apart from exhibiting a traditional material focus, constructivism has incorporated ideational factors such as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures into the ontological status of the international system (Krasner 1983: 2). While the ontological status focuses on identity, ideas, or norms, the relationship between structures and actors involves inter-subjective understanding and meanings. External environments do constrain states, but states can also transform these constraints by relating to them and acting upon them in new ways (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996: 41). The institution also plays an important role in the constitution of identities from the constructivist perspective. They not only support rationalist and utilitarian functions such as benefit and cost calculation, but also identities and interests as a result of mutual interregional interactions (Hook and Kearns 1999: 3).

Within this inter-subjective social context, constructivists view the behaviour of states as driven by rules of appropriate behaviour. ‘Norms therefore constitute states/agents, providing them with understandings of their interests’ (Checkel 1998: 326; 2005: 804). Accordingly, norms ‘describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996: 5). It is subsequently through internal actors and external pressures, such as bureaucratic politics, factions and business activities, that foreign policy and ideas of national interest become shaped (Hook et al. 2001: 38, 72). Norms are deliberately chosen to reflect ‘identity and culture’, and although they are difficult concepts to define, the examination of the constituent parts of identity and culture through norms is more practical (Dobson 2003: 27-9).

2.4.1 The impact of norms on foreign policy

A norm is generally defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Norms are distinct from behaviour even though they are generally associated with value judgements.
and therefore are often viewed as devices depicting standards of ‘good’ or ‘bad’
behaviour, although most norms studied by IR scholars tend to focus on those
with positive associations (Kowert and Legro 1996: 485-6). In contrast, ideas and
beliefs, which may occasionally be mistaken for norms, require neither any
distinct association with actor behaviour, nor any requirement for collective
acceptance, nor any attachment to value judgements. Norms promote the concept
of ‘correct behaviour’ in a society as they prompt justification of states’ actions.
Once institutionalized, norms, acting on the basis of established beliefs and values,
become a source of legitimacy and constrain the behaviour of states (Berger 1996:
327; Katzenstein 1996: 5). States continuously create and recreate identities and
reassess norms, and therefore reshape conceptions of their interest through the
constant testing of these identities and norms against actual events, and through
interaction with other states (Barnett 1996: 412; Berger 1996: 326; Wendt 1992:
399, 411).

Norms are dynamic concepts, and consequently should not be viewed as
static, but rather subject to forces of evolution and change. By looking at the
origins of norms and their mechanisms for exercising influence, the conditions
under which norms become dominant can be identified. Typically, before a norm
comes into being, there is no self-interest in its promotion. A variety of influences
lead to the creation of norms, which according to Finnemore and Shikkink (1998:
887-917), who examine the norms of women’s suffrage and laws of war, follow a
standard life cycle from emergence, through a tipping point to a cascade which
leads to internalisation, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

![Figure 2.1 The norm life cycle](image)

The norm life cycle

1 Author’s figure is according to Finnemore and Shikkink’s (1998: 894-905) norm life cycle.
Changes to norms at each stage of the cycle, and throughout their subsequent evolution, are influenced and characterised by different actors, who subject the norms to diverse behaviours in order to obtain influence over them. Many norms share their origins within domestic issues, then become internationalised by a process of universal acceptance outside of their domestic setting. In the first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998: 890-900) norm life cycle model, norm entrepreneurs convince a critical mass of states to take up the new norms which co-exist in balance with existing norms, and thus create a tipping point after which the second stage of norm evolution begins. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 892, 895-6) argue the dynamics of norm dissemination in their discussion of the norm life cycle. They note that at the end of the first phase of the cycle, once the tipping point has been passed, norm acceptance by other actors becomes increasingly, and rapidly, prolific. Through the process of internalisation, the norm becomes enforced, widely accepted and embedded into a state’s constitution and professional working practices, thereby making it very powerful but hard to discern. Although the phases represent the main life cycle of a norm, its ability to traverse this entire process is far from certain, as norms inter-compete for acceptance or the achievement of cascade. Once the norm has become adopted, transnational influences may become more significant than domestic pressures in the norm’s evolution and subsequent diffusion. Norm makers frequently use congruence between transnational norms and local beliefs and practices to facilitate their acceptance and implementation. The key to the successful acceptance of a transnational norm lies in its potential for localisation; a factor that plays a key role in the evolution of a norm (Acharya 2004). The process and outcome of localisation is often complex, but the key to its success lies in constructive intervention and flexible engagement. The process of localisation commonly results in the internalisation of a domestically embedded norm, such as sovereignty or developmentalism, and plays a role in the defining of domestic interests. As the influence of the norm expands domestically, it affects the nation’s interactions with the wider international community, inducing a further transition of the norm into an international norm, such as Asianism, bilateralism, multilateralism or internationalism (Hook et al. 2001: 72-5).

Two important factors play critical roles in the norm life cycle: the norm entrepreneur and the identity of the regime. Norm entrepreneurs actively construct enhanced perceptions of appropriate behaviour within their communities by raising the awareness of the norm. The entrepreneur commonly constructs a cognitive framework in order to broaden communal understanding, by contesting the importance of the new norm through challenging the logic of appropriateness.
of existing and opposing norms. The aim of this process is to invoke empathic, altruistic or ideational commitment from the community to perceive the new norm favourably. The entrepreneur acts in accordance with the redefined conception of their interest (Finnemore and Shikkink 1998: 893, 895-9).

Identity plays a role in facilitating norm localisation, since external norms often require initial adaptation to local circumstances (Acharya 2004: 241-70). This allows the norm to be viewed as strengthening a society without extinguishing its identity, as well as leading to the reinforcing of both its existing norms and its leadership by local agents who are viewed as more persuasive than external agents, without seemingly being manipulated by them. Thus, initiatives seeking to accommodate local sensitivities are more likely to succeed, in place of those that seek to supplant them. Since change depends on not only the agent but the local beliefs shaping it, localisation is viewed as progressive rather than regressive and static.

Having addressed the concepts of norms, as well as understanding their life cycle, the discussion will continue by drawing upon the constructivist view of foreign aid. For constructivists, ‘how the state’s identity is likely to shape its willingness to provide aid’ is an important question, because foreign aid policy practices are related to donors’ ideas, such as those exemplified by Thérien (2002: 449-66).

As constructivist insights suggest, the transformations of the aid regime cannot be understood outside the ideological and discursive environment in which they were engendered. In line with these insights, it is important to emphasise that the debate on development assistance has always been framed in terms of an opposition between forces of the Right and forces of the Left.

(Thérien 2002: 449)

Thérien (2002: 454) highlights that the decision about how aid is distributed is largely based upon the concept of the donor’s aid norms, as well as on its social relations with aid recipient countries. He argues that the prevailing ideas from that period arose through a combination of factors which include contributions from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in defining a vision of international cooperation in the inter-war years, as well as international initiatives taken between 1950 and 1970, that included the creation of the IDA in 1960, the establishment of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961, and the creation of the UNDP in 1965.
Other dominant discourses of the time included the development model promoted through foreign aid during the 1950-70s, which assured that economic growth would adequately compensate the social requirements of Third World populations. This development, which emphasised infrastructural improvement, used foreign aid for the construction of dams and roads, and assumed that the population would eventually all benefit from these projects (Thérien 2002: 455). Conversely, Structural Adjustment Programmes, that grew out of the protectionist and monetarist policies throughout the developed world in the 1980s, became promoted by the IMF and World Bank as an alternative model, and prerequisite for obtaining foreign aid (ibid.: 456-7).

These two examples show how the transformations of donors’ ideas change the form of aid, and reiterate Hattori’s argument that foreign aid identifies ‘a basic shift in the nature of anarchy in international relations after World War II’ (Hattori 2001: 649). Based upon Hattori’s analysis, aid practice transforms material dominance and subordination into gestures of generosity and gratitude. This transformation, in turn, signifies the material hierarchy underlying the donor-recipient relation. In this process, recipients become complicit in the existing order that enables donors to donate in the first place. He demonstrated his argument by highlighting how US and Soviet military aid in the Cold War era was a much inferior form of symbolic domination (Hattori 2001: 635-43), namely, the identity behind the manner of giving and the norms that donors believe in are the incentives for donors’ aid decisions. Norms, therefore, ‘describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996: 5).

2.4.2 What does constructivism reveal about China's foreign relations?

As the constructivist perspective focuses primarily upon issues of culture and identity, the idea of ‘who is China’ becomes an important question in clarifying both the norms of behaviour, and the source of the motivation behind China’s foreign policy. Constructivists have examined China’s identity, which influences what it considers its interests, in order to understand Chinese foreign relations (Berger 1996; Johnston 1996a). History, geography, and ethnicity have played significant roles in shaping China’s relations with the world, such as its traditional Chinese world order (see Shih 1993; Zhang 2001: 250-71). Pye (1996: 109) views China as a ‘civilization pretending to be a nation-state’, noting that Chinese political behaviour references cultural precedents. ‘These culturalist understandings often lead to essentialized views of Chinese identity and practice’ (Callahan 2004: 3). Callahan (2004: 37-8, 149-52) argues that Chinese foreign
policy has been described as closely related to its sense of insecurity, which is a result of its ‘national humiliation’, namely the shame it felt over its lost territory. Idealized versions of China’s past inspire Chinese scholars’ and policymakers’ plans for China’s foreign behaviour (Callahan 2004). Berger (2003: 387-8) illustrates Chinese willingness to challenge the US, despite undermining its own economic and security interests by exemplifying:

Neoliberal institutionists and Neorealists alike should be perturbed by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) readiness to risk a military confrontation with the United States over Taiwan despite the overwhelming preponderance of American maritime and strategic power in the Pacific and despite the damage that such a belligerent policy inflicts on China’s international image and the possibilities for international cooperation.

Additionally, China and Japan have nurtured close economic relations, despite their relatively lukewarm social and political ties (Interview 2006a; 2007i). The origins of the growing disparity of relations can be traced as far back to the height of the dynastic Chinese empire in the 16th century (Hook et al. 2001: 27-9). A more recent cause for this disparity in relations originated primarily from the invasion and division of China by foreign powers during the ‘century of shame and humiliation’, and the memories of Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanjing massacre in 1937, and subsequent events during World War II. The strength of the Chinese response to the Nanjing massacre, most notably at Taierzhuang in 1938, highlighted how deep the division in Sino-Japanese relations became historically. The Chinese are particularly sensitive to Japanese actions that may trigger painful memories, such as Japanese accounts of their actions during World War II presented in historical textbooks and the visit of senior Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine (Jiang 2002: 153; Li 2009: 139). China is aware of the relevance of how a ‘correct historical view’ is perceived about itself (Li 2009: 139). Historical aspects feature prominently in many demonstrations throughout China, such as the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, which was viewed in terms of humiliation comparable to that inflicted a century earlier at the hands of the West (Callahan 2004: 52-3, 183).

The PRC was established in a bipolar international system with ‘the sense of loss of sovereignty at the hands of the United States and other Western states [that] echoed the humiliation experienced in its earlier relations with Western powers’ (Kent 2007: 39). Within this system, China’s interest was constructed by
its victim identity, through the desire to preserve autonomy. As Kornberg and Faust (2005: 15) highlighted, ‘China would lean to one side and then to the other, and it would seek friends in the Third World, but its continual security imperative was the jealous preservation of its sovereignty.’ By defining itself on the basis of anti-imperialism, through its social interaction with other states, China was forming an identity to attain recognition from the Third World, with whom they shared common empathy. The opening up and reform of the Chinese state, introduced by Deng Xiaoping, initiated the PRC’s first major ideational transformation since its formation. Prior to Deng, China for most of the period from 1949 through 1976, was isolated internationally due to its opposition to American and Soviet hegemony. This isolated victim identity provided China with a role in seeking foreign relations with Third World countries. Beijing came to view itself as one of the leading actors of the international communist movement, and one who bore ‘a heavier responsibility for the unity of the entire socialist camp and international communist movement’ (Griffith 1964:259). As Chen Zhimin (2005: 44) notes, despite China being alienated from the international community in the 1960s, it was able to obtain ‘a sense of greater international status through its “thought centre” [leading ideological] role in world revolutionary movements’, by supporting radical anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements in the developing world.

With the PRC’s legitimate membership in the UN, China overcame its lack of ‘international legitimacy’ (Kent 2007: 63). In addition, through its ‘open-door’ policy, China actively interacted with the international community, in particular through its economic relations, and consequently, China expanded its participation in international organisations. Pearson (1999: 229) argued that the ideas of the Chinese Government play a predominant role in shaping the nature of Chinese policy changes.

This is particularly true of the original impetus for the “open” policy; in the 1970s and early 1980s, policy communities which favoured joining the global economic regimes formed within China in isolation from international forces and made the decision to pursue participation in the multilateral economic organizations (and global markets generally). The influence of outside forces came later in the process, and only after the basic decision to “open” China was made.

(ibid.: 227)
Building upon this, China’s identity underwent change from that of an isolated victim state to one of a rising great power state, despite Chinese leaders’ assertions that they would always identify with developing countries. These assertions have, since then, echoed the remnants of its vestigial victim identity. Snow (1994: 309) highlighted that China would abandon the developing world once it had repaired relations between itself and Western powers following changes in Chinese identity. This identity of a big power state reflects Johnson and Evans’ (1999: 265) view, that through China’s participation in international organisations:

[Chinese decision makers] appear to have been more sensitive to social incentives—fear of appearing to be pariah, the saboteur of processes that were highly legitimate for a large number of states in the system; and a desire to maximize a diffuse image as a responsible major player whose identity as such required participation in major institutions regulating interstate behavior.

China’s rapid increase in participation in global affairs since the 1970s has stimulated constructivists to investigate the interaction between China and the international community. As Economy (2001: 232) observed:

[N]umerous scholars have attempted to shed light on the values and priorities that China brings to the negotiating table and the nature of Chinese participation once it has joined an international regime.

Johnston (2003: 45-56) argues that within East Asia, China is progressing towards key norms of security, by manoeuvring away from revisionism in two significant respects: by avoiding domestic social and political upheaval, through increased state control, and by attempting to minimise the US/China security dilemma, through increased multilateral cooperation and reassurance. Frieman (2004) additionally argues that Chinese behaviour has adjusted, in no small part, due to international non-proliferation norms, and through links with Western organisations that promote ideas of cooperative security. The means by which this socialization occurs is typically argued to be through the accumulated effect on individual people. In the Chinese case, this would arise from ‘the development of a Chinese community of arms control experts who have burgeoning transnational links with organizations in the West that support cooperative security ideas’.
2.4.3 The implications of constructivism for the understanding of China’s foreign aid

As outlined earlier, as a result of its increasing integration and ‘legitimate recognition’ from the international system, China’s identity as a victimised and isolated state has been in decline, stimulating a transformation in Chinese identity. Following China’s admission to the UN, as the primary embodiment of Chinese integration in the international system, a move which was further underlined by its open door policy during the 1970s, it became more involved in global economic and security institutions (Johnson and Evans 1999: 235-72; Pearson 1999: 207-34; Zhou 2008: 144-5). Throughout its diplomatic exchanges with the outside world, China continued to redefine its status and identity, in order to re-position itself within the international community (Zhou 2008: 144). In so doing, ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics, the status of great power of developing countries’ became its representation of self-identity (Zhou 2008: 144; also see China 1997).

The transformation of Chinese identity, as a big power state, promoted a China that possessed a more proactive attitude, which therefore increased its ambition in participating in international foreign aid programmes. Following the redefining of its identity, China became more comfortable with its dual role as both an aid recipient of the developed world, as well as aid donor to the developing world. Since it was a great power in the developing world, China became furnished with Western capital, technology, knowledge and experience that it required to rebuild itself, while at the same time, as a senior member of the developing world, China continued to provide aid to its ‘friends and partners’ in developing nations (Zhou 2008: 144). This idea was illustrated by Deng Xiaoping at the third plenary session of the 11th Chinese Central Committee, when he clarified that the present Plenum would adamantly promote ‘relying on self-reliance and supplementing it with foreign aid’, since its isolation from the Soviet Union had isolated itself from the major global powers (Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 1982: 5). From that time, China not only began to maximise the effectiveness of foreign aid from the UN, Japan and Germany, but it also continued to provide aid to developing countries (Zhou 2008: 144, 146). In so doing, China displayed characteristics and experience of a nation with significant economic leverage, while at the same time, it showed no propensity to ‘overturn established regime norms’ (Pearson 1999: 207), such as its advocacy of the sovereignty norm, namely non-interference, which sustained its continued and
unchallenging support of countries such as Myanmar and Sudan, which will be explained in more detail in the case study chapters. By expanding its interaction with other aid donors, thereby becoming increasingly disciplined to the rigours of the global market and the desires of its own domestic actors, China continued to promote changes to its behaviour through its aid policy. Even though control of its foreign aid decision making processes remained highly centralised, the impact from interacting with global aid donors began being channelled through its own domestic perspective (Interview 2006b; 2006d, 2007d). During the 1970s, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations held five national working meetings, initially annually between 1971 and 1973, then biannually thereafter, for the purpose of discussing foreign aid under the direction of the State Council (Zhou 2008: 146). In subsequent discussions, Deng Xiaoping reiterated the central ideas of deploying less financial aid with a view to becoming highly efficient.

Internationally and domestically embedded norms exist in a state of competition with regard to foreign aid, as demonstrated by China’s own experiences as a former recipient of World Bank funds. These experiences shaped China’s principles of self-reliance in its own foreign aid to developing nations and focussed its aid policy on the stressing of long-term economic development in place of other goals such as social or political development. Such goals are consistent with Chinese foreign policy, which include principles relating foreign aid with non-intervention in developing countries’ domestic affairs, which have been applied somewhat subjectively and less frequently in recent years, and aid disbursement for military purposes. Additionally, it has immediate foreign policy concerns that involve challenges to its sovereignty, such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. As ‘China has become a born-again believer in regional multilateralism’ (Shirk 2007:118), it may seek a more prominent role in shaping international norms in future in order to demonstrate its willingness to engage in activities that will rationalise and allay suspicions towards Beijing’s motivations. China’s contribution to multilateral fund donations, such as its contribution to the World Bank’s IDA Fund in December 2007, along with its joint co-financing of collaborative arrangements through the Chinese Export-Import (EXIM) bank, demonstrate the constructivist view that through socialising with international society, norms became more internalised through localisation. As it transformed from being an aid recipient state, to something more akin to a donor, it began to recognise its interest in increased responsibility.

China is changing from a recipient nation to a donor nation in international aid. It is expected to play a bigger role in international
poverty alleviation. [......] Yao Shenhong, deputy director-general of the International Cooperation Department under the Ministry of Commerce, said that China is willing to share its experiences in poverty alleviation with other developing nations. He said that China began to offer help to other nations years ago and would make further contributions ‘in its own way’.

(People’s Daily 2007a)

Despite the changes that have transpired in China’s identity, norms, and interests throughout the distribution of its foreign aid, public opinion, in general, plays a largely insignificant role in influencing Chinese aid programmes in the constructivist paradigm. Sustained public discussion over the effectiveness of aid, or how it conforms to international norms, is extremely rare, largely due to the lack of information available on such matters, and also due to the role of central government in determining aid implementation concerns, which are addressed by high ranking political leaders and selected official researchers (Interview 2007e; 2007n). Until there are distinct improvements in aid bureaucracy, a dedicated aid agency or financial institution, or a community of aid professionals whose members belong to a larger global epistemic community that is conversant and versed in the key principles that constitute international aid norms, a significant barrier to the convergence of norms within China remains (see Haas 1992; for Central Government Management Structure China’s Foreign Aid, see Chin and Frolic 2007: 7; Zhou 2008: 156-8). Although efforts are being focussed upon the recruitment of expertise, through the organisation of conferences and the invitation of leading scholars to become more involved in this process, thereby assisting with the ongoing design of aid, the moves are still largely limited. Until such interaction occurs, the diffusion of international norms in China in practice, with regard to aid, will remain relatively elusive (Interview 2006c; 2006d; 2007l; 2007d; 2007m). Therefore, the main concern to constructivists remains the trajectory of Chinese aid and whether any convergence towards international aid norms, such as DAC standards or Chinese aid behaviour, is directly guided by the embedded norms. Constructivists are particularly interested in how China’s primary motivations for aid donation have undergone change, along with how it has sought greater alignment with the international aid norms and modal practices.

Chapter 3 continues this discussion by examining, in detail, the constituent components of these identities, and norms, in order to highlight how they have contributed to the debate on China’s foreign aid.
CHAPTER 3
NORMS AND CHINA

3.1 Introduction

As norms play a central role in analysing China’s foreign relations in this thesis, it is important to examine the literature on this subject. Although the literature on the concept of norms in studies of China’s foreign policy has continued to grow, few studies have focused upon the norms themselves, within its foreign aid policy, or upon their impact on state behaviour, despite China’s growing presence as an ‘emerging’ aid donor. The main body of literature on norms in China focuses primarily on China’s compliance with international norms in widespread and influential areas, such as human rights, the environment, and arms control. Kent (1999) studies the human rights norm in China by examining its participation and limitation through United Nations humanitarian regimes; Yu Hongyuan (2008) argues that international regimes have contributed to the development of coordination in China’s policy making within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and Frieman (2004) gives an account of China’s demonstrated compliant behaviour, by documenting China’s role in seven specific arms control regimes. In addition to the aforementioned focus on specific issues, Chan (2006) and Kent (2007) examine China’s changing international behaviour through its interaction with international organisations, by covering and comparing issues such as trade, arms control, environmental protection, and human rights to investigate how China has complied with international norms. The majority of the remaining literature, as analysed by Johnston (1996a), Hu (1999), Pearson (1999), Johnston and Evans (1999), Wang (2000) and Lampton (2001), points out China’s internalisation (learning) of international norms by examining both the extent of China’s cooperation with the international community, and the quality of its subsequent integration, through the study of the changes in the way that Chinese foreign and security policy is made. An additional perspective was provided by Wang (2004: 38), who combined the traditional IR theories and the insights of constructivism to examine the diffusion of international norms in China’s government reforms. Wang (2004: 4-40) argues that the manner by which the Chinese Government has accepted international norms varies along two dimensions: rhetoric and practice. From the discussion, Wang identifies a broad spectrum over which the
international norms of power separation, media oversight, rule by law, Central
Bank autonomy, and meritocracy in the civil service existed. These range from
norms that gained minimal recognition in the official discourse, and subsequently
received little practical implementation, at one extreme, to norms that have
enjoyed enthusiastic endorsement from the Government, which have become
institutionalized over the years, at the other extreme. The study also cites a variety
of mixed cases with varying degrees of rhetorical and practical acceptance that
were found to lie in between the two extremes.

Medeiros and Fravel (2003: 32) highlight that Chinese foreign policies are
informed by China’s growing emphasis on great-power relations (daguo guanxi). The
Chinese media cite that the image and identity of being ‘a responsible great
state’ (fuzeren de daguo) play a role in China’s foreign policy behaviour (People’s
that China’s self-image of being a responsible great power facilitated the
extension to the arms control agreement which China signed in the 1990s. Chan
(2006: 15) proposes that in accordance with the traditional Chinese Confucian
ideal of mingzheng yanshun (when names are right, speech is consequential), the
idea of dingwei (to define one’s position) therefore becomes significant in
determining one’s behaviour. The idea of dingwei which Chan cites is closely
linked to the constructivist idea of national identity, and affects how a state is
going to behave, fulfil its identity, and exercise its foreign policy. Chang
(2004: 51-2, 255-60) analyses three definitions of Chinese dingwei of ‘great power’. The
first defines China as ‘a systematic great power’ (yiji in Chinese terminology).
Under this definition, China would construct its foreign policy through
‘partnership relations’ (huoban guanxi), by placing emphasis on its ‘great power’
as a primary factor in the forging of its foreign policy priorities. The second
defines China as a ‘responsible big power’, implying that it would be more likely
to comply with international norms and order, become engaged in international
organisations and regimes, or even propose reforms. The third defines China as an
‘anti-great power’ or a ‘challenge great power’, whereby China regarded the
international order as immoral and would be inclined to oppose and challenge the
existing values and norms, which it would view as hegemonic. The observable
behaviour of China would be to the degree of the definitions, either exclusive or
inclusive, characterising its identity (ibid.: 264-8). Katzenstein, Keohane, and
Krasner (1998: 679) reflect this argument of China’s emphasising its great-power
identity, by stating that constructivists insist ‘on the primacy of inter-subjective
structures that give the material world meaning’. In so doing, China displays
‘different components that help in specifying the interests that motivate action:

It should be noted that the aforementioned works concentrate on the manner in which international norms impact upon China rather than on how norms in China shape its international behaviour. Moreover, the argument of China’s good self-image alone when used to define China’s identity as a ‘great power’ (daguo) only focuses on China’s outward-looking mentality and is restricted to a limited historical period. Norms not only enable actors, create new interests or categories of action, but also initialise dynamic concepts (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Both internationally and domestically embedded norms exert an important influence upon China’s international relations. Therefore, the evolution of these norms is central to an understanding of China’s international behaviour.

Before conducting an examination of the norms which are central to an understanding of China’s international behaviour, the choice of the particular norms used in this thesis requires justification. According to Womack (2008: 5), ‘developments in [China’s] foreign policy have occurred in four major areas since the 1990s’. These have largely affected China’s policies of non-interference, good neighbourhood, institutional involvement, and multi-polarity and cooperation. These developments have arisen through not only China’s own experiences, but also through China’s exposure to elements that were beyond its control in the international community. These considerations make the choice of both internationally and domestically embedded norms important in the investigation of the changes that have transpired. Two internationally embedded norms which China has become increasingly exposed to are Asianism and internationalism. The impact of its exposure to these norms may be seen through its institutional involvement in the regions. The influence of the change in policies that have arisen through its unavoidable exposure and response to these norms:

[R]eflects an obviously thought-through strategy of clearing the path in the rise to power - and keeping options open [displaying] a substantial willingness to erase the most abrasive asperities of their foreign policies. [......] the acceptance of those norms was aimed at defusing the unease of smaller Asian nations in face of its overbearing and bullying conduct and, as a whole, it has been successful in that respect. The changes reflect an understanding [......] of the novelty in the exercise and forms of power: setting the agenda, shaping the preferences of others, framing issues in
ways consistent with one’s own interests, worldviews and objectives is a more efficient method than intimidation, domineering and antagonization [domination and antagonism].

(Buhler 2006: 16)

Two prominent norms that reflect China’s own experiences over the past sixty years, and play an important role in foreign aid, are sovereignty, informed by its non-interference policy, and developmentalism, through the shaping of the Beijing Consensus. As a relatively new concept, the Beijing Consensus remains the subject of continued international debate, set against the backdrop of China’s fast growing economic development. This study intends to contribute positively to this ongoing discussion.

These norms will be investigated in the case studies to best evaluate how they were shaping foreign aid in a region which had long held traditional links with China, Southeast Asia, as well as in a region that had been important, and pivotal, in shaping China’s more recent history, Africa, and thirdly, in a region that China had recently expanded its presence in, Latin America. In each of the regions, internationalism will highlight how China has expanded its role in institutions across the regions and how this has shaped its propensity to behave more responsibly in the international community. Asianism, a norm that defines China’s role in Asia, will be focussed upon exclusively in Southeast Asia, to highlight how China has striven to improve cooperation, integration, and define a leadership role for itself in Asia since the end of the Cold War. The domestically embedded norms, of sovereignty and developmentalism, will highlight how China’s foreign aid has been influenced by its non-interference policy, and its own developmental model in the form of the Beijing Consensus.

3.2 Internationally embedded norms

3.2.1 Asianism

i) Definition

The norm of Asianism geographically refers to East Asia and also incorporates Southeast Asia. This geographical dimension is often referred to by Chinese leaders in announcements directed towards the membership of Asian organisations.

Premier Wen Jiabao introduced the concept of ‘harmonious East Asia’ at the ‘10+3’ - 10 members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

(China Daily 2007)

China considers Southeast Asia to be integral to the Asianist norm and believes that the countries of the region should support and demand regional cooperation and integration based upon a shared identity of their cultural legacy. ‘Asian values’, consequently, justify the Asian behaviour that characterises their interactions with external global communities (MFA 2004d; People's Daily 2005c; Saaler 2007: 2; Xinhua 2007a) by shaping the ‘set of ideas, feelings, or attitudes appropriated by Asians to promote solidarity and cooperation with “Asia”, usually against the political, economic, and cultural influence of “the West”’ (Hatsuse 2007: 226). In addition to the construction of a modern Asian identity, the Asianist norm also induces China to promote a leadership role, especially in relation to Japan (Huang 2005: 5; Xinhua 2008a).

At the Boao Forum in Hainan in 2009, ‘values’ were cited for their role in Asia’s recovery from the global economic crisis. It was highlighted how adherence to these values had prevented Asia from copying the practices of the West that had induced the crisis. According to Xinhua News (2009f), China was particularly singled out as a paragon that would lead Asia to recovery and future prosperity. Chinese president Hu Jintao stressed the importance of Asian cooperation as a path to recovery at the forum by pointing out that:

China will work with other Asian countries to seize opportunities, meet challenges and build a peaceful and open Asia of development and cooperation. [...] [We] should work together to ensure [...] dynamic growth.

(China Daily 2008)

ii) Evolution and influence

Since dynastic China was the prominent power across East Asia and prominently influenced the region of Southeast Asia, the historic manifestation of Asianism originated and emerged from the relationship China developed with the peoples of the region over the centuries (Sun 2004). This has shaped the classic historical Chinese perception of its civilisation and stature, which can be understood through an examination of its ‘tribute system’.¹ The adoption of various aspects

¹ For more information about China’s tributary system, see Fairbank and Teng (1941) and Mancall (1968).
of Chinese culture and civilization over the millennia, combined with the power, wealth and influence of the ancient dynasties, saw many of the region’s former kingdoms and empires turn to China for security, trade and recognition. Tribute was often used as a way of ensuring Chinese recognition, while allaying fears of Chinese invasion. By showing deference to the Chinese emperor, fledgling states and regional empires could diplomatically achieve security and in some cases alliances with the Chinese, thereby reducing threats from neighbours fearing a Chinese reaction to any conflict in the region. The tribute system comprised a network of interstate relations and tributary trading systems, with China occupying a central position, thereby allowing it to maintain unity in East Asia for many centuries. This Sino-centric world order permitted China’s successive rulers to draw homage, reverence and wealth from tributes paid by neighbouring states. As Western nations began to advance throughout Asia in the 18th and 19th century, the regional reaction opposing their presence, in response to the West’s perceived interference, developed into Asianism. The collapse of the Sino-centric world order at the end of the 19th century mirrored the rise of Japanese colonialism. Consequently, China developed the notion of Asianism as a Japan-centric regional order that challenged centuries-old traditions in the region. Since China viewed Asianism in terms of Japan’s expansionist activities throughout the region, which took the form of successive militaristic invasions and colonisations, the Asianist narrative became irrelevant outside of the discourse of Japanese colonial rule (Wang 2006: 7). This idea of ‘solidarity among Asian people’ derived from a diplomatic term which the Chinese Government had begun using in the early 1950s, in seeking to improve relations with the ‘people’ of Japan, as opposed to the ‘militarists’ who had led Japan on its path of destruction during the 1930s and 1940s (Hatsuse 2007: 230).

Following the formation of the PRC in 1949, and the start of the Cold War, Asia became divided into two opposing blocs, which severely restricted both economic and political cooperation in the region (Hatsuse 2007: 226). Zhou Enlai’s (1955: 62) discourse in 1955 at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung stressed China’s solidarity with Asian countries against the West by emphasising how ‘the days when the destiny of the Asian and African peoples was manipulated at will by others’ was over. Zhou (ibid.: 63) also pointed out that by:

[S]uffering from the same cause and struggling for the same aim [......] the Chinese delegation has come here to seek common ground in doing away with the sufferings and calamities under colonialism.
Despite the efforts made at Bandung to promote Asian unity, Chinese communist allegiances impeded relations with its neighbours for several years. Regional opposition to China's communist activities throughout the Western aligned countries of the region catalysed the formation of ASEAN in 1968. From the early 1970s onwards following China's admission to the UN, it began to renew its relations across the region, primarily through bilateral relations in order to counterbalance ongoing Cold War superpower activities in the region. Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, China increasingly became involved with the regional institution of ASEAN, serving initially as a dialogue partner. During the early 1990s, the concept of 'Asian values' resurfaced as economies throughout the region experienced an explosive period of growth. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 marked a key transition for the Asianist norm, and China's attitude towards regional multilateralism and financial cooperation.

The outbreak of a financial crisis [...] justified the significance of Asian value and Asian culture. [...] A well-organized and disciplined collective is able to accomplish a great deal. Facing outside invasion and colonialist domination, endeavours from a few individuals have proved to be fruitless. Solidarity of the whole people under a vigorous leadership is indispensable to attain national independence and democracy.

(MFA 2004d)

In light of the growing disagreements with the IMF-prescribed solutions to the crisis, which disregarded sovereignty norms and became increasingly 'perceived [in terms of] Western arrogance and triumphalism', the collective learning of the Chinese policy makers rationalised, through a process of cognitive dissonance, feedback effects and transnational persuasion, that beneficial regional multilateral cooperation could be effected through changes in its relational identity (Sohn 2008: 320). These ideational transitions determined the change in China's behaviour from its muted opposition to Asian financial co-operation in the 1990s, to its active support of regional financial cooperation in the early 2000s, as evidenced in the emergence of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the Chinese-Japanese-South Korean trilateral financial cooperation, and the Asian Bond Fund Initiative, despite such a fund preferentially benefiting Japan (Sohn 2008: 321). Zhong Wei, a senior government consultant on Chinese foreign financial policy claimed, 'if China actively supports the move for an Asian bond
market, the Japanese yen will dominate the proposed market and assets valued in yen will become the biggest gainers. China cannot get big direct benefits. [However,] the proposal to set up such a common market is highly valuable, and it needs the continuous efforts and close co-ordination of all participants' (China Daily 2003, quoted from Sohn 2008: 324). He Fan, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, also commented that ‘even if Japan eats the biggest portion of the cake, China should take part as the country itself can obtain benefits’ (China Daily 2003, quoted from Sohn 2008: 324). The learning of the benefits of cooperation reflects the changes that have transpired in Chinese foreign behaviour, which resulted in its long-term support for Asian financial co-operation. Therefore, China’s foreign policies are informed by Asianism through the frame of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Boao Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Six-Party Nuclear Talks, and the Asian Community Summit (Sohn 2008: 309). Through these institutions, China also promotes the formation of an East Asian community as a manifestation of Asianism, which promotes economic development as a key driving force, by disregarding certain historical Asianist stigmas, attributable to its past failings (Bergsten 2007: 1-9).

Following on from the concept of a ‘harmonious world’, Hu Jintao’s proposal of the concept of a ‘harmonious Asia’ was raised in 2006. Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Yi further conceptualised that Asianism ‘is maturing alongside China’s participation in regional cooperation mechanisms such as the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation] organization and Southeast Asian Regional Forum’ (China Daily 2007). Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out at the 10th ASEAN+3 Summit that: ‘China remains committed to East Asian cooperation and will work with other countries to promote peace and development and build an East Asia of peace, prosperity and harmony’ (MFA 2007a). Through this, the Chinese Government, informed by the Asianist norm, continues its foreign policies of ‘establishing good-neighborly relations and helping with our neighboring countries’ prosperity and peace’, in order to reinforce further the Asianist norm through multilateral cooperation (ibid.).

The norm of Asianism, can be seen to play a strengthening role in the sense of China’s ‘periphery-ism’, ‘Asia-ism’ and ‘Asia-Pacific-ism’, or regionalism, which promotes being ‘friendly to one’s neighbors and partners with them’, through implementing policies of ‘befriending, reassuring and benefiting one’s neighbors’ and strengthening regional cooperation (China Daily 2007). These moves reinforce the need for cooperation and prioritisation in relation to its aid giving, as the next empirical chapter on Southeast Asia, will illustrate (ibid.).
3.2.2 Internationalism

i) Definition

The internationalist norm specifies that responsible states should use multilateralism within the mechanisms of international institutions, such as the UN, to resolve global human issues (Goertz and Diehl 1992: 634-64; Herrmann and Shannon 2001: 621-54). Although multilateralism and internationalism may appear identical in nature, multilateralism is merely an approach to achieving internationalism. The distinction lies in a state’s devotion to international responsibility. Internationalism requires that a foreign policy goal is not only pursued multilaterally, but also responsibly, whereas multilateralism may be pursued either responsibly or irresponsibly.

Before the PRC’s admission to the UN in 1971, internationalism was traditionally regarded as an unlikely norm to engender China’s commitment to the international community. Following its admission, however, a shift in China’s attitude towards international cooperation became apparent (Kent 2007: 2). As China transformed itself from an isolated to an increasingly interdependent state, the norm of internationalism encouraged it to promote international responsibility and multilateral cooperation. Ni Feng (2004: 146) investigated this newly emerged norm, stating that ‘China is repositioning itself from a revolutionary country that rejected the existing international regime, to a responsible power within the system’. These observations were further reinforced by Wu and Lansdowne (2008: 3) who argued that the changes arose from ‘China’s recent turn to multilateralism […….] as evidenced in both its declaratory and operational policies’. At the G20 London summit in April 2009, China responded to the norm by encouraging a more regulated global financial system that was less dependent upon one country or currency in order to ensure global financial stability. Its aim was to encourage confidence in a global recovery by strengthening the coordination of macroeconomic policy, and the avoidance of protectionism. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also pointed out, by directly questioning international responsibility, that the G20 should ‘pay close attention’ to developing countries for a more multilateral international financial policy (BBC 2009d). Following the G20 summit, and in response to Hu Jintao’s outlining of the above issues, the summit leaders issued a joint statement indicating the consensus that had been reached for managing the financial and economic crisis, which included increasing funding to multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to assist countries, particularly those in the developing world, that were experiencing financial difficulties, and the strengthening of financial regulation (BBC 2009c;
ii) Evolution and influence

The internationalist norm in China is mutually constituted by its identity as a great power, and by the manner of its perceived responsibility to the world.1 Zhang Yongjin (2001: 250-71) argues that it is meaningless to debate whether China is a responsible power that is keen on promoting the status quo, or an irresponsible revisionist power, without a prior analysis of the changing identity of the Chinese state. In his view, the PRC has come a long way in transforming its national identity from a revolutionary power to a post-revolutionary developmental state through an ongoing process of revolution, war and reform. As such, China’s perceived responsibilities increase as it becomes more integrated into international society. ‘The international relations of the People’s Republic of China is a saga of the isolation-alienation-socialisation-integration of China in international society since 1949’ (Zhang 1998: 244). Following its ascension to the UN in 1971 and the start of the period of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s, ‘China’s socialisation and its integration into the society of states’ (Zhang 1998: 73) contributed to the modification of its policies in response to the proclamation of the three pillars of China’s foreign policy, namely the centrality of the UN, China’s alignment with the developing world, and its cooperation through multilateral channels. Greater economic modernisation became officially sanctioned following the normalisation of relations with the US, the abandonment of state trading monopolies, and the encouragement of foreign investment after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress.

It was at this point that its international and domestic interests converged [.....] confidence and the loosening of ideological constraints in the country at large allowed it to seek entry into more politically sensitive and strategically important [international organisations], such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the Conference on Disarmament and UN human rights bodies.

(Kent 2007: 51)

In developing its internationally responsible image, China was compelled to consolidate its efforts in four main areas. Firstly, China had to fulfil its responsibility towards improving the well being of its own population through the

1 For a wider discussion on China’s identity as a great power and its constitutive responsible behaviour, see Zhang and Austin (2001) and Kim (2003:35-75).
development of its regime. Secondly, in meeting its legal responsibilities, China had an obligation to honour its institutional commitments, as well as to take responsibility for any misconduct on its part. Thirdly, China had to regard those additional responsibilities which obligate great powers to lead the international community by example, and by adherence to orderly and coherent behaviour. Lastly, there were special responsibilities accorded to major powers with prime positions within the United Nations Security Council, which dictated the maintaining of global peace and stability (Chen 2009: 11-4). The main forces motivating China's behaviour arose through its need to show responsibility by addressing its own interests, defining its principles, acting within its capacity and managing the external expectations of the international community. By addressing its own interests, China has expanded its trade networks globally. This expansion has increased the requirement to maintain regional peace and stability along its trade routes, thereby prioritising the need for increased multilateral diplomacy and a need to maximise the common interests between itself and its neighbours or trading partners. This is reflected in the shift in multilateral alignment between China and the developed world, away from developing countries, through its ambition to enhance its responsible image. Though this appears to represent a marked departure from its past alignment with the developing world, this realignment allows it to expand market access to the developing world through its new privileged position, and highlights how China is nurturing the foundations for its long-term ambitions using multilateral channels. Wen Jiabao addressed this issue in his final statement at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in 2009 (People's Daily 2009a). Although the universal sharing of interests between diverse nations is complicated, China's promotion of the concept of a 'harmonious world' discourse obligates China to embrace more shared interests with its trading partners.

Through the defining of the principle of responsibility, China's leaders expressed the concept of peaceful development by stressing the importance of an optimum environment that was conducive to multilateral growth and development. There is a requirement within such an environment to balance both national ambitions with global visions that are acceptable to the international community. By addressing this requirement, China has become more proactive towards the norm of internationalism. This was demonstrated at the 2009 London G20 summit, when China encouraged global multilateralism, whilst refraining from being coerced into 'saving capitalism from itself'. As part of its proposed reforms for the IMF, its adherence to multilateralism is reflected in its express desire to engage in further G20 summits (Zhang 2009). At the 2009 G20 summit in London
and Pittsburgh, China’s response and contribution to the IMF recovery fund was linked to its GDP rather than its financial reserves, in a move that aimed to contribute to, and not to damage, its long-term prospects (China Daily 2009b; MFA 2009i; Zhang 2009).

As China has continued to grow, there has been an increase in external expectations and demands upon it from the international community. As the European Union (EU) and the US, since 2005, have accepted that China has become part of the international community, and as such, will become influential in shaping future global mutual ambitions, they have increasingly demanded that China conform to, and support, the existing policies of the major nations. However, China is positioned, through its multilateral links with the developing world, to promote an enhanced balance between the two worlds, by shaping a new diplomacy that is more favourable and mutually beneficial than current Western-driven standards. Furthermore, China remains aware of the West’s propensity to frame global responsibility from its own unilateral perspective (People’s Daily 2009e), and, as such, comes under regular criticism in cases of ongoing unresolved international tension, such as in Myanmar (The Washington Post 2008b).

China’s involvement in international organisations accentuated its legitimisation. By acceding to a large number of international treaties and participating in the activities of an increasing number of international organisations, especially in the areas of trade, arms control, environmental protection, and human rights, China has deepened its integration with the rest of the world. As it becomes less isolated, China faces structural problems in aligning with the international community, since the core values, institutional designs, behaviour norms, and decision-making processes, as well as the international regimes, are products of Western experiences (Liu 2004: 6). Consequently, China attempts to balance its obligation to the developed world in accordance with the policies of good governance and anti-terrorist activities alongside its obligations to the developing world through supporting issues of sovereignty and independence.

Internationalism as a norm in China’s foreign aid behaviour expressed its great-power identity in the 1990s and prompted China to build an image of being a responsible great power. This international image, as a result, became its state interest, alongside state security and economic development. As China’s stake in maintaining relationships with developed countries matured, its identification and symbolic status as the leading country of the Third World in the global political arena decreased. China’s international image became moderated through the
gradual relinquishing of its identity and position as the leading country of the Third World, and the stressing of its role as a ‘responsible big power’. As a result, aid donation became beneficial in its self-identification. Although the specific details of aid remained concealed, China would publicly announce the scale and nature of its aid plan to demonstrate its willingness to address issues, such as humanitarian aid and Debt reduction (Interview 2006h; 2006i). China has also increased its recognition of international contribution through its participation in the Millennium Review Summit, UNDP, ADB, a new multi-donor-supported South-South dialogue, and the International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC), which will be examined in detail in each of the case study chapters.

3.3 Domestically embedded norms

After reviewing two internationally embedded norms, the investigation will examine two domestically embedded norms to identify how China’s own experiences are shaping its policies.

3.3.1 Sovereignty

i) Definition

According to the classic Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm, states should not interfere in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Where conflict arises, the sovereign state should exercise the right to repel such interference in its affairs (Axtmann, 1996; 2004: 260). This exemplifies the overlap between a norm and a traditional realist national interest. From the realist viewpoint, sovereignty defines statehood and forms the postulated foundation of international anarchy, whereas constructivists view sovereignty as a norm or social construction. The extent to which these factors define this term varies; however, recent efforts, from within institutions such as the UN, to redefine sovereignty in line with human rights, stress the importance of international responsibility and moral legitimacy, thereby placing a higher priority on a state’s duty to protect its population than on its right to independence. Such transformations would supersede non-intervention on the grounds of defined criteria from within these institutions (Zhang 2008: 113-4).

Having become established in Europe in the 17th century, sovereignty became the basis upon which diplomatic relations were conducted. Territorial integrity, non-intervention, and political self-determination were the foundations upon which sovereignty was based. When the Western powers arrived in China at the time of the Qing dynasty, seeking to establish diplomatic relations between
their respective governments and the Qing leadership, in the form of embassies and trade consuls, they did so in keeping with the protocols and rules of international relations established and accepted by modern Western states since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. With the Qing refusal to participate in this system and allow the establishing of modern state-to-state relations, Qing China was unable to form alliances and treaties with states which could have aided it in safeguarding its sovereignty. As a result, Western states were not hindered diplomatically from disrespecting Qing sovereignty, leading to China’s ‘Century of Humiliation’ and the awakening of Chinese concerns over its sovereignty.

Sovereignty concerns continued following the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese Republic. As China descended into anarchy and warlordism, challenges to its sovereignty continued, with foreign powers backing competing warlords, while the Nationalist Kuomingtang (KMT) with its Western backers and the CCP backed by the Soviet Union, fought to liberate China from each other, and later on from Japanese occupation. The ensuing civil war, between the KMT and CCP, expanded concerns over sovereignty, with the CCP adopting the doctrine of anti-imperialism, arguing against the KMT’s close relations with the United States and the West. The domestic sovereignty norm embedded in the PRC became rooted in the experience leading up to the CCP’s successful defeat of the KMT. In keeping with its adherence to the sovereignty norm, China should not support, either direct or indirect, interference in the affairs of other sovereign states, and should resist such external interference.

ii) Evolution and influence

Sovereignty as a norm was manifested through the discourse of the Eight Principles of China’s Foreign Aid as outlined by Zhou Enlai in 1964, which themselves originated from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

In providing aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries and never attaches any conditions.

(Renmin Ribao 1964)

Since Mao Zedong (1991: 659) was inspired by the revolutionary doctrines of Marxism and Leninism, the norm of sovereignty was limited by such ideals distinctly, because Mao distributed aid to other countries, largely in Southeast Asia and Africa, in support of world revolution, and therefore, interfered with
countries’ domestic sovereignty. Zhang Yongjin (2008: 102) supported this idea by arguing that: ‘China’s understanding and practices of sovereignty statehood have been either incomplete, selective, instrumental or even contradictory’. The sovereignty norm affecting China’s behaviour during the 1950s and 1960s was a result of its experience of colonialism and foreign interference. Along with the Soviet Union, it regarded its support of liberation movements and their struggle for independence, during the period of decolonization, as legitimate, since China was not interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states, as these states were ruled by illegitimate imperial foreign powers. Once these states had achieved independence and established sovereign rule, China no longer felt it was legitimate to continue its involvement, and by the 1970s, it began to complain about the interference of the superpowers in the affairs of these newly independent states. This can be seen during the period between the 1950s and 1970s when China remained absent from revolutions taking place in Latin America, where countries had become independent much earlier.

By the time of the reform period in the late 1970s, China’s view of sovereignty, reiterated Zhou Enlai’s original principles, as highlighted by Deng Xiaoping’s clarification:

> We should respect other parties and peoples in their search for solutions to their own issues. We object to others imposing their own orders, and we should refrain from giving orders to others. This is an important principle.  

*(People’s Daily 1980)*

Shortly afterwards, in 1980, the sovereignty norm was further addressed at the twelfth Party Congress:

> In [China’s] exchanges and communications with foreign political parties, the CPC [Communist Party of China] observes the four basic principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, of which the principle of independence is the basis for establishing a new type of party-to-party relations.  

*(IDCPC 2003)*

In the practice of China’s foreign aid, adherence to these principles has remained largely subjective. The process of aid negotiation in China commonly transpires
during the state visit to Beijing of high officials from the prospective recipient country, or during reciprocal visits by Chinese officials (Interview 2006h; 2006i). China emphasises that its foreign aid donation differs significantly from that of other major donors, in that it does not attach any political agenda upon its receipt, with the exception of the recipient’s choice of recognising Taiwan as a sovereign state. While it may be argued that this interferes with the foreign policy of the recipient country, China justifies this stance in terms of conforming to its own domestic sovereignty. Before China entered the UN, it viewed international recognition as key to it becoming a legitimate state. After replacing Taiwan at the UN, as the officially recognised international state of Chinese culture, its implementation of the ‘one-China’ policy was constructed to strengthen this legitimacy, by further undermining Taiwan’s international status. In order to legitimise its seat at the United Nations, the PRC offered aid in return for diplomatic support from member states. Africa has been at the forefront of a long-standing conflict between PRC and ROC over diplomatic recognition. Most of the countries that Taiwan and China competed for were poor, less developed, and heavily in debt. This competition for recognition prompted enhanced aid and financial offerings by one side, in order to compensate for the influence of the other. Hertz (2004: 35) commented upon the competition between China and Taiwan by stating that:

The Chinese and Taiwanese, for example, continue to mirror the bipolar world of the cold war by competing for diplomatic recognition in Africa and the Pacific on the basis of which can give the most aid, with their ‘clients’ playing them off against each other as effectively as ever.

China stresses its ‘one-China’ policy under which trade and investment agreements will be ratified, so long as the recipients agree to support this view. China has not only used the promise of trade, aid, investment, and other benefits to persuade states to renounce their recognition of Taiwan, but also exercised its veto against the sending of UN peacekeeping troops to countries which had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, such as Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 1999 (Xinhua 2005c). The only exception to this behaviour to date has been seen through China’s involvement in UNPKO in Haiti; a nation that continues to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

China, through a combination of its own territorial disputes, the effect of Western sanctions following the Tiananmen incident, and differing pressures from
external sources to censure its own domestic affairs, has reiterated the issue of non-interference in domestic affairs. This demonstrates its concern that other nations should not use foreign aid issues as a pretext for influence and interference. China criticised Western countries and international organisations for applying their values to developing countries, including itself, on issues such as human rights. Lantos et al. (2007: 5) address China’s concern with sovereignty by stating:

It is common to attribute Beijing’s actions in Sudan to China’s [...] economic self-interests [...]. This view, in our opinion, is overstated, lacks precision about Chinese motivations, and fails to explain why there was a shift in late 2006 to positions more closely aligned with the United States and other concerned Western powers. Sudan’s contributions to China’s total energy needs are very small [...]. While the relationship with Sudan is important on a microeconomic level [...] it does not represent a critical strategic relationship on a macroeconomic scale [...]. An important, but often overlooked motivation is Beijing’s concern with protecting the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference [which] have been cast as bedrock to China’s strategy for becoming a global power backed by robust alliances.

The sovereignty norm also provides China with the rationale to defend its developmental agenda choices and that of aid recipient countries, by condemning Western countries’ tied aid policies, which will be discussed in the following section. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi pointed out at a United Nations Conference that during the current world financial and economic crisis:

Developed countries should implement the Monterrey Consensus, fulfil the commitment of using 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) as official development assistance and act further to reduce and cancel the debt of developing countries. [......] provide on a priority basis financing support to developing countries with no harsh conditions attached, and use its new resources mainly to assist developing countries.

(MFA 2009e)

China’s opening up to the international community has increasingly exposed it to
the effects of globalisation. This has progressively transformed it as it sought to capitalise on the opportunities that were presented in its accommodation of a global market economy. Due to this transformation, China has had to rethink its stance on sovereignty at a time when the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm is also undergoing a shift towards greater adherence to human rights (Zhang 2008: 101-10). Over the past decade, questions have arisen regarding the dynamism of the sovereignty norm, as China’s ‘position on sovereignty is not what it used to be’ (Carlson 2005: 2). As the global sovereignty norm has evolved, in response to ‘external pressures (both material and normative)’, China is therefore ‘changing [the] relationship between relatively persistent and historically conditioned sovereign centric values’ (Carlson 2005: 3), Zhang Yongjin (2008: 102) points out that:

These variations in China’s understanding and practices of sovereignty have been heavily informed by China’s historical transformation from a universal empire to a civilisational state, and its contemporary metamorphosis from a revolutionary power to a globalised state. Contemporary Chinese discourse of sovereignty demonstrates […] that China has become increasingly ambivalent towards the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty.

Carlson (2005: 11-20) classifies sovereignty into four distinct categories: territorial, jurisdictional, sovereign authority and economic. Zhang (2008: 110-5) illustrated that the changes within these main categories highlighted the manner by which the sovereignty norm was being transformed, and is reflected in China’s embracing of globalisation, its contesting of sovereign practices, and its problematizing of sovereignty.

China’s economic sovereignty and status has become eroded gradually by its pursuit of globalisation, as its traditional values and state identity confront major intellectual and political challenges. The traditional concepts of sovereignty are becoming contested, and the norms reconstituted, as a result of two pillars of China’s economic success; global capital investment in China and trade growth. The transformation of the norm, along with its economic success, both renews, and encourages, the redefining of the moral purpose of China’s governing elite, despite exposing China’s development to economic vulnerabilities (Zhang 2008: 110-2).

As the effects of globalisation have become more pronounced, state sovereignty has continued to be undermined as global economic institutions and
multinational companies have redefined the boundaries of the traditional concepts of domestic and international. China has negotiated this transformation surprisingly well, largely by abandoning its strict adherence to the ideals of economic sovereignty, thereby allowing it to converge with international practices without apparently weakening its stance on sovereignty. The concessions that China made to gain admission to the WTO showed the extent to which the Chinese policy makers were prepared to bend their traditional economic sovereignty in order to do so (Zhang 2008: 113-5). A further reason for China’s embracing of the WTO in favour of protecting its revisionist developing world agenda is China’s realisation of how it can use the coalition channels of the WTO to gain access to developing world markets, as seen by its alignment with the agricultural policies of the US. However, on issues related to textiles, it has remained somewhat reticent in light of US protectionism, despite its strong links with the developing world (Pearson 2006: 242-75). Despite these economic changes, the normative changes remain shallow, as seen by its unrelenting current adherence to territorial sovereignty.

With regard to sovereign authority and jurisdictonal sovereignty, the overall increased global exposure to non-traditional security threats, which include a wide range of issues such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), climate issues, terrorism, epidemics, transnational crime and multilateral policing through peacekeeping operations (PKO), has shaped international society and humanity in general, and in doing so, has induced shifts in China’s policies towards more humanitarian interaction, thereby softening its stance on non-interference (see Chen 2009: 157-73). China’s contribution to international peacekeeping was a ‘responsibility that China should shoulder as a major power’ (Interview 2007f; 2007k), and as such, implies China’s great-power identity (Asia Times 2007). This is further revealed through China’s uptake of multilateralism in global policies due to the shift in its understanding of the sovereignty norm (Zhang 2008: 113). China’s shift towards increased multilateralism, and protective intervention of human rights, comes at a time when the US is increasingly stressing the limits of sovereignty. Kim (2006: 277-9) argues that the weakening of these international boundaries has had the effect of sensitising the Chinese governing political body to domestically driven concerns that are in the national and international interest.

State sovereignty has shifted in recent years, as globalisation has transformed the sovereignty norm, such that the state serves its people. This has arisen through an increasing need and obligation for international intervention, based upon legitimate and universal principles in cases where states fail in their
responsibility to protect their populations.

China has become increasingly aligned with human rights, as this issue has become significantly more politically and economically desirable and legitimate. Two distinct features of the Chinese human rights policy have become more apparent since the 1990s; a distinct emphasis on development and subsistence, and an emphasis on non-interference and sovereignty. Jiang Zemin addressed these points in his speech at Harvard University:

Today, in finding a road to development suited to us, we will proceed from our own national conditions to address the issue of how to conduct economic construction and political and cultural advancement without blindly copying other countries' models. In handling international affairs, we decide our positions and policies from an independent approach. The Chinese people cherish [their] friendship and cooperation with other countries, as well as their right to independence they have won through protracted struggles. (China Informed 1997)

This evolution of the sovereignty norm raises pertinent dilemmas over whether there should be institutions to encourage states to engage in intervention during times of international crisis or to restrain them. Although both solutions set dangerous precedents, charters should at least address sub-clauses pertaining to 'common interest' (The Economist 1999). The determination of such 'common interests' should address; firstly, the use of intervention by internationally accepted means, other than force, such as PKO; secondly, the redefining of national interests into collective interests; thirdly, that decisive action must be taken when needed in defence of common humanity; and finally, that the commitment to the ensuing peace must be as firm and consistent as the commitment to wage war. These changes arise as global communities are becoming increasingly determined and willing to confront and challenge issues of contention rather than tolerate them, thereby further evolving sovereignty (The Economist 1999).

As argued above, China's approach to the evolving sovereignty norm demonstrates that:

China, by utilizing the rhetoric of nonintervention and protecting sovereignty, appeared to simply be saying "no" to humanitarian intervention and multilateral peacekeeping. Nonetheless, this
conclusion has not been supported by a comprehensive empirical investigation into the main characteristics of the Chinese approach to sovereignty and intervention during the 1990s.

(Carlson 2006: 217)

Moreover, as China has become focussed on its developmentalist policies since the 1990s, it has seen that development and human rights were sequentially linked (Sullivan 1998: 132). The shift towards human rights demonstrates that social learning has shifted sovereignty to the conditionality of responsibility to its population on humanitarian grounds. This is inducing a rise in individualism, as international society is reconstituting China’s moral purpose (Zhang 2008: 114-5).

The influence of the traditional sovereignty norm on China has weakened with its return to the international community, by affecting its attitude towards non-interference in its aid policy. As the sovereignty norm evolved, China modified its policy of non-interference. In doing so, it negotiated with the opposition parties in Zimbabwe and Sudan, pushed for the acceptance of UN forces in the Sudan, provided a forum for discussing the nuclear issues in North Korea, and addressed similar issues in Iran. Most notably, it applied subtle and implicit pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar. While its recent notable involvement in United Nations peacekeeping activities in global conflict zones contributes to international intervention in other states, China still places importance on its sovereignty in its own domestic affairs, by repeatedly stressing the relative importance of economic, cultural, and solidarity rights over civil and political rights, as well as the Taiwan issue and human rights.

3.3.2 Developmentalism

i) Definition

The developmentalist norm specifies the manner by which the pursuit of an optimum path that a nation should take in its development is controlled in political, economic and social terms. The Beijing Consensus frames the current developmentalist norm in terms of China’s own developmental success and experience (see Ramo 2004, Interview 2006d; 2006g; 2007m). The Consensus is not presented in terms of unrestrained development as much as a firmly controlled guided path to growth, which allows access to the international community via paths that protect the life and political choices of the developing world (People’s Daily 2005a).

With regard to the emergence of a country into the international
community, developmentalism balances the paths between national development and globalisation in the modern world. National development maintains a commitment to autonomy and sovereignty, whereas globalisation gradually erodes this in favour of universalism (Dirlik 2003: 241-2). The key to achieving balance between these two opposing paths lies in stressing the central importance of local mechanisms for development within the global framework. Western approaches to development established a precedent for success which it has sought to prescribe to the rest of the world, however, this precedent was shaped largely by colonialism and imperialism; ideologies that China has displayed an historic aversion towards (Perdue 2003: 8). The Western approaches advocate growth through economic, political, and social openness. As such, its economies are founded upon trade in competitive global markets. This approach ensures that the economies remain sustainable and continue to grow. Such markets are dominated by the highly developed, and mostly Western countries, who pursued this path to development in the post World War II years. Conversely, for developing countries, entry into such development paths and markets, in more recent times, is considered difficult because of the significant barriers to entry. These approaches to development were viewed as stifling to both political and economic development in the Third World, and the Western view of globalisation is viewed largely in terms of the legacy of colonialism and imperialism (Dirlik 2003: 243-4). China, by contrast, has followed a development path that has achieved a level of economic success that is appealing to developing nations seeking successful models to emulate (Ramo 2004; Beeson 2009:5-39). This pathway entails development along a path which remains localised to the developing country, and relatively free from the competitive forces of Western dominated markets, until such time as the localised economy has grown in strength.

Table 3.1 demonstrates three different development paths, in political, economic and social terms, and shows how the examples of Marxist, liberal and authoritarian development relate to the global economy. The table shows a traditional Western development path, as well as China's development paths from the early days of the PRC under Marxist communism, and its modern path, manifested by the Beijing Consensus.
Table 3.1 Comparison of developmental paths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Development under Marxism</th>
<th>Development under the Washington Consensus</th>
<th>Development under the Beijing Consensus</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Totalitarian control</td>
<td>Democratic control</td>
<td>Authoritarian control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Human rights</td>
<td>Heavily restricted</td>
<td>Reformed at same rate as economy</td>
<td>Relegated to late stage development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>State planned and controlled</td>
<td>Market regulated (Promotes attainment of key prescriptions of good governance and privatisation, to facilitate equal access to free markets.)</td>
<td>Government controlled (Economic development is pursued in preference to political or social development.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with free market</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Pragmatically subjective/ideologically polarised (Ideologically polarised towards South-South cooperation, whilst more pragmatic in reality, as seen in the apolitical nature of economic relations with Western oriented countries, such as US, EU, Japan, Korea, Taiwan.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples and explanation of success/failure of respective pathways</td>
<td>Success: Cuba(^1) Failure: North Korea(^2) The collapse of the Soviet bloc at the end of Cold War rendered this pathway largely unsustainable, as success was only achievable through united efforts, failure demonstrated by individual nations’ pursuance of policy.</td>
<td>Success: Botswana(^3) Failure: Rwanda(^4) Cited reasons for failure indicate too great an adherence to privatisation, at the expense of public sector. This became undermined by a lack of resources, due to inefficient good governance. The subsequent blame was apportioned to inherent corruption, though it was equally due to inefficiencies in effective deployment channels.</td>
<td>Successful: China Failure: Not yet(^5) Authoritarian control potentially restricts possibility for onset of political reform as ruling body extends its hold on power, thereby preventing efficient growth.(^6)</td>
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\(^1\) Cuba’s Marxist developmental path and its concentration on meeting the basic needs of its population has enabled it to become a regional leader in medicine and healthcare, despite the US trade embargo, and has seen its participation in medical aid programmes and exchanges across Latin America (see Kirk and Erisman 2009).  
\(^2\) The DPRKs ideologically driven developmental model based on self-sufficiency and closed markets, led to the collapse of the state’s economy, and is an obstacle to economic reform. (For more about the DPRK’s developmental path, see Ahrens 2003: 53-73.)  
\(^3\) Botswana’s adherence to the democratic model has allowed the state to maintain a stable democracy with an open market and a standard of living equal to that of Mexico, and is arguably the best example of successful economic development in Africa (see The Economist 2009).  
\(^4\) Economic troubles resulting from debt and Structural Adjustment Policies are often noted as a contributing factor behind the Rwandan genocide (see Chossudovsky 2003: 103-24).  
\(^5\) The Beijing Consensus remains only a possible alternative to the Washington Consensus at present, as China continues to be the testing ground of an alternative development model which has yet to be adopted by another developing country.  
\(^6\) As what constitutes the Beijing Consensus is still under debate, and due to the vagueness of its precise definition, along with its promotion of self-reliance, the precise attributing of this pathway to a country in terms of either success or failure is difficult. By its very nature, the countries are encouraged to follow the example of self-reliance set by China, whilst retaining their local identity. Consequently, the following examples only demonstrate the success or failure of countries which have followed self-reliant development paths, whilst retaining their identity through (semi-) authoritarian control.
ii) Evolution and influence

As China began to develop relatively recently, its leaders have continued, since the reform period began in 1978, to perceive significant threats to its growth. These threats have arisen due to three distinct factors (Beeson 2009:5-39). Firstly, as China is a large developing country, the management of its development has remained problematic. Major issues have arisen over local and national interests, the wide scale supply of resources, and the balancing of local and central relations. Secondly, by developing late, China has entered an increasingly competitive global market alongside more dominant players, such as Japan and the United States. This led it to make use of its large and cheap work force, along with its growing domestic market, to initiate a political economy that is attractive to foreign investment. Thirdly, as the PRC remained a command economy until 1978, the legacies of CCP authoritarian rule needed to be managed effectively throughout the creation of China’s increasingly competitive and industrialised base. This required the exercising of increased levels of ‘flexible authoritarianism’ in managing its transition towards a market economy (Cabestan 2004).

The developmentalist norm evolved through two distinct phases. The initial phase transpired during its early reform years, at a time when China’s image was informed by its newly established neutral identity. During this period, as the PRC had minimal experience of development in modern economic terms, its reform interests were shaped by its potential rather than actual experience. Deng Xiaoping epitomized the developmentalist norm entrepreneur, as a pathfinder and paragon of China’s future prosperity, by adopting the Reform and Open policy, promoting China’s economic development while preserving its political stability. This explains why it needed to exercise prudence and control over reforms, by initiating them in areas such as agriculture, as it had substantial experience and knowledge of this field. By achieving success in such areas, it could demonstrate the self-reliance and competence that it needed to further its reforms. As success in agricultural reforms became apparent, further reforms increasingly expanded into foreign trade and investment, and then into industry. These began to feedback positively into China’s identity and image of a great power as the developmentalist norm raised China’s self-esteem. As reform within the new regime was built upon the legacies of the older system, state regulation remained paramount amid concerns over sustaining successful development, and as such social indicators of health, education and poverty were designated of higher significance than liberalisation. In addition, since China had no significant debt issues impeding its progression toward economic development, the IMF and World Bank held little sway over the restrictions of state control over
development, allowing the success of the reforms to be displayed and controlled in terms favourable to the CCP (Singh 2002). By 1979, the CCP continued their experimental reform by establishing regional special economic zones (SEZs) within China so model economic reforms could be further tested and managed in a controlled environment, before implementing policies further afield (People’s Daily 2002). Another critical factor that proved pivotal in developing economic wealth and transfer of control in these zones was the origin of its FDI. As more SEZs were created, during the 1980s and early 1990s, approximately three quarters of China’s FDI was derived from sources local to China, such as Hong Kong or Taiwan, rather than from overseas conglomerates, and these investments were subsequently rewarded with additional beneficial economic conditions to enhance their productivity. Such practices, though, resulted in claims of round-tripping of investments to channel funds into the SEZs to enhance their profitability. The success of these zones has contributed to the establishment of regions of immense wealth in Eastern and Southern China which have impacted positively on China’s self-esteem and encouraged it to pursue its great-power status. This has also created significant wealth imbalances, leaving central and western regions more marginalized, which is problematic for China’s social security services (Singh 2002).

The subsequent and most recent phase of the developmentalist norm evolution began in the early to mid-1990s, as it actively sought to manage its transition into globalisation (The Economist 1999). This second phase occurred at a time when its self-esteem had benefited from the success of its initial reforms, and although its self-confidence had grown, China still remained cautious about controlling its future success. The domestically embedded developmentalist norm therefore is responsible for transforming a revolutionary China into a developmentalist state with its attendant focus on order and security. The fall out from the Tiananmen incident, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, raised its awareness of the fragility of its position and catalysed a major transition in China. This resulted in the CCP addressing key policies which they considered essential in the maintaining of control during its economic reform. One key policy change was to distance the party from the growing entrepreneurial element in society, whom, they believed, were pushing for more capitalist reforms (Dickson 2008: 2, 10-9). Though this practice was increasingly exercised in the early 1990s, it became diminished by the start of the 21st century.

Another timely reminder of the challenge confronting China arose at the end of the Cold War, through the successive emergence of new East European countries onto the world scene. China followed their development exposure to the
Western prescriptions of the Washington Consensus with interest. This development, in numerous cases, resulted in the complete, and somewhat catastrophic, removal, and replacement, of long-term infrastructures (People’s Daily 2005a). Fearful of following a similar path at a time when US unilateralism was increasing, and upon the advice of former leader Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Government implemented a series of further controlled reforms, implemented initially within strict testing grounds, which paved the way towards a market economy. By implementing a series of changes that took the form of liberal economic moves, state enterprises, which had been the cornerstones of communist development, were gradually dismantled and the housing sector underwent privatisation (The Economist 1999).

While economic reform had brought many new challenges for China, it had responded to these changes by exercising prudence and control over its national interests. By the late 1990s, China was beginning to heed the critical lessons of expanding globalisation that were becoming apparent, notably in Indonesia, where ineffective management of reform had led to catastrophic political damage being inflicted (Lanteigne 2008: 170). China also witnessed significant failings throughout the developing world, largely in nations that had been subjected to the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus (see Doner et al. 2005; Gore 2000: 789-804). Several key international events, the bombing in Belgrade of the Chinese embassy and the Hainan spy plane incident, contributed to growing nationalism in China and made the CCP increasingly wary of the relative compatibilities of globalisation and its national interests (Lanteigne 2008: 170). China’s adherence to the developmentalist norm, which was being influenced by its concerns of achieving visible developmental success, demonstrated to varying degrees the ongoing anxieties that had existed during the 1990s regarding perceived threats to its economic development, its increasing need for foreign exchange, and its need for retaining constraints on its budgets (Lanteigne 2008: 170, 173). This induced the CCP’s pursuit of ‘pragmatic nationalism’, which resulted in the formulation of two key policies, the ‘three represents’ and the ‘go out’ policy, the latter of which was formulated from Jiang Zemin’s ‘three closeness’ theory (MFA 2002e). As success in these policies required extensive entrepreneurial expertise, the formulation of these policies was closely followed by the CCP sanctioning greater entrepreneurial involvement in its development programmes in a notable reversal of its policy from the late 1980s (Lanteigne 2008: 168; Zhao 2005: 131-44). Though increased entrepreneurial involvement may have resulted in the acceleration of capitalist reforms, China’s development shared several key aspects with Asian development, which was
modelled largely on Japan’s ‘flying geese’ model of development, through its
top-down control which prioritised economic growth and its detachment from the
embracing of liberal markets. This allowed the CCP greater protection of its
policies and emergence into globalisation, which could further the image of the
CCP as a successful leading body.

The expression the Beijing Consensus was proposed by Joshua Cooper
Ramo in 2004, when he stated that China, which ‘most pointedly’ ignored the
World Bank- and IMF-championed Washington Consensus, ‘now [has] records
that speak for [itself]’. The Beijing Consensus expressed the scepticism felt in the
developing world, regarding the benefits of privatization and free trade. Ramo
(2004) argued that other nations could, and should, be able to fit into the global
system ‘in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of
life’, although he was unclear about the precise nature of this platitude. It remains
to be seen if Beijing’s top-down model will work outside of a semi-authoritarian
China, or if the Chinese economy can continue to remain exclusively prosperous.
The consensus best exemplified China’s controlled emergence into the
glocalisation and grobalisation that was transpiring between China and the
international community. Glocalisation indicates the control of globalisation at a
local level, while grobalisation highlights how other developing countries are
turning to China’s model of apparent success to shape their own models of
development after years of Western policies shaped by the Washington Consensus
(Lanteigne 2008: 176).

Having outlined the Beijing Consensus, the discussion will continue by
reviewing how the consensus is presented by China, in addition to how it is
viewed by the international community. The discussion will conclude by outlining
those features of the consensus which may be studied to evaluate its
implementation in developing regions.

**iii) How China presents the Beijing Consensus**

Having been a developing country itself, China holds a view of development that
differs significantly from more traditional aid donors, which traditionally
followed development agendas akin to the prescriptions of the Washington
Consensus. As such, China promotes the Beijing Consensus as an alternative
development model. The Chinese view of development stresses that there are no
universal paths or defined prescriptions to development (Ramo 2004: 7-10). In
order to develop as a country, and emerge into the international system,
development has to be closely controlled and tested in a model environment,
where it can be nurtured and refined in gradual stages such that its environment
remains stable and free from competitive forces until it is sufficiently mature enough to enter the system, both effectively and competently. Shih (1993: 44-5) reflects this by highlighting that China’s Third World policy is intended as a model for emulation.

By presenting an alternative path to development through the Beijing Consensus, China has been able to style itself as leader of the global South and champion of a progressive international order, further underlining the identity of China as a great power. China’s belief in this developmentalist policy encourages its aid donation to nurture developing world markets, upon which future trade relations can be founded. In order to accelerate the beneficial aspects of development, China promotes the use of innovation, and indirect cost-effective solutions, in achieving developmental goals. This allows traditional targets of development to be achieved not only through non-traditional, and less costly approaches, but also without having to adhere to the traditional donor’s specific development criteria. China also holds a firm belief in the overall positive benefit of development. It believes that development is comprised of both positive and negative aspects, termed ‘green or clean GDP growth’ and ‘black GDP growth’ respectively, by traditional aid donors. In China’s view, if the ‘clean GDP growth’ exceeds the ‘black GDP growth’, then the long-term prospects for development are beneficial, and the ‘black GDP growth’ can be regarded as transient (Ramo 2004: 12, 22-23). Coupled with this is its belief that short-term policy failures in reaching goals constitute an acceptable part of overall long-term developmental success. The ‘go out’ policy has its origins in Hu Jintao’s ‘Three Closeness’ (san ge tiejin) theory, which was formulated from a refinement of Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’ (san ge daibiao). This theory postulated that the development path should be close to the people, reality, and life, in order to address the fundamental issues of the specific case of development (SAIS 2006). The ‘three closeness’ theory also reflects China’s strong belief in the importance of culture and localisation in development (Ramo 2004: 31), where developmental schemes are moulded by the local cultures so they adapt to their environment beneficially.

The Beijing Consensus has become reinforced by the identities that were inherent in China during its own development. In the initial process of development, China was displaying an image of competent self-reliance. However, as the success of its reforms grew, this increasingly reflected through the exercising of the developmentalist norm, an image of competent economic professionalism which echoed Deng’s early epitomisation of the developmentalist norm entrepreneur, by demonstrating reproducible success according to a strictly formulated path. Such success on its own terms fuelled its self-esteem and fed
back into its great-power identity. Wang Bo and Liz Padmore highlighted these ambitions in the preface to a book by Zhang Yongjin (2005: VI) when they pointed out that:

China’s recent transformation from ‘isolated’ to ‘globalised’ has been a reflection of the Chinese government’s desire to maintain sustainable long-term economic prosperity, which it believes can only be achieved through full integration into the global economy. While this further transition into the international fold has begun to reshape the internal priorities and commitments of the Chinese government, China in turn has begun to redefine the world economic order of which it seeks to become a part.

The ‘go out’ policy is producing a new generation of entrepreneurs who aspire to match and extend this success in the name of national, and self-interests, therefore, the promotion of this image to the developing world is fuelling mutual aspirations and ambitions. As the Beijing Consensus is still evolving, China is exercising prudence through its non-interference policy, by offsetting potential resentment and discontent that might arise through similar policy failings in the developing world, which fuelled the rejection of the Washington Consensus in the late twentieth century. The success or failure of policies is framed in terms of the self-reliance of the individual nations.

iv) How the world perceives the Beijing Consensus

Ramo (2004) defined the Beijing Consensus as essentially the use of constant innovation and experimentation, through the refining of effective policies, the use of different means of measuring success including sustainability and equality, as well as self-determination. The development path advocated by the Beijing Consensus has met with a wide range of perceptions worldwide (Dirlik 2006). The vagueness of what, in essence, is not a consensus as such, as no firm definition exists on what it precisely constituted, is more of an attitude that China has been able to apply to itself through harsh control and wide exploitation of its readily abundant mass population; as such, it will be hard to replicate elsewhere. Criticism has also been levelled at the sustainability and equality aspects of the Consensus, as the apparent wealth gap that has arisen in China attests to gross inequality.

Conversely, strong government promotion of economic growth, along with firm government control, makes this model appealing to developing countries
who have grown tired of the destructive prescriptions of Western-imposed models. Though this initially raised fears that some governments embracing this development path would fail to relinquish power over their own subsequent successful nations (China 2008), many have commonly not displayed such behaviour, and more importantly, countries that have displayed such behaviour, such as Myanmar and Zimbabwe, have exhibited little or no interest in actively developing their countries.

As the Beijing Consensus is more of an attitude and consequently more diffuse, its speculative application to the developing world seems enticing to maintaining the status quo and redressing the damage inflicted by the Washington Consensus.¹ By focussing upon developing countries’ key industries, such as agriculture, China is increasing the strongly-shared sense of South-South cooperation and non-Western union, which in turn, has enhanced mutual understanding. This is consequently being viewed, notably in Africa, as an historic opportunity to break from the neo-colonial ties to the West (Lammers 2007: 16-8). The possibility of following China’s example of raising a substantial proportion of its population out of poverty within two decades, without externally-enforced Structural Adjustment Programmes, has bolstered African countries’ optimism that they too can devise their own development path, and that the Western model was inherently flawed. According to Lammers (2007: 16-8), early signs of the success of the Beijing Consensus became apparent in Africa in 2004. The provision of Chinese developmental aid had, by that time, created in excess of 15,000 new African graduates from Chinese universities alone. The return of these graduates to their homelands has fuelled a serendipitous ‘brain gain’, thereby reinforcing China’s image and the developmentalist norm (Lammers 2007: 16-8). A further consideration that often impedes localisation arises from extensive external influences which direct development according to the subjective self-interests of traditional aid donors. In order to minimise this

¹ The Washington Consensus was a 10 point prescriptive plan formulated by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the late 1980s, which used a neo-liberal shock solution to stimulate development in developing countries. The consensus prescribed the implementation of key economic infrastructural components deemed necessary to support a growing economy. The main reasons for its ‘failure’, though, arose from its one size fits all approach to development and failure to appreciate the differential local settings existent in the developing world due to poor infrastructure and high unemployment. Such failings were attributed more to local inherent corruption and squandering of resources than to any part played by Washington in framing the plan in local contexts (Perdue 2003). The main reasons behind the policies of these key paths to development have been outlined in Perdue’s paper on western development. The West’s policies are shaped in terms of orientalism, scientism, evolutionism and territorial essentialism which led many western countries to a messianic belief in countries aspiring to be more Western, and which failed to recognise that successful cultures existed outside of these frameworks. For more information about the Washington Consensus, see Williamson (1993), and Kuczynski and Williamson (2003).
factor, and maximise both the self-reliance and determination of a developing nation emerging into the competitive international community on its own terms, China is also promoting the development of asymmetric defensive mechanisms (Ramo 2004: 37) to offset the challenges presented by more developed countries. This factor is especially appealing to the developing world.

v) The features of developmentalism in China’s foreign aid

The success of providing direct and indirect innovative aid throughout the region, fuels a self-sustaining form of self-confidence in the recipient country, which induces what Ramo (2004:16) described as Total Factor Productivity, whereby the success of assistance becomes more than the sum of the components provided.

The developmentalist norm, as manifested in the Beijing Consensus, may be viewed in its foreign aid policies through investigating and addressing the following six key issues: firstly, by identifying where China has used aid to promote and encourage innovation, or creative environments for growth and development; secondly, by highlighting where such innovation has induced and fuelled regional self-confidence, through China’s targeting of localised processes of development aimed at inducing chain reactions which fuel further development; thirdly, by demonstrating where China has become closer to the people through implementing schemes, and learning through various single step approaches; fourthly, by indicating how China has pursued policies with long-term benefits, despite encountering potentially problematic issues; fifthly, by detailing how China is creating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) as long-term regional support infrastructures to encourage economic development and equality in trade, outside of external influence; and lastly, by showing how China has deployed its aid to enhance strategic leverage, either intentionally or unintentionally throughout the region, as a means of developing asymmetric defence mechanisms. In each case study, the investigation of the developmentalist norm will address and provide insights into these six issues.

3.4 The trajectory of identities and norms in China’s foreign relations since 1949

Over the past sixty years, China has successively demonstrated three distinct and significant identities. Each of these successive identities has existed, to date, throughout an approximate twenty-year period, beginning with China’s identity as a victim of Western colonialism, which lasted for the first twenty years of the PRC from 1949 onwards. The victim identity underwent transformation, when
China gained admission to the UN in the early 1970s, into that of a neutral actor and supporter of the developing world. The neutrality of China’s new identity also counterbalanced the superpowers of the US and USSR. It maintained this identity until the end of the Cold War, when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in light of growing US unilateralism, its identity transitioned further, as a result of the induced shift in its compensatory neutral role towards that of a great power.

The similarities that were apparent in China’s behaviour, before and following its identity transformations, were reflected in the norms that were present, and exerting an influence at those times. A pivotal norm influencing China’s international relations in the 1940s and early 1950s was sovereignty, whereas the emergence of internationalism in the early 1970s, and uptake of developmentalism in the late 1980s, transformed its respective identities during those times. The shaping of its behaviour in this manner, along with the subsequent policies and activities that this behaviour induced, reflected its determination to establish a renewed identity for itself through its experimentation with new norms. After being influenced by these norms and following the stabilisation of its behaviour, China’s identity underwent a transition. Following this transition, its efforts then became focussed upon translating the influence of these norms into its policies and activities. The scale of China’s identity transformation is also reflected in the magnitude of its behavioural change. Hence in the early 1970s, the identity shift that followed the balance of norm influences of both internationalism and sovereignty induced a much larger shift in identity than that observed in the late 1990s, when China having additionally adopted developmentalism in the late 1980s, further engaged Asianism.

From the early days of the PRC, China’s identity as a victim was shaped extensively by the extraordinary events of the last two centuries of its history. China’s ‘Century of Humiliation’ which began in 1840, arose from an extended period of pressure from the West, notably the United States and Europe, and later from Japan, leading to numerous defeats and loss of territory. This culminated in the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the formation of the Republic of China in 1912. China then entered a period, which lasted for approximately three and a half decades, where the country became divided between numerous factions, under the influence of the Nationalists, the Communists, and regional warlords. The ongoing anarchy, by the late 1920s, pushed China into a state of Civil War. By the early 1930s, the Japanese took advantage of the chaotic situation in China and launched an invasion from its Korean colony into Manchuria, an event that further inflamed the ongoing Sino-Japanese wars. These events devastated China on all
levels. Internationally and regionally, it meant the loss of its great-power status, with many states no longer regarding China as the pre-eminent power in Asia, but rather a large, impoverished, and technologically backward state. Chinese factions continued to struggle against the Japanese occupation, during the 1930s and early 1940s, while fighting their own battle for leadership and control of China’s vast territory. Foreign powers, most notably the Americans and the Soviets, backed the opposing factions of the CCP and KMT, and in the case of the Soviets, passed on the ideological doctrines of anti-imperialism and socialist revolution. Both played important roles in the formation of China’s identification with victimization, and its support for world revolution. The loss of its great-power status has fuelled China’s significant pursuit of, and efforts towards, its re-establishment over the following six decades.

By 1949, following their victory over the Nationalists, the CCP proclaimed the PRC. The PRC began extricating the major sources of contention of the previous century in an attempt to repair their damaged country. However, the legacy of this ‘Century of Humiliation’ was manifest in a loss of self-confidence and self-esteem, as China’s national identity and projection began to reconcile the loss of its former status and prestige as the ‘Middle Kingdom’. By reflecting upon the behaviour of the Qing dynasty, and its penchant for maintaining traditional socio-political and economic structures, Zhou Enlai highlighted how ‘Qing ideals, sense of identity [.....] and the conflicting systems of these two quite different civilizations’ had resulted from ‘the shift in the balance of power from East to West’ (Zhou 2007: 447; also see Dittmer and Kim 1993). China’s failure to adapt to a changing world, reinforced the idea of ‘the unchanging East’, and contributed to China’s fall in wealth, power and standing.

The blame for China’s weakness, eventual occupation and collapse, was collectively apportioned to the Qing dynasty, the Nationalists, and foreign powers. Under Soviet tutelage the Chinese leadership adopted Marxist axioms on imperialism and capitalist exploitation, and came to side with the Soviet’s view of American led Western imperialism. In 1950, renewed threats to regional stability compelled China to respond to North Korean aid pleas during the DPRK’s war of unification with South Korea. Again, China was drawn into conflict with Western powers in the form of the US led fifteen member UN alliance, as it assisted North Korean attempts to prevent the establishment of a pro-American Korean peninsula. Following the armistice in 1953, China further strengthened its identification with revolution as a mechanism for self-improvement. This influenced its perspective on cooperation, towards achieving decolonisation through revolutionary means. After allying itself closer to the Soviet Union, it began to rebuild its war-ravaged,
undeveloped and backward economy. International representation of Chinese interests at the UN, however, remained in the hands of the Nationalists, who the CCP had forced into exile in Taiwan in 1949. This further fuelled the PRC’s self-identification as a victim of ‘Western’ aggression, exploitation, and colonisation.

During its victim identity period, the PRC continued to view its sovereignty and leadership as being under threat from the Western powers, and their domination of international institutions (Kornberg and Faust 2005: 14-9). As Harding (1984: 214) points out that:

China’s leaders [Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai] have regularly viewed international politics as a struggle for hegemony among superpowers, have maintained an abiding concern with their security and sovereignty against threats from abroad, have sought to preserve a high degree of independence and initiative in their international conduct, and have tended to identify their country with the developing nations of the Third World, rather than with either of the two superpowers.

The legacy of its enforced period of ‘humiliation’ and subjugated potential, still resonates deeply in modern Chinese foreign policy, strategic culture, and overall worldview.

China’s identification with the developing world led it to play a prominent role at the Bandung conference in 1955, where it nurtured stronger connections with many colonised, or former colonised, countries in the developing world, who at that time were seeking, or strengthening, their independence, and were either communist or non-aligned (see Shao 1979). From the mid-1950s onwards, the PRC focussed upon providing aid to countries of the developing world which had formed relations with China, following the Bandung conference. The aid, however, was accompanied by assistance from China in translating its own success into de-colonisation by revolution. China’s behaviour highlights a major contradiction towards the norm of sovereignty, which stressed non-interference in a nation’s internal affairs. China’s communist allegiances, and Mao’s determination to undermine Western influences in the developing world, constrained the norm of sovereignty at this time (see Zhong 1994: 255-313). Interfering in a state’s internal affairs, was acceptable in the name of de-colonization and anti-imperialism, and could no longer be rationalized once the era of decolonization came to an end. This was notable through China’s
considerably more enhanced adherence to non-intervention in independent nations of the developing world, throughout Latin America.

Within the PRC, China’s development aid was initially managed by the newly established Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries, which was later renamed as the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries within the Ministry of Commerce. During this period, China worked alongside the Soviets, and its IDA was influenced by their communist aligned policies. China strived to display marked prudence in making its resources as effective as possible.

However, by the late 1950s, as its communist alliances fragmented following the Sino-Soviet rift, much of the success that fuelled its own domestic revolutionary activities appeared increasingly elusive. As its alliances reduced in number, it sought to strengthen its remaining relations, through a need to survive and recuperate its international position. The increasing loss of these alliances fuelled its victim image further, and as it sought to offset the influence of the superpowers, notably in Africa and Southeast Asia, its identification with its remaining allies in these regions strengthened. Much of China’s activities in Latin America, outside its support of Cuba, remained marginal due to its reduced capacities, and the enhanced anti-communist sentiment in the region’s politics. Although these reasons were also extant throughout much of Southeast Asia, the region’s relative proximity to China, increased incidence of colonised nations and urgency of offsetting the regional superpower influence, prioritised China’s activities. In 1964, in Mali, Zhou Enlai proposed eight principles for formulating foreign aid. These were proposed as guidelines and shaped China’s goals on three distinct levels: firstly, the ‘poor helping the poor’ in post colonial countries to improve self-reliance, agriculture, technical assistance and projects with low turn around times; secondly, working on communist world revolution; and thirdly, countering the KMT influence by mitigating the position of the ROC globally (Chin and Frolic 2007: 5). As the 1960s progressed, and its international isolation increased, China’s aid, and the rhetoric that accompanied it, began to reflect the extreme desperation of its position, as its aid and determination to show its capacities, self-reliance, and separation from the Soviet camp became more apparent. China’s increasingly isolated international position was seen in Indonesia in 1965, through the extreme anti-Chinese backlash, and became even more significant after its Cultural Revolution commenced in 1966 (Xinhua 2006a). In the face of ongoing competition from the US and USSR, China engaged in higher-risk and larger-scale projects, such as the Tan-Zam railway, in addition to its lower-risk standard sports stadium projects (Yu 1980: 117-44). Though the
Tan-Zam project was only realised in the 1970s, its formulation was completed during the 1960s during a visit of a CCP delegation to Africa.

The determination to demonstrate its capacities reflects how it was reacting to its desire to assist the developing world through the framework of South-South cooperation, and gain further international recognition in order to legitimise its position in the international community. China provided economic assistance to developing countries through its emphatic desire to form its own sphere of influence, remaining independent from both Soviet communism/socialism and of the emerging Non-Aligned Movement (Zha 2005). The tangible success of this foreign policy provided China with support from developing country members of the UN, and gave it sufficient incentive to induce a transformation of its identity and image. As Mao Zedong is often quoted, it was China’s African friends who carried China into its seat in the UN headquarters (Interview 2006a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007g). This reaffirmed not only that its revolutionary activities were limited and counter productive to its future growth, but also, its goals for the developing world could now be focussed through mechanisms within the UN, which had previously been unattainable during the early years of the PRC.

The switch of recognition from the ROC to the PRC, was viewed by the CCP as an international acknowledgement of its authority and leadership, and enhanced international status. While the issue of sovereignty in Taiwan remained unresolved, China continued to deal with security issues and began to involve itself in international affairs more actively, as the norm of internationalism increasingly emerged. This brought China out of its international isolation, stimulating the reallocation of resources, which had been diverted towards China’s ‘recognition effort’, towards other foreign policy objectives. Aid during the 1970s and 1980s reflected the changes in China’s behaviour as it began to identify with its new neutral identity, and became a stronger supporter of the developing world. Its foreign policies shifted from being reckless and extravagant, to being more multilateral and cost effective. Its neutral identity also led to it adapting its policies from the pursuit of Maoist communism towards increased alignment with the international community and a commitment to regime survival. As China moderated its ideological doctrines of anti-imperialism and socialist revolution that had limited the sovereignty norm, it became aware of the consequences of this self-inflicted national damage upon its pursuit of re-establishing its great-power status. In light of this, China remained opposed to both superpowers. and so, by remaining on the sidelines, while the Soviets and Americans sponsored regimes in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, the
Chinese continued to promote an image of neutrality and independence. After denouncing the superpowers for involving themselves in the affairs of sovereign states, China took on an observer role, participating marginally in conflicts backed by the Soviet Union and the United States. By opposing the interference of both the Soviets and the West, and limiting its involvement in other state’s affairs, China was free from the criticism levied against the superpowers for their proxy wars and conflicts in the developing world. This allowed China to form friendly relationships with developing countries who had become disillusioned with the West. By 1973, the Chinese Government reinforced its nascent international role through aid giving, by increasing the scale of its aid financially, as well as in terms of overall government expenditure and as a percentage of GDP for the decade of the 1970s (Zha 2005). After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping gradually returned to a position of power, through being reappointed to the position of Party Vice-Chairman in July 1977, and was tipped to take over and is generally regarded as having taken over the role of de facto leader at the Third Plenum in December 1978. After these changes, Deng increasingly took over management of China’s national and foreign economic policy making. As China identified itself less as a victim, there was little need for it to justify the aid it allocated to fellow victims, as China could cite its international obligation when supporting the developing world; consequently, China’s quantity of foreign aid began to decrease. In fact, this move, in 1978, marked a distinct change in its behaviour as it began to seek development aid from Japan, in order to assist its own economic and societal development. This was followed by an increase in its campaigning for membership of such international development institutions as the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB. By prioritising the utilisation of external resources for its own development above that of assisting other developing countries, China became one of the few nations that remained both a significant aid recipient and donor. China has frequently been cited as the World Bank's largest borrower as well as the recipient of the largest proportion of aid from Japan between 1979 and 2000 (Takamine 2006: 1, 5, 161-4).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China’s relations with Southeast Asia and Latin America significantly improved, through the shared promotion of South-South cooperation. China’s aid policies shifted towards promoting the increase in aid recipient self-reliance, as it became focussed upon its own domestic growth. The 1980s also marked a gradual but persistent decline in the role of communist/socialist ideology as a basis for China’s pursuit of its diplomatic ties with developing countries. In the same period, there was a marked increase in China’s need to maintain relationships with the developed world that
mirrored its decrease in identification with the Third World. This moderation of its neutral identity explains why China's foreign aid showed no increase, despite substantial increases in its own economy and national budgets. The continued opening up of China's economy, at this time, led to its economic growth and development, raising its international status and reputation, and increased confidence in the CCP's leadership.

By the late 1980s, in light of China’s own domestic developmental success during the decade, the domestically embedded norm of developmentalism began to become reinforced. Although the conforming to this norm at this time focussed a renewal of China’s activities towards enhanced development in the aid recipient regions, the global events of the period also contributed to the uptake of the developmentalist norm, and its impending identity transition into that of a great power. At the end of the Cold War, when Soviet influence in the world collapsed, leaving an increasingly unilateral United States, Chinese identity as a significant neutral supporter of the developing world became unbalanced, inducing a shift in its identity. Having freed itself from its revolutionary past, and in light of its successful domestic development, as well as its increasing involvement in regional institutions, it began to identify with becoming a great power in order to continue to counterbalance the United States. These events, which contributed to the uptake of developmentalism, along with the aftershock of Tiananmen Square, had the effect of shifting the focus of the internationalist norm away from South-South cooperation, and increasingly towards international responsibility. Its aid from the 1990s onwards reflects this transition, as its foreign policies and activities have become more significantly enhanced through the re-enforcement of this identity.

As China’s behaviour, following its identity transformation stabilised, Deng Xiaoping formulated his idea to ‘focus on developing the economy but keep a low profile in international affairs’ as a means for dealing with the diplomatic difficulties of the G7/G20 and other industrialized countries (Huang 2009). This allowed China to continue prioritising the stabilisation of its aid commitments rather than increasing them. Consequently, China increasingly and actively sought partnerships abroad, both with international organisations and on an interstate level. In the mid-1990s, China’s policies in Southeast Asia, which were informed by its increasing international responsibility, desire for development and adherence to regional stability by maintaining and enforcing of sovereignty, led it to draw further on the norm of Asianism. Though this did not induce a further change in identity, it did reinforce its existing identity as a great power, as it strengthened China’s ongoing pursuit of re-establishing this lost legacy. In
Southeast Asia, this was reflected by its increased involvement with ASEAN, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and greater cooperation throughout the region in its reform and infrastructural projects. In Africa and Latin America, its policies have become reflected through its supportive, but non-interventionist, role in the institutions of the region. Since the start of the 21st century, China has continued to reinforce these norms through its foreign aid policies to aid recipient countries. Though China's identity has remained constant through this period, the ongoing changes to the norms themselves, as seen in global sovereignty, have induced further changes in China's behaviour and foreign policies as it continued to strengthen its great-power identity.

The reach of Chinese finance in developing countries has raised concerns about issues such as debt sustainability, environmental standards, human rights, and the undermining of the international norms that have built expectations about what constitutes aid, and how aid effectiveness is assessed (BBC 2007a; The Guardian 2007a; 2007b; The Washington Post 2007). Chinese officials and scholars disclose that the volume of their aid is a state secret (Interview 2007d; 2007f; 2007i). Their justification for this lack of transparency is due to the fact that if they published how much aid they were providing, including to which specific governments, they would soon find themselves under pressure from many of those governments to increase their aid in order to keep up with the largest recipients, and also from their own people to meet their own domestic needs. This fact reinforces the CCP assertion of strong state control, which shapes China's identity and makes a concrete picture of China's aid difficult to ascertain. This raises questions over the proportion, timing, and nature of how Chinese aid is determined. Therefore, it appears that China does not yet have a clear aid policy. More commonly, decisions are announced by senior leaders often to smooth official overseas visits. Accordingly, the pattern of Chinese external orientation and behaviour becomes more important. While China's impact on regional and global outcomes is significant, Chinese behaviour and its formulation of foreign policy is key to the continuity and change of China's foreign relations.

The study of the norms that influence China’s policies and interests raises several questions: firstly, how has the role of identity influenced China’s definition of its interests? The concept of identity relates to the self-perception that China has of itself in the global community. This has played a major role in influencing China’s behaviour, and consequently, its definition of interests. During the early years of the Cold War, China assumed the identity of a victim, in light of the detrimental events which it had suffered prior to and during its twenty-two-year long civil war. This identity led China to act in an aggressive.
defensive and hostile manner towards the outside world. As relations with the West improved, and China gained increased recognition and inclusion into the UN and other institutions, over the following two decades, its identity became more subdued and impartial. It repositioned itself equidistant to the political stances of the superpowers, who it viewed as being equal, and diametrically opposed in their hegemonic perspectives. The success of Deng’s economic reforms, of the late 1970s, in transforming the Chinese economy, raised China’s confidence significantly. By the late 1980s, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the growing unilateralism of the United States, China began to pursue a global leadership role. As it nurtured this role, it became increasingly more self-centred and opportunistic in achieving its goals. However, when this conduct negatively impacts upon its interests, its determination to behave responsibly counters and redresses its behaviour.
The second question concerns the timing of when the norms have appeared, evolved and undergone internalisation. These stages are highlighted in the following table:

### Table 3.2 The life cycle of norms in China’s foreign relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norm appearance</th>
<th>Norm evolution</th>
<th>Norm internalisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asianism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1990s</td>
<td>Late 1990s</td>
<td>Mid-2000s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity: Great power</td>
<td>Identity: Great power</td>
<td>Identity: Great power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeared in the early 1990s in its current form, as China was becoming focussed upon greater international responsibility.</td>
<td>Evolved, in late 1990s, prevalent during 1997 Asian financial crisis, triggered by China’s enhanced role in crisis.</td>
<td>Norm evolving towards cascaded in mid-2000s, as multilateral efforts in region expanded, though internalisation is running parallel with its growth as a great power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Internationalism** | | |
| Early 1970s | Early 1990s | In progress |
| Identity: Neutral actor | Identity: Great power | Identity: Great power |
| Appeared in 1970s as it emerged from its isolation into, and increasingly cooperated with, the international community. | Evolution began in early 1990s when China’s identity changed from neutral actor to great power, still ongoing. | Norm not internalised yet, as still evolving parallel with its growth as a great power. |

| **Sovereignty** | | |
| 1949 | 1950-60s | Early to mid-1970s |
| Identity: Pre-Victim | Identity: Victim | Identity: Neutral actor |
| This norm highlights how an existing internalised norm from the 1940s was being reshaped by the PRC’s victim identity. | Present following civil war, though heavily constrained by Maoist and communist philosophies. | Following admission to UN, and transition from victim identity to neutral actor, internationalism began to influence sovereignty, and reduce influence from Maoist and communist philosophies. |
| 1990s | In progress | In progress |
| Identity: Great power | Identity: Great power | Identity: Great power |
| Norm re-emerged, underlined by developmentalism and internationalism. | Re-emerged Norm still evolving parallel with its growth as a great power. | Re-emerged norm has yet to cascade, again, though appears more mature as the renewed norm is in balance with its old internalised variation. |

| **Developmentalism** | | |
| Late 1970s | Late 1990s | Mid-2000s |
| Identity: Neutral actor | Identity: Great power | Identity: Great power |
| Emerged in current form in 1970-80s with own domestic reforms. | Norm evolved as Cold War ended, and enhanced China’s need to become a great power. Norm further evolved due to perceived failings of the Washington Consensus, and as internationalism increased confidence in its re-establishing of its great-power status. | As internalisation depends on clear definition of the Beijing Consensus, then difficult to interpret how internalised this norm has become. China’s intense promotion of the Beijing Consensus indicates developmentalist norm internalisation from mid-2000s. |
The relationship between identity, image and norms is cyclical; identity which reflects self-perception promotes a nation’s image, which impacts upon the behaviour shaped by the norms through a desire to maintain its image. This behaviour then feeds back, thereby reinforcing or undermining identity (Figure 3.1).

![Figure 3.1 Relationship between norms, identity, and image](image)

During the 1960s, China was increasingly isolated from the global community and projected its image of a victim, becoming deadlocked in its actions globally. Its increasingly hostile image, resulting from the perceived hostility from the superpowers, fed back and re-enforced this victim image. The thawing of relations with the West, beginning in the 1970s, gave China an opportunity to moderate its identity, which led to a change in its behaviour, and was seen as a pivotal step in maintaining this more open state.

Having discussed China’s identities, norms and their relationships, the discussion will continue by examining a case study of Southeast Asia, which represents a region in which China has long held both cultural and historical ties.
PART TWO
CHAPTER 4

CHINA’S FOREIGN AID TO SOUTHEAST ASIA

This chapter will investigate China’s foreign aid activities in Southeast Asia, by exploring the norms identified in the previous chapter: Asianism, internationalism, sovereignty and developmentalism. By examining all four norms both independently and interactively, this investigation will establish the broad contextual basis for China’s foreign aid behaviour in the region.

4.1 The significance of the Southeast Asian case

The importance of Southeast Asia in relation to Chinese foreign aid can be understood by examining two areas which have had an impact on Chinese-Southeast Asian relations. The first area concerns their mutual historical and cultural ties; this area is important in understanding the traditional ‘tribute system’ and the impact of an Asian identity for the making of China’s foreign aid policy. The second area concerns economic development and trade; this area is important because China’s economic and multilateral activities in Southeast Asia have increased prolifically. China’s economic assistance is matching its expansion of activities in the region, in infrastructure and market driven projects, which are related closely to the region’s prosperity (Perlez 2006).

An examination of Chinese-Southeast Asian relations provides a historical overview, which will seek to explain the PRC’s current foreign relations in the region and its connection to foreign aid. As will be explained, geographical factors have played an important role in Chinese-Southeast Asian relations, and events stemming from the presence of Western colonial powers have had the greatest impact on Chinese foreign relations. By examining China’s historical relations with mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, it can be shown that the changes that occurred to the PRC’s identity and international image transpired in response to influences from events in the region. The end of the Cold War and the Asian financial crisis had a profound influence on both China and states in the region; such influences became visible through regional trade and economics. Although members of ASEAN are not identical and the aid relationships between

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1 The term ‘Southeast Asia’ as used in this chapter refers to East Timor and the 10 members of the ASEAN: Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
China and Southeast Asian countries vary widely, the observation of China’s involvement in multilateral institutions is helpful in analysing the development of norms and Chinese identity in the formation of Chinese foreign aid policy.

In addition, international attention has been focussed upon China’s aid in Southeast Asia, as highlighted in a 2008 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report (Lum, Thomas et al. 2008: 84) which noted that: ‘China has become one of the largest providers of economic assistance in the region’. Although this report stated that China was not a major provider of ODA, it demonstrates an awareness of China’s rising influence in its aid behaviour. It also contended that this ‘largely stems from its role as a major source of foreign aid, trade, and investment’ (Lum, Morrison and Vaughn 2008: 1). In August 2009, Zhang Qiyue, the Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, commented upon how China and Southeast Asia’s mutual interests had become ‘intertwined in an unprecedented way’ (Xinhua 2009i). China will ‘continue to promote ties with Southeast Asian countries as they were indispensable development partners’ and ‘were an important part of China’s geopolitical strategy’ (ibid.). Zhang further commented that ‘her experience in Indonesia had influenced her ideas on deepening practical cooperation’, which stressed cooperation in trade, economic, and infrastructural development, as a prelude to the launching of the world’s largest FTA in 2010 across the region (ibid.). This reflects how ‘China firmly practices trade liberalisation and opposes trade protection’ (Xinhua 2009k). In addition, China has increased its involvement in multilateral regional institutions, in order to promote its regional cooperative business networks with its Southeast Asian counterparts. These activities will be funded by the establishment of a US$15 million Asia Cooperation Fund by 2010 (MFA 2004e).

This raises the question of why, and in what direction, this activity is proceeding (Asia Times 2009b; Economy 2005; FPIF 2006). Therefore, a study of norms allows the significant differences that have arisen in modern China’s international relations to be understood (Li 2009: 1-46, 171-208). As was previously discussed in Chapter 3, Asianism has, since the mid-1990s, reflected China’s regional identity through its foreign policies and its position relative to the largest aid donor in the region, which constitutes a Japanese-led Asianism. Asianism also highlights the ongoing challenges between regional powers, Japan and China, in assuming an Asian leadership role. The Asianist norm has played a significant role in Chinese aid to mainland Southeast Asia, most notably in Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia, all of which have been long-term recipients of Chinese aid in the region. The aid provided has been aimed at infrastructure projects for building roads, railways, airfields, and ports, in addition to providing
extensive military provisions used by some of the governments to remain in power. While Chinese projects build dams and roads, strengthen regional infrastructures, consolidate control over the South China Sea, and provide enhanced trade and investment cooperation, some argue that this may lead to the ‘China threat’, namely through China’s domination of the entire region. For example, Leifer (1999: 87-90) argues that China’s continuing economic growth, along with the modernization of its armed forces and increase in military spending, have raised many concerns in the region about Chinese interests. This is particularly the case with respect to Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea and the perceived prospects of military conflict with other states laying claim to territory in the same region (also see Acharya 1999: 129-51).

This argument is more evident, for example, from China’s continued aid to the repressive regime in Myanmar. By providing military and economic assistance, along with its role as an economic patron of the authoritarian regimes in Laos and Cambodia, the PRC has been given a predominant voice in the region, as will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter with respect to the Mekong River Project. However, though China has strong ties with mainland Southeast Asia, it has not initiated sufficient change in the maritime countries of the region to exercise unlimited regional influence. Economy’s (2005: 413) discussions with Southeast Asian officials suggest that with regard to maritime Southeast Asia:

China has yet to assume a real leadership role outside the realm of trade. With regard to transnational issues – health, crime, and environment, among others – China is often a major contributor, if not the primary source of the challenge.

In line with Economy’s view, the fact that Asianism is a more cultural concept cannot be disregarded. The hierarchy of China’s ancient ‘tribute system’ is difficult to reconcile with the identification of Asian countries according to the Westphalian concept of sovereign equality, as the system implies a dominant China and subservient neighbours. This is not an image China feels comfortable with promoting explicitly, therefore, China avoids references to Sino-centrism or the ancient tribute system; although this does not mean that the Chinese leadership does not have internalised expectations of deference. From a perspective supported by Chinese scholars, there is a positive relationship, linked to the historic tribute system, between the PRC’s aid donation and recipient countries (Interview 2006a; 2006b; 2006d; 2006e; 2007h; 2007l; 2007n).

With regard to China’s approach to Southeast Asian regionalism, the
regional organization, ASEAN, established in 1968, provides a case to examine to what extent and under the influence of which norms its economic assistance was given priority. China became more proactive after the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, which highlighted China’s increased cooperative role in the region. With the creation of ASEAN+3, China’s participation promoted further economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.

Since there are significant differences between China’s identification with maritime and mainland Southeast Asia, it is necessary to highlight the various influences that have made the maritime sub-region of Southeast Asia distinct from the mainland. As maritime Southeast Asia was geographically more dispersed, it was subject to significantly less influence from Chinese culture. The region was influenced much more by Islamic and Hindu civilisations from the subcontinent, which worked as a barrier to the spread of Chinese influence beyond the mainland. This resulted in the Muslim population of the region becoming incorporated into the global Islamic community, thereby segregating the dispersed collections of Chinese communities there. Consequently, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei became predominantly Muslim, with minority Buddhist, Hindu and Christian populations. Indonesia, in particular, with the world’s fourth largest population, often assumes a leadership role among the Muslim nations of the region. China’s aid to Indonesia was established in the early years of the PRC; despite this, as Indonesia is the recipient of aid from several donors, the precise influence of China’s aid was difficult to establish.

The arrival in the Philippines of the Europeans in the sixteenth century and the Americans in the nineteenth century enhanced the influence of Western civilisations in Southeast Asia. This Western influence is visible on the minor island nation of East Timor, where predominantly Christian East Timorese live along side minority Muslim and Buddhist populations. Like in the case of the Philippines, in the past, the East Timorese have sought, and continue to support allegiances with countries from outside of Southeast Asia. The onset of the Cold War also created regional divisions as the region fragmented further into nations that were either aligned or non-aligned with the respective Cold War superpowers. This influence explains why Chinese aid was not forthcoming in the early stages of its aid activities, as this added to China’s security concerns. By recognising the geographical component of Chinese-Southeast Asian relations, a more concise analysis of the case is possible.

Explanations for the transitions in China’s identity towards its current proactive state, which induced these changes in its foreign policy, may be traced back to the end of the Cold War. In the absence of the Soviet Union, which
counter-balanced US power, China could no longer remain neutral, especially in the face of growing US unilateralism. Rather than regressing to its former socialist revolutionary mindset, it moved away from its neutral identity, which was built upon its bilateral regional relations, through economic multilateralism, thereby fostering an identity of a great power. As highlighted in China’s foreign relations overview in Chapter 3, after the end of the Cold War, China prioritised its foreign relations policy with Southeast Asia to ‘be a companion with a neighbouring country, and be friendly to a neighbouring country’ (China 2009a). This contrasted with Chinese relations across the region during the Cold War which was often mired in animosity, distrust, and conflict. As relations with the countries across the region have adjusted in more recent times, China has been keen to transform these changes into enhanced and mutually beneficial political and economic ties.

China’s growing regional influence is derived through a diverse range of factors, ranging from its role as a market for the region’s natural resources, the economic benefits bestowed through its aid and investment, primarily through loans for infrastructure projects, gestures of friendship expressed through diplomatic and foreign assistance, the PRC’s status as an economic development model, as well as economic and cultural integration originating from proximity and migration. As Chinese President Hu Jintao pointed out during his April 2002 visit to Malaysia: ‘China’s development would be impossible without Asia, and Asia’s prosperity without China’ (Asia Times 2002). Bilateral relations have become more aligned as China and its neighbours increased cooperation in non-traditional security areas, regional economic development, and maritime security, notably in the South China Sea. China’s ongoing relations with ASEAN, which strengthen its great-power identity, seek to counterbalance the region’s relations with the US and Japan. These relations are being energized by China’s use of ‘soft power’. Percival (2007: 111-2) illustrates China’s growing ‘soft power’ in Southeast Asia by noting that ‘soft power’ can include:

- economic benefits, shared norms and values, cooperation on non-traditional issues, infatuation with the new China, the mutual benefits of tourism and education, diplomacy and style, and networking and reciprocal obligations within ethnic Chinese communities.

Although this Chinese ‘soft power’ in the region is only perceived in certain quarters, there are three principal reasons why China’s promotion of a positive
and beneficial image would be helpful to enhance its regional position: firstly, maritime countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, have strong links with the United States and Japan, so substantial gains may be achieved by China’s projection of itself as a benevolent body, in order to supplant or at least counterbalance these powers. Secondly, as populations in this region are decidedly nationalist in their political views, there is much ground to be gained in terms of promoting cooperation and trust. Thirdly, as Southeast Asian countries have a history of being hostile to former revolutionary states, such as in the case of Indonesia in the 1960s, the repairing of regional bonds is of importance for ensuring continued regional unity. The impact of ‘soft power’ stimulated Kurlantzick (2006a: 272-4; 2006b) to mark 1997 as the turning point in the emergence of China’s ‘charm offensive’ in Southeast Asia. China’s embrace of free trade in the region along with its promotion of the idea that it will become a major source of foreign direct investment also re-enforces its image. In addition to the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, Beijing is also negotiating closer bilateral trade ties and economic partnerships with individual Southeast Asian states, though when asked for clarification, Chinese officials were unwilling to provide details, regarding disbursement channels for Chinese aid in the region. Comments from the Chinese Academy of Social Science, however, indicate that the majority of China’s aid disbursements are made bilaterally (Interview 2007a; 2007b; 2007n).

4.2 Historical relations with Southeast Asia

Chinese relations with Southeast Asia extend back into its dynastic past, where mainland Southeast Asian states participated in the ‘tribute system’, and became recipients of Chinese civilisation and culture. As such, China was viewed as a major actor in the region, as it offered protection to many neighbouring countries through this hierarchy. Despite this, and due to competing influences from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, the states never became fully integrated into the Chinese view of Asia. Although this left many nations relatively free of Chinese culture and influence, this also left them vulnerable to attack as they were smaller and weaker. Consequently, they became more susceptible to the aggression of the Western powers much earlier than countries in East Asia. Mainland Southeast Asia’s subjugation by Western imperialist powers in the nineteenth century led to serious Chinese security concerns which continue to vex China’s current leaders through a sense of inability to defend the extremities of the region.

Even when nations gained their independence from Western colonisers,
the onset of the Cold War meant that regional identities became shaped by further sovereignty and independence issues, which made integration of all of the region’s countries both complex and difficult. In line with its communist identity, China developed its foreign relations policy in conjunction with its views on class-based world revolution during the 1950s and early 1960s. In the aftermath of the Korean War of 1950-53, North Korea (DPRK) was supported by the PRC, who had assisted them for the majority of the war, in fighting against UN forces. China also contributed significant amounts of aid to other communist allies, as seen by the donation to North Vietnam of a gift of US$20 million, and loans of US$61 million and US$157.5 million in 1959 and 1961 respectively (Renmin Ribao 1959; 1961a).

In the 1950s, all of the PRC’s aid recipients in Asia had had a tribute relationship with China historically. As a result of historical and Cold War politics, countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Vietnam (North Vietnam) were the sole recipients of Chinese aid during the early years of the PRC, as a mixture of obligation and capacity shaped China’s regional behaviour. The foundation of this relationship therefore implied the presence of a single legitimate China at its centre (Copper 1976: 4-7; Law 1984: 171-7). Levine highlights that the nature of Chinese bilateral aid relationships with Southeast Asian countries and their suspicions of multilateral organizations were reflected by their inclinations towards the tribute system (Levine 1984: 107-45). Although in these early years, the re-establishment of the ancient model governing regional relations was not seriously considered by the CCP, many of the countries in Southeast Asia still viewed the PRC as a predominant actor in the region (Barnett 1961: 291). A similar shift to a more radical foreign policy occurred in Sukarno’s Indonesia, when China saw great potential for a militant Asian coalition opposed to the imperialism of the United States. This prompted the extension of a US$30 million aid loan to the nation (Far Eastern Economic Review 1961). However, this aid proved short-lived and was subsequently discontinued following an anti-Chinese backlash, as an army-led counterrevolution occurred in 1965 and rejected China’s interference in its domestic affairs, which had arisen through China’s identification with Indonesia’s communist party, the Parti Kommunis Indonesia (PKI) (Copper 1976: 53).

The leadership of the PRC has, since its foundation, been sensitive to the determination of the United States to limit the power and influence of China across Asia (Stoessinger 1974: 23). This resulted in the exclusion from China’s list of aid recipients, of those countries allied with the United States, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Following the Sino-Soviet rift, aid
competition in Indo-China between China and the Soviet’s pursuit of policies aimed at peaceful coexistence and people’s war, was also marked by a series of notable effects (Camilleri 1980: 74). Firstly, both China and the Soviets found the region difficult to influence; secondly, the local communist parties were strongly independent, as seen through the increase in intra-regional altercations between neighbouring communist ruling bodies, and as such, they constituted a weak opposition within their national governments; and thirdly, as most Asian countries had allied with the United States, this excluded them from the Sino-Soviet rivalry (Robinson 1982: 175). North Vietnam, in particular, continued to pose the most difficult challenge to China’s leadership during the early 1970s, as China continued to offer aid commitments to North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Even before reunification, it was North Vietnam, rather than the PRC, which had the decisive influence over communist military operations in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In order to pursue the war effort in South Vietnam, much of the Laotian and Cambodian territory was occupied by North Vietnamese troops (Camilleri 1980: 225-6). As a result, the PRC was determined to offer aid to Cambodia and Laos to help them against the North Vietnamese by constructing road systems across the north of Laos for military use. The PRC’s misgivings about North Vietnamese intentions were reinforced when Hanoi attempted to move closer to Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute (Levine 1984: 117). The PRC’s new aid commitment to North Vietnam was substantially reduced after 1976, despite its neutral international image, and was terminated following China’s invasion of North Vietnam in 1979, after Vietnamese troops invaded and occupied Cambodia. The continued support of the Soviets made possible the Vietnamese leadership of Laos and Cambodia during the 1980s. China’s influence proved pivotal as a stabilising force when the non-Vietnamese dominated states united and encouraged the PRC to become involved in the region, along with the United States in response to the Soviet-Vietnamese conquests (Robinson 1982: 179).

China’s transformed neutral identity in the international community grew in prominence following its increased interactions with ASEAN, and prompted it to take ASEAN interests and concerns into account in its decision-making, leading to an adjustment of its aid policy. With relations between its maritime Southeast Asian neighbours continuing to be primarily based upon trade, both the Philippines and Thailand became the newest PRC aid recipients in the 1980s (Copper 1986: 508; ZDJMN 1988: 634; 1989: 55). In addition to this, China also joined the multilateral foreign aid programmes of the UN (ZDJMN 1989: 640-1). As China normalised its relations with all of the region’s countries, its image of neutrality and independence was further promoted following Li Peng’s proposal
of the ‘four principles’ and initiatives from ASEAN for China-ASEAN relations during a visit to Bangkok in 1988 (Xinhua). China proclaimed it would not seek to become a hegemonic power nor would it interfere in the domestic affairs of the ASEAN countries, the further development of economic relations, and the continued support for regional cooperation and initiatives from ASEAN (Hao and Huan 1989: 221). This would allow China to diminish the anxiety of a ‘communist threat’ or the ‘China threat’ (Leifer 1999: 89).

The end of the Cold War triggered a new period of integration and cooperation between Southeast Asia and China.

China has become a main force promoting economic cooperation in Asia and economic recovery in East Asia. Since the 1990s, with the bursting of its bubble economy, Japan has undergone economic stagnation, which weakened its ability to support the economic growth in East Asia. The Asian financial crisis that broke out in 1997 hit East Asia’s economy severely. China, as a responsible large country, tightened up its cooperation with the countries and regions in East Asia to help them get rid of their difficulties. China’s swift economic growth provided them with a huge export market and promoted the recovery of East Asia’s economy. According to statistics, the growth in exports from the main Southeast Asian countries to China increased by more than 100 percent between 1990-2000. [......] China was not only the main source of surplus trade for East Asian countries and regions, but also a main destination of their overseas investment. In 2002, China replaced the United States as the largest investment destination of the Republic of Korea and Japan.

(MFA 2004c)

The Asianist norm was taken up during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, when Asia’s two most powerful economies, China and Japan, played pivotal roles in stabilising the deteriorating events. While Japan played a leadership role in the crisis, China refrained from devaluing its own currency and offered loans to ASEAN states. This move also contributed to the uptake of the internationalist norm, which increased China’s multilateral cooperation. Since 1997, ASEAN has expanded its directive by hosting the ASEAN-China, Japan and Korea (ASEAN+3) informal leadership summit, as well as the ASEAN-China (ASEAN+1) informal leaders summit. This promoted the strengthening of
relationships between the countries in Asia as a mechanism to develop internal regional solutions to East Asian problems. In 1999, Cambodia gained entry into ASEAN, thereby increasing its membership to ten. China-ASEAN cooperation was developed further in the early 2000s with the development of notable regional financial agreements, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative.

China’s regional Asian identity was subsequently challenged in 2003-4 by the onset of the SARS epidemic, and humanitarian crises such as the Southeast Asian tsunami. Although regional identities had been shaped by increased cooperation, these events prompted increased assurances and reassurances between neighbours, especially from China, of firm commitments towards positive state-led development across the entire region. Following the crises of the early 2000s, Chinese and ASEAN relations began to intensify towards the formation of a mutual FTA. China’s aid activities in the region continue to reflect its desire for regional cooperation. After President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo withdrew Filipino troops from Iraq in 2004 as part of a deal to win the freedom of a Filipino hostage, the United States cut their assistance to Manila. Shortly afterwards, China invited President Macapagal-Arroyo for a state visit, and offered greater cooperation and aid. Later on, in May 2005, at the first annual PRC-Philippines defence talks, China agreed to donate US$1.2 million in heavy engineering equipment to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), allocated five positions for Filipino officers to attend training courses in the PRC, and proposed joint naval exercises (Guoji Shichang 2005: 50). The interregional aid rivalry also focuses on Japan, despite the substantial aid provided by that country to China. Rival developments include those seen in 2006, in Laos, where China provided aid for a 100-bed hospital in response to Japan’s grant of US$12 million (China Development Brief 2006). The recent aid competition with Japan also focuses on the Mekong river, where efforts to build dams and dredge the river to create potential shipping lanes have proved significant in China’s consolidation of its image, despite the potential for environmental damage.

4.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Southeast Asia

4.3.1 Asianism

Asianism, as defined in Chapter 3, informs a shared Asian identity. It also informs China’s regional leadership role, especially in relation to Japan. It is possible to trace how this Asian identity has become reinforced through China and Southeast Asian relations by investigating how Asianism has become embedded in China’s aid practice. The strengthening of China’s great-power identity and the reinforcing
of China-ASEAN relations can be observed through three significant recent events in the region: firstly, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, secondly, the crises induced by both the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami; and lastly, the 2007 global financial crisis.

i) The 1997 Asian financial crisis

The 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered a major transition in the Asianist norm, regional unity, and China’s great-power identity, through a series of events that became viewed as ‘the virgin voyage’ of Asianism (China Daily 2007). At the end of the Cold War, East Asian identity was less identifiable, and the only regional institution of note was ASEAN, which at that time comprised only six member states and had no links with Northeast Asia. In the early 1990s, Asia’s most dynamic economies, through the course of adhering to the Japanese ‘flying geese’ model, created manufacturing sectors geared towards global export, notably for the US and EU markets. This drive towards greater Asian cooperation was in part also stimulated by an emerging regional developmentalism, which motivated the region’s desire to catch up with economies of the West in the aftermath of the Cold War. ‘Asian values’, therefore, embodied the traditions that had furnished their economic success (Li 2007; Li and Zhang 2009; MFA 2004d; Zhang 2002).

Although Asian identity still remained undefined, discussions of it at regional forums highlighted that it was at least being considered. Though economic growth progressed at a prolific rate, the lack of institutional regulation was to have both serious and serendipitous consequences throughout the region. Li Xing (2007: 4) argues that:

"[T]he rapid emergence of China and the Asian economic crisis in 1997 not only interrupted the [flying-geese model] but also started the global debates about the ‘Asian crony capitalism’ and the ‘Asian values’.

As the crisis spread across the region, bringing with it high regional unemployment on a scale that had not been seen since the 1930s, China took the step of not devaluing its currency, thereby containing the crisis. Its subsequent stimulus to the economy helped to sustain economic recovery through a substantial infrastructure spending programme (Hale 2008: 63-4). Being the only

1 This term refers to Japanese economic leadership, with the newly developing Asian ‘tiger economies’ positioned behind Japan in a flying geese pattern, following the developmental model established in Japan (see Li 2007; Li and Zhang 2009).
other major financial source of recovery open to Asia, Japan also implemented changes to help resolve the crisis (ibid.: 64). In the aftermath of the crisis, Asian leaders vowed to implement their own mechanisms for managing future regional instability. As ASEAN membership increased to 10 nations, further negotiations led to the formation of the ASEAN+3, which triggered the greater involvement of Northeast Asian nations in the regional institution. This reflected the significant increase in regional cooperation and evolution of the Asianist norm. Bowles (2002: 244, 263) points out that:

The Asian financial crisis has significantly changed the way in which regionalism in East Asia is taking place. [......] Asia’s post-crisis regionalism is qualitatively different from that which preceded the crisis, and is premised on an Asia-only vision of economic cooperation forged to counter the power of the US and Europe, then there [are] a number of important implications.

This evolution was also to have implications for China’s internationalist responsibility, as will be discussed in the next section. Although Asia’s developmental foundation had suffered a major blow, it had not sustained serious damage. A key factor that had strengthened the Asian economies, during the mid-1990s, arose through their implementation of ‘bamboo capitalism’,¹ which had structurally reinforced the top-down managed Japanese ‘flying geese’ model of development. While the foundations of ‘bamboo capitalism’ had not been fundamentally flawed, the crisis had arisen through the lack of institutional regulation throughout the region’s economic development. Many of the traditions that Asian people had long embraced, such as self-improvement and self-respect, in addition to hard work and simple living, diligence, studiousness, modesty, and devotion to their communities, were cited as not only reflective of Asian self-perception, and therefore identity, but were the key factors responsible for ensuring Asian recovery. Continued adherence to these practices played an essential role in restoring regional prosperity (ASEAN 1998). In the aftermath of the crisis reforms, a stronger Asian identity became evident in Chinese leaders’ discourse, especially in terms of economic integrity (MFA 1999; 2002a).

In 2000, China initiated the idea of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). At the 2002 ASEAN+3 Summit in Phnom Penh, Premier Zhu Rongji announced that:

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¹ ‘Bamboo capitalism’ refers to China centred development with a shift in labour and production to China with trade and capital flowing horizontally (see Li 2007: 23).
China would reduce or write-off the matured debts for Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar [...] as a member and the region’s largest developing country in Asia, China has always actively participated in and supported regional cooperation. China’s development has been closely linked with the East Asian countries. Chinese cooperation in the region has not sought special status, and we continue to support any development that is conducive to regional cooperation, in line with the common interests of East Asian countries initiative.

(MFA 2002d)

China further endorsed its regional cooperative stance in 2003 by signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). New networks of currency swaps were formulated under the newly emerged Chiang Mai Initiative, which led shortly after to the announcement of the CAFTA, to be formalised and developed by 2010. By 2006, ASEAN ministers agreed to accelerate the trade zone formation in the region, which catalysed the announcement that the East Asian FTA could be developed within ten years (ASEAN 2003; CPGPRC 2006; People’s Daily 2009g).

Since the crisis, Asian integration had matured, and by 2005 this increase in activity resulted in the East Asian summit (ASEAN 2005). At this forum, Japan welcomed the inclusion of three additional states, India, New Zealand and Australia, thereby expanding the membership of ASEAN+3 to a new ASEAN+3+3 level. However, as Chu Shulong (2007) pointed out ‘[t]he Chinese government has taken ASEAN Plus Three as “the major channel” of its efforts toward Asian regionalism and community building’. Following China’s protestation at the move, which it felt would allow external nations equal and unlimited access to the region, the attendance of these states was only permitted after they had agreed to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (People’s Daily 2005d). By doing this, China strengthened Asianism by setting a clear precedent that foreign nations, by implication the United States, could only join in the regional forums on multilateral terms which were conducive to reinforcing Asianism.

ii) 2003 SARS epidemic and 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami crises

Infectious diseases and natural disasters in the region, in the form of SARS and the Avian influenza epidemic of 2003-4, along with the Southeast Asian tsunami of late 2004, focussed the long-term regional integration goal of the East Asian
community. As Asian integration had become reinforced in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the formation of ASEAN+3, these events built upon these foundations by further focussing China’s efforts on greater Asian integration and cooperation (Teo 2005: 49-67; also see Chinwanno 2005: 153-8). There was an increased need for redistributing wealth, development, and social and health benefits in the region, arising from the realisation that epidemics could spread with equal ferocity throughout urban as well as rural populations. The wide-scale spread of an epidemic throughout an area could prove devastating to the development of the entire region. Although, at the outset of SARS, China sought to contain and downplay the extent of the epidemic, in its aftermath there was an increased need for confidence, closer economic coordination, and cooperation across the region. This was noted in the rise of East Asian regionalism, through increased trade growth across the region, a maturing of regional economies and current account surpluses, and the extensive growth of East Asian currency reserves (Teo 2005: 54-61). China’s attention during the crisis was focussed primarily on the prevention and containment of SARS, rather than on aid for its treatment throughout the region. There was also a shift towards maintaining the welfare of its own patients, notably the poorer populations affected during this period, by relaxing more traditional employment regulations (So and Pun 2004: 5-17).

In the aftermath of the Southeast Asian tsunami, the first three months of 2005 were quiet for China. Its initial aid to the disaster zone appeared sparse. In response to criticism, Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, argued that ‘China is a developing country. [...] We have a population of 1.3 billion. China’s per capita GDP is still very low’ (Tkacik and Dillon 2005). Liu further commented that the aid delivered by China, which initially amounted to US$2.7 million, was ‘equivalent to the annual income of 20,000 farmers’ (ibid.). Chinese contributions were dwarfed by other international efforts to the region. This response highlighted distinct limitations in China’s capacities for wide-scale regional disaster response. Despite appearing as a rapidly emerging economic superpower, these events still indicated how far China had to go to match the aid provided by Japan, Britain or the United States. Although China was still unable to compete with the major aid donors, China further stressed, in response to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s remarks about Japan’s best efforts, that Asian nations, as a whole, had a responsibility to provide assistance under these circumstances (BBC 2005). Following an increased public response across China, the amount of aid subsequently increased to nearly US$80 million, thereby demonstrating how Asianism had become increasingly taken up domestically in
Afterwards, China renewed its focus upon the essential areas of growth for the region. Economically, it focussed on fairer competition in trade and development and allowed regional players to keep up, rather than fall behind in competitive stakes. Politically, concerns became more subtle as more countries began conceding China’s eventual rise, despite hoping for the maintenance of a regional US presence. In the meantime, Beijing felt it had more to gain by being a responsible neighbour and more sensitive to the negative implications of its policies, so it continued to assert greater openness and transparency in its policy making in the region’s institutions. There was a continued focus upon economic development along with peace and stability to the point of avoiding conflict, as well as promoting cooperation and integration through its ongoing aid to the region, demonstrating Beijing’s keenness to promote this Asian identity. Malaysia’s hosting of a summit to establish the ‘East Asian Community’ in 2005 also demonstrated the growing unity and regionalism in Asia. With enhanced Chinese involvement in regional institutions becoming more apparent, China is displaying considerable interest in promoting common regional welfare and development, and as such, has provided economic aid, which, in turn, provides benefits for its own domestic economic development (Wong 2006: 3-14).

iii) 2007 Global financial crisis

In the years following SARS and the Southeast Asian tsunami disaster, ASEAN+3 worked towards achieving set targets and establishing new goals. In May 2006, President Hu Jintao proposed the concept of a ‘Harmonious Asia’ (China Daily 2006). Shortly after this, Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined the conceptual origins, evolutionary history, practicalities, basic structure, and timeline for implementing the new generation of ‘Asia-ism’ which was focussed on cooperation, openness and harmony. By participating more in regional cooperation mechanisms such as APEC and Southeast Asian regional forums, China was promoting the maturation of ‘Asia-Pacific-ism’, which Hu had first introduced at the APEC forum in Hanoi earlier that year. With each successive discussion of regionalism, which began with East Asianism, Asian identity has become stronger and reinforced, and with each success, China’s commitment to furthering Asianism continues to grow (China Daily 2007).

At the ASEAN+3 Summit in the Philippines in 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao addressed the targets that had been achieved since 2002, and outlined China’s future goals with ASEAN (MFA 2007a). The ASEAN+3 countries had become more focussed on their goals through cooperative efforts that reinforced Asian
identity. Through the completion of feasibility studies for the East Asian FTA, the ASEAN+3 countries realised bilateral currency swaps in accordance with the Chiang Mai Initiative, accelerated the formation of the Asian bond market, and highlighted new areas of expansion, including rural development, poverty alleviation, women’s affairs, disaster reduction and relief, mineral resource development and further cultural exchanges. China has contributed widely to the goals of ASEAN, by hosting the ASEAN culture week, poverty reduction workshops, shooting games for the region’s armed forces, and establishing an Asian regional disaster research centre. The extensive growth highlighted the efforts China was continuing to make towards its vision of a ‘Harmonious Asia’. Through this, ‘China’s future is inextricably linked to that of East Asian countries’ and this goal can only be realised through continued cooperation to develop peace, prosperity, and harmony in the region (MFA 2007a).

With the onset of the 2007 global financial crisis, efforts to provide solutions to the crisis became imperative and were the main focus of the 2009 London G20 and Boao Forum. ASEAN affirmed that its long-term goals aimed to create solutions to the crisis, and prevent future crises by adhering to the values which had brought success to the region, and reinforced an Asian identity (Xinhua 2009f). Following the G20 summit in London in April 2009, many targets outlined for resolving the crisis had been agreed in principle, but many fundamental and systematic challenges remained to be addressed. As the global market was shrinking, there was a strong need to take a stand against regional protectionism in trade and investment, along with a need for new innovative approaches for growth, whereby reserve currency countries needed to take control of their maintenance mechanisms. Although Asian countries needed to protect themselves against future risk, there were clear indications that ‘Chinese economic growth will make important contributions to the world economic recovery and Asian economic stability’ (Xinhua 2009g). Although many Asian countries found an initial international platform for discussing their resolutions at the G20, many also criticised the G20 for failing to address critical issues for long-term financial security. Many of these countries were pushing for the creation of new Asian institutions to balance the unilateralism of American institutions, by helping to maintain future security through the downplaying of unilateralism.

The Boao Forum gave many of these Asian countries the opportunity for a more sympathetic platform, by allowing them to discuss regional concerns that went unheard at the G20, especially in the aftermath of the disrupted ASEAN summit in Bangkok. Many felt that Boao provided a wider audience for
discussing issues in terms of ‘Asian values’, and so looked here for solutions to the global financial crisis in a setting detached from the US, which many blamed for the ongoing crisis. Despite Asia’s economic growth, it has suffered substantial damage economically during the crisis, increasing the calls for innovative and new solutions for the crisis. The proposals outlined at Boao aimed to reshape global finance and provide improved balance between regulation and innovation, along with solutions for expanding trade and investment to protect volatile commodity prices. While many attending the forum looked to China to produce a similar miracle to the one it had delivered in the 1997 crisis, China reaffirmed the need to adhere to ‘Asian values’ of cooperation to resolve the situation (Xinhua 2009f). While much of the Forum focused on the financial crisis and the emerging economies, there was also discussion of new areas of growth that included green development, internet innovation and the contemporary art and creative industry, as Asia explored new innovative avenues of expansion. The key to achieving the success of instigating new innovation will be through exploiting the key traits of Asian character, namely:

The unique culture in East Asia has been a main factor that turns the region into a global production and manufacturing base. [...] Mass production could be well organized through “iron discipline”. East Asian and Southeast Asian societies, which are significantly influenced by the obedient culture of Confucian, might have accepted the concept of regarding people as screws in production organizations.

(Xinhua 2009f)

As China continues to weather the crisis, it further asserts itself as a new global financial leader in the face of increasing Western protectionism. This is adding to China’s image, giving it a platform to criticise the West for the crisis, notably for the keeping of single currency reserves, while at the same time China continues to build up yuan reserves in developing countries. Despite suffering damage from the crisis, Asia continues to view that its future recovery and prosperity will be achievable by re-enforcing the Asian identity through ‘strengthening the flying geese model with China as the hub’ (China 2009b). Moreover, some also view China’s efforts as defending Asia against what it views as external US regulatory financial measures for the region, and in so doing, China is reinforcing both the region wide Asian identity, and its leadership role within it (The Washington Post 2009b).
4.3.2 Internationalism

Since the early 1970s, the norm of internationalism has increasingly been taken up through China's increased multilateral institutional activities. In the early days of the PRC, China displayed a distinct lack of internationalist responsibility. This was demonstrated through its formulation of foreign aid in two respects. Firstly, it distributed aid for the purpose of strengthening diplomatic relations; and secondly, its aid reinforced its world revolution. This can be seen between 1950 and 1960, through the correlation between Chinese aid distribution and diplomatic relations throughout Southeast Asia. This reflects the fact that the internationalist norm had not yet emerged in China at this time. As such, the distribution of aid for the purpose of strengthening diplomatic relations mirrored both China's revolutionary ideals, and also its historic legacy of the dynastic tribute system. For example, after the PRC established relations with Myanmar and Vietnam in 1950, and subsequently formed relations with Cambodia and Laos on 19 July 1958 and 25 April 1961 respectively, China granted initial official aid to the respective countries (Copper 1976: 46-9, 58-60; MFA 2009g; Renmin Ribao 1959; 1961a). In Cambodia, this aid promise amounted to US$5.6 million, while aid to Laos took the form of an official grant. In the case of the growing communist movement in Indonesia, Sukarno was viewed as an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial leader, and therefore was supported by China through the disbursement of an aid loan (Copper 1976: 51). However, when the Sukarno leadership was defeated in 1965, there was an extensive military crack-down on the communist oriented PKI. Many ethnic Chinese, from local Chinese communities, were targeted as communist agents working with China in support of world revolution and were considered to have aided the attempted coup d'état. Due to this, the PKI was designated as a threat to power in the region for serving the interests of the PRC. The Chinese aid loan of US$50 million from the CCP to the Indonesian Government was therefore discontinued (ibid.: 53). The collapse of these relations heralded the end of China's diplomatic ties with maritime Southeast Asia. It would be another two decades before Sino-Indonesian relations warmed sufficiently enough to enable links to become re-established. Since the remaining nations of the region, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia were exclusively aligned with non-communist powers, they received no support from the PRC.

Along with its newly emerging neutral image, China developed institutional links within the UN over the following two decades, increasing its activities in the region during the latter years of the Cold War. Shambaugh (2004/05: 74) pointed out that, by this time, China's involvement in the region had rivaled that of ASEAN's. In 1991, following China's increased uptake of
internationalism, the Chinese Foreign Minister represented China as a Consultative Partner of ASEAN and attended the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). This resulted in China’s participation in a series of consultative meetings with ASEAN, which included the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). By 1994, it had become a member of the ARF, an ASEAN-initiated regional security dialogue mechanism, the only one involving all the major powers of the Asia-Pacific region. In the following year, China and ASEAN established a separate political consultative forum at the vice-foreign minister’s level, to discuss political-security issues affecting the region and their relations. This annual meeting progressed quickly in terms of the depth and candidness of discussions, placing on its agenda such sensitive issues as the South China Sea disputes. By the mid-1990s, China’s attitude towards wider regional institutional cooperation and internationalism became even more positive and proactive once it came to realise that participation in the regional institutions enhanced the potential gains to its national interests, especially when their cooperative security approaches proved increasingly compatible with China’s New Security Concept (MFA 2002c). China became a full ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996, replacing its status as a consultative dialogue partner of ASEAN. In order to participate in the multilateral mechanisms of ASEAN for its aid giving, China and leaders from ASEAN countries held the first informal summit in 1997 to recognise officially the ASEAN-China process (ASEAN+1). This process was quickly followed by China’s participation in the first ‘ASEAN+3’ summit. The increase in institutional activities on a multilateral basis showed that China was ‘joining the international organisations and international system [......to] build regional community participation’ as the basic mechanism to comply with the internationalist norm (Qin and Zhu 2005: 21-7). This helped not only extinguish the ideas of a revolutionary China, but also promoted its image as a responsible power.

In addition to underlining the Asianist norm, as discussed earlier, China displayed its internationalist responsibility during the 1997 Asian financial crisis by working towards a solution to the crisis (Xinhua 2007d). From a Chinese perspective, when faced with the collapse of many of its neighbouring economies, China could have chosen to devalue its currency, which would have made its own exports more competitive. However, this would have resulted in the further deflation of the Asian economies (MFA 2000e). Such action though would also have potentially sabotaged its efforts to gain admission to the WTO and would have threatened the economy of the newly returned Hong Kong in the process. ‘China’s refusal to devalue its currency was its way of giving a guarantee to the international community and of maintaining stability in the region’ (Kirton 1999).
Following the crisis, China and ASEAN engaged region-wide reforms to the banking systems whose previously unregulated behaviour had induced the crash. In so doing, the Chinese have ‘come to see themselves as a large country and economy, a linchpin of Asia economically along with Japan, and as a responsible international citizen’ (Kirton 1999).

In a multilateral organisational mechanism, China and ASEAN announced the Asia Debt Reduction Plan in 2002, which aimed to reduce or cancel part or all of the debts for Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Later at the second session of the ASEAN 10+3 high-level regional workshops for poverty reduction held in Beijing, Hui Liangyu noted:

The Chinese Government is not only committed to solving the problem of poverty in our country, but is also actively involved in the development of supporting poverty reduction in Asia and the globe. China will further strengthen cooperation with developing countries in poverty reduction exchanges and cooperation, and will do its best to provide development assistance to the poverty-stricken country. The Chinese Government supports the China International Poverty Reduction Centre as an important platform in poverty reduction for the international community, especially the Asian region.

(CPGPRC 2006)

China’s expanded engagement with ASEAN reflects the conflict and convergence of views among states in these organisations over the importance of cooperative security and conflict management. It also reflects the increased interplay between China’s promoted international image and the norms it adheres to as a responsible state. Although China has not yet assumed a strong leadership role in terms of participation in Southeast Asian multilateral organisations, it may influence the institutionalised norms in the body as it matures. By quoting an article in Xinhua, ‘chengdan daguo zeren’ (undertaking a big power’s responsibility), the Chinese media made a point of reporting China’s shouldering of a big power’s responsibility, by citing both the official and unofficial contributions to the Southeast Asian tsunami disaster (Xinhua 2004b). In so doing, China attributed its response to the disaster, which has become known as China’s largest non-governmental donation, in terms of its internationalist responsibility. (Pan, Han, and Liu 2005: 26-7; Xinhua 2005b). Following the tsunami disaster, China also pledged government aid and promised to help rebuild the Thai tourist
industry by encouraging Chinese tourists to visit as soon as resorts were reconstructed (Percival 2007: 48).

In addition to its disaster relief aid, China has expressed its great-power identity through the internationalist norm, and through its ongoing interactions with ASEAN. ASEAN in turn has looked to China to play an enhanced role in addressing and resolving the most serious issues arising from the 2007 financial crisis by expanding opportunities for stronger cooperation and promoting long-term peace and stability in the region. In return, China proposed significant measures aimed at improving the China-ASEAN cooperation fund for developing infrastructural links between itself and ASEAN nations, by injecting US$15 billion into ASEAN countries in the form of loans to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and further expansion of the China-ASEAN and ASEAN+3 Cooperation Fund, by supplying 300,000 tons of rice for the East Asia emergency rice reserve, providing a whole range of scholarships for agricultural training, public administration and Masters studies, in addition to providing further negotiations on expanding the multilateralism of the Chiang Mai Initiative, constructing Asian bond markets, expanding foreign currency reserve pools, expanding agreements for bilateral currency swaps and promoting future ASEAN+3 FTAs (Xinhua 2009e).

Although China has promoted its internationalist responsibility, some areas of its aid activities have negatively impacted upon this image. China’s infrastructural projects along the Mekong River since the late 1990s, aimed at making the river more navigable and efficient through channel dredging and the building of hydro electric dams, have led many in the region to cite China as the cause of extensive flooding downstream in the neighbouring countries of Laos and Thailand. Following flooding in Thailand in 2000, China provided some assistance and information about its monitoring stations positioned downstream of the dams. In 2005, China held technical discussions with the Mekong River Commission (MRC) on flood management and alleviation. By 2007, China began providing the MRC with 24 hour water level and 12 hour rainfall data for their regional flood forecasts, in return for monthly flow data from the MRC’s monitoring stations downstream of China. However, the MRC countered the view that the dams, which are hydroelectric in nature, rather than irrigational, played a part in the floods, and attributed the flooding to excessive rainfall in the region. Despite this, China remains reluctant to join the MRC, as its developmental objectives of its projects would be increasingly subject to the multilateral organisation’s regulatory mechanisms (see Dosch and Hensengerth 2005: 263-86; MFA 2008a; Zhu 2009).
4.3.3 Sovereignty

China’s isolation from the international community retarded the internalization of the evolving sovereignty norm, and through the 1950s and 1960s, under the heavy influence of communist and Maoist doctrines, even resulted in China’s subjective deviation from adhering to the norm.

By empathizing with its Southeast Asian neighbours in their struggle for independence from colonization in the early days of the PRC, and subsequently from the influence of the super powers, Mao displayed sensitivity towards the states’ concerns over their own affairs. His aversion to colonialism, along with his aid experience with the Soviet Union, resulted in his formulation of two of China’s Eight Principles of Foreign Aid: the second principle, concerning the idea of aid with no-strings-attached, and the fourth principle, concerning the recipient countries’ self-reliance. This adherence to the sovereignty norm, by Mao, however, was questioned by Copper (1976: 139), when he stated that ‘Peking, however, cannot simply hand out aid without conditions’. This highlights how China’s adherence to the sovereignty norm was heavily influenced by its communist leanings and Maoist teachings. Copper further reasoned that political motivations had contributed to the significant quantities of China’s aid promises; as China lacked sufficient capital to match or surpass either Western or Soviet aid, it needed to exercise stricter control over its aid donations compared with its rivals.

Since China first proposed the five principles of peaceful coexistence in 1955 at the Bandung conference, its policies have emphasised mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The policy of ‘non-interference’ in the 1950s and early 1960s, however, was more applicable to China’s own affairs than those of the recipient countries. This can be seen in a series of discriminatory events, such as when China provided the Indonesian Government with a loan to help combat threats from both local and Taiwanese backed opposition rebel forces in 1958 (Copper1976: 51). A further example of China’s subjective adherence to the sovereignty norm can be seen in Cambodia, through China’s offer of aid to King Sihanouk in 1956, which amounted to US$22.4 million. Subsequently, when rival factions led by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen pleaded in 1997 for China’s continued assistance in their struggle against Sihanouk, they were met with less favourable responses, as China reiterated its aversion to intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. However, this had no bearing on the subsequent awarding of US$18.3 million non-repayable foreign assistance guarantee, and a US$200 million interest-free loan to Hun Sen, when he paid an official visit to Beijing in
The sovereignty norm can be seen through China’s alignment with ASEAN on specific mutually shared values, which include human rights, environmental protection and democratisation, and opposition to what is viewed as ‘interference’ from the West. By adhering to the sovereignty norm in terms of ‘non-interference’ and ‘non-intervention’, ASEAN and China aim to maintain peace and neutrality throughout Southeast Asia, as well as keep it free of any regional or external dominant powers (Nischalke 2000: 89-112). Although members of ASEAN are disparate and their aid relationships with China vary significantly, China’s involvement in the multilateral institution plays a significant role in the development of Chinese interests and identities, through the formulation of Chinese foreign aid policies. Consequently, both Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders appear to express a common dubiety towards the Western emphasis on conditional aid, despite the increase in internationalism. Unlike traditional aid donors whose aid programmes often reflected the ideals of the Western developed countries, China has sought not to directly impose its values on aid recipients but rather promote a mutually beneficial ‘win-win’ policy as a consequence of improved relations, though support for an existing government is still regarded as taking sides to some extent. According to Percival (2007: 116), Chinese-ASEAN relations demonstrate that:

[T]he Chinese version of a world in which one country rarely intervenes in another’s domestic affairs appeals to many elites that resent U.S. criticism and demands. China does not lecture them on democracy or human rights.

This was seen in 2009, following the re-sentencing of Aung San Suu Kyi to further house detention. China defended the judicial sovereignty of Myanmar, and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, by stating that ‘Beijing would not back any UN action against [Myanmar]’ (China Daily 2009d). In order to work with Southeast Asian neighbours and create a favourable peripheral environment for economic modernization, Chinese leaders have made a deliberate effort to formulate an integrated ‘good neighbour policy’ since the 1980’s, aimed at increasing China’s economic interactions with Southeast Asian countries and fostering its own positive image. This demonstrates the complex nature by which

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1 Acharya argued that norms and identity were crucial to the making of ASEAN regionalism. The norms are ‘non-use of force and pacific settlement and disputes,’ ‘regional autonomy,’ the doctrine of non-interference,’ ‘non-military pacts and preference for bilateral defence cooperation,’ and ‘ASEAN’s social-cultural norms: the “ASEAN way”’(Acharya 2001: 47-72).
sovereignty interacts with other norms such as Asianism and internationalism, and has led China in its attempts to reassure the region to associate policies with ‘becoming friends and partners with neighbours’ (yulinweishan, yilinweiban), building ‘an amicable, tranquil, and prosperous neighbourhood’ (mulin, anlin, fulin), and has even characterised itself as ‘a friendly elephant’ (youhao de daxiang) in a China-ASEAN meeting. This good neighbour policy was informed by the sovereignty norm (People’s Daily 2006b). Kurlantzick (2006a: 272) comments on this Chinese policy by stating that:

China will not interfere or meddle: foreign nations benefit because China will not make demands on other nation’s sovereignty, economic models, governance, or political culture.

By adhering to the sovereignty norm, in the face of increased internationalism, Chinese aid has also contributed to the maintenance of a peaceful environment through the development of asymmetric defensive mechanisms. Such devices attempt to ensure that the region’s countries can maintain varying degrees of self-reliance, by offsetting all but direct international pressure. Though China has actively pursued developing such mechanisms, it has found, especially in the case of Myanmar, that it has been increasingly subjected to these mechanisms (see Ramo 2004), as will be highlighted in the following section.

i) The sovereignty norm in the case of Myanmar

China’s aid relations with Myanmar highlight how its adherence to the sovereignty norm is undergoing gradual evolution. In 1990, the military junta of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which has ruled Myanmar since 1962, refused to relinquish power following democratic elections. This act resulted in the international community imposing harsh sanctions on the country in an attempt to persuade it to recognise the newly elected democratic government of the National League for Democracy (NLD). Having suffered similar international isolation during the Cold War, and with memories of the Tiananmen Square massacre and its ensuing sanctions still fresh, China became an empathetic ally of Myanmar, as well as the junta’s primary source of support through the provision of aid in the form of grants and investment in military hardware, and government run resource extraction industries. Beijing has continually disputed the effectiveness of sanctions as a means of expressing condemnation or exerting pressure internationally and politically, preferring instead to seek more diplomatic approaches to resolving crises, as sanctions, in its
view, inhibit rather than promote international dialogue. This led it to defend ‘non-interference’, by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions intent on imposing further sanctions and political leverage in order to induce change in Myanmar’s leadership behaviour (BBC 2003). This move reassured the junta in Myanmar of China’s previous affirmation in 2000 by Jiang Zemin that they opposed the action of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in the name of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ (Xinhua 2001b).

By 2007, however, the evolving sovereignty norm had influenced China’s international relations, as demonstrated when a new crisis arose over democratisation in Myanmar. This resulted in Beijing expressing a more moderate view, when Premier Wen Jiabao stated publicly that ‘China supports UN’s efforts on Myanmar to achieve stability and development’ (BBC 2007c).

In the aftermath of typhoon Nargis, which struck Myanmar in May 2008, the junta denied foreign aid organisations, such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent, access to the disaster struck regions, thereby transforming the crisis into a catastrophe. When Western aid donors asked China to exert renewed pressure on the junta on humanitarian grounds, the implications of their appeals for China to ‘be responsible’ as ‘an emerging aid donor’ appeared critical towards China. Although much international criticism had been levelled at China, for not being more instrumental in either influencing political reform in Myanmar to move towards democracy, or in expediting disaster relief in the aftermath of typhoon Nargis, the overall response of China and ASEAN has displayed significant degrees of unity, which some have viewed as the ‘ASEAN way’, thereby emphasizing the principle of ‘non-interference’ (BBC 2009b). Southeast Asian countries have all adhered to the sovereignty norm, which informed their ‘non-interference’ policy in the political system of the nation and in opposing sanctions, as their interest in maintaining the regional status quo aims to ensure panoptic regional stability. This marks a sharp contrast with the shared sovereignty norm between the Western donors, from the US and EU, and Asian countries, comprised of China and ASEAN, and reflects the differences in their policy-making towards Myanmar. In attempting to placate the international community, China has insisted that the situation in Myanmar poses no threat to international or regional peace and security, and in deflecting international interference, China has reaffirmed that ‘the future of Myanmar lies in the hands of its own people and the government through dialogue and consultation’ (People’s Daily 2007d). This reaffirms its belief that ‘the opinions of the country in question and the regional organisations concerned should be respected, and that it is eventually the responsibility of the Security Council to make the decision to ease
and defuse the crisis within the framework of the UN’, rather than through the more unilateral approaches advocated by the international powers (Lee, Chan, and Chan 2009: 111). Conversely, Myanmar’s ruling regime has ‘skilfully used the twin threats of instability in minority border regions and increasing reliance on China to dissuade its neighbours from intervening in its internal affairs and pushing it too hard’ (ibid.: 110).

In the early 2000s, China supported a less confrontational path to deal with international concerns over Myanmar, which was in keeping with its adherence to sovereignty and non-interference. This led many Western states to argue that China’s position was as an endorsement of the ruling junta. However, as the rhetoric of China and ASEAN has moderated, Myanmar has been more conciliatory towards the collective efforts of China and ASEAN in line with China and ASEAN’s enhanced uptake of internationalism. In 2009, China encouraged the international community to pursue dialogue with Myanmar rather than intervention, and as such refused to support UN sanctions. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu stated that:

This not only accords with Myanmar’s interests, it is also beneficial to regional stability [and as such] International society should fully respect Myanmar’s judicial sovereignty.

(China Daily 2009d)

While this revision to its policy of non-interference does not necessarily imply that China was endorsing good governance, it does demonstrate how China has adjusted its behaviour in line with its great-power identity and image as a responsible power.

China’s foreign aid approach reflects partly its strict adherence to the principles of the institutions of which it has become a member, in its quest for greater global recognition, in order to ‘strengthen the moral legitimacy of an international society based on the state-centric principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention’, rather than purely serving its own short-term interests, and partly to its objection of Western powers disregarding the institutions of global governance in favour of their own unilateral approaches, often in the guise of moralistic issues (Lee, Chan, and Chan 2009: 113).

4.3.4 Developmentalism

Developmentalism demonstrates how China’s foreign aid policies provide a broad range of sustainable innovative aid, of a direct and indirect nature, to the
Southeast Asian region in accordance with the Beijing Consensus. The aim of this aid is to encourage primarily economic growth in the recipient countries’ key industries, and the redressing of regional inequality and self-reliance, and in doing so, strengthening China’s identity as a great power.

By focussing on economic development, China has expanded its relations throughout Southeast Asia through a wide range of mutually beneficial projects, based not only on infrastructure (see People’s Daily 2005b), but also on education, culture and health care. It thereby clarified its aid projects in Southeast Asia in terms of Jiang Zemin’s ‘go out’ policy, which was first proposed in the region following China’s ascension to the WTO in 2002. This policy, which embodies China’s ‘three closeness’ theory, has provided China with incentives to facilitate not only its own prosperity, but also the prosperity of the region by emphasizing effective cooperative implementation, and the provision of foreign investment and aid to Chinese firms. These incentives are provided in the form of government-backed soft loans and export credit for businesses in the Southeast Asian region (MFA 2002e). Many of the regional projects have been, since 2004, further supported by the ASEAN-China cooperation fund, and in future, will also be funded by the proposed Asia regional cooperation fund. Additionally, China’s multilateral commercial initiatives are focussed upon projects run and supported by the UN, the ADB and the ASEAN. The enhancement of developmentalism highlights how the norm underwent cascade and internalisation in the early 2000s following China’s emergence in the late 1970s, and has contributed to its ongoing re-establishment of its great-power identity.

i) Forms of developmental assistance

Since China’s definition of foreign aid is broad, the target of its assistance programmes is consequently wide ranging. As the economies of Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam are predominantly agriculturally based, China has used regional aid to promote and encourage innovation, as well as create environments for growth and development, by focussing primarily upon providing agricultural and technical aid. This aid conforms to both its ‘South-South cooperation’ policy (MFA 2006c) and the practice of the developmentalism, in line with its promotion of sustainable development, by providing training in multi-agricultural and ripening techniques, training for a variety of territorial roles ranging from officers in ASEAN, tourism, and electronic business, to regional Mekong customs and excise agents. In the Philippines, Chinese agricultural cooperatives have contributed to the establishment of important bilateral ties: in 1999, China and the Philippines signed the Agreement on Enforcing Agriculture
and Related Areas cooperation; in 2000, China provided US$1 million in credit loans to the Philippines for agricultural development, and in March 2003, the centre for China-Philippine Agriculture Technique was established in the Philippines, with the support of China (MFA 2009g). In addition, Cambodia has been the recipient of a relatively large proportion of foreign aid from a variety of sources, with over half of the Government’s budget comprising external funding accounts amounting to nearly 23 per cent from China alone. These have been used for a variety of purposes, from supporting local elections (People’s Daily 2007b) to the preservation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site of Angkor Wat (BBC 2006a). Collaborative efforts from the World Bank, comprising a consortium of international financial organisations and donor countries, known as the Consultative Group for Cambodia, have set out guidelines for economic and political reform for the Government of Cambodia since 1996. China first utilised the pledging mechanisms of this institution to offer aid to Cambodia in 2007 (Asia Times 2006b).

China believes that the process of development is, by its very nature, chaotic (Ramo 2004: 11-2), and the result of the events shaping it. As the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty shifted towards human rights in the region, the ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund was established to support human resource development, finance training, and seminars, predominantly for ASEAN countries. In the 2004 Eighth China-ASEAN Summit, Premier Wen declared that China would increase the fund by US$5 million, along with the announcement that an additional US$15 million would be provided to establish the Asia Regional Cooperation Fund, to encourage the related government agencies and firms of China to become involved in the cooperative efforts within ASEAN countries. With the establishment of this fund, the Ministry of Commerce will maintain its portfolio of international aid, while the Asia Regional Cooperation Fund will be available to provide loans to Chinese firms to invest in recipient countries. The utilization of loans from the fund by Chinese firms is on the condition of a matching investment from the firm itself. This form of mixed investment, from the Ministry of Commerce, fund loan, and firms’ capital, benefits not only the recipient countries who can absorb more capital, but also the Chinese companies who expand their own opportunities, demonstrating that as China provides aid to Southeast Asia, it simultaneously opens the aid recipients’ market. This indicates how China’s policy makers determine how developmentalism provides economic benefit when formulating aid.

In addressing the regional imbalance in economic development, arising
from relatively more affluent nations such as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand being juxtaposed to the region's poorest nations, China has concentrated its economic assistance efforts on the poorer nations of the region with whom it shares relatively amicable relations through the supply of economic and military assistance along with associated implicit security guarantees. By sharing mutual land borders with China, in the case of Myanmar and Laos, or, in the case of Cambodia, relatively close borders, these nations have benefited from China's continued financing of a range of projects related to infrastructure, construction, energy, the prevention of human trafficking, and counter narcotics, in return for which the nations rely upon Chinese equipment, technical expertise, and labour (ZDJMN 1984-2003). Its use of bilateral aid in Thailand has promoted the kind of lobbying displayed in Washington; namely, to encourage important elected Thai politicians to attend study trips and conferences in China. Funds have also been distributed throughout Thailand to purchase Thai agricultural surpluses and agriculture, thereby mollifying the concerns of Thai farmers about the impact of China’s Free Trade Agreement (Kurlantzick 2006a: 274).

The success in providing direct and indirect innovative aid throughout the region promotes a self-sustaining form of self-confidence in the recipient countries. It should be noted though that the closeness of the region's cultural and historical ties, and the widespread adherence to Confucianism, makes this model adaptable, as people in Southeast Asia share similar work ethics to those in Northeast Asia (Ramo 2004: 67).

ii) A regional focus

The Mekong River Basin has become a new focus for China's Southeast Asia policy. As ASEAN and China have continued to collaborate, by implementing numerous development programmes and projects in the Mekong River Basin, within various frames such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) and the MRC, the Greater Mekong Sub-region cooperation programme has expanded to include Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand. According to China's State Report on Participation in the Mekong Sub-Regional Cooperation (MFA 2008a), China has so far joined the Agreement on Facility Passenger and Goods Transport in the Mekong Sub-Region, and has provided funds for channel improvement for the Mekong river that include US$5 million for help in regulating sections within Laos and Myanmar and the preparatory work for the Pan-Asia Railway.

China's increased investment in infrastructure projects, within its own borders and Southeast Asian nations, has provided mutual benefits. While the
region’s nations profit from China’s aid, the migration of the Chinese labour workforce to the regions, which pursue these lucrative opportunities, alleviates its domestic regional employment pressures. This is reflected in the popular saying in China: ‘If you want to get rich, build roads’ (Interview 2007c; 2007d). Trans-regional collaborations have attracted extensive investment, as seen by China’s interest-free loans and grants which amount to RMB 249 million (US$30 million), to Thailand and the ADB, for the construction of the Kunming-Bangkok highway, as well as similar sized packages to the Laotian section of this important interstate channel (National Development and Reform Commission 2003: 117).

As part of this effort to create a better long-term environment for development, China’s efforts towards creating and sustaining region-wide FTAs are already coming to fruition with the completion of the first CAFTA, which will launch on January 1, 2010 (Wong, Zou, and Zeng 2006: 13), allowing all the region’s countries increased access to each others markets. This is promoting China’s great-power status, as it will become the first major regional power to create a region wide FTA, ahead of Korea and Japan, whose own FTAs are still in various stages of development. China’s Asianist leader status is being strengthened by longer term goals of merging these three FTAs into a trans-East Asian FTA. With the completion of this, along with the pan-Asian transportation routes and enhanced trade networks linking Shanghai with Singapore, China’s aid in cooperative regional efforts is sustaining a major regional zone within Asia that can support the countries. By creating internal markets, China is also helping to create sustained growth of markets, whose existence depends less on external market factors beyond their control, which as seen in the recent financial crisis have proved pivotal in affecting global markets. While these markets will be linked to the FTAs, the combined unity within Asia will provide security and protection during times of crisis, thereby not only enhancing developmentalism, but also Asianism and internationalism in China.

Despite promoting free trade in the region, China is also negotiating closer bilateral trade ties and economic partnerships with individual Southeast Asian nations. Though China may appear to be the largest resultant competitor, it is displaying symbolic gestures, as seen by the Early Harvest Program (EHP), to reassure the region of its determination to promote growth. This policy helped neighbours like Thailand to negotiate mutual reductions in trading barriers in some agricultural goods ahead of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), as did the extension of aid to the least developed Indochinese countries for infrastructural projects. This thereby suggested that the Chinese emphasis on infrastructural development, such as bridges and dams, reduces suspicions of
symbolic domination, and creates a positive image of a benign donor. By downplaying the ‘black GDP growth’ through the presentation of ‘clean GDP’ (Ramo 2004: 23).

China’s interpretation of ‘clean GDP growth’ plays an important role in the regional developmentalist norm (Ramo 2004). Although China still attracts substantial criticism for its resource extraction projects in the region, China is reconciling this in terms of its great-power status, whereby a bigger, more powerful and cooperative China can provide better assistance across the entire region. By investing in major projects in the region, China has had to create a wide range of supporting industries to sustain these projects abroad, and in doing so, has provided much needed services for the local communities where the projects are being undertaken. This is seen in the GMS project, where many of the projects have had their associated problems, notably the environmental damage being inflicted through the dredging and damming of the Mekong River. However, the long-term goals of such projects and the impact they will have on the entire region are still being promoted as the primary incentives for the completion of such projects. A further example of China promoting what it views as the long-term good in the face of conflictingly bad evidence can be seen in the case of Myanmar, whose military junta refused to recognise the democratically elected government of the NLD, as explained earlier. Even in the face of extensive international condemnation, China has continued with its adherence to the sovereignty norm (People’s Daily 2007d; also see Guo 2008).

By providing aid with no-strings-attached, China is also providing implicit and asymmetric strategic leverage on more traditional aid donors, many of whom have become concerned with the efficacy of their attached aid policies, forcing them to consider rethinking their strategies for aid disbursal. Though China may implicitly encourage the development of asymmetric strategic leverage, its aid activities have resulted in it too becoming subjected to such leverage, as in the case of Myanmar, where the military junta utilise asymmetric methods to offset international intervention, by playing China against the wider international community (Guo 2008). Despite this, China’s adherence to developmentalism continues to view the long-term benefits of development in the region above what it views as transient issues, as it develops its great-power identity further.

4.4. Summary

China’s adherence to the norms in this region can be interpreted through a range of factors. Figures 4.1-4.5 show how each of the respective factors reflecting each norm has changed over time. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 highlights how ASEAN activity
has developed since the organisation's inception, and continues by highlighting how this activity is linked to the expansion of China’s involvement with the institution. Internationalism is reflected, in Figure 4.3, by the increase in number of international organisations in which China has gained membership. The Sovereignty norm is highlighted, in Figure 4.4, by relating the number of bilateral relations to the number of multilateral relations, in order to calculate an estimate of the probability of China adhering to its non-interference policy. Developmentalism is interpreted, in Figure 4.5, by estimating changes in norm intended practical and norm unintended rhetorical perspectives, by measuring the actual aid donated to Southeast Asia, between 2002 and 2008, and comparing it to the rhetorical accouchement that accompanied the increase in number of regional summits.

Asianism

The Asianist norm, and its concentration on Asian identity, has become significantly stronger since the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Before the crisis, Asian identity was very diffuse and hard to rationalise. Following the end of the Cold War, a new period of hope and developmentalism swept through the region, as countries embraced the Japanese ‘flying geese’ top-down model of development, which led in many cases to the formation of optimistic and non-regulated systems that induced ‘bubble economies’. The apparent and prolific success of these economies was attributed to work ethics defined by ‘Asian values’, which adhered to traditional East Asian Confucian teachings (MFA 2004d).

During much of the early 1990s, China’s interactions with Southeast Asia were still mired in the legacies of its Cold War relations, despite some initial promising interactions with ASEAN. China frequently became engaged in conflict with ASEAN countries, notably over territorial maritime disputes in the South China Sea. These conflicts highlight how China’s new identity as a great power was emerging, but had yet to internalise defined norms of behaviour, such as Asianism and internationalism. Such disputes usually escalated when they drew wider attention from the US armed forces. As it discovered its interests in the region were becoming threatened by its own actions, China formulated its New Security Concept, which aimed to moderate its hostilities in the region. In 1997, following the collapse of the Thai currency, the ‘bubble economies’ successively began to burst, inducing region wide financial chaos. As the crisis became more widespread, China did not devalue its currency; this move is widely heralded as a key factor in reducing the damage from the crisis. This move strengthened its
reputation throughout Asia and also brought it wider international recognition, promoting its Asianist leadership role and the internationalist norm further. Following the crisis, as the region began to recover, China expanded its interaction with ASEAN which resulted in the instigation of the ASEAN+1 and subsequently ASEAN+3 meetings, providing wider collaborative efforts between South East and North East Asia. This led to the strengthening of region wide collaboration through a series of bilateral currency swaps under the Chiang Mai Initiative, and helped seed the foundations for a region wide FTA. As China’s cooperative interactions with the regional institution expanded, it ratified the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, heralding a new era whereby it worked towards more peaceful collaborative efforts. There was also a marked shift towards modifying the ‘flying geese’ model into a more Chinese centred development path, by adhering to the characteristics of ‘bamboo capitalism’, as the original model was felt to have induced the environment that perpetuated the financial crisis. Although Japan’s influence in the region remained strong, as seen by its insistence on expanding ASEAN+3 meetings to include India, New Zealand and Australia, China only sanctioned their inclusion after these countries agreed to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, which bound the countries to serving the region’s interests primarily. The SARS epidemic and Southeast Asian tsunami crisis highlighted new areas of regional cooperation for China and ASEAN. In response to SARS, China broadened its region wide collaborative efforts by providing disease containment aid, as well as assistance to its neighbours whose tourist economies had been damaged by the epidemic. The non-traditional nature of these threats also reinforced both internationalism and developmentalism in parallel with Asianism, though through necessity it negatively affected China’s traditional view of sovereignty, on humanitarian grounds. The shift towards humanitarian grounds reflects the evolution of the sovereignty norm towards an increased concern with moral legitimacy.

Though China’s relief efforts for the tsunami victims were significantly overshadowed by the more traditional donor countries, it highlighted additional key areas of importance for China. By seeking greater collaborative efforts with the region, it demonstrated its international responsibility and determination to ensure region wide development, in a move that promoted its leadership role further.

Despite China’s ongoing leadership challenge with Japan, China has occasionally conceded financial ground for the sake of wider regional cooperation. By supporting financial regional plans which were developed by Japan, using its extensive Yen reserves, China has ensured the continuation of regional institutions,
despite allowing Japan to prosper competitively from such moves. China’s expansive cooperation with ASEAN has significantly widened over the past few years, as it has pushed for greater regional cooperation. During the 2007 financial crisis and its aftermath, much of East Asia looked to China for solutions to the crisis, though China continued to stress the importance of collaboration, by stressing how adherence to region wide ‘Asian values’ will still create the basis for future regional prosperity, thereby strengthening its leadership role further. All of these factors stimulate China’s desire to promote a ‘harmonious Asia’, which features China in a prominent leadership role.

![Figure 4.1 The number of ASEAN and ASEAN related summits per five year period](image)

The initial plot Figure 4.1 shows the number of summits held by ASEAN since its inception. Figure 4.2 highlights that before the countries of East Asia became involved in proceedings of ASEAN, the number of summits remained minimal. Once cooperation began between the countries, pro-activity and cooperation increased between the states. Figure 4.2 also demonstrates the competition between the three East Asian nations, highlighting that China’s involvement has contributed not only to the rise in number of summits, but also resulted in almost half of all agreements and declarations ratified during those summits. This shows the increase in practice of Asianism since the early 1990s, and highlights how the norm has increasingly emerged in the region. This
demonstrates how norm uptake is most likely to have occurred between the late
1990s and the early to mid-2000s. Its continued growth is propelling it towards
cascade and internalisation as its great-power identity strengthens, this point is
most likely to have been passed by the mid-2000s.

\[\text{Figure 4.2 The cumulative number of cooperative agreements signed between ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea, between 1993-2009 (Source data: see Appendix 3)}\]

**Internationalism**

With regard to internationalism, during the 1950s and 1960s, China displayed a
distinct lack of international responsibility through its support of world revolution
and disbursement of aid for diplomatic reasons, despite rhetorically claiming
otherwise. Multilateralism throughout the region remained next to impossible due
to Cold War alliances. Upon joining the UN, China redefined its role and
re-framed its activities in the region. By becoming more involved in the
multilateral channels of the UN, it was better able to provide neutral support to
the developing countries of the region during the 1970s. This can be seen in
Figure 4.3, which shows the internationalist norm emerging in 1970 as the PRC
began joining international institutions. While China had joined a number of
institutions throughout the early years of the 20th century, these institutions had
almost exclusively recognized the ROC as the global representative of China following the revolution in 1949; a principal exception being the non aligned movement which featured prominently in the Bandung conference of 1955. The gradual increase of the uptake of internationalism since 1970 highlights not only the intent of China’s promotion of internationalism but also the scale of the efforts that were needed to convince other countries of their intent in the region through their enhanced embrace of the norm. Although its aid activities decreased in the 1980s, as it became introspective, this activism reappeared in the 1990s, when, enhanced by the newly emerging norm of developmentalism, China’s involvement with ASEAN expanded, and led to an increase in multilateral cooperation with its regional neighbours. The continued growth in number of international institutions highlights the increase in number of areas that China had to develop in to become increasingly internationally responsible. In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, China demonstrated multilateral responsibility by engaging with ASEAN, and instigating a region-wide reform program aimed at improving the financial infrastructure that had induced the crisis. In so doing, China became more proactive and positive as it became apparent that these mechanisms could benefit its own interests. This cooperation widened in 2002 as the Asia Debt Reduction Plan was instigated, heralding the start of much wider China-ASEAN multilateral efforts, which became further strengthened in 2003, with the signing of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Although the SARS crisis and Southeast Asian tsunami highlighted significant deficiencies in China’s capacities, China made greater multilateral cooperative efforts. Its active role in creating region wide FTAs and playing a prominent role in the developing plans for recovery from the 2007 financial crisis, have broadened the internationalist norm further. Despite this, some of its aid, notably in the GMS projects, has been considered irresponsible. However, this is being reconciled in terms of the developmentalist norm and China’s overall view of the long-term benefits of its aid projects, despite the ‘black GDP growth’ that may result. Although it still refuses membership of the MRC, it has cooperated in providing information to assist in reducing further contention along the river, indicating at least an awareness of its internationalist responsibility to the region. This is reflected in Figure 4.3 by the position of the internationalist norm in 2010, which shows that although uptake of the norm has considerably increased, it has yet to become internalised. Internalisation of the norm would be represented by a leveling off of the number of institutions joined. This process is evolving alongside its growth as a great power.
The number of international organisations within the Southeast Asian region, shown in Figure 4.3, which have associations with the PRC reflects those organisations that are exclusive to the region, such as ASEAN, as well as global institutions, such as the UN, whose global multilateral involvement necessitates their inclusion in Figure 4.3, 5.1 and 6.1. From these diagrams, it can be seen that the internationalist trend is approximately constant across the three regions. The complete assignment of institutions throughout the various regions is shown in Appendix 3.

**Sovereignty**

China’s adherence to sovereignty has varied over the period between 1950 and 2010. As the PRC was founded on sovereignty, this dates its emergence to before 1949. The Communist revolution and Maoist teachings had a detrimental influence on the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm, as China during the 1950s and 1960s continued to view this activism in terms of assisting communist comrades in Southeast Asia, in their fight against Western powers,
notably the US. As many of the countries in the region were colonised by the West, China did not view them as sovereign states; therefore they had no sovereignty to observe until they became independent. As China couldn’t afford to donate vast sums of completely unconditional aid, it was able to place distinct conditions upon its receipt according to its own interests. From the 1970s onwards, the practice has increased as China’s rhetoric has remained constant; since 1990, however, this rhetoric has gradually decreased. The Southeast Asian case highlights how China provided aid in the aftermath of SARS and the avian flu outbreaks, yet had to warn other countries about the dangers of the epidemics, in contradiction to its strict non-interference in a state’s internal affairs. This is in contrast to the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty norm which evolved gradually between 1950 and 1970.

The sovereignty norm influencing China’s relations with the region since the early 1990s has been realised through multilateral alignments with ASEAN, and aims to protect the region against interference and intervention from external powers, mirroring the concepts initially extolled at Bandung in the 1950s. Though China has avoided conflict in the region, as part of its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, it faces extensive international criticism over its support of Myanmar, and its reluctance to intervene in the matter is causing international condemnation. Despite this, the changes to the Westphalian concept of the sovereignty are increasingly aligning the norm with human rights and increased moral and internationalist responsibility. Though China adheres to the sovereignty norm, developmentalism and the desire to maintain a high level of development are exerting an effect on China’s adherence to the sovereignty norm by making its rhetoric towards the junta more persuasive. Though it is still unlikely to intervene, the evolution of the norm is inducing a change of attitude in China, which may view developing strategic leverage through the support of an opposition party in a country as a means of appearing more internationally responsible, and in so doing increasing regional stability and its leadership role. Such moves appear in light of the Tropical storm Nargis in the region, the aftermath of which impacted heavily upon China’s moral legitimacy and image as a great power. Figure 4.4 shows how a calculated coefficient related to the number of bi- and multilateral relations has varied over the period from 1950 to 2010. The rational behind the coefficient reasons\(^1\) that the existence of a bilateral relation permits the opportunity for a

\[^1\] The equation shows that the probability of one country interfering with another is linked to the number of its bilateral relations; if there are only bilateral relations and no multilateral relations, the probability of a country interfering with its bilateral relative is high. This does not imply that interference will occur, only that the likelihood is strong. The presence of multilateral relations shows that the countries have shared interests with other countries across the region, and are therefore constrained by them, consequently, the number of multilateral relations increases.
country to interfere in the internal affairs of the other. The presence of a multilateral relationship serves to constrain the bilateral relations, therefore reducing the probability of interference. This measure is displayed in its simplest case, in Figure 4.4, by considering the total number of bilateral relations in a region, relative to the number of multilateral relations formed during the same period. This assumes that the relations are of equal magnitude, with relative and equivalent weightings. It also assumes the absence of unilateral relations within a region, which would introduce additional factors into the equation. From the Figure, it may be inferred that in the absence of internationalism the probability that the PRC would interfere with countries through its bilateral relations was considerable. However, as the number of multilateral relations increased relative to the bilateral relations, this probability decreased, and the non-interference coefficient increased, proportionate to China’s adherence to the sovereignty norm.

Figure 4.4 The variation of a coefficient of non-interference from 1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3)
Developmentalism

Since the manifestation of the developmentalist norm, namely the Beijing Consensus, has only grown in prominence in the last decade, Figure 4.5 shows how the norm, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, has varied during this period. Although Western donors continue to question the Beijing Consensus’s promotion of authoritarian control, the CCP is finding that since its development policies have created an increasingly affluent population, it is becoming necessary to appease this populace in order to retain its level of influence. There are distinct signs that much of the region is benefiting from the developmentalist guided aid from China.

The increased practice of developmentalism since the late 1990s shows how China has actively increased development in the region, in line with its great-power identity and the uptake of Asianism. This highlights how a limiting step of the evolution of the norm was linked to its own development, which since the 1990s, has expanded more rapidly, facilitating greater norm up take, and internalisation.

China’s adherence to the norms in this region can be interpreted from both norm-intended practical or norm-unintended rhetorical perspectives. The dimension of norm-intended practice provides an indication of the emergence and uptake of the norm, while the dimension of norm-unintended rhetoric highlights the extent to which China was attempting to convince others of its adherence to the norm. Figure 4.5 highlights how rhetoric, as measured by the number of summits held between ASEAN and China, is related to the practical deployment of aid throughout the initial decade of the 21st century. Such summits are accompanied by high levels of rhetoric promoting the cooperative efforts of the parties. As the number of summits is also directly related to the growth of Asianism, this highlights the relationship between developmentalism and Asianism in Southeast Asia.
Though significant second-order factors, as previously discussed, may be seen to moderate the norms, there are also first order factors visible through the norms, of which the most significant remains the power monopoly of the CCP. As China’s aid activities increased in the region in the early 2000s, these positively fed back through the mercantilist driven aid formulation channels, endorsing the CCP leadership’s direction of its activism. With a large proportion of the region’s aid being formulated in successful projects related to trade and infrastructure, such as the FTAs and trans Asian supply routes, this trend looks set to continue well into the next decade and beyond.

The next case study chapter will continue the investigation of China’s foreign aid policies in the African continent, by studying how the norms have been influencing China’s foreign aid policy in a continent external to China’s traditional cultural values, with which it has developed long-term ties.
CHAPTER 5

CHINA’S FOREIGN AID TO AFRICA

5.1 The significance of the African case

Africa stands out as a region of significant importance to China, because of its role as a test bed for the application of the norms and because it is free from the historical influences and challenges to China’s security and development. This raises pertinent and significant questions as to the motivations behind China’s interest in the region. Unlike Southeast Asia with its geographical proximity, cultural links, and long tradition of trade and influence, Africa has provided China with an opportunity to expand outside its traditional spheres of influence into a region long associated with Cold War dynamics and the ideological and strategic battle of the superpowers. The significance of China’s activities in the region, as demonstrated through its aid activities (Xinhua 2009a), lies in three distinct areas: firstly, the pivotal role that Africa has played in its re-emergence into the international community; secondly, its pursuit of natural resources to fuel its domestic development; and thirdly, the effect of these activities on more traditional aid donors’ attempts to develop the region.

Following the Sino-Soviet rift in 1960, China, through a necessity to survive and reconstruct its identity and global image, focussed upon the increasing awareness of the fact that the growing number of African countries that were members of the UN with voting rights constituted a very important percentage of the majority in the UN General Assembly in the early 1960s. These states were also subjected to often unwelcome influences from the superpowers, to which China was opposed; a point which strengthened China’s identification with them, prioritised its aid policy during this time, and imposed limits on the extent of bilateral relations. During the early years of the PRC, and the initial development of Sino-African relations, China provided aid to struggling African states, many of whom were, at that time, aligned with Taiwan, to develop national independence, economic self-reliance, and nurture developing world cooperation. Through these schemes, it was able to empathise with many African states, having itself been a victim of Western aggression. This point still resounds in the rhetoric of the modern PRC even today, as Hu Jintao’s speech, at the University of Pretoria, reiterated:
[T]he Chinese people once suffered from colonial aggression and oppression from the major powers in a similar way to the majority of the African countries which have similar historical experiences and tragic destinies. [......] After the founding of a new China, the Chinese Government and people have firmly provided political, material and moral support for the heroic struggle against colonial rule for the national liberation of the African people. 

(MFA 2007b)

China’s activities in Africa resulted in the region’s countries increasingly identifying with, and providing significant support for, the PRC. This enabled China to gain its seat at the UN in 1971, thereby displacing the ROC in the process. Its subsequent aid engagement in Africa during the 1970s contributed not only to the transformation of its identity into that of an international partner, without the burden of association with the imposing superpowers, but also allowed it to nurture a foundation for establishing Sino-African relations on its own terms. This has been further strengthened with the image of China as a non-threatening international aid donor and champion of the developing world. That image was reinforced by its neutrality in the 1970s and 1980s, which was due in no small part to its providing developing countries with an alternative to the traditional aid programmes of the ‘West’, a point which Premier Wen Jiabao reaffirmed:

Sino-African cooperation is an important component of South-South cooperation. [......] We are ready to work together with African countries to further develop and strengthen long-term Sino-African stability, equality and mutual benefit and all-round cooperation for a new partnership to become a model for South-South cooperation. [......] Chinese economic assistance to Africa remains sincere, and without the attachment of any political conditions.

(Xinhua 2003)

The international attention that China’s relationship has attracted is, in part, due to China’s renewed international image as an aid donor (IMF and World Bank 2007: 152). A combination of the factors, namely, the successful aid donor image, non-interference policies, challenges to traditional aid programmes, and its own remarkable economic success, has led many African states to associate the idea of
China being ‘a significant partner in developing support’ with the issue of aid contribution for Africa (DFARSA 2000). This transformation of its identity, and with it its internal self-perception nurtured primarily for its own population – along with its image portrayed to the outside community – are all related to the norms shaping China’s foreign aid policy. The significance of Hu’s affirmations, coupled with the lack of transparency by China, which does not publish exact figures regarding aid donation, reflects its internal concerns over maintaining a popular image to their own population, who may regard domestic needs as a higher priority (Interview 2006a; 2006d; 2007b). This contributes to the reiteration of China’s aid contribution to Africa through organisations such as the UN and IMF, being matched by reminders of African support of major Chinese agendas, such as its successful 2008 Olympic bid (MFA 2009b).

Since institutional responsibility for China’s foreign aid was shifted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in 1982, resulting in the creation of the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries, the number of regional bureaus has increased significantly, along with an enhanced emphasis on Africa (MOCOM 2009). As Africa remains of considerable interest to China, the attention paid to it by academics and policy planners continues to grow. This has become rather significant, and caused many Western-led aid donor bodies to argue that China’s aid donor role in the region undermines their own efforts to democratise and develop the continent, thereby raising concerns about how China’s adherence to the norms in the region are reshaping traditional donors’ plans for development (BBC 2007a). In contrast, China’s lending is generally welcomed by African governments. Loan contracts are often made at the highest political level, as demonstrated in Zambia, where such activity has continued to raise the concerns of international organisations, as well as Zambian NGOs. In keeping with the sovereignty norm, of which non-interference in state affairs plays an integral part, the Chinese Government accords little importance to transparency in agreements, as is often a condition for aid by traditional aid donors, and may in fact divert internal priorities away from its principal poverty reduction drives (Huse and Muyakwa 2008). China’s adherence to the sovereignty norm and its policy of non-interference has also benefited its own industrial and commercial interests, and generated significant returns on their investments, often in African markets that are unable to compete equally with Chinese markets. This has arisen since many of the aid projects are completed by Chinese engineering and mineral extraction companies, which expand China’s own equity market. The diverting of priorities is invoking significant antipathy from the West towards Chinese foreign policy, due to its simultaneous pursuit of, engagement in, and critical stance
towards, those norms adhered to by international aid donors. International aid donors are arguably of the same mind concerning the expectations and responsibilities they place on aid recipient nations, since China is now challenging the conventional behaviour that has come to typify donor and recipient relations. As these relations have enkindled the highest degree of interest among current China observers, they serve as the principal motivation for this study.

5.2 Historical Relations with Africa

Prior to 1949, there had been no notable established connections between the two regions, and what connections had existed contributed little to modern Sino-African relations (EPRCRA 2006). This fact was due, in part, to there being no recognised sovereign African states, with the exception of Ethiopia, and as such, Chinese foreign relations with Africa remained dormant until the establishment of independent states and governments following decolonization, and the end of the Chinese civil war (Renmin Ribao 2006).

The early Chinese-African relations of the 1950s, have been repeatedly reiterated in domestic and international meetings with African leaders across the continent, and have become widely taught in present day Chinese history classes (MFA 2006b). The PRC’s foreign relations with Africa have traversed periods of intense involvement in the region, as seen during China’s pursuit of international recognition and social revolution in the 1960s, and by lulls and in some cases withdrawals, as China’s identity transitioned between that of victim and neutral player in the 1970s, which catalysed the reduction in its support for revolutionary groups, before re-emerging in a period of renewed and intense involvement in the region’s politics, trade relations, and aid, as seen by its identity change into that of a great power.

5.2.1 Years aligned with the Soviets

In the early years of the PRC, China faced the challenge of attaining international recognition, and alongside its participation in the Soviet led world revolution, saw Africa, and their emerging struggles for independence throughout the continent, as an ally with whom to gain wider recognition for both its government and legitimacy. The establishment and promotion of shared experiences and injustices at the hands of foreign colonial powers was to prove central to China’s re-emergence in Africa, and the main focus of its foreign policy efforts in the 1950s, prior to the Sino-Soviet split. Due to its geographical remoteness, lack of cultural links, and sparse trade relations, China used its experience as a victim of
colonization to bridge the cultural and historical divide separating Africa from itself and other peoples in the struggle for self rule. Snow (1994: 284) highlighted this policy by stating:

[T]he commanders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) compared the current situation in Africa with the state of China [......] between the Boxer Rebellion and the Fourth May Movement of 1919. The conclusion drawn was that [......] we must tell them [......] about the significance of the Taiping uprising, the Boxer uprising, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and the revolutionary experience of the Communists of this generation.

This message had a significant impact on liberation movements across the region, as increasing numbers of independence struggles throughout the continent turned to the Soviets and the Chinese for support and aid in their struggle for independence. As Felix Moumié, the leader of Cameroon’s independence struggle commented in 1959, ‘the Chinese revolution is an example to be followed by the people of the Cameroon and all other peoples in Africa’ (Snow 1994: 284). Chinese involvement in Africa necessitated a public relations campaign to explain, and in some cases justify its presence in the region, in the face of decades of European indoctrination and teaching about the Chinese. African people had little knowledge of, or information about, the Chinese, other than what they had been taught by their colonial masters. It is worth remarking that China’s own knowledge and history of Africa, suffered from the same lack of independent and personal experience. This fact is supported by the continued reliance on the same limited surviving historical accounts of earlier Sino-African encounters, notably from the fifteenth century chronicles of Zheng He, that were frequently recounted by the Chinese leadership. During the 1950s, the PRC’s ongoing preoccupation with becoming internationally identified as the representation of China, along with concerns for its own security, influenced its relations with Africa. Through the sharing of this common revolutionary identity with African insurgent groups, China continued to build its relations across the continent, notably with communist and non-aligned states.

In 1955, China took part in a major conference in Bandung, where many countries of the non-aligned world gathered to formulate their visions for their collective future and identities. At the conference, China asserted that it, along with Africa, was unified in their victimization by the ‘West’. This conviction was conceptualized by Premier Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
which became adopted as the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement, as co-founded by India’s Nehru, Yugoslavia’s Tito and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, and was subsequently incorporated into the final communique of the conference.

In an effort to establish ties with the Muslim nations of North Africa, China sent envoys and diplomats from the Muslim regions of its own north-western provinces. The region north of the Sahara was home to some of the earliest states to secure independence from their European colonizers, with Egypt becoming the first African state to officially recognize the PRC in 1956 (MFA 2009f). This recognition, along with other political moves by the Nasser leadership, led to a deterioration of relations between Egypt and the United States, who at the time recognized the Taiwan based ROC as the legitimate government of China. ‘The American administration resented Nasser’s apparent lack of interest in its Middle Eastern peace initiatives and his recognition of the People’s Republic of China’ (Kunz 1991: 69). When America withdrew support for the Aswan Dam project, over Egypt’s recognition of the PRC, the Nasser led Government nationalized the Suez Canal, in a move that ignited the Suez Crisis and led to Egypt’s closer ties with the Soviet Union.

[W]ith Nasser seen to be increasingly courting the Russians and Red China, [...] the Americans, swiftly followed by the British, announced their decision to withdraw their offer of a loan, thereby scuppering the whole project [...] the unbearable pressure a $400 million loan would impose on the Egyptian economy was cited publicly as the reason.

(Shaw 1995: 3)

China took full advantage of the conflict that ensued to argue that the European colonial powers and their American counter-parts, continued to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states (see Kunz 1991:51; Shaw 1995: 155, 163).

Following the events in Egypt, it became apparent to the Chinese leadership that its future in sub-Saharan Africa also lay in the identification with, and support of, liberation movements in their fight for independence and decolonization.

They have [...] played a conspicuous part in helping Africans liquidate the last vestiges of European rule on the continent, by supplying [...] nearly all of the various liberation movements with arms and money, food and medicines, and above all by
training the movements’ commanders at the Nanjing Military Academy in the theory and practice of guerilla war.

(Snow 1994: 286)

### 5.2.2 Years of isolation

The supporting of liberation movements in their fight for independence was the first form of Chinese aid to the region, and laid the foundation for future relations and aid programmes. An examination of the chronological history of African membership in the UN is significant in understanding the importance of Africa to Chinese foreign relations. In 1955, there were only four African member states in the UN, comprising 5.2 percent of the membership. By 1968, African membership had increased to 41, comprising 32.6 percent of the membership (Kay 1969: 21).

The marked increase in UN membership reflected the increase in African nations attaining their independence from their colonial status. These newly independent countries began to rely increasingly more on support and aid from both the Soviet Union and the PRC. As such, China was positioned to exploit its new position and broaden its international status. By initially focusing its aid efforts on those African countries which had strong ties with Taiwan, China attempted to modify regional perceptions and identifications within those African nations. Chinese envoys were secretly dispatched to negotiate new agreements with their leaders in attempts to persuade them to change their allegiances (Yu 1988: 854). Although Larkin (1971: 35) observed that from the beginning of the contact with Africa, China did not support the Charter of the UN, in line with its victim and anti-Western institution stance, Ogunsanwo (1974: 59, 75) argues that China’s policy in Africa made use of ‘traditional methods of statecraft’, ‘diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations’, ‘infiltration of dissident’, and ‘organisational apparatus’ to attain diplomatic recognition, and ‘persuade as many African states as possible to vote for her’, thereby demonstrating China’s awareness of being recognised. Promises were ratified to continue Taiwan’s existing aid projects, as well as loans provided to underwrite new additional projects (Yu 1988: 854). This began a period of enhanced activities through a series of aid packages to a variety of countries during the early 1960s. In many cases, aid distribution often pre-empted the actual commencement of diplomatic relations, as was seen in Ghana in 1960, when Ghana received the first of its official aid packages from China, which was followed shortly after by the establishment of a treaty of friendship. In 1961, Ghana’s renewed loyalties were rewarded with a promise of US$19.5 million in aid to Ghana’s President Nkrumah, in the form of an interest-free loan repayable over a ten-year period beginning in 1971, as a gesture
of goodwill following Ghana’s extension of relations following the end of the
initial aid package (Renmin Ribao 1961b). In addition, Mao’s Government gave
the Government of Guinea an interest-free loan of US$25 million, which became
immediately drawn and remained viable during 1963 (Copper 1976: 89; Renmin
Ribao 1960). Later that same year, China donated 10,000 tons of rice as a gift to
Guinea (Larkin 1971: 94). This heralded the start of a mutually beneficial
relationship between the nations, as noted on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs website:

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, China has
provided Guinea with aid for the construction of the People’s
Palace, Hydro power station at KINKON and TINKISSO,
Freedom Cinema, President Office Mansions and so on.

(MFA 2003)

By September 1961, China had extended a loan to the Government of Mali for
US$19.4 million, in the year after Mali established diplomatic relations (Renmin
Ribao 1961c). Although relations with Somalia were established in 1960,
followed soon after in 1961 by China’s granting of US$130,000 in medical
supplies and extension of technical assistance in building a radio station, the first
official aid arrived in 1963 and took the form of a US$3 million grant to help
Somalia balance its budget, in addition to an US$18 million interest-free loan
(Larkin 1971: 94; MFA 2009c; Renmin Ribao 1963b). In late 1963, Premier Zhou
Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi toured Africa in what became considered ‘a
major milestone in the development of friendly relations’ (MFA 2000d). During
the tour, Zhou ‘exchanged views with the leaders of the countries concerned, and
reached extensive agreement with them on such questions as opposing
imperialism, colonialism, racism, expansionism, safeguarding world peace,
strengthening unity’ and ‘promoting the friendly relations’ with African countries
(ibid.).

China’s aid support continued to focus on various liberation groups such
as those in Angola, providing guerilla training to the Frente de Libertação de
Mozambique (FRELIMO) and its radical splinter group, Comite Revolucionario
de Mozambique (COREMO) (Henriksen 1976: 377-99; Peking Review 1969;
1972a; 1972b). Further support was provided in Zimbabwe, through Beijing’s
military and political training of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA), the military wing of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
(Renmin Ribao 1981) and in Namibia, where China provided training and
provisions to elements of the Maoist guerrilla military strategies of South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) (Dreyer 1994: 61). In South Africa, the scale of aid was somewhat limited compared with elsewhere on the continent since ‘the Chinese concentrated their effort on countries where there was an exploitable situation by which China could raise its prestige and influence’ (Taylor 2006a: 130). However, China did provide economic assistance to two major nationalist movements: The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) (Lodge 1983: 304, 309-10). Even though China intended aid to serve as a model to drive its self-reliance against colonialism, ongoing interstate conflicts were being fuelled by the political campaigns of Maoist insurgents, who neglected to promote economic development between China and themselves.

During the 1960s, China viewed Africa as an arena in which it could campaign against its opponents i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, free from threats to its security, unlike the threats posed by the involvement of the superpowers in Southeast Asia. With America’s increasing involvement in the Vietnamese conflict, alongside its continued support for Taiwan in the UN, China sought to convince the newly independent African states that America was now their new ‘common enemy’. China used the compelling argument that ‘Western’ support for the South African racist apartheid regime demonstrated that they were untrustworthy allies. Furthermore, the ‘white ruled’ government’s recognition of Taiwan, like that of America, only confirmed its claims that America and Taiwan could not be trusted. Soviet support for the ANC in its struggle against ‘white rule’ in South Africa was central to American and ‘Western’ ambivalence. South Africa’s location and rich endowment in natural resources were strategically important during the Cold War, and the behaviour of its Government was often ignored by ‘Western’ authorities as a necessary evil that had to be endured. Kay (1969: 35) noted this apparent duplicity when stating:

As of 1968 the African states have been unable to energize the power of the United Nations into a frontal assault backed by mandatory collective measures on South Africa. In fact, the voluntary arms embargo and voluntary economic sanctions called for by the Security Council and the General Assembly in 1962 have been flaunted by France and quietly circumvented by other states.
5.2.3 China’s activities following its admission to the UN

China’s aid to Africa grew as it received support from African members in the UN in the final years of China’s campaign to oust Taiwan from the international body, thus enhancing China’s international position on the world stage, and leading Mao to laud that, ‘it was China’s African friends who carried China into its seat in the United Nations headquarters’ (Renmin Ribao 2007). In the early 1970s, the new states of Africa successively secured independence. The superpowers took centre stage, with China occupying a position behind the scenes. With China no longer needing to promote itself as a victim of ‘Western colonization and aggression’ to secure support and establish relations with the new African states, the Chinese leadership initiated changes in its international image. China’s split with the USSR, due to ideological differences, had directly affected Sino-African relations and is most apparent following decolonization. With both the Soviets and the PRC benefiting internationally from their support of African independence, ideological differences could be set aside and excused for the common good, thereby strengthening its opposition to Western dominance in international organizations such as the UN General Assembly.

With their new-found influence as members of the UN, many African states sought the same support for their economic development as they had for their independence causes. However, economic development and international support in the form of aid and investment proved to be a much greater challenge. While the Soviets responded to African calls for aid in the liberation struggle, they proved substantially less enthusiastic in their response to Africa’s development needs.

The African states have realized that Soviet voting support on economic assistance issues is [......] of dubious value because of the Soviet’s unwillingness to match this voting support with requisite amounts of financial support [......which] deprives the African states of the manoeuvring room which they have used to such advantage on colonial issues.

(Kay 1969: 40)

However, as the Cold War became entrenched in Africa, the ideological differences which had led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, resurfaced. As a sign of the increasing friction between China and the Soviet Union, China began to view the Soviets as a growing hegemon in their relations with the region, and therefore no different from the Americans in trying to assert their influence and assuming a
role akin to new colonial masters of the region. This drew the continent into an ideological Cold War, as Kay (1969: 41) argues, when ‘[p]ushed by the pressures of the Cold War, both East and West have manoeuvred to obtain the largest possible voting majorities for their positions’. This led economic aid and support for African regimes, which favoured one side or the other, to become an element by which influence and alliances could be secured. China’s reaction to the playing out of the Cold War struggle in Africa was to further condemn the Soviets in much the same light as they had done with the Americans, while, at the same time, transforming its identity and international image from a victim to that of an international partner, by denouncing interference in the affairs of sovereign states and seeking cooperation and mutual assistance, rather than ideological adherence.

It is worth noting that the Chinese, unlike the Soviets, were never interested in establishing commissars or political representatives of the CCP in African countries. As Soviet socialism was deemed incompatible with these African states, the PRC held the view that Africa was also unwise to adopt either the Soviet or the ‘Western’ model and should seek a path best suited to its own historical circumstances and experiences. President Obote of Uganda had previously reported after a visit to Beijing, in 1965, that the Chinese leaders had told him that ‘they did not wish to interfere with the systems of other nations’, and that ‘in the case of Africa...they did not think their system could work’ (Snow 1994: 303). In promoting their international image of a benevolent partner, independent of the two superpower camps, China focused on expanding its relations with the region through trade, aid, and mutual cooperation, often in competition with the Soviets and the Americans. Snow (1994: 302) underlined this point by remarking:

For the Chinese to spoon-feed African states their own political doctrine would have clashed with their role as champions of African freedom – and also, of course, with the very principle of national independence on which they themselves had broken with the Soviet camp.

China took this opportunity to promote itself as a partner in the developing world, when it recognized that aid and investment had become the major priority for many African states, and that both the Soviet and the former colonial powers were not forthcoming in providing development assistance. China’s African policy was outlined by Huang Hua’s speech, in his position as Chinese Ambassador to the UN, to the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly in October, 1972, which
echoed the words of Zhou Enlai, in his 1964 tour of Africa, by stating that any prospective national organisation ‘should rely upon their own efforts and use foreign aid only as an auxiliary, and should never rely upon others to end colonial rule’ (Renmin Ribao 1972). This demonstrated China’s awareness of how the multilateral platform, of the UN, could be utilised in its struggle against colonialism. China argued that developing countries should no longer leave their fates in the hands of first world countries to decide. Beijing’s view of the ‘three world’ global order and consequently of Africa was brought further into focus following the speech by Deng Xiaoping at the UN in April 1974 (Peking Review 1974a). This served as an opportunity to implement the Eight Principles of Chinese Aid, pronounced by Premier Zhou Enlai during his earlier tour of Africa in 1963-64, which focused on development and aid that was free from the politics and ideological demands exposed by the developed world. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the aid recipients became central to these principles, as did the focus upon meaningful and visible development projects, such as the construction of the TAZARA (Tan-Zam railway), at a cost of US$500 million.

China volunteered to embark on projects like the Tan-Zam railway which were politically or psychologically important to African governments but which more profit-minded aid donors had rejected on economic grounds.

(Snow 1994: 288)

The PRC also continued to focus its attention on those African states that had not yet made the switch to recognizing them. China sought to leave the impression that recognition had its benefits, and a switch to the PRC meant support for African states in international institutions and a powerful friend in the developing world.

During the 1970s, China enhanced this international developmental alignment with the Third World, through Beijing’s UN delegates, who predominantly supported African countries’ calls for a new international economic order (NIEO), by keenly promoting the involvement of African states in a variety of international organisations that promoted dialogue with the industrialized Second World. This move led to the Lome Convention being singled out by Beijing for praise as an organisation committed to this goal (Peking Review 1975). This united front approach became fundamental to China’s burgeoning policy across Africa. Chinese support in liberation struggles challenged primarily the Soviet Union’s dominance, and focussed its ‘priority assistance’ on the Portuguese
territories of Angola and Mozambique (Jackson 1995: 388-422; Peking Review 1972b; Renmin Ribao 1975). China’s addresses to the UN condemned the Portuguese for their territorial dominance and urged assistance from liberation organisations, such as the UN de-colonisation Committee. Through its enhanced activities on this and other international platforms, in advocating a more militant approach in Africa, China increased its prestige and stature as a concerned party.

Changes in Chinese foreign policy towards Africa matched concurrent changes in geo-politics and Cold War power relations. As relations between the PRC and the US entered a period of rapprochement at the start of the 1970s, as exemplified by the subsequent visit to China of the American President Richard Nixon, the PRC focused on warming its relations with the United States and its global partners. With these closer relations to the ‘West’, formed primarily through China’s receipt of Western aid and investment, China began to identify with a role that was much less focused on challenging Soviet and ‘Western’ influence in Africa.

Despite being unable to offer any significant opposition to the Superpowers’ influence in Africa, the UN was able to provide a platform for China to project its responsible image. China feared that the Soviet Union was in a position in Africa where it could conduct an exercise similar to that which it was performing in Afghanistan at that time, following its invasion in 1979 (ibid.). Further frustration arising from its lack of influence in the region resulted in 1982 in China confronting the US, when its approach towards South Africa became intent on exposing the US’ connivance with the apartheid state. In the annual speech to the General Assembly of the UN on 4 October 1982, Foreign Minister Huang Hua attacked an unnamed superpower, implicitly accusing the US, for giving South Africa confidence to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, as well as for making military incursions into neighbouring countries (Beijing Review 1982b). China remained vocal in its criticism of the South Africans and their alleged allies in Washington, in a move which helped maintain a perceived favourable profile in Africa.

Even though China had become one of the largest recipients of foreign aid and investment, China used its new access to funds to embark upon the modernization and development of its economy, which transformed the PRC into the economic miracle that it is recognized as today. This transformation, marked by the shift from a predominantly agricultural to a manufacturing based economy, would by the early 1990s, necessitate a re-engagement with Africa in search of vital natural resources required to continue China’s economic growth and development. As its most recent identification as a great power began to take
shape, China began to re-emerge from its self imposed ‘isolation’ from Africa, and sought to promote itself as an alternative aid donor and positive role model in the developing world.

In transforming its international image, China used its successful economic transformation to challenge traditional ‘Western’ aid models, and provided an alternative model for African and other developing countries. In contrast to the ‘Western’ approach to aid, China emphasized non-interference in the affairs of the developing world, promoting itself and its success as an example of economic development, with many African states responding positively to this new image. Unlike the ‘West’, with its patronizing approach to Africa over its human rights record, and failure to modernize and develop, China remained more reserved, choosing to focus on cultural and trade relations, which paid dividends for Sino-African relations. In the months following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the African response to China’s crackdown on student protests contrasted sharply with that of the developed world. In a sign of solidarity, many African states were muted in their reaction, and in some cases, even praised the PRC’s leadership and resolve, as seen by the congratulatory telegram to the Chinese army from Chairman Mlambo of Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), and President Nujoma, of Namibia and SWAPO, combined with the Angolan foreign minister’s expression of ‘support for the resolute actions to quell the counter-revolutionary rebellion’ (Renmin Ribao 1989a; 1989b). Much of the support and response by African states to the Tiananmen incident reflected their own experience in dealing with the human rights issue, and ‘Western’ criticism. With the majority of African states sharing China’s views on democracy and human rights, by presenting a united front on the matter, along with previous objections to UN pronouncements condemning China for its human rights records, many African states became further endeared to the PRC leadership. As many African states no longer benefited from the aid and support they once received from the Soviet Union before its collapse, China became viewed as a major source of aid, and any condemnation of the PRC leadership and its policies, would therefore be detrimental to their interests. With few exceptions, much of Africa is ruled by regimes that are both sympathetic and supportive of China’s political stance on the issues of human rights and development. Taylor (2006b: 939) discusses this issue thus:

China [asserts] that human rights such as ‘economic rights’ and ‘rights of subsistence’ are the main priority of developing nations and take precedence over personal, individual rights as
conceptualized in the West.

China has reiterated over the past two decades that its record of bringing hundreds of millions of its own people out of abject poverty is a point of pride, and that Western forms of democracy and government are not compatible with China’s needs (Interview 2007b; 2007e). Many regimes in Africa echo this view and are increasingly looking to China as a model for their own development. As China’s domestic and foreign policies continue to be shaped by its evolving norms, these will provide a key to identifying in which direction their future will expand, and will be explored in the next section.

5.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Africa

Since the Asianist norm concerns the Asian identity within an Asian society, it is of little significance outside of Asia. Though China’s pursuit of a regional leadership role within Asia is, in part, played out in this region through its aid competition with other Asian countries, notably Japan, the consequences of its activities in relation to Asianism is more pertinent within Asia (see Asia Times 2006a; Japan Times 2006; 2008; Jaura and Kawakami 2008). Therefore, this discussion will focus on the norms of internationalism, sovereignty and developmentalism.

5.3.1 Internationalism

As discussed in Chapter 3, China’s internationalist responsibility can be traced back to the early 1970s, when the PRC was admitted to the UN. A considerable proportion of its success in attaining this position has been attributed to the support that China received from African states in the 1960s. Consequently, China felt both an obligation and responsibility towards these states for its new international status (Interview 2007h; 2007i).

Following its admission to the UN in 1971, China’s policy focussed on the ethical cultivation of as many allies in Africa as possible, by nurturing self-reliance to kindle the countries’ early developmental moves as a sign of its growing responsibility, and to maintaining friendships already in existence through low-level aid projects, and the limited granting of capital. China’s support of insurgents throughout Africa consequently decreased as its neutral image expanded. The decrease in support for regional insurgencies marked the countries’ successive attainments of independence from their former colonial status. Although China remained committed to providing aid, whilst remaining detached
from the hegemonic activities of the superpowers in Africa during the 1970s and early 1980s, the focus was now on diplomatic endeavours designed to maintain existing Sino-African connections, and on continuing to provide developmental economic assistance to those states. Chinese leaders continued to highlight the importance of their ties to the continent, and reaffirmed their responsibility by donating aid through new-found multilateral channels, as demonstrated by China’s donation of US$30,000 to the UN Fund Board for Namibia and the UN Trust Fund for South Africa respectively (ZDJMN 1984: VI-7). Much of the promotional discourse that had advanced Beijing’s version of Marxist-Leninism, and routine provocative threats against the superpowers had now been discarded, being replaced by quiet, viable, small scale developmental projects aimed at assisting Africa’s agriculture and health.

Due to China’s drive for domestic economic progress in the 1980s, the internationalist norm behind its aid donation became more symbolic, and resulted in its overseas aid undertakings experiencing a decline. China argued in a series of moves, noted in Chapter 3, which transpired following Deng’s ‘Open Door’ policy, that the industrialized world should provide more aid and better terms of trade and finance to developing countries. These moves helped China to attract even more international aid and investment from the UNDP and the UN Family Planning Association. Although this resulted in China becoming a competitor of aid recipient countries from these international organisations, it still publicly made efforts as an aid donor on a multilateral basis. Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang announced, during a visit by Prime Minister Pedro Pires to China in May 1986:

We hope that the ongoing special UN General Assembly when considering the African economic situation can make a positive contribution to reviving the African economy, improving North-South relations, and promoting world peace and development.

(Xinhua 1986)

The notable shift in the market which pushed China into becoming a recipient of aid was also reflected in the diverse nature of its subsequent aid, as Chinese aid officials were given leave to implement experiments to extend aid finance and help ensure that the projects completed by China could sustain their benefits in the difficult economic environment of the 1980s and 1990s. In an attempt to continue to boost China’s prestige, Beijing suggested ‘tripartite cooperation’, whereby financial assistance from developed countries would be used to fund
Chinese aid projects in Africa (ZDJMN 1989: 57). China’s seeding of capital for multilateral cooperation was further demonstrated by its contributions to various organisations, such as the UNFPA and the UN Capital Development Fund. China expanded this policy in Somalia and Rwanda, where technicians, equipment, and management were supplied to World Bank financed well drilling and rice cultivation projects (Brautigam 2008: 205). This policy was further extended in Rwanda through the establishment of an agricultural project in collaboration with Canada, where China provided partial funding for the project which was implemented by state-owned Chinese companies (ZDJMN 1989: 57). China also displayed support for the Africa Development Bank, which it joined in May 1985, and though details of China’s actual commitment remained sketchy, Beijing was keen to be seen to be involving itself in the region’s development, and so became active in expressing how it had been involved in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since its establishment in 1980 (MFA 2009h; Xinhua 2007c).

The increasingly multilateral aid activities that developed during the 1980s may have continued to shape China’s policies and the internationalist norm further, had the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and the end of the Cold War, not forced a significant reshaping of the internationalist norm. Following isolation by the West in the post-Tiananmen period, the PRC’s foreign policy orientation and interaction shifted towards expanding its interactions with regional institutions in Africa. Between June 1989 and June 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited fourteen African countries, mindful of the fact that the West was in fact a minority in international organisations, such as the UN, and that the support of African countries might be valuable in helping China break out of its isolation. With the additional support of the UNDP and the Ford Foundation in the US, China exhibited a keenness to expand trade links in previously unexplored directions, by hosting a major Sino-African Seminar on Economic Reform and Adjustment in November 1989, to which more than thirty delegates from eight African countries attended (Renmin Ribao 1989c). As states began to lose the support that they had previously enjoyed as a client of one of the superpowers, links to international organizations and alternative sources of foreign aid dominated the foreign policy objectives of many developing countries. Realizing this, Chinese foreign policy makers saw a chance for China to break new ground in its relations with Africa, as it viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity for China to assume a greater role in international affairs. Qian Qichen began a tradition in 1991 of visiting a group of African countries each January, which has continued with each successive foreign minister. In mid-1995,
after many high level discussions, Beijing started to organise conferences aimed at further reforming China’s foreign assistance programmes, bringing them even more into line with the push toward economic rationality in China’s domestic decisions. China expanded its economic and political engagement with African countries culminating with the launch in 2000 of the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). At the October 2000 Forum on Sino-African cooperation ministerial conference, the forum was used to advance a position of moral relativism with regard to human rights. It was suggested at the forum that China and Africa ‘should [……] enhance their cooperation and consultation in multilateral organisations in order to safeguard the interests of both’ (Renmin Ribao 2000). This shift was reflected again in yet another name change in China’s economic bureaucracy, to the Ministry of Commerce in the spring of 2003, a move aimed to dedicate and direct China’s cooperative efforts in accordance with the forum (Interview 2006a).

The meeting of FOCAC in 2006, heralded the announcement of new plans for Sino-African relations with designs for a ‘new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win co-operation and cultural exchanges’ in a whole range of areas, ranging from business development, healthcare, tourism, humanitarian ventures, education and anti-terrorism (MFA 2007d). At the meeting, an agreement was also reached that the foreign ministers of China and the African countries would ‘hold political consultations in New York on the sideline of the UN General Assembly, to exchange views on major issues of common interest’ (Xinhua 2006e). In May 2007, at the sixtieth Annual World Health Organisation (WHO) meeting in Geneva, the Minister of Health Gao Qiang announced that Beijing would donate US$8 million to the WHO to build African countries’ capacities and mechanisms to respond to public health emergencies. In line with China’s public announcement calling upon other countries to be more responsible, with respect to aid and development, thereby further enhancing its own image of responsibility, Gao publicly called upon other member states to increase their aid to strengthen public health systems in Africa and other developing countries (Xinhua 2007b).

On a multilateral basis, China and Africa agreed to work together to support the strengthening of UN authority and efficiency through reform, which should be based upon democratic negotiations that are conducive to maintaining unity among UN member states, and should consider the concerns of developing countries (MFA 2006e). In so doing, China demonstrated its propensity to use multilateral approaches in its speeches to show how it has been willing to support African countries, emphasize its great-power image as well as to call for moral
issues such as asking rich countries to assume their share of responsibility. China is able to use its institutional platform to counter claims that it is ignoring internationalist norms by citing its participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, which are characterised by mandates aimed at transforming war-torn states into liberal democracies. Additionally important is China’s role in African nations in regions commonly thought of as safe havens for groups linked to international terrorism, such as Al Qa’ida. By working multilaterally to bring additional prosperity and development to the regions, China’s goal may even serve to bring stability to these countries by reducing these groups platforms for dissent and popularity, a move which would not only bring additional stability to the region, but allow China’s participation in these operations to distance itself even further from the ‘China threat’, commonly perceived in Chinese policy-informed works (People’s Daily 2000; The Washington Post 2008c; Xinhua 2006c). This threat arises not from a direct challenge to global power supremacy but through the exploitation of the global economy as a means of promoting China’s own domestic stability (The Washington Post 2008c). In 2008 and 2009, China set a new precedent when, in response to Somali pirates threatening its cargo ships off the coast of Africa, it deployed its navy in international waters in a peace keeping/deterrent role. This highlights how yet more non-traditional threats to the security of its interests are shaping the internationalist norm, through the protection of its natural resources trade routes (Xinhua 20091).

The nurturing and galvanising of cooperation as a way of increasing interrelatedness between countries, while encouraging them to work together, thereby making interstate conflict more costly to the states themselves, serves to foster stronger ties and interrelatedness, and also allows China to distance itself from its own past, acting as an agent of world revolution, and by featuring prominently in resolving long standing issues around the globe, such as poverty and lack of development in Africa. Having proved catalytic in triggering such events, it may underline the norm further by participating in areas of health and peacekeeping, further playing down its past revolutionary image and strengthening its global position. China’s continued support for Africa in the recovery from the 2007 global financial crisis demonstrates its ongoing commitment to internationalism in the region, not only to Africa, but also to the wider international community (Xinhua 2009j). This was further reinforced through Hu Jintao’s 2009 tour of Saudi Arabia, Mauritius, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania, where he reiterated China’s commitment to Africa by stating that ‘China will honor its commitments, and never will reduce its aid to Africa’ (MFA 2009a; People’s Daily 2009b). During the tour, Hu proposed several multi-point
plans, with the various nations, to expand and further develop ongoing relations between China and Africa (MFA 2009a).

Given the extent of its activities in the region, such multilateral efforts to resolve long standing problems have become tainted by ‘black GDP growth’, therefore demonstrating how Chinese development projects in the region potentially undermine their international responsibilities. This can be seen through China’s deflection of criticism over its other roles in regional resource extraction, in Namibia, Zambia, Angola and Nigeria, and through its bilateral trade development with countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. Achieving long-term and sustainable success in developing these areas would enhance its image as a great power and ally not only across Africa, but also the world at large, without having to resort to the methods associated with former colonial countries. As a result of China’s ongoing regional contention of these issues in transient terms, it puts itself under the critical eye of the Western powers, which criticise it for being less willing to follow their own condemnations of the rogue nations. This becomes clear when observing China’s continued resistance to international sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe, which it feels would be internationally irresponsible and damaging to the stability of the entire region. This highlights how the norm intended practice of internationalism in China conflicts with, and is opposed to the norm unintended rhetorical exercising of internationalism by the international community. In so doing, China undermines the great power and responsible image that it has been so keen to nurture throughout. This image is being further undermined through China’s ongoing trade relations with Angola. Its support for, and exploitation of, the country’s oil supplies have become reinforced by China’s opaque business interests elsewhere in Africa, notably in Tanzania, and further afield in Latin America (Asia Times 2009a). Another ongoing source of contention in China’s international responsibility concerns its adherence to its ‘one-China’ policy, which it has continued to frame as a prerequisite for its continuation of aid to the region. This highlights how, despite its increase in activities throughout the region, this norm has yet to become internalised completely.

5.3.2 Sovereignty

As seen in Chapter 3, the sovereignty norm leads China to stress non-interference in the domestic affairs of aid recipient countries. In 1964, Mao Zedong met with African counterparts, and noted the ‘equality between us’, and that ‘our relations are like relations between brothers, not like the relations between fathers and sons’ (Li 2001: 433, 438). Chinese leaders have continued over the last sixty years to
indicate the orientation of China’s African policy, whereby ‘China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached’ (MFA 2006a). During the early years of the PRC, the sovereignty norm was influenced by its isolation from the international community.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, while China was able to deploy its technology and experience in agricultural techniques, non-interference in its foreign aid precluded multilateral cooperative efforts, through funding limitations, low levels of technology, and inexperience in the market economy. By refusing to seek cooperation with other donors, China’s determination to achieve its goals independently limited the impact of its aid, as demonstrated by its limited capacity to produce locomotives efficiently. While these flaws are apparent in retrospect, the global environment of the early 1970s was not conducive to China being willing to introduce foreign elements into its assistance efforts. Such collaborative efforts and share of success would have detracted from its own perceived successful and independent image, which it desperately sought to enhance. This experience forced China to rethink its economic assistance strategy, and following a series of important breakthroughs which modified its non-interference policy, became manifested by a shift towards cooperation.

China’s aid to Tanzania demonstrates how China significantly stretched the role of the sovereignty norm in its foreign assistance. The TAZARA project to build a railway linking Tanzania and Zambia, and which ran from 1970 until 1975, is a significant example of China’s aid activities to the Third World (Renmin Ribao 1968). The project was made possible by a significant amount of Chinese aid, and was carried out at a time before China’s own economy had begun to reform. It was also subject to competition from both the West and the Soviets over projects in the region. Since this aid firmly adhered to the sovereignty norm, China demonstrated, somewhat detrimentally to itself, an unwillingness to introduce foreign elements into its assistance efforts. Ai (1999: 199) argued that since China lacked external technical experience, personnel and economic management systems, it was unable to be more efficient and productive in its aid projects. By carrying out its aid programmes on its own, without the benefits of foreign experience, China reinforced its independence and desire to secure its position as a donor in the international community.

The TAZARA project occupied much of the period between 1970 to 1975, and during its first year of operation in 1976, the Chinese left behind advisers who continued to train and help with the operation of the line; even when the Chinese experts remained, they did so only in an advisory role that did not extend as far as management of the line. The Chinese technical expert team remained very
reluctant to be involved in the aid project’s management until 1983. Following Zhao Ziyang’s visit to Tanzania that same year, Zhao and the Government of Tanzania agreed a new form of aid provision, placing more emphasis on economic efficiency and benefits in providing aid. This allowed Chinese expert teams to become more involved in management and decision making activities in the operation of Chinese aid projects (ZDJMN 1984: VI-3). Under the agreement of August 1983, a team of 250 Chinese experts arrived in Tanzania to restore the performance of the Tan–Zam Railway. For the first time, the Chinese experts were assigned proper titles and the right and authority to participate in all decision making in relation to the operation of the railway. One of the first acts of the Chinese expert team was to purge the TAZARA organisation of incompetent managers; a move that resulted in 1984, in the TAZARA project reporting a profit (MFA 2000c). In view of the potential for interpreting this involvement in management as conflicting with the sovereignty norm, Chinese leaders sought to justify the transition by arguing that their participation in management did not constitute intervention in the recipients’ internal affairs, but rather viewed such actions as being mutually beneficial in reducing economic costs (Interview 2007b).

Even in 1996, in a state visit to Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, President Jiang Zemin continued to propose that ‘equal treatment, mutual respect for sovereignty, and mutual non-interference in internal affairs’ serve as the founding principles of comprehensive cooperation between China and Africa (ZRGN 1997: 246), thereby echoing both of China’s identities, as a victim and neutral party, that had, at that time, played a prominent role in Sino-African relations. Premier Wen Jiabao in 2003, like his colleagues and prime ministerial predecessors, also took the initiative in attempting to emphasize the importance of state sovereignty at the opening ceremony of the second ministerial conference of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, by reiterating the fact that:

Being a developing country itself, China provides assistance to African countries with the deepest sincerity and without any political conditions [...], and we will never forget the invaluable support China has received from African countries over the years in our endeavours to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(People’s Daily 2003b)

The current president, Hu Jintao, delivered a speech at the Nigerian National
Assembly in 2006, where he stated that:

Africa has become a good friend, partner, and brother of China.

[.........] China has consistently supported the African countries in safeguarding independence and sovereignty, national self-selection in accordance with the wishes of the path of their development and supported the African countries' seeking of unity, self-reliance and independent efforts to solve the problems in Africa.

(Xinhua 2006b)

Hu reiterated China’s adherence to its ‘no-strings-attached’ policy, in relation to the sovereignty norm and its foreign aid policy. The ‘non-interference in domestic affairs’, which is informed by this norm, has been welcomed by African leaders since China’s ‘non-interference’ policy implicitly means supporting or at least tolerating the current regime. In countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, such a policy is of great significance (The Economist 2007). The inherent inertness of the norm over the decades reflects how China’s extended period of isolation had significantly retarded its evolution.

Divergence arose, in no small part, from the limitations of non-interference which appeared to induce conflict as China realized the need to protect its economic interests. China continues to exercise constraint through the sovereignty norm, in furthering its multilateral UN aid activities. Despite this, as the global sovereignty norm has undergone significant evolution in the last two decades, since the end of the Cold War, China’s adherence to the sovereignty norm in the region has increasingly come under increased pressure to likewise evolve, as seen through its involvement in Sudan, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

i) ‘Non-interference’ in the political context

While the ‘non-interference’ policy was stressed in the early years of Sino-African relations, China did not stay away from African aid recipients’ domestic politics. China lauded its support for anti-colonial liberation movements, arguing that by supporting African independence movements, it was helping to establish the creation of sovereign African states, ruled by their own population and not by a distant imperial power. This view underpinned the ideology of world revolution, and was a central foreign policy goal for much of the communist world, and China was no exception. By aiding colonies in Africa fighting for independence, China was not interfering in a sovereign state’s internal affairs; the African
colonies were not sovereign states, since their populace had not granted authority to their colonial leaders, but was imposed upon them against their will. In effect China was applying the sovereignty norm in order to help bring about independence for Africa. It was a crucial policy for China internationally, and the block upon which a majority of African states relations with the PRC are built. As Mao reassured his African visitors:

[R]egardless of whether the country has been independent or not, one day you will attain complete independence and liberation, and as such the Chinese people, as a whole, will support all of you.

(Zhong 1994: 283)

However, Chinese leaders were less sensitive and more likely to violate the sovereignty norm in the case of the Angolan civil wars. Despite this, Chinese aid either proved insubstantial or was never actually implemented (Wolfers and Bergerad 1983: 210). China maintained ties and offered aid to three major opposing organisations in Angola, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and União Nacional para a Indépendencia Total de Angola (UNITA) (Beijing Review 1982a; Marcum 1978: 132, 160, 418). Bilateral developments matured in 1982 when China announced that it was ‘willing to normalize relations with Angola’ (Beijing Review 1982a). Following this normalisation, China continued its aid to the country, and linked its policy of reconciliation with Angola to the identity that both countries belonged to the developing world, thereby stressing the importance of mutual support (Renmin Ribao 1984a; 1984b). When an Angolan delegation visited Beijing, they concurred with the Chinese Government that ‘both of us are facing common task of developing our economies’ (Renmin Ribao 1992). The norm also exposes weaknesses in its own policies, betraying its propensity to control other nation’s foreign policy through aid, rather than interference in the nation’s affairs directly, as seen in its attitude towards African nations over the ‘one-China’ policy. China’s forcing of states to accept its perception of Taiwan displays the inertness of the norm of sovereignty. In the 2006 presidential elections in Zambia, the strong Chinese response to the radically anti-Chinese populism of the Zambian presidential candidate Michael Sata, challenged the sovereignty norm, leading to its warning that it ‘might cut off ties with Zambia if Mr Sata is elected’ (BBC 2006b). Although the Chinese argued that such action was instigated because ‘Sata claimed his support for Taiwan’, this implied that he did not respect Chinese sovereignty (Interview 2007b; 2007i; 2007j).
Zhang Haibing (2008) discussed these shortcomings at the Shanghai Workshop on Global Governance in 2008, by outlining that recognition and acknowledgement of a country, under international law, is considered a fundamental precondition for bilateral relations. By acknowledging Taiwan, African countries are denying China’s unique international status, by undermining the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, under which it conducts its international exchanges. The countries therefore disregard the mutual respect required for bilateral relations, rendering them unworkable and impossible. Consequently, the ‘one-China’ principle is recognised as a prerequisite of China’s foreign aid, and not a political tool (Interview 2007j).

A basic principle in international law is that the acknowledgement of a country is the prerequisite and basis for bilateral relations. To acknowledge Taiwan is to deny China’s unique status in international law [......] thereby making bilateral cooperation including aids impossible. [......] Therefore, the One-China principle is a prerequisite for China’s foreign aids, not an additional political string.

(Zhang 2008:235)

These long-standing principles also help explain the Chinese resistance to calls by the West that they impose political conditions. As Huse and Muyakwa (2008: 28) argue, ‘[t]he case of Mwanawasa and Sata illustrates how the Chinese cannot keep out of politics’. This has resulted quite frequently in there being a distinct divergence between the norm and actual events, through the inducement of tensions when the norm conflicted with its interests.

ii) ‘Non-interference’ in the economic context

Links to China’s self-interests are evident in the funding of projects in the recipient countries; as Huse and Muyakwa (2008: 15) argue, the policy of no attached conditions to loans does not mean that recipient countries are free to spend capital borrowed from China liberally according to national priorities:

The flexibility of Chinese lending is restricted by the form of Chinese aid as China provides only project based funding, and almost exclusively as tied aid or in kind. China does not, for instance, provide budgets to support targeting health and education sectors.
As Chinese aid is almost entirely project based, grants are normally offered with the requirements mirroring the internationally accepted practices of more traditional aid donors. Like many Western donors, China requires that aid recipient countries use Chinese goods or services, or create a structure where China provides Chinese goods directly. The International Crisis Group (ICG) (2008: 1) also raised the issue that although Chinese support for problem regimes, such as in Sudan, is useful to state companies in signing initial energy agreements, it is less helpful in securing Beijing’s long-term energy interests, especially when it is confronted with mounting risks to its investments, citizens, and security. In the Sudan, the bulk of the Chinese oil fields are situated in the South of the country, which anticipates a self-determination referendum in 2011, the results of which could see the region secede. Since China’s non-interference strategy makes no effort to improve Africa’s attractiveness for increased external investment, it appears that China’s long-term reputation in the region may well diminish as did that of the West’s (Sweeney 2007). It is clear that the sovereignty norm adhered to by the PRC will face pressure and will have to evolve to changes in a modern world.

iii) The Sudan case

The Sudan case is important as the impact of China’s aid to the Sudan is subject to significant international scrutiny and criticism. In light of the imposition of sanctions on Sudan by the international community, China’s growing economic role as an international partner of the country has attracted substantial international attention. China has for a long time refused to interfere in the affairs of the Sudan by resisting calls to join the international community in applying pressure on the Government of the country to bring about change in regions such as Darfur. This non-interference is generally interpreted as condoning the Sudanese Government’s behaviour, in the interests of protecting its access to the resources it requires to meet its developmental needs, notably its oil drilling activities, within the country. These considerations were resounded by Morrison and Gill in their memorandum to the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in February 2007:

Sudan’s energy is important to China and its future, but China’s motivations for its policies in Sudan also have their roots elsewhere. An important, but often overlooked motivation is
Beijing’s concern with protecting the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference. These have been cast as bedrock to China’s strategy for becoming a global power backed by robust alliances.

(Lantos et al. 2007)

Responding to concerns that China’s aid to Africa is detrimental to good governance on the continent, Sun Baohong, the Counselor to the embassy of the PRC in the US, has responded by stating, ‘[w]e are dedicated to non-interference and social development of African countries.’ She further argued that the Chinese believe that sanctions and other methods as promoted by the West are ‘not productive’ and lead only to ‘increasing hostility […] We think that when you’re dealing with a failing state or a sensitive state, other methods than those used by Western people will be more productive’ (Mutume 2008: 7).

In accordance with this viewpoint, Beijing opposed the passing of UN resolution 1706, which called for UN peacekeepers to replace the ineffective African Union force in Darfur, without the agreement of Khartoum (UN 2006). China’s response to the Sudan issue, demonstrates how its adherence to the sovereignty norm has conflicted with the internationalist norm. By raising the concerns of the institutions whose membership it prizes highly, Beijing has demonstrated through its recent handling of the situation in Sudan, that it is learning there are further limitations to its policy of non-interference (MFA 2007c). Recent reports suggest that Beijing is beginning to heed the message from the numerous criticisms and attacks, thereby demonstrating the significant conflict that arises between the sovereignty and internationalist norms.

After the AU reneged on its promise of the previous year to honour Sudan’s bid for the chairmanship of the organisation, the AU chose Ghana in its place in order to prevent Khartoum from gaining control (The Guardian 2007a). This event placed further pressure on the Chinese leaders to rethink the sovereignty norm in Darfur. As Sudan comes under increased pressure from the UN Security Council, China has struggled to balance its policy of ‘non-interference’. There is little reason to believe that China will shift toward the isolation policy advocated by the West, but in Hu’s meeting with President al-Bashir of Sudan, the Chinese president made clear the limits of non-interference, by taking his strongest stance yet on Darfur, and according to Reuters (2007), Hu told al-Bashir, ‘Darfur is a part of Sudan and you have to resolve this problem.’ Despite this, China took every opportunity to reassure Khartoum that it has not fallen out of favour with Beijing, when Hu called upon
nations to ‘respect the sovereignty of Sudan’, and provided al-Bashir with an interest-free loan to build a new presidential palace, and wrote off another US$80 million debt (The Washington Post 2007). In 2008, Hu once again urged Sudan to cooperate in the swift deployment of international peacekeeping forces and to help end humanitarian abuses (The Washington Post 2008a). Although China has remained careful about adhering to the sovereignty norm, even though its involvement with the UN is arguably driven by its concern that it may likewise become the recipient of some future interference in its own affairs, it has found that it has become a target of the asymmetric power that it has provided to Sudan. Whilst Western governments were the primary source of criticism for the Chinese support of Khartoum, Beijing remained confident of its ability to appease its critics, that it was not supporting a regime that had committed genocide, whilst endorsing its non-interference policies which aimed to protect its own interests. Yet as other African states have become more vocal in their disapproval of Khartoum’s scorched-earth tactics in Darfur, Beijing has found it necessary to shift its course in the hope that subtle changes in policy will prove more effective in the long-term than imposing harsher conditions, the results of which may be more difficult to predict.

5.3.3 Developmentalism

As the developmentalist norm, which upholds its great-power image, is expressed primarily through the Beijing Consensus, this discussion will continue to examine China’s aid to Africa, by reviewing the issues that exemplify the consensus, as outlined in Chapter 3. By promoting the Beijing Consensus, it is developing the region’s technologies to build ‘relations that will have a long lasting impact on Africa’ (Chinafrica 2009).

In recent years, Chinese developmental aid, in line with the fundamental promotion of economic development of the Beijing Consensus, has continued to play a part in its African quest for natural resources, notably through its mineral mining efforts in Zambia and Namibia, and its oil based industries in Nigeria, Angola and Sudan. China’s increasing need for energy, raw materials, and markets for low price consumer goods, generated through its own expanding manufacturing industries, makes the economies of China and Africa relatively complementary. This enhances mutually sustainable cooperative efforts throughout the region. As such, China’s aid has been primarily deployed where it serves its interests most favourably and strengthens its great-power identity, either through the supplying of technical assistance or through infrastructure based projects which are completed predominantly by state, or privately owned, Chinese
enterprises. Despite this investment in service and infrastructure industries, Africa has more recently reiterated its calls for China to balance its investment in regional manufacturing industries. While China remains cautious about expanding its investiture in immature regional markets, the 2007 global financial crisis may well induce China to reinforce African manufacturing industries to offset the extensive decline in its own domestic manufacturing that resulted during the crisis (China Daily 2009c).

China’s modern development aid to Africa is focused upon four main areas of technological assistance (Chinafrica 2009; MOCOM 2007). These include Industrial technology, Agricultural technology, Engineering technology, and innovative high technology (Table 5.1); the latter of which exploits Africa’s most abundant natural resource, namely solar power.

Table 5.1 Examples of activities within Africa’s four main technology sectors

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<th>Industrial Technology</th>
<th>Agricultural Technology</th>
<th>Engineering Technology</th>
<th>High Technology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>food processing</td>
<td>tractor and implement parts</td>
<td>heavy duty trucks</td>
<td>solar power products</td>
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<tr>
<td>block making</td>
<td>drills</td>
<td>special vehicles</td>
<td>(tapping Africa’s abundant solar resources)</td>
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<tr>
<td>electric tools</td>
<td>generator/welding machines</td>
<td>generator equipment</td>
<td>electric products</td>
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<td>bottle blowing machines</td>
<td>water pumps</td>
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<td>asbestos tile machines</td>
<td>engines and electric motors</td>
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<td>woodworking machines</td>
<td>grain processing</td>
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<td>incubators</td>
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Chinese aid takes the form of modalities, such as grants, investment, tied aid, concessional loans, government guarantees, cancelled debt programs, and the implementation of low market tariffs for market access (Lönnqvist 2008). By investing aid in Africa’s internal industries, China is demonstrating an ‘ethos of solidarity and respect with developing countries’, notably Africa, as it aims to multilaterally assist in the development of the countries’ key industries. These industries are primarily the major sources of potential employment for much of the region’s populations (Lönnqvist 2008: 1). By developing these industries, along with food crops in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, the recipient countries can improve not only their supply of sale-able commodities, but also develop their intra-regional markets through which to trade such goods. China’s focus on engineering and infrastructural projects also helps develop the trade links across the region by improving access between these markets. China’s continued support for African markets was demonstrated in the aftermath of the 2007 global
financial crisis, through examples of solidarity and ongoing commitment to developing the region (Xinhua 2009j). The developing of intraregional trade links and markets, through the multilateral channels within Africa, stimulates territorial self-reliance through the enhancement of regional self-confidence. This thereby induces a self-perpetuating need to sustain and continue to support these growing markets. By promoting multilateral growth across the region, China is attempting to induce developmental chain reactions throughout the regional economies more effectively than through targeting individual nations alone. Despite this, its multilateral motivations continue to work in its own interests as they significantly undermine Taiwan’s regional alliances (Lönnqvist 2008: 8-9).

China’s regional rationalization of the ‘three closeness’ theory is exemplified by the ‘go out’ policy, the prototype for which was formulated in the region around 1992, and further perpetuated following Jiang Zemin’s tour in 1996, and aimed to ‘maintain friendship and push for new development’ (Lönnqvist 2008: 2). Chinese businesses are becoming widely dispersed throughout the African continent in the pursuit of aid and investment, development projects, human resource training, and supplying medical and educational aid through the Confucius Institutes (Xinhua 2008b; 2008c). In addition to this, and fulfilling one of the promises of the 2006 FOCAC summit, is the realisation of increasing the number of African graduates from Chinese universities, who upon their return to Africa are creating a brain gain across the region (MOCOM 2007). This provides the region with heightened levels of professionals, who have acquired international experience, and who thereby strengthen Sino-African relations.

Unlike in Southeast Asia, China’s aid to Africa has yet to result in the formulation of FTAs. Its aid is currently helping to develop SEZs, such as those established in Zambia, as well as potentially in Dar El Salaam, over the next few years. With Africa’s current levels of development and intra regional trade still in its infancy, the development of FTAs would largely be meaningless across the region. However, by nurturing SEZs to expand the markets, and addressing the reduction of tariff access to the markets for the region’s poorest countries, China is continuing to develop the regional economies through the multilateral channels of the region’s institutions.

i) The Case of Tanzania

The origins of key features of the Beijing Consensus may be seen through the evolution of Chinese development aid to Tanzania. The PRC has been one of the most important aid providers to Tanzania since the 1960s. as was demonstrated through the Agreements on Economic and Technical Cooperation, which
reformed much of Tanzania's traditional industries,\(^1\) the famous TAZARA project of the early 1970s linking to Zambia's Copperbelt with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, as well as China's aid to agricultural development in the country, as seen in the Mbarali Farm, the Ubungo Farm, the agricultural technical extension services in the Dodoma, Mbeya, and Morogoto regions and technical cooperative schemes (Bailey 1975: 587-93; Moshi and Mtui: 2008: 13-4).

In the late 1970s, at a time when China began its own domestic economic reforms, China's aid to Africa began to reflect an emphasis on markets and profits in the form of joint profit schemes, rather than simple one-way transfers. Zhao Ziyang formalized the four principles guiding China's economic and technical cooperation with African countries so as to focus upon 'equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity in form, and common progress' (ZDJMN 1984: VI-3). In the mid-1980s, there was a change in infrastructure and building projects such that Chinese enterprises became more focussed upon contract projects and labour cooperation, aimed at creating greater regional self-reliance. As a result, China's efforts in Africa refocused on the revitalization of former Chinese aid projects. Reports were compiled and returned to the higher level governmental authorities regarding the problems arising from the high cost Chinese aid projects in Tanzania, which were only generating low economic returns; these reports resulted in a notable change in policy. When Tanzania requested that China provide aid for building the Party's headquarters during a visit by State Councillor Chen Muhua in August 1986, Chen declined the request citing that the investment was too costly for China to afford (Interview 2007b; ZDJMN 1987: 413-4). Similar renovation requests in other Chinese aid projects were subsequently declined during the decade, notably at Ruvu Farm, Mbarali Farm, and the Friendship Textile Factory, which were under the collaborative management of teams of Chinese experts (ZDJMN 1989: 56).

Through the stressing of beneficial cooperation and actual results, China not only aimed to strengthen economic development in Africa, but also helped

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\(^1\) Before Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the nation of Tanzania, in 1964, China had given aid to both countries. Following their union, a period of enhanced joint activism commenced when China and Tanzania signed the first Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, whereby China announced aid to Tanzania in the form of a US$2.8 million grant and a US$42 million interest-free loan, that was repayable over a twenty year period, and took the form of a complete set of projects, equipment, general goods and technical support. This support would be provided in an interest-free loan, which would be appropriated in accordance with project construction during the five year lifespan of the project (Copper 1976: 97; Renmin Ribao 1964). In 1965, China and Tanzania signed a protocol on the agreement of Economic and Technical cooperation as outlined in the Agreement of 1964. In this protocol concrete aid projects, such as the Friendship Textile Factory, the Ruvu Farm, and the Ubungo Tool Factory were formulated (Ai 1999: 175, 176). In 1966, during a Tanzanian delegation visit to China, aid projects were promised to 'initiate or bring to completion a number of development projects, most of which the British Government had promised to help build' (Ogunsanwo 1974: 198; Renmin Ribao 1966).
conceptualise its own ‘three closeness’ theory and ‘go out’ policy. In March 1992, China and Tanzania signed an agreement establishing a joint-owned automobile assembly factory, which was to become the first non-governmental joint Sino-Tanzanian venture in Dar es Salaam (Interview 2007c; ZDJMN 1993: 779). In 1995, when vice Premier Zhu Rongji visited Tanzania, he strongly campaigned for action to transform the Friendship (Urafiki in Swahili) Textile Factory into a joint venture, in line with the idea that aid should be used to support Chinese enterprise in the country. The two Governments reached an agreement to transform the factory into a joint China—Tanzanian venture under the support of Chinese aid, making it the first Chinese aid project in Tanzania to undergo such a change (Interview 2007d).

Although Chinese aid complied with its ‘no-strings-attached’ policy, ‘aid provision has become more practical with more focus on benefit and economic efficiency for Chinese interests’ (Interview 2006d). This trend mirrors the path followed by most of the Chinese companies in Tanzania, which initially entered markets with governmental support, but subsequently moved into the private construction sector. Consequently, foreign aid was viewed as a means of providing greater political stability in the region through offering new opportunities for economic development (Renmin Ribao 1995). After 1995, China accelerated the ‘win-win’ cooperation of the 1980s in its pursuit of strategic partnerships, where aid had become an increasingly robust economic instrument following its successful trialling in the previous decade.

By the new millennium, trade and political engagement sharply expanded and Chinese companies increased their outward investment across Africa, which resulted in a well-planned policy that culminated in the year 2000 with the launch of the triennial FOCAC meeting. Following the third FOCAC meeting in 2006, where China unveiled the Beijing Action Plan commitment for Africa, with the view of establishing between three and five SEZs in Africa before the FOCAC summit in late 2009, the Chinese Government formally announced two such zones; the first of which was established in Zambia. While the remaining zone has yet to be confirmed, current opinion believes this will most likely be established in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, as Zhang Dejiang, a member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee visited the city in 2007 to negotiate with the Tanzanian Government (MEA 2006f; People’s Daily 2007c).

Over the past three decades, as seen in the Tanzanian case, the developmentalist norm has reshaped the contents and forms of aid provision that have been supplied to the nation. These modifications have gradually converted China’s aid into a manifestation of the Beijing Consensus, in order to meet the economic needs of the country’s economic development.
ii) Comparison of developmentalism with the Western model

With regard to Africa, China has long considered itself to have held fortuitous mutual relations, nurtured through South-South cooperation, and based not only upon mutual poverty issues, but also upon the abilities to provide suitable resolutions to them. Through this relationship, the developmentalist norm has become empowering through China's ability to raise the living standards of hundreds of millions of its own people above the international poverty level, thereby resolving a long standing problem of its own.

With the distinct possibility of a changing economic world order becoming increasingly likely, the construction of a foundation for Africa's industrial development which is capable of supporting industrialisation and endogenous growth would seem to be more beneficial to inducing African development than the current Western focus upon social development. Correspondingly, Chinese political discourse refrains from promoting ideologies of 'democratisation' and 'neoliberalism', which have dominated traditional Western efforts. In so doing, China highlights the significance of state involvement during early economic development, which was critical in developing Western levels of prosperity in both the West and in Asia. Dominant donor institutions however choose to ignore such concepts in favour of promoting economic and political liberalisation, despite the economic development successes that have transpired within China, which demonstrate, somewhat controversially, the relative importance of liberalisation in development. This 'development without democracy' policy has met with concern even amongst African states, where civil society analysts have noted how this may compromise an important path to political liberalisation through development, leaving it open to abuse from individual African governments.

In talking about China's aid in Africa, Liu Jianchao, deputy spokesman of the Foreign Ministry commented that, 'although people may call it a Beijing Consensus, we are not trying to pose as a model for other countries' (The New York Times 2005). However, as seen in Chapter 3, in China, enthusiasm for the Beijing Consensus is found among those who seek to make their country a world leading state. As Dirlik (2006: 5) argued the key aspect of the Beijing Consensus may be its acknowledgement of the desirability of a global order.

This global order would also be founded, not upon homogenizing universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a simultaneous recognition of commonality and difference. Deng Xiaoping's reforms beginning in the 1980s gave priority to
economic intercourse over political correctness.

In many ways, the Beijing Consensus in Africa mirrors those ‘Asian values’ that have proliferated throughout Southeast Asia in the late 1980s. As seen previously in Southeast Asia, with regard to Asian values, Africa, with its large concentration of developing states, serves as the main testing ground for the Beijing Consensus. Although the PRC’s institutions of cooperation mirror the form and much of the content of the institutions of developed states, the Beijing Consensus appears much the same as Japan’s institution of the 1990s through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) (TICAD 1993). This arises because China approves of African states concentrating their investment in infrastructure and human capital, rather than on primary products, and the addressing of development problems that are not being solved through market fundamentalism’s favoured corporate initiatives. By expanding this influence successfully in competition with more traditional Western powers, it is further expanding these zones of prosperity, through development, outwards from its core mainland.

China’s aid in Africa continues to be formulated by the channels and policies of the EXIM bank. This continues to encourage authoritarian control throughout the region, as seen in its aid to Sudan and Zimbabwe which notably fuels government ownership in the region, rather than more beneficial citizen ownership. Given the social infrastructure throughout the continent, however, the concept of citizen ownership remains diffuse (UN 2009: 51). China’s resource extraction processes are generating a large proportion of ‘black GDP growth’, not only attracting significant international concern, but also raising questions and fears throughout the multilateral institutional channels within Africa itself of China’s long-term motivations and the consequences of its behaviour. China’s buying up and reopening of mineral mines, in Namibia and Zambia, to mine copper, zinc and lead, along with oil in Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, is perpetuating poor employment practices throughout the region, as the safety of workers remains of very low concern compared to the actual extraction process (Chinafrica 2009). The extraction processes are also carried out with little regard to the environment or local populations upon whom the local industries depend. These activities therefore endanger the sustainability of these businesses. While the light industrial manufacturing sectors in many African nations are suffering from growing imports from China, the dominant extraction industries are benefiting from Chinese capital investment, as well as a seemingly bottomless market. China’s respect for national sovereignty is attractive not only to Zimbabwean President Mugabe, but scores of other African nations that are
reluctant to implement economic and political reforms considered necessary by Western donor institutions and countries. This results in China being the target of much international condemnation over its behaviour in Africa. China counters such condemnation, which negatively affects the internationalist norm and China’s great-power image, by claiming to be constrained by local laws and sovereignty. China has also responded to claims by highlighting the regional neglect of the traditional donors, along with demonstrations of the inherent difficulties of conducting any kind of business operations in the region, due to the poor levels of infrastructure or regulation, which it has refrained from altering in line with its non-interference policy (Chinafrica 2009).

The deployment of China’s aid across Africa is also notably empowering the region’s asymmetric powers. Though this aid is welcome throughout a large portion of the African continent, and enhances regional self-confidence, China’s aid activities in Sudan and Zimbabwe, in particular, are further subjecting it to the same asymmetric forces by those recipients who have become empowered through China’s aid. While China’s aid in Sudan supports the regime, which stands accused of committing numerous atrocities in Darfur, Zimbabwe is also using asymmetric power to realign its relationship with China from a recipient to equal partner, where its receipt of aid would be replaced by increased direct investment (Chinafrica 2009). Though this scenario may be achievable through its distinctly bilateral relations with the country, its adherence to sovereignty and internationalism would significantly impact upon such actions. China’s failure to act to counter such efforts would also empower additional nations in the region to utilise their asymmetric power in a similar manner. By conforming to its non-interference policy and insistence on perpetuating self reliance, it seems unlikely that China would easily conform to such requests/demands from the recipient countries.

Despite the ‘black GDP growth’, as a result of China’s mineral extraction processes, Africa in recent years has noted a significant increase in the price of its commodities, which has had the effect of improving the local economies and export businesses within Africa. This is not only strengthening regional self-confidence, but also empowering the region with additional asymmetric power which will enhance its business standing in the international community. However, with China providing so much of the impetus for this development, Chinese aid is creating a significant amount of inequality, in terms of low indigenous innovation, and value added levels, potentially making its policies unsustainable, which further impact upon the internationalist and developmentalist norms.
By fostering self-reliance through the region, China is also reducing Africa’s reliance on traditional aid donors, by encouraging Africa to take more proactive steps in its own development through the African civil society organizations and African Union. By working alongside these multilateral organisations, China can focus on reducing its ‘black GDP growth’ through the encouragement and implementation of regulatory standards, thereby fuelling China’s beneficial influence. In doing so, it can improve human rights issues (Lönnqvist 2008: 9). Such precedents for China reorienting its ‘black GDP growth’, despite its reluctance to partake in the multilateral regulatory channels of regional institutions, are seen in its development projects in Southeast Asia along the Mekong River, demonstrating at least a willingness to appear internationally responsible, even if the actual improvements to its activities are not immediately forthcoming. Additionally, China is undermining its own reputation in the region, by perpetuating regional working practices. China bears a responsibility to improve such practices, in order to improve its ‘green GDP growth’. This ‘black GDP growth’ is also indicative of the same lack of infrastructure that undermined the policies of the Washington Consensus. China’s additional support of infrastructure development may improve infrastructure to the point where such working practices become transient and undergo change as a necessity to keep up with progress.

5.4 Summary

The summary will conclude this case study with an examination of the norms by highlighting internationalism through the membership of multilateral institutions, sovereignty and non-interference through the comparison of the relative ratios of bi and multilateral relations, and developmentalism, through comparing the norm intended practical and norm unintended rhetorical perspectives of the norm. The examination of developmentalism will serve to demonstrate how the intentions behind the policies, guided by the norms, namely the unintended rhetoric, vary in relation to the actual effects of the norms in practice, as seen by the intended practical perspectives. Each of the norms are represented in Figures 5.1-5.3 and demonstrate how they have changed over time.

Asianism

As the norm of Asianism pertains to formation of an Asian identity and relative status within Asian society, the investigation of this norm in relation to Africa was considered irrelevant. China’s aid to Africa has no bearing on the aid recipient
countries’ identification with an Asian identity, as this concept in itself is meaningless outside of Asia. Although with regard to an Asian leadership role, several major aid donors are currently active in Africa, including China and Japan, the effect of their aid driven mechanisms remains relatively more domestic, and as such was the focus of the investigation of the norm in the Southeast Asian region.

Internationalism

The norm of internationalism initially emerged following China’s admission to the UN in 1971. Prior to this date, China’s activities in Africa had been motivated by its pursuit of social revolution and international recognition. As such, though it sought to demonstrate multilateralism, there was little in the way of associated responsibility. Following its admission to the UN and the change of its identity into a neutral power, it realised that its aid activities could be enhanced through the multilateral channels of the UN, and actively became engaged in utilising these channels to enhance its image as a responsible and non-hegemonic state. This can be seen in Figure 5.1, by the increase in membership of international institutions during the 1970s. As China began to focus upon its domestic development, its direct activities in Africa decreased. Following a reformulation of its aid programmes to enhance their cost-effectiveness and in order to maintain its image of responsibility and neutrality, China relied more heavily upon the multilateral channels of the institutions it had joined to maintain a steady support for the African nations. So although its activities moderated, it maintained its interest throughout the continent. This steady growth in membership of the institutions can be seen throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. China’s image underwent transformation into that of a great power in the early 1990s. This stimulated China’s expanded need for resources to fuel its increased growth, in line with its great-power image. This strengthened China’s re-emergence in Africa as a notable aid donor, and was further endorsed in 1996 by Jiang Zemin’s tour of the continent, during which he helped to nurture the foundations of China’s ‘go out’ policy, as well as lay the foundations for the newest regional institution, FOCAC. The triennial meetings of FOCAC have resulted in an enormous increase in aid activity between meetings, most notably after the 2006 meeting, in which long-term multilateral plans for the development of the region’s markets were formulated. This shift in the norm is visible in Figure 5.1 by the increased number of international organisations joined in the early 2000s. As with the Southeast Asia diagram, figure 4.3, the cumulative number of organisations reflects the combination of regional and global multilateral organisations that are active in Africa. Though the increase in activity represents considerably greater multilateral
responsibility, this is remaining tempered by the sovereignty and developmentalist norm in nations such as Zimbabwe and Sudan, where its reluctance to conform to growing international concerns has resulted in its becoming increasingly criticised for its inactivity. Therefore, although the uptake of the norm has increased substantially, it has yet to undergo cascade and internalisation.

![Cumulative membership of international organisations by decade from 1950-2010](source: see Appendix 3)

**Figure 5.1** The cumulative membership of international organisations by decade from 1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3)

**Sovereignty**

The sovereignty norm has progressed along a different path from the other embedded norms in China in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, sovereignty played an important role in China’s aid and relations within Africa, as it strove to gain support and recognition globally. At this time, although the norm was already internalised in the PRC, it was heavily influenced by China’s Communist leanings and Maoist teachings. This influence also isolated the norm from developing beyond the form that it had existed in during the 1940s. As many of the countries in Africa were seeking independence by the 1950s, China did not view them as
sovereign states, so consequently felt no obligation to adhere to sovereignty in its revolutionary pursuits. In Figure 5.2, the probability of non-interference is calculated from the relative ratios of bi and multilateral relations across the continent. This may be seen through its relatively high probability of interference in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the gradual decrease in probability of interference as membership of institutions increased. After it gained admission to the UN in the early 1970s, and its identity changed to a neutral actor, it continued to practice its policy of non-interference; however as many of the nations in Africa were by this time independent, China’s practice of sovereignty became more apparent. This also reinforced China’s practice of internationalism. By the 1980s, there was a notable shift in sovereignty, as the newly emerging norm of developmentalism began to motivate its greater involvement in managing regional projects. Though it has continued to practice sovereignty in its activities throughout the region, in more recent times, notably since 2000, its policy of non-interference has adjusted through its institutional roles. This reflects not only how global sovereignty has evolved since the late 1990s, but also how developmentalism has enhanced China’s desire to evolve at a similar rate, thereby overcoming the norm’s inertia that arose through China’s isolation from the international community. This may be seen in Figure 5.2 by the renewed decrease in probability of direct and unconstrained intervention.

![Figure 5.2](image)

**Figure 5.2** The variation of a coefficient of non-interference from 1950-2010 (Source data: see Appendix 3)
Developmentalism

The developmentalist norm in Africa, as seen in Figure 5.3, has undertaken a comparatively similar path to the norm in the case of Southeast Asia. Since the study of developmentalism focused upon the promotion of the Beijing Consensus, the figure displays the norm unintended rhetorical and norm intended practical perspective between 2002 and 2008, by relating the number of countries visited by senior members of the CCP, primarily Hu Jintao and Wenjia Bao, throughout the period, as a measure of rhetoric, compared with the estimated aid distributed throughout the region along the practical dimension. The rhetorical dimension is purely relative as it does not account for the rhetoric originating from earlier tours of the continent, such as the tour in 1996 by Jiang Zemin. With the founding of FOCAC in 2000, China’s practice of developmentalism expanded significantly into what became known, in 2004, as the Beijing Consensus. Though China has strengthened regional mechanisms of self-reliance, and asymmetric defence, its increased activities have affected the internationalist norm, through the increase in ‘black GDP growth’, from its mineral resource extraction programs, most notably in Namibia and Sudan. Despite this, China continues to increase its rhetoric in promoting the benefits of its activities in the region, through the creation of SEZs, with the long-term goals of enhancing intraregional markets, and in so doing demonstrates how the norm of developmentalism has undergone cascade and internalisation in China.

The first order factors guiding China’s aid, notably the CCP’s maintenance of control over the disbursement of aid projects, have continued to shape China’s ongoing activities in Africa in line with its own interests and pursuit of great-power status. A large number of these projects continue to promote its own development, through regional resource extraction programs, which in turn fuels its equity markets. As traditional aid donors evaluate the direction of China’s activities in the region, in light of their effects on their own practices, there currently appears to be no rapid solution to the long standing issues that China’s activities have raised.
Figure 5.3 Comparison of norm unintended rhetoric and norm intended practice of developmentalism between 2002 and 2008, in Africa (Source data: see Appendix 3)

The next case study will continue the investigation of China's foreign aid across Latin America by studying how the embedded norms in China, have shaped a region in which its aid activities and historical connections are relatively recent.
CHAPTER 6

CHINA’S FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA

This chapter focuses upon the relations between China and the Latin American region, which comprises the countries of Central and South America, in addition to the islands of the Caribbean. Out of all the locations reviewed in these case studies, this region has historically had the least contact with China and played a marginal role in Chinese foreign relations. Recent changes in the politics of international relations, global trade, and China’s developmental needs have redirected attention towards the region, as it has become a focus of modern Chinese foreign policy and aid. These new moves into the region by China were highlighted in the Chinese Government’s new policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean which was released on 5 November 2008.

6.1 The significance of the Latin American case

Studies of China’s aid policy in Latin America have contended, among other things, that the significance of Chinese aid engagement in the region is linked to three main issues: firstly, its recent foreign economic policies, which continue to broaden China’s expansionist activities (Asia Times 1999); secondly, its domestic sovereignty concerns over Taiwan and promotion of the Beijing Consensus, particularly in the face of declining US regional involvement (BBC 2004c; Erikson and Chen 2007; Gore 2000: 789-804; IFICIA 2008); and thirdly, China’s response to international pressure for it to contribute more towards realizing its international responsibilities (Lum et al. 2009: 14-5; The New York Times 2009).

As China has entered the region after having internalised the developmentalist norm, China’s behaviour reflects its management of the norm rather than its exclusive promotion.

The shared identity that China had been successful in promoting throughout Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, namely that of a victim of Western colonial aggression, had less impact on governments in Latin America, and corresponded to a period when the PRC’s presence in the region was limited by ongoing American support for Taiwan, and the region’s support of American foreign policy. As Xiang Lanxin (2008: 46) argues: by ‘lacking local power bases and real influence, China did not pay much attention to the region in the 1950s and the 1960s’. Although during that period, Mao expressed support for the Latin
American struggle against US ‘imperialism’, most Latin American political leaders were anti-communist and Latin America remained a difficult region for Mao’s revolution to penetrate (Jiang 2008: 29; Xiang 2008: 46). In the 1960s, the CCP ‘experienced not only problems with governments in Latin America, but also with Communist Parties of the region — even if they were pro-Chinese factions.’ Che Guevara, for example, was never verbally or materially helped by the Chinese’ (Deckers 1989: 246).

In response to the support that China received from the developing world in gaining admission to the UN in 1971, China consistently voiced its support for a new world order, as advocated through the framework of South-South cooperation. Although Latin America has not been directly cited as being instrumental in China’s successful admission to the UN, its inclusion within the developing world enhanced China’s identification with it. China’s involvement in Latin America before the mid-1980s was largely restricted to nurturing bilateral relations with Cuba in the early 1960s, and in Chile in 1970, making it the first South American country to recognise the PRC. By the 1980s, however, by which time its identity had transformed into that of a member of the international community, China began to express a desire for state-to-state relations. Hence, the countries of the region became significant with respect to China’s rising great-power identity, during the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s (Dominican Today 2008; Johnson 2005; Lum et al. 2009: 14-5; The New York Times 2009). Since the late 1990s, the Chinese Government has continued to develop its foreign policies in Latin America, as seen in the increase in the number of official visits and growing economic exchanges (Zhang 1994: 38-9, Zhang 2007: 27). While many have highlighted how China’s aid to Latin America rationalised this activism with China’s mercantile interests, China’s policy paper at least acknowledged its responsibility based on international and developmental issues (MFA 2008b). Latin America has become a major area of Chinese foreign policy attention, with greater focus on both trade and investment, becoming an integral part of China’s role as an aid donor (Dumbaugh and Sullivan 2005: 4). This chapter aims to discuss whether the norms, implied in the 2008 policy paper, namely sovereignty, internationalism, and developmentalism, have had any impact on China’s aid distribution in the region.

This region is the source of an abundance of natural resources, many of which the PRC lacks and, as such, requires in order to continue the programme of modernization and economic development. China’s drive for the natural resources of Latin America has focussed primarily upon securing minerals and oil, particularly from Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and Cuba (BBC 2008b; People’s Daily
The ‘loans-for-oil’ agreement, signed by China in early 2009, provided Brazil with US$5 to 10 billion and Ecuador with a further US$1 billion (People’s Daily 2009f; Xinhua 2009b). Geographically speaking, the region is of great significance to China’s global trade, as the Panama Canal represents an important transport route for Chinese goods to North American and European markets, as well as a major channel for the transport of resources from West Africa and the Caribbean. The region is also significant in that in comparison with Africa, Latin America, whilst being comprised of many countries in the developing world, now also has considerably more enhanced political stability, a more developed infrastructure, through which resources and goods may be distributed or exported, and well established global trade links, facilitating alternative paths of access to overseas markets. Having greater integration in the global economy, Latin America is viewed as a region that can not only meet China’s resource needs, but is also becoming a major market for Chinese products (Interview 2007a).

Concerning diplomacy, since most of the ROC’s remaining official diplomatic allies are situated in Latin America, Li He (2005: 77-102) has argued that the region is a major focus of Chinese foreign policy, as the PRC continues its ongoing dispute over political recognition vis-à-vis Taiwan (also see Interview 2006j; 2006k; 2007a; 2007l; ZRGN 1986: 252-3; 1989: 353; 1991: 276, 286). Unlike Africa, a region in which China has played a significant role politically, especially during de-colonization, Latin America had been viewed as beyond China’s reach for the majority of the Cold War, as it was seen in terms of its relative proximity to America (Interview 2006b). Although most of the countries of Latin America had gained their independence during the nineteenth century and secured their positions in the community of nations, China perceived a decline in overall Latin American authority to the United States’ ‘Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty’ (Li 1991: 11). Many of the region’s countries had increasingly become ruled by pro-United States, and increasingly dictatorial, junta governments, such as Peron in Argentina, and Batista in Cuba. China’s engagement with the Castro Government in Cuba following the revolution in 1959, and the Chilean Government in 1970, following the election of leftist Salvador Allende, were among the first governments in the region to recognize the PRC and were increasingly anti-US (Montalva and Navia 2007).

Since much of the region remained heavily influenced by the US until the early 1990s, much of Latin America’s foreign relations involved cooperation with Western powers and allies of the United States. This factor played a major role in the region, by contributing to Taiwan’s regional political and diplomatic success. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War,
the PRC found the political environment in Latin America more favourable, which led it to re-evaluate the region's political and diplomatic potential. As China continues to seek diplomatic relations throughout the region following the thaw of the Cold War, pressure on countries that continue their support for Taiwan has intensified. The argument of isolating Taiwan through the use of foreign aid was observed in 2004, when the Dominican Republic changed its allegiance following Beijing's counter-offer of assistance, in the form of a pledge of US$122 million, compared with Taiwan's US$9 million (*BBC* 2004a; 2004b). Furthermore, when China established diplomatic relations with Costa Rica in June 2007, the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange agreed to buy US$300 million in Costa Rican Government bonds (*The New York Times* 2008). This relationship is further illustrated by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez's statement: 'China offered US$20 million in aid for more than 3,000 victims of the flood disaster in Costa Rica in 2007, the year when the two countries established diplomatic ties' (*People's Daily* 2008), which further infers China's use of aid in achieving its political objectives. The clarification and understanding of these factors is critical in the continuing discussion of norms, as it highlights cases where China's perceived adherence to the norms of internationalism, sovereignty and developmentalism, influences its foreign policy, and in some cases violates it. This has been seen through the manner in which it upholds the sovereignty norm, initially through its attempts to reduce Soviet spheres of influence that remained in the region during the 1970s and 1980s, to provide a trade alternative to the United States or to intervene in a sovereign state's foreign policy of recognising the ROC.

The importance of Latin America to Chinese foreign policy can also be seen in Chinese discourse. On a tour of five Latin American countries in 1990, President Yang Shangkun outlined the four principles of China's new foreign policy towards Latin America: firstly, that China will establish and develop friendly cooperative relations with all Latin American countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; secondly, bilateral trade and economic and technological cooperation should be expanded on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, for the purpose of meeting each other's needs, and by way of learning from each other's strengths to offset weakness; thirdly, both China and Latin American countries should respect each other's traditions and concept of values, learn and draw on each other's experiences, strengthen people-to-people contacts, promote understanding and friendship, and develop various forms of cultural exchanges on a broad basis; and lastly, China and Latin American countries should make joint efforts to establish a new international political and
economic order through mutual support, earnest consultation, and closer cooperation in world affairs (ZRGN 1991: 286). Whilst the first and fourth points reflect the internationalist norm, the second and third points are endorsements of the developmentalist and sovereignty norms respectively. These norms were pointed out again in Jiang Zemin’s address in San Diego, Chile in April 2001 (MFA 2001) and Hu Jintao’s oration to the Brazilian Parliament in November 2004, (Xinhua 2004a). These two speeches underline the focus of China’s Latin American policy, and how it relates to wider multilateral issues of South-South cooperation, and the creation of a new economic world order. The argument of China’s policy is that economic globalization and rapid technological development have induced a globally imbalanced developmental situation, which has resulted in biased international political and economic orders. Developing countries have therefore found it increasingly difficult to control their national sovereignties, security, and interests. Hence, ‘developing countries should work together to establish a reasonable, new international political and economic order’ in which Latin America plays a key role (Xinhua 2004a).

Following the release in Beijing of the Chinese Government’s new policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean by China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi on 5 November, 2008, the country’s ambassador to Barbados, Liu Huanxing, highlighted the benefits of aid assistance, debt cancellation, and cooperation in developmental issues, relating to environmental protection, climate change, human resources and social security, that Latin America could reap economically. The policy paper did not clarify how the Chinese Government would implement Chinese investment in Latin America, nevertheless, it maintains the policy framework outlined in the two speeches, emphasizing that China and Latin American states are developing countries, and thus have to share a common emphasis on South-South cooperation, by stressing how the two sides should continue to ‘strengthen the coordination and cooperation in international affairs, consistently communicate with each other regarding important international and regional issues’, and ‘support each other on such important issues as sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (MFA 2008b). Additionally, China and Latin America should ‘strengthen the role of the United Nations, make the international political and economic order more fair and equitable, promote democracy in international relations and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries’ (MFA 2008b). The policy paper also highlights how China would provide Latin American countries with political support in those affairs that would influence their development, such as environmental and ecological protection, and foreign debts.
During a tour of Peru in November 2008, Hu Jintao stressed the importance of building ties between China and the countries of Latin America and used the visit to propose a five point plan for strengthening innovative development and aimed to increase ‘the mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese and Latin American peoples’ (Xinhua 2008e). Further afield, nations throughout BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico), especially Brazil, have voiced agreement over the importance of China, the structure of the global institutions and the dynamics of international relations, especially in relation to trade. The idea that the development of China will prove beneficial to the entire world order has increasingly necessitated the engagement of the BRICSAM nations with China (Moore and Tranjan 2008).

6.2 Historical relations with Latin America

China’s relations in Latin America expanded, albeit marginally, from their initial relations with Cuba in the 1960s and Chile in the early 1970s. As its victim identity and communist leanings impeded the significant development of relations with other countries in the region, it was not until relations elsewhere throughout the Americas improved during the 1970s that further significant relations began to develop. These relations formed initially through a shared common identity under the framework of South-South cooperation. Once these relations began to emerge, there was a steady and progressive broadening of relations across the region.

During the 1950s and 1960s, China’s relations with Latin America were limited by the United States Cold War policy of containment. Following Fidel Castro’s successful revolution in 1959, Cuba became the first country in the region to formally recognise the PRC. The significance of Cuba in Chinese Latin American relations cannot be overstated, as it has played a major role not only within the region, but also externally, affecting China’s interactions with both the US and the wider international community (Li 2007a: 834). The Cuban revolution offered a valuable opportunity for China to reappraise its relations with Latin America, with the realization that revolution in the backyard of the US was not only possible, but had also become a reality. When Cuba became the first Latin American country to recognise the PRC in September 1960, it marked the commencement of Chinese engagement in the region. Premier Zhou Enlai reassured Castro that ‘China would furnish all the necessary assistance to the Cuban people in fighting for freedom’ (quoted from Zhang 1995: 91). After the establishment of formal relations, their shared communist ideology provided China with a framework for defining its aid provision to Cuba, which was the first country in the region to receive assistance, and resulted in the signing of a trade
and payments agreement pledging to help train Cuban technicians and supply economic aid (Li 2001: 468-9). A pledge to ship 10,000 tons of Chinese rice to Havana was fulfilled within a year, and marked the commencement of Sino-Cuban aid activities (Warner 1961: 101). In addition to substantial assistance, China offered Cuba a US$60 million interest-free loan in 1960. This was delivered between 1961 and 1965, and was designed in part to support the permanent residence of Chinese technicians and their equipment on the island, who were involved in 24 agricultural and industrial projects, and RMB 70 million in 1963, the purpose of which remains unclear (Copper: 1976: 34; Li 2001: 469-71; Renmin Ribao 1963a). China also established the Institute of Latin America Studies, a faculty of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in Beijing in 1961, as a national research organisation dedicated to studying the region (ILAS CASS). In 1963, China signed a protocol, promising the transfer of Sino-Cuban trade surpluses into the existing interest-free loan. In order to resolve the Cuban trade deficit, China transferred the outstanding balance into a commodity loan, which amounted to US$40 million in 1965. This move reflected Zhou Enlai's earlier postulation in 1963, that a 'loan is merely a form. It can be paid back later or even not at all' (Li 2001: 498).

With Castro's failure to convince the Americans of the legitimacy of the Cuban Revolution, and the subsequent US embargo on Cuban trade, the Cuban Government sought formal markets and allies beyond the influence of the US, by aligning with Soviet Communism. With the Soviet expansion of the Cold War into the Americas, this international structure further limited the opportunity for the PRC to broaden its international recognition in the region. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the fear of socialism spreading further into the region preoccupied American thinking, and became a focus of its national security policy. While the Sino-Soviet split was contemporaneous, American support for Taiwan and its presence in the region continued unaffected, leaving the PRC confined to its position of isolation. It would take almost a decade for the PRC to distance itself from its socialist revolutionary origins, and convince the international community of its independent foreign policy. As Mora (1999: 94) observes: 'Beijing was unable to establish normal diplomatic or economic and trade relations with any country except Cuba until the early 1970s', and as a result, 'China supported revolutionary groups that sought to overthrow "reactionary" governments', though in Latin America, its actual engagement remained limited (Deckers 1989: 246). It would not be until the PRC replaced the ROC at the UN in 1971, and entered a period of rapprochement with the US, that the PRC would be able to broaden its official relations with Latin American countries. With much
of Latin America dependent upon US aid and access to its markets, many Latin American states took their foreign policy cues from Washington, and as such, a new rapprochement with the PRC allowed the countries of the region to establish a dialogue, and later on, formal relations with China.

From the 1970s onwards, Sino-Latin American relations began to adapt to the changes in the PRC’s identity. The PRC’s early self-perception as a victim had been promoted during the 1950s and 1960s, along with its shared colonial experience, and had helped to secure international recognition in Africa and Southeast Asia. However, this image did little to facilitate Chinese relations in Latin America, as countries in the region had secured their independence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and had few revolutionary movements requiring international support. As a result, this identity soon became an impediment, as the PRC sought the vital resources and investment that it required to modernize and develop its economy. As Mora (1999: 95) explains:

[Owing to] Beijing’s long exclusion from the post-war international system and the desperate condition of its economy, the search for legitimacy and sources of capital, technology, and markets, along with the need to deny Taiwan diplomatic recognition, became the concrete goals of China’s policy toward Latin America in the late 1970s and 1980s.

Following a decade of independent foreign policy, the PRC concentrated on promoting an international image in support of the Third World, and demonstrated that it sought to play a responsible role by promoting South-South cooperation, thereby increasing its interaction with Latin America. The world-wide expansionist power of the Soviet Union provided the Chinese with the opportunity to unite with all possible anti-Soviet forces during the 1970s; Hsiung (1980: 1-15) argues that anti-hegemony and self-reliance were the milestones of Chinese foreign policy towards Latin America in the 1970s. With Latin America under strong US influence, the region played a marginal role in the broader Sino-Soviet competition throughout the Third World. This role, however, was sufficient to fuel accusations of Chinese collaboration with reactionary regimes, such as those of Pinochet in Chile (Deckers 1989: 247). Many Western powers, particularly those aligned to the left, remained astonished at China’s indifference towards the brutal military coup against Salvador Allende, especially following its refusal to accept refugees at their embassy in Santiago, continued diplomatic relations, and even the further development of trade exchanges following the coup.
China's muted reaction to the events in Chile became indicative of the PRC's foreign policy behaviour, which reflected its adherence to non-interference.

As China sought to modernize and develop its economy, the need for a favourable international image, in order to acquire the economic assistance and investments that it needed, became its priority. The PRC softened its anti-American rhetoric and focussed its efforts on domestic concerns and economic development. This policy was extended to Latin America during the 1970s, where China followed its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, choosing to concentrate on mutually beneficial trade relations. After China ended its self-imposed isolation from the international community, it adopted a more proactive foreign policy which promoted its Cold War neutral image and focussed upon trade and economic exchange. By establishing trade relations with states that had not yet recognized the PRC Government, the Chinese leadership believed that it could further enhance its diplomatic relations by beginning a discourse on establishing formal relations and asserting its stance towards Taiwan. Between 1970 and 1977, China distributed US$179 million of economic assistance in the region, primarily to Chile (US$65 million), Guyana (US$62 million), Peru (US$42 million) and Jamaica (US$10 million), in a move which prompted the establishment of diplomatic relations (Lin 1996: 34; Li 1991: 47). In addition to its economic cooperation agreement with these nations, it offered further economic and technical assistance to Suriname and Barbados.

China's assistance to Peru in 1971, took the form of protocols, which offered loans to help with the purchase of well digging equipment (Li 2001: 507). This assistance came less than a year after China had contributed RMB 1.5 million to Peru in humanitarian disaster aid relief, in the aftermath of the region's earthquake in 1970 (Li 2001: 482). Additionally, Chile received US$2.5 million, and Bolivia, a country without diplomatic relations with China, received substantially lower disaster relief payments of US$80,000 (Ratliff 1972: 859).

Soon after, China signed an agreement with Guyana offering £10 million over five years between 1 July 1972 and 30 June 1977, in which it emphasised its condition-free aid (MFA 1977: 130-1). This was shortly followed by the dispatch of Chinese agricultural experts to Guyana to help with rice growing activities. In 1975, China signed a further agreement, with Guyana, offering RMB 20 million (MFA 1982: 33-5). In 1976, China and Jamaica signed a trade agreement, a commodity loan agreement concerning China's provision of 5,000 tons of rice to Jamaica, and a protocol on a project for producing polyester cotton mills with Chinese assistance.
Having championed the cause of the Third World, in line with its neutral identity, at a time when the world remained divided by the Superpowers, China continued to expand its regional relations during the 1980s in response to the enhancement of its role in the politics of the international community and its domestic development needs. This expansion initially occurred through its South-South cooperation, but later on expansion occurred as its institutional role developed to form the foundations upon which its more recent developmentalist expansion activities in the region have been based.

China’s official interactions in Latin America began in October 1981, when Premier Zhao Ziyang attended the North-South Conference in Cancun, Mexico, in what became the first state visit by a Chinese Government leader to mainland Latin America. At the meeting, Zhao Ziyang proposed the Chinese Government’s five principles of international cooperation, which aimed to establish a New International Economic Order (People’s Daily 1981). This focussed attention on the debt problem in Latin America during its notorious La Década Perdida. During a later meeting with Brazilian president João Figueiredo in Beijing in 1984, Deng Xiaoping identified peace and development as the most pressing world challenge, categorizing each as the East-West problem (peace) and the North-South problem (development) (Jiang 2008: 30). Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian further highlighted that:

Serious debt problems have become a pressing issue that the developing countries, especially those in Latin America, are facing. […] We believe that the solution to the debt problem should be the responsibility of the creditors, commercial banks, international financial institutions and debtor countries. The principle of solving this debt problem should be the promotion of development in order to pay back the debt.

(ZRGN 1985: 195)

Wu was to reiterate these same concerns during a subsequent visit to Peru, Ecuador and Chile, in 1987 (ZRGN 1988: 203).

From October 28 to November 12, 1985, Zhao Ziyang returned to the region where he visited Colombia, Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (ZDJMN 1986: 349). During this visit, he highlighted that ‘both sides are victims of the unjust world order, and reiterated his proposal to establish a new world order by promoting North-South dialogue and deepening South-South cooperation’. In so doing, emphasising China’s identity as a victim of imperialism (ZRGN 1986:
While continuing its support for, and identification with, the developing world, the PRC began strengthening its position diplomatically across Latin America and the Caribbean (Li 2007b: 23-43). Part of China’s diplomatic offensive involved the increase in the number of visits to the region by high ranking Chinese officials and diplomats, which were matched by reciprocal invitations for Latin American leaders and trade representatives to visit Beijing (Zhang 1994: 38-9, Zhang 2007: 27). During the 1980s, Sino-Latin American relations expanded, as Mora (1999: 97) highlights:

During this period, 10 Latin American presidents from eight countries, and eight prime ministers and vice premiers from six countries visited China. Foreign ministers from 15 Latin American nations and 30 legislative delegations from 14 countries also visited Beijing.

The countries which subsequently received aid after establishing such relations included Ecuador, Columbia, Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the Bahamas (Li 2001: 536-53). Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1985, the Chinese Government provided the Bolivian Government with both economic and technical assistance, by helping with the construction of seven complete sets of projects which included cultural centres, well-drilling projects, and small hydro-electric power stations, the carrying out of three technical cooperation projects, including rice and vegetable cultivation, and seven rounds of material assistance (MFA 2006d).

As the 1980s ended and most of Latin America experienced a favourable balance of trade with China, political events such as the collapse of communism in Europe, and the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, forced the PRC to re-examine its foreign policy performance in the region. Western criticism over Tiananmen prompted China to solidify and rally support from the Third World, and resulted in China’s temporary re-isolation from the West. In 1990, China established a channel for political dialogue between itself and the Rio Group. Since that time, nine talks have been conducted at the foreign-ministry level. China had repeatedly praised the important role of the Rio Group and considered it to be an important political force among developing countries (MFA 2000a). The praising of the Rio Group, in contrast to the wider Organisation of American States (OAS), reflected China’s preference towards, and identification with, South-South cooperation in the region, despite the ongoing improved relations between China and the United
States. During that same year, Chinese President Yang Shangkun toured five Latin American countries, Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, where he strengthened commercial, technological, and cultural ties between China and the countries of the South American Cone and Mexico, by initiating dialogue on peaceful coexistence and the advocacy of international cooperation. During the tour, he postulated four principles of China's new foreign policy towards Latin America. Yang’s visit was also cited as heralding 'a new chapter in Sino-Latin American friendship', and became recognised as ‘an important milestone in the history of Sino-Latin American friendly relations’. Yang reiterated the call that ‘China and Latin American countries should make joint efforts in establishing a new international political and economic order, through mutual support, earnest consultation, and closer cooperation in world affairs’ (ZRGN 1991: 286).

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, aid to the region from the Superpowers consequently began to decrease. This provided China with an opportunity to further its role as an aid donor in the region. As Li He (2005: 88; 2007a: 847) stated, ‘the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently have played the PRC and Taiwan against each other’ in the face of ‘declining aid from the West and the former Soviet bloc’. From the 1990s onwards into the new millennium, many leaders in Latin America came to view US investment and the shift of manufacturing to China as their loss. With many countries in the region mired in poverty, through having followed development models proposed by the West, disillusionment amongst many populations was mirrored by the successive rise of left-wing parties, which formed governments across Latin America. This strengthened the developmentalist norm by enforcing self-reliance and provided China with an opportunity to promote itself as a potential model for economic development. As Li He (2007a: 851) points out:

It is worth noting that as China’s economy and its soft power keeps growing, and the region continues to be frustrated with the perceived lack of attention and interest from Washington, some Latin American countries might turn to the Chinese way of development: that is, blending economic growth and authoritarian form of government.

The subsequent focus of attention on China by many Latin American countries, extended beyond trade, access to markets, and technology. Consequently, China took advantage of this new found interest in its system and development model.
This caused many China observers in the West, and specifically in the United States, to view China’s rise as a threat to American influence in Latin America (The Washington Post 2006a).

In 1992, Li Peng led a Chinese Government delegation at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Li Peng’s proposition of attributing equal importance to environmental protection and economic development, met with general approval from the Latin American countries and the international community. During the conference, Li Peng also held separate talks with the President of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello, on issues relating to bilateral relations, in addition to talks with President Menem of Argentina, the President of Chile, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, the President of Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, the Cuban President of Council of State, Fidel Castro Ruz, and a representative of the President of Suriname, thereby multilaterally enhancing China’s bilateral relations network (China). In 1993, China became an observer of the Latin American Integration Association. In November of the same year, President Jiang Zemin visited both Brazil and Cuba in his first foreign visit as president of the CCP, where he emphasised the improvement of Sino-Latin American trade, and promised its continuation (ZRGN 1994: 129). By proposing a New International Economic Order, Jiang Zemin affirmed that every country in the world should participate in the network of global economic and commercial relations, where every country should have the right to decide on the structures of its social and economic system, in order to be able to control its own resources and development. He called for South-South cooperation, in order to share experiences and expand the opportunities for development that existed within each country (Li 2001: 524-5).

During the 1990s, China enhanced its efforts on developing a common market of the south with Latin America, through the dealings with APEC and MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market). In June 1994, when China became an observer to the Latin American Integration Association, it held two official talks with MERCOSUR, and formalised a regional trade agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay that had been founded in 1991. APEC offered a venue for China to develop its multilateral ties with Asian-Pacific and Latin American countries. Since China commenced its participation in APEC, Asia-Latin American interactions have progressed, with the addition of three Latin American countries to the institution: Mexico, Chile, and Peru. China has continued to send high level delegations to the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (EALAF/FEALAC) meetings, in a key role aimed at improving
cooperation between East Asia and Latin America. In 1995, Premier Li Peng visited Mexico, Cuba, and Peru, where he reiterated his call for a 'new international political and economic order', where China and Latin America should expand 'mutual support, consultation and cooperation in world affairs' to strengthen their position internationally (ZRGN 1996: 204). Li returned to Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in 1996, where he reaffirmed their mutual support, consultation and cooperation, and targeted four main priority areas: trade, direct cooperation among enterprises, joint tapping of natural resources, and exchanges in science and technology (Li 2001: 529-35, Mora 1999: 102; ZRGN 1997: 265).

The relations between China and multilateral organisations and institutions in the Latin American region became closer as political consultations and dialogues intensified. In 1997, China applied for borrower member status of the Caribbean Development Bank, further strengthening financial links between the two regions. This position was granted early in the following year (Hogenboom 2008: 8). In October 1997, a delegation from MERCOSUR, held initial talks during a visit to China (MFA 2006c). China’s diplomatic and economic effort was not only directed at key individual countries, but also focussed on old and new multilateral organisations. At about this time, the financial crisis in Southeast Asia was at its peak. This proved a timely reminder of the importance of multilateral efforts, outside of South-South cooperation, and resulted in a shift in China’s policies to embrace greater multilateral responsibility. This became apparent through its broadened commitment to more Western and American dominated institutions that were external to those traditionally associated with South-South cooperation.

With the strengthening of economic ties between China and Latin America in the 1990s, Chinese investment in the region, along with bilateral trade, has grown significantly. Since 1991, when China officially applied to join the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a Chinese delegation has regularly attended their annual meeting in an observer role (MFA 2002b). As the leading multilateral source of development financing for Latin America and the Caribbean, the IDB has also been the main source of multilateral financing for economic, social and institutional development projects, in addition to trade and regional integration programmes.

The significance of Latin America to China, however, extends beyond the economic realm, since it is also a potential partner in China’s ongoing quest to establish a ‘just and harmonious world order’. As Hirst (2008: 90-7) explains, through joining multilateral institutions, such as the UN, China and Latin America have accessed an assembly through which they may unite through mutually
shared perspectives on various international issues in the context of South-South cooperation. In accordance with this view, China has continued to hold regular talks with the Rio Group since 1990, along with similar talks with Mercosur since 1994. In 2004, the Organization of American States (OAS) accepted China as a permanent observer. Furthermore, China gained an observer status in the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the Latin American Parliament, in addition to attaining full membership of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in 2009 (China; *China Daily* 2009a; *People’s Daily* 2004b).

After gaining membership of the bank, Liu Kegu, the Vice President of the China Development Bank (CDB), signed a memorandum of cooperation with the IDB, stating that:

> [T]he CDB will take an active part in the IDB’s financing activities in Latin America, especially in areas of energy, transportation, urban infrastructure and agriculture, to promote economic and trade cooperation between China and Latin America.

(*Xinhua* 2009d)

The direction of this foreign policy was complemented by a concentrated economic offensive, aimed at expanding the PRC’s influence by utilizing aid as a practice. Since the PRC’s role as a foreign aid donor in the region was less established, and in light of criticism of China’s need for long-term commodities and energy solutions, as a step towards its involvement in the region, the analysis of the norms provides an approach to establishing whether the norms of Chinese aid commitment are consistent with, or proportional to, its rational concerns.

### 6.3 Norms in Chinese aid to Latin America

As explained earlier in the thesis, since the Asianist norm pertains to the formation of a shared Asian identity within Asia, its relevance in Latin America is of little direct consequence. As such, this case study will focus upon the norms of internationalism, sovereignty and developmentalism.

#### 6.3.1 Internationalism

China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean reflects how the status of Latin America and the Caribbean had been upgraded to a regional concern, thereby addressing the points of Chinese economic assistance and the
internationalist norm:

The Chinese Government will also continue to call upon the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more concrete steps to reduce and cancel debts owed by Latin American and Caribbean countries. [......], with a view to promoting South-South cooperation, bringing about a more just and equitable multilateral trading regime and ensuring a bigger say and greater role in decision-making for developing countries in international trade and financial affairs.

(MFA 2008b)

i) The evolution of internationalism in Latin America

China’s involvement in the region’s institutions became considerably enhanced during the 1990s and early 2000s. The changes that shaped internationalism in other regions, such as the Asian financial crisis, SARS, and the global financial crisis in 2007, reshaped China’s involvement in Latin America, as its policies became further focussed towards international responsibility.

In the early 1990s, as China’s internationalist involvement was largely focussed upon South-South cooperation, there was a gradual expansion towards the promotion of responsibility for global issues. This was seen in Li Peng’s delegation to the UN conference on the Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, as well as China’s increased interactions with MERCOSUR in 1994, following China’s attainment of an observer role to the Latin American Integration Association. By 1997, the onset of the Asian financial crisis marked the turning point in the internationalist norm, as China renewed its focus upon international responsibility. China began to engage institutions that were more Western and American-dominated in the region than those with which it had traditionally become associated with. By the early 2000s, though China’s efforts towards South-South cooperation remained strong, as seen, for example, in President Hu Jintao’s speech to the Parliament of Brazil in 2004, where he pointed out the need for ‘maintaining consultation and coordination, strengthening international cooperation on the tone of addressing South-South cooperation’ (Xinhua 2004a), their internationalist activities had become directed towards global issues. This became apparent in the aftermath of the SARS epidemic in Southeast Asia, when non-traditional security threats reshaped China’s realisation that epidemics such as SARS, and avian flu, could spread prolifically throughout the world, and prove devastating to a region’s development. As such, there was an
increased need for countries to work together to prevent and contain the spread of disease. This factor would heavily influence China’s response to the outbreak of Swine flu in Latin America in 2009.

In addition, China’s growing regional responsibility on a multilateral basis was reflected during one of Premier Li Peng’s most important trips to Latin America in 2001, where he delivered a speech at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UNECLAC), and clarified through a series of defined stages how multilateralist informed internationalism had strengthened the relationship between China and Latin America. The first stage made full use of the existing mechanisms for intensifying dialogue and cooperation, through such organisations as the Rio Group. The second stage intensively developed consensus and broadened cooperation in international forums and organisations, such as the UN, the Asia-Pacific Forum for Economic Cooperation, the Group of 77, and the EALAF. The third stage broadened economic cooperation and trade in favour of common development based on mutual benefits and reciprocity. The fourth stage established long-term relations of broad and integrated cooperation (Xinhua 2001a; ZRGN 2002: 338). China has continued to participate in Latin America’s regional organisations through the mechanism of the UN. In May 2004, it officially achieved observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS); an institution that had been founded in 1948. This was followed soon after by its admission to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Its role in these institutions allowed it to provide wider support for Latin American governments in their economic and social development. As China enhanced its bilateral relations through multilateral channels, its commitment to the internationalist norm in the UN, ‘reinforced a movement by the Chinese government to play a larger role in world affairs, including participating more actively in regional groups’ (The Washington Post 2004). As China has been subject to criticism for not sharing a greater proportion of the burden of peacekeeping duties in the region, it voted in April 2004, for UNSC Resolution 1542, which authorized the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (UN 2004), a move that led Vice Minister Meng Hongwei to state that:

China’s active involvement in peacekeeping missions of the UN, especially in Haiti which has not set up a diplomatic relationship with China, fully exhibits a peace-loving and responsible image of the country.

(China Daily 2004)
This move reflected trends following the end of the Cold War, that along with China’s rise as a great power, there was a need for China to demonstrate internationally that it could behave as a legitimate and responsible great power. By sharing its duties in the international community, rather than abstaining and maintaining levels of suspicion as to its motives, it could contribute to stability within the international community.

This was not only the first time that China had dispatched a police unit in a multilateral peacekeeping role, but also marked the first time that China had dispatched peacekeepers to a UN member state with which it did not share diplomatic relations. China’s involvement in UNPKO in Haiti, assisted in stabilizing an area of conflict, and has contributed to the overall economic development of a region. This move demonstrated how the internationalist norms of the international governing body and multilateral activities in peacekeeping have shifted China’s principle of non-interference. Its peacekeeping role has further enhanced its interaction with other major Latin American countries such as Chile and Brazil, further demonstrating how the strength of the responsibility image underlines the internationalist norm (People’s Daily 2004c). Such a move also demonstrated the setting of a significant precedent, in contradiction to its previously observed regional behaviour, as Haiti remains one of the region’s remaining nations that is diplomatically allied with Taiwan. The setting of this precedent, however, does not preclude the possibility that China may in the future use its veto within the UN for curtailing these peacekeeping operations, thereby further demonstrating how it may potentially influence its goals, adhere to the internationalist norm, and prevent the infliction of damage to its responsible image in countries of low strategic importance.

Less than a year later in February 2005, China allocated US$1 million to create a Cooperation Fund within the OAS (China 2005), in a move that further demonstrated its renewed focus on wider multilateral regional institutions. The global financial crisis in 2007 provided a further opportunity for China to demonstrate its international responsibility. China renewed its activism in the region in late 2008, when President Hu visited the APEC summit in Lima, ahead of a three-nation tour, which also included Costa Rica and Cuba (BBC 2008a; 2008b). During the visit, Hu made efforts to reassure his Latin American counterparts of China’s commitment to the region, by renewing promises for long-term investment in the commodity markets of the region, and the promotion of infrastructure development; an area that had been neglected since the last aid promises to the region. The sources of potential investment lay in further
developing the free trade area with Chile, which was constituted in 2007, and the establishment of further free trade markets with Peru and Costa Rica, all of which also further strengthen the developmentalist norm in China. Hu’s tour was closely followed by a similar tour by two senior officials, Vice Premier Hui Liangyi and Vice President Xi Jinping, in a move which reinforced China’s commitment to the region, and accompanied the release of its regional policy paper. Such a move reaffirms its commitment to the sustained long-term development of the region and its image as a responsible leader (*BBC* 2009a), which it has reinforced by continuing to display its dedication to growth by increasing its investment in commodities such as oil, minerals and soya beans, thus downplaying its mercantile image. As Eriksson highlights:

China now wishes to show that it is a responsible stakeholder in the Latin American region. Previously the image of the Chinese people in Latin America reflected solely doing business in the region, by only displaying interest in the regions resources. Now, the Chinese want to show they’re interested in the long-term development in Latin America.

(*BBC* 2009a)

China’s growing awareness of environmental problems and concerns has become more prominent through its association with the region. This policy paper also outlined tighter controls and regulations on environmental protection, by providing training, education, and capacity building on bilateral relations, in addition to the prevention of pollution and desertification. These measures complement the bills on climate change collaboration efforts that were proposed through the multilateral mechanisms of the UN. In apparent efforts to expand regional development, China has also been keen to expand in many areas, especially in those related to agriculture and crops, notably connected to its enhanced soya bean export trade (*MFA* 2008b).

To reconfirm this, a four point plan was put forward to encourage the promotion of mutual trust, particularly in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis (*People’s Daily* 2009c). This plan centred on boosting human and cultural exchanges, and the strengthening of consultation and cooperation in international affairs. China’s multilateral expansion has broadened its potential for mutual cooperation as a basis for enduring these current difficult times, allowing it to emerge significantly stronger over the coming years. Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping highlighted this point by stating that:
In face of the global financial crisis, China is ready to work with Latin American nations to strengthen coordination and boost confidence so as to contribute to the stable growth of the global economy.

*(People’s Daily 2009c)*

When China became the 48th member country to join the IDB in January 2009, Zhou, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, noted that it had become ‘the most important platform’ for China’s collaboration with this region when he announced that:

> China is ready to join hands with other IDB members in the face of the ongoing financial crisis to promote sustainable economic and social development in the region.

*(Xinhua 2009c)*

By joining the IDB, China’s ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, also highlighted that:

> [S]uch multilateral tools were the key to solving the international financial crisis, which threatens Chinese and Latin American growth. We don’t want to compete with the U.S. for anything here in Latin America.

*(McClatchy 2008)*

In its role as a member, China contributed US$350 million to the IDB Group, and was represented at the Board of Executive Directors by sharing a chair with other donor nations. The role of the Executive directors, primarily, but not exclusively, has been to approve loans, establish policies, and set interest rates *(China 2008)*. US$125 million out of the total US$350 million donation was allocated for investment in the IDB’s Fund for Special Operations, which provides soft loans to Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Meanwhile, multiple IDB grants, an equity fund to be administered by the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), along with the Multilateral Investment Fund were each allocated US$75 million *(HKTDC 2008)*. In early May 2009, China continued to demonstrate its responsible image through its dispatch of two major aid shipments to Mexico, along with a promise of US$5 million in cash and medical supplies in
response to the outbreak of Swine flu (Xinhua 2009h). By taking the initiative to be the first international response to the outbreak in the region, China seized an opportunity not only to demonstrate its responsible image, but also to show how it had evolved since its own unfortunate experience with SARS in 2003.

6.3.2 Sovereignty

As seen in the case studies of Southeast Asia and Africa, the sovereignty norm in China is founded on both practical and ideological grounds. This can be seen through the manner by which it exercises pragmatism towards its material considerations, yet refuses to compromise its 'one-China' policy. This section continues the discussion of the sovereignty norm in relation to China’s recent activism in Latin America.

i) The effectiveness of the sovereignty norm

China’s adherence to the sovereignty norm in Latin America, unlike that in Southeast Asia and Africa, has been heavily influenced by the proximity of the region to the United States. In the early 1960s, the United States’ response to communist activities in the region, such as the events that led to the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, demonstrated how seriously the US responded to threats of regional interference. In view of this, given the sovereign and decolonised status of the region’s countries, not to mention the Cuban-Soviet relationship, China’s compliance with the ideals of sovereignty was a less costly compromise, especially with the recent memories of the Korean War and its aftermath. Since the late 1970s, China’s continued and enhanced adherence to the sovereignty norm is reflected in the termination of interactions with regional insurgents, in favour of enhanced multilateral involvement in regional institutions such as the UN, OAS, Inter American Development Bank, APEC, the China-Latin America forum, the China-South American common market dialogue, and the China-Andean Community (Li 2007a: 834). This highlights how sovereignty has become strengthened through China’s pursuance of, and adherence to, other norms such as internationalism. China has realised that membership of such institutions is a more effective method for providing support for other countries without directly interfering in their domestic affairs.

During the Cold War, the sovereignty norm informed the Chinese foreign aid policy in Latin America, which focused mainly on encouraging greater Third World independence through its opposition to what it viewed as US interference in the region. This was reflected in China’s rhetoric towards powers that violated
regional sovereignty. Somewhat ironically, though, such violations, commonly led by the United States, were conducted in response to communist backed insurgents fighting for regional independence and world revolution, which China strongly endorsed at that time. This demonstrated how although its rhetoric was strong, its practice of sovereignty remained subjective. US sanctions on trade with Cuba have for several decades fed anti-US sentiment, which China has benefited from and was equally keen to nurture, during the Cold War. This has at times engendered increased US animosity aimed at regime change on the island, ranging from the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion, which enforced China’s rhetoric about regional interference, the US’s policies aimed at the de-stabilisation of the Castro Government, through to issues related to its war on terror, and controversies over Guantanamo Bay. China further demonstrated its opposition to outside interference in the region, even with Latin American countries with which it had no established relations at that time, when the US intervened with the use of force during an internal political crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Mao issued a statement denouncing the US action, and offered to ‘support the Dominican people in their patriotic armed struggle against the U.S.’ (Mao 1966: 15).

After China’s admission to the UN, it was now able to demonstrate its adherence to sovereignty by using international responsibility as an argument for promoting non-interference. During this time, the Chinese leadership perceived the strength of the sovereignty norm in Latin America and the Caribbean as a factor which promoted this norm broadly. As Zhou Enlai pointed out:

The struggle in Latin America to oppose imperialism and for national independence has made marked progress and a breakthrough has been brought about; the beacon of this struggle has brought light to the whole Western Hemisphere [in the 70s].

(MFA 2000b)

Furthermore, at a banquet in honour of the visiting Mexican president, Luis Echeverria, held in April 1972, Zhou stated that:

Latin America is emerging on the world stage with a new face. […….] The Chinese Government and the Chinese people firmly support the just struggle of the Latin American people, and believe that a united Latin America, through its struggle, will win a greater victory over the expansionary influence of imperialism, and new
and old colonialism. 

As a member of the UN, and in line with its neutral identity, China implemented institutional efforts to help countries maintain their sovereignty, and promote non-interference, in the face of what it viewed as ongoing hegemonism by the US. Among the institutional efforts supported by the PRC was the establishment of a 200-nautical-mile territorial water zone along the region’s countries’ coasts, a regionally exclusive economic zone, economic independence, and the Latin American nuclear-weapon free zone (MFA 2000b). Despite these activities, there is no data supporting China’s use of aid to influence Latin American domestic policies. Though the sovereignty norm had been upheld in its assistance, China’s involvement with institutions made its involvement in the domestic affairs of the region’s countries imprudent. Furthermore, as Deng’s reforms progressed after 1978, there was a significant decline in China’s institutional involvement in regional affairs, as it focussed upon its own domestic reform. From the outset of the 1980s, China’s aid subsequently took the form of promises to its newly diplomatically aligned allies. As previously illustrated, Antigua and Barbuda (1983), Belize (1987), Bolivia (1985), Columbia (1980), Nicaragua (1985) and Uruguay (1988) established diplomatic relations with the PRC, and subsequently received aid from China.

Through its policy of non-interference, China continued to support Latin American countries through institutions and in its opposition to ongoing interference from other nations. The most notable regional interference during the 1980s emerged from the US, which had traditionally been proactive in the region, as a consequence of continued and vestigial communist and independence forces, around the Panama Canal. Between 1983 and 1989, the US invaded Grenada, funded the Contras in Nicaragua and Honduras, aided the ongoing civil war in El Salvador and invaded Panama. It also participated in intelligence gathering operations in South America, which served its anti-insurgent and anti-narcotics policies during the 1990s. These policies fuelled a substantial portion of regional anti-US sentiment, which accentuated the region’s search for alternative markets, such as China (Li 2007a: 836, 856).

While China has been keen to expand bilateral assistance with Latin American nations such as Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay, its adherence to its non-interference policy has been demonstrated in recent years by the restraint it has shown in actively expanding the military technologies of the region beyond that of a defensive capability (see Chu 2003: 3, 4, 7; Paz 2006).
This was demonstrated by its provision of spy satellite technology to Brazil (Johnson 2005), and its expanding of military training programmes for Latin American officers, following the termination of US backed programs in the region (Bachelet 2005). It also remained detached from distinctly pro-active arms procurement activities in Venezuela in 2004-5 (Domínguez 2006: 8), and by conducting distinctly low key naval activities in the early 2000s around the Panama canal, so as to downplay any hegemonic intention (Roy 2005: 72).

The case of Argentina further highlights how China has exercised its non-interference policy in the region. Even after developing links with China that resulted in significant improvements in its global financial position, China stopped short of providing a means for Argentina to fully settle its IMF debt loan by the end of 2004, which would have freed it from its regional obligations (Paz 2006: 109). China’s fear of antagonising the US served to counter any bargaining power that Argentina might have had using developmental issues, which only appears to have played a role in pre-relational discourse.

As global sovereignty has undergone change, this has affected the sovereignty norm in several notable ways. In the recent elections in Ecuador, as well as in Venezuela, under the Chavez Government, the installation of left-wing governments has fuelled regional nationalism, which opposes foreign oil investment and resource extraction (Kurlantzick 2006c: 33-40; LatinAmerican Post; Li 2007b: 24-7). Despite this, China remains content to maintain relations across the region and in accordance with its non-interference policy, despite this potentially affecting its business interests. Further divergence from the sovereignty norm was demonstrated by its multilateral UN involvement in peacekeeping activities in Haiti (China Daily 2004; People’s Daily 2004c; The Washington Post 2004). The deployed contingent of Chinese military police, under the direct command of a Brazilian, represents the first incidence of the deployment of Chinese military personnel in the Western hemisphere. Though this may be viewed with alarm in some quarters, this transition mirrors the more recent shift in other regions under the influence of human rights policies, reflecting more benign intentions.

**ii) Limitations of the sovereignty norm**

The most obvious contradictions to the sovereignty norm in the region have arisen through Beijing’s overt measures to reduce the region’s ties to Taiwan, and its involvement in UN Peacekeeping operations in Haiti, the latter of which has been discussed previously. China’s ongoing relations with Cuba also provide an interesting contradiction to the sovereignty norm in the region.
In the 1950s, most of Latin America had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. These relations began to erode when the Cuban regime, under Fidel Castro, established ties with China in 1960. In the 1970s, Chile led a major shift in relations in favour of the PRC, which resulted, over the following decades, in many of the region’s countries gradually following its example (Watson 2004). The latest major transition in allegiances was seen in Costa Rica, which was rewarded with a presidential visit, along with a new football stadium for its decision in 2007 to recognise China. Furthermore, China agreed to buy US$300 million in Costa Rican Government bonds (The New York Times 2008). The aid compliance can be further illustrated by China’s aid assistance following the region’s floods in 2007, when diplomatic relations became established (People’s Daily 2008). China’s policy has, like in Africa and Southeast Asia, resulted in Beijing being played off against Taipei. The forcing of nations to renounce Taiwan, thereby constituting a violation of the sovereignty norm, is fuelling more recent efforts by China to coerce members of MERCOSUR into pressuring a long-time ally of Taiwan, Paraguay, into joining free trade area negotiations (Li 2007a: 844).

By supporting and adhering to its non-interference policy, China has in the last two decades benefited from advantageous relations with Cuba, and shared many international cooperative efforts in the face of ongoing sanctions against the Castro Government. While China openly flaunted its relations with Cuba during this time, it did so carefully, in order to maintain amicable relations with Washington. The cooperative efforts proved beneficial to China through its numerous nickel resource contracts, as well as ongoing Cuban endorsement on issues relating to China’s domestic policy on human rights, Taiwan, and Tibet (Li 2007a: 839). By heavily investing in nickel operations in Cuba, China has in turn become a much needed ally from Cuba’s direct sources of debt, Europe, Russia, Japan, and three major Latin American countries of Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico. Since these three Latin American nations along with Brazil, form important strategic bilateral alliances with China, China is positioned to serve its own needs in Cuba by influencing the foreign policies of several of Cuba’s major financial donors. This raises a dilemma for China: how much would China assist Cuba’s ability to remain free from foreign influence by coercing other countries.

Though China’s role as a peace-keeper was already discussed in internationalism, this role marks a notable deviation from sovereignty, since China’s international role is directly linked with shaping Haiti’s development, by offsetting regional violence, maintaining regional stability, and through the direct enforcement of an internationally determined resolution to Haiti’s domestic
troubles. Though this contradicts China’s long standing policy of ‘non-interference’, it shows how the sovereignty norm is evolving and how China is adapting to changes in its evolution. The UN’s peacekeeping role of addressing conflicts, with economic, social and political origins, is an example of the sovereignty norm’s evolution and its focus on increased moral legitimacy. China’s involvement in Haiti, through the rebuilding of the national infrastructure, demonstrates to the international community that China is willing to take on the responsibility of a legitimate great power.

6.3.3 Developmentalism

China’s relations with Latin America have for the most part, with the exception of Cuba, where China had an established aid relationship since the 1960s, focussed on greater trade and economic growth, by sharing a common interest in modernization and economic development. Despite the non-existence of extensive historical and cultural ties between the regions, China, during the 1970s, considered the Latin American development model in the formulation of its own domestic reforms (Xiang 2008: 45-6). However, the realisation of this pro-Western development model, in China, was abandoned in favour of China’s own domestic model. Subsequently, in the 1980s, Latin America succumbed to its own model of development, which resulted in its ‘lost decade’, as mounting debt across the region brought regional development to a standstill, and in some cases, forced it to regress.

Following the end of the Cold War and with China’s wider involvement in regional institutions and its increased uptake of both internationalism and developmentalism, relations between the two regions began to broaden economically. During the 1990s, China’s involvement in the region was largely confined to the institutions with which it was affiliated. However, by the early 2000s, China’s investment in the region became enhanced, as it commenced wide-scale regional bilateral and multilateral projects. This generated significant regional interest in China’s model of development (Ramo 2004), especially with respect to declining Western regional economic activities, which many countries in the region found particularly appealing. The region’s countries viewed this model of development as a means of recovering and enhancing their former prosperity. In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, in the face of even greater Western protectionism, countries of the region appeared to be increasingly turning to China (The Washington Post 2009b), in pursuit of forging what they perceived as a ‘missing link’ in global economic markets, namely the link between the markets of Latin America and Asia (Paz 2006: 104).
China’s development aid to the region has grown steadily since China renewed its regional activities in 2004 (Paz 2006: 46). Since then, investment in the region’s resource extraction processes and industries, principally in Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Argentina has grown significantly, and as suggested by Paz (2006) can be seen as a form of financial support, and thus a type of aid. The scale of the aid reflects its importance to China’s interests in the region. For example, countries such as Venezuela and Brazil received in excess of US$16 billion and US$8 billion in aid respectively in 2007 (Lum et al. 2009: 15), a figure that is annually increasing, whilst Central American countries, such as Costa Rica, received an estimated US$400 million (Lum et al. 2009: 15).

i) The practice of the Beijing Consensus

In continuing the investigation into how the Beijing Consensus is perceived and embraced through China’s development aid to the region, this section will investigate how the stimulation of innovative growth, expansion of regional self-confidence, localisation of development, formation of regional free trade areas, counterbalancing of ‘black GDP growth’, and development of asymmetric power, have been induced through China’s foreign aid policy to the region, and informed by the developmentalist norm.

China’s development aid has been focussed on a range of cost effective and innovative projects across the region, as highlighted in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Chinese aid supported projects in Latin America (Lum et al. 2009: 15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aid supported project areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Infrastructure (aviation, rail and ports), satellite technology, agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Natural resources, ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>Steel, oil exploration, mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid, infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Oil and Gas exploration and production, transportation, telecommunications, light industry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in the cases of Southeast Asia and Africa, the focus of China’s activities in the region has been on resource extraction, such as nickel and copper from Cuba and Chile, and oil from Venezuela; all of which are exported to China’s equity markets (Zweig and Bi 2005: 25-38). China’s aid also re-enforces the regional supply routes, as seen by the development of export infrastructure on
both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the continent (Lum et al. 2009: 14-5). The enhancement of region-wide supply routes could also reduce the region's dependency on more traditional trade routes, like that of the Panama Canal (Roy 2005: 72). This also serves China's interests, as this trade route is also a major shipping route for its exports from Africa. The development of telecommunication and satellite technology also enhances these channels of distribution, through improved levels of communication technology. China's focus of aid on Argentine agriculture, notably through investments in its soya bean markets, has helped the country's economic recovery and development, and exemplifies how China's development model has proved to be effective.

The disbursement of innovative aid not only aims to provide a cost effective method for creating sustainable development but also aims to raise regional self-confidence, by triggering developmental chain reactions in growth. China's aim to promote mutual trust, through its aid to the region, hopes to demonstrate that it is 'ready to work with Latin American nations to strengthen coordination and boost confidence' (People's Daily 2009a). This is also complementary to the internationalist norm. Its four point plan, as outlined in its 2008 regional policy paper, centred on enhancing cultural exchanges, and strengthening consultation and cooperation between itself and the region. When Vice Premier Hui Liangyi and Vice President Xi Jinping toured the region in 2009, they were keen to highlight that China's interests in the region extended beyond resource extraction, and lay 'in the long-term development of Latin America' (BBC 2009c). Although China's aid rhetoric and practice varies, evidence of the region's growth in self-confidence can be seen through the notable expansion of projects and aid through the region, as governments are widely embracing China's increasing investment in the region. The enhanced prosperity in Argentina in recent years has fuelled considerable regional self-confidence, and provided clear evidence that redevelopment outside of the traditional paths of development, as prescribed by the Washington Consensus, are not only possible, but also achievable (Paz 2006: 106-7; 109).

China's UNPKO efforts in Haiti are fuelling self-confidence in the region, by demonstrating China's commitment to long-term multilateral resolutions to the region's fundamental problems (People's Daily 2004c). China's policy paper in 2008 highlighted China's growing awareness of prominent regional environmental issues and concerns, such as pollution, desertification and climate change, and outlined the need for implementing tighter regulations and controls across the region, through the providing of training, education, capacity building, and using the multilateral channels of the UN (Xinhua 2008d).
While China’s ‘go out’ policy is primarily focussed on its infrastructural projects in Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile, it is also providing aid to humanitarian growth and development, notably in the region around Central America and the Caribbean. In order to counter the seemingly ambiguous differences in cultural perception between the regions, and to establish their own image of Chinese culture, the PRC has continued to establish Confucian institutes across the region, in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru, aimed at expanding regional knowledge about China (Hanban). By raising levels of mutual understanding between the two regions, China hopes to build upon the foundations of its relationships, which are also being strengthened further through China’s role in UNPKO in Haiti, as previously outlined.

A central principle of the Beijing Consensus is the promotion of equality in the economic development of a region. Although economic equality is often tarnished by ‘black GDP growth’, the pursuit of this goal has been demonstrated in Southeast Asia and in Latin America through the establishment of Free Trade Areas. China’s development aid to the region was instrumental in the foundation of the Sino-Chilean FTA in 2007. Chile was chosen as the most suitable country in the region to establish an initial regional FTA, since it was the country with the highest levels of development in the region, with an increasingly well developed regional infrastructure, and access to markets. The success of creating this FTA has fuelled China’s aspirations of developing further region wide FTAs, involving Costa Rica, Peru, and Paraguay, the latter of which remains one of the only countries in the region still to maintain relations with Taiwan. The expansion of free trade in the area, not only contributes to enhancing intra-regional markets, but also provides China with better access to wider global markets.

ii) Limitations to developmentalism in Latin America

One of the obstacles to development across the developing world is the growth of ‘black GDP’, which diminishes the magnitude of positive development in the region. China’s aid to the region has significantly contributed to this growth, though China remains resolute in promoting the long-term benefits for the region, and as such, reconciles ‘black GDP growth’ in transient terms relative to long-term prosperity. China’s mineral extraction processes across the region are contributing to significant environmental damage, as was also seen in Southeast Asia and Africa. The rapid influx of cheap Chinese goods into Latin American markets (Xinhua 2005a) is also inducing ‘black GDP growth’. through the undermining of local businesses, and fuelling of regional unemployment. China is correspondingly attempting to compensate for this growth, as highlighted in its
regional policy paper, by showing its awareness of the environmental problems in the region; despite this, its paper failed to provide definitive plans for implementing solutions to these problems. In response to the influx of Chinese goods into the region’s markets, countries have increasingly introduced anti-dumping duties upon Chinese imports, which have resulted in China increasing its investment in the development of regional markets; a move that indicates China’s interest in enhancing the sustainability of the markets in the region (Xinhua 2005a).

In recent years, ‘black GDP growth’ has further fuelled regional nationalism, as seen in Ecuador and Venezuela, and has resulted in the increased incidence of left wing semi-authoritarian governments that have taken office across the region (Kurlantzick 2006c: 33-40; LatinAmerican Post; Li 2007b: 24-7). These governments are increasingly opposed to foreign oil investment and resource extraction activities, fuelling another significant factor in the Beijing Consensus, namely self-reliance. Ramo (2004) highlights how self-reliance in a region could be achieved through the development of asymmetric forms of power, thereby increasing states’ abilities to cope with external influences. The promotion and development of asymmetric power, through China’s aid, is a fundamental factor behind China’s developmental activities in the region, due to the proximity of the United States. The development of regional asymmetric power is critical along the trade routes through the Panama Canal, which are heavily defended and policed by the US military. Regional anti-US sentiment has remained significant throughout the continent over the past sixty years, due in no small part to its prominent exercising of military power across the region, which has accentuated the region’s pursuit of alternative markets (Li 2007a: 836, 856). This is most visible in countries such as Venezuela, under the Chavez Government, as well as in Cuba, both of which have increasingly tense relations with the United States. Cuba’s potential to use asymmetric power in the region is disproportionate to its size. Having remained a long-term ally of the PRC, and the recipient of a significant amount of its aid, Cuba has developed significant levels of asymmetric power over other countries in the region, which it has received investment from, and who rely on China for aid, such as Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. China, however, remains cautious about its activities in the region, since it also maintains prominent business interests in the US market. American President Barak Obama’s policies in the region, announced in 2009, towards Cuba, following its re-admission to the OAS after five decades of exile (BBC 2009b), indicated a reduction in hostilities towards the nation. These moves serve to potentially undermine China’s regional asymmetric power (The Washington Post 2009a).
A further indication of China’s promotion and development of regional asymmetric power was evident through its distinctly low key naval activities near the Panama Canal (Roy 2005: 72), along with its reluctance to become involved in regional arms procurement activities (Dominguez 2006: 8). Innovative technological aid to Brazil, in the form of spy satellite technology, highlights how China has supported defensive, rather than offensive, policies in the region, as demonstrated by its provision of military training programs to the region following the cessation of similar programs run by the US. Further evidence of China’s promotion of asymmetric power in the region can be seen in Argentina, where China’s increased export business and investment is also serving to help the country reduce its IMF debt, thereby reducing its dependency on dollar reserves. By increasing its investment in Argentina, it is slowly diminishing the region’s dependency on dollars for trade, by providing an alternative currency over which it retains significant control through the mechanisms of the CCP. The replacement of the dollar as a trading currency would enhance its image as a major global power (Toyoda 2008: 21-4).

6.4 Summary

As with the case studies of Southeast Asia and Africa, the summary will conclude this case study with a similar examination of the intended practical and unintended rhetorical perspectives of the embedded norms in the Latin American region to those seen in the other case studies. Asianism was not investigated in this case study, as its role in the formulation of aid to the region was not considered important. While sovereignty continues to reflect changes in global politics, China’s non-interference policy in the region highlights how its behaviour has been reactive, whereas in Africa and Southeast Asia, its behaviour has been more proactive. The other two norms, internationalism and developmentalism, have emerged and evolved in line with China’s relatively recent activities in the region.

Internationalism

In the early 1970s, when China gained admission to the UN, the newly emerging internationalist norm informed its foreign policies towards the provision of South-South cooperation. This is shown in Figure 6.1, by the explosive admission to international institutions in the region from 1970 onwards. In the early 1980s, as it became increasing engaged in Latin America through its institutional role, rather than through its former bilateral relations, many of which it formed in the
previous decade it demonstrated its promotion of South-South cooperation in its institutional interactions, which at that time eclipsed its international responsibilities. By the 1990s, though its international responsibilities remained inferior to its South-South cooperation efforts, these combined efforts through the institutions had significantly increased the practice of internationalism. At this time, the newly emerging developmentalist norm was beginning to exert an influence on its activities. By the late 1990s, as the internationalist norm had increasingly evolved in other regions, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, which had had a significant impact upon Latin America, there was a shift towards international responsibility, which began to match and surpass its South-South cooperative efforts. This corresponded to an increase in international responsibility, rather than a decrease in South-South cooperation, which it still promoted quite strongly. In the early 2000s, as the global sovereignty norm was also evolving towards the promotion of human rights, this added moral legitimacy to internationalism and multilateral responsibility, and resulted in China’s increased involvement in UNPKO. In the aftermath of the SARS epidemic in Southeast Asia, internationalism and multilateral responsibility expanded as China became increasingly aware of the non-traditional threats that virulent disease could inflict upon its interests. In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis and the 2009 Swine Flu epidemic, which originated in Mexico, China has been motivated by both its international responsibilities and promotion of South-South cooperation to provide assistance to the region, in moves that will further strengthen its internationally responsible great-power identity. Moves such as these demonstrate how the norm continues to be taken up in the region, but has yet to undergo cascade.
Sovereignty

The sovereignty norm in Latin America provides the clearest indication of all three regions of China’s long-term adherence to non-interference. Although the sovereignty norm was prominent at the founding of the PRC, China’s revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia and Africa have complicated the analysis of the norm. An important consideration in Latin America, which contributes to understanding this divergence, is the fact that countries within Latin America gained their independence and sovereign status in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As such, and given their relative distance from the PRC, China remained more reluctant to become involved in regional insurgencies. The only notable exception was in the 1960s, when China became allied with Cuba, marking the foundation of interactions with the region. At this time, China’s
unintended rhetoric was prominent, despite its ongoing pursuit of world revolution. This can be seen in Figure 6.2, by the initial high probability of non-interference. In the face of increased US action in the region, adherence to this policy remained significant. From the early 1970s, it became involved in the region through both its bilateral and institutional relations. These early multilateral relations arose notably through its capacity within the UN. This can be seen by the shift of the probability of non-interference, and highlights how China was able to provide legitimate assistance to the region, through the multilateral channels of the institutions. By the 1990s, China’s relations with the US had become further strengthened, in line with the development of the internationalist and developmentalist norms. US action in the region also declined from its elevated levels of the 1980s. China continued to promote sovereignty and non-interference in the region, though this practice was moderated by its adherence to its ‘one-China’ policy. As global sovereignty underwent change in the late 1990s in a direction towards the promotion of human rights, these new factors moderated China’s adherence to sovereignty, as it not only increasingly engaged in relations with countries who had formerly been allied to Western Cold War countries, but also, became involved with them through its increased interactions with the UN. China set a new precedent by deploying a UNPKO force in Haiti, in line with its increasing uptake of internationalism. Rather than prove detrimental to the probability of non-interference, this increase in moral legitimacy through multilateral involvement increases the probability of non-interference, as seen by the continued increase in the early 2000s in Figure 6.2. This demonstrates how the evolving sovereignty norm has affected China’s international relations since its re-emergence in the international community. However, the evolving sovereignty norm is in balance with the existing sovereignty norm, as it has yet to undergo further cascade and become fully internalised.
Developmentalism

Though Chinese relations with Latin America date back, in the cases of Cuba and Chile, several decades, its developmental aid to the region is extremely recent. This has been due largely to the proximity of the region to the United States, as well as the region's geographical distance from the PRC. China became increasingly involved in the region through its institutions during the 1990s, with its promotion of South-South cooperation, in the aftermath of the notorious La Década Perdida. As the developmentalist norm fuelled its newly emerged great-power identity, the region shared a common need for accelerated recovery. The internationalist norm in China increasingly evolved from providing South-South cooperation towards greater international responsibility. Despite this, China's actual initial aid disbursement did not begin until after Hu Jintao's visit to the region in 2004. As a consequence of its recent commencement of aid activities in the region, its development aid closely projects the concepts of its own developmental path, described by the Beijing Consensus. As China has become more engaged in the region, primarily through investment in regional resource extraction and through channelling its own exports into the region's markets, it has through its range of regional projects disbursed innovative aid, which has
assisted countries, such as Argentina in 2004, to enhance their self-confidence after having experienced extended periods of financial uncertainty. China’s ‘go out’ policy has become prominent throughout its projects in the region, notably, in its infrastructure projects in the cone of South America, and through humanitarian aid to Central America in response to crises and epidemics, and its involvement in UNPKO. China’s involvement in the creation of regional FTAs is becoming more prolific, following the creation of the first Sino-Chilean FTA in 2007. As seen in other regions, China’s developmental aid has also created significant ‘black GDP growth’ through environmental damage from its resource extraction projects to the region, and through its excessive importing of cheap products, which are proliferating throughout regional markets. This is inducing regional nationalism and fuelling an embracing of left wing semi-authoritarian governments, which are expressing growing anger towards the effect of foreign economic policies. Arguably, the most important regional factor that is being fuelled by China’s developmental aid is asymmetric power, which is empowering regional countries to offset unwelcome influences from the US; a factor which has fuelled widespread regional resentment in recent years. Figure 6.3 highlights how the developmentalist norm has grown in the region in line with China’s changing practice of distributing development aid between 2002 and 2008. The practical increase in this figure as measured by the increased in distributed aid reflects the enhanced promotion of the developmentalist norm. The accompanying increase in rhetoric is attributable to the regional visits by Hu Jintao, in 2004 and 2008. It should be noted that due to the recent commencement of activity in the region, the rhetorical axis, as reflected by the number of visits is relative, and does not include additional factors which have contributed to the regional rhetorical promotion of developmentalism, such as the policy paper released in late 2008 and the nine nation tour of 2009, by Hui Liangyu and Li Jinping. The increased growth in developmentalism since 2004 reflects how China has internalised this norm and become increasingly active in the region.
As this was the final case study, this thesis will conclude its investigation of China’s foreign aid by reviewing and analysing the findings examined throughout the case studies.

Figure 6.3 The increase in uptake of developmentalism between 2002 and 2008 in Latin America (Source data: see Appendix 3)
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The conclusion presents the empirical findings of the investigation of the norms to the understanding of China’s international behaviour and foreign aid policy from the three case studies. The implications of the findings are further discussed in order to address the question raised in the introduction. This discussion concludes by outlining the contribution that this work makes to the study of Chinese international relations, and sets out the broader theoretical and empirical implications for the continued study of this topic.

7.1 Findings of the study

This analysis primarily explored the behaviour of China as an aid donor, following its admission to the UN in 1971, and suggested that China’s aid policies were influenced by the norms, which had, in turn, been shaped by its identity. The examination investigated the impact of internationalism, sovereignty, and developmentalism on its aid programmes and regional policies within the three regions, and further examined the case of Asianism within Southeast Asia. The examination concluded with an appraisal of the impact of the norms upon China’s aid policy.

7.1.1 The role of norms for the making of China’s foreign aid policy since 1949

During the early years of the PRC, when China adopted a victim identity, the most significant norm shaping its behaviour was sovereignty. Sovereignty remained a dominant domestically embedded norm, irrespective of how undermined it became by China’s revolutionary tendencies. The absence of internationalism, at that time, allowed China to become influenced heavily by its Soviet and Maoist teachings.

The extent to which China sought to project sovereignty raises several issues. Sovereignty became a significant norm upon which the PRC was founded in 1949 as a result of China’s century-long struggle against colonial and regional interference in its domestic affairs. The formation of the PRC was also accompanied by the foundation of China’s identity as a victim of external
interference. The victim identity, along with its leaning towards Soviet communism, fuelled its revolutionary ideals throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Although China upheld the sovereignty norm, its revolutionary ideals and victim experiences prompted it to view other colonised developing countries as occupied rather than sovereign states, and as such, it was obligated to provide aid in the restoration of sovereignty to what it viewed as the legitimate ruling bodies in these countries, rather than acknowledge their colonial masters. This theme was prominent in its rhetoric of the time, which echoed its revolutionary inclinations, most notably in the aftermath of the Bandung conference, where it stressed that the limits of its interference extended only as far as regional decolonisation.

China’s victim identity and the absence of internationalism prompted the PRC to exercise its own subjectivity in defining non-interference throughout Southeast Asia and Africa. Its adherence to the sovereignty norm, despite its revolutionary activities, may also be inferred through the absence of its activities in countries in Latin America, which had gained their independence in the late nineteenth century, and were already sovereign states. Consequently, China observed this and correspondingly refrained from engaging in revolutionary activities in those countries, with the exception of Cuba. In this case, the island had already undergone revolution before China established relations with the Castro Government in 1960. The sovereignty norm evolved due to three key factors that became prominent from the early 1970s onwards in China: firstly, many of the colonised developing countries, in Africa and Southeast Asia, had, by this time, gained their independence; secondly, China’s victim identity transformed into that of a neutral actor; and thirdly, the internationalist norm began to emerge in China.

The extent to which China projected the developmentalist norm reflects the norm’s absence at that time. This factor, along with the absence of internationalism, is highlighted by China’s lack of urgency in developing to keep up with the international community. In the 1950s, its leanings towards Soviet communism fuelled its long-term goal of developing a communist world order, separate from the capitalist West. This can be seen in its rhetoric and enhanced activities aimed at decolonising countries of the developing world. These developmental efforts, following the Sino-Soviet rift of 1960, became increasingly desperate throughout the 1960s as it attempted to demonstrate its relative self-reliance and capabilities through its projects, as seen through the formulation of the Tan-Zam railway project.

As already outlined, China at this time resisted any accommodation of internationalism, and as it adhered to the ideology of communism, it only
marginally accommodated its regional non-aligned neighbours, which reflected its resistance to Asianism. When China’s identity shifted to that of a neutral actor, the transition stimulated its uptake of internationalism. This continued to reshape its international relations, as the combined effect of both internationalism and sovereignty became apparent through its exercising of greater responsibility through institutions, and its significant decrease in revolutionary activities.

As China’s neutral identity expanded in the 1970s and resulted in its discontinuing support for insurgents throughout Africa and Southeast Asia, China was increasingly able to project its adherence to sovereignty, and further strengthened its adherence to the internationalist norm through the UN. Since that time, it has adhered to the sovereignty norm, through its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The exception to this is its insistence on bilateral relations being founded upon the ‘one-China’ policy, which it frames in terms of obligations to international law.

The onset of developmentalism in China resulted in further shifts in sovereignty becoming more noticeable. Developmentalism has become one of the most important embedded norms to be projected within modern China, as its emergence at the end of the 1970s fuelled China’s initial economic reforms, and resulted in the shift towards multilateral aid distribution through the institutions, at a time when its aid activities in the developing world were decreasing. The developmentalist norm affected China’s policies in Africa in the mid-1980s, as reflected by the shift towards post-project management, in the Tan-Zam railway project, and thereby indicated how the increasing uptake of developmentalism by China, was affecting the sovereignty norm and policy of non-interference.

At the beginning of the 1970s, as China’s identity was changing to a neutral actor, and it was becoming increasingly more accommodating of internationalism, China’s activities and relations were limited largely to its former bilateral alliances throughout the regions. During the following decade, it focussed its activities on its support of South-South cooperation, and the nurturing of new relations with non-communist countries. As it began its period of reforms in the late 1970s, and improved relations with the US, it increasingly used the channels of the UN to distribute aid multilaterally. The increase in accommodation of internationalism through the institutional framework of South-South cooperation, highlighted how it was also increasingly regionally accommodating, if not actively taking up, the norm of Asianism, in Southeast Asia. By the end of the 1980s, as the Cold War was ending and China’s identity shifted towards that of a great power, it increasingly took up the norm of developmentalism, which further increased its uptake of internationalism and
Asianism. As the 1990s progressed, the effect of the increase in norm uptake began to induce shifts in the sovereignty norm.

A particular element of the sovereignty norm in China arises from China’s extended period of isolation from the international community. China internalised the sovereignty norm before the late 1940s. Between that time and the early 1970s, China remained isolated from the evolving global sovereignty norm. Once China re-entered the international community, it became re-exposed to the evolving sovereignty norm. While the global sovereignty norm increasingly evolved towards human rights, the older sovereignty norm embedded in China, displayed less flexibility. The sovereignty norm in China is gradually evolving along with global sovereignty, as it re-emerges in the norm life-cycle, and becomes exposed to increasingly competitive factors on its path to cascade. The positive factors fuelling its evolution include internationalism and developmentalism, whereas the negative factors arise from the legacies of the early PRC, notably through the authoritarian mechanisms of the CCP. The balance between the internalised sovereignty norm in China and the re-emerged norm highlights many of China’s seemingly contradictory divergences from sovereignty in recent years. The shift towards the re-emerged sovereignty norm is projected through its increased involvement in UNPKO, while its stringent adherence to older non-interference policies, which have been the hallmark of the PRC, is projected through its adherence to sovereignty, as seen in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

China’s most recent projection of developmentalism, following its identity shift to a great power in the late 1980s, is highlighted prominently through regional activities and its desire to accelerate its level of development after years of isolation from the international community. The increased uptake of the norm throughout the 1990s not only fuelled China’s uptake of internationalism and Asianism, but significantly increased China’s motivation and activities towards its regional resource extraction programmes and overseas market expansion. The developmentalist norm as framed by the Beijing Consensus has subsequently cascaded and become internalised within China, as it increasingly promotes the norm throughout its regions of activity.

As its great-power identity has become increasingly strengthened, China has significantly increased its accommodation of internationalism, as is seen through its increased involvement in institutions throughout the world. Throughout the 1990s, this involvement matched its uptake of developmentalism and the newly emerged Asianist norm. The improvement in China’s position regarding international responsibility also affected the evolution of the sovereignty norm, as previously discussed. This is reflected in its increased
involvement in regional peacekeeping activities through the UN, and its humanitarian aid. Although internationalism has been taken up increasingly over the past two decades, the norm has still to cascade and undergo internalisation. This can be seen, most notably, where it challenges the norm of sovereignty, in Southeast Asia and Africa.

China has increasingly accommodated Asianism since the early 1990s, following the shift in its identity to a great power. As the economies of Asia underwent growth, fuelled by the developmentalist norm, the success of this growth was attributed to ‘Asian values’. China’s identity as a great power was becoming manifest, along with the increased uptake of both developmentalism and internationalism. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 provided China with an opportunity not only to demonstrate its more constrained behaviour, but also its increased affinity with Asian unity and identity. Following the crisis, China began to widen its multilateral involvement with the institutions of ASEAN, through the newly emerged institutions of ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3. Its institutional activities in the early 2000s provided it with greater opportunities to demonstrate its commitment to Asian unity through regional cooperation. The onset of the SARS and avian flu epidemics in 2003-4, as well as the Southeast Asian tsunami in 2004, highlighted the importance of regional cooperation to China for the management of non-traditional security threats, and catalysed a greater enhancement in its activities in the region, as it sought to compensate for the deficiencies in its capabilities that these events had highlighted. By 2009, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many countries within Asia increasingly looked to China for solutions to the recovery of the region, thereby highlighting how much China had increased its regional leadership role. China’s enhanced cooperation with the region will become further enhanced in 2010 with the establishment of the Southeast Asian regional Free Trade Area. This has been created as part of China’s ongoing regional multilateral projects which include the development of major transportation routes linking Shanghai to Singapore and demonstrates how Asianism is increasingly being taken up throughout the region as its great power identity strengthens.

The identities that China has adopted during these times have shaped the norms that it took up and in some cases internalised. Appendix 1 highlights the events that have transpired over the past sixty years in each region, and Appendix 2 highlights the factors that transformed China’s identities, and the corresponding effect that these changes had on the accompanying norms. Appendix 3 provides the reported data which was used to create the case study summary figures in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6. Figure 7.1 highlights the norm emergence during each
identity period, demonstrating the relative influences of the emerged norms at the start and end of each period. Each plot displays the norms positioned relative to domestic and international sectors, as well as whether they have cascaded or not. The scale of each norm is a relative measure of the number of years that the norm has existed within the life cycle. As a norm enters the life cycle and approaches the tipping point, it attains a critical mass, reflecting its acceptance. The mass attained by the norm at the point of cascade may therefore reflect the length of time it has taken to reach the tipping point; hence, rapidly tipped norms, such as developmentalism and Asianism, attain a critical mass sufficient to transcend the tipping threshold more rapidly than internationalism which in the diagram has taken longer to reach its respective critical mass. As such, this may suggest that the critical mass required for the tipping of internationalism exceeds that of the other norms that preceded it. Though the factors contributing to the tipping of each norm undoubtedly differ, and the thresholds may well differ between the norms, the plots merely reflect the fact of whether the norm has tipped or not; such states will therefore be common to all norms. Once the centre of gravity of the norm crosses the tipping threshold, however, the cascaded norms growth ceases as it has exceeded the critical mass required for acceptance. Although each norm increases in size over time, the relative density of the older norm then begins to decrease compared to the newer surrounding cascaded norms, as the tipped norms become internalised in the society. This causes more recently cascaded norms to impact upon the older norms, and cause them to distort, under their newer influences, as seen by the distortion of sovereignty by developmentalism. As older norms, such as internationalism attempt to cascade, their ability transcend the cascade threshold becomes impeded by the recently cascaded norms, such as Asianism. Though the critical mass of Asianism may be less that of internationalism, their relative densities may be more comparable. As sovereignty is the oldest of the four norms, it has become distorted due to the relative impact from the other norms. The emergence of the global sovereignty norm in the life cycle, is reflected by the newly emerging uncascaded sovereignty norm, which displays both domestic and international character as seen by its position traversing the central axis. Although it has recently re-emerged into the norm life cycle, it appears larger as the norm has been present in the international community for a longer period of time. Since the interactivity between each pair of norms may occur along multiple and differing dimensions, the exact representation of the norm interaction is difficult to visualise in the figure. Additionally, though the spacial positions of the norms that have crossed the tipping threshold may reflect the degree of internalisation of the cascaded norm,
their relative positions have been accentuated in the diagram to enhance the clarity of the figure.

Figure 7.1 The evolution of norms affecting China's foreign aid policies between 1950 to 2010, reflected through its corresponding identity.

1 The diagram highlights how shortly after the formation of the PRC, the sovereignty norm was not only the first of the four norms to have emerged, but also that it was firmly internalised. As a result, this embedded norm is positioned across the cascade threshold. Since the interaction between the norms occurs across multiple dimensions, it is not possible to reflect the exact inter norm interactions on this diagram. This diagram can only highlight when the norms emerged relative to sovereignty, and the fact that the emerged norms affected the existing norms. The relative inertia and density of the norms is reflected by how much the embedded norm shifts when impacted upon by other more recently cascaded norms. As Sovereignty is firmly internalised, and significantly older, its resistance to the other norms is demonstrated in 2010 by the fact that it is becoming distorted. As other norms, such as developmentalism and Asianism have become more recently internalised they are smaller and of greater density, and therefore able to exert greater influences over the older norms, despite their extended period of internalisation. The plots also demonstrate how developmentalism has not only grown substantially since 1990 but also has affected all of the other norms through its growth.
7.1.2 Norm implications for China’s foreign aid

The significance of the norms to China’s foreign aid is linked with the circumstances that shaped its emergence as an aid donor from the 1970s onwards. Since then, China’s status has grown with its stature as both a rising economic power and aid provider, therefore mirroring the evolution of its own self-image. In the early years of the PRC, sovereignty existed as an internalised norm but became undermined by revolutionary tendencies. After it gained admission to the UN, its identity shifted from that of a victim to a neutral actor, as it adopted further norms from the 1970s onwards, in place of its former revolutionary ideals. The developmentalist norm has grown in significance since the late 1980s, due to China’s own accelerated development, and highlights the nascent tension between itself and dominant liberal developmental paths.

The implications of the Asianist norm for China’s foreign aid policy remain dependent upon factors within Asia, rather than Africa or Latin America. In the aftermath of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami, China has become more involved within the framework of ASEAN+3, as seen through its proposal of renewed measures to expand region wide cooperative efforts. Although many Asian nations participated in the London G20 meeting in 2009, China remained one of the key Asian contributors to the meeting. Later in 2009, at the Boao Forum in Hainan, Asian countries met to discuss, among other things, the global financial crisis, and advocated increased multilateral cooperative efforts as a solution, highlighting its clear commitment to continuing to provide aid to the region through the multilateral mechanisms of the region’s institutions. The Boao Forum highlighted the extent to which China’s vision of a future Asian identity would be reflected, through the diverse range of novel and innovative fields into which Asian countries seek to diversify.

The implications for internationalism highlight the seriousness of China’s engagement of international responsibility through institutions. Significant recent factors that have increased China’s responsible behaviour internationally arise from the realisation of the dangers it faces from non-traditional security threats, for example, from the SARS and Avian flu epidemics, as well as regional catastrophes, such as the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004. A clear indicator of norm uptake by China has been visible by the extent to which China has not only acted responsibly but encouraged responsible behaviour through its aid. China is increasingly responding in a responsible manner conducive to its role within international institutions, as seen through its involvement in UN peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid activities. There has also been an increase in its institutional involvement with projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Though membership
of these regional institutions will constrain its business interests in the region. China has become more involved in recent years in an advisory role, in the face of increasing criticism of its activities. The continued increase in China’s responsibilities in Southeast Asia, in responding to regional development, will also impact upon both Asianism and developmentalism, in such projects as the Trans-Asian Highways, linking China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand to Singapore. Its international response to countries such as Myanmar may also affect its status through its adherence to the sovereignty norm (MFA 2008a; National Development and Reform Commission 2003: 117). In Africa, factors influencing multilateral responsibilities in the region will be similarly affected by its non-interference policies in both Zimbabwe and Sudan. As noted in Chapter 5, in 2008 and 2009, China faced new challenges to its demonstration of international responsibility, as its cargo ships from Africa became the target of Somali pirates, thereby highlighting how yet more non-traditional threats to the security of its interests are shaping the internationalist norm. In Latin America, China’s responsible image is empowering its efforts to counter the apparent zeal of both its regional resource exportation and the influx of Chinese exports. Through its increased investment in regional markets and infrastructure, in moves it hopes will temper the region and prevent the collapse of internal markets, China is simultaneously protecting its long term regional prospects and moderating the increase in regionalism. Internationalism, out of the four norms studied, remains the least taken up of the norms.

Sovereignty not only represents the norm that has undergone the most significant divergence in international opinion in recent years, as Kofi Annan’s UN paper illustrates (The Economist 1999), but also, as it was the norm upon which the PRC was founded, it has affected, and has become affected by, all of the other norms. The promotion of sovereignty was of considerable benefit to China during the early days of the PRC, as non-interference in countries’ affairs encouraged the formation of alliances in Southeast Asia, Africa and Communist countries. It also accounts for China’s lack of involvement in revolutions in Latin America during that same period. However, such behaviour has more recently affected negatively the internationalist norm. The sovereignty norm remains pivotal in China’s diplomatic efforts in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe, within the frame of non-interference, and will be a contributory factor in the future role of this norm. At present, this norm remains a significant impediment to solving long standing issues like that between Myanmar and the international community. Although developmentalism, within the framework of the Beijing Consensus, infers the adherence to sovereignty, regionalism in Latin America has
demonstrated that the acceptance of the developmentalist norm adhered to by China in the regions may still be impeded somewhat within a Chinese framework. Since sovereignty is also evolving, due in part to a mix of influences from internationalism and developmentalism, China’s activities within UNPKO will also significantly influence how the re-emerged sovereignty norm becomes taken up in its regions of activity.

The embracing of the Beijing Consensus remains the strongest indicator of the efficacy of the developmentalist norm. Factors such as non-interference and declining Western interest, induced through the 2007 financial crisis, are compounding the internalisation of this cascaded norm. In Southeast Asia, the key to China’s continued success remains through its multilateral efforts to raise standards of development in the region, whilst offsetting negative influences, such as its non-interference in the domestic affairs of Myanmar, which has prolonged the international ostracism of the country and delayed the country’s development, and has contributed to a substantial increase in ‘black GDP growth’. In Africa and Latin America, increased regional acceptance of this norm arises not only through providing a more welcome alternative to current Western policies, but also arises from the reduced activities of more traditional aid donors. This acceptance is still facing considerable resistance from factors such as regionalism in Latin America, which continues to be induced in response to this norm.

7.1.3 Factors contributing to and resulting from shifts in China’s identity

An examination of the factors contributing to China’s identity shifts, in Appendix 2, highlights three factors that have been common throughout China’s identity transformations over the past sixty years. The first factor highlights how China’s transformation of its identity has occurred during periods when its security was increasingly threatened, and was followed by an increase in its uptake of norms. In the early 1970s, after facing increasing isolation from the international community, China’s identity transformed from a victim to a neutral actor, as the country took up internationalism. By the late 1970s, as China’s reform period began, the domestic developmentalist norm emerged. In the late 1980s, in the latter years of the Cold War, and in the face of increasing US unilateralism, China’s identity changed to that of a great power, which induced its increased uptake of developmentalism. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China took up Asianism further. The second factor highlights how its embracing of these new norms has stabilised and enhanced China’s behaviour as a nation. A third factor that is common to these transitions concerns the incidence of identity change, which based upon these observations, has occurred approximately every
twenty years throughout the life of the PRC. This approximately corresponds to each successive generation in China. While, as previously discussed, the change of each successive identity has affected China’s demonstrated behaviour, the uptake of norms by China is increasingly less likely to induce significant shifts in its identity, as China’s behaviour becomes more constrained due to the ability of its strengthened identity to withstand significant threats to its security. Any external activity short of outright direct action against it or its regional activities is likely to be countered by the asymmetric power it has developed to maintain peace and stability throughout Asia, and its regions of activity.

7.2 Contributions and future work

This study has contributed to the ongoing understanding of Chinese foreign policy from an IR perspective, by presenting a current account of the effect of China’s aid activities around the world from a constructivist perspective. By including an analysis of the historic relations between China and its respective regions of activity, the importance of historical events, which have been commonly neglected from conventional theoretical discourses of China’s foreign policies, has been demonstrated, particularly at periods when China’s identity underwent notable shifts. The study addressed the question of why these identity shifts were induced in different periods, and explored not only the relationship between the identity shifts and the norms of behaviour during those periods, but also the effect that these shifts had on the resulting norms that China took up and internalised.

Furthermore, this investigation addressed the relative importance of China’s internationally and domestically embedded norms, which have commonly been confused with policies. By carefully discussing and analysing the four major norms that are related to China’s aid, the influence and interaction of the norms on aid and foreign policy behaviour was addressed. Through understanding the role of norms in China’s current foreign policy, it was possible to identify and explain key aspects of China’s relationships across the various regions studied. The importance of the norms was highlighted and used to understand the problems confronting China as it diversifies into different regions of the world. It was additionally shown how China’s future activities will not only become shaped by changing norms, but also how the integration of factors from other IR theoretical studies, such as realism, may help to clarify the extent to which its aid efforts are effective. This serves as a foundation for a future and broader discussion of norms to the understanding of China’s international behaviour.

While this study addressed the above issues, a further field which could serve as a future direction for the continued study of this subject regards the
factors affecting the internalisation of the norms. Such factors play an important role in the localisation of the norm following cascade. Addressing these factors may help to clarify exactly why developmentalism and Asianism were preferentially taken up by China, whilst the internationalist norm has experienced a more protracted period of uptake. Addressing these factors may also highlight whether the internalisation of internationalism arises predominantly from China’s accommodation of the rules and legislations of global communities, or whether global communities are becoming more accommodating of China as it continues to grow in its great power role. China’s continued role in events such as the pirate issue in the Indian Ocean, or its continued relations with Sudan and Zimbabwe, may provide key indicators to the direction that internalisation of this important norm may ultimately take.
# APPENDIX 1

China’s identity and behaviour between the 1950s and 2010s

— Southeast (SE) Asia, Africa and Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Identity</th>
<th>Regional Behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SE Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s-1970s</td>
<td>• aligned with Soviet Camp in aftermath of civil/Korean War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity:</td>
<td>• led to hostile relations with pro-Western neighbours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>• irresponsible international pursuit of decolonisation through revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• following Bandung, enhanced regional cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• after Soviet rift, aid became symbolic with communist neighbours, through bilateral relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• pursued international recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s-1990s</td>
<td>• significant reduction in revolutionary support and improved regional relations, through enhanced adherence to non-interference, in interests of regional stability and greater independence of regional nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity:</td>
<td>• used multilateral mechanisms of UN to improve relations in region, under the framework of South-South cooperation to assist with redevelopment of region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Actor</td>
<td>• a shift to institutional efforts behind the scenes at the UN to improve responsible image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• acted to stabilise US/Soviet influence in region, through institutional mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• undertook domestic reform and improved relations throughout region through ASEAN (early 1990s), mirroring its uptake of developmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td>• acted to stabilise US/Soviet influence in region, through institutional mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s-1970s</td>
<td>• reduction of revolutionary activities/support, mirrored independence of nations in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity:</td>
<td>• having ascended to UN, a shift from exclusive bilateral relations to mixture of bilateral and multilateral efforts towards improving its developing world supporter/neutral image in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>• used own position to reciprocate influence for regional benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• increased institutional efforts to reduce superpower politics influencing and impeding regional development, to enhance its image of neutrality and responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• adherence to sovereignty noticeable by its reluctance to manage aid projects in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• shift towards assisted project management in 1980s, mirrors emergence of developmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• activities changed focus in mid-1980s towards project based efforts, to maximise productivity/cost effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America</strong></td>
<td>• relations limited to Cuba, through revolutionary affinity, led to exclusive partnership till 1970s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ relatively minor activities and enhanced adherence to sovereignty due to enhanced US regional presence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ extensive use of rhetoric to challenge US in region through channels of UN</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SE Asia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ pre-1997 China displayed aggression over territorial claims, led to creation of New Security Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ increasing multilateral involvement in region to play down China threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ played pivotal role in 1997 Asian financial crisis recovery; led to increased multilateral cooperation through ASEAN, and signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ enhanced multilateral efforts, with renewed efforts focussing upon more reform, following 1997 financial crisis, mirrored uptake of Asianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ enhancement of regional activism, seen through 'go out' policy and wider regional involvement, enhanced business activities in region/region wide infrastructural projects e.g. GMS, trans Asian highway, regional FTAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ post-SARS/tsunami even greater involvement in institutions in face of non-security threats, resulted in enhanced unity and activism in region, even greater uptake of developmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ change in global sovereignty norm increased moral legitimacy, led to change to greater promotion of human rights and environmental concerns, evolution of sovereignty norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ quest for resources led it to promote its own development model as paragon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ distributed soft power through region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ proactive in creation of FTA in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ post-2007 financial crisis seeks greater reform of international financial systems, being sought as role model in region for advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ adherence to the sovereignty norm over Myanmar, though in other cases where this affects human rights, notable moderation in rhetoric becomes more apparent</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>■ greater incidence of managing projects in region through bilateral and multilateral efforts, which reduce perception of actual intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ enhanced business activities in region, mirroring uptake of developmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ enhanced deployment of entrepreneurs throughout region to enhance regional and domestic prosperity, through creation and expansion of 'go out' policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ activism resource extraction backing its own development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ promotion of Beijing Consensus throughout region to counter Western models which have perceived failings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ creation of FOCAC enhanced cooperation in region further</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ responsible image moderating, towards enhanced moral legitimacy, but slow change in non-interference policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ increase in moral legitimacy of sovereignty norm induces greater involvement with UNPKO/anti pirate activities, mirror evolution of sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ non-interference policy continues to assist pariah states, thereby impacting on internationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ tolerance of nations like Sudan decreasing in recent years as adherence to human rights in other norms has impact here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>■ developmentalism impacting on sovereignty through formation of SEZ to expand markets, though framed as multilateral enhancements to region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Latin America

- notable involvement in multilateral institutions in region
- enhanced business activities in region, mirrors uptake of developmentalism
- notable continued downplaying of revolutionary/hegemonic image due to proximity of US
- increased multilateral efforts to effect influence over region provide channels for varying from norm
- maintenance of key supply routes that are key to its business enterprises in region and Africa
- responsibility image being strengthened by shift towards human rights and involvement in UNPKO in Haiti
- notable variations from sovereignty norm include involvement in UNPKO as well as continued efforts to reduce Taiwanese regional influence
- adherence to sovereignty norm noted by reluctance to completely modify regional nations' obligations to US (e.g. Argentina)
- long term relation with Cuba may provide insight into propensity to influence internal politics of region to support its interests
- bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote regional acceptance of Beijing Consensus as developmental model
- post-2004, enhanced business and investment activism in region, becoming countered by regionalism, which is prompting renewed activism by China to increase investment in region, to support export trade and formation of new markets
### APPENDIX 2

Factors inducing evolution of the norms between the 1950s and 2010s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period/Identity</th>
<th>Factors contributing to identity shift/adjustment</th>
<th>Influence on Norms, from identity shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1950s-1970s     | • deterioration of relations with Soviets in late 1950s, and increasing international isolation  
• progressive regional failure in inciting revolution e.g. backlash towards China in Indonesia  
• gradual decolonisation of colonial states through legitimate means  
• ascension to UN and ability to apply mechanisms of institutions to achieving goals | Asianism  
• current Asianist norm had not emerged |
| Identity: Victim |                                                  | Internationalism  
• norm emerged in early 1970s  
• shift to pursuance of South-South cooperation/ international recognition following displacement of ROC as principal embodiment of China, through increased membership of institutions |
| 1970s-1990s     | • collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War undermined its neutral position, and increase in US unilateralism  
• declining Western involvement in regions  
• reduced regional condemnation in aftermath of Tiananmen Square incident | Sovereignty  
• norm internalised pre-1949  
• adherence to non-intervention policy undermined by revolutionary tendencies, in SE Asia and Africa  
• policy of non-interference served its interests during its period of global isolation |
| Identity: Neutral |                                                  | Developmentalism  
• norm emergence in late 1970s  
• success in own domestic development  
• greater uptake in late 1980s, fuelled by increase in urgency to develop following end of Cold War |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1990s-2010s</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity: Great Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• assisting regional countries recover from failure of traditional aid donors policies, such as Washington Consensus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• effects of non-traditional security threats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• growth of own markets and need for more wide scale markets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• increased global activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asianism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• post-1997 led to greater multilateral cooperation and pursuance of strong regional unity, greater uptake of Asianism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• re-enforcement of priorities following SARS/tsunami- expansion of its multilateral pro-activity aimed at enhancing its Asian leader status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• distinct shift towards displaying greater responsibility by increased uptake of norm/involvement in institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• reshaping of attitude towards moral legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• involvement in global institutions and enhanced addressing of human rights issues is gradually reshaping the norm, despite considerable resistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• increased involvement in multilateral efforts such as UNPKO, reshaping/negatively affecting non-interference policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmentalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• further shift towards presenting its own successful development as a more successful alternative to Western models, norm internalisation in early 2000s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• adherence to mutual and multilateral ‘win-win’ solutions to development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3

The following data was used to construct Figures 4.1-4.5, 5.1-5.3 and 6.1-6.3.

Asianism Data

Figure 4.1 showing the number of ASEAN meetings per year/decade was generated from the following data, as reported on the ASEAN website (www.aseansec.org).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>ASEAN Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>ASEAN Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ASEAN Informal Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>ASEAN Informal Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ASEAN Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ASEAN Informal Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>ASEAN Informal Summit</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>ARF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ASEAN Summit</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ARF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ASEAN Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>ASEAN Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>ARF</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>ASEAN Commemorative Summit (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>ARF</td>
</tr>
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</table>
The number of agreements/declarations ratified was determined from the statistical data on the ASEAN website (http://www.aseansec.org/20185.htm).

<table>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>EAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>ROK</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ROK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Internationalism Data**

The following list of international organisations that China has joined is from the CIA World Factbook and is cited as accurate as of February 2010 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2107.html).
Caveat: The source of the data in the diagram is the CIA World Factbook. It should be noted though, that the list of organisations fails to reflect China’s association with notable Latin American institutions such as ALADI, ECLAC, FEALAC and MERCOSUR. As such this list represents the minimum number of international organisations that have accepted the PRC as a member or observer.

The region identifies where the organisation is most active, those organisations listed as International are considered to have a global multilateral role, with an equal level of activity in all regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year PRC joined</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Decade</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDB (nonregional member)</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Telecommunity</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arctic Council (observer)</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (dialogue partner)</td>
<td>Association of SE Asian Nations</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+1</td>
<td>ASEAN+ China</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
<td>ASEAN+ China, Japan, Korea</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>LA</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asian Summit</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>1980</td>
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<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter American Development Bank</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>LA</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>1980</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank of Reconstruction and Development</td>
<td>2000**</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organisation</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>International</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>ICRM</td>
<td>Institute of Crisis and Risk Management</td>
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<td>International</td>
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<td>IFRCS/ICRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
<td>2005 (Beijing office opened)</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>International Hydrographic Organisation</td>
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<td>International</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Organisation Name</td>
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<td>International 1970</td>
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<td>International Mobile Satellite Organisation</td>
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<td>International 1970</td>
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<td>Interpol</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>International 1980</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>International 1970</td>
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<td>IOM (observer)</td>
<td>International Organisation of Migration</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>International 2000</td>
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<td>IPU</td>
<td>International Parliamentary Union</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>International 1980</td>
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<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organisation of Standardisation</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>International 2000</td>
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<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<td>International 1970</td>
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<td>LAIA (observer)</td>
<td>Latin American Integration Association</td>
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<td>LA 1990</td>
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<td>MIGA</td>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>International 1990</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>UN Mission to Western Sahara</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Africa 2000</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission to DR Congo</td>
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<td>International 2000</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<td>LA 2000</td>
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<td>International 2000</td>
<td></td>
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<td>PIF (partner)</td>
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<td>SEA 2000</td>
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<td>International 2000</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Operation in the Cote d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>Africa 2000</td>
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</table>
Sovereignty Data

The following data shows the year that the PRC established diplomatic relations with countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa.

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Decade</th>
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Statistically speaking, the conditional probability of exposure to an event may be determined by calculating the ratio of the number of entities exposed to an event to the combined number of exposed and protected entities. In this case, the number of exposed entities may be inferred from the number of bilateral relations, and the number of protected entities may be inferred from the number of multilateral relations. Though the scale of the exposed and protected entities may differ significantly from the numbers of bi- and multilateral relations, the ratio of these terms will be proportionate.

The coefficient of non-interference was determined as follows:

For a given decade and region

\[ \text{Non-interference coefficient} = 1 - \left( \frac{\Sigma B}{\Sigma B + \Sigma M} \right) \]

where

\( B \) = number of bilateral relations between the PRC and the respective region at that period in time

\( M \) = number of institutions joined by the PRC within the respective region (including globally multilateral organisations) at the period in time

**Developmentalism Data**

The following data outlines the estimated aid distributed across each region by the PRC during a given year (source: CRS report T. Lum) and the number of high level regional visits, or in the case of SE Asia, the cumulative number of cooperative summits held in the region at that point in time. When plotted in Figures 4.5, 5.3 and 6.3, these display the norm intended rhetorical dimension versus the norm intended practical dimension for developmentalism.

Data for 2008 aid distribution was calculated from the same paper from the agreed project budgets during Q1 of 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>African Aid (million $)</th>
<th>Visits</th>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>3130</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6083</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>15171</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>33133</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>55626.5</td>
<td>23</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Latin America Aid (million $)</th>
<th>Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>0</td>
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227
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>SE Asia Aid (million $)</th>
<th>Summits</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6094</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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The following table combines the data from the above three tables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Combined Aid (million $)</th>
<th>Number of visits/summits</th>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>116674.5</td>
<td>76</td>
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November.
—— (2006c) The World Economic Studies, SIIS, Shanghai, 6 November.
—— (2006d) SIIS, Shanghai, 6 November.
—— (2006e) SIIS, Shanghai, 8 November.
—— (2006f) Department of International Politics, School of International Relations
and Public Affairs (SIPRA), Fudan University, Shanghai, 13 November.
—— (2006g) Department of International Politics, SIPRA, Fudan University, 13
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—— (2006h) Department of International Relations, School of International and
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—— (2006i) Department of International Relations, SIPA, Shanghai Jiao Tong
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Renmin University of China, Beijing, 23 October.
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