Anglo-Saxon Conceptions of the Inner Self:

An Exploration of Tradition and Innovation in Selected Cynewulfian and Alfredian Texts

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Centre for Medieval Studies, University of York
2008
Abstract

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The extant vernacular literature of the Anglo-Saxons bears witness to a profound and widespread interest in the inner domain of human experience, as can be seen in the great variety of vocabulary relating to inner faculties and processes and in the diversity of recurring formulas, expressions and metaphors depicting the inner life. This thesis examines the remarkably innovative conceptions and expressions of the inner self which we find in a number of Cynewulfian and Alfredian texts.

Part One of this thesis considers the diverse approaches to matters of soul, mind and self in a number of disciplines in order to introduce the relevant terminology and accompanying critical controversies. In Chapter One, I argue for a definition of the inner self as the centre of agency, experience and identity and consider the way in which attention to the inner domain is a useful hermeneutic tool for the analysis of anthropological and psychological ideas in the Western intellectual tradition. Chapter Two introduces the relevant Old English vocabulary in reference to divergent critical approaches and the persistent difficulties which we face when trying to analyse Anglo-Saxon anthropological and psychological ideas in terms of a rigid soul-body or spirit-matter dualism. Chapter Three examines how attention to the inner domain allows us to appreciate the diversity of vernacular accounts of psychological workings and of differing anthropological schemata in Old English literature.

In Parts Two and Three, I examine a number of texts, both in poetry and prose, which explore the inner self in reference to larger ideas about human nature and human purpose and which engage with the implications of Latin Christian anthropological ideas. In Part Two, Chapters Four, Five and Six examine Cynewulf’s Christ II, Juliana and Elene respectively, with particular emphasis on the way in which the poet underpins his didactic instructions with detailed explorations of the human condition in accounts
of human nature, human types and individual characters. In Part Three, Chapters Seven and Eight explore the systematic approach to psychological and anthropological ideas in the Alfredian ‘philosophical’ works, namely the *Consolation* and *Soliloquies*, respectively. In all of these case studies, I focus on the way in which the internal coherence of ideas in the texts (and in the respective canons) informs the authors’ constructions of interiority and in doing so illustrate that a philosophical approach to both poetic and prose texts allows a wider appreciation of innovative thought and expression relevant to human and personal identity in the Anglo-Saxon period.
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### Abbreviations and Short Titles

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Short Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANQ</td>
<td><em>American Notes and Queries.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASE</td>
<td><em>Anglo-Saxon England.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGDSL</td>
<td><em>Beiträge zur Deutschen Sprache und Literatur.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>London, British Library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCC</td>
<td>Cambridge, Corpus Christi College.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSL</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina.</td>
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</table>
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.


Augustine, De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, PL 44.959-992.


The Dictionary of Old English Corpus in Electronic Form, ed. Antonette diPaolo Healey, systems analyst Xin Xiang (Ann Arbor, 1998); (http//quod.lib.umich.edu).


Early English Text Society

Original Series

Supplementary Series


English Language Notes.

English Studies.


Greek

Germanic

Gregory the Great, Homiliae xl in Evangelia, PL 76.1075-1312, at 1218-9.

Indo-European


Lat.  Latin


MÆ  *Medium Ævum.*

ME  Middle English

MGH  *Monumenta Germaniae Historica.*

----- AA  Auctores Antiqissimi

MLR  *Modern Language Review.*

MnE  Modern English


MS(S)  manuscript(s)

NM  *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen.*

NP  *Neophilologus.*

NQ  *Notes and Queries.*

n.s.  new series

OE  Old English


P.Gmc.  Proto-Germanic


PMLA  *Publications of the Modern Language Association.*


RB  *Revue Bénédictine.*


*RTAM*  
*Recherche de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale.*

*SC*  
*Sources Crétiennes.*

*SELIM*  
*Revista de la Sociedad Española de Lengua y Literatura Inglesa Medieval; Journal of the Spanish Society for Mediaeval English Language and Literature.*

*ser.*  
series

*Solil.*  

*Trin.*  

*ZfDA*  
*Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum und Deutsche Literatur.*
Throughout this thesis, I have capitalised all book, article and other source titles for the sake of consistency (excepting German titles).


I have used the standard short titles for Latin texts as employed by the *Fontes Anglo-Saxonici: World Wide Web Register* and have adhered to the short titles for Old English texts listed by Bruce Mitchell, Christopher Ball, and Angus Cameron in ‘Short Titles of Old English Texts’, *ASE* 4 (1975): 207-21, and ‘Short Titles of Old English Texts: Addenda and Corrigenda’, *ASE* 8 (1979): 331-33. In a number of instances, however, I have employed alternative short titles in order to avoid confusion when referring to Latin and Old English texts with the same title and have explained these choices where appropriate.

All English translations of foreign-language secondary sources in this thesis are my own, as are all translations of Old English texts (unless otherwise noted). In cases where I supply Old English or Latin phrases in brackets in the main text, I do not supply additional translations if the given reference has already been paraphrased in the discussion. In cases where I cite more than ten lines of poetry, I provide additional line references in the left margin for ease of reference. I use Roman numerals to refer to the books (capitalised) and chapters of prose works, except in the case of the forty-two chapters of the Old English *Consolation* which are rendered by Arabic numerals for the sake of efficiency. When referring to arguments which occupy entire chapters of a given
prose work, I do not supply line numbers in addition to the relevant chapter numbers. In all other cases, references to the page numbers of the specified editions are placed in brackets before the relevant line numbers.

I transliterate all Greek terminology and citations according to a single convention. When citing secondary sources, however, I retain the orthography of the author or editor.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding this project, and to the Centre for Medieval Studies at the University of York for supporting this thesis.

My most sincere thanks go to all those who have been directly involved in the research and writing of this thesis; to Gabriella Corona for her contribution during the first two years, to Peter Biller for his encouragement and illuminating perspective as a member of my Thesis Advisory Panel, and, of course, to my supervisors Mary Garrison and Matt Townend, whose support and advice have been invaluable. Matt Townend’s open-mindedness and unfailing professionalism provided greatly appreciated encouragement, direction and focus. Mary Garrison’s erudition, encouragement and advice have been invaluable to me and her professional commitment as well as her generously given support are deeply appreciated.

I would also like to thank a number of people whose encouragement has meant more to me than they perhaps realise. Ineke van ‘t Spijker’s work has been as inspiring to me at a professional level as has her kindness over the past years. Of those people with whom work and play fused into one in the King’s Manor attic, Pragya Vohra, John Clay, Carolin Esser and Christine Phillips will always define my time at the CMS for me. My friend Dirk Bansch deserves very special thanks for his inexhaustible optimism and his unstinting practical support. Last, and certainly not least, my thanks go to my family: to Sandra, whose friendship has been a particularly valued link to the ‘world outside’, and to my parents and best friends, Erika and Rob, who know already what I could only inadequately express here.
Introduction

There are surely few subjects in the history of human thought which have occupied us as consistently and as universally as ‘ourselves’. At the most fundamental level, our awareness of ourselves as distinct entities would appear to be one of the basic preconditions for all conscious thought, action and interaction with others. Such basic self-awareness would also appear to be the prerequisite for further reflection about ourselves as individuals, as members of particular groups or as instances of a biological species. Crucially, however, whether we are exploring our own subjective feelings, moods and mental states or whether we are engaging in more objective analysis and definition of ourselves in our various capacities, our thought about ourselves is deeply embedded in our culturally variable frameworks of beliefs. On the one hand, we appear to assess even the most apparently subjective ‘feeling’ in light of our shared conceptual and linguistic funds when we identify it (perhaps as a specific ‘emotion’) and when we evaluate it (in light of the social acceptability of that ‘emotion’ in general and in light of our ‘feeling’ it in a particular instance). On the other hand, the ways in which we define and evaluate ourselves as individual subjects, as distinct personalities or indeed as objectified ‘selves’ (perhaps consisting of parts, dispositions, activities and experiences) are deeply informed by our shared ideas about biological, psychological and social norms. Both the practical and ideological contexts which shape ideas about ‘selfhood’ and ‘human nature’ are therefore vital elements in studying such conceptions across cultures.

In considering Anglo-Saxon conceptions and constructions of the ‘inner self’, this thesis views Old English accounts of personal experience, behaviour and identity firmly in the context of Anglo-Saxon thought about human nature and human workings in general. I am therefore not seeking evidence for constructs of an ‘inner self’ or of

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personal identity in an essentially modern Western individualistic sense, nor do I focus my investigation on modes of personal self-expression in Anglo-Saxon literature. Rather, I proceed from the striking interest in the inner life which is evident across Old English literature and consider the important status and function ascribed to this distinctive domain of human experience and agency in Anglo-Saxon thought about human and individual identity. In other words, I am interested in the way in which Anglo-Saxons conceived and made sense of the multiplicity of drives, impulses and experiences by which they defined themselves as individuals and as human beings. The primary focus of this thesis, therefore, lies not solely with the vernacular expression of psychological ideas, but rather with the way in which vernacular conceptions and expressions of psychological and anthropological workings affect Anglo-Saxon conceptions of identity. The present inquiry is accordingly at least as much a philosophical as a literary investigation in that it is concerned with the wider conceptual frameworks which appear to inform Anglo-Saxon constructions of the inner self. Since my particular focus and approach throughout this thesis depart from conventional literary analyses of Anglo-Saxon psychology or anthropology, this introductory prelude presents an overview of the basic subject matter and methodology of my inquiry as a whole, postponing full bibliographical references to the relevant chapters.

Anglo-Saxon interest in the inner domain of human experience manifests itself in many forms, ranging from essentially personal introspection to more objective self-examination and to didactic accounts concerned with the regulation of inner inclination and impulse in light of normative social or religious standards. This thesis considers how a number of Anglo-Saxon writers explored and made sense of aspects of experience and behaviour in reference to an 'inner self' which is conceived both as the central locus of experience and as the principle of action in human beings. By

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2 For the diverse roles which varying forms of 'individualism' play in 'Western' traditions of intellectual thought, I refer to the *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Wiener, vol. 2 (New York, 1973-74), pp. 595-604. I discuss the various qualifications to my use of the controversial label 'modern Western individualistic' more comprehensively in Chapter One.

3 The methodologies of the relatively modern disciplines of anthropology and psychology can of course not be equated with the theological and philosophical modes of inquiry we find in early medieval writings. Nevertheless, for the purpose of brevity, I use the terms 'anthropology' and 'psychology' to indicate the systematic study of man and his workings.
investigating relevant patterns of thought and expression – first more generally across the extant vernacular literature and subsequently in more detail in a number of carefully selected texts – I illustrate that the inner self may be seen both as a psychological entity and as the core of individual identity precisely because it is conceived not only as a defining element in human beings in general but also as that aspect of the human being which accounts for individual variation in character and behaviour.

In order to justify my approach to the inner self as both a psychological entity and as the core of identity in Old English texts, Part One of this thesis considers the way in which we may most fruitfully approach the relevant patterns of thought and expression across the extant Anglo-Saxon corpus of vernacular literature. Given the essentially abstract nature of concepts such as ‘selfhood’, ‘identity’ and ‘human nature’, Chapter One surveys the relevant methodological disputes across the disciplines and introduces the much debated terms and concepts which stand at the heart of this study. Since our own contemporary approaches to selfhood are inherently informed by a lengthy intellectual immersion in and engagement with Western thought about a dual human nature which consists of body and soul / mind (or matter and non-matter), an initial review of this intellectual tradition is needed to highlight both how diversely our contemporary vocabulary is applied and how certain conceptual complexities appear to be inherent in our culturally distinctive ways of thinking about ourselves. Such an overview highlights the caution which is required when applying culturally loaded terms to the relevant Old English vocabulary. It also allows us to identify a number of fundamental questions within this ongoing Western intellectual discourse which are directly relevant to the study of Anglo-Saxon thought about human nature, selfhood and interiority.

Most important, any account which attempts to explain human experience and behaviour in light of a dual human nature must necessarily account for the relation between the two posited components of man (whether in causal or other terms) if it
seeks to maintain unity or continuity of identity. Any attempt to account for the self within a dualistic conceptual framework, furthermore, must span the dichotomy of the physical and metaphysical. Even if we create different aspects of the self to account for the multiplicity of drives, impulses, activities and experiences by which we identify ourselves, the definition of our true core as well as its relation to the totality of what we are remains a fraught endeavour. Whilst the idea of a spiritual soul, perhaps as a carrier of the true self, has become largely relegated to religious and esoteric circles in light of increasingly favoured ‘scientific’ approaches to anthropological questions, the philosophical debate about a matter-spirit dichotomy in man continues in various forms, ranging from the exploration of a duality of matter and non-matter to a concern with the apparent incompatibility of physical causality on the one hand and apparently non-physical agency or consciousness on the other. Indeed even the most materialistic stance which rejects any notion of a soul or spiritual aspect of man must necessarily engage with the question of whether we are more than the totality of our neurological processes or whether the consciousness which appears to mark us out as distinct subjects can be reduced to cerebral and physiological effects. Since these concerns affect not only our definition and application of terms such as ‘self’ and ‘human nature’, but also emerge as particularly relevant to the study of Anglo-Saxon thought about human identity, the general and theoretical nature of Chapter One prepares for my investigation of Anglo-Saxon conceptions of human nature, selfhood and the inner self in subsequent chapters.

Old English descriptions of human nature and its various components vary considerably in focus and expression – as is to be expected in a body of literature consisting of many diverse genres and styles spanning at least four centuries. What is apparently consistent in an essentially Christian age of literacy, however, is the concept of a dual human nature composed of body (lic, lichoma etc.) and soul (sawul, gast).

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4 A useful example of contrasting positions which account for the unity of man in causal terms is the stance that the ‘soul’ (Gk. psyche. Lat. anima) is the causal principle of life, movement, sensation and reason in the body (a vastly influential stance in Christian thought throughout the Early Middle Ages) and the view, more prevalent today, that the self is the totality of physiological and neurological phenomena and therefore a cumulative effect rather than a cause. I consider the thinkers and schools of thought relevant to these matters in more detail in 1.2 below.

5 I do not define the ‘soul’ as an exclusively spiritual entity per se here since, as I discuss in Chapter One, materialistic accounts of the ‘soul’ (Gk. psyche. Lat. anima) go back at least to Pre-Socratic philosophy and remain particularly prominent in early Christian theology.
Whilst deeply influenced by Latin Christianity in theory and praxis, most Old English accounts of human experience and behaviour cannot be entirely understood in terms of the divide between a material and transient body on the one hand, and an animating, sentient, rational and eternal soul on the other. Despite maintaining a descriptive (and often formulaic) duality of man, Old English accounts of the details of human experience and action primarily involve a number of other components which cannot be entirely classified in either spiritual or material domains: namely the mod and hyge (translated primarily as ‘mind’, ‘heart’ or ‘soul’ depending on the given context) and a number of variant poetic terms such as ferð and sefa (translated primarily as ‘mind’, ‘heart’, ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’). The precise nature and function of these Old English terms do not map onto our own culturally specific concepts of ‘mind’, ‘heart’ and ‘soul’ and these words, along with their underlying concepts, remain fiercely debated amongst Anglo-Saxonists. I suggest that their status and role in Anglo-Saxon conceptions of selfhood and human nature may be fruitfully examined in reference to an inner-outer dichotomy rather than in reference to a dualistic schema of matter and spirit. Indeed reference to the inner-outer dichotomy which is so prominent in the vernacular literature itself allows us to trace the way in which the Old English ‘inner aspects’ transcend or at least renegotiate the conceptual boundaries between the ‘spiritual’, ‘mental’ and ‘emotional’ – and apparently at times even the ‘corporeal’ – which so thoroughly inform our own categorisation of human domains of experience.

In Chapter Two, I introduce the relevant Old English vocabulary in reference to the ongoing critical debate about how to approach and interpret Anglo-Saxon conceptions and expressions of the inner aspects and the idea of an inner self. Attention to the conceptual schema of an inner-outer categorisation of human nature across the Old English corpus highlights an overwhelming localisation of those human aspects associated with agency and experience ‘within’ man. Crucially, as the central agencies and loci of experience, the inner aspects often serve as explanatory principles of

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6 I present these characteristics of the ‘soul’ merely as representative categories associated with the most influential Latin Christian ‘intellectualist’ positions which have their roots in Greek philosophical thought. Again, the details of various theological conceptions of the nature of the soul are considered more closely in Chapter One.
experience, behaviour and identity (both in general and in the particular) without reference to a dichotomy of 'body and soul' or 'matter and spirit'. Chapter Two as a whole, therefore, establishes the important relations between conceptions of agency, experience and identity in Old English literature and substantiates my view of the inner self as the essential human agency, as the locus of experience, and as the totality of processes, drives and activities by which men identify themselves.\(^7\)

In Chapter Three, I go on to illustrate how an approach to the inner aspects in terms of an 'inner-outer' dichotomy of human nature can allow us to re-evaluate the function and status of the inner faculties and their processes in Anglo-Saxon thought about man. The inner-outer dichotomy is itself a widespread conceptual schema across cultures, containing notions of, for example, the invisible (or intangible etc.) as opposed to the visible (or tangible etc.). More notably, in Anglo-Saxon literature itself, the inner-outer schema exhibits a particularly interesting relationship with the influential soul-body / spirit-matter schema. In many ways, the 'inner' takes over the role of the 'spiritual' of the dominant Christian positions – for example inner cause and outer effect or inner agency and outer action.\(^8\) Indeed in its general versatility (and hence in its wide applicability), the conception of an inner core of agency and identity neatly by-passes the need to assimilate a view of the self with theological or philosophical debates about the nature of a spiritual soul as the causal principle of life, movement, sensation and reason. Although such analytical ideas are sporadically expressed across the corpus, a survey of Anglo-Saxon positions on the relation of the inner self to the soul and body shows a remarkable variety of stances within which the status of the inner aspects remains that of the defining inner agencies.

\(^7\) Given the philosophical focus of this inquiry, I frequently refer to generalities about human nature throughout this thesis and apply the terms 'human being' and 'man' in much the same sense. In this use of 'man' as much as in my preference for masculine examples and masculine pronouns in abstract examples, I am of course not driven by any sexual bias, but rather by a bias against the impractical convention of adding a redundant he / she or that of feminising all abstract examples (which has the lamentable though inevitable effect of suggesting the particular rather than the general).

\(^8\) This is of course a simplification, since the inner domain as the centre of agency may well be the receptacle of external impulses (perhaps through sense-perception or even as a recipient of divine or demonological influence) which affect human agency and subsequent behaviour. For the moment, my point pertains simply to the conceived continuity of an inner agency in man as the cause of external action.
As is often noted, many prose works of the vernacular corpus appear to be particularly influenced by Latin Christian intellectual anthropology and psychology. They accordingly differ in style, diction and in ideological inheritance from the poetic corpus, which is generally associated with more long-standing and apparently native traditions of thought about man and his workings. This fundamental division between ideological and literary traditions in Old English prose and poetry respectively allows us to localise a dominant trend of intellectual engagement with theological and even philosophical questions in Old English prose. It does not, however, account for the great variety of Anglo-Saxon perspectives on the relation between body and soul – or indeed for the diverse nature of Anglo-Saxon thought about the relation between the inner self on the one hand and the material and spiritual domains of human beings on the other. Just as early medieval theological accounts of body-soul relations and of the nature, role and status of the soul differ greatly across antique and early medieval Christian writings, conceptions and expressions of these matters differ significantly across the extant Old English corpus. The relevant vernacular accounts reflect varying conceptual traditions to varying degrees depending on varying literary and ideological contexts. Similarly, intellectual engagement with questions of selfhood and human nature and the accompanying conceptual endeavour to assimilate the prominent inner-outer schema with a matter-spirit dichotomy show remarkable variability in both poetry and prose. A notable concern with the spiritual domain of human existence in more explicitly Christian texts, whether in homilies or in didactic poems, would appear to associate the inner more closely with the spiritual. This, however, is more likely to be the result of increasing interest in spiritual salvation and of eschatological concerns with the fate of the soul, rather than constituting a direct conceptual identification of the inner aspects with the soul itself. Indeed the vast bulk of Old English literature is not explicitly concerned with categories of spirit and matter and, overall, descriptions of the central inner aspects and their workings stand beside soul-body formulations of human nature – both in poetry and in prose texts. Significantly, the inner aspects consistently appear as

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9 The notable variety of early medieval theological positions about the relation between body and soul, and indeed about the nature of the soul itself, makes it rather dangerous to claim an orthodox Christian consensus which places the core of agency and identity exclusively with a spiritual and eternal soul, as I illustrate in Part One.
the dominant human agencies associated with individual identity and personality as expressed by commonly communicable formulas and images and they overwhelmingly appear as the individualised determinants of the fate of a (less individualised) spiritual soul. Although the corpus as a whole suggests that Anglo-Saxons were perfectly content to use conventional and often formulaic accounts of the inner aspects of man to explain experience and behaviour in life and to relate this core of man only indirectly to a spiritual soul which is primarily associated with the afterlife, a number of vernacular texts do engage with the notion of an inner self in light of a matter-spirit dichotomy and do embrace questions about the continuity of this self in the earthly life and in the post-corporeal afterlife. I consider precisely such texts in Parts Two and Three of this thesis.

Having surveyed the wider relevant traditions and patterns across the Old English corpus in Part One, I turn to the close analysis of two particularly innovative bodies of poetic and prose texts in Parts Two and Three. Part Two (Chapters Four, Five and Six) and Part Three (Chapters Seven and Eight) consider how the inner self is conceived and expressed in the poetry of Cynewulf and in the ‘philosophical’ prose works of Alfred respectively. At the most practical level, the Cynewulfian and Alfredian canons each provide the (relatively rare) possibility of assessing distinctive stylistic and conceptual tendencies across closely related vernacular texts. Our relative certainty about their respective common authorship accordingly facilitates the study of distinctive and internally consistent approaches to concepts of an inner self.¹⁰ Despite the obvious differences in style and genre as well as in their literary and ideological traditions, both sets of texts examine the notion of an inner self in significant detail and with great intellectual sophistication. Both consider the nature and workings of the inner self in reference to their respective views of human beings and human workings, as shaped by their notable interests in human nature and human purpose in general. Indeed both canons explore such larger ideological frameworks to underpin their own didactic and pastoral concerns with human behaviour as it relates to practical ethics in human life on earth as well as to the spiritual concern of personal salvation. As instances of

¹⁰ The ideas of ‘canonicity’ and ‘common authorship’ have been the subjects of much scholarly research and disagreement – I survey the relevant debates about ‘Cynewulfian’ and ‘Alfredian’ canons in the respective introductions to Parts Two and Three.
particularly sophisticated poetic and prose approaches to the inner self, the Cynewulfian and Alfredian canons provide significant insights into the relevance of thought about human and personal identity across the stylistic divides. Ultimately, therefore, I have chosen to focus in detail on these canons because they present theologically aware perspectives which embrace - albeit in rather different ways - a number of profound questions about personal and human identity in their presentations of the inner self and do so with a striking awareness of the doctrinal and ideological implications of their stances. I examine these particular dimensions of the texts at hand not in the form of conventional close literary readings, but in analyses which are essentially philosophical in their preoccupations and thus focus on often neglected aspects of these texts and their ideas.

Part Two of this thesis considers three poems of the Cynewulf canon which explore the role and workings of the inner self in light of a shared conceptual framework of human nature and human purpose. Although Christ II, Juliana and Elene differ in focus, in subject matter and indeed in genre, they are essentially didactic poems, each of which presents a distinctive angle on the centrality of the inner life in human experience and action and emphasises the need for introspection in practical and spiritual self-improvement. In order to illustrate that Cynewulf's conception of the inner self is inextricably bound up with an overarching conception of human nature and human purpose throughout his poetry, Chapter Four examines the poem in which these larger anthropological ideas are most apparent, namely Christ II. Having considered how Cynewulf addresses the human condition, human nature and the inner self in the most generic terms and explains inner workings in reference to a larger, theologically substantiated view of human purpose in Christ II, Chapters Five and Six, respectively, go on to analyse the way in which Juliana and Elene explore the particular

11 By 'generic', I mean that which is associated with all men as a genus. Although, 'species' might be a more appropriate category here, the adjective 'specific' is unsuitable, just as the adjective 'general' is unsuitable in that it implies lack of detail. I therefore use 'generic' with the qualification that I am not suggesting what is inherent or innate in man, but rather what is shared by human beings. For example, when I refer to human choice or free will as 'generic capacities', I mean that all men are characterised by the possession of this capacity, but I do not imply that it is an innate capacity. In the Christian context with which Cynewulf is concerned, for example, free choice is a gift given to all men on Christ's Incarnation and not something which all men have possessed innately and continuously since Creation.
manifestations of such shared human characteristics and tendencies in various character
types and in individuals. Taken together, all three poems provide a spectrum of aesthetic
and intellectual angles which allow us to trace a distinctive view of the inner self
throughout Cynewulf's poetry. By analysing the way in which Cynewulf develops
varying ideological and literary traditions in his explorations of human experience and
identity, it can be seen that his consistent emphasis on an inner rather than a spiritual
self is compatible with fundamental Christian tenets of a dual human nature consisting
of body and soul. As the locus of experience and as the principle of action, the inner self
is contrasted with but not divorced from the physical and as man's central agency this
inner self assumes the role of causal principle as well as that of a unifying core of
identity. Part Two as a whole thus illustrates how attention to an inner-outer dichotomy
in Cynewulf's conception of human nature provides a valuable hermeneutic tool for the
analysis of the poet's presentation of the inner self and its important function in the
activities of self-reflection and didactic instruction alike.

On a rather different literary and indeed ideological basis, the role of the inner
self is also a striking feature in the 'philosophical' texts of the Alfredian canon, to
which I turn in Part Three. In form, style and, crucially, in subject matter, the Old
English Consolation and the Old English Soliloquies (discussed in Chapters Seven and
Eight respectively) present uniquely systematic investigations into human nature and
the inner self in the vernacular corpus. Deeply influenced by Latin Christian intellectual
anthropology and psychology, these two texts explore the inner self in the context of
larger metaphysical spheres of reality and associate the inner self (represented primarily
by the mod) more intimately with the spiritual and eternal soul (sawul) than any
preceding vernacular text. Part Three therefore considers the way in which Alfred
develops a view of the inner self as the central executive agency and locus of experience
in reference to the essentially dualistic metaphysics and anthropology conveyed by his
Latin sources. I argue that Alfred's association of the 'inner' with the 'spiritual' is
neither an unconditional assimilation of the mod and sawul (as has been suggested), nor

12 As I discuss in the introduction to Part Three, the extent of Alfred's own involvement in the prose
translations of his reign has come into question and I refer to Alfred as the author of the Consolation and
Soliloquies with a number of reservations in mind.
an outright adoption of Latin Christian models of soul and self. Rather, Alfred's sophisticated consideration of the relations between body and soul and his discussions of the nature and status of the inner self within this dualistic schema fully explore the implications of moving the essence of the self into the spiritual domain of man.

Although I do not suggest that Alfred and Cynewulf engaged in philosophical modes of analysing and thinking about the inner self, I do subscribe to the view that attention to philosophical concerns and questions in their writings can enable a more thorough understanding of their conceptions of human nature and selfhood. Rather than being unsuited to the literary forum of Old English poetry and prose, an analytical approach which makes use of philosophical frameworks for considering articulations of human experience can enable a study of the wider and deeper implications of the prominent subject of the inner life in Anglo-Saxon thought, whether pertaining to matters of identity, psychology, anthropology or ethics. Such a broader approach, moreover, allows us to assess the practical and ideological functions of the inner self. As an explanatory principle of human agency and experience, the inner self becomes vital for the articulation of didactic theory as well as being a crucial element in self-definition at a more abstract level. Interest in the sophisticated and innovative ways in which certain Old English texts deal with questions about human nature (and even human purpose) as ideological frameworks for assessing and evaluating individual experience and behaviour is somewhat underrepresented in Anglo-Saxon studies at large. The approach to tradition and innovation which I take here stresses the value of exploring the conceptual structures which inform isolated anthropological and psychological ideas within a given text. Rather than accounting for the elusive nature of the inner aspects solely in reference to literary modes of expression, this thesis therefore argues that the important terms and concepts relevant to the inner self deserve an examination which is more sensitive to the ideological and conceptual necessities of embracing a Christian anthropology – a framework of beliefs which has such far reaching consequences for practical ethics as well as for metaphysical and eschatological deliberations.
By drawing attention to the innovative ways in which certain Anglo-Saxon writers explored questions about human nature and human identity in light of their conceptual engagement with Latin Christian thought across the poetic and prose divide, this thesis highlights an important intellectual tendency to explore what defines men in order to articulate what they are and what they should be. In their own distinctive ways, the Cynewulfian and Alfredian canons display a focus which we do not find in the poetic corpus at large. Their intellectual vigour and analytical approaches differ markedly from wider poetic and homiletic explorations of anthropological and psychological matters, and they exemplify a certain conceptual freedom which we do not find so prominently in the more ‘orthodox’ discussion by Ælfric and other writers of the subsequent Benedictine Reform period. Perhaps – if we accept the conventional dating of the Cynewulfian and Alfredian writings in the ninth century – these canons bear witness to a particularly innovative phase in Anglo-Saxon thought about man in changing religious, social and intellectual contexts. The relevant texts do not merely adopt and translate Latin Christian theological ideas about man and his workings into the native forum, but actively engage in innovative explorations of how to make sense of individual and human experience in light of the traditions of thought available to them. Their concern with how men are to understand themselves, their experiences and their actions as human beings and as individuals in the larger scheme of things, I suggest, deserves to be seen as a valuable and innovative stage within a long-standing Western tradition of thought about ‘ourselves’. In order to present Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the inner self in precisely this forum, my inquiry as a whole must begin with an overview of the relevant ideological and critical traditions and it is these to which I now turn.
Part One

Critical and Ideological Traditions
Chapter One
Approaching Human Nature, Self and Inner Self

In order to begin exploring Old English conceptions and expressions of the inner self, it is of course necessary to demonstrate that this is a valid area of inquiry in reference to Anglo-Saxon England. To what extent were Anglo-Saxons even concerned with ideas of selfhood and interiority and in what contexts can we find evidence for such interests? How are such interests best approached – for example, can their appearance in literary texts be examined in an analytical and philosophical fashion as I propose? These are the central questions of Part One of this thesis. Since, however, concepts of self and interiority as well as their relation to ideas about human nature are themselves fiercely debated across the disciplines, the task at hand is not simply an analysis of a straightforward concept in a given period. Rather, the abstract notions of human nature, self and inner self as well as their spheres of applicability require further elucidation from the outset. Thus, in this first chapter, I introduce the terms and concepts which stand at the heart of this thesis.

As is increasingly acknowledged in cross-cultural studies, abstract concepts such as human nature, self and inner self are informed by culturally specific, discipline-specific or even individually distinctive thought about the nature of these concepts.\(^1\) The attempt to find a clear set of definitions for the cross-cultural and interdisciplinary discourse is a notoriously fraught endeavour. As Catherine McCall states in reference to recent philosophical debates, there is considerable controversy about how to approach and define the relevant concepts even within individual disciplines:

Many philosophers have written about the nature of persons, or human beings, and the conditions of identity which pertain to individuals or selves or persons. However, a critical examination of such literature reveals a lack of clarity concerning the nature of the subject. ... Thus theories are presented, criticised, and defended by philosophers who hold fundamentally different assumptions concerning the nature of the subject of such theories.\(^2\)

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This assessment is as valid for philosophical inquiry as for other disciplines concerned with conceptions of human beings, their workings and their identity across cultures, whether past or present. Since any attempt to present an authoritative set of definitions must itself remain merely one more controvertible stance within the larger debate, the only adequate way of avoiding misunderstanding in such a contentious area of discourse (even if it cannot avert the personal disagreement of the reader!) is to provide a justification of such definitions as a framework for each particular discussion. Precisely this is the aim of the present chapter.

Rather than proceeding from any single discipline-specific definition of the inner self (and therefore imposing predetermined ideas when investigating the notion of an inner self in Anglo-Saxon texts), the two parts of this chapter consider approaches to selfhood and interiority in reference to critical traditions within the relevant disciplines and in reference to the ideological contexts which inform the historically variable semantic spectrum of these terms. In 1.1, I argue for a more general view of the self as a self-conscious subject of agency and experience in line with the increasingly prominent scholarly trend of moving away from a definition of the self as an essentially modern construct which emphasises the unique and autonomous nature of the individual. This broader approach allows us to recognise the great variety of forms which self-conceptions can take in differing contexts. A more comprehensive approach such as this can also enable us to consider the practical and ideological functions of the relevant concepts within varying attempts to make sense of human experience and identity, whether shared or personal. In 1.2, I examine the approaches to interiority in the formulation of ideas about the self in the Western intellectual tradition of thought (and indeed in the critical evaluation of this tradition) in order to identify and explore a number of fundamental preoccupations which have a direct bearing on Anglo-Saxon thought. Whilst there is certainly no unified ‘Western’ consensus about what the ‘self’ is, the elevation of the ‘inner’ in explaining the experiences and activities by which we define ourselves has a lengthy and distinctive history in which concepts of soul, mind or consciousness have all played their pivotal parts, been challenged, rejected or reformulated.3 A survey of the great diversity of approaches to interiority and selfhood

3 Reference to any ‘Western’ concept necessarily involves a mode of generalisation that cannot embrace the diversity of thought within a broadly delineable cultural heritage. Challenges to a Western concept of
in the Western intellectual tradition becomes necessary not only for our awareness of the ways in which we apply loaded terms such as ‘soul’, ‘mind’ and ‘inner self’, but also in order to highlight a long-standing tradition of considering the inner self in reference to, rather than in abstraction from, conceptions of a shared human nature and a common identity. The general and theoretical nature of the following discussion therefore prepares for my investigation of the relevant ideas in Anglo-Saxon texts in subsequent chapters.

1.1 Approaching the Self and Inner Self

When mentioning the self and inner self in contemporary English speaking cultures, a number of deeply entrenched connotations spring immediately to mind. To begin with, the self would appear to be that which is essentially and distinctively ‘me’ rather than something ‘other’ or something communally or biologically shared. This sense is amplified by the qualification ‘inner’ which, sociologically speaking, tends to be associated with that which is essentially personal and private as opposed to what is public — perhaps an outward identity catering to social expectations or norms. Indeed the division of inner and outer selves would appear to encode for us not only a division between the private and the public, but also a conception of the true and essentially distinctive self lying within and hence accessible only to the self-conscious subject. Whereas the scholarly tradition of associating the self with something private, personal

self have been articulated both on account of excessive exclusivity as well as inclusiveness, for example, by Melford E. Spiro, ‘Is the Western Conception of the Self “peculiar” within the Context of World Cultures?’, *Ethos* 21.2 (1993): 107-153; Dorothy Holland, ‘Selves as Cultured: As told by an Anthropologist who lacks a Soul’, *Self and Identity*, ed. Ashmore and Jussim, pp. 160-90. For discussions of Western distinctiveness in considering self- and personhood see in particular F. Johnson, ‘The Western Concept of Self’, *Culture and Self*, ed. Marsella, De Vos and Hsu, pp. 91-138. I employ the overarching label ‘Western’ with these debates in mind.

4 This delineation of ‘self’ from ‘other’ may be conceived from a variety of related perspectives. It may, for example be viewed anthropologically in terms of subjective awareness and experience (discussed p. 21 below), from a sociological (or socio-political) perspective perhaps as the delineation or abstraction of the unique and autonomous individual from his social context, or, more broadly, in terms of the innate value of the individual and his moral autonomy on the one hand, and his freedom for self-development and self-fulfilment on the other. For a succinct discussion of these ideas in relation to forms of ‘individualism’ in Western culture, I refer to Steven Lukes, ‘The Meanings of Individualism’, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971): 45-66.

5 The relation between public and private identity remains at the forefront of sociological debate, particularly in reference to the gap between the person and his social roles, and the way in which social roles shape identity. The view of privacy as referring to ‘the individual in relation to himself: his sense of his own uniqueness and apartness’ and the public as an aspect ‘which exhausts only a portion of his total self’ are premises which dominate in sociological debate, see Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfield, *Between Public and Private: The Lost Boundaries of the Self* (London, 1979), p. 28.
and unique remains prominent in contemporary literary circles concerned with the distinctive and original self-expression of a given author through his artistic medium, this is not the concept of self with which the present study is concerned. Indeed the long-standing monopoly over the term ‘self’ as a modern construct which is inextricably rooted in Western thought about the uniqueness of the autonomous individual is increasingly being both challenged and refuted in those disciplines concerned with conceptions of self and identity across cultures. A discussion of the relevant arguments allows me to contextualise my own approach to conceptions of self and inner self as crucial constructs for explaining human agency, experience and identity, and provides the basis for my insistence on viewing these in the context of culturally shared frameworks of beliefs about human nature and human workings.

The view of the self as something denoting the core of personal identity and the subject of consciousness and experience is conventionally seen as a relatively modern phenomenon. Although the substantive ‘self’ developed morphologically from the reflexive pronouns relatively early in the English language, it is conventionally agreed that the sense which has come to dominate our contemporary understanding of this term developed much later. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, associates the following primarily philosophical senses of ‘self’ with the seventeenth century:

That which in a person is really and intrinsically he (in contradistinction to what is adventitious); the ego (often identified with the soul or mind as opposed to the body); a permanent subject of successive and varying states of consciousness; What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation; one’s nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times.

Seventeenth-century philosophical inquiry, often characterised as being informed by an increasing sense of personal self-consciousness and subjectivity in epistemological matters, has accordingly been seen as a formative period in the articulation of a modern

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6 In discussing literary approaches to selfhood, I employ the term ‘individualistic’ primarily in the sense of the uniqueness of the individual and his autonomous capacity for moral choice as well as his right for personal development without external restraints. Unless otherwise specified, the socio-political senses (whether deriding ‘individualism’ as socially destructive self-interest or applauding the rights of the individual as the basis of a free society) are of less relevance to my present discussion. For a fuller discussion of these various senses of ‘individualism’, I refer to DH1 2, pp. 596-04.


8 OED, s.v. self (n.): B 3, 4a.
concept of self and in the identification of the self as an object of inquiry. Since the wider critical debate about the historical emergence of a sense of a personal and unique self has largely viewed the various philosophical, political, social and economic aspects of Western individualism as pivotal factors, the relation between concepts of the self and the individual requires closer attention at this point.

The scholarly tradition of associating an individualistic conception of self with an increasing perception of a gulf between private and public spheres has its roots in the influential research of scholars such as Jacob Burckhardt who posited the ‘discovery of the individual’ in the Humanistic thought of fifteenth-century Renaissance Italy. Cultural historians, most notably Colin Morris, in turn identified an increasing sense of individuality which accompanied changing liturgical practices (such as a shift from public penance to personal contrition) in the twelfth century. This line of argument leaves little room for a ‘sense of self’ in early medieval (or indeed in prior) thought without reference to the individual as an abstracted entity. Besides broadening the modern definition of the ‘individual’ to suit an early medieval context, more recent studies have also significantly challenged the assimilation of self and individual. Caroline Walker Bynum amongst others has argued for a sense of a personal and private self in twelfth-century writings in reference to a more complex relationship between personal and group identity. Focusing on communal and public ‘models’ which inform private self-conceptions, she concludes:

If the twelfth century did not ‘discover the individual’ in the modern meaning of expression of unique personality and isolation of the person from firm group membership, it did in

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10 Jacob Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (publ. 1860; Frankfurt, 1989); Wallace K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance in Historical Thought: Five Centuries of Interpretation* (Boston, 1948).


some sense discover – or rediscover – the self, the inner mystery, the inner man, the inner landscape. ... A new sense of self, of inner change and inner choice, is precipitated by the necessity to choose among roles, among groups. A new sense of becoming part of a group by conforming one's behaviour to an external standard is necessitated by a new awareness of a choosing and an interior self.¹³

By separating a sense of the personal self from ideas of the modern individual. Bynum articulates an idea of the choosing and reflective self with particular emphasis on the 'interior self'. It is interesting that once the definition of the self is de-individualised and re-socialised, introspection and a sense of one's private (though not entirely abstracted) interiority appear to become crucial determinants of a sense of self. Although notions of interiority are frequently associated with notions of privacy and inward self-reflection, this association again only covers a very limited aspect of the forms which interiority can take in self-conceptions and self-constructions.

As Ineke van 't Spijker has pointed out, 'the meaning of inwardness has too often been taken for granted'.¹⁴ In her investigation of the diverse presentations of the homo interior in a number of eleventh and twelfth-century writings, van 't Spijker places the renewed focus on interiority in the period in a wider context:

On the one hand, the ritual element of the earlier Middle Ages did not disappear, but was absorbed into the greater interiority. On the other hand, this religiosity of interiority, affectivity and experience lent itself just as much to the process of stylization and modelling as the earlier more ritual devotions had done.¹⁵

Van 't Spijker's examination of the subtle differences between varying types of interiority in one period as much as across different periods presents an often neglected aspect of the wider debate and illustrates that our definitions not only of the 'individual' and the 'self', but also those of 'inwardness' must take into account the diverse contexts which shape them. Given the lengthy philosophical tradition of introspection as a means to self-knowledge (and knowledge per se) which goes back at least to Hellenistic and Classical Greek thought, I would like to briefly consider some of the diverse approaches to interiority which appear to accompany different conceptions of the self in order to highlight that the concept of the 'inner self' need not be limited to a context of personal or even subjective self-examination, such as those which we find in the twelfth and fifteenth-century 'renaissances'.

¹⁴ Ineke van 't Spijker, Fictions of the Inner Life, p. 3.
¹⁵ ibid., p. 5.
The recognition of the self as an object of inquiry (though not in the sense of unique self-expression or self-fulfilment) has been placed as early as the 'axial age' of Classical Greece, Judea and early Christianity. The view that Plato (ca. 427-347 BC) made the investigation of 'man and his inner life the central philosophical task' is well represented, although Classical philosophical approaches to the inner domain and to introspection as a means to knowledge (both self-knowledge and knowledge of truths) are generally seen as forms of objective approaches to the inner self. An increasing sensitivity to circumstantial factors which shape individual character and personality (rather than a focus on set character types) has in turn been identified in Hellenistic and Roman philosophical thought and a 'recognition of individual uniqueness', even 'the ideal of realizing individual uniqueness', has been attributed to writers such as Cicero (106 BC - 43 AD). The development of such ideas in Christian thought has in turn often been seen as constituting an increasing trend towards a more personal and subjective approach to interiority, facilitated not least by an increasing awareness of personal responsibility in anticipation of Judgment and an increasing focus on man's personal relationship with God. These conditions appear to present a broader set of criteria when seeking the roots of a 'more modern' sense of self. Precisely such roots have been most prominently identified in the influential thought of St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430). Since his anthropological and psychological ideas, as well as his articulation of an 'introspective struggle with human experience', have been seen as particularly important for Anglo-Saxon thought about the self, it is helpful to pause for a moment to consider some of the ways in which Augustine's approach to interiority and selfhood have been interpreted.

On the one hand, Augustine’s development of the biographical genre in his 
*Confessiones* has been seen to reflect a deepening concern with a private and personal form of self-examination and introspection, whether in his characterisation of the *homo interior* or even in a posited invention of ‘the concept of private inner space’. On the other hand, his articulation of the self as the thinking, feeling ‘I’ (Lat. *ego*, *Ciuit. Dei* XI, 26), has been seen as the first instance of an argument which has been fundamental to the philosophy of mind ever since René Descartes famously developed it in the seventeenth century, namely the *cogito ergo sum* (‘I think therefore I am’). Given that Augustine’s *Confessiones* are confessions to God and given that, for Augustine, man’s personal inner space is that forum within which he can cultivate his spiritual relationship with God, caution is of course needed when stressing the similarities of his thought with modern approaches to selfhood over and above the continuity of his thought with preceding stances. Despite identifying the self as the subject of thought and therefore raising the mental realm as one of the crucial determinants of the self, Augustine’s view of the self is not that of the subjective and abstracted observer which we find in the mind-body dualism of thinkers such as Descartes. Rather, Augustine’s writings constitute a particularly vivid example of how the line between subjective and objective approaches to an inner self can be extremely thin. His psychological ideas (considered in 1.2 below) in many ways underpin his characterisation of the *homo interior* and his expression of personal experience takes place within a sophisticated framework of ideas about human nature and human purpose in a way which transcends a focus on individuality. We shall have ample opportunity to explore this further when considering the influence of Augustine’s ideas in a number of Old English texts in subsequent chapters. As I shall argue, attention to the objective frameworks which inform anthropological and psychological ideas enables a broader appreciation of the diverse forms which conceptions of selfhood and interiority can take.

22 I have opportunity to return to this argument in Chapter Eight below, when considering King Alfred’s adaptation of a similar argument in Augustine’s *Soliloquia*. A comprehensive analysis of the parallels between Augustine and Descartes’ *cogito* is provided by Gareth B. Matthews, *Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes* (Ithaca, 1992).
Rather than viewing subjective introspection and an emphasis on personal and private inner experience as the foundation for defining the self, I employ a much wider sense of self and a de-subjectivised approach to interiority throughout this thesis. Indeed such a wider conception of the self is necessary when studying the almost insurmountable variety of thought about ourselves across cultures. Put differently, general and perhaps even universally applicable conceptions and expressions of ourselves are needed as shared premises for considering and communicating that which is essentially culture-specific and 'different'. Whatever our contemporary focus on the personal, private and individualistic in defining the self, there is a growing consensus across the disciplines that a basic sense of self is a fundamental practical and conceptual human need, however variably shaped across cultures.\textsuperscript{24} In the most practical sense, our implicit awareness of ourselves as distinct experiencing and acting subjects would appear to be a basic premise for all conscious thought and action – indeed for all conscious interaction with the external world. As the cross-cultural anthropologist Andrew Lock puts it in his article ‘Universals in Human Conceptions’:

> Self-awareness is necessary and basic to the successful performance of the many different roles which the individual has to adopt within society.\textsuperscript{25}

The apparently practical necessity of delineating ‘myself’ from the ‘other’ in order to exercise my social functions, however, entails not only the assumption that I recognise myself as an agent in respect of any one particular action at any one time, but that I recognise myself as a responsible agent with certain persistent and defining roles and responsibilities. In other words, ‘I’ must be conscious of myself as a responsible agent, irrespective of whether I conceive myself as a particular type, a distinct personality or a uniquely autonomous being. The importance of the self-aware and unified subject indeed stands at the heart of contemporary philosophical debate about personal identity and selfhood.\textsuperscript{26} Christine Korsgaard, phrases the issue as follows:

> The need for identification with some unifying principle or way of choosing is imposed on us by the necessity of making deliberative choices.\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{25} Andrew Lock, ‘Universals in Human Conception’, *Indigenous Psychologies*, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{26} A helpful introduction to the prevalent debates in philosophy of mind is provided in *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology*, ed. William G. Lycan (Chapel Hill, 1990), pp. 3-11.

Whether considered from an anthropological perspective as self-awareness or from a philosophical perspective as self-consciousness, there would appear to be a rather 'common-sense' need for understanding ourselves as distinct agentive and experiencing entities which persist with some degree of unity over time. Put differently, our body, our temperaments and our views may change over the course of our lifetime, but it would appear to be a conceptual and a practical necessity to identify some unity and / or continuity in the multiplicity of experiences, decisions and actions which define our existence. Leaving the question of whether there is actually such a thing as the self to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, I am interested here in the importance of a concept of self for practical, social and ethical functioning. In this broadest sense, the self as an agency and core of experience is crucial not only to personal identity, but becomes the central substratum by which men identify themselves as human beings and as individuals.

Very few scholars have considered Anglo-Saxon thought about selfhood and interiority in reference to the wider interdisciplinary debate outlined above. Peter Clemoes identified and investigated a narrative shift of interest from the social hero to the 'Christian hero' of the spiritual community ('the individual ultimately answerable to Christ the Judge') in Old English literature. He argued that the traditional vernacular mode of thought and expression initially 'resisted exchanging its usual public forum' for the 'more psychological delving' required by the 'more personal sequence of shame, repentance, confession, penance and absolution' which accompanied the onus on private penance in the 'English church' by the eighth century.

In arguing that a number of texts 'gradually transferred the conceptual basis of individual living from the social, temporal relative mode onto the religious, eternal, absolute plane', Clemoes moved away from a focus on individuality and personal uniqueness in its modern sense to suggest a sense of self which remained fundamentally entrenched in communal ideas, whether secular or spiritual.

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28 I refer here specifically to the approach taken by 'common-sense', 'folk', or 'hermeneutic' psychology.
30 ibid., p. 366. The liturgical worship which 'promoted individually steered meditation' and personal communication with God, Clemoes argued, gradually encouraged a 'new-found sense' of one's essential self as a soul destined for its own final judgment', ibid., pp. 370, 371.
31 ibid., p. 407.
More recently, Antonina Harbus has proposed a more particular sense of personal and private self in Anglo-Saxon culture. Rather than focusing on religious or social contexts which facilitated an increasing sense of self and personal introspection, she examined trends of self-reflection and personal self-expression in secular poetry of varying dates, primarily the Old English elegies of the Exeter Book. In reaction against conventional scholarly generalisations, and in particular against the opinion that ‘there is little evidence that medievals engaged in introspection or experienced inner struggles’, Harbus argued that Anglo-Saxon writers and audiences were interested in the self as a ‘subject of inquiry’ and that poems such as *The Wife's Lament* exhibit not only the experience of ‘inescapable inner struggles’, but also a perception of the self as ‘separate from others and created by personal experience’. Her view of Anglo-Saxon ‘awareness of the self as a source of identity, agency, and cognitive functions’ stresses parallels between early medieval and modern views of the self as a primarily conscious and somewhat abstracted observer, and concentrates on the way in which the pervasive interest in the inner realm and in psychological workings facilitate and inform personal self-constructions and self-expression in vernacular literature. As I shall argue in Chapter Two, Old English accounts of the inner life are revealing for Anglo-Saxon approaches to identity in a way which transcends subjective self-examination in a strictly personal sense. Attention to the ways in which the inner self appears as an object of inquiry (for example as an explanatory principle of generic or individual experience and behaviour) highlights that both subjective and objective expressions of the inner self often depend on a view of a shared human nature and a common condition as a framework for making sense of personal experience.

As has become apparent in the preceding discussion, definitions of ‘self’ and ‘interiority’ need not be limited to conceptions of the unique, private and subjective realm of thought about ourselves. It is increasingly accepted across the disciplines that these abstract concepts should be approached in reference to the diverse contexts in

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32 Antonina Harbus, ‘The Medieval Concept of Self in Anglo-Saxon England’, *Self and Identity* 1 (2002): 77-97. Harbus initially broadens the definition of ‘self’ to the self-referential on a linguistic basis, arguing that ‘the self was an everyday feature of discourse’ in that it appears frequently as an adjective and pronoun, and as an element in several compound terms, ibid., p. 83. Her focus on the importance of introspection and personal self-expression, however, stresses the parallels between Anglo-Saxon and more modern approaches to the self.


34 ibid., p. 93.
which they occur. Whilst we appear to take the self in its broadest sense for granted, we must acknowledge that the articulation and definition of the self is as variable across cultures as it is contested in individual disciplines. The de-subjectivised approach which I take to ideas about selfhood and interiority throughout this thesis allows me to consider the implications of psychological ideas for views of identity, both human and personal. When exploring the importance of inner workings, faculties and capacities for conceptions of identity, however, the inner self cannot be abstracted from views of human nature as a whole. Before turning to conceptions and expressions of the inner self in Old English literature, it is therefore necessary to introduce some of the fundamental concerns which accompany Western intellectual inquiry into notions of self and inner self in relation to a number of diverse views of human nature.

1.2 Looking into Human Nature in the Western Intellectual Tradition: Soul, Mind, and Inner Self

An examination of ideas about the inner self in the context of thought about human nature requires familiarity with some of the fundamental anthropological schemata which frequently act as conceptual frameworks for psychological theory and which are often embedded in systems of beliefs about human nature and purpose. Concerns with anthropological schemata such as a matter-spirit or body-soul dualism, and with forms of materialism have recently come to the fore in debates about Anglo-Saxon psychology. An awareness of the implications of divergent anthropological positions is equally important for our interpretation of Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the inner self. For example, is the core of man associated with an incorporeal experiencing and thinking mind which is conceived as distinct from the body? Does such a substratum of personal identity continue beyond corporeal death, perhaps as part of an eternal, spiritual soul which transcends the material and transient body? If a body-soul dualism is the dominant framework for exploring human experience and identity, does man’s perceived core account for the totality of diverse domains of experience or are human and personal identity rooted more distinctly in either material or spiritual spheres? In preparing to engage with some of these questions as they present themselves

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35 Leslie Lockett’s recent arguments for a materialistic conception of the ‘mind’ has brought these matters to the fore, as I discuss in detail in Chapters Two and Three, Leslie Lockett, ‘Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons’, PhD Diss., University of Notre Dame (2004).
in a number of Old English texts, it is not only necessary to be aware of the diverse models which may have circulated in the Anglo-Saxon period, but also to be aware of certain conceptual complexities accompanying articulations of anthropological dualism or materialism as regards self-conceptions and self-constructions. Rather than listing a range of sources which may have influenced Anglo-Saxon ideas on matters of self, mind, soul and human nature, this discussion takes a broader approach to some of the issues which recur in historically diverse accounts of human nature and human workings and which directly or indirectly inform our own approaches to anthropological and psychological issues along with the terminology we employ.

Whether appearing in the context of materialistic or dualistic anthropologies, concepts of ‘soul’, ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’ have assumed a pivotal place in ways of thinking about ourselves in the Western intellectual tradition. Whilst many general historical accounts of Western thought about selfhood appear content to proclaim that pre-modern philosophies and theologies identified the self with a spiritual and immortal soul, such generalisations are hardly conducive to appreciating the great variety of thought, the notable creativity and the explorative vigour of the trends and thinkers whose ideas interact and shape the larger ideological context in which Anglo-Saxon thought should be placed. In Classical philosophical thought, the Gk. psyche and Lat. anima (primarily translated as ‘soul’ or ‘mind’) appear to have been diversely conceived as an animating force, a psychological entity or the substratum of the self in varying relations with the body. The psyche / anima was conceived as a material substance in early Ionian philosophy, in the dominant Hellenistic philosophical schools, as well as in certain strands of early Christian thought. The view of the ‘soul’ as a spiritual, incorporeal and immortal entity which ultimately came to dominate in Christian thought remains the most prominent connotation of the term ‘soul’ in popular discourse today

36 For example, Raymond Martin and John Barresi, The Naturalization of the Soul, p. 1.
37 Paul MacDonald provides an illuminating survey of the divergent uses of psyche in Homeric, early philosophical and Classical Greek texts, as well as of the complex linguistic factors accompanying the Latin translation of Greek ideas about the psyche in History of the Concept Mind: Speculations about Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 1-2, 12-87, 89-93; see also C. F. Alford, whose survey of the various Ancient Greek terms for ‘soul’ concludes that by the time of Plato’s middle writings, the term psyche can be viably regarded as reflecting man’s essential self, in The Self in Social Theory: A Psychoanalytical Account of its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau (Chelsea, 1991), pp. 48-61.
38 An excellent discussion of the divergent and recurring forms of materialism in the Western intellectual tradition is provided by Raymond Martin and John Barresi’s introduction in Personal Identity (Maldon, 2003), pp. 1-74; also idem, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, pp. 13, 42-4. I shall touch on the relevant materialist positions over the course of this discussion.
and largely underlies the relegation of this term to religious or esoteric contexts). Our preference for terms such as ‘psyche’ or ‘mind’ in anthropological, psychological and philosophical debates today is, however, accompanied by at least as many complexities. Increasingly coloured by a concern with a thinking entity distinct from the body (and often disassociated from the idea of a spiritual soul) since Descartes’ influential articulation of a mind-body dualism, the term ‘mind’ is no less versatile than the term ‘soul’. In reference to pre-modern accounts, the term ‘mind’ is frequently applied to designate a thinking or rational faculty (for example Lat. mens, animus) of the soul, or to the psyche and anima themselves in a specific context of investigating mental processes and consciousness.39 ‘Mind’ and ‘consciousness’ have in turn also been seen to encompass the totality of non-corporeal elements or, more recently, the totality of physiological or neurological processes and / or effects which we associate with the self.40 Clearly, soul and mind cannot be defined as either spiritual or non-corporeal entities per se and our various articulations of these abstract concepts tend to involve reference to the elusive inner domain which transcends material and spiritual (or non-corporeal) categories.

The many forms which soul and mind can take require that we consider these concepts in their historical and ideological contexts, although a detailed discussion of the complex processes of ideological transmission and adaptation and of the continuity and discontinuity of the relevant ideas across cultures is of course beyond the scope of this discussion. My primary aim here is to introduce the variable semantic spheres of terms such as soul and mind with a particular focus on their status in divergent accounts of human nature, as well as on the functions which these concepts can assume in articulations of human and personal identity. This discussion is necessarily highly selective and is certainly not intended as a comprehensive historical survey of concepts of soul, mind and self. On the one hand, it provides an opportunity to introduce some of the thinkers and theories to which I will be referring repeatedly throughout this thesis. On the other hand, it allows me to touch on some of the crucial conceptual issues which re-emerge in various guises in a number of Anglo-Saxon articulations of the inner self.

39 A fuller account of the confusion surrounding our approaches to ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ when exploring historical accounts can be found in MacDonald, History of the Concept Mind, pp. 1-2.
40 A particularly succinct articulation of the dominant positions in modern philosophy of mind is presented by William G. Lycan, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (Chapel Hill, 1990), pp. 5-11.
The interaction of diverse strands of Hebrew, Greek and Roman ideas in the formation of Christian thought may at first seem somewhat divorced from the specific socio-cultural and ideological context of Anglo-Saxon England. The various conceptual intricacies which accompany such ideological interaction, however, remain relevant when considering the interaction of Anglo-Saxon and Latin Christian thought about man and his workings. Certain philosophical questions about the unity and continuity of identity which are already inherent in Greek dualistic and materialistic modes of thinking about man become relevant to our understanding of a number of Old English translations of Latin intellectual works. Similarly, theological concerns about the nature of the soul and its relation to the body are pivotal for appreciating the diverse subtleties in Old English didactic accounts in the extant corpus of vernacular literature. In reviewing some of the crucial issues relating to human nature and the inner domain, the relevant philosophical and theological issues need to be placed in their wider ideological context. Thus, although the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and indeed of many patristic thinkers, were not available in Anglo-Saxon England, reference to their influential anthropological and psychological ideas (and to the complexities which these set up for subsequent thinkers) provides a useful basis from which to explore a number of crucial issues relating to questions of selfhood and identity. The following cursory sketch outlines the way in which a number of concerns re-emerge in varying forms in different contexts, and argues that these have a direct bearing on the ways we approach anthropological and psychological schemata in Old English literature.

Alfred Whitehead’s famous comment that ‘the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’ remains apt if we consider the legacy of the anthropological dualism traditionally accredited to Plato. Although there is considerable critical debate about ‘whether the soul is [conceived as] mortal or immortal, material or immaterial, bipartite or tripartite, and so forth’ in the various stages of Plato’s writings, there remains an overwhelming consensus that Plato ultimately moved away from preceding philosophical ideas about the psyche as a material causal principle of the body and viewed it as an immaterial.

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41 For a wider study of the transmission of Classical and Antique texts in the medieval West, see M. L. W. Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe (Ithaca, 1957), pp. 238-50. I shall touch on the relevant literature available in the Anglo-Saxon period below.

pre-existing and immortal seat of 'psychological' capacities and drives. The Georgias provides the first significant evidence that Plato identified the essential self with a spiritual soul (psyche) that is fundamentally distinct in substance from the body (soma). His division of the psyche into higher and lower faculties in the Phaedrus and Republic has, in turn, been interpreted as 'the ultimate theoretical origin of the idea of the unconscious', although such claims must be approached with great caution. Plato's tripartite division of the soul into reasoning (logistikon), spirited (thumoeides) and desiring or appetitive (epithumitikon) parts or natures accounted for the multiplicity of human drives and impulses in terms of a hierarchically construed psyche (Republic IV, X; Phaedrus 245-6a). For Plato, the psyche as a whole could attain its rightful and natural virtue of justice when reason assumed its rightful rule over desire by the aid of the spirited and motivational faculty and when each part exercised its respective virtue of wisdom, courage, and moderation. Plato's tripartite division of the soul into distinct faculties, however, raises a number of complex questions relating to the unity and continuity of identity when viewed in the context of a dualistic anthropology.

Plato's metaphysical position (as developed in his middle writings, the Phaedo, Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus) in essence holds that things in material reality are characterised by multiplicity, transience and flux and are merely the semblances of certain immaterial principles (referred to as Forms or Ideas) which are in themselves true, real and unchanging. Plato appears to have associated the essence of self with an immaterial psyche rather than with the body in order to account for its immortality and

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43 An excellent survey of the relevant scholarship on these points is presented by Paul MacDonald, History of the Concept Mind, pp. 37-54. The most interesting summary of Pre-Socratic accounts of the psyche remains that of Aristotle in De Anima (DA) Book II, W. D. Ross, ed., Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford, 1961).
47 For a comprehensive treatment of the wider issues involved, I refer to Wolfgang Wieland, Platon und die Formen des Wissens (Göttingen, 1999).
its access to the Forms (Phaedo 66a) in thought and cognition.\textsuperscript{48} The view of a simple and non-composite soul (Phaedo 78b-c 79b) is, however, difficult to reconcile with the psyche as a seat of diverse psychological events which involve the whole spectrum of bodily and non-bodily impulses, affects and experiences (Republic IV. X: Phaedrus 245-6).\textsuperscript{49} The difficulty of accounting for an entity which can encompass the totality, unity and continuity of the self in terms of two fundamentally different spheres of reality – one material and one non-material – is one of the crucial complexities which Plato’s anthropological and psychological ideas set up for subsequent thought.\textsuperscript{50}

Before turning to the importance of Plato’s tripartite psychological model and his dualistic anthropological model in antique and medieval Christian accounts, it is necessary to introduce another influential psychological model which is accompanied by a distinct set of complexities relating to human identity. Although the works of Aristotle (384-322 BC) were not widely available in early medieval intellectual culture, some of his basic psychological ideas were widely disseminated out of their original philosophical context.\textsuperscript{51} Aristotle’s view of three levels of the soul (psyche), for example, was widely incorporated in antique and early medieval psychological accounts, including a number of Anglo-Saxon writings.\textsuperscript{52} In De Anima (DA), Aristotle identified three levels of increasingly complex souls in basic animate objects, animals, and humans: first, an animating and vegetative level; second, a sentient and perceptive level; and third, a rational level (DA 413a-23).\textsuperscript{53} Whilst maintaining the rational nature of man as a central tenet and accounting for psychological workings in reference to the psyche, Aristotle dealt with the complexity of unity and continuity in human identity by

\textsuperscript{48} Plato’s theory of cognition, as outlined already in the Meno posits that knowledge of the Forms is innate in the soul and that learning itself becomes the process of recollection (anamnesis). R. S. Bluck, Plato’s Meno (Cambridge, 1961); J. Burnett, Plato’s Phaedo (Oxford, 1911); as discussed by D. Scott, ‘Platonic Anamnesis Revisited’, Classical Quarterly 37 (1987): 346-66. The idea of Recollection, filtered and adapted by writers such as Boethius and St. Augustine, also made its way into Old English literature, see Chapter Seven.


\textsuperscript{50} As Lovibond argues convincingly, Plato himself appears to have moved towards a view of the rational part of the soul as the immortal aspect of man in his later writings, ‘Plato’s Theory of Mind’, pp. 53-55.

\textsuperscript{51} For the availability and engagement with Aristotelian works in the early middle ages, see John Marenbon, Aristotelian Logic: Platonism and the Context of Early Medieval Philosophy in the West (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 4-9, 77-120.

\textsuperscript{52} For a survey of patristic references to the three levels or degrees of the soul, see MacDonald, History of the Concept Mind, pp. 138. I shall consider the relevant Old English reference in the vernacular translation of Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae in Chapter Seven.

presenting a hylomorphic model (DA 412b-14a) according to which the psyche was the form (morphe) of the corporal matter or stuff (hyle). Leaving aside the intricacies of this theory for present purposes, Aristotle in essence proposed that soul and body are mutually dependent and together inextricably make up the individual. Since soul and body are interdependent in that soul informs matter and is individuated by matter (DA 414a-20), the self is not identified with a soul that pre-exists, transcends and outlives the body. Instead, the soul ceases to be when the body dies. Nevertheless, Aristotle did not negate an immortal aspect of the human being, but accounted for a post-corporeal life in terms of a rather elusive component of man, the nous (pure intelligence). This nous appears to have been conceived as distinct from the informed (or ensouled) matter of the particular individual and reflects man’s participation in a higher level of intelligence which permeates the universe (DA 413a7, 429a22-7). The nous therefore sits ill at ease with the continuity of individual identity, as became a dominant point of contention in the renewed engagement with Aristotelian ideas in thirteenth-century scholasticism. As I shall argue in Chapters Seven and Eight, related questions of continuity as well as unity of self (though in a specifically Christian context) are dealt with most innovatively in certain Old English prose texts.

The need to account on the one hand for continuity of soul and body (whether as cause and effect, spirit and matter, or inner and outer) and on the other hand for something higher and ‘more than matter’ in man is more than apparent in subsequent thought about identity, whether directly or indirectly informed by the positions of Plato and Aristotle. These issues have been approached in different ways by thinkers in materialistic and dualistic schools of thought. Since both anthropological schemata appear to have been available in Anglo-Saxon intellectual culture, it is useful to take a brief look at some of the relevant complexities accompanying the most influential materialistic and dualistic positions.

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56 Martin and Barresi, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, pp. 93-7.
57 Leslie Lockett has argued that a number of materialistic accounts of ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ were available in Anglo-Saxon intellectual culture, although the extent of diffusion and influence is questionable. Lockett, ‘Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons’, pp. 183-5. I shall return to Lockett’s thesis that the Anglo-Saxons themselves espoused a materialistic view of the ‘mind’ in Chapters Two and Three.
Materialism, as we find it in Hellenistic and Roman schools of Epicurean and Stoic thought, certainly promises to avoid the problem of having two essentially divorced spheres of metaphysical and anthropological reality. This is not to say that these schools subscribed to a form of anthropological monism. Rather, the soul was thought to consist of particularly fine matter (fine atoms for the Epicureans, and varying degrees of tensions or ‘mixes’ of fire and air for certain Stoics). The interaction between types of matter in the universe at large as well as in the microcosm of man was a particular focal point of Hellenistic materialism in addressing metaphysical causality and order as much as human agency, freedom of action and diverse psychological processes. Interestingly, where the atomistic reality described by Lucretius (ca. 99 – 55 BC) operated in terms of the deterministic collision of atoms, he developed a view of free action by introducing an ‘x-atom’ (as Annas aptly coins it), which is neither matter nor void – a point which highlights the difficulty of accounting for free agency within a worldview defined by material causality. Stoic materialism, in turn, largely proposed a providential order ensuing from a materialistically conceived God and articulated a view of introspection as a means to returning to this Principle, whilst emphasising inner assent and individual volition in their psychological ideas. Clearly, a materialistic view of interiority was no hindrance to the study of non-visible and non-tangible processes. The Stoics and Epicureans conceived of inner processes as corporeal motions and contractions and often localised different parts of the soul in different parts of the body. Descriptions of inner processes as physically conceived motions have many

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58 Such indiscriminate reference to Epicureans and Stoics is of course a dangerous generalisation given the great variability of thought amongst individual thinkers broadly following and developing the thought of Epicurus (ca. 341-270 BC) and Zeno (ca. 333-264 BC). My purpose here is merely to highlight a number of features of materialism relevant to my own concerns in subsequent chapters and so I must refer to A. A. Long, *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* (Oxford, 2006) for a fuller account of the various positions and doctrines associated with these philosophical schools.


62 As already noted, this emphasis on volition in individual character formation appears to have been a particularly important stage in developing conceptions of a personal and private self. Long, ‘Representation and the Self in Stoicism’, pp. 84-101; Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 137, see also p. 19 above. A particularly illuminating discussion of Stoic ‘assent’ is provided by John Rist, ‘Faith and Reason’, *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, pp. 26-39.

analogues across cultures, including Anglo-Saxon literature. The detailed Stoic accounts of tubes and channels which serve to explain causal mechanisms in man are, however, a long way away from anything we find Old English texts and when drawing analogies between apparently materialistic psychologies it is important to consider the metaphysical contexts which inform the given anthropological and psychological ideas. Whereas, for example, a concern with material causality is rarely attested in Old English descriptions of the relation between body and soul, the notion of the soul as that entity which strives to return to its Principle is a most relevant concern, albeit in the context of the more pronounced anthropological dualism developed in Neoplatonic and Christian thought.

The metaphysical context of the influential form of anthropological dualism articulated by Plotinus (ca. 204–270 AD) is of particular relevance for present purposes, not least because it allows me to touch on a number of implications which a dualistic metaphysics can have for views of the role and status of body and soul in human identity. In drawing on a number of mystical elements from Plato’s thought (most notably that of the *Timaeus*), Plotinus developed a view of reality in which the perfect, transcendent and immaterial Principle of all things, the One (*hen, monás*), overflows into varying levels of reality. From this first creative principle of reality (*hypostasis*), also named God, emanates the second *hypostasis* (pure intelligence) and from this, in turn, emanates the third *hypostasis* (world soul) which brings forth non-creative material reality. For Plotinus, all things innately seek to return to their source, and human souls, entirely spiritual entities incarcerated in the material body, strive to return to this spiritual principle by transcending the individuation of matter. Whilst raising familiar questions as regards the continuity of personal identity, this framework emphasises the importance of men’s freedom to move away from their origin and home


64 These physically conceived motions have been analysed in terms of a ‘hydraulic model of emotions’, sometimes associated with a ‘common sense’ psychology of the ‘mind’ as a physically conceived entity located in the chest, see Lockett, *Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons*, pp. 141-44. As the intricate metaphysical systems containing these models suggest, however, it is important not to associate materialism with ‘common sense’ conceptualisations of human workings indiscriminately. A main thrust in contemporary ‘common sense’ psychology, for example, is the reassertion of the inner domain as something more than material effect, namely the conscious and agentic self.


and thus to remain ignorant of their identity, or to seek it through contemplation and transcendence of individuality in (often mystical) union with the One. Related ideas were transmitted into Anglo-Saxon intellectual culture primarily through the writings Boethius (480-525) and St. Augustine, as I shall discuss in Chapters Seven and Eight. As regards the broader metaphysical and anthropological dualism developed by Plotinus, one important point must be made here. Plotinus’ arguments against the Gnostic view of a duality of two equal principles of Good and Evil at work in the universe and in man (manifest in dichotomies of matter and spirit, light and dark and so on), presented a framework within which the early Christian Church could reassert the omnipotence of the one true Lord and which facilitated more complex anthropological and psychological ideas that did not simply associate man’s baseness with the material body and his virtue with the spiritual soul.67 Christian accounts of the relation between body and soul and concerns with the nature, constitution and status of the soul in human experience and identity, accordingly differ considerably.

Given the limitations of this brief sketch, it is of course not feasible to even attempt to trace the complex ideological interaction of diverging strands of Hebrew, Greek, Hellenistic, Roman and early Christian thought. There is substantial debate as to whether we find a monistic or a dualistic view of man in the Hebrew scriptures, in the Septuagint and in the New Testament, and there is even fiercer debate about the degree to which Greek philosophical concerns affect the view of man in the New Testament and early Christian writings.68 For present purposes, it is necessary to skip ahead to a number of patristic accounts in order to highlight how some of the dominant anthropological schemata and psychological models already touched on above emerged in different forms in the specifically Christian context relevant to Anglo-Saxon culture.

The materialist anthropology of Christian thinkers such as Tertullian (ca. 160-225) highlights a continued concern with questions of causality and the unity of body and soul.69 Tertullian argued for the material nature of the anima, asking, for example,

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68 An admirable account of the divergent scholarly positions and the development of the relevant vocabulary is provided by MacDonald, *History of the Concept of Mind*, pp. 1-36, 89-160.

how an ‘empty’ thing could move a material thing (De Anima 6.3). It is perhaps questionable whether proponents of the matter-spirit dualism which came to dominate Christian thought indeed bridged the gap between two fundamentally different spheres of reality. Be this as it may, one of the main transmitters of the patristic debate in early medieval intellectual culture, Isidore of Seville (ca. 560-636), reframed the opposition between the two positions by suggesting that materialists were unable to conceive of the anima as an immaterial entity due to their inability to understand ‘non-materiality’ itself. In the wider Christian discourse about man, however, differing positions on the role of soul and body in the transmission of original sin, the centrality of the Spirit and the workings of divine Grace in the renewed spiritual life of man were more prominent than a concern with the soul as an innate causal principle (whether material and mortal or immaterial and immortal). The attribution of agency, responsibility and psychological characteristics to the soul remained a central feature in materialistic as much as in dualistic accounts and I shall accordingly restrict myself here to a brief survey of the most immediately relevant psychological models.

The Platonic model of the tripartite soul and Aristotle’s three levels of soul were widely adopted and developed in Christian writings. Particularly in monastic and ascetic thought, Plato’s notion of the appetitive part of the soul came to be more closely associated with the body and the division between irrational and rational aspects of the soul (Gk. psyche, Lat. anima) as a bipartite division in parallel with an overarching spiritual and corporeal duality was particularly prominent. As regards the tripartite model itself, Cicero’s influential interpretation of the three faculties as parts (Lat.

71 Augustine, for example, suggests a fusion of light and air as the mediating link in De Genesi ad Literam 7.19, J. Zycha, ed., Sancti Aureli Augustini De Genesi ad Literam Libri Duodecim, CCEL 28/1 (Vienna, 1894), pp. 3-456.
73 A most helpful study of the various relevant adaptations in the writings of Clement, Origen and Tertullian is provided by David N. Bell, ‘The Tripartite Soul and the Image of God in the Latin Tradition’, RTAM 47 (1980):16-52. See also Ch. 18 in Lactantius’ De Opificio Dei, ed. S. Brandt, CSEL 27 (Vienna, 1895), and John Cassian’s Conlationes, which suggests a materialistic tripartite soul in the context of a larger matter-spirit duality in which only God is truly immaterial, M. Petschenig, ed., Iohannis Cassiani Conlationes XIII, CSEL 13 (Vienna, 1886), pp. 690-91, 128-36.
74 Bell, 'The Tripartite Soul', pp. 17-8; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford, 2004), pp. 111-76.
partes), rather than as natures (Gk. eidē). appears to have dominated interpretations until a renewed interest in the nature and substance of a simple or divided soul emerged in the context of Christological debates. 75

Of particular importance for present purposes is Augustine’s development of the tripartite model in light of his interest in the anima and animus as made in the image of God. 76 For Augustine, mens is the highest aspect of the anima (‘quod excellit in anima, mens vocatur’ Trin. XV.7.11) and has a threefold nature: 77

Haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas, quoniam non sunt tres uitae sed una uita, nec tres mentes sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt sed una substantia. Memoria quippe quod uita et mens et substantia dicitur ad se ipsam dicitur, quod uero memoria dicitur ad aliquid relatiue dicitur. (Trin. X.II.18) 78

Since, for Augustine, this threefold nature reflects the Holy Trinity, the role of self-understanding and understanding of the soul through introspection becomes a central element of his view of intellectual and moral improvement – as we will have the opportunity to explore at greater length in reference to the Old English translation of Augustine’s Soliloquies in Chapter Eight. The centrality of the spiritual soul in Augustine’s thought does not, however, lead him to identify the self exclusively with the anima. Rather, his psychology, sensitive to the many varied dimensions of human experience, allows him to conclude that the human being is a ‘rational substance consisting of soul and body’ (Trin. XV.7.11). Nevertheless, the involvement of the soul in all aspects of human experience and its central role in volition and conscious assent facilitates a view in which the soul, rather than the body, assumes primary moral responsibility. 79 In this stance, Augustine appears to differ from another thinker whose influence is widely apparent in Anglo-Saxon culture, Gregory the Great (ca. 540-604).

As Carole Straw has demonstrated. Pope Gregory’s view of the status and roles of soul and body in human agency takes on a different form than that of St. Augustine:

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76 As Gerard O’Daly illustrates. Augustine incorporated the Platonic and Aristotelian models as well as his own tripartite model of the mens, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London, 1987), pp. 12-6.

77 For a discussion of Augustine’s other threefold analyses of the mens, see Mary Clark, ‘De Trinitate’, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, pp. 91-102.


79 Roland Teske, ‘Augustine’s Theory of Soul’, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, pp. 116- 132; Rist has shown how deeply Augustine’s psychological analysis of memory, will and understanding is embedded in Stote psychological accounts of assent, in ‘Faith and Reason’, pp. 32-5; see also Part Three.
While Augustine carefully separated body and soul, affirming the goodness of the body and locating sin in the will of the soul, Gregory tends to view sin as arising from the conflict of soul and body. But by setting spirituality in opposition to the body, Gregory causally links them.  

The implications which this position has for Gregory's psychology of sin is of particular interest here, since it greatly influenced the psychological ideas of the Old English poet Cynewulf, as I shall discuss in Chapter Five. Gregory's development of biblical imagery of spiritual warfare in metaphorical depictions of spiritual forces working in man presents a less rigorously analytical mode of exploring the inner life and the roles of body and soul in human agency and culpability than does that of St. Augustine. The broad appeal of both of these influential thinkers in Anglo-Saxon England is reflected by the wide availability of their works in numerous manuscripts, and more indirectly in the dissemination of their ideas across diverse genres of vernacular literature, in catechesis and liturgy, as well as in the works of Anglo-Latin writers such as Bede, Aldhelm and Alcuin.

Given the importance and influence of Alcuin's psychological ideas beyond Anglo-Saxon intellectual culture, his view of the *anima* and *mens* requires mention here. In his *De Ratione Animae*, Alcuin developed the Platonic model of a tripartite *anima* (*DRA* 2. 11-7) and Augustine's view of the tripartite *mens* within a dualistic anthropology, emphasising that the better, spiritual part of the human being acts as the mistress of the body (*DRA* 1, 2-10). Like Augustine, Alcuin considered knowledge of the *anima* as a central means to knowing God in that His image and likeness reside in the soul (*DRA* 3, 1-3). Alcuin also incorporated a further position, drawing on Isidore's *Differentiae* 2.29, namely that the faculties of the soul are not parts but different names for the *anima* in its various functions (*DRA* 6, 14-56). Although the issue of 'parts' or 'natures' of the *anima* became a particular concern for a number of Carolingian scholars in the ninth century, the specific theological debates fuelling such re-examination of the nature and substance of the *anima* do not appear to have been of immediate concern in Anglo-Saxon England before the pre-Benedictine Reform period in the late tenth

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81 For the availability of Augustine's and Gregory's works in Anglo-Saxon England, see Lockett, 'Corporality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons', pp. 181-2, 186.
83 *Atque secundum officium operis sui uariis nuncupatur nominibus: anima est dum uuiificat, dum contemplatur spiritus est, dum sentit sensus est, dum sapit animum est, dum intelligit mens est, dum discernit ratio est, dum convenit uoluntas est, dum recordatur memoria est. Nomi tamen haec ita diuidetur in substantia sciet in nominibus quia haec omni auna anima.* (*DRA* 6, 14-56 3).
Be this as it may, views of a tripartite soul were current in a number of vernacular texts. I shall argue in subsequent chapters that these psychological descriptions need not be interpreted as de-contextualised 'borrowings', but that in a number of cases they are fully integrated into the wider anthropological and metaphysical frameworks which are developed over the course of the works in which they appear. Thus, the foregoing survey of some of the intricacies which accompany divergent anthropological and psychological models becomes directly relevant to my examination of constructions of human identity in Old English texts themselves.

The notable developments in theological, philosophical and scientific psychologies which occur from medieval Scholasticism onwards naturally fall beyond the scope of this inquiry. Suffice it to say that the tension between soul and body in the Western intellectual tradition persists in many transmuted forms, whether in a mind-body dualism, in more recent reactions against an extreme dualism of a self which is essentially separate from the body, or in reactions against forms of materialism. These ideological developments, as touched on at the outset of this discussion, need to be borne in mind when considering Anglo-Saxon ideas about human nature and human workings. On the one hand, our view of the soul as an essentially spiritual (perhaps esoteric) entity needs to become more flexible, as does our view of the non-corporeal mind as an aspect of the soul or as an abstracted thinking entity. On the other hand, the great variability of thought about human nature and selfhood in the Western tradition suggests that an approach to anthropological and psychological models greatly benefits from a consideration of the wider (often metaphysical) contexts into which they are inscribed. As I shall argue in Parts Two and Three, precisely such contexts are explored in a number of vernacular texts. Whilst I do not suggest that we find an explicit concern with materialism or dualism in the extant Old English corpus, I do suggest that the concerns inherent in certain ways of thinking about man are directly relevant to the Old English adoption of a dualistic Christian anthropology. This interaction of traditions relevant to conceptions of self and identity is the subject of the next two chapters.

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Chapter Two
Approaching the Inner Self in Old English Literature

As this chapter illustrates, the extant vernacular literature of the Anglo-Saxons bears witness to a profound and widespread interest in the inner domain of human experience. This apparently long-standing interest – embedded both in the language itself and in Old English literary traditions – can be seen in the great variety of terms relating to inner faculties and processes, and in the diversity of recurring formulas, expressions and metaphors depicting the inner life. Since definition of the individual terms is greatly debated amongst Anglo-Saxonists, the present discussion introduces the relevant Old English vocabulary in reference to the various scholarly approaches and interpretations.

The possibilities for scholarly disagreement are vast in an abstract field of study such as the present one. Nevertheless, there are of course certain fundamental concerns which underlie the various successive waves of methodological stances and interpretations. Even if scholars often emphasise the discontinuity of their research with previous work, all research in this field essentially builds upon preceding scholarship (whether on its perceived failures or in its emerging gaps). Accordingly, a survey of scholarship in this field will provide a comprehensive overview of the many relevant issues at stake, whether linguistic, literary or ideological. Although my own approach focuses less on isolated lexical features than on the philosophical implications of psychological ideas and their expression, the painstaking research and findings of, for example, those linguistic and etymological studies which have recently been rejected in favour of cognitive psychological and anthropological approaches require full acknowledgement here. The following discussion surveys the various scholarly methodologies and findings, first in relation to the ‘inner aspects’ as ‘psychological entities’ (referred to variously as ‘soul’ or ‘mind’) and subsequently in relation to the ‘inner self’ as the core of individual and human identity.
2.1 The Inner Aspects as Psychological Entities: Mind, Heart and Soul

The notable interest of Anglo-Saxon writers in the inner life is illustrated by the great range and volume of Old English vocabulary relating to inner faculties, processes and activities. The following list is by no means exhaustive, but it does provide a representative slice of the relevant nouns (excluding compounds) along with their standard definitions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner faculty / capacity (*predominantly poetic words)</th>
<th>Standard dictionary definitions</th>
<th>Occurrences in poetry</th>
<th>Occurrences in prose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mod</td>
<td>heart, mind, soul, spirit, mood, pride, courage</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hyge</td>
<td>thought, intention, mind, heart, disposition, spirit, courage</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ferō*</td>
<td>Spirit[edness], heart, mind, soul, intellect, life</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sefa*</td>
<td>heart, mind, soul, thought, understanding, sensation</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gemynd</td>
<td>memory, soul, thought, mind</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in)gebōne</td>
<td>thought, intention, mind, determination</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in)gehygd</td>
<td>thought, intention, purpose, mind</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>gescead</td>
<td>reason, thought, understanding, discrimination</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawul</td>
<td>soul</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gæst</td>
<td>spirit, soul</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>andgēt</td>
<td>understanding, sensation, perception, intellect</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the definitions in column two suggest, the modern translator is largely dependent on his own instincts and tastes in interpreting a given passage. The following excerpt from the Battle of Maldon reflects the significant scope for variable readings and translations (emphasis added):

\[Hige sceal pe heardra, \quad heorte pe cenre, \quad mod sceal pe mare, \quad pe ure mægen lytel.\]

\[Thought must be the harder, heart the keener, \quad Spirit shall be more - as our might lessens.\]

\[Our hearts must grow resolute, our courage more valiant, our spirits must be greater, though our strength grows less.\]

Along with the other terms listed in the first column of Table 1 above, the italicised nouns in this passage appear to be extremely amenable to diverse textual contexts. Unless we see the differences between heart and mind, mind and thought or mind and

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1 The statistics used in this table are derived from online word-searches in The Dictionary of Old English Corpus in Electronic Form, ed. Antonette diPaulo Healey, systems analyst Xin Xiang (Ann Arbor, 1998); (http:quad.lib.umich.edu). I have attempted to include all spelling variations in these searches to represent the relative frequencies of occurrence.


soul as important for Anglo-Saxon conceptions of psychological workings, the apparent elusiveness of these terms may be passed over with relatively little frustration. For a host of scholars, however, precisely this versatility and elusiveness has been the cause of significant interest (as well as frustration). The notable discontinuity between our vocabulary and that of the Anglo-Saxons is clearly a significant obstacle to our understanding of the underlying concepts and their spheres of application. Of the terms listed above, not a single one has survived into modern English without having undergone a substantial change of meaning. Indeed the predominantly poetic terms (column 1*) had essentially ‘died out’ by the end of the Middle English period.

Scholarly approaches to these terms have accordingly taken a variety of forms.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, interest in Anglo-Saxon psychology was focused primarily on the definition of individual words, most often in reference to their etymological histories. Although the value of etymological study for our understanding of the Old English terms has increasingly come into question, etymological findings provide a helpful overview of the semantic variability of certain lexemes across the Germanic languages and I shall occasionally draw on the relevant findings of such studies in reference to the semantic (in particular the semasiological) development of a number of terms. The ultimate inadequacy of linguistic research into individual words when abstracted from textual context and literary norms of application (such as poetic variation), however, has increasingly come to the fore.

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8 A comprehensive list of all word-studies written before 1979 is provided by Angus Cameron, Alison Kingsmill and Ashley Crandell Amos, Old English Word Studies: A Preliminary Author and Word Index (Toronto, 1983).

9 By semasiological developments, I mean the apparent development of an abstract sense from an essentially concrete meaning, specifically in nouns or verbs which indicate an abstract inner faculty or process by means of a concrete noun or verb. Samuel Kroesch presents a fascinating list of such terms in ‘The Semasiological Development of Words for ‘perceive’ etc. in the Older Germanic Dialects’, Modern Philology 8.4 (1918): 461-510. The contextualisation of terms when surveying semantic patterning must, however, remain paramount, particularly since the supposition of semasiological developments raises questions about the metaphorical application of certain terms and expressions.
Many of the early etymological word-studies can be seen in the context of a more general interest in a putative ancestral heritage, as reflected in anthropological studies of the time. An entire host of (often conflicting) interpretations proposed conceptual patterns for (Proto-)Germanic or broader Indo-European anthropologies and psychologies, as well as entire systems of thought about human nature based on the analysis of individual words across the Germanic languages. Anthropological theories of animism were particularly popular in the 1930s and influenced studies such as Elisabeth Meyer’s investigation into the semantic history and development of Gmc. *moda. Meyer concluded that the meanings of the cognates in the extant Germanic languages which derived from Gmc. moda, namely ‘pride’, ‘anger’ and ‘courage’ (only peripheral meanings of OE mod), developed from ancient ideas about a supernatural and magical power or force (‘Kraft’) akin to an animistic mana principle. The idea that ‘primitive’ cultures often explained human behaviour in terms of supernatural and irregular principles working in man, and that the influence of Christian thought contributed to the conceptual internalisation of such impulses in theories about the...

10 Anthropological interest in universal patterns of ‘primitive’ thought and of the development from ‘shamanistic’ and ‘animistic’ to philosophical and later scientific thought produced numerous epic works narrating the history of developing thought about the ‘soul’, such as Kurt Breysig, Die Geschichte der Seele im Werdegang der Menschheit (Berlin, 1931). The influence of this trend on literary research can already be seen in the monumental works of Richard Broxton Onians, The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate (Salem, 1951 repr. 1987) and Bruno Snell’s Die Entdeckung des Geistes: Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen (Hamburg, 1946). More recently, Richard North has adapted Snell’s approach to Anglo-Saxon and Old Norse ideas about the human being, Pagan Words and Christian Meanings, Costerus n.s. 81 (Amsterdam, 1991).

11 Helmut Benning’s conclusions to his study of feorh (life, spirit) and the etymologically related ferð (spirit, mind, heart) deserves full citation here as one of the more daring attempts to base an entire system of thought on the etymological history of one or two lexemes: ‘Der ferð-‘gebende’ Gott (ae. feorghigeof) ist ursprünglich das mit dem Baum als Kosmos [got. fairhvus, (ae. feorh, an. flor, as., ahd. fer(ah) usw. “Leben, Blut”, (ae. feorh “Heil”) identifizierte Urwesen, welches als Weltsache und geistiges Prinzip (ae. feorh, as., ahd. fer(ah) “Seele, Geist”), als göttlicher Urahn und Hüter aller Menschen [se. firas, an. firar usw.; ...got. fairhvus und manas “Menschheit”...], als Stammvater aller Lebewesen, die mikrokosmisch das große wachstümliche Ganze “wiederholen” (ae. feorh “Leib, Körper, Mensch, Tier”, an. florr “Mann”...), in allem, was da lebt, gegenwärtig ist, allen Wesen für die Dauer ihres Daseins die nötige feorh-“Nahrung” (ae. feorhneru) sichert, die Menschen “im Heil erhält” (Gu 397). … Der Grüne ist nicht nur Ursprung, sondern auch Ziel allen Lebens...’. [The life-giving God is originally that primal being which is identified with the tree as cosmos, which – as world soul and spiritual principle, as divine ancestor and protector of all men, as progenitor of all creatures who microcosmically repeat the larger, organically growing whole – is present in all that lives, and secures for all creatures for the duration of their existence the necessary life-nourishment, which maintains human beings in salvation. … The Green One is not only the origin, but also the destination of all life...‘]. ‘Welt’ und ‘Mensch’ in der Allengässichen Dichtung: Bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Germanisch-Allengässischen Wortschatz, Beiträge zur Englischen Philologie 44 (Bochum, 1961). Single word-studies of course continue to be written, such as John Highfield, ‘Mod’ in Old English ‘Secular’ Poetry: An Indicator of Aristocratic Class’, Bulletin of John Rylands University Library of Manchester (1996): 79-92.


13 Broadly speaking, mana was interpreted to explain human behaviour in terms of supernatural and irregular principles working in man. ibid., pp. 26, 34, 39-45, 65.
emotions is certainly not particular to Meyer’s analysis. More recently, however, the apparent representations of emotions as externally originating forces and even of inner faculties as potentially ‘wayward’ or ‘unruly’ entities in Old English literature have been interpreted in ways which are more sensitive to cultural variability. Nevertheless, anthropological models have remained an important feature in the diverse analyses of Anglo-Saxon psychological ideas.

From the sixties onwards a ‘multiple-soul’ theory seems to have been particularly popular and left its trace in more recent research into Anglo-Saxon psychology. In his article ‘Toward an Archaic Germanic Psychology’, for example, Stephen Flowers collated the findings of various word studies in order to propose a common ancestral ‘polypsychic conception’ of man in terms of an ‘embodied soul’, a ‘disembodied soul’ and a ‘separable soul’. The theory of multiple souls, however, seems to me to have little substance beyond its classification of varying domains of experience as distinct ‘souls’. Indeed increasing exclusion of the term ‘soul’ across the social sciences appears to characterise a wider scholarly move away from universalist soul-theories and towards a focus on cultural relativism. In Anglo-Saxon studies this focus has been accompanied by increasing attention to the specific linguistic and literary contexts in which the individual terms appear.

In linguistic scholarship, Hans Eggers’ and Gertraud Becker’s studies of the Old Saxon Heliand poem, reflect the earliest trend of considering the syntactic spheres of

15 In contrast with Latin Christian forms of demonology, a more native poetic tendency to describe the inner aspects as uncontrollable forces working upon and within man has been considered by scholars such as Malcolm Godden, ‘Anglo-Saxons on the Mind’, Learning and Literature in Anglo-Saxon-England: Studies Presented to Peter Clemoes, ed. Michael Lapidge and Helmut Gneuss (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 271-98; Antonina Harbus, ‘The Medieval Concept of the Self’, pp. 77-97, as discussed in 2.2 below.
16 The anthropological approach to multiple-soul beliefs on a universal scale is reflected, for example, in Hans-Peter Hasenfratz, Die Seele: Einführung in ein religiöses Grundphänomen (Zürich, 1986).
application of the relevant terms and of accounting for their apparent closeness of meaning in reference to historical and contextual developments. In Anglo-Saxon studies itself, a number of doctoral theses in the seventies and eighties analysed Old English words denoting various aspects of the human being in terms of distinct semantic groups and attempted to delineate syntactic, syntagmatic and collocational spheres of the individual terms within such groups (or semantic fields) in order to define clear semantic parameters. The immediate difficulty with such word studies lies in the sheer number of instances of the relevant words (Table 1, p. 39 above) and the accompanying difficulty of synthesising the bulky lexical data in a way which accounts for chronological, genre-specific and ideological influences, as well as for textual and ideological contexts. In 1979, for example, Margrit Soland addressed Old English words for body and soul in the poetic corpus by contrasting their occurrences in Beowulf with their occurrences in a selected poetic Kontrastkorpus. Soland's attempts to find fixed definitions, such as a 'spiritual gast and sawul', and a hreder and breost which are the loci of an 'emotive mod', a 'feeling and thinking hyge' and a 'deliberative sefa', are not, however, representative of the wider application of the relevant terms across the extant corpus.

Michael Phillips' more comprehensive selection of terms and texts (1986), in contrast, appreciated the significant overlap in emotional and cognitive activities associated with all of the inner faculties. Although his analysis of 'mind-', 'soul-' and 'body-words' across the entire extant Old English corpus neglected wider textual and literary contexts, it established four distinct sub-categories within this semantic field, namely 'body part terms' (breost, hreder, heorte) which are applied metonymically, 'non-transcendent soul-terms' (mod, hyge, fero, sefa), 'transcendent soul-terms' (gast, sawul), and 'life terms' (feorh, lif). Despite a number of extremely harsh criticisms which have been levelled against Phillip's 'oversimplistic view of the vocabulary', his four-fold categorisation of the semantic group is generally accepted and has been

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20 Margrit Soland, Althochdeutsche Ausdrücke für "Leib" und "Seele": eine semantische Analyse (Zürich, 1979). Her choice of samples itself suggests an expectation of finding a differentiation between 'heroic' and 'Christian' applications of these terms in poetry (a differentiation which was not found).
21 Ibid., p. 120.
independently corroborated by more comprehensive research which takes ideological and linguistic contexts into consideration.\textsuperscript{23} In particular, Phillips' semantic distinction between 'transcendent soul terms' on the one hand and 'non-transcendent soul terms' on the other is widely supported in reference to the distinct spheres of application of the relevant terms throughout the extant literature.

The majority of studies broadly agree that terms such as sawul and gast appear to have taken on a deeply Christian sense by the time they are recorded in Old English texts.\textsuperscript{24} As we shall see in Chapter Three, these terms occur primarily in contexts of the parting of soul and body (lic, flesc) at death, or in contexts of the afterlife. Their application across the corpus suggests a dualistic conception of the human being as well as a belief in the immortal nature of the sawul and gast. When sawul and gast do occur in contexts of composite human life, they are primarily presented as treasured possessions or, less often, in relation to moral and spiritual concerns.\textsuperscript{25} As Phillips' label 'non-transcendent soul terms' suggests, terms such as mod, hyge, ferd and seta are in contrast almost never associated with the post-corporeal life.\textsuperscript{26} Unlike the sawul and gast, they are associated with the full spectrum of agentive and psychological functions which we tend to label as emotion, thought and volition. Two features are particularly striking for present purposes. First, terms such as mod cannot be differentiated from each other semantically in terms of emotional, cognitive or other distinct capacities - they appear as agencies and loci of all psychological activities and experiences. Second, the mod and its variants are hardly ever linked with the sawul and gast in a way which suggests that they are conceived as inherent aspects or constituent parts of the sawul or


\textsuperscript{24} I am concerned here with perceived patterns of application which have been independently corroborated by numerous studies. Thus rather than providing repetitive lists of occurrences here, I refer to the examples listed in Phillips, 'Heart, Mind, Soul'; see also Low, 'The Anglo-Saxon Mind', pp. 2-19; Lockett, 'Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons', pp. 21-40. I shall cite and discuss the most relevant instances in more detail in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{25} Lockett suggests a number of instances in which the soul experiences joy in the afterlife, but these do not fully suggest personal characteristics of the soul, see 'Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons', p. 38. The most notable instances in which psychological characteristics are attributed to the soul during life occur in the prose of King Alfred and Ulfric, Abbot of Fynsham, see Chapters Three, Seven and Eight.

\textsuperscript{26} I discuss the explicit exceptions in Part Two.
gast, as in Latin Christian psychological models.\textsuperscript{27} Whilst these broad features are useful and widely accepted rules of thumb in approaching Old English ideas about the inner life, the evidence gained from syntactical and collocational patterns must be considered in reference to contextual literary and ideological factors which significantly affect the application of the relevant terms.

In light of the failure of scholars to find stable definitions for the individual 'non-transcendent soul terms' (also referred to as 'mind words') on a purely linguistic basis, the vast majority of recent studies have accounted for the apparent semantic fluidity of these terms in reference to poetic modes of expression and, increasingly, in reference to ideological contexts. The most important factor here has been the identification of two distinct traditions within the extant Old English corpus: one, a traditional 'native' or 'common sense' psychology which is embedded in poetic narrative, and two, a more theologically (and philosophically) informed tradition which characterises later prose writings under the strong influence of Latin Christian intellectual anthropology and psychology. It is accordingly necessary to look at the relevant critical interpretations more closely.

The distinctive vocabulary and formulaic nature of Old English poetry has long been associated with putative ideas believed to be deeply embedded in a long-standing oral tradition of thought and expression.\textsuperscript{28} The first scholar to apply himself in detail to differences in conception, diction and expression of psychological and anthropological ideas in Anglo-Saxon poetry and prose respectively, appears to have been Richard Woesler.\textsuperscript{29} His diachronic account of Old and Middle English conceptions of man identified the beginnings of an ideological change in King Alfred's introduction of a 'new' vocabulary into the Old English language in the ninth century.\textsuperscript{30} Woesler thus accounted for the differences between Anglo-Saxon ideas about man in poetry (viewed

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\textsuperscript{27} I consider the exceptions in Chapters Three, Seven and Eight.

\textsuperscript{28} Precisely this interest is reflected in the intense early scholarly focus on a traditional or ancestral 'Germanic heritage'.

\textsuperscript{29} Woesler, 'Das Bild des Menschen', pp. 83-97.

\textsuperscript{30} Woesler argues that early Anglo-Saxons saw the human being as a unity of 'body' and 'mind' (Gest) and accordingly saw intellectual processes in terms of a 'Sinn-Verstand Einheit' as expressed by gewit, 'the practical and intellectual skill' of man. He holds that the further conceptual unity of thought, emotion and volition encompassed by the mod gradually fragmented into distinct faculties under the influence of Christianity and that the inability of mod to adapt to this new picture of human nature led to its eventual disappearance within which munde superseded mod, and revum superseded gewit and craft (skill) in prominence, ibid., pp. 328, 325.
as 'untouched by Christianity') and the imported Christian ideas expressed in the prose tradition (with its 'new' vocabulary) in terms of a chronological development from pagan to Christian thought. As is now widely acknowledged, however, much of the extant poetry is itself fundamentally Christian and whilst the poetic tradition no doubt contains archaic expressions, vocabulary and formulas which appear to hark back to pre-Christian traditions, the ideological integration of the Christian faith is an essential element of distinctively native thought.

Exclusive focus on a pre-Christian 'native' (superseding the previous focus on a 'Germanic') heritage in Old English poetry has been increasingly challenged by a trend which asserts the influence of Latin Christian literary conventions and rhetorical techniques in Old English poetry as well as in prose. A particularly apt example of how these contrasting positions can affect our interpretation of Anglo-Saxon psychology can be seen in the varying responses to the following lines from The Seafarer:

Forþon nu min hyge hweorfeð ofer hreþelocan, mid mereþelode hweorfeð wide, cymeð eft to me gielleð anfloga, hreþer unwearnum ofer holma gelagu.

Therefore, now, my 'soul / mind' turns beyond its breast-chamber, my 'soul / mind' roams far with the sea-flood over the whale's home [and] comes back to me eager and greedy across the earth's surfaces; the lone-flyer cries, urges the unresisting breast over the waves of the sea.

Vivian Salmon, Neil Hultin and Marijane Osborn represent the view that widespread popular and 'non-Christian' concepts of an 'external' or 'wandering soul' underlie the roaming hyge of the Seafarer.\(^{31}\) Paul Orton and Peter Clemoes, in contrast, illustrated the prevalence of the metaphor of a 'wandering mind' for imaginative and contemplative processes in Latin Christian traditions and suggested this essentially Christian imagery as the dominant sense and inspiration in the Old English passages.\(^{32}\) These varying opinions illustrate the significant difficulties we face in translating the relevant Old English terms as soul or mind and thus imposing specific connotations which are deeply embedded in wider systems of belief (whether as anthropological

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universals or specific Latin Christian psychologies). Clearly, the interaction of culturally specific ‘native’ and ‘Latin Christian’ ideas and modes of expression across the Old English corpus remains a vital consideration when examining apparently divergent traditions and their chronology in Anglo-Saxon England. 33

The most influential study in this field is Malcolm Godden’s article ‘Anglo-Saxons on the Mind’ (1980), which re-articulated the nature of ‘two distinct traditions of thought about the mind’ in reference to both literary and ideological heritages: 34

There is, first of all, a classical tradition represented by Alcuin of York (writing in Latin and on the continent, but influential for Anglo-Saxon vernacular writers), King Alfred and Ælfric of Eynsham, who were consciously working in a line which went back through late antique writers such as St Augustine and Boethius to Plato, but developed that tradition in interesting and individual ways. In particular they show the gradual development of a unitary concept of the inner self, identifying the intellectual mind with the immortal soul and life-spirit. Secondly, there is a vernacular tradition more deeply rooted in the language, represented particularly by the poets but occasionally reflected even in the work of Alfred and Ælfric. It was a tradition which preserved the ancient distinction of soul and mind, while associating the mind at least as much with passion as with intellect. 35

Godden articulated a number of fundamental issues which have come to dominate research in this area. His identification of the sawul as a ‘spiritual soul’ and of the mod. hyge, ferd and sefu as interchangeable variants for the ‘emotional and intellectual mind’ has been pivotal to the ways in which subsequent Anglo-Saxonists apply the terms ‘soul’ and ‘mind’. Godden’s acceptance of the relative synonymity of the ‘mind-words’ in reference to the poetic tradition of variation is now overwhelmingly accepted, and his clear delineation of this ‘mind’ from the ‘spiritual soul’ essentially established the ‘mind’ as a distinct area of inquiry. Godden’s consideration of the important relations between modes of thought and modes of expression in his treatment of two distinct traditions of the mind in Old English literature, moreover, has become a pivotal concern in subsequent studies in the field. 36

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35 ibid., p. 127.
36 Antonina Harbus’ book-length study of the various manifestations of a native conception of ‘mind’ across the poetic genres is the most comprehensive study of its kind to date. The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry, Costerus n.s. 143 (Amsterdam, 2002).
Amongst the many studies which have explored a specifically 'native' conception of the mind in diverse poems and genres, a recent critical trend stands out in particular. This is reflected by a group of unpublished theses which have rejected previous attempts to delineate distinct meaning-spheres of the individual mind-words and have focused instead on the relation between modes of thought and literary expression in the divergent traditions of the extant corpus. Soon Ai Low, for example, reformulated Godden's division between a poetic native tradition and a classically informed prose tradition in terms of a distinction between a narrative, 'common sense' or 'folk psychology' and 'scientific' or 'theological psychology' concerned with didactic instruction and exposition.\textsuperscript{37} In reference to this distinction, Low proposed that the semantic fluidity of the mind-words not only arises from the poetic convention of variation, but that it also reflects a distinctly non-analytical way of conceptualising the mind and its workings.\textsuperscript{38} Drawing on recent anthropological research and in particular on developments in cognitive psychology and cognitive linguistics, she focused on certain conceptual metaphors, such as 'up-down', 'in-out' and 'mind-as-container'. Low's interest in different metaphorical models of the mind in Old English literature and her emphasis on metaphorical modes of expression is also reflected in a number of other theses which have treated diverse aspects of metaphorical representation of the mind more comprehensively.

In 1980, Michael Matto highlighted the versatile functions and the central importance of metaphorical expression in literary accounts of psychological workings in Old English literature, primarily in reference to the linguistic operations of metaphors of the mind in general.\textsuperscript{39} Paula Warrington, in turn, focused on the importance of the 'mind-as-container model', which characterises the mind as a treasure trove or storage box containing thoughts and emotions, and which can be analysed in terms of an 'input -- storage -- output' schema reflecting the various stages of 'perception and sensation -- memory and contemplation -- speech and action'.\textsuperscript{40} Her focus on the role of memory in

\textsuperscript{18} ibid, p. 17. As I shall suggest in Parts Two and Three, this is certainly not always the case.
\textsuperscript{40} Paula Frances Tarrant Warrington, 'Memory and Remembering: Anglo-Saxon Literary Representations and Current Interpretations of the Phenomena Considered', PhD Diss. Leicester (2005). This model is particularly relevant to modes of self-conceptualisation, as I argue in Parts Two and Three.
the processes of cognition and in the development of character illustrates the ways in which the in-box / out-box metaphor is amenable to poetic articulations of inner processes as well as to more complex explorations of psychological workings in analytical prose texts. Although Warrington does not expand on the ramifications which an Augustinian articulation of memory can have in Old English accounts, her model, as I suggest in Chapters Seven and Eight, is certainly operative in texts such as the Old English Consolation and Soliloquies and significantly informs their characterisation of personal identity.

In 2004, Leslie Lockett focused on the currency of an anthropological ‘hydraulic model of the mind’, in which the mind and its emotional or mental processes are conceived in terms of physically imagined swellings and contractions. Drawing on divergent analogues from pre-socratic, Christian and early medieval thought, Lockett challenged ‘the general scholarly acceptance that the mind was metaphorically represented as a physical entity and therefore as an immaterial aspect of the spiritual and immortal soul’. Whilst her conclusions about the chronology of a shift from a materialistic view of the mind to a metaphorical conception of the mind by the year 1000 perhaps leave themselves open to objections, Lockett’s suggestions are based on a detailed study of intellectual contexts and possible ideological interactions. Most relevant for present purposes, her interest in the relation between mind and soul and her reformulation of the status of the mind within a dual human nature is a vital consideration which had previously been largely neglected. In light of the presence of a dualistic schema of human nature in Anglo-Saxon writings (explored more fully in my next chapter), the dominant critical convention has been to interpret the *mod. ferð, hyge* and *sefja* in the non-corporeal (though not immortal or eternal) realm, whether as a spiritual or wandering soul or as an imagining mind. In reconsidering the metaphorical nature of descriptions of the relevant words in spatial or material terms, Lockett thus challenged their perceived non-corporeal status and established a debate which is not easily resolved in the absence of explicit statements on the issue in the wider corpus itself.

42 ibid., p. 2.
43 Lockett outlines the debate, ibid., pp. 1-5.
Given our inability to define, classify or indeed fully understand the relevant terms and their underlying concepts within an early medieval Christian dualistic schema of matter and spirit, I shall reconsider the position and status of these soul- or mind-words within human nature in reference to their status as inner agencies. Terms such as mod, sefa, hyge and ferð are unambiguously located 'within' the chest (see Chapter Three) and precisely this localisation gives rise to the metonymic use of terms such as chest and breast (hreðer) or heart (heorte) to explain cognitive, emotional and volitional processes and activities. Given the elusive issue of whether the 'mind' or 'non-transcendent soul' terms were actually conceived physically or metaphorically, I avoid the over-employed terms soul and mind, and refer, more simply, to 'inner aspects', as potentially distinct from the soul and spirit (sæwl and gæst). Besides the inadequacies of the term 'soul' already outlined, the prevalent term 'mind' itself involves numerous difficulties. In many ways, the use of the term 'mind' to designate an entity which reflects the mental and emotional centre of the human being requires a whole-scale redefinition of the ways in which we tend to employ the term, as is evident in the countless qualifying definitions accompanying diverse critical interpretations. We increasingly employ 'mind' as representative of the mental and cognitive realm as opposed to the emotional domain – two distinct spheres which encapsulate the 'head-heart' polarity that characterises our own popular way of thinking about our workings in the Western tradition. In view of the general scholar shift from 'soul' to 'mind' across the disciplines, it may therefore also be worth considering whether our increasing association of 'mind' with 'brain' in conceptualising ourselves is not somewhat obstructive when considering a group of words which are so clearly associated with the entire spectrum of psychological workings, impulses and activities. My ultimate reason for avoiding both 'soul' and 'mind' as umbrella terms within this study, however, arises from my interest in the function which the inner aspects – as the loci of experience and the principles of action – carry for human and personal identity. The next part of this chapter accordingly considers the notion of an inner self.

11 It is of course not practical to translate Old English passages by inserting 'inner self' whenever the occasion arises. My use of this label is primarily methodological and when translating the inner aspect words, I shall employ 'heart' when it appears in an 'emotional' context and 'mind' when it appears in the context of cognition or thought. However different Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the inner self may be, such compromise is of course necessary when translating foreign concepts into our own familiar terms. Since, however, mod is the most frequent term under discussion in this thesis, I generally leave it untranslated to highlight the points I shall be making.
2.2 The ‘Inner Self’ as the Core of Individual and Human Identity

As already noted in Chapter One, relatively few studies have considered the relationship between Anglo-Saxon psychology and Anglo-Saxon conceptions of human and personal identity. Terms such as inner self, mind and soul are frequently applied quite interchangeably and somewhat indiscriminately, which doubtless intensifies the difficulties of appreciating the subtleties involved in this area of discourse. Godden, it would appear, was the first to articulate the issue in a way that raises a number of fundamental questions about Anglo-Saxon conceptions of selfhood:

The poets, perhaps here reflecting tendencies in normal Anglo-Saxon usage, are more inclined to associate the ‘mind’ with emotion and a kind of passionate volition and self-assertion, and to distinguish it from the conscious self. It seems to be closely associated with mood and individual personality, a kind of mixture of id and ego in opposition to a super-ego. The poets generally distinguish it from the soul or spirit which leaves the body in death.

If there is a distinction between the conscious self as super-ego and the mind as id-ego complex, are we to infer that the drives which make up individual personality are dislocated from the conscious self? Are the two conflicting modes of volition (the passionate and the conscious) indicative of two distinct types of agency within the human person and if so, what implications does this have for identity?

Antonina Harbus has picked up on some of these questions in her article ‘The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England’. Since it is the first comprehensive account of its kind, I will deal with it in some detail. Proceeding from the premise that ‘the I, the self, is distinct from the soul, the body and the thinking mind’, Harbus focuses on a perceived split between self and mind in the poetic tradition and characterises the relation between these two ‘distinct entities’ as a ‘bipartisan combative’ one:

The two [self and mind] are constructed as mutually dependent, controlling, and potentially wayward constituents of the human person, a model of subjective existence which presupposes a primarily cognitive quality to the ego.

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45 On this note, I must object to the somewhat careless use of adjectives such as ‘mental’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘cerebral’ as variant terms describing the ‘life of the mind’. ‘Cerebral’, I would argue, has very little place in a discussion of Anglo-Saxon thought about psychological workings, given the virtual absence of brain-related statements in the texts themselves. In cases where I use such adjectives, I shall define these as they arise.


48 ibid., pp. 85, 84.
It would appear that by ‘ego’. Harbus is here referring to Godden’s ‘super-ego’ or ‘conscious self’. re-defined as the ‘self’ per se: a ‘self-conscious’ and ‘self-monitoring’ entity, the ‘ultimate root of moral authority’ which appears to have had a ‘need … to exercise some sort of control over the mind’. Harbus thus retains Godden’s ‘sense of multiple personalities’, suggesting that the mind stands to the self as a ‘sub-conscious self’ stands to the ‘conscious self’, but nevertheless insists that ‘the mind, not a separate self or selves, is construed in the medieval model of separate identities’. Like Godden, Harbus proposes an internal split between mind and self on the basis of a ‘wayward’ and ‘unruly’ mod as expressed in poems such as the Wanderer and Seafarer, but unlike Godden, she suggests that ‘this inconvenient waywardness of mind causes a tense symbiotic power relationship of human definition’. By this, presumably, Harbus means that the ‘split self’ or ‘self-mind-split’ characterises conscious self-definition, informed, it would appear, by the ‘aim to be in control of the agency of one’s actions’, these agencies presumably being the dislocated inner aspects. However, a number of difficulties accompany her insistence that Anglo-Saxon texts reflect ‘a local belief in the possible dislocation of mind and self … [and] the imagined ideal of their coincidence’.

Harbus’ pronounced (though somewhat ambivalent) distinction between self and mind appears to be primarily oriented towards illustrating the self-reflective and introspective nature of the texts under consideration:

Many features of the Anglo-Saxon self are typical, not of primitive or collective cultures, but of our contemporary ones. There is an awareness of the self with an interest in self-reform; a former self can be read as a text influencing the current version of the self: the self is a source of agency; and the self is a thinking, remembering entity involved in mental reorientation.

This essentially modern perspective on the self emphasises the subjective cognitive aspect of the term – indeed she defines the Anglo-Saxon self as the ‘dominant cognitive apparatus’ and defines ‘mind’ not as Godden’s ‘volitional entity’, but as a ‘distinct cognitive apparatus’. I find very little evidence in the extant corpus, however, that Old English poets conceived themselves, however divided and reflectively aware, as such

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52 ibid., p. 89.
53 ibid., p. 92.
54 ibid., pp. 92-3.
55 ibid., p. 87.
fundamentally cognitive creatures. Whilst expressions of a wayward mod which needs to be restrained, unquestionably suggest a distinct awareness of conflicting impulses perceived in subjective experience, it is not clear to me that these must be seen in light of a rather clinical abstraction of an observing self from a motivational or subconscious self or in terms of any Freudian id, ego, superego model. Certainly, Harbus' use of such schemata highlights the presence of self-reflective concerns in Old English poetry:

The implied dislocation of self and mind allows the self to situate its subjectivity outside the mind and acknowledge the desirability of self-control. The mind can be directed by the self in this schema, the ultimate moral authority.\(^{56}\)

Her approach also highlights the self-constructing tendencies of much poetry and an objective interest in the self as a developing entity. In abstracting the 'now-self' from 'past-self' and from the individual as well as from mind, soul and body, however. Harbus' definition of self becomes somewhat impractical.\(^{57}\) The function of the self for providing unity and continuity within the subject can be lost from sight in this way. To abstract the self-conscious self from the mod is to abstract the self from all of the motivations, drives and impulses (whether understood or not) which make up the individual as well as to reduce the self to a 'passive observer' which can accordingly not constitute the core of personality and identity which Harbus associates with the self. Precisely this abstraction of the observing self from the self which thinks, feels and acts remains a contested point even in contemporary philosophical debate.\(^{58}\)

As regards Harbus' articulation of a shifting power balance between self and mind, the existence of 'self-compounds', personal pronouns and various modes of expressing activities of thought with the 'I' does not appear to me sufficient grounds to propose that we are necessarily dealing with a disassociated entity. Reference to the 'I' as often as not includes the body and bodily actions as well as the psychological activities of the inner aspects, in addition to providing self-conscious and self-evaluative statements about personal experience. It appears, moreover, that Harbus' interpretation is only able to maintain the distinction between separate agencies and to account for the many instances in Old English which the 'mind' is the clear moral authority and

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\(^{56}\) Harbus, 'The Medieval Concept of the Self', p. 87.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., pp. 89-90.

\(^{58}\) Korsgaard, 'Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency', p. 171.
executive agency, by suggesting that the self consciously transfers agency to the mod. Ultimately, Harbus' statement that the 'mind shades into the self' is not conducive to the fundamental distinction which she proposes as a basic mechanism of Anglo-Saxon psychology. Her following summary highlights the difficulty of abstracting the mind from the self:

[Anglo-Saxon literature] can provide valuable insight into early medieval thoughts on the self, specifically on how this entity is conceived as separate from but ultimately dependent upon the mind and as a seat of moral authority, source of agency, and individual identity. Both mind and self in combination, it would appear here, make up the seat of moral authority, agency and identity and the self must include the mind, not only in the thinking capacity which Harbus amplifies throughout, but as the container, locus and principle of action and experience by which one can understand oneself as a distinct person and as a human being. Given Harbus' own statement that it is 'difficult to identify when the purely cognitive faculty is being distinguished from the essential entity of a person or source of agency', it may be worth quite simply asking whether the agencies were actually conceived as essentially dislocated.

The view which I hold throughout this thesis is that the inner aspects are essential elements of identity precisely because of their comprehensive agency or at least their function in explaining agency and the bases of behaviour by which one may identify and evaluate oneself. My approach to the self therefore suggests that personal identity in Anglo-Saxon thought resides precisely in what we are, what we do and what we experience. The diverse aspects of the self necessarily account for the multiplicity of drives and impulses which characterise our experience and allow us to analyse and articulate this in light of shared conceptual and linguistic norms. I do not suggest that the inner realm is the totality of the self – body and spiritual soul remain essential aspects of the self. Rather, I suggest that the inner domain provides precisely that forum which transcends the spiritual and material on a metaphorical level and on an intellectual analytical level, as Parts Two and Three of this thesis demonstrate. Before looking at specific examples from both poetry and prose, however, it is necessary first to trace the prominence and variability of the inner-outer dichotomy of human nature.

59 Harbus, 'The Medieval Concept of the Self', p. 93.
60 ibid., p. 81.
61 ibid., p. 84.
across the extant vernacular corpus and to consider the role which the inner aspects perform within the extremely variable thought about human beings as expressed in Anglo-Saxon literature.
Chapter Three
Conceptions of the Inner Self in Old English Literature

As the preceding chapters have established, this study approaches the inner self as an entity which relates to the inner bases of agency and experience by which men identify and define themselves both as individuals and as human beings. Rather than focusing solely on the representation of the inner aspects and their workings in Old English literature, this study goes beyond psychological considerations to include wider anthropological concerns. The notion of an inner domain depends on the contrast with an outer domain and when considering the status and function of the inner self in the context of the human being as a whole, this inner-outer dichotomy emerges as a useful tool for examining the apparent diversity of Anglo-Saxon ideas about man and his workings. Rather than mapping onto dichotomies of body and soul or matter and spirit, the inner-outer schema transcends such rigid dualities in a way which facilitates a more subtle approach to the complexity of human experience as a composite, sometimes internally conflicted being.

Beginning with a survey of Anglo-Saxon ideas about a dual human nature consisting of body and soul, the following discussion examines whether concepts of matter and spirit are formative in Old English articulations of human nature and human experience. I shall argue that conceptions of human and personal identity are less often expressed in terms of the duality of matter and spirit than by the examination of the inner domain whether as a meeting point of transience and transcendence, human and divine, or fallibility and potential. In this sense, the inner domain provides a forum within which the totality of self can be addressed and in which the complexity of human experience can be explored in an objective, rather than in a necessarily subjective way. These considerations allow me to examine the variety of ways in which a conceptualisation of the inner aspects as the core of agency and experience remains constant within differing accounts of a dual human nature and to highlight their centrality in Anglo-Saxon psychological and anthropological accounts.
3.1 The Ins and Outs of Human Nature in Old English Literature

As the following discussion illustrates, the dichotomy of inner and outer is a prevalent feature in Anglo-Saxon depictions of human nature and the human self. It can be seen to inform conceptions of the human constitution, as well as conceptions of the processes, activities and experiences which are thought to define human beings. Notions of inner and outer in Anglo-Saxon thought about human nature, however, cannot be mapped onto dichotomies of spirit and matter, soul and body, or mind and body. As in the wider Western tradition, Old English views of the inner realm do not necessarily refer to the immaterial soul or mind. Indeed the complex relations between the various aspects of man are notoriously difficult to decipher in terms of a matter-spirit duality in Old English accounts. The dichotomy of inner and outer, in contrast, presents a schema with relatively flexible boundaries for exploring the human constitution, its perceived workings and interrelations.

Since a dualism of the soul (sawul and l or gast) and body (lic, lichoma, flæsc etc.) is widely present in Anglo-Saxon descriptions of the human being, I shall begin by considering the distinctly Christian expressions of such a dualism before arguing that this does not necessarily present the most prominent framework for exploring human experience and human behaviour in Anglo-Saxon culture at large. Across the corpus of Old English vernacular literature, human life on earth is consistently defined by the union of body and soul. With the exception of a number of specifically intellectual and theological texts, however, the wider poetic corpus and the vast bulk of the extant prose appears relatively unconcerned with questions of matter or substance, or indeed with the nature of the soul before, during and after composite human life.

In most poetic and homiletic accounts, descriptions of death offer the most vivid depictions of corporeal transience and spiritual (gaestlice) transcendence in a literal sense. As body and soul part, or as the soul leaves the body on death, each component of man goes on to a different fate. In explicitly Christian accounts the body returns to earth or, in a homiletic vein, becomes food for the worms:
Such graphic descriptions of physicality and decay accordingly go hand in hand with notions of earthly transience rather than indicating any concrete concern with the nature of materiality and spiritual substances. There is very little evidence that notions of 'matter' or 'stuff' in the philosophical sense of Gk. *hyle* are of any concern in Anglo-Saxon thought about the *lic* and *sawul*. Whilst it has been argued that this lack of interest itself suggests a 'common sense' materialistic perspective, the lack of interest in specific substances pertains as much to body as to soul. Ideas about spiritual beings, whether spirits in general (*gasta*) or human spirits and souls (*gasta, sawla*) can hardly be seen to be informed by Platonic notions of the immaterial Forms or Ideas. At the same time, however, the notion of matter, particles or other substance-definitions are of equally little concern. It is worth bearing these points in mind when debating about the metaphorical or non-metaphorical nature of Old English descriptions of tormented and suffering souls in the afterlife or in visions of souls leaving the body.

In contrast with the body, the soul (*sawul, gast*) is conventionally described as going on to heaven or hell to receive its just reward for the deeds done in life. Whilst most poetic accounts go no further than this basic view of a departing soul, homiletic literature and a number of apocalyptic poems show a more pronounced interest in the fate of the soul after death. Homiletic previews of Judgment Day again have a particularly effective didactic purpose – embellished by an apparent fascination with the gruesome details of the sinner’s tormented soul in the afterlife. An exceptional poetic account of the post-corporeal fate of the soul, however, appears in Cynwulf’s *Elene*.

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**Juliana 413b-17a**

\[Ic ðære sawle ma\]
\[geornor gyme ymb ðæs gastes forwyrd\]
\[ðonne ðæs lichoman, se ðe on legre sceal\]
\[weordan in worulde wyrme to hroþor.\]

bifolen in foldan.

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\[I care more eagerly about the ruin of the soul, the spirit, than about the body which must become a delight for the worms in its grave in the world, condemned to the earth.\]
This picture of the threefold categorisation of souls, together with a similar account offered by Ælfric. and Alfred (discussed in Chapter Eight) provide the most detailed descriptions of purgatory that we find in the entire corpus. This point reiterates the importance of appreciating the theological sophistication of certain explicitly Christian poems when investigating anthropological ideas in Anglo-Saxon literature in terms of two distinct traditions. The most theologically explicit interest in the fate of the soul in the afterlife, however, is without question to be found in the prose tradition.

As I discuss at length in Chapter Eight, King Alfred’s Soliloquies presents one of the few accounts which consider the disposition and capabilities of individual souls in the afterlife. Later writings from the Benedictine Reform period (most notably those of Ælfric) explore not only the afterlife, but also the origin of the soul in reference to theological orthodoxies. Whilst the influence of Latin Christian theological anthropologies and psychologies are fundamental in such accounts, it is important to note that this trend is not representative of all prose. As the following example from the anonymous Vercelli Homily VIII suggests, many earlier descriptions of the Creation of man do not appear to be particularly concerned with theological precision.

Ic þe geworhte of eorþan lyme mid minum handum; ond þinum ðám eorðlicum limum ic sealde mine sawle; ond ic þe hiwode to mines sylifes antlinesesse. (Ver. Hom. VIII, 153) I made you from the clay of the earth with my hands; and into your earthly limbs I gave my soul, which I fashioned in my own likeness.

The notion that God put his own soul into man no doubt reflects some of the conceptual laxity which Ælfric later felt compelled to correct. The same may be said for Christian poems such as Christ III, which implies that God made man – rather than the soul – in his own likeness:

Of lame ic þe leopoh gesette, geafic ic þe lifgenda gast. Of clay I formed limbs for you, I gave you a living spirit. 
arode þe ofer calle gescealle, gedythe ic þet þu onson hæfdest. I honoured you above all creatures. I brought it about that you had an appearance 
mægwite me gelicene. and form resembling me. (Chr. III 1381-83a)

Ælfric, in contrast, consistently emphasises that it is the soul, not the body, which is made in God’s image and that although spiritual, the human soul is not made of God’s own nature.
Besides the clear differences in theological depth in the prose and poetic traditions, the poetic corpus and the anonymous prose homilies appear less concerned with the details of the soul before or after composite human life, than with the contrast between these two fundamental components of man. Their accounts of the origin of the *sæwul* are largely in line with Christian teaching based on *Genesis* and their interest in its afterlife (as in the case of bodily resurrection) is limited to an acceptance of its immortality. Throughout the extant corpus (both poetry and prose) the *sæwul* appears as the immortal (*ece*) and spiritual (*gæstlice*) aspect of man. Whatever the pre-Christian meaning of the OE word *sæwul* may once have been, the term appears to have assumed these essentially Christian connotations by the time it appears in our written sources.¹

Whereas poetic accounts are (perhaps for pragmatic reasons) more interested in the soul's immortality than its precise form or substance, Ælfric and Alfred again present more detailed investigations into such questions – again in reference to patristic teachings. It is particularly relevant for present purposes that the wider acknowledgement (however detailed or cursory) of the varying fates of souls in the afterlife amplifies the general view across the corpus that the spiritual soul is an essential carrier of human identity – the sole vehicle for personal continuity in earthly life and the afterlife and accordingly that entity which reaps the rewards earned during life.

As Malcolm Godden and others have illustrated, the influence of Latin Christian models of the soul (*anima*) is evident in the intellectual prose works of Ælfric and Alfred and characterises their view of psychological workings to varying degrees. In contrast with the wider corpus, these writers attribute psychological traits, capacities and attributes to the eternal and spiritual *sæwul*. The following passages present a conception of the *sæwul* as central to human identity – it is endowed with those rational, volitional and emotional capacities which determine individual character and which

define human beings in accordance with the Latin Christian intellectual tradition of the *anima*.\(^2\)

Heo is on bocum manegum naman geceyged be hyre weorces þenungum. Hyre nama is *anima*, þæt is sawul, and seo nama geliȝpt to hire life; and *spiritus*, gast, belimþ to hire ymbwlatunge. Heo is *sensus*, þæt is andgit oðde felhnyss. ponne heo geftet. Heo is *anima*, þæt is mod, ponne heo wat. Heo is *mens*, þæt is, eac mod, ponne heo understandt. Heo is *memoria*, þæt is, gemund, ponne heo imynæd. Heo is *ratio*, þæt is, gescead, ponne heo tosoccat. Heo is *voluntas*, þæt is willæ. ponne heo hwæt wyle. Ac swa þeah ealle þas naman syndon sawul; ælc sawul is gast ac swa þeah nis na ælc gast sawul.\(^3\)

Ælfric here adapts the OE vocabulary accordingly, equating the various functions of the soul with a number of OE faculties which are otherwise never associated directly with the *sawul*. Whereas Ælfric appears to develop this model in light of Carolingian ideas about the simple nature of the *anima* (1.2 above). Alfred’s passage draws upon the quasi-Platonic description of the tripartite soul which Godden has identified in the Latin accounts of Alcuin, Tertullian and other thinkers whose works were available in Anglo-Saxon England.\(^4\)

In books it [the soul] has different names according to the function it fulfils. It is called *anima*, that is, soul, and the name refers to its life; and *spiritus*, [that is] spirit, belongs to its [power of] contemplation. It is *sensus*, that is understanding or sensation, when it perceives. It is *anima*, that is *mod*, when it knows. It is *mens*, that is also *mod*, when it understands. It is *memoria*, that is memory, when it remembers. It is *ratio*, that is reason, when it reasons. It is *voluntas*, that is will, when it desires anything. But all these names constitute a single soul: every soul is a spirit, but not every spirit is a soul.

But man alone has reason, not any other creature because he has surpassed all other earthly creatures with ‘thought’ and with ‘perception / understanding’. Therefore reason must rule both over will and over anger because it is the most special power of the soul.

In Chapter Seven I illustrate that this model is not the dominant psychological model in Alfred’s *Consolation* as a whole – indeed this model appears somewhat divorced from the wider context of descriptions in the prose *Consolation* as well as from that of the *Meters* in which it occurs. The central observation I would make here, however, is that in these passages both Ælfric and Alfred draw upon specific and relatively unfamiliar terms such as *gescead* (reason) and *yrre* (anger) as dominant psychological categories which are seldom presented as central

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\(^2\) As discussed in 1.2 above.


\(^4\) Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*; Sedgefield 1899 7-149 King Alfred’s Old English Version of Boethius’ *De consolatione philosophiae* (Oxford).
psychological entities in the wider corpus. On the one hand, therefore, these two prose passages introduce the Classical importance of 'reason' as the defining characteristic of man and present the spiritual soul as the carrier of personal characteristics that survive into the afterlife. On the other hand, the wider writings of both authors present the mod and other inner aspects primarily in terms of more familiar native descriptions. As I illustrate at length in Part Three, Alfred's contemplations about human nature and the human self are built as much on the adaptation of native ideas as on the distinctive adaptation of Latin Christian psychologies. The fundamental point for the moment is that both Ælfric and Alfred present ideas which are fully integrated into a Latin Christian anthropology of matter and spirit. For them it is the sawul, as that animating and eternal principle, which must be the psychological core of identity which provides continuity of identity in the earthly life and the afterlife. Indeed for justice and punishment to pertain to the soul in the afterlife, it must be with this highest aspect of the human being that responsibility lies during composite life on earth. Whereas it is in light of these more pronounced interests in human workings and the intricacies of human behaviour and experience (as much as in larger anthropological ideas about human nature and human purpose) that Ælfric and Alfred develop their respective ideas about men, the wider prose and poetic traditions appear to be less concerned with the details of assimilating native ideas with a matter-spirit dichotomy in human nature.

Despite maintaining the fundamental (and often formulaic) notion of the duality of man, it would appear that Old English writings across the wider corpus did not employ this schema to explain human workings, human experience and human behaviour in the composite life of body and soul on earth. In the poetic tradition, the sawul largely appears as a possession to be cared for, protected and nourished - an entity itself devoid of psychological traits, capacities or characteristics. Although the sawul is frequently depicted as being joyful or sad in its afterlife, it is hardly ever associated with emotions or with thought during human life. In addition, the moral and

6 Phillips, 'Heart, Mind and Soul', pp. 142-64.
7 The notable exceptions in the poetic corpus can be found in the hagiographical poems, in particular in Cynewulf's Juliana, in Andreas and in Guthlac B. In these poems, however, the intellectual capacities of the guæt, the human spirit, are intimately related to matters of divine Grace, where the Holy Spirit can be seen to work in and through men as I discuss in Chapter Five.
responsible agency of man appears to lie instead with his inner aspects – those aspects occupied with judgement, thought, evaluation, decision and volition as well as with innate or subconscious impulses and desires. Indeed, in the poetic tradition, the ambiguous relationship of the inner aspects with the spiritual or eschatological soul on the one hand and with the body on the other has given rise to the scholarly debate about whether to place the inner aspects in the non-corporeal realm of man (whether as a part of the spiritual soul or as a distinct mind) or in the corporeal domain. Since this debate hinges on whether we interpret Anglo-Saxon ideas about human workings and human psychology either in light of Latin Christian anthropology and psychology or in light of current psychological and anthropological theories – and therefore upon essentially pre-conceived systems of belief and pre-conceived interpretative frameworks – I would like to review the relevant arguments in reference to the dominant imagery of a number of relevant texts themselves. In doing so it will become apparent that the more neutral framework of inner and outer takes precedence over a concern with concepts of both matter and spirit as a schema for analysing the causes and bases of human behaviour across the great majority of the extant corpus.

One of the strongest reasons for associating the inner aspects with the sawul rather than with the body (besides of course those expectations inherent in labelling them ‘mind’), would appear to be that the inner aspects are frequently contrasted with the body. In general, however, such contrasts do not appear to involve considerations of matter and non-matter (or indeed concerns with substance at any level). Rather, many appear to function as a contrast between inner and outer domains of experience and action. In the poetic corpus, we find contrasts between inner aspects such as, for example, the mod and the outer word or deed.

Drunce benge þe ond dollie word,  
man on mode ond in mype lyge,  
yre ond æfeste ond ide-sæ lufan.  

A drunken man is he who with foolish word  
sins in his mod and lies with his mouth  
angrily and enviously, and loves women.  

(Precepts 33)

The underlying motivations of this contrast would appear to rely on the continuity between inner and outer in terms of inner causes and outer effects or in terms of inner

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8 Phillips, ‘Heart, Mind and Soul’, pp. 164-72. On this note it is important not to presuppose a fundamental delineation of thought and emotion as self-evident categories.
experiences and outer manifestations or expressions of these. The continuum to which I refer can also be seen as a continuum between inner activity (thought) and outer activity (word and deed), as Paula Warrington has analysed at length.\(^9\) This analysis raises a dichotomy of inner and outer activity which could also involve a contrast between the inner as private and the outer as public. Indeed we certainly find numerous accounts which amplify the private and unseen nature of inner motivation, thought and disposition:

\[
\text{Ne last þinne ferð onhælne.} \quad \text{Do not let your 'spirit' be concealed,}
\]
\[
\text{degol þet þu deopost cunne. Nelle ic þe min dyrne gesecgan,} \quad \text{that secret which you know most}
\]
\[
gif þu me þinne hygecærft hylest ond þine heortan gebohtas.} \quad \text{deeply, I will not tell you my secret if}
\]
\[
\text{(Maxims I, 1-3) you hide your power of mind and the}
\]
\[
\text{thoughts of your heart from me.}
\]

In causal terms, however, the decision to conceal one's intentions, opinions or knowledge – even the decision to conceal one's personality – lies 'within' man. Put differently, the opening or binding of the *brestthord* depends less on a dislocation between private and public domains as on a continuum between inner decision and outer effect. It is precisely this identification of the volitional centre 'within' (and hence as the agitative and causal principle of action in man) which allows an investigation of the inner aspects as explanatory principles of outer visible behaviour.

The function of the inner aspects as core agencies remains central whether we interpret them as non-corporeal or corporeal. Indeed their definitive localisation within the chest or breast and the prevalence of kennings (such as *brestcofa*) which amplify the image of their containment within an outer, physically visible part of man can serve as grounds for interpreting them either as *distinct from* or as *integral to* the body.\(^{10}\) Leslie Lockett's argument that descriptions of psychological events in terms of swellings, contractions, boiling and freezing within a physically imagined container need not be interpreted metaphorically finds as much support in the texts themselves as


\(^{10}\) The same may be said for physically known internal organs, such as the *heorte*, which is associated with the same range of activities as the outer chest. The centrality of the heart both as an emotional and mental core may well be influenced by the Latin use of *cor* (which *heorte* often glosses), but since this sphere of usage is prominent across the corpus as a whole, no such distinct trend can be discerned. In Afriic we find some reference to the *bræin*, but as Low points out, this is more likely to arise from an analogy with Christ as head or a translation of a Latin passage out of context. Low, *Mind and Metaphor*, p. 54.
do readings which insist on metaphorical interpretation. Although the essential functions of the inner aspects as central agencies and loci of experience are not affected by our view of them as corporeal or non-corporeal entities, such contrasting interpretations do carry significant implications for the value which is placed on body or soul in self-definition. By this, I mean that if, for example, we identify our agentive centre and dominant drives more with the body than with the soul, this significantly affects our ability to integrate a Christian world view which is essentially oriented towards the spiritual union with God, whether in composite or post-corporeal life. If man's essence is associated more closely with the transient body, how do we account for his continuing existence as a non-corporeal soul? Is man attempting to transcend his essential humanity in light of these spiritual ends? Alternatively, if man's fundamental drives and impulses (emotions as much as thought) arise essentially within the body, how do we approach theological ideas which place the body beneath the soul in value? I shall explore the variety of Old English perspectives on such matters by considering presentations of the inner aspects in reference to varying positions about the relation between body and soul across the corpus.

3.2 The Status, Role and Function of the Inner Aspects in a Dualistically Conceived Human Nature

Despite maintaining the fundamental duality of man, it appears that a matter-spirit divide is not the primary concern of Anglo-Saxon writers who explore the workings of human beings in composite life. This can be readily illustrated by a brief survey of the diverse thought about the relation between body and soul across the extant corpus. As regards the relationship, rather than merely the formulaic contrast between body and soul, we find a great variety of perspectives across the extant corpus. The most obvious places to look for a detailed account of this relationship would appear to be the two poems known as Soul and Body I and Soul and Body II, in the Vercelli and Exeter Books respectively. Both of these poems show the post-corporeal soul as it addresses the deceased body about its behaviour in life. The sawul in Soul and Body I praises the body for its good deeds and addresses it as its lord. The soul in Soul and
Body II, on the other hand, berates the body for its sins and claims to have suffered countless evils whilst entrapped in the flesh. The significant point here is that both souls attribute responsibility for the type of life they led together to the body.

The soul receives from God Himself its punishment or glory, just as the earthen vessel gained for it previously in the world.

Lockett has cited these poems as examples supporting a physically conceived 'mind' which places agency and responsibility with the body, rather than with the soul. It is, however, important to recognize that these poems fall into a distinctive literary category which appears to have developed from early apocryphal visions of the afterlife into a set form: the diatribe of soul against body either on the deathbed, from an intermediary post-corporeal state, or at the public trial on Judgment day. The view of corporeal responsibility and perhaps even independent agency expressed in this tradition is not representative of the poetic corpus as a whole. It is less representative of native articulations of human workings than the works of Alfred and Ælfric.

Across the poetic corpus as a whole, body and soul often appear as 'kinsmen', the body is described as a 'friend' whose loss is to be mourned by the soul after their severance upon death. In Riddle 42, the soul and body appear as 'lord and servant': in Cynewulf's Juliana they appear as a 'wedded pair'. In Beowulf, the body appears as the 'protecting fortress of the soul'. Even in texts which describe the body as the 'prison' of the soul, the body's negative connotations do not appear to relate to human agency itself. The centre of experience and the root of action are consistently 'in', 'through' or 'by' the inner aspects. Certain bodily desires, non-virtuous emotions or passions and vices are frequently associated with the body in explicitly Christian poems. Indeed the body often appears as the lower aspect of man and sometimes as the symbol of his fallen state. The body is that transient, earth-oriented and earth-bound entity which appears to be explicitly involved in man's continuing enslavement to the devil. It is, however, not the body, but the inner aspects, which carry responsibility in light of their volitional and deciding functions for action. There is, moreover, little suggestion that

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they are exclusively physical aspects. Whilst they are fully involved in the processes and desires of the body, they are equally involved in the assessment of such desires and in the decision of how to act upon it. Precisely this conscious volitional function could be interpreted as grounds for viewing the inner aspects as essentially non-physical.

In much explicitly Christian poetry the inner aspects indeed appear more closely involved with the spiritual domain, primarily in light of their desire for or contemplation of God, as we shall see in Part Two. The involvement of the inner aspects with moral concerns, with virtue or with vice, however, is never accompanied by an explicit conceptual identification of the inner aspects with the soul itself. The soul remains the valued possession of man – the potential prize for the devil’s efforts – and its fate remains largely dependent on the inner aspects as blessed by the Lord’s Grace. Increasing interest in spiritual salvation and an increasing concern with the eschatological fate of the soul accordingly provide a framework within which moral agency becomes oriented towards spiritual salvation, but which does not reflect an identification of the inner aspects with the spiritual soul itself.

In reference to these diverse examples, I suggest that the centrality of the inner aspects overrides any concern with matter or spirit as guiding considerations for evaluating human experience and human behaviour and, most importantly, for human agency and responsibility. Christian dualism is unquestionably an important element of Anglo-Saxon thought – indeed it must be since Christian ideas about spiritual salvation inform ethical and practical instruction. Dualism, however, does not appear to be the guiding schema within Anglo-Saxon thought about human workings. The inner aspects are involved in innate corporeal drives as well as in higher thought and spiritual concerns. I suggest that it is precisely the central and conscious volitional capacities of the inner aspects which allow us to recognise their function as a bridge between Christian dichotomies of the spiritual and corporeal. Man is essentially a composite being, flawed and endowed with potential. The inner domain provides precisely that elusive sphere in which man can investigate the totality of drives by which he identifies himself as a human being and as a distinct person. Precisely the elusiveness of this
framework adapts well to varying views of the role of the body or the soul in human workings.

As this brief survey has shown, the vast bulk of Old English literature is not explicitly concerned with psychological or anthropological analysis. The inner aspects consistently appear as the dominant human agencies associated with individual identity and personality as expressed by commonly communicable formulas and images, and overwhelmingly they appear as the individualised determinants of the fate of a (less individualised) spiritual soul. As the central agencies and loci of experience, the inner aspects serve as explanatory principles of experience, behaviour and identity (in general and in the particular) without reference to a dichotomy of 'body and soul' or 'matter and spirit'. In general, descriptions of the central inner aspects and their workings stand loosely beside soul-body or spirit-matter formulations of human nature - both in poetry and in prose texts. Attention to the conceptual schema of an inner-outer categorisation of human nature across the Old English literary corpus, however, suggests that in many ways, the inner assumes the role of the spiritual of the dominant Christian positions - for example inner cause and outer effect or inner agency and outer action. In its general versatility (and hence in its wide applicability), the conception of an inner core of agency and identity neatly by-passes the need to assimilate a view of the self either with primarily material or spiritual domains of experience, or to become involved in theological or philosophical debates about the nature of a spiritual soul as the causal principle of life, movement, sensation and reason. Anglo-Saxon positions on the relation of the inner self to the soul and body show a remarkable variety of stances within which the central importance of the inner aspects remains constant. Fundamentally, they contain all the elements which make up individual character. As I have argued, it is precisely in this elusiveness they encompass the totality of what makes man human.
Although evidence from across the corpus suggests that Anglo-Saxons were perfectly content to use conventional and often formulaic accounts of the inner aspects of man to explain experience and behaviour in life and to relate this core of man only indirectly to a spiritual soul which is primarily associated with the afterlife, a number of vernacular texts do of course engage with the notion of an inner self in light of a matter-spirit dichotomy and do embrace questions about the continuity of this self in the earthly life and in the post-corporeal afterlife. The writings of Ælfric and Alfred provide the most notable examples in light of their fuller exploration of Latin Christian ideas about man, his workings and his spiritual destiny. The fundamental division between ideological and literary traditions in Old English prose and poetry respectively allows us to localise a dominant trend of intellectual engagement with theological and even philosophical questions in Old English prose. It does not, however, account for the great variety of Anglo-Saxon perspectives on the relation between body and soul as outlined above.

Ultimately, vernacular accounts of human beings and their workings reflect varying conceptual traditions to varying degrees depending on varying literary and ideological contexts. Similarly, intellectual engagement with questions of selthood and human nature and the accompanying conceptual endeavour to assimilate the prominent inner-outer schema with a matter-spirit dichotomy shows remarkable variability in both poetry and prose. Indeed caution is needed when associating the use of metaphor and conceptual illustration in the poetry with a mode of thinking which is essentially different from the mode of thought behind the prose writings. Despite the obvious distinctions between the poetic and the prose traditions, I suggest that concerns with unity and continuity of agency and identity can be found across the poetic corpus. Cynewulf, for example, attributes certain cognitive faculties to gast. Alfred, in turn, does not just import a Platonic model of the soul, but builds his view of an inner self on 'native' imagery and expressions. Both authors follow through the implications of embracing a Christian anthropology into native frameworks of beliefs and show a significant concern with psychological workings as much as with self-conceptions based upon agentive and experiential continuity in this life and the afterlife. As I argue
in the remainder of this thesis, however, neither of these writers entirely bridges the gap between the inner aspects and the sawul. This point perhaps underlines the essentially mediating function of the inner aspects between spiritual and material domains of the self.
Part Two

Poetic Innovation: The Cynewulf Canon
Poetic Innovation: The Cynewulf Canon

Old English poetic accounts of human nature and human workings are not easily categorized in terms of chronology, provenance or even genre. As we have seen, most studies of Anglo-Saxon psychology lean towards more general definitions of the poetic corpus as being representative of a native tradition or of a popular tradition in which the intellectual or ‘expert psychology’ of Latin Christian theologians and more traditional, vernacular ideas appear together without having been welded into a coherent system of thought about human nature and human workings.¹ The details of such ideological interaction, however, are surely imperative to our endeavour to gain a fuller understanding of Anglo-Saxon thought about anthropological and psychological matters. Certainly, the interaction between thought and language is a crucial concern in defining a native psychological idiom in poetry as a whole. The view that poetic expression in itself reflects a fundamentally metaphorical or anecdotal way of thinking about the inner realm or that poetic expression is in itself incompatible with systematic thought about the individual self and human nature in general is an extremely large claim when left uncorroborated by close readings of individual poems in their textual context.² Whilst the diversity of the poetic corpus as a whole makes it difficult to order the tendencies of individual poems into larger conceptual trends, a group of poems which is defined by common authorship promises a particularly attractive test case for analysing both stylistic and ideological strands in those poems, individually and collectively.

The four signed poems of Cynewulf (Fates of the Apostles, Christ II, Elene and Juliana) provide a unique opportunity for detailed investigation of an Old English approach to human workings which may serve as a basis for comparison with the wider corpus. They do so not only because of their distinctive stylistic patterns and thematic

¹ These respective positions, taken by Malcolm Godden in ‘Anglo-Saxons on the Mind’ and developed by Soon Al Law in ‘The Anglo-Saxon Mind’, are discussed in Chapter Two above.
² I refer here to the position suggested by Law in ‘The Anglo-Saxon Mind’, see 2.1 above.
foci but also due to the poet’s notable fusion of literary and ideological traditions. As Andy Orchard observes:

The ongoing fascination with Cynewulf’s work stems in part from the way in which it seems to blend so many areas of Anglo-Saxon culture that are often seen as mutually exclusive, combining as it does, imported Christian, Latinate, and literary themes, images, diction and techniques of composition with those drawn from the native, secular, vernacular, and ultimately oral tradition.¹

Fates of the Apostles and Elene of the Vercelli Book, and Christ II and Juliana of the Exeter Book all draw heavily on Latin sources, making use of classical rhetorical techniques and ideas from Latin Christian learning, whilst being at the same time articulated in the idiom of the vernacular formulaic tradition. All four poems make extensive use of both Latin and vernacular topoi and metaphors, employing figural modes of expression as well as native vernacular type-scenes.² The artistry of the Cynewulf canon cannot be defined simply in terms of its translation of Latin ideas into an Old English medium or of its presentation of a ‘foreign’ ideology in a form comprehensible to a contemporary audience. The synthesis at play in the poems need not be seen as a conscious and artificial creation but appears rather to grow out of the poet’s thought and expression at a fundamental level. Indeed, the perhaps greatest appeal of the signed poems for an ideological inquiry such as this is the intellectual vigour and aesthetic mastery with which apparently divergent accounts of human workings from Latin Christian and native traditions, whether in formula or metaphor, become framed and absorbed by Christian theological ideas about human nature, human capacity and human purpose. Cynewulf’s representation of the inner life within this framework is the subject of the next three chapters.

However appealing for analytical purposes, it must be acknowledged at the outset that the common authorship of the Cynewulfian texts and related questions of provenance and date have been extremely contentious. Cynewulf was once accepted as the author of the majority of poems in the Exeter and Vercelli manuscripts, but the so-

called Cynewulfian group was gradually narrowed down to fourteen (or fewer) texts on the basis of thematic and stylistic considerations. Cynewulf’s authorship itself is now overwhelmingly attributed only to the four signed poems mentioned above. The complex relations between these four and a number of unsigned poems continue to be a focal point of research. Whereas the signatures in *Fates, Christ II, Juliana*, and *Elene* themselves provide the clearest evidence for their shared authorship, codicological arrangement amplifies the close relations between *Christ II*, the *Advent Lyrics* (or *Christ I*) and *Judgment Day* (or *Christ III*), as well as those between *Fates* and *Andreas.*

Manuscript order also highlights parallels of theme and style which themselves merge with considerations of genre. The homiletic aspects of *Christ II*, for example, recall a number of features in *Christ I* and *III*, as well as in the *Phoenix* and the *Dream of the Rood*. Similarly, hagiographical patterns in *Andreas* and in the *Guthlac* poems present significant parallels with *Fates, Juliana* and *Elene*, and bear witness to the shared literary traditions which frame Cynewulf’s own inquiries.

In order to avoid expounding the diverse critical views in the controversy about authorship here, relevant links and parallels amongst this larger group of texts will be considered in more detail when appropriate in my closer readings of the signed poems. The main point for the moment is that all of the poems in question are deeply informed by Latin literary models and genres. Indeed many of the poems are vernacular

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1. This group is variously seen to contain the four signed poems (*Fates, Elene, Christ II, Juliana*), the *Guthlac* poems, the other two poems of the *Christ* trilogy, the three poems of the *Physiologus*, the *Phoenix*, and the *Dream of the Rood*. Detailed considerations of nineteenth-century criticism on the matter are presented by Claes Schaar, *Critical Studies in the Cynewulf Group*. Lund Studies in English 17 (Lund, 1949) and a useful overview of relevant issues is offered by R. D. Fulk, ‘Cynewulf: Canon, Dialect, and Date’, *Cynewulf: Basic Readings*, ed. Robert E. Bjork (London, 1996), pp. 3-21.

2. Idiosyncratic views excluding one or more of the signed poems from the accepted Cynewulf canon are represented by Daniel Donoghue, *Style in Old English Poetry: The Test of the Auxiliary* (New Haven, 1987), pp. 107-16; see also Orchard, ‘Both Style and Substance’, pp. 294-6.

3. Until the late nineteenth century, the *Christ* trilogy was seen as a single poem and *Fates* was seen as an epilogue to *Andreas*. The signature in *Christ II* was therefore transferred by default to *Christ I* and *III* and that of *Fates* to *Andreas*. Again, the most useful overview of these critical developments can be found in Schaar, *Critical Studies*, in Kenneth Sisam, *Studies in the History of Old English Literature* (Oxford, 1953), and in Fulk, ‘Cynewulf: Canon, Dialect, and Date’, pp. 3-21.

4. The poetic portrayals of the themes of Christ’s Incarnation, Crucifixion and Ascension in the *Christ* trilogy recall the same themes in *Phoenix* and *Dream of the Rood*. Schaar outlines the features which link these latter two poems with the Ruthwell Cross in *Critical Studies*, pp. 35, 37-9. With increasing recognition of the separate nature of the poems and with challenges to Cynewulf’s authorship of *Christ I* and *III*, the connection between *Christ II* and *Dream of the Rood* becomes weaker, as do the immediate parallels between *Christ II* and the *Phoenix* and the *Physiologus* poems.
adaptations of Latin sources. The four signed poems of Cynewulf, however, share distinctive features and interests which transcend their various genres and underline the poet's ability to work freely within the boundaries of literary convention. The stylistic and thematic features which have been taken to suggest authorial distinctiveness highlight the innovative tendencies of the signed poems and thus become directly relevant when examining the context of Cynewulf's anthropological and psychological ideas.

Studies of formulaic composition have been particularly prominent in the attempt to define a distinctively 'Cynewulfian style'. As Robert E. Diamond has shown, the signed poems are '40% formulaic'. but manipulation of formulas and stock phrases can be discerned across all four poems. Orchard succinctly characterises their most notable stylistic features as the distinctive combination of paronomasia, polyptoton and homoeoteleuton, as well as a shared formulaic diction. Joseph Wine, in turn, notes that the four signed poems are defined by a particularly sophisticated use of these rhetorical techniques, which sets them apart from the wider poetic corpus. In doing so,
Wine implicitly agrees with the idea that the *Andreas* and *Guthlac* poets draw upon a Cynewulfian style in their own compositions.\(^{16}\) As we shall see in Chapter Five, the similarities of diction relevant to the inner self in these poems raises interesting questions about the extent of Cynewulf's potential influence as regards conceptions as well as expressions of the inner life.

Another notable feature of the signed poems is their extensive adaptation of source texts. Whilst *Juliana*, *Elene* and *Christ II* largely follow the structure of their supposed Latin sources, the Old English poet's interpolations illustrate his willingness to build up series of themes and images which significantly alter the focus of the given narratives. I shall discuss such alterations in more detail in the relevant chapters and restrict the present survey to those themes which recur across the signed poems. Since Cynewulf's expansions, emphases and omissions are accentuated not only by his own development of theme and imagery in the poems, but also by his recapitulation of crucial concerns and motifs in his signed epilogues, a brief look at these epilogues provides a succinct overview of some of Cynewulf's central interests.

The poetic epilogues which contain Cynewulf's acrostic signatures (consisting of runes from the Old English *fuþorc*) are perhaps the most distinctive features of the four poems. They have no precedent in any of the poet's immediate sources nor any analogue in the extant Old English poetic corpus.\(^{17}\) Crucial to the debate about authorship (and indeed to the nature of authorship in Anglo-Saxon literary culture), the signatures have received particular critical attention both as graphic illustrations of the fusion of aesthetic traditions and as indicators of the poet's central concerns.\(^{18}\) Although

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\(^{17}\) The acronyms appear in the runic groups in *Juliana* (CYN-W-W-L-L II 703b-709a), in single yet ordered runes in *Christ II* and in *Elene* (C-Y-N-(I)-W-U-L-F II 797-807a and 1256b-1270a respectively) and in *Fates* the single runes appear in mixed order (I-W-U-L-CYN II 96-106).

the meanings of the runes themselves are fiercely debated. Ralph Elliot's suggestion that they 'represent the same catalogue of words in all four signatures' emphasises that the signatures underline thematic parallels which run through all four epilogues. Even if it is not incontrovertible that, for example, the rune 'C' stands for cēn ('torch') as a symbol of the apocalypse or that the 'flowing away of water' (L = lagoflod) refers to the 'transitory nature of man and his possessions', the poet's concern with earthly transience and Judgment Day are explicit in the epilogues. Arguments for the homiletic orientation of all four epilogues have received strong support - themes of prayer and intercession, of Judgment and of apocalyptic visions being presented alongside the poet's personal address and exhortations to his audience. The didactic elements of the epilogues, moreover, are by no means discontinuous with the preceding poems. As Dolores Warwick Frese has demonstrated at length, verbal repetition and continuity of theme and imagery in the epilogues clarify and amplify the didactic tone of the poetic narratives, strongly suggesting the compositional unity of the poems and their epilogues in addition to their shared concerns. The epilogues themselves therefore not only present the most distinctive Cynewulfian touch, but also draw particular attention to the poet's chief interests and to his ultimately didactic concern: namely that the thoughts, words and deeds of men in their composite mortal existence on earth will be justly rewarded in the eternal, post-corporeal life. As is evident in poems and epilogues together, these concerns are as much about concrete and practical instruction for good Christian living as about the intellectual and moral edification which, as I illustrate throughout Part Two, the poet sees as central to salvation.

The didactic impetus of Cynewulf's signed poems is particularly relevant to the present inquiry. The poet's focus on God's Judgment of man (both the Judgment of the

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individual upon corporeal death and the eventual Judgment of types of men on Judgment Day involves an implicit concern with the relationship between the earthly life of mortals and their afterlife. between the thoughts, words and deeds of men and their eventual fate. The depiction of Judgment as the just consequence of action in life not only involves the evaluation of men (whether of human types or of individual men) but also promises insights into the poet’s conception of human agency and responsibility. There is strong evidence that Cynewulf did not merely compile erudite conglomerations of formulaic descriptions and metaphorical accounts of human workings, and, as I shall illustrate in the following chapters. Cynewulf’s exploration of agency and responsibility relies implicitly on a consideration both of human nature and of human capacity to fulfil a given human purpose.

Without claiming that the signed poems present analytical treatises on human nature, this study considers the thought structures which underlie Cynewulf’s accounts of human workings. The conceptual implications of the relevant accounts can give us valuable information about the evaluative criteria which essentially inform the poet’s picture of good human being. Unlike de-contextualised semantic studies or lexical semantic field studies, this investigation explores the conceptual framework within which Cynewulf felt able to place images of, for example, the swelling and boiling mod or the breostcofa as treasure trove alongside metaphors informed by the Gregorian stages of sin. This approach allows us to explore how metaphors of cosmic warfare and allegories of psychomachia (which so often suggest figural determinism) are accompanied by repeated emphasis on human responsibility for ignorance, vice and sin. In the same way, attention to conceptions of the human constitution allows us to consider matters of identity and self-conception by exploring, for example, the way in which the inner aspects of the human being as presented in Cynewulf’s poetry are associated with human agency and appear to determine – yet apparently not partake in – the fate of the eternal soul when it is judged upon death. Rather than suggesting that the Cynewulfian texts present a systematic exposition of such questions. I propose that they certainly explore them implicitly in the process of considering the human condition. In the signed poems, human experience is approached at generic and personal levels – in
gnomic reflection, third person narrative and first person reflection. Cynewulf's concern with the means of human salvation is deeply informed by an intellectual sophistication which bases clear didactic instruction on a deeper understanding of human nature, which can in turn be applied to the life of the individual. Cynewulf's reflections on human types and their fates, as well as on men's individual choices and their consequences, point towards an underlying conception of human nature, human purpose and human capacity to fulfil this purpose.

Whilst Christian anthropology and theology permeate the four signed poems, we should presuppose neither an Ælfrician adherence to the Church Fathers nor the irrelevance of theological controversy in Cynewulf's poetry. As discussed in Part One above, early medieval Christian anthropology was by no means fixed as regards the details of the human condition in relation to the precise nature of the soul (anima) or its exact relations with the body, of the transmission of inherited sin or indeed of human capacity in light of free will and Grace. Bearing this in mind, it is not unreasonable to entertain the possibility that there would have been enough conceptual flexibility to accommodate interacting Latin Christian and native vernacular models of human nature and in particular of the inner self in one coherent and didactically useful framework.

The question of tradition and innovation, of adaptation and free working within convention remains closely linked to the relation between thought and expression. Cynewulf's amalgamation of a wide range of elements is undeniably innovative, however deeply rooted in stylistic, literary and cultural conventions. On the one hand, his use of diction relevant to the inner self is notable in comparison with the wider poetic corpus. His frequent use of inner aspect compounds (in particular ferdsexta, attested only in the signed poems) and a wide range of inner aspect words (most prominent in dense clusters) characterise his extensive poetic variation and repetition of key ideas such as the need to contemplate Christian truth and man's spiritual needs.

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23 This contemplative aspect of Cynewulf's poetry has been identified in his thematic focus on man's need to contemplate revelation as much as in his style. Das, for example, illustrates Cynewulf's often noted propensity for abstract reflection by presenting formal arguments such as the poet's use of appositions and variations to emphasise generalised conclusions in relative clauses, in *Cynewulf and the Cynewulf Canon*, p. 164.
Conventional formulas and poetic vocabulary, however, do not appear to limit his exploration of inner processes. His use of variation goes beyond formulaic expression, moving the sawul. gast and the inner self ever closer in their constitutive roles, underlining the compatibility of traditional native concepts with a wider Christian anthropology. As I shall illustrate in the coming chapters, the primacy of the inner self in human experience and action is a striking feature of Cynewulf’s exploration of man’s state as a composite being. Ultimately, it facilitates a view of men on earth which suggests a hopeful perspective of the human condition – most evident of course in those characters who allow themselves to be guided, empowered and uplifted by seeking and accepting God’s Grace.

Given the uncertainties surrounding the Cynewulf canon with regard to provenance and date, it is difficult to contextualise the ideas it presents. The accepted dates of the Exeter and Vercelli Manuscripts provide termini ante quem for the Cynewulf poems of about 950 AD. The more problematic terminus post quem ranges from 700 to 950. Despite numerous attempts to shift the dates of original composition towards the latter half of this period and therefore to associate it with the blooming of the Benedictine reforms, the prevalent critical consensus holds that the signed poems, and therefore Cynewulf himself, can be placed in the ninth century. My immediate concern is with Cynewulf’s ability to fuse traditions in an innovative way and since matters of date and provenance are difficult to prove or disprove in reference to ideological considerations, such lines of investigation (along with inquiries into the historical identity of the poet himself) must remain outside the scope of this study. Given the broadly common consensus that the four signed poems are the closest in

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24 Again, Fulk provides the most useful overviews of the complex critical debates surrounding the dates of the signed poems in ‘Cynewulf: Canon, Dialect, and Date’, pp. 18-9.
25 Fulk considers the Cynewulf quartet to be in the second of three general stages of Old English literature, placing it in the middle of the ninth century, ‘Cynewulf: Canon, Dialect, and Date’, pp. 4-5. Patrick W. Conner, on the other hand, considers rhyme to be an indicator of a later date (‘On Dating Cynewulf’, in Cynewulf, ed. Bjork, pp. 23-55) but has been contradicted in this by numerous critics, see Orchard, ‘Style and Substance’, pp. 282-3. Based on thematic considerations, Maureen Halsall has associated Cynewulf’s poetry with a relatively early date, possibly in line with the early conversion period, ‘Runes and the Mortal Condition in Old English Poetry’, JEPG 88 (1989): 477-86. Roberta Bux Boose and Norman D. Hinton, in contrast, propose a later date on the basis of a prominent apocalyptic concern in the Cynewulf canon, ‘Cynewulf and the Apocalyptic Vision’, NP 74 (1990): 279-93. Anderson also argues for a late date, proposing Benedictine influences, particularly ‘monastic mysticism, with the theology of compunction at its centre’, Cynewulf, pp. 14-7.
terms of language, style and themes. I limit myself to a detailed investigation of three of
the signed poems and include reference to Fates or other 'Cynewulfian' poems only
when parallels or divergences with the signed poems allow concrete inferences which
are relevant to patterns of thought about human nature and in particular about the inner
self.26 Whatever direction future research into common authorship of the canon may
take, the close relations between Christ II, Juliana and Elene are well established and as
I shall demonstrate, these poems present three complementary perspectives on the
centrality of the inner self in human and personal identity.

The following discussions of Christ II, Juliana and Elene do not attempt to order
the poems in terms of an internal chronology based on aesthetic merit or maturity of
thought.27 Since I am concerned with concordances in Cynewulf's approach to human
nature and the inner self, I shall begin with an analysis of Christ II and its outline of the
theological context which informs the poet's presentation of human nature. This general
account concentrates on mankind within Christian salvation history and makes a
number of important theological statements about man's nature and capacity for choice
which are seen at work in all of the poems. Having considered this theological context, I
shall move on to a discussion of Juliana and its consideration of human types in action.
A stylised passio, Juliana presents a view of the cosmos as defined by the larger forces
of God and devil, of good, truth and virtue as opposed to evil, error and vice.
Particularly interesting within this framework is the poem's allegorical presentation of
these forces working within man as well as its combination of psychomachia metaphors
and patristic accounts of the processes of vice and sin with more traditional native
formulas. Finally, turning to Elene, I consider the way in which the general theological
principles of Christ II and the typological accounts of Juliana appear alongside more
detailed explorations of individual human beings who move from the darkness and
ignorance of non-Christian being to the light, joy and wisdom of life in accordance with

26 Given that the relatively short poem Fates of the Apostles provides primarily formulaic descriptions of
the inner aspects and their workings which allow less of an insight into Cynewulf's conception of their
status and role in human nature, I have chosen to omit this signed poem from the present inquiry and only
refer to it when drawing attention to certain shared features across the Cynewulf canon.
27 Roberta Bus Boose and Norman D. Hinton consider Cynewulf as the 'poet of the apocalypse' and of a
chronological 'evolution [across the texts] as the poet mastered both his craft and his theme' with Elene
as the intellectual and aesthetic climax, 'Cynewulf and the Apocalyptic Vision', pp. 284, 287.
Christ. The prominent themes of conversion and enlightenment here give a particular insight into Cynewulf's conception of internal workings and the role of the inner self in individual development. The next three chapters, which treat *Christ II, Juliana* and *Elene* respectively, illustrate that the various insights into human nature and human workings provided in these poems reflect a coherent approach to the inner self as the core of human identity. Whilst they develop distinctive angles in their exploration of the inner realm of man, all three poems are deeply informed by the same theological context and all engage with the Christian metaphysics and dualistic anthropology which directly informs their presentation of the inner life.
Chapter Four
Cynewulf's Christ: Human Nature in its Theological Context

Of Cynewulf's signed poems, Christ II presents the most comprehensive approach to human nature in that it places its vision of man firmly in the context of human salvation history.¹ As I illustrate in this chapter, Cynewulf explores human nature and its workings in reference to a shared history and a shared purpose which can be understood through contemplation of Christ. The importance not only of knowing Christian events, but also of understanding their significance for mankind at large and for each man in the particular emerges as an important aspect of Cynewulf's didactic message and is, I argue, inscribed into the very structure of Christ II. Attention to the poem's progression from the narration to the interpretation of Christian events, and finally to concrete didactic instruction, highlights the importance which Cynewulf attaches to historical and even metaphysical contexts when exploring the nature and purpose of human life. Cynewulf's sophisticated theological awareness throughout the poem suggests that he fully engages with the implications of the matter-spirit duality inherent in the Latin Christian world view and his articulation of a comprehensive theological context frames and informs his deliberations about human nature and purpose. The anthropological insights which are built up over the course of the poem, in turn, provide a framework within which each individual can understand and evaluate himself, his experience and his behaviour. Christ II accordingly presents a valuable opportunity to explore the role and status of the inner aspects within a vernacular poetic account that integrates apparently native modes of thinking about the inner life into a fundamentally Latin Christian view of a dual human nature. Moreover, Cynewulf's account of the inner self as a generic entity in this poem provides an ideal departure point for investigating the overarching anthropological and psychological ideas which stand in the background of his more detailed investigation of the inner life of character types and individuals in Juliana and Elene.

¹ I use the terms 'salvation history' and Heilsgeschichte interchangeably and employ the term 'soteriology' when referring to systematic theological thought about human salvation.
Cynewulf’s *Christ* (also known as *Christ II* or the *Ascension Poem*) narrates and explores the significance of Christ’s Ascension and occupies a position in the *Exeter Book* between the two poems known as *Christ I* (or the *Advent Lyrics*) and *Christ III* (or *Judgment Day*), which deal with Christ’s Incarnation and with His Final Judgment of humankind on Doomsday, respectively. Although the so-called *Christ* poems have long been recognised as three separate poems, renewed critical attention to their chronological and thematic contiguity has emphasised the ‘unifying’ effect of *Christ II* in the trilogy.\(^2\) *Christ II* places its central subject matter, Christ’s Ascension, firmly in the context of all of Christ’s acts and it would appear to be this comprehensive theological scope which ‘causes the reader to move backward into the Advent and Nativity themes of *Christ I* and forward into the Judgment and Doom considerations of *Christ III*.\(^3\) As already noted, the importance of this broad theological scope for present purposes, is that it presents a theological context which frames and informs Cynewulf’s deliberations about human nature and human purpose. Cynewulf’s articulation of this context allows us to trace the way in which he explores an anthropological dichotomy of matter and spirit in the context of a shared Christian world-view. As I shall illustrate in the coming discussions, the inner realm is central in Cynewulf’s considerations of the complexities of human experience as a composite being.

Since I investigate the role of the inner aspects within Cynewulf’s view of human nature in *Christ II* not by isolating individual formulas and descriptions but by considering these in their textual context, this analysis must include reference to the poem’s larger structure as well as to the poet’s adaptation of sources – in particular to Cynewulf’s distinctive development of themes and *topoi* which recur throughout his poetry. A brief survey of the structural, stylistic and thematic features of the poem as a whole accordingly becomes necessary at the outset.

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2 It has, for example, been suggested that *Christ II* was composed to supplement and unify *Christ I* and *III*, Frese, ‘The Art of Cynewulf’s Runic Signatures’, p. 330; Colin Chase, ‘God’s Presence through Grace as the Theme of Cynewulf’s *Christ II* and the Relationship of this Theme to *Christ I* and *Christ III*’, *NEF* 3 (1974): 87-101; also, Calder, *Cynewulf*, p. 72.

3 Frese, ‘The Art of Cynewulf’s Runic Signatures’, p. 229. Whilst this avenue of inquiry is beyond the scope of this discussion, a number of parallels and more prominently – a number of relevant contrasts between the descriptions of human nature and human workings in the three poems require mention in this chapter, for example, notes 10, 23 below.
In many of its themes and in its overall progression, *Christ II* appears to draw heavily on a section of Pope Gregory's homily on the Ascension. *Homily* 29.9-11.4 Cynewulf not only includes most of the episodes which Gregory the Great employs to illustrate the significance of Christ's Ascension, but also largely follows Gregory's order of topics.5 Despite his clear reliance on this Latin homily, Cynewulf develops a distinctive focus and structure in *Christ II* which, as I shall argue, moves from the narration (440-585) to the interpretation (586-711) of Christian events before translating the various insights in his concluding exhortation to the spiritual life (712-866).6 The particular importance of this structure of the poem for the present investigation is that by narrating Christ's acts more fully than his sources, and by subsequently relating them to human beings in greater detail, Cynewulf creates a framework which allows him to explore what men are, what their purpose is and in consequence, how they should act.

Cynewulf's opening narration of Christ's acts, like that of Gregory, places Christ's Ascension at the centre of an interrelated sequence of Christian events, aligning and contrasting Christ's Incarnation. Final Judgment and His Ascension. As George Hardin Brown has shown, Cynewulf makes full use of the conventional patristic motifs of descent and ascent.7 In *Christ II*, Christ's Advent and Incarnation, His Coming (448a), contrast with His departure from earth to heaven at the Ascension (512-14), which in turn contrasts with His return to earth on Judgment Day (523-6).8 These down-

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5 Cynewulf includes references to the garments of the heavenly hosts at the Lord's Nativity and Ascension (*Chir.* II 443b-49a; *Hom.* 29.9), to the figurative account of the Lord's Ascension as a bird in flight (*Chir.* II 633-58; *Hom.* 29.10), to the Lord's gifts to men (*Chir.* II 669-91a; *Hom.* 29.10), to the leaps of Christ (*Chir.* II 715-45; *Hom.* 29.10), and concludes with the same didactic use of Doomsday imagery.

6 I retain the traditional line numbering in which *Christ II* occupies lines 440-866 of the 1664 lines of the Christ trilogy. All line references in this discussion are taken from *The Exeter Book*, ASPR III, ed. George Philip Krapp and Elliott van Kirk Dobbie (New York, 1936), pp. 15-27. All translations of the Old English text in this discussion are mine.


8 *se afeling cwom* 448a, ‘the prince came'; *me sweotole geostol yseويه* 448.14, ‘now you see clearly that the true Lord departed to heaven’; *wiges agend* 521-14, ‘the Possessor of victory will go up high’; *Wile of sweat broht wuron magne* 512-14
up-down motifs frame Christ’s presence on earth in terms of His coming and going, whilst His Resurrection during this time (from deade aras 467a) parallels the upward motion of the Ascension itself (up stige ancenned sunu 464). Cynewulf not only develops the motifs and images of his source, but also adds details of events and even entire events that are not present in Homily 29. Cynewulf’s addition of, for example, Christ’s Harrowing of hell (558-70) presents one of the most significant departures from Gregory’s homily and draws heavily on the imagery, detail and lyrical tone of Bede’s hymn On the Lord’s Ascension.9 On the one hand, therefore, Cynewulf develops a more comprehensive theological context than we find in either of his sources.10 On the other hand, Cynewulf blends a variety of topics and motifs as he organises his material in light of a distinctive focus on the significance of Christ’s acts for men. This becomes particularly evident in Cynewulf’s conscious separation of the narration and subsequent interpretation of Christian events in successive parts of the poem.

In marked contrast to Gregory, who immediately outlines the significance of Christ’s Incarnation and Ascension for men, Cynewulf defers his explication of the connotations of moral debasement and elevation which are contained in the conventional homiletic imagery of Christ’s descent and ascent:

Quia nascente Domino videbatur divinitas humiliata; ascendente vero Domino, est humanitas exaltata. (Hom. 29. Col.1218B) When the Lord was born, divinity seemed humiliated; but when the Lord ascended, humanity was exalted.11

Cynewulf only explicitly considers the significance of Christ’s acts for men in lines 586 to 711, where he expands Gregory’s account of man’s fall (Hom. 29. Col.1218B-C: Chr. II 611b-626), and examines in more detail the benefits which are granted to men through Christ’s various acts. The progression from narration to contemplation in Christ


10 It is also more comprehensive than the theological context of the advent lyrics, which only makes explicit reference to Christ’s Harrowing (149-55). Christ III, on the other hand shows a very similar use of the historical perspective. Its account of Doomsday looks back to the Crucifixion (1100-1115, 1230), Harrowing (150) and Advent (1199) and also relates these events quite explicitly to human soteriology in a brief narration of human history (1390-1430).

11 Translations of the Latin text used throughout this discussion are taken from M. J. B. Allen and D. G. Calder, Sources and Analogues of Old English Poetry (1976), pp. 81-83.
II is widely acknowledged, as is the didactic nature of the final segment of the poem (712-866), although different interpretations of the poem’s tripartite structure have variously amplified the ‘meditative’, ‘contemplative’ or ‘didactic’ tone and purpose of the poem as a whole.12

The diverse elements in Christ II, as well as the poem’s evident indebtedness to Gregory’s homily and Bede’s hymn, have resulted in split critical opinion about whether to classify the poem as ‘homiletic’, ‘meditative’ or ‘lyrical’. D. R. Letson, for example, suggests that Christ II ‘is ... thoroughly homiletic in form, purpose, description, style, and origin’, whereas R. W. Adams proposes that ‘the poet ... does not have foremost in mind a homiletic or instructive purpose, but that it is ‘ultimately removed from doctrine per se and a good deal closer to ... lyric intensity and personal devotion’.13 Emphasising the ‘reflective’ rather than the ‘mystical’ aspect of Cynewulf’s tone and style, Anderson in turn defines Christ II as an example of ‘meditative poetry ... in which narrative events seem to function primarily as contexts from which to develop ideas’.14 Ultimately, it appears that no single stylistic or thematic element dominates the poem sufficiently to be able to place Christ II into any specific literary niche. Motifs such as human life as a sea-voyage (850-866), the theme of spiritual warfare (564-573a), or hortatory expressions (such as utan ‘let us ...’ or us is pears micel ‘there is great need that we ...’) are as conventional in patristic and homiletic texts as they are in the vernacular poetic tradition, be this in the gnomic self-searching of The Seafarer or in the gnomic instruction of the Maxims.15 Cynewulf’s Christ draws on a wide variety of styles and traditions – on homily, hymn and vernacular formulaic poetry – in underpinning his didactic guidance with in-depth theological considerations

12 The tripartite structure of Christ II has given rise to numerous interpretations, as for example in Krapp and Dobbie, ASPR III, p. xxvi; Jean Milhaupt, ‘The Structure of Christ II’, pp. 70-77; Anderson, Cynewulf, p. 47. Milhaupt and Anderson focus on the three main sections as dealing with past, present and future, respectively. Calder in turn suggests that Cynewulf lacks the clarity of structure present in the other signed poems (Cynewulf, p. 74). The idea that this progression is inherent in the stages of the poem and therefore intrinsic to the didactic design of the poem is further supported by Cynewulf’s focus on the processes of revelation and understanding, as discussed below.


14 Anderson, Cynewulf, pp. 45-50.

15 These are some of the phrases which Letson uses to argue for the homiletic nature of Christ II, ‘The Homiletic Nature’, pp. 192-4.
from which men can learn to understand the significance of Christ's acts for men in general and throughout history, as well as for each man in the here and now. In contrast with the didactic aims of Cynewulf's relatively short sources (Gregory's *Ascension Homily* and Bede's *On the Ascension*) which appear less concerned with the details of human nature and human salvation, the anthropological focus of *Christ II* emerges as one of its most striking features.

As I have suggested, the narrative structure of the poem itself traces the way in which an understanding of Christian history informs an understanding of human nature and the self — and accordingly, how Christian truth provides the guide to Christian living and salvation. The next three sections of this chapter consider how Cynewulf's opening narrative of Christian events establishes the theological context (4.1) which subsequently serves as a framework for exploring a shared human nature and a shared human purpose (4.2) and which finally provides optimistic exhortations for man to realise his potential for the spiritual life on earth and beyond (4.3). Cynewulf's didactic concerns primarily pertain to the spiritual (gastlice) health of men in their lives as composite beings on earth and to the eschatological fate of the human soul (sawul, gust). Notable throughout is that the inner realm becomes central to Cynewulf's exploration of the complexity of experience of the composite human being as that inner core which is central to matters of agency, experience and identity.

### 4.1 Establishing the Cosmic Context: Knowing Christ as Lord

The importance of a comprehensive theological context in *Christ II* is evident in Cynewulf's adaptation of his sources to include references to Christ's Advent and Incarnation (443b-46, 51b-2), to His Crucifixion (470) and Resurrection (467a), to the Harrowing of hell (558-70) and to Judgment Day (523-6), as well as in Cynewulf's summary of his fuller list of events towards the end of *Christ II* (720-41a). This is not to say that Cynewulf offers a neat chronology as a linear structural principle in the poem. On the contrary, his narration of Christian events is confined to the first hundred and
fifty lines of the poem and even within this initial narrative section he adopts a thematic rather than a chronological treatment of Christian events.

The chronology of the events in *Christ II* – in particular Cynewulf’s inclusion of Christ’s Harrowing of hell after the Ascension (and indeed after his reference to Doomsday) – has received substantial critical attention. Although it has been suggested that this positioning of the Harrowing reflects a ‘laxness’ which is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon liturgy, we can assert confidently that this chronological anomaly is not due to carelessness since Cynewulf inserts the Harrowing into its appropriate chronological place in his later summary of Christ’s leaps (720-41a, 4.3 below). As Adams has shown, Cynewulf’s description of the Harrowing draws on Bede’s hymn *On the Lord's Ascension* (20) in which it appears in a speech of the angelic host upon Christ’s arrival in heaven. Rather than simply including an episode from Bede’s hymn in order to extend Gregory’s list of events, however, Cynewulf’s insertion of the Harrowing at this point seems to me to be entirely in line with his thematic development of a theological context which, as I illustrate below, becomes the primary forum within which Cynewulf considers man’s place in the larger scheme of things. Cynewulf’s narration of the Christ events establishes a metaphysical context which makes use of conventional Christian dichotomies of matter and spirit and since this greatly informs his anthropological ideas, the dominant themes in his arrangement of Christ’s acts require closer attention here.

At the outset of *Christ II*, the narrative perspective is entirely human and the scene itself is entirely temporal. The faithful messengers who spread the word of the

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16 John C. Pope’s comparison of the accounts of the Harrowing in Bede’s hymn and Christ II and his related arguments for a missing folio in the poem present an appealing explanation for the rather abrupt introduction of this event in line 558, but do not eliminate the chronological inconsistency, ‘The Lacuna in the Text of Cynewulf’s Ascension (Christ II 556b)’, Studies in Language, Literature and Culture of the Middle Ages and Later in Honour of Rudolph Willard, ed. E. B. Atwood and A. A. Hill (Austin, 1969), pp. 210-219. Brown, ‘The Descent-Ascent Motif’, pp. 7-8, Calder (Cynewulf, p. 54), and Anderson (Cynewulf, p. 47) all agree with Pope’s thesis of a lacuna, whereas Cook (Cynewulf’s Christ, p. 31) and Letson (‘The Homiletic Nature’, p. 196) seek alternative explanations. The critics listed here present merely a sample of the ways in which the Harrowing has been integrated into one or the other of the poem’s themes.

17 Cook, Cynewulf’s Christ, p. 31.

Lord’s Advent (449b-453a) rejoice at His prophesied Resurrection (468-72a) and later witness His actual Ascension (498-9a). The Lord’s arrival is localised in Bethlehem (449a) and His departure in Bethania (456b), precisely forty days after the Resurrection (466-7). In developing Gregory’s description of the Ascension, Cynewulf uses imagery from Bede’s hymn to extend this temporal scope. Like Bede, Cynewulf introduces the heavenly perspective of the angels who await Christ in heaven and contrasts angelic and human perspectives by building further on the motifs of up-down and ascent-descent. As men watch the Lord climb up from earth to heaven (Asc. Dom. 122.419.9-10; Chr. II 498-9a) and lament his departure (Chr. II 476-80), the angelic voices from up above provide the comfort that he will return again to earth on Judgment Day (Asc. Dom. 122.419.17; Chr. II 523-6). On the one hand, therefore, we find a contrast between earthly and heavenly perspectives. The sadness of those left behind on earth (476-80, 485-90) contrasts with the joy of heaven (Chr. II 550b-51a) at Christ’s arrival there, just as the joy of the heavenly city (blisse ... in peodnes burg 552a-553a) is contrasted with the lamentations of the earthly city of Jerusalem (Hierusalem ... in pa halgan burg, geomormode 533b-35). On the other hand, the two realms of heaven and earth also appear to be aligned in the common joy of both angels and faithful men: hope and joy is renewed in the city at the prospect of the Lord’s coming, whether in anticipation of His return to earth on Judgment Day or in the heavenly city at His Ascension:

| Hyht wæs geniwad,     | Hope was renewed, joy in the city, by the man’s coming. |
| blis in burgum,        |                                                      |
| þurh þæs beornes cyme. |                                                      |

(Chr. II 529b-30)

The suggestion of a larger community of the faithful on earth and in heaven becomes explicit in Cynewulf’s insertion of the Harrowing at this point and increasingly establishes the spiritual nature of such community. Immediately after his reference to the cities of earth and heaven, Cynewulf extends the cosmic scope further to include a

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19 Interestingly, these human witnesses initially lament His departure, as discussed p. 92 below.
20 Brown discusses the various scriptural analogues here, ‘The Descent-Ascent Motif’, p. 3. I suggest that Cynewulf’s use of Acts 1:3 serves to amplify the temporal scope here.
21 Calder sees these contrasts as being indicative of the ‘ironic distance between earth and heaven’. Cynewulf, p. 52. He also sees the misery of the faithful left behind (which is contrary to Hom. 29) as motivated by ‘psychological realism’ rather than theological accuracy, ibid., p. 54.
22 Since the cities are mentioned in juxtaposition, it is not clear which city is the referent here. S. A. J. Bradley, for example, translates this line as ‘Joy was renewed, and bliss in the cities...’, Bradley, ed. and trans., Anglo-Saxon Poetry (London, 1982), p. 221.
third realm, namely the city of hell itself: *feonda byrig* (‘the city of the enemy’ 569a). Again, we might expect an absolute contrast between these three cities, perhaps in terms of the respective realms of God and devil, and of men’s susceptibility to either of these two realms. Cynewulf’s focus, however, lies instead with the faithful of all three cities. The earthly ‘troops’ (*begna gedryht* 457-58a) follow Christ to Bethania and Jerusalem. The faithful ‘troops’ (*preat* 570) liberated from hell follow Christ to heaven after the Harrowing, and the heavenly ‘troops’ (*preat* 517-20; *here* 573a-76b) accompany Him at the Ascension. Cynewulf’s focus on the followers of Christ in all three domains increasingly points towards the unity which is possible at the transcendent spiritual level.

The imagery of cosmic warfare (which differentiates Cynewulf’s account of the Harrowing from that of Bede’s hymn) confirms that Cynewulf is concerned with the spiritual sphere:23

Now those devil-warriors are overcome, humiliated and bound in life-torment in the abyss of hell, bereft of honours. They could not profit in war, the throwing of weapons, since the King of Glory, the Helm of Heaven, did battle against His ancient enemies by His own might, when He led out the greatest booty from imprisonment in the city of enemies – countless people – this same throng which you now look upon. The Saviour of souls will now seek the Spirit’s gift-throne, God’s own child, after the battle-play. Now you know clearly what this Lord is who leads this army. Now go boldly [and] glad-heartedly to meet with friends.

These lines establish a spiritual opposition between the King of Heaven (564b), the Saviour of Souls (571b) who liberates this spiritual booty from incarceration in hell, and the satanic enemy (566a). This Christian imagery of spiritual warfare is a particular favourite of Cynewulf, as I shall consider at length in Chapter Five.24 In the present

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23 In all three *Christ* poems, the Harrowing gives rise to this imagery of spiritual warfare: *Advent Lyrics*, 149-55, *Christ III*, 150ff.

passage, the imagery of spiritual battle between Christ and devil predicts Cynewulf's later concern with the moral influences of Lord and devil on the souls of men (see 4.3 below), but the most notable feature in these early lines is that Cynewulf’s image of spiritual opposition is again punctuated by an emphasis on the unifying power of Christ amongst His faithful followers in all cosmic domains. The Lord’s power in the cosmic battle-play (gudplegan 573a) reveals Him as the true Lord, Victor over the realms of hell as well as Ruler of earth and heaven (ealles wealdend middangeardes ond mægenbrymmes 556b-57). Under this omnipotent Lord, men not only follow the call to extend the community of the faithful on earth (481-7a), but are united with the angels themselves in the peace and joy (575-6a above and italics below) of the sacred covenant:

\[ Sib sceal gemæne \]
\[ englum ond aldum \]
\[ wesan wideferh. \]
\[ godes ond monna, \]
\[ lufu, lifes hyht, ond ealles leohtes gefea. \]
\[ Wa:r is a:tsomne \]
\[ gæsthalig treow, \]
\[ (Chr. II 581b-585) \]
\[ Peace between angels and mortals shall hence-forth be for ever, eternally. There will be a covenant between God and men, a spirit-holy pledge, love, hope of life and the joy of all light. \]

The Christian community exists beyond space or time at the spiritual level in which love, hope, joy and true life reside eternally in Christ. Cynewulf’s careful articulation of these fundamental Christian principles predicts his later concern with the spiritual dimension of human experience and establishes a dichotomy which permeates his anthropological considerations.

Whilst Cynewulf’s initial narrative section omits direct references to the soteriological implications of the Christ events (in contrast with Hom. 29, p. 85 above), it certainly does not lack theological insight or symbolism, whether in its loaded imagery or in its skilful development of themes. Instead it establishes a historical (though not chronological) Christian context and, as I have argued, even a metaphysical or cosmic context which transcends the temporal realm in a way that has no precedent in either of Cynewulf’s immediate sources. At a narrative level, Cynewulf’s account of the Ascension presents the turning point from an earthly to a cosmic perspective, as illustrated by a transition from temporal to spiritual concerns. This is not only evident in Cynewulf’s introduction of the cosmic imagery of spiritual warfare, in which Christ and
devil battle for the souls of men at the Harrowing, but can also be seen in the changing human perspective itself.

At the moment preceding Christ’s Ascension, the faithful are mourning the impending departure of their Lord in characteristically poetic descriptions of inner turmoil:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Gesegon} & \text{ hi on heahþu} \\
& \text{ godbearn of grundum.} \\
& \text{ hat æt heortan,} \\
& \text{ hæs þe hi swa leofne} \\
& \text{ geseon under swegle.}
\end{align*}
\]

They saw the Lord, the God-child ascend up from earth into the heights. Their ‘minds’ were sad, hot at heart, mourning in ‘thought’, because they would no longer be able to see here below heaven the One so beloved.

The intensity of emotion is expressed by the familiar depiction of heat affecting the heart. The suggestion in this passage is that men’s joy and misery are initially defined by Christ’s actual presence or absence amongst men on earth. The apostles lament at not being able to see him (italics above) and their grief is only assuaged by Christ’s ensuing promise of His continued and unfailing presence:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{“GefeoO ge on ferðöe!} \\
& \text{ ac ic lufan symle} \\
& \text{ ond eow meaht giefse} \\
& \text{ awo to ealdre,} \\
& \text{ þurh gife mine} \\
& \text{ forð on frofre,} \\
& \text{ strengðu staþolfæstre}
\end{align*}
\]

In Christ II, the Ascension itself thus also presents the turning point at which men move beyond the literal following of Christ on earth to another level of allegiance.

The importance of the inner realm in following the Lord and holding his covenant is a dominant feature in the poem. After Christ’s literal departure, men must hold and love the Lord and the word within themselves in order to be granted inner strength, power and comfort which transcend time and space (line 478 above). Whether in spreading the faith, in maintaining inner peace, or cultivating the virtue and wisdom granted by Christ, the inner realm is a crucial image in the poem as a whole:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{... sibbe sawað} & \quad \text{on sefan manna} \\
& \quad \text{(Chr. II 487)} \\
\text{hat æt heortan,} & \quad \text{wæs seo treowlufu} \\
& \quad \text{beorn breostsefa.} \\
\text{... sow peace / kinship in the ‘hearts’ of men.}
\end{align*}
\]

The love of the pledge was hot at his heart, his chest welled up inside, [in] the man’s ‘breast’.

92
Then the One who created the world, God's Spirit, honoured us and gave gifts, up with the angels in eternal firmaments, and sowed and set manifold gifts and also diverse wisdom of 'mind' in the 'hearts' of men.

The inner domain is again the graphic locus, subject to heat and motions such as welling and swelling inside man. It is less relevant whether the heart or chest is the literal locus or the allegorical core in these lines, than that it is characterised as the central venue of experience. It is precisely this interiority of faith and worship within Christian living and virtue which later emerges as the centrepiece of Cynewulf's didactic message, both in terms of man's inner relationship with God and as the inner basis of outer action:

As I shall discuss in more detail in 4.3 below, the primacy of the inner as the locus of true faith and as the principle of virtuous action illustrates Cynewulf's clear emphasis on the importance of personal, private and inner worship as the root of outer exercise of this devotion. Cynewulf's approach to the relationship between inner and outer domains cannot be simplified in terms of private devotion and external ritual. His ethical ideas do not posit an ethics of intention over and beyond the exercise of faith in the practical sphere, but display a didactic interest in the inner bases of virtuous behaviour. In other words, Cynewulf's view of interiority and exteriority builds on the essential continuum of inner cause and outer effect, as well as on the significance of external events and stimuli for the inner life.
of the descent of the Holy Spirit after the Ascension (645-50a) and of the associated establishment of the Church as the true spiritual community (701b-11). The cosmic or metaphysical context which he establishes here clearly involves a delineation of temporal and spiritual spheres – as is indeed necessary in light of the fundamental theological concept of the spiritual community and the covenant of the faithful. The effect which this essentially Latin Christian context has on Cynewulf's view of human nature, the human constitution and its workings, and on how man's inner aspects appear in light of Cynewulf's spiritual concerns, however, remain to be explored in reference to Cynewulf's interpretative and hortatory passages in Christ II.

As this examination of the initial narrative part of Christ II has highlighted, the importance which Cynewulf attaches to a comprehensive theological context is evident both in his expansion of Gregory's lists of Christian events and in his thematic ordering of these events. Cynewulf's integration of motifs of spiritual warfare and his perspective of Christ's relation with man in terms of a metaphysical lordship schema establish a distinctive focus which is present neither in Gregory's homily nor in Bede's hymn. As the next part of my discussion illustrates, Cynewulf uses this context as a framework for exploring human nature and human purpose as well as man's capacity to fulfil this purpose. As we shall see, the interpretative passages of Christ II provide a detailed treatment of the human condition in reference to Christian salvation history and engage with the implications of a matter-spirit dichotomy in man. These anthropological considerations are the premises upon which Cynewulf builds in his final hortative passages of the poem, which illustrate how an understanding of oneself through Christ allows the individual to make sense of and evaluate his own experience, and to direct his desires and behaviour in light of his nature and purpose as a human being.

4.2 Human Nature in its Soteriological Context: Understanding Man through Christ

The significance of Christ's acts for men becomes increasingly apparent towards the end of Cynewulf's initial narrative, as outlined above. The first explicit articulation
of the full importance of these events for men, however, occurs in his interpretative section (586-711). This part of Christ II provides us with important insights into Cynewulf’s view of human nature and human workings which are outlined in direct reference to the theological context established at the outset of the poem. Whilst adhering, overall, to the order of topics of Gregory’s homily, Cynewulf develops these episodes in a way which illustrates how the various gifts and benefits accompanying Christ’s acts shape human beings and reveal the shared nature by which men may understand and evaluate themselves in relation to their Lord. As I shall argue in the coming discussion, Cynewulf places man firmly in his historical and metaphysical contexts and in doing so establishes the basis for his subsequent didactic exhortation to the Christian ‘spiritual’ life. Given that Cynewulf’s central focus on the spiritual sphere of human existence is thoroughly embedded in a Latin Christian worldview, the next part of my discussion traces the extent to which this theological context informs his anthropological thought.

Having narrated Christ’s acts in lines 440-485, Cynewulf turns to the immediate significance of these events for men in the here and now (italics added for emphasis):

Hwæt, we nu gehyrdan, hu ƿæt hælubærn ðurh his hydorcymne hals eft forgeaf; gefreode ond gefrœpade folc under wolcnum, ðære meotades sunu, þet nu monna gehwylc cwic pændæ hæt wunæð, geceosan mot swa helle hienþu swa heofones mærþu, swa ƿæt leohте leoft swa þa laþan niht, swa þrymmes þrace swa þystra wræce, swa mid dryhten dream swa mid deoflum hream, swa wite mid wraþum swa wulдор mid arum, swa lif swa deað, swa him leofre bið to gefremmane, wuniað in worulde.

Lo, we have now heard how the Saviour-child, glorious Son of the Ordainer, gave health again through His coming here, liberated and protected people beneath the clouds so that every man who now dwells here alive may choose either the humiliation of hell or the glory of heaven, either the bright light or the loathsome night, either heaven’s glory or dark exile, either joy with the Lord or misery with devils, either torture among the wretched or honour among the glorious, either life or death as is preferable to him to do, whilst flesh and spirit dwell in

Although this catalogue is informed by conventional Christian imagery and themes (which we encounter repeatedly across the Cynewulf canon), it again has no immediate parallel in either Gregory’s homily or in Bede’s hymn. Cynewulf here translates the two cosmic domains of heaven and hell into moral options that entail eschatological consequences. In other words, the choice (589b) is between two opposing types of life which imply two contrasting fates. The opposition covers literal, tropological and
anagogical dimensions and at the same time develops previous cosmic images. Thus, the imagery of light and dark, glory and humiliation, and of joy and misery recalls previous descriptions of heaven (503-5; leohthes gefeah 584; dreama dream 565b) and hell (in cwicsusle gehyned and gehæfte, in helles grund 561b-2). With this passage, moreover, we move from a view of human beings as passive war-booty in a cosmic conflict (above, p. 90) to a new focus on the central importance of the active human role, as reflected in man’s choice between two options that demarcate spiritual life or death on earth and beyond. This choice, as we hear, is to be made by man during his life on earth, a life defined by the union of flesh and spirit (597b-98a). The appearance of this anthropological dichotomy at the end of a catalogue concerned with the opposition between the moral and spiritual spheres of devil and Christ is particularly intriguing. Rather than associating the flesh with one domain and the spirit with another, however, the intricate layers contained in the opposing domains of devil and God suggest a more complex view of anthropological duality.

Since Cynewulf articulates his ideas about body and soul and about human nature and potential firmly in reference to a larger theological context, I shall trace these ideas in reference to Cynewulf’s exploration of the significance of Christ’s acts for men.

In the ensuing passages (lines 611b-711), Cynewulf essentially considers the various gifts and benefits accompanying Christ’s acts. After listing the great variety of material gifts which the Lord bestows on Creation (600-11a), such as possessions and wealth (æhta sped 604b, welan 605a) and the shelter, light and weather which provide sustenance (605-11a, duguè 609. feorhnere 610a) and health for men on earth, Cynewulf turns to those gifts specifically associated with Christ’s Ascension and concludes his wide-ranging list in reference to the central gift of hæle (613a, literally ‘health’ or ‘wholeness’; more specifically ‘salvation’):
secgan þone ond lóf
ond huru þære hælo
ða he þa yrmðu
æt his upstige

þæs we ealles sculon
beodne ussum,
þe he us to hyhte forgeaf,
eft oncyrd
þe we ær drugon...
(Chr. II 611b-15)

For all this we must say thanks and praise to our Prince, and especially for that health
[salvation] which He gave to us as hope, when at His Ascension He reversed the
wretchedness which we previously suffered...

In discussing the hæle given back to men at the Incarnation (586-98a, p. 95 above),
Cynewulf placed emphasis on man’s renewed moral choice. In lines 611b-15, Cynewulf
now deepens his picture of hæle as the ‘hope’ or ‘joy’ (hyhte) enabled by Christ’s
Ascension. The notion of salvation itself – of giving ‘health’ back to men (586, 613a) –
of course depends on the notion of the fall of man (or in Cynewulf’s words, the loss of
hælo) in this Christian context and Cynewulf develops the soteriological context of
man’s fall and his redemption through Christ in elaborating Gregory’s brief reference to
the First Judgment and its reversal at the Ascension:

Sed hoc nobis magnopere, fratres charissimi, in
hac solemnitate pensandum est, quia deletum est
hodierna die chirographum damnationis nostrae,
mutata est sententia corruptionis nostrae. Illa enim
natura cui dictum est: Terra es, et in terram ibis
[Genes, III, 19], hodie in coelum ivit.
(Hom. 29.10, Col.1218C-D)

Dearest brothers, in this celebration we must
consider especially that it was on this very day
that the certificate of our damnation was
destroyed, the sentence of our corruption
commuted. For our nature, of which it was said,
“You are earth and into the earth you will
return.” [Gen. 3.19], on this day went into
heaven.

...ond geþingade
wið fæder swæsne
cyning anboren.
saulum to sibbe,
þurh yrne hyge
620
‘Ic þec ofer eorðan geworhte, on þære þu scealt
ymþum lifgan,
wunian in gewinne
feondum to hrobor
ond to þære ilcan scealt
625
wyrmum aweallen,
of þære eorðan scealt

þeodbuendum
fæþa máeste,
Cwide eft onhwearf
se þe ær sungen wæs
aeldum to sorge:
‘I made you from the earth; on it you shall live in
wretchedness, dwell in strife and endure exile, to
the glee of enemies [you will] sing the death-
song, and you will again turn into that same
[earth], well with worms, [and] from that earth
you must then seek further the fire of
punishment.’
(Chr. II 616-26)

... and the Single-born King interceded for earth-
dwellers with the beloved Father for the greatest
of feuds. He reversed again, for the peace of
souls, that pronunciation which had been
proclaimed in anger before, to the sorrow of
mortals:

Cynewulf here contrasts the hope and joy facilitated by the Ascension with the poverty
and desolation of man’s fallen state (614-15) and continues to use the contrasting
imagery of enmity and peace, misery and joy, and death and life. Again, his concern is
with the peace of the spiritual community, the renewed relationship with the Lord which
is enabled by Christ through his acts. Given the dichotomy of body and soul which we
already encountered in lines 597b-8a, we might perhaps expect the peace of souls to
contrast with the literal mortality of the body. Crucially, however, Cynewulf’s passage

suggests that they are conceived as concrete and temporal gifts. For an interpretation of these as gifts as
gifts of Nature and Grace, see Chase, ‘Grace through Christ’s Presence’, p. 92.
seems to encompass man’s damnation to literal death (wyrmum aweallen 625a) as well as to man’s eschatological damnation to hell (wites fyr 625b). Just as God’s first Judgment pertains to man as a whole, Cynewulf’s depiction of Christ’s reversal of this Judgement underlines that the Ascension allows man to transcend mortality in the renewed spiritual life on earth as well as in the eschatological afterlife. In other words, although the body is unquestionably the transient aspect of man, doomed to return to the worms, Cynewulf emphasises that Christ’s Incarnation and Ascension reverse his damned state – represented by the mortality of the body and its decay with the worms as well as by his spiritual mortality in hell. The redemption of both body and soul is a crucial element of Cynewulf’s account of the possibility of salvation granted by Christ.

Although Cynewulf does not go into the question of inherited sin, for example of whether sin might be transmitted by soul or body, he is quite clear about the dignification of the body through Christ’s Incarnation. After God’s First Judgment of men, the Lord Himself comforted and honoured men by taking on human form without sin:

He climbed into the woman, that unblemished maiden and there received human form without sins – that became a comfort to all earth-dwellers.

Lo, this Prince did us, the race of men, honour when He received limbs and body...

Interestingly, Cynewulf here amplifies the honour to men above the debasement of divinity which Gregory emphasises in his homily (p. 85 above). The apparent elevation of the status of the body through Christ – whether as the reversal of inherent sinfulness or as the transcendence of the sinful flesh – is also suggested in Cynewulf’s interpretations of the Ascension:

That Saviour-child climbed up high with our body, the living God.

I shall return to the roles of body and soul in matters of human agency and responsibility in greater detail when considering Cynewulf’s discussion of such matters

21 I return to Cynewulf’s account of Christ’s ‘leaps’ in their textual context in 4.3.

29 The role of the body in human salvation is a prominent interest across Gregory’s writings, although is rather unpronounced in Homily 29, see Straw, Perfection in Imperfection, pp. 135-6.
in his didactic conclusions (4.3 below). Suffice it to say for the moment, that Cynewulf’s focus on human salvation by Grace pertains as much to the body as to other aspects of man. This becomes particularly clear in his account of the talents and gifts which the Lord bestows upon men at the Ascension.

Whereas Gregory the Great follows 1 Cor. 12.8, listing primarily spiritual gifts relevant to the interpretation of scripture, Cynewulf’s expanded enumeration of the gifts given to men at the Ascension presents us with a fuller range of talents.

Dedit vero dona hominibus, quia, misso desuper Spiritu, aliis sermonem sapientiae, aliis sermonem scientiae, aliis gratiam virtutum, aliis gratiam curationum, aliis genera linguarum, aliis interpretationem tribuit sermonum [Cor. XII, 8].

But ‘He gave gifts to men’, because, when the Holy Spirit was sent from above, it allotted the word of wisdom to one, to another the word of knowledge, to another the grace of virtues, to another the grace of healings, to another the various kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues [1 Cor. 12.8]. So He gave gifts to men.

It is worth citing Cynewulf’s more comprehensive list in full here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>660</td>
<td>ða us geweorðade  se pas world gescop, 665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>666</td>
<td>godes gæstænu,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>667</td>
<td>ond us giefe sealdæ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>uppe mid englum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>674</td>
<td>ece stæbelæs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>675</td>
<td>ond eac monigealde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>677</td>
<td>modes snytræ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>678</td>
<td>seow ond sætæ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>680</td>
<td>geond sæfan monna.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cynewulf’s fuller range of gifts reflects the vernacular treatment of the gifts of men in gnomic poems like the Gifts of Men and Maxims. 30 Whereas the gifts of wise eloquence

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30 Anderson has surveyed the various scriptural, patristic and so-called ‘Germanic’ elements of this catalogue in significant detail. Anderson, Cynewulf, pp. 28-43; see also J. E. Cross, ‘The Old English Poetic Theme of the Gifts of Men’, NP 46.1 (1962): 66-70. Letson, surprisingly, considers lines 586-626 as an essentially homiletic catalogue, as ‘little more than a paean explaining and expanding this Gregorian
(wordlahe wise 664), fine perception (æðele ondgiet 666a), skill in song and harp playing (666b-70a), recitation of divine law (670b-71a), astrology and writing (671b-73a) are compatible with the new spiritual life enabled at the Ascension, the gifts of skill in battle, seafaring, tree climbing, weapon making and travel experience (673b-81a) are more difficult to reconcile even with the end of personal salvation.  

In the critical debate about whether to interpret Cynewulf's list of gifts literally or allegorically, the dominant view proposes a proportional split between 'physical' and 'spiritual' gifts, a position which is in keeping with Cynewulf's idea of the Lord's grace pertaining to all aspects of man.

Without denigrating the temporal qualities and gifts of men, Cynewulf's list places particular emphasis on the workings of the Holy Spirit in men. His list begins and ends with the wisdom which the Spirit grants to men (660-4, 683-4a) and the descriptions in his catalogue place emphasis on the meta-physical, the spiritual level at which men participate in the community of Christ, however limited their own gifts may be in comparison with the Lord's abundance:

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685 So the Ruler, the Son of God, grants His gifts to us on earth. He does not give all of the Spirit's wisdom to a single man lest pride harms him, by his own skill [thinking himself to be] above others. So mighty God, King of all creatures, honours the offspring of the earth by unstinting gifts, with skills; just as He bestows glory on the blessed in heaven, He establishes peace always and forever between angels and men; in this way He honours His creation.

Cynewulf is certainly concerned with the spiritual domain at which the peace of the faithful community operates (italics above). It is not at all clear, however, whether it is man's spiritual soul that is involved at this level. Rather, in accordance with the
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vernacular tradition, the inner aspects stand at centre stage and their involvement in this spiritual domain is a striking feature in his list of talents.

The Holy Spirit (godes gæstsumu 660a) sends wisdom ‘into’ the mod and sefa (660-3) and noble understanding (ædele ondgiht 666a) ‘into’ the modes gemynd (665a). Song and speech, in turn, arise from wise skill within (ham bid snytrtu craeft / bifolen on ferde 667b-8a) as much as do the capacity to expound divine Law (670b-1a) and the ability to understand astrological phenomena (671b). Whether we see the specific gifts of human interpretation and understanding as mental rather than as spiritual talents (as Letson and Wine do), or view specific skills such as the art of poetry as instances of divine ‘inspiration’ (as Anderson does), the diverse talents of men appear to reflect the involvement of the Spirit in all virtuous human action and the inner realm emerges both as the locus of inner action and the principle of outer action. We may of course postulate that the gifts of the Spirit (gæstes gife) represent aspects of the Logos dwelling in humans and illustrate men’s capacity to be intelligent or divine. Cynewulf’s images, however, do not operate in reference to a spiritual soul which reflects, for example, the trinitarian image of God. Instead, the inner realm quite graphically operates as the realm in which spiritual forces operate within and interact with the human.

In line with poetic tradition, it is the inner aspects with which man explores the spiritual mysteries (440-2), rejoices in Christ’s presence (475), laments at his absence (500 535, 540), receives inner peace as well as strength (487, 661) and chooses to follow Christ and participate in the spiritual community (see further 4.3 below). Although the inner aspects do not in any way appear to participate in the afterlife of the soul or indeed to be considered as essentially spiritual aspects of man, their involvement in the process of salvation – whether as receptacles of Grace or as active initiators of the spiritual life – highlights their thorough involvement in the spiritual sphere of human experience. They do so as receptacles for receiving and containing the divine gifts, and the infusions and inspirations of poets and prophets (665, 670a-71), but also as agents of thought, and, crucially, of choice. Cynewulf’s presentation of these inner aspects in the context of an anthropological duality, however, reflects a number of unusual traits.

33 For Anderson, ‘memory’, ‘understanding’ and ‘inspiration’ present the three stages of the poetic vocation, which Cynewulf expresses across his signed poems, Cynewulf, p. 38.
A particularly interesting feature of Christ II is that despite its use of poetic descriptions and conventions to express human workings, Cynewulf appears far more interested in the *gaest* (597b-98a; 776b-78a) than in the *sawul* (which appears exclusively in alliterating contexts (*saulum to sibbe* 619, also 819, 571). In the one instance where *sawul* is collocated with the body it is varied with *gaest* (817-820a). This lexical choice appears to reflect Cynewulf’s interest in highlighting the parallels between the human spirit and the spiritual sphere of cosmic reality – that of battling spirits (*gaesta gifrast* 813a), of the Holy Spirit (*gaest, gaestes giefes* 644a, 710a; *gaestes snytrtru* 684a), and of the spiritual community of the spiritual Lord (*godes gaestsunu* 660a, 860a; *gaestic tungol* 699; *fieder, frofre gaest* 728a; *bone bliðan gaest* 774b; *gaestes wîte* 848a) with its spiritual pledge (*gaesthalig trow* 584). Furthermore, whereas Cynewulf presents the *sawul* as devoid of psychological or personal characteristics, he appears to be stretching poetic convention by attributing faith itself to the human *gaest*:

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þæt we mid heortan
þær we mid gaeste
Is us þearf micel
georne gehyfoc
(Chr. II 751b-53)
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There is great need for us to seek health / salvation with our hearts, where we will believe firmly with [our] spirit

This attribution of active faith to the *gaest* finds numerous parallels in the homiletic tradition, but in poetry it is only paralleled in verse hagiography that is either included in or considered to be influenced by the Cynewulf canon.\(^\text{34}\) This use of *gaest* in an agentive sense in *Andreas*, for example, has been described as a ‘bad habit’ resulting from the absence of an alliterating ‘mind-word’ beginning with g- (as opposed to *sefa* which can be supplied instead of *sawul* in agentive contexts).\(^\text{35}\) Certainly, *gaest* alliterates in line 753, but since the view of a thinking and contemplating *gaest* is also a pronounced feature in *Juliana* and *Elene* (as I discuss in subsequent chapters) the close relationship between the *gaest* and the inner domain suggested in these lines should not be dismissed here. Although Cynewulf’s application of the term *gaest* in *Christ II* overall makes it abundantly clear that he views this aspect as the spiritual part of man in contrast with the body, and that he clearly embraces the larger metaphysical duality of transient material and transcendent spiritual realms of existence, it would appear that the primary importance of the spiritual in *Christ II* is only tentatively applied to his presentation of the human constitution itself. The primacy of the inner aspects as loci of

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\(^{35}\) Lockett, ‘Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons’, p. 58.
experience and as active participants in the moral and spiritual domains remains the dominant feature of Cynewulf's picture of man in *Christ II*. The central role of the inner domain becomes a particularly notable feature of Cynewulf's exploration of man's composite state in the didactic conclusions of the poem, as the final discussion of this chapter illustrates.

4.3 Applying Christian Understanding to the Life of the Individual

I have demonstrated so far that the design of *Christ II* contains a didactic methodology which moves from the narration of Christian events to the interpretation of these events. Cynewulf's narration of the larger theological context in which Christ liberates men from moral and eschatological enslavement to the devil prepared for his outline of the soteriological context which highlighted his particular interest in man's freedom of choice between two types of life and two respective eschatological fates. In the final didactic passages of the poem, Cynewulf increases his focus on human responsibility and adds concrete instructions to his preceding contemplations. His final exhortations to the spiritual and moral life on earth and his eschatological concerns with God's Judgment of the soul in the afterlife take place in the context of a more condensed treatment of a dual human nature and a dualistic worldview which is prescribed by the larger theological and soteriological contexts already outlined. As I shall argue, the inner domain emerges as a central feature in Cynewulf's examination of the complexities of human experience at a moral level, not only as the inner basis of outer action, but also as that forum within which each individual can participate in the spiritual community and move towards salvation by God's Grace.

Many interpretative insights in Cynewulf's preceding discussion are accompanied by hortatory exclamations, most prominently relating to the thanks and praise owed for the gifts (598b-604, 612b) and in particular for the hope of *haele* (613a) granted by Christ at His Ascension. The most comprehensive and detailed translation of theological insights into didactic instruction, however, occurs from line 746b. Cynewulf initially gathers the many images relating to Christ's movements between heaven and
earth and presents His acts as ‘leaps’ in accordance with *Hom.* 29. 10 (Col. 1218C-D).36

In *Christ II* this passage is the first to establish typological parallels between man and Christ in order to illustrate that it is Christ’s own example which shows men the rightful path:

Thus here on earth God’s eternal Son sprang in leaps over the high hillsides, courageous up over the mountains. So must we men spring in leaps in the thoughts of our hearts from strength to strength [virtue to virtue] and strive after glorious things, so that we may rise by holy works to the highest heaven where there is joy and bliss in the virtuous company of God’s servants. There is great need for us to seek salvation with our hearts, where we will believe firmly with [our] spirit that the Saviour-child, the living God, climbed up high with our body.

Drawing on his previous narration and explication of the relevance of the Christ events for men in general, Cynewulf now provides explicit instructions for each individual in more concrete terms. His emphasis on each man’s need to seek salvation with his heart (752) illustrates his interest in the inner striving (752) and inner virtue (746b-48) which enable good works (750a). Rather than suggesting an ethics of intention which supersedes the need for good works, it is apparent that both inner striving for heavenly glory (746b-751) and the execution of holy works (750a) are perceived as necessary preconditions for salvation. Whereas Cynewulf’s preceding narration and contemplation of Christian truths might lead us to expect a didactic onus on the contemplative life over and above the active life, his interest in the inner domain here suggests that true intention and spiritual faith (753) are the roots of all virtuous behaviour. An understanding of these bases of inner and outer virtue thus becomes an important element in the process of self-realisation through Christ.

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36 Gregory moves from Habacuc’s to Solomon’s account of the glory of the Ascension primarily to amplify the growth of the Church as central to the ‘high points of [the Lord’s] great works’ (*Hom.* 29.10). The first two leaps of Incarnation and Birth bring comfort to men (*paet to frofre gewearo* 722b-23a). The third and fourth leaps of Christ’s Crucifixion and Resurrection embellish the ‘up-down’ motif (*rodercyninges ras. *pa he on rode astaq 727; *pa he bone beam ofgeaf, folderne faest 729b-30a). The most obvious addition to Gregory’s list, the Harrowing, (730b-36a) again makes extended use of the imagery of lines 558-70 (*pa he hellwarena heap forhygde / in cwicstas, cyning inne gebond, 731-2) but now explicitly emphasises the chains of sin from which Christ liberates the faithful (*in carcerne clommum gefastnad, synnum gesaled 735). The misery of hell again contrasts directly with the joy of heaven. Significantly it is with the sixth, the final leap of the Ascension that hope and joy is attained in the fulfilment of prophesy (715-19; 736b-43).
In *Christ II*, faith itself, it would appear, is a matter of choice. Cynewulf already expressed this idea in the main body of the poem. Besides highlighting the importance of man’s free moral choice (Cynewulf never refers to this as free will) in his account of the Incarnation (p. 95 above), Cynewulf also adapted Gregory’s account of Christ’s Ascension as the metaphorical flight of a bird (*Hom* 29.10, col.1218C, *Chr. II* 639-58) in order to highlight the importance of men’s willingness or unwillingness to believe in Christ’s divinity. Unlike the faithful who witness and contemplate Christ’s Ascension, the Jews, with hearts of stone (*heartan stænne* 641b), contradict (*ondsæc fremedon 655b*) the event and the word of the prophet. They cannot understand (*ne ongitan meahtan* 637b), not because of intellectual weakness (as we shall also hear again in *Elene*), but because they refuse to recognise (*noldan hi þa torhtan tacen oncnawan* 642) and believe (*ne gelyfdon* 656a). In adapting Gregory’s brief reference to the unbelieving Jews, Cynewulf thus focuses on how recognition of Christian truth is ultimately a matter of individual choice. The refusal to acknowledge Christ’s descent and ascent in human form lies at the heart of faithless vice and sin (638-49). Conversely, as we hear in Cynewulf’s later exhortations, the need to both contemplate and accept the spiritual mysteries (*gaestgerynum* 713, 440b) and to care for one’s spiritual health (*gaestes þærfe* 816) are essential to that virtue by which each man may work towards his salvation by God’s Grace.

Cynewulf’s didactic emphasis on man’s need to believe in the revealed events (751 b-3), to become aware of their significance and immediate relevance, has of course been a persistent feature throughout *Christ II*. The need for contemplation of *gaestgeryne* (spiritual mystery) was announced in the first lines of the poem (440-442). Contemplation of these mysteries by wise men (713) sets the rightful example which contrasts with the example of the Jews, who not only disbelieve, but also disregard their own spiritual need (706-710). Cynewulf’s final exhortations thus present the accumulation and culmination of preceding insights. As we hear in his didactic conclusions, contemplation of the Spirit’s form (*Is us þærfe micel / þæt we gaestes wite ...georne bipencen* 847b-49) is as important as man’s contemplation of his own spiritual need (816). For Cynewulf, the better life is clearly the spiritual (*gaestlice*) life, although what precisely this is and what it tells us about Cynewulf’s view of human identity requires closer attention. Since Cynewulf’s emphasis on spiritual concerns pertain both
to man's life as a composite being and to the eschatological fate of the soul, I shall consider this emphasis in the context of his wider anthropological and metaphysical ideas as expressed in the conclusions of *Christ II*.

Since the eschatological fate of the soul depends on the deeds done during composite life, concerns with human choice and responsibility remain central to Cynewulf's epilogue. The primary concern throughout this epilogue (796-814, into which Cynewulf's signature is inscribed, 825b-47b) is the instruction of men on earth (817b-819, 848b-9a) in anticipation of Judgment. In this chronologically appropriate apocalyptic finale, Cynewulf emphasises the transience of the worldly domain and the futility of earthly things (840b-45) and in doing so highlights the importance of man's transcendent spiritual need during life on earth: 38

Therefore I want to teach each dear one that he should neither neglect nor overwhelm in greed the spirit's need, whilst God wills that he lives here in the world, whilst together journey the soul in the body, in the guest-house. Every man should eagerly reflect during his days how humbly the Ruler of power came to us from the first through the angel's word. Now he will be zealous when He comes again, hard and righteous.

Cynewulf evidently amplifies the centrality of the spiritual life. His reference to the body as a ‘guest-house’ here even suggests that the *gæst / sawul* acts as the central and continuing carrier of identity, that eternal aspect of man which dwells only temporarily in the body. For Cynewulf, Doomsday reveals the transience of all earthly things including the body and it appears that the body, whilst dignified by Christ, is thus the inferior aspect of man whose needs are inferior to those of the spirit. The spiritual life, however, does not consist merely in the contemplation of Christ's spiritual nature and mystery in the contemplative or ascetic life. On this point, Cynewulf's exhortations contrast with Gregory's use of the principle of *imitatio Christi* as an incentive for apparently ascetic orientation:

37 As in Gregory's homily, Judgement Day becomes the ultimate impetus to choice of the better life on earth, whilst framing all *Heilsgeschichte* in the context of Christ's First and Second Coming: 'And especially we must consider that He who ascended in peace will return with terror; and whatever He commanded us with gentleness, He will exact from us with severity. So let no one undervalue the time given for repentance. Let no one neglect to do his task while he can, because our Redeemer will come to judge us all the more strictly in that He was so patient with us before the Judgement.' (*Hom. 29.11.4-10*).

38 It is because he did not follow the Lord's commandments in scripture (792-3a) that he faces the fear (789b-793a) which all sinners must share on that final day (833b-840), the prospect of eternal pain and exile (*synwrace 794a*).
Therefore, dearest brothers, we should follow Him there with our hearts where we believe He ascended with His body. Let us flee from earthly desires. Let nothing delight us now below, we who have a Father in heaven.

In reference to the need to forsake idle pleasures (*forpon we a sculon idle lustas, synwunde forseon 756-57a*), Cynewulf does not suggest the rejection of the world for contemplation of the heavenly realm. Rather, as we saw at the outset of this discussion, his interest in the inner bases of behaviour in his description of *imitatio Christi* amplifies the need for inner virtue (746b-48) and good works (750a). Though debased on account of their transience, the body and corporeal experience are of course intrinsic elements of identity in that human nature and human life on earth are fundamentally defined by the composition of body and soul or spirit (597b-98a, 776b-78a). Rather than associating the self first and foremost with the eternal soul, it appears that Cynewulf uses the inner domain to explore the complexity of human experience and suggests that man’s rightful orientation towards the better life depends on self-understanding as a composite being. This is particularly apparent in his examination of human agency and responsibility in the processes of temptation, vice and sin.

In lines 758-72 Cynewulf emphasises the moral dimensions of man’s need to believe in Christ in the context of an opposition which is again directly associated with the choice between two types of life (757b) and which is again placed in the context of a larger cosmic battle:

```
Habbæ we us to frofre fæder on roderum ælmeahtigne. He his aras þonan, 
760 halig of heahðu, hider onsended, þa us gesciladþ wið sceþpendra 
eglum earþfarum, þi læs unholdan 
wunde gewyrceþ, þonne wrohtbora 
in folc godes forð onsended
765 of his brægbogan biterne stræl. 
Forpon we fæste sculon wið þam færscyte 
symle wærlice wearde healdan, 
by læs se attres ord in gebuge, 
biter bordgelac, under banlocan,
770 feonda færsearo. þet bið frecne wund, 
blatast benna. (Chr. II 758-71a)
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We have as our aid the almighty Father in the heavens. He sends his messengers from there, holy from the heights, who shield us here against the harsh flight of arrows, lest these fiends should work wounds [in us] when the harbinger of sin sends forth bitter darts from his bow into the people of God.

Therefore we must always warily keep firm guard against a sudden onslaught, lest the poisoned point, the bitter dart, should pierce in under the bone-coffer by the clever way of enemies. That is a fierce wound, the most dangerous of gashes.

The imagery of spiritual warfare is not present in Gregory’s *Homily 29* and Cynewulf appears to be drawing on widely developed biblical images, such as the devil’s darts.
(Eph. 6:17). In his presentation of the Father in heaven as the sanctuary (fregopa 73b) and the Spirit's weapons (774-5) as the defence against devilish arrows and deceptions (lapra lygesarum 776a), Cynewulf clearly amplifies the moral dimension of the danger. Cynewulf's metaphor represents the body as an external fortress which the devil attempts to breach in order to attack the responsible core within. As Holly Jagger has argued, Cynewulf's attitude towards the body is highly ambivalent and his metaphors of corporeality give a sense of 'man's precarious physicality, especially in the images of the body as an insecure enclosure and temporary wrapper of the soul'. Rather than being the root of sin, the body appears here as the weaker element - as that aspect of man which is either more susceptible to or less resilient against the darts of the devil (767-9). Nevertheless, as we hear repeatedly, the Lord's protection guards against the devilish arrows (779-82a) and since the metaphor itself operates on images of interiority and exteriority rather than materiality and spirituality, the moral roles of body and soul remain elusive.

Rather than suggesting that Cynewulf is not concerned with the details of moral responsibility and agency, the metaphor illustrates the useful function which the inner domain assumes in the examination of psychological processes in the context of a dualistic anthropology. We could insist that the soul or spirit is internalised in the metaphor, or consider the way in which the inner domain presents a more elusive locus of agency which is able to engage with the totality of varying domains of experience without specifying causal relations. As we have already seen, this inner domain acts as the central locus of spiritual events and as that forum within which man can participate in the spiritual community, both as the receptacle of spiritual gifts and the venue of devilish attack. The flexibility and centrality of the inner domain as agentive and experiencing core thus reflects man's humanity rather than exclusively his corporeality or spirituality. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Cynewulf develops this role of the inner aspects by means of more extensive use of the psychomachia imagery in Juliana and by more detailed accounts of inner workings in Ellen.
It has become clear over the course of this chapter that Cynewulf’s anthropological ideas are informed by the theological, historical, and metaphysical contexts which he outlines at great length in Christ II. The history of mankind is shaped by fall and by redemption through Christ, as well as by His guidance, sustenance and protection. Though of course deeply informed by a fundamentally Latin Christian worldview, Cynewulf’s narration, interpretation and instruction do not merely take over accounts from his immediate sources. His poem places Christ’s redeeming acts in the context of human salvation history at large and in doing so it explores questions of human nature, human purpose and man’s capacity for self-realisation in the process of moving towards salvation. Over the course of the poem, there is a shift from the temporal to the spiritual realm which is facilitated by the theological climax of the Ascension. Here the spiritual becomes firmly located inside man. As I have argued throughout, the inner domain in Christ II emerges as a central feature in Cynewulf’s exploration of the complexity of human experience as a composite being.

For Cynewulf, human nature and human life on earth are fundamentally defined by the composition of body and soul or spirit. Significantly, Cynewulf is far more interested in the gaest (penden flæsc ond gaest wunia in worulde 597b-98a; se us lif forgeaf. leomu. lic ond gaest 776b-78a) than in the sawul. This feature goes hand in hand with Cynewulf’s interest in the spiritual life, the renewed life facilitated by Christ’s acts. Rather than denigrating the body outright or seeking in it the root of sin, Cynewulf emphasises the way in which Christ honours and comforts men by taking on human form. Christ’s gifts of physical talents and His Ascension in body (pæt hælobearn heoman up stige / mid usce lichoman. lifgende god 754-5) dignify the status of man’s corporeal form and amplify human potential for the better life, the spiritual life on earth and beyond. Cynewulf’s use of gaest as I have argued, amplifies the spiritual dimension of human experience in life without fully integrating inner aspects into a matter-spirit dichotomy. Rather, the inner aspects themselves appear to determine the eschatological fate of the sawul / gaest by choosing and participating in the spiritual community already in earthly life. Cynewulf’s view of the inner aspects as receptacles of Grace and therefore as deeply involved in the process of salvation allows us to recognise their central and defining status in human being. Indeed their intermediary status between corporeal and spiritual domains and their central role in mediating two dichotomous
orientations allows the inner aspects to account for the totality of human experience, including the fallibility of human understanding and human choice during life on earth. The better life, the spiritual life, is ever present in Gregory's homily and is of course informed by the larger Christian tradition of ecclesia as the community of the faithful. In Christ II, however, the various aspects of this 'better' life are woven into the larger didactic structure of the poem. Contemplation of Christ's acts necessitates not only thanks, praise and virtuous behaviour, but facilitates a deeper understanding of ourselves as human beings. This life, for Cynewulf, is the spiritual life in which man contemplates the spiritual mysteries and gains an understanding of his own spiritual need which resides in his participation in the community of the faithful on earth and beyond.
Chapter Five

Juliana: A Figural Approach to the Inner Self

With Cynewulf's Juliana, we move from the contemplative and sometimes almost analytical tone of Christ II to a narrative poem which is deeply embedded in the hagiographical tradition and which accordingly focuses on the lives and feats of particular (and remarkable) characters. As the poem's editorial title suggests, Juliana is the central protagonist of this narrative. Cynewulf's account of the struggles (and the ultimate martyrdom) which this saintly Christian character faces at the hands of the pagan Heliseus appears to be based on a Latin prose Passio S. Iulianae extant in the Acta Sanctorum.1 Much attention has been paid to Cynewulf's systematic adaptation of his apparently 'historically and psychologically realistic' source into an 'abstract' and 'highly stylised fiction'.2 Most scholars agree that the dynamics of the narrative and of its themes and imagery are driven primarily by contrast and opposition: the abstract opposition between good and evil and the cosmic opposition between God and the devil are reflected at the human level by the opposition between Christian saint and pagan sinner. Since Cynewulf's adaptations appear to be informed by a 'polarisation of character and attitude', which is variously seen to entail a 'psychological simplification' or even a 'thorough elimination of the deliberately pointed psychology of his source',


most critics have approached Cynewulf's apparently 'flat' and 'stylised' character types primarily in terms of their figural importance and not in terms of any psychological insight they might offer. Those critics who do acknowledge that 'Cynewulf's concerns in the poem are both theological and psychological' have sought patristic psychological ideas primarily in the poem's description of the processes of human vice and sin which Cynewulf integrates into his extended metaphor of psychomachia in lines 325-417a. Indeed in these lines, which have no parallel in the Passio S. Julianae (henceforth Passio), Cynewulf's own interest in psychological processes is undeniable. I suggest, however, that rather than being divorced from the larger narrative, Cynewulf's discussions of the processes of vice and sin in men are fully integrated into the poem as a whole and significantly inform his mode of characterisation itself.

In reference to Cynewulf's adaptation of character and theme in Juliana, I shall show that the polarised and stylised characters of this poem are not, as is so often claimed, devoid of psychological insight. Certainly, Cynewulf's static character types essentially reflect a stylised universal conflict between good and evil and reflect the cosmic opposition between God and devil at the human level in terms of the struggle between Christian saint and heathen sinner. Nevertheless, it is essentially a human struggle which carries the concrete and didactic weight in the poem and Cynewulf's mode of characterisation not only allows him to reflect abstract theological oppositions in figural terms but also to explore the significance of God and the devil and of good and evil forces at the human level. Although larger moral oppositions are represented in the struggle between absolute character types, this does not mar insight into the workings of human nature or the inner realm. Despite presenting stylised human types, the detail which Cynewulf devotes to their characterisation goes far beyond that of his source. Indeed, as I shall illustrate in this chapter, Cynewulf's detailed descriptions of


the inner states and motivations of his characters highlight his didactic concern with the ‘inner’ centre of human agency and responsibility. Cynewulf’s interest in the inner domain is not only suggested by an abundance of detailed descriptions, but is also reflected at narrative and structural levels. On the one hand, his characterisation of the *dramatis personae* fully prepares for his detailed description of the inner processes of vice and sin, just as his characterisation of the external conflict between saint and sinner prepares for the internalised psychomachic conflict between Juliana and the devil. This important episode, which provides one of the most detailed accounts of inner workings in vernacular poetry, not only assumes a central position in the poem but is pivotal to the narrative and its outcome, enforcing the idea that inner states and events determine all outer action.

In this chapter, I again consider the overall mechanisms of the poem in order to explore the narrative and thematic importance of the ‘inner’ in *Juliana*. Beginning with a detailed consideration of the poem in reference to its source in 5.1. I trace the various narrative stages and the way in which these create and develop key themes and imagery relating to the presentation of human nature and inner workings. Attention to larger cosmic oppositions and their representation in the stylised human conflict allows me to highlight the way in which *Juliana* reformulates the essence of the theological context treated in *Christ II* in order to develop a quite specific focus on human types. Moving from this discussion of character types to the importance of the inner realm in Cynewulf’s central description of *psychomachia* in 5.2, I consider how the allegorised details of this episode and its descriptions of psychological and moral processes reveal a particularly innovative picture of the role of the inner self within human nature and present a unique articulation of such ideas in the extant poetic corpus.

5.1  Structure and Themes: Approaching the Inner Life through Human Types

Although a certain degree of caution remains as to whether Cynewulf’s *Juliana* is an ‘original’ adaptation of the Latin *Passio S. Julianae* or whether Cynewulf may
have drawn on an intermediary source. Most studies of Juliana are based heavily on source comparison. In light of Michael Lapidge’s most persuasive arguments that an extant redaction of the passio dating from the early ninth century is very similar to, and possibly identical with, the exemplar used by Cynewulf, I feel confident in employing such source comparison to highlight the distinctive development of them and imagery in Juliana.

Whilst the introductory (1.1-3) and concluding lines (22.4-6) of the Passio are replaced by a poetic introduction (1-17) and the Cynewulfian signed epilogue (695b-731) in Juliana, the main bodies of both texts share the same basic plot. Both begin by announcing the context of persecution in Maximian’s reign (Pass. 1.3-4; Jul. 1-17) and move to the specific setting (Pass. 1.4-6; Jul. 18-26) of Heliseus’ (lat. Eleseus) rule in the city of Commedia (lat. Nicomedia). Heliseus’ desire to marry Juliana (Pass. 1.6-7; Jul. 26a-28a) is supported by her father Affricanus (lat. Africanus) (Jul. 32-33a) and Juliana’s own objections to this union (Pass. 1.16-7; Jul. 28a-32a) establish the framing tension of the narratives. Her refusal to marry Heliseus (Pass. 1.20-22; Jul. 46-54) sets the scene for a series of verbal exchanges which make up the central three episodes of both passio and poem (enclosed by the introductory, Pass. 1.1-2.23, Jul. 1-89, and concluding passages, Pass. 13.1-22.4, Jul. 530b-695a). The verbal parallels between the three respective attempts of Affricanus, Heliseus and a devil to persuade Juliana to accept Heliseus as her heathen lord and husband amplify the structural importance of this three-fold attack:

Filia mea dulcissima Juliana, lux oculorum meorum ... (Pass. 1.2-6-7)

δια τον νεόν γραμμάτειαν κατ’ ονοματικήν \\

[My sweetest daughter Juliana, light of my eyes ...]  

δια τον νεόν γραμμάτειαν κατ’ ονοματικήν \\

[You are my daughter, the dearest and sweetest in my ‘heart’, the only one in the world, light of my eyes ...]  

5 Both Margaret Bridges and Daniel Calder express significant caution about the relation between Juliana and the Bollandist composite text which they use, but go on to base their highly comprehensive interpretations primarily upon such source comparison. Calder, Cynewulf, pp. 75-6. Bridges, Generic Contrast, p. 11.

6 Lapidge, ‘Cynewulf and the Passio St. Juliana’, p. 147. All references in the following chapter are taken from Lapidge’s text, printed in the appendix of his article on pp. 156-165. I have kept Lapidge’s text divisions and add line references which accord with his edition.

In order to clarify when I am referring to characters of the Latin or Old English texts, I employ the Latin and Old English names, except in the case of the Old Julianus (Juliana in both texts). Given that Cynewulf presents us with many spelling variations, I have opted for ‘Heliseus’ (rather than Heliseus) and ‘Affricanus’ (rather than Africanus) for the sake of consistency.
The importance of these three speech sequences has accordingly been widely discussed. Whether we interpret the three assailants as representing ‘the demands of earthly kinship, earthly lordship and satanic influence’, or as an ‘unholy trinity of father, son-in-law and unholy spirit’, the basic threefold pattern is prescribed by the Latin Passio.9 Although the importance of the Holy Trinity as a structural and thematic principle in the Passio is also present in Juliana, the specific ‘trinitarian concern’ which a number of scholars have identified in this pattern seems to me to be stronger in the Passio than in Juliana itself.10 More notable in both texts is that despite the obvious parallels between the three verbal exchanges in the Passio S. Juliana and in the Old English Juliana, the length and position of the third exchange suggest its pivotal importance. Indeed this exchange between Juliana and the devil makes up just under a third of the entire Passio and 287 of 731 lines of Juliana and stands not only at the structural, but also at the narrative heart of both texts.

Whereas the first two exchanges explore the reasons for Juliana’s rejection of Heliseus - first at the private level between father and daughter and subsequently at the public level between ruler and subject – the third exchange between Juliana and a devil internalises the conflict. At a narrative level, this third verbal battle marks a reversal of the power relations of the poem. Whereas Juliana is initially passed from her father to Heliseus (Pass. 2.22-3; Jul. 158-161a) and is subjected to verbal and physical coercion...
(Pass. 3.1-4.10; Jul. 160b-230), her subsequent confinement in the prison cell (Pass. 4.18; Jul. 232b-530a) presents the forum within which she moves from passive resistance to active dominance. Here Juliana becomes the aggressor, interrogator, tormentor and judge of the devil and her metaphorical grip on him marks the private victory which prepares for the public reversal of power that follows. In the final tribunal. Heliseus’ powers are proved increasingly futile as Juliana is repeatedly saved by divine intervention (from molten lead and fire Pass. 14.1-9. Jul. 17.9-11) and joyously embraces her ultimate death sentence (Pass. 19.1-2: Jul. 608-12). Indeed Juliana retains the last word, so to speak, in her final edifying and instructing speech to the bystanders (Pass. 20.1-17: Jul. 638-669). Her victory is punctuated by her elevated and revered death (Pass. 21.1-7; Jul. 688b-95a) in contrast with Heliseus’ banishment and subsequent death in a raging storm at sea (Pass. 22.1-4: Jul. 671b-88a). The turning point of both texts is unquestionably the third verbal battle. Cynewulf’s thematic alterations to this passage lend particular force to the idea that inner events determine outer states and in doing so also place the episode at the thematic heart of his poem. Indeed this episode presents the greatest number of Cynewulf’s alterations to the Passio which reveal his significant interest in man’s inner workings. Before turning to the details of inner workings which Cynewulf develops in this central passage, however, I would like to illustrate how this interest does not occur only in one isolated discussion, but presents one of the central concerns from the outset of Juliana.

As is widely agreed, Cynewulf greatly expands the ‘bare bones’ of the Latin Passio S. Julianae by adding distinctive themes and images and by establishing specific conceptual associations which he develops over the course of his poem. The apparently systematic nature of these thematic adaptations suggests that they are more than a mere by-product of the vernacular versification of a prose source. The way in which Cynewulf uses the framework of the Passio in order to explore his own concerns has accordingly been of significant critical interest. A number of studies have concentrated on the socio-historical dimension of Cynewulf’s alterations, although the

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11 As Calder phrases aptly: ‘He invariably cuts down the crisp and short Latin ... to the barest bone, but only so that he can flesh out a formal amplificatio to suit his own entirely different needs.’ Calder, Cynewulf, p. 80
prevalent focus has been on the way in which Cynewulf’s ‘artistic endeavour’ moves away from a concern with concrete or historical ‘realism’ towards the symbolic and the abstract. As I shall suggest, this has significant implications for Cynewulf’s characterisation of the inner life.

One of the most widely noted features of Cynewulf’s apparently systematic adaptation of the Passio is his creation of polarities and oppositions – more specifically, the ‘polarisation of character and attitude’ which is seen as geared towards the representation of the ‘Christian life in terms of … an absolute and all-embracing struggle’. Whereas Alvin Lee characterises the larger opposition as ‘the war between the lords of heaven and hell for the soul of the earthly warrior’ and Daniel Calder regards the conflict as a ‘spiritual battle of universal proportions’, Raymond St. Jacques extends the scope of the opposition, viewing Juliana as a ‘universal history understood as a conflict between the forces of good and evil’. These various levels of cosmic and abstract opposition in the poem are unquestionably reflected in the opposition between Christian saint and heathen sinner by extension of imagery and verbal parallels. I would stress in particular that it is the relevance of these larger spiritual forces of good and evil to human beings on earth – of their impact at the human level – with which Cynewulf’s narrative itself is primarily concerned. Indeed, as in Christ II, Cynewulf’s interest in a larger cosmic context can again be seen to operate as a framework within which he explores human nature and human workings – this time, more specifically, the workings of distinct human types. This feature is best illustrated in reference to the themes and images which Cynewulf introduces and develops over the course of Juliana.

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12 Leonore MacCaigley Abraham finds that ‘an adequate explanation for the majority of these differences and all the substantive changes in the legend (including the social characterisation of the dramatis personae, the characterisation of the conflict and the trial proceedings themselves) can be found in Anglo-Saxon judicial customs and attitudes’. ‘Cynewulf’s Juliana: A Case at Law’, p. 187. Calder, in turn, sees a poem designed to ‘simplify, elevate, and formalize a narrative that moves in the direction of the abstract’ Calder, Cynewulf, p. 80. Wittig likewise considers a move away from concrete concerns to ‘generalities’, ‘Figural Narrative’, pp. 39-40. (Further concurring views are referred to in note 2 above.) Overall, these positions need of course not conflict, but the explanation of individual details in reference to perceived aesthetic intentions often does. Whereas Abraham, for example, sees the elimination of Juliana’s mother from the Latin Passio as a legal formality relevant to the matter of guardianship, Calder interprets this absence as a conscious interpolation indicative of polarisation, ibid., p. 174.

13 Calder, Cynewulf, p. 79; Wittig, ‘Figural Narrative in Cynewulf’s Juliana’, p. 39.

Although both the Passio and Juliana begin by announcing the context of persecution in the reign of Maximian, Cynewulf significantly expands the introduction of the Latin text.\(^\text{15}\)

\[
\text{Denique temporibus Maximiani Imperatoris persecutoris Christianae religionis... (Pass. I.1.6-7)}
\]

In the days of the emperor Maximianus, a persecutor of the Christian religion...

\[
\text{Hwæt! We ðæt hyrdon hælæd eahtian, deman ðædhwate, ðætte in dagum gelæmp Maximianes, se geond middangeard, ærcæs cyning, eahtynsse ahof,}
\]

Lo! We have heard heroes, judges bold in deed, tell what happened in the days of Maximian, the graceless king, who raised persecution across the earth, killed Christian men, razed churches; the heathen warrior-lord spilled the blood of God-praising men, of right-doers on the grassy plain. His dominion was broad, wide and exalted across nations – almost across the entire expansive earth. There went harsh soldiers through the cities as he had commanded. Often they raised violence, erroneous / heretical / perverted deeds, those who despised the Lord’s law by wicked powers. They raised enmity, raised heathen idols, murdered the holy, killed the book-skilled, burned the elect, persecuted God’s champions with spear and fire.

Cynewulf here recasts the scene of persecution under Maximian in terms of the warring sides of heathen warriors (hæpæn hildfruma, þegnas þryðfolle) and Christian heroes (godes ceoman). From the outset, the opposition contains an explicit moral dimension: the men who raise pagan idols, raise persecution, violence and enmity (15a, 4b, 12b, 14b). By pitting the powers (firencraft) of the graceless Maximian and his men against the skills (hoccraft-) of God’s chosen ones, the ‘right-doers’ (ryhtfremmendra) and ‘wrong-doers’ are immediately identified as Christians and heathens respectively. This identification is made explicit in lines 12b to 14a by an association of sinful deeds with error. The double sense of gedwola as ‘error’ and ‘heresy’ contrasts the pagans with the learned (by implication scripturally learned, hoccrafte) and God-praising Christians – a contrast which is extended by Cynewulf’s reference to the pagans’ hatred of God’s law (13b-14a). Although the power balance in this world appears to favour violent

\(^{15}\) Cynewulf omits the opening lines of the Passio (Benignitas Salvatoris nostri, martyrum persecutoriae comprobata, eam usque processit, ut fidei amicos coronaret et immicos eorum ex ipsis inscitra claustris ecrueret 1.1-5) providing instead his poetic introduction of lines 1-17. The Passio’s concluding line (Passa est aetum sancta Iuliana xiii Kalendarum Martyrarium a Prahfæcio Eleusis, regnante Domino nostro Iesu Christo, cui est gloria in sæcula sæculorum. Amen) is in turn replaced with the signed Cynewulfian epilogue (695b-731).
rulers, Cynewulf's moral undertones already hint at the ultimate futility of pagan power in that it is based on error, wickedness and sin. The speeches and events of the poem as a whole illustrate the truth and virtue of the Christian faith and reveal the error underlying pagan heresy by means of Christian and pagan claim and counterclaim battled out over the course of the three exchanges and subsequently in the final public illustration of the Lord's ultimate justice. A central element of Cynewulf's didactic message thus lies in his polarisation of the human conflict, as we see in the typological oppositions between the central characters themselves.

Like the Passio, Juliana moves from the opening scene of a wider conflict to the specific setting (Pass. 1.4-6; Jul. 18-26) of the city of Commedia (lat. Nicomedia) in which the heathen ruler Heliseus goes against the Word of God (Oft he hæpengield / ofer word godes weoh gesohte, 22b-23) in a way that reflects the rejection of God's law by Maximian and his men. The main opposition in this localised scene soon emerges as that between the pagan Heliseus and the Christian Juliana. The larger persecution is initially inverted as Heliseus pursues Juliana for her hand in marriage (Pass. 1.6-7; Jul. 26a-28a), although her refusal to agree to the union 'unless he embrace the Christian faith' (Pass. 1.20-22; Jul. 46-54) acts as a catalyst for all subsequent events and precipitates outright conflict. In developing this conflict Cynewulf gradually reveals the reasons and motivations underlying the opposition of his characters and in doing so moves from apparently concrete to fundamentally religious and spiritual concerns. As I shall illustrate in reference to Cynewulf's development of human oppositions, these concerns are accompanied by an increasing focus on inner motivations and inner allegiances which emerge as the basis of all outer action.

In the first exchange between Juliana and her father, Affricanus appears to view Heliseus' extensive temporal wealth and power (waes æhtwellic æþels cynnes / rice gereda, 18-19b) not only as the rightful basis of the earthly ruler's authority but also as the foundation of nobility and virtue itself (italics added for emphasis):

\[
\begin{aligned}
\text{Widecest pu to swipe} & \quad \text{sylfere raedes} & \text{You contradict your bridegroom too strongly by,} \\
\text{hnum brædguman.} & \quad \text{se is betra fomme hu,} & \text{your own counsel he is better than you, nobler} \\
\text{æþela for coronan.} & \quad \text{æthypnedra} & \text{in the world, more abundant in possessions. He is} \\
\text{feohgestreona.} & \quad \text{He is to freonde god.} & \text{good [to have] as a friend. Therefore it is fitting}
\end{aligned}
\]
Affricanus’ perverted view of the earthly lord’s love as a ‘happy’, ‘blessing’ or ‘enriching’ love (eadlufan) – indeed as an ‘eternal’ (ece) love – betrays a viewpoint which is entirely limited to the temporal realm. In accordance with this limited scope, his view of earthly wealth as a basis for authority and of Heliseus’ earthly love as the most enriching love is a direct inversion of Juliana’s pure love for the true Lord (... hire mægðhad mana gehwylces / fore Cristes lufan clæne geheolde 30-31) as previously contrasted with Heliseus’ lust for Juliana (hine fyrwet bræc 27a). Accordingly, Affricanus sees Juliana’s refusal as utter folly which deserves its just punishment (bu on geaft hafast / þurh þin orlegu unþipyrfe / ofer witena dom wisan gefongen 96b-98). This again inverts Juliana’s own criteria for true authority, wisdom and justice. Only when Juliana extends the discussion beyond the question of immediate earthly allegiance to religious allegiance by referring to the power of her Lord over all creation (105-113) does Affricanus pit his own religious claims against those of his daughter. His appeal to kinship and local gods (þe us leofran sind / þe þissum folec to freme stondæd ... 122b-123) appears to represent his own religious justification for his system of inverted values. Despite frequent contrasts between earthly and heavenly domains, the core of the opposition soon emerges as a fundamentally spiritual opposition from which all opposing allegiances and values arise.

Unlike Affricanus, Heliseus is fully aware of the larger picture from the outset. In a Cynewulfian addition to the Passio, Juliana’s rejection of Heliseus becomes a personal smart, an insult to the basis of his authority and a matter of ‘heresy’ against his own gods:

In fact his scope is initially so limited to the earthly domain that he even grants the ultimate power over life and death to the earthly, rather than to the divine Lord. Dem þu hi to dcæfe, gyf þe gedæfen þine to life leæt, swa þæ leofre sw. (87-88). ‘Judge her to death if it seems fitting to you’ or leave her alive, if it pleases you better: I discuss such inversions of lordship and judgment in more detail below.
Heliseus here immediately cuts to the heart of the matter, extending the debate from the personal and local level to the fundamental question of religious allegiance. In doing so he reveals that the root of the conflict lies less in an inherent opposition between earthly and heavenly authority than in the opposition between Christian saint and pagan sinner on earth. Whilst Juliana rejects earthly wealth and love as a basis of authority and allegiance, she does not reject earthly wealth and love per se. Rather, she rejects Heliseus despite his earthly wealth (italics added for emphasis):

| Heo ðæs beornes lufan                  | She firmly rejected the man's love even though he owned wealth-abundance under his hoard-lock, immeasurable treasures across the earth. All this she forsook. |
| fæste wiðhode, ðæah ðe feohgestreon   | |
| under hordlocan, ðyrsta unrim          | |
| æhte ofer eorðpan. Heo ðæst eal forseah | |

Although temporal riches cannot entice Juliana to marry Heliseus, her refusal does therefore not appear to stem from her rejection of his earthly prosperity (or indeed from her desire for a chaste life).¹⁷ Juliana does not reject Heliseus because he is an earthly lord or even because he loves the 'earthly' above the 'heavenly'. She rejects him because he loves pagan idols and thus the devil himself:

| Gif þu sooþe god                     | If you love and believe in the true God, and raise His praise, [if] you acknowledge the Shelter of spirits, I will immediately be eagerly and unwaveringly at your will. |
| lufast ond gelast fest, ongietest gesta hleo | Likewise I say to you: if you trust in a lesser god [and] plan your deeds by devil-worship, invoking heathen idols, you shall not have me or coerce me into union [with you]. |
| unwaetlice                           | |
| Swylice ic pe scege.                  | |
| þurh deofolgield                      | |
| hæþð hapenweah. ðæþ geþretian         | |
| ne meaht þu habban mec, þe to gesingan. (Jul. 47b-54) | |

These lines establish a picture in which religious allegiance not only lies at the heart of all dimensions of the conflict, but itself reflects a moral code and a system of values which each party claims as true, right and just. As Juliana puts it, her 'will' would be aligned with that of Heliseus if he were to understand and accept the true God as his rightful Lord (47b-10a) and, by implication, to adhere to His moral law and the values contained therein. Crucially, whereas the Passio identifies heathen idols with devils (or

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¹⁷ For fuller interpretations of Cynewulf's adaptation of the Passio on matters of chastity, see Anderson, Cynewulf, p. 88. Palmer, 'Characterization in the Old English Juliana', pp. 47-9. In Cynewulf's text, Juliana's desire for chastity (30-1, p. 120 above) primarily contrasts with Heliseus' lust and is soon abandoned to stress a more fundamental concern with religious allegiance, as is clear in Juliana's willingness to marry Heliseus if only he were to convert (47b-54).
demons) only in passing and at a much later stage, Cynewulf uses this decisive identification to develop further his earlier association of error and sin with paganism. For Juliana, devil worship is a matter of the thought which manifests itself in sinful deeds (byrht deofolgield daede bipencests 52) and inner allegiance accordingly emerges as the root of every level of opposition between the characters. We can trace the importance of inner allegiance more fully in reference to Cynewulf's development of the continuum of thought, word and deed and the accompanying images of 'inner' and 'outer' domains as the overall conflict becomes ever more polarised.

As the opening battle imagery of pagan and Christian camps (12b, 17b, 11a) is increasingly shifted to the verbal arena of the localised conflict. Affricanus and Heliseus are explicitly identified as warriors of the heathen camp – their voices oppose and contrast with the words of the Christian saint:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{When the nobleman, stained by sinful deeds,} & \\
\text{swollen with anger, heard the woman's words, he,} & \\
\text{rough and blind, commanded swift messengers to} & \\
\text{bring the holy one's father for counsel at a} & \\
\text{meeting. Voices rose up as they leaned} & \\
\text{spears together, those war-makers. Heathens were they} & \\
\text{both, father-in-law and son-in-law, sick with sins.} & \\
\end{array}
\]

As in the opening lines of the poem, the wicked deeds of these pagan adversaries are associated with the violence of weapons and again the association of sin and error (here in the form of sickness and blindness, 65a, 61a) characterises the heathen aggressors. Over the course of the first exchanges, the error and sin of Juliana's two heathen adversaries manifest themselves in both words and deeds. The true words of Juliana (132) oppose the lies of Affricanus which appear as acts in themselves (135b): 18

18 Most of Juliana (like its source) takes the form of verbal exchanges rather than of outright action. Alexandra Hennessey Olsen and Marie Nelson have considered the importance of 'speech-acts' in the Cynewulf canon at great length. A. H. Olsen, Speech, Song, and Poetic Craft: the Artistry of the Cynewulf Canon, American University Studies, ser. 4, English Language and Literature 15 (Frankfurt am Main, Bern, and New York, 1984); M. Nelson, 'The Battle of Maldon and Juliana: the Language of Confrontation', Modes of Interpretation in Old English Literature: Essays in Honour of Stanley B. Greenfield, ed. Phyllis Rugg Brown, Georgia Ronan Crampton, and Fred C. Robinson (Toronto, 1986), pp. 137-50
By presenting lies and sinful deeds as arising from error (italics above), Cynewulf establishes a continuum of inner vice and outer sin. The sickness of sin, also presented as the deafness and dumbness inherent in pagan error and lies (italics below), likewise manifest themselves in physical violence – although again, outer word and deed cannot alter Juliana's inner faith:

Never shall you teach me that I, with lies, with dumb and deaf devil-worship, should offer tribute to the enemies of spirits, the worst servants of torture, but I shall honour the glorious Lord of middle-earth and heaven's throng, and by Him alone measure all, so that He shall be my Protector, Helper and Saviour against the hell-enemies.

Here, Juliana builds on previous associations to amplify the instrumental role of the devil in human error and sin (deofolgieldum 150, also purh deofolgielde, 52). Human vice and virtue, rooted ultimately in pagan error or Christian insight respectively, are again presented as being inherent in human allegiance to God or the devil. In his additions to the Passio, then, Cynewulf establishes clearly that error, both intellectual and moral, lies at the heart of all vice, as is reflected in the heresy manifest in allegiance to the false lord. Rather than simply associating error and vice with paganism (and, by implication, virtue with Christian faith), Cynewulf here begins to develop more intricate causal relations between the workings of the devil and the processes of inner vice and outer sin in terms of the continuum of thought, word and deed (error-vice-sin or insight-virtue).19 In developing these associations in terms of men's inner allegiances, Cynewulf is building up the themes which dominate his detailed discussion of the processes of vice and sin in the central exchange of his poem.

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19 For a discussion of the widespread usage of the triad of 'thought, word and deed' beyond its relevance to considerations of inner and outer domains, see Patrick Sims-Williams' discussion of the subject in reference to early medieval insular texts. 'Thought, Word and Deed: An Irish Triad', *Eru* 29 (1978): 78-111.
I have argued so far that Cynewulf's extensive treatment of the relationship between human inner workings and ethical praxis in the context of religious allegiance demonstrates his notable interest in psychological questions from the outset of Juliana. A crucial element which enables Cynewulf to develop his account of human religious opposition is of course the stylised characterisation of diametrically opposed human types. Since this stylised characterisation is itself directly relevant to the idea that inner allegiance is accompanied by a given moral code and system of values and is reflected in distinct types of qualities and perhaps even dispositions, I would like to digress briefly to consider the way in which Cynewulf's mode of characterisation enforces his own didactic message in Juliana.

As is often noted, in creating the human anti-types of the Christian Juliana and the pagan Heliseus, Cynewulf significantly adapts the characters of the Latin Passio. In order to amplify the religious dimension of the conflict between Juliana and Heliseus, he persistently adds direct and explicit character contrasts which reveal them as representatives of Christian saint and pagan sinner. As has already become apparent, Heliseus and Juliana are polar opposites in their allegiances, in their types of loves, in the objects of their desire and will, and crucially in their dispositions (594b-602a). Juliana appears as the ‘unwavering Christian’, imbued with the virtues of steadfast faith and consistency (233b-235). Unlike the Latin Juliana, Cynewulf’s saintly character does not fear or pray for her earthly preservation or for relief from pain or hardship, but consistently faces and embraces all subsequent challenges and torments in defence of Christian truth. Heliseus, in turn, appears not as the ‘nominal’ pagan of the Passio, but as an equally devout follower of the pagan gods in whose supremacy he firmly

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20 Palmer, Abraham and Calder, for example, have argued that the Latin Passio has a socio-political motivation for its saint’s rejection of Eleusis (1.15-19), whereas the objections of Cynewulf’s Juliana are entirely religious (pp. 121-2 above). Abraham infers from this that the Latin Eleusis, unlike Cynewulf’s Heliseus, is of inferior social status, whereas Calder attributes the diplomatic parties which surround the [marriage] negotiations to the polarisation of the conflict. Cynewulf, p. 85, see also note 3 above.

21 Calder, Cynewulf, p. 79.

22 In Pass. 5.1-23, Juliana’s pleas for mercy (exaudi me, Domine, ... me miserere, et praesta mihi misericordiam tuam 5.5-6), strength and protection (ne desereras me ... ne prsecias me a facade tua 5.8-9) concern not only her spiritual state (animam in eximum postquam 5.2), but are accompanied by a more immediate and perhaps physical concern (Esto mihi, Deus, praesens auxiliator et adjuvator inter tormenta quae indueor, est super me ille qui indueit tua praeceptum non semelabit 5.19). See also pp. 130-1 below.
believes. Indeed all pagan characters of the poem share fixed character traits, such as anger or malice (as discussed on pp. 118, 122), which appear to arise from their error and which contrast with the virtuous calmness and fortitude of Juliana herself.

Whilst Cynewulf clearly devotes a significant amount of detail to the inner motivations and states of his characters, these inner states reflect outer situations in a highly stylised fashion. Heliseus’ angered mental state, his violent words and deeds, for example, reflect the external violence of a city or world under pagan rule. Similarly, Juliana’s inner peace and her physical passivity appear to reflect the justice and peace of the Christian community which ultimately emerges victorious in spite of the persecution to which they are subjected. Little attention has been paid to these dimensions of Cynewulf’s characterisation. Most critical attention has focused on the figural function of his characters. Joseph Wittig’s analysis, for example, demonstrates clear instances in which Cynewulf adapts his source material to create parallels between Juliana and both Christ and the Church. Although Calder qualifies Wittig’s emphasis on the figural function of Juliana’s character by arguing for a ‘dual identity’ inherent in two simultaneous states, namely ‘the actuality of Juliana’s sainthood and the process by which she achieves it’, both readings nevertheless insist on the ‘unrealistic’ nature of Cynewulf’s poem and emphasise its ‘psychological simplification’ or ‘elimination of psychological realism’. Indeed Calder ultimately views the poem as a ‘sharply etched ritual drama’ in which ‘personages who already perceive their end’ act out ‘roles that require only the fulfilment of a known teleology’. I would stress, in contrast, that such a reading of the poem and its characters greatly undermines the didactic force which is achieved precisely by Cynewulf’s polarisation of character and conflict.

By stylising his characters into absolute paradigms of Christian virtue and epitomes of pagan vice, Cynewulf appears to be presenting his reader with two moral options — with two moral exemplars that illustrate the inner dispositions and outer

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23 Calder, *Cynewulf*, p. 77.
26 ibid., pp. 82, 80.
behaviour which entail an eschatological fate in either heaven or hell and which accompany man's choice to follow the false or true lord. Although the characters themselves are firm in their respective allegiances and defend their beliefs with all their powers, they are nevertheless under persistent duress to change their respective positions. At this didactic level, Juliana's key characteristic must be her inner fortitude and fearlessness if she is to illustrate the way in which men may themselves achieve a virtuous Christian life amidst the perpetual onslaught of deceptions, errors and temptations of human life. Although her faith in itself involves certainty about the sovereignty and justice of the true Lord, and although her implied understanding of scripture would suggest a firm belief in the prophesies that His Justice will eventually prevail, it is not necessary to impose a superhuman foreknowledge of her own fate on Juliana as a specific narrative protagonist in order to highlight her figural nature. Indeed Juliana herself is far from certain about her own fate:

Biddað bearn gode
meotud moncynnes,
sigora sellend.

Pray [to the] Son of God, that the King of angels, Lord of mankind and Giver of victory be merciful to me.

It is in her experience as a human being, however exemplary, that Juliana reflects the larger persecution of the faithful on earth and it is in her human imitation of Christ's human suffering that she becomes the model for others. At this didactic level, then, Juliana's idealised disposition depends on its humanity, even though this does not necessarily take the form of an internal conflict, doubt or wavering. In other words, in order to be an accessible model, and indeed to be a human ideal, Juliana must not only 're-enact' but must 'participate' in the conflict in a human way. I suggest, therefore, that the didactic functions of Cynewulf's stereotyped characters require that we view them not merely as figural constructs without psychological depth, but as human characters who not only illustrate the importance of inner states for outer action but also reflect the pivotal importance which inner choice and inner allegiance occupy in Cynewulf's view of human life and fate as is reflected in their own lives and deaths.

27 'The serenity of the Old English Juliana is made possible only by the double perspective and the ritual mode in which Cynewulf has set this narrative.' Calder, Cynewulf, p. 90.
To summarise, then, Cynewulf's adaptation of the Latin *Passio* allows us to trace a distinct thematic focus which is geared towards a didactic illustration of the importance of the inner domain in examining spiritual concerns in human life on earth. On the one hand, his creation of polarities between pagan and Christian camps – as reflected by the representative human types of the vicious pagan Heliseus and the saintly Christian Juliana – establishes a human conflict whose spiritual basis is gradually revealed over the first exchanges of the poem. By emphasising the spiritual concerns of pagan and Christian alike, and by gradually deepening the discussion of inner processes in the context of the theme of inner allegiance, Cynewulf amplifies the primacy of the inner domain as the determining principle of all outer actions and states – whether in reference to the triad of Christian worship in thought, word and deed or in reference to the error, lie and sin of the pagan adversary. Although most critics concur that Cynewulf's polarised characterisations do not present the inner turmoil and conflict which has become the standard for psychological realism, it is not necessary to see Cynewulf's absolute character types only in terms of their representative, figural or abstract theological functions. The detail which he devotes to inner states – however stylised – serves to underline a didactic interest in the bases of experience and behaviour and his interest in the relationship between human inner workings in relation to ethical praxis is central to the question of agency and identity. It suggests a concept of selfhood in which the inner self emerges as the true agentive and experiencing self. Whilst Cynewulf's interest in the inner domain is evident from the outset of *Juliana*, his interest in this domain and in the workings of good and evil forces in men reaches its climax in the central discussion of the processes of vice and sin.

5.2 The Centrality of the Inner Battle in *Juliana*: Allegorising Inner Workings

By the end of the first two exchanges, Cynewulf has developed a stable association between devil-worship and the sinful nature of pagan thought, word and deed. Having shown Juliana's resilience in face of all these challenges, Cynewulf has already begun to illustrate the futile powers of the pagan gods in contrast with the
omnipotence and sustaining powers of Juliana’s God. Although Heliseus’ threats and physical tortures have come to nothing, neither party has admitted defeat or made any concession at this stage – the truth of Christian and pagan claims is yet to be confirmed or disproved. Their public battle is suspended in lieu of the exchange between Juliana and the devil which explores the deepest spiritual matters yet. It is in this third exchange that Juliana assumes her dominant position and her interrogation of the devil facilitates our most detailed insight into Cynewulf’s conception of the devil’s wiles and his workings in men. This central episode gathers and elucidates the various strands of theme and imagery developed so far. The battle imagery is brought to a climax in the psychomachic episode of lines 382-401a. The typified presentation of sinful and virtuous characters in light of an association between inner thought and will and outer word and deed, is gradually intensified and expanded, leading up to a detailed description of the processes of devilish temptation and sin in men in lines 362b-82a. In this central episode, moreover, the conflicting claims of saint and sinner are fully revealed as Christian truth and devilish deception and lie respectively. Rather than providing an isolated discussion of the processes of vice and sin, this episode is fully integrated into the psychological and moral concerns of Juliana as a whole. The following discussion accordingly considers Cynewulf’s distinctive treatment of the inner life which is so central to his vision of human nature and the self.

Standing at the structural and narrative heart of the poem, the exchange between Juliana and the devil (Jul. 236-558) takes place on a battleground which is inherently different from the previous ones. A number of Cynewulf’s alterations to the Passio here emphasise the nature – and in consequence the importance – of this new setting. To begin with, Cynewulf’s emphasis on the secluded location of the prison cell presents a direct contrast with his emphasis on the public setting of Heliseus’ tribunals.  

28 Unlike the Passio’s characters, Cynewulf’s Juliana and Heliseus interact before a crowd (heo...het word acwrd / on wera mengu, 44b-15: da for pam folce...beordworm spræc 184-188): Juliana humiliates Heliseus before the people (heo mea swa torne telæ gerahæ tæ for passum folce 74-74a) and although he seeks to humiliate her in return (by stripping her naked and flogging her, 184-8), Heliseus is ultimately unable to subjugate her before this crowd (peram weliian was wære to julianæ / har he hit for worulde wædan mehtæ: 569-70). Abraham sees these changes as indicating ‘equal involvement of the entire populace’, whilst Anderson sees the added ‘internal audience’ as ‘witnesses who are gradually drawn into the conflict and forced to choose between good and evil’. L. M. Abraham, ‘Cynewulf’s Juliana: a Case at Law’, Allegorica 3:1 (1978): 172-89, p. 175; Anderson, Cynewulf, pp. 97-9.
Cynewulf amplifies this contrast further by juxtaposing the light of the sun (se0 sunsciene 229a) and the darkness of the cell (heolstre bihelmad 241a). Whereas Bridges and Wittig see the dark cell as a figural hell, the immediate contrast between light and dark appears to me to be more complex. In Heliseus’ public tribunal the sun is perverted into an instrument of torture (pær slege prowade / sace singrimme 229b-30) as Heliseus has Juliana strung up by her hair. The darkness of the secluded prison cell, in turn, becomes the forum for Juliana’s private triumph. Indeed, in contrast with the Passio (Pass. 4.15-5.1. 6.1), Cynewulf’s description of her move ‘into’ the dark prison cell emphasises that this move is also a metaphorical shift ‘inwards’ and that it is the inner realm within which her victory will take place (italics added for emphasis):

225  da þam folctogan  fracaúlic þuhte  þat he ne meathe  mod oncyrran,  fæmnan foreponge. 

...  
ond he ædre het  eft assettan,  laðgeniðla,  ond gelædan bibeard  to carcerne.  Hyre wæs Cristes lof  in forðocac  faste biwedan,  milde modsefan,  magen unbrice  ða wæs mid clustre  carcernes duro  behiden, homra geweorc.  Halig þer min  warfast wunade.  Symle heo wuldorcyning  herede et heortan,  heofonrices god.  
235  in þam nyceliðan,  nergend fira,  heolstre bihelmad.  Hyre wæs halig gest  singal gesið.  ða cwom semninga  in þet hinræced  hæleda gewinna,  ytelos ondwis.  Hæfde engles hiw  (Jul. 225-244)  

Then it seemed shameful to the ruler that he could not change the mind and purpose of the maiden.  
...  
and he, that hateful enemy, ordered her to be taken down directly [from the gallows] and commanded her to be taken to prison. The worship of Christ was firmly entrenched within her ‘heart-locker’, an invincible power in her gentle ‘mind’. Then, the prison door, the work of hammers, was fastened with a lock; the saintly one dwelt there inside, firm in faith. She consistently lauded the King of glory, God of the realm of heaven, in her heart, the Saviour of men, inside that constraining confinement, enveloped in darkness. The Holy Spirit was a constant companion to her. Then, suddenly, the opponent of men, well versed in evil, entered into that prison. He had the appearance of an angel...  

Cynewulf’s emphasis on the faith which Juliana holds inside (233b-235) and his clustering of inner, aspect words (italicised above) make it clear that her resilience and strength lie ‘within’ her. The nature of the setting, moreover, announces that it is precisely this inner domain which Cynewulf is about to explore.

In his version of the episode, Cynewulf replaces the Latin Juliana’s lengthy prayer (Pass. 5.1-23) with a brief description of Juliana’s steadfast faith (233b-235). This faith is reflected by the fact that the Holy Spirit is Juliana’s only companion in the cell - until, that is, the devil enters the scene.80 Cynewulf’s introduction of both the Holy Spirit and the devil into the cell in close succession (241b-44a) prepares for an

80 M. F. Bridges, Generic Contrast in Old English Hagiographical Poetry, Anglistica 22 (Copenhagen, 1984), p. 100. Wittig, ‘Figural Narrative in Juliana’, p. 44.
idea which will be articulated fully in his later psychomachic episode (364-413a). namely that the devil is attempting to gain entry into Juliana’s inner fortress. Since the saint ultimately repels the devil’s advances, the prison cell into which the devil enters does not appear to present a straightforward allegory of the ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ itself. It nevertheless, presents the private or personal sphere in which the satanic spirit (unclene gæst 418b: hean helle gæst 457b, 615a) seeks to challenge the position of the Holy Spirit within the saint. Moving inward, then, the ensuing encounter goes on to explore in detail how the devil perverts men, both by narrative example and metaphorical explication.

As in the Passio, the devil initially addresses Juliana in a deceivingly amicable tone (pp. 114-5 above). In contrast with the Latin Belial (Pass. 6.2) Cynnewulf’s devil appears immediately aware of the strength of her allegiance and faith (see dyreste / ond seo woepste wuldocyning Jul. 247b-48). Nevertheless, he soon emerges as the most dangerous of her three adversaries. At first unafraid (see forht ne wæs 258b) when her visitor states the obvious physical threat posed by Heliseus (247-256a), Juliana responds quite differently to the devil’s claim to be conveying God’s command that she relent:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{da wæs seo færne} & \quad \text{for ðam færspel}\nonumber \\
\text{egsan geaclad,} & \quad \text{pe hyre se aglæa,} \\
\text{wulodes wiþerbreca,} & \quad \text{wordum sæged}.
\end{align*}
\]

270

Onge ē þa fæstlice, ferð stapelian, geong grondorleas, to gode cleopian ‘Nu ic þec, beorna hleo, biddan wille ece elmihtig, þurh þæt æple ge sceap þe þu, fæder engla, æt fruman setteæ.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{þæþ þu me ne læte} & \quad \text{of leof hweorfan þinne cadgief, swa me þes ar bodað} \\
\text{frecne færspel,} & \quad \text{þe me fore stondæd.} \\
\text{Swa ic þe, bihlite, biddan wille} & \quad \text{þæþ þu me gyþde, cyninga wuldor,} \\
\text{þrynmes hyrde,} & \quad \text{hwaet þes þegn sy.} \\
\text{lythlacende, þe mec lætæd from þe} & \quad \text{on stearene weg.} \quad \text{(Jul. 267-82a)}
\end{align*}
\]

Then the maiden was stricken with fear by the abrupt tidings which the wretch, heaven’s enemy, announced to her with his words.

The young innocent one began to found her ‘spirit’ and cried out to God: ‘Now I wish to beg You, Protector of men, eternal Almighty, by that noble creation which You, Father of angels, founded in the beginning, so that You do not let me turn away from the praise of Your blessed Grace, although this messenger, who stands before me, tells me these terrible fearful tidings. I likewise wish to beg, most merciful Lord, that You, Glory of kings, keeper of the heavenly host, show me what this messenger is, hovering in the air, who instructs me away from You onto such a harsh path.

Given that one of Juliana’s persistent traits so far has been her fearlessness in face of attack, her fearful reaction (267-68a) now clearly distinguishes the moment and the episode as a whole. It is not clear whether the devil’s suggestions are ‘terrifying tidings’ (frecne færspel 275-6a) because they elicit a momentary temptation to relent or whether they simply make Juliana aware of her own fallibility. Whatever the case, Juliana
displays complete faith in God, even if not in herself. Crucially, she immediately recognises the danger, namely that the devil’s teaching is deceptive (Jul. 281a-82b: Pass. 6.10). The divine response to her prayer confirms her caution and wariness whilst at the same time increasing her fortitude and empowering her to the extent that it is the devil who becomes afraid (forhtafongen 320a):

`Forfør he bone fraetgan ond fæste gehedal, oþþæ he his siðfæt sege mid ryhte, ealne from orde, hwæt his æpelu syn.' (Jul. 284-286)

Seize that perverse creature and hold him tightly until he truthfully tells you his mission, all of it from the beginning, what his origins are.

Significantly, the nature of power becomes intimately associated with understanding here. In a metaphorical seizing – or rather ‘grasping’ (adprehende) – of this devil (tenuit Belial. Pass.7.2; heo þæt deofol genom 287b), he is to be understood and overpowered.31 On the one hand, Cynewulf is adding further levels to his previous treatment of inner ‘error’ by suggesting that understanding is the defence against the error which is introduced into men by the devil. On the other hand, understanding the nature of the devil, it would appear, means understanding the nature of vice and sin in human beings and such understanding is crucial if men are to avert these in practice. Beginning with the nature of the devil’s involvement in human history, the ensuing exchange moves from the general to the particular, explaining sin in mankind and later, in the greatest detail of all, the phenomenon of evil in types of men: in their erroneous thoughts, false words and wicked deeds. The importance placed on the devil’s attack and the importance of its inner setting highlights Cynewulf’s concern with the primacy of the devil in matters of worship and virtue. Juliana has already repelled the attacks of the devil’s earthly followers and the inner basis for her ability to do so is now explored over the course of the third conflict.

As I mentioned at the outset of this discussion, the third exchange as a whole presents the greatest number of alterations which Cynewulf makes to his source and most forcefully highlights his central interest in man’s inner workings. After the Latin Belial has introduced himself in the guise of a friend (p. 115 above), the Juliana of the Passio interrogates him to find out his true mission:

31 The Passio reads: ‘Confide, Juliana, ego tecum sum, glorificans te. Tu autem adprehende istum qui tecum loquitur, ut scias quis est ece’ (Pass. 6.10-12). Although the Latin pun is not as effectively executed with the Old English vocabulary, Cynewulf makes the relation between understanding and power abundantly clear throughout the episode, as discussed below.
Beata Juliana dixit: ‘Quis te misit ad me?’
Daemon respondit: ‘Satas parter meus.’


Sancta Juliana dixit: ‘Et quod est opus illius?’ Daemon respondit: ‘Beelzebub.’

Sancta Juliana dixit: ‘Et quae opera iusta proficiscimini, narra mihi.’ (Pass. 11.8.16-17)

Sancta Juliana dixit: ‘Ad quae opera iusta proficiscimini, narr mihi.’ (Pass. 11.8.16-17)

Blessed Juliana said: ‘Who sent you to me?’
The demon replied: ‘Satan, my father.’

Saint Juliana said: ‘And what do they call your father?’ The demon replied: ‘Beelzebub.’

Saint Juliana said: ‘What does he do?’
The demon replied: ‘He is the inventor of all evil. For the moment we are in his presence, he directs us to tempt the souls of the faithful.’ (Pass. 11.8.1-6)

Despite covering the same topics as the exchange in the Passio, Cynewulf transforms this brief exchange into longer alternating speeches between the saint and devil. In developing a pointed dialogue into what appear more like alternating monologues, he subtly changes the focus of this allegorical verbal battle in accordance with his own concerns. Whereas, for example, the Latin Juliana asks about the devil’s intentions, Cynewulf, in contrast asks how the devil perverts the righteous:

Sancta Juliana: ‘Tell me, against what just works do you proceed?’

Sancta Juliana dixit: ‘Ad quae opera iusta proficiscimini, narr mihi.’ (Pass. 11.8.16-17)

secgan, sawla feond, hu þu soðfæstum
purh synna slide swipast sceapen,
facne bifongen. (Jul. 347b-350a)

[You shall tell me more, enemy of souls, about how you harm the righteous greatly by the slide into sins, entrapped in deceit.]

As a result, the response of Cynewulf’s devil becomes a detailed discussion of the processes of temptation and sin in terms of psychomachic imagery (Jul. 362-417a), an addition for which there is no precedent in the Passio. Moreover, whereas the Latin devil only begins to outline his aim of perverting men from the course of salvation (Pass. 8.14-9.16) in response to this question, Cynewulf punctuates every one of the devil’s responses with psychological descriptions.

Having moved inwards, Cynewulf adds significant psychological detail by intensifying familiar formulas and associations which have already been established. Whereas the Latin devil initially identifies himself as the one who ‘makes’ men carry out evil deeds (ego sum qui feci… Pass. 7.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20), Cynewulf’s devil describes the processes of his influence in more detail (italics below):

Then I again deceived Herod in his mind so that he commanded John to be beheaded.

in hyge bisweop /set he lóhannes bibead
Then I again deceived Herod in his mind so that he commanded John to be beheaded

These parallels, though sometimes in different orders, are evident between Pass. 8.1-2 and Jul. 328-31; Pass. 8.6-8 and Jul. 332-7; Pass. 8.9-10; Pass. 8.15-9.2 and Jul. 357-70; Pass. 9.9-10 and Jul. 382-9; Pass. 9.13-4 and the later Jul. 409-13.
When I taught Simon with cunning-thoughts, so that he began to persecute Christ’s chosen servants and addressed those holy men with blasphemy, through deep error [he] said they were sorcerers.

I engaged with deviant trickery when I deceived Nero so that he commanded Christ’s servants, Peter and Paul, to be killed.

Thus I have committed many despicable evils with my brothers, black sins which I cannot tell about or fully relate, nor know the tally, of hard hateful thoughts.

The devil introduces or teaches evil thoughts (underlined above) which lead to sinful deeds and his instrumental influence is underlined by the now familiar formula purh ...gedwolan (301a ‘through error’). The devil’s role in ‘error’ and ‘heresy’ throughout human history recalls the pagan rule of Maximian in the poem’s opening lines. His disobedience to God’s law (13b-14a) and the consequent murder of Christ’s servants (5a) are now confirmed as the devil’s own working (297a, 299b). As further parallels are established between the evil reigns of Maximian, Heliseus and the devil in hell (325-44), Cynewulf repeatedly stresses the causal relations by repetition (purh misgewiel med oncyrren 327; purh myrvelsan mod ... odcyrred 338). The theme of devilish instigation is clearly more than mere poetic embellishment – it is an important element of Cynewulf’s psychological ideas. These are dealt with most comprehensively in Cynewulf’s subsequent elucidation of the inner processes of error and vice as the causes of outward lies and sinful deeds.

In an extended answer to Juliana’s central question about how the devil perverts men, Cynewulf presents a strikingly detailed account which departs significantly from the Passio in psychological detail:

When we find a wise man holding fast to God’s work, we fill him with many lusts. We turn his soul toward those objects we place near him; we introduce error into his thoughts; and we do not allow him to persevere either in prayer or any good work.

Again if we see people attending church, sorry for their sins and desiring to hear the Divine Scriptures in order to keep some part of them, we immediately enter their homes. We do not allow them to do anything good and we introduce many thoughts into their hearts.

When we find a wise man holding fast to God’s work, we fill him with many lusts. We turn his soul toward those objects we place near him; we introduce error into his thoughts; and we do not allow him to persevere either in prayer or any good work.

Again if we see people attending church, sorry for their sins and desiring to hear the Divine Scriptures in order to keep some part of them, we immediately enter their homes. We do not allow them to do anything good and we introduce many thoughts into their hearts.
In outlining how the devil, taking on various guises (363a), deceives men and places sinful thoughts (ongean bere grimra geponca 367) and desires (italics below) before them, Cynewulf’s account is clearly concerned with the causes of that inner error which lead to fully fledged vice and sin. Unlike the Passio, which perhaps implies human passivity in such processes (non permittimus), Cynewulf’s devil deceives men into wanting to hear or obey the devil’s teaching and hence into wanting to sin (378b-80a). It is voluntarily, then, that men turn from virtue (380b-81) and from the rightful Lord’s law. The causal connection (hæt ‘so that’, 370b, 373a) between the mod’s desires and active sin is clear (underlined above), and it appears that inner desire and love of sin (italics above), as opposed to the will for God (365a), is crucial in this account.

A number of critics have identified parallels between this passage and Gregory’s accounts of the stages of sin in Moralia in Job (IV.xlix), Hom. in Evang. (XVI.i), and in the Liber Reg. Past. (III.xxix).33 It is an account which is transmitted in Bede’s Historia Ecclesiastica (L.xxvii) and is likely to have been known to Cynewulf himself.34

The idea was first explored by C. Abbetmeyer, Old English Poetic Motives derived from the Doctrine of Sin, pp. 37-8, and was developed by Doubleday, ‘The Allegory of the Soul as Fortress’, p. 504. Numerous critics have since followed up the suggested parallels. See Calder, Cynewulf, pp. 92-3; Anderson, Cynewulf, pp. 89-90; J. P. Hermann, Some Varieties of Psychomachia in Old English II. The Middle Ages, American Benedictine Review 34:2 (1983): 188-222, at p. 212.

defensiones audacia perpetratur. Fit enim suggestio per adversarium, delectatio per carmen, consensus per spiritum, defensionis audacia per elationem. 35

consent, and bold self-defence. The suggestion comes from the adversary, the delight comes from the flesh, consent comes from the spirit, and the bold-self-defence springs from our pride.

Doubleday finds the stages of suggestio in lines 366-8, delectatio in lines 369-370a, consensus in lines 370b-371 and defensio audacia in lines 372-376a of Juliana. 36 The subtle differences between the two accounts are, however, potentially significant for an understanding of Cynewulf’s picture of human agency and responsibility.

To begin with, Cynewulf’s devil seems to suggest both evil thoughts and evil desires (366-7) rather than making a clear distinction between suggestio, delectatio and consentio, as in Gregory’s first three stages of sin. 37 For Gregory, the devil at first introduces the suggestion and the soul’s consent is influenced by the pleasure experienced by the body. Cynewulf’s account makes no reference here to a consenting soul or spirit. In line with poetic convention, the mod represents man’s moral agency. As regards the body’s involvement in vice and sin, Doubleday sees the Gregorian stage of delectatio in the devil’s sweetening of pleasures (ie him geswete symna lustas 369), but Cynewulf’s reference of the ‘pleasure of sins’ (769b) makes no mention of the body and its variation with the lower ‘loves of the mod’ (370a) could be interpreted in terms of a mod-body contrast or alignment. Although the Old English devil certainly suggests or introduces bad thoughts and desires into the mod, there is no indication that the body’s pleasure in any way influences the will of the mod here. Indeed the move inwards highlights that Cynewulf’s account is not concerned with a distinction between body and spirit in examining moral agency in this passage. His metaphor operates on a contrast between inner and outer domains of cause and effect which allows him to evade such specific anthropological categorisations. Whether the inner aspects are man’s ‘corporeally imagined mind’, as Lockett puts it, or a non-physical, perhaps even spiritual entity, is of less concern than Cynewulf’s representation of the mod as the core of human agency and responsibility which underlies vice and sin and accordingly represents that fallible as well as potentially virtuous element at the heart of human

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35 Moralia in Job, IV xlix. Pt 75.661.
37 As I shall argue in Chapter Six, the flexibility of terminology relevant to inner processes is an intrinsic feature of most poetic accounts but does not necessarily suggest a ‘fuzzy’ mode of conceptualising inner workings. Rather, we must be sensitive to a different mode of conceptualising the various domains of experience and their interactions.
being. This feature becomes increasingly prominent in Cynewulf’s ensuing reformulation of the processes of vice and sin in his metaphorical account of psychomachia.

In lines 382 - 417a, Cynewulf integrates his analysis of vice and sin into the larger themes of the poem by developing the imagery of battle further. In contrast with the Passio, Cynewulf’s devil describes his assault on men in a way already encountered in Christ II (see 4.3 above):

| GIF IC æNIGNE ELLENROFNE | If I meet any bold and brave champion of the Lord with storms of arrows, who does not want to flee far away from battle - but [who] wise[ly] raises a barrier against me, a holy shield, spiritual battle-armour. [and who] does not want to abandon God. but, bold in prayer, gives resistance, firm on his feet, [then] I must turn wretchedly far from there, bereft of joys, to bewail [my] grief in the grip of embers, because I was unable to withstand at battle by power of my strength, but, saddened, I must seek another, less courageous one beneath the banner of war, a lesser soldier whom I can excite with my luring and hinder at battle. |
| GEMETE MODIGNE METODES CEMPAN | 
| WIÐ FLANFRÆCE, NELE FEOR BONAN | 
| BUGAN FROM BEADUWE, AC HE BORD ONGEAN | 
| HÆFŒ HYGESNOTTOR. HALIGNE SCYLD. | 
| GASTLIC GUÝREF, NELE GODE SWICAN, | 
| AC HE BEALD IN GEHEDE BIDSTEAL GÝFŒ | 
| ÞÆSTE ON FEÐAN, IC SCELER FEOR ÞONAN | 
| HEANMÓD HWEORFAN, HROÞRA HÍDÆLED, | 
| IN GLEDA GIPÈ, GEHÔU MÉANAN, | 
| ÞæT IC NE MÉAHTE MAGNÉS CRÆFTE | 
| GÝDÉ WÝGÓNGAN, AC IC GEOMÓR SCELER | 
| SCÉAN ÓPERNE ELLÉNÆSRAN, | 
| UNDER CUMBÓLHÚGAN, CEMPÁN SÆRNAN, | 
| ǷEC IC ONBÝRYÐÁN MÆGE | 
| BEÓRMÁN MÍNE. | 
| AGALÁN AT GÝPE. ... (Jul. 382-97a) | 

In Juliana, the assault has shifted from pagan persecution in deeds to the verbal battle (and persecution) of Juliana, and now to the attack upon her inner fortress. The psychomachic imagery of this passage is familiar territory throughout patristic texts and throughout Old English literature, being fundamentally inspired by Ephesians VI. 11-17. 38 Martin Irvine and J. P. Hermann have suggested the influence of Prudentius’ Psychomachia in Cynewulf’s use of battle imagery here. 39 Despite the significant popularity of Prudentius’ work in Anglo-Saxon England, however, there is one fundamental feature which suggests that Cynewulf was developing more general psychomachic imagery to suit his own purposes. 40 Prudentius’ characteristic innovation


in the psychomachia tradition is his opposition of allegorised vice and virtue within the soul itself.\textsuperscript{41} Cynewulf, however, does not oppose abstracted vices with virtues in the soul. His metaphor in lines 382-401\textsuperscript{a} represents the assault of the devil on man and not an inner conflict between the vices and virtues within.\textsuperscript{42} Although the nature of the devil’s assault is certainly spiritual, the metaphor itself works on the image of the devil probing human thoughts and intentions, as the concluding lines of Cynewulf’s battle descriptions make clear:

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
... & \textit{beah} he godes hwæt & \textit{Though he begins [to do] something good spiritually.} \\
onginne gastlice, & ic beo gearo sona, & I am soon ready to go through his ‘thoughts / intentions’ [to see] how firm his ‘spirits’ are inside, \\
\textit{he} & \textit{eal geondwile.} & \textit{how firm the resistance is built.} \\
\textit{hu gefæstas} & \textit{ferd innanweard,} & \\
\textit{wilsteall} geworht. & (Jul. 397\textsuperscript{b}-401\textsuperscript{a}) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The devil’s assault pertains specifically to Juliana’s inner domain and to man’s inner susceptibility to error and vice. The imagery does not reflect a conflict of innate inner faculties or virtues and vices but the allegorised interaction of spiritual forces within an inner-outer schema. As in Christ II, the inner domain again emerges as the locus within which Cynewulf explores spiritual workings, although man himself is clearly far from passive. As Cynewulf develops the psychomachia allegory further, the inner-outer schema also becomes a crucial element in the exploration of man’s moral workings in reference to a dualistic soul-body schema.

In the devil’s account of his success in deception, Cynewulf integrates notions of soul and body in a way which initially suggests an alignment between the \textit{mod} and \textit{savul} within the fortress of the body:

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textit{i ce } & \textit{I open the gate of the wall through a wound; the} \\
\textit{phones weatles geat} & \textit{tower is accessible, the entrance is opened. Then} \\
onyc & \textit{I first send bitter thoughts with a torrent of} \\
\textit{breostefan} & \textit{arrows into the ‘breast-mind’, by diverse desires} \\
\textit{purh} & \textit{of the \textit{mod}, so that it seems better to him to do} \\
epshcartare & \textit{sins, pleasures of the body, above the praise of} \\
in & \textit{the} & \textit{God.} \\
\hline
\textit{purh} & \textit{mod} & \textit{thoughts} \\
\textit{geonpalas} & \textit{wills} \\
\textit{purh} & \textit{modes} & \textit{bitter} \\
\textit{mislice} & \textit{millan,} & \textit{geponcas} \\
\textit{purh} & \textit{selle} & \textit{him} \\
\textit{him} & \textit{lymm} & \textit{lym} \textit{need} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


\textsuperscript{42} Moreover, the characters who embody the given virtues do not face abstract vices. Cynewulf does, to an extent, oppose vices and virtues in the characters of Heliseus and Juliana, but these are not systematic enough to be aligned with any order of “vice-and-virtue pairs” in \textit{Prudentius: Psychomachia}, or indeed with the alternative orders found in Cassian, Aldhelm or Alcuin. Irvine suggests that Juliana in effect re-enacts the combat between \textit{Pudicitia} and \textit{Veterum cultura deorum} in the \textit{Psychomachia}; and although this applies in part, the most prominent opposition is that between Heliseus’ anger and Juliana’s calm fearlessness (an opposition which enables his most important character contrast, see p. 143 below). See also Irvine, ‘Cynewulf’s Use of Psychomachia Allegory’, p. 59.
Again, the arrows are intended to pierce through the external fortress of the body into the *mod* itself. Again, the *mod* is deceived and its false desires constitute the inner vice which leads to outer sin (406-8). It is not clear whether the opening in the fortress is the weak will itself (*purh teonan, purh mislice modes willan*) or the pleasure of the body. The body again appears as the weaker and penetrable aspect of man and is indeed associated with sin in a way that recalls Gregorian *delectatio* (*lices luslas*). This reference, however, occurs in the context of outer action (*leahtras to fremman*) rather than bodily desire opposing the will of the *mod*. We could suggest that the *mod* is itself conceived as corporeal, but a few lines later Cynewulf’s contrast between soul and body may equally well align the desiring and deciding *mod* with the *sawul* at a moral level. As the devil tells us, he is more interested in the *sawul* and *gaest* than in the body (413b-15a) and the preceding imagery suggests that the spiritual soul is aligned with the inner domain. Cynewulf indeed associates the human spirit with faith and contemplation in a number of passages in *Juliana*. Juliana contemplates with her spirit and holds the spiritual pledge within it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>halge treowe</th>
<th>hio in gaeste bare</th>
<th>She held the holy pledge in her spirit, contemplated eagerly...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hogde georne</td>
<td>(Jul. 28b-29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geong on gaeste</td>
<td>(Jul. 34b-5a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In lines 413b-17a, however, Cynewulf’s concern with the *gaest* and *sawul* clearly pertains to its eschatological fate (*gaestes forwyrd*) in a way that is reminiscent both of its status as a possession and of the larger theme of spiritual warfare between Christ and devil. Cynewulf’s contrast between body and soul therefore appears primarily that of the familiar formulaic contrast rather than being the dominant anthropological schema for exploring human experience. The inner aspects, in turn, dominate as the determiners of this spiritual fate as well as being closely aligned with the bodily desires that lead to
sin. Their intermediary role again appears to reflect the totality of human experience and impulse in a way that places them at the centre of the stage.

By using the allegory of spiritual warfare to describe the assault of the devil and of his temptations. Cynewulf departs from the Passio to establish a continuity of theme and imagery which is quite certainly his own. His use of battle imagery internalises the conflict, but does so in terms of the devil’s attack on Juliana’s inner fortress in a way that is entirely continuous with the introduction of Holy Spirit and devil into the prison cell. At the narrative level, we witness how the larger struggle of the Christian God and Satan for human souls is internalised as Cynewulf illustrates the workings of the evil spirit and Holy Spirit throughout the exchange in the prison cell. Although the devil attempts to deceive Juliana and lead her astray, the Holy Spirit speaks and works through her (see halge oncwæd / purh gæstes giefe, 315-16a) as she challenges and averts the devilish wiles. In the context of battling spiritual forces (halig gæst 241a; gaestgeniða 245b. hean helle gæst, 457. 615. unclaene gæst 418) Juliana acts by the Spirit’s power (purh gæstes giefe 316a) and speaks through her spirit’s thought (purh gaestgehygd 148a). The narrative as a whole bears out the centrality of the inner in terms of the endeavours of satanic spirits and of the Holy Spirit fighting to gain hold of men. Nevertheless, the importance of human choice and human responsibility is amplified rather than diminished by Cynewulf’s development of this imagery. Although the devil implants thoughts and desires (403b-406), the devilish arrows are evidently suggestions which require consent and Cynewulf’s fundamental point is clear. Man turns ‘knowingly’ from Christ’s law (411), he consciously sins by choosing to hear and obey the devil’s teaching and thereby places himself in the devil’s power (411-13a). Without eliminating the potency of his metaphors, and without limiting the aesthetic effects of variation, Cynewulf thus amplifies the role of conscious human volition in the processes of vice and sin in men. In doing so he moulds the traditions available to him to suit his narrative and aesthetic purposes.

Cynewulf’s didactic concerns are fully illustrated by the example of the resilient Juliana herself. The reversal of the power balance in her encounter with the devil is

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14 Indeed the poetic variation in lines 366 and 367 creates an extremely thin semantic line between thought and desire, as was also the case in lines 362-82 above.
expressed by a number of inversions. In the previous episodes, Afric anus and Heliseus initiated the verbal battles (78-9, 164-5): now Juliana asks the questions (315b-16a, 345-47a, 418-20a, 444-5). As she interrogates the devil, her dominance becomes inscribed into the very form of the dialogue. Like her own human opponents in the public sphere, Juliana becomes the active aggressor in the spiritual sphere. As Calder has argued, Juliana's grip on the devil should be taken metaphorically:

Too many critics see only the slight figure of a woman holding the devil himself 'prisoner' while she shouts him into submission through the force of her contumacious rhetoric. But such a reaction is misguided. Juliana, as a person, does not hold the devil fast; rather, the firmness of her faith in God's truth and power, reiterated at crucial intervals, renders the devil 'powerless'.

Since the devil's purpose is to deceive and as a consequence to pervert men, turning them from the path of salvation by turning them away from Christ (325-27b), Juliana thwarts his very purpose and reduces him to an instrument in the cause of the righteous by forcing him to reveal the truth about himself and his evil influence upon men. In doing so she inflicts the worst torments upon him:

| Beat ormate, | Is þeos þrag ful strong, | This torment is extremely harsh, excessive violence, |
| Julian and ðafian | le sceal þinga gehwylc | I must suffer and submit to everything in your |
| womdeæda onwrecon | on þine dom, | judgment and reveal every black evil deed that I ever |
| swærtæ gesyredæ. | be þic wiðeferg | contrived. |

(Jul., 464b-468a)

Since the saint's interrogation is both her own means to the truth and also her punishment (466b) of the devil, we also see Juliana assuming the role of judge in this episode - ironically, at the instigation of the devil himself: þu þæs deman scealt (256b). Unlike Juliana in the public sphere, however, the devil must suffer righteous judgment of the events he has been forced to relate. Cynewulf thus maximises the semantic potential in his use of verbs such as deman (to judge, assess, discern, condemn), creating a situation in which the revelation of Christian truth becomes central to the conflict. The devil's admission of Christian truth appears as Christian confession, whilst Juliana's discriminating evaluation of his words becomes her judgment in a

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15 Calder, Cynewulf, p. 94.
16 Although this particular passage is added by Cynewulf here, the same imagery also appears in the Passio (10; 11; 12; 19).
17 At the outset of the poem we heard that brave heroes will judge in their telling of the story (2.4) and Juliana now assumes precisely this role. Although the devil had clearly intended to align the saint's judgment with that of the earthly judge Heliseus (249b-257), his plan ultimately records only on him. Juliana's evaluative judgment is not erroneous like that of her earthly opponent.
similar Christian sense (Jul. 506b-26a). The devil’s admission of guilt and responsibility seals his ultimate capitulation to her bold and courageous power.

There was none of them who so boldly bound me with shackles and besieged me with rebukes before you now overpowered and firmly intercepted that great strength which my father, enemy of mankind, gave to me when he, my lord, commanded me to journey out of darkness to sweeten sin for you. In this, sorrow has come to me, a grievous struggle.

Although the devil had sought to turn Juliana from the path of salvation by his powers of deception (pæt ic be meahtes / butan earþepum anes cæstre / ahwyrån from halor, 358b-60a), he must acknowledge that Juliana’s powers of truth are superior (518b-21).

By shifting true power and victory inwards and associating it with the understanding of Christian truth, Cynewulf accordingly completes his associations of error, vice and sin with paganism and wisdom and virtue with Christianity. By highlighting that the powers of Juliana and the devil are given to them by their respective fathers and lords (italics above) the devil’s confession places his struggle with Juliana into its universal context and acknowledges that Satan’s powers of deception are inferior to God’s powers of truth. Juliana’s foundation in Christ gives her greater spiritual power than the demon who assaults her. Significantly, her pivotal inner victory over the devil becomes manifest in the public forum at the end of the poem.

The involvement of spiritual forces in Juliana is not limited to the metaphorical domain – angels intervene to save her from the flames, just as the cowardly devil continues to spur on his own followers in the final public scene of execution. Given the parallels between Heliseus and the devil, and given the causal connections established between spiritual lords and their followers, Juliana’s absolute victory over the devil

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18 Calder sees the devil’s confession as a ‘parody of Christian confession’ with a ‘transparent ploy to win her sympathy’. Cynewulf, pp. 95-6. In its wider context, however, the devil’s confession becomes more interesting. Juliana does not accept the devil’s claim that he is compelled in his actions by his evil master (341a-44), but forces him to confess his full guilt and perhaps therewith his responsibility (506b-10). Despite acknowledging Juliana’s superior power and wisdom and ultimately begging for mercy (559-45), the devil can, however, hardly be said to be repentant. Juliana’s eventual release of the devil is therefore more symbolic of her victory over him (and the dangers he represents) than of Christian mercy itself.

19 The Passio here reads: ‘...et ut breuiter dixam, omnia mala quae in isto mundo praesunt sunt, ego ipse confess... 11 cum omnia mala facti, nemo tamen ausus fuit me torquere quantum tu, nemo apostolorum manum meam tenuit. Tu autem et legasti me! Nemo martyrum me eccegit. Nemo prophetarum mihi in iuriam fecit. Nemo patriarcharum mihi manum misit. Nam ipsius filii Dei experimentum coepit in deserto facere illum ascensione in montem excelsum, et non fut ausus contra me aliquid dicere: et tu me sic tormentis consumist.’
foreshadows Heliseus` ultimate defeat in this final public resolution. At a personal level, Juliana`s inner victory brings about her outer victory over Heliseus, who is reduced to a crazed beast whilst she remains the paradigm of virtue:

Then the judge became wild and grim-minded: he began to tear his clothes, he also flashed and ground his teeth~ crazed in wits like a wild animal. He roared fierce-heartedly and cursed his gods because they could not withstand the power of the will of a woman. The glorious maiden was single-minded and unafraid, mindful of her strength, the Lord`s will.

At the public level, Juliana`s speeches and her martyrdom bring about the conversion of the entire populace. In death, Juliana is honoured as her soul is led to heaven and her body is worshiped by the newly converted citizens of Nicommedia (669b-71a, 689-92a). Heliseus, in turn, is exiled from his community and ends wretchedly at sea before experiencing his eternal exile in hell (673-8). In its characterisation and narrative illustration of ethical principles, Juliana adapts a dualistic framework of matter and spirit to serve his ultimately didactic purpose.

Over the course of this chapter, the pivotal importance of the inner battle has become abundantly clear at structural, narrative and thematic levels - and of course in Cynewulf`s own central interest in the inner domain as the central venue for exploring human experience. Despite the duality of cosmic forces and formulaic constructions of a dual human nature, it appears that the complex experience of human being cannot be defined in terms of a self which is identified exclusively with the soul or with the body, as Cynewulf`s own concluding remarks in Juliana suggest:

As in Christ II, Cynewulf`s view of human nature in Juliana appears in the context of a larger cosmic worldview which requires reference to the spiritual and transcendent realm in light of its fundamentally Christian concerns. Rather than focusing on the
immediate implications of a soteriological context, however. *Juliana* illustrates its didactic preoccupations in a narrative fiction which traces the dispositions, choices and fates of human epitomes of Christian *virtue* and pagan *vice*. As has become apparent, the stylised approach in *Juliana* facilitates a detailed picture of Cynewulf’s conception of inner workings in human types. My next chapter considers his exploration of the inner bases of agency, experience and identity in the development of individual characters in *Elene*. 
Chapter Six  
*Elene: The Centrality of the Inner Self in Human Enlightenment*

*Elene*, the longest of Cynewulf’s signed poems, has received the greatest amount of critical attention and is often seen as the culmination of Cynewulf’s poetic career. ¹ My own motivation for treating *Elene* at this point is not to suggest any chronological order amongst the poems. Rather, my analysis of the Cynewulf canon has moved from the larger ideological context and general anthropological picture in *Christ II.*, to the exploration of the inner life through human types in the figural narrative of *Juliana*, and now to *Elene*, where we find the most detailed treatment of the workings of the inner self as illustrated in the development of individual characters.

Although *Elene* is a verse adaptation of a version of the *Acta Quiriaci* in the *Acta Sanctorum*, it is less easily classified as a hagiographical poem than is *Juliana*.² *Elene* is no typical *vita* focusing on a single exceptional person. Following in the Western tradition of the *inventio* legend, *Elene* combines the story of Helena’s discovery of the Cross with the story of Judas Cyriacus’s conversion and is thus predisposed to a thematic consideration of the significance of the Cross for mankind.³ Whereas the *Acta Quiriaci* focuses on the parallels between *inventio* and *conversio*, Cynewulf adapts this thematic baseline into a fully-fledged consideration of Christian enlightenment. As in all of his poems, Cynewulf adapts his source material in light of his own concerns, fusing styles and ideas of both Latin Christian and vernacular traditions.⁴ Widely appreciated as an exceptionally ‘sophisticated’ and ‘polished’ work,

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¹ The following critics infer an order amongst the signed poems from their evaluations of thematic and aesthetic sophistication of the poems. Das, *Cynewulf and the Cynewulf Canon*, p. 34; Schaar, *Critical Studies*, pp. 47-8; Anderson, *Cynewulf* p. 14; Calder, *Cynewulf*, p. 124; Bosse and Hinton, ‘Cynewulf and the Apocalyptic Vision’, p. 284.

² *Acta Apocrypha, Saint Judaeus-Quiriaci*, Mai IV, Pars I, ASS, ed. Godefrius Henschenius and Daniel Papenbrochius (Antwerp, 1860). All Latin translations of this text are taken from Allen and Calder. *Sources and Analogues*, pp. 60-8. Bjork considers *Juliana* to be the only one of Cynewulf’s signed poems which can be classified as a saint’s life in *Old English Lives of Saints*, pp. 34-7.


⁴ A great deal of attention has been paid to the interaction of literacy and orality, and of the learned intellectual and vernacular traditions as they emerge in the style, themes and imagery of *Elene*. Ursula
Elene rightly deserves its praise – though it need not be elevated entirely at the expense of Cynewulf’s other poems. The ideological strands and modes of expression reflected in the other signed poems essentially enrich and complement a reading of Elene.

Whilst the larger soteriological considerations observed in Christ II and the stylised, typological characterisation encountered in Juliana are also features of Elene, this chapter concentrates on the way the themes of conversion and enlightenment highlight the centrality of the inner self in the personal development of individual characters. In contrast with the more general tone of Christ II and Juliana, Cynewulf’s interest in the inner lives of a diversity of characters in Elene provides the most detailed insights into his conception of inner workings, as well as into the continuum of inner and outer activity. This can be seen most clearly in the poem’s concern with the acquisition and propagation of Christian understanding as well as with the application of Christian understanding to Christian practice in the just and virtuous Christian life. In light of the abundance of vocabulary relevant to human thought, knowledge and contemplation, the theme of wisdom in Elene has received much critical attention.6

Whilst human understanding is evidently central to Cynewulf’s view of human enlightenment, his use of the imagery of dark and light highlights his interest in not only ‘intellectual’ or ‘cognitive’ development, but also ‘emotional’ and ‘moral’ enlightenment. What emerges most clearly from the many descriptions of inner workings in Elene, however, is that our analytical categories of ‘cognitive’, ‘emotional’ and ‘volitional’ faculties or processes (however useful these are as analytical tools) do not appear to inform Cynewulf’s conception of man’s inner workings. As has already emerged in the previous two chapters, the semantic boundaries between ‘thinking’.

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‘feeling’ and ‘wanting’ are noticeably unfixed in Cynewulf’s accounts of psychological processes. The relevant descriptions in *Elene* suggest that this apparent semantic fluidity is neither a conceptual laxity accompanying poetic modes of thought and expression, nor a sign of a ‘vernacular model of the mind’ which is essentially at odds with Latin Christian intellectual psychologies such as those informed by (Neo)Platonic categories of reason, spiritedness and desire. Although it is of course necessary to ask whether Cynewulf’s traditional poetic diction is even capable of accommodating rigidly defined conceptions of human faculties and their workings, I suggest that Cynewulf’s apparently ‘native’ account of inner workings is entirely compatible with Latin Christian psychological ideas in that his account of the role (rather than the constitution) of the inner self stresses the central importance of a ‘unified inner self’ as man’s agentive and responsible core.

I begin this discussion by tracing the way in which the various examples and patterns of enlightenment in *Elene* establish a picture of individual and communal movement towards Christ, rather than of a static opposition between human types. In light of these observations, I reconsider the much discussed ‘sapiential’ theme, which is most frequently considered in terms of an opposition between the Letter of the Old Law and the Spirit of the New Law – in terms of an opposition between Jewish and Christian wisdom. Rather than simply falling into two opposing categories, however, the types of knowledge and wisdom which Cynewulf presents in *Elene* range from heathen ignorance and the wilful negation of truth by Jews, to Christian understanding of scripture, and finally to the fuller wisdom which is bestowed by the Holy Spirit. Besides being most relevant to Cynewulf’s own Christian audience, the distinction between knowing Christian events and being fulfilled by the Holy Spirit’s wisdom offers a

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6 I surveyed such philosophical inheritance within Christian ‘psychology’ in Chapter One of this thesis.
As outlined in Chapter Two, the idea of ‘multiple souls’ and ‘fragmented selves’ was popular in cross-cultural anthropology as a means of comparing the multiple drives, impulses and experiences which are seen to characterise human experience. Such anthropological models have been applied to Old English poetry as a tool for making sense of ‘popular’ or ‘non-analytical’ constructs of self. Whilst the label ‘unified soul’ or ‘unified inner self’ is misleading (suggesting for example the harmony of a tripartite soul under the right rule of reason), I maintain this label in the context of the debate amongst Anglo-Saxonists, who see a movement away from the multiplicity of ‘inner aspects’ as distinct from ‘soul’ and ‘self’ towards a ‘unified inner self’ in the Old English prose traditions.
particularly fruitful forum for investigating inner workings in the enlightenment process.

6.1 Enlightenment as the Structuring Theme in \textit{Elene}

Despite following the narrative progression of its source, \textit{Elene} essentially develops according to its own thematic interests. Cynewulf’s treatment of the theme of conversion is built on the contrast between heathen and Christian characters in the poem, as amplified by the imagery of dark and light, blindness and understanding, and sin and salvation. Though inherent in the larger associative imagery, the fundamental contrasts between non-Christian and Christian characters are not simply presented in terms of opposition, as they are in \textit{Juliana}. As Robert Stepsis and Richard Rand point out:

What develops in the course of the poem is a movement from one realm to the other. The devil still exists in absolute darkness and God still occupies a kingdom of unfailing light. But the human characters, Constantine (and presumably through Constantine, Elene), Judas and the people of Jerusalem, all move from one spiritual condition (darkness) to another (light). What makes this movement, or conversion, possible is, of course, Christ, or His symbolic relics, the Cross and nails which make a similar journey from darkness to light.\(^8\)

A particularly significant effect of the development of imagery in \textit{Elene} is that not only conversion, but enlightenment in a wider sense emerge as central in the poem. The development which characters undergo is not merely the nominal change from heathen or Jew to Christian, but rather, a deeper, more profound change akin to a \textit{peripateia}. Indeed a pattern of gradual and progressive enlightenment (rather than a sudden leap from non-Christian to Christian being) guides the narrative as a whole, as can be seen in the development of individual characters as much as in their communal efforts to reveal and propagate Christian truth.

In the poem as a whole, the development of the three central characters – Constantine, Elene and Judas – establishes a sense of mutual dependence in the

communal movement towards the light of Christ. The first two fits of the poem narrate Constantine’s vision of the Cross (1-98), his victorious battle against the Huns and Goths under the banner of the Cross (99-152) and his subsequent conversion to the faith (153-193). In narrating Constantine’s own conversion, these opening episodes establish a distinct pattern of enlightenment which is developed in varying forms in the subsequent enlightenment and conversions of the other characters in the poem. As I shall illustrate in reference to the personal developments of these various characters, man’s receptivity to revelation, his active seeking for deeper truths and the transmission of Christian wisdom constitute the cornerstones of Cynewulf’s view of human enlightenment.

At the outset of Elene, Constantine is oppressed by fear (modsorge wæg. 61b) under the earthly threat of the barbarian forces. Upon hearing the words of an angel (hu to heofenum beseoh 83), however, he is eager to open himself to the vision of the Cross in the skies, to look up beyond the limits of earth into the heavenly domain:

Upon seeing the brightness of the angels and the Cross (72a. 73a. 88b. 90b. 92a), Constantine’s fear is replaced by joy (cyning wæs by bliðra l ond pe sorgleasra... on fyrhōsefan 96b-98): his night slips away (nithhelm toglad 78) and the dawn of the day of victory takes its place. Having raised the Cross on his banner in battle and having experienced its power in his own victory over the barbarians (99-112a), Constantine actively seeks (þaes frieggan ongan 157) the meaning of this symbol from the heathen elders of his realm. Three times they fail to provide answers before referring him to the Christian wise ones who subsequently reveal the insights he seeks in their catechetical instruction (175-191a). Upon his baptism (fulwihte 192a), Constantine contemplates scripture with the aid of the Spirit’s Grace (furh gastes gife 198-202a) and his resulting preoccupation with the actual Cross (ford gemynig ymb þæt mare treo. 212-14a) leads him to command his mother Elene to seek it in the inventio mission to Jerusalem.
Whilst, therefore, the catalyst of Constantine’s conversion and enlightenment is the angelic messenger who reveals to him the vision of the Cross, Constantine’s own desire to understand and to reveal the truth about this Cross to others presents him as an essentially active initiator of the human chain of enlightenment which follows in the poem. Although the inherent joy of the human experience of passing on the good news (godspel) which makes divine enlightenment possible is latent throughout, the most prominent theme accompanying Cynewulf’s narration of this chain of conversion is the process of active human seeking – as we see most clearly in the next stage of the poem which is concerned with Elene’s mission of finding the actual Cross.

Elene’s journey to the Holy Land and her confrontation with the Jews plays on a number of the patterns seen in the previous fitts. In warlike and heroic scenes, Elene eagerly (wæs sōna gearu 222b) undertakes the commanded voyage and journey to Jerusalem (212-276) as a warlike queen with her warriors (guðcwen gumena preate 254). Her confrontation with the Jewish preat (326a) parallels Constantine’s inquiry into the Cross. Like Constantine, Elene initially fails to gain answers in three successive meetings with the Jewish wise ones (276-312, 313-363, 364-410), but in seeking her own answers (372b-76, 315-19, 406b-10, discussed more closely below) Elene herself initiates the quests of the Jews. In accordance with her commands, the Jews seek the wisest among them, although they do so in an ambivalent way (reonigmode...georne sohton 320-322b) which contrasts the eager quests of both Constantine and Elene. Once they have found Judas, who reveals to them the true Christian events and their own historical guilt in Christ’s crucifixion (419b-535), the Jews refuse both to acknowledge and to reveal Christian truth, contriving instead to keep the actual Cross concealed (565-72). In contrast with Constantine (and presumably Elene), they carry out the quest unwillingly and publicly deny any knowledge of the truth they have found. Unlike the pagan and Christian sages of the previous fitts, the Jews only aid their inquisitor when coerced and threatened into handing over the one who can reveal to her the hidden truths she seeks (he pe mæg sod gecyðan / onwrean wyrdan gerýna swa ðu hine wordum frignes 588b-89). Both the parallels and contrasts of these episodes accordingly highlight the importance of conscious human choice to accept or deny and to reveal or
conceal information and understanding. As becomes increasingly clear in the progressing narrative, human choice and the active human quest for truth are defining and pivotal elements in the enlightenment of the various characters.

The importance of human choice (and implicitly of conscious human volition) is most fully illustrated by Judas, who initially rejects the instructions of both his father (441-53) and Elene (670-84). As in the case of all the Jews, it is initially coercion which brings about Judas’ cooperation. Judas’ seven-day incarceration in a pit (691-708), however, illustrates the deeper change of heart which is necessary for the literal inventio as much as for his own conversio. In this symbolic incarceration, the ‘guilty one’ (692a) experiences physical and mental torment (siomode in sorgum...under hearmlocan hunger gepreataod / clommm beclungen, 694-6a) before relenting:

Ic eow healsie þurh heofona god
þæt ge me of ðyssum earfeðum up forlæten,
heanne fram hungres geniðlan.  Ic þæt halige treo
lustum cyðe, nu ic hit leng ne mæg
helan for hungre.  Is þæs haeft to ðæn strang,
þreanyd þæs þeal ord þæs þroht to ðæs heard
dogorrimum.  Ic adreogan ne mæg,
ne leng helan be ðæm lifes treo,
þeah ic ær mid dysige þurhdrifan ware
ond ðæt soð to late seolf geceowe.
(Ele. 699-708)

I entreat you, by the God of heaven, that you let me up from this torment, wretched from the torture of hunger. I will gladly reveal the holy tree, now that I can no longer conceal it due to hunger. This imprisonment is too strong, the affliction so cruel and this toil so hard as the days add up. I cannot endure or hold out any longer about the tree of life, though I was previously permeated by error, and myself only recognised the truth too late.

The symbolism of the passage as a whole suggests that Judas’ ‘hunger’ (701a, 703a) is more than physical and that his dark state of misery and ‘error’ reflects the Jewish condition itself, whilst his re-emergence from the narrow darkness of the pit (711-5) appears to reflect his elevation to the new life of light. Although Catharine Regan and Thomas Hill have taken this scene to represent a baptismal ‘conversion’, I would stress that in Elene, Judas’ choice to seek the Cross does not represent the full cleansing of baptism (which occurs much later in the poem, 1045) or the completion of his catechumenate in a way that recalls Constantine’s own conversion. Rather, his re-emergence appears to mark his choice to undertake a lengthy, active and earnest search for the Cross and for Christian truth as is suggested by his gradual increase of faith in subsequent passages.

Immediately after being aided out of the symbolic pit, Judas prays to God. In this prayer he does not simply seek information about the location of the Cross, but actively goes beyond Elene’s commands in seeking confirmation of Christ’s divinity (italics mine): 11

Judas’ own thoughts and spirits are immediately raised by the miraculous smoke (þær æræred wearð beornes breostsefa 803b-4a). On the one hand this divine revelation grants him confirmation and establishes his deep faith. On the other hand it provides him with hope for merciful inclusion in the heavenly community (813-21a). Whereas all previous converts have gained their insights from human intermediaries, Judas’ own enlightenment occurs in direct communication with God. His own enlightenment accordingly stands at the structural centre of the poem and presents the narrative pivot which brings about the actual unearthing of the Cross – the inventio – and the accompanying conversio of all remaining characters of the poem. Judas’ own full conversion, however, is a lengthy one involving successive and deepening stages of enlightenment.

After opening himself to Christian truth and actively seeking God’s confirmation, Judas’s faith is increasingly confirmed over the remainder of the poem. In seeking the actual Cross, his prayer to be shown which of the three crosses on Calvary is the true Cross of Christ (864b-66) is answered by the miraculous reanimation of a dead man (876-89). The suggestion that this symbolic resurrection also answers Judas’

11 This passage follows a theologically detailed passage in the prayer which draws on the theological context already discussed in Chapter Four: Gif þin willa sie, wealdend engla, / þæt ricie se ðe on rode was, / ond purh Marian in middangeard / acenned wearð in cildes had... gedo nu, fæder engla, ford beacen þin. (772-88b). ‘If it be your will, Ruler of angels, that He should rule Who was on the Cross and [Who] was born of Mary into the world in form of a child...show forth your emblem now, Father of angels.’
personal prayers for inclusion in the spiritual community of Christ (citation above) is soon confirmed by his victory over the devil (898-951) through the Holy Spirit which now dwells within him (\textit{him wæs halig gast / befolen fæste, fyrrhat lufu / weallende gewitt} 935b-7a). Fully confirmed in his faith (\textit{his geleafa weard / faest on ferde siddan frofre gast / wic gewunode in þæs weres breostum} 1035b-38a) as the new man renamed Cyriacus, he finally becomes the bishop of Jerusalem who cares for the Christian community at large (1030b-38a).

Despite the differences between the conversions of Constantine and Judas-Cyriacus, both characters reflect distinct patterns of enlightenment and deepening stages of faith which involve successive stages of revelation, receptivity and active seeking. Significantly, openness to and fulfilment by the indwelling Spirit (rather than baptism or ‘nominal’ conversion) presents the climax of enlightenment after which the characters turn to the propagation and sustenance of the faith for the benefit of others. The importance of transmitting the \textit{godspel}, for both the personal and the communal good, is amplified by the reciprocal dimension of the chain of conversion and enlightenment in \textit{Elene} which is built into the circular structure of the poem itself.

Constantine’s initiation of the literal \textit{inventio} filters into Elene’s initiation of the Jewish quest for truth, all of which depend upon Judas for their completion. The \textit{inventio} (or news of it), in turn, fills first Judas (and bystanders 894-8a), then Elene (955-66) and finally Constantine (989b-90a) with joy. The sense of mutual dependence in this circular pattern is repeated in the final fitts of the poem. Following the speedy completion of Constantine’s new mission of church building and commemoration of the Cross (1006-1025), Elene bids Cyriacus to find the nails which pierced Christ’s hands (1062b-81). In contrast to the \textit{Acta}, it is Elene herself who is preoccupied with the nails (\textit{mod gemynde...for pam næglum} 1063-4a) and who herself initiates this final task. As I have argued at length elsewhere, Elene must herself be included in the larger patterns of enlightenment in the poem.\textsuperscript{12} Significantly, just as Constantine received the Spirit by

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Elene’s Spiritual Journey: ‘Heo gefylled wæs wisdomes gife’}, M.Phil Diss., Trinity College Dublin (2003).
going beyond the angel’s commands and Judas received the Spirit by going beyond
Elene’s commands, Elene herself receives the Spirit in her own quest:

Heo gefylled wæs wisdomes gife, ond pa wiæ behold halig heofonlic gast, hreber weardode, æðelæ innoð. (Ele. 1142b–45a)

She was filled with the gift of wisdom and the Holy heavenly Spirit occupied that dwelling, guarded the noble one within her chest.

I shall return to the nature of this ‘fulfilment’ in more detail below, but for the moment, my point is that it is willing openness and active seeking which results in the characters’ personal and rather graphic fulfilment by the Spirit, just as it is active seeking which allows the characters to transcend their subsequent representative or instrumental roles. In going beyond Elene’s literal commands, Judas becomes the saintly and invaluable aid to Elene as well as to the Christian community at large, whilst Elene develops from the emissary and representative of her emperor and son into his spiritual and practical counsellor who sends back the nails for the bridle of Constantine’s horse (1172b–75).  

The thematic progression of the poem as a whole, then, reflects a chain of conversion and enlightenment in which the individual and communal movement towards the light of Christ becomes more prominent than typological opposition. The cooperation and interdependence of heathens, Jews and Christians (and the transcendence of such categories in the larger movement of enlightenment) draws as much attention to the human mediation and activity which stands beside God’s revelation, as to the importance of the role of the individual in seeking and revealing Christian truth. Although the central importance of the reception of the Spirit, rather than of baptism or nominal conversion, reflects Cynewulf’s concern with the spiritual domain of human experience, the poem as a whole extends these interests to the practical implication of the Christian life. By the end of Elene, Cyriacus cares for the spiritual and physical health of his flock (1211b–17a), whilst Elene supports him by her own exhortations to the people and by material gifts (1217b–26a). Thus the close relationship between personal enlightenment and the need to reveal Christian joy and

13 The significance of the nails on the bridle has been interpreted as empowerment in battle, but also a curb to earthly pride as developed by Jerome. J. Gardner, ‘Cynewulf’s Elene: Sources and Structure’, NP 54.1 (1970): 65–76, at p. 72; J. J. Campbell, ‘Cynewulf’s Multiple Revelations’, pp. 244–6. I have discussed Elene’s own development in more detail in my unpublished M. Phil Dissertation, ‘Elene’s Spiritual Journey’, pp. 27–35.
understanding to others shows the importance of ‘the inner’ and ‘the outer’ both in terms of the personal and communal as well as in the contemplative and practical dimensions of Christian life.

The patterns of personal enlightenment in *Elene* are particularly important for the present inquiry in that they allow us an insight into the role and workings of the inner self. All characters are somehow affected by both divine and human mediators who present them with the choice to recognise and accept or deny Christian truth, to uphold and spread the faith or to obscure and conceal this process. Choice (and implicitly the individual ‘will’) is therefore central to the movement from dark blindness, misery and sin to the light of insight, joy and virtue. The association of active and independent seeking with the reception of the Spirit is particularly striking and I return to the implications of this feature below. For the moment, the central point is that the larger patterns of enlightenment in *Elene* suggest a concern with movement, development and change rather than of static opposition between human types. In light of this observation, I now turn to the details of the inner workings in Cynewulf’s picture of enlightenment, beginning with the themes of understanding and wisdom which are so prominent in the poem.

### 6.2 Types of Human Understanding

As already observed in my readings of *Christ II* and *Juliana*, human knowledge and contemplation of Christ (in particular of His significance for the life of the individual) is a central aspect of Cynewulf’s didactic concerns. In *Elene*, the volume and variety of terminology relevant to thought and understanding forms an inherent aspect of the narrative itself. Though not confined to Elene’s interaction with the Jews, the poet’s preoccupation with knowledge, understanding and wisdom in enlightenment is most evident in the central dialogues of the poem.
Critical attention to the sapiential theme has accordingly focused on Cynewulf’s differentiation between Jewish and Christian wisdom. Catherine Regan, for example, sees a distinction between the ‘inadequacy’ of the Old Law, to which the Jews adhere ‘excessively’, and the spiritual wisdom of the New Law, as represented by Elene.¹⁴ Similarly, Thomas Hill sees a typological ‘confrontation of two kinds of wisdom – the wisdom of the word and law of the Jews, and the Christian wisdom of Elene’, a distinction between Jewish leornungscraft (learning-skill) and Christian gerune (mystery), between letter and spirit.¹⁵ Although this distinction certainly informs the confrontation between Jewish and Christian characters, I suggest a more complex pattern of understanding and wisdom in the poem as a whole. A review of the various types of wisdom presented in Elene shows a significant distinction both between the ignorance and delusion of the heathens and Jews, as well as between Christian knowledge of scripture or events and the full Christian wisdom of those who are infused by the Holy Spirit. These types of wisdom point not so much to opposed absolutes as to (often supplementary) modes and states of understanding which accord with the focus on change and development in Elene.

The defectiveness of non-Christian ‘wisdom’ is evident from the outset of the poem. Memory and knowledge of writings define the wisdom of the heathen elders (153b-56) just as memory and wide learning typify the wisdom of the Jews (379b-82a):¹⁶

\[
\text{...} \quad \text{þa wisestann} \\
\text{þurh fyrmgewriton} \quad \text{þa he snyttro cræft} \\
\text{heoldon higepancum} \quad \text{gefriegen hæfdon,} \\
\text{hæleða rædas.} \quad \text{(Ele. 153b-6)}
\]

... forþsnottera 
þurh modgemynnd 
on sefan snyttro. 
\(\text{(Ele. 379b-82a)}\)

... exceedingly wise ones ... those who had gained the power of wisdom by ancient writings, [who] held men’s counsels in their ‘mind’s thoughts’.

... those wisest ones ... those who had gained the power of wisdom by ancient writings, [who] held men’s counsels in their ‘mind’s thoughts’.

1⁶ Robert DiNapoli, in ‘Poesis and Authority’, has suggested that a vindication of the poetic oral tradition can be discerned in the conflict between Christian orality and Jewish literacy, but word skill and memory are consistently coupled in the poem and neither appears to be more associated with wisdom than the other, for example in lines 169, 190, 323, 343, 589, 595.
Although the wisest amongst the heathens recognise the Cross as the symbol of the King of Heaven (170b-71a), they do not know and cannot explain the significance of the Cross (ne ful geare cudon sweotole gesecgan be þam sigebeacne 167b-68). Their incomplete knowledge contrasts with the wisdom of the baptised Christians (þa þurh fulwihte lærde waren 172b-73a) who wisely relate the spiritual mysteries (ðus gleawlice gastgerynum sægdon 189-90a). Similarly, although the Jews are learned in their writings, their inability to answer Elene contrasts their wisdom with hers.¹⁷ Since, however, Elene herself has at this stage not yet received the wisdom of the Spirit, the nature of the contrast requires closer attention.

Once arrived in Jerusalem, Elene seeks the wisest Jews (þam snoterestum 277a): more specifically, those who are able to expound the Lord's mysteries through right law (þa de deoplicost dryhtnes geryno / þurh rihte æ reccan cudon 280-81) and who are able provide the answers she seeks by a far-reaching mind and deep knowledge of the ancient writings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nu ge rabe gangaþ</th>
<th>Now go quickly and find again those who know the ancient writings and your right law best, so that they can tell me the answer by a wide [-reaching] mind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ond findaþ gen</td>
<td>þa þe fyrngewritu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>þurh snyttro</td>
<td>craeft selest cunnen,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æriht eower,</td>
<td>þæt me ondsware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>þurh sidne sefan</td>
<td>secgan cunnen. (Ele. 372b-6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although Elene acknowledges the Jews before her to be higgleawe (333a), she specifies that they must hear the ‘holy secrets’, the ‘words’ and the ‘wisdom’: Gehyrad...halige rune, word ond wisdom (333-34a). The contrast between apparently literal knowledge of the Law and its deeper contemplation by Christians, however, is not one of outright opposition.¹⁸ There is an inherent dependence of Christian upon Jew and of Christian wisdom upon Jewish learning in the scene. Elene needs the Jews in order to find the Cross, whilst the Jews depend on Elene to lead them to truth. Whereas Regan sees this dependence primarily in terms of the supplementation of the letter by the spirit, and thus characterises the deficiency of Jewish learning in terms of ‘total adherence’ to the Old Law, I suggest that Elene’s own accusations against the Jews pertain not to their

¹⁷ Elene’s wider knowledge of all scriptures is implicit: Ìc þæt gearolice ongten hæbbe / þurh witgena wordgeryno / on godes bocum þæt ge geardagum / wyrde waren wuldorcyninge, / dryhtne dyre ond dedhwate. (Ele. 288-92); Hwæt, we þæt gehyrdon þurh halige bec / þæt eow dryhten geaf... (Ele. 364-5).
¹⁸ Although Elene seeks deep thought from the Jews, she is never presented as deep-thinking herself – this appears to be associated specifically with prophets in the poem (350-2, 1188b-90).
excessive adherence to the Old Law', or to their inability to see the deeper truth of prophesy. As a closer look at their exchanges shows, her accusations pertain to the Jews' outright contradiction of Christian prophesy.

Despite acknowledging the Jewish capacity for wisdom, Elene accuses the Jews of turning against wisdom, both in their historical guilt in the Crucifixion and in their continuing rejection of the truth of their own law (italics below):

Hwæt, ge ealle smyttro unwislice, wraðe wiðweorpon, þa ge wergdon þane þe eow of wergþe þurh his wuldres miht, fram ligcwæle, lyan þóhte, of hæftnedete. (Ele. 293-7a)

Alas! You all turned unwisely against wisdom in malice when you accused the One who thought to release you from fiery torment and enslavement through His glorious might.

Often you, wretched exiles, have done foolish deeds, and despised the scriptures, the teaching of your fathers - never more greatly than now. when you rejected the remedy for your blindness and contradicted truth and right. [namely] that the Son of the Ruler, the only-begotten King, the Foremost of Princes, was born in Bethlehem. Although you knew the Law, the words of the prophets, you, sin-working ones, did not want to know the truth.

Given that the Jews apparently lack knowledge of Christian events and claim innocence by ignorance (397-403, 413), Elene’s assignment of historical guilt to those Jews before her has been seen as hostile ‘persecution’. Since, however, no amount of learning or mental skill adds up to true wisdom, the criteria with which Elene judges the Jews are not informed by ‘epistemological’ or by purely ‘intellectual’ concerns. As lines 394b-5 above show, Elene specifies that the Jews contradict and wilfully deny the truth which is contained in the Old Law itself. It is in this moral and essentially volitional dimension that the continuation of Jewish guilt resides and it is in this sense that Elene’s accusations are soon validated. Having heard about the true events from Judas, the Jews contrive to keep both truth and Cross concealed:

Heo weron stearce, stane heardran, noldon þæt geryne rihte cyðan, ne hire andswær, enige secgan, They were strong, harder than stone, they did not want to rightfully reveal the secret, nor tell her any answer that she sought from them, those bitter

20 DiNapoli, ‘Poesis and Authority’, pp. 619, 623. He finds that Cynewulf ‘treats the Jews with remarkable sympathy...that underscores the innocence of the Jewish community’. p. 19.
21 This passage, and therefore my analysis here, depends upon Cynewulf’s dubious equation of The Old Testament solely with its prophetical passages.
Both this scriptural reference to the Jews' 'hearts of stone' and the image of their wilful refusal to know the truth recall Cynewulf's emphasis in Christ II that it is not knowledge alone or mental skill in itself which is pivotal to Christian faith and understanding, but the human will to accept and acknowledge revealed truth (see Chapter Four above). The enduring guilt of the Jews therefore resides in the conscious and informed choice which itself lies at the hard heart of the dark Jewish condition as represented in the poem.22 It is again in reference to the prophets' words that Elene accuses the Jews of lacking wisdom's conscience (nahton forepances, wisdomes gewitt 356b-57) and the moral connotations of gewitt here are underscored by the notion that in going against truth the Jews go against right (ge wiðscon soðe ond rihte 390).

Indeed the consistent collocation of truth and right throughout the poem (390, 663, 564a-66b, 588b-590a, 516-17a) essentially underscores the super-cognitive dimension of wisdom in the poem.23

The idea that Jewish 'un-wisdom' lies less in lacking information or limited interpretative skills than in the wilful rejection of known truths is most evident in Elene's account of historical Jewish guilt:

You condemned to death the One who Himself awakened the world from death, among the multitude of men, during the former life of your people. Thus, blind in 'heart', you confused lie with truth, light with darkness, malice with glory; with 'treacherous-thoughts' you wove a web of injustice. The wretchedness will harm you, the guilty ones, henceforth. You judged the bright power by dark thoughts and lived in error to this day.

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23 This association is not alliterative or exclusively formulaic, and seems to me to amplify the fine conceptual and semantic boundaries between OE rihte and soð.
The confusion of truth and falsehood and of sin and virtue suggests that the Jews’ blindness itself essentially involves a moral dimension in which human choice is central. The image of the Jews following error above God, as in Juliana, highlights the wider connotations of gedwola as ‘heresy’ which involves a denial of the true order.24

Jewish error, therefore, appears as the outright denial of Christ’s divinity and thus of His true and rightful Lordship. The ‘wisest’ Jews brought before the queen (ba de snyttro mid eow, mægn ond modercaft, maest hæbben 407b-8) are as foolish and blind in contradicting truth and right (ge wiosocon soode ond rihte 391b) as their ancestors. For Cynewulf, then, true wisdom is defined by far more than epistemological concerns, namely by moral and volitional elements. The point at which Christ’s truth and right is embraced, however, does not mark the point of full wisdom itself. As I have already suggested, the different modes of Christian understanding presented in the poem themselves enforce the idea of gradual enlightenment.

Turning, then, to Christian wisdom itself, we find a particularly notable distinction drawn between the knowledge and acceptance of Christian teaching on the one hand, and the bestowal of deeper and fuller wisdom by the Spirit’s Grace (burh gastes gife 199, 1057) on the other. Since, for Cynewulf, all forms of understanding are essentially granted by God in that all understanding depends on God’s revelation of truth (and, in turn, on man’s acceptance of this revealed truth), the distinction between Christian knowledge and spiritual insight cannot be seen in terms of a human mode of understanding on the one hand, and the Spirit’s bestowal of understanding upon the individual on the other. Whilst Cynewulf therefore does not appear to be concerned with man’s empirical or human rational capacity for knowledge as distinct from God’s revelation of knowledge to men, his interest in God’s mediation of truth and in men’s response to this is particularly striking. Besides revelation in scripture (already considered above) mediation and subsequent confirmation of Christ’s truth, right and

24 I have discussed these connotations of gedwola at length in Chapter Five above. In Elene, we also find ‘error’ opposed to ‘right’ (370) and find an emphasis on the distinction between the Old Testament as ‘right law’ (375a, 590) and the ‘wrong law’ of the devil (1041).
might occurs in a variety of humanly apprehensible forms: in dream visions, in more
concrete visible signs, or in the physical relics themselves. 25

Despite the importance placed on the earthly medium, Cynewulf is not
concerned with the details of knowledge acquisition. He makes no reference to inner
and outer senses (for example to ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ eyes and ears as we encounter in
Alfredian writings, discussed in Part III below) or to the continuum between inner and
outer in terms of the processes of sense perception, cognition or reasoning. Instead, the
continuum between the senses and understanding is implicit – it is upon sight or touch
that men come to know or are confirmed in their knowledge of the truth. Upon seeing
the miraculous smoke, Judas knows (Nu ic burh sæd hafl seolf gecnawen / on heardum
hige þæt ēu hælend eart / middangeardes 807-9a). Similarly, upon seeing the second
miracle which reveals the true Cross, the bystanders become mindful of the Lord: þa
wæs þam folce on ferhôsefan / ingemynde (894-5a). In particular the ‘experiential’ sense
of the verb cunnan is further amplified in the responses to the Cross and nails, where
understanding appears as more than simply ‘cognitive’ confirmation which elicits some
‘emotional’ response. 26

| ða wæs modgemynd | myclum geb Blissod, |
| hige onryrde | þurh þat halige treo, |
| inbryrde breostsefa | syðdan beacen gefeh, |
| halig under hrusun | He mid handum befeng |
| wuldres wynbeam, | ond mid weorode ahof |
| offoldgræfe. | (Ele. 839-44a) |
| ða wæs wopes bring, | Then, his ‘mind’ was greatly gladdened by that |
| hat heafodwylm | holy tree, his ‘purpose’ was strengthened, his |
| (nalles for torna) | ‘heart’ exalted within, when he saw the beacon |
| ofer wira gespon, | holy under the ground. He embraced the joyful |
| wuldres gefylled | tree of glory with his hands and raised it from its |
| 1135 cwene willa. | earthly grave amidst the crowd. |
| Heo on cneow sette | Then, his ‘mind’ was greatly gladdened by that |
| leohte geleafan, | holy tree, his ‘purpose’ was strengthened, his |
| lac weorðode, | ‘heart’ exalted within, when he saw the beacon |
| | holy under the ground. He embraced the joyful |
| | tree of glory with his hands and raised it from its |
| | earthly grave amidst the crowd. |
| | There was the sound of weeping, a hot flood |
| | poured over the cheek (but not in any way for |
| | sorrow did tears fall over the ‘nails’); of glory |
| | was the queen’s will fulfilled. She set [herself] |
| | upon [her] knees, in the light of faith, exultant in |
| | bliss, honouring the gift which was brought to |

25 Cyning wæs þy blôdra / ond þe sorgleasra... on fyrhôsefan, þurh þa fægerun gesðyð (96b-98).
Constantine’s vision is more ambiguous in that it can be seen as a dream vision and therefore as a divine
inspiration, however graphically described in Elene, see Antonina Harbus, ‘Text as Revelation: Constantine’s

26 The wide semantic spectrum of cunnan as more than ‘cognitive’ knowing, but rather as experiencing,
encountering or becoming acquainted with events is well represented in the poem. Whereas witan appears
more specifically associated with ‘intellectual knowledge’, its broader semantic range of ‘know, observe,
feel’ is worth noting, as is the wider sense of wit ‘understanding, sense’ and its relations inwit, gewit, and
the adjective wis (wise, learned, experienced). The whole family of verbs thus shares the broader
connotations I have observed in the abstract noun wisdom. Samuel Kroesch offers a particularly
interesting hypothesis about the semasiological development of cunnan and witan from essentially
concrete IE forms denoting ‘taking in’ or ‘going’, respectively, as reflected in all the cognate languages.

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The tangible dimension of the reception of the relics appears to further confirm and deepen the knowledge and joy of Christ’s truth. Again, it is difficult to delineate the cognitive and emotional, and indeed the volitional aspects in this experience.

As Anderson has pointed out, the imagery of tears and fire (see above lines 936, 1133) suggests a deep longing, a *compunctio amoris*, which is fulfilled in the reception of the relics.\(^\text{27}\) Indeed the eagerness with which Judas and Elene embrace the Cross and nails graphically show their embracing of Christ’s Cross and of Christ’s truth. This metaphorical willingness to embrace Christ in every sense, in each case immediately precedes and is paralleled by the reception of full wisdom in the Holy Spirit:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Him ða gleawhydig Judas oncweð,} & \quad \text{Then, the clever-thinking Judas, the battle-bold warrior answered [the devil]: the Holy Spirit was} \\
hæleð hildedæor, (him wæs halig gast befolen fæste, } & \quad \text{firmly bestowed upon him, a fire-hot love,}
\\nweallende gewitt þurh witgan snyttro), & \quad \text{understanding welling by the wisdom of a}
\\nond þæt word gecwæð, wisdomes ful. & \quad \text{prophet; and spoke the words full of wisdom...}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Heo gefylled wæs wisdomes gife, ond þa wic beheold} & \quad \text{She was filled with the gift of wisdom and the}
\\nhalig heofonlic gast, } & \quad \text{Holy heavenly Spirit occupied that dwelling,}
\\næðelne innod, swa hie ælmhtig & \quad \text{guarded the noble one from within her chest;}
\\nsigebearn godes } & \quad \text{thus the almighty Victory-son of God protected}
\\n\text{sioðdan freodode.} & \quad \text{her from then on.}
\end{align*}
\]

Again, this is not merely the addition of an ‘emotional’ experience to essentially ‘cognitive’ acceptance of Christ. It is not just ‘full knowledge’ that is bestowed by the Spirit, but the joy and light, the realisation and fulfilment of all desire or want in the experience of Christ. The graphic infusion of the Spirit ‘into’ the open and embracing inner aspects satisfies and fulfils man in every sense without suggesting a causative or hierarchical pattern in this experience.

\(^{27}\) Since this imagery is conventional throughout the patristic text with which Cynewulf is clearly familiar, it is not necessary to date his poetry in the Benedictine Reform period as Anderson does, *Cynewulf*, pp. 9-13.
Since 'cognitive', 'emotional' and 'volitional' dimensions appear to be involved in all stages of human enlightenment, it is difficult to characterise this final fulfilment as an essentially 'mystical experience'. Though certainly concerned with the mysterious (geryne) and to an extent inexplicable (unasecgendlic) dimensions of Christian spirituality, Elene itself is not a 'mystical' poem. Rather, Cynewulf's view of human enlightenment presents 'cognitive', 'volitional' and 'emotional' domains as intricately entwined in human striving and in human fulfilment by the Spirit. Despite the clear importance of human knowledge, contemplation and understanding of the significance of Christ's events, Cynewulf presents a picture of human enlightenment which goes beyond the 'intellectual', as his descriptions of full Christian wisdom illustrate. The next part of my discussion concentrates on the way in which this picture of a permeating enlightenment involving every level of human experience does not rely on a Latin-categorisation of inner faculties or psychological domains, but reflects a rather different underlying conceptualisation of man's inner workings.

In summary, then, the 'sapiential' theme in Elene highlights a number of discernable types of understanding which underline the theme of progressive enlightenment in the poem. First, total ignorance of the Cross and its significance characterises heathen life. Second, the wilful error of the Jews leads them to contradict and conceal the Christian truth. Third, the willing embrace of the word and its significance characterises Christian understanding. Fourth and finally, there is a fuller form of wisdom which is bestowed by the Spirit's Grace on those exemplary characters who actively seek such understanding with all of their being. In all of these categories, wisdom (or the lack of it) consists of both intellectual and moral dimensions – the contradiction of truth is at once the contradiction of right. The difference between Jewish wisdom and Christian wisdom lies in the wilful neglect or acceptance of the word of prophesy, in the contradiction (569b) or proclamation of its fulfilment in Christ, whilst the difference between nominal and full Christian wisdom lies in the level of human engagement and striving. Whilst all forms of Christian wisdom clearly depend on divine Grace, Judas and Elene's permeating experience follows intense seeking, and the fulfilment of their will in the reception of the Holy Spirit amplifies the sense of
gradual and progressive enlightenment over the course of the poem. Cynewulf's presentation of all types of knowledge and wisdom transcends the 'cognitive' and even the 'intellectual', involving conscious 'volitional' as much as 'emotional' dimensions which emerge most clearly in the graphic fulfilment of the exceptional characters in the poem. It is to the details of these inner workings to which I turn now.

6.3 Inner Workings and the Role of the Inner Self in Enlightenment

My analysis of the theme of enlightenment in *Elene* has highlighted a gradual change from darkness to light in individual characters and communities, not only from blindness to sight, but from sin to salvation and from misery to joy. Cynewulf's depiction of enlightenment, moreover, involves aspects of human activity and experience which we would characterise as 'intellectual' or 'cognitive', 'moral' and 'volitional', and 'emotional'. Such strict delineations between various types of inner workings, however, are difficult to trace in the language of the poem itself. Just as Cynewulf's depiction of knowledge and wisdom involves the 'super-cognitive', his poetic diction suggests less defined boundaries between the semantic domains of 'thinking', 'intending' and 'wanting', and between 'want', 'desire' and 'volition' than our modern vocabulary allows for. When looking at Cynewulf's picture of enlightenment, then, it is necessary to consider the larger spectrum of inner workings – the wider convergences, confluences and interrelations of inner experiences and activities. As the following analysis argues, the Old English diction used in the poem to express inner workings points towards a conception of the constitution of the inner self which is not founded upon a differentiation between distinct and interacting faculties. Interestingly, however, this does not result in a conception of the inner self which is inherently incompatible with philosophically informed Latin-Christian psychologies, such as those based on a tripartite division of the soul.

As regards Cynewulf's presentation of knowledge, it has already become clear that the poet is not concerned with the analytical details of epistemology. Since, for
Cynewulf, knowledge itself involves the acceptance of revealed truth. The conceptual and semantic distinctions between knowing (*cunnan, witan*) and belief or faith (*geleafan*) are extremely subtle. Judas, for example, seeks a sign from God so that he may believe the better (*ic geylef pe sel, 795b*) and responds to the heavenly sign, the miraculous smoke, not with an assertion of faith, but with an assertion of knowledge:

```plaintext
Nu ic purh sod hafu seolf gecnawen on heardum hige þæt ðu hælend eart middangeardes. (Ele. 807-9a)
```

Now, by truth, I have myself come to know in [my] hard 'mind' that You are the Saviour of middle earth.

```plaintext
Now I know that You, Glory of all kings, are revealed and born [pun: known / recognised].
```

Rather than suggesting that faith (as the willing acceptance of truth) precedes knowledge or experience of truth, most occurrences of *geleafan* (faith, belief) in the poem are intimately associated with either 'knowledge' or 'experience' of Christ's truth or with the infusion of wisdom itself.28 When, for example, Elene marvels at Judas' victory over the devil, the wisdom and cleverness which permeate Judas appear indistinguishable from his faith:

```plaintext
ond þa wundrade ymb þæs wyrnes spyttro, hu he swa geleafful on swa lyllum fæce ond swa uncydig æfre wurde, gleawnesse purhgoten. (Ele. 958-61a)
```

And she then marvelled at the man's wisdom, how he had become so faithful and so knowing in so little time, permeated by sagacity.

The same close relation between faith, knowledge and wisdom can be seen in Elene's reception of the Spirit (cited p. 161 above), which, incidentally, presents the only mention of her faith in the poem:

```plaintext
leohite geleafan, lac weorðode, Heo on cneow sette blissum hremig, þe hire brungen wæs gynma to geoce. Gode þæncode, sigora dryhtme, þæs þe his sod gecneow ondweardlice þæt wæs oft bodod feor ær beforan fram fruman worulde, folcum to frofre. (Ele. 1135b-1142a)
```

She set [herself] on [her] knees, in the light of faith, [and], exultant with joy, honoured the gift which had been brought to her as a comfort for sorrows. She thanked God, the Lord of victories, because she had herself come to know the truth which was often proclaimed long before, from the beginning of the world as a comfort to people.

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28 The particular association of faith with the power of the Spirit is notable in Stephen's baptism (*onfenc after fyryste fulwities bad / leohhte geleafan 490-91a*), in Judas' initial reception of the Spirit (cited above) and in his baptism where the Spirit confirms his faith: *His geleafæ wearð / fæst on ferhœde, siddan frofre gast / wic gewunode in þæs wyrnes breostum, lyldæ to bote* (1035b-38a). The single exception is when Judas' father believes after witnessing the Crucifixion: *Fordan ic sódlice ond min swres fæder / syðan gelyfdom* (517-18a). The association of faith, wisdom and knowledge in all other occurrences of faith is more striking.
Here we see not only the close relation between knowledge or experience of truth (*hio sod gecneow*), wisdom (*heo gefylled waes widosmes gife*) and faith (*leohte geleafan*), but also their intimate association with the joy of hope and comfort (*blissum hremig, gnyrna to geoce*) in the infusion of the Spirit. This apparent closeness of faith and knowledge is not simply a poetic laxity in semantic and conceptual differentiation. For Cynewulf, faith is understanding of Christ’s truth in the sense of being the full acceptance and embrace of truth. Conversely, doubt (*tweon 667-8, 795b-801*) is the negation and rejection of truth which amounts to error and which, like wisdom, transcends cognitive categories.

Although the openness of the characters is as close as Cynewulf comes to describing an ‘assent’ to truth, men’s openness involves willingness which itself precedes both faith and Christian understanding in the poem. Rather than paralleling, for example, an Augustinian notion of faith (*fides*) as the precondition for knowledge (*scientia*) and as ‘thinking with assent’, the inner processes at play are less defined in *Elene*.29 The idea that Cynewulf does not conceive of distinct faculties of thought and of volition which interact in faith and understanding is confirmed by his use of ‘verbs of thinking’ and ‘wanting’ in the poem, as I shall demonstrate in a brief overview of their application in *Elene*.

The most prevalent ‘thinking words’ in the poem are the verb *pencan* and the closely related nouns (*ge)bhot, (*ge*)panc.30 Like their modern English descendants, ‘to think’ and ‘thought’, these Old English words have an extremely broad semantic range suggested in the prefixes (*be)pencan ‘to think about, contemplate’), in the grammatical constructions they take (*pencan* + gen ‘to think of, recall, remember’), and in their qualification or semantic specification by adjectives (*snyttro gejeahl* 1059, *prealic gepboht* 426b) or compounding (*searopancum 414, inwitpancum 309*).31 Thus in *Elene*.

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29 For example, *Trin. XV.2.2; De Praed. Sanct. II.5*. Cynewulf makes no distinction between *scientia* and *sapientia* in the poem – his concern is with knowledge of higher things.
30 These are most common across the poetic and prose corpuses as a whole. A semantic study of their development is offered by Michiko Ogura, ‘OE Verbs of Thinking’, *NM* 87 (1986): 325-41.
31 It is again interesting that the etymological roots of OE *pencan* go back to the IE categories of ‘touch, reach, hold, take hold of, grasp’ to those of ‘perceive, understand, know, think’. Related cognates are Lat. *tango* ‘reach, arrive at, come to, touch, take hold of, handle’ and *tongere* ‘know’. 

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we find ‘moral’, ‘intentional’ or ‘volitional’ as well as ‘contemplative’ connotations in the activity of thinking and in modes of thought themselves. The following table presents the relevant nouns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Be ðam se witga sang, snottor searæpæncum, (sefa deop gewod, wisdomes gewitt)…</th>
<th>About this the prophet sang, wise in deep thoughts (his mind wound deeply, the insight/knowledge of wisdom)</th>
<th>thoughts relating to intellectual knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nu ge geare cunnion selest þince</td>
<td>Now you know clearly what seems best to you in your ‘minds’ to reveal, if this queen asks us about that tree – now that you know my ‘mind’s thoughts’.</td>
<td>thoughts as intention, inclination, conscious intention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...so that holy God, the mighty Lord, Glory-giver of hosts and Comforter of spirits, fills for me the ‘purpose/desire’ of my life, my will.</td>
<td>thoughts as volitional thinking, purpose or desire (underlined by apposition with willan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gefylle, frea mihtig, weoruda wuldorgeofa, gasta geocend.</td>
<td>They did not have foresight, the ‘conscience/insight’ of wisdom</td>
<td>thought as foresight and moral understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wisdomes gewitt</td>
<td>nahton forepances, (Ele. 356b-7a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cynewulf certainly makes full use of this semantic versatility in his application of the imagery of light and dark. Hence, in the following passage in particular, the dark ‘thoughts’ of the Jews are loaded with a variety of connotations which go beyond even our own wide sense of ‘thought’, as already discussed and translated (above on p. 158):

Swa ge modblinde mengan ongunnon
lige wið soðe, leohi wið þystrum,
æfست wið are, inwitæpæncum
wroht webbedan. Eow seo wergöu forðæn
sceðþeo sceyldfullum. Ge þa sciran miht
deman ongunnon, ond gedweolan lifdon,
þeostærum geæpæncum, OD þysne dæg.
(Ele. 306-12)

The association of volitional and intentional, as well as intellectual thought with the inner aspects themselves (either in agentive or metonymic senses) underscores the essentially executive and responsible role of the inner aspects (whether in formulaic or metaphorical descriptions of these ‘thinking’ or ‘thought-processes’, i.e. 1188b-90a above). Cynewulf’s fondness for dense clusters of inner aspect words highlights a
conceptualisation of the essentially interconnected dimensions of experience which are involved in enlightenment.\textsuperscript{32}

Although experiences which we tend to categorise as ‘emotional’ accompany ‘intellectual’ ones (i.e. \textit{pa bürh fulwiht / lærde waren, him was leoht sefa / ferhô gefeonde} 172b-4a), it is difficult to delineate any causal or hierarchical relations. The poet does not, for example, explicitly present a cognitive or rational faculty which guides the emotions or the will. The joy and hope of the faithful Christian is not a direct consequence of his theological understanding of events, but rather accompanies knowledge in the imagery of light and dark. Similarly, knowledge of truth does not entail acceptance of truth, as the example of the Jews shows most clearly. Indeed in verbs of both ‘thinking’ and ‘feeling’ a sense of volition seems to be at play.\textsuperscript{33} As Godden has observed about Old English verbs of emotion in the wider corpus, active constructions suggest that an element of will is involved in the emotion.\textsuperscript{34} Reactive emotion itself is most graphic in instances where the will is fulfilled or denied. In order to delineate the essentially different conceptualisation of inner workings I have highlighted the broader semantic ranges inherent in the relevant vocabulary. Given that I have focused in particular on the ‘volitional’ element in the Old English verbs and expressions of ‘thinking’ and ‘feeling’ which Cynewulf uses, this pivotal concept itself requires elucidation.

Cynewulf’s use of the noun \textit{willa} is semantically most closely related to the verb \textit{willan} ‘to want’, suggesting a meaning which is inadequately rendered by our own loaded terms ‘will’ (conscious, rational, intentional and chosen) or ‘desire’ (irrationally, emotionally, in a Christian context even physically grounded). Whereas the reason-emotion (head-heart) polarity (itself indicative of our reliance upon the long-standing

\textsuperscript{32} E.g. \textit{pa ðær lūdas wæs / on modsefan miclum geblissod...fyrhûgleaw on fædme... deophycgende} 874b-81a; \textit{Mec þara nægla gen / on fyrhûsefan fyrwet myngab... A min hige sorgað / reonig ræted, ond gerestêd no / arban me gefyile fæder almitigt, wereða wealdend / willan minne} (Ele. 1077b-84).

\textsuperscript{33} The most interesting instance of our need to rethink the conceptual structures of inner workings and categories in Old English can be seen in Cynewulf’s depiction of ‘loving’. For us ‘love’ has become the epitome of our conception of emotions as \textit{passiones}, states that happen to men and are to be suffered rather than chosen. The expression \textit{swa pin mod lufap} (597b) highlights a closeness between ‘want’, ‘like’ and ‘love’ (whether in terms of inclination or conscious intent is not clear).

\textsuperscript{34} Godden, ‘Anglo-Saxons on the Mind’, p. 274.
‘Western’ intellectual tradition) informs our modern English use of the relevant vocabulary, the Old English vocabulary again suggests that no such rigid distinction can be drawn. This is of course not to say that Old English poetry displays no conceptual differentiation between ‘perceptual’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional’ activities or states – it certainly does. Rather, the distinction is not definitive for the conceptualisation of man’s inner constitution. The mechanisms of activities such as thinking and rejoicing are conceived differently, as they must be without the defining concept of ‘rationality’ or ‘irrationality’ and the ordering of inner faculties which this crucial factor entails.35

‘Want’ for earthly dominance (452b), or for salvation (621a-2), illustrates the great variety of senses of inclination, drive, longing as well as that of conscious choice. The notion of volition itself, however, is most often expressed in the verbs of thinking, intention or orientation. Since it is difficult to distinguish concepts of ‘will’ and ‘desire’ or to identify any drives or impulses (such as reason or the body) which affect the direction of the various aspects of men’s willan, I retain the OE term in my discussion to encompass all of the above senses. I do so, bearing in mind that the willa does not appear to be conceived as a distinct faculty subject to reason or the emotions in an internal hierarchy, but rather as a disposition or inclination in particular, it is inherently involved in the activities of ‘thinking’ and ‘feeling’ itself.

Cynewulf’s use of the individual characters’ willan plays a prominent role in the progression of the poem in that the wants, desires and ‘wills’ of the individual characters (along with their deepening faith and understanding) gradually become aligned with the Lord’s will. The most striking implication of the human willa in the context of Cynewulf’s imagery of light and dark, however, is that at the outset of each individual enlightenment, the darkness of the erroneous will entails distress and misery, suggesting that man’s dark blindness is also a state of misery characterised by unfulfilled desire, want and essentially lack which is only fulfilled and realised in the joyous experience of Christ. In this sense it is the experience of Christ that man (not just the individual, but man as a being with a direction and telos) is fulfilled. The imagery of the spiritual fulfilment of the exceptional and exemplary characters of the poem appears

35 As already mentioned, the term gescead (‘reason’) is not entirely absent in poetry. see lainglory (3).
to denote the highest human potential: they become saintly characters. On the one hand, the nature of such fulfilment highlights Cynewulf's emphasis upon the spiritual as the highest nature in composite man. On the other hand, the idea of such fulfilment in composite life (and the accompanying practical dimension involved in expanding and sustaining the spiritual community) presents an essentially positive view of human nature and of human potential attainable on earth (rather than in the ultimate transcendence of the body and the ultimate meeting with God in the afterlife). The role of the inner self in spiritual fulfilment amplifies this positive view of human nature and human capacity.

As throughout the poetic corpus, the appearance of the inner aspects in *Elene* stands somewhat ambiguously beside the larger Christian anthropological dualism of body and soul/spirit. Cynewulf's use of the term *gæst* predominates in his accounts of the larger dual components of human nature and accords with his overwhelming focus on the spiritual dimensions of human experience. In *Elene*, as in *Christ II* and *Juliana*, we find a particularly interesting instance of variation which offers a rare poetic example of the *sæwulf* and *gæst* as the animating principle in man:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>870</th>
<th>folc unlytel, pæ her menigo cwom,</th>
<th>A multitude came there, a large crowd, and they brought a deceased man upon a carrier, closely surrounded by a throng of men (it was the ninth hour), a young man, <em>bereft of his 'spirit/soul'...</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brohton on bere beorna bretæ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on neaweste, gingne gastlesæne.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>876</td>
<td>Heht pæ asettan sawlesæne,</td>
<td>[Judas] then commanded them to set down upon the earth the <em>soul-less body, bereft of life</em>, and he, herald of right raised up in his wise embrace, two of the crosses above the decayed house [corpse], in deep thought...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>life belidenes lic on eordan,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unlifgenedæs ond up ahof</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rihites wemend ðara rodæ twa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>880</td>
<td>fyrhœgleaw on fæðne ofer ðæt fæge hus, deophycgende.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gæste gegeawrod, geador bu samod</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lic ond sawl.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the context of reanimation and *conversio* in the *inventio* scene makes it very tempting to infer a distinction between the original animating 'soul' and the infused 'spirit' as the reanimating force in the renewed spiritual life in Christ, there is no supporting evidence. More unusually for Cynewulf, however, both the *sæwulf* and the

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36 As observed in reference to *Juliana* in Chapter Five, Cynewulf does not appear to distinguish between soul and body and flesh and spirit.
**gæst** (rather than just the **gæst** as in *Juliana*) are each associated at least by implication with agency:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>gaste minum...</th>
<th>nales sceame worhte</th>
<th>my spirit worked no shame [for me]...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>manfremmende</td>
<td>Sawla ne moton</td>
<td>Not for long are sin-working souls now able to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>æhtum wunigan.</td>
<td>in minum leng</td>
<td>remain in my possession...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Ele. 470b-71a)</em></td>
<td><em>(Ele. 905b-7a)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since this second instance occurs in the context of the devil’s lamentations it is likely to result from the theme of the soul as booty in the cosmic conflict between devil and Christ. Even with this potential overlap in the function of the soul and the executive and agentive inner aspects, the relation between the inner aspects and the sawul / **gæst** remains, as always, unstated.

In accordance with wider poetic usage, the inner aspects are not associated with the afterlife, but always with human activity and experience which determines the fate of the post-corporeal soul in light of divine Judgment. In *Elene*, however, the inner aspects explicitly appear as the locus of man’s reception of the Spirit and therefore assume a central importance not only in terms of man’s responsible agency, but also in being the meeting place of the human and the divine. Although it is impossible to discern whether the inner aspects are physically conceived containers or whether their reception of the Spirit is the metaphorical embrace of Christian truth, the inner aspects are the essentially human faculties in which the communion between man and God takes place. I suggest that the graphic depictions of spiritual fulfilment in *Elene* allow us to recognise the inner aspects as the mediating link between body and soul / spirit and between human and divine. Ultimately, nothing in *Elene* reflects an analytical concept of epistemology or the processes of specifically human knowledge acquisition. The primacy of the inner self in human experience emerges not in its role as (or containment of) the highest, reasoning faculty as the defining characteristic of man. Rather, the inner self emerges as the meeting point of the human and divine: the place in which God is embraced and in which man attains, realises and experiences his highest potential.37

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37 The inner self is the determining principle of action and as such is delineated from it in terms of inner and outer as seen in the frequent *mod-margen* apposition.
Both as locus and as executive moral agency, the inner aspects in *Elene* are central to human self-realisation as far as is possible for the composite being.

In conclusion, the theme of enlightenment which structures the poem as a whole highlights the non-typological modes of characterisation which allow us to gain an insight into the importance of the role of the inner self and thus of the individual in his own development. As in all the signed poems, the theme of spiritual warfare and the involvement of the devil in human error and sin and the involvement of God in human enlightenment, virtue and salvation stand in the background. In *Elene*, however, the cosmic dualism and figural characterisation are less prominent and allow a focus on the personal role which each man exercises in his own enlightenment. Cynewulf shows remarkable interest in human understanding and the human will for God and his image of seeking and finding and of question and answer appears to me to present the whole journey of enlightenment in terms of the communication and interaction between man and God. Cynewulf’s use of imagery to express the lacking and unenlightened condition of men when severed from God, suggests a human drive towards and capacity for fulfilment which can only be realised in Christ. Central to enlightenment is the inner self, whose workings are particularly suited to the image of wholehearted seeking and reception of Christ’s light in the Spirit. Despite articulating the inner life and inner workings in *Elene* in a way which differs from Latin Christian intellectual models of *anima* and *animus*, Cynewulf’s account of this inner domain is entirely compatible with the overarching intellectual theology of man which he embraces in his writings. Both as executive and responsible agencies and as (perhaps metaphorical) locus of the communion between the human and the divine, the inner aspects constitute an ‘inner self’ which is central for man’s elevation to his highest state of wisdom and virtue in both the spiritual and practical life on earth. It is in the essentially human inner self that man transcends his limitations and fulfils his highest potential in the quest for Christ.
Part Three

Prose Innovation: The Alfredian Canon
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There is a long-standing critical tradition which accepts that a number of extant Old English prose texts can be linked with the educational and literary reforms attributed to King Alfred and that this literary programme is deeply informed by its historical and ideological context.¹ If we accept this traditional association, it would appear that we can place the prose texts of the so-called Alfredian canon in a specific historical, cultural and intellectual context, namely that of later ninth-century Anglo-Saxon England, more confidently than we can place the poems of Cynewulf. This is not to say that there is no critical disagreement about the authorship, provenance and dates of individual texts which have been associated with King Alfred (849-99) and his circle of scholars. On the contrary, critical debates about Alfred's own authorship and involvement in composition, along with debates about the nature of authorial collaboration, the commissioning of texts, and wider literary cross-pollination amongst texts of the period are in many ways more current than the debates surrounding the Cynewulf canon.² Nevertheless, the historical, literary and intellectual contexts of the ninth-century learning reforms remain important considerations when exploring the nature, development and impact of the so-called Alfredian literature, both at stylistic and ideological levels.³ Alfred's military efforts to lay the foundations for a 'unified England' in a time of political turmoil among the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and of sustained Viking incursions appear to frame the literary reforms which, hand in hand


with his political and social reforms, have been seen as being oriented towards establishing a sense of ‘national identity’. This distinctive literary and ideological movement facilitated not only a remarkable approach to collective identity, but also, as I shall argue in this third and final part of my thesis, a uniquely innovative approach to questions about human and personal identity.

In choosing to translate those Latin books ‘most necessary for all men to know’, the Alfredian literary programme reflects the desire to revive the Latin learning of earlier times as much as it reflects a conscious movement into a new era of Anglo-Saxon learning. On the one hand, this programme clearly based itself firmly on Latin Christian authority and its presentation of Old English as the direct descendant and heir of Hebrew, Greek and Latin amplifies the projected cultural continuities. On the other hand, the range of texts and the types of translations themselves point towards a telling confidence in the Anglo-Saxon ability to render, explain and adapt Latin works – or rather, to explore and develop a firmly integrated Latin Christian heritage in the native vernacular forum. Precisely this interplay of traditions and their innovation in the Alfredian literature provide an invaluable opportunity to study Anglo-Saxon anthropological and psychological ideas and such ideological interplay is nowhere more evident than in the so-called ‘philosophical’ works of Alfred, namely in the Old English Consolation and the Old English Soliloquies. Before introducing these texts more fully.


6 Sweet, King Alfred’s West Saxon Version of Gregory’s Pastoral Care, p. 26 lines 43-7.

7 For more detailed discussions of the manuscript histories and editions referred to in this thesis, see Chapters Seven and Eight below.
it is useful to gain a brief overview of the debates surrounding the Alfredian canon so as to place the *Consolation* and *Soliloquies* in their wider literary and intellectual context.

The practice of attributing a number of Old English literary translations of notable Latin works to King Alfred himself was already apparent in the ninth and tenth centuries. A number of Old English texts explicitly name Alfred as their author, namely the Old English *Pastoral Care*, the *Soliloquies*, the *Consolation* and the *Laws*.\(^8\) We also find near-contemporary references to his authorship of the *Consolation* and the Old English translation of Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*.\(^9\) The fullest account of the 'works translated by King Alfred' is the list of William of Malmesbury in his *Gesta Regum Anglorum* (1120-7), which mentions Old English translations of Orosius' *Historia Adversus paganos*, Pope Gregory's *Regula* (or *Cura*) *Pastoralis*, Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, an *Enchiridion* and the psalms.\(^10\) Current critical consensus has moved away from a general acceptance of this list and meanwhile holds that only the Old English *Pastoral Care*, the *Consolation*, the *Soliloquies* and probably the *Psalms* can be attributed to Alfred or his immediate circle of scholars.\(^11\) The Old English translation of Gregory's *Dialogi*, in turn, is largely accepted as a work commissioned by Alfred (as suggested in Asser's *Life of Alfred*), whilst the Mercian *Bede* and the *Orosius* are thought to be only indirectly linked with the Alfredian circle.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) Godden discusses these attributions in significant detail, 'Did King Alfred Write Anything?', pp. 3-9.


\(^12\) Although Asser attributes the Old English *Dialogues* to a certain Waerferd, there is no preatory detail about authorship, Fulk and Cain, *A History of Old English Literature*, p. 66. The Old English *Orosius* (which mentions Alfred as Othere's king) has more tenuous links with the Alfredian circle, but is datable to before 900 due to fragments copied in MS Cotton Domitian ix, f. 11, Whitelock, 'The Pros of Alfred's Reign', pp. 77-8. Elizabeth M. Liggins argues for the inclusion of this work on lexical grounds in 'The Authorship of the Old English Orosius', *Anglia* 88 (1970): 289-322, although Bately has argued against the lexical affinity of the *Orosius* with the *Pastoral Care*, *Soliloquies*. *Boethius* and *Psalms*, see 'King...
All seven texts share a number of features which have occasioned their inclusion in the Alfredian canon at one time or another, but which can also be more generally seen as integral to the development of ‘the first significant literary prose’ during the reign of King Alfred.\(^{13}\) Whether in the clarification and identification of scriptural references, in the direct explication of ideas and terminology or in the use of concrete ‘illustrations, comments, metaphors and similes’ which present explanatory analogies from Anglo-Saxon culture, the purpose of edification and elucidation is seen as a broadly defining element of this early Old English prose.\(^{14}\) The simplification of Latin syntax (be it in series of short clauses in the Pastoral Care or in the change of hypotactic to paratactic constructions in the Consolation), which is apparently equally conducive to the purpose of explication, is also a consistent feature of ninth-century vernacular prose translations.\(^{15}\)

The Old English prose texts range from relatively literal translation to interpretation and ‘free adaptation’ and so appear to reflect the different aspects of the famous dictum which we find in the prefaces to the Pastoral Care and the Consolation: *hwilum... word be worde, hwilum andgit of andgite* (‘at times word for word, at times sense for sense’).\(^{16}\) From a stylistic point of view, the Bede, Orosius and Dialogues are often characterised as being ‘over-literal in their renderings’, departing little from their sources beyond ‘short explanatory glosses’.\(^{17}\) In this they have been likened to the


\(^{15}\) See note 14. The distinctive style of original composition, as for example in the prefaces, must also be noted here, Godden, ‘Did King Alfred Write Anything?’, pp. 4-5; Fulk, *A History of Old English Literature*, p. 54.


\(^{17}\) Whitelock, ‘The Prose of Alfred’s Reign’, pp. 77, 89-93; Greenfield and Calder, *A New Critical History*, pp. 45, 55-8; the significant shortening of the Bede, however, should be noted in the comparison, William Brown Jr., ‘Method and Style in the Old English Pastoral Care’. *JEGP* 68 (1969): 666-84. Whitelock has linked the Parker MS of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles with the Orosius, but whilst they are acknowledged as writings of Alfred’s reign, the immediate influence of the Alfredian circle upon the Chronicles is now widely rejected, as discussed by Greenfield and Calder, *A New Critical History*, pp. 59-62.
Pastoral Care - in stark contrast to the more abstract and reflective Consolation and Soliloquies.\textsuperscript{18} Such divergent approaches to source texts do of course not disprove close literary influences in that fidelity to an important and influential work such as the Cura Pastoralis may well have been more appropriate than fidelity to more obscure and speculative texts such as Augustine's Soliloquies. Nevertheless, the parallels in diction and expression between the Pastoral Care, Soliloquies, Consolation and Psalms appear to differentiate these texts from the Orosius, Bede and Dialogues.\textsuperscript{19} Parallels in explanatory examples, metaphors and shared themes in turn appear to link the Pastoral Care, Consolation and Soliloquies particularly closely.\textsuperscript{20} Despite lexical, stylistic and thematic affinities, sufficient differences nevertheless remain amongst the four core texts of the Alfredian canon that only the Consolation and Soliloquies appear close enough in terms of style and diction to assert their common authorship without doubt.\textsuperscript{21} The nature of authorship and scholarly collaboration in the Alfredian writings has accordingly come under close scrutiny of late and the resulting debate has raised questions about the position of the philosophical texts in the wider canon.\textsuperscript{22}

In light of the complexities involved in the lexical study of texts which have been copied and transcribed repeatedly and in view of the difficulties of discerning authorial patterns in texts which ultimately stem from 'the same time and region and milieu and writing tradition', Alfred's own authorship and involvement in composition has increasingly come into question.\textsuperscript{23} Besides the long-standing objection that the

\textsuperscript{18} Greenfield and Calder, \textit{A New Critical History}, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{19} Although Whitelock has pointed out that the generic requirements of historical writings such as the Orosius and the Chronicles differ considerably from the requirements of the more analytical Consolation and Soliloquies, such requirements do not of course entirely predetermine style or diction. Overall, the individual differences appear to outweigh the shared trends across the Alfredian works, Whitelock, 'The Prose of Alfred's reign', p. 89; and in particular the lexical studies of Janet Bately, also note 11 above.

\textsuperscript{20} For surveys of the thematic and stylistic parallels see Greenfield and Calder, \textit{A New Critical History}, p. 48. Whitelock, 'The Prose of Alfred's Reign' pp. 79-80, 83-9. Godden, however, dismisses such parallels, 'Did King Alfred Write Anything?', p. 10.

\textsuperscript{21} The undeniably close relation between the Consolation and the Soliloquies was first noted by F. G. Hubbard, 'The Relation of the Blooms of King Alfred to the Anglo-Saxon Boethius, \textit{MLN} 9 (1894) 321-42 and remains unchallenged, even by Godden, 'Did King Alfred Write Anything?', pp. 9-10.

\textsuperscript{22} Frantzen, King Alfred, pp. 1-4; Richard W. Clement, 'The Production of the Pastoral Care', \textit{Studies in Earlier Old English Prose}, pp. 129-52; (also note 1 above).

\textsuperscript{23} Godden, 'Did King Alfred Write Anything?', p. 10. Since Alfred's contemporary biographer, the Welsh monk and advisor Asser, mentions no translations, his account has been seen as a basis for dating the translations after 893, or, alternatively, for arguments against the king's involvement in any of the translations. Dorothy Whitelock, 'The Prose of Alfred's Reign', pp. 74-5; Godden, 'Did King Alfred Write Anything?', pp. 3-4, 12-13, 19 notes 3 and 4. I distance myself from the numerous arguments
glorification of Alfred the Great essentially arose from West-Saxon propaganda, there have also been more recent arguments against the reliability of the prefaces in reference to the prevalent practice of attributing texts to figures of authority (notably to kings or emperors), as was common practice on the Continent in the ninth century. There are certainly numerous arguments which challenge the confidence we might have in asserting King Alfred’s direct involvement in the composition of texts and even in the degree to which we can be certain about whether the four core Alfredian texts, along with other writings associated with Alfred’s reign can indeed be placed in the ninth century. Although the debate about Alfred’s own involvement in composition and the precise form of the Alfredian canon is developing in new directions, one of the few certainties amidst the many debates surrounding the Alfredian canon remains the close stylistic and intellectual affinity of the Consolation and the Soliloquies. It has recently been suggested that these texts may well be ‘slightly later fictions, seeking to claim the king’s authority and distinction for works in reality unconnected to him’. Their deep reliance on Alfredian writings and their origin in the pre-Benedictine context nevertheless remain unchallenged. Throughout my discussion I shall refer to ‘Alfred’ as the author of the Soliloquies and Consolation for the sake of simplicity and shall refer to the four West-Saxon texts as ‘Alfredian’ in line with critical convention. The arguments in my investigation neither fall nor stand on the question of authorship and my references to ‘Alfred’ the author are not intended as a statement in relation to the wider critical debate. I employ this authorial name bearing the significant questions about the nature of composition and of authorship itself in mind.

against Alfred’s authorship which rely on an assessment of the king’s own intellectual ‘skill’ or level of literacy.


25 Godden discusses these matters in significant detail in ‘Did King Alfred Write Anything?’, pp. 1-23. Although the nature of the composition of the Boethius and the Sololoquies does not suggest communal dictation, this does not preclude the involvement of more than one person in the formulation of ideas in the texts. Clement offers a particularly interesting discussion of the implications of scribal variation for matters of authorship and collaboration in relation to the Pastoral Care, asserting Alfred’s guiding input. Clement, ‘The Production of the Pastoral Care’, pp. 129-52.

26 Godden, ‘Did King Alfred Write Anything?’, p. 17. Since Godden’s suggestion appears to reside in ‘probabilities’ and ultimately in the ‘personal opinion’ which is required in weighing up the ‘possibilities’, further research is necessary if their membership in the Alfredian canon is to be discredited, ibid, pp. 17, 18.
The *Consolation* and the *Soliloquies* stand out not only in the Alfredian writings, but also in Old English literature as a whole. Their ideological heritage is the same deeply Christian tradition which informs texts such as the *Pastoral Care*. In adapting fundamentally philosophical works, however, their tone and style emerge as distinctively analytical in comparison with other vernacular prose works. It has been noted that 'among the great Anglo-Saxon scholars none can be classed as philosophers, save perhaps Alcuin' and the *Consolation* and the *Soliloquies* can certainly not be classified as works of logic or ethics in the Classical philosophical tradition. Their explorative vigour and analytical approach in establishing 'truths' (whether theological or otherwise) in reference to a whole-scale system of beliefs is, however, perhaps all the more striking in the absence of an Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. The question whether these texts consciously and systematically alter the complex philosophical ideas of their sources, or whether they inadvertently interpret them in light of their own intellectual climate has been an important aspect in assessing both their literary and philosophical value. I suggest that the way in which both texts approach the anthropological and psychological ideas of their sources provides strong support for the former position, namely that the author of these texts consciously engaged with the conceptual implications of the ideas expressed in his sources in remarkably systematic and innovative ways.

In form, style and, crucially, in subject matter, the Old English *Consolation* and the Old English *Soliloquies* provide a unique and invaluable insight into a systematic vernacular conception of the inner self. First, both texts take the form of interior dialogues which are rarely attested across the extant vernacular corpus. In the Old English *Consolation*, the conversation between the Boethius-character and the *Ratio*

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29 The dialogue between body and soul in *Soul and Body I* and *II*, for example, cannot be described as an inner dialogue in this sense.
('reason') of the Latin *De Consolatione Philosophiae* are largely replaced by the dialogue between *Mod* and *Wisdom* or *Gescead* ('reason, discrimination'). In the Old English *Soliloquies*, the Augustine-character of the Latin *Soliloquia* is gradually replaced by *ic* ('I') in its inner conversations with *Gescead* (Lat. *Ratio*). Second, both dialogues (in line with their sources) analyse anthropological and psychological subjects which necessitate abstract and specific vocabulary, whether in the clarification of complex Latin source passages or in the elaboration of specific concepts. In the Old English *Consolation*, the Boethius-character (later the *mod*) must come to understand the nature of man and the true nature of the divinely ordered world before he can find consolation for his apparently miserable situation. Since self-understanding is central to this consolation, we again learn not only about human nature and human purpose, but find extensive discussions relating to human freedom and potential as well as to the ways in which man comes to know and recognise truth. In the *Soliloquies*, in turn, the Augustine-character seeks to understand the nature of God and the nature of the soul (*Solil.* I.ii.7). Hence we are not only offered insights into the nature of the soul itself, but also a detailed exploration of the processes of knowledge acquisition and moral improvement, which again shifts the focus of the discussion inwards to the inner bases of experience and behaviour. In these analytical and edifying contexts, then, both texts present strikingly detailed and (as I shall argue) analytical descriptions of the constitution of the inner self and of inner workings such as the processes of perception, cognition and volition with which their sources are concerned.

As Woesler and Godden first pointed out, the indebtedness of the Alfredian texts to philosophical and theological texts of the intellectual tradition beyond their immediate sources defines their approach to the inner self. Hence, we find the earliest Old English account of a (Neo)Platonic tripartite soul as well as numerous accounts of psychological processes which are heavily indebted to patristic accounts. On the one

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30 I capitalise the personified *Wisdom, Gescead* and *Ratio* in line with editorial convention here. See also Chapter Seven for further reasons underlying my capitalisation of Wisdom, Truth and Goodness when referring to these as abstract concepts identified with Neoplatonic Ideas or with the One True Christian God.

hand, the development of an essentially new vocabulary to render concepts such as ‘reason’ (Lat. *ratio*, OE *gescead*, almost entirely absent in vernacular poetry) and of terminology used to explain and explore the complex psychological ideas of the Latin accounts amplifies the significant influence of this intellectual heritage. On the other hand, the definition of newly introduced terminology and its paraphrasing by more familiar vocabulary serve to elucidate generally unfamiliar terms as much as they aid us in understanding the semantic spheres in which the more familiar Old English terms could be applied. Besides their clear willingness to explore and explain the ideas of their sources, the Alfredian translations also consciously adapt the focus and even the arguments of their source texts, both their larger argument structures and their specific accounts of human workings. As I shall illustrate in the following chapters, the Old English ‘translations’ do not simply contextualise the ‘foreign’ in ‘native’ terms. Rather, the pervasive ideological structures which inform the texts point towards a systematic approach to matters of human and personal identity, both in style and substance.

The literary quality and the theological sophistication of the *Consolation* and *Soliloquies* have received significant attention. My particular focus in the following chapters rests primarily on the systematic integrity of Alfred’s approach to human nature and the inner self in the context of a clearly defined argument. I therefore dwell less on the gradual build-up of imagery in the texts (as I did in my analysis of the Cynewulfian poems in Part Two) than on the articulation of the various stages of the progressing discussions. My own mode and tone of analysis in Part Three is accordingly more philosophical than literary in that it outlines, for example, logical syllogisms in considering alterations to the source arguments. This is not to say that I undervalue the sophisticated use of metaphor and Christian imagery in the texts, but, rather, that I see the concise articulation of complex ideas and their pointed recapitulation in metaphor and image as a defining feature of the works – a feature which allows a particularly

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detailed insight into the conceived relations between the inner and spiritual aspects of man and into the precise workings of those inner powers and faculties which inform human character and which underlie outer action and behaviour.\textsuperscript{34}

The \textit{Consolation} and \textit{Soliloquies} provide substantial insights into the integration of Latinate ideas and modes of exposition into the vernacular without the 'constraints' of formulaic or other poetic conventions of expression. Their analytical style and approach (in particular their development of analytical vocabulary) reveal a concern with the definition of specific domains of human experience and show an interest in precise workings of the inner faculties themselves. Semantic studies such as that of Hanspeter Schelp have provided valuable information about the semantic spheres of the relevant vocabulary in the Alfredian canon and Soon Ai Low's list of metaphors in Old English literature allows us to see the conventional use of Christian metaphors in the Alfredian prose works as much as in Christian poetry.\textsuperscript{35} Again, however, I do not abstract relevant words, phrases or passages from their textual context, but rather consider Alfred's anthropological and psychological ideas in the conceptual context which is built up over the course of each work. In contrast with Cynewulf's poetry, it is not necessary to establish that there is a comprehensive worldview and a coherent metaphysical context at play in the \textit{Consolation} and \textit{Soliloquies} – the philosophical nature of their sources provides precisely such a context as a framework for their respective arguments. Rather, in my investigations in Part Three, I focus on the larger conceptual contexts of the works in order to illustrate how Alfred's significant adaptation of these contexts frames an innovative vision of human nature and human purpose. My discussion of these essentially analytical prose texts in Part Three thus complements my discussion of Cynewulf's poetry in Part Two by highlighting the deeply sophisticated approaches to matters of self and identity which can be found in Anglo-Saxon poetry and prose alike and by highlighting that the thorough engagement

\textsuperscript{34} This does not imply, of course, that the use of paraphrase is always more helpful to the critic than the poetic use of variation. Nevertheless, the specification of distinct domains of human experience in the texts is articulated more clearly than in preceding writings, whether in verse or prose.

with varying ideological traditions is apparent on both sides of the stylistic and literary divide.

As the foregoing prelude has announced, the final two chapters which comprise Part Three of this thesis will consider the distinctive articulation of the role and status of the inner self in the *Consolation* (Chapter Seven) and *Soliloquies* (Chapter Eight). Although I do not insist on a chronology of the texts by treating them in this order, the *Soliloquies* appears to build on the metaphysical and anthropological ideas established in the *Consolation* and appears to take a number of questions which the *Consolation* raises about human identity to their full and logical conclusion. Be this as it may, Chapters Seven and Eight highlight the way in which both texts build up a larger metaphysical order which frames their accounts of human nature and human purpose, as is particularly clear in the detailed cosmology of the *Consolation* and in the opening prayer of the *Soliloquies*. This context (which is complementary in both texts) establishes the larger framework for their (again complementary) visions of human nature and human purpose and for the various detailed discussions of inner processes which we encounter in the texts. The interest of the *Consolation* in the theme of order on a cosmic scale facilitates insights into the way in which a dualist metaphysics and anthropology shapes Alfred’s view of the human constitution and the centrality of the inner self in human identity. This metaphysical and anthropological context is articulated more succinctly in the *Soliloquies*, which in turn develops a more detailed discussion of the nature and relation of soul and body and which considers the nature and status of the inner self as the continuous core of human identity in the present life and in the next. In light of their extensive metaphysical deliberations and their engagement with intricate psychological ideas, the *Consolation* and *Soliloquies* delve deeply into the implications which Christian dualism has for the details of man’s inner life, inner workings and thus for individual and generic identity of human beings. As I shall argue over the course of the next two chapters, their sophisticated engagement with philosophical and theological ideas leads them to associate the inner self increasingly with the spiritual domain of man precisely because the essence of the self must reside in a core which can provide the continuum of identity in this life and the
next if it is to experience the just rewards earned in life. Rather than simply adopting this whole-scale system, the *Soliloquies* and *Consolation* establish these insights gradually. Although the resulting picture may seem perfectly ordinary to us today, these two works are the first Anglo-Saxon vernacular writings to articulate it explicitly.
Chapter Seven

The Old English Prose Consolation: A Philosophical Construction of Interiority

The Old English Consolation is a conceptually dense and complex work which confronts a broad range of philosophical and theological questions. It is widely accepted that the Anglo-Saxon writer goes beyond literal translation and even interpretation in adapting numerous arguments and discussions from Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae (henceforth De Consolatione). In distinctively reworking this Latin text, the Old English Consolation develops the (Neo)Platonic elements of its source and incorporates theological ideas from the wider Latin Christian tradition as well as distinctly Anglo-Saxon elements of thought and expression. Besides presenting a particularly fruitful forum for exploring the interaction of diverse ideological and literary traditions, the alterations which the author makes allow us to trace the way in which the Consolation raises, explores and answers a number of questions which are directly relevant to Alfred's view of human nature and the role of the inner self in human identity.

The damaged and apparently corrupted condition of the two extant prose versions of the Consolation (Cotton Otho A.vi and Oxford Bodley 180) of course raises significant questions about the extent to which a comprehensive and detailed analysis of

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1 In this chapter I concentrate on the prose text of the Consolation rather than on the Meters of Boethius which have survived in MS London, B. L., Cotton Otho A.vi in a mid-tenth century copy of the prosimetrical text. The similarity of the surviving prose in this copy and that of the prose version in MS Oxford, Bodleian Library, Bodley, 180 (a copy dating from the twelfth century) is notable and throughout this discussion I use Walter Sedgefield's composite text edition, King Alfred's Old English Version of Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae (Oxford, 1899). In order to avoid confusion in my references to the Boethius-characters of the Latin and Old English versions and to the author Boethius, I refer to the Old English text as the Consolation (rather than the Boethius), although I retain the conventional abbreviation Bo. in reference to the Old English text. All translations of the Old English text are mine. References to the Latin text (abbrev. De Con.) and accompanying translations are taken from Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, in Boethius: The Theological Tractates, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. and trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand and J. Tester, The Loeb Classical Library 74, ed. J. Henderson (Harvard, 1973).

2 The most comprehensive studies of the formulation of ideas in the Old English Consolation to date are Kurt Otten, König Alfreds Boethius (Tübingen, 1964); Anne F. Payne, King Alfred and Boethius on Analysis of the Old English Version of the Consolation of Philosophy (Madison, 1968); also Greenfield and Calder, A New Critical History, pp. 46-51; W. F. Bolton, 'How Boethian is Alfred's Boethius?'. Studies in Earlier Old English Prose, ed. Szarmach, pp. 153-68.
the text is possible. My study of the *Consolation* was completed before the publication of the much anticipated edition by Malcolm Godden and Susan Irvine. I have therefore been unable to take advantage of the extensive textual re-construction which has facilitated the most recent collaborative research into the influences of the relevant commentary traditions, sources and analogues carried out in the Boethius Project. Nevertheless, the composite text edition by Sedgefield along with Kurt Otten’s study of the most immediately influential commentaries and sources provide a solid basis for my subsequent discussion. Since a detailed investigation of the many aspects of the prose texts (and their relation to the Old English verse translation of the *Meters of Boethius* in Cotton Otho A.vi) must lie beyond the scope of the present study and since it would be impossible to deal fully with all the complex strands of the developing argument in the Old English prose *Consolation* as a whole, my concern here is to highlight Alfred’s systematic approach to anthropological and psychological questions.

The *De Consolatione Philosophiae* written by Manlius Severinus Boethius during the imprisonment in 524/5 which preceded his execution by the Ostrogoth emperor Theodoric, is a fundamentally Neoplatonic inquiry into the nature of good and evil in the universe. In essence, the five books of the *De Consolatione* (consisting of forty chapters interspersed with thirty-nine metres) present the intellectual quest of the incarcerated Boethius-character in which he moves from a state of imprisonment and exile in the darkness, ignorance and misery of worldly concerns to the enlightened understanding and joy of the mind (*mens*) in union with the Highest Intelligence by the aid of Lady Philosophy. The forty-two chapters of the Old English *Consolation*...
transform the account of the Latin text into an essentially Christian journey of enlightenment enabled by divine Wisdom as it reveals itself to the human mod. Although Alfred’s work has been characterised as theological rather than philosophical, the Old English Consolation is not a simplistic ‘Christianisation’ of its source. The text probes deeply into fundamentally philosophical questions and whilst these receive essentially Christian answers, the analytical nature of the work presents a profound exposition of human nature and man’s place and purpose within the larger metaphysical order. Its analytical tone and style, moreover, facilitate a unique insight into the details of the author’s conception of man’s constitution and its workings, particularly of inner faculties, processes and activities.

The Old English Consolation is invaluable for the study of vernacular presentations of human nature and its workings in that it contains an abundance of analytical passages which discuss, define and explicate the human constitution, the nature of soul and body, and the workings of men’s inner faculties. The frequency with which the work’s description of the human soul (sawul) in 33 (81)13-24 is cited attests to the importance placed on the work by scholars of Anglo-Saxon psychology. Besides this Platonic division of the sawul into the three hierarchically ordered faculties of ‘reason’ (gesceadwisnes), ‘will’ (wilnung) and ‘anger’ (yrre), we find an Augustinian account in 14 (32)1-3 which attributes understanding (andgiti), memory (gemynd) and rational will (gesceadwislica willa) to the soul (sawul). Clearly these two passages illustrate the author’s engagement with the ‘Latin intellectual tradition’ in Godden’s sense (all the more so since there are no immediate parallels for these descriptions in Boethius’ Latin text). The dominance of this intellectual tradition, however, must not be overamplified out of context. The majority of analyses in the text as a whole present inner faculties such as memory (gemynd), reason (gesceadwisnes), understanding (andgiti) and will (willa) as aspects and faculties of the mod. which is itself consistently described by familiar vernacular metaphors of interiority without being explicitly described by familiar vernacular metaphors of interiority without being explicitly

1 I capitalise the personified Wisdom of the dialogue throughout. Since this interlocutor is later identified with God Himself, my capitalisation has a dual function (see note 11 below).
associated with the spiritual and immortal soul. Thus the *Consolation* presents neither a standard model of interiority which is representative of Anglo-Saxon thought on the matter nor one which directly translates 'foreign' ideas into the vernacular. It is clearly a work which makes many abstract and intellectual subjects of Latin learning available to a native audience in the vernacular, yet its manner of adaptation (both of the argument structure and of psychological discussions) itself suggests not the presentation of long-established or normative ideas but rather the exploration of diverse questions within the boundaries of diverse ideological traditions.

As I shall argue in this chapter, the prose dialogues do not merely present a medley of psychological models randomly adopted from various distinct (and potentially conflicting) authorities. Although the study of sources and analogues for the work's various descriptions of men and their inner workings is of course crucial, any critical attempt to categorize its various psychological discussions into hypothetical pre-Christian, native, Neoplatonic or Patristic traditions would draw attention away from a potentially unified vision of human nature in the argument as a whole. Rather than abstracting the relevant passages concerned with inner processes or constitutions from their textual context, I therefore consider the larger philosophical framework of the *Consolation* in order to show that it is precisely this distinctive framework which shapes the author's construction of interiority.

Whilst it is not possible to give an entirely exhaustive account of the complex progression of arguments in the *Consolation* in this chapter, I begin in 7.1 by setting out the philosophical framework which facilitates Alfred's inquiry into human life and human purpose in the larger scheme of things. Since Alfred's Christianisation of Boethius' Neoplatonic metaphysics directly informs his anthropological ideas, 7.2 goes on to consider the way in which Alfred's view of man's constitution directly reflects his view of a larger universe in which that which is true and lasting is higher in value and potency than that which is transient. For Alfred, man's most precious possession is not
only the immortal and spiritual sawul, but more prominently the mod, which is the locus of gescead (reason, discrimination) and the moral virtues as well as being the central agency which determines how man uses (or abuses) his free will. In 7.3 I therefore take a more detailed look at the construction of interiority in the many detailed accounts of inner faculties and processes which in the Consolation show a particular interest in the interaction between man’s gescead and his willa (will, want, desire). Finally, in 7.4 I turn to the significant questions which Alfred’s psychological discussions raise about the relation between man’s inner aspects and his immortal soul. By viewing the human constitution within the metaphysical context which shapes it, it can be seen that Alfred’s diverse psychological accounts and his various assertions about human potential and capacity are consistent with the work’s larger vision of human nature and human purpose. Since Alfred’s account of man’s inner core of agency, experience and identity suggests a conscious concern with the implications which a dualistic Latin Christian anthropology has for the nature and status of the inner self, my discussion as a whole illustrates that the construction of interiority in the Consolation is as sophisticated as the work itself.

7.1 Establishing the Philosophical Framework: Placing Man in Context

There can be few more poignant settings for an intellectual inquiry into the nature of human happiness and of goodness in the universe than that of Boethius’ De Consolatione. The autobiographical nature of the text lends particular force to the human experience of disillusionment and hopelessness in the face of injustice in the world and accentuates the consolation of finding true stability, meaning and goodness in the world of ideas.9 As the protagonist Boethius finds himself unjustly imprisoned without hope of release or mercy, the prison cell becomes the setting not only for his literal abstraction from the world but also for the liberation of his mind (mens) from its

9 For a discussion of Platonic Ideas and Forms and their development in Neoplatonic and Christian thought, see Chapter One above.
worldly concerns by philosophical contemplation of higher truths. A brief synopsis of the progressing argument at this point allows us to establish the philosophical framework which Alfred engaged with in his adaptation.

The five books of the *De Consolatione* present distinct stages of a philosophical inquiry which ultimately cures the protagonist Boethius of his miserable affliction. In Book I Lady Philosophy diagnoses the mental delusion (I.iv.1) of her former pupil, namely his belief that the happiness of men depends on the fickle workings of Lady *Fortuna* rather than on a just or benevolent order in the world (I.vi). In order to cure her pupil of the mental sickness (*mentium morbum* I.ii.13) which has caused him to forget previously known truths, Lady Philosophy goes on in Book II to re-assess the nature of human happiness by illustrating that true happiness cannot be found in external material things, but must be sought within (II.iv.72-3). Turning to the nature of true happiness, Book III initially illustrates how earthly riches (III.iii), power (III.iv-v), glory or good repute among men (III.vi) and bodily pleasure (III.vii) are mere semblances of true happiness, whether sought singly or hoarded in greed. When sought in unity in the perfect self-sufficient principle of Good and Being which is God, however, true happiness can be gained by participation in the divine (III.x.89-90). By establishing God as that towards which all things are oriented and as that which unites all disparate elements in the universe in harmony, Lady Philosophy confirms the rule of Goodness in the world (III.vii), but in doing so also introduces the complexity of accounting for the existence of evil in a benignly ruled universe (III.xii.79-2). Book IV consequently deals with the questions of theodicy and of how evil can go unpunished in a justly ordered world by arguing that evil is deprivation of Good (IV.ii.117-8) and that wicked men achieve nothing other than the self-annihilation which is punishment in itself (IV.ii, iv). The insight that all things are oriented towards Good, even things which men perceive

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10 In order to distinguish between Boethius the author and Boethius the protagonist of the *De Consolatione*, I refer to the author simply as Boethius and to the character of the narrative as ‘the Latin protagonist Boethius’ or the ‘Boethius-character’.

11 Throughout this discussion Goodness, Truth, Wisdom (etc.) are capitalised when they are informed by ideas about the Neoplatonic One, the Perfect Principle, Origin and End of all creation.
as evil due to their limited understanding (IV.vi), introduces the subject of Book V. which addresses the apparent determinism inherent in such an all-pervasive metaphysical order. The argument reconciles God’s foreknowledge of events with human freedom by arguing that God knows things as one simple and eternal present rather than as successive moments (V.i.). Overall, the wide range of subjects covered by the De Consolatione clearly establishes a comprehensive context for the exploration of human nature and purpose within a defined metaphysical order. Alfred utilises this larger argument structure in a way which highlights a number of distinct concerns relevant to his conception of man and his workings.

In the Consolation, Alfred largely follows the arguments of Boethius’ first three books despite often departing from the details and themes of his source. A Christianised perspective of Boethius’ Neoplatonic metaphysics can be seen in numerous alterations which appear to reflect Carlingian commentary traditions, and a number of pervasive thematic alterations (such as his characterisation of Wisdom and Wyrd) highlight his distinctive interpretation of the Latin text and its personae.12 Alfred’s re-working of references to Classical culture in light of analogies to Anglo-Saxon culture also suggests a confidence and freedom in his mode of adaptation.13 Although the alteration of numerous philosophical sub-conclusions suggests that Alfred misunderstood some of the details in Boethius’ philosophical argument, his first thirty-nine chapters establish, along with Boethius, that human happiness is not to be found in earthly things, but in the perfect Principle of Good, namely the One true God, whose benevolent rule is all

pervasive (Bo. 34 (83) 20 – (89) 3; 39 (127) 33 – (128) 10). The most notable departures from Boethius’ argument structure, however, occur in the final chapters of the Old English work, where Alfred simplifies Boethius’ discussion of the relation between providence and fate (De Con. IV.vi; Bo. 39 (128) 10 – (132) 22) and largely omits Boethius’ discussion of divine determinism and human free will (De Con.V.iv. vi; Bo. 40 (140) 10 – 41 (146) 32). Whereas Karl Schmidt and Kurt Otten see these significant alterations as the result of Alfred’s difficulties with the complex philosophical ideas of his source, Anne Payne has argued that Alfred consciously adapts Boethius’ ideas in light of his own worldview.14 Whilst I agree that Alfred’s distinctive metaphysical worldview differs notably from that of Boethius and informs most of his alterations to the Latin argument, I suggest that Alfred’s significant departure at the end of the Old English Consolation points less towards his development of a distinctive argument which resolves the difficulties of determinism and free will, than to his lack of interest in the question itself.

Alfred introduces the question of free will (Bo. 40 (140) 18-21) towards the end of his discussion of divine providence as the all-pervasive rule of Goodness which is the will of God. Although he follows Boethius in raising questions about the compatibility of divine foreknowledge, pre-ordinance and free will, Alfred’s discussion does not seriously challenge either God’s omnipotent and benign rule or the existence of free will.15 In answer to the question of how God can allow men to have freedom if he knows that they will do evil (Bo. 41 (141) 28-9), Gescead suggests that a just lord would not enslave all of his followers:

| bet were uncynlicre, gif God nÆfde on eallum his ræc ðæs gesceaf þe under his anwalde. Forðæm he gesceop twa gesceadwisa gesceafasæfre, englas & men; þæm he geaf micle gife freodomes, bet hi musten don swa god swa yfel, swæðer swa ði wolden. He sealde swiðe fæste |

It would be more unfitness if God did not have in His entire kingdom any free creature under His rule. Therefore he created two rational creatures free, angels and men; to them he gave the great gift of freedom, so that they may do good or evil, whichever they wanted. He has given a very firm


15 Whereas Boethius begins Book V with a lengthy discussion of causality and chance (De Con. V.i) upon which he builds his later definition of the causal relation between providence and foresight (De Con. V.iv), Alfred simply asserts that nothing happens by chance (weas gehyrred) but only by providence (sio godcunde foresiþhing, Bo. 40 (140)9-16).
Alfred appears perfectly content to rely on previously established conclusions here. namely that all events are good by providence although man cannot understand its workings fully, and that the certainty of God's all-pervasive justice should be man's ultimate disincentive to vice. In answering the objection that God's punishment of good and wicked men would be unfair if He determined their actions (Bo. 41 (142) 25-31),

*Wisdom* refers to scripture in support of preceding conclusions:

Ac ic þe secege, gif þæt soð is þæt ge secgað, þæt hit wæs unnet gebod on godcundum bocum þæt God bebead þæt mon sceolde forlastan yfel & don good; & eft se cwide þe he cwæd: swa mon ma swincð, swa mon maran mede onfehð.

(Bo. 41 (143) 11-15)

But I say to you: if it is true what you say then it would be an unnecessary commandment in the divine book that God decreed that men should avoid evil and do good, and also the saying in which he said: the more man toils. the greater rewards he shall receive.

This is of course hardly a philosophical argument of Boethian calibre. Indeed Alfred's ultimate treatment of the compatibility of divine pre-determination and human freedom has nothing to do with Boethius' systematic argument in which human freedom becomes compatible with divine knowledge of events when God is moved outside human time.¹⁶ Alfred's ultimate solution instead takes the form of a flat compromise which allows God's determinism in some things but not in others (Bo. 41 (144) 25-30) and which essentially stresses man's inability to discern the benevolent workings of divine providence (Bo. 41 (145) 5-10).

Whether Alfred simply misunderstands Boethius' argument or whether he disagrees with it on theological (or other) grounds, it is quite clear that Alfred is not concerned with establishing the existence of free will and does not see God's power to intervene in human affairs as a limitation of human freedom. Although, for Alfred, human freedom is quite simply a given, a divine gift (Bo 41 (142) 9), his concluding interest in the different types of understanding which accompany varying levels of freedom a very firm law with that other gift to each man until his end; that is, the freedom that man may to do what he wants, and the law by which He rewards each according to his works, both in this world and in the world to come, either good or evil, according as man does.

freedom in different creatures (Bo. 41 (145) 28 - (146) 7) suggests that Alfred himself is far more interested in how man comes to misuse his free will by human error than with the question of how there can be such a thing as free will. This interest, moreover, seems entirely in line with his overall argument in the Consolation. Chapters 1-36 establish that men are innately oriented towards their own true happiness, which is God, but that they seek happiness in false earthly things due to their own error and lack of self-understanding. Chapters 32-9, in turn, establish that vice and wickedness lead man away from happiness towards self-annihilation in that evil which is deprivation of Good. In Chapters 40 and 41, Alfred defines freedom as relative to the degree in which man understands himself and his will (Bo. 40 (140) 23-6; 41 (142) 2-15). In light of these foregoing concerns, Alfred’s final interest in man’s modes of understanding and his concluding exhortations indicate that the matter of determinism is peripheral to his own didactic concerns with man’s moral and intellectual capacity for Good. In other words, the matter of human freedom appears to have been resolved by Alfred’s foregoing analyses of the interaction between the human will for Good and the understanding which guides him there. Alfred’s final emphasis on man’s need to understand as well as he can despite his limitations and to strive towards heaven in thoughts and acts therefore appears to be the natural conclusion to his entire investigation:

This conclusion is not solely based on the need to adhere to scriptural authority but has been progressively established over the course of the Consolation. The remainder of this discussion will consider the way in which Alfred builds up a coherent vision of human
nature and human purpose within the framework of his progressing argument. Attention to Alfred's presentation of the inner domain, as we shall see, again becomes a useful hermeneutic tool for the analysis of constructions of human and personal identity.

Alfred's concern with the inner domain is clear from the outset. Like Boethius’ description of the prison cell in the De Consolatione, Alfred's opening scene firmly establishes the inner nature of the dialogue which is to come. As the tyrannical Deodric throws Boetius into the cell, the narrowness, darkness and isolation of the setting reflects the inner state of the protagonist himself.¹⁷

When the worthy man came into such great distress, he was all the more greatly afflicted in his mod because his mod had been so strongly attached to worldly joys before - he could remember no comfort inside that prison, but instead fell down on the floor and prostrated himself most miserably and despairingly began to weep...

The darkness of the cell is soon aligned with Boetius' blindness (swa blindnesse on pisse dimme hol 2 (8) 10), the narrowness and constriction of the pit parallel his inner affliction (1. (7) 25).¹⁸ The conflation of 'intellectual' and 'emotional' categories in Alfred's picture of the miserable mod predicts that its state is as much a deeper moral affliction than one arising from the shock of immediate incarceration (De Con II.i.26-8).

Indeed Alfred does not keep us waiting long before making the allegorical significance of Boetius' base and prostrate position (ofdune on pa flor, Bo. 1 (8) 4) explicit.

Upon arriving in the cell, or rather upon entering 'into' Boetius' mod (paer gan in to me heofoncund Wisdom, 3 (8) 16), Wisdom attributes Boetius' affliction to his

¹⁷ In order to distinguish between the protagonists of the Latin and Old English works, I refer to all characters in the Old English dialogue by their Old English spellings (i.e. Boetiw) and to the Latin characters as 'the Latin protagonist Boethius' or 'the Latin Theodoric'.

¹⁸ Whereas Payne emphasises that prison walls signify 'perceptual blindness' (Alfred and Boethius, p. 11), the imagery of restriction in the vernacular corpus often signifies 'emotional turmoil' (Lockett, 'Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons', pp. 14-7). This more comprehensive sense is particularly apparent in the metrical version (Met. 1.74-82b).
having forgotten his former teacher.\textsuperscript{19} In Alfred's account, the imagery of blindness and sickness in association with inner disturbance and, more notably, inner error (\textit{dysig. gedwolan}) is more dominant than the imagery of forgetting and remembering, which carries strong undertones of Platonic \textit{anamnesis} in Boethius' account.\textsuperscript{20} By repairing Boetius' sight, by metaphorically opening (and drying) the eyes of his \textit{mod} (I (8) 7), Wisdom intends to clear his pupil's clouded and erroneous vision (I.iv.17-19) and thus to elevate him from this lowly state (\textit{hreowskiendum gepohete... up arærede}. 1 (11) 3) all the way to heaven:

Forpam gif þu þe ofseamian walt þines
gedwolan, þonne onginne ic þe sona beran &
bringe mid me to heofonum. \textit{(Bo. 3 (9) 18-19)}

Therefore if you will be ashamed of your error,
then I will soon begin to raise you up and bring
you with me to heaven.

The purgation of error after repentance makes the Christian element within the learning process explicit here. The state of blind error in which Boetius finds himself is not only his exile from Wisdom, but is soon revealed as a state of exile from God and the heavenly community:

\textit{Ac þeah þu nu fyr seo ðonne þu ware, ne eart}
þu þeal ealles of þam earde adrifn, þeah þu
þeron gedwolode. Ne gebrohte þe eac nan oðer
man on þam gedwolan butan þe sylfum þurh
þine agene geneleste. Ne sceolde þe eac nan
man sweleces to gelefan þær þu gemunan
woldest hwylcra gebyrda þu ware & hwylcra
burgwara for worulde; oððe eft gastliche hwilces
geferscipes þu ware on þinum mode, & on
ðinre gesceadwisnesse; þæt is þæt þu eart an
þara rihtwisena & þara ryhtwillendra; þa beoð
þære heofencundan Jerusalem burgware.}
\textit{(Bo. 5 (11) 9-18)}

But though you are now more distant than you
were, you are not entirely driven from your home,
though you have erred from there. No man brought
you into error other than yourself, \textit{[namely]}
through your own heedlessness. Nor should any
man believe such about you if you would
remember of which birth you are and of which
citizenship in the world; or again, spiritually, of
which companionship you are in your \textit{mod} and in
your understanding; that is that you are one
amongst the righteous and right-willing who are of
the divine community of Jerusalem.

In the Old English argument, then, the \textit{mod} has by its own heedlessness and error (\textit{gedwolan}, a loaded term as we saw in Chapter Six) become estranged from its true

\textsuperscript{19}Although \textit{Wisdom}, like \textit{Philosophia} is introduced as the fostermother (\textit{Bo. 3 (8) 27}) whom Boetius has forgotten, Alfred retains the grammatical gender of wisdom (\textit{m.}) and refers to him by the masculine pronoun (\textit{he}). Since \textit{Wisdom}, unlike \textit{Philosophia}, is ultimately identified with God Himself, I retain this masculine characterisation throughout. For a more detailed discussion, Kimberly Cook, 'Philosophy's Metamorphosis into Wisdom: an Explanation of King Alfred's Re-Creation of the Central Symbol in \textit{The Consolation of Philosophy}', \textit{Journal of Evolutionary Psychology} 17 (1996): 177-85.

\textsuperscript{20}Despite integrating the theme of 'forgetting', Alfred himself does not appear particularly concerned with this theme beyond its utility as a context for re-learning forgotten truths (and thus for illustrating them to the reader). The theory of \textit{anamnesis} in Platonic thought holds that certain truths are present in the soul from its very creation. Augustine's development of the idea that human learning is 'remembering' raises a number of interesting points about his own beliefs about the pre-existence of the soul. See Rist, \textit{Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized}, pp. 144-82.
origin and home (eard), from its own place in the world, and by implication from its own true and righteous nature. Alfred’s early association of identity with man’s home and community announces the thematic context of his subsequent inquiry. The association of the mod with the spiritual community of the righteous, moreover, amplifies the moral dimension which will emerge as a central theme in his investigation.

As already noted, Boethius’s teleological argument in the De Consolatione establishes that all men seek happiness by their nature, that true happiness can only be found in the One and that man himself inherently seeks God. The importance of man’s desire or will for a certain end, therefore, is crucial to the argument as a whole. In probing the extent of the error which is the root of Boetius’ miserable affliction, Wisdom like Philosophia, is perplexed that Boetius perceives injustice and disorder in the world despite acknowledging that ‘God is the Creator of all’ (De Con I.v.23-6; Bo 5 (13) 16) and the ‘Director of His own work’(De Con I.v.15-19; Bo 5 (12) 19-21). The root of his error and affliction, it soon emerges, lies in his lacking understanding of the end of all things:

As in the De Consolatione (and its wider intellectual heritage), life, reason and mortality define man. In the present context, however, this knowledge appears to be insufficient.
In order to understand oneself one must understand one's purpose, namely that end towards which one should be heading. In both the *De Consolatione* and the Old English *Consolation*, the particular importance of knowing one's end as well as one's origin does not reside exclusively in the fact that such knowledge reveals the full circle of human life, man's course and purpose. More importantly, *Wisdom*’s emphasis on knowing the end which determines man's path lies in his assertion that men alone can deviate from this path (*Bo 5 (12) 21-24*). As we hear later, man can stray from his rightful course in light of his free will and in anticipation of this insight the theme of finding one's true end by understanding one's nature and one's true will becomes central to the argument.

In his analysis of true and false *gesælda* (happiness, prosperity) in Chapters 7 - 35, Alfred follows the first three books of the *De Consolatione* closely in establishing that men seek wealth (*welan*), power (*anweald*), honour (*weordiscipes*), fame (*mæða*) and will (*willan*, meaning the fulfilment of will in sufficiency, prosperity and joy).

\[ \delta\varepsilon\varepsilon\ e\varepsilon\ a\ e\ v i\ w i n\varepsilon\delta, \ & \ w e l \ d\varepsilon \ p\varepsilon\ h\ v i \ w i n\varepsilon\delta, \ p\varepsilon\ h\ a\ h\ i\ v i\ s l i c\ v i\ h i\ w i l\varepsilon\varepsilon\ v i\ a\ n. \ (B\varepsilon. 24 (56) 24-5) \]

All of this they want, and do well that they want it, though they seek it aimlessly.

The proof that these things cannot be found in earthly things essentially depends on the analysis of human nature and human purpose. In other words, the understanding of one's nature is central to understanding what one truly wants and the investigation of true *gooda* ('goods') and true *gesælda* ('happiness, prosperity') in the *Consolation* thus provides a number of arguments which are particularly important for Alfred's anthropological ideas.

The first relevant argument which is developed in both texts establishes that happiness should not be sought in material things because these are by nature fickle and transient. Earthly wealth which depends on material things is as quantitively limited as is its value to man (*Bo. 13 (28) 18-21*). Earthly power which depends on material wealth or the allegiance of men is useless to man in that wealth can be lost (and with it allegiance...
based upon material wealth). Fame and honour, in turn, when sought from the good opinion of men is limited in both time and space due to the transience of human life and the smallness of the world in the larger scheme of things (Bo. 18 (42) 4 - (45)19). In essence, attachment to fleeting, inconsistent and transient things involves a constant seeking of changing ends which amounts to directionless erring, being lured hither and thither without any fixed point of orientation or direction (Bo. 7 (15) 23-6). This argument leads to the insight that men should not seek wealth, prosperity or reputation in external earthly things, but rather within themselves:

Quid igitur o mortales extra petitis intra vos positam felicitatem? Error vos inscitaque confundit. Ostendam breviter tibi summae cardinem felicitatis. Estne aliquid tibi te ipso pretiosius? Nihil inquires. (De Con. II.iv.72-5)

Why then do you mortals look outside for happiness when it is really to be found within yourselves? Error and ignorance confuse you. Let me briefly show you on what the greatest happiness really turns. Is anything more precious to you than yourself? Nothing, you will agree.

Hwy sece ge þonne ymbutan eow þa gesælða þe ge oninan iow habbað þurh þa godeundan mieht geset? Ac ge nyton hwæt ge doð; ge sinit on gedwolan. Ac ic eow mæg mid feawum wordum gereccan hwæt se hrof is ealra gesælða; wið þas ic wat þu wilt higian þon ær þe þu hine ongiteþ; þæt is þonne good. Meaht þu nu ongitan hwæðer þu auht þe deorwyrðe hæbbe þonne þe sealfne? Ic wene þeah þæt þu wille cweþan þæt þu nauht deorwyrðe næbbe. (Bo. 11 (25)14-21)

Whereas Boethius argues that inner happiness is that happiness which cannot be lost (De Con. II.iv.76-84), Alfred argues that gesceadwisnes (reason, understanding, discrimination) is man’s truest possession in that it cannot be taken or harmed:

Ic wat, gif þu nu hæfde fulne aneawld þines selifes, þonne hæfde þu hwæþwugu on þe selfum þæs þe þu næfre þinun willum aelstan noldes, ne sio wyrd þe on geniman ne meahte. Forðæm ic de mindgige þæt þu ongite hætte nan gesæld nis on þis andweardan life þonne seo gesceadwisnes, forðæm hio þurh nan þing ne meag þæm men losian; forðy is betere þæt feoh hætte næfre losian ne meag þonne hætte meag & sceal. (Bo. 11 (25)21-8)

I know, if you now had full control of yourself, then you would have something within yourself which you would never willingly give up, and which Fate could not take from you. Therefore I remind you to understand that there is no other happiness in this present life than ‘reason’, because this cannot be lost by men through anything; and that possession which can never be lost is better than that which can, and some day must.

Although Alfred makes fundamentally the same point as Boethius about happiness here, his emphasis on gesceadwisnes as man’s truest possession anticipates Boethius’ next argument in De Con. II.v.

Moreover, it cannot protect men from the violence and power of other men (Bo. 16 (37) 10-13).
This second argument, with which *Philosophia* increases the dosage of her medicine, pertains to the nature of the ‘good’ which is in a thing itself and which determines its innate and inherent value in the larger scheme of things. First, earthly possessions cannot enrich man because man cannot possess the intrinsic good of another thing, whether this be the beauty of a gem or the goodness of another man. By establishing a hierarchy in which material things are of less value than non-material things, Boethius argues that man debases himself in the larger scheme of things when he seeks to possess a lower good than that which is by nature his own:

Itane autem nullum est proprium vobis atque insitum bonum ut in externis ac sepositis rebus bona vestra quaeratis? Sic rerum versa condicio est ut divinum merito rationis animal non aliter sibi splendere nisi inanimatae supellectilis possessione videatur? Et alia quidem suis contenta sunt; vos autem deo mente consimiles ab rebus inimis excellentis naturae ornamenta captatis nec intellegitis quantam conditori vestro faciatis injuriam. Ille genus humanum terrenis omnibus praestare voluit; vos dignitatem vestram infra infima quaequet detruditis. (*De Con.* II.v.70-80)

Have you no personal good of your own within yourself, that you seek your goods in other things externally? Is the state of nature so upside-down that man, a living and rational — and therefore godlike — animal, can only appear splendid to himself by the possession of lifeless stuff? Other things are content with what is their own; but you men, like God in your minds, seek to bedeck your nature, excellent that it is, with lower things, and do not see how greatly you injure your Maker. *He* wanted man to be above earthly things; *you men* reduce your worth to less than that of the lowest.

This argument again shifts the focus inwards, this time to the innate good which is man’s truest possession. For Alfred, this is again *gescead*, although Boethius’ reference to the godlike nature of reason appears to prompt Alfred into drawing the Augustinian parallel between the Holy Trinity and the tripartite soul:

Ic wat þæt ge wenað þæt ge nan gecundlic god ne gesælþa oninnan eow selum næbbe, forðæm ge hi secæð butan eow to fremdum gesceafum. Swa hit is mishweorfed þæt þæm men hincð, þæah se godcundlice gesceadwis, þæt he on him selfum næbbe sælþa genoge, buton he mare gegaderige þara ungesceadwisene gesceafþa þonne he beþurfe ðode him gemeticre sie. ... Hwæt, ge bonne þeah hwæthewega godecundlices on eowerre saule habbað, þæt is andgít & gemyn, & ge gesceafdisilca willa þæt hine þara twega lyste. Se þe bonne þas ðreo hæfð, bonne hæfð he his sceopenendes onlicnesse swa forð swa swa ænegu gesceafþa fyrmost meæ hiere sceopenendes onlicnesse habban. Ac ge secæð þære hean geɔcynde gesælþa & heora weordiscipe to þæm niþerlicum & to þæm hrosendlicum þingum. Ac ge ne ongitæ hu micelne teonan ge dóð Gode eowrum scippende, forþæmpe he wolde þætte ealle men wæran ealra operra gesceafþa wealendæs; ac ge undereþoðæ eowre hehstan medemnesse under þa eallra nyðemestan gesceafþa. (*Bo.* 14 (31) 24 -(32) 12)

I know that you think that you have no natural good or prosperity within yourself, because you seek them outside yourself from other creatures. Thus it is perverted think that man — despite being divinely ‘rational’ — does not have enough in prosperity in himself, but [instead] seeks to gather more than he needs or more than is fitting from non-rational creatures.... Lo, you do have something godlike in your souls: that is understanding and memory and the rational will to choose between two things.

He who has these three things has his Creator’s likeness more fixedly than any creature may have it.

But you seek the prosperity and glory of a higher nature in lower and transient things. But you do not understand how much you wrong your Creator because He intended that all men be rulers over other creatures — rather, you place your highest excellence under the lowest creatures.
Alfred's reliance on the notion of longevity in determining man's truest possession evidently assimilates the inner self with his spiritual domain, the eternal sawul. Besides establishing that man must not seek happiness in the external and transient realm, this argument introduces the idea that man must seek 'goods' which are proper to his nature, an idea which Alfred develops in a distinctive way in subsequent arguments.

In Boethius' ensuing discussions about the true value of things, he illustrates that earthly power has no 'good' of its own because it cannot make men wise or good (De Con. II.viii). The argument does not simply shift from a utilitarian view of goods (bonum) as things which enrich and empower men to a view of moral good and virtue. Rather, it depends on the idea that men can only possess goods which are in accordance with their own innate good. Alfred greatly elaborates this idea in his accounts of the true and lasting 'goods' (gooda) which are bestowed by Wisdom — in each case without precedent in the Latin text: 22

...the name which I should have by right is that I am wealth and honour... my servants are wisdom(s) and virtues / skills and true wealth...

Every skill has its special gift and the gift and the honour / value which it has gives it very generously to those who love it. Wisdom is the highest virtue / skill and has within itself four other skills; one of them is caution, another moderation, the third is courage and the fourth is righteousness. Wisdom makes his lovers wise and honourable and moderate and patient and righteous and fills those who love him with every good manner.

Alfred consistently amplifies the importance of the moral as well as intellectual virtues, but integrates these fully into the progressing argument. On the one hand, Alfred emphasises the interconnection of all virtues (Bo. 33 (74) 15 – (78) 17) in the same way that Boethius' establishes the interconnection of all 'goods' (De Con. III.vii). On the

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22 In contrast to Wyrd and Gesældo, Wisdom gives men the rewards he promises and his relationship with man reflects the proper mutual obligation and service (Bo. 7 (18) 5-9).
other hand, the idea that in seeking Wisdom man is seeking Goodness illustrates that
Boetius’ own quest is as much a moral as an intellectual one. Although Alfred’s use of
the term *craeft* to designate virtue in the *Consolation* has been much discussed, it has not
been noted that the term’s usual connotations of skill and power strengthen the
philosophical argument.23 Alfred develops an account of the moral virtues as goods
which are useful to man not only in that they increase his highest natural good but also
in that they empower him by bringing him towards his true *gesælda* (joy, prosperity).
namely God himself. Given the shift of power from the external to the internal world,
and the intrinsic goodness of *craeft* as the ability to do good, the inner ‘virtues’ emerge
as the true powers which enable man to move towards the perfect Good, Prosperity and
Happiness which is God:

> Forðy sint þa craeftas betteran þonne þa unðeawas,
forðæmæ ælc mon sceal bion geþafa, sam he wille
sam he nylle, þæt se sie anwaldegost þæm
becuman to þam hehstan hrofe eallra gesceafa, þæt
is God.  

(Bo. 36 (108)16-9)

These virtues skills are better than vices because every man must agree, whether he wants to or not, that he is most powerful who may come to the highest pinnacle of all Creation, which is God.

As I shall discuss in Chapter Eight, Alfred develops his account of the inner virtues in
ways which are significant for his conception of human and individual identity in the
*Soliloquies*. In the *Consolation*, however, the main point is that true wealth lies within
man and that only the virtues gained in the service of Wisdom and Goodness can enable
man to fulfil his potential by bringing him closer to God.

Alfred’s development of Boethius’ argument establishes the end of human life
as something which must be recognised if man is to understand his nature and his
purpose. In recognising his innate will for happiness through contemplation of God, man gains not only the understanding necessary for self-fulfilment in true happiness and
prosperity, but also gains the virtues necessary for the ethical life which is a crucial
element of re-joining the heavenly community in this life and the next. In shifting true
human wealth and power along with human value inwards, the *Consolation* develops an

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23 As Nicole Günther Discenza noted in her recent study, the use of *craeft* for ‘virtue’ in the *Consolation*
and *Soliloquies* is unique within Old English Literature. Nicole Günther Discenza. *The King’s English*
anthropological hierarchy which directly reflects the matter-spirit dualism of Alfred's metaphysical order. A brief look at this anthropological schema in the *Consolation* allows us to consider the role and status of the inner self in Alfred's conception of man.

7.2 The Human Constitution in Context: Metaphysical and Anthropological Hierarchies

As has been established, the first three books of the *De Consolatione* and the first thirty-five chapters of the *Consolation* establish that *worulgesælde* are false goods. Whether sought singly or in accumulation, they are 'of no good' to man because they neither enrich him by increasing his natural good nor empower him in a way that enables him to find the true Happiness which is God. Since, for Boethius, God is the perfect Principle of all Being and Goodness from Whom all life comes and towards which all things are oriented (*De Con.* IV), his metaphysics involve descending levels of Being and Goodness which emanate from God to the lowest material creation. As I illustrated in 7.1, man's innate good and his capacity for increasing this good – even for becoming godlike – determine his place in this larger metaphysical hierarchy. In Alfred's version of the argument, the most dominant theme is the superiority of the eternal above the transient. Precisely this hierarchy is reflected in Alfred's account of the microcosm of man and his argument as a whole presents numerous analytical passages which address the details of the relationship between soul and body and the status of the inner self in a dual human nature. Since most of the relevant references and descriptions occur at different stages in the argument, the following discussion considers them in reference to the larger conceptual structure of metaphysical and anthropological hierarchies.

As we have seen, the idea that man's most lasting possessions are his truest possessions has significant implications for human identity in that it shifts man's essence inwards. Given that external things can be taken away more easily, they are 'less owned' and of less value than the body:
swa is þæs monnes lichoma betera & deorwyrða
þonne ealle his æhta.  (Bo. 32 (72) 22-3) | so is man's body better and dearer than all his possessions.

Similarly, the human body, which can be harmed, lost or taken is less 'owned' than the rational mod:

On hwæm mæg ænig mon oðrum derian buton on his lichoman, oðde eft on hiora welum, þe ge hatað gesæða? Ne nan mon ne mæg ðæm gesceadwisan mode gederian, ne him gedon þæt hit sie þæt þæt hit ne bið.  (Bo. 16 (36) 12-16) | In what may any other man harm another but in his body or also in his wealth, which you call prosperity / happiness? No man can harm the rational / discerning mod, or make it be something which it is not.

This is a particularly interesting instance of a contrast between the outer body and the inner mod (Lat. mens II.vi.25), which appears to refer to the invincibility of the human mind. Although the argument operates on an inner-outer contrast, its full force appears to reside in the fact that the mod cannot be harmed, transformed or extinguished. We heard already that gescead cannot be taken away (p. 198 above) although it can clearly suffer in conditions of error. Similarly, the rational mod can clearly suffer in adverse conditions, yet its immutability marks it out as a core component of the self.24 The metaphysical framework of Alfred's argument as a whole requires that man's truest possessions and the essence of his self are the most lasting possessions and the implications which this overall argument has for the perceived role of the inner self in a dual human nature are particularly important here, as a look at Alfred's statements about the human constitution will confirm.

The Consolation, in accordance with Latin Christian as well as native conventions, defines man as being composed of body and soul:

| Wisdom | Wast þu hwæt mon sie? |
| Mod | Ic wat þæt hit bið sawl & lichoma. |
| Wisdom | Hwæt, þu wast þæt hit bið mon, þa hwile þe sio sawl & se lichoma untodælde biðð; ne bið hit nan mon siðdan hi todælde biðð.  (Bo. 34 (90) 27-31) |
| Do you know what man is? | I know that he is soul and body |
| | So, you know that it is man, while the soul and the body are undivided; it is not man when they are divided. |

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24 The Latin argument qualifies the invincibility of the mind in a way which does not quite come across in Alfred's reference to the gesceadwisan mode: Num quidquam libero imperabis animo? Num mentem firma sibi ratione cohaerentem de statu propriae quietis amovebis? (De Con. II.vi. 24-6), 'Can you ever command a free mind in anything? Can you ever disturb the natural calm of a mind made whole by reason?' (Stewart and Rand, p. 211). The invincibility of gesceadwisnes itself, however, is perhaps best understood in reference to the spark of light which has not been extinguished by Boetius' sufferings (Bo. 5 (13) 30).
Alfred accepts the immortality of the soul within this dualistic scheme as a premise throughout the work, even if he does not substantiate it in the argument of the *Consolation* itself.25

Men’s souls are immortal and eternal and this is clear enough that no man need doubt that all men end in death, as does their [earthly] wealth.

All of Alfred’s contrasts between soul and body are informed by the conventional contrast between their respective immortality and transience. Thus the higher value of the soul is implicit in its immortal nature.26

Just as the heavens are better and higher and fairer than all they contain, except man alone, so is man’s body better and more precious / valuable than all his possessions. But how much better and more precious do you think is the soul than the body? ... The beauty of the body is very fleeting and very fragile, very much like the flowers of the earth. ... Although you may now appear fair to some, that does not make it any more so; but the unreason of their eyes prevents them from realising that they see the outside of you, not the inside. But think very earnestly now, and contemplate discerningly about what these fleshly goods are and [about the kind of] joys you now desire so excessively. Then you may clearly understand that the beauty of the body and its strength can be lost in three days of fever...

Although bodily virtues such as health and beauty are men’s rightful goods, the inferiority of the material domain in relation to the spiritual domain is clear. As the above passage makes clear, the virtues of the *sawul* are by their nature more enduring and more truly possessed than those of the transient body which are only the semblances of the true good which lies in man. Thus, just as the soul is superior to the body in that it is most truly possessed, its virtues are superior to those of the body:

| ealle þa licumlican good bioð forcuðran ðonne | All the bodily goods are lower than the virtues of the soul. |
| ealle sawle cræftas. | *(Bo. 24 (54) 21-2)* |

25 As I shall discuss in Chapter Eight, the eternal nature of the *sawul* is one of the central concerns of the *Soliloquies*. Since Alfred refers to proofs for the eternal nature of the *sawul* in the *Consolation*, there are grounds for arguing that the *Soliloquies* were written first, but since the work appears to rely on numerous arguments established in the *Consolation* the chronology must remain less certain than their shared intellectual context.

26 *Hweot heafod he at þam hilsan after þas lichoman gedale & þære sawle? Hu ne witon we þæt ealle men lichomlicwe swetla, & þeoh sio sawl biö libbende?* (28 (45) 24-7) ‘What does he have from [earthly] reputation after the parting of body and soul? Do not we know that all men perish corporeally and yet the soul will [remain] alive?’. Even instances in which the soul is not explicitly contrasted with the body are nevertheless informed by this contrast, for the soul’s journey to heaven or hell is dependent upon its parting from the temporal body, see *Bo. 11 (26) 8; 35 (102)1-3; 62 (147) 29-31.*
At a moral level, the contrast between spiritual soul and body is amplified by the opposition between the soul’s highest virtues, namely reason, and the lowest lust of the body:

> Would you enjoy excessive carnal pleasure?
> Now good services of God would then forsake you, because your weary flesh had you in its power, and you did not have it in your power. How can man carry himself more poorly than to make himself subservient to his paltry flesh and not to his rational soul?

Although gescead, wisdom and the moral virtues are attributed to the sawul as well as to the mod throughout the Consolation, it is particularly interesting that all references to the sawul as man’s agency occur in a context which amplifies the potential divinity or the actual virtue of men. As we saw on pages 198-9 above, Boethius’ reference to man’s godlike nature was accompanied by Alfred’s comparison of the Augustinian triad of memory, understanding and rational will to the Holy Trinity itself (Bo. 14 (32) 1-10). Similarly, even the famous Platonic description of the sawul (discussed in 7.4 below) occurs in a context which highlights man’s potential for the salvation of his soul in the afterlife:

> O Lord, You gave to souls a home in heaven and there give them precious gifts, to each according to its deserving; and You cause them to shine very brightly, and yet with very diverse brightness, some more brightly, some less brightly, like the stars, each according to its deserving. Lord, You gather together heavenly souls and earthly bodies, and join them in this world. Just as they came here from You, so do they also strive hence to You.

Although the description of the sawul as willing, reasoning and passionate firmly attributes agency and an entire psychological mechanism to the sawul, the rule of gescead emphasises the virtue of the soul as well as its potential for assuming its place in the heavenly home.²⁷ Given the importance which is placed upon the sawul as man’s responsible and thinking agency in these two accounts, it is surprising that sawul (or saul) occurs only thirty-seven times in a work of around fifty thousand words. In the

²⁷ Only in one instance do we find the suggestion that the soul is corruptible, but this occurs in a context in which Alfred alters the Latin. (Bo. 31 (71) 6-8).
Consolation as a whole, the dominant core of man is without question the mod and this more versatile entity requires closer attention here.

Throughout the prose dialogues of the Consolation, human nobility, skill and power lie in the mod in much the same way that they do in the sawul.

ælces monnes god & his æpelö bioð ma on þam mode þonne on þam flæsc. (Bo. 30 (69) 10-11)  

Every man’s good and his nobility are more in the mod than in the flesh.

The mod is repeatedly contrasted with the body (also 30 (69) 28; 16 (36) 2-7), although the relevant passages always translate a Boethian argument which contrasts the thinking mind (mens, animus) with the external world. Like the sawul, the mod too is defined by its possession of gescead, that skill or power which allows man to retain his place and purpose in the larger metaphysical order. Nevertheless, the semantic sphere of mod remains as broad in the Consolation as throughout the vernacular corpus in that it is the mod which not only thinks, but also feels and strives. In many ways the familiar image of the mod as a container and treasure trove of thoughts and desires is better suited to the overarching argument of possessions and inner wealth than is the constitutional analysis of the sawul. Be this as it may, Alfred presents the mod and not the sawul as the central speaker and it appears as the true representative of the human self, as is also suggested by its gradual replacement by ic towards the end of the dialogue. It is the mod which hears Wisdom and in following him it seeks man’s proper good. It is the mod which seeks to understand God and which, by the aid of Wisdom (and occasionally also of Gescead) learns its own true nature and its own true desire for God. Crucially, however, it is also the mod which can fail in the human quest due to its natural fallibility – a fallibility which does not characterise the sawul.

Forpam æghwelec man heftō gecyndelic god on him selfum, forpam ælc mod wilnað soðes godes to begitanne; ac hit bið amerred mid þam lænum godum, forðæm hit bið ofdælre ðæerto. (Bo. 24 (53) 11-14)  

Thus every man has natural good in himself and every mod wants to gain true good, but it is confused by transient goods because it is more susceptible to these.

Whereas the mod can be elevated by Wisdom in its thoughts and spirits, it faces many dangers in seeking its true Happiness:

bet is þæt þætte swiðe singalice & swiðe hæsiglice beswicō eala þara monna mod þe beoð on heora gecynde gecorene, & þeah ne beoð to þam hrofe  

It is something which very consistently and very heavily lures the mods of all those men who are elevated in their nature but who are not yet come to
It is never the *sawul*, but always the *mod* which is blinded by ignorance and false desires:

Swa beod da synfullan mod ablend mid heora yflan willan þæt hi ne magon gesion þæt leoh leare beorhtan sōðfæstnesse, þæt is se hehsta wisdom. (Bo. 38 (121) 12-4)

Thus sinful *mods* are blinded by their evil will so that they cannot see the light of bright Truthfastness which is the highest Wisdom.

Since the argument of the *Consolation* is concerned with the processes by which men can err from their rightful path and become exiled in the error and misery of worldly concerns and loves, the *mod* stands at centre stage. The most detailed descriptions of psychological workings occur not in descriptions of the *sawul* (save in the two tripartite models), but descriptions of the *mod* and Alfred’s coherent presentation of this central inner aspect is pivotal to his exploration of the inner bases of human experience and behaviour.

7.3 Man’s Inner Workings: Defining Faculties and Capacities

As the form of the dialogue in the *Consolation* makes clear, the absence of *Wisdom* characterises the *mod*’s state of desolation, error and exile. The quest of the *mod* in Alfred’s argument is not only an intellectual journey of self-understanding but a process of self-realisation in which man comes to understand his will for God and attains those powers and skills which bring him closer to his own fulfilment. A crucial element of Boethius’ argument for the all-pervasive rule of Good in the universe is that all things strive by their nature towards Good and his distinction between natural orientation and the conscious will is crucial in raising the question of whether there is such a thing as free will at the end of his third book. In Alfred’s argument, as I shall illustrate, this distinction between natural orientation and the human conscious will is less defined and greatly affects his treatment of the question of free will. For Alfred, human freedom fundamentally depends on man’s ability to recognise his true will for
God by the aid of Wisdom and thus to achieve self-realisation and self-fulfilment in the moral life oriented towards God. Since for Alfred, man’s true will for God is his innate drive towards Good, his freedom to seek false ends in error becomes his self-imposed enslavement to false ends. Only the recognition of his true will brings true freedom. Just as Wisdom is crucial to the mod’s self-realisation in the dialogue, the interaction between understanding and will within the mod is a central dynamic in Alfred’s psychological ideas. Again, therefore, the relevant passages must be considered in reference to the progressing argument in order to appreciate that Alfred’s diverse accounts of the workings of the mod (and even his Platonic and Augustinian descriptions of the tripartite sawul) are fundamentally in accordance with his overarching vision of human nature and human purpose.

When Wisdom first enters into the mod to guide it homewards, he seeks not only man’s knowledge or understanding (gewit), but man’s rightful will (rihtes willan):

ne me na ne lyst mid glase geworhtra waga ne heahsetla mid golde & mid gimnum gerenodra, ne boca mid golde awrittenra me swa wiðe ne lyst swa me lyst on þe rihtes willan. Ne sece ic no her þa bec, ac þæt þæt þa bec forstent, þæt is, þin gewit. (Bo. 5 (11) 26-30)

I am not pleased by glass-worked windows or by thrones gilded with gold and gems, nor do books written in gold please me as much as right will pleases me in you. I do not seek books here, but that which the books contain, namely your knowledge.

The discussions of Chapters 7 – 39 establish that all men actually seek only one thing, namely happiness although men seek it falsely in the multiplicity of transient things rather than in the Unity of God. Wisdom is clearly crucial to the mod’s understanding of its true desire and hence the true end and purpose of human life. Alfred’s characterisation of the mod’s guide as Wisdom (and not Philosophia) has been much discussed and interpretations range from the idea that wisdom was Alfred’s only available term for philosophia, to the idea that Alfred consciously developed his character in reference to Anglo-Saxon cultural conventions.²⁸ In the dialogue itself, Wisdom occasionally appears with Gesceadwisnes (3 (9) 15); 5 (10) 28; 10 (21) 18; 11 (23) 17; 13 (27) 14, 14 (29) 15), a feature which has been seen to suggest the identification of ‘wisdom’ with ‘reason’, although Alfred defines gescead as a distinct gift of Wisdom, as well as the highest of all the virtues which accompany man’s love of

²⁸ Payne, Alfred and Boethius, ch. 7; Bolton, ‘How Boethian was Alfred’s Boethius’, pp. 37-56.
wisdom, and as the highest aspect of wisdom which resides in the sawul and mod.

Interestingly, most critics dismiss the identification of Wisdom with God, despite the clear statement in the Consolation:

Swilc is se wisdom þæt hine ne mæg nan mon of þisse weorulde ongitan swilcne swylce he is; ac æc winð be his andgåtes mæde þæt he hine wolde ongitan gif he meahte. Ac se wisdom mæg us eallunga ongitan swylce swylce we sint; þeah we hine ne mægen ongitan eallunga swylcne swylce he is; fordæm se wisdom is God.

(Bo. 41 (145) 7-13)

Such is Wisdom that no man of this world can fully understand what it is; but everyone strives by the measure of his own 'understanding' and wants to understand it, if he can. But Wisdom is able to understand us entirely as we are, though we may not be able to understand Him entirely as He is; because Wisdom is God.

Boethius expressly states that Philosophia is not God (De Con. IV.vi.196-200). Together with Alfred's references to heofencund Wisdom in the Consolation, however, the divinity of Wisdom seems clear and its identification with Goodness and Power and Virtue further substantiates the argument that Alfred developed Wisdom in a way that suited his own argument fully. Since all forms of good come from God, and since the natural good of man is in itself potentially divine, there is no reason why an account of Wisdom as God should in any way contradict accounts in which wisdom and reason appear as innate human faculties and capacities. In following Wisdom, the mod is seeking Happiness and Truth as much as Goodness and Virtue and in doing so is of course ultimately seeking God, Who rewards him for this loyal service with true and lasting goods. The allegorical nature of the dialogue therefore underscores the importance of the interaction between understanding and will in the human mod.

If we take this framework too literally, a number of questions about determinism raise their heads. However, Alfred's account firmly places the onus on man's own seeking and following of Wisdom and on the increase of the mod's powers in the very quest for God. At the outset, for example, Boetius refuses to follow Wisdom by accusing him of not rewarding loyal service with prosperity on earth (Bo 3 (9) 20-9). The mod's gradual recognition of Wisdom and his eventual understanding that Wisdom does provide man with the true wealth and powers which lead to happiness depend on the recognition of man's own nature and his own purpose. Rather than determining or

29 De Con. IV.vi.196-9, 'But it is grievous that I should talk of all this as if I were a god. For it is not allowed to a man either to comprehend with his natural powers or to express in words all the devices of the work of God.' (Stewart and Rand, p. 371). Earlier in the dialogue the Latin Boethius-character establishes that God set Philosophia in the minds of men (De Con. I.iv.28-31).
ruling an essentially deviant will, *Wisdom* allows the *mod* to recognize its true will over the course of the argument. This basic framework underpins all psychological accounts in the *Consolation*.

Although Alfred follows Boethius’ overall argument structure in the first four books of the *De Consolatione*, a number of alterations of psychological discussions reveal Alfred’s distinctive ideas. To begin with, Alfred’s discussion of man’s true will for God departs from Boethius’ discussion of natural order. Alfred follows the argument that all creatures strive towards the Unity which is true Being and seek to live and not to perish in their own dissolution (*De Con.* III.vi), but adds that all things strive for God because He is the only eternal Being (*Bo.* 34). For Boethius, the universe is ordered by the natural striving of all creatures, whether irrational or rational, towards the true Being and Good which is God. Although Alfred argues along with Boethius that things seek God by their nature (*gecynd*), which is separate from the will (*willa*), Alfred develops the following passage in distinct ways:

Neque nunc nos de voluntariis animae cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione tractamus, sicuti est quod acceptas escas sine cogitatione transigimus, quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes. *(De Con.* III.xi.85-9)

Nor are we now dealing with the voluntary motions of the intelligent soul, but with the exertion of nature, such as when we digest food we have taken in without any conscious thought, or when we draw breath in our sleep without knowing it.

A little while ago I said that no creature would perish by its own desire, but I am now more concerned with nature than with desire, because these are at times differently inclined. You may know by many things that nature is very great. It is an exceedingly powerful [force of] nature that to our body comes all its strength from the food we consume, and yet the food passes out through the body. Yet its taste and its energy pass into every vein, just as when a man sifts meal the meal passes through each opening, and the bran is sifted out. So also our spirit journeys very far without our volition or control because of its nature, not its will; this is when we are asleep.

Alfred clearly makes the distinction between a shared universal nature and the conscious will which is the special and defining property of men alone. As this distinction becomes reformulated in terms of natural instinctual, even bodily desire on

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30 This emphasis on the eternal, is particularly important in Alfred’s argument in the *Soliloquies*, Chapter Eight below.
the one hand and rational will on the other, we gain a glimpse into the inner mechanisms of volition:

Nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animae voluntatibus, verum ex naturae principiis venit. Nam saepe mortem cogentibus causis, quam natura reformidat, voluntas amplectitur, contraque illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas gignendi opus, quod natura semper appetit, interdum cohercet voluntas. (De Con. III.xi.89-96)

Hæt, þa nytenu þonne & eac þa oðra gesceaftra ma wilniað þæs þe hi wilniað for gecynde þonne for willan. Ungecyndelic is ælcere wuhte þæt hit wilnige frecennesse ðæð deaðes, ac þæh mæning þing bið to þæm gened þæt hit wilniað þara ægðes; fordæm se willa bið þonne strengra þonne þæt gecynd. Hwilum bið se willa swiðra þonne þæt gecynd, hwilum þæt gecynd ofercynþ þone willan. Swa nu wænnes deð; sio bið ælcum men gecynde, & hwilum þæh hire bið forwæned hire gecyndes þurh þæs monnes willan. Eall sio lufu þæs hæmedþinges bið for gecynde, nallas for willan. (Bo. 34 (93) 9-19)

Both writers identify the universally shared desire for survival and flourishing with the desire for the true Being and Good which is God, and go on to establish the rule of Good in the universal order. Interestingly, when Boethius states that the natural striving of all creatures for Good means that they serve God voluntarily and that no creature would or could resist this God Who ‘rules and sweetly disposes things’ (De Con III.xii.65-9), Alfred adds that men and sinful angels are the exception. He therefore maintains the distinction between conscious will and nature, whereas Boethius’ argument leads to the later conclusion of determinism.

With Alfred’s exception in place, Boethius’ inquiry into determinism in Book V does not flow quite so easily and it appears that Alfred develops his own solution to the question of human freedom. At the end of Chapter 40, we hear that men are only free in so far as they understand themselves, what they want and what they do not want:

Se þe gesceawdisnesse hæð, se maeg deman & tosceadan hwæs he wiligan sceal & hwæt he onsceunian sceal; & ælc mon hæð þone freom þæt he wat hwæt he wile, hwæt he nele. (Bo. 40 (140) 23-6)

This qualification of human freedom, which as I discussed in 7.1 drastically departs from Boethius’ own argument, appears to identify man’s true will with his own natural
orientation towards his own happiness. Although Alfred maintains the distinction between nature and will in reference to bodily lusts, he specifies elsewhere that excessive bodily lust is harmful to man and therefore contrary to man's true will. Overall, Alfred appears to single out the innate desire for Good and for God as the true will of man and by revealing this true will to man, reason facilitates human freedom. Although this argument does not surmount the difficulty of why God provides different men with different powers for self-fulfilment, it does allow men to do with their freedom what they want — either to realise their own true nature or to enslave it in self-negation. Men are free to go against themselves and their Lord, but whereas error remains the root of evil and takes the form of doubt, the true human will itself remains man's innate guide to happiness in that it is unsatisfied and miserable when being lured hither and thither in the search for false ends. As a capacity (an innate spark, I.ii) rather than as an actuality, human gescead must be exercised and even when exercised, it is fallible, as the hierarchy of understanding in the Consolation confirms. Though a great gift (pam micle gif gesceadwisnesse, 42 (146) 8), it is not as great, as enriching and as empowering as the understanding of angels:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{It is wretched that most men do not seek what is given to them, namely reason, and that they do not seek what is above them, namely that which angels and wise men have, which is certain understanding.} \\
\text{Though we contemplate much, we have little certain knowledge without doubt; but for the angels there is no doubt at all about the things they know. Thus their certain knowledge is much better than our reason, just as our reason is much better than the perception of beasts.}
\end{align*}
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The essential cooperation of understanding and will as those elements affecting error and doubt is as notable in Alfred's analytical descriptions as in his metaphors. In Alfred's two descriptions of the tripartite sawul, the interaction between reason and will is particularly interesting in light of his overall argument. The Augustinian model of the soul in 14 (32) 1-3 (p. 199 above) highlights a closeness between the rational will (gesceadwislica willa) which loves reason (andgit) and memory (gemynd), perhaps

\[\text{31 Also Bo. 41 (145) 28 - (146) 9.}\]
because they enable man to realise his true end by showing man what he is and where he should be heading. The Augustinian psychology behind this tripartite division of the sawul appears to be of less significance than the trinitarian dimension which establishes the parallels between the sawul and God himself. Indeed memory, like anger, seems peripheral to the central interaction of gescead and willa throughout the Consolation:

Forp ic cwæð þæt sio sawul ware þreofead, forþamþe uþwitan secgæð þæt hio hæbbe þrio gecynd. An ðara gecynda is þæt heo bið wilnigende, ðæþ þæt hio bið провe. þridde þæt hio bið gesceadwis. Twa þara gecynda habbað netenu swa same swa men; ðæþ þara is wilnung, ðæþ is irisung. Ac se mon ana heæð gesceadwisnes, nalles nan oðru gesceafa; forði he heæð oferþungen ealle þa eorðlican gesceafta mid geðealhte & mid andgite. Forþam seo gesceadwisnes sceal wealdan ægðer ge þære wilnuna ge þæs yrres, forþam hio is synderlic cæðt þære saule. (Bo. 33 (81) 16-25)

I say that the soul is threefold because philosophers say that she has three natures. One of these is that she is desiring, the other is that she is irrascible, the third is that she is discriminating/understanding/rational. Beasts have two of the natures just as men do; one is desire and the other anger. But man alone has reason — not any other creature — because he has surpassed all other earthly creatures with thought and understanding. Thus reason shall rule both the will and anger because it is the most special skill of the soul.

In this much discussed passage, anger and will assume a negative dimension in that they must be ruled by reason, implying that both are somehow by definition deviant. It is not clear whether will indicates man’s lower bodily desire unconditionally or whether it pertains to free will in a wider sense. Either way, as man’s highest capacity, gescead certainly guides the will by allowing man to understand his true will for God. In the Consolation as a whole, man’s will does not appear as something which must be ruled by reason or as something which is contrary to man’s good. Rather, the will itself presents man’s innate orientation towards the Good which is God Himself. The necessary cooperation between human understanding and human will is a crucial element in Alfred’s account of human flourishing.

A more metaphorical approach to this interaction can be seen in Alfred’s adaptation of Boethius’ image of the ‘wheel of fortune’, where he develops the image of a wheel into the idea that God is the centre of stillness and permanence, the axle around which the multiplicity of mutable creation turns. The best men fare closest to the

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32 Anger does not appear to be an actively obstructing force within the prose discussions but its presence instead simply indicates the absence of failure of reason.

peaceful centre-point, whilst the worst men fare closest to the turmoil of the turning wheel. The position of average men in the middle of the spokes, halfway between centre and rim offers an interesting insight into the cause of human doubt and fallibility:

Swa bið þæm midlestan monnum; oðre hwile he smeað on his mode ymb his eorðlice lif, oðre hwile ymb ðæt godcundlice, swilce he locie mid oðre eagan to heofonum, mid oðre to eorðan. 

(Bo. 39 (129) 27-30) So it is with the man who is most central: sometimes he thinks about earthly life in his mod and at other times about the divine; it is as if he were looking with one eye at heaven and with the other at the earth.

The greatest difficulty facing the mod as the centre of authority within a composite being would appear to be that it looks towards higher and lower things – it is affected by material and spiritual needs. The more the mod fixes its sight on God and moves away from earthly concerns, however, the more it gains happiness. The image of the eyes of the mod (also 3 (8) 24; 34 (89) 12-16; 37 (122) 4-12; 42 (147) 23-5) suggests not only intellectual sight but longing and willing and the fundamental co-operation between understanding and volition is implicit.

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The image of the axle is repeated numerous times in reference to the fallibility of the mod. In one instance, however, it is applied to the sawul itself, namely directly after Alfred’s account of the Platonic soul:

Swa ðu gesceope þa saule þæt hio sceolde ealne weg hwærfian on hire selfre, swa swa eall þes rodor hwærð, oðde swa swa hwæol onhwærð, smægende ymb hire sceppeond, oðde ymbe hi selfe, oðde ymbe þas eorðlican gesceafte, þonne hio þonne ymbe hire scippend smæad, þonne bið hio ofer hire selfre; ac þonne hio ymbe hi selfe smæad, þonne bið hio on hire selfre; & under hire selfre hio bið þonne þonne hio lufað þas eorðlican þing, & þara wundrað. 

(Bo. 33 (81) 25-32) Thus you made the soul so that it should turn on itself – like the whole firmament does, or like a wheel turns – reflecting upon its Creator, upon itself, or upon earthly things. When it thinks about its Creator it is above itself; but when it thinks about itself it is in itself; and it is beneath itself when it loves and admires earthly things.

Here, the sawul is clearly a thinking agency whose orientation elevates or debases man as much as the mod does. Although the context of this passage is oriented towards the positive capacity of the sawul, its apparent involvement in human life raises the question of its relation to the mod and the spiritual nature of the mod anew. Given the coherence of Alfred’s construction of psychological workings overall, this matter becomes crucial to our understanding of his anthropological ideas.

Also Bo. 39 (130) 15-25.
There appears to be a clear preference for the mod as the inner agency of thinking and feeling within the human journey of the Old English Consolation. Although certain functions and capacities of the mod (such as speech) may be explained by the dialogue format, the identification of mod with the true inner self is pervasive throughout the argument. When the mod strays, it does not stray from man like some unruly subconscious drive. Rather, its straying indicates that man himself is straying from God. As the primary inner aspect of man, the mod is contrasted with the body and appears as his highest and truest aspect with which responsibility for action lies. Whereas the sawul is consistently that which is contrasted with the body to emphasise the contrast between the lower and higher natures of man, the mod is that which appears to carry all responsibility for the needs of both body and soul. This becomes particularly evident in the mod’s fallibility and it would appear that precisely this fallibility represents its humanness.

In Chapter 38 Alfred adapts Boethius’ account of the myth of Circe, who bewitches and transforms the bodies of men into those of animals although their core remains human. Significantly, this human core or essence is presented as the mod rather than the sawul:

*Hwæt, þa menn þe ðisum leasungum geleðdon, þeah wisston þæt hio mid þam drycræfte ne mihte þara monna mod onwendan, þeah hio þa lichoman onwendan. Eala þæt hit is micel creft þæs modes for þone lichoman. Be swylecum & be swylecum þu miht ongitan þæt se creft þæs lichoman bið on þam mode, & þætte ælcam men ma derið his modes unþæawas. Þæs modes unþæawas tioð eallne þone lichoman to him, & þæs lichoman metrumnes ne meæg þæt mod eallunga to him getion.*

(Bo. 38 (116) 26-34)

The mod, necessarily concerned with higher and lower things as the central core of composite man, appears to be the agency of all executive decisions as well as that which carries responsibility for all human action. This wide scope of responsibility does not appear to be attributed to the sawul.
The mod's relationship with faculties such as 'memory' (gemynd) and 'thought' (ingejonc) is usually expressed by the genitive or locative dative and the 'mod-as-locus' or 'mod-as-container' appears to be the treasure trove of true possessions and wealth. In a way, this conceptualisation is particularly suited to the argument structure of the Consolation, concerned as it is with the increase of natural good. Although the sawul is said to have natures rather than contents, there is no denying that both the sawul and mod appear as the core human agencies. Their relationship is never tackled in the work. The argument structure of the Consolation itself requires that the mod is moved firmly into the eternal and therefore spiritual domain, just as it requires that the eternal sawul becomes more involved in the life of man on earth. The sawul itself thus encroaches on man's traditional inner domain in possessing certain faculties and capacities which suggest generic if not individual identity (as in Alfred's tripartite divisions of the sawul). Most critics have accepted the spiritual nature of the mod even without reference to the larger argument structure. Godden, for example, observes that:

The soul for [Alfred] is both greater than the human mind or consciousness, as pre-existing it, and less, since it is also found in animals. He seems, indeed, to suggest that the soul becomes the mind, and thereby loses some of its powers, when it becomes imprisoned in the body. Alfred, however, frequently substitutes sawl for Boethius' mens or cor in reference to the inner self, and seems to treat mind (mod) and soul (sawul) as very closely related concepts ... Alfred seems to have been content with Boethius's view of the conscious rational mind as the essential inner self but wanted to emphasise its identity with the soul or immortal life spirit.35

Otten's more detailed study of the argument and the diction of the Consolation illustrates that the rendering of animus and anima by both mod and sawul shows that many functions attributed to the soul in the Latin De Consolatione Philosophiae are encompassed by the mod, which he suggests, refers to Geist and Seele alike.36 He nevertheless stresses the apparently corporeal descriptions of this semantically broad human aspect:

Mod wird gewissermaßen als ein Organ empfunden, das vom übrigen Menschen funktional selbstständig gedacht werden kann. Mod ist aber das Organ des Bewußtseins und das verantwortliche Organ des Menschen zum Guten und Bösen, der Sitz der Seelenkräfte und des Willens, und darum wendet sich die Philosophia an Mod als Erlebniseinheit.17

36 Otten, König Alfruds Boethius, pp. 165-180.
37 'To some extent, 'Mod' is perceived as an organ which can be thought of as functionally independent of the rest of the human being. However, Mod is the organ of consciousness and the organ in man responsible for good and evil, the seat of the soul's powers and of will, and it is for this reason that Philosophia turns to Mod as the totality of experience', ibid. p. 167.
Leslie Lockett has argued that the corporeal mind was literally conceived as a physical entity until after the Alfredian period.\textsuperscript{38} She finds that ‘Gregory’s triadic psychologization of sin... places the mind in a position of governance over the soul and over the body’ and argues that Gregory’s authority on this point affected Alfred’s works. The apparently intermediary position of the mod between man’s higher and lower natures, however, appears to preclude our categorizing it firmly into either domain and the overall evidence of the text suggests its closer affinity with the spiritual domain in light of its necessary longevity as one of man’s truest possessions.

In order to be man’s truest possession and the core of his very self, the mod (like the sawul) must be eternal. It must present the lasting continuum of human identity in this life and the next. In the following passage, the use of mod and sawul are highly ambiguous.

\textit{Hwæt hæfð he æt ðæm hlisan æfter ðæs lichoman gedale & ðære sawle? Hu ne witon we ðæt ealle men lichomlice sweltað, & ðeah sio sawl bið lībbende? Ac sio sawl færð swīðe friolice to hefonum, siððan hio ontiged bið, & for ðæm carcerne ðæs lichoman onlesed bið. Heo forsihð bonne eall ðæs eordiclean þing, & fægnað ðæs ðæt hio mot brucan ðæs heofonlican, siððan hio bið abrogden from ðæm eordiclean. bonne ðæt mod him selfum gewita bið Godes willan.} (Bo. 18 (45) 24-32)

What does man have from earthly repute after the parting of body and soul? Do we not know that all men die in body and yet the soul remains alive? And the soul fares very freely to heaven when it is unbound and released from the prison of the body. It then forsakes all earthly things and rejoices at that which it can enjoy in heavenly things when it is severed from the earthly. Then the mod itself is witness to God’s will.

The context of the mod’s experience of God appears to occur here in anticipation of its full knowledge in the afterlife. If, however, one questions the editorial punctuation before bonne (underlined above) and translates it as ‘when’ rather than ‘then’, the possibility of the mod’s contemplation of divine will could appear as the pre-requisite for the actual fate of the sawul in the afterlife. This, however, is hardly a clear-cut matter and the mere possibility is not enough to swing the argument in favour of either an ‘eternal mod’ or a ‘determining mod’. The following example suggests precisely the latter idea, namely that the moral activities and decisions of the mod during life determine the eternal fate of the sawul:

\textsuperscript{38} Locket, ‘Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons’, Chapter 3.
Lo, evil will and lust afflict nearly every living man's mod. Just as the bee must lose [life] when it stings something in anger, the sawul must die after wantonness unless man turns to God / good.

Ultimately, however, the good of both the mod and the sawul is at stake in the Consolation. Heofoncund Wisdom heals the afflictions of the mod and God heals the unrighteous sawul.

But I will now tell you about the medicine of my teaching which you now ask from me. It is very bitter in the mouth and it stings in the throat when you first taste it, but it softens once it is inside and is very agreeable to the insides – and is very very sweet to digest.

What is the soul's health other than righteousness or what is her deformation other than vice? Who then is a better doctor for the soul than He who created it, namely God? He honours the good and punishes the evil; He knows what every man deserves.

Salvation therefore applies to both mod and sawul, whatever the full effect of this may be. The cure of the sawul is never specified beyond descriptions of its immortal fate and here too the context is one of ultimate justice rather than gradual improvement in life. The cure of the mod, on the other hand, lies primarily in the uprooting of earthly vice and ignorance – and of the earthly misery which comes along with these faults.

Although the familiar roles of Old English mod and sawul are extended to encompass certain aspects of the Latin anima and animus, the limitations of the Old English sawul and mod are not breached beyond recognition. Both the mod and the sawul have the same capacities and faculties. The sawul has something divine in it, namely the combination of 'memory' (gemynd), 'reason' or 'understanding' (andgil), and 'will' (willa). In Chapter 33, the sawul has the three natures of 'reason' (gesceadwisnes), will (wilnung) and anger (irsung). Mod, likewise, is rational and

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39 Also, Bo. 33 (81) 6-21.
understanding, and has memory (modes...gemynd 12 (27) 4) and will (modes willan 41 (140) 30). Nevertheless, the involvement of the sawul in earthly activity is as limited as the involvement of the mod in the afterlife and thus the distinctions inherent in wider vernacular usage of mod and sawul are still retained. As Godden points out, the author of the Old English Consolation ‘stops short of equating the two terms’.⁴⁰ I would go further than this by specifying that Alfred’s presentation of the spiritual and eternal spheres of the mod and the increased agentive capacity of the sawul suggests their close relationship, but certainly not their outright assimilation. The choice of mod rather than of sawul as the speaker and primary character within the Consolation is no doubt indicative that it more easily represents the inner self and core of man on earth in accordance with the wider argument as a whole.

The larger argument of the Consolation has established that the human mod may find its way home and leave the exile of mental erring and the misery of worldly concerns by the guidance of heofoncund Wisdom. In accordance with the Latin Christian intellectual heritage, man is defined by his capacity for reason (gescead), although the quest of the Consolation is not a purely intellectual quest for Truth or Wisdom, but a journey of self-realisation and self-fulfilment which depends as much on man’s right will and his moral improvement as on his understanding of his true nature and purpose as a human being. Alfred’s distinctive characterisation of Wisdom as God and therefore as Goodness and all Perfect Virtue amplifies the essentially moral nature of the quest and the onus on human seeking emphasises man’s ultimate responsibility in self-improvement. Throughout the Consolation, the interrelation between man’s gescead and his will is invested with particular importance. Both free will and gescead distinguish man from other creatures and allow him to find his true path home by revealing to him his innate will for God. Although Alfred’s presentation of man’s innate will as his true will can conflict with the idea of the irrational will of the body as opposed to the rational will of the mod and sawul. Alfred’s definition of human freedom as the ability to know what one wants and to avoid what one does not want lends

additional force to *gescead* as man’s defining feature. Only by his understanding can man free himself from the oppression of base concerns and desires and fulfil his own God-given potential for Good, whether in the ethical life on earth or in the afterlife of the *sawul*.

By considering the way Alfred builds up his account of human nature and human purpose in reference to the progressing argument of the work, this investigation has demonstrated that the construction of interiority in the *Consolation* is an integral aspect of the larger philosophical argument presented. Alfred’s deep engagement with the complex anthropological and psychological inquiries of Boethius’ *De Consolatione* shows a clear understanding of the teleological argument of its source and maximises the investigation into true and false goods in a way which places particular emphasis on the exploration of man’s own true will and therefore his own true purpose. The *mod* is central to human prosperity and fulfilment, both as the means to God on earth and as the determinant of a path which leads to eternal reward and fulfilment. Since the *Consolation* is concerned with human life rather than with the afterlife, it is certainly no coincidence that the *mod* is the most prominent character in the *Consolation* in that it appears to reflect the essence of the human self, both in its potential and in its fallibility. In the *Consolation*, the vindication of human nature as a whole and the re-assertion of the possibility of true human power and goodness in a transient world is surely a significant consolation by any standards. The centrality of the inner self is embedded in the argument structure in that it is man’s truest and most lasting possession and the central agentive core of a composite human nature which reflects the larger metaphysical hierarchy of eternal spirit and transient materiality. The inner self increasingly shifts into the spiritual domain, and the *sawul* is itself internalised in a way which tentatively involves it in human experience and agency. Alfred’s psychology is characterised less by a rigid internal hierarchy of ruling and subservient faculties than by a subtle interrelation between the true and rightful will (which man has by his own nature) and the understanding which allows the self-realisation which enables self-fulfilment. The fundamental cooperation between
understanding and will is presented in a way which is perhaps more sensitive to the subtle diversity of inner experience, as the gaze of the *mod* and the *sawul* towards God suggests. Their gaze reflects the orientation of all inner capacities towards God, that whole-hearted striving which intensifies man's eventual experience of God, whether in contemplation or in the afterlife itself. The *Consolation*'s presentation of the inner self thus amplifies the work's larger philosophical argument by demonstrating that every aspect of man's truest being is oriented towards and can only be satisfied by the transcendent experience of God. These various elements are further amplified in the *Soliloquies*, in which Alfred takes the question of human identity and the immortality of the inner self to the logical conclusion which his metaphysical framework requires.
Chapter Eight

The Old English Soliloquies: ‘Know Thyself through God’

Despite being the most frequently edited text in the Alfrian canon, the Old English Soliloquies have received noticeably little critical attention. Although brief overviews of the work and its concerns are commonplace in general introductions to Alfrian prose, there does seem to be a surprising reluctance to embark upon close and detailed studies of the text in its own right. The Soliloquies have been described as the ‘most ambitious’ as well as the ‘most problematical’ of the Alfrian works, since ‘the very great conceptual and source difficulties inherent in the Old English text are linguistically compounded by late orthography and morphology’ in the surviving twelfth-century manuscript London, BL, Cotton Vitellius A.xv. fols. 4-59. A similar critical neglect (in relative terms at least) can be seen in the case of its source, Augustine’s Soliloquia. As an early work written in the retreat at Cassiciacum in 386, this incomplete meditation is generally described as being ‘unrepresentative’ of the thought and style of the author of the Civitate Dei and Confessions. There appears to have been limited circulation of Augustine’s text before the twelfth century and there is

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1 I use the most recent edition by Thomas A. Carnicelli, ed., King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies, (Cambridge, 1969).
4 By ‘relative’, I mean that critical interest in Augustine’s Soliloquia is sparse in comparison with the voluminous analyses of Augustine’s wider writings (also note 5 below). For the Latin text I use Augustinus, Soliloquia, ed. W. Hörmann, CSEL 89 (Vienna, 1986), pp. 1-98. I refer to the Latin text by its Latin title, reserving the Modern English title Soliloquies for references to the Old English version.
5 Augustine himself ultimately rejected many of the ideas in this early work in his later Retractions, ed. A. Mutzenbecher, CCL 57 (Turnhout, 1984). A surge of interest in the Soliloquia in the first half of the twentieth century was characterised by a tendency to seek ‘modernist’ trends in the text (particularly in reference to its articulation of the cogito ergo sum) and to see in it the clearest insight into Augustine’s own ‘personality’, as for example in Cleveland and Müller’s editions, The Soliloquies of St. Augustine, trans. Rose Elizabeth Cleveland (Boston, 1910), pp. i-xix; Selbstgespräche über Gott und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, ed. Hanspeter Müller (Zürich, 1954), pp. 15-45. More recently, however, the critical focus appears to lie on the non-rationalist aspects of the work, Catherine Conybeam, The Irrational Augustine (Oxford, 2006); Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford, 2006). For the biographical context of the Soliloquia, I refer to Peter R. L. Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London, 2000).
scant evidence for its reception in Anglo-Saxon England. Be this as it may, Alfred clearly appears to have seen in this work something of profound interest and as his reworking of the text suggests, this something is its investigation of human knowledge about the soul and about God.

The theory that the concluding attribution of the *Soliloquies* to Alfred (*haer endiaes pa cwidas pe Alfred kining alas...*, Solil. III (97) 17) suggests that the work is a compilation of sayings identifiable with William of Malmesbury’s and Asser’s reference to an *Enchiridion* or ‘handbook’, has now been largely dismissed in light of the work’s coherent internal structure and argument. Milton Gatch in particular has demonstrated not only the work’s internal consistency, but also that Alfred was remarkably sensitive to the general drift of Augustine’s argument and adapted it in light of his contemporary ideological climate. Although we have no extant Latin copy of the *Soliloquia* datable to Alfred’s period and can accordingly not attribute all alterations in argument of the *Soliloquies* to the Old English writer with certainty, the absence of an intermediary text and the presence of numerous stylistic and thematic concordances with the *Consolation* allow us to treat the distinctive argument of the Old English version as a conscious and in many ways original adaptation. Indeed in light of an analysis of the argument structure of the Old English work, I shall go further than Gatch and argue that the Anglo-Saxon author’s adaptations are not only of the ‘kind...that would be expected in the ninth century’, but appear to arise from a more distinctive focus. Indeed some of Alfred’s theological positions, such as his view of the kinds of human knowledge available in the afterlife, have been called not only ‘original’ but even ‘radical’. As I shall argue in this chapter, Alfred’s most significant deviations

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7 Whitelock considers the scholarly responses to passages in the *Soliloquia* which describe the work as sayings (*cwipas*) or blossoms (*blotsom*), in ‘The Prose of Alfred’s Reign’, pp. 71-3; Gatch provides a highly interesting survey of the critical debate as to whether the Old English preface suggests that Alfred is gathering the metaphorical ‘wood’ for his text from diverse patristic sources or whether he can be seen to choose his wood carefully in constructing his own ‘structure’ in the *Soliloquies*, ‘King Alfred’s Version’, pp. 206-9.

8 Gatch, ‘King Alfred’s Version’, pp. 201, 199.

9 For a list of the concordances between the *Consolation* and *Soliloquies*, see Carnicelli, *King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies*, pp. 29-37.

from both the argument and the conclusion of Augustine's *Soliloquia* suggest that rather than keeping with the argument as well as he can, Alfred consciously and confidently pursues his own paths of inquiry into the nature of the soul and God.\textsuperscript{11}

Augustine's argument in the *Soliloquia* moves, in the broadest terms, from an investigation of man's modes of knowing different types of things in Book I, to the nature of Truth and falseness in Book II.\textsuperscript{12} What seem to be 'circuitous paths of reasoning' (II (26) 1-2) to the 'Augustine-character' of the Latin dialogue (and at times, admittedly, to the reader), eventually emerge as distinct building blocks of the ensuing argument: Since 'Truth and knowledge are eternal' (I.ii) and since both are 'innately in the soul' (I.x), 'the soul itself must be eternal' (II.xx).\textsuperscript{13} The arguments surrounding this basic thread of course present the main substance of the discourse in which Augustine explores the nature of the sciences (I.iv, II.iii-viii), man's modes of knowing (I.ii-iii), and the moral conditions which enable or impede understanding (I.vii-ix). As I shall illustrate in this chapter, Alfred adapts the central argument of the *Soliloquia* and selectively embraces and develops Augustine's various psychological discussions in a way that highlights his fundamental concern with the eternal nature of the soul and, most interestingly, with the eternal nature of the individual self.

At the very outset of the *Soliloquies*, Alfred specifies that the central concern of the dialogue is 'the nature of his own self' and in particular 'whether his *sawul* and *mod* are eternal': *hwæt he sylf wære, hwæper hys mod and hys sawel deadlic were and gewitendlice, þe heo were alibbendu and ecu* (Solil. I (48) 19 – (49) 2). This is the only

\textsuperscript{11} I thus disagree with Gatch on this point, see 'Alfred's Version', pp. 214-6, 17.

\textsuperscript{12} Since Augustine's thought in the *Soliloquia* is deeply influenced by the Neoplatonic concept of Forms and Ideas united in the One (theologically construed as the One true God), I capitalise Truth, Goodness and Wisdom in this discussion when indicating their conceptual identification with the One. (To capitalise falsehood would be to give it single existence, which, according to Augustine's ideas about theodicy, it does not have.) Since this Neoplatonic sense of Truth is not always evident in all of Alfred's references, I do not capitalise instances which do not identify truth or wisdom with God Himself.

\textsuperscript{13} This argument summary is of course simplified. The other basic stages of Augustine's argument for the eternal nature of the soul are 1. Since Truth is Being, Truth does not perish and so Truth is eternal (I.xii) 2. What is inextricably and intrinsically related to another thing remains as long as the other thing remains in existence. (II. v) 3. Mathematics and Logic are true. (II.vi) 4. Mathematics and Logic are Reason. (II. vii) 5. Reason is inextricable from (i.e. an essential attribute of) the soul. (II.viii) 6. Hence, since the soul is inextricably linked with Truth, it is equally eternal (II.xi). Since Alfred does not follow this line of reasoning, I shall not discuss the difficulties and implications of Augustine's wider arguments unless immediately relevant.
instance in Old English literature in which the immortality of the *mod* is directly addressed and in which the close relation between the *mod* and *sawul* emerges as a central concern.\(^{14}\) Whether in style, in diction or in the concerns which it embraces, the *Soliloquies* is of course deeply informed by the Latin Christian tradition as represented by the writings of Augustine of Hippo and Pope Gregory I. Although Alfred’s presentation of the inner self moves increasingly towards the spiritual and eternal aspect of composite man in his definition of the *mod* as an aspect of the *sawul* (*Solil. II* (65) 1-8), he does not depart entirely from modes of expression or conceptualisation of the inner aspects which are familiar from the poetic corpus (such as metaphorical accounts of the *mod* as container and treasure trove of valuable inner thoughts and experiences). In particular the application of vernacular vocabulary and imagery, conventional as well as innovative, allows us to trace the author’s attempt to delineate and define concepts and workings of an inner self and, as I shall argue, suggests an original attempt to explore human nature and the inner self in the context of the available frameworks of beliefs.

In this final chapter, then, I shall explore Alfred’s treatment of the soul and inner self in the context of the progressing argument of the *Soliloquies*. Since it is not possible to provide a full account and commentary of all of Alfred’s departures from Augustine’s argument in the space available here, I focus on those alterations which, taken together, underline an overall continuity and coherence of argument. In 8.1, I illustrate how Alfred’s distinctive announcement of subject matter, namely his interest in the eternal nature of *sawul, mod* and *sylf*, guides his argument as a whole and significantly informs his major alterations. Alfred’s first book establishes the *mod* as an inherent aspect of the eternal *sawul*, and his second book departs from the subject matter of the Latin *Soliloquia* in order to focus almost exclusively on the immortality of these human aspects. Alfred’s addition of an original third book, which deals with the experience and nature of the *sawul* in the afterlife, provides the logical conclusion to his foregoing argument. Having outlined the thematic continuity of the work, I go on to consider

\(^{14}\) The only comparable instance is in Ælfric’s *Christmas Homily*, where the immortality of the *mod* is implicit in its assimilation with the eternal *sawul*, as discussed in Chapter Three above.
Alfred’s presentation and definition of the self in more detail, initially in reference to the self during human life, and subsequently in reference to the self as it continues and develops in the afterlife. In 8.2 I consider Alfred’s presentation of the mod and its various capacities and faculties in life. Since his various discussions suggest a focus not so much on the intellectual aspects of human knowledge as on the wider moral dimensions of human enlightenment, I consider his distinctive conception of man’s inner constitution in more detail in 8.3. The idea that not only the sawul and the mod, but also the various powers, virtues and possessions of the mod are immortal, suggests a view of human identity and selfhood which depends on the fundamental continuity of man’s generic faculties as well as the particular characteristics, dispositions and experiences which define the individual in the afterlife. In 8.4, I then consider the way in which Alfred’s account of the human self in the afterlife concludes his larger inquiry in a logical way which does not shrink away from potentially unorthodox theological stances. Overall, the logical and thematic integrity of Alfred’s argument in the Soliloquies and his remarkably systematic engagement with complex questions about human and personal identity are irreconcilable with the idea that Alfred amalgamates prevalent ideas from divergent ‘traditions’ in a random way. As the following analysis illustrates, Alfred’s mode of thought and exposition in the Soliloquies is not only innovative but definitively original.

8.1 Exploring the Human Self:
The Argument Structure of the Old English Soliloquies

As in the Consolation, the dialogue of the Soliloquies is an inner dialogue in which Gesceadwisnes (rather than Wisdom) answers the contemplations and doubts (hys modis smeagunga and tweounga) of the mod of Augustinus (Solil. Pref. (48) 13-7). In the opening lines of the text itself, Alfred immediately specifies his particular interest in the nature of the human self:

15 Again, I refer to the Old English characters by their names in the Old English text (i.e. Augustinus) in order to differentiate them from the Latin characters (i.e. the Latin Augustine-character) and from the actual author Augustine of Hippo.
Volventi mihi multa ac varia mecum diu, ac per multos dies sedulo quaerenti memetipsum ac bonum meum, quidve mali evitandum esset...

(Aug Sol. I.i.1 (1) 1-3)

For many days I had been debating within myself many and diverse things, seeking constantly, and with anxiety, to find out my real self, my best good, and the evil to be avoided...

Then he said, his mod often travelled in questioning and contemplating diverse and seldom known things, and most greatly of all concerning himself: what he himself was, whether his mod and his sawel were mortal and transient, or whether they were ever-living and eternal, and also about his good: what it was and which it was, and which good were best for him to do and which evil best [for him] to avoid.

Whereas the Augustine-character of the Latin *Soliloquia* introduces the question of his own true nature relatively briefly in the context of what good is to be sought and what evil is to be avoided, Alfred amplifies his question about the nature of man’s self (sylf) specifically in relation to the immortality of the sawul and mod. The implication is that mod and sawul are the fundamental elements of the human self, although in precisely what capacity remains unclear. Carnicelli, for example, notes that ‘the use of the [singular] verb were here suggests that mod and sawul ‘were felt as exact synonyms, and hence only a single subject’, although he acknowledges ‘the possibility that were represents [the plural verb] weren with the loss of -n’. As I shall argue in reference to a number of crucial passages in the text. Alfred does not simply assimilate mod and sawul, but defines their relationship in a way that emphasises their distinctive semantic parameters and rules out their synonymy. The opening suggestion that Alfred sees the mod and sawul as integral to Alfred’s definition of the human self and that his particular focus on their immortality is an essential aspect of his investigation into human and personal identity is fully borne out in the text as a whole. As I shall illustrate in this first part of the discussion, Alfred’s interest in the immortality of the sawul and mod, as well as the extent and longevity of its knowledge and consciousness (gewit II (91) 24) shapes the distinctive development of the larger argument of the Old English *Soliloquies.*


17 Carnicelli, *King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies,* p. 49 note 18.
After introducing the subject and personae of the inquiry, Alfred, like Augustine, presents a lengthy opening prayer (Aug. Sol. I.i.2-6; Solil. I (50) 10 – (56) 9) which acts as a thematic introduction and which presents – in a relatively concise form – the basic theological and metaphysical tenets which frame the subsequent arguments. In essence this invocation identifies God as the Truth, Wisdom, Life, Blessedness, Good and Beauty by which all things are true, wise, alive, blessed, good and beautiful (I.3), as the One True Perfect Substance and Principle on which all life depends (I.i.4), and as the rightful Ruler (I.i.5) Whose eternal laws guide all creation (I.i.4) in that all originates from and strives towards Him (I.i.4). Although Alfred renders the Latin prayer closely, he makes Augustine’s Christian connotations explicit by additional explanations and clarifications. Thus Alfred amplifies the moral connotations of God’s pledge and makes’ explicit references to the Holy Trinity when Augustine refers to the Unity of the One Perfect Principle (italics added for emphasis):

Deus pater veritatis, pater sapientiae, pater verae summaeque vitae, pater beatitudinis, pater boni et pulchri, pater intellegibilis lucis, pater evigilationis atque inluminationis nostrae, pater pignoris quo admonemur redire ad te. (Aug. Sol I.2 (5) 2-5)

I call to You, Lord, because You are the Father of Truthfastness, and of Wisdom, and of true Love, and of the Highest Life, and of the Highest of Joys, and of the highest Good, and of the highest Brightness, and of the Intelligible Light; You Who are the Father of the Son Who woke us and still rouses us from the sleep of our sins, and warns us to come to You.

In whatever I say do Thou come to my help, O Thou one God, one true Eternal Substance, where is no discord, no confusion, no change, no want, no death: where is all harmony, all illumination, all steadfastness, all abundance, all life: where nothing is lacking and nothing redundant; where Begetter and Begotten are one.

To suggest that Alfred eliminates the ‘metaphysical’ concerns of the prayer in favour of a ‘concrete and localised view of man’s relationship with God’ is to simplify the adaptation at hand. Gatch Alfred’s Version, p. 203. Augustine’s prayer, as Endter puts it, ‘is not logical in structure, but progresses by associative imagery which is inspired by scriptural passages, namely Job. 2:3; 4:7; 5:8 and Gal. 8:2.’ König Alfreeds des Großen Bearbeitung der Soliloquien des Augustins, ed. William Endter, Bibliothek der angelsächsischen Prosa 11 (Darmstadt, 1922; repr. 1964), p. xvi.
butan deade. þu þe simle swa wunast on þere hehstan beornnessse, and on þere hehstan gestaðóinesse, on þere hehstan anmodnesse, and on þere hehstan gerhyhte. Forðám þe nanes godest nis wana, ac þu simle wunast swa ful ælces goodes on ecnesse. þu eart fæder and sunu and se halgan gast. (Solil. I (53) 1-7)

Augustine’s Neoplatonic account of universal order and the pervasive rule of the Good in a universe in which all creatures strive towards the Good, their Origin and End (Aug Sol. I.i.2), parallels Boethius’ cosmology, and Alfred’s characterisation of this metaphysics is notably close to descriptions which we find in the Consolation.19 Whereas all creatures are ‘bridled with the bridle of God’s commandments’ (Solil. I (54) 1-3), man alone has freedom:

...cuius legibus arbitrium animae liberum est bonisque praemia et malis poenae fixis per omnia necessitatibus distributae sunt. Deus, a quo manant usque ad nos omnia bona, a quo coercentur usque a nobis omnia mala. (Aug. Sol. I.i.4 (8) 12-6)

Se god sealde fridom manna saulum, þæt hy moston don swa good swa yfel, swæðer hy woldon, and gehet good eadlean ðam weldondum, and yfel ðam yfeldedum. (Solil. I (54) 3-7)20

As in the Consolation, Alfred amplifies the importance of reason for such freedom in man’s ability to discriminate between good and evil in a way that emphasises the importance of self-understanding. The argument directly recalls the argument against worldly wealth and prosperity (woruldwela) which we encountered in the Consolation:

Deus, a quo admonemur ut vigilemus. Deus, per quem a malis bona separamus. Deus, per quem mala fugimus et bona sequimur. Deus, per quem non cedimus adversitatiabus. Deus, per quem bene servimus et bene dominamur. Deus, per quem discimus aliena esse quae alicuiando nostra, et nostra esse, quae alicuiando aliena putabamus. Deus, per quem malorum escis atque inlecebris non haeremus. Deus, per quem nos res minutae non minuant. Deus, per quem melius nostrum deteriori subiectum non est. (Aug. Sol. I.i.3 (6) 9-17)

God, by whom we are warned to watch: God, through whom we discriminate good things from evil things: God, through whom we flee from evil and follow after good: God, through whom we yield not to adversity: God, through whom we both serve well and rule well: God, through whom we discern that certain things we had deemed essential to ourselves are truly foreign to us, while those we had deemed foreign to us are essential: God, through whom we are not held fast by the baits and seductions of the wicked: God, through whom the decrease of our possessions does not diminish us: God, through whom our better part is not subject to our worse.

Drihten, þu þe us manast þæt we wacian, ðu us sealdest gesceadwisnesse þæt we magon tosedan and tosceadan good and yfel, and fleon þad yfel. ...  

Lord, You Who remind us to be watchful, You have given us ‘reason / discrimination’ so that we may discern and tell apart good and evil and flee that evil. ...

19 In particular the description of the courses of sun and moon in the Solil. 50.10 and Bo. 49.20-1.

20 Compare Bo. 41 (142) 8-10, 11-16.
You have taught us well to understand that which we previously thought was our own, was [actually] foreign and transient to us, namely worldly wealth, and You have also taught that we previously assumed to be foreign to us, is [in truth] our own, namely the heavenly realm which we had forsaken. You Who have taught us that we [should] do nothing forbidden, and have also taught us not to despair, though our powers wane. You Who have taught us to place our body in subservience to our *mod*.

The parallels with the argument of the *Consolation* hardly need stressing here. Alfred’s expanded references emphasise the superiority of the *mod* over the body in reference to reason, thought and man’s own will.

The central question of self-knowledge, however, is itself a fundamental element of Augustine’s argument. Since the Lord made man in his own image, man can understand the truth of God’s omniscient rule if he understands himself (*Aug Sol*. I.i.5; *Solil*. I (54) 8-11). The entire prayer is indeed summarised as the desire to know God and the soul (*Aug Sol*. I.ii.1; *Solil*. I (56) 2-3). Besides amplifications which predict Alfred’s particular interest in the afterlife (of the *sawul* (*Solil*. I (52) 21-4) and even in reference to bodily resurrection (*Solil*. I (53) 25-7), the prayer itself largely predicts the subject matter of the coming inquiry in much the same way that Augustine’s prayer does. Since the ensuing dialogue is to confirm by rational inquiry those principles of faith expressed in the opening prayer, the idea that God is the True Principle which cannot be known by the senses (*Aug Sol*. I.i.1; *Solil*. I (52) 8-11) announces the coming investigation into the ways in which men may know immaterial and material things (*Aug Sol*. I.iii-vii; *Solil*. I (64-76). The idea that man seeks God and has only the will without knowing the way (*Aug Sol*. I.i.5; *Solil*. I (52) 25-30) foreshadows Augustine’s account of divine illumination (*Aug Sol*. I.viii). The idea that man must be purified and prepared or healed (*Aug Sol*. I.i.6; *Solil*. I (54) 19-25) anticipates the coming discussion about the moral state which impedes man’s knowledge of himself, his soul and God (*Aug Sol*. I.ix-xv; *Solil*. I (85-92). The opening appeal to God, as the Source, Foundation and Aid to all knowledge, emerges as fundamental to the inquiry itself as much as it predicts the conclusion that man, in his composite and fallible state, cannot find God fully, either intellectually or morally without His aid. Alfred’s most significant
alterations in the *Consolation*, however, are already predicted by his own characterisation of the metaphysical order in which God creates, sustains and draws men towards him less by emanation than by Grace: *Du be œart forgysfende ... þu mycela gyfta us sealdest...* (Solil. I (51) 22).

The first stage of the argument in Book I sets out to establish whether man truly desires to know God and the soul (*Aug Sol. I.i-vii; Solil. I (55-76)*) and how he can come to know these (*Aug Sol. I.viii-xix; Solil. I (76-84]*) . In this first and longest book of the *Soliloquies*, Alfred largely follows Augustine's arguments that inner sight is the only way man can come to know immaterial things such as the soul and God (*Aug Sol. I.viii-xix; Solil. I (76-84]*) and that man's moral state significantly affects his ability to know (*Aug Sol. I.viii-xix; Solil. I (76-84]*) . Besides numerous alterations which explain Augustine's arguments in reference to Anglo-Saxon customs, Alfred omits two lengthy discussions about the nature of the sciences (*Aug Sol. I.ix*) and inserts two detailed accounts of man's moral and intellectual virtues (*Solil. I (79-80]*) in their place (discussed fully below in 8.2).21 Without departing from Augustine's fundamental argument, these alterations keep the discussion focused firmly on the nature of man's inner life and thus on the immediate concerns which Alfred announced at the outset of his inquiry. The most significant departure from Book I of the *Soliloquia* comes at the very end of Alfred's first book and this conclusion, as I shall illustrate here, prepares for his ultimate departure from Augustine's argument in Books II and III.

The argument in question comes almost as an addendum to the preceding inquiry which has established that the inner, rather than the outer senses are central to understanding God (*Solil. I (79]*) , but that the moral condition of the Augustine-character impedes his full understanding.22 Whereas the Latin Augustine-character requests a more positive note for ending the first book, the Old English *Augustinus* (by

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21 More comprehensive discussions of these minor alterations are provided by Gatch, 'King Alfred's Version', pp. 21-39; Waterhouse, 'Tone in Alfred's Version', pp. 50-79.
22 Alfred leaves out the reference to the Augustine-character's own perverse lusts (*Aug Sol. II.xv*) and so the Old English character's request to know about the soul is less directly associated with preceding disappointments about his personal inability to gain understanding. Greenfield and Calder suggest that Alfred leaves these references out due to his own sense of decorum. *A New Critical History of Old English Literature*, p. 43.
now ‘ic’) seems perturbed by the ‘excessive detours’ of the preceding argument and directs the matter back to the ‘eternal nature of the sawul’ (Solil. I (80) 4-6). In response to the Latin Augustine-character’s pleas, Ratio argues that to understand God, man must first understand what Truth is and bids him to contemplate an argument in preparation for the inquiry into Truth and perception in Book II. For the sake of brevity, I shall summarize this argument as a syllogism:

A. Whatever is, is of necessity somewhere
B. Truth is and thus must be somewhere
C. Truth is not a body in space
D. Truth is not in mortal things
E. Since Truth is (though not in C or D), there must be immortal things
BUT
F.1. Nothing is true in which Truth is not
F.2. Everything which is not true is false
THEREFORE
G. Nothing can be rightly said to be except the immortal

Alfred follows this argument, aligning Truth with Purity and all forms of Virtue until stage C, and subsequently appears to consider D out of the context of the argument (Solil. I (81) 26-31). Unfortunately, the answer to the question of whether the perfect Forms of Wisdom and Virtue are spiritual or material (hweđer hi lichamlice sien pe gastlice) is missing in the extant manuscript and due to Alfred’s significant departure from the Soliloquia, editors have been reluctant to reconstruct the missing argument.23 Carnicelli, for example, notes that this ‘abrupt shift in the topic of discussion indicates an apparent gap in the MS. There is, however, virtually no basis for reconstruction’.24 I suggest, however, that Alfred’s conclusion after the lacunae can be understood without reference to the missing text:

eall ðat byd soð, ðætte byd ða hwile ðe hit byd. 
Ac ðæt þu sóðfestnes hæst, þæt ys god; he was a, and a byd, undeadadlic and æce. Se god hædð 
ealle créftas on hym gesunde and ful medeme. 
(Solil. I (82) 12-14)

All that is true is so while it is. But what you call Truthfastness, that is God; He always was and always will be immortal and eternal. God has all virtues in Himself wholly and perfectly.

This conclusion that Truth, Wisdom and Goodness are eternal and immaterial, establishes (or perhaps recapitulates) the identification of Truth, Goodness and all abstract principles with God, in much the same way as in the Consolation (Chapter Seven above) and in the opening prayer. The apparently ‘abrupt shift’ from a discussion

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24 Carnicelli, King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies, p. 82, note 3.
of first Principles and lower forms to human and divine virtues, is less perplexing when viewed in reference to the shared lines of reasoning in the *Soliloquies* and the *Consolation.* This identification substantiates the eternal, perfect and immaterial nature of Truth in line with Neoplatonic metaphysics and supplies the most probable solution to the problem of how Alfred conceived of the relationship between Truth and Goodness and men’s possession of these attributes in a more imperfect form, namely by Grace, as the *Soliloquies* go on to state:

Se haeft gesceapena twa æca gesceafra, þæt sint engelas and manna sauwele, þam he sealde sumne дал ëcra gyfa, swilcra swilce nu wisdom is, and rihtwisnes, and ðære manega þe us lang ðince to rimanne: engelum he gef be heora andefna, and manna saulum he gyfð, æcere be hyre andefne, swilca gyfa. Ða swilcan gifra hi ne þurfon nætre forletan, forðam heo beoð æca; and he gyfð eac mannum manega and mislicum gooda gifra on þissu wurlda, þeah hi æca ne sien. Hi beoð þeah stælwyrða þa hwile þe we on þisse wurlde beoð. Hweðer ðu git ongyte þæt sawla beoð undeadlice?

*(Solil. I (82) 14-22)*

He has created two immortal creatures, these are angels and the souls of men, to whom He has given some part of eternal gifts, such as wisdom and righteousness and many others which it will take us a long time to list; to angels he gives such gifts according to their share, and to men’s souls he gives such gifts according to their share. Such gifts they need never lose, because they are eternal; and He gives to men many more diverse good gifts in this world, although those are not eternal. They are nevertheless useful while we are in this world. Have you understood yet that souls are immortal?

This argument substitutes Augustine’s reference to emanation from the perfect Forms to lower forms of virtue with a simpler idea of ‘giving’, in a way which recalls Alfred’s characterisation of the metaphysical order in the opening prayer (*Solil. I (51) 22, above*). Precisely this framework of Grace informs Alfred’s anthropological ideas in the *Consolation* and in the *Soliloquies*. Alfred also employs the same argument relating to man’s truest possessions as the most lasting gifts of God, an argument which is pivotal to his investigation into the nature of man’s true self. At the level of the immediate argument, however, Alfred’s distinctive conclusion prepares directly for his investigation into the eternal nature of the *sawul*. Whereas the *Ratio* of the Latin text presents an argument in preparation for the discussion of perception and Truth in Book II, Alfred uses the distinction between ‘Truth’ and ‘the true’ to reach a very different (and in many ways more satisfying) conclusion to the first book and introduces the subject matter of his own second book.

In comparison with the 1200 lines of Book I, the 225 lines of Book II and the 150 lines of the incomplete third book of the *Soliloquies* are strikingly short. In Book II

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25 *ibid.*, p. 82, note 3.
at least, the extant manuscript shows little suggestion of a lacuna either in the continuity of argument or in the announced subject matter, although Book III is unfortunately significantly corrupted. 26 In essence, the entire second book of the Soliloquies is wholly oriented towards establishing the immortality of the soul by a variety of arguments, both in appeals to scripture and in more ‘logical’ arguments which base themselves on preceding metaphysical considerations, whilst Alfred’s original third book considers the nature of the knowledge possessed by the sawul and mod in the afterlife. The continuity of Alfred’s argument as a whole is striking when we consider the systematic nature of his alterations.

Book II, like Book I, opens with a brief prayer which facilitates a return to the original subject matter: þæt ic mage...ōngitan...me selfne (Solil. II (84) 4-5). Like the Ratio of the Latin text, Gescead (by now Heo) initially tackles the question of self-knowledge by asking Augustinus whether he knows he exists and lives and whether he wants to do so forever (Solil. II (84) 6-15). 27 Alfred largely follows Augustine in arguing that he wants to be in order to live in order to know:

Da cwæð heo: Nu ic gehyre þæt þu lufast æall þæt ðu lufast for þam þrim þingum, and ic ongyte æac hwilce þara þreora þinga þu swiðost lufast. ðu lufast þæt þæt þu si, forðam þu woldest libban, and forðam þu woldest libban þe þu woldest witan. þi ic ongyte þæt ðu lufast þone wisdom ofer æalle ðeore þing; þæt, me ðingð, seo ðin hehsta good and æac þin ged.  
Da cwæð ic: söð þu me seargent. Hwæt is se hehsta wydson æalles buton þæt hehste good? Óðc heoht is þæt hehste good buton þæt ælc man on þisse wurde swa miclum lufið god swa he wisdom lufið? Sam he hine miclum lufige, sam he hine lyttum lufige, sam he hine myddlinga lufige, be þam ðæle he lufið god þe he wisdom lufið.  

(Solil. II (84) 31- (85) 7)  
Then she said: Now I hear that you love all that you love because of three things, and I also understand which of these three things you love the most. You love to exist because you want to live and you want to live because you want to know. From this I understand that you love Wisdom above all other things – that, it seems to me, is your highest Good and also your God. Then I said: You speak the truth to me. What is the highest Wisdom except the highest Good? Or what is the highest Good other than that every man in this world loves Good as much as he loves Wisdom? Whether he loves This greatly or loves This less or loves This moderately, he loves Good in the same amount as he loves Wisdom.

Having again referred to the common identity of Wisdom and Good, and having therefore integrated the moral dimension of his desire with the intellectual striving for Wisdom, Alfred joins Augustine in asking whether he wants to live forever in order to know forever or whether life and knowledge end in death (Solil. II (85) 13-4). Whereas Augustine begins his lengthy investigation into the nature of perception and Truth.

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26 As discussed in 8.4 below.
27 Again, I consider the details of Alfred’s alterations in more detail in 8.4 below.
however, Gescead answers the question of the Old English *Augustinus* in reference to
the metaphysical framework which he established in the prayer, in the conclusion of
Book I and now in his renewed identification of Wisdom and Goodness as the unified
End of the human will.

ymbe hwæt twæost þu nu? Hu nu ne were þu ær geæafa þæt god were æce and ælmiðhīt, and hæfde
twa gesceadwissa and æcca gesceafæa gesceaepena swa swa we ær sædon, þæt sint engelas and manna saula, ðám he hæfð forgien æcca gyfæ? Da gyfæ hi ne ðurfon næfre alætan. Gyf ðu nu þis gemynst and þīses gelifeast, ðonne wast ðu buton twoen þæt þu æart and simle bist and simle lufast and simle hwæthwugu wast, þeah ðu æall nyte þæt ðu witan woldest. *(Solil. II (85) 16-22)*

What are you in doubt about now? Did you not already agree that God is eternal and almighty
and created two rational and eternal creatures, as
we said before: these are angels and men’s souls,
whom He has given eternal gifts? They need
never lose these gifts. If you now remember and
believe this, then you know without doubt that
you are and always will be and will always love
and will always know something, although you
do not know all that you want to.

Although we already heard in the opening prayer that God gives gifts to men so that
they do not perish *(Solil. I (51) 23-4)*, the argument that since man never gives up these
gifts he will never stop existing, living and knowing does not convince *Augustinus* *(ic)*,
who wants to know rather than believe *(Solil. II (86) 22-3)*. Gescead initially points out
the folly of this desire in reference to the argument established in Book I, namely that
with the exception of the holy fathers (who do not doubt and whose words must be
believed *(Solil. II (87) 8-16)*) men cannot know in their fallible state:

*da cwæð heo: ic wundrige hwi ðu swa swiðe georne and swa gewislice þæt to witanne, þætte næfre nan
man of ðisse carcerne þīses andweardan lyfes swa swa
gewislice witan ne myhte swa ðu ðu witan ... ne
mæg næfre nan ongitan, ædæmæ þæo sawl byð wyð
þæm lychaman gedeled, æall þæt he witan wolde; ne
furðum ðonne giet er domes dæge, swa sweotole
swa he wolde.* *(Solil. II (86) 24 - (87) 7)*

Then she said: I marvel why you want to know so
very eagerly and for certain what no man in the
prison of this present life can know as certainly as
you want [to know] ... no man may ever
understand all that he wants to before the soul is
parted from the body, nor as clearly as he wants to
know, before Doomsday.

Since man can never know more clearly than he can believe in life, faith
becomes elevated above knowledge. Alfred, however, does not simply enforce the
authority of scripture, but provides further examples which underpin the necessity for
having faith in the eternal nature of the *sawul* by considering the nature of rightful
authority itself *(Solil. II (87) 18 - (89) 18)*. Ultimately man must believe his *gescead* as
well as Christ:

*Nis hyt nan tweeþ þæt sawla beó undeadlice. gelig*  
þinre agenre gesceadwisnesse, and gelig Criste,  
There is no doubt that souls are immortal. Believe your own reason, and believe Christ, the Son of

28 Ironically, it is in this departure from Augustine’s second book that we find distinctly *Augustimian*
arguments about the role of faith and reason in discerning correct authority. *(Solil. II (88) 1-8).*
God, and believe all his saints, because they were very truthful witnesses. and believe your own soul which tells you all the while through its reason that it is in you. It also says that it is eternal. because it wants these eternal things.

Although *Augustinus* is already ashamed about his previous doubt (*Solil. II* (89) 22), *Gescead* nevertheless presents this final argument for the eternal nature of the *sawul* and it is by far the strongest argument when considered in the context of the metaphysical framework which Alfred has built up over the course of the *Soliloquies*:

There is no creature so foolish that it wants to seek something which it cannot find. or desire that which it cannot possess. Forsake now this unrightful doubt; it is clear enough that you are immortal and will always be.

In contrast with Augustine’s argument that the soul is eternal because there is something eternal (i.e. truth) innately in it, Alfred argues for the eternal nature of the *sawul* by considering what it desires – the end towards which it is oriented. It is precisely in the striving which he has displayed in the dialogue itself, that *Augustinus* reveals the will to know about things (*Solil. II* (89-91) ) and, as we heard in the opening prayer, this will is all that man has before *gescead* enables him to discover the path to God. In its departures from the argument of the Latin *Soliloquia*, the Old English *Soliloquies* therefore shows its closest affinities with the arguments of the *Consolation*. In Book III, however, we see how Alfred takes a number of the questions which were raised in the *Consolation* to their full conclusion.

At the end of Book II, Alfred established that not only his *sawul*, but also his *mod*, *gesceadwisnes* and all the good gifts and virtues bestowed on him by God are eternal and raises the subject matter of the third book, namely whether knowledge increases or decreases in the afterlife:

Now I hear that my soul is eternal and will always live. and all that my *mod* and my ‘reason’ gathered in good ‘virtues’ – this they shall always keep.

And I also hear that my ‘knowledge’ is eternal. But I would like to know yet about the ‘knowledge’ about which I asked before. [namely] whether it waxes or wanes after the parting of body and soul; whether it will stay still in the same in that place as it did before death in this world or will at times grow and at other times fade.
Alfred's arguments for the continuity and immortality of the human self in Book II provide the springboard for his consideration of what we are and what we experience and know in the afterlife, which is the sole subject of Book III.

In a sense, Book III presents the conclusion to all outstanding matters in the *Soliloquia*. To begin with, it considers the continuity of knowledge, which was the main subject of Book I. Book III also confirms the promise that man will know fully once he sees God in the afterlife. He will know the eternal nature of his soul as much as he will know God, in a literal and allegorical sense. Moreover, since the quest has been as much a moral as an intellectual one, the just rewards for a life of virtue are bestowed in full upon the one who earned them, in the joy of the heavenly afterlife (or of course the reverse in hell). Central to this vision of the afterlife is the continuity of the human self— that truest and most lasting possession of man. Indeed the parts of Book III which have survived give a vivid insight into the afterlife which goes beyond the conventional apocalyptic visions of the vernacular homiletic and poetic texts. In the afterlife, man's *sawul* and his *mod*, as well as his knowledge (*gewit*) and goodness increase in the direct presence of God. Man comes to know full Truth, can foresee the future of men on earth, and can actively intercede in their well-being, thus maintaining a continuity not only of the individual self but also of the heavenly and earthly community itself. As Godden has illustrated, the view of man's increased and continued knowledge in the afterlife significantly departs from orthodoxy, but the increase of full knowledge and joy in finding and knowing God literally in the afterlife is the logical conclusion of Alfred's preceding arguments.29 In order to consider the details of the self as Alfred conceives of it in the afterlife, however, it is necessary to establish first how Alfred defines the self in human life on earth. Given the integral continuity of Alfred's inquiry, the remaining discussions of this chapter deal with Alfred's analytical accounts of man's inner and spiritual workings in reference to Book I, and with the continuity of this self in reference to Books II and III of the *Soliloquies*.

The first book of the Old English *Soliloquies* makes up over two thirds of the entire work and a number of the adaptations which it makes to the Latin *Soliloquia* provide a particularly detailed insight into Alfred’s conception of the inner self. In many aspects, Alfred is clearly deeply informed by Augustine’s psychological ideas and Alfred’s discussions of the processes of knowledge and the importance of man’s moral condition for human understanding are entirely in line with the argument of the *Soliloquia*. Most notably, Alfred explicitly identifies the *mod* as an aspect of the eternal *sawul* (an exceptional definition in Old English literature) and he appears to be deeply influenced by the intellectual tradition which sees ‘reason’ as a defining element of man. In transferring the Latin *Ratio*-character to *Gescead* in the *Soliloquies* (like the *Consolation* which alternates *Wisdom* and *Gescead as Boetius’* internal guide), Alfred elevates *gescead* at a narrative level as much as he elevates it in the psychological analyses of the argument itself. Although *Gescead* is the essential guide who leads *Augustinus* (often along tortuous paths) towards Truth, the *gescead* of the *mod* does not reflect the inherently rationalistic and intellectual connotations of the Latin *ratio*. As I shall argue here, Alfred’s distinctive presentation of *gescead* as a virtue oriented towards the discrimination of good and evil highlights a number of significant differences between his underlying conceptualisation of the inner self and that which informs Augustine’s *Soliloquia*. A closer look at the passages in which Alfred’s focus on the moral dimension of human enlightenment shapes the development of his argument reveals his distinctive conceptualisation of inner workings and of the centrality of the inner self in human and personal identity.

In adapting Augustine’s discussion of the various modes of ‘knowing’ in Book I, Alfred follows the Latin argument that those things which *Augustinus* seeks to know, namely the soul and God, cannot be known in the way that material things can be known by the senses. The first stage of this argument distinguishes between two modes and types of knowing, namely that of the outer senses (*pam uttran gewitte, pam uttran andgytte*) and that of the inner senses (*pam innran gewitte, inran andgytte, ingethance*).
Alfred's detailed descriptions of these different modes of 'taking things in' (ongitan) indicates that he is introducing an essentially unfamiliar way of thinking about how men gain understanding. The necessity for Alfred to specify the various physical sensory organs (as he also does in the opening prayer I (51) 10-12) under the heading lichamlice ongitan, for example, suggests that he not only needs to explain the 'inner' faculties of cognisance, but also the 'outer' faculties of perception.

Then she said: it seems to me now that you do not trust the outer senses, neither the eyes nor the ears, nor the [sense of] smell, nor the [sense of] taste, nor touch; indeed you cannot understand through any of those as clearly as you want to, unless you understand it in your '(inner-)thought' by your 'reason'.

In contrast to the much shorter Latin statement (R: Respuis igitur in hac causa omne testimonium sensuum? A: Prorsus respuo. Aug Sol.18.34-5), Alfred does not entirely reject the testimony of the senses, but instead highlights the continuum of the outer and inner in the processes of perception and understanding.

In order to illustrate that the outer senses can provide the rudimentary insight which is sometimes necessary for understanding higher truths, Augustine turns to the classic examples of the sphere and line as instances of geometric truths, apprehensible only by the intellect (Lat. intellectus, OE inran andgytte). Alfred develops the images of the 'ball' and 'line' in reference to the diameters and measurements which allow astrological inferences about the constellations of the stars (Solil.1 (60) 15 - (61) 12), but his point is that of Augustine, namely that the outer senses can facilitate deeper contemplation.

Then she said: it seems to me now that you do not trust the outer senses, neither the eyes nor the ears, nor the [sense of] smell, nor the [sense of] taste, nor touch; indeed you cannot understand through any of those as clearly as you want to, unless you understand it in your '(inner-)thought' by your 'reason'.

In this matter my experience with the senses has been as with a ship: for when they had carried me where I was going, and I had dismissed them, and was as if placed on dry land, and had begun to turn these matters over in thought, I was, for a long time, unsteady of foot. Wherefore it seems to me that one could sooner swim on dry land than perceive geometrical truths by the senses, although in learning the rudiments they are of course of some use.

30 As Gatch notes, 'Old English does not have an equivalent for the Latin sensus and Alfred must resort to circumlocution, usually involving physical perception (andgit) when the terms and concepts crop up'. 'King Alfred's Version', p. 26. Andgit, as I argued in Chapter Six, is not specifically physical perception, but can be more widely applied due to its broader sense of 'intake', either as process or faculty.

31 As Gatch points out, Alfred's introduction of this analogy is most likely based upon a confusion of the science of geometry with the better known science of astrology. 'King Alfred's Version', pp. 29-30.
Alfred already appears to be predicting the ultimately moral nature of the inquiry (ænige creft to geleornianne) rather than merely delineating perception from thought. Indeed rather than following Augustine’s inquiry into whether different objects require different modes of knowing (his particular focus is on the sciences), Alfred develops a metaphor which emphasises his fundamentally moral as well as intellectual interests.

In this first significant excursus from Augustine’s argument, Alfred’s metaphor of the ship establishes a picture of the inner sight of the mod as a vision which involves not only intellectual sight, but steadfast looking:

Then she said: because of these things it is necessary that you look rightfully to God with the eyes of the mind just as a ship’s anchor rope is held straight from the ship to the anchor, and fasten the eyes of your mod on God, just as the anchor is fixed in the earth. Though that ship be out on the sea on the waves, it is sound and undamaged, if the rope holds firmly; because one end of it is firmly in the earth and the other on the ship.

Whereas the boat initially symbolised the role of the human senses as vehicles to inner understanding (Solil. I (61) 13-22), the ship now represents the mod itself: God holds the mod as an anchor stabilises a ship amongst the tumultuous waves of earthly life.

Alfred uses this familiar Christian image not only to establish the importance of the inner senses in seeing God, but to amplify the moral dimension of inner sight. By illustrating how the internal eyes, the eyes of the mod, gaze in a straight line directly upon God, Alfred transfers the image of intellectual ‘seeing’, which has so far been the subject of Augustine’s inquiry, to the essentially moral domain. The imagery of the
modes eagan here calls to mind the descriptions from the *Consolation*, where the *mod* and also the *sawul* fix their sight upon God in a way that transcends intellectual sight. Indeed Alfred’s further examination of this ‘inner gaze’ of the *mod* in the following lines confirms his essentially practical and moral, rather than abstract and intellectual concerns.

As Alfred resumes the analytical tone which preceded his metaphorical account of the *mod* as ship and defines the ‘eyes of the *mod*’ in an account of the inner senses which has no precedent in Augustine’s text, the moral dimension of this sight becomes apparent:

| Then I said: what is that which you call the eyes of the *mod*? |
| Then she said: *gesceadwisnesse*, along with other virtues. |
| Then I said: what are these other virtues? |
| Then she said: Wisdom and humility and guardedness and moderation, righteousness and well-willing / kindness, purity / chastity, temperance / abstinence; with these anchors you must fix the rope on Good / God, Who will hold the ship of your *mod*. |
| Then I said: Lord, make me all that you teach me! I would if I could, but I cannot understand how I can get the anchors or how I may fix them, unless you show me more clearly. |

The *modes eagan*, it appears, are not primarily intellectual sight or perception, but involve the whole spectrum of the human virtues and the gaze of the *mod* is not random observation or understanding, but steadfast looking characterised by benign moral intention and disposition. Since the image of the ship as the *mod* and the anchor as God here appears to be transformed into a view of the anchors as the stabilizing virtues which define the sight of the *mod*, Gatch may seem justified in proposing that:

> [Alfred,] faced with [Augustine’s] reference to Stoicism [and its epistemological ideas] and the return of the Latin text to the geometrical example, ... reverts to the ship simile, seizes the anchor line, and holds on for dear life.\(^\text{12}\)

Although the analogies are somewhat disjointed in Alfred’s overall development of the ship metaphor, his identification of God with all united and perfected Virtue at the end of Book I to an extent resolves the tension of the anchor as both God and the virtues.

Indeed the lengthy digression which follows in Alfred’s argument amplifies this context.

Gatch suggests that Alfred’s account of how men can gain virtues represents an appeal to authority in that ‘Alfred was unequipped to appropriate or adapt literally the argument of Augustine in this passage’.

Given that Alfred has already departed from the epistemological concerns of Augustine and is following his own lines of inquiry, his digression need not be seen as an attempt to grapple with Augustine’s argument. In essence, Alfred’s account posits that men may gain a virtue for every vice which they forsake (Solil. I (62) 14-17) and goes on to explore how man ought to honour the eternal anchors bestowed by the eternal Lord over and above the authority and wealth of earthly lords (Solil. I (62) 14-17). His ultimate conclusion is that since Augustinus loves nothing more than the eternal life promised by the eternal Lord (Solil. I (63) 23-4), he must follow His commandments (Solil. I (63) 26). Throughout this digression, Alfred expands his discussion from the epistemological concerns of the Latin argument so as to consider the fuller spectrum of inner capacities which he deems necessary for the knowledge of God and highlights the overarching relationship between Lord and follower in the acquisition of virtue. When Alfred rejoins Augustine’s discussion of the moral impediments to human understanding (Solil. I (64) 4ff) there is accordingly no serious rupture in the continuity of Alfred’s own argument.

Alfred’s emphasis on the importance of the moral dimension of the mod’s sight in the Soliloquies is entirely in accordance with Augustine’s position in the Soliloquia. Although Augustine has so far been concerned specifically with intellectual sight and with man’s modes of understanding and although he applies the terms animus and mens primarily in intellectual contexts, he evidently conceives of the mens as more than the intellectual capacity which our own term ‘mind’ suggests. Whereas in Augustinian’s

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33 ibid, p. 216.
34 See note 40 below.
35 Overall, Augustine uses anima as the overarching term in the Soliloquia – we find relatively few occurrences of mens and animus in the sections of the text which Alfred translated. Of these, however, a number of instances suggest a super-intellectual functioning of the mens and animus (I.iii 14-7, I.v.11, 11-14, l.ix.5-7, l.x.17, 13-5, l.xi. 6-7, l.xiii.27, 6-7).
Soliloquia, we find no detailed analytical subdivision of the mens itself into faculties of memory, understanding and will (or love) as we do elsewhere in his writings (Conf. 10.10.16, 13.11.12; De Civ. Dei 11.26; De Trin. 14.8.11), the interdependence of reason, love and volition is apparent throughout his argument in the Soliloquia. To begin with, it is the desire to know which initiates the Latin Augustine-character’s dialogue with Ratio. Just as ratio cannot seek understanding without the correct love, however, man cannot fully understand his true desire (or indeed his true self) without the aid of ratio. This conception of an insolubly entwined relationship between human reason and the will (or love) for God is illustrated most fully in Augustine’s account of the processes of human understanding (pp. 245-6 below). Alfred’s presentation of the mod as the seat of the full spectrum of inner activities, powers and capacities therefore not only accords with the conventional vernacular conception and presentation of the inner aspects as agents and loci of all inner experience and agency, but also with Augustine’s conception of the mens. Alfred’s introduction of the essential interrelation between gescead and the moral virtues from the outset of his argument, however, suggests that the necessity of the virtues for man’s knowledge of God is integral to his conception of the inner self.

Alfred rejoins Augustine’s argument at the point when it introduces the importance of the moral virtues for human understanding. Alfred’s emphasis on man’s need to look to God in a fixed and steadfast line (for dam þingum is dearþ þu rihte hawie Solil. I (61) 23-4) in his metaphor of the ship and anchor already anticipated this.

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36 Although it is the capacity for reason which defines the mens (as much as the anima and man himself, Aug Sol. I.ii.7, 13-7), this identification of a specifically intellectual function itself suggests a broader conception of the mens – as indeed does Alfred’s identification of gescead as one specific aspect of the mod’s sight (below on pp. 244-5).

37 One conception underlying this interconnection of aspects within the mens, is Augustine’s idea that the mens is itself the Trinitarian image of God: Conf. 7.1.2, De Trin. 1.1.1: 2.18.54; 3.1.1: 10.10.15-6.

38 In most such contexts, Alfred prefers mod to sawul in glossing Augustine’s anima. Besides references to the modes eagan, the mod is the dominant inner aspect associated with the full range of inner activity and agency in life: in relation to thought and contemplation (Pref. 2.13, 14; Bk. I 2.20, Bk. II 65.7), to sadness (Bk. I 30.7, 34.13, 35.3) related to vice or false love (50.3), to moral deficiency and misplaced love (38.10, 39.4, 47.6-10) and to virtue (23.7, 28.12, 33.13). In instances where Augustine contrasts animus with corpore, however, Alfred consistently uses the conventional contrast of sawul and lic(human).
discussion which emphasises that man must not only be able to see, but that he must
look and want to see in order to actually see: 39

Nam mentis quasi sunt oculi sensus animae, disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut videri possint veluti terra est atque terrena omnia. Deus autem est ipse qui ilustrat.

Ego autem Ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. Non enim hoc est habere oculos quod aspicere; aut item hoc est aspicere quod videre. Ergo animae tribus quibusdam rebus opus est: ut oculos habeat, quibus iam bene uti possit, ut aspicient, ut videant. (Aug Sol. i.vi.12 (60) 3-13)

Wite þæt eorist gewiss, þæt ðæt mod byð þære sawle æge; and þæt þu scealt eac witan, þæt oðer byð þæt man eagan heæbbe, oðer bið, þæt man hawie, and þæt oðer bið þat man geseo þæt þæt he after hawode; forðeð byt þæt þæt he geseon wolde. forðam ælc man þæra þe eagan heft ærest hawæ þæs þe he geseon wolde oð dône first þe he byð gehawæ. þonne he hyt þonne gehawæ heæt, dônne gesyð þe hit. Ac þu scealt witan ðæt ic þe (Þæ) nu wîd sprece, ic eom gesceadwisnes, ond ic eom ælcum manniscum mode on þam stæle þe seo hawung byð þam þam eagum…

(Solil. II (65) 1-8)

For the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul. Now the truths of science are made visible to the mind as the light of the sun makes visible to the eyes the earth and terrestrial objects. But it is God Himself who shines.

And I, Reason, am such to the mind as is sight to the eyes: for to have eyes that you may look is one thing, and to so look that you may see is another. And so it is that the task of the soul is three-fold, that it possess eyes fit for use, that it look, that it see.

Know first this for sure, that the mod is the eye of the sawul; and you shall also know this: it is one thing that man has eyes, it is another that man looks, and it is yet another thing that man sees which he has looked for; the fourth [thing] is that he wants to see [it]. Therefore each of those who has eyes first looks for that which he wants to see until he initially sees it. When he has looked for it then he sees it. But you must know that I, who am speaking to you now, I am Gesceadwisnes and I [occupy] that role in every human mod which the [act of] looking is for the eyes…

For both Augustine and Alfred, the will to see is as important as the capacity to see.

Augustine attributes the desire, the capacity and the activity to the anima and although Alfred appears to localise these in the mod, he explicitly defines the relationship between the mod and sawul, making clear that they are not conceived as synonyms in the Soliloquies. The mod itself is the ‘eye’ of the sawul and Alfred thus follows Augustine in identifying the mod (mens) as an apparently inherent faculty of the sawul

39 The manuscript is significantly corrupted at this point and editors have struggled to see how it can be integrated fully into the progression of the argument. Carnicelli notes that ‘This passage [the introduction of reason 6-8] is a senseless interruption, due apparently to Alfred’s confusion of two closely similar passages in the Latin source. In the first Latin passage (64.18-20), the Reason identifies itself as the speaker, ratio quae tecum loquitur, and states a general analogy between the two kinds of seeing: Nam mentis quasi sui sunt oculi sensus animae. In the second (64.22), the Reason mentions itself by name, then states the analogy more explicitly: Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. In the Latin text, the analogy is developed in detail (65.10ff) only after it has been stated a second time. Alfred translates the first passage in 64.5-8 and 65.1. He seems, however, to have mistaken the first statement of the analogy for the second, for he next proceeds to develop the analogy in detail (65.2-6), upsetting the order of the Latin text and making a translation of the second passage unnecessary. When he does come to translate the second passage (65.7-8), he compounds the redundancy by adding a second self-introduction by the Reason…which he has already translated once in 64.5-6.’ in King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies, pp. 65-6 notes 6-8. Although it appears to me that the passage does provide a relatively smooth transition from the consideration of the virtues to the notion that intent is necessary for inner sight (and subsequently back to Augustine’s discussion of the Christian virtues), my main interest here is the implication of this description for Alfred’s conception of man’s inner constitution.
This crucial (and unique) vernacular definition of the relation between *mod* and *sawul* clearly places Alfred’s psychological ideas firmly in the Latin Christian intellectual tradition (in Godden’s sense). The sight of the *mod*, moreover, is here defined as *gesceadwisnes*, which itself appears to denote the intellectual capacity of the *mod* much in the same way that *ratio* denotes the specifically intellectual faculty of the *mens*.

This specifically intellectual sense of *gescead* is further strengthened in Alfred’s version of Augustine’s ensuing discussion of the interrelation between *ratio* and the theological virtues which are necessary for man’s sight of God. In order for the *anima* to see God, Augustine argues, *ratio* itself must be supplemented or ‘perfected’ by the theological virtues which Augustine relates to the three necessary components of ‘rightful sight’: the eyes (i.e. the capacity), the ‘looking’ (*aspicere*, i.e. the exercise of the capacity) and the ‘seeing’ (*videre*, i.e. the successful or perfected activity or function of the soul which is oriented towards God).

* R. Aspectus animae, ratio est; sed quia non sequitur ut omnis qui aspicit videat, aspectus rectus atque perfectus, id est, quem visio sequitur, virtus vocatur; est enim virtus vel recta vel perfecta ratio. Sed et ipse aspectus quamvis jam sanos oculos convertere in lucem non potest, nisi tria illa permaneant: fides, qua credatur ita se rem habere, ad quam convertendus aspectus est, ut visa faciat beatum; spes qua cum bene aspexerit, se visurum esse praesumat; caritas, qua videre perfuique desideret. Iam aspectum sequitur ipsa visio Dei, qui est finis aspectus, non quod iam non sit, sed quod nihil amplius habeat, quo se intendat. Et haec est vere perfecta virtus, ratio pervenendi ad finem suum, quam beata vita consequitur. Ipsa autem visio intellectus est ille, qui in anima est, qui conficitur ex intellegente et eo quod intellegit, ut in oculis videre quod dicitur, ex ipso sensu constat atque sensibili, quorum detracto quolibet, videri nihil potest. (Aug Sol. I.vi.(21) 10 – (22) 4)

* R. The gaze of the soul is reason; but since it does not follow that every one who looks, sees, that right and perfect looking, which is followed by seeing, is called virtue, for virtue is rectified and perfected reason. But that very act of looking, even though the eyes be sound, cannot turn them toward the light unless three things persist: Faith — by which the soul believes that that toward which the gaze has been directed, is such that to gaze upon it will cause blessedness: Hope — by which, the eyes being rightly fixed, the soul expects this vision to follow: and love — which is the soul’s longing to see and to enjoy it. Such looking is followed by the vision of God Himself, who is the goal of the soul’s gaze, not because it could not continue to look, but because there is nothing beyond this on which it can fix its gaze. This is truly perfected reason — virtue — attaining its proper end, on which the happy life follows. And this intellectual vision is that which is in the soul a conjunction of the seer and the seen: as seeing with the eyes results from the conjunction of the sense of sight and the sensible object, either of which being lacking, nothing can be seen.

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40 Whereas Augustine refers to ‘the eyes of the mind’ (presumably *ratio*) as the ‘senses of the soul’. Alfred makes the *mod* itself the ‘eye of the soul’. This equation of *mod* and ‘eye’ probably bases itself upon Augustine’s own analogy of the *ratio* of the *mens* with the sight of the eyes (hence *gescead* as sight and *mod* as eye). The resulting picture, however, is essentially the same in that *gescead* / *ratio* is an aspect of the *mod* / *mens* which is in turn an aspect of the *sawul* / *anima*. The notion that Augustine is equating the ‘eyes of the mind’ with the ‘senses of the soul’ without reference to these relationships is unlikely here and it seems equally unlikely that Alfred should have misunderstood this point. I consider the significant implications of Alfred’s identification of the *mod* as an aspect of the *sawul* for his conception of the inner self and its continuity in the afterlife in 8.4 below.
Just as Augustine states that ratio and the theological virtues (faith, hope, charity or love) are necessary for full understanding, Alfred asserts that gescead as well as the other virtues are necessary for full sight:

\[\text{Then she said: the looking of the soul is reason and contemplation. But many souls look with these and yet do not see that which they want, because they do not have entirely healthy eyes. But he who wants to see God, he must have the eyes of his mod healthy: that is, that he must have firm faith and right hope and full love. If then he has all these, then he has the blessed and eternal life. The sight with which we shall see God is 'understanding'. That understanding is between two things: between that which understands and that which is understood – and which is as firm in both as love is between the lover and the one who he loves. In both it is as firm as we said before about the anchor-rope, which on one end was firm in the ship [and] on the other [end firm] in the ground.}

Alfred’s paraphrase of smeauung (‘thought’, contemplation’) here suggests that gescead is the intellectual ‘looking’ (hawung) of the sawul, much in the same way that ratio is the intellectual capacity of the anima. As such, gescead appears as the active means to perfected sight (gesyhd), namely the full vision of angyt (intellectus) which in this context of the loving union with God appears to denote deeper and fuller ‘understanding’ (or perhaps even more literally, a more comprehensive ‘embracing’ or ‘taking in’). Whereas Augustine makes an explicit distinction between ratio per se and ratio as a true virtue when perfected by the theological virtues, Alfred is content to refer to his image of the anchors and thus to suggest the interrelation of the moral virtues and gescead in the sight of the mod. Alfred’s presentation of gescead as a virtue akin to the moral virtues suggests that his view of inner workings goes beyond the parameters of Augustine’s ratio.

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41 Alfred consistently defines gescead as the ‘looking’ (seo hawung) of the mod or sawul (1.65.7-8, 67.1 above). Although this renders the Latin aspierere and aspectus, it is not clear whether Alfred’s addition of a fourth element to sight (namely ‘that he wants to see’) 1.65.4) divorces the will to look from the activity of looking or simply amplifies the volitional dimension of ‘looking’ as an aspect of the function of gescead itself.

42 This renewed reference to his own previous account of the virtues replaces Augustine’s allusion to his complex theory of perception. Although Alfred does not find the analogy of perceptive processes conducive to his purposes here, his replacement of perception as union with love as union suggests an awareness of Augustine’s equation of the two elsewhere in his writings (e.g. De Trin. 8.4.6).
Alfred's indebtedness to the 'Latin intellectual' psychological ideas is not only evident in his characterisation of the _mod_ as an inherent aspect of the spiritual _sawul_, but also in his definition of _gescead_ as the defining capacity of man. Like the Old English _Consolation_, the _Soliloquies_ express the idea that man is defined by his capacity for 'reason' in that this faculty distinguishes him from animals:

A: Animam me amare dixi, non animalia.
R: Aut homines non sunt amici tui aut eos non amas; omnis enim homo est animal et animalia te non amare dixisti.
A: Et homines sunt et eos amo, non eo quod animalia, sed eo quod homines sunt; id est ex eo quod rationales animas habent, quas amo etiam in latronibus. _Licit enim mihi in quovis amare rationem, cum illum iure oderim, qui male utitur eo quod amo._ Itaque tanto magis amo amicos meos, quanto magis bene utuntur anima rationali, vel _certe quantum desiderant ea bene uti._

(_Aug Sol._ I.i.i.7 (12) 15-24)

_A: I said that I love not animals, but the soul._

_R: Either, then, your friends are not men or you love them not; for every man is an animal, and you say you do not love animals._

_A: They are men and I love them, not in that they are animals, but in that they are men: that is, from the fact that they possess rational souls, which I love even in thieves. For it is permitted me to love reason in anything whatever, although I may justly hate him who makes a bad use of it. So much the more, then, do I love my friends, by as much as they make a good use of that rational soul, or as much, indeed, as they desire to do so._

Then I said: I do not love [my friends] because they are corporeal beasts, [such] men [are] not.

Then she said: Why, do your friends not also have bodies just like beasts?

Then I said: I do not love them for that, but because they are men and have 'reason' in their _mods_ — this I love even in servants. Those who I hate, I hate because they _turn the good of their 'reason' to evil_.

_Because of this [reason] I am able to choose to love the good and hate evil — therefore I love all of my friends, some less, some more, and each of those who I love more than the others, I love him all the more than the others because I perceive that he has a better will than the other, and [that] his 'reason' wants to do [what is] beneficial._

Alfred here expands the description of _gescead_ as a faculty subject to good use or misuse, emphasising its importance in relation to moral character (italics above). Rather than loving his friends according to their desire to use reason, the Old English _Augustinus_ loves those who direct their _gescead_ towards 'good' and those who (apparently due to _gescead_) have a better will. 43 Given that Augustine's inquiry into the self involves the same inquiry into the good which man should seek and that evil which he should avoid (_Aug Sol._ I.i.2) which we encountered in the _Consolation_, the

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43 The editorial emendation of _nyttran willan_ to _wille_, as supported by Jost and Camicelli, appears to make _gescead_ the grammatical subject which 'wants to do' or is that by which man wants to do the better. If we agree with Endter's acceptance of _willan_, however, it could appear that the better will itself is the object of the action. I retain Camicelli's emendation here since it is grammatically more coherent. _Camicelli, King Alfred's Version of St. Augustine's Soliloquies_, p. 58, note 4.
importance of ‘reason’ in guiding man in the discovery of his own right will is latent throughout.\textsuperscript{44} Alfred amplifies that it is \emph{gescead} which enables man’s rightful love and will (\textit{fordin me ys egder ðara alysaf, ge ðæt good to luftanne ge ðæt yfel to hatianne}) and that the discernment of good and evil is the particular domain of \emph{gescead}:

\begin{quote}
Deus a quo admonemur ut vigilemus. Deus per quem a malis bona separamus. Deus per quem mala fugimus, et bona sequimur.
\end{quote}

\textit{(Aug Sol. i.i.3 (6) 9-11)}

\begin{quote}
Drihten, þu ðæt us manast ðæt we wacian, ðu us sealdest gesceadwisne ðæt we maegon toseðan and tosceadan good and yfel, and fleon þad yfel.
\end{quote}

\textit{(Solil. I (52) 1-2)}

God, by Whom we are warned to watch: God through Whom we discriminate good things from evil things: God, through Whom we flee from evil and follow after good.

Lord, You Who remind us to be watchful, You Who gave us ‘discrimination’ so that we may discern and tell apart good and evil, and flee that evil.

Precisely this function of distinguishing between good and evil highlights the inherent sense of \emph{gescead} as ‘discrimination’ and suggests a distinct interpretation behind Alfred’s choice to render the Latin \emph{ratio} by this term.\textsuperscript{45}

Alfred clearly retains many of the intellectual connotations of \emph{gescead} which characterise Augustine’s \emph{ratio} and appears fully aware of this term’s sense of ‘reasoning’ and its association with logical argumentation. At one point, \textit{Gescead} describes itself as the ‘reasoning’ or ‘expounding’ inner guide:

\begin{quote}
Ac ic þe meg secgan ðæt ic eom seo gesceadwisnes ðines modes, þe ðe wið spreoð, and ic eom seo racu ðe me onhagað ðe to gerhihtrecenen, ðæt þu gesyhtst myd ðines modes eagan god swa sweotole swa þu nu gesyhtst myd ðæs licuman eagan ða sunnan.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

\textit{(Solil. I (64) 5-8)}

But I can tell you that I am the \emph{gesceadwisnes} of your \emph{mod} which argues with you, and I am the ‘argumentation / reason’ which drives me to ‘rightly explain / expound’ to you so that you see God with your \emph{mod}’s eyes as clearly as you now see the sun with your bodily eyes.

Unlike Augustine, however, Alfred characterises \emph{gescead} as an inner power (\textit{craeft}) akin to the moral virtues. Indeed his notion of \emph{gescead} as a virtue which is specifically oriented towards the discrimination of good and evil recalls the monastic conception of

\textsuperscript{44} Even without reference to the argument of the \textit{Consolation}, however, the importance of the interaction between \emph{gescead} and the \emph{will} in the \textit{Soliloquies} is clear, not least because it is a fundamental tenet of Augustinian psychology.

\textsuperscript{45} At no point in the \textit{Soliloquia} does Augustine explicitly identify the function of \emph{ratio} as the discrimination between good and evil. Although he sees \textit{diuidicatio spirituum} (Conf. 13, 18, 23; \textit{De Div. Quaest.} 1, 2, 8) – never \textit{discretio spirituum} – as a specific function of \emph{gescead} (See Rist, ‘Faith and Reason’, pp. 124-8) this view is fully integrated into his own account of the processes of perception. A detailed account of Augustine’s theory of perception, though not in reference to \textit{diuidicatio spirituum}, is provided by Gerard O’Daly, \textit{Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind} (London, 1987), pp. 80-129.

\textsuperscript{46} Carmicelli notes that the phrasing \textit{me in ðe me onhagað} in the manuscript ‘is redundant and illogical’, \textit{King Alfred’s Version}, p. 64, note 6. The additional \textit{in ðe} could be significant if we interpret it as emphasizing the inner nature of \textit{gesceadwisnes} in the \textit{mod}, although the additional \textit{me} would remain redundant.
In the eastern monastic tradition, a shift in the sense of *discretio* as ‘discernment of good and bad authority’ to that of ‘prudence, humility or moderation’ appears to have resulted from the ascetic orientations of the desert fathers, for whom *discretio* accordingly denoted not so much the conceptual ability in discerning authority (whether as an intellectual virtue or as a spiritual gift), but rather the practical obedience to such correct authority. Hence, in the Rule of Benedict and in the writings of Cassian – so crucial in transmitting the eastern monastic ideals to the West – the virtue of *discretio* was seen to be most fully exercised in absolute obedience to the abbot and it was in its capacity as the virtue of humility, prudence or moderation in obedience to correct authority that *discretio* became not only a virtue attainable by all, but the ‘mother of all virtues’. Whereas *gescead* itself is etymologically related to *discretio*, there is little evidence that either Alfred or vernacular writers after him linked the term *gescead* with prudence over and above intellectual or spiritual discernment. Of course, *gescead* is pivotal to the moderate life which is so central throughout the Alfredian writings in that it allows man to recognise his own will and love for God in contrast to material or earthly excess. The primary sense of *gescead* remains intellectual, but since Alfred retains many of the intellectualist aspects of Augustine’s ‘ratio’ without

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47 The term *gescead* is itself etymologically related to the Gk *diakriseis* and Lat. *discretion*, the terms applied in the Septuagint and Vulgate to the spiritual gift (*ta pneumatika*) of discerning or ‘telling apart’ good and evil spirits in men. The monastic tradition of ‘discernment of spirits’ was developed in particular by the desert fathers in reference to 1 Cor.12:10-14. As Joseph Lienhard has demonstrated, early patristic texts presented *diakriseis*/*discretio* as a charisma granted by God to the select so that they may discern correct authority amongst men, in ‘On Discernment of Spirits in the Early Church’, p. 528. Significantly, the conceptions of these vices did not develop in parallel with conceptions of the Christian virtues, i.e. the good spirits working in men were not internalised into inner virtues. Rather, the Christian virtues, drawn from biblical references to spiritual gifts or philosophical references to practical and intellectual virtues – as well as from the combination of the cardinal and theological virtues – only gradually came to be diametrically opposed until reformulated most prominently by Gregory. A comprehensive outline of the developing conception of the relation between vices and virtues is provided by Richard Newhauser, *The Treatise on Vices and Virtues in Latin and the Vernacular*, Typologie des Sources du Moyen Age Occidental 68 (Turnhout, 1993).

48 A vast range of research has arisen from the recent critical interest in this particular aspect of *discretio*.spirituum, which certainly informs the meaning of MnE ‘discretion’. Particularly relevant here are the analyses of Regis Appel, ‘Cassian’s Discretio: A Timeless Virtue’, *American Benedictine Review* 17 (1966): 20-29; Edith Scholl, ‘The Mother of Virtues: Discretio’, *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 36.3 (2001), 389-401; Lienhard (note 16) and Dekkers (note 21).

49 John Cassian, *Collationes II*, CSEL 13. Cassian considers *discretio* to be the *fons* and *radix* of all virtues, ibid. The more famous expression ‘mother of all virtues’ stems from the *Rule of Benedict* 64.17-19.

50 Indeed Ælfric, who is certainly indebted to Alfred’s development of the prose vocabulary uses not *gescead* but *prudentia* when discussing the ‘mother of all virtues’. Mary Clayton suggests a number of Carolingian sources for this choice of terminology. ‘Temperance as the Mother of Virtues in Ælfric’, *Notes and Queries* 55:1 (2008), pp. 1-2. Alfred’s *gescead*, like humility and moderation, is a virtue but it is listed as a virtue which is essentially distinct from *eadmeto* and *gemetgung* (1.62.4-5).
diminishing its status as a divine gift of discriminating between good and evil. Alfred appears to be drawing on the wider sense of *discretio* which balances spiritual discernment with its practical application in moderation and humility which defines the writings of Pope Gregory, the Carolingian commentators and the Venerable Bede.\(^{51}\)

*Gescead*, like *ratio*, of course underpins faith, as the form and argument of the *Soliloquies* and the *Soliloquia* make clear. Augustine's *ratio*, however, does so as an innate 'rationalistic' faculty which emerges as a fundamentally limited capacity reflecting human limitation, particularly man's moral deficiency. Augustine's lengthy detours of reason illustrate how logical deduction and induction can be dangerous if one reasons from false premises – they can lead the thinker utterly astray.\(^{52}\) In avoiding the most excessive excursuses of Augustine's argument, Alfred not only remains closer to the announced subject of his inquiry, but also depicts *Gescead* as a most reliable and even infallible guide. Hence, when *Gescead* throws its weight of authority against *Augustinus'* hubristic desire to know as well as believe, the conclusion is final:

\[
\text{nefre nan man of ðisse carcerne þiþne andweardan lifes swa gewislice witan ne myhte swa swa þu wiñast ... ærðam þe seo sawl byd wyð þam lychaman gedeled. (Solil. II (86) 26 – (87) 5)}
\]

no man in the prison of this present life can know as certainly as you want [to know] ... before the soul is parted from the body.

Alfred consistently casts *gescead* as the inner authority which leads to and underpins divine authority (*Solil. II* (91) 12-19). Although Alfred's *Gescead* presents examples from scripture as the primary 'proofs' of its argument, it does not entirely neglect the logical supporting arguments which underpin its own infallible authority. Moreover, her discrimination of good and evil, does not pertain solely to the correct authority of God and the prophets (*II* (79) 17-23), but also to the discernment of man's own chief good (and the evil which he must avoid *I* (54) 5-7). As the discerner and inner representative


\[^{52}\] John Rist illustrates succinctly how this conceived limitation of 'reasoning' alone is a prominent theme across Augustine's writings, 'Faith and Reason', *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Leonore Stump and Norman Kretzman (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 26-39. Recently, a critical trend has developed which re-evaluates the thesis of the 'Two Augustines' and argues that Augustine's early writings do not represent a primarily 'rationalist' or 'intellectualist' stance. Most notable here are Carol Harrison's *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology* and Catherine Conybeare's *The Irrational Augustine*. In her fascinating analysis, Conybeare goes so far as to argue that the persona of 'Augustine' in the *Soliloquies* represents man's 'non-rational nature' which challenges the supremacy and reliability of 'human reason'. She concludes that the dialogue ironically reveals how Augustine considers innate love, rather than reason itself to be the most direct route to the vision of God, *ibid.*, pp. 139-162.
of the ultimate authority, Alfred’s gescead certainly appears as a divine gift (I (51) 12-14) rather than as the limited human capacity suggested by Augustine’s ratio.

In the context of Alfred’s overarching metaphysical view of all cræftas as the eternal gifts of God which are to be treasured and which cannot be forsaken, Alfred’s view of man’s inner life becomes particularly striking. On the one hand, it appears that Alfred’s presentation of the inner faculties and powers, the mægen and cræftas, suggests that we cannot expect to find a tripartite division of sawul or mod or indeed any ‘constitutional’ conception of mutually balancing or hierarchical forces within the inner self as a framework for explaining human experience. Although gescead is clearly elevated in its capacity to discriminate between good and evil and to guide the human will, Alfred’s description of perfect and interrelated Virtue in God accommodates his account of the essential interdependence of all cræftas in the sight of the mod – that rightful longing and fixation on God. On the other hand, Alfred’s presentation of the cræftas as man’s most valuable gifts raises particularly interesting implications for his conception of human and personal identity. Indeed in Book II, Alfred is not only concerned with the immortal nature of the sawul, but also with the eternal nature of the mod and gescead, as well as the various virtues which men have gathered in life. The remaining two parts of my discussion accordingly take a brief look at the way in which Alfred defines the continuum of human identity in Book II and subsequently consider Alfred’s conception of the self in the afterlife.

8.3 Continuity of Identity: The Eternal Sawul, Mod and Gewit

As I argued in 8.1, Alfred’s identification of all true and perfect Virtue with God at the end of Book I prepares for his investigation into the eternal nature of the sawul and mod which he announced at the very outset of the inquiry (I.i.1). His main argument for the eternal nature of the sawul in Book II is informed by his metaphysical view of God as the Giver of all goods and possessions (I.i.2; II.6). To begin with, this picture accommodates Alfred’s conception of cræftas as inner powers both in terms of the idea
that God gives these powers as innate capacities or potentials which men must activate and exercise, and in terms of the idea that the exercise of potential and virtue is itself dependent upon God's aid. 53 Alfred therefore not only 'conflates' faculties and virtues in the permeating presence of Grace, but even describes the basic innate components of man, his soul and body as gifts. His notion of the sawul, mod, gescead and even the craftas as eternal gifts which men cannot lose was initially mentioned in Alfred's first significant departure from Augustine's argument in I (62) 14- (63) 27. Here he described the virtues as eternal 'wealth' (welan (62) 26) gained from friendship with the eternal Lord and as gifts to be treasured above earthly goods. This picture recalls the hierarchy of possessions encountered in the Consolation (Chapter Seven above) - a hierarchy in which man's truest goods are those which are eternal. In his conclusion to Book I of the Soliloquies, Alfred not only gathers his various insights about the human constitution, but also prepares for his own arguments in Books II and III. The best of possessions, as we have seen, are the eternal ones and whether it is the sawul, the mod or its powers and contents, these are all eternal aspects which appear to constitute the essence of the self as it is on earth and as it will continue to be after corporeal death. In asking 'what is eternal in myself', Alfred appears to be asking 'what is truly me'. At the very outset of the Soliloquies, Alfred's 'Augustine' asked: hwaet he sylf were: hwæper hys mod and hys sawel deadlic were and gewitendlice. pe heo were a libbendu and ecu? Now, in Books II and III we come to the heart of his answer.

Book II begins with a brief prayer which facilitates a return to the original subject matter of self-knowledge (paet ic mage...ongitan...me selfne Solil. II (84) 4-5)). Like the Ratio in the Latin text, Gescead (by now heo) initially tackles the question of self-knowledge by asking how Augustinus knows that he exists (II.i.1). Augustine's almost fleeting use of a complex epistemological argument ('I know that I am because I

53 In a sense, it is not surprising that Alfred does not go into the details of Grace here. On the one hand, it is not his subject of inquiry. On the other hand, the move from potency to act and the relation between capacity and its realisation in terms of Grace must be seen in light of Alfred's interest in active virtue, which necessitates the capacity in itself. As Clemoes notes: 'Craft denoted an innate talent...an ability to control action from potential to performance, and so combined the generality of the former with the latter's particularity.' Clemoes, Interactions of Thought and Language, p. 78.
think' *Aug Sol.* II.i.2) identifies the ‘I’ with the thinking subject and aligns thought with human existence. Rather than going into the complex implications which this argument raises, however, Augustine proceeds from the centrality of ‘thought’ and ‘knowledge’ in human self-definition to argue that since knowledge itself is eternal (*Aug Sol.* II.ix) and since knowledge is innately present in the *anima* (*Aug Sol.* II.xii), the soul itself must be eternal (*Aug Sol.* II.xii). Whereas Augustine’s argument depends on a lengthy analysis of the nature of knowledge and Truth, Alfred requires no such analysis to gain his own conclusions. At the outset of Book II, however, Alfred adapts the opening argument of Augustine, which can again be most succinctly expressed as a syllogism:

A. ‘I know that I exist in that I think, but how do I know that I will be (exist) forever or think forever’
B. I know that I want to exist in order to know (a life without knowledge would be worthless)
C. I want to live so that I may think and I want to live forever so that I may always know
D. Knowledge is happiness
E. Knowledge is the ultimate end for which man wants to exist and live

A. I know for certain that I live and think
B. I know that I want to live forever
C. Will I know more than I do now when dead?
D. I want to be in order to live in order to know
E. I live for the sake of Wisdom which is Good and God

Alfred’s version of the argument omits the epistemological implications of A, but nevertheless maintains the distinction between existence and life (*beon, libban*) and amplifies the suggestion of the Latin argument that human life (rather than existence) is characterised by knowing: ‘What would human life be without knowing’ (*Soli*. II.i.12) In light of Alfred’s emphasis on Wisdom as Good (E), Alfred again amplifies the moral dimension of man’s desire for God (B, C). He thus prepares for his own subsequent argument that the *sawul* is immortal because it strives towards the eternal (II.i.12), rather than because it has innately eternal knowledge within itself (*Aug Sol.* II.xii).

When Augustine raises the question whether all three things (being, living and

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54 Elsewhere in his writings, Augustine develops the *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am), an argument which was designed to counter scepticism as well as to establish what can be known for certain about the self. For Augustine, this theme is an important one, taking many forms across his writings, most famously, the form of the *cogito*. The intellectual context of this monumental question was for Augustine, as for Descartes, the refutation of epistemological scepticism as much as the exploration of what we can know about the ‘I’. It is not viable to go into the almost insurmountable volume of criticism which is concerned with the existential implications of this argument here, since Alfred himself entirely evades the *cogito* in his adaptation. The essential point is that although Augustine certainly establishes the definitive nature of thought within man, he stops short of identifying the ‘thinking I’ with the mind or soul as opposed to the material body (a stance which becomes definitive in Descartes’ articulation of the *cogito*).
knowing) as we know them in the present life, will continue in the afterlife in order to consider the eternal nature of knowledge itself (Aug Sol. II.ii-ix), Alfred, therefore, returns to his identification of God as Wisdom and stresses the purpose of loving Good as much as Wisdom, which are united perfectly in God. By restating the interrelated moral and intellectual purpose of human life, Alfred articulates the question of whether being, living and knowing are eternal in a way that includes love:

What are you in doubt about now? Did you not already agree that God is eternal and almighty and created two rational and eternal creatures, as we said before: these are angels and men's souls, to whom He has given eternal gifts? They need never lose these gifts. If you now remember and believe this, then you know without doubt that you are and always will be and will always love and will always know something, although you do not know all that you want to.

Alfred's own proof for the immortality of the sawul thus draws on a sophisticated metaphysical framework which accommodates his own view of man's nature and purpose in transcending the earthly and focuses on the will which is oriented towards moral improvement as much as intellectual enlightenment. This picture certainly accords with the argument of the Consolation (Chapter Seven above) in that man's true will for what is eternal and good emerges as that by which man comes to know himself.

It is particularly significant for the present inquiry that the hierarchy of possessions which make up the individual is taken all the way through to its logical conclusion in the Soliloquies. On the one hand, Alfred's inquiry into Truth and Wisdom has emerged as a fundamentally moral quest in light of his identification of Truth, Wisdom and Good with God, the Origin and End of all things. The rewards and the knowledge bestowed in heaven thus depend essentially on the continuity of that same self, which earned them in life. Given that the entire subject matter of Book I has been concerned with man's ability to know God and that its conclusion is that man, in his corporeal state cannot know for certain, Alfred's argument in Book II integrates the question of whether man will continue to live and continue to know, or indeed whether he will gain the full knowledge which he seeks in life as well as the rewards of heavenly joy for a life lived well in the quest for God. This leads to the most telling statement
about which of the eternal components, faculties or contents truly make up the self which transcends man's corporeal state.

Nu ic gehyre þæt min sawel is æcu and a lifað, and eall þæt min mod and min gescadwisnesse goodra crefta gegadrad, þæt mot þa simele habban. And ic gehere æac þæt min gewit is æce. Ac me lyste gyt witan be ðam gewitte þæt ic ær acsode: hweðer hyt æfter þæs lichaman gedale and þære sawle weoxe þe wanede; þe hyt swa on stæle stode, þe hyt swa dyde swa hyt ær dað on pisæ weorulde, ðære hwile weoxe, ðære hwile wanode. (Solil. II (91) 21-7) Now I hear that my soul is eternal and will always live, and all that my mod and my 'reason' gathered in good 'virtues' – this they shall always keep. And I also hear that my 'knowledge' is eternal. But I would like to know yet about the 'knowledge' about which I asked before, [namely] whether it waxes or wanes after the parting of body and soul; whether it will stay still in the same in that place as it did before death in this world or will at times grow and at other times fade.

Alfred's late introduction of the gewitte as an overarching term for things known, experienced and loved is a particularly important one as it locates consciousness, whether self-knowledge or knowledge of others in the sawul and mod, the fundamental human agencies. His argument seems to be moving very strongly towards the question of consciousness rather than abstract knowledge in that gewit now appears as the totality of cæraetas which the mod and sawul have gathered during life. As a human power, the gewit is established as eternal, all things having been given by God. The true question of continuity of identity, therefore, lies in the question of whether the gewit changes in the afterlife and this is the principal subject of Alfred's third book.

8.4 The Self in the Afterlife: Sawul and Mod in the Presence of God

As Malcolm Godden aptly states, 'Book III of the Soliloquies is a mess'. Even in reference to Augustine's De Videndo Dei, upon which Book III of the Soliloquies has been thought to rely, it is difficult to reconstruct the original sequence of Alfred's argument. As Karl Jost has illustrated, the confusion in the text itself appears to arise from the dislocation of leaves in a previous copy and Godden's recent reconstruction is

55 Godden, 'Text and Eschatology', p. 177.
56 Godden presents convincing arguments against Wölker's thesis of reliance on the Videndo Dei and points out that 'nowhere does the text claim to be drawing on Augustine's De Videndo Dei', ibid. pp. 187-88. For contrasting positions see R. P. Wölker, 'Über die Angelsächsische Bearbeitung der Soliloquien Augustins', Beiträge zur Geschichte der angelsächsischen Literatur 4 (1877): 101-3; Camicelli, King Alfred's Version of St. Augustine's Soliloquies, p. 105.
by far the most convincing.\textsuperscript{57} Since I shall take a thematic approach to this shortest of books in the \textit{Soliloquies}, the details of textual reconstruction need not be of central concern here. Despite significant corruption, those parts of Book III which have survived provide a vivid insight into a vision of the afterlife which goes beyond the conventional apocalyptic visions of the anonymous vernacular homiletic and poetic accounts in general. The various elements of Alfred's account allow us to examine the way in which his depiction of the extent of human knowledge in the afterlife adds the final touches to his conception of the human self (\textit{i.e.}, \textit{me sylfe}) as the totality of the immortal \textit{sawul} and \textit{mod} as well as its possessions -- be these experience or knowledge gained during life, the memory of self and friends, or consciousness itself.

As I shall argue here, it appears that a conception of the continuity of personal identity is a fundamental aspect of Alfred's vision of the post-corporeal life. This continuity is not only directly relevant to matters of eternal punishment or reward, but also establishes a rather more practical continuity between personal past and present alongside a sense of community between those on earth and those in heaven -- a conception of community which appears central to Alfred's view of individual identity. A brief overview of Alfred's concluding book confirms that his account of an individual self which is necessarily immortal shifts his view of human and personal identity towards the spiritual aspect of man. It also confirms that Alfred fully embraces the implications of locating the very contents and possessions of the \textit{mod} which make up the self in this spiritual domain. The result is one of the most innovative accounts of personal identity in Old English literature.

Alfred's rather late introduction of the immortal \textit{gewit} and his interest in the growth or decline of human \textit{gewit}, facilitate a discussion of the continuity of human knowledge in the afterlife, both in terms of man's memory of his earthly self and his experiences, and in terms of his memory of his relationship with others. Alfred's exploration of the continuity and the decline or growth of the \textit{gewit} in the afterlife is the central subject of Book III and pertains as much to the knowledge and experience

gained in life as to the cumulative importance of such knowledge and memory for individual personality. Continuity of personal identity appears to be central for Alfred and is an integral aspect of his arguments in the Soliloquies as a whole. In many ways, the didactic undertones which Alfred developed over the course of his inquiry into moral and intellectual growth in the preceding books culminate in his accounts of man's punishment and rewards in the concluding book. Reward, as we shall see, is the increased knowledge which follows human striving for Truth, as well as the joy of God’s presence. Together these complete human striving at every level. As regards knowledge, confirmation of the soul’s immortality in the afterlife and self-knowledge through God’s Judgment is only available in the afterlife, as has been a consistent tenet throughout Alfred’s argument. A brief survey of the various dimensions of experience in the afterlife highlights the central importance of personal identity in Alfred’s account.

For Alfred, personal memory of one’s own experiences in life is necessary for the full force of eternal rewards or punishments to become apparent. For Alfred, the knowledge of past and present intensifies the experience of justice and joy in the afterlife.

The wicked have all the more punishment in the world to come because they know the glory and honour of the good, and all the more so because they remember all the good fortune they had in this world, and also know the good fortune that those who came after them in this world have. And likewise the righteous, after they are out of this world, shall very often remember both the good and evil that they have had while they were in this world.

The continuity of personal memory, it would appear here, is a crucial element of punishment and reward in that full joy depends on man’s consciousness of his just fate. In other words, man’s memory of past mistakes and desires, combined with the knowledge of the joy of the righteous or misery of the wicked depends on the continuum of personal identity and the fulfillment of personal hope in heavenly joy. Rewards are, after all, dependent on the thoughts and acts of the individual during life.
Rather than presenting varying degrees of knowledge as rewards for individual striving, however, all men, both wicked and good, appear to receive full knowledge.

In contrast with limited corporeal knowledge (II. 92), man comes to see God and gains the full knowledge which was unavailable to him in his human limitation:

...and after Judgment Day we are promised that we may see God openly, entirely as he is, and to know him for ever afterwards as clearly as He knows us. There will never be any lack of Wisdom for us then. He will not hide anything from us, he who lets us know Himself... We will all see God... All the good will see Him, for their comfort and joy and honour and blessedness and glory; and the wicked will see Him just the same as the good, but to their torment.

As Godden has discussed at length, Alfred's concern with the extent of human knowledge in the afterlife in many ways departs from 'patristic orthodoxy' in that it attributes full knowledge to all men in that afterlife, not merely to saints.58 Since full understanding is ultimately the punishment for wicked men, Alfred's didactic emphasis lies on the degree of joy or misery, which is imparted by full knowledge rather than on the degree of knowledge attained. Furthermore, it is also moral deserving which determines the degree of power which individual men have in the afterlife. The good can intercede for the good (III.86-9), whereas the wicked remain powerless (II.89-90). Their passive observations are part of their punishment. At this level the continuity of personal memory of others on earth unites past and present at personal and communal levels. In Book III as a whole, the inquiry into gewit is not so much about whether knowledge will increase in the afterlife as whether man continues to develop and experience in the afterlife.

The very vision of God and of the self in the afterlife can of course not be 'certain knowledge' and Alfred consistently backs up the accounts of Gescead with scriptural authority. Gescead herself again ultimately leads to faith:

Nu þu hæfstan gehyræ þæt we naðer (ne myd þam lichamlican eagem) ne myd þæs modes eagan nanwiht ne magon þisse weorulde geseon ealmunga swa swa hyt is. Ac of þam ðæle þæ þæt we hys geseoð, we sceolun gelifan þane del þæ þæt we hys

Now you have heard that we cannot from this world see anything entirely as it is, neither with the bodily eyes nor with the mod's eyes. But from the part of it which we see we must believe in the part that we do not see. But it is promised to us, without

The literal sight of God, so specifically related after Judgment Day, seems to be going beyond even faith and orthodox patristic positions, as Godden has shown, and the vision itself is distinctly that of the author. At its centre stands the idea of a continuous and enduring self which is pivotal for the idea that ‘I’ receive and experience my just rewards and that I remain myself, with the same loyalty and love of the good friends which I have left behind. By the memory of each other, men on earth and men in heaven may aid each other through intercession and prayer – despite being separated by the otherwise insurmountable chasm of corporeal death itself. The slow build up of Alfred’s definition of this self over the course of the *Soliloquies*, thus finds its logical conclusion in the continuity and fulfilment of man’s truest self in the afterlife.

As we already saw in the *Consolation*, the possession of virtues and desires and knowledge ranges from the corporeal and transient body to eternal and thus higher and lasting possessions of the *sawul*. In the *Soliloquies*, Alfred takes the construction a step further by identifying the self and the possessions which are eternally and most truly the self in the *sawul*, not in the transient corporeal domain. Alfred’s didactic emphasis on the continuity of this core self depends on the location of all aspects of personality which are associated with the *mod* in the *sawul* itself. Alfred firmly locates the essence of the self in the eternal and godlike aspect of man which facilitates the realisation of his highest potential in life and thereafter.
In this chapter I have considered Alfred's presentation of the human inner self during life and in the afterlife. Throughout his argument, Alfred adapts Augustine's points to highlight the essentially moral nature of understanding and coming to see God. In doing so, he establishes a conception of the inner self which incorporates elements from the intellectual Latin Christian tradition, the monastic tradition as conveyed primarily by Gregory, and from the native vernacular tradition of viewing the mod as the container and treasure trove of all those aspects, powers and faculties which define generic human identity as much as individual personality. In shifting the mod and its contents explicitly into the spiritual domain (as the Latin Christian anthropology and metaphysics of his argument requires), Alfred does not simply adopt a 'foreign' ideological system of beliefs. He innovatively constructs the inner self as the central core of man's identity, shaping it in line with the requirements of his larger systematic thought. The mod is explicitly revealed as an inherent aspect of the sawul. Although gescead is listed as merely one of the cæfias of the mod, it does not lose its pivotal and defining role in man's inner life. It is elevated as the best or highest of the virtues, both as the discretio concerned with obedience to correct authority and as the intellectual aid which guides man towards God. As an infallible inner authority, the gift of God, gescead nevertheless underpins faith. The mod as a whole is the site of the interaction between gescead and the will and it is that place within which virtues as much as understanding are gathered during life. In essence, the mod cultivates the moral desires, dispositions and thoughts which lead to its fuller (indeed remarkably extensive) knowledge of all things in the afterlife. The mod's insights are only fully confirmed and known (in the most literal sense) in the actual sight of God and Alfred's argument requires the continuity and increase of knowledge in the afterlife. Given his own didactic concerns and his consistent emphasis on moral as well as intellectual improvement, Alfred's inquiry into the continuity of all of the mod's truest possessions highlights his interest in the fundamental continuity of personal identity. This picture of a continuing and enduring self is indeed the natural conclusion to Alfred's own view of
the true human self which resides in man’s highest and most godlike aspects, his spiritual *mod* and *sawul*. 
Conclusion

This study has examined the remarkably innovative approaches to psychological and anthropological questions which we find in a number of Cynewulfian and Alfredian texts. Any reference to innovation of course depends on the departure from established tradition and this issue becomes particularly elusive when considering the rich interaction of diverse literary and ideological heritages in the Anglo-Saxon period. In early medieval studies, close scrutiny of source material and textual culture is the precondition for appreciating subtle ideological developments in the transmission and adaptation of ideas without ‘imposing the modern obsession with originality’.¹ As this thesis has illustrated, attention to the internal coherence of ideas and of frameworks of beliefs in individual texts (and in literary canons) is itself an essential and valuable aspect of studying processes of adaptation. Whether we attribute the innovative nature of the Cynewulfian and Alfredian writings to the given author’s conscious or inadvertent alteration, to the informed revision or misinterpretation of the ideas of his sources, or to the authorities upon which he is drawing, the articulation of coherent conceptual frameworks as a basis for exploring ideas about man and his workings is a striking feature of these two canons. My focus throughout this thesis has accordingly rested on the way in which the authors of the selected texts explore the role of the inner self within identity firmly in the context of their ideas about human nature and human purpose.

Part One of this thesis considered the diverse critical approaches to the abstract and essentially culture-specific terms relevant to anthropological and psychological inquiry in order to validate my own philosophical approach to the relevant patterns of thought and expression in Old English literature. Rather than approaching the inner self as an entity which essentially reflects personal and subjective experience or which suggests the abstraction of the individual from his social context (or, epistemologically speaking, from the external world) and relocates his essence in an autonomous and private self, my concern has been to illustrate the central importance of the inner self

¹ Lockett, ‘Corporeality in the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxons’, p. 293.
both as a psychological entity and as the core of human identity in Anglo-Saxon literature.

Chapter One considered the way in which the elusive domain of the 'inner' and its schematic differentiation from 'outer' spheres of human experience and action provide a useful hermeneutic tool in considering anthropological and psychological questions. In reference to divergent approaches to identity and selfhood, my discussion highlighted the great variability of approaches to the inner realm in the cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary discourse and argued for a broader definition of the inner self as the locus of experience and as the centre of agency. This broader approach to the inner self allowed me to gather diverse articulations and conceptions of soul, mind, and consciousness in the Western intellectual tradition of thinking about 'ourselves' and to introduce the historically varied application of the relevant terminology. This survey, in turn, allowed me to highlight a number of fundamental preoccupations and concerns which accompany divergent approaches to selfhood and identity. The elusive category of interiority accommodates variously conceived human faculties, capacities and entities such as soul, mind and consciousness in a way that facilitates an examination of the underlying functions which such concepts carry in our ways of thinking about human and personal identity. Thus, a number of distinctive concerns with agency, unity and continuity of identity can be traced across divergent anthropological structures, whether in (Neo)Platonic and Christian dualism or monist and dualist materialism. This exploration of the utility of an inner-outer hermeneutic schema when engaging with divergent strands in Western intellectual thought of Antiquity and the early Middle Ages established the wider context for my investigation of the relevant conceptual trends in Anglo-Saxon literature itself.

Chapter Two introduced the relevant Old English terminology in reference to divergent critical approaches to Anglo-Saxon thought about anthropological and psychological matters. The great variety of Old English vocabulary relating to inner faculties and processes, and the diversity of recurring formulas, expressions and metaphors depicting the inner life in the vernacular literature bears witness to a deeply
rooted interest in the inner realm of human experience. In order to account for the
notable diversity in conception, diction and expression of the inner life across the extant
corpus, most research has focused on the distinction between a traditional native or
‘common sense’ psychology embedded in poetic narrative and a more theologically
(and philosophically) informed approach which characterises the later prose writings. In
light of this delineation of traditions, the dominant scholarly consensus has identified a
native focus on the ‘mind’ (most prominently *mod*, *hyge* and their poetic variants *sefa*
and *ferd*) which initially stood in ambiguous relation to the immaterial and immortal
‘soul’ (*gast*, *sawul*), but which gradually became identified with this spiritual aspect of
man under the strong influence of Latin Christian intellectual anthropology. This
fundamental division between ideological and literary traditions in Old English prose
and poetry respectively allows us to localise distinct intellectual and artistic trends, but
does not account entirely for the great variety of Anglo-Saxon perspectives on the
relation between body and soul, or for the diverse nature of Anglo-Saxon thought about
the relation between the inner self on the one hand and the material and spiritual
domains of human beings on the other. The elusiveness of the vernacular ‘non-
transcendent soul’ or ‘mind’ words presents a number of difficulties when we attempt to
categorise them strictly in terms of the Latin Christian anthropological schema of a
soul-body or spirit-matter dualism and my attention to an inner-outer dichotomy
allowed me to trace the way in which the Old English ‘inner aspects’ appear to
transcend or at least renegotiate the conceptual boundaries between the ‘spiritual’,
‘mental’ and ‘emotional’ – and apparently at times even the ‘corporeal’ – which so
thoroughly inform our own categorisation of human domains of experience.

As I illustrated in Chapter Three, the anthropological schema of a transient body
and an eternal soul (which goes on to receive its just rewards or punishments in the
afterlife) largely sits beside a dominant native focus on the inner self as the defining
element of man and as that aspect which reflects individual character. The inner self, I
argued, acts as an explanatory principle of experience and behaviour as much as it
defines human and personal identity. Only relatively few analytical prose works from
the later Anglo-Saxon period appear concerned with actual categories of substances.
such as matter and spirit. The difficulty of accounting for continuity of identity in reference to a spiritual core which is ultimately divorced from the material domain, and the difficulty of attempting to account for the totality and unity of the self in reference to an exclusively material or spiritual core of agency do not appear as pressing concerns in the wider vernacular corpus. As most literature, both prose and verse, is more immediately concerned with the moral dimensions of experience and agency during life and with the promise of eternal rewards as a didactic impetus, the nature of those poetic and prose accounts which embrace the implications of a dualistic anthropology for their psychological ideas are all the more striking. In a number of these texts, the concern is again not explicitly with the precise substance of soul, body and inner self, but rather with the implications of unity and continuity of agency and experience. Thus the inner-outer dichotomy emerged as a central aid in my exploration of the given anthropological and psychological ideas.

Moving from the analysis of patterns and trends across the corpus to specific case studies, Parts Two and Three considered the construction and status of the ‘inner self’ in the poetry of Cynewulf and in the ‘philosophical’ prose works of Alfred respectively. Both sets of texts present a wide base for establishing distinctive approaches to the role of the inner self in human nature and for evaluating the workings of the inner self as principles of action and determinants of behaviour. Both sets of texts shift the inner self towards man’s spiritual domain and in doing so embrace profound questions about human nature and human purpose with a sophisticated awareness of the doctrinal and ideological implications of their stance. My emphasis throughout Parts Two and Three was accordingly less on isolated psychological ‘models’ of interiority than on the way in which certain vernacular constructions of interiority provide concrete instructions in self-understanding which underpin the didactic concerns of the authors. As I argued, the constructions of interiority which we find in the selected Cynewulfian and Alfredian writings fully engage with the implications of the matter-spirit metaphysics and anthropology of Latin Christian intellectual thought. Furthermore, they do so in conceptually adventurous and confident ways which are not entirely determined by either native vernacular or Latin Christian literary conventions. By
considering the conceptual frameworks within which both authors contextualise their ideas about man and his workings in each poem as well as in each canon, my focus has accordingly been on the internal consistency of anthropological and psychological ideas.

In its three chapters, Part Two of this thesis considered three poems of the Cynewulf canon which share a conceptual framework of human nature and human purpose and which explore the role and workings of the inner self in reference to this framework. Although Christ II, Juliana and Elene differ in focus and subject matter, they are essentially didactic poems, each of which presents a different angle on the centrality of the inner life in human experience and action, both practical and spiritual. Though deeply rooted in native poetic convention, Cynewulf presents the inner self and its various activities and processes in innovative ways. His distinctive use of formulas and compounds occasionally expands conventional semantic boundaries, for example in attributing faith and thought (if not agency) to the spiritual aspect of man (gaest). The influence of Latin rhetorical techniques is evident in Cynewulf’s figural modes of composition and characterisation, just as the influence of Latin Christian theologians is evident in his sophisticated exposition of the theological principles which inform his didactic interests in the spiritual, intellectual and practical improvement of men on earth. In this didactic context, matters of agency and selfhood become crucial concerns. Cynewulf’s descriptions and expressions of inner processes point towards a conception of an inner self which is the principle of action, the centre of experience and the core of man’s identity as is familiar across the poetic corpus. His exploration of the inner life, however, also draws heavily on Latin Christian literary techniques and his allegorical representations of the inner life in particular raise questions about his conception of the inner sphere within the framework of a dual human nature of body and spirit as expressed in conventional Christian dualities of letter and spirit. A comparison of the shared themes and expressions across his poems allowed me to trace the conceptual and ideological framework which informs Cynewulf’s view of human nature and in particular his construction of man’s inner self.
In Chapter Four I considered Cynewulf’s overarching view of human nature in its soteriological context as expressed in *Christ II*. This poem narrates Christ’s Advent, Incarnation, Ascension and His return on Judgment Day in parallel to the fall and redemption of man and considers the importance of these Christian events for humankind in general (in terms of human *Heilsgeschichte*) and for each individual who must choose the renewed life in Christ. Cynewulf uses this larger theological framework to underpin his own practical and spiritual instructions for his audience. He provides concrete instruction relating to prayer and to the correct thoughts, words and deeds which comprise the virtue and goodness that appear to be necessary prerequisites for spiritual salvation by God’s Grace. The wide scope of Cynewulf’s overarching ideological framework addresses the human condition, human nature and the inner self in the most generic terms. We find accounts of the capacities of human choice and free will as gifts bestowed upon all men by the Lord, as well as accounts of particular capacities and gifts bestowed on individuals so that they may become virtuous in the practical and the spiritual life. These overarching ideas, along with particular modes of expressing the various capacities and workings of the inner self, reappear across the Cynewulf canon.

Whereas *Christ II* builds up a picture of the inner self in the context of a generic human nature which is shaped by Cynewulf’s overarching theological and eschatological concerns, *Juliana* and *Elene* narrate the temptations, struggles and successes of particular characters. As is illustrated in these narratives, the dispositions, choices and actions of Cynewulf’s various characters highlight men’s responsibility to think, want and act well during earthly life if they are to expect their just rewards in the afterlife. In *Juliana* and *Elene*, we thus saw more detailed explorations of individual inner workings.

In Chapter Five, I explored *Juliana*, an unambiguously hagiographical poem which presents a distinctive approach to the inner self by employing extensive figural characterisations. *Juliana* reformulates the theological context of *Christ II* in terms of a cosmic opposition between Christ and the devil. Rather than presenting human souls
merely as passive possessions or booty in cosmic warfare, however, *Juliana* emphasises the need of its human characters to choose between respective lords and, metaphorically, to choose between goodness and virtue on the one hand and evil, vice and sin on the other. Cynewulf reflects the cosmic conflict in the microcosm of the inner self – indeed the inner realm emerges as the central stage of all significant action, and physical reality becomes merely the consequence and reflection of inner states and battles. Although devil and Holy Spirit wrangle for access to the saint’s ‘inner fortress’, Cynewulf highlights the accountability of the individual in accepting or rejecting devilish suggestion. Cynewulf’s interest in the details of such inner workings is particularly evident in his integration of Pope Gregory’s theology of the processes of vice and sin into this allegorical picture of *psychomachia*. The inner self consistently appears as the executive agency which determines conscious and volitional action, but human agency is not exclusively associated with a spiritual soul in this poem. Although Cynewulf certainly stretches poetic convention in associating moral insight with the human spirit (*gast*) – and therefore leans towards the same delineation of ‘mind’ and ‘soul’ which is so prominent in the writings of Augustine, Alcuin and Ælfric – his entire metaphor is built on the involvement of spiritual forces in the inner self. The inner self is affected by physical and spiritual needs, but remains the executive agency which determines volitional thought and subsequent action as the core of the self – the inner cause and principle of outer behaviour.

Whereas we find a dualistic and typological structure in the mode of characterisation in *Juliana* overall, those passages which deal with the inner self in detail fully embrace the complexities of human experience and enforce the importance of the choice and responsibility which lies within. This same interest in inner processes is also a notable feature in *Elene*, Cynewulf’s poetic account of St. Helena’s finding of the True Cross. In Chapter Six, I considered this longest and most critically acclaimed of Cynewulf’s signed poems, which again makes use of a figural framework. Jews and Christians stand opposed in their concealment or revelation of the actual Cross on Calvary, just as they stand opposed in their denial or embrace of Christ. Much attention has been paid to the figural opposition between the Jewish literal understanding of the
Old Law on the one hand and Christian allegorical and spiritual understanding on the other. The mutual dependence of all characters and the central themes of conversion and enlightenment which unite the poem as a whole, however, provide a particular insight into Cynewulf's conception of the role, function and status of the inner self in human nature and of individual inner workings. Chapter Six of this thesis accordingly considered the central importance of the inner self in individual human enlightenment as depicted in *Elene*. In this poem, Cynewulf's view of enlightenment essentially involves a 'whole-hearted' striving for truth and for God – a striving which embraces all aspects of human experience. True wisdom is not merely 'intellectual' knowledge or understanding, but involves 'volitional' and 'emotional' elements which are at play in the active quest, in the discovery and in the embrace of the Cross – both literally and allegorically. Cynewulf's flexible use of the inner aspect words renegotiates our familiar categories of 'emotion', 'volition' and 'cognition', and his presentation of love as a driving volitional force in many ways resembles an Augustinian analysis of human motivation. Be this as it may, Cynewulf's overall presentation of inner processes and capacities appears to be based on an underlying conception of the inner self which differs from that of the broader Latin-Christian tradition. The inner self is depicted in striking detail in the experiences of Cynewulf's various characters. In essence, it is the agentive and experiencing core (however differently constituted) which encompasses man's highest potential on earth without being an exclusively 'spiritual' entity. Rather, as I have suggested, it appears as man's means to self-realisation and man's capacity for interacting with the divine – whether as the human locus of individual experience or as the human capacity for virtuous living in composite life.

My consideration of the Alfredian prose texts in Part Three again focused on the importance of anthropological and metaphysical considerations for psychological workings, with a particular emphasis on the role of the inner self in conceptions of human and personal identity. In Chapter Seven, I considered the hierarchical view of human nature and its components which the author develops in the Old English prose *Consolation*. In reference to larger metaphysical spheres of reality Alfred evaluates the various aspects of the human being in terms of their value as human possessions. In
reference to the futility and transience of earthly wealth and the true and enduring prosperity of true knowledge and spiritual virtue in the larger scheme of things. Alfred identifies the soul (sawul) as man's highest, best and — significantly — his truest possession. Alfred to an extent vindicates the value of the material world and of man's corporeal nature by presenting these as means to higher spiritual ends. Whilst the hierarchy within human nature and the localisation of man's truest and most lasting essence in the eternal spiritual domain are clearly defined in the argument as a whole, Alfred's dominant concern appears to lie with the inner self (primarily reflected by the mod) as that substratum of identity which allows him to account for the wider spectrum of experiences and so with that entity which defines man's composite state in terms of its fallibility as well as its potential. Although we find a rather isolated account of a tripartite soul (sawul) which is associated with agency and volition in terms of a quasi-Platonic division of reason, anger and desire, it is the mod which explores, thinks, feels and desires throughout the dialogue as a whole. Since Alfred is less concerned with questions of material or spiritual substances and since he makes no explicit reference to the relationship between the mod and sawul in this text, the assimilation of the inner self and the spiritual soul is far from complete. Precisely where the inner aspects fit into Alfred's hierarchical picture of human nature emerges more clearly in the Soliloquies.

In Chapter Eight, I considered Alfred's significant interest in questions of identity and selfhood in the Soliloquies. In the Old English work, as in its Latin source, the personified Augustinus seeks to understand the nature of God and the nature of the soul (sawul) by means of his faculty of discrimination (gescead). Significantly, Alfred introduces his own line of inquiry by asking 'what am I?' in conjunction with the question of whether the sawul, the mod, and the various inner possessions associated with the mod (including the knowledge and experience it gains in life) are eternal. He clearly views these elements as central to self-definition and over the course of his inquiry provides a detailed exploration of the nature and workings of the core aspects of man. In his exploration of the processes of knowledge acquisition and cognition in terms of the continuum between outer sense-perception and inner cognition, Alfred fully utilises Augustine's metaphor of the rational mind as the 'inner sight' of the soul.
Significantly, he develops Augustine's psychological metaphors into a picture of the *mod* as that inner aspect of man which contains in itself the multiplicity of capacities, powers and drives by which men identify themselves, both as individuals and as human beings. His association of these inner aspects with the soul (*sawul*) is the only instance in Old English literature which identifies a direct constitutional relationship between man's inner agency and his spiritual soul. This relationship is explored further in Alfred's discussion of the eternal nature of not only the *sawul*, but also the *mod* and the *gewit* (accumulated insight). As in the *Consolation*, Alfred again asserts the eternal nature of these entities in reference to their status as man's most lasting, immutable, invincible, and therefore most valuable, and 'truest' possessions. His account of the *mod* as that aspect of the human being which encompasses individual identity and as the essence of self that remains in the afterlife essentially suggests that all those aspects of man which are central to human identity (whether components, capacities, processes or memories) must necessarily be eternal if continuity of identity is to be maintained in the afterlife. I accordingly argued that it is in light of this concern with selfhood that Alfred felt the need to associate the inner self with the spiritual domain of man, and that his sophisticated exploration of the relations between body and soul, as well as his discussions of the nature and status of the inner self within this dualistic schema, fully explore the implications of moving the essence of the self into the spiritual domain of man.

By examining the ways in which frameworks of beliefs informed and were developed in selected verse and prose works, this thesis has highlighted a notable capacity for innovative thought about human and personal identity in Anglo-Saxon intellectual culture. The close study of a number of texts from the Cynewulfian and Alfredian canons has demonstrated a coherence of anthropological and psychological ideas which has, I believe, hitherto received less critical recognition than is merited. This internal coherence of the relevant ideas allows a philosophical treatment of the works which highlights their systematic approaches to human nature within the context of overarching beliefs about man and his place and purpose in the larger scheme of things. In my discussion of the Cynewulf canon, analyses of *Christ Il. Juliana* and
Elene allowed me to trace three complementary perspectives on the role and status of the inner self in human nature, in static types of men, and in developing individuals. In my treatment of the Alfredian prose works, examinations of the Consolation and Soliloquies highlighted how two complementary vernacular accounts explore the implications of a clearly defined metaphysics and anthropology in their constructions of human and personal identity. In both canons, the inner domain provides a forum within which the authors are able explore the complexities of human experience as a composite being. The depth and scope of their inquiries, as I have argued, bear witness to particularly innovative trends of thought in Anglo-Saxon intellectual culture and thus deserve recognition as valuable accounts within a longstanding tradition of exploring 'ourselves'.
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